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5. The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Voluntari. 6. In March 2014 a large-scale criminal investigation was initiated against several persons for money laundering and fiscal fraud. On 3 December 2014 the investigation was extended in respect of thirty-two other persons, including the applicant. 7. Within the framework of the criminal investigation, on 4 December 2014 several police officers carried out a search at the applicant’s home. According to the search report, signed by the applicant and by her appointed lawyer without any objections, the search started at 6.15 a.m. and lasted until 2 p.m. 8. Immediately after the search and in accordance with the provisions of Articles 265-266 of the Romanian Criminal Code of Procedure (hereinafter RCCP, see paragraph 33 below), namely on the basis of an order to appear before the investigation body, the applicant was taken by police officers to the Bucharest police headquarters. 9. According to the record drawn up at the time, the enforcement of the order to appear was executed between 2.10 p.m. and 2.40 p.m., when the applicant arrived at the police station. 10. The order to appear had been issued by the prosecutor on 3 December 2014. It mentioned that “In the interests of the investigation ongoing in the above-mentioned criminal file [number] concerning money laundering and fiscal fraud, the questioning of [the applicant’s name and identification data] in her capacity of suspect is necessary. The criminal investigation bodies (...) will bring the suspect to the police headquarters on 4 December 2014 for the purpose of making a statement [before the investigating authorities].” 11. The documents on file show that between 8.40 a.m. on 4 December 2014 and 3 a.m. the next day, the investigating authorities, namely five prosecutors and six judicial police officers, conducted interviews in respect of fourteen witnesses and twenty-five suspects and/or defendants in connection with the criminal investigation involving the applicant. 12. According to the register kept by the police to record third parties entering the police station on a daily basis, the applicant’s appointed lawyer, Mr R.-M.S., entered the premises of the police headquarters at 4.10 p.m. The applicant contended that up until that time, her lawyer had been prevented from joining her because he had not submitted a written mandate proving that he lawfully represented her (see also paragraph 22 in fine, below). 13. It appears from the file that during her stay in the police station, the applicant’s phone conversations were tapped. 14. At an unspecified time before 7.32 p.m., a prosecutor informed the applicant that she was a suspect in an ongoing criminal investigation, and was to be charged with complicity in fiscal fraud; the applicant was also informed of the rights and obligations she had in that capacity. When invited to give a statement, she refused, claiming that she was unwell and needed medical assistance. The minutes recording this interview do not mention the exact time of their drafting; they are signed by the applicant, who confirmed having received a copy. Her lawyer does not appear to have been present. 15. The Government contended that the applicant’s request for medical assistance had been part of her defence strategy, as proved, in their view, by the transcripts of a phone conversation she had had with a third party at 7.14 p.m., in which she was advised accordingly (see also paragraph 13 above). The same argument was backed, according to the Government, by the conclusions of the medical investigations, which attested to the fact that no urgent need for medical care had been identified in her case (see paragraph 16 below). 16. At 7.32 p.m. an ambulance was called to the police station. It arrived at 7.50 p.m. and provided medical care (mainly intravenous infusion with minerals) to the applicant until 8.31 p.m., when she was taken to the Emergency University Hospital. Accompanied by police officers, she arrived at the hospital at 8.40 p.m., and was diagnosed with lipothymia. She remained in the hospital until 00.10 a.m. the next day and several medical examinations were performed during this time, following which vitamins, calcium and analgesics were administered. The diagnosis when the applicant left the hospital, accompanied by police officers, was neurovegetative dystonia and light hypokalemia. 17. The applicant claimed that during the whole time she was in hospital she had been guarded by police officers, who had then escorted her back to the police headquarters. 18. At about 00.22 a.m. the applicant’s questioning started. In the presence of her chosen lawyer, the applicant refused to give a statement on the grounds that she was very tired, having spent the last four hours in hospital. She also referred to the fact that neither she nor her lawyer had been given the opportunity to familiarise themselves with the contents of the criminal case file in which she was a suspect. 19. Subsequently, at 01.10 a.m., the applicant was informed in the presence of her chosen lawyer that the prosecutor had decided to remand her in custody (reţinere) for twenty-four hours. 20. Her lawyer lodged a complaint with the prosecutor against the decision to remand her in custody, as well as another complaint concerning her being unlawfully deprived of her liberty as of 12.00 p.m. on 4 December 2014. 21. In the first complaint, it is claimed that the order to appear became effective on 4 December 2014 at 6.20 a.m., and that the applicant was de facto remanded in custody as of 2.20 p.m. It is argued that the applicant’s deprivation of liberty throughout that interval was unlawful and unjustified, aimed solely at obtaining statements from her under duress. 22. In the second complaint it is claimed that on 4 December 2014, as of 12.00 p.m. when the search of her home ended, the applicant’s liberty to move around was restricted, as proved by the fact that she had been accompanied by police officers not only to the police station but also to the hospital, where she had been taken under escort to obtain medical assistance. The applicant mentioned that her lawyer had not been allowed to accompany her or to assist her because he did not have a written mandate, even though the lack of such a document was objectively justified by the circumstances in which she had been taken to the police station. 23. The prosecutor dismissed both complaints on the same day, holding that the measure to remand the applicant in custody was lawful, necessary and proportional to the gravity of the charge. He stated that the order to appear became effective after the house search had been performed, the presence of the applicant during the search being necessary in relation to its conduct and thus outside the limits of such an order. The prosecutor further considered that the time interval during which the applicant was under medical surveillance could not be included within the eight-hour time-limit set out by Article 265 § 12, as that was an incident excluding the responsibility of the investigating authorities. The limitation of her lawyer’s access to the criminal file had been justified by the necessity to get to the truth and to obtain from the applicant a genuine statement, uninfluenced by those already given by the other suspects or witnesses. 24. On 5 December 2014, relying on testimonial, documentary and audio surveillance evidence, the prosecutor asked the Bucharest County Court to place the applicant in pre-trial detention (arest preventiv) for thirty days as her release posed a threat to public order. 25. By an interlocutory judgment delivered on 6 December 2014, the Bucharest County Court allowed the prosecutor’s request and ordered the applicant’s detention until 3 January 2015. An appeal lodged against this was dismissed by the Bucharest Court of Appeal on 15 December 2014. Her pre-trial detention was extended for another thirty days by a decision of the Bucharest County Court issued on 29 January 2015, upheld on appeal. 26. The applicant was released on 11 February 2015 after two months of pre-trial detention. 27. It appears that the proceedings on the merits are still pending. 28. The applicant claimed that for two months, she had been placed in a cell measuring 9 square metres, which she had shared with three other detainees. She also complained about the poor conditions of hygiene, lack of ventilation and natural light. According to the applicant, the toilet was not separated from the living area by any partition, thus offering no privacy. 29. The Government provided information about the applicant’s conditions of detention. They submitted that the applicant had been detained in a cell measuring 9.32 sq m, which she had occupied with two or three other detainees from 5 to 8 December 2014. From 9 December to the date of her release, the applicant had been placed in a room measuring 9.42 sq m, along with two or three others. 30. They stated that each cell had sanitary facilities such as a toilet and a shower, which were separated from the rest of the cell by a curtain. Both cells had access to natural and artificial light, as well as ventilation provided by a double-glazed window measuring 115cm x 77cm.

5. The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Muğla. 6. On an unspecified date the applicant brought an enforcement order through a bailiff’s office against her former husband, G.F., to collect alimony in arrears and accrued interest. 7. On 9 March 2006 G.F. objected to that order by bringing a case against the applicant before the Datça Enforcement Court. He requested that the court declare the enforcement order null and void on the grounds that he had made the payments in question in full. 8. In the first hearing G.F.’s representative requested the court to take out an expert report to determine whether the payments he had made corresponded to the alleged debt. The court adjourned its examination on the question whether an expert report would be sought to a hearing to be held on 10 May 2006. 9. In that hearing, the applicant’s representative left it to the court’s discretion for an expert to be appointed concerning the determination of the amounts that were already paid. The court therefore ruled for an expert to be appointed and scheduled another hearing for 7 June 2006. 10. In the meantime, but before the hearing of 7 June 2006, the applicant’s representative requested that he be excused from that hearing since he had another scheduled court hearing elsewhere. 11. The court held the hearing as scheduled but noted that the applicant’s representative was excused. In that hearing, the court noted that the expert report had been submitted in the case-file and read its contents out in the presence of G.F.’s legal representative. The latter asked the court to rule in accordance with the findings in the expert report, which had concluded that all the relevant alimony payments had been made. The court scheduled a hearing for 21 June 2006 holding that the absent party be notified. 12. On 21 June 2006, in its final hearing, the court ruled against the applicant on the basis of the expert report in question. Neither the applicant nor her representative was present at that hearing. There is no indication in the transcript of the hearing that suggests that the court examined whether the applicant’s representative had been notified in due time. 13. On 31 July 2006 the applicant’s representative lodged an appeal before the Court of Cassation, arguing that the notice for the court hearing of 21 June 2006 had been served on him only on 26 June 2006, resulting in him and her client missing the opportunity to participate in the hearing and submit their observations on the findings of the expert report. He explained in that connection that the expert’s calculations had been erroneous and did not correspond to the bank transfer receipts in the case-file. 14. On 5 December 2006 the Court of Cassation upheld the decision of 21 June 2006 without responding to the applicant’s arguments. 15. The applicant’s rectification request against that decision was rejected on 13 March 2007.

4. The first applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Moscow. The second applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Irkutsk. 5. On 20 February 2009, the first applicant, a lawyer at the time, was elected to be a member of the council of the Irkutsk Regional Bar (“the Bar”). 6. On 24 October 2010 the members of the council conducted elections for the presidency of the Bar. Five members of the Council voted for S. and the other five voted for the second applicant. 7. On 25 November 2010 the second applicant issued an order appointing herself acting President of the Bar. 8. On an unspecified date a group of lawyers applied to the Commercial Court of the Irkutsk Region challenging the second applicant’s appointment. The court granted their request to enjoin the second applicant from fulfilling the functions of acting president pending the outcome of the proceedings. 9. On 19 January 2012 the Commercial Court discontinued the proceedings. The final decision on the matter was taken by the Supreme Commercial Court on 26 September 2012. 10. On 11 February, 2 March and 5 April 2011 several members of the Bar, including the applicants, lodged complaints with the President of the Commercial Court of the Irkutsk Region, to the Supreme Commercial Court of the Russian Federation and to the Supreme Judicial Qualifications Board, alleging that Judge R. had acted in contravention of the applicable laws on jurisdiction when she had accepted the claims concerning the second applicant’s appointment to the office of President of the Bar for consideration. They further claimed that (1) S. had announced in public that his opponents in the council of the Bar would be disbarred and that he would organise a “red terror” in response to the “orange revolution”; (2) S.’s ultimate goal had been to get rid of his opponents in the Council of the Bar through rotation and disbarment; (3) S. had had an extra‑professional relationship with the Deputy President of the Regional Commercial Court, who had been instrumental in ensuring a favourable outcome in the proceedings against the second applicant’s appointment; (4) through his personal connections with the Deputy President of the Regional Commercial Court, S. had obtained an injunction against the second applicant and ensured that a group of bailiffs had been present at the Bar’s conference in order to put pressure on the participants and his opponents. 11. On an unspecified date in July 2011 the lawyers posted their complaints on the website of the President of the Russian Federation. They sent a copy of their complaint to the President of the Supreme Commercial Court and to the Public Anticorruption Committee. 12. On 18 July 2011 the First Deputy of the President of the Regional Commercial Court informed the plaintiffs that their allegations had not been confirmed by the conducted investigation. 13. On 27 July 2011 the President of the Regional Commercial Court forwarded a copy of the lawyers’ complaint to the Bar and the First Vice‑President of the Bar instituted disciplinary proceedings against the applicants. 14. On 31 October 2011 the council of the Bar disbarred the first applicant. The council considered that (1) the letters sent by the group of the lawyers to the Judicial Qualifications Board and the President of the Commercial Court had not been a correct or permissible conduct in response to the actions of the judges of the Commercial Court; (2) the complaints had contained untrue allegations damaging to the reputation and goodwill of Judges B. and R., and S., a lawyer; (3) the first applicant had been disrespectful towards them. The Council concluded that (1) the first applicant had violated the relevant legislation and the Code of Professional Conduct for Lawyers (Кодекс профессиональной этики адвоката); (2) the dissemination of information damaging the reputation and goodwill of judges and lawyers was incompatible with membership of the Bar; (3) the first applicant’s conduct had disparaged the Bar and its members. 15. On 8 December 2011 the Kirovskiy District Court of Irkutsk dismissed a complaint lodged by the first applicant against the decision of 31 October 2011. 16. On 11 March 2012 the Irkutsk Regional Court upheld the judgment of 8 December 2011 on appeal. 17. On 16 December 2011 the council of the Bar disbarred the second applicant. The reasons underlying the council’s decision were identical to the one used in the first applicant’s case. 18. On 27 December 2011 the Kirovskiy District Court of Irkutsk dismissed a complaint lodged by the second applicant against the decision of 16 December 2011. 19. On 19 April 2012 the Irkutsk Regional Court upheld the judgment of 27 December 2011 on appeal.

5. On 6 March 2006 the applicants were taken into police custody on suspicion of aiding and abetting the MLKP (Marxist-Leninist Communist Party), an illegal armed organisation. 6. On 7 March 2006 the applicants were brought before a judge at the Ankara Assize Court. They were mainly questioned about their participation in a number of demonstrations and about various CDs, documents, books and periodicals that had allegedly been found by the police in their homes. The applicants denied the veracity of the allegations that they had acted in support of an illegal organisation. In particular, although they all accepted that they had participated in legally organised demonstrations, they denied having chanted illegal slogans or slogans in favour of an illegal organisation. They also claimed that the material found in their homes had not been illegal. In particular, Necla Çomak claimed that the documents found in her home were related to a legal association, namely the Working Women’s Association (Emekçi Kadınlar Derneği). 7. On the same day the Ankara Assize Court ordered the detention of Levent Çakır, Deniz Bakır, Alihan Alhan, Necla Çomak, Metin Kürekçi, Latife Canan Kaplan and Uğur Güdük. The other applicants were released. 8. On 22 March 2006 the Ankara public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Ankara Assize Court against the applicants. In the indictment, the public prosecutor noted that the applicants had participated in two demonstrations organised by trade unions and non-governmental organisations held on 17 December 2005 and 19 February 2006 with the authorisation of the governor’s office. He further noted, on the basis of video footage provided by the police, that the applicants had carried banners on behalf of the ESP (the Socialist Platform of the Oppressed) and the SGD (Socialist Youth Association), which, according to information on the Internet, were connected to the MLKP. The applicants were charged with membership of an illegal organisation under Article 220 § 7 and Article 314 of the Criminal Code. 9. On 18 May 2006 the Ankara Assize Court held the first hearing in the case. The applicants conceded before the court that they had participated in the demonstrations of 17 December 2005 and 19 February 2006 but stressed that those demonstrations had been legal. As to the documents, periodicals, books and CDs found in their homes, the applicants maintained that none of the material they had had was illegal, and that they did not accept the content of the search-and-seizure reports prepared after the searches conducted in their homes, as those reports had not been drafted in their presence. 10. During the hearing held on 22 June 2006, Latife Canan Kaplan, Uğur Güdük and Levent Çakır were released pending trial. 11. Between 18 May 2006 and 17 January 2007 the Ankara Assize Court held nine hearings. 12. On 17 January 2007 the Assize Court convicted Deniz Bakır, Metin Kürekçi, Necla Çomak and Alihan Alhan of membership of a terrorist organisation under Article 314 § 2 of the Criminal Code, on the basis of Articles 220 § 7 and 314 § 3 of the same Code. Metin Kürekçi, Necla Çomak and Alihan Alhan were sentenced to six years and three months’ imprisonment. Deniz Bakır was sentenced to seven years and six months’ imprisonment. The rest of the applicants were convicted of disseminating propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713) and sentenced to one year and eight months’ imprisonment each. 13. On 27 September 2007 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment, holding that the applicants had not had an opportunity to submit their defence submissions in relation to the classification by the Assize Court of their acts under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713. 14. Between 6 February and 22 October 2008 the Ankara Assize Court held seven more hearings. On 22 October 2008 the court issued a judgment containing the same conclusions and sentences as in its judgment of 17 January 2007. It also ordered the release of Metin Kürekçi, Necla Çomak and Alihan Alhan, taking into account the period of time that they had spent in detention and the length of the sentences imposed on them. 15 In its judgment, the Assize Court noted that although the ESP and the SGD were legal entities, their activities were in line with those of the MLKP. The court observed that members of the ESP and SGD regarded members of the MLKP who had been killed by the security forces or during hunger strikes as “martyrs” and that they had organised commemorative ceremonies for them. The court further observed that the declarations issued by the MLKP on the Internet were consistent with the aims of the ESP and the SGD. The court hence considered that the ESP and the SGD appeared in the legal domain on behalf of the MLKP and had an organic relationship with it. The court found it established, on the basis of the conduct of members of the ESP and the SGD and having regard to the documents found in the accused’s homes, that ESP and SGD members were carrying out activities in line with the strategies of the MLKP and had been holding legally authorised demonstrations in favour of that organisation on the pretext of exercising their democratic rights. 16. In convicting the applicants, the Ankara Assize Court noted that all the applicants except Selçuk Mart had participated in the demonstration of 17 December 2005. As regards Selçuk Mart, the court observed that he had attended the demonstration of 19 February 2006. The court found it established that the applicants had chanted the following slogans during the demonstration held on 17 December 2005: “M-L-K-P”, “Yaşasın partimiz MLKP” (“Long live our Party, MLKP”), “Devrimin zaferi, biji MLKP” (“Victory to the revolution, long live the MLKP”), “İşçiler partiye, MLKP’ye” (“Workers join the party, join the MLKP”). The court further found it established that Necla Çomak and Uğur Güdük had chanted the slogan “Yaşasın 1. Kürdistan konferansı” (“Long live the first Conference of Kurdistan”). Lastly, the court noted that Selçuk Mart had chanted the slogan “Dısa dısa serhildan MLKP Kürdistan” (“Rise up again and again, MLKP Kurdistan”) during the demonstration of 19 February 2006. 17. The Assize Court further noted that Metin Kürekçi and Mehmet Ali Tosun had been wearing clothes and carrying pennants with “ESP” on them during the demonstration of 17 December 2005, and that Uğur Güdük and Selçuk Mart had been wearing clothes and hats with “SGD” on them. The first‑instance court also noted that Serdar Kır and Necla Çomak had had red ribbons attached to their arms and that the latter had incited the crowd to chant slogans. The court further found it established that Levent Çakır had given a clenched-fist salute during the demonstration. 18. The Assize Court also noted that Metin Kürekçi, Alihan Alhan and Deniz Bakır had been taken into police custody in the past on account of their participation in various public meetings. There were also several police records in respect of Necla Çomak. Alihan Alhan and Deniz Bakır had also previously been remanded in custody. The court further noted that books which had previously been the subject of seizure orders had been found in the homes of Metin Kürekçi, Necla Çomak, Filiz Uluçelebi and Mehmet Ali Tosun. Metin Kürekçi had also had written material regarding the ESP and SGD. Necla Çomak had been in possession of notes on the illegal organisation and leaflets which belonged to the ESP. 19. The Assize Court concluded that Metin Kürekçi, Necla Çomak, Alihan Alhan and Deniz Bakır should be convicted as members of the MLKP because they had aided that illegal organisation. The court found it established that those applicants had directed the crowds, incited people to chant slogans in favour of the MLKP, carried banners, prepared organisational documents and been previously involved in activities in favour of the MLKP. The court considered that those applicants’ acts represented continuity and diversity, and that they had an organic relationship with the MLKP. The court held that the applicants had aided the MLKP by acting and directing other people to act “in a manner planned by” that organisation. It convicted them under Articles 220 § 7 and 314 §§ 2 and 3 of the Criminal Code. 20. As regards Levent Çakır, Uğur Güdük, Latife Canan Kaplan, Serdar Kır, Selçuk Mart, Mehmet Ali Tosun, Filiz Uluçelebi and Mesut Açıkalın, the Assize Court noted that they had chanted slogans and carried banners and flags in favour of the MLKP during the demonstrations of 17 December 2005 or 19 February 2006 and had been in possession of banned books and documents in favour of that organisation. The court found that those applicants’ acts had constituted propaganda in favour of the MLKP and thereby propaganda inciting people to commit violence or other methods of terrorism. They were therefore convicted pursuant to section 7(2) of Law no. 3713. 22. On various dates between 10 March 2009 and 12 July 2012 all the applicants except Necla Çomak served the prison sentences imposed on them. 24. On 2 November 2012 the Ankara Assize Court revised its judgment of 22 October 2008 pursuant to Law no. 6352, which had entered into force on 5 July 2012, in respect of Metin Kürekçi, Alihan Alhan, Deniz Bakır, Necla Çomak, Levent Çakır, Serdar Kır, Selçuk Mart and Filiz Uluçelebi. The court decided to reduce the sentences imposed on Metin Kürekçi, Alihan Alhan, Deniz Bakır and Necla Çomak pursuant to Article 314 § 2 of the Criminal Code, on the basis of Articles 220 § 7 and 314 § 3 of the same Code, to two years and one month’s imprisonment. As regards Levent Çakır, Serdar Kır, Selçuk Mart and Filiz Uluçelebi, the Assize Court decided to suspend the execution of the sentences imposed on them under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713, in accordance with provisional section 1 of Law no. 6352. The suspension was for a period of three years, on condition that they did not commit an offence when expressing ideas and opinions through the medium of the press or other media, or by any other means.

5. The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Kyiv. 6. The end of 2008 and the beginning of 2009 were marked by a dispute between Ukraine and Russia on the conditions for gas supplies, including the price paid by Ukraine and the transit price charged by Ukraine to Russia. It culminated in Russia cutting off supplies in early January 2009, affecting not only Ukraine but also European States dependent on Russian gas. 7. On 18 January 2009 the Prime Ministers of Ukraine and Russia, Ms Yulia Tymoshenko and Mr Vladimir Putin, reached an agreement with a view to resolving the dispute. 8. On 19 January 2009 the chairmen of the boards of the respective countries’ gas companies, Naftogaz Ukrainy and Gazprom of Russia, formalised the terms of the agreement by signing a 2009-2019 gas supply contract. In particular, it provided for a new approach to gas pricing and for passing to direct contractual relations (Gazprom had previously supplied gas to Ukraine through an intermediary, RosUkrEnergo AG, a Swiss-registered joint venture company, 50% of which was owned by Gazprom itself and 50% by two Ukrainian businessmen through a private company, also registered in Switzerland). 9. On 20 January 2009 the first deputy chairman of the board of Naftogaz Ukrainy, D., and the deputy chairman of the board of Gazprom signed a further contract regarding the terms of natural gas transit through the territory of Ukraine. Under Addendum no. 1, a claim of 11 billion cubic metres of natural gas imported by way of transit to Ukraine by RosUkrEnergo AG was ceded to Naftogaz Ukrayiny. 10. On 28 January 2009 the President of Ukraine Mr Viktor Yushchenko appointed the applicant as chief of the State Customs Service of Ukraine, upon the Prime Minister’s nomination. 11. On 26 February 2009 D. sent a letter to the applicant, requesting customs clearance for the 11 billion cubic metres of natural gas referred to in the contract of 20 January 2009 and the annulment of nineteen customs declarations stating that the gas had been imported for transit purposes. 12. Also on 26 February 2009 Mr Oleksandr Turchynov, the First Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine, instructed the applicant in writing to ensure prompt customs clearance of the gas in question. 13. On 27 February 2009 the applicant countersigned D.’s letter with the statement “To [K.] for execution taking into account the requirements of Article 88 of the Customs Code of Ukraine” (K. was chief of the Regional Customs Office for Power, and the legal provision in question set out the duties and responsibilities of customs applicants). On the same day the applicant also countersigned Mr Turchynov’s letter with the statement “To [K.] for execution”. 14. On 7 February 2010 Mr Viktor Yanukovych was elected President of Ukraine after defeating Ms Tymoshenko in a run‑off. 15. On 22 March 2010 the applicant resigned. 16. On an unspecified date RosUkrEnergo AG instituted proceedings in the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, alleging that the 11 billion cubic metres of gas was its property and had been unlawfully expropriated by Naftogaz Ukrayiny. 17. On 8 June 2010 the Institute found for RosUkrEnergo AG. 18. On 10 June 2010 the State Security Service of Ukraine (hereinafter “the Security Service”) instituted criminal proceedings against D. on suspicion of large-scale embezzlement on account of his involvement in the gas transactions of January 2009. 19. On 22 June 2010 the police questioned Mr Sh., who had been the deputy chief of the Customs Clearance Unit of the Regional Customs Office for Power in January 2009, as a witness in the proceedings. He replied in the positive to a question about whether he was familiar with D.’s letter to the applicant of 26 February 2009 (see paragraphs 11 and 13 above). 20. On 23 June 2010 the applicant appeared for questioning as a witness in the proceedings against D. He was accompanied by his lawyer. 21. The questioning concerned the two letters sent to the applicant on 26 February 2009 and his actions thereupon. 22. After the end of the applicant’s questioning at 3.43 p.m., the investigator informed him about the imminent institution of criminal proceedings against him. The applicant remained at the Security Service, without any immediate procedural steps being taken against him. According to him, he was not allowed to leave. The Government stated that it was the applicant’s own decision to wait until the decision on criminal proceedings was ready. 23. The proceedings were instituted later that day on suspicion of neglect of his official duties entailing grave consequences under Article 367 § 2 of the Criminal Code (“the CC”, see paragraph 52 below). The charge was related to his countersigning the letters for customs clearance for the gas imported by way of transit without verifying the lawfulness of those demands and so causing substantial damage to the prestige of the State and to RosUkrEnergo AG’s interests. The criminal case was joined to that against D. (see paragraph 18 above). 24. At 6.42 p.m. on 23 June 2010 the applicant signed the decision on the institution of criminal proceedings against him with a statement that he had de facto been under arrest from 3.43 p.m. that day. 25. According to the Government, the applicant and his lawyer studied the decision from 4.15 p.m. to 6.45 p.m. 26. At 7.02 p.m. the investigator drew up a report on the applicant’s arrest with a general reference to Articles 106 § 2 and 115 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”, see paragraph 50 below). As noted in the report, the investigation had established that the applicant had had no legitimate grounds to endorse the First Deputy Prime Minister’s request of 26 February 2009 (see paragraph 12 above). The investigator further stated that the applicant’s rights as a suspect had been explained to him at 6.30 p.m. The applicant wrote on the report that the arrest period had actually started at 3.43 p.m. 27. At 8.05 p.m. on 23 June 2010 the applicant was questioned as a suspect. He emphasised that he was willing to cooperate with the investigation and that his behaviour in the proceedings had been flawless. He also stated that there were no grounds for his arrest and that he was prepared to pay bail as a preventive measure in accordance with the CCP. 28. On 24 June 2010 the Kyiv Pecherskyy District Court (“the Pecherskyy Court”) remanded the applicant in custody for two months. By way of reasoning, the court noted that the applicant was suspected of a serious offence potentially entailing imprisonment; that he could interfere with investigative activities, either by absconding or tampering with evidence; and that he was capable of influencing witnesses, regard being had, in particular, to his connections with former colleagues, his prominent social status and his wealth. Moreover, the applicant had no employment or young children under his charge. The court therefore rejected an application by fifty Members of Parliament to release him on their personal surety. 29. The applicant appealed, contending in particular that his arrest had been arbitrary and not based on a reasonable suspicion that he had committed a crime. Moreover, the court’s findings as to the probability of his interfering with the investigative activities were arbitrary. He had been a civil servant with an impeccable reputation, no prior criminal record, strong family ties and a permanent residence in Kyiv. Moreover, his conduct in relation to the criminal proceedings concerning the gas dealings had been beyond reproach. Between the date of the initiation of the related proceedings against D. on 10 June and the applicant’s arrest on 23 June 2010, he had twice been abroad and had returned to Ukraine of his own free will; he had duly reported for questioning as a witness as soon as he had been summoned; and he was willing to continue his cooperation with the authorities in good faith. Lastly, he referred to the surety offered by the Members of Parliament to ensure his proper conduct in the proceedings. 30. On 2 July 2010 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal (hereinafter “the Court of Appeal”) dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the custodial measure. The court noted, in particular: “... the particularly large amount of damage caused to RosUkrEnergo AG and the existence of serious consequences, manifested in the prestige of the State being undermined, indicate a high degree of danger to society from the crime, a primary ground for imposing on A. V. Makarenko a preventive measure entailing his being remanded in custody.” 31. The appellate court also concurred with the first-instance court’s finding that the applicant might take advantage of his social connections and wealth to influence the investigation if he remained at liberty. 32. On 28 July 2010 the Supreme Court rejected an application by the applicant for leave to appeal in cassation against the decisions as not envisaged by law. 33. On 30 July 2010 the applicant challenged the lawfulness of his arrest of 23 June 2010 before the Kyiv Shevchenkivskyy District Court (“the Shevchenkivskyy Court”). He alleged, firstly, that his arrest had not fallen within the ambit of Article 106 § 2 of the CCP and so had been arbitrary and unforeseeable. Furthermore, before his official arrest at 7.02 p.m., he had already been held at the Security Service for more than three hours without any legal grounds. On 27 September and 12 October 2010 the Shevchenkivskyy Court and the Court of Appeal, respectively, rejected the applicant’s complaint, finding that the investigator had acted in accordance with the law. 34. On 20 August 2010 the Pecherskyy Court extended the term of the applicant’s pre-trial detention until 10 October 2010. The court noted that a number of investigative measures were still necessary and there were no reasons justifying lifting the custodial measure. 35. On 27 August 2010 the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the appeal against that decision. 36. On 25 October 2010 the Supreme Court rejected a request for leave to appeal in cassation as not envisaged by law. 37. On 30 September 2010 the Security Service re-classified the applicant’s actions as intentional abuse of office under Article 364 § 3 of the CC rather than neglect of his official duties under Article 367 § 2 (see paragraphs 51-52 below). 38. On 6 October 2010 the Pecherskyy Court extended the applicant’s detention until 23 October 2010, referring to essentially the same arguments as before. 39. On 12 October 2010 the Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance court’s decision. 40. On 13 October 2010 the applicant was notified of the completion of the pre-trial investigation and given access to the case file. 41. On 22 October and 9 December 2010 and on 5 January, 7 February and 9 March 2011 the Court of Appeal extended the applicant’s detention by one month (the last extension was until 10 April 2011), given that further time was required for the applicant and his lawyers to study the case file, which consisted of forty-eight volumes. In all those rulings the appellate court noted that it had had regard to “the circumstances of the case, information as a whole about the character of the accused, the gravity of the offence ... and the absence of any grounds for changing the preventive measure [in his respect] to a more lenient one”. 42. On 1 April 2011 the applicant applied to be released under an undertaking not to abscond. He noted that his health had seriously deteriorated in detention and that he required a specialist medical examination and assistance on account of several heart conditions but that there was no cardiologist in the detention facility. 43. On 13 April 2011 the applicant’s lawyer complained to the Prosecutor General’s Office that the term of his client’s detention ordered by the court had expired on 10 April 2011. He therefore requested the applicant’s immediate release. There was no follow up to that complaint. 44. On 14 April 2011 the Pecherskyy Court held a preparatory hearing for the applicant’s trial. It decided to keep him in pre-trial detention as it found no grounds to change the measure. The applicant re-submitted his request for release as formulated on 1 April 2011 (see paragraph 42 above), however, the court ruling did not contain any reference to it. 45. On 26 April 2011 the Pecherskyy Court remitted the case to the Prosecutor General’s Office for further investigation given that meanwhile, on 11 April 2011, the latter had instituted criminal proceedings against former Prime Minister Tymoshenko on suspicion of abuse of authority for signing the gas contracts in January 2009 (see paragraph 7 above). The court held that the factual circumstances in those proceedings were the same as in the applicant’s case. 46. On 5 July 2011 the Court of Appeal released the applicant under an undertaking not to abscond. 47. On 20 July 2012 the Pecherskyy Court found him guilty as charged and gave him a suspended sentence of four years’ imprisonment. 48. The parties did not inform the Court of any further developments in the criminal proceedings against the applicant. Publicly available material shows that on 3 March 2014 the Pecherskyy Court absolved him from criminal liability and found him not to have had any criminal record.

6. The applicant was born in 1972 and is currently detained at Varna Prison. 7. Before the events at issue, he had several previous convictions for theft. 8. A seventy-five-year-old lady, a neighbour of the applicant’s parents, was murdered in her house in Varna on the morning of 18 June 2006, and a number of her personal possessions were stolen from the house. The applicant was suspected of having committed the offence and a search order was issued in respect of him. 9. On the morning of 21 June 2006 the applicant was arrested. He had been hiding in an abandoned house in a neighbouring village. The police report on his arrest stated that he had “slightly” resisted the arrest, and that force had been used in order to take him out of his hiding place (under a bed) and handcuff him. 10. The applicant was taken to the police station in the nearby town of Valchi Dol, where, at 11.30 a.m., an order for his arrest was issued under section 63(1) of the Ministry of the Interior Act 2006 (see paragraph 26 below). The applicant signed a declaration stating that he wanted to be assisted by a lawyer and that he had liver and stomach pains, due to “past ailments”, and wished to be examined by a doctor. 11. Later in the day, two police officers from Varna, Z.K. and V.V., arrived in Valchi Dol. They had a conversation with the applicant, during which he confessed, according to him under physical duress, to having committed the murder and described his actions in the days preceding his arrest. In addition, he confessed to having stolen a gun and other personal possessions from another house on an earlier occasion. The confession was written down and was signed by the applicant and Officer V.V. 12. Later on that same day the applicant was transferred to the police station in Varna, where he asked to be examined by a doctor. The examination started at about 8 p.m. The doctor identified bruises and haematomas on the applicant’s right elbow, right flank, buttocks and wrists, which had been caused by hard, blunt objects less than twenty-four hours earlier. 13. On 22 June 2006 an investigator brought charges against the applicant in relation to another offence, an unrelated theft, and a prosecutor ordered his detention for up to seventy-two hours. On 23 June 2006 the Varna District Court ordered the applicant’s detention on remand in connection with that charge. The criminal proceedings concerning that charge proceeded alongside the proceedings which are the subject of this application, and were completed in March 2007. 14. The murder investigation, to which the investigation into the alleged theft of a gun and other personal possessions mentioned in the applicant’s confession to Officers Z.K. and V.V. was joined, continued over the months which followed. The police gathered further evidence and witness testimony, some of which was identified on the basis of that confession. They never found the objects stolen from the victim’s house. On 18 December 2006 an investigator brought charges against the applicant in connection with the two offences mentioned above. On that occasion the applicant had a lawyer, retained by him on the same day. The applicant made a brief statement that he was not guilty. 15. On an unspecified date in 2007 the applicant was indicted and taken to court. 16. The Varna Regional Court (hereinafter “the Regional Court”), which examined the case at first instance, held its first hearing on 25 June 2007. It heard the doctor who had examined the applicant on the evening of 21 June 2006 (see paragraph 12 above). She stated that she maintained the opinions expressed in her previous report, and the prosecution and the defence posed no further questions. Officers Z.K. and V.V. were examined as witnesses and recounted their conversation with the applicant on 21 June 2006 and the confession he had made to them. They replied to questions posed by the prosecution and the defence. The applicant’s father was examined as well, and he stated that he had visited his son about ten days after his arrest. The applicant had told him that he had been beaten in order to confess, and some traces of this beating had still been visible on him. The Regional Court heard other experts and witnesses. 17. During the next hearing, held on 3 October 2007, the applicant made a statement on the charges. He said that he had not committed the offences, as at the time of the murder he had been at his grandmother’s house in another village, and that he had confessed to the offences under duress. 18. On 11 February 2008 the Regional Court examined more witnesses and then the parties made oral submissions. Counsel for the applicant contested the testimony of Z.K. and V.V. in particular, arguing that their examination had been contrary to Article 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 31 below). He pointed out moreover that, while the applicant had made a confession to those two officers, he had not repeated that confession when taken before an investigator. At the same time, the confession was one of “the pillars” of the indictment, as there was no other evidence showing the course of the events inside the victim’s house. 19. In a judgment given on 11 February 2008 the Regional Court convicted the applicant and sentenced him to life imprisonment. On the basis of the evidence collected, it concluded that the applicant had stolen a gun and other personal possessions several days before the murder, and on the day of the murder had entered the victim’s house in order to steal food. When she had surprised him in the house, he had attacked her, hitting her with the gun stolen earlier – in such a way that a part of the gun’s cock had broken off and fallen to the floor – and with an axe which he had found in the house. After the murder the applicant had run away. A stranger had given him a lift to another village, but the applicant had forgotten a bag containing his clothes and the gun in the stranger’s car. 20. In establishing the facts, the Regional Court relied on the following most important pieces of evidence: a metal fragment which had been found under the victim’s body and which the experts confirmed to be the missing part of the cock of the gun; traces of the victim’s blood found on the handle of the gun found in the applicant’s bag; the testimony of the person who had given the applicant a lift in his car and had found that bag; the fact that that person had also recognised the applicant’s photo when it had been shown to him by the police; and the testimony of Officers Z.K. and V.V., who had recounted what the applicant had confessed to them with regard to the course of the events in the victim’s house. As to the officers’ testimony, the Regional Court pointed out that it considered it credible, since the confession as recounted by them had enabled the police to continue the investigation and identify further evidence. 21. The applicant lodged an appeal. 22. In his written and oral submissions to the Varna Court of Appeal (hereinafter “the Court of Appeal”), counsel for the applicant contested once again the testimony given by Z.K. and V.V. He argued that the Regional Court had not commented on the evidence showing that the applicant had been beaten in order to make the confession the officers had recounted, pointed out that the confession had not been repeated once the applicant had been taken before an investigator, and relied again on Article 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 23. In a judgment of 30 May 2008 the Court of Appeal upheld the applicant’s conviction and sentence, finding that his guilt had been proved beyond reasonable doubt. In addition to the evidence described above, it relied on the testimony of a neighbour of the victim, who had seen a person considered to be the applicant on the roof of the victim’s house shortly before the murder. As to Z.K. and V.V., the Court of Appeal pointed out that they had not been investigating bodies within the meaning of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and that their testimony had been assessed in the light of all other evidence. Furthermore, it commented on the exonerating evidence, in particular expert reports finding no fingerprints of the applicant and no traces of his scent in the victim’s house, saying that this was not sufficient to refute the accusations. 24. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. His counsel contested once again the testimony of Officers Z.K. and V.V., pointing out that the lower courts had not commented on the evidence showing that the applicant had been beaten in order to confess. Moreover, the officers’ testimony had been given in breach of Article 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 25. In a final judgment of 13 November 2008 the Supreme Court of Cassation upheld the Court of Appeal’s judgment. As to the arguments of the defence concerning the testimony of Z.K. and V.V., it observed that the confession as recounted by the officers contained details which could only have been known to the perpetrator of the crimes at issue, and thus could not have been “instigated”. Moreover, allowing Z.K. and V.V. to testify had not been in breach of Article 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

5. The first applicant is a Russian national who was born in 1951 and lives in Volzhskiy, in the Volgograd Region. 8. In March 1994 she was granted Russian citizenship and the Russian embassy in Bishkek put a stamp in her Soviet passport to this effect. 10. On 14 July 2001 she obtained a new Russian “internal passport” (a citizen’s identity document for use inside Russia). 11. In 2006 the first applicant applied to the Federal Migration Service (FMS) for an “international passport” required for foreign travel. 12. On 11 April 2006 an official from the FMS seized her Russian passport, which was later destroyed. The FMS referred to a report of 26 January 2006 on a check carried out by the agencies of the interior, according to which the first applicant had never properly acquired Russian citizenship and therefore had no right to be in possession of a Russian passport. The report stated, in particular, that whereas the first applicant had been issued with a Russian passport on 14 July 2001, she was not registered in the database of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a person who had acquired Russian citizenship. Furthermore, according to a letter of 18 October 2015 from the Russian embassy in Kyrgyzstan, it had no records on her obtaining Russian citizenship either. Accordingly, she had been issued with a Russian passport erroneously in 2001. 15. In a response of 27 October 2006 the Volgograd Region prosecutor’s office stated that the FMS was not competent to seize passports, something which only the agencies of the interior could do; that the first applicant’s passport had been seized in breach of the law; and that the prosecutor’s office recommended that the FMS rectify the situation. 16. On 20 March 2007 the FMS issued report no. 37 to the effect that the first applicant had never properly acquired Russian citizenship, and that a Russian passport had been issued to her unlawfully. 18. On 28 May 2007 the Volzhskiy Town Court found in favour of the first applicant and held that the check which had been carried out by the agencies of the interior had been unlawful. 19. The decision was subsequently quashed by means of supervisory review and the case was remitted for fresh examination. 21. However, the FMS did not set aside the decision to seize the first applicant’s passport, and a new passport was not issued to her either. 22. The first applicant again instituted court proceedings, this time for a finding that the seizure of her passport had been unlawful. 23. On 4 April 2008 the Volzhskiy Town Court dismissed the first applicant’s complaint. It accepted the FMS’s arguments that she had never acquired Russian citizenship, although it also found that the FMS officials’ actions of 11 April 2006 had been procedurally incorrect, as the FMS did not have competence to seize passports. 26. The first applicant then instituted another set of court proceedings against the FMS concerning its inaction in relation to issuing her with an identity document. She also contested the FMS report no. 37 of 20 March 2007. 30. On 14 April 2009 she was granted Russian citizenship under a simplified procedure on the basis of a FMS decision of 16 March 2009 to this effect. 33. According to the second applicant, between 1987 and 2010 he lived in the Rostov Region. Initially, he had a Soviet Union passport issued on 21 December 1981 by the Chkhorozkuskiy Department of the Interior of the Republic of Georgia. 34. On 23 December 1998, in accordance with the procedure then in force, the second applicant was issued with an insert for his passport (вкладыш) specifying that he was a citizen of the Russian Federation. 35. On 19 February 2002 the Passport and Visa Directorate of Police Office no. 1 of Taganrog, in the Rostov Region, issued the second applicant with a Russian passport. 37. On 18 January 2010 the second applicant applied to the FMS of the Centralniy District of Kostroma to register his place of residence. 38. According to the Government, owing to doubts as to whether the second applicant had been issued with a Russian passport in accordance with the established procedure, the FMS of the Centralniy District of Kostroma sent a request to the FMS of the Rostov Region. 39. On 30 June 2010 the FMS of the Rostov Region issued a certificate which reads, in so far as relevant: “On 19 February 2002 [the second applicant] was issued with [a Russian passport] following the exchange of [his passport] issued on 21 December 1981 by the Chkhorozkuskiy Department of the Interior of the Republic of Georgia. In section 8 of the application for issue (exchange) of [the second applicant’s] passport it is noted ‘RF citizen according to section 13(1)’. According to the information [available to the FMS of the Rostov Region], [the second applicant] has not been registered at the address [in Taganrog] since 17 February 2010, as he has moved to Kostroma. In the database of [the Ministry of Foreign Affairs], available to the FMS of the Rostov Region, there is no information as to whether [the second applicant] has obtained Russian citizenship. A copy of [the second applicant’s] passport issued on 21 December 1981 by the Chkhorozkuskiy Department of the Interior of the Republic of Georgia contains a [glued] insert issued by the Department of the Interior of the Leninskiy District of Rostov-on-Don on 21 December [year illegible] to the effect that [the second applicant] is a citizen of the Russian Federation in accordance with section 13(1) of the Russian Citizenship Act of 28 November 1991. On 29 January 2010 ... a request was sent to [the FMS of the Rostov Region] to confirm that [the second applicant] had Russian citizenship. According [to the information received], the issue of the above insert to [the second applicant] and its lawfulness or otherwise is [not] [section illegible] confirmed ... The decision to issue [the second applicant] with [a Russian] passport was made ... by [V.], former head of the Passport and Visa Directorate of Police Office no. 1 of Taganrog, in the Rostov Region, who on 26 April 2004 was ... dismissed from service because she had reached retirement age. It appears to be impossible to question [V.] concerning the circumstances of the issue of the Russian passport [to the second applicant], since she is absent from her place of residence. Accordingly, [V.] ... issued [the second applicant] with a Russian passport in the absence of documents confirming that he was a Russian citizen, and without checking the documents presented for the issue (exchange) of the passport, in breach [of the rules] then in force. The above circumstances allow the supposition that [V.] might have had an interest in issuing [the second applicant] with a Russian passport in breach of the established rules, which constitutes an offence punishable under Article 286 of the Criminal Code. Furthermore, it may be conjectured that [the second applicant] presented a passport [issued in 1981] which contained wrong information to the effect that he had Russian citizenship. On the basis of the foregoing, [it is proposed] ... to consider that [the second applicant’s passport] was issued in breach of the established rules ...” 40. On 22 July 2010, when the second applicant turned 45, in accordance with the applicable procedure, he applied to the FMS to exchange his passport. 41. The second applicant received a verbal refusal to issue him with a new passport. According to the official who notified him of the refusal, the second applicant had failed to prove that he had had a permanent place of residence in Russia on 6 February 1992 (see paragraph 57 below), and he had only had a registered place of residence in Russia since February 2002. 42. On 28 July 2010 the second applicant provided the Kostroma Region FMS with a written explanation to the effect that between 1989 and 2002 his place of residence had been registered in Rostov-on-Don, although he had actually been living with his partner, M., in the Krasnodar Region. 43. On 13 August 2010 the Residential Registration Department of the Leninskiy District of Rostov-on-Don provided the second applicant with a certificate confirming that he was not registered in the Leninskiy District and there was no information about him in the archives either. 44. On 23 September 2010 the Krasnodar Region FMS informed the Kostroma Region FMS that its archives contained no information about the second applicant, and that it appeared to be impossible to question M. because she was absent from her place of residence. 45. On 27 September 2010 the Kostroma Region FMS issued a decision to the effect that the second applicant was not a Russian citizen. With reference to the certificate of 30 June 2010 issued by the FMS of the Rostov Region, the decision stated, in particular, that according to the enquiries carried out, the second applicant’s Russian passport had been issued in breach of the applicable rules. It further stated that it had proved impossible to obtain documentary evidence that the second applicant had been living in Russia on 6 February 1992, and the stamp in his passport only confirmed that he had been registered as resident in the Rostov Region from 15 February 2002 to 17 February 2010. The decision also noted that the database of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs contained no information as to whether the second applicant had obtained Russian citizenship. Accordingly, the enquiries made had obtained no evidence that the second applicant had acquired Russian citizenship or that he had been living in Russia on 6 February 1992. 47. At a hearing on 20 October 2010 a representative from the FMS of the Centralniy District of Kostroma stated, in particular: “On the basis of the written instructions from the FMS that there should be an urgent check on all passports previously issued to individuals not born in the territory of the Russian Federation, we sent a request for information to the FMS of the Rostov Region. The FMS of the Rostov Region sent a certificate confirming that the [second applicant’s] passport should be considered as having been issued in breach of the applicable rules. I sent a report stating that it was necessary to obtain corroboration that [the second applicant] either had or did not have Russian citizenship. The head of the FMS ... issued a decision to the effect that [the second applicant] was not a Russian citizen. [The second applicant] was invited to familiarise himself with that decision. [I]t was suggested that he apply for a residence permit and subsequently Russian citizenship, under a simplified procedure. In 2004 the FMS issued instructions for checks to be carried out only in respect of individuals who had applied to exchange their passports. [The second applicant] applied [to exchange his passport], and I discovered that he had not been born in the territory of the Russian Federation, and sent the request. [His] passport was not seized: the FMS did not issue instructions to this effect, so that people would not be left without [an identity] document.” 48. On 21 October 2010 the Sverdlovskiy District Court of Kostroma upheld the decision of the FMS. It noted that, as a result of a check carried out pursuant to sections 51 and 52 of the 2002 Regulation on the Examination of Issues Related to Citizenship of the Russian Federation, the FMS had found that the second applicant had been issued with a Russian passport in breach of the applicable rules, and was not entitled to Russian citizenship. In particular, it had not been confirmed that he had been living in Russia on 6 February 1992. This justified the refusal to exchange his passport. The court also noted that the reports of the checks carried out by the FMS had not been appealed against or set aside in accordance with the established procedure, and that they were not the subject of the court’s examination in those proceedings. 49. The court further dismissed the second applicant’s argument that the fact that he had been using the previously issued Russian passport for eight years constituted a valid reason to exchange the passport. The court likewise dismissed his argument that he had not violated any laws or regulations in 2002, when he had been issued with the Russian passport. The court found that his passport was invalid regardless. 51. On 6 December 2010 the Kostroma Regional Court upheld the decision. The appeal court noted, in particular, that the certificate issued by the Rostov Region FMS on 30 June 2010 showed that a Russian passport had been issued to the second applicant on the basis of a certificate of 23 December 1998 issued by the Department of the Interior of the Leninskiy District of Rostov-on-Don confirming that he was a Russian citizen in accordance with section 13(1) of the 1991 Law on Citizenship of the Russian Federation. However, the legal validity of that certificate had not been confirmed. It further noted that, according to the results of the enquiries carried out in the places indicated by the applicant as his places of residence in Russia between 1989 and 2002, no confirmation of his registration and residence as of 6 February 1992 had been received with respect to any of the addresses indicated. 52. The appeal court also noted that the second applicant’s argument that he had not been informed about the report issued following the check carried out by the FMS, and that therefore he could not have appealed against it, had not affected the lower court’s conclusions. 53. On 25 March 2013, following the entry into force of Law no. 182‑FZ on Amendments to the Russian Citizenship Act of 12 November 2012, the second applicant applied for Russian citizenship.

5. The applicant, Mr Steingrim Wolland, was born in 1961 and lives in Oslo, Norway. He ran a law firm in his own name in Oslo until his licence to practice was suspended as a result of the opening of bankruptcy proceedings against him personally in April 2009. 6. On 9 March 2010, the prosecuting authority (Økokrim – The National Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime) issued charges (siktelse) against the applicant for aiding and abetting fraud in connection with art sales (kunstbedrageri), an application for a bank loan (lånebedrageri), and forgery of documents in connection with the latter. 7. On 10 March 2010 the Oslo City Court (tingrett), finding that there were reasonable grounds for suspicion (skjellig grunn til mistanke) in respect of the charges, decided at the request of the prosecuting authority to authorise that a search be carried out at the applicant’s premises, including his office. The applicant did not lodge an appeal against the City Court’s decision. 8. On 23 March 2010 the police were at the applicant’s premises – his home and office. In accordance with Article 205 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 37 below) a third party – a lawyer acquaintance of the applicant – was present. As there was a presumption that some material would be covered by the applicant’s statutory legal professional privilege as a lawyer, and therefore be exempt from seizure pursuant to Article 204 § 1 (ibid.), documents were put in sealed bags instead of being searched for evidence by the police. The police also collected a hard disk and a laptop. The third party had no objections as to how the police had proceeded. 9. Mirror copies (speilkopier) of the hard disk and laptop were taken; the hard disk and laptop were returned to the applicant two days later. 10. On 3 May 2010, at the prosecuting authority’s office, the applicant went through the paper documents that had been collected and sorted out those which he considered to be covered by legal professional privilege. This material was stored separately and placed under seal. 11. On 5 January 2011 the prosecuting authority applied to the City Court to examine the paper material that had been collected at the applicant’s premises and to have those documents that could lawfully be seized made available to it for search. As to the mirror copies, the prosecuting authority proposed that the City Court authorise a staff member at Økokrim’s computer department to acquaint him or herself with the material. The prosecution authority would thereafter return to the City Court with an application for a decision on whether specific documents would be exempt from seizure owing to legal professional privilege. The City Court accepted this procedure (see, however, paragraph 31 below). Subsequently, the prosecuting authority, upon discussions with the applicant as to which keywords (søkeord) should be used when looking for documents on the mirror copies, made keyword-searches which gave results in 2,309 files. 12. By a letter of 16 February 2011 the applicant’s lawyer disputed the lawfulness of what he categorised as the “seizure” (“beslag”), arguing that there had been no reasonable grounds for suspicion against the applicant and requested that the City Court quash the “seizure” decision and order that the collected material be returned to him. 13. On 6 May 2011 the prosecuting authority submitted the 2,309 files from the mirror copies to the City Court for examination. 14. In response to the letter from the applicant’s lawyer of 16 February 2011 (see paragraph 12 above), the City Court wrote a letter of 11 May 2011, pointing out that the procedure applicable to material allegedly covered by legal professional privilege had been set out by the Supreme Court (Høyesterett) in its decision of 3 March 2011, reported in Norsk Retstidende (Rt.) 2011 page 296 (see paragraphs 38-39 below). In line with that procedure, there were no grounds on which the City Court could at that time hold a court hearing devoted to the discontinuation of any “seizure” and return of the material. No seizure had been decided – the court was at the time carrying out the task of reviewing the material collected in order to decide on what should be made available to the prosecuting authority for it to search. The City Court would obtain the views of the parties in a hearing before making a formal decision as to whether to authorise the search of the prosecution. Its decision would be amenable to appeal. Since the handling of the case so far had taken considerable time, the City Court’s examination would be expedited. 15. The applicant and his lawyer disagreed with the City Court’s description of the procedure to be followed. After further exchanges between the parties, the City Court reiterated in a letter of 22 July 2011 – which was formally a judicial decision amenable to appeal (see paragraphs 16-24 below) – that a decision on seizure had not yet been taken. There was a presumption to the effect that documents and other materials in the office of a private lawyer were subject to legal professional privilege. In such cases the court would first go through the material in order to examine what could be made available to the prosecuting authority for it to search. The City Court also informed the parties that it was about to complete this task, having examined each document. It also reiterated its disagreement with the applicant’s view that before carrying out its perusal of the material it ought to consider anew whether there were reasonable grounds for suspicion against him, failing which its examination of the material would be unlawful, and that in the absence of such grounds it ought to return all the material to him with the seals intact. 16. On 19 August 2011 the applicant appealed against the City Court’s decision of 22 July 2011 not to examine the merits of his request to quash what was in his view a “seizure”, and to return the material. 17. On 9 November 2011 the Borgarting High Court (lagmannsrett) dismissed the appeal. 18. The High Court, as had the City Court, reiterated that the relevant procedure for the search and seizure of material allegedly subject to legal professional privilege had been thoroughly examined by the Supreme Court in Rt. 2011 page 296 (see paragraphs 14 above and 38-39 below). The City Court was at the time in the process of sorting out which documents could be lawfully searched by the prosecuting authority, and there had been no decisions on seizure taken. 19. From the above it was apparent, in the High Court’s view, that the applicant was not at that stage of the procedure entitled to have the question of whether to maintain the “seizure” in force (spørsmålet om opprettholdelse av beslaget) under Article 208 reviewed (see paragraph 37 below), and it could not see how him disputing the existence of reasonable grounds for suspicion in his case could lead to a different result. The Supreme Court’s decision contained no statements suggesting that the procedure should be different in such cases. Nor could the High Court find that there were other grounds, even if regard were had to Articles 6, 8, 10 and 13 of the Convention, as invoked by the applicant, suggesting that the accused had a wider right to judicial review in cases where he or she disputed the grounds for suspicion. 20. The High Court also noted that the Code of Criminal Procedure contained several provisions conferring on the accused a right to judicial review in respect of enforcement measures taken in the form of search and seizure, inter alia could a decision by a court to the effect that documents were to be handed over to the prosecution authorities after perusal of the documents in accordance with Article 204 (see paragraph 37 below) – which was what the City Court was doing at the time – be appealed against. The High Court considered that the Convention did not give the applicant any rights to have the legality of searches and seizures judicially reviewed beyond what followed from the Code of Criminal Procedure. The search had been authorised by the City Court on 10 March 2010, finding that there were reasonable grounds for suspicion against the applicant. The applicant had not filed any timely appeals against the decision and the search had been effectuated. 21. From the reasoning above it also followed that the applicant’s alternative submission that he ought to have a right to judicial review of whether there was a legal basis for an “ongoing search” (om det er grunnlag for en “pågående ransaking”) could not succeed. 22. It was also clear that the accused did not on a general basis have a right to judicial review of the reasons for the charges brought against him, whether there were reasonable grounds for suspicion or not, regardless of the use of any enforcement measures. The existence of such reasons could be examined again but then only in connection with, for instance, future investigative measures where the latter were required. The Convention provisions relied on could not lead to any different result. 23. Against this background, the High Court concluded that the City Court’s procedure had suffered from no defects. Its decision of 22 July 2011 had been based on a correct approach to the handling of the material gathered at the applicant’s premises. 24. On 20 December 2011 the Appeals Leave Committee of the Supreme Court (Høyesteretts ankeutvalg), whose jurisdiction was limited to reviewing the High Court’s procedure and interpretation of the law, rejected the applicant’s appeal in both respects. 25. On 25 January 2012 the City Court held a hearing (see paragraph 14 above) on the issue of which materials could be sent to the prosecuting authority for it to search. In the court records it was registered that the court had informed the parties that it was desirable if a decision could be reached as soon as possible and preferably within a month. In a decision of 11 May 2012, it ruled that 1,264 documents collected from the data carriers could be handed over. The applicant accepted the decision with respect to 858 of the documents, but appealed in respect of the remaining 406 and some of the paper documents. The prosecuting authority also appealed. 26. On 4 September 2012 the High Court dismissed the prosecuting authority’s appeal and rejected the applicant’s appeal except for one issue relating to a bank account transcript. 27. On 26 October 2012 the Supreme Court quashed the High Court’s decision in so far as it had rejected the applicant’s appeal (Rt. 2012 page 1639). It found, in essence, that the High Court had applied a too narrow understanding of what was lawyer’s work (egentlig advokatvirksomhet) that could bring legal professional privilege into play. 28. During its reconsideration of the case, the High Court, on 8 January 2013, concluded that thirty-six of the disputed 406 documents could be submitted to the prosecuting authority for it to search. On 22 May 2013 the Supreme Court rejected an appeal by the applicant against the High Court’s decision. 29. On 11 June 2012 the applicant applied to have some of the material, including the mirror copies, returned to him. The City Court, on 18 September 2012, refused his application in so far as it concerned the mirror copies, but granted the other parts thereof. 30. The applicant appealed against the decision to the High Court, which on 8 January 2013 ordered that the mirror copies were to be returned to the applicant unless the prosecuting authority promptly (relativt omgående) requested that the City Court examine them. It referred, inter alia, to the general obligation to ensure progress in investigations, as reflected in Article 226 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 37 below). 31. Upon an appeal by the prosecuting authority, the Supreme Court, on 27 June 2013 (Rt. 2013 page 968) agreed with the High Court that the prosecuting authority’s continued possession of and searches on the mirror copies (see paragraph 11 above) had been unlawful. The mirror copies should, like the paper documents, have been placed under seal and transferred to the City Court without the prosecution authority having accessed material on them through keyword-searches. Unlike the High Court, however, the Supreme Court did not for that reason find that the copies should necessarily be returned to the applicant. It quashed the High Court’s decision in order for that court to further assess the prosecuting authority’s submissions that the copies should instead be kept with the City Court, as the High Court had not sufficiently considered that possibility. 32. The prosecuting authority transferred the mirror copies to the City Court on 2 September 2013. 33. When, on 20 May 2014, the High Court contacted the prosecuting authority, its decision concerning the mirror copies having been quashed by the Supreme Court (see paragraph 31 above), the authority responded by informing the High Court of the developments in the criminal case against the applicant (see paragraph 35 below). It moreover stated that the seizure had been lifted on 28 May 2014 and requested that the case therefore be dismissed. The material could be deleted by the court or the data carrier could be handed over to the applicant. The applicant argued that the case should not be dismissed and requested that the High Court examine the merits of his application to have the mirror copies returned, in order for him to have a judicial review of whether his Convention rights had been violated. 34. In a letter of 25 June 2014 the High Court set out its views on the matter. It stated, inter alia, that the case concerned the applicant’s application to have the mirror copies returned. This request would be met if the copies were actually returned, which was what the prosecuting authority had proposed. This made it difficult to see why the applicant should have legal standing to require that the courts examine his application. Moreover, the court assumed that the applicant could obtain a review of his Convention claims in other ways. The case as concerned the mirror copies was ultimately dismissed on 22 August 2014. There is no information about the applicant having appealed against this decision. 35. On 10 January 2013 the City Court acquitted the applicant of having obtained credit by way of fraud (lånebedrageri) (see paragraph 6 above). On 12 June 2013 the High Court convicted him for having shown gross negligence in that respect. This judgment became final when the Supreme Court’s Appeal Committee refused leave to appeal on 18 October 2013. The charges concerning forgery of documents (ibid.) were dropped on 11 February 2013. Some of the charges concerning aiding and abetting art fraud (kunstbedrageri) (ibid.) were dropped on 16 February 2011 and the remainder on 21 August 2013.

4. The applicants were born in 1966 and 1975 respectively and are currently detained in Sevan Prison. They are brothers and used to live in and run their business activities from the town of Gavar before their conviction and imprisonment. 5. On 5 November 2009 a resident of Gavar, H.H., reported to the police that at around 6.20 p.m. his car had been shot at by someone travelling inside a black sports utility vehicle (SUV) on a street in Gavar, as a result of which his son H. and his friend (who had been with him in the car) had received gunshot injuries and had been taken to hospital. 6. On the same date the Gavar investigative department instituted criminal proceedings for attempted murder and illegal possession of firearms. 7. In the course of the investigation, a number of people were questioned, including eyewitnesses and police officers. It was determined that at around 1 p.m. on 5 November 2009 the applicants and their friend H.P. had beaten up V.M., the son-in-law of H.H. Later that day the shooting in the street had taken place. The applicants had subsequently gone missing, and H.P. had left the country. 8. During his interview H.H., who had been given the status of victim in the proceedings, stated, inter alia, that his car had been shot at by someone travelling inside a black SUV. He had seen the first applicant in the vehicle. As the car had driven away, he had recognised it as the second applicant’s car. 9. A.S., a person close to the applicants’ family and employed by them in one of their businesses, stated in his interview that on the day of the events in question he had met the applicants and H.P. shortly after the shooting and had understood from their conversation that they had shot at H.H.’s car. 10. S.G., the applicants’ relative, stated during his interview that on the day of the events in question the second applicant had called him to enquire about the incident. In particular, he had tried to find out who had been inside H.H.’s car and what exactly had happened to them. He had later been informed by his son that the people gathered at the scene of the incident had told him that the applicants had shot at H.H.’s car. He had then talked to the second applicant and tried to obtain more specific information from him. He had not denied anything, so it had become clear to him that it had been the applicants who had committed the offence. 11. M.M., a friend of the mayor of Gavar who was the applicants’ relative, stated in his interview that he had lent his car to the mayor (who had allegedly then helped the applicants to leave town). He had later heard from the people gathered in the street that the applicants had shot at H.H.’s car and fled. He had found his car the next morning entirely covered in mud. 12. At some point S.K., the first applicant’s friend, was questioned. He stated, inter alia, that in November 2009 the first applicant had called him to ask if he would put up some guests in his empty apartment in Yerevan for a couple of days. On the same day he had met the first applicant and given him the key to the apartment. The next day he had gone to the apartment, where he had found the first applicant and two other men whom he did not know. Several days later he had decided to visit the first applicant and his guests once again, but they had already left. He submitted that he did not know exactly why the first applicant and his guests had been visiting Yerevan and staying in his apartment. 13. On 10 November 2009 a new set of proceedings was instituted for hooliganism. The applicants and H.P. were charged with aggravated hooliganism and a warrant was issued for their arrest. 14. On 9 December 2009 H.P. was arrested. He was also charged with illegally crossing the State border. 15. It appears that H.P. admitted to the charges. During his interview he stated, inter alia, that after the incident with V.M. on 5 November 2009, the applicants had given him various types of firearms, which he had put in the second applicant’s SUV. While driving together with the applicants, they had noticed H.H.’s car in the street, which had turned in their direction and started to follow them. They had then seen that H.H. was armed. The first applicant had screamed to open fire, which H.P. had done from the back seat, where he had been sitting. The applicants had then also fired their guns. The shooting had lasted for about twenty seconds, after which the second applicant had driven towards the centre of Gavar. Several seconds later they had heard shooting behind them. 16. On 9 April 2010 the proceedings in respect of H.P. were severed from the main proceedings. On 11 May 2010 the Gegharkunik Regional Court convicted H.P. as charged, and he received a custodial sentence. 17. On 5 May 2010 the proceedings were stayed on the grounds that the identity of the perpetrator of the attempted murder was unknown and, as regards the incident of hooliganism, the accused had absconded. 18. On 15 June 2010 the applicants gave themselves up to the police and the main proceedings were resumed. During their interviews that day, the applicants refused to answer most questions and pleaded not guilty. 19. During their interviews on 18 June and 21 June 2010 respectively the applicants pleaded not guilty and denied participating in the crimes they were being questioned about. 20. On 3 September 2010 the proceedings for hooliganism were severed from the main proceedings and sent to court. 21. On 7 September 2010 the main proceedings for attempted murder were once again stayed on the grounds that the identity of the perpetrator was unknown. 22. By a judgment of 26 October 2010 the Regional Court found the applicants guilty of hooliganism. They received custodial sentences and were released. 23. On 4 March 2011 the proceedings were resumed and the case was assigned to the Special Investigative Service. 24. On 14 March 2011 the applicants were detained and charged with the attempted murder of two or more persons committed by a group and illegal possession of firearms. The applicants’ rights were explained to them and they exercised their right to be represented by a lawyer. 25. On 16 March 2011 H.P. was charged with the same offences as the applicants. 26. On 18 April and 3 May 2011 respectively the applicants were interviewed, but they refused to answer any questions. 27. According to the Government, on 18 May 2011 a face-to-face confrontation was held between the first applicant and H.H., who maintained his previous statements. During the confrontation, the first applicant maintained his innocence and exercised his right to pose questions to H.H., who gave self-incriminating answers. On the same day a confrontation was held between the second applicant and H.H., who again maintained his previous statements. However, the second applicant refused to answer H.H.’s questions and did not ask him any questions. 28. On 19 May 2011 the applicants were again questioned in respect of the alleged attempted murder, but they refused to answer questions and maintained their innocence. 29. According to the Government, at the end of the investigation the applicants and their representative acquainted themselves with the material in the criminal case file. On 16 June 2011 the applicants’ representative lodged a request with the investigator, asking, inter alia, that a confrontation be held between the applicants, A.S. and H.P. This request was refused by the investigator as ill-founded. In particular, the investigator stated that the confrontations requested by the applicants could not be conducted at that stage of the proceedings because (a) a warrant had been issued for A.S.’s arrest and his whereabouts remained unknown, and (b) H.P., exercising his rights as an accused, had refused to take part in a confrontation with the applicants. 30. On 22 June 2011 the criminal case was sent to the Regional Court for trial. 31. On an unspecified date H.P. was examined before the Regional Court, but he mainly contradicted his pre-trial statements. 32. On 13 July 2011 H.H. wrote to the Regional Court to ask that his pre-trial statements be taken into account since he was in another city for health reasons and did not wish to attend the trial as the events had made him suffer psychologically. 33. In the course of the trial, the Regional Court attempted to secure the attendance of H.H. and H., as well as the witnesses A.S., M.M., S.G. and S.K. 34. In particular, on 20 July 2011 the Regional Court issued decisions requiring H.H. to appear in court. In reply to those, on 28 July 2011 the Gavar police informed the Regional Court that H.H. was not in the city. According to the relevant police records, H.H.’s wife had told the police that H.H. and H. were in the Nagorno Karabakh Republic for health reasons and had mentioned an address in Yerevan, indicating that H.H. and H. had been living there. However, on 28 July 2011 the Yerevan police informed the Regional Court that H.H. was not at the above-mentioned address. The owner of the apartment had told them that H.H. and H. had rented it for about eight months. However, they had left and she had no information about their whereabouts. 35. On 4 August 2011 the Regional Court issued new decisions requiring the witnesses A.S., M.M., S.G. and S.K. to appear in court. On 10 August 2011 the Gavar police informed the Regional Court that A.S., M.M., S.G. were not in the city and that they had no information about their place of residence. In particular, it appeared that A.S., M.M. and S.G. had left the country. On the same day, the Yerevan police informed the Regional Court that S.K. was absent from his place of permanent residence, as he had apparently been working in another city. 36. On 17 August 2011 the Regional Court again issued decisions requiring H.H., M.M., S.G. and S.K, among others, to appear in court. On 24 August 2011 the Gavar police addressed a similar reply regarding the whereabouts of H.H., M.M. and S.G. Specifically, M.M. was apparently in Russia and S.G. had left for Egypt. Meanwhile, by means of a telegram addressed to the Regional Court on 9 August 2011, S.K. asked the court to take into account his pre-trial statements. On 26 August 2011 the Yerevan police informed the court that he was not in Yerevan. 37. On 24 August 2011 the applicants asked the Regional Court to disregard the pre-trial witness statements of A.S., M.M., S.G. and S.K. but not to exclude them from the list of the witnesses to be heard at trial. 38. On 14 September 2011 the Regional Court again decided to order H.H. to appear in court. On 22 September 2011 the Gavar police informed the court that daily visits by the police officers to H.H.’s place of residence had not yielded any results and that he had apparently not been seen there for about a year. 39. On 23 February 2012 the Regional Court convicted the applicants and H.P. as charged and sentenced them to thirteen years’ and twelve years’ imprisonment respectively. In doing so, the Regional Court referred, among other items of evidence, to the pre-trial statements of H.H. and the witnesses A.S., M.M., S.G. and S.K., all of whom had failed to attend the applicants’ trial. The Regional Court also referred, inter alia, to the testimony of more than twenty witnesses obtained during the pre-trial and trial stages; the records of confrontations conducted as part of the investigation; a forensic medical examination report; a complex ballistic and fingerprint examination report; a complex ballistic and forensic chemical examination report; the record of an investigatory experiment; records of an operative-investigative measure; a vehicle inspection report concerning H.H.’s and the second applicant’s cars; a crime scene inspection report; a number plate recognition report concerning the second applicant’s car; transcripts of calls to and from several telephone numbers; and a complex forensic fibre examination report. 40. The applicants lodged appeals, complaining, inter alia, that the pre-trial statements of H.H. and the witnesses A.S., M.M., S.G. and S.K. had been admitted in evidence against them even though they had failed to attend the proceedings. 41. On 20 July 2012 the Criminal Court of Appeal upheld the Regional Court’s judgment in full. 42. The applicants lodged an appeal on points of law, raising similar arguments to those raised in their previous appeals. 43. On 7 September 2012 the Court of Cassation declared the applicants’ appeal on points of law inadmissible for lack of merit.

4. The applicant was born in 1992 and lives in Voronezhskaya, Krasnodar Region. 5. In summer 2014 Ms F., the head of the Ust-Labinskiy District and of the non-governmental organisation “Human Rights Defender”, spoke at a television talk show on the situation in the eastern region of Ukraine and relations between Russia and Ukraine. 6. On 28 July 2015 the applicant published on YouTube a video with the title “Kolkhoz TV on Ukrainian crisis” (Колхозное телевидение об украинском кризисе) where he made comments on Ms F.’s speech as follows: “Ms F.: Nobody in the whole world has ever thought that Russia would become such a strong country and ... that Russia would reach new horizons... The applicant (Mr R.): Nodding ironically, showing the brochure “Life of a galley slave”. Ms F.: ... would organise worldwide renowned Olympic Games... Mr R.: Nodding ironically, showing brochure “Winter Olympic Games in subtropics”. Ms F.: ...and would host the Eurovision competition and, at the same time, would become a leading leader among gases (станет лидирующим лидером среди газа). Mr R.: Yet today, according to the latest reports of the Mendeleyev international rating agency, Russia has reached the top of the list, drawing ahead of such gases as carbon, hydrogen and oxygen. Ms F.: ...There is a war against Russia, which has become a first-rate power and everybody is annoyed by this fact...They want us to die of drug and alcohol abuse and poverty etc. Mr R.: But it is not true that we die of alcohol, drugs and poverty... poverty? Ms F.: ... Ukraine is, so to say, our Russian belly... Mr R.: I am afraid of asking what the Far East is. Ms F.: And that’s why we must, certainly, help these people who have found themselves in a horrible situation because Kyiv, to be honest, does not need these people. It needs gas. Mr R.: But who is ‘the leading leader among gases’? That means they need Russia! Ms F.: So, Slavyansk means gas... Mr R.: Slavyansk means gas. As we know, gas means Russia. This proves that Slavyansk belongs to us on lawful grounds. In fact, it does not. Ms F.: ... We must not get involved in a war... Mr R.: Wait! You have said that a war has been declared on us. How can we not get involved in the war if we have been drawn into the war, as everybody knows, by Bulgarians? Ms F.: ... we may not interfere [with what is happening in Ukraine]. Yes, we are sorry, yes, people die there. As has previously been said, what if our people go there and die? Mr R.: I would recommend that this woman go to mothers of Russian soldiers, in particular those who had been dismissed from the service or who were on leave and who returned from Ukraine in coffins, so she could tell them that we did not interfere and that we do not have troops there. Ms F.: And if now the economic situation in the country worsens and Russian people seek to rebel? We are already under pressure from various religious conventions (конвенций) which have infiltrated the country. Even in Krasnodar Region there are many such protestant, so to say, religious cults, as I call them, which influence people’s minds. Mr R.: What, [beep] you are talking about?! Ms F.: I guess they are now trying to convince us ideologically that if we are not happy with regional authorities’ decisions we need to organise rallies, revolutions etc. I believe that we must not take the bait! Mr R.: ... because this breaks with long traditions and principles: to stay in a horsebox and eat all this sh** coming from the television. Ms F.: We all, including all human rights defenders, need to work together as a team... Mr R.: A person who claims to be a human rights defender must know what human rights are... Now you have an idea of what is happening inside the heads of those who watch television! Next patient, please!” 7. On 11 January 2016 Ms F. brought an action against the applicant, stating that he had offended her and had harmed her reputation. 8. On 28 January 2016 the Ust-Labinskiy District Court of the Krasnodar Region allowed her claim. The court held as follows: “... [the applicant] disseminated untrue statements about Ms F. which damaged her honour, dignity and reputation, because these statements referred to unethical behaviour on her part... The court has established that the defendant used abusive and obscene language in his video ..., therefore [the applicant] intended to humiliate Ms F. and damage her reputation. ... Ms F., the head of the Ust-Labinsk District, has sustained damage of a non‑pecuniary nature due to emotional distress caused by the defendant’s defamatory and discrediting statements and allusions to her unethical conduct. In accordance with the principle of reasonableness, taking into account the seriousness of the wrongful acts, the nature of the offence and the contents of the publication, the degree of suffering involved, and that the information concerned a public activist and was available for the general public, the court allows the plaintiff’s claim for non‑pecuniary damage in part and awards 50,000 roubles (‘RUB’)”. 9. On 24 February 2016 the applicant lodged an appeal against the decision of 28 January 2016. He submitted that he had not offended Ms F., but had rather commented on her statements regarding the situation in Ukraine; nor had he disseminated any untruths relating to Ms F. As to obscene words, the applicant had used only one word meaning “prostitute”. However this word had been an interjection rather than an offence, and had been bleeped out. The applicant emphasised that the first-instance court had established that Ms F. was a public person who should tolerate critics, but had still issued a decision violating freedom of political speech. 10. On 5 May 2016 the Krasnodar Regional Court upheld this decision on appeal, stating that the applicant had failed to provide any proof in respect of statements about Ms F. used in his video, and that he had used vulgar and obscene words humiliating Ms F. 11. On 1 August and 1 November 2016 the Krasnodar Regional Court and the Supreme Court of Russia dismissed the applicant’s cassation appeals.

5. The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Zheleznodorozhnyy, Moscow Region. 6. The applicant was a locomotive driver with Russian Railways in the Moscow Region. He was a member of one of the railway workers’ trade unions, Rosprofzhel (“the trade union”). 7. On 7 April 2008 the trade union entered into negotiations with Russian Railways, seeking a general pay raise and the introduction of long‑service bonuses for the relevant staff. As the negotiations failed, the trade union decided to organise a strike. On 25 April 2008 the trade union committee decided that the staff of Russian Railways in two suburban Moscow sectors should participate in the strike as from 4 a.m. on 28 April 2008. The trade union committee’s decision referred to minimum services which would be provided during the strike, although the parties have not made any submissions in this regard. 8. Russian Railways did not apply to the courts for the strike to be declared unlawful. On 28 April 2008 the applicant took part in the strike. He came to work but refused to take up his duties. The strike caused delays in circulation of the trains in the sector where the applicant worked. 9. On 9 July 2008 the applicant was dismissed for two breaches of disciplinary rules. The first breach ascribed to him had had no relation to his trade union activities. (A year previously, on 8 June 2007, the applicant had been officially reprimanded for having stopped the train 50 metres after the platform). The second breach was the applicant’s refusal to take up his duties during the strike on 28 April 2008. 10. The applicant complained to a court that he should not have been dismissed for having participated in the strike organised by his trade union. 11. On 19 August 2008 the case was heard by the Meschanskiy District Court of Moscow (“the District Court”). The court confirmed the lawfulness of the applicant’s dismissal for a repeated failure to properly perform his professional duties. Regarding the applicant’s participation in the strike, the court relied on the Railway Acts of 1995 and 2003 (Articles 17 and 26 (2) respectively – see paragraphs 15 and 17 below). The Acts prohibited strikes of railway workers responsible, inter alia, for the circulation of trains, shunting, and services to passengers. The court stressed that those limitations were aimed at securing safety on the railway and that railway workers were subjected to stricter disciplinary rules than workers in other sectors of industry. The applicant was a locomotive driver; therefore, his work was directly linked to the circulation of trains, shunting, and the provision of services to passengers. The District Court concluded that the applicant had been precluded from participating in the strike. Relying on a report dated 29 April 2008 issued by the Moscow Interregional Transport Prosecutor’s Office, the District Court furthermore noted that the strike had caused a number of cancelled and delayed trains which had resulted in “massive violations of the rights and lawful interests of citizens, leading to their belated arrival at their workplaces and educational institutions, at medical facilities providing health care, [and] for long-distance trains, bus runs and flights”. The strike had also “contributed to the mass gathering of people on railway platforms, which [had] directly threatened their safety”. Given the above and the applicant’s earlier transgression, his dismissal had been justified. The District Court did not discuss the question of whether advance notice of the strike had been given or other issues related to the lawfulness of the strike of 28 April 2008. 12. On 29 January 2009, following an appeal by the applicant, the Moscow City Court confirmed the judgment of 19 August 2008.

5. The facts of the cases, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6. In the early morning of 27 December 2001 a group of approximately twenty federal servicemen who had arrived in two armoured personnel carriers (“APCs”) and UAZ vehicles surrounded the house where the applicant lived with her son (Mr Alvi Bugayev), his wife (Ms Z.S.), and their four children. They forcibly entered the house, dragged the applicant’s son out of bed and, without allowing him to put clothes or shoes on, took him away. The servicemen also took a car (used for transportation by Mr Alvi Bugayev and owned by his uncle, Mr I.A.) and all the identification documents they found in the house. 7. Mr Alvi Bugayev was then detained for fifteen days in the Urus‑Martan temporary district “the VOVD”). 8. On 12 January 2002 a prosecutor of the Urus-Martan district, Mr K., informed the applicant that Mr Alvi Bugayev was to be released on the same day. The applicant, Mr Alvi Bugayev’s wife and their children spent the entire day at the entrance to the VOVD awaiting his release. In the evening, Mr Alvi Bugayev drove his car out of the police station. Several military cars followed him. 9. Mr Bugayev’s wife managed to get into his car. During a short conversation with her he expressed fear for his life, describing to her the servicemen’s intention to kill him. Being troubled by the pursuit of the military vehicles, Mr Bugayev decided to drive to his sister’s house, which was located a mere 200 metres away from the VOVD. 10. After Mr Bugayev had got out of the car near his sister’s house, a vehicle stopped near him, four servicemen with automatic guns got out and shot Mr Bugayev dead in front of his wife and children. The applicant did not witness the killing, as she was still walking away from the police station. 11. The incident of 12 January 2002 took place during the daily curfew period that had been placed on the area. 12. On 12 January 2002 the Urus-Martan district prosecutor’s office (“the investigators”) opened criminal case no. 61000 into the killing of the applicant’s son. The relevant part of the decision read as follows: “On 12 January 2002, at approximately 6 p.m., a number of unidentified criminals murdered, using firearms, Mr Alvi Bugayev near [the building at the address] 5 Sovetskaya Street in the town of Urus-Martan in the Chechen Republic; [after the murder] they left the crime scene in a white VAZ car (model 2106).” 13. On the same date (12 January 2002) the investigators questioned Mr Bugayev’s wife, Ms Z.S., who stated that the perpetrators of her husband’s killing had been those servicemen who had threatened to kill him. 14. On 13 January 2002 the investigators questioned Mr I.A. and Mr Ya.A., whose statements were not furnished to the Court. 15. On 13 January 2002 the investigators examined the crime scene and collected several bullets and spent cartridges. On the same date, they ordered an expert ballistics examination of the evidence. According to the resulting expert report, dated 6 February 2002, the cartridges had been fired from a Kalashnikov machinegun. 16. On 13 January 2002 the operational search officer, M., reported to his superiors that according to the information that he had obtained, Mr Bugayev had been killed by servicemen and that one of the perpetrators had told Ms Z.S. that her husband had been killed for being a “traitor”. 17. On 13 January 2002 the investigators questioned Ms R.Ya. who stated that she had witnessed the killing. Her statement was similar to the applicant’s submission before the Court. 18. On 19 January 2002 the investigators requested that the VOVD provide them with a list of the people who had been detained with Alvi Bugayev and of the police officers who had questioned him while he had been in detention. In response, on 5 February 2002, the VOVD provided a list of five men who had been detained with Mr Bugayev. As for the police officers, no information on their identities was given. 19. On 22 January 2002 the investigators granted Ms Z.S. victim status in the criminal case. 20. Between 13 and 16 February 2002 the investigators questioned two of the applicant’s relatives and a neighbour; their statements did not provide any pertinent information. 21. On 12 March 2002 the investigators suspended the investigation for failure to identify the perpetrators. Neither the applicant nor her relatives were informed thereof. 22. On 4 April 2002 the local forensic bureau issued a report, according to which Mr Bugayev had died of multiple gunshot wounds. The applicant was not informed of the report. 23. On 26 April 2004 the applicant lodged a complaint with the investigators’ superiors, stating that they had not provided her with information on the progress of the investigation. 24. On 11 May 2004, in reply to the above-mentioned request, the Urus‑Martan prosecutor informed the applicant that she had the right to familiarise herself with those contents of the case file that referred to steps taken with her participation but that the full contents of the case file would be accessible to her only after the completion of the investigation. 25. On 24 May 2005 Ms Z.S. and the applicant lodged a complaint with the Urus-Martan prosecutor, stating that she had received no information on the progress of the criminal investigation. 26. On 1 June 2005, in reply to the above-mentioned complaint, the investigators informed Ms Z.S. and the applicant that “at present, operational search measures are being taken to identify the culprits”. 27. On 21 December 2006 the applicant wrote to the Urus-Martan prosecutor requesting that the investigation be resumed and that she be granted victim status. 28. On 17 January 2007, following the applicant’s above-mentioned complaint, the investigators’ superiors overruled the suspension of the investigation as unlawful and premature and ordered that it be resumed, citing the need to take investigative steps, such as questioning the applicant and other witnesses. The applicant was informed of that decision. 29. On 17 January 2007 the deputy Urus-Martan district prosecutor ordered that the investigators take a number of steps in the criminal case, including the detailed questioning of the eyewitnesses to the killing and other witnesses. 30. On 19 January 2007 the investigators requested that the VOVD inform them of the identities of the police officers who had worked there at the time of the killing of Mr Bugayev so that they could be questioned. In their reply of 23 January 2007, the police stated that in January 2002 their staff had consisted of police officers on a mission from the Republic of Bashkortostan (Bashkiria). 31. On 20 January 2007 the investigators again questioned Ms R.Ya., who had witnessed the killing and whose statement was similar to the applicant’s submission before the Court. 32. On 23 January 2007 the investigators questioned the applicant, whose statement was similar to her submission before the Court. In addition, she stated that her daughter-in-law, Ms Z.S., had left the region. 33. On 26 January 2007 the investigators questioned Mr S.Sh., who had been detained with Mt Bugayev in January 2002 and whose statement did not provide any new information. 34. On 30 January 2007 the investigators questioned Mr A.M., who stated that in January 2002 he had participated in the examination of the scene of Mr Bugayev’s killing and that he had no information concerning the perpetrators’ identities. 35. On 6 February 2007 the applicant again wrote to the Urus-Martan prosecutor requesting that the investigators take all possible steps to identify the perpetrators of her son’s killing. 36. On 13 February 2007 the applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case. 37. On 17 February 2007 the investigation was suspended again for failure to identity the perpetrators. The applicant was informed thereof in July 2007. 38. On 6 August 2007 the applicant requested that the investigators provide her with a copy of the decisions to open the criminal case and to grant her victim status and with the latest decision to suspend the investigation. On 8 August 2007 the requested documents were forwarded to the applicant. 39. Upon receipt of the above-mentioned documents, in September or October 2007 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Urus-Martan Town Court stating that the investigators’ had failed to investigate her son’s murder effectively and requesting that the proceedings be resumed. 40. On 26 November 2007 the Town Court dismissed the complaint as groundless. 41. There is no further information on any progress in the proceedings. 42. At the material time, the applicant’s relative, Colonel Ruslan Yunusov, who was born in 1964, was the Deputy Minister for Emergency Situations of the Chechen Republic. 43. on the night of 29-30 December 2001 an armoured reconnaissance patrol vehicle (BRDM) of the Russian federal forces opened unprovoked fire on a vehicle of the Ministry for Emergency Situations (“the MES”) and wounded one of Mr Yunusov’s colleagues. After the incident the BRDM, which belonged to the Leninskiy district military prosecutor’s office in Grozny, drove off. The incident was reported to the Minister for Emergency Situations of the Chechen Republic. 44. On 4 January 2002 the BRDM arrived at the premises of the MES in Grozny for some repair work, where it was recognised as the vehicle that had been involved in the above-mentioned incident. Officers of the MES requested that the vehicle remain on their premises to await the arrival of the Grozny military commander, who had been informed of the incident. 45. The BRDM crew refused to obey the order, shut their vehicle’s hatches and tried to drive off the MES premises through the exit gates (checkpoint no. 4). Colonel Yunusov jumped onto the military vehicle and covered its eye slits with his jacket trying to stop it from moving. The BRDM turned the turret and, having opened fire, drove through the gates with Mr Yunusov on its hull. The vehicle drove at high speed in the direction of the Leninskiy district military commander’s office, which was located in the vicinity. 46. Shortly thereafter, servicemen of the Leninskiy district military commander’s office opened fire on Mr Yunusov on the BRDM and shot him. The vehicle stopped at the gates of the office and Mr Yunusov was taken to Grozny Town Hospital no. 9, where he shortly thereafter died of his wounds. 47. The Grozny prosecutor’s office (in the documents submitted also referred to as the Staropromyslovskiy district prosecutor’s office) opened criminal case no. 54001 in connection with the killing of Colonel Yunusov on 4 January 2002. 48. On 4 January 2002 the investigators examined the crime scene and collected several pieces of evidence. 49. On 7 January 2002 they ordered an expert examination of the bullet taken out of the body of Mr Yunusov and on 18 January 2002 the Forensics Bureau of the Chechen Ministry of the Interior reported that it had been fired from a Kalashnikov machinegun. 50. On 16 January 2002 the investigators decided to forward the criminal case for further investigation to the military prosecutor’s office, as the killing had been perpetrated by federal servicemen. On 5 February 2002 that decision was overruled by the investigators’ superiors as premature. 51. On 28 February 2002 the investigators asked their superiors for an extension of the time-limit for the investigation. Their request contained, inter alia, the following: “... According to the information collected by the investigation ... at about 12 p.m. on 4 January 2002 Corporal Yu.M. and Sergeant M.B. from the military commander’s office were carrying out welding work on BRDM no. 140 on the premises of the Ministry of Emergency Situations, when an order was given by the Grozny military commander to the officers of the Ministry of Emergency Situations to detain the vehicle [and its team] on suspicion of their involvement in gunfire opened from that vehicle on 29 December 2001. However, Corporal Yu.M. and Sergeant M.B. quickly got into the BRDM and started driving off the premises. The Deputy Minister for Emergency Situations, Colonel Yunusov, and ... Mr R.A. tried to stop the vehicle ... Yunusov threw his jacket over its slits and got onto the hull. Then the BRDM increased its speed and opened fire, broke down the gates ... and drove to checkpoint no. 106 on Garazhnaya Street with Mr Yunusov on its hull. Mr R.A. ran after the BRDM and loosed two gun shots at its wheels. At that time policemen from the Leninskiy VOVD (K., B., S., E., who were at checkpoint no. 106, and G., Kh. and L. who were at checkpoint no. 101) fired warning shots into the air. However, the BRDM broke down the barriers and started moving in the direction of the gates of the Leninskiy temporary department of the interior [the VOVD]. In connection with this, the above-mentioned police officers from both checkpoints, as well as the officers who were on the roof of the VOVD (I., B., G. and Ba.), opened fire on the BRDM’s wheels. As a result of that gunfire, Colonel Yunusov, who was on the hull, was wounded in the chest and died in hospital from his wounds ...” 52. On 1 March 2002 the investigators ordered a ballistic examination of the bullet taken from Mr Yunusov’s body and of the handguns and machineguns of eleven police officers and ten servicemen from the military commander’s office implicated in the shooting. On 22 March 2002 the experts concluded that the bullet that had killed Mr Yunusov had been shot from a Kalashnikov machinegun belonging to a police officer, A.L. 53. Between January and October 2002 the investigation questioned a number of witnesses to the incident, including military officers, and confirmed that Colonel Yunusov had been shot by the machinegun belonging to officer A.L., who at the time in question had been deployed on a temporary military mission to the Chechen Republic from the Vologda Region of the Russian Federation. 54. On 20 October 2002 the first applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case. As can be seen from the documents submitted, the applicants and their representatives regularly contacted the authorities with requests for information concerning progress in the criminal proceedings. Between 2002 and 2006, the applicants also lodged several complaints at various levels of the prosecutor’s office for it to expedite the investigation in the criminal case and to prosecute the servicemen responsible for Mr Yunusov’s killing. 55. For instance, on 21 July 2005 the applicants’ representatives complained to the Staropromyslovskiy district prosecutor of the lack of information concerning the investigation and the investigators’ failure to inform the applicants of the most important steps taken, such as the results of the expert examination of evidence and the questioning of key witnesses. They requested to be informed of progress in the proceedings and asked for the investigation to be resumed in the event that it had been suspended. 56. Between October 2002 and 17 January 2006 the investigation was suspended and then resumed on at least seven occasions. From the documents submitted by the parties, it can be seen that the applicants were not informed of the majority of those procedural decisions. 57. On 17 January 2007 the investigators’ supervisor overruled the decision of 17 January 2006 to suspend the investigation and ordered that it be resumed in order that a number of steps might be undertaken. The decision stated, inter alia, the following: “It is necessary to take the following measures: - make a coherent plan regarding investigative steps and operational search measures to be taken; - according to expert report no. 265 of 22 March 2002, the spent bullet casing found in the clothing of Mr Yunusov had been shot from a machinegun belonging to Mr A.L. It is necessary to take sufficient steps to establish his whereabouts and to question him. A decision concerning his procedural status must be taken ...” From the documents submitted it can be seen that no tangible steps, other than that of sending formal requests for information, were taken in order to comply with those orders. 58. On 14 June 2007 the investigators’ superior issued orders to the investigators instructing them to comply with the orders issued on 14 October and 13 December 2005 and 17 January 2007. In particular, the investigators were to take steps to establish the whereabouts of officer A.L. From the documents submitted it can be seen that those orders were not complied with. 59. On 31 July 2007 the above-mentioned orders were reiterated. From the documents submitted it can be seen that the orders were again not complied with. 60. On 20 November 2007 the applicants’ lawyer, Mr M.A., lodged a complaint with the investigators’ superiors, stating that he had been denied access to the investigation file, despite the court’s ruling in this respect (see paragraph 72 below). He stated that the lack of information about the proceedings precluded the applicants from appealing before a court regarding any possible omissions on the part of the investigators. He also requested that the applicants be informed of steps taken to establish the whereabouts of officer A.L., to whom had belonged machinegun no. 2094, with which Mr Yunusov had been shot. 61. On 3 December 2007 the deputy prosecutor of the Staropromyslovskiy district of Grozny allowed the complaint in part, stating that before the completion of the investigation, the applicants were entitled to access only that part of the contents of the investigation file concerning steps taken with their participation. On the same date the applicants were informed of the deputy prosecutor’s decision. 62. On the same date (3 December 2007) the deputy prosecutor also ordered the investigators to remedy the procedural violations (требование об устранении нарушений федерального законодательства, допущенного в ходе предварительного следствия) that had occurred during the investigation of Mr Yunusov’s murder. He stated, in particular, that the proceedings had been suspended prematurely and unlawfully, given that a number of necessary steps had not been taken despite previously issued orders, and that the applicants had not been informed of progress in the proceedings. 63. On 19 December 2007, at the above-mentioned order of the supervising prosecutor, the investigators allowed the applicants to access part of the contents of the investigation file. 64. On 22 January 2008 the investigation in the criminal case was resumed in order for a number of steps to be taken, including the establishment of the whereabouts of Mr A.L. 65. On 29 January 2008 the investigators’ superior issued orders to the investigators instructing them to take a number of steps, including obtaining information from the Vologda Region police in order to establish the addresses and full details of a number of the police officers (including Mr A.L.), who had been deployed in Grozny at the time of the incident. The documents submitted show that no such steps were taken, other than the sending of requests for information. 66. On 21 February 2008 the investigation was suspended again. The applicants were informed thereof. 67. There is no further information on progress in the proceedings. 68. On a number of occasions between November 2002 and August 2006 the applicants requested the investigators’ permission to access the investigation file, but to no avail. 69. On an unspecified date between September and November 2006 the applicants lodged a complaint with the Staropromyslovskiy District Court (“the District Court”) in Grozny, stating that the investigators had refused to grant them access to the investigation file and that the proceedings had been suspended. 70. On 23 January 2007 the District Court dismissed their complaint. The applicants appealed, and on 4 April 2007 the Chechen Supreme Court overruled the dismissal and remitted the complaint for fresh examination. 71. On 16 April 2007 the District Court again dismissed the applicants’ complaint. The applicants appealed and on 20 June 2007 the Chechnya Supreme Court overruled the dismissal and again remitted the complaint for fresh examination. 72. On 2 August 2007 the District Court allowed the applicants’ complaint, ordering that a thorough and comprehensive investigation be carried out into the murder and that the applicants be allowed to access part of the investigation file. 73. On an unspecified date in 2015 the second applicant lodged a claim for compensation for the non-pecuniary damage caused by the killing of Colonel Yunusov. On 29 June 2015 the Leninskiy District Court in Grozny dismissed the claim on procedural grounds. 74. On 26 January 2005 the third applicant and the applicants’ relatives – Mr Dzhabrail Abiyev (in the documents submitted also referred to as Zhabrail Atabayev), who was born in 1989, and Mr Alkhazur Atabayev, who was born in 1989 – were driving in the fourth applicant’s VAZ 2110 car after visiting a relative in a Grozny hospital. 75. As the vehicle was travelling at a distance of about 250 metres from a federal forces checkpoint, which was situated next to the Transmash (Трансмаш) factory and manned by police officers from the “West” (Запад) battalion of the Chechen Ministry of the Interior their car came under unprovoked fire from machineguns and a grenade launcher wielded by armed men in three UAZ vehicles without registration numbers who had just passed through the checkpoint. 76. After the shooting had stopped, several servicemen from the checkpoint approached the perpetrators. The latter got into their cars and drove away, passing without hindrance through the checkpoint. 77. As a result of the firearms assault, Mr Dzhabrail Abiyev and Mr Alkhazur Atabayev were killed on the spot and the third applicant, Mr Adam Atabayev, received several gunshot wounds to the legs; he was taken to a Grozny hospital. 78. Later on the same date, some of the federal television channels broadcast news of the “liquidation” by federal forces of the applicants’ two relatives, who were described as members of illegal armed groups. 79. On 26 January 2005 the applicants complained about the killing to the authorities, and on the same date the Staropromyslovskiy district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 43015. 80. On 26 January 2005 the investigators examined the crime scene, where they collected more than fifty spent cartridges and six bullets, two hand grenades and two flare-shells cases. On the following day, 27 January 2005, they ordered an expert examination of the evidence. On 24 and 25 February 2005 the experts concluded that the grenades had been industrially made and that fourteen cartridges were of the type used with TIS (ТИС) machineguns and sniper rifles equipped with devices for noiseless and flameless shooting. Fifty-nine cartridges were of the type used with Kalashnikov machineguns and six were of the type used with the TT pistol. 81. On 28 January 2005 the investigators ordered a forensic examination of the bodies of Mr Dzhabrail Abiyev and Mr Alkhazur Atabayev. According to the experts’ conclusions, dated 15 February 2005, they died of multiple gunshot wounds. 82. On various dates between 27 January and 1 April 2005 each of the applicants was granted victim status in the criminal case. 83. On 27 January 2005 the investigators questioned the third applicant, whose statement concerning the incident was similar to the applicants’ submission before the Court. 84. On 1 February 2005 the investigators again questioned the third applicant, who added information to his previous statement to the effect that he had been driving the car during the accident and that Dzhabrail Abiyev and Alkhazur Atabayev had been in the back seat. When the shooting had started, he had been shot in the left leg, had managed to get out of the car and had found that both Mr Abiyev and Mr Atabayev were dead. He had hidden behind the right side of the vehicle and had shouted out in Russian and Chechen, asking for the shooting to stop, but to no avail. Then the shooters had launched two flares and had continued shooting while he tried to crawl away. After moving about 20 or 25 metres he had come across several servicemen from the nearby checkpoint, who had taken him to hospital. 85. On 4 February 2005 the investigators questioned the first applicant, whose statement was similar to the applicants’ submission before the Court. She also stated that to her knowledge, the men who had taken the third applicant to the hospital had been present by the place of the shooting and worked in law-enforcement agencies (в правоохранительных органах). 86. On 20 February 2005 the investigators ordered a trace examination of the bullets, cartridges and shells collected from the crime scene. On 28 March 2005 the experts reported that the victims’ car had been shot at from its front and left side. 87. On 25 February 2005 the investigators ordered a forensic examination of the third applicant. On 20 March 2005 the experts reported that the third applicant had suffered injuries of medium-level gravity – namely, multiple gunshot wounds to the muscles and tendons of the left thigh and right shin. 88. On 16 February 2005 the investigators questioned the second applicant, whose statement was similar to the applicants’ submission before the Court. 89. On 18 March 2005 the investigators requested that Operational Search Bureau no. 2 (ORB-2) in Grozny inform them of whether Mr Vakha T. was one of officers of the Anti-Organised Crime Department (РУБОП) as, according to the witness statements, he had been one of the persons who had been present next to the place of the shooting at the time of the incident. On the same date the ORB-2 replied that no such person worked there. 90. On 18 March 2005 the investigators requested that the commander of the West battalion of the Chechen Ministry of the Interior provide (for the purposes of their being questioned) a list of the servicemen of that unit who had been manning the checkpoint at the time of the shooting. 91. On 28 March 2005 the Memorial Human Rights Centre lodged a complaint on the applicants’ behalf with the Russian Prosecutor General. Their letter stated, in particular, that Dzhabrail Abiyev and Alkhazur Atabayev, who had been teenagers at the time in question, and the third applicant had been driving when they had been attacked by unidentified persons in the vicinity of the West battalion and that according to local residents, gunfire had been opened on them from that direction. The letter requested that the applicants be informed of whether a criminal case had been opened into the incident and whether the perpetrators had been identified. 92. On 1 April 2005 the investigators questioned the fourth applicant, whose statement was similar to the applicants’ submission before the Court. In addition, he stated that State servicemen had been responsible for the gunfire opened on the car containing his relatives. 93. On 1 April 2005 the investigators questioned the applicants’ relatives, Mr R.A. and Mr A. Kh., who had arrived at the crime scene shortly after the shooting. Their statements were similar to the applicants’ submission before the Court. In addition, they stated that the gunfire directed towards their relatives had been opened by servicemen riding in armoured UAZ vehicles without registration numbers and that one of the servicemen had been Mr Adlan G. 94. On 5 April 2005 the investigators requested that the commander of the West battalion provide them with information regarding whether officers Vakha T. and Adlan G. were serving in their unit. The investigators pointed out that it was the second such request that they had made and that the previous one had gone unanswered. 95. On 11 April 2005 the investigators questioned Mr M.S., who stated that on 26 January 2005 Mr Abiyev, Mr Atabayev and the third applicant had met with him and his friend Khasan in the courtyard of Grozny Town Hospital no. 3, where they had gone to visit a mutual friend. After that the third applicant, Mr Abiyev and Mr Atabayev had driven away. A few minutes later he had heard the sounds of automatic gunfire coming from the direction in which they had left. He had run out of the hospital courtyard but had been stopped and thrown to the ground by several men, and a beanie hat had been pulled over his face. Then one of those men had heard on his portable radio that “Everything is in order” (Норма); he had then been allowed to leave. 96. On 25 April 2005 the applicants lodged a complaint with the investigators’ superiors, stating that the investigators were aware of the perpetrators’ identities but had failed to take active steps to prosecute them. In particular, they requested that Mr Adlan G., Mr Vakha T. and Mr Akhmed G. be questioned concerning their whereabouts at the time of the incident on 26 January 2005. 97. On 26 April 2005 the investigators suspended the investigation for failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicants were not informed thereof. 98. Between April and May 2005 various law-enforcement bodies replied in the negative to queries made by the investigators regarding whether special operations had been conducted by their units on the date of the incident. In addition, the replies indicated that no criminal proceedings were pending against Mr Abiyev, Mr Atabayev and the third applicant, and that neither were they suspected of illegal activities. 99. On 11 May 2005 the deputy Staropromyslovskiy district prosecutor overruled as premature and unlawful the decision of 26 April 2005 to suspend the investigation and ordered that it be resumed so that a number of steps could be taken, including the questioning of the persons indicated by the second applicant in his request of 25 April 2005 (see paragraph 96 above). 100. On an unspecified date between 1 and 12 May 2005 the applicants lodged a complaint with the Staropromyslovskiy district prosecutor, stating that the investigators had failed to take the following steps: “ ... [They have failed] 1. To clarify the reasons for which on 27 or 28 January 2005 the television news broadcast stated that two illegal fighters had been killed and one had managed to abscond and to find out who provided the television channel with this information; 101. On 12 May 2005 the investigators issued a plan of steps to be taken within the criminal investigation. The plan stated, in particular, that there were two main theories concerning the attack on the applicants’ relatives and the third applicant: (i) it had been perpetrated in connection with a blood feud, and (ii) it had been committed by law-enforcement agencies during a special operation. The investigators were, inter alia, to question the persons indicated by the applicants in their request of 25 April 2005 and to identify other witnesses to the incident. The documents submitted show that no tangible steps were taken to verify the blood-feud theory. 102. On 15 May 2005 the investigators questioned Mr A.M., who stated that on 26 January 2005 he and three of his friends had been present next to the premises of the plant, when at about 7 p.m. three grey UAZ vehicles without registration numbers had pulled over and armed men in camouflage uniforms had got out of the vehicles. He and his friends had immediately left for home. On the way, a few minutes later, he had heard gunfire and two explosions. Half hour later he had learned of the attack on the car. 103. On 20 May 2005 the investigators again questioned the fourth applicant, who reiterated his previous statement and added that shortly after the incident at the crime scene his sister (the first applicant) had seen a group of about twelve military servicemen in dark uniforms and balaclavas getting into grey UAZ vehicles. She had run up to their vehicles, but two of the men had stopped her. As he had found out later, one of these two men had been Mr Vakha T. 104. On various dates between 26 May and 10 June 2005 the investigators questioned several people who resided in the vicinity of the site of the incident. All of them gave similar statements confirming the applicants’ submission before the Court but denied having any information concerning the perpetrators’ identities. 105. On 11 June 2005 the investigators again suspended the investigation for failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicants were not informed thereof. 106. On 29 July 2005 the Staropromyslovskiy district prosecutor again overruled the suspension as premature and unlawful and ordered that the investigation be resumed in order for a number of steps to be taken, including an examination of the evidence collected at the crime scene. It appears that those orders were not complied with. 107. On 8 August 2005 the investigators again suspended the investigation for failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicants were not informed thereof. 108. On 20 October 2005 the deputy Staropromyslovskiy district prosecutor again overruled the suspension as premature and unlawful and ordered that the investigation be resumed in order for a number of steps to be taken, including the establishment of the identities and questioning of Mr Adlan G. and Mr Vakha T. It appears that those orders, other than the sending of formal requests for information to various law-enforcement agencies regarding whether they had conducted special operations on the date of the incident, were not complied with by the investigators. 109. On 20 November 2005 the investigators again questioned the fourth applicant, who reiterated his previous statements and added that the two grenades and bullets from the TT model pistol had been planted in the car of Mr Abiyev, Mr Atabayev and the third applicant during the crime scene examination. 110. On 20 November 2005 the investigators again suspended the investigation for failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicants were not informed thereof. 111. On 4 December 2005 the deputy Staropromyslovskiy district prosecutor again overruled the suspension as premature and unlawful and ordered that the investigation be resumed in order for a number of steps to be taken, including the establishing of the identities and the questioning of Mr Adlan G. and Mr Vakha T. It appears that those orders were not complied with. 112. On the same date, 4 December 2005, the investigation was suspended again. The applicants were not informed thereof. 113. On 15 May 2006 the deputy Staropromyslovskiy district prosecutor again overruled the suspension as premature and unlawful and ordered that the investigation be resumed in order for a number of steps to be taken, including the establishing of the identities and the questioning of Mr Adlan G. and Mr Vakha T. It appears that those orders were not complied with. 114. On 15 June 2006 the investigation was suspended again. The applicants were not informed thereof. 115. On 11 August 2006 the deputy Staropromyslovskiy district prosecutor again overruled the suspension as premature and unlawful and ordered that the investigation be resumed in order that the previously ordered steps could be taken. 116. On 29 August 2006 the investigators again questioned the fourth applicant, who reiterated his previous statements. He also stated that the persons who had participated in the attack on the car had been Mr Vakha (also known as Bekhan) T. and Mr Adlan G.; he knew this because the first applicant had recognised them when they had stopped her from approaching the culprits in the UAZ vehicles, as Mr Vakha T. had removed his balaclava when talking to her. He furthermore stressed that the bullets and grenades found in the car had not belonged to his nephews (who had at the material time been studying at school) and that this evidence had been planted after the shooting by the perpetrators. 117. On 4 September 2006 the investigators again questioned the third applicant, who stated that the grenades and bullets found in the car had belonged to neither him nor to Dzhabrail Abiyev or Alkhazur Atabayev. In his opinion, this evidence had been planted by the perpetrators of the shooting. 118. On 4 September 2006 the investigators questioned the applicants’ relative, Mr R.A., whose statement did not provide any new information. 119. On 11 September 2006 the investigation was suspended again. The applicants were not informed thereof. 120. On 6 October 2006 the investigators’ supervisor overruled the suspension as premature and unlawful and ordered that the investigation be resumed in order that a number of steps could be taken. None of those steps were taken. 121. On 6 November 2006 the investigation was suspended again. The applicants were not informed thereof. 122. On 18 January 2007 the deputy Staropromyslovskiy district prosecutor again overruled the suspension as premature and unlawful and ordered that the investigation be resumed in order for the previously ordered steps to be taken. 123. On 26 January 2007 the investigators questioned a local resident, Ms L.M., whose statements did not provide any new information. 124. Between 26 January and 2 February 2007, the investigators familiarised the first, third and fourth applicants with the decision to order a forensic examination of the bodies of Dzhabrail Abiyev and Alkhazur Atabayev and with the resultant expert reports. 125. On 18 February 2007 the investigation was suspended again. It is unclear whether the applicants were informed thereof. 126. On 26 March 2007 the deputy Staropromyslovskiy district prosecutor again overruled the suspension as premature and unlawful and ordered that the investigation be resumed in order for the previously ordered steps to be taken. The applicants were informed of that decision on 30 March 2007. 127. On various dates in April 2007 the investigators questioned several local residents, who made statements to the effect that they had heard about the incident from their relatives or neighbours. 128. On 11 April 2007 the investigators again questioned the fourth applicant, who reiterated his previous statements and insisted that Mr Vakha T. and Mr Adlan G. had been involved in his relatives’ killing. In addition, he stated that at the crime scene there had been three armoured UAZ vehicles and one regular UAZ vehicle. 129. On 16 April 2007 the investigators questioned Mr S.Kh., whose statement was similar to that given by Mr A.M. (see paragraph 66 above). 130. On 30 April 2007 the investigators suspended the criminal investigation. The applicants were informed thereof shortly afterwards. 131. On 19 September 2008 the investigators’ supervisor overruled the suspension as premature and unlawful and ordered that the investigation be resumed in order for a number of steps to be taken. None of those steps were in fact taken. 132. On 20 October 2008 the investigators again suspended the criminal investigation. The applicants were not informed thereof. 133. On 17 November 2008 the deputy Leninskiy district prosecutor criticised the investigators’ failure to comply with the previously given orders and ordered that the investigation be resumed and the ordered steps taken. 134. On 19 November 2008, following the district prosecutor’s criticism, the investigation was resumed in order for the requested steps to be taken. 135. On 4 December 2008 the investigators again questioned the fourth applicant, who reiterated his previous statements. 136. Between 13 and 17 December 2008 the investigators questioned several local residents, who gave statements to the effect that they had heard about the incident from their relatives or neighbours. 137. On 19 December 2008 the investigators again suspended the criminal investigation. It is unclear whether the applicants were informed thereof. 138. On 19 January 2009 the deputy Staropromyslovskiy district prosecutor again overruled the suspension as premature and unlawful, criticised the investigators for their failure to take the requested steps and ordered that the proceedings be resumed so that the previously ordered steps could be taken. 139. On 9 February 2009, following the district prosecutor’s criticism, the investigation was resumed. The requested steps were not taken. 140. On 13 March 2009 the investigators again suspended the criminal investigation. It is unclear whether the applicants were informed thereof. 141. On 5 April 2009 the deputy Staropromyslovskiy district prosecutor again overruled the suspension as premature and unlawful, criticised the investigators for their failure to take the requested steps and ordered that the proceedings be resumed and the previously ordered steps taken. 142. On 12 April 2009, following the district prosecutor’s criticism, the investigation was resumed. The ordered steps were not taken and on 12 May 2009 the investigation was suspended again. 143. From the copies of the contents of the investigation file it can be seen that the applicants regularly gave statements to the investigators and contacted them and their superiors, asking for information on the progress of the criminal proceedings. For instance, on 16 January 2010 the fourth applicant lodged a complaint with the Russian Prosecutor General, stating that the local law-enforcement agencies were stalling the investigation and trying to cover up the incident and their involvement in the killing of the local law‑enforcement officers. 144. Following the above-mentioned complaint, on 30 May 2010 the investigation was resumed. In addition, on the same date the investigators opened a criminal case against the unidentified persons who had killed the applicants’ relatives on 26 January 2005. That criminal case was joined with criminal case no. 43015 under the joint number 43015. 145. On various dates in June 2010 the investigators questioned several local residents, who gave statements to the effect that they had heard about the killing of the applicants’ relatives from their relatives or neighbours. 146. On 30 June 2010 the investigators again suspended the criminal investigation. It is unclear whether the applicants were informed thereof. 147. On 2 August 2011 the investigators again questioned the third applicant, who reiterated his previous statements. 148. On 4 August 2011 the investigators again suspended the investigation. 149. On 23 August 2011 the investigation was resumed and then again suspended on 23 September 2011 without any steps having been taken. 150. On 17 November 2011, after the applicants complained to the investigators’ superiors, the proceedings were resumed in order for a number of steps to be taken. None of those steps were taken and on 18 November 2011 the investigation was suspended again. 151. On 7 October 2011 the investigators’ superiors again overruled the suspension as premature and unlawful, criticised the investigators for their failure to take the requested steps and ordered that the proceedings be resumed and the previously ordered steps taken. 152. On 22 October 2011, following the superiors’ criticism, the investigation was resumed. The requested steps were not taken, except for the sending of formal requests for information, and on 22 November 2011 the investigation was again suspended. The applicants were informed of the suspension. 153. On 4 April 2014 the investigation was resumed. There is no further information on any progress in the proceedings.

5. The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Istanbul. 6. On 10 May 1999 a certain İ.Ö. lodged a criminal complaint against the applicant, claiming that he had issued an uncovered cheque dated 26 April 1999. 7. On the same date the Bakırköy public prosecutor’s office indicted the applicant in the Bakırköy Criminal Court of First Instance under section 16 (1) of Law no. 3167 – in force at the material time – for issuing an uncovered cheque. The cheque bore the applicant’s name underneath the name of the company of which he was president of the executive board, and the address of the company on the cheque was indicated as being “... Bakırköy / Istanbul”. 8. On 2 September 1999 the trial court held a preparatory hearing (tensip) and ordered that a summons be served on the applicant. 9. On 6 October 1999 the trial court sent a copy of the bill of indictment, together with the notice of the first hearing, to the address written on the cheque. On the same day the trial court asked the Bakırköy public prosecutor’s office to confirm the applicant’s identity and enquire about his full address and provide it with this information. 10. On 7 October 1999 the summons was returned on the grounds that the applicant had left that address, leaving “P.K. [post box] 5 Bakırköy” as an alternative address. 11. Within the context of the enquiries to find out what the applicant’s new address was, it appears that the Bakırköy public prosecutor’s office asked the police and the mayor of the neighbourhood (muhtarlık) to collect information. In that connection, the police went to the address written on the cheque and concluded that the applicant had left it. According to the information received from the mayor of the neighbourhood, the applicant had left that address without giving any notification. 12. On 14 February 2000 the trial court held the first hearing in the absence of the applicant. The court decided to authorise his detention in absentia (tevkif müzekkeresi) with a view to obtaining his statements, under Article 223 of the former Code of Criminal Procedure, in force at the material time. 13. Between 14 February 2000 and 13 October 2004 the trial court waited for the detention order to be executed. 14. On 11 October 2001, while the criminal proceedings were ongoing, another court in Istanbul, namely the Bağcılar Criminal Court of First Instance, sent a summons to the applicant’s home address – “... Avcılar / Istanbul” – requiring him to give evidence as a complainant in another set of criminal proceedings. 15. On 16 July 2001, in another set of criminal proceedings, the Küçükçekmece public prosecutor’s office delivered a decision not to prosecute, in which it also indicated the applicant’s address as being “... Avcılar / Istanbul”. 16. On 26 May 2003 the trial court once again attempted to serve the summons at the address written on the cheque, but failed to do so for the same reasons. 17. On 21 June 2004 the trial court decided to serve the summons at the same address, in accordance with section 35 (4) of the Notification Act (Law no. 7201). 18. On 13 October 2004 the trial court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to a fine (ağır para cezası) of 500,000,000 Turkish liras (TRL). That judgment was served on the applicant on 30 October 2004. The seven-day time-limit for lodging an appeal against the judgment expired, and in the absence of an appeal it became final. 19. On an unspecified date in 2006 several police officers from the Firuzköy police station in Avcılar, Istanbul, went to the applicant’s apartment with an arrest warrant and invited him to attend the police station. At the police station, the applicant was informed that an arrest warrant had been issued against him following his conviction by a criminal court, and that he would be put in prison unless he paid the 500 Turkish liras (TRY)[1] fine previously imposed by the court. The applicant, who was unaware of any criminal proceedings against him, requested the details of the judgment in question and applied to the registry of the Bakırköy Criminal Court of First Instance for further information. 20. Upon examining the relevant case file at the registry of the first-instance court, the applicant discovered that he had been charged and convicted in absentia for issuing an uncovered cheque on 27 April 1999 and sentenced to a fine of TRY 500[2], an amount corresponding to the amount of the cheque. Moreover, the judgment, which had been delivered on 13 October 2004 by the Bakırköy Criminal Court of First Instance, had become final in the absence of an appeal. 21. On 5 May 2006 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Bakırköy Criminal Court of First Instance, challenging the judgment in question on the grounds that it had been delivered in his absence and the accusations against him were ill-founded. He emphasised that he had not received any notice of the criminal proceedings or the judgment, not even when he had gone to the Bakırköy public prosecutor’s office three months prior to the delivery of the impugned judgment to obtain his criminal record details for an unrelated matter. He added that the claimant in the criminal proceedings, İ.Ö., was his former girlfriend, and that he had given her a blank cheque as a guarantee that he would discharge their joint debt to a bank. They had in fact signed an official document on 12 March 1998 in the presence of a lawyer confirming that İ.Ö. would only be entitled to cash this cheque if the applicant failed to discharge their joint debt to the bank. Upon settling the debt with the bank, the applicant had requested that İ.Ö. return the blank cheque to him, but İ.Ö. had failed to do so, alleging that she had lost it. He had accordingly reported the cheque as missing to the bank, and had asked to be notified in the event of any attempts to cash it. On 27 April 1999, very shortly after his move to a new address, his former girlfriend had apparently attempted to cash the cheque, and when the cheque had not cleared, had brought a criminal complaint against him. Despite his instructions, he had not been contacted by his bank when the cheque in question had been deposited by İ.Ö., nor had he been advised that the cheque had bounced. 22. On the same day the Bakırköy Civil Court of First Instance issued a summary judgment dismissing the applicant’s appeal as lodged out of time. It held that the judgment of 13 October 2004 had been duly served on him on 30 October 2004 in accordance with section 35 of Law no. 7201, and the appeal should therefore have been submitted by 8 November 2004. 23. On 22 May 2006 the applicant appealed against the summary judgment, reiterating the arguments he had previously submitted to the Bakırköy Civil Court of First Instance. He emphasised that, although his accurate address details could easily have been obtained from the mayor of the neighbourhood, the judgment of October 2004 had been served at the address which his company had moved out of on 15 April 1999. In his absence, it had apparently been posted on the door of the building. He therefore requested that the judgment which had been delivered in his absence be quashed or rectified. 24. On 21 September 2006 the Principal Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation delivered her opinion on the applicant’s appeal, where she requested that the first-instance court’s judgment of 5 May 2006 be quashed on account of the unlawful service of the initial judgment rendered in his absence. 25. On 2 October 2006 the Court of Cassation upheld the lower court’s decision, holding that the judgment in question had been duly served on the applicant in accordance with section 35 of Law no. 7201 on Notifications. 26. On 8 November 2006, in accordance with Article 308 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the applicant requested that the Principal Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation lodge an application to have the Court of Cassation’s decision set aside. 27. It appears that the applicant was imprisoned on 24 November 2006 on account of his failure to pay the fine of TRY 500 imposed by the Bakırköy Criminal Court of First Instance on 13 October 2004. 28. On 26 November 2006 the applicant was conditionally released. 29. On 1 December 2008 the Principal Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation rejected the applicant’s application under Article 308 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, maintaining that the applicant’s arguments had already been examined by the Court of Cassation in its decision of 2 October 2006.

4. The applicants were born in 1960 and 1959 respectively and live in Vilnius. 5. In 1991 the applicants’ grandfather, P.S., applied for restoration of his property rights to land which had been nationalised by the Soviet regime. In 1994 the administrative authorities acknowledged that P.S. had the right to have his property rights restored. 6. On 28 September 2004 the Vilnius County Administration (hereinafter “the VCA”) restored P.S.’s property rights by giving him 8.17 hectares of land, consisting of several plots in Kryžiokai and Naujaneriai, areas in the Vilnius city municipality. 7. On 25 May 2005 P.S. sold a plot of 0.50 hectares out of the 8.17 hectares given to him to S.M. On 30 June 2005 P.S. sold a plot of 1.27 hectares to Ž.J. Both sale agreements were certified by a notary. 8. On 26 July 2005 P.S. died. The applicants were issued with a certificate of inheritance in respect of his estate on 21 December 2005. 9. On 28 July 2008 the prosecutor of the Vilnius Region (hereinafter “the prosecutor”) lodged a claim with the Vilnius Regional Court, seeking to have P.S.’s property rights to 2.50 of the 8.17 hectares given to him annulled. The prosecutor submitted that 2.50 hectares of the plot was covered by forest. Since that forest was situated in a city, it was considered a forest of national importance and could therefore only be owned by the State (see the relevant domestic law cited in Beinarovič and Others v. Lithuania, nos. 70520/10 and 2 others, §§ 86-89, 12 June 2018). In view of the circumstances, the VCA’s decision had to be declared unlawful and its effects annulled. The prosecutor asked that after annulling P.S.’s property rights to that part of the land, the applicants’ property rights to it also be annulled. 10. The applicants and the VCA disputed the prosecutor’s claim. However, on 21 October 2009 the Vilnius Regional Court allowed it. On 24 May 2010 the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal lodged by the applicants, and on 10 December 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed their appeal on points of law, upholding the lower courts’ decisions in their entirety. 11. On 15 December 2008 the prosecutor lodged a further claim with the Vilnius Regional Court, seeking to have P.S.’s property rights to 0.15 hectares of the 8.17 hectares given to him annulled, on the grounds that it was covered by a forest of national importance, as well as to have the applicants’ property rights to that part of the plot annulled. Since the 0.15 hectares had been sold to S.M. (see paragraph 7 above), the prosecutor asked that after annulling P.S.’s property rights, the sale agreement between him and S.M. be annulled in respect of that part of the land. 12. The applicants disputed the prosecutor’s claim. However, on 10 December 2009 the Vilnius Regional Court allowed it. The court annulled P.S.’s property rights to the 0.15 hectares, as well as the sale agreement between P.S. and S.M. with respect to that amount of land. It stated that the applicants, as P.S.’s heirs, had to take over his legal obligations, and ordered them to return to S.M. what he had paid for the 0.15 hectares – 49,500 Lithuanian litai (LTL, approximately 14,340 euros (EUR)). 13. On 23 September 2010 the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal lodged by the applicants, and on 11 April 2011 the Supreme Court dismissed their appeal on points of law, upholding the lower courts’ decisions in their entirety. 14. The Court has not been informed whether the applicants have paid the amount of LTL 49,500 (approximately EUR 14,340) to S.M. 15. On 14 November 2008 the prosecutor lodged yet another claim with the Vilnius Regional Court, seeking to have P.S.’s property rights to 0.87 hectares of the 8.17 hectares given to him annulled, on the grounds that it was covered by a forest of national importance, as well as to have the applicants’ property rights to that part of the plot annulled. Since the 0.87 hectares had been sold to Ž.J. (see paragraph 7 above), the prosecutor asked that after annulling P.S.’s property rights, the sale agreement between him and Ž.J. be annulled in respect of that part of the land. 16. The applicants disputed the prosecutor’s claim, but on 8 March 2010 the Vilnius Regional Court allowed it. The court annulled the VCA’s decision to restore P.S.’s property rights in the part concerning the 0.87 hectares, as well as the sale agreement between P.S. and Ž.J. in respect of that amount of land. It ordered the applicants, as P.S.’s heirs, to return to Ž.J. what she had paid for the 0.87 hectares – LTL 188,730 (approximately EUR 54,660). 17. The applicants appealed against the first-instance court’s decision, but on 12 July 2011 the Court of Appeal upheld it in its entirety. The applicants then lodged an appeal on points of law, but on 19 September 2011 the Supreme Court refused to examine it on the basis that it raised no important legal issues. 18. On 22 August 2013 the applicants paid to Ž.J. the amount of LTL 188,730 (approximately EUR 54,660), as well as LTL 6,440 (approximately EUR 1,865) in bailiff’s expenses. 19. On 23 February 2012 the applicants received a letter from the National Land Service (the institution which took over the relevant functions of the VCA after an administrative reform – hereinafter “the NLS”) confirming that, after the courts had annulled P.S.’s property rights to 3.52 hectares of land, he had retained the right to have those property rights restored. The applicants were informed of the forms of restitution provided for by the domestic law (ibid., § 92) and asked to inform the authorities of their preferred form of restitution. It is unclear whether the applicants replied to this letter. 20. On 24 July 2012 the applicants received another letter from the NLS which stated that there was a possibility for the applicants to receive a plot of land for the construction of an individual home in the Vilnius city area, but as there were 4,806 other candidates waiting to receive plots in the area, the restitution process would take a long time. The applicants were asked to consider an alternative form of restitution, such as being given a plot of land in a rural area, a plot of land for the construction of an individual home in a different city, or monetary compensation (ibid.). They were also informed that there remained about 0.10 hectares of vacant land in Kryžiokai, so if they wished to receive a plot in that area, their request would be considered when the land plan was being prepared. 21. On 21 August 2012 the applicants sent a letter to the NLS. They submitted that the annulment of their property rights to 3.52 hectares of land had caused them pecuniary damage in the amount of LTL 627,630 (approximately EUR 181,770), consisting of the value of the 2.50 hectares of land which had been taken away from them (see paragraph 9 above), according to a private assessment, as well as the amounts which the applicants had been ordered to pay to S.M. and Ž.J. (see paragraphs 12 and 16 above). In the applicants’ view, being put on the list with 4,806 other candidates and being made to wait for an undetermined period of time for restitution was unacceptable. The applicants asked to be allocated a plot of land for the construction of an individual home in Vilnius in the order of priority, and if that was not possible, to be informed how many plots were available in Vilnius and when they might expect to receive one. They also stated that they would agree to receive a plot of land in Kryžiokai but would first want to know its exact location. The applicants stated that they did not wish to choose any other form of restitution. 22. On 14 December 2012 the NLS approved the list of candidates to receive plots of land in several areas around Vilnius, including Kryžiokai. The applicants were included in that list as candidates to receive 3.52 hectares of land. On 31 December 2012 the NLS held a meeting at which candidates were offered plots in the relevant areas. The applicants took part in that meeting and chose four plots, measuring a total of 0.8035 hectares. As regards the remaining land, they stated that they would wait for the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in their case. However, as it appears from the information at the Court’s possession, those four plots were eventually not given to the applicants, for reasons not provided to the Court. 23. On 21 August 2014 the NLS adopted a land plan of the aforementioned areas around Vilnius, as well as the list of individuals who would be allocated plots in those areas. The applicants were included in the list and were entitled to receive two plots of land, measuring a total of 0.203 hectares. The applicants later submitted to the Court that those two plots included installations and buildings belonging to third parties. 24. On 21 April 2015 the applicants sent a letter to the NLS, asking it to temporarily suspend the planning of the two aforementioned plots “while court proceedings [were] ongoing” (kol vyksta teismai). The Government submitted that the applicants’ letter must have been referring to the proceedings before the Court, as no relevant domestic proceedings had been ongoing at that time. 25. On 25 May 2016 the applicants took part in another candidates’ meeting and chose three plots, measuring a total of 0.23 hectares. It does not appear that they were offered any more plots at that meeting. 26. In another candidates’ meeting held on 10 July 2018 the applicants were offered a plot of 0.1239 hectares in joint ownership with a third party, but they refused it on the grounds that such joint ownership would not be financially beneficial to them. 27. On 11 October 2018 the NLS adopted a decision to restore P.S.’s property rights by giving him 0.23 hectares of land. The decision stated that his rights to the remaining 3.29 hectares would be restored at a later date. 28. At the date of the latest information provided to the Court (15 October 2018), the applicants’ property rights to 3.29 hectares of land had still not been restored.

6. The applicants were born in 1969 and 1964 respectively and live in Sandnes, Norway. 7. The second applicant went to Sweden in the 1980s and met the first applicant in 1993. They have three children, A (born in December 2002), B (born in December 2003) and C (born in February 2007). The second applicant also has a son, D (born in 1989), from a previous relationship, who has lived with the applicants. The applicants lived in the city of Linköping until May 2007 when the first applicant travelled to Iran with the children. 8. In February 2007, staff at the Neonatal Unit at the University Hospital in Linköping, where C was treated after her birth, contacted the Linköping Social Council (socialnämnden) due to concerns about the family. The staff had observed that the first applicant had difficulties in understanding C’s needs and lacked ability to read her signals. Moreover, she was very withdrawn and took no initiative to feed C or change her nappy. The staff had suggested that she consult a psychiatrist, but the first applicant had refused. Furthermore, when the second applicant had visited the hospital with A and B, the children had been noisy and unruly and staff had had to intervene to calm them. When the staff had informed the applicants about their concern for the children and their intention to contact the social services, the second applicant had responded aggressively. 9. On the basis of the information from the hospital, the Social Council started an investigation into the family’s situation in accordance with Chapter 11, Section 1, of the Social Services Act (socialtjänstlagen, 2001:453). They contacted persons from the Neonatal Unit, the primary health care clinic for children and the women’s clinic, as well as A and B’s child-minder, all of whom expressed great concern about how the applicants were coping with their family situation and described how they had failed to provide A and B with the necessary structure and rules. The Social Council repeatedly offered the applicants placement in an investigation home, but the applicants refused. Instead, they agreed to have a team from the Social Council visit their home on a number of occasions. It was further decided that the whole family should undergo psychiatric examinations. 10. However, it would appear that the applicants repeatedly refused to let the Social Council team enter their home and, from mid-April, before the investigation was completed, the applicants stopped all contact with the team and informed them that they did not intend to undergo psychiatric examinations. The Social Council unsuccessfully tried to re-establish contact with the applicants. In late May 2007, the first applicant and the children left their home, allegedly to spend time with friends. Several persons who were normally in contact with the applicants expressed concern about the children’s situation and the fact that their whereabouts were unknown to them. 11. On 11 September 2007, the Social Council decided to take all three children into public care immediately, on a provisional basis, by virtue of Section 6 of the Special Provisions on the Care of Young Persons Act (lagen med särskilda bestämmelser om vård av unga, 1990:52; hereafter “the 1990 Act”). On 21 September 2007, the Administrative Court (länsrätten, as of 15 February 2010 förvaltningsrätten) confirmed the decision of the Social Council, as did the Administrative Court of Appeal (kammarrätten) and the Supreme Administrative Court (Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen) upon further appeal. However, the decision was never enforced since it turned out that the first applicant and the children were in Iran. Friends of the applicants informed the Social Council that the first applicant was afraid to return to Sweden since she feared that her children would be taken into public care. Thus, on 13 February 2008 the Social Council cancelled the care order since it could not be enforced. The first applicant and the children stayed in Iran until October 2008 when the whole family moved to Sandnes in Norway. 12. In May 2009, the local Norwegian Social Council was contacted by A’s school because he had told the school that both he and B had been beaten by the second applicant. The applicants denied the accusations. The Norwegian Social Council decided to initiate an investigation during which it was agreed that the second applicant would live away from the home and that a Social Council Unit would visit the family daily. On 16 May 2009, the applicants and their children disappeared. Subsequently, the second applicant telephoned, from a Swedish telephone number, the Norwegian Social Council, which in turn contacted the Swedish authorities as it suspected that the family might be in Sweden. Moreover, an anonymous person had telephoned the Swedish Social Council to express serious concerns about the children who, according to this person, were at an address in Linköping. When the Social Council staff went to the address given, the family was not there but their luggage was in the apartment. Consequently, on 25 May 2009, the Social Council decided to take A, B and C into immediate public care on the basis of its previous investigation and since it feared that the family would again leave for Iran. 13. On 28 May 2009, the applicants and their children were stopped at Stockholm Airport on their way to Iran and a team from a Social Council close to the airport assisted in the enforcement of the care order. The report made by the Social Council team which picked up the children at the airport described a chaotic situation. The first applicant and B and C had been apathetic while A had been hyperactive. The second applicant had mostly been on the telephone. Neither the first nor the second applicants had reacted when the team had taken the children away with them. A, B and C were all placed in a foster home (familjehem) together, but later A was moved to a separate foster home since he was hyperactive and required special attention. 14. On 10 June 2009, after holding an oral hearing, the Administrative Court confirmed the Social Council’s decision to take the children into immediate public care. 15. The applicants appealed against the judgment to the Administrative Court of Appeal which, on 6 August 2009, struck the case out since, in the meantime, the children had been taken into public care (see paragraph 20 below) and the immediate public care order thereby had lapsed. 16. On 25 June 2009, the Social Council applied to the Administrative Court for a public care order in respect of all three children, in accordance with Section 2 of the 1990 Act. The Council maintained that the applicants had shown a serious lack of ability to care for their children, that there was a clear risk of impairment of their health and development if they were not protected and that the applicants opposed the planned necessary care. It submitted a comprehensive investigation report into the family’s situation in support of its request. The report was based, inter alia, on submissions from the children’s temporary foster homes, the local health care service, reports based on psychiatric examinations of the children, notes from the Child and Youth Psychiatric Clinic (Barn- och ungdomspsykiatrin; hereafter “BUP”) and information from relatives and the Norwegian Social Council. 17. According to the report, none of the children had been accustomed to structure or routines. A maintained that he had been beaten by the second applicant and B had told her foster home that she, A and the first applicant had all been beaten by the second applicant. It was mainly the first applicant who had cared for the children. Hospital and Social Council staff, as well as relatives, had for a long time been worried about her psychological health and encouraged her to seek help. She had denied that she needed help and had refused all treatment. All of the children had lacked communication and emotional response from their parents, which had affected their psychosocial development and their ability to interact socially with other children as well as adults. A was hyperactive and had difficulties following rules and functioning in social situations. His behaviour corresponded to several of the symptoms of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). B was remarkably silent and withdrawn. Psychiatrists had assessed that she was traumatised and had recommended therapeutic treatment combined with a safe environment where she did not have to deny her experiences. Both she and C were behind in their language development and lacked the ability to express their emotions. Several instances had, over the years, emphasised the children’s need for emotional contact with the applicants. The second applicant had failed to compensate for the first applicant’s inability in this regard and neither of the applicants had managed to establish routines for the children’s basic needs such as food, hygiene, clothes and necessary medical care. Thus, the applicants’ ability to care for their children properly was questioned. The applicants’ impulsive behaviour had led to an unstable and insecure living situation for the children, such as when they had suddenly decided to move to Iran. There was an imminent risk that the applicants would again travel to Iran with their children. All of the children were in need of stability and an environment with clear rules and structure, including stable adults who could compensate for their previous lack of emotional care. 18. The applicants disputed that public care was needed. They submitted that they were capable parents who cared for and loved their children. They had cooperated with the Social Council in 2007 but had been treated inappropriately and disrespectfully by the authorities. They had not fled to Iran but had gone there to visit family, as they did every year. They submitted documentary evidence including medical certificates. According to a Chief Physician at Linköping University Hospital Women’s Clinic, the first applicant had accepted special assistance offered to her after the birth of all three children and had kept to this commitment. It had been noted that she felt great affection for her children. Moreover, according to a physician at the applicants’ local health centre, all the children had demonstrated the ability to make emotional contact and had behaved in a way appropriate for their age. 19. The legal representative assigned to defend the children’s best interests supported the Social Council’s stance. He had met all three children and, according to him, the information contained in the investigation gave reason for grave concern for the children’s situation. The parents’ lack of ability to understand their children’s needs, as well as the information about abuse, meant that it was necessary to take the children into public care to ensure that they received proper care. 20. On 20 July 2009, after holding an oral hearing where the applicants and several witnesses were heard, the Administrative Court granted a public care order in respect of each of the three children. It found that, on the basis of all the material in the case, it had been shown that the applicants lacked the ability to care for their children and to understand their needs. This inability had already impaired the children’s health and development in important areas. In the court’s view, there was a real risk of further damage unless the children were given proper care to meet their special needs. Since the applicants did not agree to voluntary care, it was necessary to take the children into public care. 21. The applicants appealed against the judgment to the Administrative Court of Appeal, maintaining that public care was not necessary for any of their children. They denied that either of them had ever hurt the children and stressed that the public prosecutor, in July 2009, had decided to discontinue a preliminary investigation against the second applicant concerning child abuse. Moreover, there was no medical evidence substantiating any accusations of physical violence. They emphasised that all three children were healthy and behaved in a manner appropriate for their age. They welcomed the fact that A’s condition had been diagnosed and were willing to accept appropriate help from the Social Council. The reasons for their decision to travel to Iran in May 2009 were that the second applicant’s father had fallen seriously ill and to spend their holidays there. They submitted, inter alia, further medical certificates and an assessment of the Social Council’s investigation issued by an associate professor. 22. The Social Council contested the appeal. It stated that A had been diagnosed with ADHD and Oppositional Defiant Disorder and emphasised that he was in need of a structured environment and appropriate help in order to develop in a positive way. B was still traumatised and communicated only by nodding or shaking her head. C was physically active, had become more independent and no longer feared daily sounds, such as the vacuum cleaner. The Council submitted a psychosocial investigation report from November 2009, a neuropsychological investigation report dated 26 October 2009 and a medical certificate dated 8 September 2009, all concerning A. 23. The children’s legal representative supported the Social Council’s stance. During a meeting with the children, A had declared that he wanted to live with his parents and siblings and that there were too many rules where he now lived. He had stated that the second applicant had sometimes beaten him and had sometimes been kind. B had told her foster home parents that the second applicant had beaten her. The representative emphasised the children’s need to see their parents but referred to the extensive material in the case-file which showed that the children had special needs. The investigations had also highlighted clear warning signals that the children had suffered at home. Moreover, the representative found it questionable whether the applicants would agree to voluntary care, since they had refused to cooperate with the Social Council on previous occasions. 24. On 11 December 2009, after holding an oral hearing where several witnesses were heard at the applicants’ request, the Administrative Court of Appeal upheld the lower court’s judgment in full. It found that the signs of lack of proper care which had appeared during the investigation in 2007 now appeared even more clearly. The investigations carried out after the decision on public care in June 2009 indicated that all of the children had special needs which had been neglected. Additionally, the court noted that both A and B had told various persons, in different situations, that they had been beaten by the second applicant. Although these accusations had not led to any charges against the second applicant, the court stressed that this information had to be taken seriously, since the main purpose of the 1990 Act was to protect the child. Moreover, the court observed that the Social Council had had difficulties carrying out the investigation correctly, mainly due to the applicants’ unwillingness or inability to cooperate with the authorities. The applicants’ unwillingness to cooperate had also manifested itself in their decision to move twice to another country, which had also jeopardised the security and stability of the children’s environment. Making an overall assessment, the appellate court found that the investigations strongly indicated that the applicants had failed to care for their children properly and that they lacked understanding of the children’s special needs and their own inability to care for them. Thus, there was a real risk of damage to the children’s health and development. Lastly, the court noted that both of the applicants had declared that they were willing to receive help from the Social Council while, at the same time, they had refuted the accuracy of the investigation and claimed that the information was fabricated or much exaggerated. They also opposed the care plan developed for the children. Accordingly, there were valid grounds to take the children into public care. 25. The applicants appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court which, on 15 April 2010, refused leave to appeal. 26. On 22 September 2010, the Social Council decided that the children should remain in public care. 27. The applicants appealed against the decision to the Administrative Court. They stated that they were settled in Norway, both of them holding full-time jobs, and that they were in contact with the Norwegian Social Council. They insisted that they had fully cooperated with the Swedish Social Council and had done all that had been required of them, including travelling to Linköping for meetings with the Social Council and allowing the Norwegian authorities to visit them at home. Moreover, they were actively involved in an ADHD association and were attending courses to understand the condition better and be able to help A. With assistance from the Norwegian authorities and the school, they could take care of A and meet all of his needs. The applicants further questioned whether the Social Council really had a clear plan for how, in due time, to reunite them with their children and contested the Council’s view that they opposed the plan for visits with the children. In fact, the first applicant’s visit with the children had gone very well and the children had also reacted positively to photographs and letters from their parents. Taking into consideration the children’s very young age, they emphasised the importance of not waiting too long before starting the reunion process, and including more frequent visits, in order to avoid a sudden removal from the foster homes which could cause the children emotional harm. Furthermore, the applicants categorically denied that any violence had occurred in their home and they alleged that if any of the children showed signs of trauma, it was most likely due to the traumatic separation from their parents. They submitted, inter alia, medical and other certificates to substantiate their good psychological health. 28. The Social Council contested the appeal. It confirmed that the applicants had cooperated with the authorities and had come to planned meetings with the Council. It attached much importance to the fact that this cooperation needed to continue over time. However, it maintained its view that the applicants opposed the visiting plan since they had requested that the public care of their children be lifted and the children be returned home and since they opposed further care under the provisions of the Social Services Act. Although both of the applicants had demonstrated improvements in their capacity to assess the children’s needs, they still lacked basic understanding of how to care properly for their children. The Council stressed that A had been taken into care due to lack of care at home, not because he had been diagnosed with ADHD. Moreover, A repeatedly spoke about how he had been beaten by the second applicant and he had had to be reassured before the meeting with the first applicant that he would return to the foster home after the meeting. Thus, the decision on public care was partly based on the need to protect him, as well as B and C. The Council further observed that, as concerned B, a psychologist had stated that there were reasons to believe that she had been neglected or traumatised at a preverbal stage of her life and that, consequently, her problems were not linked to being taken into care. Lastly, turning to C, it was asserted that she needed to be protected from neglect in order to develop positively and have her needs met. The Council repeated that there had been concern for the children for a long time and that its findings were based on an overall evaluation of the children’s situation and their parents’ ability to care for them. It submitted various investigation and evaluation reports about the children which it had used as a basis for its decision to keep them in public care. 29. The children’s legal representative supported the Social Council’s stance. 30. On 20 January 2011, after having held an oral hearing, the Administrative Court rejected the applicants’ appeal and upheld the public care order. It first noted that the applicants demonstrated great affection for their children and wanted them to be well and that they were engaged in activities and receiving assistance to understand the problems. The visit between the first applicant and her children had gone well. However, the court observed that the applicants still denied that they had failed in the care of their children and it found that they continued to lack understanding of the children’s problems and their own ability to meet the children’s special needs. Thus, it found no basis for lifting the care order. Moreover, since the applicants had not agreed to the care plan developed for each child, which included their living in a foster home over a longer period of time, there was no basis for voluntary care. 31. The applicants appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal, maintaining their claims and adding that they had never tried to intervene in the public care of their children but fully cooperated with the authorities in every way possible. They had fully understood that reunion with their children would have to be a gradual process, but it was important that their parent-child links did not disappear. In their view, there was no evidence of any risk that they would flee abroad with their children. Moreover, they considered that the Social Council had based its assessment on old investigations which were no longer relevant. They also questioned for how long the public care would continue, since that might jeopardise the connection between them and their children. They submitted, inter alia, medical certificates and a written observation dated 12 October 2009 and issued by an associate professor concerning the investigations carried out by the Social Council. 32. Both the Social Council and the children’s legal representative contested the appeal. They stressed that all three children had developed positively but that they were still in need of a stable environment. They were undergoing treatment at the BUP due to their special needs. The commitment shown by the applicants was positive for the future, but the deficiencies in care which had been evident when the children were taken into public care still existed. 33. On 15 April 2011, after holding an oral hearing, the Administrative Court of Appeal upheld the lower court’s judgment in full. It first found that the material in the case indicated that the children still had special needs but that they had developed well since being taken into public care. The court further considered that, although the applicants had participated in activities and improved their understanding of A’s special needs relating to his ADHD, they still lacked a more profound understanding of their daughters’ special needs and of their own shortcomings in caring properly for their children. Thus, it concluded that the applicants were not currently in a position to meet their children’s special needs and provide the care they required, for which reason the children had to remain in the foster homes. Since the applicants opposed such care, it was necessary to maintain the public care. 34. Upon further appeal by the applicants, the Supreme Administrative Court refused leave to appeal on 15 June 2011. 35. On 25 May 2009, when the Social Council decided to take A, B and C into immediate public care, it also decided to keep secret the address of the children’s foster homes and not to grant the applicants contact rights to visit their children. These decisions were confirmed on 10 June 2009 by the Administrative Court. Upon appeal by the applicants, the Administrative Court of Appeal decided, on 6 August 2009, to strike the case out of its list of cases (see paragraph 15 above). 36. On 26 August 2009, the Social Council decided to continue to keep secret the address of the children’s foster homes and to limit the applicants’ contact rights by not allowing any visits. The applicants appealed to the Administrative Court, which quashed the Social Council’s decision and, as concerned the contact rights, referred the case back. Consequently, on 16 October 2009, the Social Council issued a new decision denying the applicants any contact rights. In accordance with Section 14, paragraph 3, of the 1990 Act, this decision was reassessed by the Social Council on 23 November 2009 but it found no reason to change the previous decision since it considered that there was still a risk that the applicants would intervene in the care of the children if granted contact rights. 37. The applicants appealed against the decision, demanding that it be reversed. They also requested that at least the first applicant be allowed to visit the children. The applicants pointed to the fact that the children had said that they missed them and they stressed that all allegations concerning any sort of abuse were groundless. They denied that they had previously tried to evade the social authorities and emphasised that, even if the authorities believed that there was such a risk, this should not prevent them from being granted contact rights in the presence of representatives of the Social Council. They were also willing to hand over their passports to the authorities. 38. The Social Council contested the appeal. It stated that there were strong reasons to believe that the applicants would intervene in the care of the children and stressed that it was necessary to decide on total restrictions in order to keep the children’s residences secret. If the children’s location was revealed, they would have to be moved to new foster homes. It submitted a document issued by the director of the treatment centre where A had been observed which, among other things, stated that A had said that he missed his mother but had also expressed a wish to be like other children and live in a family where he could feel safe. To the staff at the treatment centre, he had described occasions when he had felt unsafe, such as when he and his siblings had lived alone with the first applicant and when he had been beaten by the second applicant. Since A had been placed at the treatment centre, he had developed and his ability to follow routines had greatly improved. It was of utmost importance that this positive development continue. If A were to meet the applicants, the negative consequences would significantly outweigh the positive. A would suffer from a conflict of loyalty which would seriously impede his positive development. 39. On 10 December 2009, after holding an oral hearing, the Administrative Court upheld the Social Council’s decision. It noted that the applicants had been prohibited from visiting their children for six months and stressed that such extensive restrictions required exceptionally strong grounds. In the court’s view, the applicants were not willing to cooperate with the authorities and had repeatedly demonstrated a tendency to evade the Social Council’s investigations into their family situation. It further noted that all of the children were in need of special care and stability in order for their development to progress positively. On the basis of the investigation the court found that if the applicants were granted contact rights to visit the children, there was a real risk that the second applicant, in particular, would intervene in the public care of the children. Moreover, the court considered that since there was a risk that the children’s residence addresses would be disclosed even if the first applicant were to visit the children alone, she could not be allowed any contact rights alone either. In reaching this conclusion, the court had regard to the best interests of the children and Article 8 of the Convention. 40. The applicants appealed against the judgment to the Administrative Court of Appeal, maintaining their claims. They stressed that the allegation of violence at home was completely unsubstantiated and that the Social Council’s investigation was insufficient and could not form the basis for the complete prohibition of any contact between them and their children. All three children had said that they missed their parents, in particular their mother, for which reason a supervised visit of the first applicant with her children should be authorised. They had not seen their children for ten months and not even been allowed to talk to them on the telephone or write to them. Moreover, they were ready to hand in their passports and meet the children in a neutral location to eliminate any concerns that the authorities had about them “fleeing” with their children. In the applicants’ view, the prohibition on seeing their children violated Article 8 of the Convention. 41. The Social Council maintained that its decision was justified under the Convention and should be upheld. It was true that A and B had expressed the wish to meet their parents. C had not done so, but this was probably because of her late language development. Still, due to the risk that the applicants might escape with the children or obstruct their current care, and since the children had extensive care needs into which the applicants lacked insight, there was a need to prohibit contact rights. Moreover, currently there was no dialogue between the Social Council and the applicants and this would have to be re-established before contact rights could be granted. 42. On 8 April 2010, after holding an oral hearing, the Administrative Court of Appeal rejected the appeal. It first noted that, despite the applicants’ submissions, it did not appear that the second applicant had altered his negative attitude towards the Social Council and was prepared to cooperate. The appellate court further observed that Article 8 of the Convention did not contain a general prohibition on complete contact restrictions. Still, it shared the applicants’ concern that the complete contact restriction could harm the children and noted that the Social Council had a great responsibility to ensure that the children’s need for contact with their parents was met. However, for this to be possible, the parents had to cooperate. Moreover, the court had to evaluate whether the combined risks that contact rights would entail for the children’s health and development outweighed the corresponding risks if there were no contact. In the present case, the court considered that the only way to find suitable solutions to avoid the risks involved in contact rights between the applicants and the children was for the Social Council to plan the visits carefully together with the applicants and for the applicants to be willing to receive the help and support that they needed. As long as these conditions were not fulfilled, it would not be possible to arrange the contact. Furthermore, the appellate court had carefully considered the possibility of granting only the first applicant contact rights with the children. However, in view of its findings, and the first applicant’s passive attitude, it did not consider this a viable option. Thus, a complete prohibition on contact remained the sole solution in the current situation. 43. Upon further appeal, the Supreme Administrative Court refused leave to appeal on 4 June 2010. 44. On 22 September 2010 the Social Council decided that the first applicant should be allowed to meet the children on one occasion during the autumn of 2010 while the second applicant should not be allowed to meet them. Following an appeal by the applicants, the Administrative Court and the Administrative Court of Appeal upheld the decision in judgments delivered on 20 January 2011 and 15 May 2011 respectively. On 15 June 2011, the Supreme Administrative Court refused leave to appeal. 45. On 22 December 2010 the Social Council decided that the first applicant should be allowed contact rights with the children on two occasions between January and June 2011 and that, during the same period, the second applicant should be allowed to meet the children on one occasion. 46. On 29 June 2011 the Social Council decided that the applicants should be allowed contact rights with their children according to a contact plan. The plan specified that the applicants should meet with their children once every third month, for two hours each time, in a place decided by the Social Council and where staff from the Social Council would be present, as well as a counsellor and interpreter (to translate if the second applicant spoke Persian with the children). Moreover, telephone contact was allowed twice a year, for no more than 20 minutes, in a controlled setting. 47. The applicants appealed against the decision to the Administrative Court, requesting that the contact restrictions be lifted. They stressed that their meetings with their children had gone very well and that they had followed carefully all of the Social Council’s instructions. The children had been happy to see them and hugged them. The fact that they had later had a reaction in their foster home was normal since the meetings had been short and had taken place in an unnatural environment. Moreover, the children had been given negative information about their parents which had affected them and they probably felt a conflict of loyalty between their parents and their foster home. The applicants questioned how a reunion of the family would be possible if they were only allowed to meet their children so rarely and for a short time. They also repeated that they had never escaped with their children to Iran but that they had travelled there once every year to visit relatives. In fact, they had never tried to intervene or obstruct the public care of their children. Instead, they had cooperated and done all they had been asked to do. Both applicants had sessions with psychologists and the second applicant attended a programme called “alternatives to violence”. In this respect, he underlined that he had never been aggressive or violent toward his children. 48. The Social Council maintained its decision. It noted that reunion could only take place once the children’s need for care had ceased. So far the meetings between the parents and children had gone well. B and C had had no negative reactions to the last meeting with the applicants but A had had nightmares. The next meeting would take place in an apartment, to give a more natural environment. The children would also meet with their older half-brother. Moreover, the children saw each other on a regular basis, at least every third week, to play and be together. The Social Council also submitted reports of its investigations into the children’s current situation and development. 49. On 27 September 2011, after an oral hearing, the Administrative Court rejected the appeal. It noted from the outset that only contact restrictions which were necessary for the purpose of the care order were allowed, and that the best interests of the children should be paramount when making this evaluation. The court then observed that all three children were receiving extra help and assistance to develop and function in their social settings. They were developing well in their foster homes. It further noted that the applicants’ meetings with their children had gone well and that their contact rights had been extended. However, in the court’s view, the applicants had accepted various measures because the Social Council had told them to do so, not because they felt that they were necessary. Thus, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the court found that the contact restrictions decided by the Social Council were necessary for the time being. It noted that the Council regularly had to re-evaluate the need for contact restrictions, which opened the way for fewer restrictions in time to come. 50. The applicants appealed against the judgment to the Administrative Court of Appeal and requested that their contact restrictions be eased to allow them to meet their children once every other month. They maintained their submissions as presented before the lower court. Moreover, the second applicant stated that he had realised during his therapy sessions that he had been “hard” towards the first applicant, which he realised must have affected the children negatively. However, he maintained that he had never been violent towards his children. 51. The Social Council opposed any changes to the contact restrictions. In its view, the current restrictions were necessary to ensure the children’s continued positive development. It acknowledged that the last two meetings between the applicants and their children had gone well, but stated that the telephone conversation had not been satisfactory since the second applicant had asked questions to try to find out where the children were living and A had felt pressured and sad afterwards. 52. On 20 March 2012 the Administrative Court of Appeal granted the appeal and ordered that the applicants should have contact rights with their children once every other month. In all other parts the contact plan was maintained. The court noted that the second applicant had begun to have better insight into his behaviour and could acknowledge that the way he had sometimes treated his wife could be considered as violence. This was a first step in a process of change with the goal of the children returning home. A part of this process was the contact between the parents and their children. The appellate court found that contact restrictions had been necessary in the instant case but considered that, having regard to the current situation, it should be possible to extend the contact rights as requested by the applicants. 53. Neither the applicants nor the Social Council appealed against this judgment to the Supreme Administrative Court. 54. The decisions to keep the children in public care and to limit the applicants’ contact rights have continued to be reconsidered on a regular basis as stipulated by domestic law (see the part on relevant domestic law, paragraph 68 below). Most of these decisions have not been submitted to the Court, but it appears from the parties’ submissions that, on 27 March 2013, the Social Council decided to keep the children in public care and rejected a request by the applicants to extend their contact rights. The Administrative Court rejected the applicants’ appeals against these decisions. 55. However, on 4 September 2013, the Social Council granted the applicants extended contact rights, allowing them to meet with the children for three hours every two months and to have telephone contact with them twice a year. 56. The applicants appealed against the decision to the Administrative Court which, on 20 January 2014, increased the applicants’ contact rights by one hour, that is to four hours in total, every other month. It considered that this was in the best interests of the children. 57. Upon further appeal by the applicants, the Administrative Court of Appeal upheld the lower court’s judgment on 23 April 2014. 58. On 10 December 2014 the Social Council decided to maintain the public care order and not to alter the contact rights. 59. The applicants appealed to the Administrative Court, demanding that the public care order be lifted or, at least, that they be granted increased contact rights. 60. The children’s legal representative supported the Social Council’s decisions as she considered that it was in the best interests of the children. They had expressed the wish to stay in their foster homes and, while they said that the meetings with their parents went well, they did not wish them to be increased. 61. On 24 February 2015, after having held an oral hearing, the court rejected the appeal. It noted that the second applicant had continued to show aggressive behaviour towards social workers and that he had been convicted, inter alia, of making unlawful threats (14 counts), threatening a public official (15 counts), slander and abusive conduct against a public official (5 counts) and sentenced to one year and six months in prison. Moreover, the first applicant had been unable to take an active part and be available to her children during their meetings. The applicants had also intervened in the public care of their children, in breach of the contact restrictions. They had, for example, waited outside B and C’s school and followed them to their foster homes, and they had also gone to A’s foster home, making the children afraid and anxious. They had also sent letters and cards directly to the foster homes, despite an agreement that such items should be sent via the social authorities, in order to avoid upsetting the children. The court found that there was therefore no possibility to terminate the public care or transform it into voluntary care. Furthermore, all the children wanted to stay in their foster homes and the current level of visits was working well for the children. Thus, there were no reasons, according to the court, to depart from the well-functioning scale of contact, which was also in line with the will of the children. 62. The applicants appealed against the judgment to the Administrative Court of Appeal. On 22 April 2015, after having held an oral hearing, the appellate court upheld the lower court’s judgment in so far as it concerned the continuation of the public care. It considered that the applicants still lacked insight into their inability to care of their children, which had led to the public care at the outset, since they continued to blame the social authorities. However, the court extended the contact rights to six hours every other month. It noted that there was nothing to indicate that the scale of contact could not be moderately extended without negatively affecting the children’s care. It was important for the well-being of the children that the time spent with their parents provided rewarding moments and had potential to develop their relationship. They should therefore be given enough time during each meeting to share activities and be together. 63. The Court has not been informed of further developments in the case at the domestic level.

5. The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Ercsi. 6. On 28 February 2007 the applicant filed an action with the Székesfehérvár Labour Court against his former employer, claiming unlawful dismissal. On 6 June 2008 the court found in his favour and obliged the respondent to the action to pay him a severance payment, outstanding wages, a lump sum in compensation, and default interest. 7. On appeal, on 25 February 2009 the Fejér County Regional Court changed the judgment in part. In June 2009 the respondent filed a petition for review. 8. In an order of 2 June 2010 the Supreme Court forwarded the respondent’s petition to the applicant and informed him that, within eight days of receiving the order, he could file comments on the respondent’s petition and/or request an oral hearing. 9. On 7 June 2010 the applicant received the order, and on 14 June 2010 he dispatched his comments on the petition for review. The document was received by the Supreme Court on 17 June 2010. 10. Meanwhile, on 16 June 2010 the Supreme Court, sitting as a review court, had given a judgment in which it had reversed the previous decisions and dismissed the applicant’s action. The court stated that the applicant had not filed any comments on the petition for review. 11. The applicant complained and addressed his complaint of 6 December 2010 to the President of the Supreme Court. The Head of the Civil Division informed him that his comments on the petition for review had been belated.

5. The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Sestaci. 6. The applicant is a journalist who, at the time of the events, was employed as Head of the Press Department of the Prosecutor General’s Office. In January 2003 he sent to a newspaper two letters containing information about pressure put on the Prosecutor General’s Office by a high-ranking politician. In one of the letters, the Vice-President of Parliament expressed discontent that several police officers were being criminally prosecuted for allegedly ill-treating and unlawfully detaining suspects. In another letter it was stated that one of those police officers had previously been convicted of similar offences, but had been exempted from serving a sentence and had soon been re-employed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Subsequently, the newspaper published an article on the basis of the letters. The applicant was then dismissed by the Prosecutor General for having violated the internal regulations of the Press Department. In proceedings for his reinstatement brought against the Prosecutor General’s Office, he argued before the domestic courts that the disclosure of the letters had been in good faith and had pursued the aim of “fighting corruption and trading in influence”. He argued that, in any event, the letters could not be classified as secret under domestic law. The domestic courts found in favour of the applicant’s employer, on the grounds that the applicant had breached his duty of confidentiality by disclosing the letters, and that he had failed to consult other heads of departments before disclosing the letters to the newspaper. 7. On 30 March 2004 the applicant lodged an application with the Court. 8. In a judgment of 12 February 2008 the Grand Chamber of the Court held that the applicant’s dismissal from his employment had infringed his right to freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention (see Guja v. Moldova [GC], no. 14277/04, ECHR 2008). 9. The Court found that, for the purposes of Article 10 § 2, the measure taken against the applicant had constituted an interference with his right to freedom of expression, had been “prescribed by law”, and had pursued a legitimate aim. 10. As to whether the measure had been “necessary in a democratic society” within the meaning of that provision, the Court noted firstly that the applicant had not had alternative channels for disclosing the letters, and that, in the circumstances of the case, external reporting, even to a newspaper, could be justified. Against that background, it also found that the information disclosed by the applicant was of major public interest, because it concerned such issues as the separation of powers, improper conduct by a high-ranking politician, and the government’s attitude towards police brutality. Balancing the different issues involved, the Court also took into consideration the detriment caused to the Prosecutor General’s Office by the disclosure. In doing so, the Court came to the conclusion that the public interest in having information about undue pressure and wrongdoing within the Prosecutor General’s Office revealed was so important in a democratic society that it outweighed the interest in maintaining public confidence in the Prosecutor General’s Office. Lastly, the Court noted that the applicant had acted in good faith and that the most severe sanction possible had been imposed on him. In view of all the considerations, the Court came to the conclusion that the interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression, in particular his right to impart information, had not been “necessary in a democratic society”, and that there had been a breach of Article 10 of the Convention. 11. As to the application of Article 41, the Court ordered Moldova to pay the sum of 10,000 euros (EUR) for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, and EUR 8,413 for costs and expenses. 12. After the Court had delivered the above judgment, the applicant applied to the domestic courts to have the domestic judgments confirming his dismissal set aside. He was successful, and on 28 May 2008 the Supreme Court of Justice ordered his reinstatement. On the same day the applicant lodged an application for reinstatement with the Prosecutor General’s Office. 13. According to the applicant, on 29 May 2008 he had a meeting with the Prosecutor General, who asked him to resign from his position. As the applicant refused, the Prosecutor General told him that “he had enough wits to force him to do that”. He was told to go home and wait for his employment order. The Government disputed the above submissions. 14. On 5 June 2008 the Prosecutor General issued an order reinstating the applicant as Head of the Press Department and ordering that his salary arrears be paid. On the same date the Prosecutor General wrote to the head of the trade unions of the Prosecutor General’s Office, seeking the trade unions’ approval of the applicant’s dismissal from his employment on the basis of section 14(8) of the Public Service Act (see paragraph 23 below). In accordance with the labour legislation in force, the trade unions’ approval was a necessary step in dismissing the applicant, and it was obtained the next day. 15. On 6 June 2008 the applicant was invited to the Prosecutor General’s Office and presented with the employment order. According to the applicant, he was, however, not allocated an office and not given a badge to access the building. Each morning he had to wait outside the building until one of his superiors allowed him to enter. Since he had no office, he stayed in the library or in the press office. However, when other employees from the press office had to leave the office, he was locked outside it with the explanation that his superiors had not allowed him access to sensitive information. The applicant was not given any tasks. The Government also disputed the above submissions. 16. On 16 June 2008 the applicant was presented with a dismissal order, effective as of 10 June 2008. The dismissal was based on section 14(8) of the Public Service Act. The reason for the applicant’s dismissal was the appointment of a new Prosecutor General in 2007. According to the order, the trade unions had consented to his dismissal on 6 June 2008. 17. On 10 July 2008 the applicant contested the order of 16 June 2008 before the Chisinau Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) and sought reinstatement. He presented details about his meeting with the Prosecutor General of 29 May 2008 and about his discussion with him (see paragraph 13 above). He also stated that since his re-employment on 6 June 2008 he had not received a badge to access the building, had not been given an office, and had not been given any tasks. Moreover, on the very day of his reinstatement, the Prosecutor General had obtained the trade unions’ approval of his dismissal. He argued, inter alia, that since 2003 the Prosecutor General had changed twice, and that he was the first person to be dismissed on the basis of section 14(8) of the Public Service Act. The applicant also argued that that section was not applicable in the circumstances of the case, since the position of Head of the Press Department of the Prosecutor General’s Office was not part of the cabinet of the Prosecutor General. He expressed the view that his dismissal constituted a failure on the part of the State to abide by the Court’s judgment of 12 February 2008. 18. The Prosecutor General’s Office did not contest the applicant’s allegations about the Prosecutor General’s discussion with him and about the treatment to which he had been subjected during his employment. It only submitted that labour-law provisions had been respected at the time the applicant had been dismissed. 19. On 17 December 2008 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s action and ruled that his dismissal had been in accordance with the law. In particular, the court found that since the new Prosecutor General had been appointed in 2007, he had the power to terminate the applicant’s employment on the basis of section 14(8) of the Public Service Act. The Court of Appeal considered that the Court’s judgment of 12 February 2008 had been implemented once the domestic courts had revised the judgments confirming his dismissal in 2003. The Court of Appeal did not give any consideration to the applicant’s arguments concerning his discussion with the Prosecutor General and/or his experience during the time of his employment. 20. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court of Justice in which he submitted, inter alia, that the Prosecutor General’s Office had failed to prove wrong his contentions about its failure to issue him with a badge or an office and to give him tasks. After making reference to the Court’s judgment of 12 February 2008, the applicant claimed that his reinstatement had been simulated, referring to it as “the so‑called reinstatement”. He also contended that his dismissal had not been the result of an ordinary labour dispute, and that in fact the Prosecutor General’s Office had acted in bad faith with a view to getting rid of an inconvenient employee (salariat incomod). However, the appeal on points of law was dismissed on 29 April 2009. Like the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court did not make any assessment of the applicant’s allegations about his discussion with the Prosecutor General and the treatment to which he had been subjected during his ten days of employment. The Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s argument about the State’s failure to execute the Court’s judgment of 12 February 2008 by finding that that judgment had been enforced once the domestic judgments had been reviewed and the applicant had been reinstated in his previous position. 21. The applicant informed the Department for the Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights about the developments described above, and alleged that his being dismissed once again and the outcome of the new reinstatement proceedings amounted to a failure by the State to comply with the Court’s judgment of 12 February 2008. In an action report of 2 December 2016 (see DH-DD(2016)1446) the Government informed the Committee of Ministers about the general and individual measures taken in the course of implementing the Court’s judgment of 12 February 2008, and expressed the view that that judgment had been enforced once the Supreme Court had reviewed and quashed its own judgment of 26 November 2003. They asked the Committee of Ministers to terminate the execution procedure in respect of that case. 22. At the time of issuing the present judgment, the procedure for supervising the execution of the judgment of 12 February 2008 is still ongoing before the Committee of Ministers.

6. The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in San Marino. 7. The applicant owned the entire share capital (and at the material time was also the director) of S.M.I., a fiduciary company operating in San Marino. Company S.M.I. is currently in compulsory liquidation. 8. On an unspecified date an individual, B., conferred a mandate to Z. for the latter to open a fiduciary account (conto fiduciario) with company S.M.I. in his own name but on behalf of the former. Thus, on 2 March 1988 Z. signed a fiduciary management mandate (mandato di amministrazione fiduciaria) with company S.M.I. on behalf of B. 9. As part of the mandate, company S.M.I. opened fiduciary account no. 381‑AF07701 in order to carry out some financial operations concerning securities listed on the Italian Stock Exchange. 10. By a contract of 20 March 1990, signed in the context of the above‑mentioned fiduciary mandate (on behalf of B.), company S.M.I. and another company, K., purchased from company P.A. some shares of its subsidiary company, A.N. As part of the price for these shares, companies S.M.I. and K: (i) waived a previous debt owed to them by an owner of company P.A., and (ii) undertook to reimburse a debt of 11,000,000,000 Italian liras (LIT) that company P.A. owed an Italian bank, S. (in particular, company S.M.I. undertook to reimburse LIT 9,900,000,000 and company K. LIT 1,100,000,000). 11. Eventually B. complained that company S.M.I. had not returned to him part of the proceeds (LIT 9,035,264,332) obtained from the purchase (see paragraph 10 above) and subsequent sale, a few months later, of the shares of company A.N. Nor had company S.M.I. recorded that sum in the statement related to the fiduciary account. B. had become aware of the breach of contract during previous criminal proceedings (ongoing for other reasons, in Milan) in which company S.M.I. had submitted statements concerning the above-mentioned fiduciary account. 12. On 4 October 2001 B. filed a civil complaint against Z. and company S.M.I., represented by its legal representative and director (the applicant), in order to obtain from them, in solidum, the payment of LIT 9,035,264,332. 13. By an interlocutory judgment of 4 June 2007 the first‑instance judge (Commissario della Legge) found that not all the financial operations carried out by company S.M.I. on behalf of B. in execution of the fiduciary mandate had been correctly recorded in the financial statement. The judge applied the rules governing contracts of mandate as established by the domestic case‑law and practice, relying, in particular, on the duty of the agent (mandatario  in this case, company S.M.I.) to give evidence of the operations carried out in execution of a mandate in order to demonstrate that it had fulfilled its reporting obligation (obbligo di rendiconto). According to the judge, the only evidence that company S.M.I. had submitted for that purpose had been the above‑mentioned financial statement. However, B. had demonstrated that the statement was incomplete and therefore unreliable. Thus, company S.M.I. had failed to discharge its burden of proof to show that it had returned to B. the sums obtained from the transfer of company A.N.’s shares. 14. Given the unreliability of the statement, the judge, applying the domestic practice concerning the assessment of documentary evidence, took into consideration only the parts of the statement which constituted evidence against the party which had drafted the document, that is to say, only the credit entries (the sums of money company S.M.I. admitted to having been received by B.) but not the debit entries reported therein (indicating what sums S.M.I. had claimed to have used in execution of the fiduciary mandate). Thus, the judge considered all the credit entries (amounting to LIT 34,962,635,382) and deducted from them the sums which B. acknowledged having received and those which company S.M.I had used on his instructions (amounting to LIT 25,927,371,050) as also admitted by him. This left an outstanding debt of LIT 9,035,264,332 (approximately 4,662,778.93 euros (EUR)) which company S.M.I. owed B. 15. However, according to the judge, this was the result of presumptions being made, and B. had not entirely discharged the relevant burden of proof. Thus, to compensate for the partial lack of evidence and allow B. to entirely discharge his burden of proof, the judge in the same aforementioned interlocutory judgment summoned B. so that he could take a “supplementary oath” (giuramento suppletorio – an oath of a party on his or her own behalf as confirmation of otherwise inadmissible or inconclusive evidence – for more details, see Relevant domestic law, paragraph 68 below). The wording of the “supplementary oath”, as set by the judge, was as follows: “I swear and declare that I did not authorise any other withdrawals [of money] as reported in financial statement no. 381-AF0770l apart from the ones that I have acknowledged and that [were] indicated in my counsel’s submission of 24 April 2003. Thus, company S.M.I. must return to me LIT 9,028,398,950.” 16. Consequently, the proceedings continued solely for the purposes of the taking of the “supplementary oath”. 17. In the same interlocutory judgment the judge also found that Z. had been a mere agent of B. and removed him from the case. 18. On 30 June 2008, B. took the above-mentioned “supplementary oath” as set out by the judge. 19. No first‑instance judgment on the merits was ever issued. 20. On 12 December 2008 company S.M.I. appealed against the interlocutory judgment of 4 June 2007. B. cross-appealed and requested, inter alia, that the interlocutory judgment of 4 June 2007 be declared final and that company S.M.I.’s requests be rejected. 21. By a judgment of 9 June 2011, filed with the registry on 30 June 2011, and served on the applicant on 20 July 2011, the Judge of Administrative Appeals, in his capacity as Judge of Civil Appeals (Giudice Amministrativo d’Appello in veste di Giudice delle Appellazioni Civili), dismissed the appeal. The judge confirmed that company S.M.I. had a remaining debt to B. of LIT 9,028,398,950 (EUR 4,662,778.93), and ordered it to pay him that sum of money together with default interest and currency revaluation. 22. The judge specified that the judgment (against which S.M.I. had lodged this appeal) had to be considered a “partial interlocutory judgment” (interlocutoria mista) falling into the category of judgments which examined the merits in part [and thus could be appealed against, as opposed to a “mere interlocutory judgment” (interlocutoria mera) which did not examine the merits and therefore could not be appealed against]. It could not be regarded as a “mere interlocutory judgment” since the first‑instance judge, finding that B. had partially proven his statements, had partly examined the case on the merits. Thus, the judgment had become final after B. had taken the “supplementary oath”, and was amenable to appeal. 23. On 6 July 2011 company S.M.I. attempted to further appeal against the judgment of 30 June 2011, before the Third‑Instance Judge (Terza Istanza). By a judgment of 6 April 2012 the complaint was declared inadmissible on the grounds that the only role of a Third‑Instance Judge was to decide which one of two non‑concordant judgments had to be upheld. That prerequisite did not exist in the case at hand, since both the first and second-instance judgments had been concordant on the merits. 24. On an unspecified date the applicant (in his own name) filed a criminal complaint against B. under Article 359 of the Criminal Code, accusing him of swearing a false oath. He claimed that, by the statements made under oath on 30 June 2008, B. had committed perjury. A criminal investigation was subsequently initiated. 25. In turn B. filed a complaint against the applicant, accusing him of slander. The investigating judge (Commissario della Legge Inquirente) joined the two investigations. 26. By a decision of 11 May 2015 the investigating judge closed the proceedings since in his opinion there was no evidence that B. had committed perjury. The judge considered that since the expert’s report showed that it was not possible to conclude who had made the payment to bank S., there was no evidence to show the non‑existence of the debt to B. and consequently the falsity of the statements which he had made under oath. 27. On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a complaint with the Judge of Criminal Appeals requesting that the investigation be reopened. 28. By a decision of 31 July 2015, Judge L.F., a Judge of Civil Appeals in his capacity as Judge of Criminal Appeals (Giudice delle Appellazioni Civili in veste di Giudice delle Appellazioni Penali) dismissed the complaint and upheld the decision to close the case. In the opinion of the judge it was implausible that a reopening of the investigation could lead to the discovery of new documents able to demonstrate the origin of the funds used to pay off the debt to bank S. The expert had already analysed all the documents available, which had been found not only in the headquarters of company S.M.I., but also in the archives of the court in Milan (where other proceedings were ongoing). He had not found any records of such a payment. Moreover, the payment dated back to 1990. Furthermore, the dispute at hand had arisen because company S.M.I. and B. had decided, by mutual consent and on purpose, not to record all the operations carried out in execution of the fiduciary mandate. 29. Meanwhile, on 30 October 2014 the applicant (in his own name) had lodged an application with the first-instance civil judge to have civil proceedings no. 300/2001 reopened (istanza di riassunzione del giudizio). 30. Within that application, the applicant submitted a “jactitation suit” (azione di iattanza /di accertamento negativo) (see paragraph 42 and 74 below), requesting the judge to declare that the supplementary oath sworn by B. had been false. The applicant argued that after the taking of the “supplementary oath” new evidence had come into his possession. According to him, B. had not provided company S.M.I. with the necessary funds to carry out the purchase of company A.N.’s shares. Thus, the statement that B. had not authorised any other money withdrawals (except for the ones he had expressly acknowledged) had been false since he had at least authorised company S.M.I. to pay off the debt of LIT 9,900,000,000 owed to bank S., in execution of the obligations arising from the contract for the purchase of company A.N.’s shares. That debt had been paid off by company S.M.I. with the proceeds deriving from the sale of the shares of company A.N., since no other funds had been provided by B. for that purpose, and therefore the sum of LIT 9,900,000,000 had to be subtracted from the amount of the alleged debt claimed by B. 31. By a decision of 12 November 2014 the Chief Justice (Magistrato Dirigente), relying on the domestic law on the competence of the courts (see paragraph 61 below), referred the case to the Court for Trusts and Fiduciary Relationships (Corte per il Trusts ed i Rapporti Fiduciari ‑ hereinafter “the Court for Trusts”). The latter had been instituted by Constitutional Law no. 1 of 26 January 2012 and had competence to hear all cases concerning trusts and fiduciary relationships (see paragraph 56 below). 32. Thus, proceedings no. 2/2014 were instituted before the Court for Trusts. 33. By a decision of 3 December 2014, pursuant to the relevant law (see paragraph 57 below), the President of the Court for Trusts (hereinafter “the President”) referred the case to a panel composed of two judges (Judge G. and the President himself). By the same decision, the President calculated the amount of legal fees. To this end, he relied on the “Rules on Court Fees and Judicial Remunerations”, which he had issued himself the day before (2 December 2014). He considered that the claim had an “undetermined value”, however, the applicant had requested to establish the non‑existence of a debt of EUR 4,662,778.93. Therefore, on the basis of the latter value and the applicable rules, the President calculated the amount of court fees as being EUR 6,000 and the variable part of the judge’s remuneration (la parte variabile del compenso spettante al giudice) as being EUR 23,000 (EUR 20,000 – in accordance with the relevant table – increased by 15%, given that the case had been referred to two judges) as well as EUR 500 in reimbursement of judicial expenses. The President ordered the applicant to pay (i) the court fees in toto and (ii) half of the required payments (for a total amount of EUR 17,750) at least seven days before the date of the first hearing, failing which the claim would be barred (see paragraph 57 below). 34. Although he was regularly notified of the reopening of the proceedings, B. did not respond. 35. In the course of the proceedings, the court ordered some expert reports to be drawn up. The final liquidation balance sheet of company P.A. was also added to the case file, amongst other things. The applicant submitted a consultant’s report aimed at showing that company S.M.I.’s debt to B. did not exist. That report was also added to the case file. 36. At a hearing of 26 May 2015 the court questioned the applicant and heard Z. (a witness called by the applicant). 37. On 10 June 2015 the applicant filed written submissions as requested by the court. 38. On 30 June 2015 the court, having considered the applicant’s submissions incomplete, heard the applicant again. 39. On 14 July 2015 the applicant submitted further written submissions. 40. By a judgment filed with the registry on 18 September 2015 the court partly acceded to the applicant’s complaint. 41. The court considered that the applicant had an interest in bringing proceedings, given the position which he had held in company S.M.I. (see paragraph 7 above). Notwithstanding the fact that the applicant, in his own name, had not been a party in the “original” civil proceedings (brought by B. against company S.M.I.) the outcome of those proceedings (the fact that company S.M.I. had been ordered to pay a substantial sum of money to B.) could have been detrimental to his personal property and reputation both because he would have been liable to pay the sums found to be due, but also because those sums would have been due as a result of his mismanagement. 42. The court accepted the applicant’s characterisation of the action lodged against B. as a “jactitation suit” aimed at establishing the falsity of the statements that B. had made under oath in the course of the civil proceedings. Addressing the applicant’s claim (that he had brought to the court’s attention new evidence which had come into his possession after the taking of the “supplementary oath”, or written evidence which he could not submit before, on the basis of which he had initiated the “jactitation suit”), the court found that the applicant had not submitted any such new evidence. Thus, according to the court, the applicant’s action should have been rejected on procedural grounds, without the merits of the case being dealt with. Nevertheless, in the court’s view, the fact that the parties of the case before it (the applicant and B., the latter in absentia) were different from the original parties in the “ordinary” civil proceedings (company S.M.I. and B.), allowed the court to consider the “jactitation suit” procedurally admissible, even in the absence of new evidence (that is to say, in the absence of the prerequisites for the admissibility of a “jactitation suit” as established by the domestic case-law, see paragraph 68 below). The court justified its decision not to follow the above-mentioned precedent on the basis that the final judgment in the “ordinary” civil proceedings had to be considered “res inter alios acta” (a thing involving and affecting different parties). 43. As to the merits, the court declared false only the first part of the “supplementary oath” (in which B. had declared that he had authorised only the operations he had explicitly acknowledged in the list submitted by his lawyer on 24 April 2003 and not the further money withdrawals which had been recorded in bank statement no. 381‑AF0770l – see paragraph 15 above). However, the court held that what he had said under the second part of the “supplementary oath” (relating to the final amount due) had been true. It dismissed the applicant’s request to reduce the amount of the debt and confirmed that company S.M.I. had to pay B. the same sum of money. 44. According to the court, the wording of the “supplementary oath” did not imply that the second part had to be seen as a consequence of the first part, despite the use of the word “thus” (per cui). It was therefore preferable to separate the two parts, since operations could have existed which may not have had any effect on the amount of the final balance. 45. In connection with the first part, the court noted that the authorisation of the mandator (in this case, B.) to use the proceeds obtained from a certain financial operation in order to pay off an obligation arising from the same operation (as had happened in the case at hand) had to be considered implicit in a contract of mandate. This was a “natural effect” of the contract. It followed that the first part of the “supplementary oath” (in which B. had stated that the only operations which had been authorised were those listed by B.’s legal representative) had not been exact and the applicant was thus right on that point and the first part of the “supplementary oath” had to be considered false. 46. In any case, having examined all the evidence, in the court’s view, the declaration of falsity of the first part of the statement made by B. under oath did not necessarily impact upon the quantification of the debt since (i) all the parties to the contract of 20 March 1990 had acted under the instructions of the same mastermind (B.), (ii) company P.A. (the seller of the shares of company A.N., from which company S.M.I. had taken over the debt owed to bank S. – see paragraph 10 above) belonged to company S.M.I., and (iii) bank S. had not even been notified of the taking over of the debt. Thus, there was no risk that company S.M.I. had to actually pay the debt. In addition, the applicant had not given evidence of any payments made by company S.M.I. enabling a reduction in the amount which it owed B. 47. By the same judgment the court also calculated the total amount of litigation fees to be EUR 29,500 (which included the estimate provided previously) and approved the fees requested by the lawyers (EUR 37,887). 48. On 2 October 2015, relying on section 11 (2) of Delegate Decree no. 128 of 30 September 2013 (see paragraph 57 below), the applicant (in his own name) applied to the President of the Court for Trusts for leave to appeal part of the judgment of 18 September 2015. 49. The applicant claimed, inter alia, that the splitting of the wording of the “supplementary oath” into two parts, and the finding of falsity of the first part and not the second, had been illogical and erroneous. According to the applicant, his “jactitation suit” had aimed at ascertaining the existence of actual damage arising from the falsity of the “supplementary oath” and such damage had arisen from the second part of the “supplementary oath” (the one in which B. had claimed the return of a quantified sum) and not the first part. Furthermore, the two parts of the “supplementary oath” had to be considered strictly connected. Thus, the finding that the first part of the “supplementary oath” had been false should have also automatically led to a declaration of falsity of the second part since between them a logical causal link (nesso logico di causalita) existed. In addition, the decision to split the “supplementary oath” into two parts had not been reasoned and, in the applicant’s view, he needed not bring any proof of the non‑existence of the debt, it being an automatic result of the falsity of the statement given on oath. 50. On 19 October 2015 the President dismissed the application for leave to appeal on the grounds that: (i) most of the applicant’s grounds of appeal concerned the merits of the case (which, under the relevant law, cannot constitute a ground of appeal against judgments of the Court for Trusts, see paragraph 57 below), (ii) in the first-instance proceedings before the Court for Trusts, the applicant had not given evidence of any payments made by company S.M.I. able to reduce the amount which it owed B. In this connection, the judge stated that the applicant did not seem to realise that the Court for Trusts had given fully detailed reasoning as to its decision to consider the second part of the “supplementary oath” as true, far more than had ever been done in the various phases of the proceedings before the [ordinary] courts. Thus, the court had correctly concluded that the second part of the “supplementary oath” had been true and that the amount of the debt had to remain the same. 51. The judge added that had he granted leave to appeal, it would have certainly been unsuccessful, which showed the quality of the applicant’s defence in the case at hand. Moreover, according to the judge, leave to appeal also had to be refused because the applicant had not set out any reasons as to why the court had been wrong in its reasoning justifying its decision to split the “supplementary oath” into two parts. 52. On 3 November 2015 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Judge of Civil Appeals concerning the refusal of leave to appeal, relying on Section 11 (3) of Delegate Decree no. 128 of 30 September 2013 (see paragraph 57 below). He essentially reiterated the same requests which he had already submitted earlier. 53. By a decision of 11 February 2016, Judge L.F., in his capacity as Judge of Civil Appeals, dismissed the complaint and upheld the decision not to grant leave to appeal. The decision was served on the applicant’s legal counsel by email on 16 February 2016. 54. In the opinion of the judge, the complaint did not contain any issues of law. In particular, whether it had been legitimate for the Court for Trusts to split the “supplementary oath” into two parts was not a point of law (that is to say concerning the interpretation or application of a law or legal principle) and actually concerned the interpretation of the wording of the “supplementary oath” by the Court for Trusts, which had to be considered a complaint on the merits. 55. The judge observed that, on the one hand, the court had considered that the first part of the “supplementary oath” had been false on the basis of the rules governing contracts of mandate and in the light of the evidence of the operations carried out by company S.M.I. On the other hand, the second part of the “supplementary oath” had been held to be true on the basis of the fact that no evidence had demonstrated that company S.M.I. had made any relevant payments in B.’s name (namely the reimbursement of the debt). Thus, the decision to split the “supplementary oath” into two parts had been a consequence of the court’s finding that the two parts were not logically connected.

5. The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in İzmir. 6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties and as they appear from the documents submitted by them, may be summarised as follows. 7. The applicant and his brother sell building materials. The applicant claimed that on 8 January 2007, while he and his brother were driving in their van to their place of work in İzmir, a number of plain-clothes police officers on two motorbikes indicated to him that he should pull over. The police officers then told him that he had been driving erratically and asked him to get out of the vehicle. The applicant and his brother had got out of the van and asked to see the police officers’ identity cards. The police officers then became agitated and started hitting the applicant’s brother. When the applicant asked them to stop, they sprayed him with tear gas and he fell to the ground. Then one of the police officers put his fingers in the applicant’s nostrils and pulled him up and the applicant tried to push that police officer away. The applicant then heard one of the police officers cocking his pistol. Thinking that the plain-clothes police officers, who had refused to show him their identity cards, could in fact be robbers, the applicant got hold of a wooden stick from the back of his van to defend himself. At that moment, one of the police officers, C.U., fired three rounds towards the applicant. One of the bullets hit the applicant’s abdomen and he fell to the ground. The police officers then handcuffed the applicant and his brother. One of them grabbed the wooden stick and started hitting the applicant’s brother, while another officer hit and kicked the applicant. Although the applicant’s brother asked the officers to take the applicant to a hospital, they did not listen to him. Instead, the applicant and his brother were taken to a police station, where they were placed in custody. The applicant’s brother had shouted and asked the custody officers to take his brother to a hospital. 8. The applicant was subsequently taken to the accident and emergency ward of a hospital, where he underwent surgery. The doctors observed a bullet entry hole, five centimetres above his navel, and a corresponding bullet exit hole on the lower lumbar, three centimetres above the sacrum. The doctors noted that, as it travelled through the applicant’s body, the bullet had damaged the applicant’s small and large intestines, and considered his injury to be life-threatening. It was also stated in a medical report that his injury would prevent him from working for a period of forty‑five days. A neurosurgeon who examined the applicant concluded that the applicant’s injuries amounted to a “permanent deterioration in the functioning of one of his organs or his nerves”. It was also established in December 2008 that as a result of having been shot, the applicant had developed “post-traumatic stress disorder” and “severe depression”. Three neurosurgeons who examined the applicant stated in their report of 11 December 2009 that they had observed atrophy (wasting away of the muscle) of the applicant’s thigh muscles and sensory loss on the front of the thighs. Finally, according to a report issued by a hospital in İzmir on 19 April 2010, as a result of the applicant’s injury, his ability to work had been reduced by 27% (see also paragraph 53 below). 9. On 22 May 2008 a prosecutor filed an indictment with the İzmir Criminal Court of First Instance and charged Officer C.U. with the offence of intentionally causing a life-threatening injury. The same day the prosecutor also decided not to bring any proceedings against Officer C.U. and the remaining officers in respect of the applicant’s complaints of ill-treatment and an objection lodged by the applicant against that decision was rejected on 31 October 2008. 10. On 4 June 2008 the İzmir Criminal Court of First Instance considered the possibility that the offence attributed to Officer C.U. could be reclassified as “attempted murder”, and forwarded the case file to the İzmir Assize Court, which had jurisdiction to deal with such offences. 11. In the course of the investigation and the trial, Officer C.U. maintained that he had not shot the applicant intentionally and that his pistol had accidentally fired when he and the applicant had had a scuffle. 12. The Forensic Medicine Institute concluded that the applicant had not been shot at close range. 13. On 15 March 2010 the First Chamber of the İzmir Assize Court found that Officer C.U. had fired in the air twice before firing in the direction of the applicant without aiming at a particular part of his body. Contrary to what was claimed by Officer C.U., there had been no scuffle between him and the applicant when Officer C.U. had fired his weapon. It also found that, although Officer C.U. had not attempted to kill the applicant, he had used disproportionate force and caused an injury which had threatened the applicant’s life. The Assize Court sentenced Officer C.U. to five months’ imprisonment but suspended the pronouncement of his conviction under Article 231 of the Criminal Code of Procedure (see “Relevant Domestic Law” below). 14. The applicant lodged an objection against the Assize Court’s decision and argued, in particular, that the decision to suspend the pronouncement of the conviction would encourage other police officers to carry out similar acts against members of the public. 15. The objection was rejected by the Second Chamber of the İzmir Assize Court on 7 June 2010. 16. In the meantime, the applicant instituted proceedings against the Ministry of the Interior before the İzmir Administrative Court and claimed 11,000 Turkish liras (TRY) in respect of pecuniary damage and TRY 50,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. In its decision of 17 June 2010 the İzmir Administrative Court found the Ministry responsible for the damage suffered by the applicant and awarded him TRY 712 (approximately 370 euros (EUR) at the time) in respect of pecuniary damage and TRY 50,000 (approximately EUR 26,000) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage, plus statutory interest. The Ministry of the Interior appealed against the decision. 17. On 21 April 2014 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the İzmir Administrative Court’s decision insofar as it concerned the pecuniary damage but quashed the part of the decision concerning the non-pecuniary damage because it considered that the applicant had also been partly responsible for the incident. 18. The case file was returned to the İzmir Administrative Court which decided on 24 February 2016 to award the applicant TRY 20,000 (approximately EUR 6,200 at the time) plus statutory interest in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The appeal lodged by the applicant against this finding is currently pending.

4. The applicant was born in 1990 and lives in Istanbul. 5. On 28 August 2007 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of child molestation and on the same day he was brought before a judge at the Gaziosmanpaşa Juvenile Court, who placed him in detention on remand. 6. On 3 September 2007 the applicant filed an objection against the decision on his detention. On 18 September 2007 the Beyoğlu Juvenile Assize Court dismissed his objection on the basis of the case file, without holding a hearing. 7. On 23 October 2007 and 19 November 2007 the Gaziosmanpaşa Magistrates’ Court prolonged the applicant’s detention ex officio. 8. On 16 December 2007 the Bakırköy public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Bakırköy Juvenile Assize Court, charging the applicant with child molestation. 9. On 31 December 2007 the Bakırköy Juvenile Assize Court ordered the continuation of the applicant’s pre-trial detention on the basis of the case file, and decided that it had no jurisdiction ratione loci and that the case should be heard by the Beyoğlu Juvenile Assize Court and referred the case file to the latter. 10. On 24 January 2008 the Beyoğlu Juvenile Assize Court declared itself incompetent ratione loci as well and sent the case file to the Court of Cassation to render its decision on the conflict of jurisdiction ratione loci. On the same date the court also ordered the continuation of the applicant’s pre-trial detention on the basis of the case file. 11. On 30 January 2008 the applicant filed an objection against the decision on the continuation of his pre-trial detention. On 14 February 2008 the Bakırköy Juvenile Assize Court dismissed his objection on the basis of the case file, without holding a hearing. 12. On 23 June 2008 the Court of Cassation gave its decision authorising Bakırköy Juvenile Assize Court over the case. 13. On 13 August 2008 the trial court held a preparatory hearing and ordered the continuation of the applicant’s detention on the basis of the case file. On 12 September 2008 and 9 October 2008, respectively, the court ex officio examined the applicant’s detention on remand on the basis of the case-file and decided to extend it. 14. On 30 October 2008 the court held its first hearing, in which both the applicant and his lawyer were present. At the end of that hearing, the court ordered the continuation of the applicant’s detention. 15. During the hearings held on 21 January 2009, 14 April 2009 and 21 July 2009, at which the applicant was present, the trial court ordered the continuation of the applicant’s detention on remand. Between the hearings, which were held with regular intervals of one month, the court ex officio examined the applicant’s detention on remand on the basis of the case‑file and decided to extend it 16. On 3 November 2009, at the end of the fifth hearing before the court, the applicant was released pending trial. 17. According to the latest information in the case file, the criminal proceedings against the applicant were still pending.

4. The applicant was born in 1981 and lives in Sochi. 5. On 27 November 2010 the applicant, a police captain, was arrested for soliciting a bribe. He was taken into custody and his detention was extended on several occasions. On 4 July 2011 the case was submitted for trial in the Tsentralnyy District Court of Sochi. 6. On 8 July 2011 the District Court determined that the case was not ready for trial and returned the file to the prosecutor. By the same decision, it extended the applicant’s detention until 10 August 2011. 7. On 9 August 2011 the director of the IZ-23/2 remand prison where the applicant was held reported to the Sochi prosecutor and to the president of the Tsentralnyy District Court that, in the absence of an order extending the applicant’s detention beyond 10 August, he would need to be released on that date. On the same date the Sochi prosecutor replied to him that there were no grounds for releasing the applicant because the date for hearing the prosecutor’s appeal against the District Court’s order of 8 July had been fixed for 17 August. The applicant was not released on 10 August. He complained about his unlawful detention to the head of the Investigations Committee and the regional head of the Ministry of the Interior but did not receive any reply. 8. On 17 August 2011 the Krasnodar Regional Court quashed the District Court’s order on appeal. As regards the custodial measure, it held that no extension had been necessary because by virtue of Article 255 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the applicant could be held in custody for an initial six-month period starting from the date on which the case had been submitted for trial.

7. The applicants were born in 1967, 1965, 1968, 1960 and 1958 respectively and live in İzmir. 8. The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. 9. The applicants have been employed in the duty-free shops at İzmir Adnan Menderes Airport since 1993. They are members of the Tekgıda Work Union, which had signed a collective labour agreement with the General Directorate of Monopolies on Spirits and Tobacco, the applicants’ employer and formerly a State-run enterprise. 10. During their employment the applicants operated in “work and rest cycles”. Accordingly, in the four months of the summer period they worked continuously for twenty-four hours and rested the next twenty-four hours. For the remaining eight months of the year, the winter period, they worked for twenty-four hours and rested for the next forty-eight hours. Their work schedule did not take account of weekends or public holidays as the duty‑free shops remained open twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. As regards rest breaks and periods, section 22 of their collective labour agreement provided that such periods would be counted as working time and that they could not be subject to wage deductions. 11. On 10 October 2003 the applicants, with the assistance of their lawyer, instituted individual and separate proceedings against their employer before the İzmir Labour Court. They claimed compensation for the overtime hours they had worked beyond the legal working time for the previous five years of their employment. They referred to the Labour Code in force at the material time and to their collective agreement. Both documents defined overtime as work in excess of the regular forty-five-hour working week and provided for remuneration for such work at one and a half times the regular hourly rate. 12. On 1 November 2003 the applicants instituted new proceedings against their employer before the İzmir Labour Court and requested further remuneration for work done on weekends and public holidays and compensation for annual leave that they had not taken. 13. Having regard to the common background of the applicants’ complaints in both sets of proceedings, the İzmir Labour Court decided to join each applicant’s proceedings and to seek an expert report concerning the calculation of their claims for overtime, weekend and public holiday pay and remuneration for unused annual leave. 14. On 14 July 2004 the expert submitted a report in which he noted, inter alia, that clause 25 (c) of the collective agreement concluded between the parties provided for an entitlement to overtime pay, calculated on the basis of one and half times the hourly rate. He further referred to an official audit report by the Ministry of Labour, dated 10 September 2003, which noted that during the preceding summer period, between the months of June and September, workers at the company in question had worked overtime of 139.5 hours in months which had thirty-one calendar days and 135 hours in the remaining months. In the previous winter period, between October and May, they had worked 22.5 hours and fifteen hours of overtime respectively. The hours worked in excess of the legal working time should have been remunerated accordingly. According to the expert report, the applicants’ employer had previously been cautioned, on 25 November 1996, by the Ministry of Labour concerning its practices on working hours. 15. On the basis of his examination of the company’s timekeeping records, the expert calculated the number of hours worked as overtime in respect of each applicant, deducting three hours of rest per each day worked. 16. The expert determined that the employer did not owe anything to the applicants for weekend and public holiday work as the remuneration for those days had been in accordance with the applicable regulations. The expert also noted that the applicants could not claim any compensation for unused annual leave as they were still working at the company and such leave was only payable at the end of a contract. 17. The applicants raised a number of objections to the expert report. They stated that the timekeeping records used for the calculation did not reflect the actual hours worked as they were unofficial copies kept by the employer, which were not signed by employees. In that regard, the applicants submitted that they had worked for more hours than established by the expert. They requested that the court take other evidence into account, including the defendant employer’s shift orders, which detailed who would work when and for how long, as well as reports from the Regional Labour Inspectorate. They also submitted that the deduction of three hours of rest per day was not based on fact but was an assumption by the expert. The applicants submitted that in any event the expert’s hypothetical conclusion on rest periods could not be relied on because the collective agreement had expressly provided for the inclusion of such periods as a part of working time. The applicants raised no objections to the expert’s conclusion on the dismissal of their claims for pay for work at the weekend and on public holidays and for unused annual leave. 18. In submissions of 22 July 2004, the defendant employer raised objections to the expert report and also argued that the timekeeping documents could not be relied on as they were unofficial copies. It also maintained that it had been unable to pay overtime in full owing to a lack of funds from the State. It submitted that the applicants had in any event been aware of the working arrangements and had never requested a transfer to another unit of the General Directorate of Monopolies. 19. The İzmir Labour Court asked the expert to supplement his report with findings concerning the parties’ objections. 20. On 4 July 2005, the expert submitted a supplement to his report, in which he corrected his findings concerning the rest periods in the light of the applicants’ objection and calculated the hours they had worked as twenty-four in the course of a twenty-four-hour shift. He maintained his findings regarding the timesheets, submitting that his in situ examination of the workplace and comparisons between the official record and the employer’s copies had not revealed any inconsistencies. 21. On 12 September 2005 the İzmir Labour Court found in favour of the applicants in part and awarded them the amounts given in the expert’s report in respect of the unpaid overtime. It rejected their claims for pay for weekend and public holiday work and for unused annual leave. 22. Both parties appealed to the Court of Cassation. 23. On 17 April 2006 the Court of Cassation quashed the decision and remitted the case. It found that the Labour Court had not taken into account any time that could have been used for rest periods and that therefore the calculation of overtime could not be deemed accurate. It also stated that the overtime calculation should be based on weekly working hours rather than the monthly working time used in the expert report. 24. In the resumed proceedings, the İzmir Labour Court requested that the expert amend the report in light of the Court of Cassation’s decision. 25. On 11 September 2007 the expert revised the findings as ordered and concluded that the applicants were likely to have had a minimum of three hours for rest during a twenty-four-hour shift. The expert therefore recalculated their entitlement to overtime on the basis of twenty-one hours of actual work and compared it with the legal working week of forty‑five hours. 26. On 26 May 2008 the İzmir Labour Court awarded the applicants compensation for overtime as determined in the revised expert report. 27. The defendant employer appealed, arguing that the presumption established in the case-law of the Court of Cassation that a person could not work more than fourteen hours in the course of a twenty-four-hour shift should be applied to the facts of the dispute. The Court of Cassation then quashed the first-instance judgment on 28 October 2008 and remitted the case on the following grounds: “It can be seen from the case file that during the summer months [the applicants] worked for 24 hours and subsequently rested for 24 hours; and in the winter months they worked for 24 hours and subsequently rested for 48 hours. However, as determined by the well-established case-law of the Grand Chamber of the Court of Cassation’s Civil Division, in workplaces where there are 24-hour shifts, after the deduction of time spent on certain activities such as resting, eating and fulfilling other needs, a person can only work for 14 hours a day ... This approach must also be followed in the present case.” 28. In the resumed proceedings, the İzmir Labour Court decided to follow the decision of the Court of Cassation and another expert report was drawn up for that purpose. The report, dated 21 July 2009, calculated the applicants’ daily working time as fourteen hours, in line with the Court of Cassation’s presumption of fact. The calculation in the new report led to no overtime being found for the weeks in which the applicants had worked three days as the working time was less than the legal limit of forty-five hours. For the weeks in which the applicants had worked four days, the report calculated the total working time as fifty-six hours, leading to an assessment in the report of nine hours of overtime. On 28 December 2009 the İzmir Labour Court rendered a final judgment in the applicants’ case, based on the expert report of 21 July 2009. As a result of that interpretation, some of the applicants’ claims were dismissed entirely, while the others were awarded almost ninety percent less than the previous expert report had calculated. 29. On 25 January 2010 the applicants appealed against the decision and maintained that the fact that they had worked continuously for twenty-four hours had already been confirmed by the legal records of the Ministry of Labour, both parties’ witness statements and other evidence in the file, including the expert reports overturned by the Court of Cassation. Although they had proven that fact, the judgment had been based on the presumption that working for more than fourteen hours a day was physically impossible. 30. On 18 March 2010 the Court of Cassation upheld the İzmir Labour Court’s decision without responding to the applicants’ objections.

5. The applicant was born in 1979 and is detained in Strzelce Opolskie Prison. 6. The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. 7. The applicant was detained in Mysłowice Remand Centre from 20 April 2010 to 12 January 2011 and in Wojkowice Prison from 12 January 2011 to 9 March 2012 (1 year, 10 months and 20 days). 8. The parties’ statements relating to the conditions of the applicant’s detention from 20 April 2010 to 9 March 2012 are to a large extent contradictory. 9. The applicant submitted that throughout his detention in Mysłowice Remand Centre and Wojkowice Prison, he had been held in overcrowded cells in which the space per person had been below the Polish statutory minimum standard of 3 m². 10. In their observations, the Government submitted that the applicant had been detained in overcrowded cells only on 20 April, 18 and 19 May 2009. 11. In the course of civil proceedings instituted by the applicant (see paragraphs 14-16 below), the domestic courts established, without giving any further details, that the applicant had been detained in overcrowded cells from 20 April 2010 to 9 March 2012 (1 year, 10 months and 20 days). 12. Regarding the conditions of detention in Mysłowice Remand Centre, the domestic court established that the overall conditions in cells were adequate. The applicant had one hot shower per week and one hour of outdoor exercise per day. 13. Regarding the conditions of detention in Wojkowice Prison, as established by the domestic courts, the toilets were separated from the cell’s living area, every prisoner had his own bed, a stool and access to cold running water. The prisoners had basic hygiene products at their disposal. The ceiling was infested with humidity. The applicant had one hot shower per week and one hour of outdoor exercise per day. 14. On 24 February 2012 the applicant brought a civil action for the infringement of his personal rights on account of inadequate living conditions in Wojkowice Prison from November 2005 to July 2006 and from January to March 2007, in Mysłowice Remand Centre from 20 April 2010 to 12 January 2011 and, subsequently, again in Wojkowice Prison from 12 January 2011 to 9 March 2012. The applicant argued that he had been detained in overcrowded cells, where the space per person had been below the statutory minimum of 3 m². He claimed 80,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) (approximately 20,000 euros (EUR)) in compensation. 15. On 18 December 2012 the Katowice Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s action, finding that from 20 April 2010 to 9 March 2012 the applicant had been detained in cells above the minimum statutory standard. As regards the remainder of the period, the claim was time-barred as lodged outside the three-year period of statutory limitation. 16. On 27 June 2013 the Katowice Court of Appeal overruled the lower court’s judgment and allowed the applicant’s action, finding that from 20 April 2010 to 9 March 2012 he had been detained in overcrowded cells. The court relied in this respect on the applicant’s submissions, holding that the State Treasury had in fact acknowledged these by its multiple refusals to provide the first and the second instance courts with an official register of cells in which the applicant had been detained. It also granted the applicant PLN 1,000 (EUR 250) in compensation, holding that the breach of the statutory minimum standard had not been significant.

5. The applicant was born in 1985 and lives in Bratislava. 6. On 20 December 2014 the Bratislava IV District Court ordered the applicant’s pre-trial detention in the context of criminal proceedings in which he was prosecuted for committing the criminal offence of manslaughter. The reason for his detention was the risk of reoffending. 7. On 3 March 2015 the applicant submitted a request to the District Prosecution Office for release from pre-trial detention. In it, he asked for his detention to be replaced with supervision by a probation officer. The request was received by the latter on 4 March 2015 and dismissed on 5 March 2015, following which it was transferred to the District Court for a judicial determination. 8. On 26 March 2015 the District Court held a hearing and dismissed the applicant’s request for release. The written version of that decision was served on the applicant on 14 April 2015 and, after several unsuccessful attempts at delivery, was served on the applicant’s lawyer on 21 April 2015. 9. The applicant’s lawyer lodged a written interlocutory appeal with the District Court within the statutory three-day period, namely on 24 April 2015. The case file was transferred to the Bratislava Regional Court on 29 April 2015 and the applicant’s appeal was dismissed in chambers on 7 May 2015. The written version of that decision was served on the applicant’s lawyer on 18 May 2015. 10. On 1 June 2015 the applicant filed a constitutional complaint, relying inter alia on Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. He alleged that the authorities had not proceeded speedily with his request for release. He formally challenged the proceedings held before the District Curt, the decision of the Regional Court of 7 May 2015 and the proceedings preceding this decision. He also requested compensation of 2,000 euros (EUR) in addition to his legal costs and expenses. 11. On 30 March 2016 the Constitutional Court declared the part of his complaint in respect of the proceedings held before the District Court admissible and the remainder inadmissible. The Constitutional Court held that it had found no irregularities in the Regional Court’s decision of 7 May 2015. 12. On 21 June 2016 the Constitutional Court found a violation of the applicant’s right guaranteed under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. It did not award him any compensation or legal costs and expenses. The Constitutional Court scrutinised only the District Court’s proceedings and concluded that they had lasted 44 days. The District Court had therefore failed to deal with the applicant’s request speedily and to serve the written decision on him promptly. With respect to the financial compensation, the Constitutional Court referred to “the principle of fairness”, “the particular circumstances of the case”, the duration of the delays and the intensity of the interference, and concluded that the finding of a violation of the applicant’s right constituted a sufficient redress.

4. The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Kaišiadorys. 5. The applicant worked as a lawyer in his own private practice. 6. On 28 January 2011 V.Š., a convicted prisoner, provided a statement to the Special Investigation Service (Specialiųjų tyrimų tarnyba, hereinafter “the STT”) and stated the following. He had heard from other inmates that the deputy head of Pravieniškės Correctional Facility, L.D., took bribes to transfer inmates to units with lighter security and that L.D. had mentioned to V.Š. that it was possible to be released on probation for money. V.Š. was questioned by the STT and stated that in December 2010 L.D. had asked him to his office and enquired whether he wanted to be released early. L.D. had indicated that he had a friend who could help V.Š. obtain release on probation and promised to organise a meeting with him. V.Š. was asked again that month by L.D. to go to the latter’s office, where he met the applicant (see paragraph 7 below). V.Š. asked the applicant what he should do in order to obtain release on probation. The applicant stated that V.Š. would first have to be transferred to a unit with lighter security. V.Š. asked the applicant how much it would cost him and the applicant replied that Kaišiadorys [District Court] would cost him 7,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL, approximately 2,027 euros (EUR)). After that the applicant indicated several judges that would agree to release V.Š. on probation. The applicant also stated that the cost for the same thing in the Kaunas Regional Court would be approximately LTL 10,000 (approximately EUR 2,896) but that that was not the final amount. The applicant also mentioned that V.Š. would have to pay LTL 1,000 (approximately EUR 290) for the transfer to a unit with lower security. After that conversation V.Š. started recording his discussions with L.D. and the applicant using a voice recorder watch which he said he had obtained from other inmates in exchange for cigarettes. Figures mentioned during the other meetings were LTL 2,000 (approximately EUR 579) for the transfer to another unit and LTL 12,000 (approximately EUR 3,475) for the judges at the Kaunas Regional Court as that amount could be more easily divided in three than LTL 10,000. V.Š. stated that no agreement on legal services had been concluded with the applicant. V.Š. then contacted an acquaintance, G.T., a former police officer who promised to contact the authorities. 7. The transcript of the conversation recorded between V.Š. and the applicant on 26 January 2011 showed that V.Š. had around LTL 35,000 (approximately EUR 10,137). The conversation went as follows: “The applicant: ‘ ...You understand that the intermediary who will go will also need some, and..’ ... The applicant: ‘You know, salaries there are [LTL] 7,000, so you know...’ The applicant: ‘As with [D], when he brought, looked, he went there with those pennies, [they] said no, and he did not have any more...’ V.Š.: ‘Listen, I will be honest, for example I said, the deputy head asked me, asked. I told him that I will have ten, ten euros, so to say thirty five litai.’ The applicant: ‘... With that, we can easily talk about Kaunas.’ ... The applicant: ‘I believe you. I think that it will go through with such an amount of money.’” The applicant told V.Š. that that amount might not actually be necessary. V.Š. then told the applicant that G.T. would contact him and give him LTL 2,000 (EUR 579). The applicant also told V.Š. that he had won a case against Lithuania at the Court and that he had not accepted a bribe in that case. The conversation went as follows: “The applicant: ‘I have already been burnt and only got things straight in Strasbourg. I have won [in] the Strasbourg Court against Lithuania. I previously worked as a prosecutor.’ V.Š.: ‘The deputy did not tell me anything.’ The applicant: ‘I could go back to being a prosecutor. I have won a case against Lithuania in Strasbourg.’ V.Š.: ‘I will ... shake your hand. I can say ... that this seems unreal to me.’ The applicant: ‘... The prosecutor with a bribe... Strasbourg proved that it was a provocation. I proved it in Strasbourg. The proceedings [there] took eight years.’ The applicant: ‘It was nothing to do with a bribe .... I ... bought an apartment, I asked someone to give me a loan... He ... was in prison later. He was released... and became a snitch.’ V.Š.: ‘A friend’. The applicant: ‘... He used to sleep at my mother’s place... I don’t know where he disappeared to. He will not die a natural death. I was not the only one he set up. Two judges in Kaunas as well.’ ... The applicant: ‘And I won a case in Strasbourg later. The Supreme Court rehabilitated me.’ V.Š.: ‘Yes.’ The applicant: ‘The Grand Chamber of seventeen judges, the plenary session for criminal cases.’ ... The applicant: ‘So look. When will that person come? So that I know what ...’ V.Š.: ‘So I can call you and simply say one word. Tomorrow, the day after tomorrow.’” The applicant asked V.Š. to make sure that G.T. did not tell anyone about the agreement and V.Š. assured him that G.T. would not ask any questions. 8. On 31 January the STT asked a prosecutor to apply to a pre-trial judge for authorisation for G.T. and V.Š. to offer and give a bribe to L.D. and the applicant, in accordance with the provisions of domestic law. The prosecutor also sought permission to make video and/or voice-recordings, to take pictures and to allow three officers to monitor L.D.’s and the applicant’s telephone conversations. The prosecutor also asked the Vilnius City Second District Court on the STT’s behalf to authorise covert surveillance of the applicant and L.D. for two months. The STT additionally informed the prosecutor that a pre-trial investigation had been opened against L.D. and the applicant. 9. On the same day the Vilnius City Second District Court authorised taps on the telephones of L.D., V.Š., G.T. and the applicant and allowed G.T. and V.Š. to perform actions which imitated criminal conduct for two months, until 31 March 2011. V.Š. was allowed to use various types of telecommunications and electronic network measures. 10. On 31 January 2011 V.Š. was transferred to a unit with lighter security, based on good behaviour and active participation in the commemoration of the Day of the Defenders of Freedom. 11. On 31 January 2011 G.T. was questioned by the STT. He stated that he had visited V.Š. earlier in January 2011 and that the latter had asked him whether he could give LTL 2,000 to someone. G.T. had agreed. 12. On 1 February 2011 V.Š. and G.T. signed documents stating that they were not allowed to incite someone to commit an offence. 13. On the same day the applicant visited V.Š. and they talked about the situation of V.Š. 14. Later that day G.T. called the applicant and agreed to meet him the following day. After the meeting G.T. left LTL 2,000, given to him by the STT officers, in the side pocket of the applicant’s car. 15. On 3 February 2011 V.Š. called the applicant and asked how matters were proceeding. The applicant said that he would call back, but later asked to call the following Tuesday. On 10 February 2011 V.Š. called the applicant and said that they would be in touch; he also asked if the applicant would pay him a visit and the applicant said that he would come at some point in the future. On 14 February 2014 V.Š. called the applicant and said that he had received a character reference from the psychologist and the applicant stated that he would be in touch. V.Š. then asked the applicant whether he should call him and the applicant said that he could call when the documents for his transfer to a unit with lighter security were ready. On 19 February 2011 V.Š. called the applicant and informed him that the documents for the court had already been prepared. The applicant stated that he would be in touch and would come to visit V.Š. because they could not talk on the telephone. The applicant said that V.Š. could call him the following Wednesday or Thursday but then decided that Wednesday would be the best day. On 1-3 March 2011 V.Š. called L.D. and complained that he could not reach the applicant and asked for help in finding him. On 3 March 2011 L.D. called a certain A. and asked him where the applicant was. A. told him that it was not the first time that the applicant had disappeared. 16. On 7 March 2011 L.D. called the applicant and said that people were looking for him. The applicant said that V.Š.’s case was still in progress. L.D. asked the applicant to come and meet V.Š. and the applicant said that he had understood. V.Š. then called the applicant, who said he was going to visit him in a few hours and that they would talk in person. V.Š. again called the applicant later that day and asked whether he should bring the medical certificate to the meeting and the applicant said that he was already in the correctional facility. During the visit they discussed the fact that V.Š.’s case had not yet been transferred to court. V.Š. asked whether the applicant still had the necessary access [in the Kaunas Regional Court]. The applicant confirmed that he did, that the person concerned was coming back from Austria the following Monday and that without that person the matter could not be settled there. The applicant asked whether V.Š. wanted him to participate in a hearing before the court of first instance and V.Š. said yes. Then they talked about someone else’s situation and the applicant said that he knew the prosecutor and had bought him. The applicant further said that not every prosecutor could be bought but there were two he could buy. V.Š. said that he had LTL 30,000 (approximately EUR 8,689) and it did not matter for what [court] he had to pay. The applicant then asked V.Š. to speak quieter. He also asked V.Š. to call him from time to time. V.Š. asked whether he would have to pay something before the hearing in the Kaišiadorys District Court and the applicant said he would not have to give much because the chances were fifty-fifty. The applicant also stated that the rest of the money would be held in reserve for Kaunas [Regional Court] and he would take LTL 1,000 for Kaišiadorys [District Court]. Later in the same conversation he mentioned LTL 1,500 (approximately EUR 434). The applicant asked V.Š. to get in touch with his contact person, who was to call and meet the applicant in the evening. After the applicant had left the correctional facility V.Š. called him and told him that the papers had been sent to the court on the twenty-third. The applicant asked V.Š. to call him in an hour. When V.Š. called, the applicant told him that the hearing would take place on 23 March and that the applicant would participate in it; he also asked to call him in the evening. 17. On 9 March 2011 V.Š. called the applicant, who said that he would write him a message. On 14 March 2011 V.Š. called the applicant and they again discussed V.Š.’s situation. On 17 March 2011 V.Š. called the applicant and the applicant said that they would keep in touch after the following Sunday, and V.Š. was asked to call on Monday after lunch. On 18 March 2011 V.Š. called the applicant, who said that he would not participate in the hearing at the court of first instance regarding V.Š.’s release on probation and that if something happened he would inform V.Š. On 21 March 2011 V.Š. called the applicant, who confirmed his intention as regards the court of first instance because he did not expect anything good to come out of it. However, he said he would try to talk to someone and V.Š. said he would not forget his debt to the applicant. On 23 March 2011 V.Š. called the applicant and informed him that the Kaišiadorys District Court had decided not to release him on probation. The applicant then said that he would visit V.Š. so he could sign an appeal. On 23 March 2011 V.Š. called L.D. and asked him to ask the applicant about his chances to be released on probation. L.D. called the applicant the same day and asked how matters were proceeding with their client. The applicant said that he would come on Friday and that they would talk then. On 25 March 2011 the applicant visited V.Š., who signed some blank pieces of paper, on which the applicant said he would later write an appeal. V.Š. asked whether they would be covered by the amount they had discussed before. The applicant said that he would see, that he had talked with the men in question and asked them to do everything and that they would receive some money. V.Š. then told the applicant that his contact person would come the following Monday. After that, they discussed amounts and the applicant told V.Š. that the entire sum discussed would be necessary. V.Š. asked whether they were talking about thirty [thousand] and whether that amount included the applicant’s share and the applicant said it did. The applicant also said that before that amount would have guaranteed his release on probation one hundred percent but that now there was some trouble. The applicant then told V.Š. to call his contact person and ask him to meet the applicant on Monday. V.Š. asked whether his person (G.T.) should bring thirty (thousand) and the applicant confirmed that he should. 18. On 29 March 2011 the applicant and G.T. met in the applicant’s car, where LTL 30,000 was given to the applicant so that he could secure V.Š.’s release on probation. The applicant was arrested by STT officers immediately afterwards and the money was found in the side door pocket of the applicant’s car. 19. V.Š. was questioned additionally on 30 March 2011. He stated that L.D. had talked of the applicant as a reliable person who had access to prosecutors and judges. V.Š. also showed that L.D. had been the first one to start a conversation about the possibility of V.Š. being released on probation and that L.D. had told him several times before that “serious men pay money and are released and do not sit in prison” (rimti vyrai moka pinigus ir eina į laisvę, o ne sėdi kalėjime). 20. On 8 April 2011 the Kaunas Regional Court dismissed V.Š.’s appeal and upheld the first-instance decision not to release him on probation. 21. On 9 August 2011 a bill of indictment was drawn up against L.D. and the applicant. The applicant was accused of promising to influence L.D. and the judges at the Kaišiadorys District Court and the Kaunas Regional Court with a bribe so that V.Š. would be released on probation. He was also accused of taking a bribe of LTL 2,000 and LTL 30,000 respectively on two occasions. 22. On 31 August 2011 the Court of Appeal examined an application by the prosecutor to transfer the criminal case from the Kaišiadorys District Court. The Court of Appeal held that the applicant had stated that he could influence two judges in Kaišiadorys and thus decided to transfer the case to the Kėdainiai District Court so that the proceedings would be fair. 23. On 19 October 2011 the Vilnius City Third District Court approved an application by V.Š. to be released on probation. The court held that at that time V.Š. was serving his sentence in Vilnius Correctional Facility, where he had taken part in the social rehabilitation, legal and social education programmes and had provided information that he would be employed on release. 24. By a judgment of 18 July 2012 the Kėdainiai District Court found the applicant guilty of bribing an intermediary and sentenced him to sixty days in prison. The court found it established that G.T. had given the applicant LTL 2,000 and LTL 30,000 respectively during their meetings on 2 February and 29 March 2011 in return for a promise that the applicant would help in the proceedings for V.Š.’s release on probation. The applicant pleaded not guilty and stated that an act of provocation had been organised against him. He also stated that the money he had received was remuneration for his services as V.Š.’s lawyer. The applicant said that although no agreement on the provision of legal assistance had been concluded, he had intended to conclude one after the proceedings for V.Š.’s release on probation. The applicant refused to provide comments on the recordings and stated that his conversations with V.Š. were irrelevant because he had only wanted to show that he was working on his case. Those conversations had not been of any consequence as he had not been able to influence L.D. or the judges at Kaišiadorys District Court and Kaunas Regional Court (Pokalbių telefonu ir įrašu su V.[Š.] nekomentuoja, paaiškindamas, kad visi jo pokalbiai su V.[Š.] buvo dėl akių, kadangi kažką kalbėti su V.[Š.] reikėjo, tad nieko nereiškiančiais pokalbiais jis tik siekė parodyti, kad dirba, tačiau tuo jis nesiekė sukelti jokių pasekmių, kadangi negalėjo paveikti nei L.[D.], nei Kaišiadorių apylinkės ar Kauno apygardos teismo teisėjų). G.T. stated that he had known V.Š. since 2000 and that V.Š. had called him and asked for help. When G.T. had gone to Pravieniškės Correctional Facility, V.Š. had told him that the applicant required money and that V.Š. doubted that the money would be used in the proper way. The court’s conclusions were based on the evidence given by V.Š., G.T., L.D. and other employees of Pravieniškės Correctional Facility. It also addressed the secret recordings of the applicant’s conversations, including those recorded prior to the authorisation for actions imitating criminal conduct. The court held that the transcripts of the conversations between the applicant and V.Š. showed that the applicant had been the first to indicate the amounts of money to be paid. The applicant’s statement that he had been going to conclude an agreement on legal services after he had taken LTL 30,000 were refuted by his conversation with G.T., where the applicant had stated that in case of failure he would keep 20% of the money and return the rest. The video-recordings showed that the applicant had not counted the money and that he had indicated to G.T. to put it in the side pocket of the car door. That allowed the court to draw the conclusion that the applicant realised that the money was remuneration for his criminal activity. The court further held that V.Š.’s testimony, voice and video‑recordings showed that the applicant had not been incited to take a bribe and that the criminal conduct simulation model had been applied within the limits prescribed by the court (see paragraph 12 above). By the same judgment the Kėdainiai District Court found L.D. guilty of abuse of office and forgery, which had allowed V.Š. to be transferred to a unit with lighter security (see paragraph 10 above). It ordered L.D. to pay a fine of LTL 12,480 (approximately EUR 3,614). L.D. pleaded guilty, but stated that V.Š. had named the applicant as a lawyer that could help him obtain release on probation. The court decided to return the recorder watch to V.Š. 25. The applicant and L.D. lodged an appeal. The applicant argued that the provisions of domestic law had been applied incorrectly, that V.Š. and G.T. used undue pressure, and that V.Š. had used unauthorised equipment, the recorder watch, which he had not been allowed to have in prison. The applicant asked the appellate court to question V.Š. and ask him how he had acquired such a watch in a correctional facility. The applicant also stated that L.D. had overseen matters relating to V.Š.’s transfer to a unit with lighter security and that there was no evidence that he had tried to bribe L.D. The applicant also stated that he had never named any specific person in the courts whom he would have bribed because he had not intended to perform such an act. He had only talked to V.Š. about the outcome of the proceedings for release on probation because V.Š. had called him constantly. 26. On 23 October 2012 the Court of Appeal approved an application by the prosecutor to transfer the case to Panevėžys Regional Court from Kaunas Regional Court for examination on appeal in order to have a fair trial. 27. The Panevėžys Regional Court held an oral hearing where several witnesses, including V.Š., had been questioned. On 13 June 2013 the Panevėžys Regional Court held that V.Š. had purchased the watch for his personal use and that the provisions of domestic law did not directly prohibit the use of such equipment in prison. The court also held that the initial contact between V.Š. and the applicant had been arranged by L.D., that V.Š. had not known the applicant beforehand and had not had any motive to incite him to commit a crime. The court also found that no agreement on the provision of legal services had been concluded between the applicant and V.Š. and that the applicant’s argument that he had intended to conclude one later had been dismissed as an attempt to improve his situation. On the basis of the audio-recordings, the court also observed that the applicant had been the first to say that he could settle the matter for money. The court also found that there had been no incitement and that the authorities had not put any active pressure on the applicant to commit an offence. On the contrary, the applicant had incited V.Š. to give him an amount that would be sufficient for himself, an intermediary and three court judges. The court also held that at the time the offence had been committed, Article 226 § 1 of the Criminal Code provided for two alternative sentences for bribery of an intermediary: arrest or imprisonment for up to three years. On 5 July 2011 the Criminal Code had been amended and the applicant’s offence had then satisfied the requirements of Article 226 § 2 of the Criminal Code, which provided for various sentences: a fine, arrest or imprisonment for up to five years. As the provision in force provided for a more lenient sentence, the court decided to impose a fine of LTL 65,000 (approximately EUR 18,825). The court dismissed L.D.’s appeal by the same judgment. 28. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. He again argued that he had been incited to commit an offence, that V.Š., as a convicted prisoner, was not allowed to have recording equipment, that he had been provided with that equipment by the STT, and that the transcripts of the recordings should not have been used as evidence against him in the case. The applicant also alleged that the LTL 2,000 had been remuneration for his legal services and that he had not actually taken the LTL 30,000 from G.T., who had simply left the money in his car. The applicant further complained that the court of first instance had not even assessed whether the evidence had been lawfully collected. The appellate court, in turn, had approved evidence that had been gathered unlawfully and had misinterpreted domestic law. The applicant also argued that V.Š.’s testimony had contradicted itself: it was not clear who had informed the STT about the alleged crime. 29. On 28 January 2014 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law. The court held that the pre-trial investigation had been opened on 28 January 2011 upon the request of V.Š. Together with his testimony, V.Š. had given the authorities his voice-recording watch, where he had recorded his conversations with L.D. and the applicant. The court held that convicted prisoners who used voice recorders breached internal prison regulations, but that did not mean that officers who carried out a pre‑trial investigation and obtained information from such a voice recorder acted unlawfully. The court also held that the finding of the applicant’s guilt had not been based solely on the evidence obtained from V.Š.’s watch. The court observed that L.D. had suggested the applicant as a lawyer because he knew the prosecutors and judges dealing with V.Š.’s case, while L.D. had not incited the applicant to take bribes. By the same judgment the Supreme Court left an appeal on points of law by L.D. unexamined because therein he had raised arguments that had not been raised before the appellate court. 30. On 19 December 2014 the Supreme Court examined an application by the applicant to reopen the proceedings. It decided not to do so, but reduced the fine to LTL 13,000 (approximately EUR 3,765).

5. The applicant was born in 1973. He is a carrier of thalassemia disease. On an unspecified date, he contracted non‑reversible ischemia, which resulted in septic gangrene and the subsequent amputation of his right leg at the hip. He uses crutches, as he is neither eligible to have a prosthetic limb fitted, nor does he have the necessary financial means for such a procedure. The applicant also claims to be a drug user. 6. On 1 May 2013 the applicant was arrested and then detained in Omonoia police station. On 7 May 2013 the public prosecutor ordered his pre-trial detention in Korydallos prison on the basis of decision no. 3386/2010 of the Three-Member Court of Appeal for Felonies (Τριμελές Εφετείο Κακουργημάτων) but he could not be admitted there as the prison was overcrowded. He was subsequently transferred back to Omonoia police station, where he remained until 28 May 2013. On that date he was transferred to Korydallos prison, where he stayed until 30 December 2013. He was subsequently transferred to Larissa prison, where he remained until 25 November 2014. On that date he was transferred to Korydallos prison, from where he was released the next day, that is to say 26 November 2014. 7. On 13 November 2013 the applicant was convicted by the Three‑Member Court of Appeal for Felonies to a sentence of eight years’ imprisonment and a fine of 20,000 euros for the offence of buying and selling drugs as a person not addicted to drugs (decision no. 5519/2013). 8. The applicant submitted that the conditions of his detention in Omonoia police station, where he had remained for a period of twenty‑seven days, had been very poor. He had been detained in a cell on the third floor measuring around 40 sq. m, which had held between seventeen and thirty detainees, and sometimes even more. The ventilation system had been dirty and inadequate. The cell had been filthy and unfurnished, with no beds and only a cement bench running along the length of three of the walls, which had accommodated six to eight people, including the applicant. The rest of the detainees had had no access to mattresses but slept on blankets laid on the floor. For a certain period, both male and female prisoners had been held in the cell until a certain organisation filed a complaint and the women were moved elsewhere. 9. There had been only one shower and two floor-level toilets, one of which had not functioned. A guard had had to open the door of the cell every time the applicant needed to visit the toilet and sometimes its use had taken place in front of the other prisoners, since it had no door. He had not been provided with hygiene or cleaning products, nor had he had access to medical care despite his disability and the wounds to his leg, which had become worse owing to the conditions in which he had been detained. The food quality had been poor and he had drunk water directly from the sinks in the toilet area, without any glasses or cups. 10. There had been no outdoor exercise or other occupational activities and, owing to the lack of space within the cell and his disability, the applicant had spent all day sitting on the cement bench. He had not had any access to a telephone or to any form of recreational activity such as television or radio. 11. On 28 May 2013 the applicant was transferred to Korydallos prison, where he was initially admitted to the prison hospital for two days. His admission note recorded “right leg amputated ‒ unable to meet his own needs; ulcerated left tibia”. On 30 May 2013 he was discharged from the prison hospital. The discharge note referred to “the right leg amputated, blood test HT 34.6%, HB 10.4 due to thalassemia minor”. The applicant submitted that he had been asked to sign a declaration that he wished to stop his pharmaceutical treatment, but in fact he had never been provided with any. 12. The applicant remained in Korydallos prison until 30 December 2013. He submitted that he had been placed in a cell with eight other prisoners instead of remaining in the hospital, where he could have received better treatment. Instead of being provided with a special bed adapted to his needs, he had had to sleep on the lower tier of a bunk bed on which he had barely been able to lie down, owing to his disability. The in-cell toilet was not screened off and its use had therefore been visible to the other prisoners. It was not adapted to his needs and its shape had made it very difficult for him to use, having only one limb. During his stay, he had not been regularly monitored by a doctor, nor had he ever been admitted to the prison hospital again after his first visit. The applicant argued that his medical situation had required him to be detained in a hospital; however, this had not been arranged, apart from the two days he had spent in the prison hospital upon his transfer to Korydallos. 13. On 30 December 2013 the applicant was transferred to Larissa prison, where he remained until 25 November 2014. 14. The applicant claimed that the conditions of detention had been very poor in that prison facility as well and that he had not received appropriate medical treatment. He had been placed in a cell along with many other prisoners, as the prison had been overcrowded, and he had not been provided with a special bed or special toilet facilities adapted to his needs. The cell had been filthy and insufficiently lit and ventilated. The toilet had been similar to the one in Korydallos prison. The applicant’s access to outdoor exercise had been difficult and dangerous owing to his disability. 15. The applicant submitted that he had not received appropriate medical treatment, that he had not been regularly monitored by a doctor, and that at no time had he been admitted to a hospital with access to nursing staff who would have taken appropriate measures to ensure that his needs were met. 16. The Government’s main submission concerning the applicant’s detention in Omonoia police station was that it had not reached the level of severity required for it to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention. In particular, the applicant had been detained in Omonoia police station from 8.30 p.m. on 1 May 2013 until 2 p.m. on 28 May 2013, that is to say for twenty-seven days. 17. Omonoia police station had had five beds, all of which had pillows, mattresses and bed linen. The cell had been regularly cleaned and was intended for short-term detention only. 18. Concerning the applicant’s medical treatment in Korydallos, the Government submitted that during his imprisonment in Korydallos, the applicant had been regularly seen by a doctor. Apart from the initial two days from 28 to 30 May 2013, the applicant had been checked by doctors of various specialisms, according to his needs, on 9 November, 9 December and 19 December 2013. 19. As regards the general conditions of his detention, the Government submitted that, in view of his disability, the applicant had been placed in cell no. 3, because it was situated on the ground floor. The cell measured 70 sq. m and had a capacity of twenty detainees. The records at the Government’s disposal did not show the exact number of the applicant’s fellow inmates but at the time of the Government’s submissions the cell had accommodated seventeen detainees. 20. There had been two toilets and a shower, and the detainees had had access to a yard measuring 30 sq. m. The cell had two windows ensuring sufficient light and ventilation, it had been heated and was generally in better condition than the rest of the prison cells. The wing had had a common room measuring 140 sq. m with plastic tables and a kitchen at the detainees’ disposal. The cells had been regularly disinfected. 21. The applicant had been transferred to Larissa prison on 30 December 2013, where he stayed for approximately eleven months. He had been detained in ward no. 2 on the ground floor, along with elderly detainees and detainees with disabilities. The ward was in the direct proximity of the doctor’s office, it had measured 234.60 sq. m and, during the applicant’s incarceration, had accommodated fifty-three detainees on average. 22. The ward had four squat toilets and a sitting toilet, used by detainees with disabilities. It had had twenty-eight two-tier bunk beds, each with its own television. There were plastic tables and stools for everyone, as well as bedside tables and two fridges. It had been regularly disinfected and was cleaned on a daily basis. Light and ventilation were provided by five large windows. Additionally, the Government adduced examples of weekly menus during the applicant’s incarceration and pointed out that the ward had had access to a yard. 23. The inmates had had at their disposal numerous cultural and sports activities for their entertainment. Meals had been designed with the assistance of the prison doctor and special dietary needs had been accommodated. To demonstrate this point, the Government submitted examples of the various meals offered. 24. There had been two psychologists at the prison who could be consulted at either the doctors’ initiative or the detainees’ request. The record submitted by the Government showed that the applicant had met with the prison psychologist twenty-seven times, and had been provided with financial, psychological and material assistance through the channel of the prison’s Department of Social Service. 25. The applicant had been provided with hygiene products, clothes, shoes and a card for making telephone calls. As regards his medical treatment, the applicant had been monitored by the prison doctors and had occasionally been transferred to Larissa hospital. In total, his medical record showed that he had been medically assisted on twenty-seven occasions either in-house or at the city hospital. 26. The Government pointed out that the applicant had not referred to or adduced any evidence showing that he had submitted any request before the prison authorities concerning his complaints before the Court. They additionally submitted that in none of the medical documents did the applicant appear to have been a drug user, as he had falsely claimed in his application. Moreover, he had been convicted for buying and selling drugs as a non-user. Lastly, the applicant had benefited from a beneficial calculation of the days served, owing to his disability.

5. The applicant was born in 1967. He was a member of the National Assembly (Milli Majlis), elected in 2005. 6. The applicant provided the following account of the impugned events. 7. On 16 March 2007 the National Assembly was hearing a 2006 Cabinet of Ministers report presented by the Prime Minister. The presentation of the report was to be followed by questions and subsequently by a debate. 8. According to the applicant, when he was given an opportunity to ask a question, he began to deliver a speech criticising the Cabinet of Ministers. After a few sentences his microphone was cut and he was not allowed to finish his speech. This prompted the applicant to engage in a verbal argument with the Speaker. 9. The applicant claimed that while he and the Speaker were arguing, F.A., a member of parliament who was seated behind him, shouted an insult directed at the latter. In reply, the applicant, also using insulting language, demanded that F.A. mind his own business. F.A. allegedly responded by continuing to shout curses directed at the applicant and his close family members, and a heated argument between the applicant and F.A. ensued. 10. The applicant, using gestures, invited F.A. to follow him so that they could settle their differences outside the assembly room and began heading towards the exit. However, according to the applicant, at that point F.A. approached him from behind and punched him in the face. The applicant pushed F.A. away, as a result of which F.A. fell onto a desk. However, he allegedly continued to throw punches at the applicant. The applicant also attempted to punch F.A., but was stopped by several other members who had quickly intervened to stop the fight. He was led out of the assembly room and left the parliament building. 11. The Government neither disputed the applicant’s above account of the events nor provided a separate description thereof (see paragraph 56 below). 12. The above incident in the National Assembly was video recorded and broadcast later by various public television channels. 13. On the same day F.A. lodged a criminal complaint against the applicant with the Prosecutor General’s Office and the latter instituted criminal proceedings under Articles 132 (battery) and 221.2.2 (hooliganism accompanied by resistance to a State official or other person carrying out duties in protection of public order or prevention of breaches of public order) of the Criminal Code. 14. According to the applicant, at around 10.30 a.m. on 19 March 2007 he was arrested by masked police officers in the street. The police allegedly applied force during his arrest. 15. Several hours after the arrest the National Assembly lifted the applicant’s parliamentary immunity, following a request by the Prosecutor General. 16. By a decision of the Prosecutor General’s Office of 19 March 2007, the applicant was formally charged with criminal offences under Articles 132 and 221.2.2 of the Criminal Code. The decision stated that the applicant’s actions had caused F.A. to experience symptoms of a closed craniocerebral trauma. 17. On the same day, based on a request by the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Nasimi District Court ordered the applicant’s remand in custody for a period of two months. 18. On 16 March 2007 the investigator in charge ordered F.A.’s medical expert examination. The forensic report, finalised on 17 April 2007, found that F.A. had a closed craniocerebral trauma, concussion, a haematoma on his forehead and other less serious injuries. According to the expert, the injuries had been caused by several punches to the head and the time of the infliction of injuries corresponded to 16 March 2007 as claimed by F.A. 19. On 27 March 2007 the investigator carried out the inspection of the videotapes (videokasetə baxış keşirilməsi barədə protokol), which were submitted by various television channels and contained footage of the incident. 20. On 3 May 2007 the charges against the applicant were reclassified under Articles 127.2.1 ((deliberate infliction of less serious harm (az ağır zərər) to health, in connection with the victim’s performance of his professional or public duties)), 127.2.3 (deliberate infliction of less serious harm to health, in a publicly dangerous way and with hooligan intent) and 221.2.2 (hooliganism accompanied by resistance to a State official or other person carrying out duties in protection of public order or prevention of breaches of public order) of the Criminal Code. 21. After the completion of the pre-trial investigation, on 8 May 2007 the Prosecutor General’s Office issued an indictment in respect of the applicant under Articles 127.2.1, 127.2.3 and 221.2.2 of the Criminal Code and the case went to trial. 22. During the trial the applicant pleaded not guilty and claimed that he had not been the instigator of the fight and it had been F.A. who had punched him first. 23. On 18 May 2007 the Sabail District Court convicted the applicant on all counts, revoked his mandate as a member of parliament and sentenced him to two years’ imprisonment suspended for two years. The applicant was released, but was forbidden to change his place of residence during the period that the suspended sentence was in force, without notifying in advance the relevant authority for the execution of court judgments. The description of the acts for which the applicant was found guilty read as follows: “At 12.30 p.m. on 16 March 2007 at [the National Assembly’s address] [the applicant], while making a speech during a plenary session [of the National Assembly], in breach of parliamentary ethics used rude and insulting expressions violating human dignity and honour despite a warning and a call to order [by the Speaker of the National Assembly] in accordance with Articles 45 and 46 [of the National Assembly’s internal regulations. [The applicant], by committing deliberate actions aimed at manifestly displaying, without any reason, disrespect towards the members of parliament, parliamentary officials and members of the public watching the parliamentary session, insulted and offended [the latter] with indecent expressions. [The applicant] used violence to offer resistance to [F.A.] who, by carrying out his civic obligation, called [the applicant] to order and prevented a breach of order in a parliamentary session as defined by law. [The applicant], by punching [F.A.] in the head and various other parts of his body with hooligan intent, inflicted less serious harm (az ağır zərər) to [F.A.]’s health and disrupted the conduct of the plenary session [of the National Assembly] for twenty minutes.” 24. It is evident from the judgment that, in finding the applicant guilty, the court relied on the following evidence: the testimony of F.A.; the testimonies of a number of members of parliament and parliamentary officials who had witnessed the incident; and the medical forensic report of 17 April 2007. The court’s judgment was silent as regards the video evidence. According to the applicant, his request to play the videotape during the trial hearing was refused by the first-instance court. 25. On 22 June 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal, in which he complained, inter alia, of an erroneous assessment of the factual circumstances, procedural irregularities in obtaining forensic and other evidence, and misapplication of the substantive criminal law. In particular, he argued that the classification under Article 221.2.2 presupposed the existence of other victims against whom the act of hooliganism had been directed, apart from a person to whom the resistance was offered, whereas in his case F.A. had been the only victim involved. The applicant also complained that, having regard to the decision of the Plenum of the Supreme Court on the judicial practice concerning cases related to hooliganism, F.A. could not be considered as a person carrying out a duty in protection of public order. In addition, the applicant argued that the trial court had relied on the prosecution’s distorted version of the events rather than examining the video footage of the incident which showed that he had not been the instigator of the fight. 26. On 24 July 2007 the Baku Court of Appeal held a preliminary hearing. It appears from the transcript of the hearing that the applicant applied to have the court ensure F.A.’s presence at the appeal hearing and examine the videotape of the incident. The court dismissed the applicant’s application with regard to the latter as follows: “The Court’s Panel, after having briefly deliberated on the bench, Decides To ensure the participation of [F.A.] at the court hearing and to reject the remaining part of the application as being unfounded ...” 27. On 6 August 2007 the appellate court upheld the Sabail District Court’s judgment. The court found that the applicant’s guilt was confirmed by the witness testimonies and the medical forensic report. The court’s judgment was silent in relation to the applicant’s complaints concerning incorrect classification of the crime and the failure to examine the video evidence. The applicant lodged a cassation appeal reiterating his complaints. 28. On 4 December 2007 the Supreme Court upheld the lower courts’ judgments. In its decision the court did not address the applicant’s above complaints. 29. The applicant suffered from spinal disc herniation before his arrest. According to the applicant, the conditions of his pre-trial detention were harsh and unsuitable for his health condition as he experienced chronic pain. His state of health significantly deteriorated during the two months’ pre-trial detention owing to the delays in providing him with the requisite medical assistance. Although he continuously complained about this to various domestic authorities, no measures were taken to adequately address his medical problems. His request to be transferred to a specialised medical institution was granted only after he had gone on hunger strike. 30. On 19 March 2007 following his arrest the applicant underwent a medical examination, which concluded that he was “practically healthy”. 31. On 27 March 2007 the applicant was examined by a neurologist, who found that he was “neurologically healthy” and did not need inpatient treatment. 32. On 28 March 2007 the applicant underwent an X-ray examination, which did not reveal any pathology in his thorax. 33. After this, the applicant refused to undergo medical examinations on several occasions. 34. On 13 April 2007 the applicant was transferred to the Ministry of Justice’s Medical Facility and diagnosed with “lumbosacral radiculitis”. He received inpatient medical treatment in the neurology department of the facility for thirty-five days until his release from custody on 18 May 2007. During his treatment in the facility, he underwent various medical examinations, which did not reveal any need for surgery, and a “conservative treatment” was recommended. 35. On 13 August 2007 the applicant applied to the Department of Execution of Court Judgments of the Ministry of Justice for permission to travel to Germany for medical treatment. 36. On 16 August 2007 the Department refused the applicant’s request. The applicant appealed to the courts. 37. On 17 September 2007 the Sabail District Court issued a decision permitting the applicant to travel abroad for medical reasons. 38. The ban on the applicant’s departure from the country was de facto lifted on 22 September 2007.

6. The applicant, Editorial Board of Grivna Newspaper, is a Ukrainian single shareholder company which has its registered offices in Kherson. Grivna is a regional newspaper published in that city (hereinafter “the newspaper”). 7. In 2006 the newspaper published two articles containing negative statements about Mr I., who from 1996 to 2012 was President of the Kherson Regional Court of Appeal. The articles gave rise to defamation proceedings, which are the subject of the present case. The translation of the relevant parts of the articles is given below. The passages which were the subject of the domestic proceedings are underlined and numbered for reference. The parts of the articles rephrased and summarised by the Court are presented in square brackets. Where initials are used, the actual articles contained I.’s full name: his first name, surname and/or patronymic in various combinations. 8. In January 2006 the plenary Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (hereinafter “the Parliament”) was to examine the question of I.’s appointment to the position of judge on a permanent basis, until retirement age. The matter was to be examined because I.’s previous ten-year appointment was expiring (see the relevant constitutional and legislative rules concerning the appointment of judges at paragraph 52 below). 9. Prior to the Parliament’s session, on 5 January 2006 another regional newspaper, Vgoru, published an article alerting the readers that the matter of I.’s permanent appointment would be examined by Parliament and urging readers to send comments on I.’s candidature to the relevant parliamentary committee. 10. On 12 January 2006 Parliament examined the question of I.’s permanent appointment. Owing to concerns raised by some Members of Parliament about I.’s candidature (see the summary of the transcript of the debate at paragraph 13 below), Parliament decided to adjourn the examination of the question. 11. An article, published in the issue of the newspaper dated 19‑26 January 2006, was dedicated to the above event and entitled “Purgatory for Judges” (Чистилище для судей). It spread over two full pages. The first page of the article contained the following text: “We often criticise Members of Parliament, and for good reason. But this gathering of people with different views and business interests under the same roof sometimes produces unpredictable decisions. Perhaps it is too soon to call this ‘democracy’. However, the fact that the MPs have ‘rejected the advances’ of the President of the Kherson Court of Appeal, Mr I. (получил от народных депутатов «гарбуза») [A1] speaks volumes. So let us talk about justice in the Kherson Region and first of all about its President Mr I. Below we publish a transcript of the proceedings of Parliament concerning... appointment of judges for life. On 12 January 2006 many Kherson residents watched live this sitting of Parliament and our Mr I. was the main hero of that ‘show’ [A2]. We have been writing about him much lately. Other publications have been writing even more. We will provide our readers with a brief reminder about Mr I. based only on our own publications which, by the way, have not been challenged. [We] are also in possession of a number of incontrovertible documents. We give you this in lieu of a prologue: ‘... In his eight years and counting at the head of the Regional Court I. has found himself dozens of loyal people – lawyers, judges, and important businessmen – for whose personal and business interests he has successfully lobbied through favourable judicial decisions [A3] (обзавелся десятками преданных людей... чей бизнес и личные интересы успешно лоббировал с помощью нужных решений в судах)... Here is the conclusion: I. is considered the person in charge and untouchable [A4] in the Kherson Region where 14 governors succeeded each other in 10 years... If one removes him successfully, even if peacefully, the people will believe in changes for the better in the pervasively corrupt judicial system...’ This document arrived in our offices last autumn. It was addressed to a very high‑ranking and influential official in the capital in response to his request for information from Kherson. But the first official documents had appeared right after I. took up his position and they corroborate the above-mentioned reasoning. Here is just a short quote from the letter by members of the regional council to the President of the Supreme Court dated 17.02.1998: ‘Using his position I. received 100,000 US Dollars from G. who has been released from serving his sentence and confiscation of his assets. He thus helped G. avoid his liabilities vis-à-vis his... creditors.’ They go on to describe I.’s ‘tricks’ (проделки) on two pages! [A5] And here is the response of the Supreme Court’s President to the above-quoted episode: [there followed a quote from a letter of the President of the Supreme Court stating that in April 1998 I. had been reprimanded for a breach of professional ethics by the Qualifications Commission of Judges]. So I. has been ‘duly punished’ at the very dawn of his career. It appears that the lesson did him good since our offices have no information about the highest judge of the region receiving any subsequent reprimands. A new person became the Supreme Court’s President soon afterwards and I. could feel more confident. Perhaps his relative at the Supreme Court helped to make it so [A6]. A relative so influential that he is now awaiting his appointment to the Constitutional Court... ... And now I.’s 10-year term as judge is coming to an end. New laws provide for lifetime appointment by a majority vote in Parliament. And here our President ‘has made himself famous’ nationwide (‘прославился’ на всю страну). [A7] [The article then mentioned Judge O., whose resignation was discussed at the same plenary sitting of Parliament as I.’s appointment] But Mr I. is a ‘hard nut to crack’ and is dreaming of keeping his post no matter what (‘крепкий орешек’ и, несмотря ни на что, он мечтает сохранить пост). [A8]” 12. The first page of the article also contained extensive quotes from articles previously published in February, April and May 2005 in the same newspaper, in particular one dated 28 April 2005 which discussed assets allegedly belonging to I. and his relatives. That article contained quotes from a letter of the chairman of the Council of Judges dated 8 April 2005. The letter contained an acknowledgement that Judge D., President of the Civil Division of the Supreme Court, was the father-in-law of I.’s son. 13. Almost the entire second page of the article was taken up by the verbatim reproduction of the transcript of Parliament’s plenary sitting of 12 January 2006 at which Parliament examined questions about the appointment and resignation of a number of judges. According to the transcript, several MPs said that they had received complaints about the situation in the Kherson Region’s courts. I. denied any wrongdoing and stated that all complaints had been checked by the appropriate authorities and found baseless. The head of the relevant parliamentary committee stated that the committee had also conducted an inquiry into complaints raised about I. and found them to be groundless. He also implied that I. might have been a victim of a slander campaign orchestrated by aggrieved litigants. However, in view of the concerns raised by several MPs, I.’s candidature was withdrawn for additional checks. A brief discussion followed concerning Judge O., from one of the district courts of the Kherson Region, who had presented her resignation to Parliament. One of the MPs made a speech to the effect that Judge O. had resigned to avoid responsibility for bribery. 14. The newspaper’s reproduction of the transcript was followed by the following conclusion: “As you can see, dear readers, representatives of the Kherson justice system have ‘distinguished themselves’ twice. It was not only Mr I. who disgraced himself in front of the entire country [A9] but also his subordinate from one of the district courts.” 15. Mr I.’s photograph was displayed on the first page of the article, covering approximately one sixth of the page. He was shown in formal attire, with a neutral facial expression, apparently sitting at a desk. Under the photograph the following caption appeared: “I will recompense them according to their deeds (Old Testament)[1] Mr I. is shown in the photo” 16. In the same issue of the newspaper another photograph of I. was published with the caption “Parliament so far has not given a ‘life sentence’ to the president of the Kherson Court of Appeal”. The copy of the article provided to the Court by the applicant company does not contain that second photograph. 17. Within the next two weeks other newspapers published at least three articles commenting in critical terms on the Parliamentary session dedicated to I.’s appointment and his activities in general. 18. I. brought a claim in the Kherson Suvorovsky District Court against the applicant company seeking retraction of statements A1-A9 and compensation for non-pecuniary damage. He argued that the publication in the newspaper, which had a circulation of 62,500, had negatively influenced his professional reputation and public opinion of the judicial system at large, triggering actions aimed at putting pressure on the courts, namely numerous demonstrations outside the region’s courthouses. 19. The case was tried by Judge S. (trial judge). 20. According to the applicant company, in the course of the trial it produced, by way of proof of the factual grounds for the impugned statements, twenty‑five articles published in the local newspapers from 1997 to 2006. 21. On 16 April 2006 the applicant company lodged an application with the Supreme Court urging it to reassign the case, in view of the plaintiff’s position, to a court in a different region (see paragraph 42 below for the relevant domestic legal provision). It argued, in particular, that the trial judge had previously examined a claim lodged by I.’s son, himself a vice president of a district court in Kherson, and had allegedly breached the law in those proceedings. It also argued that, as a long-term president of the Kherson Regional Court of Appeal, I. had supervisory functions in respect of all judges in the region. 22. On 28 April 2006 the applicant company asked the first-instance court to postpone hearings in the case until the Supreme Court had ruled on its reassignment application. I. objected. The court decided not to postpone the hearings. 23. On 19 May 2006 the applicant company asked the court to suspend proceedings in the case under Article 201 of the Code of Civil Procedure (see paragraph 43 below) pending examination by the Supreme Court of its application for case reassignment. The court refused. The applicant company challenged the trial judge on the grounds that he had rejected its request to suspend the proceedings. The judge rejected the challenge. 24. On 22 May 2006 the first-instance court delivered its judgment allowing the claim. (i) The court declared: (a) the photographs and captions to them and statements A1-A5 and A7-A9 baseless, insulting and damaging to I.’s reputation, and (b) statement A6 untrue and damaging to I.’s reputation. (ii) The court ordered the applicant company to publish its judgment and awarded I. 100,000 Ukrainian hryvnyas (UAH) in compensation for non‑pecuniary damage and UAH 5,000 in court fees (about 14,860 euros and 740 euros (EUR) respectively at the time). (iii) By way of reasoning the court stated that statements A1-A5 and A7‑A9 could not be protected as value judgments, since they were deliberately insulting. Article 10 § 2 of the Convention permitted restrictions on freedom of expression for the protection of the reputation of others. Neither the transcript of Parliament’s plenary sitting nor other documents before the court provided a factual basis for those statements. (iv) The defendant had failed to prove the truth of the factual statement A6 or to point to the source of that information. (v) As to the photographs, the court considered that the applicant company had failed to prove that I.’s photographs had been taken either with his consent or at a public event. While it was established that the photograph with the biblical quote (see paragraph 15 above) had been taken at an official meeting on 5 May 2005, it presented only I. and not the event in general and so was unrelated to the event. The defendant had thus exercised the choice of which fragments of the photographs to publish, selecting those where only the plaintiff was shown “in a certain light”. Combined with the captions added, this demonstrated that publication of the photographs was intended as an attack on the plaintiff’s honour and dignity. (vi) The totality of the circumstances showed, for the court, that the applicant company’s purpose in publishing the impugned statements and photographs was deliberately to damage I.’s reputation. 25. On 23 May 2006 the Supreme Court, apparently unaware that the examination of the case at first instance had already been completed, reassigned the case to a district court in the Mykolaiv Region on the grounds that “a judge was a party to the proceedings”. 26. The applicant company appealed against the first-instance court’s judgment arguing in particular that the court had not been impartial because it had refused, without giving particular reasons, to suspend proceedings while the reassignment application had been pending before the Supreme Court. The applicant company also argued that the first-instance court’s judgment was contrary to Article 10 of the Convention. 27. As to statement A6, the applicant company alleged that I.’s daughter-in-law (the wife of his son) was the daughter of D., who at the time was the President of the Civil Division of the Supreme Court. The plaintiff was not contesting that fact. The use of the term “perhaps” in statement A6 showed that it had been meant to communicate that the author was wondering whether a relative’s presence on the Supreme Court was protecting I. rather than being a positive affirmation that this was indeed the case. It was thus a value judgment and was true. 28. On 5 July 2006 the Supreme Court reassigned the case, at I.’s request, to the Zaporizhzhya Regional Court of Appeal. 29. On 18 August 2006 the Zaporizhzhya Regional Court of Appeal varied the judgment of the first-instance court and reaffirmed the essential part of its reasoning: (i) The Court of Appeal reduced the amounts awarded to UAH 20,000 for non-pecuniary damage and UAH 1,000 for court fees (about EUR 2,970 and 148 respectively at the time), having regard to the applicant company’s financial situation, and upheld the remainder of the first-instance court’s judgment. (ii) By way of reasoning, the Court of Appeal stated that, according to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, the fact that the subjects of published information had public status made such persons more open to criticism but did not deprive them of the right to sue to defend their reputation. (iii) The Court of Appeal found unconvincing the applicant company’s argument that it had pursued the legitimate aim of informing the public, as opposed to damaging I.’s reputation as President of the Regional Court. Given that the impugned statements and captions to the photographs had been presented as a narrative about certain circumstances (розповідь про певні обставини), the first-instance court’s conclusion that they could not be seen as value judgments, but rather as insults, had been justified. An insult was a statement made not with the purpose of communicating information but with the purpose of insulting a person. 30. In its appeal on points of law, the applicant company reiterated essentially the same arguments as in its previous appeal (see paragraph 27 above). As to statement A6, the applicant company added that a letter from the chairman of the Council of Judges of Ukraine dated 8 April 2005 and quoted in the impugned article (see paragraph 12 above) was in the file. The letter was addressed to a certain Mr B. and contained a detailed response to his complaints against I. The Council stated, in particular, that the fact that D. was the father of I.’s daughter-in-law did not mean that I. had abused his position. 31. On 10 March 2008 the Odessa Regional Court of Appeal, acting as the court of cassation, amended the lower courts’ decisions by rejecting I.’s claim for damages, retaining only the award of court fees (see paragraph 29 (i) above). It held that the very fact of the decisions in his favour constituted sufficient redress for I. It upheld the remainder of the lower courts’ decisions. It held, in particular, that the trial judge’s failure to suspend proceedings pending examination of the reassignment application by the Supreme Court did not constitute grounds for quashing its judgment. The court held that the aim of the impugned phrases had been solely to humiliate and disparage a representative of the judiciary and the phrases had made no contribution to the resolution of the problems in the administration of justice. Criticism of a judge was possible in the context of a public debate on problems related to inefficiencies in the judicial system or to a judge’s lack of independence or impartiality. However, the impugned article had not discussed those issues. 32. As concerns the matter of impartiality of the first-instance court’s judge, the Court of Appel made no comment. The court of cassation stated that the fact that that judge had refused to suspend the proceedings and had rejected the challenge against himself (see paragraph 23 above) did not constitute grounds for quashing the lower courts’ decisions. 33. The article, published in the issue of the newspaper dated 11-18 May 2006, was authored by Ms K., who was at the time the director of the applicant company, and entitled “Ex-court president is ‘burying’ Lady Justice under his claims (Экс-председатель суда «завалил» Фемиду исками)”. Its relevant parts read: “Claims raining down on the independent media of the Kherson Region from Mr I., who until recently used to be President of the Regional Court of Appeal, cannot be called anything other than a trend. Newspapers which take a consistent line in favour of a just and honest judicial system are being targeted. It seems that I. ‘has had enough’ of a clear and consistent position of Mr S., the head of the Kherson City committee of the Union of Retired Officers of the Armed Forces and Law Enforcement. Following a defamation claim against the Grivna newspaper, Mr I. also sued the VIK newspaper which had published S.’s open letter to the [regional governor]. S. had asked the governor to state his position concerning the events which became a topic for examination in the Parliament and are constantly in the newspapers. In his letter the author appealed to the government’s representative in the hope that he would not remain an impartial observer but could influence the situation as regards justice in the region. [B1] Claims of retired servicemen seeking increases in their pensions to which they are entitled by law have been pending before the courts of the region for two years. While in other regions pensioners get the money to which they are entitled by law, in our region only several dozen pensioners managed to get their money. Why do the courts work this way in our region? [B2] ... Remarkably, this publication in the VIK newspaper was not the end of contacts between S. and I. Literally days after the publication of that issue, the letter writer and the judge had a conversation, at the request of the latter. S. says that a dressing-down is the only term that can describe the tone of the ‘conversation’. After this meeting the officer’s hope of establishing a dialogue with the judge and of clarifying the situation collapsed. This was the subject of a new open letter he addressed directly to Mr I. And then something totally unexpected for the retired submarine officer happened: he was attacked at night by strangers, received a serious blow to the head, obliging him to be hospitalised. A coincidence? The relevant authorities could answer this question but they initially refused to register S.’s complaint about the attack. He has not been informed about the results of the investigation. [B3] This is the short story of the [contacts between S. and I.] The final touch to the story will be a court judgment on the defamation claim. The claim will be examined by the same Judge St. of the Suvorovsky District Court who surprisingly gets to examine I.’s claims. In contrast to the case against our newspaper, where I. is seeking damages for himself, in the case against VIK his claims are entirely selfless. He is asking that damages be paid to [an orphanage]. Charity is of course a laudable enterprise, but the editorial boards of both Grivna and VIK understand that the point of the operation is not to get some money (затеяно все далеко не из-за желания получить деньги). [B4] Most likely, court decisions... in his favour would come in handy for I. when Parliament again examines the question of his lifetime appointment. Claims granted at first instance and on appeal may serve as proof for the argument that journalists’ unjustified attacks (this is how Lady Justice’s servants call our critical publications) are made up and baseless. [B5] Especially because Judge St. does not take into account a seemingly logical idea... that if one of the parties is a court or a judge then the case should be examined by a higher court... [B6]” 34. I. brought a claim against the applicant company and K., seeking retraction of statements B1-B6 and compensation for non-pecuniary damage. As regards, in particular, statement B3, the plaintiff submitted that it was based entirely on S.’s account of the events and that the author of the article had made no attempt to obtain the version of the Kherson Regional Court’s staff. As far as the attack on S. was concerned, the story was presented in such a way as to generate a “cheap sensation” by creating the impression that I. was somehow implicated in the attack. 35. According to the applicant company, in the course of the trial it produced as proof of the factual grounds for the impugned statements twenty-four articles published in the local newspapers from 1997 to 2006. 36. The applicant company also produced the letter from S. to the regional governor, reference to which was made in statements B1 and B2. In the letter, dated 14 February 2006, S. stated that I. possessed property which could not be explained by his lawful income and that the Parliament had refused to appoint I. on a permanent basis. The region “was one of the last in Ukraine in terms of delivering lawful, just decisions in cases of retired military officers who sought to defend their right to a decent pension” in the courts. S. asked the governor to explain why I. was still allowed to remain in the position of the President of the Regional Court and why the governor did not intervene. 37. On 19 August 2006 the Zaporizhzhya Shevchenkivsky District Court allowed the claim in part, ordering the author of the article to apologise by retracting statements B1-B5 and the applicant company to publish the retraction in the newspaper. The court awarded UAH 50,000 (about EUR 7,450 at the time) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage, from the defendants jointly and severally, to be paid to an orphanage. The following elements of the District Court’s reasoning are worthy of note. (i) Referring to Article 10 of the Convention the court stated that the public status of the subjects of publications did not deprive them of the right to protection of their reputation. Even though the impugned statements constituted value judgments, they were insulting. (ii) According to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights the fact that subjects of the published information had public status made such persons more open to criticism but did not deprive them of the right to sue to defend their reputation. (iii) The impugned statements were insulting. The defendants had failed to provide evidence of grounds for such statements and the evidence they did provide did not contain incontrovertible facts which would allow assessment of the person of the plaintiff and the work of the court over which he presided (не містять беззаперечних фактів, які б дозволили оцінити особу і діяльність суду). (iv) Referring to Article 5 of the Information Act setting out objectivity as one of the principles of information relations (see paragraph 49 below), the court said that the implementation of that principle in respect of value judgments meant that they had to have a basis. Freedom of the press and protection offered to elements of provocation in journalistic expression could not justify baseless criticism with insulting elements, as had occurred in the case. (v) That position was in accordance with the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. In Lingens v. Austria (8 July 1986, § 46, Series A no. 103) it had stressed the need to distinguish between facts and value judgments, the truth of which was not susceptible of proof. At the same time the District Court stressed the following quote from the same paragraph of Lingens: “The Court notes in this connection that the facts on which Mr. Lingens founded his value-judgment were undisputed, as was also his good faith.” (vi) The District Court went on to note that the defendants had failed to provide proof that the facts which the journalist evaluated in the impugned article were undisputed/incontrovertible (доказів незаперечності оцінених журналістом фактів у даній справі відповідачі суду не надали)[2] and, therefore, the court did not consider that they had acted in good faith in accordance with Article 5 of the Information Act. The court concluded that the defendants’ intention was not to inform the public but rather to spread negative information about the plaintiff. (vii) The court refused to declare statement B6 defamatory. 38. On 14 November 2006 the Zaporizhzhya Regional Court of Appeal upheld the judgment but modified it to the effect that damages were to be paid to I. and not the orphanage, since domestic law did not allow for the possibility of directing the funds awarded to a plaintiff to a third party charitable institution. The Court of Appeal agreed with the lower court’s assessment of the amount of damages, account being taken of the plaintiff’s moral suffering and disruption of his social ties, including as a public official. The first-instance court had not established that the journalist had acted in good faith and checked the information she disseminated and, accordingly, no exemption from liability under the State Support of Media Act applied (see paragraph 51 below). The Court of Appeal stated that an insult was a statement which was uttered not with the aim of disseminating information but with the aim of humiliating a person. 39. On 21 December 2007 the Odessa Regional Court of Appeal, acting as the court of cassation, upheld the lower courts’ decisions. It stated that the Court of Appeal’s decision was in accordance with the substantive and procedural law and there were no legal grounds to quash it. 40. On 2 November 2006 I. was appointed to the position of judge on a permanent basis and continued to hold the position of President of the Kherson Regional Court of Appeal until 2012.

6. The applicants, Petra Wunderlich, who was born in 1967, and Dirk Wunderlich, who was born in 1966, are married to each other. 7. The applicants are the parents of four children: M. (born in July 1999), J. (born in September 2000), H. (born in April 2002) and S. (born in September 2005). 8. The applicants reject the State school system and compulsory school attendance and wish to homeschool their children themselves. In 2005 their oldest daughter, M., reached school age. The applicants refused to register her in a school. Several regulatory fines and criminal proceedings were conducted against the applicants for failing to comply with rules on compulsory school attendance. The applicants accepted these decisions and paid the fines, but did not change their behaviour. 9. Between 2008 and 2011 the applicants lived with their children abroad. In 2011 they returned to live permanently in Germany, but did not register their children with any school. 10. By a letter of 13 July 2012 the State Education Authority (staatliches Schulamt – hereinafter “the Education Authority”) informed the competent family court that the applicants were deliberately and persistently refusing to send their children to school and provided a chronological list of administrative fines and criminal investigations against the applicants – amongst others for hitting one of the daughters – as well as of other incidents since 2005. The Education Authority concluded that the children were growing up in a “parallel world” without any contact with their peers and that they received no attention of any kind which would enable them to have a part in communal life in Germany. It therefore suggested a court measure under Article 1666 of the German Civil Code (see paragraph 25 below), arguing the children’s best interests were endangered owing to their being systematically deprived of the opportunity to participate in “normal” life. The youth office (Jugendamt – hereinafter: “the youth office”) supported the request of the Education Authority. It considered that the persistent refusal of the applicants endangered the best interests of the children. 11. The Darmstadt Family Court initiated court proceedings and heard testimony from the applicants, their children and the youth office. It also appointed a guardian ad litem for the children. In the oral hearing, on 6 September 2012, the applicants stated that they had paid the administrative fines imposed on them for not sending the children to school and that, despite the State sanctions, they would continue to homeschool their children. Already in a previous written submission the applicants had confirmed their unwillingness to send their children to school and had stated that the authorities would have to remove their children from the family home and take them away from them entirely if the children were ever to go to a State school. The children explained during the hearing that it was primarily their mother who taught all four children and that school normally started at 10 a.m. and lasted until 3 p.m., with a break for lunch, which was prepared by their mother. 12. On 6 September 2012 the Darmstadt Family Court withdrew the applicants’ right to determine their children’s place of residence, their right to take decisions on school matters and right to apply to the authorities on behalf of their children, and transferred these rights to the youth office. It also ordered the applicants to hand their children over to the youth office for enforcement of the rules on compulsory school attendance and authorised the youth office to use force if necessary. In its reasoning the court stated that the parents’ persistent refusal to send their children to a State school or a recognised grant-aided independent school not only violated section 67 of the Hesse School Act (Hessisches Schulgesetz) (see paragraph 31 below) but also represented an abuse of parental authority which risked damaging the children’s best interests in the long term. Independent from the question of whether it could be ensured that the children were acquiring sufficient knowledge through the applicants’ homeschooling, the children’s not attending school was preventing them from becoming part of the community and learning social skills such as tolerance, assertiveness and the ability to assert their own convictions against majority-held views. The court found that the children needed to be exposed to influences other than those of their parental home to acquire those skills. Lastly, the court concluded that no less severe measures were available. Owing to the persistent refusal of the applicants to send their children to school, only withdrawing parts of parental authority could ensure the children’s continual attendance at school and would prevent them suffering harm on account of them being educated at home. 13. The applicants appealed against that decision. 14. In a letter dated 15 November 2012 the youth office informed the applicants that it intended to assess the children’s knowledge on 22 November 2012 and asked the applicants to have their children ready to be collected on that day. On 22 November 2012 a member of staff of the youth office, acting as the children’s guardian, attempted to take the children to the Education Authority’s premises to conduct the learning assessment. The children refused to go with him. A second attempt to take the children to the learning assessment on the same day by two members of the public-order office and a police patrol also failed on account of the children’s refusal to accompany them. In a letter dated 10 December 2012 the applicants were notified of two dates (19 December 2012 and 17 January 2013) on which the children were to be assessed at home. The applicants submitted statements to the Education Authority in which they informed the latter that the children did not wish to participate in the assessment. In a letter dated 20 December 2012 the Education Authority informed the applicants’ lawyer that in order to ensure the children’s school attendance the children would, among other things, firstly have to undergo a learning assessment. At the same time the parents were informed that the appointment of 19 December 2012 had been cancelled, but the appointment of 17 January 2013 still stood. However, staff of the Education Authority were not allowed to enter the family home when they arrived for the appointment in January 2013. The father spoke to the members of staff and explained that he believed that the Family Court’s decision had been unlawful and that he alone was authorised to decide whether his children attended school or not. 15. On 25 April 2013 the Frankfurt am Main Court of Appeal rejected the parents’ appeal, but clarified that the applicants retained the right to determine their children’s place of residence during school holidays in Hesse. At the outset the court noted that up to that date the children had not attended school, even though the decision of the Darmstadt Family Court had not been suspended. It also observed that all attempts to conduct a learning assessment had failed on account of the children’s and the parents’ resistance. As to the law, the court outlined that the decision to withdraw parts of parental authority under Articles 1666 and 1666a of the Civil Code (see paragraphs 25 and 26 below) presupposed a significant endangerment of the best interests of the children, which the parents were unable or unwilling to prevent. To establish such an endangerment, a process of balancing the various interests had to be undertaken, during which the rights and interests of the children and of the parents as well as the interests of society had to be considered. In particular, a withdrawal of parental authority could not be justified to enable children to receive the best possible education but only to prevent any endangerment of children. Applying these principles to the case at hand, the court concluded that the applicants’ persistent refusal to ensure that their children attended school risked damaging the best interests of the children. According to the court, the children’s best interests were in concrete danger on account of them being kept in a “symbiotic” family system and being denied an education which met standards which were both well recognised and fundamentally important for growing up in society. The education they were receiving from the applicants could not compensate for not attending school. Five hours of homeschooling – including a lunch break –, which was conducted concurrently for all four children, could not suffice to offer each child a range of schooling appropriate to his or her age. In addition, the children were also not members of any sports club, music school or similar organisation where they could acquire other skills important for their education. The court also noted that the applicants’ submissions as a whole showed that their main concern was creating a strong attachment between the children and their parents to the exclusion of others. Moreover, by their persistent refusal they were also teaching the children that they did not need to comply with the rules of community life if they found them disagreeable. Lastly, the Court of Appeal found that there were no less severe measures available, since merely issuing instructions would have been ineffective, as shown by the applicants’ previous conduct and submissions. Consequently, the withdrawal of parts of parental authority by the Family Court had been correct. 16. On 9 October 2014 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to accept the applicants’ constitutional complaint for adjudication, without providing reasons. The decision was served upon the applicants on 16 October 2014. 17. In later proceedings (see paragraph 23 below) the Frankfurt am Main Court of Appeal transferred the right to determine the children’s place of residence back to the applicants on 15 August 2014. 18. On 26 August 2013 the youth office arranged a meeting between the applicants, their lawyer, the youth office and the Education Authority. During the meeting the applicants declared that they refused – on principle – to have their children schooled outside the family. In addition, Mr Wunderlich stated, amongst other things, that he considered children to be the ‘property’ of their parents. 19. On 29 August 2013 the applicants’ children were removed from the parental home and placed in a children’s home. The children had to be carried out of the house individually with the help of police officers after they had refused to comply with the court bailiff’s requests to come out voluntarily. 20. On 12 September 2013 and on 16 September 2013 the knowledge of the applicants’ children was assessed for ninety minutes each during two school appointments with a view to determining the children’s appropriate class and schooling requirements. 21. In written submissions dated 10 September 2013 concerning other ongoing proceedings before the Family Court the applicants agreed to the children’s attending school. On 19 September 2013 the court heard testimony from the applicants, their children and a member of staff of the Education Authority. The children were subsequently handed back to the applicants that same day, since the applicants were now willing to allow their children to attend school. 22. Following the return of the children on 19 September 2013, they attended school for the school year of 2013-14. On 16 May 2014 the Education Authority lodged a criminal complaint against the applicants for failing to comply with rules on compulsory school attendance. On 25 June 2014 the applicants again withdrew their children from school. 23. On 15 August 2014, in parallel proceedings, the Frankfurt am Main Court of Appeal transferred the right to determine the children’s place of residence back to the applicants. The court held that, as pointed out in its decision of 25 April 2013 (see paragraph 15 above), the applicants’ persistent refusal to send their children to school constituted child endangerment and that neither their temporary schooling nor the learning assessment of the children had changed that conclusion. However, the court continued, the situation had changed in comparison to that of August 2013, at which point – according to the information provided by the youth office – several elements had led to the children’s removal from the family home: a risk emanating from the children’s father to their physical integrity could not be excluded; failed attempts to bring the children to school by the police had led to the risk of the children internalising the attitude that laws had had no bearing on them; attempts to carry out a learning assessment had failed owing to the resistance of the applicants; and according to the information available at the time, it had been possible to assume that the children had had no contact with anyone outside of the family whatsoever. According to the information gathered since the removal of the children by the youth office, any risk to their physical integrity emanating from the applicants could now be excluded. Moreover, the learning assessment had showed that the knowledge level of the children was not alarming and that the children were not being kept from school against their will. Since permanent removal of the children from their parents would be the only possible way to ensure the continued schooling of the children, this was no longer proportionate as it would have a greater impact on the children than being homeschooled by their parents. The Court of Appeal however emphasised that the present decision should not be understood as permission for the applicants to homeschool their children. In that regard it observed that the Education Authority had already lodged a criminal complaint against the applicants for failing to comply with the rules on compulsory school attendance, which carried a maximum sentence of six months’ imprisonment.

6. On 21 November 2016 the Civil and Criminal Court (Tribunale Civile e Penale) of Rome decided to issue a warrant for the applicant’s arrest, as he was suspected of tax evasion, money laundering, embezzlement and membership of a transnational criminal organisation. On 13 December 2016, via a “Red Notice” issued through Interpol, the Italian judicial authorities requested the applicant’s provisional arrest (voorlopige aanhouding) for the purpose of extradition. On the same day the applicant was arrested in Sint Maarten, brought before the Procurator General (procureur-generaal) and detained in Philipsburg Police Station. 7. On 15 December 2016 the applicant was brought before the investigating judge (rechter-commissaris), who found the continuance of the applicant’s provisional arrest lawful. 8. In the days following his arrest the applicant was visited several times by a doctor, who found that the applicant had received treatment for a malignancy on his tongue in 2015, and that this should be monitored regularly. In addition, the applicant’s blood pressure was too high. He was prescribed medication, and after a few days the applicant’s blood pressure had sufficiently decreased. According to a letter from the doctor to the public prosecutor, dated 23 December 2016, the applicant was in good health, was not experiencing any exacerbations of past ailments at that time, and his blood pressure was responding well to medical treatment. The doctor concluded that there were no medical impediments to the applicant’s detention. 9. On 19 December 2016 the applicant lodged an application with the Joint Court of Justice of Aruba, Curaçao, Sint Maarten and of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba (Gemeenschappelijk Hof van Justitie van Aruba, Curaçao, Sint Maarten en van Bonaire, Sint Eustatius en Saba, hereinafter “the Joint Court”), requesting the suspension of his detention. The applicant argued under Article 5 § 1(f) of the Convention that deprivation of liberty should be the ultimum remedium, in that a person should only be deprived of his liberty when this was strictly necessary and the aim pursued could not be achieved in a less restrictive manner. In his opinion, his fragile state of health and considerable business interests in Sint Maarten opposed (a continuation of) his detention. The Procurator General opposed suspension of the applicant’s detention, arguing that there was a high risk of absconding, given that the applicant was a wealthy businessman in whose home two identity cards from Columbia and the Dominican Republic had been found during a search, and that he had use of a private jet in the United States of America. Against this background, only deprivation of liberty could prevent the applicant from finding ways to evade extradition. 10. On 20 December 2016 the Sint Maarten prosecution authorities apparently decided to transfer the applicant from Sint Maarten to Curaçao, another country within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The applicant filed an appeal against that decision with the Joint Court. 11. On 4 January 2017 the Joint Court rejected the applicant’s request for suspension of his detention. It found that, under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, it was competent to examine the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention. It noted that the applicant had not established that he was unable to receive adequate medical care in detention or that his business interests were at risk. It further took into account that the Italian authorities had not yet filed a formal extradition request, whereas the forty-day time-limit for doing so under Article 16 § 4 of the European Convention on Extradition had not yet expired. The Joint Court, taking all interests at stake into consideration – including the Procurator General’s substantiated claim that there was a high risk of absconding – decided to reject the applicant’s request for suspension of his detention. No further appeal lay against that decision. 12. On 12 January 2017 the formal request for the applicant’s extradition to Italy, dated 30 December 2016, was received by the Minister Plenipotentiary of Sint Maarten (Gevolmachtigd Minister van Sint Maarten). 13. On 3 February 2017 the Procurator General filed a request for the applicant’s extradition with the Joint Court. A hearing was initially fixed for 21 March 2017 but, at the applicant’s request, was rescheduled for 16 May 2017. 14. On 7 February 2017 the applicant filed a fresh application with the Joint Court, requesting that his detention be either terminated or suspended. He argued, inter alia, that the prospects of his extradition being found permissible were at best highly doubtful, in the absence of guarantees by the Italian authorities that he would be allowed to serve a possible prison sentence in Sint Maarten or elsewhere in the Kingdom of the Netherlands and that a sentence imposed in Italy would be converted into a penal sanction prescribed by Dutch law for the same offence. He further argued that his serious health condition – considered in the light of the inadequate medical care and hygiene in the detention centres of Sint Maarten, as found by the Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) in various reports – and his considerable business interests necessitated suspension of his detention pending extradition. He lastly argued that the police cells in which he had been held since 13 December 2016 were neither intended nor suitable for longer periods of detention. 15. On 22 February 2017 the Joint Court accepted the applicant’s appeal against the decision of 20 December 2016 to transfer him to Curaçao. It found that the Procurator General of Sint Maarten was not competent under the applicable statutory provisions to have free use of the detention facilities in other countries within the Kingdom. It therefore quashed the decision of 20 December 2016 and prohibited the Sint Maarten Public Prosecution Department or the Procurator General from transferring the applicant from his place of detention in Sint Maarten to another place of detention in another country within the Kingdom. 16. On 8 March 2017 the Joint Court rejected the applicant’s request of 7 February 2017. As regards the permissibility of the extradition request, it considered that it could not act in anticipation of the actual extradition procedure. The question before it at that time concerned the lawfulness of the detention pending extradition. On this point, it found that all formalities for the applicant’s detention pending extradition had been satisfied. It noted that the Procurator General was opposed to terminating or suspending the detention, arguing that there was still a high risk of absconding. It further noted that the personal situation of the applicant relating to his medical situation and business interests – the grounds he relied on in his request – had already been taken into account in its decision of 4 January 2017, and it did not appear that, two months later, there were facts or circumstances which should lead to another conclusion. Lastly, the Joint Court saw no reason to grant the applicant bail. 17. On 13 March 2017 the applicant was visited by a dentist, who diagnosed a gum/periodontal infection around a tooth which had to be extracted. In addition, the dentist prescribed antibiotics and a disinfectant for irritated gums. The dentist recommended that the applicant be provided with vitamin B and iron to cope with vitamin and mineral deficiencies. He further recommended that the applicant be seen by a dentist every three to four months to avoid similar infections. On 3 April 2017 the dentist reported that the infection had subsided but the build-up of plaque was already visible again, and this was probably due to the lack of possibilities for adequate oral hygiene. 18. Meanwhile, on 21 March 2017 the applicant had lodged a new petition with the Joint Court, requesting either termination or suspension of his detention, or a transfer to the sickbay at Point Blanche Prison in Sint Maarten. Relying on a CPT report of 25 August 2015 (see paragraph 29 below) and the Court’s considerations in the case of Muršić v. Croatia ([GC], no. 7334/13, §§ 138-41, ECHR 2016), the applicant argued that there was at least a strong presumption that the conditions of his detention should be regarded as contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. On this point, he submitted that for three months he had been staying in a cell measuring 16 square metres which he often had to share with five or sometimes even six other persons. Furthermore, the cells were dark and unhygienic and there was a foul smell. He further submitted that the unhygienic circumstances had caused the infection diagnosed by the dentist on 13 March 2017. 19. On 12 April 2017 the Joint Court rejected the applicant’s request of 21 March 2017. It noted that the Procurator General opposed the request, submitting that it was a fact of common knowledge that the prison infrastructure of Sint Maarten offered room for improvement, but that this was the responsibility of the Minister of Justice of Sint Maarten. The applicant could be transferred to Curaçao, where the conditions of detention were better, but the applicant had opposed such a transfer. If he consented to a transfer, he could find himself a spacious single-occupancy cell in Curaçao within a matter of days. The Joint Court further noted that on two previous occasions it had considered and rejected requests filed by the applicant to suspend or terminate his detention, and it found no substantial change of (personal) circumstances warranting a different finding as regards the applicant’s deprivation of liberty. In this respect the Joint Court took into account that during the hearing on 4 April 2017, on which his request was examined, it was confirmed that the applicant by that time was no longer detained in a multi-occupancy cell, but in a single-occupancy cell, that he daily received vitamins and that, if he wished so, he could see a doctor or dentist. It also took into account that, in reply to an explicit question it had put to him about a possible voluntary transfer to Curaçao, the applicant had indicated that this was not an option for him. Lastly, it found no medical reason for the applicant to be transferred to the sickbay of Point Blanche Prison. 20. On 20 April 2017 the applicant was visited by his general practitioner, who, in a written statement dated 23 April 2017, expressed surprise at the fact that the applicant had only been seen by a doctor once whilst in detention. The general practitioner found that the applicant’s blood pressure was too high. In addition, he found that the scar caused by the surgical removal of the malignancy on the applicant’s tongue could give cause for concern, and recommended that the applicant be seen by a specialist as soon as possible. 21. On 20 June 2017, following a hearing held on 16 May 2017, the Joint Court declared the applicant’s extradition permissible on the basis of the facts as set out in the decision of 21 November 2016 of the Civil and Criminal Court of Rome, facts which also constituted criminal offences under the laws of Sint Maarten. Having found that the extradition request complied with the applicable formal and material requirements, the Joint Court advised the Governor (Gouverneur) of Sint Maarten to proceed with the applicant’s extradition to Italy. The applicant filed an appeal in cassation with the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad). 22. On 23 June 2017 the Joint Court rejected a fourth request by the applicant for suspension of his detention pending extradition. The applicant had filed that request during the hearing of 16 May 2017, arguing, inter alia, that his detention was not or was no longer compatible with his rights under Article 3, Article 5 and Article 6 § 2 of the Convention because of the deplorable conditions and duration of his detention, and the lack of justification for his detention. The Joint Court noted, amongst other things, that the applicant was a very wealthy man who had travelled extensively in the past and who apparently had close ties with the Dominican Republic, from where extradition would not be possible. It further noted that the applicant had been detained at Philipsburg Police Station since his arrest because, being a wealthy man, he could not be held in the remand centre of Point Blanche Prison for safety reasons, which, in the circumstances, justified his detention at the Philipsburg Police Station. In respect of the duration of his detention at that facility, the Joint Court noted that, although on legal grounds it had prohibited the Sint Maarten Prosecution Department from transferring the applicant – who had fiercely opposed such a transfer – to a place of detention in another country within the Kingdom of the Netherlands, it remained open to the applicant to consent voluntarily to such a transfer. It further held that, despite the critical submissions of the defence about the applicant’s conditions of detention, and taking all circumstances of the case at hand into account, the detention situation was not unlawful. 23. On 4 August 2017, after the applicant had withdrawn his appeal in cassation on 21 July 2017 without indicating any specific reason, the Governor of Sint Maarten approved the applicant’s extradition. On 16 August 2017 the applicant was extradited to Italy.

4. The applicants are Russian nationals who, at the material time, lived in the Chechen Republic. Their personal details are set out in the appended table. They are close relatives of individuals who disappeared after allegedly being unlawfully detained by servicemen during special operations. The events concerned took place in areas under the full control of the Russian federal forces. The applicants have not seen their missing relatives since the alleged arrests. 5. The applicants reported the abductions to law‑enforcement bodies, and official investigations were opened. The proceedings were repeatedly suspended and resumed, and have remained pending for several years without any tangible results being achieved. The applicants lodged requests for information and assistance in the search for their relatives with the investigating authorities and various law-enforcement bodies. Their requests received either only formal responses or none at all. The perpetrators have not been identified by the investigating bodies. 6. Summaries of the facts in respect of each application are set out below. Each account is based on statements provided by the applicants and their relatives and/or neighbours to both the Court and the domestic investigative authorities. The Government did not dispute the principal facts of the cases, as presented by the applicants, but questioned the involvement of servicemen in the events. 7. The applicant is the wife of Mr Vait Askhabov, who was born in 1976. 8. At about 3 p.m. on 12 March 2001 a convoy of military vehicles, supported by four helicopters, arrived in the village of Chiri-Yurt. Mr Vait Askhabov at that time was working in his garden. As the main part of the convoy was passing along the main street, two armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and four military lorries stopped next to his garden and their crew started to repair one of the APCs. Shortly thereafter something exploded next to the APC. The servicemen immediately cordoned off the area, including the applicant’s house. They went to the garden fence and ordered Mr Vait Askhabov to climb over the fence and come to them. They then forced him into a military Ural lorry and did not let anyone come close to that lorry. About thirty minutes later they drove away with Mr Vait Askhabov. Several people, including Mr Vait Askhabov’s sister (Ms L.A.) and his neighbours (Ms Z.Kh., and Ms A.U.) witnessed the incident. The applicant submitted to the Court their written statements, which confirmed the applicant’s account of the events. Mr Vait Askhabov has been missing ever since. 9. On 13 March 2001 the applicant complained to the Shali district prosecutor’s office of Mr Vait Askhabov’s abduction. 10. On 12 July 2001 the Shali district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 23132 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code of Russia (“CC”) (abduction). Four days later Mr Vait Askhabov’s father was granted victim status in the criminal proceedings. 11. In September 2001 (the exact date is illegible) the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 12. On 31 July 2002 the Shali District Court declared Mr Vait Askhabov a missing person. 13. On 24 February 2004 the applicant asked the Ombudsman of Chechnya to request the investigators to conduct an effective investigation. 14. On 19 March 2004 the investigation was resumed. The investigator sent several requests for the persons involved in the operation of 12 March 2001 to be identified, but to no avail. A month later the investigation was suspended. 15. On 23 December 2004 the investigation was resumed in order for the crime scene to be examined and several persons to be questioned concerning Mr Vait Askhabov’s possible membership in illegal armed groups. The persons questioned denied that possibility. A month later the investigation was suspended. 16. On 28 May 2007 the applicant complained to the President of the Chechen Republic that the investigation had been ineffective. That complaint was forwarded to the investigators. 17. On an unspecified date in June 2007 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Shali District Court alleging that the investigation had been ineffective and that the investigators had failed to take basic steps. 18. On 29 June 2007 the Shali District Court allowed the claim. It noted that the investigation had not achieved any positive results, that it had been deliberately protracted, and that the applicant had been denied access to the criminal case file. The court ordered the investigator to take all necessary investigative steps and to provide the applicant with access to the case-file documents. 19. Subsequently, the proceedings were resumed on 11 December 2007 and 7 March 2008, and suspended on 12 January and 7 April 2008, respectively, without attaining tangible results. 20. On 31 January 2011, following strong criticism from the Shali district prosecutor’s office, the proceedings were resumed. 21. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 22. The first applicant is the wife of Mr Shamkhan Murdalov, who was born in 1977. The second applicant is his mother. The third, fourth and fifth applicants are his children. 23. Mr Shamkhan Murdalov was a member of illegal armed groups during Russia’s first military campaign in Chechnya between 1994 and 1996. 24. On the morning of 21 May 2004 Mr Shamkhan Murdalov – with his relative, Mr R.B., and acquaintance, Mr Kh.Z. – left his home in the village of Valerik and went to Grozny to buy building supplies. On their way, at the entrance to Grozny, at the Chernorechensky traffic police station, they were stopped by a group of about ten armed police officers in uniforms. Some of the police officers were in balaclavas; those without were of Slavic and Chechen appearance. They forced Mr Shamkhan Murdalov, Mr R.B. and Mr Kh.Z. out of the car, pulled black plastic bags over their heads, put them into a Gazel vehicle parked nearby and drove off in the direction of Grozny. The arrest was witnessed by several persons. 25. The applicants submitted to the Court written statements by Ms M.D. (Mr Shamkhan Murdalov’s aunt) and Ms P.M. (a resident of Valerik), who witnessed the events. According to the submitted statements, on 21 May 2004 the women were traveling from Valerik to Grozny in a bus. When the bus was stopped at the traffic police station they witnessed the arrest of three men, one of whom they recognised as Mr Shamkhan Murdalov. 26. On 24 May 2004 Mr R.B. and Mr Kh.Z. were released. They stated that following their arrest they had been taken to the Russian military base in Khankala and questioned. 27. On the same date, 24 May 2004, the police arrived to search the applicants’ house. Instead of searching the entire house, the police officers went straight to the rooftop, where they found hidden machine guns and bullets. 28. The whereabouts of Mr Shamkhan Murdalov have been unknown since 21 May 2004. 29. After the abduction, the applicants requested a number of law enforcement agencies to provide assistance in the search for their relative. In particular, in December 2004 they complained to the military prosecutor’s office, the Chechnya prosecutor’s office and the Ministry of the Interior. 30. On 5 April 2005 the Zavodskoy district prosecutor’s office in Grozny opened criminal case no. 41035 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). Six days later the second applicant was granted victim status. 31. Over the following days the investigator questioned the second applicant, witnesses to the search of 24 May 2004, and a police officer from the Chernorechensky traffic police station. He confirmed that on 21 May 2004 a car with several passengers had been stopped by a special unit responsible for combatting unlawful armed groups. The passengers had been forced out of the car and taken in the direction of Grozny. 32. On 5 June 2005 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 33. On 19 January 2006 the proceedings were resumed. The investigators asked various authorities to provide information relevant to the proceedings, but no pertinent information was received. On 19 February 2006 the investigation was again suspended. 34. On 10 October 2007 the investigators’ superiors overruled the suspension owing to the need to question the traffic police officers who had witnessed the arrest. 35. In November 2007 the investigators obtained statements from the police officers on duty at the time of the arrest, Mr Kh.V, and Mr A.D. They stated that on 21 May 2004 officers from the North-Caucasus Regional Operative Military Headquarters and/or the Federal Security Service (“the FSB”) had arrived at their traffic police station and arrested three persons on suspicion of their being members of an illegal armed group. 36. On 19 November 2007 the proceedings were suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 37. Between June and December 2008 the proceedings were resumed and suspended on several occasions, but no tangible results were achieved. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 38. The first, second and third applicants are respectively the wife, daughter and son of Mr Rustam Makayev, who was born in 1973. 39. At about 2.20 a.m. on 1 December 2001 armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms arrived at the applicants’ house in the town of Urus‑Martan in an UAZ minivan, Ural lorries and an APC. Three or four servicemen entered the applicants’ house for an identity check, while the others entered the other house located in the same courtyard. The servicemen searched the applicants’ house, asked Mr Rustam Makayev a number of questions and took him to the courtyard, where another ten or eleven servicemen were waiting. One of them was filming the events on video camera. They then put Mr Rustam Makayev in the UAZ and drove off towards the centre of Urus-Martan. 40. In the morning the applicants went to the Urus‑Martan district military commander’s office, where the FSB officer, Mr. S.G., told them that Mr Rustam Makayev would be questioned and released in two hours. On the same day the applicants complained of the abduction to the Urus‑Martan prosecutor’s office. 41. According to the applicants, in January 2002 a person working at the Urus-Martan military commander’s office promised them that Mr Rustam Makayev would be released in return for their handing him over a gun. However, the next day the same person said that Mr Rustam Makayev had been transferred from FSB custody to the Main Intelligence Service and that he would not be able to release him. 42. According to the applicants, several days later a man at the Urus‑Martan military commander’s office asked them to provide him with a list of persons who had been abducted in the area. Sometime later he told the applicants that all of the abducted men on the list had been killed. 43. In October 2002 someone left a note in the applicants’ courtyard stating that Mr Rustam Makayev was allegedly detained in the Zverevo detention facility in the Rostov region. However, the applicants were unable to obtain any information from that facility. 44. Following complaints lodged by the applicant on 4 December 2001 and on 22 December 2001 the Urus-Martan prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 25169 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 45. Having questioned Mr Rustam Makayev’s father and wife, who confirmed the account of the events, as described above, the investigators suspended the proceedings on 22 February 2002 for failure to identify the perpetrators. 46. Between May and June 2002 the applicants requested various authorities to assist them in establishing their relative’s whereabouts. In reply, the applicants were each time informed that their request had been forwarded to another law enforcement authority for examination. 47. On 29 November 2002 the criminal proceedings were resumed. 48. On 29 January 2003 the applicants requested the investigators to expedite the investigation into the abduction. Two days later Mr Rustam Makayev’s father was granted victim status in the proceedings. 49. On 28 February 2003 the investigation was suspended again. 50. On 1 August 2003 the applicants requested that the proceedings be resumed. 51. On 5 September 2003 and 19 February 2004 the criminal proceedings were resumed and on 5 October 2003 and 8 April 2004 they were again suspended. In the meantime, in September and November 2003 the investigators examined the crime scene and questioned the applicants’ neighbour, Ms R.A, who had witnessed the events of 1 December 2001. Her statements were similar to those of the applicants before the Court. On 24 March 2004 the investigators inspected a logbook from the Urus-Martan police station. No records with Mr Rustam Makayev’s name were found. 52. On 17 August 2004 the applicants requested to be allowed to access to the investigation file. 53. On 27 October 2004 the Chechnya prosecutor’s office informed them that their request for assistance in the search for their relative had been forwarded to the investigators. 54. On 27 May 2005 the military prosecutor of the United Group Alignment in the North Caucasus Region (Военная прокуратура Объединенной группировки войск (сил) по проведению контртеррористических операций на территории Северо‑Кавказского региона) informed the applicants that their relative’s abduction was being investigated by the Urus-Martan prosecutor’s office. 55. Between January 2007 and August 2008 the applicants lodged a number of requests with various law-enforcement agencies. In reply, they were informed that their requests had been forwarded to another law‑enforcement body. 56. The proceedings in the criminal case were resumed on 29 May and 1 September 2008, and suspended on 29 June and 1 October 2008 respectively. No tangible results were achieved. 57. On 1 January 2009, at the first applicant’s request, the investigators produced a progress report, stating that the perpetrators had not been identified. 58. On an unspecified date in early 2010, Mr Rustam Makayev’s mother contacted the head of the Chechen Parliament asking for assistance in the search for her son. The request was forwarded to the investigators, who on 2 June 2010 informed her that the undertaken investigative measures had not brought any results. It appears that the criminal proceedings are still pending. 59. The applicant is the sister of Mr Adam Sadgayev, who was born in 1967. 60. At the material time Mr Adam Sadgayev, his common-law partner, Ms M.Shch., and his mother, Ms A.S., lived in the town of Shali. 61. At about 5 a.m. on 17 February 2005 a group of about twenty armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms arrived at Mr Adam Sadgayev’s house in a Gazel vehicle and an UAZ minivan. Some of the servicemen were in balaclavas and military helmets. Those without were of Slavic appearance; they spoke unaccented Russian and used portable radio sets. The servicemen broke into the house and searched the premises. Thereafter, they took Mr Adam Sadgayev away to an unknown destination. 62. Mr Adam Sadgayev’s abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses, including his partner, mother and neighbours. The applicant submitted written statements by Ms M.Shch., Ms A.S., and one of the neighbours, Mr D.V., who confirmed the account of the events, as described above. Mr Adam Sadgayev’s whereabouts remain unknown. 63. Immediately after the abduction the applicant and her relatives informed the authorities thereof and requested that a criminal investigation be initiated. According to the applicant, the investigators had lost their initial complaint of the abduction, which led to a delay in the opening of the criminal case. 64. On 5 April 2005 the Shali district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 46036 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 65. A week later Ms M.Shch. was granted victim status in the criminal case and questioned. 66. On 5 July 2005 the investigators informed her that the proceedings in the case had been suspended. 67. In 2006 the proceedings were resumed on 26 January, then suspended on 7 March, again resumed on 28 March and suspended on 28 April. During the active part of the investigation several relatives and neighbours of Mr Adam Sadgayev were questioned. 68. On 14 February 2007 the suspended proceedings were resumed. The authorities added several of Mr Adam Sadgayev’s character references to the case file, questioned several witnesses, and then, on 5 April 2007, suspended the investigation again. 69. On 1 December 2008 Ms M.Shch. asked to be allowed to access the criminal case file. Her request was allowed three days later. 70. On 21 August 2009 the deputy Shali district prosecutor stated that Ms M.Shch had been granted victim status wrongly, as her marriage to Mr Adam Sadgayev had never been officially registered. As a result, her witness statements were excluded from the case file. 71. On 16 September 2009 the suspended proceedings were resumed and lasted until a new suspension on 26 September 2009. 72. On 24 December 2010 the investigators resumed the proceedings again. Four days later the applicant was granted victim status in the case. 73. On 30 December 2010 the proceedings were suspended yet again. It appears that they are still pending. 74. The first applicant is the mother of Mr Ruslan Edilsultanov, who was born in 1980. The second applicant is his wife and the third, fourth and fifth applicants are his children. 75. At about 6.30 a.m. on 13 April 2003 a group of fifteen to twenty armed men in camouflage uniforms arrived in two grey UAZ vehicles and one armoured personnel carrier (APC) without a registration plate at the applicants’ house in the village of Cheri-Yurt. The men spoke unaccented Russian, most of them were in balaclavas; those without were of Slavic appearance. 76. Having checked the identity documents, the men ordered Mr Ruslan Edilsultanov to get into one of the UAZ vehicles and then drove off with him in the direction of the village of Stariye Atagi. Then they passed through the premises of a military unit stationed in the village of Chechen‑Aul and went in the direction of the town of Argun. 77. In the search for their relative the applicants went to the office of the FSB in Stariye Atagi. One of the FSB officers confirmed that Mr Ruslan Edilsultanov had been brought to their premises but said that he had then been transferred to the town of Shali. 78. At the Shali prosecutor’s office the applicants were informed that Mr Ruslan Edilsultanov had been detained there for a short time and then transferred to Khankala, the main military base of the Russian federal forces in Chechnya. 79. Sometime later the applicants received information from unidentified sources that Mr Ruslan Edilsultanov had allegedly been detained in a remand prison in Vladikavkaz. During one of the applicants’ visits to that prison, a senior officer, who introduced himself as “Yuriy Borisovich”, confirmed that the applicants’ relative had indeed been detained on their premises for some time but said that he had then been transferred elsewhere in the town of Pyatigorsk. The applicant provided that information to the investigators. 80. The whereabouts of Mr Ruslan Edilsultanov remain unknown. 81. On 13 April 2003 the applicants informed the authorities of the abduction and requested that a criminal case be opened into the incident. 82. On 12 May 2003 the Shali district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 22080 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). On the same day the first applicant was granted victim status in the case and questioned. She confirmed the circumstances of her son’s abduction, as described above. Several days later the investigator questioned the second applicant and other relatives of Mr Ruslan Edilsultanov. 83. On 12 July 2003 the investigation in the case was suspended. 84. From the material in the case file it appears that between 2003 and 2005 the investigative authorities took some steps, the nature of which is unknown, as the copies of the relevant documents submitted by the Government are illegible. 85. On 19 April 2006 the investigation was resumed. The investigators examined the crime scene, questioned several relatives and neighbours of Mr Ruslan Edilsultanov, and then decided to suspend the proceedings on 21 May 2006. 86. On 22 July 2006 and 30 January and 6 March 2009 the first applicant herself, and Memorial, a non-governmental organisation, acting on her behalf, enquired about the progress in the case. By letters dated 20 November 2006, 24 March 2007, and 12 March 2009, respectively, the investigators informed her that the proceedings had been suspended. 87. On 7 May 2009 the proceedings were resumed and the first applicant was granted access to the case file. The next day the proceedings were again suspended. 88. On 21 December 2010 the applicants lodged a complaint with the Shali Town Court, complaining of the investigator’s failure to take basic steps. 89. On 14 January 2011 the deputy Shali district prosecutor ruled the suspension unsubstantiated and resumed the proceedings. The investigators were instructed to question the first applicant, request the remand prison in Vladikavkaz to provide information about Mr Ruslan Edilsultanov’s detention between 2003 and 2004, and to obtain blood samples from his relatives. 90. In view of the above-mentioned developments, on 17 January 2011 the Shali Town Court dismissed the applicants’ complaint. 91. On 10 February 2011 the investigators again questioned the first applicant, who reiterated the statement that she had given previously, and obtained blood samples from her. A week later the investigation was suspended again. 92. On 30 April 2012 the first applicant enquired about progress in the proceedings. By a letter of 27 May 2012 she was informed that the proceedings had been suspended. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 93. The applicant is the mother of Mr Salakh Yakhyaev, who was born in 1975, and Mr Anzor Yakhyaev, who was born in 1982. 94. At about 6.30 a.m. on 17 March 2003 a group of about thirty armed servicemen in camouflage and black uniforms and balaclavas broke into the applicant’s house in the village of Avtury, where she lived with her and her sons’ families. The servicemen took three of the applicant’s sons to the courtyard and ordered the applicant in unaccented Russian to show their passports. Having received and examined the documents, the servicemen left the applicant’s youngest son in the courtyard and took the other two, Mr Salakh Yakhyaev and Mr Anzor Yakhyaev, away with them. When the applicant went outside she saw that the servicemen had arrived in two grey UAZ minivans, a white VAZ-2106 vehicle and a white VAZ-21099 vehicle. The vehicles had no registration plates. The abductors drove off in the direction of the village of Geldegen. Mr Salakh Yakhyaev and Mr Anzor Yakhyaev have not been seen since. 95. The applicant submitted written statements by eyewitnesses to the events, including the grandmother of Mr Salakh Yakhyaev and Mr Anzor Yakhyaev (Ms Sh.G.) and their aunt (Ms Z.A), who both confirmed the account of the events described above. She also submitted written statements by their neighbour, Ms Kh.M., who had witnessed the abduction from her window. 96. On 25 March 2003 the applicant complained of the abduction to the Chechnya Prosecutor’s Office. 97. On 15 May 2003 the Shali district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 22081 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 98. On 20 May 2003 the applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case. 99. On 15 July 2003 the investigation was suspended owing to the failure to identify the perpetrators. 100. On 8 April 2004 the Shali District Court declared Mr Salakh Yakhyaev a missing person. 101. On 26 October and 19 November 2004 the applicant requested the investigators to resume the proceedings. 102. On 27 May 2005 she asked the Government of Chechnya to assist in the search for Mr Salakh Yakhyaev and Mr Anzor Yakhyaev. Her request was forwarded to the investigators. 103. By a letter of 31 August 2005 the Shali district prosecutor’s office informed the applicant that operational search measures had been taken to find her missing sons. 104. On 17 July 2006 the criminal proceedings were resumed. Having questioned the applicant on 10 August 2007 the investigator suspended the proceedings on 17 August 2006. 105. On 22 December 2006 the Chechnya Prosecutor’s Office informed the applicant that the investigation had been resumed on 5 December 2006. 106. On 24 December 2006 the investigator questioned Mr Salakh Yakhyaev’s wife, who had witnessed the events of 17 March 2003 and who gave a statement similar to that of the applicant. On 6 January 2007 the investigation was suspended again. It was resumed on 5 April and 3 August 2007, and 21 April and 6 October 2008, and suspended on 6 May 2007, and 3 January, 21 May and 7 November 2008 respectively. 107. On 21 May 2009 the applicant requested permission to access the criminal case file. On 3 July 2009 the investigators allowed the request in part and she was granted access to some of the documents in the file. A request lodged by the applicant for the proceedings to be resumed was refused. 108. On 17 August 2010 the applicant appealed to the Shali District Court against the investigators’ decision of 21 May 2008 to suspend the proceedings. 109. In the meantime, the investigators resumed the investigation on 4 September 2010. Taking that into account the Shali District Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint on 7 September 2010. 110. The applicant appealed against the above-mentioned decision before the Chechnya Supreme Court. She stated that the investigation had been pending for seven years and had not yet attained any tangible results. The Supreme Court dismissed her appeal on 22 December 2010. 111. Meanwhile on 3 October 2010 the proceedings were suspended yet again. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 112. The first and second applicants are the parents of Mr Rizvan Oybuyev, who was born in 1974, the third applicant is his wife and the fourth, fifth and sixth applicants are his children. 113. At around 11 p.m. on 1 April 2005 a group of armed servicemen in a green Gazel minivan, a grey VAZ-21099 car, a VAZ-2109 vehicle and a VAZ‑2106 vehicle arrived at the applicants’ family house in the village of Stariye Atagi. The men were in camouflage uniforms and spoke unaccented Russian. Most of them were in balaclavas; those without were of Slavic appearance. Having broken into the house, they searched the premises and checked Mr Rizvan Oybuyev’s identity documents. Then they forced him into one of the vehicles and drove off. 114. Mr Rizvan Oybuyev’s brother, Mr I.O., ran after the convoy of military vehicles and saw them heading in the direction of an abandoned mill at the outskirts of the village, where a Russian military unit was stationed. Mr Rizvan Oybuyev’s whereabouts have been unknown since. 115. The abduction of Mr Rizvan Oybuyev took place in the presence of several witnesses, including the applicants and their neighbours. The applicants submitted to the Court written statements by Mr Rizvan Oybuyev’s brothers and their neighbours. They confirmed the account of the events described above. 116. Immediately after the abduction the applicants informed the authorities of the incident and requested, both orally and in writing, that criminal proceedings be opened. 117. On 6 May 2005 the Grozny district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 44037 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 118. On 17 May 2005 the first applicant was granted victim status in the case and questioned by the investigators. 119. Having questioned several relatives of Mr Rizvan Oybuyev the investigator suspended the proceedings on 6 August 2005. 120. After the first applicant lodged a complaint with the Government of the Chechen Republic the investigation was resumed on 20 January 2006. On the same day the authorities carried out an examination of the crime scene. 121. Between 21 and 27 January 2006 several neighbours and Mr Rizvan Oybuyev’s close relatives were questioned. 122. On 22 February 2006 the investigation was suspended owing to a failure to identify the perpetrators. 123. On 20 November 2007 the Stariye Atagi administration – apparently at the applicants’ request – issued a certificate stating that on 1 April 2005 Mr Rizvan Oybuyev had been detained and taken away from his home by Russian servicemen. 124. On 14 March 2008 the Grozny District Court of the Chechen Republic declared Mr Rizvan Oybuyev a missing person. 125. On 27 June 2008 the sixth applicant asked the Grozny district prosecutor’s office about progress in the investigation. By a letter of 2 July 2008 he was informed that the proceedings had been suspended. 126. On 21 July 2009, apparently after the resumption of the proceedings, the third applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case. 127. On 10 March 2011 the third applicant enquired about recent developments in the investigation and requested access to the investigation file. By a letter of 1 April 2011 she was informed that the proceedings had been suspended on 22 February 2006. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 128. The applicants are close relatives of Mr Suleiman Said-Khusein (also spelled as Suliman Said-Khusin) Elmurzayev, who was born in 1978. The first applicant is his late mother, who died on 17 October 2013. The second applicant is his sister. 129. At about 4 a.m. on 2 April 2005 the applicants’ family was at home in the village of Duba-Yurt when a large group of armed military servicemen in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas arrived at their house in two UAZ minivans and a white Niva car. Having ordered all male members of the family to go outside, the servicemen searched the premises, speaking Russian among themselves. Then they forced Mr Suleiman Said-Khusein Elmurzayev and his father, Mr S.E., into the vehicles and drove off in the direction of Khankala, passing unrestrictedly through a military checkpoint located at the outskirts of the village. 130. On 8 May 2005 the body of Mr S.E. was found on the bank of the Sunzha River, Chechnya. 131. The whereabouts of Mr Suleiman Said-Khusein Elmurzayev have remained unknown since his abduction. His abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses, including the applicants, their family members and neighbours. The applicants submitted written statements by Mr Suleiman Said-Khusein Elmurzayev’s wife and one of his sisters. 132. Shortly after the incident the applicants complained about the abduction to the authorities. 133. On 5 April 2005 the police officers from the Shali district department of the interior (ОМВД России по Шалинскому району Чеченской Республики) questioned three neighbours and two relatives of Mr Suleiman Said-Khusein Elmurzayev. The witnesses confirmed the circumstances of the abduction, as described by the applicants in their submission to the Court. 134. On 14 June 2005 the Shali district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 46060 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 135. On 2 August 2004 the uncle of Mr Suleiman Said-Khusein Elmurzayev was granted victim status in the criminal case. 136. On 14 August 2005 the investigators suspended the proceedings. 137. On 19 January 2006 the proceedings were resumed. Following the interrogation of several witnesses, the investigator suspended the proceedings on 20 February 2006. 138. The investigation was again resumed on 1 March 2006. Fifteen days later the investigators joined the criminal proceedings with those opened into the murder of Mr M.S. on 2 August 2005. 139. On 1 April 2006 the legal classification of the crime against Mr Suleiman Said-Khusein Elmurzayev was changed to that of aggravated murder committed by a group of persons (Article 105 § 2 of the CC). 140. On 2 June 2006 the proceedings were suspended. They were subsequently resumed on 21 July 2006 but then suspended again on 21 August 2006. 141. In the meantime, on 19 August 2006 the uncle of Mr Suleiman Said-Khusein Elmurzayev was deprived of victim status for lack of close blood ties with the abducted persons. 142. On 11 February 2008 the investigation questioned several witnesses. 143. On 20 February 2009 the investigators requested the Staropromyslovskiy District Court of Grozny to grant them access to classified documents relating to the special operation in the village of Duba‑Yurt. The request was granted on 4 March 2009. No pertinent information on the abduction was found during an examination of the classified files on 7 April 2009. On the next day the proceedings were suspended again. 144. On an unspecified date between 2009 and 2010 the first applicant asked the Chechen President to assist in the search for Mr Suleiman Said‑Khusein. Her request was forwarded to the investigators, who informed her that the proceedings had been suspended but that the operational search activity was ongoing. 145. On 19 August 2011 the first applicant enquired about the progress of the investigation. From the response of the Grozny district prosecutor’s office dated 25 August 2011 she learned that the proceedings had been resumed on 24 August 2011. It appears that they are still pending. 146. The first and second applicants are the parents of Mr Magomed Elzhurkayev, who was born in 1982. The third applicant is his sister. 147. At about 4 a.m. on 3 August 2004 the applicants’ family was at home in Grozny when a group of approximately thirty armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms arrived at their house in a VAZ-21010, a UAZ minivan and a Zhiguli car. Most of the servicemen were in balaclavas and only one of them, apparently a commander, was unmasked; they spoke Chechen and Russian. A group of about fifteen of them broke into the applicants’ house and searched the premises. Having checked their identity papers, they seized the service identity card of the brother of Mr Magomed Elzhurkayev, Mr R.E., who was a police officer. Then the servicemen forced Mr Magomed Elzhurkayev outside, put him into one of the vehicles and drove off, passing unhindered through checkpoints on their way. 148. On the same morning an acquaintance of Mr Magomed Elzhurkayev was arrested by the North Caucasus Regional Department for the Fight Against Organised Crime (Северокавказское региональное управление по борьбе с организованной преступностью) (“the RUBOP”). He was detained in a detention facility for five days and then released. He stated that he had been held in the same facility with Mr Magomed Elzhurkayev and that he had been able to hear the latter’s voice. The applicants provided this information to the investigators. 149. The whereabouts of Mr Magomed Elzhurkayev have remained unknown ever since. His abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses, including the applicants and their neighbours. The applicants submitted written statements by three neighbours, who confirmed the applicants’ account of the events. 150. About a month after the abduction, the RUBOP arrested Mr A.I., a friend of Mr Magomed Elzhurkayev. Mr A.I. was questioned about his relations with Elzhurkayev’s family, shown Mr R.E.’s service identity card seized from the applicants’ house on 3 August 2004, and subsequently released. 151. On an unspecified date in 2008 the first applicant went to the Leninskiy district prosecutor’s office in Grozny in connection with the investigation into the abduction. At the office she saw a RUBOP officer called “Muslim”. She recognised him as the unmasked serviceman who had been in charge of her son’s abduction on 3 August 2004. The applicant immediately informed the investigators about it. 152. On 3 August 2004 the applicants informed the authorities of the abduction and requested that criminal proceedings be opened. 153. On 13 August 2004 the Staropromyslovskiy district prosecutor’s office in Grozny opened criminal case no. 33066 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 154. On 3 and 18 August 2004 the second and third applicants, respectively, were granted victim status in the case. They were questioned, and confirmed the circumstances of the abduction, as described above. 155. On 4 August 2004 the investigators requested a number of State authorities to inform them whether they had arrested or detained Mr Magomed Elzhurkayev. No replies in the positive were received. 156. On 20 October 2004 the investigators questioned the first applicant. She confirmed the circumstances of the abduction, as described above. 157. On 13 October 2004 the investigation in respect of the case was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators and then resumed on 24 May 2005. The applicants were informed of that resumption on 14 June 2005. 158. On 24 June 2005 the investigation in the case was suspended. Subsequently, it was resumed on 28 June 2005, 1 November 2005 and 12 December 2005, 22 May 2006, 2 February, 24 March, 7 July, 3 September and 24 November 2008 and 19 July 2009 and 7 July 2010 (following criticism by the investigating authority supervisors, who each time ordered it to be resumed), and again suspended on 28 July and 1 December 2005, 12 January and 22 June 2006, 4 March, 25 April, 8 August, 3 October and 25 December 2008, 29 July 2009 and 12 July 2010. 159. On 9 July 2010 the first applicant was granted victim status in the case and questioned. She reiterated the statements that she had previously given. 160. On 27 August 2011 the first applicant requested the investigators to inform her about the progress in the proceedings and to grant her access to the case file. The outcome of this request is unknown. 161. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 162. The first applicant is the wife of Mr Zayndi Dudarkayev (in the documents submitted also spelled as Dudurkayev), who was born in 1954. The second applicant is his brother. The other five applicants are his children. 163. At about 3 a.m. on 4 November 2002 a group of ten to twelve armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas broke into the applicants’ house in the village of Goyskoye. Speaking unaccented Russian, the servicemen searched the premises, checked Mr Zayndi Dudarkayev’s passport and took him away to an unknown destination. At the time of the events the applicants’ neighbours saw heavy military vehicles parked on the road near their house. 164. Two days after the abduction, on 6 November 2002, the same military servicemen again arrived at the applicants’ house in an Ural lorry. They thoroughly searched the premises and left. 165. The whereabouts of Mr Zayndi Dudarkayev have remained unknown since the date of his abduction. The abduction took place in the presence of the applicants. 166. On 5 November 2002 the first applicant informed the authorities of the abduction and requested assistance in the search for her husband. 167. On 8 November 2002 the first applicant was questioned by the investigators. Her statement to the authorities was similar to the account submitted by the applicants before the Court. 168. On 23 December 2002 the Urus-Martan district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 61164 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 169. On the same date, 23 December 2002, the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 170. It appears that on 1 February 2003 the investigators resumed the proceedings and questioned the first applicant, who was also granted victim status in the criminal case. She confirmed the circumstances of the abduction, as specified above. It appears that shortly thereafter the investigation was suspended again. 171. On 1 April 2004 the first applicant submitted requests to several law enforcement agencies for assistance in the search for her husband. It is unclear whether any reply was given to these requests. 172. On 6 April 2005 the investigator in charge of the case issued an information note describing the course of the proceedings and the main versions of the events, according to which Mr Zayndi Dudarkayev had been variously abducted by servicemen, members of an illegal armed group, or private persons aiming to extract information/obtain a ransom or to pursue a blood feud. It was noted that the operative search measures conducted in the case had been inefficient. 173. On 18 June 2007 the supervising prosecutor requested that operational search activities be undertaken in order to establish Mr Dudarkayev’s whereabouts. 174. On 23 June and 5 July 2007 the investigators informed their superiors that the operational search activities had not produced any positive results. 175. On 14 February 2008 the supervising prosecutor ruled that the decision of 23 December 2002 to suspend the investigation had been premature and unlawful and ordered that the proceedings be resumed. Subsequently, the investigation was suspended and resumed on several occasions in response to criticism from the supervising prosecutors: it was suspended on 26 March 2008 and 16 May 2008 and 14 January 2012, and then resumed on 16 April 2008 and 7 December 2011 respectively. 176. Between February and April 2008 the investigators asked a number of law-enforcement authorities and detention facilities whether they had arrested or detained Mr Zayndi Dudarkayev or whether any special operation had been conducted on the date of his abduction in Goyskoye. No information in the affirmative was received. 177. On 13 March 2008 the first applicant was questioned again. She reiterated the statements that she had previously given. 178. Between 15 and 20 March 2008 the applicants’ neighbours were questioned. All of them confirmed the circumstances of the abduction, as described by the applicants. 179. On 18 February 2011 the first applicant lodged a request to be granted full access to the investigation file. Her request was refused. 180. On 18 March 2011 the first applicant appeared before the Urus‑Martan Town Court to complain about her lack of access to the criminal case file. On 28 March 2011 the court allowed the complaint and ordered the investigators to grant her access to the contents of the investigation file. 181. On 2 December 2011 the first applicant lodged another complaint challenging the decision of 16 May 2008 to suspend the investigation. On 7 December 2011 the court dismissed her complaint, having learned that the investigators had resumed the proceedings on the same date (7 December 2011). 182. Later in December 2011 the investigators questioned the first applicant and seven fellow residents of her village. Two of them had witnessed the incident of 4 November 2002, and five of them had heard about it from their relatives. 183. On 23 January 2012 the investigation was suspended. It was again resumed on 19 August 2013. It appears that the proceedings are still pending.

5. The applicant was born in 1985 and lives in Łatanice. 6. The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. 7. The applicant was detained in Kielce Remand Centre from 6 September to 4 October 2012 (28 days). 8. The applicant submitted that throughout his detention in Kielce Remand Centre, he had been held in overcrowded cells in which the space per person had been below the Polish statutory minimum standard of 3 m². 9. In their observations, the Government admitted that the applicant had been detained in an overcrowded cell. However, they emphasised that the space in each cell had exceeded 2 m² per person and that the hardship caused by staying in an overcrowded cell had been compensated by adding 30 minutes to his daily walk as well as additional cultural and educational classes or sports activities. 10. In the course of civil proceedings instituted by the applicant, the domestic courts established that for twenty-eight days the applicant had been detained in an overcrowded cell (see also paragraph 13 below). 11. Regarding the conditions of detention, the domestic courts established that the overall conditions in cells were adequate. Cells were equipped in compliance with the relevant law; they were properly ventilated and the toilet area had been separated from the rest of the living space in the cells. 12. On 12 August 2013 the applicant brought a civil action against the State Treasury for infringement of his personal rights and for compensation on account of his detention in overcrowded cells in various penitentiary facilities. He claimed 35,000 Polish zlotys (approximately 8,750 euros) in just satisfaction. 13. On 28 May 2014 the Warsaw Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) dismissed the applicant’s action. It confirmed, however, that temporarily (from 6 September to 4 October 2012) the applicant had been detained in cells in which the space per person had been below the Polish statutory minimum standard of 3 m², but not below 2 m². 14. On 1 April 2015 the Warsaw Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) dismissed the applicant’s appeal.

7. The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Aydın. 8. At the material time, the applicant was the manager of a hotel in Kuşadası. 9. On 10 July 2002 at 4.50 a.m. the applicant was arrested by police officers from the counter-terrorism unit of the İzmir Security Directorate in connection with an operation conducted against an illegal organisation, namely the Bolşevik Parti – Kuzey Kürdistan / Turkiye (Bolshevik Party –North Kurdistan/Turkey). According to the arrest report, which was signed by the applicant, the police found eighty-eight left-wing books and periodicals in his room. Those books were seized by the police with a view to ascertaining whether they were illegal. 10. On 11 July 2002 at approximately 2.15 a.m. the applicant took part in an identity parade in the absence of a lawyer. The applicant identified another co-accused, a certain M.B., and stated that he had allowed him to stay in his hotel free of charge without registering him in the hotel’s guestbook. 11. On the same day at 1.10 p.m. the applicant was interviewed by the police in the absence of a lawyer. The applicant was asked, inter alia, what his ideology was, for how long he had been reading the periodical Çağrı that had been found and seized in his place of work, and which other meetings or demonstrations – held within a democratic platform – he had participated in. The applicant explained that he regularly bought the periodical Çağrı from a newspaper kiosk and enjoyed reading it. This periodical, which was sold legally, was supportive of leftist ideas. He also stated that he was friends with Mehmet Desde (who was the applicant in Desde v. Turkey, no. 23909/03, 1 February 2011) and E.Y., whom he had met when he had been in Germany. The applicant had allowed them to stay in his hotel and use his car when they had needed a vehicle. The applicant admitted that he had expressed his wish to be involved in the activities of the Bolshevik Party, but Mehmet Desde, who had connections in the organisation, had never replied to him. 12. On 13 July 2002 the applicant was questioned by the public prosecutor again in the absence of a lawyer. He admitted to having lent his car to Mehmet Desde and to having provided him with accommodation in his hotel. However, he denied any affiliation with the illegal organisation. Following his questioning, the applicant was released. 13. Although Mehmet Desde used his right to remain silent before the police, he made statements before the public prosecutor in the absence of a lawyer, where he stated that he had stayed in the applicant’s hotel for two days and had borrowed the applicant’s car. 14. On 6 September 2002 the public prosecutor at the İzmir State Security Court lodged a bill of indictment against the applicant together with nine other co-accused. The prosecutor charged the applicant with aiding and abetting an illegal organisation, Bolşevik Parti – Kuzey Kürdistan/Türkiye –, under Article 169 of the Criminal Code and section 5 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act as in force at the material time. 15. On 24 October 2002, at the first hearing in the case, the applicant, who was represented by a lawyer, denied the charges against him. He maintained that he had not been involved in any illegal activity. He further stated that Mehmet Desde, E.Y. and M.B. had come to his hotel as guests and that they had not gathered with an ulterior motive. The applicant also stated that he had lent his car to Mehmet Desde and M.B. when they had told him that they wanted to drive to another coastal town. When asked about his statements before the police, the applicant denied them, alleging that they had been obtained through coercion and torture by the police as a result of which he had been pressured to sign his statement. At the end of that hearing, the trial court asked the applicant to make additional defence submissions given that his actions might be reclassified as assisting members of a terrorist organisation under section 7 (1) and (2) of Law no. 3713. He reiterated his previous defence submissions. 16. At the hearing held on 24 July 2003, the applicant made his defence submissions in relation to the merits of the case and denied the allegations against him. He further stated that his only mistake had been not registering Mehmet Desde and M.B. in his hotel’s guestbook. At the same hearing the İzmir State Security Court convicted the applicant of aiding and abetting a terrorist organisation under section 7 (2) of Law no. 3713 as then in force and sentenced him to ten months’ imprisonment and a fine. Having regard, inter alia, to the statements of the applicant as well as of the other co-accused, the “written evidence” and the content of the case file as a whole, the trial court concluded that the applicant had committed the offence of aiding and abetting a terrorist organisation by allowing the other co-accused, namely Mehmet Desde, E.Y. and M.B., to stay in his hotel without registering them in his hotel’s guestbook and by lending his car to those people. Furthermore, the trial court listed the periodicals found in the applicant’s possession as evidence in the “written evidence” part of its judgment. 17. On 8 April 2004 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment, holding that in rendering its judgment the first-instance court should have taken into account the recent amendments made to section 7 of Law no. 3713. 18. In the meantime, pursuant to Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, published in the Official Gazette on 30 June 2004, State Security Courts were abolished. The case against the applicant was therefore transferred to the İzmir Assize Court. 19. On 12 October 2004 the İzmir Assize Court convicted the applicant once again under section 7 (2) of Law no. 3713 as then in force and sentenced him to ten months’ imprisonment and a fine. Having regard, inter alia, to the statements of the applicant as well as of the other co-accused, the “written evidence” and the content of the case file as a whole, it held that the applicant had committed the offence of aiding and abetting a terrorist organisation by allowing the other co-accused, namely Mehmet Desde, E.Y. and M.B., to stay in his hotel without registering them in his hotel’s guestbook and by lending his car to those people. It listed the periodicals found in the applicant’s possession as evidence in the “written evidence” part of its judgment. 20. On 13 December 2004 the applicant appealed. 21. While the appeal proceedings were pending before the Court of Cassation, in 2005 the new Criminal Code of Criminal Procedure came into force. By a decision dated 10 November 2005, the Principal Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation sent the case file back to the first‑instance court and requested that the latter reconsider the case in the light of the amendments made to the Code of Criminal Procedure. The case was accordingly transferred back to the İzmir Assize Court. 22. The public prosecutor before the İzmir Assize Court submitted his opinion on the merits of the case and requested the acquittal of the applicant and his co-accused on the grounds that the organisation which they had allegedly founded did not correspond to the definition of a terrorist organisation under section 7 (1) of Law no. 3713. Consequently, he considered that the applicant’s acts could not be characterised as aiding and abetting an illegal organisation under section 7 (2) of the same Law. 23. On 16 March 2006 the İzmir Assize Court convicted the applicant and sentenced him to ten months’ imprisonment and a fine under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 as then in force. Having considered the structure, methods, purpose and activities of the said organisation, the court concluded that it could be categorised as a terrorist organisation, contrary to the submissions of the accused and the public prosecutor in charge of the investigation. It noted that even though the members of the organisation had not resorted to physical violence, they had used “psychological duress” (manevi cebir), such as issuing threats, in order to achieve their aims. The trial court considered that the aim of the organisation was to start an uprising with a view to replacing the democratic regime with a totalitarian Marxist and Leninist regime. Thus, the fact that the organisation in question had not resorted to violence was not considered problematic with regard to categorising it as a terrorist organisation. It went on to state that the periodicals Çağrı and Güney had been the legal media outlets of the organisation. The trial court further held that the applicant had admitted to the allegations in his statements to the police. Moreover, having regard, inter alia, to the statements of the applicant as well as of the other co-accused persons, the “written evidence” and the content of the case file as a whole, it held that the applicant had committed the offence of aiding and abetting a terrorist organisation by allowing the other co-accused persons, namely Mehmet Desde, E.Y. and M.B., to stay in his hotel without registering them in his hotel’s guestbook. Again, it listed the periodicals found in the applicant’s possession as evidence in the “written evidence” part of its judgment. 24. On 23 March 2006 the applicant appealed against the judgment. 25. On 5 October 2006 the Principal Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation lodged a written opinion with the Ninth Division of the Court of Cassation in which he submitted, inter alia, that the objections of the lawyers concerning the use of police statements to convict the co-defendants should be rejected as irrelevant and unsubstantiated. However, the Principal Public Prosecutor also submitted that the Division should quash the judgment of the İzmir State Security Court on account of the legislative amendments to Law no. 3713. 26. On 25 December 2006 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of 16 March 2006 stating that the lawyers’ objections in respect of the applicant and two other co-defendants were irrelevant and unsubstantiated. The applicant maintains that he only became aware of the judgment in April 2007. There is nothing in the case file to indicate that the applicant became aware of the judgment on the date of delivery.

5. The first applicant, Mr Evghenii Antonov, is a Russian national who was born in 1979 and lives in Tiraspol. The second applicant, Mrs Iryna Antonova, is a Ukrainian national who was born in 1954 and lives in Tiraspol. 6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows. 7. The first applicant was arrested in Tiraspol in August 2009 and accused of having in his possession a hunter’s knife and a packet of marijuana. He was initially held in the pre-trial detention centre of the “MRT” Ministry of Internal Affairs (“IVS Tiraspol”), and on 30 October 2009 was moved to the Hlinaia prison in Grigoriopol. 8. A few days after his arrest the first applicant called the second applicant and asked her to bring him food and warm clothes. He told her that he was being held in a dark, damp cell without basic hygiene. 9. The second applicant was not allowed to see the first applicant, and the OSCE was refused access to IVS Tiraspol on 19 October 2009, where some 90 detainees, including the first applicant, were on a hunger strike to protest against ill-treatment and inhuman conditions of detention. Further complaints to the Moldovan, Russian and “MRT” authorities were unsuccessful. 10. On 9 December 2009 the second applicant was able to see the first applicant during a court trial; she submitted that he looked tired and weak. 11. On 9 November 2010 the Tiraspol city court found the first applicant guilty of preparing to commit theft, carrying an illegal weapon and having been in possession of a narcotic substance. At the time of the last submissions to the Court, the case was pending before the “MRT” Supreme Court. 12. The first applicant, Mr Alexandru Băluţă, is a Moldovan national who was born in 1984 and lives in Lunga. The second applicant, Mrs Tamara Băluţă, is a Moldovan national who was born in 1954 and lives in Lunga. 13. The first applicant was arrested in Tiraspol in December 2004 and accused of murder and arson. He was allegedly severely beaten. He was released in 2007 with an undertaking not to leave the city without permission. However, he left to work abroad and was rearrested on 13 September 2009, when he returned home. 14. He was initially held in the pre-trial detention centre of the “MRT” Ministry of Internal Affairs (“IVS Tiraspol”), then moved to the Hlinaia prison in Grigoriopol. 15. The first applicant has allegedly been held in inhuman conditions of detention, namely in a dark, damp cell without basic hygiene and without any facilities for a daily walk. According to the second applicant, food and other items which she attempts to send to the first applicant do not reach him (except for bread) and all her requests to see him have been refused. 16. On 13 October 2009 the second applicant found out that many of the detainees in IVS Tiraspol were on hunger strike in protest against abuse and inhuman conditions of detention. She alleged that on 16 October 2009 a special riot police force entered the prison and beat up the prisoners. 17. The OSCE was refused access to IVS Tiraspol on 19 October 2009. Further complaints to the Moldovan, Russian and “MRT” authorities were unsuccessful. In particular, on 27 October 2009 the second applicant complained to the Russian Embassy in Moldova, which promised to officially contact the “MRT” prosecutor’s office in connection with the case. 18. In reply to the second applicant’s letter of 12 October 2009, asking for permission to see the first applicant, on 29 October 2009 the Prosecutor’s Office of the “MRT” replied that “under [the applicable legislation] the investigator is not under an obligation to authorise the meeting of detainees with their relatives. In your case, such meetings were refused.” No other reasons were given. 19. On an unknown date the applicant was transferred to another prison in Grigoriopol, also under the control of the “MRT” authorities. 20. The first applicant, Mr Oleksandr Bezrodnii, is a Ukrainian national who was born in 1986 and lives in Tiraspol. The second applicant, Mrs Liudmila Bezrodnyaya, is a Russian national who was born in 1967 and lives in Tiraspol. 21. The first applicant is the leader of the non-governmental organisation “The World of Youth”. He was arrested in Tiraspol on 23 July 2009 and accused of stealing roses from a public park, as well as endangering the life of three “militia” officers and private security agents. He was initially held in the pre-trial detention centre of the “MRT” Ministry of Internal Affairs (“IVS Tiraspol”), then moved to the Hlinaia prison in Grigoriopol. 22. On 29 July 2009 the second applicant was told by a lawyer appointed by the “MRT” court that the first applicant had been brought to that court for a hearing. When the second applicant saw the first applicant, he allegedly had blood on his face and some green substance on his head, which she claims masked the effects of a severe blow to his head. She also saw bruises on the first applicant’s body. The first applicant was allegedly able to tell the second applicant that he was being ill-treated with the aim of extracting self-incriminating statements from him. 23. Also on 29 July 2009 the “Tiraspol town court” ordered the first applicant’s detention pending trial for an undetermined period of time. It reiterated the charges against the first applicant and stated that “... the court takes into account the fact that [the first applicant] is charged with a serious offence for which the law provides a punishment of lengthy imprisonment, that he is not well viewed by society, that he is unemployed and has already been convicted of a criminal offence in the past, that he does not acknowledge his guilt, which gives the court reasons to believe that if released he may abscond or reoffend. The case-file contains sufficient evidence to support the investigator’s request.” 24. On an unknown date in September 2009 the first applicant attended a court hearing and was able to have a brief conversation with the second applicant, in the course of which he told her that he had been ill-treated and intimidated. He described the conditions of detention in the following manner: he was held in a cell in the basement of the detention centre without any access to daylight; he was held with persons with infectious diseases such as HIV and tuberculosis; there were insufficient beds (in the form of hard platforms, without any mattresses or bed linen), forcing the detainees to take it in turns to get some sleep; he was only allowed one shower a month; the toilet was in the cell and was very rarely cleaned; the cell was damp and lacked a working ventilation system; the cell was full of parasitic insects and on the rare occasions when disinfections were carried out the detainees were present in the cell; there were almost no hygiene products; the food was inedible, full of mould and insects; and no medical assistance was given to him despite his injuries. 25. The second applicant submitted that all the food and other items which she had attempted to send to the first applicant had been rejected by the prison administration or destroyed. On 13 October 2009 the second applicant was told by the prison staff that no food was necessary for the detainees since they were on hunger strike. She was warned that if the strike continued, riot police would be called in. 26. On 15 October 2009 Mr V. Ursu, a member of the Consulting Committee for Prevention of Torture in Moldova, reported that on 14 October 2009 he had been informed by relatives of several persons detained in the detention centre of the “MRT” Ministry of Internal Affairs that many detainees in that centre were on hunger strike and that they were being subjected to ill-treatment. 27. On 16 October 2009 the second applicant found out that the riot police had entered the prison. She was unable to find out what had happened to the first applicant. 28. The applicants have submitted several press reports concerning the hunger strike at the above-mentioned detention centre and the alleged ill-treatment of detainees. They have also submitted copies of press reports by the “MRT” media, according to which on 22 October 2009 the “MRT” Minister of Justice declared that pre-trial detention centres were overcrowded. 29. The OSCE was refused access to IVS Tiraspol on 19 October 2009. Further complaints to Moldovan, Russian and “MRT” authorities were unsuccessful. In particular, on 27 October 2009 the second applicant complained to the Russian Embassy in Moldova, which promised to officially contact the “MRT” prosecutor’s office in connection with the case. In letters to the Council of Europe and to the Centre for Human Rights the second applicant noted that she had seen the first applicant covered in blood and with bruises on his head. 30. In a letter to the Tiraspol city court, dated 3 February 2010, the first applicant complained that he had been severely beaten by the “MRT” militia on 23 July 2009 when he had been arrested. He noted that he had numerous bruises and hematomas on his body and limbs, that he had suffered many blows to his head and that his leg was so swollen and bruised that he had been taken to a medical facility (“medical town” – лечебный городок), which should have registered the treatment administered to him. 31. On 28 July 2010 the first applicant was found guilty by the Tiraspol city court and sentenced to 4 years’ imprisonment suspended for three years. That sentence was quashed by the “MRT” Supreme Court on 31 August 2010 and sent for re-examination by the Tiraspol city court. The case was pending before that court at the time of the last submissions made to the Court. 32. The relevant materials have been summarised in Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC] (no. 11138/10, §§ 61-77, ECHR 2016).

5. The first applicant is the widow and the second applicant is the son of the late John Demjanjuk. They were born in 1925 and 1965, respectively, and live in Ohio, the United States of America. 6. On 12 May 2011 the Munich Regional Court II, after 91 days of trial, convicted John Demjanjuk on 16 counts as an accessory to the murder of at least 28,060 persons. It found it established that he had, in his capacity as a guard in the Sobibór extermination camp, aided and abetted the systematic murder of persons who had been deported to the said camp in 16 convoys between 27 March 1943 and September 1943. It sentenced him to a total of five years’ imprisonment for these crimes. The judgment ran to 220 pages plus appendices. 7. Both the accused and the public prosecutor filed appeals on points of law against that judgment. Defence counsel submitted a brief containing the grounds for the appeal on points of law in November 2011 and subsequently submitted four additional briefs, the last of which was received by the Regional Court on 12 January 2012. On 24 February 2012, the public prosecutor’s office instructed that the file, along with the submissions by the public prosecutor’s office in response to the defence counsel’s submissions, be transferred to the Federal Court of Justice, which was competent to examine the appeal on points of law. 8. John Demjanjuk died on 17 March 2012. At that time, the Federal Court of Justice had not yet received the case file. 9. By decision of 5 April 2012 the Munich Regional Court II discontinued the proceedings in accordance with Article 206a § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure due to the death of the accused (see paragraph 14 below). In that same decision, relying on Article 467 § 3, second sentence, number 2 of the Code (see paragraph 15 below), it ruled that the accused’s necessary expenses were not to be borne by the treasury. The Regional Court reasoned as follows: “... The accused had been convicted on 16 counts as an accessory to murder after 91 days of trial with a comprehensive taking of evidence. The conviction was based on a thorough examination of the evidence as to the facts and an assessment of all relevant legal aspects. Even though the conviction could not become final in the absence of a decision on the appeal on points of law, Article 467 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure did not apply. The procedural impediment occurred after the judgment convicting the applicant had been handed down. The duration of the trial, which had lasted for almost one and a half years, was attributable, to a significant degree, to the time-consuming strategy pursued by the defence. The defence had made excessive use of their right to make statements under Article 257 § 2 of the Code, often repeating arguments already made several times, and had filed around 500 applications for the taking of evidence, a large number of which had been directed at evidence that had either already been taken or that was impossible to obtain, such as the examination of deceased persons. Likewise, the defence had filed more than twenty complaints alleging bias with regard to each of the professional judges sitting on the case, again often repeating arguments and considerations that had already been ruled on. It would have been possible to conclude the trial within a few months, while fully respecting defence rights, if the defence had exercised its procedural rights in a targeted, structured and technical manner. It would thus have been possible to conclude the proceedings, with a final verdict, during the lifetime of the accused. Against this backdrop, it is not equitable, even in the absence of a conclusive finding of guilt, in the context of the discretionary decision to be made, to order that the accused’s necessary expenses be reimbursed by the treasury. ...” 10. Counsel for the late accused filed an immediate appeal against the Regional Court’s decision of 5 April 2012. He submitted, inter alia, that the decision not to reimburse the accused’s necessary expenses, and its reasoning, breached the presumption of innocence guaranteed by Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. On 17 April 2012 counsel submitted powers of attorney from the applicants in the present case. 11. On 4 October 2012 the Munich Court of Appeal dismissed the immediate appeal as inadmissible due to a lack of standing. The procedural status as an accused in criminal proceedings was personal in nature and could not be transferred, including by way of inheritance. In respect of the late accused, it had ceased because of his death. The Court of Appeal went on to state that the immediate appeal was, in addition, ill-founded. Article 6 § 2 of the Convention had not been breached. Having regard to the Court’s judgment in the case of Nölkenbockhoff v. Germany, 25 August 1987, Series A no. 123, it considered that the decision not to reimburse the late accused’s necessary expenses did not breach that provision, as it did not contain a finding of guilt, which the decision itself explicitly stated. It was permissible, in view of the establishment of the late accused’s guilt by the trial court, to find that there continued to be, at the time the proceedings were discontinued, a state of suspicion against the late accused, and to apply Article 467 § 3, second sentence, number 2, of the Code of Criminal Procedure on that basis. 12. On 12 October 2012 counsel filed a complaint to be heard, which the Court of Appeal dismissed as ill-founded on 15 November 2012. 13. On 18 December 2014 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the applicants’ constitutional complaint (no. 2 BvR 2397/12), without providing reasons.

5. The applicant was born in 1960. 6. At the time of the events the applicant was serving in the Turkish Army as a lieutenant-colonel. 7. On 8 May, 10 May and 11 May 2000, the applicant was interrogated by the military prosecutor within the context of a criminal investigation initiated against him for embezzlement. 8. On 16 June 2000 an arrest warrant was issued in respect of the applicant on suspicion of embezzlement. 9. 19 June 2000 the applicant applied to the Military Prosecutor’s Office. He was placed in detention on remand on the same day by the General Staff Military Court. 10. On the same day, the applicant gave a power of attorney to a lawyer. 11. On 22 June 2000 the applicant’s brother Şükrü Aymelek, who was a lawyer, was also placed in detention on remand. On 10 April 2012 the applicant’s brother was released. 12. On 26 June 2000 the General Staff Military Prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the General Staff Military Court charging the applicant with embezzlement under Section 131 of Military Criminal Code, involving in trade activities as a soldier under Additional Section 1 of Military Criminal Code and breaching Article 13 of the Law No. 3628 (Law on Disclosure of Assets and Fight Against Bribery and Corruption). The siblings of the applicant, Şükrü Aymelek and Ulviye Toprakkıran were also charged with the same bill of indictment with embezzlement and breaching Article 13 of the Law No. 3628. 13. On 29 May 2001 the General Staff Military Prosecutor filed an additional bill of indictment and charged the accused with additional acts related to the crimes already stated in the first bill of indictment. 14. On 19 September 2001, the applicant submitted a petition with the prison authorities, complaining that he had not been able to see his brother Şükrü Aymelek, who was also detained in remand. The applicant stated that he regretted that his brother was also in prison because of him, and requested to see him. 15. On 19 September 2002 the applicant was found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment for embezzlement and being involved in trade activities as a soldier by the General Staff Military Court, composed of a military officer with no legal background and two military judges. 16. On 6 January 2003 the applicant appealed against the decision of the General Staff Military Court. 17. On 2 April 2003 the Military Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of 19 September 2002 on procedural grounds and on the merits. 18. On 17 December 2003 the General Staff Military Court found the applicant guilty for embezzlement and being involved in trade activities as a soldier, but reduced his prison sentence. The applicant appealed. 19. On 2 June 2004 the Military Court of Cassation upheld the decision of 17 December 2003. 20. On 13 January 2014 the applicant requested from the Military Court of Cassation to reopen the criminal proceedings alleging that a witness who had not been heard, was ready to give statements before the court. The applicant submitted that witness’ written statements to the Military Court of Cassation as well. 21. On 19 February 2014 rejected the applicant’s request for reopening of the criminal proceedings, on the grounds that the witness’ statements did not have any evidential value, which could warrant a lesser sentence or the acquittal of the applicant.

5. The five applicants are Iraqi nationals. They now live in Switzerland, where they were granted asylum in July 2017 (see paragraph 31 below). The first and second applicants, Mr S.F. and Mrs W.O., born respectively in 1975 and 1978, are spouses. The other three applicants, Mr Y.F., Mr S.F. and Mr A.F., born respectively in 1999, 2004 and 2014, are their sons. 6. On 14 August 2015 the applicants, who had fled from Iraq, covertly crossed the Turkish-Bulgarian border. They were travelling with four other families. From there, they took taxis which drove them to the outskirts of Sofia, where they slept under the open sky for two nights. On 17 August 2015, they hired other taxis to drive them to the Bulgarian-Serbian border, somewhere around the town of Bregovo. Shortly before the border, the applicants switched cars, getting into a Toyota sports utility vehicle, which was supposed to take them through a wooded area to the border itself. They intended to cross that border covertly as well, and from there continue towards Western Europe. 7. At that time, the second applicant was three months pregnant. 8. According to media reports, over the last few years the above‑mentioned route has been a popular one for migrants trying to cross Bulgaria covertly on their way to Western Europe. According to a report submitted by the Government, in August 2015 the Bulgarian border police intercepted 350 adult migrants and 132 minor migrants near Bregovo and took them into custody. 9. In the late afternoon of 17 August 2015 the applicants were driven in the Toyota towards the Bulgarian-Serbian border near the village of Rabrovo, which is about fifteen kilometres south of Bregovo, twenty-five kilometres west of the town of Vidin, and about two kilometres from the border. It was also transporting the four other families; together with the applicants, it carried a total of eighteen passengers, eight of whom were minors. 10. At about 5 p.m., when the Toyota was just a few metres away from the border, two officers of the Bulgarian border police intercepted it. The driver fled. One of the officers gave chase, while the other ordered all the passengers to step out of the vehicle. The first officer could not catch up with the driver and came back. According to the applicants, he was apparently annoyed about his inability to detain the driver and hit one of the passengers. The applicants submitted that they had been afraid that he might hit them as well. 11. Half an hour later, two more officers came to the scene; subsequently, a bus, with a driver and a photographer, also arrived. According to the applicants, the officers insulted the arrestees, called them “mice” (the applicants did not specify in what language), and made insulting gestures. They ordered the applicants and the other passengers to get into the bus and drove them to the Bregovo Border Police Department’s detention facility in Vidin. According to the applicants, the drive took about an hour. According to the Government, the drive could not have taken less than three hours. The preparation of the documents relating to the applicants’ arrest then took another hour, and the written declarations that they had been acquainted with their rights were stamped as having been signed at 9 p.m. The applicants could not have therefore been placed in their cell earlier than 10 p.m. 12. Upon their arrival at the border police’s detention facility in Vidin, the applicants were searched. According to them, all their effects – including travelling bags, mobile telephones, money, food, and even the fifth applicant’s nappies, baby bottle and milk – were taken away from them, except for a mobile telephone belonging to the third or the fourth applicant, which they managed to conceal. According to a search report submitted by the Government, when searching the second applicant the authorities seized from her four mobile telephones, SIM cards, a USB flash drive, two digital video disks and cash. The Government also pointed out that in a video submitted by the applicants (see paragraph 15 below), travel bags and personal effects were visible inside their cell. 13. After the search, the arrestees were split into two groups. The applicants and another family were put in one cell, and the others in an adjoining one. In the application form, the applicants stated that both cells were on the detention facility’s second floor. 14. According to the applicants, the cell was hot and its window could not be opened. 15. The applicants also submitted a video, which according to them had been shot with the mobile telephone that they had managed to conceal during the search (see paragraph 12 above). It shows that the cell was at ground level, about 4 by 4 metres, with a large double window (secured on the inside by a mesh grille), an open door, and a padlocked metal grille on the door. In the video the cell looks run-down, with dilapidated walls, paint coming off the ceiling in flakes, and a dirty floor partly covered with dirty (and in places damp) cardboard sheets. The furniture consists of two old and dilapidated bunk beds and a single bed, with four or five bare soiled mattresses. Two of the mattresses are on the floor, one is on the single bed, and one is on the bottom bunk of one of the bunk beds. A single crumpled‑up bed sheet lies on one of the mattresses on the floor. Personal effects, such as a small shoulder bag, training shoes and some litter, are strewn about. Other random objects – food remains, empty plastic bottles, rubbish and a torn blanket – are piled up in a corner. The third and fourth applicants can be seen sitting on one of the bunk beds, whereas the fifth applicant (the toddler) can at first be seen sitting on the floor beside the door and then being picked up and carried around by the first applicant. Apart from the five applicants, three other people can be seen in the cell: a middle‑aged woman lying on the single bed, a boy (perhaps two or three years old), and the man shooting the video. 16. The video was submitted by the applicants on a digital video disk containing two video files. One is in .mpg format and bears a time stamp according to which it was last modified at 5.36 p.m. on 17 September ‎2015; and the other is in .mp4 format and bears a time stamp according to which it was last modified at 3.27 p.m. on 15 December 2015. The footage in both files is identical, except that: (a) the faces of the applicants in the first one have been pixelated (whereas in the second they have not); (b) the running time of the first video is one minute and twenty-one seconds (whereas that of the second is one minute and thirty-two seconds, as it continues for another ten seconds); and (c) in the first file the footage is horizontal whereas in the second it is rotated to the right at a ninety-degree angle. The footage in the first file has a definition of 1,280 by 720 pixels and is at twenty-four frames per second, whereas that in the second file has a definition of 1,920 by 1,080 pixels and is at twenty-nine frames per second. 17. The applicants explained that the above-mentioned dates and times corresponded with when they had copied the video files in Switzerland, and that they had in fact recorded the original video on 18 August 2015, at about noon. Since they had taken the SIM cards out of the mobile telephone several times in the course of their journey and then re-inserted them, the telephone had not indicated the correct time and date, making it impossible to pinpoint the exact date and time when the video had been recorded. 18. In a letter to the Government Agent, an official from the Migration Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Sofia, having compared the video footage with the photographs in the applicants’ migration files, stated that he could confirm that the applicants were indeed the people featured in the video. 19. According to the Government, the border police’s detention facility in Vidin was equipped in accordance with the relevant regulations. They did not provide further details in that respect. 20. According to the applicants, after being put in the cell, they were not given anything to eat or drink, or allowed to go to the toilet. Since there was no toilet or a bucket in the cell, they had to urinate onto the floor. The Government did not comment on that point. 21. About four hours later, at about 10 p.m., officers came and took the first applicant to another building in order to take his picture and to digitally fingerprint him. After that, the officers took out the second applicant for fingerprinting. After the fingerprinting procedure, the officers left the applicants in the cell for the night. 22. Between 10.30 a.m. and 11 a.m. and between 11 a.m. and 11.30 a.m. the next day, 18 August 2015, a border police investigator interviewed respectively the first and the second applicants. The interviews were conducted in English and translated into Bulgarian with the help of an interpreter. 23. According to the applicants, after the interview the second applicant asked the guards to give her back her bag, so that she could prepare a baby bottle for her toddler (the fifth applicant), and the guards did so. The Government did not comment on that point. 24. After that, the guards took the applicants one by one out of the cell to go to the toilet. 25. According to the applicants, later that day, a ten-month-old child in the adjoining cell touched an electrical wire and suffered an electric shock. That caused panic among the detainees, and the guards allowed all of them out of their cells. An ambulance was called. When hearing that the applicants had not had anything to eat or drink since their arrest, the nurse who came with the ambulance argued with the guards and took the second applicant and her youngest child, the fifth applicant, to a hospital in Vidin, where the second applicant was examined by a gynaecologist between 8.05 p.m. and 8.35 p.m., and the fifth applicant was examined by a paediatrician between 8.20 p.m. and 8.40 p.m. Two or three hours later they were taken back to the detention facility. 26. According to the applicants, at that point the guards told them that they would give them food if they paid for it; the guards then took money from their bags and gave them two loaves of bread, a yoghurt, four bottles of Coca-Cola, one kilogram of tomatoes, one kilogram of cucumbers, one kilogram of bananas, and a small piece of paté. According to the Government, the applicants were provided with food and water, in accordance with the relevant regulations. In support of their assertion, the Government submitted a table setting out the prescribed daily rations for adult and minor detained migrants and a report, drawn up by the head of the Bregovo Border Police Department on 1 September 2015, which listed the names of all migrants – including the applicants – which had been detained in the Department’s detention facility in Vidin during the month of August 2015 and provided with food there. 27. Then, at about 10 p.m. or 11 p.m., the applicants were put back in the cell. According to them, they were allowed to go to the toilet before that, but had not been able to do so during the night. The Government did not comment on that point. 28. The next day, 19 August 2015, the applicants were served with orders for the first and second applicants’ removal from Bulgaria and for their detention pending removal, all issued the previous day. It does not appear that separate orders were issued with respect to the third, fourth and fifth applicants, who were mentioned as accompanied minors in the orders for the first and second applicants’ detention (see paragraph 33 below). 29. According to the applicants, at about midday on 19 August 2015 they were given back their belongings and driven to an immigration detention facility in Sofia. According to the Government, that happened much earlier that day, at about 6 a.m. or 7 a.m., since the relevant records showed that the applicants had been placed in the detention facility in Sofia at 2.45 p.m., and the normal travel time between the two facilities was about six or seven hours. 30. On 24 August 2015 the applicants sought international protection in Bulgaria. Their applications were registered by the State Agency for Refugees on 31 August 2015, and they were released from the immigration detention facility in Sofia and settled in an open facility for the accommodation of asylum-seekers. On 23 September 2015 those proceedings were, however, discontinued because the applicants had vanished from the facility. 31. In the meantime, the applicants made their way to Switzerland, where they likewise sought international protection on 8 September 2015. On 8 January 2016 the Swiss authorities decided not to examine their applications but rather to transfer them back to Bulgaria under Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third‑country national or a stateless person (“the Dublin III Regulation”), which also applies to Switzerland (see A.S. v. Switzerland, no. 39350/13, §§ 12-13, 30 June 2015). Following legal challenges by the applicants, on 7 July 2016 the Swiss authorities varied their own decision and proceeded with the examination of the applications. Just over a year later, on 27 July 2017, the applicants were granted asylum in Switzerland.

5. Mr Vasilevskiy was born in 1973 and lives in Blagoveshchensk. 6. Mr Vasilevskiy stayed in detention for longer that he should have because the sentencing courts did not count the time he had spent in pre-trial detention towards the overall duration of his sentence, in breach of the applicable domestic provisions. In response to Mr Vasilevskiy’s repeated complaints, on 7 May 2007 the Belogorskiy District Court in the Amur Region corrected the error and acknowledged that his sentence had expired on 26 February 2006. Mr Vasilevskiy was released on 13 June 2007. He sought compensation for 472 days during which he had been wrongfully detained. 7. On 13 December 2013 the Blagoveshchensk Town Court in the Amur Region awarded him 150,000 Russian roubles (RUB – 3,320 euros (EUR) at the then-applicable exchange rate) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. Mr Vasilevskiy lodged an appeal, submitting in particular that that sum was substantially lower than that which the Court would have awarded in a similar case. 8. On 28 February 2014 the Amur Regional Court dismissed his appeal. As regards the level of compensation, it held that the Town Court had “had regard to the case-law of the European Court but had correctly determined the amount of compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage in the light of the requirements of Russian law”. 9. Mr Bogdanov was born in 1981 and lives in the Novgorod Region. 10. On 30 March 2007 Mr Bogdanov was convicted of supplying drugs on four separate occasions in 2006 and sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment. On 20 March 2013 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation acknowledged, referring to the Court’s case-law under Article 6 of the Convention, that the police had incited Mr Bogdanov to commit the last three of the four offences. It declared that part of evidence inadmissible, voided his conviction in that part, reduced his sentence to six years’ imprisonment and ordered his immediate release. 11. By that time, Mr Bogdanov had spent 119 days in custody over and above the adjusted six-year sentence. He sought to recover damages in respect of his wrongful imprisonment. 12. On 13 March 2014 the Valdayskiy District Court in the Novgorod Region awarded him RUB 80,000 (EUR 1,576). However, on 9 July 2014 the Novgorod Regional Court reduced the award to RUB 15,000 (EUR 324), referring to the “circumstances in which the criminal proceedings had been instituted” and the “category of offence that Mr Bogdanov had been charged with”. On 30 September 2014 the Regional Court rejected a cassation appeal lodged by Mr Bogdanov.

5. The applicants were born in 1940 and 1950 respectively and live in the village of Khasanya situated on the outskirts of Nalchik, the capital of Kabardino-Balkaria Republic, a region in the North Caucasus. They are the parents of Mr Rasul Tsakoyev, who was born in 1978. At the material time, he lived with them and worked in a shop selling mobile phones. 6. According to the applicants, their son Mr Rasul Tsakoyev was suspected of membership of the illegal armed group, “Yarmuk”, and was under the surveillance of the Department for Combating Organised Crime of the Ministry of Interior for Kabardino-Balkaria (Управление по Борьбе с Организованной Преступностью Министерства внутренних дел по Кабардино-Балкарской Республике – “the UBOP”). On several occasions − in particular, on 4 May and 8 September 2003 and again on 18 August 2004 − he had been unlawfully detained for a number of hours, had been beaten and questioned by State agents, but had then been released without charge. 7. On 27 and 28 September 2004, a special antiterrorist operation against Yarmuk members was carried out in the town of Nalchik, in the nearby village of Khasanya, and in other settlements in the Elbrusskiy district in Kabardino-Balkaria (see paragraph 15 below). (b) Mr Rasul Tsakoyev’s disappearance on 27 September 2004 8. On the morning of 27 September 2004 Mr Tsakoyev went to the shop where he worked. In the afternoon he told his colleague, Mr M.T., that he needed to go out for a short while. Later he called the colleague from his mobile phone and said: “They are following me again, I will be back soon”. Mr M.T. understood that Rasul Tsakoyev was talking about the police. Since Mr Tsakoyev did not return to work, between 4 and 5 p.m. Mr M.T. called him, but his mobile phone was switched off. Later in the evening, he again tried calling Mr Tsakoyev, but his telephone was still off. Rasul Tsakoyev did not return home that night. 9. At about 6 a.m. on 28 September 2004 the police conducted a search at Mr M.T.’s home. The applicants learned about the search from his wife, who called them to warn that their house might be searched too. After the search, Mr M.T. was taken to the premises of the UBOP. He was held there for about twenty hours and then released. 10. Also on the morning of 28 September 2004, the applicants learned that another friend of Rasul Tsakoyev, Mr R.M., had also been taken to the premises of the UBOP. They went to the building to find out whether Rasul Tsakoyev was likewise detained there and asked the duty officer about their son. The officer told them that he had been brought there and would soon be released. No information regarding the grounds for their son’s detention, the possible charges against him, or the exact time of his release was given. They waited at the entrance to the UBOP for a while and then returned home. Sometime later Mr R.M. and Mr M.T. were released, but Rasul Tsakoyev did not return home. 11. On 29 September 2004 the applicants again went to the UBOP and requested information as to their son’s whereabouts. They told Mr A.Z., the head of Khasanya village administration, that their son had been detained by UBOP officers and asked him to speak to the police and establish their son’s whereabouts. After spending about an hour at the UBOP premises, Mr A.Z. told the applicants that he had spoken with the head of the UBOP, superior officer K., who had told him that their son had not been detained on those premises but had been taken to Khankala in the Chechen Republic. 12. That afternoon the applicants again went to the UBOP and requested information about their son. However, they were given no information and the head of the UBOP, officer K., refused to see them. 13. On the same date, the applicant’s daughter complained in writing to the Nalchik prosecutor about the abduction of her brother Rasul Tsakoyev, it was to be presumed by representatives of the law-enforcement agencies. 14. Later on 29 September 2004 Mr M.T. received a phone call in which he was told that two men from the village of Khasanya had found Rasul Tsakoyev next to a local gas station. He had been severely beaten. 15. On 30 September 2004 the local newspaper “Газета Юга” (Gazeta Yuga) in its issue no. 40 (553) published an official statement by the Ministry of the Interior of Kabardino-Balkaria, stating that as a result of the special operation a resident of Khasanya had been arrested, along with two residents of Nalchik. According to the applicants, nobody from Khasanya except their son had been arrested during the special operation. (c) Rasul Tsakoyev’s return, his account of the detention and ill-treatment and his subsequent death 16. Between 8 and 8.30 p.m. on 29 September 2004 two residents of Khasanya, Mr A. A. and Mr R.A., brought Rasul Tsakoyev home. He was severely beaten and groggy. His body was covered with bruises and abrasions, there were cigarette burns on his neck, punctures under his nails, lacerated wounds on his shoulders, marks left by handcuffs and wires on his wrists, and traces of injections on his left forearm and fingers. His heels were smashed and he smelled of medicines. 17. Mr Tsakoyev told the applicants that on the evening of 27 September 2004, while walking not far from his shop, police officers in masks and camouflage uniforms bearing the stripes of the SOBR (спецотряд быстрого реагирования – quick response unit) had stopped him. They had put a bag over his head and forced him into a car. They took him to a building where they had taken the bag off. He had immediately recognised the UBOP premises since he had already been questioned there many times. During the three days of his detention there he had been tortured by UBOP officers who, under the orders of the superior officer K., pressurised him into confessing in writing to participation in an illegal armed group. Specifically, he had been given no food or water, the UBOP officers had beaten him with rubber truncheons, had burned cigarettes against his face, head, neck and shoulders, put needles under his nails, and tied his hands and feet with steel wire which had left marks. Once he had been given a liquid to drink which made him sick and he had thrown up. Then he had been given some pills that he had spat out. The officers had also tortured him with electric shocks. After lengthy beatings, a doctor in white overalls had entered the room, examined him, checked his pupils and made some injections that left marks on his shoulders. On the afternoon of 29 September 2004, he had been taken out of the UBOP premises, driven by car to a rubbish dump some two kilometres from the village of Khasanya and left there. He had walked to the gas station on the outskirts of Khasanya, where two local residents Khasanya had found him and taken him home. 18. On 29 September 2004 after Mr Tsakoyev had been brought home, his relatives called an ambulance. The ambulance doctors diagnosed Mr Tsakoyev with closed craniocerebral injury, brain concussion, multiple contusions, closed fracture of the ribs and contusion of the kidneys. They said he needed to be urgently hospitalised and took him to the Republican Clinical Hospital. 19. On 4 October 2004 Rasul Tsakoyev died in hospital. According to the medical report of the same date, his death was caused by renal failure, myoglobinemia, right-side pneumonia and severe multi-trauma. 20. According to the forensic report of 13 October 2004 (see paragraph 61 below), Rasul Tsakoyev had the following injuries: massive blunt trauma with crushing of body muscles complicated by myoglobinemia, renal failure, respiratory failure and encephalopathy; contusion of the heart, lungs, kidneys and bowels; fracture of the sixth and seventh ribs on the left side; posttraumatic pneumonitis on the right side; closed craniocerebral injury and brain concussion; large bruises of the chest and extremities; abrasions of the head and extremities. The above injuries had been caused by hard blunt objects. Abrasions on the wrists had most likely been caused by handcuffs. 21. On 8 October 2004 residents of the Khasanya village organised a protest meeting demanding prosecution of the police officers responsible for the ill-treatment and death of Rasul Tsakoyev. The head of the Kabardino‑Balkaria Government, Mr Gubin, and the Kabardino-Balkaria prosecutor, Mr Ketov, had promised the crowd that the perpetrators would be prosecuted. 22. On 19 October 2004 two hundred and forty residents of the Khasanya village submitted a joint petition to the Kabardino-Balkaria prosecutor asking him to ensure the prosecution of the police officers who had abducted Rasul Tsakoyev on 27 September 2004 next to the prosecutor’s office and then tortured him until 29 September 2004, causing his death from the ill-treatment they had inflicted. 23. On 20 December 2004 the residents of Khasanya sent their joint petition to the Russian Prosecutor General and demanded an effective investigation into the circumstances surrounding the death of Rasul Tsakoyev. 24. The Government did not dispute the circumstances of the case, as presented by the applicants. They agreed that Mr Tsakoyev had been subjected to ill-treatment as a result of which he had died. However, the alleged involvement of the police in the incident was not confirmed by the criminal investigation. 25. The Government submitted that between May and June 2005 the Kabardino-Balkaria police had obtained information indicating that Rasul Tsakoyev had actively aided members of the illegal armed group Yarmuk and those leaders had given him and Mr M.A. a large amount for money for the preparation of terrorist attacks in Kabardino-Balkaria. After the failure of the attacks, members of Yarmuk group had been displeased with Rasul Tsakoyev and had claimed their money back. Members of the Yarmuk group used camouflage uniforms and balaclavas and might have impersonated representatives of law-enforcement agencies. 26. The Government also submitted the following information concerning Rasul Tsakoyev’s friends and/or colleagues Mr M.A., Mr A.Z., Mr M.T., Mr R.M. and Mr Z.S. as well as the UBOP superior officer K. According to their submission, between January 2005 and April 2009 these five friends of Mr Tsakoyev had all been put on the wanted list and then eventually killed as results of various special operations carried out by law‑enforcement agencies. As for officer K., on 12 January 2008 he had been shot dead by unidentified culprits. 27. In response to the Court’s request for a copy of the entire contents of the criminal investigation file, the Government furnished a copy of some of its contents. The Government stated that the parts of the file recording the steps taken against members of illegal armed groups could not be submitted to the Court. The partial contents as submitted ran to 560 pages and could be summarised as follows. 28. On 30 September 2004 the first applicant had complained to the Kabardino-Balkaria prosecutor, stating that his son had been unlawfully detained and severely beaten by UBOP officers and that he was being treated in the intensive care unit at the Republican Clinical Hospital. The first applicant also stated that his son had been unlawfully detained by the police on several occasions, namely on 4 May and 8 September 2003 and on 18 March and, finally, on 27 September 2004, and requested that the perpetrators of his son’s abduction and ill-treatment be prosecuted. 29. On 7 October 2004 the Nalchik prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 21/175-04 under Article 111 of the Criminal Code (infliction of grave injuries leading to death). 30. On 9 October 2004 the first applicant was granted victim status in the criminal proceedings and questioned. The applicant stressed that his son had told him that he had been abducted and tortured by UBOP officers on the premises of the police unit and that he had been subjected to severe beatings on the direct orders of the head of the UBOP, officer K. 31. On 9 October 2004 the investigators questioned Rasul Tsakoyev’s sister, Ms Kh. Ts., who gave a statement similar to that given to the investigation by the first applicant and to the applicants’ submission before the Court. In addition, she stated that, while he had been at home on 29 September 2004 Rasul Tsakoyev had told her that at least six police officers had participated in his abduction and two police officers of Kabardian ethnic origin had subjected him to the severe beatings. 32. On 9 October 2004 the investigators questioned Rasul Tsakoyev’s aunt, Ms Z. E., who gave a statement similar to that given by the first applicant and to the applicants’ submission before the Court. 33. On the same date, 9 October 2004 the investigators questioned the second applicant, who gave a statement similar to that given to the investigation by the first applicant. In addition, she stated that whilst her son had been at home after the ill-treatment he had told her that he had been abducted by six policemen, taken to the UBOP premises and beaten there by two policemen who had spoken Kabardian between themselves and Russian to him. They had tortured him, pressurising him to admit to assisting members of illegal armed groups. They had demanded that he identify a bearded man in a photograph. The applicant also stated that on 8 September 2003 the police had searched their family home with a warrant. During the search the police officers had told her that her family was suspected of aiding members of illegal armed groups in Chechnya and illegally storing firearms in the house. However, the police had found nothing and had merely taken Rasul for questioning. Rasul had been under surveillance by the police on suspicion of participation in a radical movement. 34. On 11 October 2004 the investigators questioned Mr A.A., who stated that on 29 September 2004 he and Mr R.A. had seen Rasul Tsakoyev next to the gas station. The latter had been severely beaten and could barely walk. He had told them that he had been subjected to beatings on the premises of the UBOP and that the police officers who had carried out the beatings had spoken Kabardian and Russian. The witness and Mr R.A. had taken Mr Tsakoyev home, where they had helped his relatives to call for an ambulance. 35. On the same date, 11 October 2004, the investigators questioned Mr R.A., who gave a statement similar to that of Mr A.A. He also stated that Rasul Tsakayev had alleged that he had been severely beaten by the police officers on the premises of the UBOP. 36. On 11 October 2004 the investigators also questioned the head of the Khasanya village administration, Mr A.Z., who gave a statement similar to the applicants’ submission before the Court. In addition, he stated that when he had asked the head of the UBOP, officer K., whether Rasul Tsakoyev had been detained on their premises, the latter had replied in the negative but told him that he was suspected of aiding an illegal armed group run by a certain Mr M. Atabayev by supplying it with money and telephones. The witness further stated that on 29 September 2004 he had seen the Imam of the Khasanya mosque, Mr Kh.M., who had told him that Rasul Tsakoyev and two of his friends were being held in detention on the police premises in Nalchik. 37. On 11 October 2004 the investigators questioned the deputy head of the Khasanya village administration, Mr R.F., who stated that at the end of September 2004 he had learnt from the Imam of the Khasanya mosque Mr Kh.M. that Rasul Tsakoyev had been detained and taken to the UBOP unit and that he had died at the beginning of October 2004 as a result of the beatings to which he had been subjected by the police. 38. On 12 October 2004 the investigators questioned Mr S.Ch. and Mr A.B., who stated that they had found Rasul Tsakoyev in a severely beaten condition next to the gas station on 29 September 2004. Mr Tsakoyev had told them that he had been subjected to ill-treatment at the UBOP premises. 39. On 12 October 2004 the investigators also questioned Mr Z.S., who stated that he had visited Rasul Tsakoyev at home before he had been taken to the hospital. Mr Tsakoyev had told him that he had been beaten by officers from the UBOP. The witness further stated that on 3 October 2004 he had spoken with police officer Kh.G., who had told him that he had not personally participated in Mr Tsakoyev’s ill-treatment but that it had been the UBOP the superior officers who had issued the orders to beat him. 40. On 13 October 2004 the investigators questioned Rasul Tsakoyev’s colleague Mr M.T., who stated that early in the morning of 28 September 2004 several police officers had searched his house after showing him their warrant. After that he had been taken to the first floor of the UBOP building, where he had been questioned first by by officer E. and then, about three or four hours later, by another policeman on the second floor. The police officers had told him that his telephone had been tapped due to the suspicion that he had been aiding members of illegal armed groups. On the evening of 28 September 2004 he had been released and at the entrance to the UBOP building he had met the applicants, who had been searching for their son. The following day he had learnt that Rasul Tsakoyev had been abducted and ill-treated by UBOP officers, who had lied about it to the applicants on 28 September 2004 when they went to the police station searching for their son. 41. On 13 October 2004 the investigators questioned Rasul Tsakoyev’s friend Mr R.M., who stated that on 28 September 2004 police officers and the officers from the Federal Security Service (the FSB) had searched his house with a search warrant. After that he had been taken to the second floor of the UBOP building and had been questioned about Rasul Tsakoyev by an officer named Anzor and had been told that his detention had been ordered by the head of the UBOP, officer K. He had then been handcuffed to the radiator for the whole night. The following day, 29 September 2004, he had been allowed to go home at about 10 a.m. At the entrance to the building, he had seen the applicants, who had been searching for Rasul Tsakoyev. Later on, when he visited Mr Tsakoyev at the hospital, the latter had told him that he had been beaten on the UBOP premises. 42. On 14 October 2004 the investigators questioned Mr Kh. M., the Imam of the Khasanya mosque, who stated that he had assisted the applicants and Rasul Tsakoyev’s friends in their search after his abduction by masked policemen. On 27 or 28 September 2004 he and Mr R.N. had arrived at the UBOP premises, where they had spoken with a police officer whose office was on the second floor in the same building as the UBOP. In their presence, the officer had telephoned someone in the UBOP and had told them that Rasul Tsakoyev and his two friends had been detained by the UBOP but would be released after questioning (see also paragraph 49 below). The following day, when the witness returned to the building, he had not been allowed to enter, but had been given permission to leave food for the three men. The following day he had seen Rasul Tsakoyev at home, beaten to a pulp. 43. On 14 October 2004 the investigators questioned Mr R.N., who gave a statement similar to that given by the Imam Kh.M. In particular, he stated that Rasul Tsakoyev and two other men had been detained in the UBOP building and that he and the Iman had been allowed to leave some food and drink for them. 44. On 18 October 2004 the investigators questioned Rasul Tsakoyev’s friend Mr Z. G., who stated that he had visited him in hospital at the beginning of October 2004 and that the latter had told him and the others that he had been abducted and beaten by UBOP officers on the direct orders of the head of the UBOP. 45. On 3 and 5 November 2004 the investigators questioned medical doctors Mr A.M., Mr K.M. and Mr A. Ch., who stated that they had treated Mr Tsakoyev in the hospital until his death on 4 October 2004. According to the doctors, his condition had been very serious, he could barely talk and had been put on a ventilator, but to no avail. Mr Tsakoyev had not informed them about the origin of his injuries. 46. On 9 November 2004 the investigators questioned the police investigator Ms Kh. K., who stated that she had questioned Rasul Tsakoyev on 30 September 2004 at the hospital. He had been very weak and had told her that on 27 September 2004 he had been abducted in Nalchik, next to the prosecutor’s office, by four unidentified police officers who had arrived in a red VAZ-model vehicle. He said that they had taken him somewhere for two nights and had severely beaten him, and that he would not be able to identify the policemen, who had spoken Russian, as they had had balaclavas over their faces. Even though Mr Tsakoyev had told her that he had been beaten by police officers, he had not said that they had been from the UBOP. 47. Between 9 and 22 November 2004 the investigators questioned several residents of Nalchik: Ms M.Ch. ,Ms Z.Ch., Mr Al. Kh. and Mr An.K., whose mobile telephone numbers had been used to call Rasul Tsakoyev or receive calls from his number on the afternoon of 27 September 2004. All of them stated that they had not used those SIM cards with their respective phone numbers and denied knowing anything about either Mr Tsakoyev or his abduction. 48. On 11 November 2004 the investigators questioned police officers A.Ch. and R.K., both of whom stated that on 29 September 2004 they had been on duty at the entrance of the UBOP building and that they did not recall any visitors wanting to speak with officer K. 49. On 16 November 2004 the investigators questioned the deputy head of the Dolinskiy Department of the Interior in Nalchik, officer A.K., who stated that at the end of September 2004 the Imam of Khasanya village had arrived at his office with another man and had asked him whether three or four acquaintances of his had been arrested by the police and held in detention. The witness had made several phone calls to various police stations and had been told that several men had been detained by the UBOP. He, the Imam and the other man had gone to the UBOP, where he had seen officer Z.Sh., who confirmed that several men from Khasanya had been taken there for questioning. 50. On 17 November 2004 the investigators questioned police officers M.M., I.S., A.K. and V.L., who gave similar statements to the effect that on 29 September 2004 they had been the duty officers at the UBOP premises and that they did not recall anyone visiting their office and asking about Rasul Tsakoyev. All of them also stated that at the time officer K. was travelling a lot for work and had frequently been out of the office. 51. On 23 November 2004 the investigators questioned Ms Dzh.G., who stated that at the end of September 2004 her father had witnessed the abduction of a young man by several men in balaclavas who had pulled over in a car and quickly forced him inside. After the car had driven off, her father had found a mobile telephone, which had fallen out the young man’s pocket, and had given it to her as a gift. She had received several calls from young men who had asked her in the Balkar language who she was and why she had the phone. After that she had turned the telephone off and had used it only when needed. At the end of October 2004 she had thrown away the young man’s SIM card and put a new one in. She did not know Rasul Tsakoyev and had no information about his abduction or ill-treatment. The investigators seized the telephone from Ms Dzh.G. on the same day, 23 November 2004. 52. On 23 November 2004 the investigators questioned the father of Ms Dzh.G., Mr A.G., who gave a statement similar to that of his daughter (see the paragraph above). 53. Between 10 and 14 December 2004 the investigators questioned the UBOP officers M.G. and Z.Sh., both of whom gave similar statements to the effect that at the end of September 2004 they had been asked by relatives and friends of Rasul Tsakoyev’s about his possible whereabouts on their unit’s premises. They had checked some offices, but had not found him. In addition, they stated that at the material time officer K., like a number of other officers, had work in the Elbrusskiy district. 54. On 16 December 2004 the investigators questioned the deputy head UBOP officer, A.E., who stated that at the end of September 2004 he had seen Mr M.T., who had been detained on the premises of their building. He was unaware of the reasons for his detention and did not know whether Rasul Tsakoyev had been taken there. 55. On 1 February 2005 the investigators conducted a face-to-face confrontation between Rasul Tsakoyev’s friend Mr Z.S. and officer Kh.G., during which the witnesses maintained their contradictory statements. According to Mr Z.S., the UBOP police officers had tortured Mr Tsakoyev, whereas Mr Kh.G. denied seeing him on the UBOP premises. 56. On 1 February 2005 the investigators carried out another face‑to‑face confrontation, this time between Rasul Tsakoyev’s friend Mr Z.G. and officer Kh.G., during which the witnesses maintained their contradictory statements. According to Mr Z.G., officer Kh.G. had told him that the police officers had tortured Mr Tsakoyev on the direct orders of officer K., whereas Mr Kh.G. denied giving such information. 57. On 3 February 2005 the investigators carried out a third face-to-face confrontation, this time between Rasul Tsakoyev’s friend Mr Z.G. and officer E.B., during which the witnesses maintained their contradictory statements. According to Mr Z.G., officer E.B. had been present at the hospital where Rasul Tsakoyev had been hospitalised at the end of September 2004 and in his presence officer Kh.G. had admitted that Rasul had been detained in the UBOP and tortured on the direct orders of the superior officer. Mr E.B. admitted being at the hospital at that time but denied hearing any such conversation. 58. On 8 November 2005 the investigators questioned Mr Sh.D. and Mr M.B. The copies of their statements submitted to the Court were illegible. 59. On 4 October 2004 the investigators carried out an examination of the crime scene in room no. 3 of the intensive care unit of the Republican Clinical Hospital, where Rasul Tsakoyev was treated between 29 September and 4 October 2004. 60. On 11 October 2004 the investigators seized Rasul Tsakoyev’s clothing from the first applicant for forensic examination. On 19 October 2004 the forensic report was received. It stated that no biological material had been found on the outer items of the clothing and that the traces of blood on Mr Tsakoyev’s underwear had not belonged to his blood group. 61. On 12 October 2004 the investigators ordered a report on Rasul Tsakoyev’s body based on his medical records. On 13 October 2004 the experts issued their report, according to which the injuries had been inflicted about seven days prior to his death, that is to say on 27 or 28 September 2004, and that those injuries had been caused by hard blunt objects (see paragraph 20 above). 62. On 18 October 2004 counsel G. hired by the applicants requested that the investigators question witnesses Mr Z. S., Mr Yu. S., Mr Z. G. and officers G. and B. On the same date, the request was granted in the part relating to the questioning of Mr Yu. S., Mr Z. G. and officers G. and B. It was dismissed in the part relating to Mr Z. S. since he had already been questioned. 63. On 19 October, 20 and 22 November 2004 the applicants complained to various State authorities, including the Russian Prosecutor General, about the inefficiency of the investigation. In their complaints they stated that their son had been abducted by UBOP police officers, had been tortured on the direct orders of officer K., and that he had died as a result. They argued that the head of the Kabardino-Balkaria Government, Mr Gubin, and the Prosecutor of Kabardino-Balkaria, Mr Ketov, had failed to keep their promise to bring the perpetrators to justice (see paragraph 21 above). 64. On 21 October 2004 the first applicant requested that the investigators provide him with the following documents: a statement of calls made from and received on Rasul Tsakoyev’s mobile phone between September and October 2004; excerpt from the UBOP detention register for the period from 27 to 28 September 2004; transcript of Rasul Tsakoyev’s questioning on 18 September 2004. The first applicant also requested that a search be conducted for the persons who now had Rasul Tsakoyev’s mobile phone and that it be tapped. He said that he suspected that his son’s telephone was in the hands of the UBOP officers who had abducted him. 65. On the same date, 21 October 2004, the investigators granted the above request in full. The text of their decision included the following: “... On 21 October 2004 the victim D. Tsakoyev requested that the investigators obtain a court authorisation for the tapping of mobile telephone number 8‑928‑637‑61-27 ‒ which had belonged to Rasul Tsakoyev and had been lost after [his] arrest by the officers of the UBOP of the Kabardino-Balkaria Ministry of the Interior ‒ obtain a detailed list of the phone calls, and take operational search steps to establish the whereabouts of Mr Tsakoyev’s telephone. This request should be granted in full for the following reasons. The circumstances referred to by [the first applicant] D. Tsakoyev, are considered to be substantiated by the investigation and necessary for a full, objective investigation into the circumstances of the incident ...” From the documents submitted it appears that, although the request was formally granted, the steps it specified therein were not taken. 66. On 22 October 2004 the investigators received a list of the ten police officers who had participated in the search of Mr R.M.’s and Mr M.T.’s households on 28 September 2004. 67. On 25 November 2004 the Kabardino-Balkaria prosecutor received the first applicant’s complaint, which had been forwarded by the Representative of the Russian President in the Southern Federal Circuit on 20 November 2004. According to the first applicant, his son Rasul Tsakoyev had been tortured on the premises of the UBOP on the direct orders of the superior officer K., and his son had told him about it prior to his death in hospital. The applicant stressed that his son had been detained on several occasions prior to the last detention and that he had been a person of interest for the local police. According to the applicant, the following evidence proved that his son had been abducted and tortured specifically by UBOP officers and not by any other policemen: “1. On 4 May and 8 September 2003 and then on 18 August 2004 Rasul Tsakoyev was detained by the officers from that particular unit; 2. A search was conducted on 28 September 2004 in the households of Rasul Tsakoyev’s friends Mr M.T. and Mr R.M. and they, in particular Mr R.M., had subsequently been questioned only about Rasul Tsakoyev; 3. On 28 September 2004 the Imam of the Khasanya village Kh.M. asked officers from the UBOP whether they were detaining Rasul Tsakoyev, Mr R.M. and Mr M.T.; the officers replied that all three of them had been detained on the premises of that unit and that at that time there were no superiors in the station to order their release; 4. On 29 September 2004, I, as the father of Rasul Tsakoyev, went to that police unit with the head of the Khasanya village administration, Mr A.Z., ... but only Mr A.Z. was allowed to enter the premises. After a 30-40 minute conversation there, Mr A.Z. came out and told me that, according to officer K., Rasul had been transferred to Khankala. After that we went home. However, sometime later Rasul’s friends told us that he had not been taken anywhere but had been detained in the UBOP building. This information was confirmed by one of the duty officers at the entrance to the UBOP premises. In addition, the local press stated that on 28 September 2004 several residents of Khasanya, Kendelen and Nalchik had been detained as a result of a special operation. Nobody from Khasanya village except for Rasul Tsakoyev had been detained on 27 or 28 September 2004. ... 5. Prior to his death Rasul told us that he had been beaten and tortured by two police officers in balaclavas who had demanded that he confessed to aiding terrorists and supplying them with telephones and food. During those inhumane procedures, officer K. had entered and asked the officers: “So, anything?” and they had replied: “He would not confess”. Officer K. had ordered them to continue. As a result of those actions by the police officers from the UBOP unit, my son Rasul Tsakoyev died. 6. During Rasul’s stay at the hospital, police officers Kh.G. and E.B. visited him and confirmed [to us] that Rasul Tsakoyev had been detained in the UBOP building at the material time [27-29 September 2004]. Given the above, I have reasons not to trust the law-enforcement bodies in Kabardino-Balkaria and request that you take the investigation of the criminal case under your personal control and transfer it to the prosecutor’s office of the Southern Federal Circuit for a full and complete investigation ... I request that you take those steps as the investigative authorities are not taking sufficient measures and not interested in solving the crime and prosecuting the perpetrators in court.” No reply was given to this request. 68. On 7 February 2005 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 69. On 2 March 2005 the first applicant requested that the investigators resume the investigation and take the following investigative steps: question the person who had Rasul Tsakoyev’s mobile phone; arrange a face-to-face confrontation between the applicants, their daughter and the head of the UBOP, officer K.; arrange a face-to-face confrontation between officer K. and another witness. 70. On 7 March 2005 the first applicant’s request was refused. The applicant appealed against the refusal to the investigators’ superiors. 71. On 1 April 2005 the investigators’ superior, the Kabardino-Balkaria prosecutor, dismissed the complaint. The decision stated, inter alia, that the statements made by officer K. and by Mr Z. contained no conflicting information and there was therefore no need for a face-to-face confrontation. Officer K. had provided information on his whereabouts between 27 and 29 September 2004. He had neither met with the applicants nor talked to them. Accordingly, there was no need for a face-to-face confrontation either. As regards Ms Dzh. G., who was using Rasul Tsakoyev’s mobile phone, it had been found by her father. Neither of them had been involved in the infliction of injuries on Rasul Tsakoyev and no face-to-face confrontation was therefore required. 72. On 13 May 2005 the investigation was resumed. The decision stated that it was necessary to verify the possible involvement of an illegal armed group headed by Mr M.A. in the offence and to take other steps. 73. On the same date, 13 May 2005, unidentified persons broke into the house of the applicants’ counsel, G., while he was absent. They opened his safe but did not steal anything. Later somebody called him on the phone and said that he had been warned. Since at the time counsel G. was working solely on Rasul Tsakoyev’s case, he concluded that the trespassing and the phone call must have been related to it. At the end of May the applicants had to accept the withdrawal of his assistance. 74. On 27 and 30 May 2005 the first applicant complained to the Kabardino-Balkaria prosecutor about the attempt to put pressure on his counsel. In his complaints, he also mentioned the murder of Mr A. Z. on 14 May 2005. 75. On 1 June 2005, the Kabardino-Balkaria prosecutor’s office replied that his complaint of 30 May 2005 had been enclosed in the case file. 76. On 16 June 2005 the investigation was again suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 77. On 23 August 2005 the applicants’ new legal counsel, D., requested that the investigators provide her with copies of documents from the case file. 78. On 24 August 2005 the investigators provided the counsel with copies of the decisions to institute and suspend the investigation but refused to provide copies of other documents. 79. On 29 August 2005 counsel D. again requested that the investigators provide her with copies of documents in the case file, including records of witness questioning and the expert reports. 80. On 30 August 2005 the investigators allowed the request in part only concerning provision of copies of the procedural decisions and of other documents in the case file. 81. On 16 September 2005 the first applicant applied to the Minister of the Interior asking the latter to take steps to ensure an effective investigation in the case and to resume the proceedings. His request was forwarded to the investigators. 82. On 15 December 2005 the investigators replied to the first applicant that all possible investigative steps had been taken and that there were no grounds for resuming the proceedings. 83. On 9 March 2006 the first applicant requested that the investigators take the following steps: grant victim status to the second applicant; join the medical evidence of 29 October 2004 to the case file; give him Rasul Tsakoyev’s mobile phone; question him again; arrange face-to-face confrontations between the applicants, officer K. and Ms Dzh. G.; request from the UBOP a copy of the transcript of Rasul Tsakoyev’s questioning on 18 September 2004. 84. On 19 March 2006, following the decision of the Kabardino‑Balkaria Supreme Court of 28 February 2006 (see paragraph 102 below), the decision to suspend the investigation was overruled and the proceedings were resumed. 85. In April 2006 the applicants applied in person to the deputy prosecutor of Kabardino-Balkaria, who promised to supervise the investigation personally. 86. On 19 April 2006 the investigators examined Rasul Tsakoyev’s telephone and included it as evidence in the case file. 87. On 20 April 2006 the applicant’s legal counsel D. asked the deputy prosecutor of Kabardino-Balkaria for assistance in obtaining a copy of the decision to resume the investigation. She stated that her previous request had been refused by the investigator. Her request was not granted. 88. On 21 April 2006 the first applicant visited the investigators to collect Rasul Tsakoyev’s mobile phone but was unsuccessful. 89. On 25 April 2006 the investigators refused to institute criminal proceedings against officer K. and other UBOP officers for lack of corpus delicti. In particular, according to the decision, relatives of Rasul Tsakoyev stated that he had told them that he had been ill-treated in the UBOP. However, officer K. stated that between 26 and 29 September 2004 he had been participating in a special operation in the Elbrusskiy district and had only returned to Nalchik on a few occasions. On 29 September 2004 he had come to the UBOP to fetch certain documents from his office. Mr Z. had come to see him and had asked whether Rasul Tsakoyev was being detained at the UBOP. Officer K. had then called the duty officers, who had replied that he was not being held there. Officer Ger. stated that in September 2004 he had participated in a special operation in the Elbrusskiy District together with officer K. and other UBOP officers. On one of those days he had come to the UBOP in Nalchik. There had been a lot of people outside the UBOP building. Some men in the crowd had asked him to find out whether Rasul Tsakoyev was being detained at the UBOP. He had searched for Mr Tsakoyev in the UBOP and, not having found him, had told the men so. Doctor K., who had examined Rasul Tsakoyev upon his admittance to the emergency ward of the Republican Clinical Hospital, stated that during the examination Mr Tsakoyev had only said that he ached all over but had given no details of what had happened to him. The Kabardino-Balkaria Ministry of the Interior confirmed that between 27 and 29 September 2004 UBOP officers had participated in a special operation in the Elbrusskiy District. The decision concluded that there was no evidence corroborating the suggestion that officer K. or other UBOP officers had been responsible for the injuries caused to Rasul Tsakoyev. 90. On 26 April 2006 the investigation was suspended again. The suspension decision stated, inter alia, that the question had been raised whether Rasul Tsakoyev might have been abducted due to possible disputes relating to his business. However, it was impossible to question his business partner, Mr M.T., who had absconded and had been put on a wanted list (see paragraph 26 above). 91. On 2 June 2006 the first applicant asked the investigators to return Rasul Tsakoyev’s mobile phone to him and to provide him with copies of the procedural decisions taken in the case. 92. On 6 June 2006 the investigators replied that the mobile phone had been returned to the first applicant. On the same date, he was provided with copies of the five procedural decisions taken in the case. 93. On 17 July 2006 the first applicant wrote to the Russian Prosecutor General, the prosecutor of Kabardino-Balkaria, and the director of the Federal Security Service (the FSB) in Kabardino-Balkaria, asking them to resume the investigation and to hand it over to different investigative officers (see also paragraph 67 above). 94. On 21 July 2006 the investigators rejected the request and informed the applicant of their decision on 23 March 2007. 95. On 2 September 2009 the investigators’ superiors ordered that the investigation be resumed and that a number of steps be taken: “The [last] decision to suspend the investigation was premature and unsubstantiated as not all of the steps it is possible to take in the absence of those to be charged with a crime have been taken. It must therefore be overruled. It is necessary that the investigators take the following steps: - question the medical nurses Ms N.S. and Ms A.A. to find out whether Rasul Tsakoyev informed them about the circumstances in which he had received the bodily injuries; - questioning of the UBOP officer B.M. ... concerning the circumstances of the transfer of Rasul Tsakoyev and others to the UBOP; establish whether Mr Tsakoyev was taken to the UBOP premises on 27-29 September 2004 and if so, who questioned him and whether physical force was used against him; - examine the crime scene with the participation of Mr A.G.; - establish eye-witnesses to Rasul Tsakoyev’s abduction; - establish which officers were on duty at the Kabardino-Balkaria prosecutor’s office on 27 September 2004 and find out the circumstances of Rasul Tsakoyev’s abduction; - obtain information from the Kabardino-Balkaria Ministry of Health as to whether any calls were made on 27-29 September 2004 for an ambulance to go to the UBOP premises; - examine the circumstances of the seizure by the UBOP officers of Rasul Tsakoyev’s car and its return [to the applicants] a month later; - ask the Kabardino-Balkaria Ministry of the Interior to provide information concerning the participation of officer K. in the special operation in the Elbrusskiy district; ...” 96. From the documents submitted it appears that the orders were not complied with and none of the above steps was taken by the investigators. 97. From the documents submitted it appears that the criminal proceedings are still pending. 98. On 16 September 2005 the applicants’ counsel lodged an appeal before the Nalchik Town Court against the decision of 16 June 2005 to suspend the investigation and the decision of 30 August 2005 partially granting her request for documents. 99. On 26 September 2005 the Nalchik Town Court dismissed the complaint. The applicants appealed. 100. On 8 November 2005 the Kabardino-Balkaria Supreme Court set aside the decision and remitted the complaint for a fresh examination. As regards the suspension of the investigation, the court noted that, although the first applicant indicated to the investigators the particular persons whom he believed to be involved in the offence, there was no indication that his version of events had been investigated. 101. On 23 December 2005 the Nalchik Town Court allowed the complaint. The court found, inter alia, that in the course of the investigation it had not been verified whether the red VAZ-2107 car Mr Rasul Tsakoyev had been forced into belonged to the UBOP. Likewise, although officer K. had claimed that he had been elsewhere during the events, no evidence had been obtained to corroborate his statement. Furthermore, Mr A.G., who had found Mr Rasul Tsakoyev’s mobile phone and had claimed to have witnessed his abduction, had not been questioned at the crime scene. No measures had been taken to identify other possible witnesses to the abduction and the crime scene had not been examined at all. Moreover, the source of the newspaper article referred to by the first applicant (see paragraph 15 above), which stated that several residents of Khasanya had been detained in the course of a counter-terrorist operation, had not been established. 102. On 28 February 2006 the Kabardino-Balkaria Supreme Court upheld that decision on appeal.

4. The facts, as submitted by the parties, are similar to those in the case of Association “21 December 1989” and Others v. Romania (nos. 33810/07 and 18817/08, §§ 12-41, 24 May 2011). 5. All applicants were ill-treated and injured on the night of 21⁄22 December 1989 during the events which led to the fall of the communist regime in Bucharest. The applicant in application no. 30392/15 (Vasu v. Romania) suffered injuries that needed twenty-two days of medical care and the other two applicants were beaten by militia forces on the same occasion. 6. In 1990 the military prosecutor’s office opened, of its own motion, investigations into the illegal detention, ill-treatment and injury suffered by the applicants and other participants in the events of December 1989 in respect of several offences as mentioned below. The main criminal investigation was recorded in file no. 97/P/1990 (currently no. 11/P/2014). 7. At the same time, another investigation concerning the offences of illegal deprivation of liberty, illegal arrest and abusive investigation against a large number of persons, including the applicants, culminated in the committal for trial of senior military and public officials and their subsequent conviction by a decision of the Supreme Court of Justice of 10 May 1991, which became final on 14 November 1991. It cannot be seen from the court’s decision whether the injured persons, including the applicants, participated in those proceedings (see, mutatis mutandis, Bănuțoiu and Ștefoglu v. Romania [Committee], nos. 64752/13 and 54607/14, § 7, 3 July 2018). 8. As regards the offence of improper conduct, the military prosecutor’s office decided on 27 October 1993 (Ms Nicoleta-Lorena Giurcanu ‑ applicant in application no. 30365/15, hereinafter “the first applicant”), 9 March 1994 (Mr Traian Vasu – applicant in application no. 30392/15, hereinafter “the second applicant”) and 27 August 1993 (Ms Luminița Zeleniuc – applicant in application no. 30410/15, hereinafter “the third applicant”) not to open a separate investigation of its own motion on the grounds that the offence of improper conduct fell under a subsequently enacted amnesty law; that decision was communicated only to the third applicant on 25 September 2008. No decision was adopted in respect of the applicants’ injury. 9. Further, without a formal decision to overturn the decisions issued by the military prosecutor’s office (see paragraph 8 above) and to reopen the applicants’ respective cases, in the main criminal investigation, the prosecutor heard evidence from the applicants, who reiterated their complaints regarding the offences of illegal deprivation of liberty and assault and battery, based on their ill-treatment and injuries during the events of December 1989. Thus, the first applicant asked on 29 April 2005 to be joined to these proceedings as a civil party and for the investigation of the case to be pursued by the military prosecutor’s office. The second applicant gave statements as an injured party on 7 January 2000 and 23 November 2004. The third applicant raised civil claims on 25 September 2008 and requested that the persons responsible be identified and committed to stand trial. 10. The relevant procedural steps taken in the main criminal investigation were described in Association “21 December 1989” and Others v. Romania (cited above, §§ 12-41), and Sidea and Others v. Romania ([Committee] no. 889/15, §§ 8-11, 5 June 2018). 11. On 14 October 2015 the military prosecutor’s office issued a decision in respect of the offence of instigating illegal deprivation of liberty, concerning all the applicants, by closing the main criminal investigation on the grounds of res judicata in relation to the Supreme Court of Justice’s decision of 10 May 1991 (see paragraph 7 above). In addition, the military prosecutor’s office closed the main investigation in respect of the offence of instigating improper conduct regarding the second applicant, as it fell under an amnesty law (see paragraph 8 above). No decision was adopted with respect to the injury and assault and battery complained of by the applicants. 12. The decision of 14 October 2015 (see paragraph 11 above) was subsequently annulled by a Prosecutor General’s decision of 5 April 2016, confirmed by the High Court of Cassation and Justice on 13 June 2016. On 1 November 2016 the military prosecutor ordered the opening of a criminal investigation in rem for the offence of crimes against humanity in respect of the same factual circumstances. 13. According to the information submitted by the parties, the main criminal investigation is still ongoing (see Bănuțoiu and Ștefoglu, cited above, § 12).

4. The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Galgiai in the Vilnius Region. 5. In 1991 the applicant applied for restoration of her property rights to land which had been nationalised by the Soviet regime. 6. On 23 December 2002 the Vilnius County Administration (hereinafter “the VCA”) restored the applicant’s property rights by giving her two plots of 2.44 hectares and 0.16 hectares in Galgiai, an area in the Vilnius city municipality. It appears that, even though the decision referred to 2.44 hectares, the applicant was in fact given a plot measuring 2.2859 hectares. 7. On 22 May 2007 the applicant sold the plot of 2.2859 hectares to company S. for 2,500,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL  approximately 724,000 euros (EUR)). The sale agreement indicated that company S. was purchasing the plot with the aim of transferring it to company V. The agreement was certified by a notary. Company S. had previously concluded a lease agreement (išperkamosios nuomos sutartis) with company V., by which company S. undertook to buy a plot of land selected by company V. and to transfer it to the latter. 8. On 1 December 2008 the prosecutor of the Vilnius Region (hereinafter “the prosecutor”) lodged a claim with the Vilnius Regional Court, seeking to have the applicant’s property rights to 0.38 hectares of the land given to her annulled. The prosecutor submitted that, according to the data provided by the State Forest Management Service, 0.38 hectares of the plot of 2.2859 hectares was covered by forest. Since that forest was situated in a city, it was considered a forest of national importance and could therefore only be owned by the State (see Beinarovič and Others v. Lithuania, nos. 70520/10 and 2 others, §§ 86-89, 12 June 2018). In view of the circumstances, the VCA’s decision had to be declared unlawful and its effects annulled. The prosecutor asked that after annulling the applicant’s property rights, the sale agreement between her and company S. (see paragraph 7 above) be annulled in respect of that part of the land. 9. The applicant, the VCA and company S. disputed the prosecutor’s claim. However, on 14 April 2009 the Vilnius Regional Court allowed the claim. It observed that even though the area covered by forest was only 0.38 hectares, it formed part of a plot measuring 2.2859 hectares and had not been demarcated. The court stated that it had no way of determining the exact location of the forest and it therefore annulled the applicant’s property rights to the entire plot. Since the VCA’s decision had referred to 2.44 hectares, the court annulled the applicant’s property rights to 2.44 hectares. 10. The court also considered that the sale agreement between the applicant and company S. and the lease agreement between companies S. and V. (see paragraph 7 above) had been simulated (apsimestiniai sandoriai). In the court’s view, it was evident that company V. did not plan to use the land for agricultural activity but intended to change the purpose of the land and to develop a construction project, and that company S. had purchased the land not seeking to become its owner but with the aim of gaining profit from financing company V.’s acquisition of it. These and other related circumstances led the court to conclude that the applicant, company S. and company V. had in fact entered not into two separate agreements but into a single finance lease agreement (finansinės nuomos sutartis). The court emphasised that, under domestic law, land and natural resources could not be the object of a finance lease agreement. Accordingly, the agreements between the applicant, company S. and company V. were null and void ab initio. 11. In accordance with the Civil Code, company S. was ordered to return the plot of land to the State, and the applicant was ordered to return LTL 2,500,000 (approximately EUR 724,000) to company S. (see Beinarovič and Others, cited above, § 94). 12. Following the Vilnius Regional Court’s decision, company S. asked it to order interim measures and to seize property belonging to the applicant to the value of LTL 2,500,000. The court allowed the request for interim measures. On 24 April 2009 four plots of land and two apartments owned by the applicant were seized. 13. The applicant lodged an appeal against the Vilnius Regional Court’s decision of 14 April 2009 (see paragraphs 9-11 above). She paid LTL 14,983 (approximately EUR 4,340) in court fees for the lodging of the appeal. The VCA and company S. appealed against that decision as well. However, on 8 June 2010 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals and upheld the first‑instance court’s decision in its entirety. The court held that the applicant and company S. “could not be considered bona fide acquirers merely because the land in question had become private property as a result of a decision adopted by a public authority”. It stated that, in accordance with the law, any transaction which was contrary to mandatory statutory provisions had to be annulled and the parties had to return to each other everything which they had received, and that in the present case there were no exceptional circumstances which would justify applying a different rule. 14. The court stated that, having found that the VCA’s decision had to be annulled, it was not necessary to examine the agreements concluded between the applicant, company S. and company V. However, since the first-instance court had examined them (see paragraph 10 above), the Court of Appeal did so as well and upheld the findings made by the lower court. It considered that companies S. and V. had deliberately concluded a simulated agreement in order to hide their actual intentions. Furthermore, the applicant had to have been aware of company S.’s intention to transfer the land to company V. because that had been explicitly included in the sale agreement which she had signed. The court stated that the applicant should have acted more diligently and should have carefully analysed the contents of the agreement before signing it, seeking professional advice if necessary. 15. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, in which she argued that as her land was located in a rural area and the forest on that land was not a forest of national importance, there were no grounds to annul her property rights. However, on 24 August 2010 the Supreme Court refused to accept it for examination on the grounds that it raised no important legal issues. 16. On 5 October 2010 company S. was issued a writ of execution against the applicant in the amount of LTL 2,500,000 (approximately EUR 724,000). 17. On 21 November 2011 the applicant sent a letter to the Vilnius land management authorities asking for her property rights to be restored in kind. On 28 December 2011 the authorities informed her that it might be possible to return to her some of the land which had previously been given to her and that there were two other vacant plots in Galgiai, measuring 0.18 hectares in total, which could be given to her as well. 18. On 23 February 2012 the applicant received a letter from the National Land Service (the institution which took over the relevant functions of the VCA after an administrative reform – hereinafter “the NLS”) confirming that, after the courts had annulled her property rights to 2.44 hectares of land, she had retained the right to have those property rights restored. It stated that a plot of 0.14 hectares in Galgiai had already been assigned to her, which she would receive when the land plan for that area had been prepared. It also stated that there were two other vacant plots in Galgiai, measuring 0.18 hectares in total, which could be given to her. As for the remaining land, the applicant was informed of the forms of restitution provided for by domestic law (see Beinarovič and Others, cited above, § 92) and was asked to inform the authorities of her preferred form of restitution. 19. On 7 March 2012 the applicant sent a letter to the NLS stating that she wished to receive a plot of 0.08 hectares in Galgiai and that she would inform them of her choice concerning the remaining plots later. 20. On 24 July 2012 the applicant received another letter from the NLS which stated that there was a possibility for her to receive a plot of land for the construction of an individual home in the Vilnius city area but as there were 4,806 other candidates waiting to receive plots in the area, the restitution process would take a long time. The applicant was asked to consider alternative forms of restitution provided for by domestic law (ibid., § 92). 21. On 9 August 2012 the applicant sent a letter to the NLS. She stated that a forest of national importance had only occupied 0.38 hectares of the land which had been given to her (see paragraph 8 above) and thus there should have been no obstacles to returning the remaining 2.06 hectares to her in natura. The applicant emphasised that she had financial obligations vis-à-vis company S. and therefore asked that her property rights be restored without undue delay. She also stated that she had been informed by the Vilnius land management authorities that two plots of 0.08 and 0.10 hectares would be allocated to her in Galgiai (see paragraphs 17 and 18 above). As for the remaining land, the applicant asked to be allocated a plot of land for the construction of an individual home in Vilnius as a matter of priority, taking into account the fact that she had applied for the restoration of her property rights in 1991 (see paragraph 5 above) and that they had already been restored to her in 2002 (see paragraph 6 above). She stated that she was under an obligation to transfer the land to company S. and to inform it of any steps taken in the restitution proceedings. She therefore asked the NLS to reply to her as soon as possible. It is unclear if the applicant received any response to that letter. 22. On 23 December 2013 the NLS adopted a decision to restore the applicant’s property rights by giving her two plots of agricultural land, measuring a total of 2.0441 hectares. The decision stated that the rights to the remaining 0.3959 hectares would be restored later. 23. On an unspecified date the applicant asked the NLS to allocate to her the 0.18 hectares of land in Galgiai (see paragraphs 17 and 18 above) but the NLS refused. The applicant lodged a complaint with a court but on 10 February 2015 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court dismissed it. The court stated that there were several candidates waiting to have their property rights restored in that area and that the applicant could not claim to have priority over them. She therefore had to take part in the restitution process, during which her property rights would be restored in accordance with the applicable regulations. 24. On 17 May 2017 the NLS adopted a decision to restore the applicant’s property rights by giving her 0.08 hectares of agricultural land. The decision stated that the rights to the remaining 0.3159 hectares would be restored later. 25. On 30 June 2017 the NLS adopted a decision to restore the applicant’s property rights by giving her 0.3159 hectares of land for the construction of an individual home. 26. In October 2011 the applicant signed an agreement with company S. by which she undertook, in lieu of the monetary payment of LTL 2,500,000 (see paragraph 11 above), to transfer to the company any land which would be given to her during the subsequent restitution process. However, pursuant to that agreement, company S. retained the right to claim a monetary payment of LTL 2,500,000 from the applicant without prior notice. 27. After the applicant’s property rights were restored in December 2013 and May and June 2017 (see paragraphs 22, 24 and 25 above), she transferred those plots to company S. On 23 July 2018 company S. confirmed to the applicant that it did not have any outstanding claims against her and that it had asked domestic courts to lift the seizure previously imposed on her property (see paragraph 12 above). 28. In her last letter to the Court (8 November 2018), the applicant stated that the seizure of her property had not yet been lifted and that the relevant court proceedings were ongoing. The Government did not comment on that point.

4. On 29 October 2008 O.M., M.I. and B.T., former nuns in the Macedonian Orthodox Church (“MOC”), founded the applicant association. The minutes of the constituent assembly (записник од основачкото собрание) included the following statement: “... nuns gathered at the assembly do not accept the teaching of the Macedonian Orthodox Church, (which) they consider wrong and unorthodox. (Consequently) they do not want to have any canonical communication with episcopes and priests of the Macedonian Orthodox Church. Not only is (that) church in dispute (раскол) with all other orthodox churches, it is not recognised by anyone. This is so because all other churches consider its teaching heretical and wrong. We ... do not want to waste our life in religious doubt ... to be led by immature and non-religious people ... we would be offended on religious grounds if we are associated with another religious community ...” 5. On the same date, the founding members created the following official documents: (a) a founding decision; (b) decisions authorising O.M. to represent the applicant association and submit an application for its registration; and (c) the Charter (Статут) of the applicant association. 6. The relevant parts of the founding decision read as follows: Article 1 “This decision serves (the purpose of) the registration of Stavropegic Monastery of Saint John Chrysostom in the register of churches, religious communities (верски заедници) and groups (религиозни групи) in the Republic of Macedonia, as a voluntary, non-profit association of Christians who do not belong to any religious community and, in particular, have nothing in common with the Macedonian Orthodox Church. ” Article 3 “Because it is a Christian religious community ...” 7. The relevant parts of the Charter read as follows: Article 1 “The Stavropegic Monastery of Saint John Chrysostom is a voluntary association of individuals who exercise, through their religious beliefs and doctrinal sources, freedom of religion ... through preaching, prayer, religious rituals, and other forms of expression.” Article 2 “The Stavropegic Monastery of Saint John Chrysostom is a religious community founded by nuns (completely devoted to God) and private citizens (световни лица), whose religious beliefs correspond to the Old and New Testament (the Bible). ” Article 3 “The name of the religious community is: Stavropegic Monastery of Saint John Chrysostom, with its registered office in v. Nizopole-Bitola.” 8. On 5 November 2008 O.M. submitted an application for registration of the applicant association “as one of the religious communities” to the Skopje Court of First Instance (“the registration court”). The above‑mentioned documents were appended to the application. On 10 December 2008 the registration court requested that the applicant association submit evidence concerning the nationality of its founding members, a requirement with which the applicant association complied. 9. On 18 February 2009 the registration court refused to register “the voluntary association of physical persons named in the application as Stavropegic Monastery of Saint John Chrysostom”. It found that the application for registration did not meet the requirements laid down in sections 1 and 2 of the 2007 Act on the legal status of a church, religious community and association (“the 2007 Act”, see paragraphs 14 and 15 below) in that (a) it referred to a form of voluntary association of physical persons which was not covered by the Act and (b) the registration of the applicant association “would violate the freedom of religion ‑ provided for in the Convention and the Constitution ‒ of other lawfully registered voluntary associations of physical persons”. As to the former, the court held that the 2007 Act provided for the registration of churches, religious communities and groups but not of other religious entities, in this case a “monastery” (манастир), as specified in Article 1 of the applicant association’s Charter. The court did not elaborate further on the second ground on which it based its decision. 10. The applicant association complained about that decision, arguing that it had sought to be registered as a religious community under the name specified in the founding documents, which was evident from the application for registration. It also submitted that non-registration was a very drastic measure (in this connection it argued that the court should have indicated any shortcomings that were to be rectified). The court had failed to explain whose religious beliefs would be affected by its registration. Assuming that it referred to the followers of the MOC, the court had not explained how its registration would violate their rights. The applicant association pointed out that in 2002 the registration court had refused to register it as a non-governmental organisation and had ruled that an association with such a name should seek registration under the legislation regulating religious communities and associations that was in force at the time. 11. On 29 April 2009 the Skopje Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant association’s appeal and upheld the lower court’s decision, endorsing the reasons given therein. 12. On an unspecified date, O.M. lodged an appeal with the Constitutional Court complaining of a violation of freedom of thought and discrimination on religious grounds owing to the refusal by the registration court to register the religious community with which she was associated. 13. By a decision of 9 September 2009 the Constitutional Court rejected the constitutional appeal, finding that O.M. had not sought protection of her rights and freedoms but “had complained on behalf of the religious community with which she was associated”. It also held that the complainant “had sought protection of freedoms and rights only formally... without submitting any arguments, evidence or facts ...”. Lastly, the court stated that the complainant had requested that it review the application of the law by the registration court in the proceedings for the registration of the religious community, which, according to the Constitutional Court, was beyond its jurisdiction (U.br.189/09).

5. The applicant was born in 1984 and lives in Bălți. 6. On 5 February 2011 at 1.30 p.m. the applicant was arrested on suspicion of trafficking in human beings and placed in detention for a period of seventy-two hours, which is the maximum duration of detention under the Moldovan law before a detainee is brought before a judge. 7. On 8 February 2011 at 10.20 a.m. the prosecutor applied to a judge for the applicant’s remand in custody and at 2 p.m. the applicant was brought before a judge, who ordered his remand in custody for thirty days. It is not clear at what time the decision was adopted, but there is a handwritten note on it which states it had been presented to the applicant at 3.50 p.m., followed by the applicant’s signature. 8. The applicant appealed against the above decision and argued, inter alia, that the detention which had taken place before the court’s decision of 8 February 2011 had been longer than seventy-two hours, which was the maximum duration provided for by law. He also submitted that he had not been given access to the materials in the case-file relied upon by the prosecutor when requesting his remand in custody. 9. On 17 February 2011 the Bălți Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The court did not pay attention to the applicant’s allegation that he had no access to the materials in the case-file. 10. On 5 March 2011 the prosecutor in charge of the case applied to a judge for a prolongation of the applicant’s detention for another thirty days. A judge examined and upheld it on the same date. He ordered the applicant’s detention until 6 March 2011. 11. On an unspecified date, the same judge issued a new decision rectifying the date of the validity of the applicant’s order for remand in custody from 6 March to 6 April 2011. The applicant appealed. 12. On 16 March 2011 the Bălți Court of Appeal upheld the applicant’s appeal and quashed the decision of the lower court, after having found that the second decision modifying the date from 6 March to 6 April 2011 had not been taken in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure. The court found therefore that the applicant’s detention had been unlawful since 6 March and ordered his immediate release. 13. It appears from the materials contained in the case file that the applicant has been convicted at first instance and that the proceedings are still pending before the Bălți Court of Appeal. According to the information provided by the parties, the applicant is currently wanted by the authorities.

5. The applicant was born in 1939 and lives in Vác. 6. He was awarded a disability pension on 6 May 1995. Since he had accrued service periods in both Hungary and Austria, his pension was established accordingly, both under the Act no. LXXXI of 1997 on Social Security Pension Benefits (“the 1997 Pensions Act”) and the Social Security Agreement between Hungary and Austria. On 1 May 2004 (the date of Hungary’s accession to the EU) his monthly pension was 74,361 Hungarian forints (HUF) (approximately 250 euros (EUR)). 7. On 18 April 2006 he requested a review of his pension rights in accordance with Article 94(5) of Regulation 1408/71/EEC of the Council of the European Communities on the Application of Social Security Schemes to Employed Persons and their Families Moving within the Community (hereinafter “the Regulation”). The provision stipulated that the rights of a person to whom a pension had been awarded prior to the entry into force of the Regulation could, at the request of the person concerned, be reviewed, taking into account the provisions of the Regulation. With regard to the applicant, the date of “entry into force” was Hungary’s EU accession. 8. On 1 September 2006 the applicant’s monthly pension was reviewed by the Budapest and Pest County Pensions Board (Fővárosi és Pest Megyei Nyugdíjbiztosítási Igazgatóság), acting as a first-instance pension authority. The applicant’s pension was increased to HUF 134,566 (approximately EUR 449) per month with effect from 1 May 2004. 9. On 7 September 2006 the applicant appealed against that decision, because the pension authority had calculated an overlap period (during which he had worked in Austria but had also had to pay social security contributions in Hungary) as a mere Hungarian service period with a very low average salary. 10. Despite the appeal, the decision was implemented with immediate effect and the applicant received HUF 1,996,104 (approximately EUR 6,650) in arrears. 11. On 16 January 2007 the Central Hungary Regional Pensions Board (Közép-Magyarországi Regionális Nyugdíjbiztosítási Igazgatóság), acting as a second-instance pension authority, increased the applicant’s monthly pension to HUF 135,450 (approximately EUR 452) with effect from 1 May 2004. For the period 1 May 2004 to 28 February 2007 he received a total of HUF 42,065 (approximately EUR 140) in arrears and interest. 12. The applicant challenged the final administrative decision in court and requested that a question concerning the correct interpretation of the Regulation be referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) for a preliminary ruling. 13. On 12 October 2007 the Budapest Labour Court dismissed the applicant’s action and upheld the pension authority’s decision. 14. The applicant lodged a petition with the Supreme Court for review of the Budapest Labour Court’s judgment. On 6 March 2009, in the review proceedings, he submitted written pleadings to the Supreme Court. The pleadings were not submitted to the Court in the present proceedings and the parties’ submissions differed as to the content of the document containing them. According to the Government, the applicant withdrew his request for a preliminary ruling on that date, whereas the applicant alleged that he had only submitted that the reference to the CJEU was not necessarily inevitable, provided that his interpretation of EU case-law was followed. However, in his view, this did not amount to a withdrawal of the request for a reference for a preliminary ruling. 15. On 3 June 2009 the Supreme Court reversed the Budapest Labour Court’s judgment and ordered new proceedings, insisting that the EU law principle concerning the prevention of overlapping of benefits be taken into account. In response to the applicant’s request for a reference for a preliminary ruling, the Supreme Court held that the procedure appeared to be unnecessary “because the conditions had not been fulfilled”. 16. In the case remitted to it, the Labour Court quashed the decision of the pension authority and instructed it to recalculate the applicant’s pension in accordance with EU rules (without counting the overlap period as a mere Hungarian service period). The judgment became final on 19 March 2010. 17. On 7 July 2010 the Central Hungary Regional Pensions Board adopted a new decision in accordance with the instructions of the Budapest Labour Court and increased the applicant’s monthly pension to HUF 139,545 (approximately EUR 465) with effect from 1 May 2004. The decision ordered the payment, in arrears, of the difference between the pension due and the amount already paid. The 1997 Pensions Act provides that if a pension authority has made a mistake to the detriment of an applicant, the difference is to be paid for only the last five years preceding the date the mistake was discovered (the duration of the statutory limitation period). Payment of the difference was therefore ordered for the period after 19 March 2005 only (namely from the date exactly five years before the date on which the Labour Court’s judgment became final, see paragraph 16 above). The amount paid to the applicant in arrears and interest was HUF 581,515 (approximately EUR 1,940). 18. On 23 July 2010 the applicant appealed against the decision, claiming the arrears for the whole period following Hungary’s EU accession. 19. On 11 November 2010 the Pension Appeals Board (Nyugdíjbiztosítási Jogorvoslati Igazgatóság) amended the decision of 7 July 2010 (see paragraph 17 above), reduced the applicant’s monthly pension to HUF 138,170 (approximately EUR 460) with effect from 1 May 2004, but limited payment to the period following 19 March 2005. 20. The Appeals Department of the National Pensions Administration (Országos Nyugdíjbiztosítási Főigazgatóság Jogorvoslati Főosztály) conducted a repeated second-instance review and, in a decision dated 5 November 2011, amended the decision of 11 November 2010 (see paragraph 19 above). It increased the applicant’s monthly pension to HUF 139,605 (approximately EUR 465) with effect from 1 May 2004, retaining however the limitation of payment as regards the period preceding 19 March 2005. 21. The applicant requested a court review of the pension authority’s decision of 7 July 2010, as amended by the decisions of 11 November 2010 and 5 November 2011. He relied on Article 94(6) of the Regulation. 22. On 29 February 2012 the Budapest Labour Court upheld the pension authority’s decisions (see paragraphs 17, 19 and 20 above). 23. On 22 March 2012 the applicant submitted a petition for review of the Budapest Labour Court’s judgment. He argued that domestic law was to be interpreted and applied in conformity with EU law, of which the relevant provision, Article 94(6) of the Regulation, was directly applicable and had direct effect in the case. He contended, in essence, that he had a right, as acknowledged in the decisions of the pension authority, to an adjusted pension for the whole period following 1 May 2004. The national rule restricting the very payment of that pension to a shorter period of time constituted a “limitation of rights” prohibited by the Regulation. He was of the opinion that the Budapest Labour Court’s judgment, in giving precedence to the rule of national law over the relevant provision of the Regulation, had violated the principles of primacy and effectiveness of EU law. In his petition for review, the applicant did not request that the case be referred to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling; instead, he requested what he considered to be a correct application of Article 94(6) of the Regulation. Nevertheless, he argued that the Budapest Labour Court’s judgment had violated Article 234 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (“EC Treaty”, now Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”)), without providing a detailed explanation on this point. 24. On 26 June 2013 the Kúria upheld the judgment of the Budapest Labour Court. Both the Budapest Labour Court and the Kúria reasoned that the Regulation concerned only the acquisition of rights but not the actual payment of allowances. In the courts’ view, the applicant had indeed acquired a right to an amended pension from 1 May 2004 and his rights in this regard were not subject to any forfeiture or limitation; it was only the actual payment of the increased amount which had been limited. In the courts’ opinion, therefore, the relevant provisions of the 1997 Pensions Act and those of the Regulation did not conflict. As regards the applicant’s argument concerning the alleged violation of Article 234 of the EC Treaty, the Kúria’s judgment did not contain any reasoning. 25. In parallel to the litigation described above, on 2 February 2008 the applicant lodged a petition with the Constitutional Court, arguing that the rules of the 1997 Pensions Act were in conflict with EU law. On 4 October 2010 the court rejected the petition, stating that it lacked competence to examine an alleged conflict between Hungarian and EU law (see decision no. 126/E/2008 of the Constitutional Court). 26. The relevant part of Article XXVIII of the Fundamental Law of Hungary provides: “(1) Everyone shall have the right to have any charge against him or her, or his or her rights and obligations in any litigation, adjudicated within a reasonable time in a fair and public trial by an independent and impartial court established by an Act. ...” 27. Section 80(1) of the 1997 Pensions Act provides as follows: “If, following the examination of a pension request, it turns out that the pension authority violated the applicable law and ... the pension established or disbursed was therefore unduly low, then the arrears and ... interest shall be paid for the five-year period preceding the establishment of the violation.” 28. The relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act no. III of 1952), as in force at the material time, provided as follows: Article 155/A “(1) The court may request the [CJEU] for a preliminary ruling in accordance with the rules laid down in the Treaty establishing the European Community. (2) The court shall make a reference for a preliminary ruling by order (végzés) and shall [simultaneously] stay the proceedings. In the order, the court shall specify the question for which a preliminary ruling is requested and describe the circumstances of the case and the relevant domestic law inasmuch as it is necessary for answering the question referred to the [CJEU]. The order shall be notified to the [CJEU] and, for information, to the Minister in charge of justice at the same time. (3) No appeal lies against a court decision making a reference for a preliminary ruling or dismissing a request for a reference for a preliminary ruling.” Article 272 “(2) The petition for review shall specify the decision that is the subject thereof and the substance of the decision requested; furthermore, it shall set out the alleged infringement, specify the legal provision that has been breached and explain the reasons why the impugned decision requires modification.” Article 275 “(2) The Kúria may review a final decision only within the framework of the petition for review ... unless it decides to dismiss the action of its own motion, or if the court that rendered the decision had not been properly formed, or if a judge who should have been disqualified by law took part in rendering the decision.” 29. In leading case no. BH 2015.7.203 the Kúria held as follows: “A petition for review does not meet the requirements [of the Code of Civil Procedure] if, for the purposes of the specification of the infringement, it contains only a general reference to [certain] Chapters ... of the Code of Civil Procedure. The petition for review cannot be examined on the merits if the party specifies the infringed legal provision but does not provide any reasoning in that connection.” 30. In leading case no. BH 2016.12.342 the Kúria held, in so far as relevant: “A petition for review may only be examined on the merits if[, in addition to a pure reference to the allegedly violated legal provision,] the petitioning party also describes the substance of the infringement, explains his or her legal opinion thereon and sets out the reasons supporting his or her argument.” 31. In leading case no. BH 1995.2.99 the Kúria held, in so far as relevant: “The petition for review must specify the alleged infringement concretely; it is not sufficient to refer to previous submissions. ... [The petitioning party] did not set out the reasons on which he relied in challenging the final judgment; he only referred to the content of his appeal [against the first-instance judgment]. However, the petition for review is an independent, extraordinary remedy[. Given] its special nature, references to previous submissions are not accepted.” 32. Section 46(1) of the Constitutional Court Act (Act no. CLI of 2011) provides as follows: “If the Constitutional Court, in proceedings conducted by it in the exercise of its competences, declares an omission on the part of the legislature that results in a violation of the Fundamental Law, it shall call upon the organ responsible for the omission to take action and set a time-limit for that.” 33. The relevant parts of the Constitutional Court’s decision no. 7/2013 (III.1) AB of 1 March 2013 read as follows: “[26] The Fundamental Law of Hungary, having entered into force in January 2012, imposes on the Constitutional Court the ... task of reviewing the conformity of judicial decisions with the Fundamental Law. In accordance with Article 24 (2) (d) of the Fundamental Law and section 27 of the Constitutional Court Act, the Constitutional Court bears ultimate responsibility for ensuring judicial decisions’ conformity with the Fundamental Law. In determining whether a judicial decision is or is not in conformity with the Fundamental Law, the Constitutional Court actually acts in order to redress a violation of a right enshrined under the Fundamental Law, hence it acts in protection of the Fundamental Law ... ... [30] In its decision no. 61/2011 (VII.13) AB the Constitutional Court took the principled stance that “in the case of certain fundamental rights, the Constitution specifies the substance of a fundamental right in the same way as international instruments (for example the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the European Convention on Human Rights) do. In such cases, the level of protection to be afforded by the Constitutional Court to the fundamental right should in no way be lower than the level of international protection afforded to the given right (typically by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg)” ... Based on this consideration, the Constitutional Court has reviewed the case-law of the [European] Court [of Human Rights] on the right to a reasoned court decision, which it also finds applicable in interpreting the right enshrined in Article XXVIII (1) of the Fundamental Law. ... [33] 3. The right to a reasoned court decision ... arises in the context of the constitutional requirement of a fair trial, specified in Article XXVIII (1) of the Fundamental Law. ... The Constitutional Court is to examine whether the procedural laws prescribing the duty of giving reasons were or were not applied in conformity with the requirements set forth in Article XXVIII (1) of the Fundamental Law ... [34] ...The constitutional requirement of giving reasons, being examined by the Constitutional Court, is inherent in Article XXVIII (1) of the Fundamental Law and determines the limits of the courts’ margin of appreciation, notably by requiring courts to give reasons for their decisions, in conformity with the procedural laws. The constitutional violation of the duty to give reasons means the application of this procedural rule is not in conformity with the Fundamental Law ... The constitutional requirement of a fair trial demands, as a minimum, that the courts should, with due care, examine the parties’ observations made on the relevant parts of the case and should include an assessment of those observations in their decisions ... ... [40] In the light of the above considerations, the Constitutional Court finds, on the merits, that the high court ... examined the questions ... concerning the relevant circumstances of the case and gave appropriate reasons as regards its conclusions. [41] The Constitutional Court therefore dismisses this part of the constitutional complaint.” 34. In a complaint adjudicated by the Constitutional Court on 19 May 2014 (decision no. 3165/2014 (V. 23) AB), the complainant argued that the Kúria had failed to comply with its obligation to refer a question on the interpretation of EU law to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling and to provide adequate reasons for its decision not to do so (see paragraph 5 of the decision). The Constitutional Court held that the competence to decide whether a reference for a preliminary ruling was necessary in the circumstances was vested solely in the judge hearing the particular case and the Constitutional Court lacked jurisdiction to overrule such decisions. It rejected the complaint as inadmissible and did not address the issue of adequate reasoning. 35. On 14 July 2015 (decision no. 26/2015 (VII. 21) AB) the Constitutional Court examined a complaint regarding a final judgment of the Budapest High Court concerning its failure to refer a question to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling and to provide reasons for its decision not to do so. Following an analysis of the CJEU’s relevant case-law, the Constitutional Court found that, in the case at issue, the question proposed by the claimant related to the qualification and interpretation of domestic law (which, in the claimant’s view, contradicted EU law), rather than to the interpretation of the applicable EU law provision itself. In these circumstances, the Constitutional Court shared the Budapest High Court’s opinion that there had been no need for a reference for a preliminary ruling. It observed that, in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure as in force at the relevant time, the courts were not required to give reasons for not making a reference to the CJEU. It held that such a situation – that is to say, if the courts did not adopt a formal decision complete with reasons when they refused to refer a question to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling – violated parties’ rights to a fair trial. Accordingly, it declared that there had been an omission on the part of the legislature resulting in a violation of the Fundamental Law (see paragraph 32 above), and invited Parliament to amend the relevant legislation by 31 December 2015. However, the Constitutional Court’s decision did not find the Budapest High Court’s particular judgment unconstitutional on account of the court’s failure to provide reasons for the non-referral – indeed, it did not contain any arguments related to the lack of reasons in that particular judgment. 36. In accordance with the Constitutional Court’s decision no. 26/2015, Article 155/A (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure (see paragraph 28 above) was amended as of 4 December 2015 with the following additional wording: “If the court dismisses a request for a reference for a preliminary ruling, it shall formulate its decision in the form of an order (végzés). The court is obliged to give reasons for that decision, by the latest in its decision on the merits that concludes the proceedings.” 37. In decision no. 3082/2016 (IV. 18) AB adopted on 12 April 2016 the Constitutional Court noted obiter dictum, in connection with a particular case, that the court hearing the case at issue had observed its obligation to provide reasons for not making a reference to the CJEU. 38. The relevant part of Article 267 of the TFEU[1] provides: “The [CJEU] shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning: (a) the interpretation of the Treaties; (b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union; Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court to give a ruling thereon. Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court. ...” 39. In applying that provision, the CJEU has held that a court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law is required, where a question of interpretation of EU law (rather than a question relating to the validity of a Community act, see the judgment in Gaston Schul Douane-expediteur BV v. Minister van Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit, C-461/03, judgment of 6 December 2005, ECR I-10513, § 19) is raised before it, to comply with its obligation to bring the matter before the CJEU, unless it has established that the question raised is irrelevant or that the EU law provision in question has already been interpreted by the CJEU (acte éclairé) or that the correct application of EU law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt (acte clair). The CJEU has also held that the existence of such a possibility must be assessed in the light of the specific characteristics of EU law, the particular difficulties to which its interpretation gives rise and the risk of divergences in judicial decisions within the EU (see Srl Cilfit and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v. Ministry of Health, 283/81, judgment of 6 October 1982, ECR 3415, § 21, and X v. Inspecteur van Rijksbelastingdienst and T.A. van Dijk v. Staatssecretaris van Financiën, joined cases C-72/14 and C‑197/14, judgment of 9 September 2015, § 55). With that proviso, the CJEU also held that it was for the national courts against whose decisions there was no judicial remedy under national law, to take responsibility upon themselves independently for determining whether the case before them involves an acte clair (see X and van Dijk, cited above, § 59). 40. As regards the specific characteristics of EU law, the CJEU emphasised, among other aspects, that EU law used terminology which was unique to it and that the legal concepts did not necessarily have the same meaning in EU law as in the law of the various member States. It also stressed that every provision of EU law must be placed into context and interpreted in the light of the provisions of EU law as a whole, having regard to the objectives thereof and to its state of evolution at the date on which the provision in question was to be applied (see Cilfit, cited above, §§ 19 and 20). 41. The CJEU also defined the meaning of the expression “where any such question is raised” contained in the third paragraph of Article 267 of the TFEU (see Cilfit, cited above, §§ 8-9). It later summarised its settled case-law on this point as follows (see Belgische Petroleum Unie VZW and Others v. Belgische Staat, C-26/11, judgment of 31 January 2013, §§ 23‑24): “23. ... [I]t should be borne in mind that the fact that the parties to the main action did not raise a point of European Union law before the referring court does not preclude the latter from bringing the matter before the [CJEU]. In providing that a request for a preliminary ruling may be submitted to the [CJEU] where ‘a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a member state’, the second and third paragraphs of Article 267 TFEU are not intended to restrict this procedure exclusively to cases where one or other of the parties to the main action has taken the initiative of raising a point concerning the interpretation or the validity of European Union law, but also extend to cases where a question of this kind is raised by the court or tribunal itself, which considers that a decision thereon by the [CJEU] is ‘necessary to enable it to give judgment’ ... 24. Moreover, according to settled case-law, in proceedings under Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court.” The CJEU further held, in the case of Lucio Cesare Aquino v. Belgische Staat (C-3/16, judgment of 15 March 2017, § 43), that: “[i]t follows from the relationship between the second and third paragraphs of Article 267 TFEU that the courts referred to in the third paragraph have the same discretion as all other national courts as to whether a decision on a question of EU law is necessary to enable them to give judgment.” 42. Article 94(6) of the Regulation 1408/71/EEC of the Council of the European Communities on the Application of Social Security Schemes to Employed Persons and their Families Moving within the Community, as in force until 1 May 2010, provided as follows: “If an application referred to in paragraph 4 or 5 [in particular, an application for the review of a pension awarded prior to the entry into force of this Regulation] is submitted within two years from the date of entry into force of this Regulation, the rights acquired under this Regulation shall have effect from that date, and the provisions of the legislation of any Member State concerning the forfeiture or limitation of rights may not be invoked against the persons concerned.” It appears that the interpretation of that provision has so far not been the subject of a preliminary ruling of the CJEU.[2]

5. The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Vantaa, Finland. 6. The applicant has been living and working in Finland since 1999 on the basis of a permanent residence permit. 7. In 2009 the applicant married a Russian national, Ms I.K., in Helsinki. After the marriage the couple settled in Vantaa, Finland, living in a flat owned by the applicant. I.K. had a temporary residence permit (expired in summer 2015). 8. On 24 December 2012 I.K. gave birth to a daughter, V. The parents exercised joint custody in respect of the child, in accordance with Finnish law. The applicant also has two children from a previous marriage, both residing in Vantaa. V. had a temporary residence permit in Finland (expired in December 2014). On an unspecified date she acquired Russian nationality. 9. In January 2013 I.K. suffered two strokes and was partially paralysed. She was admitted to hospital. 10. The applicant took parental leave to take care of V. I.K.’s parents (most often her father) often visited from Russia to help care for V. while I.K. was undergoing medical treatment. 11. In April 2013 I.K. was discharged from hospital. She had not, however, fully recovered mobility in one hand and one leg. 12. Relations between the applicant and I.K. apparently deteriorated, and in June 2013 I.K. travelled to Russia, accompanied by her father, for further medical treatment and physiotherapy. V. remained with the applicant. 13. Since the applicant had to return to work, in July 2013 he took V. to his parents in Norway, where V. was taken care of by her paternal grandmother and aunt. 14. Following her return to Finland in August 2013, I.K. instituted proceedings with a view to having the child returned to Finland under the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“the Hague Convention”). 15. In October 2013 the applicant brought V. back to Finland, and the proceedings for the return of the child were discontinued. 16. Meanwhile, in August 2013 I.K. initiated divorce proceedings, asking the court to grant her sole custody of V. and to determine V.’s place of residence as being with her. 17. Between November 2013 and March 2014 five interim decisions were issued by the Vantaa District Court (“the District Court”) determining that, pending resolution of the proceedings, the applicant and I.K. should have joint custody of V. and that the latter should reside with the applicant. 18. On 14 November 2013 the District Court addressed the applicant’s concern that there was a risk of I.K.’s taking V. to Russia without his consent and ordered that V.’s passport be handed in to the police. 19. On 23 December 2013 the District Court noted that there was no risk of the child’s being taken outside Finland as her passport had been handed in to the police. 20. On 11 April 2014 the District Court dissolved the marriage between the applicant and I.K. 21. On 23 December 2014 the District Court held that the applicant and I.K. should have joint custody of V. and that V. was to reside with the applicant. The court also established a detailed schedule setting out I.K.’s contact with V. up until 2019. In taking that decision the District Court took into account I.K.’s state of health, in particular the fact that she had not completely recovered mobility in one hand and one leg after her stroke and was still undergoing rehabilitation procedures, which made it difficult for her to react quickly to the toddler’s active behaviour and to prevent potentially dangerous situations. The judgment was enforceable pending a decision in appeal proceedings. 22. I.K. appealed against the above judgment. 23. On 20 November 2015 the Helsinki Court of Appeal dismissed I.K.’s appeal and upheld the judgment of 23 December 2014. The Court of Appeal confirmed that, since the applicant and I.K. had joint custody of their daughter, I.K. had no right to remove V. from Finland without the applicant’s consent. 24. I.K. lodged a further appeal with the Supreme Court of Finland. 25. On 26 February 2016 the Supreme Court refused I.K. leave to appeal. 26. In the meantime, while the appeal proceedings were pending, on 5 February 2015 I.K. took V. to Russia without the applicant’s consent. She informed him by email that she did not intend to come back to Finland. 27. On 20 February 2015 the applicant applied to the Finnish Ministry of Justice to have the child returned to Finland under the Hague Convention. 28. The Finnish Ministry of Justice sent an enquiry to the Ministry of Science and Education of the Russian Federation, which confirmed that the child was residing with I.K. in St Petersburg. 29. On 6 August 2015, after failed attempts to come to an agreement with I.K. as regards V.’s return to Finland, the applicant lodged an application with the Dzerzhinskiy District Court of St Petersburg seeking the child’s return to Finland on the basis of the Hague Convention. 30. I.K. objected to V.’s return to Finland. Relying on Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention, she claimed that V. was already settled in her new environment in Russia, that she did not speak the Finnish language, that V.’s return to Finland would separate them and that it would thus be psychologically traumatic for her. She further indicated that V. had been removed to Russia so that she could be provided with the medical assistance she needed and, finally, that the applicant was suffering from a mental disorder. 31. The childcare authority involved in the proceedings considered that the child’s interests would best be met if she continued to reside with her mother, I.K. 32. The Ombudsman for Children in St Petersburg considered that V.’s removal from Finland to Russia had not been unlawful since the applicant and I.K. had joint custody of the child and the child’s removal to Russia did not diminish the applicant’s rights on the territory of the Russian Federation; moreover, V. had a number of medical conditions which could expose her to a risk of physical harm in the event of her return to Finland. 33. By a judgment of 2 December 2015, the Dzerzhinskiy District Court granted the applicant’s request and ordered that the child be returned to Finland immediately. The court found, and it was common ground between the parties, that V.’s place of habitual residence was Finland and that her removal from Finland had taken place without the applicant’s consent. It concluded, therefore, that the child’s removal had been in breach of the applicant’s custody rights. It also found that there were no grounds for granting an exception to the child’s immediate return under Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention: the argument concerning the risk of V. suffering psychological harm in the event of her return to Finland and the allegation that the applicant was suffering from a mental disorder were found unsubstantiated; I.K. had provided no evidence to the effect that the medical assistance necessitated by V.’s state of health could not been provided to the latter in Finland; V.’s return to Finland would not entail her separation from I.K. since the Finnish Court had determined that the parties should have joint custody of the child and had set out a detailed schedule of I.K.’s contact with V. 34. However, on 3 February 2016 the St Petersburg City Court (“the City Court”) quashed the above judgment on appeal and rejected the applicant’s request for V.’s return to Finland. The City Court held that since the judgment of the Vantaa District Court of 23 December 2014 ‒ which had determined V.’s residence as being with the applicant in Finland ‒ had not yet entered into force, I.K.’s actions in bringing V. to Russia had not been unlawful. The circumstances of the removal of the child, a national of the Russian Federation, to Russia had not violated the applicant’s parental rights. The City Court noted that at the time of the child’s removal, as well as the time of the examination of the appeal, she had not had a valid Finnish residence permit. The City Court also took into account the following facts: that since February 2015 V. had been permanently resident in St Petersburg ‒ at the address where I.K. was registered ‒ where suitable conditions had been created for her life and development; that both parties had registered places of residence in Russia; that at the time of her removal V. had been aged two years and one month, of which she had spent several months (from July to October 2013) in Norway, where she had been taken by the applicant without I.K.’s consent; and finally that V. did not speak Finnish and since February 2015 had been attending various medical facilities and nursery school in Russia. In view of the foregoing, the City Court came to the conclusion that Finland was not the State in which V. was habitually resident. Since February 2015 V. had integrated well into the Russian social and family environment and her retention in Russia was therefore not unlawful within the meaning of Article 3 of the Hague Convention. V.’s attendance at a kindergarten in Finland for a short period of time between November 2014 and January 2015 did not constitute sufficient proof of integration into the social environment in Finland such that Finland could be considered as the child’s habitual place of residence. Lastly, the City Court noted that the report of the Ombudsman for Children in St Petersburg stated that both parents had parental authority in respect of V., that the applicant’s rights were not diminished on the territory of the Russian Federation, and that the removal of the child from her mother in Russia to her father in Finland for the purposes of permanent residence in Finland could, on account of her numerous medical conditions, cause her physical harm. The court further noted that medical documents contained in the case file confirmed that the child had a number of medical conditions. It concluded that this circumstance ‒ which under Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention constituted an exception to immediate return ‒ also led to the conclusion that there were no grounds for granting the applicant’s request. 35. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Presidium of the City Court. 36. On 12 May 2016 a judge of the St Petersburg City Court refused to refer the case for consideration by the Presidium of that Court. 37. On 4 August 2016 a judge of the Supreme Court of Russia refused to refer the case for consideration by the Civil Chamber of that Court. 38. On 7 September 2016 the Primorskiy District Court of St Petersburg ruled that V. should reside with her mother, I.K., in St Petersburg and ordered the applicant to pay child maintenance starting from 8 June 2015. 39. Referring to temporary financial difficulties and insisting on V.’s return in Finland, the applicant has not been complying with the above‑mentioned judgment. 40. On 5 October 2016 enforcement proceedings were instituted against the applicant. Restrictive measures were applied against him by the bailiffs service in the form of a prohibition on exiting the Russian territory. That decision currently prevents the applicant from travelling to Russia. 41. As of 13 February 2018 the applicant’s child maintenance arrears amounted to 494,644 Russian roubles (RUB)[1]. 42. The applicant has not seen his daughter since she left Finland. 43. The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“the Hague Convention”) entered into force between Russia and Finland on 1 January 2013. It provides, in so far as relevant, as follows: Article 1 “The objects of the present Convention are – a) to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State; and b) to ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in the other Contracting States. ...” Article 3 “The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where – a) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and b) at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention. The rights of custody mentioned in sub-paragraph a) above, may arise in particular by operation of law or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or by reason of an agreement having legal effect under the law of that State.” Article 4 “The Convention shall apply to any child who was habitually resident in a Contracting State immediately before any breach of custody or access rights. The Convention shall cease to apply when the child attains the age of 16 years.” Article 11 “The judicial or administrative authorities of Contracting States shall act expeditiously in proceedings for the return of children. If the judicial or administrative authority concerned has not reached a decision within six weeks from the date of commencement of the proceedings, the applicant or the Central Authority of the requested State, on its own initiative or if asked by the Central Authority of the requesting State, shall have the right to request a statement of the reasons for the delay. If a reply is received by the Central Authority of the requested State, that Authority shall transmit the reply to the Central Authority of the requesting State, or to the applicant, as the case may be.” Article 12 “Where a child has been wrongfully removed or retained in terms of Article 3 and, at the date of the commencement of the proceedings before the judicial or administrative authority of the Contracting State where the child is, a period of less than one year has elapsed from the date of the wrongful removal or retention, the authority concerned shall order the return of the child forthwith. The judicial or administrative authority, even where the proceedings have been commenced after the expiration of the period of one year referred to in the preceding paragraph, shall also order the return of the child, unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment. ...” Article 13 “Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the judicial or administrative authority of the requested State is not bound to order the return of the child if the person, institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that – a) the person, institution or other body having the care of the person of the child was not actually exercising the custody rights at the time of removal or retention, or had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention; or b) there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation. The judicial or administrative authority may also refuse to order the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views. In considering the circumstances referred to in this Article, the judicial and administrative authorities shall take into account the information relating to the social background of the child provided by the Central Authority or other competent authority of the child’s habitual residence.” Article 14 “In ascertaining whether there has been a wrongful removal or retention within the meaning of Article 3, the judicial or administrative authorities of the requested State may take notice directly of the law of, and of judicial or administrative decisions, formally recognised or not in the State of the habitual residence of the child, without recourse to the specific procedures for the proof of that law or for the recognition of foreign decisions which would otherwise be applicable.” Article 19 “A decision under this Convention concerning the return of the child shall not be taken to be a determination on the merits of any custody issue.” 44. The Explanatory Report to the Hague Convention, prepared by Elisa Pérez-Vera and published by The Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) in 1982 ( “the Explanatory Report”), provides as follows: 1. The notion of ‘the best interests of the child’ “21. ... the legal standard ‘the best interests of the child’ is at first view of such vagueness that it seems to resemble more closely a sociological paradigm than a concrete juridical standard. 24. ... [the philosophy of the Hague Convention] can be defined as follows: the struggle against the great increase in international child abductions must always be inspired by the desire to protect children and should be based upon an interpretation of their true interests. ... the right not to be removed or retained in the name of more or less arguable rights concerning its person is one of the most objective examples of what constitutes the interests of the child. ... the true victim of the ‘childnapping’ is the child himself, who suffers from the sudden upsetting of his stability, the traumatic loss of contact with the parent who has been in charge of his upbringing, the uncertainty and frustration which come with the necessity to adapt to a strange language, unfamiliar cultural conditions and unknown teachers and relatives. 25. It is thus legitimate to assert that the two objects of the Convention – the one preventive, the other designed to secure the immediate reintegration of the child into its habitual environment – both correspond to a specific idea of what constitutes the ‘best interests of the child’. However ... it has to be admitted that the removal of the child can sometimes be justified by objective reasons which have to do either with its person, or with the environment with which it is most closely connected. Therefore the Convention recognizes the need for certain exceptions to the general obligations assumed by States to secure the prompt return of children who have been unlawfully removed or retained.” 2. The notion of the child’s ‘habitual residence’ and the ‘wrongfulness of his or her removal or retention’ “64. Article 3 [of the Hague Convention] as a whole constitutes one of the key provisions of the Convention, since the setting in motion of the Convention’s machinery for the return of the child depends upon its application. In fact, the duty to return a child arises only if its removal or retention is considered wrongful in terms of the Convention. 66. ... the notion of habitual residence [is] a well-established concept in the Hague Conference, which regards it as a question of pure fact, differing in that respect from domicile. 68. The first source referred to in Article 3 is law, where it is stated that custody ‘may arise ... by operation of law’. That leads us to stress one of the characteristics of this Convention, namely its application to the protection of custody rights which were exercised prior to any decision thereon. This is important, since one cannot forget that, in terms of statistics, the number of cases in which a child is removed prior to a decision on its custody are quite frequent. Moreover, the possibility of the dispossessed parent being able to recover the child in such circumstances, except within the Convention’s framework, is practically non-existent, unless he in his turn resorts to force, a course of action which is always harmful to the child. 71. ... from the Convention’s standpoint, the removal of a child by one of the joint holders without the consent of the other, is equally wrongful, and this wrongfulness derives in this particular case, not from some action in breach of a particular law, but from the fact that such action has disregarded the rights of the other parent which are also protected by law, and has interfered with their normal exercise. The Convention’s true nature is revealed most clearly in these situations: it is not concerned with establishing the person to whom custody of the child will belong at some point in the future, nor with the situations in which it may prove necessary to modify a decision awarding joint custody on the basis of facts which have subsequently changed. It seeks, more simply, to prevent a later decision on the matter being influenced by a change of circumstances brought about through unilateral action by one of the parties.” 3. The exceptions to the principle of the child’s prompt return under Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention “34. ... [the exceptions] to the rule concerning the return of the child must be applied only as far as they go and no further. This implies above all that they are to be interpreted in a restrictive fashion if the Convention is not to become a dead letter ... The practical application of this principle requires that the signatory States be convinced that they belong, despite their differences, to the same legal community within which the authorities of each State acknowledge that the authorities of one of them – those of the child’s habitual residence – are in principle best placed to decide upon questions of custody and access. As a result, a systematic invocation of the said exceptions, substituting the forum chosen by the abductor for that of the child’s residence, would lead to the collapse of the whole structure of the Convention by depriving it of the spirit of mutual confidence which is its inspiration. 113. ... the exceptions [in Articles 13 and 20] do not apply automatically, in that they do not invariably result in the child’s retention; nevertheless, the very nature of these exceptions gives judges a discretion – and does not impose upon them a duty – to refuse to return a child in certain circumstances. 114. With regard to Article 13, the introductory part of the first paragraph highlights the fact that the burden of proving the facts stated in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) is imposed on the person who opposes the return of the child ... 116. The exceptions contained in [Article 13] (b) deal with situations where international child abduction has indeed occurred, but where the return of the child would be contrary to its interests ... Each of the terms used in this provision, is the result of a fragile compromise reached during the deliberations of the Special Commission and has been kept unaltered. Thus it cannot be inferred, a contrario, from the rejection during the Fourteenth Session of proposals favouring the inclusion of an express provision stating that this exception could not be invoked if the return of the child might harm its economic or educational prospects, that the exceptions are to receive a wide interpretation ...” 4. The use of expeditious procedures by judicial or administrative authorities “104. The importance throughout the Convention of the time factor appears again in [Article 11 of the Hague Convention]. Whereas Article 2 of the Convention imposes upon Contracting States the duty to use expeditious procedures, the first paragraph of this Article restates the obligation, this time with regard to the authorities of the State to which the child has been taken and which are to decide upon its return. There is a double aspect to this duty: firstly, the use of the most speedy procedures known to their legal system; secondly, that applications are, so far as possible, to be granted priority treatment. 105. The second paragraph [of Article 11 of the Hague Convention], so as to prompt internal authorities to accord maximum priority to dealing with the problems arising out of the international removal of children, lays down a non-obligatory time‑limit of six weeks, after which the applicant or Central Authority of the requested State may request a statement of reasons for the delay. Moreover, after the Central Authority of the requested State receives the reply, it is once more under a duty to inform, a duty owed either to the Central Authority of the requesting State or to the applicant who has applied to it directly. In short, the provision’s importance cannot be measured in terms of the requirements of the obligations imposed by it, but by the very fact that it draws the attention of the competent authorities to the decisive nature of the time factor in such situations and that it determines the maximum period of time within which a decision on this matter should be taken.” 45. The relevant provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which was signed in New York on 20 November 1989 and entered into force in respect of Russia on 15 September 1990, read as follows: Preamble “The States Parties to the present Convention, ... Convinced that the family, as the fundamental group of society and the natural environment for the growth and well-being of all its members and particularly children, should be afforded the necessary protection and assistance so that it can fully assume its responsibilities within the community, Recognizing that the child, for the full and harmonious development of his or her personality, should grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding, ... Have agreed as follows: ...” Article 3 “1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration. ...” Article 7 “1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth ... to know and be cared for by his or her parents. ...” Article 9 “1. States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or her parents against their will. ...” Article 18 “1. States Parties shall use their best efforts to ensure recognition of the principle that both parents have common responsibilities for the upbringing and development of the child. Parents or, as the case may be, legal guardians, have the primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child. The best interests of the child will be their basic concern. ...”

6. The applicant is registered under Hungarian law as a cooperative based in Aranyosgadány. 7. The applicant’s aim is to support its members in their agricultural activity, in particular by purchasing expensive machines and lending them to its members free of charge. The members pay a regular “contribution fee” to the cooperative. 8. The applicant considered that the lending of machines constituted the very essence of its economic activities. It therefore deducted the value-added tax paid in respect of the machines from the tax which it was liable to pay. 9. In 2008 the Hungarian Tax Authority fined the applicant, having found that the lending of machines to members free of charge was not an “economic activity” within the meaning of Act no. LXXIV of 1992 on Value-Added Tax. As a consequence, the applicant was not entitled to deduct the tax paid on the goods it purchased. 10. The applicant challenged the decision of the Tax Authority before the administrative courts. Pointing to the special provisions applying to cooperatives and to the fact that its members paid contribution fees, it argued, on the basis of domestic law, that the service in question was to be considered a genuine economic activity. 11. On 17 February 2009 the Baranya County Court upheld the administrative decision. The Supreme Court, in review proceedings, upheld that judgment on 26 November 2009. In response to the applicant’s argument to the effect that the contribution fee paid by members should be taken into account as a “consideration” for the lending of machines, rendering the applicant’s activity an “economic” one, the Supreme Court referred to the Aardappelenbewaarplaats judgment of the CJEU (C-154/80, EU:C:1981:38), in which that court had held that “a provision of services for which no definite subjective consideration is received does not constitute a provision of services ‘against payment’ ”. 12. On 9 December 2010 the applicant, represented by a different lawyer from the one who had represented it in the previous set of proceedings, introduced a second set of proceedings, seeking damages against the Supreme Court before the Budapest Regional Court. It alleged that the Supreme Court had violated European Union law on account of its failure to apply, of its own motion, Article 17 of the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC (see paragraph 30 below) in its 2009 judgment and on account of the wrongful qualification of the applicant’s activity for the purposes of the value-added tax deduction. The applicant argued that the European Union law provision analysed in the Aardappelenbewaarplaats case was Article 8 of the Second Council Directive 67/228 (defining the basis for assessment of value-added tax), rather than Article 17 of the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC (concerning tax deduction). It was the latter that should have been directly applicable in the case before the Supreme Court. In the applicant’s view, the Aardappelenbewaarplaats case was about whether turnover tax should be imposed on storage services provided free of charge for members of a cooperative association, whereas the case before the Supreme Court had concerned a different question, namely the deductibility of input VAT. Alleging the Supreme Court’s liability for judicial malpractice, the applicant relied on the Köbler judgment of the CJEU (see paragraph 31 below). It requested that the Budapest Regional Court obtain a preliminary ruling from the CJEU as to the conformity of the Supreme Court’s judgment with European Union law and the conditions for establishing whether the Supreme Court might be liable for a wrongful judgment. 13. On 31 May 2011 the Budapest Regional Court rejected the applicant’s claim against the Supreme Court. It held that in the main proceedings, the Supreme Court had been bound by the applicant company’s claim taking issue only with the alleged absence of a “consideration” and the resulting qualification of its service as not being an “economic activity”. The Regional Court was of the view that in that respect the Supreme Court had duly examined the relevant European Union law of its own motion. 14. Without requesting a preliminary ruling, the Budapest Regional Court held that the Köbler judgment was not relevant in the case because the applicant had sought to sue the Supreme Court on the basis of the Hungarian Civil Code, rather than seeking to sue the Hungarian State itself under European Union law. 15. The applicant appealed and requested the second-instance court to obtain a preliminary ruling also on the question of whether the Köbler principles were applicable if the reparation claim was directed against the Supreme Court and not the State. 16. On 28 August 2012 the Budapest Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance judgment, without requesting a preliminary ruling. It accepted the applicant’s argument that the reasoning of the first-instance judgment was erroneous with respect to the alleged irrelevance of the Köbler case, but held that, in any event, the applicant’s claim was ill-founded on other grounds. Notably, it pointed to the fact that during the first set of proceedings (see paragraph 10 above) the applicant had failed to refer to European Union law, and considered that this fact in itself had rendered the applicant’s claim unfounded. 17. Arguing that European Union law was to be applied proprio motu, even without an explicit reference from the plaintiff, the applicant requested a review of the final judgment by the Kúria (the historical appellation by which the Supreme Court was renamed in 2012, see the first sentence of point 36 of the Constitutional Court’s decision cited in Baka v. Hungary [GC], no. 20261/12, § 55, ECHR 2016). It also reiterated its request that the case be referred for a preliminary ruling and proposed that the Kúria also ask whether the liability of a State under the Köbler principles may be subjected to the precondition that an explicit reference to the relevant provisions of European Union law must be made by the plaintiff in the main – in the present case first – proceedings. 18. The questions thus proposed by the applicant for the purposes of a preliminary ruling read as follows: “1. Does the reparation claim fall within the scope of European law in civil proceedings, such as actions in damages based on section 349 of the Hungarian Civil Code, brought by an individual against the Supreme Court of the Member State concerned, in which the plaintiff claims that the Supreme Court has violated a right conferred on him by a directly applicable provision of European law in previous administrative proceedings. If so, to what extent? 2. In the common system of value-added tax, with regard to the specificities thereof, may Council Directive 77/388/EEC, especially its Article 17(2)(a), be interpreted as meaning that a national measure (e.g. a judgment) is incompatible with it if it denies the right of a cooperative, otherwise subject to value-added tax in the Member State concerned, to deduct input VAT paid on machines purchased, for the sole reason that the cooperative handed over those machines to its members, a ‘grouping of growers’, without consideration? 3. Is the liability of a Member State’s Supreme Court excluded, under the rules of European law, by the sole fact that an individual did not allege explicitly the infringement of a specific provision of European law in the judicial proceedings for the review of an administrative decision denying him the right to tax deduction? Or should the domestic court enforce of its own motion the directly applicable provision of European law (in this case, Article 17(2)(a) of the Sixth Directive)? 4. Is the infringement sufficiently serious if the Supreme Court of a Member State denies, in administrative proceedings, an individual’s right to tax deduction without analysing the underlying provision of European law directly or referring the case for a preliminary ruling, in circumstances where the reasoning of the refusal to refer the case [to the CJEU] is based on the Supreme Court’s reliance on a judgment of the [CJEU] adopted on a different subject and where this latter court has not yet adopted a ruling on the issue at hand?” 19. On 2 October 2013 the Kúria dismissed in a procedural order (végzés) the applicant’s request for a preliminary ruling. Firstly, it noted that it was not in dispute between the parties that the case fell within the scope of European Union law; the referral of the first question would therefore have been futile. Secondly, concerning the second, third and fourth questions, the Kúria held that they could have been considered in the first proceedings, but that they fell outside the scope of the action in damages brought against the Supreme Court on account of alleged judicial malpractice. It further held that in the framework of the action in damages, assessment of the consequences of the applicant’s failure, in the first set of proceedings, to make explicit allegations of an infringement of European Union law (see question 3 quoted in paragraph 18 above) was the task of the national courts, and that it did not raise any question of interpretation that would fall under the jurisdiction of the CJEU. 20. The applicant complained to the Kúria about the above refusal but in vain; on 4 December 2013 it held, in a procedural order (végzés), that no appeal lay against such a decision. 21. On 11 December 2013 the Kúria upheld, in a judgment (ítélet), the final decision of the Budapest Court of Appeal. It reiterated that the applicant could have relied on the Sixth Council Directive and put forward its arguments concerning the allegedly correct interpretation of domestic law in the light of European Union law before the Supreme Court in the 2009 proceedings. Since the applicant had failed to do so, the Supreme Court had indeed been prevented, by force of the applicable procedural rules, from examining such arguments as raised in the subsequent proceedings for damages, concerning the compatibility of the final judgment of 2009 with European Union law. Therefore, the Supreme Court could not bear responsibility for the infringement of European Union law alleged by the applicant. The judgment of the Kúria was served on the applicant on 7 February 2014. 22. On 13 March 2014 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint under section 27 of the Constitutional Court Act (see Mendrei v. Hungary (dec.), no. 54927/15, § 13, 19 June 2018), claiming that the proceedings before the Kúria had been unfair on account of the latter’s allegedly arbitrary refusal to refer the case for a preliminary ruling. Contending that the Constitutional Court should be considered as a “court or tribunal” for the purposes of Article 267 of the TFEU, the applicant also requested the Constitutional Court to turn to the CJEU in order to enquire whether an “arbitrary” refusal of a last-instance jurisdiction to refer a case for a preliminary ruling may violate the party’s right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (see paragraph 29 below) and, if so, under what conditions such a refusal might be considered arbitrary. The applicant argued, in particular, that the Kúria had failed to recognise an issue of fundamental importance, namely that whether a certain legal issue (the consequences of a plaintiff’s failure to put forward explicit allegations as to an infringement of European Union law) fell within the ambit of national law or European Union law was itself a question belonging necessarily to the realm of European law. Ignoring that concept, the Kúria had “solved” the problem in an arbitrary fashion, that is, by refusing the reference and barring the applicant’s access to a “lawful judge”, the CJEU in the circumstances. 23. The applicant’s constitutional complaint contained the following passages: “The complainant ... does not want to call into question the merits of the Kúria’s impugned judgment in the present procedure [but rather complains that] the Kúria acted unfairly in the review proceedings ... The Kúria’s procedure was in breach of the claimant’s constitutional right to a fair trial, guaranteed by Article XXVIII (1) of the Fundamental Law, in so far as the Kúria acted arbitrarily in omitting to refer the case for a preliminary ruling. ... The Kúria failed to explain, in line with the Cilfit requirements ... why and how it had deemed itself exempt from the obligation to refer a question [on the interpretation of EU law to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling]. ... [I]n the light of the above, the Kúria failed to comply with its obligation to refer [a question to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling] and that in an arbitrary, grossly unprofessional manner ...” 24. On 19 May 2014 the Constitutional Court rejected the constitutional complaint as inadmissible, without putting forward a preliminary ruling request (see decision no. 3165/2014. (V.23.), referred to in Somorjai v. Hungary, no. 60934/13, § 34, 28 August 2018). It held that the question whether a request for reference to the CJEU should be made or not was to be decided by the judges hearing the case in the ordinary courts, and that the Constitutional Court lacked jurisdiction to review such decisions. It further noted that the only claim an applicant might make in constitutional complaint proceedings initiated under section 27 of Act no. CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court was that a judgment be quashed. Consequently, no request for a preliminary ruling was possible under that law, and the applicant’s request to that effect had to be rejected. 25. The Constitutional Court’s decision contained the following passage: “[The applicant] was of the view that the rejection by the Kúria of his request to have the case referred to the [CJEU] had been arbitrary in that the Kúria should have provided professionally appropriate, objective and duly detailed reasons in that respect but, in the applicant’s opinion, it had failed to do so. In that connection, the applicant referred to the requirements contained in the [CJEU]’s Cilfit and Köbler judgments ...” Apart from that passage, the decision did not address the issue of adequate reasoning by the Kúria. 26. Certain provisions concerning the Constitutional Court’s power of review in connection with constitutional complaints were set out in Mendrei (cited above, §§ 12-15). Section 43 of the Constitutional Court Act, which was not quoted in Mendrei (cited above), provides as follows: “(1) If the Constitutional Court, in the course of proceedings provided for in section 27 and on the basis of a constitutional complaint, declares that a judicial decision is contrary to the Fundamental Law, it shall quash the decision. (2) Provisions of Acts that contain regulations in respect of court proceedings shall be applied to the procedural consequence of a Constitutional Court decision that quashes a judicial decision. (3) In court proceedings conducted as a consequence of the quashing of a judicial decision by the Constitutional Court, the decision of the Constitutional Court as to the constitutional issue shall be adhered to. (4) The Constitutional Court, when it quashes a judicial decision, may also quash judicial decisions or the decisions of other authorities which were reviewed by the given decision.” 27. The provisions of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act no. III of 1952) pertaining to the reference for a preliminary ruling, as in force at the material time, were set out in Somorjai, cited above, §§ 28 and 36. Article 361 of the old Code of Civil Procedure provided as follows: “In order to provide redress following a constitutional complaint, the Kúria shall decide as follows: ... (c) if the Constitutional Court has quashed a judicial decision, [the Kúria] shall ... remit the case to the first or second-instance court for new proceedings and a new decision; or order the adoption of a new decision in respect of an application for review.” 28. The relevant European Union law and the case-law of the CJEU pertaining to the preliminary ruling procedure was outlined in, among other authorities, Somorjai (cited above, §§ 38-41) and Baydar v. the Netherlands (no. 55385/14, §§ 21-29, 24 April 2018). 29. Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides, in so far as relevant: Right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial “Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article. Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone shall have the possibility of being advised, defended and represented. ...” 30. Article 17(2)(a) of the Sixth Directive (Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes), as amended by Article 28f thereof, provides: “In so far as the goods and services are used for the purposes of his taxable transactions, the taxable person shall be entitled to deduct from the tax which he is liable to pay: (a) [VAT] due or paid within the territory of the country in respect of goods or services supplied or to be supplied to him by another taxable person; ...” 31. In its Köbler judgment (C-224/01, EU:C:2003:513, point 1 of the operative part), the CJEU ruled as follows: “The principle that Member States are obliged to make good damage caused to individuals by infringements of Community law for which they are responsible is also applicable where the alleged infringement stems from a decision of a court adjudicating at last instance where the rule of Community law infringed is intended to confer rights on individuals, the breach is sufficiently serious and there is a direct causal link between that breach and the loss or damage sustained by the injured parties. In order to determine whether the infringement is sufficiently serious when the infringement at issue stems from such a decision, the competent national court, taking into account the specific nature of the judicial function, must determine whether that infringement is manifest. It is for the legal system of each Member State to designate the court competent to determine disputes relating to that reparation.” 32. In connection with the role of the national courts in application of European Union law, the CJEU held, among other things, as follows (see, respectively, joined cases C-430/93 and C-431/93 Van Schijndel, EU:C:1995:441, point 2 of the operative part; and C-2/06 Kempter, EU:C:2008:78, paragraph 45): “Community law does not require national courts to raise of their own motion an issue concerning the breach of provisions of Community law where examination of that issue would oblige them to abandon the passive role assigned to them by going beyond the ambit of the dispute defined by the parties themselves and relying on facts and circumstances other than those on which the party with an interest in application of those provisions bases his claim.” “[W]hile Community law does not require national courts to raise of their own motion a plea alleging infringement of Community provisions where examination of that plea would oblige them to go beyond the ambit of the dispute as defined by the parties, they are obliged to raise of their own motion points of law based on binding Community rules where, under national law, they must or may do so in relation to a binding rule of national law ...”

6. The applicant was born in 1942 and lives in Blagoevgrad. 7. The background to the banning of the two rallies at issue in the present case has been set out in detail in the judgments in the following cases: Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v. Bulgaria, nos. 29221/95 and 29225/95, ECHR 2001-IX; United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Ivanov v. Bulgaria, no. 44079/98, 20 October 2005; United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden-PIRIN and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 59489/00, 20 October 2005; Ivanov and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 46336/99, 24 November 2005; United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 59491/00, 19 January 2006; United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Ivanov v. Bulgaria (no. 2), no. 37586/04, 18 October 2011; United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Others v. Bulgaria (no. 2), no. 34960/04, 18 October 2011; Singartiyski and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 48284/07, 18 October 2011; and United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden-PIRIN and Others v. Bulgaria (no. 2), nos. 41561/07 and 20972/08, 18 October 2011. 8. The applicant was one of the applicants in Ivanov and Others (cited above). He is the brother of Mr Yordan Kostadinov Ivanov, who was one of the applicants in United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Ivanov, United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Others, United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Ivanov (no. 2), and United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Others (no. 2) (all cited above). 9. On 15 September 2006 the applicant, acting on behalf of the unregistered organisation the Macedonian Initiative Committee, notified Blagoevgrad’s mayor that the Committee intended to stage a rally at 4 p.m. on 30 September 2006 in Macedonia Square to commemorate the eighty-second anniversary of “the day of the genocide of Macedonians in Bulgaria – 12 September 1924”. The rally would consist of the laying of wreaths and flowers and the reading of a short address. 10. The same day the mayor replied to the applicant that the rally could not proceed as the municipality had planned an event in Macedonia Square for the same date – a concert marking the Day of Music. That parallel event made the staging of the rally impossible. 11. On 18 September 2006, again acting on behalf of the Macedonian Initiative Committee, the applicant sought judicial review of the mayor’s decision. He argued that under the applicable international-law agreements, that organisation was entitled to stage peaceful rallies without being registered. 12. In a final decision of 19 September 2006, the Blagoevgrad District Court held that the application was admissible and that the mayor’s decision was amenable to judicial review. However, it went on to find that the mayor’s decision was lawful, because there was a risk that the rights and freedoms of others might be infringed. It was not appropriate to hold the rally, which, in view of its intended theme, was political in character, alongside the municipality’s event. The performance of musical works could not at all be reconciled with political addresses. It was not proper to force music lovers to listen to political speeches and declarations, especially ones not accepted unequivocally by Bulgarian society, which was particularly sensitive to assertions that a Macedonian minority existed in Bulgaria and that its rights were being infringed. 13. As a result, the Macedonian Initiative Committee called off the rally. The applicant submitted that he was not aware of whether the municipality’s event had in fact taken place. He had made a request for information in that connection under freedom-of-information laws, but had not received a reply. The municipality’s cultural calendar for 2006 showed that the concert marking the Day of Music had been scheduled for 1 October rather than 30 September 2006. 14. An earlier attempt by the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden (“Ilinden”), an unregistered association based in south-western Bulgaria, in an area known as the Pirin region or the geographic region of Pirin Macedonia, to organise a similar rally on 11 or 12 September 2006 had also been fruitless. Blagoevgrad’s mayor had banned that rally, and a legal challenge to his decision had been dismissed by the Blagoevgrad District Court on 8 September 2006 (see United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Ivanov (no. 2), cited above, §§ 58-63). 15. The circumstances relating to the rally organised by Ilinden on 12 September 2007 are set out in United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Ivanov (no. 2) (cited above, §§ 90-95) in the following way: “90. On 28 August 2007 Ilinden notified the Mayor of Blagoevgrad of its intention to stage a rally on Macedonia Square, in front of Gotse Delchev’s monument, at 4.30 p.m. on 12 September 2007. The event, which was to mark the anniversary of ‘the genocide against the Macedonians’, would consist of the laying of a wreath and flowers on the monument and a short speech. It would last one hour. 91. On 29 August 2007 the Mayor replied that the notification could not be examined as Ilinden had not produced documents proving its official registration. It was thus impossible to identify the ‘managing bodies of [the] event’. Moreover, the municipality had planned an event on Macedonia Square for the same date, a children’s holiday under the name ‘Hello, school’, to mark the beginning of the school year, which made the holding of the rally impossible. 92. On 30 August 2007 Ilinden sought judicial review by the newly created Blagoevgrad Administrative Court ..., reiterating the arguments raised in its previous applications. In a decision of 30 August 2007 the Blagoevgrad Administrative Court found that under the 1990 Meetings and Marches Act, which was lex specialis in relation to the general rules of administrative procedure, the court competent to examine an application for judicial review of a Mayor’s decision to ban a rally was the district court. It therefore sent the file to the Blagoevgrad District Court. 93. In a final decision of 5 September 2007 the Blagoevgrad District Court dismissed the application. It held that, while the lack of registration did not amount to sufficient grounds to prohibit the rally, the fact that another event, likely to draw a number of people, many of whom were children, was due to take place on the same date in Macedonia Square was enough to justify the ban. In the court’s view, it was inopportune to allow two wholly different events to be staged at the same time and place. 94. According to the applicants, no school event took place at 4 p.m. on 12 September 2007 on Macedonia Square. When a number of members and supporters of Ilinden gathered in front of the American University in Blagoevgrad at about 5 p.m., they were stopped by the police and a number of them were arrested. They were taken to a police station, held for about three hours and charged with committing administrative offences for having tried to take part in a banned rally. 95. On 22 October 2007 the deputy Mayor of Blagoevgrad imposed administrative punishments (fines of 200 Bulgarian levs (102.26 euros) each) on [Mr Yordan Kostadinov Ivanov] and on a number of members of Ilinden for having taken part in a banned rally, in breach of a public-order regulation issued by the Blagoevgrad Municipal Council. All of them sought judicial review. In a series of judgments delivered on 18 and 19 February, 11 March, and 22 and 29 May 2008 the Blagoevgrad District Court annulled the fines. In some of the judgments it found that they were invalid, as under the applicable rules the deputy Mayor had no power to impose administrative punishments. In other judgments the court found that the deputy Mayor’s decisions were defective because they did not specify which administrative offences had been committed. In others it held that although the Mayor’s ban on the rally planned for 12 September 2007 was legally binding, the actions of the members of Ilinden on that date had not amounted to the staging of a rally, as they had been too few and had not tried to wave banners and make speeches, but merely to lay flowers on Gotse Delchev’s monument. The court went on to say that every person, regardless of their political convictions, had the right to honour the memory of national heroes in peace.” 16. It was the applicant who acted on behalf of Ilinden in its dealings with Blagoevgrad’s mayor and the courts in relation to that rally.

5. The applicant was born in 1946 and currently lives in Berlin, Germany. 6. In 2005 he was an English teacher in a school in Kyiv, Ukraine. At that time he entered into private relations with a married woman living in Kyiv. In 2006 the woman gave birth to a child. Her husband was indicated as the father in the child’s birth certificate. In 2007 a DNA test was performed proving that the applicant was in fact the father of the child. The applicant was not prevented from having access to the child by her mother, who accepted financial support from him on a monthly basis. The applicant bought a car for the child’s mother. In 2011 he wrote a will bequeathing all his property to the child. 7. The applicant had regular contact with the child until 2015 when the mother informed the applicant that she had divorced her husband and that she had decided to marry a German national and move with the child to Germany. As the applicant opposed the decision to emigrate to Germany, the mother denied him access to the child and prevented him from communicating with the child. 8. In June 2015 the applicant initiated proceedings before the Darnytskyy District Court of Kyiv (“the District Court”) seeking recognition of his paternity and to have the child’s birth certificate amended accordingly. 9. During the hearing the mother of the child admitted that the applicant had provided regular financial support and had taken part in the upbringing and education of the child. However, she submitted that the applicant’s claims were time-barred under Article 129 § 2 of the Family Code, which provided a one-year time-limit for such claims (see paragraph 15 below). The applicant contended that he had delayed his lawsuit because he had not wished to disturb the child’s family situation and he had not been prevented from communicating with the child on a regular basis until 2015. Only when the child’s mother had decided to emigrate to another country with the child had he decided to seek formal recognition of his paternity. 10. On 17 November 2015 the District Court allowed the applicant’s claims, declaring him the father of the child and ordering the amendment of the child’s birth certificate. The District Court considered that the applicant had missed the time-limit for valid reasons. It took into account the applicant’s argument that he had not wished to disturb the family and cause any harm to the child with a lawsuit during the long period when the mother had in fact assisted him in having regular access to the child. 11. On 3 February 2016 the Kyiv Court of Appeal overturned the District Court’s decision and dismissed the applicant’s claim as time-barred. The appellate court stated that Article 129 § 2 of the Family Code provided a one-year time-limit, which had started to run from the moment the applicant had found out or should have found out about his paternity. The applicant had become aware of his paternity in 2007 when the DNA test had been performed (see paragraph 6 above); however he had applied to the court in 2015 (see paragraph 8 above), which had been too late. 12. The applicant appealed on points of law, arguing that the Court of Appeal had applied the statute of limitations without duly taking into account the reasons for which he had delayed his action and without examining the child’s interests. 13. On 13 July 2016 the Higher Specialised Civil and Criminal Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law, without examining whether the applicant had provided valid reasons which could justify his non-compliance with the time-limit set out in Article 129 § 2 of the Family Code.

5. The first applicant was founded in 1990 and has its seat in Podgorica. The second applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Podgorica. The second applicant is the first applicant’s founder, executive director, and the owner of 99.2698 % of its shares. The remaining 0.7302% is owned by the second applicant’s wife and son. 6. On 3 August and 11 November 1998 respectively the first applicant concluded two contracts with the Development Land Social Fund (Društveni fond za građevinsko zemljište, poslovni prostor i puteve Podgorica). Under the first contract the first applicant obtained the right to use (pravo korišćenja) four plots of development land (građevinsko zemljište) with a total surface of 11,443 m2, on which it planned to build a shopping centre and an office building. The second contract concerned the communal charges for the necessary infrastructure on the land at issue (naknada za uređenje građevinskog zemljišta). On an unspecified date thereafter the four plots of land were joined into one, marked as no. 2090/1036. Pursuant to sections 419 and 420 of the Property Act 2009 (see paragraph 61 below) the first applicant became the owner of the land at issue on 9 December 2011. 7. On 15 April 2005 the Property Administration (Uprava za nekretnine) issued a decision by which it divided the cadastral plot of land no. 2090/1036 into two, one of which kept the number 2090/1036 and had 11,365 m2, and another one which was registered as no. 2090/1220 and which had 77 m2. 8. On 3 March 2016 the cadastral plot of land no. 2090/1036 was further split into two, the smaller part of 44 m2 becoming a cadastral plot of land no. 2090/1581. The bigger part kept the number 2090/1036 and measured 11,321 m2. 9. On an unspecified date in 2004 the first applicant’s plan for the shopping centre and the office building was registered in a Detailed Urbanistic Plan (Detaljni urbanistički plan, “DUP”). 10. In December 2004 the DUP for the relevant area was changed, one of the changes being that the cadastral plot of land no. 2090/1036 and an adjacent plot of land of 1,557 m2, owned by the Municipality, were joined into one urban plot (urbanistička parcela). 11. On 6 June 2005 the President of the Municipality decided to change the relevant DUP further, which decision entered into force on 7 July 2005. Construction in the area was prohibited thereby for the next 90 days except in case of those investors who had already obtained a building permit prior to this decision. 12. On 6 October 2005 another decision was issued, providing that the DUP would be changed within 90 days and construction was further prohibited until the adoption of a new DUP but up to one year at most. The ban did not apply to the investors who had already obtained a building permit. This decision entered into force on 14 October 2005. 13. On 20 January 2006 a new decision to change the DUP was issued, revoking the previous two decisions. As regards its contents it corresponded to the decision of 6 October 2005. It entered into force on 23 January 2006. 14. On 21 July 2006 a new DUP was issued; it entered into force on 29 July 2006. Thereby the adjacent plot of land that had previously been added to plot no. 2090/1036 was apparently split into three: two parts became parts of two newly-formed urban plots of land and the third part remained attached to the applicant’s land and would appear to be part of a traffic route (saobraćajnica). It would also appear that in this urban plot of land the DUP planned the construction of two buildings instead of the shopping centre planned by the first applicant. 15. On 28 July 2010 a new decision to change the DUP was issued. 16. On 16 May 2013 the DUP was changed again, apparently providing for the construction of buildings similar to those initially planned to be built there by the applicants. 17. Following the changes of the DUP in December 2004 (see paragraph 10 above), on 25 January 2005 the first applicant contacted the Property Secretariat (Direkcija za imovinu; “the Secretariat”) in the Podgorica Municipality. It sought to “complete” the urban plot, that is to buy the adjacent cadastral plot of land which had been added to its own land, thus forming one urban plot of land; having received no reply it renewed its request on 23 May 2005 and 2 August 2005. 18. On 27 January 2005 the Spatial Planning Secretariat of Podgorica Municipality issued Urban Technical Conditions, which stated that the cadastral plot of land no. 2090/1036 was smaller than the relevant urban plot and that it needed to be “completed” (potrebno je izvršiti njeno dokompletiranje). 19. On 23 February 2005 the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Spatial Planning (“the Ministry”) granted the first applicant a location for the construction of business premises on plot no. 2090/1036, in accordance with the 2004 DUP. The decision specified that the Urban Technical Conditions of 27 January 2005 were a constituent part of this decision. 20. On 15 August 2005 the first applicant appealed, having received no reply from the Secretariat. The same day the Secretariat informed the first applicant that no completion of plots could be done given that the revision of the DUP was ongoing at the time, which meant “urbanistic re‑consideration of the area” at issue. 21. By 6 April 2017 there had been at least seven remittals, either by the Municipality’s Chief Administrator (as the competent second-instance body) or the Administrative Court. 22. In the course of these proceedings, on 2 September 2016 the Secretariat enquired at the Property Administration if the same urban plot of land, as it had existed at the time when the first applicant had first filed a request for completion, could be formed again. On 23 September 2016 the Property Administration replied that the size of the said plot of land had been changed in the meantime and that there was no basis for re-forming the urban plot as it once had been. 23. On 6 April 2017 the Secretariat dismissed the first applicant’s request again. On 19 May 2017 the Chief Administrator upheld this decision, considering that due to the changes of the planning documents the completion of the said plot of land could not be done and that therefore the first applicant’s request had been correctly dismissed. On 23 June 2017 the first applicant instituted an administrative dispute before the Administrative Court, which would appear to be still pending. 24. On 11 July 2005 the first applicant requested the Agency for Construction and Development of Podgorica (Agencija za izgradnju i razvoj Podgorice; “the Agency”), a legal successor of the Development Land Social Fund, to calculate the final communal charges for the urban plot no. 2090/1036. 25. On 20 July 2005 the Agency replied that the calculation could not be made due to the construction ban. 26. On 26 July and 6 September 2005 the first applicant urged the Agency to make the necessary calculation, submitting that the ban applied only to construction and not to the calculation of charges. 27. On 13 September 2005 the first applicant made its own assessment of the communal charges in the amount of 131,324.65 euros (EUR) and made the payment. The payment was returned the next day as it had been made “without cause” (uplaćen bez osnova). 28. In the course of the proceedings the applicant repeated its request to the Agency on several occasions, including between 5 and 14 October 2005, submitting that the construction ban as the basis for refusal was unlawful and/or the ban was not in force at the relevant time. 29. By 1 December 2005 the applicant’s request had been refused by the Agency at least four times on the grounds that construction was banned pursuant to either the decision to change the DUP of 6 June 2005 or the decision of 6 October 2005. The Agency also held that the calculation could not be done as the first applicant had no building permit. 30. On 1 December 2005 the second-instance body rejected the first applicant’s appeal on the grounds that this was not a matter for administrative proceedings. The first applicant initiated an administrative dispute before the Administrative Court in this regard but in view of the opinion of the second-instance body it withdrew that claim, and instead pursued the proceedings before the Commercial Court. 2 Judicial proceedings 31. On 16 September 2005 the first applicant instituted proceedings before the Commercial Court (Privredni sud) in Podgorica against the Agency for refusing to calculate the communal charges. 32. On 7 April 2006 the Commercial Court ruled in favour of the first applicant and ordered the Agency to calculate the charges. The court considered in particular that the first decision to change the DUP, which prohibited construction, had entered into force on 7 July and expired on 5 October 2005, while the next decision had entered into force on 14 October 2005. Therefore, there had been no construction ban before 7 July 2005 or between 5 and 14 October 2005, when the first applicant requested the communal charges to be calculated and when the Agency was bound to calculate them. The court also noted that the Agency’s reasoning for refusing the first applicant’s request, notably that “the calculation [could] not be done as the first applicant had no building permit” was illogical, since the calculation of charges was a pre-condition for getting a building permit. 33. The Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court upheld the previous decision on 18 April and 29 December 2008 respectively. The Supreme Court held, inter alia, that the first applicant had been granted the location for construction by the competent Ministry before it was decided that the DUP would be changed and that a decision to change the DUP could not affect the investors who had already been granted a location. 34. On 6 August 2008 the Agency calculated the charges. It provided for a new contract to be concluded with the first applicant, which specified that pursuant to the 1998 contract the applicant had already paid a certain amount and that the remaining amount to be paid was EUR 269,309.83. 35. On 13 October 2008, upon the first applicant’s request, the Commercial Court issued an enforcement order, which provided that the Agency would calculate the charges within 30 days or it would face a penalty of EUR 550, and would have to calculate the charges within the following 15 days. 36. On 20 October 2008 the first applicant received the above calculation from the Agency. On 22 October 2008 it requested that the contract specify in accordance with which DUP the construction would be undertaken. 37. On 27 October 2008 the Agency replied that the first applicant’s request was outside the Agency’s competence and that the first applicant should address bodies in charge of urban planning in that respect. On 28 October 2008 the Agency notified the Commercial Court that it had complied with its judgment and the enforcement order. 38. On 10 November 2008 the first applicant informed the Commercial Court that it did not consider the relevant judgment enforced as it had “serious objections” to the documents submitted by the Agency due to which it had not signed them. 39. On 16 February 2009 the Agency informed the Commercial Court that the first applicant had no objections in respect of the calculation itself, and noted that no statute provided for an obligation or a possibility for the first applicant to sign the calculation. 40. On 8 July 2005 the first applicant requested a building permit for the shopping centre from the Ministry. 41. On 26 July 2005 the first applicant notified the Ministry that the Agency was refusing to calculate the charges and asked the Ministry to urge that the Agency do so. On 12 August 2005 the Ministry responded that it had no competence as regards matters relating to the calculation of the charges. 42. On 14 September 2005 the first applicant informed the Ministry that it had done the calculation itself and had made the payment (see paragraph 27 above). 43. On 23 September 2005 the Ministry dismissed the first applicant’s request on the grounds that it had not paid the communal charges or completed the urban plot pursuant to the Urban Technical Conditions. 44. On 18 November 2005 the first applicant instituted an administrative dispute before the Administrative Court. It submitted, inter alia, that the requirement to buy an adjacent plot of land had been introduced in addition and was unnecessary given that the shopping centre was planned entirely on the cadastral plot of land no. 2090/1036. It also maintained that the refusal to calculate the charges was groundless as the ban related to construction only and not to the calculation of the charges, and that it was a deliberate obstruction. 45. On 29 December 2005 the Administrative Court dismissed the first applicant’s claim on the grounds that there was no contract between the first applicant and the Agency concerning the communal charges, that the first applicant had failed to submit all the evidence required by the relevant statutory provision in order to obtain a building permit, and it had failed to obtain an adjacent plot of land as required by the Urban Technical Conditions. The court did not deal with the first applicant’s explicit submission that the said requirements were unlawful and/or unnecessary. 46. On an unspecified date thereafter the first applicant lodged a request for judicial review before the Supreme Court, maintaining that there was a contract between itself and the Agency concluded in 1998. It also submitted that the courts had blamed the first applicant for not paying the charges and completing the plot, even though it had done everything it could to comply with these requests, and had actually complained about the unlawfulness of the relevant State bodies’ refusal to cooperate in these matters. 47. On 2 March 2006 the Supreme Court upheld the previous decision, considering that the first applicant had indeed failed to submit proof that it had paid the communal charges and completed the urban plot as requested. 48. On 29 August 2014, following the change of the DUP in 2013, the first applicant requested a building permit for “central activities building” (za izgradnju objekta centralnih djelatnosti). On 27 July 2017, after five remittals, the proceedings were still pending. 49. Between 15 August 2005 and 20 September 2006 the first applicant filed three motions with the Constitutional Court for the assessment of the constitutionality and legality of the decisions to change the DUP issued on 6 June 2005, 20 January and 21 July 2006 respectively. 50. On 30 January 2006 the Constitutional Court discontinued the proceedings (obustavlja se postupak) upon the first motion as the impugned decision of 6 June 2005 was no longer in force. 51. On 6 December 2006 and 27 June 2007, respectively, the Constitutional Court rejected the other two motions. 52. The DUP in the area at issue was subject to changes in 1990, 1996, 1997, 1999 (the changes in 1999 were done pursuant to the first applicant’s request to that effect), 2002 (entered into force in 2003), 2004 (entered into force in 2005), 2006, 2010 and 2013. The purpose of the land also changed over time, from “sports and recreation” to “central activities” (centralne djelatnosti). 53. Between 8 February and 8 July 2005 the first applicant obtained a number of permits related to the planned construction of the shopping centre (electro-energetic, water supply, sanitation, geo-mechanic, urbanistic, as well as those related to fire safety, environmental protection, workplace safety, traffic, etc.). 54. Between January and August 2005 there were at least four other requests relating to the land in respect of which the DUP was changed (three of which were also for completion of relevant plots of land). In all four cases the claimants were informed that their requests could not be met in view of the changes which the DUP was undergoing. 55. On 14 August 2006 the Ministry sent a letter to the mayors of all Municipalities. The letter stated, in substance, that “certain local government units” interpreted section 33 of the Spatial Planning and Development Act (Zakon o planiranju i uređenju prostora) (see paragraph 69 below), which provided for a possibility of a construction ban where appropriate, in a way that was incompatible with its contents, essence and meaning. The Ministry further explained that a decision on ‘a construction ban’ related exclusively to a ban on issuing a decision granting a location, as a document on the basis of which a building permit was issued, and that in a case where the decision on location had been issued prior to the construction ban, the competent body had a duty to issue a building permit to an investor, provided that the conditions provided in section 34 of the Construction Act (Zakon o izgradnji objekata) were fulfilled, regardless of whether the construction ban in the relevant area was in force. 56. Between 1 August and 8 December 2006 the first applicant was granted a location and was issued urban planning conditions for the construction of a warehouse in another part of Podgorica. It also obtained other relevant consents (concerning water supply, electricity, fire protection, traffic, ecology, sanitation, etc.) and the Ministry’s urbanistic consent to technical documentation. On 28 December 2006 it concluded a contract with the Agency concerning the charges, and on 10 January 2007 it obtained a building permit for that location. By 17 December 2007 it had built the warehouse and obtained a permit to use it (upotrebna dozvola). 57. On 27 August 2015, following the first applicant’s proposal to that effect, a meeting was held between the representatives of the first applicant and the Agency. The Agency undertook to study the first applicant’s submissions in relation to the urban plot of land no. 2090/1036, including the one that it had not been allowed to honour all the obligations. It would appear, however, that the first applicant never received any response from the Agency.

5. The first applicant was born in 1937 and lives in Sopot. The second applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Gdańsk. 6. On 10 April 2010 an aircraft of the Polish Air Force was carrying a Polish State delegation from Warsaw to Smolensk, Russia, to attend a ceremony marking the 70th anniversary of the Katyń massacre. The delegation was led by the President of Poland and included many high‑ranking officials. The aircraft crashed during the approach to Smolensk aerodrome, killing all ninety-six people on board (eighty‑eight passengers and eight crew members). 7. The applicants are the widows of two victims of the crash, Mr Leszek Solski, an activist of the Katyń Families Association, and Mr Arkadiusz Rybicki, a member of parliament. 8. On 29 July 2011 the Polish Committee for the Investigation of State Aviation Accidents (Komisja Badania Wypadków Lotniczych Lotnictwa Państwowego) published its report on the causes of the crash. It concluded: “the immediate cause of the accident was the descent below the minimum descent altitude at an excessive rate of descent in weather conditions which prevented visual contact with the ground, as well as the delayed execution of the go-around procedure. Those circumstances led to impact with an obstacle on the ground, resulting in the separation of part of the left wing with the aileron, and consequently to the loss of aircraft control and eventual ground impact.” The committee excluded the possibility that an explosion had taken place on board. An earlier report by the Russian Inter‑State Aviation Committee contained similar findings. The Parliamentary Group on the Examination of the Smolensk Crash reached different conclusions, however, and suggested that an explosion on board might have been one of the causes of the accident. According to the applicants, the Parliamentary Group was not an official investigative authority. 9. The Warsaw Regional Military Prosecutor’s Office opened an investigation into the crash on 10 April 2010. 10. Both applicants were granted victim status in the investigation. 11. On 4 April 2016 the investigation was assigned to an investigative team of the State Prosecutor’s Office (Prokuratura Krajowa). 12. On 21 June 2016 the State Prosecutor’s Office organised a meeting with the victims’ families. The purpose of the meeting was to explain the need to carry out exhumations and autopsies, as well as to hear opinions from all the families concerned. 13. The first applicant attended that meeting. She submitted that the prosecutor had focused on criticising the report of the Polish Committee for the Investigation of State Aviation Accidents. Only those families who supported the prosecutor’s decision on the exhumations had been allowed to speak. The second applicant did not attend the meeting. She did not trust the State Prosecutor’s Office because she felt that it favoured those families who supported the exhumations and the conspiracy theories around the crash. 14. On 7 October 2016, pursuant to Article 209 §§ 1 and 4 and Article 210 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”), a prosecutor of the State Prosecutor’s Office decided to appoint a team of international and national forensic experts with a view to carrying out autopsies on the bodies of eighty-three victims of the crash (the bodies of nine victims had already been exhumed and four victims had been cremated). The prosecutor asked the experts to: “(1) carry out the medical imaging, examination and autopsy of the victims’ remains; (2) determine the cause of death, and the manner and circumstances in which the victims sustained their injuries, including whether the injuries were sustained before or after their death, as well as to ascertain whether the injuries occurred at the place and time of the crash; (3) ascertain whether the established injuries indicate that they came about as a result of the aircraft’s impact with the ground and the disintegration of the aircraft parts ...; (4) ascertain whether the victims’ bodies have injuries typical of an explosion of explosive or flammable material, or of some other sudden release of energy; (5) ascertain whether the method used by the Russian experts to examine the corpses and carry out the autopsies was consistent with the current standards, and whether the conclusions of their forensic report with regard to the injuries, the circumstances in which they had occurred and the cause of death correspond to the conclusions of the report established by the [current] team of experts; (6) determine the identity of the victims by comparing the results of the genetic testing with their genetic profiles, established at an earlier stage of the proceedings ...; (7) take samples from the victims’ remains for further toxicological, histopathological, physicochemical and genetic examination.” The prosecutor further ordered (point IV of the decision) that for the purpose of carrying out the above-mentioned measures, the bodies of eighty-three victims be exhumed on dates to be determined in separate orders. 15. In his decision, the prosecutor noted that directly after the crash, the Russian authorities had carried out autopsies and identification procedures on the victims’ bodies. The victims’ remains had subsequently been repatriated to Poland and buried. In the course of its investigation, the Warsaw Regional Military Prosecutor’s Office had started to have doubts about the diligence of the Russian experts in identifying the victims and the injuries sustained by them. From August 2011 the Military Prosecutor’s Office had carried out exhumations and autopsies on nine victims of the crash. The results of those examinations had confirmed that the Russian experts had not properly recorded the injuries sustained by the victims and, in the case of six out of the nine bodies exhumed, had wrongly identified the victims. The prosecutor stated that, in the circumstances, doubts also remained in respect of the other victims of the crash. He further intended to resolve doubts concerning the alleged explosion on board. 16. On 12 October 2016 the second applicant wrote a letter to the Minister of Justice – Prosecutor General, objecting to the exhumation of her husband’s body. On 14 October 2016 the first applicant wrote a similar letter to the State Prosecutor’s Office, stating that she was convinced that her late husband had been properly identified. She had been present at the Moscow Forensic Institute where the identification of the victims had been carried out and had seen the body of her husband herself. The State Prosecutor’s Office replied in the negative to both letters. The second applicant was also informed that a meeting with the relatives of the victims and the prosecutors would be scheduled prior to each exhumation in order to explain the reasons behind the decision to carry out the exhumations. 17. The prosecutor’s decision of 7 October 2016 was served on the applicants’ lawyer on 20 October 2016. 18. On 27 October 2016 the applicants personally and through their lawyers lodged interlocutory appeals (zażalenie) against the prosecutor’s decision of 7 October 2016. They objected to the exhumation of their husbands’ remains and asked that that part of the decision be reversed. 19. The applicants argued that the prosecutor had applied Article 209 § 1 and Article 210 of the CCP without any consideration for the relevant provisions of the Constitution. Furthermore, the prosecutor’s decision had breached Article 2 § 1 (3) of the CCP, which provided that criminal proceedings had to respect the legal interests of a victim. The applicants further alleged that the reasons for the decision had been vague and sparse. The prosecutor had failed to properly establish that the exhumation of their husbands’ remains was necessary, since such a measure should be one of last resort. 20. In the applicants’ view, the decision on exhumation violated the respect due to the remains of their late husbands, as well as their personal right to respect for the memory of a late relative (kult osoby zmarłej). Furthermore, in issuing a general order to exhume all the victims, without taking into account their individual circumstances, the prosecutor had demonstrated a lack of respect for the victims and had violated the families’ right to dignity. 21. The applicants invoked Articles 2, 30, 45 and 47 of the Constitution, alleging, inter alia, that the prosecutor had applied the provisions of the CCP in breach of a person’s inherent right to dignity. They further relied on Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. The applicants also claimed that the prosecutor had failed to inform them of their right to lodge an interlocutory appeal against his decision. 22. Lastly, the applicants relied on a letter dated 25 October 2016 from the Ombudsman to the Prosecutor General presenting arguments in favour of a judicial review of the prosecutor’s decision on exhumation. The Ombudsman considered that exhumation of human remains carried out following a prosecutor’s decision constituted an interference with the right to respect for the memory of a late relative, one of the personal rights protected by the Civil Code. Those personal rights constituted part of an individual’s private life. Under Article 47 of the Constitution, everyone had the right to legal protection of his or her private life. In the light of that provision, everyone who considered that his or her private life had been violated by an act of the authorities had to have the opportunity to seek legal protection. Relatives therefore had to be provided with legal remedies with a view to determining whether the prosecutor’s decision on exhumation was disproportionate. 23. On 23 and 24 November and 6 December 2016 the prosecutor refused to entertain the applicants’ interlocutory appeals, finding them inadmissible in law. He stated that the applicants had wrongly interpreted his decision of 7 October 2016 in considering that it constituted a basis for the exhumation of their husbands’ remains. A decision on that matter would be issued in a separate order, specifying the time and place of exhumation. Nonetheless, he stated that a decision on exhumation under Article 210 of the CCP was not amenable to appeal. His decisions refusing to proceed with the interlocutory appeals did not contain any reference to the constitutional and Convention arguments raised by the applicants. 24. On 6, 7 and 21 December 2016 the applicants lodged interlocutory appeals against the prosecutor’s decision with the Warsaw Regional Court. They alleged that the prosecutor’s decisions refusing to entertain their interlocutory appeals had violated the provisions of the Constitution (Articles 45, 47 and 77 § 2), the Convention (Articles 3, 8 and 13) and the CCP. In their view, a correct interpretation of the relevant provisions of the CCP, in the light of the Constitution and the protection of fundamental rights, should have resulted in the availability of an interlocutory appeal against the prosecutor’s decision of 7 October 2016. 25. The applicants invoked their right to dignity, the obligation to respect human remains and their right to respect for the memory of a late relative. They submitted that the decision of 7 October 2016 concerned not only the appointment of a team of forensic experts but also the exhumation of their husbands’ remains. In their view, that decision predetermined a decision to exhume the remains of their husbands; at a later date the prosecutor would only set the exact date of the exhumation. The decision on exhumation constituted interference with the applicants’ legal interests and therefore it was constitutionally required that they be provided with a legal remedy aimed at reviewing the prosecutor’s decision. The applicants also stated that the prosecutor had failed to respond to their arguments based on the Constitution and the Convention. 26. The applicants also reiterated the arguments raised by the Ombudsman in his letter of 25 October, and in his subsequent letters of 2 and 18 November 2016 to the Deputy Prosecutor General. 27. On 3 April 2017 the Warsaw Regional Court (case no. VIII Kp 17/17) decided to refer a legal question to the Constitutional Court on the constitutionality of Article 210 of the CCP in so far as that provision did not provide for the opportunity to lodge an interlocutory appeal against a prosecutor’s decision to exhume a body. The court alleged that the impugned provision was incompatible with Article 45 (the right to a court), Article 47 (the right to private and family life) and Article 78 (the right to appeal) of the Constitution and Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention. The court considered that the prosecutor’s decision of 7 October 2016 had predetermined the issue of exhumation. Having analysed the provisions of the CCP, the Regional Court found that prosecutors’ decisions ordering an autopsy (Article 209 of the CCP) or exhumation (Article 210 of the CCP) were not susceptible to judicial review. It noted, inter alia, that the right to grieve and the respect for that right owed to close relatives of a deceased person fell within the constitutional notion of “private and family life”. In the event of the authorities interfering with that right, the individual concerned should be provided with a remedy. Article 210 of the CCP was deficient in that respect from a constitutional and Convention perspective, since it did not provide for judicial review of a prosecutor’s decision ordering exhumation. 28. As a result of the decision to refer a legal question, the proceedings before the Warsaw Regional Court have been suspended until the Constitutional Court issues a decision on the matter. The proceedings before the Constitutional Court are currently pending (case no. P 18/17). 29. On 24 May 2017 the applicants again urged the State Prosecutor’s Office to revoke its decision on exhumation. The prosecutor replied in the negative on 7 June 2017. 30. The Government informed the Court that the exhumation of the applicants’ husbands had initially been planned for 24 and 26 April 2018. The exhumations had been planned in line with the wishes of the families and the bodies of those victims whose families had not complained had been exhumed first. The bodies of those victims whose families had complained against the prosecutor’s decision would be exhumed at a later stage. 31. On 13 April 2018 the prosecutor issued two orders setting the dates of the exhumation of the bodies of the applicants’ husbands for 14 and 16 May 2018. The prosecutor stated that those orders were being issued in execution of the decision of 7 October 2016. The reasoning was limited to a brief reference to the ongoing investigation and the decision of 7 October 2016. 32. The applicants lodged interlocutory appeals against the orders of 13 April 2018. On 27 April and 7 May 2018 the prosecutor refused to examine the applicants’ interlocutory appeals on the grounds that they were inadmissible in law. 33. On 7, 8 and 9 May 2018 the applicants lodged interlocutory appeals with the Warsaw Regional Court against the prosecutor’s decision refusing to examine their appeals. They argued that the prosecutor’s decision violated various provisions of the CCP and the Constitution, as well as Articles 3, 8 and 13 of the Convention. 34. The Government submitted that in accordance with the code of conduct adopted by the investigative team of the State Prosecutor’s Office, the prosecutors in charge of the investigation had taken steps to arrange a meeting with the applicants and their lawyers in order to explain the reasons for the intended investigative actions, to clarify the aim of the autopsies and to elucidate other important issues, such as the families’ participation in the investigative actions and the issue of reburial. 35. On 19 April 2018 the second applicant’s lawyer informed the State Prosecutor’s Office that his client would not take part in the proposed meeting with the prosecutors because she opposed the exhumation. The lawyer communicated with the prosecutors on all aspects of the planned exhumation. 36. On 24 April 2018 the first applicant and her lawyer participated in a meeting with the prosecutors responsible for the investigation. The participants discussed the organisational aspects of the exhumation. 37. The exhumation of the remains of Mr Arkadiusz Rybicki, the husband of the second applicant, was carried out on 14 May 2018. According to reports in the media, a few hundred people protested peacefully against the exhumation at the cemetery in Gdańsk. The exhumation exercise was secured by a large group of police officers. 38. The exhumation of the remains of Mr Leszek Solski, the husband of the first applicant, took place on 16 May 2018. 39. The investigation is pending. 40. On 3 November 2016 the applicants sought an injunction in the civil courts to prevent the prosecutor from carrying out the exhumation of their husbands’ remains. They argued that it would interfere with their personal right to respect for the memory of their late relatives. 41. On 10 November 2016 the Warsaw Regional Court refused to grant an injunction. It held that the applicants had demonstrated that the planned exhumations would interfere with their personal rights, namely their right to respect for the memory of their deceased close relatives. The exhumation, the examination of the corpses and a second burial would interfere with that right. However, the Regional Court found that the applicants had failed to demonstrate that the intended interference with their personal rights would be unlawful and therefore dismissed their application. Pursuant to Article 209 § 1 and Article 210 of the CCP, a prosecutor was competent to order the exhumation of bodies in the context of an investigation in which the deaths were being treated as suspicious. The legislature had decided that irrespective of the will and consent of the family, the prosecutor had a duty to order that an autopsy be carried out in every case of suspicious death and, if the corpse had been buried, also to order its exhumation. The legislature had given priority in this context to the investigation of serious crimes and punishment of the perpetrators over the protection of the right to respect for the memory of deceased family members. 42. On 5 December 2016 the Warsaw Court of Appeal dismissed an interlocutory appeal lodged by the applicants and upheld the Regional Court’s findings. The Court of Appeal noted that its decision could not have been altered by the applicants’ argument about the unconstitutionality of Article 209 § 1 and Article 210 of the CCP because the prosecutor’s decision ordering exhumation was not amenable to appeal. It found that even if those provisions were eventually found to be unconstitutional, that would not render the prosecutor’s decision unlawful.

5. The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Batumi. 6. He was a judge at the Khulo District Court. On 12 November 2004 the Supreme Council of Justice initiated disciplinary proceedings against him on the grounds set out in section 2(2)-(a) Act of 22 February 2000 on Disciplinary Proceedings against Judges of Ordinary Courts (hereinafter, “the Disciplinary Proceedings Act” – see paragraphs 16 and 17 below). He was accused in particular of having kept a defendant in a criminal case under his consideration in unlawful detention for the period of fourteen days in September 2004, which fact was qualified as a “manifest breach of the law” within the meaning of the above-mentioned provision of the Disciplinary Proceedings Act. 7. On 18 November 2004 a Panel of the Disciplinary Council of Judges (hereinafter, “the Panel”), composed of Mr K.K. (the President of the Panel and rapporteur), Mr G.Ch., Mr D.S. and Mr I.K., considered the case at an oral hearing. According to the transcript of the hearing, the applicant admitted to the act he had been accused of. After examining the circumstances of the case, the Panel found the applicant guilty of the misconduct in question. Describing the mistake at issue as unacceptable, the Panel decided, despite his lack of prior disciplinary sanctions and his good professional reputation, to remove the applicant from judicial office. 8. The applicant lodged an appeal with the Disciplinary Council of Judges (hereinafter, “the Disciplinary Council”) on points of fact and law. He questioned the assessment of the circumstances of the case and the application of the legal provisions to the established facts in the decision of 18 November 2004. 9. By a decision of 27 January 2005, the Disciplinary Council unanimously upheld the Panel’s decision of 18 November 2004 in its entirety. 10. The applicant appealed on points of law to the Supreme Court of Georgia. In a judgment of 11 July 2005, the Supreme Court quashed the Disciplinary Council’s decision of 27 January 2005 for lack of reasoning and legal assessment of the facts, and remitted the case for re-examination. 11. On 4 August 2005 the Disciplinary Council, composed of six members, including three members, Mr K.K. (President and rapporteur), Mr G.Ch., Mr I.K, who had sat at the first hearing, re-considered the applicant’s case; another member of the Disciplinary Council who participated in the examination of the applicant’s case was Ms N.K. During the oral hearing, the applicant challenged the above-mentioned three members of the bench – Mr K.K., Mr G.Ch. and Mr I.K – on the ground that they had considered his case when it had come before the Panel on 18 November 2004. The request was dismissed. 12. After re-considering all the factual circumstances of the case, the Disciplinary Council found, in its decision of 4 August 2005, that the applicant had committed “a manifest breach of the law” and upheld the Panel’s decision of 18 November 2004 in its entirety. 13. In his appeal on points of law, the applicant complained that Mr K.K. had presided over all of the benches of both the Disciplinary Council and the Panel, and three of the members sitting on the Disciplinary Council when it ruled on 4 August 2005 had already dealt with the case at first instance on 18 November 2004. He also complained about his request for their withdrawal being rejected. Finally, the applicant criticised the haste with which the case had been considered by the Disciplinary Council. 14. On 14 November 2005 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law, finding that the case had been objectively and exhaustively examined by the disciplinary bodies and that the punishment imposed had been appropriate. As for the rest, noting that the Disciplinary Proceedings Act had instituted a system whereby members of the disciplinary panel could also sit on the Disciplinary Council, the Supreme Court concluded that the composition of the benches complained of by the applicant had been perfectly legal. Moreover, in the court’s opinion, the fact that the persons concerned had previously participated in the examination of the case was not in itself sufficient to prove that the Disciplinary Council, in its ruling on 4 August 2005, had not been impartial. 15. According to the materials available in the case file, the applicant did not voice, even in remote terms, either before the Panel, the Disciplinary Council or the Supreme Court any complaint about the lack of professional qualifications by any of the individual members of the Disciplinary Council who had participated in the examination of his case.

5. The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Poltava. 6. On 18 April 2003 the applicant’s employer, Grebinkivska District State Administration (“the Administration”), received a statement from the Grebinkivskyy District prosecutor’s office dated 17 April 2003 (“the prosecutor’s statement”). The document analysed the amount of preventive social work performed by the applicant in connection with minors in 2002 and concluded that the applicant, as the head of the juvenile service department of the Administration, had no knowledge of the relevant law and displayed an irresponsible attitude towards her professional duties. The document contained a demand that the applicant be disciplined. 7. On 21 April 2003 the Administration examined the prosecutor’s statement and decided to give the applicant a warning against the use of excessive formalism in her work. On 14 May 2003 the Administration informed the prosecutor’s office of the actions taken in consequence of their consideration of the prosecutor’s statement. 8. On 10 April 2004 the applicant brought civil defamation proceedings against the Grebinkivskyy District prosecutor’s office, Prosecutor Mr B., the Poltava Region prosecutor’s office and the State Treasury of Ukraine, alleging that the prosecutor’s statement contained untrue information relating to her professional activity and that this negative evaluation of her attitude to work had damaged her honour, dignity and professional reputation. She asked the court to order the Grebinkivskyy District prosecutor’s office to retract the prosecutor’s statement and to pay her compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 9. On 8 December 2005 the Pyryatynskyy District Court of Poltava Region applied defamation law as contained in the Civil Code of 2003, the Prosecutor’s Office Act and the Information Act. It considered the case on its merits and allowed the applicant’s claim in part. 10. On 17 July 2006 the Poltava Regional Court of Appeal did not challenge the approach of the first-instance court in considering the case under civil law defamation provisions. However, it disagreed with the application of the Civil Code of 2003 and applied the old Civil Code of 1963. It partly allowed the claim and increased the level of compensation awarded to the applicant for non-pecuniary damage. 11. On 20 September 2006 the State Treasury of Ukraine appealed against the decision to the Supreme Court. 12. On 6 February 2008 the Supreme Court of Ukraine quashed the above decision of 17 July 2006 and closed the proceedings, finding that the case should not have been examined in civil proceedings. The court indicated that the prosecutor’s statement should have been contested either before a superior prosecutor (in accordance with section 22 of the Prosecutor’s Act) or before “a court”. The Supreme Court also ruled that, according to paragraph 4 of Resolution no. 7 of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of Ukraine dated 28 September 1990, entitled “on the application of legislation by the courts regulating defence of honour, dignity and reputation of citizens and organisations” (“the Resolution”), it was not possible to file a civil defamation claim in respect of statements contained in courts’ decisions or decisions of various investigative bodies.

5. Following judicial proceedings which ended with a final judgment of the Bălţi Court of Appeal of 8 December 2009, the applicant company obtained a final ruling obliging the Cadastral Authority to register immovable property privatised by it in 1999 and in 2004 in its name. 6. On an unspecified date the defendant in the proceedings lodged a request for a review of the judgment of 8 December 2009, seeking its annulment on the grounds that in a technical report dated 25 May 2009 it had been stated that the immovable property in question did not qualify as immovable property (“the review request”). 7. On 24 August 2010 the Bălţi Court of Appeal dismissed the review request on the grounds that the information contained in the technical report of 25 May 2009 did not qualify as new and relevant information which could not have been obtained before the delivery of the final judgment in the case. 8. On 22 December 2010 the Supreme Court quashed the above judgment and ordered a re-examination of the review request. 9. On 16 November 2011 the Chişinău Court of Appeal re-examined the review request and allowed it. The court relied on grounds other than those relied upon by the defendant in framing the request. In particular, the court relied on a Government decision from 2005, in accordance with which the disputed goods had been transferred to the defendant’s control. The court quashed the final judgment of 8 December 2009 and ordered a fresh examination of the case. 10. On 16 August 2012, after examining the merits of the case, the Edineţ District Court again found in favour of the applicant company and required the Cadastral Authority to register some of the immovable property privatised by the applicant company in 1999 and in 2004 in its name. The Cadastral Authority challenged that judgment by lodging an appeal and the proceedings are still pending.

5. The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Thessaloniki. He is a taxi driver by profession. 6. In December 2007 the applicant published an article in a local newspaper, Chortiatis 570. The article’s title was “The ludicrousness of power” and stated, inter alia, the following: “It is known to more or less all of us how some people, fellow citizens or neighbours, especially the latter, act when they think that interests of any kind which they have had ‘since the beginning of time’ are affected ... when these same people get involved in politics and take up a little post, owing to there being a lack of other interested people who are all too often more capable. Because those people will serve petty political – but mostly their own personal – interests much more readily in order to impose themselves more easily than others, others whose vote they wormed out by making many promises ... Those are the totally (un)worthy, squeaky clean people in proper clothes every Sunday ... Those who, when placed in paid positions in charge of local executive bodies, and especially in the local municipality of Filyro, are the same people who consider that their land has suddenly become bigger, and claim a little of the public space between their land and the street. In this space, which they consider to belong to their yard, they plant trees, as if they suddenly have a mania for saving the environment ... they construct their buildings (in our case, a gazebo with a tiled roof) a little further from the limits of their land, saying with impudence that it is not they who are to blame for this, but ‘the bad Albanian’ to whom they assigned [the building work]. So, in order to hinder any ‘reckless’ neighbours or other visitors who [have] the audacity to park their cars in the area between the limits of their land and the street, that is to say in the remaining public space, they put TREES-OBSTACLES. Because they care about any accidents that may happen – not, of course, owing to someone’s choosing to walk or park his or her car there, but owing to the fact that the height of this construction, which accidently (as they claim) juts out of their land, is such that any unsuspecting person runs the risk of getting head injuries when he or she steps out of his or her car ... As they are bailiffs, like spies, they also find out the names of the people who come into the PAVLIDIS area in PHILYRO in order to work, from the number plates of the cars. [These people] find themselves faced with criminal complaints, because they dare to park where all the others park ...” 7. The head of the local council, E.P., filed a criminal complaint against the applicant for slanderous defamation via the press. 8. On 24 September 2008 the three-member first-instance criminal court of Thessaloniki (Τριμελές Πλημμελειοδικείο) held a hearing in the case. The applicant argued that, under Article 367 of the Criminal Code, his act had not been wrongful, as what he had written in the published text was true. Furthermore, relying on Article 367 § 1 of the Criminal Code, he argued that he had written this with a legitimate interest in the case, which was his belief that E.P. had used her position as an elected member of the local council in order to plant trees and construct a pavement in front of her house without permission. The court held that the complainant could be identified from the content of the article, and found the applicant guilty of slanderous defamation via the press. It sentenced him to a six-month suspended prison sentence (decision no. 6484/2008). The applicant appealed against that decision. 9. On 28 May 2009 the three-member Thessaloniki Court of Appeal (Τριμελές Εφετείο – hereinafter “the Court of Appeal”) changed the charges from slanderous defamation to insult (εξύβριση), and found the applicant guilty of insult via the press. It sentenced him to a four-month suspended prison sentence (decision no. 2830/2009). The applicant appealed on points of law on grounds including, inter alia, a lack of sufficient reasoning as to the rejection of his argument under Article 367 of the Criminal Code, which he had repeated in the Court of Appeal. 10. On 5 May 2010 the Court of Cassation (Άρειος Πάγος) quashed the judgment which had been appealed against, on the grounds of a lack of reasoning, and remitted the case to the Court of Appeal (decision no. 905/2010). 11. On 13 July 2010 the Court of Appeal held a new hearing in the case. The applicant argued again that his act had not been wrongful, as what he had written in the published article was true, and he had written with a legitimate interest in the matter. The Appeal Court rejected the applicant’s argument and held the following: “... Considering the above-mentioned content of the article and the then ongoing dispute between the parties and especially their personal confrontation at the City Council, it is at the outset clear and without a doubt that the references (facts and characterisations) solely and exclusively concern the complainant. Furthermore, from the impugned article it is apparent that in it the following facts are included: that the complainant 1) had built a gazebo with a tiled roof on her land and that a part of the roof jutted out onto the street; 2) had built a pavement and had planted trees in a public space; 3) threatened to sue persons (who were proven to be the drivers of the defendant) who dared to park in a place where other residents also parked their cars. It is also apparent that these facts are accompanied by adverse judgments against her and that those facts are connected to her in her capacity as head of the local council, that is to say that her above-mentioned actions had taken place arbitrarily and in abuse of her position at Chortiatis Municipality. It was proved that the above-mentioned facts which the defendant disseminated to others via the local press were true, as the complainant admitted ... It was also proved that a) the above-mentioned facts that the defendant disseminated in the above-mentioned way could harm, seen objectively, the honour and reputation of the complainant, also in view of her aforementioned capacity in conjunction with the fact that the dissemination took place via the local press and became known to an indefinite number of people; b) the defendant knew that the disseminated facts were capable of harming the honour or reputation of the complainant, and c) the defendant wanted to make such a dissemination harming her honour and reputation. It follows that, in the present case, the above-mentioned elements objectively and subjectively constitute the criminal act of simple defamation (Article 362 of the Criminal Code) which, however, goes without punishment, under Article 366 § 1 (a) of the Criminal Code. Nevertheless, taking into account the way the above-mentioned defamation was expressed, and in the circumstances which were previously detailed, the court concludes that there was an intention to insult, and for this reason the defendant must be punished for this act. In particular, the court bases its conclusion on the fact that the applicant presented the above-mentioned true facts along with unacceptable value judgments and references to the complainant’s public post, such as, ‘Because those people will serve petty political – but mostly their own personal – interests much more readily in order to impose themselves more easily than others, others whose vote they wormed out by making many promises’, and unfamiliar characterisations such as, ‘Those are the totally (un)worthy, squeaky clean people in proper clothes every Sunday’, or, ‘As they are bailiffs, like spies, they also find out the names of the people from the number plates of the cars’. Lastly, the defendant’s separate argument that he committed this act with a legitimate interest must be dismissed as unfounded, as the above-mentioned expressions included in the article ‘The ludicrousness of power’, which the defendant published in the newspaper Chortiatis 570, indicate that he intended to insult the complainant. These phrases were not necessary in this case for the expression of the defendant’s desire to protect the legitimate interest upon which he relied, and he could have used other phrases such as: ‘they try to serve their [own] personal interests’ instead of, ‘Because those people will serve petty political – but mostly their own personal – interests much more readily in order to impose themselves more easily than others, others whose vote they wormed out by making many promises’; or the phrase, ‘the elected public persons’ instead of, ‘Those are the totally (un)worthy, squeaky clean people in proper clothes every Sunday’; as well as the expression, ‘as bailiffs, they know how to find other people’s data’, instead of, ‘As they are bailiffs, like spies, they also find out the names of the people from the number plates of the cars’ ...” 12. Based on the above, the Court of Appeal found the applicant guilty of insult via the press and sentenced him to a two-month suspended prison sentence (judgment no. 2712/2010). The applicant appealed on points of law. 13. On 23 February 2011 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law (decision no. 351/2011). The court held that the judgment of the Court of Appeal had included sufficient reasoning. In addition, it had been correct to dismiss the applicant’s argument that he had acted with a legitimate interest as it had held that the applicant had intended to insult E.P and that he had used expressions which had not been necessary for defending his alleged legitimate interest, adding at the same time which expressions could have been used instead. The decision was finalised (καθαρογραφή) on 24 March 2011. 14. In addition, in 2008 E.P. lodged a civil action for damages against the applicant. The Thessaloniki multi-member First-Instance Court by its judgment no. 697/2011 ordered the applicant to pay 5,000 euros (EUR) to E.P. Following the applicant’s appeal, the Thessaloniki Court of Appeal ordered the applicant to pay EUR 2,500 (judgment no. 119/2014). The judgment became final and the applicant paid to E.P. EUR 2,500 and EUR 1,913.77 in interest.

4. The applicants were born in 1937, 1934 and 1941 respectively. The first and third applicants live in Sofia. 5. The applicants’ fathers owned printing houses in Sofia, which were nationalised by the Communist authorities in 1949 and 1950. After that their assets were taken over by a State-owned printing house. In 1991 the latter was registered as a State-owned company, currently named ‘Obrazovanie i nauka’ EAD. The company is managed by the Minister of Education. Among the tasks of the company is the printing of school textbooks. 6. In 1997 Parliament adopted the Compensation of Owners of Nationalised Real Property Act (hereinafter “the Compensation Act” – see paragraph 23 below). 7. In March 1998 the first and second applicants and their mother applied under the Compensation Act to receive compensation for the nationalised printing house. As to the manner of compensation, they expressed preference to receive shares in ‘Obrazovanie i nauka’ EAD. In a decision of 14 June 1999 the Minister of Education allowed their request, stating that the exact number of shares to be awarded would be determined after a valuation of the assets of the former printing house. 8. Despite that, in another decision dated 3 July 2000 the Minister rejected the request for compensation. That decision was quashed by the Supreme Administrative Court in a final judgment of 24 June 2002, on the ground that it impermissibly modified the previous one, which had become final. 9. After that an expert prepared a valuation of the nationalised property, which was confirmed by the Minister of Education on 5 June 2003. It stated that the first and second applicants and their mother were entitled to compensation for 57,932 Bulgarian levs (BGN, equivalent of 29,630 euros (EUR)), which equalled 579 shares in ‘Obrazovanie i nauka’ EAD, each with a face value of BGN 100 (EUR 51). 10. However, on 26 August 2003 the Minister adopted another decision, stating that the applicants and their mother were to receive compensation bonds instead of shares. He relied in particular on the fact that ‘Obrazovanie i nauka’ EAD had been included in the list under section 11 of the concluding provisions of the Privatisation and Post-Privatisation Control Act 2002 (hereinafter “the Privatisation Act” – see paragraph 24 below). Once again, that decision was quashed by the Supreme Administrative Court, in a final judgment of 18 October 2004, as it impermissibly modified the previous decisions awarding the first and second applicants and their mother compensation in the form of shares, which had become final. The domestic court held in particular that section 11 of the concluding provisions mentioned above could not justify such a modification. 11. In 2006 the first and second applicants and their mother filed with the Minister of Education and other State bodies several complaints, requesting that the compensation procedure be completed. In a letter dated 7 April 2006 the Council of Ministers (Government) informed them that the Ministry of Education was seeking “a lawful solution”, which “would not infringe upon the public interest and would not be in breach of the [Privatisation Act]”. In another letter dated 30 August 2006 the parliamentary Committee on Petitions informed the applicants and their mother that it had urged the Minister of Education to find a solution, pointing out that with the enactment of the Compensation Act Parliament had sought “to restore historical justice”. 12. The first and second applicants’ mother passed away in 2007 and was succeeded by them. 13. In August 1998 the third applicant, her mother and her sister applied under the Compensation Act to receive compensation for the nationalised printing house. They stated that they preferred to receive shares in ‘Obrazovanie i nauka’ EAD. 14. Their request was allowed by the Minister of Education in a decision of 22 December 1998. 15. In 1999, 2001 and 2003 an expert drew up three valuations of the expropriated property. The last of them, stating that the third applicant, her mother and her sister were entitled to compensation for BGN 26,309 (the equivalent of EUR 13,460), equalling 263 shares in ‘Obrazovanie i nauka’ EAD, each with a face value of BGN 100, was confirmed by the Minister of Education on 6 June 2003. 16. Despite the above developments, in another decision dated 26 August 2003 the Minister stated that the third applicant, her mother and her sister were to receive compensation bonds instead of shares. As in the procedure described above concerning the first and second applicants, he relied on the fact that the company had been included in the list under section 11 of the concluding provisions of the Privatisation Act (see paragraph 24 below). That decision was quashed by the Supreme Administrative Court in a final judgment of 31 March 2004, on the ground that it impermissibly modified the previous decisions concerning the compensation to be provided, which had become final. The domestic court again held that section 11 of the concluding provisions mentioned above could not justify such a modification, as it was not applicable to pending compensation proceedings. 17. The third applicant’s mother and sister passed away in 2006 and 2004 respectively, leaving the third applicant her father’s only surviving heir. 18. In 2007 the Ministry of Education requested the Privatisation Agency to authorise the transfer to private parties of shares in ‘Obrazovanie i nauka’ EAD. The authorisation, related to the claims of all applicants, was given on 23 April 2008. 19. The Ministry took no further measures to complete the compensation procedures. 20. In 2011 the third applicant wrote a letter to the executive director of ‘Obrazovanie i nauka’ EAD, urging him to enter into the company register her shareholding and to present to her copies of all decisions taken by the company’s general meeting after 2003. She received no response. 21. In a decision of 5 March 2013 the Council of Ministers authorised the sale by ‘Obrazovanie i nauka’ EAD of real properties owned by the company (such an authorisation was required by law). The applicants applied for the judicial review of that decision, arguing that it affected their rights as shareholders. In a judgment of 27 January 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed their application, noting that they were not shareholders in the company, since the compensation procedures had not been completed with the actual transfer of shares to them in accordance with the law.

5. The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Adana. 6. On 16 February 2006 a gathering was held in Adana on the anniversary of the arrest of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party), an illegal armed organisation. The protesters gathered in front of the building of the Adana branch of the Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi) (DTP), where a press statement was read out. Being a member of the DTP, the applicant participated in the gathering. 7. Subsequently, clashes occurred between police officers and some demonstrators who were attempting to block the traffic. According to police reports, two police officers were injured as a result of objects thrown from the DTP building. The police then entered the DTP building and arrested 223 people, including the applicant. The next day, the applicant was detained on remand. 8. On 10 March 2006 the Adana public prosecutor charged the applicant and sixteen other people with membership of the PKK under Articles 220 § 6 and 314 of the Criminal Code. The prosecutor alleged that the accused had participated in the public gathering in question in response to calls made by the PKK and had resisted the police officers, and that they had therefore acted on behalf of the PKK. 9. On 5 May 2006 the applicant was released pending trial. 10. On 10 September 2008 the Adana Assize Court convicted the applicant under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713). The assize court did not find it established that the applicant had attended the reading out of the press statement in response to calls made by the PKK or that she had injured any police officers. It therefore concluded that the applicant could not be convicted of membership of the PKK or resistance to the police. The court nonetheless considered that on 16 February 2006 the applicant had gone to the DTP building with a view to disseminating propaganda in support of the PKK and that she should therefore be convicted under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713. The applicant was sentenced to ten months’ imprisonment. 11. Taking into account the applicant’s good behaviour during the trial and the absence of any previous criminal record, the court suspended the pronouncement of her conviction on condition that she did not commit another intentional offence for a period of five years, under Article 231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hükmün açıklanmasının geri bırakılması). 12. On 20 November 2008 the court dismissed an objection lodged by the applicant against the above-mentioned decision. The final decision was served on the applicant on 9 January 2009.

5. The applicant was born in 1982 and is currently detained in Bostadel Prison, in Menzingen. 6. In a judgment of 27 May 2005 the Criminal Court of the Canton of Basle Urban (“the Criminal Court”) found the applicant guilty, on account of acts committed between 2000 and 2004, of robbery, endangering life, assault with a dangerous object causing multiple bodily injuries, multiple acts of coercion, multiple offences of receiving stolen goods, and offences under federal legislation on drugs, road traffic and weapons. The Criminal Court sentenced him to eight years’ imprisonment, after deducting periods spent in pre-trial detention from 22 May to 25 June 2003 and from 3 May 2004 until the delivery of the judgment. In addition, the Criminal Court declared enforceable a twelve-month custodial sentence that had been suspended when handed down on 2 May 2001, for theft and attempted coercion. On 19 July 2005 the applicant was transferred to Bostadel Prison. 7. In a judgment of 12 January 2007 the Court of Appeal of the Canton of Basle Urban (“the Court of Appeal”) dismissed an appeal by the applicant, essentially upholding the first-instance judgment. In a judgment of 12 May 2007 the Federal Court dismissed a subsequent appeal by the applicant. 8. In a letter dated 4 July 2007, addressed to the intercantonal commission for the assessment of the dangerousness of offenders in the Cantons of Solothurn, Basle Urban and Basle Rural (“the intercantonal commission”), the applicant asked for the conditions of his sentence to be relaxed. The intercantonal commission submitted its report on 29 October 2007. It found that it was premature to grant any adjustments other than the opportunity to work in an outside environment, on the grounds that the applicant, who did not have a mental illness or a personality disorder, had not shown willingness to “come to terms with his criminal past”. The intercantonal commission thus concluded that the applicant was to be regarded as a danger to the public. It recommended an expert psychiatric assessment and vocational guidance measures, and acknowledged that the applicant could work in an outside environment but could not be granted any other adjustments of the conditions of his sentence, such as being able to spend the holidays with his father. 9. Acting on instructions from the Department of Justice of the Canton of Basle Urban, Dr R.A., a psychiatrist and psychotherapist, issued a psychiatric opinion on 24 September 2008 after examining the applicant in person, and diagnosed him as having moderate paranoid and narcissistic personality disorders (World Health Organization International Classification of Diseases – ICD-10), with full criminal responsibility. Dr R.A. found that these disorders had already been present at the time when the offences had been committed. He also noted that the applicant was not prepared to engage in self-reflection and to change his attitude, meaning that there would generally be a high risk of reoffending, and concluded that the prognosis was highly unfavourable. 10. On 15 October 2008 the governor of Bostadel Prison drew up a progress report on the applicant’s detention, in which he noted that there was a high risk that the applicant might escape and accordingly proposed that he be employed within the prison premises. 11. In a report dated 10 November 2008 the intercantonal commission found that the applicant represented a danger to the public, and recommended that no adjustments to the conditions of his sentence be ordered and that the appropriate court be asked to review whether the conditions for an (outpatient) therapeutic measure in conjunction with the sentence (vollzugsbegleitende therapeutische Massnahme) were satisfied (Article 63 of the Criminal Code). The intercantonal commission also recommended that should such a measure prove unsuccessful, consideration be given to converting the sentence into indefinite detention. 12. On 30 December 2008 the Department of Justice of the Canton of Basle Urban asked the Court of Appeal to ascertain whether, following its judgment of 12 January 2007, the conditions for ordering a therapeutic measure were satisfied. On 9 June 2009 the governor of Bostadel Prison issued a progress report on the applicant’s detention, in which he noted in particular that the applicant had refused any psychotherapy. In a judgment of 4 December 2009 the Court of Appeal held that there was no legal basis justifying a subsequent order for an outpatient therapeutic measure, but wondered whether it might be advisable to order institutional measures. To clarify this possibility, it proposed that an additional expert report be drawn up. 13. In a report dated 5 January 2010 the governor of Bostadel Prison noted in particular that the applicant had displayed good behaviour while working in an outside environment and that release on parole could therefore be envisaged, even if only for a limited period. 14. On 30 June 2010, in an additional report to the expert report of 24 September 2008, after examining the applicant in person, Professor A.E., a psychiatrist and psychotherapist, concluded that it was unlikely that an institutional therapeutic measure would serve any useful purpose, given that the applicant was not showing any motivation to change his attitude towards the offences he had committed and was incapable of developing empathy. She added that the applicant was not especially overawed, in emotional terms, by the sentence he was serving. However, she did not rule out all possibility of treatment, referring to some more promising therapeutic approaches. 15. On 7 July 2010, referring to the above-mentioned additional psychiatric report, the post-sentencing authority of the Canton of Basle Urban (“the post-sentencing authority”) asked the Court of Appeal to review whether, following its judgment of 12 January 2007, the conditions for ordering subsequent indefinite detention, or possibly an institutional therapeutic measure, were satisfied (Articles 64 and 59 of the Criminal Code respectively, taken together with Article 65; see paragraph 24 below). In submissions of 20 September 2010 the applicant asked the Court of Appeal to find that this was not the case. 16. On 17 December 2010 the governor and the sentence supervision officer of Bostadel Prison produced a report on the progress of the applicant’s detention, in which they noted that there was no obstacle to a gradual relaxation of the conditions of his sentence until his release on parole. In a letter dated 21 April 2011 to the Court of Appeal, they confirmed their findings of 17 December 2010. 17. In a judgment of 6 May 2011, after hearing evidence from Professor A.E. and the applicant’s representative that day, the Court of Appeal ordered the applicant’s subsequent indefinite detention under Article 65 § 2 of the Criminal Code, in its version in force since 1 January 2007. At the hearing that day, the applicant and his lawyer had had the opportunity to put questions to A.E. 18. In a judgment of 30 January 2012 the Federal Court partly upheld an appeal by the applicant against the Court of Appeal’s judgment of 6 May 2011, finding that the conditions for ordering subsequent indefinite detention were not satisfied. It noted that indefinite detention was an exceptional measure and could only be ordered with caution. It pointed out that in view of the significant restrictions this measure entailed for the person concerned, indefinite detention should be regarded as a last resort, and this applied a fortiori where it was ordered subsequently. It added that the indefinite detention of a young person who had received no previous treatment could only be justified if it was unlikely that within a period of approximately five years, therapy would lead to a significant reduction of the risk of reoffending. In addition, the Federal Court noted that it was appropriate to consider whether an institutional therapeutic measure should be ordered. It found that it could not be ruled out that the applicant might respond favourably to psychological counselling. Accordingly, it quashed the judgment appealed against and remitted the case to the Court of Appeal for a fresh decision. 19. In a judgment of 22 August 2012 the Court of Appeal ordered an institutional therapeutic measure, in accordance with Article 65 § 1 of the Criminal Code, at the same time suspending the execution of the part of the sentence remaining to be served (“Der Restvollzug ... wird aufgeschoben ...”). Before giving judgment, the Court of Appeal had requested information from Professor A.E. In her reply dated 25 June 2012 she had affirmed, with reference to Article 59 § 3 of the Criminal Code, that in view of the type, severity and complexity of the applicant’s mental disorder, only an institutional measure was likely to meet his therapeutic needs to an adequate extent. She had also pointed out that the prisons in Thorberg (Canton of Berne) and Pöschwies (Canton of Zurich) had therapy departments (“Therapieabteilungen”) for the purposes of Article 59 § 3 of the Criminal Code and that this should be borne in mind. 20. According to the applicant, he should have completed his sentence on 19 March 2013, taking into account his pre-trial detention from 22 May to 25 June 2003 and from 3 May 2004 onwards (see paragraph 6 above). 21. In a judgment of 28 May 2013 the Federal Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant against the judgment of 22 August 2012, observing that the subsequent ordering of an institutional therapeutic measure was compatible with the Convention, from the standpoint of Articles 5 and 7 and of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7, and with federal law. More specifically, the Federal Court acknowledged that the law governing measures for offenders other than sentences (Articles 56-65 of the Criminal Code) applied retrospectively to criminal acts committed before the entry into force of the relevant law on 1 January 2007 (paragraph 2, sub-paragraph 1, of the transitional provisions of the 13 December 2002 amendment to the Criminal Code). The Federal Court left open the question of the application of the principle of non-retrospective application to institutional therapeutic measures ordered subsequently, pointing out that although such measures were to be regarded as a penalty within the meaning of Article 7 of the Convention, the fact that such a measure had been ordered subsequently in the applicant’s case had not resulted in a heavier penalty being imposed on him than the one applicable under the law in force when the criminal acts had been committed, seeing that the measures provided for under the former law (Article 43 of the Criminal Code, in force until 31 December 2006) had been at least as strict as those applicable under the new law; that being so, there had been no breach of the principle of non-retrospective application in the present case. Regarding Article 5 § 1 (a) of the Convention, the Federal Court noted that although a subsequent order for an institutional therapeutic measure was inherently at variance with the binding nature of the principal judgment, there had to be a sufficient causal link between the judgment and the measure for the subsequent detention ordered in the context of review proceedings to comply with that Convention provision. Such a link had been present in his case. With regard to the ne bis in idem principle, after noting that Article 4 § 2 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention provided for a number of exceptions to that principle, the Federal Court observed that the review conducted in the present case for the purposes of ordering a subsequent institutional therapeutic measure on the basis of the applicant’s serious mental illness, which had already been present but had not been detected at the time of the initial judgment, did not constitute a second penalty in respect of him. In response to the applicant’s argument that the expert medical opinions no longer reflected his current psychiatric condition, the Federal Court pointed out that the extremely detailed expert opinion of 24 September 2008 had been supplemented by the report of 30 June 2010 and corroborated by the expert’s oral statements at the hearing on 6 May 2011 concerning the diagnosis and the risk of reoffending. The Federal Court thus concluded that the expert opinions reflected the applicant’s current state of health. 22. Having been invited by the Court to provide information about the applicant’s current situation, the parties submitted observations on the matter. In a letter dated 26 May 2016 the applicant informed the Court that he was still in Bostadel Prison, and had been there since 19 July 2005 (see paragraph 6 above). He maintained that he was not receiving any treatment or therapy. In a letter dated 31 May 2016 the Government confirmed that the applicant was still in Bostadel Prison. They added that the prison offered programmes, in the form of therapeutic services provided by the Forensic Institute of Central Switzerland (Forensisches Institut Zentralschweiz (forio)), aimed at treating disorders such as those affecting the applicant. The Government stated that he had categorically refused to undergo any (psychiatric) treatment whatsoever and had justified his refusal by referring to the proceedings pending before the Court. Both parties appended reports by Bostadel Prison on the applicant’s behaviour. The reports indicated that his behaviour was decent and discreet, including in the context of his work assignments.

5. The first applicant, Mrs Daniela Nedescu, is married to the second applicant, Mr Călin Nedescu. They were born in 1976 and live in Bucharest. 6. In 2008 the applicants, who were childless but wanted to have children, decided to try assisted reproduction at a private clinic, the S. Clinic. It appears that the S. Clinic had previously applied to the National Transplant Agency (“the Transplant Agency”) for authorisation to function as a cell and tissue bank and user in accordance with the legal requirements, an application which was still pending completion in 2008. 7. Following an ovarian stimulation and in vitro fertilisation, seven embryos were obtained, of which three were transferred immediately to Mrs Nedescu, who became pregnant and gave birth. 8. The four remaining embryos were frozen and put in storage at the S. Clinic in November 2008 with a view to their future use by Mrs Nedescu. 9. On 15 July 2009 the procedure for obtaining the required authorisation from the Transplant Agency was completed and the S. Clinic was authorised to act as a medical centre that could function as a storage bank for genetic material. 10. On 24 July 2009, following a criminal investigation into the delivery of the above authorisation, the Directorate for the Investigation of Organised Crime and Terrorism attached to the Prosecutor General’s Office of Romania (DIICOT) closed the S. Clinic, seized all the genetic material found there, including the applicants’ embryos, and transferred it to the Mina Minovici Institute of Forensic Medicine (“the IFM”). The applicants’ embryos and those of other couples were kept in containers. Each container had different vials for each set of embryos. 11. It appears from a DIICOT report dated 9 November 2009 that the embryos of more than 240 families were seized at the S. Clinic. As with other patients of the Clinic, the applicants were neither informed of the seizure, which they learned about from the media, nor consulted about the transfer of the seized embryos from the S. Clinic to the IFM. 12. On 13 March 2010 the applicants requested that DIICOT allow them to retrieve their embryos as they wished to undergo a new assisted reproduction procedure in another clinic. They pointed out that it was of the utmost importance that they be allowed to retrieve the embryos rapidly since the storage period was to expire in August 2010 and there was a strict procedure for the transfer. 13. On 30 March 2010 DIICOT allowed the applicants to recover the embryos directly from the IFM. They had to be accompanied by an embryologist and provide a special container with liquid nitrogen. 14. On 21 July 2010 the applicants went to the IFM accompanied by an embryologist, however, they were not allowed to retrieve the embryos. They were asked instead to show that the Transplant Agency had approved the transfer. 15. The first applicant, under the supervision of a specialist doctor, therefore attempted to have a new ovarian stimulation in the hope of creating new embryos. 16. However, on 18 August 2010, while being treated for premature menopause, she underwent a medical examination which revealed that her state of health did not allow her to undergo another ovarian stimulation. 17. The applicants joined the criminal proceedings instituted against the administrative board of the S. Clinic and the doctors practising within or in cooperation with it, and sought damages under domestic tort provisions for not being able to use the embryos. In an interlocutory judgment of 29 November 2010 the applicants’ action was dismissed for lack of victim status on the grounds that the IFM’s refusal to allow them to recover the embryos had no link with the crimes allegedly committed by the accused. The applicants were directed to bring a claim for damages before a civil court. 18. The applicants therefore resumed their efforts to retrieve the embryos deposited with the IFM, but were not successful. 19. In November 2010 they brought an action before the Bucharest Court of Appeal against the Transplant Agency and the Ministry of Health, seeking to obtain the agency’s authorisation to transfer their embryos to an authorised clinic, in Romania or abroad, where Mrs Nedescu could try again to become pregnant. 20. On 12 December 2010 Mrs Nedescu had another examination, which led to the same conclusions as on 18 August 2010. 21. On 13 December 2010 the Transplant Agency informed the applicants that it refused to approve a transfer of the embryos. It stated that DIICOT had moved the embryos to the IFM unlawfully as the institute had never obtained the required permit to act as a tissue and cell bank. The provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure relied on by DIICOT had also not provided any guarantees for the safety of the embryos deposited with the IFM. 22. At a hearing on 22 March 2011 the applicants asked the Court of Appeal to order the transfer of the embryos from the IFM to a private clinic of their choice located in Sibiu, the P. Clinic, which was authorised to carry out assisted reproduction and act as a genetic material storage bank. 23. The court dismissed the applicants’ application on the same day. It relied on the provisions of section 148(4) and (5) of the Health Care Reform Act. It found that the Transplant Agency’s refusal to allow the transfer of the embryos had been lawful since neither the S. Clinic nor the IFM had been accredited or authorised to function as genetic material banks and the transfer of genetic material could only be performed between institutions authorised to function as such storage banks. 24. The applicants appealed against the judgment to the High Court of Cassation and Justice. 25. On 12 October 2011 DIICOT appointed a public hospital, the P.S. Hospital, as the new legal custodian for all the embryos, including the ones belonging to the applicants. The transfer of the embryos to the new custodian took place on 19 October 2011. According to a report drafted by the judicial authorities on that occasion, Ms A.M., the doctor from P.S. Hospital who took delivery of the embryos, drew up a disclaimer to the effect that the genetic material listed in the inventory accompanying the embryos had been received without any prior checks of the vials, that it had not been possible for her to check each individual item owing to the absence of the embryologist who had participated in the initial freezing and that the procedures in use at that time were different from those used by the first custodian. 26. On 20 December 2011 the High Court of Cassation and Justice allowed the appeal against the judgment of 22 March 2011 and ordered the Transplant Agency to implement the prosecutor’s decision to return the embryos by allowing their transfer from the IFM to an authorised clinic or hospital of the applicants’ choice in Romania or abroad. It found, firstly, that the Transplant Agency, which was organised as a structure within the Ministry of Health, had been duly informed about the investigating authorities’ decision to deposit the material seized at the S. Clinic with the IFM, and that, secondly, the Ministry of Health had signed the record drawn up at the end of the procedure for moving the embryos to the IFM, together with the investigating authorities. It held that in so far as the Transplant Agency’s task was to coordinate the activities of procuring, processing, preserving, storing, approving and distributing human tissue and cells in Romania, there had been no legal grounds for it to interfere with the implementation of the prosecutor’s decision to return the embryos to the applicants. The High Court further relied on the Government’s observations submitted to the Court in the case of Knecht v. Romania (no. 10048/10, 2 October 2012), from which it could be seen that the investigating authorities had authorised Ms Knecht to retrieve her embryos from the IFM, and that the Government’s understanding was that Ms Knecht had been lawfully entitled to arrange for their transfer to an authorised clinic. The High Court stressed that Mr and Mrs Nedescu’s embryos had been stored in the same container as those belonging to Ms Knecht. There was therefore nothing to prevent them from arranging the transfer of their embryos to an authorised clinic or hospital of their choice, in Romania or abroad. Lastly, the court granted costs and fees of 4,000 Romanian lei (RON) to the applicants. 27. On 26 March 2012 DIICOT informed the applicants that the prosecutor had appointed P.S. Hospital as the new legal custodian of their embryos. They therefore had to agree on a transfer date with that institution in order to retrieve the embryos. 28. The applicants contacted P.S. Hospital, which informed them on 27 September 2012 that they could only retrieve the embryos if they were accompanied by a representative from the Transplant Agency, an embryologist from the S. Clinic, where the embryos had been stored initially, and a DIICOT representative. 29. On 1 November 2012 P.S. Hospital informed the applicants that in order to retrieve their embryos they had to agree on a date, obtain an authorisation document from the Transplant Agency, make sure a certified specialist embryologist was present and provide a special container with liquid nitrogen from an accredited transportation company. 30. On 12 November 2012, in reply to a request from the applicants, P.S. Hospital informed them that it could not transfer the remaining embryos to Mrs Nedescu as they had only been appointed as a custodian by DIICOT. Nevertheless, the applicants could attempt to obtain new embryos at the hospital which could then be transferred to her. 31. In a letter dated 7 January 2013 to the Government Agent, a representative of P.S. Hospital reiterated that the embryos could only be retrieved after prior approval from the Transplant Agency and that an embryologist from the S. Clinic and a DIICOT representative had to be present. It also stated that they declined any responsibility for the identification, quality and viability of the frozen embryos deposited with the IFM because DIICOT had not organised any individual identification when the embryos had been transferred. The hospital could therefore only assume that the embryos belonging to the Nedescus were among those that had been transferred to it. The hospital reiterated that the IFM had no authorisation to function as a genetic material bank (for tissues and cells). Furthermore, the hospital did not only have the task of implementing DIICOT’s decision to allow the applicants to remove the embryos and ensure respect for the conditions that the removal be made in the presence of an embryologist and include the provision of a container with liquid nitrogen. It also had to comply with the relevant legislation on the removal and transfer of genetic material and with the conditions set down by the Transplant Agency in a decision of 3 June 2011, Decision no. 5. The representative also stated that the existing embryos could be transferred to the mother at the hospital but that the hospital’s own doctors would not carry out the procedure as they could not assume any responsibility owing to the quality of the embryos. However, the hospital preferred that such a transfer be performed elsewhere. 32. On 16 January 2013 the applicants applied to DIICOT to be appointed custodians of their own embryos. They indicated that they were able to bear the costs of becoming custodians. A DIICOT prosecutor informed the applicant’s lawyer by telephone that the application had been rejected. In a letter dated 18 April 2013 to the Government’s Agent, a DIICOT chief prosecutor stated that the cost of appointing the applicants as custodians was very high and that the judicial bodies involved had no competence to make such a decision. In any event, “no formula allowing for consensus among all the parties involved has so far been identified”. 33. Following the criminal investigation of the S. Clinic (see paragraph 10 above), the High Court of Cassation on 21 October 2014 found its managers, owner and the then director of the Transplant Agency guilty of association for the purposes of creating a criminal group. It handed down various prison sentences.

5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6. The first and second applicants’ son was killed in a traffic accident on 17 July 2010 in which the fourth applicant sustained serious injuries. The third applicant is the fourth applicant’s mother. 7. The applicants joined the criminal proceedings concerning the accident as victims. 8. On 9 and 10 December 2010 the applicants lodged a civil action within the criminal proceedings against the suspect, J., claiming compensation for non-pecuniary damage and reimbursement of the legal costs incurred in the criminal proceedings. 9. On 28 January 2011 the applicants, represented by lawyers of their own choice, concluded an out-of-court settlement with J. (hereinafter “out-of-court settlement agreement”). They informed the prosecutor that they had agreed that the case would be settled (kokkuleppemenetlus). J. informed the prosecutor that he had paid the compensation to the applicants as laid down in the out-of-court settlement agreement. 10. On 4 February 2011 the applicants’ consent to the application of the settlement procedure was recorded in a report signed by the prosecutor and the applicants’ representatives. The report stated that the applicants had been informed of their rights under the settlement procedure and set out the consequences of applying the settlement procedure. In a section entitled “Remarks”, it was noted that the applicants had given up their claims in respect of non-pecuniary damage against J. (as lodged on 9 and 10 December 2010), but had not given up their claim for reimbursement of the legal costs incurred in the criminal proceedings. The report also stated that the victims had no right to withdraw their consent to the settlement procedure. At that time, the applicants had submitted neither an itemised list of legal costs nor any supporting documents. 11. On 11 February 2011 J. gave his consent to the application of the settlement procedure. The prosecutor, J. and the latter’s counsel signed a settlement agreement in which they agreed, inter alia, on the type and extent of the damage caused. The agreement stated that the victims had withdrawn the civil claims they had lodged within the criminal proceedings. 12. On 14 February 2011 the Harju County Court committed J. for trial and scheduled a hearing for 7 March 2011. J., his counsel and the prosecutor were summoned to appear at the court hearing. The applicants, however, were not summoned. 13. On 4 March 2011 the applicants lodged a claim for legal costs in the amount of 6,483.66 euros (EUR) and submitted supporting documents. The Harju County Court received their submission on 7 March 2011. 14. J., his counsel and the prosecutor attended the hearing held before the Harju County Court as scheduled. According to the court record, the trial judge disclosed the applicants’ claim for reimbursement of their legal costs. J. asked the court not to examine the claim as it had been absorbed by the out-of-court settlement agreement. The applicants alleged that they had not been allowed to address the court notwithstanding their presence in the court building. 15. In a judgment of the same date, the Harju County Court convicted J. of violating traffic and driving regulations and sentenced him to a suspended prison term. It also withdrew J.’s driving licence and ordered him to pay the State Treasury expenses consisting of compensation levies (sundraha) and the cost of expert assessments. It held that the victims had given up the civil claims they had lodged within the framework of the criminal proceedings. The judgment made no reference to the applicants’ claim for reimbursement of the legal costs incurred in the criminal proceedings. 16. The applicants lodged an appeal against that judgment. They complained that they had not been allowed to attend the court hearing of 7 March 2011 and that the court had left their claim for reimbursement of the legal costs undecided. 17. On 23 March 2011 the Harju County Court refused to examine the appeal. Relying on Articles 246 and 318 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCrP; Kriminaalmenetluse seadustik), the court found that the applicants had not been parties to the court proceedings and did not, therefore, have the right to appeal (see paragraph 29 below). 18. The applicants appealed against the County Court’s decision, insisting that they had been parties to the proceedings and had the right to appeal. 19. At a public hearing on 5 April 2011 the Tallinn Court of Appeal examined the appeal in the presence of J. and his counsel, the prosecutor and the applicants’ counsel. At the hearing, the prosecutor firstly noted that the applicants had not submitted any documents concerning their claim for legal costs, despite the fact that they had had a week after the settlement to do so. According to the report of the hearing, the prosecutor later noted that those documents could have been submitted when the applicants had signed the report (see paragraph 10 above) or a few days later. The report stated that J. had wanted to submit the out-of-court settlement agreement to the judge in order to prove that it covered all the relevant damages. However, the Court of Appeal had refused, considering that it did not concern the subject matter of the dispute before the court in those proceedings. 20. By a decision of 13 April 2011, the Tallinn Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants’ appeal and upheld the Harju County Court’s decision of 23 March 2011. It referred to Article 243 of the CCrP, under which the victim was not entitled to revoke his or her consent to the application of the settlement procedure, and to Article 246 of the Code, which provided that the victim did not have to be summoned to a court hearing in settlement proceedings (see paragraphs 28 and 29 below). The Court of Appeal concluded that the applicants, as victims, had not been parties to such court proceedings and that, accordingly, they had no right to appeal against the County Court’s judgment. 21. Although the Court of Appeal’s decision stated that it was final and not amenable to appeal, the applicants’ counsel nevertheless challenged it before the Supreme Court. 22. By a decision of 3 October 2011 in case no. 3-1-1-60-11 the Supreme Court refused to examine the appeal on points of law because the Court of Appeal’s decision had been final and not amenable to appeal. It nevertheless stated that according to the established case-law, in settlement proceedings the court should not limit itself to merely analysing the settlement reached. It must also verify whether there were still questions that should be addressed in the subsequent judgment, but which had not been included in the settlement agreement. The court noted that according to Article 245 of the CCrP, the settlement agreement did not necessarily have to address matters dealing with the costs of criminal procedure or cover the extent of granting the civil claim or of compensating for the damage caused by the criminal offence. However, referring to Article 306 §§ 11, 13 and 14 of the CCrP and Article 248 § 1 (3) of the CCrP, the Supreme Court considered that those matters should not be overlooked by the court concerned (see paragraphs 30 and 31 below).

4. The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Yerevan. 5. On 16 August 2004 he was charged with fraud in Armenia and the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court in Yerevan issued an arrest warrant. 6. On 8 November 2006 the applicant was arrested in Ufa, Russia. On an unspecified date the Russian Prosecutor General received an extradition request from his Armenian counterpart. 7. On an application a district prosecutor in Ufa, on 27 December 2006 the Kirovskiy District Court in Ufa remanded the applicant in custody, without setting a time-limit for his detention. On 13 February 2007 the Supreme Court of Bashkortostan upheld the detention order on appeal. 8. On 23 March 2007 a deputy Prosecutor General granted the extradition request; on 17 July 2007 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld that decision in final instance. 9. On 24 August 2007 the applicant was extradited to Armenia where he was acquitted of all charges and released. 10. On 16 February 2008, when attempting to return to Russia, the applicant was detained by the Russian border control and held in custody until 22 February 2008. The parties did not produce a record of the applicant’s arrest or any judicial decision authorising his detention.

5. The applicant was born in 1985 and lives in Gdańsk. 6. On 9 June 2011 the Gdańsk Appellate Prosecutor’s Office opened an investigation (no. Ap V Ds 27/11) into the kidnapping of J.R. the previous day. The investigation was delegated to the Central Bureau of Investigation of the Police (“the CBI”), Gdańsk branch. The CBI is the unit of the police responsible for preventing and combatting organised crime. 7. The kidnappers had demanded a ransom of 1,000,000 euros (EUR) from J.R.’s husband. Part of the ransom was paid on 15 June 2011. It appears that the victim was freed on 16 June 2011. 8. The CBI and the prosecutor obtained evidence relating to the applicant’s phone calls and his connections to the mobile-phone network. On that basis, the police identified a number of possible suspects, including the applicant, among the friends of J.R.’s family and employees of the family company. On 16 June 2011 the prosecutor ordered that the applicant and other suspects be arrested on suspicion of kidnapping. The applicant was arrested on 16 June and released on 18 June 2011 (see paragraphs 11 and 17 below). 9. In the ensuing investigation, the police arrested the actual kidnappers. 10. On 20 April 2012 the prosecutor discontinued the investigation against the applicant and other suspects, finding that they had not committed the alleged offence. The prosecutor noted that the evidence available on 16 June 2011 had justified the decision to arrest the applicant and other suspects. 11. On 16 June 2011 at 7.40 p.m. the applicant was arrested at his friends’ flat in Tczew on suspicion of kidnapping. The arrest was carried out by the anti-terrorist police squad assisted by the CBI officers. The applicant was taken to the CBI headquarters in Gdańsk. 12. According to the police record dated 16 June 2011, the applicant had the following injuries on admission to the police detention facility in Gdynia: bruising of the left cheek and abrasions on his arms and back. 13. The following day the prosecutor charged the applicant with kidnapping and questioned him. The applicant and other suspects denied that they had been involved in the kidnapping. DNA tests had not confirmed the applicant’s and the other suspects’ involvement. 14. According to the record of arrest (protokół zatrzymania), the applicant did not ask for a medical examination. Nonetheless, the CBI arranged for him to have a medical examination at the hospital. 15. According to a medical certificate issued by the Regional Specialist Hospital in Gdańsk on 17 June 2011, the applicant complained that he had sustained injuries to his head, face and right arm during his arrest. An X-ray examination did not reveal any fractures. The certificate stated that the applicant’s general condition was good and that he could take part in the investigation. The certificate further stated that the applicant was suffering from tenderness of his left temple (tkliwość okolicy skroniowej lewej), swelling of the left side of his face with bruising (obrzęk lewej części twarzy z podbiegnięciami krwawymi), and tenderness of his right arm and wrist. The final diagnosis established bruising on his face and right wrist (stłuczenie twarzy i nadgarstka). 16. On 17 June 2011 the applicant was also examined in the health centre of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration in Gdańsk. He complained of pain in the left side of his face and the right wrist. An examination established significant swelling in the area of his left eye socket (silny obrzęk w okolicy oczodołu lewego) and minor swelling of the right wrist. 17. The applicant was released on 18 June 2011 at 10 a.m. 18. On 27 June 2011 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against the participating police officers in connection with his arrest. He alleged that he had been ill-treated during his arrest and subsequently in police custody. The applicant attached a copy of the medical examination report of 17 June 2011 and photographs documenting his injuries. 19. The applicant’s criminal complaint was transferred to the Bydgoszcz Regional Prosecutor’s Office. On 27 July 2011 the Bydgoszcz Regional Prosecutor instituted an investigation into the allegation of abuse of power by the police officers under Article 231 of the Criminal Code. 20. On the same day the applicant was heard by the prosecutor. He gave the following account: on 16 June 2011 he and his girlfriend had visited their friends, Ł.W. and D.W., in their flat. A sister of D.W.’s was present too. Between 6 and 7 p.m. the applicant had heard explosions. Shortly afterwards, a group of armed and masked police officers had stormed the flat. The applicant and others had followed the police orders to get down on the floor. The applicant had seen one of the police officers hit Ł.W. in the face with a rifle and seen Ł.W. bleeding. The other police officer had kicked the applicant in the face. The applicant had also been hit in the head, back and legs. Later, one of the officers had handcuffed him. The applicant alleged that subsequently an electrical discharge weapon, or Taser (paralizator elektryczny – hereinafter “EDW”) had been used on his back, buttocks, genitals and ears. One of the police officers had pressed the applicant’s face into a pool of Ł.W.’s blood on the floor. When being taken to a police car he was suffocated. In the police car, an EDW was continually used on the applicant’s back until he started suffocating. The applicant was taken to a police station, where he was made to kneel down in front of a wall for half an hour. The police wanted to know where the money was and who he had worked with to kidnap the woman. The applicant was forced to sign a document which he could not read. He was then taken to a police detention facility in Gdynia. After his release, the applicant went to a hospital in Gdańsk for a medical examination. He also saw a surgeon, a neurologist and a psychologist. 21. The applicant alleged that as a result of his arrest he had sustained bruising to his head and back and sprained thumbs, as well as burns on his back from the EDW. 22. The prosecutor noted that owing to a technical error it had not been possible to examine the CCTV footage dated 17 June 2011 from the Gdańsk Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, where the applicant had been questioned. 23. The prosecutor established that on 9 June 2011 the Gdańsk Appellate Prosecutor’s Office had opened an investigation into the kidnapping of J.R., and a ransom demand. On 16 June 2011, having regard to the evidence in his possession, the appellate prosecutor ordered the arrest of a number of suspects, including the applicant and his girlfriend. 24. The prosecutor heard evidence from other individuals arrested with the applicant. The applicant’s girlfriend stated that police officers in balaclavas and bulletproof vests had forced the door of the apartment. One of the officers had handcuffed her. The applicant’s girlfriend had heard the applicant screaming and had seen blood on the floor of the flat. She had been taken to a police station, where she had been threatened with the EDW. After her release, she had seen the applicant with a swollen face and a black eye; his back was covered with little scabs from the EDW. 25. Ł.W. testified that, inter alia, the police had forced the door and thrown a stun grenade into the apartment. The police officers had ordered everyone to get down on the floor. Ł.W. stated that the applicant had been kicked and hit by three police officers, and that the EDW had been used on him. 26. D.W. stated that one of the police officers had hit her husband, Ł.W., in the face with a rifle. Z.M. confirmed this. Ł.W., D.W. and Z.M. were arrested on suspicion of possession of drugs. They were not suspected of involvement in the kidnapping. 27. The prosecutor ordered a forensic opinion to be prepared. She requested that the forensic expert establish, inter alia, what injuries the applicant had sustained in connection with his arrest. The forensic expert had access to the relevant parts of the prosecutor’s case file and medical documentation. 28. The forensic opinion was prepared on 26 June 2012. On the basis of the medical documentation, including the police record dated 16 June 2011 and certificates dated 17 June 2011, the forensic opinion established that the applicant had sustained tenderness of his left temple, swelling of the left side of his face with bruising, swelling of the right wrist, and abrasions on his wrists and his back. It further established on the basis of photographs that the applicant had also had bruising on his left arm, the side of his torso and below his navel, and abrasions on his knees. 29. The forensic expert stated that the bruising could have been caused by the impact of a blunt object or a fall onto such an object. In the applicant’s case, the bruising of the face and torso could have resulted from being kicked; however, being kicked with military‑type boots would be more likely to have caused abrasions or crush wounds. The bruising of the applicant’s left arm could have resulted from having arm locks applied to him while he was being moved. The abrasions on his wrists could have resulted from the use of handcuffs. The expert further stated that the angular abrasions on the applicant’s back could have resulted from the use of an EDW. 30. The forensic opinion concluded that the applicant’s injuries had resulted in impairment to his health for a period not exceeding seven days. 31. The prosecutor also heard evidence from the police officers. She established that the arrest had been carried out by a special anti-terrorist police squad composed of eight officers. They had been accompanied outside the flat by seven police officers from the Gdańsk branch of the CBI. The police had considered it necessary to use the special squad because the suspects had been involved in kidnapping, their methods had been brutal, and there was a risk that they possessed dangerous implements. Members of the anti-terrorist squad were equipped with rifles, helmets, and bullet-proof vests, and were wearing balaclavas. The squad had forced the door open and used a stun grenade. 32. The applicant was arrested by officer R. According to his evidence and those of other officers involved, the applicant had been lying down on the floor with his hands under his body. Officer R. had been sitting on the applicant. The officer had ordered the applicant to lift his arms so he could be handcuffed. However, the applicant had refused to do so and had tried to dislodge the officer. Given the risk that the applicant might have had a firearm and seeing that the applicant had refused to be handcuffed, officer R. had decided to use the EDW on the applicant’s back as the other officer was attempting to handcuff him. Officer R. stated that he did not remember how many times he had discharged the weapon, but he had done so to overcome the applicant’s resistance. He had aimed the weapon at the applicant’s back. Officer R. stated that each discharge had released direct current for a few seconds. This may have been applied to different parts of the applicant’s back. The applicant was then arrested. 33. Officers of the special squad stated that they did not use any other force. 34. On 26 July 2012 the Regional Prosecutor discontinued the investigation into the alleged abuse of power by the police officers for lack of sufficient evidence that a criminal offence had been committed. 35. The prosecutor found that officers of the special squad had explained in detail what had happened during the arrest and the manner in which coercive measures were used. The officers had stated that they had only used measures which had been justified by the situation. They had denied that they had hit, kicked or hit with a rifle any of the arrestees. With regard to the EDW, the prosecutor stated: “The electroshock weapon was used in accordance with procedure, and only in respect of [the applicant], in the circumstances described by the police officer arresting him and owing to his non-compliance with the orders.” 36. The prosecutor noted that the arrest of five people (two men and three women) had taken place in a flat, in fact in one room (with four people in it) in a very small space. At least eight people (four arrestees and at least four officers) had been in this room. In connection with the use of a stun grenade in the flat, it could not be ruled out that the arrestees had sustained some unintended injuries. 37. The prosecutor noted that the applicant had not recorded any objections to the manner of his arrest in the record of arrest, despite the allegedly drastic actions of the police officers. Furthermore, on 11 October 2011 the Gdańsk‑Południe District Court had dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the prosecutor’s decision of 16 June 2011 ordering his arrest. The court had found that, in the light of the evidence available at the material time, the arrest had been justified and carried out lawfully. 38. In conclusion, the prosecutor accepted that the applicant had sustained the injuries as described in the forensic opinion. Nonetheless, having analysed the totality of the evidence in the case, the prosecutor could not unequivocally establish that the injuries had resulted from the officers’ actions. The prosecutor noted that the arrests had been carried out rapidly, and that the officers’ actions had been aimed at apprehending the suspects swiftly and efficiently. The police officers had presented a consistent version of events. Despite the fact that the version of events presented by the applicant could not be entirely ruled out, the prosecutor, having regard to the principle of in dubio pro reo, decided to discontinue the investigation for lack of sufficient evidence for suspicion that the alleged offence had been committed. 39. The applicant appealed against the prosecutor’s decision. He alleged that the prosecutor’s assessment of the evidence had been one-sided and aimed at exonerating the police officers. 40. The applicant submitted that it was undisputed that he had sustained numerous injuries in the course of his arrest. This had been confirmed by the forensic opinion. His injuries could not have resulted from anything but ill-treatment on arrest, specifically from the use of the EDW, blows with a rifle, and kicks. The applicant also underlined that all the arrestees had consistently described brutal behaviour on the part of the police officers. All the arrestees had confirmed that none of them had offered any resistance and that they had all followed police orders. 41. On 18 March 2013 the Gdańsk-Północ District Court upheld the prosecutor’s decision. It found that the prosecutor had correctly assessed the evidence in the case and had reached proper conclusions. It noted that there was no need to supplement the evidence. The court held that in the light of the collected evidence it was not possible to unequivocally determine that the alleged offence of abuse of power had been committed. 42. The court noted that the cases and manner of use of coercive measures by the police was regulated in the Ordinance of the Council of Ministers of 17 September 1990 on the Use of Coercive Measures by the Police. Police officers could use these measures in accordance with the rules laid down in section 16(1) and (2) of the Police Act of 6 April 1990. 43. The court attached importance to the fact that the Gdańsk-Południe District Court had dismissed the applicant’s appeal against his arrest. That court had found that the arrest had been carried out lawfully. 44. The court noted that the arrestees’ behaviour and the fact that the arrest had concerned a case of kidnapping had determined the nature of the actions taken by the officers. The officers had acted out of surprise and the situation had developed rapidly. Their objective had been to proceed to a quick and effective arrest. Thus, the manner of the carrying out of the arrest had been undoubtedly conditioned by the necessity to execute it effectively. 45. The court noted that there were two conflicting versions of events. In this context, it found that those conflicting versions did not permit a clear determination of the relevant facts. In addition, other evidence in the case, particularly medical evidence, did not allow such a determination. 46. Accordingly, the actions of the police officers could not be considered to amount to a criminal offence. It did not appear unequivocally from the case file that the applicant (and other suspects) could have sustained the injuries as alleged by them in the course of their arrest. The medical evidence did not clarify the relevant uncertainties. The court also noted that the applicant and other suspects had not challenged the police officers’ actions in the record of arrest or during their questioning. 47. Section 16 of the Police Act of 6 April 1990, in the version applicable at the material time, read, in so far as relevant: “1. If a lawful order given by a police authority or police officer has not been complied with, a police officer may apply the following coercive measures: 1) physical, technical and chemical means of restraining or escorting persons or of stopping vehicles; 2) truncheons; 3) water cannons; 4) police dogs and horses; 5) rubber bullets fired from firearms; 2. Police officers may apply only such coercive measures as correspond to the exigencies of a given situation and are necessary to have their orders obeyed.” 48. The Ordinance of the Council of Ministers of 17 September 1990 on the Use of Coercive Measures by the Police (Rozporządzenie Rady Ministrów w sprawie określenia przypadków oraz warunków i sposobów użycia przez policjantów środków przymusu bezpośredniego) was issued on the basis of section 16(4) of the Police Act. It was applicable at the material time. 49. Section 1(1) of the Ordinance stipulated that the police may use coercive measures in accordance with the rules laid out in section 16(1) and (2) of the Police Act. Coercive measures could be used after a person had failed to comply with an order and after a warning had been given (section 1(2)). A police officer could act without giving an order or a warning if a delay would cause danger to life, health or property (section 1(3)). The Ordinance prescribes that a police officer should use coercive measures in a manner which causes as little harm as possible, and should discontinue their use if the person complies with orders (section 2(1)(2). 50. Section 5 of the Ordinance provides that physical force can be used to overpower a person, to counter an attack, or to ensure compliance with an order. When such force is being used, it is forbidden to strike a person, except in self-defence or to counter an attack against life, health or property. 51. Section 8 of the Ordinance regulates the use of electrical discharge weapons (paralizator elektryczny). Such a weapon may be used against persons who cause danger to life, health or property and if the use of other coercive measures is impossible or has been rendered ineffective. The EDW may be used specifically, inter alia, in the following situations: in order to overpower a person who is refusing to obey an order to immediately drop a dangerous implement; to counter an attack or to overcome active resistance; to arrest a person suspected of having committed an offence or to prevent the escape of a detainee (section 8(3)). Care should be exercised when using an EDW, having regard to the fact that such a weapon may cause danger to life and health. 52. In a letter to the Commander in Chief of the Police (Komendant Główny Policji) dated 28 June 2017, the Ombudsman (Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich) expressed his concerns about the use of EDWs by the police. He recommended that police officers should be obliged to file a detailed report after every use of that weapon. In his annual report for the year 2017, the Ombudsman also addressed the issue of the use of EDWs by the police. 53. The 20th General Report on the Activities of the Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT), dated 26 October 2010, stated, inter alia: “72. Electrical discharge weapons [“EDWs”] are increasingly being used when effecting arrests, and there have been well-publicised examples of their misuse in this context (e.g. the repeated administration of electric shocks to persons lying on the ground). Clearly, the resort to EDW in such situations must be strictly circumscribed. The guidance found by the CPT in some countries, to the effect that these weapons may be used when law enforcement officials are facing violence – or a threat of violence – of such a level that they would need to use force to protect themselves or others, is so broad as to leave the door open to a disproportionate response. If EDW gradually become the weapon of choice whenever faced with a recalcitrant attitude at the time of arrest, this could have a profoundly negative effect on the public’s perception of law enforcement officials. ... 77. EDW should be equipped with devices (generally a memory chip) that can be used for recording various items of information and conducting checks on the use of the weapon (such as the exact time of use; the number, duration and intensity of electrical discharges, etc). The information stored on these chips should be systematically read by the competent authorities at appropriate intervals (at least every three months). Further, the weapons should be provided with built-in laser aiming and video recording devices, making safe aiming possible and enabling the circumstances surrounding their use to be recorded. ... 78. Electrical discharge weapons issued to law enforcement officials commonly offer different modes of use, in particular a ‘firing’ and a ‘contact’ (drive-stun) mode. In the former, the weapon fires projectiles which attach to the person targeted at a short distance from each other, and an electrical discharge is generated. In the great majority of cases, this discharge provokes generalised muscular contraction which induces temporary paralysis and causes the person concerned to fall to the ground. In contrast, when the ‘contact’ mode is used, electrodes on the end of the weapon produce an electrical arc and when they are brought into contact with the person targeted the electrodes cause very intense, localised pain, with the possibility of burns to the skin. The CPT has strong reservations concerning this latter mode of use. Indeed, properly trained law enforcement officials will have many other control techniques available to them when they are in touching distance of a person who has to be brought under control. ... Post-incident procedure 82. Following each use of an EDW, there should be a debriefing of the law enforcement official who had recourse to the weapon. Further, the incident should be the subject of a detailed report to a higher authority. This report should indicate the precise circumstances considered to justify resort to the weapon, the mode of use, as well as all other relevant information (presence of witnesses, whether other weapons were available, medical care given to the person targeted, etc). The technical information registered on the memory chip and the video recording of the use of the EDW should be included in the report. 83. This internal procedure should be accompanied by an external monitoring element. This could consist of systematically informing, at regular intervals, an independent body responsible for supervising law enforcement agencies of all cases of resort to EDW. 84. Whenever it transpires that the use of an EDW may not have been in accordance with the relevant laws or regulations, an appropriate investigation (disciplinary and/or criminal) should be set in motion.” 54. The CPT’s report on the visit to Poland carried out from 11 to 22 May 2017 stated, inter alia: “22. ... the Committee also recommends that particular attention be paid to reiterating to all police officers instructions regarding the proper conduct as concerns the use of electric discharge weapons (tasers) and to enforcing those rules. In this context, it should be made clear to all police staff that electric discharge weapons may only be used when there is a real and immediate threat to life or risk of serious injury. Recourse to such weapons for the sole purpose of securing compliance with an order is inadmissible. The CPT considers that the use of electric discharge weapons should be subject to the principles of necessity, subsidiarity, proportionality, advance warning (where feasible) and precaution. Furthermore, recourse to such weapons should only be authorised when other less coercive methods (negotiation and persuasion, manual control techniques, etc.) have failed or are impracticable and where it is the only possible alternative to the use of a method presenting a greater risk of injury or death (e.g. firearms).”

5. The applicants were born in 1950 and 1945 and live in İstanbul and Ankara respectively. They are university professors specialising, inter alia, in human rights protection. 6. On 5 February 2002 the applicants were appointed as members of the Consultative Council on Human Rights (“the Consultative Council”), a public body answerable to the Prime Minister which was set up under Law No. 4643 of 12 April 2001 and is responsible for providing the Government with opinions, recommendations, proposals and reports on the whole range of issues relating to the promotion and protection of human rights. 7. At its first meeting on 26 February 2003 the Consultative Council elected Mr Kaboğlu as its chairman. At its second meeting on 9 May 2003 the Consultative Council elected Mr Oran chairman of the Working Group on issues relating to minority and cultural rights. 8. On 1 October 2004 the General Assembly of the Consultative Council discussed and adopted a report on minority and cultural rights (“the report”), presented by the above-mentioned working group. On 22 October 2004 the report, as amended by Mr Oran in line with the comments put forward by members of the Consultative Council at the meeting on 1 October 2004, was submitted to the Deputy Prime Minister responsible for Human Rights Affairs. The report first of all dealt with the concept and definition of and the historical background to the protection of minority and cultural rights in worldwide and in Turkey. It then went on to consider issues relating to the protection of minorities in Turkey, relying on the relevant provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne, national legislation and practice and the case-law of the higher courts. According to the report, there were two primary reasons for the problematical situation of minorities in Turkey: a theoretical reason tending to define the supra-identity in terms of “race” (ırk) and religion as Turkish (Türk) and not as Türkiyeli (“coming from Turkey”, “citizen of Turkey”), which resulted in alienating the infra-identities of citizens who do not belong to the Turkish “race” or the Muslim religion; and an historical/political reason stemming from the paranoia (paranoya) inherited from the dismantling of the country in the recent past, a syndrome referred to in the report as “the Sèvres syndrome”[1]. 9. Having explained that the Governments in the 1920s and 1930s had attempted to create a homogeneous and monocultural nation, the report stated that, having regard to the presence in the country of a patchwork of different cultures and identities, and in the light of global developments as regards the organisation of society up until the 2000s, now was the time to revise the citizenship concept and to adopt, like all the European nations, a multi-identity, multicultural, democratic, liberal and pluralist societal model. It consequently proposed rewriting the Constitution and the relevant legislation from a liberal, pluralist and democratic angle, including the participation of the organised fringes of society; guaranteeing the rights of persons laying claim to different identities and cultures to preserve and develop those identities on the basis of equal citizenship; making central and local administrations more transparent and democratic such as to ensure participation and oversight by the citizens; signing and unreservedly ratifying the international treaties laying down the universal standards of human rights, and in particular the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities; and, as regards international treaties, discontinuing the practice of entering reservations or interpretative declarations tending to negate infra-identities in Turkey. 10. Following the publication of the report, several articles were published in broadly ultranationalist newspapers disparaging the text and criticising the applicants. Furthermore, a number of political leaders and senior officials criticised the report and its authors. On 26 October 2004, for example, an MP speaking in the National Assembly used, with regard to the authors of the report in question, expressions such as “hired boffins” (entel devşirme), “individuals spitting their venomous saliva”, “people in the pay of foreigners”, “persons who hate the words ‘Turkish nation’”, “traitors”, “those who want to split up the Republic of Turkey”, and “enemy of the Turks”. The Deputy Prime Minister spoke of a “marginal report by marginal people”, claiming that the authors had drawn it up without informing the Government of its content. The Minister of Justice described the report as “sowing intellectual discord”. The Deputy Chief-of-Staff also criticised the report, declaring that the unitary structure of the State was beyond question. Moreover, the Director of Human Rights at the Prime Minister’s Office questioned the validity of the report by alleging that there had been no quorum when it had been adopted by the Assembly of the Consultative Council. 11. On 1 November 2004 Mr Kaboğlu, in his capacity as Chairman of the Consultative Council, organised a press conference in order to reply to the criticisms of the report in question. At the beginning of the conference, which was shown on television, an ultranationalist trade unionist, F.Y., who was also a member of the Consultative Council, interrupted the meeting by ripping up a copy of the report in front of Mr Kaboğlu and saying “this report is fake and unlawful, we will not allow it to be read.” 12. In February 2005 the Prime Minister’s Office informed the applicants and twelve other members of the Consultative Council that their term of office would end on 5 February 2005. The Consultative Council has not been reconvened by the Government since that date. 13. On 14 November 2005 the Ankara public prosecutor brought proceedings against the applicants on charges of incitement to hatred and hostility and denigration of the State judicial organs on account of the content of the report. After criminal proceedings lasting some four years and seven months, the applicants were acquitted on the charge of incitement to hatred and hostility; as regards the charge of denigration of the State judicial organs, since the Justice Minister had not consented to the opening of criminal proceedings – a legal precondition for that particular offence – the case was struck off the list. 14. In that context, the applicants received death threats from ultranationalist groups and individuals by mail and email. In view of the threats and at the request of counsel for Mr Kaboğlu, the Istanbul Police Department granted him personal protection as from 2007, which protection has been renewed every year since that date. In January 2007 the Ankara police department decided ex officio to task a police officer with protecting Mr Oran. In January 2013 the measure was converted into one of on-call protection. 15. On 28 October 2004 the daily newspaper Halka ve Olaylara Tercüman published an article by N.K.Z. on the subject of the report on minority and cultural rights. In the article, the author stated the following: “These people should not be considered as liberal intellectuals. Some of them may be bona fide liberals. But their ringleaders are nothing less than traitors ...; there are no two ways about it: the Turkish nation, the Turkishness of Turkey and the Republic of Turkey are facing all-out treason ...; if [the country’s Turkish majority] begins to growl, shout and roar, the traitors will find no hiding or breathing place ...; you obscurantists (karanlıkçılar) who present yourselves as liberal intellectuals ..., you can stick your phoney minorities up your Europe (siz o uydurma azınlıklarınızı alın da gidin Avrupa’nıza sokun)! ... I would warn some of [those who are going too far] not to play with fire.” 16. On 31 December 2004 the applicants brought civil proceedings against the author of the article and the newspaper publishers. They claimed compensation for the non-pecuniary damage which they had sustained on account of the insulting and threatening language used by the author of the article against them. 17. By judgment of 25 January 2005 the Ankara Regional Court dismissed the applicants’ claim. The court ruled that the impugned article had not directly targeted the claimants since their names had not been cited, and that it was only to be expected that opinions which had been set out in a scientific report designed to guide government policies, but which had prompted concern about the preservation of Turkey’s unitary structure, should be severely criticised. 18. On 20 April 2006 the applicants appealed on points of law. They submitted that since the author of the article had referred to their report he had obviously been directing his insults and threats at them and not at any unnamed persons. They further argued that the court’s refusal to condemn the impugned article, which, they submitted, had comprised insults and incited to violence against them, had amounted to an infringement of their right to freedom of expression. 19. On 14 June 2007 the Court of Cassation upheld the first-instance judgment on the grounds that it complied with the requisite procedure and law and that it had not been based on any erroneous assessment of the evidence. That judgment was served on counsel for the applicants on 10 July 2008. 20. On 27 October 2004 the daily newspaper Yeniçağ published an article relaying statements made by B.A., the Chairman of the Public Employers’ Union Confederation, Kamu-Sen, concerning the applicants’ report. B.A. had said: “This report is a real piece of treachery, and those who wrote it should have it ripped to shreds over their heads. Those who want to see the Turkish nation as a minority in this country will have us to contend with.” 21. On 8 November 2004 the daily newspaper Ortadoğu also published B.A.’s statements, including the following: “This report is the result of a line of thought that has been put about for years with a view to dividing and separating us ... I would appeal to those responsible, and I swear that the price of the soil is blood, and if need be blood will be shed.” 22. On 7 January 2005 the applicants brought civil proceedings against B.A. They claimed compensation for the non-pecuniary damage which they considered they had sustained on account of the insults and threats against them contained in those two statements. 23. By judgment of 25 July 2006 the Ankara Regional Court dismissed the applicants’ claim on the grounds that their report was the subject of public debate, that in view of their social status they should tolerate criticism, including virulent critiques, and that B.A.’s statements had remained within the bounds of acceptable criticism. The court also considered that the expression “the price of the soil is blood, and if need be blood will be shed” was a popular saying which meant that people could lay down their lives for their country, rather than being a threat to the applicants. Furthermore, the statement “those who want to see the Turkish nation as a minority in this country will have us to contend with” was only a criticism of the opinions expressed in the report. 24. The applicants appealed on points of law. They argued that the impugned statements by B.A. had amounted to a clear and concrete call to violence, and had been intended to intimidate them and single them out as targets. 25. On 22 October 2007 the Court of Cassation upheld the first-instance judgment on the grounds that it had complied with the requisite procedure and law and that it had not been based on any erroneous assessment of the evidence. That judgment was served on counsel for the applicants on 26 November 2007. 26. On 26 October 2004 A.T. published an article in the daily newspaper Yeniçağ including the following passages: “The rapporteur for the second set of Sèvres negotiations, Prof. Dr Baskın Oran ...”, “the treasonous report (ihanet raporu) penned by Baskın Oran”, “when the time is ripe, they will be held to account for having prepared a treasonous report ...” 27. Another article by A.T., published on 31 October 2004 in the same newspaper, contained the following passage: “... The report, concerning minority and cultural rights, [was drafted by] twenty-four leftist, separatist, subversive [persons] unhappy about the unity of the country [who deserve] the death penalty ...” 28. On 4 November 2004 the Yeniçağ newspaper published another article signed by A.T. which included the following sentences: “F.Y. vehemently protested against İbrahim Kaboğlu and Baskın Oran, who had prepared and defended a report which might as well be called the ‘report on the second set of Sèvres negotiations’”; “the leaders of the traitor networks say that there are millions of ülkücü [‘idealists’, extreme right-wing activists] ...: so all these people are idiots and you are intelligent, is that it? Kaboğlu’s and Oran’s bad faith has been revealed on many occasions. Irregularities in the operation of the Consultative Council have been exposed. Why do these gentlemen ignore the protests against the irregularities committed during the preparation of this report, [and why] do they prefer to attack those who exercise their right to tear up this bumph dubbed as a ‘report’?” 29. In another article published on 5 November 2004 in the same paper, A.T. stated the following: “... The lickspittles with their report on minorities and cultural rights are threatening the country’s integrity ... İbrahim Kaboğlu says ‘Atatürk did not say Türk, he said Türkiyeli’ ... Anyone who goes so far as to hijack the words of Mustafa Kemal shows his bad faith, separatist aims and treachery...” 30. Another article by A.T., published on 6 November 2004 in Yeniçağ, contained the following statements and expressions: “Within the Prime Minister’s office people are working on dismantling Turkey, and when we intervene we are accused of using brute force ...; be careful, twenty-four persons did vote for this report, but they did not sign it. The traitors are emerging when Turkey is weakened. ... The main pro-Sèvres cheerleader, Kaboğlu, ... was going to present the report to the public ... No one sees the unlawfulness, the deviousness, the betrayal underlying this case. They condemn as brutal F.Y.’s act of snatching the report from the hands of the pro-Sèvres cheerleader and ripping it up. If someone had kicked and punched the pro-Sèvres leader and his treacherous assistants, that would have been brutality. In my view, if those individuals had been beaten up, people would have been relieved. The Sèvres apologists deserved a good thrashing... No punches were thrown, and yet they consider the ripping up of the bumph as a brutal act ...” 31. On 7 November 2004, A.T. wrote the following in his article published in the same newspaper: “... No one mentions the fact that the intention had been to publish the treasonous document [clandestinely]. They pay scant attention to the treachery, but on the other hand they consider that in tearing up the report F.Y. had committed a brutal act ... just because they sup from the same dog-bowl as İbrahim Kaboğlu and Baskın Oran.” 32. On 31 December 2004 the applicants brought an action for damages against A.T. and the company owning the newspaper having published the impugned articles. 33. By judgment of 25 July 2006, the Ankara Regional Court dismissed the applicants’ claim on the grounds that the statements in the impugned articles fell within the ambit of the provisions protecting their author’s freedom of expression. The court held that insofar as the report in issue contained virulent criticism of the governments of the Republic and dismissed those who objected to their ideas as paranoiacs, the applicants should also tolerate the same kind of criticism, or indeed even more virulent criticism, short of actual violence. 34. The applicants appealed on points of law. They complained that the Regional Court had failed to protect them in the exercise of their freedom of expression and had considered that the insults against them had fallen within the ambit of the legal provisions protecting freedom of expression. 35. By judgment of 12 November 2007 the Court of Cassation upheld the impugned judgment on the grounds that it had complied with the requisite procedure and law and that it had not been based on any erroneous assessment of the evidence. In a dissenting opinion, one member of the Court of Cassation considered that A.T.’s articles had overstepped the bounds of the right to criticism as protected under the right to freedom of expression, on the grounds that those articles had comprised insulting expressions explicitly targeting the applicants. The judgment was served on counsel for the applicants on 2 January 2008. 36. In an article published in the daily newspaper Akşam on 27 October 2004, S.K. wrote the following on the subject of the applicants’ report: “... After the European Union’s ‘never make any progress’ report of 6 October 2004, it was expected, as a ‘conditioned reflex’, that those in the pay of the wild west (vahşi batının beslemeleri), almost all of whom are former ... communists, would follow their masters, and even surpass them. The comparison is perfectly apt. Like little dogs rolling over and wagging their tails when their food is served in their dog-bowls or when [they are promised] a bone, they begin their subtle attacks ... Those who pose as the eyes, ears and spleen of the Trojan horse infiltrating our country, the fools and idiots posing as smart alecs ...; in this report on minorities prepared by this insolent, perfidious and pathetic minority, the losers, who would never have dared commit this type of treason before, are clearly targeting the indivisible integrity of the State and the nation ...; some losers who, their whole lives long, have never got rid of their paranoia about Turks ... designate as ‘Sèvres paranoia’ the watchful and persevering attitude of those who represent the heart, head and intelligence of our nation against the new Sèvres dictates and are attempting to insult them, driven on by their wilfulness; their shared characteristic is apostasy ...; someone has said ‘he who is not a communist at the age of twenty is an ass, and he who is not a capitalist at the age of thirty is the ass’s son’. Being a liboş [a derogatory word for liberals in Turkey] under the auspices of the [European Union] suits these ex-communist apostates perfectly. Just look at this assailant (baskıncı[2] eleman) who drew up this scandalous report on minorities on behalf of the Consultative Council on Human Rights ... This is the treacherous dagger which this man, ... disguised as a scientist, and the minority which he is using, has perfidiously stabbed into the heart of the Republic of Turkey and into the unity and peace of our nation...! And there is another man whose life depends on the fact of eating and swallowing; the more dogfood he eats, the more applause he attracts ... A miserable spy and apostate. Are his windows flung open not to the world, but to his stomach? Alongside a Statesman, the miniature poodle aspires to the status of a large poodle. Now he constantly growls. Perhaps he thinks [that if he continues to] bark ever more loudly, his western masters will one day make a man of him. Oh the poor little chap! God has made him a dogfood gobbler. Calm down a little, [you might scratch] the Rolex on your front paw. Carry on anyway with your bird-brain dividing, dismantling and growling. In any case we are not forced to listen to you. The most you will manage to do is tug at the backs of a few trouser legs. We have seen lots of crawlers like you, you know, and how many have we stoned? If someone like you, rootless and without a pedigree, can [bark] at people, how unfortunate for you! Oh crack-voiced, short-breathed bootlicker! Go on then! Waste your saliva! What a pity [you are allowed to] talk, what a shame [you are listened to and people are allowed] to listen to you ...” 37. On 7 January 2005 the applicants brought an action for damages for insult and defamation against the author of that article and the company owning the newspaper which had published it. 38. By judgment of 8 June 2006 the Ankara Regional Court upheld the applicants’ claim. Considering that the impugned article overstepped the bounds of admissible criticism and infringed the dignity of the applicants, the court ordered the defendants to pay the latter damages in respect of the non-pecuniary damage sustained. 39. By judgment of 31 January 2008 the Court of Cassation (4th Civil Chamber) quashed the first-instance judgment. It found that the first section of the impugned article had consisted of severe criticism of the attitude of Turkish intellectuals to national issues, that the second section on Baskın Oran had amounted to a statement of a critical opinion on the report in question, and that the expressions used in the last section had not concerned the applicants. The Court of Cassation consequently considered that the article in question had comprised not any gratuitous attacks on the applicants but a series of acerbic and virulent critiques of their report, and that it had not overstepped the bounds of admissible criticism. In a separate dissenting opinion, one member of the Court of Cassation expressed the view that the first-instance judgment should be confirmed. 40. On 20 November 2008 the Ankara Regional Court decided not to follow the Court of Cassation’s judgment and to uphold the judgment which it had delivered on 8 June 2006. 41. On 3 June 2009 the Plenary Assembly of the Civil Chambers of the Court of Cassation, upholding the arguments put forward in the cassation judgment of 31 January 2008, set aside the Ankara Regional Court’s judgment. 42. By judgment of 3 December 2009 the Ankara Regional Court, bound by the judgment of the Plenary Assembly of the Civil Chambers, dismissed the action brought by the applicants. That judgment was served on counsel for the applicants on 28 January 2010.

4. The applicant, Mr Grigoriy Nikolayevich Pleshchinskiy, is a Russian national who was born in 1954 and lives in Solnechnogorsk, Moscow Region. 5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows. 6. The applicant was kept in Solnechnogorsk Police’s temporary detention centre in overcrowded cells from 2 to 10 October 2003; 20 to 24 October 2003; 17 to 21 November 2003; 21 to 28 November 2003; 22 to 29 December 2003; 26 to 30 January 2004; 2 and 3 February 2004; 31 March to 2 April 2004 and then on several occasions between April and 22 July 2004. He had to relieve himself in a bucket in the presence of other detainees and it was very difficult to breathe in the cells. There was no tap or other access to water, no proper light, no table on which to eat food and no area for outdoor activities. In the winter the walls and ceiling were covered with ice or damp. He had no access to a shower. 7. The applicant made numerous journeys in 2003-2004 between Volokolamsk remand centre and the temporary detention centre in Solnechnogorsk, which took three to four hours in an overcrowded van, which was cold in the winter and stuffy in the summer. 8. On 11 July 2005 the applicant sued the State for compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage caused by the allegedly appalling conditions of his detention in the temporary detention centre. 9. On 14 November 2005 the Solnechnogorsk Town Court rejected the applicant’s claims. It established that the material conditions of his detention could be explained by insufficient funding. 10. On 22 November and 6 December 2005 the applicant lodged appeals against the decision of 14 November 2005. 11. On 19 December 2005 the applicant was informed that the text of the judgment had been available since 5 December 2005. 12. On an unspecified date the court sent a summons to an appeal hearing which had been scheduled for 30 January 2006. However, the applicant did not receive the summons as it contained an error in the address, which was written as “2, Vishnevskaya Street” instead of “2, Vishnevaya Street”. 13. On 30 January 2006 the Moscow Regional Court upheld the decision of 14 November 2005 in the applicant’s absence. 14. In reply to an enquiry from the applicant about the date of the appeal hearing, he was informed on 1 February 2006 that it had been held on 30 January 2006. 15. In December 1992 the municipality allowed the applicant and his son, a minor at the time, to obtain ownership of the flat in Solnechnogorsk in which they were living by way of privatisation. The applicant obtained a title certificate, which, however, named him as the sole owner. 16. After reaching the age of majority, the son sued the father, asserting his right to the flat and seeking an annulment of the above-mentioned certificate. 17. In support of his claim the plaintiff submitted a copy of the housing register, and certificates from his school and kindergarten. All the documents showed that the plaintiff had been permanently residing in Solnechnogorsk. 18. The applicant sought to prove that at the material time the plaintiff had lived in a flat in another town, Taganrog, and tried to obtain certificates of his moving in and out of the privatised flat. However, the competent authority would not issue them unless they were requested by a judge. However, the judge considered that the evidence adduced by the plaintiff sufficed. 19. On 4 May 2005 the Solnechnogorsk Town Court of the Moscow Region granted the plaintiff’s claim. It held that the housing law provided that minors living with a tenant in a flat leased under a social lease agreement enjoyed the same rights as the tenant as of the privatisation date. Accordingly, where flats were privatised without payment, they could become owners of the flat together with the adults. Furthermore, under the privatisation law then in force, a privatisation agreement had to contain a reference to the minors who enjoyed the right to use the premises in question. 20. On 14 June 2005 the Moscow Regional Court upheld the decision of 4 May 2005 on appeal.

4. The applicants were born in 1942 and 1969 respectively. The first applicant lives in Gabrovo and the second applicant lives in Varna. 5. Mr Ts. Mihalev, father of the first applicant and grandfather of the second applicant, owned a machinery factory in Gabrovo, which was nationalised in 1947. After the nationalisation the property was allocated for use to a State-owned enterprise, which in 1991 was transformed into a State-owned company named T.. Under domestic law, such a transformation entailed the newly-created company becoming, in principle, the owner of the assets which had until then been allocated to it for use and management; some assets allocated to State-owned enterprises or companies could nevertheless be the subject of restitution (see paragraph 15 below). 6. After the Restitution of Ownership of Nationalised Real Property Act (hereinafter “the Restitution Act”, see paragraphs 15-16 below) came into force in 1992, the first applicant and his brother asked the mayor of Gabrovo to strike the factory building out of the register of State properties. Their request was allowed in a decision of the mayor of 28 August 1992, which explicitly referred to the Restitution Act. On that basis in 1993 the first applicant and his brother obtained a notary deed, which also stated that the property had been subject to restitution under the Restitution Act. 7. In 1994 the first applicant and his brother concluded a rent contract with company T., which undertook to pay rent in exchange of the use of the building. The term of the contract was extended on several occasions, the last of which in 2002. 8. In 1997 the first applicant’s brother transferred his share in the building to his daughter, the second applicant. 9. After the entry into force of the Compensation of Owners of Nationalised Real Property Act (hereinafter “the Compensation Act”, see paragraph 17 below), in January 1998 the first applicant and his brother applied to receive compensation for moveable properties such as industrial equipment and materials which had been nationalised together with the factory. In a decision of 21 December 1999 the Minister of Economy awarded them compensation for these properties, noting in addition that the factory building had been the subject of restitution and no compensation was due for it. That decision was upheld in a final judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 17 September 2002, after the first applicant and his brother sought its judicial review, contesting the manner of compensation. Eventually, in 2005 they received compensation bonds with a face value of 19,494 Bulgarian levs (BGN, the equivalent of 9,970 euros (EUR)). 10. Company T. was privatised in 2003 and the new management stopped paying rent to the applicants for the factory building, arguing that it had in fact never been subject of restitution. 11. In January 2009 company T. brought proceedings against the applicants, claiming to be the factory building’s owner. It argued that the restitution of the property had not taken place, because the preconditions under the Restitution Act had not been complied with, and that it had become the owner of the building as a result of its transformation into a company (see paragraph 5 above). 12. In a judgment of 27 October 2009 the Gabrovo Regional Court dismissed the claim. However, on 17 May 2010 the Veliko Tarnovo Court of Appeal quashed the lower court’s judgment and allowed the action against the applicants, finding that the preconditions for restitution had indeed not been met. On the basis of expert evidence and witness testimony, it concluded that after the nationalisation the building had been modified in a manner and to a degree which meant that in 1992 it had not existed in its state prior to 1947. Accordingly, the applicants could not rely on restitution and company T. had become the owner of the building on the strength of its transformation from a State-owned enterprise into a company in 1991 (see paragraph 5 above). In a final decision of 30 March 2011 the Supreme Court of Cassation refused to accept for examination the applicants’ appeal on points of law. 13. In June 2011 the applicants applied to the Gabrovo regional governor to receive compensation for the factory building under the Compensation Act. In a decision of 19 July 2011 the governor dismissed their request, as it had not been submitted within the time-limit provided for under that Act (see paragraph 17 below). After the applicants applied for its judicial review, the governor’s decision was upheld in a final judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 14 June 2012.

5. The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Weinheim. He is a campaigner against abortion and operates an anti-abortion website. 6. On 12 and 13 April 2005 the applicant distributed leaflets in the vicinity of the medical practice of Dr St., who performed abortions there. The leaflets stated, inter alia, that the abortions performed by Dr St. in his practice, for which he gave the address, were unlawful according to the case-law of the Federal Constitutional Court. In addition the leaflet contained the following statements: “According to international criminal law: Aggravated murder is the intentional ‘bringing-to-death’ of an innocent human being!” (Sinngemӓβ aus den internationalen Strafgesetzen: Mord ist das vorsӓtzliche “Zu-Tode-Bringen” eines unschuldigen Menschen!) “The murder of human beings in Auschwitz was unlawful, but the morally degraded NS State allowed the murder of innocent people and did not make it subject to criminal liability.” (Die Ermordung der Menschen in Auschwitz war rechtswidrig, aber der moralisch verkommene NS-Staat hatte den Mord an den unschuldigen Menschen erlaubt und nicht unter Strafe gestellt.) 7. The applicant also addressed passers-by and the physician’s presumed patients and attempted to engage with them in conversations about abortion. 8. Dr St. lodged an application for a civil injunction against the applicant and on 25 October 2005 the Mannheim Regional Court granted the requested injunction. The court ordered the applicant to desist from speaking to passers-by in the immediate vicinity of the medical practice and labelling the abortions performed by the plaintiff unlawful with the objective of irritating female patients and preventing them from visiting Dr St.’s practice. 9. On 24 February 2007 the Karlsruhe Court of Appeal upheld the decision and slightly modified the wording specifying the geographical area concerned by the injunction. It also refused to grant leave to appeal on points of law. 10. The Regional Court as well as the Court of Appeal both referred to a previous decision of the Federal Court of Justice in which it had confirmed a civil injunction against similar conduct by the applicant (see paragraph 13 below). The courts held that in the case at issue there were no factual or legal differences justifying deviating from the case-law of the Federal Court of Justice. In so far that the doctor in the present case was slightly more well-known than the doctor in the original case, the Court of Appeal held that this was of minor relevance. The fact that Dr St. had appeared as an expert before the German Parliament many years previously did not have any substantial effects on Dr St’s public profile at that time. Moreover, the involvement of Dr St. in different legal disputes was irrelevant, as trying to enforce his rights in the appropriate legal procedure could not redound to Dr St.’s disadvantage. In sum, the applicant had vilified the non‑criminal professional activities of Dr St. by implying that he committed criminal acts and interfered with the relationship of trust between doctor and patient, which deserved special protection against the interventions of others. The applicant had therefore severely interfered with Dr St.’s personality rights. This interference was not justified by the applicant’s freedom of expression in view of the massive “pillory effect” the applicant had created by singling out the plaintiff and criticising him in a harsh way in the immediate vicinity of his practice. 11. On 29 May 2007 the Federal Court of Justice refused a request by the applicant for legal aid on the grounds that the applicant’s intended appeal on points of law lacked sufficient prospect of success. On 20 July 2009 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit the applicant’s complaint for adjudication for being inadmissible, without providing reasons (no. 1 BvR 1670/07).

4. The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Râmnicu-Vâlcea. 5. In 1993 the applicant married N.E.C. and their daughter M.A. was born in 2001. Following the couple’s divorce on 28 February 2007, the mother was granted physical custody of the child. As the parents had reached an agreement regulating the applicant’s contact with the child, the visiting rights were not discussed in the divorce proceedings. 6. Until December 2009, the applicant had unhindered opportunity to talk to his daughter on the phone and to take her to his home whenever he wished. After that date, N.E.C. stopped answering the phone and the only possibility for the applicant to see his daughter was outside her school. 7. Consequently, on 7 July 2011 the applicant instituted contact proceedings before the Râmnicu-Vâlcea District Court, as a result of which on 16 December 2011 a visiting schedule was established in favour of the applicant. 8. N.E.C. appealed, arguing that the applicant had never been prevented from visiting the child but that since the divorce he had not visited her more than once every three months and had not contributed in any way to the continuous medical treatment she required. During the proceedings the parties reached an agreement about the visiting schedule. On 17 May 2012 the County Court questioned M.A. and noted: “The parents divorced about 5-6 years ago and after that she often used to visit her father up until about 6 months ago, when her mother stopped allowing her to answer the phone, because the father only wanted to make [N.E.C.] angry. Since then, she can no longer answer the phone and her father has not seen her. From her mother’s accounts, she understood that her father was a bad person who caused trouble to [N.E.C.] as they both had businesses selling the same products, and her father had taken away her mother’s employees by promising them higher salaries. She does not wish to visit her father because that would make her mother upset and she does not want that because she cares a lot about her mother. Her mother does not wish her to visit her father, who has a new family and a small child. (...).” 9. In a decision of 15 June 2012 (hereinafter “the contact order”) the County Court took note of the parents’ agreement as to the visiting schedule and considered that it was beneficial for the child to maintain contact with her father. 10. N.E.C. lodged an appeal on points of law, unhappy that the child would have to go to the applicant’s home. In a final decision of 19 November 2012 the Piteşti Court of Appeal upheld the County Court’s decision. It noted that the child was used to going to her father’s home and continuing this habit would help consolidate their relationship. It found: “The consolidation of the relationship between the applicant and the minor by means of complying with the County Court’s decision is even more necessary since, from the report of the interview with the minor, it appears that the minor had been visiting her father after the parents’ separation until about six months before the hearing, [when the mother] stopped allowing her to talk on the phone with the applicant; from the same report it appears that the minor does not wish to see her father in order not to upset her mother. In these circumstances, the [County Court] has correctly decided that the visits should take place in the applicant’s home, in order to allow the normal parental ties to develop and to avoid the possibility of inculcating feelings of hatred towards the father, which would run counter to the child’s harmonious psychological development.” 11. As N.E.C. continued to oppose any contact with the child, on 13 March 2013 the applicant contacted a court bailiff and started enforcement proceedings. On 23 March 2013 the application was allowed by the Brezoi District Court, which ordered enforcement of the contact order. 12. The bailiff invited N.E.C. to bring the child to his office on 5 April 2013, which she failed to do. On 3 May and 7 June 2013 and on 7 March 2014 he went to her home together with the applicant, the police and representatives of the Vâlcea Directorate General on Social Welfare and Child Protection (“the child protection authority”). On each occasion they found no one there, despite prior notification. 13. On 11 April 2013, at the applicant’s request, the bailiff lodged with the Brezoi District Court an application for penalties against N.E.C., under the provisions of Article 905 of the Code of Civil Procedure (“the CCP”, see paragraph 27 below). N.E.C. reiterated that, as M.A. was refusing to see her father, she would not agree that the child be taken against her will to the applicant’s home. On 20 June 2013 the court ordered N.E.C. to pay a fine of 500 Romanian Lei (RON – approximately 115 euros (EUR) at the relevant time) for each day of non-enforcement of the contact order, starting from the date on which the District Court decision was notified to her. The District Court reiterated the findings of the report of 17 May 2012 concerning the interview with M.A. (see paragraph 8 above) and found that the mother was responsible for the failure to enforce the visiting schedule. It found: “From the same report it appears that, although the minor likes to visit her father, she does not wish to do so any more because she does not want to upset her mother. The court concludes that the non-enforcement of the obligation set down in the contact order is caused exclusively by the debtor and there is no evidence to show that the minor herself would refuse in absolute terms contact with the creditor or that she would manifest aversion towards him.” 14. On 21 August 2013, acting on an application lodged by the bailiff under Article 188 § 2 of the CCP (see paragraph 27 below), the Brezoi District Court fined N.E.C. RON 100 (approximately EUR 22 at the relevant time) for obstructing the enforcement proceedings. 15. Meanwhile, on 18 August 2014 the bailiff noted that N.E.C. was continuing to reject the visiting schedule and concluded that the enforcement had become objectively impossible. Consequently he terminated the enforcement proceedings and lodged a criminal complaint against N.E.C. (see paragraph 20 below) under the provisions of Article 911 § 2 of the CCP (see paragraph 28 below). 16. The applicant objected to the stay of execution and asked the Brezoi District Court to compel the bailiff to continue the enforcement proceedings. He also argued that the provisions of the CCP allowing the bailiff to stay the execution while a criminal complaint was ongoing were unconstitutional in so far as it allowed the debtor − in bad faith − to stay or obliterate the enforcement efforts and to manipulate the child’s behaviour to the point of rejecting the non-custodial parent. He did not otherwise contest the findings of the bailiff’s report. On 22 May 2015 the Brezoi District Court dismissed his objection on the grounds that it had become objectively impossible to enforce the court order and that the bailiff had correctly stayed the enforcement once the prosecutor’s office had taken over the case. On 22 March 2016 the appeal lodged by the applicant was also dismissed as unfounded by the Vâlcea County Court. The latter found that the bailiff had complied with all the obligations arising from Articles 909-913 of the CCP (see paragraph 28 below). Later on, in its decision no. 299 of 12 May 2016, the Constitutional Court dismissed the constitutional complaint raised by the applicant (see paragraph 30 below). 17. On 4 March 2014 the applicant asked the District Court to quantify the amount of damages to which he was entitled under Article 905 § 4 of the CCP (see paragraph 27 below). N.E.C. maintained that it had been the applicant who had distanced himself from the child and that due to the break-up of the father-daughter relationship it was impossible to comply with the contact order at that time. On 25 September 2014 the District Court ordered N.E.C. to pay the applicant RON 9,200 (approximately EUR 2,100 at the relevant time). The latter could not obtain this payment as N.E.C. had sold all her possessions and had not declared any fixed income. 18. On 6 January 2015 the applicant asked the child protection authority to seek a court order for three months of psychological counselling for his daughter, reiterating that N.E.C. was alienating M.A. from her father. On 9 January 2015 the child protection authority refused to intervene since the bailiff had not recorded in his report that the child had opposed the enforcement “in absolute terms”, as required by Article 912 of the CCP (see paragraph 28 below). 19. On 14 January 2015 the applicant reiterated his request for psychological counselling. In addition, he asked that the relationship between the parties involved be monitored for a period of six months and that N.E.C. be fined for the delays in executing the contact order. The child protection authority’s inspectors met N.E.C. on four occasions: on 29 January, 11 March, 23 April, and 17 July 2015. Subsequently, in a letter of 22 July 2015 the authority informed the applicant that N.E.C. had not allowed them to talk with the child about her relationship with her father. The child protection authority advised as follows: “In view of the fact that for the past four years your relationship with your daughter has only consisted of a few isolated encounters, we consider that reinitiating the father‑daughter relationship must be done gradually, bearing in mind the child’s wishes, her school programme and her extra-curricular activities. (...) For the time being, [N.E.C.] considers that it is not in the child’s best interest to reinitiate the father-daughter relationship and refuses to lend her support to this end. In the light of the above, we consider that it is important for the child that both you and your former spouse try to improve your communication and that you change your current attitude (complaints before courts and other institutions, enforcement proceedings (...)), in order to overcome the conflicts and to offer your daughter the support and reassurance that she requires at this age.” 20. Acting upon the criminal complaint lodged by the bailiff on 18 August 2014 (see paragraph 15 above), the prosecutor’s office attached to the Vâlcea County Court started an investigation into the commission of the offence of a breach of a court judgment (nerespectare a hotărârii judecătoreşti). 21. On 4 March 2015 the prosecutor changed the legal classification of the alleged facts into the offence of a breach of custody measures (nerespectarea măsurilor privind încredinţarea minorului). 22. On 4 January 2016 the prosecutor interviewed M.A. in the presence of N.E.C.’s lawyer and a psychologist from the child protection authority. M.A. refused to re-establish contact with her father and expressed her belief that her father was only trying to hurt her mother through his actions because of their work-related conflicts, of which she had been partially informed by her mother. She said: “I believe that by his actions my father wants, in reality, to hurt my mother. Yesterday I discussed this subject with my mother, as I had done once before, and she told me that she did not wish to trouble me, as those were work-related problems created by my father. It might be that through his actions my father wants to hurt my mother. I know some aspects, but not too much about the conflict between my parents concerning my mother’s work. It is possible that my father started these actions because he loves me and wishes to know me. I no longer want to know him or to have personal relations with him. (...) I think it would be best if my father left me alone. (...) It is true that my mother has never said bad things about my father, but she has never encouraged me to have personal ties with him either.” 23. On 22 April 2016, acting at the prosecutor’s request, the psychologists from the child protection authority assessed M.A. They noted in their report that M.A. refused to see her father because she had been disappointed by the manner in which he had tried to get in touch with her, namely via the authorities, thereby causing upset to her mother. The expert did not consider that counselling for M.A. would be beneficial for re-establishing the relationship between the applicant and his daughter. He recommended psychological support for the parents. 24. On 24 February 2017 the prosecutor decided to terminate the investigation on the grounds that it had not been established beyond any doubt that N.E.C. had acted in such a manner as to repeatedly prevent the applicant from seeing his daughter and that the lack of communication was caused by M.A.’s unequivocal wish and will. 25. On 18 April 2017, in response to a complaint lodged by the applicant, the prosecutor in chief of the prosecutor’s office upheld the above decision. However, in a decision of 3 October 2017 the Râmnicu Vâlcea District Court allowed a complaint lodged by the applicant, quashed the prosecutor’s decision and sent the case back to the prosecutor’s office for further examination. The court considered that, because of the mother’s influence over her, the child might suffer from parent alienation syndrome which constituted a form of psychological abuse; in order to clarify this aspect, further psychological investigation was needed. 26. In 2016, the applicant resumed contact with his former spouse, through the offices of a new bailiff. He tried to visit her home in order to see the child on 6 May, 3 June, 1 July, and 5 August 2016. On 6 April 2017 he asked N.E.C.’s opinion as to what would be the appropriate method for him to re-establish contact with his daughter.

5. The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Berlin. 6. On 13 March 2010 there was a fight in the applicant’s apartment between the applicant, S. (the applicant’s flatmate at the time) and S.’s guests. By letter from the police of 18 March 2010, the applicant was notified that preliminary proceedings against him had been initiated and that he was accused of having insulted S. and of having pushed and punched him in the face, resulting in bruising to S.’s skull and jaw problems. The letter also stated that he was given the opportunity to submit written or oral comments and that he was free, at any time, even before being questioned, to consult defence counsel to be chosen by him. 7. On 7 March 2011 the Berlin Tiergarten District Court issued a penal order (Strafbefehl) against the applicant, finding him guilty of libel and two counts of assault against S. and B., a guest at the event in question, and sentencing him to 80 day-fines of EUR 30 each. The applicant, who had applied for access to, and been given copies of the file prior to the issuance of the penal order, lodged a timely objection against that order and asked to be given access to the file again, which was granted. 8. On 9 May 2011 the District Court admitted S. as private accessory prosecutor (see paragraph 18 below), represented by counsel paid for by S. himself. 9. On 12 May 2011 S.’s lawyer, in the context of the criminal proceedings, lodged civil claims for compensation under Articles 403 et seq. of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 19 below) and applied for legal aid to be granted to S. for the pursuit of those claims. The applicant was given the opportunity to submit written comments on this and made use of that opportunity. 10. On 24 May 2011 the Berlin Tiergarten District Court granted legal aid to S. and appointed his lawyer to represent him in the pursuit of the civil claims in the context of the criminal proceedings. 11. The following day the main hearing took place, lasting for some 75 minutes. The District Court orally heard S. as well as B. and M., the latter two having been present at the event in question, as witnesses and also evaluated a medical certificate concerning the injuries sustained by S. It convicted the applicant of libel and two counts of assault and sentenced him to a fine of 90 day-fines of EUR 15 each. In respect of the civil claims, it also ordered him to pay EUR 430 in damages (EUR 400 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage and EUR 30 in respect of pecuniary damage) plus interest to S. S.’s lawyer had been given leave to address only the civil compensation claim. The applicant had made written submissions setting out his position prior to the hearing and was orally heard by the District Court. 12. On 26 May 2011 the applicant lodged an appeal on facts and law. 13. On 4 July 2011 the judge presiding over the competent appeals chamber of the Berlin Regional Court informed the public prosecutor’s office of his intention to appoint defence counsel for the applicant. That same day, Mr Förster, the applicant’s lawyer in the Convention proceedings, gave notice that he now represented the applicant. In a written submission of 11 July 2011, he stated that he wished to pursue the appeal lodged by the applicant as an appeal on points of law (resulting in the competency of the Berlin Court of Appeal, rather than of the Regional Court). In addition to complaining of a wrongful application of law to the merits of the case, he alleged a procedural error because no defence counsel had been present for the applicant throughout the trial before the District Court. He claimed that representation by defence counsel had been necessary, given that the private accessory prosecutor S. had been represented by counsel who had been present at the main hearing. 14. On 14 March 2012 the Berlin Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on points of law, save for allowing the applicant to pay the fine in instalments. It found that the conditions for mandatory appointment of defence counsel under Article 140 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 20 below) were not met. The legislature had deliberately chosen to limit the presumption that an accused cannot defend himself to cases where the competent court had appointed counsel for the victim for the private accessory prosecution in accordance with Articles 397a and 406g §§ 3 and 4 of the Code (see paragraph 20 below). There were legitimate reasons for that distinction, given that counsel was appointed for the private accessory prosecutor for victims of certain grave offences or where the victim was not able to safeguard his interests sufficiently, or could not be expected to do so, including in scenarios which gave rise to particular factual or legal difficulties. In the present case, counsel for S. had been appointed by the court only in respect of the civil claims (see paragraph 10 above), but not for the private accessory prosecution, in respect of which counsel had been hired by S. at his own expense (see paragraph 8 above). 15. Where counsel acted for the (victim and) private accessory prosecutor, without having been appointed by the court, the presumption contained in Article 140 § 2 of the Code did not apply. In such a scenario, the individual circumstances of the case had to be assessed in order to determine whether defence counsel had to be appointed. Turning to the circumstances of the case, the Court of Appeal concluded that the applicant was capable of effectively defending himself without counsel and had indeed done so. It considered that the applicant had knowledge of the parts of the file relevant for the decision, which did not give rise to factual or legal difficulties, that the nature of the offences and the potential sentence at stake were not significant, and that the factual background and the taking of evidence were easily understandable. Counsel for S. had only acted in respect of the civil claims. The applicant’s written submissions, including his timely appeal against the District Court’s judgment, showed that he was capable of safeguarding his legal interests on his own. 16. On 30 April 2012 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s request to be heard. 17. On 18 September 2012 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the applicant’s constitutional complaint (no. 2 BvR 1377/12), finding that it was inadmissible because he had not applied for the appointment of defence counsel before the District Court.

5. The applicants alleged principally that their twenty-one relatives (spouses, children, brothers and an uncle) had been killed by State servicemen on 5 February 2000 in the Novye Aldy settlement on the outskirts of Grozny (see Appendix for details). 6. A criminal investigation into the murders was opened on 5 March 2000 by the Grozny town prosecutor’s office. Over the years, the applicants or close members of their families were granted victim status in the proceedings. Those proceedings are still ongoing. 7. The documents indicate that only one applicant, Olga Soltykhanova (application no. 22304/10), was in the Novye Aldy at the time of the events; the other applicants were out of the district or out of Chechnya, owing to heavy fighting in the preceding months. 8. In support of their claims, the applicants submitted copies of the death certificates issued in respect of their relatives, copies of some documents from the criminal investigation file, decisions granting them or their close relatives victim status in the criminal proceedings, statements which they had made, statements from witnesses to the events, and press and NGO reports. Several applicants also submitted documents issued in 2000 and 2001 by the local administration or “neighbourhood committees” confirming that the houses in which they had lived had been destroyed or damaged in 2000. 9. Some applicants complained that their state of health had deteriorated due to the stress and anguish which they had suffered in the aftermath of the Novye Aldy killings, and particularly in view of the inadequate and callous response of the authorities to their plight. 10. The facts of the present case are connected to the case of Musayev and Others v. Russia (nos. 57941/00 and 2 others, 26 July 2007) in so far as the applicants claimed that their relatives had been killed by the same people and in the same circumstances as the relatives of the applicants in that case. 11. The applicants in Musayev and Others complained that eleven of their relatives had been killed by unidentified servicemen on 5 February 2000 in the Novye Aldy. The first applicant had witnessed the deaths of his seven distant relatives (cousins and nephews). Other applicants in Musayev and Others were more closely connected to the victims, and were their husband, sister or brothers. The first applicant had been granted victim status in the domestic criminal proceedings and had participated in those proceedings (see Musayev and Others, cited above, §§ 68, 81, 94). It appeared that in the domestic criminal proceedings the proximity of the relationships between the victims and the deceased had not been fully ascertained, and, as noted in the Musayev and Others judgment, no single list existed of the victims and the people who had been granted victim status in the proceedings (ibid., §§ 74, 80, 162). The Government did not challenge the first applicant’s victim status under Article 2 of the Convention. 12. On the basis of the parties’ submissions and inferences drawn by the Court, it was established that on 5 February 2000 eleven relatives of the applicants had been killed by State servicemen in the Novye Aldy settlement on the outskirts of Grozny, during a special operation (a “sweeping” operation) carried out by, amongst others, servicemen from the Police Special Task Unit (Отдел милиции особого назначения (ОМОН)) from St Petersburg (hereinafter the St Petersburg OMON). 13. According to the documents examined by the Court, more than fifty people had been killed on that day in the Novye Aldy by unidentified servicemen wearing camouflaged uniforms and using automatic weapons, equipped with portable radio sets, armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and military Ural trucks. The same servicemen had also looted and burnt down a number of houses. 14. In April 2006, when the parties exchanged observations in Musayev and Others, the criminal investigation was still ongoing. Although the investigation file reflected some attempts to identify the servicemen involved, there was no information that anyone had been charged with the crimes. The Court concluded that the authorities had failed to carry out an effective investigation into the deaths. 15. In addition, the first applicant, who had witnessed the deaths of his relatives and had himself been held at gunpoint, was found to be a victim of inhuman and degrading treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. Lastly, a breach of Article 13 of the Convention was found, since the criminal investigation into the deaths had been inefficient, rendering any other remedy equally futile. 16. On 5 March 2000 the Grozny town prosecutor’s office opened criminal investigation no. 12011 into the murder of several inhabitants of the Novye Aldy settlement in Grozny by “unidentified men armed with guns” under Article 105 § 2 of the Criminal Code (the murder of two or more persons with aggravating circumstances); the decision also referred to the looting of residents’ property. In response to the Court’s request in the present case, the Government submitted copies of eight volumes of documents from criminal case no. 12011, produced after the judgment issued in Musayev and Others. Those documents can be summarised as follows. 17. The applicants submitted that, prior to the Musayev and Others judgment in July 2007, they had not been aware that another group of victims had applied to the Court. They also submitted that, prior to that date, they had had no reasons to doubt the effectiveness of the domestic investigation, even if no regular updates from the prosecutor’s office had been forthcoming. Some of the applicants also referred to their previous contact with lawyers whom they had instructed to apply to the Court in 2005, but one lawyer had died, and either their instructions to other lawyers had not been complied with or the applicants had not kept any written proof of those instructions. As the documents in the Court’s possession indicate, in March 2005 thirty-one families of victims of the Aldy events sent a letter to the Court stating their intention to apply to the Court. That letter included at least ten applicants in the present case. The signatories failed to submit proper applications or otherwise pursue that complaint, which was eventually discontinued. 18. The deaths of eleven people were found to be in breach of Article 2 of the Convention in the Musayev and Others judgment (cited above), and the family members of five of those people are applicants in the present complaint (see Appendix). While the first applicant in the Musayev and Others case was a cousin and a nephew of the deceased, the applicants in the present group are the deceased’s spouses, children and brothers. 19. The applicants in the present case (or their close relatives) were granted victim status in criminal investigation file no. 12011 on various dates between March 2000 and June 2012 (see Appendix). Eight applicants were questioned and received victim status in March and April 2000. Six were granted victim status in April and May 2004, and one in March 2005. The other five received such status between December 2007 and July 2012. On 19 April 2004 the investigator of the Chechnya prosecutor’s office granted an application made by a lawyer, Mr A. Khamzayev. The application was for thirty-two people to have victim status. The list included fourteen applicants in the present case, twelve of whom later obtained and countersigned proper individual decisions as indicated above. There is no information that any other procedural acts involving the applicants’ participation occurred between April 2000 and December 2007 (see the following paragraph). 20. The investigation was adjourned and resumed a number of times (see subsection 5. Various procedural steps below); on 5 December 2007 the investigation was resumed. As of 2008 the applicants in the present case and in Musayev and Others and their close relatives were regularly questioned about the events of 5 February 2000. Thus, in December 2008 the following applicants were questioned: Zoya Musayeva (no. 21200/09), Malika Ganayeva (no. 30538/09), Ruslan Khadzhimuradov (no. 21194/09), Birland Tasuyeva (no. 27064/09), Ibragim Musayev (no. 21200/09), Aset Khakimova (no. 32851/09), Osman Kudozov (no. 30578/09), Manshura Sugaipova (no. 27259/09), Birlant Beterakhmadova (no. 24693/09), Baret Shamsatova (no. 27159/09), Abulkhasan Khaydayev (no. 30531/09), Alpatu Khirikhanova (no. 24700/09), Yakhita Bishayeva (no. 32855/09), and Yakhita Dzhabrailova (no. 32992/09). In November 2012 the investigators questioned Elina Umarkhadzhiyeva and Madina Dzhamoldayeva[1] (no. 30538/09); in December 2013 they questioned Rashid Gerikhanov (no. 27063/09), Aysest Musostova (no. 32862/09), Abulkhasan Khaydayev (no. 30531/09), and Birlant Beterakhmadova (no. 24693/09). During questioning, the investigators informed the applicants about forensic expert reports on the bodies that had been carried out in 2000. The applicants were also asked questions about the loss of property and were asked to estimate the pecuniary damage which they had sustained. While they provided some estimates, no documents were provided, and all applicants stated that they intended to seek pecuniary damages as civil parties during the trial. 21. Additional questioning of the applicants, their relatives and other local residents continued into 2009 and the years which followed. New victims of the events were identified as late as 2014, and their relatives were granted victim status in the proceedings. The questioning of other local residents continued until 2014, when they were granted victim status in the proceedings, notably in respect of the loss of property. 22. On 9 February 2009 Mrs Birlant Beterakhmadova (application no. 24693/09) complained to the Staropromyslovskiy District Court of Grozny regarding the decision of 24 November 2008 to adjourn the investigation and the prosecutor’s failure to conduct an efficient investigation into the murders. 23. On 3 April 2009 the Staropromyslovskiy District Court noted that the decision of 24 November 2008 had been quashed on 15 March 2009 by the Chechnya Investigative Committee, and dismissed Mrs Beterakhmadova’s complaint. She did not appeal against that decision. 24. The decision of 10 April 2006 to adjourn the investigation (and subsequent similar documents) indicates that in May 2005 the investigation identified S.B. as a suspect. He was charged with aggravated murder and robbery. In February 2000 S.B. had been a police technician with the sapper battalion of the St Petersburg OMON. The charges stated that on 5 February 2000 he, along with three other unidentified persons, had killed Mr Sultan Dzhabrailov (the husband of Mrs Yakhita Dzhabrailova, applicant in case no. 32992/09) by shooting him with a Kalashnikov machine gun. S.B. was also charged with robbing two other people of money and jewellery, A.M and B.M. In October 2005 S.B. escaped to Belarus and his name was put on the international wanted list. In February 2006 the Zavodskoy District Court in Grozny ruled that S.B. should be arrested. The decision of 10 April 2006 states that the investigator informed the victims of that decision, but the case file contains no relevant correspondence. Copies of letters submitted by the parties indicate that a copy of that decision was sent to the victims on 14 November 2007. 25. In April 2011 the investigators asked the prosecutor’s office in St Petersburg to question S.B.’s civil partner about his whereabouts. In November 2012 she stated that she had had no information about S.B.’s whereabouts since 2006, although she had seen him in 2008 in St Petersburg. 26. In November 2012 the investigators examined a social network page belonging to S.B. and noted that the latest photographs on it had been uploaded in 2007. In May 2013 the investigators sought to obtain additional information about S.B.’s whereabouts by questioning his other relatives, locating his mobile phone, and so on. 27. During the questioning of victims and witnesses the investigators collected additional information about the suspects. Thus, in February 2009 Mr Ibragim Musayev (application no. 21200/09) referred to servicemen from the 245th motorised rifle regiment, the commander of that regiment, and the commander of company no. 6 (see Musayev and Others, cited above, § 107) as possible suspects. 28. In April 2010 the investigation produced a list of over 170 servicemen of the St Petersburg OMON who had been posted in Chechnya in February 2000, and asked for verification of whether one of them had a tattoo in the shape of a snake on his neck, mentioned by one of the witnesses. Dozens of servicemen were inspected, but no one with a snake-shaped tattoo was identified. When questioned in February 2011, the servicemen, in brief statements, confirmed that they had served in Chechnya in February 2000 but had no knowledge of the civilians killed in the Novye Aldy. 29. In April 2010 the investigators sent a letter asking the prosecutor of the Northern Caucasus military circuit to identify and question the servicemen and commanders of the 245th motorised rifle regiment (see Musayev and Others, cited above, §§ 105-07). The letter contained detailed information and questions about the events of 5 February 2000, and asked the prosecutor to identify and question the people who had used known radio call signs and to identify the commanders of the operation. In June 2010 an officer of the military unit concerned stated, as a witness, that all details about the use of radio equipment and the assignment of calls were stored as secret information for five years. Several reminders followed in 2011 asking, in particular, for the former commander of the 245th regiment, Major-General S.L., to be questioned. 30. In June 2010 the investigator in charge sought similar information from another military unit (the 15th motorised rifle regiment), including the names of the unit commanders who had taken part in the operation on 5 February 2000. In particular, the letter referred to the commander of company no. 6 of the regiment, who, the investigators suggested, had written a note left by the servicemen for the local residents. 31. In May 2011 the investigators asked the military investigators to submit information about the commanders of the 245th motorised rifle regiment and to ask them a number of specific questions about the events of 5 February 2000. 32. In April 2011 the investigators asked the investigator of St Petersburg to carry out additional ballistic reports on 357 guns used by the St Petersburg OMON in February 2000. 33. In May 2011 the investigator in charge informed the military prosecutor of the Southern military circuit that the special operation on 5 February 2000 in the south of Grozny had been under the command of Colonel Ye.K., the head of the operative headquarters of the internal troops of the Ministry of the Interior. He reminded the military prosecutors of his previous requests for the commanders of that operation to be identified and questioned. It does not appear that any progress was achieved in this respect. 34. During additional questioning in the period 2009-2013, local residents were asked about the damage to their property caused in 2000. They explained that many houses had been burnt down by the servicemen, and that those who had stayed in the district had been forced to give up their jewellery and valuables as a result of threats. Others estimated the amount of pecuniary damage caused (see Appendix). No one was granted victim status in relation to any property offence and no additional documents were requested from the residents. The victims stated that they would seek damages in the course of a criminal trial, as civil parties. 35. On 18 January 2014 the investigator ruled that no criminal proceedings should be opened in connection to the crimes relating to property, due to the expiration of the statutory limits for those crimes. It does not appear that that decision was challenged. In December 2014 decisions according civil party status in criminal proceedings with regard to property claims were issued in respect of the following applicants: Ayset Musostova (no. 32862/090), Birlant Beterakhmadova (no. 24693) and Zoya Musayeva (no. 21200/09). Osman Kudozov (application no. 30578/09) submitted documents which indicated that the house for which he claimed compensation had been owned by M.K., his sister. In his written statement to the Court he stated that at some point M.K. had received compensation from the State for the lost property, but he submitted no relevant documents. 36. On 5 December 2007 the investigation of criminal case file no. 12011 into the events of 5 February 2000 was resumed, and the victims were informed accordingly. 37. On 5 January 2008 the investigation was adjourned. 38. The investigation was then resumed, but on 18 August 2008 was adjourned again, and the applicants were informed accordingly. 39. The investigation was then resumed, but adjourned again on 24 November 2008. A letter informing the victims of the adjournment was dated 24 October 2008. 40. It appears that the investigation was reopened and then adjourned again on 11 January 2009. 41. It was then reopened in March 20009, and on 16 April 2009 adjourned again, for similar reasons as those stated in the decision of 10 April 2006 (see paragraph 24 above). 42. On 22 March 2010 the Chechnya Investigative Committee gave an order for an investigating group to be set up which would include investigators from the military prosecutor’s office, in view of information about the possible implication of military servicemen in the crimes. 43. In June 2010 the investigators watched a video filmed in the Novye Aldy on 9 February 2000 (see Musayev and Others, cited above, § 25) and produced the video’s transcript for the file. 44. In November 2012 the investigators compiled a table of people who had been killed on 5 February 2000, indicating their places of burial, the next-of-kin granted victim status in the proceedings, and the dates of such decisions. The table contains information about forty-seven deaths, including the deaths of twenty people about which the applicants in the present case complain; the one exception is Isa Akhmadov, born in 1964 (the brother of Aysest Musostova, application no. 32862/09). At the same time, the table contains information about the death of a certain Isa Akhmatov, born in 1959, in respect of whose death another person (his brother) was questioned and granted victim status in June 2012. 45. In December 2014 the investigation recognised civil party status of three applicants in connection with the destruction and theft of property during the events of 5 February 2000. 46. It does not appear that the applicants were informed of any other developments, or that they sought further information from the investigating authorities.

5. The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Chernivtsi. 6. In October 2002 the Zalishchytskyy Local Court of Ternopil Region issued a writ of enforcement in a case against a private company, U. The parties did not provide any documents related to the proceedings against company U. 7. Under that writ in March 2005 the State Bailiffs’ Service seized, among other property items which belonged to company U., an industrial construction (a 2,000 sq. meters metallic shed) of a declared worth of 98,000 Ukrainian hryvnas (UAH) equivalent at the material time to around 13,950 euros (EUR). 8. In December 2005 the State Bailiffs’ Service concluded an agreement with a private company M. to hold an auction in order to sell the seized shed. 9. On 3 April 2006 the applicant participated in this auction and bought the above construction for UAH 26,000 (at the material time around EUR 4,200). The applicant submitted copies of the bills according to which he had paid the above amount in full. 10. On 10 August 2006 the applicant sold the shed to a private person T. for UAH 50,000. 11. On an unidentified date, a third person S. lodged an administrative claim against the bailiffs and the applicant seeking to declare the bailiff’s seizure and sale of the shed unlawful as in fact it belonged to him. In view of this claim, in October 2006 the sales contract between the applicant and T. was annulled by the parties and the applicant returned the money to T. On 23 November 2006 the Zalishchytskyy Local Court of Ternopil Region found that the shed belonged to S. and thus the bailiffs had unlawfully seized and sold it. There is no information as to whether there was an appeal against this decision. 12. In parallel, criminal proceedings for abuse of office were initiated against bailiff D. in charge of the respective enforcement proceedings. On 16 March 2007 the applicant was given victim status in these proceedings. In the relevant resolution it was noted that the applicant sustained pecuniary damage and had not been reimbursed the money he had paid at the auction. The amount of the damage aggravated the charges against the bailiff. 13. On 2 August 2007 the Zalishchytskyy Local Court convicted the bailiff as charged. In the text of the sentence the applicant is referred to as a witness. Apparently, no civil claim was submitted by the applicant in the course of these criminal proceedings. There is no information whether there was an appeal against this sentence. 14. In May 2008 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the Bailiffs’ Service and the local department of the State Treasury claiming compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. The applicant referred to provisions on compensation of damage of the Civil Code of Ukraine, in particular Article 1174, and to Article 11 of the Law of Ukraine “On the State Bailiffs’ Service” according to which damage caused to an individual by actions or omissions of a state official, in particular, by a bailiff during enforcement proceedings, had to be compensated by the State (see paragraphs 19 and 21 below). 15. On 1 December 2008 the Sadgirskyy District Court of Chernivtsi found for the applicant based on the above legislative provisions. It awarded the applicant UAH 60,262 (equivalent to around EUR 6,884) which comprised: i) cost of the shed (UAH 26,000); ii) bank commission (UAH 262); iii) lost income (UAH 24,000) and iv) non-pecuniary damages (UAH 10,000). 16. Following the defendant’s appeal, on 12 March 2009 the Chernivtsi Regional Court of Appeal quashed this decision and rejected the applicant’s claims as unsubstantiated. The court held that since the applicant was not a party to the enforcement proceedings in the case against company U. he could not claim damages from the bailiffs under Article 11 of the Law of Ukraine “On the State Bailiffs’ Service” (see paragraph 21 below). The court of appeal did not examine the applicability of the Civil Code provisions, relied upon by the applicant and the local court. The court further noted that the applicant failed to demonstrate that the shed had been in fact seized from him without any compensation, or that the sales contract with company M. in charge of the auction had been dissolved. 17. The applicant appealed in cassation stating that he no longer owned or used the shed as its seizure and sale were found unlawful by the court decision of 23 November 2006 (see paragraph 11 above) and it had been returned to S. He noted that the money he paid at the auction had not been reimbursed. He thus sustained damages. To support his claim the applicant reiterated again the Civil Code provisions. 18. On 23 July 2009 the Supreme Court of Ukraine refused to open cassation proceedings finding the cassation appeal ill-founded.

5. The applicant was born in 1975 and is detained in the Corradino Correctional Facility, Paola, Malta. 6. The applicant is currently serving a term of imprisonment for drug-related offences. On 3 December 2009 he was sentenced to sixteen years’ imprisonment and fined 40,000 euros (EUR) by the Criminal Court. The punishment was confirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeal on 19 September 2013. 7. The applicant started to serve his prison sentence and on 10 December 2009 he had been placed in Division 2 (cell no. 88) of the Corradino Correctional Facility. He remained in various cells in Division 2 to date, except for two brief periods in 2011 where he had been placed in Division 6 (a high security unit) for nine and eleven days respectively, the latter ending on 4 December 2011. In particular after 4 December 2011 the applicant had been staying in cell no. 45 until 26 December 2014 and thereafter had been hosted in cell no. 70, both in Division 2. 8. The applicant alleged that a huge amount of maintenance was needed to the area due to its old age (around 200 years old) and that it lacked both light and air. Windows were behind two iron grids and a third layer of exterior iron bars (hereinafter referred to as ‘triple‑barred windows’). Division 2 also had three skylights, which were kept closed even during the summer months, leading to a great amount of heat. The “environment” was squalid and had a bad smell. 9. In the period during which he had been placed in cell no. 45, the applicant had had to suffer the fumes and excessive heat from the bakery close to his cell, which fumes and heat poured into his poorly ventilated cell. The applicant also described the cell as being nearly underground and as structurally condemned. Due the triple-barred windows he could barely see outside. In winter the cell was very humid and cold. 10. When, on 26 December 2014, he moved to cell no. 70 (see paragraph 7 above), which was very small and had very little ventilation; the applicant felt claustrophobic. Furthermore, he claimed to hardly ever having had access to running water. 11. According to the applicant, in Division 2 the food was of a very poor quality, non-nutritious, and portions were too small. Additionally, the food quality was so terrible that between 1 and 4 September 2015 prisoners had to be taken to hospital as a result of food poisoning. The applicant claimed that the kitchen was so dirty that mice were found dead in it. 12. The applicant complained that there was no combined automated toilet‑flushing system installed. Therefore, inmates had to flush their own personal toilet by means of a water bucket which was provided to them. Moreover, at times there was no access to running water in the cell. Access to water was limited in general, and water available was not potable. While inmates were permitted to buy bottled water, they were forced to reduce their daily intake when they were short on cash. 13. As to the showers, hot water was often not available and the water was dirty. The applicant submitted that there were not enough showers, with one of the showers having a broken and cracked tray that could cause injury if one were not careful. He alleged that, for all the inmates in Division 2, only one shower was available most of the time, with two showers being available during the summer months. 14. The applicant claimed that the cost to make telephone calls was very high and had been increased on 3 December 2014. He had complained to the prison authorities to no avail. 15. He complained that the prison allowance given to detainees was too little. This made everything available at the tuck shop excessively expensive. It inevitably also impacted the inmates’ ability to buy bottled water and make telephone calls. 16. The applicant claimed to have suffered health issues and had even been confined to his bed because of illness for some time. The emergency buzzer in the cell never worked and when he had been confined to his bed because of illness and tried to ring it, no one came, since the buzzer did not work. It took thirty minutes for someone from the staff to show up, at which point he was told off by the staff member. 17. Petitions were filed in regard to these conditions. Furthermore, some of his fellow inmates had lodged constitutional cases concerning the situation. However, none led to any change.

5. The applicants were born in 1951 and 1948 respectively and live in Makiyivka. 6. On 2 February 2002 B., the applicants’ son, died in a road accident in the town of Makiyivka. B.’s car collided with another car being driven by Br., who sustained serious bodily injuries and was taken to hospital. 7. On the same day the Makiyivka town police inspected the scene of the accident and questioned M., who was Br.’s passenger at the time of the accident. 8. On 4 and 5 February 2002 forensic medical experts identified the injuries on the applicants’ son’s body and noted that there was ethyl alcohol in his blood and urine. 9. Between 5 February and 8 April 2002 the police conducted technical vehicular examinations and questioned Br., the applicants, and several other witnesses. According to the results of the technical examinations, the applicants’ son swerved into the oncoming traffic lane and collided with Br.’s car, which was moving in the opposite direction. The expert therefore concluded that the applicants’ son had contravened traffic rules and thus caused the road accident. 10. On 18 April 2002, after the applicants had lodged their complaints, the Makiyivka District police opened a criminal investigation into the circumstances of the applicants’ son’s death. 11. Between May 2002 and January 2005 the police ordered three forensic technical expert examinations, an additional technical examination, a vehicular trace examination, and three forensic expert examinations of the applicants’ son’s body. The police also conducted several on-site accident reconstructions, questioned witnesses, and took other investigative measures. The investigating authorities found that the surviving driver, Br., had previously been employed in a police security company, but that he had resigned before the accident happened. 12. In the course of the above investigations, on 4 November 2003 the Chief Department of Investigations at the Ministry of Internal Affairs issued instructions as to the manner in which the case was to be investigated. It was emphasised that there had been contradictions in the evidence; the scene of the accident had not been inspected properly; Br.’s car had not been seized; the circumstances of the accident had not been noted carefully; and the witnesses had not been identified. 13. On 2 July, 4 September and 29 October 2004 the criminal case was terminated because the investigators considered that it had been the applicants’ son who had contravened traffic rules and caused the accident resulting in his own death. Those decisions were quashed as unsubstantiated by supervising prosecutors, who found that further measures were required to ensure full and objective investigation. Numerous investigating instructions were given. 14. Between 2005 and 2007 the investigators ordered two more technical expert examinations and a vehicular trace examination, three medical forensic expert examinations of the applicants’ son’s body, and a medical forensic examination of Br. 15. On 5 November 2007 the investigator ordered a new technical expert examination, which was completed on 19 June 2008. According to the results of the examination, it had been the applicants’ son who had contravened traffic rules and caused the accident in which he had died. 16. On 23 June 2008 the investigator terminated the criminal proceedings because of the death of the applicants’ son. The applicants objected to the grounds on which the case had been terminated, because their son had not been exonerated. 17. On 1 September 2009 the prosecutor quashed the decision of 23 June 2008, noting that the applicants had objected to the grounds for termination of the proceedings, and therefore it had been for the court to take a final decision in the case. 18. On 29 September 2009 the investigator asked the Gornyanskyy District Court of Makiyivka (“the District Court”) to close the criminal case concerning the traffic accident in which the applicants’ son had died. 19. On 23 June 2010 the District Court rejected the investigator’s request and sent the case back to the prosecutor’s office, finding that there had been procedural errors in referring the case to the court. In particular, the investigator was instructed to prepare a bill of indictment. 20. On 3 September 2010 the investigator closed the criminal case by his own decision, on the grounds that the person responsible for the accident had died. That decision was quashed on 3 December 2010 by a supervising prosecutor for failure to follow the court’s instruction of 23 June 2010. 21. On 28 January 2011 the investigator referred the case to the District Court for a further decision on discontinuing the proceedings. 22. On 31 January 2012 the District Court discontinued the criminal proceedings because of the death of the person responsible for the accident. The applicants appealed, arguing that the investigation had not been thorough and that the available evidence had been contradictory. 23. On 24 April 2012 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal quashed the decision of 31 January 2012 as unlawful, finding that the first-instance court should carry out a full examination of the case and give judgment, either finding the applicants’ son guilty or acquitting him. 24. On 26 December 2013 the District Court found the applicants’ son guilty of causing a traffic accident, but the sentence was not imposed owing to his death. 25. On 7 April 2014 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal quashed the above judgment, finding that the first-instance court had violated the applicants’ right to defence, and remitted the case for a fresh examination by the same court. 26. From April 2014 illegal armed groups associated with two self‑proclaimed entities known as the “Donetsk People’s Republic” and the “Luhansk People’s Republic” began operating in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, seizing control of certain parts of those regions by force, including Makiyivka. Ukrainian Government forces launched a military anti-terrorist operation against them. A ceasefire line was later put in place. 27. According to information provided by the applicants, their case was going to be examined by the “authorities” of the “Donetsk People’s Republic”.

4. The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Karlovac. 5. At about 5.50 p.m. on 2 November 2012 the police spotted the applicant with another man, V.P., in a vehicle parked in the car park of a supermarket in Biograd na Moru. The applicant was already known to the police as a convicted drug dealer. While he was inside the supermarket the police approached V.P., who tried to throw away a plastic bag containing heroin. The police arrested him. When the applicant left the supermarket, he started to run away, but the police officers caught him and arrested him at about 6 p.m. 6. According to the Government, since the applicant resisted arrest, the police officers had to apply force (a so-called “leg sweep” technique). 7. According to the applicant, he was beaten by the police officers while lying on the ground. 8. The applicant was then taken by the officers to the premises of the Zadar police. 9. A criminal complaint was lodged against the applicant on charges of substance abuse. 10. Medical documentation shows that on 3 November 2012 the applicant was seen by a doctor in the Zadar General Hospital and that he had sustained injuries the day before ”in a fight”. The injuries recorded were a haematoma below both eyes and a perforated left eardrum. A further medical record of 29 August 2013 shows that the applicant had a broken crown on one of his teeth. 11. On 2 November 2012 officers B.R. and B.M. compiled a report for the Criminal Police Department of the Zadar police (“the Zadar criminal police”) on the force they had used against the applicant. The report stated that at about 5.50 p.m. that day several officers from the Drug Crimes Division of the Zadar police had followed a lead that the applicant had been procuring large amounts of heroin from an unknown person in Šibenik and selling it on in Zadar and Biograd na Moru with another person, V.P. The officers had arrived in a van in the car park of a supermarket in Biograd na Moru. Several officers had stayed in the van while officers B.R. and B.M. had attempted to carry out an identity check on the applicant and V.P., who had both been known to the police as convicted drug dealers. V.P. had tried to throw away a plastic bag containing about 5 grams of heroin. The applicant had attempted to run away to avoid being arrested. Officers B.R. and B.M. had grabbed him by his hands but he had continued to resist them. Officer B.M. had then applied a leg sweep technique which had made the applicant fall to the ground and hit the left side of his face. The officers had then applied an arm lock technique to handcuff the applicant. He had refused the medical assistance offered to him and had said that he had had no objections to the conduct of the police officers. 12. A report on the use of force against the applicant compiled on 3 November 2012 by the Zadar criminal police and signed by the applicant indicates that he had “no objections”. A record of the applicant’s detention of the same date states that he had a visible injury, a haematoma above his right eye, and that he said that he had fallen down. 13. On 5 November 2012 the chief of the Zadar criminal police sent a report on the use of force against the applicant to the chief of the Zadar police, describing the events at issue in the same manner as officers B.R. and B.M. He expressed the opinion that the police officers had lawfully used forced against the applicant. 14. On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a complaint with the Ministry of Interior about the force used against him by the police officers. 15. On 28 December 2012 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the Zadar Municipal State Attorney’s Office (“the State Attorney’s Office”), alleging that police officers B.R., B.M. and S.K. had hit and kicked him all over during his arrest on 2 November 2012, even though he had not put up any resistance. He also alleged that later on, on the police premises, an officer wearing the badge no. 4373 had pushed him down the stairs. He enclosed a medical report dated 3 November 2012 showing that he had suffered a haematoma under both eyes and a perforated eardrum, the latter of which was considered a serious bodily injury. 16. On 8 January 2013 the State Attorney’s Office asked the Zadar police to interview officers S.K. and B.R. as well as other officers involved in the incident, including the officer whose badge number the applicant had remembered. The police were also instructed to obtain medical records concerning the applicant’s injuries and to proceed with the case urgently and submit their report within thirty days. 17. On 14 January 2013 officer A.V., the chief of the Drug Crimes Division of the Zadar police, interviewed B.R. and F.Z. The record of the interview with B.R. describes the applicant’s arrest in the same terms as the report compiled by officers B.R. and B.M. (see paragraph 11 above). F.Z. was one of the officers who had stayed in the van when the two other officers had attempted to carry out identity check on the applicant and V.P. F.Z. did not describe the use of force against the applicant by the two other officers, but did state that the allegations in the applicant’s criminal complaints were false. 18. On 16 January 2013 the Zadar police asked the Prison Service for the identity of the officer with badge no. 4374 but it turned out that none of the officers had had that particular badge number. 19. On 17 January 2013 officer A.Š., the chief of the Forensics Division of the Zadar police interviewed officer S.K. He said that on the critical occasion he had been on duty in Zadar and had had no knowledge of the events at issue. 20. On 28 March 2013 the chief of the National Police asked the chief of the Zadar police to check the applicant’s allegations from the standpoint of the police and to cooperate with the State Attorney’s Office. 21. On 9 April 2013 the State Attorney’s Office informed the applicant that the police had been asked to carry out an enquiry into his allegations. The report it had received on 23 January 2013 indicated that the applicant had resisted the police officers in their attempt to carry out an identity check and put him in a police vehicle, in response to which the officers had used force against him which had resulted in him being forced to the ground and “receiving a blow to the head”. It was concluded that the applicant’s allegations were unfounded and he was informed of his right to complain to the Zadar County State Attorney’s Office. 22. On 12 April 2013 I.M., an officer from the Professional Conduct Department of the Zadar police interviewed officer M.K., a guard from the police’s detention facility. He said that in November 2012 the applicant and V.P. had been brought into the facility by police officers on suspicion of substance abuse. He had noticed some injuries on the applicant, namely a bruise above his eye. The applicant had said that he had fallen. At about 6 p.m. both the applicant and V.P. had sought medical assistance because of withdrawal symptoms. An ambulance had arrived and taken the applicant to the Zadar General Hospital. M.K. had made an official note about these events and had also informed the Deputy State Attorney. 23. On 25 April 2013 officer I.M. (see paragraph 16 above) wrote a report on the force used against the applicant. She stated that the State Attorney’s Office had forwarded the applicant’s complaint to the General Crime Department of the Zadar police, against officers S.K. and B.R. as well as one unidentified officer, alleging that they had ill-treated and hit him which had caused him bodily injuries. The State Attorney’s Office had asked that several officers be interviewed and that the applicant’s medical documentation be made available. The complaint had been assigned to the chief of the Zadar criminal police. Officer I.M. stated that the chief of the Drug Crimes Division had interviewed officers B.R., B.M. and F.Z, while the chief of the Forensics Division had interviewed officer S.K. The related report had been sent to the State Attorney’s Office on 21 January 2013. Officer I.M. then described the incident in question as reported by the police officers implicated. She concluded that the applicant’s complaints were unfounded and that it had been aimed at securing him a better position in the criminal proceedings against him. 24. On the same day the chief of the Zadar police sent a letter to the applicant informing him that the police officers had lawfully used force against him and that no case of ill-treatment could be established on the basis of the medical reports or statements of the police officers concerned. Furthermore, his own statements had been contradictory. 25. On 26 April 2013 the chief of the Zadar police sent a report to the chief of the Supervisory Service of the National Police (Služba za nadzor, unapređenja rada i razvoj policije), repeating the findings of officer I.M. 26. On 8 May 2013 the applicant replied to the State Attorney’s Office, stressing that his submission was a criminal complaint rather than a petition and asked that a decision concerning the merits of his allegations be adopted. 27. On 14 May 2013 the State Attorney’s Office ordered the police to identify the fourth police officer mentioned in the criminal complaint who had allegedly pushed the applicant down the stairs and had the badge no. 4743 (not 4374) and whose last name was A. 28. On 12 November 2013 the Deputy State Attorney interviewed officers B.M. and B.R. B.M. said that on 2 November 2012 the police had received information that the applicant had been procuring heroin and selling it on in the Biograd na Moru and Zadar area. B.M. had been working that day with officers B.R., J.P. and F.Z. They had noticed the applicant with V.P. in a vehicle which had been parked in the car park of a supermarket in Biograd na Moru. The applicant had left the vehicle and entered the supermarket while V.P. had stayed inside it. B.M. and B.R. had approached the vehicle, identified themselves to V.P. who had then left the vehicle and thrown away a plastic bag which had contained about fifty grams of heroin. V.P. had not put up any resistance and had been handed over to officers J.P. and F.Z. who had placed him in the police vehicle. B.M. and B.R. had approached the applicant inside the supermarket and identified themselves. Since there had been some customers in the supermarket the officers had not resorted to handcuffing the applicant but had instead taken the applicant by the arm and escorted him towards the exit. The applicant had verbally expressed his discontent but when inside the supermarket had not physically resisted the officers. B.M. had held the applicant by one of his wrists. When they had left the supermarket the applicant had made a sudden movement to free himself and had attempted to flee. Officer B.M. had caught up with him and applied a leg sweep technique. Officer B.R. had also then caught up with the applicant who had then fallen to the ground, together with officers B.M. and B.R. While on the ground the applicant had fiercely and aggressively resisted the officers, attempting to get up and flee. That had lasted for about three to four minutes. It had been difficult for the officers to hold the applicant down, as he had weighed about 90 kilograms. B.M. admitted that in responding to the applicant’s fierce resistance he might have hit him once or twice in order to prevent him from fleeing. His intention however had not been to hurt him. After the applicant had been overcome, he had been restrained and there had been no further hitting or ill-treatment. B.M. also stated that the officers’ conduct in respect of the applicant had been completely professional and that the use of force against the applicant had been “unavoidable”. The officers had been cautious since they had known the applicant as a drug dealer and had had to ensure that he did not flee and destroy the evidence. B.M. also said that officer S.K. had never worked with them. B.R. described the incident in the same terms as officer B.M. As regards the specific moment when the applicant and two officers had fallen to the ground he said that the situation had become really messy because the applicant had put very strong resistance to fight them off. Officer B.R. admitted that in the commotion he or officer B.M. had hit the applicant on the head but neither of them had had any intention to hurt the applicant. The commotion on the ground had lasted for about three to four minutes after which the officers had managed to overcome and handcuff the applicant. He also stressed that there had been a risk of the applicant fleeing and destroying the evidence. 29. On 26 November 2013 the State Attorney’s Office dismissed the complaint on the basis of statements taken from the police officers involved as well as from officers, the applicant’s allegations and the medical documentation enclosed. It found that officers B.M. and B.R. had had no intention of causing serious injuries to the applicant. The decision relied on the officers’ assertion that during his arrest the applicant had put up strong resistance and that the force used against him had been necessary. The applicant was informed of his right to take over the prosecution by lodging an indictment against the accused within eight days. 30. The applicant then took over the prosecution. 31. On 10 December 2013 the applicant asked for an investigation into the matter. He lodged an indictment with the Zadar Municipal Court the following day, against officers B.R., B.M. and S.K. He repeated his allegations and requested that the accused, V.P. and the security guards of a supermarket on duty at the critical time be questioned, and that a forensic report be ordered in order to establish how his injuries had been caused. 32. The applicant’s request for an investigation was dismissed on 11 June 2014 by a Zadar County Court investigating judge on the grounds that the officers involved had had no intention of causing serious bodily injuries to him. No further witnesses were questioned and no reasons were given in that regard. 33. The applicant appealed on 16 June 2014. He argued that the relevant facts surrounding his arrest had not been assessed, that no evidence had been collected and that it was for the State authorities to prove that the injuries he had sustained during his arrest had not been caused by the police. The appeal was dismissed on 30 June 2014 by a three-judge panel of the Zadar County Court on the grounds that the perforated eardrum the applicant had suffered during his arrest did not amount to a serious bodily injury. 34. A subsequent constitutional complaint lodged by the applicant was declared inadmissible on 21 October 2014 by the Constitutional Court for lack of competence on the grounds that it did not concern his civil rights and obligations or a criminal charge against him. 35. On 11 December 2013 the applicant lodged an indictment with the Zadar Municipal Court against B.R., B.M. and S.K. on charges of causing serious bodily injury. 36. It was declared inadmissible on 30 April 2014 on the grounds that it did not contain all the relevant information, namely that the accused had not given any oral evidence beforehand, as required by law. 37. On 9 May 2014 the applicant lodged an appeal, arguing that when his criminal complaint had been dismissed by the State Attorney’s Office on 26 November 2013 he had been instructed to take over the prosecution by lodging an indictment within eight days. He had complied with that time‑limit and had also on 11 December 2014 asked the Zadar County Court to take oral evidence from the accused. The appeal was dismissed on 4 February 2015 on the grounds that the accused had not given any evidence beforehand.