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4. The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Toretsk. 5. In December 2007 the applicant lodged a claim with the Dzerzhynsk Court against the Social Insurance Fund (“the Fund”), seeking damages for injuries caused by a work-related accident. 6. By a judgment of 17 January 2008, the above court allowed the claim in part and awarded the applicant certain amounts in damages. The applicant and the Fund both sought to appeal against that judgment. 7. In particular, on 25 January 2008 the applicant lodged through the Dzerzhynsk Court a statement of intent to lodge an appeal (“the statement of intent”; заява про апеляційне оскарження). The copy of the statement of intent submitted to the Court bears the Dzerzhynsk Court’s stamp with reference number 1561 showing 25 January 2008 as the date of receipt. On 13 February 2008 the applicant lodged the appeal itself, in which he requested that the appellate court quash the judgment of 17 January 2008 and award him the claimed damages in full. A copy of the appeal bears the Dzerzhynsk Court’s stamp, with 13 February 2008 showing as the date of receipt. The applicant stated that no separate procedural decisions had been made about his appeal because it had been mislaid by the court. 8. In a ruling of 18 March 2008 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) examined the appeal lodged by the Fund, rejected it as unsubstantiated and upheld the judgment of 17 January 2008. The ruling did not mention the applicant’s appeal, and only stated that at the hearing, which was held on the same day, the applicant and his representative had contested the Fund’s appeal and had asked the court to reject it. 9. According to the transcript of the court hearing on 18 March 2008, the applicant’s representative stated during the hearing that the applicant had lodged the statement of intent on 25 January 2008 and the appeal itself on 13 February 2008. She also stated that they were not challenging the judgment of 17 January 2008 as regards the application of the law but rather were merely seeking an award of the full amount of damages claimed by the applicant. The applicant’s representative also asked the Court of Appeal to reject the Fund’s appeal. The applicant submitted that at the hearing his representative had also produced a copy of his appeal and had asked the Court of Appeal to join it to the case file; however, the latter refused to do so. 10. The applicant appealed in cassation to the Supreme Court of Ukraine. A copy of the appeal in cassation submitted to the Court shows that the applicant had dated it 17 May 2008. In it the applicant stated that he had lodged an appeal against the judgment of 17 January 2008 but that when he had arrived at the appellate hearing on 18 March 2008, it transpired that his appeal had been mislaid and his submissions had therefore not been examined by the Court of Appeal. He thus asked the Supreme Court to quash the ruling of 18 March 2008 and to remit the case for fresh examination. 11. On 27 June 2008 the Supreme Court refused to grant leave for the applicant’s appeal in cassation. It stated that the Court of Appeal had examined the appeal lodged by the Fund, but that the applicant had not personally appealed against the judgment of 17 January 2008 and for this reason the case could not be reviewed in cassation. It did not address the applicant’s argument that he had indeed lodged an appeal, but that it had been mislaid. The decision of the Supreme Court indicated that the applicant’s appeal in cassation had been lodged in “April 2007”.

6. The applicant was born in 1977 and is a life-sentenced prisoner. He has been detained in X Prison since 2008. During the relevant period he was detained in the increased surveillance wing of the prison. 7. In January 2012 the applicant had been relocated from one section of the increased surveillance wing to another. 8. On 11 February 2012 the applicant entered the cell of a fellow prisoner and stabbed him multiple times in the stomach, back and arms with a scissor blade. The attacked prisoner was taken to hospital following the incident. According to the applicant’s explanation to the prison he had considered it necessary to punish his fellow inmate, as he had allegedly behaved arrogantly towards him. 9. On 13 February 2012 the prison administration decided to impose additional security measures (täiendavad julgeolekumeetmed) on the applicant. It took into account the stabbing incident of 11 February 2012, the applicant’s history of aggressive behaviour and emotional characteristics (see paragraphs 12–13 below), and the need to ensure the health and safety of all those employed and detained in the prison. The measures entailed placing the applicant in a locked isolation cell (eraldatud lukustatud kamber); restricting his freedom of movement and communication inside the prison; banning him from using the prison’s sports facilities; and handcuffing him whenever he was taken outside of his cell. The decision stated that the measures were to be applied until the grounds for them ceased to exist, but for no longer than six months. It also indicated that the decision had to be served on the applicant. 10. The applicant lodged a complaint against the decision with the Tartu Administrative Court, but as he had failed to pay the State fee, the court refused to examine it. 11. On 10 August 2012 the prison administration took two decisions by which it decided to prolong the application of additional security measures. On 9 August 2012 the applicant had been given the possibility to express his opinion about the planned prolongation. The decisions indicated that they had to be served on the applicant. 12. In the first decision the authorities listed the applicant’s five previous convictions (for, inter alia, theft, hooliganism, acts of violence, fraud, and extortion causing damage to life or health) before he was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. They then noted that the applicant had been convicted and given a life sentence in 2001 for the murder of two people and the attempted manslaughter of another person. The authorities also provided a detailed summary of incidents, altogether seventeen, which had occurred in prison between February 2002 and the incident of 11 February 2012 and which involved unlawful activity, disruptive behaviour and insubordination, and repeated violence or the threat of violence on the part of the applicant against the prison officers. They further listed a total of twenty-five prior decisions, taken since 2003, to apply additional security measures to the applicant. 13. The decisions also referred to a personal risk assessment dated 20 September 2011, which stated that the applicant had a low tolerance to stress and low self-criticism, which was supported by the fact that expressing anger had previously helped him get his way. He blamed others for his problems, and was found to resort to self-harm and injuring others to get what he wanted. 14. Taking this into account, as well as the fact that on 30 May 2012 the applicant had, in a telephone call to the Ministry of Justice, said that he would be left with no option but to assault a prison officer, the prison authorities held that it would not be possible to discontinue the additional security measures. The fact that the applicant did not have any valid disciplinary punishment at the time the decision was taken was not considered decisive. 15. By the first decision of 10 August 2012 the following additional security measures were imposed on the applicant: (i) placement in a locked isolation cell to better monitor him and prevent contact with other prisoners, towards whom he might become violent; (ii) restriction on his freedom of movement and communication inside the prison to prevent contact with other prisoners, whose health he might endanger; (iii) a ban on using the prison’s sports facilities, as it was not possible to ensure the restrictions on his freedom of movement and communication while escorting him to these facilities. 16. The use of handcuffs on the applicant outside of his prison cell was at first not prolonged, but the decision was amended by another decision of the same date which required him to be handcuffed via the hatch on his cell door even before anyone entered. It was considered that he might pose a danger to the prison officers, particularly at the moment when the door was being opened, regardless of whether or not he was to be escorted outside of his cell. 17. The measures were subject to review within no more than six months after being served on the applicant. 18. On 30 September 2012 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Tartu Administrative Court, seeking to have the decisions of 10 August 2012 annulled. On 31 January 2013 the court found that the prison authorities had duly considered the applicant’s most recent actions, as well as his overall prior behaviour and personal risk assessment. It found that the application of additional security measures to the applicant had been justified in the interests of other prisoners and the prison officers, and dismissed his complaint. 19. On 2 March 2013 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Tartu Court of Appeal, requesting that the judgment of the Tartu Administrative Court be quashed and that the decisions of 10 August 2012 be declared unlawful, as it was no longer necessary to annul them as they had ceased to have effect six months after they had been adopted. 20. On 8 April 2013 the Court of Appeal allowed an application by the applicant to have the annulment proceedings reclassified as proceedings for the determination of unlawfulness. 21. On 9 January 2014 the Tartu Court of Appeal adopted a decision to join the cases in the second and third sets of court proceedings (see paragraph 29 below). 22. On 28 February 2014 it dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the judgment of the Administrative Court in the second set of court proceedings. The court noted that the prison had discretion in deciding whether to apply additional security measures and thus the judicial review of such decisions was limited. It found that in the present case the additional security measures had not been applied as a punitive measure, but to prevent possible harm to the life and health of the prison officers and other prisoners. The unpredictable, aggressive and violent behaviour of the applicant had given grounds for a reasonable fear that he might pose such a danger. The Court of Appeal also took a decision regarding the judgment of the Administrative Court of 4 October 2013 in the third set of court proceedings (see paragraph 30 below). 23. On 1 April 2014 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court against the judgment of the Court of Appeal in the joined cases. On 5 June 2014 it refused to examine the appeal. 24. On 15 February 2013 the prison administration prolonged the application of additional security measures after giving the applicant the opportunity to express his opinion about the planned prolongation. The decision stated that it had to be served on the applicant. 25. The decision relied on the already mentioned information (see paragraphs 12 and 16 above) and a new personal risk assessment dated 26 September 2012 (which considered the applicant to be dangerous; it noted that he had a low tolerance to stress and that aggressive behaviour was one of the coping strategies which helped him get his way). In addition, the prison authorities relied on information from the security department that the applicant had attempted to obtain prohibited items through other prisoners so that he could “settle scores”, once the additional security measures were discontinued, with those he had had disagreements with. Based on the above, the security measures were considered necessary to prevent the likely harm the applicant might cause. The same security measures as applied by the decisions of 10 August 2012 were imposed (see paragraphs 15 and 16 above) and were again subject to review within no more than six months after being served on the applicant. 26. On 7 April 2013 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Tartu Administrative Court, seeking to have the decision of 15 February 2013 annulled. 27. On 4 October 2013 the court dismissed the complaint. It found that the prison authorities had correctly assessed that the applicant could still be considered unpredictable and dangerous to other prisoners and the prison officers and that the application of security measures – as a preventive step – had been justified. 28. On 5 November 2013 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Tartu Court of Appeal. 29. As noted above, on 9 January 2014 it adopted a decision to join the administrative cases in the second and third sets of proceedings (see paragraph 21 above). 30. On 28 February 2014 it adopted a judgment reversing the judgment of the Tartu Administrative Court of 4 October 2013 in part. The court held that the first-instance court should have found the decision of X Prison of 15 February 2013 unlawful with regard to the period 10 to 14 February 2013, since X Prison had been obliged to review its decisions of 10 August 2012 within no more than six months. It upheld the remainder of the judgment of the Tartu Administrative Court of 4 October 2013. In doing so, the court relied, inter alia, on the information gathered by the prison security department (see paragraph 25 above), which the court examined in closed proceedings as the material was confidential. The court found that the aforementioned information gave X Prison sufficient grounds to believe that, upon the lifting of the additional security measures, the applicant would pose a danger to other prisoners and the prison officers. 31. On 1 April 2014 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against the judgment of the Court of Appeal, but on 5 June 2014 the Supreme Court refused to examine it. 32. The applicant was kept in different cells over the relevant period, all measuring approximately 9.9 square metres. The Government provided photographs of the relevant cells and a list of the personal items the applicant had in his cells. According to the list, the applicant had had a television set in his cell since 26 July 2012. The applicant was authorised to wear his own clothes. 33. The applicant was able to have long-term and short-term visits from his next-of-kin. Between 10 August 2012 and 15 August 2013 he was authorised to have thirteen long-term visits (of up to twenty-four hours) to meet his wife and daughters and two short-term visits. On some occasions the visits were cancelled, as the visitors did not attend. During the period concerned he had one meeting with his lawyer. 34. The applicant had the right to make telephone calls and send letters. He could use the Internet to access legislation and could borrow books from the library. 35. He had an opportunity to spend one hour daily in the open air and do physical exercises alone in the prison exercise yard, which measured 22.7 square metres. 36. Between 5 September 2012 and 13 March 2013 the applicant participated in a social reintegration programme entitled “The Right Moment” (focusing on issues such as the mapping of problems, emotions and thoughts; expression and verbalisation of feelings; coping with conflict and tolerating different viewpoints) and between 27 March and 31 July 2013 in the “Anger Management” programme. Both programmes entailed discussions with a psychologist to analyse the covered topics. 37. Between 28 October 2012 and 4 August 2013 the applicant participated, on an individual basis, in musical activity under the guidance of a recreation leader (huvijuht). According to the information provided by the Government, the activity took place between seven and ten times a month. 38. The applicant was under constant medical supervision. During the period from November 2006 to August 2016, he turned to the prison medical services with different health issues a total of 1102 times. On 23 August 2016 a psychiatrist issued a certificate stating that, based on a psychological assessment, the applicant did not have an irrational fear of forests (see paragraphs 41 and 58 below). 39. According to a statement (õiend) issued by the prison on 1 January 2017, between 11 February 2010 and 11 August 2013 the applicant’s cell did not overlook a forest. He was placed in a cell with a forest view on 12 August 2013. 40. The applicant submitted that he had not been allowed to take part in any social events or recreational activities, and had been totally prevented from associating with other inmates. He added that “during the first few years” (which includes the relevant period in the present case) in a locked isolation cell, he had not been able to use a television set or a radio and that these had been provided only “some two years” after his initial placement in the locked isolation cell. He submitted, however, a reply from X prison dated 10 October 2013, in which the authorities refused to grant him permission to have a radio (as every prison cell already had a built-in radio), but noted that he had been authorised to have a television and thus had been guaranteed sufficient access to information. 41. In a certificate (tõend) dated 16 August 2013 a psychiatrist asked for the applicant to be relocated to a cell without a forest view. In an opinion dated 23 August 2013 a clinical psychologist discouraged his placement in such cells as they might increase his feeling of loneliness and isolation, particularly at night. 42. With reference to his musical activity, the applicant submitted a document dated 1 December 2014 in which the X prison authorities explained that in relation to the incident of 11 February 2012, the applicant had not been allowed to take part in musical or art activity, but added that such a right had been granted as of October 2014.

4. The applicant was born in 1974 and lived, prior to his arrest and conviction, in Moscow. 5. On an unspecified date the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having murdered Ch. He was charged with unlawful purchase and possession of firearms and aggravated murder. 6. On 11 July 2006 the investigator questioned Sh., who had witnessed Ch.’s murder. Sh. identified the applicant as the perpetrator. On 27 July 2006 she confirmed her earlier statements in the applicant’s presence. On an unspecified date Sh. was admitted to hospital and was unable to attend the trial. 7. On 28 March 2007 the trial by a jury opened in the Moscow City Court. 8. On 10 April 2007 the jury returned a guilty verdict. The twelve jurors held the applicant responsible for the murder by ten votes to two, and for unlawful possession of firearms by nine votes to three. 9. By a judgment of 13 April 2007, the Moscow City Court sentenced the applicant to eighteen years’ imprisonment. 10. On 18 April 2007 the applicant lodged a statement of appeal in which he alleged, inter alia, that Sh.’s statement had been read out during the trial in contravention of the applicable rules of criminal procedure. On 28 April 2007 he lodged a supplementary statement of appeal “in connection with newly discovered circumstances”. He wrote that he had found out that on several occasions the presiding judge had entered the room where the jurors had been deliberating and advised them to declare him guilty. The applicant asked the appellate court to take evidence from the jurors and to quash the conviction. 11. On 14 May 2007 Judge Sht., who had presided over the applicant’s trial, refused to amend the minutes of the trial to take note of the applicant’s statement that the judge had been present during the jury’s deliberations, had advised them as to how to fill out the questionnaire and had made comments about the applicant’s character and guilt. 12. On 21 May 2007 the applicant’s representative obtained a statement, certified by a notary public from N., a juror. The juror stated that during the trial the presiding Judge Sht. had often visited the deliberations room, that he had spoken of the applicant’s guilt as if it had been already established and that he had given them instructions on how to fill out the questionnaire. 13. On 5 June 2007 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the conviction on appeal. It rejected the applicant’s complaint about the presiding judge’s interference with the jury deliberations in the following terms: “The [applicant’s] allegations ... that the presiding judge breached the secrecy of jury deliberations and that he entered the deliberations room and told the jury how they were supposed to answer the questions [issued by the judge] are not substantiated. It follows from the trial record that the defence did not object to the actions of the presiding judge and did not allege any breach of confidentiality of jury deliberations. The [applicant’s] argument that he learned about those breaches only after the end of the trial is not grounds for quashing the conviction. The additional documents submitted by the defence – the statement by one of the jurors certified by a notary public – may only give rise to an application to law-enforcement authorities, which would have to decide on the institution of criminal proceedings. Moreover, the jurors rendered the verdict by a majority vote rather than unanimously ...” 14. As regards the applicant’s argument that Sh., a witness, was not questioned in person during the trial and that the presiding judge allowed an earlier statement of hers to be read out, the Supreme Court noted as follows: “The defence did not object to the reading-out of the statement by Sh., who did not appear in court on account of her undergoing treatment in hospital. Neither [the applicant] nor his counsel questioned the authenticity of the medical certificate submitted by Sh.’s counsel ...” 15. By a letter of 16 July 2007, the Moscow city prosecutor’s office rejected the applicant’s complaint concerning the actions by the presiding judge by reference to the Supreme Court’s findings in the judgment of 5 June 2007.

6. The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Frankfurt am Main. 7. On 30 October 2013 the Frankfurt am Main District Court issued an arrest warrant against the applicant as there was a strong suspicion that he had aided the commission of crimes, worth several million euros, of aggravated fraudulent conversion, corruption, corruption in commercial practice and aggravated tax evasion through an elaborate system of bribes and fictitious invoices in connection with international business undertakings by a company. The arrest warrant was based on the risk of his absconding owing to the possible heavy sentence for the offences in question. He was also married to the co-accused, who, like him, was a national of the Russian Federation, and he did not have a legal residence or other significant ties to Germany. There was also a risk of collusion. On the same day, he was arrested and the District Court ordered his detention on remand. On 11 September 2014 the District Court included additional charges in the arrest warrant. 8. On 19 December 2014 the Frankfurt am Main prosecution authorities brought criminal proceedings against the applicant, charging him with eight counts of aiding aggravated fraudulent conversion, one count of aiding aggravated corruption and fourteen counts of aiding aggravated tax evasion. On 26 January 2015 the Darmstadt Regional Court sent the translation of the 280-page indictment to the applicant. On 6 March 2015 he responded to the indictment and asked the court not to open the main proceedings. On 18 March 2015 the prosecution authorities asked the Regional Court to amend the proceedings against the applicant, based on the results of the investigation obtained after the criminal proceedings had been brought. 9. On 6 May 2015 the Regional Court decided to open the main proceedings, which commenced on 8 June 2015. On 14 July 2016 the Regional Court convicted the applicant on five counts each of aiding fraudulent conversion and tax evasion and sentenced him to four years and six months’ imprisonment. The conviction has not yet become final, with appeals lodged by both the applicant and the prosecution authorities still pending at the time the Court examined the application. 10. On 26 October 2016 the Frankfurt am Main District Court decided to set aside the arrest warrant of 30 October 2013, which since the outset had been the basis for the applicant’s continuous detention on remand. 11. From 15 January 2014 onwards the applicant challenged the lawfulness of his remand detention before the Frankfurt am Main District Court and the Frankfurt am Main Regional Court without success. Following a request by the prosecution authorities, the Frankfurt am Main Court of Appeal on 28 July 2014 ordered the prolongation of the applicant’s remand detention. It also ordered that the case file be re-submitted to it by 28 October 2014 at the latest for the next periodic review. Until that time, it transferred the competency for further reviews to the court having jurisdiction according to the general provisions (see paragraphs 21 and 22 below). It considered that there was a risk that the applicant might abscond and that continued detention on remand was not disproportionate in light of the sentence which he risked incurring if found guilty. On 5 September 2014 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court against that decision. The court refused to accept it for adjudication, without providing reasons (no. 2 BvR 2050/14), a decision which was served on the applicant on 6 October 2014. 12. Subsequently, the applicant initiated another set of review proceedings before the District Court and lodged a complaint of bias against the competent judge. The complaint was eventually rejected in accordance with the proceedings prescribed by law, as were the remedies pursued by the applicant. On 8 December 2014 the Frankfurt am Main District Court dismissed an application from the applicant to set aside the detention order as it had become devoid of purpose (prozessual überholt) because the Frankfurt am Main Court of Appeal had been seized with a review of the applicant’s detention under Articles 121 et seq. of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 13. On 24 October 2014 the prosecution authorities submitted a statement and the case file to the Frankfurt am Main Court of Appeal, requesting the extension of the applicant’s detention on remand in accordance with Articles 121 et seq. of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 14. On 7 November 2014 the applicant requested that the detention order be set aside. He also requested that the Court of Appeal decide on his objection and an appeal to be heard, lodged on 25 August 2014 against the Court of Appeal’s decision of 28 July 2014, prior to the expiry of the time‑limit given to him to respond to the prosecution authorities’ submission. On 10 November 2014 the Court of Appeal dismissed the objection and the appeal to be heard. 15. On 19 November 2014 the names of the judges called to decide on the continuation of the applicant’s detention were disclosed to the applicant, following his request of the same day. On 25 November 2014 the applicant lodged a complaint of bias against two of the three judges concerned, arguing that they had repeatedly contacted the wrong authorities – either the Frankfurt am Main District Court or Regional Court, rather than the prosecution authorities – to request the case file and had taken two and half months to decide on his objection and appeal to be heard. That had amounted to an arbitrary handling of his case and the judges involved could not decide on the continuation of his detention with the necessary impartiality. The judges gave their statements on 27 November 2014 and 1 December 2014. The applicant then requested additional statements from them, which was not deemed to be necessary by the Court of Appeal on 11 December 2014. Four days later the applicant lodged another complaint about bias, arguing that their statements in response to his first such complaint could not restore his confidence in their impartiality. The judges concerned again gave statements and the applicant’s counsel was given the opportunity to respond. On 30 December 2014 the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s first complaint of bias as ill-founded, finding that there were no indications that the judges concerned were partial, even assuming that they had made a procedural mistake in connection with requesting the case file, leading to a delay in deciding on his objection and appeal to be heard. On 8 January 2015 the applicant lodged an objection against that decision. On 22 January 2015 the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s second complaint of bias as ill-founded, also addressing his objection in its decision. 16. On 26 January 2015 the Court of Appeal asked the Frankfurt am Main Regional Court about the current state of the criminal proceedings and what developments there had been. The Court of Appeal was informed by the prosecution authorities that the criminal proceedings had been brought before the Darmstadt Regional Court, rather than the Frankfurt am Main Regional Court, so the Court of Appeal made a similar enquiry to the court in question on 3 February 2015. 17. On 10 March 2015 the applicant’s lawyer sent to the Court of Appeal two comprehensive submissions which he had made in the main proceedings before the Regional Court and asked the appeal court to take them into account when deciding on the continuation of the applicant’s remand detention. 18. On 27 March 2015 and on 10 April 2015 the applicant lodged two applications with the Court of Appeal, asking it to take a decision in the pending review proceedings without delay. 19. On 21 April 2015 the applicant lodged another constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court, alleging that the absence of a decision by the Court of Appeal in the pending detention review proceedings had violated his right to liberty and security. On 27 April 2015 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to accept the complaint for adjudication without providing reasons (no. 2 BvR 726/15). 20. On 15 May 2015 the applicant was served with a decision by the Frankfurt am Main Court of Appeal, taken on 15 April 2015 and issued on 13 May 2015, ordering the continuation of his detention on remand. It found that the risk of his absconding continued to exist. It further considered that in the light of, inter alia, the amount of evidence to be examined, the requests for legal assistance sent to several countries, and the scope and complexity of the case, there was no indication of undue delay in the conduct of the criminal proceedings, with the trial being scheduled to commence in June 2015. The applicant’s continued detention on remand was, therefore, proportionate. The court did not address the duration of the review proceedings nor provide any reasons for it.

5. The applicant was born in 1973. She grew up in Šiauliai, which in 2003, the time relevant in this case, had about 130,000 inhabitants. She currently lives in Vilnius. 6. The applicant’s medical records show that in May 1992 she was treated for three weeks at Kaunas Psychiatric Hospital (Kauno psichiatrijos ligoninė), where doctors diagnosed her with an acute paranoid reaction disorder (ūmi paranoidinė reakcija). The applicant had been taken to hospital by her parents, who had stated that she had previously joined the Believers in God religious sect (Dievo tikėjimo sekta) and that she had become agitated and disorientated. At her parents’ request and once her health had improved, in summer 1992 she continued treatment at a psychiatric institution in Šiauliai (Šiaulių psichoneurologijos dispanseris), where her diagnosis was acute paranoid psychosis (ūmi paranoidinė psichozė). The doctors noted that the applicant had joined another religious sect, the Hungarian sect (Vengrų), and that her condition had worsened after joining in certain of the sect’s activities in a forest. In particular, she had not been able to communicate well and had spoken only about religion-related topics while at the hospital. Subsequently, the applicant received treatment in the same psychiatric institution in Šiauliai in 1994, when she was diagnosed with paranoia (paranoidinė būsena). She was disorientated and depressed. The doctors noted that the applicant had an inner conflict – she was dissatisfied with the hyper care (hipergloba) given to her by her mother, but was nevertheless not independent or mentally mature. In the summer of 1996 the applicant was again admitted to hospital and treated in the psychiatric institution in Šiauliai, where she was diagnosed with moderately severe endogenous depression (endogeninė depresija, vidutinio gilumo). Once her mental state had improved, the applicant refused to stay in psychiatric institution and was released. 7. On an unknown date, the applicant obtained a degree in law. In 1997 she won a competition to pursue postgraduate studies (podiplominei stažuotei) in the United States, where she studied for two years. 8. In May 2002, the applicant’s father became ill with cancer. The applicant was distressed, did not sleep well and had a car accident. Her mother took her the same month to the Volte private hospital in Vilnius, where she was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (potrauminio streso sutrikimas). She spent a week in the hospital and was released at her own wish so she could be treated as an outpatient. 9. In December 2002 the private company which employed the applicant as an in-house lawyer was put into liquidation. The applicant later found a job as a lawyer at the Ministry of Economy (Ūkio ministerija). 10. In February 2003 the applicant made her first visit to the Ojas Meditation Centre, the Lithuanian branch of the Osho religious movement (see Leela Förderkreis e.V. and Others v. Germany (no. 58911/00, § 6, 6 November 2008), where she started meditating (pradėjo medituoti). She states that she found “inner spiritual and emotional healing for [her] stressed and disharmonious inner state, [caused by her] father’s illness, car accident and the loss of [her previous private sector] job”. 11. According to the applicant’s medical records and court decisions (also see paragraphs 29, 33 and 45 below), on the morning of 7 May 2003 she arrived for work as usual at the Ministry of Economy in Vilnius. She suddenly felt exhausted and asked her superior (viršininkė) for some time off. When her superior refused, the applicant slammed doors and ran out of the office. She was stressed and agitated. She then left her vehicle unlocked in the middle of the street, returned to her apartment, undressed completely, and began screaming on her balcony. She did not open the door to her work colleagues. The applicant’s mother called her the same day, but could not communicate with her because of the applicant’s state of mind. The mother then asked for help from the applicant’s cousin, E.Š. At about 8 p.m. the applicant’s sister, G.M., and her cousin, E.Š., arrived in Vilnius, and called an ambulance. The applicant was then taken by force to Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital (Respublikinė Vilniaus psichiatrijos ligoninė), a public hospital under the Ministry of Health Care. 12. At the psychiatric hospital, the applicant refused to sign a form consenting to her admission and treatment. Her cousin did so instead, at 9.15 p.m. The applicant was agitated, aggressive and could not understand the situation. She was physically restrained three times for forty minutes, and forcibly administered neuroleptics, including haloperidol. She fell asleep at 4.20 a.m. on 8 May. 13. Later the same morning, the applicant was seen by a psychiatrist, doctor D.Š., who was also a head of division at that hospital, and doctor A.G. The doctors indicated in her medical records that the applicant “did not object to being treated” at that hospital (also see paragraph 29 below). 14. In her application to the Court, and without being contradicted on this point by the Government, the applicant stated that from 8 May to 13 May 2007 she had been placed under the strictest patient regime at Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital. She had been supervised by a nurse twenty‑four hours a day in a ward with eight other patients. She had not been able to leave the ward without a nurse. From 13 May to 5 June, the applicant was under a strict care regime. She could have a walk around the hospital grounds, but only if accompanied by a nurse. On 5 June, and until her release on 26 June 2003, the applicant’s care regime was changed and at certain times of the day she could take walks on her own within the territory of the hospital. 15. The applicant’s medical record of 26 May 2003 reads that the applicant at that time did not yet fully understand how sick she was (pilno liguistos būklės suvokimo dar nėra). The record also states that “it has emerged that the patient attends the Osho non-traditional meditation and improvement centre. During conversation [the applicant] states that attending the centre ‘brings her peace’ while not disturbing her social functions; it is also her ‘essential interest’. [The applicant] has an uncritical attitude to attending the centre. Psycho-correction therapy to be continued”. 16. The record of 2 June 2003 reads that the applicant was clear-headed (mąstymas nuoseklus) and was not agitated (afektas adekvatus). The applicant “was gradually adopting a critical attitude towards psychotic behaviour and also about ways to spend her free time. The treatment was to be continued.” 17. The record of 20 June 2003 reads that “during psycho correction, the applicant was categorical about attending the Ojas Centre, and asserted that ‘it was a personal matter (tai jos asmeninis reikalas)’. The applicant showed no psychotic symptoms.” 18. The applicant was released from Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital on 26 June 2003, after fifty-two days. Her medical records, issued by that hospital and later confirmed by the court appointed experts, stated that from 8 May until 26 June 2003 the applicant had a transitory psychotic disorder (tranzitorinis psichozinis susirgimas), which was a serious mental disorder. The applicant’s medical record of 26 June 2003 stated that her affect (mental state) was flat (calm) and stable (afektas lygus, stabilus) and that she was clear‑headed. She had realistic and concrete plans for the future, had a critical attitude towards psychotic behaviour (atsiradusi kritika psichoziniam elgesiui), and had promised to continue treatment as an outpatient. 19. On 17 June 2003, while the applicant was still being held in Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital, an episode of the Srovės television programme was aired on the LNK national television channel. The channel made an announcement (anonsas) about the forthcoming broadcast in the following way: “R.S. [journalist]: a secret has been revealed (demaskuota paslaptis). There is a centre which has not been registered anywhere and where the meditation practised is so powerful that to become a member you have to submit medical proof that you are not ill with HIV. ... After such meditation Violeta is today in a psychiatric hospital. Her mother is in tears ...” 20. The programme itself contained the following statements, including two by doctor D.Š., head of division and a psychiatrist at Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital, who was interviewed by the journalist on what appeared to be the premises of Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital: “A.K. [journalist]: B. is a woman who has had a management job all her life. ...Today B. has agreed to talk because what has happened is completely unexpected. The woman did not foresee disaster, she did not foresee how her older daughter, who is now an adult, the thirty-year-old Violeta, had been charmed and what she got herself involved with.” “R.S.: The organisation we are talking about today has many secrets ...” “Doctor D.Š.: It does not appear that this young woman (mergina) would participate in orgies. She is not hypersexual, and, well, you know, as far as I have learned, she is of high morals and studied for a couple of years in America for a master’s degree.” ... “R.S.: We are meeting Violeta’s mother and her seventeen-year-old sister at Vilnius train station. The mother and her daughter came here by train from Šiauliai, wishing to tell Violeta’s story. They did not wish to meet in Violeta’s home town (gimtuosiuose namuose), Šiauliai. They are afraid to hurt Violeta’s father. He is seriously ill and it would be hard for him to accept (išgyventi žinią) what has happened to his elder daughter. More than a month ago, in the apartment in the capital where Violeta lives, the most horrible event in the young woman’s life took place. Violeta suddenly had a complete nervous breakdown, acute psychosis. For Violeta’s family, the reason for that psychosis is the influence of the Ojas Meditation Centre.” The programme then discussed the activities of the Ojas Meditation Centre in Vilnius. The journalist implied that the followers of Osho in Vilnius held sex orgies. As to the applicant’s identity, the journalist also mentioned that “Violeta obtained a master’s degree abroad, had an important job in State service (dirbo atsakingą valstybinį darbą)” and that the person was “currently being treated at a psychiatric hospital”. The programme included the following statements: “R.S.: Violeta’s family state that a couple of weeks before the tragedy Violeta would meditate all day and practically not speak to anyone else. She is currently being treated in a psychiatric hospital. ...After two months of meditation Violeta was placed in a psychiatric hospital, in a state of acute psychosis (ūmios psichozės būsenoje).” “Doctor D.Š.: They [people belonging to sects] do not talk about it at all. As far as I have heard, the teachings there [at the Ojas Meditation Centre] take a couple of years, and enlightment happens or something of that kind. This takes place over four years, something is being cleansed. She [Violeta] does not talk about that. She even says that she performs some kind of practice (atlieka praktikas) there; she hides [things]. This is a common trait of members of sects, that they very much hide that fact. Or, if [things] come to light, they portray it as completely innocent. That is very common.” M.V., who according to the register of religious organisations in Lithuania is the “leader” and master (lyderis (meistras)) of the Ojas Meditation Centre in Vilnius, stated during the broadcast that the applicant had been terrorised by her mother. The broadcast concluded with statements by the journalist and M.V.: “R.S.: Maybe it is a coincidence, but a clear danger to Violeta’s mental state appeared just after she had started meditating in accordance with Osho teachings. The young woman will need a long and difficult course of medical treatment (mergina dar ilgai ir sunkiai gydysis). The fact that she has only been in this [Ojas Meditation] centre for a couple of months leads one to reflect on how the practices of the Ojas Meditation Centre can affect someone who is constantly seeking to liberate their soul.” “M.V.: Actually, there is a Catholic atmosphere and a Catholic resistance, maybe even a Christian resistance, against meditation, because there is no God in meditation ...” The applicant’s mother and sister were shown during the programme and identified by their real first names as “B., Violeta’s mother” and “G., Violeta’s sister”. They made statements about the destructive influence that, in their view, the Ojas Meditation Centre had had on the applicant. 21. On 14 August 2003 on the internet site of the Ojas Meditation Center the applicant published a five-page open letter to the journalists at Srovės, signing it with her real name and surname. She expressed regret that the broadcast had not been an objective portrayal of her story. She stated that “by using me, you have maybe created an interesting story, but it is very one-sided. Maybe by unraveling (narpliodamos) the story through my mother you also wanted to protect me and sought to help me, but in reality your broadcast has caused me to feel much distrust and a lot of pain”. The applicant then mentioned that she had previously been admitted to psychiatric institutions in 1992 and 2002, emphasising that those two periods had been unrelated to meditation. She also wrote that she had only started attending the Ojas Meditation Centre in February 2003 and that her emotional breakdown in May 2003 had had no connection to those visits. For the applicant, the Srovės journalists had therefore given an unfair account of her story, and had shown bias by implying that her mental health issues had been caused by meditating at the Ojas Centre. The applicant also stated that in 2002 she had consulted several psychotherapists (psichoterapeutai), who had helped her realise that her psychological problems had roots in her childhood, when she had been controlled by and had lived in fear of emotional and physical violence from her mother. Even at the time of writing there had been resistance and mockery from her family when the applicant had shared her new interests, such as yoga or meditation. The applicant also stated that she “had not been put under a spell (neapžavėjo)” by meditation. Instead, meditation had entered her life naturally as the result of a long and intense spiritual search. She continued: “Meditation for me is a way to learn about myself and the world, and on the basis of that understanding and by deepening it, to open myself to peace, joy, truth and love. Today meditation for me is a means to reduce emotional, spiritual and psychological tension and stress, to understand the reasons behind unhappiness, including by learning how to avoid it. Meditation allows me to live a more conscious life (sąmoningesnis) and one which is full of joy.” 22. The applicant also referred in the letter to her involuntary admission to Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital in 2003, where she had been taken by force and deceit, and where she had never agreed to be treated. She wrote that the psychiatrists had blindly believed her mother’s stories and had diagnosed her as being under the influence of a sect (sektantiškumas). That had led to the psychiatric treatment she had received being mainly directed at how to cure her from practising meditation (pagydyti nuo meditacijos) in a hostile environment that had damaged her psychologically and emotionally. In particular, the psychiatrists at the hospital had interrogated her (buvau kamantinėjama) about the Ojas Meditation Centre and its practices, forced her to promise not to meditate, alleged that sex orgies had taken place there, that meditation was harmful for her mental health, that she should follow the Catholic religion which is traditional in Lithuania and that meditation was not compatible with her “social status”. During one visit (vizitacija), a doctor had called her “the one from the Ojas Centre”, rather than using her name. The applicant also wrote that when she had spoken about meditation at the Ojas Meditation Centre doctor D.Š. had simply made fun of it, had said that that was not meditation, and that the applicant knew nothing about what meditation actually was. The applicant had not been able to resist the psychiatrists at the hospital because refusing to talk to them or disagreeing with their statements about the Ojas Meditation Centre or their instructions to stop meditating had been treated as signs of mental illness. For that reason, the amount of medication at the hospital had not been reduced for a long time, strong drugs had been injected into her, and her release from hospital had been postponed. The applicant also noted that she had intended to submit a written statement to the hospital that she refused treatment, but she had been persuaded not to do so because the doctors had threatened that otherwise they would diagnose her problems in such a way that could later prevent her from getting a job. 23. The applicant concluded by noting that in July 2003 she had attended a session at the Ojas Meditation Centre, and had finally been able to meditate and recover after nearly two months in Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital in a hostile environment that had harmed her mind and body. She saw meditation as means to live a more conscious and meaningful life. 24. In May 2006 the applicant sued Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital for compensation for non-pecuniary damage. She alleged: (1) unlawful deprivation of liberty; (2) a violation of her right to a private life; (3) a violation of her right to freedom of religion; (4) a violation of her right to the inviolability of her body; (5) failure to provide proper medical care; and (6) a breach of her right to be properly informed about her diagnosis, methods of treatment and prognosis. 25. Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital responded by saying that on 7 May 2003 the applicant had been involuntarily hospitalised since she had been in a state of acute psychosis and had posed a danger to herself and others. The hospital also submitted that the applicant had never complained in writing about being held unlawfully. The hospital argued that it had not disclosed any confidential information about the applicant, and that it could not be responsible for the actions of the applicant’s mother and the way the Srovės broadcast had been presented. It added that the Osho religious movement had been acting outside the law in 2003 because it had only been registered in Lithuania as a religious movement on 12 April 2005 (see paragraph 56 below). Furthermore, the applicant had not proved that the hospital had had no reason to think that her non-traditional religious beliefs had been the reason behind her emotional outburst (emocinės iškrovos priežastis). 26. The Vilnius Regional Court ordered the State Forensic Psychiatry Service at the Ministry of Health Care to produce a report to answer certain questions regarding the applicant’s medical condition and her admission to Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital between 7 May and 26 June 2003 on the basis of her medical records. The forensic report was produced in November 2007. 27. On 25 June 2008 the Vilnius Regional Court granted the applicant’s action. (a) As to the lawfulness of the restriction of liberty when the applicant was held at Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital 28. The Vilnius Regional Court noted at the outset that according to Articles 27 and 28 of the Law on Mental Health Care a person could be placed in hospital without his or her consent if there was a clear and present danger of him or her harming themselves or others. Even then, a court order was needed within two days to keep the person in hospital. Should a court refuse such an order, the forced hospitalisation and treatment had to be discontinued (see paragraph 69 below). 29. On the basis of the forensic expert report and other material, the Vilnius Regional Court firstly observed that the applicant had not actually denied that she might have required medical assistance on 7 May 2003 because of her state of mind. However, the court found that as of 8 May 2003 she had no longer been in need of medical support. That was confirmed by the applicant’s medical file, where doctor D.Š. had noted on 8 May at 8.15 a.m. that “the patient is responding to meaningful contact, is correctly orientated (pacientė prieinama prasmingam kontaktui, orientuota teisingai)”. Also, at 8.30 a.m. on the same day, doctor A.G., the other psychiatrist treating her at Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital, had written that “currently the patient is sleepy because of medication ... her mind is clear, she is well orientated when it comes to place and time ... currently the affect is flat (pacientė š.m. mieguista dėl vaistų poveikio, sąmonė aiški, orientacija vietoje ir laike tiksli... šiuo metu afektas lygus)”. The court also based itself on the applicant’s other medical records. All that meant that the applicant’s state of health had no longer corresponded to that set down in Article 27 of the Law on Mental Health Care to permit her further forced hospitalisation. Despite that, the applicant had been held against her will and treated at Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital until 26 June 2003, without the hospital ever asking for a court order. That had been in breach of the two‑day time-limit set in Article 28 of the Law on Mental Health Care. 30. The Vilnius Regional Court also agreed with the applicant’s argument that she had not been able to leave the hospital because she was under the influence of drugs, had faced a threat of being physically restrained if she disobeyed the doctors, and had been under a strict regime. The court noted that the requirement that a psychiatric patient should normally be able to express his or her consent to be hospitalised and treated had also been underlined by the Committee for the Prevention of Torture. 31. The Vilnius Regional Court also observed that there was no written evidence that the applicant had ever agreed to be placed in Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital between 7 May and 26 June 2003. According to the forensic expert report, the applicant had not been able to understand her actions on 7 May 2003; however, the experts had not reached the same conclusion about the period between 8 May and 26 June 2003. That notwithstanding, the applicant had been forced to stay in hospital for fifty‑two days for treatment. The court also emphasised that the patient was always the weaker party in relation to the hospital and its personnel. The hospital’s argument that the applicant had agreed to stay by acquiescence was therefore null and void. The court also relied on doctor D.Š.’s admission during court hearings that the applicant’s life had “not necessarily been in danger” for all of the fifty-two days of treatment and to the same conclusion by the applicant’s treating doctor A.G. In fact, the records signed by doctor A.G. on 8 and 12 May 2007 stating that the applicant was being treated at the hospital had given only one side (vienašališki) of the situation as they had not been countersigned by the applicant. In that context, the court also had regard to the applicant’s explanation that because of the side effects of the medication (sleepiness, inability to concentrate) and the possibility of physical restraint (being tied down) in case of disobedience, she had not been able to express her disagreement about being treated at the hospital in writing. The court also considered that the consent given on 7 May 2013 by the applicant’s cousin, E.Š., for the applicant to be put in hospital and treated could also not be considered as an act of agreement expressed by the applicant. 32. In the light of those factors, the Vilnius Regional Court concluded that the procedure set down in domestic law for forced admission to hospital and treatment had not only been breached in the applicant’s case, but outright disregarded. (b) As to the applicant’s right to privacy 33. The applicant’s mother also testified before the Vilnius Regional Court. She said that she had learned on 7 May 2003 that the applicant was delirious and had asked E.Š. for help. That had led to the applicant being taken to Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital. The mother also said she had contacted the Ojas Meditation Centre in Vilnius about her daughter, but had not received a constructive response. She had then contacted the journalists from Srovės, because she had wished to find out what was happening to her daughter. She had not known what diagnosis the psychiatric hospital had given the applicant and had only told the Srovės journalists which hospital her daughter was in. 34. Doctor D.Š. testified that she was head of division (skyriaus vedėja) at Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital when the applicant had been treated there. She said that the journalists had not called her directly but that the hospital administration had informed her that they would come and had “kind of stated that the talk would be about Mockutė”. The doctor testified that she had “not discussed [the applicant’s] health” with the journalists, only the Ojas Meditation Centre and meditation as such. 35. The Vilnius Regional Court then turned to the applicant’s complaint of a breach of her right to privacy. Relying on Article 14 of the Law on Mental Health Care and Article 2 § 1 of the Law on the Legal Protection of Personal Data (see paragraphs 59 and 61 below), the court noted that “there was evidence in the case-file (byloje yra pateiktas įrodymas) that doctor D.Š. had, without obtaining the applicant’s consent to disclose confidential information, revealed to the Srovės journalists that the applicant had been diagnosed with acute psychosis (ūminė psichozė), that she was being treated at Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital, and that she had studied in the United States”. The interview with the doctor had been shown during the Srovės programme on 17 June 2003. The court noted that even in 2008 (šiuo metu) there were not many people in Lithuania who had studied in the United States and so that characteristic had not been very common. The court also considered that “other information revealed to the journalists about the applicant could also allow the applicant’s identity to be established”, although the court did not specify what other information it meant. (c) As to the applicant’s right to freedom of religion 36. The court then had regard to the applicant’s complaint about freedom of religion by referring to Article 9 of the Convention. It also relied on Article 7 of the Law on Mental Health Care (see paragraph 67 below). 37. The court found valid the applicant’s complaints that the doctors had tried to dissuade (atkalbėti) her from meditating, attempted to alter her views on non-traditional meditation religion and had treated her against meditating and attending the Ojas Meditation Centre. That conclusion was based on the applicant’s medical file, which contained the following records for 26 May and 20 and 23 June 2003: “ ... absence of a critical attitude towards attending [the Ojas Meditation] Centre”; “during psycho-correction expressed opinion in categorical terms about attending the Ojas Centre, argues, that ‘it is a personal matter’”; “when efforts were made during psycho-correction to get the applicant to form a critical attitude (suformuoti kritiką) towards non-traditional religious beliefs, [the applicant] for a long time remained uncritical and also categorical”. The first-instance court underlined the fact that the psychiatric hospital had not provided any proof of the suggestion that practising a non-traditional religion would place the applicant or others in danger. The court thus concluded that “by attempting to alter the applicant’s attitude to non-traditional religion, meditation, and their practice at the Ojas Meditation Centre” the hospital had breached her right to freedom of religion. Lastly, the court rejected as legally irrelevant the hospital’s assertion that at the time of the applicant’s admission to hospital the meditation centre had been operating “unlawfully”. The Vilnius Regional Court observed that the religious movement had been a party to court proceedings for its registration at the time and had been registered on 12 April 2005. (d) As to the applicant’s remaining complaints 38. After finding that between 9 May 2003 and 26 June 2003 the applicant had been placed in hospital and given treatment against her will in breach of domestic law (see paragraph 31 above), the Vilnius Regional Court considered that there had therefore been a breach of the applicant’s right to the inviolability of her body. Furthermore, Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital had failed to prove that it had properly informed the applicant about her state of health, her diagnosis, the methods of treatment and the prognosis for her condition (see paragraph 70 below). 39. However, the Vilnius Regional Court dismissed as unsubstantiated the applicant’s claims that she had been provided with inappropriate medical care at Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital and that the doctors there had forged her medical records. (e) The first-instance court’s conclusion 40. The Vilnius Regional Court thus granted the applicant’s civil claim in full and awarded her 110,000 Lithuanian litas (LTL, approximately 31,850 euros (EUR)) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. She was also awarded legal costs of LTL 1,000 (EUR 290). 41. Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital appealed. According to the hospital, there was no proof that doctor D.Š. had disclosed confidential information about the applicant’s acute psychosis and that she was being treated at the hospital. The doctor had merely given an opinion about an unidentified person. Moreover, the doctor had pointed out during the first‑instance hearings that she had only given her views when answering the questions the journalists had put to her. Three witnesses – the applicant’s mother, sister and the journalist R.S. – had explained during the first‑instance court’s hearings that the television programme had been initiated by the applicant’s relatives, who had provided information about the applicant. The first-instance court’s reference to studies in the United States as a way of identifying someone was not sufficiently weighty either, and such information was not protected under Article 14 of the Law on Mental Health Care. 42. As to the applicant’s right to freedom of religion, the hospital argued that the lower court had erred in equating meditation with religion. The fact that since February 2003 the applicant had attended meditation sessions of “unknown origin and manner (neaiškios kilmės ir pobūdžio meditacijas)” and that they could have been one of the reasons behind her illness, had not been denied. The hospital insisted that in February 2003 the Ojas Meditation Centre had been operating outside the law. The hospital also relied on a 29 August 2003 statement by the Ministry of Justice that Osho movement centres did not have the status of a religion (see paragraph 55 below), which supported the hospital’s view that meditation was not a religious practice. Accordingly, the applicant’s “fictitious” (tariama) religious freedom had not been breached. 43. The applicant responded by submitting that the right to privacy included the right not to have her health or other confidential information revealed to the journalists or her mother. The applicant added that when she had been in the psychiatric hospital, doctor D.Š. had persistently asked about the meditation she practised and had spoken of it with contempt. Doctor A.G. would tenaciously try to persuade her to denounce her religion and give up meditation. 44. On 20 March 2009 the Court of Appeal upheld the hospital’s appeal in part. (a) As to the lawfulness of the applicant’s placement in Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital 45. The appellate court upheld the Vilnius Regional Court’s finding that on the basis of her health on 7 May 2003 the applicant had been lawfully placed in Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital. Her condition that day had corresponded to the domestic legal requirements for involuntary hospitalisation (see paragraph 68 below). However, the hospital had not provided any evidence that her treatment from 8 May had been indispensable. It was therefore clear that as of that date her treatment at the hospital and her presence there had been involuntary and also amounted to an unlawful deprivation of liberty. The Court of Appeal relied on the Supreme Court’s practice in case no. 3K-3110/2004 of 11 February 2004 to the effect that it was obligatory to follow the procedure set out in Articles 16 and 28 of the Law on Mental Health Care, both when providing a patient with the necessary help (būtinoji pagalba) and when placing that person in hospital without his or her consent. Under that procedure, it had been possible to place the applicant in hospital and treat her without her consent for no longer than forty-eight hours. Without a court order, the forced hospitalisation and forced treatment had to be discontinued. However, there was no information in the case file that such an order had been granted. To make matters worse, the hospital had never even asked the court for such an authorisation. The Court of Appeal thus fully shared the lower court’s view that legal procedures had been outright disregarded, making the applicant’s stay in the hospital unlawful. (b) As to the applicant’s right to privacy 46. The Court of Appeal noted that under Article 22 of the Constitution and Article 14 of the Law on Mental Health Care, patients had a right to have information about their health kept confidential (see paragraphs 58 and 59 above). It could not be disclosed by doctor in charge of treatment or by hospital administration. 47. That being so, the Court of Appeal did not agree with the first‑instance court’s conclusion that doctor D.Š.’s interview with the journalists, which had been shown during the television programme of 17 June 2003, had disclosed information that had revealed the applicant’s identity. The appellate court relied on the Supreme Court’s ruling in case no. 3K-3-630/2004 of 24 November 2004, where it had found that in cases where there was no direct mention of a person in a publication, the process of identification was based on the aggregate evidence of the presence of features which could sufficiently describe the person in mind (see paragraph 63 below). In the particular case of the applicant, the Court of Appeal also referred to her open letter of 14 August 2003 to the Srovės journalists (see paragraphs 21 and 22 above), where she had acknowledged that the television broadcast had been instigated by members of her family, that she had not been shown in the programme in person, and that she had been given a different name. The Court of Appeal considered that the fact that the main character of the programme (laidos herojė) had studied in the United States was not sufficient to establish that the programme was about the applicant. As the applicant had not established that the information disclosed during the broadcast had allowed her to be identified, her claim for breach of privacy had to be dismissed. 48. Lastly, the appellate court rejected the applicant’s argument that her privacy had been breached because confidential information had been given to her mother. The applicant had been treated earlier in psychiatric institutions in Kaunas and Šiauliai because of mental health problems and her mother had been aware of those previous periods in hospital. Moreover, providing information to close relatives about the applicant’s health could not be regarded as a breach of her right to privacy. (c) As to the applicant’s right to freedom of religion 49. The Court of Appeal noted that the right to freedom of religion had been enshrined in Article 26 of the Constitution (see paragraph 64 below) and Article 9 of the Convention. It also noted that under Article 7 of the Law on Mental Health Care, people in hospital had the right to perform religious rites. That right could be restricted by a psychiatrist’s decision only if there was a clear danger to the patient or others, and such restrictions had to be recorded in the patient’s medical file (see paragraph 67 below). 50. On the facts of the case, the Court of Appeal disagreed with the lower court’s conclusion that there had been a breach of the applicant’s right to freedom of religion while she was in Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital. For the Court of Appeal, there was no evidence in the file that the applicant had been forbidden from performing religious rites. Even though the medical records showed (yra matyti) that her doctors had tried to get the applicant to form a critical attitude towards her religious convictions (religinius įsitikinimus), there was no information that any restrictions had been applied to her. The Court of Appeal found that “the doctors’ attempts to get the applicant to form a critical attitude towards her religious convictions did not mean that [the applicant’s] religious freedom had been breached”. (d) As to the applicant’s remaining complaints 51. The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court’s findings that there was no proof that the applicant had received inappropriate medical treatment. It also shared the lower court’s conclusion that Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital had not properly informed the applicant about the treatment she received therein. (e) The appellate court’s conclusion 52. Having dismissed part of the applicant’s complaints, the Court of Appeal lowered the award for non-pecuniary damage to LTL 20,000 (approximately EUR 5,800). The applicant was also ordered to pay Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital’s legal costs of LTL 3,202 (approximately EUR 927). Lastly, the appellate court quashed the part of the first-instance decision on the applicant’s costs being paid by the hospital so she had to bear the legal costs herself. 53. On 17 June 2009 the applicant submitted an appeal on points of law. She argued that the lower courts had failed to properly apply Convention norms on the right to privacy and freedom of religion. 54. By a ruling of 19 June 2009 the Supreme Court refused to admit the appeal for examination, holding that the applicant’s arguments were not sufficient to merit examination. 55. On 12 March 2003 the Ojas Meditation Centre applied to the Ministry of Justice to be registered as a religious community. On 29 August 2003 the Ministry of Justice rejected the application because it considered that although the Centre was on the “border between self-help psychology and religion (egzistuojantis savipagalbos psichologijos ir religijos paribyje)”, it should not be treated as a religious community. Even though the Osho teachings mentioned in the Ojas Meditation Centre’s by-laws were called religious, meditation there was more based on esoteric doctrines of self-improvement than on a religious practice whose main feature was connecting with God, gods or other sacred forms. The Ministry of Justice also noted that Osho movements did not have the status of a religion in western Europe countries. 56. The Ojas Meditation Centre then started court proceedings. Its action was eventually granted by the Supreme Administrative Court on 4 February 2005. The court found no evidence that the Ojas Meditation Centre propagated any controversial practices amongst its members. It was registered as a religious community (religinė bendruomenė) on 12 April 2005 (see Gineitienė v. Lithuania, no. 20739/05, § 24, 27 July 2010). 57. In her observations sent to the Court on 13 January 2015, the applicant stated that she had continued to that day to practise meditation at the Ojas Meditation Centre.

4. The applicant company, S.C. Textinc S.A., is a Romanian company whose registered office is in Timişoara. 5. On 12 December 2008 the Timişoara Finance Inspectorate (hereinafter, “the T.F.I.”) instituted enforcement proceedings against the applicant company on the grounds that it had an outstanding tax liability for the year 2008 amounting to 237,128 Romanian lei (RON). 6. The applicant company, represented by its appointed lawyer, Mr. P. Sălăjan, challenged before the Timişoara District Court the T.F.I.’s decision to open enforcement proceedings. It claimed that it had no outstanding fiscal debts and submitted documentary evidence in this respect. 7. At the first hearing in the proceedings the T.F.I. acknowledged that the applicant company had no outstanding tax liability and that the enforcement proceedings had been instituted in error. Invoking Article 275 of the Romanian Code of the Civil Procedure (hereinafter, “the CCP” – see paragraph 15 below), it also contended that as it had acknowledged its error at the first hearing in the proceedings it should not be ordered to pay the costs and expenses incurred by the applicant company. 8. By a judgment of 16 February 2009 the Timişoara District Court allowed the applicant company’s challenge concerning the T.F.I.’s decision to open enforcement proceedings and ordered the T.F.I. to pay the applicant RON 9,893; this sum represented respectively the fees of the applicant company’s lawyer (9,700 RON), stamp duty and trial tax (193 RON). The court held that although the T.F.I. had acknowledged its error at the first hearing it could not be exonerated from the payment of the costs and expenses incurred by the applicant company, as the challenge proceedings were the result of a mistake on its part. The court further noted that the T.F.I. had started enforcement proceedings against the applicant company for a non-existent debt and that the latter had accordingly had to hire a lawyer and pay the trial fees in order to defend itself. The court also noted that the applicant company had submitted evidence to support its request for the reimbursement of the expenses it had incurred. 9. The T.F.I. lodged an appeal on points of law against the judgment of 16 February 2009. It claimed that the first-instance court had not observed the principle of adversarial proceedings and of equality of arms, as it had not had the opportunity to challenge the amount paid by the applicant company in lawyer’s fees, which in its opinion were too high. 10. By a final judgment of 12 August 2009 the Timiş County Court dismissed the appeal as unfounded. While holding that the lawyer’s fees corresponded to his input in the case, the court reiterated that the judge was entitled to increase or to reduce a lawyer’s fees, according the specific criteria set out by Article 274 of the CCP (see paragraph 15 below). The court thus concluded that the judgment given by the Timişoara District Court was lawful and well-founded; it further awarded the applicant company the amount of 7,596 RON in legal costs in respect of the appeal proceedings. 11. The T.F.I. lodged with the Timiş County Court an application for the judgment of 12 August 2009 to be set aside (contestaţie în anulare – see paragraph 14 below) on the grounds that the County Court had not examined all the arguments that it had raised in its appeal on points of law; the T.F.I. referred in particular to the fact that before the Timişoara District Court they were not given the possibility to bring their arguments concerning the amount requested by the applicant company and then awarded in legal costs and expenses by the first-instance court. 12. In a final judgment of 19 February 2010 the Timiş County Court, sitting in a different formation from that of 12 August 2009, allowed the request: it set aside the judgment of 12 August 2009 (see paragraph 10 above) and allowed the appeal lodged by the T.F.I. against the judgment of 16 February 2009 (see paragraph 8 above), which it partly amended. The County Court held that the appellate court had not examined the arguments raised by the defendant in their appeal on points of law in relation to the manner in which the first instance court applied Article 274 § 3 of the CCP (see paragraph 15 below); in particular, the first instance court had not allowed the parties to bring their arguments concerning the amount of the legal costs requested by the applicant company. Such an omission was sufficient, in the County Court’s view, to justify the quashing of the previous judgments. 13. The County Court then re-examined the amount paid by the applicant company in lawyer’s fees and considered that in relation to the lawyer’s input in the case, it was justified to reduce that amount from RON 9700 to RON 700. It also considered that the stamp duty and trial tax in the amount of 193 RON were not to be granted to the applicant company, in so far as this amount could be requested separately from the fiscal authorities, based on the Law no. 146/1997 on stamp duty, as a consequence of the fact that the challenge to the enforcement had been allowed.

4. The applicant was born in 1960 and is detained in Nizhniy Tagil. 5. On 20 January 2009 the Verkh-Isetskiy District Court in Yekaterinburg remanded the applicant in custody on suspicion of fraud. The authorised detention period was subsequently extended on several occasions. 6. On 16 February 2010 the District Court determined that the case was not ready for trial. It directed the prosecution to remedy certain defects and extended the authorised period of the applicant’s detention until 22 April 2010. 7. On 21 April 2010 the Sverdlovsk Regional Court heard an appeal against that detention order and decided that the applicant could be released on bail. By a supplementary decision taken on the following day in the absence of the applicant and his representatives, the Regional Court fixed the time-limit for posting bail until 11 May 2010. On 29 April 2010 that decision was sent by fax to the remand prison where the applicant was held. He was however unable to post the bail because the District Court did not have a deposit account. The applicant remained in custody. 8. On 12 May 2010 the District Court held that the applicant must be re-detained for his failure to comply with the bail conditions. It did not set any time-limit for the application of the custodial measure. 9. On 2 June 2010 the Regional Court quashed the detention order, finding that the detention order had lacked a basis in fact. It annulled the custodial measure and ordered the applicant’s release. 10. The applicant was released on 4 June 2010. 11. The conditions of the applicant’s detention in remand prison IZ-66/1 can be summarised as follows: (a) Cell 622, from January to June 2009, measured 30 square metres and accommodated 20 to 25 persons who took turns to sleep; windows were not glazed; the toilet was not separated from the living area; (b) Cell 129, June and July 2009, 9 square metres and 6 inmates; (c) Cell 407, July 2009, 12 square metres and 12 to 14 inmates; (d) Cell 408, August 2009 to April 2010, same as above; (e) Cell 155, April 2010, 15 square metres; (f) Cell 134, May 2010, 14 square metres for 8 inmates.

5. The applicant was born in 1983 and lives in Palanga. 6. On 22 November 2013 the director of company M. lodged a complaint with the Klaipėda police, alleging that the applicant’s wife, who had been providing accounting services to company M., had unlawfully transferred large amounts of money from that company’s bank account to other companies. The director claimed that company M. had not obtained any services from those companies and that he had not pre-approved those transfers. 7. On 25 November 2013 the Klaipėda police opened a pre-trial investigation into allegations of embezzlement and falsification of documents, under Article 184 § 1 and Article 300 § 1 of the Criminal Code. The director of company M. was questioned as a witness and stated that in May 2012 he had entered into a contract for accounting services with company A., of which the applicant was the director. In accordance with that contract, the applicant’s wife had begun providing accounting services to company M. In the beginning he had been happy with her work, but later he had noticed certain bank transfers which appeared suspicious to him. One such suspicious transfer had been a payment of 120,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL) (approximately 34,750 euros (EUR)) to company A. 8. On 4 December 2013 the applicant’s wife was granted the status of a “special witness” in the investigation; in line with the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter “the CCP”), she was questioned about her own possibly criminal activity and was exempted from liability for refusing to testify or giving false testimony (see paragraph 27 below). She stated that all the transfers from company M.’s bank account which she had carried out had been pre-approved by its director. She also stated that the transfer to company A. had been made by mistake, and the entire amount had been returned to company M. within a week. 9. On 9 April 2014 the applicant was called as a witness. He refused to give testimony in relation to his wife’s actions and the payment of LTL 120,000 received by company A. from company M. 10. On 26 May 2014 a prosecutor from the Klaipėda regional prosecutor’s office gave the applicant a fine of LTL 650 (approximately EUR 188) for refusing to testify, as provided for in Article 163 of the CCP (see paragraphs 31 and 32 below). 11. The applicant lodged a complaint with a senior prosecutor. He argued that the status of a “special witness” was similar to that of a suspect, and therefore he should not have been compelled to testify against his wife, who had such status. He relied on Article 31 of the Constitution, which prohibits compelling a person to testify against his or her family members (see paragraph 18 below). 12. On 9 June 2014 a senior prosecutor from the Klaipėda regional prosecutor’s office dismissed the applicant’s complaint on the grounds that, in accordance with the CCP, only the family members of a suspect or an accused were exempt from liability for refusing to testify, but the CCP did not extend such a privilege to the family members of a “special witness” (see paragraph 19 below). 13. The applicant lodged a complaint with the Klaipėda District Court, raising essentially the same arguments as those which he had raised before (see paragraph 11 above). He also asked the court to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court for a ruling on whether the CCP provisions which exempted the family members of a suspect or an accused from liability for refusing to testify, but not the family members of a “special witness”, complied with the Constitution. 14. On 9 July 2014 the Klaipėda District Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint and upheld the reasoning in the prosecutor’s decision (see paragraph 12 above). It stated that the applicant’s right not to testify against his wife would have been breached only if his wife had had the status of a suspect and not that of a witness. It also considered that the applicant’s request to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court was “subjective and legally unfounded”. That decision was final and not open to any further appeal. 15. Subsequently, the applicant lodged an appeal with the Klaipėda Regional Court, but on 22 July 2014 that court refused to examine it, on the grounds that there was no provision for such an appeal in law. The applicant then lodged an application to reopen the proceedings with the Supreme Court, but on 23 September 2014 the court ruled that it had no authority to reopen proceedings concerning procedural penalties imposed under Article 163 of the CCP. 16. On 11 September 2014 the applicant was questioned as a witness in the pre-trial investigation. He stated that he was the director of company A., which provided accounting services to other companies. His wife worked as the financial director of company A., and from May to November 2012 she had provided accounting services to company M. The applicant stated that he had not known how or why LTL 120,000 had been transferred to the bank account of company A. He knew only that that entire amount had been returned to company M. within a week, in a transfer carried out by his wife. 17. On 22 September 2014 the Klaipėda regional prosecutor’s office discontinued the pre-trial investigation on the grounds that no criminal offences had been committed. It appears that that decision was not appealed against and became final.

4. The applicant was born in 1969 and is currently serving a prison sentence. 5. At around 5 a.m. on 13 May 2006 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of robberies by officers of the police unit for combating organised crime in the Ryazan region (УБОП при УВД по Рязанской области – “the organised crime unit”), assisted by officers of the special rapid response unit of the Ryazan region (СОБР (ОМСН) УВД Рязанской области – “the rapid response unit”). 6. The applicant’s account of subsequent events is the following. He was taken to the Moskovskiy district police station of Ryazan, where the (unnamed) police officers beat him for an hour, forcing him to confess to carrying weapons. He was then taken to the organised crime unit, located at a different address, where police officers N.A. and I.O. physically assaulted him and subjected him to electric shocks in a gym. Two other (unnamed) police officers of the rapid response unit then continued physically assaulting him, chained his handcuffs to some exercise equipment, pinched his nose and sprayed tear gas into his mouth to force him to confess to robberies and assaults. On the evening of 13 May 2006 the applicant was taken to the Zheleznodorozhnyy district police station of Ryazan. 7. At 7.40 p.m. on 13 May 2006 investigator A.A. from the investigation unit of the Zheleznodorozhnyy district police department drew up a record of the applicant’s arrest. The record indicates that the applicant was arrested at 7 p.m. that day. 8. According to the applicant, during his time at the Zheleznodorozhnyy police station, he was allegedly driven to the organised crime unit several more times and subjected to various forms of ill-treatment. This allegedly included beatings, electric shocks and having a plastic bag placed over his head so that he lost consciousness. 9. At 2 p.m. on 15 May 2006 the Zheleznodorozhnyy District Court of Ryazan extended the applicant’s arrest until 6 p.m. on 16 May 2006. 10. According to the applicant, on the evening of 15 May 2006 he was physically assaulted again at the Zheleznodorozhnyy police station by an unknown police officer, who tried to force him to confess to different unsolved crimes concerning weapons, thefts and drugs. 11. On 16 May 2006 the District Court remanded the applicant in custody. He was placed in a Ryazan pre-trial detention facility (IZ 62/1). 12. According to records from IZ 62/1 dated 16 May 2006, on his arrival at 4.20 p.m. that day the applicant was examined by a medical assistant (feldsher). He had the following injuries: (i) multiple abrasions covered in brown scabs on his forehead and the back and top of his head; (ii) swelling on the inner surface of the lips; (iii) multiple large purple and blue bruises on his chest, abdomen, left side, forearms and shoulders; (iv) purple and yellow bruises on his knee joints; and (v) abrasions covered in brown scabs on the back of the toes of his left foot. 13. On 18 May 2006 the material concerning the applicant’s injuries was forwarded from the pre-trial detention facility to the Zheleznodorozhnyy district prosecutor’s office of Ryazan. It was registered on 25 May 2006. 14. On 25 May 2006 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Zheleznodorozhnyy district prosecutor against the police officers, requesting that they be prosecuted. His complaint was registered that day. 15. On 30 May 2006 the material in both files concerning the applicant’s alleged ill-treatment were joined. 16. On 5 June 2006, 20 December 2006 and 10 June 2008 officials at the prosecutor’s office, and later the Zheleznodorozhnyy inter-district investigation unit of the investigative committee for Ryazan (“the investigative committee”) issued refusals to initiate criminal proceedings against the police officers. 17. The two earlier refusals were overruled by the higher authority within the investigative committee on 25 September 2006 and 9 June 2008 respectively, and the investigation authorities were ordered to carry out additional inquiries. The most recent refusal of 10 June 2008 was issued in accordance with Article 24 § 1 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCrP”) on the grounds that none of the elements of crimes under Articles 285 and 286 of the Criminal Code (abuse of powers) were present in respect of the police officers’ actions. 18. Police officer A.S. from the organised crime unit stated in an explanation of 8 June 2006 that on 13 May 2006 eight officers from the rapid response unit had carried out the applicant’s arrest. As the applicant and three other individuals were armed and refused to get out of their car, physical force (unspecified “sambo” wrestling techniques) and special devices (handcuffs) were used on them. A.S. could not remember whether those arrested had received any injuries. According to him, they were then taken to the Moskovskiy police station. A.S. referred to a report on the arrest. 19. According to the report on the arrest, signed by the head of division no. 1 of the rapid response unit on 13 May 2006, the arrest operation had been carried out between 5.00 a.m. and 5.30 a.m. on 13 May 2006 by eight officers from the rapid response unit. The applicant and four other suspects had been in a car. Two guns had been found during the search. It was stated in the report that the police officers had used “physical force” and handcuffs, and that “no incidents had happened”. 20. Police officers of the rapid response unit (T.D., M.A., O.S., K.D., K.A. and Ch.D.) stated that they had carried out the applicant’s arrest at around 6 a.m. on 13 May 2006. They arrested four individuals (including the applicant), who all resisted arrest. They used physical force and special devices (handcuffs). 21. Police officer P.V. from the organised crime unit stated that, after the applicant’s arrest in the early hours of 13 May 2006, he had searched him in the presence of attesting witnesses. He denied subjecting him to any physical or verbal abuse. 22. Police officers R.A. and B.A. of the Moskovskiy police denied subjecting the applicant to any ill-treatment. 23. Investigator A.A. stated in an (undated) explanation that the applicant had been arrested in the early hours of 13 May 2006 by police officers of the organised crime unit. During his arrest the applicant resisted, and physical force was used on him. A.A. did not know whether the applicant had been subjected to any ill‑treatment by the police officers of the Zheleznodorozhnyy police station. At 7 p.m. on 13 May 2006 the applicant was taken to his room. A.A. arrested him on suspicion of organised robbery pursuant to Article 91 of the CCrP. A.A. denied subjecting the applicant to any physical or psychological pressure. 24. In its most recent refusal to open a criminal case against the police officers dated 10 June 2008, the investigative committee briefly concluded that the applicant’s injuries had resulted from the use of force and special devices (handcuffs) by police officers of the rapid response unit during the applicant’s arrest, as the applicant had resisted arrest. (b) Judicial review of the investigators’ decisions 25. Relying on Article 125 of the CCrP, the applicant appealed against two of the refusals to open a criminal case against the police officers to the courts, namely those of 20 December 2006 and 10 June 2008. 26. On 10 June 2008 the Zheleznodorozhnyy District Court of Ryazan ruled that the applicant’s appeal against the refusal of 20 December 2006 should not be examined, and terminated the proceedings on the grounds that on 9 June 2008 the investigative committee had already revoked the refusal. 27. On 16 December 2008 the same court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the refusal of 10 June 2008, holding that it was lawful and well-grounded. In particular, the court noted that the applicant’s arguments concerning his alleged ill-treatment in police custody from 13 to 15 May 2006 had been examined during his criminal trial and on appeal and dismissed as unconfirmed. On 5 February 2009 the Ryazan Regional Court fully endorsed that decision on appeal. 28. On 26 May 2006 a copy of the applicant’s complaint of ill-treatment was forwarded to the Sovetskiy district prosecutor’s office of Ryazan for a separate inquiry in relation to the police officers of the organised crime unit. 29. On 2 June 2006 and 24 February 2009 respectively, in accordance with Article 24 § 1 (1) of the CCrP, officials at the Sovetskiy prosecutor’s office and Moskovskiy inter-district investigation unit of the investigative committee for Ryazan issued refusals to initiate criminal proceedings against the police officers as none of the elements of crimes under Articles 285 and 286 of the Criminal Code (abuse of powers) were present in respect of their actions. On 25 December 2008 the first refusal was overruled by the higher authority within the investigative committee as unsubstantiated, and the investigation authorities were ordered to carry out an additional inquiry. 30. In its most recent refusal to open a criminal case against the police officers dated 24 February 2009, the investigative committee briefly noted the outcome of the applicant’s criminal case and concluded that there was no objective information showing that any crimes had been committed against the applicant by the police officers. 31. In December 2006 and May 2008 respectively the applicant lodged two more complaints with the Prosecutor General’s Office and the investigative committee against the police officers, investigators and other State officials, requesting that they be prosecuted for unlawful arrest, detention and abuse of power in connection with the events of 13 to 16 May 2006 and his criminal case. 32. On 16 January 2007, 12 April 2007 and 26 May 2008, officials at the Zheleznodorozhnyy prosecutor’s office and the Zheleznodorozhnyy inter‑district investigative committee issued refusals to initiate criminal proceedings against the police officers. 33. The two earlier refusals were overruled by the higher authority within the investigative committee on an unspecified date and 14 May 2008 respectively, and the investigation authorities were ordered to carry out additional inquiries. The most recent refusal of 26 May 2008 was issued in accordance with Article 24 § 1 (2) of the CCrP, because none of the elements of crimes under Articles 285, 286 and 301 of the Criminal Code (abuse of powers and unlawful arrest and detention respectively) were present in respect of the police officers’ actions, as the applicant’s allegations had not been confirmed in the course of the inquiry. (b) Judicial review of the investigators’ decisions 34. Under Article 125 of the CCrP, the applicant appealed against all three of the refusals mentioned above. 35. On 2 April 2007 the Zheleznodorozhnyy District Court of Ryazan examined the applicant’s appeal against the refusal of 16 January 2007 and concluded that it had been unlawful and unsubstantiated because not all of the applicant’s arguments had been examined concerning, in particular, his allegedly unlawful arrest and detention. The investigation authority was ordered to rectify those deficiencies. It appears that the refusal was subsequently overruled by the investigative committee, and an additional inquiry was ordered. 36. On 14 May 2008 the same court ruled that the applicant’s appeal against the investigator’s refusal of 12 April 2007 should not be examined, and terminated the proceedings on the grounds that on 14 May 2008 the investigative committee had already overruled it. 37. On 10 December 2008 the court dismissed the applicant’s appeal, holding that the refusal of 26 May 2008 was lawful and well-grounded. It also endorsed the findings of the trial and appellate courts in the applicant’s criminal case. On 22 January 2009 the Ryazan Regional Court upheld that decision on appeal. 38. On 28 April 2008 the Ryazan Regional Court convicted the applicant of organised banditry, illegal possession of firearms and armed robbery, and sentenced him to fifteen years’ imprisonment and a fine. 39. At trial, the applicant complained that the investigative measures carried out during the preliminary investigation of his criminal case had been unlawful, and that he had been coerced into making a confession. 40. The trial court dismissed the applicant’s allegations as unconfirmed. It referred mainly to the results of the pre-investigation inquiry into the applicant’s allegations of ill‑treatment, which had resulted in the (subsequently overruled) refusal of 20 December 2006 to open a criminal case against the police officers. 41. On 7 August 2008 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld that judgment on appeal, finding the conclusions of the trial court duly reasoned.

5. The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Yerevan. 6. In 1983 and 1988 the applicant was found guilty of indecent acts with minors and sentenced to prison sentences. 7. On 25 January 2001 the Court of Cassation decided to allow an extraordinary appeal lodged by the Deputy Prosecutor General of Armenia, quashed the two judgments and terminated both sets of criminal proceedings against the applicant on the grounds of absence of corpus delicti. In particular, the Court of Cassation found that there was no evidence to suggest that the applicant had committed the imputed offences, and that the court judgments had been based on assumptions and erroneous interpretation of the law. 8. From 2001 the applicant lodged two civil claims against the State, seeking compensation for pecuniary damage sustained as a result of his two convictions. These claims were allowed on 10 September 2001 and 26 August 2005 by the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan, which decided to award the applicant – as an acquitted person – sums of money in compensation for lost income, medical costs incurred to restore his damaged health, his future treatment abroad and travel costs to be incurred in that connection. 9. On 13 April 2005 Investigator N. of the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Prosecutor’s Office instituted a criminal case under Article 316 § 1 of the Criminal Code (“the CC”) in respect of the applicant who was suspected of having assaulted two traffic-police officers, V.S. and G.G., who had stopped the applicant’s car for a violation of traffic laws. 10. On the same date, the applicant was arrested and two days later charged, under the same Article, with assaulting the two traffic-police officers. 11. On 16 April 2005 it was decided not to detain the applicant and to release him on a written undertaking not to leave his place of residence, on the grounds that he was a disabled person suffering from a number of diseases, had no previous convictions, had two children who were minors, as well as his wife and mother as dependants, and had a permanent place of residence. 12. On an unspecified date the two police officers were recognised as victims for the purposes of the criminal case. 13. On 5 May 2005 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan, on the basis of an application by the investigator, changed the preventive measure in respect of the applicant from a written undertaking not to leave his place of residence to detention on remand for a period of two months. The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision, which was dismissed by the Criminal Court of Appeal on 2 June 2005. 14. In the course of the investigation the applicant testified that V.S. and G.G. had demanded a bribe from him in order not to record a violation of the traffic laws and then subjected him to beatings when he refused. A forensic medical examination of the applicant was carried out, which found that he had suffered injuries, including concussion and a fractured cheek bone. 15. On 10 June 2005 the applicant’s lawyer addressed a letter to the investigator, alleging that it had been the applicant who had been assaulted by V.S. and G.G rather than the other way around. Thus, the applicant’s actions had been wrongly assessed as falling within the scope of Article 316 § 1 of the CC, while no charges had been brought against the police officers. The lawyer requested the investigator that such charges be brought. 16. On 20 June 2005 the District Prosecutor decided to replace the applicant’s detention on remand with a written undertaking not to leave his place of residence, on the same grounds as previously (see paragraph 11 above). 17. On 21 June 2005 Investigator N., having reviewed the materials of the criminal case against the applicant, took a decision to discontinue a part of that case and not to carry out criminal prosecution (Որոշում քրեական գործի մասը կարճելու և քրեական հետապնդում չիրականացնելու) with regard to the infliction of injuries on the applicant by V.S. and G.G.. The investigator found that the traffic-police officers had inflicted injuries on the applicant as they had tried to overcome his resistance at the time of arrest, and therefore their actions had amounted to a legitimate use of force. 18. On 16 February 2006 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan acquitted the applicant, finding that he was not guilty of the imputed offence. The District Court also held that the police officers V.S. and G.G. had exceeded their authority by acting violently against the applicant, which had caused serious damage and grave consequences to the applicant and his family. In particular, the applicant had been taken to the police station unlawfully and had been arrested on the basis of false information provided by traffic-police officers V.S. and G.G. The police officers had subjected the applicant to beatings, as a result of which the latter had sustained injuries, including a concussion and a fractured cheek bone. Furthermore, they had forced the applicant into the police car and driven him to the police station leaving the applicant’s car, with his eight‑year-old son inside, in the outside lane of the road. As a result, the applicant’s son had suffered psychological trauma and damage to his health. In spite of the fact that the applicant had not violated the conditions of his written undertaking not to leave his place of residence and that he had been a disabled person and had had two minors as dependants, the investigator had applied to a court with an unfounded application seeking to have him detained. As a result, the applicant had been detained from 5 May to 20 June 2005. Moreover, the grounds for his release on 20 June 2005 under a written undertaking were the same as those which had already been used on 16 April 2005 to justify his release under a written undertaking as opposed to placing him in pre-trial detention. The District Court lastly found that the investigator had taken an unfounded decision not to prosecute the police officers by assessing their actions as lawful and asked the Prosecutor General, with reference to Article 184 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”), to institute criminal proceedings against them under Article 309 § 3 of the CC for exceeding their authority, resulting in grave consequences. 19. On unspecified dates the prosecutor’s office and Officers V.S. and G.G. lodged appeals against that judgment. 20. On 14 November 2006 the Criminal Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals and upheld the judgment of the District Court, finding that the applicant had acted in necessary self-defence. However, it decided to annul the request made to the Prosecutor General on the grounds that Article 21 of the CCP prohibited the reopening of proceedings if there had been a decision of the prosecuting authority to discontinue the proceedings or not to carry out prosecution. On 21 June 2005 the investigator had taken such a decision in respect of V.S. and G.G., which had never been annulled, hence Article 21 excluded the possibility of prosecuting them. 21. On 15 May 2007 the Court of Cassation declared inadmissible for lack of merit an appeal lodged by police officers V.S. and G.G. against that judgment. 22. On 27 November 2007 the applicant lodged a complaint with the courts, seeking to annul the investigator’s decision of 21 June 2005 as it contradicted the findings reached by the courts in his trial when assessing the actions of the police officers. 23. The district prosecutor argued that the applicant’s complaint must be dismissed, since he had missed the six months’ time-limit prescribed by Article 21 § 4 of the CCP. The applicant argued in reply that, pursuant to Article 21 § 5 of the CCP, the time-limits prescribed by that Article did not apply in the event of newly emerged circumstances, which in his case were the judgments adopted in his criminal case. Furthermore, the prosecuting authority was obliged by law to take measures to restore his rights of its own motion. 24. On 25 March 2008 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan decided to dismiss the complaint, finding the district prosecutor’s arguments under Article 21 of the CCP to be valid. It further stated that the district prosecutor’s office could not bear responsibility for the applicant’s failure to contest the investigator’s decision in due time. 25. The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision. 26. On 19 May 2008 the Criminal Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal, finding that Article 21 § 5 of the CCP was not applicable to his case and holding that the applicant had failed to contest the investigator’s decision of 21 June 2005 within the time-limits prescribed by Articles 21 and 290 of the CCP, as well as the time-limit for requesting a reopening of a case prescribed by Article 426.3 of the CCP. The Court of Appeal’s decision was subject to appeal within one month of the date of its delivery. 27. On 16 March 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against the Court of Appeal’s decision, together with a request that the missed one-month time-limit for appeal be renewed. 28. On 8 April 2009 the Court of Cassation found that the applicant had failed to show that he had valid reasons for missing the prescribed one-month time‑limit and decided to refuse the examination of the applicant’s appeal on points of law. 29. On 11 September 2007 the applicant lodged a civil claim against the State, seeking further compensation for pecuniary damage, specifically for loss of income, and compensation for non-pecuniary damage in relation to his two unfair convictions, in the amount of 15,078,664 United States dollars, and in relation to his unlawful arrest and detention and infliction of bodily harm, in the amount of 1,000,000 euros (EUR). 30. On 26 November 2007 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court decided to dismiss his claims. It stated at the outset that the applicant was an “acquitted person” within the meaning of Article 66 of the CCP and was entitled under the same Article to claim pecuniary damage suffered as a result of his unlawful arrest, detention, indictment and conviction. However, the types of compensation that the applicant sought were not envisaged by Article 66 § 4 of the CCP, apart from that sought for loss of income, which the applicant had failed to substantiate. 31. On 28 November 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal. 32. On 7 March 2008 the Civil Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the judgment of the District Court, finding that the applicant had already been compensated for pecuniary damage in relation to his convictions, while his new claims for pecuniary damages were unsubstantiated. As regards the claim for non-pecuniary damage, this had to be rejected on the grounds that Armenian law did not provide for compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 33. On 29 July 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, which was declared inadmissible for lack of merit by the Court of Cassation on 28 October 2008. 34. On 26 February 2009 the applicant lodged another civil claim against the State, seeking compensation for pecuniary damage suffered as a result of his ill-treatment, such as various medical costs. 35. On 26 December 2011 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan examined the applicant’s claim. It held at the outset, with reference to the judgments adopted in the applicant’s criminal case and Article 52 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that the applicant had a case for damages under Article 1063 of the Civil Code, taking into account the fact that the police officers’ actions had been unlawful within the meaning of that Article. The District Court went on to conclude, however, that there was no causal link between the police officers’ unlawful actions and the specific medical costs claimed by the applicant, and decided to dismiss the claim. 36. On 25 January 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal. 37. On 4 October 2012 the Civil Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the judgment of the District Court. 38. On 2 November 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, which was declared inadmissible for lack of merit by the Court of Cassation on 28 November 2012.

6. The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Yerevan. 7. The applicant is an ethnic Armenian who was born and raised in Iran and who subsequently went to live in Armenia. 8. On 19 February 2008 a presidential election was held in Armenia. The subsequent protest rallies were eventually terminated on 1 March 2008 following intervention by the police, which resulted in clashes between protesters and law-enforcement officers and numerous arrests. 9. On 1 March 2008 the applicant, who was apparently near the main rally location around the time of the police intervention, was taken to a police station on suspicion of assaulting a police officer. It appears that when asked for his identity at the police station, the applicant introduced himself as Vardges Gasparyan. 10. In the applicant’s arrest record drawn up on 2 March 2008 his name was indicated as both Vartgez Gaspari and Vardges Gasparyan. 11. In a note dated 3 March 2008 the investigator stated that the applicant’s wife had presented his passport and that the information provided by the applicant about his identity did not correspond to the information contained in his passport. 12. On 5 March 2008 the applicant was formally charged and brought before the Arabkir and Kanaker-Zeytun District Court of Yerevan. The court examined an application lodged by the investigator for the applicant’s pre-trial detention for a period of two months on the grounds that, if he remained at large, he could abscond, obstruct the course of justice, commit another offence and evade criminal responsibility. 13. The applicant submitted before the District Court that the application was unsubstantiated. He had a higher education, was married, was head of a company, had a minor child dependent on him and had no previous convictions. The imputed acts fell into the category of offences of medium gravity and it had not been substantiated that if he remained at large, he would evade criminal responsibility. 14. The District Court decided to allow the investigator’s application, taking into account the dangerousness of the imputed offence and the fact that if the applicant remained at large, he could abscond, obstruct the proceedings, commit another offence and influence witnesses. 15. On 11 March 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal, arguing that there was no evidence suggesting that if he remained at large, he would abscond, obstruct the course of justice, unlawfully influence witnesses, commit another offence or evade criminal responsibility. He was a respected and trusted person in the society, was known to be of good character, had a permanent place of residence and a minor child dependent on him, and had always respected the law. 16. On 20 March 2008 the Criminal Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The Court of Appeal stated that it followed from the case file that after having been brought to the police station, the applicant had introduced himself as Vardges Gasparyan instead of Vartgez Gaspari, thereby providing false information about his identity. His real name was discovered only after his passport had been presented. This provided sufficient grounds to believe that if the applicant remained at large, he could abscond, falsify or conceal evidence and obstruct the investigation by failing to appear when summoned by the authority conducting the criminal proceedings. 17. On 23 April 2008 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan decided to set the case down for trial and to keep the applicant in detention. 18. On 14 May, 17 June, 17 July and 5 August 2008 the applicant applied to the District Court for his release. 19. The District Court dismissed the applications of 14 May and 17 June, finding that the grounds for the applicant’s detention still persisted. It adjourned the examination of the applications of 17 July and 5 August until circumstances necessary for a decision to be taken had been clarified. 20. At the hearing of 23 September 2008, the applicant once again urged the court to release him and asked it to reason its decision. The presiding judge refused to take a decision, stating that it had already been decided on 17 July to adjourn that question. It appears that an argument erupted between, on the one hand, the applicant and his lawyer, who insisted that the judge take a decision on the applicant’s request or otherwise withdraw from the case, and on the other hand, the judge and the prosecutor, who objected to the demand that the judge withdraw. The applicant then wanted to leave the courtroom in protest against the allegedly unlawful actions of the judge. The judge decided to penalise the applicant by removing him from the courtroom on the grounds that he was obstructing the normal course of the hearing, abusing his procedural rights and disrespectfully refusing to follow the judge’s orders. The hearing was adjourned until 29 September 2008. 21. At the hearing of 29 September 2008, the presiding judge refused to grant the applicant’s lawyer permission to lodge an application for release. Thereafter the applicant declared that he wished to lodge a challenge to the judge. In response, the judge decided once again to penalise the applicant on the same grounds as previously, by removing him from the courtroom and adjourning the hearing until 3 October 2008. 22. On 22 October 2008 the applicant lodged another application, seeking to be released on bail. It appears that no decision was taken on that application. 23. On 10 November 2008 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to one year’s imprisonment. The beginning of his sentence was to be calculated from 2 March 2008. The periods from 23 to 29 September and from 29 September to 3 October 2008, during which the court hearings were adjourned because of the applicant’s removal from the courtroom, were not to be calculated as part of his sentence, pursuant to Article 314.1 § 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP). 24. On 27 February 2009 the Criminal Court of Appeal, taking into account that Article 314.1 § 6 of the CCP had been amended in the meantime (see paragraph 35 below) and as a consequence the periods during which the trial court hearings had been adjourned were to be calculated as part of the applicant’s sentence, decided to release him on the grounds that he had already served his one-year sentence. 25. Between 6 March and 23 December 2008 the applicant was kept at Nubarashen Remand Prison. 26. From 6 to 7 March 2008 the applicant was held in cell no. 9, which measured about 20 by 25 sq. m and accommodated seven to eight inmates. The cell was located in a semi-basement and was very damp and unsanitary. The air was stale, as the only source of ventilation was a window measuring one square metre and facing a pit filled with several centimetres of rubbish and frequented by rats. In the evening the toilet situated in the corner of the cell became clogged and sewage from the upper floors flooded the entire cell floor. The inmates’ appeals to the prison guards produced no results and they were allowed only to direct the flood towards the corridor. The applicant addressed a letter to the head of the remand prison, complaining about the unsanitary conditions in the cell and, in particular, the flooding, and requested that measures be taken. 27. At noon on 7 March the applicant was transferred to cell no. 29, which measured about 20 by 25 sq. m and accommodated about ten inmates. While in that cell, the applicant declared a hunger strike in protest against alleged human-rights violations in Armenia. 28. At around 2 p.m. on the same date the applicant was transferred to cell no. 4, where he was kept until 14 March 2008. He shared the cell with another hunger striker. The cell measured about 20 sq. m and was again situated in the detention facility’s semi-basement. The conditions were allegedly unsanitary, the air was damp and it stank of sewage. The only window to the basement cell, measuring 1 sq. m, had a pit in front of it which prevented natural light from entering the cell. No out-of-cell activities were allowed. 29. From 14 to 20 March 2008 the applicant was kept in cell no. 79, which measured 20 sq. m. The cell was relatively calm and ventilated. 30. From 20 March to 15 April 2008 the applicant was kept in cell no. 20, which measured about 20 sq. m and accommodated ten to twelve inmates. Almost all of his cell-mates smoked. Being a non-smoker, he felt asphyxiated and his eyes watered continuously. The television was switched on twenty-four hours a day, which disrupted his sleep. On 15 April 2008 the toilet became clogged and the cell floor flooded with sewage from the upper floors. The applicant complained and was transferred to cell no. 42 on the next floor. 31. From 15 April to 4 September 2008 the applicant was kept in cell no. 42, which measured about 25 sq. m and accommodated up to fourteen inmates. The cell had only eight beds, so the inmates had to sleep in turns. There was a serious lack of fresh air, since almost all of his cell-mates smoked. The sanitary conditions were relatively satisfactory. 32. From 4 September to 23 December 2008 the applicant was kept in cell no. 10, which measured about 12 sq. m and accommodated three to four inmates.

8. The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Komotini. 9. The applicant’s husband, Moustafa Molla Sali, a member of the Muslim community of Thrace, died on 21 March 2008. On 7 February 2003 he had drawn up a notarised public will in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Civil Code. He had bequeathed his whole estate to his wife, namely: one-third of a 2,000 sq. m plot of farmland near Komotini; one-half of a 127 sq. m apartment, a parking space and a basement in a block of flats in Komotini; one-quarter of a shop in Komotini with a surface area of 24 sq. m, and another shop measuring 31 sq. m in Komotini, which was subsequently expropriated in return for compensation that has already been paid to the applicant; and four properties in Istanbul. 10. By decision no. 12.785/2003 of 10 June 2008 the Komotini Court of First Instance, on the basis of a next-of-kin certificate submitted by the applicant, approved the will presented before it. On 6 April 2010 the applicant accepted her husband’s estate by notarised deed. The Treasury was notified and the applicant registered the property transferred to her with the Komotini Land Registry, paying the corresponding registration fees. It does not appear from the case file that the applicant had to pay any inheritance tax on the property transferred to her. 11. On 12 December 2009, meanwhile, the deceased’s two sisters had challenged the validity of the will before the Rodopi Court of First Instance. They asserted a claim to three-quarters of the property bequeathed. They submitted that they and the deceased belonged to the Thrace Muslim community and that therefore any questions relating to his estate were subject to Islamic religious law (Sharia law) and the jurisdiction of the mufti, rather than to the provisions of the Civil Code. They contended that the application of Muslim customs and Sharia law to Greek nationals of Muslim faith was laid down in the provisions of Article 14 § 1 of the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres (ratified by decree of 29 September/ 30 October 1923) and Articles 42 and 45 of the Treaty of Lausanne (ratified by decree of 25 August 1923) (see paragraphs 65-68 below). They argued that the law of succession applicable to Muslims was based on intestacy rather than testacy. Under Islamic law, where the deceased was survived by close relatives, the will only served to complement the intestate succession. Those provisions had continued to apply after the adoption of the Greek Civil Code, pursuant to section 6 of the Introductory Law to the Code, solely in respect of Greek nationals of Muslim faith living in Thrace. 12. By judgment no. 50/2010 of 1 June 2010, the Rodopi Court of First Instance dismissed the challenge brought by the deceased’s sisters. It held that applying the Islamic law of succession to Greek Muslims in such a way as to prevent them from disposing of their property in anticipation of their death gave rise to unacceptable discrimination on grounds of religious beliefs. It found that the consequent inability of such persons to draw up a public will was in breach of Article 4 (principle of equality), Article 5 § 1 (free development of personality), Article 5 § 2 (principle of non-discrimination) and Article 13 § 1 (freedom of religious conscience) of the Constitution, as well as Article 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The court emphasised that even if it should be inferred from section 5(2) of Law no. 1920/1991 (ratifying the Legislative Act of 24 December 1990 on Muslim ministers of religion) that inheritance matters for Muslims were governed by Sharia law, such law should be applied in a manner compatible with the Constitution and the Convention. The incompatibility in the present case had stemmed from interpreting the Islamic law of succession in such a way as to deprive the persons concerned of some of their civil rights, against their wishes. The court added that although the application of Sharia law was based, inter alia, on international law, and in particular on the combined effect of Articles 42 and 45 of the Treaty of Lausanne, it should not result in the Islamic law of succession being applied in such a way as to curtail the civil rights of Greek Muslims, because the aim of the treaty had not been to deprive the members of that minority of such rights, but to strengthen their protection. 13. The court pointed out that a Greek Muslim contacting a notary in order to draw up a public will was exercising his right to dispose of his property, in anticipation of his death, under the same conditions as other Greek citizens. It was consequently impossible to annul the will or to override any of its legal effects on the grounds that a will of that kind was prohibited by Sharia law. Upholding the claimants’ arguments would thus amount to introducing an unacceptable difference in treatment among Greek nationals on the grounds of their religious beliefs. 14. On 16 June 2010 the deceased’s sisters appealed against the aforementioned judgment. 15. On 28 September 2011 the Thrace Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal (judgment no. 392/2011). It emphasised, firstly, that the legislative provisions enacted pursuant to the Treaties of Sèvres and Lausanne had been intended to protect Greek nationals of Muslim faith and were in conformity with the Constitution and the Convention. That applied both to Islamic wills and to intestate succession, and the mufti had no jurisdiction in relation to public wills. The court held that since the testator was free to choose the type of will he wished to draw up in the exercise of his rights and therefore to draw up a public will in accordance with Article 1724 of the Civil Code, he was not obliged to follow Islamic law, which did not cover matters relating to such wills. Furthermore, the mufti had no jurisdiction over the testator’s wishes, which could not be circumscribed. Otherwise, there would be discrimination on grounds of religion, which was unlawful under the general rules on prohibition of discrimination. 16. More specifically, the Court of Appeal noted that the decision taken by the deceased, a Greek citizen of Muslim faith belonging to the Thrace Muslim religious minority, to ask a notary to draw up a public will, choosing personally to decide how and to whom he would bequeath his property, fell within his legal right to dispose of his property in anticipation of his death, under the same conditions as other Greek nationals. 17. On 23 January 2012 the deceased’s sisters lodged an appeal on points of law. 18. By judgment no. 1862/2013 of 7 October 2013 and on the basis of a provision of international law, namely Article 11 of the 1913 Treaty of Athens, and provisions of domestic law, namely section 4 of Law no. 147/1914, section 10 of Law no. 2345/1920 (enacted pursuant to the 1913 Treaty of Athens) and section 5(2) of Law no. 1920/1991 the Court of Cassation allowed the appeal. It noted that section 10 of Law no. 2345/1920 (on the provisional Arch-Mufti and muftis serving Muslims residing in the territory) reproduced the contents of Article 11 § 8.1 of the Treaty of Athens, pursuant to which muftis exercised their jurisdiction over Muslims in the spheres of marriage, divorce, maintenance payments, guardianship, trusteeship, capacity of minors, Islamic wills and intestate succession. It emphasised that the law governing interpersonal relations among Greek nationals of Muslim faith, as laid down in the above-mentioned treaty ratified by Greece, was, pursuant to Article 28 § 1 of the Constitution, an integral part of Greek domestic law and prevailed over any other legal provision to the contrary. Examining the reasoning of the Court of Appeal’s judgment, it concluded that that court’s determination of the case had breached the relevant legislative provisions, because the law applicable to the deceased person’s estate had been the Islamic law of succession, which formed part of domestic law and applied specifically to Greek nationals of Muslim faith. It noted that the estate in question belonged to the category of property held “in full ownership” (mulkia) – public land which had belonged to the Ottoman administration, the full ownership of which had been transferred to private individuals and which had been governed by Sharia law during the Ottoman occupation – and that, consequently, the impugned public will had to be deemed invalid and devoid of legal effect on the grounds that Sharia law recognised no such institution. 19. The Court of Cassation remitted the case to the Thrace Court of Appeal. 20. By judgment no. 183/2015 of 15 December 2015 the Court of Appeal set aside the judgment delivered by the Rodopi Court of First Instance on 1 June 2010. In line with the Court of Cassation’s judgment, it held that the relevant legislative provisions had been intended to protect Greek nationals of Muslim faith, constituted a special body of law and did not breach the principle of equality secured under Article 4 of the Constitution or the right of access to a court as guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention. It pointed out that the law applicable to the deceased’s estate had been Sharia law, because the property bequeathed belonged to the “mulkia” category, and that consequently the public will at issue was devoid of legal effect because Sharia law did not recognise any such institution. It emphasised that the judgments of the Court of Cassation were binding on the courts to which cases were remitted as regards the legal issues determined by those judgments. It therefore considered itself bound by the Court of Cassation’s judgment of 7 October 2013 and could not overrule it, thus being unable to allow a request by the applicant to seek a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice of the European Union concerning the interpretation of section 5(2) of Law no. 1920/1991 and of Article 45 of the Treaty of Lausanne. Since an appeal on points of law was lodged against that judgment, it was not immediately enforceable. 21. On 8 February 2016 the applicant appealed on points of law against the judgment of the Court of Appeal, and the hearing in the Court of Cassation was scheduled for 11 January 2017. She put forward a number of grounds of appeal. 22. In her first ground of appeal she submitted that the impugned judgment had been insufficiently reasoned as regards one specific point which she considered to have had a decisive influence on the outcome of the proceedings, namely that it had ignored the question whether her husband had been a “practising Muslim”, which was a precondition for the application of the special body of law. 23. The applicant’s second ground of appeal was that section 5(2) of Law no. 1920/1991 and certain Articles of the Civil Code had been incorrectly interpreted and applied. She submitted that the impugned judgment had extended the scope of the provisions creating a separate body of law for Greek nationals of Muslim faith to members of the Muslim community who did not faithfully adhere to Islamic doctrine. 24. The applicant argued in conclusion that those grounds of appeal had not been encompassed in the legal issue determined by judgment no. 1862/2013 of the Court of Cassation. She pointed out that that judgment had concerned Greek nationals of Muslim faith in general and had not addressed the matter of the law applicable to non-practising members of the Muslim community. 25. In her additional observations, the applicant contended that the case, which concerned the drawing up of a public will, a possibility afforded to all Greek citizens regardless of religious considerations, fell outside the mufti’s jurisdiction. The specific provisions concerning the Muslim minority could not, in her submission, be applied without violating the individual rights of Muslims as guaranteed under the Greek Constitution, as well as by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 26. By judgment no. 556/2017 of 6 April 2017 the Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal on points of law. It did not refer to the Convention in its reasoning. 27. As regards the applicant’s first ground of appeal, it declared it inadmissible, finding that it was based on the extent of the deceased’s religious sentiment as a Muslim, a criterion that had no legal effect. It added that the deceased’s Greek nationality did not preclude the application of Sharia law. 28. As regards the second ground of appeal, the Court of Cassation held that the Court of Appeal’s judgment had contained sound reasons, in line with the Court of Cassation’s judgment no. 1862/2013. It emphasised that the Court of Appeal had assessed the facts of the case in the light of substantive law and had given sufficient reasons for its determination of the fundamental issue of recognising the invalidity of the will. 29. That judgment marked the end of the proceedings in respect of the property located in Greece. 30. As a result of the whole proceedings, the applicant was deprived of three-quarters of the property bequeathed. 31. In 2011, meanwhile, the testator’s sisters had applied to the Istanbul Civil Court of First Instance for the annulment of the will, in accordance with the principles of private international law enshrined in the Turkish Civil Code. They submitted that the will was contrary to Turkish public policy. Hearings were held on 9 February and 26 May 2016, but the court adjourned its consideration of the case on the grounds that the applicant still had to appeal on points of law against judgment no. 183/2015 of the Thrace Court of Appeal. The new hearing in the case was scheduled for 28 September 2017, and then adjourned until 18 January 2018. By the date of the present judgment the Court had yet to be informed of the progress of those proceedings.

4. The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Nalchik, the Ingushetiya Republic. He is a practising lawyer. 5. On 10 October 2006 the applicant was travelling by a collective taxi from Nalchik to Grozny in Chechnya. At about 1 p.m. a police officer stopped the vehicle at the Ingush-Chechen administrative border and proceeded to check the passengers’ identity documents. He discovered that the applicant’s signature in his passport had been made in red ink and told him that he would be charged with an administrative offence under Article 19.15 of the Code of Administrative Offences for using an invalid identity document. The applicant raised his objections, claiming that the wrong kind of ink did not render his passport invalid. 6. The police first took the applicant by car to the Goragorsk police station (ТОМ пос. Горагорск) where an inspector told him that he was “temporarily detained for the purpose of drawing up a report”. Once the report had been completed at 3.15 p.m., another police officer took the applicant, again by police car, from Goragorsk the Nadterechnyi district police station (ОДЧ Надтереченского района). An operative established his identity, verified his documents and let him go at 5.10 p.m. The station chief later stated that the applicant had “thanked him for a prompt release”. 7. The applicant asked the supervising prosecutor to investigate whether the police had abused their powers by detaining him. The Nadterechnyi district prosecutor’s office issued several decisions refusing institution of criminal proceedings. One of them was set aside by the Nadterechnyi District Court on 13 July 2007 for the following reasons: “The issue whether the administrative detention of Mr Timishev was necessary has not been clarified. Pursuant to Article 27.3(1) of the Code of Administrative Offences, administrative detention may be applied in exceptional circumstances if this is necessary for the prompt and proper examination of the alleged administrative offence. The decision ... refusing institution of criminal proceedings indicates that a report on the administrative offence ... was compiled and forwarded to [Mr Timishev’s] place of residence. In these circumstances, the court sees no grounds for the administrative detention of Mr Timishev.” 8. Subsequent decisions refusing institution of criminal proceedings stated alternatively that it was impossible to establish the time of the applicant’s detention because it had not been recorded in any documents, that the applicant had been detained for disobeying police orders, that he had been actually free to go after 3.15 p.m. but had asked to be taken to the Nadterechnyi office to file a complaint there and the police had ensured his safe passage. Each time the prosecutor concluded that the police had not committed any prosecutable offence. 9. On 27 January 2009 the Nadterechnyi District Court identified a number of serious shortcomings in the investigation. The court pointed out that it had not been established why the report on the administrative office could not have been drafted at the checkpoint and why it was considered necessary to escort the applicant to Goragorsk. It remained unclear what had happened to the report: the investigator had not obtained the forwarding letter or any information about the outcome of the proceedings. The investigator had not inquired why an escorting report required under Article 27.2(3) of the Code or the detention report required under Article 27.4 of the Code had not been prepared. Nor had he determined what “exceptional circumstances” within the meaning of Article 27.3(1) had called for the applicant’s detention and at what time the applicant had actually left the Nadterechnyi police station. 10. The court was not convinced that the applicant had asked the police to take him to the Nadterechnyi office to file a complaint. It considered implausible that the police had provided a car and an escort to help him complain about their conduct. Even assuming that he had indeed wished to make a complaint, the investigator did not establish what had happened to it or, alternatively, why he had not written it, or why he had gone there in person instead of sending it by post from Goragorsk. Statements by the police officers who stated that the applicant had been “released” were also indicative of the fact that he had been taken to the Nadterechnyi office against his will. 11. Finally, the court criticised the investigator’s assumption that the applicant had committed an administrative offence. It noted that, according to the Guidance on Issuing Passports (order no. 605 of 15 September 1997), the head of the passports department should have asked the passport holder to sign the passport with special ink. Responsibility for the wrong kind of ink should lie with the official who departed from the Guidance rather than with the applicant. 12. On 9 April 2009 the investigator issued a further decision refusing institution of criminal proceedings. It was similar in its wording to the previous ones and did not touch upon the areas of concern identified in the District Court’s judgment.

5. The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Timişoara. 6. In 2004 the applicant lodged a civil action against her employer, a private company, C.G.H.T. (“the company”), seeking the revocation of its decision of 17 October 2003 to dismiss her, and claiming various salary entitlements. 7. On 29 April 2004 the Timiș County Court dismissed her action as ill‑founded. The applicant appealed. 8. In a final judgment of 29 September 2004 (“the judgment”), the Timișoara Court of Appeal allowed the applicant’s appeal. It ordered the company to revoke its dismissal decision and to pay the applicant pecuniary damages in the form of all her salary entitlements from 17 October 2003 until the pronouncement of the final judgment, updated and index-linked. The domestic court also awarded the applicant the costs and expenses incurred in the proceedings. 9. On 15 November 2004 the Timiș County Court validated the judgment (învestire cu formulă executorie), pursuant to Article 374 of the Romanian Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter “the RCCP”), as in force at the time (see paragraph 37 below). 10. The applicant instituted enforcement proceedings on 21 January 2005, requesting the bailiffs’ office M.S.R. & S.A.I. (“the bailiff”) to enforce the judgment. 11. On 26 January 2005 the bailiff issued a notice of payment (somație) and served it on the company. 12. According to a report of 11 February 2005 issued by the bailiff, the bailiff and the applicant’s lawyer visited the company’s premises. As the company’s legal representative was not present, the bailiff granted the company a further five days in which to execute the final judgment of their own accord. 13. However, the company refused to fulfil its obligations. Moreover, it lodged a complaint seeking to have the enforcement proceedings annulled, pursuant to Article 399 of the RCCP, as in force at the time (see paragraph 39 below). During those proceedings and at the company’s request, on 24 February 2005 the Timișoara District Court ordered the suspension of the enforcement proceedings until a final judgment was given; the suspension was made subject to payment of a deposit of 4,000,000 Romanian lei (ROL), namely approximately 90 euros (EUR). 14. In response, on 16 May 2005 the applicant brought urgent proceedings seeking to have the impugned suspension lifted. She argued that the matter was urgent because she needed to obtain the salary entitlements that would allow her to provide for herself and her infant. 15. In a judgment of 18 May 2005 the Timișoara District Court dismissed the applicant’s request, holding that she had not proved the existence of any imminent damage, so as to justify the urgency of the request. 16. On 2 June 2005 the Timișoara District Court allowed the company’s complaint against the enforcement proceedings. The court held that the procedural requirements had not been thoroughly complied with in so far as the bailiff had failed to serve the company with a copy of the enforceable judgment. 17. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against the court’s judgment. On 6 October 2005 the Timiș County Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law as ungrounded. The first-instance judgment thus became final. 18. The company lodged another request seeking to obtain the annulment of the restriction order (anularea măsurii de poprire) issued by the bailiff in respect of its bank accounts. On 21 April 2005 the Timișoara District Court allowed the request, in so far as the restriction order had been issued subsequent to the suspension of the enforcement proceedings ordered by the court (see paragraph 13 above). 19. In the meantime, on 29 June 2005, the bailiff issued another notice of payment. On 4 July 2005 it was posted, together with the enforceable judgment, at the company’s main entrance. 20. On 2 November 2005 the bailiff received a letter from the applicant, in which she enquired whether the company had complied with the outstanding judgment. The bailiff replied in the negative on 4 November 2005. 21. In so far as this was the last exchange of information between the applicant and the bailiff concerning the impugned enforcement procedure, and in view of the obligations imposed by law on the creditor, who was required to play a constantly active role throughout the enforcement procedure, on 28 May 2007 the bailiff issued an official report, noting that, under Article 389 of the RCCP as in force at the time, the procedure had become time-barred (“perimarea executării”; see paragraph 38 below). It is not clear whether that report was communicated to the applicant or not. 22. On 5 May 2005 the applicant lodged a complaint before the Timișoara District Court seeking to obtain a court order for immediate enforcement of the judgment, pursuant to Article 5803 of the RCCP as in force at the time (see paragraph 40 below). 23. In a decision of 18 August 2005 the Timișoara District Court allowed the applicant’s complaint and ordered the company to pay a coercive fine of ROL 500,000 per day until it fulfilled its obligations. 24. An appeal by the company against that decision was allowed on 16 December 2005 by the Timiş County Court. The court held that the coercive fine had the nature of a civil penalty aimed at securing the enforcement of a personal obligation which could not be otherwise executed, as provided for by Article 5803. However, the payment of the company’s debt could be enforced with the assistance of a bailiff; therefore the applicant’s complaint was ill-founded. 25. On 12 July 2005 the applicant complained to the Minister of Justice about the outcome of the judgment of 2 June 2005 (see paragraph 16 above). The complaint was lodged under the provisions of Law no. 303/2004, defining the framework for judges’ disciplinary and criminal responsibility and the specific authorities empowered to initiate such proceedings. 26. On 24 August 2005 the applicant’s complaint was forwarded to the Timișoara Court of Appeal. On 5 September 2005 the Timișoara Court of Appeal noted that the impugned proceedings had been terminated by a judgment that was final and therefore not subject to appeal. 27. In 2005 the applicant complained to different State authorities that the company’s representatives had failed to execute the judgment. She relied on Articles 277, 278 and 280 of the Labour Code and Article 83 of Law no. 168/1999 regarding the resolution of labour disputes (see paragraphs 43-44 below). 28. On 5 December 2006 a criminal investigation was initiated against M.D., the company’s administrator, for refusal to execute the judgment. On 4 February 2008 the prosecutor’s office at the Timișoara District Court decided to discontinue the proceedings against M.D. and fined him RON 1,000, namely approximately EUR 250. The prosecutor investigating the case found that M.D.’s actions could not be classified as an offence. 29. A complaint lodged by the applicant against that decision was dismissed on 8 April 2008 by the senior prosecutor at the Timişoara District Court. 30. On 2 June 2008 both the applicant and M.D. appealed against the prosecutors’ decisions before the Timişoara District Court. The court dismissed both appeals on 17 October 2008. It held that the applicant’s appeal had been lodged outside the time-limit. With regard to M.D.’s appeal, it reiterated that even though he had not executed the judgment, his actions could not be classified as an offence and, therefore, the administrative fine had been fair. 31. In a final judgment of 28 January 2009 the Timiş County Court dismissed appeals on points of law lodged by the applicant and M.D. 32. On 5 August 2014 the company’s two shareholders decided that the company should be liquidated (dizolvare), in accordance with the provisions of Law no. 31/1990 on trading companies. At their request, the Companies Registration Office (Oficiul Registrului Comerţului) decided on 7 August 2014 to publish the shareholders’ decision in the Romanian Official Journal. The decision was published on 26 August 2014, in accordance with the provisions of Emergency Government Ordinance no. 116/2009 regulating the registration of specific acts in the companies register (see paragraph 48 below). 33. It was noted in an accounting report drawn up on 30 August 2014 that the company’s only creditors were the two shareholders. 34. On 10 October 2014 one of the shareholders asked the Companies Registration Office to strike the company off the register. The request was granted on the same day, and the Companies Registration Office decided that the decision would be published in the Romanian Official Journal. 35. No appeal was lodged against the decisions taken by the Companies Registration Office in respect of the company.

6. The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Yalta, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. 7. On 11 October 1997, following a purchase agreement, the applicant became owner of flat no. 2 at 1 Pushkinska Street in Yalta (“the Pushkinska flat”) in a multi-dwelling building which had been built before 1917 (“the Pushkinska building”) and was a municipal property. The flat had one room and measured 37.5 sq. m. According to the applicant, she did not reside in the flat and rented it out in the summer as it was located in the historic part of the city centre and next to the beach. 8. At the beginning of 2005, all flats in the Pushkinska building – with the exception of two which belonged to the applicant and K.– had been bought by a private construction company, JSC Zodiak-tsentr (hereinafter “the Company”). 9. On 22 September 2005 the Executive Committee of the Yalta City Council (“the Executive Committee”) approved a report on the examination of the Pushkinska building issued by an interdepartmental commission set up by the Executive Committee. The report suggested that the building was in poor technical condition with its carrying walls unsafe. On the basis of the report, the Executive Committee classified the building as a dangerous structure and found that it was under a threat of collapse (“Decree 1349”). No copies of the report and Decree 1349 have been made available to the Court. 10. On 5 October 2005 Yalta City Council (“the Council”) and the Executive Committee concluded an agreement with the Company which provided, inter alia, that the Company would purchase two flats to move the applicant and the owner of another apartment from the dangerous building in exchange for granting to the Company title over the applicant’s and the other person’s flats and then over the building as a whole (“the agreement”). The Council and the Executive Committee further undertook to take measures to evict the applicant from the dangerous building, to authorise the Company to demolish the Pushkinska building, and to grant a construction permit. The agreement was approved by the Council during its 19 October 2005 session. According to the applicant she was not aware of the agreement at the time. 11. On an unspecified date in 2006 the Council adopted the general city development plan which, according to the applicant, envisaged the renovation of the Pushkinska building (підлягає реконструкціі (відновленню)), with construction of an additional floor. No copy of the plan has been made available to the Court. 12. To comply with the agreement, the Company purchased flat no. 1 at 23 Sosnova Street (“the Sosnova flat”) in Yalta as a replacement for the applicant. The flat measured 57.7 sq. m, had two rooms and was located away from Yalta city centre. The Council and the Executive Committee refused to take the apartment into municipal ownership. In this view, the Company instituted court proceedings against the Council and the Executive Committee for their failure to comply with the terms of the agreement. In judgments of 6 June 2006 and 10 October 2006 the Commercial Court of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the Sevastopol Commercial Court of Appeal respectively obliged the defendants to comply with their obligations under the agreement. On 22 March 2007 the Sosnova flat was transferred into municipal ownership. 13. On 31 May 2007 the Executive Committee passed a decision by which it, inter alia, offered the Sosnova flat to the applicant. No copy of the relevant decree has been made available to the Court. 14. On 16 June 2007, in a letter, the Executive Committee invited the applicant to appear, by 1 July 2007 at the latest, before the relevant body and obtain the title deeds (ордер) to the Sosnova flat. The applicant did not respond to the offer as she believed the authorities’ demand had no legal basis. 15. On 17 July 2007 the Executive Committee applied to the Yalta City Court to have the applicant evicted and her title to the Pushkinska flat terminated, her moved to the Sosnova flat and her property rights over the latter flat established. It relied on Articles 109, 110 and 112 of the Housing Code and Articles 321 § 2 of the Civil Code as the legal grounds for the claim (see paragraphs 31 and 32 below). The Executive Committee noted, in particular, that the Pushkinska building was under the threat of collapse and that, as the body responsible for observance of the technical condition of buildings and rehousing of residents from dangerous ones, it did not wish to be answerable for any grave consequences which the dangerousness of the Pushkinska building might cause. 16. On 4 October 2007 the Yalta City Court allowed the Executive Committee’s application. 17. On an unspecified date the Court of Appeal of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (“the Court of Appeal”) remitted the case for fresh consideration to the first-instance court, noting that the Council, as the owner of the Sosnova flat, had not been involved in the proceedings. 18. On 4 April 2008 the Council joined the proceedings as a co-plaintiff and supported the Executive Committee’s claims. 19. On 9 April 2008 the Yalta City Court found against the applicant. It annulled the applicant’s title to the Pushkinska flat, ordered her eviction and rehousing in the Sosnova flat and vested her with the title to the latter flat. The court made the following findings: (a) it was not in dispute between the parties that the Pushkinska building was a municipal property and was maintained by a municipal company, and that it was the Executive Committee’s task under the relevant laws to exercise control over the safety of buildings irrespective of their form of ownership; (b) in carrying out this obligation, the Executive Committee found that the building had been under the threat of collapse and these findings had been valid and had not been appealed against by any interested person. The agreement and the Council’s decision of 19 October 2005 approving it were likewise valid; (c) pursuant to Article 112 of the Housing Code the Executive Committee had been obliged to provide the applicant with a replacement dwelling, which it had done, but the applicant had refused to move on a voluntary basis without providing any reasons; and (d) pursuant to the agreement, which had been approved by the Council, the Pushkinska building was to be demolished, and not renovated, as claimed by the applicant, which made her return to the property impossible; she thus had to be evicted from that flat and moved to another apartment with her title to the Pushkinska flat annulled by the court, which would be in compliance with Article 346 § 2 of the Civil Code. 20. The Yalta City Court further found that the Sosnova flat constituted adequate compensation for the applicant in respect of the Pushkinska flat. It had more rooms and space than the Pushkinska flat and was in an appropriate condition and in the same city. The court also noted that the market value of the Sosnova flat, according to a sale agreement dated 2005, was higher than the starting price for the whole Pushkinska building. It thus concluded that the applicant’s interests had been protected in full. 21. The applicant appealed, stating, inter alia, that the deprivation of her property was unlawful. In particular, the Pushkinska flat was her private property and not that of the State and thus the provisions of the Housing Code, cited by the trial court, had been inapplicable to her situation and could not have served a basis for annulment of her title to the property. Article 346 § 2 of the Civil Code was a reference provision which specified that a property right could be terminated in “other cases provided for by the law” but the court had failed to specify any legal provision providing for this “other case”. She further argued that there had been no public need behind deprivation of her flat but only private business interests, given that the title to the Pushkinska flat after her rehousing was to be given to the Company. Even assuming that the building was in poor structural condition, no proper decision existed suggesting that it would be subject to demolition. The applicant referred in that connection to Governmental Decree no. 189 of 26 April 1984, in accordance with which as it was within the Regional Council’s ambit to decide, on the basis of a proposal by a city council, whether a building should be demolished or restored and stated that the Council had thus acted ultra vires when it had allowed the Company to demolish the building in the agreement. She also relied on the general city development plan, which had been adopted a year after the agreement, pursuant to which the Pushkinska building was to be renovated, with an additional floor constructed, but not demolished. She argued that her property thus would remain extant. 22. The applicant further alleged that she, as the owner of the Pushkinska flat, had not been involved in any way in choosing the form of the compensation for her flat. She had not been a party to the agreement and at the time had not been informed at all of any intentions to void her property rights over the Pushkinska flat and to evict her. Then she was just presented with the fact that she had to move to an apartment chosen for her by the company, without her consent. The offered flat had not been of the same value as the Pushkinska flat and had not compensated her in full for her losses. She referred to the location of the Sosnova flat, the impossibility to profit from renting it out, and its poor general condition. In support, she provided an expert report, which stated that the building at no. 23 Sosnova Street was situated in a zone of active ground subsidence and that urgent and expensive construction work was necessary to prevent further damage. The applicant also disputed the fairness of the calculations used by the first-instance court, referring to the fact that, just before the Pushkinska building had been declared dangerous, the Company had bought several flats from the applicant’s neighbours, which had been in poor condition, for very high prices – much higher than the building price referred to by the Council. Lastly, she argued that she could not have property rights over the Sosnova flat imposed on her against her will. 23. On 17 June 2008 the Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of 9 April 2008. It reiterated that it had been correctly established by the first-instance court that the Pushkinska building had been under the threat of collapse and that in this situation, pursuant to Article 112 of the Housing Code, the applicant must be evicted and provided by the Executive Committee with another dwelling. It noted that the Executive Committee had complied with its obligation and by its Decision of 31 May 2007 had assigned a replacement dwelling to the applicant. 24. The Court of Appeal then rejected as unsubstantiated the applicant’s argument that the Executive Committee’s demands had breached her property rights. It pointed out in that connection that Article 41 of the Constitution allowed deprivation of property in exceptional cases of public necessity, on the grounds of and by the procedure established by law, and – the court emphasised – on the condition of advance and complete compensation of its value. It noted that the Sosnova flat had complied with the requirements of Article 113 of the Housing Code and was more spacious than the Pushkinska flat. The applicant’s rehousing in that flat was thus not in breach of her rights but in her own interests and her arguments to the contrary were unsubstantiated. 25. On 18 August 2008 the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected an application for leave to appeal on points of law from the applicant. 26. The applicant was unsuccessful in her attempts to reopen the proceedings under newly discovered and exceptional circumstances. 27. On 26 August 2008 the applicant and her son were evicted from the Pushkinska flat and the documents confirming their property right over the Sosnova flat were served. 28. On 9 July 2009 the Executive Committee granted the title to the Pushkinska flat to the Company. 29. In 2018, in her comments on the Government’s observations, the applicant informed the Court that the building at 1 Pushkinska Street had not been demolished but renovated, with an additional floor added on top, and had been converted into a privately owned hotel.

5. The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Moscow. 6. On 2 June 2015 the applicant asked the Federal Migration Service to issue him a travel passport. His application was refused by reference to the fact that he had been convicted on two occasions and given suspended sentences which had not yet expired (see, for details, as regards the first conviction, Navalnyy and Ofitserov v. Russia, nos. 46632/13 and 28671/14, 23 February 2016, and, as regards the second conviction, Navalnyye v. Russia, no. 101/15, 17 October 2017). 7. The applicant asked the court of general jurisdiction to overturn the refusal, relying in particular on the Court’s finding of a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 in a similar case of Nalbantski v. Bulgaria (no. 30943/04, 10 February 2011). 8. On 30 September 2015 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court in Moscow upheld the refusal as lawful, finding as follows: “The complainant’s reference to the European Court’s judgment of 10 February 2011 in the case of Nalbantski v. Bulgaria is unsubstantiated because, in view of Mr Navalnyy’s personality, there are clear indications of a real public interest that outweigh the [complainant’s] right to freedom of movement.” 9. On 4 December 2015 the Moscow City Court upheld the District Court’s judgment in a summary fashion. On 14 January 2016 the City Court corrected a clerical error in the date of the judgment. 10. On 27 April 2017 the applicant was assaulted when leaving his office. The attacker threw green dye in his face and he suffered a chemical burn to his right eye. 11. Faced with the risk of losing sight, on 3 May 2017 the applicant asked for authorisation to go to Spain for eye surgery. On the following day he was issued with a travel passport on humanitarian grounds.

4. The applicants were born in 1987 and 1986 and live in Gümüşhane and Erzincan respectively. 5. On 18 May 2007 the applicants participated in reading out a press statement in commemoration of İbrahim Kaypakkaya, the leader of the TKP/ML[1] (Turkish Communist Party – Marxist/Leninist), who had died in 1973, allegedly under torture in police custody. 6. On 7 January 2008 the Erzurum public prosecutor initiated criminal proceedings against fifteen people, including the applicants, charging them with disseminating propaganda in favour of the TKP/ML, under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713). According to the indictment, during the gathering, the second applicant had read out a press declaration containing statements praising the TKP/ML and İbrahim Kaypakkaya, and the following slogans had been chanted by the demonstrators: “İbrahim is our leader”, “Our struggle continues and shall continue”, “İbrahim Kaypakkaya is immortal”, “Down with the USA” and “We will drown fascism in the blood it has shed”. The group had also carried a banner which read “İbrahim Kaypakkaya is immortal – Partizan”[2]. 7. On 31 March 2009 the Erzurum Assize Court found the applicants guilty as charged and sentenced each of them to ten months’ imprisonment pursuant to section 7(2) of Law no. 3713. In its judgment, the assize court held that the applicants had disseminated propaganda in favour of the TKP/ML, given that the second applicant had read out the press statement and the first applicant had chanted slogans. The court based its judgment on a report prepared by an expert regarding a police video-recording of the public gathering in question. 8. Taking into account the applicants’ good behaviour during the trial and the fact that they had no previous criminal convictions, the court suspended pronouncement of the applicants’ conviction on the condition that they did not commit another intentional offence for a period of five years, under Article 231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hükmün açıklanmasının geri bırakılması). 9. The applicants filed an objection against the decision of 31 March 2009. In their petition, they stated that the first-instance court had erred in interpreting the facts and the law, and they asked to be acquitted of the charges against them. They further stated that their prosecution had constituted a breach of Article 10 of the Convention. 10. On 20 July 2009 the Diyarbakır Assize Court held that the application of Article 231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the case was in line with the domestic law, and rejected the applicants’ objection without examining the merits of the case. That decision was served on the applicants on 5 August 2009.

5. The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Buseck. 6. In 2003, the applicant purchased one of four residential property units in a shared complex, into which she moved with her family. 7. In January 2005, the applicant and the owners of the other three properties instigated independent evidentiary proceedings before the Regional Court against the property developers on the basis of alleged defects in the residential property units, in particular the water drainage system. On 25 February 2005 the court ordered an expert report from H.K., an expert in residential buildings; H.K. wrote a report dated 16 July 2005 and presented his findings to the court, most recently in a hearing held on 30 March 2007. 8. On 23 June 2007 the applicant instigated proceedings against the property developer seeking compensation for alleged defects in her residential unit – namely, defects in the drainage system, together with defects in other parts of the building which had led to damp and mold on the walls. She sought compensation of roughly 17,000 Euros (EUR). 9. Over the following months, after the applicant had made an advance payment on the court fees, the Regional Court forwarded to the other parties to the proceedings the applicant’s statement of claim and the defendants’ statement of defence; extended the deadline for the applicant to make further submissions; forwarded the submissions of the applicant’s neighbours (in which they (i) declared their wish to join the proceedings by way of intervention and (ii) sought EUR 8,000 in damages); held an oral hearing, in which it discussed the factual and legal situation and suggested a friendly settlement; waited for the applicant to propose the basis for a friendly settlement agreement; and forwarded further submissions made by the parties. 10. On 17 March 2008 after the applicant’s final rejection of a friendly‑settlement proposal, the Regional Court ordered an expert opinion from H.K., who had already been involved in the independent evidentiary proceedings. In the following weeks, the applicant complained about the ordering of the expert opinion and challenged H.K.’s impartiality. On 26 June 2008 after obtaining further submissions from the parties and the interveners, the Regional Court once again suggested a friendly settlement. On the following day, it sent the case file to H.K. The parties several times exchanged submissions and suggestions regarding the basis for a friendly settlement. On 14 July 2008 H.K. invited the parties to participate in an onsite visit, which took place on 28 August 2008. Subsequently, H.K. informed the parties that another onsite visit was necessary; this finally took place on 22 October 2008. 11. On 5 January 2009 the Regional Court requested H.K. for a progress report; H.K. replied to that request by stating that he needed to undergo urgent medical surgery, which he assumed would result in a delay of at least eight weeks. On 11 February 2009 the wife of H.K. informed the Regional Court that there would be a further delay of at least six months, due to the illness of her husband. The Regional Court informed the parties of this and invited them to submit comments. The applicant requested a replacement for H.K. 12. On 23 February 2009 the Regional Court dismissed H.K. and ordered the return of the case file. On 31 March 2009, H.K. returned the file. On 12 May 2009 the Regional Court asked the Chamber of Commerce to suggest potential replacement experts. On 26 May 2009 the Chamber of Commerce suggested two experts, one of whom was G.K. On the same day, the Regional Court forwarded those suggestions to the parties. On 15 June 2009 the defendants rejected both suggestions. On 17 June 2009 the applicant made further submissions and applied for permission to inspect the case file. On 2 July 2009 the applicant’s representative returned the file to the court. On 7 July 2009 the Regional Court asked for further advance payments on the court fees, which the applicant paid on 3 August 2009. On 7 August 2009 the Regional Court made a suggestion regarding how to proceed with regard to the expert. On 20 August 2009 the applicant agreed. On the same day, the Regional Court forwarded to the defendant the applicant’s statement that he agreed to the proposed expert. 13. On 25 September 2009 the Regional Court amended the decision to order an expert opinion (see paragraph 10 above) and ordered an expert opinion from G.K. (instead of H.K.). The following four months were dominated by a dispute between G.K., the Regional Court and the applicant about the amount due in further advance payments of court fees; during that dispute various submissions and objections were made. The dispute lasted until the middle of January 2010. 14. On 28 May 2010 the Regional Court asked G.K. for a progress report. On 26 June 2010 G.K.’s office informed the Regional Court that the progress report would only be submitted in the twenty-eighth calendar week (12-18 July 2010). On 10 August 2010 the Regional Court again asked G.K. for a progress report. On 31 August 2010 G.K. informed the Regional Court that he was overloaded with work and suggested that the court order the opinion from H.K. (the original expert), to which the parties to the proceedings agreed. 15. On 21 September 2010 the Regional Court ordered the opinion from H.K. 16. On 30 September 2010, H.K. invited the parties to participate in another onsite visit, which was scheduled for 28 October 2010. However, the visit had to be rescheduled several times – once because the defendants were unable to attend and three times because the applicant was unable to attend; eventually the visit took place on 17 January 2011. On 4 May 2011, the applicant complained about the length of time it was taking for the expert to prepare his opinion. 17. On 9 May 2011, the Regional Court asked H.K. for a progress report. On 18 May 2011, H.K. informed the Court that the opinion would be provided in the twenty-second calendar week (30 May-5 June 2011). On 5 August 2011, H.K. provided his opinion in written form. 18. On 8 August 2011 the Regional Court forwarded the expert opinion to the parties and asked them to submit comments within five weeks. On 30 August 2011 the applicant lodged an objection to the method of calculating the fee for the expert opinion and applied for an extension of the deadline in order to be able to prepare substantial submissions in the light of the content of the expert opinion. On 10 October 2010 the applicant submitted substantial reasoning for her objection and made substantial submissions in the light of the expert opinion. The Regional Court also invited H.K. to submit comments. 19. On 5 December 2011 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s objection regarding the method of calculating the fee for the expert opinion. On 20 December 2011 the applicant appealed against that decision and, on 24 January 2012, submitted arguments supporting her appeal. On 12 March 2012 the Court of Appeal ruled that the fee for the expert opinion had been calculated wrongly and annulled the decision setting out that fee. 20. On 11 May 2012 the Regional Court asked H.K. for his views on the comments of the parties regarding his expert opinion. On 24 May 2012 H.K.’s wife informed the Regional Court that he had fallen ill, again, and that it was unclear when he would recover. On 29 May 2012 the Regional Court forwarded that information to the parties and invited them to submit comments. On 22 June 2012 the applicant applied for an extension of the deadline for the submission of comments. On 3 July 2012 the applicant applied to be allowed to inspect the case file. 21. On 24 July 2012 the Regional Court scheduled an oral hearing for 12 October 2012. 22. On 12 October 2012 the oral hearing took place and the parties agreed on a friendly settlement. 23. On 23 July 2012 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Court of Appeal in which she sought compensation, alleging that the civil proceedings had been excessively lengthy. 24. On 30 January 2013 the Court of Appeal rejected the complaint as unfounded. It ruled – explicitly referring to section 198 of the Courts Constitution Act (see § 18 below), as well as Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and judgments of the Court – that the proceedings before the Regional Court had not been unreasonably long. 25. The Court of Appeal ruled that any assessment of the reasonableness of the length of proceedings had to start with the principle that a court must conduct proceedings expeditiously. That court had to make use of all available options in order to expedite the proceedings in question. A lengthening of the proceedings by the court would not give rise to a compensation claim if it had been based on a reasonable legal position and had taken place in accordance with the rules of procedure. It had to be established whether or not there had been a delay which, at least in principle, constituted grounds for a claim for compensation; different delays at different stages of the proceedings had to be added together and calculated as one single figure. Lastly, an overall assessment of whether the length of proceedings had been reasonable had to be carried out, with regard being paid to the circumstances of the case – in particular the complexity and difficulty of the proceedings. 26. In application of these principles, the Court of Appeal assessed all phases of the proceedings and reasoned that the Regional Court had generally expedited the proceedings sufficiently and that it had caused a delay only in the summer of 2010 because it had failed to sufficiently instruct the expert at the time in question and had failed to undertake the measures necessary to ensure that the expert submitted his opinion in good time. Had the court done so, the expert’s excessive workload would have become apparent and a different expert could have been appointed earlier. Furthermore, it had to be taken into account that the proceedings had been complex; this had in particular been due to the complexity of the relevant facts and the difficulty in gathering evidence. Moreover, there had been three intervening parties on the side of the applicant, which had contributed substantially to the length of the proceedings. In addition, the applicant had repeatedly lodged applications, objections and appeals throughout the proceedings, and this had also substantially contributed to the length of the proceedings. Finally, the Court of Appeal took into account that the applicant herself attributed substantial importance to the proceedings, for both financial and health reasons. Nevertheless, viewed overall, the length of the proceedings did not appear unreasonably long. 27. On 5 December 2013 the Federal Court of Justice dismissed an appeal lodged by the applicant on points of law. It found the judgment of 30 January 2013 to be in line with section 198 of the Courts Constitution Act, as well as with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 28. The applicant lodged a constitutional complaint; on 3 February 2016, the Federal Constitutional Court declined to accept the constitutional complaint for adjudication, without giving any reasons for its decision (2 BvR 157/14).

5. The applicant was born in 1942 and lives in Montana. 6. On 20 August 1997 the applicant’s daughter was killed in a traffic accident. Several other people were killed or injured as well. The accident was the fault of H.H., a lorry driver. 7. Criminal proceedings were opened against H.H. and in 1998 he was indicted and brought to court. At the first court hearing the relatives of the other victims brought civil claims against H.H. and his employer. The applicant did not bring such a claim. 8. In a judgment of 30 June 1999 the Vidin Regional Court (hereinafter “the Regional Court”) convicted H.H. of negligently causing the deaths of several people, including the applicant’s daughter, and injuring others, and sentenced him to a term of imprisonment. It allowed the civil claims, finding H.H. and his employer jointly liable to pay damages to the civil parties. 9. Upon appeal, the Regional Court’s judgment was quashed on 19 April 2000 by the Sofia Court of Appeal (hereinafter “the Court of Appeal”). Finding serious breaches of the procedural rules, it remitted the case to the prosecuting authorities, so that it could be restarted from the stage of the preliminary investigation. 10. On an unspecified date in 2000 or 2001 the prosecution prepared a new indictment against H.H. and he was once again brought to court. 11. The first court hearing was held on 30 March 2001. The Regional Court accepted for examination a civil claim against H.H. and his employer brought by the applicant, and recognised her as civil party to the proceedings. 12. In a judgment of 18 September 2002 the Regional Court convicted H.H. of causing the deaths of several people and injuring others, and sentenced him to a term of imprisonment. In addition, it awarded damages to the remaining civil claimants – damages due jointly from H.H. and his employer – but it did not make any decision in respect of the applicant’s claim. 13. On 12 March 2003 the Court of Appeal upheld H.H.’s conviction, reducing his sentence. That part of the judgment became final on 8 October 2003 when it was upheld by the Supreme Court of Cassation. However, as concerns the civil claims, the Court of Appeal quashed the lower court’s judgment and remitted the case for fresh examination. It reasoned that the Regional Court had committed serious procedural breaches by, among other things, not taking a decision on the applicant’s claim. 14. The Regional Court examined the case for a third time, only in relation to the part concerning the civil claims, and on 6 April 2004 gave a judgment. It ordered H.H. and his employer to pay damages to the civil parties, including 10,000 Bulgarian levs (BGN – the equivalent of 5,100 euros (EUR)), plus default interest, to the applicant. 15. Upon an appeal by H.H. and his employer, on 8 March 2006 the Court of Appeal quashed the lower court’s judgment in so far as it concerned the award made to the applicant, and discontinued the examination of her claim. It found that that claim was inadmissible, on the grounds that it had been submitted outside the time-limit provided for in Article 61 § 4 of the 1974 Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 22 below). It pointed out that the requirement under that provision that a claim should be brought before the commencement of the examination of a case by a court had to be interpreted as referring to the initial examination by a court of first instance. The applicant had brought her claim during the subsequent examination of the case, after its remittal. 16. Upon an appeal by the applicant, that conclusion was upheld by the Supreme Court of Cassation on 4 March 2007. 17. On 22 August 2007 the applicant brought a tort action against H.H. and his employer before the civil courts. She claimed BGN 10,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus default interest as of 20 August 1997. 18. In a judgment of 17 July 2008 the Sofia District Court dismissed the claim. It held that the applicant’s inadmissible civil claim brought in the context of the criminal proceedings could not have interrupted the running of the relevant limitation period, which was five years. Only a claim brought in accordance with the relevant procedural requirements and subsequently found to be well-founded could have had such an effect. In addition, even if the running of the limitation period could be considered to have been interrupted by the applicant’s bringing her claim in the context of the criminal proceedings, that interruption had been retroactively invalidated by the Court of Appeal’s decision of 8 March 2006 finding that the claim was inadmissible and discontinuing the proceedings. Accordingly, the running of the limitation period – which had started in 1997 because the perpetrator’s identity had been known immediately after the accident in which the applicant’s daughter had died – had never been validly interrupted. The applicant’s claim for damages, brought ten years later, was time-barred. The applicant had brought her claim before a tribunal, namely the criminal court, which had been barred from examining it; this meant that this tribunal had had to transfer the claim to the civil courts with jurisdiction, but this had not been done. 19. The applicant filed an appeal, which was dismissed by a judgment of the Sofia City Court of 13 March 2009. While it considered the applicant’s claim well-founded in principle, since the tort resulting in the liability of H.H. and his employer had been proven, that court agreed that the claim was time-barred. It pointed out that the applicant’s bringing her claim in the context of the criminal proceedings could only have interrupted the running of the relevant time-limit if the claim had been allowed. However, after the proceedings had been discontinued, in the absence of recognition of the applicant’s right to receive damages, the time-limit had to be considered to have never been interrupted. The applicant had to bear the adverse consequences of having brought her claim in the context of the criminal proceedings in breach of the rules, and this was so notwithstanding the fact that the claim had been, erroneously, initially accepted for examination by the Regional Court. 20. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. In a final decision of 9 July 2009 the Supreme Court of Cassation refused to accept the appeal for a cassation review.

5. The applicant company, an editorial and publishing house registered in Moscow, edits and publishes a national newspaper with a circulation of 500,000, the Novaya Gazeta (“the newspaper”). The second applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Moscow. 6. At 11.30 a.m. on 12 August 2000 K-141 Kursk, a nuclear cruise missile submarine of the Russian Navy (“the Kursk”), sank as a result of explosions on board while in the Barents Sea on a naval training exercise. Most of the crew died within minutes of the explosions. However, twenty‑three crew members (of the 118 aboard) survived the explosions and gathered in a stern compartment. They wrote a note to report the events. All of these twenty-three men died on board the Kursk before the arrival of a rescue team. It is not known for certain how long the men remained alive after the explosions. However, it was established later that they had died in a fire caused by oily sea water coming into contact with the equipment, which had triggered a chemical reaction. 7. In case no. 29/00/0016-00 (“the investigation”), the Chief Military Prosecutor’s Office launched an official investigation into the accident under Article 263 § 3 of the Russian Criminal Code (a provision on “a breach of safety procedures while using a means of transportation which causes the death of two or more persons by negligence”). 8. On 22 July 2002 the Chief Military Prosecutor’s Office terminated the investigation for lack of evidence of a crime. The prosecutors found that there had been minor technical defects in the Kursk and certain omissions in the organisation and conduct of the naval exercise and the rescue operation. However, they found that it was impossible to establish a causal link between those defects and omissions and the sinking of the submarine and the death of the crew members. In particular, they established that the twenty-three crew members in the ninth compartment had died as a result of fire and asphyxiation within eight hours of the explosions. In view of the rapidity of their death, any attempt to rescue them would have been futile. 9. On 30 December 2002 B.K., counsel for the relatives of the deceased members of the Kursk crew, challenged the decision to terminate the investigation before the Chief Military Prosecutor. On 4 January 2003 his complaint was dismissed. B.K. challenged both decisions in court. 10. On 21 April 2004 the Military Court of the Moscow Garrison confirmed the decision of 22 July 2002. On 29 June 2004 the Appeal Tribunal of the Military Court of the Moscow Garrison upheld the judgment on appeal. 11. Between 2000 and 2005 the applicant company published in the newspaper a number of articles written by the second applicant covering the Kursk catastrophe and the investigation into it. 12. On 11 August 2003 the newspaper published an editorial written by the second applicant. It was timed to commemorate the third anniversary of the Kursk catastrophe. The article appeared under the headline “The Kursk case must be reopened” («Дело «Курска» надо открывать заново»), followed by a subtitle “Those wearing military rank insignia are among those responsible for the wreck of the submarine and the death of its crew” («В гибели лодки и экипажа есть виновные в погонах»). 13. The article criticised the authorities for their decision to discontinue the investigation. It began by congratulating the investigators on their hard and meticulous work and their discovery of many omissions by senior officers of the Navy. It further alleged that there were reasons to believe that the investigators had made the conclusion about the absence of a causal link between the naval officers’ omissions and the death of the Kursk crew members under pressure. The article reproduced excerpts from the complaint lodged by B.K. against the decision to discontinue the investigation. The complaint had contested the investigators’ findings and presented an alternative interpretation of the evidence collected. The article went on to suggest that the authorities should pay close attention to B.K.’s arguments and reconsider their decision not to prosecute the senior naval officers. 14. The article further described the authorities’ fierce reaction to B.K.’s complaint. The reaction of V.K., the chief forensic expert of the Russian Ministry of Defence, had been particularly harsh, as he had publicly accused B.K. of making a reputation for himself out of the Kursk catastrophe. The article continued as follows: “V.K. presided over the panel of medical experts (which means that he was responsible for collating all the medical expert opinions in the case file). ... The expert examination performed by V.K. ... [was] not supposed to be key evidence, BUT [IT] BECAME DECISIVE[1], as [the expert] pursued a specific aim: to prove that twenty-three crew members in the ninth compartment had died no later than eight hours after the explosion in the Kursk.” 15. The article suggested that the expert findings made by V.K. were particularly convenient for the naval officers responsible for the belated commencement of the rescue operation. Those findings indicated that even if the rescue operation had commenced in good time, it would have been in any event impossible to rescue the men in the ninth compartment, in view of the rapidity of their death. Hence, the conclusion that there was no causal link between the omissions during the rescue operation and the death of the crew members. The article then continued: “This is the aim pursued by V.K. in his expert examination: to help the naval officers in charge of the rescue operation avoid criminal responsibility. V.K. uses bizarre wording: ‘Died no later than four and a half to eight hours after the explosion[2] in the Kursk’. However, in the earlier expert reports it was mentioned that the crew [had] died [several hours] after the ignition of the fire[3] in the ninth compartment, and that it was not possible to establish the time of the ignition. The case file does not contain any proof of a causal link between the explosion and the fire in the ninth compartment. ... The fire in the ninth compartment ... started a considerable time after the explosion and the sinking of the Kursk. What V.K. did is called distortion of the facts («подтасовка фактов»). However, the investigators preferred not to notice this distortion, and to make official findings on the basis of V.K.’s expert opinion.” 16. The article further mentioned that independent experts had found it impossible to scientifically establish the crew members’ exact time of death. V.K.’s findings were not scientifically based, and his military rank gave reason to believe that he was biased. 17. V.K. brought defamation claims against the applicants before the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow (“the District Court”). He sought a retraction of the following four statements that, in his view, had tarnished his honour, dignity and business reputation: [1] “[The expert] pursued a specific aim: to prove that twenty-three crew members in the ninth compartment had died no later than eight hours after the explosion in the Kursk.” [2] “This is the aim pursued by V.K. in his expert examination: to help the naval officers in charge of the rescue operation avoid criminal responsibility.” [3] “V.K. uses bizarre wording: ‘Died no later than four and a half to eight hours after the explosion in the Kursk’.” [4] “What V.K. did is called distortion of the facts.” 18. V.K. also sought compensation for non‑pecuniary damage and legal costs. 19. On 6 November 2003 the District Court dismissed the claim in full. It found that the first impugned statement was a true statement of fact. It was undisputed that V.K. had performed a medical expert examination and had found that the submarine crew had died within four and a half to eight hours of the explosion of the submarine. The remaining statements about the aims pursued by V.K. and the alleged distortion of the facts were the second applicant’s opinions based on a sufficient factual basis. They did not contain any allegations of violations of laws or moral principles by V.K. Therefore, they were not damaging to his honour, dignity or business reputation. 20. On 14 May 2004 the Moscow City Court (“the City Court”) quashed the judgment on appeal. It found that the District Court had erred in finding that the statements published by the applicants did not amount to an allegation of a violation of laws by V.K. As an expert in a criminal investigation, he had been bound by the rules of conduct established for experts by the Criminal Procedure Code. Allegations regarding an expert having improper aims and distorting the facts amounted to an accusation regarding him or her giving a biased expert opinion in violation of those rules. Moreover, in the City Court’s view, a journalist could not claim exemption from liability for defamation on the grounds that he or she was expressing an opinion if that opinion was damaging to a third party’s honour or dignity. The case was referred to the District Court for re‑examination. 21. On 6 December 2004 the District Court granted V.K.’s claims in part. Referring to Resolution no. 11 of the Plenary Supreme Court (see paragraph 30 below), it emphasised that in a defamation case the only thing that a claimant had to prove was the fact that there had been dissemination of an impugned statement by a respondent. It also emphasised that the burden of proof as regards the truthfulness of a disseminated statement lay with the respondent. The District Court found that the impugned statements – namely the allegations that V.K. had performed an expert examination with a definite aim in mind and had distorted the facts in order to achieve that aim – amounted to an accusation of perjury, an offence under Article 307 of the Criminal Code, and an accusation that there had been serious breaches of the Criminal Procedure Code. In so far as relevant, the District Court’s judgment read as follows: “In the court’s opinion, the analysis of the impugned statements reveals that they contain allegations that V.K. performed an expert examination with the intention of receiving a predetermined result, that is, he was biased and had a personal interest in the proceedings. The same statements affirm that, in breach of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, V.K. did not withdraw from the case. Accordingly, the contested statements contain allegations of breaches of laws by V.K. ... and tarnish his honour, dignity and business reputation. The respondents’ argument that the impugned statements were a permissible expression of opinion by a journalist cannot be accepted by the court ... for the following reasons. ... Freedom of expression guaranteed by the Constitution of the Russian Federation may not be used as an instrument for an attack on the honour and dignity of other citizens. Therefore, a journalist could not claim exemption from liability for defamation on the grounds that he or she was expressing an opinion if that opinion was damaging to the interests protected by the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, namely honour, dignity and business reputation. The respondents’ argument – that the material from the criminal case file revealed many breaches of law which had taken place during the expert examination with the participation of V.K. – was not confirmed during the hearing. The documents from the criminal case file submitted by the respondents do not contain any direct reference to unlawful acts committed by V.K. during the expert examination. A civil court does not have competence to review judicial or other decisions taken in the framework of criminal proceedings. ... The evidence submitted by the respondents does not prove the truthfulness of the disseminated statements about the claimant.” 22. The District Court ordered the applicant company to pay V.K. 50,000 Russian roubles (RUB – approximately 1,350 euros[4] (EUR)) and the second applicant to pay him RUB 5,000 (approximately EUR 135). As regards court fees, the applicant company was ordered to pay RUB 9, and the second applicant was ordered to pay RUB 10. The District Court also ordered the applicant company to publish a retraction. 23. The applicant company appealed, complaining in particular of a violation of its right to freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention and Article 29 of the Russian Constitution. It argued that the article contained the journalist’s opinions and value judgments on a matter of public interest, and they had a sufficiently accurate and reliable factual basis and were not susceptible of proof. 24. On 19 July 2005 the City Court upheld the judgment on appeal, endorsing the District Court’s reasoning. It did not mention Resolution no. 3 of the Plenary Supreme Court (see paragraph 31 below). In so far as relevant, the appeal judgment read as follows: “The respondents have not proved that the disseminated statements corresponded to reality. ... In the statement of appeal, the respondent [company] claims that the journalist expressed her opinion, which was based on the criminal case material, and that civil law does not hold a journalist liable for the expression of a subjective opinion. This argument is analogous to the one already assessed by the first-instance court, and the [appeals] panel endorses that assessment. Moreover, the impugned statements contain statements of fact, not the journalist’s subjective opinion. ...” 25. On 15 August 2005 the District Court issued writs of execution against the applicants in V.K.’s favour. 26. On 23 March 2006 the applicant company transferred to the bailiffs’ bank account RUB 50,009 to be paid to V.K. 27. It is not clear whether the second applicant paid the amount which the District Court ordered her to pay to V.K.

4. Between 1986 and 1987 the applicants took part in the clean-up operation at the Chernobyl nuclear disaster site. They were subsequently registered disabled and became entitled to various social benefits and compensation paid on a regular basis. 5. Considering these benefits insufficient, the applicants together with other 482 people, sued the Russian Ministry of Finance for additional compensation corresponding to non-pecuniary damage suffered as a result of their participation in the operation. 6. On different dates in January and April 2011 the Nalchik Town Court of Kabardino-Balkaria (“the Town Court”) allowed their claims in part and awarded each claimant, including the applicants, compensation ranging between 1,100,000 Russian roubles (RUB) and RUB 1,800,000 for non‑pecuniary damage. 7. No appeals were lodged against these judgments within the statutory ten-day time-limit. The judgments became final. Some judgments in respect of several applicants remained unenforced (see “Enforcement status” in the Appendix). 8. On different dates in 2012 and 2013 the domestic courts granted the defendant authority’s request to extend the time-limit for appeal essentially on the ground that the defendant authority had not been served with the impugned judgments. Subsequently the regional Supreme Court quashed the judgments delivered in the applicants’ favour on the grounds that they had been based on retrospective application of the law. The applicants were ordered to repay the sums received under the judgments. 9. The applicants lodged a supervisory review application. There is no indication that they requested the enforcement proceedings to be suspended pending the examination of their supervisory review application. 10. Between June and August 2013 the Presidium of the regional Supreme Court partially quashed the appeal judgments as regards the applicants’ obligation to reimburse the sums paid.

5. The applicants, Mr İrfan Dündar and Mr Fırat Aydınkaya, were born in 1972 and 1979 respectively and live in Istanbul. At the material time, the applicants were the legal representatives of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, an illegal armed organisation. 6. On 29 and 30 April 2004 the newspaper Ülkede Özgür Gündem published two interviews with the applicants. The interviews contained the applicants’ statements following meetings with their client, Abdullah Öcalan, in prison. The first interview was included in two articles in the issue of 29 April 2004 entitled “Lawyers convey Abdullah Öcalan’s opinions concerning developments within the KONGRA-GEL[1]” and “The pain of change”. The second interview published on 30 April 2004 was entitled “Abdullah Öcalan is an opportunity for Turkey” and “Abdullah Öcalan’s opinions are important for an enduring peace”. 7. In their interviews published on 29 April 2004 in the two articles cited above, the applicants commented on the following issues: the difficulties they encountered in getting to İmralı island, where Abdullah Öcalan was detained, their need to have a meeting with their client prior to the hearing to be held before the European Court of Human Rights on 9 June 2004, their client’s state of health , the alleged fake news published in some newspapers regarding the applicants’ meetings with their client, their client’s opinions regarding the current state of politics in Turkey, in particular his view that democrats in Turkey should form a coalition with a view to establishing social peace and enabling Turkey’s access in European Union, Abdullah Öcalan’s views on the conflicts occurring within the KONGRA‑GEL, and in particular, his views that democratisation of the “Kurdish organisations” would allow the State of Turkey to be more democratic, his opinions on the pro-Kurdish legal political parties, and his view that individuals should liberate themselves before trying to liberate others. 8. In the interview published the following day, 30 April 2004, the applicants made statements on the following issues: Abdullah Öcalan’s criticism of the failure of the pro-Kurdish political groups during the municipal elections held on 28 March 2004, the view of Abdullah Öcalan and his lawyers that “the Kurdish movement” had failed to take into account Abdullah Öcalan’s opinions and projects, the criminal and disciplinary investigations and the criminal proceedings instituted against the applicants for disseminating their client’s views, Abdullah Öcalan’s criticism of “Kurdish organisations”, problems between Abdullah Öcalan and the leaders of the “Kurdish movement”, the applicants’ role both as legal and political representatives of Abdullah Öcalan and their meetings with individuals close to the State of Turkey as well as representatives of foreign States on behalf of their client, and the applicants’ view that Abdullah Öcalan’s opinions offered an opportunity for resolving the Kurdish issue in a democratic/political manner and that his opinions had transformed the State of Turkey. 9. On 30 April 2004 the public prosecutor at the now defunct Istanbul State Security Court filed a bill of indictment under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713), charging the applicants with disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK/KONGRA-GEL on account of the interview published on 29 April 2004. In the indictment, the applicants were accused of acting on Öcalan’s instructions and conveying messages from him about the PKK’s strategy. Subsequently, criminal proceedings were launched against the applicants before the Istanbul Assize Court. 10. On 7 May 2004 the Istanbul public prosecutor filed a second bill of indictment against the applicants, again charging them with disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 on account of the interview published in the 30 April 2004 issue of the newspaper. 11. On 24 August 2004 the Istanbul Assize Court decided to join the two sets of criminal proceedings against the applicants owing to the factual and legal similarities between them. 12. During the proceedings the applicants maintained that they had made the statements with a view to providing information to the press, since the case against Abdullah Öcalan had attracted media interest, but that they had been misquoted to a certain extent in the newspaper. They stressed that they had not acted with the intention of disseminating propaganda in favour of any illegal organisation. 13. On 18 February 2010 the Istanbul Assize Court convicted the applicants of disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK/KONGRA‑GEL under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713. It sentenced them to ten months’ imprisonment each, but decided to suspend pronouncement of their convictions on condition that they did not commit another intentional offence for a period of five years, in accordance with Article 231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 14. In its judgment, the Istanbul court held that the applicants had overstepped the limits of the lawyer-client relationship and made statements in a manner that induced and promoted the adoption, dissemination and enrootment of Abdullah Öcalan’s opinions in society. The first-instance court considered that in the light of the applicants’ role, the readers they targeted, the aim of the publication, and the manner in which their applicants’ interviews were perceived by the readership, the interviews could not be deemed to be protected by the right to freedom of expression or the privilege of the lawyer-client relationship. The court further considered that the right to freedom of expression carried with it duties and responsibilities and could be restricted for the purpose of protecting national security and territorial integrity in a democratic society. The Istanbul Assize Court concluded that the reported interviews were aimed at disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK/KONGRA-GEL and found the applicants guilty. 15. On 20 September 2010 the applicants’ objection to the assize court’s judgment was dismissed by the same court.

9. The first applicant, Mr S., was born in 1989. The second applicant, Mr V., and the third applicant, Mr A., were both born in 1982. 10. On Saturday 10 October 2009 from 8 to 10 p.m. a football match between Denmark and Sweden was held in Copenhagen. The stadium had a capacity of 38,000 spectators. Beforehand the police had received intelligence reports of intentions among various club factions from Denmark and Sweden to instigate hooligan brawls. Consequently, in addition to the Copenhagen Police, which was in operation as usual, an extra 186 police officers were called on duty. Most of them wore uniforms throughout the day. They were familiar with members of local football factions. 11. The three applicants went to Copenhagen to watch the match. They were detained during the day by virtue of section 5(3) of the Police Act (Politiloven) (see paragraph 29 below). 12. Altogether 138 spectators/hooligans were detained, approximately half of them under section 755 of the Administration of Justice Act (Retsplejeloven) (see paragraph 35 below), being charged with various criminal offences, while the other half were detained under section 5(3) of the Police Act outside the context of criminal proceedings. 13. The first applicant was detained from 4.45 p.m. to 12.06 a.m., a total of seven hours and twenty-one minutes. 14. The second applicant was detained from 3.50 p.m. to 11.27 p.m., a total of seven hours and thirty-seven minutes. 15. The third applicant was detained from 3.50 p.m. to 11.34 p.m., a total of seven hours and forty-four minutes. 16. The last disturbances in the city centre of Copenhagen resulting in detentions took place at 10.51 p.m. and 11.21 p.m., at which time it was recorded that a police transport wagon was holding thirty-five detainees (those detained at 10.51 p.m.). 17. On 15 October 2009, on behalf of the applicants, their representative requested that the police bring the cases before the courts in order to examine the lawfulness of the detention under chapter 43a of the Administration of Justice Act. She also sought compensation under section 469, subsection 6, of the same Act. 18. On 4 November 2009, the parties having agreed on a common venue, the cases were brought before the Aarhus City Court (Retten i Aarhus). The applicants, three witnesses on their behalf, the leader of the police operation and four other representatives of the police were heard. The case was tried over three days, on 11 March, 6 September and 28 October 2010. 19. The applicants explained that they had been part of a group of approximately twenty-five people from Aarhus, who had arrived in Copenhagen well before the match was due to begin. They had met between five and ten friends from Copenhagen and entered a pub. A group of forty or fifty people had afterwards left the pub to find a bigger pub on the Strøget pedestrian shopping street but the police had led them down a side street and detained the second and third applicants and four others. Subsequently, the first applicant had gone with some friends to another pub. Later on he had gone to a square opposite Tivoli Gardens to meet a friend from Aarhus. While standing outside with this friend, and talking on the phone with another friend from Copenhagen, he had been detained. The applicants argued that they had not been involved in any altercations; nor had they had any such intention. They confirmed that on a couple of previous occasions, they had been held in police custody in connection with other football matches. 20. A “Memorandum on detentions in connection with the international match between Denmark and Sweden on 10 October 2009”, prepared by Chief Inspector B.O., the strategic commander for the event, was submitted to the City Court. It stated that the police had received intelligence reports that hooligan groups from both countries were set on fighting each other on the match day. The risk of fighting was increased by the fact that the match would not start until 8 p.m., leaving considerable time for each group to consume alcoholic beverages beforehand. In order to prevent such clashes, the plan was to start engaging in proactive dialogue from 12 noon, when the first fans/spectators appeared, and in the event of clashes, first to arrest the instigators under section 755 of the Administration of Justice Act and charge them or, if that was not possible, to detain the instigators by virtue of section 5(3) of the Police Act. Since detention under the latter provision, as far as possible, should not exceed six hours, the memorandum specifically stated that it was preferable to avoid detaining anyone too early during the day, since they would then have to be released during or after the game, with the possibility that they would head for the city centre again and resume their involvement in brawls. At 3.41 p.m. the first big fight started between Danish and Swedish supporters at Amagertorv Square, on Strøget in the centre of Copenhagen, resulting in five or six individuals being detained, including the second and third applicants. Subsequently, elsewhere, other supporters were detained, including the first applicant. Up until the start of the match, further individuals who instigated and directed fights were detained, but the manoeuvre tactics continued to be a dialogue to ensure that the large number of supporters behaved and made their way to the stadium to watch the match. After the match, another large brawl started in the city centre, resulting in further detentions of a large group of Swedish and Danish supporters/hooligans. 21. Before the City Court, Chief Inspector B.O. stated, inter alia: “... that he was the strategic commander for the event and located in the control room in connection with the international football match between Denmark and Sweden on 10 October 2009. The police had received intelligence reports of intentions among various club factions from Denmark and Sweden to initiate hooligan brawls in connection with the match. The police were therefore prepared for it not to be the usual audience of festive Danish and Swedish supporters. This information had come from police ‘spotters’ in different networks of football fans. They had received information that Danish and Swedish groups had planned to collaborate ... Police preparations had targeted different locations in Copenhagen. It was the intention to locate the various groups, talk to them to calm them down and accordingly dampen tempers before they reached the national stadium. The police had already deployed forces and divided them into groups at around 2 p.m. on the basis of intelligence that the spectators would arrive early to go partying. They had managed to locate the groups of fans by means of their spotters, and it had turned out that the fans were divided into a Swedish and a Danish group. They had seen the first large fight between Danish and Swedish hooligans at around 3.40 p.m. The fight had occurred in the central part of Strøget, the pedestrian shopping street, outside bar D, where the Swedish group had settled down. Prior to the fight, they had located the Danish groups in the central courtyard of Boltens Gård. According to the intelligence, the Danish people involved were supporters of the football clubs of Brøndby, Lyngby [Copenhagen] and AGF [Aarhus]. This intelligence had been collected by police officers in the home towns of these clubs. Those police officers had come to Copenhagen to assist, and they had recognised supporters. The fight had taken the police somewhat by surprise, but they had managed to segregate the Swedish supporters at the bar D, and guide the Danish participants down Valkendorffsgade, a small side street off the pedestrian shopping street. It was a group of about fifty to sixty Danish fans altogether. He did not know the number of persons involved directly in the fight, but had understood from local reports that there were about fifty or sixty persons on either side. A fight of this kind causes a lot of uncertainty. He himself had been in the control room, but had had regular contact with people at the scene of the incident. He was the one who had made the decision to detain persons who could not be charged with an offence, that is, detention pursuant to the Police Act. It had been planned that only the instigators should be detained. To the extent possible, they had also intended to avoid detaining many people early in the day because those people would then have to be released during or right after the match and would then be able to head for the city centre again and resume fighting. He had made use of local [police] spotters to identify six leading members, who had then been detained. They had been identified on the basis of police officers’ prior knowledge of them, combined with their ongoing observations. The crucial factor had naturally been the individuals’ actual behaviour. They would not have been detained if they had not been acting as instigators ... The detainees had been released following an assessment of the situation in central Copenhagen. The police had started releasing the detainees after midnight, when the situation in central Copenhagen had calmed down and it had been assessed that there was no one with whom the newly released persons could start a fight. He was, of course, aware of the six-hour rule laid down in the Police Act, but it might be necessary to exceed this maximum period. They had done so deliberately that particular evening. Had there been no violence after the expiry of the six-hour period, there would have been no justification for not releasing the detainees. The purpose had definitely been to avoid confrontations and fights and situations causing uncertainty. They had made a continuous assessment during the period of detention. Normally there were no problems in relation to the six-hour rule in connection with matches played earlier in the day/on weekdays when people did not arrive so early. The control room team had included an investigator who had had regular contact with the Bellahøj police station regarding the detentions. The detainees who had been charged with an offence had been released after the match. As regards the persons detained under the Police Act, a comprehensive, general assessment had been made and then those persons had been released one by one when the danger had passed. He had been involved in the general assessment of the length of the detention periods, but not in the assessment of the individual cases. The control room had been closed down shortly after midnight, when the observers around the city had reported that things were quiet and that people were on their way home/back to their hotels. As already mentioned, it had been decided to release detainees on the basis of a general assessment made in the control room, but the actual releases had been effected at the Bellahøj police station. The police’s assessment had been that the detainees would meet up again and start new fights if released before the streets of the city centre had become quiet ...” 22. Police Constable P.W. stated: “... that he had participated as a member of a special patrol in the police action in Copenhagen on 10 October 2009 in connection with the international match. They had received intelligence that hooligans from Aarhus would meet with other hooligans from Denmark to fight Swedish football fans. The Copenhagen Police had asked for help from the police of other districts in Denmark who were familiar with members of local factions. He and his colleagues had met at around 11 a.m. for a briefing. He and a colleague of his from the Police of Eastern Jutland had then moved around the city to look for any hooligans from Aarhus whom they might recognise. They had been told that people from Brøndby had gathered at a particular bar, and they had gone there. Among the people they had seen were [the first and second applicants]. [The second applicant] had been sitting together with A, the leader of South Side United (SSU), which is a local faction from Brøndby. There had been a good atmosphere, and no violence. The witness had remained standing outside for a short while and had talked to people from Aarhus. It had probably been around 1 p.m. He and his colleague and some other officers had then posted themselves opposite the bar to keep an eye on what was going on. They had received reports that Swedes and Danes were to meet and fight. At some point the Danish hooligans had started leaving the bar, walking down the pedestrian shopping street towards Amagertorv Square [around 700 metres from the bar]. [The witness] had worked in the special patrol for four years and had met [the first and second applicants] several times at previous fights in connection with football matches. He had seen them take part in fights and heard them shout ‘White Pride Hooligan’. He and his colleagues had followed the group and reported back to the control room. When they had come closer to Amagertorv Square, police personnel carriers had been parked crosswise to prevent the group from colliding with the Swedish football fans. The Danish hooligans had then been turned around and taken down a side street, where they had been registered and searched. They had been told by the control room to select two leading hooligans from Aarhus. He and his colleague had agreed on selecting [the second and third applicants]. It had happened in a calm manner. The reason why [the second applicant] had been taken to the police station was that they had indeed seen him talking to A, combined with their prior knowledge of him. [The third applicant] had also been taken to the police station because of their knowledge of him. [The witness] had written a report on the detentions a couple of hours later. When questioned about Exhibit 46 at the bottom and its continuation on Exhibit 47 at the top [the police reports written by him], according to which both [the second and third applicants] had issued several orders to the other hooligans from Aarhus, the witness stated that he could no longer recall the details, but if this was what he had written, then that was how it had been. The purpose of detaining those two persons had been to create calm and prevent clashes. This had apparently succeeded because he had been present during the international match himself, and it had been obvious that the hooligans from Aarhus had been missing someone to take control. When the group from the bar was being guided into the side street, a couple of people might have tried to disappear into the crowd, but the group had followed directions from the police. White Pride supporters were characterised by being highly structured. It was very clear that someone was in control. Directions were issued by the leaders, and the directions were obeyed. The three factions present at the bar had come from Aarhus, Brøndby and Lyngby and were not usually friends. They had come out together and walked in a group towards Amagertorv Square, where the Swedish hooligans were supposed to be.” 23. Police Constable M.W. stated: “... that he had participated in the police action in Copenhagen on 10 October 2009 as a dog handler. He had been involved in the administrative detention of a person [the first applicant] at Axeltorv Square. He did not recall the name of this person, but it was the only person whom he had been involved in detaining. He and a colleague of his had been sitting observing in a car at Axeltorv Square, when a citizen, a man aged 40 to 45, holding his son of about five by the hand, had contacted them saying that three people, whom he had pointed out from a very short distance, were planning a fight as they had been calling various mates, telling them to meet up at the entrance to Tivoli Gardens and try to start a fight with some Swedish supporters. This citizen had overheard the calls just before he had contacted the police, and he had pointed out one of the three persons in particular. The person in question was still talking on his mobile phone at that time. The witness and his colleague considered the person making the report to be highly credible. The person making the report did not look like a typical football supporter. The witness had continued to keep an eye on the person standing with his telephone to his ear. When the three men noticed that the witness and his colleague had caught sight of them, they had started to walk in different directions. The witness had then detained the person who had the telephone to his ear. Some colleagues driving in the police personnel carrier which had arrived in the meantime had detained the other two people ...” 24. Chief Inspector P.J. stated: “... that he had been involved in placing detainees in cells, upholding the detentions and releasing the detainees. When the Copenhagen Police planned comprehensive police actions and expected to detain many people, he was usually selected as the person responsible for verifying that standard procedures were observed when the detainees were placed in a cell at Bellahøj police station. On the relevant evening he had been assisted by two leaders, each of whom had assistance from two colleagues in carrying out body searches, and making photo recordings, of the detainees. Ten additional police officers were there to help. One of his tasks had been to make sure that the six-hour rule was observed. They had been faced with the issue that the six-hour period applicable to two of the persons detained under the Police Act expired at 9.50 p.m. He had contacted the control-room supervisor before the expiry of this period. Concurrently, clashes had been starting in the streets, and the control-room supervisor had decided not to let the relevant persons out. They had not wanted to add fuel to the fire. This decision had been made by the supervisors because he himself did not have the power to make such a decision. He had talked to the control room many times during that evening from 9.30 p.m. onwards. Very many detainees had been brought to the police station up until around 11 p.m., reaching a total of 136 detainees. Half of them had been detained under the Police Act. He had regularly asked when they should start releasing the detainees. He had not called and asked about specific names, but a general assessment had been made on an ongoing basis for all detainees from the time when the statutory six-hour periods started to expire. The radio communication had made it possible for him to keep updated about when things started calming down after the arrests of people in the Boltens Gård courtyard, and finally it had been confirmed that he could start releasing the persons detained under the Police Act. He did not keep a log of all telephone calls and was therefore unable to give the exact time. As far as he recalled, there had probably been one detainee under 18 years old who had been fetched by his parents before the end of the six-hour period, but otherwise no one else had been let out before the two initial detainees. It could very well have happened that some of his colleagues had started taking people out of the cells before the end of the six-hour period when they had received the information from the control room, because everybody was highly aware of the six-hour rule. If the persons concerned had subsequently been returned to their cells, the reason was an order from the control room saying that they should continue to be detained.” 25. By a judgment of 25 November 2010 the City Court found against the applicants for the following reasons: “The Copenhagen Police ought to have brought the matters before the court within five days of receipt, as set out in section 469(2) of the Administration of Justice Act. The court finds, however, that the non‑submission does not as such give rise to liability making the plaintiffs eligible for compensation. Based on the evidence, the court accepts as fact that the Copenhagen Police had received intelligence prior to the international football match between Denmark and Sweden on 10 October 2009 that Danish and Swedish hooligan groups had arranged to meet in connection with the match and that the police had seen the first large fight between Danish and Swedish football fans at Amagertorv Square at 3.41 p.m. This implied a concrete and imminent risk of disturbance of public order, and the police were under a duty to attempt to prevent such disturbance; see section 5(1) of the Police Act. According to the evidence given by Police Constable P.W., compared with the police report prepared by the same witness on 11 October 2009 (Exhibits 47 and 48), the court accepts as fact that [the second and third applicants] were detained after the witness had specifically seen the persons concerned talking with an activist from the local Brøndby faction of South Side United on 10 October 2009 and issuing orders to others, in combination with the fact that the persons concerned were known to the police for having been detained several times previously in connection with similar football events. The court also accepts as fact, based on the evidence given by Police Constable M.W., compared with the evidence given by Chief Inspector B.O., that [the first applicant], who had also been detained several times previously in connection with similar events, was detained because a person, whom M.W. and his colleague had deemed to be highly credible, had spontaneously contacted him stating that he had just overheard a person, whom he had simultaneously pointed out as being [the first applicant], calling other people by phone and inciting them to start a fight with Swedish football fans at Tivoli Gardens together with him. Less radical measures could not be deemed sufficient to avert the risk of additional unrest in those circumstances, and the court finds that the Copenhagen Police did not exceed their powers by detaining [the applicants] under section 5(3) of the Police Act on that basis. Based on the evidence, the court accepts as fact that during the afternoon and evening, about 138 persons were detained, half of them being detained pursuant to the Police Act; that the unrest continued for the rest of the afternoon and all evening; and that the detention of the plaintiffs was ended as soon as the city centre had become quiet, in the assessment of the police, after a group comprising thirty-five Danes was arrested towards midnight. The court finds, in the circumstances of the present case, that there is no basis for invalidating the assessment made by the police, according to which the release of the detainees before the city centre had become quiet would have entailed a concrete and imminent risk of further unrest, including clashes with spectators who had been let out of the national stadium after the end of the match and who were still in the streets in large numbers. It is stated in the second sentence of section 5(3) of the Police Act that detention must be as brief as possible and should not extend beyond six hours where possible. According to the preparatory notes on this provision, as described in the second column on page 32 of Bill no. 159 of 2 April 2004, the purpose of the detention must be taken into account in this assessment and any person so detained must be released when the circumstances giving rise to the detention no longer exist. It also appears from the preparatory notes on the same provision that normally the six-hour period can only be exceeded in connection with actions involving the detention of a considerable number of people, in which situations the time spent on transfer to the police station and registration and identification of detainees would render it impossible, in practice, to observe the six-hour rule. Whilst the legislative intent of the provision is to extend detention to more than six hours only in exceptional situations, if an extension is not justified by practical issues related to the detention of a large number of people that render it impossible to observe the maximum period, the court finds on the above grounds, in view of the purpose of the detentions compared with the organised nature, scope and duration of the unrest, as well as the length of the specific periods by which the maximum periods had been exceeded, that the conditions for detaining [the applicants] pursuant to section 5(3) of the Police Act for more than six hours were met. Accordingly, there is no basis for awarding compensation to [the applicants].” 26. On appeal, for the reasons stated by the City Court, on 6 September 2011 the High Court of Western Denmark (Vestre Landsret) upheld the judgment. 27. On 12 December 2011, finding that the case raised no issue of principle, the Appeals Permission Board (Procesbevillingsnævnet) refused leave to appeal to the Supreme Court (Højesteret). 28. It appears that forty-nine persons (not including the applicants) were charged with criminal offences on the day of the match, notably for breaching the Executive Order on Police Measures to Maintain Public Order and Protect the Safety of Individuals and the Public, etc., and the Right of the Police to Launch Temporary Measures (bekendtgørelse om politiets sikring af den offentlige orden og beskyttelse af enkeltpersoners og den offentlige sikkerhed mv., samt politiets adgang til at iværksætte midlertidige foranstaltninger) (see paragraph 33 below). However, those charges were later withdrawn because it was deemed impossible to obtain sufficient evidence to prove that every single one of the persons charged had committed one or more criminal offences. One person was convicted under section 119 of the Penal Code for having thrown a glass item at a police officer’s head, and another person was convicted under section 121 for having verbally insulted a police officer on duty.

4. The applicants live in Shnogh village. 5. In the 1970s a copper-molybdenum deposit (‘Teghout’) was discovered about four and six km away from the villages of Teghout and Shnogh respectively, in the Lori Region. 6. In 2001 a private company, Armenian Copper Programme CJSC, was granted a mining licence for the exploitation of the Teghout copper‑molybdenum deposit for a period of twenty-five years. 7. On 1 November 2007 the Government adopted Decree no. 1279-N approving the designation of territories situated within the administrative boundaries of the rural communities of Shnogh and Teghout in the Lori Region as expropriation zones, to be taken for State needs, thus changing the land use category. According to the decree, Armenian Copper Programme CJSC or Teghout CJSC, founded by the former for the purpose of the implementation of the Teghout copper-molybdenum deposit exploitation project, were to acquire the units of land listed in its annexes. 8. The plot of land belonging to the applicants was listed among the units of land falling within these expropriation zones. 9. The applicants, a family of five, live in Shnogh village and earn their living from agriculture. They jointly owned a plot of arable land in the village measuring 1.622 ha. The land was used for growing crops for the family and feeding their livestock. 10. On an unspecified date Teghout CJSC addressed a letter to the applicants containing an offer to buy their plot of land for 818,000 Armenian drams (AMD, approximately 1,780 euros (EUR)) plus an additional 15% as required by law, making the final offer AMD 940,700 (approximately EUR 2,045). 11. The applicants did not reply to the letter, not being satisfied with the amount of compensation offered. 12. On 12 May 2008 Teghout CJSC lodged a claim against the applicants, seeking to oblige them to sign an agreement for their property to be taken for State needs. The company based its claim, inter alia, on a valuation report prepared at its request by Oliver Group LLC, a licensed valuation company. According to the report, the market value of the applicants’ plot of land was estimated at AMD 818,000 (approximately EUR 1,780). 13. In the proceedings before the Lori Regional Court, the fourth applicant represented the other applicants and argued that the market value of their land had been underestimated. He requested additional time to be able to submit an alternative valuation report. 14. It appears that the applicants were unable to obtain a valuation of their property by another company. They claim that no other valuation company was willing to make an independent assessment of the market value of their land. 15. During the proceedings Teghout CJSC submitted another valuation of the applicants’ property, stating that Oliver Group LLC had prepared a corrected report according to which the market value of the property was AMD 900,000 (approximately EUR 1,960). The final amount of compensation, including the additional 15% required by law, would thus be equal to AMD 1,035,000 (approximately EUR 2,250). 16. On 26 September 2008 the Regional Court granted Teghout CJSC’s claim, awarding the applicants a total of AMD 1,035,000 in compensation. 17. The applicants lodged an appeal complaining, inter alia, that the market value of their land had been seriously underestimated and that the amount of compensation offered to them was inadequate. They further argued that the fact that Oliver Group LLC had submitted two different valuation reports during the proceedings raised doubts as to the credibility of its reports, and that the court should have initiated an independent valuation of their property. 18. On 29 January 2009 the Civil Court of Appeal upheld the Regional Court’s judgment, finding, inter alia, that the market value of the property to be taken for State needs had been correctly estimated, on the basis of the valuation report contained in the case file. 19. The applicants lodged an appeal on points of law. They argued, inter alia, that the Regional Court had failed to order an independent valuation of the property, despite having the power to do so under the law. They submitted that they had disagreed with the valuation report submitted by the other party to the proceedings, which was moreover not an expert opinion and therefore could not be admitted as evidence. 20. On 24 June 2009 the Court of Cassation declared the applicants’ cassation appeal inadmissible for lack of merit.

4. The applicant, a Syrian national, was born in 1993 and currently resides in Khartoum, Sudan. 5. On 24 April 2015 the applicant arrived in Russia, being in possession of a study visa. He enrolled in the Izhevsk State Technical University and had his registered residence in the town of Izhevsk. His visa expired on 26 April 2016. 6. On 4 May 2016 the applicant applied for refugee status alleging the risks to his life and safety in the light of the on-going conflict in Syria. The request and the subsequent appeals were dismissed by the Russian migration authorities and the courts. 7. On 8 June 2016 the applicant was arrested and put in detention by the migration authorities. 8. By a judgment of 9 June 2016 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Izhevsk found the applicant in breach of migration rules, an offence under Article 18.8 § 1.1 of the Code of Administrative Offences, and ordered his expulsion. In order to facilitate enforcement, the court ordered that the applicant be placed in detention. 9. On 10 June 2016 the Supreme Court of the Udmurtiya Republic upheld the lower court’s judgment. 10. On 22 June 2016 the Court indicated to the respondent Government, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, that the applicant should not be extradited, expelled or otherwise involuntarily removed from Russia to Syria for the duration of the proceedings before the Court. Since that date the enforcement of the applicant’s expulsion was monthly postponed by the domestic courts. 11. On 13 January 2017 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on appeal amended the lower courts’ judgments and excluded administrative removal from the sanction, since it would have exposed the applicant’s life to risk in Syria. 12. On 20 January 2017 the applicant left Russia for Lebanon.

5. The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Yerevan. 6. She is a civil servant working for the Ministry of Environmental Protection (hereinafter “the Ministry”) as a State inspector. She suffers from cardiac problems, including a heart rhythm disorder. 7. According to the applicant, on 10 January 2012 H.A., her head of division, and A.K., his deputy, used violence against her in H.A.’s office. In particular, they assaulted her, grabbed her hands, insulted her and forcibly took a document concerning her which she had taken in to them in order to write down her objections. As a result of the violence she fainted, sustained bodily injuries, received numerous bruises on her hands and was seriously humiliated. 8. On 12 January 2012 the applicant filed a written report with the head of staff of the Ministry, giving a detailed account of what had happened. She stated, inter alia, that she had returned her appraisal report for the second half of 2011 to H.A. since she had disagreed with the assessment received. On 10 January 2012 she had been informed by one of her colleagues that H.A. wanted to see her in his office. During their meeting, H.A. had given her the appraisal report and asked her why she had not signed it. She had responded that she wanted to discuss it. H.A. had refused to provide any clarifications, stating that he was the one to make decisions and would submit the report to the relevant division without her signature. H.A. had then ordered her to return the appraisal report, which she had refused to do, stating that she would write down her objections, sign the document and then return it to him. When she had been about to leave, H.A. had immediately closed and locked the door to his office and had started to approach her, shouting that she was a thief and had stolen a document from his office. Using physical violence and personal insults, he had tried to take the papers from her. After she had called for help, A.K. had entered the office and instead of diffusing the situation had also insulted her and ordered her to hand him the documents. The two of them had grabbed her hands, causing her serious pain, and forcibly taken away the papers. As a result of the stress and pain she had fainted for a short period of time, after which she had been told that she could leave as there was nothing else to discuss. She concluded by stating that as a result of the violent behaviour of H.A. and A.K. she had suffered injuries, health problems and serious distress. She requested that the relevant measures be taken in accordance with the law. 9. After the incident, the applicant felt unwell and underwent a medical examination. She was diagnosed with acute bronchitis and Wolff‑Parkinson-White syndrome (a heart rhythm disorder) and was put on sick leave from 13 to 27 January 2012. 10. On 14 January 2012 the applicant reported the incident to the police, stating that on 10 January 2012 she and H.A., her head of division, had had an argument during which he had been violent and caused her bodily harm. She made a statement giving an account of events similar to that in her report to the head of staff of the Ministry. 11. The investigator ordered a forensic medical examination the same day to determine whether the applicant had any bodily injuries and, if so, their nature, origin, seriousness and the time and manner of their infliction. 12. On 15 January 2012 H.A. gave a statement to the police. In particular, he stated that the applicant had refused to return her appraisal report to him, after which he had left his office, closed the door and called A.K., asking him to come to see him with the other employees. During that time the applicant had kept shouting and swearing. She had called their superior to say that he had locked her in. He denied harassing the applicant either physically or verbally and said that she had used foul language. 13. On the same day A.K. made a statement and similarly denied using violence against the applicant. Between 16 and 25 January 2012 a number of the applicant’s colleagues who were at work on the day of the incident were questioned and denied that H.A. and A.K. had been violent towards the applicant. 14. On 18 January 2012 the forensic medical examination was completed. The relevant parts of the expert’s opinion read as follows: “Complaints: At present [the applicant] complains of a nervous breakdown. Results of personal examination: An irregularly shaped, non-homogenous, greenish‑yellow ecchymosis measuring 6 x 2 cm is present on the mid-third of the inner right upper arm. Two similar round-shaped ecchymoses are present on the inner surface of the same area measuring 1 cm in diameter: on the mid-third of the inner left upper arm measuring 1 cm in diameter; on the lower third of the inner left upper arm measuring 2 x 1 cm and 1.5 x 1.2 cm and on the mid-third of the outer left forearm measuring 2.5 x 1.5 cm. Conclusion: [The applicant’s] bodily injuries in the form of ecchymoses [around] the right and left upper arms and the left forearm have been inflicted with blunt, hard objects possibly in the period mentioned; [the injuries] taken separately as well as all together do not contain elements of [short-term] damage to health.” 15. On 24 January 2012 the investigator took an additional statement from the applicant. She stated that she had no objections to the opinion of the forensic medical expert and intended to pursue her complaint. 16. On 25 January 2012 the investigator took another additional statement from the applicant. The relevant parts read as follows: “Question: In the course of collecting evidence H.A. and A.K. said that they did not hit you and did absolutely not grab your hands. What can you say about this? Answer: ... I do not know why H.A. and A.K. said that but it is logical that they would deny committing such acts. I will reiterate once again that H.A. and A.K. pulled and pushed me and grabbed my hands thus causing me injuries.” 17. On 27 January 2012 the investigator took a further additional statement from the applicant. She stated: “I inform you that since the time I [went] to the police ... [H.A.] and [A.K.] have not even apologised; moreover, they have created such an atmosphere that it is impossible to work, since other employees ignore me and avoid contact with me for fear of losing their jobs. Since H.A. and A.K. are continuing this kind of behaviour, abusing their official capacity, in the circumstances I am unable to reconcile with them. I am complaining and requesting that H.A. and A.K. be prosecuted. I also wish to add that because of their actions I have had health problems and as a result have been on sick leave from 13 to 27 January ...” 18. On 28 January 2012 H.A. was questioned again and stated, inter alia, that the applicant had made a false statement. He had never harassed her or grabbed her hands and had remained seated in his chair until she had left. As for the injuries discovered on the applicant’s body, H.A. stated that he had never touched her and did not know how they had been inflicted. 19. It appears that no decision was taken by the investigator for about a month. 20. On 24 February 2012 the applicant sent a written request to the head of the Marash Division of the Central Police Department for criminal proceedings to be brought against H.A. and A.K. She stated in her request, inter alia, that she had been informed of the provisions of Article 183 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, under which criminal proceedings could only be instituted on the basis of a complaint by her. She further stated that she had not reconciled with H.A. and A.K. and was calling for them to be prosecuted. On the same date the investigator took an additional statement from the applicant. A further additional statement was taken from her on 27 February 2012. 21. On 1 March 2012 the prosecutor instructed the investigator to refuse to bring criminal proceedings against H.A. and A.K. on the grounds that no crime had been committed. It was suggested that the applicant had perceived the events subjectively and that her supervisors had never used violence against her. 22. On 5 March 2012 the investigator refused to bring criminal proceedings against H.A. and A.K. for lack of corpus delicti in their actions. The decision stated, in particular, that the applicant had made unclear and contradictory statements with regard to the incident. It further stated that the evidence collected had revealed that on 10 January 2012 first H.A. and then A.K., who had gone to the latter’s office, had tried to calm the applicant down, as she had been insulting H.A. During the incident A.K. had caught hold of her hand and taken the document that she had taken from H.A. Intentional infliction of bodily harm was punishable under Article 118 of the Criminal Code, but negligent infliction of bodily harm was not punishable. In the case at hand the applicant’s injuries had been caused by H.A. and A.K.’s negligence; it had not been established that they had intentionally caused her injuries. 23. On 13 March 2012 the applicant lodged a complaint with the prosecutor against the investigator’s decision. She argued, inter alia, that contrary to what was stated in the decision she had described in detail how she had been treated. In particular, she had submitted that first H.A. had grabbed her hands using force, harassed her and locked her in his office so that she could not leave. Thereafter A.K. had come in and also assaulted her. The applicant complained that the conclusion in the investigator’s decision, according to which H.A. and A.K. had caused her injuries by negligence, could not be substantiated and pursued the purpose of exonerating public officials from responsibility. She further complained that, as a result of deliberate violence on the part of H.A. and A.K., she had experienced severe emotional suffering as a woman since her superior had debased her and caused her serious bodily harm without good reason, right in the workplace. In addition, the applicant stated that the incident had taken place in the workplace and naturally all the witnesses questioned by the investigator were the subordinates of H.A. and A.K. If criminal proceedings were instituted, they would be questioned as witnesses and warned about criminal liability for making false statements. 24. H.A. also lodged a complaint against the investigator’s decision, claiming that it had not been established that he or A.K. had ever hit the applicant. 25. On 15 March 2012 the prosecutor dismissed the applicant’s complaint and allowed H.A.’s complaint. In particular, the prosecutor upheld the investigator’s refusal to institute criminal proceedings but changed the grounds for it, stating that no crime had been committed involving H.A. and A.K. The decision stated that no evidence had been obtained that would establish that H.A. and A.K. had inflicted injuries on the applicant, except her own unspecified and contradictory statements. As regards the applicant, the decision stated, inter alia, that because the stress she had suffered as a result of the incident in H.A.’s office she had perceived and described what had happened in a subjective manner. In these circumstances, her contradictory statements did not correspond to the evidence gathered but that did not create grounds for prosecuting her for false accusations. 26. On 4 April 2012 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court (hereinafter “the District Court”), requesting that criminal proceedings be instituted. She reiterated her previous arguments and complained, in particular, that the question of her injuries had not been addressed at all in the prosecutor’s decision, which had ignored the results of the forensic medical examination. In the end, it had never been established who had inflicted her injuries. The applicant further complained that the prosecution had relied on the statements of subordinates of those who had committed the offence in question. Their statements could not be considered objective and reliable in view of the serious fear of those concerned losing their jobs. If criminal proceedings were instituted, they would have the procedural status of witnesses and would be warned about criminal liability for making false statements. 27. On 18 May 2012 the District Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint. In doing so, it found that the disputed decision had been lawful, while the applicant’s arguments stemmed from an individual and subjective interpretation of the events in question and the procedural measures undertaken in relation to them. 28. The applicant lodged an appeal against the District Court’s decision. She argued, inter alia, that it had failed to examine her arguments. In particular, the issue of the existence of a number of injuries on her body as established by the forensic medical examination had not been addressed at all. 29. On 12 July 2012 the Criminal Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal and fully upheld the District Court’s decision. In doing so, it stated that the applicant had made unclear and contradictory statements about the circumstances of the incident which had not been corroborated by other evidence, namely the statements of H.A., A.K. and others questioned in relation to the incident. 30. On 2 August 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. She argued that the decisions of the District Court and the Criminal Court of Appeal had failed to explain the existence of injuries on her body or the fact that H.A. had locked her in his office. She also reiterated her arguments in relation to the refusal to institute criminal proceedings and the unreliability of the statements made by her colleagues. 31. On 6 September 2012 the Court of Cassation declared the applicant’s appeal on points of law inadmissible for lack of merit.

4. The facts, as submitted by the parties, are similar to those in Association “21 December 1989” and Others v. Romania (nos. 33810/07 and 18817/08, § 12-41, 24 May 2011). 5. The applicants or their close relatives participated in demonstrations and were injured or killed by gunfire during the events of December 1989 in Bucharest, Brașov and Vișina which led to the fall of the communist regime. 6. In 1990 the military prosecutor’s offices from several cities opened criminal investigations into the use of violence against the demonstrators, including the applicants’ injury or their close relatives’ death during these events. The main criminal investigation was recorded in file no. 97/P/1990 (current no. 11/P/2014). In a number of cases the prosecutor decided between 1991 and 1996 not to open an investigation or to discontinue the proceedings. These cases were further examined in the main criminal investigation file irrespective of a formal decision ordering re-opening, applicants being questioned by the prosecutor and raising civil claims, according to the circumstances of each case. 7. The most important procedural steps were described in Association “21 December 1989” and Others (cited above, §§ 12-41), and also in Ecaterina Mirea and Others v. Romania (nos. 43626/13 and 69 others, §§ 6-15, 12 April 2016). Subsequent relevant domestic decisions are shown below. 8. On 14 October 2015 the military prosecutor’s office closed the main investigation, finding that the complaints were partly statute-barred, partly subject to an amnesty, and partly ill-founded. It also found that some of the occurrences could not be classified as offences and some were res judicatae (see Anamaria-Loredana Orășanu and Others v. Romania [Committee], no. 43629/13, § 11, 7 November 2017). 9. The decision of 14 October 2015 was annulled by a Prosecutor General’s decision of 5 April 2016, confirmed by the High Court of Cassation and Justice on 13 June 2016. It was noted that the investigation in file no. 11/P/2014 was incomplete and that the facts could not be established based on the evidence gathered up to that date. 10. On 1 November 2016 the military prosecutor ordered the initiation in rem of a criminal investigation for the offence of crimes against humanity in respect of the same circumstances of fact. Up to February 2017 further steps were taken in gathering information from domestic authorities, the prosecutor’s office contacting 211 civil parties, questioning members of the political party which took over the presidency at the time of events, planning the hearing of military officers and other participants in the events, verifying the activity of the relevant military units and the audio/video recordings broadcast by radio and television. 11. At the date of the latest information available to the Court (submitted by the parties on 13 April 2017 and 19 May 2017), the criminal investigation was still ongoing.

5. The applicants, who are brothers, were born in 1964 and 1962 respectively and live in Mardin. 6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7. At the time of the events giving rise to the application, the applicants held teaching posts with the Ministry of Education and were employed as primary school teachers. 8. On 22 January 2000 the first applicant was taken into police custody on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation, Hizbullah, following the discovery of his profile in the format of a CV (özgeçmiş) amongst documents confiscated from the organisation’s safe house in Beykoz, Istanbul. On 26 January 2000 he was questioned by the police. In his statement, which he refrained from signing, he denied the allegations that he was a member of Hizbullah but submitted that he had given some of the same personal information about himself reflected in the CV to an individual named F.Ş. in 1983. He further submitted that he had adopted a religious lifestyle and had been in contact with religious communities since 1983; however, his activities had never gone beyond reading the Quran to children in mosques. In a statement given on 29 January 2000 to the public prosecutor, the applicant stated that he had refrained from signing his statements before the police since they had contained expressions which had not been used by him. He further submitted that the fact that his profile had been discovered in the safe house meant nothing, since anyone could have given that information to Hizbullah. He stated that, in any event, he had not given information about himself to the organisation. 9. On 22 January 2000 the second applicant was taken into police custody in similar circumstances to the first applicant, that is, following the discovery of his profile in the format of a CV amongst documents confiscated from the organisation’s safe house in Istanbul. On 28 and 29 January 2000 he was questioned by the police and the Mardin public prosecutor respectively, and denied all allegations against him on both occasions. Claiming that he had never been in contact with Hizbullah, he stressed that the CV shown to him as evidence by the police during questioning differed from the one he had seen at the time of his detention a week earlier, and that they both contained inaccurate information about his background. 10. On 29 February 2000 the public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Diyarbakır State Security Court, accusing the applicants of membership of an illegal armed organisation. He further accused the second applicant of complicity in the murder of two individuals and the wounding of a third. 11. By Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, published in the Official Gazette on 30 June 2004, State Security Courts were abolished. The cases against the applicants were therefore transferred to the Diyarbakır Assize Court. 12. On 13 September 2004 the Diyarbakır Assize Court held that the first applicant’s involvement with the terrorist organisation had been limited to handing in his CV and attending its indoctrination sessions, which therefore fell within the scope of aiding and abetting rather than membership. Having regard to the fact that the alleged crime had been committed before 23 April 1999, the court held that Law no. 4616 – which provided for the suspension of criminal proceedings in respect of certain offences committed before that date (see paragraph 38 below) – was applicable. It thus suspended the criminal proceedings against the first applicant. On 28 September 2007 the proceedings against him were discontinued on account of the expiry of the five-year prosecution period. The decision became final on 31 October 2007. 13. On 7 December 2007 the Diyarbakır Assize Court reclassified the charge against the second applicant as aiding and abetting an illegal organisation and discontinued the proceedings in respect of that charge on account of the expiry of the five-year prosecution period. It further acquitted him of the remaining charges for lack of sufficient evidence. 14. Owing to the fact that they were being prosecuted on charges of membership of an illegal organisation, the applicants were suspended from their positions. Furthermore, on 27 January 2000, following the initiation of the criminal investigation against the applicants, the Mardin Directorate of Education (“the Directorate”) initiated a disciplinary investigation against the applicants and a number of other civil servants into their political and ideological activities. Among those questioned within the context of that investigation were the applicants, about six to nine of their colleagues, as well as the principal and vice-principal of the primary school. In respect of the first applicant, three teachers briefly stated that they had been aware that the applicant was a Hizbullah supporter or had heard such rumours. One teacher colleague stated that he believed the applicant was a Hizbullah supporter as he had seen his wife wearing a çarşaf (chador). In respect of the second applicant, the teachers said that they knew him to be religious but that they had not witnessed him engaging in any ideological propaganda at school. One teacher submitted that the second applicant was rumoured to be a Hizbullah supporter. In respect of both applicants, most of the teachers submitted that their suspension from the school had disrupted the working order of the institution in so far as the applicants’ students had had to be transferred to the rest of the teachers, resulting in merged classes of sixty to seventy pupils. The principal and vice-principal stated that they had not witnessed or been made aware of anything to suggest that the applicants had connections with the illegal organisation. The applicants denied the allegations and stated that they wanted to return to their duties as soon as possible. 15. In an investigation report dated 30 June 2000, investigators took into account the evidence in the criminal proceedings, in particular the fact that the applicants’ CVs had been discovered on a computer confiscated from the organisation’s safe house, and concluded that the applicants were members of Hizbullah. They also went on to add that this conclusion was corroborated by the statements of the applicants’ teacher colleagues. They then decided that the nature of the criminal proceedings against the applicants on charges of membership of a terrorist organisation fell within the ambit of section 125 (E) (a) of the Law on Civil Servants (Law no. 657), which provides for the dismissal of a civil servant for disrupting the peace, tranquillity and working order of an institution for ideological and political purposes. The investigators therefore recommended the applicants’ dismissal on those grounds. 16. On 24 October 2000 the applicants were invited by the Supreme Disciplinary Council of the Ministry of Education (“the Supreme Disciplinary Council”) to submit defence statements in response to the allegations concerning their active membership of the illegal terrorist organisation Hizbullah and their alleged disruption of the peace, tranquillity and order at the workplace for ideological and political purposes. 17. In separate submissions the applicants denied all the allegations against them. They denied having given Hizbullah their CVs and highlighted obvious spelling mistakes, discrepancies and inaccurate information in the copies contained in the case file to demonstrate that they had been prepared by someone else without their knowledge. The first applicant further argued that the disciplinary investigation file contained no objective assessment of whether he had engaged in ideologically or politically motivated behaviour at the workplace so as to disrupt the peace, tranquillity and the working order of the school. In that respect he submitted that the conclusion reached by the disciplinary authorities was not grounded on facts but solely on accusations and rumours. 18. By a decision of the Supreme Disciplinary Council dated 18 April 2001, the applicants were dismissed from the civil service pursuant to section 125 (E) (a) of Law no. 657. The relevant parts of the decision read as follows: “...The acts attributed to the applicant[s]: Membership of the illegal terrorist organisation Hizbullah and carrying out activities for the organisation, disrupting the peace, tranquillity and working order of the institution for ideological and political purposes. ... Based on the examination of the information and documents in the case file, the veracity of the acts attributed to the applicant[s] and their continuous nature has been established. Having regard to the importance of the teaching post and the characteristics and seriousness of the offence, it has not been deemed appropriate to impose a lighter penalty. Based on the following considerations, the recommendation for the applicant[s]’ dismissal was accepted unanimously ...” b. Proceedings before the Administrative Courts against the dismissal of the first applicant 19. On 4 August 2001 the first applicant brought a claim against the Ministry of Education in the Diyarbakır Administrative Court, challenging his dismissal. He requested a stay of execution of the dismissal order because criminal proceedings were still pending against him. 20. On 10 January 2002 the Diyarbakır Administrative Court rejected his request for a stay of the dismissal order. 21. Relying on his right to be presumed innocent, on 18 February 2002 the first applicant challenged that decision before the Regional Administrative Court. 22. On 4 March 2002, having regard to the fact that the first applicant had been dismissed on account of his alleged membership of a terrorist organisation, the Regional Administrative Court granted his request for a stay of the dismissal decision and held that he had been charged with a criminal, not a disciplinary, offence, the determination of which could only be made by a competent criminal court. It therefore held that he could not be dismissed from public service for membership of a terrorist organisation without a final conviction. If he were to be convicted, however, he could be dismissed on the grounds that he no longer qualified for civil service. The case was remitted to the Diyarbakır Administrative Court. 23. On 3 December 2002 the Diyarbakır Administrative Court adjourned its examination of the merits of the case pending the outcome of the criminal proceedings. 24. On 14 April 2005, shortly after the Diyarbakır Assize Court’s decision to suspend the criminal proceedings, the Diyarbakır Administrative Court rejected the first applicant’s request for the dismissal decision to be quashed. The relevant parts of the judgment read as follows: “The applicant and other civil servants holding various posts in the district have been the subject of a disciplinary investigation in connection with their alleged acts of ‘disrupting the peace, tranquillity and working order of the institution for ideological and political purposes; participating, provoking, encouraging or otherwise assisting in acts such as boycotts, occupations, obstructions, slowdowns and strikes or being collectively absent from work.’ The Ministry of Education’s investigation report dated 30 June 2000 recommended the applicant’s dismissal from public service because [he] was a member of the Hizbullah terrorist organisation. Despite the fact that the criminal proceedings against the applicant [on charges of membership of a terrorist organisation] have been suspended, it is an established principle of case-law that exoneration from criminal liability does not preclude the finding of a disciplinary offence. Hence, following an examination of the case file and investigation report, the court finds it established that the applicant committed the disciplinary offence in so far as he gave the organisation his profile and attended its lessons and meetings.” 25. On 21 June 2005 the first applicant appealed against the judgment of the Diyarbakır Administrative Court to the Supreme Administrative Court, requesting a stay of the decision ordering for his dismissal from service. He challenged the grounds on which he had been dismissed, arguing that membership of a terrorist organisation was not one of the disciplinary offences listed in the Law on Civil Servants which warranted dismissal from public service. Moreover, he relied on his right to be presumed innocent since the criminal proceedings against him had been suspended and there had been no definitive finding of guilt. He also argued that the Diyarbakır Administrative Court’s failure to give reasons in its decision implied that it had not established the facts giving rise to the disciplinary action independently. 26. In a decision dated 27 September 2005 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the first applicant’s request for a stay of the dismissal order without providing any further reasons. On 6 June 2006 it also dismissed his appeal. 27. On an unspecified date the first applicant requested a stay of his dismissal order and rectification of the decision in the Supreme Administrative Court, maintaining the same grounds of appeal as in his previous appeal (see paragraph 25 above). 28. The Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the first applicant’s requests on 13 February 2008 and 14 April 2009 respectively, without responding to his arguments. c. Proceedings before the Administrative Courts against the dismissal of the second applicant 29. On an unspecified date the second applicant brought a case before the Diyarbakır Administrative Court, challenging his dismissal and requesting a stay of execution of the dismissal order. On 10 January 2002 the Administrative Court dismissed the request for a stay of execution. 30. The second applicant appealed against that decision to the Diyarbakır Regional Administrative Court. He complained, inter alia, that the criminal proceedings on charges of membership of an illegal organisation were still pending before the Diyarbakır State Security Court and that, therefore, his dismissal without a conviction on the basis of abstract accusations infringed the presumption of innocence; that the allegations that he had disturbed the peace and order at the workplace remained completely unproven and unsubstantiated; and that in delivering its decision, the Supreme Disciplinary Council had failed to comply with the six-month time‑limit set out in Law no. 657. 31. On 4 March 2002 the Diyarbakır Regional Administrative Court ordered a stay of execution of the dismissal decision. It reiterated at the outset the three principal conditions for an act to be considered a disciplinary offence: (i) that it be carried out by the employees of an institution within that institution; (ii) that it disrupt the established order of the institution; and (iii) that the act constituting the disciplinary offence, as well as the related penalty, be set out in the relevant laws and regulations. The Regional Administrative Court then went on to examine the different types of offences that may be committed by civil servants, differentiating between acts amounting to disciplinary offences exclusively, acts considered to be offences under both disciplinary and criminal laws and, lastly, acts defined as offences only under the Criminal Code. In the light of this classification, the Diyarbakır Regional Administrative Court decided that the act attributed to the second applicant, that is, membership of a terrorist organisation, fell under the third category of acts punishable only under the Criminal Code, the determination of which could only be made by a competent criminal court. Bearing in mind that the relevant criminal proceedings were still pending before the Diyarbakır State Security Court, the Regional Administrative Court concluded that the second applicant could not, for the time being, be lawfully dismissed from the civil service on account of membership of a terrorist organisation. The case was remitted to the Diyarbakır Administrative Court. 32. On 8 September 2006 the Diyarbakır Administrative Court annulled the Supreme Disciplinary Council’s dismissal decision as unlawful. Noting the discrepancy in the latter’s decision, the court stated that while the second applicant was being accused by the administration of membership of a terrorist organisation, the legal basis put forward for his dismissal was the disruption of peace and order at the workplace through ideological and political propaganda under section 125 (E) (a) of Law no. 657. Considering that none of the people questioned at the school had witnessed such propaganda by the second applicant there, and bearing further in mind that “membership of a terrorist organisation” was not one of the exhaustive grounds for dismissal from the civil service listed in the relevant section, the second applicant’s dismissal had had no legal basis. 33. The Ministry of Education appealed against the decision. On 20 June 2008 the Supreme Administrative Court overturned the decision of the Diyarbakır Administrative Court and amended the legal grounds for the second applicant’s dismissal. The Supreme Administrative Court firstly acknowledged that the charges against the second applicant of aiding and abetting an illegal organisation had been discontinued on account of the expiry of the five-year prescription period laid down for that offence, and that he had been acquitted of the remaining charges. Referring to the second applicant’s statements given to the police, his CV obtained from the Hizbullah safe house in Istanbul and the bill of indictment filed against him by the Mardin public prosecutor, the Supreme Administrative Court then found it established that the second applicant was a member of a terrorist organisation who in addition had recruited members to the organisation and pursued the ideology of the terrorist organisation in the classroom. It continued that even if his colleagues had not witnessed such action on the part of the second applicant at the school, his dismissal had still been justified under a different subsection of section 125 (E), namely subsection (g), which authorised the dismissal of civil servants who were found to engage in “disgraceful and shameful conduct incompatible with the position of a civil servant”. 34. On 27 May 2009 the Diyarbakır Administrative Court transferred the case to the Mardin Administrative Court, which was deemed to be the court with jurisdiction in the instant case. 35. On 24 November 2009, complying with the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court, the Mardin Administrative Court upheld the disciplinary decision ordering the second applicant’s dismissal from the civil service under section 125 (E) (g) of Law no. 657. The relevant parts of the judgment read: “Notwithstanding the discontinuation of the criminal proceedings against the applicant on charges of membership of an armed organisation and his acquittal on charges of murder and battery, the investigation and [criminal] case file reveal that the applicant’s profile was discovered in the organisation’s [safe] house in Istanbul and that his statements to the police and the bill of indictment demonstrate the fact that he was a member of the organisation, recruiting new members and lecturing on its ideologies, facts which were corroborated by his statements and [CV]. These acts fall within the scope of disgraceful and shameful conduct incompatible with the position of a civil servant ... which therefore justify his dismissal from public service.” 36. On 17 September 2010 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed a request for leave to appeal lodged by the second applicant.

6. The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table. 7. On 5 April 2004 the Vyborgskiy District Court of St Petersburg (“the Vyborgskiy District Court”) declared the applicant legally incapable in her absence. The applicant submitted that she had only learnt about that judgment on 19 April 2004. She lodged her appeal twice, accompanied by requests that the court reset the time-limit for lodging the appeals. On 11 October 2004 the Vyborgskiy District Court rejected the applicant’s latest request that the court examine her appeal. On 22 December 2004 the St Petersburg City Court upheld that decision on appeal. 8. On 27 February 2009 the Constitutional Court of Russia declared unconstitutional the practice of divesting people of their legal capacity in their absence, unless their absence resulted from specific circumstances. 9. On 8 June 2009 the applicant sought the reopening of her case in view of the judgment of the Constitutional Court of 27 February 2009. After an initial refusal, on 24 September 2009 the St Petersburg City Court quashed the judgment of 5 April 2004 and remitted the applicant’s case for a fresh examination. 10. On 26 November 2009 the Vyborgskiy District Court discontinued the incapacitation proceedings, as the plaintiff, the applicant’s daughter, had failed to attend. The applicant thus regained her legal capacity. 11. On 7 March 2008 an emergency doctor was called to attend to the applicant and found that she required hospitalisation. A psychiatrist examined the applicant on her admission to the hospital and confirmed that she was in need of in-patient care. 12. On 10 March 2008 the applicant’s brother, who was her legal guardian at the relevant time, consented to her confinement. Four days later his status as a legal guardian was cancelled and transferred to the hospital. On 31 March 2008 the hospital, in that capacity, agreed to the applicant’s involuntary confinement. 13. According to the applicant, the hospital dismissed her requests to be discharged, and she was not allowed to use a mobile phone, send correspondence or receive visitors. When the applicant contacted her lawyer allegedly seeking to update her application before the Court and to challenge her involuntary confinement, he attempted to meet her at the hospital on 13 March and 1 April 2008, but was refused permission to do so. 14. The applicant’s lawyer then lodged a complaint against the hospital, asserting his right to communicate with his client. The lawyer supported his complaint with a copy of the power of attorney that the applicant had issued to him on 21 June 2005 for her application to the Court. On 9 February 2009 the Primorskiy District Court of St Petersburg (“the Primorskiy District Court”) dismissed the complaint, having noted that the applicant lacked legal capacity to appoint a lawyer. 15. On 10 March 2009 an expert commission issued a two-page report diagnosing the applicant with schizophrenia. It relied on the applicant’s medical history since 2001 and her state of health leading to her hospitalisation in 2008. The experts further stated that during her stay at the hospital, the applicant had been avoiding contact; she had been complaining about her confinement; she had remained suspicious and negative and had maintained her delusional ideas about her neighbours, doctors and other patients. They concluded that the applicant required further psychiatric treatment in the hospital. 16. On the same day the Primorskiy District Court held a hearing concerning the applicant’s involuntary treatment in the psychiatric hospital. The applicant’s doctor presented to the court the expert commission’s report of 10 March 2009 and her own opinion confirming that the applicant needed compulsory treatment in the hospital. The applicant was absent from the courtroom during that presentation, but her State-appointed lawyer, Ms L., was present. After the presentation the applicant was brought into the courtroom and was informed about her rights. She then said that she wanted to go home and did not wish to continue her treatment. The judge did not ask her any other questions. Ms L.’s only intervention during the whole hearing was to state that she “had no objections” to the applicant’s continued confinement in the psychiatric hospital. The Primorskiy District Court concluded that the applicant required involuntary treatment in the hospital. 17. On 21 April 2009 the St Petersburg City Court quashed the judgment of 9 February 2009, having flagged a violation of counsel’s right to meet with his client. On 25 May 2009 the applicant met her lawyer. 18. On 8 June 2009 the applicant asked the court to reset the time-limit for lodging an appeal against the judgment of 10 March 2009. On 30 June 2009 the District Court rejected the request. 19. On 15 September 2009 the St Petersburg City Court quashed the decision of 30 June 2009 and reset the time-limit for lodging an appeal against the judgment of 10 March 2009. On 30 September 2009 the St Petersburg City Court examined the appeal and found the applicant’s involuntary treatment lawful. 20. Once the applicant had regained her legal status on 26 November 2009 (see paragraph 10 above), she refused to continue her treatment in the hospital and was discharged on 31 December 2009. 21. On 11 November 2010 the Petrodvortsovyy District Court of St Petersburg (“the Petrodvortsovyy District Court”) declared the applicant legally incapable. It noted that in view of the fact that Russian law did not provide for partial incapacitation to take into account the degree of a person’s mental disorder, it had no alternative but to deprive the applicant of her full legal capacity. On 17 March 2011 the St Petersburg City Court dismissed an appeal lodged by the applicant, having fully endorsed the Petrodvortsovyy District Court’s reasoning. 22. On 27 June 2012 the Constitutional Court of Russia examined a complaint lodged by the applicant in relation to her incapacitation and invited Parliament to amend the legislation and introduce the possibility of partial incapacitation (see paragraph 39 below). On 30 December 2012 the Russian Civil Code was amended accordingly; the entry into force of the amendment was delayed until 1 March 2015 (see paragraph 40 below). 23. Following the Constitutional Court’s ruling, on 26 March 2013 the Petrodvortsovyy District Court remitted the applicant’s case for a fresh examination. However, on 6 August 2013 the Petrodvortsovyy District Court confirmed its previous decision stripping the applicant of her full capacity, having stated that the amendment to the law had not yet entered into force. On 28 November 2013 the St Petersburg City Court upheld the judgment on appeal. 24. On 29 June 2009 the Promyshlennyy District Court of Stavropol, acting in the applicant’s absence, stripped him of legal capacity. The judgment of 29 June 2009 was not appealed against and it therefore became final. 25. In October 2012 the applicant sought the restoration of his legal capacity. On 6 March 2013 the Kochubeyevskiy District Court of the Stavropol Region (“the Kochubeyevskiy District Court”) dismissed the applicant’s request. On 4 June 2013 the Stavropol Regional Court upheld that decision on appeal. 26. On 25 July 2016 the Kochubeyevskiy District Court granted the applicant’s application to be declared partially capable. 27. On 27 January 2009 the Koptevskiy District Court of Moscow (the “Koptevskiy District Court”) declared the applicant legally incapable in his absence. The judgment of 27 January 2009 was not appealed against and it therefore became final. 28. On 20 January 2013 the applicant appealed against the judgment of 27 January 2009, having asked a court to reset the time-limit for lodging the appeal as he had not been informed about the incapacitation proceedings, had not attended them and had not received a copy of the judgment. 29. On 14 February 2013 the Koptevskiy District Court reset the time-limit for lodging an appeal. On 10 September 2013 the Moscow City Court quashed that decision and dismissed the applicant’s request to have the time-limit for submitting his appeal reset. 30. On 7 August 2003 the Dmitrovskiy District Court of the Moscow Region (“the Dmitrovskiy District Court”) divested the applicant of full legal capacity in his absence. The judgment of 7 August 2003 was not appealed against and it therefore became final. 31. The applicant allegedly learnt that he had been stripped of legal capacity only in 2012. On 24 December 2012 he asked the Dmitrovskiy District Court to reset the time-limit for lodging an appeal against the judgment of 7 August 2003. On 22 January 2013 the Dmitrovskiy District Court dismissed the request. 32. On 29 May 2013 the Moscow Regional Court examined an appeal lodged by the applicant against the decision of 22 January 2013. It reset the time-limit and at the same hearing examined the merits of an appeal lodged by the applicant against the judgment of 7 August 2003. Having found that in 2003 the Dmitrovskiy District Court had examined the applicant’s case in his absence despite the lack of any information on the applicant’s ability to attend, the Moscow Regional Court quashed the judgment of 7 August 2003. It then proceeded to re-examine the merits of the case. After having heard the parties and basing its findings on a medical expert report of 2003, the Moscow Regional Court again declared the applicant legally incapable. 33. On 4 September 2006 the Zyuzinskiy District Court of Moscow (“the Zyuzinskiy District Court”) declared the applicant legally incapable. The applicant, who was being treated in a psycho-neurological facility at the time, did not attend the hearing. 34. The applicant allegedly only learned about that judgment in 2013. She asked the court to reset the time-limit for lodging an appeal in view of the lack of notification about the proceedings and her absence from the hearing. 35. On 24 October 2013 the Zyuzinskiy District Court refused to reset the time-limit, having also noted that the Russian law in force at the material time had not called for the mandatory presence of the applicant at the court hearing. On 28 January 2014 the Moscow City Court upheld the decision of 24 October 2013 on appeal.

5. The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Dublin, Ireland. 6. On 28 October 2008 the applicant was travelling on a passenger bus from Moldova to Romania, with Ireland as his final destination. 7. At 12.30 a.m. his bus arrived at the Albiţa border crossing between Moldova and Romania. Romanian custom officers stopped the bus, got on and started searching the passengers. Two silver ingots were found in the applicant’s pockets. 8. A customs officer decided that the applicant had failed to declare the ingots and confiscated them. An offence report drafted by the officer stated that the applicant had failed to declare two silver ingots of 1 kg each and had thereby breached the provisions of Article 653 (a) of the Customs Regulations (see paragraph 12 below). In addition to the confiscation the applicant was fined 3,000 Romanian lei (approximately 750 euros (EUR)). The report also stated that according to documents produced by the applicant he had bought the two ingots from a bank. 9. The applicant lodged an administrative complaint with the Albiţa Customs Office, asking for the annulment of the offence report of 28 October 2008 and the restitution of the confiscated goods. He explained that he had legally acquired the two ingots, which had a value of EUR 500. He had kept them on him in order to prevent them being stolen during the bus trip and not to elude customs. He also stated that it had not been possible to declare goods to customs in a discrete manner or in writing. The passengers had not been allowed to get off the bus before the customs officers had got on and he had wished to avoid saying what he was carrying in front of the other passengers. 10. On 26 January 2009 the Huşi District Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint as ill-founded. Based on the elements in the case file, the court observed that the customs officer had asked the applicant whether he had anything to declare and the applicant had said no. Under those circumstances the court held that the applicant had been correctly sanctioned by the customs officer. 11. An appeal on points of law by the applicant (recurs) was dismissed with final effect on 3 June 2009 by the Vaslui County Court. The court held that the applicant, who had signed the offence report, had failed to produce any evidence to challenge the customer officer’s findings in that document. 12. The relevant provisions of the Romanian Customs Regulations, as approved by Government Decision No. 707/2006, are as follows: Article 156 “(1) A written customs declaration shall be submitted for the following goods: .... c) objects made of precious metals, with or without precious stones, which exceed the purposes of personal use as set forth in legal provisions; (2) For the goods listed in paragraph (1) travellers shall submit the written customs declaration on standard forms which are made available free of charge, upon request, by customs offices.” Article 653 “The following is considered an offence and shall be sanctioned with a fine between 3,000 and 8,000 lei: a) concealing from customs any goods or merchandise which should be placed under a customs regime. In such situations the goods shall be confiscated; ...” Article 657 “The offences set forth in the present chapter are subject to the regulations provided for by Government Ordinance No. 2/2001 on the legal system concerning offences ...” 13. According to the Romanian Integrated Customs Tariff in force at the relevant time silver imported from the Republic of Moldova was not subject to any duties. 14. The relevant provisions of Government Ordinance No. 2/2001 on the legal system concerning offences in force at the relevant time are as follows: Article 5 “(1) Offences may be punished with principal and complementary sanctions. (2) The principal sanctions are: ... b) a fine ... (3) The complementary sanctions are: a) the confiscation of goods destined, used or derived from offences; ... (4) Special laws may provide for additional principal or complementary sanctions. (5) The sanction must be proportionate to the degree of social danger of the offence committed. (6) Complementary sanctions are applied in line with the nature and gravity of the offence. (7) Only one principal sanction can be applied for the same offence and one or more complementary sanctions.” 15. The Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1214/2007 amending Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff entered into force on 1 January 2008 and from that date was directly applicable in all Member States. In Section XIV, Chapter 71 the regulation does not provide for any customs duties for silver in unwrought or semi-manufactured forms or in powder.

5. The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Kyiv. 6. On 22 January 2007 the first-instance court found the applicant guilty of inflicting bodily injuries on another individual and sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment. 7. On 28 March 2007 and 23 October 2007 the Kyiv Regional Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court respectively upheld the applicant’s conviction. 8. From 13 April 2007 to 17 June 2011 the applicant had been serving his sentence in Boryspil Correctional Colony (“the prison”). 9. On 17 June 2011 he was released on probation. 10. In his initial submissions, the applicant stated that he had been detained in dirty cells with poor ventilation and insufficient heating in winter. Inmates suffering from HIV and tuberculosis were kept together with healthy prisoners. The food and water provided to him and other prisoners were unsatisfactory and hazardous to their health. 11. In his reply to the Government’s observations, the applicant also submitted that the cells had been overcrowded. Without specifying the periods of his detention in particular cells, he stated that he had been held in four cells, with the following characteristics: - cell 1, measuring about 70 square metres and accommodating 50 prisoners; - cell 2, measuring about 100-120 square metres and accommodating 85 prisoners; - cell 3, measuring about 120-130 square metres and accommodating 110 prisoners; - cell 4, measuring about 45 square metres and accommodating 35 prisoners. 12. Prisoners were often subjected to ill-treatment by guards, which included arbitrary solitary confinement in disciplinary cells, verbal and physical abuse and threats. On many occasions during the daytime, while the prisoners were absent, searches were carried out in the applicant’s cell, as a result of which the cell was left in a mess and some personal belongings and documents from the applicant’s case file went missing. Some searches had been carried out at night. As a result, the applicant experienced fear and stress. 13. No adequate medical assistance was provided to the applicant during his imprisonment. In particular, he did not undergo a thorough medical examination and no long-term strategy for his medical treatment was drawn up. He only received occasional and symptomatic treatment. 14. Under the threat of disciplinary punishment, the applicant was forced to work overtime, often for twelve to fourteen hours per day and seven days per week. He did not receive adequate remuneration for the work done. 15. The prison authorities screened all the applicant’s correspondence, including letters to and from the Court, and selectively failed to send letters, or delayed sending or delivering them. For example, his letter of 23 February 2009 to the Court (which the Court, in fact, received in due time) was not sent by the prison administration and the Court’s letter of 21 January 2011 was received by him a month after being dispatched by the Court. He therefore had to send some letters to the Court via friends who were at liberty. The applicant also submitted copies to the Court of letters he had received from it while in prison, one of which bore the prison stamp. 16. According to the applicant, he brought the aforementioned matters to the attention of different authorities, including the prosecutor’s office. However, those complaints were either not dispatched or were ignored. 17. The Government challenged the trustworthiness of part of the applicant’s submissions concerning the conditions of his detention, specifically his allegations that he had been detained in cells with poor sanitary and hygiene conditions together with inmates suffering from tuberculosis. They contended in this respect that the applicant had failed to support the allegations with any evidence. 18. The Government submitted that in accordance with domestic legislation, inmates suffering from tuberculosis were detained separately from other prisoners. The relevant medical tests were performed once a year to reveal those affected by this disease. 19. The food and water were regularly checked and were of adequate quality. The heating functioned adequately and the temperature in the cell in winter was between 18oC and 20oC. The sanitary conditions were appropriate. In support of their account of the facts, the Government submitted: information notes concerning living conditions in the prison, issued by the prison governor in reply to a request from the Government; an extract from the applicant’s detention card concerning the provision of bedding; and records of completed disinfection operations carried out in the prison in July and October 2011. (b) Medical assistance 20. The Government submitted that throughout the period of his detention in the prison the applicant had been provided with adequate treatment for different medical issues he had complained of and his health had generally remained stable. 21. According to the summary of the applicant’s medical record submitted by the Government, upon arrival at the prison in April 2007 the applicant underwent a medical examination and was found to be healthy; he did not request medical assistance until March 2009. 22. On 2 March 2009 the applicant was diagnosed with acute exacerbation of chronic bronchitis and was provided with appropriate treatment. 23. On 5 March and 5 April 2009 the applicant was diagnosed with lumbar radiculoneuritis and prescribed appropriate treatment (diclofenac and menovazin). 24. On 23 September 2008 and 29 April 2009 the applicant was found to be suffering from dermatitis and prescribed appropriate treatment. 25. On 12 May 2010 the applicant was diagnosed with possible hypertension and prescribed treatment. (c) Other issues relating to the applicant’s detention 26. The Government could not provide any factual information about whether any force had been applied to the applicant by prison guards, or about the searches conducted in his cell, because the time-limit for keeping the relevant documents had expired and the records had been destroyed. They further stated that the applicant’s ill-treatment complaint was couched in very general terms and not supported by evidence. 27. The Government challenged the trustworthiness of the applicant’s submissions concerning his forced labour. They submitted that he had performed work that prisoners were normally required to perform under the relevant domestic legislation and had received remuneration accordingly. He had normally performed the tasks of a service worker (господарча обслуга). When he had refused job offers, he had assisted unpaid with different kinds of prison maintenance work, for no more than two hours a day. 28. The Government provided no information as regards the applicant’s allegation that his correspondence had been monitored by the prison administration. As regards the applicant’s communication with the Court, they denied that all the letters sent to him had been opened. According to a certificate issued by the prison governor, to which the Government referred, the applicant had sent only one letter to the Court, on 3 December 2008, and had received no reply. 29. Lastly, the Government contended that the applicant had made no complaints to the domestic authorities concerning the material conditions of his detention, his alleged ill-treatment and the poor medical assistance provided to him. 30. On 7 May 2008 the applicant lodged the present application with the Court. 31. On a number of occasions before and after his application to the Court the applicant, at his request, was provided with copies of different documents from his case file, including judgments of 22 January 2007 and 28 March 2007 in his criminal case, his indictment and appeals against his conviction. 32. By letters of 8 and 15 September 2008 the Brovary Town Court, at which his case file was kept, informed the applicant, inter alia, that the case file did not contain his cassation appeals or any replies from or judgments of the Supreme Court. The applicant’s request for a copy of his entire criminal case file was refused by the Brovary Town Court as having no basis in law. 33. By a letter dated 14 January 2009, the Court invited the applicant to submit a copy of the judgment of the Supreme Court of 23 October 2007. Further to this letter, on 7 February 2009 the applicant submitted requests to the Brovary Town Court and the Supreme Court, asking for a copy of their refusals to provide him with the judgment requested or a copy of his request with an acknowledgment of receipt. 34. On 17 February 2009 the Brovary Town Court informed the applicant that the case file did not contain any letters or judgments of the Supreme Court. 35. On 9 April 2009 the applicant was provided with a copy of the Supreme Court’s judgment in his criminal case and on 13 April 2009 he submitted it to the Court. 36. On 12 September 2009, at his request, the applicant was familiarised with records relating to his detention in the prison. 37. After his release from the prison on 17 June 2011, the applicant was given full access to his criminal case file.

5. The first applicant was born in 1941 and lives in Istanbul. He is the president of the second applicant, a company with its registered office in Istanbul. 6. In 1984 the second applicant, Em Export Dış Ticaret A.Ş. (hereinafter “the applicant company”), entered into a business contract with a State-owned company, namely the Iron and Steel Company of Turkey (Türkiye Demir Çelik İşletmeleri), for transactions in substantial amounts of coal and iron between the two companies over a certain period of time. 7. In 1988 and 1990 respectively, the applicant company brought two sets of proceedings before the Ankara Commercial Court, claiming that the Iron and Steel Company had failed to respect its contractual obligations. The court joined the two sets of proceedings and accepted the applicant company’s case. It ruled that the Iron and Steel Company was to give the applicant company a certain amount of iron and pay it compensation. The Iron and Steel Company appealed against the judgment. In the meantime, the applicants initiated enforcement proceedings while the case was still pending before the Court of Cassation. 8. As a result of the enforcement proceedings, in 2000 the Iron and Steel Company paid a total of approximately 1,600,000,000,000 Turkish liras (TRL)[1] to the applicant company. 9. By a letter dated 23 June 2000, the then under-secretary to the Treasury wrote to the Ministry of Finance requesting a tax audit of the applicant company. In their letter, the authorities indicated that the enforcement proceedings had caused such substantial damage to the Iron and Steel Company that some of its factories had stopped production. They claimed that the applicant company’s initiation of enforcement proceedings without having waited for the final decision had aimed at obstructing the Iron and Steel Company’s business and benefiting from its financial difficulties. 10. On 27 July 2000 the Directorate General of Tax Inspectors (Vergi Denetmenleri Bürosu Başkanlığı – hereinafter “the Tax Inspectorate”) decided that an audit would be carried out in respect of the applicant company. 11. On 23 August 2000, having established that the applicant company could not be found at its registered addresses, two tax inspectors went to another address in Mecidiyeköy, Istanbul, which appeared to be its business premises, in order to examine its account books. The records subsequently prepared by the inspectors stated that the first applicant, who had introduced himself with a false name, had requested a period of fifteen days to submit the relevant documents and had refused to sign the records. The inspectors also noted that following the first applicant’s refusal to sign the records, they had summoned a police officer and prepared an official letter in his presence. That official letter invited the applicant company to submit all documents related to its income and expenditure within fifteen days. The applicant company was informed that it should make a specific request in order to have the audit conducted at its premises, provided that the premises were available for such a procedure. The letter also stated that the representatives of the applicant company would be charged with tax evasion if they failed to declare the company’s income and present its account books. 12. By a letter dated 5 September 2000, the applicant company informed the inspectors that the documents were ready for examination at its office. It said that a separate room at its premises would be allocated to the inspectors during the audit and asked to be given two days’ notice in order to prepare the room and the staff who would present the documents. 13. On 13 September 2000 one of the inspectors, S.K., sent an official letter to the applicant company, stating that it was not possible to carry out the audit at its business premises as the address was not registered. She invited the first applicant to provide her with the documents requested previously within fifteen days. 14. On 29 September 2000 the first applicant responded, arguing that S.K. had not complied with the relevant legislation and that she had acted in bad faith. He pointed out that the documents were at the disposal of the authorities for examination at the applicant company’s premises on condition that they gave it five days’ notice. 15. On 10 October 2000 the tax inspectors went to the address in Mecidiyeköy together with two police officers. According to the records, the applicant company’s staff refused to present the required documents and requested five days’ notice to do so. Subsequent records stated that following a discussion during the drafting of the first record, the staff had decided to present the books for 1998 but not those relating to the tax year 2000. The inspectors stated that seven books and a total of 396 receipts had been submitted. They pointed out that all of the documents had been signed, stamped and given back to the company’s representatives. Lastly, they noted that although the office was physically available to them to carry out an audit, it would not be possible to do so in view of the tension caused by the company’s staff. The records were signed by those present, namely two inspectors, two police officers and the applicant company’s lawyer. 16. On 26 October 2000 S.K. applied to the Şişli public prosecutor’s office in the name of the Tax Inspectorate, requesting a warrant to search three addresses related to the applicant company. She submitted that an examination of its tax files had revealed that the applicant company appeared to be hiding the money it had received from the Iron and Steel Company in order to evade the payment of taxes. Summarising the content of the records drawn up until that point and referring to all the correspondence between her and the applicant company, she maintained that the company’s representatives had acted in a hostile manner and tried to obstruct the work of the inspectors by hiding information such as their names and the official address of the company, as well as by unjustly accusing her. She pointed out that under section 138 of the Tax Procedure Act, the authorities were not required to inform taxpayers in advance of an audit and that in view of that provision, the applicant company’s request to have several days’ notice, despite having already been informed of the audit, was unacceptable. She concluded that a search was required under those circumstances. 17. On the same day the Şişli Magistrates’ Court issued a warrant authorising a search of the applicant company’s premises. The relevant parts of the search warrant read as follows: “Pursuant to the Şişli public prosecutor’s request dated 26 October 2000, it is decided that: 1. A search will be carried out at the business premises of Em Export Dış Ticaret A.Ş., located at ... Mecidiyeköy, Istanbul, taking into account that the account books and other documents to be examined are [being] presented to the authorities at that address. The search will be conducted during the daytime and only once. 18. Later the same day, two tax inspectors, including S.K., searched the applicant company’s premises and seized a number of documents. According to the records, the search was carried out in the presence of the first applicant, staff members of the applicant company and two police officers. It was noted that the documents that were considered relevant for the audit had been placed in a bag and sealed, and that a detailed inventory would be made at a later stage. The records were signed by the two inspectors, the two police officers and a staff member of the applicant company. The first applicant refused to sign them. 19. On 1 November 2000 the applicant company was informed that the seized documents would be “unsealed” (mührün fekki) on 28 November 2000 and was invited to be present during the procedure. 20. On 27 November 2000 the first applicant sent a letter, stating that he had not understood the meaning of “unsealing”. He reiterated his argument that the audit should be carried out at the applicant company’s premises. 21. On 28 November 2000 S.K. and two other inspectors opened the two bags containing the documents that had been seized during the search and drew up an inventory. The inspectors recorded the fact that the seals had been broken in the absence of the taxpayer as it had not attended the procedure despite having been invited to do so. The inventory listed the names of all the books and tax declarations seized. A note was made that the receipts concerning various years had been classified and sealed separately. 22. On 11 December 2000 the head of the Tax Inspectorate informed the first applicant of the address where the seized documents were being kept. He also explained what “unsealing” meant. 23. By two letters dated 4 November and 6 December 2000 the Tax Inspectorate requested that the applicant company submit the account books for the years 1996, 1997 and 2000, as they were not among the seized documents. 24. On 23 December 2000 the applicants submitted certain documents. 25. On 23 January 2001 the Tax Inspectorate requested an extension of the audit period, on account of the substantial number of documents seized during the search and the fact that the applicant company had not submitted the missing documents until 23 December 2000. It also stated that the applicant company had not yet presented some of the documents requested. In line with the request, the Şişli Magistrates’ Court extended the audit period by six months. 26. The applicants objected to that decision. On 31 May 2001 the Şişli Criminal Court of General Jurisdiction decided to annul the remainder of the extended period, holding that the four months that had passed since the Magistrates’ Court’s decision must have been sufficient to conclude the audit. 27. During the course of the audit, tax inspector S.K. compiled three records, listing in detail the information obtained from the seized documents and putting certain questions to the applicants in respect of those. One of the records was read by the applicants’ lawyer, who objected to its findings by means of a handwritten note. The other two records stated that the applicants had submitted a letter, according to which they refused to sign them. Consequently, the seized documents had been kept by the authorities. 28. In the meantime, S.K. had several exchanges of correspondence with the enforcement authorities, whereby she requested certain information about the amount that had been paid to the applicant company and how much of that amount corresponded to interest. 29. By a letter dated 1 May 2002 the applicant company was informed that the audit had been completed. 30. On 25 May 2002 S.K. drew up a tax-assessment report, noting several irregularities in the applicant company’s financial records and payment of taxes, in particular with regard to the amount it had obtained as a result of the payment made to it by the Iron and Steel Company. In that connection, among many documents examined, the report also referred to the information provided by the enforcement authorities, which specified the total amount paid to the applicant company by the Iron and Steel Company and the interest rate applied in the calculation of that amount. It pointed out that the applicant company, which had not been active for a long time, appeared to have made a substantial number of transactions with some of its partners, without any documents justifying them. Moreover, it found that the company had profited from its investments in foreign currencies, which had not been declared to the authorities. Concluding that the applicant company had acted fraudulently in its bookkeeping, the report requested that corporate income tax and provisional tax be imposed on it, together with a penalty for potential lost revenue. As regards the procedure that had been followed, the report pointed out that the authorities had been unable to locate the applicant company at its registered addresses. It also stressed the difficulties caused to them by the company’s staff at another address which the company was using temporarily as its business premises. Reiterating the content of the records drawn up during the visits to that latter address, the report noted that after having obtained a search warrant from the Magistrates’ Court, the inspectors had had to seize the relevant documents and take them to the Tax Inspectorate, as the audit could not be carried out there due to the staff’s behaviour and as it was not the applicant company’s registered business address within the meaning of section 139 of the Tax Procedure Act (Law no. 213). 31. On 11 July 2002 the Tax Office issued several tax notices to the applicant company under sections 341 and 344 of the Tax Procedure Act. It ordered it to pay TRL 123,205,000,000 in income tax and TRL 587,688,150,000[2] as a penalty (cezalı gelir stopaj vergisi ve fon payı tarhiyatı) in respect of different periods of year 2001. For the year 2000, the Tax Office ordered the applicant company to pay provisional income tax of TRL 111,059,520,000 and a penalty of TRL 563,071,740,000[3] (geçici kurumlar gelir vergisi ve vergi ziyaı cezası). 32. The applicant company brought two sets of proceedings before the Istanbul Tax Court, requesting the annulment of the income tax and the penalty imposed in respect of different periods of year 2001. It stated that both the tax and the penalty had resulted from the payment made to it by the Iron and Steel Company following the judgment of the Commercial Court to that effect, and that the amount was not yet subject to any tax as proceedings were still pending before the Court of Cassation. It also challenged the findings of the tax-assessment report, arguing that the transactions between partners did not justify the imposition of the tax and the penalty. With regard to the procedure, the applicant company claimed that both the search and the audit had been conducted unlawfully. Despite the allegations of tax inspector S.K., its address was registered and the documents should have been examined at its premises. Although the Tax Procedure Act provided that a search could only be conducted on suspicion of tax evasion, S.K. had obtained a search warrant without there being any such indication. The applicant company further alleged that S.K. had refused to make an inventory of the documents seized during the search, had prevented it from sealing the documents with its own seal and had distorted the facts in the search records as well as in the tax-assessment report she had drafted. Lastly, the audit had been carried out unlawfully after the expiry of the period indicated in the warrant issued by the domestic court. 33. On an unspecified date the Tax Court held a hearing attended by the applicants and S.K. 34. On 11 June 2003 the Tax Court delivered two judgments regarding the two sets of proceedings brought by the applicant company. The court allowed the applicants’ claims in part, and reduced the tax penalty to one-third of the amount originally imposed. It dismissed the applicant company’s claims as regards the unlawfulness of the search and seizure, finding that the procedure had been in compliance with the relevant legislation. Referring to section 139 of the Tax Procedure Act, the court held that the applicants’ behaviour before the search, as well as their failure to submit the required documents and to respond to the tax inspectors’ letters, had made it clear that the audit could not be conducted at the applicant company’s premises. It also held that the documents in the case file did not substantiate the company’s allegations against the tax inspector. As for the tax and the penalty imposed, the court held that despite certain flaws in the tax inspector’s methods, the findings of the tax-assessment report were reliable. In that connection, it held that the amount paid to the applicant company by the Iron and Steel Company was subject to taxation and that the former had failed to clarify the source of substantial transactions with some of its partners. 35. The applicant company appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the Tax Court had relied on the tax-assessment report, which, according to it, had been drawn up unlawfully. S.K. had distorted the content of certain documents she had seized during the search and had not notified it of the records she had drawn up during the course of the audit, in breach of the relevant legislation. Lastly, the applicant company requested that a criminal investigation be opened against S.K. 36. On 27 April 2004 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the judgments. 37. The applicant company applied for rectification of the judgment, arguing that although the tax-assessment report pointed to the absence of certain receipts as one of the reasons for the penalty, those receipts and other important documents had unlawfully been taken from its premises during the search and had not been made accessible to the applicants later on. It submitted that despite its requests to that effect, the Tax Court had failed to obtain those documents and to request that criminal proceedings be instituted against the officials who were responsible for their unlawful seizure. The Supreme Administrative Court rejected the rectification requests on 25 November 2004. Final decisions were served on the applicant company on 10 January 2005. 38. On 14 November 2000 and 29 June 2001 respectively, the Governorship of Istanbul imposed two provisional seizure measures on the applicant company in line with S.K.’s reports. 39. Both seizure measures were found to be unlawful and were annulled by the Istanbul Tax Court. 40. Subsequently, on 19 December 2001 the applicant company requested that criminal proceedings be instituted against S.K., claiming that she had abused her powers by presenting false information to the authorities. On 14 October 2002 the Governorship of Istanbul delivered a decision. Finding that S.K. had acted in compliance with the law, it refused to give permission for the opening of an investigation against her. 41. On 20 February 2003 the District Administrative Court dismissed an objection lodged by the applicant company to that decision. 42. The applicant company brought two sets of proceedings before the Istanbul Tax Court, this time requesting the annulment of both the provisional income tax and the penalty imposed in respect of tax year 2000. It argued that the tax assessment report had been drafted in vague terms and had failed to clearly indicate the reasons for its conclusions. In its petition, the applicant company repeated once again its claims as regards the unlawfulness of the search and the audit. 43. On 11 June 2003 the Tax Court accepted the cases and held that both the provisional income tax and the penalty related to it had been imposed unlawfully. The domestic court noted that due to the applicant company’s failure to declare its yearly income in full, its income for year 2000 had been calculated ex proprio motu by the authorities. It found that an income calculated in that manner was not subject to provisional taxation and that no penalty could be imposed on the company as a result. The court did not mention the search and seizure. 44. On 27 April 2004 the Supreme Administrative Court partially quashed the judgments, finding that although the annulment of the provisional taxation was in line with the relevant legislation, as the set-off period had elapsed, under the relevant provisions a penalty could still be imposed for failure on the part of the taxpayer to declare the correct amount. 45. On 10 March 2005 the Tax Court dismissed the applicant company’s claim for annulment of the penalty, holding that it was in line with the legislation as the company had failed to declare a certain part of its income. The court held that it was not necessary to rule on the provisional tax, as that part of the judgment had already been upheld by the Supreme Administrative Court. 46. The applicant company appealed. After raising several arguments concerning the imposition of the tax penalty and its calculation, it pointed out that the search had been conducted unlawfully in that all the documents had been seized by the inspectors without making an inventory. It further argued that the Tax Court had failed to address its arguments and to deliver a reasoned judgment. 47. On 5 October 2005 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the judgments. The decisions were served on the applicant company on 2 December 2005. 48. In 2004 and 2005 the applicant company made several payments to the Tax Office as regards the years 2000 and 2001.

5. The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Chişinău. 6. On 23 July 2007 the Râșcani District Court ordered the applicant’s detention pending trial for thirty days. He was charged with the offence of robbery, taking of hostages and blackmail while in Ukraine, in 1997 and 1998. The applicant was residing at the material time in Brussels, Belgium. 7. On 18 November 2008, the applicant was arrested in Brussels at the Moldovan authorities’ request and placed in a Belgian prison pending extradition to Moldova. 8. On 5 October 2009 the applicant was extradited to the Moldovan authorities. On the same day he was brought before a judge (Centru District Court), who ordered his detention on remand. 9. On 25 December 2009 the Chişinău Court of Appeal prolonged the applicant’s detention on remand for ninety days. 10. From then on, the applicant’s detention was prolonged every three months. Each time, the reasons for his detention were that it was an exceptional case, that there was a reasonable suspicion that he had committed serious offences punishable by imprisonment, that the criminal case was complex and that if released the applicant could interfere with the investigation, influence the witnesses and victims, re-offend or abscond (as he had earlier been declared a wanted person). 11. On 20 May 2010 the applicant made a habeas corpus request, asking for his detention to be replaced with a preventive measure other than deprivation of liberty. The applicant’s lawyer also raised a complaint about the impossibility to consult the applicant during the court hearings while not seated at the same desk next to him. He also complained about the denial by the court’s registry of the applicant’s request to receive copies of his case file. On 17 June 2010 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s lawyer’s claims and on 21 June 2010 it prolonged the applicant’s detention warrant for another ninety days, relying on exactly the same reasons as before. 12. On 22 February 2012 the Bălți Court of Appeal, acting as a court of first instance, acquitted the applicant and ordered his release from detention. The court noted that its judgment could be challenged by an appeal on points of law within fifteen days. 13. On 6 April 2012 the Prosecutor’s Office lodged an appeal on points of law against the judgment of 22 February 2012. In the appeal the Prosecutor’s Office made reference to Article 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The applicant objected that the appeal had been lodged out of time. Nevertheless, on 21 December 2012 the Supreme Court of Justice upheld it and reopened the proceedings. The Supreme Court did not refer to the applicant’s objection that the appeal had been lodged out of time. 14. The proceedings ended on 30 December 2015, when the Buiucani District Court found the applicant guilty, but discontinued them on the ground of statutory time-limit. 15. The applicant was detained from 5 October 2009 to 23 October 2009 in the Department for Combating Organised Crimes. He was placed in a remand facility situated in a basement. The total surface was of 3 square metres, with no bed, chair, toilet facilities or washstand. He slept for four days on a concrete floor, using a bucket for his needs. In addition, the applicant had no daily walks outside his cell. 16. Four days later, the applicant was moved to cell no. 6 of the same detention facility. He was detained with two other inmates in a cell measuring 9 square metres for fifteen days. The applicant was held in similar conditions of detention as described above. He also claims that he was fed only once per day with soup and a slice of bread. During twenty days of detention he had access to the showers only once. 17. On 23 October 2009 the applicant was transferred from that remand facility to prison no. 13 (Chișinău). He was placed for three days in cell no. 38 with a total surface of 12 square metres. The applicant was detained with seven to twelve other inmates. In particular, the applicant describes his conditions of detention as follows: the cell was equipped with twelve wooden beds, it was not heated, the quality of food was very poor, there was a lack of ventilation, worsened by the inmates’ smoking directly in the cell, and poor lighting. 18. On 27 October 2009 the applicant was transferred to cell no. 78 measuring 30 square metres. He was detained there with twelve other detainees. The cell was equipped with twelve wooden beds. 19. On 5 December 2010 the applicant was transferred from prison no. 13 (Chișinău) to prison no. 11 (Bălți), where he was detained until the date of his acquittal by the Bălți Court of Appeal on 22 February 2012. On the date of his arrival he was not fed. He was placed in cell no. 6 with a total surface of 21 square metres. The applicant was detained with fourteen to nineteen other inmates. The cell was equipped with only fourteen beds and the detainees had to sleep in turns. The applicant described his conditions of detention as follows: toilet insufficiently separated from the cell, lack of a washstand, lack of water and ventilation, lack of adequate lighting, damp and cold cell. 20. On 30 December 2010 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Prosecutor’s Office complaining about the poor conditions of detention. In a reply dated 10 January 2011, the Prosecutor’s Office informed the applicant that his complaint about the poor conditions of detention was well founded and that following a control carried out in Prison No. 11 multiple breaches of the law had been discovered. The prison administration was asked to remove the shortcomings found. It does not appear that any change in the applicant’s conditions of detention occurred after the Prosecutor Office’s involvement. 21. On 15 January 2011 the applicant was transferred to cell no. 21 with a total surface of 16 square metres. The applicant was detained along with fifteen to seventeen other inmates and they had to sleep in turns as the cell was equipped with only twelve beds. The conditions of detention as described by the applicant were as follows: lack of bed linen, clothing and hygiene products, inadequate quality of food, lack of medical assistance. The applicant also contends that he was bitten by parasitic insects present in the cell. 22. The applicant complained to the domestic courts and the investigating authority about the inhuman and degrading conditions of detention. On 20 January 2011 the Bălți Prosecutor’s Office acknowledged the existence of the inhuman conditions of detention in prison no. 11 (Bălți).

5. The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in St Petersburg. She is the mother of the late Mr Denis Aleksandrovich Vyrzhikovskiy. 6. On 1 October 2010 police officers apprehended the applicant’s son and his friend, Ms Z. and took them to the Moskovskiy District Department of the Interior of St Petersburg (УВД по Московскому району г. Санкт‑Петербурга). No record of their arrest was drawn up. 7. For approximately six hours the applicant’s son was ill-treated by police officers He was repeatedly punched in the stomach and hit to the head, right palm and both calves. He was also subjected to the so-called “swallow” method of torture (“ласточка”), with his head, hands and legs being pulled together towards the spine. 8. Two police officers then took the applicant’s son and Ms Z. to another police station. Ms Z. later testified to having seen a bruise on Mr Vyrzhikovskiy’s forehead and to his having been in pain and having had difficulties getting into a police car. 9. Early in the morning on 2 October 2010 Mr Vyrzhikovskiy was taken from the station to a hospital. He died there eight days later. An autopsy report stated that the cause of death was “a severe fat pulmonary embolism aggravated by bronchopneumonia with cerebral edema resulted from a comminuted humeral head fracture with a tear of joint capsules and massive bruises, suffusion and strain of soft tissue and the subcutaneous fat layer.” A pathologist also found the following ante mortem injuries on Mr Vyrzhikovskiy’s body, all directly linked to his death: massive bruises covering hands, chest, upper back, neck, armpits and most of his face and ears; bruises on the left hip, right palm, right part of the stomach, right thigh, left knee, both calves; abrasions and bruises on the buttocks. All injuries had been inflicted by hard blunt objects. 10. On 12 October 2010 criminal investigation was initiated. The applicant was granted victim status in the proceedings. Several police officers were charged with manslaughter and abuse of powers entailing a substantial violation of individual rights, committed using violence. 11. On 26 March 2014 the Moskovskiy District Court of St Petersburg found the officers guilty as charged and sentenced them to various terms of imprisonment. On 1 October 2014 the St Petersburg City Court partially quashed the judgment and acquitted officers of manslaughter for lack of evidence. While having found it established that the injuries had been inflicted on the applicant’s son intentionally in the police custody, the City Court remitted the case for an additional investigation in order to identify those responsible for his death. 12. On 2 March 2015 the investigation was suspended because the time‑limit for the investigation had expired and it was impossible to identify the perpetrators and to carry out any investigative measures in the absence of an accused. On 12 November 2015 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of St Petersburg upheld that decision as lawful. The decision became final on 27 January 2016.

5. The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Melitopol. 6. Between 2004 and 2006 the applicant was head of Melitopol City Council’s Disadvantaged Persons’ Welfare Centre (Центр по обслуговуванню одиноких, непрацездатних та малозабезпечених громадян Управління праці, соціального захисту та житлових субсидій Мелітопольської міської Ради – “the Centre”). On 21 April 2006 she was dismissed as part of a reorganisation of the Centre. Another person was subsequently appointed to a position similar to the one previously occupied by the applicant. 7. In May 2006 the applicant instituted civil proceedings in the Melitopolskyy Local Court (“the Melitopolskyy Court”) seeking reinstatement, salary arrears and compensation for non-pecuniary damage. On 24 October 2006 the court rejected the applicant’s claim. It found that the Centre had offered the applicant another position but that she had rejected this proposal, and that a more experienced person had been appointed as the head of the Centre. Following an appeal by the applicant, on 7 December 2006 the Zaporizhzhya Regional Court of Appeal upheld the decision of 24 October 2006. The applicant lodged a further appeal, and on 22 August 2007 the Supreme Court of Ukraine quashed these decisions and remitted the case to the first-instance court for fresh consideration. It held that the case was to be considered under the administrative justice procedure since it concerned a public-service dispute. 8. Accordingly, the applicant instituted administrative proceedings before the Melitopolskyy Court, which, on 21 February 2008, again found against her for reasons similar to those listed in its decision of 24 October 2006. The applicant appealed, and on 16 July 2008 the Dnipropetrovsk Administrative Court of Appeal quashed this decision and terminated the proceedings on the grounds that it fell to be examined under the civil justice procedure as the applicant was not a public servant. On 2 March 2011 the Higher Administrative Court of Ukraine upheld this decision. On 14 April 2011 the same court rejected the applicant’s request for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Ukraine against the decision of 2 March 2011. 9. On 28 March 2011 the applicant again lodged a civil claim seeking reinstatement, salary arrears and compensation for non-pecuniary damage. On 4 August 2011 the Melitopolskyy Court refused to examine the merits of the applicant’s civil claim as the applicant had sought to have adjourned previous court hearings in respect of her case on numerous occasions without good reason. On 5 October 2011 the Zaporizhzhya Regional Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the first-instance court.

5. The applicant institute is a private institute that carries out research in the field of social sciences. Its registered office is in Ljubljana. 6. In June 2003, the Ministry of Education, Science and Sport (hereinafter “the Ministry”) made two calls for tenders for the purpose of making awards for scientific research projects; one call was directed at private entities and the other at public research organisations. The Ministry announced that in 2004 it would finance 100,000 research hours, which were estimated to amount to 750,000,000 Slovenian tolars (SIT – approximately 3,130,000 euros (EUR)). The research projects were to be evaluated under the Rules on Quality Assessment and Funding of the Public Research Organisation Programme. The applicant institute submitted a tender for research in the field of social sciences. 7. Subsequently, the Ministry seems to have joined the proceedings for the two tenders, but no formal decision regarding the joinder appears to have been made. On 17 February 2004 the Ministry decided that the applicant institute would not be awarded any funding. 8. The applicant institute applied to the Administrative Court of the Republic of Slovenia (“the Administrative Court”), seeking the setting aside of the Ministry’s decision. The action was granted by a decision of 4 April 2007 and the case was remitted to the Ministry for reconsideration. 9. On 19 October 2009 the applicant institute lodged another action before the Administrative Court on account of the Ministry’s failure to adopt a decision within the prescribed time-limit. 10. On 30 March 2010 the Ministry again decided that the applicant institute would not be awarded any funding. It explained that the institute’s research programme had been ranked fifth among the research programmes in the field of political sciences and that only four programmes in that group would receive funding. The Ministry pointed out that it was presumed that no conflict of interests existed, even when evaluators worked in the same institution whose tenders they were evaluating and that this was a common European practice. It was further noted that evaluators had signed a declaration of confidentiality and an undertaking to withdraw in the event that a conflict of interests was found. 11. In order to reflect the fact that the Ministry had adopted the decision of 30 March 2010, the applicant institute supplemented its action of 19 October 2009, which it had originally lodged on account of the Ministry’s failure to adopt a decision (see paragraph 9 above), with a request that the Ministry’s decision be set aside. It further urged the Administrative Court to decide that it would be awarded funding. It complained that the Ministry had joined the proceedings that had initially been intended for consideration of tenders from private research organisations to the proceedings for consideration of tenders from public research organisations, without issuing a formal decision to that effect. It also complained of errors in the evaluation of the competing programmes, because not all of the criteria specified in the Rules on Quality Assessment and Funding of the Public Research Organisation Programme had been taken into account. It argued, inter alia, that the evaluation procedure had been unfair because some of the evaluators had been biased, as they had been evaluating research programmes which were competing with the very programmes in which they themselves participated. This provoked a distortion of the results of the procedure, as shown by the fact that only those research programmes in which the evaluators were leaders or members of research teams obtained financing. The applicant institute expressly requested a hearing at which witnesses could be heard with regard to the alleged procedural errors in the evaluation of the programmes. Additionally, it submitted a letter of 2 December 2003 which one of the witnesses, K., had sent to the Minister of Education, Science and Sport and several other addressees. In the letter K. notified them of problems he had detected in the tender proceedings in which he had participated as an evaluator. 12. After the parties had exchanged a number of written submissions, the Administrative Court, without holding a hearing, dismissed the action. In its decision of 2 February 2011 the court gave an extensive account of the proceedings before the Ministry and the submissions of both parties. The reasons for the decision were given on a single page. Invoking section 71(2) of the Administrative Dispute Act (Zakon o upravnem sporu – hereinafter “the ADA”, see paragraph 23 below), the Administrative Court chiefly referred to the submissions of the Ministry. It considered, among other things, that the Ministry had not acted unlawfully in joining the proceedings. It accepted the Ministry’s submission that its decision had been dictated by the nature of the research and infrastructural programmes, taking into account the guidelines of the National Research and Development Programme. The court also pointed out that the procedural rules for the evaluation of research programmes adopted by the National Scientific and Research Council clearly defined the stages of the evaluation procedure, the participants in it and their tasks. Regarding the alleged conflict of interests, the court stated that it agreed with the Ministry as to why no such conflict existed and cited section 71(2) of the ADA (see paragraph 23 below). As to the alleged errors in the evaluation of the competing programmes, the court merely disagreed with the applicant institute that not all criteria had been taken into account and again cited section 71(2) of the ADA. 13. No reasons were given for not holding a hearing. None of the evidence relied on by the applicant institute in their appeal (see paragraph 11 above) was acknowledged or referred to in the court’s reasoning. 14. On 31 March 2011 the applicant institute lodged an appeal on points of law. It complained that the Administrative Court had not held a hearing even though the facts of the case had been contested and the applicant institute had explicitly requested a hearing at which witnesses could be heard. It also argued that the Administrative Court had failed to address its allegations that errors had been made in the evaluation procedure, and complained that insufficient reasoning had been given for the decision. 15. On 1 September 2011 the Supreme Court rejected the appeal as inadmissible. No reasons were given in its decision on the merits of the applicant institute’s complaints. 16. The applicant institute then lodged a constitutional complaint, arguing, among other things, that the decisions of the Ministry and the domestic court had been arbitrary and that the courts had failed to address its allegations that errors had been made in the evaluation procedure. It reiterated that the witnesses it had proposed had not been heard and that no hearing had been held. 17. On 19 November 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant institute’s complaint, finding that it did not concern an important constitutional question or entail a violation of human rights with serious consequences for the applicant institute.

5. The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Kyiv. 6. At the time of the events he was the director of a private company. 7. In August 2002 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant on suspicion of tax evasion and forgery in office. Subsequently, the tax-evasion charge was dropped. 8. On 7 December 2004 the Kyiv Dniprovskyy District Court (“the Dniprovskyy Court”) found the applicant guilty of forgery in office. It held that he had entered knowingly false data in the company’s tax returns. More specifically, instead of applying a straight-line depreciation method in respect of the company’s intangible assets, the applicant calculated their depreciation costs as the difference between the company’s gross revenues and expenses. As a result, the documents showed the absence of any profit or loss in the company’s activity, whereas in the reality it had had losses. The applicant was sentenced to one year’s restriction of liberty (namely detention in a semi-open penal institution by the place of his residence) with a ban on holding administrative posts for one year. The sentence was suspended on probation for one year. The applicant was under an undertaking not to leave the town until the judgment became final. 9. The applicant appealed. He submitted that the activity of the company had been subject to numerous tax inspections, which had not found any violations of the tax legislation. He therefore contended that he had not done anything criminal and that that fact had not received due attention of the first-instance court. Furthermore, the applicant considered that the expert questioned in the trial did not have adequate qualification. Lastly, he argued that the tax police investigator, who had also been questioned, was not impartial and that his statements should not have been relied on. Accordingly, the applicant requested the appellate court to quash the first‑instance court’s judgment and to pronounce a new one, acquitting him for the lack of the constituent elements of a crime in his actions. 10. On 10 February 2005 the Dniprovskyy Court sent a letter to the Kyiv City Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) stating as follows: “The [Dniprovskyy Court] is sending you the criminal case regarding [the applicant] convicted under Article 366 § 1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine [forgery in office], for the appellate examination at 10.35 a.m. on 17 March 2005.” 11. In addition to the president of the Court of Appeal, the above letter was also addressed to the prosecutor, the applicant and his lawyer. There is no evidence in the case file as to whether the applicant and/or his lawyer received it. According to the applicant, they were unaware of its existence. 12. On 17 March 2005, following a hearing held with the prosecutor’s participation, but in the absence of both the applicant and his lawyer, the appellate court rejected the applicant’s appeal. It delivered its ruling “having heard the report of the judge-rapporteur of the appellate court and the explanations of the prosecutor, the latter considering the judgment lawful and [the applicant’s] appeal groundless, having checked the case-file materials and having discussed the arguments advanced in the appeal”. The issue of the applicant’s and his lawyer’s absence from the hearing was not mentioned in the appellate court’s ruling. 13. The applicant appealed on points of law, challenging, among other things, the examination of his case on appeal in his and his lawyer’s absence as being in breach of his defence rights. 14. On 23 January 2007 the Supreme Court, in written proceedings, upheld the decisions of the lower courts. Referring to the case-file materials, it noted that the first-instance court had informed the applicant and his lawyer about the scheduled appellate hearing, without further details.

4. The applicant was born in 1983 and at the time of lodging his application he was serving his prison sentence in Bolu F-type prison. 5. On 10 December 2007 the applicant wrote a letter to a member of parliament, in which he had praised the imprisoned leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan by using “Kürt Halk Önderi”, meaning the leader of Kurdish people. 6. Pursuant to the Regulations on the administration of penitentiary institutions and the execution of sentences, the applicant was found guilty of breaching prison order by the Kocaeli F- type Prison Disciplinary Board (referred hereafter as “the Board”) and on 24 December 2007 the applicant was sentenced to 13 days’ solitary confinement, on account of his statements in the above mentioned letter. 7. On 17 January 2008 the Kocaeli Enforcement Judge rejected the applicant’s objection. 8. On 14 February 2008 the Kocaeli Assize Court upheld the judgment of 17 January 2008.

4. The applicant, Mr Sergey Marksovich Dudin, is a Russian national, who was born in 1962 and lives in Parfino, Novgorod Region. He is represented before the Court by Mr K. V. Pakin, a lawyer practising in Velikiy Novgorod. 5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows. 6. On 23 July 2007 the applicant was apprehended by police at the cargo terminal “Shushary” in Saint Petersburg under suspicion of robbery. Later that day he was transferred to Krestsy, Novgorod Region. 7. On 25 July 2007 the Krestetskiy District Court of Novgorod Region (the District Court) ordered pre-trial detention of the applicant. Subsequently the period of the applicant’s detention was extended on 20 September and 2 November 2007. 8. In the order of 2 November 2007 the District Court authorised extension of the applicant’s detention “until and including 24 December 2007”. 9. On 11 December 2007 the District Court scheduled a preliminary hearing for the applicant’s trial in order to decide on his further detention. The relevant section of the operative part of the decision read as follows: “[The court] ORDERED To schedule a preliminary hearing in the criminal case of Mr Dudin ... on 25 December 2007 at 10.00 a.m. ... To transfer [from the detention facility] the accused Mr Dudin for the hearing at the set date and time. To keep the measure of Mr Dudin’s restraint – pre-trial detention – unchanged.” 10. On 25 December 2007 between 10.00 a.m. and 11.00 a.m. the District Court held a preliminary hearing ordering the criminal case to be send to trial and the applicant’s further detention. During the hearing the applicant and his representative raised the objection regarding unlawfulness of the applicant’s detention between 24 December 2007 and the time of the hearing, but the District Court dismissed it without advancing any specific reasons in this regard. The applicant appealed. 11. On 21 February 2008 the Novgorod Regional Court upheld the lower court’s decision. In the relevant part the Regional Court’s decision read as follows: “Mr Dudin’s and his representative’s arguments regarding unlawfulness of the detention ... at the moment of the adoption of the decision [are unfounded] ... [T]he present criminal case was transferred to court on 11 December 2007, i.e. within the period of [the accused’s detention ordered during investigation] and according to section 2, Article 255 of the Criminal Procedure Code the period of the defendant’s detention is calculated from the date when the case was transferred to court and until the judgment is pronounced and may not exceed six months.” 12. On 27 May 2008 the District Court convicted the applicant of aggravated robbery and sentenced to six years’ imprisonment. On 10 July 2008 the conviction was upheld on appeal by the Novgorod Regional Court and the period of the applicant’s pre-trial detention between 23 June 2007 and the day of conviction was fully counted towards execution of his sentence. 13. On 2 March 2011 the applicant was released before serving his full sentence on probation. 14. The applicant lodged a civil action against the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation seeking non-pecuniary damages for his allegedly unlawful detention without a court order between 24 and 25 December 2007. 15. On 24 April 2008 the Novgorodskiy Town Court of Novgorod Region found that between midnight 24 December 2007 and 11.00 a.m. on 25 December 2007 the applicant’s detention was unlawful and violated his rights under Article 22 of the Russian Constitution and Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. The applicant was awarded non-pecuniary damages of 2000 Russian roubles (50 euros). During the hearings the representative of the Ministry of Finance acknowledged that the applicant’s detention during the abovementioned period was not secured by a court order. The representative of the Ministry of the Interior (intervening in the proceedings) admitted that the authorisation for the detention expired on 24 December 2007. The representative of the regional Prosecutor’s Office (also intervening in the proceedings) maintained that the applicant’s detention was lawful, but stated that any detention without a court order would be unlawful. 16. On 11 June 2008 the Novgorod Regional Court annulled the lower court’s judgment on appeal and adopted a new judgment dismissing the applicant’s claims. The Regional Court argued that while the order of 2 November 2007 set the period of detention “until and including 24 December 2007”, the decision of 11 December 2007 to schedule a preliminary hearing to 25 December 2007 essentially ordered the detention until that date, because it left it “unchanged” (see paragraph 6 above).

5. The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Yerevan. He is a former Minister of Foreign Affairs and at the material time he headed a political movement called “Civil Disobedience”. 6. On 5 May 2007 criminal proceedings were instituted under Article 190 § 3 (1) of the Criminal Code (money laundering) in respect of the applicant. 7. On 7 May 2007 the applicant was arrested and on 10 May 2007 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan ordered the applicant’s detention for a period of two months, upon an application by the investigator, taking into account the nature and the dangerousness of the imputed offence and the fact that the applicant, if remaining at large, could abscond and obstruct the investigation by exerting unlawful influence on the persons involved in the proceedings. The applicant objected to that application, arguing that the investigator had failed to submit any well‑founded arguments in support of the allegation that he would abscond or obstruct justice, whereas he had no previous convictions, was known to be of good character, had a permanent place of residence and stable social life, and was a well-known public figure. The District Court’s decision stated that it could be contested before the Criminal Court of Appeal within fifteen days. 8. On 11 May 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal, raising similar arguments. 9. On 24 May 2007 the Criminal Court of Appeal decided to uphold the decision of the District Court, finding that the nature and the dangerousness of the imputed offence, the particular circumstances of the case and the possible investigative measures to be carried out gave sufficient reasons to believe that the applicant could obstruct the investigation. 10. On 2 July 2007 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan extended the applicant’s detention by two months, upon an application by the investigator, finding that the applicant, if remaining at large, could obstruct the investigation, abscond, exert unlawful influence on the persons involved in the proceedings and commit another offence. The District Court’s decision stated that it could be contested before the Criminal Court of Appeal. 11. On 3 July and 3 September 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal, raising arguments similar to those previously raised. 12. On 24 July 2007 the Criminal Court of Appeal decided to uphold the decision of the District Court, finding that the nature and the dangerousness of the imputed offence, the particular circumstances and complexity of the case; the investigative measures to be carried out and the applicant’s behaviour, namely his refusal to give any testimony, which was a factor slowing down the investigation, gave sufficient reasons to believe that the applicant could obstruct the investigation by exerting unlawful influence on the persons involved in the proceedings and also abscond. 13. On 31 August 2007 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan extended the applicant’s detention by two months, upon an application of the investigator, on the same grounds as before. The District Court’s decision stated that it could be contested before the Criminal Court of Appeal. 14. On 3 September 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal, raising arguments similar to those previously raised 15. On 6 September 2007 the investigator decided to replace the applicant’s detention with a written undertaking not to leave his residence and to release him in view of the fact that the investigative measures would take some time and it was no longer necessary to keep the applicant in detention. 16. On 17 September 2007 the Criminal Court of Appeal decided to leave the applicant’s appeal of 3 September 2007 unexamined in view of the fact that he had been released.

5. The applicant was born in 1981 and lives in Dubrovnik. 6. On 21 October 2010, at 4:40 p.m. in Dubrovnik, police officers of the Criminal Police Department of the Dubrovnik-Neretva County Police (Odjel kriminalističke policije Policijske uprave dubrovačko-neretvanske) (hereinafter “the police”) arrested the applicant on suspicion of drug abuse. 7. According to the Government, the applicant resisted arrest and the police had to apply force in order to be able to bring him to the police station. During this process both the applicant and one of the police officers who had arrested him, S.D., sustained minor bodily injuries. 8. According to the applicant, he did not resist arrest and did not sustain injuries during his arrest; rather, it was during his stay in the police station that the police officers ill-treated him in order to pressure him to make incriminating statements against his co-accused in the trial. 9. The applicant was taken to the police station immediately after his arrest. At 9.40 p.m. he was examined by a doctor, who found that he had sustained minor bodily injuries – excoriations on his left elbow, on the left side of his chest and behind his left ear. Minor bodily injuries were also found on the police officer, S.D., who had arrested the applicant – specifically, excoriations on his right knee and elbow. During their medical examination the applicant and the police officer S.D. stated that they had sustained their injuries by falling to the ground. The doctor’s report of the examination was forwarded to the police. 10. According to a common report issued on the same day by the three police officers who arrested the applicant, S.D., L.D. and I.R., the applicant had resisted arrest and they had had to apply force in order to bring him to the police station. In particular, it was noted that the applicant had been found in a vehicle on the road and arrested. He had refused to step out of his vehicle, so S.D. had grabbed him by his left wrist and had applied the so‑called “wristlock” technique in order to get him out of his vehicle. At that point police officer L.D. had grabbed the applicant by his right hand in order to apply the so-called “elbow-lock” technique, but due to the fact that the applicant had continued to resist all three of them had fallen to the ground. The applicant had tried to stand up and L.D. had kept him on the ground by pressing his knee against his back. The applicant had then been handcuffed and placed in the back seat of a police vehicle. In the police vehicle the applicant had continued to resist and the police officer S.D. had applied the “elbow-lock” technique and leaned him forwards in order to restrain him. By the time they had parked in front of the police station, one handcuff had come loose, so L.D. and I.R. had applied the “elbow-lock” technique again. When they had entered the police station the applicant had once again fallen to the ground. Then the applicant had been seated in a room and had ceased to resist, so the police officers had stopped using force and removed his other handcuff. Lastly, it was noted that during the application of coercive measures the applicant and S.D. had sustained injuries which, according to the doctor’s report, had been minor. 11. On the same day a shift manager of the Criminal Police Department noted in a report that the applicant had actively resisted arrest and that S.D., L.D. and I.R. had applied coercive measures against him – bodily force, restraining techniques and handcuffing. It was also noted that the applicant had been examined by a doctor, who had found that he had sustained excoriations on his left elbow, on the left side of his chest and behind his left ear. The applicant signed the report and stated that he did not have any objections to the procedure that had been followed. 12. On 25 October 2010 the chief of the Dubrovnik-Neretva County Police examined the information gathered in respect of the application of coercive measures against the applicant and found that they had been necessary, justified and lawful. 13. According to a police report made on the day of the applicant’s arrest, the applicant was informed of the reasons for his arrest and his right to remain silent, to hire a lawyer of his own choosing and to have a person of his choice be informed of his arrest. The report noted that the applicant had declined to hire a lawyer and that he had asked that his father be informed of his arrest. In this connection it was noted that the applicant’s father had been contacted at 6.20 p.m. The applicant signed the report without making any objections to its contents. On the same day the police lodged a criminal complaint against the applicant under a reasonable suspicion of drug abuse. 14. On 22 October 2010 at 9.45 a.m. the applicant was questioned by the police. In the report on his questioning it was noted that the applicant had been advised of his right to remain silent and to hire a lawyer of his own choosing who could be present during the questioning. In this connection it was noted that the applicant had declined to hire a lawyer. The applicant then gave a statement, explaining that in August 2010 he had on two occasions acted as an intermediary in the selling of amphetamines. He also stated that between 2008 and 2010 he had on several occasions bought cocaine from a certain D.Š. He expressed regret for his actions. The questioning ended at 11.10 a.m. The applicant signed the report on his questioning without making any objections regarding its contents. 15. On 22 October 2010 at 12 p.m. the applicant was brought for questioning before an investigating judge of the Dubrovnik County Court. A deputy Dubrovnik County State Attorney, K.K., was also present during the questioning. According to the report on his questioning, the applicant was twice advised by the investigating judge of his right to remain silent and to hire a lawyer of his own choosing, who could be present during the questioning. The applicant replied that he understood the advice and the grounds for his being under suspicion and maintained that he did not require a lawyer for that day’s questioning and that he would give a statement to the investigating judge and answer questions. He then explained that in August 2010 he had on two occasions acted as an intermediary in the selling of amphetamines and that between 2008 and 2010 he had on several occasions bought cocaine from D.Š. Lastly, the applicant stated that he had been arrested the day before at 5 p.m. and that apart from the use of force during his arrest he did not have any objections about the police conduct during his stay in the police station. The questioning ended at 12:50 p.m. The applicant signed the report on his questioning without making any objections as to its contents. He was then released. 16. On 29 October 2010 an investigation was opened in respect of the applicant and D.Š on the reasonable suspicion of their having engaged in drug abuse. On 2 December 2010 the investigation was extended to encompass a third person, V.V. 17. On 3 December 2010 the applicant hired a lawyer, D.P., to represent him. 18. On 4 January 2011 the Dubrovnik County State Attorney’s Office (Županijsko državno odvjetništvo u Dubrovniku) indicted the applicant, D.Š., and V.V for drug abuse. 19. On 3 May 2011 a hearing was held before the Dubrovnik County Court, which the applicant and his lawyer attended. The hearing was adjourned in order for V.V.’s ability to follow the proceedings to be determined. 20. The hearing of 7 June 2011, which the applicant and his lawyer attended, was adjourned owing to the illness of the presiding judge. 21. At a hearing held on 20 June 2011, which the applicant and his lawyer attended, the Dubrovnik Country Court (“the trial court”) established the identity of the defendants and the charges brought against them. The applicant stated that he understood the charges brought against him and the warnings regarding his rights given by the presiding judge and that he would present his defence and answer questions. He pleaded not guilty. He asked to give his defence at the end of the trial. Evidence was read out aloud, whereas certain evidence was excluded from the case file at the request of the defence. The trial court heard three witnesses. 22. At a hearing held on 21 June 2011, which the applicant and his lawyer attended, the trial court heard I.G., a witness. 23. At a hearing held on 1 July 2011, which the applicant and his lawyer attended, the trial court continued to hear I.G. and examined certain other evidence. The applicant’s lawyer then proposed that the trial court examine the medical records of the applicant’s father who allegedly suffered a stroke after learning of the applicant’s arrest, as well as a medical certificate dated 27 January 2011 confirming that on 21 October 2010 the applicant had been examined by a doctor and that the doctor’s report had been forwarded to the police. He also proposed that the trial court hear the applicant’s sister and examine the power of attorney by which she had hired a lawyer to represent the applicant during the time that the investigating judge was questioning him. The applicant’s lawyer, D.P., explained that this proposed evidence was relevant for the establishing of the conduct of the police against the applicant. D.H., the lawyer allegedly hired by the applicant’s sister, who represented D.Š., the applicant’s co-accused in the trial, stated that the power of attorney in question had been signed in his office on the night when the applicant had been held in the police station. The trial court examined the applicant’s father’s medical records and rejected the other proposed evidence, considering them irrelevant for the proceedings at that point. 24. At a hearing held on 4 July 2011 the trial court heard the applicant’s co-accused, D.Š. D.Š. stated, inter alia, that he had not sold drugs to the applicant and that he had learned from his lawyer, D.H., that the police had ill-treated the applicant in the police station and had beaten him. The trial court then heard the applicant. 25. The applicant reiterated the part of his statement given to the investigating judge on 22 October 2010 concerning the criminal accusation against him, namely that he had on two occasions acted as an intermediary in the selling of amphetamines. He retracted the part of his statement concerning the buying of cocaine from D.Š. He alleged that after he had been brought to the police station he had been physically and psychologically ill-treated and had been coerced to into giving such a statement to the investigating judge. He further alleged that the following morning his father and sister had come to the police station, and when he had seen his father crying, he had agreed to give his statement to the investigating judge. He explained that once he had been brought to the police station he had immediately confessed to being an intermediary in the selling of amphetamines. However, when the police had started questioning him about D.Š. and the cocaine, he had asked for a lawyer. Later, at one point police officer L.D. had told him that D.H. had arrived at the entrance of the police station but had not been allowed to come in. He alleged that he had been beaten by police officers L.D., S.D. and I.R. 26. When asked by the prosecutor, the applicant explained that during his arrest and transportation to the police station the police officers had used force against him and had beaten him. When further asked by the presiding judge and the lawyer, D.H., the applicant explained that even though on 22 October 2010 he had been advised by the investigating judge of his right to remain silent and to hire a lawyer, he had been afraid of the police officers who had brought him before the investigating judge, given that they had been the same police officers who had beaten him. The applicant’s lawyer then asked that the applicant’s sister be heard on account of a conversation that she had had with the police officer, L.D. He also asked that D.H. be heard and that the medical documentation relating to the injuries the applicant had sustained during his questioning by the police be examined. The trial court dismissed these requests, considering such evidence to be unnecessary. 27. In a closing statement the applicant’s lawyer asked the trial court to take into account, when determining the applicant’s sentence, the fact that he had confessed to his crime. The applicant reiterated his lawyer’s statement and added that he intended to finish school and start working and would never repeat his actions. 28. On 6 July 2011 the Dubrovnik County Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to two years’ imprisonment. It also found D.Š. and V.V. guilty as charged and sentenced them to eight and two years’ imprisonment, respectively. In finding D.Š. guilty the trial court referred to, inter alia, the statement that the applicant had given to the investigating judge concerning his having purchased cocaine from D.Š. in the period between 2008 and 2010. It did not consider credible the applicant’s allegation that he had given his statement to the investigating judge under police duress. It found that during the trial the applicant himself had alleged that he had given his oral statement to the investigating judge uninterruptedly, without the police officers being present, and after being advised of his right to hire a lawyer and to remain silent. In this respect it noted that the applicant had told the investigating judge that he had been ill‑treated by the police only during his arrest, and not during his stay in the police station. It considered that the fact that the applicant had changed the nature of his allegation was an attempt to help his co-accused D.Š in the trial. 29. The trial court dismissed evidence proposals relating to the applicant’s alleged ill-treatment in the police station, specifically that his sister be heard in respect of this allegation, finding that his sister had not been present during his arrest and transportation to the police station, and later on had not been in the same room with the applicant and the police officers. As to the criminal accusation against the applicant, the trial court found that the applicant had confessed to being an intermediary in the sale of amphetamines and it took his confession into account as a mitigating circumstance. 30. The applicant appealed against the first-instance judgment to the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske). In his appeal he stated that he had not resisted his arrest and had not sustained injuries during his arrest. He explained that once he had been brought to the police station he had immediately and voluntarily confessed to his crime. Therefore, he could have had no reason to resist the police only a few minutes beforehand. He further stated that the police had physically and psychologically pressured him into incriminating D.Š. and had denied him access to a lawyer. He alleged that he had given a statement to the investigating judge under duress applied by the police officers who had brought him before the investigating judge. He complained about the trial court’s dismissal of his proposals regarding evidence relating to those circumstances. He lastly stated that, given that the trial court had believed the statement that he had given against D.Š. and had taken it into account when convicting D.Š., he should have been given a milder sanction. 31. On 29 February 2012 the Supreme Court upheld the applicant’s conviction but reduced his sentence to one year’s imprisonment. The Supreme Court found that in his appeal the applicant himself had stated that the police officers had had no reason to exert pressure on him given that he had immediately confessed his crime. As to the change of the applicant’s line of defence during the trial, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that this had probably been an attempt to help his co-accused, D.Š., in the trial, rather than constituting a credible reason for retracting his earlier statements. The Supreme Court lastly found that the applicant’s statement had helped to convict D.Š. and that therefore his sentence was to be reduced to one year’s imprisonment. 32. The applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske). He complained that during his stay in the police station he had asked for a lawyer and that his sister and father had hired D.H. to represent him. However, he stated that the police had forced him to waive this right. He further complained that he had been ill-treated during his stay in the police station. He explained that he had not resisted arrest and had not been injured during his arrest, but during his stay in the police station when he had been forced to incriminate D.Š. 33. On 7 November 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint as ill-founded. The decision was served on the applicant’s representative on 18 November 2013.

5. The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Benevento. 6. On 2 April 2013, between 1 and 1.15 p.m., the applicant was stopped by two officers of the Benevento municipal police while she was driving her car. 7. According to the applicant, the police officers checked her driver’s licence and her vehicle documents. An argument broke out between the applicant and the officers. In the applicant’s view, her nervous and hostile attitude led the police officers to suspect that she was intoxicated, which she denied. As the officers did not have the necessary equipment to perform a breathalyser test, they requested the assistance of the road police (Polizia Stradale). The applicant returned to her car. Once she had got back into the vehicle, one of the police officers pulled the car door open and dragged her out by the arm. 8. As recorded in the municipal police officers’ report of 3 April 2013, the applicant had been stopped because she had been driving in an erratic manner, braking suddenly and changing lanes abruptly. The applicant did not seem to be able to exit the vehicle by herself and had had to be assisted by one of the officers. The officers reported that they had smelt alcohol on her breath and that she had been unsteady on her feet. The applicant had insulted and threatened them. 9. At 1.30 p.m. traffic police officers arrived on the scene with the breathalyser equipment. 10. According to the applicant, she was not able to take the test because she was in a state of anxiety that had been exacerbated by one of the officers shouting at her that she was drunk. That had caused her to tremble and had meant she could not keep the breathalyser tube in her mouth. The applicant requested that carabinieri be called to the scene, but the request was denied. 11. According to the traffic police report (annotazione di servizio della Polizia Stradale), the applicant agreed to be breathalysed, but did not blow into the device in the manner she had been told to do by the officers and refused to cooperate. At one point she had thrown the device’s mouthpiece into the face of one of the officers. The applicant was described as being in a “clearly altered” state, smelling strongly of alcohol and staggering. 12. The applicant was taken to the municipal police station (Comando di Polizia Municipale), where she arrived at approximately 1.50 p.m. 13. According to the applicant, once at the station the lieutenant on duty started drafting an offence report (verbale di contestazione) for driving under the influence of alcohol. The two officers who had stopped her in the street and escorted her to the station and another officer were also present. She repeatedly requested that she be allowed to use a telephone to let her family and her lawyer know of her whereabouts but her requests were denied. When she tried to pick up a telephone, one of the officers hit her in order to make her sit down. The same officer twisted her arms behind her back and handcuffed her, hurting her wrists. He then squeezed her buttocks and asked her if the handcuffs were tight enough. The applicant started screaming loudly and the officer removed the handcuffs in a violent manner. In doing so, he fractured the applicant’s right thumb and caused other injuries to her wrists. He then warned her not to cause further trouble and threatened her. The applicant left the station between 2.15 and 2.30 p.m. and proceeded further on foot as her car had been seized. 14. As recorded in the joint report issued on 3 April 2013 by the two municipal police officers who had stopped her in the street and the lieutenant on duty at the municipal police station, upon her arrival at the station the applicant had started threatening and insulting them. When the lieutenant started drafting the offence report, she grabbed a telephone from a desk and ran into the corridor. When the lieutenant tried to stop her, the applicant pushed him violently, causing him to fall. She then threw the telephone out of the window. The applicant, who was in an extremely agitated state, pushed and kicked the other two officers, and they eventually handcuffed her. When the applicant calmed down, the handcuffs were removed. The applicant ran out of the station, leaving her bag and personal belongings behind. Her vehicle and driver’s licence had been seized under road traffic legislation. The same account of the events is recorded in the offence notification (informativa di reato) filed by the directing commander of the Benevento municipal police with the Benevento public prosecutor on 3 April 2013. 15. According to the applicant, once she had left the station she got a lift to the emergency department of a local hospital, where she was examined. 16. At approximately 8 p.m. the applicant went to the State Police and attempted, unsuccessfully, to lodge a criminal complaint against the municipal police officers. According to the report of the officer on duty, the applicant complained that she had been assaulted by Benevento municipal police officers and that her finger had been fractured. When the officer informed her that the she could not file a criminal complaint because the station was closed, the applicant started speaking incoherently in a loud voice. Given her nervous and agitated state, the officer called the local questura (police headquarters) for backup. The applicant requested that an ambulance be called. The ambulance arrived at 8.30 p.m. and the applicant was examined by the ambulance medics. She was taken home by ambulance at approximately 9 p.m. 17. On 4 April 2013 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against the two police officers who had stopped her in the street on 2 April 2013 and the other two officers who had been present at the municipal police station, but whose names she did not know, alleging assault and battery, infliction of bodily harm, abuse of office, and threats. 18. An investigation into the applicant’s allegations was initiated. Seven people identified by the applicant as witnesses (persone informate sui fatti) were interviewed. Two were people who stated they had seen one of the officers dragging the applicant out of her vehicle. One was the owner of a bar where the applicant had gone in order to call her former spouse once she had left the hospital on 2 April 2013. Another was the applicant’s former spouse, who stated that her alcohol intake was limited to consumption during meals. He further stated that because of a traumatic event in her life the applicant became agitated, trembled and had trouble expressing herself when subjected to stress. The other three were colleagues, who stated that the applicant had not appeared to be intoxicated when she had left her office on 2 April 2013. The police officers who had allegedly been involved in the ill-treatment were not interviewed, and neither was the applicant. 19. On 17 January 2014 the public prosecutor requested that the proceedings be discontinued. The basis of the request was that “the allegations in the criminal complaint are not confirmed by the statements made by the witnesses identified by the victim”. 20. On 27 February 2014 the applicant lodged an objection against the prosecutor’s request to discontinue the proceedings. She complained about the lack of reasoning in the prosecutor’s request and alleged that the investigation had not been thorough. In that connection, she complained about the “total absence” of investigative measures with respect to the events that had occurred at the municipal police station and requested that the investigating judge order such measures without delay. Moreover, the applicant complained that she had not been questioned and requested that she be interviewed immediately. She also requested that officials interview the person who had taken her to the hospital when she had left the police station and other individuals. She also challenged the credibility of the official police reports, as they were in stark contrast with her account of the impugned events. 21. At a hearing on 22 September 2014 the applicant’s lawyer repeated the complaints and requests contained in the objection against the prosecutor’s request to discontinue the proceedings and reiterated, in particular, the request to conduct an investigation into the events that had occurred at the municipal police station. 22. By an order of 3 October 2014, served on the applicant on 27 October 2014, the Benevento District Court preliminary investigations judge (giudice per le indagini preliminari) decided to discontinue the proceedings. The order stated that the evidence gathered during the preliminary investigation had not been sufficient to warrant indicting the officers. It stated that the victim’s allegations had not been corroborated by evidence and that further investigative measures, as requested by the victim, would have “no influence whatsoever”. 23. On 25 October 2013 the applicant was charged with a number of offences in connection with the events of 2 April 2013, including resisting a police officer, insulting a public official, and driving under the influence of alcohol. The applicant was also charged with causing bodily harm to a police officer. 24. On an unspecified date, the public prosecutor and the applicant reached a plea agreement with respect to the offence of bodily harm and requested that the judge proceed with the imposition of a sentence (applicazione della pena su richiesta delle parti). 25. On 21 November 2014 the Benevento preliminary hearings judge took note of the plea agreement and gave the applicant a suspended sentence of twenty-eight days’ imprisonment. On the same day, the preliminary hearings judge suspended the proceedings against the applicant in connection with the charges of resisting a police officer, insulting a public official and driving under the influence of alcohol. The applicant was placed on probation with a requirement that she perform community service. 26. On 2 April 2013, the applicant went to the emergency department of a local hospital. At 6.42 p.m. she was examined by a radiologist, who established that her right thumb was fractured. 27. On 3 April 2013 the applicant returned to the emergency department. According to the medical report, the applicant arrived at the hospital in an agitated state, complaining about pain in several parts of her body. She was examined by a doctor who noted the presence of a splint on her right hand to treat a fracture. The doctor further noted the presence of bruising resulting from traumatic injury (trauma contusivo con ecchimosi) to the right thigh, right shoulder and left wrist. 28. On 4 April 2013 the applicant went to a different hospital. She was examined by an orthopaedist, who confirmed the fracture of the thumb and the presence of bruises on her left thigh and on her back. The doctor recommended surgery to treat the fracture. 29. Owing to a traumatic event in her life, the applicant suffers from chronic post-traumatic stress disorder, which has evolved into a major depressive disorder. She also suffers from a disorder which is characterised by mood swings which are exacerbated in times of particular stress, by the consumption of alcohol or sleep deprivation. The disorder in question includes peaks of manic behaviour when the applicant loses contact with reality and experiences a sense of impending threat to her own safety and that of those around her. The applicant was prescribed drugs for insomnia in February 2013. Combining the drugs with even moderate amounts of alcohol can have the same consequences as excessive alcohol consumption.

5. The applicant was born in 1975 and, as can be seen from the case materials, is currently serving a sentence in a penal institution (see paragraph 20 below). 6. On 24 May 1996 the applicant was convicted of aggravated double murder and other offences. He was sentenced to the death penalty, which was subsequently commuted to twenty years’ imprisonment in 1997 (“the first conviction”). The sentence started to run from the date of the applicant’s arrest on 24 August 1995 and was due to expire on 24 August 2015. 7. On 29 March 2002 the applicant attempted to escape. 8. On 12 April 2006 after a series of decisions and the remittal of the case to the investigating authorities, the Tbilisi City Court convicted the applicant of attempted escape and the illicit procurement of an official document. He was sentenced to four years and six months’ imprisonment (“the second conviction”). The first-instance court added the applicant’s outstanding sentence for the first conviction to the subsequent sentence, resulting in a total cumulative sentence of thirteen years and six months. The court indicated that the cumulative sentence would start to run from 29 March 2002, the date of commission of the second offence. It was due to expire on 29 September 2015. 9. On 29 December 2006 the provision of the Criminal Code regulating the imposition of cumulative sentences was amended. Article 59 of the amended law provided that, as regards accumulated sentences, the final sentence imposed should be calculated from the imposition of the later sentence. The amended legislation did not explicitly address the question of its retroactive effect (see paragraph 21 below). 10. On 20 April 2007, in a different set of proceedings, instituted by the applicant to have legislative amendments reducing the maximum length of a sentence for aggravated murder applied to his first conviction, the Supreme Court reduced the applicant’s sentence for the first conviction to fifteen years’ imprisonment. When doing so, the Supreme Court did not refer either to the starting date of the sentence or the applicant’s second conviction. 11. On 20 February 2008 the Supreme Court rectified its decision of 20 April 2007 based on the applicant’s request to that end, stating that the outstanding sentence for the applicant’s first conviction and the sentence for the second conviction were to be cumulative, and that the cumulative sentence of eight years and six months had to start running from 29 March 2002, namely the date of commission of the second offence rather than the date of the imposition of the later sentence, which was 12 April 2006. Appellate proceedings concerning the second conviction were still pending when the Supreme Court adopted the two decisions. Based on the decision of the Supreme Court of 20 February 2008, the applicant’s sentence would have expired on 29 September 2010. 12. On 3 December 2008, without taking note of the Supreme Court decisions of 20 April 2007 and 20 February 2008 (see paragraphs 10-11 above), the Tbilisi Court of Appeal upheld the applicant’s second conviction and ruled that he had to serve a cumulative sentence of thirteen years and six months which had started to run on 29 March 2002 which was again, the date of the commission of the second offence. That sentence would have expired on 29 September 2015. 13. On an unspecified date the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against the appellate court’s judgment of 3 December 2008. He requested a reduction in the sentence imposed for his second conviction and the reduction of the cumulative sentence by five years in view of the Supreme Court’s decisions of 20 April 2007 and 20 February 2008 to that end (see paragraphs 10-11 above). The case file and the applicant’s appeal on points of law were sent to the Supreme Court on 21 January 2009. 14. On 3 April 2009, while the applicant’s appeal on points of law was pending before the Supreme Court, the Tbilisi Court of Appeal adopted, by means of a written procedure and without the parties’ involvement, a decision rectifying an error in its judgment of 3 December 2008 (“the rectified appellate decision”). Relying on Article 615 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP” – see paragraph 24 below), the decision corrected the starting date of the cumulative sentence to 12 April 2006 – the date on which the first-instance court’s decision concerning the second conviction had been adopted. The appellate court did not elaborate on its decision except for noting that the judgment of 3 December 2008 had contained “an inaccuracy” regarding the starting date of the sentence. Based on that new starting date, the applicant’s sentence was due to expire on 12 October 2019. As shown by the case files, the decision of 3 April 2009 was served on the applicant on 16 April 2009. 15. On 7 April 2009 the Supreme Court issued a reasoned decision, without holding a hearing, and granted the applicant’s appeal on points of law. It noted that the appellate court had failed to take account of the reduction of the applicant’s first sentence by the Supreme Court on 20 April 2007 (see paragraph 10 above). The Supreme Court further reduced the sentence for the applicant’s second conviction to three years. It took note of the rectified appellate decision of 3 April 2009 (see paragraph 14 above) and stated that the re-calculated cumulative sentence of seven years’ imprisonment had started to run on 12 April 2006, namely the date of the imposition of the sentence for the second offence. That term was due to expire on 12 April 2013. 16. On 22 April 2009 the applicant requested the rectification of the decision of the Supreme Court of 7 April 2009 in respect of the starting date of his cumulative sentence. He noted that it was only by means of the Supreme Court’s final decision that he had learned about the rectified appellate decision of 3 April 2009. He submitted that the rectified appellate decision had been contrary to the final decision of the Supreme Court dated 20 February 2008 which had set a different starting date for his cumulative sentence, and would have resulted in a release date of 29 September 2010. He further submitted that the rectification had lacked any legal basis and had gone beyond the scope of Article 615 of the CCP, as it had substantially affected the duration of his sentence. Maintaining that his appeal had been the sole basis for the appellate court’s judgment of 3 December 2008, the applicant submitted that the rectified appellate decision, made by that very court, had been in violation of Article 540 § 1 of the CCP which had provided a guarantee for an appellant against a worsening of his or her position in the proceedings in the absence of an appeal from the prosecuting authorities. The applicant further indicated that, in addition to the foregoing arguments, taking into account the reduction of his sentence by the Supreme Court on 7 April 2009, his sentence should have expired on 29 March 2009 and that accordingly he was to be released from prison immediately. 17. On 24 April 2009 the Head of the Registry of the Chamber of Criminal Cases of the Supreme Court replied to the applicant, stating that the rectified appellate decision of 3 April 2009 had constituted an integral part of the appellate judgment of 3 December 2008. Therefore, the Supreme Court was not in a position to address the applicant’s complaint. 18. On 11 May 2009, relying on Article 553 of the CCP (see paragraph 22 below), the applicant lodged an interlocutory appeal on points of law against the rectified appellate decision. The applicant reiterated the arguments set out in his rectification request of 22 April 2009 (see paragraph 16 above). 19. On 15 June 2009 an assistant to the Chairman of the Tbilisi Court of Appeal replied to the applicant’s appeal of 11 May 2009 (see paragraph 18 above), noting that the Tbilisi Court of Appeal had adopted a judgment on 3 December 2008 and subsequently rectified on 3 April 2009 an error regarding the starting date of the sentence. It was further noted that, in its decision of 7 April 2009, the Supreme Court had accepted the rectification of the inaccuracy by the appellate court regarding the starting date of the sentence and that the rectified appellate decision had therefore been left unchanged. Accordingly, the response concluded, the interlocutory appeal on points of law against the decision of 3 April 2009 could not be accepted for consideration. 20. The applicant was released from prison on 27 January 2013 – earlier than the anticipated release date of 12 April 2013 – based on an Amnesty Act. As the applicant’s submissions before the Court show, on 6 February 2017 he was arrested on charges of aggravated fraud and repeated forgery of official documents. On 18 October 2017 the applicant was sentenced, at first instance, to eight years’ imprisonment. This set of proceedings against the applicant is not the subject of the present application.

5. The applicant was born in 1986 and lives in Sofia, Bulgaria, where he apparently moved from France in November 2013. 6. At 12.40 a.m. on 24 January 2014 he was arrested in Sofia while breaking into cars with a view to stealing items from them. He was taken to the First District Police Station and placed under police detention. According to the applicant, he was not put in a cell, but handcuffed to a bench in the station’s corridor. 7. According to the applicant, throughout the whole time that he spent in the police station he was not given any food or drink, allowed to go to the toilet, or allowed to use a telephone. He was visited by an ex officio lawyer appointed for him by the authorities. However, the lawyer spoke no French and very little English – a language that the applicant is apparently familiar with – and did not explain to him anything about the procedure in his case. 8. In the late afternoon or the evening of 24 January 2014 the applicant was taken to a hospital for a medical examination, and then, at about 10 p.m. the same day, taken to a pre-trial detention facility in Sofia. 9. It appears that the next day, or one of the following days, the applicant was brought before the Sofia District Court with a view to a decision on whether he should be remanded in detention, and that it was decided that he should remain in custody pending trial. A subsequent request for release apparently made by his counsel in the end of February 2014 was rejected as well. 10. According to the applicant, upon his arrival in the pre-trial detention facility on the evening of 24 January 2014 (see paragraph 8 above), he was given a dirty mattress, pillow and blanket, but no bedlinen. Since he had arrived in the facility after suppertime, he could not eat or drink anything until lunchtime the following day, 25 January 2014. 11. According to the applicant, the cell in which he had been placed had been dirty, cold, poorly ventilated, infested with cockroaches, overcrowded, and with a toilet which was not properly separated from the rest of the cell. 12. According to the applicant, he was not able to maintain his personal hygiene, as he was not provided with toilet paper or other toiletries, and had had no money to purchase them. As a result, it had been impossible for him to go to the shower for two weeks. On the third day of his stay in the facility, he had seen spots erupt on his skin and had asked to be examined by a medical doctor. The doctor had come to see him three days later, and had only examined him from a distance, without entering the cell. On an unspecified date in March 2014, the applicant was given a blood test which revealed that he had a staphylococcus infection. He was given antibiotics for it but was not taken to a hospital. 13. According to the applicant, food had also been so poor and served so unhygienically that he had lost twenty-three kilogrammes during his stay in the detention facility. The space for out-of-cell exercise had also been so small that on many occasions he had chosen not to take his daily exercise. 14. In the detention facility, there was a cardphone which inmates could use to call outside numbers. It was located in the space where they could take their daily one-hour out-of-cell exercise. Since it had to be shared among them, each inmate had about six minutes to use it. As the applicant had had no money on him when arrested, he could not however purchase a phonecard. With the help of a co-detainee who spoke some English, about two weeks after his arrival in the facility he managed to obtain one minute of call time free of charge, and on 5 February 2014 contacted the consulate of France in Sofia. The consulate immediately informed the applicant’s Bulgarian girlfriend, a Bulgarian friend of his and his parents, who resided in France, that he had been arrested and detained, and the consul came to visit him. The same day the applicant’s mother, who lived in France, wired money to the consul so that she could purchase food and clothes for the applicant. The consulate also arranged for a lawyer to represent the applicant in the criminal case against him. 15. With the money that he received via the consulate, the applicant was able to purchase a phonecard. According to him, he had made many requests to that effect in the days after 5 February 2017, which the Government had not provided. The Government insisted that they had made available to the Court all documents in the applicant’s detention file. They submitted a declaration by him dated 24 February 2014 whereby he had asked the detention facility’s head to issue him a phonecard preloaded with 20 Bulgarian levs of credit and, as required under the relevant regulations (see paragraph 30 below), had submitted for approval a list of the persons – his Bulgarian girlfriend, a Bulgarian friend, his lawyer, and his mother and father in France – whom he wished to call. The same day the facility’s head approved the list. The applicant was apparently able to call his mother in France for the first time two days later, on 26 February 2014. 16. According to the applicant, the relevant order (see paragraph 31 below) had provided that detainees could purchase phonecards or recharge them twice a month. The Government did not comment on that point or submit a copy of the order. According to the official form used by the applicant to make his above-mentioned declaration, phonecards could be recharged once a month. The applicant alleged that the facility’s staff had often not complied with the recharging schedule and that on one occasion he had been unable to recharge his phonecard for five weeks. He did not provide further details in that respect, but from the documents submitted by him it appears that between 24 March and 14 April 2014, a period of three weeks, he had not spoken on the telephone to his mother in France. 17. Detainees in the facility could get two visits a month, each lasting up to twenty minutes. According to the Government, the applicant had received such visits on 5, 8 and 9 February and 23 March 2014. However, on one occasion on 22 March 2014 the applicant’s Bulgarian girlfriend, who had come to visit him, was turned away with the explanation that the same day he had been moved to a different wing, detainees in which could be visited on another date according to the schedule of visits. She was apparently able to visit him the next day. It appears that a Bulgarian friend of the applicant who had also come to visit him on 22 March 2014 was likewise turned away. 18. According to the Government, during his stay in the detention facility the applicant had been visited by his lawyer on twelve occasions in February and March 2014, and by consular staff on two occasions. He had also received parcels with food and other items on twenty-one occasions. 19. Throughout his stay in the detention facility, the applicant was able to correspond with his parents in France with letters passed via his lawyer or the staff of the consulate of France in Sofia. 20. On 17 April 2014 the applicant and the prosecution entered into an agreement whereby he pleaded guilty and accepted to serve a sentence of three months’ imprisonment. The same day the Sofia District Court approved the agreement, and the next day, 18 April 2014, the applicant was moved to Sofia Prison. Since his pre-trial detention was taken into account in calculating the amount of time that he had to serve under his sentence of imprisonment, he spent there only six days, until 24 April 2014, when he was released. According to the applicant, conditions in Sofia Prison were nearly identical to, or even worse than, those in the detention facility. 21. The applicant’s parents came from France to Bulgaria to see him on 25 April 2014, the day after his release. It appears that they could not do so earlier because it was not possible for his mother to take leave from work.

5. The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Gornja Maoča. 6. On 28 October 2011 Mr Mevlid Jašarević, a member of the local group advocating the Wahhabi/Salafi version of Islam (see, concerning this group, Al Husin v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, no. 3727/08, § 20, 7 February 2012), attacked the United States Embassy in Sarajevo. One police officer was severely wounded in the attack. In April 2012 Mr Jašarević and two other members of the group were indicted in relation to that event. Mr Jašarević was eventually convicted of terrorism and sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment. The other two defendants were acquitted. The relevant part of the first-instance judgment rendered in that case, depicting the religious community to which the applicant also belonged, reads as follows: “In his Report/Findings and Opinion and at the main trial, the expert witness Prof. Azinović clarified the notions of ‘Wahhabism’ and ‘Salafism’ from a scientific perspective: ‘... Salafi communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, like the one in Gornja Maoča (in which the accused lived at the time of the attack), are often isolated and inaccessible. The choice of remote and isolated locations to establish settlements is often informed by the belief that true believers who live in a non-believer (or secular) country need to resort to hijrah – emigration or withdrawal from the surrounding (non-believers’) world, following the example set by the Prophet Muhammad and his followers, who moved from Mecca to Medina in 622 to establish the first Muslim community. Despite mutual differences, most of the Bosnian Salafi groups share some common traits that are not inherent in Islamic organisations (or religious sects) only. In practice, they confirm the tendencies of certain traditional religious communities to isolate from other believers and define their holy community through their disciplined opposition to both non-believers and half-hearted believers. This pattern is inherent in fundamentalist movements and sects within almost all religious traditions. Such movements as a rule have similar characteristics despite the differences in theological doctrines, size and social composition, the scope of their influence or their tendency towards violence. Yet these fundamentalist and puritan groups mostly do not encourage or approve violence, whether it is aimed against members of the same group or against the outer world. According to the available sources and their own declarations, members of the community in Gornja Maoča oppose the concept of a secular State, democracy, free elections and any laws that are not based on Sharia. The positions taken by this group are, inter alia, available at a number of web sites, including www.putvjernika.com, while part of its followers live in Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro, Slovenia, Austria, Germany, Switzerland, Australia and other countries.’ ... 6.1.5.1 Punishment of the accused (Article 242 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) Having been called by the court officer to stand up when the Trial Chamber entered the courtroom at the first hearing, the accused refused to do so. Also, the accused Jašarević and Fojnica were wearing skullcaps, which the Court could correlate with clothing details indicating their religious affiliation. Pursuant to Article 256 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, all those present in the courtroom must stand up upon the call from a court officer. The President of the Trial Chamber asked the accused to explain both their refusal to stand up and the reasons why they had entered the courtroom wearing skullcaps. The accused stated that they only respected Allah’s judgment and that they did not want to take part in rituals acknowledging man-made judgment. The Court thereupon warned the accused that standing up was a statutory obligation of the accused and that under Article 242 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, disruptive conduct constituted contempt of court, which the Court would punish by removing them from the courtroom. After the warning, the President adjourned the hearing and provided the accused with a reasonable period of time to consult their attorneys in order to change their minds. When the Trial Chamber returned to the courtroom, the accused did not stand up, and therefore the President removed them from the courtroom. The transcript from the hearing was subsequently delivered to the accused. At a new hearing, the accused Fojnica and Ahmetspahić again did not want to stand up on being called by the court officer, while the accused Jašarević refused to enter the courtroom. The President therefore asked the accused to respond whether it was their definite decision to act in the same way until the completion of the trial. The accused confirmed that, until the completion of the trial, they had no intention of showing any respect, by standing up, for the Court, which they did not recognise. The Court found that to continue to bring the accused to scheduled hearings would unnecessarily expose the Court to significant expense. Therefore, the Court decided to remove the accused from the trial until its completion, with a warning that they would be notified of any scheduled hearing, and that, prior to it, they could notify the Court if they changed their mind, in which case the Court would allow them to come to the hearing. The accused Fojnica and Ahmetspahić then changed their mind and regularly appeared before the Court, while the accused Jašarević did so only at the following hearing. The Court delivered to the accused the audio-recordings and the transcripts from the hearings they had not attended in order to allow them to agree with their defence attorneys on their defence strategy.” 7. In the context of that trial, the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“the State Court”) summoned the applicant, who belonged to the same religious community, to appear as a witness on 10 September 2012. He appeared, as summoned, but refused to remove his skullcap, notwithstanding an order from the president of the trial chamber to do so. He was then expelled from the courtroom, convicted of contempt of court and sentenced to a fine of 10,000 convertible marks (BAM)[1] under Article 242 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The relevant part of that decision reads as follows: “The Court has examined the situation encountered in the courtroom with the utmost care. The Court is aware that the witness belongs to a religious community, organised under special rules in the village of Maoča, of which the accused are also members. In view of that, the Court has acquainted the witness with the provisions of Rule 20 of the House Rules of the Judicial Institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the obligations of the parties in the judicial institutions, which ban visitors from entering these buildings in clothing that is not in accordance with the generally accepted dress codes within the professional environment of the judicial institutions. In addition, the Court has pointed out to the witness that, in public institutions, it is not acceptable to display religious affiliation through clothing or religious symbols, and that the Court is obliged to support and promote values that bring people closer, not those that separate them. The Court has particularly emphasised that the rights of the individual are not absolute and must not jeopardise common values. The witness’s attention has especially been drawn to the fact that people of various religious beliefs, belonging to different religious groups, appear before the court and that it is necessary to have confidence in the court. Thus, the court is not a place where religious beliefs can be expressed in a way that discredits certain common rules and principles in a multicultural society. That is why the law obliges everyone who appears before the Court to respect the Court and its rules. The Court finds the witness’s refusal to accept the rules of court and to show respect to the Court by accepting its warnings, to be a flagrant breach of order in the courtroom. The Court has found that this behaviour is connected to a number of other identical cases before it, in which the members of the same religious group behaved in the same manner, publicly indicating that they did not recognise this Court. The frequency of such disrespectful behaviour and contempt of court is producing dangerous criminogenic effects and undoubtedly presents a specific threat to society. It is not necessary to particularly substantiate how this behaviour impairs the Court’s reputation and confidence in the Court. A legitimate conclusion may be that it is essentially directed against the State and basic social values. Therefore, a severe and uncompromising reaction on the part of the State, taking all existing repressive measures, is crucial for dealing with such behaviour. Restraint on the part of the State in cases of this or other types of extremism can have serious consequences for the reputation of the judiciary and the stability of society in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bearing in mind the frequency, seriousness and gravity of this type of breach of order in the courtroom and its damaging consequences, the Court has decided to punish the witness by imposing the maximum fine of BAM 10,000. Such a severe penalty should be a message to all the parties in the courtroom that contempt of court is unacceptable. The Court must be respected and the level of respect for the Court is the same as for the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina.” 8. On 11 October 2012 an appeals chamber of the same court reduced the fine to BAM 3,000 and upheld the rest of the first-instance decision. It held that the requirement to remove any and all headgear on the premises of public institutions was one of the basic requirements of life in society. It further held that in a secular State such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, any manifestation of religion in a courtroom was forbidden. The relevant part of that decision reads: “The Chamber observes that it is obvious and well known that skullcaps, hats and other headgear should be removed when entering any premises, and notably the premises of State and other public institutions, as there is no longer a need to wear them and removing a skullcap or a hat is an expression of respect for this institution and its function. The duty to remove headgear exists not only in this court but also in other courts and institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as in other States. Such rules and duties apply to all persons without exception, regardless of religious, sexual, national or other affiliation. Indeed, this is a duty of all those who visit the State Court in whatever capacity, as explained in more detail in Rule 20 of the House Rules of the Judicial Institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina: ‘Visitors must respect the dress code applicable to judicial institutions. Visitors shall not wear miniskirts, shorts, t-shirts with thin straps, open heel shoes and other garments that do not correspond to the dress code applicable to judicial institutions’. It would appear from the case file that the judge in charge of this specific case first directed the witness to remove his skullcap in the courtroom, and then gave him an additional ten minutes to think about it as well as about the consequences of rejecting that order. As the witness had nevertheless failed to remove his skullcap, showing thereby wilful disrespect for the authority of the court, the President of the Trial Chamber fined him in accordance with Article 242 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It follows from the aforementioned that the judge in charge did not invent the duty of removing the skullcap when addressing the court, as claimed in the appeal. This is indeed a matter of a generally accepted standard of behaviour in the courtroom which applies not only to this Court but also to other courts; furthermore, it has always been applied. This duty stems from Rule 20 of the House Rules of the Judicial Institutions cited above. Therefore, the allegations made by the lawyer Mulahalilović in the appeal are not only unjustified but totally inappropriate. The allegation in the appeal that the witness was punished simply because he was a believer who was practising his religion, and that he had thereby been discriminated against, is also unsubstantiated. The duty of removing headgear and behaving decently applies without exception to anyone visiting the court premises. All persons visiting the Court, regardless of their religion, nationality, sex or other status, have the same rights and obligations and are obliged, among other things, to remove their skullcaps, hats and other headgear. This was explained to the witness. Any behaviour to the contrary has always been interpreted and is still interpreted as disrespectful towards the court, and the appellant is aware of that. Bosnia and Herzegovina, as mentioned in the impugned decision, is a secular State in which religion is separate from public life. The Chamber therefore holds that the premises of the Court cannot be a place for the manifestation of any religion. It clearly follows from the aforementioned that the witness Husmet Hamidović was not deprived of his right to freedom of religion and freedom to manifest religion at his home or any other place dedicated for that purpose, but not in the courtroom. Therefore, the allegations by the lawyer Mulahalilović of a violation of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights, and of discrimination on religious grounds, are unsubstantiated. Having found that the witness’s punishment was justified and that his appeal was ill-founded in that part, the Appeals Chamber then examined the amount of the fine and decided that it was excessive. As noted in the appeal, BAM 10,000 is the maximum fine for contempt of court. The maximum fine should be imposed in the most serious cases. Turning to the relevant criteria, the nature and the seriousness of the conduct must certainly be taken into consideration. However, the appellant is wrong in claiming that his means should have also been taken into account, as the fine for contempt of court is not a criminal sanction, but is of a disciplinary nature. While the witness showed a high level of determination in disrespecting the court (he again failed to remove his skullcap after a pause of ten minutes given to him to reflect) and this fact definitely affected the amount of the fine, the act itself (failure to remove headgear) is not the most serious case of contempt of court which would justify the maximum fine. Since the witness did not use offensive language, there was no need to impose the maximum fine. This is notwithstanding the fact that members of the same religious group have lately shown a pattern of disrespectful behaviour. While it is true that the general prevention is one of the aims of sanctions, including disciplinary ones, disciplinary sanctions are primarily directed at individuals. Everyone should therefore be held responsible and adequately punished for his/her conduct only, and not for that of other members of any group. This follows from Article 242 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the circumstances of this case, and having regard to the nature and the intensity of contempt of court committed by this witness, the appeals chamber finds that a fine in the amount of BAM 3,000 is appropriate. The appeal by the lawyer Mulahalilović is therefore partially accepted and the impugned decision amended.” 9. As the applicant had failed to pay the fine, on 27 November 2012 the fine was converted into thirty days’ imprisonment pursuant to Article 47 of the Criminal Code. That decision was upheld on 13 December 2012 and the applicant served his prison sentence immediately. 10. On 9 July 2015 the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina found no breach of Articles 9 and 14 of the Convention, fully accepting the reasoning of the State Court. At the same time, it found a breach of Article 6 of the Convention because of the automatic way in which fines were converted into imprisonment and ordered that Article 47 of the Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina be amended. However, it decided not to quash the decision converting the fine into imprisonment in this case, relying on the principle of legal certainty. The relevant part of the majority decision reads as follows: “40. The Constitutional Court notes that the present case concerns a specific situation where the universally accepted standard of conduct in a judicial institution intertwines with the right of the appellant to manifest in a courtroom, contrary to that standard, affiliation with his religious community. The appellant claims that the State Court did not have a basis in law for imposing a fine for his failure to comply with a court order, as the Code of Criminal Procedure does not contain a provision prescribing any such measure, for which reason his right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion was violated. 41. Starting from the main objection raised by the appellant, that the limitation in the case at hand was not prescribed by law, the Constitutional Court notes that the European Court (The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (no. 1), 26 April 1979, § 49, Series A no. 30) has held that two requirements flow from the expression ‘prescribed by law’ in Article 9 of the European Convention. ‘Firstly, the law must be adequately accessible: the citizen must be able to have an indication that is adequate in the circumstances of the legal rules applicable to a given case. Secondly, a norm cannot be regarded as a ‘law’ unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct: he must be able - if need be with appropriate advice - to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail.’ In addition, the wording of many statutes is not absolutely precise. The need to avoid excessive rigidity and to keep pace with changing circumstances means that many laws are inevitably couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague. The interpretation and application of such enactments depend on practice (see Kokkinakis, cited above). 42. Accordingly, as concerns the issue of whether the State Court, in adopting the challenged ruling, acted in accordance with the law, the Constitutional Court observes that the provision of Article 242 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that the judge or the presiding judge may order that a party to the proceedings who disrupts order in a courtroom or disobeys court orders be removed from the courtroom and be fined in an amount of up to BAM 10,000. The Constitutional Court also observes that the cited provision, on which the State Court relied, does not prescribe a list of all types of conduct which may be regarded as disruption of order in a courtroom, but rather each court, in the circumstances of a given case, decides whether some type of conduct may be considered disruptive or not, which falls within the scope of that court’s margin of discretion (see the Constitutional Court decision no. AP 2486/11 of 17 July 2014, § 33). This is a universally accepted standard of conduct of the courts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is in accordance with the position of the European Court, referred to in the Kokkinakis judgment, that the interpretation and application of such enactments that are couched in vague terms depend on practice. 43. The Constitutional Court notes that the State Court relied also on Rule 20 of the House Rules, providing that ‘visitors must respect the dress code applicable to judicial institutions’, as an internal act of the State Court and other judicial institutions. The Constitutional Court observes likewise that the mentioned provision does not specify what that dress code is. However, the State Court in the case at hand kept in mind that the universally accepted standard of conduct in a civilised society required that upon entering the premises of a public institution one should remove one’s headgear out of respect for that institution and its function. Likewise, the Constitutional Court is aware that the said House Rules were not published, but that is not a problem since the present case concerns a universally accepted and usual standard of conduct in a judicial institution in a civilised and democratic society that Bosnia and Herzegovina aspires to become. The Constitutional Court also holds that the standard in issue could and should have been known to the appellant. In addition, the Constitutional Court observes that the State Court clearly and unequivocally warned the appellant of that universally accepted standard of conduct, which is indeed mandatory for all visitors of judicial institutions, irrespective of their religion, sex, national origin or other status. 44. Moreover, the State Court clearly warned the appellant of the consequences of such conduct and, although it was not required to do so, accorded him an additional time to reconsider his position. This is clearly in accordance with the stance taken by the European Court in relation to the notion ‘prescribed by law’ (The Sunday Times, cited above). Indeed, the State Court clearly and unequivocally informed the appellant of the applicable rules in the judicial institutions and of the consequences of disobeying the rules. Moreover, at his own request, the appellant was granted additional time to think about all this. The Constitutional Court especially emphasises the fact that the limitation in question applied only while the appellant was in the courtroom, that is, during his testimony before the State Court. The Constitutional Court holds that the State Court did not thereby place an excessive burden on the appellant, given that it simply requested that the appellant adjust his conduct to the House Rules, which applied to all visitors, and only in the courtroom. Bearing in mind all the aforementioned, the Constitutional Court holds, in the circumstances of this particular case, that the State Court, using the margin of discretion referred to in Article 242 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, acted in accordance with the law, and that, contrary to the appellant’s opinion, the interference, which was of a limited nature, was lawful. 45. As to the question whether the interference in the present case had a legitimate aim, the Constitutional Court notes that the State Court simply relied on a universally accepted standard of conduct in a judicial institution, which requires all the visitors of judicial institutions to respect ‘the dress code applicable to judicial institutions’. That court further relied on the inadmissibility of the manifestation in public institutions of religious affiliation and religious symbols which were contrary to the usual standards of conduct, and in so doing it took into account its obligation to support the values that bring people closer and not those that separate them. The Constitutional Court notes that the State Court underlined in that regard that Bosnia and Herzegovina was a secular State where religion was separated from public life and that therefore no one could manifest his/her religion or religious affiliation in a courtroom. Considering the position of the European Court that in democratic societies in which several religions coexist (as is the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina) it may be necessary to place restrictions on the freedom of religion (Kokkinakis, cited above), in the context of the obligation of an independent judicial institution to support the values that bring people closer, and not those that separate them, the Constitutional Court holds that the restriction in the present case, which was of a temporary nature, aspired to achieve legitimate aims. Finally, the Constitutional Court reiterates that Article 242 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is primarily designed to allow the State Court unhindered and effective conduct of proceedings. A judge or the president of a chamber is thereby given the possibility of imposing a fine for any inappropriate behaviour which is directed at disrupting order in a courtroom or at damaging the reputation of the State Court. In the present case, the State Court considered the repeated refusal of the appellant to comply with an order of the court to be damaging to the reputation and the dignity of a judicial institution. Therefore, the Constitutional Court finds that the restriction in issue, which was of a limited nature, was in accordance with the legitimate aim of maintaining the dignity of a judicial institution for the purposes of Article 9 of the European Convention. 46. Finally, as to the question whether the decision was necessary in a democratic society in order to achieve one of the legitimate aims under Article 9 of the European Convention, the Constitutional Court reiterates that, according to the settled case-law of the European Court, the Contracting States have a certain margin of appreciation in assessing the existence and extent of the need for interference, but this margin is subject to European supervision, embracing both the law and the decisions applying it, even those given by independent courts (Dahlab, cited above). Furthermore, under the well-established case-law of the European Court, the Court is called upon to establish whether the measures undertaken at the national level were justified in principle – that is, whether the reasons given by the national authorities to justify them were ‘relevant and sufficient’ and whether the measures were proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued (The Sunday Times, cited above, § 50[2]). 47. The Constitutional Court notes that the appellant was fined for contempt of court; that is, for his failure to respect an order of the State Court to remove his skullcap in the courtroom. The Constitutional Court further notes that the first-instance decision imposed a fine in the amount of BAM 10,000, but that the second-instance decision reduced the fine to BAM 3,000. The Appeals Chamber held that the fine set in the first-instance decision was excessive, and taking into consideration all the circumstances of the case, it concluded that a fine in the amount of BAM 3,000 was appropriate. The Constitutional Court observes that the State Court acted in this case in accordance with its margin of discretion, accorded by Article 242 of the Code of Criminal Procedure enabling the courts to fine participants in proceedings who refuse to obey court orders, with a view to conducting proceedings efficiently and maintaining the authority and dignity of courts. The Constitutional Court took into account the fact that owing to his failure to pay the fine, the appellant’s fine was converted to a prison sentence pursuant to Article 47 of the Criminal Code. However, the Constitutional Court will examine that factor in the following paragraphs of this decision concerning the right to a fair trial. Therefore, in view of the above and the circumstances of this particular case, the Constitutional Court holds that the impugned restriction did not constitute an excessive burden for the appellant, that the measure undertaken by the State Court pursued legitimate aims within the meaning of Article 9 of the European Convention, and that there was a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the restriction and the legitimate aim pursued. 48. Accordingly, the Constitutional Court concludes that the impugned decision did not breach the appellant’s right to manifest his religion under Article II § 3 (g) of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Article 9 of the European Convention.” 11. Two out of the eight judges of the Constitutional Court appended dissenting opinions. They disagreed with the majority as concerns Articles 9 and 14 of the Convention. In particular, given that the applicant had appeared as summoned and had stood up while addressing the court, they considered that his conduct had not been disrespectful. They further maintained that, unlike public officials, private citizens, such as the applicant, did not owe a duty of neutrality. Therefore, the applicant’s punishment for refusing to remove a religious symbol in a courtroom constituted, in their opinion, disproportionate interference with his right to freedom of religion.

10. The applicant was born in 1978 and is currently detained in the centre for persons in preventive detention on the premises of Straubing Prison (hereinafter “the Straubing preventive detention centre”). 11. On 29 October 1999 the Regensburg Regional Court convicted the applicant of murder and, applying the criminal law relating to young offenders, sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment. It found that in June 1997 the applicant, then aged nineteen, had strangled a woman who had been jogging on a forest path by use of considerable force with a cable, a tree branch and his hands, had partly undressed the dead or dying victim and had then masturbated. The court, having consulted two medical experts, found that the applicant had acted with full criminal responsibility when killing the woman for sexual gratification and in order to cover up his intended rape. The court noted that, despite indications to that effect, both experts had not wished to draw the conclusion that the applicant suffered from a sexual deviancy as the young applicant had made few statements on the motives for his offence. 12. On 12 July 2008 a new legislative provision, section 7(2) of the Juvenile Courts Act, entered into force. It authorised the ordering of subsequent preventive detention (see for the terminology also paragraphs 104-106 and 157 below) of persons convicted under the criminal law relating to young offenders (see paragraphs 54-57 below). 13. From 17 July 2008 onwards, after he had served his full prison sentence, the applicant was remanded in provisional preventive detention under Article 275a § 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 61 below). 14. On 22 June 2009 the Regensburg Regional Court, with Judge P. sitting on the bench, ordered the applicant’s subsequent preventive detention under section 7(2)(1) of the Juvenile Courts Act, read in conjunction with section 105(1) of the Juvenile Courts Act (see paragraphs 56 and 59 below). The court, having regard to the reports made by a criminological expert (Bo.) and a psychiatric expert (Ba.), found that the applicant continued to harbour violent sexual fantasies and that there was a high risk that he would again commit serious sexual offences, including murder for sexual gratification, if released. On 9 March 2010 the Federal Court of Justice dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law against the Regional Court’s judgment. 15. On 4 May 2011 the Federal Constitutional Court, in a leading judgment, allowed the applicant’s constitutional complaint. It quashed the Regional Court’s judgment of 22 June 2009 and the Federal Court of Justice’s judgment of 9 March 2010 and remitted the case to the Regional Court. It further found the order for the applicant’s provisional preventive detention – which had become devoid of purpose once the order for the applicant’s subsequent preventive detention in the main proceedings had become final – to be unconstitutional (file no. 2 BvR 2333/08 and no. 2 BvR 1152/10). The Federal Constitutional Court found that the impugned judgments and decisions had violated the applicant’s right to liberty and the constitutional protection of legitimate expectations guaranteed in a State governed by the rule of law (see in more detail paragraphs 68-75 below). 16. On 5 May 2011 the applicant requested that the Regensburg Regional Court order his immediate release. He claimed that following the Federal Constitutional Court’s judgment of 4 May 2011, which had quashed the judgment ordering his subsequent preventive detention, there was no longer any legal basis for his detention. 17. On 6 May 2011 the Regensburg Regional Court, allowing the Public Prosecutor’s request of 5 May 2011, again ordered the applicant’s provisional preventive detention under sections 7(4) and 105(1) of the Juvenile Courts Act, read in conjunction with Article 275a § 5, first sentence, of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraphs 59 and 61 below). The court found that the applicant’s provisional preventive detention was necessary because there were weighty grounds for expecting that his subsequent preventive detention would be ordered under section 7(2)(1) of the Juvenile Courts Act, read in the light of the judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court of 4 May 2011. 18. By submissions dated 27 June 2011, received by the Regional Court on 29 June 2011, the applicant lodged an appeal against the Regional Court’s decision, for which he submitted further statements of grounds on 15, 19, 22, 25 and 26 July 2011. He claimed, in particular, that his provisional preventive detention was unlawful. 19. On 4 July 2011 the Regensburg Regional Court refused to amend its decision of 6 May 2011. 20. On 16 August 2011 the Nuremberg Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal as ill-founded. It had regard to: (i) a request lodged by the Nuremberg General Public Prosecutor on 20 July 2011 requesting the dismissal of the applicant’s appeal; (ii) the findings of fact made by the Regensburg Regional Court in its judgment of 22 June 2009; (iii) the findings of two medical experts in the proceedings leading to the judgment of 22 June 2009; (iv) the findings of two other experts in previous proceedings regarding the applicant’s mental condition and the level of danger that he posed; and (v) the new restrictive standards set by the Federal Constitutional Court in its judgment of 4 May 2011. 21. On 29 August 2011 the Nuremberg Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s complaint regarding a breach of his right to be heard and his objection to the decision of 16 August 2011. The decision was served on counsel for the applicant on 6 September 2011. 22. On 7 September 2011 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court against the decision of the Regensburg Regional Court dated 6 May 2011, as confirmed by the Nuremberg Court of Appeal. He further requested that the execution of those decisions be stayed by way of an interim measure until the Federal Constitutional Court delivered its decision. The applicant claimed, in particular, that his right to a speedy decision, enshrined in his constitutional right to liberty, had not been respected in the proceedings concerning the review of his provisional preventive detention. 23. On 18 October 2011 the Federal Constitutional Court communicated the applicant’s constitutional complaint to the regional Government of Bavaria, to the President of the Federal Court of Justice and to the General Public Prosecutor at the latter court. 24. On 25 October 2011 the Federal Constitutional Court, in a reasoned decision, refused to stay the order for the applicant’s provisional preventive detention by way of an interim measure. 25. By submissions dated 1 January 2012 the applicant replied to the submissions of the regional Government of Bavaria, of the President of the Federal Court of Justice and of the General Public Prosecutor at the latter court dated 28, 24 and 25 November 2011 respectively. 26. On 22 May 2012 the Federal Constitutional Court, without giving reasons, declined to consider the applicant’s constitutional complaint (file no. 2 BvR 1952/11). The decision was served on counsel for the applicant on 30 May 2012. 27. On 17 November 2011 the applicant lodged a fresh request for judicial review of his provisional preventive detention. By a decision of 28 November 2011 the Regensburg Regional Court upheld the applicant’s provisional preventive detention as ordered on 6 May 2011. On 2 January 2012 the Nuremberg Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal against that decision. 28. In the resumed proceedings before the Regensburg Regional Court following the remittal of the case to it (see paragraph 15 above), the applicant lodged a motion against Judge P. for bias. The latter had been a member of the bench of the Regensburg Regional Court which had ordered the applicant’s subsequent preventive detention on 22 June 2009 (see paragraph 14 above). The applicant alleged that Judge P. had remarked to the applicant’s female defence counsel on 22 June 2009, immediately after the delivery of the Regional Court’s judgment ordering the applicant’s subsequent preventive detention, in reference to the applicant: “Be careful that after he is released, you don’t find him standing in front of your door waiting to thank you.” He claimed that the remark had been made in the course of a discussion in camera between the judges of the Regional Court and the applicant’s two lawyers concerning the applicant’s possible transfer to a psychiatric hospital following the Regional Court’s judgment. 29. In a comment of 13 December 2011 on the applicant’s motion for bias, Judge P. explained that he remembered having had a discussion about the applicant’s possible transfer to a psychiatric hospital at a later stage, after the delivery of the judgment. However, given the length of time that had elapsed, he neither recalled the precise contents of the discussion nor the exact context in which he had allegedly made the impugned remark. 30. On 2 January 2012 the Regensburg Regional Court dismissed the motion for bias lodged by the applicant. The court considered in particular that, even assuming that the applicant had established to the satisfaction of the court that Judge P. had made the remark in question, there were no objectively justified doubts as to P.’s impartiality as a result thereof. Even assuming that the applicant could reasonably consider the sense of the words “thank you” in the above context as meaning that the applicant could commit a violent offence, it had to be noted that the Regional Court, including Judge P., had just established that the applicant still suffered from fantasies of sexual violence and that there was at that time a high risk that he would again commit serious offences against the life and sexual self‑determination of others. Assuming that Judge P. had indeed made the remark in question, his “advice” had therefore constituted in substance nothing more than the application of the Regional Court’s said findings to a particular case. The remark had further been made in the context of a confidential exchange between the participants in the proceedings in the absence of the applicant. Judge P. could have expected that the applicant’s female counsel would interpret his remark in the above-mentioned manner within that context. 31. Furthermore, Judge P.’s remark had reflected his view as it had been on the day of the Regional Court’s judgment of 22 June 2009. It did not suggest in any way that Judge P. had not been ready to take an impartial decision in the present proceedings, more than two years after the impugned remark and following the conclusion of a new main hearing. The fact that Judge P. had previously dealt with the applicant’s case did not in itself render him biased. (b) The new order for the applicant’s subsequent preventive detention 32. On 3 August 2012 the Regensburg Regional Court, having held hearings over twenty-four days, again ordered the applicant’s subsequent preventive detention. 33. The Regional Court based its 164-page judgment on sections 7(2)(1) and 105(1) of the Juvenile Courts Act, read in conjunction with the Federal Constitutional Court’s judgment of 4 May 2011. It considered, firstly, that a comprehensive assessment of the applicant, his offence and, in addition, his development during the execution of the sentence relating to young offenders revealed that there was a high risk that the applicant, owing to specific circumstances relating to his person or his conduct, could commit the most serious types of violent crimes and sexual offences, similar to the one he had been found guilty of, if released. 34. The Regional Court found, secondly, that the applicant suffered from a mental disorder for the purposes of section 1(1) of the Therapy Detention Act (see paragraph 85 below), namely sexual sadism. Having regard to the case-law of the Federal Court of Justice and the Federal Constitutional Court, it considered that, whereas a mere “accentuation of the personality” was not sufficient to constitute a mental disorder within the meaning of the said Act, such disorder did not have to be so serious as to exclude or diminish the criminal responsibility of the person concerned for the purposes of Articles 20 and 21 of the Criminal Code (see paragraphs 82-83 and 88-89 below). Given that the sexual sadism from which the applicant suffered was of a serious nature and had substantially affected his development since adolescence, it amounted to a mental disorder within the meaning of the Therapy Detention Act. 35. The Regional Court based its view on the reports of two experienced external medical experts whom it had consulted, K. and F., who were professors and doctors for psychiatry and psychotherapy at two different university hospitals. One of the experts consulted, K., was firmly convinced that the applicant continued to suffer from sexual sadism while the other expert, F., formulated his findings more cautiously, stating that it was certain that the applicant had suffered from sexual sadism in 2005 and that this disorder could not be expected to have disappeared. 36. Having regard to the findings of these experts, as well as to those of several medical experts who had previously examined the applicant since his arrest following his offence, the Regional Court was satisfied that the applicant has had violent sexual fantasies involving the strangulation of women since the age of seventeen. He was suffering from a sexual preference disorder, namely sexual sadism, as described by the relevant tool for the classification of diseases, the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems in its current version (ICD-10);[1] this disorder had caused, and been manifested in, his brutal offence, and still persisted. The court, having regard to the experts’ findings, observed that the applicant had hidden the sadistic motives behind his offence in the proceedings before the trial court in 1999, which, despite some indications of sexual deviance, had then interpreted the offence as an intended rape which had failed. The applicant, who had given diverging versions of the motive for his offence, had only admitted in 2005/2006, during his examination by a psychological and a psychiatric expert, that in his murder he had put into practice intensifying fantasies of exercising power over women by attacking their neck and by masturbating on their inanimate bodies. The applicant’s new statements concerning his fantasies were more reconcilable with the trial court’s findings as to the manner in which the offence had been carried out. 37. The court further observed that the therapy followed by the applicant up until 2007, in particular social therapy, which both experts K. and F. had considered as appropriate treatment for his condition, had been unsuccessful. Even though the applicant appeared not to refuse further therapy as a matter of principle, he was not currently undergoing any treatment. He had, in particular, opposed the prosecution’s request to the Regensburg Regional Court in 2010/2011 to transfer him to a psychiatric hospital under Article 67a §§ 2 and 1 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 67 below) in order to treat his condition in a different setting. He had further refused meetings aimed at establishing a new individualised therapeutic programme with reference to the pending court proceedings. 38. In an appeal on points of law against the Regional Court’s judgment of 3 August 2012, the applicant complained of the unlawfulness of his “retrospective” preventive detention and of the fact that the judgment had been delivered with the participation of a biased judge, P. 39. On 5 March 2013 the Federal Court of Justice dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law as ill-founded. 40. On 11 April 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court. He complained, in particular, that the “retrospective” order for his preventive detention had infringed the prohibition on retrospective penalties under the Constitution and Article 7 § 1 of the Convention. Furthermore, that order had failed to comply with his constitutional right to liberty, with the protection of legitimate expectations in a State governed by the rule of law and with Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. He further argued that his constitutional right to a tribunal established by law had been violated because Judge P. had been biased against him. 41. On 5 December 2013 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the applicant’s constitutional complaint without giving reasons (file no. 2 BvR 813/13). 42. The Regensburg Regional Court subsequently reviewed the necessity of the applicant’s preventive detention at regular intervals. It decided on 18 September 2014, 2 March 2016 and 6 April 2017 that the detention had to continue because the applicant’s mental disorder and consequent dangerousness persisted. Each of the court’s review decisions was based on a fresh report by a different psychiatric expert, all the experts consulted having diagnosed the applicant with sexual sadism. The applicant is currently still in preventive detention. 43. During the execution of his ten-year prison term (up until July 2008) the applicant was, in particular, detained in the social-therapeutic department for sexual offenders of Bayreuth Prison from 2001 to 2007, where he underwent social therapy. As the applicant failed to pursue the therapy with the requisite sincerity and motivation, the core issue of his deviant sexual fantasies could not be sufficiently addressed and the therapy was not completed successfully. In 2007 he was transferred to the social therapy for sexual offenders department of Straubing Prison, where a fresh attempt to treat him also failed owing to the applicant’s lack of motivation vis-à-vis the different therapies provided. 44. During the execution of his first preventive detention order, issued on 22 June 2009, the applicant had objected to the prosecution’s request to transfer him to a psychiatric hospital under Article 67a §§ 2 and 1 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 67 below) in order to consolidate further his rehabilitation by undergoing treatment in that hospital. Moreover, he had turned down proposals for a further therapeutic programme in Straubing Prison. 45. On 7 May 2011, following the quashing of the first preventive detention order and the new order for the applicant’s provisional preventive detention, he was transferred from the wing for persons in preventive detention in Straubing Prison to a wing for persons in detention on remand. As a consequence, the applicant lost the privileges reserved for persons in preventive detention. In particular, he was no longer able to undergo any kind of therapy. On 13 September 2011 he was transferred back to, and once again detained in, the preventive detention wing of Straubing Prison until 20 June 2013, where he was offered social therapy. He rejected the proposal. 46. Since 20 June 2013 the applicant has been detained in the newly built Straubing preventive detention centre. That institution, which is situated in a separated fenced-off compound on the premises of Straubing Prison and can house up to 84 detainees, has more staff than Straubing Prison, namely one psychiatrist, seven psychologists, one general practitioner, four nurses, seven social workers, one lawyer, one teacher, one prison inspector, forty-four general prison staff members and four administrative staff members, providing for the detainees. Inmates can stay outside their cells, which nowadays measure 15 m² (compared to some 10 m² previously) and now include a kitchen unit and a separate bathroom, between 6 a.m. and 10.30 p.m. 47. In the Straubing preventive detention centre, inmates are provided with individualised medical and therapeutic treatment by specialised staff in accordance with an individual treatment plan. The treatment options have been considerably increased as compared to those proposed under the previous preventive detention regime in Straubing Prison. The applicant initially refused all types of therapeutic provision at that centre, including one-to-one or group social therapy, participation in an intensive treatment programme for sexual offenders, and therapy administered by an external psychiatrist. He took up one-to-one psychotherapy only after the period covered by the proceedings here at issue, from 10 June 2015 until 30 June 2017, with a psychologist from the preventive detention centre.

5. By a court decision the applicant was under an obligation to provide financial support in the amount of a quarter of his income for his child, who was living separately. 6. In November 2006 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the State bailiffs service, claiming that they had erroneously determined his debt for child support in the amount of 75,083.05 hryvnias (UAH)[1] and that they had taken wrongful actions to ensure the collection of the debt. The applicant claimed, in particular, that the bailiffs had determined the debt on the basis of the gross earnings the applicant had received as a private entrepreneur, without deducting the expenses he had incurred in the course of those activities. The bailiffs objected to the claim and submitted that they had received the information about the applicant’s income from the tax authorities. 7. The court ordered an expert accounting report to determine the actual income of the applicant at the relevant time. 8. In June 2007 the expert provided the report, indicating that the applicant had submitted to the tax authorities the information about his gross earnings obtained in the course of his business activities. The expert further concluded that the applicant’s actual income was much lower than that determined by the bailiffs and that the debt for child support constituted UAH 1,650.90[2]. 9. On 9 November 2007 the Zhytomyr District Court, relying on the expert report, found that the bailiffs had wrongly determined the amount of child-support debt. 10. On 13 February 2008 the Zhytomyr Regional Court of Appeal quashed the above decision and dismissed the applicant’s claim as unfounded. The Court of Appeal considered that the first-instance court had needlessly ordered an expert accounting report which was based on the tax legislation, given that the amount of child support was not a matter of tax law. The Court of Appeal noted that the bailiffs had relied on the official data obtained from the authorities and had correctly determined the amount of debt by referring to the available information on the applicant’s income. The Court of Appeal then added that the applicant had not provided any evidence to disprove the amounts of income determined by the bailiffs. 11. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, arguing that the Court of Appeal had endorsed the bailiffs’ calculation without dealing with his objections based on the expert report. 12. On 9 July 2008 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law, stating in general terms that the Court of Appeal had taken a lawful and reasoned decision. 13. Ms Kobilyeva married her husband in 1984. Both the applicant and her husband worked at a rubber-production company. In 2000 the company provided the applicant’s husband with a flat in which all the family resided. In 2002 a flat ownership certificate was issued to the applicant’s husband. 14. In 2008 the applicant divorced her husband. In 2009 she instituted civil proceedings against her former husband, arguing that the flat was their common marital property and that she was entitled to half of the flat. 15. On 21 July 2009 the Bila Tserkva Town Court dismissed the claim as unsubstantiated, stating that the flat was the personal property of the former husband and not part of their marital property. The court had regard to the written evidence as well as oral statements of the company director, who had submitted that the company had provided the flat to the applicant’s former husband in order to reward him for his professional achievements. The court referred to Article 57 of the Family Code of 2002, which provided that rewards and awards for personal achievements of one of the spouses were part of his or her individual property and not the marital property of both spouses. 16. The applicant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the court had wrongly resolved the dispute on the basis of the Family Code of 2002, which had come into effect on 1 January 2004 and which could not apply retrospectively to the property regime in respect of the flat at issue. Under the Marriage and Family Code of 1969, which had been in force when her former husband had acquired the flat, the latter had been the common marital property of the spouses, and no exceptions were made for rewards or awards for personal achievements of one of the spouses. 17. On 27 October 2009 the Kyiv Regional Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal as unfounded, holding that she had failed to prove that the flat was the marital property of the former spouses and that she had made any contribution to the acquisition of the flat. The applicant then raised those arguments before the Supreme Court. On 16 February 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed as unfounded an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant. 18. The applicant’s husband worked at company O. from 1981 until his death on 3 July 2006. 19. On 20 December 1995 company O., the applicant’s husband and K., a construction company, concluded an agreement under which the applicant’s husband was to be provided with a three-room flat, no. 42, in a multi-storey building. Company O. financed the construction work. As a party to that agreement, the applicant’s husband was obliged to carry out internal repairs in the flat. On 26 July 1996 the administration of company O. and its trade union confirmed that the applicant’s husband and his family, which included two children, were entitled to flat no. 42 in the building which was under construction. 20. On 22 December 1998 company K., company O. and another company which was participating in the financing of the construction of the building, concluded another agreement specifying once again that the applicant’s husband would be provided with a three-room flat, no. 42. On the same date company O. issued a certificate stating that the applicant’s husband was the successor of company O. under the agreements of 20 December 1995 and 22 December 1998, given that company O. had been declared bankrupt and the construction work had not been completed. 21. In 2002 company K. made further arrangements and agreements aimed at raising funds for the completion of the building. In 2005 company K. transferred the flat at issue to another individual. 22. After the death of her husband, the applicant instituted civil proceedings against company O. and company K., seeking to oblige them to provide her with a flat analogous to the one specified in the contracts with her husband. On 12 April 2010 the Kirovskyy District Court of Kirovohrad dismissed the claim, finding that the applicant’s husband “had not been a party” to the agreements of 20 December 1995 and 22 December 1998 and that therefore the defendants could not be held liable for failing to comply with any contractual obligations. As to the alleged succession of rights by the applicant’s husband in accordance with the certificate of 22 December 1998, such allegations had not been based on law. 23. The applicant appealed, arguing that her husband had been expressly designated as a party to the agreement of December 1995. In any event, under the applicable law, contracts could be concluded for the benefit of a third party and such beneficiary was entitled to seek proper performance of the contract. Furthermore, company O. had assigned its rights to the flat to the applicant’s husband. Lastly, the applicant argued that the rights to the flat had been retained by her husband’s family after his death. 24. On 21 September 2010 the Kirovohrad Regional Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal, holding that the claim against company K. was groundless because it had been just a technical contractor and not a party responsible for the provision and distribution of flats; it had been the responsibility of company O. to provide the applicant’s husband with the flat. However, there was no evidence that company O. still existed as a legal entity or had any successors. Furthermore, the applicant herself had never been a party to the agreements with the defendants. 25. The applicant then raised those arguments before the Supreme Court. On 19 January 2011 the Supreme Court dismissed as unfounded an appeal on points of law. 26. The applicant’s grandmother worked in an agricultural collective farm and was entitled to a share in the plots of land allocated to that farm. According to the applicant, his grandmother had died without having actually been provided with the share of land. 27. The applicant instituted civil proceedings against the local authorities and the collective farm, claiming that, as his grandmother’s successor, he had to be provided with the share of land to which his grandmother had been entitled. He enclosed, among other things, official letters from the domestic authorities confirming to him that his grandmother had had the right to a share of land. 28. Following the applicant’s request, on 4 March 2010 the Obukhiv District Court ordered the local land resources department to submit to the court the land ownership documents given to the farm, including an official list of citizens who had been given the shares in the plots of land allocated to the farm. As the official list had not been provided, on 30 March 2010 the court requested it once again. Subsequently, the court sent a warning that administrative liability could be imposed for failure to submit the requested list of citizens. 29. On 25 may 2010 the Obukhiv District Court dismissed the applicant’s claim after finding that he had failed to substantiate it and to prove that his grandmother had not received any share of land. The court stated, in particular, that the applicant had failed to submit the official list of citizens who had been given shares in the plots of land allocated to the farm. The court noted that its attempt to obtain that evidence had not been successful. 30. The applicant appealed, arguing that (i) the fact that his grandmother had not received the share of land had been confirmed, in his opinion, by the official replies from the local authorities which he had submitted to the court; and (ii) he did not have access to the list of citizens mentioned by first-instance court. 31. On 4 November 2010 the Kyiv Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal, endorsing the first-instance court’s reasoning that by not providing the official list of citizens who had received the shares of land, the applicant had failed to prove that his grandmother had not received any such share. 32. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, arguing that he could not have access to the above-mentioned list and it was for the courts to take measures to obtain the list from the defendants. However, even in the absence of the list, there were official replies from the local authorities confirming, in his opinion, that his grandmother had not been allocated the share of land to which she had been entitled. 33. On 4 January 2011 the Higher Specialised Court for Civil and Criminal Matters dismissed the appeal on points of law, noting that the applicant had failed to present the above-mentioned list of citizens in support of his claim.

6. The applicants were born in 1955 and 1948 respectively. The first applicant died on 29 August 2018. The second applicant lives in St Petersburg. 7. The applicants were former spouses. They divorced in 1988, but continued to live together in the same apartment. 8. The applicants’ daughter, O., married K.O.V.-S., a national of Finland. The couple settled in Finland. 9. On 28 September 2006 O. gave birth to a daughter, M. 10. In May 2008 O. and M. moved in with the applicants in Russia. 11. On 3 April 2011 O. died of a serious illness. M. remained living with the applicants. 12. According to the Government, during O.’s illness the applicants’ relatives Mr and Ms Z. started to help the applicants with the upbringing of M.: they took the girl to their place of residence on weekends and holidays, and attended events in her kindergarten. 13. On 16 May 2011 the second applicant was appointed M.’s guardian with the written consent of the first applicant. 14. On 24 October 2012 the Kirovskiy District Court of St Petersburg granted the second applicant’s application and deprived K.O.V.-S. of his parental rights over M. 15. According to the Government, after the death of O., a protracted family dispute arose between the applicants. The first applicant was dissatisfied with the way the second applicant fulfilled his duties as M.’s guardian and insisted that their son, N.B., should take on those obligations. Furthermore, there was a disagreement as to whether M. should start school in September 2013. 16. When the question of M.’s schooling arose Mr and Ms Z. decided to apply to adopt the girl. The applicants at that stage supported their decision. 17. From February to April 2013 Mr and Ms Z. underwent training courses for individuals wishing to adopt a child left without parental care. 18. On 29 May and 13 June 2013 respectively the Kronverkskoye municipal entity issued positive decisions on Mr and Ms Z.’s suitability to become adoptive parents. 19. On 19 June 2013 the head of the Krasnenkaya Rechka municipal entity received a written statement from the second applicant to the effect that he did not object to the adoption of M. by Mr and Ms Z. 20. According to the Government, when the first applicant found out that the second applicant had agreed to the adoption of their granddaughter, she started to set the child against Mr and Ms Z. and to interfere with their communication. She further tried, in vain, to deprive the second applicant of his guardianship of M. and have N.B. appointed as the child’s guardian. 21. In connection with this situation, in the beginning of July 2013 Ms Z., with the consent of the second applicant, lodged an application seeking to be appointed as M.’s second guardian. 22. On 2 July 2013 the head of the Krasnenkaya Rechka municipal entity took a decision to appoint Ms Z. as M.’s second guardian. The child’s place of residence was determined as being with Ms Z. 23. On 4 July 2013 M. moved in with Mr and Ms Z. 24. From that moment on the first applicant began to lodge applications with the childcare authorities alleging that Ms Z. prevented her communicating with the child. 25. On 26 September 2013 a meeting was held between the parties on the subject of the first applicant’s and N.B.’s communication with the child with the participation of the Krasnenkaya Rechka municipal entity, the childcare authorities, the Children’s Rights Commissioner in St Petersburg, the prosecutor’s assistant of the district prosecutor’s office, an expert specialising in conflict resolution and a psychologist of the District Centre for Social Assistance to the Family and Children. An oral agreement was reached between Ms Z. and the first applicant to the effect that the latter’s meetings with the child were to take place on 5 October and 12 October 2013 for two hours in the presence of Ms Z. On 1 November 2013 Ms Z. and the first applicant were to come to the office of the Children’s Rights Commissioner for a debriefing on the meetings. 26. On 9 December 2013 the first applicant informed the childcare authorities that none of the meetings had taken place. 27. While the first applicant did not have any contact with the child after that, the second applicant continued communicating with M. until November 2014. Subsequently Mr and Ms Z. prevented the second applicant from staying in touch with M. 28. Meanwhile, on 13 November 2013 Mr and Ms Z. lodged an adoption application with the Primorskiy District Court of St Petersburg (“the District Court”). 29. On 25 November 2013 the second applicant submitted to the deputy head of the local administration of the municipal entity Krasnenkaya Rechka his agreement to M.’s adoption by Mr and Ms Z. He expressed his wish for the adoption case to be heard in his absence. 30. On 26 November 2013 the District Court granted the application by Mr and Ms Z. to adopt M. The judgment was not appealed against and became final on 7 December 2013. 31. In 2015 the applicants, acting separately, applied for restoration of the procedural time-limit for appeal against the adoption judgment of 26 November 2013 seeking to challenge it on account of, inter alia, their loss of post-adoption contact with their granddaughter, which ran contrary to the child’s interests. 32. On 11 February 2015 the second applicant applied to the District Court to have the procedural time-limit for lodging his appeal against the adoption judgment of 26 November 2013 restored. 33. On 16 March 2015 the District Court granted the second applicant’s application. 34. On 13 May 2015 the St Petersburg City Court (“the City Court”) upheld the judgment of 26 November 2013 on the second applicant’s appeal. The City Court dismissed the second applicant’s argument to the effect that the child’s close relatives had been unaware of the adoption proceedings. It noted that the second applicant had known about the proceedings, had not raised any objections to the adoption and had asked to have the case examined in his absence. The City Court further held that notification, let alone involvement in the proceedings, of the child’s other relatives (grandmother and uncle), was not required by law. As regards the second applicant’s argument to the effect that the child’s adoption had led to the termination of all contact between her and the grandparents, the City Court stated, relying on Article 67 §§ 1 and 2 of the Family Code, that the grandfather, grandmother, brothers, sisters and other relatives have a right to contact with the child and that in the event of a refusal by the child’s parents to afford them such contact, they are entitled to apply to a court to have the obstacles to their contact with the child eliminated. 35. On 21 August 2015 the City Court and on 22 December 2015 the Supreme Court of Russia (“the Supreme Court”), following a prior application for review of the final judgment, decided not to refer the case for review in the cassation procedure. 36. Meanwhile, on 28 May 2015 the first applicant applied to the District Court to have the procedural time-limit for lodging her appeal against the adoption judgment of 26 November 2013 restored. Relying on Article 137 of the Family Code she argued that by failing to involve her in the adoption proceedings the domestic court had ruptured her family ties with her granddaughter. 37. However, on 14 July 2015 the District Court dismissed her application. The District Court held that the first applicant had not been a party to the proceedings resulting in the judgment of 26 November 2013, that the above judgment had had no bearing on her rights and obligations, and therefore she had had no standing to appeal against it. The District Court further held that the first applicant misinterpreted Article 137 of the Family Code. It did not follow from the provisions of Article 137 that the first applicant’s family ties with her granddaughter would be ruptured. Relying of Article 67 of the Family Code, the District Court considered that it was open to the first applicant to apply to a court for the determination of her contact with the child. 38. On 10 September 2015 the City Court upheld the above decision on appeal. 39. On 11 December 2015 the City Court and on 29 January 2016 the Supreme Court decided not to refer the above decisions for review in the cassation procedure. 40. On 3 March 2014 the first applicant instituted court proceedings against Mr and Ms Z. seeking to oblige them not to thwart her contact with her granddaughter M. and to have determined the contact schedule with the latter. 41. On 18 April 2014 the administration of the municipal entity Krasnenkaya Rechka submitted that the girl needed a calm psychological atmosphere; that she perceived the situation around her as tense and anxious; and that she did not understand the conflict between the applicants themselves and between the first applicant and the girl’s adoptive parents. 42. On 16 October 2014 in her conversation with a psychologist M. submitted that the applicants “had never been friends”, that they often swore, even in her presence; and that she was not frightened when they swore because she was used to it. 43. On 21 January 2015 an expert of the Istina Independent Expert Organisation gave her opinion that the child considered and called Mr and Ms Z. her parents. She had close emotional bonds with them. Despite the absence of contact, the girl remembered and loved her grandmother. This was explained by the fact that the adoptive parents, although preventing their communication, were not exercising psychological pressure on the girl and were not denigrating the grandmother. The expert considered, however, that communication between the child and the grandmother could have a negative impact on the psychological state of the child, as there was an unsettled conflict between the applicants and the Z.s: the grandmother disapproved of the child’s adoption and was challenging its lawfulness. The expert further considered that the child’s residence with the grandparents would not be ideal, because, given the instability of interfamilial relations and the protracted conflict in the applicants’ family, there existed a risk of the child’s being involved in the adults’ conflict. However, since the girl retained the positive image of her grandmother and expressed her wish to communicate with her, it was possible to establish a contact arrangement, which would provide for an obligatory preparatory stage, including reconciliation between the relatives. 44. On 10 February 2015 the Pushkinskiy District Court of St Petersburg established, on the basis of the relevant reports and expert examinations, that M. still had a positive image of the first applicant and had expressed a wish to have contact with her, and that it was therefore possible to establish a contact schedule between them. The Pushkinskiy District Court therefore ordered Mr and Ms Z. not to place obstacles in the way of the first applicant’s communication with M. and held that contact between the first applicant and M. should take place as follows: during the first six months after the finalisation of the judgment – each second and fourth Sunday of the month from 3 p.m. to 6 p.m. outside the parents’ and the grandparents’ places of residence in the presence of the parents, and thereafter on the same conditions without the parents present. A year after the finalisation of the judgment the first applicant was able, in addition to the above arrangements, to spend two weeks with M. during the summer holidays with sixty days’ prior notice to the parents of the place of the planned holiday. Mr and Ms Z. appealed. 45. Following an appeal by Mr and Ms Z., on 17 September 2015 the City Court quashed the above judgment on appeal and discontinued the proceedings. The City Court held that the District Court had committed substantial violations of material and procedural law which resulted in wrongful conclusions. Relying on Articles 137 §§ 4 and 5 of the Family Code and clause 18 of the ruling of the Plenary of the Supreme Court no. 8 of 20 April 2006 (see paragraphs 54, 55 and 68 below), the City Court held that the first applicant had not applied for continued post-adoption contact with her granddaughter within the adoption proceedings, for which reason this issue had remained unexamined by [the District Court examining the adoption case] and no reference had been made in the adoption judgment regarding continuation of family ties between the first applicant and her granddaughter after her adoption. In such circumstances, the City Court considered that civil and family law did not enable the first applicant to claim the elimination of obstacles to her contact with the child and determination of the terms of such contact with the latter. 46. On 7 December 2015 the City Court and on 29 February 2016 the Supreme Court, following a prior application for review of the final judgment, decided not to refer the decision of 17 September 2015 for review in the cassation procedure. 47. On an unspecified date in 2015 the second applicant instituted court proceedings against Mr and Ms Z., seeking to oblige them not to thwart his contact with his granddaughter M. and to have the contact schedule with the latter determined pursuant to Article 67 of the Family Code. 48. On 1 December 2015 the District Court held that since the adoption judgment of 26 November 2013 did not contain an indication as to the continuation of family ties between the second applicant and his granddaughter after the adoption, the former did not have a right to claim the elimination of obstacles to contact with the child and determination of the terms of his contact with his granddaughter. Consequently, the District Court discontinued the proceedings. 49. On 2 March 2016 the City Court upheld the above decision on appeal.

5. The applicant was born in 1963 and currently lives in Alexandria (Egypt). 6. On 15 February 2010, while crossing the border between Serbia and Croatia with his wife, the applicant was caught by the Croatian customs authorities carrying the sum of 563,300 euros (EUR) which he had failed to declare, contrary to the law. The customs authorities immediately seized the EUR 560,000. 7. On the same day the customs authorities instituted administrative‑offence proceedings (prekršajni postupak) against the applicant before the Financial Inspectorate of the Ministry of Finance (Ministarstvo financija, Financijski inspektorat – “the Ministry”) for failing to declare EUR 560,000 – a sum exceeding EUR 10,000 – an administrative offence defined in section 40(1) of the Foreign Currency Act and section 74 of the Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism Act. 8. In his defence, the applicant explained that he and his wife had been visiting her daughter in Serbia who had recently had a serious attack of epilepsy, and submitted documentary evidence suggesting that his wife’s daughter did indeed suffer from epilepsy. The money he had been carrying originated from: (a) a company called SCI (société civile immobilière) M. registered in France, of which he was the director and the only member, from whose account he had withdrawn EUR 326,008.03 with a view to starting another business; and (b) the sale of their house in France (the remaining amount). The applicant submitted relevant documents as evidence of those transactions. He also explained that he had not wished to deposit the money in a bank account because, in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, he had been afraid that his bank would go bankrupt and that he would lose most of that money, given that the French State only guaranteed up to EUR 50,000 of bank deposits. 9. During the proceedings the Ministry requested information from the relevant authorities in Serbia, France and Italy. While the Italian authorities did not reply at all, the Serbian authorities informed the Ministry that neither the applicant nor his wife had been recorded in their register of suspicious transactions, and the French authorities only confirmed the authenticity of the transactions on which the applicant relied to prove the origin of the money he had been carrying. 10. By a decision of 9 July 2010 the Ministry found the applicant guilty of having committed the administrative offence in question and fined him 5,000 Croatian kunas (HRK). At the same time, the Ministry imposed a protective measure (zaštitna mjera) confiscating EUR 318,500 under section 69(2) of the Foreign Currency Act. 11. On the basis of the documentary evidence, the Ministry established that: (a) the company SCI M. had been founded in 2002 and recorded in the business and companies register in Strasbourg, and under French law its members were liable for its debts in proportion with their share in the company, that is, the applicant in respect of 99.75% and his wife in respect of 0.25%; (b) on 6 July 2009 the applicant had indeed sold his house in France, and EUR 243,091.82 from the proceeds of sale had been paid into his bank account on 29 July 2009, from which he had first transferred EUR 30,000 to his company’s account on the same day and then withdrawn EUR 211,500; and (c) on 21 December 2009 the applicant, acting as the company’s director, had sold its real estate, and EUR 326,008.03 from the proceeds of sale had been paid into the company’s bank account on 19 January 2010, a sum which had been withdrawn by the applicant the next day. 12. The Ministry held that the origin of the money which the applicant had failed to declare was irrelevant in relation to the commission of the offence of which he had been convicted or the imposition of the fine. However, that consideration was relevant in relation to the imposition of the protective measure of confiscation. 13. In particular, the Ministry decided not to confiscate EUR 241,500 of the money which the applicant had not declared, because it found that this sum did indeed originate from the sale of his house in France. 14. As regards the remaining EUR 318,500 (of the EUR 560,000 which had been seized), the Ministry held that this sum was part of the funds which the applicant had withdrawn from his company’s bank account (EUR 326,008.03) on 20 January 2010 (see paragraph 11 above). The Ministry further held that: (a) since there was no evidence that the applicant had borrowed that money from his company, by carrying it across border he had disposed of it as if it had belonged to him, which amounted to misappropriation of the company’s funds, an offence punishable in every country; and (b) he had failed to pay the relevant taxes in France on that amount. It therefore decided to confiscate that sum. 15. The applicant appealed by arguing that: (a) the evidence collected indicated that the French authorities had been aware of the transaction from which the confiscated sum originated, but had done nothing about it, which suggested that they considered that it originated from a legitimate source, (b) the Ministry correctly assumed that he had not borrowed the confiscated sum from his company, as he had actually lent EUR 358,600.81 to his company in 2008 and 2009, for which he had submitted documentary evidence; (c) under French law, he was fully liable for the debts of his company, the payment of which, including taxes, he therefore could not have avoided by misappropriating the company’s funds as the Ministry implied; (d) the Ministry had attempted to interpret foreign (French) law, and in such a complex area as tax and commercial law, about which it had known very little; and (e) it was peculiar that the Ministry had confiscated for the benefit of the Croatian State budget the amount on which he had, in the Ministry’s own view, not paid the relevant taxes in France. 16. By a decision of 17 September 2010 the High Court for Administrative Offences (Visoki prekršajni sud Republike Hrvatske) dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the Ministry’s decision, endorsing the reasons given therein. 17. The applicant then, on 17 December 2010, lodged a constitutional complaint, alleging, inter alia, a violation of his constitutionally protected right of ownership. 18. By a decision of 17 November 2011 the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) declared the applicant’s constitutional complaint inadmissible and served its decision on his representative on 2 December 2012. It found that, even though the applicant had relied on the relevant Articles of the Constitution in his constitutional complaint, he had not substantiated his complaint by any constitutional-law arguments, but had merely repeated the arguments raised in the proceedings before the Ministry and the High Court for Administrative Offences. Therefore, the Constitutional Court had been unable to examine the merits of his constitutional complaint. 19. The relevant domestic and international law and practice is summarised in the case of Boljević v. Croatia, no. 43492/11, §§ 16-21, 31 January 2017. 20. Under French law, a société civile immobilière (SCI) is a civil (non‑commercial) company constituted for the ownership and management of real estate (Articles 1845 to 1870-1 of the French Civil Code). It is a legal entity, meaning it has a legal personality distinct from that of its members. The members are, however, liable for the debts of the company without limitation, meaning that they may be liable in relation to their personal assets (Article 1857 of the French Civil Code).

5. The first applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Illertissen. The second applicant was born in 1989 and lives in Harburg. 6. On 9 December 2007 both applicants went to a football match in Munich. 7. The police had predicted an increased risk of clashes between rival football supporters owing to confrontations at previous matches between the two teams. Therefore a total of 227 police officers were deployed, including two squads – comprising eight to ten police officers each – of the 3rd platoon of the Munich riot control unit (Unterstützungskommando), one squad of the 2nd platoon of the Munich riot control unit and the 23rd platoon of the 6th Dachau public-order support force battalion (Bereitschaftspolizei). The deployed officers of the Munich riot control unit also included “video officers”, who carried handheld video cameras and recorded videos of incidents that might be relevant under criminal law. The officers of the Munich riot control unit were dressed in black/dark blue uniforms and wore black helmets with visors. The officers of the Dachau public-order support force battalion wore green uniforms and white helmets with visors. Both uniforms did not include any name tags or other signs identifying the individual officers. However, on the back of the helmets an identification number of the squad was displayed. 8. After the match had ended the police cordoned off the stands of the supporters of one of the teams, including both applicants, to prevent them from leaving the stadium and encountering supporters of the other team. The cordon was lifted after around fifteen minutes. 9. According to the first applicant, he left the stands after the blockade had been lifted. While walking between the exit of the stands and the exit of the football stadium a group of police officers dressed in black uniforms came running towards the exiting spectators with their truncheons raised above their heads. Some of these officers started hitting the spectators with their truncheons without any prior warning as soon as they reached them. The first applicant himself was hit with a truncheon on the head, which resulted in a bleeding laceration of 3 cm behind his ear. After having reached the exit of the stadium he was treated by a paramedic in an ambulance that was parked close to the ground. Subsequently, he returned to his home town, where he was treated in the emergency unit of the local hospital. 10. The second applicant also exited the stands after the blockade had been lifted. Before exiting the stadium he was grabbed by the shoulder and, after turning round, had pepper spray doused in the face at close range. He lay down on the ground and was subsequently struck on his left upper arm with a truncheon. He suffered swelling and redness of his face and pain in his arm. 11. Both applicants were able to identify their attackers as police officers, but were not able to distinguish them further, owing to their identical uniforms and the lack of identifying signs or name tags. 12. According to the Government the blockade was lifted due to the aggressive behaviour of some of the spectators and the pressure applied to the police cordon. When the supporters streamed from the stands towards the exit, they came upon police units which had been called in to provide backup for the police cordon. Subsequently some of the supporters continued their aggressive behaviour towards these officers and provoked them. The supporters’ conduct resulted in the arrest of one supporter and two police officers sustained minor injuries. After a few minutes the police pacified the situation and got the exiting supporters under control. 13. The Government furthermore challenged the accounts of the applicants and submitted that there was no credible evidence that the applicants had deliberately been hit or harmed by police officers and that the injuries had been a result of the police operation. 14. As of 15 December 2007 the press reported about the police operation in the aftermath of the football match, inter alia quoting football supporters describing arbitrary attacks by police officers of the riot control unit with truncheons and pepper-spray. In an article of 18 December 2007 a spokesperson of the police commented on the operation and stated that the alleged assaults by police officers would be investigated. On 2 January 2008, the Munich public prosecutor’s office instigated a preliminary investigation. On 21 January 2008 the second applicant reported the alleged police violence and submitted a medical certificate concerning the effects of the pepper spray on his face from the same day. He filed a formal criminal complaint on 7 March 2008. The first applicant filed a criminal complaint against an unidentified police officer on 25 April 2008. He also submitted a medical certificate confirming a bleeding laceration on his head. The certificate was issued at 12.05 a.m. on 10 December 2007. Several other spectators at the match had also lodged criminal complaints against unidentified police officers. 15. The investigation was conducted by the unit of the Munich police responsible for offences perpetrated by public officials under the responsibility of the Munich public prosecutor’s office. The officer in charge interviewed a total of twenty witnesses, including the applicants, the officer in charge of the Munich riot control unit and the squad leaders of the deployed squads of the 2nd and 3rd Munich riot control units. 16. The investigating division was also provided with a DVD showing excerpts of the video surveillance recorded by the riot control police at the football match. The DVDs were compiled by the “video officers” of the Munich riot control unit. In line with their usual procedure the entire recorded video material was reviewed by the respective video officer after his or her deployment and the parts which were deemed relevant under criminal law and of sufficient quality to serve as evidence were copied to a DVD. 17. On 10 September 2008 the competent public prosecutor discontinued the investigation. He found that the investigation had produced evidence that some of the police officers had used truncheons against spectators, including women and children, in a disproportionate way and without an official order or approval. However, he concluded that the investigation had not led to a situation where concrete acts of violence could be related to specific police officers and it could not be ascertained either whether the use of force had been justified. In sum, the public prosecutor had been able neither to establish whether the applicants’ injuries had been inflicted by police officers nor to identify the suspects who had allegedly struck and used pepper spray on the applicants. 18. The applicants appealed against the decision to discontinue the investigation and argued, in particular, that the public prosecutor had only questioned the squad leaders, but had not identified all the officers involved in the operation and deployed in the area of the stadium at issue. 19. On 14 October 2008 the public prosecutor reopened the investigation and ordered further enquiries. On 20 October 2008 the head of the investigation unit met with the platoon leaders of the Munich riot control unit and other division heads of the Munich police to discuss the investigation. Neither the public prosecutor nor the applicants’ representative attended the internal police meeting. Subsequently, a further twenty-two witnesses were interviewed including fourteen platoon leaders, squad leaders and video officers of the deployed police units. The individual squad members of the three squads of the Munich riot control unit were not interviewed. The applicants had requested that they be interviewed, as the evidence had suggested that the alleged perpetrators had belonged to one of these three squads. 20. The investigating police unit was also provided with video surveillance recorded by the 23rd platoon of the 6th Dachau public-order support force battalion. Upon the request of the applicants to secure the entire video material of the police operation, and not only the already submitted video excerpts, it was established that the original video tapes and possible digital copies had already been deleted and that only the excerpts were still available. 21. On 4 August 2009 the public prosecutor discontinued the investigation again. In a detailed fifteen-page decision he first summarised the investigative measures taken, referring in particular to the interviews of several witnesses, including police officers and the alleged victims, the review of video material from the police and from the internet, the assessment of the applicants’ written observations and of the submitted documents, inter alia, medical certificates, as well as gathered information and reports on past events and applicable guidelines. After assessing all the available evidence, the public prosecutor concluded that the enquiries had shown that several supporters had aggressively approached, insulted and provoked the deployed police officers and that therefore a situation had existed in which the officers could have been justified in using their truncheons. Besides this general conclusion he held that the applicants had neither been able to identify a particular suspect nor to determine whether the suspected police officers had been male or female and that the investigation had not produced other persons who had witnessed the alleged acts against the applicants. Furthermore, he outlined in detail certain “considerable discrepancies” in the witness statements of the first applicant and referred to “unspecific” statements of the second applicant. Consequently, according to the public prosecutor, there was insufficient evidence to establish criminal conduct by specific police officers to the detriment of both applicants. He concluded that the investigation had to be discontinued again, since the considerable additional investigative measures had not revealed disproportionate conduct on the part of individual police officers, in particular truncheon strikes against innocent bystanders, which would require criminal prosecution of the respective officers. 22. On 20 August 2009 the applicants appealed and pointed out that the members of the deployed squads had still not been questioned and that the inspected videos were fragmentary, but nonetheless contradicted certain parts of the statements made by the squad leaders. 23. On 3 February 2011 the Munich general public prosecutor confirmed the decision of the public prosecutor’s office of 4 August 2009 to discontinue the investigation. The instructions on available legal remedies attached to the decision informed the applicants that they could request a judicial decision in the framework of proceedings to force criminal proceedings (Klageerzwingungsverfahren). 24. On 19 September 2011 the Munich Court of Appeal declared the applicants’ application to force further enquiries inadmissible. The court interpreted the applicants’ request as an application to force criminal proceedings (Klageerzwingungsantrag) and held that these proceedings were only admissible if the prosecution of one or more identified accused had been requested. An application to force criminal proceedings against an unidentified accused had to be declared inadmissible, since the proceedings were not supposed to identify the accused or replace investigations. Only in a case where a public prosecutor’s office had entirely refrained from investigating a crime had a court the possibility to order an investigation. Under Article 173 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung – hereinafter “the CCP”; see paragraph 37 below) a court was only allowed to conduct minor enquiries to fill in remaining gaps in an investigation. Moreover, the applicants had not submitted specific facts or evidence that would have allowed the court to identify an accused. 25. On 25 October 2011 the applicants lodged a constitutional complaint, relying on Articles 2 § 2, 19 § 4 and 103 § 1 of the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) (see paragraphs 29-31 below). Besides referring to articles of the Basic Law, the applicants also referred in their complaint to Articles 2, 3, and 13 of the Convention. In essence they complained that the investigation had not been effective and that the Court of Appeal had not evaluated the effectiveness of the investigation. 26. On 23 March 2015 the Federal Constitutional Court (hereinafter “the Constitutional Court”) refused, in a reasoned decision (2 BvR 1304/12), to admit the applicants’ constitutional complaint. The court held that the investigations had been conducted diligently, but had not established sufficient suspicion of criminal conduct on the part of specific police officers. Moreover, the remaining gaps and factual uncertainties could not be attributed to omissions in the investigation. The court also found that it had not been necessary to question all the squad members who had possibly been involved. In its decision the Constitutional Court referred to the Court’s case-law concerning the procedural obligation of Article 2 of the Convention and, in particular, to the cases of McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom (27 September 1995, Series A no. 324) and Grams v. Germany ((dec.), no. 33677/96, ECHR 1999‑VII). The court also emphasised that the public prosecutor’s office had been the responsible authority for the investigation and thereby “master of the proceedings” (Herr des Verfahrens). 27. During the investigation the applicants also filed criminal complaints in respect of assistance given in an official capacity in avoiding prosecution or punishment (Strafvereitelung im Amt) and suppression of evidence (Beweismittelunterdrückung). The applicants alleged that several relevant parts of the video material, showing disproportionate police violence, had been deleted. The investigation against the five police officers was discontinued by the Munich public prosecutor’s office. 28. A subsequent appeal before the Munich general public prosecutor was to no avail.

7. The applicants were born in 1987 and 1985, respectively, and live in the Hozat district of Tunceli. 8. On 5 April 2007 the applicants attended a concert performed by a band called “Grup Yorum” in Hozat. During the concert they chanted certain slogans, such as “Revolutionary prisoners are immortal” (“Devrimci tutsaklar ölümsüzdür”), “Revolutionary prisoners are our honour” (“Devrimci tutsaklar onurumuzdur”). 9. On 17 October 2007 the Malatya public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Malatya Assize Court charging the applicants with disseminating propaganda in favour of the “DHKP/C” (Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front), an illegal armed organisation, under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713). The public prosecutor noted that the first applicant had chanted the slogan “Revolutionary prisoners are our honour” (“Devrimci tutsaklar onurumuzdur”) during the concert. As regards the second applicant, the public prosecutor alleged that he had chanted the following slogans during the same concert: “Mahir, Hüseyin, Ulaş; Fight until emancipation”[1] (“Mahir, Hüseyin, Ulaş; Kurtuluşa kadar savaş”); “Martyrs of the revolution are immortal” (“Devrim şehitleri ölümsüzdür”); “Revolutionary prisoners are our honour”, “Victory on mountains, emancipation at the front; long live victory, long live resistance” (“Dağlarda zafer, cephede kurtuluş; yaşasın zafer, yaşasın direniş”). 10. During the criminal proceedings against them, the applicants stated that they had attended the concert of 5 April 2007 and had sung along with the musicians but had not chanted the slogans noted in the indictment. 11. On 6 March 2008 the Malatya Assize Court convicted the applicants as charged and sentenced them to ten months’ imprisonment each. In its judgment, the assize court considered it established, on the basis of a police video recording of the concert of 5 April 2007, a report on the video recording, the indictment, the applicants’ defence submissions and the public prosecutor’s observations on the merits of the case, that the applicants had chanted the slogans noted in the indictment. The court considered that the concert in question had become a propaganda activity in favour of the DHKP/C and that the applicants had chanted slogans that were used by that organisation. The Malatya Assize Court concluded that the applicants had committed the offence of dissemination of propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation. 12. The applicants appealed. 13. On 4 July 2011 the Court of Cassation upheld the first-instance court’s judgment. 14. On 13 and 14 September 2011 the applicants were informed that they had to start serving their prison sentences within ten days. According to the applicants’ submissions, which were not contested by the Government, upon receipt of the summons to serve the prison sentences, both applicants duly served them.

4. The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Yerevan. 5. On 1 August 2002 the Government adopted Decree no. 1151-N, approving the expropriation of tracts of real estate situated within the administrative boundaries of the Kentron district of Yerevan, to be taken for State needs, with a total area of 345,000 sq. m. 6. It appears that the applicant ran a small kiosk on a plot of land situated within the area to be expropriated. It also appears that the authorities demolished this kiosk for the development of that area within the framework of Decree no. 1151-N. 7. On 10 October 2002, as compensation for the applicant’s kiosk, the Mayor of Yerevan adopted decision no. 1785-A, granting her the right to lease a plot of public land of 5 sq. m. at a specified address in the Kentron district of Yerevan for seven years and to construct and run her kiosk on this land. By the same decision, the Mayor authorised the local authority of Kentron district to conclude the lease agreement with the applicant. 8. On 17 December 2002 the applicant received planning permission for the plot of land specified in decision no. 1785-A. 9. On 26 December 2006 and 24 August 2007, following the applicant’s enquiries concerning the implementation of decision no. 1785-A, the Kentron district authorities suggested that the applicant address her enquiries to the Mayor of Yerevan, while on 1 May and 6 September 2007 the latter suggested that the applicant address her enquiries to the Kentron district authorities. 10. On 26 February 2008 the applicant initiated proceedings in the Administrative Court against the Mayor and Kentron district, seeking to implement decision no. 1785-A. 11. On 30 July 2008 the Administrative Court granted the applicant’s claim and obliged the Mayor of Yerevan to conclude the agreement specified in decision no. 1785-A with the applicant. No appeals were lodged and this judgment became final on 30 August 2008. 12. On 9 September 2008 the Administrative Court issued a writ of execution for the judgment of 30 July 2008. 13. On 24 September 2008 the Department for the Enforcement of Judicial Acts (“the DEJA”) instituted enforcement proceedings against the city of Yerevan, obliging it to conclude the land-lease agreement with the applicant within ten days. 14. On 17 June 2009 the Mayor’s office offered the applicant a possibility to start negotiations. However, by her letter of 30 June 2009 the applicant refused to negotiate with the Mayor’s office. 15. On 2 March, 23 April, 3 and 31 July, 23 November, 23 December 2009, 17 and 18 March and 7 April 2010, upon the applicant’s enquiries concerning the enforcement of the judgment of 30 July 2008, bailiffs informed the applicant that the enforcement of the judgment of 30 July 2008 was in progress and that she would be informed of the results. 16. On 16 June 2010 the applicant initiated proceedings in the Administrative Court against the DEJA, requesting that the court oblige it to enforce the judgment of 30 July 2008. 17. On 22 June 2010 the Administrative Court declared the applicant’s claim inadmissible on the grounds that she lacked standing. The Administrative Court reasoned that the applicant had failed to show that her rights had been breached as a result of an administrative action by the DEJA. The Administrative Court noted that the DEJA had taken certain actions in order to enforce the judgment of 30 July 2008 and that the enforcement procedure was still pending. The decision of the Administrative Court of 22 June 2010 was upheld in the final instance by the Court of Cassation on 25 August 2010. 18. On 21 October and 4 November 2010, following an enquiry by the applicant, the bailiff responded that the enforcement was in progress and that the applicant would be informed of the results. 19. On 24 January 2011, pursuant to the applicant’s enquiries concerning the implementation of decision no. 1785-A, the Mayor of Yerevan informed her of the changes in legislation concerning land and reminded the applicant that she had to conclude the land-lease agreement with Kentron district. 20. On 3 May 2011 the Mayor’s office offered the applicant three different plots of land acceptable in terms of urban planning. However, by a letter sent to the Mayor’s office, she refused to accept any of the plots. 21. On 4 August 2011, relying on section 41(1)(8) of the Enforcement of Judicial Acts Act, the DEJA decided to discontinue the proceedings on the grounds that enforcement of the judgment of 30 July 2008 had become impossible. It reasoned that, by a letter of 17 June 2009 addressed to the applicant, the Mayor of Yerevan had suggested that the applicant approach the department of management of immovable property of the Yerevan Mayor’s office for the implementation of the judgment of 30 July 2008, but the applicant had failed to do so. 22. On 27 February 2012 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Administrative Court against the DEJA, seeking to declare the decision of 4 August 2011 null and void, as well as to oblige the DEJA to enforce the judgment of 30 July 2008. 23. On 15 February 2013 the Administrative Court rejected the applicant’s first claim, reasoning that there were not sufficient grounds for declaring the DEJA’s decision of 4 August 2011 null and void. It refused to examine the applicant’s second claim. 24. On 14 May 2012 the applicant initiated proceedings in the Administrative Court against the DEJA, seeking to oblige it to enforce the judgment of 30 July 2008. 25. On 12 June 2013 the Administrative Court terminated the proceedings on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction. This decision was upheld in the final instance by the Court of Cassation on 18 December 2013. 26. On 18 July 2013 the applicant initiated proceedings in the Administrative Court seeking, inter alia, that the DEJA reopen the proceedings discontinued on 4 August 2011. On 4 December 2013 the Administrative Court rejected the applicant’s claim, reasoning that, for the proceedings which had been discontinued on the grounds of impossibility, there were no legal grounds for reopening. 27. On 3 March 2014 the applicant initiated proceedings in the Administrative Court against the DEJA, seeking that the decision of the DEJA of 10 February 2014 refusing to initiate new proceedings be declared invalid, and that the DEJA be obliged to initiate new proceedings. 28. On 28 September 2016 the Administrative Court granted the applicant’s first claim, declaring the decision of the DEJA of 10 February 2014 invalid. As to the applicant’s second claim, the Administrative Court terminated the proceedings in that regard on the basis of the lack of jurisdiction. 29. The proceedings concerning the judgment of 28 September 2016 are pending before the Administrative Court of Appeal.

5. The applicants are Russian nationals who at the material time lived in the Chechen Republic and the Republic of Ingushetia, a region neighbouring Chechnya. They are close relatives of individuals who disappeared in these regions in 2000-05 after allegedly having been unlawfully detained by service personnel. In each of the applications the events took place in the areas under full control of the Russian federal forces. The applicants had no news of their missing relatives thereafter. 6. In each of the cases the applicants complained in respect of the abduction to law-enforcement bodies and official investigations were instituted. In every case the proceedings, after being suspended and resumed on several occasions, have been pending for several years without attaining any tangible results. It follows from the documents submitted that no active investigative steps have been taken by the authorities other than forwarding formal information requests to their counterparts in various regions of Chechnya and the North Caucasus. Following such requests, the authorities generally reported that service personnel’s involvement in the abduction had not been established and that no special operations had been ongoing at the relevant time. The applicants also lodged requests for information and assistance in the search of their missing relatives to various authorities but received only formulaic responses, if any. The perpetrators have never been established by the investigating bodies. It appears that all of the investigations are still pending. 7. Summaries of the facts in respect of each application are set out below. Each account of events is based on statements provided by the applicants and their relatives and/or neighbours to the Court and the domestic investigating authorities. The Government did not dispute the principal facts of the cases as presented by the applicants, but contested the involvement of service personnel in these events. 8. The first applicant is the mother of Mr Suliman (also spelled as Suleyman) Isayev, who was born in 1966, Mr Rumid Isayev, who was born in 1969, and Mr Ramzan Isayev, who was born in 1973. The second applicant is the wife of Mr Suliman Isayev and the third applicant is the wife of Mr Ramzan Isayev. 9. On 7 April 2001 Mr Rumid Isayev went to the village of Lermontovo in Chechnya to visit his relatives. At about 8 p.m. he was detained by Russian service personnel at the checkpoint on the road between the villages of Kulary and Lermontovo. 10. The whereabouts of Mr Rumid Isayev remain unknown ever since. 11. Immediately after the disappearance the first applicant informed the authorities thereof and requested assistance in the search for Mr Rumid Isayev. 12. On 10 June 2001 the Grozny district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 19079 under Article 127 of the Criminal Code (unlawful deprivation of liberty). 13. On 10 August 2001 the investigation in the case was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 14. On 7 April 2008 the first applicant was granted victim status in the case. 15. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 16. During her questioning as a victim in the proceedings concerning the abduction of Mr Suliman Isayev and Mr Ramzan Isayev, the first applicant also described the circumstances of the disappearance of Mr Rumid Isayev (see paragraphs 26, 40 and 42 below). 17. At the material time, Mr Suliman Isayev and Mr Ramzan Isayev lived with their families in the village of Kulary, Chechnya. The two families occupied neighbouring houses at nos. 66 and 68 Pervomayskaya Street. 18. On 5 October 2003 the presidential elections were due to take place in the Chechen Republic. Enhanced security measures were taken on account of this event; the village of Kulary was patrolled by armed service personnel. 19. At about 6 a.m. on 4 October 2003 a group of around twenty armed men wearing camouflage uniforms and balaclavas arrived in a UAZ-469 vehicle (таблетка) and three VAZ vehicles without registration numbers. The service personnel, who spoke unaccented Russian, broke into the applicants’ houses and searched the premises. At some point they fired a gun. Then they forced Mr Suliman Isayev and Mr Ramzan Isayev into one of the vehicles and drove away with them in the direction of the Baku to Rostov-on-Don highway. The vehicles passed the roadblock unhindered. The abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses, including the applicants’ neighbours. 20. Immediately after the abduction the applicants complained to the head of the Federal Migration Service’s Office in Kulary, Mr I., about the abduction of their relatives. Mr I. informed them that Mr Suliman Isayev and Mr Ramzan Isayev were detained in the building of the Urus-Martan District police station. 21. The whereabouts of Mr Suliman Isayev and Mr Ramzan Isayev remain unknown ever since. 22. On 4 October 2003 the applicants informed the authorities of the abduction and requested that a criminal investigation be opened into the incident. 23. On 4 October 2003 the investigators from the Grozny district prosecutor’s office examined the crime scene and found a bullet casing. 24. On 3 November 2003 the Grozny district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 42190 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code (abduction). 25. On the same date the second and the third applicants were granted victim status and questioned. They gave a detailed account of the circumstances of the abduction of their husbands, similar to that before the Court. 26. On 28 November 2003 the first applicant was granted victim status and questioned. She confirmed the circumstances of the abduction of her three sons as described above. 27. The investigators sent several requests for information to the law‑enforcement authorities. The responses contained statements that no information about Mr Suliman Isayev and Mr Ramzan Isayev was available. 28. On 1 December 2003 the investigators questioned the first applicant’s eldest son, Mr Kh.I. He stated that on 10 October 2003 he had gone together with Mr I. to the police station. Only Mr I. had been allowed to enter it. Mr. I. had informed him that his brothers had been detained there and that they would be transferred to the village of Tolstoy-Yurt the next day. Mr Kh.I. also told the investigators that the ex-wife of his disappeared brother Mr Rumid Isayev, Ms. G., had complained to the law-enforcement authorities of the alleged involvement of his brothers in the abduction of people. According to him, she had sought revenge against his family because they had asked her to leave after the disappearance of Mr Rumid Isayev. 29. On 3 December 2003 the investigators questioned Mr I. He confirmed that he had learnt about the detention of Mr Suliman Isayev and Mr Ramzan Isayev in the police station from a police officer. When he had visited it on 10 October 2003 together with Mr Kh.I., he had been informed that Isayev brothers had not been detained there. Then Mr. I. and Mr. Kh.I. had visited the premises of the 6th division of the Anti-Organised Crime Department (Региональное управление по борьбе с организованной преступностью – hereinafter “the RUBOP”) in Urus-Martan but the Isayev brothers had not been detained there either. Mr I. denied that he had had any information about where the Isayev brothers had been detained. 30. On 20 December 2003 the investigators ordered a ballistic expert examination of the bullet casing found at the crime scene. 31. The ballistic expert examination established that the casing had been part of the cartridge of a bullet for a Kalashnikov machine gun of 5.45 mm calibre. 32. On 18 January 2004, during a confrontation with Mr Kh.I., Mr. I. repeated his previous statements. 33. On 3 February 2004 the investigation was suspended. The applicants were informed thereof. 34. On 6 April 2006 the first applicant lodged a request with the prosecutor of the Chechen Republic asking for the search of her sons to be intensified. In reply the Grozny district prosecutor’s office informed her that the operational search activities aimed at establishing her sons’ whereabouts were in progress. 35. On numerous occasions between 2004 and 2006 the first applicant complained to high-ranking officials of the Chechen Republic in respect of the disappearance of her sons and requested assistance in the search for them. 36. On 8 May 2007 the NGO Memorial, acting on the first applicant’s behalf, asked the Grozny district prosecutor’s office for information about any progress in the investigation. 37. On 17 May 2007 the Grozny district prosecutor’s office informed the first applicant and the NGO Memorial that the investigation had been suspended and that the operational search activities were in progress in order to establish the whereabouts of Mr Suliman Isayev and Mr Ramzan Isayev. 38. On 26 December 2007 the investigation was resumed. The applicants were informed thereof. 39. In January 2008 the investigators questioned several witnesses who knew about the circumstances of the abduction of the Isayev brothers from others. 40. On 27 January 2008 the first applicant was questioned again. She confirmed that she suspected Ms. G. of organising the abduction of her sons. 41. On 27 January 2008 the investigation was suspended. The applicants were informed thereof. 42. On 20 March 2008 the investigation was resumed. The investigators questioned the first applicant with the participation of the interpreter. She additionally stated that four days after the abduction together with Mr. Kh.I. she had visited the 6th division of the RUBOP in Urus-Martan where they had learnt that her sons had been detained in that division. The first applicant had also reiterated the circumstances of the abduction of her son Mr Rumid Isayev. 43. On 24 March and 18 April 2008 the investigators questioned Ms G., who denied that she had complained to the law-enforcement authorities about the alleged involvement of the Isayev brothers into the abduction of people. 44. On 31 March 2008 the Grozy District Court ordered the phone tapping of two mobile numbers belonging to Ms G. 45. On 8 April 2008 the Zavodskoy District police station in Grozny informed the investigators that no complaints concerning the alleged involvement of the Isayev brothers into the abduction of people lodged by Ms. G. were registered in the station’s logbooks. 46. On 20 April 2008 the investigation was suspended. The first applicant was informed thereof. 47. On 14 March 2013 the second applicant asked the investigators’ permission to make copies of the criminal case file. In reply the investigators informed her that copying of the case-file material was impossible owing to the need to keep the investigation secret. The second applicant was allowed however to familiarise herself with the case file. 48. On 27 March 2013 the second and the third applicants asked the investigators give them copies of the case-file documents that they were entitled to have. 49. On 22 April 2013 the second and the third applicants familiarised themselves with the criminal case file. The next day they asked to resume the proceedings and take additional steps to establish their husbands’ whereabouts. 50. On 6 May 2013 the investigation was resumed; it was suspended on 11 May 2013. 51. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 52. On 30 January 2008 the first applicant complained of the inaction on the part of the investigators’ to the Grozny District Court. On 22 February 2008 the court rejected her complaint as unsubstantiated having found that all the necessary steps had been taken by the authorities. On 19 March 2008 the applicant appealed against that decision. The outcome of the appeal is unknown. 53. The applicant is the wife of Mr Sergey Vasilkov, who was born in 1953. 54. In January 2000 the Russian federal forces conducted an extensive military operation against members of illegal armed groups (незаконные вооруженные формирования) in Grozny. The town was subjected to shellings and sweep operations. By the end of January 2000 the central parts of the city were under the Russian forces’ control (see Umayeva v. Russia, no. 1200/03, § 79, 4 December 2008, and Khashiyev and Akayeva v. Russia, nos. 57942/00 and 57945/00, §§ 16 and 41, 24 February 2005). 55. At about 11 a.m. on 17 January 2000 a group of armed service personnel, wearing camouflage uniforms and equipped with portable radio sets, arrived in a Ural lorry at the applicant’s house at number 16 1st Poltavskaya Street in Grozny. They were of Slavic appearance and spoke unaccented Russian. The service personnel detained Mr Sergey Vasilkov for the purposes of an identity check, put him in the lorry and drove off to an unknown destination. Three other people, the applicant’s relative Mr. G., as well as Mr S.Ch. and Mr A.D. were also detained and taken away together with the applicant’s husband. The abductions took place in the course of the sweep operation in the Karpinskiy Kurgan settlement of Grozny. 56. The whereabouts of Mr Sergey Vasilkov remain unknown. 57. On 21 March 2001 the applicant informed the authorities of the abduction of her husband. On the same day she was interviewed by a police officer. She confirmed the circumstances of the abduction as described above and stated that five days later she had seen in the street one of the service personnel who had participated in her husband’s abduction. In her opinion, the abductors were from a special division of a military unit. 58. On 25 March 2001 the same police officer interviewed the applicant’s niece, Ms S. who confirmed the applicant’s statements. 59. On 15 April 2001 the Grozny prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 13064 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code into the abduction of Mr Sergey Vasilkov and Mr G. 60. On 15 June 2001 the investigation was suspended. 61. On 27 June 2001 the applicant complained to the Zavodskoy District police station about the abduction of her husband and requested assistance in the search for him. 62. On 11 July 2001 the Grozny prosecutor’s office opened a new criminal case no. 13103 into the abduction of Mr Sergey Vasilkov. 63. On 17 July 2001 Ms S. was questioned. She confirmed the circumstances of the abduction of Mr S.Ch. and Mr A.D. which she had eyewitnessed. Referring to the service personnel, she stated that Mr S.Ch. and Mr A.D. had been taken for an identity check to the checkpoint at Karpinskiy Kurgan and that they would have been released in one day. 64. On an unspecified date the applicant was questioned. 65. On 11 September 2001 the investigation in the case no. 13103 was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. It appears that the applicant was not informed of this decision. 66. On 6 November 2003 the investigation was resumed and cases nos. 13064, 13103 and 12284 (opened into the abduction of Mr S.Ch. and Mr A.D.) were joined under the joint number 12284. 67. On 3 December 2003 the applicant was granted victim status. 68. On 9 December 2003 the investigators examined the crime scene. 69. On 6 January 2004 the investigation was suspended. The applicant was informed thereof. 70. On 26 January 2005 the investigation was resumed. 71. On 10 February 2005 the investigators questioned Mr U. who stated that Mr S.Ch. had allegedly been found half a year after his abduction in a prison in Volgograd. However, he had never returned home. 72. The investigation was subsequently suspended on 27 February 2005, then resumed on 1 December 2009, suspended again on 31 December 2009 and resumed on 8 July 2011, then suspended on 13 July 2011 and resumed on 25 December 2012. 73. On 25 January 2013 the applicant was questioned again. 74. On 4 February 2013 the investigators questioned Ms N.S. who confirmed the circumstances of the abduction of the four men as described above. 75. On 5 February 2013 the investigation was suspended. 76. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 77. On 25 November 2009 the applicant challenged the investigators’ decision to suspend the investigation of 27 February 2005 before the Zavodskoy District Court of Grozny. On 2 December 2009 the court terminated the proceedings having found that the investigation had been resumed the day before. 78. On 27 July 2009 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow dismissed the applicant’s claim for non-pecuniary damage caused by the abduction of her husband by State service personnel because their involvement in this incident had not been proven. 79. The applicant is the wife of Mr Vakha Dadakhayev, who was born in 1979. 80. At 6 a.m. on 2 April 2005 a group of seven or eight armed men in camouflage uniforms and black bulletproof vests broke into the applicant’s house at 26 Gvardeyskaya Street in Gekhi. They were of Slavic and Chechen appearance and spoke Russian and Chechen. The men were equipped with portable radio sets. One of them grabbed the applicant by the throat and threatened to kill her if she moved. The others forced Mr Vakha Dadakhayev outside, saying that they were taking him for interrogation to the Urus-Martan District police station. After the intruders left, the applicant went outside and saw several cars without registration numbers parked near the house: one khaki UAZ minivan and three VAZ-2115 and VAZ-2107 vehicles. The applicant opened the door of one of VAZ-2107 cars and saw her husband on the back seat with three men. When she asked where they were taking him, the men replied that they were going to the police station. Then they drove off towards the checkpoint in Gekhi, which was situated on the road to Urus‑Martan. 81. One of the applicant’s neighbours, Mr A.-Kh. B., followed the convoy and saw that there were two armoured personnel carriers (APCs) parked in Gagarin Street, where the convoy with Mr Vakha Dadakhayev passed through. 82. On 6 April 2005 the body of Mr Vakha Dadakhayev, with numerous bruises and thermal injuries, was found on the outskirts of Gekhi near the Baku – Rostov-on-Don highway. 83. On 2 April 2005 the applicant complained to the police about the abduction of her husband and requested assistance in the search for him. The investigators interviewed her and examined the crime scene. 84. On 7 April 2005 the Grozny district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 44024 under Article 105 of the Criminal Code (murder), after the discovery of the body of Mr Vakha Dadakhayev. 85. On 10 April 2005 the investigators ordered a forensic medical examination of the corpse. 86. The forensic medical examination established that death of Mr Vakha Dadakhayev could have been caused by multiple rib fractures accompanied by injury of internal organs. 87. On unidentified dates in April-May 2005 the investigators questioned the applicant and her relatives who confirmed the circumstances of the abduction as described above. 88. On 1 June 2005 the applicant was granted victim status and questioned. 89. On 7 August 2005 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicant was not informed of this decision. 90. According to the applicant, between 2005 and 2010 she applied to various law-enforcement authorities in person and requested information on the progress in the investigation. In reply she was told that the investigation was pending. 91. On 29 March 2010 the applicant applied to the Grozny district investigative committee for access to the criminal case file. 92. On 23 August 2010 her request was granted by the investigators and the applicant copied the entire case file. 93. On 3 February 2011 the investigation was resumed. The applicant was informed thereof. 94. The investigators sent several requests for information to the law‑enforcement authorities. The responses contained statements that no information about Mr Vakha Dadakhayev was available and that no security operations in his respect had been carried out. 95. On 10 February 2011 the applicant was allowed to read the forensic medical examination report. On the same date she was questioned again. 96. On 14 February 2011 the investigators questioned Ms S.D, a relative of Mr Vakha Dadakhayev, who lived in the same street as the applicant at the time. She stated that after the abduction she had seen traces left by military footwear in her courtyard. 97. On 17 February 2011 the investigators questioned Ms A., the applicant’s neighbour, who confirmed having heard the cars leaving the applicant’s house after the abduction. Then she had entered the house and had noticed the traces left by military footwear on the floor. 98. On 3 March 2011 the investigation was suspended and then resumed on 21 June 2011. The applicant was informed thereof. 99. On 24 June 2011 the investigation was suspended; it was resumed again on 19 December 2011 and then suspended on the next day. 100. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 101. On 26 January 2011 the applicant complained to the Grozny District Court in Chechnya of the investigators’ inaction and pointed out numerous defects of the investigation. On 4 February 2011 the District Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint as the investigators had already resumed the investigation a day before. On 22 February 2011 the applicant appealed against this decision. 102. On an unspecified date the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic quashed the decision of 4 February 2011 and remitted the case for fresh examination to the same court. On 25 April 2011 the Groznenskiy District Court granted the applicant’s complaint and found that the decision of 3 March 2011 suspending the investigation was premature. The court obliged the investigators to resume the proceedings and to take investigative steps aimed at identifying the perpetrators. 103. The first applicant is the wife of Mr Musa Bamatgiriyev, who was born in 1954. The second and the third applicants are his children. 104. At the material time Mr Musa Bamatgiriyev and his family lived at Tridtsatiy Uchastok Street in the Oktyabrskiy district of Grozny. A special anti-terrorist unit of the Chechnya Ministry of the Interior was located nearby. 105. On 15 November 2004 Mr Musa Bamatgiriyev’s brother was abducted by service personnel. During the night after his abduction a group of armed service personnel in masks broke into the applicants’ home and searched the premises. Having found that Mr Musa Bamatgiriyev was not at home, they left. 106. At about 7 p.m. on 15 March 2005 Mr Musa Bamatgiriyev left home to visit his neighbour, who lived in a nearby building, when a group of armed men in black camouflage uniforms seized him on the street, forced him into a “Zhiguli” car without registration numbers and drove off in the direction of Grozny city centre, passing without restriction through checkpoints on the way. 107. According to the applicants, Mr Kh.M., who was allegedly an agent of a law-enforcement agency, participated in the abduction. The applicants provided this information to the investigators. 108. On 23 July 2005 a relative of the applicants, Ms T.N., received a telephone call from an unidentified person who offered information about Mr Bamatgiriyev’s whereabouts in exchange for 5,000 United States dollars (USD). According to the applicants, the caller’s telephone number belonged to the office of the Shali District police station in Chechnya. The applicants also gave that information to the investigators. 109. In October 2006 two men arrived at the first applicant’s house and told her that Mr Bamatgiriyev had been abducted by law-enforcement agents. The men suggested that she pay them USD 10,000 for information concerning his whereabouts. They visited the first applicant at least three times afterwards and promised to give information in exchange for money. One of the men also told the applicant that Mr Kh.M. had known about the abduction of her husband beforehand. The first applicant subsequently informed the investigators about these developments. 110. The whereabouts of Mr Musa Bamatgiriyev have remained unknown ever since. 111. After the abduction of Mr Musa Bamatgiriyev, Ms Z.I. informed the authorities thereof and requested assistance in the search for him. On 30 May 2005 the first applicant complained about the authorities’ inaction to the President of Chechen Republic. 112. On 9 August 2005 the Oktyabrskiy district prosecutor’s office in Grozny opened criminal case no. 42095 under Article 105 of the Criminal Code (murder). 113. On 19 August 2005 the first applicant was granted victim status and questioned. 114. The investigators also questioned several witnesses who stated that on the day of the abduction a VAZ-21099 vehicle with people in camouflage uniforms inside had been parked all day near Mr Musa Bamatgiriyev’s house. 115. On 9 November 2005 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. On 18 December 2005 it was resumed, then suspended again on 18 January 2006 and resumed on 30 April 2007. 116. On several occasions the prosecutor of the Oktyabrskiy district of Grozny ordered the investigators to identify and question the eyewitnesses of Mr Musa Bamatgiriyev’s abduction. It appears that the investigators failed to follow this order. 117. On 7 June 2007 the investigators questioned Mr Kh.M. who stated that he had been in the Kostroma Region when Mr Musa Bamatgiriyev had been abducted. He also stated that he had heard about the membership of Mr Musa Bamatgiriyev in illegal armed groups. 118. On 30 June 2007 the investigation was suspended. It was subsequently resumed on 23 August 2007, suspended on 23 September 2007, then resumed on 30 October 2007 and suspended on 1 December 2007, resumed again on 11 March 2008 and suspended on 11 April 2008, resumed on 18 June 2008 and then suspended on 18 July 2008. 119. On 22 September 2008 the deputy prosecutor of the Oktyabrskiy District of Grozny pointed out several defects of the investigation and ordered that the investigators took remedial measures. Subsequently, on 30 September 2008 the investigation was resumed, then suspended again on 6 November 2008 and resumed on 15 December 2010, then suspended on 30 December 2010. 120. On 5 March 2012 the investigation was resumed following the supervisor’s criticism. Subsequently it was suspended on 10 April 2012, resumed on 1 July 2013 and suspended on 8 July 2013, then resumed on 31 July 2014 and suspended on 24 August 2014, resumed again on 28 September 2014 and suspended on 2 November 2014. 121. On numerous occasions between 2005 and 2013 the first applicant complained to various law-enforcement authorities about the abduction and requested assistance in the search for her husband. She consistently insisted on the involvement of Mr Kh.M. in the abduction. In reply she received letters stating that operational search activities were in progress to establish Mr Musa Bamatgiriyev’s whereabouts. 122. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 123. On 12 June 2008 the first applicant challenged the investigators’ decision to suspend the investigation and their failure to take basic investigative steps before the Zavodskoy District Court of Grozny. On 19 June 2008 the court dismissed her complaint having found that the investigators had already resumed the proceedings. On 4 February 2009 the Chechnya Supreme Court upheld this decision on appeal. 124. On 14 September 2010 the first applicant lodged another complaint with the Zavodskoy District Court challenging the investigators’ inaction. On 11 October 2010 the court allowed her complaint and ordered that the investigation be resumed. 125. The applicants are the relatives of Mr Sayd-Khuseyn (also spelled Said Khuseyn) Tembulatov, who was born in 1972. The first applicant is his mother, the second applicant is his brother and the third applicant is his sister. 126. According to the applicants, on 2 April 2001 the Russian military forces in Chechnya conducted a special sweep operation in Argun and cordoned off certain town districts with military vehicles. 127. At around 7.30 p.m. that day a group of about twenty armed men wearing camouflage uniforms and balaclavas arrived in two APCs with identification numbers “A 631” and “813” at the first applicant’s house at 12 Solnechnaya Street in Argun. The men, who spoke unaccented Russian, broke into the house and searched the premises. Having seized Mr Sayd‑Khuseyn Tembulatov’s passport, the servicemen forced him into one of the APCs and drove off to the outskirts of Argun where they joined a larger group of servicemen and then left in the direction of Khankala. The abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses, including the first applicant and the neighbours. 128. On the same day a resident of the neighbouring house at 8 Solnechnaya Street in Argun, Mr T.A., was abducted under similar circumstances. 129. After the abduction the applicants complained to the Argun military commander’s office, where they were informed that Mr Sayd-Khuseyn Tembulatov had been detained by “a special group from Khankala” which had not coordinated its operation with the local commander. 130. On 31 May 2001 the local radio station Chechnya Svobodnaya broadcast an interview with an officer of the Federal Security Service (“the FSB”) named “Vadim”. He stated that Mr Sayd Khuseyn Tembulatov and Mr T.A. had been detained among other members of illegal armed groups by the FSB. 131. The whereabouts of Mr Sayd-Khuseyn Tembulatov have remained unknown since. 132. On 3 April 2001 the first applicant together with the mother of Mr T.A. complained to the head of Argun Administration about the abduction of their sons and requested assistance in the search for them. 133. On 4 April 2001 Mr Kh.T., the father of Mr Sayd-Khuseyn Tembulatov, complained to the Argun inter-district prosecutors’ office in respect of the abduction of his son and asked that a criminal case be opened into the incident. 134. On 11 April 2001 the first applicant was interviewed by a police officer. She confirmed the circumstances of the abduction as described above. 135. On 13 April 2001 the Argun inter-district prosecutors’ office opened criminal case no. 45038 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code (abduction). 136. On 23 April 2001 Mr Kh.T. was granted victim status and questioned. 137. On 1 June 2001 the first applicant informed the investigators about the interview with an officer of the FSB which had been broadcast over the radio the day before (see paragraph 130 above), and asked for the search for her son to be intensified. 138. The investigators sent several requests for information to various authorities and law-enforcement bodies. On 1 May 2001 the Argun military commander’s office informed them that no special operations had been carried out by his troops on 2 April 2001. 139. On 13 June 2001 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the culprits. 140. In 2001-02 the first applicant and her husband Mr Kh.T. complained to various authorities of the abduction of their son and requested assistance in the search for him. 141. On 2 October 2002 the investigation was resumed. The investigators sent several requests for information to various military units about any special operations in Argun on 2 April 2001 and the two APCs involved in the abduction. The replies contained statements that no special operations had been carried out on these dates, and that an APC with the registration number “A 631” was listed as belonging to military unit no. 3179 deployed in Reutovo-3 in Moscow Region. 142. On 2 November 2002 the investigation was suspended and resumed again on 7 August 2003. Mr Kh.T. was informed of both decisions. 143. On 8 September 2003 the investigation was suspended. Mr Kh.T. was informed thereof. 144. On 25 March 2005 the Argun deputy prosecutor gave written instructions to the head of the Argun Town police station in which he indicated further investigative steps to be taken in the investigation into the abduction of Mr Sayd-Khuseyn Tembulatov. 145. On numerous occasions between 2004 and 2010 the first applicant complained to the main Military prosecutor’s office and various authorities about the abduction and requested assistance in the search for her son. In reply she received letters stating that the authorities were taking measures to establish Mr Sayd-Khuseyn Tembulatov’s whereabouts. The military prosecutor’s office replied that no State service personnel had been involved in the abduction. 146. On 4 March 2010 the investigators dismissed the first applicant’s request to allow her to read the case file and make copies of the documents. 147. On 30 July 2010 the first applicant asked the investigators to grant her victim status in the criminal case because her husband, Mr Kh.T., had died in September 2009. 148. On 5 August 2010 the investigation was resumed and the first applicant was granted victim status. On the same day she was questioned. 149. On August 2010 the investigation was suspended. The first applicant was informed thereof. 150. On 16 February 2011 the investigation was resumed. The investigators questioned several neighbours of the first applicant whose statements about the abduction of Mr Sayd-Khuseyn Tembulatov were similar to the applicants’ submissions before the Court. 151. On 14 March 2011 the investigators ordered a forensic DNA examination. 152. On 16 March 2001 the investigation was suspended. It was subsequently resumed on 2 August 2011 and suspended again on 12 August 2011. 153. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 154. On 18 October 2010 and on an unspecified date in 2011 the first applicant challenged the decision to suspend the investigation of 8 September 2003 and the investigators’ failure to take basic investigative steps before the Shali Town Court. On 29 October 2010 and 17 February 2011 respectively the court rejected her complaints having found that the investigators had earlier quashed the decision to suspend the investigation and resumed the proceedings. 155. The applicants are close relatives of Mr Mayr-Ali Shavanov, who was born in 1966, and Mr Lema (also spelled as Lema) Shavanov, who was born in 1986 (in the documents submitted the date was also referred to as 1981). The first applicant was their mother; she died on 27 July 2018. The second applicant was their father; he died on 22 April 2016. The third applicant is the wife of Mr Mayr-Ali Shavanov and the fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh applicants are his children. The eighth applicant is the wife of Mr Lema Shavanov. The ninth and tenth applicants are his children. 156. At about 7 a.m. on 18 February 2001 Mr Mayr-Ali Shavanov, Mr Lema Shavanov and their acquaintance Mr Sh.U. drove two UAZ-469 vehicles from Staryye Atagi to Grozny to buy fuel. They were stopped by a large group of armed military service personnel in camouflage uniforms at a roadblock next to the Prigorodnoye village, on the tenth kilometre of the Grozny-Shatoy motorway. The service personnel spoke unaccented Russian; they were in three armoured infantry vehicles (боевая машина пехоты) with the registration numbers 318, 341 and 356. Having checked the identity documents, the service personnel pulled bags over the Shavanov brothers’ heads, forced them into one of the armoured infantry vehicles and drove off in the direction of Grozny. 157. Mr Sh.U. asked one of the service personnel where the brothers were being taken to. The serviceman replied that they were taken to Khankala. 158. The whereabouts of Mr Mayr-Ali Shavanov and Mr Lema Shavanov have remained unknown ever since. 159. On 18 February 2001 some of the applicants went in person to the Grozny District police station and the Grozny district prosecutors’ office and reported the incident, requesting that the authorities open a criminal case into the abduction. 160. On 20 February 2001 the brother of Mr Mayr-Ali Shavanov and Mr Lema Shavanov, Mr L.Sh. complained to the Grozny prosecutor of their abduction. 161. On 1 April 2001 the Grozny district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 19044 under Article 127 of the Criminal Code (unlawful deprivation of liberty). The decision to open the criminal case stated that the Shavanov brothers had been detained by federal military service personnel. 162. On 2 April 2001 the investigators interviewed Mr Sh.U., who confirmed the circumstances of the abduction as described above. 163. On 10 April 2001 Mr S.Sh., the cousin of the Shavanov brothers, was granted victim status in the criminal case and questioned. He stated that on 26 February 2001 he had met a Chechen man called “Khamzat”. He offered to pick up Mr S.Sh.’s brothers who had been detained by the reconnaissance unit of motorised rifle battalion no. 71 (разведывательный батальон 71 мотострелкового полка) in exchange for money. They had agreed to meet, but Khamzat had not come to the meeting. 164. On 19 April 2001 the first and the second applicants were granted victim status and questioned. 165. On 11 May 2001 the second applicant was questioned again. He stated additionally that he had visited the roadblock at the entrance to Khankala. There an officer had told him that on 18 February 2001 he had seen the armoured infantry vehicles with the registration numbers 318, 341 and 356 entering Khankala; they had been followed by two UAZ-469 vehicles. 166. On 14 May 2001 Mr Sh.U. was questioned again. He had found out that three armoured infantry vehicles with the registration numbers 318, 341 and 356 had been stationed in Prigorodnoye village in the morning of 18 February 2001. 167. On 26 May 2001 the investigators questioned Mr S.U. who had seen in the morning on 18 February 2001 at the roadblock in Prigorodnoye village two UAZ vehicles which had belonged to Shavanov brothers. A group of military service personnel with their commander had been standing next to the vehicles. 168. On 1 June 2001 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. It is unclear whether the applicants were informed of this decision. 169. On 15 August 2001 the investigation was resumed. On 15 September 2001 the investigation was suspended again. It was subsequently resumed on 29 August 2002, then suspended on 15 September 2002, resumed on 20 November 2002, suspended on 20 December 2002 and resumed again on 16 May 2003. 170. On 18 June 2003 the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102 informed the investigators that the armoured infantry vehicles with the registration numbers 318, 341 and 356 were listed as belonging to the military unit no. 23132 deployed in Shali. 171. On 20 June 2003 the investigation was suspended. It was resumed on 18 December 2003, then suspended on 22 January 2004, resumed on 14 March 2004 and suspended again on 30 May 2004. 172. On 21 October 2006 the investigation was resumed. 173. On 10 November 2006 the investigators questioned the first and the second applicants and Mr S.U. All of them reiterated their earlier statements. The first applicant additionally stated that in May 2002 she had met a woman at the central market in Grozny whose son had been detained in Khankala together with the Shavanov brothers. 174. On 17 November 2006 the investigators questioned Ms Z.D., whose son had been detained together with the Shavanov brothers, held in a pit, in Khankala. 175. On 23 and 29 November 2006 the investigators examined the crime scene. 176. On 21 November 2006 the investigation was suspended again. It was resumed on 15 April 2008 and then suspended on 15 May 2008. 177. On numerous occasions between 2001 and 2006 the first and the second applicants as well as Mr L.Sh. complained to various military and law-enforcement authorities of the disappearance and requested assistance in the search for their relatives. In reply they received letters stating that the law-enforcement agencies were taking measures to establish the whereabouts of the Shavanov brothers. 178. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 179. On 10 April 2008 the applicants challenged the investigators’ failure to take basic steps before the Grozny District Court. On 18 April 2008 the court dismissed her complaint having found that several days earlier the investigators had already resumed the proceedings. 180. The first applicant is the mother of Mr Arbi Umarov and Mr Aslanbek (also spelled as Aslambek) Umarov, who were born in 1957 and 1969 respectively. The second applicant is the mother of Mr Andarbek Abubakarov, who was born in 1975. The third applicant is the mother of Mr Mayrbek Murtazaliyev, who was born in 1979; the fourth applicant is his wife and the fifth and sixth applicants are his children. 181. The circumstances of the abductions of local residents in the course of the special military operation conducted in Novyye Atagi on 24 April 2001 have already been examined by the Court in Ibragimova v. Russia (no. 30592/10) as regards the abduction of Mr Masud Khakimov (see Pitsayeva and Others v. Russia, nos. 53036/08 and 19 others, §§ 248-49, 9 January 2014). 182. At the material time the applicants and their families lived in a Red Cross refugee camp situated in the building of a former school in Novyye Atagi in the Shali district. 183. Between 2 and 3 p.m. on 24 April 2001 a large group of armed men in camouflage uniforms arrived at the camp in four APCs, several UAZ vehicles. They broke in and abducted Mr Arbi Umarov, Mr Aslanbek Umarov, Mr Andarbek Abubakarov, Mr Mayrbek Murtazaliyev and Mr Masoud Khakimov (with regards to the abduction of Mr Masoud Khakimov, see Pitsayeva and Others, cited above). 184. Immediately after the abduction the applicants complained thereof to the Shali district military commander’s office. The commander, Officer N., confirmed to the applicants that their relatives had been detained by military service personnel and that the detainees would return home the following day. 185. The applicants have not seen their relatives since their abduction. 186. The Government did not submit the criminal case file concerning the abduction of the applicants’ relatives on the grounds that it was classified. For the main information and witness statements concerning the military operation in Novyye Atagi on 24 April 2001 see Pitsayeva and Others (cited above, §§ 251-56). 187. On 12 July 2001 the Shali district prosecutors’ office opened criminal case no. 23131 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code into the abduction of the applicants’ relatives and Mr Masud Khakimov. 188. On 10 and 15 August 2001 the first and the second applicants respectively were granted victim status in the criminal case. 189. On 12 September 2001 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. It was subsequently resumed and again suspended on numerous occasions. Thus, the investigation was resumed on 1 May and 1 July 2002, 13 June 2008, 15 May 2009 and suspended on 1 June and 26 September 2002, 11 June 2007 and 14 June 2009. 190. Meanwhile, on 7 August 2002 the criminal case was transferred to the military prosecutors’ office of military unit no. 20116 (later – no. 68798) for further investigation, where it was given the number 34/35/0173-02. 191. On a number of occasions between 2001 and 2011 the first, second and third applicants complained to various law-enforcement authorities and NGOs in respect of the abductions of their sons and requested assistance in the search for them. 192. On 27 November 2008 the Naurskiy District Court of the Chechen Republic declared Mr Arbi Umarov and Mr Aslanbek Umarov missing persons following a request by the first applicant. 193. On 27 March 2011 the first applicant was informed that the investigation had been suspended. On 12 April 2011 it was resumed; the first, second and third applicants were informed thereof. 194. The investigation was subsequently resumed and suspended on numerous occasions. In particular, it was suspended on 27 May 2011, then on 12 July 2011 this decision was annulled by the investigators’ superior; on 12 August 2011 the investigation was suspended again and resumed on 12 October 2011, then suspended on 11 November 2011. On 12 November 2013 the investigation was resumed, then suspended on 12 December 2013, resumed again on 9 October 2014 and suspended on 29 December 2014. 195. It appears that the result of the investigation is still pending. 196. On an unspecified date in 2008 the first applicant challenged the investigators’ decision of 11 June 2007 to suspend the proceedings before the Military Court of the Grozny Garrison. On 6 October 2008 the court rejected the complaint having found that on 13 June 2008 the investigators had resumed the proceedings. 197. The applicant is the mother of Mr Imran Inalkayev, who was born in 1980. 198. On an unspecified date in the beginning of February 2000 (in certain documents submitted the date was referred to as 2 February 2000) Mr Imran Inalkayev was going from the settlement (поселок) of Sleptsovskaya to the town of Urus-Martan in a regular local bus. At the checkpoint located at the crossroad next to the villages of Valerik, Shalazhi and Gekhi a group of armed military service personnel in camouflage uniforms stopped the bus to check the passengers’ identity. Having checked his documents, the service personnel detained Mr Imran Inalkayev and took him into the checkpoint building. There were an APC and a Ural lorry parked near the building. The abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses. 199. The whereabouts of Mr Imran Inalkayev have remained unknown since. 200. On an unspecified date in February 2000 and subsequently on several occasions in 2001-03 the applicant informed the authorities of the abduction and requested assistance in the search for her son. 201. On 14 April 2003 the Urus-Martan district prosecutor’s office refused to open a criminal case into the incident. 202. On 28 August 2003 the supervising prosecutor annulled the above decision following the applicant’s complaint and opened criminal case no. 34089 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code (abduction). 203. On 6 September 2003 the applicant was granted victim status and questioned. 204. On various dates the investigators sent several requests for information to the law-enforcement authorities. Most of the responses contained statements that no information about Mr Imran Inalkayev was available. 205. On 28 October 2003 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators; the applicant was informed thereof. Subsequently, the investigation was resumed on 7 October 2004 following the applicant’s complaints to the supervising prosecutors, who criticised the investigation and ordered that steps be taken. Then the proceedings were suspended on 15 November 2004, again resumed on 16 May 2011 and suspended again on 26 May 2011. 206. On 9 June 2007 the investigators instructed the Urus-Martan police to undertake measures aimed at establishing the whereabouts of Mr Imran Inalkayev. In particular, they ordered to interview relatives and neighbours, to examine cemeteries and to obtain copies of documents about his activities. It appears that some measures were taken but brought no tangible results. 207. On 20 May 2011 and 24 May 2011 the investigators questioned the eyewitnesses of the events. They confirmed the circumstances of the abduction as described above. 208. On several occasions between 2006 and 2011 the applicant complained to various law-enforcement authorities of the disappearance and requested assistance in the search for her son. The authorities forwarded her requests to the prosecutor’s office. In reply she received letters stating that the law-enforcement agencies were taking measures to establish Mr Imran Inalkayev’s whereabouts. 209. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 210. On 5 May 2011 the applicant challenged the investigators’ decision to suspend the proceedings of 15 November 2004 and their failure to take basic steps before the Urus-Martan District Court. On 16 May 2011 the court terminated the proceedings having found that earlier on the same day the investigation had been resumed. 211. The first applicant is the wife of Mr Ruslan Sugatiyev, who was born in 1965. The second applicant is his mother, the third and the fourth applicants are his children. The fifth applicant is the mother of Mr Beslan Yusupov, who was born in 1971. The sixth and the seventh applicants are his wife and daughter respectively. The eighth applicant is the father of Mr Said-Magomed Abzayev, who was born in 1975. The ninth applicant is his wife, the tenth applicant is his daughter and the eleventh applicant is his mother. 212. In the morning on 8 February 2002 Mr Ruslan Sugatiyev, Mr Beslan Yusupov and Mr Said-Magomed Abzayev were driving from Dzhalka village to Grozny in two UAZ vehicles. At about 7 a.m. on the same day they reached checkpoint no. 111, known as Otvaga, where a group of military service personnel in camouflage uniforms and masks stopped their cars and ordered them to get out. The service personnel allegedly belonged to a military unit called 34 ObrON (34 ОбрОН) stationed nearby; they were armed with machineguns and grenade launchers, and they were in three APCs and a Ural lorry. Having searched Mr Ruslan Sugatiyev, Mr Beslan Yusupov and Mr Said-Magomed Abzayev, they forced them into the Ural lorry and drove off in the direction of Argun. The abduction took place in the presence of several police officers manning the checkpoint who subsequently gave their statements to the investigators (see paragraph 218 below). 213. Several days after the abduction the applicants received a handwritten note from the abducted men stating that they had been detained at a checkpoint and taken to the base of the 34 ObrON military unit in Argun. 214. According to the applicants, after the abduction the commander of the first special task battalion of the military unit no. 3671 Officer N.Sh. sought a ransom from them in exchange for information about their relatives. 215. The whereabouts of the applicants’ relatives have remained unknown ever since. 216. Immediately after the abduction the applicants informed the authorities thereof and requested that criminal proceedings be opened. 217. On 18 February 2002 the Argun inter-district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 78021 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code (abduction). 218. On the same day the investigators questioned seven police officers who had manned the checkpoint on the day of the events and witnessed the abduction. Their statements concerning the circumstances of the abduction were similar to the applicants’ submissions before the Court. 219. On 18 April 2002 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 220. On an unspecified date in 2002 the office of the Chechen Government informed the investigators that Mr Ruslan Sugatiyev, Mr Beslan Yusupov and Mr Said-Magomed Abzayev were detained in a military unit in Argun near elevator no. 34. 221. On 8 May 2003 the sixth applicant requested that proceedings be resumed because she had information about her husband’s whereabouts. On the same day the investigation was resumed. 222. On 10 May 2003 the sixth applicant was granted victim status and questioned. She told the investigators about the handwritten note received from the abducted men (see paragraph 213 above). 223. On 13 May 2003 the investigators questioned Mr Ruslan Sugatiyev’s brother, Mr S.S. He confirmed the circumstances of the abduction as described above and additionally stated that the Ural lorry, in which his brother had been taken away from the checkpoint on 8 February 2002, had been seen on several occasions entering the base of the 34 ObrON military unit. He also added that Mr Ruslan Sugatiyev’s and Mr Said‑Magomed Abzayev’s UAZ vehicles had been taken away by military service personnel on the day of the abduction and had been subsequently parked on the unit’s premises. 224. On 14 May 2003 the investigators questioned the first and the eighth applicants, who confirmed the circumstances of the abduction as described above. 225. On 30 May 2003 the forensic examination established that the note received by the applicants (see paragraph 213 above) could have been partially written by Mr Said-Magomed Abzayev. 226. On 13 June 2003 the investigators examined the crime scene. 227. On 8 July 2003 the investigation was suspended. Subsequently, it was resumed on 14 November 2003, suspended on 14 December 2003, then resumed on 15 December 2004 and suspended again on 15 January 2005, resumed on 17 January 2005 and then suspended on 18 February 2005. 228. On 13 November 2003 the sixth applicant asked the investigators to resume the proceedings. On 1 December 2003 she was questioned; she informed the investigators where Officer N.Sh. had been serving. 229. On 5 January 2004 the eighth applicant was granted victim status. 230. On 27 January 2004 Officer N.Sh. was questioned. He denied demanding a ransom from the applicants and stated that Mr S.S. had suggested that he pay him USD 10,000 for any information about his brother. Officer N.Sh. stated that he had no information about the detention of the applicants’ relatives. 231. On 25 June 2008 the eighth applicant challenged the investigators’ failure to take basic steps before the Shali Town Court. On 7 July 2008 the court allowed his complaint. 232. On 21 February 2011 the first applicant asked the investigators to grant her victim status and to allow her to make copies of the criminal case file. 233. On 7 March 2011 the investigation was resumed. On the same day the first applicant’s request was granted. 234. On 12 March 2011 the investigation was suspended again. 235. On 1 July 2011 the fifth applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case upon her request. 236. On 29 December 2011 the investigation was resumed. It was suspended on 30 January 2012. 237. On numerous occasions between 2002 and 2011 the first, sixth and eighth applicants complained to various law-enforcement authorities about the disappearance of their relatives and requested assistance in the search for them. In reply the applicants received letters stating that operational search activities were undertaken to establish their relatives’ whereabouts. 238. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 239. The first applicant was the mother of Mr Khanpasha Kakhiyev, who was born in 1968. She died on 26 August 2016. The second applicant is the brother of Mr Khanpasha Kakhiyev. 240. The present application concerns the abduction of the applicants’ relative in the course of the same special operation carried out by the Russian federal forces in Avtury in May 2002 as in the case of Mezhidovy v. Russia (see Mezhidovy and Others v. Russia [Committee], nos. 50606/08 and 9 others, § 8, 23 October 2018). 241. At about 1 p.m. on 14 May 2002 a large group of armed military service personnel arrived in an APC and an armoured infantry vehicle at the applicants’ house at 25 Kooperativnaya Street in Avtury. The service personnel were of Slavic appearance and spoke unaccented Russian. Having searched the premises, they detained Mr Khanpasha Kakhiyev, put him into the APC and drove off to an unknown destination. The abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses, including the first applicant and her daughter, Ms K.Kh. The arrest was filmed by the service personnel; later the applicants managed to obtain a copy of the video recording and to provide it to the investigators. 242. On 20 April 2010 two sets of human remains were found in a forest near Avtury. One set was identified by the applicants as belonging to Mr Khanpasha Kakhiyev (see paragraph 252 below). The other set belonged to Mr Magomed-Emin Mezhidov, who had been abducted on 15 May 2002 in the course of the special operation in Avtury (see Mezhidovy and Others, cited above, §§ 11 and 17). 243. Immediately after the abduction the applicants informed the authorities and requested that a criminal investigation into the incident be opened. 244. On 28 September 2002 the Shali district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 59240 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code (abduction). On the same day the first applicant was granted victim status and questioned. 245. The investigators sent several requests for information to various law-enforcement authorities. The responses contained statements that no information about Mr Khanpasha Kakhiyev was available. 246. On 28 November 2002 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicants were informed thereof. 247. In the beginning of 2004 the second applicant complained to the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic of the disappearance of his brother and asked for assistance in the search for him. In reply he was informed that operational search activities aimed at establishing the whereabouts of Mr Khanpasha Kakhiyev were under way. 248. In July 2006 the first applicant asked the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic for assistance in the search for her son. In reply she was informed that on 17 July 2006 the investigation in the case was resumed. 249. On an unspecified date a police officer from the Shali District police station reported that he had visited several neighbours of the applicants. Although they had eyewitnessed the abduction of Mr Khanpasha Kakhiyev, they had refused to give written statements about it. 250. On 15 August 2006 the second applicant was questioned. His statements concerning the circumstances of the abduction of his brother were similar to the applicants’ submissions before the Court. 251. On 17 August 2006 the investigation was suspended. The applicants were not informed of this decision. 252. On 22 April 2010 the investigators found the skeletal remains of Mr Khanpasha Kakhiyev and Mr Magomed-Emin Mizhidov, as identified by their relatives, with bullet holes in their heads (see paragraph 242 above). On the same day, the investigators resumed the proceedings and ordered a forensic medical examination of the remains. 253. The forensic medical examination established that Mr Khanpasha Kakhiyev’s death could have been caused by the skull bone fracture. 254. On 23 April 2010 the investigators ordered a ballistic expert examination of the bullet found at the burial site. 255. The ballistic expert examination established that the bullet was part of the cartridge for a Makarov handgun of 9 mm calibre, a Stechkin pistol, or another gun of 9 mm calibre. 256. On 23 April 2010 the investigators ordered a biological expert examination of the clothes of Mr Khanpasha Kakhiyev found at the site. 257. The biological expert examination discovered no blood or other biological substances on the clothes. 258. On 22 May 2010 the investigation was suspended; it was resumed on 27 December 2010. 259. On 29 December 2010 the investigators examined the site. 260. In January 2011 the investigators questioned several witnesses who confirmed that a special operation had been carried out in Avtury in May 2002, during which around seventy individuals had been detained by service personnel. Almost all of them had been released except for Mr Khanpasha Kakhiyev and Mr Magomed-Emin Mizhidov. Some witnesses confirmed that they had heard from other individuals detained together with Mr Khanpasha Kakhiyev that he had been severely beaten and could hardly move because his hands and legs had been shot. 261. On 23 January 2011 the investigators obtained the video recording of the abduction from the second applicant and included it into the case file. 262. On 18 September 2012 the first applicant asked the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic to inform her about the progress in the criminal proceedings and to resume the investigation if it had been suspended. It is unclear whether any reply was given to that request. 263. It appears that the investigation is still pending.

5. The applicants were born in 1971 and 1997 respectively and live in St Petersburg. They are a single mother and her son. 6. In 1995 the first applicant and her mother left Uzbekistan for Russia and settled in St Petersburg. They were granted the status of “forced migrants” for an initial period of five years. In 1997 the second applicant was born. 7. In 1998 the Federal Migration Service (“the FMS”) provided the applicants and the first applicant’s mother with a room in a three-room flat. A social tenancy agreement was concluded with the first applicant’s mother. 8. In October 2000 the FMS extended the forced migrant status of the first applicant and her mother until 2 June 2001. 9. In July 2001 the second applicant was registered as living in the room. 10. On 8 November 2001 the FMS deprived the first applicant of her status as a forced migrant on the grounds that she had not applied in due time for it to be extended. According to the first applicant, she was not informed of that decision until 2003. 11. In 2002 the first applicant was excluded from the social tenancy agreement owing to the fact that she had lost her forced migrant status. 12. On 17 February and 16 April 2003 the first applicant applied to the FMS with a request to re-establish her status as a forced migrant. 13. On 20 February and 8 May 2003 respectively the FMS upheld its decision of 8 November 2001 and dismissed the first applicant’s request. 14. In February 2009 the first applicant’s mother died. 15. In July 2009 the FMS ordered the applicants to vacate the room. The applicants did not vacate the room and continued to live in it. 16. In December 2009 the applicants were placed on the waiting list for social housing. 17. On 19 January 2010 the applicant applied to the FMS with a new request to re-establish her forced migrant status. 18. On 25 January 2010 the FMS upheld its decision of 8 November 2001. The first applicant decided to challenge that decision in court. 19. On 3 November 2010 the Primorskiy District Court of St Petersburg held that the decision of 25 January 2010 had been unlawful and had to be set aside. In particular, the court held that the first applicant had had valid reasons for missing the deadline for applying for an extension of her forced migrant status. The court ordered the FMS to extend the first applicant’s migrant status. 20. On 25 January 2011 the St Petersburg City Court quashed the decision of 3 November 2010 and dismissed the first applicant’s complaint against the decision of the FMS of 25 January 2010. The court held, in particular, that between 2003 and 2010 the first applicant had not tried to contest the refusals of the FMS of 8 November 2001, 20 February and 8 May 2003 to re-establish her forced migrant status, which showed that she had lost interest in having that status. In her complaint the first applicant had contested the decision of 25 January 2010 and therefore, it was irrelevant whether she had had valid reasons for missing the deadline for applying for an extension of her status. The court held, that the decision of 25 January 2010 had been based on Section 5 (4), of the Federal Law on Forced Migrants, which provided that the extension of the status of forced migrants could be granted only at their request (see Relevant domestic law below). Therefore, there were no grounds for declaring that decision unlawful. 21. In 2011 the FMS brought court proceedings against the applicants, seeking their eviction from the room. 22. The local authorities objected to the eviction, because the room was the only dwelling available to the second applicant. 23. The applicants submitted that their eviction would be in breach of Article 8 of the Convention, since it was not necessary in a democratic society. The room in question was their only dwelling. They had been on the waiting list for social housing since 2009. The first applicant was a single mother whose income was insufficient for buying a flat. 24. On 15 May 2012 the Primorskiy District Court of St Petersburg ordered the applicants’ eviction from their room, without providing any alternative accommodation. In particular, the District Court held as follows: “... Panyushkina M.S. [the first applicant] lost her forced migrant status in 2001, her minor son has never had such a status, and therefore the court comes to the conclusion that the respondents unlawfully occupy the disputed housing and should be evicted without the provision of any alternative accommodation ...” 25. The applicants lodged an appeal against the eviction order, submitting that their eviction was disproportionate since the court had not taken their arguments into account. 26. On 4 October 2012 the St Petersburg City Court upheld the eviction order. In particular, the City Court held as follows: “... It is impossible to take into account the arguments submitted by Panyushkina M.S. [the first applicant] in her grounds of appeal, whereby the eviction from the disputed housing without the provision of any alternative accommodation is a violation of their [the applicants’] housing rights, since they do not have any other housing. The housing stock aimed at providing forced migrants with temporary housing is for a strictly designated use – the provision with housing of individuals who have been legally acknowledged to be forced migrants and their family members; the loss or deprivation of the status of forced migrant implies the loss of the right to live in the housing, termination of the social tenancy agreement and the obligation to vacate the occupied accommodation ...” 27. The applicants did not lodge a cassation appeal against the above decisions. 28. On 22 November 2012 the bailiff instituted enforcement proceedings with regard to the eviction order. The applicants were given five days to comply voluntarily with the judgment of 15 May 2012. 29. On 13 May 2013 the first applicant asked the administration of the Primorskiy District of St Petersburg to provide her with alternative accommodation. 30. On 12 August 2013 the administration of the Primorskiy District of St Petersburg concluded an agreement with the first applicant for use of social accommodation free of charge for a period of one year. The Government submitted that it had been open to the applicants to apply for an extension of that agreement. However, they had not asked for the agreement to be extended after the expiry of the initial period. The applicants submitted that it had not been possible to ask for any extension of the agreement. 31. On 12 September 2013 the applicants vacated the disputed room in compliance with the eviction order of 15 May 2012. 32. On 11 March 2015 the enforcement proceedings were terminated on the grounds that the applicants had voluntarily vacated the room. 33. Since 15 March 2016 the second applicant has been registered as living in the flat belonging to his father and his paternal grandmother. 34. The first applicant was currently renting for her and her son a room in a shared apartment at her own expense. Her landlord had not registered her as living at the address of the rented room. She submitted that she had asked her former husband to register the second applicant as living in his flat by necessity, because the absence of registration had subjected him to everyday difficulties. However, de facto the second applicant had continued to live with the first applicant. 35. According to the information provided by the Government, in 2016 the administration of the Primorskiy District of St Petersburg prepared a draft order for the removal of the second applicant from the waiting list of persons eligible for social housing.

5. The applicant was born in 1956 and was convicted of attempting to undermine the constitutional order and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. At the time of the events relating to the application, he was serving his sentence in the Edirne F-type prison. 6. Since his imprisonment the applicant has been represented by his lawyer in respect of several applications, including the present application, before the Court. 7. On an unspecified date, the applicant’s lawyer sent a package by post to the applicant. The prison administration believed the contents of the package to be suspect and therefore lodged a request on 12 August 2005 with the public prosecutor for a decision to be taken by an enforcement court to determine whether the material sent to the applicant concerned defence-related documents or whether they concerned any objectionable content so as to prevent them from being handed over to the applicant. 8. On 25 August 2005 the Edirne Enforcement Court allowed an application by the prosecutor and examined the contents of the package, which contained a book entitled Globalisation and Imperialism (Küreselleşme ve Emperyalizm), a magazine with the title Rootless Anational Publication (Köxüz Anasyonal Neşriyat), and a newspaper with the title Express International Sha la la (Express Enternasyonal Şalala). The court held that the material in question did not relate to the rights of the defence and that therefore they should not be handed over to the applicant pursuant to section 5 of Law no. 5351. 9. On 16 September 2005 the applicant objected to the decision of the Edirne Enforcement Court before the Edirne Assize Court. He submitted that he had asked his lawyer to bring those books and magazines in question simply because he had wanted to read them. He submitted that it had been the prison administration which had told his lawyer that they could not be brought in person and had therefore to be sent by post. He further argued that while it was correct that they had not been related to his rights of defence, they were not illegal publications and there had been no basis for the prison administration to withhold them from him simply because they had been sent by post by his lawyer. 10. On 30 September 2005, the Edirne Assize Court dismissed the applicant’s objections on the basis of the case file, holding that the decision of the Edirne Enforcement Court had been in accordance with law and procedure. 11. In the meantime, that is to say on 16 September 2005, the prison administration lodged another request with the public prosecutor in relation to the package sent by the applicant’s lawyer. In that request, it submitted that the applicant’s lawyer’s conduct had been incompatible with her duties as a lawyer and requested that section 5 of Law no. 5351, which provides for an official to be present during consultations between a prisoner and his or her lawyer, be applied to the applicant. 12. On 23 September 2005, referring to its earlier decision of 25 August 2005, the Edirne Enforcement Court in an examination carried out on the basis of the case file, without holding a hearing and without seeking submissions from the applicant or his lawyer, granted an application on the part of the prison administration and therefore held that an official was to be present during the applicant’s consultations with his lawyer. The decision did not specify how long the restriction was to remain in force. The Edirne Enforcement Court further held that, if requested, a separate decision would be taken as to whether the exchange of documents between the applicant and his lawyer would also be subject to a restriction. 13. On 24 October 2005 the applicant objected to the decision of 23 September 2005 before the Edirne Assize Court. He submitted that the impugned decision did not explain why it was necessary to restrict the privacy of his consultations with his lawyer. He argued in that connection that a provision which provided for such a restriction could only be applied if it had emerged from documents and other evidence that visits by lawyers to a person convicted of organised crime had been serving as a means of communication within the criminal organisation in question. He argued that no such element had been present in his situation and the court had not conducted any examination in that connection. Lastly, he maintained that there were no legal provisions prohibiting the exchange of legal books and magazines between a prisoner and his lawyer. The applicant did not request that the examination of his case be carried out by holding a hearing. 14. On 27 October 2005 the Edirne Assize Court dismissed the case on the basis of the case file and without holding a hearing. Without responding to the applicant’s arguments, it held that the Edirne Enforcement Court’s decision of 23 September 2005 had been in accordance with the law and procedure. 15. On 29 May 2008 the applicant lodged an application with the Edirne Enforcement Court for the restriction on the conversations between him and his lawyer to be lifted. 16. On 4 June 2008 the applicant’s application was dismissed on the basis of the case file. The court held that the decision of 23 September 2005 had become final and that there was no need for a further examination. 17. The applicant lodged another application on 2 November 2010 and applied for a hearing in accordance with the new amendments to the procedure before the enforcement courts (see paragraph 27 below). On 6 December 2010 the Edirne Enforcement Court dismissed the applicant’s application for a hearing, holding that the new amendments to the procedure concerned only the examination of objections against disciplinary sanctions, so that in so far as the restriction of 23 September 2005 had not been a disciplinary sanction, no hearing could be held in respect of that complaint. It further dismissed the applicant’s application for the restriction to be lifted, holding that the decision of 23 September 2005 had been final. An appeal against that decision by the applicant was dismissed on 24 August 2011. 18. On 21 February 2013 the applicant lodged an application again with the Edirne Enforcement Court and repeated his request for the restriction to be lifted. The court dismissed that application on 11 April 2013, holding that there had not been any change in the circumstances of the applicant and the decision relating to the restriction on the consultations with the applicant’s lawyer. In that connection, the court held that there was still a risk in view of the previous decisions taken in respect of the applicant by the enforcement courts as well as the lawyer’s conduct. An appeal by the applicant against that decision was rejected on 10 June 2013. 19. At time of the adoption of this judgment, the restriction on the applicant’s right to confıdential communications with his lawyer remains in place. 20. On 17 February 2006 the applicant lodged an application with the Court, complaining about the Edirne Enforcement Court’s decision of 25 August 2005. 21. On 8 December 2015 the Court delivered an inadmissibility decision on account of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies and held that the applicant had to make use of the new domestic remedy established by Law no. 6384 (see Altay and Others v. Turkey (dec.), no. 9100/06 and 155 others). 22. On 1 November 2016 the Compensation Commission held that the Edirne Enforcement Court’s decision not to hand over the book and the periodicals sent to the applicant by his lawyer had infringed the applicant’s right to receive information within the meaning of Article 10 of the Convention. They held in that connection that the impugned decision had constituted an interference which had not been based on relevant and sufficient reasons, notably because the domestic court had not explained in its decision in what respect the books and magazines in question had jeopardised the security of the institution.

5. The applicant was born in 1984 and is currently being detained in a correctional colony in the village of Torbeyevo, Mordovia Republic, Russia. 6. On 21 April 2005 the applicant was convicted during a public hearing of murder and was sentenced to imprisonment. He and his lawyer had had thirty-five minutes to study the case file, which consisted of five volumes. The conviction was upheld on appeal in a public hearing on 18 August 2005 (“the 2005 proceedings”). 7. On 30 July 2010 the appeal judgment was quashed by way of a supervisory review (on grounds not related to the applicant’s Article 6 complaints in respect of the 2005 proceedings) as the applicant’s right to defence had been breached during the appeal hearing. The case was sent for fresh examination on appeal. 8. The applicant was allowed to re-read the case file within the new appeal proceedings. He and his lawyer had five days, from 4 to 8 October 2010, to study the now six-volume case file (about 1,500 pages) in remand prison no. IZ-24/1 in Krasnoyarsk, where the applicant was being detained. The applicant was allegedly held in a metal cage while studying the case, without a table or any other facilities to take notes. After studying the case file both the applicant and the lawyer filed appeals. In his appeal statements the applicant analysed the case materials in detail, referred extensively to all the main items of evidence, including expert opinions and witness testimony, and referred to exact pages in the case file. 9. The applicant’s case was examined by the Supreme Court of Russia (“the Supreme Court”) over four hearings, three of which (21 October, 30 November and 16 December 2010), according to the trial record and the court’s procedural decisions, were held in camera. The case file did not contain any formal decision by the Supreme Court to close the hearings to the public. The applicant was represented by two lawyers who confirmed to the court that they had had enough time to study the case file. 10. On 16 December 2010 the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of 21 April 2005. The Supreme Court’s judgment was delivered to the remand prison, where the applicant was still being detained, on 11 January 2011 (“the 2010 proceedings”).

5. The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Elbasan, Albania. He is the brother of Sh.P., born in 1973. Sh.P. died on 22 February 2011. 6. On 29 March 2010 the Shkodër District Court sentenced Sh.P. to four years’ imprisonment for attempted murder. The trial was held in absentia. On 2 December 2010 the Shkodër Court of Appeal upheld the Shkodër District Court’s decision. On 3 February 2011 the latter decision was executed and Sh.P. was sent to serve his prison sentence in the Lezhë detention facility. 7. It appears from the case file that Sh.P. was diagnosed by the doctor of the Lezhë detention facility as suffering from psoriasis, parapanesis inferior (partial paralysis of both legs) and elephantiasis. On 9 February 2011 Sh.P. was urgently transferred to Tirana Prison Hospital (Qendra Spitalore e Burgjeve) because according to the doctor of the Lezhë detention facility, he could not be properly treated in an ordinary prison setting. On 17 February 2011 he was transferred to Tirana University Hospital Centre (Qendra Spitalore Universitare Tiranë). It appears from the hospital file of 17 February 2011 that the applicant’s brother had been diagnosed with elephantiasis, morbid obesity and multi-organ insufficiency, and was prescribed medication. 8. It appears that on 22 February 2011 Sh.P. died in the intensive care unit of Tirana University Hospital. 9. On 22 February 2011 a group composed of a judicial police officer, a criminalist and a forensic medical expert carried out an on-site investigation (kqyrjen e vendit të ngjarjes) at Tirana University Hospital Centre and an external examination of the corpse (kqyrjen e kufomës) of Sh.P, and took photographs at the scene. On the same day, the judicial police officer seized Sh.P’s medical file (sekuestroi kartelën klinike) kept at Tirana University Hospital Centre. 10. On 22 February 2011 the judicial police officer in charge of the case ordered a forensic examination of Sh.P. and put the following questions to the forensic medical experts: “1. What kind of injuries were noticeable on the deceased? 11. On 22 February 2011 the applicant was questioned as a person with knowledge of the event. He stated that his family members had informed him that his brother was being sent to Lezhë detention facility. On 17 February 2011 his mother had told him that his brother had fallen ill and was being transferred to the hospital in Tirana. When he had arrived at the hospital he had found his brother unconscious and tied to the bed with the sheets. He had noticed that the mattress and the blankets were wet and that the area around the bed was very dirty. At approximately 6 a.m. on 22 February 2011, his sister had called him to say that their brother’s condition had deteriorated. When he had arrived at the hospital, he had found his brother dead. He added that he wanted to know the cause of his brother’s death. 12. On 25 February 2011 the judicial police officer in charge looked at the admissions register of Tirana Prison Hospital, where it was recorded that Sh.P. had been transferred to that facility on 9 February 2011. 13. On 9 March 2011 and again on 25 March 2011 the Tirana prosecutor’s office requested Sh.P.’s file from the Lezhë detention facility. On 21 March 2011 the Lezhë detention facility replied by letter stating that the applicant had been suffering from dyspnea, his lower limbs had both had oedemas, and that he had therefore been urgently transferred to Tirana Prison Hospital. In addition, they attached Sh.P.’s prison file. 14. On 10 March 2011, the prosecutor in charge of the case ordered a series of investigative actions to be carried out by a judicial police officer: “(1) to contact forensic experts who would carry out a forensic examination to find out the cause of death of the deceased; (2) to seize the criminal and medical files of Sh.P. from the prison facilities, as well as from the hospital; (3) to search the registers of the Tirana Prison Hospital, Tirana University Hospital and Shkodër civilian hospital in order to find out when he had been hospitalised, what the diagnosis had been, how long he had stayed, etc.; the pages of the register relevant to the search would have to be attached to the report; (4) to question Tirana prison employees, medical staff who had taken care of Sh.P., and his family members about his medical history, his treatment, when he had last been hospitalised, etc.; and (5) to carry out any other action which might be deemed necessary before 29 March 2011.” 15. On 25 March 2011 I.O., one of the doctors who had been taking care of the applicant’s brother in the hospital, when questioned by the judicial police officer, stated that while under their supervision Sh.P. had been manifesting respiratory and hepatic insufficiency. According to him, Sh.P. had been diagnosed with multi-organ insufficiency and morbid obesity. Sh.P. had been treated like any other patient and the treatment prescribed had been administered in accordance with the rules. 16. On 25 March 2011 P.D., one of the doctors who had been taking care of the applicant’s brother in the hospital, when questioned by the judicial police officer, stated that Sh.P. had been transferred to Tirana Prison Hospital from Lezhë prison hospital. He had been treated like any other patient and the treatment prescribed had been administered in accordance with the rules. 17. On 30 March 2011 a group of forensic experts carried out an examination of Sh.P. The forensic medical report stated, inter alia: “...1. Two ecchymoses were noticed on both forearms. Oedemas on the lower extremities. Psoriasis. ... 2. ... Ecchymosis caused by blunt objects (sende të mbrehëta). Rest of the lesions are a consequence of the other illnesses of the deceased ... 4. ... The death of Sh.P. was a result of acute cardio-respiratory insufficiency due to complications of the generalised metabolic illness of the deceased ... 5. With regard to the question whether Sh.P. underwent a negligent medical treatment, this would be the subject of an inquiry by another forensic medical commission once they had the investigative file at their disposal ...” 18. On 24 February 2011 the police reported Sh.P.’s death to the Tirana prosecutor’s office, which registered it in a criminal file. After having carried out some investigative actions, on 13 April 2011 the Tirana prosecutor’s office decided not to institute criminal proceedings (mosfillimin e procedimit penal) and to give notice of that decision to the interested parties. The decision was based on the medical report of 30 March 2011, which had found that the death of Sh.P. had been the result of acute respiratory and cardiac insufficiency and other diseases. Furthermore, the decision stated that there was no fact, evidence or indication that a criminal offence could have been committed. On 13 May 2011 the applicant was notified of the Tirana prosecutor’s decision. 19. On 17 May 2011, the applicant lodged a complaint with the Tirana District Court against the decision of the Tirana prosecutor’s office. On 20 October 2011 the Tirana District Court rejected the applicant’s complaint on the grounds that he did not have legal standing to complain against the impugned decision, because he had only been notified of it as a family member of the deceased. The first-instance court also stated that under Article 291 of the Criminal Procedural Code, only the persons who had reported an offence could complain against a decision not to institute criminal proceedings. 20. On 20 April 2012 the Tirana Court of Appeal upheld the Tirana District Court’s decision of 20 October 2011. On 23 January 2014 the Supreme Court rejected an appeal lodged by the applicant. On 17 November 2015 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s complaints against the ordinary domestic courts’ decisions, with the argument that the statutory denial of standing to challenge the prosecutor’s decision did not violate the essence of the applicant’s right of access to a court. 21. On 16 February 2015 the applicant reported the death of his brother to the Tirana prosecutor’s office. On 27 March 2015 the Tirana prosecutor’s office decided not to institute criminal proceedings based on the applicant’s report. On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a complaint with the Tirana District Court about the above-mentioned decision. On 18 November 2015, the Tirana District Court, making reference to the first set of proceedings and evidence used in those proceedings, decided without hearing the applicant to reject his complaint.

5. The applicant is a legal entity, a local community of the Christian Baptist Church in the Republic of Poland operating on the basis of the Act of 30 June 1995 on Relations Between the Republic of Poland and the Christian Baptist Church Act (ustawa o stosunku Państwa Polskiego do Kościola Chrześcijan Baptystów w RP – hereinafter “the 1995 Act”) with its seat in Wrocław. 6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7. The case concerns a property with a four-storey building and another building dedicated to sacral purposes in Wrocław. Before World War II the property was used by the Baptist Commune belonging to the Bund Evangelisch-Freikirchlicher Gemeinden in Deutschland operating on the territory of the German Reich. The property number was 1077/42. It measured 0.785 ha. 8. On 4 September 1946 the Wrocław Governor (Wojewoda Wrocławski) decided that the property in question should become subject to the applicant church’s management (przejęcie w zarząd) on the basis of section 2(4) of the 1946 Decree on abandoned property (dekret o majątkach opuszczonych i poniemieckich – hereinafter “the 1946 Decree”). 9. In 1956 the applicant church lodged a request to be registered in the land and mortgage register as the owner of the property and the request was granted. The property was registered under the number 945. 10. On 23 April 1959 the Minister of the Economy announced a new interpretation of section 2 (4) of the 1946 Decree. 11. On 23 June 1959 the District Residential Buildings Board for Wrocław-Krzyki (Dzielnicowy Zarząd Budynków Mieszkalnych) decided that all kinds of property which were subject to the church’s management were to pass into the ownership of the State and ordered that the applicant church transfer the property in question to the State. The order did not concern the part of the property which was dedicated exclusively to sacral purposes. 12. On 19 August 1966 a new land-register entry 35905 was opened for the property no. 1077/42. The land-register entry 945 was however not closed. 13. In 1968 the property was registered under the land-register number 35905 was given a new plot number 9 and its area was recalculated. The new measurement was 0.371 ha. It appears that the plot number 9 constituted only a part of the previous property number 1077/42 and comprised only the building dedicated to sacral purposes. 14. The remaining part of the original property number 1077/42, which comprised the four-storey building, was given new plot numbers 39 and 33/5. It measured 0.325 ha and a new land-register entry 63650 was opened for it. In 1977 the State was registered as the owner of this property and, after the reform of the local governments of 1990, the property was transferred to the City of Wrocław. 15. The present application concerns the right to the property referred to above in paragraph 14. 16. On 9 May 1996 the applicant church requested that the Wrocław Governor issue a decision confirming the applicant church’s ownership of the property in question. It relied on the newly enacted 1995 Act (see paragraphs 47-50 below). 17. On 12 September 1996 the Wrocław Governor refused to issue a decision which would confirm that the property in question belonged to the applicant church. The Governor found that the applicant church had failed to satisfy a requirement laid down in section 39 of the 1995 Act, specifically that it had not possessed the property in question on the day of entry into force of the Act relied upon. The Governor further held that: “... in the circumstances of the case, section 40 of the Act likewise cannot be applied because the property in question is located on territory which was not part of Poland before 1 September 1939. The fact that the property was owned by an organisational unit of the Baptist Church operating in the German Reich does not constitute a basis to claim return of ownership because its ownership was transferred to the State under the [1946 Decree].” 18. On 23 September 1996 the applicant church appealed against this decision to the Minister of the Interior and Administration. 19. On 18 February 1998 the applicant church sent a letter to the Minister, specifying that the time-limits laid down in the Code of Administrative Proceedings had been exceeded and requested that the Minister issue a decision. 20. On 1 July 1998 the Minister replied that the length of the proceedings was attributable to amendments of the 1995 Act and informed the applicant church that the relevant decision would be issued by 15 August 1998. 21. This time-limit was not respected and therefore, on 12 January 1999, the applicant church lodged with the Supreme Administrative Court a complaint in respect of the alleged inactivity of the administrative authority. 22. On 5 March 1999, before examination of the applicant church’s complaint, the Minister of the Interior and Administration issued a decision, annulling the challenged decision and ordering the return of the case to the Governor. The Minister ordered that, when re-examining the case, the Governor should take into account the amended section 4 of the 1995 Act. 23. In view of the fact that the Minister had issued a decision, on 28 April 1999 the applicant church withdrew the complaint of 12 January 1999 concerning the inactivity of the administrative authority. 24. After remittal of the case, on 24 March 1999, the Governor of Lower Silesia (Wojewoda Dolnośląski) asked the Wrocław Commune whether there was any property available which could be granted to the applicant church in return for the property in question. It appears that the Governor’s letter was left without reply. 25. On 29 May 1999 the Governor requested from the Minister of the Interior and Administration an official interpretation of the amended section 4 of the 1995 Act “in view of the many doubts as regards the proper interpretation of this provision”. 26. On 20 June 2000 the Minister replied that, since the administrative authorities were bound by provisions of law binding on the day of decision, it was irrelevant that the applicant church’s original request had been lodged when section 4 of the 1995 Act had had different wording. 27. On 21 July 2000 the applicant church asked the Governor to issue a decision in its case, pointing out that the time-limits laid down in the Code of Administrative Proceedings had been exceeded. 28. On 20 October 2000 the applicant church lodged a complaint (zażalenie) with the Minister of the Interior and Administration that the Governor had exceeded the statutory time-limits and had failed to issue a decision on the merits or to justify the delay in the proceedings. 29. On 7 December 2000 the applicant church lodged a complaint with the Supreme Administrative Court about the alleged inactivity of the Governor. 30. On 1 March 2001 the Minister of the Interior and Administration found the applicant church’s complaint of 20 October 2000 well founded and ordered the Governor to issue a decision on the merits before 30 April 2001. 31. On 30 April 2001 the Governor stayed the proceedings. 32. On 7 July 2001 the applicant church appealed against the decision to stay the proceedings. 33. On 17 December 2001 the Minister of the Interior and Administration allowed the appeal, finding that the proceedings should not have been stayed, annulled the challenged decision and returned the case to the Governor. 34. On 12 March 2002 the Supreme Administrative Court examined the applicant church’s complaint against the inactivity of the administrative authority and ordered the Governor of Lower Silesia to issue a decision on the merits within the time-limit of thirty days. 35. On 21 June 2002 the Governor’s office gave a decision and refused to return the property in question to the applicant church. It found that the applicant church, although registered as owner under the land-register number 945 and treated in the past by the administrative authorities as owner, had never in fact owned the property, which had only been left under the applicant church’s administration (oddane w zarząd). 36. On 12 July 2002 the applicant church appealed. 37. On 23 September 2002 the Minister of the Interior and Administration annulled the challenged decision and returned the case for re-examination to the Governor. The Minister found, among other things, that the Governor had had no right to question the validity of the entry in the land register. 38. On 23 February 2003 the applicant church complained to the Governor about the delay in the proceedings. 39. On 8 February 2007 the Governor’s office gave a procedural decision in which it held that owing to the particularly complicated nature of the case, the decision on the merits could not be issued within the statutory time-limits and set a new deadline for decision of 30 June 2007. 40. On 18 June 2007 the Governor of Lower Silesia gave a decision on the merits and refused to return to the applicant church the property in question. The Governor relied on the amended 1995 Act and found that the applicant church had failed to satisfy the requirements laid down in section 4 of the Act, namely that it could not be a legal successor of the Church which had not operated on the territory of Poland before 1 September 1939. 41. On 11 July 2007 the applicant church appealed. 42. On 6 February 2008 the Minister of the Interior and Administration upheld the challenged decision. 43. On 11 March 2008 the applicant church lodged a complaint with the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court. 44. On 12 September 2008 the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court dismissed the applicant church’s complaint. 45. On 10 November 2008 the applicant church lodged a complaint against the Regional Administrative Court’s judgment with the Supreme Administrative Court. 46. On 13 October 2009 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant church’s complaint. The judgment was served on the applicant church’s lawyer on 6 January 2010.

5. The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Weinheim. He is a campaigner against abortion and operates an anti-abortion website. 6. On 25 November 2004 and 7 December 2004 the applicant distributed leaflets in the immediate vicinity of the medical practice of Dr S. The leaflets contained, inter alia, the following text on the front page: “Did you know that Dr S. [full name and address] performs abortions that are unlawful according to the case-law of the Federal Constitutional Court?” (Wussten Sie schon, dass Dr S. ... Abtreibungen durchführt, die nach der Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts rechtswidrig sind?) Underneath, the following was in smaller type: “According to international criminal law: aggravated murder is the intentional ‘bringing-to-death’ of an innocent human being.” (Sinngemӓβ aus den internationalen Strafgesetzen: Mord ist das vorsӓtzliche “Zu-Tode-Bringen” eines unschuldigen Menschen!) The back side of the folded leaflet contained the following text: “The aggravated murder of human beings in Auschwitz was unlawful, but the morally degraded NS State allowed the aggravated murder of innocent people and did not make it subject to criminal liability.” (Die Ermordung der Menschen in Auschwitz war rechtswidrig, aber der moralisch verkommene NS-Staat hatte den Mord an den unschuldigen Menschen erlaubt und nicht unter Strafe gestellt.) The applicant further quoted parts of the Federal Constitutional Court’s leading judgment of 28 May 1993 (BVerfGE 88, 203) (see paragraph 17 below) with regard to abortion and a statement by Christoph-Wilhelm Hufeland, the personal physician of Goethe and Schiller. He also cited section 12(1) of the Conflicts in Pregnancy Act (see paragraph 17 below) and asked readers to make use of their influence on those performing and assisting in abortions. 7. By a letter of 23 December 2004 Dr S. requested that the applicant sign a declaration to cease and desist. The applicant refused and published the following statement on his website: “If Dr S. [full name], by carrying out abortions, publicly shows that he agrees with abortions, then he should stand by his opinion. Instead Dr S. considers the leaflet campaign to be slander, threatens an interim injunction and has already given his lawyer a mandate to lodge a criminal complaint for defamation/slander. We ask ourselves: Is Dr S. unprincipled and characterless?” (Wenn Dr S. mit der Durchführung von Abtreibungen öffentlich bekundet, dass er für Abtreibungen ist, dann sollte er auch dazu stehen. Stattdessen sieht Dr S. in der Flugblatt-Verteilaktion eine Rufmordkampagne, droht mit einer einstweiligen Verfügung und hat bereits seinem Rechtsanwalt die Vollmacht gegeben, eine Strafanzeige wegen Beleidigung/Verleumdung zu erwirken. Wir fragen uns: Ist Dr S. stand- und charakterlos?) 8. Subsequently Dr S. applied to the Karlsruhe Regional Court for a civil injunction ordering the applicant not to claim on the Internet that the plaintiff performed unlawful abortions and not to disseminate leaflets containing his name and the assertion that unlawful abortions were performed in his medical practice. He also lodged a claim for non-pecuniary damages in the amount of 20,000 euros (EUR) and for pre-trial legal fees. 9. On 30 September 2005, the date of the oral hearing before the Karlsruhe Regional Court, the applicant distributed a second leaflet directly in front of Dr S.’s practice. Among other places, the applicant deposited this second leaflet, in which Dr S. was not mentioned by name, into letterboxes in the immediate vicinity of the latter’s practice. The following sentence was on the front side of the leaflet: “Near you: unlawful ABORTIONS ... and YOU are silent about the AGGRAVATED MURDER of our CHILDREN?” (In Ihrer Nähe: rechtswidrige ABTREIBUNGEN ... und SIE schweigen zum MORD an unseren KINDERN?) [Emphases in original] The back of the folded leaflet contained the following text: “These pre-natal infanticides have meanwhile taken on proportions that bring to mind a new HOLOCAUST!” (Diese vorgeburtlichen Kindstötungen haben mittlerweile Ausmaße angenommen, welche an einen „neuen HOLOCAUST“ erinnern!) [Emphases in original] Farther down the leaflet read: “I’m simply unable to understand that medical personnel and doctors, who are supposed to help and save lives, stoop to take part in aggravated murder.” (Noch weniger kann ich verstehen, dass Mediziner und Ärzte, welche helfen und Leben retten sollen, sich für’s Morden hergeben) 10. On 4 November 2005 the Karlsruhe Regional Court granted the requested injunction and ordered the applicant to desist from asserting publicly, both in writing and orally, on the Internet as well as on leaflets, that the plaintiff performed unlawful abortions in his medical practice. In addition, the Regional Court awarded compensation for the pecuniary damage requested by the plaintiff (EUR 811.88) and dismissed the claim in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. 11. The court held that the applicant’s statements were protected by freedom of expression and contributed to a public debate. Moreover, they had to be classified as statements of fact and, as such, the information that abortions were unlawful was in line with the judgment of the Constitutional Court and not incorrect. However, when read in conjunction with the whole leaflet, the statements had a “pillory effect” and amounted to a serious interference with Dr S.’s personality rights, which was not justified by the applicant’s freedom of expression. The court came to this conclusion based on the facts that the applicant had singled out Dr S. by mentioning him by name and distributing the leaflets in the vicinity of his practice, that he had quoted the Federal Constitutional Court’s judgment only in parts and had omitted the parts that stated that doctors had not been subject to criminal liability, that he had implied by defining aggravated murder that Dr S. had committed this criminal offence and that he had associated Dr S. with the Holocaust. Nonetheless, in regard to non-pecuniary damage the court concluded that even though the attacks on Dr S.’s reputation had been grave enough to justify the injunction, they had not been sufficiently serious to justify non-pecuniary damage. 12. The applicant and Dr S. appealed against the Regional Court’s decision. Additionally Dr S. expanded his action to include the second leaflet (see paragraph 9 above), which subsequently became the subject matter of the judgment of the Karlsruhe Court of Appeal. 13. On 28 February 2007 the Karlsruhe Court of Appeal confirmed the reasoning of the Regional Court and in essence dismissed both appeals. However, it partly modified the Regional Court’s judgment concerning the precise wording of the requested injunction. It ordered the applicant to desist from asserting in public that Dr S. performed unlawful abortions in his medical practice and asserting in direct connection to this that “aggravated murder is the intentional ‘bringing-to-death’ of an innocent human being”. The Court of Appeal further ordered the applicant to desist from asserting that Dr S. performed unlawful abortions causing “infanticide”. At the outset, it emphasised that the applicant’s view that abortions should be subject to criminal liability and were not compatible with higher-ranking law fell within the applicant’s freedom of expression. However, the court also noted that the very wording of the applicant’s statements showed that he labelled abortions, as performed by the plaintiff, aggravated murder, which could not be tolerated, neither if the statements were considered statements of fact nor if considered value judgments. In the court’s view the applicant had created an unacceptable “pillory effect” by singling out the plaintiff, who had not given the applicant any reason to do so. In that regard the court noted that Dr S. had not been involved in the public debate about abortions in any way. 14. In regard to the second leaflet the Court of Appeal held that even though Dr S. had not been mentioned by name, it had referred to him as it had been distributed in front of his medical practice and deposited in letterboxes in the vicinity. Similarly to the first leaflet, a not negligible part of the readers would have understood from the leaflet that Dr S.’s professional activities had constituted aggravated murder. However, even if understood in a non-legal sense, the leaflet had made it understood that the applicant had conducted illegal and punishable abortions. Since the applicant had not clarified that he had only been criticising abortions, which were according to the case-law of the Federal Constitutional Court (see paragraph 17 below) unlawful but not subject to criminal liability, he had exceeded the limits of justifiable criticism. As to the claim for damages the Court of Appeal upheld the first‑instance judgment. It also did not grant leave to appeal on points of law. 15. On 29 May 2007 the Federal Court of Justice refused a request by the applicant for legal aid for his complaint against the denial of leave to appeal on points of law on the grounds that the applicant’s intended appeal on points of law lacked sufficient prospect of success. 16. On 2 July 2009 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit a complaint lodged by the applicant for adjudication for being inadmissible, without providing reasons (no. 1 BvR 1659/07).

4. The facts, as submitted by the parties, are similar to those in Association “21 December 1989” and Others v. Romania (nos. 33810/07 and 18817/08, §§ 12-41, 24 May 2011). 5. The applicants or their close relatives participated in demonstrations and were injured or killed by gunfire during the events of December 1989 in Bucharest, Slobozia, Târgoviște and Reșița, which led to the fall of the communist regime. 6. In 1990 the military prosecutor’s offices from several cities opened on their own motion criminal investigations into the use of violence against the demonstrators. The applicants’ injury and their close relatives’ deaths were investigated along with most of the cases in a main criminal investigation recorded in file no. 97/P/1990 (current no. 11/P/2014). 7. The most important procedural steps were mentioned in Association “21 December 1989” and Others (cited above, §§ 12-41) and in Sidea and Others v. Romania ([Committee] no. 889/15, §§ 8-11, 5 June 2018). Subsequent relevant developments of the criminal investigation are as follows. 8. On 1 November 2016 the military prosecutor ordered the initiation in rem of a criminal investigation for the offence of crimes against humanity in respect of the same circumstances of fact. Up to February 2017 further steps were taken in gathering information from domestic authorities, the prosecutor’s office contacting 211 civil parties, questioning members of the political party which took over the presidency at the time of events, planning the taking of evidence from military officers and other participants in the events, verifying the activity of the relevant military units and the audio/video recordings broadcast by radio and television. 9. From March 2017 the military prosecutor examined military and civilian archives, including the vast archives of the Romanian Senate. They also viewed and transcribed more than 400 hours of audio/video recordings. They proceeded with the re-examination of several witnesses. They questioned military personnel involved in the December 1989 military operations and fifty-one members of the political party which ruled at the time and of other authorities. They verified the documents indicating the military units’ actions from that period. 10. At the date of the latest information communicated by the parties to the Court (29 March 2018), the criminal investigation was still ongoing.

5. The applicant was born in 1942 and lives in Maribor. 6. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (“the SFRY”) was a federal State composed of six republics: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, Montenegro and Macedonia. Nationals of the SFRY had “dual citizenship” for internal purposes, that is to say they were citizens of both the SFRY and one of the six republics. They had freedom of movement within the federal State and could register as permanent residents wherever they settled on its territory. 7. The SFRY had two pension systems – military and civil. The pension rights of military personnel were regulated by and secured through the federal authorities. In particular, members of the Yugoslav People’s Army (hereinafter “the YPA”), the armed forces of the SFRY, paid their contributions to and received their pensions from a special military pension fund based in Belgrade (Zavod za socialno osiguranje vojnih osiguranika, hereinafter “the YPA Fund”). The YPA Fund paid pensions to military pensioners irrespective of where they undertook military service or lived once retired. This was the only pension fund existing at federal level. In parallel, each republic had in place its own pension legislation and public pension fund set up for the payment of civil pensions. 8. Between 1991 and 1992 the SFRY broke up. On 25 June 1991 Slovenia declared its independence. 9. In 1992 the Slovenian Government issued the Ordinance on the payment of advances on military pensions (see paragraph 28 below, hereinafter “the Ordinance”) which regulated, on a temporary basis, the payment of military pensions to former YPA military personnel residing in the Republic of Slovenia who had applied for or fulfilled the conditions for retirement under the rules governing the pension and disability insurance of military personnel (hereinafter “the SFRY military rules”) by 18 October 1991, the date of withdrawal of the YPA from Slovenia (see P.P. v. Slovenia, no. 39923/98, Commission decision of 1 July 1998, Decisions and Reports (DR) 3, p. 25). This was followed in 1998 by a new Act on the Rights Stemming from the Pension and Disability Insurance of Former Military Personnel (see paragraph 29 below, hereinafter “the 1998 Act”) which put in place a comprehensive regulatory framework for the pension rights of former YPA military personnel, in most cases allowing for pensions to be paid only to Slovenian nationals. 10. In 1994 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (succeeded in 2006 by Serbia) transformed the YPA Fund (see paragraph 7 above) into the Social Insurance Fund of Military Personnel of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the basis of the Yugoslav Army Act. The (transformed) YPA Fund continued paying YPA pensions to the citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. However, it remains uncertain to what extent, if at all, the YPA Fund continued paying YPA pensions to the citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia residing in the other former SFRY republics (see also, mutatis mutandis, Kudumija v. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, and Remenović and Mašović v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, (dec.), nos. 28233/08 and 2 others, § 11, 4 June 2013). 11. At the inter-State level, however, the question of responsibility for the payment of pensions to military personnel who had acquired or applied for pensions with the YPA Fund under the rules governing the pension and disability insurance of military personnel (hereinafter “the SFRY military rules”) remained unresolved until the Agreement on Succession Issues entered into force in 2004 (see paragraph 30 below). 12. The applicant was a citizen of the Republic of Serbia in the SFRY. Following its dissolution, he retained citizenship of the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. He has been residing in Slovenia since 1964 and has had permanent resident status since 1981. In 1969 he married a Slovenian woman, with whom he had two children. He was a non-commissioned officer in active military service in the YPA until 30 September 1991, when he retired. 13. On 16 July 1991 he applied for retirement to the Maribor military district headquarters, and was then “available” (na razpolago) until his retirement. On 13 November 1991 the YPA Fund found him to be entitled to an old-age pension under the SFRY military rules as from 1 October 1991 with more than forty-one pensionable years with bonus (benificirana doba) in the YPA. The applicant maintained that he had only received his pension from the YPA Fund twice (in November 1991 and January 1992), when he had personally gone to Belgrade to collect it. 14. On 23 October 1991 the applicant applied for Slovenian citizenship under section 40 of the Citizenship Act (see paragraph 26 below). By a decision of 11 July 1992 the Ministry of Interior dismissed his application. It based its decision on section 40(3) and section 10(1)(8) of the Citizenship Act, which stipulated that the Ministry was allowed to refuse an application where there was reason to believe that the person posed a threat to public order, security or national defence. After the Constitutional Court quashed the decision and the case was remitted to the Ministry of Interior for fresh consideration, the latter on 2 September 1997 again dismissed his application on the same grounds. The applicant instituted court proceedings, which were unsuccessful. On 13 October 2005 the Constitutional Court rejected a constitutional complaint by him on the grounds that it was no longer relevant because he had acquired Slovenian citizenship in 2003 (see paragraph 19 below). 15. On 27 February 1992 the applicant applied for an advance on his military pension under the Ordinance (see paragraph 28 below). On 29 April 1993 he requested the YPA Fund to discontinue the payment of his pension. By a decision of 17 May 1993 his payments were stopped with effect from 31 January 1992. The applicant lodged this request after realising that the Pension and Disability Insurance Institute of Slovenia (hereinafter “the Institute”) only granted advances under the Ordinance provided that the YPA Fund stopped paying the pension. By a decision of 5 May 1993 the Institute found that the applicant had been entitled to such an advance starting from 1 November 1991. It held that he had been a permanent resident of Slovenia since 1 April 1981 and had fulfilled the conditions for pension entitlement under the SFRY military rules by 18 October 1991. 16. On 13 October 1998 the Institute, on the basis of section 25 of the 1998 Act (see paragraph 29 below), issued of its own motion a decision not to convert the applicant’s advance on his military pension into an old-age pension under the 1998 Act. His advance was suspended as of 31 October 1998. The Institute decided that since the applicant had been in active military service in the YPA from 25 June to 18 July 1991 and from 18 July 1991 had been on leave, he did not fulfil the statutory conditions for converting the advance on his military old-age pension into an old-age pension under section 2(1)(4) of the 1998 Act. 17. The applicant appealed, complaining that at the relevant time he had not been on leave, but had been available until his retirement. On 30 September 2002 the Institute dismissed his appeal, holding that he could not be considered a beneficiary under section 2(1) of the 1998 Act as he did not have Slovenian citizenship and did not comply with the requirements applicable to foreign beneficiaries. It added that he could re-apply for an old-age pension under the 1998 Act once he acquired Slovenian citizenship. 18. The applicant subsequently applied for judicial review of the Institute’s decision before the Ljubljana Labour and Social Court, maintaining that, as a resident of Slovenia, he should have been treated in the same way as Slovenian citizens. 19. On 1 April 2003 the applicant acquired citizenship by naturalisation under section 19 of the amended Citizenship Act read in conjunction with section 10(1) of the Citizenship Act (see paragraph 27 below). 20. On 4 June 2003, after lodging a new request with the Institute, the applicant was granted an old-age pension as from 1 April 2003. 21. On 13 January 2006 the Ljubljana Labour and Social Court dismissed the application for judicial review (see paragraph 18 above). It pointed out that the applicant’s situation had to be assessed with regard to the different categories of beneficiaries listed in section 2(1) of the 1998 Act. It concluded that the applicant had not fulfilled the conditions for an old-age pension set out in section 2(1)(2) of the 1998 Act. Likewise, as a foreigner he had not met the conditions set out in section 2(1)(4) of the 1998 Act. He had therefore been eligible for an old-age pension under section 2 of the 1998 Act only from 1 April 2003 onwards, the date on which he had acquired Slovenian citizenship. 22. The applicant lodged an appeal with the Higher Labour and Social Court. On 21 March 2007 the appeal was dismissed, essentially on the grounds that in the legally relevant period the applicant had been a foreigner who had not had rights to a pension or other benefits under the SFRY military rules by 25 June 1991 as required by section 2(1)(2) of the 1998 Act. The court held that the other provisions of section 2 of the 1998 Act were applicable only to Slovenian citizens and, thus, the applicant, who had not fulfilled the condition of nationality, should not have relied upon them. 23. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, claiming he should have been treated the same as Slovenian citizens. On 23 March 2009 it was dismissed by the Supreme Court, which followed the lower courts’ reasoning. It held that in the period at issue the applicant had not met the requirements of any of the categories of beneficiaries under section 2 of the 1998 Act, having applied for the pension under the SFRY military rules on 16 July 1991 and having only acquired Slovenian citizenship on 1 April 2003. 24. On 24 March 2010 the Constitutional Court decided not to accept a constitutional complaint by the applicant for consideration, finding that it did not concern an important constitutional issue or entail a violation of human rights which had serious consequences for him.

5. The applicant company is a limited liability company established under Lithuanian law with its registered office in Vilnius. 6. In September and October 2012, for about two weeks, the applicant company ran an advertising campaign introducing a clothing line by designer R.K. The campaign featured three visual advertisements which were displayed on twenty advertising hoardings in public areas in Vilnius and on R.K.’s website (hereinafter “the advertisements”). 7. The first of the three advertisements showed a young man with long hair, a headband, a halo around his head and several tattoos wearing a pair of jeans. A caption at the bottom of the image read “Jesus, what trousers!” (Jėzau, kokios tavo kelnės!). 8. The second advertisement showed a young woman wearing a white dress and a headdress with white and red flowers in it. She had a halo around her head and was holding a string of beads. The caption at the bottom of the image read “Dear Mary, what a dress!” (Marija brangi, kokia suknelė!). 9. The third advertisement showed the man and the woman together, wearing the same clothes and accessories as in the previous advertisements. The man was reclining and the woman was standing next to him with one hand placed on his head and the other on his shoulder. The caption at the bottom of the image read “Jesus [and] Mary, what are you wearing!” (Jėzau Marija, kuo čia apsirengę!). 10. On 28 September and 1 October 2012 the State Consumer Rights Protection Authority (Valstybinė vartotojų teisių apsaugos tarnyba – hereinafter “the SCRPA”) received four individual complaints by telephone concerning the advertisements. The individuals complained that the advertisements were unethical and offensive to religious people. 11. After receiving those complaints, the SCRPA asked the Lithuanian Advertising Agency (Lietuvos reklamos biuras – hereinafter “the LAA”), a self-regulation body composed of advertising specialists, to give an opinion on the advertisements. On 2 October 2012 a seven-member commission of the LAA decided by five votes to two that the advertisements breached the General Principles and Articles 1 (Decency) and 13 (Religion) of the Code of Advertising Ethics (see paragraph 37 below). The LAA commission held: “In the commission’s view, the advertisements may lead to dissatisfaction of religious people. [The advertisements might be seen as] humiliating and degrading people because of their faith, convictions or opinions. Religious people always react very sensitively to any use of religious symbols or religious personalities in advertising, so we suggest avoiding the possibility of offending their dignity. In this case the game has gone too far. (Šiuo atveju užsižaista per daug.) Humour is understandable but it can really offend religious people. We suggest finding other characters for communicating the uniqueness of the product. ... It is recommended ... to have regard for the feelings of religious people, to take a more responsible attitude towards religion-related topics in advertising, and to stop the dissemination of the advertisements or change the characters depicted therein.” 12. On 8 October 2012 the SCRPA received a complaint from a law firm in Kaunas concerning the advertisements. The complaint stated that the advertisements degraded religious symbols, offended the feelings of religious people and created “a danger that society might lose the necessary sense of sacredness and basic respect for spirituality” (kyla pavojus visuomenei nustoti būtinos sakralumo pajautos ir elementarios pagarbos dvasingumui). It asked the SCRPA to fine the applicant company and to order it to remove the advertisements as being contrary to public order and public morals. 13. The SCRPA forwarded the aforementioned complaints and the LAA opinion (see paragraphs 10-12 above) to the State Inspectorate of Non-Food Products (Valstybinė ne maisto produktų inspekcija – hereinafter “the Inspectorate”). On 9 October 2012 the Inspectorate informed the applicant company that the advertisements were possibly in violation of Article 4 § 2 (1) of the Law on Advertising as being contrary to public morals (see paragraph 34 below). It stated: “The Inspectorate, having examined the material presented to it, is of the view that the advertisements use religious symbols in a disrespectful and inappropriate manner. Religious people always react very sensitively to any use of religious symbols or religious personalities in advertising. The use of religious symbols for superficial purposes may offend religious people. Advertisements must not include statements or visuals which are offensive to religious feelings or show disrespect for religious people.” 14. The applicant company submitted written explanations to the Inspectorate. It firstly submitted that in the advertisements the word “Jesus” was used not as an address to a religious personality but as an emotional interjection which was common in spoken Lithuanian, similar to “oh my God!”, “oh Lord!”, “God forbid!” (Dievuliau, Viešpatie, gink Dieve) and many others. The applicant company argued that, because of its common use to express one’s emotions, that word had lost its exclusively religious significance. It further submitted that the people depicted in the advertisements could not be unambiguously considered as resembling religious figures, but even if they were, that depiction was aesthetically pleasant and not disrespectful, unlike various kitschy and low-quality religious items typically sold in markets. It further contended that, in the absence of a State religion in Lithuania, the interests of one group – practising Catholics – could not be equated to those of the entire society. It lastly submitted that the LAA opinion had been based on emotional assessment but not on any proven facts, as demonstrated in particular by such phrases as “religious people always react very sensitively to any use of religious symbols or religious personalities in advertising” or “the game has gone too far” (see paragraph 11 above). The applicant company therefore argued that the advertisements had not breached any law and that holding to the contrary would be detrimental to the right to freedom of thought and expression, protected by the Constitution. 15. On 27 November 2012 the Inspectorate drew up a report of a violation of the Law on Advertising against the applicant company. The report essentially repeated the contents of the Inspectorate’s previous letter to the applicant company (see paragraph 13 above), adding that “advertisements of such nature offend[ed] religious feelings” and “the basic respect for spirituality [was] disappearing” (nelieka elementarios pagarbos dvasingumui). It was forwarded to the SCRPA. 16. On 29 January 2013 the SCRPA asked the Lithuanian Bishops Conference (Lietuvos vyskupų konferencija), which is the territorial authority of the Roman Catholic Church in Lithuania, for an opinion on the advertisements. On 5 March 2013 the latter submitted the following opinion: “Religious symbols are not just simple signs, pictures or logos. In the Christian tradition, a religious symbol is a visible sign representing the invisible sacred reality. The advertisements ... make both visual and written references to religious sacred objects, such as a rosary, the names of Jesus and Mary, and the symbol of the Pietà. Christ and Mary, as symbols of faith, represent certain moral values and embody ethical perfection, and for that they are examples of appropriate behaviour and desirable life for the faithful. The inappropriate depiction of Christ and Mary in the advertisements encourages a frivolous attitude towards the ethical values of the Christian faith, and promotes a lifestyle which is incompatible with the principles of a religious person. The persons of Christ and Mary are thereby degraded as symbols of the sacredness of the Christian faith. For that reason, such depiction offends the feelings of religious people. The degrading and distortion of religious symbols by purposely changing their meaning is contrary to public morals, especially when it is done in pursuit of commercial gain, and must therefore not be allowed, in line with Article 4 of the Law on Advertising.” 17. On 21 March 2013 the SCRPA held a meeting in which representatives of the applicant company, the State Inspectorate of Non‑Food Products and the Lithuanian Bishops Conference participated. A representative of the Bishops Conference repeated its previous position (see paragraph 16 above) and stated that it had received complaints from about a hundred religious individuals concerning the advertisements. Representatives of the applicant company also expressed essentially the same position as in their previous submissions to the Inspectorate (see paragraph 14 above). They in particular argued that the people depicted in the advertisements differed in several aspects from the depiction of Jesus and Mary in religious art, and that an educated and cosmopolitan society would not equate every picture with such art. They further submitted that the advertisements had relied on wordplay and they had been meant to be funny but not to offend anyone. 18. On the same day the SCRPA adopted a decision against the applicant company concerning a violation of Article 4 § 2 (1) of the Law on Advertising (see paragraph 34 below). It noted that the concept of “public morals” was not defined in any legal instruments, but it necessarily implied respect for the rights and interests of others. It also stated that “advertising must be tasteful and correspond to the highest moral standards” and that “advertising which might humiliate or degrade people because of their faith, convictions or opinions must be considered immoral and unacceptable”. The SCRPA considered that “the elements of the advertisements taken together – the persons, symbols and their positioning – would create an impression for the average consumer that the depicted persons and objects were related to religious symbols”. It further stated: “When determining whether the use of religious symbols in the present case was contrary to public morals, [the SCRPA] notes that religious people react very sensitively to any use of religious symbols or religious persons in advertising, especially when the chosen form of artistic expression is not acceptable to society – for example, the bodies of Jesus and Mary are adorned with tattoos. [The SCRPA] also agrees with the Lithuanian Bishops Conference that the use of religious symbols for commercial gain in the present case exceeds the limits of tolerance. [The SCRPA] considers that using the name of God for commercial purpose is not in line with public morals. With that in mind, [the SCRPA] notes that the inappropriate depiction of Christ and Mary in the advertisements in question encourages a frivolous attitude towards the ethical values of the Christian faith, promotes a lifestyle which is incompatible with the principles of a religious person, and that way the persons of Christ and Mary are degraded as the sacred symbols of Christianity ... In addition, the inappropriate depiction of Christ and Mary in the advertisements was not only likely to offend the feelings of religious people but actually offended them because [the SCRPA] has received complaints about them ... and the Lithuanian Bishops Conference has received a letter expressing dissatisfaction of the [nearly a hundred] religious individuals, which demonstrates that the feelings of religious people have been offended. It must be emphasised that respect for religion is undoubtedly a moral value. Accordingly, disrespecting religion breaches public morals.” 19. Accordingly, the SCRPA concluded that the advertisements had breached Article 4 § 2 (1) of the Law on Advertising (see paragraph 34 below). When determining the penalty, it took into account several circumstances: the advertisements had been displayed in public places and must have reached a wide audience, and there had been complaints about them; at the same time, the advertisements had only been displayed for a few weeks and only in the city of Vilnius; the applicant company had stopped displaying them after it had been warned by the authorities, and it had cooperated with the SCRPA; it had been the first such violation committed by the applicant company. As a result, the applicant company was given a fine of 2,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL – approximately 580 euros (EUR); see paragraph 36 below). 20. The applicant company brought a complaint concerning the SCRPA’s decision (see paragraphs 18 and 19 above) before an administrative court. It argued that the persons and objects shown in the advertisements were not related to religious symbols: neither the characters themselves nor their clothes, positions or facial expressions were similar to the depiction of Jesus Christ and the Virgin Mary in religious art; the only physical similarity was the long hair of the man but every man with long hair could not be presumed to be a depiction of Jesus. The applicant company also submitted that the expressions “Jesus!”, “Dear Mary!” and “Jesus [and] Mary!” were widely used in spoken language as emotional interjections, and the advertisements had used them for the purpose of wordplay, not as a reference to religion. 21. The applicant company further argued that the Law on Advertising did not explicitly prohibit all use of religious symbols in advertising but only when such use may offend the sentiments of others or incite hatred (see paragraph 34 below). It submitted that the advertisements were not offensive or disrespectful in any way, and that the SCRPA had not justified why they “exceeded the limits of tolerance” or why “using the name of God for commercial purposes [was] not in line with public morals” (see paragraph 18 above). The applicant company also submitted that complaints by a hundred individuals (see paragraphs 10, 12 and 17 above) were not sufficient to find that the majority of religious people in Lithuania had been offended by the advertisements. 22. Lastly, the applicant company submitted that the advertisements were a product of artistic activity and were therefore protected freedom of expression, guaranteed by the Constitution. 23. On 12 November 2013 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court dismissed the applicant company’s complaint. The court considered that the SCRPA had correctly assessed all the relevant circumstances (see paragraphs 18 and 19 above), and concluded that “the form of advertising used by [the applicant company was] prohibited because it distort[ed] the main purpose of a religious symbol (an object of religion) respected by a religious community – that purpose being to refer to a deity or to holiness”. 24. The applicant company appealed against that decision. In its appeal it repeated the arguments raised in its initial complaint (see paragraphs 20‑22 above). It also provided four examples of other advertisements for various products which had depicted religious figures, religious symbols and Catholic priests – one of those was an advertisement for beer depicting a wooden figure of Jesus, common in the Lithuanian folk art (Rūpintojėlis). The applicant company argued that such examples strengthened its argument that the use of religious symbols in advertising was not prohibited as such, unless it was offensive or hateful – and it submitted that its advertisements did not fall into either of those categories, as they did not include any slogans or visuals directly degrading religious people or inciting religious hatred. 25. On 25 April 2014 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant company’s appeal. The court held: “The entirety of the evidence in the present case gives grounds to conclude that the advertisements displayed by [the applicant company] are clearly contrary to public morals, because religion, as a certain type of world view, unavoidably contributes to the moral development of the society; symbols of a religious nature occupy a significant place in the system of spiritual values of individuals and the society, and their inappropriate use demeans them [and] is contrary to universally accepted moral and ethical norms. The form of advertising [chosen by the applicant company] does not conform to good morals and to the principles of respecting the values of the Christian faith and its sacred symbols, and [the advertisements] therefore breach Article 4 § 2 (1) of the Law on Advertising. ... In its appeal [the applicant company] alleges that there are no objective grounds to find that the advertisements offended the feelings of religious people ... It must be noted that the case file includes a letter by almost one hundred religious individuals, sent to the Lithuanian Bishops Conference, expressing dissatisfaction with the advertisements in question. This refutes [the applicant company’s] arguments and they are thereby dismissed as unfounded.” 26. On 21 August 2014 the President of the Supreme Administrative Court asked that court to examine whether there were grounds for reopening the proceedings in the applicant company’s case (see paragraphs 40 and 41 below). He considered that it was necessary to assess whether the decision of 25 April 2014 (see paragraph 25 above) had adequately addressed the applicant company’s arguments related to the permissible restrictions of freedom of expression, guaranteed by the Constitution and various international legal instruments, and whether it had properly examined the necessity and proportionality of restricting that freedom, in line with the relevant case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. The President submitted that if any such shortcomings were identified, that would give grounds to believe that the Supreme Administrative Court had incorrectly applied the substantive law and that its case-law was developing in an erroneous direction. 27. On 20 November 2014 a different panel of the Supreme Administrative Court refused to reopen the proceedings in the applicant company’s case. It emphasised that proceedings which had been concluded by a final court decision could be reopened only when there had been a manifest error in the interpretation or application of the law, and not when it was merely possible to interpret that law differently. 28. The court observed that the freedom of expression, guaranteed by the Constitution, was not absolute and could be restricted (see paragraphs 31 and 42-44 below), and one of the permissible restrictions was provided in Article 4 § 2 (1) of the Law on Advertising (see paragraph 34 below). It stated that the decision of 25 April 2014 (see paragraph 25 above) had not denied the applicant company’s right to freedom of expression, but it had sought to balance that right against public morals, and the latter had been given priority. The court considered that the decision of 25 April 2014 had not denied the essence of the applicant company’s right and had not been manifestly disproportionate because the fine had been close to the minimum provided in law (see paragraph 36 below), so there were no grounds to find that the law had been interpreted or applied incorrectly. 29. The court further observed that the advertisements had had a purely commercial purpose and had not been intended to contribute to any public debate concerning religion or religious symbols. Referring to the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in Müller and Others v. Switzerland (24 May 1988, § 35, Series A no. 133) and Otto‑Preminger‑Institut v. Austria (20 September 1994, § 50, Series A no. 295‑A), it stated that it was not possible to discern throughout Europe a uniform conception of the significance of religion in society and that even within a single country such conceptions might vary; for that reason it was not possible to arrive at a comprehensive definition of what constituted a permissible interference with the exercise of the right to freedom of expression where such expression was directed against the religious feelings of others, and a certain margin of appreciation was therefore to be left to the national authorities in assessing the existence and extent of the necessity of such interference. The Supreme Administrative Court considered that the panel which had adopted the decision of 25 April 2014 had taken into account the fact that Catholicism was the religion of a very big part of the Lithuanian population and that the use of its most important symbols in the advertisements, which distorted their meaning, offended the feelings of religious people. 30. The Supreme Administrative Court thus concluded that the decision of 25 April 2014 had adequately justified the restriction of the applicant company’s freedom of expression and had correctly applied Article 4 § 2 (1) of the Law on Advertising.

4. The applicant was born in 1963 and at the time of lodging his application he was serving his prison sentence in the Bolu F-type prison. 5. On 3 December 2007 the applicant wrote a letter to the Ministry of Justice, in which he had praised the imprisoned leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan by using the honorific “sayın”, meaning esteemed. 6. Pursuant to the Regulations on the administration of penitentiary institutions and the execution of sentences, the applicant was found guilty of breaching prison order by the Bolu F- type Prison Disciplinary Board (referred hereafter as “the Board”). 7. On 12 December 2007 the applicant was sentenced to 11 days’ solitary confinement on the orders of the Board, on account of his statements in the above mentioned letter. 8. On 25 December 2007 the Bolu Enforcement Judge rejected the applicant’s objection. 9. On 15 January 2008 the Bolu Assize Court upheld the judgment of 25 December 2007.

4. Ms Bazanova (“the first applicant”) was born on 4 December 1964 and lives in Serpukhov. 5. On 6 October 2009 the first applicant, deputy head of the municipal administration at the time, was arrested on the charges of abuse of power and bribery. Ts. and K. alleged that they had bribed the first applicant in order to facilitate the purchase of plots of land. 6. On 19 November 2010 the Moscow Regional Court opened the trial in the first applicant’s case. 7. On 23 March 2011 K. complained to the court that certain publications about the trial had an adverse effect on his private life. The information disclosed had been damaging to his reputation. His statements had been taken out of context and misconstrued. He also alleged that unknown persons had followed and threatened him in the courthouse. 8. On the same date Ts. lodged a similar complaint with the court. He alleged that the publications in the local newspaper about the trial and his role in it had been damaging to his reputation. 9. On 24 March 2011 the prosecutor asked the court to hold the trial in camera. He relied on the complaints lodged by K. and Ts. The court granted the prosecutor’s request and decided to hold the trial in camera in order to protect the interests of the witnesses. 10. On 11 August 2011 the Regional Court found the first applicant guilty on two counts of abuse of power and two counts of bribery and sentenced her to 7.5 years’ imprisonment and a monetary fine. The first applicant appealed. 11. On 12 October 2011, having heard the judge rapporteur, the prosecutor, the first applicant and her counsel, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the first applicant’s conviction in part (one count of abuse of power and one count of bribery in respect of Ts.’s attempt to purchase a plot of land) and quashed it in part (one count of abuse of power and one count of bribery in respect of K.’s attempt to purchase a plot of land) remitting the matter for fresh consideration. The court also reduced the first applicant’s sentence and the amount of the fine. 12. On 8 October 2013 the Regional Court found the first applicant guilty as charged, as regards charges of abuse of power and bribery in respect of the bribe paid by K., and sentenced her cumulatively to 7 years and 3 months’ imprisonment and a monetary fine. The court held a public hearing. It appears that the first applicant did not appeal against the judgment of 8 October 2013. 13. Mr Mukhachev (“the second applicant”), was born on 29 December 1976 and lived, prior to his conviction, in Zheleznodorozhniy, Moscow Region. 14. On 4 August 2009 the second applicant was arrested on the charges of extremism and fraud. He remained in custody pending investigation and trial. 15. On 31 March 2011 the Savelovskiy District Court of Moscow fixed the trial for 14 April 2011. The court decided to hold the trial in camera in order to ensure security for the parties to the proceedings and their family members. 16. On 30 September 2011 the District Court found the second applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to 9 years’ imprisonment. The second applicant appealed. 17. On 14 December 2011, having heard the judge rapporteur, the prosecutor, the second applicant and his counsel and the counsel for the civil party, the Moscow City Court upheld, in substance, the second applicant’s conviction on appeal.

5. The applicants’ particulars appear in the appendix to this judgment. 6. During 1991 and 1992 Serbian paramilitary forces gained control of about a third of the territory of Croatia and proclaimed the “Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina” (Srpska autonomna oblast Krajina, hereinafter “Krajina”). At the beginning of August 1995 the Croatian authorities announced their intention to take military action with the aim of regaining control over Krajina. The operation was codenamed “Storm” (Oluja) and took place from 4 to 7 August 1995. Before the military action, the vast majority of the population of Krajina fled Croatia. Most of them went to Bosnia and Herzegovina but some also went to Serbia. Some returned to Croatia after the war. The number of people who fled is estimated at between 100,000 and 150,000. 7. On 5 November 1997 Croatia ratified the Convention. 8. The applicants and P.M. (born in 1942), who was the husband of one of the applicants and the father of the others, lived in Razbojište, near the larger village of Krupa, on the territory of Krajina. During the night of 4 to 5 August 1995 all the family, save for P.M., fled Croatia. P.M. was killed during Operation Storm on 5 August 1995. According to the applicants, P.M. was killed in the courtyard of his house in Razbojište, although he was an unarmed civilian. According to the Government, he was armed and was killed in an exchange of fire with the Croatian Army in the broader area of Krupa. The villages of Razbojište, Krupa and Žegar and the settlement of Milići are located near each other. 9. On 11 October 1995 the police found the remains of an unidentified person in Razbojište and they were buried in Gračac Cemetery under the number 434. 10. On June 2002 exhumations were carried out at Gračac Cemetery. The process was conducted under the auspices of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (Međunarodni kazneni sud za bivšu Jugoslaviju) and the County State Attorney’s Office in Zadar. Body no. 434 was also dug up and an identity card was found in the name of P.M. The remains were examined at the Institute for Forensic Medicine in Zagreb (Zavod za sudsku medicinu i kriminalistiku) and on 15 October 2002 an autopsy report was issued which concluded that the cause of death had been three wounds from shelling. On 24 November 2003 the third applicant identified the remains as those of her father, P.M. 11. The police opened an investigation into the circumstances of P.M.’s death after the applicants on 5 September 2005 brought a claim for damages with the State Attorney’s Office in connection with his killing (see paragraph 20 below). 12. On 21 October 2005 the police interviewed Ž.M., who said that P.M. had joined a village guard unit during the war. Ž.M. did not know who might have killed P.M. 13. On 11 August 2015 the Zadar police received an anonymous letter stating that on 10 August 1995 two men, V.G. and M.B., had killed twelve elderly people in the village of Žegar in the “Milića” cave, near Krupa. 14. On 25 August 2015 the police interviewed O.M. and S.M., residents of Žegar. O.M. said that he had never heard of someone being killed in the “Milića” cave even though he had lived all his life in the area. He also said that during Operation Storm five people from the settlement called Milići, part of the village of Žegar, had been killed, including P.M. They had all been members of the paramilitary forces and had been armed. He had heard that they all had perished in rocky areas of the village but did not know the cause and manner of their deaths. 15. On 26 August 2015 the Zadar police informed the Zadar County State Attorney’s Office that five persons had been killed in the settlement of Milići during Operation Storm, one of whom was P.M., who had died on 5 August 1995. 16. On 14 September 2015 the police interviewed V.G., a captain in the Croatian Army during Operation Storm, who had been in command of the Zadar Military Police Third Company of the 72nd Battalion, who said that he had never been to Žegar and had never heard of anyone being killed there. He had been in Benkovac (a town situated some forty kilometres from Žegar) throughout Operation Storm. He had also said that he could state with certainty that none of the members of his unit had committed any crimes, otherwise he would have known about it. 17. On 16 September 2015 the police interviewed M.B., a Croatian soldier and member of the 72nd Battalion during Operation Storm. He also said that he had never been to Žegar and had never heard of anyone being killed there. He had been near Obrovac (a town situated some twenty kilometres from Žegar) during the military operation. 18. On 1 October 2015 the Zadar County State Attorney’s Office closed the investigation. 19. On 22 January 2016 the Zadar County State Attorney’s Office informed its counterpart in Split County that it had not been able to confirm the allegations made in the anonymous letter of 11 August 2015 as there was no indication that twelve elderly people had been killed in the “Milića” cave. However, five members of the Serbian paramilitary forces had been killed during Operation Storm, including P.M. Enquiries had therefore been stopped since the information given in the anonymous letter had proved to be unreliable. 20. On 5 September 2005 the applicants submitted a claim for damages with the State Attorney’s Office in connection with the killing of P.M. The request was refused. On 12 April 2006 the applicants brought a civil action against the State in the Zagreb Municipal Court, seeking compensation in connection with P.M.’s death. The claim was dismissed on 30 March 2010 on the grounds that it had not been established how P.M. had been killed and that the applicants had not proved that his killing had amounted to a terrorist act for which the State was liable. It had also not been established that he had been killed by members of the Croatian army or police in areas where there had been no operations related to the war. In addition, the claim had become statute‑barred. During the proceedings information was obtained from the archives of the Ministry of Defence showing that the Croatian army had entered the area in question on 6 August 1995, whereas P.M. had been killed on 5 August 1995. The first-instance court also accepted the statement of the witness O.M., who said that the village of Žegar had been shelled on 5 August 1995. The first-instance judgment was upheld by the Zagreb County Court on 21 September 2010. On 10 June 2014 the Supreme Court upheld the lower courts’ judgments in respect of the ruling that the applicants’ claim had become statute-barred. 21. A constitutional complaint lodged by the applicant was dismissed on 25 February 2015.

4. The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Moscow. From 1995 until his retirement on 21 August 2006 he was a prosecutor of the North-Western District of Moscow. 5. On 29 May 2007 the Moscow city public prosecutor’s office opened a criminal investigation into the recent activities of a group of former and acting law-enforcement officers and officials. 6. On 24 April 2008 the applicant was arrested and remanded in custody pending investigation and trial (see Valeriy Samoylov v. Russia, no. 57541/09, 24 January 2012). 7. On 23 July 2009 the prosecutor completed the investigation in respect of fifteen suspects, including the applicant, and transferred the case to the Moscow City Court. 8. On 5 August the City Court held a preliminary hearing and decided not to allow access to the public for hearings of the criminal case. In particular, the court held as follows: “[The court] will examine the present case in camera. The case file contains information classified as state secrets and the disclosure of this information might have a serious adverse effect on the interests of society and the State.” 9. On 24 May 2010 the jury delivered a guilty verdict in the applicant’s case. 10. On 9 June 2010 the City Court sentenced the applicant to nine years’ imprisonment and a fine in the amount of 500,000 roubles (RUB). The applicant appealed, complaining in particular about the lack of a public hearing. 11. On 16 November 2010 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation held an appeal hearing. The court heard the prosecutor, the civil party, the defendants, including the applicant, and their counsel. The court upheld, in substance, and reduced the applicant’s sentence to eight years’ imprisonment. As regards the applicant’s complaint about the lack of public hearing, the court stated as follows: “... the [trial] court justified its decision to hear the case in camera. The case file contains documents constituting State secrets and the disclosure of such information might entail a serious violation of the [interests] of society and the State.” 12. On 10 September 2009 the main national television channel broadcast a programme on the circumstances of the criminal case against the applicant. The presenter stated that the applicant, a former district prosecutor, lived on unearned income and that the value of his assets significantly exceeded his revenues. He further claimed that the value of the applicant’s house was 2 million United States dollars (USD). The programme featured footage of the applicant’s two-storey house and its interior and the tax declarations of the applicant and the members of his family. A photograph of the applicant in his prosecutor’s uniform was also shown. 13. On an unspecified date the applicant and his wife brought a civil action for damages against the television channel, arguing, inter alia, that the respondent company had failed to obtain their consent for disclosure of their personal data, including the tax information and the footage of their house and its interior. 14. On 18 May 2010 the Ostankinskiy District Court dismissed the applicant’s claims in full. In particular, the court ruled: “The mass media have repeatedly reported, and continue to report, on the financial situation and revenues of high-ranking officials. Accordingly, the court considers it possible to refer to the case-law of the [European Court of Human Rights] and notes, in particular, that journalistic freedom also covers possible recourse to a degree of exaggeration, or even provocation. [The court referred to Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria (26 April 1995, Series A no. 313).] Regard being had to the above, the court accepts that the exact value of the house owned by the plaintiffs, the exact amount of their incomes and the exact amount of their real property, in the circumstances of the case, are immaterial. The most important issue is that the value of their house does not correspond to their income. ... According to the investment agreement ... the value of the house was estimated at ... USD 60,000 ..., which did not include the cost of the interior, including the installation of a winding staircase and a jacuzzi ... [One of the plaintiffs’ witnesses] submitted that [the applicant] had been offered a reduced price for the house because of his friendship with the management of the construction company ... [The court] finds it incompatible with the standing of the prosecutor. [The court] further takes into account that the plaintiffs had their title to the house registered on the basis of the purchase agreement ... Accordingly, in addition to the amount paid under the investment agreement ... the plaintiffs paid a significant sum of money which exceeded their income ... and the amount they received when they sold their three‑roomed flat ... for the equivalent of USD 50,000 ... ... Pursuant to [the Russian Federal Law on the Mass Media], a journalist must obtain consent for the disclosure of information concerning a person’s private life from that person or his representative, except when such disclosure is necessary for the protection of public interests. [The court] considers that this rule applied when [the journalist] disclosed information concerning the income of the prosecutor’s family. This is justified by the public interest. The question raised in the programme about the public servant’s income and the value of his property is a matter of public interest. The Court considers that [the applicant’s] claims that the respondent party should retract the information presented in the TV show that [the applicant] was involved in criminal activities and had received unlawfully from an entrepreneur USD 500,000 should also be dismissed. ... ... [the journalist] presented in the show evidence contained in the criminal case file, including a certificate showing the plaintiffs’ revenues, video footage featuring the plaintiffs’ house, and excerpts from their telephone conversations. The journalist obtained those materials lawfully, with the investigator’s approval. The journalist assessed that evidence. The veracity of his assessment cannot be subject to verification given that such verification should be carried out [in the course of the criminal investigation]. ... According to Ms Samoylova (the applicant’s wife and a plaintiff), the Moscow City Court is examining a criminal case against [the applicant] ... [The court considers] that the journalist presented to the public his opinion that there is evidence confirming that [the applicant] is implicated in the commission of the offences he is charged with; [the journalist] commented on the criminal investigation, showed evidence collected and assessed it. ... ... The court considers that [the journalist] produced evidence confirming his statements about the [applicant’s] involvement in illegal activities and dismisses the plaintiffs’ claims.” 15. On 20 December 2010 the City Court upheld the judgment of 18 May 2010 on appeal.

5. The applicant was born in 1980. He is currently serving a prison sentence in Bezhetsk, Tver Region. 6. On 10 July 2005 the body of B., a police driver with the Ruza District Police Department of the Moscow region (ОВД Рузского района Московской области), was found with multiple injuries near the village of Baranovo in the Ruza District. The next day the Ruza town prosecutor’s office opened criminal investigation into B.’s murder. 7. On 11 July 2005 at night the applicant was arrested in P.’s house by three police officers. According to him, he did not resist the arrest, but the police officers kicked and punched him on the legs, in the kidneys and around the groin region at least seven times. After the arrest he was taken to a temporary detention facility (IVS) located on the premises of the Ruza district police department. Then two police officers took him out of the cell and led him to a room. There one of the officers hit the applicant with a rubber truncheon all over his body about twelve times. Then they brought him back to the IVS cell. Soon afterwards another officer entered the cell and punched the applicant in the face and body about five times. During the ill-treatment the officers demanded that the applicant confess to B.’s murder. 8. At 4.05 a.m. on 11 July 2005 in the IVS, L., an investigator with the Ruza town prosecutor’s office, drew up a record of the applicant’s arrest. Between 3.05 p.m. and 5.20 p.m. the applicant was examined as a suspect in the presence of a State-appointed lawyer, K., in the IVS. The applicant confessed to the crime, stating that he had inflicted several blows to the victim’s body. It was stated in the record of the interview that the applicant had been informed of his right under Article 51 of the Constitution not to incriminate himself. 9. On the same day the applicant’s family members were notified of his arrest. They retained a lawyer, R., who came to see the applicant on the same day. According to the applicant, the prosecutor of the Ruza district denied R. access to him on the grounds that the latter was being examined as a suspect in the presence of the State-appointed lawyer at that moment. 10. On the evening of 11 July 2005 the applicant’s mother saw the applicant appearing in a television programme, Vremechko. According to her, he could hardly move and bore evident signs of ill-treatment. At 10.35 p.m. on the same day, R. sent a telegram to the Ruza district prosecutor’s office asking for a meeting with the applicant. He also requested the medical examination of the applicant, who had been allegedly subjected to ill-treatment in the IVS. The next day R. repeated these requests in another telegram sent to the Moscow Region prosecutor’s office. 11. On 12 July 2005 the applicant was brought before a judge of the Ruza District Court, who ordered that he be placed in pre-trial detention. R., who represented the applicant at the hearing, submitted that the latter had been subjected to ill-treatment by the police officers from the moment of his arrest. The prosecutor responded that the telegrams sent by R. containing these allegations had been received and that there would be an inquiry into them. 12. According to the applicant, during the hearing on 12 July 2005 he had informed the judge and the prosecutor of his ill-treatment by police officers and had showed them traces of the beatings. However, they had remained unresponsive, not reacting to his allegations. After the hearing the escorting guards had taken the applicant to the first floor of the courthouse and subjected him to ill-treatment. They had punched him in the kidney region, demanding that he confess to the crime. The beatings had continued for about ten minutes, with breaks; afterwards the applicant had been taken to the IVS. 13. On 13 July 2005, following a meeting with the applicant, R. lodged an application with the Ruza district prosecutor’s office for the applicant’s immediate transfer to a remand centre in Mozhaysk, Moscow Region. He stated that the applicant had been subjected to ill-treatment by the police at the Ruza district police department and that the implicated police officers could interfere with the investigation of this incident. He sent a similar complaint to the Moscow Region prosecutor’s office on the following day, adding that three of B.’s brothers had worked at the Ruza district police department at the time of the applicant’s detention in that facility. According to the applicant, he was transferred to remand centre IZ‑50/4 in Mozhaysk, Moscow Region only on 24 July 2005. 14. On 12 and 13 July 2005 the applicant complained to the Moscow regional prosecutor of his alleged ill-treatment by police officers during his apprehension, while in police custody and while in the courthouse. 15. On 14 July 2005 a forensic medical expert from the Ruza Forensic Medical Bureau examined the applicant at the request of an investigator from the prosecutor’s office. The expert recorded the following injuries: (i) two bruises on the eyelids measuring 3 cm by 2.5 cm and 2.5 cm by 1.5 cm; (ii) a bruise on the chin measuring 3 cm by 3 cm, with abrasions on its surface 1.5 cm by 1.5 cm in size; (iii) eleven bruises on the back measuring from 0.3 cm by 0.7 cm to 7 cm by 1.5 cm; (iv) nineteen bruises on the chest and stomach measuring from 1 cm by 1 cm to 2 cm by 13 cm; (v) two abrasions on the left leg (from the knee to the foot) measuring 1 cm and 5 cm long, respectively, and (vi) a 6-cm-long abrasion on the internal side of the left hip. The applicant stated that the injuries had been inflicted during his arrest and while he had been in police custody by police officers who had punched and kicked him and beaten him with a truncheon. The expert concluded that the injuries could have been inflicted on the date and in the circumstances described by the applicant with a hard blunt object of limited surface area. He specified that bruises could have been inflicted with a hard blunt object of an elongated shape, and that the applicant’s injuries were unlikely to have been caused by his falling from his own height. 16. On 21 July 2005, following a pre-investigation inquiry, a deputy prosecutor of Ruza refused to institute criminal proceedings against two police officers, Sh. and D.K., for lack of the elements of a crime in their actions, and against unidentified police officers for lack of evidence of a crime in their actions. He found, in particular, that the applicant’s injuries could have been the result of the lawful use of force by Sh. and D.K. when apprehending the applicant, who had resisted arrest. They stated that they had used force lawfully during the applicant’s arrest and submitted that they had had to lay him down on the floor, and while handcuffing him, had pressed their knees into his back to keep him still. The decision stated that P., who had been present during the applicant’s arrest, had not confirmed the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment. The deputy prosecutor also considered that the applicant’s alleged ill-treatment in the IVS by unidentified police officers had not been confirmed. He relied on the statements of officers U., B. and V.P. (who had been on duty in the IVS on 11 July 2005) and denied any malpractice in respect of the applicant. 17. In August 2005 the Ruza town prosecutor made a submission (представление) to the head of the Ruza district police department, requiring him to conduct an internal inquiry into the applicant’s ill-treatment by unidentified police officers in the IVS and to subject those responsible to disciplinary proceedings. 18. R. lodged an appeal against the decision of 21 July 2005 with the Ruza District Court. On 16 August 2005 the Ruza town prosecutor annulled the decision of 21 July 2005 and ordered an additional inquiry into the applicant’s allegations of ill‑treatment. In his decision the prosecutor held that the investigator should adduce the results of the ongoing internal inquiry into the alleged unlawfulness of the applicant’s detention in the IVS, verify the applicant’s allegations, and assess them. 19. By an order of 22 August 2005 the head of the Ruza district police department reprimanded officers U. and B., who had been on duty in the IVS when the applicant had been brought there, for lack of diligence. He found that – in breach of the law on the pre-trial detention of suspected and accused persons – on 11 July 2005 two unidentified police officers had taken the applicant out of the cell and subjected him to ill-treatment. 20. On 26 June 2006 R. lodged a request with the Ruza town prosecutor to inform him of the results of the additional inquiry. On 30 June 2006 the prosecutor provided him with a copy of a decision issued by an investigator of the Ruza town prosecutor’s office dated 23 August 2005 refusing to open criminal proceedings against the police officers. The investigator of the Ruza town prosecutor’s office, N., maintained the findings made in the decision of 21 July 2005. 21. In August 2006 R. lodged an appeal against the decision of 23 August 2005 with the Ruza Town Court. He argued that the investigating authority had failed to explain the origin of the applicant’s injuries. 22. On 9 October 2006 the Ruza District Court decided that the above‑mentioned decision had been unlawful and unsubstantiated and that an additional inquiry was needed. It held that the investigator had failed to address the instructions given by the prosecutor in his decision of 16 August 2005 – in particular, to take all necessary measures to identify the culprits and to hold them criminally responsible. 23. According to the Government, on 26 October 2006 the investigator of the Ruza Town Prosecutor’s Office issued a new decision refusing to institute criminal proceedings against police officers. However, they failed to produce a copy of this decision. According to the applicant, neither he nor his lawyer was notified about it. 24. On 28 February 2006 a jury trial against the applicant and his co‑defendant began before the Moscow Regional Court. The applicant pleaded not guilty. At the hearing of 14 March 2006, L., who represented the applicant during the trial, requested that the record of the applicant’s interview as a suspect be declared inadmissible and excluded from the body of evidence. He submitted that the statements made in the course of that interview had been obtained by means of the applicant’s ill-treatment and in the presence of a State-appointed lawyer, who had not acted in the applicant’s best interests. L. also requested to examine the report of 14 July 2005 containing the results of the applicant’s forensic medical examination. 25. The trial court refused both requests, noting that the allegations of ill-treatment by the police officers were unconfirmed. It relied on the refusal of 23 August 2005 to open a criminal case on account of the alleged ill‑treatment (see paragraph 20 above), which had gone unchallenged at the time. The court also noted that the applicant had not objected to the participation of K., the State-appointed lawyer, in the proceedings and had made no remarks in the interview record to the effect that he had rejected his services. Furthermore, the court considered that the contents of the report by forensic medical expert did not constitute part of the factual circumstances to be determined by the jury. It therefore allowed to be read out before the jury the record of the applicant’s interview as a suspect of 11 July 2005. 26. On 11 April 2006 the jury found the applicant guilty of battery, the misappropriation of a car, murder, the causing of intentional damage to property, and the acquisition of property obtained in a criminal manner. The Moscow Regional Court sentenced him to eighteen years’ imprisonment. 27. The applicant lodged an appeal against the judgment with the Russian Supreme Court, complaining, inter alia, that the initial statements that he had given during the investigation had been inadmissible. 28. On 13 July 2006 the Supreme Court of Russia dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the judgment of the Moscow Regional Court. It stated that the trial court had duly assessed the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment, noting that the applicant had never denied the use of force by the police to restrain him during his apprehension. 29. On 12 October 2007, at the applicant’s lawyer’s request, the Ruza prosecutor’s office re-opened the criminal case on account of newly discovered circumstances – namely certain information in the victim’s medical records. However, the proceedings were terminated on 25 October 2007, and (following an appeal by the applicant’s lawyer) by a final decision of 18 February 2008 the Supreme Court upheld that decision.

4. The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Groznyy in the Chechen Republic. 5. On 23 June 2012 the applicant was arrested in connection with a drug-related offence and placed in custody. 6. On 14 August 2012 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Groznyy found the applicant guilty and sentenced him to one year’s imprisonment. 7. On 14 November 2012 the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic quashed the conviction and ordered a retrial. 8. On 30 May 2013 the Oktyabrskiy District Court again convicted the applicant and sentenced him to one year’s imprisonment. The court stated that the “preventive measure [should] remain unchanged until the conviction [had become] final”. 9. On 24 June 2013 counsel for the applicant asked the director of the remand prison to release the applicant since he had already served the one-year sentence. On the same day a judge of the District Court faxed a letter to the director, informing him that the applicant should not be released until the Supreme Court had examined the matter on appeal since the District Court ordered the preventive measure to remain unchanged. 10. On 3 July 2013 the Supreme Court upheld the conviction and the applicant was released.

5. On 23 December 2004 the applicants and 126 others lodged a claim with the Komárno Land Office, an authority that is now part of the Komárno District Office (“the Land Office”), for restitution of land under the Restoration of Land Ownership Act (Law no. 503/2003 Coll., as amended). 6. On 27 May 2010 the Land Office dismissed the claim on the grounds that all the claimants lacked standing to bring it. 7. On 21 November 2011 the Nitra Regional Court upheld that decision following an administrative-law appeal by the claimants, lodged on their behalf by four individuals. 8. However, following an appeal lodged by the claimants with the Supreme Court, on 29 January 2014 that court quashed the Regional Court’s judgment and remitted the case to it on the grounds that the latter had failed to establish the representatives’ authority to act on behalf of all the claimants. The proceedings before the Regional Court had been conducted merely in the presence of the designated representatives and the court had failed to summon the claimants in person and to have its judgment served on them. It had thereby breached the claimants’ right of access to a court. 9. Accordingly, it became incumbent on the Regional Court to determine anew the claimants’ administrative-law appeal against the decision of the Land Office of 27 May 2010. In those proceedings, the court invited the claimants to clarify issues concerning their legal representation with a view to ensuring that they would be represented by a common representative. 10. In a decision of 4 December 2014 the Regional Court issued several rulings. In so far as relevant for the present application, it ruled that the claimants would all be jointly represented by a lawyer who had up until then represented only some of them. 11. On 25 May 2016 the Supreme Court upheld the decision of 4 December 2014 following an appeal lodged by the claimants. 12. The proceedings are still pending before the Regional Court. 13. Meanwhile, on 21 January 2015 the Constitutional Court had rejected a complaint lodged by the applicants about the length of the proceedings in their claim, in so far as they had taken place before the Land Office and the Regional Court. The Constitutional Court held that the length of the administrative proceedings before the Land Office and of the judicial‑review proceedings held before the Regional Court could not be considered together. Having split the complaint into those two segments, the Constitutional Court rejected the complaint concerning the administrative proceedings on the grounds of non-exhaustion of ordinary remedies. In particular, it noted that the applicants had failed to challenge the alleged inactivity of the Land Office under Article 250t § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) (see paragraphs 19 et seq. in “Relevant domestic law and practice” below). As regards the judicial-review proceedings, the Constitutional Court dismissed the complaint as manifestly ill-founded. It noted that those proceedings as a whole had lasted some four and a half years. However, the case had been pending on appeal before the Supreme Court for about two years of that period. Although the length of the appellate proceedings had been unsatisfactory, as such it had not been complained of by the applicants, who had limited their compliant to the proceedings before the Regional Court. In addition, the Constitutional Court observed that the proceedings had been procedurally complex on account of the number of claimants. In sum, despite the fact that its judgment had been quashed as flawed, the length of the proceedings before the Regional Court had not been excessive.

5. The applicant was born in 1963 and is serving a prison sentence in the Perm Region. 6. The facts presented below are based on the official version of the events contained in the trial judgment of 25 July 2006. At the time, the applicant was a military deputy prosecutor. 7. On 24 January 2000 someone broke into the applicant’s flat and stole property belonging to him. The applicant suspected that the theft had been committed by K. He assigned a number of army privates to search for K. 8. On 29 January 2000 the applicant together with a group of privates and a police officer, M., broke into a flat where K. was hiding. The applicant hit and questioned K. and the latter admitted that he had robbed the applicant’s flat. The applicant and the privates took K. with them. 9. On the same date, the applicant and M. went to see Kras. at his flat. The applicant asked for the ring that K. had stolen from his flat and sold to Kras. The applicant threatened the latter with a gun and Kras. gave the ring back to the applicant. 10. In the subsequent days, the privates who were under the applicant’s direct command repeatedly beat K. As a result, K. signed a note acknowledging his debt to the applicant. On several occasions the applicant met with K.’s mother, asking her to repay K.’s debt and threatening her with negative consequences for K. should she fail to comply. 11. On an unspecified date the applicant ordered the privates to beat up Sh., who had been detained as a suspect in a criminal case. The privates complied. 12. On 26 April 2000 the applicant ordered the privates to beat up Chern., a witness in a criminal case who had refused to cooperate. The privates beat up Chern. The applicant was present and supervised the beatings. 13. On 29 April 2000 the privates beat up B., another witness in a criminal case, on the applicant’s order. The applicant was present and supervised the beatings. 14. On 8 April 2000 the applicant had a fight with Sor. during which he stabbed him. Sor. died. The applicant panicked and hid Sor.’s body in a forest nearby. The body was discovered in August 2000. 15. On 25 July 2006 the Military Court of Garrison 101 found the applicant guilty of murder, extortion and four counts of abuse of power, and sentenced him to fifteen years’ imprisonment. The court relied on forensic evidence and witnesses’ statements. The majority of the witnesses were questioned in court. Five of them did not attend and the trial judge, R., read out their statements. 16. The applicant appealed against his conviction. His main argument was that he had been wrongfully convicted. He claimed that the killing of Sor. had been justifiable as he had acted in self-defence; that he should have been acquitted of extortion; and that the prosecution had failed to prove that he had abused his power as regards the beatings of the suspects and witnesses. The applicant also claimed that, in contravention of the applicable rules of criminal procedure, during the preparation of the verdict the trial judge had repeatedly left the deliberations room and that he had prepared the text of the verdict outside Perm where the trial had been held. The applicant relied on written statements made by his counsel, B., and by M., a retired serviceman. In particular, M. submitted that in July 2006, when Judge R. had been supposed to be drafting the judgment in the applicant’s case, he had seen the judge in another town. The judge had talked openly about the applicant’s trial, telling everyone that he would find the applicant guilty and sentence him to a long term of imprisonment. The applicant also complained that the trial court had failed to question five witnesses. 17. On an unspecified date the applicant retained counsel P. On 27 March and 17 April 2007 P. submitted twelve additional statements of appeal. The appeal court refused to accept them, holding that they had been submitted outside the time-limit, given that counsel P. had not submitted the original statement of appeal. 18. Following the applicant’s appeal, on 22 June 2007 the Military Court of the Third Circuit upheld his conviction in substance. As regards the applicant’s argument that the trial court had failed to question five witnesses, the court noted that three of them had been ill and had been unable to attend the hearing. The court made no comment as regards the remaining two witnesses. It also dismissed as unsubstantiated the applicant’s allegations concerning Judge R., holding as follows: “There is no evidence showing that [Judge R.] discussed with anyone any issue relating to the [applicant’s case]. Nor does the case file contain any material confirming the [applicant’s] allegations that [Judge R.] made statements in public about the verdict he was drafting ... The allegations made in the statements of appeal do not constitute such evidence either.” 19. On an unspecified date the applicant applied for a supervisory review of his conviction. He reiterated the arguments raised in his statement of appeal. 20. On 26 January 2009 the Presidium of the Military Court of the Third Circuit conducted a supervisory review and upheld the applicant’s conviction. The court discerned no violation of the rules of criminal procedure and dismissed the applicant’s complaint. 21. On 23 June 2009 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation noted that the applicant had not been notified of the date and time of the supervisory review hearing, quashed the judgment of 26 January 2009 and remitted the matter for fresh consideration. 22. On 17 September 2009 the Presidium of the Military Court of the Third Circuit conducted a new supervisory review of the applicant’s conviction and upheld it. The court reiterated its earlier findings contained in the judgment of 26 January 2009. 23. On 10 June 2010 the Supreme Court quashed the judgment of 17 September 2009 and remitted the matter for fresh consideration in view of the unlawful composition of the supervisory-review court. 24. On 11 August 2010 the Presidium of the Military Court of the Third Circuit conducted a new supervisory review of the applicant’s conviction and upheld it. The Presidium ruled, inter alia, that the trial court’s reliance on the witnesses’ statements had been justified, given that those witnesses had been unable to attend the hearing and that their testimonies had not been the decisive or sole evidence in the applicant’s case. The Presidium dismissed as unsubstantiated the applicant’s argument that the trial judge had failed to comply with the applicable rules of criminal procedure when preparing his verdict. Lastly, the Presidium reiterated its earlier findings as regards the dismissal without consideration of the additional statements of appeal lodged by counsel P.

7. The applicant was born in 1987 and lived in Syria before he came to Russia in 2015. 8. The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. 9. On 23 March 2016 the applicant was arrested for violation of migration rules. On the same day the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Izhevsk (“the district court”) imposed an administrative fine on the applicant and ordered his administrative removal and detention until his removal. 10. On 5 April 2016 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Udmurtiya excluded the removal order from the administrative penalty imposed on him by the district court. 11. On 2 June 2016 the applicant was released. 12. On 3 June 2016 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Udmurtiya re‑opened the applicant’s case at the request of the migration official and sent it for re-examination to the district court. 13. On 16 June 2016 the district court reviewed the administrative removal order of 23 March 2016 and confirmed its validity. The applicant was detained on the same day. On 12 September 2016 the judgment of 16 June 2016 was upheld by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Udmurtiya. On 7 February 2017 the applicant filed a cassation appeal against these three decisions at the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. 14. On 15 July, 7 November and 19 December 2016 and 27 January, 2 March and 10 April 2017 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Izhevsk allowed an application lodged by the bailiff for the postponement of the enforcement of the order of administrative removal by one month owing to the application of an interim measure by the Court on 17 June 2016. The district court granted the bailiff’s request having relied on Article 31.5 of the Code of Administrative Offences ((“the CAO”), see paragraph 21 below). In these proceedings the applicant’s lawyer also argued that there was a lack of grounds for the applicant’s detention and requested that the enforcement proceedings be terminated and that the applicant be released. However, the district court dismissed her arguments, having concluded that, “the grounds for the applicant’s detention had already been established by the court in the removal proceedings and the discontinuation of the enforcement proceedings in the circumstances of [the applicant’s] case is not provided for by Article 31.7 of the CAO” (see paragraph 22 below). All these decisions, except the one of 15 July 2016 (no appeal was brought), were upheld by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Udmurtiya. 15. On 17 May 2017 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (“the Supreme Court”) examined the cassation appeal complaint of the applicant and reviewed the judgments issued in respect of his removal (see paragraph 13 above). The Supreme Court confirmed the judgments but discontinued the enforcement of administrative penalty in the form of the removal imposed on the applicant on 23 March 2016. The Supreme Court found that the applicant might be exposed to a risk of torture or ill-treatment in Syria in the event of his return there. On 2 June 2017 the applicant was released (after the decision entered into force). 16. On 11 May 2016 the applicant’s request for refugee status was dismissed. According to the applicant, he did not appeal against this decision because the migration authorities had convinced the applicant that “his application for temporary asylum would be granted”. 17. On 4 July 2016 the applicant’s request for temporary asylum was dismissed. 18. On 25 November 2016 a second request lodged by the applicant for temporary asylum was denied by the migration authorities and the applicant did not lodge a complaint against this refusal. 19. According to the information provided by the applicant’s lawyer on 9 November 2017, while the proceedings before the Court were ongoing, the applicant left Russia of his own volition on 2 August 2017 and had settled in Sweden.

5. The first applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Belgrade, Serbia. The second applicant is a privately owned company, founded by the first applicant in 1990, with its registered seat in Ilijaš - Podlugovi, Bosnia and Herzegovina. 6. On 19 December 2001 the second applicant requested a licence to build a petrol station on the main highway in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 7. On 21 October 2002 the Federal Road Directorate of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“the Directorate”) rejected the request. The second applicant appealed on 31 October 2002. 8. On 28 February 2003 the Federal Ministry upheld that decision. 9. On 28 March 2003 the second applicant initiated proceedings for judicial review before the Supreme Court of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“the Supreme Court”). 10. On 25 August 2005 and 24 August 2006 the second applicant urged the Supreme Court to expedite the proceedings. 11. On 22 November 2006 the Supreme Court quashed the decisions of 21 October 2002 and 28 February 2003 (see paragraphs 7-8 above) on procedural grounds, and remitted the case to the Directorate. 12. On 9 May 2007 the second applicant informed the Supreme Court that the decision of 22 November 2006 had not been enforced yet. 13. On 16 August 2007 the Directorate rejected the second applicant’s request. On 30 August 2007 the second applicant appealed. 14. On 8 November 2007 the second applicant complained to the Administrative Inspectorate of the Federal Ministry of Justice about the inaction of the administration. 15. On 12 November 2007 the Federal Ministry upheld the decision of 16 August 2007 (see paragraph 13 above). The decision was served on the second applicant on 18 April 2008. 16. On 30 May 2008 the second applicant initiated proceedings for judicial review with the Supreme Court seeking it to quash the decisions of 16 August 2007 and 12 November 2007 (see paragraphs 13 and 15 above). On 31 August 2009 the Supreme Court referred the claim to the Mostar Cantonal Court, as the competent court. 17. On 27 November 2009 the Mostar Cantonal Court rejected the application for judicial review. 18. On 6 January 2010 the applicant submitted a request for an extraordinary review of the decision of 27 November 2009 with the Supreme Court, which request was rejected as unfounded on 12 May 2010. That decision was served on the second applicant on 9 July 2010. 19. On 6 September 2010 the second applicant lodged a constitutional appeal before the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“the Constitutional Court”) complaining, notably, about the length of the above administrative proceedings. 20. On 23 December 2013 the Constitutional Court rejected the appeal as unfounded. It noted that the relevant proceedings had lasted eight years and five months in total, that seven different decisions had been rendered by the competent authorities and that, therefore, the length of the proceedings had not been excessive.

5. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in the village of Tsereteli, Marneuli Region, Georgia. 6. On 1 December 2005 a certain individual, Ms K., applied to the Governor of the Marneuli Region for the permit necessary for the construction of a petrol station on a plot of land situated in the region. The Governor assigned the examination of the application to the applicant, his deputy, who was responsible for the development of the region’s infrastructure and the management of State lands. 7. A meeting between the applicant and Ms K. took place on the same day, 1 December 2005, in the former’s office. According to the official version of events, during the meeting, when Ms K. enquired about the necessary documents and applicable procedure for the issuance of the construction permit, the applicant replied that, apart from the necessary formalities, she would also need to make a pay-off (ქრთამი) to the amount of 30,000 United States dollars (USD); of this amount, USD 20,000 would be the share of the Governor himself, whilst the rest would be divided between the applicant and representatives from the various agencies involved. 8. On 6 December 2005 Ms K. informed the Department of Constitutional Security of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (“the DCS”) that the applicant had requested a bribe from her in return for a promise to assist her in obtaining the requisite construction permit. She expressed her readiness to cooperate with the DCS. The authority immediately opened a criminal case into Ms K.’s allegations (“the bribery case”). 9. Still on 6 December 2005, the General Public Prosecutor’s Office (“the Prosecutor’s Office”) issued the DCS with a general authorisation to remain in charge of the bribery case and to conduct all types of investigative measures necessary. 10. By rulings dated 7 December 2005, the Tbilisi City Court authorised secret video surveillance of the applicant’s meetings with Ms K., as well as the tapping of their telephone conversations. 11. On 8 December 2005 Ms K. bought a plot of land from another private individual, Ms N. (hereinafter “the sales agreement”), for the purpose of constructing a petrol station on it. On the same day, the applicant contacted a notary and the head of the Land Registry of the Marneuli Region, requesting them, respectively, to certify the sales agreement and to register, in an expedited manner, the plot in Ms K.’s name. 12. On 12 December 2005 Ms K. brought to the applicant’s office the sales agreement and a record from the Land Registry of the Marneuli Region confirming her title to the newly acquired plot of land. During that second meeting, which was secretly filmed by Ms K., the applicant reiterated his request for a bribe. He asked her to bring USD 10,000 as a down payment, emphasising that this sum was not supposed to cover any official fees or charges prescribed by law for the issuance of a construction permit. Ms K. promised to bring the sum the following day. 13. On 13 December 2005 Ms K. brought USD 10,000 to the applicant in cash. The banknotes had been pre-marked with a special substance by the DCS. The meeting took place in the applicant’s office, and it was secretly filmed by Ms K. and closely supervised by the DCS. As soon as Ms K. handed over the money to the applicant, DCS officers entered the room and arrested the applicant. 14. A search of the applicant’s person was conducted on the spot, which led to the discovery of the banknotes in the right inner pocket of his suit. The law-enforcement officers immediately examined the banknotes using a special lamp and observed the marks made by a substance previously applied by the DCS. The same substance was also detected on both of the fingers of the applicant’s hands and on the clothing of his suit. The accuracy of these findings was later confirmed by a forensic chemical examination. 15. On 14 December 2005 the applicant was charged, under Article 338 § 2 (b) of the Criminal Code of Georgia, with the crime of requesting a bribe in a large amount. 16. The results of an examination of the secret recordings of the various meetings between the applicant and Ms K. confirmed the authenticity of those recordings. On 8 February 2006 the investigator in charge of the case acquainted the applicant and his lawyer with the results of the above‑mentioned forensic examinations. The accused party did not contest that evidence. 17. When questioned by the Bolnisi District Court, the applicant, who was represented by two lawyers of his choice, complained that he had been entrapped by the DCS. He stated that he had never had any intention of accepting a bribe but had been helping Ms K. out of good will, as he had considered her to be a distant relative. He confirmed that he had been assisting Ms K. in the various administrative formalities related to the purchase of the relevant land. The applicant furthermore admitted to having received money to the amount of USD 10,000, from the applicant, but added that the sum had been meant to be transmitted to a construction company as an advance payment for its upcoming construction of the petrol station. He stated that he could not explain why Ms K. would have wished to induce him to accept a bribe. 18. When questioned by the trial court for the first time on 20 April 2006, Ms K. stated that she had met the applicant in his office and informed him of her intention to construct a petrol station. She had falsely presented herself as his distant relative in order to obtain the applicant’s favour more easily. Ms K. confirmed that the applicant had then assisted her with the relevant administrative formalities with the notary and the Land Registry of the Marneuli Region. As to the sum of USD 10,000, Ms K. stated – reiterating the applicant’s version of events – that it had been intended that the money would be paid through the applicant’s offices to a private construction company in relation to the ongoing construction project of a petrol station. Ms K. emphasised that she had never been sure that the applicant had intended to retain any part of the above-mentioned sum for his personal benefit. Nevertheless, still suspecting that there might have been illegal intent involved in the applicant’s wish to be involved in the money transfer, Ms K. had decided to inform the DCS of her conversation with the applicant. 19. On 2 May 2006 the prosecutor in charge of the applicant’s criminal case instituted criminal proceedings against Ms K. for giving conflicting witness statements, on the grounds of the alleged inconsistency between the statements that Ms K. had originally given to the DCS during the investigation stage and those given before the trial court on 20 April 2009. 20. On 3 May 2006 Ms K. requested that the Bolnisi District Court hear her again in relation to the applicant’s case, stating that she had forgotten to testify in respect of a number of significant factual details when the court had previously heard her on 20 April 2006. 21. On 17 May 2006 Ms K. lodged a complaint with the Prosecutor’s Office in respect of the initiation of the criminal proceedings against her (see paragraph 19 above). She submitted that the statements she had given to the trial court on 20 April 2006 had been truthful and had fully reflected the content of her several meetings with the applicant, which could have been verified by examining the relevant secret video and audio recordings. 22. When questioned by the trial court on 23 June 2006, both the notary who had certified the sales agreement and the head of the Land Registry of the Marneuli Region confirmed that the applicant had been urging them to expedite the registration of Ms K.’s title to the plot of land on which a petrol station was scheduled to be constructed. The two witnesses furthermore stated that the plot still constituted Ms N.’s property, given that the sales agreement had been annulled shortly after having been concluded. 23. Allowing a request lodged by the applicant on 23 June 2006, the trial court admitted to the criminal case file as evidence a recording of a television programme and a newspaper article in which Ms K. had publicly acknowledged having been an DCS undercover agent in four other unrelated criminal cases. 24. On 7 July 2006 Ms K., who at that time had already been placed in pre‑trial detention in relation to the criminal proceedings instituted against her for giving conflicting witness statements, was heard by the Bolnisi District Court for the second time. She confirmed the statements that she had given during the investigation stage. Namely, she testified that the applicant had clearly requested her to pay “unofficially” the sum of USD 30,000 in return for promised assistance with the construction project, of which sum USD 20,000 was supposed to go, according to the applicant, to the Governor. She stated, however, that she did not know whether the applicant had any intention of retaining any part of the remaining USD 10,000 for his personal benefit. Ms K. also confirmed that the applicant had indeed conducted negotiations with a number of construction companies on her behalf at that time. 25. Ms K. did not deny that, prior to her involvement in the case against the applicant, she had acted as an undercover agent for the DCS in four other unrelated cases. She further stated before the trial court that she had already acted as an undercover agent of the DCS when she had approached the applicant for the first time on 1 December 2005. She stated that the initial objective of that undercover anti-criminal operation, led by the DCS, had been to expose the criminal activity of the Governor of the Marneuli Region. Notably, the DCS had been in possession of information that the Governor had been prone to requesting bribes in return for providing various public services. It was only after that initial plan had failed that the law-enforcement agency’s attention had shifted towards the Governor’s deputy, the applicant. Ms K. also stated that the sales agreement in respect of the plot of land had been annulled shortly after the applicant’s arrest, as it had in fact been a fictitious transaction concluded under the DCS’s close supervision. According to Ms K.’s statements, Ms N. had also been collaborating with the DCS at that time, and the first meeting between Ms K. and Ms N. had taken place on the DCS’s premises. 26. On 7 July 2006 the applicant requested the trial court to summon Ms N. as an additional witness so that he could question her in relation to her purported collaboration with the DCS and role in the sequence of the events which had led to the initiation of the criminal proceedings against him (see the preceding paragraph). In reply, the Prosecutor’s Office claimed that it had already attempted to summon Ms N. as a witness, but that the latter’s whereabouts were unknown. Relying on that standpoint, the Bolnisi District Court ruled that it was objectively impossible to summon Ms N. as a witness. 27. By a judgment of 17 July 2006, the Bolnisi District Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to seven years’ imprisonment. The court stated that the collection of the evidence in the case file – the statements given during the trial by Ms K., the notary and the head of the Land Registry; the judicially authorised secret video and audio recording; and the results of the personal search of the applicant on 13 December 2005 and of the forensic chemical and phonoscope examinations – confirmed the applicant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. As regards the applicant’s statement that the money discovered on his person (USD 10,000) had not been a bribe but a valid advance payment for preparatory works associated with Ms K.’s construction project, the District Court answered that this was not supported by the totality of the collected evidence; it did not provide any additional explanation in that respect. As to the applicant’s argument that he had been induced to commit the offence in question by Ms K., who had been an agent provocateur of the DCS, the court did not address that argument at all. 28. On 15 August 2006 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Tbilisi Court of Appeal against his conviction, reiterating his complaint alleging entrapment and reasserting his version of events. 29. On 18 October 2006 the examination of the applicant’s appeal by the Tbilisi Court of Appeal began. During a hearing held on 8 November 2006, the applicant – referring to statements given by members of his family that they had recently seen Ms N. at her house – the applicant requested the appellate court to summon the latter so that he could finally question her. The appellate court granted the applicant’s request. 30. Ms N. was scheduled to appear before the appellate court on 1 December 2006, but failed to do so. The applicant noted that his family members, who were living in the same village (Orjonikidze) as Ms N., had approached her and asked her to testify before the court, but the latter had refused the request in a resolute manner. The Prosecutor’s Office noted that it had been unable to secure Ms N.’s appearance but promised to do so for the next hearing, which was scheduled for 6 December 2006. 31. On 2 December 2006 Ms N. submitted a written statement to the Tbilisi Court of Appeal. Noting that she had recently learned of the ongoing examination of the applicant’s criminal case, she stated that she was unable to appear as a witness before the appellate court because of her difficult family situation. Ms N. stated, in particular, that her aged mother had been seriously ill and remained under her constant supervision. 32. On 6 December 2006 the Prosecutor’s Office presented a handwritten letter from Ms N.’s neighbours dated 4 December 2006, according to which the witness had long abandoned her house in the village and her current whereabouts were unknown. The Tbilisi Court of Appeal ruled that it was objectively impossible to summon Ms N., as her whereabouts could not be identified. 33. By a decision of 6 December 2006, the Tbilisi Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s appeal and upheld his conviction of 17 July 2006 in full. As with the first-instance court, the applicant’s argument about his alleged entrapment by the victim, the DCS’s agent provocateur, was left unanswered by the appellate court. The appellate court rejected as unfounded the applicant’s argument that the USD 10,000 had been meant to be used as an advance payment for construction works. The court noted in this connection that by the time the applicant had received the sum from Ms K. the construction permit had not been issued, and neither had an architectural plan and expenditure estimate been drawn up. 34. On 16 April 2007 the Supreme Court of Georgia, rejecting an appeal by the applicant on points of law as inadmissible, finally terminated the proceedings. 35. On 24 November 2008 the applicant was granted early release from prison under a presidential pardon.

5. The applicant was born in 1982 and lives in Bern, Switzerland. At the time of the events giving rise to the present application, he was the editor‑in-chief of Ülkede Özgür Gündem, a daily newspaper published in Turkey. 6. On 6 July 2004 an article written by Mr B.G. entitled “Analysing the Kurdish dynamic correctly” was published in Ülkede Özgür Gündem. In his article, Mr B.G. stated his views on the role of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK (an illegal armed organisation), a number of organisations associated with the PKK in regional and international politics and political developments in Turkey. Next to the article a photograph of Abdullah Öcalan shaking hands with a group of armed men was published. 7. On 8 July 2004 the public prosecutor at the Istanbul Assize Court filed a bill of indictment, charging the applicant with disseminating propaganda in favour of the KONGRA-GEL[1] under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713) on account of the article published on 6 July 2004. In the indictment, the public prosecutor quoted the following passage from the article: “... Abdullah Öcalan, who has contributed to the essential dynamic of the Kurdish movement and the HPG[2], the PJA[3] and the KONGRA-GEL, organisations which have acted as military, political and ideological leaders and which have represented his leadership,... [must be well understood]”. The public prosecutor stated that a photograph of Abdullah Öcalan in which he was standing in a rural area holding a weapon had been published in the newspaper, next to the article. The public prosecutor considered as a result that the applicant had disseminated propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation inciting others to violence or other methods of terrorism. Subsequently, criminal proceedings were launched against the applicant before the Istanbul Assize Court. 8. During the proceedings the applicant maintained that the article in question had been a news article and had not contained propaganda inciting to violence. 9. On 24 May 2005 the Istanbul Assize Court convicted the applicant of disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK/KONGRA-GEL under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 and sentenced him to six months’ imprisonment and a fine. In its judgment, the Istanbul Assize Court held that the content of the article and the publication of Abdullah Öcalan’s photograph amounted to dissemination of propaganda in favour of the PKK/KONGRA-GEL. 10. The applicant appealed. In his appeal petition, referring to a number of the Court’s judgments, the applicant claimed that he had not had the intention of disseminating propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation and that his criminal conviction had been in breach of Articles 6 and 10 of the Convention as he had been exercising his right to impart information. He also noted that the first-instance court had failed to examine the article in its entirety. 11. On 16 May 2006 the principal public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation returned the case file to the first-instance court and requested that the latter revise its judgment in the light of the recent legislative amendments. 12. On 28 September 2006 the Istanbul Assize Court once again convicted the applicant under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713, with the same reasoning that it had adopted on 24 May 2005. The court sentenced the applicant to a fine of 1,802 Turkish liras (TRY). 13. The applicant appealed. 14. On 18 November 2009 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of 28 September 2006. 15. According to a document dated 15 January 2010, signed by the President of the Istanbul Assize Court and the Istanbul public prosecutor, the applicant was required to pay the fine of TRY 1,802.

4. The applicant was born in 1997. 5. Following the death of her grandmother in 2010 the applicant, who was a minor at the time, began to show signs of distress. Her parents sought the opinion of a psychiatrist, who emphasised that their daughter was suffering from emotional instability, alternating between periods of anger and periods of agitation. 6. On 19 April 2013 the applicant went to a party where there were drugs and alcohol. The police arrived, seized the drugs and alcohol and checked the identity of the minors who were present. 7. On 23 April 2013 the prefect of Rome informed the public prosecutor at the Rome Youth Court (“the Youth Court”) of the police operation carried out on 19 April 2013 and of the presence of V.C., a minor, at the scene. A criminal investigation was opened and the public prosecutor at the Youth Court was informed. 8. On 31 May 2013 the public prosecutor heard evidence from V.C.’s parents. They stated that their daughter had been having difficulties and that they were worried about her, saying that she was taking drugs and stealing money at home. They also told the prosecutor that, according to the psychiatrist who was treating the applicant, she suffered from a bipolar disorder and an attention deficit disorder caused by drug use and also showed signs of a borderline and anti-social personality. 9. Subsequently, in June 2013, V.C.’s parents informed the prosecutor that they had discovered through their daughter’s Facebook page that she had been approached by a photographer to pose for pornographic photographs. The Government maintained that the parents had told the prosecutor on that occasion that their daughter did not want to be placed in a specialist institution. 10. On 5 June 2013 the public prosecutor heard evidence from the applicant, who stated that she had started to take drugs when she was twelve but had since stopped. The applicant stated that she did not wish to be placed in a specialist institution or in a foster family. 11. On 25 June 2013 the applicant’s mother informed the public prosecutor by telephone that the situation had not improved and that the applicant had been approached to pose for pornographic photographs. 12. On 2 July 2013 the public prosecutor informed the Youth Court that it was clear from the statements made by the parents and the applicant, who had admitted stopping school and using drugs, and from the psychiatrist’s diagnosis, that V.C. was in danger as she was no longer attending school and there was a risk that she might be caught up in a child prostitution ring, given that she had been approached to pose for photographs. The public prosecutor therefore requested the Youth Court to institute urgent proceedings under Article 25 of Royal Decree no. 1404 of 1934 and to have the minor placed in a specialist institution and in the care of the social services. 13. On 24 July 2013 the Youth Court appointed a judge (giudice onorario) to hear evidence from the applicant, her parents and the social services, in order to learn more about her environment and take the appropriate measures to protect her. 14. On 14 October 2013, that is, almost three months later, the Youth Court gave the social services notice to appear before it. However, they did not appear. 15. The Youth Court gave notice to the applicant’s parents to appear before it on 21 October 2013. The parents gave evidence without the social services being present and stated that their daughter did not want to give evidence. 16. On 24 October 2013 the public prosecutor requested the judge to place the child in the care of the social services and in a specialist institution. 17. On 9 December 2013 the Youth Court, after hearing evidence from the parents and adding to the file the conversations which the applicant, who had refused to give evidence, had had on Facebook, and taking into account the fact that the social services had not attended the hearing, decided that it was necessary to place the child in the care of the social services. The court ordered her placement in a specialist institution for an initial twelve-month period so that she could follow a specific programme designed to help her to amend her behaviour, which the court described as erratic, and thus to resume a normal life. 18. On 11 December 2013 the social services received a copy of the Youth Court’s decision. 19. On 17 December 2013 a first meeting was held between the social services and the applicant’s parents. During the meeting the parents told the social services that there was a risk that their daughter might be caught up in a prostitution ring. They informed the social services that a criminal investigation was in progress. 20. On 18 December 2013 the social services contacted the psychiatrist who was treating the applicant and later met the applicant. 21. On 19 December 2013 the public prosecutor at the District Court informed the public prosecutor at the Youth Court that a criminal investigation was in progress concerning two individuals for exploitation of the applicant for prostitution. The applicant had given evidence on 4 and 9 December 2013 (see paragraph 48 below). The public prosecutor stressed that the arrest of the two suspects was imminent, and requested the prosecutor at the Youth Court to inform him of the measures taken to implement the Youth Court’s decision of 9 December 2013 (see paragraph 17 above), given that the applicant was due to give evidence at the ad hoc hearing (incidente probatorio) (see paragraph 51 below). 22. On 20 December 2013 the applicant reiterated that she did not wish to be placed in a specialist institution. 23. However, in January 2014 she consented to such placement. 24. On 30 January 2014 the social services contacted the regional drug addiction agency for advice on how to help the applicant withdraw from drugs. 25. During the night of 30 January 2014 V.C. was the victim of a rape (violenza sessuale) committed by two individuals (see paragraph 54 below). On 31 January the applicant went to hospital with a police officer and her mother in order to be examined. 26. On 6 February 2014 the social services told the Youth Court that they had had several meetings with V.C.’s parents and with the psychologist and psychiatrist whom she was seeing. They also informed the court that the girl had agreed to be placed in a specialist facility with a view to drug rehabilitation treatment. 27. On 7 February 2014 the social services were informed of the assault on the applicant. 28. On 19 February 2014 the President of the Youth Court made an urgent request to the social services to inform her of the measures taken to assist the applicant. She stressed that, in view of the applicant’s age, it was still possible for her to change her behaviour and that a programme should be put in place to protect her from the risks she was facing. 29. On 25 February 2014, having received no information on the applicant’s situation, the Youth Court requested the competent social services departments to draw up a report on the measures taken to assist her. 30. On 13 March 2014 the youth mental health department informed the Youth Court that the applicant had been diagnosed as being anti-social and drug-dependent and that she had agreed to being placed in a treatment centre (comunità terapeutica). The department had therefore requested the V.L. centre to admit her. 31. On 17 March 2014 the department dealing with drug dependency issues informed the Youth Court that the applicant had not consented to her placement and that, in any event, a psychiatric expert opinion was required prior to placement. 32. On 27 March 2014 the social services requested that the applicant be placed in a care facility as a temporary measure. On 31 March 2014 the care facility that been chosen stated that it did not have any places available. 33. In a report of 3 April 2014 the department dealing with drug dependency issues informed the court that it had chosen a treatment centre where the applicant could undergo rehabilitation. 34. On 3 April 2014 V.C.’s parents requested the Youth Court to enforce the decision of 9 December 2013 ordering their daughter’s placement in a specialist institution in order to help her. They also requested that a curator be appointed and that the court take urgent steps to protect their daughter. 35. On 4 April 2014 the Youth Court ordered the child’s immediate placement in the Karisma treatment centre. The measure took effect on 14 April 2014. 36. On 2 July 2014 the staff of the Karisma centre observed that the applicant’s behaviour was challenging owing to her drug and alcohol dependency. 37. On 19 December 2014 the Karisma treatment centre informed the social services that the applicant’s problems persisted and that it did not have the necessary infrastructure to deal with them in view of the applicant’s drug addiction. They requested her transfer to a facility specialising in the treatment of minors with drug dependency problems. 38. The social services did not respond to this request. 39. On 7 September 2015 V.C. left the Karisma centre and returned to live with her parents. 40. On 22 October 2015 the social services sent a report to the Youth Court stressing that two meetings had been held with the applicant’s parents and that a psychiatric expert assessment had been carried out. According to the expert, the applicant had problems with numeracy and was advised to follow a course of pharmacological treatment. 41. On 19 May 2016 the Youth Court held a hearing that was not attended by the social services. The applicant gave evidence. She stated that she had gone back to school and was continuing to be monitored by the social services. She said that she had made new friends and had had a positive experience in the treatment centre. 42. On 1 June 2016 the public prosecutor’s office approved the continuation of the programme that had been put in place. The applicant stated that no such programme had actually been in place. 43. On 22 December 2016 the Youth Court gave notice to two representatives of the social services to appear before it in order to provide an update on the applicant’s situation. According to the social services, the applicant’s situation had improved and their involvement was thus no longer necessary. 44. On 10 January 2017 the public prosecutor issued an opinion in favour of discontinuing the proceedings instituted on the basis of Article 25 of Royal Decree no. 1404 of 1934. 45. In a decision of 17 January 2017 the Youth Court discontinued the proceedings. 46. An investigation into the prostitution ring was opened in April 2013 and was concluded in December of that year. 47. On 25 September 2013 the public prosecutor at the Youth Court reported on the applicant’s situation to his counterpart at the Rome District Court. 48. The applicant gave evidence in the criminal investigation on 4 and 9 December 2013. She said that she had worked as a prostitute for two individuals. 49. On 16 January and 6 February 2014 two suspects were arrested. 50. On 21 January 2014 the prosecuting authorities again heard evidence from the applicant. 51. On 26 March 2014, at the ad hoc hearing (incidente probatorio), the applicant reiterated that she had worked as a prostitute for the two suspects between August and December 2013. 52. On 17 November 2014 the Rome District Court sentenced the two defendants to prison terms of five years and four years respectively for living on the earnings of prostitution. It also ordered them to pay damages to the applicant, who had applied to join the proceedings as a civil party. The court found that the two defendants had put pressure on the applicant to engage in prostitution, had benefited from the applicant’s prostitution and had shared the proceeds. In its decision the court stated that the applicant had been the victim of sexual exploitation from August to December 2013 and that the defendants had been aware of her age. On 4 February 2016 the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction. 53. The applicant stated that she had not received the amount awarded by the courts in respect of damages. 54. An investigation into the gang rape (violenza sessuale di gruppo) of the applicant on the night of 30 January 2014 was opened concerning two suspects. The case was set down for preliminary hearing on 6 November 2015 before the Rome District Court. It appears from the file that a further hearing was held on 16 February 2016 and that the proceedings are still pending.

5. The applicants were born in 1965 and 1964 respectively and live in Plovdiv. 6. On 14 March 1998 a 26-year-old woman, S.D., lodged a complaint with the Plovdiv police stating that she had been abducted, held captive and raped by the two applicants the previous day. 7. On the same day, criminal proceedings for rape were instituted against a person or persons unknown. S.D. underwent a medical examination, which revealed several bruises on her head, neck, arms and knees. The doctor stated that there were no other physical marks or biological evidence from which it could be conclusively determined that S.D. had had sexual intercourse. When questioned by the investigator, S.D. explained that the applicants had forced her to accompany them into premises in Plovdiv city centre, where they had ill-treated and raped her. 8. On 18 March 1998 S.D. was questioned again. She withdrew her initial statement, explaining that she wanted to keep her peace, that she was not feeling well and that she had personal problems. 9. On the same day, the investigator questioned Mr Momin as a witness. Mr Momin explained that S.D. had accompanied him and the other applicant to a café in Plovdiv city centre early in the morning of 13 March 1998, but he denied having had sexual intercourse with her. He added that, as far as he knew, Mr Dimitrov had not had sexual intercourse with S.D. on that day either. Both of them had then accompanied S.D. back to her home. 10. On 24 March 1998 Mr Dimitrov was also questioned as a witness. He stated that, on the morning of 13 March 1998, he and the other applicant had planned to go for coffee in Plovdiv city centre, that he had also decided to invite S.D., with whom he had previously had an intimate relationship, and that she had accepted the invitation. After they had entered the premises, which were being refurbished, he had had consensual sex with S.D. while Mr Momin had gone out to buy coffee nearby. Shortly afterwards, he, S.D. and Mr Momin had taken a taxi, which had dropped Mr Momin off at his workplace and S.D. at her home. 11. On 29 January 1999 S.D. was questioned again. She stated that she had had an intimate relationship with Mr Dimitrov in the past. On 13 March 1998 she had gone with the two applicants to premises in Plovdiv city centre for a coffee, and on arriving there, they had found that the coffee machine was not working. Mr Momin had then gone out to buy three coffees. S.D. stated that while he was out, she had had consensual sex with Mr Dimitrov and that later on, after drinking the coffees brought back by Mr Momin, the three of them had taken a taxi and she had returned home. The following day, under pressure from her relatives and to take revenge on Mr Dimitrov, who had admitted to her that he was married, she had lodged a complaint with the police against him and Mr Momin. 12. On 1 February 1999 the investigator sent the file to the district prosecutor’s office, attaching his opinion to the effect that the criminal proceedings could be discontinued in the absence of a criminal offence. 13. On 10 March 1999 the prosecutor in charge of the investigation returned the file to the investigator for further inquiries. That order was set aside on 26 April 1999 by the Plovdiv district prosecutor’s office, which ordered the prosecutor in charge of the investigation, I.P., to carry out a number of additional investigative measures himself. 14. On 12 April 2000 S.D. sent a letter to the prosecutor I.P. reiterating her wish to withdraw her initial statement and asking him to discontinue the proceedings. She also informed him that she was very ill and undergoing chemotherapy. 15. On 12 May 2000 the prosecutor I.P. formally charged Mr Dimitrov with the rape of S.D. 16. On 18 December 2000 the prosecutor I.P. asked the Plovdiv District Court to question S.D. under Article 210a § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, on the grounds that her testimony was of particular importance to the investigation. 17. On 19 December 2000 at 9.40 a.m., in the presence of the prosecutor I.P., a judge of the Plovdiv District Court questioned S.D. The judge noted that Mr Dimitrov had been informed of this procedure in a letter from Plovdiv no. 4 police station. 18. During questioning, S.D. altered her previous statement and reiterated her original version of the events, according to which she had been kidnapped, taken captive and raped by the two applicants. In particular, she stated that Mr Dimitrov had picked her up from her home on the morning of 13 March 1998 and had forced her into a taxi where Mr Momin was sitting inside. Both applicants appeared to have consumed alcohol. The taxi had dropped them off at a café that was being refurbished in Plovdiv city centre; she had tried to escape, but Mr Dimitrov had hit her on the neck and pushed her inside, where he had forced her to undress and had hit her on the head several times. She had then suffered an episode of hypoglycaemia, from which she had recovered by taking several sachets of sugar found by the two applicants. Then she had had non-consensual sex twice with Mr Dimitrov and once with Mr Momin. Afterwards, she had been taken home in a taxi paid for by the applicants. She had lodged a complaint the following day, after confiding in her family. 19. S.D. explained that she had withdrawn her original statement because she had been threatened by Mr Dimitrov and other people close to the two applicants. Immediately after a chemotherapy session she had received a visit from a lawyer, Ms N., who had apparently been sent by the same people. The lawyer had persuaded her to sign the letter retracting her original statement and withdrawing her complaint, and the letter had then been sent to the prosecutor in charge of the investigation (see paragraph 14 above). S.D. added that she had cancer, but was feeling well. 20. On 20 April 2001 both applicants were charged with the abduction, false imprisonment and rape of S.D. 21. On 3 May 2001 counsel for both applicants, Mr S., requested that his clients be confronted individually with S.D. His request was rejected on 2 July 2001 by the prosecutor I.P., on the grounds that this was a non-compulsory investigative measure which, moreover, was not necessary for the establishment of the facts of the case at hand. 22. On 25 June 2001 S.D. died of her illness. 23. On 11 February 2002 the district prosecutor’s office drew up the indictment and committed both applicants for trial. They were accused of having abducted S.D., held her captive, issued death threats against her and raped her. 24. The Plovdiv District Court examined the criminal case between 14 January 2004 and 21 February 2007. It decided to admit S.D.’s statement of 19 December 2000 in evidence. The record of the questioning was accordingly read out in court. The court also heard evidence from the two applicants, the three police officers who had attended to S.D. when she had lodged her complaint, the victim’s relatives and three other witnesses. In addition, it heard the opinion of a medical expert on the nature and origin of the injuries found on S.D.’s body during her medical examination on 14 March 1998. The applicants, represented by lawyers of their choosing, challenged the evidence against them, adduced evidence in their defence and sought their acquittal. 25. In a judgment of 21 February 2007 the Plovdiv District Court found Mr Dimitrov guilty of raping S.D. and acquitted him on the other charges. He was given a suspended sentence of three years’ imprisonment. The court acquitted Mr Momin on all the charges. 26. In the reasoning set out in its judgment, the District Court held that the only fact that could be established from the evidence gathered was that S.D. had had non-consensual sexual intercourse with Mr Dimitrov. It based that conclusion in particular on the two defendants’ statements, part of S.D.’s statement, the findings of the expert medical opinion and the statements of the other witnesses questioned. It rejected the rest of S.D.’s evidence. In that connection, the court noted that the victim had changed her account during the investigation, that it had not had the opportunity to examine her in person, that the other witnesses had portrayed S.D. in a negative light, that her statement had been given two years after the events and that it contradicted the other statements and the findings of the medical examination performed on S.D. the day after the events in question. 27. Mr Dimitrov and the public prosecutor’s office both appealed. 28. The Plovdiv Regional Court heard the case between 27 June and 4 July 2007. It ordered two expert medical opinions on the basis of the evidence to establish the process and causes of an episode of hypoglycaemia, and to check the accounts given by S.D. and Mr Dimitrov as to the cause of the injuries found on S.D.’s body during her initial medical examination. The applicants, represented by lawyers of their choosing, challenged the evidence against them, including the admissibility and credibility of the victim’s statement of 19 December 2000, and sought their acquittal. 29. In a judgment of 4 July 2007 the Plovdiv Regional Court overturned the first-instance judgment and found both applicants guilty of having abducted S.D., held her captive, issued death threats against her and raped her. Mr Dimitrov was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment and Mr Momin to five and a half years’ imprisonment. 30. In the reasoning set out in its forty-four-page judgment, the Regional Court established the facts of the case as follows. At the material time S.D. had been suffering from diabetes. She was separated from her husband and lived with her son at her grandmother’s house. She knew Mr Dimitrov as she had previously had an intimate relationship with him. She also knew Mr Momin, who worked in a shop near her home. On the morning of 13 March 1998, after consuming alcohol the previous night, the two applicants had taken a taxi to S.D.’s home. Mr Dimitrov had called S.D. and she had come out of the house. He had then grabbed her by the hand, threatened her and forced her into the taxi, where the other applicant, Mr Momin, was waiting for them. The taxi had dropped them all off in front of a bar that was being refurbished in Plovdiv city centre. Mr Dimitrov, who had the keys, had opened the door and let Mr Momin in first, before pushing S.D. inside. The two applicants had then forced S.D. to undress. Mr Dimitrov had threatened her and hit her several times. S.D. had suffered an episode of hypoglycaemia, and the applicants had made her swallow the contents of several sachets of sugar. They had carried on threatening her, holding her down and beating her, and in that way had forced her to have sex with each of them. Subsequently, they had all left the premises in a taxi, which had dropped the applicants off at a restaurant and S.D. at her home. She had confided in her relatives, who had persuaded her to alert the police. During the subsequent investigation, S.D. had been threatened by Mr Dimitrov and people close to the two applicants in an attempt to make her withdraw her statement. Under pressure, S.D. had changed her version of events during the course of the investigation. She had then become seriously ill. The pressure on S.D. had increased further: she had been persuaded by a lawyer, apparently sent by Mr Dimitrov’s employer, to sign a declaration withdrawing her statement and her complaint; the declaration had then been sent to the investigating bodies. S.D. had subsequently been questioned by a judge, had retracted her original statement and had given evidence about the pressure exerted on her during the investigation. On 25 June 2001 S.D. had died. 31. The Regional Court based its findings of fact on S.D.’s statement of 19 December 2000, the statements by the three police officers who had attended to her at the police station the day after the events and had carried out the initial investigative steps, the statement by S.D.’s husband and a certain V.M., part of the statements by the applicants and Mr Dimitrov’s employer, the findings of the site inspection report and the photographs taken in the course of the inspection, various items of documentary evidence, the findings of the initial medical examination of the victim and the two additional medical examinations, and the two psychiatric examinations of the applicants. 32. The Regional Court devoted six pages of its reasoning to an analysis of S.D.’s statement of 19 December 2000. It accepted the statement in its entirety, finding it to be coherent, logical, precise, specific and consistent with the details emerging from the other material admitted in evidence. 33. The Regional Court noted firstly that S.D. had had no cause to make false accusations against the applicants; it rejected as ill-founded and illogical the applicants’ accounts to the effect that S.D.’s statement had been influenced by her relatives, or even motivated by a desire for revenge or a feeling of jealousy. 34. Next, the Regional Court found that the statement in question was credible in that it was consistent with those given by the police officers who had registered the victim’s complaint and had observed her psychological and physical state on the day after the events. It added that the statement was also consistent with the findings of the medical examinations and expert opinions and the findings noted in the site inspection report. 35. The Regional Court further noted that, although two years had elapsed between the events and the questioning of S.D., her statement was very detailed. It found that her alteration of her version of events in the course of the investigation had been due to the pressure exerted on her by the applicants and people close to them. 36. The Regional Court lastly noted that both applicants and two of the defence witnesses, who had close links to them, had tried to discredit S.D. by accusing her of amoral behaviour. It rejected their evidence and found that the evidence given by S.D.’s husband was credible in this respect. By describing S.D. as a caring mother and a person whose behaviour and way of life were in no way morally objectionable, the husband had, despite being separated from her, given testimony from which a positive psychological image of S.D. could be formed. 37. Both applicants appealed to the Supreme Court of Cassation. Among other things, they challenged the admissibility and credibility of S.D.’s statement of 19 December 2000. 38. In a judgment of 7 January 2008 the Supreme Court of Cassation dismissed the applicants’ appeals as to the establishment of the facts and the defendants’ guilt, and upheld the Regional Court’s judgment in respect of those issues. However, it decided to reduce the applicants’ sentences to five years’ imprisonment for Mr Dimitrov and four years for Mr Momin. 39. The Supreme Court of Cassation found that the applicants’ right to participate in the questioning of S.D. on 19 December 2000 had not been violated. In particular, it noted that, although Mr Dimitrov had yet to appoint a lawyer at that time, he had been informed of S.D.’s questioning and had therefore had the opportunity to take part. With regard to Mr Momin, at that stage of the investigation he had yet to be charged and he had therefore not been entitled to participate in the questioning of S.D. 40. The Supreme Court of Cassation rejected the applicants’ arguments challenging the credibility of S.D.’s statement. It found that the Regional Court had correctly accepted the statement in its entirety after testing its credibility by comparing it with the other evidence gathered. It noted that the Regional Court had examined and rejected all the arguments casting doubt on the statement. It further held that the Regional Court had established the facts on the basis of all the evidence and that, on that basis, S.D.’s statement was “an important element, but not the only element” in establishing Mr Dimitrov’s guilt and “the main evidence” in establishing Mr Momin’s guilt.

5. The applicant was born in 1985 and lives in the Kızıltepe district of Mardin. 6. On 30 March 2006 the applicant participated in a march and the reading out of a press statement held by the Party for a Democratic Society (Demokratik Toplum Partisi –“the DTP”) in Kızıltepe. The protesters gathered in front of the building of the Kızıltepe branch of the DTP and walked to the building of the district branch of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi), where a press statement was read out. The press statement concerned the clashes that had occurred between demonstrators and the police in Diyarbakır on 29 and 30 March 2006. The protestors then returned to the DTP building. During the march the protesters chanted slogans. The applicant participated in the march and the reading out of the press statement as a member of the DTP. 7. On 8 March 2007 the Diyarbakır public prosecutor filed an indictment charging the applicant and eleven other individuals with disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713). The public prosecutor claimed that the applicant had attended the demonstration of 30 March 2006 and chanted the slogan “Tooth for tooth, blood for blood, we are with you Öcalan” (“Dişe diş, kana kan, seninleyiz Öcalan”). 8. Within the context of the criminal proceedings initiated following the indictment dated 8 March 2007, an expert who had examined the police video recordings of the public gathering of 30 March 2006 observed that the applicant had acted together with the crowd, but that it could not be established whether he had chanted the above-mentioned slogan since he had covered his mouth and nose. 9. On 22 April 2008 the Diyarbakır Assize Court convicted the applicant under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713. In its judgment, the court noted that the applicant had accepted that he had participated in the march and the reading out of the press statement, but denied the veracity of the allegation that he had chanted any slogan. The Assize Court found it established that the march and the gathering at which a press statement had been read out on 30 March 2006 had turned into a propaganda event in favour of the PKK and an illegal demonstration, and that the accused, including the applicant, had actively participated in that event. The Assize Court further observed that although, according to the expert report, it could not be established that the applicant had chanted the slogan, on the basis of the photographs in the case file, it was established that he had acted together with the demonstrators. Noting that there were other demonstrators who had covered their mouths and that the police documents showed that the applicant had actively taken part in the demonstration and instructed others to chant slogans, the Assize Court concluded that the applicant had committed the offence of dissemination of propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation. The applicant was sentenced to ten months’ imprisonment. 10. On 2 July 2009 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of 22 April 2008. 11. On 4 February 2011 the applicant started serving his prison sentence. On 21 June 2011 he was conditionally released.

5. The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Bečej, where he was employed as a police officer. 6. On 24 January 2003 the Bečej Municipal Court (“the Municipal Court”) started judicial investigation proceedings against the applicant for the alleged commission of a number of criminal offences concerning the performance of his duties. 7. On 26 May 2003 the competent directorate of the Ministry of Interior dismissed the applicant from the police force (effective as of 30 May 2003). The decision noted that the criminal proceedings had been instituted against the applicant and that Article 45, in conjunction with Article 34 (1)(2), of the Ministry of Interior Act 1991, which was in force at the time of the dismissal, should be applied. According to this provision a police officer could be dismissed, at the discretion of the Ministry of Interior, if he no longer met the requirements for being a police officer, which included the requirement that criminal proceedings of a particular type should not be pending against him. The applicant lodged an appeal against this decision, but on 30 June 2003 his appeal was rejected and the dismissal thus confirmed. 8. On 23 July 2003 the applicant lodged a claim with the Municipal Court seeking his reinstatement. 9. On 31 October 2003 the Municipal Court partly discontinued the criminal proceedings against the applicant based on the applicable procedural prescription period. 10. On 12 November 2003 the remainder of the criminal proceedings were discontinued because the public prosecutor had withdrawn the charges. 11. On 30 December 2003 the Municipal Court annulled the decision on the applicant’s dismissal of 26 May 2003 by partial judgment, establishing that everyone charged with a criminal offence should be presumed innocent until proven guilty by a court of law, and that a broad interpretation of Article 45 of the Ministry of Interior Act 1991 in regards to the persons who were not found guilty could be only to their detriment. 12. On 17 June 2004 the Novi Sad District Court (“the District Court”) upheld this judgment. The applicant’s former employer thereafter submitted an appeal on points of law. 13. In the meantime, the applicant was reinstated to his previous post by decision of the Ministry of Interior of 13 January 2005. The decisions of 26 May and 30 June 2003 were also repealed. 14. On 9 March 2005, however, the Supreme Court upheld the appeal on points of law, reversed the judgments of 30 December 2003 and 17 June 2004 and rejected the applicant’s claim for reinstatement. It found that the dismissal of 26 May 2006 had been in accordance with the Article 45, read in conjunction with Article 34 (1)(2) of the Ministry of Interior Act 1991, and that the mere fact that the criminal proceedings had been pending against the applicant was sufficient reason for the applicant’s dismissal. 15. On 4 July 2005 the applicant was thus again dismissed from his job, which decision was upheld on 11 August 2005 by the Minister of Interior. 16. On 4 August 2005, the applicant brought another set of the proceedings for the annulment of his second dismissal. However, the Municipal Court, the District Court and the Supreme Court, by their judgments of 27 October 2005, 10 May 2007 and 18 December 2007, respectively, all ruled against him and upheld his dismissal on the basis of Article 45, read in conjunction with Article 34 (1)(2), of the Ministry of Interior Act 1991. 17. On 14 March 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Constitutional Court concerning the outcome, fairness and the length of the civil proceedings concerning his dismissal, the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty and the “right to work”. 18. On 17 February 2011 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s appeal. In regards to the court judgments of 31 October 2003, 17 June 2004 and 9 March 2005 the Constitutional Court established that the his complaints were inadmissible ratione temporis given that the Serbian Constitution had come into force on 8 November 2006, i.e. after the first set of the proceedings concerning the applicant’s dismissal. On the other hand, with respect to the judgments of 27 October 2005, 10 May and 18 December 2007, the Constitutional Court found that they were not arbitrary, and upheld the legality of the applicant’s second dismissal on the basis of Article 45, read in conjunction with Article 34 (1)(2), of the Ministry of Interior Act 1991. In the Constitutional Court’s view, the fact that the applicant was ultimately dismissed on 4 July 2005, instead of on 26 May 2003, was only in the applicant’s favour, and that fact alone could not affect the legality of his “dismissal as such”. 19. Before this on 19 January 2011, the Constitutional Court rendered a decision in the case of Stefanović v. Serbia (UŽ 753/2008), concerning the same legal issue in which it ruled in favour of the appelant in that case (see Milojević and Others v. Serbia, nos. 43519/07 and 2 others, §§ 36-37, 12 January 2016).

6. The applicants were born in 1982 and 1983 respectively and are currently serving sentences in penal facilities in the Republic of Komi and the Murmansk Region respectively. 7. On 25 and 19 September 2002 respectively the applicants were arrested in Grozny in the Chechen Republic and taken to the Operational‑Search Division of the North Caucasus Operations Department of the Chief Directorate of the Russian Ministry of the Interior in the Southern Federal Circuit (ОРБ-2 СКОУ ГУ МВД РФ по ЮФО  hereinafter “ORB-2”). After their arrest they were taken to the temporary detention facility at ORB-2 (hereinafter “the IVS”). Official records of the applicants’ arrest were drawn up on 30 and 24 September 2002 respectively. Throughout this time the applicants remained without legal assistance. Their families were unaware of their whereabouts. 8. According to the applicants, for several days during their unrecorded detention they were repeatedly ill‑treated by officers of ORB-2 and forced into confessing to being members of an illegal armed group in Grozny, and to the murders of several people, including police officers and military servicemen. 9. The applicants described in detail the circumstances of the alleged ill‑treatment. They submitted, in particular, that the officers of ORB-2 had punched and kicked them, beat them up with truncheons, administered electric shocks while putting gas masks or plastic bags over their heads, and had threatened them with rape and blackmail. According to the second applicant, he was also beaten over the head with a plastic bottle filled with water while his head was pressed against the floor. Furthermore, the perpetrators jumped on his head with all their weight, burnt his back with cigarette butts, beat his fingers with a varnished stick while his hands were pressed against a table, and threatened to pierce his hands with staples and shoot him. The applicants alleged that two of the perpetrators had been officers Yakh. and Gul. 10. Once the applicants’ arrests were formalised, they reiterated their confession statements in the presence of the chief investigator, S., and two legal aid lawyers, Ts. and D. The applicants confirmed that they had made their statements voluntarily. According to them, officers Yakh. and Gul. were both present during their interviews. 11. When questioning the second applicant on 24 September 2002 in the presence of D. and officer Yakh., S. lifted up his shirt and saw marks of beatings on his back (bruises, marks from electric wires and swellings). When asked how they had been caused, the second applicant said that he had fallen down the stairs. Several days later he told D. that he had received the injuries in a fight with his brother. 12. On 18 and 22 December 2002 respectively the applicants were transferred from the IVS to remand prison IZ-20/2 in Chernokozovo in the Naurskiy District of northern Chechnya. 13. The Government failed to submit the applicants’ medical documents for the period between September and December 2002, relying on the fact that they must have been destroyed following the expiry of their storage time-limit. 14. The Government provided a copy of a register of medical examinations of persons admitted to IZ-20/2 in the period between 26 November 2002 and 4 October 2003. The entries concerning both applicants state “no bodily injuries”. 15. After their transfer to the remand prison in December 2002 the applicants made several complaints to the Prosecutor’s Office of the Chechen Republic of their having been subjected to torture while in police custody at ORB-2. However, the institution of criminal proceedings was refused. On 3 December 2003 the investigator S. submitted as follows: “Following their transfer to the SIZO in Grozny there was a flow of complaints and applications. At the present time I cannot remember the exact dates when the decisions on the applicants’ complaints and applications were made.” 16. On 14 and 18 April 2003 S. refused to institute criminal proceedings into the second applicant’s complaints of ill-treatment. The decisions were taken on the basis of statements by officers Gul. and Yakh., who denied using any physical force against him. It appears that a further complaint of ill-treatment submitted on 9 July 2003 to the Prosecutor’s Office of the Chechen Republic received no reply. 17. On 25 November 2003, during the course of the trial, the applicants complained to the court that during their unrecorded detention (between 25 and 30 September in respect of the first applicant and between 19 and 24 September in respect of the second applicant) they had been subjected to torture involving electric shocks, gas masks, beatings and threats by officers of ORB-2 and forced into making a confession. The applicants alleged that one of the perpetrators had been the chief operational officer, Yakh. 18. On the same day the Rostov Regional Court (“the Regional Court”) requested the Prosecutor’s Office of the Chechen Republic to conduct an inquiry into the applicants’ allegations. 19. On 8 December 2003 D., an investigator from the Leninskiy district prosecutor’s office of Grozny, having questioned S. (the investigator in charge of the pre-trial investigation in the criminal case against the applicants), Yakh. (the chief operational officer of ORB-2), T. (the legal aid lawyer for the applicants’ co-defendant) and Ts. (the legal aid lawyer for the first applicant), as well as M. (an attesting witness in several investigative activities), refused to open a criminal investigation into the applicants’ complaints of ill-treatment for lack of evidence that a crime had been committed. The decision, in so far as it concerns the applicants, reads as follows: “[S.] submitted that he had been in charge of the pre-trial investigation of the criminal case [against the applicants] and that operational assistance had been provided by officers of [ORB-2], including the chief operational officer, Yakh. After their arrest [the applicants] were placed in the temporary detention facility at [ORB-2], following which they were transferred to remand prison [illegible]. ... During the initial pre-trial investigation [the applicants] made no complaints of having been subjected to any unlawful methods of investigation. However, they subsequently made [relevant] complaints, which were decided by [S.] in the framework of the criminal case under investigation. On each occasion the [applicants’] arguments were not objectively confirmed and it was decided [that a criminal investigation would not be instituted]; he could not remember the dates of the relevant decisions ... [The applicants made their statements of their own free will; they were not subjected to any violence; all investigative measures were carried out with the participation of legal aid lawyers]. The legal aid lawyer Ts. submitted that she had represented [the first applicant] from 30 September 2002 until the end of the preliminary investigation. During the course of the preliminary investigation [the first applicant] had not complained of having been subjected to unlawful methods of investigation and physical violence, and Ts. had not lodged any complaints of ill-treatment with the prosecutor’s office on [the first applicant’s] behalf. ... [Yakh.] submitted that ... no physical violence had been used against [the applicants] by the officers of [ORB-2], and that [the applicants] had made their statements of their own free will.” 20. On 9 December 2003 the presiding judge received a copy of the above-mentioned decision and read it out in court. 21. The trial court further questioned S. and the attesting witness M., who submitted that no physical force had been used against the applicants, who had made all their statements voluntarily and without coercion. S. admitted that when he had questioned the applicants at ORB-2 they had been handcuffed to the radiator to prevent them escaping. 22. On 18 and 30 December 2003 and 12 April 2004 the applicants’ lawyer asked the trial court to exclude the evidence obtained from the applicants under torture, but the requests were dismissed. 23. During the submissions the presiding judge allowed the prosecutor to amend one of the charges against the applicants in so far as it concerned a change to the date of the alleged murder of P. (from 30 to 29 May 2001). 24. On 11 May 2004 the Regional Court convicted the applicants, along with another co-defendant, of membership of an illegal armed group, several counts of murder, attempts on the life of law-enforcement officers and illegal possession of firearms. They were sentenced to twenty‑five years’ imprisonment. The applicants’ conviction was based on self‑incriminating statements given by the defendants during the pre-trial investigation in the period between September and December 2002 while they had been on the premises of ORB-2 (records of their questioning as suspects, records of their questioning as accused, records of confrontation between the parties, records of crime-scene examinations), and the findings of forensic medical examinations. The court also relied on statements by prosecution witnesses, including Ts., L. and K., and victims, although these did not link the applicants to the crimes they had been charged with. Despite the court’s rulings, most of the prosecution witnesses and the victims did not attend the trial. Having regard to the challenging social situation in the Chechen Republic, where the witnesses in question lived, the court used the statements obtained from them at the pre-trial stage as evidence. The defence witnesses were all heard during the trial and provided alibis for the applicants. The court, however, excluded their testimony, as they were all either their relatives or friends. The court decided that the applicants’ sentences should start to run from 25 and 19 September 2002 respectively. 25. The applicants appealed, claiming, inter alia, that they had been subjected to ill-treatment during the pre-trial investigation and convicted on the basis of evidence obtained under torture, that they had not been afforded an opportunity to examine the prosecution witnesses and the victims, and that during the submissions the presiding judge had allowed the prosecutor to amend one of the charges against them, thereby violating their right to defence. Attached to the second applicant’s appeal were witness statements by D., the legal aid lawyer who had represented him during the pre-trial investigation. The relevant part reads as follows: “On 24 September 2002, when [the second applicant] was being questioned as a suspect, we saw that his back was covered in bruises. I agreed to make the relevant submissions to the [Regional Court]. However, somebody has misled the trial court, stating that I had “flatly refused to make any depositions”. I was not questioned during the pre-investigation inquiry, nor [did I] give any depositions to anybody except the lawyer [representing the applicants during the trial].” 26. On 18 August 2004 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the judgment on appeal and reduced the applicants’ sentences to twenty-three and twenty‑four years’ imprisonment respectively. The court held that the applicants’ allegations had been reasonably found to be unsubstantiated, and that the difficult social situation in Chechnya could account for the inability to secure the attendance of the prosecution witnesses and victims. The appellate court found that the amendment of one of the charges against the applicants had not violated the applicants’ right to defence since, in any event, in the statements made during the pre-trial investigation they had mentioned having committed the crime “in around the spring of 2001” and furthermore during the trial had denied committing it at all. 27. On 25 October 2013 the Ust-Vymskiy District Court of the Republic of Komi reviewed the first applicant’s sentence in line with amendments to the criminal law and reduced it to twenty-two years’ imprisonment. 28. Following communication of the applicants’ complaint of ill‑treatment to the Government in October 2011, on 6 December 2011 the prosecutor of the Leninskiy district of Grozny quashed as unlawful and unsubstantiated the decision of 8 December 2003 refusing to institute a criminal investigation into the applicants’ complaints of ill-treatment. An additional pre-investigation inquiry was ordered, so that the applicants could be questioned concerning the circumstances of the alleged ill‑treatment, the identity of the alleged perpetrators, the injuries allegedly sustained as a result of the ill-treatment and any requests made for medical assistance in this connection. 29. The case file contains no further information about the outcome of the additional pre-investigation inquiry. 30. Following the applicants’ conviction, in September 2004 their families requested the head of the Rostov Regional Department of the Russian Federal Penal Authority (“the FSIN”) to allocate them to penal facilities in regions adjacent to their home region, the Chechen Republic. 31. In November 2004 the first applicant was allocated to a strict-regime correctional colony in the Republic of Komi, located over 3,000 kilometres from the Chechen Republic. 32. In December 2004 the second applicant was allocated to a strict‑regime correctional colony in the Omsk Region, located over 3,400 kilometres from the Chechen Republic. 33. On 22 August 2005 the first applicant’s family asked the head of the FSIN to transfer him to a penal facility in a less remote region. They referred, in particular, to his state of health (tuberculosis) and indicated that appropriate facilities were available in the Republic of Kalmykia. Their request was rejected. 34. The second applicant and his family lodged requests with the Omsk regional prosecutor, the head of the FSIN, the Prosecutor General of Russia and the Ombudsman for the Omsk Region seeking the applicant’s transfer to a less remote penal facility. They argued that he was serving a twenty‑four year sentence over 3,400 km from his home region, and that his parents had difficulties travelling long distances in view of their advanced age. It was likely that over time they would be unable to travel and would have no opportunity to visit their son. 35. In May 2006 the FSIN refused the second applicant’s request on the grounds that there were no strict-regime penal facilities in the Chechen Republic and no exceptional circumstances preventing him serving his sentence in the Omsk Region. Reference was made to Article 73 § 2 and Article 81 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences (“the CES”). 36. On 18 July 2006 the applicants and their families complained to the Supreme Court of Russia that the applicants were being detained in penal facilities far from their home region and asked it to facilitate contact. The complaint reached the court on 28 July 2006. The case file contains no further information as to the outcome of this request. 37. On 4 December 2006 the second applicant asked the Prosecutor General of Russia to transfer him to a penal facility in the Chechen Republic or a nearby region. He pointed to difficulties in terms of family visits and contact. 38. On 15 March 2007 the FSIN again rejected the second applicant’s request. 39. On 30 July 2009 the FSIN rejected the first applicant’s request to be transferred to a penal facility in the Chechen Republic, with reference to Article 73 § 4 and Article 81 § 2 of the CES. 40. Subsequently, on an unspecified date the second applicant was transferred from the correctional colony in the Omsk Region to a correctional colony in the Murmansk Region, located over 3,700 km from the Chechen Republic.

7. The applicant was born in 1979. 8. The applicant is the biological mother of four children. Together with her husband, G., a French citizen, she has a son, P., who was born on 13 November 2001. In December 2005 he was placed in foster care in Slovenia and has remained there ever since, having only occasional contact with the applicant. The applicant does not attend meetings with the welfare workers and foster parents and does not pay maintenance for him. On 19 November 2007 the applicant gave birth to her second child, M. In April 2008 the competent French authorities placed M. in foster care in France and referred the applicant for psychological counselling. M. was later adopted in France and has no contact with the applicant. 9. On 5 January 2010 the applicant gave birth to her third child, A., in the Postojna Maternity Hospital. The hospital informed the Ljubljana Social Work Centre of A.’s birth. The Ljubljana Social Work Centre arranged for the applicant to be transported to and accommodated at her mother’s home. The Cerknica Social Work Centre (“the Cerknica Centre”) provided the applicant with a nursing service and housekeeping assistance three times a week. The T. Association also helped the applicant care for A. Nonetheless, it was noted that the applicant was unable to take care of A. and often travelled and left A. at home, and that the applicant’s mother could not cope with this. Since December 2010 A. has been living with his father, G., in France. 10. The present application concerns the withdrawal of the applicant’s parental rights in respect of her fourth child, E., who was born on 31 December 2010. 11. On 29 December 2010 the applicant’s mother phoned the Cerknica Centre to inform them that the applicant was returning from France by train and was heading directly to Postojna Maternity Hospital, where she would shortly give birth. On 4 January 2011, after the applicant had given birth to E., the Cerknica Centre’s social workers visited her in the hospital, where the medical staff brought to their attention that the applicant was unable to take care of E. and needed constant supervision and help. Consequently, on 7 January 2011 the applicant’s stay in the hospital was extended until 10 January 2011. Following her discharge from the hospital, she went to live with her mother temporarily – an arrangement which the applicant and her mother agreed upon following an intervention by the Cerknica Centre. The Cerknica Centre provided the applicant with family help at home, a social service which included the participation of the T. Association and the community nursing service, domestic help with household tasks three times a week, and the assistance of a peripatetic worker from the Ljubljana Psychiatric Hospital. 12. On 19 January 2011, via email, the Cerknica Centre asked the Slovenian Consulate in Paris to enquire of G. whether he was willing to take care of E. On 7 February 2011 the consulate replied to the Cerknica Centre that the French social services had talked with G., who had doubts as to whether E. was his daughter and whether he could take care of her. The Cerknica Centre’s records of the phone call show that on 11 February 2011 it tried to telephone G. but was unsuccessful. On 15 February 2011, via email, the Cerknica Centre asked the consulate to enquire of G. whether he was willing to give his consent to E.’s adoption. 13. On 20 January 2011 the peripatetic worker who monitored the applicant at home (see paragraph 11 above) informed the Ljubljana Psychiatric Clinic of his concerns about the applicant’s mental state. The applicant was referred for an emergency examination by a clinical psychologist, which she refused to undertake. In addition, the community nursing centre and the worker helping the applicant with household tasks informed the Cerknica Centre of problems they had noticed in the applicant’s care of the newborn. 14. On 28 January 2011 the social workers talked to the applicant, who, considering E. old enough to travel, explained to them that she was planning to travel to France before 31 January. Subsequently, the team of professionals met at the Cerknica Centre and concluded that E.’s well-being was at serious risk. 15. On 30 January 2011 the applicant travelled to France to see her husband. She left E. with her mother, E.’s grandmother. As the applicant’s mother was not willing to take care of E., on 1 February 2011 the Cerknica Centre issued an interim removal order with immediate effect whereby E. was removed from her parents and placed in the Crisis Centre for Children. The Cerknica Centre also filed a criminal complaint against the applicant for abandoning a child, but the criminal proceedings were later discontinued. 16. On 16 February 2011 E. was placed in the care of the Cerknica Centre on the basis of section 201 of the Marriage and Family Relations Act (hereinafter “the Family Act” – see paragraph 60 below). On 18 February 2011, by way of an interim care order, the Cerknica Centre placed E. in the care of foster parents, who later adopted her (see paragraph 50 below). On 23 March 2011 the Cerknica Centre issued a final removal and care order removing E. from her parents and placing her in foster care. It based its decision on sections 119, 120, 157 and 158(2) of the Family Act (see paragraph 60 below). It does not appear that the applicant attempted to challenge the removal and/or care order in any way. 17. Following E.’s birth the applicant often changed places and travelled back and forth to France. Her location was not always known to her family or the Cerknica Centre, which tried to reach her, unsuccessfully. 18. The applicant has been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. In October 2009 she was placed in a psychiatric hospital for the first time, in Ljubljana Psychiatric Clinic. Since giving birth to E. she has been placed in a psychiatric hospital several times, including against her will on at least one occasion. 19. In her statement of 10 January 2011 a doctor from the Postojna Maternity Hospital noted that the applicant had been refusing to take medication, and the peripatetic worker from the Ljubljana Psychiatric Clinic said the same in his statement of 20 January 2011 (see paragraph 13 above). 20. The case file indicates that as of 7 January 2011 the applicant was regularly examined by a psychiatrist from the Idrija Psychiatric Hospital, often on a monthly basis. 21. The Cerknica Centre’s records of 9 April 2014 show that the Cerknica Centre offered services including counselling to the applicant, who refused this, arguing that she had already joined a self-help group and had monthly sessions with a psychologist and psychiatric examinations every three months. 22. Dr M., who examined the applicant, stated in his report of 31 March 2014 and at a hearing (see paragraph 41 below) that the applicant’s illness, paranoid schizophrenia, had been in remission for some time and she had been taking her medication regularly. In 2015 the applicant’s condition worsened and she had to be hospitalised twice in that year. 23. On 15 March 2011 the Cerknica Centre held the first meeting of the Individual Project Team (hereinafter “the IPT”), which was set up under the Foster Care Execution Act (see paragraph 61 below) to monitor E.’s foster care. Although, as E.’s parent, the applicant was invited to the meeting, she did not attend it because she was travelling. The IPT was composed of social workers, the foster parents and the applicant. 24. The Cerknica Centre’s records of the IPT’s meeting, prepared by a social worker, show that on 6 June 2011 the applicant visited the Cerknica Centre, enquiring about E. for the first time. On 5 July 2011 the first contact session with E. took place. The social worker who was supervising the contact session noted in the report that the applicant’s behaviour during the contact session had been inappropriate for E.’s age, because she had tried to put E., then six months old, on her feet. 25. The Cerknica Centre’s records of the IPT’s meeting show that on 12 January 2012 the applicant again asked the Cerknica Centre if she could see E. The second contact session took place on 31 January 2012. The applicant cancelled the next scheduled contact session which was to take place on 28 March 2012 because of her alleged departure to France. On 15 May 2012 the third contact session took place. The Cerknica Centre’s records of a phone call with the applicant indicate that on 19 June 2012 the Cerknica Centre contacted her with a view to arranging another contact session, but no agreement was reached as she ended the conversation saying that she was busy. On 2 July 2012 the Cerknica Centre enquired with the applicant as to whether she wanted another contact session to be arranged, but she declined, referring to her poor “state”. As further noted in the Cerknica Centre’s records, the applicant confirmed that she was aware that the Cerknica Centre would organise another session as soon as possible if she so wished. Following a request by the applicant of 4 July 2012, the fourth contact session took place on 11 July 2012. A social worker from the Kranj Social Work Centre who was supervising the contact session noted in her report that the applicant was tired during the contact session and stopped playing with E. after a couple of minutes. The contact session scheduled for 26 September 2012 was cancelled due to the applicant’s illness. 26. Another thirteen contact sessions between the applicant and E. took place before the end of 2014. They all took place in the presence of the foster parents and the Cerknica Centre’s social worker. According to the records of the IPT meetings, the presence of the foster parents was necessary because of E.’s age and the need to ensure her sense of security, given that she and the applicant did not have a close relationship. 27. The reports of the contact sessions prepared by the social worker supervising them indicate that during most of the sessions the applicant appeared distant and remained largely passive, observing E. without having any interaction with her. Numerous reports of the contact sessions further indicate that during the sessions E. did not approach the applicant on her own initiative. On several occasions she wanted to leave before the end of the contact session and stayed only because the foster parents entertained her. Furthermore, in her reports of the sessions, the social worker noted that the foster parents encouraged E. to establish contact with the applicant and the relatives present at the sessions, and that they were accessible and communicative with respect to the applicant and her questions about E. Following a request made by the applicant at the IPT meeting in February 2014 for help in establishing her relationship with E., the social worker and the foster parents offered her help with regard to future contact sessions and encouraged her to engage more actively in establishing the relationship. It was noted in the reports of the contact sessions of 2 July 2014 and 10 September 2014 that the applicant had made efforts to establish a connection with E., which had led to some interaction between them. However, no such interaction had occurred at the last contact session, which had taken place on 26 November 2014. 28. The records of the IPT meetings, which took place every couple of months, show that the contact sessions took place on the dates agreed at the meetings based on the applicant’s requests. The Cerknica Centre, the foster parents and the applicant agreed that the contact sessions would take place gradually because E. did not know the applicant. 29. On 8 January 2014 the applicant asked the Cerknica Centre for contact sessions on a more regular basis. The Cerknica Centre advised her to institute proceedings before the Ljubljana District Court, which was competent to decide on her contact with E. in the absence of the agreement. 30. As requested by the applicant in May 2016, the inspection authorities of the Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities carried out an inspection with a view to determining whether the Cerknica Centre had impeded contact between the applicant and E. Their report and the documents in the file show that on at least on five further occasions the Cerknica Centre informed the applicant that she should institute proceedings before the Ljubljana District Court if she was not satisfied with the existing arrangements. The IPT records also show that at that time the applicant was in contact with her lawyer, with whom she had discussed the possibility of taking the matter to court. 31. According to the report issued by the inspection authorities, the Cerknica Centre had acted in a professional way in arranging the contact sessions, and had good reasons to put the interests of the child first. The inspection report also noted that the Cerknica Centre had insisted on that contact pending a decision by the Constitutional Court, and had on numerous occasions informed the applicant of the judicial remedy she should use if she found the existing contact arrangements unsatisfactory. The report further found that after the Constitutional Court had confirmed the withdrawal of the applicant’s parental rights (see paragraph 48 below), the Cerknica Centre had properly considered that the contact had been forced upon E. and thus was not in her best interests. 32. It would appear that the Cerknica Centre also asked the Human Rights Ombudsman to provide a general opinion on what would be in the child’s best interests in the situation in question – the withdrawal of parental rights or permanent foster care. On 29 July 2015 the Human Rights Ombudsman replied to the Cerknica Centre, noting that if the child could not be reunited with her family, the next best solution was adoption. They confirmed that foster care should be understood to be a temporary measure and that, as regards a change in contact arrangements, advising the mother to institute court proceedings was the only available option. 33. The records of the Cerknica Centre indicate that on 23 September 2015 the Cerknica Centre enquired of the applicant whether she had taken any steps to change the arrangements by means of court proceedings. According to those records, she answered that she had been too busy with other things. 34. On 15 February 2016 the Cerknica Centre sent the applicant some photos of E. 35. On 7 March 2011 the Cerknica Centre lodged an application with the Ljubljana District Court seeking that the applicant and G. be divested of their parental rights, on the grounds that they had neglected and abandoned E., had not taken care of her basic needs, had repeated the problematic behaviour, and had jeopardised the well-being of the child. In the Cerknica Centre’s opinion, protecting the interests of the child required the withdrawal of the parental rights of both parents. 36. The applicant received legal aid and was represented by legal counsel in the proceedings. She disputed the Cerknica Centre’s arguments in the application of 7 March 2011, and argued that she, as a result of mental illness, was not able to understand the proceedings. She submitted that since E. was safe in foster care there was no urgency to divest her of her parental rights. In her view, the court should wait for her mental health – which at that point was poor – to improve before deciding the application. Provided that she received appropriate therapy, she would be capable of taking care of the child, so the withdrawal of her parental rights was not necessary. In addition, the applicant argued that the aim of the proceedings was to give E. up for adoption and preclude her from later seeking to have her parental rights restored. 37. The court appointed an expert psychiatrist, Dr K., who met the applicant for an interview. In his opinion of 16 May 2012 he submitted to the court that the applicant suffered from a disease on the schizophrenia spectrum, but had the capacity to be a party in the proceedings. He noted that the applicant was in remission (the period when a patient does not have positive psychotic symptoms); however, that was a recent development and the remission was still unstable. He further noted that the disease could rapidly turn into its active form. Dr K. also stated that provided the applicant took the prescribed medication regularly, her health condition would not deteriorate; however, if she failed to do so, the deterioration would be inevitable. He attached the opinion of an expert in clinical psychology, J., who had also examined the applicant and found that her attitude toward her health condition was not sufficiently serious and that her sense of reality was deficient. The applicant showed indications of extensive and persecutory delusions, while her emotional state was elated and inappropriate for the situation. Dr K. further explained that, in his opinion, the applicant was not able to take care of the child at that time. Her health condition had not improved to such a degree that she could assume the care and upbringing of a child who was a minor. 38. On 29 November 2012 the Ljubljana District Court issued a decision whereby it divested the applicant and G. of their parental rights in relation to E. on the basis of section 116(1) of the Family Act (see paragraph 60 below). With regard to the applicant’s understanding of the proceedings, the Ljubljana District Court concluded, on the basis of Dr K.’s expert opinion as well as the applicant’s own statements, that she was regularly taking the medication and that she did not lack the capacity to be a party to the proceedings at issue. With respect to G., who had not responded to the Cerknica Centre’s application for the withdrawal of his parental rights and had remained inactive in the court proceedings, the court noted that he had not shown any interest in E. and had clearly demonstrated that he was not going to take care of her. With respect to the applicant, it found that the applicant had abandoned E. and had seriously neglected her parental responsibilities. The court pointed out that the same pattern could be observed as regards the applicant’s attitude towards the other three children. 39. Following an appeal by the applicant, on 16 April 2013 the Koper Higher Court quashed the first-instance court’s decision in the part relating to the applicant and remitted the case for re-examination. It stressed that the lower court had failed to clarify whether the applicant’s behaviour in question and her attitude towards her illness and treatment was due to the mental illness itself, or was a result of her voluntary actions. 40. In the new proceedings, the Ljubljana District Court appointed a new expert psychiatrist, Dr M., and obtained the opinion of an expert psychologist, Dr P. The court held a hearing and, inter alia, examined the applicant and the two experts. 41. After personally examining the applicant on 23 September 2013, Dr M. submitted to the court a written expert opinion confirming that she had a mental disorder on the schizophrenia spectrum and noting that her character appeared to have been affected by the illness. According to Dr M., the applicant’s lack of a realistic understanding of her illness, her negative attitude towards treatment, and her abandonment of E. were all the results of her mental illness. Acknowledging that the illness could be controlled and the symptoms managed by medication, as well as noting that the course of the condition depended on each individual, Dr M. stressed that the prognosis for the applicant’s illness was not good, and therefore it was not possible to expect her to be able to take care of E. In particular, it was noted that, notwithstanding the episodes of remission, schizophrenia, like some other mental illnesses, led gradually to a permanent deterioration in a person’s capacities, and such a process would occur despite the applicant’s medical treatment. Dr M. also noted that, in the interview, the applicant herself had openly expressed doubts as to whether she could take care of her daughter on her own. 42. After conducting an interview with the applicant and clinically examining her, Dr P. submitted a written report in which he noted that the applicant suffered from a chronic mental disorder on the schizophrenia spectrum which was incurable but treatable (manageable). In his opinion, deterioration causing the applicant’s unpredictable behaviour was inevitable, and the old behaviour pattern was likely to repeat. According to him, the applicant’s understanding and awareness of the child’s needs had been reduced to an understanding and awareness of her primarily physiological needs. The applicant did not understand the parental role and was unable to see the child as an individual with her own needs and desires. He found that the applicant was properly equipped intellectually, but had emotional problems such as diminished empathy. In his opinion, at that time the applicant was not able to care for or bring up E., and was not a suitable person to do so because she could not be expected to provide a stable environment for the child. He also noted that she had not expressed a wish to have custody of E., but had expressed her desire to have more frequent contact with her. Dr P. found E. lively, communicative and cordial, but restrained in relation to the applicant. The expert concluded that contact with the mother was burdensome and forced upon E. The expert also noted that, when observing the contact session, he had not noticed any emotional connection between the applicant and E. 43. On 3 April 2014 the Ljubljana District Court issued a new decision divesting the applicant of her parental rights in relation to E. on the basis of section 116 of the Family Act (see paragraph 60 below). The court found, on the basis of the new expert opinions (see paragraphs 41 and 42 above), that the applicant had suffered from paranoid schizophrenia for many years before its critical manifestation. It further reasoned that the consequences of the disease in the applicant were a non-critical attitude to the illness, and as a result the applicant was not able to understand her health problems, their seriousness, or the importance of treatment. Equally, her neglectful conduct in relation to E. when she had left her did not reflect the true will and conscious action of the applicant. The court weighed the interests of the child against those of the applicant. It noted that, in the absence of any realistic possibility of the applicant resuming care of the child, it was more appropriate to withdraw her parental rights and provide the child with a substitute family for permanent care and emotional stability. Having regard in particular to the above‑mentioned expert opinions, the court concluded that the applicant should be divested of her parental rights. It based the conclusion on the fact that she suffered from paranoid schizophrenia which, though controllable, was incurable, could possibly worsen, and would in any event lead to negative personality changes. The court also had regard to fact that the applicant had four children but all the children were cared for by other foster or adoptive parents, and she had spent only a month with E., whereas E. had spent most of her life with the foster family, in an environment where she could be provided with permanent care and emotional stability, something which could not be provided by her mother. 44. The applicant appealed, arguing that it was unacceptable to divest her of her parental rights solely because of her mental illness, and that the legislation provided no basis for such an extreme and disproportionate measure. In her opinion, E.’s interests would be sufficiently safeguarded by foster care, which would be a less intrusive measure. Moreover, she argued that her illness was in remission, she was regularly taking medication, and did not present any danger to E. She further argued that the conclusion that contact was not in E.’s interests was unfair. In her view, the first-instance court had not taken into account that she had been doing her best, including by trying to find a job in order to improve her situation. 45. On 21 October 2014 the Koper Higher Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It held that the fact that her actions had not been deliberate could not be a crucial factor in a decision under section 116 of the Family Act. The main criterion for a decision was the child’s best interests. The court further found that the reason behind the withdrawal of the applicant’s parental rights was the fact that there was no prospect that the family would ever be reunited. During the remission stage of her illness, the applicant could function in her daily life, but she could not take care of her daughter either at that time or in the future. In this connection, the court found that the applicant lacked empathy, did not understand her parental responsibilities, and had been mostly passive during the contact sessions with E. The court noted that the applicant had not abused her contact rights, but had failed to establish proper communication with E., and consequently a basic parent-child relationship. The court rejected the applicant’s argument that E. should remain in foster care, finding that this was only a temporary measure intended to enable parents to exercise their parental responsibilities pending their children being returned to them. Since reunification of the applicant’s family was not likely to happen, protection of the child’s best interests required a more lasting measure aimed at ensuring permanent care and emotional stability for the child. The court concluded that “when balancing the child’s interests against the mother’s rights, it was not possible to give priority to the mother’s interest in maintaining her parental rights”. 46. The applicant subsequently asked the Supreme State Prosecutor to lodge a request for the protection of legality. On 19 February 2015 the Supreme State Prosecutor informed the applicant that there were no grounds for his intervention in the case. 47. On 30 January 2015 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against the Koper Higher Court’s decision (see paragraph 45 above). She invoked several provisions of the Constitution, as well as Articles 6, 8 and 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the Convention. She disputed the lower court’s findings concerning the poor quality of the contact she had had with E., and argued that depriving her of her parental rights was unjustified because she had not posed any danger to E., and the court’s preference for adoption over fostering in cases such as hers violated the biological parents’ rights. In her opinion, the lower court’s position implied that people with incurable mental illnesses who presented no danger to their children could not have parental rights just because they were unable to take proper care of their children. She also argued that the concept of proper care had not been defined by any of the lower courts. Furthermore, she pointed out that she wished to maintain contact with E., but had been unable to do so since the Koper Higher Court’s judgment of 21 October 2014. 48. On 10 December 2015, by five votes to three, the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint. It found that the lower court’s arguments relating to the applicant’s permanent inability to take care of E., the absence of a family bond between her and E., her inability to establish a relationship with E. during the contact sessions, and the benefits of providing E. with a substitute family for permanent care and emotional stability, justified the withdrawal of her parental rights in the child’s best interests. In the Constitutional Court’s opinion, when weighing the child’s interests against the mother’s rights, the interests which should prevail were E.’s interests in her permanent and stable care and upbringing. As regards the applicant’s argument concerning discrimination against mentally ill people, the Constitutional Court found that the withdrawal of her parental rights had not been based on the fact that she suffered from mental illness, but on the fact that she had been permanently incapable of taking care of E. and the finding that there was no prospect that the family would ever be reunited. It was for domestic courts to protect the child’s interests in the most appropriate way. In E.’s case, they had decided that this was possible only by ensuring a permanent and stable substitute family environment. Moreover, the Constitutional Court upheld the Koper Higher Court’s finding that section 116 of the Family Act could be applied to the present case despite the applicant lacking intent as regards her actions threatening E. (see paragraph 45 above). It considered that the Koper Higher Court’s interpretation of the scope of the application of section 116 complied with Article 54 (1) of the Constitution, which provided that parents could be divested of their parental responsibility or have that responsibility limited only on the grounds provided for by law in order to protect a child’s interests. In the Constitutional Court’s view, that provision did not imply that the State was to protect the child’s interests only when he or she was threatened by the deliberate actions or omissions of his or her parents. The Constitutional Court’s decision was served on the applicant’s representative on 12 January 2016. 49. Judge D. Jadek Pensa of the Constitutional Court, who voted against the above decision, wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by the other two dissenting judges. She pointed out that the interference in the applicant’s case had been particularly serious, and noted that the right to know one’s parents and have contact with them was an internationally recognised right of a child. In her view, the lower court should explain why E. would be at risk of harm by knowing her mother and having contact with her. She also found it questionable whether the applicant had been given sufficient opportunity to form a bond with E., and argued that the positive obligations imposed on the authorities, including the Cerknica Centre, had been disregarded. 50. On 16 May 2016 the Cerknica Centre issued a decision on E.’s adoption by her foster parents. On 2 June 2016 the decision became final and the foster care in respect of E. was terminated and in effect replaced by the adoption. The applicant was not a party to those proceedings. 51. In its decision, the Cerknica Centre relied on Article 20 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and section 141 of the Family Act (see paragraphs 60 and 63 below). It emphasised that foster care was a temporary measure and that a child needed a long-term placement which provided him or her with permanent loving care and intimacy from the same person. The Cerknica Centre found that it had exhausted all possibilities for reunification with the biological family. Furthermore, the Cerknica Centre held that the relationship between E. and her foster parents was strong and safe, indicating that the foster parents would take care of her in a responsible and appropriate manner. 52. On 19 May 2016 the applicant initiated court proceedings against two social work centres which had been involved in the contact arrangements in the past and E.’s adoptive parents, seeking the regulation of her contact with E. and an interim decision setting out temporary contact arrangements pending the court proceedings. She requested that contact sessions take place every fortnight for three hours. In her opinion, it was in the child’s interests for her to know her mother. She maintained that contact sessions with E. in the past had been rare, and that she had expressed her wish to have them more often; however, the Cerknica Centre had limited them even further and had suspended them after the Constitutional Court’s decision (see paragraphs 31 and 48 above). The applicant received legal aid and was represented by legal counsel in the proceedings. 53. The Koper District Court appointed an expert in psychiatry and paediatric psychiatry, Dr Z., who, inter alia, carried out a psychiatric examination and an interview with the applicant, and held a paediatric psychiatric interview with E. In her expert opinion, Dr Z. emphasised the applicant’s inability to establish an adequate relation with E. Notably, her findings showed that the applicant was emotionally unresponsive, lacked empathy, had a distorted view of reality, and was not capable of either perceiving the child as an individual or reacting to her needs. In Dr Z.’s opinion, E.’s contact with someone like the applicant, who did not understand and was not able to react to the child, would be unpleasant, painful and burdensome. Since, in the present case, it was the child’s biological mother who did not know how to respond or touch the child, the contact experience could be traumatic for E. Dr Z. also emphasised the relevance of the applicant’s negative attitude towards E.’s adoptive parents, which could be harmful to E. She observed that, in the past, E.’s adoptive parents had encouraged E.’s contact with the applicant and had not acted as her competition. The expert refused to arrange a contact session between the applicant and E., as she believed that that would be contrary to the professional rules of medicine and harmful for E. 54. On 9 August 2016, after holding a hearing, the Koper District Court dismissed the applicant’s application for the regulation of contact (predlog za ureditev stikov) and an interim decision. It firstly observed that E. had been adopted after the contact proceedings had been initiated (see paragraph 50 above). Consequently, the social work centres had stopped playing a role in arranging the contact, and the court dismissed the applicant’s application in so far as it was directed against them, without any further examination. Furthermore, the adoption had resulted in a different legal basis which the court had to apply in determining contact between the applicant and E. In particular, since the applicant was no longer considered to be E.’s parent, the relevant provision for the regulation of contact became section 106.a of the Family Act, which regulated a child’s contact with people who were not his or her parents (see paragraph 60 below). The court held that it would allow contact between E. and the applicant if it established on a cumulative basis that E. was personally attached to the applicant, had a family-type relationship with her, and that the contact was in E.’s interests. Therefore, it found the question of responsibility for the quality of contact sessions in the past irrelevant for the purposes of determining the case at hand. 55. In its assessment, the court relied on Dr Z.’s expert opinion (see paragraph 53 above) and the statements of the social worker who had supervised the contact sessions in the past and observed that, during the sessions, the applicant had been largely passive and there had been no proper interaction between her and E. It concluded that there was no personal connection between the applicant and E. Having regard to the nature of the actual relationship between the applicant and E., the applicant’s health situation at that time, her inability to form a relationship that would be beneficial to E., her negative attitude towards the adoptive parents, and the consequences the contact would have for E., the court found that the contact would not be in her interests. As the child’s interests constituted the first and paramount consideration in the case, it dismissed both the application for contact and the application for an interim decision. 56. The applicant appealed, maintaining that the decision not to grant her any contact was disproportionate and based on flawed findings and an erroneous application of the law. She argued that Dr Z.’s expert opinion was incomplete and focused on the observations of contact sessions in 2014. In the applicant’s opinion, Dr Z. had failed to examine the possibility that progress in establishing a relationship with E. could have been made had the Cerknica Centre not arbitrarily suspended the contact more than a year and a half earlier. Furthermore, invoking Article 8 of the Convention, she argued that the first-instance court had not carried out a proportionality test when weighing up the rights of the child and the applicant. It had also failed to assess whether the authorities had done everything to maintain her relationship with E., especially after her parental rights had been withdrawn. 57. On 4 April 2017 the Koper Higher Court dismissed the appeal. It found that the first-instance court had convincingly established in a well-reasoned decision that contact with the applicant was not in E.’s interests because of the applicant’s lack of emotional capacity to establish a relationship with E. and her negative attitude towards the adoptive parents. The Koper Higher Court emphasised that in cases like the one at hand, where the interests of the biological mother, the child and the adoptive family had to be balanced against each other, the interests of the child constituted the main guidance. Since the reintroduction of contact with the applicant would be harmful, even traumatic, for E.’s health and development, the mother’s right to family life had to give way to the child’s right. 58. The applicant lodged an application for leave to appeal on points of law, which was rejected as inadmissible by a decision of the Supreme Court of 8 August 2017. The court held that the decision against which the applicant had lodged an application for leave to appeal had been issued in non-contentious civil proceedings in which an appeal on points of law was inadmissible unless otherwise provided for by law. 59. A request by the applicant for free legal aid for the proceedings before the Constitutional Court had been rejected on the basis that the proceedings had no prospect of success owing to non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. She did not appeal against that decision, nor did she lodge a constitutional complaint.

5. The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Zgornja Korena. 6. On 3 June 2010 the Maribor Local Court found the applicant guilty, pursuant to the (old) Criminal Code (see paragraph 34 below), of two counts of violent behaviour, which had been committed in the periods between 1 May and 29 June 2003, and between 1 July 2003 and 22 November 2004, respectively. The applicant was given a suspended prison sentence. The judgment became final on 17 June 2011. 7. On 9 April 2004 the applicant was granted a licence to work as a liquidator in insolvency proceedings under the Compulsory Composition, Bankruptcy and Liquidation Act (hereinafter “the Bankruptcy Act”) then in force. His name was entered in the Register of Liquidators maintained by the Ministry of Justice. At the time of his appointment the Bankruptcy Act regulated the conditions under which such a licence could be granted and revoked (see paragraph 28 below). 8. On 1 October 2008 a new Financial Operations, Insolvency Proceedings and Compulsory Dissolution Act (hereinafter “the Financial Operations Act”) came into force, replacing the Bankruptcy Act (see paragraph 29 below). 9. On 21 June 2011 the Maribor Local Court informed the Ministry of Justice that the applicant’s conviction for the criminal offences committed in 2003 and 2004 had become final (see paragraph 6 above). Accordingly, on 27 June 2011 the Ministry of Justice revoked the applicant’s licence, based on section 109 of the Financial Operations Act. It stated that pursuant to that provision, the applicant, having been convicted of an offence prosecuted ex officio (hereinafter “publicly prosecutable”) committed with intent, had to be divested of his licence. Three days following the decision the applicant’s name was removed from the registry of liquidators. 10. On 25 July 2011 the applicant lodged an administrative action against the decision revoking his licence. He argued that at the time he had committed the criminal offence he could not have foreseen that it would have entailed such a sanction and that section 109 of the Financial Operations Act should not have been applied retrospectively – an issue which in his view had been entirely disregarded by the Ministry of Justice. The applicant also emphasised that at the time he had acquired the licence the law had not provided for the measure of revocation in a case of conviction for a criminal offence. In this connection, he referred to Article 28 of the Slovenian Constitution, which sets out the principle of legality in criminal law prohibiting, inter alia, any retroactive application of criminal law. Accordingly, he could not have been expected to anticipate that such legal consequences would have arisen from his actions which, furthermore, had no bearing on the performance of his duties as a liquidator. He argued that over the years in this profession, he had gained extensive experience and had built up his reputation. His job as a liquidator had constituted his only source of income and he and his family had thus suffered a grave and unexpected loss of earnings following the revocation of his licence. 11. On 7 November 2012 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s action, finding that the revocation of his licence had been entirely lawful. As regards the applicant’s assertion that the measure should not have been applied retroactively, it found that the time when the offence had been committed was not to be considered relevant since the measure in question pertained to the final conviction, thereby respecting the presumption of innocence. 12. On 21 December 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, reiterating the argument that his licence had been unlawfully revoked. He further alleged that the Administrative Court had failed to address that key argument and to provide a reasoned response to his complaints. Moreover, the applicant was of the view that, assuming that the Administrative Court had correctly interpreted the relevant provisions of the Financial Operations Act, those provisions were inconsistent with the Constitution. 13. On 13 February 2013 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s appeal on points of law as inadmissible, holding that the question he had raised did not meet the standard of “an important legal question” which should be resolved by the Supreme Court. The relevant provision of section 109 of the Financial Operations Act was unambiguous and did not require any particular interpretation; it was clear from its wording that it applied equally to those liquidators who had acquired their licence prior to the enactment of the Financial Operations Act as well as to those who had acquired it after the new Act had come into force. Moreover, the Act did not specifically provide that the measure in question applied only to convictions for criminal offences committed after it had entered into force. Lastly, the Supreme Court held that the applicant had failed to substantiate that the revocation of his licence had had particularly harmful consequences for him. 14. On 19 April 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint, relying on several constitutional provisions, including those enshrining equal protection of rights, the right to judicial protection and to enjoy the freedom of work. He complained that the lower courts’ decisions had been very brief and had not answered his arguments and that no evidence concerning, inter alia, his financial situation had been assessed. He continued to aver that when given the licence, he had complied with all the pertinent criteria and that the relevant provisions of the Financial Operations Act were unconstitutional. He also argued that the courts had not applied the more lenient law, which had been the old Bankruptcy Act. Moreover, the courts had disregarded the fact that only a suspended prison sentence had been imposed on him and that the legal distinction to include all criminal offences committed with intent was arbitrary and not relevant to the aim of maintaining public confidence in the profession at issue. 15. On 6 November 2013 the Constitutional Court decided not to consider the applicant’s constitutional complaint, relying on the second paragraph of section 55(b) of the Constitutional Court Act (see paragraph 36 below). 16. In the meantime, as it transpires from a decision granting him unemployment allowance, on 15 April 2012 the applicant was dismissed from the Institute for Insolvency Management. He was subsequently unemployed. From November 2014 to November 2015, he was employed through a programme for older workers. 17. On 28 February 2013 the applicant’s conviction was expunged from his criminal record. 18. On 8 April 2013 the applicant applied for a new liquidator’s licence. 19. On 29 May 2013 the Ministry of Justice rejected his application, citing the Financial Operations Act’s provision, pursuant to which a licence could not be granted once it had been revoked (point 2, paragraph 4 of section 108 of the Financial Operations Act – see paragraph 30 below) and noting that the applicant’s licence had been revoked on 27 June 2011. 20. On 27 June 2013 the applicant lodged an administrative action against the above decision. He argued that the sanction of permanent revocation was absolutely disproportionate and that neither judges nor lawyers were subject to such strict conditions as both were able to reapply for office after they had been dismissed. The applicant further submitted that he had lost his job virtually overnight and that the companies which had provided support services to him, such as accounting, had also been seriously affected by the measure. He also explained that he was unemployed and found it difficult to provide for his children who were in his sole custody. 21. On 5 January 2014 the applicant lodged pleadings referring to a judgment issued in criminal proceedings unconnected with the present case. He argued that a convicted person could successfully apply for a liquidator’s licence after his conviction had been expunged from his criminal record. 22. On 12 March 2014 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s action. It found that the refusal to grant a licence was based on a valid law, which prohibited granting of a licence to an applicant whose previous licence had been revoked. It did not address the applicant’s argument that further to the expungement of his conviction from his criminal record he should have been able to reapply. 23. Subsequently, the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. 24. On 10 March 2015 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law on the grounds that he had failed to demonstrate that there was an important legal question, he had not pointed to any inconsistencies in the case-law and he had not shown that he had suffered very severe consequences as a result of the impugned measure, which the court pointed out had been a refusal to grant him a licence and not the earlier revocation. 25. On 27 May 2015 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal, relying on several provisions of the Constitution including equal protection of rights, the right to judicial protection, freedom of work, as well as Articles 6, 7 and 14 of the Convention. He argued that his case was an important one and that if the current position of the courts remained in effect, he would never be able to work as a liquidator again. The applicant disputed the Supreme Court’s decision, which had required him to show that there had been inconsistencies in the case-law. The Supreme Court ignored his argument to the effect that the relevant provisions were unconstitutional and instead took a position that only a departure from case‑law would merit the examination of his appeal. The applicant furthermore argued that the interpretation of the relevant legislation had not yet been settled. 26. On 14 December 2015 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s constitutional complaint as inadmissible, citing the second paragraph of section 55(b) of the Constitutional Court Act (see paragraph 36 below). The decision was served on the applicant on 4 January 2016.

6. The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Skopje. At the time of the events he was vice-president of the SDSM opposition party and a member of parliament. The present applications concern criminal libel proceedings brought against the applicant by Mr S.M., who at the time was a senior member of the then ruling political party and at the same time head of the Security and Counter Intelligence Agency (“the Agency”). According to the Internal Affairs Act (sections 24 and 25), the head of the Agency is appointed by the Government and is accountable to it and the competent Minister. The impugned proceedings concerned statements made by the applicant at press conferences held at his political party’s headquarters. 7. On 14 December 2007 the applicant held a press conference that was broadcast by the main news programme of the A1 television channel, which had national coverage and was the most popular channel at the time. The relevant part of the applicant’s statement at the press conference reads as follows: “In the year and a half he has formally been head of the Security and Counter Intelligence Agency and practically the head of the police, has M. (the plaintiff’s surname), abused his powers in order to influence the Macedonian Stock Exchange and have timely information to enable him to obtain a profit? Is there any truth in the rumours (гласини), which have become stronger, that police wiretapping equipment is being misused for trading on the Stock Exchange? ...” 8. The applicant submitted a transcript of the broadcast, which was also viewed at the trial (see paragraph 11 below). Besides the information described above, the transcript included a journalist suggesting that the applicant’s political party had asked the head of the Public Revenue Office whether Mr S.M. had paid taxes on his property, which had been assessed as being worth several million euros (EUR). The same programme also gave Mr S.M.’s reply, denying the allegations and stating that the money in question had been transferred to the respondent State from a foreign bank account. The transcript of the broadcast was published on the channel’s website on the same day under the headline: “SDSM: M. has wrongfully used wiretapping equipment”. 9. The applicant submitted articles published over the following days on the channel’s website, which described the subsequent exchange of comments and replies between the applicant and his political party, on the one hand, and various State institutions on the other. The articles stated that the applicant’s political party had asked the relevant institutions to investigate the origin of Mr S.M.’s assets and that the Ministry of the Interior had requested that it submit any evidence in support of its allegations. 10. On 1 February 2008 Mr S.M. brought private criminal proceedings accusing the applicant for libel, which was punishable at the time under Article 172 § 1 of the Criminal Code. He claimed that the applicant’s statement at the press conference (see paragraph 7 above) had contained defamatory allegations about him. The applicant did not submit any comments in reply. 11. The Skopje Court of First Instance (“the trial court”) scheduled twelve hearings. The applicant, who was legally represented, did not personally attend any of the scheduled hearings. Several hearings were adjourned owing to the applicant’s work in Parliament. At the trial, the court heard Mr S.M. and was provided with audio-and video-recordings of the programme on A1. The relevant part of the transcript of the hearing of 24 March 2009, when the court examined that material, reads as follows: “... The court views ... the video and audio-recording of the news programme broadcast on A1 television on 14 December 2007 on which ... there is a photo of the plaintiff S.M. and the voice of a journalist who states the following: ‘The (SDSM) ask(s) whether the head of the (Agency), S.M., earned hundreds of thousands of euros by misusing police wiretapping equipment for trading on the Stock Exchange. Their suspicions are based on a declaration of assets (анкетен лист), which S.M. submitted half a year ago, in which he specified that he possessed shares valued at EUR 300,000. SDSM ask(s) whether M. obtained any of that property during the nine months he has been in office, without submitting a declaration, and whether that was the reason for his failing to submit the declaration within the first nine months of his mandate’ The recording continues with a photograph of [the applicant] at a stand in front of the SDMS logo and states that [statement described in paragraph 7 above] ... The video material continues with a commentary by the journalist stating that: ‘S.M. replied to the allegations by SDSM by saying that the money in question was linked to a lawful business which he had abroad’ and the tape continues with the plaintiff’s statement ...” 12. The defence did not submit any evidence (including the evidence described in paragraphs 8 and 9 above). In the concluding remarks, the applicant’s lawyer stated that the applicant had made the impugned statement in an interrogatory form and as the vice-president of an opposition political party, which had the role of expressing concerns about and assessing the work of State officials. 13. On 3 November 2009 the trial court, sitting as a single-judge (Judge V.M.), found the applicant guilty of defamation and fined him EUR 1,500 with seventy-five days’ imprisonment in default. It also ordered him to pay court fees of EUR 30 and a further EUR 230 to cover Mr S.M.’s costs. The court further ruled that the operative part of the judgment should be published at the applicant’s expense via A1 television’s news programme. The relevant parts of the judgment read as follows: “... The accused is the vice-president of SDSM ... ... [the applicant] said [the words described in paragraph 7 above] from a podium which had the SDMS logo behind it ... ... a statement ... must contain certain facts and ... be false ... The fact of that which ... is expressed or disseminated being false constitutes the core of the criminal offence of libel. Consequently, a victim is not required to prove that a defamatory statement is false, rather the accused is obliged to prove (the veracity of) what was said ... ... based on the audio and video material to hand the court finds that [the applicant] made statements about [Mr S.M.] in a form capable of persuading an ordinary viewer ... that they are truthful ... ... the court does not deny that questions can be put to and answers sought from State officials ... It is true that every person, including a member of a political party, as is [the applicant], has the right to put questions of public interest, to criticise the work of the Government and to express concerns about someone who holds the highest office in the executive. This makes the victim a ‘legitimate target’ of constructive criticism and public debate, but not of statements and assertions that had no factual basis, as in the present case. ... the court cannot accept, as contrary to the evidence, [the applicant’s] defence that the allegations were made in an interrogatory form (in an attempt) to obtain an answer from the victim as a State official. (Given) the manner in which the applicant expressed his allegations and other circumstances, the court has found that the [applicant’s] allegations are false and (represent) an assertion made in an interrogatory form, which have had a considerable effect on the claimant’s reputation and dignity. The defence cannot rely on Article 176 of the Criminal Code and (claim) that the (impugned) expression should have been examined in the context of the position he held, namely vice-president of an opposition political party. Such a status does not entitle him to express or disseminate untruthful allegations which are detrimental to the reputation and dignity of a third party. ... the court considers that the fact that [the applicant] has already been convicted by a final judgment of the same offence is an aggravating factor ...” 14. On 11 May 2010 the Skopje Court of Appeal, sitting as a three-judge panel composed of Judges M.S., L.I.Sh. and S.K., upheld the trial court’s judgment, finding no grounds to depart from the established facts and the reasoning. 15. Based on legislative amendments of November 2012, on 12 February 2013 (see paragraph 36 below) the trial court stayed the execution (се запира постапката за извршување на санкција) of the sanction (a fine) imposed on the applicant. 16. The applicant paid Mr S.M.’s costs for the criminal proceedings. He did not pay the court fees and did not publish the trial court’s judgment via A1, which ceased to exist in 2011. 17. The applicant lodged a constitutional appeal with the Constitutional Court in which he complained that his conviction had violated his right to freedom of expression. He reiterated his arguments that he had been punished for a question that he had raised at a press conference that had been held on behalf of his political party. The question had been addressed to the public and had been based on information submitted to his political party about suspected irregularities in the work of a State official. The aim had been to stimulate public debate on whether the official had been diligent in performing his official duty. 18. By a decision of 23 February 2011 (served on the applicant on 30 March 2011), the Constitutional Court by a majority dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It noted that he had not attended any of the scheduled hearings and held that freedom of expression was not absolute and could be restricted in accordance with the law. In that connection, it referred to Article 172 of the Criminal Code, which punished the dissemination of untrue information that could affect the reputation and dignity of a third party. The court further held that: “The way in which [the applicant] expressed his opinion (мислење) in public concerning the performance of public duties by a public official (in an interrogatory form, as a member of an opposition political party, from a political party’s podium (говорница), the consequences of his public action ...), without trying to prove the veracity of his question or statement, taken as a whole, represents an action which only appears to fall within the ambit of the freedom of conviction, conscience, thought and public expression of thought, but in substance it affects the reputation and dignity of the citizen who holds that public office at the time and violates those values. Accordingly, the statement lost the attributes of the freedom (of thought and public expression of thought) and (represents) an abuse of (that freedom).” 19. In comments submitted in reply to the Government’s observations (November 2015), the applicant informed the Court that Mr S.M. had brought civil proceedings against him after his conviction, seeking compensation for non-pecuniary damage. The claim was examined at three levels of jurisdiction. By a final judgment of 9 April 2014 the applicant was ordered to pay 550,000 Macedonian denars (MKD) plus interest in respect of non-pecuniary damage and MKD 46,180 for the trial costs incurred by Mr S.M. in the compensation proceedings. 20. On 9 September 2007 the applicant held a press conference at SDSM’s offices regarding the public sale of State-owned building land in the central area of Skopje, where the construction of a hotel was planned. It was broadcast on local television news. According to a transcript of the entire press conference (evidence not submitted to the criminal courts), the applicant presented the events involved and information obtained from the State authorities regarding the sale in question. He further detailed the conclusions of research done by his political party, showing that the company that had been selected was incorporated in the respondent State at the same address as O. Holding (a local company) and was partly owned by a company which had business ties with O. Holding. In that connection, he alleged that a deal had been done so that “the land would be given to people who had close family or party ties” with the Prime Minister. As described in the trial court’s judgment (see below), the applicant stated that: “The attractive location behind the ‘Ramstor’ shopping mall planned for the construction of a hotel was granted to a company supported (зад која стои) by O. Holding ... After the revelation of this megascandal, the biggest dilemma is whether the Academy Award for the most corrupt politician should be given to the Prime Minister or his cousins? To those who created or to those who carried out the deal?” 21. By a press release of the same date (9 September 2007) sent “in relation to the press conference held by the political party SDSM and with a view to provide the public with objective and correct information” the Ministry of Transport and Communication informed the media about the procedure and the selected company. 22. In reply to a request for information, SDSM notified the public prosecutor on 1 October 2007 about the company that had been selected (it was registered at the same address as O. Holding and its manager was a former O. Holding employee), alleging that it had not met the requirements of the sale. It further requested that the public prosecutor investigate whether the transaction had been in conformity with the Anti-Corruption Act. 23. On 19 September 2007 Mr S.M. brought private criminal charges, accusing the applicant of making (see paragraph 20 above) defamatory allegations about him. He denied ever having had any connection, private or professional, with the public sale of the land. He had also not signed the sale contract with the company that had been chosen. The applicant did not submit any comments in reply. 24. The trial court scheduled seventeen hearings. The applicant was represented by a lawyer, but did not attend any of the scheduled hearings in person. Some of the scheduled hearings were adjourned because the court bailiff was unable to serve summonses on the applicant. At the trial, the court heard Mr S.M. and viewed audio and video material of television coverage of the applicant’s statement. The defence did not submit any evidence, not even the information submitted to the public prosecutor (see paragraph 22 above). 25. On 23 February 2011, after one remittal, the trial court, sitting as a single-judge (Judge D.G.I.), convicted the applicant of defamation. It fined him EUR 1,000 with one hundred days’ imprisonment in default, ordered him to pay a court fee of EUR 30 and a further EUR 375 to cover Mr S.M.’s trial costs. Relying on the latter’s testimony, the court held that the applicant’s allegations had concerned Mr S.M., regardless of the fact that he had not been identified by name. That was because the applicant had previously given false statements about Mr S.M. and had often referred to him as “the Prime Minister’s cousin”. Mr S.M. admitted that he had had contact with the managers of O. Holding, although that had been as friends. He had had no cooperation with them in business terms or been involved in any way in the construction of the hotel. 26. The relevant parts of the trial court’s judgment read as follows: “... the court considers ... that [the applicant’s] [statement described in paragraph 20 above] could have a considerable effect on the complainant’s reputation and dignity ... since he is the holder of a public office and (such) statements are disseminated quickly and aggressively in public. That the complainant was not identified by his full name by the [applicant] is irrelevant since the relevant circumstances clearly and unequivocally suggest that the matter concerned [Mr S.M.]. Furthermore, the news presenter identified the complainant by his surname. ... The [applicant’s] assertion, (which he made) as vice-president of a political party, contained untrue allegations about the complainant susceptible of violating his honour and reputation ... [The statement in question] was not substantiated with any evidence because the private complainant, as head of the Agency, does not have the competence to participate in the public sale of State-owned land and the accused did not present any evidence that [Mr S.M.] was privately involved in the sale transaction in question ...” 27. On 18 May 2011 a three-judge panel (Judges Z.N., L.I.Sh. and G.S.) of the Skopje Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the applicant in which he had complained, inter alia, that the complainant had not been identified in his statement, which had been made in an interrogatory form and in a political context and, accordingly, not punishable, as specified in Article 176 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 34 below). The court upheld the trial court’s judgment, finding that the applicant had made a false assertion (тврдење со невистина содржина) about the complainant. It continued: “It is a statutory presumption that a statement of fact harmful to the honour and reputation of a third party is untrue. The burden of proof therefore rests with the accused to prove that the assertion is true. Accordingly, [the applicant] was required to prove that his statement was true, which is not the case ... The contents of the statement, the time, place and way in which it was given imply that it was serious and that it could objectively create a perception in the minds of third parties about certain facts. This court finds [the statement] defamatory since the factual assertion contained therein was able objectively to affect the reputation and dignity of the private complainant.” 28. On 12 February 2013 the trial court stayed the execution of the fine it had imposed (see paragraph 36 below). The applicant paid the court fees and the trial costs incurred by Mr S.M., who did not claim compensation for damage in respect of this criminal conviction for defamation. 29. The applicant lodged a constitutional appeal with the Constitutional Court in which he claimed that as a representative of a political party he had been required to bring to light information that had been brought to his attention. He had not made a factual statement but had raised a question regarding allegations of corruption. 30. By a decision of 12 September 2012 (served on the applicant on 1 October 2012) the Constitutional Court unanimously dismissed the applicant’s constitutional appeal for protection of the right to freedom of expression. The court held that: “In the concrete case, the court ... punished [the applicant] ... as a necessary measure for the protection of the reputation, dignity and authority of another person. That was because [the applicant], by relying on freedom of public expression, interfered with the protected right of another person, namely Mr S.M ... [The applicant] is a member of parliament and vice-President of the SDSM and he made the statement in SDSM’s headquarters (if the statement had been given in Parliament, he would have enjoyed immunity and private charges would not have been possible). Although freedom of expression is important for all, it is particularly important for representatives of the people ... Therefore, interference with a Member of Parliament’s freedom of expression calls for the closest scrutiny by the court. Analysis must be made ... of whether (the applicant’s) conviction and sanction represent a justified restriction of his rights and freedoms ... namely whether the courts struck a fair balance between the need to protect the reputation and dignity of the victim and [the applicant’s] freedom of public expression. The freedom of political debate is not of an absolute nature ... the court notes that the impugned statement concerns the public sale of State-owned building land ... and should be considered in the context of a debate concerning an issue of public interest, which in particular was of prime political interest ... The court considers that the veracity of the statement ... was of primary importance for the courts. Those courts ... established that [the applicant’s] statement was not true or that there was no evidence to prove the contrary. ... the court has the right and duty to assess whether the courts enabled [the applicant] to prove the veracity of (his) statement. In this connection the court finds that [the applicant] was able, during the entire proceedings, to present evidence as to the veracity of his statement. In the absence of proof to confirm the veracity (of the statement) or the existence of a strong basis for it to be regarded as truthful, the court must accept the courts’ findings that the statement was false. Despite the fact that the statement is part of a public debate, the question is whether (it) ... had any impact or was relevant for the public as a contribution to a better understanding of the issue subject to public debate ... The way in which the (applicant) expressed his opinion (мислење) in public concerning the performance of a public office by a public official (in an interrogatory form, as a member of an opposition party, from the podium (говорница) of the political party, the consequences of his public action ...) without trying to prove the veracity of his question or statement, taken as a whole, represents an action which only appears to fall within the ambit of the freedom of conviction, conscience, thought and public expression of thought, but in substance it affects the reputation and dignity of the citizen who holds the public office at the time and violates those values. Accordingly, the statement lost the attributes of the freedom (of thought and public expression of thought) and (represents) an abuse of (that freedom).” 31. By a judgment of 20 May 2008 the trial court, sitting as a single‑judge (Judge D.G.I.), had found the applicant guilty of making defamatory allegations about the then Minister for Transportation and Communications regarding the public sale of the same State-owned land subject to application no. 24133/13 above. The applicant was convicted and fined EUR 1,000 for the following statement, which was made at a press conference on 12 September 2007 at the offices of his political party: “... by selling land to a company that does not fulfil the (statutory) conditions, Minister J. obviously committed a criminal offence-abuse of office. We therefore expect that the public prosecutor will immediately lodge an indictment”. 32. As explained in the judgment, the court established that when the applicant had made the statement, the procedure for the public sale of the land was still ongoing, namely the relevant standing committee within the Ministry had not yet submitted its proposal to the Minister about the best bidder. The Minister had then granted the land to the best bidder in December 2007. Furthermore, several institutions, which had reviewed the work of the committee, had not found any irregularities. The court did not accept the applicant’s defence (he did not attend any of the scheduled hearings) that his statement had been an expression of a reasonable suspicion about the public sale of the land. The court refused the following defence applications: to examine a member of the standing committee; to admit committee minutes in evidence regarding the public sale; and to hear information from the public prosecutor about the committee’s work. It held that the proposed evidence concerned the committee’s work which was not the subject of the proceedings. A three-judge panel of the Skopje Court of Appeal (Judges M.S., L.I.Sh. and V.Dz.) upheld the lower court’s judgment. Both courts considered that the applicant had made the statement in his own name and not on behalf of his political party.

4. The applicant was born in 1991 and lives in Orenburg. 5. The facts of the applicant’s ill-treatment were established in a judgment of the Promyshlenniy District Court of Orenburg of 15 December 2011, as upheld on 14 February 2012 by the Orenburg Regional Court, and are as follows. 6. At around 7 p.m. on 30 August 2009 the applicant was arrested at a bus stop by police officers of the criminal investigation unit and taken to a police station in Orenburg (УВД по г. Оренбургу). From 8 p.m. to midnight on 30 August 2009, and from 12 noon to 6 p.m. on 31 August 2009, police officers K. and M. subjected the applicant to physical and psychological violence in order to obtain a confession from him about a drug-related crime which they suspected him of having committed. 7. The facts of the ill-treatment on 30 August 2009 were established as follows. Officers K. and M. pushed the applicant to the floor and punched and kicked him numerous times in the head, face, chest, arms and legs. K. placed a plastic bag over his head, closing off his access to air, while M. held him down. As regards the ill-treatment on 31 August 2009, officers K. and M. punched the applicant numerous times in the head and threatened to detain him. 8. At 8 p.m. on 31 August 2009 the applicant was formally arrested on suspicion of possession of drugs and placed in a temporary detention facility. 9. On 2 September 2009 the applicant was released after giving an undertaking not to leave his place of residence. On the same day he sought medical help at a traumatology centre (TP no. 2). According to his medical records, he had abrasions on his forearms, a bruise under his right eye, a bruise in the left lumbar region and abrasions on his legs. 10. On 3 September 2009 the applicant made a complaint to the Orenburg regional investigative committee regarding his ill‑treatment. 11. On 4 September 2009 he underwent a forensic medical examination ordered by the investigation authority. According to report no. 6368, he had the following injuries: (i) a haematoma (swelling) of the soft tissues in the parietal region of the head, measuring 4 by 3 cm; (ii) four bruises of indefinite form on the right infraorbital region of the face, on his neck, on the left side of his chest and around the right iliac (hip) bone, measuring up to 4 by 3 cm each; and (iii) seventeen abrasions, some linear and some of indefinite form, on both forearms, his right hip and left lower leg, measuring from 0.8 by 0.5 cm to 2.5 by 1 cm each. The expert concluded that the applicant’s injuries had resulted from being struck repeatedly with a hard, blunt object with a limited surface area on the day of the alleged incident, and had not caused any “health damage”. Subsequent forensic medical expert reports of 4 December 2009 and 21 October 2010 came to similar conclusions. It was stated in the first of those reports that the applicant’s injuries had been caused by at least twenty traumatic blows to his body. 12. Officers K. and M. were convicted under Article 286 § 3 (a) of the Criminal Code and banned from exercising official duties for three years. They were also given a three-year suspended sentence with a three-year probation period, which required them to appear monthly before the Service for the Execution of Sentences and disclose any change of place of work or residence. 13. The following circumstances were taken into account in sentencing the police officers. The fact that officer K. had a child under 14 years old was considered a mitigating circumstance, while the fact that he and M. had committed the crime with a group of other officers was considered an aggravating circumstance. It was further taken into account that K. and M. had positive references from their places of work and residence, had no previous convictions, and had led a law-abiding way of life without committing any administrative offences for more than two years since the crime had been committed. 14. On 31 November 2009 criminal proceedings against the applicant under Article 228 § 2 of the Criminal Code (possession of large quantities of drugs) were terminated for absence of a crime, pursuant to Article 24 § 1(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 15. In 2012 the applicant brought a civil claim against the Russian Ministry of Finance, seeking 2,655,936 Russian roubles (RUB) in compensation for his unlawful detention and ill‑treatment in police custody by K. and M. 16. On 28 June 2012 the Leninskiy District Court of Orenburg allowed the applicant’s claim in part and awarded him RUB 20,000. In determining the amount of compensation, the court found that the applicant had sustained injuries as a result of the police officers’ actions and had experienced physical and mental suffering, but that this had not caused him any “health damage”. 17. The applicant appealed against that judgment to the Orenburg Regional Court, which on 19 September 2012 increased the amount of compensation to RUB 80,000.

4. The applicant was born in 1977. He is currently serving a life sentence in Dnipro. 5. By the final domestic judgment of 16 July 2002, the applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder and other crimes. 6. Until September 2004 the applicant was detained in the Cherkassy pre-trial detention centre (“the Cherkassy SIZO”) in which, he stated, cells had been overcrowded and had lacked basic amenities. 7. In October 2004 the applicant was transferred to Sokalska Correctional Colony no. 47 in Zhvyrka (“the Sokalska Colony”), where he remained until 15 November 2007. 8. The applicant stated that during his detention in the above Colony, one of his cellmates had been Mr V.M. Guk, a former applicant to the Court, with whom he had shared the cell for three years. Mr Guk’s application has already been examined by the Court, which found, in particular, a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the conditions of his detention in the above Colony (see Guk v. Ukraine [Committee], no. 16995/05, §§ 83-86, 8 December 2016). 9. According to the applicant, during his stay in the Colony he was held in a cell, in which the living space was “extremely insufficient”. As confirmation thereof, he referred to a written statement signed by Mr Guk, which he had submitted to the Court. According to that statement, the cell measured 3.7 by 3.4 metres (12.58 square metres) including a sanitary facility measuring 1.35 by 1.3 metres (1.76 square metres). 10. The cell lacked basic amenities: no furniture for storage of personal belongings and food; a very small table; no rubbish container; and no toilet cleaners. The tap water was of a poor quality and water filters were not provided. Heating in the cell was inadequate; the air was damp and cold; the walls were covered with mould. (b) Submissions by the Government 11. According to the Government, the equipment in the applicant’s cell corresponded to the domestic standards. Prisoners were provided with all necessary amenities. The quality of the tap water corresponded to the standards. The temperature in the cell was not less than 18 degrees Celsius and the air in the cell was neither damp nor cold. 12. According to the applicant, the washing unit in the Colony had no changing facilities, so the prisoners had first to undress in their cells. A guard watched them wash and hurried them up. The prisoners had to shave with poor-quality razors. Prisoners with tuberculosis washed in the same unit as healthy prisoners; no disinfection measures were taken. Sick and healthy prisoners took their daily walks in the same courtyards, which were also small, damp and dark. 13. Whenever the guards opened the cell, the prisoners had to retreat to its far corner, squat and put their arms behind their heads. When taken out of the cell, the applicant was handcuffed; he was required to walk in a squat or some other unnatural position; his head was covered with a black bag; handcuffs were not disinfected. 14. Until April 2005 the prisoners had been required to roll up their mattresses in the morning. During the daytime they had been prohibited from lying down on the beds. 15. In support of the above submissions, the applicant referred to the written statement of Mr Guk, which confirmed the procedure the prisoners had had to follow when the guards had opened the cell. It also stated that, when taken out of the cell, the prisoners had been handcuffed and escorted in a crouched position; a bag had often been put over a prisoner’s head. Sick and healthy prisoners washed in the same unit and walked in the same courtyard. Mattresses on the beds had to be rolled up during the daytime. 16. The applicant also stated that the administration had carried out searches of personal belongings, leaving them in disorder and often damaged; his watch had been stolen by an unidentified guard. Prisoners had not been provided with adequate medical assistance; they had been constantly ill-treated by the administration. In 2004-2005 the applicant had been regularly beaten by the guards. In 2004-2006 family visits had not been adequately organised. The applicant’s correspondence with relatives had been reviewed and a number of his letters had disappeared. (b) Submissions by the Government 17. The Government stated that the washing unit had a changing room. Disinfection measures in the Colony had fully complied with the domestic standards. Prisoners with tuberculosis were detained in a separate cell; they washed after others, and the washing unit was disinfected afterwards. 18. Whenever the cell was opened, the prisoners were required to retreat to its far end, but not to squat. When escorted out of the cell, they were handcuffed, but not required to walk in a squat or with the head covered with a bag; handcuffs were in a proper condition and their disinfection was not required. 19. Searches were conducted pursuant to the relevant regulations, and there were no situations alleged by the applicant. Prisoners were not prohibited to use mattresses during the daytime.

6. The applicant was born in 1980 and lives in Püspökladány. 7. On 6 March 2010 the applicant got into a fight in a car park in front of a nightclub in Püspökladány, apparently under the influence of alcohol and drugs. The incident was reported to Püspökladány police station. 8. The applicant asserts that around 3 a.m. he and his girlfriend were sitting in his car, not in traffic, pulled over to the side of the road, when patrolling police officers approached them. According to the file produced in the subsequent criminal proceedings, the applicant refused to take a breathalyser test for alcohol. Following an identity check and a search, he was handcuffed and taken to Püspökladány police station to be held for questioning (előállítás), on suspicion of having committed an offence. According to the police reports, the police officers believed that he was under the influence of either alcohol or drugs. 9. At the police station the applicant started to insult the police officers and was handcuffed again. According to the applicant, he was also placed in leg restraints, during which time he suffered injuries. He was then transported to the Püspökladány medical emergency service by four police officers for a blood and urine test. 10. The applicant told a doctor that he was unable to urinate. According to the police reports, the applicant was under the influence of alcohol, “uncooperative, making the insertion of a catheter necessary”; he was also “violent and resisted the procedure”. Furthermore, “it was necessary to physically restrain him and have recourse to force” to obtain the necessary urine sample. 11. The doctor on duty proceeded with the applicant’s catheterisation while the latter’s arms were handcuffed. Afterwards, the doctor cut the applicant’s shirt and took a blood sample. He also issued a medical report on the applicant’s injuries. 12. On 22 April 2010 the applicant was fined 50,000 Hungarian forints (HUF – approximately 180 euros (EUR)) for the minor offence of failing to comply with lawful police measures. That decision was subsequently overturned, and the proceedings were discontinued by a decision of the Püspökladány District Court of 22 April 2011. The Püspökladány District Court established that the police measure could not be held to be lawful, since the medical intervention had been carried out without the applicant’s written consent, required under the Health Care Act. 13. Furthermore, in a judgment of 15 November 2011 the Püspökladány District Court found the applicant guilty of disorderly conduct, drink-driving and violence against a representative of a public authority. He was sentenced to two years and three months’ imprisonment. The applicant challenged the evidence obtained through the urine test, and the court found it established that he had consented to the use of the catheter, as evidenced by five or six witness testimonies, and he had only withdrawn his consent upon realising that the intervention was painful. The judgment stated that, irrespective of the result of urine test, it was clear that the applicant had been under the influence of alcohol at the material time, as observed by the police officers, the witnesses and the doctor on duty. On appeal, the applicant’s sentence was reduced to one year and nine months’ imprisonment suspended for five years by the Debrecen Regional Court. 14. On 11 March 2010 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against the police officers involved in the incident, alleging that they had interrogated him by subjecting him to ill-treatment – beating him, using handcuffs and leg restraints, and forcibly taking blood samples from him and urine samples by catheterisation. 15. On 26 November 2010 the investigations division of the Debrecen public prosecutor’s office discontinued the criminal proceedings for lack of any conclusive evidence. As to the urinary catheterisation, relying on the witness testimonies of the doctor on duty, a nurse, a driver who was on duty at the medical service at the time and the police officers, the prosecutor’s office concluded that the applicant had voluntarily agreed to the sample being taken by catheterisation. Referring to an expert opinion produced by the Medical Expert Division of the Forensic Expert and Research Institute, the prosecutor’s office found that urinary catheterisation did not amount to a surgical intervention. In any event, the use of physical restraint had only been necessary as the applicant had become aggressive and tried to resist once the medical intervention had started. 16. The applicant lodged a complaint against the decision, requesting that the investigation into the unlawful use of leg restraints and the catheterisation continue. By a decision of 10 January 2011 the Hajdú Bihar county chief public prosecutor’s office dismissed the applicant’s complaint, endorsing the findings of the first-instance authority. 17. In a parallel procedure, on 16 March 2010 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Independent Police Complaints Board (“the Board”), the body responsible for inquiring into alleged violations of fundamental rights committed by the police, challenging the use of handcuffs and leg restraints, the fact that he had been held for questioning, his ill-treatment at the hands of the police officers, and the forcible taking of urine and blood samples. The Board inquired with the doctor on duty about the incident, who stated in his reply that the applicant had agreed to the insertion of a catheter before a number of witnesses, and that he had interpreted the fact that the applicant had removed his clothes as consent to the procedure. According to the doctor, the applicant had been cooperative and had only turned violent at a later stage. According to the facts established by the Board, since the applicant had been unable to produce the urine sample, the police officers had asked the doctor on duty to carry out the catheterisation. 18. The Board commissioned an expert opinion from the chief physician of the Budapest Institute of Forensic Medicine, who stated in an opinion of 4 June 2010 that, although some medical institutions required written consent for catheterisation, this was not the policy of the majority of institutions. In his opinion, such a procedure was not general practice, and recourse to an “emergency” intervention was professionally unreasonable. In any event, according to professional guidelines, if a urine test could not be carried out, a blood test was sufficient. 19. In an opinion of 4 August 2010 the Board found that the use of handcuffs had been legitimate and that the ill-treatment alleged could not be established. However, as regards the catheterisation and the use of leg restraints, the Board concluded that those measures had infringed the applicant’s right to dignity, physical integrity, health and a fair trial. It forwarded its opinion to the Commander of the National Police Service. 20. Following the adoption of the Board’s opinion, the applicant’s complaint was examined by the Commander of the National Police Service under section 92(1) of Act no. XXXIV of 1994 on the Police (“the Police Act”), with a view to establishing whether the police measure had been unlawful. It was dismissed on 26 October 2010. The decision established that the applicant had informed the doctor on duty that he had been unable to produce a urine sample and that he would not drink water in order to be able to do it later. He had behaved aggressively and had been uncooperative, but had nonetheless agreed to the catheterisation before witnesses by loudly screaming “do the catheterisation”, and had undressed voluntarily. He had only been restrained to prevent him from causing injuries to himself or the doctor, once the procedure had started. Moreover, the forcible taking of a sample was justified in situations where there were grounds to believe that the driver of a vehicle was under the influence of alcohol or drugs. 21. The applicant sought judicial review of the decision, arguing that he had not been heard during the proceedings and the facts had been established solely on the basis of the testimonies of the police officers and the medical staff. He disputed the finding that he had voluntarily undressed for his catheterisation. He emphasised that he had submitted a medical report substantiating his allegations about the use of leg restraints, which had been disregarded by the Commander of the National Police Service. 22. On 7 February 2012 the Budapest Regional Administrative and Labour Court dismissed his action. The court emphasised that, according to the medical expert opinion commissioned by the Board, there was no clear medical approach to catheterisation and the question of whether it was an invasive or non-invasive intervention, thus hospital practice differed in relation to the necessity of consent. If an examination was considered invasive, oral consent was not sufficient. In any case, the procedure could always be stopped. The medical expert also stated that, in comparison to a blood test, a urine test was not a precise method to establish whether a person was under the influence of drugs. Furthermore, catheterisation was a procedure that could be interrupted at any time. 23. The court concluded that the procedure had been in compliance with the provisions of the Police Act setting out that a police officer could oblige a driver to provide a sample of breath, blood and urine for the purposes of a test. The court also indicated that the question as to whether consent was required for catheterisation, and whether the procedure should or should not have been carried out against the applicant’s will, was outside the scope of its examination. It had been up to the doctor and not the police officers to decide on the method by which to take a sample. The court also took note of several witness testimonies and concluded that the use of leg restraints could not be established in the applicant’s case. 24. The applicant lodged a petition for review with the Kúria, arguing that the Commander of the National Police Service had failed to establish the facts of the case. In particular, the service had not commissioned a medical report capable of substantiating the use of leg restraints, had not heard him in person, and had drawn erroneous conclusions as regards his consent to the catheterisation. The applicant further submitted that the first-instance court had erred in classifying the medical examination, since it had been neither obligatory under the provisions of the Police Act, nor reasonable or proportionate according to medical standards. 25. The Kúria upheld the first-instance judgment on 25 March 2014, endorsing its reasoning. The judgment was served on the applicant on 11 July 2014.

4. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 5. The applicant was born in Baku, Azerbaijan, in 1992 and came to Russia in 2003, together with his mother and grandmother. He graduated from a secondary school and a vocational training college in St Petersburg. He has no identity documents. 6. On 7 February 2014 the Kirovskiy District Court in St Petersburg found the applicant guilty of illegally residing in Russia, which was an offence Article 18.8 § 3 of the Code of Administrative Offences, imposed a fine on him and ordered his administrative removal from Russia. The judgment described him as a “native” (уроженец) and a national of Azerbaijan. Pending his removal, the applicant was to be detained in the special facility for the detention of aliens (СУВСИГ УФМС по СПб и ЛО) located in Krasnoye Selo in the Leningrad Region. 7. On 12 February 2014 the Federal Migration Service requested the Consulate General of Azerbaijan in St Petersburg to submit information about the applicant’s nationality. Replying to that inquiry, on 14 April 2014 the Consulate confirmed that the applicant was not a national of that State. 8. On 19 May 2014 a bailiff asked the District Court in St Petersburg to discontinue the enforcement proceedings because the applicant could not be issued with travel documents or removed from Russia. 9. By a judgment of 17 July 2014, as upheld on appeal on 30 October 2014, the St Petersburg courts refused to discontinue the proceedings, finding that the bailiff had not shown that she had taken sufficient measures to secure the applicant’s removal. 10. On 7 August 2014 counsel for the applicant asked the St Petersburg City Court to review the Kirovskiy District Court’s judgment by way of supervisory review, to annul the sanction of administrative removal and to release the applicant. Counsel pleaded in particular that the applicant’s removal was not a realistic prospect and that his continued detention could only be justified if deportation proceedings were genuinely in progress. On 25 November 2014 a deputy president of the City Court acceded to her request. Noting that the applicant was not an Azerbaijani national, the judge found that his removal was not feasible and that his detention was likely to become indefinite. He amended the judgment, replacing the removal with the requirement to leave Russia voluntarily under control. 11. On 27 November 2014 the applicant was released. 12. The applicant described his conditions of detention as follows. From 7 to 20 February 2014 he shared Cell 307 measuring 17 square metres with ten other detainees. It was not furnished, inmates unrolled mattresses for the night. From 20 February to 5 May 2014 he was held in a smaller, seven‑square-metre cell (Cell 310), together with five or six persons. Two-tier bunk beds were brought in only in late April 2014. From 5 May to 27 November 2014 he was in Cell 309 measuring seventeen square metres. Initially it had accommodated twelve persons but their number rose to seventeen in November when they started renovating the cells on the seventh and eighth floors of the facility. Detainees had to remain within the floor on which their cell was located; they could not go outside or to other floors. Outdoor exercise was limited to a fifteen-minute walk once a week because there was not enough staff to supervise the detainees. The facility did not have a library, board games, radio or workshop, or offer any other meaningful activities.

4. The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Novosibirsk. 5. The applicant was charged with and subsequently found guilty of murdering his father and uncle. The final decision on the matter was taken by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on 31 October 2002. 6. On 18 April 2003 the applicant lodged an application with the Court in which he complained of the unfairness of the criminal proceedings against him. In particular, he alleged that he had not been provided with legal assistance in the appeal proceedings (application no. 21272/03). 7. On 26 March 2007 the Court gave notification of the application to the Russian Government. 8. On 4 July 2007 the Presidium of the Supreme Court quashed the appeal judgment of 31 October 2002 by way of a supervisory review and remitted the matter for fresh consideration. 9. On 29 November 2007 the Supreme Court held a new appeal hearing in which the applicant took part by means of a video link and was represented by State-appointed counsel, A. The court upheld, in substance, the applicant’s conviction. The applicant had been allowed fifteen minutes to confer with his counsel by means of video link prior to the hearing. 10. On 15 January 2009 the Court examined the admissibility and merits of the case and held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention in that the applicant had not received effective legal assistance during the appeal proceedings in his criminal case. 11. On 14 September 2009 a panel of the Grand Chamber accepted the Government’s request for the case to be referred to the Grand Chamber. 12. On 22 September 2010 the Grand Chamber delivered a new judgment in the applicant’s case. Noting that the applicant had been unable to enjoy effective legal assistance before the appellate court, it found a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 6 § 3 (c) thereof. In particular, the Grand Chamber concluded that the time allotted to the applicant for communication with his counsel had been insufficient and that the means of such communication had not ensured the requisite privacy. 13. On 13 October 2011 the President of the Supreme Court, referring to the Court’s judgment in the applicant’s case, asked the Presidium of the Supreme Court to reopen the proceedings. 14. On 23 November 2011 the Presidium of the Supreme Court granted the President’s request, quashed the judgment of 29 November 2007 and remitted the matter to the appellate court for fresh consideration. 15. On an unspecified date the Supreme Court appointed Ms K., a lawyer practising in Moscow, to represent the applicant. On 15 February and 1 March 2012 lawyer K. studied the applicant’s case file. 16. On 15 March 2012 the Supreme Court held a hearing in the applicant’s case. The applicant complained that he had not been provided with an opportunity to discuss his case with State-appointed counsel without running a risk of being overheard by a third party. The court adjourned the hearing in order to arrange for communication between the applicant and his lawyer. 17. On 22 March 2012 the applicant communicated with his lawyer by means of a video link. According to the Government, only counsel K. was present in the room during the video conference. The court’s employee responsible for the functioning of the video link was located outside the room in which counsel K. was present. The applicant was also alone in the video conference room. A guard was stationed outside. 18. On 5 April 2012 the Supreme Court upheld, in substance, the applicant’s conviction on appeal. Counsel K. attended the hearing. She did not submit fresh grounds for appeal and made submissions to the court that appeared to be based on the grounds for appeal originally filed by the applicant and counsel A. The applicant, who was detained in Novosibirsk, took part in the hearing by means of a video link. He had agreed to be represented by counsel K. and confirmed that he had been provided with sufficient time to communicate with her to discuss his case. He also agreed to pay her a legal fee. 19. From 7 February to 29 May 2012 the applicant was detained in remand prison SIZO-1 in Novosibirsk. According to excerpts from the remand prison population records submitted by the Government, he was held in the following cells: Cell no. Period of detention Cell size (square metres) Number of sleeping places Number of inmates 322 From 7 to 8 February 20. According to the Government, the cells in which the applicant was detained were furnished with a sink, a table, a bench, a cupboard for storing food products, a coat stand, a mirror, a drinking water tank, a rubbish bin, wash basins, a heater, an electric plug and an alarm button. There was a toilet cabin which ensured complete privacy for the person using it. The windows in the cells had small vents, which could be kept open to ensure access to fresh air. There were no grilles or shutters on the windows preventing access to daylight. During the daytime the cells were lit with a 95-watt electric bulb. During the night the cells were lit with a 60-watt electric bulb. The central heating system was always in a good working order. The temperature in the cells was maintained at +22 to +25oC in the summer and +19 to +21oC in the winter. The cells were cleaned once a week. The bed sheets were changed each time the inmates took a shower. Once a month the cells were disinfected, which ensured that they were free of insects or rodents. 21. According to the applicant, cells nos. 48 and 18 were overcrowded throughout the time he was detained there. During his detention in cell no. 48 he was not always provided with an individual bed. He did not have bed sheets, cutlery or toiletries. The cell was infested with bedbugs. The lighting was insufficient. The dining table was too small to accommodate all inmates. The applicant had to eat sitting on the floor. The table was located 1 metre away from the toilet. The toilet was separated from the living area of the cell by a brick wall that was 35 centimetres high. The flush was broken and the toilet caused a constant unpleasant smell in the cell. The ventilation system did not function. The food was of low quality. The inmates had to do their laundry in the cell. Some of the inmates had lice. The daily outdoor exercise lasted no more than 35 to 45 minutes. The exercise area was too small and often overcrowded. 22. On 15 March 2012 the applicant brought a civil action against the remand prison, alleging that he had been detained in inhuman and degrading conditions there. 23. On 14 March 2013 the Dzerzhinskiy District Court of Novosibirsk dismissed the applicant’s claims. The applicant appealed, challenging the District Court’s findings as regards the conditions of his detention in cell no. 48. 24. On 10 September 2013 the Novosibirsk Regional Court quashed the judgment of 14 March 2013 and granted the applicant’s claims in part. The court acknowledged that the applicant had been detained in cramped conditions in cell no. 48 and awarded him compensation for non-pecuniary damage in the amount of 10,000 Russian roubles (RUB). In particular, the court held as follows: “Regard being had to the evidence submitted, [it follows] that during the period under consideration the personal space afforded to each inmate in the cell where the applicant was detained ... was 2.6 sq. m. From 7 February to 16 March 2012 ... the cell was overpopulated and the personal space afforded to the inmates was 2.2 sq. m, 1.95 sq. m and 1.7 sq. m. ... In view of the above, [the court] considers that it has been established that during the period under consideration the personal space afforded to the applicant in cell no. 48 in remand prison no. 1 in Novosibirsk was below the standards set forth in the national legislation and in the case-law of the ECHR.” 25. According to the applicant, he received the compensation awarded to him by the judgment of 10 September 2013 in July 2016.

5. The first applicant was born in 1968 and is detained in Lukiškės Remand Prison; the second applicant was born in 1975 and is detained in Vilnius Correctional Facility. 6. In February 2014 the first applicant lodged a petition with the Parliamentary Commission on Petitions (“the Commission”), requesting a change to the wording of the provision of the Code for the Execution of Sentences in order that it would read that electronic items could be given to inmates by their friends and acquaintances as well as by their spouses, partners and close relatives. In March 2014 the Commission decided not to examine the first applicant’s petition as it was not clear enough. In March 2014 the first applicant lodged a new petition with the Commission. In April 2014 the Commission informed the first applicant that his petition would be examined. In June 2014 the Commission examined the first applicant’s petition and decided to dismiss it. Addressing the first applicant’s proposal that Article 96 § 1 of the Code for the Execution of Sentences be amended so that it would permit inmates to receive electronic items from their acquaintances or friends, as well as from their spouses, partners or close relatives, the Commission held that the existing regulation was aimed at preventing inmates from receiving items acquired by criminal means – for example, by their accomplices in crime. In June 2014 the Lithuanian Parliament dismissed the first applicant’s proposal that Article 96 § 1 of the Code for the Execution of Sentences be amended. 7. It appears from the information provided by the Government that from 2007 onwards the first applicant had a computer game player, a computer game, and a television set; moreover, in November 2014 he purchased a laptop with his own money. It also appears from the information submitted by the Government that the applicant has a sister, a brother, an aunt, an uncle and a cousin (that is to say close relatives). 8. On 17 September 2013 the second applicant lodged a complaint with the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court alleging overcrowding and other inadequate sanitary conditions in the Prison Hospital. He alleged that he had been confined to the Prison Hospital from 22 March until 4 April 2010, from 25 February until 4 March 2011, from 21 until 27 September 2011, and from 17 until 24 January 2014. He subsequently provided a specified complaint (patikslintas skundas – that is to say a complaint in which he clarified certain issues). 9. On 19 May 2014 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court ascertained that the second applicant had been confined to the Prison Hospital from 22 March until 13 April 2010, from 25 February until 4 March 2011, from 21 until 27 September 2011 and from 17 until 24 January 2014. The court also applied the three-year statutory time‑limit to part of the second applicant’s complaint. It held that the second applicant had been placed in overcrowded wards for fifteen days and awarded him 100 Lithuanian litai (LTL – approximately 29 euros (EUR)) in compensation for the fifteen days that he had spent in overcrowded wards during the periods from 21 until 27 September 2011 and from 17 until 24 January 2014. The second applicant’s other grievances were dismissed as unsubstantiated. 10. The second applicant appealed, and on 9 December 2014 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance decision. However, it held that the first-instance court had erred in determining the relevant amount of personal space. The court held that under domestic regulations, a person confined to the Prison Hospital had to have at least 5.1 square metres of personal space. The court recalculated the number of days and held that between 25 February 2011 and 4 March 2011 the second applicant had had 4.05 square metres of personal space at his disposal, and that between 17 and 24 January 2014 he had had 2.83 square metres of personal space. The court held that it was impossible to determine how much personal space the second applicant had had between 21 and 27 September 2011; accordingly, it calculated in favour of the second applicant the number of days during which he had not had enough personal space (that is to say the court calculated the number of such days and, in the absence of specific data, stated that the applicant had been held in overcrowded cells for more days than he probably had been held there). It then ruled that he had not had enough personal space for twenty days in total. However, he had been able to move around the Prison Hospital from 6 a.m. until 10 p.m., and he had also been able spend time outside. 11. On 15 July 2013 the second applicant lodged a request with the administration of Vilnius Correctional Facility to be allowed to receive a portable digital music (MP3) player from J.G., a person who was not his relative. On 17 July 2013 his request was refused. 12. In July 2013, the second applicant lodged a complaint about the above‑mentioned refusal with the Prison Department, which replied in August 2013 that the administration of Vilnius Correctional Facility had acted in accordance with domestic law. 13. On 20 August 2013 the second applicant lodged a complaint with the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court regarding the refusal of the administration of Vilnius Correctional Facility to allow him to receive an MP3 player from someone to whom he was not related. He asked the court to oblige the Correctional Facility administration to issue him with permission to receive equipment and other items from acquaintances in view of the fact that his relatives were not visiting him, and to award him compensation for non‑pecuniary damage in the amount of EUR 10,137. 14. On 13 January 2014 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court ruled that the second applicant could receive an MP3 player from his spouse, partner or a close relative. However, as the person who had offered to bring him the player did not fall within the category of such persons, the refusal of the Vilnius Correctional Facility administration had been lawful. The court had no doubts about the relevant provisions of domestic law and observed that they were designed to motivate inmates to work, to communicate with their relatives and to enhance their social ties. The court furthermore observed that (among other items) MP3 players did not constitute essential items but rather entertainment items. It therefore dismissed the second applicant’s complaint. 15. The second applicant appealed, and on 30 October 2014 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance decision. The court held that the second applicant had not denied that he had close relatives, but had simply submitted that they were not visiting him. The second applicant found himself in the same position as that of other inmates. His right to have an MP3 player had not been denied, as he could have purchased one. It was not prohibited for persons other than close relatives to give money to convicted inmates; thus, the second applicant could have received money with which to buy an MP3 player. 16. It appears from the information provided by the Government that the second applicant had been working in Vilnius Correctional Facility from 2 July 2012 until 31 March 2014 and had been receiving remuneration for his work. 17. On 8 April 2014 the second applicant asked the administration of Vilnius Correctional Facility to allow him to receive an MP3 player by post from his mother, J.U. On 5 May 2014 his request was refused because domestic law did not provide the possibility to send items to inmates by post. 18. On 24 March 2015 the second applicant lodged a request with the administration of Vilnius Correctional Facility to be allowed to receive certain electronic items (a television monitor and related parts, such as headphones) from his partner, K.J. His request was granted. 19. It appears from the information provided by the Government that the second applicant received a personal computer in January 2011 (which he returned to his relatives in June 2011); another personal computer, a monitor and headphones in June 2011 (which he returned to his relatives in July 2016); and a USB key (which was destroyed at the second applicant’s request in December 2016) and a laptop in August 2016. 20. From the information provided by the Government it appears that the applicant was able to watch television as there were specially equipped rooms which the inmates could use at any time, given that they could freely move around the premises of Vilnius Correctional Facility.

10. The applicants’ details can be found in the Annex. 11. These two applicants met in February 2007, and in 2009 they entered into a stable and committed relationship with each other. 12. On 11 October 2009 Ms Mortagna moved to Toronto, Ontario, Canada for work purposes. A month later the two applicants decided to get married and on 27 August 2010 they married in Toronto. 13. In the meantime, on 2 April 2010, Ms Mortagna’s employment came to an end and as a result she was no longer entitled to a residence permit. She therefore returned to Italy and since then has been cohabiting with Ms Orlandi. 14. On 18 April 2011 their physical cohabitation was registered and since then they have been considered as a family unit for statistical purposes. 15. On 9 September 2011 the two applicants asked the Italian Consulate in Toronto to transmit to the Civil Status Office in Italy the relevant documents for the purposes of registration of their marriage. 16. On 8 November 2011 the relevant documents were transferred. 17. On 13 December 2011 the Commune of Ferrara informed the two applicants that it was not possible to register their marriage. The decision noted that the Italian legal order did not allow marriage between same-sex couples, and that although the law did not specify that couples had to be of the opposite sex, doctrine and jurisprudence had established that Article 29 of the Constitution referred to the traditional concept of marriage, understood as being a marriage between persons of the opposite sex. Thus, the spouses being of different sex was an essential element to qualify for marriage. Moreover, according to Circular no. 2 of 26 March 2001 of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, a marriage contracted abroad between persons of the same sex, one of whom was Italian, could not be registered in so far as it was contrary to the norms of public order. 18. These two applicants, who live in Italy, met in 2007 and entered into a stable and committed relationship with each other. 19. On 9 January 2008 they started cohabiting in G.P.’s apartment, although D.P. maintained formal residence in his own apartment. In 2009 G.P. purchased a second property which, in the absence of any legal recognition, for practical and fiscal reasons remained in his name only. In 2010 G.P. purchased, through a mandate in the name of D.P (for the purposes of purchasing such property), a garage. In June 2011 the couple moved into D.P.’s apartment and established their home there. They have since been considered as a family unit for statistical purposes. 20. On 16 August 2011 the two applicants got married in Toronto, Ontario, Canada. On 10 October 2011 they opened a joint bank account. On 12 January 2012, before a notary, the two applicants appointed each other reciprocally as guardians in the event of incapacitation (amministratore di sostegno). 21. Following the applicants’ request, on 7 January 2012, the Italian Consulate in Toronto transmitted to the Civil Status Office in Italy the relevant documents for the purposes of registration of their marriage. 22. On 20 January 2012, the Commune of Peschiera Borromeo informed the two applicants that it was not possible to register their marriage. The decision noted that the Italian legal order did not allow marriage between same-sex couples. Moreover, according to Circular no. 2 of 26 March 2001 of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, a marriage contracted abroad between persons of the same sex, one of whom was Italian, could not be registered in so far as it was contrary to the norms of public order. 23. Following the entry into force of the new law (see paragraph 97 below), on 12 September 2016 the two applicants requested that their marriage be transcribed as a civil union. According to the applicants’ submissions of 30 January 2017 their request was still pending and no reply had yet been received. 24. According to documents dated 31 March 2017 submitted to this Court in June 2017, by the Government, the applicants’ marriage was transcribed as a civil union on 21 November 2016. A certification of this registration, submitted by the Government, is dated 16 May 2017. 25. The two applicants met in Italy in 2002 and entered into a stable and committed relationship with each other. Mr Bray, who is Canadian, did not have a residence permit in Italy at the time, Mr Isita therefore travelled repeatedly to Canada. 26. On 18 July 2005 the couple married in Vancouver, Canada. In the same year Mr Isita designated Mr Bray as his heir. In 2007 Mr Isita retired and moved to Canada permanently, although he maintained formal residence in Italy. 27. In 2004 the two applicants had purchased some land together; in 2007 the couple purchased a further piece of land, and in 2008 they purchased a house and in 2009 a commercial property with an annexed cottage. In 2009 they also opened a joint bank account. 28. On 10 October 2011 they asked the Civil Status Office to register their marriage contracted in Canada. 29. On 25 November 2011 the Commune of Naples informed the two applicants that no such registration was possible. The decision noted that the Italian legal order did not allow marriage between same-sex couples as reiterated in Circular no. 55 of 2007 issued by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. 30. Following guidance from the Mayor of Naples, directing the Civil Status Office of the commune to register such marriages (see below), Mr Mario Isita and Mr Grant Bray re-submitted an application to have their marriage registered. According to information sent to the applicants by email, their request was granted on 6 August 2014. However, further to the circular issued on 7 October 2014 by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (see paragraph 89 below) the registration was cancelled on an unspecified date. 31. On an unspecified date, following the entry into force of the new law, the two applicants requested that their marriage be transcribed as a civil union. According to the applicants’ submissions of 30 January 2017 their request was still pending and no reply had yet been received. 32. According to undated documents submitted to this Court in June 2017, by the Government, the applicants’ marriage was transcribed as a civil union on 27 October 2016. A certification of this registration, submitted by the Government, is dated 29 March 2017. 33. These two applicants met in October 1995, and a month later entered into a stable and committed relationship with each other. 34. In 1996 Mr Giartosio purchased a house in Rome, Italy and in spring 1998 the two applicants started to cohabit there. There they established their common residence. 35. In 1998 the two applicants symbolically celebrated their union before their friends and family. In 2001 Mr Giartioso allowed limited access to his bank account in favour of Mr Goretti. In 2005 the two applicants drafted wills nominating each other as each other’s heirs. 36. On 9 September 2008 the two applicants got married in Berkeley, California. 37. In 2009 the applicants purchased property together and opened a joint bank account. 38. Following their request of the same day, on 29 September 2011 the Commune of Rome informed the applicants that the registration of their marriage was not possible, as it was contrary to the norms of public order. 39. On 1 October 2011 the couple filed a declaration with the Rome “Registry of civil unions” to the effect that they were entering into a civil union and constituting a de facto couple. The declaration is acknowledged by the relevant authorities, but has only symbolic value (see relevant domestic law and practice below). 40. Following guidance from the Mayor of Rome directing the Civil Status Office of the commune to register such marriages (see below), on 15 October 2014 Mr Gianfranco Goretti and Mr Tommaso Giartosio re‑submitted an application to have their marriage registered. Their request was also granted and the marriage was registered. However, further to the circular issued on 7 October 2014 by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (see paragraph 89 below) by a decision of the Prefect of Rome of 31 October 2014 the above-mentioned registration was cancelled. 41. On 23 November 2016, following the entry into force of the new law and their request to that effect, the applicants’ marriage was transcribed as a civil union. 42. These two applicants met in July 1993 and immediately entered into a committed and stable relationship with each other. A few weeks later Mr Dal Molin moved in with Mr Rampinelli in La Spezia, Italy. 43. In 1997 the couple moved to Milan, Italy. 44. In 1998 Mr Rampinelli moved to Germany for employment purposes, maintaining a long-distance relationship with Mr Dal Molin; however they met every week. 45. In 1998 Mr Dal Molin purchased a property in Milan with financial assistance from Mr Rampinelli. 46. In 2000 Mr Rampinelli returned to Italy; the couple moved to Mediglia and continued cohabiting. 47. In 2007 Mr Rampinelli moved to the Netherlands, again for work purposes, maintaining however, a long-distance relationship with regular weekly visits to Italy. 48. After being in a relationship for fifteen years, on 12 July 2008 the couple got married in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. In November 2008 the couple opened a joint bank account. 49. In 2009 Mr Dal Molin left his job in Italy and moved to the Netherlands. As he was unemployed, he was totally dependent on his spouse. Mr Rampinelli also supported financially Mr Dal Molin’s mother, a victim of Alzheimer’s disease. They are under a system of separation of estates; however, their accounts are in joint names and their wills indicate each other as heirs. 50. On 28 October 2011 the applicants requested the General Consulate in Amsterdam to transmit to the respective Civil Status Offices in Italy the relevant documents for the purposes of registration of their marriage. 51. On 29 November 2011 the Commune of Mediglia informed the applicants that the registration of their marriage was not possible, as it was contrary to the norms of public order. No reply was received from the Commune of Milan. 52. Following the guiding decision by the Mayor of Milan, mentioned above, the applicants also re-submitted an application to have their marriage registered. According to the information provided by the applicants on 30 January 2017, their marriage was never registered. 53. However, on 4 October 2016, following the entry into force of the new law and their request to that effect, the applicants’ marriage was transcribed as a civil union. 54. The two applicants married in The Hague on 1 June 2002. 55. On 12 March 2004, the applicants being resident in Latina, Italy, they requested the Civil Status Office to register their marriage contracted abroad. 56. On 11 August 2004 their request was rejected in accordance with the advice of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of 28 February 2004. The decision noted that the Italian legal order did not provide for the possibility of two Italian nationals of the same sex contracting marriage; this was a matter contrary to internal public order. 57. On 19 April 2005 the applicants lodged proceedings before the competent Tribunal of Latina, requesting the registration of their marriage in the light of DPR 396/2000 (see relevant domestic law below). 58. By a decision of 10 June 2005 the Latina Tribunal rejected the applicants’ claim. It noted that the registration of the marriage was not possible, because if such a marriage had been contracted in Italy it would not have been considered valid according to the current state of the law, as it failed to fulfil the most basic requirement, that of having a female and a male. In any event, the marriage contracted by the applicants had no consequence in the Italian legal order in so far as a marriage between two persons of the same sex, although validly contracted abroad, ran counter to international public order. Indeed same-sex marriage was in contrast with Italy’s history, tradition and culture, and the fact that so few European Union (EU) countries had provided such legislation went to show that it was not in line with the common principles of international law. 59. An appeal by the applicants was rejected by a decision of the Rome Court of Appeal, filed in the relevant registry on 13 July 2006. The Court of Appeal noted that such registration could not take place, given that their marriage lacked one of the essential requisites to amount to the institution of marriage in the domestic order, namely the spouses being of different sexes. 60. On 17 July 2007 the two applicants appealed to the Court of Cassation. In particular they highlighted, inter alia, that public order referred to in Article 18 of Law no. 218/95, had to be interpreted as international public order not national public order, and thus it had to be established whether same-sex marriage was against that order, in the light of international instruments. 61. By a judgment of 15 March 2012 (no. 4184/12) the Court of Cassation rejected the appeal and confirmed the previous judgment. Noting the Court’s case-law in Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, (no. 30141/04, ECHR 2010) it acknowledged that a marriage contracted abroad by two persons of the same sex was indeed existent and valid, however, it could not be registered in Italy in so far as it could not give rise to any legal consequence. 62. The Court of Cassation referred to its case-law, to the effect that civil marriages contracted abroad by Italian nationals had immediate validity in the Italian legal order as a result of the Civil Code and international private law. This would be so in so far as the marriage had been contracted in accordance with the laws of the foreign state in which it had been contracted, and that the relevant substantive requirements concerning civil status and the capacity to marry (according to Italian law) subsisted, irrespective of any non-observance of Italian regulations regarding the issuing of the banns or the subsequent registration. The former were subject solely to administrative sanctions and the latter were not conducive of any legal effects – since registration had the mere significance of giving publicity to a deed or act which was already valid on the basis of the locus regit actum principle. Thus, had the marriage been contracted by persons of the opposite sex, in the absence of any other fundamental requirements it would have been valid and conducive of legal effects in the Italian legal order. In that case the Civil Status Officer would have no option but to register the marriage. However, the case-law had shown that the opposite sex of the spouses was the most indispensable requirement for the “existence” of a marriage as a legally relevant act, irrespective of the fact that this was not stated anywhere explicitly in the relevant laws. Thus, the absence of such a requirement placed in question not only the validity of the marriage, but its actual existence, meaning that it would not be conducive to any legal effects (as opposed to a nullity). It followed that according to the ordinary law of the land, two same-sex spouses had no right to have their marriage contracted abroad registered. 63. The Court of Cassation considered that the said refusal could not be based on the ground that such a marriage ran counter to public order (as dictated by the relevant circulars), but that the refusal was simply a consequence of the fact that it could not be recognised as a marriage in the Italian legal order. 64. The Court of Cassation went on to note that the social reality had changed, yet the Italian order had not granted same-sex couples the right to marry as concluded in the Court of Cassation judgment no. 358/10 (which it cited extensively). Indeed the question whether or not to allow same-sex marriage, or the registration thereof, was not a matter of EU law, it being left to regulation by Parliament. However, the Italian legal order was also made up of Article 12 of the Convention as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights in Schalk and Kopf (cited above); in that case the Court considered that the difference of sex of spouses was irrelevant, legally, for the purposes of marriage. It followed that, irrespective of the fact that it was a matter to be dealt with by the national authorities, it could no longer be a prerequisite for the “existence” of marriage. Moreover, the Court of Cassation noted that persons of the same sex living together in a stable relationship had the right to respect for their private and family life under Article 8 of the Convention; therefore, even if they did not have the right to marry or to register a validly contracted marriage abroad, in the exercise of the right to freely live with the inviolable status of a couple, they could bring actions before the relevant courts to claim, in specific situations related to their fundamental rights, treatment which was uniform with that afforded by law to married couples. 65. In conclusion, the Court of Cassation found that the claimants had no right to register their marriage. However, this was so not because the marriage did not “exist” or was “invalid” but because of its inability to produce (as a marriage deed) any legal effect in the Italian order. 66. Law no. 218 of 31 May 1995 regarding the reform of the Italian system of private international law, in so far as relevant, reads as follows: Article 16 “i) Foreign law shall not be applied if its effects are contrary to public order. ii) In such cases, another law shall apply, in accordance with other connecting criteria provided in relation to the same subject matter. In the absence of any such connecting criteria, Italian law shall apply.” Article 17 “The following provisions are without prejudice to the prevalence of Italian laws which in view of their object and scope shall be applied notwithstanding reference to the foreign law.” Article 18 “Legal certificates released abroad shall not be registered in Italy if they are against public order.” Article 27 “Capacity to enter into marriage and other conditions required to enter into marriage are regulated by the national law of each spouse at the time of the marriage, this without prejudice to the unmarried status (stato libero) of any of the spouses, obtained as a result of an Italian judgment or one which has been recognised in Italy.” Article 28 “A marriage is valid, in relation to form, if it is considered as such by the law of the country where it is celebrated or by the national law of at least one of the spouses at the time of the marriage or by the law of the common state of residence at the time of the marriage.” Article 29 “i) Personal relations between spouses are regulated by the national law common to both parties. ii) Personal relations between spouses who have different nationalities or several nationalities common to both are regulated by the law of the state where their matrimonial life is mostly spent.” Article 65 “Foreign documents concerning the status of individuals and the existence of family relations are recognised under Italian law if released by public authority of the State whose law is recognised by the present law ... unless those documents violate the public order...” 67. Title VI of the First Book of the Civil Code deals with marriage, and is divided into six chapters (which are again divided into sections). Chapter III deals with the celebration of a civil marriage. Its Articles 115 and 130, in so far as relevant, read as follows: Article 115 “A citizen is subject to the provisions of section one [conditions to contract marriage] of this Chapter even when contracting marriage in a foreign state according to the form applicable in such foreign state ...” Article 130 “Nobody is entitled to claim the title of spouse and the legal consequences of marriage unless a certified copy of the celebration as recorded in the family registers is presented.” Article 131 “A factual reality reflecting the recognition by society of a civil status, which is in conformity with the marriage deed, sanctions any defect of form present in the marriage deed.” 68. Other pertinent provisions of the Civil Code read, in so far as relevant, as follows: Article 167 “Each or both spouses may by public deed, or a natural third person may by means of a will, create a patrimonial fund for the needs of the family, assigning selected property, real estates or other goods which are recorded in the official Italian registers, or bonds.” Article 230 bis “1. In the absence of contractual relationships, family members who work permanently for the family business are entitled to maintenance, to the financial increments of the business, and to a share in the business, according to the type and standard of work done. 3. The notion of family member includes: the spouse, relatives within the third degree, and in-laws within the second degree. A family business is a business in which the spouse, relatives within the third degree, and in-laws within the second degree, work.” Article 408 “... A guardian in the event of incapacity may be chosen by the interested person, by means of a public deed or an authenticated private deed.” Article 540 “The surviving spouse is entitled to half of the entire estate of the deceased, subject to the provisions of Article 542 if there are surviving children. Irrespective of whether there are any siblings or parents of the deceased, the surviving spouse is entitled to live in the family house and to use its furniture, whether it is their common possession or solely belongs to the deceased.” Article 1321 “A contract is an agreement between two or more parties with the intent to establish, regulate or extinguish a patrimonial relationship between them.” Article 1372 “Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties ... They have no effects on third parties unless so provided by law.” 69. Registration of civil status acquired abroad is provided for by the Decree of the President of the Republic no. 396 of 3 November 2000 entitled “Regulation of the revision and simplification of the legal order of civil status pursuant to Article 2 (12) of Law no. 127 of 15 May 1997” (DPR 396/2000). Its Article 16, regarding marriages contracted abroad, reads as follows: “When both spouses are Italian nationals or one is an Italian national and the other a foreigner, a marriage abroad may be contracted before the competent diplomatic or consular authorities or before the local authorities according to the law of the place. In the latter case a copy of the marriage deed shall be deposited with the diplomatic and consular authority.” 70. Article 17 relates to the transmission of the deed, and according to Article 18 deeds contracted abroad may not be registered if they are contrary to public order. 71. For the purposes of guidance on the application of DPR 396/2000 the Ministry of Internal Affairs issued various circulars. Circular no. 2 of 26 March 2001 of the Ministry of Internal Affairs expressly provided that a marriage between two persons of the same sex, contracted abroad, cannot be registered in the Civil Status Registry in so far as it is contrary to the norms of public order. Similarly, Circular no. 55 of 18 October 2007 provided that the Italian legal order does not allow homosexual marriage, and a request for registration of such a marriage contracted abroad must be refused, it being considered contrary to the internal public order. These circulars are binding on the Officer for Civil Status, who is competent to ascertain that the requisites of law are fulfilled for the purposes of registration. 72. In the Italian legal order marriage registration does not produce any ulterior legal effects (non ha natura costitutiva); it serves the purpose of acknowledgment in the public domain (significato certificativo, efficacia dichiarativa) in so far as it gives publicity to a deed or act which is already valid on the basis of the locus regit actum principle (the rule providing that, when a legal transaction which complies with the formalities required by the law of the country where it is carried out is also valid in the country where it is to be given effect). 73. Extracts from relevant judgments read as follows: Decision of 3 April 2009 of the Venice Tribunal “The difference of sex constitutes an indispensable prerequisite, fundamental to marriage, to such an extent that the opposite hypothesis, namely that of persons of the same sex, is legally inexistent and certainly extraneous to the definition of marriage, at least in the light of the current legal framework.” Rome Court of Appeal decision of 13 July 2006 and Treviso Tribunal decision of 19 May 2010 “[Marriage between two persons of the same sex] may not be registered in the Italian Civil Status Registry because it does not fulfil one of the essential requisites necessary for marriage in the internal order, namely the difference of sex of the spouses.” Constitutional Court judgment no. 138/2010 74. The Italian Constitutional Court in its judgment no. 138 of 15 April 2010 declared inadmissible the constitutional challenge (submitted by persons in a similar situation to those of the applicants) to Articles 93, 96, 98, 107, 108, 143, 143 bis and 231 of the Italian Civil Code, as it was directed to the obtainment of additional norms not provided for by the Constitution (diretta ad ottenere una pronnunzia additiva non costituzionalmente obbligata). The case had been referred to it by the ordinary courts in the ambit of a procedure challenging the refusal of the authorities to issue marriage banns for the claimants’ same-sex marriage. 75. The Constitutional Court considered Article 2 of the Italian Constitution, which provided that the Republic recognises and guarantees the inviolable rights of the person, as an individual and in social groups where personality is expressed, as well as the duties of political, economic and social solidarity against which there was no derogation. It noted that by social group one had to understand any form of community, simple or complex, intended to enable and encourage the free development of any individual by means of relationships. Such a notion included homosexual unions, understood as a stable cohabitation of two people of the same sex, who have a fundamental right to freely express their personality in a couple, obtaining – in time and by the means and limits to be set by law – a juridical recognition of the relevant rights and duties. However, this recognition, which necessarily requires general legal regulation, aimed at setting out the rights and duties of the partners in a couple, could be achieved in other ways apart from the institution of marriage between homosexuals. As shown by the different systems in Europe, the question of the type of recognition was left to regulation by Parliament, in the exercise of its full discretion. Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court clarified that without prejudice to Parliament’s discretion, it could however intervene according to the principle of equality in specific situations related to a homosexual couple’s fundamental rights, where the same treatment between married couples and homosexual couples was called for. The court would in such cases assess the reasonableness of the measures. 76. It went on to consider that it was true that the concepts of family and marriage could not be considered “crystallised” in reference to the moment when the Constitution came into effect, given that constitutional principles must be interpreted bearing in mind the changes in the legal order and the evolution of society and its customs. Nevertheless, such an interpretation could not be extended to the point where it affects the very essence of legal norms, modifying them in such a way as to include phenomena and problems which had not been considered in any way when it was enacted. In fact it appeared from the preparatory work to the Constitution that the question of homosexual unions had not at all been debated by the assembly, despite the fact that homosexuality was not unknown. In drafting Article 29 of the Constitution, the assembly had discussed an institution with a precise form and an articulate discipline provided for by the Civil Code. Thus, in the absence of any such reference, it was inevitable to conclude that what had been considered was the notion of marriage as defined in the Civil Code, which came into effect in 1942 and which at the time, and still today, established that spouses had to be of the opposite sex. Therefore, the meaning of this constitutional precept could not be altered by a creative interpretation. In consequence, the constitutional norm did not extend to homosexual unions, and was intended to refer to marriage in its traditional sense. 77. Lastly, the court considered that, in respect of Article 3 of the Constitution regarding the principle of equality, the relevant legislation did not create an unreasonable discrimination, given that homosexual unions could not be considered equivalent to marriage. Even Article 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 9 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights did not require full equality between homosexual unions and marriages between a man and a woman, as this was a matter of Parliamentary discretion to be regulated by national law, as evidenced by the different approaches existing in Europe. 78. Similarly, the Italian Constitutional Court, in its judgments nos. 276/2010 of 7 July 2010 filed in the registry on 22 July 2010, and 4/2011 of 16 December 2010 filed in the registry on 5 January 2011, declared manifestly ill-founded claims that the above-mentioned articles of the Civil Code (in so far as they did not allow marriage between persons of the same sex) were not in conformity with Article 2 of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court reiterated that juridical recognition of homosexual unions did not require a union equal to marriage, as shown by the different approaches undertaken in different countries, and that under Article 2 of the Constitution it was for the Parliament, in the exercise of its discretion, to regulate and supply guarantees and recognition to such unions. 79. Generally, domestic jurisprudence until 2012 seemed to indicate that the impossibility of registering a homosexual marriage contracted abroad was a result of the fact that it could not be considered a marriage. However, this line of jurisprudence was put aside in the Court of Cassation judgment no. 4184/12 (in the case of the applicants) concerning the refusal of registration of same-sex marriages contracted abroad, and a further development occurred in 2014, as follows: Court of Cassation judgment no. 4184/2012 80. See paragraphs 61-65 above Judgment of the Tribunal of Grosseto of 3 April 2014 81. In the mentioned judgment, delivered by a court of first instance, it was held that the refusal to register a foreign marriage was unlawful. The court thus ordered the competent public authority to proceed with its registration. While the order was being executed, the case was appealed against by the State. By a judgment of 19 September 2014 the Court of Appeal of Florence, having detected a procedural error, quashed the first-instance decision and remitted the case to the Tribunal of Grosseto. By a first-instance decision of 2 February 2015 the Tribunal of Grosseto again ordered the competent public authority to proceed with its registration. Proceedings leading to the Court of Cassation judgment no. 2487/2017 82. On an unspecified date a certain GLD and RLH (a same-sex couple, one of whom was an Italian national) had requested their marriage contracted in France to be registered in the Civil Status Office of the relevant commune. However, the relevant mayor had refused their request. The couple instituted proceedings against such a decision, but were unsuccessful before the first-instance Tribunal of Avellino. 83. By decree no. 1156, filed in the relevant registry on 8 July 2015, the Milan Court of Appeal found in favour of the claimants. Referring to the judgments of the Court of Cassation nos. 4148 of 2012 and 8097 of 2015, the Court of Appeal considered that since the marriage had been validly contracted in France, it could not be weakened because of a move to Italy, which would be discriminatory and would entail a breach of Article 12 of the Convention, as well as a breach of the right to free movement under European Union law. The Court of Appeal noted that the matter was regulated by Article 19 of legislative decree no. 396/2000 concerning registration of marriages contracted abroad, given that Article 28 of Law no. 218/1995 provided that a marriage was valid in respect of form if it is so considered in accordance with the laws of the country where it was contracted. It reiterated the principle that the same sex of the couple does not go against (non costitusice un limite) public order, be it national or international. 84. The judgment became final on 15 July 2016 given that the Court of Cassation in its judgment no. 2487/2017 of 31 January 2017 found that the appeals had not been lodged according to the relevant procedures. 85. In a case before the Tribunal of Reggio Emilia [at first–instance], the claimants (a same-sex couple) had not requested the tribunal to recognise their marriage entered into in Spain, but to recognise their right to family life in Italy, on the basis that they were related. The Tribunal of Reggio Emilia, by means of an ordinance of 13 February 2012, in the light of the EU directives and their transposition into Italian law, as well as the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, considered that such a marriage was valid for the purposes of obtaining a residence permit in Italy. Constitutional Court judgment no. 170/14 of 11 June 2014 86. Judgment no. 170/14 of the Constitutional Court found a breach of the Constitution, as a result of the legally obligatory termination of a marriage, and the impossibility of the partners in that case (who had become same-sex partners following gender reassignment of one of the partners) to obtain an alternative recognition of their union. In that case the Constitutional Court also left to the legislature the task of urgently enacting another form of registered cohabitation, one which would protect the couple’s rights and obligations. Court of Cassation judgment no. 8097/2015 87. In the light of the findings of the Constitutional Court judgment no. 170/14 of 11 June 2014, the Court of Cassation held that it was necessary to maintain in force the rights and obligations pertaining to the marriage (after one of the spouses had changed sex) until the legislator provided for an alternative means of recognition. Judgment of the Court of Cassation no. 2400/15 88. In a case concerning the refusal to issue marriage bans to a same‑sex couple who had so requested, the Court of Cassation, in its judgment of 9 February 2015, rejected the claimants’ request. Having considered recent domestic and international case-law, it concluded that - while same‑sex couples had to be protected under Article 2 of the Italian Constitution and that it was for the legislator to take action to ensure recognition of the union between such couples - the absence of same sex-marriage was not incompatible with the applicable domestic and international system of human rights. Accordingly, the lack of same sex-marriage could not amount to discriminatory treatment, as the problem in the current legal system revolved around the fact that there was no other available union apart from marriage, be it for heterosexual or homosexual couples. However, it noted that the court could not establish through jurisprudence matters which went beyond its competence. 89. Following decisions of some mayors (including the mayors of Bologna, Naples, Rome and Milan) to register same‑sex marriages validly contracted abroad, by a circular issued on 7 October 2014 by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, addressed to the Prefects of the Republic, the Government Commissioners of the Provinces of Bolzano and Trento, and the President of the Regional Government of Val D’Aosta, the following instruction was issued: “Where mayors have issued directives concerning the registration of same-sex marriages issued abroad, and in the event that these directives have been enforced, you are requested to formally invite such mayors to withdraw such directives and cancel any such registrations which have already taken effect. At the same time you should warn them that in the absence of any action on their part the acts illegitimately affected will be annulled ex officio in accordance with the provisions of Article 21 nonies of Law no. 241 of 1990 and Article 54 (3) and (11) of legislative decree 267/2001.” 90. By a first-instance judgment no. 3907 of 12 February 2015 filed in the relevant registry on 9 March 2015, the Administrative Tribunal of Rome, Lazio, reiterating that there existed no right to have registered same‑sex marriages contracted abroad (and therefore confirming the legitimacy of the content of the circular of 7 October 2014), nevertheless declared the above order of 7 October 2004 null and void. Having examined the relevant legal framework, it considered that the Central Administrative Authority and Prefects were not competent to order the annulment of any such registrations, such competence being reserved solely to the judicial authorities. 91. This decision was overturned on appeal by the Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 8 October 2015, filed in the relevant registry on 26 October 2015. 92. The court noted that Article 27 and 28 of Law no. 218 of 31 May 1995 provided that the subjective conditions for the validity of a marriage are to be regulated by the national law of each spouse to be, and that a marriage is valid, in respect of its form, if it is considered to be valid according to the law of the place where it has been celebrated or the national law of at least one of the spouses. Furthermore, Article 115 of the Civil Code explicitly subjected Italian nationals to the relevant civil laws in relation to the conditions necessary to contract marriage, even if the marriage is contracted abroad. A combined reading of those provisions demands the identification of the mandatory substantive requirements (particularly, the status and capacity of the spouses-to-be) which would allow such a marriage to produce its ordinary legal effects in the national legal order. The difference in sex of the spouses to be was the first condition for the validity of a marriage according to the relevant articles of the civil code, and in line with the long cultural and legal tradition of the institution of marriage. It followed that same-sex marriage was devoid of one of the essential elements enabling it to produce any legal effect in the Italian legal order. In consequence, a State official whose duty it is to ensure (before registering a marriage) that all the formal and substantive requirements have been fulfilled, would be unable to register a same-sex marriage contracted abroad in so far as it does not fulfil the requirement of having a “husband and wife” as required by law (section 64 of Law no. 396/2000). For this reason such a marriage could not be registered, even assuming it were not against public order. Quite apart from this inability arising from the ordinary Italian legal order, relying on the relevant constitutional court judgments (nos. 138 of 2010 and no. 170 of 2014) the court found that neither could any obligation be derived from the constitution or international instruments to which Italy was a party. Nor could the recent ECtHR judgment in Oliari and Others v. Italy (nos. 18766/11 and 36030/11, 21 July 2015) supersede the obstacles created by Article 29 of the Constitution as interpreted by the domestic courts. Indeed that judgment had solely found for the need to introduce a relevant legal framework for the protection of same-sex unions, and reiterated that the introduction of same-sex marriage was a matter to be left to the State. The same conclusions had to be reached even in connection with the rights to freedom of movement and residence as understood in the relevant EU legislation, in so far as the recognition of same sex-marriages celebrated abroad fell outside the scope of EU legislation. It followed that in the absence of a right to same-sex marriage, the latter could not be compared to heterosexual marriage. Indeed, admitting the registration of same-sex marriages obtained abroad, irrespective of the absence of legislation to that effect, would mean superseding the choice of the national parliament. In relation to the nullity of the order of 7 October 2014, it noted that the mayor was subordinate to the Minister and, in line with the relevant norms, in circumstances such as the present one the Prefect had the power ex officio to quash any illegitimate measures taken by the mayor. Indeed the power of the ordinary judge to delete such registrations risked creating uncertainty on such a delicate matter, because of the independence of such a body and the possibility of conflicting decisions. It followed that the appeal was upheld and the first-instance decision quashed. 93. In more or less the same time, similar proceedings were on-going in connection with the Mayor of Milan’s decision of 9 October 2014 to register a same-sex marriage obtained abroad and the circular of 7 October 2014 (inviting the mayors to cancel such registrations), and the subsequent cancellation, ex officio, of such registrations by means of a decree of 4 November 2014 as well as further annotations made on 11 February 2015 resulting from the latter decree. 94. By a first-instance judgment no. 20137 of 2015, the Administrative Tribunal of Lombardia, found in favour of the mayor and annulled the subsequent impugned acts (but not the circular of 7 October 2014). It considered that in his supervisory powers a Prefect can issue orders or directives in the ambit of the functioning of the Civil Status Office. However, the Prefect cannot issue an act of annulment in the context of registrations of same-sex marriages obtained abroad, given that the applicable laws give the power to rectify or annul erroneously-registered marriages only to the ordinary judicial authorities. 95. By means of a judgment no. 05048/16 of the Supreme Administrative Court, published on 1 December 2016, the first-instance decision to annul the impugned acts was confirmed on the basis of a different reasoning. Having analysed all the relevant laws and jurisprudence, the Supreme Administrative Court found that no law had attributed to the Minister for Internal affairs (or the Prefect) the power of annulling acts performed by mayors in order to register marriages. Indeed such power was attributed to the Government in its collegial composition. Further, it was not for the court to determine during such proceedings whether the decisions of the mayors to register such marriages were legitimate or not. 96. A set of similar proceedings concerning the registrations made by the Mayor of Udine was also on-going at the same time, and was decided in favour of the mayor in a first-instance judgment no. 228 of 2015 of the Administrative Tribunal of Friuli Venezia Giulia, which annulled the impugned acts. The judgment was confirmed on appeal by means of a judgment no. 05047/16 of the Supreme Administrative Court published on 1 December 2016 on the basis of the reasoning referred to in the previous paragraph. 97. By Law no. 76 of 20 May 2016, hereinafter “Law no. 76/2016”, entitled “Regulation of civil unions between people of the same sex and the rules relating to cohabitation”, the Italian legislator provided for civil unions in Italy. The latter legislation came into force on 5 June 2016. 98. The same legislation, in particular its Article 28 (a) and (b), provided that within six months from its entry into force, the Italian Government was delegated to adopt legislative decrees providing for the modification of relevant laws concerning private international law, in order to provide for the applicability of same-sex civil unions as provided in Italian law, to persons who have contracted marriage, civil union or any other corresponding union abroad. 99. By decree no. 144 of the President of the Council of Ministers of 23 July 2016, which came into force on 29 July 2016, transitory provisions were adopted pending the relevant legislative decrees mentioned above (under Article 28). In particular, it was provided that marriages or civil unions contracted abroad are to be registered through the consular offices. 100. On 19 January 2017 three legislative decrees (nos. 5, 6 and 7 of 19 January 2017) were adopted in line with the above requirements and on 27 February 2017 the relative decrees allowing for the entry into force of such measures as well as legislative changes to other relevant laws were adopted by the Ministry for the Interior. 101. Until then Italian domestic law did not provide for any alternative union to marriage, either for homosexual couples or for heterosexual ones. The former had thus no means of recognition (see also Oliari and Others, cited above, § 43, concerning a report of 2013 prepared by Professor F. Gallo (then President of the Constitutional Court)). 102. Nevertheless, some cities had established registers of “civil unions” between unmarried persons of the same sex or of different sexes: among others are the cities of Empoli, Pisa, Milan, Florence and Naples. However, the registration of “civil unions” of unmarried couples in such registers has a merely symbolic value. 103. Before the adoption of Law no. 76/2016, cohabitation agreements were not specifically provided for in Italian law. 104. Protection of cohabiting couples more uxorio had been derived from Article 2 of the Italian Constitution, as interpreted in various court judgments over the years (post 1988). In more recent years (2012 onwards) domestic judgments had also considered cohabiting same-sex couples as deserving such protection. 105. In order to fill the lacuna in the written law, with effect from 2 December 2013 it had been possible to enter into “cohabitation agreements”, namely a private deed, which did not have a specified form provided by law, and which may be entered into by cohabiting persons, be they in a parental relationship, partners, friends, simple flatmates or carers, but not by married couples. Such contracts mainly regulated the financial aspects of living together, cessation of the cohabitation, and assistance in the event of illness or incapacity[1]. 106. The relevant Council of Europe materials can be found in Oliari and Others (cited above, §§ 56-61). 107. The relevant European Union law can be found in Oliari and Others (cited above, §§ 62-64). 108. Of particular interest is Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States. Its Article 2 contains the following definition: “ ‘Family member’ means: (a) the spouse (b) the partner with whom the Union citizen has contracted a registered partnership, on the basis of the legislation of a Member State, if the legislation of the host Member State treats registered partnerships as equivalent to marriage in accordance with the conditions laid down in the relevant legislation of the host Member State. (c) the direct descendants who are under the age of 21 or are dependants and those of the spouse or partner as defined in point (b) (d) the dependent direct relative in the ascending line and those of the spouse or partner as defined in point (b);” 109. According to the European Commission «Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on guidance for better transposition and application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States» COM(2009) 313 final (pg. 4): “Marriages validly contracted anywhere in the world must be in principle recognized for the purpose of the application of the Directive. Forced marriages, in which one or both parties is married without his or her consent or against his or her will, are not protected by international or Community law. ... Member States are not obliged to recognise polygamous marriages, contracted lawfully in a third country, which may be in conflict with their own legal order. ... The Directive must be applied in accordance with the non-discrimination principle enshrined in particular in Article 21 of the EU Charter.” 110. The comparative law material available to the Court on the introduction of official forms of non-marital partnership within the legal systems of Council of Europe (CoE) member States shows that fifteen countries (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) recognise same-sex marriage. 111. Nineteen member States (Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy (as from 2016), Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom) authorise some form of civil partnership for same-sex couples (by itself or besides marriage). In certain cases such a union may confer the full set of rights and duties applicable to the institute of marriage, and thus be equal to marriage in everything but name, as for example in Malta. Portugal does not have an official form of civil union. Nevertheless, the law recognises de facto civil unions[2], which have automatic effect and do not require the couple to take any formal steps for recognition. Denmark, Finland, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Ireland and Iceland used to provide for registered partnership in the case of same-sex unions, this was however abolished in favour of same-sex marriage. 112. It follows that to date (2017) twenty-seven countries out of the forty‑seven CoE member states have already enacted legislation permitting same‑sex couples to have their relationship recognised as a legal marriage or as a form of civil union or registered partnership. 113. According to information available to the Court (dated July 2015), concerning the practice of twenty-seven member States which did not at the time provide for same sex-marriage (Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Lithuania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovenia, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine), concerning the registration of same-sex marriages contracted abroad, the following situation emerges: all of these member States, with the exception of Andorra, Malta, as well as Estonia (following a court ruling of 2016), refuse to allow same-sex couples to register domestically a same‑sex marriage validly contracted abroad. The reasons for refusal vary; some member States base their position on the legal definition of marriage as a union between a man and a woman only, and some States go further and rely on grounds of public order, tradition and procreation. 114. The twenty-five member States which did not at the time allow same‑sex marriage registration can be divided into two groups: those that allowed for married same-sex couples to register their relationship as a same‑sex partnership (nine member States - Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia (until 2016), Finland, Germany, Ireland, Slovenia and Switzerland) and those that did not (the remaining sixteen member States). Of the EU member States surveyed none reported a distinction in their legislation between marriages obtained within the EU or elsewhere. 115. On 26 June 2015, in the case of Obergefell et al. v. Hodges, Director, Ohio Department of Health et al, the Supreme Court of the United States held that same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry in all States, and that there was no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognise a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another State on the ground of its same-sex character (see for details, Oliari and Others, cited above, § 65).

5. The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Kramatorsk. 6. In July 2001 a journalist, Mr Igor Aleksandrov, was beaten to death by unknown persons in the premises of the local television company in Slovyansk, which he headed. He was the author of a number of television programmes on corruption and organised crime in the region. 7. The above tragic event sparked a broad public outcry. 8. In August 2001 the police arrested a certain V. on suspicion of Mr Aleksandrov’s murder. V. was homeless and had no means of subsistence, being newly released from prison, where he had served a sentence for theft. Although he confessed to the crime in question many times, his statements lacked coherence. Eventually, he mentioned that he had entered into an agreement with a certain B., also a former convict, who had promised him a car and an apartment in exchange for his confessing to the journalist’s murder. B. himself had been acting upon the instructions of certain law‑enforcement officials. He had assured V. that the latter would be taken care of in prison and that his term of imprisonment would be minimal. 9. It appears that B. went missing in October 2001. 10. In May 2002 the first-instance court acquitted and released V. In July 2002 he died, supposedly of heart failure. Subsequently, a criminal investigation was launched into V.’s suspected poisoning. Its outcome is not clear from the case-file materials. 11. On an unspecified date criminal proceedings were initiated in respect of the assumed murder of B., even though his body had not been found. 12. At the time of the events the applicant held the post of deputy head of the Kramatorsk City Police Department. 13. On 28 January 2004 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant in respect of a suspected abuse of office having led to grave consequences. Namely, he was suspected of having falsified the criminal case against V. According to the prosecution, the applicant, aiming to avoid responsibility for the failure to uncover the journalist’s murder, had instructed B. to find a vulnerable person who would agree to confess to the crime in question in exchange for remuneration. Accordingly, B. had convinced V. to play that role. The applicant was also suspected of having instructed his subordinates to either bribe or coerce a taxi driver into committing perjury with a view to his acting as a witness against V. 14. On 10 February 2004 the applicant was arrested as a suspect. 15. On 13 February 2004 the Kyiv Pecherskyy District Court (“the Pecherskyy Court”) remanded the applicant in custody pending trial. His pre-trial detention was subsequently extended on many occasions. 16. On various dates in 2004 further criminal cases were opened against the applicant and other persons in respect of: several counts of suspected kidnapping and aggravated murder and a further episode of abuse of office (selling a car which had been impounded as material evidence). Furthermore, a criminal case was opened against the applicant in respect of B.’s murder. All the cases in question were joined to the one initiated earlier. 17. During his questioning on 8 November 2004 the applicant confessed to having falsified, together with another police officer, the criminal case against V., as well as to having been involved in V.’s poisoning and to having murdered B. 18. On 28 November 2004 the applicant retracted his statements of 8 November 2004 and lodged a complaint with the Prosecutor General’s Office, submitting that he had been coerced into self-incrimination under psychological pressure. 19. On 5 April 2005 the Supreme Court extended the term of the applicant’s pre-trial detention to eighteen months (until 10 August 2005) in the light of the particular complexity of the proceedings. 20. On 8 July 2005 the pre-trial investigation was declared completed. The investigator also made a formal declaration that the case file was available for inspection by the accused and their lawyers. 21. On 14 July 2005 the applicant was given access to the case file. 22. On 5 August 2005 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal (“the Kyiv Court”) extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention to twenty months (until 10 October 2005) on the grounds that the applicant and his lawyers had not finished studying the case file, which consisted of over a hundred volumes. The applicant’s lawyer submitted that the extension was not justified as, in any event, they had not received access to all the case-file materials. His argument was dismissed. The court based its ruling on Articles 156 and 165‑3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 61 below). 23. On 6 October and 8 December 2005, and on 6 March and 7 April 2006, the Kyiv Court extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention, respectively, to twenty-two, twenty-five, twenty-six and twenty-seven months (until 10 May 2006) on the same grounds as before. 24. On 28 April 2006 the case file was sent to the Supreme Court for it to determine the court which would conduct the trial. 25. On 23 May 2006 the Supreme Court referred the case to the Zaporizhzhya Regional Court of Appeal (“the Zaporizhzhya Court”). 26. On 12 September 2006 the Zaporizhzhya Court held a preparatory hearing. It decided to keep the earlier chosen preventive measure in respect of the applicant. 27. On 18 June 2008 the trial court allowed a request by the prosecutor for the charge regarding B.’s murder to be severed into a separate set of proceedings. That part of the case was sent to the Prosecutor General’s Office for additional investigation. There is no information on any further developments in those proceedings or their outcome. 28. On 17 December 2008 the trial court severed into a separate set of proceedings another charge against the applicant – concerning suspected abuse of office leading to grave consequences (the falsification of the criminal case against V.) – and remitted it to the prosecution authorities for additional investigation. 29. The remaining charges against the applicant, in respect of which the Zaporizhzhya Court continued his trial, concerned several counts of kidnapping and murder, as well as abuse of office on account of his having sold the evidence. 30. On 19 February 2009 the Zaporizhzhya Court delivered a judgment by which it acquitted the applicant of kidnapping and murder for lack of evidence of his guilt. The applicant was, however, found guilty of abuse of office in respect of his having sold evidence. He was sentenced to five years and nine days’ imprisonment. Given that the applicant had already served that term, he was released in the court room. As a preventive measure until the verdict became final, he was placed under an undertaking not to leave the town. 31. On the same date the trial court issued a separate ruling (see paragraph 59 below) with a view to bringing to the attention of the Prosecutor General’s Office certain shortcomings in the pre-trial investigation, which it considered to have been superficial and inadequate. The court also noted that throughout 2005-2008 the investigator in charge had given numerous interviews to various television and print media depicting the applicant and the other co‑accused as guilty, without changing their names (see paragraphs 41-43 below). The Zaporizhzhya Court held that such behaviour had been in breach of the accused’s right to presumption of innocence and had amounted to exerting pressure on the court. 32. On 29 October 2009 the Supreme Court quashed the lower court’s decision of 17 December 2008 (see paragraph 28 above), as well as both the judgment and the separate ruling of 19 February 2009 (see paragraphs 30 and 31 above). It criticised the Zaporizhzhya Court, in particular for not having made any specific recommendations as to how the investigation could be improved. As regards the separate ruling, the Supreme Court noted that it had wrongly been issued in respect of the part of the proceedings remitted for additional investigation. The criminal case was remitted for fresh examination by a first-instance court. The Supreme Court, however, upheld the part of the trial court’s decision placing the applicant under an undertaking not to leave town as a preventive measure. 33. Pursuant to a decision of the President of the Supreme Court, the case was referred to the Lugansk Regional Court of Appeal (“the Lugansk Court”) as a first-instance court, which started the trial on 22 February 2010. 34. On 25 January 2012 the Lugansk Court ordered the applicant’s pre-trial detention following a request made by the prosecutor. The case file before the Court does not contain a copy of that order. 35. On 6 February 2012 the trial court severed the charge of abuse of office (concerning the illegal sale of evidence) into a separate set of proceedings and remitted it to the prosecution authorities for additional investigation. 36. On 20 March 2012 the Lugansk Court found the applicant guilty of abuse of office leading to grave consequences (concerning the falsification of the case file in respect of V.) and sentenced him to seven years’ imprisonment, with no right to hold public posts for three years. It also found the applicant guilty of perjury and sentenced him to four years’ imprisonment on that count. As regards the last-mentioned charge, the court held that the prosecution had become time-barred and that the applicant was not therefore to serve that part of the sentence. By the same judgment, the trial court acquitted the applicant of the other charges (creating a criminal gang, as well as several counts of kidnapping and aggravated murder) for want of evidence. It decided to keep the applicant in detention as a preventive measure until the verdict became final. 37. On 17 August 2012 the Rubizhne Town Court (“the Rubizhne Court”) held a preparatory hearing for the applicant’s trial in respect of the abuse-of-office charge regarding the illegal sale of evidence, which had been remitted for additional investigation on 6 February 2012 (see paragraph 35 above). It observed that, while the issue of a preventive measure had not been dealt with within that set of proceedings, the applicant was already detained in a different context under the judgment of 20 March 2012. Accordingly, the Rubizhne Court ordered his pre-trial detention as the most appropriate preventive measure pending trial in respect of the severed charge also. 38. On 12 December 2012 the Higher Specialised Court for Civil and Criminal Matters (“the Higher Specialised Court”) modified the Lugansk Court’s judgment of 20 March 2012. It held that the applicant was to be absolved from serving the sentence altogether, given that the only charge which had entailed the imposition of that sentence (abuse of office on account of the falsification of the case file in respect of V. – see paragraph 36 above) had become time-barred as well. The Higher Specialised Court therefore ordered that the applicant be released. 39. The applicant, however, continued to be detained as a preventive measure in the context of his trial on the charge of abuse of office concerning the illegal sale of material evidence, which remained pending (see paragraph 37 above). 40. On 24 January 2013 the Rubizhne Court allowed a request lodged by the applicant for the criminal proceedings to be discontinued because the only remaining charge against him (abuse of office on account of the illegal sale of evidence) had become time-barred. The applicant was released in the court room. 41. In 2005 a thirty-minute documentary “The Deadly Agreement” (Смертельна угода) was broadcast on one of the national television channels, STB. As indicated during the programme, it was created with the support of the Security Service of Ukraine and the Ministry of the Interior (specifically, its Main Department for the Organised Crime Combatting). The documentary was about the agreement between V. and the law-enforcement officials, and the subsequent murder of V. and B. The applicant was named as the person who had proposed the agreement and as B.’s murderer. The programme comprised, in particular, short films, in which the roles of the applicant and the other persons concerned were played by professional actors. One of those short films depicted the applicant murdering B. Furthermore, there were numerous interviews given by the investigator in charge, as well as by several officials of the Security Service. They shared their version of the events of the case in the form of what appeared to be factual statements, without specifying at what stage the proceedings had reached at the times of the various interviews. The fate of V. was described with a lot of emotion. The programme also contained extracts from the applicant’s questioning of 8 November 2004, during which he confessed to having falsified the criminal case against V. and to having murdered B. (see paragraph 17 above). 42. The above-mentioned programme was transmitted on STB at least twelve times between 2005 and 2008, and possibly later. 43. In addition, the investigator in charge of the applicant’s case gave numerous interviews (making the same assertions as those made in the aforementioned programme) to various printed media. 44. In 2012 the applicant was detained, with brief interruptions, in the Lugansk SIZO. According to the applicant, he was detained there from 20 March until 28 December 2012; however, according to the Government’s submissions and the documents in the case file, the period of his detention in that facility was from 25 January until 20 December 2012. 45. According to the applicant, the cells were extremely small and lacked proper ventilation; the sanitary conditions were very poor; the toilet was not separated from the living area and the applicant was obliged to take meals in its close vicinity; and the bed was infested with bedbugs. Furthermore, the applicant was allegedly often deprived of the daily hour‑long outdoor walk provided for by law. 46. The Government submitted that they were not in a position to provide a description of the material conditions of the applicant’s detention in the Lugansk SIZO given that, following the outbreak of the armed conflict in the Eastern Ukraine in 2014, Lugansk was on non-Government controlled territory. 47. On 25 January 2012, upon the applicant’s arrival at the Lugansk SIZO, he underwent a medical examination, chest X-ray and blood analysis, with no particular health concerns being reported. At the same time, the doctors documented his medical history – namely, that he had suffered from hepatitis and had had surgery on account, in particular, of an inguinal hernia and an umbilical hernia. According to the applicant’s medical records, he did not raise any health-related complaints at that stage. 48. On 30 January 2012 a dermatologist and a psychiatrist examined the applicant in the Lugansk SIZO and reported the absence of any acute health concerns. At the same time, he was registered for medical monitoring on account of hypertension, chronic pancreatitis and chronic cholecystitis. 49. Following complaints made by the applicant of headaches, dizziness and numbness of the tongue, on 28 November 2012 he was examined by a doctor of the Lugansk SIZO, who diagnosed a hypertensive crisis and administered him some medications. It was recommended that the applicant be examined by a general doctor of the inter-regional hospital attached to the Lugansk SIZO and that he undergo an electrocardiogram. 50. On 29 November 2012 the applicant underwent an electrocardiogram, which showed that he had a rotated heart and indications of left ventricular hypertrophy. 51. On 6 December 2012 a general doctor of the inter-regional hospital attached to the Lugansk SIZO examined the applicant and diagnosed him with: ischemic heart disease, stable effort angina, diffuse cardiosclerosis, cardiac insufficiency and high-risk hypertensive heart disease. Certain medications were prescribed to the applicant and it was recommended that he undergo inpatient medical treatment in the SIZO’s medical unit and that his blood pressure be monitored. 52. The Government were not able to provide further factual details as to whether the applicant had undergone the recommended medical treatment because they did not have access to the Lugansk SIZO’s documentation (see also paragraph 46 above). 53. According to the applicant, he was not hospitalised. 54. On 24 January 2013 the applicant was released (see paragraph 40 above). 55. The case file contains an extract from the applicant’s clinical record from the cardiological department of the town hospital, in which he underwent inpatient medical treatment from 10 until 22 April 2013 on account of headaches and chest pain, accompanied by shortness of breath. According to the applicant’s explanation summarised in that record, he had been suffering from headaches and hypertension since 2000 and his health had been deteriorating because of stressful circumstances in his life since September 2004. A limited improvement in the applicant’s health condition was reported at the time of his discharge. 56. The case file also contains a report of the ultrasound scan of the knee joints that the applicant underwent on 5 July 2013. He was diagnosed with a “Baker’s cyst” (a pocket of fluid forming a lump behind the knee) in respect of both knees. 57. The applicant lodged a civil claim against the State Treasury seeking compensation for non-pecuniary damage in respect of his unlawful criminal prosecution and detention under the Compensation Act (see paragraph 62 below). 58. Courts at three levels of jurisdiction (the Kramatorsk City Court on 10 December 2013, the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal on 17 January 2014 and the Higher Specialised Court on 17 February 2014) rejected his claim as being without basis. They held that the Compensation Act did not provide for compensation in the applicant’s situation because he had been acquitted only in part.

4. The applicant was born in 1966 and is detained in Włocławek. 5. Criminal proceedings against the applicant concerning charges of leading an organised criminal gang, assault and extortion have been pending since 29 September 2005 (case no. IV K 59/09, Łódź Regional Court). 6. On 1 October 2009 the applicant was arrested and detained on remand. 7. On 2 March 2010 the applicant was indicted before the Łódź Regional Court. The bill of indictment was directed against the applicant and twenty‑two co-accused charged with over 900 offences in total. The applicant was charged on thirty-eight counts with respect to various offences related to stealing cars, dealing in drugs, assaults and burglaries, in the context of an organised criminal gang. 8. At a session on 23 November 2010 the trial court decided to sever the remainder of the case from the proceedings against the applicant, which would be dealt with at a separate trial and joined with other charges brought against him. In consequence, the proceedings against the applicant were to be transferred to another division of the Łódź Regional Court. The decision pertaining to the competence of the court was quashed on 14 December 2010. On 28 December 2010 the trial court extended the applicant’s detention on remand. On 4 February 2011 the proceedings were stayed pending the outcome of another trial, but that decision was quashed upon appeal on 16 March 2011. The case was transferred to the relevant division of the court in March 2011, and thereafter the presiding judge scheduled the beginning of the trial for 14 September 2011 and undertook other preparative actions (such as tracing the addresses of some twelve witnesses). During the proceedings the applicant lodged multiple procedural requests which were examined by the trial court. In particular, he asked for adjournments of hearings, asked for new evidence to be admitted, and challenged a judge and a prosecutor. 9. The Łódź Regional Court held about twenty-four hearings in total and on 13 May 2013 convicted the applicant and sentenced him to nine years’ imprisonment. 10. The applicant appealed against the judgment. 11. A hearing of the appellate court scheduled for 15 April 2014 was cancelled due to the absence of the applicant’s lawyer. 12. On 12 June 2014 the Łódź Court of Appeal allowed the applicant’s appeal in part and reduced his sentence to eight years’ imprisonment. The applicant lodged a cassation appeal. 13. On 17 December 2014 the Supreme Court dismissed the cassation appeal. 14. The applicant lodged two complaints under the Law of 17 June 2004 on complaints of breaches of the right to have a case examined in an investigation conducted or supervised by a prosecutor, and in judicial proceedings, without undue delay (ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu przygotowawczym prowadzonym lub nadzorowanym przez prokuratora i postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki - “the 2004 Act”). 15. On 7 September 2011 the Łódź Court of Appeal dismissed the first complaint. The court, relying on the Convention principles, ruled that, taking into account the complexity of the case, the length of the proceedings had not been excessive. During the period under consideration the trial court had prepared diligently for trial by, for instance, securing the presence of a large number of witnesses who had been summoned from various detention facilities. 16. On 28 November 2012 the Łódź Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s second complaint. The court examined the course of the proceedings and ruled that there had been no delays on the part of the courts. It noted that the trial court had taken many procedural decisions requested by the parties, including the applicant.

5. The applicant was born in 1938 and lived in Budva. 6. On 8 October 2009 the applicant’s brother was murdered in Belgrade, Serbia. Shortly afterwards the applicant publicly offered a reward for any relevant information. 7. On 29 April 2013 X was murdered in an ambush in Belgrade by 15 shots. X’s brother had been identified in 2010 by the Organised Crime Prosecution Service in Serbia as the leader of a criminal organisation responsible for, inter alia, the murder in 2003 of the then Prime Minister of Serbia. 8. On 18 July 2013 the Organised Crime Prosecution in Serbia opened an investigation in respect of the applicant and several other persons in relation to the murder of X. The investigation order implied that the applicant had arranged the murder of X as he had considered X’s brother responsible for the murder of his own brother. On an unspecified date between 18 and 26 July 2013 the applicant was arrested in Montenegro. 9. On 26 July 2013 the Ministry of Justice of Serbia sought the applicant’s extradition to Serbia on suspicion that he had committed an aggravated murder. On 29 January 2014 the High Court (Viši sud) in Podgorica refused the request, which decision was upheld by the Court of Appeals (Apelacioni sud). On an unspecified date in February 2014 the applicant was released from detention. On 4 April 2014 the Supreme State Prosecution of Montenegro authorised the applicant’s prosecution in Montenegro. 10. On 8 April 2014 the applicant was arrested in Montenegro. The decision was based on the assessment that he could influence the witnesses and that his release could seriously disturb public peace and order. It also took into account the gravity of the offence he was suspected of and the severity of the penalty potentially faced. 11. On 9 April 2014 the High State Prosecutor ordered an investigation (naredba o sprovođenju istrage) in respect of the applicant on reasonable suspicion that he had committed aggravated murder through incitement (teško ubistvo putem podstrekavanja). 12. On 10 April 2014 the applicant was heard by an investigating judge of the High Court in Podgorica. He submitted, inter alia, that he had neither any reason nor any possibility to influence the other suspects given that they were in detention under a special regime in Belgrade. He also submitted that he had been in extradition detention for seven months and that the public had not been disturbed after he had been released. He also maintained that he had not fled, nor did he have any reason to do so, and that his wife and a minor child lived in Montenegro, too. He offered to hand in his passport and to put up bail (jemstvo) in lieu of detention. 13. The same day the investigating judge ordered the applicant’s detention as of 8 April 2014, for one month at most, on reasonable suspicion (osnovana sumnja) that he had committed an aggravated murder through incitement, the penalty for which was ten years of imprisonment or more. The detention was ordered on the basis of Article 175 § 1(2) and (4) of the Criminal Procedure Code (hereinafter “CPC”; see paragraph 44 below). The decision specified that the applicant could influence witnesses. It also took into account the manner in which the offence had been committed, that the motive for it had been revenge and that the applicant’s release could provoke an outcry among the people and could threaten public peace and order. In view of all that it was considered unacceptable that the applicant remain free during the proceedings. 14. On 15 and 24 April 2014 the High Court, in a three-judge panel, dismissed the appeals against the detention order lodged by the applicant and his representatives respectively. The court relied on the same reasons and found that there was no violation of Article 5 of the Convention. 15. The applicant’s detention was further extended on 7 May, 6 June, 7 July, 4 August and 5 September 2014, each time for a month, relying on Article 175 § 1(2) and (4). The reasoning was the same as before: there was reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the said criminal offence; if released he could influence the witnesses, given that the investigation was ongoing and several witnesses were yet to be heard; the statutory penalty for the said criminal offence was ten years’ imprisonment or more, which offence was particularly grave in view of its motive – revenge – and its consequence – X’s death; and there were exceptional circumstances indicating that his release would seriously threaten public peace and order given that the media had extensively reported on the murder of X. 16. By a decision of 20 June 2014 the Court of Appeals upheld the decisions of 7 May and 6 June 2014. The court also examined the applicant’s health-related and family circumstances and considered them to be “of no impact” (nijesu od uticaja). No appeal was allowed against the decisions of 7 July, 4 August and 5 September 2014. 17. On 7 October 2014 the High State Prosecutor issued an indictment against the applicant for aggravated murder through incitement and for criminal association. The same day the High Court extended his detention “until a further decision of the court”. On 16 October 2014 the High Court’s decision was quashed by the Court of Appeal. 18. On 17 October 2014 the High Court extended the applicant’s detention “until a further decision of the court”, on the basis of Article 175 § 1(4) of the CPC. It relied on the same reasons as before, and added that, if released, the applicant could abscond. It considered that detention was proportionate to the gravity of the criminal offence at issue, taking into account “all the circumstances of the case”, and that the purpose of detention from Article 175 § 1(4) could not be achieved by any other, less restrictive measure. 19. On 22 October 2014 the High Court returned the indictment, requiring further investigation in respect of the offence of criminal association. 20. On 31 October 2014 the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeals submitted by the applicant and his representatives against the decision of 17 October 2014 extending his detention. It considered that the High Court’s reasoning was clear and detailed, the only exception being the finding that the applicant could abscond, which was an obvious error (omaška), but it considered it of no importance for the lawfulness of his detention. It also held that what was relevant for the lawfulness of the applicant’s further detention was that the indictment should be issued within six months, which had been complied with given that the investigation had begun on 9 April 2014 and the indictment had been issued on 7 October 2014. It was of no relevance that the indictment had been returned, or that it had been issued for two criminal offences whereas the applicant’s detention had been extended relying on only one of the two. The court “also considered ... [the applicant’s] personal and family circumstances ... and ... other submissions, but found them ... of no influence”. 21. On 13 November 2014 the High State Prosecutor ordered further investigation (naredba o proširenju istrage), in particular in respect of criminal association. 22. On 15 December 2014 the applicant approached the prison authorities and sought that he be released. He submitted that his detention had not been reviewed after a 30-day period and that therefore it had been unlawful as of 15 November 2014. He relied on Article 179 § 2 of the CPC (see paragraph 47 below). 23. The same day, 15 December 2014, the High Court extended his detention “until a further decision was taken by a court” relying on Article 175 § 1(4) of the CPC. The decision specified that the investigation had not been terminated yet, and given that the applicant was in detention the court of its own motion, pursuant to Article 179 § 2 of the CPC, reviewed his further detention. Invoking the same reasons as before, in particular that releasing the applicant would seriously threaten public peace and order, the court considered that there were sufficient reasons justifying the extension of detention. The court also considered that detention could not be replaced by any other, less restrictive measure. 24. Between 19 and 22 December 2014 the applicant appealed against this decision. He submitted, in particular, that the court had failed to review within 30 days whether the reasons for his detention persisted, and when it had done so, it had merely copied the earlier reasoning without really examining what exactly would disturb public peace and order, as nothing had happened when he had been released after the seven-month extradition detention. He submitted that this was contrary to both national legislation and Article 5 of the Convention. 25. On 25 December 2014 the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeals. It held that pursuant to Article 179 § 2 of the CPC the court had a duty to review whether the reasons for detention persisted and to issue a new decision extending or revoking it every 30 days before the indictment entered into force, and every two months after the indictment had come into force. However, the court’s failure to do so within the said time-limits by no means meant that the detention had ceased. It also held that the applicant’s detention had been lawful, as the indictment had been issued within six months. It was irrelevant that it had been returned and further investigation requested. 26. On an unspecified date, apparently between 25 December 2014 and 8 January 2015, the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. He relied on Articles 29 and 30 of the Constitution, Article 177 of the CPC (see paragraphs 38-39 and 46 below) and Articles 5, 6 and 13 of the Convention. He submitted, inter alia, that: (a) the courts had failed to review his detention and issue a relevant decision within 30 days; (b) his detention had already lasted for more than eight months without the indictment having entered into force even though it was statutorily limited to six months; (c) the decisions extending his detention had been insufficiently reasoned, the reasoning having been identical, merely copied from one decision to another, and the reasons set out in the first detention order could no longer suffice. In particular, the court had not taken into account the overall length of his detention or his personal circumstances – he was 77 years old at the time, had a minor daughter, had severe health problems, had never been convicted before, and had been a respectable citizen. Also, the decisions had not specified how long the detention would last, which made them arbitrary and his deprivation of liberty unlawful. The applicant referred to, inter alia, Letellier v. France, 26 June 1991, Series A no. 207; Clooth v. Belgium, 12 December 1991, Series A no. 225; and Jablonski v. Poland, no. 33492/96, 21 December 2000. 27. On 29 May 2015 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional appeal, which decision was served on 9 January 2016. The court considered unfounded (neutemeljeni) the applicant’s allegations relating to his detention not having been reviewed within the statutory time‑limits and the indictment not having entered into force. It acknowledged that reasonable suspicion was a conditio sine qua non, but that after a certain time it was no longer sufficient. It held, however, that the High Court and the Court of Appeals had examined the existence of reasonable suspicion, assessed the existing evidence and other circumstances justifying the extension of detention, indicated which evidence had been taken into account and given clear and precise explanations in accepting them. Therefore, the disputed decisions were reasoned, there was no arbitrariness in them and hence no violation of Article 5. 28. The applicant’s detention was further extended on 15 January, 30 January, 2 March, 2 April, 4 May, 4 June, 6 July, 6 August, 10 September, 9 October, 9 November and 9 December 2015, 11 January, 11 February, 11 March, 11 April, 11 May, 13 June, 15 July, 25 July, 1 September, 4 October and 4 November 2016. The decisions of 11 March, 11 April and 15 July 2016 have not been included in the case-file. All the other decisions extended detention “until a further decision of the court” and gave the same reasons for detention as before. All these decisions were upheld by the Court of Appeals. The court explicitly held that once the indictment had been issued and then returned the detention was extended or revoked pursuant to Article 179 § 2 of CPC. 29. On 29 January 2015 the High State Prosecutor issued an indictment against the applicant for aggravated murder through incitement and for criminal association. On 13 February 2015 the High Court returned the indictment, seeking further investigation. 30. Between 26 February 2015 and 23 September 2016 the applicant was hospitalised in Cetinje. He was hospitalised again on 28 November 2016. There is no information in the case file as to when he was released from hospital. 31. Between 17 April 2015 and 10 August 2016 the time limit for finalising the investigation was extended 17 times, each time for one month, pursuant to the High State Prosecutor’s request to that effect. 32. On 8 June 2016 an indictment was issued in Serbia against the applicant and several other persons for criminal association. On 15 July 2016 the indictment was approved by the High Court in Belgrade. 33. On 22 July 2016 the High State Prosecutor in Podgorica issued a third indictment against the applicant for aggravated murder through incitement and for criminal association. On 19 October 2016 the indictment was returned for further investigation. 34. On 25 July 2016 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal against the High Court decision of 11 May 2016 extending his detention, and the Court of Appeals’ decision of 30 May 2016 upholding it. He invoked, inter alia, Articles 5, 6 and 13 of the Convention. He submitted that the Court had found a violation of Article 5 in a case identical to his, and referred to Mugoša v. Montenegro, no. 76522/12, 21 June 2016. He complained again about the unlawful detention, in particular between 15 November and 15 December 2014, and about all 25 decisions extending his detention being insufficiently reasoned, the reasoning having been copied from one decision to another. It would appear that this constitutional appeal is still pending. 35. On 9 December 2016 the applicant’s detention was revoked and he was released. The High Court found that the reasons for his detention no longer persisted. The court took into account the length of detention thus far, the fact that the indictment had been returned for the third time, and that it was uncertain when and if at all it would come into force, and held that the applicant should not bear the consequences of that. It also took into account that the detention could last three years at most, as well as Article 6 of the Convention. This decision was upheld by the Court of Appeals on 14 December 2016. 36. On 11 March 2017 the applicant was murdered in front of his house by at least 15 shots fired from a moving vehicle. 37. On 13 April 2017 the High Court terminated the proceedings (obustavio postupak) due to the applicant’s death. The indictment against the applicant in Montenegro had never entered into force.

5. The applicant, a Turkish national, was born in 1980 in Neustadt/Weinstraße (Neustadt) and lives in Speyer. He has a daughter of German nationality, born in 2009, who lives with her mother. 6. The applicant’s parents had migrated to Germany. In 1982 the applicant witnessed the murder of his mother by his father. His father subsequently fled to Turkey, where he was sentenced to imprisonment, and where he continued to live after his release from prison. 7. After the death of his mother, the applicant lived and grew up, together with his sister, with his grandparents in Neustadt. He was partly accommodated in a daytime clinic and attended a special needs school, from which he was expelled, without a school certificate, for physical violence against a teacher. 8. On 25 January 1996, the competent authority of the city of Neustadt issued the applicant a permanent residence permit. 9. Since 1996 the applicant has repeatedly been convicted of criminal offences. On 26 September 1996 the Neustadt District Court convicted the applicant of drug trafficking and sentenced him to a juvenile sentence of one year and four months, suspended on probation. On 20 July 2000 the same court convicted him on twenty counts of drug trafficking and sentenced him to a juvenile sentence of ten months, again suspended on probation. On 2 July 2001 it convicted him on twelve counts of commercial trafficking of drugs and, cumulating it with the judgment of 20 July 2000, sentenced him to juvenile custody for two years and three months. On 10 January 2002 it convicted him on two counts of attempted aggravated extortion by use of force and, cumulating it with the judgment of 2 July 2001, sentenced him to juvenile custody for four years. 10. On 18 January 2005 the applicant was released from prison. The execution of the remainder of his sentence was suspended on probation, subject to the condition of long-term therapy for his drug addiction. The applicant subsequently participated in outpatient drug rehabilitation and a methadone programme. 11. On an unspecified date in spring/summer 2005 a different District Court convicted the applicant of drug possession and fined him. It established that on 7 May 2005 the applicant had been found in possession of heroin. On 9 July 2007 the Neustadt District Court convicted him of several offences committed in 2005 and 2006, including violent and traffic offences, as well as drug trafficking, and sentenced him to two years and six months’ imprisonment. 12. In June 2008 the sentence was deferred when the applicant was admitted to a specialist clinic for the purpose of receiving drug therapy. The deferment was revoked two weeks later, after the applicant had been expelled from drug therapy for disciplinary reasons. In August 2008 the sentence was again deferred and the applicant was again admitted to a specialist clinic for the purpose of receiving drug therapy. He was diagnosed with polysubstance dependence, which is simultaneous addiction to different drugs, and a dissocial personality disorder. In February 2009 the execution of the remainder of the sentence of the judgment of 9 July 2007 was suspended on probation and the applicant was released from prison. He continued therapy. 13. On 6 November 2009 the applicant was taken into pre-trial custody. On 9 December 2010 the Frankenthal Regional Court convicted him of drug trafficking and acquisition of drugs and sentenced him to four years and three months’ imprisonment. It established that the applicant had been a heroin dealer since August 2009, in order to finance his own consumption and to earn a living. After serving the initial part of his sentence in prison, the applicant was moved to a psychiatric prison as of August 2011. He was again diagnosed with polysubstance dependence and a combined personality disorder characterised by narcissistic and dissocial symptoms. 14. The subsequent therapy evolved slowly. In May 2014, the clinic still considered the applicant’s risk of relapse to be significant. It was only in November 2014, after the applicant had graduated from secondary school, that the clinic’s evaluation changed. On 2 December 2014 the applicant was released and the remainder of the sentence was suspended on probation. 15. On 31 July 2002, after the conviction of 10 January 2002 (see paragraph 9 above), the competent authority of Neustadt ordered the expulsion of the applicant to Turkey. It referred, in particular, to the applicant’s prior convictions. On 22 April 2003, the competent committee on legal affairs (hereafter - “the committee”) rejected the application for administrative review of the expulsion order. On 18 October 2003 the Neustadt Administrative Court rejected the appeal. On 14 January 2005 the Rhineland-Palatinate Administrative Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the Administrative Court and quashed the expulsion order. It established that the applicant could rely on a right of residence under Article 7 of the Decision No. 1/80 of the EEC/Turkey Association Council of 19 September 1980 (see paragraph 30 below). He could hence only be expelled on the basis of a discretionary decision of the authority, requiring a current and concrete danger of further significant criminal offences. Against this background, the reasons provided for the justification of the expulsion order were not sufficient. In this context the Court of Appeal referred, in particular, to the fact that the applicant had at the time not yet undergone inpatient therapy, which he was willing to do. Moreover, the applicant could refer to exceptional life circumstances, in particular the violent death of his mother. 16. In December 2007 the competent authority notified the applicant that it was willing to order expulsion to Turkey, anew. The applicant informed the authorities that he was now engaged to J., a German national, and that he was intending to undergo stationary treatment of his addiction. On 1 February 2008, the authority nevertheless ordered the expulsion of the applicant to Turkey. It referred to the numerous previous criminal offences, in particular those after 14 January 2005, and concluded that the applicant posed a sufficiently significant risk to the public. 17. The applicant applied for administrative review of that decision. On 4 June 2009, shortly after the applicant had acknowledged paternity of the child J. expected at that time, the city committee suspended the proceedings. 18. The applicant’s daughter was born out of wedlock on 23 September 2009. As of that day, J. exercised sole custody rights. In the following weeks, the applicant lived with his daughter and J. in a common apartment, until he was taken into pre-trial custody in November 2009 (see paragraph 13 above). 19. On 19 September 2013, the city committee resumed the suspended proceedings and orally heard the applicant as well as J. who had, in 2011, given birth to a second child by a different father. On 24 September 2013, the committee rejected the application, maintaining that the applicant posed a current and concrete danger for public safety, as he was likely to commit further significant criminal offences. He was a chronic offender with a high potential for aggressive behaviour. Having regard to the applicant’s interests protected by Article 8 of the Convention, it found the expulsion order to be a proportionate interference. 20. On 22 May 2014 the Neustadt Administrative Court ordered the reduction of the re-entry ban to five years and dismissed the remainder of the applicant’s appeal. It found that the expulsion order did not contravene the binding force of the judgment of the Court of Appeal of 14 January 2005 (see paragraph 15 above) since it was essentially based on events subsequent to that judgment, in particular the judgments of the District Court of 9 July 2007 (see paragraph 11 above) and the judgment of the Regional Court of 9 December 2010 (see paragraph 13 above). The expulsion order was based on sections 55 § 1 and 56 § 1 of the Residence Act in conjunction with section 14 of Decision No. 1/80 of the EEC/Turkey Association Council of 19 September 1980 (see paragraph 30 below). The authority had correctly established that the applicant posed a current and concrete danger to the basic interests of Germany, and that his expulsion was indispensable to preserve these basic interests. 21. The Administrative Court essentially based its conclusions on the seriousness, the frequency and the drug context of the criminal offences, as well as on the expectation that the applicant would be likely to commit such offences again. In this connection, the court referred to the numerous convictions based on drug-related offences, as well as the frequent failure of therapy for his drug addiction. Not even favourable conditions, such as the drug therapy as of August 2008, the suspension of the remaining sentence, further therapy, the expected paternity and finally the birth of his child brought about substantial changes in the applicant’s life. Also, at the time, the treating clinic considered the applicant’s risk of relapse to be significant. 22. The applicant’s relationship with his daughter was protected by Article 8 § 1 of the Convention. It had, however, been kept from developing more intensely, due to his arrest only months after his daughter’s birth. The same was true for the relationship with his family of origin, in particular his sister. He had also failed to substantiate the actual status of the relationship with J. After initial, rather frequent visits by J. and their common daughter in prison, contact became rather infrequent after J. gave birth to a second child by a different father. The fact that the applicant was about to finish secondary school (see paragraph 14 above) did not justify a more positive prognosis. Since he lacked the necessary vocational training, his prospects of finding a job were still rather slim. The authorities had correctly taken account of the applicant’s interests, of the fact that he had been born in Germany and that he had family in Germany, in particular his daughter and his sister. Making explicit reference to Article 8 of the Convention and the Court’s case-law, the Administrative Court established that the reasons at the heart of the expulsion were sufficient to justify it, even though the expulsion might cause hardship for the daughter, who did not live with the applicant. The applicant’s interests were sufficiently taken into account by limiting the re‑entry ban and he could, moreover, apply for a further reduction of the re‑entry ban, if the relevant facts were to change. 23. The applicant also lacked economic or social integration. He had never worked and essentially lived on social benefits. As for any difficulties the applicant might face in Turkey, those seemed surmountable. Regarding his allegation that he had no command of the Turkish language, criminal investigations into his offences had shown that he had been perfectly capable of switching between German and Turkish for drug dealing. Also, other oral communication in Turkish had been established, for example two telephone calls with his father from prison. At the oral hearing, he had also conceded that his fluency had improved since 2005. Moreover, the applicant was familiar with Turkish living conditions, since he had visited Turkey twice as a child. His grandfather had shown a rather traditional attitude and he had, in order to improve his Turkish skills, spent a lot of time with family since 2005. He would not be without support in Turkey, even though the relationship with his father might be tense and other contact in Turkey could only be established through his sister. 24. On 25 March 2015 the Rhineland-Palatine Administrative Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s request for leave to appeal, endorsing the Administrative Court’s assessment, while also taking into account the developments that had taken place since. 25. On 7 October 2015, the Federal Constitutional Court did not accept the complaint for adjudication without providing reasons (no. 2 BvR 826/15). 26. An attempt to deport the applicant on 9 October 2015 was unsuccessful, because the applicant did not possess a valid passport. 27. On 17 December 2015, the applicant submitted an asylum application, invoking the danger of re-traumatisation as a bar to his deportation. He was granted a temporary permit to stay for the purposes of the asylum proceedings (Aufenthaltsgestattung). No information about the current state of these proceedings has been submitted to the Court. 28. On 17 March 2016 the competent authority rejected an application by the applicant concerning a further reduction of the duration of the re‑entry ban. The applicant appealed against that decision to the Administrative Court. No information about the current state of those proceedings has been provided.

5. The applicants were born in 1979 and 1983 respectively. The first applicant is serving a life sentence in Dnipropetrovsk Prison no. 89. The second applicant lives in Obukhiv. 6. On 24 March 2000 the applicants got married. 7. On 16 February 2001 the first applicant was found guilty of a number of criminal offences and was sentenced to life imprisonment. 8. The applicants requested that the prison administration allow them a long-term family visit on many occasions, in particular, in 2006. Their requests were rejected on the grounds that Article 151 of the Code of Execution of Sentences did not provide for long-term visits to life prisoners. 9. In April 2007 the applicants lodged an administrative claim against the State Department for Enforcement of Sentences seeking an entitlement to a long-term conjugal visit every three months. They submitted that they were willing to have a common child and that a denial of that right to them was unlawful and arbitrary. The courts, on three levels of jurisdiction, rejected that claim as not based on law. The final decision of the Higher Administrative Court was delivered on 8 December 2009. 10. According to the information provided by the Government, the first applicant was disciplined on three occasions during the period of his detention from 2001 to 2016: once in 2001 following the discovery of an unreported written message on him; once in 2003 on account of his attempt to get in touch with an inmate in an adjacent cell; and once in 2013 on account of unauthorised possession of a mobile telephone. 11. The applicants got divorced on an unspecified date. According to the Government, it happened “shortly after the introduction of the application”. According to the applicants, the divorce took place on an unspecified date in 2014. 12. As indicated in the information note issued on 24 June 2016 by the administration of Dnipropetrovsk Prison no. 89, during his detention in that prison starting from 2003, the first applicant had had forty short-term visits and nine long-term family visits. More specifically, on 10 December 2003 and 10 June 2004 he had short-term visits from the second applicant, as well as his mother and sister. The second applicant did not pay him visits thereafter. During the period from 2004 to 2012 the first applicant had regular short-term visits from his mother, sister and some other persons. On 13 September 2012 he had a visit from his sister and a certain Ms L. who was registered in the prison’s logbook as his fiancée. Since then he had regular short-term visits from Ms L. On 11 July 2014 the first applicant was allowed for the first time a long-term family visit, which was from his sister. On 5 December 2014 the first applicant got married with Ms L. and they were allowed a long-term family visit on that occasion. Subsequently, they enjoyed long-term conjugal visits about every three months.

5. The first applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Reykjavík. The second applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Reykjavík. Both applicants are attorneys practising in Reykjavík. 6. On 16 February 2012 Y and Z were indicted for participating in fraud and market manipulation along with two other individuals. On 7 March 2012, in accordance with Article 31 of the Criminal Procedures Act No. 88/2008 (hereinafter “the CPA”), the first applicant was appointed as Y’s defence counsel and the second applicant was appointed as Z’s defence counsel. 7. On 7 March 2012, the indictment of the prosecution against, inter alios, Y and Z was registered before the District Court of Reykjavík. At a preliminary hearing they pleaded not guilty to the charges laid against them. From March to December 2012 the prosecutor and the applicants, along with the other defence counsel in the proceedings, repeatedly submitted arguments in further preliminary hearings about various issues, such as the evidence submitted by the prosecution, the deadline for the defence to file pleadings and the defence’s request to dismiss the case. The Supreme Court issued three rulings on procedural matters in the case. 8. On 19 December 2012, after consulting the prosecution, the applicants and the other defence counsel, the District Court judge decided that the trial would take place from 11 to 23 April 2013. The same day, the second applicant replied to the judge’s email stating that, although it was reasonable to decide dates for the trial, he wanted to remind the judge that the case was not ready for trial at that time because the prosecution had not submitted the requested evidence and issued a witness list. Shortly afterwards the judge replied with “Merry Christmas!”. 9. On 24 January and 7 March 2013 the prosecution submitted further evidence in the case. During the second of these preliminary hearings, the applicants and the other defence counsel requested more time to study the evidence and the postponement of the trial, inter alia, because the submission of evidence had not been concluded. By a decision of the same day the District Court rejected the request. 10. In a preliminary hearing on 21 March 2013, the prosecution and one defence counsel submitted further evidence. The applicants and the other defence counsel requested that the prosecution provide them with certain documentary evidence. In a preliminary hearing on 25 March 2013 the applicants and the other defence counsel requested again that the trial be postponed for 6-8 weeks to allow them to study new evidence presented by the prosecution. By decisions of 26 March 2013, the District Court rejected both requests. By a decision of 4 April 2013, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. 11. On 8 April 2013 each applicant wrote a letter to the District Court judge in the case, arguing that they could not, for reasons of conscience, continue to perform their duties as defence counsel for their clients. The applicants stated, inter alia, that they had not been informed about the deadline to submit their pleadings to the Supreme Court before its ruling of 4 April 2013, the prosecution had neglected to send them a copy of its pleadings, the defence had not had adequate access to important documents, the prosecution had tapped telephone conversations between them and their clients and the whole procedure had in general violated their applicants’ rights under the Constitution, the CPA and the Convention. Lastly, the applicants stated that their clients’ rights had been so grossly violated that they were forced to resign from further participation in the case. They noted that they had discussed this with their clients and made clear that the latter approved of their decision. The applicants requested that their appointment as defence counsel for their clients be revoked in accordance with Section 21 (6) of the Attorneys’ Act No. 77/1998. 12. On the same day, the District Court judge replied to the applicants’ letters and rejected their requests. The judge referred to the CPA and the Attorneys’ Act. He reiterated that the trial would start on 11 April 2013 as previously decided. The applicants replied to the letter immediately, referred to their previous arguments and stated that they would not attend the trial on 11 April 2013. 13. On 11 April 2013, Y and Z attended the trial accompanied by new defence counsel. The applicants did not attend the hearing and were not summoned to appear by the court. The presiding judge recorded the aforementioned communications between him and the applicants and declared that it was unavoidable to relieve the applicants of their duties as defence counsel. New defence counsel were appointed for Y and Z and the trial was postponed for an unspecified period. The prosecution requested that the applicants be fined for contempt of court under Section 223 of the CPA (see paragraph 32 below). 14. Before this Court the applicants submitted that, according to news reports, the presiding judge had explicitly rejected the prosecution’s request, stating that the conditions to impose fines were not fulfilled at that time. However, the Government stated that the court records (which were not submitted to the Court) did not reflect that the presiding judge had taken a position on this point. In any event, the Government argued that the statement had not been a formal one, it had not been noted in the court records and there was great uncertainty as to whether it had been made and, if so, what had actually been said. 15. A new trial was held before the District Court from 4 to 14 November 2013. In the meantime, the presiding judge had withdrawn from the case and a new judge had been appointed. 16. By a judgment of 12 December 2013, Y and Z, along with the other two accused, were convicted. Furthermore, the applicants were each fined 1,000,000 Icelandic krónur (ISK; approximately 6,200 euros (EUR) at the material time) under Section 223(1) (a) and (d) of the CPA for offending the court and causing unnecessary delay in the case by not attending the trial on 11 April 2013 and thereby damaging their clients’ and the other defendants’ interests. The judgment was delivered in the absence of the applicants. 17. On 13 December 2013 the applicants appealed to the Supreme Court against the District Court judgment as regards the imposition of fines, by way of an appeal lodged by the prosecutor at their request. Before the Supreme Court, the applicants primarily requested that the District Court judgment be annulled as to the imposition of their fines and, as a subsidiary request, that the fines be reduced, were the Supreme Court to reject their request for annulment. 18. In their submissions to the Supreme Court the applicants claimed firstly that they had been penalised without having been given the opportunity to defend themselves against the prosecution’s claims or being made aware of the court’s intention to impose fines on them. This had been a violation of their right to a fair trial under Article 6 §§ 1 to 3 of the Convention and Article 70 of the Constitution. Secondly, the applicants maintained that they had had valid reasons to resign from the case and that the legal conditions to fine them had not been fulfilled. 19. As regards their first claim, the applicants argued that they had at no point been informed that the court was considering imposing fines on them and they had not been invited to defend themselves before the District Court, which was a fundamental part of the right to a fair trial. 20. As regards the second complaint, the applicants argued, inter alia, that imposing fines on them as defence counsel had not been in accordance with the CPA as they had not been defence counsel at the time the District Court judgment was delivered. They argued that, according to Section 224 of the CPA, they should have been fined immediately as “others”. Furthermore, the applicants maintained that their conduct in question had not occurred during the proceedings as the CPA required. In any event, their behaviour could not be considered as offending the court since they had not attended any hearings with the judges who had imposed the fines and decided on the merits of the case. The applicants further stated that their actions had been in their clients’ interests, and their clients had approved of their decisions. 21. The applicants submitted documentary evidence along with their submissions to the Supreme Court. They did not ask to examine witnesses or to give statements themselves before the court. 22. The Supreme Court held an oral hearing in the case where the applicants were represented by legal counsel. No witnesses were heard and the applicants did not give statements before the court. 23. The applicants were represented by two separate defence counsel before the Supreme Court. However, the applicants claimed before this Court that, due to the limited time given to present the case before the Supreme Court, each defence counsel put forth arguments on behalf of both applicants. 24. According to the second applicant’s summary of the oral pleadings before the Supreme Court the applicants argued, inter alia, that a decision to impose court fines was an ex proprio motu decision of the court, without the parties’ involvement, and could therefore not be quashed and referred back to the first instance court. Furthermore, the applicants argued that referring the case back to the District Court for a new trial due to a violation of the CPA and Article 6 of the Convention could never be legitimate at this point as the time-limits for imposing fines on them had expired. According to Section 223 and 224 of the CPA the applicants could only be fined as “defence counsel” in a substantive judgment in the criminal case against their clients or as “others”, during the main trial in the criminal case against their clients. Additionally, the applicants argued that the amount of the fine was tenfold compared to fines imposed in previous cases and that no maximum amount for fines was stipulated in the CPA. Furthermore, the applicants referred to the principle of legality in criminal cases (Article 69 of the Constitution) and the principle of lex certa. 25. By a judgment of 28 May 2014, a majority of the Supreme Court (three out of five judges) confirmed the District Court judgment as regards the fines imposed on the applicants. 26. In its judgment the Supreme Court described the facts in detail. It referred to the obligation incumbent on attorneys under Article 20 of the Attorneys’ Act to accept the appointment or nomination as defence counsel in criminal proceedings if they fulfilled statutory requirements. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the applicants could not resign as defence counsel in a criminal case with reference to Section 21 (6) of the Attorneys’ Act as it only applied to civil cases. Their decision not to attend the trial in spite of the District Court rejecting their request to relieve them of their duties as defence counsel was not in accordance with the law or in the interest of their clients or the other defendants. Their statements about resigning from their positions as defence counsel had furthermore been a gross violation of their obligations as defence counsel under Section 34 (1) and 35 (1) of the CPA. The applicants had completely disregarded the legitimate decisions of the District Court judge, who had had no other option than to revoke their appointment as defence counsel and to appoint others to secure legal representation for the accused. 27. The Supreme Court subsequently set out in detail the applicable legal provisions on the imposition of court fines, namely Sections 222 to 224 of the CPA, and noted that the provisions did not stipulate any maximum fine. The court considered, moreover, that the fines imposed on the applicants were substantial and therefore categorised them as criminal punishment. 28. Furthermore, the judgment contained the following reasons: “As previously stated, the second sentence of Section 222 (1) of [the CPA] permits the prosecution to instigate proceedings for offences subject to fines pursuant to this chapter [Chapter XXXV]. According to general rules the defendants in question must then be provided with the opportunity to defend themselves. Such a case was not instigated. On the other hand it was, as previously stated, also possible for the judge in the criminal case, of his own accord, to impose fines in accordance with the first sentence of [Section 222 (1)]. Under those circumstances a special claim on behalf of the prosecution was not required. There are no grounds to hold that [the applicants] should have enjoyed lesser protection under the law, depending on which of the above-mentioned options were chosen when assessing whether they should be subject to the imposition of fines, which amounted to penalties, cf. Article 70 of the Icelandic Constitution and Article 6 (1) and (3) of [the Convention], cf. Act No. 62/1994. When it became clear that [the applicants] would not fulfil their duty of attending the trial and the court was considering imposing fines on them, they should have been summoned to a special hearing and given an opportunity to present their case and submit further arguments to that end, beyond what they had already clearly raised in their correspondence with the District Court. However, this was not done. Instead [the applicants] were relieved of their duties at the hearing on 11 April 2013 and a decision to impose fines on them was taken in the judgment delivered on 12 December 2013. As stated in Chapter V of the judgment the prosecutor lodged an appeal regarding this part of the case. That was done at the request of [the applicants] who, according to law, had the right to have the fines imposed on them by the District Court reviewed by a higher court following an oral hearing. [The applicants’] right to defend themselves on appeal is therefore not subject to any limitations by law and they were provided with the opportunity to raise any views in the oral hearing of the case, and as appropriate by giving statements themselves and presenting witnesses, cf. Article 205 (3) of [the CPA], or by instigating special witness proceedings, cf. Article 141 (1) of the same Act. In the light of this, the applicants’ rights have not been impaired due to the lack of an oral hearing by the District Court before the decision was taken to impose fines on them. Accordingly, the procedure which has taken place is in accordance with the law and does not violate their rights to a fair trial under Article 70 (1) of the Icelandic Constitution and Article 6 (1) and (3) of [the Convention], cf. Act No. 62/1994. For reference see the judgment of [the Court] in the case of Weber v. Switzerland from 22 May 1990 and the judgment in the case of T v. Austria from 14 November 2000. Accordingly, with reference to the reasoning of the appealed judgment, the decision on the fines imposed on [the applicants] must be upheld.” 29. The minority shared the majority’s opinion that the applicants’ conduct in not attending the trial in the criminal case against their clients had not been in accordance with the law and had been a violation of their duty as defence counsel. The minority also agreed that their conduct had caused a delay in the proceedings and the imposed fines had constituted criminal punishment. 30. However, the minority held as follows: “When it became clear that [the applicants] would not attend the hearing, a hearing should have been convened immediately, according to provisions of [Chapter XXXV of the CPA], and [the applicants] given notice of the charges and the opportunity to object to the decision to impose the fines. However, that was not done. Instead [the applicants] were relieved of their duties at the trial on 11 April 2013 and new defence counsel were appointed in their stead. However, the decision to impose fines on [the applicants] was made in the judgment of 12 December 2013, without notifying them, who were not defence counsel any more, of those intentions and without allowing them to defend themselves, both as regards the decision to impose the fines and the amount. In accordance with the aforementioned, the processing of the case before the District Court was flawed, but no legal provision allows this part of the criminal case to be referred back to the District Court to be heard again. Given these circumstances in the processing of the case, the appealed provision of the District Court’s judgment on the court fines should be annulled.”

4. The applicant was born in 1984 and lives in Athens. 5. On 21 September 2013 the applicant was arrested in Athens for possession of a fake French passport. He was taken to a public prosecutor, who initiated criminal proceedings against him. 6. On 24 September 2013 the applicant was sentenced to ten months’ imprisonment for use of a false instrument, giving false unsworn testimony, and illegally entering the country (judgment 46181/2013 of the three-member Athens Court of First Instance). The execution of the sentence was suspended following an appeal by the applicant after the pronouncement of the judgment. 7. On 25 September 2013 the applicant was arrested again and put in administrative detention with a view to being expelled from the country (decision no. 538848/1-α/25.9.2013 of the Director of the Aliens Subdivision of Attica (Υποδιεύθυνση Αλλοδαπών Αττικής). 8. On 28 September 2013 the Director of the Aliens Subdivision of Attica ordered the applicant’s expulsion on the grounds that he had entered the country illegally, did not possess a valid residence permit, was considered to pose a danger to public order, and had been convicted by a criminal court for possession of false documents. Moreover, that authority decided not to give the applicant a deadline to leave the country of his own free will, but to keep him in detention until the expulsion order was executed, for a period not exceeding six months, because the applicant posed a danger to public order, for the reasons mentioned above. 9. According to the applicant, he was informed of those decisions on 30 September 2013. He also claimed that he had submitted objections to his detention via a fax sent by his lawyer on 27 September 2013, objections which had not been registered. In those objections, he had included a request for international protection. 10. On 4 October 2013 the applicant appealed against the expulsion decision to the Director of the Aliens Division of Attica, submitting at the same time a request for international protection. On 7 October 2013 the applicant’s request for international protection was sent to the Asylum Department. His appeal against the decision ordering his expulsion was dismissed the next day. 11. On 8 October 2013 the applicant filed objections to his detention before the Athens Administrative Court of First Instance (Διοικητικό Πρωτοδικείο Αθηνών) (his first set of objections). He claimed, inter alia, that he had already submitted objections before the expulsion decision had been issued, but those had not been taken into consideration. Referring to the Court’s judgment in Tabesh v. Greece (no. 8256/07, 26 November 2009), he argued that his detention was unlawful, since his expulsion to Syria was not possible, given the ongoing intensive military action taking place there. He also claimed that he was an asylum seeker and that his conditions of detention in Zografou police station were very poor. 12. On 10 October 2013 the applicant’s objections were rejected by the President of the Athens Administrative Court of First Instance. In her reasoning, she noted that it was not clear whether the applicant had in fact submitted the first objections, that up to that date he had not submitted any proof that he was Syrian, and that he could request asylum before the head of Zografou police station. She also noted that the legality of the applicant’s detention was not affected by the conditions of his detention, which in any event were tolerable, taking into account the difficult financial situation of the country and the fact that little time had elapsed since the applicant’s arrest (judgment no. 5563/2013). 13. On 18 October 2013 the applicant was transferred to the Attica Regional Asylum Service, before which he reiterated his asylum request. On the same date the Director of the Attica Aliens Directorate issued a decision modifying the legal basis of the applicant’s detention and basing it instead on the grounds that he posed a danger to public order and/or national security and that his detention was necessary for the speedy determination of his application for asylum. In addition, the decision suspended the applicant’s expulsion order (decision no. 538848/1-Z). The applicant contested the date of the above-mentioned decision before the domestic authorities, and claimed that it had been issued several days later and backdated. 14. On 21 October 2013 the applicant gave his Syrian identity card to Zografou police station. He also claimed that he had submitted via his lawyer a request to be informed of the decision by which he had been detained, or to be set free if such a decision did not exist. 15. On 23 October 2013 the applicant filed objections to his detention, asking for judgment no. 5563/2013 to be revoked (his second set of objections). In his application, he referred, inter alia, to the fact that he had proved his Syrian nationality by giving his identity card to the police, and that he should be set free, as his expulsion could not be achieved. He also referred to the submission of his asylum request to the Asylum Service on 18 October. In addition, he maintained that he had a permanent address, submitting a lease contract concluded by his brother and an affidavit signed by his brother confirming that he would provide him with accommodation. 16. On 25 October 2013 the applicant’s application was dismissed by the President of the Athens Administrative Court of First Instance. In her reasoning, she observed that the applicant had not yet been registered as an asylum-seeker, but the procedure was ongoing, taking into account a document dated 24 October 2013 from the Aliens Division of Attica which said that the applicant had expressed his wish to request asylum on 7 October 2013, but this had not yet been registered by the new Asylum Service. She also noted that the lease did not prove that the applicant had a permanent address, because he could easily change his address in view of the fact that he had already been arrested for an offence (judgment no. 5772/2013). 17. On 1 November 2013 an interview concerning the applicant’s asylum request took place before the Attica Regional Asylum Service. 18. On 8 November 2013 the applicant filed objections to his detention with the Athens Administrative Court of First Instance, asking for judgments no. 5563/2013 and 5772/2013 to be revoked (his third set of objections). He referred to a deterioration of his health and asked to be released on the additional grounds that, in accordance with a circular order issued by the Greek police, even Syrians who had not requested asylum should not be put in detention. He also submitted complementary observations contesting the date of the decision modifying the legal basis of his detention. 19. On 13 November 2013 his application was dismissed (judgment no. 5935/2013). In her reasoning, the president of the court noted that the applicant had been admitted to hospital on 9 November 2013 and had been discharged with medication, showing “no signs of major active psychopathology”. She further ruled that the applicant’s objection regarding the date of the document modifying the legal basis of his detention was unsubstantiated. 20. On 12 November 2013 the applicant was granted refugee status (decision no. 10664/2013) and was released the next day, following the revocation of return decision no. 538848/1-β that had been issued on 28 September 2013. 21. On 27 November 2013 the applicant lodged an application for annulment of the decision dated 28 September 2013 of the Director of the Aliens Subdivision of Attica by which it had been decided that he would be returned to his country of origin and that he would be detained with a view to being expelled. The application for annulment was dismissed owing to the fact that it had not been signed by a lawyer and the relevant fee had not been paid. 22. The applicant submitted that his conditions of detention in Zografou police station had been very poor. He had been detained in a basement, which had been damp and inadequately ventilated. The cell had been filthy and overcrowded. The food provided had been of very poor quality. He had not had access to outdoor exercise or other recreational activities. The above-mentioned conditions had created a risk of contagious diseases. In addition, medical treatment had not been provided. In view of the above, the applicant’s physical and emotional health had deteriorated. 23. The Government submitted that the detention facilities at Zografou police station were located in the basement of the police station and consisted of three dormitories, each measuring 12 sq. m with a capacity of three detainees. There was also an additional space, measuring 7.67 sq. m, outside the dormitories. It had a toilet and a shower with hot water, which detainees could access throughout the day and night. Beds were not allowed in the detention area; however, every detainee had at his disposal a mattress in good condition and two or three blankets which were frequently washed and replaced. 24. The area was adequately lit, ventilated and heated; in addition, it had fans outside the dormitories to be used during the summer months. The number of detainees at the time the applicant had been held there had varied; however, it had never exceeded the capacity of nine detainees. The premises were cleaned every day by a cleaning company, and they were disinfected once a month. Food was provided three times a day by an external restaurant. 25. International organisations and non-governmental organisations had free access to the premises. Detainees could be visited twice a day by friends and relatives, and had unobstructed access to television and pre-paid phones. 26. The applicant’s needs had been taken care of; in particular, he had been transferred to the psychiatric ward of Sotiria Hospital in Athens, where he had been examined by a psychiatrist. The psychiatrist had concluded that the applicant did not present any major active psychopathology, and had prescribed him medication for anxiety.

4. The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Vodnjan. 5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6. On 9 July 2010 the applicant was indicted before the Pula-Pola Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Puli-Pola) on charges of indecent behaviour. 7. He was tried in summary proceedings (skraćeni postupak). During the proceedings before the first- and the second-instance courts he was represented by a lawyer, M.K. 8. On 11 October 2011 the Pula-Pola Municipal Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to one year’s imprisonment. 9. On 7 November 2011 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Pula‑Pola County Court (Županijski sud u Puli-Pola), challenging the factual and legal grounds for his conviction and sentence. He did not ask that he or his lawyer be invited to the session of the appeal panel. 10. On an unspecified date in 2011, the Pula-Pola County Court, acting as the court of appeal, forwarded the applicant’s appeal and the Pula-Pola Municipal Court’s case file to the Pula‑Pola County State Attorney’s Office (Županijsko državno odvjetništvo u Puli-Pola) for their examination and opinion. 11. On 7 December 2011 the Pula-Pola County State Attorney’s Office returned the case file to Pula-Pola County Court accompanied by a submission which read as follows: “In the criminal case against Slobodan Kliba, accused of the criminal offence referred to in Article 193 § 2 in conjunction with Article 192 § 1 of the Criminal Code, the defence lodged an appeal against the judgment of the Pula Municipal Court No. K-344/10 of 11 October 2011 complaining about errors of facts, alleging that the Criminal Code had been violated and challenging the sanction as well as the decision concerning costs and expenses. I consider the appeal unfounded, therefore I propose that it be dismissed as in my opinion the facts in the criminal proceedings in question were duly established. The Criminal Code was not violated and the sanction inflicted is appropriate, considering the type and seriousness of the criminal offence of which the accused was found guilty. The costs of proceedings were properly estimated and can be borne by the accused, regard being had to his financial status.” The submission in question was not forwarded to the defence. 12. On 20 January 2012 the Pula-Pola County Court held a session which the parties did not attend. On the same day it dismissed the appeal as unfounded and upheld the first-instance judgment. 13. On 13 March 2012 the applicant, represented by lawyer V.D.L., lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) complaining, inter alia, that his right to a fair trial had been violated because the submission of the Pula-Pola County State Attorney’s Office had not been communicated to the defence. 14. On 14 January 2016 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint as unfounded. It held that the fact that the Pula-Pola County State Attorney’s Office submission of 12 July 2013 had not been forwarded to the applicant had not breached his constitutional rights, having regard to the content of the submission, the fact that he had been tried in summary proceedings and that he had not asked that he or his lawyer be invited to the session of the appeal panel. 15. The decision of the Constitutional Court was served on the applicant’s representative on 2 February 2016.

5. The first applicant was born in 1972 and is detained in Vilnius. The second applicant was born in 1982 and is detained in Pravieniškės. 6. The first applicant has been detained in Lukiškės Remand Prison since 17 March 2008. 7. On 27 July 2012 he lodged a civil claim against the State, alleging that he was being detained in overcrowded and unsanitary cells. He claimed 74,690 Lithuanian litai (LTL – approximately 21,630 euros (EUR)) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 8. On 8 November 2012 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court allowed in part the applicant’s claim. It firstly held that the time‑limit for claiming damages was three years after the damage arose, and accordingly dismissed the part of the applicant’s claim concerning the period before 27 July 2009 as time‑barred. The court then examined various documents provided by the prison authorities and found that, during the remaining period, for about one year and seven months the size of the personal space afforded to the applicant had not complied with the domestic requirements (until 11 May 2010 the minimum personal space in prison cells stipulated by domestic law was 5 sq. m, and from 11 May 2010 it was 3.6 sq. m). 9. The court also found, on the basis of reports submitted by domestic public healthcare authorities, that the temperature and the amount of natural light in some of the cells in which the applicant had been detained had not complied with domestic hygiene norms. However, it dismissed as unproved the applicant’s allegations that the cells had been dilapidated and that there had been parasites and rodents. Furthermore, the court considered that the applicant had not proved that his health had deteriorated as a result of the conditions of his detention. 10. The applicant was awarded LTL 1,500 (approximately EUR 434) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 11. The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision, but on 20 May 2013 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed his appeal and upheld the lower court’s decision in its entirety. 12. The second applicant was detained in Vilnius Correctional Facility from 8 June 2012 to 5 February 2016. 13. On 4 October 2013 he lodged a civil claim against the State, alleging that he was being detained in overcrowded dormitory‑type rooms. He claimed LTL 11,000 (approximately EUR 3,200) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. 14. On 12 March 2014 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court allowed in part the applicant’s claim. The court found that for seventy‑nine days the applicant had had 2.9 sq. m of personal space, in breach of the domestic requirement of 3.1 sq. m applicable to dormitory‑type rooms. It also found that for eighteen days, when the applicant had been kept under stricter disciplinary regime, he had had 3.34 sq. m of personal space, in breach of the domestic requirement of 3.6 sq. m applicable to such cells. 15. However, the court noted that the applicant had been allowed to move freely around the correctional facility during the day, except when he had been serving disciplinary penalties, and that the material conditions of his detention had been appropriate. It also considered that the applicant had not proved that his health had deteriorated as a result of the conditions of his detention. The court therefore dismissed the applicant’s claim for non‑pecuniary damages. 16. The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision and on 15 May 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld in part his appeal. It found that, according to the applicant’s submissions which the administration of the correctional facility had failed to refute, for 274 days he had had between 2.33 and 3.04 sq. m of personal space, in breach of the relevant domestic requirements. The court considered that, despite the fact that the applicant had been allowed to move freely during the day and that the material conditions of detention had been appropriate, there were grounds to award him non-pecuniary damages. The applicant was awarded EUR 130.

5. The first applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Washington DC, the United States of America (hereafter “the USA”). X, the second applicant, was born in 1998 and lives in Moscow. 6. The applicants are father and daughter. The first applicant lodged the application on his own behalf and on behalf of his daughter, who was underage at the material time. 7. Until 2008 the first applicant had been living in Moscow together with his wife E. and their daughter, X. 8. In June 2008 the family moved to the USA. X started to attend school there. 9. On 2 December 2008 X moved to Tashkent, Uzbekistan, to live with her maternal grandparents temporarily, as her mother had become seriously ill. 10. On 26 December 2008 E. died of cancer in the USA. 11. On 4 January 2009 the first applicant went to Tashkent for E.’s funeral. He then returned to the USA to deal with the necessary formalities, temporarily leaving X in Tashkent with her maternal grandparents, B. and S., because her state of health after her mother’s death prevented her from travelling. An agreement was concluded between the first applicant and his parents-in-law that they would take X to Moscow as soon as he returned there from the USA. 12. The first applicant returned to Moscow in March 2009. However, B. and S. refused to take X to Moscow. 13. During the following months the first applicant applied to the Russian Consulate in Uzbekistan, to the Russian Embassy in Uzbekistan and to the Russian Ministry of International Affairs for assistance in recovering his daughter. 14. By letter of 29 September 2009, the Ministry of International Affairs informed the first applicant that on 18 September 2009 officials from the Russian Consulate in Uzbekistan had visited B., S. and X in their home in Tashkent. They had found that X’s living conditions were excellent. She had a separate room with all necessary facilities, including a personal computer with access to the Internet. She attended a local school and numerous extracurricular activities and was an exemplary pupil. B. had told the officials that the first applicant had not visited his daughter. B. had been worried that if X returned to the first applicant, she would not be taken good care of. He had also considered that it would not be in X’s best interests to move to the USA. She would be better off living in Tashkent where her mother was buried and where most of her family and friends lived. X had told the officials that she missed her father and could not understand why he had not visited her for so long. The officials had concluded that there were no obstacles preventing the first applicant from visiting his daughter in Tashkent and eventually taking her away with him. 15. On 9 October 2009 the Uzbek childcare authority visited X. The officials found that X’s living conditions were good. X told them that she missed her father but preferred to live with her grandparents. 16. On 9 January 2010 the first applicant arrived in Tashkent. He went to X’s school where he was able to talk to her. B. and S., however, prevented him from visiting X again or taking her away with him. 17. On 19 July 2010 the Tashkent childcare authority visited X and found that her living conditions were comfortable and that she was taken good care of by her grandparents. She attended school and extracurricular activities. 18. In July 2010 the first applicant complained to the prosecutor’s office of the Khamzinskiy District of Tashkent that B. and S. were unlawfully retaining his daughter. By letter of 20 July 2010, the prosecutor’s office replied that he was free to take his daughter away at any time. If B. and S. prevented him, he should apply to an Uzbek court. 19. On 1 September 2010 the first applicant applied to the Cheremushinskiy District Court of Moscow, seeking X’s return to him. He submitted that his parents-in-law were unlawfully retaining his daughter against his will. They were preventing him from seeing X and from contacting her by telephone or via the Internet. He also submitted that there was a strong attachment between him and X and that X was suffering as a result of being separated from her father. 20. The Cheremushinskiy District Court registered the case on 3 September 2010 and invited the parties for a talk on 27 September 2010. 21. On 27 September 2010 the Cheremushinskiy District Court asked the childcare authority to prepare an opinion on the case and scheduled the first hearing for 19 October 2010. 22. The hearing of 19 October 2010 was adjourned until 19 November 2010 at the first applicant’s request. 23. On 21 October 2010 the Moscow childcare authority visited the first applicant’s flat in Moscow and found it comfortable. They also questioned his uncle, who stated that the first applicant lived and worked in the USA. He had a comfortable income and a spacious flat. He had bought medical insurance for X and had enrolled her in the best school in the area where he lived. He also stated that B. and S. had been preventing the first applicant from contacting X, in particular by cutting off her telephone and Internet access. 24. On 13 November 2010 the Moscow childcare authority visited a flat belonging to B. in Moscow and found it comfortable. On the same day the Moscow childcare authority questioned B.’s representative, who stated that the first applicant lived in the USA, often travelled for work and could not therefore take care of his daughter. He did not support her financially and did not visit her. B.’s representative also conceded that B. was preventing the first applicant from contacting his daughter. 25. Hearings were held on 19 November and 15 December 2010. The first applicant reiterated the arguments set out in his complaint of 1 September 2010. He also stated that he permanently lived and worked in the USA, had a stable income and could provide his daughter with everything she needed. He complained that S. and B. were not only preventing him from contacting X, but were also exercising influence on her in order to set her against him. He also submitted the following documents from the USA: X’s school records; X’s and his own character references from the neighbours, X’s teachers and the parents of her school friends; certificates from his employer confirming his income and health insurance covering himself and his daughter, and stating that his post was based in Washington, DC, and did not require frequent travel; an opinion by the doctor who had treated X’s mother that, in view of an increased hereditary risk of cancer, X needed regular medical supervision in a specialised clinic; and a description of the first applicant’s flat in Washington, DC, by a real‑estate agent. 26. B. and S. stated that they were worried that the first applicant would not have sufficient time to take care of X because he had to travel a lot for work. They were taking good care of their granddaughter and supported her financially because her father did not pay any child maintenance. X had been born in Tashkent, attended school there and had many friends. Neither her father nor her paternal grandparents, who also lived in Tashkent, visited X or showed any interest in her life. X’s return to her father against her will would traumatise her. They submitted affidavits by X’s teachers that when the first applicant had visited X at school in January 2010, the girl had been frightened and had asked them to call her grandparents. 27. The next hearing was scheduled for 24 January 2011. The court ordered B. and S. to bring X to testify at that hearing. 28. On 20 January 2011 the childcare authority issued its opinion on the case. It found that, given that the parents had priority rights over anyone else in raising their children, X should be returned to her father. 29. On 24 January 2011 the Cheremushinskiy District Court discontinued the civil proceedings, finding that civil proceedings between the same parties and concerning the same facts were pending before Uzbek courts. 30. On 2 February 2011 the applicant appealed against the decision to discontinue the proceedings. On 8 April 2011 the Moscow City Court quashed the decision of 24 January 2011 on appeal as unlawful. 31. On 19 April 2011 the mayor of the Mirzo-Ulugbek District of Tashkent appointed S. as X’s guardian, finding that her mother had died, that her father’s whereabouts were unknown and that she had been brought up by S. since 2008. 32. On 28 April 2011 the Cheremushinskiy District Court resumed the proceedings and scheduled the next hearing for 27 May 2011. 33. The hearing of 27 May 2011 was adjourned until 21 June 2011 because the first applicant and his counsel did not appear. 34. At the end of the hearing of 21 June 2011 the Cheremushinskiy District Court decided to send a request for assistance to the Uzbek courts, asking that X be questioned about the following matters: – whether her grandparents were preventing her from seeing or contacting her father; – when she had seen her father for the last time; – whether she missed her father; – whether she wanted to live with her father; and – whether she talked to her father over the telephone and, if so, on whose initiative the telephone calls were made. 35. On 20 July 2011 the Russian Ministry of Justice forwarded the request to their Uzbek colleagues. 36. On 24 October 2011 the Ulugbekskiy District Court of Tashkent questioned X. Assisted by a specialist from the childcare authorities and by her guardian, S., X stated that her grandparents did not prevent her from contacting her father. She had access to the Internet and was present on social networks. She would like to contact her father, but she did not know his telephone number or email address, and had no social network account for him. She had seen her father for the last time about two years earlier. She missed him and would like to see him more often, but she would prefer to live with her grandparents. 37. On an unspecified date the Cheremushinskiy District Court received the questioning record and scheduled the next hearing for 15 November 2011. 38. The hearings of 15 November and 22 December 2011 were adjourned because the first applicant and his counsel did not appear. The next hearing was scheduled for 1 February 2012. 39. On 31 January 2012 the first applicant asked that the hearing of 1 February 2012 be held in his absence. He submitted that he was prevented from travelling to Moscow and that his counsel was on maternity leave. They could not therefore attend the hearing. 40. The hearing of 1 February 2012 was adjourned until 27 February 2012 because the first applicant and his counsel did not appear and because the childcare authority needed additional time to prepare a new opinion on the case, taking into account the child’s wishes. 41. On 27 February 2012 the childcare authority issued a new opinion on the case. It found that X should remain with her grandparents. 42. On 27 February 2012 the Cheremushinskiy District Court rejected the first applicant’s request for X to be returned to him. Taking into account X’s wishes and the opinion of the childcare authority, the court held that it would be in X’s best interests to remain with her grandparents. 43. On 26 March 2012 the first applicant lodged appeal submissions. He complained, in particular, that the excessive length of the judicial proceedings had resulted in X’s getting used to living with her grandparents. He also complained that X had not been questioned by the District Court. Her questioning by an Uzbek court should not be taken into account because she had been under the influence of her grandparents, who had been present during the questioning. Lastly, the first applicant argued that under Russian law he had a right to priority over any other person in raising his daughter. The District Court’s judgment had legitimated X’s unlawful retention by her grandparents, who hindered any contacts between him and his daughter. All telephone numbers had been changed and, despite his repeated requests, he had not been given his daughter’s new telephone number. Her social network account had been inactive since January 2009. His relatives’ numerous attempts to visit X had been unsuccessful, as B. and S. had refused to let them into the house. By contrast, he had had the same telephone number and email address for at least ten years and X knew them. If she had unlimited access to telephone and the Internet, as B. and S. claimed, she could have contacted him without any difficulty. The first applicant claimed that those facts could have been easily verified but the District Court had failed to do so. 44. Meanwhile, on 29 February 2012, the Mirzo-Ulugbek District Court of Tashkent, Uzbekistan, deprived the first applicant of parental authority over X at S.’s request. The District Court noted at the outset that it had been unable to obtain the first applicant’s submissions on the case. It had sent two requests for assistance to a competent Russian court, asking it to collect the first applicant’s submissions; the Russian court had however replied that it was impossible to obtain the first applicant’s submissions because he did not live at his registered place of residence. The District Court then found that X had been living with her maternal grandparents since 2008. The first applicant had not taken part in her upbringing and had not supported her financially. He had visited her only once, in 2010. The District Court also took note of X’s statement that she no longer remembered her father and wished to live with her grandparents. 45. On 18 May 2012 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 27 February 2012 on appeal, finding that it had been lawful, well-reasoned and justified. 46. On 8 October 2012 a judge of the Moscow City Court refused to refer a cassation appeal lodged by the first applicant to the Presidium of that Court for examination, finding that no significant violations of substantive or procedural law had influenced the outcome of the proceedings. 47. In June 2015 X moved to Moscow with her grandparents.

4. The applicant was born in 1943 and lives in Bucharest. 5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, refer to the same context and domestic criminal proceedings as those described in the case Association “21 December 1989” and Others v. Romania (nos. 33810/07 and 18817/08, §§ 12-41, 24 May 2011). 6. During the events which led to the fall of the communist regime, on the night of 21/22 December 1989 the applicant’s son was killed by gunfire in Bucharest. 7. In 1990 the military prosecutor’s office opened several investigations into the December 1989 armed crackdown on the anti-communism demonstrations. A main criminal investigation concerning the use of violence against civilians in Bucharest and other cities was registered with the highest prosecutor’s office – the military prosecutors section − under no. 97/P/1990 (current number 11/P/2014). In the main criminal investigation the applicant raised civil claims and asked that the perpetrators of the offence of homicide committed against her son be identified and punished. 8. At the same time, another investigation concerning the offences of complicity in seriously aggravated homicide and complicity in attempted seriously aggravated homicide, committed against a large number of persons, including the applicant’s son, culminated in the committal for trial of public officials, members of the ruling political party, and their subsequent conviction by a final decision of the Supreme Court of Justice of 20 April 1992. 9. The relevant procedural steps taken in the main criminal investigation were described in the cases Association “21 December 1989” and Others (cited above, §§ 12-41) and Sidea and Others v. Romania ([Committee] no. 889/15, §§ 8-11, 5 June 2018). 10. On 14 October 2015 the military prosecutor’s office closed the main criminal investigation, finding that the applicant’s complaint regarding the offence of homicide committed against her son was statute-barred and that a complaint concerning instigation of homicide was a matter of res judicata following the Supreme Court of Justice’s decision of 20 April 1992 (see paragraph 8 above). 11. The decision of 14 October 2015 was subsequently annulled by a Prosecutor General’s decision of 5 April 2016, confirmed by the High Court of Cassation and Justice on 13 June 2016. On 1 November 2016 the military prosecutor ordered the opening of a criminal investigation in rem for the offence of crimes against humanity in respect of the same factual circumstances. 12. According to the information submitted by the parties, the main criminal investigation is still ongoing (see Bănuțoiu and Ștefoglu v. Romania [Committee], nos. 64752/13 and 54607/14, § 12, 3 July 2018).