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6. The applicants, all of whom are Moldovan citizens, live in the Republic of Moldova. They were born in 1961, 1946, 1939, 1946, 1946 and 1951 respectively. 7. In 1994 each applicant concluded a contract with ASITO (an insurance company incorporated in Moldova), according to the terms of which he or she paid an insurance premium in exchange for an annuity pension. The size of the monthly pensions varied between 200 Moldovan lei (MDL) and MDL 600 (between the equivalent of 45 United States dollars (USD) and USD 135 at the time). 8. On different dates between 1999 and 2001 ASITO stopped paying the pensions, in some cases, or refused to start paying them, in other cases, invoking a change in the interest rate of the National Bank of Moldova and calling for the termination of the contracts. 9. On unspecified dates in 2001, the applicants brought civil actions against ASITO, seeking the payment of the pension arrears to date and requiring the company to abide by the contracts of 1994. 10. All the applicants obtained final and enforceable judgments between 2001 and 2002, by which the domestic courts ordered ASITO to pay the pension arrears and to resume the execution of the contracts. The courts found the contracts to be valid and dismissed ASITO’s requests to terminate them or to exempt it from abiding by them on the ground of force majeure, which in ASITO’s view was constituted by the economic crisis, inflation and the change in the interest rate of the National Bank of Moldova. The Court was not presented with information on whether those judgments were complied with by ASITO. 11. On 14 December 2001 the Prosecutor General lodged an “appeal in the interest of the law” with the Supreme Court of Justice. According to the Prosecutor General, the appeal had the purpose of clarifying the controversy surrounding the contracts and of setting a uniform practice for all courts. 12. On 11 March 2002, the Plenary Supreme Court of Justice issued a judgment deciding the dispute between ASITO and the pension beneficiaries in favour of the former. In particular, it ruled that the economic crisis, inflation and the change in the interest rate of the National Bank of Moldova could be relied upon by ASITO in order unilaterally to avoid the annuity contracts. It also ruled that its judgment was binding on all the courts, although it could not, however, affect already existing judgments and it could not be used against the parties to proceedings which had already been decided. 13. Subsequently, on different dates, ASITO brought civil actions against the applicants asking for the termination of the contracts concluded in 1994. It relied on the same arguments as in the first sets of proceedings and also the judgment of the Plenary Supreme Court of 11 March 2002. 14. Between December 2002 and June 2003 ASITO obtained final favourable judgments against all the applicants. The courts dismissed the applicants’ submissions to the effect that the matter of the unilateral denunciation of the contracts by ASITO on grounds of hardship had already been resolved by final judgments and found instead that the subject matter of the proceedings which had ended in final judgments favourable to the applicants had been different, because those proceedings had been concerned with the enforcement of the annuity contracts up to the moment of their termination, while the subject matter of the new proceedings was the termination of the contracts. 15. On 25 October 2004, after the Court communicated the present cases to the Government, the Plenary Supreme Court of Justice upheld a revision request lodged against its judgment of 11 March 2002 by a group of ASITO pensioners who are not applicants in the present cases. The Supreme Court quashed its previous judgment while finding inter alia that ASITO could not rely on the economic crisis, inflation and the change in the interest rate of the National Bank of Moldova for avoiding its annuity contracts.

5. The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Taganrog, in the Rostov Region. 6. On 15 June 1998 a prosecutor opened a criminal investigation against the applicant. 7. On 18 December 1998 the applicant was arrested and allegedly beaten up by police officers. On 19 December 2002 the prosecutor refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers. 8. On 15 December 1999 she was released on bail. 9. On 14 March 2000 the Rostov Regional Court received the case file and commenced the trial against the applicant and four other persons. 10. On 13 June 2000 the Rostov Regional Court found the applicant guilty of fraud and extortion and conditionally sentenced her to five years' imprisonment. However, on 2 November 2000 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation quashed the judgment on appeal and remitted the case for a retrial. 11. On 14 May 2001 the Rostov Regional Court found the applicant guilty of fraud, extortion, robbery, kidnapping, and theft and sentenced her to seven and a half years' imprisonment. She was taken into custody from the courtroom. 12. On 16 January 2002 the Supreme Court quashed the judgment of 14 May 2001 on appeal and remitted the case for a retrial. The applicant was remanded in custody pending the determination of the criminal charges against her. 13. On 1 July 2002 the Rostov Regional Court extended the applicant's detention until 1 October 2002. It found as follows: “The defendants [the applicant and four other persons] are charged with kidnapping, illegal deprivation of liberty, burglary and other crimes. They have been in custody: ..., [the applicant] – since 18 December 1998, ... The Prosecutor requested that the defendants' detention be extended by 3 months. Having examined the Prosecutor's request, and having heard the parties to the proceedings, the court considers it necessary to extend the defendants' detention by 3 months, that is, until 1 October 2002 inclusive, because they are charged with serious and particularly serious criminal offences. Under Articles 255 and 256 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure, the defendants' detention on remand is extended by 3 (three) months, that is, from 1 July 2002 to 1 October 2002.” 14. On 6 November 2002 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the extension order, finding that it was sufficiently justified. 15. On 1 October and 31 December 2002 and 31 March, 26 June, 25 September and 15 December 2003 the Rostov Regional Court extended the applicant's detention until 1 January, 31 March, 30 June, 26 September, 25 December 2003 and 15 March 2004 respectively. The wording of the decisions was identical to that applied in the decision of 1 July 2002. 16. The applicant appealed against each of the above-mentioned extension orders to the Supreme Court, arguing that they were not sufficiently reasoned and that the court had not taken into consideration her individual situation. On 12 February, 14 May, 16 July, 16 October and 24 December 2003 and 31 March 2004 respectively, the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the above-mentioned decisions on appeal. 17. In the meantime, on 19 February 2004 the Rostov Regional Court extended the defendants' pre-trial detention until 19 May 2004, citing the gravity of the charges against them. The applicant appealed against the extension to the Supreme Court. 18. On 10 March 2005, that is, after the applicant's conviction by the Regional Court (see paragraph 20 below), the Supreme Court of Russia discontinued the examination of the applicant's appeal because she had been convicted by the Regional Court in the interim. 19. As regards the trial proceedings in the period from 27 February 2002 to 25 February 2004, the case was adjourned on over forty-two occasions: at the request of the applicant and her co-defendants, who wished to study the case file or the records of the hearings; at the requests of the applicant and her co-defendants for the replacement of their representatives and the need for their newly appointed representatives to study the case file; due to the illness of the defendants' representatives and their failure to appear before the court; and due to the illness of the applicant and co-defendants or following complaints made by them concerning their health. On one occasion the hearing was adjourned due to the failure of the authorities to transport the defendants to the courtroom. 20. On 17 May 2004 the Regional Court found the applicant guilty of multiple counts of fraud, multiple counts of kidnapping, extortion, theft and robbery and sentenced her to five years' imprisonment. 21. The applicant lodged an appeal. She claimed, in particular, that lay judges had sat on the bench unlawfully. The law had been changed and after 1 January 2004 lay judges were no longer permitted to take part in the administration of justice. 22. On 10 March 2005 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation held an appeal hearing. The Supreme Court dismissed her appeal as unsubstantiated. As to her allegations about the allegedly unlawful composition of the tribunal, the court found that the trial had begun before 1 January 2004 and that the participation of two lay judges in the determination of the criminal charges against her had been in accordance with the principle of continuity of the trial. 23. From 14 May 2001 to 17 May 2005 the applicant had been held in detention facility IZ-61/1 of Rostov-on-Don (Следственный Изолятор ИЗ-61/1 Главного управления Федеральной службы исполнения наказаний по Ростовской области). Throughout this period the applicant had been held in the following cells: (a) cell no. 181 measuring 25.5 square metres and designed to accommodate 7 detainees; (b) cell no. 184 measuring 36.8 square metres and designed to accommodate 10 detainees; (c) cell no. 186 measuring 24.8 square metres and designed to accommodate 7 detainees; (d) cell no. 191 measuring 34.6 square metres and designed to accommodate 9 detainees; and (e) cell no. 84 (punishment cell) measuring 6.5 square metres and designed for one person. (a) The Government's account 24. The design capacity of the cells had not been exceeded. 25. In each cell the applicant had an individual bed and had been provided with bedding (a mattress, a pillow, a blanket, two bed sheets and a pillowcase), personal hygiene items, tableware, potable water and cleaning supplies. 26. Each cell had two windows measuring 1.14 by 1.32 meters, which allowed sufficient access of daylight. The cells had been equipped with filament lamps (four lamps per regular cell, one lamp per punishment cell) and security lights. The level of artificial lighting had corresponded to established sanitary norms and had allowed the inmates to read and write. 27. All cells had been ventilated by a system of extractor fans. Natural ventilation through windows had also been available. 28. The applicant had received food of adequate quality and quantity in accordance with established legal norms. 29. In support of their observations the Government provided several certificates issued by the director of IZ-61/1 in November 2006 and photographs of the cells in which the applicant had been held. (b) The applicant's account 30. The cells in which the applicant had been held had always been overcrowded. They had accommodated up to twenty inmates at any given time. The inmates had slept in shifts. 31. The cells had been dimly lit by two filament lamps. Access to natural light had been limited because the windows had been heavily barred from both the inside and outside. It had been impossible to read or write in such light. The outside grids on the windows had not been removed until April 2003. 32. There had been no vents in the windows, and therefore, no access to fresh air. The air in the cells had always been stiff and heavy with smoke. Starting from April 2003 the window panes had been taken out in spring until late autumn. 33. Food had been scarce and of poor quality. The complaints raised by the applicant and other inmates in this regard had been to no avail. 34. The applicant had never been provided with any personal hygiene items. 35. The applicant claimed that the photographs of the cells in question provided by the Government had been taken after her departure from IZ‑61/1 and apparently after emergency repairs. 36. The Government submitted that the holding cells (конвойное помещение) of the Rostov Regional Court had been situated in the semi‑basement of the premises. The holding cells area had contained eight individual cells measuring four square metres and three collective cells measuring twenty square metres. The holding cells area had been equipped with one lavatory pan shared by the detainees and the wardens. All cells had been equipped with extractor fans. They had been illuminated with filament lamps. 37. The detainees had been provided with dry rations (сухой паек) when taken to the courthouse. They had received hot food in accordance with a schedule before their departure from, and after their return to, the detention facility. 38. The Government supported their submissions with certificates issued by the director of IZ‑61/1 on 26 November and 30 November 2006 and photographs of the holding cells area of the Rostov Regional Court (showing the corridor passage with barred doors and the bathroom unit). (b) The applicant's account 39. At the courthouse the applicant had been detained in a badly lit damp windowless cell measuring one square meter without ventilation or heating. The furnishing of the cell had consisted of a small bench. The walls in the cell had been coated with “shuba”, a sort of abrasive concrete lining. The cell had not been equipped with a lavatory or a wash basin. The applicant had been obliged to beg the wardens to take her to the lavatory. 40. On the days of court hearings, the applicant had been taken to the “assembly section” of the detention facility before breakfast, and on most occasions she had been taken back to the detention facility after dinnertime had already passed. She had never been given any dry rations to take with her to the courthouse, and she had never seen other detainees receive any. The applicant's relatives had not been allowed to supply her with food on the days of court hearings. 41. The applicant noted that the Government had not provided photographs of the cells of the court's holding cells area. 42. On 15 October 1998 the applicant authorised Mr A. to sell her flat. On 29 December 1998 Mr A. sold the applicant's flat. The transfer of title to the flat was subsequently registered by the regional registrar's office. 43. On 18 March 2003 the police refused to institute criminal proceedings against the registrar on suspicion of an allegedly fraudulent sale of the applicant's flat. The applicant was also informed of the right to contest the sale before a civil court.

5. The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Baku. 6. He was the Deputy Chairman of the Musavat Party. He also worked as a columnist for the Yeni Musavat newspaper. 7. On 23 January 2013 rioting broke out in the town of Ismayilli, located to the northwest of Baku. According to media reports quoting local residents, the rioting was sparked by an incident involving V.A., the son of the Minister for Labour and Social Protection and nephew of the Head of the Ismayilli District Executive Authority (“the IDEA”). It was claimed that after being involved in a car accident, V.A. had insulted and physically assaulted passengers travelling in the other car involved in the accident, who were local residents. On hearing of the incident, hundreds (perhaps thousands) of local residents took to the streets and destroyed a number of commercial establishments and other properties in Ismayilli thought to be owned by V.A.’s family. 8. On 24 January 2013 the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Prosecutor General’s Office issued a joint press statement, placing the blame for the rioting on E.S., a hotel manager, and his relative E.M., who had allegedly been drunk and who, it was claimed, had committed acts of hooliganism by damaging local residents’ property and inciting people to riot. 9. On 24 January 2013 the Yeni Musavat newspaper decided to send the applicant on a mission to Ismayilli to cover the events in question. A mission order (no. 28) was issued in this respect by the Yeni Musavat for the period from 24 to 25 January 2013. 10. On 24 January 2013 the applicant travelled to Ismayilli with three other persons. He arrived there in the afternoon. In the city centre he saw Ilgar Mammadov, the Chairman of the Republican Alternative Civic Movement (“REAL”), who was also visiting the town separately from the applicant. They stopped to greet each other and immediately went their separate ways. 11. Approximately twenty minutes after his arrival in the town, the applicant was arrested by the police and was taken to the local police station. In the police station the applicant was ordered to leave Ismayilli and was sent to Baku in his own car accompanied by a police car. 12. The Government did not submit any comment in respect of the applicant’s submissions. 13. On 29 January 2013 the Prosecutor General’s Office and the Ministry of Internal Affairs issued a further joint press statement concerning the events in Ismayilli. It stated that ten people had been charged with criminal offences in connection with the events of 23 January 2013 and they had been detained pending trial. In addition, fifty-two people had been arrested in connection with their participation in “actions causing a serious breach of public order”; some of them had been convicted of “administrative offences” and sentenced to a few days’ “administrative detention” or a fine, while others had been released. The statement further noted that “lately, biased and partial information has been deliberately disseminated, distorting the true nature of these events which were the result of hooliganism”, including information about the large numbers of injured people and the disappearance of one individual. The statement refuted that information, highlighting that only four people had been admitted to the regional hospital with injuries and that no one had disappeared. It further stated, inter alia, the following: “Following the carrying out of enquiries, it has been established that on 24 January 2013 the Deputy Chairman of the Musavat Party, Tofig Yagublu, and the co‑Chairman of the REAL Movement, Ilgar Mammadov, went to Ismayilli and made appeals to local residents with a view to engendering social and political destabilisation. These included calls to resist the police, not to obey officials and to block roads. Their illegal actions, which were calculated to inflame the situation in the country, will be fully and thoroughly investigated and receive legal assessment.” 14. On 1 February 2013 the applicant was questioned as a witness by an investigator at the Serious Crimes Department (“the SCD”) of the Prosecutor General’s Office in connection with the Ismayilli events. After the questioning ended, he left the premises of the SCD and returned home. Despite the Court’s explicit request to the Government to submit copies of all documents relating to the proceedings in question, the Government failed to provide the Court with a copy of the record of the questioning. 15. On 4 February 2013 the applicant was again questioned by the investigator. Moreover, according to the applicant, face-to-face confrontations were held between the applicant and two persons, R.N. and I.M., who attested that the applicant had incited protesters to throw stones at and to disobey the police. The applicant rejected the accusations against him submitting that they were false and fabricated. 16. Despite the Court’s explicit request to the Government to submit copies of all documents relating to the proceedings in question, the Government failed to provide the Court with a copy of the record of the questioning, or of the face-to-face confrontations between the applicant and R.N. and I.M. These confrontations were not mentioned in the official charges against the applicant (see paragraph 17 below) or in any other official document made available to the Court by the parties relating to the applicant’s pre-trial detention. 17. On the same day the applicant was charged with criminal offences under Articles 233 (organising or actively participating in actions causing a breach of public order) and 315.2 (resistance to or violence against public officials, posing a threat to their life or health) of the Criminal Code. The specific acts attributed to the applicant were described as follows in the investigator’s decision of 4 February 2013: “Beginning at around 3 p.m. on 24 January 2013, Yagublu Tofig Rashid oglu, having taken advantage of the fact that from around 9.30 p.m. on 23 January 2013 a group of persons in the town of Ismayilli had engaged in acts of malicious hooliganism causing a serious breach of public order, had deliberately burned, in a publicly dangerous manner, property belonging to various persons [including] the Chirag Hotel, four cars, five mopeds and scooters, and an auxiliary building located in the yard of a private residential house, and had committed acts of violence against Government officials, having, in his false way of thinking, considered [the above events] as a ‘rebellion’, aiming to make the above acts develop and acquire a continuous character in order to create artificial tension and to violate the social and political stability in the country, being a resident of Baku, arrived in Ismayilli and, together with Mammadov Ilgar Eldar oglu and with the active participation of others, [committed the following:] organised, as an active participant, acts causing a serious breach of public order, by means of openly and repeatedly inciting town residents [E.I.], [M.A.] and others, who had gathered at the square near the administrative building of the Regional Education Department located on the Nariman Narimanov Street opposite to the administrative building of [the IDEA], [to do the following:] [i] to enter in masses into the area in front of the building of [the IDEA], which is the competent body of the executive power of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and by doing so to create difficulties for the movement of traffic and pedestrians, [ii] to disobey the lawful demands to disperse, made by Government officials wanting to stop their illegal behaviour, [iii] to resist uniformed police officers protecting the public order, by way of committing violent acts posing danger to [police officers’] life and health, using various objects, [iv] to disrupt the normal functioning of [the IDEA], State enterprises, bodies and organisations, as well as public-catering, commercial and public-service facilities, by way of refusing to leave, for a long period of time, the areas where the acts seriously breaching the public order were being committed, and [v] to stop the movement of traffic, by way of blocking the central avenue and the Nariman Narimanov Street, and was finally able to achieve that, at around 5 p.m. of the same day in the town of Ismayilli, a group of persons consisting of [E.I.], [M.A.] and others had marched in masses from the mentioned square in the direction of the administrative building of [the IDEA] and had thrown stones at officers of the relevant bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs who were preventing [this march] in accordance with the requirements of the law. By these actions, Yagublu Tofig Rashid oglu committed the criminal offences under Articles 233 and 315.2 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan.” 18. On 4 February 2013 the prosecutor lodged a request with the Nasimi District Court asking for the application of the preventive measure of remand in custody (həbs qətimkan tədbiri) in respect of the applicant. Despite the Court’s explicit request to the Government to submit copies of all documents relating to the proceedings in question, the Government failed to provide the Court with a copy of the prosecutor’s request. 19. On the same day a hearing was held before the Nasimi District Court in the presence of the applicant, his lawyer, an investigator and a prosecutor. It appears from the court decision that at the hearing, to explain the necessity of pre-trial detention, the investigator and the prosecutor gave reasons such as the likelihood of the applicant absconding from and obstructing the investigation, and the nature of the criminal acts attributed to him. However, they did not refer to any evidence implicating the applicant in the events in Ismayilli. The applicant and his lawyer submitted that the accusation against the applicant was groundless and was not supported by any evidence. In particular, the applicant submitted that he had visited Ismayilli as a journalist to cover the events there and he had spent only thirty minutes in total in the town. He also stated that he had had no other link to the events in question. The applicant’s lawyer stated that there were no reasons to believe that the applicant would abscond from or interfere with the investigation. 20. By a decision of 4 February 2013, the Nasimi District Court ordered the applicant to be detained for a period of two months pending trial. The relevant part of the decision read as follows: “The materials collected in respect of the criminal investigation give rise to sufficient grounds to believe initially, in accordance with the principle of presumption, that Yagublu Tofig Rashid oglu committed the acts provided for in Articles 233 and 315.2 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan in force. Taking into account the character and degree of danger to the public of the criminal offences attributed to the accused, the fact that he is charged with a criminal offence qualified as less serious crime, as well as the existence of sufficient grounds to believe that, if released, he would abscond from the investigation and the court or influence other persons involved in the proceedings, the court considers that the request must be granted and the preventive measure of remand in custody must be applied in his respect.” 21. On an unspecified date the applicant appealed against this decision. He complained that there was no evidence that he had committed any criminal offence and there had been no justification for the application of the preventive measure of detention pending trial. 22. On 8 February 2013 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal, finding that the detention order was justified. In this connection the appellate court held that the first-instance court had correctly taken into account the fact that the applicant had been charged with a less serious criminal offence punishable by more than two years’ imprisonment, and the likelihood that if released he might abscond from the investigation and obstruct the normal functioning of the investigation. 23. The applicant’s arrest and the institution of criminal proceedings against him attracted significant public and media interest both inside the country and internationally. 24. Immediately after the applicant’s arrest, a number of domestic NGOs, as well as international NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, condemned the authorities’ actions, deeming the arrest to be “politically motivated persecution” on “trumped up” charges. 25. On 6 February 2013, Pedro Agramunt and Joseph Debono Grech, PACE Monitoring Committee co-rapporteurs on Azerbaijan, expressed their concern at the arrest of the applicant, noting that it “gave rise to justified doubts and legitimate concerns” and urging the authorities to release the applicant and Ilgar Mammadov. 26. On 8 February 2013, Thorbjørn Jagland, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, made the following official statement: “I am concerned by the recent events in Azerbaijan and the heavy-handed response of the police to the protests. I am particularly disturbed by the arrest on 4 February of Tofig Yagublu and Ilgar Mammadov, in relation to recent events in Ismayilli. Mr Mammadov is the Director of the Baku School of Political Studies, a close co‑operation partner of the Council of Europe. Today’s decision of the Baku Court of Appeal not to release these two men and its refusal to allow the Council of Europe’s representative to be present during the court proceedings is of particular gravity. I call on the authorities of Azerbaijan to respect the fundamental principles and legally-binding standards of the European Convention of Human Rights, which they have undertaken to uphold when joining the Council of Europe.” 27. On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a request with the Nasimi District Court asking to be put under house arrest in place of pre-trial detention. He claimed, in particular, that his detention had not been justified and that there was no reason for its continuation. In support of his request, the applicant pointed out that he had a permanent place of residence and that there was no risk of his absconding from or obstructing the investigation. 28. On 5 March 2013 the Nasimi District Court dismissed the request and found that the preventive measure should be left “unchanged”. The relevant part of the decision read: “Taking into account the character and degree of danger to the public of the criminal offences attributed to the accused, the court considers that it is not possible to attain the objective of the preventive measure without keeping the accused Yagublu Tofig Rashid oglu in detention and totally isolating him from society. For this reason, the request must be dismissed in accordance with Article 163 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Azerbaijan.” 29. On 14 March 2013 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the Nasimi District Court’s decision of 5 March 2013. 30. On an unspecified date the prosecutor lodged a request with the court asking for an extension of the applicant’s pre-trial detention by two months, noting that more time was needed to complete the investigation. Despite the Court’s explicit request to the Government to submit copies of all documents relating to the proceedings in question, the Government failed to provide the Court with a copy of the prosecutor’s request. 31. On 18 March 2013 the Nasimi District Court examined the prosecutor’s request for the extension of the applicant’s detention period. At the hearing, the applicant and his lawyer asked the judge to dismiss the prosecutor’s request, submitting that the applicant had not committed any criminal offence and had no link to the events in Ismayilli. The applicant’s lawyer also submitted that the applicant had always cooperated with the investigation, that there was no risk of his absconding, and that the investigation had failed to justify his continued detention. On the same date the judge extended the applicant’s detention pending trial by two months, until 6 June 2013. He substantiated the necessity of the extension of the applicant’s detention as follows: “Taking into account that the pre-trial detention period of Tofig Yagublu ends on 4 April 2013 and that it is not possible to carry out the investigative steps indicated in the request during the remaining period of time, as well as the existence of sufficient grounds to believe that, if released, he would abscond from the investigation and thus fail to comply with requests to meet with investigators without any good reason, and disrupt the normal course of the investigation by unlawfully influencing persons involved in the proceedings and having regard to the character of the acts attributed to him, the court considers that the detention period of Tofig Yagublu must be extended for a period of two months, namely until 4 June 2013.” 32. On an unspecified date the applicant appealed against this decision, claiming that the extension of his detention was unlawful. He noted, in particular, that there was no evidence that he had committed any criminal offence, that the investigating authorities had not taken any investigative steps, and that the first-instance court had not taken into account his family situation, place of residence or other personal circumstances when it had extended his detention. 33. On 29 March 2013 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The appellate court made no mention of the applicant’s specific complaints. 34. It appears from the case file that on 25 April 2013 the applicant was charged with new criminal offences under Articles 220.1 (mass disorder) and 315.2 (resistance to or violence against public officials, posing a threat to their life or health) of the Criminal Code. In essence, the charge under Article 220.1, which carried a much heavier sentence (four to twelve years’ imprisonment), replaced the previous charge under Article 233. The investigator’s decision in this respect was not made available to the Court by the Government. 35. One of the effects of the new charge under Article 220.1 of the Criminal Code was that the applicant could no longer apply for bail, because the law did not permit individuals accused of deliberately committing “serious crimes” to be released on bail. Moreover, as a person charged with a serious crime, the applicant’s pre-trial detention could now be extended for a longer period overall. 36. It appears from the case file that on 15 May 2013 the Nasimi District Court decided to extend the applicant’s detention period for a further three months. The Government did not provide the Court with a copy of the Nasimi District Court’s decision of 15 May 2013. 37. On 21 May 2013 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the Nasimi District Court’s decision of 15 May 2013. The relevant part of the appellate court’s decision read as follows: “Relying on the above mentioned, the panel of the court considers that the first‑instance court took into account: the fact that the grounds for the detention of Yagublu Tofiq Rashid oglu are still valid; that a number of investigative steps still needed to be taken for the completion of the investigation; the complexity of the criminal case; the gravity of the criminal offence committed by the accused; and the existence of sufficient grounds to believe that, if released, he would abscond from the investigation. [The first-instance court] reached a correct, lawful and justified conclusion concerning the necessity of the extension of the detention period of Yagublu Tofig Rashid oglu.” 38. On 13 August 2013 the Nasimi District Court extended the applicant’s detention for a period of three months, that is to say until 4 December 2013. It appears from the decision that the applicant and his lawyer stated before the court that the applicant had not played any role in the events of Ismayilli and had not committed any criminal offence. They further submitted that the applicant had always cooperated with the investigation and that there was no risk of his absconding. The relevant part of the decision of 13 August 2013 read as follows: “Taking into account that the pre-trial detention period of Tofig Yagublu ends on 4 September 2013, that numerous persons were involved in the proceedings the size of the case file, the complexity of the criminal case, the necessity of carrying out the investigative steps indicated in the request and that sufficient time was needed to do so, and that it is not possible to carry out these steps indicated in the request during the remaining period of time, as well as the existence of sufficient grounds to believe that, if released, he would abscond from the investigation and fail to answer calls to meet with investigators without any good reason, and disrupt the normal course of the investigation by unlawfully influencing persons involved in the proceedings, and the nature of the act attributed to him, the court considers that the detention of Tofig Yagublu must be extended for a period of three months, that is to say until 4 December 2013.” 39. On an unspecified date the applicant appealed against this decision reiterating his previous complaints. 40. On 22 August 2013 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The appellate court’s reasoning was essentially the same as in the previous extension decisions. 41. No further extension decisions were included in the case file. 42. The applicant’s criminal trial began in November 2013. On 17 March 2014 the Shaki Serious Crimes Court convicted the applicant and sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment. 43. On 24 September 2014 the Shaki Court of Appeal upheld the applicant’s conviction. 44. The applicant’s cassation appeal is pending before the Supreme Court.

7. The applicant was born in 1944 and lives in the village of Goyty in Urus-Martan District in the Chechen Republic. 8. The applicant is the mother of Mr Khanpasha Lechayevich Dzhabrailov, born in 1976. At the material time the applicant, Mr Khanpasha Dzhabrailov, his wife and their three children lived at 24 Shamov Street, Goyty village. 9. The account below is based on eyewitness statements of the applicant and her daughter, Ms Raisa Dzhabrailova. 10. According to the applicant, the village of Goyty was under the federal forces’ control from December 1999. The road leading to and from the village was blocked by federal checkpoints. 11. On 10 April 2003 at around 4 a.m. a khaki UAZ vehicle, a grey UAZ off-road vehicle («таблетка») and a grey bus with a blue stripe arrived at the Dzhabrailovs’ house. Around twenty armed men in masks and camouflage uniforms got out of the vehicles; the applicant believed that they belonged to the Russian military because they spoke unaccented Russian and could move freely around the village during the curfew. 12. Around ten servicemen entered the house, woke the Dzhabrailovs and, threatening them with their machine guns, forced them to the floor. Then they seized Mr Khanpasha Dzhabrailov’s badge of an employee of a local human rights NGO, grabbed the young man and dragged him to the door. When the applicant and her daughter-in-law asked them where they intended to take Mr Khanpasha Dzhabrailov, the servicemen gave no clear answer but shouted at the women, using mostly swear words. They then blindfolded Mr Khanpasha Dzhabrailov and took him away. 13. Ms Raisa Dhzbrailova followed the servicemen and saw them put Mr Khanpasha Dzabrailov into the bus and leave in the direction of Urus‑Martan. (b) The Government’s account of events 14. According to the Government, on 10 April 2003 at about 4 a.m. a group of at least ten unidentified persons in masks and camouflage uniforms armed with automatic firearms entered the house at 24 Shamov Street in Goyty village, abducted Mr Khanpasha Dzhabrailov and took him away to an unknown destination. 15. On 11 April 2003 the applicant complained in writing about her son’s abduction to the military commander’s office of the Urus-Martan District. 16. On 27 April 2003 the prosecutor’s office of the Urus-Martan District (“the district prosecutor’s office”) instituted an investigation into Mr Khanpasha Dzhabrailov’s disappearance under Article 126 § 2 of the Russian Criminal Code (aggravated kidnapping). The case file was given the number 34051. 17. On 30 April 2003 the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic (“the republican prosecutor’s office”) forwarded the applicant’s complaint about her son’s disappearance to the district prosecutor’s office. 18. On 27 June 2003 the district prosecutor’s office stayed the investigation for failure to identify those responsible. 19. On 10 June (or September) 2003 the military commander’s office of Urus-Martan District informed the applicant in reply to her complaint of 11 April 2003 (see paragraph 15 above) that they had carried out an internal inquiry which had not established Mr Khanpasha Dzhabrailov’s whereabouts or the identities of those who had abducted him. They also assured the applicant that they would continue searching for her son. 20. On 10 September 2003 the district prosecutor’s office informed the applicant that they had stayed the investigation in case no. 34051 on 27 June 2003 and advised her that she had the opportunity to appeal against that decision. 21. On 30 September 2003 the department of the interior of Urus-Martan District informed the applicant that since 27 May 2003 they had been carrying out search activities in relation to the kidnapping of Mr Khanpasha Dzhabrailov. 22. On 9 December 2003 the republican prosecutor’s office forwarded the applicant’s complaint about her son’s kidnapping to the district prosecutor’s office and ordered them to update her on the outcome of the investigation. On 17 December 2003 the district prosecutor’s office replied, without specifying the date, that the investigation into Mr Khanpasha Dzhabrailov’s kidnapping had been stayed. 23. On 28 January 2004 the district prosecutor’s office informed the applicant that the investigation in case no. 34051 had been suspended and invited her to provide the investigators with any new pieces of relevant information that she might obtain. 24. On 12 July 2004 the republican prosecutor’s office informed the applicant that investigative measures were being taken to resolve Mr Khanpasha Dzhabrailov’s kidnapping. 25. In a letter of 22 September 2005 the district prosecutor’s office informed the applicant’s daughter, Ms R. Dzhabrailova, that operational and search activity was under way in criminal case no. 34051 and that she would be notified if any important information emerged. 26. On 15 December 2005 the republican prosecutor’s office forwarded Ms R. Dzhabrailova’s complaint to the district prosecutor’s office with a request for more activity in the investigation, for all necessary measures to be taken to establish the whereabouts of the missing person and for Ms R. Dhzabrailova to be informed of the results of the examination of her complaint. 27. In a letter of 2 January 2006 the district prosecutor’s office informed the applicant’s daughter that operational and search activity was under way in criminal case no. 34051 opened on 27 April 2003, that during the preliminary investigation the authorities had taken the steps it was possible to take in the absence of the culprits, and that she would be notified if any important information emerged. 28. In a letter of 14 March 2008 the investigator in charge informed Mr L. Dzhabrailov that the investigation in case no. 34051 had been stayed on 4 March 2008 and that it was open to him to challenge this decision in accordance with Articles 124 and 125 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure. The letter did not specify the ground on which the investigation had been suspended. 29. According to the applicant, at some point she and her daughter spoke to an official of the district prosecutor’s office, who had allegedly said to them that Mr Khanpasha Dzhabrailov had confessed that he had been a participant in illegal armed groups. In the Government’s submission, in the criminal investigation file there was a police report, rather than Mr Khanpasha Dzhabrailov’s confession, stating that the applicant’s son had been a member of illegal armed groups and participated in operations under command of Salman Raduyev, one of the Chechen field commanders. According to the Government, however, this information had not been confirmed during the investigation. 30. In the applicant’s submission, since the beginning of 2008 the investigating authorities had visited her house on three occasions and questioned ten witnesses, all of whom had confirmed that Mr Khanpasha Dzhabrailov had been a law-abiding person and had had no enemies. 31. According to the Government, the investigation was repeatedly suspended owing to failure to establish those responsible and then reopened pursuant to supervising prosecutors’ orders, but had been unable to date to identify the alleged perpetrators. 32. In the Government’s submission, in course of the investigation the investigating authorities questioned the applicant as well as Mr L. Dzhabrailov and Ms R. Dhzabrailova, who confirmed the circumstances of the incident of 10 April 2003. In particular, the applicant had stated, as alleged by the Government, that on the date in question ten unidentified armed people in masks and camouflage uniforms had arrived at the Dzhabrailovs’ address in a grey UAZ off-road vehicle, a UAZ vehicle and a Gazel minibus, put Mr Khanpasha Dzhabrailov in the UAZ off-road vehicle and taken him away. According to the applicant, the other witnesses gave similar oral evidence. 33. According to the Government, the status of victim was granted to Ms Ya. Dhzbrailova – Mr Khanpasha Dzhabrailov’s wife – on 26 May 2003, and then to Mr L. Dzhabrailov on 15 June 2004. It does not appear that the applicant has ever been declared a victim in the case. 34. The Government also submitted that the investigating authorities sent enquiries to law-enforcement bodies in the Chechen Republic and further in the Northern Caucasus. According to the replies received by the investigators, no criminal proceedings had ever been brought against Mr Khanpasha Dzhabrailov, he had not been arrested by any of those law‑enforcement agencies, nor kept in any detention centres, there was no information as to whether he had participated in illegal armed groups, he had not been found among unidentified corpses and had never applied for assistance to any medical institutions. The replies also stated that the federal forces had not conducted any special operation in the Urus-Martan District on 10 April 2003, and that Mr Khanpasha Dzhabrailov’s whereabouts could not be established despite steps taken to find him. 35. In the Government’s submission, at present investigative actions are being taken aiming at resolving the crime and punishing those responsible. 36. On 26 January 2004 the applicant complained to Urus-Martan Town Court that the investigators were taking no action in case no. 34051. She also requested that she be admitted to the proceedings as a victim and a civil party and be allowed access to the investigation file. It is unclear whether Urus-Martan Town Court replied to that complaint. 37. On 22 March 2004 the applicant complained to the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic that the investigation was ineffective and requested that she be admitted to the proceedings as a victim and a civil party and be allowed access to the investigation file. 38. On 12 May 2004 the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic forwarded the applicant’s complaint to the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic to be examined in compliance with the subject matter jurisdiction rules. 39. It is unclear whether the applicant’s complaints have been examined by domestic courts. 40. In September 2007, when the application was communicated to them, the Government were invited to produce a copy of the investigation file in criminal case no. 34051 opened in connection with the abduction of the applicant’s son. The Government refused to submit any documents from the file, stating that under Article 161 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure disclosure of the documents was contrary to the interests of the investigation and could entail a breach of the rights of the participants in the criminal proceedings. They also submitted that they had taken into account the possibility of requesting confidentiality under Rule 33 of the Rules of Court, but noted that the Court provided no guarantees that once in receipt of the investigation file the applicant or her representatives would not disclose these materials to the public. According to the Government, in the absence of any sanctions in respect of the applicant for the disclosure of confidential information and materials, there were no guarantees concerning compliance by the applicant with the Convention and the Rules of Court. 41. In December 2007 the Court reiterated its request. In reply, the Government again refused to produce any documents from the file for the aforementioned reasons. At the same time, they suggested that a Court delegation could be given access to the file in Russia, with the exception of those documents containing military and State secrets, and without the right to make copies of the case file.

4. The applicant was born in 1937 and lives in Trnava. 5. On 30 June 1993 the applicant brought a civil action against his neighbour, Mr P., in the Trenčín District Court (Okresný súd). He maintained that in 1991 P., with his truck, had damaged the applicant’s fence. He sought damages and an order that P. repair the fence and refrain from using the road adjacent to it. 6. As his submissions were unclear, the applicant was summoned four times for an informative interview; invited to state his claims in accordance with the applicable procedural requirements; and requested to pay the court fee. In response, the applicant twice restated his action and paid the court fee on 25 August, 25 October and 16 November 1993, respectively. 7. The hearing held on 16 December 1993 was adjourned with a view to obtaining an expert report concerning the damage. The report was filed on 18 April 1994. 8. Another hearing was called for 13 May 1994 but it had to be adjourned as the applicant did not appear. 9. On 30 May 1994 the applicant and P. reached a friendly settlement of the case before the District Court in which P. agreed to repair the fence. 10. On 30 May 1994, by a separate decision, the District Court ruled on the fee to be paid to the expert for his report. On 15 December 1994 the Bratislava Regional Court (Krajský súd) upheld this decision on the applicant’s appeal. 11. On 12 January 1995 the applicant lodged a petition with the District Court for the judicial enforcement of the settlement, arguing that the way in which P. had repaired the fence did not comply with the settlement. 12. On 10 August 2000 the District Court dismissed the petition, finding that P. had repaired the fence properly. 13. On 30 November 2001, on the applicant’s appeal, the Trenčín Regional Court quashed the decision of 10 August 2000 and remitted the matter to the District Court for re-examination. It found that the District Court had failed to establish the relevant facts adequately and that the evidence before it was not sufficient to justify the conclusion it had drawn. 14. On 9 December 2003 the District Court appointed a construction expert to inspect the site and assess whether or not there had been compliance with the settlement. The expert filed his report on 27 January 2004. 15. On 29 January 2004, by three separate decisions, the District Court again dismissed the applicant’s petition for judicial enforcement of the settlement; ruled that the applicant did not qualify for an exemption from the obligation to pay the court fee; and determined the amount of the fee to be paid by the State to the expert for his report. As to the merits, on the basis of the expert report the District Court concluded that P. had fulfilled his undertakings and that there was no cause for enforcement. 16. On 19 February 2004 the applicant challenged the above mentioned decisions of 29 January 2004 by three separate appeals. As to the merits, he argued that the netting used by P. was not the same as the original, and that P. had failed to paint it. 17. On 30 June 2004 the Regional Court upheld all three decisions of 29 January 2004 fully endorsing the factual findings and conclusions of the District Court. 18. The applicant challenged the length of the proceedings in the above matter by a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution to the Constitutional Court (Ústavný súd). In the text of the complaint, the applicant impugned the whole length of the proceedings. However, in the object of the complaint, as expressed in a standardised and prescribed form, the applicant formally challenged the enforcement phase of the proceedings only and claimed 200,000 Slovakian korunas[1] (SKK) in compensation for his non‑pecuniary damage. 19. On 14 January 2004 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint admissible and granted the applicant free legal aid. 20. On 29 April 2004 the Constitutional Court found that, in the enforcement proceedings, the District Court had violated the applicant’s right under Article 48 § 2 of the Constitution to a hearing “without unjustified delay”, and his right under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention to a hearing “within a reasonable time”. It further awarded the applicant SKK 15,000[2] by way of just satisfaction in respect of his non‑pecuniary damage and ordered the reimbursement of his legal costs. The Constitutional Court found no justification for the total length of the proceedings in the complexity of the case or the conduct of the parties. Moreover, it found that the District Court had been inactive without any justification from 12 January 1996 to 25 June 1997, from 20 August 1997 to 24 September 1999, and from 18 March 2002 to 9 December 2003, a total of 5 years and 2 months.

5. The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Jedwabno. In 1996 he lost both his forearms in an accident. He is certified as having a first-degree disability, requiring the assistance of another person. 6. On 17 June 2002 the applicant, who was a suspect in criminal proceedings, was summoned by the police to present himself, two days later, at the Szczytno District Police Headquarters (Powiatowa Komeda Policji). 7. On 19 June 2002 the Szczytno District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) remanded the applicant in custody on suspicion of having committed a number of offences against a minor and of having coerced a person into committing perjury. 8. The domestic court justified the applicant’s pre‑trial detention by the existence of strong evidence against him, the likelihood that a severe penalty would be imposed and by the need to secure the proper course of the proceedings. On the latter point, it emphasised that the applicant, who had remained at large for some time after the start of the investigation, had attempted to coerce witnesses into giving false testimony in the case. The authorities took into consideration the applicant’s disability and a medical certificate issued by his doctor on 15 March 2002, which stated that the applicant was not able to live independently. 9. On 1 July 2002 the Szczytno District Prosecutor (Prokurator Rejonowy) dismissed the applicant’s request for the pre‑trial detention order to be lifted. The prosecutor reiterated the reasons for the applicant’s pre‑trial detention as they had been presented by the Szczytno District Court. Moreover, it was noted that the applicant had been detained for four months in the past in Szczytno Remand Centre, in connection with another criminal case against him. The Szczytno Remand Centre had never informed the authorities of any obstacles to providing the applicant with adequate care and conditions during his detention. In case of medical necessity the authorities were prepared to transfer the applicant to a remand centre hospital, where he would be able to obtain specialist medical treatment. It was pointed out that the testimony of the applicant’s mother, who had submitted that the applicant was unable to live independently, had been contradicted by the statements of other witnesses who had described the applicant as being completely independent. 10. On 12 July 2002 the Olsztyn Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) upheld the decision to keep the applicant in pre‑trial detention. 11. On 29 July 2002 the Szczytno District Prosecutor dismissed a request by the applicant for pre‑trial detention to be replaced with a different preventive measure. 12. On 30 August 2002 the applicant was indicted on numerous counts of extortion of money from a minor and other related offences. 13. His pre‑trial detention was extended by decisions of the Szczytno District Court of 5 August, 6 September and 31 October 2002. The last two decisions were upheld by the Olsztyn Regional Court on 27 September and 22 November 2002 respectively. The domestic courts reiterated that there was strong evidence against the applicant and a likelihood that a severe penalty would be imposed, and referred again to the need to secure the proper course of the proceedings. Additionally, it was noted that the authorities needed more time to hear the witnesses for the defence and to complete other investigative steps. 14. In the meantime, on 1 July and 25 October 2002, the Olsztyn Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s requests to have the measure in question lifted for humanitarian reasons. 15. The first hearing was held on 10 October 2002. 16. On 31 October 2002 the Szczytno District Court convicted the applicant of several of the charges and sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment. 17. On 17 January 2003 the Olsztyn Regional Court decided to extend the applicant’s detention while his criminal case was pending on appeal. 18. On 24 January 2003 the same court refused to lift the measure because the applicant had been convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment by the first‑instance court. In addition, the court relied on the assessment that, despite the applicant’s disability, his detention did not put his life or health at any risk. 19. On 31 January 2003 the Olsztyn Regional Court upheld its own decision of 17 January 2003. 20. On 19 February 2003 the Olsztyn Regional Court upheld the first‑instance judgment in the main part, changing the legal classification of one of the offences of which the applicant had been convicted by the first‑instance court. The judgment was served on the applicant on 26 May 2003. 21. No cassation appeal was lodged in the case. 22. Throughout the proceedings the applicant was represented by a lawyer of his choice. 23. From 19 June 2002 until 5 March 2003 the applicant was detained in Szczytno Remand Centre. From 5 until 28 March 2003 he was committed to Olsztyn Remand Centre. From 28 March until 7 July 2003 he was again detained in Szczytno Remand Centre. 24. On 7 July 2003 the applicant was granted leave from serving his sentence (przerwa w odbywaniu kary) to seek orthopaedic care outside the penitentiary system. 25. After his leave came to an end, the applicant was held in Szczytno and Olsztyn Remand Centres alternately. He was detained in the former facility from 13 July 2004 until 15 February 2005, from 9 until 17 August 2005 and from 25 April until 21 October 2006. He was detained in the latter facility from 15 February until 9 August 2005 and from 17 August 2005 until 25 April 2006. 26. On 21 October 2006 the applicant was granted parole (warunkowe zwolnienie) and is currently at liberty. 2. The description of the conditions of the applicant’s detention and procedure for obtaining arm prostheses (a) From 19 June 2002 until 7 July 2003- without prostheses 27. In Szczytno Remand Centre (from 19 June 2002 until 5 March 2003 and from 28 March until 7 July 2003) the applicant was held in various multi-occupancy cells in the general wing. 28. The applicant claimed that the conditions in Szczytno Remand Centre had not been adapted to his specific needs. He asserted that, despite his disability, the remand centre staff had not provided him with any special care. That had made his life in detention very difficult. The applicant had not been able to carry out many of his daily or routine tasks, such as serving his meals, making his bed, cutting his toenails, washing, shaving and getting dressed, and cleaning himself after going to the bathroom. He had had to seek help from his fellow inmates, which had put him in a position of dependency. 29. The Government submitted that during his detention the applicant had been self-sufficient. He had his meals, got dressed, made his bed and read newspapers without the aid of another person. Occasionally, in very minor tasks such as making sandwiches, he received help from his fellow inmates. 30. In their submission, the applicant was under the special care of the remand centre’s administration. He was released from the duty to clean his cell and benefited from various privileges, such as longer family visits, the right to receive additional food parcels and to take a shower six times per week. As a reward for winning various prison competitions, the applicant was granted unsupervised leave from the remand centre five times. Three of these periods of leave lasted a few days. The applicant was also under the supervision of the prison psychologist, whom he consulted eleven times. 31. Prior to the applicant’s detention, on 15 March 2002 an orthopaedist of the Olsztyn Regional Specialised Hospital (Wojewódzki Szpital Specjalistyczny) issued a medical certificate (zaświadczenie lekarskie), stating that the applicant was not fit for self-sufficient existence and detention in a prison. 32. On 19 August 2002 the Head of the Medical Establishment at Szczytno Remand Centre (Zakład Opieki Zdrowotnej) issued a memorandum to the Governor (Dyrektor) of Szczytno Remand Centre, in which he stated that there was no medical reason to transfer the applicant to a specialist facility since his health was good. It was noted that the assistance which the applicant required was not of a medical nature but, rather, related to his physical inability to carry out his daily tasks independently. 33. In a letter of 3 September 2002 the remand centre governor informed the applicant that his complaints about the conditions of his pre‑trial detention had been considered ill‑founded. It was noted that the remand centre doctor had not found any medical reasons to justify the applicant’s transfer to another place of detention or his release. Furthermore it was stated that the applicant was independent in his daily routines in the remand centre. He could dress himself, make his bed, eat, and read newspapers without anyone’s assistance. In other daily tasks the applicant received help from his inmates. 34. On 13 October 2002 the applicant was informed by an official of a local self‑government organisation, who visited him in the remand centre, about the procedure for renewing his application for prostheses. 35. The same day, the Szczytno Remand Centre’s in-house doctor made an official application for prostheses on the applicant’s behalf. 36. On 23 January 2003 the State-run Sick Fund (Kasa Chorych) approved a full reimbursement of the cost of basic mechanical prostheses (protezy mechaniczne), which was PLN 3,600 (approximately EUR 860). The prostheses were to be made by the Orthopaedic Equipment Establishment (Zakład Sprzętu Ortopedycznego) in Olsztyn. 37. By a letter of 28 February 2003 the Director of the Olsztyn Regional Prison Service (Dyrektor Okręgowy Służby Więziennej) replied to allegations that the Szczytno Remand Centre had not supported the applicant in his efforts to obtain forearm prostheses and that the medical care provided during his detention had been inadequate. It was observed that, prior to the applicant’s detention, in July 2001 the Sick Fund had approved the applicant’s request to obtain forearm prostheses free of charge. However, the grant could not be executed due to a shortage of funds. On 15 March 2002 the State Sick Fund extended the validity of its prostheses approval until 30 September 2002. On 13 October 2002 the applicant was informed by an official of a local self‑government organisation, who visited him in the remand centre, about the procedure for renewing his application for prostheses. Despite this, the applicant did not proceed with his application for four months. Finally, thanks to the remand centre’s assistance, on 23 January 2003 the State Sick Fund approved a full reimbursement of the cost of the prostheses. The applicant was scheduled to be transferred to Olsztyn Remand Centre in order to have the prostheses made in a local orthopaedic centre. It was concluded that the applicant’s detention did not put his life or health at any risk and that, having had his forearms amputated six years previously, he was now perfectly independent in carrying out his daily routines in detention. 38. On 5 March 2003 the applicant was transferred to Olsztyn Remand Centre in order to have the prostheses made. The basic prostheses offered, however, did not suit the applicant. He declared that he would only accept bio-mechanical (kinetic) prostheses (protezy biomechaniczne). That type of prostheses were not made in Olsztyn but by the Independent Public Establishment for Orthopaedic Supplies (Samodzielny Publiczny Zakład Zaopatrzenia Ortopedycznego) in Poznań. 39. On 28 March 2003 the applicant was transferred back to Szczytno Remand Centre. An application for bio-mechanical prostheses was made by the prison authorities on his behalf. 40. On 7 May 2003 the Szczytno District Court found that the applicant’s detention in Szczytno Remand Centre did not put his life or health in danger but created only minor difficulties for him. 41. The total cost of the applicant’s bio-mechanical prostheses was estimated at 50,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) (approximately EUR 12,000). On an unspecified date the applicant was informed that a refund of PLN 3,600 (approximately EUR 860) could be granted by the National Health Fund (Narodowy Fundusz Zdrowia). Under the applicable law every patient seeking to obtain bio-mechanical prosthesis had to pay the difference from his or her own budget. 42. On 12 May 2003 the Olsztyn Regional Court ruled that the applicant be transferred to Poznań Remand Centre, where he could have fittings for his bio-mechanical prostheses, provided that he undertook to pay the non‑refundable portion of the price. In the Government’s submission, the applicant did not agree to that. 43. On 29 May 2003 a psychiatrist at Szczytno Remand Centre diagnosed the applicant with a form of depression which in his opinion could be attributed to the applicant’s fear of not being able to obtain forearm prostheses. It was noted that the applicant had twice attempted to commit suicide when he had been held in a correction centre when he was a minor. The doctor did not make any recommendation as to the conditions of the applicant’s detention or his treatment. 44. A copy of the applicant’s medical records reveals that during this part of his detention, he was consulted by various specialists on approximately twelve occasions. 45. On 7 July 2003 the applicant was granted a six‑month period of leave from serving his sentence to seek orthopaedic care outside the penitentiary system. The domestic court observed that, even though the applicant’s disability did not make him, strictly speaking, unfit for detention, it was nevertheless making it more difficult for him, especially without prostheses. The leave was subsequently extended until 7 July 2004. (b) From 13 July 2004 until 21 October 2006 – with prostheses 46. While at liberty, presumably in March 2004, the applicant obtained two basic mechanical forearm prostheses and underwent the necessary physiotherapy (rehabilitation). 47. On 18 March 2004 the applicant obtained a medical certificate from a private medical clinic, stating that he had recently received new prostheses and urgently required physiotherapy. It was further noted that the applicant was not self-sufficient and required the aid of third persons, and that he could not be detained in prison. 48. On 7 July 2004 the applicant’s leave came to an end but he failed to return to prison. On 13 July 2004 he was arrested and committed to Szczytno Remand Centre to serve the rest of his prison sentence. 49. The applicant was detained in Szczytno Remand Centre from 13 July 2004 until 15 February 2005, from 9 until 17 August 2005 and from 25 April until 21 October 2006. He was also detained in Olsztyn Remand Centre from 15 February until 9 August 2005 and from 17 August 2005 until 25 April 2006. 50. By letter of 25 November 2004 the director of a rehabilitation centre in Szczytno (Ponadlokalne Centrum Rehabilitacyjno-Edukacyjne dla Dzieci i Młodzieży Niepełnosprawnej) provided the applicant with the following information. According to the results of the medical consultation of 10 November 2004 and the opinion of a specialist in rehabilitation, the applicant did not require any further rehabilitation or training in using his arm prostheses. With his basic mechanical prostheses, the applicant could carry out simple daily tasks such as eating and brushing his teeth. Those prostheses, however, did not allow for high precision movements, such as those necessary for washing, putting on smaller items of clothing, shaving or going to the bathroom. 51. On 26 November 2004 the Governor of Szczytno Remand Centre applied to the Szczytno District Court for permission to transfer the applicant to a detention facility near Poznań in order to enable him to undergo further physiotherapy. On 30 November 2004 the request was rejected by the Szczytno District Court on the ground that the applicant’s presence was necessary in Szczytno, where new criminal proceedings were pending against him. 52. On 17 January 2005 the Szczytno Remand Centre governor informed the applicant, in reply to the latter’s query, that during his detention “adequate help was secured [to him] by the remand centre administration through the applicant’s inmates”. It was also noted that the applicant had refused to work with a physiotherapist whose presence at the remand centre had been arranged by the administration. 53. On 7 and 20 April 2005 an in‑house doctor at Olsztyn Remand Centre issued two medical certificates stating that the applicant could not receive adequate care and treatment in prison because of the nature of his disability. 54. On 25 April 2005 the Szczytno District Court asked for an expert medical report to verify whether or not the applicant was fit to be kept in prison. 55. On 21 June 2005 two experts, in cardiology and orthopaedics respectively, issued a report, stating that although the applicant found his prostheses helpful, he still needed the assistance of others in many of his daily activities, as his mechanical prostheses did not allow him to make any precise movements. It was noted that the applicant had expressed a wish to obtain more advanced bio‑mechanical prostheses, which were available from the Orthopaedic and Rehabilitation Equipment Establishment in Poznań. In addition, the applicant was diagnosed with hypertension. Nevertheless, the experts concluded that the applicant had adapted well to his disability and that his overall health was good which, in turn, made him fit to continue his detention. On the other hand, it was pointed out that some assistance should be provided to the applicant in his daily routines by the remand centre staff. 56. On 8 November 2005 the Head of the Healthcare Establishment (Kierownik Zakładu Opieki Zdrowotnej) of Olsztyn Remand Centre informed the applicant of the following: the applicant’s disability did not require any medical treatment; his other ailments could be treated within the prison healthcare system; bio-mechanical prostheses were not refunded by the National Health Fund; and lastly, according to the applicable law, a person with a first-degree disability required the assistance of another person in his or her daily existence. Such assistance could not be provided to the applicant in the remand centre. Nevertheless, as stated in the expert opinion of 21 June 2005 (see paragraph 49 above), the applicant was fit for detention because he was well-adjusted to his disability. 57. The applicant provided the Court with a document dated 23 December 2005 in which the Deputy Governor of Olsztyn Remand Centre stated that the applicant had been detained in a four-person cell in wing A, which was not adapted for special needs prisoners. It was also noted that Olsztyn Remand Centre as such did not possess any cells in which special arrangements had been made to accommodate the needs of physically disabled persons. 58. The Government submitted that in Olsztyn Remand Centre the applicant had been committed to a wing in which cells had been kept open almost all day long. Other than that, the conditions of the applicant’s detention there were similar to those in Szczytno Remand Centre. 59. A copy of the applicant’s medical records reveals that during this part of his detention, he was consulted by various specialists on approximately sixty occasions. 60. The applicant lodged numerous complaints with the administration of Szczytno Remand Centre, domestic courts and penitentiary authorities, arguing that he should not be detained due to his disability or, alternatively, that he should be offered special care. In addition, he complained about the difficulties he had had in obtaining forearm prostheses (see paragraphs 28, 29, 32 and 35 above). 61. On 13 October 2003 the Szczytno District Prosecutor (Prokurator Rejonowy) discontinued an inquiry into the applicant’s allegations that between 19 June 2002 and 7 July 2003 the staff of Szczytno Remand Centre had failed in undertaking the necessary actions to provide the applicant with arm prostheses. The authorities referred to the events described in paragraphs 34-42 above and concluded that the prison authorities had not acted to the applicant’s detriment but, to the contrary, had made extensive efforts to provide him with arm prostheses.

7. The applicants were born in 1944 and 1948, and live in Penza. At the material time the first applicant was a trade-union leader, the second applicant a journalist. They also co-chaired the Penza Regional Voters' Association “Civic Unity” (Grazhdanskoye yedinstvo). 8. On 15 August 2000 the Co-ordination Council of the Penza Regional Voters' Association Civic Unity adopted at its meeting the draft text of an open letter, entitled “Media coverage of the reforms of President Putin in the Penza Region” (“Informatsionnoye obespecheniy reform Prezidenta V.V. Putina v Penzenskoy oblasti”). 9. On 16 August 2000 the text was discussed at a round table attended by the applicants, the editors-in-chief of local newspapers and journalists. The draft was amended and elaborated. The discussion concluded with the adoption of the open letter by the Co-ordination Council of Civic Unity and managers of the independent media in the Penza Region to the President of the Russian Federation, the Security Council of the Russian Federation, the Journalists' Union of Russia, the plenipotentiary representative of the President for the Volga Federal District, and the Minister for Press and Information of the Russian Federation. The open letter was signed by the applicants and four editors-in-chief. 10. On 24 August 2000 the Novaya birzhevaya gazeta newspaper published the open letter on its front page. The relevant extracts of the letter, translated from Russian, read as follows: “We (authors of the open letter) subscribe to various political views but are unanimous in our support of the President's drive to curb corruption in the country, bring order to the economy, and assert the rule of law and democratic standards in all sectors of society. We have gathered at the round table because of our common concern for the fate of the President's reforms in the Penza Region. The Penza Region is gradually transforming into a private holding controlled by Governor V. Bochkaryov and his close circle ... [emphasis added, see below] Today we (the independent media) embarrass the regional authorities because we openly disagree with the selfish and destructive policy of the governor and his team, we publish materials denouncing bribe-takers and officials who abuse their position ... Once again, as in early 1991 when the [Communist] Party's nomenclature feared their imminent dismissal, the regional authorities have started reprisals against the independent media. Journalists are subjected to threats and beatings, our publications are prohibited from being printed and distributed in the region ... On the other side – the independent media, whose attempts to stand for the rule of law, human rights, to talk about bringing order to the economy and to expose corruption are routinely suppressed by the governor and his acolytes ...”[1] 11. The remainder of the open letter harshly criticised the Governor of the Penza Region personally and contained allegations of serious wrongdoings. 12. On 3 February 2001 twelve members of the Penza Regional Government lodged a civil action with the Leninskiy District Court of Penza for the protection of their honour, dignity and professional reputation and for compensation for non-pecuniary damage allegedly sustained as a result of the publication of the open letter. They named the applicants and other signatories to the letter, as well as the newspaper that published it, as co-defendants. 13. On 3 March 2001 the original plaintiffs were joined by fourteen other members of the Penza Regional Government with identical claims. 14. On 30 March 2001 one of the original plaintiffs, Mr D., withdrew his claim. Speaking to the Novaya birzhevaya gazeta newspaper, he described the proceedings as “an attempt to bring the media under control”. In April 2001 Mr D. was dismissed from his position in the Government. 15. The applicants brought a counterclaim against the plaintiffs, alleging that they had violated civil-service law in that they had used their official position to discredit and adversely affect the functioning of the Civic Unity association. The applicants claimed compensation for non-pecuniary damage allegedly caused by a violation of their rights and freedoms, in particular, the right to freedom of opinion guaranteed by the Constitution. 16. On 15 May 2001 the Leninskiy District Court of Penza gave judgment. It carried out at the outset a detailed analysis of federal and regional laws on the structure of the Penza Regional Government and reached the following conclusion on the plaintiffs' standing in the defamation suit: “... any State official in the Penza Region wields a certain power and authority that is essential to the performance of his functional duties; hence, he falls into the category of 'regional authority'. Considering that the 'regional authority' is made up of individuals, that is, State officials, the term 'regional authority' applies to each plaintiff who is, by virtue of his position, a State official in the Penza Region. The words 'the close circle of Governor Bochkaryov', 'the governor's acolytes', and 'the governor's team' used in the impugned publication are – in the court's opinion, and despite the defendants' and their representatives' assertions to the contrary – applicable to all State officials [working in] the executive body of the Penza Regional Government and, therefore, to the plaintiffs.” 17. The District Court then examined the truthfulness of the applicants' statements referring to the “destructive” policy of the governor's team. It found that the applicants had not used any “scientific methodology for a comprehensive assessment of the social and economic development of the region” for the preparation of the open letter and that their evaluation had been entirely based on their personal views. The court rejected the statement by Mr D. on the economic decline in the Penza Region in 2001 because he had been dismissed from the Government and therefore, in the court's opinion, he was on the defendants' side. The court concluded that the statements referring to the “selfish and destructive policy” were untrue. 18. Likewise, the District Court found no evidence to support the statements referring to the persecution of journalists in the Penza Region. It pointed out that one of the signatories, the editor-in-chief of a local newspaper, could not prove that an attack on one of his journalists had been politically motivated. In the court's opinion, the fact that certain members of the Government had put pressure on local officials to subscribe to the newspapers controlled by the governor to the detriment of all others was lawful and could not be interpreted as “prohibition on distribution”. 19. The District Court held that the extracts of the open letter bold-faced in the text above were not true and damaged the honour and dignity of the plaintiffs as the members of the Penza Regional Government. It ordered that all the plaintiffs be jointly compensated for non-pecuniary damage: the defendant newspaper was to pay 50,000 Russian roubles (RUR) and each of the applicants and four of their co-defendants was to pay RUR 2,500. The court also ordered the defendant newspaper to publish a rectification. 20. The District Court dismissed the applicants' counterclaim on the ground that the plaintiffs had exercised their right to a court and, therefore, had not violated any of the applicants' rights. 21. On 24 July 2001 the Penza Regional Court examined an appeal by the applicants and upheld the judgment of 15 May 2001.

7. In February 1994 the Persons and Family Act was amended to require the registration with the Council of Ministers of non-profit organisations which had religious or related activities. Seventy-eight requests for registration were submitted, but only twenty-three organisations were registered. Those turned down were primarily Protestant groups. 8. Denial of legal status made it impossible for those organisations to hire public lecture halls or sign contracts in the name of the organisation. The unregistered organisations were unable to open bank accounts or publish journals or newspapers in the name of the organisation and were denied certain tax advantages. 9. Among the organisations whose registration was turned down was “Word of Life”, a Christian Evangelical group that had become active in Bulgaria in the early 1990s. 10. As a result of the authorities' refusal to register Word of Life, the religious organisation began clandestine activities. Meetings were periodically thwarted by the police followed by media propaganda against the organisation and its members. 11. On 20 June 1994, acting on an order from the Sofia's Prosecutor's Office, the police closed a hall used by Word of Life in Sofia and prevented members from using it. 12. On 22 June 1994 a Swedish citizen was expelled from Bulgaria because of his participation in a Word of Life course (see Lilja v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 41574/98, 20 November 2003). 13. On 23 June 1994 a force of around thirty policemen prevented members of Word of Life from attending a meeting at a hall, because it had purportedly been cancelled. 14. On 23 February 1995 the police raided private homes in the town of Veliko Turnovo and a conference hall in the Hotel Etur. They confiscated religious literature, audio tapes and video cassettes, which they displayed at a press conference the next day. No charges were subsequently brought against any members of Word of Life. 15. On 20 July and 27 September 1995 the police raided two gatherings of Word of Life followers in private homes. Religious literature was confiscated and the hosts were required to declare in writing that they would no longer organise religious gatherings in their homes. 16. Throughout 1994 and 1995 the local Ruse media reported regularly on “unlawful” gatherings and religious activities by Word of Life followers. The media campaign intensified, with the national press joining in, during the summer and autumn of 1995. Press coverage was focused on the River Shipbuilding and Navigation School (Техникум по речно корабостроене и корабоплаване – “the School”) in Ruse because several of the non-academic staff were allegedly followers of Word of Life. The media also waged a personal campaign against some of those individuals by naming and condemning them as followers of the religious organisation. It called for their dismissal and named the applicant as one of the individuals whose employment should be terminated (see, for example, paragraph 22 below). 17. As a direct result, the Regional Prosecutor's Office and the National Security Service initiated inquiries into the religious activities of the School's staff members. 18. On 18 September 1995 the Regional Prosecutor's Office, in summarising the findings of the National Security Service, found that there were insufficient grounds for opening a preliminary investigation. At the same time it stated that, inter alia, the activities at the School were “not free of criminal culpability”, and that they were in contravention of the Religious Denominations Act and “probably” the relevant education Acts and regulations. Moreover, the allegedly “unlawful” religious activities were considered to have been carried out with the tacit approval of its principal. 19. Soon thereafter, the Regional Governor (областният управител) and a local member of parliament (“the MP”) called for radical measures to be taken to curb the alleged religious activities at the School and to dismiss the principal. They made public threats that, if such measures were not taken, they would petition the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (“the Ministry”) to dismiss the Chief Educational Inspector for Ruse (“the Educational Inspector”). 20. On 23 October 1995 the principal of the School was dismissed by the Ministry. The dismissal order directly referred to the negative media coverage and the findings of the Regional Prosecutor's Office and accused her of tolerating the activities of Word of Life at the School to the detriment of its staff and pupils. It also suggested that the principal should have dismissed those members of staff who were Word of Life followers. It is unclear whether the principal appealed against her dismissal. 22. In a broadcast on the Hristo Botev radio station, aired on 7 December 1995, the MP stressed that there were still members of Word of Life working in the School, such as the swimming pool manager (the post occupied by the applicant), and inferred from this that the Ministry had not conclusively resolved the matter with the dismissal of the former principal. 23. The applicant was a mechanical engineer and had a second university degree in pedagogical sciences. She had been involved in the religious activities of Word of Life since 1994. 24. On 14 October 1994 the applicant was appointed by the School to the post of “mechanic” at its swimming pool on a temporary employment contract until 23 February 1995. 25. On an unspecified date, the Ministry approved a new roster of posts (щатно разписание) for the School effective as of 1 January 1995, which provided for the post of “swimming pool manager” with a requirement for the holder of the post to have completed a course of secondary education. By a further amendment of 1 April 1995 the holder of the post was required to have a higher-education qualification. 26. On 6 April 1995 the applicant was promoted to the post of “swimming pool manager” and concluded a temporary employment contract with a term up to 31 August 1995. 27. On 31 August 1995 the applicant's temporary employment contract was extended until 31 August 1996. 28. On 20 September 1995 the applicant concluded an employment contract of indefinite duration, which provided for her appointment to the post of “swimming pool manager” as of 1 July 1995. Her job description indicated that her responsibilities included, inter alia, managing and supervising the staff of the swimming pool, organising their work schedules, monitoring the regular accounting of the proceeds from the swimming pool and organising the swimming lessons. The job description did not expressly refer to any education or professional qualification requirements for the post. The applicant's basic salary was set at 4,992 old Bulgarian levs (approximately 111 Deutsche marks (DEM)) with a 16% bonus for length of service. 29. On an unspecified date the Ministry approved a new roster of posts for the School effective as of 1 October 1995. It provided for the post of “swimming pool manager” with a requirement that the holder of the post have a higher-education qualification. 30. On 23 October 1995 the principal of the School was dismissed and a new one was appointed soon thereafter. 31. On 2 November 1995 the applicant was summoned to a meeting with the Educational Inspector and his deputy. Another member of staff, Mrs M., was also summoned to the meeting, which took place on the premises of the School. At the meeting, the inspectors asked for their resignations as a means of easing public tensions. The applicant contended, although this was disputed by the Government, that the inspectors had threatened them that if they did not resign of their own accord or did not renounce their faith, they would be dismissed on disciplinary grounds. The inspectors claimed that irrespective of their work performance they “could instruct the [new] principal” to dismiss them. Mrs M. denied being a member of Word of Life, while the applicant did not and also refused to resign. No assessment or mention was made during the meeting as to whether the applicant was performing her job well and whether she met the requirements for holding her post. 32. On 3 November 1995 the applicant informed the new principal of the School in writing of her meeting of the previous day with the Educational Inspector and his deputy. No action was taken in response. 33. Thereafter, the new principal alienated the applicant – her office phone was removed, the locks to the swimming pool were changed without her being provided with a set of keys and the supervision of the renovation of the swimming pool was entrusted to a subordinate even though it should allegedly have been her responsibility. The new principal also made enquiries as to the applicant's work performance. 34. On 24 November 1995 the human resources department of the School prepared a list of thirty-one employees allegedly without job descriptions. The applicant's name and post were among them. 35. On 7 December 1995 Hristo Botev radio aired the interview with the MP in which he implied that the applicant's post was one of those still being occupied by a member of Word of Life (see paragraph 22 above). 36. By an order of 28 December 1995 the applicant was dismissed, with immediate effect, on the grounds of not meeting the education and professional qualification requirements for the post of “swimming pool manager” (Article 328 § 1 (6) of the Labour Code). When she was served with the order, the applicant enquired as to which requirements she did not meet, but the new principal did not inform her. 37. On 27 May 1996 the applicant initiated proceedings before the Ruse District Court challenging the lawfulness of the dismissal. She also sought reinstatement in her previous post and compensation for loss of income. 38. The applicant maintained that her dismissal was directly related to her religious beliefs and her refusal to resign of her own accord. Such a reason for terminating her employment contract, she argued, was a violation of Article 8 § 3 of the Labour Code and Article 37 of the Bulgarian Constitution, which prohibited religious discrimination. 39. During the trial it was established that in December 1995 there had been a further amendment to the School's roster of posts, which the Ministry had approved in a letter of 30 January 1996, but with effect from 1 January 1996. The amended roster of posts no longer envisaged the post of “swimming pool manager”, but provided for the post of “sports complex organiser”. On an unspecified date a job description had also been prepared for the new post which set out the requirements for the holder of the post as follows: “university degree in sports, university degree in economics, as an exception – secondary education with specialisation in the relevant sport, qualified lifeguard, certified swimming instructor.” 40. The applicant argued before the Ruse District Court that the changes to the School's roster of posts should have taken place in accordance with standard practices and should not have been arbitrary. She claimed that the standard practice was to make changes to the roster of posts before the beginning of the academic year. The applicant also claimed that the changes were arbitrary because there had not been any objective necessity, stemming from the work being performed, to change the requirements for the post. 41. A hearing was held on 9 July 1996 at which the respondent party presented the new job description for the post of “sports complex organiser”. 42. At a hearing on 19 November 1996 several witnesses gave evidence. The Educational Inspector testified that the standard practice was to make changes to the roster of posts before the academic year unless an urgent need, usually of a financial nature, required otherwise. He confirmed that he had met with the applicant in early November 1995 in connection with the findings of the Regional Prosecutor's Office and that he had invited her to resign in view of the mounting discontent and public opinion. He stated that he had not enquired as to the activities of Word of Life at the School and that he was not familiar with the applicant's work performance. 43. Mrs M. also testified and informed the court that the new principal had threatened her with dismissal if she talked about her work at the School. She testified as to the meeting of 2 November 1995 with the Educational Inspector and stated that, faced with the claim of being a follower of Word of Life, she had denied it. She stated that she had broken down and cried during the meeting because she had two children to support and did not want to be left without a job. Mrs M. also informed the court that, as far as she was aware, the applicant had been a good and diligent employee, who had maintained good relations with the other members of staff. 44. A teacher from the School also testified at the hearing. He informed the court that since its construction in 1974 the swimming pool had always had a manager, but that there had never been a requirement of a university degree in sports for the post. The teacher also testified as to the content of the radio broadcast of 7 December 1995, in which the applicant had been singled out for dismissal by the MP. 45. On 25 November 1996 the applicant filed her written submissions with the Ruse District Court, contending that the evidence in the case supported her claim. She maintained that the School's roster of posts had been changed in the middle of the academic year with the sole aim of introducing such requirements for her post as to allow her dismissal on those grounds. 46. On 5 May 1997 the Ruse District Court dismissed the applicant's claims. In its judgment the court noted that the burden of proof as to whether the dismissal had been lawful or not lay with the School. It found, inter alia, that the School had complied with the procedure for changing the roster of posts and that the new job description for the post was in conformity with the standard job descriptions for such posts as approved by the Ministry. In addition, the court found that with the changes to the requirements for the post the School had envisaged the possibility that the person appointed to the job would not only manage and organise the activities of the swimming pool but could also act as a lifeguard or swimming instructor, a factor which the court deemed to be of “vital importance”. Based on these considerations, the court found that “there really had been preconditions [which entailed] changing the requirements for the post” and that the dismissal was therefore lawful. Separately, the Ruse District Court found that the applicant's claims that her dismissal had been motivated by her religious beliefs were not supported by the evidence in the case, that in fact the applicant had had very good relations with the other members of staff and that there were no complaints as to her work performance. The court also reasoned that the applicant's assertions in this respect were refuted by the fact that Mrs M. was still employed by the School. 47. On 27 June 1997 the applicant appealed against the judgment of the Ruse District Court. She claimed, inter alia, that its findings were not based on the evidence established in the case and were therefore unfounded. She claimed that the Ruse District Court had failed to make a proper assessment of key evidence, such as the testimonies of the Educational Inspector and Mrs M. 48. The applicant also questioned the grounds of the first-instance court for dismissing her claim and contended that they were frivolous and at odds with the substance of her complaint alleging religious discrimination. Firstly, she had never claimed that her personal relations with her colleagues had suffered as a result of her religious beliefs. Secondly, she submitted that the first-instance court's reasoning that there had been no discrimination against her, considering that Mrs M. was still employed by the School, was incorrect as there were various possible reasons for Mrs M.'s continued employment, such as the fact that the media had not singled her out for dismissal. 49. The applicant also claimed that the Ruse District Court had never analysed in substance her complaint alleging religious discrimination, but had dealt with the matter purely as an issue of unfair dismissal. 50. Finally, she maintained that the facts of the case clearly showed that following her refusal to resign on 2 November 1995 the School had simply tried to find a legal ground for dismissing her and that the chosen method was to change the requirements for the post she occupied so that she would become ineligible to hold it. 51. On 22 July 1997 the former principal of the School filed submissions with the Ruse Regional Court, attesting to a conversation she had had in June 1995 with the Educational Inspector. At the meeting he had identified four employees in respect of whom there had been “information that they were members of a sect” and whose employment he had insisted be terminated. At the time, the former principal had suggested that those employees resign of their own accord, but they had refused and no further action had been taken against them. It is unclear whether the applicant was one of those employees. 52. In a judgment of 23 July 1997 the Ruse Regional Court dismissed the applicant's appeal. The court found, inter alia, that the School had both a need and the right to change the roster of posts and the requirements for the applicant's post and to dismiss her because she did not meet those requirements. It also found that the Ruse District Court had adequately addressed the applicant's allegations of religious discrimination and found them to be “totally and irrefutably ... irrelevant” based on the fact that she had maintained good relations with her colleagues and had been a good employee. Any allegations of subjective reasons or discriminatory grounds for her dismissal were therefore considered unfounded. 53. On 18 September 1997 the applicant filed a petition for review (cassation appeal), claiming, inter alia, that the lower courts had failed to properly evaluate the evidence before them and had never addressed the substance of her complaint alleging religious discrimination. She maintained that they had failed to assess the circumstances surrounding her dismissal and especially the events leading up to it, which clearly demonstrated the real reason why this legal method had been used to terminate her employment. 54. A hearing was conducted on 16 November 1998, which the applicant and her counsel, though duly summoned, did not attend. They presented their submissions to the court in writing. 55. In a final judgment of 9 December 1998 the Supreme Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant's appeal. The court found, inter alia, that the applicant's arguments were unsubstantiated, and upheld the findings of the lower courts. It stressed that the School had the right to change the requirements for the post and that such changes were not subject to judicial review. In addition, it compared the duties and responsibilities of the posts of “swimming pool manager” and “sports complex organiser” and found them to be essentially the same. The Supreme Court of Cassation also noted that the old job description had lacked any education or professional qualification requirements for the post, while the new one had included such requirements. It reasoned, therefore, that the employer had simply filled a gap that had previously existed in that respect. 56. The court refused to address the remainder of the arguments of the applicant as it found them to be irrelevant to the proceedings and to the issue of the dismissal.

4. The applicant was born in 1977 in Sivas. 5. On 6 May 1998 the applicant was taken into police custody on suspicion of being a member of an illegal organisation. 6. On 9 May 1998 he was brought before the public prosecutor and investigating judge at the Istanbul State Security Court, who ordered his pre-trial detention. 7. On 11 May 1998 the public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court filed a bill of indictment against the applicant, charging him with membership of an illegal organisation. 8. On 14 July 1998 due to the factual and legal connection between the cases, the court decided to joint the applicant’s case to other proceedings, involving seven accused (no. 1998/2). 9. On the same day the applicant was released pending trial. 10. On 29 July 2000 a change took place in the judges sitting as a bench at the Istanbul State Security Court and therefore, the next hearing was scheduled on 7 September 2000. 11. On 16 November 2000 the hearing was postponed to 20 February 2001 due the change in the assignment of judges at the trial court. 12. On 20 February 2001 the applicant was summoned to appear before the court in order to make his supplementary submissions for his defence, in view of a possible alteration of the offence he was charged with. 13. On 10 May 2001 the court observed that the registered writ having sent to the applicant, returned to the case file without a delivery. 14. On 30 November 2001 the public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court filed an additional bill of indictment, charging the applicant with using explosives. 15. From the date of 10 May 2001 to 24 May 2007, despite the authorities’ efforts to have summoned the applicant, his whereabouts could not be established. During that period, the court ordered the Avcılar Police Department to make an enquiry to the applicant’s family about his non‑appearance. Subsequently, the court was informed that the applicant had gone abroad to study. 16. The trial court invited the prosecutor’s office to transmit the arrest warrant against the applicant to the customs with a view to securing his appearance before the court once he entered the country. 17. Following a constitutional amendment, State Security Courts were abolished and the applicant’s case was transferred to the Istanbul Assize Court. 18. On 6 November 2007, in his defence submissions to the court, the applicant’s lawyer claimed that the applicant had already been tried by another chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court on the basis of the same facts and requested that the matter be examined further. 19. On 3 April 2008 the Istanbul Assize Court ordered the case file of the proceedings in question to verify the reason for the applicant’s previous conviction. 20. On 24 February 2009 the court ruled that the criminal proceedings be discontinued on the ground that the prosecution was time-barred. On the same day, the applicant’s lawyer lodged an appeal against the judgment. 21. According to the submissions in the case file, the proceedings are currently pending before the Court of Cassation.

5. The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Manojlovce. He is the father of Jovica Mitić ("JM") who, on 8 October 2007, at the age of 28, hanged himself whilst serving a cumulative prison sentence of one year and nine months at Leskovac District Prison ("the District Prison"). 6. On 14 August 2007 JM was arrested by the Leskovac Police Department on suspicion of larceny. The same day the investigating judge of the Leskovac District Court ("the District Court") decided to open an investigation against him on the larceny charge and to detain him for a period of one month. 7. On 15 August 2007, after having been placed in a detention unit of the District Prison, JM was examined by DP, the prison doctor, and a detention medical file was opened at the prison infirmary. During the examination, JM said that he had been involved in four traffic accidents in the past two months in which he had injured sixth cervical vertebra. He denied any other recent injury, surgery or illness. During his detention, JM visited the prison doctor three times complaining of trouble sleeping (17, 22 and 24 August 2007). He was prescribed 10 mg of diazepam and 15 mg of flormidal once a day. 8. On 21 August 2007 the Police Department informed the prison authorities that various District Courts had previously issued several arrest warrants for JM in connection with prison sentences imposed on him earlier by three final judgments (six months ordered on 19 November 2003 for larceny and forgery; three months ordered on 16 May 2005 for enabling substance abuse; and one year ordered on 7 November 2005 for forgery). The prison authorities were thus requested to transfer JM from a detention unit to a prison unit to serve a cumulative prison sentence of one year and nine months. They were also warned that, being a recidivist and a fugitive, he should be placed in the high-security prison unit. 9. On 27 August 2007 JM was placed in the high-security prison unit. On 28 August 2007 he was examined by the prison doctor and by TI, the prison psychologist, as a part of the standard procedure. During the examination JM denied any family history of mental illness and said that prior to imprisonment he had used sedatives for his sleeping problems. In her record of the examination, the prison psychologist described him as introverted, dishonest and dissimulative. 10. JM was examined again on 4 September 2007 for what appears to be muscle pain (the medical file submitted by the Government is partly illegible). On 21 September 2007 he complained of a "twinge" and the prison doctor discovered bruises on his left shoulder, shoulder blades and right upper arm. The doctor considered the bruises to be three days old. JM refused to say how he got these bruises and it would appear that he refused to file a formal complaint with the prison authorities. The doctor observed that he appeared nervous. She prescribed ibuprofen and 10 mg of diazepam twice a day. 11. On 25 September 2007 JM failed to show up for a scheduled medical check-up. On 2 October 2007 JM visited the prison doctor concerning a dermato-venereal condition and an appointment was made for him with a specialist outside the prison. Two days later he complained of insomnia and minor anxiety. He refused to see the prison psychologist and the prison doctor increased the daily dose of diazepam to 10 mg three times per day and again prescribed 15 mg of flormidal once a day. 12. On 3 October 2007 JM attempted to escape together with three other inmates. On 5 October 2007 disciplinary proceedings were initiated against each of them and a disciplinary measure of placement in solitary confinement for a period of 15 days was imposed on each. 13. Before being placed in solitary confinement, JM was examined by the prison doctor, who established that he was fit to undergo solitary confinement with the continuation of previously prescribed daily therapy (paragraph 11 above). During his stay in solitary confinement JM was visited by the prison doctor once a day and was receiving his therapy administered by a member of the prison medical staff. He did not complain of any health problem. The cell in which he was placed was equipped with CCTV which covered the entrance door of the cell and part of the toilet door. It did not make video recordings but only projected images to a screen located in the office of the head of the prison guards. 14. On 7 October 2007 the applicant came to visit his son but was informed that the visit was not allowed because JM had been placed in solitary confinement following disciplinary proceedings against him (paragraph 31 below). He was allowed to leave a package which was given to JM the same day. 15. Early in the morning of 8 October 2007 JM was served with breakfast. At approximately 8.15 a.m. he was visited by the prison doctor and a member of the prison staff. Between 8.45 a.m and 9.00 a.m. a member of the prison medical staff gave him his daily treatment. He later recalled that JM’s demeanour was calm and responsive. 16. At around 12 noon the same day JM was discovered by a prison guard and a correctional officer hanging from the heating pipe in his cell by a ligature fashioned out of a bed sheet. At 12.05 p.m. he was pronounced dead. 17. At 12.20 p.m. on the same day the investigating judge of the District Court conducted an on-site investigation during which the cell was secured by two police officers. The deputy public prosecutor was also present. Photographs were taken of the cell and of JM’s body. The on-site investigation was closed at 2.00 p.m. The investigating judge made a record of the investigation, including a description of JM’s cell and the items found therein, as well as of the reconstruction of the events of that morning based on an interview with the prison warden. The written statements of the prison staff who had contact with JM, given to the prison warden, were also included in the file. JM’s family was informed of his death the same day. 18. The same day the police questioned the prison guard and the correctional officer who had discovered JM’s body. The prison guard said that he had arrived at work at 7.45 a.m. and had visited all the cells, including that of JM. Everything appeared normal. He further said that he had seen JM alive in his cell at 10.50 a.m. The correctional officer said that he had last seen JM on 4 October 2007. His impression was that, while JM was an introverted person, there was nothing peculiar in his demeanour. 19. The police also interviewed the prison doctor, the member of the prison medical staff who was giving treatment to JM and two other members of the prison staff who had had contact with him. They maintained that JM had never disclosed any suicidal tendencies and that he had seemed relaxed the last time they had seen him. The official record of all the interviews was made. 20. At 10.00 p.m. that day Dr RK performed an autopsy on JM’s body, at the request of the investigating judge. The doctor noted that he had been informed by the investigating authorities that JM’s body was discovered at around 10.00 a.m. He went on to describe the external appearance of the body and noted that the ligature had left a twenty-five by thirty millimetres wide trace on the front of JM’s neck and a thirty by forty millimetres wide trace on the back and sides of his neck. He further observed an oblong purple bruise on JM’s neck; it did not disappear when pressed. The doctor further noted an old bruise, which measured twenty by fifteen millimetres on JM’s right upper arm. He concluded, based on its colour and appearance, that it was an old injury. The internal examination did not show, in his opinion, any anomalies. The histopathological examination of JM’s internal organs had shown severe blood stasis, particularly in the lungs and kidneys. The microscopic examination of his neck subcutaneous soft tissues revealed fresh bleeding. The toxicology screening revealed no traces of poison; some traces of alcohol were discovered. The autopsy report concluded that JM’s death had occurred between 9.00 a.m. and 10.00 a.m. as a result of asphyxia caused by hanging. The report included photographs. 21. Before the autopsy report was received by the court and the applicant, on 9 October 2007 the applicant requested a second autopsy. He was informed the same day by the investigating judge that a second autopsy could not be ordered before the report of the first had been received. JM’s body was given to his family the same day. 22. On 9 October 2007 one of the inmates who was also in solitary confinement as a result of the escape attempt (paragraph 12 above) informed the prison doctor and the correctional officer, in two separate visits of which official records were made, that during a daily walk in the prison yard, JM had told him that he planned to stage a suicide attempt in order to be transferred to the Special Prison Hospital in Belgrade. The inmate expressed his regret for failing to inform the prison authorities of JM’s intentions. 23. The same day, the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against the prison warden and unspecified prison officers for the alleged murder of his son and abuse of authority. The applicant argued, in particular, that his son had been unjustly and arbitrarily punished for the alleged escape attempt as he was the only one who had been punished with solitary confinement which had caused psychological suffering and his eventual suicide. On the same day, the public prosecutor requested a report of the events of 8 October 2007 from the prison authorities and that police officers question all persons indicated in the applicant’s complaint, in particular about JM’s treatment in prison and why he had been placed in solitary confinement. 24. At the request of the public prosecutor, the police again questioned the prison guard and the correctional officer who had discovered JM’s body, the prison doctor, the member of the medical staff who had administered treatment to JM and two other prison officers who had had direct contact with him. They all reiterated their earlier statements that, in particular, there had been nothing peculiar in JM’s behaviour that would have indicated that he was suicidal. 25. On 16 October 2007 the police report was sent to the prosecutor’s office. It also contained a written statement of the prison warden dated 15 October 2007, the record of visits JM had received and decisions concerning disciplinary proceedings against three other inmates who had participated in the escape attempt (paragraph 12 above). The prison warden submitted that JM’s treatment was in compliance with the prison rules. JM had visiting rights (he had received eight visits from his family and three from his lawyer) and had received adequate medical treatment. On 19 December 2007 the public prosecutor decided not to prosecute. 26. On 28 December 2007 the applicant filed an indictment with the District Court against the prison, the prison doctor and nine other prison officers for alleged murder, having taken over the prosecution of the case as a “subsidiary prosecutor” (paragraph 30 below). He maintained his allegations in his criminal complaint, adding that the prison doctor had made a wrong assessment in deciding that his son was fit for placement in solitary confinement. On 4 January 2008 the investigating judge of the District Court requested the prison authorities to submit a report on JM’s treatment in the prison (in particular, as regards his visiting rights, his medical treatment and any disciplinary proceedings against him). The investigating judge also requested a file from the public prosecutor’s office. 27. On 11 January 2008 the prison authorities sent the requested report to the investigating judge. It contained, in particular, the statement of the prison doctor dated 9 January 2008: she gave an account of JM’s medical treatment in prison and stated that, while he had not requested medical assistance while in solitary confinement, she had visited him once per day in accordance with prison regulations. 28. On 14 January 2008, after examining all the documents, the investigating judge expressed the opinion that there were not enough elements for an indictment and that the investigation should be discontinued. 29. On 23 January 2008 a chamber of three judges of the District Court accepted that conclusion and decided not to prosecute. That decision was upheld by the Supreme Court of Serbia on 12 March 2008.

4. The applicants were born in 1955, 1934 and 1968 respectively, and live in Miskolc, Hungary. 5. In 1993 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicants and other suspects. In the context of a series of complicated economic offences, they were charged with several counts of aggravated fraud, tax fraud, forgery of documents, bribery, fraudulent bankruptcy and accounting crimes. In the ensuing proceedings the applicants were assisted by defence counsel of their choice. 6. On 25 November 1996 the first applicant’s bank accounts were frozen in order to secure the eventual confiscation of any criminal profit he might have made. Simultaneously, the applicants’ homes were searched. On 10 June 1997 the Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County Regional Court changed the decision of 25 November 1996 and extended the freezing measure to include all of the first applicant’s assets. 7. On 23 June 1995 the Miskolc District Public Prosecutor’s Office preferred a bill of indictment. The charges concerned altogether eight defendants. 8. After having held 30 hearings between 17 June 1997 and 7 July 1998, on 8 July 1998 the Miskolc District Court convicted the applicants of several counts of fraud, tax fraud, fraudulent bankruptcy, forgery of documents as well as accounting crimes, while acquitting them of other charges. The first applicant was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment and to the confiscation of his frozen property in the value of 300 million Hungarian forints; the second and the third applicants were sentenced to three and a half years’ and three years’ imprisonment respectively. In the reasoning of its 76-page judgment, the District Court relied on evidence given by numerous witnesses, several opinions prepared by expert accountants, tax advisers and engineers, and documentary evidence. 9. In October 1998 the applicants submitted their initial and, on 14 May 1999, their detailed appeal. Meanwhile, on 6 January 1999 the Heves County Regional Court was appointed to hear the case, for reasons of incompatibility, instead of the competent Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County Regional Court. 10. After having held a hearing on 22 June 1999, on 20 September 2000 the Heves County Regional Court re-characterised part of the offences committed by the applicants, acquitted them of some charges, and reduced the first applicant’s prison term to five years and six months, and the second applicant’s term to three years. For the remainder, it upheld the first-instance judgment. 11. On 29 December 2000 the second and third applicants filed a petition for review. On 6 March 2002 the Supreme Court acquitted them of the charge of tax fraud and upheld the remainder of the second-instance judgment in their respect. 12. The first applicant’s repeated requests for a retrial were finally refused on 21 May 2002.

5. The applicant was born in 1974 and is now serving his sentence in the Tula Region. 6. At about 11.30 a.m. on 10 April 2003 the cashier desk of the Petelino psychiatric hospital in the Tula Region was robbed by three men armed with a submachine gun and a sawn-off shotgun. Two police patrols arrived at the scene less than five minutes later. 7. The police officers who apprehended the applicant described the events in the following manner. Officer B. stated, in particular (his statement to the investigator is dated 17 June 2003): “I saw three men cross the motorway and disappear behind the forest shelter belt... I started running across the forest to intercept the criminals. At that moment I heard a burst of submachine gun fire. As I emerged out of the forest, I saw two men in front of me who later turned out to be K. and [the applicant]. K. wore light-blue jeans and a dark jacket, and [the applicant] wore dark tracksuit bottoms. K. carried a Kalashnikov submachine gun with no butt, and [the applicant] had a sawn-off rifle ... I told the criminals to freeze, drop the guns and offer no resistance. K. and [the applicant] ... crossed the motorway. Then I shot a few rounds in burst mode in the direction of the criminals but above their heads and told them again to freeze. [The applicant] fell on the roadside, and the rifle flew out of his hands ... K. turned around, saw the police car and fired several shots in its direction. Then he slipped and fell. I ran up to him, pointed my gun at him and told him to stop resistance and drop the weapon. The muzzle of his submachine gun was pointed at my face, so I kicked the gun out of his hand and used physical force on him in accordance with section 12 of the Police Act ... During that time, [Officer M.] was trying to tie up [the applicant] because he was trying to get up and run away ... During the arrest we had to use physical force on K., [the applicant], and Sh. because they actively resisted us. As a result, they sustained injuries but I cannot say what injuries and where because they were covered in mud.” 8. Officer M., in his statement to the investigator made on 11 April 2003, testified as follows: “Three men were running some seventy metres ahead of us... One of them – the one who was a bit taller, in light-blue jeans and black jacket – turned to us and fired a burst from his submachine gun in our direction ... [Officer B.] fired two shots at the running men ... The men had already crossed to the roadside in the direction of Novomoskovsk ... but the man in tracksuit bottoms fell on the roadside and covered his head with his hands. The man in blue jeans and black jacket fired a burst at the police car and started going down towards the forest but slipped and fell on his back ... He pointed his submachine gun at [Officer B.] who, in turned, pointed his gun at him and told him to drop the weapon. Meanwhile, I ran up to the second man who had fallen on the ground, covered his head with his hands and pushed away his sawn-off rifle ... and I told [Officer S.] to cuff his hands which he did. I ran up to [Officer B.] and told the man in blue jeans to throw the gun away. The man reclined on his back and put the gun aside. I kicked it away and, using martial arts, bent his arm behind his back, led him away and put him on the ground where handcuffs were applied to him ...” 9. On the same day Officer S. testified in the same vein: “... the man in tracksuit bottoms fell on the roadside and covered his head with his hands... [Officer M.] and I ran up to the second man who had fallen on the ground and covered his head; [Officer M.] kicked aside the sawn-off rifle and told me to use handcuffs on him which I did ...” 10. It appears from Officer Shch.'s statement of 15 July 2003 that he did not take part in the applicant's arrest: “... [Officers B., M., and S.] were running after them through the forest. [The applicant] fell on the roadside and [Officer S.] or someone else, I do not remember who, arrested him ...” 11. According to the applicant, he had fallen to the ground immediately after the police started firing, and covered his head with his arms. The applicant claimed that a police officer had approached him and kicked him in the head. His head had jerked and his face had hit gravel, chipping two teeth. 12. The applicant and two other men were brought to the Shatskoye police station in the Leninskiy district of the Tula Region. 13. The applicant submitted that he had been brought to an office on the second floor. Three riot-squad (“OMON”) and two operational officers had entered the room. They had worn camouflage fatigues and woven hats. The OMON officers had made him kneel down with his hands cuffed behind his back. The officers had kicked and punched him, dealing blows all over his body, including his face and lips. One officer had hit him several times with a chair leg, another officer had straightened his right leg out and dealt a strong blow on his knee. He had been told to strip down and an officer had pushed the chair leg into his rectum. 14. At 8 p.m. the investigator Mr Bu. carried out a visual examination of the applicant's person in the presence of two attesting witnesses and a chemistry specialist. He noted that the applicant's face was covered with a “grey substance” and also with a “blood-like brown substance”. One of his front teeth was chipped. There were no injuries on the anterior side of his body, but his other side was covered with bruises and haematomas. The applicant had a bruise on his right hip and abrasions on both knees. 15. On the following day, 11 April 2003, the applicant was placed in the temporary detention ward of the Leninskiy district police station. The applicant wrote a complaint to the prosecutor about the beatings. 16. On 13 April 2003 the investigator Mr Bu. refused to institute criminal proceedings into the applicant's allegations. Referring to the arresting officers Mr Shch. and Mr B. who claimed that the applicant had forcefully resisted the arrest, and to the statements by two operational officers who denied that the applicant had been beaten at the police station, the investigator adopted the view that the visible injuries had been caused during the arrest. 17. At 11.15 a.m. on 15 April 2003 a medical expert commissioned by the investigator of the Leninskiy district prosecutor's office Mr M. carried out a detailed examination of the applicant's injuries. The expert recorded multiple bruises and abrasions on the applicant's face, lips, left ear, right temple and cheek-bone, back, arms, wrists, right hip and shin, haemorrhage in the sclera of both eyes, and a broken tooth on the upper jaw. According to the expert, those injuries had been caused by no fewer than thirteen blows of a hard blunt object and no earlier than seven days before the examination. 18. On 18 April 2003 the applicant was transferred from the Leninskiy district police station to remand centre no. IZ-71/1 in Tula. On arrival at the remand centre he was examined by a doctor. According to the medical certificate of the same date, the applicant had a bruise around his right eye, as well as an abrasion and an injury on his right hip. He told the doctor that he had been beaten at the police station. 19. On 19 June 2003 a deputy Leninskiy district prosecutor issued a new decision refusing to institute criminal proceedings into the applicant's allegations of ill-treatment. The text of the decision was identical, word by word, to that of the decision of 13 April 2003. 20. The applicant complained to a higher prosecutor. On 19 February 2004 the acting Leninskiy district prosecutor upheld the decisions of 13 April and 19 June 2003 as lawful and justified. 21. In November 2003, counsel for the applicant complained about the ill-treatment to the Uzlovaya town prosecutor, the Tula regional prosecutor, the Prosecutor General's Office, the Internal Security Department of the Tula Regional Police, the Federal Security Service, and other authorities. On 11 August and 22 December 2003 and 27 January 2004 the applicant also sent complaints about ill-treatment to the Tula regional prosecutor. 22. On 25 December 2003 a deputy Tula regional prosecutor replied to the applicant's lawyer that his complaints about ill-treatment had already been examined and that a decision refusing to institute criminal proceedings had been made. 23. On 18 June 2004 the applicant complained to the trial court about ill‑treatment and the authorities' failure to investigate his allegations. It is unclear whether any formal response was received. 24. On 2 September 2004 Officers B., M., S., and Shch. and the investigator Mr Bu. were heard in the witness stand by the trial court. Officer Shch. stated that the defendants had not offered any resistance during the arrest and that they had been immediately handcuffed. He denied using any physical force during the arrest and pointed out that K. had been dirty but had had no visible injuries. Officer B. submitted that no force had been employed but he had bent K.'s arms and handcuffed him. Officer S. confirmed that, once on the ground, the defendants had no longer resisted the arrest and that there was no attempt to punish them after the arrest. Officer M. testified that one of the defendants had been handcuffed, and the other's hands had been tied with a belt. The investigator Mr Bu. said that he was unable to remember any injuries on the defendants. 25. On 10 January 2005 the applicant challenged the investigator's decision of 13 April 2003 before a court of general jurisdiction. He submitted that the inquiry had been incomplete because the investigator had never interviewed him about the alleged ill-treatment. The statements by the arresting officers had been contradictory: in the criminal proceedings they had denied that he had offered any resistance, whereas the investigator had found that the injuries had been caused during the arrest. The applicant enclosed the medical certificates dated 10 April and 15 April 2003. 26. On 25 February 2005 the Leninskiy District Court of the Tula Region dismissed the applicant's complaint without taking cognisance of the merits. It held, firstly, that the contested decision did not restrict the applicant's constitutional rights or impede his access to justice and therefore was not amenable to review under Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Secondly, it stated that an inquiry into the applicant's allegations of ill-treatment had been carried out in the framework of criminal proceedings against him and therefore concerned the evidence in the criminal case which was pending before the trial court. The District Court declared itself incompetent to examine the matters which were being examined by the trial court. 27. The applicant was not present or represented at the hearing before the Leninskiy District Court. He filed an appeal, in which he complained that the District Court had not ensured his representation at the hearing and failed to examine the evidence of ill-treatment he had submitted. 28. On 13 April 2005 the Tula Regional Court upheld, in summary fashion, the District Court's judgment. It noted that there had been no violation of the applicant's right to defence because both he and counsel for him had been informed of the hearing date but had not sought leave to appear. 29. On 12 April 2003 the Leninskiy District Court of the Tula Region remanded the applicant in custody for an initial two-month period. 30. On 16 April 2003 the applicant was charged with an armed robbery of the hospital. 31. On 9 June, 6 August, 14 October, and 29 December 2003 the Uzlovaya Town Court extended the applicant's detention until 15 February 2004. On 13 February 2004 it granted a further extension until 10 April 2004. 32. On 9 April 2004 the case against the applicant and his co-defendants was submitted to the Uzlovaya Town Court for trial. 33. On 16 April 2004 the applicant complained to the Tula regional prosecutor that, following the expiry of the last detention order on 10 April 2004, there was no legal basis for his continued detention. He did not receive a reply. 34. On 23 April 2004 the Uzlovaya Town Court gave a decision fixing the date of the preliminary hearing. The decision did not mention the question of the applicant's detention. 35. At the preliminary hearing on 13 May 2004 the Town Court ruled that the bill of indictment was procedurally defective in that it contained incorrect information about the applicant's personal details. The court decided to return the case to the prosecutor for five days so that he could remedy these defects. It also rejected applications for release by the applicant and his co-defendants, noting that the preventive measure had been imposed lawfully and that there were no grounds for varying it. 36. On 17 May 2004 the prosecutor again sent the case for trial. On 31 May 2004 the Uzlovaya Town Court set the opening date for the trial and held that all the defendants should remain in custody, without citing any grounds for the continuation of their detention on remand or setting a time-limit for it. 37. On 4 November 2004 the Uzlovaya Town Court heard the prosecutor's application for a further extension of the applicant's detention. The applicant and his co-defendants applied for release, maintaining that the initial six-month period of their detention pending trial had expired on 9 October 2004. 38. The Town Court held that the six-month period of detention should be calculated from the date when the case had been sent for trial again, that is, from 17 May 2004. It extended all the co-defendants' detention by three months, citing as the ground the complexity of the case and the large number of victims and witnesses who had not yet been examined. The applicant filed an appeal. He submitted that, if the six-month period were to be calculated from 17 May 2004, his detention from 9 April to 17 May 2004 must have been unlawful. On 17 December 2004 the Tula Regional Court rejected his appeal in summary fashion, endorsing the reasoning of the Town Court. 39. On 10 February 2005 the Uzlovaya Town Court granted a further extension of the defendants' detention until 17 May 2005. On 15 April 2005 the Tula Regional Court upheld that decision on an appeal by the applicant. 40. On 19 July 2005 the Uzlovaya Town Court convicted the defendants of four robberies and sentenced the applicant to ten years' imprisonment in a high-security institution. On 25 January 2006 the Tula Regional Court upheld the conviction on appeal. 41. The applicant submitted copies of three articles published in the regional press in 2004. The articles described the robbery of the hospital and two other robberies imputed to the applicant and his co-defendants. The perpetrators were described as “jackals from Petelino”, “robbers” or a “gang”. The same photograph accompanied all three articles; the face and upper body of the person on the photograph were covered with a jacket.

9. The applicant, who was born in 1942, settled in Sweden in the second half of the 1980s. His mother tongue is Finnish. 10. On 3 December 1991 the applicant was charged before the District Court (tingsrätten) of Gothenburg with aggravated drunken driving and driving without a driver’s licence. According to the record of the police investigation, he did not request the assistance of a public defence counsel. On 9 January 1992 the District Court, apparently of its own motion, appointed the lawyer H. as public defence counsel for the applicant. 11. On 22 April 1992 the applicant was charged with another incident of aggravated drunken driving and driving without a driver’s licence. According to the record of the police investigation, he stated that he wished the lawyer S. to be appointed as public defence counsel. 12. On 31 August 1992 the applicant was charged with yet another incident of aggravated drunken driving and driving without a driver’s licence. According to the record of the police investigation, he did not wish to be assisted by public defence counsel. 13. On 22 December 1992 the applicant was charged with causing a traffic accident, leaving the scene of the accident and driving without a driver’s licence. According to the record of the police investigation, he did not wish to be assisted by public defence counsel. 14. On 21 January 1993 the applicant was charged with possessing a knife in a public place. According to the record of the police investigation, he did not wish to be assisted by public defence counsel. 15. On 22 January 1993 the public prosecutor applied for a detention order regarding the applicant, who was suspected of attempted aggravated assault. According to the prosecutor’s application, the applicant wished to have S. as public defence counsel. At the subsequent hearing, the lawyer P.S. replaced, with the District Court’s permission, H. as public defence counsel. According to the minutes from the hearing, the applicant requested that S., a Swedish lawyer who had previously assisted him and who knew Finnish, should be appointed as his public defence counsel, whereupon the judge informed him that he should give reasons for his request in writing. The court rejected the application for a detention order and released the applicant. Subsequently he did not submit a written request for a replacement of defence counsel. 16. On 9 February 1993 the applicant was charged with attempted aggravated assault and possessing a knife in a public place. 17. When scheduling the main hearing, the District Court had telephone contact with the applicant who reiterated his request to have S. appointed as his public defence counsel. The court asked the applicant to contact H. in the matter. 18. Before the District Court the applicant apparently lodged some submissions independently of counsel H. It appears that these submissions were all in Finnish, the applicant invoking his right under the Nordic Language Convention (Nordiska språkkonventionen) to submit pleadings in his mother tongue. All the written submissions were translated into Swedish and entered into the case-file. 19. At the main hearing on 10 May 1994 the applicant was assisted by H. as public defence counsel. Neither the minutes of the hearing nor the judgment delivered in the case contains any indication that the applicant at that time expressed a wish to have his public defence counsel replaced. In addition to counsel’s oral submissions, the applicant defended himself orally in Finnish via a court-appointed interpreter. He denied some of the offences he was charged with, confessed some and declared that he neither confessed nor denied the remainder of the charges. 20. By a judgment of 24 May 1994 the applicant was convicted on all the above-mentioned counts and sentenced to 1 year and 2 months in prison. He was also ordered to pay 450 Swedish kronor (SEK) of the total litigation costs in the case. These included H.’s fees which amounted to SEK 10,395 for, inter alia, ten hours of work. The remainder of the costs was borne by the State. 21. The applicant appealed against the judgment in respect of the charges he had denied. The prosecution also appealed, seeking a more severe sentence. The prosecution stated that the applicant was in great need of public counsel for his defence, although he clearly did not wish to be represented by H. 22. On 23 August 1994, in the proceedings before the Court of Appeal (hovrätten) for Western Sweden, the applicant requested that counsel H. be replaced by S. The applicant reiterated that he had previously been assisted by S. and that he was able to communicate with him in Finnish. S. had declared that he was willing to assist the applicant as public defence counsel. 23. On 6 September 1994 the applicant’s request was refused, the appellate court considering that sufficient reasons for counsel to be replaced had not been presented. On 30 November 1994 the Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen) refused the applicant leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision. 24. As in the proceedings before the District Court, the applicant apparently lodged some submissions in Finnish before the appellate court, all of which were translated into Swedish and entered into the case-file. 25. The Court of Appeal heard the case on 22 May 1995. H. attended the hearing as the applicant’s counsel. There is no indication in the minutes of the hearing that the applicant opposed H.’s presence. Having heard H.’s oral pleadings, the Court of Appeal gave the applicant the floor via a court-appointed interpreter. 26. On 6 June 1995 the Court of Appeal upheld the applicant’s conviction and sentence. It also decided that the litigation costs in the appeal proceedings – including H.’s fees of SEK 3,455 – should be paid by the State. 27. On 23 August 1995 the Supreme Court refused the applicant leave to appeal.

5. The applicants were born in 1947, 1973 and 1977 respectively. While the first applicant lives in Sarajevo, her sons, the second and the third applicants, live in Belgrade, in Serbia. 6. On 24 June 1983 the local authorities expropriated an apartment in Sarajevo which was occupied (but not owned) by the applicants. The local planning authorities were ordered to allocate the first applicant a suitable replacement apartment. This decision entered into force on 21 October 1983. 7. On 6 April 1987 the first applicant initiated court proceedings seeking the allocation to her by the local planning authorities of a suitable replacement apartment. 8. On 29 April 1998 the Sarajevo First Municipal Court held that, while it was clear that the local planning authorities were required to allocate the first applicant a suitable replacement apartment, the courts of law had no power to designate such an apartment. The Sarajevo First Municipal Court, consequently, declined jurisdiction. This decision entered into force on 31 March 1999 when the Sarajevo Cantonal Court upheld it. 9. On 24 November 1999 the first applicant complained to the Human Rights Chamber about non-enforcement of the administrative decision of 24 June 1983. 10. On 7 May 2003 the Human Rights Chamber found breaches of Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. It ordered the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (a constituent Entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina) to allocate, or to cause the local planning authorities to allocate, to the first applicant a suitable replacement apartment at the latest within one month. The Human Rights Chamber awarded the first applicant, in pecuniary damage, 18,200 convertible marks (BAM) (approximately 9,300 euros (EUR)) plus BAM 200 (approximately EUR 100) per month from June 2003 until the end of the month in which she was to be allocated a suitable replacement apartment. She was further awarded BAM 3,000 (approximately EUR 1,550) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. Lastly, she was awarded default interest on the above amounts at an annual rate of 10%. This decision entered into force on 4 September 2003. 11. On 24 March 2005 the local planning authorities offered the first applicant a tenancy of an apartment in Sarajevo. On 31 March 2005 the applicant rejected the offer. 12. On 1 July 2005 the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina paid the following amounts to the first applicant: BAM 18,200 in respect of pecuniary damage, BAM 3,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage and default interest on the above amounts at the rate indicated in the Human Rights Chamber’s decision. 13. On 15 September 2005 the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina requested the interpretation of the order to allocate, or to cause the local planning authorities to allocate, to the first applicant a suitable replacement apartment set out in the Human Rights Chamber’s decision. 14. On 15 December 2005 the legal successor of the Human Rights Chamber, the Human Rights Commission within the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, explained that in accordance with the Human Rights Chamber’s decision the first applicant should be given ownership of a suitable apartment and not only a tenancy. 15. On 19 September 2006 the local planning authorities offered the first applicant a tenancy of the same apartment as on 24 March 2005. The applicant has not accepted the offer. 16. On 8 November 2006 the first applicant filed a criminal complaint against the Government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina (non-enforcement of a final and enforceable decision of the Human Rights Chamber constitutes a criminal offence). It would appear that no decision has been taken in that regard. 17. On 13 March 2008 the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina paid an additional amount of BAM 10,069.76 to the first applicant in respect of pecuniary damage (that is, BAM 200 per month for the period from June 2003 until September 2006 plus default interest on those monthly amounts at the rate indicated in the Human Rights Chamber’s decision).

5. The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Bratislava. 6. The applicant's family owned a plot of agricultural land located in the Prešov area. At the beginning of the 1960s the State put the land at the disposal of an agricultural cooperative. The applicant's family remained the owners of the land in name (nuda proprietas). 7. In 1964 the right to use the land was conferred on the Slovakian Union of Fruiterers and Gardeners. The area where the plot is located was turned into a “garden community” consisting of individual gardens which were put at the disposal of third parties, members of the above Union (“gardeners”). 8. On 14 January 2000 the gardeners requested under section 7(1) of Law no. 64/1997 that the ownership relationship in respect of their gardens be settled by the Prešov District Office in a land consolidation procedure under section 7(4) of that Act. 9. On 10 January 2002 the District Office made a formal announcement under section 18(1) of Law no. 64/1997 of the commencement of the land consolidation procedure under section 7(4) of the Act. The announcement contained a register of the original ownership and a surveyor's plan concerning the current state of the land (“the preliminary inventory”). 10. Three land owners objected to the preliminary inventory. The applicant's legal predecessor, Ms J. Salusová, objected that she did not own one of the plots concerned. On 17 June 2002 the District Office dismissed the objection, as the propriety certificate clearly indicated that she co-owned the relevant plot. 11. On 3 October 2002 the District Office approved the preliminary inventory under section 9(4) of Law no. 64/1997. 12. On 27 October 2002 Ms J. Salusová died. On 20 May 2003 a notary authorised by a court confirmed that the applicant had inherited a share in Ms J. Salusová's land used by the gardeners. 13. On 13 February 2003 the applicant complained to the Constitutional Court that Law no. 64/1997 ran contrary to his constitutional right to own property. On 28 February 2003 a constitutional judge informed the applicant that individuals lack standing to initiate proceedings concerning conflict of laws. 14. In a letter of 21 March 2003 the District Office invited the applicant under section 10(1) of Law no. 64/1997 to state whether he preferred to be compensated by being granted a substitute plot or paid an amount of money in lieu in respect of his title to the plot. The letter contained a list of specific plots that the administrator of the State's real property, the Slovak Real Estate Fund, had proposed as possible substitute plots in the applicant's case. In response, on 9 May 2003, the applicant rejected the proposed plots. 15. On 5 August 2003 the District Office decided on the compensation for the landowners. The decision was not subject to appeal. It was envisaged that the gardeners would subsequently acquire title to their gardens. 16. On 27 January 2004 public prosecutor lodged an objection and proposed that the administrative authority quash its decision on the matter of compensation, since one of the landowners had been omitted from the procedure. On 26 February 2004 the District Land Office in Prešov granted the objection. Subsequently it took further steps with a view to eliminating shortcomings in the procedure. 17. On 10 April 2006 the Slovak Real Estate Fund proposed new substitute lands as the release of the former substitute lands was suspended. 18. On 3 July 2007 two other heirs of Ms J. Salusová asserted their right in respect of their predecessor's land. On 18 September 2007 they informed the administrative authority that they did not accept the substitute land offered to them. 19. On 4 December 2008 the District Land Office delivered a new decision on compensation under sections 10(3)(a) and 11 of Law no. 64/1997. It indicates that the applicant is to receive 423.72 euros (EUR) for 1,702 square metres of land owned by him. That amount corresponds to EUR 0.249 per square metre. 20. The plots in issue have been entered in land register as arable land and grass-grown land. They were originally outside the town's built-up area. The Prešov municipality's zoning plan approved on 30 January 2008 indicates that the area including the applicant's land now falls within a zone designated for family housing. The relevant entry in the register was amended and indicates that the plots are within the built-up area of Prešov. 21. On 5 April 2009 the Forensic Engineering Institute in Žilina, at the Government's request, made a valuation of the applicant's land used by the gardeners. The opinion states, inter alia, that the land is situated within the constructible area of the town of Prešov, which is the seat of regional authorities and institutions. It is located some two kilometres from the bus and railway station. There is a fifteen metre-wide protection zone on the land along an aerial high-voltage line. Part of the land is situated on a steep slope. 22. The experts noted that four gardens in the area had been put up for sale at prices of between EUR 24.22 and EUR 39.25 per square metre. However, the price included also the gardeners' investments, such as huts, vegetation and other facilities. The institution concluded that the market value of the land was EUR 7.67 per square metre and its rental value EUR 0.532 per square metre a year. 23. The applicant disagreed with that valuation as it did not reflect the actual value of his land. In particular, he objected that only one method had been used. The experts had failed to take into account his land's development potential in view of the existing zoning plan. A contract submitted by the applicant indicates that on 27 August 2008 he and other co-owners had sold different land situated in the vicinity of that which the gardeners use, for the equivalent of EUR 33.19 per square metre. Finally, the applicant argued that the aerial power line had been erected without the consent of the landowners. It could not be ruled out that the line would be removed in the near future.

4. Ms Valentyna Mykolayivna Derkach, is a Ukrainian national, who was born in 1962. Mr Mykola Ivanovych Palek, is also a Ukrainian national, who was born in 1957. Both applicants reside in the town of Vyshgorod, Ukraine. 5. In 2001-2002 the applicants instituted separate sets of proceedings in the domestic local courts seeking the recovery of salary arrears and other payments against their former employer-the State-owned “Atomspetsbud” company which carried out construction work in Chernobyl, more precisely in the zone subject to compulsory evacuation. 6. By a decision of the Vyshgorodsky District Court of Kiev Region of 5 March 2002, Ms Valentyna Derkach was awarded UAH 9,133 (the equivalent of 1,405.08 euros [“EUR”]) in salary arrears and compensation. The decision came into force. On 22 April 2002 the Slavutsky District Department of the State Bailiffs' Service initiated enforcement proceedings. 7. By a decision of the Vyshgorodsky District Court of Kiev Region of 15 May 2002, Mr Mykola Palek was awarded UAH 15,476 (the equivalent of EUR 2,380.92) in salary arrears and compensation. The decision came into force. On 8 August 2002 the Bailiffs' Service instituted enforcement proceedings. 8. On 29 June 2002 the Ministry of Energy decided to wind-up the debtor company, given its unprofitability. On 18 July 2002 a liquidation commission was established. 9. In December 2002 the writs of execution in both cases were forwarded to the liquidation commission. 10. The judgments remain unenforced, in particular due to the fact that the debtor's property could not be attached to enforce the judgments. Attachment would have required a special authorisation of the Ministry for Emergencies due to the location of the debtor's property in the Chernobyl area, contaminated by radiation. Authorisation was not granted.

7. On the night of 2 December 1997 a customer of a bar was brutally beaten up after leaving with a friend to go home. The friend who accompanied him witnessed the start of the attack from a distance. The victim later died from his injuries. 8. A preliminary investigation into the murder was opened on the following day. 9. On 11 December 1997 the applicant, who had also been in the bar on the night in question, was arrested and questioned by the police. He signed a statement confessing to having beaten the victim, which he subsequently retracted claiming that it was extracted from him under duress. 10. On 12 December 1997 the applicant was charged with murder and detained on remand. Immediately thereafter, the applicant was questioned by an investigator. In the presence of a State-appointed attorney and after having been informed of his right not to give testimony the applicant reiterated the statement he had given on the previous day and made a full confession. 11. During the preliminary investigation various witnesses were questioned, DNA tests were performed on the applicant's clothes and a crime scene experiment was conducted. Various experts' opinions were also obtained, such as to assess the applicant's physical and mental state, as well as his eyesight. A medical examination of the victim was also conducted. In addition, an agronomical expertise was commissioned to determine what the foliage cover of the trees was at the time of the murder and whether that could have impaired the witness's line of sight. A meteorological expertise was also obtained to assess whether the weather could have had a similar hampering effect. 12. On an unspecified date, the Prosecutor's Office filed an indictment for murder against the applicant with the Plovdiv Regional Court. 13. Subsequently, the Plovdiv Regional Court remitted the case back to the investigation stage on at least two occasions. 14. Revised indictments were entered against the applicant on 13 January and 14 October 1999. The final indictment against the applicant was for murder with extreme viciousness. The prosecution claimed that the applicant had beaten up the victim after he had refused to lend him money to pay his bill in the bar. 15. The Plovdiv Regional Court conducted six hearings between 30 January and 3 December 2001. 16. In a judgment of 3 December 2001 the Plovdiv Regional Court, acting as the court of first instance, acquitted the applicant. According to the minutes, it then ordered his release, but imposed a restriction on him not to leave his place of residence without the permission of the Prosecutor's Office. The court considered that it was unclear whether the applicant's confession was given voluntarily. Assessing it in the light of the other evidence and witnesses' statements, the court found that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the applicant. 17. The Prosecutor's Office appealed against the judgment on 18 December 2001. 18. It is unclear how many hearings were conducted before the Plovdiv Court of Appeals. 19. In a judgment of 20 September 2004 the Plovdiv Court of Appeals quashed the lower-court's judgment and examined the case on the merits. It found the applicant guilty of murder with extreme viciousness, sentenced him to seventeen years' imprisonment and ordered that he pay damages to the victim's family. In reaching its decision, the Plovdiv Court of Appeals found that the first-instance court had given too much weight to the applicant's assertions that his confession had been extracted under duress, which it considered to be unsubstantiated. In addition, it found the applicant's version of the events on the night of the murder to be in contradiction with the other evidence in the case and to be in conflict with his actions on the next day when he tried to hide the clothes he had worn on the previous night and, subsequently, when he presented the police with other garments for examination. 20. On an unspecified date the applicant filed a cassation appeal against the judgment. 21. It is unclear whether and when the applicant's appeal was examined by the Supreme Court of Cassation. 22. The applicant was arrested by the police on 11 December 1997 and questioned. 23. On the next day, 12 December 1997, he was detained on remand by order of an investigator, which was confirmed by the Prosecutor's Office later on the same day. The applicant was assisted by a State-appointed attorney. The grounds for detaining him on remand, as stated in the decision of the investigator, were that “there is a danger that the charged may abscond or re-offend”. 24. The applicant's detention was confirmed by a prosecutor on 11 May 1998 without citing any grounds. 25. At the latest, the trial stage of the criminal proceedings against the applicant began on 14 October 1999. 26. The applicant made several unsuccessful appeals against his detention. Information was provided only about some of them. 27. The applicant's appeals dating from 18 June, 2 September and some time at the beginning of November 1999 were dismissed by the Plovdiv Regional Court on 13 July, 15 September and 5 November 1999, respectively. Separately, an appeal dated 16 September 1999 was rejected on the next day by a judge-rapporteur of the Plovdiv Regional Court because he found that it had been filed only one day after the court had ruled on a previous appeal and considered that there was a lack of new circumstances justifying a new right of appeal. 28. In each of his appeals, the applicant petitioned for his release and argued that there was no risk that he would abscond, re-offend or obstruct the investigation, because he had a permanent address, had no prior criminal record, was the main breadwinner in the family, the financial and living conditions of his wife and children had worsened, the two-year maximum period of pre-trial detention under Section 152 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“CCP”) was being violated and, in any case, that there was insufficient evidence that he had perpetrated the offence. 29. In its decisions to dismiss the applicant's appeals the Plovdiv Regional Court found that there was a risk that the applicant might abscond, re-offend or obstruct the investigation essentially because he was charged with a serious intentional offence. In respect of the claimed violation of the two-year maximum period of pre-trial detention the court found that it had not been exceeded because that period concerned only detention pending the investigation stage of the proceedings and was not applicable to detention at the trial stage. 30. The Plovdiv Regional Court explicitly refused to examine the specific evidence in the case as to whether there was a reasonable suspicion against the applicant. In its decision of 13 July 1999 it stated that “[t]he court does not find it necessary to consider the evidence in substance....” 31. Similarly in its decision of 15 September 1999 it considered that “[t]he court cannot go into the specifics of the case and examine the collected evidence in the context of the [present] proceedings....” 32. On an unspecified date in 2000 the applicant filed another appeal against his detention under the rules introduced on 1 January 2000. 33. On 11 May 2000 the Plovdiv Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, with reasoning similar to that contained in the previous decisions of the Plovdiv Regional Court. 34. On 29 August 2001 the applicant appealed before the Supreme Court of Cassation against the aforementioned decision of the Plovdiv Court of Appeals of 11 May 2000. The basis for the appeal was paragraph 19 of the Amendments to the CCP promulgated on 27 April 2001. 35. On 24 September 2001 the Supreme Court of Cassation refused to initiate cassation proceedings. It found that it was not competent to review the lawfulness of a detention at the trial stage. 36. The applicant was released on 3 December 2001 by virtue of the judgment of the Plovdiv Regional Court.

4. The applicants were born in 1931 and 1958 and live in Oulu and Espoo respectively. 5. The applicants are father and son. On 17 June 2000 they were involved in an incident in which the first applicant was attacked by a group of men. The second applicant went to his rescue. They both sustained injuries and the second applicant's camera and mobile phone were broken. 6. The applicants filed a criminal complaint with the police on that same date. On the following day, one of the alleged attackers filed a criminal complaint against the second applicant alleging that he had kicked and hit him during the incident. 7. On 19 June 2000 the police questioned the second applicant as an injured party. He then informed the police that he would make a claim for damages in the court proceedings. At the end of the interview the police took a brief statement from the second applicant in respect of the criminal complaint filed against him. He did not contest the alleged conduct but maintained that it had been justified. 8. On 6 July 2000 the police questioned the first applicant as an injured party. He also informed the police about his intention to make a claim for damages in the court proceedings. 9. On 19 March 2003 the second applicant was again questioned by the police. He was first heard as a suspect and then as a victim. 10. On 8 July 2003 the public prosecutor filed an application for a summons with the Iisalmi District Court (käräjäoikeus, tingsrätten). Charges were brought against two persons, L. and R., for robbery. R. was also charged with having physically assaulted the second applicant. The second applicant, for his part, was charged with having physically assaulted L. The applicants later joined the charges as far as they were the alleged victims. 11. On 23 September 2003 the first applicant submitted to the court a specified claim for damages. Apparently the second applicant also filed such a claim prior to the trial. 12. On 4 May 2005 the District Court held an oral hearing during which it received witness testimonies and written evidence. 13. On 1 June 2005 the court issued its judgment. It found that L. and R. had used physical violence against the first applicant. They were convicted of assault and sentenced to a fine respectively. They were also ordered to pay the first applicant some EUR 400 in damages and the second applicant EUR 300 for the camera. The court further found that the second applicant had physically assaulted L. for the purpose of defending his father. As he had used more violence than had been necessary in the circumstances, he was convicted of assault and sentenced to a 30 days' conditional prison term. He was also ordered to pay damages to L. The court dismissed the charge concerning the alleged assault against the second applicant for lack of evidence. 14. Both applicants appealed against the judgment to the Itä-Suomi Court of Appeal (hovioikeus, hovrätten) renewing their initial claims regarding punishment and damages, in so far as they had been rejected by the District Court. The second applicant also requested that he be acquitted or, in the alternative, exempted from punishment and liability in damages. On 18 September 2007, having held an oral hearing, the court came to the same conclusion as the District Court. It upheld the lower court's judgment giving some further reasons of its own. 15. On 11 April 2008 the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen) refused the applicants leave to appeal.

8. The applicant was born in 1928 and lives in Cielcza, Poland. 9. The realities of the international situation following the end of the Second World War prevented the Republic of Poland from asserting any claims arising out of persecution of its citizens, including as forced labourers, by Nazi Germany. 10. In the period immediately following the Second World War, Poland did not conclude a specific agreement with Germany regarding the issue of reparations. It relied on the Potsdam Agreement of 1 August 1945, concluded by the governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 11. On 27 February 1953 the London Agreement on German External Debts (the London Debt Agreement) was concluded by the United States of America, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union. Under this Agreement, consideration of claims arising out of the Second World War by countries that had been at war with, or were occupied by, Germany, and by nationals of such countries, against the Reich or agencies of the Reich was deferred until the final settlement of the issue of reparations. 12. On 23 August 1953, the day after a similar declaration by the government of the Soviet Union, the government of Poland declared that it renounced any claims against Germany in respect of war reparations as of 1 January 1954. In a declaration of 27 September 1969 made at the United Nations, the government of Poland clarified that the renouncement of 1953 did not affect individual claims arising out of unlawful acts. 13. It was only after the conclusion of the Treaty on the Final Settlement with respect to Germany of 12 September 1990 (the so‑called Two‑Plus‑Four Treaty) and the conclusion of two treaties between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Poland in 1990[1] and 1991[2] that the issue of persons persecuted by the Nazi regime was addressed in the bilateral agreement of 16 October 1991 (see paragraph 28 below). 14. The applicant was subjected to forced labour during the Second World War on the territory of occupied Poland. In February and March 1941 he worked on a German farm near Cielcza. Subsequently, from April 1941 to April/May 1944, the applicant worked as a forest labourer in Cielcza. Finally, he was relocated to an area situated 200 kilometres from his habitual place of residence, where he was required to reinforce German defences from May/June 1944 to 26 January 1945. In February 1944 the applicant reached the age of 16. 15. On 20 October 1993 the applicant applied to the Polish-German Reconciliation Foundation (Fundacja Polsko‑Niemieckie Pojednanie – “the Foundation”) for compensation on account of his forced labour from the funds contributed by the government of the Federal Republic of Germany under the Agreement of 16 October 1991 (see paragraphs 28-29 below). On 2 February 1994 the Foundation’s Verification Commission (Komisja Weryfikacyjna), having regard to a document issued by the social security authorities, established that the applicant had been subjected to forced labour from February 1941 to January 1945 and awarded him 1,050 Polish zlotys (PLN) in compensation. This payment was granted within the framework of the “primary payments scheme” (wypłaty podstawowe). The issue of deportation was apparently not addressed in the decision. The applicant’s subsequent appeal against this decision was dismissed by the Appeal Verification Commission (Odwoławcza Komisja Weryfikacyjna) on an unspecified date. The Appeal Verification Commission found that the amount of payment granted to the applicant had been calculated correctly. 16. On an unspecified date in 1999 the Foundation’s management board (Zarząd Fundacji) adopted Resolution no. 29/99, which introduced a deportation requirement for claimants who had been forced labourers. The resolution also provided that those claimants who had been subjected to forced labour as children under the age of 16 could be granted compensation regardless of whether the deportation condition was met (see paragraph 35 below). 17. On 2 March 2000, following the adoption of Resolution no. 29/99, the Foundation’s Verification Commission granted the applicant a supplementary payment of PLN 365. The decision on supplementary payment related to the applicant’s forced labour as a child under the age of 16 ( from April 1941 to February 1944). Thus, the period of forced labour from March 1944 to January 1945 was not taken into account because the deportation condition as defined in Resolution no. 29/99 had not been met. The period of forced labour from February to March 1941 was not acknowledged in the absence of appropriate evidence. 18. On 12 March 2000 the applicant appealed against that decision to the Appeal Verification Commission, challenging the amount of compensation granted. It appears that the applicant complained that the period of his forced labour between May/June 1944 and 26 January 1945, carried out in particularly harsh conditions connected with his relocation, was not taken into account by the Verification Commission. Having received no reply to his appeal, the applicant made further enquiries with the Foundation on 31 October 2000 and 3 January 2001. 19. In the meantime, the applicant had lodged a complaint with the Ombudsman regarding the Foundation’s inactivity. On 4 April 2001 the Ombudsman informed the applicant that, regrettably, he was not in a position to question the lawfulness of resolutions adopted by the Polish‑German Reconciliation Foundation or any other foundation. The Polish‑German Reconciliation Foundation was established in accordance with the Foundations Act of 6 April 1984. In this particular case, the Foundation operated under the supervision of the Minister of the State Treasury. However, the Ombudsman could not interfere with the Foundation’s actions as long as they complied with its statute and other legal regulations. The Ombudsman also referred to the Supreme Court’s decision of 31 March 1998, which refused to recognise the Polish-German Reconciliation Foundation as a public administration body (see paragraphs 41‑42 below). 20. By a letter of 24 April 2001, the President of the Foundation’s Appeal Verification Commission informed the applicant that, under the Foundation’s internal regulations in force at the material time (Resolution no. 29/99), only forced labourers deported to the Third Reich or to an area occupied by the German Reich (with the exception of the territory of occupied Poland) were eligible for compensation. Finally, the applicant was informed that no further appeal lay against the decision of the Appeal Verification Commission. 21. Nevertheless, on an unspecified later date, the applicant lodged a complaint against the decision of the Appeal Verification Commission of 24 April 2001 with the Supreme Administrative Court (Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny). It appears that in his complaint the applicant also challenged Resolution no. 29/99. 22. On 14 December 2001 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint, considering it inadmissible in law. It relied on Decision no. OPS 3/01, adopted by the Supreme Administrative Court on 3 December 2001 (see paragraph 45 below). 23. In a letter dated 23 September 2002, the Minister of the State Treasury informed the applicant that, in order for a forced labourer to be granted compensation, it was necessary for him to comply with the deportation requirement as specified in Resolution no. 29/99 of the Foundation’s management board. 24. On 21 November 2000 the applicant applied to the Foundation for compensation under the scheme for slave and forced labourers (the second compensation scheme), established under the Joint Statement of 17 July 2000, the German Law of 2 August 2000 on the creation of the Remembrance, Responsibility and Future Foundation (“the German Foundation Act”) and the subsequent Agreement of 16 February 2001 between the Remembrance, Responsibility and Future Foundation and the Polish-German Reconciliation Foundation (see paragraph 37 below). On 17 April 2001 the Foundation’s Verification Commission rejected his request on the ground that he did not satisfy the deportation requirement set out in section 11(1)2 of the German Foundation Act. It appears that the applicant did not appeal against the decision of the Verification Commission of 17 April 2001. The applicant’s subsequent complaints to the Minister of the State Treasury were to no avail. 25. In a letter dated 28 June 2005, the Foundation’s management board, referring to the Court’s admissibility decision in the present case, informed the applicant that its Resolution no. 29/99 of 18 August 1999 concerning interpretation of the term “deportation” had never restricted or violated his rights to receive a benefit, for the following reasons: (a) the applicant did not comply with the deportation requirement specified in Resolution no. 27/92 of 17 August 1992, under which deportation was defined as “deportation outside one’s place of permanent residence into the territory of the Third Reich combined with performing labour for the benefit of the Third Reich”; (b) the granting of compensation within the framework of the so-called primary payments for the period between February 1941 and January 1945 had been in breach of the Foundation’s regulations, namely Resolution no. 27/92; (c) thus, the applicant should have received compensation solely for the period up to February 1944, namely, for the period until his 16th birthday, since he had never complied with the deportation requirement as specified in Resolution no. 27/92; (d) the Foundation’s error committed in respect of the primary payment was rectified within the framework of the supplementary payments, and thus it could not be said that the applicant’s rights were restricted or breached. 26. The applicant was further informed that, since he had resided and performed forced labour on the territory of Wielkopolska province which, known as Warthegau province at the time, was annexed by the Third Reich in October 1939, the obligation to perform forced labour in the area of the applicant’s residence (his first workplace was located 10 km from his place of residence and the second – Cielcza forest – was in his habitual place of residence) could not be considered as deportation with a view to performing forced labour. Similarly, the obligation to reinforce German defences on Polish territories annexed by the Third Reich was not considered “deportation” under Resolution no. 27/92. Lastly, the applicant was informed that in cases such as his, when the Foundation had made an error in favour of a claimant, the consequences of that error were borne by the Foundation, which had never claimed reimbursement of the overpaid amounts.

4. The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Somlóvásárhely, Hungary. 5. On 6 May 1993 the applicant's wife requested the Ajka District Court to hold a preliminary hearing with a view to instituting divorce proceedings. In turn, on 7 July 1993 the applicant brought an action before the District Court claiming maintenance for the couple's son, who was at the time in the applicant's care. The District Court held hearings on the maintenance claim on 13 September and 3 November 1993. On the latter date the applicant's wife formally filed for divorce. The divorce proceedings were subsequently joined to the claim for maintenance. 6. In the joined proceedings, hearings took place on 27 April, 17 June, 16 September and 31 October 1994, 3 February and 5 April 1995. 7. On the latter date the District Court pronounced, in a partial decision, the couple's divorce. In line with the parties' agreement, it granted the mother custody of their son. The court ordered the applicant to pay maintenance, regulated his right of access to the boy and ordered the parties to share the use of their flat which was in common ownership. The court relied on the testimonies of numerous witnesses, including a social worker, the applicant's two step-children born out of the mother's previous marriage, and the couple's son. 8. On the applicant's appeal of 12 May 1995, the Veszprém County Regional Court held a hearing on 26 September 1995. At a hearing on 10 October 1995 the Regional Court allowed the applicant's appeal and amended the District Court's decision in the part concerning the amount of maintenance and the details of his access rights. 9. On 13 December 1995 the proceedings were resumed before the District Court in respect of the division of the matrimonial property. A hearing was held on 13 December 1995. A further hearing took place on 21 February 1996. On the latter date the District Court decided to obtain various expert opinions. 10. On 31 May and 23 July 1996, respectively, property and valuation experts submitted their opinions. 11. At a hearing on 18 October 1996 the District Court appointed a motor-vehicle expert to prepare an opinion. On 12 December 1996 the expert was urged to submit his opinion. On 31 December 1996 the expert informed the court that the applicant could not be located at the address notified to him. On 17 February 1997 the expert was requested to submit an opinion as soon as possible. On 27 February 1997 the expert submitted his opinion. 12. Further hearings were held on 28 April, 12 May and 17 November 1997. Meanwhile, on 6 June 1997 the applicant requested further expert evidence to be taken. Although it experienced difficulties in finding an expert jeweller, the District Court finally appointed one on 27 February 1998 and requested the parties to contact him. On 30 July 1998 the expert submitted his opinion. 13. On 28 September 1998 an expert psychologist submitted his opinion. A hearing scheduled for 28 October 1998 was adjourned at the applicant's request. 14. The next hearing took place on 20 January 1999. The District Court ordered the property expert to complete his opinion of 31 May 1996, taking into account any possible changes which might have occurred in the meantime. On 19 March 1999 the District Court requested the expert to proceed as a matter of urgency. On 24 March 1999 the expert submitted his opinion, which was based on an on-site inspection of the property. 15. Further hearings took place on 27 September and 25 October 1999. On the latter date both the applicant and his representative failed to appear before the court. Meanwhile, the District Court made enquiries with the parties' bank as regards the mortgage situation of their flat. On 29 October 1999 the court requested the parties to waive their rights to secrecy in respect of their bank details. The waivers were sent to the bank on 17 November 1999. On 28 December 1999 the District Court made a further enquiry with the bank as regards payments transferred from the parties' bank account to cover housing expenses. On 24 January 2000 the District Court ordered the applicant to submit his waiver in the form required by the bank. The bank submitted the requested banking details on 27 March 2000. 16. At the hearings of April and 22 May 2000 several witnesses were heard on the use of the parties' flat. On the latter date the District Court carried out an inspection of the flat. 17. On 13 December 2000 the District Court ruled on the division of the matrimonial property. On 20 and 27 December 2000, respectively, the applicant and the defendant appealed. 18. The Veszprém County Regional Court held hearings on 20 February, 1 and 20 March 2001. During this period the parties were involved in negotiations aimed at reaching an agreement on the sale of their flat. On the parties' joint request of 28 March 2001, the Regional Court discontinued the proceedings on 3 April 2001 and annulled the decision of 13 December 2000.

9. The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in İzmir. 10. Until 1985 he lived in Germany, where he completed part of his schooling. He subsequently moved to Turkey, where he continued his education, eventually going on to university. 11. In 1993 he became an active member of the Association of Opponents of War (Savaş Karşıtları Derneği – “the SKD”), founded in 1992. Until late 1993 he represented the SKD at various international conferences in different countries. After the SKD was dissolved in November 1993 the İzmir Association of Opponents of War (İzmir Savaş Karşıtları Derneği – “the ISKD”) was founded and the applicant served as its chairman from 1994 to 1998. 12. In August 1995 the applicant was called up. Invoking his pacifist convictions, he refused to perform military service and publicly burned his call-up papers at a press conference in İzmir on 1 September 1995. 13. On 8 October 1996 he was arrested. On 18 October 1996 he was indicted by the military prosecutor attached to the Ankara Military Court of the General Staff (“the General Staff Court”), under Article 155 of the Criminal Code and Article 58 of the Military Penal Code, on a charge of inciting conscripts to evade military service. 14. In a judgment of 28 January 1997 the Ankara General Staff Court sentenced the applicant, on the basis of the indictment of 18 October 1996, to six months’ imprisonment and to a fine. The court also found that the applicant was a deserter and made an order requesting the military prosecutor attached to that court to enlist him. 15. On 3 March 1997 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. In his grounds of appeal he relied on, among other provisions, Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention, claiming that he was a conscientious objector. 16. In a judgment of 3 July 1997 the Military Court of Cassation upheld the first-instance judgment. 17. In the meantime, on 22 November 1996, the applicant was transferred to the 9th Regiment, attached to the Bilecik gendarmerie command. He refused to wear military uniform or carry out the orders of the regiment’s commanding officer. He was detained in the regimental prison, where he refused to wear prison uniform. 18. On 26 November 1996 the military prosecutor at the Court of the Eskişehir Tactical Air Forces Command (“the Command Court”) indicted the applicant on a charge of “persistent disobedience” and sought his conviction under Article 87 of the Military Penal Code. 19. Ruling on the applicant’s refusal to wear prison uniform, the Command Court, in a judgment of 2 December 1996 after urgent proceedings, restricted his right to receive visitors for fifteen days, as a disciplinary measure. 20. Ultimately, in a judgment of 6 March 1997, the Command Court sentenced him to five months’ imprisonment for persistent disobedience. 21. On 4 July 1997 the Military Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of 6 March 1997. 22. In the meantime, the applicant had failed to rejoin his regiment after being released on 27 December 1996. He was arrested and remanded in custody. 23. He was indicted on 7 March 1997 by the military prosecutor at the Command Court, on charges of desertion and “persistent disobedience”. 24. In a judgment of 23 October 1997 the Command Court sentenced the applicant to ten months’ imprisonment and to a fine. 25. In the meantime, on 29 May 1997, he had been released on the condition that he rejoined his regiment on 31 May to perform his military service. As he failed to do so he was arrested on 9 October 1997 and transferred to Eskişehir prison to serve the sentence imposed by the Command Court on 6 March 1997. 26. In an indictment of 16 October 1997 the military prosecutor at the Command Court called for the applicant’s conviction for desertion between 31 May 1997 and 9 October 1997. 27. In a judgment of 22 January 1998 the Command Court sentenced the applicant to ten months’ imprisonment on the basis of the charges in the bill of indictment. 28. In a judgment of 30 September 1998 the Military Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of 22 January 1998. 29. On 26 January 1998 the applicant was escorted to his regiment at Bilecik. He was arrested for refusing to wear military uniform. 30. In a judgment of 11 June 1998 the Command Court sentenced him to seven months and fifteen days’ imprisonment on account of incidents that had occurred on 28 January 1998. 31. On 7 October 1998 the Military Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of 11 June 1998. 32. After being escorted back to his regiment on 20 March 1998, the applicant was arrested on 21 March 1998 for refusing to wear his military uniform. 33. In a judgment of 4 May 1998 the Command Court sentenced him to seven months and fifteen days’ imprisonment for “persistent disobedience” on 20 and 21 March 1998. 34. In a judgment of 7 October 1998 the Military Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of 4 May 1998. 35. In the meantime, on 4 May 1998, the applicant was sent back to his regiment, where he refused to wear military uniform. 36. In a judgment of 11 June 1998 the Command Court sentenced him to seven months and fifteen days’ imprisonment on account of the incidents of 4 May 1998. 37. In a judgment of 7 October 1998 the Military Court of Cassation upheld the first-instance judgment of 11 June 1998. 38. The applicant was released on 24 November 1998 and transferred to his regiment, but once again refused to wear military uniform. 39. He was prosecuted and arrested on account of the incidents of 24 November 1998, and on 26 November 1998 the Command Court sentenced him to seven months and fifteen days’ imprisonment. 40. In a judgment of 22 September 1999 the military Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of 26 November 1998. 41. The applicant served a total of 701 days in prison as a result of the above sentences, with the exception of the prison sentence imposed after his last conviction. He is wanted by the security forces for the execution of his sentence and is currently in hiding. He is no longer active in the association or in any other political activity. He has no official address and has broken off all contact with the authorities. He has been accommodated by his fiancée’s family. He has been unable to marry her legally or to recognise the son born to them.

8. The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Athens. 9. On 25 April 1987 she got married and on 23 January 1988 gave birth to a daughter. 10. On 19 November 1996 the applicant left the matrimonial home and went to England, leaving her daughter with her husband. 11. On 6 February 1997 the applicant's husband lodged an interlocutory application with the Athens Court of First Instance for an interim-custody order. On 1 March 1997 the applicant filed a cross-application for interim custody. 12. On 2 May 1997 the Court of First Instance made an interim order granting custody of the child to the father (judgment no. 11208/1997). 13. On 12 January 1998 it made a final order granting the father custody (judgment no. 1/1998). An appeal by the applicant against that judgment was dismissed by the Athens Court of Appeal on 29 February 2000 (judgment no. 1559/2000). The applicant did not appeal on points of law against that judgment. 14. In the meantime, on 9 and 23 May 1997 the applicant and her ex-husband each applied to the Athens Court of First Instance for interim orders concerning access. The hearing of the applicant's application, which was initially scheduled for 28 May 1997, was adjourned to 9 July 1997 so that it could be examined with the father's application. 15. On 6 June 1997 the applicant made a further application, seeking an order requiring her ex-husband to bring the child to her house. On the same day the judge issued an order granting the applicant interim access every Saturday from 10 a.m. to 2 p.m. On Saturday 7 June 1997 the applicant's former husband failed to comply with that order. On 9 June 1997 he asked the court to set aside the judge's interim order, which it did on 10 June 1997 (judgment no. 15142/1997). 16. In a medical report dated 26 June 1997, three psychologists who had examined the child and her father but not the applicant stated that the child was suffering from “physical negligence and abandonment by her mother, a denial of love and affection, and indifference to her achievements and the activities she was involved in”. They concluded that keeping “a distance from her mother temporarily would contribute to suppressing the child's negative feelings”. 17. After the hearing on 9 July 1997, the Court of First Instance delivered its judgment on 30 July 1997. In particular, it held: “On 19 November 1996, after the breakdown of the marital relationship between the parties, [the applicant] left the matrimonial home...and settled temporarily in Bristol, England, without giving any sign of life until 17 December 1996. She did not contact her daughter, who was constantly in tears and desperate to find her mother, being unable to understand her long absence. When the child visited her mother on 17 December 1996 at the hotel where she was staying in Bristol, [the applicant] left her alone in the room and went away, leaving the child with feelings of intense fear and insecurity ...It should also be noted that in early May 1997 the applicant, who had already returned to Greece and was accompanied by her mother, visited her daughter's school in order to meet her teachers; when her daughter saw her in the playground she ran away terrified, calling out for her teachers to help her and protect her from her mother. On the other hand, the applicant has a university education, moral principles and a high standard of living; for the whole period when they lived together as a family until the moment she left the matrimonial home, [the applicant] showed an interest in and took care of her daughter, whom she undoubtedly loves excessively.” Taking into account the above circumstances and the interest of the child, the court decided that the child should stay with her mother once a week and for some days during the school holidays (judgment no. 21171/1997). 18. On 2 August 1997 the applicant spent the day with her daughter. 19. On 6 August 1997 the applicant's former husband asked the court to review its decision in judgment no. 21171/1997. The hearing took place on 8 August 1997. On 9 August 1997 the child was brought to her mother's house, but refused to stay with her. On 11 August 1997 the court confirmed the previous arrangement for visiting rights but reduced the number of days the child could spend with her mother during the summer holidays, so as to take into account holiday plans that had been made by the child's father and her paternal grandparents. The court found that the applicant was a highly educated person “with moral principles” and that “she loved her daughter” (judgment no. 22372/1997). 20. On 23 August the child was brought to the applicant's house but again refused to stay with her. The applicant and her daughter were then taken to the Syntagma Square Police Station, where, under unspecified circumstances, the applicant kicked her daughter and tore out clumps of her hair. 21. On 27 August and 23 September 1997 the applicant's former husband sought a review of judgments nos. 21171/1997 and 22372/1997. He also asked for the applicant's visiting rights to be provisionally suspended. The judge granted his applications and suspended the applicant's visiting rights without hearing prior representations from the applicant. 22. On 24 September 1997 the applicant appealed against the order suspending her visiting rights. On 29 September 1997 the judge dismissed her appeal (judgment no. 26451/1997). 23. On 11 December 1997 the Court of First Instance stated that it was essential for the child to have contact with her mother and that the father was under a duty to facilitate such contact. It found that the child's reluctance to see her mother was due to the behaviour of her father, who had involved the child in his own disputes and problems with the applicant (judgment no. 34780/1997). 24. On 16 December 1997 the applicant issued a summons against her former husband requiring him to comply with judgment no. 34780/1997, but to no avail. 25. In the meantime, the applicant asked the juvenile-court public prosecutor to intervene in order to facilitate communications with her daughter. On 30 December 1997 the Public Prosecutor referred the matter to the Psychiatric Department of the Athens Children's Hospital, where a psychiatrist examined both parents and the child. In her report dated 25 June 1998, the psychiatrist noted: “It has been difficult to see the mother who has been cancelling the appointments” and stated: “If [the child's] psychological problems are to be alleviated, it is necessary for her to be reunited with her mother and to have regular contact with her”. The psychiatrist also proposed specific measures in order to ensure the child's well-being (such as a psychological assessment of both parents and individual psychotherapy of the child at least once a week). The psychiatrist's report was sent to the public prosecutor, who took no further action. The authorities refused to give the applicant a copy of the report on the ground that it was confidential. The applicant obtained a copy only on 22 February 2002. 26. On 3 January 1998 the applicant's former husband brought his daughter to the applicant's house, but she refused to stay with her mother. 27. On 12 May 1998 the applicant asked the court to take formal note that her former husband had deliberately prevented her from having contact with the child from 9 August 1997 to 19 April 1998. On 26 February 1999 the court dismissed the applicant's request on the ground that the child did not want to see her mother and that the father was not responsible for the lack of contact (judgment no. 493/1999). 28. On 3 May 1999 the applicant appealed. On 12 February 2001 the court of appeal dismissed her appeal. It found that the applicant was not able to have access to her daughter owing to the latter's absolute refusal to see her mother, which in turn was the result of the child's feelings of distress after the applicant's departure from the family home. The child's father was doing all he could to reunite the family. Moreover, the applicant lived almost permanently abroad and it was therefore in any event impossible for her to visit her daughter once a week. The interest of the child should prevail and further strain on her mental health should be avoided at all costs (judgment no. 971/2001). 29. On 25 June 2001 the applicant appealed on points of law. The hearing took place on 15 January 2002. On 7 March 2002 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant's appeal as ill-founded (judgment no. 429/2002). 30. On 16 February 1998 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against her former husband alleging that he had obstructed her contact with her daughter. On 10 May 1999 the Athens Criminal Court, sitting with a single judge, found the applicant's former husband not guilty (judgment no. 55770/1999), holding in particular: “The child reacts to any contact with her mother, after the latter abandoned her in Bristol in December 1996 after the child had travelled there to see her. The situation is typified by an incident on 23 August 1997, when [the applicant] assaulted her daughter at the Syntagma Square Police Station, kicking her and tearing out her hair (see the certificate from the police incident book). The [applicant's former husband] has never prevented his daughter from seeing her mother, nor has he ever urged her to avoid her mother.” 31. Following that judgment the applicant lodged criminal complaints against her former husband every time he failed to comply with the court's rulings. The father also brought various criminal charges against the applicant. Currently, more than thirty-five sets of criminal proceedings are pending.

7. The first applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Varna. The second applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Sokobanja. 8. The facts of the cases, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 9. The applicant ran a transport business as a sole proprietor (samostalni preduzetnik) from 1979 to 1995. 10. In 1990 and 1991 the applicant provided transport services to the Pocerski Metković local community (Mesna zajednica Pocerski Metković) in Šabac. According to the contract, the local community which had engaged his services had levied what were known as self-imposed local taxes (“SILT”; samodoprinosi). 11. On an unspecified date in 1994 the applicant, together with two other traders, brought an action against the local community requesting payment for services provided. The applicant’s business ceased to exist in 1995 and the applicant, as its sole proprietor and manager, took over the outstanding claim as its successor. 12. The local community was represented in the proceedings by the Solicitor General (javni pravobranilac) of the Šabac Municipality, the latter being the founder of the Pocerski Metković local community. 13. On 11 May 2001 the Valjevo Commercial Court ordered the local community to pay the applicant 24,400 Serbian dinars (RSD) with interest. The court also ordered the local community to pay all the claimants jointly the amount of RSD 54,520 for the costs of the civil proceedings. On an unspecified date soon after, the judgment of 11 May 2001 became final and enforceable. 14. On 29 April 2003 the applicant applied to the Valjevo Commercial Court for enforcement of the said judgment, and proposed that this be carried out by bank transfer. 15. On 6 October 2003 the Valjevo Commercial Court ordered the enforcement, also awarding the applicant RSD 4,664 for the costs of the enforcement proceedings. Thereafter, the said court transmitted this enforcement order to the competent department of the Central Bank in Kragujevac (Narodna banka Srbije). 16. On 9 June 2006 and 8 October 2007 the applicant enquired about the enforcement. He was informed that the debtor’s bank account had been frozen since 13 November 2003 and that he had been registered as the second-class priority creditor. 17. According to the Government, on 19 December 2003 the Commercial Court archived the enforcement case as terminated. The applicant, however, had apparently not received any decision to this effect, nor did the Government submit that such a decision had been adopted. 18. Pursuant to the rules of court, the enforcement court was obliged to keep the case file for five years from the date on which the enforcement proceedings had been terminated. After the enforcement court’s proposal of 4 August 2010 for elimination of worthless registration material and archival holdings, the next day the Inter-Municipal Historical Archive in Valjevo destroyed the applicant’s case file in accordance with the Law on Cultural Goods (published in Official Gazette of the RS, no. 71/94). According to the relevant court’s statement, no minutes of the destruction or the record of any documents had been made. 19. The judgment of 11 May 2001 remains unenforced. 20. The applicant ran an installation business “Instalaterska radnja Sokosat” as a sole proprietor. The business entered into a contract with the Sokobanja local community (Mesna zajednica Sokobanja), regarding the maintenance of the cable-satellite transmission system on the territory of that local community. 21. As the local community failed to pay for the services provided, the business brought an enforcement action before the Zaječar Commercial Court. On 9 October 2002 that court ordered direct enforcement of the outstanding invoices (izvršenje na osnovu verodostojne isprave). 22. On 9 December 2002, following an appeal by the local community, the court suspended the enforcement order and referred the case to civil proceedings. 23. The local community was represented in the proceedings by the Solicitor General of the Sokobanja Municipality, the latter being the founder of the Sokobanja local community. 24. On 17 April 2003 the Zaječar Commercial Court partly upheld the enforcement order, and ordered the local community to pay the business (i) the amounts of RSD 342,098.80 of debt and RSD 18,672 for the costs incurred within the enforcement proceedings, (ii) interest on the two above amounts, (iii) interest on a number of other amounts that would appear to have been previously paid but with no interest calculated, and (iv) RSD 36,172 for the costs of the civil proceedings. 25. On 25 December 2003 the High Commercial Court partly upheld the judgment of 17 April 2003, while ordering the Commercial Court to re-examine the costs of the civil proceedings. 26. On 2 February 2004, with a revision on 25 March 2004, the Zaječar Commercial Court ordered the local community to pay RSD 67,750 on account of the costs of the civil proceedings. 27. On 27 May and 2 June 2004 respectively the Zaječar Commercial Court ordered the enforcement of the judgment of 17 April 2003 and of the decisions of 2 February and 25 March 2004 (domestic enforcement cases nos. I 306/04 and I 348/04) by debtor account transfer (plenidbom novčanih sredstava i prenosom na žiro-račun poverioca). The applicant was also awarded the amounts of RSD 20,574 and RSD 8,275 for the costs of the enforcement proceedings. 28. On 31 January 2005 the applicant informed the Niš Commercial Court that the Sokobanja Municipality had been failing to transfer funds from its account to the debtor’s or the applicant’s bank accounts, and that the local community had been running its activities through the municipal bank account or a special account for collection of self-imposed local taxes in order to deceive the creditor. As there were practically no funds in the debtor’s account, the applicant requested the court to change the means of enforcement by auctioning off the debtor’s specified movable assets, in particular the cable-satellite transmission system. 29. On 10 February 2005, the Niš Commercial Court (i) joined the two above-mentioned set of enforcement proceedings; (ii) repealed the enforcement order by bank account transfer; (iii) declined jurisdiction in respect of auction of the assets and transferred the case to the Sokobanja Municipal Court; and (iv) refused the applicant’s request for adoption of an interim measure in this respect. 30. On 9 May 2005, having established that the debtor was the owner of the cable-satellite transmission system, the Sokobanja Municipal Court ordered enforcement by assessment and auction. On 30 May 2005 the court revised the order, correctly increasing the debts. 31. On 13 March 2007 the Municipal Court suspended the enforcement proceedings (obustavio izvršenje) which had been instituted on the basis of the above-mentioned orders of May 2005. The court clarified that the expert engaged by the court could not establish the exact ratio of ownership between the debtor and the current distributor in respect of the cable-satellite transmission system, and stated that the citizens’ interest should not be compromised by selling it, as they had financed the development of the system. The court lastly instructed the applicant to initiate a new set of proceedings to determine the debtor’s exact ownership in respect of the system, as well as other movable and non-movable assets, and to settle the applicant’s claim in that direction. On 12 June 2007 the panel of the same court summarily upheld that decision. 32. On 29 November 2007 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s request for protection of legality as unavailable in the present case. 33. The applicant did not initiate a new set of civil proceedings as instructed. 34. The judgment of 17 April 2003 and the decisions of 2 February and 25 March 2005 remain unenforced to date. 35. Upon the request of the respondent’s State Agent before the Court, the President of the Administrative Court provided it with a succinct summary and her interpretation of the relevant domestic law. The president stated that neither the financial duties and liabilities of the local communities, nor the broader liability of the municipalities or the State for the local communities’ debts, were subject to regulation by it. The president also observed that the subject matter of the unenforced contracts in both the above cases was within the competences of the local communities in question (letter of 9 August 2011, Su I-1 212/11).

4. The applicant was born in 1943 and lives in Sopot. 5. The applicant was arrested on 24 October 2000 on suspicion of armed robbery. On the same day the Gdańsk District Court remanded the applicant in custody in view of the reasonable suspicion that he had committed armed robbery. That suspicion was supported by evidence obtained in the course of the investigation. The District Court further held that there was a reasonable risk that the applicant would obstruct the investigation and go into hiding. It also had regard to the severity of the anticipated penalty. 6. Later, several other persons were detained and charged in connection with the same investigation conducted by the Department of Organised Crime of the Gdańsk Regional Prosecutor's Office. 7. On 9 January 2001 the Gdańsk Regional Court prolonged the applicant's detention until 31 March 2001. It found that the grounds previously relied on were still valid. In addition, it held that the prolongation of his detention was justified by the need to obtain evidence, including expert reports, from many sources. 8. On 15 March 2001 the Gdańsk Regional Court extended the applicant's detention until 31 May 2001. In addition to the grounds previously invoked, it considered that there was a reasonable risk that the applicant would induce the witnesses to give false testimonies. 9. On 15 May 2001 the prosecution filed a bill of indictment with the Gdańsk Regional Court. The applicant was charged with one count of armed robbery which had been committed in an organised armed criminal group. The bill of indictment listed 118 charges brought against 19 defendants, who were all detained on remand. The case file comprised 114 volumes. The prosecution asked the court to hear evidence from 366 witnesses. 10. On 17 May 2001 the Gdańsk Regional Court ordered that the applicant be detained until 31 October 2001, finding that it was necessary in order to prevent him – and his other 12 detained co-defendants – from evading justice or tampering with evidence. It also referred to the complexity of the case stemming from the number of defendants and the number of witnesses to be heard. 11. On 16 October 2001 the Gdańsk Regional Court prolonged the applicant's detention until 31 March 2002, considering that the grounds originally given for remanding him in custody were still valid. In respect of the danger of pressure being brought to bear on witnesses, the Regional Court held, having regard to evidence given by a witness R.G., that some of the defendants had attempted to induce witnesses to give false testimonies. 12. The trial began on 28 December 2001. However, as of April 2002 the reading out of the bill of indictment by the prosecution had still not been concluded. Initially, the trial court held three hearings per month. 13. During the hearing held on 30 January 2002 the trial court ordered the removal of the applicant and some other defendants from the court room because of their disruptive behaviour. 14. Further prolongation of the applicant's detention were ordered by the Gdańsk Regional Court on 27 March 2002 (up to 30 September 2002) and on 26 September 2002 (up to 24 October 2002). In both those decisions, the Regional Court considered that the applicant's detention was the only measure which could prevent him from interfering with the proceedings. 15. It appears that the applicant refused to participate in the hearing held on 16 September 2002. 16. Since on 24 October 2002 the applicant's detention had reached the statutory time-limit of 2 years laid down in Article 263 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, further prolongations of the applicant's detention were ordered by the Gdańsk Court of Appeal. The relevant decisions were given on 2 October 2002 (extending his detention until 31 December 2002), 18 December 2002 (prolonging that period until 30 June 2003), 25 June 2003 (extending his detention up to 31 December 2003) and 17 December 2003 (ordering his continued detention until 30 June 2004). In all those decisions the Court of Appeal considered that the original grounds given for the applicant's detention were still valid. It stressed that his detention was the only measure which could secure the proper conduct of the proceedings in that particularly complex case, given the nature of the charges, the number of defendants and the connections between them. In addition, it referred to the volume of evidence to be heard. 17. In its decision of 2 October 2002 prolonging the applicant's detention, the Court of Appeal considered that holding him in custody was necessary at least until he had been heard. 18. On 15 January 2003 the applicant and 17 of his co-defendants unsuccessfully challenged the judges and lay members of the trial court. 19. In its decision of 25 June 2003 extending the applicant's detention, the Court of Appeal observed that the trial could not have been terminated due to obstructiveness on the part of the defendants who filed numerous requests challenging the trial court. It further considered that although the applicant and other defendants were free to make use of their procedural rights, the abuse of those rights had undoubtedly led to delays in the trial. It also noted that the trial court had taken various procedural steps in order to accelerate the proceedings. 20. In its decision of 29 January 2004 dismissing the applicant's appeal against the decision of 17 December 2003 prolonging his detention, the Court of Appeal held that Article 258 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure established a presumption to the effect that the likelihood of a severe penalty being imposed on the applicant might induce him to obstruct the proceedings[1]. It added that the risk of tampering with witnesses which existed in the present case did not have to be supported by any concrete facts, but resulted from the above presumption. 21. In the course of the proceedings the applicant made numerous, unsuccessful applications for release, including on the ground that his detention entailed harsh consequences for his family. He appealed, likewise unsuccessfully, against refusals to release him and decisions extending his detention. 22. The applicant's detention on remand ended on 30 June 2004 when the last order prolonging his detention expired. The applicant was released on 31 August 2004 after having served a sentence of imprisonment that had been imposed on him in another set of proceedings. 23. On 21 March 2005 the Gdańsk Regional Court made a severance order with a view to expediting the proceedings, and thereafter four defendants, who in the meantime had been released, were to be tried separately. 24. By June 2005 the trial court had held some 135 hearings of the 162 which had been scheduled. It heard more than 400 witnesses. 25. After 20 June 2005 no hearing was held due to the serious illness of the judge rapporteur. On 21 September 2005 the President of the Criminal Section IV of the Gdańsk Regional Court assigned a new judge rapporteur. Consequently, the trial had to commence de novo. 26. On 24 November 2005 the trial court made a further severance order and split the case into eleven separate cases. 27. It appears that the proceedings are still pending before the first-instance court. 28. The applicant's letter to the Court of 10 April 2006 bears a stamp “censored day ... ... year” (cenzurowano dnia ... ... r.) and no signature. The envelope in which that letter was sent bears a stamp confirming that the applicant's letter was received for dispatch by the administration of the Gdańsk Detention Centre on 9 April 2006. However, according to the postage stamp the letter was posted only on 13 April 2006. The envelope also bears a note written in pencil: “D.[etention] on R.[emand] the Sopot District Prosecutor Ds” (T.A. Prok. Rej. Sopot Ds.) and another illegible note also written in pencil. It also appears that the envelope was cut open and subsequently resealed with an adhesive tape.

4. The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Hetes, Hungary. 5. In February 1990 the applicant’s father (“the plaintiff”) had a traffic accident. With a view to seeking compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage and for loss of work capacity, he brought an action on 30 December 1991 against his insurer before the Pest Central District Court. 6. Hearings took place on 22 May and 12 November 1992. On the latter date, the District Court appointed medical and agricultural experts. The person who had caused the plaintiff’s injuries intervened in the case. 7. Meanwhile, on 30 September 1992 the District Court dismissed the plaintiff’s request for interim measures to be applied. On 3 March 1993 the Budapest Regional Court dismissed his appeal against this decision. 8. The medical expert submitted his opinion on 25 May 1993. On 16 June 1993 the District Court held a hearing and on 12 July 1993 the agricultural expert presented his opinion. 9. The next hearing took place on 28 January 1994. Pursuant to a change in legislation, the action was extended to include the National Institute for Development. 10. On 4 February 1994 the District Court decided to award 89,550 Hungarian forints (HUF) plus accrued interest to the plaintiff and granted him an allowance. 11. On appeal, on 10 November 1994 the Budapest Regional Court quashed the appealed part of the first instance decision and remitted the case in this respect. 12. On 21 December 1994 the District Court dismissed the plaintiff’s renewed request for interim measures. This decision was upheld by the Budapest Regional Court on 27 April 1995. 13. In the resumed proceedings, the District Court held a hearing on 14 June 1995 and decided to obtain the opinions of medical, agricultural and motor-vehicle experts. A hearing took place on 15 November 1995. On 14 December 1995 the District Court ordered that the agricultural expert’s opinion be completed. On 27 February 1996 the court appointed a new expert. 14. On 22 April 1996 the District Court excused the agricultural expert since he had previously worked for the first defendant and appointed a third one. 15. On 21 May 1996 the agricultural expert appointed informed the court that he was not competent to provide an opinion on the issues raised. On 23 May 1996 the District Court discharged the expert and invited the parties to submit proposals for a competent agricultural expert. 16. On 23 August 1996 the District Court dismissed the request of the Hungarian State to join the proceedings due to a change in legislation. On the appeals of the first defendant and the State, the Budapest Regional Court quashed the decision and gave the State leave to join the proceedings. 17. On 17 December 1996 the District Court appointed another agricultural expert. On 24 March 1997 he was warned that he would be fined in the event of his non-compliance with his duties. This expert was replaced by another expert on 2 April 1997. 18. On account of the wishes of the experts to be excused for reasons of lack of competence or other commitments, they had to be replaced on 30 May, 5 June, 11 July and 5 September 1997. 19. On 5 November 1997 the District Court ordered the expert who was eventually appointed to submit her opinion as soon as possible and warned her that in the event of non-compliance she would be fined. On 9 December 1997 the court imposed a fine of HUF 25,000 on the expert. Despite warnings, the expert repeatedly failed to comply with the order and the court imposed another fine of HUF 50,000 on her. 20. On 14 July 1998 a newly appointed expert submitted an opinion in reply to the court’s questions as to the value, before the accident, of the plaintiff’s livestock, the income which the plaintiff could have expected from his livestock and the number of workers and the working hours required for tending to it. 21. The next hearing took place on 21 October 1998. The plaintiff failed to appear at the hearing and his counsel’s replacement was not prepared to make a statement in the case. 22. Meanwhile, on the defendant’s appeal, on 25 January 1999 the Budapest Regional Court upheld an order of 27 August 1997 concerning the agricultural expert’s fee. A hearing scheduled for 27 January 1999 had to be postponed as the case-file had not yet been returned by the District Court. 23. In order to reconcile different medical opinions, the District Court ordered the medical expert to complete his opinion. The opinion submitted on 5 May 1999 was further supplemented on 7 July 1999 in view of the defendant’s observations. 24. Further hearings took place on 27 September and 18 October 1999. On the latter occasion both the plaintiff and his representative failed to appear or to request that the hearing be held in their absence. Therefore, the District Court ordered the suspension of the proceedings. On 29 October 1999 the proceedings were reinstated at the plaintiff’s request. 25. On 8 December 1999, 13 March, 17 April and 15 May 2000 the District Court heard further witnesses. 26. On 21 May 2000 the plaintiff died. As the District Court had not been informed of this, it delivered its judgment on 22 May 2000. The judgment did not take effect. On 3 July 2000 the District Court ordered a stay of the proceedings. 27. On 14 August 2000 the applicant was declared his father’s sole heir. On 6 September 2000 he joined the proceedings before the District Court as his late father’s successor. 28. The parties failed to appear at the hearings held on 13 September, and 2 and 30 October 2000. On the latter date the District Court decided to award HUF 7,257,275 plus accrued interest to the applicant. 29. On appeal, the Budapest Regional Court held hearings on 17 April and 26 June 2001 in the applicant’s absence. In a judgment of the latter date, it amended part of the first instance decision and lowered the award to HUF 5,507,485.

5. The applicant was born in 1958 and is currently detained in Sumy no. 116 Correctional Colony. 6. At the material time the applicant was a deputy head of the Sumy District State Administration. He has been suffering from chronic lymphocytic leukaemia since 2002 and underwent several courses of chemotherapy in 2007-09. 7. On 3 June 2009 criminal proceedings for corruption were instituted against the applicant. On the same day he was arrested and detained for eight days. According to the applicant, on the first day of his detention he was not given any water or food, and was not provided with any medical assistance. 8. On 22 June 2009 Sumy Regional Hospital informed the applicant’s lawyer B. that the applicant had been in the hospital on five different occasions between 15 March 2007 and 22 June 2009. He was suffering from chronic lymphocytic leukaemia, which fell into the category of terminal illness, so only maintenance treatment in a specialised haematology department was possible for him in addition to permanent medication while not in hospital. 9. Between 28 July and 13 August 2009 the applicant was in Sumy Regional Hospital. He was diagnosed with chronic lymphocytic leukaemia, atherosclerotic cardiosclerosis, hypertension, chronic cholecystitis, chronic pancreatitis and cysts on both kidneys. 10. On 8 September 2009 the applicant was recorded as falling into the third category of disability (the mildest) on account of his condition. In accordance with an Instruction on Assessment of Disability Levels, adopted by the Ministry of Health Protection of Ukraine on 7 April 2004, in force at the material time, the third category of disability included people with constant functional body disorders of moderate gravity, which caused moderate limitations of daily activity. 11. On 23 December 2009 the Sumy Regional Court of Appeal convicted the applicant of corruption (receiving 100,000 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH) (at the material time around 8,700 euros (EUR)) in return for allocation of 2.8 hectares of plots of land) and sentenced him to seven years’ imprisonment, banned him from holding administrative positions, and ordered his property to be confiscated. The court noted that the applicant’s state of health had been taken into consideration when he was sentenced. In these proceedings the applicant was represented by lawyers B. and D. 12. On the same day the applicant was placed in the Sumy Pre-Trial Detention Centre. 13. The applicant appealed against this sentence. In his appeal the applicant’s lawyer, M., mentioned that the applicant needed kidney surgery and was suffering from chronic lymphocytic leukaemia. He believed that these were among the conditions which could serve as a basis for release. Therefore, he stated that the applicant’s sentence amounts to “the death penalty”. 14. On 25 March 2010 the Supreme Court of Ukraine examined the case on the facts and points of law and upheld the applicant’s sentence without expressly addressing the issue of his medical condition. However, it was indicated that the lower court had correctly assessed the mitigating circumstances when sentencing the applicant. From the documents submitted by the applicant it is unclear what specific medical evidence was presented before the national courts. 15. On 7 April 2010 the applicant was transferred to Sumy no. 116 Correctional Colony. 16. On 17 April 2010 the applicant was placed in the medical wing of the colony. He was diagnosed with atherosclerotic cardiosclerosis, chronic cholecystopancreatitis, kidney cysts and chronic lymphocytic leukaemia (Stages III-IV), and given cardio and antispasmodic medication. 17. On 26 April 2010 the applicant was examined by a haematologist of a regional hospital and was recommended to undergo chemotherapy. 18. Between 22 June and 7 July 2010 the applicant underwent treatment in the Temnivska no. 100 Correctional Colony hospital. He was diagnosed with chronic lymphocytic leukaemia, atherosclerotic cardiosclerosis, hypertension, chronic cholecystitis, chronic pancreatitis and obesity. It was recommended that he continue to be treated in the haematology department where he was serving his sentence. It was further noted that, if necessary, the question of the applicant’s release should be decided after the applicant had had a full examination in a specialist clinic. 19. On 23 July 2010 the Head of the Sumy Regional Department of Execution of Sentences requested the Head of the Health Department of Sumy Regional State Administration to arrange for the applicant to be examined by a haematologist and a chemotherapist at Sumy Regional Hospital. In reply he was informed that the applicant would be placed in the haematology wing of Sumy Regional Hospital. 20. On 26 August 2010 the applicant was examined by Professor T. of the Institute of Haematology and Transfusiology of the Academy of Medical Science of Ukraine. It was noted that the applicant’s condition started to deteriorate from the beginning of 2009. He underwent five courses of chemotherapy, which had a positive but temporary effect. At the present moment the applicant’s state of health was deteriorating. He was experiencing weakness, faintness, abdominal pain, loss of appetite and loss of weight. The applicant was diagnosed with chronic lymphocytic leukaemia (IV cancerous stage), which required immunochemotherapy to be performed in a haematology unit. 21. According to a notice issued on 23 September 2010 by Sumy Regional Hospital, the applicant needed immunochemotherapy in hospital in addition to other treatment “the absence of which may lead to his death”. 22. On 28 October 2010 a letter similar to the one of 23 July 2010 was sent to the Head of the Health Department of Sumy Regional State Administration. The department was further requested to “submit information about how the sentence may be served, in view of his state of health” and whether it would be possible for him to be transferred to a medical institution of the Department of Execution of Sentences. 23. In reply the Head of Sumy Regional Department of Execution of Sentences was informed that on 25 October 2010 the applicant was examined by two haematologists, a cardiologist and a urologist from Sumy Regional Hospital. He underwent an ultrasonography, an electrocardiogram and had a blood test. The applicant was diagnosed with chronic lymphocytic leukaemia (IV cancerous stage), hepatolienomegaly (enlargement of the liver), toxic syndrome, ischaemic heart disease, cardiosclerosis, hypertension, heart failure, and cysts on both kidneys. The doctors’ commission concluded that the applicant required immunochemotherapy in Sumy Regional Hospital and that the kidney cysts should be operated on. It was considered impossible to transport the applicant to hospitals of the State Department of Execution of Sentences. 24. On 16 and 30 November 2010 the applicant refused to be transported to the oncology department of the Lviv Pre-Trial Detention Centre because it was a long way away from the colony. 25. Between 30 November and 13 December 2010 the applicant underwent chemotherapy in Sumy Regional Hospital. 26. Between 15 and 24 January 2011 the applicant was in the medical wing of the colony. He had been diagnosed with acute otitis. 27. Following requests by the applicant’s wife for his release, on 4 February 2011 the Sumy Regional Prosecutor wrote to the Head of the Sumy no. 116 Correctional Colony and the Head of the Health Department of the Sumy Regional State Administration requesting them to set up a medical panel to examine and assess the applicant by 10 February 2011 in order to decide whether there were medical grounds for the applicant’s release. The following questions were to be put to the panel: 1) What conditions was the applicant suffering from? At what stage of development were these conditions? 2) Had the applicant been diagnosed with any condition which appeared on the list of conditions for release (see paragraph 34 below)? 28. On 8-9 February 2011 the applicant underwent a comprehensive examination in Sumy Regional Hospital by a panel of six doctors which included two deputy heads of the hospital, the heads of the haematology and urology departments and other specialists. The applicant was diagnosed with chronic lymphoid leukaemia (Stage IV), ischaemia, hypertension, large cysts on both kidneys, and other conditions. The commission concluded that the applicant did not have health problems which could serve as a ground for request for release. In particular, the applicant’s diagnosis did not fully coincide with the medical condition indicated in the List, since the applicant did not have anaemia, thrombocytopenia or constant recurring infections. According to the List, chronic lymphoid leukaemia could serve as a ground for release only if complicated by those conditions. 29. On 6 May 2011 the applicant was again examined by a haematologist. He had a complete blood count, biochemical blood assay, brain computed tomography, ultrasonic examinations of various internal organs, electrocardiogram and other procedures. On 10 May 2011 the applicant was assessed by a medical panel, which consisted of ten doctors, including the deputy head of the Sumy Regional Hospital, deputy heads of various hospital departments, and professors from Sumy Medical University. The panel concluded that none of the applicant’s health problems was severe enough to serve as a basis for his release. It was also concluded that the applicant’s condition was unchanged, however, the results of his analysis showed some improvement. 30. On 20 September 2011 the applicant was placed in the surgical wing of the Correctional Colony No. 85 Hospital. He was diagnosed with unilocular cysts on both kidneys. 31. Further information about the applicant’s condition is not available.

9. The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Switzerland. Until December 1993 she lived in the Düzcealan village, attached to the Tatvan District in the province of Bitlis. She left and has never returned to the village after the events alleged below. 10. The facts surrounding the destruction of the applicant's house and property are in dispute between the parties. 11. Before the alleged incident, the village of Düzcealan had been subjected to attacks by the security forces, who had forced the villagers to become village guards. 12. On 27 December 1993 PKK members attacked and burned a bus on the Tatvan-Van highway, about one kilometre from the Düzcealan village. 13. On the same day at about 3 p.m. security forces, led by Gendarme Brigade Commander Korkmaz Tağma, entered the village and surrounded it with armoured military vehicles and unmarked cars. Thereafter, soldiers using G3 weapons and other fire arms opened fire on the village and destroyed some of the houses with mortar shells. This attack lasted about four hours. 14. At about 9 p.m. three masked men with white oil drums began burning the houses in the village. The applicant's house and possessions were also burned during the incident. All the villagers were gathered in the village square and beaten by the soldiers. Necmi Çaçan, the applicant's brother-in-law, was killed during the incident. 15. After the incident, the applicant left Düzcealan and moved to Izmir and subsequently to Istanbul. On 5 September 1996 she filed a complaint with the Istanbul public prosecutor for the attention of the Tatvan public prosecutor's office. She alleged that on 27 December 1993 security forces had raided the village of Düzcealan and burned down her house and belongings. 16. While she was living in Istanbul, on 27 May 1997 the applicant's house was raided by the police. As a result of the intimidation to which she was subjected in Turkey, the applicant had to move to Switzerland. 17. The Government submitted in the first place that the village of Düzcealan had been under constant threat from PKK members, who forced the villagers to provide them with food and supplies. Young villagers were also forced to join the PKK. However, the villagers resisted the pressures brought to bear on them. 18. In their observations, the Government disputed the facts as submitted by the applicant. They stated that no military operation had been conducted in the village of Düzcealan. In this connection, they maintained that on 29 December 1993[1], at about 3 p.m., a bus and a truck had been attacked and burned by the PKK on the Tatvan-Van highway, about one kilometre from the Düzcealan village. After this attack, PKK members escaped and entered the applicant's village. The terrorists raided the village, killed Necmi Çaçan, and burned down some of the houses. This attack lasted until the morning of the following day. 19. On the morning of 30 December 1993, an on-site investigation was conducted in the village by the non-commissioned gendarme officer, Yavuz Gürbüz. In his incident report, Mr Gürbüz noted that the houses of Hikmet Küçükarslan, Mehmet İşbulan, Sebahattin Çaçan, Hayrettin Çaçan, Feyzullah Küçükarslan and Mehmet Şirin Çaçan, and the harvest of Sait Adar, Abdülmecit Çaçan, Mehmet İşbulan, Bedrettin Çaçan, Necmi Çaçan and Hikmet Kılıçarslan had been burned by the PKK. The report further noted that Necmi Çaçan had been shot dead by members of this illegal group. The security forces found one cartridge and 94 empty cartridges, 4 of which were near Necmi Çaçan's body. The non-commissioned officer further drew a sketch of the houses which had been burned down the day before. The Government emphasised that the applicant's house was not among the houses which had been burned down on 29 December 1993. 20. Further to this incident, the Tatvan public prosecutor commenced an investigation into the destruction of the six houses and the killing of Necmi Çaçan. On 4 January 1994 the Tatvan public prosecutor delivered a decision of non-jurisdiction and transferred the file to the Diyarbakır State Security Court Public Prosecutor. On 12 December 1995 Mehmet Durman, Mehmet Şirin Mete, Alattin Çaçan and Mehmet Sait Adar, who used to reside in the Düzcealan village before April 1994, gave statements to the gendarme. They said that they had left the village in April 1994 due to pressure from the terrorist organisation. The proceedings are still pending before the Diyarbakır State Security Court as the perpetrators of the crime remain unknown. 21. When the applicant filed a complaint concerning the destruction of her house and possessions by the security forces on 5 September 1996, the authorities undertook a further investigation into her allegations. On 9 October 1996 the Tatvan public prosecutor declared that he was not competent for reasons of jurisdiction and transferred the file to the Diyarbakır public prosecutor's office at the State Security Court. On 30 October 1996 the Diyarbakır State Security Court Public Prosecutor declined jurisdiction and sent the file back to the Tatvan public prosecutor. On 14 November 1996 the Tatvan public prosecutor delivered another non-jurisdiction decision and transmitted the case file to the Bitlis Governor's office, pursuant to the Law on the Prosecution of Civil Servants. 22. Upon receipt of the file, the Bitlis Provincial Administrative Council immediately commenced an investigation and appointed Mr Sabri Dikici, a gendarme officer, to investigate the allegations against the security forces. 23. Mr Dikici took fifteen statements from nine different persons, namely Alaattin Çaçan (mayor of the Düzcealan village), Şemsettin Demir (mayor of the Kolbaşı village), Servet İlhan, İbrahim Çaçan, Yavuz Gürbüz (gendarme officers), Ismail Çaçan, Mehmet Durman, Sait Adar and Mehmet İşbulan (villagers from Düzcealan). The applicant's statement was also taken by the police. In her statement she mainly reiterated her complaint lodged with the public prosecutor. 24. On 13 February 1997 the investigator conducted an on-site inspection in Düzcealan together with the village mayor. The village mayor informed him that the applicant had already left the village when her house was burned by the PKK in April 1994. In his report, the investigator indicated that there were no signs of mortar or gunfire on the remains of the houses. He concluded that the houses had been burned down by the PKK to punish the villagers for abandoning the village in April 1994. Some of the houses were further damaged on account of bad weather. 25. The investigator inquired from the relevant military commanders whether a military operation had been conducted in the Düzcealan village on 27 December 1993. On 24 December 1997 the Bitlis Gendarme Commander informed the Tatvan District Gendarme Commander that no military operation had been conducted in the village on 29 December 1993. However, he indicated that a bus had been burned near the Düzcealan village on that day. He further maintained that as the accused gendarme commander, Korkmaz Tağma, had retired from the military, his address could not be established and it was therefore impossible to take his statement. The Bitlis Security Directorate and Tatvan District Security Directorate further stated, on 8 and 10 January 1997 respectively, that they had not been involved in an operation in the Düzcealan village on 27 December 1993. 26. In the light of the evidence before him, the investigator concluded that the applicant's house had not been burned down by the security forces as alleged, but by the PKK after the villagers had evacuated the village in April 1994. In a report dated 14 May 1997, he advised the Bitlis Provincial Administrative Council to discontinue the proceedings against the security forces. On 20 May 1997 the Governor of Bitlis approved the conclusion of the investigator and ordered that the procedure against the security forces be terminated. 27. The Government finally submitted that the applicant's husband owned three plots of land totalling 14,245 square metres in the Düzcealan village. They further contended that the applicant had only one cow, which she had sold to Ramazan Gökçe, a villager from a neighbouring village, before she left Düzcealan. 1. Documents submitted by the applicant Petition of the applicant, dated 5 September 1996, submitted to the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor's office for transmission to the Tatvan public prosecutor's office 28. In her petition, the applicant complained of the killing of her brother-in-law, Necmi Çaçan, and the destruction of her house and possessions by the security forces. Copies of title deeds to the plots of land in the Düzcealan village that belong to the applicant's husband 29. According to the copies of the title deeds, submitted to the Court, the applicant's husband, Hakim Çaçan, owns three plots of land in the village of Düzcealan. 2. Documents from the domestic investigation Non-jurisdiction decision, dated 4 January 1994, delivered by the Tatvan public prosecutor concerning the killing of Necmi Çaçan and the burning of six houses in the Düzcealan village on 29-30 December 1993 30. On 4 January 1993 the Tatvan public prosecutor delivered a non-jurisdiction decision and sent the case file on the killing of Necmi Çaçan and the burning of six houses in the village of Düzcealan to the office of the chief public prosecutor attached to the Diyarbakır State Security Court. In the decision, it was stated that on the night of 29 December 1993 unidentified PKK terrorists had attacked the Düzcealan village, killed Necmi Çaçan and burned down the houses and harvest of Hikmet Kılıçarslan, Mehmet İşbulan, Sebahattin Çaçan, Hayrettin Çaçan, Feyzullah Kılıçarslan, Mehmet Şirin Çaçan, Mehmet Sait Adar, Abdülmecit Çaçan and Bedrettin Çaçan. Non-jurisdiction decision of the Tatvan public prosecutor, dated 9 October 1996 31. On 9 October 1996 the Tatvan public prosecutor took a decision not to prosecute and transferred the case file to the office of the public prosecutor attached to the Diyarbakır State Security Court, as the complaint fell within the jurisdiction of that court, pursuant to Laws No. 2845 and 3713. Non-jurisdiction decision of the public prosecutor attached to the Diyarbakır State Security Court, dated 30 October 1996 32. On 30 October 1996 the Diyarbakır State Security Court public prosecutor remitted the case to the Tatvan public prosecutor on the ground that he lacked jurisdiction to examine this complaint. Non-jurisdiction decision of the Tatvan public prosecutor, dated 14 November 1996 33. On 14 November 1996 the Tatvan public prosecutor delivered a non-jurisdiction decision and sent the file to the Bitlis Governor's office pursuant to the Law on the Prosecution of Civil Servants. Letter of appointment of Mr Sabri Dikici as investigator, pursuant to the Law on the Prosecution of Civil Servants 34. On 22 November 1996 a gendarme officer, Sabri Dikici, was appointed as investigator by the Bitlis Provincial Administrative Council. Statement of Alaattin Çaçan, dated 13 February 1997, taken by the gendarme 35. In his statement the witness explained that he had lived in the Düzcealan village until April 1994 and had been the village mayor for three years. According to the witness, PKK members had been coming to Düzcealan to spread propaganda and ask for food, clothes and shelter. They also tried to persuade the young villagers to join the PKK. The witness recalled that the terrorists had conducted a raid in Düzcealan on the night of 29 December 1993, killed Necmi Çaçan and burned down the houses and harvest of the villagers. He emphasised, however, that the applicant's house had not been burned down on that day. It was burned down by the terrorists after the villagers had abandoned the village. The villagers left Düzcealan of their own free will. The security forces never forced the villagers to abandon their homes. The village was therefore empty when Zahide Çaçan's house was burned down. Statements of Şemsettin Demir, dated 14 February 1997 and 30 July 1998, taken by the gendarmes 36. In his statements the witness reiterated that he had been the mayor of the Kolbaşı village, a neighbouring village of Düzcealan. He recalled that following the incidents that took place on 30 December 1993, he heard that Necmi Çaçan from the Düzcealan village had been killed and that the houses of Mehmet İşbulan, Hikmet Kılıçarslan, Sebahattin Çaçan, Hayrettin Çaçan, Feyzullah Kılıçarslan, Mehmet Şirin Çaçan, and the harvest of Said Adar, Abdülmecit Çaçan, Mehmet İşbulan, Necmi Çaçan and Hikmet Kılıçarslan had been burned down by the terrorists. Due to PKK pressure, the villagers decided to evacuate the village in April 1994. Before leaving, they sold their animals in neighbouring villages. The applicant's husband sold his cow to Ramazan Gökçe from the Kolbaşı village. When the villagers left, PKK members burned down the remaining houses, including the applicant's. The witness concluded that Zahide Çaçan's house was burned down in April 1994 by the PKK after the village had already been evacuated. Statement of Ibrahim Çaçan, dated 3 February 1997 37. The witness is a gendarme officer, who used to live in the Düzcealan village until 1991. After his family left Düzcealan, the witness never returned to the village and stated that he had no knowledge of the alleged incidents. Statement of Yavuz Gürbüz, dated 25 April 1997 38. The witness was the gendarmerie commander in Yelkenli attached to Tatvan in the Bitlis province between 1991 and 1994. The Düzcealan village was among the fifteen villages in the region that were attached to his command. He stated that he did not remember the exact date of the incident. On the day of the incident, terrorists attacked a bus on the Tatvan-Van road, which is about one kilometre from the Düzcealan village. The terrorists burned the bus and tried to escape through the Düzcealan village, setting fire to five or six places in the village. The next day, at about 6 a.m., the witness went to the scene of the incident with a security team, and drafted a sketch of the bus and of the houses. Korkmaz Tağma was the Bitlis Provincial Security Commander at the time of the events. He was informed about the events via wireless. The villagers in Düzcealan abandoned their village of their own free will due to pressure from the terrorists. Letter of the Bitlis Security Directorate dated 8 January 1997 39. In a letter dated 8 January 1997, the Bitlis Security Directorate indicated that their Directorate had not been involved in any operation in the Düzcealan village on 27 December 1993. Letter of the Tatvan Security Directorate, dated 10 January 1997 40. The Tatvan Security Directorate concluded that their Directorate had not been involved in an operation in the Düzcealan village on 27 December 1993. Letter of the Bitlis Gendarme Command, dated 26 February 1997, to the Bitlis Governor 41. In this letter, the Bitlis Gendarme Commander informed the Bitlis Governor that no military operation had been conducted in the Düzcealan village on 27 December 1993. Letter of the Bitlis Gendarme Commander, dated 24 December 1997, to the Tatvan District Gendarme Commander 42. In a letter dated 24 December 1997 the Bitlis Gendarme Commander informed the Tatvan District Commander that on 27 December 1993 a bus had been burned by the PKK. He indicated that there were no military records indicating that a possible military operation had been conducted in the village of Düzcealan on the same date. Scene of incident report, dated 13 February 1997 43. On 13 February 1997 the investigator Sabri Dikici conducted an on-site visit to the village of Düzcealan together with the mayor of Alaattin Çaçan. In his report, he concluded that there were 35 households in the village and that the village had been completely evacuated. The houses, which were made of concrete, had been badly damaged or were in ruin due to disuse and the effect of bad weather. There were no signs of a mortar attack. Investigation report, dated 14 May 1997 44. Referring to the statements of the villagers, gendarme officers, the relevant military reports and documents, the investigator concluded that the applicant's allegation that her house had been destroyed by the security forces did not reflect the true circumstances of the case. He found that the village was in fact raided by the PKK on the night of 29 December 1993. However, it was clear from the testimonies of the villagers that the applicant's house was not destroyed that day. From the evidence before him, the investigator found that the applicant had in fact stayed in the village until April 1994, when the villagers evacuated Düzcealan to escape the pressure from PKK members. The applicant sold her cow to a certain Ramazan Gökçe from the Kolbaşı village and moved out before her house was burned down by the PKK. When the village was evacuated, they burned down all the houses. There was no pressure from the security forces to evacuate the village. Letter of Administrative Council, dated 20 May 1997, to the Bitlis Governor to discontinue the proceedings against the security forces 45. Referring to the investigation report prepared by gendarme officer Sabri Dikici, the Head of the Bitlis Administrative Council recommended the Governor to discontinue the proceedings against the security forces. Approval given by the Bitlis Governor on 20 May 1997 to discontinue the proceedings against the security forces 46. On 20 May 1997 the Bitlis Governor decided that the proceedings against the security forces should be dismissed. Statement of Mehmet Durman, dated 24 July 1996, taken by the gendarmes 47. In his statement, the witness explained that he had been living in Çamaltı hamlet of the Düzcealan village until April 1994. He stated that the village of Düzcealan and its hamlets had been evacuated by the villagers of their own free will as they wanted to escape from the pressure exerted on them by the PKK. After the village was evacuated, the PKK burned down all the houses. Sketch of the location of the incident, dated 29 December 1993 48. In the sketch, drafted by the gendarme officer Yavuz Gürbüz, the locations of the six houses which had been burned down on 29 December 1993 were indicated. Incident report, dated 30 December 1993 49. In the report, prepared by gendarme officer Yavuz Gürbüz, it was noted that on 29 December 1993, at about 3.45 p.m., a bus with the registration number 34 JYL 13 was burned by PKK terrorists. The terrorists then escaped to the Düzcealan village and burned down the houses of Mehmet İşbulan, Hikmet Kılıçarslan, Sebahattin Çaçan, Hayrettin Çaçan, Feyzullah Kılıçarslan and Mehmet Şirin Çaçan, and the harvest of Said Adar, Abdülmecit Çaçan, Mehmet İşbulan, Necmi Çaçan and Hikmet Kılıçarslan. They also killed Necmi Çaçan. Letter of the Tatvan District Gendarme Commander, dated 3 January 1997, to Bitlis Gendarme Commander 50. In this report, it was noted that a bus had been burned on 29 December 1993. This was followed by the killing of Necmi Çaçan and the burning down of some houses in the Düzcealan village. It was, however, established that no military records existed indicating that a military operation had been conducted in Düzcealan on that day. The Commander further noted that as Korkmaz Tağma, the accused gendarme commander, had retired from military forces, his address could not be established, with the result that no statement could be taken from him. Statement of Mehmet Durman, dated 12 December 1995, taken by the gendarmes 51. In his statement, the witness deposed that he used to reside in Çamaltı hamlet attached to the Düzcealan village. He explained that all the villagers evacuated the village and the hamlet in April 1994 due to the activities of the PKK. PKK members had been asking the villagers to supply them with food, clothes and weapons. They also wanted to persuade the children to go to the mountains. According to the witness, the security forces never forced the villagers to abandon the village. The villagers left of their own motion due to PKK pressure. The houses were burned down subsequently by PKK members after the village had been evacuated. Statement of İsmail Çaçan, dated 30 July 1998, taken by the gendarme 52. The witness used to live in the Düzcealan village until April 1994. He recalled that, on the night of 29 December 1993, PKK members raided the village, burning down the houses of Mehmet İşbulan, Hikmet Kılıçarslan, Sebahattin Çaçan, Hayrettin Çaçan, Feyzullah Kılıçarslan and Mehmet Şirin Çaçan, and the harvest of Said Adar, Abdülmecit Çaçan, Mehmet İşbulan, Necmi Çaçan and Hikmet Kılıçarslan. Necmi Çaçan, a villager, was also killed by PKK members. The PKK pressurised the villagers and demanded logistic support. In order to escape this intimidation, the witness left the village in April 1994, together with all the villagers of Düzcealan. He explained that Zahide Çaçan had also lived in the village until April 1994. He recalled that, before leaving, she had sold her cow to Ramazan Gökçe from the Kolbaşı village. Statement of the applicant, dated 30 January 1997, taken by the police 53. In her statement, dated 30 January 1997, the applicant mainly reiterated the complaints she had made to the public prosecutor. Statement of Sait Adar, dated 29 December 1993, taken by the gendarmes 54. The witness used to reside in the village of Düzcealan. Following the burning of a bus on the Tatvan-Van highway, a clash broke out between the security forces and PKK terrorists. The terrorists entered the Düzcealan village. They killed Necmi Çaçan, burned down the houses of Mehmet İşbulan, Hikmet Kılıçarslan, Sebahattin Çaçan, Hayrettin Çaçan, Feyzullah Kılıçarslan and Mehmet Şirin Çaçan, and the harvest of Abdülmecit Çaçan, Mehmet İşbulan, Necmi Çaçan and Hikmet Kılıçarslan. The witness stated that his crops were burned down by PKK members. Statement of Mehmet İşbulan, dated 30 December 1993, taken by the gendarmes 55. The witness, who used to live in the Düzcealan village, stated that on 29 December 1993 at about 4 p.m. a bus had been burned by the PKK on the Tatvan-Van highway. Subsequently a clash broke out between the security forces and PKK members. The PKK members escaped to the village of Düzcealan. When they arrived in the village, they burned and destroyed his house and harvest. The houses of Hikmet Kılıçarslan, Sebahattin Çaçan, Hayrettin Çaçan, Feyzullah Kılıçarslan and Mehmet Şirin Çaçan, and the harvest of Said Adar, Abdülmecit Çaçan, Necmi Çaçan and Hikmet Kılıçarslan were also destroyed. Moreover, they killed Necmi Çaçan.

7. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Aghios Stefanos (Attica). 8. On 30 May 1990 the Commercial Bank of Greece lodged a criminal complaint against a number of its employees, including the applicant, alleging suppression of documents, forgery and uttering, and fraud, offences which it claimed had caused it a loss of more than 20,000,000 drachmas. It accused the employees concerned of having debited the account of Greek Railways (“the OSE”) using seven cheques from a cheque book that had been produced in the railway company’s name but never actually issued to it. On 2 June 1990 the public prosecutor instituted proceedings against the applicant. 9. On 27 March 1991 the applicant was summoned to appear before the investigating judge and was placed in pre-trial detention. On 23 April 1991 he was released on bail, subject to court supervision entailing, among other things, a ban on leaving the country. 10. In a decision of 26 June 1992 the Indictment Division of the Athens Court of Appeal committed some of the accused, including the applicant, for trial in the Athens Court of Appeal, composed of three judges as is the rule for cases dealt with by courts of appeal at first instance. 11. The hearing, initially set down for 27 May 1994, was adjourned firstly until 26 January 1996 because of a strike by members of the Athens Bar and subsequently until 31 May 1996 because of the ill health of one of the other defendants. On that date the hearing was again adjourned, this time until 13 October 1997. 12. On 4 June 1996 the applicant, who before joining the bank had been an officer in the merchant navy, applied to have the ban on his leaving the country lifted so that he could work in the navy again. He argued that he needed to be in gainful employment in order to support his wife and three children and pointed out that the proceedings had been adjourned several times by the court itself. However, his application was refused by the public prosecutor and subsequently by the Indictment Division of the Court of Appeal, the Court of Appeal having earlier rejected a similar application. 13. The trial finally began on 13 October 1997 – five years, three months and seventeen days after the Indictment Division’s decision of 26 June 1992 and more than seven years after the complaint had been lodged and the proceedings instituted. Hearings were held on 13, 14, 15, 21 and 29 October 1997. One of the co-defendants requested the production in court of the back-up tape for the bank’s computer (but not the cheques in question). Counsel for the bank produced a declaration by the bank’s information technology department attesting that the copies of the computer tapes in the file were authentic. The declaration was read out at the hearing without eliciting any reaction from the defendants. During the trial at least sixty-six documents were read out and evidence was heard from three witnesses. The Court of Appeal gave judgment on 29 October 1997. It convicted the applicant and sentenced him to five years and four months’ imprisonment, to be reduced by the period already spent in pre-trial detention, and ordered the confiscation and destruction of the seven cheques in question. Lastly, it ruled that if the applicant decided to appeal, the appeal would suspend the execution of the sentence. 14. The applicant appealed against the judgment to the appropriate court, namely the Athens Court of Appeal, sitting as a bench of five judges. On 20 February 1998 that court upheld the judgment delivered at first instance but reduced the sentence to four years and ten months’ imprisonment. 15. During the trial the applicant had requested the production of certain extracts from the log file of the bank’s computer and of the original cheques and had asked for a handwriting expert, Mr Chalkias, to be summoned and cross-examined in the presence of another handwriting expert. 16. The Court of Appeal refused those requests on the following grounds: “The precision and authenticity of the extracts from the bank’s central computer records, accompanied by declarations by senior executives of the bank, are beyond dispute, and the production of the extracts is unnecessary. Nor is there any need to summon and cross-examine Mr Chalkias, because he has drawn up a detailed report which was read out at the trial. Lastly, the photocopies of the relevant cheques, which none of the parties disputes are forged, satisfy the needs of the proceedings and production of the originals therefore serves no purpose.” 17. The Court of Appeal read out the items of evidence that had already been adduced at first instance and heard evidence from twelve prosecution and five defence witnesses. 18. It noted that, contrary to what the applicant had maintained, the connection between the cheques in question and the OSE’s account could not have been established by members of the bank’s information technology department, which was empowered only to process data from branches. It further observed that on the date of the offence, the applicant had been the only person to use the computer on which the offence had been committed. The handwriting expert had concluded that characteristics of the applicant’s handwriting and signature were visible on the cheques. Lastly, the Court of Appeal noted that the applicant was one of the very limited number of the bank’s employees who knew the OSE’s account number and the names of the OSE employees authorised to issue cheques. 19. The applicant appealed on points of law. On 20 October 1998 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment appealed against in respect of the charges of suppressing documents and forgery and uttering, and remitted the case to the Court of Appeal in respect of the charge of fraud only. 20. The Court of Appeal held a hearing on 2 December 1998. The applicant again requested the production of extracts from the bank’s log file and sought a declaration from counsel for the bank attesting that the photocopies of the cheques were authentic. The Court of Appeal refused those requests. With regard to the first request, it ruled that it was impossible to recover the extracts from the bank’s log file because the relevant tape reels had not been kept, and added that the authenticity of the documents in question was clear from other pieces of documentary evidence. It construed the second request as an attempt to establish whether the defendant had had an accomplice, whereas his guilt was apparent from other evidence. The Court of Appeal also held that it had not been proved that the photocopies of the cheques had been falsified. It concluded that the defendant had committed the offence on the basis of a pre-defined plan, which he had intended to carry out several times in order to misappropriate funds from Greek Railways. 21. On 8 December 1998 the Court of Appeal found the applicant guilty of fraud within the meaning of Article 386 of the Criminal Code, holding that the loss sustained by the bank had resulted from deception on the part of its employees and that the question whether the computer had been used or not was irrelevant. It sentenced him to three years and six months’ imprisonment (to be reduced by twenty-eight days, the period already spent in pre-trial detention) and ordered the destruction of the forged cheques. 22. On 30 November 1999 the Court of Cassation, on an appeal by the applicant, upheld the Court of Appeal’s judgment.

4. The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Cologne (Köln). 5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows. 6. On 1 December 2003 the applicant and her husband entered into a notarial purchase agreement regarding the acquisition of real property with a house for the purchase price of 325,000.00 euros (EUR). The vendor assured them in the notarial purchase deed that the house disposed of two separate apartments and had all necessary permits for use by two parties. 7. In January 2004 the applicant learned that parts of the construction had been carried out without the required permission and that the use of the building by two parties had not been authorised. 8. The applicant then set time-limits for the vendor to rectify the corresponding defects on various occasions and retained part of the purchase price. Following the expiry of a final deadline set for August 2004 without the defects being removed, the applicant, who had meanwhile paid part of the purchase price in the amount of EUR 262,000.00, set off the residual sum in the amount of EUR 63,000.00 against her claim for compensation for the damage incurred by her due to the defects. The vendor for his part refused transfer of title. 9. In the following the vendor commissioned structural alteration works to be carried out on the real property in line with a construction permit obtained on 1 September 2004. However, the applicant found the alteration works to be insufficient and maintained the set-off. 10. On 28 October 2004 the applicant instituted proceedings against the vendor of the property before the Cologne Regional Court (Landgericht) for transfer of title and possession (file No. 8 O 391/04). 11. On 26 November 2004 upon receipt of advance payments for court costs by the applicant, the Regional Court scheduled a first hearing for 21 April 2005. 12. In January 2005 the vendor announced the commencement of execution as regards the outstanding part of the purchase price. 13. On 17 January 2005 the applicant lodged an action to oppose execution of the vendor’s claim for payment of the residual amount of the purchase price (Vollstreckungsabwehrklage) with the Cologne Regional Court (file No. 8 O 23/05) and requested an interim order for suspension of execution until a judgment in the case had been rendered. 14. On 19 January 2005 the Regional Court also scheduled a first hearing in this matter for 21 April 2005. 15. On 28 January 2005 the Regional Court ordered the provisional discontinuation of the execution of the vendor’s claim for payment of the remaining purchase price against provision of security (Sicherheitsleistung). 16. On 21 April 2005 a hearing took place in both proceedings (file No. 8 O 391/04 and file No. 8 O 23/05), upon which the applicant and the vendor agreed that transfer of the real property should take place on 28 or 29 April 2005 in accordance with the stipulations of the notarial purchase deed. The parties also asked for both proceedings to be suspended. It appears that the applicant took possession of the property on the agreed dates. 17. Following a request by the vendor on 14 June 2005 for both proceedings to be resumed, the Regional Court summoned the parties by order of 24 June 2005 to a hearing that took place on 10 November 2005. On the occasion of the hearing the applicant submitted written observations requesting in addition to her claim for transfer of title and possession, compensation in the amount of EUR 32,405.30. The hearing was postponed pending receipt of advance payments for court costs regarding the applicant’s additional claim. 18. A new hearing was scheduled by the Regional Court on 28 December 2005 upon receipt of the further advance payments for court costs by the applicant for 11 May 2006. 19. On 4 May 2006 the applicant, following repeated extensions of the initial time-limit set for 6 April 2006, submitted further written observations. 20. At the hearing of 11 May 2006 the Regional Court set a time-limit until 26 May 2006 for further written submissions by the vendor in reply to the applicant’s written submissions of 4 May 2006. The applicant was granted the same time-limit for written submissions with a view to specifying the claims to be set off against the remaining purchase price. 21. By a decision of 13 July 2006 regarding both proceedings the Regional Court indicated to what extent the existence of the alleged structural defects still had to be substantiated by the applicant and further pointed out that a corresponding expert opinion which had been obtained on the applicant’s own motion did not constitute sufficient evidence in this respect. The Regional Court also submitted a proposal for a friendly settlement between the parties comprising both proceedings and granted the parties a time-limit of four weeks for their related comments. 22. On 14 August 2006 the vendor submitted written observations to which the applicant replied on 5 September 2006. The vendor commented by written pleadings of 2 November 2006 and the applicant replied on 8 December 2006. 23. By written submissions to the Regional Court dated 10 and 26 October, 2 November and 8 December 2006 as well as by a letter dated 29 January 2007, the applicant and her lawyer emphasised the urgency of a decision in the matter in view of the increasing financial burden for the applicant resulting from the unclear legal situation. 24. On 16 March 2007 the Regional Court informed the applicant’s lawyer that a decision on how to proceed in the case could not yet be taken due to a further change in the person of the judge rapporteur. The Regional Court explained that the new judge rapporteur had not yet had the time to become familiarised with the complex case since other matters were to be treated as a priority. 25. On the occasion of a telephone conversation with the acting judge on 20 March 2007 and by written submissions to the Regional Court dated 23 April 2007 the applicant’s lawyer again pointed out that, as the applicant could not use the acquired property, she faced serious economic losses and stressed the importance of a decision by the Regional Court in due course so that the property would no longer lie as a wasted asset. 26. By a letter dated 27 April 2007 the presiding judge apologised to the applicant for the delays in the proceedings pointing out that the delays prior to the change of the judge rapporteur could not be attributed to the court. 27. On 16 May 2007 the Regional Court decided to order a joint expert opinion for both proceedings with a view to determining the actual defects and the measures required to have the structural alterations authorised. 28. On 27 June 2007, following receipt of the advance payment for the related expenses by the applicant, the Regional Court charged the appointed expert with the preparation of the opinion and set a time-limit of three months for its finalisation. 29. On 6 July 2007 the vendor notified the architect who had been working for him of the litigation in view of a possible third party intervention (Streitverkündung) in the proceedings. By written submissions of 9 August 2007 the architect joined the proceedings on the vendor’s side as a third party defendant. 30. On 23 August 2007 the expert carried out a local inspection of the real property. 31. On 20 September 2007 the Regional Court requested the expert to repeat the local inspection. 32. The expert opinion was rendered on 12 December 2007. 33. By written submissions of 28 December 2007 the applicant again extended her claim and requested compensation in the additional amount of EUR 41,600.00 plus interest for loss of rent for the period from May 2005 to December 2007 and asked that the vendor be obliged to compensate all further damages caused by the lack of a permit for use of the house by two parties and by the insufficient alteration works carried out by the vendor. 34. On 18 January 2008 the Regional Court forwarded the expert opinion of 12 December 2007 to the parties for comments to be submitted within a time-limit of six weeks. The applicant and the third party defendant requested the commissioning of a supplementary expert opinion. 35. On 1 April 2008 the Regional Court decided to request a second expert opinion with a view to determining the costs of the measures required to bring the house in line with the requirements of the building permit. 36. On 30 April 2008 the expert was charged with the preparation of the corresponding opinion and given a time-limit of three months for its finalisation. 37. Following an inquiry by the Regional Court on 5 September 2008, the expert announced that the opinion would be finalised by the end of September 2008. It was delivered on 24 September 2008. 38. On 15 October 2008 the expert opinion was served on the parties who were granted a time-limit of one month for possible comments. The third party defendant raised further objections against the expert opinion and requested a further supplementary opinion or, alternatively, asked that the expert be heard by the court. The applicant also asked for a supplementary expert opinion. 39. On 19 December 2008 the Regional Court scheduled a hearing for the 23 April 2009 to which the expert was summoned with a view to further clarifying her findings. 40. On the occasion of the hearing on 23 April 2009 the expert replied to questions raised by the parties and the third party defendant with respect to her expert opinion. The Regional Court made a further proposal for a friendly settlement in both proceedings to the parties and set a time-limit for 22 May 2009 for the parties’ related comments. A decision in both matters was announced for 18 June 2009. 41. By written submissions dated 8 May 2009 the applicant rejected the court’s proposal for a friendly settlement. 42. On 25 June 2009 the Regional Court rendered judgments in both proceedings. It dismissed the applicant’s claim for transfer of title to the real property since only an amount of EUR 25,078.76 could be set off by the applicant and the remainder of the purchase price had thus not been fully paid but awarded her damages for additional building costs in the amount of EUR 4.270,00 (file No. 8 O 391/04). Considering that EUR 287,078.76 of the purchase price had already been paid by the applicant, the court further declared the execution of the vendor’s claim for payment inadmissible with respect to this amount (file No. 8 O 23/05). 43. By written submissions of 27 July 2009 (file No. 8 O 23/05) and 25 August 2009 (file No. 391/04) respectively, the applicant lodged appeals against the said judgments with the Cologne Court of Appeal. 44. A hearing that was scheduled by the Court of Appeal in both proceedings for 14 January 2010 was postponed to 4 February 2010 since the third party defendant’s lawyer was unable to attend. 45. On 25 March 2010 the Court of Appeal rendered judgments in both proceedings. It dismissed the appeal against the judgment of the Regional Court in the proceedings regarding transfer of title to the real property (file No. 12 U 51/09). As regards the proceedings concerning execution of the vendor’s claim for payment, the Court of Appeal amended the Regional’s Court’s judgment considering that the purchase price already paid by the applicant amounted to EUR 298,232.76 and that with respect to this amount execution of the vendor’s claim for payment of the purchase price was inadmissible. It dismissed the remainder of the applicant’s appeal (file No. 12 U 45/09).

5. The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Zaporizhzhya. 6. On the afternoon of 21 July 2001 the applicant was beaten up by another individual. The incident took place at the market and was observed by numerous witnesses. 7. The applicant was taken to the hospital where he was diagnosed with a fractured right cheekbone and bruise to the right infraorbital region. Subsequently, he was also diagnosed with an injury to the right knee joint. 8. On 22 November 2001 the applicant complained to the police on account of his injuries. On the same date a police officer referred the applicant to a forensic examination centre to have the seriousness of his injuries assessed. 9. On 29 November 2001 a forensic medical expert completed the examination and stated that the applicant had suffered from complete ruptures of the cruciate ligament and tibial collateral ligament in his right knee; a fractured right cheekbone and a bruise on the face. The injuries were classified as being of medium severity. 10. On 1 December 2001 a police investigator opened criminal proceedings in connection with the injuries sustained by the applicant. 11. On 4 December 2001 the applicant was admitted to the proceedings as an aggrieved party. On the same date he was granted the status of civil claimant. 12. On 7 June 2002 the investigator suspended the proceedings for the reason that the individual who had inflicted injuries on the applicant could not be identified. 13. On 13 June 2002 the supervising prosecutor quashed that decision as unsubstantiated and ordered further investigation. 14. On 6 August 2002 the investigator opened a criminal case against R., a private individual, noting that during an altercation between R. and the applicant on 21 June 2001 the latter had sustained injuries. 15. On 6 September 2002 the investigator terminated the proceedings against R. for lack of corpus delicti. 16. On 16 October 2002 the supervising prosecutor quashed that decision as unlawful, noting that the investigator had failed to properly assess the witness evidence suggesting that R. had inflicted injuries on the applicant. The prosecutor therefore ordered further investigation. 17. On 20 November 2002 the investigator suspended the proceedings for the reason that the individual who had inflicted injuries on the applicant could not be identified. 18. On 18 April 2005 the supervising prosecutor quashed the decision of 20 November 2002 as unfounded and ordered further investigation. 19. On 6 February 2006 the proceedings were again suspended on the ground that the individual who had inflicted injuries on the applicant could not be identified. 20. On 30 March 2006 the supervising prosecutor quashed that decision as unfounded and ordered further investigation. 21. By letter of 31 August 2006 the police informed the applicant that the investigator deserved a disciplinary penalty for the delays in the investigation of the case; however, he had been dismissed by that time. 22. On 17 October 2007 the investigator obtained from R. a written undertaking not to abscond. 23. On 26 October 2007 R. was charged with the crime of inflicting medium severity injuries on the applicant. On the same date the applicant was once again granted the status of civil claimant and his civil claim was added to the file. 24. On 28 May 2008 the Prosecutor of the Komunarskyy District of Zaporizhzhya approved the investigator’s decision to apply to the court for the discontinuation of the criminal proceedings against R. as time-barred. 25. On 10 June 2008 the Komunarskyy District Court of Zaporizhzhya (“the District Court”) terminated the proceedings against R. as time-barred. It further noted that the civil claim was to be considered in the course of separate civil proceedings. On the same date the District Court issued a separate ruling informing the Prosecutor of the Komunarskyy District of Zaporizhzhya that the investigation had been needlessly delayed. 26. On 20 August 2008 the decision to close the proceedings as time-barred was upheld by the Zaporizhzhya Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”). On the same date the Court of Appeal issued a separate ruling informing the Prosecutor of the Zaporizhzhya Region that the investigation had been unnecessarily and inordinately delayed. It considered that the protraction of the investigation had occurred because of a lack of control on the part of the prosecutor. 27. In 2008 the applicant lodged a civil claim seeking compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage sustained as a result of the injuries inflicted on him on 21 July 2001. 28. On 19 March 2009 the District Court partly allowed the applicant’s claim and ordered R. to pay 2,808.25[1] Ukrainian hryvnias (“UAH”) in respect of pecuniary damage and UAH 2,500[2] in respect of non-pecuniary damage. It also awarded the applicant costs and expenses. The applicant appealed, arguing that the award in respect of non-pecuniary damage was insufficient. 29. On 3 June 2009 the Court of Appeal partly allowed the applicant’s appeal and increased the award in respect of non-pecuniary damage to UAH 7,000[3].

6. The applicant married Mr K in 1983. They had four children. The marriage broke down and the applicant applied for divorce. Mr K left the marital home at the beginning of 1994. The children remained with the applicant who, in December 1993, had applied to the Child Support Agency (“the CSA”) to obtain financial support from their father for bringing up the children. There had been an oral agreement that he pay GBP 150 maintenance per week towards the support of the children. According to the applicant, some payments had been voluntarily made but they had rapidly ceased. She only had a limited income from a part-time evening job and child benefit and even when she obtained full-time secretarial employment in 1994 she was struggling financially. 7. The CSA did not send a Maintenance Enquiry Form (MEF) to Mr K until 25 May 1995, which resulted in the applicant losing the opportunity to receive maintenance for the period prior to that date. 8. On 13 July 1995 Mr K returned the MEF accepting paternity. Insufficient information was given to allow a full maintenance assessment to be made. An interim maintenance assessment (IMA) was issued with effect from 5 October 1995. 9. Mr K’s liability changed many times after that date, inter alia as his employment changed and it proved difficult to obtain information. 10. According to the summary in the later High Court judgment, the key features were as follows: 11. By March 1996 arrears of GBP 4,244 had accumulated. 12. The CSA negotiated an agreement with Mr K that he would pay under the IMA, GBP 124.33 per week plus GBP 25.67 towards arrears. 13. On 21 June 1996 a liability order was applied for because he had breached the agreement. The order was discontinued when regular payments were resumed. 14. On 1 February 1999 the Secretary of State issued an apology to the applicant for the inconvenience caused by the delay in issuing the MEF and paid her GBP 10,381.14, comprising the amount of child support she might have received up to that point if the MEF had been sent at the proper time, namely GBP 8,632.04 (inclusive of interest), and GBP 1,749.10 ex gratia compensation. 15. On 1 September 1999, the CSA issued a further apology about the service which she had received and made an additional "consolatory" compensation payment of GBP 110. 16. In December 1999 and April 2000, the CSA paid the arrears not yet received plus interest for the delay. 17. On 15 December 2000 a second application for a liability order was granted for GBP 6,329.24, covering arrears from May 1995 to 11 September 2000. Payments were not made and bailiffs were instructed to levy distress, but were unsuccessful. 18. On 31 January 2001 the liability order was registered as a county court debt. Consideration was given to a committal order but the policy was to use this only as a last resort. 19. On 9 October 2001 a deduction of earnings order (EO) was issued for GBP 608.80 per month, increased to GBP 889.06 on 21 February 2002. Following this Mr K again stopped paying. EOs on the company of which he was a director proved unsuccessful. In an interview with the CSA Mr K alleged that he had stopped paying as two of the qualifying children had been living with him for five years and a third had moved in recently, while the fourth had gone to live with the mother in Spain. The CSA was aware of the changed circumstances of the children and had taken this into account in assessments. Having established that the applicant was permanently resident in Spain the case was closed on 13 January 2003 with effect from 30 September 2002. Arrears remained due however and the CSA continued to seek to enforce them. 20. On 8 November 2002 a committal hearing was held. Mr K admitted owing GBP 6,329.24 for the period 25 May 1995 to 11 September 2000 and GBP 13,859.12 for the period 12 September 2000 until 4 September 2002. He agreed to pay the former sum by 8 July 2003 and the latter sum at GBP 500 per month from November 2002. 21. Payment was not made in November 2002. He was contacted on 10 December 2002 and told that unless payment was made by 13 December 2002 committal proceedings would be restored. A payment of GBP 1,500 was made on 30 December 2002. 22. The applicant brought proceedings under the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), seeking a declaration that the provisions of the Child Support Act 1991 were incompatible with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention as they denied a parent with care of children access to court in connection with disputes as to whether the absent parent had paid or ought to pay sums due under a maintenance assessment or as to the manner in which the obligations under the maintenance assessment should be enforced and seeking damages under section 7 of the HRA based on the CSA’s undue delay after 2 October 2000 in taking steps to enforce the child maintenance assessments obtained in this case. She maintained that she had expended much energy and suffered much stress in attempting to get the CSA to obtain payments for her and had been repeatedly told that the dispute was between the CSA and Mr K and did not involve herself; she believed that she would not have received a fraction of the money eventually paid if she had not continually pressurised the CSA and complained of their inaction and inability to obtain maintenance for her. 23. On 16 May 2003, Mr Justice Wall found that the applicant had a civil right to seek maintenance for her children from their father, such right being an autonomous substantive right, plainly recognised in English law and provided for by domestic legislation. The exclusion of the claimant from the enforcement process imposed a procedural bar on the prosecution/enforcement of the claim which engaged Article 6. He found that the court was given jurisdiction by the HRA such that if the CSA had acted in any way incompatible with the claimant’s Article 6 rights she could bring an action for damages under section 7, while any decision by the CSA not to enforce or any failure to enforce timeously or effectively would be subject to challenge by judicial review. On this basis the scheme under the 1991 Act was HRA compliant and she was not entitled to a declaration of incompatibility. He issued directions with a view to an eventual trial as to whether there had been undue delay and to determine any damages. This part of the order was stayed pending appeal to the Court of Appeal. 24. On 5 March 2004, the Court of Appeal upheld the Secretary of State’s appeal and dismissed the applicant’s cross-appeal. It held, as summarised in the head note: "that the Child Support Act 1991 introduced a new child support system, its self- contained nature being a critical feature of its effect in domestic law; that the scheme was built firmly on the central premise that the assessment, collection and enforcement of maintenance orders should be in the hands of the Child Support Agency and consequentially it redefined the rights and obligations of parents and those caring for children; that there was no justification for departing from the general principle that Article 6 was concerned only with disputes recognisable as such under domestic law and founded on the existence of an underlying right; that under the scheme the applicant had no legal right in domestic law to a child maintenance payment of any particular amount or at all; and that, accordingly, she was unable to assert that she had an arguable civil right under Article 6 which entitled her to a determination by a court.” 25. The Court of Appeal further held that the judge had erred in finding that she had a right to damages to supplement her limited right of judicial review; damages could only be awarded where the Act was incompatible with Article 6, and the Act did not become incompatible because of a lack of entitlement to damages for its incompatibility. 26. On 14 July 2005, the House of Lords, by a majority of four to one, rejected the applicant’s appeal. 27. Lord Bingham of Cornhill stated in rejecting the appeal: "[6] That a caring parent in the position of Mrs <K.> was given no right of recovering or enforcing a claim to child maintenance against an absent or non-resident parent was not a lacuna or inadvertent omission in the 1991 Act: it was the essence of the new scheme, a deliberate departure from the regime which had previously obtained. The merits of that scheme are not for the House in its judicial capacity to evaluate. But plainly the scheme did not lack a coherent rationale. The state has an interest, most directly in cases where public funds are disbursed, but also more generally that children should be adequately supported. It might well be thought that a single professional agency, with the resources of the state behind it and an array of powers at its command, would be more consistent in assessing and more effective and economical in enforcing payment than individual parents acting in a random and uncoordinated way. It might also be thought that the interposition of an independent, neutral, official body would reduce the acrimony which had all too frequently characterised applications for child maintenance by caring against absent or non-resident parents in the past which, however understandable in the aftermath of a fractured relationship, rarely enured to the benefit of the children. For better or worse, the process was deliberately changed. [7] The 1991 Act cannot in my opinion be interpreted as conferring any right on a parent in the position of Mrs <K>. She is of course the person to whom child maintenance will be paid, directly or indirectly and subject to any deduction of benefit, as the person who incurs the expense of bringing up the children. But the right which she had enjoyed under the former legislation was removed, and the right to recover the maintenance has been vested in the CSA..." 28. Baroness Hale of Richmond, dissenting, found that prior to the 1991 Act a father had, at common law, a duty to maintain his legitimate minor children which had always been unenforceable in the courts. However it had been expanded and reinforced by two kinds of statutory obligation: a private law obligation to make the payments ordered by a court under various statutes (e.g. matrimonial and family proceedings) and a public law obligation to reimburse the State for benefits paid for the children. The new scheme which transferred the task of assessing and collecting maintenance from the courts did not however remove these obligations or the corresponding right of the child to benefit from them. The obligation of a parent to maintain his children and the right of the children to have the benefit of the parental obligation to maintain them were not wholly contained in the 1991 Act. The 1991 Act left all previous law intact save precluding courts from using their powers in cases where the CSA was supposed to do it for them. Accordingly the children’s civil right to parental support survived the 1991 Act which acted not only as a limit to the extent of the obligation but also as a limit to its enforcement. Article 6 was therefore engaged. 29. In assessing whether the limitations on enforcement of those rights was compatible with the Convention, Baroness Hale noted that there was undoubtedly a legitimate aim. Although the non-enforceability by the custodial parent in non-benefit cases was not a necessary feature of comparable child support schemes elsewhere in the common law world, the matter had been debated. That possibility was rejected as the Government did not want to create one law for the rich and one for the poor. There were also cases where the parent with care was sometimes in receipt of benefits and at other times not. She concluded that this was just the sort of policy choice in a socio-economic field which the courts were usually prepared to leave to the judgment of Parliament, which was best able to make the decision as to which scheme would most effectively secure the recognition and enforcement of the children’s rights generally. It would be difficult to hold that the scheme as a whole was incompatible with the children’s rights to a speedy determination and enforcement of their claims. That said, she considered that the public authority charged by Parliament with securing those rights was under a duty to act compliantly with Article 6. She would therefore have allowed the appeal and restored Mr Justice Wall’s order. 30. Meanwhile, all money owed to the applicant was paid by 27 April 2005 and her case was closed.

4. The first applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Timişoara. The second applicant, the mother of the first applicant, was born in 1921 and died on 3 September 2004. In a letter of 4 June 2007 the first applicant, as the only successor of her mother, informed the Court that he wished to pursue the application. 5. On 9 September 1991 the applicants lodged an action with the Timişoara Court of First Instance seeking rectification of the Land Registry and, accordingly, registration of their ownership right with regard to a plot of land. Of the twenty one hearings held between 2 October 1991 and 19 June 1997 five were adjourned at the applicants’ request, including between 11 February 1992 and 18 January 1993, between 2 March 1993 and 6 July 1994, and between 11 October 1994 and 27 February 1996, when the proceedings were stayed during criminal investigations against one of the defendants. On 19 June 1997 the Timişoara Court of First Instance dismissed the applicants’ action. 6. On 28 April 1998 the Timiş Regional Court upheld the applicants’ appeal and quashed the judgment of the First Instance Court, sending the case back for retrial. The court considered that, as the land had been sold during the appeal proceedings, the new owner should be involved in the lawsuit. This ruling was upheld on 22 October 1998 by a final decision of the Timişoara Court of Appeal. 7. After retrial, on 10 January 2000 the Timişoara Court of First Instance rejected the applicants’ action as groundless. On 19 July 2000 the Timiş Regional Court confirmed this decision. 8. On 10 November 2000 the Timişoara Court of Appeal allowed the applicants’ appeal, quashed the two preceding judgments and referred the case back to the First Instance Court for a fresh examination, on the ground that the two courts had omitted to rule on two complaints and with regard to another defendant. 9. On 21 December 2001 the Timişoara Court of First Instance re-examined the action and dismissed it. Of the eighteen hearings held between 12 December 2000 and 21 December 2001 one was adjourned at the applicants’ request. 10. On 2 July 2002 the applicants’ appeal was upheld by the Timiş Regional Court, which ordered rectification of the Land Registry, declared null and void the subsequent sale contracts and ordered the administrative authorities to restitute the plot of land in kind. 11. On 10 December 2002 the Timişoara Court of Appeal by a final decision allowed the opposing parties’ appeal and therefore annulled the judgment of 2 July 2002 considering, inter alia, that the courts cannot act as a substitute for the administrative authorities set up by the Real Property Act (Law no. 18/1991) to deal with claims for return of land.

5. The applicants were born in 1917, 1947 and 1957 respectively and live in Sofia. 6. In 1993 the heirs of the pre-nationalisation owners of an apartment, purchased by the first applicant's husband from the State in 1968, brought an action for restitution against the latter, seeking a declaration that the 1968 transaction had been null and void and that therefore the apartment should be restored to its original owners before the nationalisation. 7. On 18 October 1995 the Sofia District Court granted the restitution claim. 8. On appeal, on 14 July 1997 the Sofia City Court quashed the District Court's judgment and dismissed the claim of the pre-nationalisation owners' heirs. 9. The heirs of the pre-nationalisation owners submitted a petition for review (cassation). 10. By a final judgment of 22 February 1999 the Supreme Court of Cassation quashed the Sofia City Court's judgment and upheld the District Court's judgment. As a result, the title of the first applicant's husband to the apartment at issue was declared null and void. 11. The number of hearings held in the course of the proceedings is not clear. 12. On 6 May 1999 the first applicant's husband died. The first applicant and her two sons (the second and third applicants) were his heirs. 13. On 20 May 1999 the first applicant, who had not been a party to the 1993-1999 proceedings, submitted a request for reopening, stating that in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure she should have been cited as a party since she was the owner of one half of the apartment at issue and the judgment of 22 February 1999 was binding on her. 14. The second and third applicants also became parties to these proceedings as they replaced their deceased father, being his heirs. 15. By a judgment of 30 January 2001 the Supreme Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of 22 February 1999, reopened the case and remitted it to another panel of the Supreme Court of Cassation. The court found that, in violation of the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, the first applicant had not taken part in the 1993-1999 proceedings. 16. At least two hearings were held before the Supreme Court of Cassation - one on 15 May 2001 and one on 6 November 2001, the first of them was adjourned upon the first applicant's request. 17. By a judgment of 13 November 2001 the Supreme Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of 14 July 1997 and remitted the case to the Sofia City Court for new examination. 18. The first hearing before the City Court was scheduled for 27 May 2002 and was adjourned upon the first applicant's request. The following hearing was held on 6 February 2003. At least three more hearings were held - on 13 March 2003, 20 November 2003 and 9 February 2004, the first of which was adjourned because the third applicant had not been properly summoned as his address had changed. 19. On 1 March 2004 the Sofia City Court quashed the Sofia District Court's judgment of 18 October 1995 and decided to refer the case for renewed examination by the Sofia District Court. 20. On an unspecified date in March or in April 2004 the heirs of the pre-nationalisation owners appealed before the Supreme Court of Cassation, which held a hearing on 11 March 2005. By judgment of 24 March 2005 the Supreme Court of Cassation quashed the lower court's judgment, as the reopened case fell to be examined by the Sofia City Court. 21. The Sofia City Court held a hearing on 14 November 2005. 22. On 9 January 2006 the Sofia City Court found that the 1968 transaction was null and void, having regard to the fact that the apartment at issue had largely exceeded the applicants' family's needs as determined by the relevant housing regulations. 23. On 21 February 2006 the applicants appealed. The first hearing was scheduled for 18 April 2007 but was adjourned upon the first applicant's request. Another hearing was held on 20 June 2007. 24. By a judgment of 9 July 2007 the Supreme Court of Cassation upheld the previous court's judgment.

4. The applicants are Russian nationals who live in the town of Korenovsk in the Krasnodar Region. They are former employees of the Architecture and Town Planning Department of the Korenovskiy District Council (hereafter – the Council). The three applicants were employed as engineers, one as a technician and one as a land engineer. 5. In January 2001 the applicants were dismissed from their positions. 6. The applicants sued the Council for reinstatement and wage arrears for the period from October 2000 to January 2001. 7. On 28 March 2001 the Korenovskiy District Court dismissed the applicants' claims for reinstatement but awarded them the amounts listed in the schedule. The judgment became final on 22 May 2001 when the Krasnodar Regional Court upheld it on appeal. The judgment remains unenforced because the Council does not have necessary funds. 8. The applicants asked the Justice of the Peace of the 153rd Court Circuit of the Korenovskiy District to award them wage arrears for the period from February to April 2001. 9. On 20 June 2001 the Justice of the Peace accepted their action against the Council and awarded them the amounts listed in the schedule. The judgment was not appealed against and became final. 10. Enforcement proceedings were instituted, but the judgment was not enforced because the Council did not have funds. 11. On 8 August 2002 the sums awarded by the judgment of 20 June 2001 were credited to the applicants' accounts. 12. The applicants lodged an action against the Council, complaining that the Council failed to enforce the judgments of 28 March and 20 June 2001. They sought payment of the amounts awarded under those judgments. 13. On 20 November 2002 the Justice of the Peace held that the Council should pay the applicants compensation for the delay in enforcement of the judgment of 28 March 2001 for the period from 22 May 2001 to 20 November 2002 (the amounts awarded are listed in the schedule). The judgment of 20 November 2002 was upheld on appeal on 24 December 2002. 14. Enforcement proceedings were instituted but the judgment of 20 November 2002, as upheld on appeal on 24 December 2002, remains unenforced because the Council does not have funds.

5. The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Volzhskiy, Volgograd Region. 6. On 1 October 2010 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of drug offences. 7. On 2 October 2010 he was charged with two episodes of attempted drug trafficking, allegedly committed on 7 and 8 September 2010 in conspiracy with others. 8. On 3 October 2010 Kirovskiy District Court, Astrakhan, (“the District Court”) granted the investigator’s request to place the applicant in detention until 1 December 2010. The District Court held as follows: “It follows from the evidence provided by the investigator in support of his request for application of a measure of restraint that Mr A.N. Shevchenko is charged with particularly serious criminal offences which represent a significant danger to society and are punishable by deprivation of liberty for a period of five to twelve years. The charges against the applicant are justified by the report on the detection of the crime, operational search materials, search records, expert reports, and the testimony of Mr A.C. Filenko, which directly implicates Mr Shevchenko in those criminal offences. Having regard to the above, and also taking into account the circumstances of the case and information on the implication of Mr Shevchenko in the criminal offences, as well as the personality of the defendant, who is not registered as resident in the Astrakhan region and has no job and no dependents, the court has come to the conclusion that at liberty he might abscond and thereby interfere with the proceedings. Taking into account information about the personality of the defendant and the criminal offences with which he is charged, it is impossible to apply a more lenient measure of restraint.” 9. On 8 October 2010 a further set of criminal proceedings was initiated against the applicant on suspicion of drug offences allegedly committed between the beginning of September and 1 October 2010. 10. On 9 October 2010 those proceedings were joined to the first set of proceedings against the applicant. 11. On 23 November 2010 the District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 20 January 2011. The District Court held as follows: “Mr A.N. Shevchenko is charged with particularly serious criminal offences punishable by more than two years’ imprisonment. In taking a decision on this request, the court considers that the investigating authorities reasonably argue that it is impossible to finalise their investigation for objective reasons, such as there being a large number of witnesses and defendants and it being necessary to finish the investigation. The character of the case, its circumstances and the charges [brought against the co-defendants] indicate that the case is particularly complex; this is also due to there being a large number of co‑defendants. The circumstances which served as the grounds for choosing the measure of restraint in the form of placement in detention have not changed in view of the legal characterisation of the criminal offence. The personality of Mr Shevchenko, his engagement in illegal distribution of narcotic drugs which, as indicated by the evidence, constituted the source of his income, and the absence of any other income, allow the conclusion that the investigator’s request is well founded and that it is necessary to place Mr Shevchenko in isolation from society. Mr Shevchenko’s term of detention expires on 1 December 2010. This is too short a period of time to carry out planned investigative actions and to take a decision on the charges, and therefore the term of detention of the defendant should be extended.” 12. In his appeal against that detention order the applicant submitted that the District Court had based its decision on negative assumptions about his future behaviour, and had not taken into account his personality, positive references and permanent place of residence. 13. On 3 December 2010 the Astrakhan Regional Court (“the Regional Court”) upheld the detention order of 23 November 2010. 14. On 14 January 2011 the District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 20 March 2011. The District Court held as follows: “The court takes into account that Mr A.N. Shevchenko is charged with particularly serious criminal offences ... punishable exclusively by deprivation of liberty for up to twelve years, and therefore the court comes to the conclusion that the investigating authorities’ argument, that if released the defendant, fearing punishment, might abscond, since he has no registration or permanent place of residence in the Astrakhan region, is well founded. The court also takes into account that the criminal case is particularly complex, since it involves several co-defendants, and there should be individual investigations in respect of each co-defendant. In addition, there is a large volume of planned investigating activities. Having regard to the above, the court comes to the conclusion that there exist no grounds for quashing or altering the measure of restraint. It has not been established in the court hearing that there exist any factors preventing the applicant from being kept in a remand prison. The grounds on which the measure of restraint was initially applied and extended have not changed. The court also takes into account that the term of the defendant’s detention is set to expire, whereas the investigation is not yet complete and it is necessary to carry out a number of investigating activities which would require additional time.” 15. On 17 January 2011 the applicant appealed against the detention order of 14 January 2011 to the Astrakhan Regional Court (“the Regional Court”). The applicant submitted that the court’s conclusion regarding the risk that he would abscond was not supported by specific evidence. The court had not taken into account his positive references, permanent place of residence and his argument that the investigation of the case was delayed intentionally. 16. On 13 March 2011 the prosecuting authorities terminated the criminal proceedings against the applicant on charges of 2 October 2010 of two episodes of attempted drug trafficking, in the absence of corpus delicti. They considered that the applicant’s actions had to be qualified as illegal purchase and storage of narcotic drugs without purpose of sale. 17. On 15 March 2011 the District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 20 May 2011. The District Court held as follows: “The court takes into account that Mr A.N. Shevchenko is charged with offences ... which are punishable by deprivation of liberty for a period of up to twelve years. The court comes to the conclusion that the investigating authorities’ argument, that Mr Shevchenko might abscond because of fear of punishment, is well founded. In addition, Mr Shevchenko has no family or dependents; he has no official employment, and therefore no permanent source of income. Mr Shevchenko has no place of residence nor registration in the territory of Astrakhan or Astrakhan region. Mr Shevchenko has previous convictions, and has an outstanding conviction, all of which characterise him as a person disposed to commit crimes. At present the investigation of the criminal case has not been completed. The evidence before the court allow the conclusion that there exist no grounds for altering or changing the measure of restraint applied to the defendant. It has not been established in the court hearing that there are grounds which would prevent the defendant from being held in detention in the remand prison. The argument submitted by the defence and the defendant, that the defendant had no intention of absconding, are not sufficient to alter the measure of restraint to a preventive measure not involving pre-trial detention. Having regard to the above, the court comes to the conclusion that it is impossible to apply other measures of restraint, including a written undertaking, personal surety, or bail. The court also takes into account that a number of investigating activities have been planned in the present case. In addition, within fourteen days of the arrival of the case at the trial court ... a judge has to take a decision about the existence or otherwise of grounds for further extension of the detention ... therefore the court finds it necessary to extend the pre-trial detention in respect of Mr Shevchenko.” 18. In his appeal against the detention order of 15 March 2011 the applicant submitted that the detention order had not been based on relevant and sufficient reasons. 19. On 16 March 2011 the applicant was charged with illegal purchase and storage of narcotic drugs without intent to sell. 20. On 18 March 2011 the Regional Court upheld the detention order of 14 January 2011. 21. On 23 March 2011 the Regional Court upheld the detention order of 15 March 2011. 22. On 12 May 2011 the applicant was presented with the final version of the charges against him. He was charged with illegal purchase and storage of particularly large quantities of narcotic drugs without intent to sell. 23. On the same date the investigation was terminated and the applicant and his co-defendants familiarised themselves with the evidence in the criminal case. 24. On 17 May 2011 the District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 20 June 2011. The District Court held as follows: “The court has established that the grounds which were taken into account when the measure of restraint was chosen in respect of defendant A.N. Shevchenko ... have not changed, and therefore the court is not able to change or cancel the measure of restraint. Mr Shevchenko is charged with involvement in a serious crime ... which presents a significant danger to society and is directed against public health and morals. The court finds well founded the investigating authorities’ argument whereby the applicant might abscond because of fear of punishment, since he has no registration or permanent place of residence in Astrakhan or the Astrakhan region. He has no permanent job, family or dependents. The fact that the charges against Mr Shevchenko were modified and that at present he is charged with illegal drug trafficking without intent to sell cannot serve as a ground for the release of Mr Shevchenko, since that criminal offence also represents a significant danger to society. The term of the detention of Mr Shevchenko expires on 20 May 2011. This period of time is not sufficient to carry out the investigating and procedural activities referred to by the investigator in his request. Therefore, taking into account the volume and complexity of the criminal case, which involves several co-defendants charged with particularly serious crimes, the court considers that the term of detention should be extended. There are no grounds to cancel or alter the measure of restraint. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, the nature of the criminal offence with which Mr Shevchenko is charged, and his personality, the court comes to the conclusion that the term of detention of Mr Shevchenko should be extended for one more month, thus bringing the total length of his detention to eight months and nineteen days, until 20 June 2011.” 25. On the same date the investigating authorities referred the criminal case to the prosecutor’s office of the Astrakhan region for approval. 26. In his appeal against the detention order of 17 May 2011 the applicant and his counsel submitted that the court had not supported its conclusions with specific evidence, and that the investigating activities referred to in the decisions had already been carried out. Furthermore, the court had not taken into account the information about his personality and the fact that he had a permanent place of residence in the Volgograd region. 27. On 25 May 2011 the Regional Court upheld the detention order of 17 May 2011. 28. On 14 June 2011 the Deputy Prosecutor returned the criminal case to the investigating authorities. He indicated that there were a number of shortcomings in the investigation which needed to be corrected. 29. On 16 June 2011 the investigation was reopened in order to remedy those shortcomings. 30. On the same date the District Court further extended the applicant’s detention until 16 September 2011, referring to the same grounds as before. 31. On 24 June 2011 the Regional Court upheld the detention order of 16 June 2011. 32. In the first half of July 2011 the investigation was terminated and the applicant familiarised himself with the evidence in the case. 33. However, on 15 July 2011 the investigation was again reopened in order to correct the personal details of one of the applicant’s co-defendants in various procedural documents. 34. On 9 August 2011 the investigation was terminated and the case was referred to the Regional Prosecutor, who approved it on 25 August 2011. 35. On 31 August 2011 the criminal case against the applicant and his co-defendants was referred to the District Court for trial. 36. On 5 September 2011 the District Court set the preliminary hearing of the case for 12 September 2011. By a decision adopted on the same date the District Court extended the applicant’s and his co-defendants’ detention until 29 February 2012, referring to the seriousness of the charges against them. 37. On 8 September 2011 the applicant appealed against the detention order of 5 September 2011. He submitted that the charges of attempted drug trafficking had been abandoned, that he was now charged with illegal purchase and storage of narcotic drugs without purpose of sale, that the investigation had been completed and it was now impossible for him to interfere with the proceedings. 38. On 20 September 2011 the District Court referred the criminal case for examination on the merits to the Sovetskiy District Court, Astrakhan, on the grounds that the majority of criminal offences impugned to the defendants had been committed in the Sovetskiy District. 39. On 20 October 2011 the Regional Court upheld the detention order of 5 September 2011. 40. On 14 February 2012 the Sovetskiy District Court extended the applicant’s and his co-defendant’s detention until 29 May 2012, referring to the same grounds as in the previous detention orders. 41. On 18 February 2012 the applicant appealed against the detention order of 14 February 2012. He submitted, in particular, that the Sovetskiy District Court had issued a collective detention order without analysing his individual situation, and had not supported its conclusions with specific evidence. 42. On 2 April 2012 the Sovetskiy District Court found the applicant guilty of purchase and storage of drugs, and sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment. 43. On 12 April 2012 the Regional Court upheld the detention order of 14 February 2012. 44. On 21 June 2012 the Regional Court upheld the applicant’s conviction. 45. On 13 February 2013 the Tagilstroyevskiy District Court, Nizhniy Tagil, granted the applicant’s request for early release.

4. The applicant, Mrs Marina Ilyinichna Kaykhanidi, is a Russian national who was born in 1979 and now lives in Berlin. 5. Since 1996 the applicant studied at the Moscow State Linguistic University (the MSLU). In 2000 she obtained a traineeship with the Humboldt University in Berlin. She went to Germany for several months and, consequently, abandoned her courses at the MSLU. She claims that she returned to Moscow in September 2000 and resumed her studies in the MSLU. However, in May 2001 she was sent down from this university for repetitive non-attendance and failure to pass the exams. 6. On 17 July 2001 the applicant challenged her dismissal before the court. On 20 December 2001 the Cheremushkinskiy District of Moscow granted her claim. The court established that the applicant had been dismissed without having been heard about the reasons of her absences. On this ground the court found the dismissal unlawful and ordered the MSLU to reinstate her as a student. 7. The MSLU appealed, but on 20 February 2002 the Moscow City Court upheld the decision in favour of the applicant. 8. On 28 February 2002 the MSLU brought a supervisory review application. On 13 June 2002 the Presidium of the Moscow City Court quashed the lower courts’ decisions. As to the fact that the applicant had not been heard before having been dismissed, the Presidium found that the MSLU dean tried to contact the applicant, but to no avail, since she was outside Russia. The court obtained information from the border police about the applicant’s absences from the Russian territory. According to that information, the applicant was outside Russia for at least seven weeks during the study time. Further, the court obtained information from the Humboldt University which confirmed that starting from April 2001 the applicant had been enrolled at that University as a full-time student. The Presidium also held that the lower courts applied the law incorrectly and decided to remit the case to the first instance court for a fresh examination. 9. After the transmittal of the case to the first instance court the applicant amended her initial complaint, claiming from the MSLU 600,000 Russian roubles (RUB) as non-pecuniary damages. 10. On 19 March 2003 the Cheremushkinskiy District Court of Moscow discontinued the proceedings. The court found that the complaint was introduced under the provisions of the law of 1993, which provided for the judicial review of administrative actions. However, after the enactment of the new Code of Civil Proceeding on 1 February 2003, such claims should have been examined under the rules of “contentious proceedings” (исковое производство). The court advised her to re-introduce her complaint within the contentious proceedings. On 16 May 2003 the Moscow Regional Court upheld the decision of 19 March 2003. 11. The applicant re-introduced her claim; however, she did not follow the instructions of the courts. The courts at two instances again refused to examine her action.

6. The applicants were born in 1922, 1920, 1962, 1958, 1955, 1953, 1935, 1933, 1958, 1959, 1968, 1964, 1961, 1962, 1966, 1957, 1962 and 1959 respectively. The ninth, tenth, twelfth and thirteenth applicants live in the United Kingdom, the eleventh applicant lives in the United States and all the other applicants live in Malta. 7. The applicants or their ancestors (hereinafter “the applicants”) were owners of half an undivided share of several properties in Senglea, namely, five apartments on the ground floor and an adjacent entrance giving access to another twenty apartments above. At the time when the property was acquired, for the price of 345 pounds sterling (approximately 400 euros (“EUR”)), it was leased and occupied by various third parties. 8. This property was damaged during the Second World War and war-damage compensation was due to the owners under the War Damage Ordinance. 9. By a declaration of 27 February 1951 the Government took possession of this property under title of “possession and use” in accordance with the Land Acquisition (Public Purposes) Ordinance (see relevant domestic law). Under this title the owners were paid a yearly acquisition rent of 88 Maltese liras (“MTL”) − approximately EUR 205 for the entire property. This rent was calculated on the rental value declared by the owners to the Land Valuation Office. 10. Subsequently, without requesting prior consent from the owners and without having the plans of the property as it stood, the Government demolished the property and built a new set of apartments on wholly different plans, using part of the property to widen a road. The Government noted that permission for demolition was not necessary since they had legal possession of the property. At the time since the city of Senglea had been totally bombarded and consisted of a pile of rubble, the Government were engaged in an intensive restructuring and construction exercise, taking possession of properties and rebuilding the area with residences for social accommodation. In doing this the applicants alleged that the Government had also appropriated to themselves the war-damage compensation due to them. The Government considered this allegation to be unsubstantiated. 11. On 24 September 1991 the owners wrote to the Commissioner of Lands (“COL”) requesting compensation for their property. They suggested the sum of MTL 105,000 – approximately EUR 244,584. Receipt of their request was acknowledged but the claim remained unanswered. 12. By a declaration of 22 June 1993 the Government acquired the said property under the title of “public tenure” according to the Land Acquisition (Public Purposes) Ordinance (see relevant domestic law). Under this title the owners continued to be paid EUR 205 per year for the entire property. 13. In the meantime, this property was allocated as housing to third parties and included a shop. 14. The applicants pointed out that in 1988 the Government had declared that it would no longer be resorting to takings under titles of “possession and use” or “public tenure”. During political debate, the Deputy Prime Minister had in fact referred to such takings as a nefarious method of acquisition. Indeed, in the past twenty years the Government had converted takings under title of “possession and use” or “public tenure” to takings under “outright purchase”. The latter provided for a more favourable form of compensation, namely the market value of the property at the time of taking. The applicants submitted a number of examples reflecting this allegation (for example, Legal Notice nos. 271 and 272 of 2010 converting previous takings to outright purchases, and declaration no. 578 of 31 August 1990 substituting a declaration of taking under possession and use of a few months earlier with an outright purchase, following complaints by the owners. In the latter case the property had also been demolished and rebuilt and was being used for social housing). 15. The applicants also submitted an expert report valuing the entire property in Senglea at EUR 950,000. Thus, their share as owners of half an undivided share was worth EUR 475,000. 16. On 13 March 1998 the applicants brought constitutional redress proceedings. Invoking Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and Article 14 they requested that the court find a violation of their rights as a consequence of the actions taken by the COL and to grant adequate compensation. Given the way the application was presented the Government did not plead non-exhaustion in respect of the failure of the applicants to institute proceedings before the LAB. 17. The case was set down for hearing on 25 March 1998. On 25 September 1998 the court-appointed architect was requested to conduct an on-site inspection to determine whether the property built by the Government was indeed built on the applicants’ property and what use was being made of the ground floor. The report was submitted on 5 January 1999; however, the court-appointed expert failed to draw up an estimate of the value of the property in issue and the applicants’ request for additional terms of reference to be given to the expert was rejected on 16 December 1999 on the basis that the value of the property was irrelevant to the merits of the claim. Subsequently, on 7 September 2001 the case was adjourned pending negotiations regarding the possibility of reaching an amicable solution to the case. This having failed, the proceedings continued on 20 February 2002 at the applicants’ request. On 14 November 2002 the applicants requested the court to make written submissions. On 1 March 2005 the applicants requested that the case be suspended pending the determination of another constitutional case that could have affected the merits of their case. The hearing of submissions recommenced on 22 May 2007. The Government filed their written submissions on 12 September 2007 and the case was scheduled for judgment on 9 October 2007. 18. By a judgment of 16 October 2008 the Civil Court (First Hall), acting in its constitutional jurisdiction, rejected their claims. It held that, since the applicants were still owners of the said property, the taking under both titles could not be considered a deprivation of property but a control of the use of such property. This control had been necessary in view of the fact that the property had been ruined in the war and that there had been a need to provide social housing in the post-war years. For the same reasons, even assuming that the taking under title of public tenure had been a deprivation of possessions, it would have been in the public interest. In respect of the fair balance required, the court observed that, when the State was pursuing economic reform or social justice, less reimbursement was due than the full market value. While it was true that the recognition rent payable to the applicants was not high and there were no prospects for it to be increased in future years, it was comparable to the rents applicable under the controlled rents regime in force in respect of other old properties. Moreover, in the present case the owners had not been required to incur expenses for the building of the new apartments or for their maintenance and when the property had been originally purchased by the owners’ ancestors it was already rented to third parties to which such regulated rents applied. In consequence, it could not be said that the applicants had borne an excessive burden. The court found that their related complaint under the same provision in respect of the unauthorised demolition could not be examined ratione temporis. 19. Lastly, as to the complaint regarding the difference in treatment as a result of the taking under title of public tenure as opposed to an outright purchase, the court held that the choice was specifically available to the Government. However, according to the policy in force, takings under titles of possession and use were converted to outright purchases in cases where the properties were used for commercial purposes. Other properties, where the Government wished to keep control of the expropriated property, were taken under title of public tenure. While this choice allowed for a large margin of appreciation, the applicants had not proved that other people in an analogous position had been treated more favourably and it did not appear that the policy had been applied arbitrarily or in a discriminatory fashion in the applicants’ case. 20. On appeal, by a judgment of 6 October 2009 the Constitutional Court upheld the first-instance judgment. 21. Primarily, it noted that the applicants had been acquiescent for a period of forty years before they ever solicited any action from the authorities or the relevant courts. On the merits, it confirmed that the interference did not amount to a deprivation since quite apart from retaining the title of ownership, the applicants had continued to receive rent in respect of the said property and to have standing to institute proceedings in respect of complaints relating to the property. Thus, not all the legal rights of the owners had been extinguished. 22. It further noted that the legality of the interference and the public interest involved were not disputed. Indeed, the law (section 12(3) of the Land Acquisition (Public Purposes) Ordinance, prior to its amendment) allowed the State to carry out works on property taken under possession and use, without any specific limitation. Moreover, the property which had been demolished and rebuilt had been taken in a damaged state, and any complaints about the entitlement to war-damage compensation remained unsubstantiated and were irrelevant to the main complaint in issue. 23. The decision as to under which title the property could be taken fell within the margin of appreciation of the State. As to the fair balance and the relevant amount of compensation, while it was true that a rent of EUR 205 was by today’s standards low for the property in issue, the value of the property had to reflect the values applicable in 1951 and not 2009. It noted that the applicants had not even contested the amount of rent due before the Land Arbitration Board (“LAB”) and that their acquiescence had led to a situation where even if they had wanted to do so, they could not prove the boundaries of the property. However, it was also true that the authorities had failed in their duty to draft a report as to the state and the boundaries of the property before they demolished it and created new plans for it. Thus, at this stage it was impossible to determine the actual boundaries of the property and in this state of uncertainty it was not surprising that the applicants had not taken up the procedure before the LAB. In any event, the court was of the view that the complaint was manifestly ill-founded. 24. As to the complaint under Article 14, it noted the witness testimony from the Department of Lands to the effect that takings under absolute purchase had occurred, although they generally related to commercial properties; that there had been cases were the Government had acted differently and acquired property by outright purchase following a taking by title of possession and use; that there was no hard policy regulating what type of taking was required in each case; and that to the witness’s knowledge there had been no political or other specific reasons motivating such an action. The court concluded that the fact that it had been established that other property had been taken by absolute purchase was not enough to prove discriminatory treatment and therefore there could not be a violation of the said provision. 25. The Constitutional Court further criticised the delay of ten and a half years which the first-instance court had taken to decide on the case even though a good part of the delay had been attributable to the applicants who, inter alia, had taken four and a half years to make submissions. 26. Following the introduction of the application with the Court (April 2010), on 3 June 2010 the Government issued a declaration that the property was being taken under title of absolute purchase. The property was valued in terms of section 22 of the Ordinance and the compensation offered was that of EUR 168,417.43.

5. The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Istanbul. 6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7. On 15 June 2000 the applicant was charged with the offence of membership of Hizbullah, a proscribed organisation in Turkey. 8. While the criminal proceedings against the applicant were continuing before the Diyarbakır State Security Court, Law no. 4616 entered into force on 22 December 2000. Law no. 4616 provides for the suspension of criminal proceedings in respect of certain offences committed before 23 April 1999, without reaching a definitive finding as to guilt. 9. On 13 March 2001 the Diyarbakır State Security Court considered that there was no evidence to show that the applicant had been a member of the illegal organisation or that she had carried out “any activities on behalf of the illegal organisation in an active and continuous manner”. According to the Diyarbakır State Security Court, the applicant's activities “had remained within the scope of the offence of aiding and abetting the illegal organisation”, which was one of the offences in respect of which Law No. 4616 was applicable. The Diyarbakır State Security Court thus suspended the criminal proceedings against the applicant. 10. In the meantime, on 4 October 2000, that is before the criminal proceedings were suspended, the applicant was dismissed from her post as a primary school teacher because the Ministry of Education considered that the evidence in the possession of the prosecuting authorities showed that she was a member of the illegal organisation. 11. The applicant challenged her dismissal by bringing a case against the Ministry of Education before the Diyarbakır Administrative Court on 3 November 2000. 12. On 7 March 2002 the Diyarbakır Administrative Court rejected the applicant's request for the Ministry's decision dismissing her from her post to be quashed. In its decision the Diyarbakır Administrative Court referred to the Diyarbakır State Security Court's above-mentioned decision of 13 March 2001, and held that the dismissal of the applicant “whose criminal activities were deemed in the criminal proceedings to constitute the offence of aiding and abetting” had been lawful. 13. The appeal lodged by the applicant against the Administrative Court decision was dismissed by the Supreme Administrative Court on 12 November 2004. The Supreme Court decision was notified to the applicant on 16 March 2005. 14. On various subsequent dates the applicant made job applications to the education authorities. One of the applications she made, on 13 February 2008, was rejected by the local education authority in Istanbul on the basis of the Diyarbakır State Security Court decision of 13 March 2001. 15. According to an official document dated 22 February 2008, the applicant has no criminal record.

5. The applicant, Mr Victor Saviţchi, is a Moldovan national who was born in 1954. He worked as an inspector in the Făleşti County Economic Police Force. On 3 August 2000 he was arrested on a charge of taking a bribe of 4,000 United States dollars (USD) in exchange for a favour concerning a case he was dealing with. 6. The arrest in flagrante delicto was filmed by two cameras from different angles. Both videos were included in the domestic criminal file and were sent to the Court by the Government. 7. One of the videos shows a group of police officers wearing plain clothes enter a room, which looks like a small bar, where the applicant is drinking beer with the briber. At the sight of the police officers, the applicant dips his fingers into a mug of beer, after which he is immediately grabbed and restrained by four police officers. Since the applicant attempts to bend down, three police officers hold his hands behind his back while another one holds his head up. Subsequently, another police officer joins the other four. Another police officer approaches the applicant and checks the pockets of his trousers. The applicant is splashed with beer and water, apparently in an attempt to calm him down, and one of the police officers restraining him comments that he is attempting to bend down. Finally, he is forcibly cuffed and seated on a chair. After approximately four minutes of struggle, the applicant calms down. After approximately five minutes, one of the police officers announces to the others that he has stopped filming because the cassette has run out. 8. The second video starts immediately after the police officers grab and restrain the applicant. A man holding a camera can be seen kicking the applicant in the region of his chest. It appears that the man kicking the applicant is the police officer who was filming the other video (see the preceding paragraph). Immediately after this scene the image changes to a wall; however, sounds resembling two blows are heard in the background. After approximately twenty seconds the same person kicks the applicant twice in the posterior. Another police officer approaches the applicant and does something to him; however, only his back can be seen. Later the applicant, who continues to struggle, is splashed with beer and water, apparently in an attempt to calm him down. One of the police officers restraining him comments that he is attempting to bend down. After being forcibly seated on a chair, the applicant calms down and a police officer examines his hands with a special lamp to detect the presence of a special dust with which the bribe money has apparently been treated. Subsequently, his pockets are examined and USD 4,000 is extracted from the pocket of his shirt. The money appears to have been marked with a special dust and every banknote bears the inscription “Bribe Savitchi 2000”. The applicant claims that the money is not his and that he has no idea how it got into his pocket. He argues that in that pocket he had documents and a pen which mysteriously appeared on the table. 9. On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a complaint with the General Prosecutor’s Office about his alleged ill-treatment by the policemen who arrested him on 3 August 2000. 10. On 24 November 2000 the General Prosecutor’s Office refused to institute criminal proceedings against the policemen, on the ground that the applicant’s complaint was ill-founded. The decision dismissing the applicant’s complaint stated, inter alia, that several police officers who had participated in the applicant’s arrest had been questioned and they had denied the applicant’s submissions that he had been beaten up. 11. On 17 May 2004 the applicant complained to the Râşcani District Court about the Prosecutor’s Office’s refusal to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers who had ill-treated him. In support of his complaint the applicant relied on the video of his arrest (see paragraph 8 above) and the findings in the judgment of the Bălţi Regional Court of 5 June 2001 (see paragraph 14 below). 12. On 18 June 2004 the Râşcani District Court without having viewed the video, examined the case on its merits and, in a very brief decision, dismissed the complaint as ill-founded. 13. The applicant was detained during the judicial proceedings between 4 August 2000 and 5 June 2001. 14. On 5 June 2001 the Bălţi Regional Court acquitted the applicant. In its judgment it stated, inter alia, the following: “Article 109 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that investigative measures can be taken only after criminal proceedings are formally instituted... The criminal proceedings were formally instituted in this case on 3 August 2000.... The accusation is based on a number of pieces of evidence which were obtained prior to that date, such as: the warrant for the installation of a recording device of 2 August 2000, the minutes of the marking of the money of 2 August 2000, a video of 2 August 2000, and some audio recordings... ... According to Article 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the interception of telephone communications and other communications... of suspects... may be carried out in connection with criminal proceedings instituted in accordance with a decision of the authority conducting the investigation with the authorisation of the prosecutor. In the present criminal proceedings the prosecution presented four audio cassettes and three micro audio cassettes; however, it appears from the materials of the case that the interception of the communications was not authorised by a prosecutor. ... Having listened to the contents of the audio cassette HF-S 90, micro audio cassette Sony MC-60, TDK-60 and “Olimpus”, the court found that the interception and the recordings were carried out in breach of the provisions of the [Code of Criminal Procedure] and it is not clear who made the recordings, who was involved in the discussion and on which date the recordings were made. The contents of the micro audio cassette Sony MC-60... are incomprehensible.... The above audio cassettes were sent to the Prosecutor General’s Office on 2 August 2000, one day before the formal institution of the criminal proceedings. Since the above evidence was obtained in breach of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is not admissible. ... Having watched the video of the arrest, the examination of the scene of the crime and the body search, the court found the following: the film starts at 6.52 p.m.; Savitchi is surrounded by men who arrest him, his hands are twisted and he is kicked in the area of his liver. The image changes, but one can still hear the sound of blows. After that ... Savitchi is splashed with beer and water and seated on a chair with his hands cuffed behind his back... At 7.21 p.m. a wad of money is taken out of the left pocket of his shirt. One can clearly see in the film that during the disorder created at the moment of arrest (at 6.53 p.m.), while Savitchi had his hands cuffed at his back and was surrounded by men, someone approached him, bent low and stretched his arms towards Savitchi’s chest. These images cast doubt on the fact that Savitchi took the money, and his version of the facts, that the money was placed in his pocket, cannot be ruled out... ... The fact that he was splashed with water and beer seem to support the allegation that he lost consciousness... and that the special dust appeared on his hands which had been behind his back. Witnesses S. and B., who were questioned during the hearing, declared that when they entered the premises [the bar], they saw Savitchi, who had already been arrested, and that they did not see the moment of his arrest. Their testimonies are consistent with the video. The fact that he [Savitchi] dipped his fingers in beer is not sufficient proof that he took the money... The above evidence being equivocal, must be interpreted in favour of Savitchi. The policemen..., who participated in the arrest as witnesses, stated that during the arrest Savitchi had resisted and therefore he had been cuffed, he had not lost consciousness, nobody had placed money in his pocket and nobody had beaten him up. ... The declarations of the above witnesses [the police officers] are not consistent with the film and therefore the court doubts their truthfulness... ... Witness L.M. [the briber] did not confirm the fact that Savitchi requested money from her... It was A.M. [the intermediary] who told her about the money. Moreover, there were no reasons for her to fear a control... Having analysed all the circumstances of the case, the court comes to the conclusion that in the present case an entrapment was organised by the State organs, which is contrary to Article 95 (5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” 15. The Prosecutor’s Office lodged an appeal against this judgment. It did not deny the fact that some of the evidence had been obtained in breach of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 16. In respect of the description of the video of the applicant’s arrest given by the first-instance court, the Prosecutor’s Office stated that there had indeed been disorder at the moment of the arrest because the applicant had resisted. He would not calm down and had tried to throw himself to the ground. It was, however, clearly visible that the money had been extracted from his pocket. The Prosecutor’s Office stressed that the first-instance court should have paid more attention to the testimonies of victims L.M. and A.M. (the bribers) and argued that the first-instance court had refused to question a witness who had been present at the moment of extraction of money from the applicant’s pocket. The first-instance court had failed to listen to all the audio recordings presented by the prosecution. It had also failed to question the technicians who had made the audio and video recordings and wrongly interpreted the testimonies of the policemen who had arrested the applicant. 17. The Prosecutor’s Office asked for the judgment of 5 June 2001 to be quashed and the case re-examined by the first-instance court. 18. On 30 August 2001 the Court of Appeal allowed the prosecutor’s appeal in its entirety, quashed the judgment of 5 June 2001 and ordered a re-trial of the case by the first-instance court. The court found numerous mistakes in the procedure before the first-instance court, such as, inter alia, the wrongful assessment of the evidence, the breach of the accused’s right to defence, the evidence (video and audio cassettes) was not given a proper examination, the prosecutor’s motions to hear a witness and several experts were dismissed, there was insufficient evidence to prove that the applicant had not taken the bribe and the conclusion about the entrapment was wrong. 19. On 12 November 2002 the Bălţi Regional Court conducted a complete rehearing of the case, found the applicant guilty of bribe-taking and sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment. The court based the conviction, inter alia, on the statements of A.M. and L.M., who declared that the applicant had asked them for a bribe, and of five policemen who arrested the applicant, who made more or less similar declarations about the alleged bribe-giving and arrest. Only one of the five policemen declared in an affidavit that force had been used on the applicant. The other policemen stated that no force had been used. All of the policemen declared that the applicant had dipped his fingers in a glass of beer in order to wash away traces of phosphorescent dust. 20. The court also relied on the fact that the money had been found in the applicant’s pocket and that traces of phosphorescent dust had been detected on the palm of his right hand. The court also relied on two audio cassettes containing the recording of telephone conversations between the applicant and A.M. and L.M. of unknown date, and the video of the applicant’s arrest. The court stated the following: “It appears from the audio cassette TDK MC-60 that Savitchi was dealing with the case of L.M. It also appears from their discussion that he requested from her the stated amount of money, in exchange for a positive report on the case. He insisted that she resign and move to another town, and promised that after the payment of the money the problem would be solved positively; if not, the money would be returned. It appears from the discussions between Savitchi and A.M. that Savitchi was requesting USD 4,000. He was dealing with L.M.’s case and he had discovered irregularities concerning large amounts of money, and promised to help in exchange for a bribe, on condition that she resign and move to another town. From the video it appears that the money in the amount of USD 4,000 had been marked in the presence of witnesses and had been given to A.M., who, on 3 August 2000 at approximately 6.30 p.m. ... had given it to Savitchi. When the police entered the bar, the bribe was already in the pocket of Savitchi’s shirt. Savitchi put his fingers in a glass of beer in order to wash away the traces of phosphorescent dust.” 21. The court did not describe the other details of the video of the applicant’s arrest described in the judgment of 5 June 2001. It stated that the applicant’s submissions that he had not taken the money and that it had been put into his pocket were baseless. The court found that physical force had been used on him in order to overcome his resistance against the police and block his attempts to destroy the evidence. 22. The applicant appealed against this judgment, arguing, inter alia, that: “The court was influenced by the President’s [the President of the country] letter addressed to the President of the Superior Council of Magistrates, V.S.... ... ...the court failed to give any consideration to the video of the applicant’s arrest in which one can clearly see that at 6.52 p.m. someone kicked him in the stomach after which the [camera] was immediately [directed elsewhere] by the person who was filming; however, the sound of beating could still be heard in the background. A minute later, at 6.53 p.m., an unknown person obscured the view with his body and stuck the money into the applicant’s pocket... Savitchi was splashed with water and beer in order to make him regain consciousness.... The court did not find out who beat the applicant up and why force had been necessary. Moreover, the court did not take into consideration that all the police witnesses except one denied the fact that Savitchi had been beaten up.... There was a plan to make Savitchi lose consciousness in order to be able to manipulate the evidence. The court did not take into consideration the fact that some evidence, such as the report of the installing of telephone interception devices of 2 August 2000, the minutes of the marking of the money and the audio and video recordings of 2 August 2000, were obtained in breach of ... the Code of Criminal Procedure.... The recording of the telephone communication was carried out without the authorisation of a prosecutor... Moreover, even these items of evidence prove Savitchi’s innocence. ... No audio or video evidence proves that Savitchi demanded or received a bribe from L.M or A.M.” 23. On 30 January 2003 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal. In respect of his arguments it stated the following: “It follows from the materials of the case that Savitchi extorted a bribe of USD 4,000 from A.M. who informed the police. After that, investigative measures were undertaken, recording devices were used and conversations between Savitchi and A.M. about the hand-over of the bribe and its amount were recorded. A video of the marking of the bribe money was made. In this manner, Savitchi was caught red-handed and there are no doubts about his guilt. The arguments in Savitchi’s appeal are devoid of any legal basis and the court considers them to be a method of defending the accused with the aim of avoiding penal responsibility for the offence committed. Accordingly it cannot be said that the bribery was [committed as a result of] entrapment.” 24. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court of Justice, raising points about the inadmissibility of all the evidence obtained before 3 August 2000 and other arguments similar to those raised in his appeal. 25. On 10 July 2003 the Supreme Court of Justice, without holding a hearing and without giving any reasons, declared the applicant’s appeal on points of law inadmissible. 26. On 26 March 2004 the applicant wrote a letter to the Bălţi Court of Appeal, where his criminal file was held, in which he requested to be issued copies of some materials from the file. In reply he did not receive all the requested copies. 27. He repeated his request and stressed that he needed a copy of the minutes of the hearings in the criminal proceedings against him and a copy of the video of his arrest of 3 August 2000, when he was caught red-handed, for the purpose of applying to an international court. 28. By a letter of 3 May 2004 the President of the Bălţi Court of Appeal informed the applicant that under the Code of Criminal Procedure he did not have a right to receive copies of the minutes of the hearings; as to a copy of the video cassette, the applicant was informed that the court did not have the technical or economic means to make one. 29. The applicant wrote in reply that he was prepared to bear all the expenses linked to the copying of the video cassette. 30. On 30 June 2004 a Vice-President of the Bălţi Court of Appeal replied to the applicant that the court did not have the technical or economic means to make a copy of a video cassette. 31. On unspecified dates the applicant complained to the Superior Council of Magistrates about the refusal of the Bălţi Court of Appeal to issue him with copies of the required materials from his criminal file. He relied, inter alia, on the provisions of the Law on Access to Information and on Article 10 of the Convention. 32. On 2 July 2004 C.G., a Vice-President of the Supreme Court of Justice, informed the applicant that he had the right to have his lawyer see the minutes of the hearings and the video of his arrest, but not to request copies of them. 33. On 15 July 2004 the applicant introduced an action with the Chişinău Court of Appeal against C.G.’s decision of 2 July 2004, asking for the decision to be quashed and that the Bălţi Court of Appeal be obliged to issue him copies of the transcripts of the hearings of his criminal case and of the video of his arrest. He based his action, inter alia, on the Law on Access to Information and on Article 10 of the Convention. 34. On 27 July 2004 the Chişinău Court of Appeal informed the applicant that his action could not be examined, since C.G.’s letter was merely the opinion of a public official which did not infringe the applicant’s rights and therefore could not be challenged in the courts. 35. The applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court of Justice. However, on 20 September 2004 he was informed by the Supreme Court of Justice that the letter of the Chişinău Court of Appeal of 27 July 2004 was not a judicial decision and therefore could not be challenged by way of an appeal.

4. The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Virovitica. 5. At some time in 2002 an investigation was opened before the Virovitica County Court (Županijski sud u Virovitici) concerning an allegation of indecent act against a minor (a girl of twelve). On 22 April 2003 the applicant was heard by an investigating judge. He was informed of his right to be legally represented, but chose to represent himself. On 3 May 2002 the alleged victim, M.V., gave evidence before an investigating judge in the presence of a psychologist. The applicant, who at this stage was not represented by a lawyer, was not present. The Government submitted a copy of the court's summons sent to the applicant. The transcript of the hearing before the investigating judge shows that the applicant was not present, without further comments on the reasons for his absence. The transcript of M.V.'s testimony reads as follows: “One day my parents sent me to see Tomo Kovač [the applicant] to get cigarettes and our bicycle, which we had lent to Tomo. I went to Tomo's house. I was wearing underwear, tights, trousers and a T-shirt. I do not remember exactly when all this happened. When I arrived at Tomo's house I spent some time in his father Feri's workshop. Then Tomo came and took me to his flat. His wife Danijela and their son Željko were there. Tomo told me straight away that we had to go into a room and that he was going to examine me. I did not want to go into the room and Tomo hit me twice with a wooden spoon on my hands and shoulder. His wife, Danijela, told him not to hit me and Tomo hit her hands with the spoon too. Tomo also hit his son, Željko. Then he took me by the hand and led me to the room, where we were alone. He took off my trousers, tights and underwear and threw me on a bed. I was lying on my back and Tomo was touching me with his hand on the upper part of my body over my T-shirt. Afterwards he also touched my genitals, and he did that for some time. Then he told me that I should not tell anyone about it. I cannot say how long it lasted. Tomo then told me to get dressed, which I did, and then we left the room and went back to the kitchen, where we joined Danijela and Željko. Tomo had touched my genitals with his hand, but he had not put his finger inside me. When we returned to the kitchen, Tomo gave me some money and told me to buy myself something and go home. He also said that he would not give me the cigarettes because I might lose them on my way home. Then I went back home on my parents' bike. When I got back home my parents asked me if I wanted to have dinner but I refused and went to bed. I did not tell my parents anything [about what had happened to me] that evening or the next day. The next day when I was at school my mother and Tomo came to take me out of school. My mother took me to the police station to make a statement about what had happened at Tomo's. I told the police that Tomo had touched me because that was what had really happened. I attend fifth grade of a special school and am a very good pupil. I cannot read or write but I can count to ten. At first I did not tell my parents what happened at Tomo's, because I was afraid of them and I did not dare tell them about it.” It was also noted that contact with M.V. had been established with difficulty. 6. On 29 November 2002 the Bjelovar State Attorney's Office (Općinsko državno odvjetništvo Bjelovar) filed a bill of indictment against the applicant charging him with an act of indecency against a minor (bludna radnja). 7. On an unspecified date the trial against the applicant opened before the Virovitica Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Virovitici). On 25 February 2003 the trial judge asked for a psychiatrist's opinion on M.V.'s mental health and development. The report, submitted on 10 March 2003, reads, inter alia, as follows: “...[M.V.] is joyful and curious, she touches everything and asks a lot of questions, as a child would. She strongly deviates from the standard behaviour for a child of her age. Physically she is healthy. When asked a direct question about her age, she answers: 'Twelve, I don't really know, give me that pencil, this watch, a telephone.' She does not know the days of the week, she cannot count, does not know the alphabet, and writes her name with difficulty, automatically, without understanding what she is doing. She can't tell the time. She knows her parents' address. She likes to play with the telephone. She has difficulty talking about the event in question, as she remembers only parts of it. She just repeats that Tomo Kovač shouted at her and hit her with a wooden spoon, with which he also hit his child.” 8. The trial court held a hearing on 22 April 2003. In his defence before the trial court the applicant denied the charges. M.V. was also summoned. It was then recorded, in the presence of the applicant, a psychologist and a deputy state attorney, that M.V. upheld the statement she had made before the investigating judge. This statement was not read out. M.V. added that on the afternoon she had gone to the Kovač residence. Nobody, including Franjo and Tomo Kovač, had given her any money. The deputy state attorney then asked that M.V. be questioned without the applicant being present. The request was granted and the applicant was removed from the courtroom. The applicant, still unrepresented, had not had the opportunity to prepare any questions for the witness beforehand. The transcript of M.V.'s further statement, made in the applicant's absence, reads as follows: “I am afraid of Tomo Kovač because he attacks me all the time and tells me to go to see his father. This morning, before the hearing, he threatened to beat me up on my way back home from the court. That is all I have to say.” This statement was then read to the applicant who denied having threatened M.V. and said that he had not even seen her that morning before he arrived at the court. The psychologist present stated that the applicant's intellectual level corresponded to that of an average child of five years and four months. 9. The court also heard evidence from the applicant's partner who stated that M.V. had said that she had been naked with the applicant's father in his workshop before coming to the house. Other witnesses were also heard, none of whom had seen the alleged acts and who gave evidence only on the subsequent events. 10. In its judgment of 22 April 2003, the Virovitica Municipal Court convicted the applicant of an act of indecency against a minor and sentenced him to six months' imprisonment. It based the applicant's conviction to a decisive degree on the statement made by M.V. before the investigating judge. The relevant part of judgment reads as follows: “The victim gave a detailed statement of the episode with the defendant, alleging that the defendant had forced her to go into a bedroom, hitting her on her body with a wooden spoon with which he had also hit his partner, and that once in the bedroom, in a state of excitement, he had told her to take off her clothes and touched her with his hands on the upper and lower parts of her body. He had then ordered her to put her clothes back on and warned her not to tell anyone about what had happened. Psychological tests on the victim were carried out a year after the above-mentioned event. In the interview with the psychologist the victim made it clear that the subject of their conversation was the incident when the defendant had touched her body. Bearing in mind the consistency of the victim's testimony and that, according to the psychiatrist's report submitted, she had not been able to resist the defendant due to the fact that she was mentally challenged, it can be concluded that the defendant had acted against the victim in the manner described in the indictment.” 11. In his subsequent appeal the applicant, now represented by defence counsel, denied the charges against him and also complained that he had not been given an opportunity to question M.V. In particular, he argued that M.V.'s testimony should have been given in a separate room and tape-recorded so that he could have had the opportunity to hear it. He further pointed out that the transcript of the statement she made before the investigating judge could not possibly correspond to what she had actually said, because the language used in the transcript did not resemble that of a mentally challenged girl who, at the age of 12, could not read or write and did not know the names of any of her teachers. The applicant also complained that due to his poor education he had not been able to protect his own interests and that therefore a lawyer had to be appointed to him from the very beginning of the proceedings. 12. On 26 June 2003 the Virovitica County Court dismissed the appeal. As to the applicant's objection in respect of the language attributed to M.V., the County Court accepted that the wording of her testimony had been formulated by the investigating judge and that the testimony would have sounded more convincing had it reproduced M.V.'s own words. However, the court found that this shortcoming did not amount to a significant procedural defect. The appellate court made no comments on the applicant's complaint concerning his lack of opportunity to question M.V, and concentrated mainly on the question of M.V.'s reliability as a witness. The relevant part of the appellate court's judgment reads as follows: “... Bearing in mind the provision of Article 191 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Official Gazette no. 58/2002), the defendant's argument that at the main hearing held on 22 April 2003 the victim should have given testimony in accordance with the rules laid down in Article 238 para. 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Section 119 of the Act on the Juvenile Courts (Official Gazette no. 11/1997 with further amendments) – that is, in a separate room and video recorded – is well founded. However, this method of questioning a witness is prescribed only for the purposes of protecting the witnesses themselves and is not a prerequisite for the testimony to be valid. Therefore, such a procedural error did not and could not have any effect on the [first-instance] judgment. Contrary to the arguments in the appeal, the factual background has been adequately and thoroughly established in the impugned judgment. The first-instance court was right in trusting the consistent testimony of the victim on the basis of which it established the relevant facts in the proceedings.” 13. On 30 July 2003 the applicant lodged a request for extraordinary review of a final judgment (zahtjev za izvanredno preispitivanje pravomoćne presude) with the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) whereby he argued that his right to a defence had been violated during the trial because he had not been allowed to question M.V. On 15 January 2004 the court dismissed the applicant's request finding as follows: “The case-file shows that ... the defendant had been temporarily removed from the courtroom during the testimony of the victim, M.V. However, upon his return to the courtroom he was informed about the content of her statement and was able to give his objections and ask questions. For these reasons, temporary removal of the applicant from the courtroom did not violate his defence rights at the hearing” 14. The applicant then lodged a constitutional complaint against the Supreme Court's decision whereby he claimed that his right to examine or have examined a witness against him had been violated, reiterating his previous arguments. 15. On 28 May 2004 the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) declared the complaint inadmissible on the ground that it did not concern the merits of the case. The decision was served on the applicant's counsel on 24 June 2004.

6. The applicant was born in 1953; she and her husband Mr Abdul-Khamit Tepsurkayev were the parents of Khizir Tepsurkayev, who was born in 1980. The applicant lives in Urus-Martan. 7. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 8. The applicant did not eyewitness the events. The description of the circumstances surrounding the abduction of Khizir Tepsurkayev is based on the witness accounts provided by the applicant, her husband, Mr A. Ruslanbek and Mr A. Alvi. 9. At about 9 a.m. on 27 August 2001 Khizir Tepsurkayev left his house in Urus-Martan to go to the Town Court, located in the centre of the town. He was supposed to meet there with the chairman of the court to discuss his future employment as a policeman and the chairman’s guard. On his way to the centre, at the corner of Pervomaiskaya and Ordzhonikidzevskaya Streets, Khizir Tepsurkayev met his acquaintance A. Said-Arbi. The two men were talking when a VAZ-2107 car pulled up next to them. The driver, B. Mairbek, offered Khizir Tepsurkayev and A. Said-Arbi a lift with him to the centre of town. A. Said-Arbi declined the offer, explaining that he had left his passport at home and that he would need it because a sweeping operation was taking place in the centre. Khizir Tepsurkayev accepted the offer of a lift and got into the car. It appears that Khizir Tepsurkayev was not aware of the fact that B. Mairbek and his car were on the authorities’ wanted list. 10. At about 10 a.m. the car approached the building of the former Military Commissariat on Kalanchakskaya Street. There was a group of Russian servicemen there from military unit no. 6779. The group consisted of policemen from Bashkortostan and was stationed on the eastern edge of Urus-Martan. One of Khizir Tepsurkayev’s acquaintances, police officer A.Ruslanbek, was with the group. The commander of the group was officer V. Vasiliy. The group, accompanied by military cars and APCs (armoured personnel carriers), was participating in a special operation and was conducting identity checks. The servicemen were stopping and searching every car. Many people were in the area at the time, as the checks were being carried out next to the local farmers’ market. When the soldiers stopped B. Mairbek’s car, Khizir Tepsurkayev got out of the car and showed his identity documents. The officers checked them and gave them back. At that moment someone in an APC shouted that the car was on the wanted list and the driver should be arrested. B. Mairbek turned his car around and drove away as the servicemen opened fire. 11. After the car had left, commander V. Vasiliy immediately ordered the soldiers to detain Khizir Tepsurkayev. The soldiers started beating him. One of the soldiers hit Khizir Tepsurkayev on the forehead with the butt of his rifle, causing bleeding. During the beatings Khizir Tepsurkayev called for help. He called the name of his acquaintance, D. Yaragi, who lived nearby. The latter heard him and approached the crowd, but could not get through to Khizir Tepsurkayev because the soldiers started firing over the heads of the crowd. Khizir Tepsurkayev was forced into one of the APCs. 12. Another eyewitness, police officer A. Alvi (also mentioned in the submitted documents under the name of A. Aslan), participated in the special operation with another group of servicemen. He was close to the market when he heard the gunfire. Upon approaching the crowd he was told by bystanders that the officers had taken a young man, beaten him and were about to take him away in an APC. Then a group of officers from the temporary department of the interior of the Urus-Martan District (“the VOVD”) arrived in a UAZ (“tabletka”) vehicle. Khizir Tepsurkayev was taken from the APC and placed into the UAZ car, which drove away. A. Alvi immediately reported Khizir Tepsurkayev’s removal to his superiors at the VOVD. 13. After Khizir Tepsurkayev had been taken away, the group under V. Vasiliy’s command continued the special operation. The UAZ car which had taken Khizir Tepsurkayev away returned in half an hour. When A. Ruslanbek asked the officers in the car where they had taken Khizir Tepsurkayev, they refused to answer. A. Ruslanbek immediately reported Khizir Tepsurkayev’s removal to his superiors at the district department of the interior. 14. Approximately half an hour after Khizir Tepsurkayev was taken away, in the morning of 27 August 2001, a boy came to the applicant’s house and told her and her husband that their son had been abducted at the local market. The applicant and her husband immediately started searching for Khizir Tepsurkayev. 15. The applicant and her husband went to the VOVD and inquired about their son. They were told that Khizir Tepsurkayev was not there. The applicant’s husband asked an employee of the Urus-Martan administration, Mr G., about his son. The latter was familiar with the situation and told him that B. Mairbek’s car was on the wanted list, that Khizir should not have got into the car and that nothing could be done to assist the applicant and her husband in attempting to have their son released. 16. On 28 August 2001 the applicant’s husband contacted the former Mayor of Grozny, Mr M., who went with him to the VOVD. An investigator from the department acknowledged that Khizir Tepsurkayev had been detained by the department and that he “would need to work with him”. 17. Each day for two months, from morning until evening, the applicant and her husband waited for their son at the entrance to the VOVD. They asked everyone who entered or left the building about Khizir Tepsurkayev. Some of those who had also been detained during the special operation on 27 August 2001 and had been released later on, including the applicant’s neighbour, told the applicant and her husband that they had heard the police mention the surname of Khizir Tepsurkayev in the halls of the VOVD. 18. The Government did not challenge most of the facts as presented by the applicant. According to their observations of 3 July 2008 “...the Urus‑Martan district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 61008 in connection with the abduction in Urus-Martan of Kh. Tepsurkayev. The case was opened under Article 126 § 1 of the Criminal Code upon receipt of information from the office of the Envoy of the President of the Russian Federation for Ensuring Human Rights and Freedoms in the Chechen Republic...” 19. Since 27 August 2001 the applicant and her husband have contacted, both in person and in writing, various official bodies, such as the Envoy of the President of the Russian Federation for Ensuring Human Rights and Freedoms in the Chechen Republic, the Urus-Martan District administration, the Chechen administration, a member of the Russian State Duma, military commanders’ offices and prosecutors’ offices at different levels, and detention centres in Chechnya and other regions of the Russian Federation, describing in detail the circumstances of their son’s abduction and asking for help in establishing his whereabouts. The applicant retained copies of a number of those letters and submitted them to the Court. 20. On the morning of 27 August 2001 the applicant and her husband went in person to the VOVD with a complaint about their son’s detention. It appears that on the same day Mr A. Ruslanbek and Mr A. Alvi reported Khizir Tepsurkayev’s removal to their superiors. 21. On 1 September 2001 the applicant’s husband wrote to the Urus‑Martan District prosecutor’s office (“the district prosecutor’s office”) with a request for assistance in finding his son. He described the circumstances of his son’s removal by security forces and stated that his son had been taken away in a military UAZ car to the VOVD. 22. On 3 September 2001 the applicant’s husband wrote to the military commander’s office of the Urus-Martan District (“the district military commander’s office”) with a request for assistance in finding his son. He described the circumstances of his son’s abduction and stated that his son had been taken away in a military UAZ car to the VOVD. 23. On 8 September 2001 the district prosecutor’s office forwarded the request of the applicant’s husband to the military prosecutor in Moscow. 24. On 25 January 2002 the district prosecutor’s office instituted an investigation into the disappearance of Khizir Tepsurkayev under Article 126 § 1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (kidnapping) (from the submitted documents it appears that the investigation also referred to Article 126 § 2 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (aggravated kidnapping)). The case file was given number 61008 (in the submitted documents the case file was also referred to under no. 62008). 25. On 14 May 2002 the applicant wrote to the district military commander’s office with a request for assistance in finding her son. She complained that her letters to various authorities had produced no results. 26. On 30 June 2002 the Department of Federal Security Service in the Chechen Republic (the Chechnya FSB) informed the applicant that her request of 28 June 2002 had been forwarded for further examination to the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102. 27. On 1 July 2002 the applicant wrote to the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation. In her letter she stated that on 27 August 2001 her son had been detained by representatives of the Russian federal forces under the command of V. Vasiliy and taken to the VOVD. She stated that her numerous complaints to various State authorities had produced no results and that the authorities had failed to conduct an investigation in the criminal case opened in connection with her son’s disappearance. She asked for assistance in establishing the whereabouts of Khizir Tepsurkayev. 28. On 11 and 19 July 2002 the Department of the Prosecutor General’s Office in the Southern Federal Circuit informed the applicant that her requests had been forwarded for examination to the Chechnya prosecutor’s office. 29. On 24 July 2002 the Chechnya prosecutor’s office informed the applicant that the district prosecutor’s office was to examine the lawfulness of the decisions taken by the investigative authorities in a number of criminal cases, including the case opened in connection with the disappearance of Khizir Tepsurkayev. The letter stated that the investigation in the case was under the control of the Chechnya prosecutor’s office. 30. On 11 September 2002 the Chechnya prosecutor’s office informed the applicant that on 25 January 2002 the district prosecutor’s office had instituted an investigation into her son’s disappearance under Article 126 § 2 of the Russian Criminal Code; that on 25 March 2002 the investigation in the criminal case had been suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators; that concrete measures aimed at identifying the culprits were being taken; and that information concerning the investigation could be obtained from the district prosecutor’s office. 31. On 7 October 2002 the Chechnya prosecutor’s office again informed the applicant that the district prosecutor’s office was to examine the lawfulness of the decisions taken by the investigative authorities in a number of criminal cases, including the case opened in connection with the disappearance of Khizir Tepsurkayev. 32. On 15 November 2002 the district prosecutor’s office informed the applicant’s husband that the investigating authorities were undertaking search measures in the criminal case concerning his son’s disappearance. 33. On 30 November 2002 the military prosecutor’s office of the United Group Alignment (“the military prosecutor’s office of the UGA”) informed the applicant that at her request the office had examined the possibility that the Russian federal forces had been involved in the disappearance of her son and that their involvement in the abduction had not been established. 34. On 10 March 2003 the district prosecutor’s office granted the applicant’s husband victim status in criminal case no. 61008. 35. On 7 April 2003 the district prosecutor’s office informed the applicant’s husband that on an unspecified date the investigation in criminal case no. 61008 had been suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 36. On 22 July 2003 the Chechnya prosecutor’s office informed the applicant that on 25 March 2002 the investigation in the criminal case had been suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators; that on 22 July 2003 the interim prosecutor of the Urus-Martan District had overruled this decision on the ground that the investigation was incomplete; that the investigative authorities had received due instructions from their superiors; and that the investigation’s time-limit had been extended until 22 August 2003. 37. On 23 July 2003 the military prosecutor’s office of the UGA informed the applicant that her request for help in finding her son had been forwarded to the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102. 38. On 27 April 2004 the district prosecutor’s office informed the applicant that her request of 22 April 2004 had been examined. The letter stated that on 25 January 2002 the district prosecutor’s office had instituted an investigation in criminal case no. 61008; that during the investigation the authorities had taken all possible measures to identify the perpetrators and establish her son’s whereabouts; that on 22 August 2003 the investigation in criminal case no. 61008 had been suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators; and that the district department of the interior was to step up its search for the culprits. 39. On 28 April 2004 and 27 May 2005 the military prosecutor’s office of the UGA informed the applicant that information concerning the investigation could be obtained from the district prosecutor’s office. 40. On 17 May 2004 the VOVD informed the applicant that the investigators had forwarded requests for information concerning the whereabouts of Khizir Tepsurkayev to a number of law enforcement agencies. The letter also stated that the applicant would be promptly informed about any developments in the case. 41. On 24 May 2004 the applicant complained to the district prosecutor’s office. In her letter she described her son’s abduction and pointed out that it had been carried out by representatives of the Russian federal forces under the command of V. Vasiliy. She stated that three employees of the VOVD had witnessed the abduction and provided their statements to the district prosecutor’s office. The applicant complained that she had been given no information concerning the investigation in criminal case no. 61008. She requested the prosecutor to resume the investigation in the case, to undertake all possible measures for its completion and to permit her to study the case file materials and make copies of the documents. 42. On 27 May 2004 the Urus-Martan district prosecutor informed the applicant about the examination of her request. The letter stated that the investigating authorities had undertaken all possible measures to identify the perpetrators and establish her son’s whereabouts, that the authorities had been undertaking unspecified measures to identify the employees who had witnessed the abduction of her son, and that commander V. Vasiliy had died on 26 May 2003. The letter also stated that the investigation in case no. 61008 had been suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 43. On 18 August 2004 the applicant complained to the Urus-Martan district prosecutor. In her letter she stated that her husband had asked the investigators in case no. 61008 to include the accounts of the three employees of the VOVD who had witnessed Khizir Tepsurkayev’s abduction in the criminal case file, but that the authorities had ignored his requests. The applicant provided the names of the three witnesses: Mr A. Ruslanbek, Mr A. Aslan and Mr K. Ramzan. She emphasised that the investigative authorities had failed to identify the servicemen of V. Vasiliy’s group who had participated in her son’s abduction and that the suspension of the investigation in the criminal case was unjustified. The applicant asked the prosecutor to resume investigation in case no.61008 and to question the three employees of the VOVD as well as other servicemen who had participated in Khizir Tepsurkayev’s abduction, to conduct a thorough and unbiased investigation in the case, to request from the VOVD the statements of the three witnesses and to include them in the criminal case file. Finally, she asked for permission to study the case file materials and to make copies of them. 44. On 6 October 2004 the district prosecutor’s office informed the applicant’s husband that the investigation in case no. 61008 had been suspended on 6 October 2004 for failure to identify the perpetrators. 45. On 15 November 2005 the applicant requested the district prosecutor’s office to provide her with information concerning the criminal investigation into her son’s abduction. 46. On 21 November 2005 and 3 March 2006 the district prosecutor’s office informed the applicant that the investigation in the criminal case had been suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 47. On 7 June 2006 the applicant requested the district prosecutor’s office to provide her with information concerning the criminal investigation into her son’s abduction and to resume the proceedings if they had been suspended. 48. On 22 October 2007 the applicant complained to the Urus-Martan district prosecutor that the investigation into her son’s abduction was incomplete. In particular, she pointed out that the investigators had failed to identify and question the servicemen from the unit under the command of V. Vasiliy who had witnessed and participated in her son’s abduction, as well as the servicemen who had driven the APC. 49. On 14 November 2007 the applicant again complained to the Urus‑Martan district prosecutor. She provided a detailed description of the circumstances surrounding her son’s abduction and pointed out that he had been taken away in a UAZ vehicle to the VOVD and that the abductors had acted under the command of officer V. Vasiliy from military unit no. 6779. 50. At some point in 2007 criminal case no. 61008 was transferred to the Achkhoy-Martan inter-district prosecutor’s office for further investigation. 51. On 20 May 2008 the investigators questioned the applicant. 52. According to the applicant, by August 2008 she had received no further information about the progress of the investigation into her son’s abduction. 53. Without providing the relevant dates or copies of the documents, the Government submitted that the investigators had questioned the applicant’s husband, who had also been granted victim status in the criminal case. According to his witness statement, on 27 August 2001 his son had left home to go and get a job. At about 10.30 a.m. a boy had come to his house and told him and his wife that Khizir Tepsurkayev had been detained by military servicemen during a sweeping operation. At some point later the investigators had questioned the applicant’s husband again. According to his additional witness statement, at the material time his son had not been employed; early in 2001 he had volunteered at the VOVD and therefore was acquainted with many police officers. According to the applicant’s husband, while searching for his son he had approached a number of the VOVD officers. One of them had told him that on 27 August 2001 Khizir Tepsurkayev had gone to a local judge to obtain employment at the Town Court. On the way to the judge Khizir had met a member of the Wahhabi movement, Mr B. Mairbek, who was killed at some point later in 2002. B. Mairbek had offered the applicant’s son a lift to the town centre. The car had been stopped by servicemen from military unit no. 6779 stationed at the time on the outskirts of Urus-Martan. The servicemen had been conducting a special operation. Khizir Tepsurkayev had showed his temporary identification card. During the identity check it had been established that B. Mairbek’s car was on the authorities’ wanted list. At that time B. Mairbek had driven away from the military servicemen, but the applicant’s son had stayed behind. After that Khizir Tepsurkayev had been put in an UAZ vehicle and taken away to an unknown destination. According to the applicant’s husband, he had obtained this information from the local police officers who had participated in the special operation with the military servicemen. These police officers had informed the applicant’s husband that the military servicemen who had taken away his son were under the command of Lieutenant V. Vasiliy. 54. Referring to the information received from the Main Military Prosecutor’s office, the Government further submitted that senior lieutenant of military unit no. 6779 V. Vasiliy had been killed on 26 May 2002. The military servicemen who had been serving in Chechnya on 27 August 2001 had been discharged upon completion of their service. 55. According to the Government, the investigation questioned the duty officer of the VOVD, Mr A. A., who stated that on 27 August 2001 he and officers V.A., R.I. and Yu.I. had driven to participate in the special operation held in Kalanchakskaya Street in Urus-Martan. He was supposed to participate in the operation as a member of a reserve group. On the other side of the road he had seen military servicemen of an unknown military unit and officers from the VOVD. At about 10 a.m. he had heard shooting and had driven towards the sound of the gunfire with other members of the reserve group. According to the witness, he had seen a crowd and a number of armoured vehicles on Kalanchakskaya Street. When he had approached the crowd, one of police officer told him that the military servicemen had stopped a VAZ-2107 car with B. Mairbek and Khizir Tepsurkayev in it. B. Mairbek had left Khizir Tepsurkayev and driven away in spite of the fact that fire had been opened to stop him. According to the eyewitnesses, the military servicemen had put Khizir Tepsurkayev into an APC. Shortly afterwards a UAZ vehicle from the VOVD had arrived at the site. Khizir Tepsurkayev had been taken out of the APC and put in the UAZ, which had driven away to an unknown destination. According to the witness, he had known Khizir Tepsurkayev since childhood and judged his character positively. 56. According to the Government, the investigators also questioned an officer of the VOVD, Mr R. A., who had provided a statement similar to the one provided by Mr A. A. 57. On an unspecified date the investigators questioned another witness, a senior operational police officer of the VOVD, Mr R.K., who stated that on 27 August 2001 he and a colleague of his had participated in a special operation. The operation had been conducted with military servicemen of an unknown military unit. The military servicemen had stopped a VAZ-2107 car with B. Mairbek and a young man in it. According to the witness, at some point later he had found out that this young man was Khizir Tepsurkayev. During the identity check B. Mairbek had driven away from the military servicemen; one of them, officer Vasiliy V., had tried to stop him by firing over his head. After that the military servicemen had run up to Khizir Tepsurkayev. Then a UAZ car had been ordered to the place, it had arrived and taken Khizir Tepsurkayev away. 58. On an unspecified date the investigators questioned the applicant, who stated that on 27 August 2001 her son Khizir Tepsurkayev had left home to get a job in the Town Court. About an hour later a boy had run up to her yard and informed her and her husband that armed men in an APC, who had been conducting a sweeping operation in Kalanchakskaya Street, had taken their son away. The applicant, her husband and some of their neighbours had rushed to the site but found nobody there. After that they had gone to the VOVD, where they had been told that the VOVD had not taken away their son. 59. The Government submitted that according to the letters received from the military prosecutor’s office of the UGA and military unit no. 6779 no special operations had been conducted in Urus-Martan on 27 August 2001. 60. On 6 October 2004 the investigation in the criminal case was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicant was informed about this decision. 61. On 22 November 2004 the Urus-Martan Town Court overruled the decision to suspend the investigation as unlawful (see paragraph 68 below). 62. On 8 December 2004 the interim Urus-Martan district prosecutor ordered the investigators to resume the investigation in the criminal case. The applicant was informed about this decision. 63. On 6 July 2005 the investigation in the criminal case was again suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicant was informed about this decision. 64. On 7 June 2006 the applicant requested the deputy Urus-Martan district prosecutor to resume the investigation in the criminal case. On the same date the authorities rejected her request and informed her about this decision. 65. The Government further submitted that although the investigation had failed to establish the whereabouts of Khizir Tepsurkayev, it was still in progress. The investigating authorities had sent requests for information to a number of competent State agencies, such as the Chechnya Ministry of the Interior, the Urus-Martan district military commander and military unit no. 6779, and taken other steps to solve the crime. The investigation had found no evidence to support the involvement of military servicemen, the law enforcement officers or other State representatives in the crime. The law enforcement authorities of Chechnya had never arrested or detained Khizir Tepsurkayev on criminal or administrative charges and had not carried out a criminal investigation in his respect. No special operations had been carried out in respect of the applicant’s son and his body had not been found. 66. Despite specific requests by the Court the Government did not disclose any documents of criminal case no. 61008. The Government stated that the investigation was in progress and that disclosure of the documents would be in violation of Article 161 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure, since the file contained personal data concerning witnesses or other participants in the criminal proceedings. 67. On 25 October 2004 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Urus-Martan Town Court (“the Town Court”). She described the events of 27 August 2001 and complained that the suspension of the investigation in criminal case no. 61008 had been unlawful, that the investigative authorities had failed to undertake basic investigative measures and to examine a number of her requests as well as to provide her with access to the criminal case file. The applicant requested a reopening of the investigation and asked that it be conducted in a thorough and unbiased manner. She also requested to be provided with access to the criminal case file. 68. On 22 November 2004 (in the submitted documents the date is also stated as 20 November 2004) the Town Court partially granted her claim. The court’s decision stated, inter alia, the following: “...on 27 August 2001, during a sweeping operation in Urus-Martan, officers of the power structures in an APC under the command of the head of the platoon Mr V.V. from military unit no. 6779 detained Khizir Tepsurkayev.... On 18 August 2004 [the applicant] again requested the prosecutor’s office to resume the investigation in the criminal case, to question witnesses, namely employees of the Urus-Martan district department of the interior and military servicemen from the platoon of officer V.V. who had participated in her son’s detention, and to conduct an effective and objective investigation of the criminal case...[the applicant] believes that the death of officer V.V. should not serve as the basis for the suspension of the criminal investigation as he had acted [during the abduction] with other military servicemen.... [according to the applicant] the investigation had failed to identify or question the officers who had been in charge of the security operation conducted on 27 August 2001 in Urus-Martan, the heads of all power structures who had participated in the special operation, as well as persons responsible for placement of detainees... and military servicemen from the platoon of officer V.V... ... [the applicant] requests that the prosecutor’s office decision to suspend the investigation in criminal case no. 61008 be recognised as unlawful and unjustified; that the Urus-Martan district prosecutor’s office be obliged to conduct a full, thorough and effective investigation of the criminal case and provide her with access to the criminal case file .... ... From the case file materials it follows that the investigation in the criminal case has not been conducted in full. For instance, the investigators failed to take measures to clarify the circumstances provided by Z. Mutsayeva in her request of 18 August 2004. If these circumstances will be confirmed [by the investigation], in accordance with the rules of jurisdiction, the criminal case should be forwarded for further investigation to the military prosecutor’s office. Under such conditions the court finds that the applicant’s requests for a full and effective investigation are substantiated...” The court ruled that the investigators’ decision to suspend the investigation in the criminal case was unjustified and instructed the authorities to examine the applicant’s requests. The remainder of the applicant’s claim was rejected. 69. On 2 December 2004 the applicant appealed against the decision of 22 November 2004. In her appeal she referred, inter alia, to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. On 25 January 2005 the Chechnya Supreme Court upheld the decision of 22 November 2004.

4. The applicant was born in 1966 and at the time of the events was serving a prison sentence in the Buca Prison in İzmir. 5. She had been convicted of being a member of a terrorist organisation and sentenced to twenty-two years’ imprisonment. 6. On 12 November 2001, following the prison doctor’s referral, the applicant was taken to İzmir-Yesilyurt Atatürk Training and Research Hospital, escorted by three male security officers (two gendarmes and a male prison guard) and one female prison guard, in order to undergo an ultrasound scan by a gynaecologist. 7. In the hospital the applicant was taken to a consultation room located on the ground floor. The bottom of the consulting room windows was only 50 cm above floor level and the windows were unprotected. The applicant’s handcuffs were not removed and the male security officers refused to leave the consultation room for security reasons. They stated that they would wait behind a folding screen. The applicant refused to be examined in such conditions. Accordingly, the gynaecologist issued a medical report stating that she had not been able to perform the requested ultrasound scan as the patient had not given her consent. 8. On 14 November 2001 the applicant’s representative applied to the İzmir Public Prosecutor’s Office, accusing the gendarmes and the male prison guard of misconduct, arbitrary treatment and insulting the applicant. 9. On 15 November 2001 the İzmir Public Prosecutor’s Office separated the investigation file in respect of the accused gendarme officers, noting that, pursuant to Law no. 4483 on the Prosecution of Civil Servants and Public Officials, permission to prosecute had to be sought from the District Governorship. 10. On 28 December 2001 the Buca District Governor decided not to authorise the prosecution of the gendarme officers, stating that the applicant’s allegations were unsubstantiated. 11. The applicant did not file an appeal and the decision became final on 30 January 2002. 12. On 26 and 27 November 2001 respectively, the İzmir public prosecutor took statements from the male prison guard and the applicant as the complainant. 13. On 3 December 2001 the public prosecutor decided not to prosecute the prison guard. Referring to the doctor’s note dated 12 November 2001, in which it was stated that no examination had been performed as the applicant had not given her consent, the prosecutor decided that the applicant’s allegations were unsubstantiated. 14. On 29 July 2002 the Karşıyaka Assize Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against that decision. 15. In the meantime, on 23 January 2002, the applicant’s lawyer filed a complaint with the İzmir Medical Association (İzmir Tabip Odası) against the doctor who had not asked the male security officers to leave the room or remove the applicant’s handcuffs. 16. On 8 April 2002 the İzmir Medical Association found it unnecessary to initiate criminal proceedings against the doctor, holding that she had not treated the applicant disrespectfully. 17. The applicant objected and on 5 October 2002 the Turkish Medical Association (Türk Tabipleri Birliği) quashed that decision. 18. On 23 January 2003 the İzmir Medical Association examined the file once again and decided to issue the doctor with a warning for professional misconduct, namely for not taking the initiative to request the male security officers to leave the consultation room or remove the applicant’s handcuffs, as required by ethical rules.

6. The applicants were born in 1942 and 1947 respectively and live in Sofia. 7. In April 1979 the two applicants and the second applicant’s mother bought from the Sofia municipality a four-room apartment of 121 square metres in the centre of the city. In September 1979 the second applicant’s mother died; her heirs were the second applicant and her brother. In 1993 the second applicant’s brother died; the second applicant was his heir. 8. The apartment had become State property by virtue of the nationalisations carried out by the communist regime in Bulgaria after 1947. In February 1993 the heir of its former pre-nationalisation owner brought proceedings under section 7 of the Restitution Law seeking the nullification of the applicants’ title and the restoration of her own title. 9. The proceedings ended by a final judgment of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 16 February 2004. The courts found that the applicants’ title was null and void on the ground that the 1979 contract had not been signed by the mayor but by one of his deputies. Although the mayor had been entitled to authorise another person to sign such contracts, he had made no written and explicit authorisation. Furthermore, the initial approval of the sale in 1977 had not been signed by the mayor and had not also been confirmed by the mayor of the region; instead, it had once again been their deputies who had signed. 10. Later in 2004 the applicants attempted unsuccessfully to have the proceedings reopened. 11. Immediately after the final judgment in their case, it became possible for the applicants to obtain compensation from the State, in the form of bonds which could be used in privatisation tenders or sold to brokers. The applicants did not avail themselves of this opportunity. 12. On an unspecified date the applicants vacated the apartment. In July 2005 they were granted the tenancy of a four-room municipal apartment, which they share with their daughter and her husband and son. 13. The relevant background facts and domestic law and practice have been summarised in the Court’s judgment in the case of Velikovi and Others v. Bulgaria, nos. 43278/98, 45437/99, 48014/99, 48380/99, 51362/99, 53367/99, 60036/00, 73465/01, and 194/02, 15 March 2007.

4. The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Budapest. 5. In or about November 1993 the applicant and his wife brought an action against several respondents before the Budapest XVIII/XIX District Court, seeking ownership of a real estate and protection against trespass. 6. The District Court held numerous hearings between 27 June 1994 and 29 June 1995. 7. On 5 July 1995 the District Court delivered a partial judgment, dismissing the plaintiffs’ claim for protection against trespass. This decision was upheld on appeal by the Budapest Regional Court on 13 March 1996. 8. On 8 June 1998 the District Court appointed an expert who filed an opinion on 29 November 1998. 9. The final first-instance judgment was delivered on 14 September 1999. On appeal, the Budapest Regional Court decided the case on 20 March 2002. 10. The applicant lodged a petition for review with the Supreme Court. It quashed the previous judgments and remitted the case to the first-instance on 25 April 2005. 11. In the resumed proceedings the applicant notified the domestic courts that one of the respondents had died on 2 November 2002. On 22 February 2006 the Supreme Court thus established that the review proceedings had been discontinued on this account, and annulled its previous judgment of 25 April 2005 (see paragraph 10 above). The same day, the Supreme Court remitted the case to the first-instance. 12. Between 16 October 2007 and 12 March 2008 the proceedings were stalled because the applicant did not cooperate with a court-appointed expert. 13. On 16 May 2008 the case was transferred to the Buda Central District Court, due to bias of the judges at the Pest Central District Court. 14. On 12 December 2008 the latter court delivered a partial judgment. On 13 November 2009 the Budapest Regional Court held a hearing on appeal. It appears from the documents available in the case file that the case is still pending before the Regional Court.

5. The applicant was born in 1959. He is currently detained at HMP Maghaberry, Northern Ireland. 6. At about 10 p.m. on 29 March 2000 the applicant was seen by police driving a Renault 11 car along Lake Road, Craigavon, Northern Ireland with a second person, M., in the front passenger seat. Police officers followed the car and saw items being thrown from it. These were subsequently recovered and found to be firearms. The car was stopped and searched. Two black balaclavas, dark woollen gloves and one round of ammunition were found in the car, together with a blue plastic container containing petrol. 7. The applicant's case was that he had simply given M. a lift and that he knew nothing about the articles that he had brought into the car. Following his arrest, the applicant was interviewed by police. He was shown a number of the items that had been found in the Renault car and he said that, apart from the blue plastic container, he had never seen them before. He told police that at about 9.30 p.m. on the night of his arrest, he had been asked by M. to take him to Lurgan, Northern Ireland. He claimed that he had initially refused, telling M. that every time he left the house, “the police were on to” him. He was persuaded by M., however, and they went to the car, M. carrying a bag that the applicant was unable to describe. As they were driving to Lurgan they were intercepted by police cars. The applicant asserted that he had been entrapped. He was sure that someone had sent M. to his home with the guns because he had no doubt that the police did not arrive by chance to stop his car. 8. The applicant was arraigned on 8 June 2001 and pleaded not guilty to one count of possession of firearms and ammunition with intent and one count of possessions of articles for a purpose connected with terrorism. A defence statement was served on his behalf on 12 June 2001. It contained the following: “The defendant believes that he may have been entrapped by a person known to him working with the police either for the purpose of incriminating this defendant or his co-defendant. In consequence he requires disclosure of all information and material touching upon this issue and informing the state of knowledge of the police prior to the stopping and arrest of the defendant and all such material shall be disclosed because failure to do so would mean unfairness to the defendant and would be in breach of Article 6 of the European Convention.” 9. On 21 September 2001, the prosecution informed the applicant that it would apply ex parte for an order preventing disclosure. In non-jury trials in Northern Ireland, such an application is made to a judge other than the trial judge. That judge is designated by the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland and is referred to as the “disclosure judge” (see domestic law and practice below). 10. The applicant opposed the ex parte hearing of the prosecution's application by the disclosure judge. Having heard argument from counsel for the applicant and the prosecution, inter alia on the compatibility of an ex parte hearing with Article 6 of the Convention and the relevant case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, the disclosure judge, in an ex tempore judgment, found that it was proper to hear the application ex parte. He stated that while this Court's case-law suggested that ex parte applications without any notice to the defence were problematic, the present case was an ex parte application with notice. He stated: “... the European Court has certainly not forbidden that procedure. It doesn't seem to me that I would be empowered to overrule the [relevant domestic legislation] on the basis of the findings of the European Court up to the moment, but the Court will do if this case reaches it, maybe another matter, but I would propose to hear the [prosecution's] application at present.” 11. On 18 February 2002, the disclosure judge allowed the prosecution's application for non-disclosure. He outlined this Court's judgments in Rowe and Davis v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 28901/95, §§6 60-62, ECHR 2000‑II and Jasper v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 27052/95, 16 February 2000 and continued: “ ... I have to consider, in the light of the defence of entrapment advanced on behalf of the accused, whether the material which is the subject of the application is such that it might be of assistance to the defence or in any way undermines any part of the prosecution case; whether in those circumstances it is necessary in the public interest to order non-disclosure and further, if disclosure is not to be provided, what steps are appropriate to protect the interests of the accused and ensure the fairness of the trial. My reason for conducting an ex parte hearing are as follows: in order to determine whether the material is such that the public interest requires its non-disclosure I must see the material and consider the evidence and arguments submitted by the prosecutor, and I must do so in the absence of the defendants and their representatives to protect the public interest until that decision is made. There was considerable debate in [Rowe and Davis] about the best way to deal procedurally with this situation. The majority took the view that it was important for the trial judge to see the material personally. That is certainly true if the material is not prejudicial to the accused and where the trial is before a judge and jury the effect of the judge seeing even prejudicial material may not be inconsistent with the fairness of the trial process. However, in the case [of] a non-jury trial it is obviously undesirable that prejudicial material which is not going to be part of the evidence in the case should be seen by the judge who will be tribunal of fact, especially if it is not disclosed to the defence. ... No procedure exists to ensure that an assessment of the possible value to the defence of such material other than by the prosecutor or at his request the trial judge can be made in the light of the evidence at the trial. We do not have “special counsel” to carry out such an exercise. In general the Court has to rely on the judgment and integrity of the prosecutor, who can monitor the issue of whether disclosure of such material to the trial judge may become necessary in the interests of justice. ... The considerations I applied in considering the prosecution's application were: 2. All of the material for which non-disclosure is ordered and which is not prejudicial to the defendant should be available to the trial judge; 3. The prosecutor should monitor the continuing non-disclosure of potentially prejudicial material. In considering that matter it may be possible for the prosecutor to give some indication of the nature of the material to the defendant's advisors without disclosing that which it requires to keep secret so as to allow the latter to decide whether the material should be disclosed or not.” He concluded: “Having considered the matter ex parte, I have decided that in the light of the defence statement none of the material which is the subject of the application before me is such that it might reasonably be expected to undermine the case for the prosecution or to assist the accused's defence. On the evidence before me I do not anticipate any circumstances which would result in the material becoming of value to the defence. I consider that it is not in the public interest to disclose the material and have ordered accordingly. I have prepared a statement of the reasons for my decision which shall remain confidential to the prosecutor and the trial judge.” 12. When the case next came before the trial judge on 17 and 19 June 2002, the applicant and his co-accused sought an adjournment of the proceedings. The trial judge indicated that he had not received the disclosure judge's ruling or the statement of reasons and did not intend to receive anything that had not been made available to the defence. He then consulted the disclosure judge who indicated that he was content that the trial judge did not see the reasons and did not require him to do so. The trial judge then suggested that one way of proceeding would be to appoint special counsel who would be shown the material and remain throughout the trial. 13. A hearing took place on 1 August 2002 to allow the parties and counsel appearing for the Attorney-General made submissions as to whether it was appropriate either for special counsel to be appointed or for the trial judge himself to consider the undisclosed material. At that hearing, the trial judge indicated that he had by then read the ruling of the disclosure judge and the statement of reasons for his decision. The trial judge said that he considered that it was in the interests of justice that he should see the statement of reasons when the disclosure judge, in his ruling of 18 February 2002, had suggested that he should. He also stated that the statement of reasons referred to “certain items which could not in [the disclosure judge's] view prejudice the defence in any way if they were seen by me [the trial judge], but he also said that there were items which were capable of having a prejudicial effect on the trial if seen by the trial judge.” He stressed that he had not himself seen the material seen by the disclosure judge. 14. The trial judge then heard submissions from the defence, prosecution and counsel for the Attorney-General. The latter argued that the question of disclosure should be referred back to the disclosure judge for his decision. Counsel for the applicant's co-accused also suggested that the trial judge recuse himself since he had seen the statement of reasons which had not been made available to the defence. The trial judge ruled that it was not appropriate for him to recuse himself. He explained that he had reconsidered his decision not to read the statement of reasons; he had come to the view that it was important for him to read the statement of reasons in case there was something in it which would be of relevance to his decision on whether to appoint special counsel or to read the undisclosed material himself. He added: “The fact that a judge had seen a document in a non-jury trial which has not been seen by the defence does not of necessity mean that the trial is made unfair or becomes unfair and, having seen the document and read it, I am absolutely satisfied that it does not create any reason why I should no longer act as the trial judge in this case.” The trial judge also found that the disclosure judge was best equipped to know what procedural safeguards could be put in place as to the non-disclosed material, including whether it was appropriate to appoint special counsel, since he knew the nature of that material. He therefore referred the matter back to the disclosure judge. 15. The matter came before the disclosure judge on 13 September 2002. In an ex tempore judgment he ruled: “There is no further safeguard that I am aware of that would be of any assistance, that one could conceive would be of any assistance at this stage, and I would not regard the case as requiring the appointment of special counsel... The present reality is that I cannot foresee any circumstance in which the undisclosed material, that is the material undisclosed to the trial judge, would be of assistance to the defence. But it may be that the defence may advance a proposition or raise an issue that might by remote possibility make that so, and I think if the Crown concedes that that is the position then the Crown should make the matter known to the trial judge and consideration could be given then to referring back to me.” The disclosure judge said there were two types of material involved. The first could not assist the applicant because it was adverse to him. The second related to police procedures, was general in nature and content, and did not relate directly to the applicant. 16. At the applicant's trial it was established that ten police officers, in three cars, were on patrol in the general area of Lurgan and Craigavon at the time the car was intercepted. Those police officers who had attended a briefing at Mahon Road Station said that they were told that there was intelligence that loyalist paramilitaries were in possession of a firearm in the Lurgan/Craigavon area. One crew had travelled from Belfast, and they said they did not arrive in time for the briefing but they were told by radio that loyalist paramilitaries had obtained access to weapons. It emerged during cross-examination, based on logs obtained on disclosure, that at 10 p.m. a message was sent to control to the following effect: “...a vehicle acting suspiciously at Parkmore, VRM - DDZ 1039, blue/green Renault 11.” The information passed by control to the three patrol cars was recorded as: “... blue/green Renault car acting suspiciously in the Craigavon area.” No reference was made to the registration number, or “Parkmore” in the controller's message to the patrols. The case made on behalf of the applicant at trial was that the reason that the controller did not pass to those on the ground the registration number of the Renault and information as to the place where it was last seen, was that this was an operation in which police were already in position waiting for the applicant's car to appear. All police officers to whom this suggestion was made denied it. 17. On 8 October 2002, during the cross-examination of one police officer, counsel for the applicant also argued that, in order to advance the defence of entrapment, further disclosure was required. The trial judge replied: “Counsel for the prosecution has heard what you have got to say. If he feels that there is information that would assist you I have no doubt he will go back to [the disclosure judge] and ask him about it, but beyond that I can't go.” 18. At the conclusion of the case for the prosecution the trial judge was invited to rule that there was no case for the applicant to answer and to stay the proceedings on the grounds of entrapment. The trial judge rejected both applications. As to the former, he concluded that the circumstantial evidence was such that a jury properly directed could be satisfied, to the requisite standard of proof, that the applicant was in voluntary possession by actual or potential control of the items that were in the car when the police began their pursuit with knowledge of what was kept or controlled. There was a clear inference to be drawn that from the nature of the items that were thrown from the car and those that were found in it after it came to a halt that the applicant was in possession of the firearms in connection with terrorist activities. As to the latter, after referring to the case of R. v. Looseley (see paragraph 33 below), the trial judge ruled: “Although, as was suggested in cross examination the police may have been in possession of more information than was revealed at the trial I did not find any evidence to suggest that the conduct of the police could in any way affront the public conscience and I therefore declined to stay the proceedings.” 19. When the trial resumed, the applicant did not give evidence and no other evidence was called on behalf of the defence. On 12 November 2002 the applicant was convicted by the trial judge, without a jury, of two offences: possession of firearms and ammunition with intent, contrary to Article 17 of the Firearms (NI) Order 1981; and possession of articles for a purpose connected with terrorism, contrary to section 32(1) of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996. The trial judge found that taking the circumstantial evidence and the inferences to be drawn from it and, using as support adverse inferences to be drawn from the applicant's silence when questioned by the police and his failure to give evidence, he was satisfied of the applicant's guilt of the two offences beyond reasonable doubt. 20. The applicant was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment of twelve years and two years respectively. His co-accused, M., had pleaded guilty on the opening day of the trial and was sentenced to nine years' imprisonment for the offence of possession of firearms and ammunition with intent and to two years' imprisonment concurrent for the offence of having articles for a purpose connected with terrorism. 21. The applicant appealed against his conviction on both charges. On 28 October 2004, the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland unanimously dismissed the appeal. The non-disclosed material was not considered by the Court of Appeal before it gave judgment. Instead, it considered the House of Lords ruling in R. v. H and C [2004] A.C. 134 (see paragraph 32 below) and reviewed this Court's judgments in Rowe and Davis and Jasper, both cited above; Fitt v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 29777/96, ECHR 2000‑II; Edwards and Lewis v. the United Kingdom, nos. 39647/98 and 40461/98, 22 July 2003 and Dowsett v. the United Kingdom, no. 39482/98, ECHR 2003‑VII. 22. In respect of Edwards and Lewis, having quoted paragraphs 57-59 of the Court's judgment, the Court of Appeal observed: “The fact specific nature of the cases is apparent from these passages. The trial judges had to deal directly with the defence of entrapment and the material produced to them may well have sounded on that issue. Moreover there was plainly prejudicial material in the evidence that the judges saw but which was denied to the defence. Not only were the defence put at a disadvantage because they could not contribute to the assessment that the judges were making but, in Edwards' case, prejudicial material was put before the judge as well.” 23. It went on to state that from the relevant case-law of this Court the following principles could be recognised: “Full disclosure of any material held by the prosecution which weakens the prosecution case or strengthens that of the defendant should be made. Minimum derogation from this golden rule is permissible where full adherence would create risk of serious prejudice to an important public interest. The judge dealing with an application for non-disclosure must have a full understanding and appreciation on an ongoing basis of all the issues in the trial and in particular the nature of the defence. The appointment of special counsel will always be exceptional. It should not be ordered unless the trial judge is satisfied that no other course will adequately meet the over-riding requirements of fairness to the defendant.” 24. In applying those principles to the applicant's case, it found that the applicant's defence of entrapment was well known to the trial judge, the prosecution, and the disclosure judge and no other issue had been identified that might sound on the question of disclosure. The disclosure judge had been unable to envisage any circumstances in which the non-disclosed material could assist the defence either by enhancing the case that was being made for the applicant or by undermining or weakening the prosecution case. Furthermore, it agreed with the disclosure judge that there had been no need for special counsel to be appointed and there was nothing to indicate that the material characterised by the disclosure judge as wholly irrelevant to the applicant's defence might have suddenly become relevant. It rejected the applicant's contention that the disclosure judge should have obtained a daily transcript of the trial and examined it for any sign of material that might have assisted the applicant's case; this was not a case where a daily transcript would have been warranted as no new line of defence ever emerged that might have prompted a reconsideration of the disclosure judge's decision that the material did not assist the applicant. 25. On the availability of the disclosure judge's statement of reasons to the trial judge, the Court of Appeal found: “The trial judge did not read the statement of reasons given by the disclosure judge before the first hearing on the question of disclosure. The circumstances in which he considered these before the second hearing on this issue are not entirely clear. In general, where material is not to be released to a defendant, it will be inappropriate for the trial judge in a non-jury case to see it. In the present case the trial judge made clear that he had not seen any material that was adverse to the [applicant] and [counsel for the applicant] did not dispute this statement. In the particular circumstances of the present case, therefore, the trial judge's consideration of this material has not brought about any unfairness to the appellant and we do not consider that this rendered his conviction in any way unsafe.” 26. The Court of Appeal further rejected the applicant's argument that the trial judge had given insufficient weight to the entrapment theory. The Court of Appeal noted that it had been the central plank of the applicant's defence and had been thoroughly explored not only in cross-examination of the witnesses but in extensive canvassing of the various “coincidences” relied on by the applicant: the trial judge had had the advantage of hearing the witnesses give evidence about these matters and had the opportunity to assess them as they gave their explanations as to the circumstances in which they came to be involved with the applicant. 27. After dismissing the appeal, the Court of Appeal, on 19 November 2004, also refused to certify a point of law of general importance or grant leave to appeal to the House of Lords.

4. The applicant was born in 1922 and lives in Budapest. 5. On 6 March 1995 the applicant and another plaintiff brought an action before the Pest Central District Court, seeking the invalidation of a contract. 6. On 7 May 1996 the court held a hearing and, on 21 June 1996, appointed an expert who filed an opinion on 24 June 1998. 7. On 20 October 1998, 12 January, 9 March, 11 May and 22 June 1999 hearings were held. Subsequently the proceedings were interrupted on account of the death of the applicant's co-plaintiff. On 28 January 2000 a successor joined the proceedings. 8. On 10 March 2000 the case was suspended pending the termination of criminal proceedings against the respondents which the court considered a preliminary question. This prosecution, conducted on charges of financial fraud, originated in 1997. On 13 May 2005 the plaintiffs informed the court of the termination of the criminal case by the appellate criminal court and requested the continuation of the civil proceedings. 9. On 30 August, 5 and 8 November 2005 the court held hearings. On 15 November 2005 it gave judgment, finding for the plaintiffs. On 29 November 2005 the respondents appealed. 10. On 5 October 2006 the Budapest Regional Court held a hearing and, by judgment of 15 February 2007, upheld the first-instance decision. 11. On 11 May 2007 the respondents filed a petition for review. By its review judgment of 27 November 2007 the Supreme Court upheld the final judgment.

4. The applicant was born in 1959 and is currently detained in L'Aquila Prison. 5. On 16 March 1992 the applicant was arrested and remanded in custody on charges of murder and belonging to a mafia-type organisation. He was also charged with a number of counts of illegally carrying weapons. In particular, he had allegedly aided and abetted the carrying in a public place of a weapon used to commit a number of murders, including that of one M.L. 6. In a judgment of 16 October 1995, the Palmi Assize Court sentenced the applicant to fifteen years' imprisonment for membership of a mafia-type criminal organisation. He was acquitted of the other charges. 7. The applicant appealed. 8. In a judgment of 10 February 1999, the Reggio di Calabria Assize Court of Appeal reduced the applicant's prison sentence to twelve years. 9. The applicant appealed on points of law. In a judgment of 8 February 2000, the text of which was deposited at the registry on 25 February 2000, the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant's appeal. 10. In the meantime, on 19 June 1996, the Reggio di Calabria investigating judge had made a fresh order for the applicant's detention pending trial. On 15 October 1996 he had committed the applicant to stand trial in the Palmi Assize Court. The applicant was charged with several counts of murder and attempted murder, membership of a mafia-type criminal organisation and illegally carrying a weapon. The applicant was accused, in particular, of having given orders to murder M.L. He was also accused of being an accomplice to carrying the weapon used to commit the crime. The applicant had alleged that this weapon had been one of the ones that he had been accused of carrying in the first set of criminal proceedings. 11. During the proceedings a number of witnesses, including pentiti (former mafiosi who have decided to cooperate with the authorities), were examined. 12. In a judgment of 22 September 1999, the Palmi Assize Court imposed five life sentences on the applicant and ordered him to serve three years of his sentence in solitary confinement. It imposed an additional sentence of a total of seventy years' imprisonment on him. The decision was based on statements by the pentiti, which were considered to be accurate and credible and were corroborated by other evidence. 13. The applicant appealed. 14. From 2000 the applicant was subject to a restricted prison regime, provided for by section 41 bis of Law no. 354 of 26 July 1975 (known as “the Prison Organisation Act”), which, among other things, limited his contact with the outside world. Accordingly, the applicant was no longer brought to the hearing room from prison. He was, however, able to participate in the hearings of 21 February and 15 June 2001 and 5 March 2002 by means of an audiovisual link with the hearing room. 15. By a judgment of 5 March 2002, the Reggio di Calabria Assize Court of Appeal acquitted the applicant of one of the charges of murder. It found that the offences committed by the applicant were part of a single criminal design (unico disegno criminoso) and reduced his sentence to one life sentence and solitary confinement for two years. 16. The applicant appealed on points of law. He complained, inter alia, of a failure on the part of the Assize Court of Appeal to give reasons for its finding that, despite a number of gaps in their evidence, the prosecution witnesses were credible. With regard to the murder of M.L., the applicant observed that part of the evidence adduced by the prosecution was that the police had found a P38 Walther pistol inside a car parked near land belonging to him. In the first set of criminal proceedings, however, the applicant had been acquitted of the charge of carrying that pistol. Moreover, that circumstantial evidence did not in any way establish that he had given orders to murder M.L. 17. The applicant did not allege that there had been a violation of the right to a fair trial on account of the nature of his participation in the appeal hearings. 18. In a judgment of 26 February 2004, the text of which was deposited at the registry on 3 June 2004, the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant's appeal. It held that the Assize Court of Appeal had given logical and proper reasons for its decision on all the disputed issues.

4. The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in the town of Zaporizhzhya, Ukraine. 5. The applicant, being the Head of the Zaporizhzhya Airport Customs Office, gave an instruction to the customs officers that the deputies of the local councils should be exempted from customs inspections when crossing the Ukrainian border. 6. In the period from 9 March 1998 to 22 May 1998 criminal proceedings were instituted against Mr Ch., Mr S., Mr B., Mr M., Mrs N. and Mrs K. in connection with smuggling goods to Ukraine. The criminal proceedings against Mr B., Mr M. and Mrs N. were later discontinued. 7. On 22 May 1998 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant. She was charged with exceeding her powers. 8. On 11 August 1998 the proceedings against the applicant, Mr Ch. and Mrs K. were joined. 9. On 5 June 1998 the applicant gave a written undertaking not to abscond. 10. On 17 June 1998 the applicant was charged with taking a bribe. 11. On 18 June 1998 the applicant was arrested. She was remanded in custody. 12. On 7 September 1998 the preliminary investigation was terminated and the case was transferred to the court. 13. On 12 May 1999 the Zaporizhzhya Regional Court[1] convicted the applicant of criminal negligence and sentenced her to 10 months and 24 days' imprisonment. Since the applicant had already served her sentence she was released on the same date. By the same judgment the court required the applicant to give an undertaking not to abscond. 14. On 16 September 1999 the Supreme Court quashed that judgment and remitted the case for fresh consideration to the Zaporizhzhya Regional Court on the ground that the latter had failed to examine all the circumstances of the case. 15. On 16 March 2000 the Zaporizhzhya Regional Court convicted the applicant of criminal negligence and sentenced her to 10 months and 24 days' imprisonment. Since the applicant had already served her sentence she was exempted from serving it. By the same judgment the court placed the applicant under an obligation not to abscond. 16. On 1 June 2000 the Supreme Court quashed the judgment of 16 March 2000 and remitted the case for fresh consideration to the Leninsky District Court of Zaporizhzhya on the ground that the Zaporizhzhya Regional Court had failed to examine all the circumstances of the case. 17. On 3 August 2000 the Leninsky District Court of Zaporizhzhya remitted the case to the prosecution service for additional investigation. 18. On 25 December 2000 the additional investigation was terminated and the case was transferred to the court. 19. On 15 October 2001 the Leninsky District Court of Zaporizhzhya convicted the applicant of criminal negligence and sentenced her to one year's imprisonment. The applicant was exempted from serving her sentence since the charges against her had become subject to a time limitation. By the same judgment the court removed the undertaking not to abscond. 20. On 10 December 2001 the Zaporizhzhya Regional Court of Appeal upheld this judgment. 21. On 8 October 2002 the Supreme Court quashed the ruling of 10 December 2001 and remitted the case for fresh consideration to the Court of Appeal on the ground that the latter had failed to examine in due manner the appeals lodged by the applicant, Mr Ch. and Mrs K. 22. On 18 December 2002 the Zaporizhzhya Regional Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of 15 October 2001 and remitted the case for additional investigation to the prosecutor's office. 23. On 24 September 2003 the Leninsky District Court of Zaporizhzhya terminated the criminal proceedings against the applicant since the charges against her had become subject to a time limitation.

6. The applicant was born in 1939 and lives in Liepāja. 7. It appears that in 1983 the applicant was certified as being Category 3 disabled (the least severe level of disability). 8. On 28 April 2004 the applicant was certified as being Category 2 disabled (the medium level of disability) on the grounds of an unspecified illness. His disability was to be reassessed on a further occasion. 9. According to the applicant, on 29 April 2008 his Category 2 disability status was certified as permanent. 10. On 19 August 2003 the applicant was administratively detained by the municipal police. The circumstances are disputed between the parties. 11. According to the Government, at 8 p.m. on 19 August 2003 the fire and rescue services received a call about a man who was lying on the ground near an apartment building. A municipal police patrol was dispatched to the address given. Police officers I.L. and N.M. arrived there at 8.18 p.m. and found no one there. However, they were approached by an unidentified woman who indicated that somebody was lying on the stairs inside the building. They found the applicant lying face-down on the stairs between the ground and 1st floor. He appeared to be in a state of heavy alcohol intoxication, was unable to communicate or identify himself, and was unable to move. He had several bruises and grazes on his face – cheeks, eyebrows and forehead. The officers carried him by his arms and legs to a municipal police van and took him to the municipal police station. They arrived there approximately one hour later, on the way having picked up another person who had been lying on the ground unconscious somewhere else. 12. At the municipal police station, a medical orderly visually examined the applicant and treated and recorded his facial injuries. The officers then carried him to a “sobering-up room” and placed him on a wooden plank bed. Several hours later the applicant was able to reveal his identity. According to the Government, reports (protokoli) in respect of administrative detention (administratīvā aizturēšana) and the administrative offence of “indecent public behaviour while being in a state of alcohol intoxication” were being drawn up. The Government could not provide the Court with copies of these procedural documents since they were destroyed in 2008 upon the expiry of their archival period. 13. Later, at some point during the night of 19 to 20 August 2003, the applicant complained of pain in his left leg. The medical orderly called an ambulance and the applicant was taken to a hospital in Liepāja. 14. The applicant did not agree with the Government’s version of the events. According to the applicant, on 19 August 2003, between 6 p.m. and 7 p.m., he was sitting on a bench by the apartment building he lived in with a bottle of beer in his hand, when the municipal police arrived and two officers approached him with a view to taking him to the municipal police station. They did not inform him of the reasons for his detention; he got into the police van by himself and was taken to the municipal police station, where at 8.55 p.m. an administrative detention report was drawn up. 15. At the station, he was briefly examined to determine his state of health and level of intoxication. Following an examination, an officer instructed him to stand up immediately. The applicant replied that he was capable of doing so by himself, but slowly. Then another officer, who was standing behind him, ordered him to do as requested and then took him by the shoulders and pushed him against a wall. His left eye was hurt to the extent that he later required several stiches. The officer then grabbed the applicant by his clothes and dragged him on to the floor and down the stairs to the sobering-up room. The applicant tried to turn onto his left side as he had had an operation on his right leg and he was trying to spare it. While he was being dragged down the stairs, he felt a sharp pain in his left leg and started to scream. The officer did not stop; he dragged him into a cell and left him there. The applicant was unable to move. After some time, three persons entered the cell, took off his trousers, causing him more pain, and injected him with some substances. Then an unidentified officer approached him with a view to getting him to sign another report. He refused, protesting that he had already signed one. At about 5 a.m. an ambulance arrived and took him to a hospital in Liepāja. 16. The contents of the applicant’s administrative detention report were partly reproduced in expert report no. 352 of 13 November 2003 and read as follows: “This report has been drawn up by ... N.H. on 19 August 2003, at 8.55 p.m., in Liepāja in respect of the applicant [date of birth and address][, who] was administratively detained and taken to the sobering-up room of the municipal police station on 19 August 2003, at 8.55 p.m. Reason for detention: to sober up. In the presence of witnesses [the applicant’s] keys were confiscated. Detainee’s clothes: blue blazer, dark shirt, blue trousers and dark shoes. In a check-up [the following] injuries were discovered: a bruise on the face, a bruise on the left eyebrow. The applicant was released on 20 August 2003, at 5.25 a.m. Reason for release: sobered up. Upon release: received keys. No complaints.” 17. According to the ambulance log, a call was recorded at 5 a.m. on 20 August 2003. At 5.13 a.m. an ambulance arrived at the municipal police station. In the field “diagnoses” it was noted that the applicant’s left hip and head were injured, there were bruises on his face, and he was in a state of alcohol intoxication. In the field “additional findings” it was noted that the applicant had bruises on his face and the lower part of his body. He was taken to hospital, where at 5.45 a.m. his blood alcohol level was measured (0.25 ‰). 18. From 20 August to 2 September 2003 the applicant remained in hospital. Following an X-ray examination he was diagnosed with a fracture to his left hip (kreisā augšstilba kakla kauliņa lūzums). On 22 August 2003 an operation (endo-prosthesis) was performed and over the next few days the applicant received post-operative treatment. 19. On 2 September 2003 the applicant was issued with an extract from his medical file at the hospital. The extract did not contain any mention of the applicant’s own description of the circumstances relating to his hip fracture. 20. On 8 September 2003 the applicant made a complaint to the prosecutor’s office which was for the most part similar to his allegations before the Court. The municipal police were requested to prepare an internal report; on 23 September 2003 they issued report no. 9, the contents of which were later for the most part reproduced in the first decision (see paragraph 23 below). 21. On 16 September 2003 the applicant’s complaint was forwarded for examination to the Liepāja police, a branch of the State Police. 22. On 1 October 2003 an expert examined the applicant’s medical records and drew up report no. 407. Reference was made to a statement the applicant had made in the hospital that “he had fallen down somewhere on the street”. The expert concluded that the applicant had sustained a bodily injury – a fracture of the left hip – which was classified as moderately severe (vidēja smaguma miesas bojājumi). This injury could have been sustained as a result of being hit by blunt objects or bumping into such objects. 23. On 13 October 2003 the Liepāja police decided not to institute criminal proceedings with regard to the injuries suffered by the applicant (“the first decision”). Reference was made to the internal report of 23 September 2003. According to the report, the events developed as follows. At 8.18 p.m. on 19 August 2003, the municipal police received a call from the fire and rescue services informing them that a man was lying near an apartment building. Upon their arrival the officers found the applicant lying inside the apartment building on the stairs between the ground and 1st floor. He was too intoxicated to give any explanation; the police officers carried him out of the apartment building, placed him in the van and took him to the police station. He was placed in the sobering-up area, which was located in the basement. The officers carried the applicant into a cell as he was unable to move. After about three hours the applicant was able to reveal his identity. He then complained about pain in his leg and a medical orderly called an ambulance to the police station. No injections were given to the applicant. He was detained on the basis of paragraph one of section 171 of the Code of Administrative Violations. On the basis of the case-file materials in their entirety, it was concluded that the applicant “could have sustained” injuries by falling on the stairs in the apartment building. There were no grounds to believe that the applicant’s injuries had been wilfully inflicted in the sobering-up room or that excessive physical force had been used on him. There were no indications that the officers had exceeded their authority. 24. On 27 October 2003 the applicant lodged a complaint, noting that two witnesses had seen him getting into the police van by himself when being taken to the police station. 25. On 7 November 2003 the supervising prosecutor quashed the first decision and the case was remitted to the Liepāja police for additional investigation. The quashing order was issued on the ground that the applicant had not been questioned on the facts, nor had his neighbours been questioned; the person who had called the fire and rescue services had not been identified or questioned; the witnesses identified by the applicant had not been questioned; and lastly, the ambulance personnel had not been questioned. 26. During additional investigation the Liepāja police received information from the fire and rescue services and questioned the applicant’s neighbours, including V.S., who had been identified by the applicant as a witness, and a doctor from the hospital. Another medico-legal examination was also ordered. 27. On 13 November 2003 an expert examined the applicant and his administrative detention report and drew up report no. 352 in addition to report no. 407. The background to the report was described as follows: “On 19 August 2003 police officers [allegedly] inflicted bodily injuries on the applicant at the police station. On 1 October 2003 an expert examined the applicant’s medical records (report no. 407). The applicant ... alleged that he had suffered additional injuries to different parts of his body (eyebrow, lower body), [which were] not documented in the medical records”. The expert concluded that the applicant had the following injuries: “a scar on his left eyebrow that could be due to a cicatrised wound that had been stitched” and “scars on the back of the applicant’s torso and on the buttock area that could have appeared after bruises had healed”. They were both classified as minor bodily injuries (viegli miesas bojājumi). 28. On 25 November 2003 the Liepāja police again refused to institute criminal proceedings (“the second decision”). In addition to the grounds of the first decision, the second decision was based on the grounds that the fire and rescue services did not hold information about incoming calls concerning alcohol intoxication. Such calls were transferred to the municipal police. According to the second decision, an acquaintance of the applicant, V.S., stated that he had seen him sitting on a bench and consuming beer at about 6.30 or 7 p.m., and then the municipal police had arrived. Other statements were taken from neighbours, but they only indicated that the applicant often sat on the bench by the apartment building consuming alcohol. One neighbour, B.K., stated that the applicant had a “difficult” personality and that “he often started fights”. Further, it was noted that “it was not possible to identify direct witnesses who could provide objective information about [the applicant’s] arrest”. The ambulance record indicated that the applicant had been taken from the municipal police station to the hospital with injuries to his left hip and head, bruises on his face and in a state of alcohol intoxication. Finally, the doctor’s statement indicated that he had examined the applicant at 10 a.m., when he had sobered up; the doctor had inquired about the circumstances of the injury and the applicant had replied that he had fallen down somewhere on the street. A note was made that the conclusions drawn following the internal inquiry were confirmed by other case-file materials and that the statements made by the applicant and V.S. should be evaluated with caution. On the basis of the case-file materials in their entirety, it was concluded that the applicant “could have sustained” the injuries by falling on the stairs in the apartment building. There were no grounds for finding that the applicant’s injuries had been wilfully inflicted in the sobering-up room, or that excessive physical force had been used on him. There were no indications that the officers had exceeded their authority. 29. On 26 January 2004 the supervising prosecutor examined the case-file materials and dismissed a complaint by the applicant about the second decision. She noted that the Liepāja police, even after her instructions, could not find any witness to his detention. It appears that she herself questioned V.S. for a second time. He clarified that he had only seen the applicant sitting on the bench; when the municipal police had arrived, he could not see the bench any more, as the van blocked the scene from his view. He testified that the police had been there for three to four minutes. In response to the applicant’s allegations as to the location, nature and probable cause of his injuries in the circumstances, the prosecutor stated that the expert’s observation that they could have been sustained as a result of being hit with blunt objects or bumping into such objects was only a probability and not an assertion. Moreover, she considered that there were no grounds to disregard the hospital doctor’s remark that the circumstances of the applicant’s injuries had been taken down in his own words. The prosecutor noted that his injuries, as detected upon his admission to the police station (bruises on the face and left eyebrow), were confirmed by the statement of N.M; his alcohol intoxication was confirmed by the ambulance and hospital medical records and the statements of the police officers, the watch officer (N.H.), and the medical orderly (A.B.). She concluded that her previous instructions (issued on 7 November 2003) had been complied with and that on the basis of the case-file materials in their entirety “it [could] not be precluded” that the applicant sustained the injuries before his detention as he had been admitted to the station in an intoxicated state with visible injuries on his face. 30. On 17 March 2004 and 21 May 2004 two higher-ranking prosecutors dismissed the applicant’s complaints against the second decision. The first prosecutor considered that the review of the applicant’s complaints had been comprehensive and objective; no evidence had been found that the officers had exceeded their authority. Referring to the medico-legal examination report, the prosecutor considered that the applicant “could have sustained” injuries by falling from his own height, as he had indicated to the hospital doctor, whose testimony was to be given more weight as he was not an interested party. The second prosecutor also found the second decision justified. He referred to the administrative detention “documentation” and the officers’ statements to demonstrate that the applicant had been lying on the stairs in the apartment building and not sitting on the bench next to it; V.S.’s statements did not corroborate these facts. The officers had taken the applicant to the sobering-up room because he had been unable to move by himself because of either his intoxicated state or his injuries. He concluded: “It follows from the foregoing that [the applicant] must have sustained the injuries before the arrival of the municipal police officers. [The applicant’s] blood alcohol level after more than eleven hours of detention only further demonstrates that prior to detention [the applicant] was intoxicated with alcohol. This does not exclude the possibility that [the applicant] sustained injuries by falling from [his own] height.” 31. On 20 July 2004 a prosecutor at the Office of the Prosecutor General dismissed the applicant’s complaint. She examined the case-file materials and found that there were no grounds to quash the second decision. Among other things, she noted that section 171 of the Code of Administrative Violations provided for administrative liability for the use of alcoholic beverages or other intoxicating substances in public places or for appearing in public places in an intoxicated state, which was an affront to human dignity. For that reason, notwithstanding the discrepancy between the submissions of the officers, who had stated that the applicant had been lying inside the apartment building, and the applicant, who had stated that he had been sitting on a bench outside the building, the officers had had grounds to take him to the municipal police station to sober up and to draw up an administrative offence report. 32. On 4 August 2004 the applicant, in a complaint to a higher-ranking prosecutor, specified that his complaints did not relate to unjustified placement (nepamatota nogādāšana) in the sobering-up room or to being taken there by force. Rather, they related to the failure to institute criminal proceedings in connection with bodily injuries inflicted on him while there. 33. On 19 August 2004 the higher-ranking prosecutor at the Office of the Prosecutor General dismissed the applicant’s complaint. It appears that he obtained additional statements from officers I.L. and N.M., and the watch officer N.H. The prosecutor found that the applicant’s allegation that the injury on his left eyebrow had been inflicted by officers pushing him against the wall in the police station were not corroborated by the officers’ statements and the medical orderly’s indication that the applicant had been admitted with the injury. Nor was the applicant’s allegation that his left hip had been broken by the officers dragging him down the stairs at the police station confirmed. The officers had explained that they had carried him into the station as he had not been able to walk by himself. The prosecutor concluded that the applicant had sustained the injuries before his administrative detention. 34. A final decision, negative in respect of the applicant, was adopted by the Prosecutor General on 13 October 2004. He found that the applicant’s allegations concerning contradictions and discrepancies in the case-file materials were unfounded. He noted, among other things, that the applicant’s detention record and the medical record drawn up upon his admission to the police station confirmed that he already had injuries on his face and left eyebrow, thus his allegations about sustaining the injuries in the station were not confirmed. The applicant had been carried into the station because he had not been able to walk by himself and he had complained about pain in his hip only after sobering up, after which the medical orderly had called an ambulance. 35. The applicant received the decision on 15 October 2004.

4. The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in St Petersburg. 5. Between 1989 and 2001 the applicant initiated several sets of civil proceedings. 6. By judgment of 17 January 1989, the Vyborg Town Court ordered the applicant’s former husband to pay alimony. A writ of execution was issued. 7. In August 2000 the bailiff service notified the applicant that the writ had been lost and advised her to obtain a new one. 8. On 12 October 1999 the applicant brought proceedings in the Oktyabrskiy District Court of St Petersburg against her husband R. seeking judicial recognition of her and her children’s right to use a room in a certain flat. The case was assigned to judge K. 9. The applicant submitted that hearings had been scheduled for 27 February 2000, which fell on a weekend, and then for an unspecified date in March 2000 when the respondent had failed to appear. 10. The next hearing scheduled for 19 April 2000 did not take place due to the parties’ default in appearance. The summons sent to the respondent whose address had been indicated by the applicant in her statement of claim had returned to the court upon expiry of the time-limit for its storage at the post office. 11. The hearing of 16 May 2000 did not take place due to the respondent’s failure to appear. The summons returned to the court for the same reason as before. 12. The hearing of 19 September 2000 did not take place as the judge was on vacation. On account of judge K.’s heavy workload, the case was transferred to the newly appointed judge Ch. 13. The next hearing scheduled for 15 November 2000 was adjourned at the applicant’s request to give her time to specify her claims and obtain legal assistance. On the same date the court granted her motion for an injunction order. 14. At the hearing of 24 January 2001 the applicant supplemented her claims by asking the court to declare unlawful an exchange of the contested room for a house carried out by R. Following involvement of a third party P., the hearing was adjourned, the parties were summoned to a new date, and the court sent an inquiry to some State bodies for evidence. 15. The respondent and the third party did not appear at the next hearing of 17 April 2001. The summons sent to P. returned to the court upon expiry of the time-limit for its storage at the post office. The hearing was adjourned. To ensure the correct address of the summonses, the court suggested that P. be summoned by the housing authorities of the respective city district, and R. by the town council of the village where he resided. 16. At the next hearing of 1 August 2001 the applicant supplemented her claims seeking to declare all of the transactions with the room unlawful. Three other individuals who had been parties to these transactions were involved by the court as co-respondents. On the same day the court stayed the proceedings pending outcome of another dispute at the Frunzenskiy District Court of St Petersburg which involved the applicant’s claim for annulment of her marriage to R. The applicant did not challenge this decision. 17. The proceedings were resumed on 12 May 2003, three months after the Frunzenskiy District Court gave a judgment. The next hearing was scheduled for 3 February 2004; however it had to be postponed to 15 September 2004 following the request of the applicant and one of the respondents, as well as the other parties’ default in appearance. In response to the applicant’s complaint of lengthy proceedings, on 21 August 2003 the president of the St Petersburg City Court acknowledged that the workload in the District Court had considerably exceeded the maximum level, in particular due to the shortage of judges. 18. On 15 September 2004 the court dismissed the applicant’s claims. The reasoned judgment was submitted to the court’s registry on 13 May 2005. On 20 July 2005 the St Petersburg City Court upheld the judgment on appeal. 19. On 12 July 2001 the applicant brought proceedings in the Frunzenskiy District Court of St Petersburg for annulment of her marriage to R. 20. On 4 April 2002 the judge in charge of her case decided to prepare the case for examination and required certain evidence from a State body. A hearing was scheduled for 7 October 2002. However, it did not take place due to the judge’s illness. At the next hearing of 19 February 2003 the court granted the applicant’s claim. 21. On 23 January 2003 the applicant complained to the Higher Judicial Qualifications Board of the District Court’s procrastination in dealing with her case. As a result of an internal investigation, on 26 November 2004 the judge who had sat in the applicant’s case was dismissed. 22. In April 2001 the applicant brought proceedings in the Frunzenskiy District Court of St Petersburg for alimony arrears and sought to deprive her former husband of his parental rights. On 24 April 2002 the District Court declined jurisdiction in favour of another court. On 7 August 2002 the St Petersburg City Court set aside this decision. By judgment of 19 February 2003, the District Court granted the applicant’s claims.

5. The applicant was born in 1958 and is currently being held in the Kırklareli Foreigners' Admission and Accommodation Centre. 6. In 1985 the applicant joined the People's Mojahedin Organisation in Iran (“the PMOI”, also known as the “Mojahedin-e-Khalq Organization”). 7. In 1986 he arrived in Iraq. He lived in Al-Ashraf camp, where PMOI members were accommodated in Iraq, until he left the organisation in 2003, because he disagreed with the PMOI's goals and methods. After leaving the PMOI, he went to the Temporary Interview and Protection Facility (“TIPF”), a camp created by the United States forces in Iraq. This facility was subsequently named the Ashraf Refugee Camp (“ARC”). 8. On 5 May 2006, after being interviewed, the applicant was recognised as a refugee by the UNHCR Headquarters in Geneva during his stay in Iraq. 9. On an unspecified date the applicant arrived in Turkey with a false passport. 10. On 1 June 2008 the applicant was arrested by the Turkish security forces while attempting to leave for the island of Kos, in Greece, from the port of Bodrum, with a false passport. 11. In his statements to the Turkish police, the applicant stated that he had fled from the regime in Iran and arrived in Iraq, where he was recognised as a refugee by the UNHCR. He did not mention that he was a former member of the PMOI. He then described the circumstances in which he had arrived in Turkey and had attempted to leave for Greece. The applicant noted that he had contacted the UNHCR branch office in Ankara and that he had been told that he had to wait. He did not feel able to wait and attempted to leave Turkey illegally. 12. On 2 June 2008 the UNHCR branch office sent a letter to the Ministry of the Interior informing the latter that the applicant had been recognised as a refugee under their mandate. 13. On an unspecified date the UNHCR branch office asked the national authorities to grant the applicant access to the asylum procedure in Turkey. This request was rejected in view of the fact that the applicant's presence in Turkey constituted a threat to national security given his membership of the PMOI. 14. Following his detention in police custody, a detention order was made in respect of the applicant and he was transferred to Muğla prison as charges were brought against him for illegal entry into Turkey and falsifying identity documents. 15. On 1 August 2008 the applicant was transferred to the city of Van in eastern Turkey, apparently with a view to deporting him to Iran. 16. On invocation of the interim measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the applicant was transferred to the Kırklareli Foreigners' Admission and Accommodation Centre.

5. The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Baku. 6. The applicant applied for registration as an independent candidate for the forthcoming elections to the Milli Majlis (Parliament) of 6 November 2005. On 19 August 2005 the Constituency Electoral Commission (“the ConEC”) for Nasimi First Election Constituency no. 21, a single-mandate constituency in Baku, registered him as a candidate. 7. On 26 October 2005 Police Office No. 19 of the Nasimi District Police Department informed the ConEC that the applicant was privately funding certain urban improvement works (such as laying new asphalt and repairing public recreation facilities for children) in some public areas of his constituency, allegedly with the purpose of winning over the support and votes of the local residents, in breach of the requirements of the electoral law. To this effect, the police drew up a record, signed by three police officers and two employees (A.A. and V.Q.) of the local housing utilities committee responsible for the residential buildings in question, which stated that the applicant had “laid fresh asphalt in front of the residential buildings indicated on the attached drawing ... and this fact [was] confirmed by the signatures below”. 8. In support of this submission, the police office submitted handwritten statements by several local residents, all of which were addressed directly to the police and expressed gratitude to the applicant for the work he had carried out in their neighbourhood. While some of the statements were dated 26 October 2005, two statements were dated 27 October 2005. 9. In particular, a statement by I.K., dated 26 October 2005 and addressed to Police Office No. 19, read as follows: “I have resided at the above-mentioned address since 1989. During this time, no renovation has been done in the courtyard [of our building]. But in the last month a lot of renovation work has been carried out in the courtyard ... [a description of specific improvements follows]. The above-mentioned works were organised and carried out by our respected neighbour ... Nadir Orujov. He is a person who is willing to share all the problems of the entire neighbourhood and to assist [in resolving these problems]. We wish this person only victory in the upcoming elections”. 10. A statement by G.N., dated 27 October 2005 and addressed to Police Office No. 19, read as follows: “In reply to the questions asked of me, I inform you that Nadir Oruj oglu Orujov, who has nominated himself as a candidate [for the parliamentary elections], has carried out benevolent renovation works in our courtyard in the pre-election period. He has laid fresh asphalt in front of the buildings. I have written this statement myself. I confirm [the authenticity of] my signature”. 11. A statement by S.A., dated 27 October 2005 and addressed to Police Office No. 19, read as follows: “I inform you that Nadir Oruj oglu Orujov, who has nominated himself as a candidate [for the parliamentary elections], is laying fresh asphalt in front of the buildings [in our courtyard]. He is a good person. I have written this statement myself. I confirm [the authenticity of] my signature.” 12. Other statements were of a similar content. 13. According to an extract from the minutes of the ConEC meeting held on 28 October 2005, made available to the applicant and later submitted by him to the Court, the ConEC decided as follows: “1. To take into consideration the statements by voters ... 2. To confirm, based on the statements and other material submitted, breaches of Articles 88.4.4 and 88.4.5 of the Electoral Code by Nadir Oruj oglu Orujov, who is registered as a candidate for the elections to the Milli Majlis. 3. In accordance with Article 113.2.3 of the Electoral Code, to apply to the Court of Appeal with a request for the cancellation of the applicant’s registration as a candidate owing to the breach of the requirements of Articles 88.4.4 and 88.4.5 of the Electoral Code. ...” 14. The full copy of the same minutes of the above ConEC meeting, as submitted by the Government, indicates that this meeting was held on 29 October 2005. 15. By a letter of 28 October 2005, the ConEC submitted the cancellation request to the Court of Appeal. The request stated, inter alia: “[C]andidate Nadir Oruj oglu Orujov has breached the requirements of Article 88 of the Electoral Code and thus violated the rights of other candidates. There have been repeated oral submissions to [the ConEC] concerning his illegal actions. Finally, citizens have applied to Police Office no. 19 of the Nasimi District Police Department and requested [the police] to put an end to his illegal actions. ... It has been proved that [the applicant] conducted [certain renovation works], in breach of Articles 88.4.4 and 88.4.5 of the Electoral Code, with the purpose of buying votes. ...” 16. According to the applicant, he was not informed about the ConEC’s request in a timely manner. 17. The Court of Appeal examined the case the next day, at 11 a.m. on Saturday 29 October 2005. 18. According to the record of the court hearing, the court examined the documents submitted by the ConEC and heard a number of witnesses. In particular, two police officers, F. Zamanov and R. Samadov, testified that, according to “residents of the buildings” in question, the applicant had carried out unauthorised urban improvement works in the constituency. 19. The court also heard six local residents. It appears that three of them (G.N., R.I. and V.Q.) had submitted handwritten statements to the police earlier. These three witnesses told the court that they did not know the applicant personally and had not known who had carried out the renovation works, that on 26 October 2005 police officer F. Zamanov had approached each of them individually on the street, engaged them in conversation and informed them that the works had been carried out by the applicant, and that F. Zamanov had then asked them to write a “thank-you note” expressing their gratitude to the applicant for his efforts on behalf of the community. The witnesses said that they had not been told that their statements would be used against the applicant later. 20. Of the remaining three local residents, one stated that she did not know who had carried out the urban improvement works near her home, and two stated that the works had been carried out by the local residents themselves at their own expense. 21. In its judgment of 29 October 2005, consisting of one and a half typed pages, the Court of Appeal summarised the above-mentioned witness statements as follows: “... witnesses F. Zamanov and R. Samadov confirmed that [the renovation works] at [the location in question] had been carried out under the instructions and with the assistance of the candidate for the elections to the Milli Majlis, N.O. Orujov. This circumstance was also confirmed by witnesses [R.I. and G.N.] when questioned at the court hearing. ... Witnesses [V.Q. and M.M.], when questioned at the court hearing, stated that they did not know who had laid the fresh asphalt and carried out the renovation works, while witnesses [Q.H. and G.V.] stated that these renovation works had been carried out by the local residents themselves”. 22. The court then directly proceeded to a finding that the applicant, by carrying out renovation works in public areas “with the aim of winning over voters” and “promising to provide assistance to voters in return for their votes”, had attempted to influence the voters’ opinion in a manner prohibited by Article 88.4 of the Electoral Code. The court therefore decided to cancel the applicant’s registration as a candidate. 23. On 31 October 2005 the applicant enquired as to the identity of the local residents who had testified against him. He discovered that two of the persons (S.A. and T.T.) who had complained about him to the police did not actually live in his constituency and had used false addresses in their written submissions. 24. Three other witnesses (I.K., G.N. and V.Q.) made notarised affidavits addressed to the Supreme Court in which they retracted their previous handwritten submissions to the police, claiming that, in fact, none of them had known whether the renovation works had actually been carried out by the applicant, and that they had been either pressured or tricked by the police into making these statements, without being informed that the police intended to use them against the applicant. 25. The applicant lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court, arguing that the evidence used against him had been fabricated, that the Court of Appeal had made manifest errors in examining the evidence and had based its decision on unproven allegations, and that therefore his registration had been cancelled arbitrarily. With his cassation appeal, he also enclosed the witness affidavits mentioned above. 26. On 3 November 2005 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the Court of Appeal’s judgment of 29 October 2005. It refused to admit the new evidence submitted by the applicant challenging the reliability of the original evidence used against him (including the witnesses’ affidavits retracting their previous accusations in respect of the applicant); it noted that the factual circumstances of the case had been duly established by the lower court and that the Supreme Court could examine the case only on points of law. Furthermore, the Supreme Court stated that the lower court had applied the material law correctly and complied with the requirements of procedural law.

4. The applicants are residents of Voronezh. 5. The applicants are in receipt of welfare payments for their children. In 1999 – 2000 they brought separate sets of civil proceedings against a local welfare authority, claiming arrears in those payments. 6. On the dates set out in the appendix the domestic courts granted the applicants’ claims and ordered the welfare authority to pay them the respective amounts. The enforcement proceedings were commenced accordingly. 7. On 26 July 2001 the bailiffs discontinued the enforcement proceedings in respect of the judgments in the applicants’ favour and returned them the writs of execution referring to the lack of the debtor’s funds. 8. In 2002 – 2004 the applicants unsuccessfully applied to various public bodies seeking to have the judgments in the favour enforced. 9. On 2 June 2004 the applicants were paid the amounts due pursuant to the writs of execution.

5. The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Žalec. 6. On 23 November 1993 the applicant was injured in an accident at work. The applicant’s employer had taken out insurance with the insurance company ZT. 7. On 4 August 1995 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against ZT in the Celje District Court (Okrožno sodišče v Celju) seeking damages in the amount of 8,174,751 tolars (approximately 34,000 euros) for the injuries sustained. On 31 January 1996 the applicant requested that a date be set for a hearing. On 15 January 1997 and 16 April 1998 he lodged preparatory written submissions. On 6 February 1997 and 21 April 1998 the court held hearings. During the proceedings the court appointed a medical expert. At the last hearing the court decided to deliver a written judgment. The judgment, upholding the applicant’s claim in part, was served on the applicant on 21 May 1998. 8. On 5 June 1998 the applicant appealed to the Celje Higher Court (Višje sodišče v Celju). ZT cross-appealed. On 14 January 1999 the first-instance court, at the request of the Celje Higher Court, amended the apparent errors in the judgment and resubmitted the case to the Celje Higher Court. On 13 May 1999 the court allowed both appeals in part and remitted the case to the first-instance court for re-examination in the part referring to the damages for disfigurement. The judgment was served on the applicant on 26 August 1999. 9. On 21 September 1999 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court (Vrhovno sodišče). ZT cross-appealed. On 31 May 2000 the court dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld ZT’s appeal. The judgment was served on the applicant on 17 July 2000. 10. On 27 July 2000 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. On 11 June 2001 the Constitutional Court (Ustavno sodišče) dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The decision was served on the applicant on 4 July 2001. 11. On 9 April 2002 the first-instance court held a hearing concerning the damages for disfigurement. The parties reached a court settlement. On 4 October 2002 the applicant requested the court to decide on the costs and expenses. The court rendered the decision on 3 July 2003. 12. The applicant lodged an appeal with the Celje Higher Court contesting the decision on costs and expenses. On 18 November 2004 the court allowed the appeal and remitted the case to the first-instance court for re-examination. The decision was served on the applicant on 28 December 2004. 13. On 16 February 2005 the applicant lodged preliminary written submissions. The case is pending before the Celje District Court.

4. The applicants were born in 1955 and 1957 respectively and live in Istanbul. 5. On 3 and 15 March 1981 the applicants were arrested. 6. On 26 May 1981 the Ankara Martial Law Court ordered their detention on remand. 7. On 16 June 1981 the public prosecutor attached to the Adana Martial Law Court filed a bill of indictment against 343 persons, including the applicants, and charged the latter with membership of an illegal organisation, the Dev-Yol (Devrimci Yol - the Revolutionary Way). 8. On 17 June 1986 the Adana Martial Law Court convicted the applicants as charged. 9. On an unspecified date the applicants appealed. 10. On 20 March 1991 the Military Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the first-instance court and remitted the case to the Ankara Martial Law Court, since in the meantime the former court had been abolished. 11. On an unspecified date in 1991 the applicants were released pending trial. 12. Subsequent to the promulgation of Law no. 3953 on 27 December 1993, which abolished the jurisdiction of the Martial Law Courts, the Ankara Assize Court acquired jurisdiction in the applicants’ case. 13. On 18 June 2001 the Ankara Assize Court convicted Süleyman Eryılmaz under Article 146 § 1 of the Criminal Code and sentenced him to death. This sentence was subsequently commuted to life imprisonment. Regarding Ferit Çengelli, the first-instance court ordered that the criminal proceedings against him be terminated on the ground that the statutory time‑limit under Articles 102 and 104 of the Criminal Code had expired. 14. The judgment of the Ankara Assize Court was automatically referred to the Court of Cassation insofar as it concerned Süleyman Eryılmaz, since the latter’s sentence exceeded 15 years’ imprisonment. 15. On 24 July 2002 the applicants allegedly learned about the outcome of the proceedings before the Ankara Assize Court through a friend. 16. By a letter dated 7 February 2003, the applicants’ former lawyer informed the Court that the judgment of 18 June 2001 had been served on Ferit Çengelli on 3 February 2003 upon his request, and that the proceedings against Süleyman Eryılmaz were still pending before the Court of Cassation. (From the case file it appears that the State had attempted to serve the judgment on Ferit Çengelli earlier, but had mistakenly sent it to the wrong address.) 17. According to the documents submitted to the Court by the respondent Government, on 30 October 2003 the Court of Cassation quashed the Ankara Assize Court’s judgment of 18 June 2001 insofar as it concerned Süleyman Eryılmaz and remitted the case to the Ankara Assize Court. 18. According to the information in the case file, the case against Süleyman Eryılmaz is still pending before the Ankara Assize Court.

5. The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Florence. 6. A.C., C.G. and G.G. were the owners of a flat in Florence, which they had let to R.F. 7. In a registered letter of 29 June 1987, the owners informed the tenant that they intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1987 and asked him to vacate the premises by that date. 8. In a writ served on the tenant on 9 September 1988, the owners reiterated their intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Florence Magistrate. 9. By a decision of 18 October 1988, which was made enforceable on 23 November 1988, the Florence Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 13 October 1989. 10. In the meanwhile, on 4 April 1989, the applicant became the owner of the flat and pursued the enforcement proceedings. 11. On 14 November 1989, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 12. On 5 December 1989, she informed the tenant that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 26 January 1990. 13. Between 26 January 1990 and 22 January 1999, the bailiff made twenty attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession. 14. On 17 May 1990, the applicant made a statutory declaration that she urgently required the premises as accommodation for herself. 15. On 11 October 2000, the applicant recovered possession of the flat.

4. The applicant was a minority shareholder of YTONG, a.s., a joint stock company incorporated under Czech law. 5. On 24 June 2003 the general meeting of that company adopted, by votes of the main shareholder, a resolution on the winding up of the company and the transfer of all its assets to the main shareholder. The transfer contract included an arbitration clause by which any disagreement of minority shareholders with the settlement amounts was to be decided in arbitration. 6. On 11 July 2003 the court in charge of the commercial register approved the registration of the transfer. No hearing was held before that decision, which was not served on the applicant as he did not have standing to participate in the proceedings. Based on this decision the company YTONG, a.s. was deleted from the commercial register on 1 September 2003. 7. On 11 December 2003 the Olomouc High Court (vrchní soud) dismissed the applicant’s appeal contesting that decision. It ruled that since the applicant did not have standing to take part in the impugned proceedings, he was not entitled to appeal their outcome. 8. On 9 November 2006 the Constitutional Court (Ústavní soud) dismissed the applicant’s constitutional appeal, in which he claimed an impairment of his right to a fair trial and the right to property in the registration proceedings because he had not been allowed to be a party in the proceedings that by Article 220h §§ 3 and 4 of the Commercial Code created an irreversible situation. The Constitutional Court held that the Commercial Code had not impaired his right of access to a court because apart from the registration proceedings there were other proceedings where he could have asserted his rights. 9. On 2 September 2003 the applicant lodged with the Brno Regional Court (krajský soud) an action to have the winding-up resolution set aside and, in eventum, he asserted that the compensation paid for the transfer had not been adequate and claimed the remainder thereof. 10. On 18 January 2007 the Regional Court rejected the applicant’s claim to set aside the resolution referring to Article 220h § 3 of the Commercial Code by which an action to set aside a general meeting resolution on merger could not be lodged if a registration of the merger into the commercial register had been already allowed by a court in charge thereof. The court further terminated the proceedings in respect of the compensation holding that it had no jurisdiction over the dispute because of the arbitration clause in the transfer contract. 11. On 12 December 2008 the Olomouc High Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. 12. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, which is pending. 13. On 7 October 2005 the applicant lodged with the Arbitration Court attached to the Economic Chamber of the Czech Republic and Agricultural Chamber of the Czech Republic (Rozhodčí soud při Hospodářské komoře České republiky a Agrární komoře České republiky) an action whereby he asserted that the compensation for the transfer had not been adequate and claimed the remainder thereof. 14. On 19 September 2006 the Arbitration Court terminated the proceedings holding that it could not deal with the matter until the above mentioned court proceedings regarding the same issue of compensation would be finished. 15. On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a new action with the Arbitration Court. On 17 February 2011 the court discontinued the proceedings. Referring to the judgment of the Court in Suda v. the Czech Republic, no. 1643/06, 28 October 2010, it held that it had no jurisdiction to decide on the merits of the claim.

4. The applicant had foreign currency accounts in Jugobanka A.D. Skopje that was afterwards re-registered as Foreign Trade Bank Skopje (Банка за надворешна трговија Скопје) (“the bank”), through which it had made the payments to its business partners. In 1991 the applicant made available several letters of credit (акредитиви) as warranty for payments to third parties. The bank allegedly did not comply with the applicant's order to execute them and to transfer the money. The amount of these letters of credit allegedly exceeded $ 200,000. 5. On 25 June 1992 the applicant instituted enforcement proceedings requesting the then Skopje District Commercial Court (Окружен Стопански Суд во Скопје) to order the bank to transfer the money due to its account. 6. On 30 June 1992 the then District Commercial Court granted the applicant's request. As the bank objected to the order, the subsequent proceedings continued as civil proceedings on the merits of the applicant's claim. 7. At the hearing held on 26 May 1993, the then Skopje District Commercial Court required an independent expert opinion. On 18 June 2003 the expert opinion was submitted to the court. On 16 July 1993 the applicant objected to the expert opinion. 8. The hearing listed for 20 September 1993 was adjourned at the applicant's request. 9. On 20 October 1993 the applicant requested the court to fix a hearing at its earliest convenience. 10. The hearing scheduled for 8 December 1993 was postponed as the bank's counter-claim of 21 June 1993 had not been forwarded to the court on time. 11. At the hearing of 31 January 1994 the applicant was requested to clarify its claim. On 22 February 1994 the applicant complied with the order. 12. The hearing of 7 March 1994 was adjourned and the bank was ordered to submit information concerning the applicant's claim as clarified. The court adjourned the hearing of 18 April 1994 due to the parties' absence. 13. At the hearing of 6 June 1994 the court ordered the State Forensic Institute (Републички Завод за судски вештачења) (“the Institute”) to draw up an expert report concerning two letters of credit. On 1 July 1994 the Institute asked the court to order the applicant to pay the expert's costs. The expertise scheduled for 1 November 1994 was adjourned as the bank had requested the court to disqualify the expert for bias. On 17 November 1994 the court dismissed the request. On 17 February 1995 the court received the expert opinion. 14. On 24 March 1995 the then Skopje District Commercial Court launched bankruptcy proceedings against the bank. 15. On 26 April 1995 the court stayed the civil proceedings. 16. As the receiver (стечаен управник) in the bankruptcy proceedings had disputed the applicant's claim, on 5 and 6 June 1995 the District Commercial Court, as a bankruptcy court, instructed the latter to institute separate civil proceedings to ascertain its claim. 17. On 23 February 1996 the applicant requested the court to resume the civil proceedings against the bank. It also asked the court to hold a hearing and to summon the experts who had already provided their opinions. 18. The court scheduled the next hearing for 16 March 1997. As this date fell on a Sunday, on 12 February 1997 the applicant requested the court to fix a working day. 19. On the hearing of 16 April 1997 the bank objected to the applicant's capacity to stand as a party and to the experts' opinions. 20. The hearing fixed for 18 June 1997 was adjourned due to the strike of the court's administrative staff. The hearing of 8 October was also adjourned. 21. The hearings of 10 December 1997 and 23 February 1998 were adjourned as none of the parties attended, albeit properly summoned. The court considered the applicant's claim as withdrawn. 22. On 2 March 1998 the applicant requested reinstatement of the proceedings (враќање во поранешна состојба). On 27 May 1998 the court granted the applicant's request and re-scheduled the hearing for 21 September 1998 ordering it to clarify its claim. On 2 June 1998 the applicant partly withdrew its claim concerning one of the letters of credit. 23. The hearings of 21 September and 22 December 1998 and 22 February 1999 were postponed because of the defendant's absence or at the latter's request. 24. On 2 April 1999 the bank challenged the previous expert opinion. On 26 April 1999 the applicant submitted its comments on this challenge. 25. On 21 April 1999 the court required additional expert opinion to be obtained concerning the bank's challenge of 2 April 1999. On 22 December 1999 the court appointed the State Forensic Institute for Financial Matters to draw up a report. On 7 February and 29 March 2000 the Institute asked the court to order the bank to pay the expert's costs. As the expert's costs remained unpaid, on 17 May 2000 the Institute sent the case-file back to the court. 26. On 8 November 2000 the applicant requested the court to transmit the file back to the Institute paying the expert's costs. On 14 November 2000 the court asked the Institute again to draw up its report. On 11 April 2001 the court received the expert opinion. 27. The hearing scheduled for 3 December 2001 was adjourned because of the defendant's absence, albeit properly summoned. 28. On 29 November 2001 the Skopje Court of First Instance completed the bankruptcy proceedings against the bank. It noted, inter alia, that the creditors' claims had been cleared from the bank's assets (стечајна маса) and that the remaining part had been transferred to the State. 29. On 4 February 2002 the Skopje Court of First Instance stayed the proceedings as the bank had ceased to exist. 30. On 13 March 2002 the applicant appealed against this decision. It complained inter alia, that the proceedings should continue against the State, as a legal successor of the bank which assumed possession of the remaining assets after the latter had been declared insolvent. By a submission of 12 June 2002, the applicant requested the court to invite the State to join the proceedings as a legal successor of the bank. 31. On 30 October 2002 the Skopje Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeal and upheld the lower court's decision. It found that the proceedings could not continue against the State, as the applicant had not officially requested continuation of the proceedings against the latter and the court could not ex officio continue them. 32. On 5 December 2002 the applicant requested the court to resume the proceedings against the State and to ask the latter to join the proceedings as a legal successor of the bank. 33. On 19 April 2004 the applicant asked the court to hold a hearing and to summon the Solicitor General (Јавен Правобранител) on behalf of the State. 34. On the hearing of 20 June 2005 the Solicitor General refused to participate in the proceedings. The applicant stated that it would lodge a separate claim against the State. 35. As far as the Court is aware, no final decision has yet been given.

9. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Eindhoven. 10. On 23 June 1994 the ’s-Hertogenbosch Regional Court (arrondissementsrechtbank) convicted the applicant of participation in robbery with violence resulting in grievous bodily harm and sentenced him to fifteen months’ imprisonment, with deduction of the time spent in pre-trial detention. In addition, having found that the applicant was suffering from a mental disorder and was dangerous, the Regional Court further ordered the applicant’s confinement in a custodial clinic (hereafter a “TBS order” - terbeschikkingstelling met bevel tot verpleging van overheidswege). 11. On 10 October 1994, when the applicant had served his prison sentence, the TBS order took effect. However, the applicant was not transferred to a custodial clinic as there were no places available. He therefore remained in pre-placement detention in the ’s‑Hertogenbosch ordinary remand centre. 12. In order to expedite his admission to a custodial clinic, the applicant instituted summary civil proceedings (kort geding) against the Netherlands State. He withdrew these summary proceedings after his transfer to a custodial clinic in Nijmegen on 28 December 1995. 13. On 8 February 1996 the applicant took civil proceedings against the Netherlands State before the Hague Regional Court, claiming compensation in tort (onrechtmatige daad) in an amount of 29,200 Netherlands guilders (NLG), i.e. NLG 50 for each day during the first ten months of his pre-placement detention after 10 October 1994 pending transfer to a custodial clinic and NLG 100 for each subsequent day until 28 December 1995. 14. In its judgment of 24 July 1996 the Regional Court held that a delay of six months was acceptable for a transfer to a custodial clinic and that the Netherlands State had only acted unlawfully in so far as this delay had exceeded six months. It awarded the applicant compensation in the amount of NLG 50 for each day spent in pre-placement detention between 6 and 10 months after 10 October 1994 and NLG 100 for each subsequent day until 28 December 1995, i.e. a total amount of NLG 20,100. It rejected the applicant’s claim for the remainder. 15. The Netherlands State filed an appeal with the Hague Court of Appeal (Gerechtshof). The applicant filed a cross-appeal (incidenteel beroep) in which he reduced his claim for damages to NLG 24,900 in that he no longer sought compensation for the first three months of his pre-placement detention, i.e. the period between 10 October 1994 and 28 December 1995. 16. In its judgment of 20 March 1997 the Court of Appeal rejected the principal appeal filed by the Netherlands State. It did, however, quash the judgment of 24 July 1996 on the basis of the cross-appeal filed by the applicant in so far as the applicant’s claims in excess of NLG 20,100 had been dismissed in this judgment. It ordered the Netherlands State to pay a further amount of NLG 4,800 to the applicant. The Netherlands State filed an appeal in cassation with the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad). 17. On 5 June 1998 the Supreme Court quashed the judgment of 20 March 1997 and referred the case back to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal. It held, inter alia: “3.3 Article 9 § 1 (b) of the [1951] Prisons Act (Beginselenwet Gevangeniswezen) reads: ‘Remand centres are intended: (b) for the accommodation of all others lawfully deprived of their liberty by a judicial decision, court order or public authority, in so far as there is no other suitable place for their accommodation or for as long as admission to another suitable place is not possible.’ The point of departure for the examination ... must therefore be that the [applicant’s] continued stay in the remand centre ‘for as long as admission to another suitable place is not possible’ is in principle lawful as being based on the law. Moreover, the parties and the Court of Appeal have taken this approach. However, where it can no longer reasonably be held that the failure to admit a person to a custodial clinic is justified by the circumstances, the continuation of detention in the remand centre must be regarded as unlawful (Supreme Court, 28 June 1963, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1963, 480). Also, the parties and the Court of Appeal have taken this as their point of departure. Part 1 [of the cassation complaint] thus lacks a factual basis. 3.4.1 The Court of Appeal, faced with the question from what moment the situation referred to in the last paragraph of 3.3 arises, has held that ‘apart from exceptional circumstances, the stay of a [person awaiting admission to a custodial clinic] should not exceed three months’ and, further, that, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, the [applicant’s] stay in the ’s-Hertogenbosch remand centre was unlawful after a period of three months had elapsed. Parts 2-9 [of the cassation complaint] are directed against these findings and the reasons given by the Court of Appeal. 3.4.2 In the examination of these parts, it must be stated in the first place that the impugned findings of the Court of Appeal concern a situation prior to the entry into force of Article 12 of the Act on confinement to a custodial clinic of persons subject to a TBS order (Beginselenwet verpleging ter beschikking gestelden). ... this provision entered into force on 11 July 1997. The Supreme Court’s considerations hereafter will thus address the legal situation until 11 July 1997. 3.4.3 In 1963 the Minister of Justice gave an undertaking to the Upper House of Parliament that the admission to a custodial clinic of persons in respect of whom a TBS order had been given and in respect of whom a custodial clinic had been selected would be carried out within eight weeks after the TBS order had taken effect. ... In a letter to the Lower House of Parliament of 3 June 1986, the State Secretary of Justice ... stated that she was unable to maintain this undertaking, given the growth in waiting lists. Article 12 of the Act on confinement to a custodial clinic of persons subject to a TBS order reads: ‘1. The admission [to a custodial clinic] of a person in respect of whom a TBS order has been issued takes place within a period of six months after the date on which the TBS order has become effective. 2. When Our Minister, taking account of the requirements mentioned in Article 11 § 2 [of this Act], considers that admission is not possible within the period set out in the first paragraph, he may extend this period by three months each time. 3. A decision to extend within the meaning of the second paragraph shall be equated to a refusal to decide within the period mentioned in the first paragraph.’ In the Explanatory Memorandum to this Article it is stated, inter alia: ‘... in the proposed first paragraph of Article 12 a time-limit of six months is set out within which the admission must in general be carried out. This time-limit has been chosen on the basis of the fact that, in addition to the previously accepted guideline for a maximum duration for a TBS admission of twelve weeks, the time needed for the selection examination, the consultation with the envisaged institution of admission and the decision-making at the Ministry must also be taken into consideration. In 1986 my predecessor abandoned the above-mentioned time-limit of twelve weeks since, as a result of the lack of capacity of the custodial clinics including the [forensic psychiatric observation] Dr F.S. Meijers Institute, this time-limit could no longer be observed. It cannot be expected for a foreseeable time that all persons in respect of whom a TBS order has been issued can be admitted to the custodial clinic selected for them within the stated time-limit. The proposed second paragraph of Article 12 therefore opens the possibility of an extension of the six-month period by three months each time.’ 3.4.4 The following must be derived from the statements of the Minister and the State Secretary of Justice. After 1963 the Government apparently assumed that the undertaking made in 1963 concerned the time needed for selection and admission of persons awaiting admission to a custodial clinic and that this period would not exceed a maximum of twelve weeks. The State Secretary ‘abandoned’ this undertaking in 1986 on grounds of ‘the lack of capacity of the custodial clinics, including the Dr F.S. Meijers Institute’. It follows from this that, where the above-mentioned lack of capacity is not taken into consideration, the point of departure is that the procedure of selection and admission of persons subject to a TBS order does not, in principle, need to take more than three months. The consequences of this lack of capacity and other circumstances that might influence the delay in admission will be addressed in considerations nos. 3.4.5 – 3.4.10. In the light of the presupposed standard in 3.3 it cannot be said, however, that the mere exceeding of the three-month time-limit in itself renders a lawful detention in a remand centre unlawful under Article 9 § 1 (b) of the [1951] Prisons Act. This situation only arises where it can no longer reasonably be held that the failure to admit a person to a custodial clinic remains to be justified by the circumstances. Only then can it be said that, although there is a legal basis for the continued detention in a remand centre of a person subject to a TBS order, the further duration of that detention is contrary to what is fitting conduct in society according to unwritten (customary) law (in strijd is met hetgeen volgens ongeschreven recht in het maatschappelijk verkeer betaamt). 3.4.5 For cases like the present one, this unwritten law is as follows. It must be stated first that the TBS order in cases like the present one starts to run from the date of early release and that the Minister of Justice, pursuant to Article 4 of the TBS Execution Rules (Reglement tenuitvoerlegging TBS) (as in force until 2 October 1997), had to decide ‘as soon as possible on the admission to a custodial clinic intended to execute the confinement order’. This did not, however, mean that the Minister of Justice was obliged to ensure that the required capacity for persons subject to a TBS order was available at any given point in time. A certain friction between available and required capacity is indeed acceptable from the point of view of efficient expenditure of financial resources. It has already become clear in 3.4.3 that the Minister of Justice, when he allowed a delay of twelve weeks in 1963, took into account beforehand the fact that this delay would not be sufficient in all cases. It further needs to be noted that Article 12 of the Act on confinement to a custodial clinic of persons subject to a TBS order entered into force on 11 July 1997. In this provision, identical wording to which was already included in the Bill submitted on 12 October 1993, the point of departure is an admission delay, continuously subject to extension, of six months. The views of the Government and Parliament during the history of the adoption of the aforementioned Act are relevant to the examination of the question as to the period of delay in a remand centre awaiting admission to a custodial clinic intended for the person concerned which can be considered, in general, justified by the circumstances and thus acceptable in society. Noting the above, and with due regard for the considerations set out in 3.4.4, the Supreme Court is of the opinion that, after the end of the prison sentence, the pre‑placement detention in a remand centre for a period of six months of a person subject to a TBS order awaiting admission to a custodial clinic intended for him cannot be regarded as unlawful. A period longer than six months would be unlawful, unless there were special circumstances, as referred to in 3.4.7 below. 3.4.7 In part 6 [of the grounds of appeal in cassation] the complaint is made that the Court of Appeal has not accepted that it is incompatible with the standard given in the Supreme Court’s judgment of 28 June 1963 (NJ 1963, 480) that a distinction be made between general circumstances, which could be relevant for a waiting period for admission to a custodial clinic of three months, and special circumstances which could be relevant for the period after three months. ... The complaint fails. Only on grounds of special circumstances to be submitted by the State and in the event of a proven dispute relating to the person concerned and/or the State – such as, for instance, incidental and serious friction between available and required capacity for persons subject to a TBS order – can the exceeding of the maximum duration of an admission delay be justified. 3.4.10 Since the State has not adduced any of the special circumstances referred to in 3.4.7, it follows from the foregoing that the detention of [the applicant] in the ’s-Hertogenbosch remand centre must be considered unlawful from the moment when a period of six months had passed following the beginning of his stay there awaiting admission [to a custodial clinic]. 3.4.12 The complaint set out in part 10 [of the grounds of appeal in cassation] about the reasons [given by the Court of Appeal for rejecting the State’s argument in relation to the determination by the Regional Court of the amount of compensation of respectively NLG 50 and NLG 100 per day] is well–founded. The State has disputed ... on grounds that cannot immediately be refuted that the end date of the TBS would change when the starting date had been postponed. By ignoring this, the Court of Appeal has not given sufficient reasons for its impugned finding. 3.4.13 Part 10 further contains a complaint that the Court of Appeal has used an incorrect standard in the determination of compensation by assuming that the stay of [the applicant] in the remand centre can at best be compared to the case of a suspect who has spent more time in pre-trial detention than was justified. This complaint is also well–founded. The unlawfulness of detention in a remand centre after six months does not arise from the continued deprivation of liberty but from the failure to start treatment in a timely manner in a custodial clinic intended for this purpose. The comparison used by the Court of Appeal does not fit the nature of this form of unlawfulness and the non-pecuniary damage resulting therefrom. It is more appropriate to determine the scope of the damage according to equity and with due regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the duration of the continued stay of a person awaiting admission to a custodial clinic in a remand centre and the possible influence this may have on the (possibilities of) treatment.” 18. On 10 January 1999 the TBS order against the applicant expired. The public prosecutor had not sought a prolongation of the order. 19. In a judgment of 25 February 1999 the Amsterdam Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of the Hague Regional Court of 24 July 1996 in so far as it had awarded compensation to the applicant in an amount of NLG 20,100. It awarded the applicant compensation in an amount of NLG 11,250, rejected the rest of his claim and upheld the remainder of the judgment of 24 July 1996. 20. The Amsterdam Court of Appeal found it established that the delay in the admission of the applicant to a custodial clinic constituted an unlawful act in so far as this delay had exceeded a period of six months. It held that the applicant had been unable to demonstrate that there were special circumstances in his case for holding that a delay of more than three months constituted of itself an unlawful act. It agreed with both parties to the proceedings that it could not be determined what had been, in concrete terms, the effect of the applicant’s lengthy stay in the remand centre on his treatment. Relying on a report of 5 December 1996 by the National Ombudsman, the Court of Appeal further held that no general conclusive findings could be made on that issue. It did not find it established that, in the applicant’s case, the delay in admission had had a major and serious impact on treatment possibilities. 21. As to the determination of the compensation to be awarded to the applicant, the Court held that this was to be determined on an equitable basis and with due regard to all the circumstances of the case. The Court of Appeal held that an amount of NLG 1,000 for each month in excess of six months constituted adequate compensation for the applicant’s feelings of uncertainty and frustration. Having found it established that the applicant’s feelings of unrest had become more intense with the passage of time pending admission to a custodial clinic, it further held that he had sustained increasing non-pecuniary damage with the passage of time. As to this aspect, it considered that a three-monthly increase of the basic amount by NLG 250 per month on each occasion was, in the present case, in accordance with the requirements of equitable compensation. It consequently fixed the total amount of compensation at NLG 11,250. 22. It rejected the applicant’s argument that the compensation should be calculated on a daily basis. The Court of Appeal agreed with the State that the use of a daily compensation amount in cases like the present one, where the unlawfulness did not arise from the deprivation of liberty as such, suggested a degree of precision for which there was no basis in reality.

4. The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in the village of Ivanivka, the Lugansk region of Ukraine. 5. On 6 September 2000 the Krasnolutchsk City Court ordered the Krasnolutchska State Mine to supply the applicant with 8,850 kg of coal. 6. On 6 October 2000 the Krasnolutchsk City Bailiffs’ Service instituted enforcement proceedings in respect of that judgment. 7. On 5 May 2003 the Bailiffs’ Service informed the applicant that the judgment could not be enforced due to the large number of enforcement proceedings against the debtor and the fact that the procedure for the forced sale of assets belonging to the debtor had been suspended because of the moratorium on the forced sale of property belonging to State enterprises introduced by the Law of 29 November 2001. 8. On 21 October 2004 the judgment was enforced in full. 9. On 30 July 2003 the same court ordered the Mine to supply the applicant with another 8,850 kg of coal. 10. On 1 September 2003 the Krasnolutchsk City Bailiffs’ Service instituted enforcement proceedings in respect of the judgment of 30 July 2003. 11. On 19 October 2004 that judgment was also enforced in full.

4. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in the town of Kremenchug, Ukraine. 5. At the material time the applicant worked as an accountant at the Cherkasytransgas State company. 6. In May 1998 the authorities revealed a shortfall of 70,000[1] Ukrainian hryvnyas (UAH) in the Cherkasytransgas accounts. On 30 November 1998 the local police instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant for embezzlement of State funds. On 20 January 1999 criminal proceedings for forgery and negligence were also instituted. 7. On 26 January 1999 criminal proceedings against M. were instituted in connection with the same episode of embezzlement. On 1 April 1999 criminal proceedings against the applicant and M. were joined. 8. On 21 September 1999 the applicant gave a written undertaking not to abscond. 9. The criminal proceedings against M. were terminated on 22 October 1999. 10. On 1 December 1999 the applicant's case was sent to the court. 11. On 18 April 2000 the Kremenchug Court found the applicant guilty of embezzlement of State funds and sentenced her to ten years' imprisonment. The court also ordered confiscation of any property belonging to the applicant. 12. On the same day the applicant was imprisoned. 13. On 7 June 2000 the Poltava Regional Court (since June 2001 the Poltava Regional Court of Appeal) quashed this judgment and remitted the case for additional investigation. 14. On 15 August 2000 the applicant was released. 15. In the course of the investigation several expert reports on handwriting, accountancy and technical criminal questions were submitted. 16. By 11 January 2001 the additional investigation was completed and the case was transferred to the court. 17. On 3 December 2003 the Kremenchug Court found the applicant guilty of embezzlement and sentenced her to five years' imprisonment. The court also disqualified the applicant from holding positions of financial responsibility for three years and ordered confiscation of any property belonging to her. 18. On 12 March 2004 the Poltava Regional Court of Appeal reduced the applicant's sentence to three years and six months' imprisonment. 19. On 11 November 2004 the Supreme Court of Ukraine lifted the three year disqualification from holding positions of financial responsibility and upheld the remainder of the decisions of 3 December 2003 and 12 March 2004. 20. Subsequently the applicant requested the Supreme Court of Ukraine to review the case under the extraordinary review procedure but to no avail.

4. The first applicant was born in 1925 and lives in Aachen (Germany). The second applicant was born in 1929 and died in 2005. 5. On 31 March 1976 the applicants’ property, comprising flat no. 1 and appurtenant land situated in Bucharest, Intrarea Traian Demetrescu no. 14, was seized by the State under Decree no. 223/1974, following their decision to leave the country. No compensation was paid. No copy of the decision to seize the property was sent to the applicants. 6. On 18 December 1996 company T., a State-owned company responsible for the management of property belonging to the State, sold the flat to the then tenant, T.T., under Law no. 112/1995. 7. On 3 May 2001 the applicants brought court proceedings for restitutio in integrum and seeking to have the sale by the State declared null and void. 8. On 24 August 2001 the applicants lodged an application with the administrative authorities for restitution in kind of the property under Law no. 10/2001 governing immovable property wrongfully seized by the State. So far they have not received any answer. 9. On 11 October 2002 the Bucharest Court of First Instance allowed the applicants’ action in part. In the operative part of the judgment it held, inter alia, that there were no grounds for rescission of the sale by the State, but ordered T.T. to allow the applicants to take possession of the flat and the appurtenant land. The court compared the property titles, finding that the seizure had been unlawful but that T.T. had made the purchase in good faith. 10. On 19 March 2003 the Bucharest Regional Court allowed an appeal by T.T. and by company T. and, in the operative part of the judgment, varied the judgment of the first-instance court by dismissing the applicants’ action for recovery of the property. In its reasoning, the court considered that the first-instance court had been requested by the applicants to assess whether the seizure was null and void because they had not been sent a copy of the seizure decision, and that therefore the lower court should not have analysed the lawfulness of the seizure of its own motion. The Regional Court also considered that the failure to inform the applicants of the seizure did not affect its validity and that the applicants had no valid property title. 11. On 25 June 2003 the Bucharest Court of Appeal, in the operative part of a final decision, dismissed as groundless an appeal on points of law by the applicants. In the reasoning of the judgment the court considered that although some of the applicants’ criticisms were well-founded, in particular regarding the misinterpretation of the law by the Regional Court when it found that the Court of First Instance had exceeded the limits of the request made by the applicants, those criticisms did not constitute grounds for amending the previous judgment in accordance with Article 304 § 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but only for removing its reasoning. Therefore, in the reasoning part of its decision, the Court of Appeal considered, in line with the findings of the first-instance court, that the State had no valid title and that therefore the applicants had never lost their right of property. However, the court reasoned that as the applicants had not contested T.T.’s good faith in their appeal, the Regional Court had correctly dismissed their claim for recovery of the property.

8. The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Rome. 9. A.G.D. was the owner of an apartment in Rome, which she had let to V.P. 10. A.G.D. informed the tenant that she intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1983, and asked him to vacate the premises by that date. 11. By a decision of 21 October 1986, the Rome Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 30 April 1987. 12. On 13 November 1986, the applicant became the owner of the apartment and pursued the enforcement proceedings. 13. On 8 May 1987, she served a notice to quit on the tenant, but he refused to leave. 14. On 20 May 1987 she served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 7 July 1987. 15. On 3 April 1989, the applicant made a statutory declaration that she urgently required the premises as accommodation for herself. 16. Between 7 July 1987 and 1 December 1999, the bailiff made forty-nine attempts to recover possession. 17. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession. 18. After reaching an agreement with the tenant, on 18 December 1999 the applicant recovered possession of her apartment.

5. The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Specchia (Lecce). 6. In 1993 the applicant, aged eighteen at the time, was called up to undertake compulsory military service. For the purposes of his conscription he had a combined psychological evaluation and physical examination on 3 December 1993, as a result of which he was found to be fit for military service. The detailed report, which was not disclosed to the applicant (until 21 September 2010 in the course of pension proceedings), considered that the applicant was slow in understanding and executing a task but logical in its exercise, although prone to giving up. In an evaluation covering language and cultural skills, motivation, mental performance and behaviour, he obtained a grade of 4 out of 10 in each area. 7. Upon his conscription, the applicant underwent another medical examination on 14 June 1994, as a result of which he was again found to be fit for military service on the basis that he was not suffering from any illness. He was assigned to Battalion no. 123 in Chieti, where he was subject to intensive physical and mental training, including in the use of firearms. 8. On 9 July 1994 the applicant was transferred to the provincial command unit in Aquila, where he remained until 30 December 1994. During this time, from 1 September to 2 November 1994 he temporarily formed part of its logistical battalion. While in Aquila the applicant was subjected to multiple punishments. According to the documentation presented, he was subjected to eight punishments between July and December, amounting to twenty-four days of confinement, including periods of solitary confinement, for reasons ranging from negligent care of his camp-bed area to failure to report to his supervisor, or informal behaviour towards his superior. During the time he spent with the logistical battalion he was hospitalised at least four times for medical care unrelated to his mental problems (see below). 9. On 30 December 1994 the applicant was transferred to Lecce, where a commander noted that the applicant suffered from nervous tics and twitches, difficulty in socialising and learning, and absent-minded behaviour. The commander ordered the applicant to undergo a specialised medical assessment to test his fitness to perform military service. 10. On 24 January 1995 he was admitted to hospital, where he was diagnosed with anxiety disorder and considered to be in a fragile state of mind. A medical report by the NHS of Tricase of 6 February 1995 considered that in his youth the applicant had suffered from affection-relational problems and learning difficulties. He was physically weak and insecure, had a low aptitude for learning and was prone to isolation, was dysfunctional and incapable of taking up responsibilities. Tests revealed that he was unable to perform assigned tasks, had difficulty orienting himself and impaired cognitive functions (a deficit in logic and memory). He was considered to have a slight intellectual deficit (an IQ of 67) and to be incapable of creating positive relationships with people. This inadequacy caused him to live military life with anxiety and fear of his fellow soldiers, who he considered were aggressive towards him, even if they had only been joking. The report considered that the longer he remained in military service, the more severe his anxiety would become, and his defensive attitude arising from his fears would intensify. 11. The applicant remained on medical leave for recovery purposes until April 1995, when, following a specialised assessment to determine his suitability for military service, on 8 April 1995 the applicant was found to suffer from “dysphoria and borderline personality [disorder]” and was discharged due to unfitness. 12. Following his discharge, the applicant underwent further medical examinations. A report by the NHS of Tricase of 20 October 1995 considered that the applicant no longer had a defensive attitude, nor was he suffering from dysphoria and nervous tics. He was still, however, insecure, prone to isolation, unstable and unwilling to take up responsibilities. Following the tests performed, the report concluded that the stressful situation, namely his military service, having ended, the applicant had slightly improved. However, he still displayed signs of intellectual deficit. 13. At the time a report by the applicant’s doctor (Dr Russo) considered that the applicant had fallen sick because of military service or that there was at least a causal link between the two. In consequence, on 13 January 1996 the applicant asked the Defence Ministry to pay damages under Law no. 416 of 1926 and presidential decree no. 686 of 1957. 14. In the course of the examination of his request for damages, on 30 September 1999 the Medical Commission of the Bari Military Hospital diagnosed the applicant with “obsessive-compulsive disorder” (“OCD”), which it considered was not a result of his military service. It opined that the mental infirmity at issue was a pre-existing condition. It did not appear that during his military service the applicant had been involved in any events or had to carry out any duties which, given their importance, duration and nature, could have seriously influenced the onset or progression of this mental health problem. It further considered the request to have been made out of time. 15. In the meantime the applicant had repeatedly asked the relevant authorities to provide him with a copy of the pertinent documents regarding the period in which he had served in the military to enable him to substantiate his claims. On 24 November 1999 he further asked the Lecce Military District to provide him with the administrative and health documents related to his case together with the minutes of the Medical Commission’s meeting in his respect. This request was repeated four times in the year 2000 and remained unanswered. 16. On 19 June 2000 the second instance Medical Commission of Bari confirmed the findings of the Medical Commission dated 30 September 1999. 17. On 11 July 2000 the Ministry of Defence rejected the applicant’s request for damages, noting that the Medical Commission (second instance) of the Command of the Naples Health Service had, on 19 June 2000, determined that the OCD from which the applicant suffered had not been caused by his military service. 18. According to a medical certificate submitted by the applicant to this Court, issued by the Maglie Local Health Centre (mental health department) on 29 July 1999, the applicant, who had been treated by the department since 1977 for a fragile state of mind, a low IQ, and OCD which had become chronic, had developed behavioural problems to the extent of violent outbursts towards his family following his military service. 19. On 21 July 2000 the applicant instituted proceedings before the Lecce Regional Administrative Tribunal (“TAR”) for the recognition of the causal link between his mental health problems and his compulsory military service, and in the event that the court considered his condition to be pre‑existing he asked it to ascertain the military’s liability for recruiting him and in consequence to make an award of damages in his favour. 20. On 4 August 2000 the applicant lodged an urgent request with the relevant authorities to access medical documents relating to the fitness-for-service examination prior to conscription, details about his time in the military – training, work, and so on, his disciplinary record, i.e. of the punishments endured, and a record of his hospital stays, an assessment by his commander of his personality and professionalism and all other relevant material held by the Military Administration. On 22 September 2000 he was informed that the unit in Aquila had been disbanded. He was further informed that he had spent twenty-three days in “consegna semplice” (a punishment prohibiting an individual from leaving the base) and one day of “consegna di rigore” (a punishment confining the individual to a specified area on the base) and that any further information had to be requested from the Lecce Recruiting Office. The applicant lodged a request with the Lecce Recruiting Office on 28 September 2000 and on 16 October 2000 the office replied, sending the applicant an excerpt containing his disciplinary record and noting that he had spent twenty-eight, rather than twenty-three, days in “consegna semplice”. No other documentation was sent to the applicant. Following further requests on 19 October 2000, the Lecce Recruiting Office sent the applicant the psycho-physical training file. 21. On 28 December 2002 the TAR appointed Dr S. as a court expert to ascertain the nature of the applicant’s infirmity and submit a report within sixty days. 22. Following an examination of the applicant, Dr S. failed to deliver the requisite report. Thus, on 30 January 2007, the applicant asked the TAR to replace the expert. 23. By a judgment filed in the relevant registry on 20 July 2007 the TAR, considering the applicant’s interlocutory request as an application for renewal (“rinnovo”), rejected the request, noting that for seven years the applicant had failed to solicit any action whatsoever. Considering that no more evidence was necessary, it proceeded to give judgment. It held that the two Medical Commissions had agreed about the source of the applicant’s infirmity and that it had resulted from a pre-existing condition. Indeed the first-instance Medical Commission had referred to a diagnosis of the applicant made in 1997 (when he had been admitted to hospital) which evidenced a fragile and vulnerable mental state. The court went on to note that it transpired that the medical examination of June 1994 to determine the applicant’s fitness for service had not been accurate, since it should already have transpired that the applicant was not entirely fit to take up military service. 24. On 9 July 2008 the applicant appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court (“CS”). He complained, inter alia, that: the outcome of the case had been illogical – even though the TAR had considered that his fitness-for-service examination had not been accurate it had failed to pronounce itself on any liability and to award damages; the TAR had considered the applicant’s interlocutory request for the replacement of the expert as an application for renewal, even though replacement of the expert was clearly due given the delay in performing his functions, leading to the court taking a decision to dismiss the action without the relevant information. 25. By a partial judgment of 19 January 2010, the CS considered that a specialised medical examination was indeed necessary to determine the connection, if any, between the applicant’s infirmity and his military service. It ordered that such an examination be carried out by the Defence Ministry’s Medical Board (Collegio Medico Legale della Difesa – the “Medical Board”), by means of a medical assessment in the presence of the applicant’s general practitioner, and that a report be submitted within thirty days. It appears from the documents that the Medical Board appointed for the applicant’s case was made up of four full members, three from the military and one from the State Police, and an external expert in neurology. 26. In June 2010 the Medical Board’s report was filed. Its findings took into consideration a report produced that year by an expert engaged by the applicant which he had been allowed to submit to the Board (before being submitted to the CS). The Medical Board’s report noted that when the applicant was discharged he had been suffering from dysphoria, anxiety disorder and borderline personality disorder and had been considered to suffer from slight intellectual disability. It confirmed the reports submitted by the Bari Medical Commissions and highlighted the relevance of the pre‑existing nature of the applicant’s condition, also noting that upon examination by the Bari Military Hospital’s Medical Panel on 30 September 1999 and at the date of the report in 2010 the applicant had been suffering from “chronic OCD, a slight degree of intellectual disability, displayed personality changes and was prone to have marginal traits”. It concluded that at the date of review, according to the information available, the infirmity could not be considered to have been the direct result of or aggravated by ordinary military service. 27. On an unspecified date the report of 6 May 2010 prepared by the applicant’s expert (Dr Russo) was filed with the court. It noted that the applicant, a mentally healthy subject upon undergoing medical assessments prior to being drafted, had never shown any symptoms of mental illness before conscription into the military service and it was only after repeated punishment that such traits had emerged. Therefore, even assuming that he was predisposed to mental health problems, it was evident that it was the treatment he had been subjected to during military service that had caused the emergence of the illness. The implications of military service were generally of great emotional impact and a source of stress, which for a person who was in a fragile state of mental health or predisposed to mental health problems, unlike in the case of a healthy person, could trigger mental illness. The applicant’s being away from his family and his inability to relate to colleagues and superiors, in the absence of the necessary psychological support and in view of the repeated punishments imposed on him, had caused him to develop dysphoria which had later evolved into chronic OCD. Thus, in the applicant’s case there had been a causal link between his mental health problems and his military service, or the latter had at least contributed to the development of his condition. 28. On 12 November 2010 the applicant filed pleadings contesting the findings of the Medical Board and arguing that its report could not be considered objective and impartial given its nature and composition, as it was an organ of the opposing party in the proceedings. He argued that there had been a lack of transparency in the production of the report, which was highlighted by the fact that he had recently become aware of other documents related to the case which had never been disclosed to him by the authorities, the substance of which had been reflected in the report. On 14 December the applicant made further oral pleadings. 29. By a judgment filed in the relevant registry on 4 February 2011 the CS rejected the applicant’s appeal, holding that the applicant’s infirmity was antecedent to his military service and that it had not been detectible during the examination in 1994, as had been established by the Medical Board. As to the failure to disclose documentation, it considered that such documentation did not relate to the period during which the applicant had carried out military service. In any event the crux of the applicant’s complaint had concerned the conclusions of the Medical Board’s report which did not accord with his claim. However, the CS considered that the report was not contradictory or illogical in itself and it had not ignored relevant facts. It followed that given that the CS (in its limited powers of judicial review of administrative acts) (in sede di legittimità) was not allowed to assess the merits of that report, the applicant’s challenge could not be upheld. In respect of the original medical examination to determine the applicant’s fitness for military service, the CS again adopted the findings of the Medical Board, which had considered that it was possible that the applicant’s health problems had not manifested themselves in the absence of particular stimuli.

8. The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in London. 9. The applicant, then aged sixteen years, was convicted of the murder of his grandmother on 12 October 1981. At his trial, he had unsuccessfully raised the defence of diminished responsibility, based on the fact that he had been addicted to glue sniffing for several years. He was sentenced to detention at Her Majesty’s Pleasure pursuant to section 53(1) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933. His tariff (the portion of sentence representing punishment and deterrence) was set at 10 years. 10. On 26 January 1994, the applicant, aged 29 years, was released on life licence. 11. No concerns arose with his supervising probation officer until in April 1997 the applicant told her that he had been having a sexual relationship with MM, a 16-year-old youth. MM was regarded as a vulnerable youth and had been provided with the support of a social worker following his involvement in a theft offence. 12. In June 1997, the applicant was arrested on suspicion of being in possession of prohibited drugs (namely, ecstasy tablets). He was taken to a police station and released on bail. His probation officer sent him a registered letter requesting him to meet her on 20 June 1997. He did not attend the meeting or make any contact by telephone until 23 June 1997, when he agreed to meet her the next day. 13. On 24 June 1997, however, the applicant made a suicide attempt, taking 30 paracetamol tablets. He was discharged from hospital on 25 June 1997. He met his probation officer on 26 June 1997 and agreed to meet her again on 1 July 1997. He failed to keep the appointment, telephoning to say that he had overslept. 14. On 2 July 1997, he met with his probation officer and Mr L. from the Community Drug and Alcohol Services. During this meeting, the applicant admitted that he had been using drugs (LSD, ecstasy and cannabis) since his release from prison and that his use of ecstasy was beyond his control. He obtained the drugs from friends or acquaintances who expected him to do favours for them in return. He stated that he was no longer having a sexual relationship with MM but that MM had been staying with him at his flat. He met with his probation officer again on 4 July 1997. 15. In her report of 4 July 1997, the probation officer stated: “Until October 1996 [the applicant’s] response to his Licence, in terms of reporting for appointments, had been exemplary and he appeared to have made good progress in settling into the community, via stable employment and the allocation of his own council flat. It would appear however, that his resignation from his job in September 1996 significantly impacted on the sense of structure and purpose he then had about his day to day life which he now admits he has since found difficult to attain. Until recently, his presentation during our meetings gave no cause for concern. However, he now reports that he had been less than honest about the changes in his functioning as he feared a recall to prison, particularly given his initial stability and progress. In addition to his now admitted drug use, it would appear that [the applicant’s] anxieties about his future are limited to: (a) his previous unsafe sexual practices and the possible consequences of this on his health; (b) his wish to have a long-term and supportive monogamous relationship; (c) his growing sense of loneliness and isolation despite a wide social network... and (d) a sense of stagnation about the course of his life, particularly in finding alternative employment to date, despite extensive efforts. These issues, alongside [the applicant’s] behaviour over the past month, clearly indicate that he is vulnerable and that close monitoring of his situation at this time is crucial.” 16. She concluded that he posed a risk to himself and that there are “no indications that he is a risk to the public in terms of dangerousness”. 17. On 4 July 1997, the Assistant Chief Probation Officer prepared a report that stated: “[The applicant] had demonstrated, and recently admitted, that his behaviour has been both self-destructive (through drug misuse, relationships with others and a suicide attempt) and that he posed a risk to a minor. ... The area of risk to the public stems from his relationship with a minor.” She noted that there had been an openness about long-standing problems and some degree of insight coming out of the crisis of recent weeks that suggested that the applicant could work on them. She concluded that a final recommendation was difficult given the area of risk to himself and proposed that a psychiatric report be prepared concerning his current level of functioning and future prognosis and specifically an assessment of self-harm. 18. On 11 July 1997, the Parole Board considered the applicant’s case and recommended his recall to prison. 19. On 21 July 1997, the Secretary of State accepted the recommendation, revoked the applicant’s licence and recalled him to prison. He was informed that the reasons for his recall were “1. You have recently disclosed that you have been misusing drugs since your release in 1994, and following your arrest in June [1997] there is also a possibility that you will be convicted of the possession of, and intent to supply, illegal drugs. 3. You have breached your licence conditions by not maintaining contact with your supervising officer in accordance with her instructions and by not being open and honest with her. 4. You attempted suicide. The Parole Board and the Secretary of State took the view that for your own safety and the safety of others it was inappropriate to allow you to remain at liberty.” 20. On 29 July and 5 August 1997, the applicant submitted written representations to the Parole Board concerning his recall to prison. He admitted inter alia that before his arrest in June 1997 he had been taking 10 to 20 ecstasy tablets a day and that he had not been honest about his drugs abuse with his probation officer. He stated that his relationship with MM was now platonic and that he had terminated sexual contacts on discovering that he was 16. He stated that he had not been involved in drug dealing and hoped to be able to deal with his drug problem, now it was out in the open, with the assistance of the probation service within the community. 21. On 5 September 1997, the Parole Board considered the applicant’s case. There was no oral hearing. It decided: “The index offence involved the brutal murder of [the applicant’s] grandmother, when he was 16. After constructive progress in prison, which included work on one of the key risk factors - drug abuse - he was released on licence in January 1994. In July 1997, [the applicant] was recalled to prison for drug misuse, including the possibility that he will be convicted of intention to supply, having a sexual association with a minor, breach of licence conditions and attempted suicide. The Panel has considered all the relevant reports and taken careful note of [the applicant’s] representations... In spite of the considerable attempts by the Local Probation Service to enforce [the applicant’s] licence, his behaviour in recent months demonstrates that he is at risk not just to himself but to other members of the community. Irrespective of whether [the applicant] is convicted of an offence, he has admitted extensive illegal drug abuse and the concerns about his sexual involvement with a minor were sufficient to merit a case conference. Furthermore, the incidents of self harm indicate the need for thorough psychiatric assessment. It is in the interests of public safety and [the applicant’s] longer term well being that the recall be confirmed. A full assessment of the factors underlying the breakdown of the licence needs to be made, together with plans to tackle what appears to be deep rooted problems of drug abuse and social isolation. The Panel noted that [the applicant] has shown a willingness to co-operate with Probation and has demonstrated an ability to comply with the terms of his licence. Twelve months should be sufficient time for him to be assessed to stabilise and to tackle the problems identified.” 22. On 14 October 1997, the applicant was informed that the Parole Board had considered his recall on the papers and upheld the decision to revoke his life licence. He was told that he would be informed of the date of the next review once the Crown Prosecution Service had made a decision regarding the case against him for drugs possession. 23. On 17 November 1997, the applicant was informed that the Crown Prosecution Service had decided not to prosecute him for the alleged drugs offence and that his case would be reviewed by the Parole Board in October 1998. 24. A number of reports were prepared to assist the Parole Board in the coming review. 25. In his report of 10 June 1998, Mr B., the Principal Case Officer stated: “[The applicant’s] misuse of illegal substances for many years remains a major risk concern. However he acknowledges this and had taken steps to challenge this issue. If he can display the same harmony in the community as he has in the custodial setting there is no purpose served by his retention in custody. However constructive supervision and support will initially be required.” 26. His probation officer stated in a report of 29 June 1998: “... provided that he is given the necessary support and receives sustained input to encourage his current anti-drugs attitude and drug-free status, he can safely be released into the community.” 27. In a report of 23 June 1998, a forensic psychologist noted that “the major risk factor contributing to his committing the original offence ... was drugs abuse”. 28. In July 1998, the applicant received his parole dossier. On seeking legal advice prior to his Parole Board review, the applicant was advised that the Prison Service had failed to apply the procedure applicable to his recall under the interim arrangements implemented pending the entry into force of the Crime Sentences Act 1997. He should under those administrative provisions have received an oral hearing concerning his recall, though this was not a statutory entitlement. 29. An application for legal aid for bringing judicial review proceedings was made on 16 July 1998 and legal aid granted on 7 September 1998. 30. On 9 September 1998, the Prison Service informed the applicant: “We have now looked into the circumstances surrounding the revocation of [the applicant’s] life licence in July 1997. While we accept that, due to an oversight, the procedures did not follow the interim arrangements for dealing with HMP detainees, there is, in our view, no question that [the applicant’s] recall to prison was or is in any way unlawful or invalid... Under the circumstances, we see no reason or justification for any declaration or order directing his release or authorising compensation.” 31. On 30 September 1998, the applicant applied for judicial review. Leave was granted on 6 October 1998. The full hearing of his case was not scheduled to take place until 1999. 32. An oral hearing was held by the Parole Board on 27 October 1998, at which the applicant was present and represented, following which it directed the applicant’s release. In its decision it stated: “In reaching its decision the panel took account of the following: (i) the absence of any violence or threat of violence since the index offence either in prison or when on licence for three and a half years; (ii) your acceptance of an inappropriate lifestyle when previously released on licence and your frank acknowledgement of your drug abuse during that time; (iii) the fact that since recall you have been drug free; (iv) reports of your increased maturity and strong motivation to keep clear of drugs and the drug scene in future; (v) the greater relevance of the proposed community based drugs rehabilitation and relapse prevention programme that is available through drug link; (vi) the agreement of the Inner London Probation Service to provide an approved probation hostel place for up to twelve weeks to assist in your reintroduction to the community and the help you will receive in obtaining employment; (vii) your acceptance of the need to be totally honest with your supervising probation officer in future...” 33. The applicant was released on 17 November 1998. 34. In advice dated 8 January 1999, counsel advised that since he had been released no further purpose could be served by continuing with the judicial review application. There was no prospect of obtaining any damages for the period spent in detention after recall. 35. On 6 March 1999, the judicial review proceedings were ended by a consent order. 36. On 21 December 1999, the applicant was again recalled to prison, following his arrest for possession of a Class A drug (ecstasy) and a Class B drug (cannabis). His recall was recommended by the Parole Board and he continues to be detained in prison on the recommendation of the Parole Board following periodic reviews of his case. He is currently detained in open prison and his next review is scheduled for December 2002.

9. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Cartigny, Switzerland. 10. The applicant and his wife, B., who was of Finnish origin, had two children, a boy T. born on 2 June 1987 and a girl A. born on 28 September 1989. The family lived together in Switzerland until 1993 when B. took the children to Finland where she took up residence with L. as her female partner. 11. On 10 June 1994, B. applied for divorce and for custody of the children. 12. On 10 October 1994 the parents reached an interim agreement whereby the children would stay in Finland with their mother for the moment and the applicant have the right to three supervised visits. 13. The applicant states that on 13 October 1994 he became aware that the children’s maternal grandmother had made a complaint to the social services against B.’s female partner, L., alleging that she had sexually abused A. There is some indication in the documents that the applicant may also have lodged a complaint on this ground. The criminal charges lodged against L. were later dismissed by the courts. 14. Meanwhile, it appears that the applicant took proceedings with a view to having the children returned to Switzerland under the Hague Convention. However, by decisions of the Court of Appeal dated 7 December 1994 and by the Supreme Court dated 15 June 1995, the applicant’s application for return was refused, principally on the ground that he had voluntarily entered into an interim agreement that the children remain in Finland with their mother. 15. On 20 August 1996, the District Court awarded sole custody of the children to the mother, finding that the children had lived with their mother in Finland since 1993 and that it was in their best interests to remain with her. On 8 July 1997, the Court of Appeal upheld this decision, as did the Supreme Court on 14 November 1997. 16. The applicant was however granted visiting rights. It appears that the children visited him in Switzerland during Easter and the summer of 1997 and met with him in Finland in 1998 (twice) and 1999 (three times). 17. On 30 August 1999, B., the mother, died. The children were then aged twelve and nine years respectively. 18. The applicant returned immediately to Finland. On 23 September 1999, he lodged a request that the children, still living with L., be placed in a foster home and that he be accorded visiting rights. 19. Applications for custody of the children were lodged by both L. and by the applicant. During October 1999, the children were interviewed twice by a team consisting of a child psychiatrist and two psychologists. They expressed their wish to stay with L. because they felt safe and were used to living with her. A. was reported as stating that she would like to meet the applicant occasionally but only when she wished, while T. was reported as stating that the applicant was not part of his family and that he neither wanted to meet him or live in Switzerland. 20. The applicant saw the children three times during September 1999 in supervised contact visits. There was another meeting outside the social workers’ premises. 21. In a Social Welfare Board report dated 26 October 1999, it was stated that, following the mother’s death, L.’s influence on the children had increased and the children turned to her for support. It was noted that the children were not able to act against L.’s will, because they were dependent on her at that time. Consequently, the children were in a state of conflict, as they were not allowed to like the applicant. The report considered that the lack of contact with their close relatives endangered the development of their identity. 22. On 21 December 1999, after oral hearings at which the applicant, L. and another 18 witnesses, including a number of social workers involved in the case, were heard, the District Court awarded custody to the applicant. It observed inter alia, that according to the evidence, L. had been involved in bringing up the children since their return to Finland. According to a number of social workers involved in the case, the applicant was considered fit to be a custodial parent as, for example, in dealing with conflicts he had always put the children’s best interests first. The meetings between the children had also gone well. It concluded that in fact both L. and the applicant were fit as custodians. 23. As regarded the views of the children, the District Court recalled that according to a statement of 23 February 1998 given by a social worker during previous proceedings, T.’s wishes were not entirely his own; he had been influenced by B., his mother. His wishes were in contradiction with what he had told the social worker about the meetings with the applicant which had taken place. The social worker had noted that the fact that B. did not want T. to travel to see the applicant was significant and pointed out that it would be very important for the children’s psychological development that they develop a more constructive view of the applicant. It recalled the evidence of a friend of B. and L., who had given evidence before the court, had stated that the children’s attitude towards the applicant had begun to be more positive from the summer of 1998, but that no meetings had taken place as from March 1999, apparently due to the fact that the children’s activities were given priority and the meetings with the applicant tended to be proposed at short notice. T. had told her that it would be alright to meet with the applicant if he could decide when. A. had told her that she would like to meet with the applicant some day, but not at that time. T.’s attitude towards meeting the applicant was therefore fairly positive. Following B.’s death, everything had changed when the applicant came to see his children. As he allegedly had said that the law would make the children move to live in Switzerland, they did not want to meet with him anymore. According to this witness, the children feared moving to Switzerland. 24. The District Court considered that T.’s attitude during the recent interviews was in contradiction with what had happened during the meetings with the applicant, which had all gone well. It found that none of the persons heard before the court had said that the children feared the applicant and concluded that, as the atmosphere in which the children had been living had obviously affected their wishes and hopes, it was not possible to analyse what their true views really were. Therefore, their expressed wishes could not be decisive when deciding the case. Noting that the case should be decided in accordance with the children’s best interests, it decided that, given the strained relations between L. and the applicant, custody should be awarded to the latter. It was evident that L. would not be able to encourage the relationship between the children and the applicant enabling them to stay in contact. Therefore, the District Court ordered that custody be awarded to the applicant. 25. Pending L.’s appeal against the decision, the enforcement of the order was suspended by the Court of Appeal on 22 December 1999. According to the evidence of various social workers, the children had reacted to his expressed intention of taking them to Switzerland by refusing to meet with him unless L. was present. The applicant allegedly refused to meet with the children under these terms. The applicant’s attempts to enforce contact visits also apparently failed due to the children’s refusal to see him. 26. On 3 April 2000, the Court of Appeal overturned the decision concerning the suspension and requested the Social Welfare Board and its Swiss counterpart to report on the case. During the period June-September 2000, pursuant to the court’s request, the children were interviewed five times by social workers, three times in the presence of L. and twice alone. The social workers’ efforts to arrange a meeting between the children and the applicant were unsuccessful due to the children’s opposition. It was reported by the social worker in later oral evidence that the children continued to express their wish to live with L. During the interviews, the children had turned to L. for support and been dependent on her. The children’s memories of the applicant were, however, good. Nothing suggested that the children would have had any reason to feel unsafe in the applicant’s company. According to one of the social workers at the meetings, the wishes that the children expressed were more dependent on the wishes of L. than their own will. According to the evidence given by other witnesses in the Court of Appeal, including other social workers, the children expressed their wish to be left alone and that they wanted to stay in Finland every time the applicant was brought up for discussion. They seemed to fear moving to Switzerland. 27. Meanwhile, it appears that the applicant applied to the District Court for its original order to be enforced. This request was refused on 31 August 2000. His appeal to the Court of Appeal was later rejected on 28 June 2001 as meanwhile it had reached a fresh decision in the case. An application by the applicant to have the children placed in a foster home away from L. was also dismissed by the Social Welfare Board on 5 April 2000 and his appeal rejected by the Administrative Court of Helsinki on 19 December 2000. 28. On 23 March 2001, after an oral hearing over four days during February and at which the applicant and L. were heard as well as eleven other witnesses from the District Court proceedings and four new witnesses, the Court of Appeal upheld the District Court’s judgment. It ordered that the children move to live with the applicant on 16 August 2001, after a transitional period during which the children could meet with the applicant one weekend per month and one week during the summer. 29. In its judgment, the Court of Appeal agreed that both L. and the applicant were fit to have custody: nothing suggested that they would not be fit. Given the ages of the children, it considered that their view had to be taken into account, but it was also evident that the strained relationship and litigation between the applicant and B., and later on L., had had influence on their view. It considered that the negative attitude towards meeting with the applicant was based on the fear of having to move to Switzerland. Nothing suggested that the children feared the applicant as such. Although the children were as mature as other children their age, they could not however be given the absolute right to decide on their future, particularly in light of their extremely difficult situation at that time. Notwithstanding the law on enforcement, the court did not consider that in deciding on custody it was bound to follow the opinion even of a child aged 12 or more. Concluding that the decision should be based on what was in their best interests, it found that the relationship between the children and the applicant was very important for a well-balanced development. It furthermore found that the fact that the applicant had said that he would allow the children to keep in touch with L. was in the best interests of the children. While it was true that the children appeared closer to L. and their environment (including their home, school, hobbies and close personal relations) would stay the same if custody was awarded to L., the Court of Appeal concluded, nonetheless, that the children’s views did not correspond to their best interests. A situation which would lead the children and the applicant drift further apart was not in their best interests. Accordingly, it ordered that the applicant be awarded custody from 16 August 2001 after a transitional period of increased contact with the children. 30. The applicant visited Finland in March, April and May 2001, requesting visits with his children. On 30 March 2001, the applicant arrived in Helsinki and requested to see the children the same day. The social worker contacted L. to inform her of this and reported that the children refused. They allegedly wanted L. or another person to be present whereas the applicant refused any third party involvement. On only one occasion, in May 2001, did a visit take place when it was agreed between the parties that the children see the applicant at their maternal grandmother’s. However, only T. appeared, accompanied by a friend and one of L.’s lawyers. On this occasion, an incident occurred, the accounts of which vary but to which the police were called. T. subsequently informed his social worker that he was afraid of his father, who had tried, T. alleged, to keep him in the grandmother’s apartment by force and stated that he did not wish to see him again. The children did not appear at the next meeting in May 2001. They had already informed him that it would serve no purpose for him to come to Helsinki as they did not wish to see him. The social workers had several meetings with the children during this period and also made contact with their school seeking to persuade the children to attend therapy sessions. The children were recorded as stating that the applicant only made critical comments and demands and held strong views that they did not wish to live their friends and the environment they knew and that they did not trust their father. T. stated that he feared that his father would attempt to force them to leave Finland. 31. L. applied for leave to appeal. On 20 June 2001, the Supreme Court granted L. leave to appeal and suspended the enforcement of the Court of Appeal’s order. L. applied for an oral hearing, requesting that the parties, and possibly also the children, be heard. In his submissions to the Supreme Court in reply, the applicant applied for interim visiting rights and for the current psychological state of the children to be examined. He also requested that if L.’s request for an oral hearing was granted the Supreme Court should rehear the evidence presented before the lower courts. 32. On 19 October 2001, the Supreme Court gave judgment on the outstanding issues (Supreme Court Reports 2001:110). It re-iterated that it had rejected the request for an interim order as being purposeless and the request for a psychological examination as being unnecessary. It also rejected the request for an oral hearing as unnecessary in the circumstances and for the reasons set out in its judgment. 33. The Supreme Court recalled that, according to the Custody Act, the issue of custody had to be decided with regard to the child’s best interests and that if the custodial parent of the children died, custody could be given either to the other parent or to another person, depending on where the best interests of the child lay. It agreed with both the lower courts that the applicant and L. were both fit to act as custodians. Both children however had said that they wanted to stay in the environment which they knew and with L. Their views had been thoroughly examined before both the District Court and the Court of Appeal and although the conflict between the adults had apparently disturbed the relationship between the children and the applicant, there was nothing to suggest that their wish to remain with L. was not their own independent opinion, in particular given their age and maturity. 34. The Supreme Court referred to section 2 of the Act on the Enforcement of Decisions concerning Custody and Access Rights and recalling that T. was 14 and A. was 12, found that a custody decision which required the children to move would not be possible to enforce. Having regard to the purpose of awarding custody, it would not be in the children’s best interests to issue a custody order to a parent to whom they could not be transferred against their will. As the relations between the applicant and L. were bad, there was no reason to consider that it would be possible for the applicant to have custody while they continued to live with L. as that would render it impossible to take practical decisions concerning the children’s lives. In the circumstances of this case, it was therefore not in the best interests of the children to transfer custody to the applicant against their will but custody should be awarded instead to the person with whom they were currently living. 35. The Supreme Court went on to remark that future contact visits could be carried out under agreement or court order but that given the age of the children it would be dependent on their willingness to see the applicant. It underlined that according to the Custody Act, the custodian of children was under an obligation to co-operate in order to promote and maintain relationships between children and a parent. It did not make any order on the point. The applicant had not made any application in that regard. 36. The Supreme Court therefore overturned the decisions of the lower courts and awarded custody to L. 37. On 16 April 2002, the Administrative Court of Helsinki dismissed the applicant’s renewed request for the children to be placed in a foster home.

5. The applicants were born in 1969 and 1965 respectively and live in Chişinău. 6. The applicant was a police officer from 1991 to 2012, when he retired. 7. On 27 February 2008 the Chișinău Court of Appeal delivered a judgment obliging the Chișinău municipality to provide him and his family with social housing. The court concluded that the applicant had been entitled to social housing under Article 35 (1) of the Law on Police Forces. This judgment was upheld by the Supreme Court of Justice on 11 June 2008 and became final on the same day. Enforcement proceedings were instituted on 10 April 2008. 8. Between 2008 and 2012 he lodged numerous complaints about the failure to enforce the judgment in his favour to no avail. The judgment of 27 February 2008 of the Chișinău Court of Appeal has not been enforced to date. 9. The applicant was a police officer from 1988 to 2005, when he retired. 10. On 6 May 2008 the Chișinău Court of Appeal delivered a judgment obliging the Chișinău municipality to provide him and his family with social housing. The court noted that the applicant had retired from the police force in 2005 and concluded that he had been entitled to social housing under Article 35 (1) of the Law on Police Forces. This judgment was upheld by the Supreme Court of Justice on 23 July 2008 and became final on the same day. 11. Enforcement proceedings were instituted on 16 June 2008. The judgment of 6 May 2008 of the Chișinău Court of Appeal has not been enforced to date.

5. The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Ljubljana. 6. At an undetermined time, he invented a type of fish bait and secured a patent for production of this bait. On 17 September 1992 the applicant and J.Z. made a contract to engage in production of fish baits. On 24 March 1993 the applicant removed some of the production material and tools from J.Z.'s premises where the production had been taking place. On 7 April 1993 J.Z. requested the applicant to sell him the patent for the bait, if he wished to keep their business relationship active. On 16 April 1993 the applicant made an offer to J.Z. to sell him the patent, which the latter refused. On 26 April 1993 the applicant informed J.Z. that he wished to end their business relationship by cancelling the contract of co-operation, but the latter refused. 7. On 23 April 1993 J.Z. lodged a nuisance claim in the Ljubljana Basic Court, Ljubljana Unit (Temeljno sodišče v Ljubljani, Enota v Ljubljani) against the applicant and also sought an interim measure prohibiting the applicant to use or alienate any means for production of fish baits. On 7 June 1993 the court upheld J.Z.'s request for an interim measure in part. On 14 June 1993 the applicant replied to the claim and also appealed against the order issuing the interim measure. J.Z. cross-appealed. Until 14 June 1994 the court held six hearings. On that day, the court partially stayed the proceedings because J.Z. had withdrawn the request for an interim measure in part. The court also allowed the applicant's appeal and annulled its decision of 7 June 1993. J.Z. appealed against this decision to the Ljubljana Higher Court (Višje sodišče v Ljubljani). On 28 June 1994 the Convention took effect with respect to Slovenia. On 21 July 1994 the Ljubljana Higher Court dismissed the appeal concerning the interim measure. On 1 January 1995, following the reform of the Slovenian judicial system, the Ljubljana District Court (Okrožno sodišče v Ljubljani) gained jurisdiction in the case which was still pending in the first-instance court in the part referring to the nuisance claim. On 20 June 1995 the court upheld J.Z.'s nuisance claim. The judgment was served on the applicant on 15 November 1995. 8. On 22 November 1995 the applicant appealed to the Ljubljana Higher Court. On 9 July 1996 the court allowed the appeal and remitted the case to the first-instance court for re-examination. 9. On 10 December 1996 the Ljubljana District Court held a hearing which was adjourned sine die. On 10 February 1997, after the applicant had instituted proceedings against the Republic of Slovenia due to excessive length of proceedings (see below §§ 11-14), the applicant requested that the case be transferred to a new court in order to secure the impartiality of the adjudicator. After his request was dismissed by the Supreme Court (Vrhovno sodišče) on 29 October 1997, he sought a recusal of the first-instance court's judge presiding over the case. Also this request was dismissed, ultimately, by the deputy of the President of the Ljubljana District Court on 1 September 1999. On 8 March 2000 the court held a hearing. On 5 April 2000 the applicant filed preliminary written observations and adduced evidence. On 5 April 2000 the court held a hearing and rejected J.Z.'s claim. 10. On 14 June 2000 J.Z. appealed to the Ljubljana Higher Court. On 7 July 2000 the applicant lodged a reply to the appeal. On 8 January 2002 the court dismissed both appeals. 11. On 27 January 1997 the applicant instituted civil proceedings in the Ljubljana District Court against the Republic of Slovenia seeking damages in the amount of 34,740,000 Slovenian tolars (approximately 145,000 euros) for damages sustained due to excessive length of proceedings concerning the nuisance claim and interim measure. On 21 April 1998 the applicant filed preliminary written observations, raised his claim and requested that a date be set for a hearing. On 8 January 1998 the court held a hearing. On 14 December 1998 the court rejected the applicant's claim holding that the judge in charge of the case in the first-instance, conducted the proceedings in accordance with the legislation in force. The decision was served on the applicant on 15 March 1999. 12. On 29 March 1999 the applicant appealed to the Ljubljana Higher Court. On 16 June 1999 the court dismissed the appeal. The judgment was served on the applicant on 9 July 1999. 13. On 28 July 1999 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court. On 20 April 2000 the court dismissed the appeal. 14. On 30 June 2000 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. On 11 June 2001 the Constitutional Court (Ustavno sodišče) declared the case inadmissible as it was manifestly ill-founded. The decision was served on the applicant on 10 July 2001.

9. The applicants were born in 1986 and 1979 respectively and live in Saint-Josse-ten-Noode (a district of the Brussels-Capital region). 10. The applicants are brothers who live with their parents, their brother and two sisters next to the local police station of Saint-Josse-ten-Noode. They both complained that they had been slapped in the face by police officers – which allegation is disputed by the Government – one on 8 December 2003 and the other on 23 February 2004. They submitted that those events had taken place against a background of tense relations between their family and certain officers in the police station. 11. The applicants submitted that on 8 December 2003, at around 4 p.m., the first applicant had been standing with a friend in the street outside the door of the building where he lived with his family and, since he had forgotten his keys, had been ringing the bell so that his parents would let him in, when a plain-clothes policeman, A.Z., had asked him to show him his identity card. The first applicant had refused to comply, asking the officer to show him his credentials. The officer had then grabbed him by his jacket – tearing it – and taken him to the police station. The first applicant had been placed in a room and, while he was alone with A.Z., the officer had slapped him in the face as he was protesting about his arrest. 12. The applicants provided a certificate issued at 7.20 p.m. on the same day by a general practitioner attesting that the first applicant had been “in a state of shock” and had presented the following injuries: “erythema on the left cheek (disappearing)” and “erythema on the left-side external auditory canal”. 13. The Government submitted that, on account of the first applicant’s refusal to show him his identity card, Officer A.Z. had had no choice but to take him to the police station for identification. The first applicant had then caused a scene, claiming to have suffered an injustice and been subjected to an unlawful identity check, and had insulted an officer who was telling him to calm down. He had been allowed to leave the police station once his identity had been verified and after being informed by A.Z. that a police report would be filed against him for forceful resistance to a public officer, abusive behaviour and verbal threats. He had returned to the police station a few minutes later with his parents, accusing A.Z. of having struck him, but the officer had always denied this. 14. At 6 p.m. A.Z. had lodged a criminal complaint against the first applicant, alleging forceful resistance to a public officer, abusive behaviour and verbal threats. The record drawn up on that occasion showed that A.Z. had notified his superiors of the events at 5.30 p.m., as well as a certain Superintendent K. 15. The applicants indicated that on 23 February 2004, between 9.44 a.m. and 10.20 a.m. (as shown by the record of the second applicant’s questioning), while the second applicant was at the Saint-Josse-ten-Noode police station and Officer P.P. was interviewing him about an altercation involving him and his mother together with a third party (and about which the latter had filed a complaint), P.P. had slapped him in the face after asking him not to lean on his desk. He had then forced him to sign his statement by threatening to put him in a cell. 16. The applicants provided a medical certificate issued on the same day by a general practitioner, who observed “bruising [on the] left cheek” of the second applicant. The certificate did not specify the time at which it had been drawn up, although it must have been before 11.20 a.m., the time at which it was presented to the Standing Committee for the oversight of police services (known as “Committee P” – see paragraph 25 below). 17. The Government explained that the second applicant had been very arrogant during his interview: slouching in his chair, leaning casually on P.P.’s desk, laughing without any reason and giving pithy answers to questions. He had also had his statement changed several times, saying that the police were paid to do that, and had threatened the officers on leaving by shouting that they would be hearing from him again. The Government emphasised that, in spite of the attitude shown by the second applicant, who had clearly been intent on conflict, P.P. had remained calm and patient. 18. In the applicants’ submission, their family had been harassed by the Saint-Josse-ten-Noode police force. They stated that the problems had begun in 1999, when one of the officers had suspected N. of deliberately scratching his car. N. had subsequently been charged with threatening the same officer and committing robberies, on which charges he had been acquitted by the Brussels Youth Court on 21 April 2000. According to the applicants, the case against him had been entirely fabricated by members of the Saint-Josse-ten-Noode police force by way of reprisal. 19. They added that on 24 June 1999 the first applicant, then aged 13, had been “beaten” by another police officer in the police station, where he had been taken following a fight in the street. He had sustained a perforated eardrum. His mother and one of his sisters, who had been in the waiting room, had been shaken and manhandled by police officers. 20. On 25 November 1999 one of their sisters had been verbally abused by an officer of the Saint-Josse-ten-Noode police force, and on 11 March 2000 their brother, N., had been searched, jostled and verbally abused by police officers. 21. They further stated that in 2000 a “case ... initiated by the Saint‑Josse-ten-Noode police force had been opened against N. and entrusted to an investigating judge”, but the proceedings had been discontinued. In the same year the second applicant had been “wanted for questioning” and, even though the Saint-Josse-ten-Noode police force had announced on 23 July 2002 that he was being taken off the relevant “wanted” list, he had still had to make various applications to the prosecutor’s office and wait until March 2005 for the process to be completed, causing him a great deal of inconvenience. 22. On 6 April 2001 and 12 July 2001 respectively, N. and the second applicant had been verbally abused by officers of the Saint-Josse-ten-Noode police force. 23. The applicants explained that they had systematically reported to the judicial authorities or police all the incidents of which they had been victims, and had filed complaints. 24. At 9.42 a.m. on 9 December 2003 the first applicant filed a complaint with Committee P and was interviewed by a member of the investigation department. A copy of the medical certificate drawn up the previous day was appended to the initial record. 25. The second applicant followed suit at 11.20 a.m. on 23 February 2004. He indicated in particular that he considered that the “general attitude of the Saint-Josse-ten-Noode police force vis-à-vis [his] family [had become] absolutely intolerable and excessive to the point [where they had envisaged] moving house”. A copy of the medical certificate drawn up the same day was appended to the initial record. 26. The applicants’ mother was also interviewed on 23 February 2004 by the investigation department of Committee P in relation to the second applicant’s complaints. She pointed out that as soon as they had returned home she had called Superintendent K. (see paragraph 14 above) to ask him to persuade P.P. to apologise. Superintendent K. had immediately come to their house, where he had found himself in the company of the physician who had drawn up the medical certificate. The applicants’ mother also filed a complaint, indicating, moreover, that she herself had been treated with scant respect by Officer P.P. 27. On 5 May 2004 Officer P.P. was interviewed by the director of internal oversight of the local police force in relation to the complaints by the second applicant and his mother. P.P. stated in particular that the second applicant had been particularly disrespectful towards him during his interview and that, although he had grabbed the youth by the arm to make him leave the office, he had not slapped him in the face. 28. On 17 June 2004 the applicants applied to intervene as civil parties in respect of charges of harassment, arbitrary interference with fundamental freedoms, abuse of authority, arbitrary arrest and wounding with intent. They gave an overview of all their difficulties with the Saint‑Josse‑ten‑Noode police force, and expressly stated that they wished to intervene as civil parties in relation to the events of 8 December 2003 and 23 February 2004. 29. Officers A.Z. and P.P. were charged with using violence against individuals in the course of their duties and, in particular, with intentional wounding or assault, and with engaging in arbitrary acts in breach of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. 30. On 26 June 2004 an investigating judge of the Brussels Court of First Instance gave directions to the investigation department of Committee P asking it to take note of the applicants’ civil-party application, to interview them in order to ascertain the details of their complaint, to draft a report on the conduct of the Bouyid family, to draw up a list of the cases brought against them and complaints filed by them, and to explain what action had been taken in that connection. 31. Having regard to the fact that it had already taken testimony from the applicants when they had filed their respective complaints (see paragraphs 24-25 above), the investigation department of Committee P decided not to interview them again. On 26 July 2004 it forwarded a report to the investigating judge, based on the documents from the internal oversight department of the police district covering Saint-Josse-ten-Noode, describing developments in the relations between the applicants’ family and the local police force. The report then listed the cases against the family, noting in this connection that the first applicant had been implicated in proceedings opened in December 2003 for abusive and threatening behaviour and for obstructing a police officer, and N. in seven sets of proceedings opened between October 1997 and June 1999. It then noted that, in addition to the applicants’ complaints in issue in the present case, three judicial complaints had been filed by members of their family (two with Committee P, in June 1999 and July 2001, and one with the “Youth Division” in 1999) and two complaints had been dealt with by the internal oversight department of the police district covering Saint-Josse-ten-Noode. Lastly, citing a report drawn up in the context of a case against the first applicant and the findings of administrative inquiries, it noted the problematic nature of the relations between the local police and the Bouyid family and commented on the “general behaviour” of the latter, observing as follows. “In sum, according to the police officers, the Bouyid family (especially the women and the mother in particular) apparently refuse to admit that the children of the family bear any responsibility for the abusive conduct in question. The children are thus supported in their behaviour by this protective attitude. More generally, the family members are said to behave aggressively and provocatively towards the police. Following the incidents involving police officer [B.], a dialogue facilitator apparently failed in an attempt at reconciliation, owing to an intransigent attitude on the part of the women in the Bouyid family. In 1999 and 2000 the situation required the appointment of a police cadet as a mediator for this family.” 32. On 3 August 2004 the investigating judge decided to close the investigation and sent the file to the prosecuting authorities. 33. On 16 November 2004 Officer A.Z. was interviewed by a member of the investigation department of Committee P about the events of 8 December 2003. He stated in particular that he had not previously known the first applicant when he had taken him to the Saint-Josse-ten-Noode police station that particular day. 34. In an application of 10 November 2005, the Crown Prosecutor called for the discontinuance of the case on the ground that “the judicial investigation [had] not established that the facts constituted a serious or petty offence and [had] not adduced any evidence that would justify the taking of further measures”. 35. The applicants were informed that the case file would be finalised before the Committals Division of the Brussels Court of First Instance on 2 March 2006. On 1 March 2006 they sent an application to the investigating judge seeking twenty additional investigative measures. That request resulted in the adjournment sine die of the case before the Committals Division. 36. On 7 March 2006 the investigating judge ordered two of the requested measures and rejected the remainder of the application on the grounds that it concerned facts that predated the events referred to him and that the measures sought were not necessary for establishing the truth. Consequently, recapitulating all their complaints against the Saint‑Josse‑ten‑Noode police force, the applicants and other members of their family sent the investigating judge a request for an “extension of civil-party status”, but it was rejected. The two additional measures were put into effect on 25 April, 15 May and 24 May 2006. 37. In an order of 27 November 2007, the Committals Division, endorsing the grounds set out in the Crown Prosecutor’s application, discontinued the proceedings. 38. The applicants appealed against that order. 39. In an application of 3 December 2007, the Principal Crown Prosecutor requested that the discontinuance order be upheld. 40. On 5 February 2008 the applicants and other members of their family filed a complaint as civil parties in respect of all the facts that the investigating judge had considered not to have been referred to him (see paragraphs 43-44 below). 41. On 9 April 2008 the Indictments Division of the Brussels Court of Appeal, after refusing to join the case concerning the events of 8 December 2003 and 23 February 2004 to the new case that had been opened after the civil-party complaint of 5 February 2008, upheld the discontinuance order in a judgment that read as follows. “... The facts of the case can be summarised as follows: – On 8 December 2003 the defendant [A.Z.] is alleged to have engaged in illegal police conduct against the civil party Saïd Bouyid, described by the latter as follows: police officer [A.Z.], on stopping him outside his house, allegedly grabbed him by his jacket and tore it; he was then taken to the police station close by, where the same officer allegedly slapped him on the face with his right hand. – On 23 February 2004 the defendant [P.P.] is alleged to have engaged in illegal police conduct against the civil party Mohamed Bouyid, described by the latter as follows: on stopping his car in front of his house so that his mother could take out her shopping, he had a row with the driver of the car behind; he was summoned to the police station following a complaint by that driver; during the interview, Mohamed Bouyid was allegedly slapped by the defendant [P.P.] (see the medical certificate issued by Dr ...), who threatened to put him in a cell if he did not sign his statement, when in fact he wanted to change it. – The Bouyid family have apparently encountered great difficulties with certain members of the Saint-Josse-ten-Noode police force since March 1999, when police officer [B.] suspected [N.] Bouyid of having scratched his car, giving rise to a certain degree of tension and to persecution of this family by the police. – There is said to be constant provocation on the part of the police of Saint-Josse-ten-Noode making the life of the Bouyid family unbearable. Both the police’s internal oversight department for the police district [concerned] and the investigation department of Committee P conducted an in-depth investigation into the facts complained of by the civil parties. It transpires from all the findings of the judicial investigation, and in particular from the inconsistent statements of the parties in question, that there is no evidence against the defendants such as to justify their committal on the charges listed in the submissions of the Principal Crown Prosecutor, in respect of the period in which the offences were said to have been committed. The statements of the defendants, who deny the charges, are consistent; it is appropriate in this connection to refer to the detailed report concerning the general conduct of the civil parties’ family drawn up by Committee P, which sheds light on the general context of the case. The civil parties have not adduced before the court, sitting as the Indictments Division, any new, relevant and convincing information not previously brought to the attention of the court below and capable of revealing the slightest evidence against the defendants that might justify their committal for trial. Moreover, the judicial investigation did not bring to light sufficient evidence to show that a criminal offence had been committed by the defendants at the time of the incidents in which they were allegedly implicated. In addition, it does not appear from the case file that the provisions of section 37 of the Law of 5 August 1992 on police duties have not been complied with. As emphasised by the submissions of both the Crown Prosecutor of 10 November 2005 and those of the Principal Crown Prosecutor, and by the decision of the Committals Division, the facts of the present case do not constitute a serious or petty criminal offence. ...” 42. An appeal on points of law lodged by the applicants – relying in particular on Articles 3, 6 and 13 of the Convention – was dismissed on 29 October 2008 by the Court of Cassation. 43. On 5 February 2008 six members of the Bouyid family, including the two applicants, had filed a civil-party complaint with an investigating judge of the Brussels Court of First Instance concerning all their accusations against the Saint-Josse-ten-Noode police officers, in particular relating to facts that predated the events of 8 December 2003 and 23 February 2004. 44. The civil-party complaint led to the appearance of six officers before the Brussels Court of First Instance, hearing the case on the merits. In a judgment of 30 May 2012, the court declared that the prosecution of the relevant offences was time-barred. It does not appear from the file that an appeal was lodged against that judgment. 45. The Preamble to the 26 June 1945 Charter of the United Nations affirms the determination of the peoples of the United Nations “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small”. The concept of dignity is also mentioned in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10 December 1948, the Preamble to which states that “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world”, and Article 1 of which provides that “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights”. 46. Many subsequent international human rights texts and instruments refer to this concept, including: (a) the UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 20 November 1963, which “solemnly affirms the necessity of speedily eliminating racial discrimination throughout the world, in all its forms and manifestations, and of securing understanding of and respect for the dignity of the human person”, and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 21 December 1965 (ratified by Belgium), the Preamble to which refers to that Declaration; (b) the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 16 December 1966 (both ratified by Belgium), the Preamble to which states that the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family “derive from the inherent dignity of the human person”. Furthermore, Article 10 of the former provides that “all persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person”, and Article 13 of the latter states that the “States Parties ... recognize the right of everyone to education ... [and] agree that education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and the sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms ...”; (c) the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 18 December 1979 (ratified by Belgium), the Preamble to which emphasises in particular that discrimination against women “violates the principles of equality of rights and respect for human dignity”; (d) the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 10 December 1984 (ratified by Belgium), the Preamble to which points out that the “equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family ... derive from the inherent dignity of the human person”; (e) the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989 (ratified by Belgium), the Preamble to which states that “the child should be fully prepared to live an individual life in society, and brought up in the spirit of the ideals proclaimed in the UN Charter, and in particular in the spirit of peace, dignity, tolerance, freedom, equality and solidarity” (see also Articles 23 § 1, 28 § 2, 37, 39 and 40 § 1); (f) the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (Articles 19 § 2 and 24 § 5 (c)) (ratified by Belgium); (g) the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (ratified by Belgium), the Preamble to which states that “discrimination against any person on the basis of disability is a violation of the inherent dignity and worth of the human person”, and the aims of which include promoting respect for the “inherent dignity” of persons with disabilities (Article 1), this being also one of its general principles (Article 3 (a)) (see also Articles 8 (a), 16 § 4, 24 § 1 and 25); (h) the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on the abolition of the death penalty of 15 December 1989 (ratified by Belgium), the Preamble to which expresses the conviction that “abolition of the death penalty contributes to enhancement of human dignity and progressive development of human rights”; (i) the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a communications procedure of 19 December 2011 (ratified by Belgium), the Preamble to which reaffirms “the status of the child as a subject of rights and as a human being with dignity and with evolving capacities”; (j) the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 10 December 2008 (ratified by Belgium) and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 6 October 1999 (ratified by Belgium). 47. Several regional human rights texts and instruments also refer to the concept of dignity, including the following: (a) the American Convention on Human Rights of 22 November 1969 (Articles 5 § 2, 6 § 2 and 11 § 1); (b) the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe of 1 August 1975, which stipulates that the States “will promote and encourage the effective exercise of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other rights and freedoms all of which derive from the inherent dignity of the human person and are essential for his free and full development” (Principle VII); (c) the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights of 27 June 1981, Article 5 of which lays down that “[e]very individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being and to the recognition of his legal status”; (d) the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine of 4 April 1997 (which Belgium has not signed), the Preamble to which affirms, inter alia, “the need to respect the human being both as an individual and as a member of the human species and ... the importance of ensuring [his] dignity”; (e) the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000, the Preamble to which affirms that being “[c]onscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity”, and Article 1 of which states that “[h]uman dignity is inviolable [and] must be respected and protected” (see also Article 31 on “Fair and just working conditions”); (f) Protocol No. 13 to the European Convention on Human Rights concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances of 3 May 2002 (ratified by Belgium), the Preamble to which points out that the abolition of the death penalty is essential for the protection of everyone’s right to life and for the full recognition of the “inherent dignity of all human beings”; (g) the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings of 16 May 2005 (ratified by Belgium), the Preamble to which emphasises that “trafficking in human beings constitutes a violation of human rights and an offence to the dignity and the integrity of the human being” (see also Articles 6 and 16). 48. In a document entitled “CPT standards” (CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1 – Rev. 2015), the CPT stated the following. “97. Bearing in mind its preventive mandate, the CPT’s priority during visits is to seek to establish whether juveniles deprived of their liberty have been subjected to ill-treatment. Regrettably, deliberate ill-treatment of juveniles by law-enforcement officials has by no means been eradicated and remains a real concern in a number of European countries. CPT delegations continue to receive credible allegations of detained juveniles being ill-treated. The allegations often concern kicks, slaps, punches or blows with batons at the time of apprehension (even after the juvenile concerned has been brought under control), during transportation or subsequent questioning in law-enforcement establishments. It is also not uncommon for juveniles to become victims of threats or verbal abuse (including of a racist nature) whilst in the hands of law-enforcement agencies. ... 126. ... In a number of [juvenile detention centres] visited by the CPT, it was not uncommon for staff to administer a so-called ‘pedagogic slap’ or other forms of physical chastisement to juveniles who misbehaved. In this regard, the CPT recalls that corporal punishment is likely to amount to ill-treatment and must be strictly prohibited.” The CPT also noted the following in its ninth general activity report (CPT/Inf (99) 12), dated 30 August 1999: “24. In a number of other establishments visited [where juveniles were deprived of their liberty], CPT delegations have been told that it was not uncommon for staff to administer the occasional ‘pedagogic slap’ to juveniles who misbehaved. The Committee considers that, in the interests of the prevention of ill-treatment, all forms of physical chastisement must be both formally prohibited and avoided in practice. Inmates who misbehave should be dealt with only in accordance with prescribed disciplinary procedures.” 49. In its report to the Belgian Government on its visit to Belgium from 18 to 27 April 2005 (CPT/Inf (2006) 15, 20 April 2006) the CPT stated, among other things. “11. On the basis of all the information obtained during the visit, the CPT has come to the conclusion – as it did following its first three visits to Belgium – that the risk of a person being ill-treated by law-enforcement officers while in detention cannot be dismissed. Accordingly, the CPT recommends that the Belgian authorities continue to be vigilant in this area and make a special effort in the case of juveniles who have been deprived of their liberty. The CPT further recommends that law-enforcement officers be given an appropriate reminder at regular intervals that any form of ill-treatment of persons deprived of their liberty – including insults – is unacceptable, that any information regarding alleged ill-treatment will be properly investigated, and that anyone responsible for such treatment will be severely punished. 12. More specifically, concerning allegations of ill-treatment by law-enforcement officers when arresting a suspect, the CPT has repeatedly noted that this process undeniably represents a difficult and dangerous task at times, in particular when the person concerned resists or the law-enforcement officers have good reason to believe that the person poses an imminent threat. However, the use of force when making an arrest must be kept to what is strictly necessary; furthermore, there can never be any justification for striking apprehended persons once they have been brought under control.” The CPT’s report on its visit to Belgium from 28 September to 7 October 2009 (CPT/Inf (2010) 24, 23 July 2010) contains the following passage in particular: “13. In the course of its visits to police stations, the CPT delegation met only a few people who were deprived of their liberty. Nevertheless, while visiting prisons, it met a large number of people who had recently been in police custody. The majority of the detainees who spoke to the delegation did not report any instances of deliberate physical ill-treatment during their time in police custody. However, the delegation heard a limited number of allegations of excessive use of force (such as blows inflicted after the person had been brought under control, or excessively tight handcuffing) in the course of an arrest (particularly in Brussels, Charleroi and Marcinelle). As the CPT has often acknowledged, arresting a suspect is undeniably a difficult and dangerous task at times, in particular when the person concerned resists or the police have good reason to believe that the person poses an imminent threat. Nevertheless, the CPT recommends that police officers be reminded that when making an arrest, the use of force must be kept to what is strictly necessary; furthermore, there can never be any justification for striking apprehended persons once they have been brought under control.” 50. In its Recommendation Rec(2001)10 on the European Code of Police Ethics adopted on 19 September 2001, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe stated its conviction that “public confidence in the police is closely related to their attitude and behaviour towards the public, in particular their respect for the human dignity and fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual as enshrined, in particular, in the European Convention on Human Rights”. It recommended that the governments of member States be guided in their internal legislation, practice and codes of conduct of the police by the principles set out in the European Code of Police Ethics appended to the Recommendation, with a view to their progressive implementation and the widest possible circulation of the text. 51. The Code states in particular that one of the main purposes of the police is to protect and respect the individual’s fundamental rights and freedoms as enshrined, in particular, in the Convention (paragraph 1). In the section on “Guidelines for police action/intervention” it stipulates that “[t]he police shall not inflict, instigate or tolerate any act of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under any circumstances” (paragraph 36) and that they “may use force only when strictly necessary and only to the extent required to obtain a legitimate objective” (paragraph 37). Furthermore, “in carrying out their activities, [they] shall always bear in mind everyone’s fundamental rights” (paragraph 43) and “police personnel shall act with integrity and respect towards the public and with particular consideration for the situation of individuals belonging to especially vulnerable groups” (paragraph 44). 52. The Preamble to the International Convention on the Rights of the Child (“child” being defined in Article 1 as being “every human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier”) of 20 November 1989 (ratified by Belgium) refers to the above-mentioned declarations and emphasises that the need to afford special protection to the child has been recognised in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (particularly in Articles 23 and 24), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (particularly in Article 10) and the relevant statutes and instruments of the specialised institutions and international organisations concerned with child welfare. 53. Several subsequent international and regional texts are based on recognition of the need to take account of the vulnerability of minors. For instance, the Preamble to the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse of 25 October 2007 (ratified by Belgium) states that “every child has the right to such measures of protection as are required by his or her status as a minor, on the part of his or her family, society and the State”, the child being defined as “any person under the age of 18 years” (Article 3 (a)). Reference might also be made to Recommendation CM/Rec(2008)11 on the European Rules for juvenile offenders subject to sanctions or measures and Recommendation CM/Rec(2009)10 on integrated national strategies for the protection of children from violence, adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 5 November 2008 and 18 November 2009 respectively. The former instrument emphasises the extreme vulnerability of juveniles deprived of their liberty (Appendix to the Recommendation, § 52.1).The latter emphasises that “children’s fragility and vulnerability and their dependence on adults for the[ir] growth and development call for greater investment in the prevention of violence and protection of children on the part of families, society and the State”. Very recently the CPT highlighted the particular vulnerability of juveniles in the context of detention (24th General Report of the CPT, 2013-2014 (CPT/Inf (2015) 1), January 2015 – see paragraph 3 and, under “Juveniles deprived of their liberty under criminal legislation”, paragraphs 98 and 99).

4. The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Varaždin. 5. On 30 March 1988 the applicant brought a civil action in the Varaždin Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Varaždinu) against a certain J.V., seeking to recover possession of a house in Varaždin, claiming that the house had been donated to him. In his statement of claim (tužba) he indicated 1,000,000 former Yugoslav dinars (YUD) as the value of the subject matter of the dispute. 6. In his submission to the court of 1 March 2001 the applicant indicated that the value of the subject matter of the dispute was 101,000 Croatian kunas (HRK) and explained that he had adjusted the value in line with inflation, the change of currency (see paragraphs 20-22 below) and the increase of his claim. 7. On 25 September 2001 the applicant amended his claim, seeking also to register ownership of the house in his name in the land register. 8. On 5 July 2002 the Municipal Court ruled against the applicant. On 26 November 2002 the Varaždin County Court (Županijski sud u Varaždinu) dismissed an appeal (žalba protiv presude) by the applicant and upheld the first-instance judgment. 9. On 6 March 2003 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law (revizija protiv presude) against the second-instance judgment. On 26 March 2003 the Varaždin Municipal Court declared his appeal on points of law inadmissible ratione valoris because it considered that the value of the subject matter of the dispute was below the statutory threshold of HRK 100,000. It found that the value of the subject matter of the dispute indicated by the applicant in his statement of claim had been YUD 1,000,000, which, when converted into kunas, was HRK 1 (one kuna). 10. The applicant appealed against that decision (žalba protiv rješenja), arguing, inter alia, that in his submission of 1 March 2001 he had adjusted the value of the subject matter of the dispute and that the new value exceeded the statutory threshold of HRK 100,000. On 20 May 2003 the Varaždin County Court dismissed his appeal. It held that, pursuant to the Civil Procedure Act, the relevant value of the subject matter of the dispute was the one indicated by the plaintiff in the statement of claim and that subsequent changes were of no relevance. It also corrected the calculation of the first-instance court, stating that, when converted into kunas, the value of the subject matter of the dispute which the applicant had indicated in his statement of claim in fact amounted to only HRK 0.10 (ten lipas). 11. The applicant then lodged with the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) a procedural appeal on points of law (revizija protiv rješenja) against that decision. On 25 February 2004 the Supreme Court, sitting as a panel composed of judges B.G., V.P.R., I.M., P.M. and G.G., quashed the lower-instances' decisions of 26 March and 20 May 2003. It held that, while it was true that the relevant value of the subject matter of a dispute was the one indicated by the plaintiff in the statement of claim, that rule did not apply if the plaintiff subsequently amended his or her claim. Because, in the present case, the applicant did amend his claim in his submission of 25 September 2001, in which he also demanded costs corresponding to the new value of the subject matter of the dispute indicated in his previous submission of 1 March 2001, the Supreme Court concluded that the applicant's appeal on points of law of 6 March 2003 was admissible. The Supreme Court returned the case to the first-instance court in order to serve the applicant's appeal on points of law of 6 March 2003 to the respondent party for reply (section 390(1) of the Civil Procedure Act). The relevant part of the Supreme Court's decision read as follows: “I The plaintiff's appeal on points of law is well founded. Therefore, the decision of the Varaždin County Court, no. Gž-569/03 of 20 May 2003 and the decision of the Varaždin Municipal Court, no. P-274/92 of 26 March 2003 are hereby quashed and the case is remitted to the first-instance court for fresh proceedings. II The costs of the proceedings [incurred] in respect of this appeal on points of law shall be decided in a final decision. Reasons ... The appeal on points of law is well-founded. ... A decision on whether the appeal on points of law is well-founded depends on the resolution of the procedural question which value of the subject matter of the dispute is relevant. Section 40(2) of the Civil Procedure Act provides that when an action does not concern a sum of money, the relevant value shall be the value of the subject matter of the dispute indicated by the plaintiff in the statement of claim. Once the value of the subject matter of the dispute has been indicated in this way, the plaintiff is not allowed to change it in the subsequent course of the proceedings, except in a case in which the action has been amended, in which case instead of the value of the subject matter of the dispute indicated in the statement of claim, [the plaintiff] is authorised to indicate a new value of the subject matter of the dispute. In the case at issue, the following facts are important for determining the relevant value of the subject matter of the dispute and the admissibility of the appeal on points of law: 1. By the action of 13 May 1998 the plaintiff sought that a certain immovable property be handed over into his possession, and indicated 1,000,000 [former Yugoslav] dinars as the value of the subject matter of the dispute, [the amount of] which today equals 0,10 [Croatian] kunas; 2. In the submission of 1 March 2001 the plaintiff indicated a new value of the subject matter of the dispute in the amount of 101,000 [Croatian] kunas; 3. By the submission of 25 September 2001 the plaintiff amended the action by adding to the existing claim that a certain immovable property be handed over into his possession the claim for issuance of the permission to register the property (clausula intabulandi), in order to record the ownership of that immovable property in the land register. In that submission, he specified the claim for costs of the proceedings in accordance with the value of the subject matter of the dispute of 101,000 [Croatian] kunas. Having regard to such a procedural situation in respect of the value of the subject matter of the dispute, this court finds that in the case at issue the amount of 101,000 [Croatian] kunas has to be considered as the relevant value of the subject matter of the dispute, [that is,] the amount the plaintiff indicated in his submission of 1 March 2001 which [submission] preceded the amendment of the action. This is so because in the instant case it cannot be argued that the plaintiff has agreed that, even after the amendment of the action, the relevant value of the subject matter of the dispute should remain the one indicated in the statement of claim. Namely, from the circumstances of the present case it may be rightly concluded that in his submission of 25 September 2001 the plaintiff failed to indicate the value of the subject matter of the dispute in the amount of 101,000 [Croatian] kunas, considering that he had already done so in the submission of 1 March 2001. This is especially so if one takes into account the fact that in the submission of 25 September 2001 he specified his claim for costs of the proceedings in accordance with the newly indicated value of the subject matter of the dispute. Finding for these reasons that the value of the subject matter of the dispute of 101,000 [Croatian] kunas is [the] relevant [value] for determining the admissibility of the appeal on points of law, it cannot but be concluded, in accordance with section 382(3) of the Civil Procedure Act and section 10(3) of the 1999 Amendments to the Civil Procedure Act, that the appeal on points of law is admissible. For these reasons the first and the second-instance decisions had to be quashed pursuant to section 394(1) taken in conjunction with section 400 of the Civil Procedure Act, and the case remitted to the first-instance court for fresh proceedings so that it can proceed with the appeal on points of law in accordance with section 390 of the Civil Procedure Act.” 12. In the resumed proceedings, the Varaždin Municipal Court, in discharging its duties under section 390(3) of the Civil Procedure Act, forwarded the case file to the Supreme Court for a decision on the applicant's appeal on points of law of 6 March 2003. 13. On 23 February 2005 the Supreme Court, sitting as a panel composed of judges P.M., I.M., V.P.R., G.G. and B.H., declared the applicant's appeal on points of law of 6 March 2003 inadmissible ratione valoris, finding that the value of the subject matter of the dispute was below the statutory threshold of HRK 100,000. This time the court held that the relevant value of the subject matter of the dispute was the one indicated by the plaintiff in the statement of claim and that, in the present case, that value was YUD 1,000,000, which, when converted into kunas, amounted to HRK 0.10. The relevant part of the Supreme Court's decision reads as follows: “The plaintiff's appeal on points of law against the judgment of the Varaždin County Court, no. Gž-1046/02 of 26 November 2002 is hereby declared inadmissible. Reasons ... The appeal on points of law is inadmissible. Pursuant to section 382(2) of the Civil Procedure Act, an appeal on points of law is inadmissible in pecuniary disputes where ... the value of the subject matter of the dispute of the contested part of the final judgment does not exceed 100,000 [Croatian] kunas. Pursuant to section 40(2) of the Civil Procedure Act, in a case where an action does not concern a sum of money, the relevant value shall be the value of the subject matter of the dispute indicated by the plaintiff in the statement of claim. Pursuant to section 10(3) of the 1999 Amendments to the Civil Procedure Act, this provision applies to all proceedings in which a final decision of a second-instance court was rendered after the entry into force of the 1999 Amendments, [that is, after] 6 November 1999. The case at issue concerns a pecuniary dispute where the claim is directed at the handover of (immovable) property, issuance of a land register document, so that, in accordance with the cited legislation, the relevant value of the subject matter of the dispute is the one indicated by the plaintiff in the statement of claim. The value of the subject matter of the dispute indicated in the statement of claim is 1,000,000 [former Yugoslav] dinars, [the amount of] which after the denomination equals 0,1 [Croatian] kunas. Given that the second-instance judgment of the Varaždin County Court, no. Gž-1046/02 was rendered on 26 November 2002, it follows that the appeal on points of law is inadmissible.” 14. On 3 October 2005 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against that Supreme Court decision of 23 February 2005, alleging a violation of his constitutional right to a fair hearing by pointing out the discrepancy between that decision and the one of 25 February 2004. On 8 February 2007 the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) dismissed the applicant's complaint and, on 15 March 2007, served its decision on his representative. It took note of the applicant's argument concerning conflicting decisions of the Supreme Court, but held that the contested decision was in line with the relevant provisions of the Civil Procedure Act and that the proceedings before the ordinary courts had not been contrary to his constitutional right to a fair hearing.

6. The applicant was born in 1994 and currently resides in Moscow. 7. The applicant is a Kyrgyz national of Uzbek ethnic origin. He lived in the village of Osh in Kyrgyzstan together with his parents and sister. All of his relatives are Uzbek. After the mass disorder and inter-ethnic clashes that took place in the region in June 2010, he left Kyrgyzstan for Russia to study at a college. It appears that his next-of-kin remain in the country. 8. According to the applicant, he has lived in Russia since September 2010. 9. On 3 February 2011 the Kyrgyz authorities charged the applicant in absentia with violent crimes committed in June 2010, namely, participation in mass rioting, kidnapping, destruction of property and damage to property. 10. On 4 February 2011 the applicant was put on a wanted list. 11. On 25 January 2013 the applicant was arrested in Russia. The Kyrgyz authorities confirmed their intention to seek his extradition. 12. On 20 February 2013 the Deputy Prosecutor General of Kyrgyzstan sent his Russian counterpart a letter containing assurances that the applicant would benefit from legal assistance, and would not be tortured or subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment. He further asserted that the extradition request was related to ordinary criminal offences and was not aimed at persecuting the applicant on religious or political grounds, or grounds relating to his nationality. 13. On 22 April 2013 the applicant’s lawyer submitted to the Prosecutor General of Russia a letter referring to reports of international organisations and the Court’s case-law evidencing that there was a high risk that the applicant would be subjected to inhuman treatment if he were extradited. 14. On 3 May and 23 July 2013 the Deputy Prosecutor General of Kyrgyzstan supplemented the extradition request with an assurance that following the applicant’s extradition, Russian diplomatic staff would be given an opportunity to visit him in the detention facility. 15. On 13 August 2013 the Deputy Prosecutor General of Russia granted the extradition request and ordered the applicant’s extradition. He held that there were no grounds in Russian or international law for refusing to extradite the applicant. The applicant challenged that decision before the courts. 16. On 9 September 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld the extradition order, finding as follows: “The court has not established any circumstances which, under paragraph 1 of Article 464 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Russia, would exclude the possibility of extraditing an individual residing on Russian territory to a foreign state ... ... judicial review proceedings in respect of the local migration authority’s refusal to grant refugee status do not impede the decision-making process in respect of the extradition order ... The court takes into account the arguments of the defence with regard to information contained in reports of international organisations, judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, and other documents ... relating to the situation in the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, including deficiencies relating to the investigation of crimes and the conduct of judicial proceedings. However, this information cannot be regarded as sufficient grounds for refusing to extradite an Uzbek who was involved in the events that took place in Kyrgyzstan in June 2010 and has been charged with a criminal offence. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Russia stated that it had no information which could prevent the extradition of [the applicant] to Kyrgyzstan. Furthermore, ... in addition to the guarantees that [the applicant] will not be subjected to torture, inhuman, degrading treatment and punishment etc. ... the requesting party provided additional guarantees. The Kyrgyz authorities gave assurances that Russian diplomats would be allowed to visit [the applicant] ... ... the court notes that in the course of the refugee proceedings [the applicant] stated that his relatives (also Uzbek) lived in the Republic of Kyrgyzstan and had not been subjected to any persecution. The [applicant’s] allegation that the law-enforcement authorities extort money from his relatives is groundless.” 17. On 18 September 2013 the applicant lodged an appeal. On 6 November 2013 the Supreme Court of Russia dismissed the appeal, endorsing the reasoning of the first-instance court in the following wording: “... The available materials do not indicate that [the applicant] will be deprived of the guarantees provided by the Kyrgyz Republic and that if he is extradited his rights prescribed by international law and Kyrgyz legislation will be violated, that he will be persecuted on the grounds of race, sex, nationality, ethnic origin or political views, or that there will be some threat to his life or health.” 18. It appears that the extradition order became enforceable on 6 November 2013. 19. On 26 January 2013 the Babushkinskiy District Court of Moscow ordered the applicant’s detention with a view to extradition until 24 March 2013. 20. On 19 March 2013 the same court extended the applicant’s detention until 25 May 2013. On 22 March 2013 the applicant and his lawyer lodged appeals against that decision. The Moscow City Court dismissed the appeals on 13 May 2013. 21. On 21 May 2013 the Babushkinskiy District Court further extended the applicant’s detention pending extradition until 25 July 2013. Fresh appeals by the applicant and his lawyer were lodged accordingly on 22 and 24 May 2013. On 10 July 2013 the Moscow City Court dismissed the appeals. 22. On 23 July 2013 the same District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 25 September 2013. On 24 July 2013 the applicant lodged an appeal against that decision. On 18 September 2013 the Moscow City Court dismissed the appeal. 23. On 23 September 2013 the District Court examined the matter of the applicant’s continued detention and extended it until 24 November 2013. On 24 September 2013 the applicant lodged an appeal against that decision. The Moscow City Court upheld the extension order on 13 November 2013. 24. On 21 November 2013 the same District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 24 January 2014. On 25 November 2013, the applicant’s lawyer lodged an appeal against that decision. 25. On 22 January 2014 the applicant was released from custody because the Court had applied interim measures pursuant to Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. 26. On 25 March 2013 the applicant applied for refugee status. He had not lodged any such applications between 2010 and 2012. 27. On 9 July 2013 the Moscow migration authority refused to grant refugee status to the applicant. It stated that the applicant had claimed that he could not return to Kyrgyzstan because he would be prosecuted for a crime he had not committed on the grounds of his Uzbek origin. 28. The Moscow migration authority also stated that, according to the applicant, after the ethnic conflict in June 2010 in Osh, he had been oppressed by Kyrgyz nationals and had had to leave Kyrgyzstan for Russia, where he had been living since 24 September 2010. According to the applicant, he enrolled in the Rzhev college in September 2010 without any exams or payment under an agreement concluded between the Osh town council and the college. However, he left the college without pursuing his studies because he had to find work to earn money and support himself. The applicant asserted that he was not a member of any political party or religious organisation. 29. The Moscow migration authority rejected the applicant’s request on the ground that he had not presented any evidence that there was a real risk of such persecution. First, all of his family members were Uzbek and they were not being persecuted but were living in Kyrgyzstan safely. Second, it was doubtful that the applicant had been persecuted because of his ethnic origin given that the Osh town council had arranged his studies on favourable terms, free of charge, without requiring any qualifications or documents. Therefore the applicant had no grounds to fear for his life. The Moscow migration authority concluded that his submissions as to why he was unwilling to return to Kyrgyzstan did not amount to a well-founded fear of being persecuted in his country of origin on the grounds of religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, as he had not put forward any valid reasons as to why he was afraid of becoming a victim of persecution on the said grounds. 30. The applicant appealed to the Federal Migration Service (“the FMS”). He stated that the Rzhev college had been opened by the Uzbek expatriate community for young people who had had to leave Kyrgyzstan after the disorder in June 2010. He was not aware of any agreement with the town council, which was headed by a mayor with xenophobic views. The only reason for such an agreement might be, according to him, the intention to expel young Uzbeks from Osh. He also mentioned that the peaceful life of his relatives in Kyrgyzstan referred to by the Moscow migration authority presupposed only that they had not been arrested on absurd grounds. They had been constantly subjected to discrimination on the ground of their origin and the Kyrgyz authorities had extorted money from them on account of the crimes of which he had been accused. The fact that his family members were still alive did not reduce the threat to his own life if he were to return to Kyrgyzstan. 31. On 6 September 2013 the FMS upheld the refusal decision. It reiterated that the applicant’s relatives were not being persecuted. It also found that the accusation against him was not politically motivated. 32. On 10 September 2013 the applicant’s lawyer lodged a request with the Russian Representative’s Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (“the UNHCR”) to clarify whether there was a real risk of the applicant being subjected to ill-treatment if he were extradited to Kyrgyzstan. On 12 September 2013 the UNHCR replied that after the events of 2010 the Kyrgyz authorities had continued to prosecute and arrest ethnic Uzbeks. The only conviction against an ethnic Kyrgyz had been quashed recently by a higher court. Thus, there was a real threat that ethnic Uzbeks accused of offences during the mass disorder in June 2010, including the applicant, would be subjected to torture and other inhuman treatment and punishment in the event of extradition to Kyrgyzstan. 33. On 22 October 2013 the applicant sought judicial review of the decision of 6 September 2013. 34. On 22 January 2014 the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow upheld the decision to refuse the applicant’s application for refugee status. The District Court considered that the applicant had failed to substantiate his fears of persecution in Kyrgyzstan and that his allegations of unlawful criminal charges against him fell outside the scope of the refugee status proceedings. The District Court pointed out that his application for refugee status contained no indications that he had been previously accused or convicted of a criminal offence, or that he had been a member of any political, religious or military organisations. It also took into account the fact that the applicant had not applied for refugee status until after his placement in detention. 35. In his appeal against the judgment of 22 January 2014 the applicant requested a rigorous examination of his arguments related to the risk of ill‑treatment. He again referred to various reports of international organisations and reputable NGOs to support his position, including the UNHCR’s letter of 12 September 2013 in respect of himself and four other individuals of Uzbek ethnic origin. 36. On 20 May 2014 the Moscow City Court upheld that decision on appeal, reiterating the conclusions of the migration authorities and the first‑instance court. 37. For a summary of relevant international and domestic law and practice see Abdulkhakov v. Russia, no. 14743/11, §§ 71-98, 2 October 2012. 38. For a number of relevant reports and items of information, see Makhmudzhan Ergashev v. Russia (no. 49747/11, §§ 30-46, 16 October 2012). 39. In April 2012 Kyrgyzstan submitted its Second report on implementation of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, for the period from 1999 to 2011 (CAT/C/KGZ/2). It reads as follows: “6. The concept of ‘torture’ was introduced into the Criminal Code in 2003, when the Code was amended with article 305-1, entitled ‘Torture’, which reads as follows: ‘The deliberate infliction of physical or mental suffering on any person for the purpose of extracting information or a confession, punishing a person for an act the person has committed or of which he or she is suspected, as well as for the purpose of intimidating or coercing the person to commit certain actions, when such acts are committed by an official or by any other person with the knowledge or consent of an official, shall be punishable by deprivation of liberty of 3 to 5 years, with or without disqualification to hold certain posts for 1 to 3 years.’ ... 15. Under article 24 of the Constitution, everyone has the right to freedom and security of person. No one may be arrested for more than 48 hours without a judicial order, and every person under arrest must urgently, and in any case within 48 hours of the arrest, be presented before a court so as to ascertain whether the arrest is legal. Every arrested person has the right to verify the legality of the arrest in accordance with the procedures and time frames established by law. In the absence of justification for an arrest, the person in question must be released immediately. 16. In all cases, arrested persons must be informed immediately of the reasons for their arrest. Their rights must be explained to them and ensured, including the right to a medical examination and to receive the assistance of a physician. From the actual moment of arrest, the security of arrested persons is ensured; they are provided with the opportunity to defend themselves on their own, to have the qualified legal assistance of a lawyer and to be defended by a defence lawyer ...” 40. The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination considered the fifth to seventh periodic reports of Kyrgyzstan and in February 2013 made the following concluding observations (CERD/C/KGZ/CO/5-7): “6. The Committee notes with concern that, according to the State party’s report (CERD/C/KGZ/5-7, para. 12) and other reports, Uzbeks were the main victims of the June 2010 events but were also the most prosecuted and condemned. While noting that the State party itself has recognized this situation and is considering ways to correct it, the Committee remains deeply concerned about reports of biased attitudes based on ethnicity in investigations, prosecutions, condemnations and sanctions imposed on those charged and convicted in relation to the June 2010 events, who were mostly of Uzbek origin. The Committee is also concerned about information provided in the State party’s report relating to evidence of coercion to confess to crimes that the persons did not commit, pressure on relatives by representatives of law enforcement agencies, denial of procedural rights ..., violations of court procedures, threats and insults to the accused and their counsel, attempts to attack the accused and his relatives which according to the State party resulted in a violation of the right to a fair trial ... [T]he Committee recommends that the State party in the context of the reform of its judicial system: (a) Initiate or set up a mechanism to review all cases of persons condemned in connection with the June 2010 events, from the point of view of respecting all necessary guarantees for a fair trial; (b) Investigate, prosecute and condemn, as appropriate, all persons responsible for human rights violations during the June 2010 events, irrespective of their ethnic origin and their status; ... 7. While noting information provided by the State party, the Committee remains concerned at reports that a great number of persons, mostly from minority groups, in particular Uzbeks, have been detained and have been subjected to torture and other forms of ill-treatment on the basis of their ethnicity following the June 2010 events. The Committee is also concerned at information that women from minority groups were victims of acts of violence, including rape, during, and in the aftermath of the June 2010 events. The Committee is particularly concerned that all such acts have not yet been investigated and those responsible have not been prosecuted and punished (arts. 5 and 6). In line with its general recommendation No. 31 (2005), the Committee recommends that the State party, without any distinction based on the ethnic origin of the victims, take appropriate measures to: (a) Register and document all cases of torture, ill-treatment and violence against women from minority groups, including rape; (b) Conduct prompt, thorough and impartial investigations; (c) Prosecute and punish those responsible, including police or security forces; ...” 41. The UN Committee against Torture considered Kyrgyzstan’s second periodic report and in December 2013 issued concluding observations (CAT/C/KGZ/CO/2), which read, in so far as relevant, as follows: “Impunity for, and failure to investigate, widespread acts of torture and ill‑treatment 5. The Committee is deeply concerned about the ongoing and widespread practice of torture and ill-treatment of persons deprived of their liberty, in particular while in police custody to extract confessions. These confirm the findings of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (A/HRC/19/61/Add.2, paras. 37 et seq.), and of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (A/HRC/20/12, paras. 40–41). While the Kyrgyz delegation acknowledged that torture is practised in the country, and affirmed its commitment to combat it, the Committee remains seriously concerned about the substantial gap between the legislative framework and its practical implementation, as evidenced partly by the lack of cases during the reporting period in which State officials have been prosecuted, convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for torture (arts. 2, 4, 12 and 16). 6. The Committee is gravely concerned at the State party’s persistent pattern of failure to conduct prompt, impartial and full investigations into the many allegations of torture and ill-treatment and to prosecute alleged perpetrators, which has led to serious underreporting by victims of torture and ill-treatment, and impunity for State officials allegedly responsible (arts. 2, 11, 12, 13 and 16). In particular, the Committee is concerned about: (a) The lack of an independent and effective mechanism for receiving complaints and conducting impartial and full investigations into allegations of torture. Serious conflicts of interest appear to prevent existing mechanisms from undertaking effective, impartial investigations into complaints received; (b) Barriers at the pre-investigation stage, particularly with regard to forensic medical examinations, which in many cases are not carried out promptly following allegations of abuse, are performed by medical professionals who lack independence, and/or are conducted in the presence of other public officials, leading to the failure of the medical personnel to adequately record detainees’ injuries, and consequently to investigators’ failure to open formal investigations into allegations of torture, for lack of evidence; (c) The apparent practice by investigators of valuing the testimonies of individuals implicated in torture over those of complainants, and of dismissing complaints summarily; and (d) The failure of the judiciary to effectively investigate torture allegations raised by criminal defendants and their lawyers in court. Various sources report that judges commonly ignore information alleging the use of torture, including reports from independent medical examinations. ... 7. The Committee remains seriously concerned by the State party’s response to the allegations of torture in individual cases brought to the attention of the Committee, and particularly by the State party’s authorities’ refusal to carry out full investigations into many allegations of torture on the grounds that preliminary enquiries revealed no basis for opening a full investigation. The Committee is gravely concerned by the case of Azimjan Askarov, an ethnic Uzbek human rights defender prosecuted on criminal charges in connection with the death of a police officer in southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010, which has been raised by several Special Rapporteurs, including the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders (A/HRC/22/47/Add.4, para. 248; A/HRC/19/55/Add.2, para. 212). Mr. Askarov has alleged that he was beaten severely by police on numerous occasions immediately following his detention and throughout the course of the criminal proceedings against him, and that he was subjected to repeated violations of procedural safeguards such as prompt access to a lawyer and to an effective, independent medical examination. The Committee notes that independent forensic medical examinations appear to have substantiated Mr. Askarov’s allegations of torture in police custody, and have confirmed resulting injuries including persistent visual loss, traumatic brain injury, and spinal injury. Information before the Committee suggests that Mr. Askarov’s complaints of torture have been raised on numerous occasions with the Prosecutor’s office, as well as with the Kyrgyz Ombudsman’s office, and with Bazar-Korgon District Court, the Appeal Court and the Supreme Court. To date, however, the State party’s authorities have declined to open a full investigation into his claims, relying on allegedly coerced statements made by Mr. Askarov while in police custody that he had no complaints. The Committee understands that the State party is presently considering the possibility of further investigating these claims. The Committee is concerned by the State party’s refusal to undertake full investigations into allegations of torture regarding other cases raised during the review, including those of Nargiza Turdieva and Dilmurat Khaidarov (arts. 2, 12, 13 and 16). ... 8. The Committee remains concerned at the lack of full and effective investigations into the numerous allegations that members of the law enforcement bodies committed torture and ill-treatment, arbitrary detention and excessive use of force during and following the inter-ethnic violence in southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010. The Committee is concerned by reports that investigations, prosecutions, condemnations and sanctions imposed in relation to the June 2010 events were mostly directed against persons of Uzbek origin, as noted by sources including the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, in 2013 (CERD/C/KGZ/CO/5-7, paras. 6–7). The Committee further regrets the lack of information provided by the State party on the outcome of the review of 995 criminal cases relating to the June 2010 violence (arts. 4, 12, 13 and 16). ... Coerced confessions 13. The Committee is seriously concerned at numerous, consistent and credible reports that the use of forced confessions as evidence in courts is widespread. While noting that the use of evidence obtained through unlawful means is prohibited by law, it is deeply concerned that in practice there is a heavy reliance on confessions within the criminal justice system. The Committee is further concerned at reports that judges have frequently declined to act on allegations made by criminal defendants in court, or to allow the introduction into evidence of independent medical reports that would tend to confirm the defendant’s claims of torture for the purpose of obtaining a confession. The Committee regrets the lack of information provided by the State party on cases in which judges or prosecutors have initiated investigations into torture claims raised by criminal defendants in court, and is alarmed that no official has been prosecuted and punished for torture even in the single case brought to its attention in which a conviction obtained by torture was excluded from evidence by a court – that of Farrukh Gapiurov, who was acquitted by the Osh Municipal Court of involvement in the June 2010 violence (arts. 2 and 15).” 42. The Kyrgyzstan chapter of the 2013 Annual Report by Amnesty International, in so far as relevant, reads as follows: “Torture and other ill-treatment remained pervasive throughout the country and law enforcement and judicial authorities failed to act on such allegations. The authorities continued to fail to impartially and effectively investigate the June 2010 violence and its aftermath and provide justice for the thousands of victims of serious crimes and human rights violations, including crimes against humanity. Ethnic Uzbeks continued to be targeted disproportionately for detention and prosecution in relation to the June 2010 violence. ... The Osh City Prosecutor stated in April that out of 105 cases which had gone to trial in relation to the June 2010 violence, only two resulted in acquittals. Only one of those cases involved an ethnic Uzbek, Farrukh Gapirov, the son of human rights defender Ravshan Gapirov. He was released after the appeal court found his conviction had been based on his confession which had been obtained under torture. However, no criminal investigation against the police officers responsible for his torture was initiated. By contrast, the first – and, to date, the only – known conviction of ethnic Kyrgyz for the murder of ethnic Uzbeks in the course of the June 2010 violence was overturned.” 43. Human Rights Watch’s “World Report 2013: Kyrgyzstan” contains the following findings concerning the situation in Kyrgyzstan in 2012: “Kyrgyzstan has failed to adequately address abuses in the south, in particular against ethnic Uzbeks, undermining long-term efforts to promote stability and reconciliation following inter-ethnic clashes in June 2010 that killed more than 400 people. Despite an uneasy calm in southern Kyrgyzstan, ethnic Uzbeks are still subjected to arbitrary detention, torture, and extortion, without redress. ... Local human rights non-governmental organizations reported that the overall number of reported incidents of arbitrary detention and ill-treatment in police custody continued to decrease in 2012 in the south, although they still document new cases. Groups also reported the growing problem of law enforcement extorting money, in particular from ethnic Uzbeks, threatening criminal prosecution related to the June 2010 events. Victims of extortion rarely report incidents for fear of reprisals. Investigations into the June 2010 violence have stalled. Trials of mostly ethnic Uzbeks connected to the violence continued to take place in violation of international fair trial standards, including the trials of Mahamad Bizurukov and Shamshidin Niyazaliev, each of whom was sentenced to life in prison in October 2012. Lawyers in southern Kyrgyzstan continued to be harassed in 2012 for defending ethnic Uzbek clients who were charged with involvement in the June 2010 violence, perpetuating a hostile and violent environment that undermined defendants’ fair trial rights. On January 20, a group of persons in Jalalabad verbally and physically attacked a lawyer defending the ethnic Uzbek owner of an Uzbek-language television station. No one has been held accountable for such violence against lawyers. ... In hearings related to the June 2010 violence, judges continue to dismiss, ignore, or fail to order investigations into torture allegations. In a rare exception, four police officers were charged with torture after the August 2011 death of Usmonzhon Kholmirzaev, an ethnic Uzbek, who succumbed to internal injuries after he was beaten by police in custody. Repeated delays in proceedings have meant that over a year later, the trial has yet to conclude. In June, after Abdugafur Abdurakhmanov, an ethnic Uzbek serving a life sentence in relation to the June 2010 violence, died in prison, authorities did not open an investigation, alleging he committed suicide.” 44. In its report “Kyrgyzstan: 3 Years After Violence, a Mockery of Justice” issued in June 2013, Human Rights Watch observed, among other things, the following: “Criminal investigations into the June 2010 violence have been marred by widespread arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture. Unchecked courtroom violence and other egregious violations of defendants’ rights have blocked the accused from presenting a meaningful defense. Human Rights Watch has documented how investigations disproportionately and unjustly targeted ethnic Uzbeks, and how this group has a heightened risk of torture in custody. ... The ethnic clashes erupted in southern Kyrgyzstan on June 10, 2010. The violence, which lasted four days, left more than 400 people dead and nearly 2,000 houses destroyed. Horrific crimes were committed against both ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks. However, while ethnic Uzbeks suffered the majority of casualties and destroyed homes, the majority of those prosecuted for homicide have been ethnic Uzbeks. ... Human Rights Watch’s research from 2010-2013 in southern Kyrgyzstan found that prosecutorial authorities have repeatedly refused to investigate serious and credible allegations of torture. Courts have relied heavily on confessions allegedly extracted under torture to sentence defendants to long prison terms.” 45. The Kyrgyzstan chapter of the 2014 World Report published by Human Rights Watch reads, in so far as relevant, as follows: “Shortcomings in law enforcement and the judiciary contribute to the persistence of grave abuses in connection to the ethnic violence in southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010. Ethnic Uzbeks and other minorities remain especially vulnerable. Courtroom attacks on lawyers and defendants, particularly in cases related to the June 2010 events, occur with impunity. Government officials and civil society representatives formed a national center for the prevention of torture in 2013. In practice, ill-treatment and torture remain pervasive in places of detention, and impunity for torture is the norm. ... Three years on, justice for crimes committed during the ethnic violence in southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010 remains elusive. The flawed justice process has produced long prison sentences for mostly ethnic Uzbeks after convictions marred by torture‑tainted confessions and other due process violations. Authorities have not reviewed convictions where defendants alleged torture or other glaring violations of fair trial standards. At least nine ethnic Uzbeks continue to languish in pretrial detention, some for a third year. New convictions in August 2013 of three ethnic Uzbeks in Osh, and pending extradition orders of at least six others in Russia again point to judicial bias against ethnic Uzbeks. The authorities failed to tackle the acute problem of courtroom violence by audiences in trials across Kyrgyzstan, including at the trial of three opposition members of parliament in June, perpetuating an environment that undermines defendants’ fair trial rights. Lawyers were harassed or beaten in court in 2013, including for defending ethnic Uzbek clients in June 2010 cases. Mahamad Bizurukov, an ethnic Uzbek defendant, and his lawyers have been subjected to repeated threats, harassment, and physical attacks for two years, most recently in September 2013, with no accountability for perpetrators. ... Despite the adoption of a national torture prevention mechanism in 2012, and the organization of a related National Center for the Prevention of Torture in 2013, authorities often refuse to investigate allegations of torture and perpetrators go unpunished. On rare occasions when charges are filed against police, investigations, and court proceedings are unduly protracted. A telling example is the criminal case against four police officers following the August 2011 death of an ethnic Uzbek detained on charges related to the June 2010 ethnic violence. Usmonjon Kholmirzaev died several days after his release without charge, apparently from injuries he sustained from beatings in custody. The prosecution has been subjected to repeated delays over the last two years and no one has yet been held accountable for his death. In July 2013, Nurkamil Ismailov was found dead in a temporary detention facility in southern Kyrgyzstan after police detained him for disorderly conduct. Authorities alleged he committed suicide by hanging himself with his t-shirt. The Jalalabad-based human rights group Spravedlivost intervened after which authorities opened a criminal investigation on charges of negligence. In September, Ismailov’s relative and the police settled out of court for an undisclosed sum, with no admission of liability.”

4. The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Bratislava. 5. On 7 November 1997 enforcement proceedings were initiated against the applicant. 6. On 21 January 1999 the Bratislava IV District Court dismissed the applicant's objections against the enforcement and its costs. 7. On 31 January 2000 the district court dismissed the applicant's request for adjournment of the enforcement. On 30 June 2000 the decision was upheld by the Bratislava Regional Court. 8. On 29 January 2001 the applicant requested the district court to issue an interim measure and to discontinue the enforcement. 9. On 21 May 2001 the district court adjourned the enforcement pending its decision on the applicant's request for the enforcement to be discontinued. On 30 November 2001 the regional court quashed the above decision. 10. On 29 October 2003 the applicant again requested discontinuation of the enforcement proceedings. 11. On 25 October 2007 the district court rejected the applicant's request for interim measures. 12. On 17 March 2009 the district court dismissed the applicant's request for discontinuation of the proceedings. 13. On 28 January 2010 the regional court, on the applicant's appeal, quashed the first-instance decision and remitted the case to the district court for further examination. 14. On 20 May 2010 the district court discontinued the proceedings and held that it would deliver a decision on costs once the decision to discontinue the proceedings became final. 15. On 24 June 2010 the applicant's representative informed the Court that the decision has not yet become final. 16. On 6 October 2003 the applicant complained to the Constitutional Court about length of the proceedings before the Bratislava IV District Court and claimed the equivalent of 2,426 euros (EUR) at that time as just satisfaction for non-pecuniary damage suffered. 17. The Constitutional Court examined the period of the proceedings after 29 January 2001. 18. On 2 February 2005 it found that the district court had violated the applicant's right to a hearing without unjustified delay, ordered the latter to avoid further delays and to reimburse the applicant's legal costs. 19. It concluded that these represented a sufficient just satisfaction and did not award the applicant any award for non-pecuniary damage. It referred to the fact that the applicant was the liable party in the proceedings. It further held that the applicant had failed to specify the allegedly suffered harm.

4. The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Olkusz. 5. On 1 December 1999 a bill of indictment was filed against the applicant with the Olkusz District Court, after as it appears a short pre-trial stage. Two charges were brought against her: threatening to kill, and assaulting, a certain J. B.-D. The prosecutor requested that 12 witnesses be heard. 6. On 12 January 2000 the applicant requested that the case be transferred to the Kraków District Court. She further requested that all the judges of the Olkusz District Court be excluded from the examination of her case. It appears that both applications were dismissed. 7. On 4 September 2000 the applicant lodged an application requesting the hearing to be recorded on tape; this was also dismissed. 8. The first hearing in the case took place on 5 October 2000. The Olkusz District Court heard submissions from the applicant. 9. A hearing scheduled for 21 November 2000 was adjourned on account of the justified absence of the applicant. 10. A subsequent hearing scheduled for 14 December 2000 was also adjourned on account of the absence of a lay judge. 11. On 16 January 2001 the applicant again requested that all the judges of the Olkusz District Court be excluded from the examination of her case. 12. On account of that application, hearings scheduled for 23 January and 9 February 2001 were cancelled. 13. On 18 April 2001 the Katowice Regional Court dismissed the the applicant's application. 14. On 3 January 2002 the court scheduled a hearing for 17 January 2002. 15. On 7 January 2002 the applicant requested 49 certified copies from the case file. On 10 January 2002 she further requested that a lay judge be excluded. 16. On 17 January 2002 the court heard the applicant and set the date for the next hearing for 12 March 2002. 17. On 22 January 2002 the applicant made a request for 2 certified copies from the case file and 11 copies of other documents. 18. On 4 March 2002 the applicant's counsel requested that the hearing be rescheduled. A new hearing was listed for 26 April 2002. 19. On 22 April 2002 the applicant requested that the chairman of the judicial panel be excluded from the examination of her case. She further requested the exclusion of all the judges of the Olkusz District Court. On account of this application the hearing was cancelled. 20. On 30 April 2002 the applicant again requested that the chairman of the judicial panel be excluded from the examination of her case. 21. On 12 June 2002 the Kraków Regional Court granted the applicant's application concerning the exclusion of all the judges. It found that the applicant had slandered the judges in numerous applications she had filed with the court and for this reason it decided to transfer the case to the Miechów District Court. 22. On 9 July 2002 the court scheduled a hearing for 30 August 2002. During the hearing it was disclosed that the applicant had been seeing a psychiatrist on a regular basis. The prosecutor filed an application to have her examined by a psychiatrist to determine whether she had been sane at the time of the alleged crime. 23. On 18 October 2002 an expert opinion was submitted to the Miechów District Court. The psychiatrist had found that there were still doubts as to the applicant's mental health; hence it was necessary to examine her in a hospital. The Miechów District Court granted this request. 24. On 30 October 2002 the applicant's counsel appealed against the decision ordering her hospitalization. He argued that she had not been correctly summoned for the hearing at which the decision had been taken. Consequently, the said decision was quashed by the Miechów District Court on 4 November 2002. 25. On 14 November 2002 the applicant again requested that all the judges examining her case be excluded. Further, she requested to have her case transferred to the Kraków Regional Court. Her request was granted on 11 December 2002. The court found that the applicant had slandered the judges in numerous applications she had filed. The file was transferred to the Kraków-Nowa Huta District Court. 26. Between 21 January and 11 March 2003 the case file was sent to the Regional Prosecutor's Office in Kraków, for the examination of a complaint the applicant had filed in the meantime of inactivity on the part of the Olkusz District Prosecutor. 27. On 4 April 2003 the Olkusz District Court ordered an expert opinion to be drawn up on the applicant's mental health. The relevant examination was scheduled for 10 June 2003 at the psychiatric hospital in Lublin. It appears that the applicant failed to attend the examination. She also failed to attend subsequent examinations scheduled for 29 January, 7 April, 2 June, 16 July and 8 September 2004, despite a court order to have her escorted to the examination by the police. 28. On 18 July 2003 the applicant requested again that all the judges of the Kraków-Nowa Huta District Court be excluded from the examination of her case. On 7 November 2003 her application was dismissed by the Kraków Regional Court. 29. By applications of 30 March, 29 May and 4 September 2004 the applicant requested that the chairman of the judicial panel be excluded from the examination of her case. They were dismissed by the Kraków-Nowa Huta District Court on 4 May, 14 July and 7 October 2004 respectively. 30. On 14 October 2004 the applicant lodged a complaint about the court's decision of 7 October 2004. It was dismissed as inadmissible on 26 October 2004 by the Kraków-Nowa Huta District Court. 31. On 21 October 2004 the court scheduled a hearing for 17 November 2004. 32. On 16 November 2004 the applicant requested that the case file be sent back to the District Prosecutor's Office for the preparatory proceedings to be completed. 33. On 17 November 2004 neither the applicant nor her counsel attended the scheduled hearing. In the light of the application lodged by the applicant the previous day, the hearing was adjourned. 34. During a hearing held on 14 April 2005 the Kraków-Nowa Huta District Court decided that the question of whether the applicant should be detained pending trial should be examined. 35. On 15 April 2005 the court accepted the evidence from the expert opinion on the extent of the injuries sustained by the victim. On 25 April 2005 the case file was transferred to the Institute of Forensic Medicine in Kraków. A final opinion was prepared on 20 May 2005. 36. A hearing scheduled for 9 May 2005 concerning an application by the District Prosecutor to have the applicant detained pending trial was adjourned because the case file had been transferred to the experts summoned to examine the record of the victim's injuries. 37. A hearing was held on 23 May 2005; neither the applicant nor her counsel attended. In the light of the expert opinion the prosecutor modified the legal classification of the act committed by the applicant. 38. Eventually, on 29 June 2005 the District Prosecutor decided to withdraw the bill of indictment against the applicant. He considered the acts resulting in both the charges against her as having posed a “minimal threat to society” (znikoma społeczna szkodliwość czynu). 39. On 28 September 2005 the Kraków District Court discontinued the criminal proceedings against the applicant in respect of the charge of threatening to kill J. B.-D. 40. On 30 November 2005 the Kraków District Court discontinued the criminal proceedings against the applicant in respect of the charge of assaulting J. B.-D. 41. On 21 June 2005 the applicant filed with the Kraków Regional Court a complaint under the Law of 17 June 2004 on complaints concerning breaches of the right to a trial within a reasonable time (Ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki – “the 2004 Act”), alleging that the criminal proceedings pending against her had been excessively long. 42. On 28 July 2005 the Kraków Regional Court dismissed her complaint as ill-founded. The court found that the applicant had contributed to the overall length of the proceedings by obstructing the proceedings and filing numerous applications for the exclusion of judges.

4. The applicant was born in 1967 and is at present serving a prison term in Gospić Prison. 5. On an unspecified date an investigation was opened in respect of the applicant, who was suspected of having committed a number of thefts and aggravated thefts. 6. On 20 February 2004 a Varaždin County Court investigating judge (istražni sudac Županijskog suda u Varaždinu) issued a warrant for the search of the applicant's flat. The search was carried out by the police on 23 February 2004 and a number of items were seized. 7. The applicant was arrested on 23 February 2004 at 10 p.m. but was released on 24 February 2004 at 6.00 p.m. 8. On 1 March 2004 the applicant was indicted in the Prelog Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Prelogu) on numerous counts of theft and aggravated theft. He was represented in these proceedings by an officially appointed defence counsel. 9. He was arrested again on 2 March 2004 and placed in pre-trial detention in Varaždin Prison (Zatvor Varaždin) and later on in other prison facilities (see below). 10. During the criminal proceedings against him, the applicant was examined by a psychiatrist and, in a psychiatric report of 16 May 2004, it was established that the applicant suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 11. In a judgment of the Prelog Municipal Court of 26 August 2004 the applicant was found guilty of twenty counts of theft and aggravated theft and sentenced to six years and six months' imprisonment. The applicant appealed against the judgment to the Čakovec County Court (Županijski sud u Čakovcu) complaining about the outcome of the proceedings and also that his defence rights had been violated in that he had not been informed of the hearings in time to prepare his defence and that he had not had sufficient contact with the officially appointed defence counsel. 12. On 1 October 2004 the applicant was taken to the Prelog Municipal Court, where he examined the case file. His request that certain documents be copied for him was complied with. 13. The first-instance judgment of 26 August 2004 was quashed on 14 January 2005 by the Čakovec County Court which extended the applicant's detention at the same time. The first-instance judgment was quashed, inter alia, on the grounds that the applicant had not been informed of the hearings in time to prepare his defence and that he had not had sufficient contact with the officially appointed defence counsel. 14. On 30 January 2005 the applicant lodged a request with the Prelog Municipal Court seeking permission to contact his officially appointed defence counsel and some other persons. On 2 February the Municipal Court allowed the applicant unrestricted telephone communication with his defence counsel. 15. At a hearing held on 3 February 2005 the applicant challenged the presiding judge for bias. The defence counsel opposed the challenge. The hearing was adjourned pending the decision on the applicant's objection. In his submission of the same date the defence counsel requested to be relieved of his duties. 16. On 4 February 2005 the President of the Prelog Municipal Court dismissed the applicant's challenge to the presiding judge as unfounded. On the same day the presiding judge relieved the officially appointed defence counsel of his duties and the president of the court appointed a new defence counsel. The applicant was allowed unrestricted telephone communication with his new counsel. 17. On 14 February 2005 the applicant informed the presiding judge that his attempts to contact his newly appointed defence counsel had remained unsuccessful, since there had been no answer to his calls, and requested a visit from his defence counsel in prison since the next hearing had been scheduled for 17 February 2005. On the same day the presiding judge allowed an unlimited number of visits to the applicant's sister and mother but made no decision about the request concerning the defence counsel. However, the hearing scheduled for 17 February 2005 was adjourned on the oral request of the defence counsel, in order to prepare the defence. The next hearing was scheduled for 10 March 2005. 18. In the meantime, on 11 February 2005, the Prelog Municipal Court further extended the applicant's detention. A subsequent request by the applicant that his detention be lifted was dismissed on 23 March 2005 by the Prelog Municipal Court. The applicant appealed against this decision. 19. On 7 March 2005 the applicant lodged a request with the presiding judge for leave to consult the case file. He alleged that on 1 October 2004, when he had been brought to the Prelog Municipal Court, he had not had sufficient time to consult the entire file and that not all copies he had requested had been given to him and that at that time the case file had not yet been completed. This request remained unanswered. 20. At the beginning of the hearing of 10 March 2005 the applicant insulted the presiding judge and was removed from the courtroom, followed by his defence counsel. Soon afterwards counsel returned and challenged the presiding judge, and the hearing was adjourned. On 14 March 2005 the President of the Prelog Municipal Court dismissed the challenge as unfounded. 21. Upon the appeal by the applicant against the decision of 23 March 2005, on 30 March 2005 the Čakovec County Court quashed the first-instance decision and ordered the applicant's immediate release. It found that, pursuant to the relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act, the statutory time-limit for the applicant's detention had expired on 2 March 2005 and that therefore there had been no grounds for keeping him in detention after that date. 22. The applicant was released on 30 March 2005. On 31 March 2005 the presiding judge relieved the applicant's officially appointed defence counsel of his duties. 23. The next hearing before the Prelog Municipal Court was held on 1 April 2005. The applicant was present in person, but legally unrepresented. The transcript of the hearing shows that the applicant expressly stated that he did not want a defence counsel and decided to remain silent. The applicant did not sign the transcript of the hearing. In a judgment adopted on the same day, the first-instance court again found the applicant guilty of twenty counts of theft and aggravated theft and sentenced him to six years and six months' imprisonment. Immediately after the hearing the applicant was detained and placed in Varaždin Prison. On the same day the same defence counsel was officially assigned to the applicant. 24. The applicant appealed against the first-instance judgment on 4 and 22 April 2005, alleging that his defence rights had been violated in that he had not been given an opportunity to consult the case file. He alleged that on 1 October 2004 he had been brought to the Prelog Municipal Court in order to consult the case file. However, owing to the large volume of documents in the case file, the time allowed for that purpose had not permitted him to consult all the documents he had wished to. It had therefore been agreed that the requested documents would be copied and sent to him in prison. However, this request had only partially been complied with and he had never had an opportunity to read the whole case file. He further alleged that he had complained about this at the hearing held on 1 April 2005 but that his allegations had been ignored. He further complained that the search of his premises had been carried out in contravention of the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure because the requirement that two witnesses be constantly present had not been complied with. He also complained about the qualification of some of the offences as aggravated theft instead of theft and about the severity of the sentence. 25. On 18 April 2005 the officially appointed defence counsel also lodged an appeal, referring to the factual findings of the first-instance court. 26. On an unspecified date the applicant asked the Prelog Municipal Court if he could consult the case file. In its letter of 28 April 2005 addressed to the Head of Prison Administration at the Ministry of Justice, a copy of which was also forwarded to the applicant, the president of that court allowed the applicant's request. The applicant then requested that a date be fixed for consulting the case file. The President of the Prelog Municipal Court replied that the consultation was not possible because the case had been forwarded to the Čakovec County Court upon an appeal against the first-instance judgment. In a letter of 13 May 2005 a judge of the same court informed the applicant that his request had been granted and that the case file had been forwarded to the Čakovec County Court. 27. On 17 May 2005 the Čakovec County Court allowed the applicant's appeal in the part concerning the qualification of certain offences and reduced the sentence to six years and four months' imprisonment while dismissing the remainder of his complaints. The relevant parts of the appeal judgment read as follows: “In his personal appeal the defendant complains of serious breaches of the provisions regulating criminal proceedings, [these being] his inability to consult the case file; reliance of the impugned judgment on evidence under Article 9, paragraph 2, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, namely, the written record of the search of his flat and other premises, and the allegation that the identification of items (as potential evidence) by the injured parties had not been carried out in accordance with Article 243 (a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The officially appointed defence counsel also alleges in his appeal that there was a serious breach of the provisions regulating criminal proceedings in the reliance of the first-instance judgment on illegally obtained evidence, because the search of the defendant's premises had been carried out without the simultaneous presence of two witnesses. The search of the defendant's flat and other premises at the address Donji Kraljevec, Gornji kraj no. 13, was carried out by the police pursuant to search warrant no. Kir-75/04-02, issued by a Varaždin County Court investigating judge on 20 February 2004 and served on the defendant beforehand, as can be seen from a receipt on page 18 of the first-instance [court] case file. The report of the search of the [defendant's] flat and other premises of 23 February 2004 shows that the search was carried out in the presence of the defendant and two witnesses. On that occasion objects, which were enumerated in the certificates on temporarily seized items, were found and temporarily seized from the defendant. The defendant's assertion that the witnesses were not simultaneously and continually present during the search is unfounded and uncorroborated, since neither the defendant nor the present witnesses put forward any objections. As the search was carried out in compliance with Articles 211 and 214 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the report in question and the certificates regarding the items temporarily seized from the defendant constitute fully valid and legal evidence. The defendant's assertion that the first-instance court breached the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure [regulating] identification of certain objects in that the injured parties were shown the objects for identification without previously being asked to describe those objects is unfounded. Article 243(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires that a defendant or a witness be asked beforehand to describe a person or an object [to be identified] and describe their distinguishing marks only when necessary; following which the person or the object [to be identified] are to be shown to the defendant or a witness, together with other persons unknown to them, or with similar objects. It follows that this provision does not oblige the court or the police authorities to present the persons identifying [objects as potential evidence] with similar objects at each instance but [this requirement applies] only where possible. In the present case, where a large number of different objects were [to be identified], the police officers were not obliged to act in the manner the defendant argued they were in his appeal and therefore, in the view of this court, the identification of objects [as potential evidence] was carried out in accordance with the law. Therefore, the reports on identification in the present case constitute valid evidence, especially since some of the injured parties emphatically stated at the main hearing that the objects they had been presented with were theirs, which in any event – save for a few of [these objects] – the defendant did not deny in his initial defence. As regards the [alleged] inability of the defendant to consult the case file, it is to be noted that the [documents] from the case file show that the first-instance court allowed the defendant to consult the case file on 1 October 2004 (page 520) and that the requested copies of material evidence were served on the defendant in detention on 14 October 2005 (page 572). The defendant complains that his written request of 7 March 2005 to consult the case file while he was in detention was not granted. On the basis of the above [considerations], this court considers that in the present case there was no breach of Article 367, paragraph 3, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, since the defendant regularly attended the hearings, where he was able to consult the case file, copy the documents thereof and [examine] the objects aimed at establishing the facts of the case. Furthermore, during practically the entire first-instance proceedings the defendant had an officially appointed defence counsel. Thus, this court finds that there was no breach of his defence rights within the meaning of Article 367, paragraph 3, of the Code of Criminal Procedure. ... As regards the [allegations] that the facts of the case were wrongly established and incomplete, both appeals allege the same fact: that the first-instance court's refusal to hear evidence from the witnesses to the search resulted in a failure to establish whether the search of the applicant's house and adjoining courtyard had been carried out in accordance with the law. This court considers that the first-instance court correctly and completely established all the relevant facts, including those concerning the question whether the carrying out of the search on the applicant's flat and other premises was in accordance with the law. In this connection the first-instance court gave valid reasons for its decision not to accept the above-mentioned defendant's request [that two witnesses be heard], which reasons this court entirely endorses ...” 28. The applicant then lodged a request for extraordinary review of a final judgment. 29. In response to repeated requests by the applicant to consult the case file, the President of the Municipal Court informed him in a letter of 7 November 2005 that his request could not be granted because the case file had been forwarded to the Supreme Court. 30. On 22 November 2005 the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) dismissed the applicant's request for extraordinary review of a final judgment. The relevant parts of the judgment read as follows: “.. the defendant ... alleges that the impugned judgment rests on unlawfully obtained evidence, namely the report on the search of his flat, and that his defence rights were violated because he was not allowed to consult the case file before presenting his defence. ... The report on the search of the [defendant's] flat and other premises shows that the search was carried out pursuant to Varaždin County Court search warrant no. Kir 75/04-2 of 20 February 2004; and that two witnesses were present who were instructed at the outset to observe the procedure for carrying out [the search] and informed of their right to make objections before signing the report if they considered its contents to be inaccurate. The defendant was also present. All of these persons signed the report after it had been read to them, without making any objections, thus expressing their agreement with the content of the report. Such a report is lawful evidence because it shows that the search was carried out in accordance with Articles 213 and 214 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The defendant's assertion that the witnesses were not constantly present during the search is an objection to the established facts and cannot be accepted as a valid ground for lodging this extraordinary remedy. This court may consider the veracity of decisive facts only if a suspicion in that regard arises when it examines a request lodged under Article 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the present case, bearing in mind the content of the report on the search of the [defendant's] flat and other premises, this panel does not find any reasons to suspect that the search was not carried out in accordance with Articles 213 and 214 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Under Article 427(3) a request for extraordinary review of a final judgment may also be lodged [on the allegation that] the defendant's rights were violated at a main hearing. At the main hearing held on 1 April 2005, when the first-instance judgment was adopted and pronounced, the defendant's rights were not violated. The transcript of the hearing shows that the hearing started anew with a deputy State Attorney reading out the indictment. The defendant was informed of his right to a defence counsel under Article 320, paragraphs 2 and 4, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but he decided neither to exercise that right nor to present his defence, and remained silent. The defendant did not object to the procedure followed by the court or ask for the hearing to be adjourned in order to prepare his defence. The defendant's allegation that the court denied him the right to consult the case file while in detention is irrelevant for the examination of this request because he was informed of his rights at the main hearing, after which he chose not to submit his defence. ...” 31. In reply to a further request to consult the case file, lodged by the applicant on 23 January 2006, the President of the Prelog Municipal Court informed the applicant that his request could not be granted because the case file had been forwarded to the Varaždin Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Varaždinu). 32. A constitutional complaint subsequently lodged by the applicant was declared inadmissible on 23 February 2006 by the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) on the grounds that the impugned decision, namely the Supreme Court's judgment of 22 November 2005, had not concerned the merits of the case. The relevant part of the decision reads: “In accordance with [section 62 of the Constitutional Court Act], only a decision in which a competent court has decided on the merits of a case, namely, on the suspicion or indictment in respect of a criminal offence committed by the applicant, is an individual act within the meaning of section 62(1) of the Constitutional Court Act in respect of which the Constitutional Court, in proceedings instituted upon a constitutional complaint, is competent to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms of the applicant guaranteed by the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia. In the proceedings before the Constitutional Court it has been established that the impugned judgment of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia no. Kr-83/05 of 22 November 2005 is not an individual act within the meaning of section 62(1) of the Constitutional Court Act in respect of which the Constitutional Court is competent to give constitutional protection to the applicant.” 33. The medical documentation submitted by the parties shows that the applicant has been diagnosed as suffering from PTSD and a personality disorder. The applicant's stay in Varaždin Prison 34. The applicant was arrested on 23 February 2004 at 10 p.m. and released on 24 February 2004 at 6.00 p.m. He was arrested again on 2 March 2004 and placed in pre-trial detention in Varaždin Prison. As to the latter, the applicant alleges that the cells were overcrowded, that he was placed in a smoking cell and that he was only allowed to spend fifteen to twenty minutes a day in the fresh air. On 11 June 2004 the applicant was transferred to Zagreb Prison Hospital further to his complaint that he suffered from being placed in a cell with smokers. The discharge letter of 15 June 2004 shows that no lung disease had been established. The applicant was returned to Varaždin Prison. 35. In a complaint of 7 July 2004 addressed to the Prison Administration of the Ministry of Justice (Uprava za zatvorski sustav Ministartsva pravosuđa), the applicant complained about his placement in a cell with smokers. In a letter of 12 July 2007 of the Varaždin Prison authorities, addressed to the above Administration, it was explained that, owing to overcrowded conditions in that prison, it was not possible to place the applicant in a cell with non-smokers only. This information was forwarded to the applicant in a letter of the Prison Administration of the Ministry of Justice of 16 July 2004. 36. In his complaint of 12 October 2004 addressed to the Varaždin County Court, the applicant complained, inter alia, about the conditions in detention and, in particular, that he was placed in a cell with smokers and was allowed only fifteen to twenty minutes daily outdoor exercise. The applicant's complaints remained unanswered. 37. In October 2004 the applicant was released. 38. The applicant was again detained in January 2005 and placed in Varaždin Prison until 30 March 2005, when he was released. 39. On 1 April 2005, after his conviction by the Prelog Municipal Court, the applicant was arrested and again placed in Varaždin Prison. He was placed in cell no. 15, measuring 10.26 square metres, together with one other inmate, a non-smoker. 40. On 1 May 2005 the applicant made a commotion in his cell by banging chairs and his bed and verbally insulting the prison personnel. He was taken out of his cell and strapped down in a special cell. There is no written record of this measure or its exact duration. 41. During an outdoor walk on 13 May 2005 an attempt by the applicant to hit another inmate was prevented by a prison guard. The applicant was strapped down in a special cell and returned to his regular cell the same day. There is no written record of this measure or its exact duration. The same day the applicant attempted to attack a prison guard. As a consequence, he was strapped to his bed. There is no written record of this measure or its exact duration. Furthermore, the same day the applicant was transferred to Zagreb Prison Hospital. The relevant part of the discharge letter of 25 May 2005 reads: “The patient was brought from Varaždin Prison in reactive exacerbation of his mental condition. He was agitated on arrival, with no manifest psychotic or suicidal symptoms. He said that he had been refusing food since 12 May. ... He has continued to refuse food until 23 May, but has been taking liquids and vitamin pills. He has not received any other treatment. He is in a good general condition ... Elements of PTSD. Depressive-paranoid syndrome. Histrionic personality. ... Recommended treatment: Apaurin ..., psychiatric supervision and more intensive engagement on the part of the treatment services.” 42. He was returned to Varaždin Prison to the same cell. The medical record shows that he refused food from 12 to 23 May 2005, but did take liquids and vitamin pills. 43. On 8 June 2005, following an incident in which the applicant started breaking furniture in his cell, he was sent to the prison doctor. However, he verbally insulted the doctor and other medical personnel and was strapped down in cell no. 16. There is no written record of this measure or its exact duration. The applicant's stay in Zagreb Prison from 13 June to 6 July 2005 44. On 13 June 2005 the applicant was transferred to Zagreb Prison, where he was placed in the Department for Diagnostics and Programming (Odjel za dijagnostiku i programiranje). A report on the general examination of the applicant, in so far as relevant, reads as follows: “... DIAGNOSTIC INFORMATION In the intellectual capacity tests his results are above average. He adequately cooperates during the interview, apologising for having to go on a hunger strike in order to safeguard his rights. Actually, he is highly anxious and over-sensitive, everything bothers him. In terms of his personality, he is impulsive and emotionally unstable. He easily loses control of his behaviour and acts in an emotionally impulsive and inadequate manner. The low tolerance of frustrations is evident, which leads to irritability and accentuated touchiness. His tendency to react aggressively is marked and he has a significantly lowered capacity to maintain self-control and self-protection, which makes him prone to undertake activities involving a high level of risk. He has no insight into his motives and feelings and is uncritical. The likelihood that he will reoffend is high. ... WORKING CAPACITY He is capable for all types of work without restrictions. PROPOSAL AS TO THE INDIVIDUAL PROGRAMME FOR THE ENFORCEMNT OF THE PRISON TERM The prison term is to be continued in closed conditions. It is to be expected that his behaviour will be excessive (conflicts, disobedience, refusal of food ...). He may be assigned to a work place according to the needs of the institution. Psychiatric supervision as needed.” RECOMMENDATION OF THE INSTITUTION WHERE THE PRISON TERM IS TO BE CONTINUED Lepoglava State Prison” 45. The relevant part of the applicant's medical record during his stay in Zagreb Prison reads: “13 June 2005 ... In May 2005 [he was] treated at the psychiatric ward of Zagreb Prison Hospital. Pharmacotherapy: Apaurin... At present [he is] agitated, complaining of chest pain ... Treatment: Apaurin ..., Fluzepan ... ...” 46. On 6 July 2005 the applicant was transferred to Lepoglava State Prison. The applicant's stay in Lepoglava State Prison from 6 July 2005 to 14 October 2006 47. From July to September 2005 the applicant was placed in cell no. 5, measuring 9.12 square metres, together with three other inmates. Adjacent to the cell and for the exclusive use of the inmates occupying the cell was a tiled area measuring 2.15 square metres. From September to December 2005 the applicant was placed in cell no. 9, measuring 9.82 square metres, together with three other inmates. He was able to use a bathroom and toilet area measuring 20.9 square metres. 48. On 1 September 2005 the applicant petitioned the Varaždin County Court judge responsible for the execution of sentences (sudac izvršenja Županijskog suda u Varaždinu), complaining about conditions in Lepoglava State Prison. He explained that he had been continually placed in a cell with smokers and that he was detained in overcrowded conditions. He further complained that he had not been receiving any treatment for his psychiatric ailments, in particular the PTSD, and that he was being given no psychiatric treatment at all. He also complained that the examination by a doctor, who had seen him on 8 July 2005 in order to establish his fitness to work in prison, had lasted two minutes. In a letter of 11 October 2005 the judge found that the applicant was allowed to use some of his personal items, that he had complained about his placement in a smoking cell, that he had adequate medical care, and that he had been on hunger strike between 2 and 14 September 2005. 49. Although upon his arrival the applicant was assigned to a non-working group, there were subsequently several attempts to include him in working activities. For a month, starting on 28 October 2005, the applicant worked in a storehouse. Since his work there was found to be unsatisfactory, on 30 November 2005 he was offered work in a therapeutic workshop and placement in a non-smoking cell. However, the applicant refused this offer. 50. On 2 December 2005 the applicant was placed in the Department with increased supervision for a period of three months. 51. From 7 to 20 December 2005 the applicant was on hunger strike. He was subsequently returned to work in a storehouse. 52. On 7 December 2005 the applicant again complained to the Varaždin County Court judge responsible for the execution of sentences about the conditions in prison. The report of the Lepoglava State Prison authorities of 13 December 2005 state, inter alia, that the applicant had been included in the programme for persons suffering from PTSD, without any further details. The applicant's complaints remained unanswered by the competent judge. 53. On an unspecified date the applicant complained about the prison conditions and in particular the lack of adequate medical treatment to the Ministry of Justice. On 2 February 2006 the Ministry asked the Lepoglava Prison authorities to submit their report on the matter. The report of 24 February 2006, in so far as relevant, reads as follows: “Upon his arrival at the prison the inmate was assigned to a non-working group, and involved in leisure activities and the programme for persons suffering from PTSD as well as to the programme for a computer operator... The prison doctor saw him on twenty-three occasions and he was twice examined by a psychiatrist. His diagnosis includes depression, paranoia, elements of PTSD and low tolerance towards frustrations. He has regularly been receiving sleeping pills and tranquilisers (Apaurin and Cerson)....” It was also stated that the applicant had worked for a certain period but had stopped, owing to some conflicts. The applicant sent his reply to the report, in which he stated that he had actually seen a psychiatrist on three or even four occasions, but each time at his insistence although a discharge letter from Zagreb Prison Hospital of 25 May 2005 requested that he receive regular psychiatric supervision. He further asserted that he had not been able to attend group therapy sessions for persons suffering from PTSD because he had had no access to information about the time of these sessions. No decision was taken upon the applicant's complaint. 54. In April and May 2006 the applicant had a number of arguments with other inmates, which culminated on 10 May 2006 in a fight with another inmate. The applicant was transferred to the Department with increased supervision, owing to which he refused to take food. He also refused a psychiatric examination scheduled for 11 May 2006. 55. In his appeal of 16 May 2006 against a decision of the Lepoglava State Prison authorities to place him in a Strict Supervision Department, addressed to the Varaždin County Court judge responsible for the execution of sentences, the applicant complained, inter alia, that he had not been regularly receiving the prescribed pharmacotherapy. He also alleged that on 8 May 2006 he had been attacked by his cellmate, who had allegedly attempted to strangle him. The applicant further complained that he had been forced to share the cell with that inmate although he had complained to the prison authorities that later on that inmate had threatened him and had been allowed to keep a knife in the cell. The applicant also alleged that on 9 May 2006 he had been denied the prescribed pharmacotherapy and had therefore asked one of the guards to take him to the medical ward. The guard, however, had refused and threatened to crush the applicant, following which the applicant had inflicted self-injuries by cutting his veins, whereupon he had been taken to the medical ward within the prison. The applicant also alleged that on 10 May 2006, during breakfast, he had been attacked by another inmate who bit his finger. In the report of 26 May 2006, addressed to the judge responsible for the execution of sentences, the Lepoglava State Prison authorities stated that the applicant had not complied with the House Rules for a longer period. A report of the incident of 10 May 2006 was enclosed. This report stated that on 10 May 2006 during breakfast the applicant had thrown a plate at inmate M.B., who had been washing the dishes, whereupon M.B. had jumped on the applicant and bit his finger. The applicant had been taken to the medical ward, while M.B. had no injuries. The report did not address any of the incidents described by the applicant. The competent judge did not answer the applicant's complaint. 56. On 30 May 2006 the applicant wrote to the Ombudsman's Office (Pučki pravobranitelj). In a letter of 6 June 2006 addressed to the Head of the Prison Administration, the Deputy Ombudsman reiterated the applicant's allegations that he had been attacked by other inmates on two occasions at the beginning of May and that no steps had been taken against the perpetrators, as well as further allegations that the applicant, although suffering from PTSD, had not received any treatment for over a month and had been placed in a smoking cell. 57. From 30 May to 21 June 2006 the applicant was transferred to Zagreb Prison Hospital. The relevant part of the discharge letter of 21 June 2006 reads: “The patient was admitted due to the hunger strike he had started on 10 May 2006 because he had been dissatisfied with his treatment in prison. ... During the first days of his hospitalisation the patient refused food, and [he was] hostile and manipulative; on several occasions during the interviews with a psychiatrist he requested a solution to his problems in connection with the conditions in the prison, being unwilling to correct his behaviour. ... While in hospital the patient started to take food. He is discharged in a partially better condition ...” 58. During the period the applicant spent in Lepoglava State Prison in May and June 2006 he was placed in cell no. 4, measuring 10.13 square metres, together with one other inmate, and sharing an adjacent toilet area of 1.79 square metres. From June to September 2006 the applicant was placed in cell no. 1, measuring 13.72 square metres, together with three other inmates, also sharing an adjacent toilet area of 2.3 square metres. During this period the applicant spent two non-consecutive days in solitary confinement in a cell (no. 13) measuring 8.97 square metres. 59. On 1 August 2006 the applicant again petitioned the Varaždin County Court judge responsible for the execution of sentences, complaining about being placed in a smoking cell. The judge replied in a letter of 11 September 2006 that the applicant's transfer to another prison would be considered. 60. On 18 September 2006 an incident involving the use of force against the applicant occurred. The two guards involved in the incident gave oral statements on the same day to the Head of Security Division within the prison. These statements and several written reports of 18 and 19 September 2006 by the Lepoglava State Prison personnel, submitted to the prison governor, all concur that on 18 September 2006 at 12.50 p.m. the applicant had started to shout at some of them and requested to be immediately taken to the prison doctor. One of the prison guards had asked him to wait since the doctor had been with another inmate, but he had continued to shout and hit the walls and metal bars. After he had ignored warnings to calm down, he had lifted a chair and thrown it at the prison guards and continued throwing objects. Another guard had arrived, whereupon one of the guards had taken the applicant by the left hand and the other by the right hand, twisted them behind the applicant's back and handcuffed him. The applicant had continued to utter shouts and threats and had therefore been taken to a special cell where he had been strapped down. He had also refused the prison doctor's attempt to examine him. 61. Further to these reports the Government submitted that the applicant had refused to be examined by the prison doctor or to give a statement about the incident. The Head of Security Division heard the two guards involved in the incident separately. In the next two days the applicant again refused to see the prison doctor. One of the guards made a report on the applicant's refusal to see the prison doctor on 19 and 20 September 2006. 62. From 20 to 29 September 2006 the applicant was placed in Zagreb Prison Hospital. The relevant part of the discharge letter of 27 September 2006 reads: “The patient was admitted because of suicide threats. ... He expressed dissatisfaction with his treatment in the prison. During hospitalisation he has been calm, neither suicidal nor productive. He has refused food in order to have his paramedical problems resolved. He does not consider himself as ill. He insists on being discharged. ... Since the patient is not in vital danger, [and he is] productive, against suicide, he is to be discharged and it is recommended that he be placed in a day-care department.“ 63. Meanwhile, on 25 September 2006 the applicant again petitioned the Varaždin County Court judge responsible for the execution of sentences, complaining about his placement in a smoking cell. He also referred to the incident of 18 September 2006, alleging that he had been beaten up while in solitary confinement and that his request to see the prison doctor had been ignored. On 6 October 2006 the judge asked the Lepoglava State Prison authorities whether it was possible to place the applicant in another penal institution. The applicant's allegations about the attack of 18 September 2006 were ignored. 64. During the periods when the applicant did not work his daily regime was as follows: 7 a.m. – 7.30 a.m. – wake up, personal hygiene, cleaning of cells 65. During the period the applicant worked his daily regime was as follows: 66. During his stay at the Department with increased supervision the applicant's daily regime was as follows: 67. The Government submitted that at his arrival at Lepoglava State Prison the applicant had been included in the programme for prisoners suffering from PTSD and that in addition he had been continuously monitored by a psychiatrist. Later on, owing to the applicant's ill-adapted behaviour and conflicts with other prisoners he had been offered the possibility of joining a different therapy workshop, which he had refused. The Government did not specify, however, the dates of the applicant's group or individual therapy sessions. 68. The Government submitted the Lepoglava State Prison programme of therapy for inmates suffering from PTSD. The programme included one-hour weekly meetings of three small groups (five to twelve persons) who met on their own in order to discuss their problems. Each group was led by a member of the prison personnel. The qualifications or occupation of these persons was not specified; nor was it specified whether they attended the group meetings or not. The therapists met once a month with two psychiatrists in and outside the prison clinic and once a month in the prison. Participation in therapy groups was voluntary. 69. The relevant part of the applicant's medical record during his stay in Lepoglava State Prison reads: “1 September 2005 Psychiatric examination at the medical ward of Lepoglava State Prison. During the current examination he is neither psychotic nor suicidal. He says that he has not been taking food for a week. He asks to be placed in a non-smoking cell and to be given treatment for headaches and sleep deprivation. Treatment: Fortevit ..., Apaurin ..., Fluzepan ... 7 December 2005 Psychiatric examination: conscious, well-orientated, no signs of psychosis, [he] is not suicidal, [he is] very tense, has very low level of tolerance towards frustrations ... 20 April 2006 He saw a psychiatrist at the medical ward of the Lepoglava State Prison. Treatment: Apaurin ..., Sanval ... He is currently on hunger strike. ... 10 May 2006 Alleges fight with another inmate, who allegedly bit his finger. D[ia]g[nosis]: Vulnus morsum? [a wound by biting]? Indicis m.l.sin. [marks on middle left finger], Regio ph. Medialis [middle zone]. Alleges that he will go on hunger strike. ... 20 July 2006 Psychiatric examination: [he is] neither psychotic nor suicidal, [he is] anxious, tense with low level of tolerance, allegedly worried, asks for hospitalisation which is unfounded. ... 20 July 2006 Hospitalisation was ordered, but he refused to go to Zagreb Prison Hospital. ... He returned to the medical ward at 5.40 p.m., revolted, wanting to go to the hospital today although at 2 p.m. he had refused it. He took out a razor blade and made a few cuts on the surface of his left forearm. ... [He] made threats of inflicting further self-injuries if not taken to the hospital today. Hospitalisation was ordered, but there was no capacity in the hospital to admit him. ... 21 July 2006 Sent to Zagreb Prison Hospital. 24 July 2006 The admission report from Zagreb Prison Hospital of 21 July 2007: '... [the patient] is shouting, threatening to beat other patients, asking to be placed in a non-smoking room, making threats against the hospital personnel because there is only one bed available and there is no separate room for non-smokers. He does not want to stay in the hospital because he cannot get desired accommodation. He refuses to take Apaurin in his veins. He is very unpleasant, uttering threats and blackmail. Since his condition is not life-threatening and given that the patient is refusing the treatment offered, he shall be returned to prison. Started eating so as not to be removed form Division 8 of the Prison. ... 18 September 2006 ... he has been placed in solitary confinement, handcuffed to a bed. He is anxious, verbally aggressive, dissatisfied with being handcuffed, bangs on the bed with his handcuffs and asks to be released. [He] is not psychotic or suicidal ... It has not been possible to examine him because he is very restless and is banging on the bed with his handcuffs, so that it has not been possible to approach the inmate in bed. 5 October 2006 [He] refused to see a psychiatrist. ...” 70. On 14 October 2006 the applicant was transferred to Gospić Prison. The applicant's stay in Gospić Prison from 14 October 2006 to 6 January 2007 71. The applicant was placed, together with one other inmate, in a cell measuring 13.13 square metres with an adjacent toilet area measuring 3.2 square metres. The cell was furnished with two beds, two cupboards, a table and two chairs. A bathroom was available to the applicant the whole day. He did not work. 72. During his stay in this prison the applicant did not work and did not receive any treatment for his PTSD. His daily regime was as follows: 7.30 – 8.30 – possibility to see prison doctor One hour between 8.30 a.m. and 1.00 p.m. – outdoor exercise 73. On 6 November 2006 the applicant complained to the Head of the Prison Administration about the conditions in prison. He was answered in a letter of 30 November 2006 stating that his treatment had been humane, professional and in accordance with the legislative standards. 74. On 6 January 2007 the applicant was transferred to Pula Prison The applicant's stay in Pula Prison from 6 January to 5 November 2007 75. Initially, he was placed, together with another inmate, a non-smoker, in a cell measuring 10.2 square metres, furnished with two beds, two cupboards, a table and two chairs, with an adjacent toilet area measuring 3.98 square metres. The cell was heated by a radiator. The applicant did not work, had the possibility of spending time outdoors every day between noon and 2 p.m. and again between 6.30 p.m. and 8.30 p.m. During his leisure time the applicant was involved in the computer group. 76. On 21 January 2007 an incident occurred involving the use of force against the applicant. According to the Government, at 8 p.m. that day two prison guards, E.L. and I.O., were distributing pharmacotherapy to the inmates in their cells. The applicant had refused to take the prescribed medication. At 10 p.m. he had taken the prescribed medication but also asked for the medicine he had refused to take at 8 p.m.. His request had been refused. After the guards in charge had left his cell the applicant had started shouting and banging. The guards had returned and the applicant had made an attempt to kick one of them. The guards had taken the applicant, pushed him to the floor and handcuffed his hands behind his back. The applicant had continued resisting, hitting and shouting. Two other guards had arrived and the applicant was tied down in a separate cell. One of the guards had noticed a laceration next to the applicant's right eye and asked if he wished to see the prison doctor, which the applicant had refused, demanding to see a psychiatrist. He also refused to sign the report on the incident and the statement that he had not wished to see the prison doctor. 77. On the same day the guard on duty, N.B., made a report on the incident, which was submitted to the Head of Security. The guards E.I. and I.O. also made their reports on the incident. On 24 January E.I. and I.O. gave their oral statements to the officer in charge. 78. On an unspecified date the applicant wrote to the Ministry of Family, War Veterans and Inter-Generational Solidarity, which forwarded his complaint about the conditions in Pula Prison to the Head of the Prison Administration on 26 January 2007. The complaint remained unanswered. 79. On 8 February 2007 the applicant was transferred to a single occupancy cell measuring 8.73 square metres, with an adjacent toilet area. According to the Government, the cell had a window measuring 0.9 square metres and was heated by a radiator. The applicant was provided with a television set. He was able to use a common bathroom on request. 80. On 17 February 2007 another incident occurred. According to the applicant, he had been placed in solitary confinement and one of the guards thumped him several times on the left side of his chest. 81. On 21 and 22 February the applicant was examined by a doctor. The relevant part of the medical report reads: “21 February 2007 [The inmate is] complaining about pain in the left hemithorax, trauma not excluded. I have not found visible signs of trauma or haematoma. While breathing he spares left side, pain on palpation of left upper ribs. Sent for an X-ray. 22 February 2007 Pain in the left-rib area. The X-ray examination shows that there are no signs of rib-related trauma or lung alteration. He does not present allergy to medication.” 82. On 26 February 2007 the applicant was heard by a judge responsible for the execution of sentences of the Pula County Court. He stated that on 21 January 2007 at around 8 p.m. two prison guards, I.O. and E.L., had been administering pharmacotherapy to the inmates in Pula Prison. The applicant had complained that he had to take his therapy at 10 p.m. The guards had replied that they would make a note that the applicant had refused therapy. The applicant had then opened a cupboard in his cell in order to show them his medical documentation confirming his allegations. Since the guards had left, the applicant had stamped in order to make them return since there was no other way of drawing their attention. The guards had returned and opened the applicant's cell. One of them had stamped on the applicant's foot and the other had hit him in the head, while shouting at him. He further stated that, on 17 February 2007, while he had been placed in solitary confinement, four guards had arrived and strapped him to the bed, which he had not resisted. One of the guards had hit him several times on the left side of his body. The applicant had begged him to stop since he had heart problems. The same guard had also threatened to leave the applicant strapped down for twenty-four hours. 83. The Pula Prison authorities filed a report with the Pula County Court on 9 March 2007. The relevant part of the report reads: “... We have already examined the allegations of the said inmate about the acts of the prison guards of 21 January 2007. The guards involved made their reports and also gave their oral statements. The inmate Branko Dolenec was also interviewed. It has been established that the guards acted in accordance with the law and that the inmate Branko Dolenec had attempted to diminish his responsibility by saying that he had not been given the prescribed treatment at the right time. He did not wish to give a written statement of the incident. Disciplinary proceedings have been instituted against the inmate Branko Dolenec for disciplinary offences under section 145(2)(8) and 145(3)(8) of the Enforcement of Prison Sentences Act in respect of which there is a reasonable suspicion that he committed them on 21 January 2007 to the detriment of the guards about whose acts he was complaining. It is true that on 17 February 2007 a special measure of keeping order and security under section 135(6) was applied because there was a danger that he would inflict self-injuries. Beforehand, on the same day he had threatened to inflict self-injuries and repeated warnings had produced no results. In accordance with section 138(2), the applied measure lasted from 8.25 a.m. to 6 p.m. We have no information that on that occasion any of the guards used force against the inmate, or that anyone threatened to keep him tied down for twenty-four hours. ...” 84. In a letter of 23 March 2007 the judge responsible for the execution of sentences of the Pula County Court replied to the applicant that the report submitted by the prison authorities showed that on 21 January 2007 the prison guards had acted in accordance with the law and that on 17 February 2007 he had been placed in solitary confinement because he had threatened to inflict self-injuries and that neither coercive measures had been applied not any threats made against him. The relevant part of the letter reads: “As regards the event of 21 January 2007, according to the report of the Pula Prison Administration, the guards acted in accordance with the law while you, in order to diminish your personal responsibility, asserted that you had not received the prescribed medication at the right time. ... Furthermore, the information submitted by Pula Prison does not show any indication that on 17 February 2007 any force was used against you or that any of the prison personnel threatened to tie you down for twenty-four hours.” 85. On 27 March 2007 the applicant objected to the findings of the judge responsible for the execution of sentences and reiterated that on 17 February 2007 he had been strapped down for twelve hours in solitary confinement and beaten up by a prison guard. He further complained of lack of treatment for PTSD. On 16 May 2007 the judge replied to the applicant by letter, stating that his objections were unfounded. 86. On 24 May 2007 the applicant was assigned to work in the prison shop. According to the Government, until 6 August 2007 his comportment was fully satisfactory, when he suddenly started to verbally insult the prison personnel and other inmates. Owing to such frequent incidents and his exacerbated psychiatric condition, on 24 August 2007 he had again been assigned to a non-working group. 87. From 24 September to 3 October 2007 the applicant worked in the prison library. On the latter date he again started verbally insulting and attempting to physically attack the prison personnel because he was dissatisfied with the prospect of being placed in a cell with another inmate. 88. On 4 October 2007, owing to his worsening psychiatric condition and the self-infliction of injuries, the applicant was transferred to Zagreb Prison Hospital. The relevant part of the discharge letter of 18 October 2007 reads as follows: “Diagnosis: Personality disorder PTSD The patient was admitted ... because of self-inflicted injuries. On arrival he was upset and in corresponding mood, with accelerated and widened thought processes, querulous and with a number of projections but without clear psychotic indications. He did not show aggressive or further auto-aggressive drives. His complaints about his treatment in Pula Prison included allegations that he had been placed in the pre-trial detention ward in a cell with smokers. He also asserted that he had been beaten up a few days prior to his arrival at the hospital. Lacerations and older haematomas on his back and a haematoma in regression on his thigh were visible on arrival. There were no visible injuries to his head. During his stay in the hospital he was demanding, querulous, upset, constantly insisting on the alleged injustice done to him. There were no psychotic signs or aggressive or auto-aggressive drives. Only after his treatment had been altered did he become somewhat calmer and more willing to co-operate, although still persisting in his demand for “the just”. ... There are no indications for hospital treatment. Placement in a calmer and non-smoking cell is recommended together with stricter supervision and stronger efforts on the part of the treatment services as well as regular pharmacotherapy: Haldol ..., Akineton ..., Fluzepan ... and Brufen ... with regular psychiatric supervision, starting in two weeks.” 89. On 19 October 2007 the applicant was returned to Pula Prison and placed in a single-occupancy cell identical to the one in which he had stayed prior to his transfer to the hospital. The Government submitted that although there had been group therapy for inmates suffering from PTSD in Pula Prison since 5 October 2007, the applicant, owing to his mental condition which included impulsive behaviour, emotional instability and tendency towards aggressive behaviour, had not been included in that therapy. However, they submitted that psychiatric supervision had been carried out as needed, without any further details. 90. The relevant part of the applicant's medical record during his stay in Pula Prison reads: “24 April 2007 An interview. [He] announces a hunger strike as of today and [expresses an intention to inflict] self-injuries. [He is] upset, communication is not possible ... Stricter supervision measures for seven days [are recommended]. Therapy: none. ... 24 August 2007 At 4 a.m. today he was taken to a psychiatrist at Pula General Hospital ... Hospitalisation in the Psychiatric Ward of Zagreb Prison Hospital was recommended. Treatment: Apaurin ..., Fluzepan ... He could not be admitted to Zagreb Prison Hospital owing to the lack of space. He was calm during the second interview [with a psychiatrist], there was no further indication for hospitalisation in Zagreb Prison Hospital. Placement in a separate non-smoking cell was recommended. ... 4 October 2007 Yesterday [he inflicted] self-injuries ... [there is] redness on his neck and back and several lacerations measuring approximately 2 cm, haematoma measuring 2 to 8 cm. [He is] upset, tense, anxious, expresses suicidal thoughts and intentions. Given Prazine ... and it was recommended [to take him to] the Psychiatric Ward of Zagreb Prison Hospital. 25 October 2007 [He] is not taking the treatment prescribed. ...” 91. On 5 November 2007 the applicant was transferred back to Lepoglava State Prison. The applicant's stay in Lepoglava State Prison from 5 November 2007 to an unspecified date in 2008 92. The relevant part of the applicant's medical record during his second stay in Lepoglava State Prison reads: “16 November 2007 Psychiatric examination in Lepoglava State Prison: [he is] conscious, well orientated, [he is] not suicidal, [there are] no signs of psychosis, [there is] low frustration tolerance, [he is] dissatisfied with his placement, treatment and other. Placement in a smaller, non-smoking cell is recommended. [He] refuses the treatment offered (Haldol). Treatment: Apaurin ..., Fluzepan ..., stronger involvement on the part of the treatment services. D[ia]g[nosis]: Personality disorder, PTSD. [Next] check in a month. ... 28 November 2007 Psychiatric examination in Lepoglava State Prison by a psychiatrist from Zagreb Prison Hospital.... Placement in a smaller non-smoking cell is recommended.... Patient [is] motivated to work. It is recommended that he works if possible, which would also be curative. Psychiatric supervision as needed. D[i]g[anosis]: the same. Treatment: the same. ... ... 4 December 2007 Psychiatric examination in Lepoglava State Prison ... Allegedly the patient is not eating because the recommendations by psychiatrists have not been followed. We request that these recommendations be followed. On examination he is neither psychotic nor suicidal. Psychiatric supervision as needed. ... 18 December 2007 Psychiatric examination in Lepoglava State Prison ... tolerance towards frustrations still low, [he is] dissatisfied with treatment, [but is] motivated to work. Placement in a smaller, non-smoking cell is recommended as well as including him in the PTSD group. Treatment: Apaurin ..., Sanval ... Psychiatric supervision as needed. ... 15 January 2008 Psychiatric examination in Lepoglava State Prison ... somewhat better in view of his new job and a smaller cell, which had so far been the biggest problem. Ventilation interview. Treatment: Apaurin ..., Sanval.” The applicant's further transfers 93. On an unspecified date in 2008 the applicant was transferred to Varaždin Prison where he stayed until 27 April 2009 when he was transferred to Zadar Prison. On 8 June 2009 he was transferred to Pula Prison and on 28 July 2009 to Zagreb Prison. 94. As to the twenty-eight days of his unlawful detention between 2 and 30 March 2005, on 28 October 2005 the applicant applied to the Ministry of Justice (Ministarstvo Pravosuđa) for compensation in the sum of 500 Croatian kunas (HRK) per day and HRK 5,500 for lost earnings. Since he received no reply, the applicant brought a civil action against the State in the Prelog Municipal Court, seeking the above amounts in connection with his unlawful detention. He also complained that since 2 March 2004 he had been detained in inadequate, small and overcrowded cells and only allowed to spend fifteen to twenty minutes a day in the fresh air, and also that he had been detained with smokers, minors and convicts between 14 July and 26 September 2004. He further complained of inadequate conditions in the prison hospital and Lepoglava State Prison, as well as inadequate medical care. In this connection he alleged that he had not been provided with eye glasses and that an examination of his head had been carried out late, while an examination of his spine had not been carried out at all, and that he had not been provided with the requisite psychiatric treatment although he suffered from PTSD. He also alleged that he had been strapped to his bed and forced to spend long periods confined in the same room with smokers, all of which resulted in immense physical and mental suffering. The applicant complained in addition that he had had no opportunity to consult the case file during the criminal proceedings against him. He sought HRK 469,500 under all the above heads. 95. On 24 April 2006 the Prelog Municipal Court declared the applicant's action inadmissible on the grounds that he had failed to firstly seek compensation with the competent State Attorney's Office. The first-instance decision was quashed by the Čakovec County Court and the case was remitted to the Municipal Court for fresh examination. On 7 November 2008 the Municipal Court again declared the applicant's claim inadmissible on the same grounds. The applicant lodged an appeal and the appeal proceedings are still pending.

5. The applicants were born in 1970 and 1987 respectively. The first applicant lives in Noviy Redant, Ingushetia, and the second applicant in Mayskiy (also spelled as Mayskoye), North Ossetia-Alania. The first applicant is the sister of Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov, who was born in 1983. The second applicant is his wife. 6. At the material time Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov was working as a martial arts trainer in the “Ellin” sports club (gym) (in the documents submitted also referred to as the “Kaloy” sports club) in Nazran, Ingushetia. He was the mixed martial arts European champion and a well-known sportsman in the region. He and the second applicant lived in Mayskiy, a settlement on the border between North Ossetia-Alania and Ingushetia. Permanent checkpoint no. 105, also known as “Chermenskiy krug”, was located between Mayskiy on one side of the border and the settlement of Chermen on the other. The checkpoint was equipped with CCTV cameras. Every passing vehicle was checked along with the driver’s and passengers’ identity documents. From the documents submitted to the Court it appears that other traffic checkpoints were located in the area. 7. Between 9 and 10 p.m. on 6 December 2012 Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov was driving home from Nazran in his white Lada-Priora car with registration number AH214A06. At about 10 p.m. he called his wife saying that he would arrive soon, but he did not. The applicants tried to call him, but his mobile phone was switched off. At around 5 a.m. on 7 December 2012 the applicants and their relatives found Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov’s training shoe, socks and hat in a street in the neighbourhood. 8. At about 9.30 a.m. on 7 December 2012 Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov’s car was found in the vicinity of Mayskiy, not far from the motorway. The car’s front side windows were smashed and the front of the vehicle had been damaged. 9. According to the applicants, in the evening of 6 December 2012 Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov had been stopped about 200-300 metres from his house by masked men in military uniforms, who had followed him in three cars. The men had forced him into one of their vehicles and taken him to an unknown destination. The applicants did not witness the abduction. (b) Subsequent developments 10. On 20 and 24 December 2012 a local newspaper published an article concerning a meeting held on 17 December 2012 (in the documents submitted the date was also referred to as 20 December 2012) by the President of Ingushetia, Mr Yunus‑Bek Yevkurov, and other high-ranking officials with members of the sports club where Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov had worked. Information about the meeting, held in Ingush, was posted on various websites. At the meeting one of the officials stated that Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov had been aiding a member of an illegal armed group, Mr D. The President of Ingushetia reminded them that at his previous meetings with members of the sports community, at which Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov had also been present, he had warned them not to engage in illegal acts. The President also said that he had information concerning phone calls proving Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov’s involvement in illegal activities. A video recording of the meeting was provided to the investigating authorities (see paragraph 44 below). 11. The applicants have had no news of Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov since his alleged abduction. 12. The Government contested neither the applicants’ description of the circumstances of the abduction, nor their account of the subsequent events. However, they stated that the alleged abduction had taken place in the absence of witnesses and that there was no evidence that the perpetrators had been State agents. 13. In reply to the Court’s request for a copy of the contents of the criminal case file opened in connection with the disappearance, the Government submitted copies of documents running to 1,570 pages. From the documents submitted, the domestic investigation can be summarised as follows. 14. On 7 December 2012 the second applicant complained to the Prigorodniy District Investigations Department in the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania (“the investigations department”), stating that her husband had disappeared while driving home from Ingushetia. 15. On the same date the investigations department opened criminal case no. 21/1908 into the events under Article 105 of the Criminal Code (murder). The applicants were informed thereof. 16. On the same day the investigators examined the crime scene. They collected from the scene the hat, the training shoe and the socks. 17. Also on the same date, 7 December 2012, the investigators examined Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov’s car, which had been found with smashed windows eighty metres from the Vladikavkaz-Mozdok motorway. They found traces of blood in the car. The investigators collected a number of pieces of evidence, such as a finger print from pack of cigarettes, thirteen swabs of various parts of the vehicle (including the steering wheel and breaks), a number of items of clothing, two bags, a mobile telephone, eight memory cards, pieces of broken glass and a police service identity card certifying that Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov worked as a policeman in Ingushetia. On the same date a forensic expert examination of the evidence was ordered. The applicants were informed thereof. 18. On 8 December 2012 the second applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case. 19. On 10 December 2012 the investigators requested that the Prigorodniy District Court grant permission to obtain the list of calls and other connections made from Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov’s and the second applicant’s mobile telephones between 1 and 7 December and 6 and 7 December 2012. In addition, the investigators requested permission to obtain the list of all mobile connections made in the vicinity of the crime scene (see paragraph 7 above) between 6 and 7 December 2012. On 12 December 2012 the permissions were granted and on 19 and 21 December 2012 the lists were examined. 20. On 11 December 2012 the investigators requested that the Prigorodniy District Court grant permission to tap for thirty days the mobile telephone of Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov’s aunt, Ms Kh.B., and that of the second applicant, as earlier on the same date the investigators had obtained operational information that the perpetrators would try to call them to discuss payment of ransom for Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov. 21. On the same date the second applicant requested that the investigators provide her with information on the progress of the investigation and with copies of the case-file documents. On 13 December 2012 the investigators granted the request in part, stating that under national law, prior to the completion of the investigation the applicant was entitled to obtain copies of certain procedural documents but not the entire contents of the case file. 22. Also on the same date, 11 December 2012, the second applicant requested that the investigators provide her with information concerning the list of connections made to and from Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov’s mobile telephone from 7 p.m. on 6 December to 11 December 2012 and the information from the CCTV cameras installed at checkpoint “Kizlyar” on the motorway next to Mayskiy between 6 p.m. on 6 December and 3 a.m. on 7 December 2012. On 13 December 2012 her request was rejected, as under domestic law she was not entitled to obtain such information from the case file. 23. On 13 December 2012 the expert examination of Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov’s police identity card collected from his vehicle (see paragraph 16 above) concluded that the document had been forged. On 28 February 2013 the Ingushetia Ministry of the Interior confirmed to the investigators that the police identity card had been forged and that Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov had not served in the police. 24. On 17 December 2012 the second applicant requested that the investigators verify the theory that her husband had been abducted by residents of Beslan, North Ossetia-Alania, who on 24 June 2012 had attacked Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov’s sports team after a tournament held in that town. On the same date the investigators granted the request in full. In particular, they obtained copies of the inquiry carried out into the incident and questioned witnesses to the scuffle. 25. On 17 December 2012 the investigators examined the eight memory cards collected from Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov’s car and ordered their forensic expert examination. The applicants were informed thereof. 26. On the same date the investigators asked the Ministers of the Interior of North Ossetia-Alania, Ingushetia, Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria and the heads of the North Ossetia-Alania, Ingushetia, Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria Departments of the Federal Security Service (“the FSB”), as well as other law-enforcement agencies, whether they had any incriminating information concerning Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov and whether they had carried out a special operation in respect of him. 27. The investigators asked a number of banks whether they had accounts opened in Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov’s name and if so, details of the transactions on those accounts between the dates of their opening and 17 December 2012. 28. The investigators also asked a number of hospitals whether Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov was or had been treated on their premises. 29. On 19 December 2012 the investigators granted the first applicant victim status in the criminal case. 30. On 20 December 2012 the first applicant requested that the investigators allow nine lawyers from the human rights organisation United Mobile Group (“the UMG”) to represent her in the criminal case. On 24 December 2012 her request was rejected as the lawyers had failed to enclose their professional identity cards confirming their Bar membership. On 28 January 2013 the refusal was overruled as groundless (see paragraph 48 below). 31. On 20 December 2012 the first applicant provided her statement concerning the alleged abduction to the UMG lawyers. In particular, she stated that in her opinion, the abduction had been perpetrated by representatives of law-enforcement agencies for unknown reasons. The statement was provided to the investigators on the same date (see the paragraph 75 below). 32. On the same date, 20 December 2012, one of the UMG lawyers, Mr D.L., requested that the investigators take, amongst others, the following steps: “... -to include in the case file the first applicant’s statement given to the UMG on 20 December 2012 ... - to ask the motorway Kavkaz and the other traffic police stations between Ingushetia and North Ossetia-Alania whether in the period between 5 and 8 December 2012 three vehicles passed through them: a VAZ-2114 and two Lada‑ Priora cars and a white Lada-Priora with registration number AH214A 06 with Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov in it; - to request information from the “Potok” database and the video recording from the traffic police stations and checkpoints between Ingushetia and North Ossetia‑Alania as to whether between 5 and 8 December 2012 three vehicles passed through them: a VAZ-2114 and two Lada-Priora cars and a white Lada-Priora with registration number AH214A 06 with Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov in it; - to request from the mobile phone service providers information on connections between 6 and 7 December 2012 ... in order to establish the whereabouts of the subscriber of telephone number 99631744448 and his mobile connections from 6 December 2012 up to the present; Enclosures: copy of the statement of Ms L. Buzurtanova of 20 December 2012 ...” On 29 January 2013 the investigators decided to grant the request of 20 December 2012. However, from the documents submitted it appears that the requested steps were taken only in part (see paragraph 68 below). 33. On 20 December 2012 the investigators received a reply from the Counter Terrorism Centre (“the CTC”) of North Ossetia-Alania promising to inform them whether they had any incriminating information on Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov and whether they had conducted any special operations against him. 34. On the same date the investigators examined the premises of the “Ellin” sports club. No evidence was collected from the scene. 35. On or before 20 December 2012 Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov’s name was included in the Russian federal database of missing persons. 36. On 21 December 2012 the investigators requested that the Prigorodniy district department of the interior (“the ROVD”) inform them which officers had patrolled Mayskiy between 6 and 7 December 2012. The reply with the names of four police officers was given on 14 January 2013. 37. On 24 December 2012 the investigators requested permission from the Prigorodniy District Court to obtain the list of calls and other connections made in the vicinity of Raduzhnaya Street in Nazran, Ingushetia between 1 a.m. on 6 December and 1 a.m. on 8 December 2012. On 25 December 2012 the permission was granted. 38. On the same date, the investigators asked the local TV stations to broadcast a general description of the circumstances of Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov’s abduction and to request assistance in establishing his whereabouts and the perpetrators’ identities. 39. Also on 24 December 2012 the Beslan investigations department informed the investigators that on 24 June 2012 Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov had participated in a fight, as a result of which he had received insignificant bodily injuries, and that he had not given any statements about the incident. On 15 September 2012 the Prigorodniy ROVD had opened a criminal case into the injuries received by eleven sportsmen, including Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov, who had been attacked on 24 June 2012 by a crowd of about fifty to one hundred young men in Beslan. 40. On 25 December 2012 the investigators forwarded information requests concerning Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov’s whereabouts, possible detention, hospitalisation and discovery of his body to a number of law‑enforcement agencies in the Russian Federation. Replies in the negative were received. 41. Also on 25 December 2012 the investigators examined video footage obtained from the CCTV camera situated at traffic police checkpoint “Kizlyar” on the motorway next to Mayskiy between 8 a.m. on 5 December and 5 p.m. on 7 December 2012. Neither Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov’s car nor any other Lada-Priora cars were found on that footage. 42. On various dates in December 2012 the investigators received replies from the mobile telephone companies, according to which between 2008 and 2012 multiple mobile telephone numbers had been registered in the name of Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov. 43. On 18 January 2013 the head of the operational search unit of the Ministry the Interior of North Ossetia-Alania replied to the investigators’ request (see paragraph 42 above) stating, amongst other things: “In reply to your request no. 240-21/1908-2012 of 17 December 2012 I inform you that the operational services of North Ossetia-Alania have obtained information that Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov, who was born in 1983, possibly had been aiding members of illegal armed groups acting in Ingushetia, that he had provided financial assistance to them and could have acted as their contact person. According to the information in our possession, Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov could have stored illegal weapons and ammunition in his home. I inform you also that we are taking a number of operational steps to establish Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov’s whereabouts and detain persons involved in his disappearance ...” 44. On the same date, 18 January 2013, one of the applicants’ lawyers from the UMG, Mr A.R., requested that the investigators take the following steps: “... 1. Include in the case file the video of the meeting of the Ingushetia sportsmen with the President of the Republic, Mr Yunus-Bek Evkurov, concerning the abduction of Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov, which took place on 17 December 2012, and order a linguistic examination of the footage in order to obtain its translation into Russian. 2. Question former colleagues of the abducted man, including the Chief Bailiff of North Ossetia-Alania, Mr M. Ozdoyev, concerning the information provided by him during the meeting of 17 December 2012 and recorded on video. 3. Question the President of Ingushetia, Mr Yunus-Bek Evkurov, concerning, amongst other things, the incriminating information on Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov which was mentioned by him during the meeting with the sportsmen of Ingushetia. In particular, he stated the following: ‘There are print-outs of telephone conversations, I have not brought them with me, but people know what I mean anyway and the fellow villagers understand it too’. 4. Request from the Vladikavkaz prosecutor’s office the criminal case file against Mr D., who was mentioned by the Chief Bailiff of North Ossetia-Alania, Mr M. Ozdoyev, by the secretary of the Security Council Mr A. Kotiyev, and by President Evkurov. Those officials spoke of the criminal nature of Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov’s interactions with Mr D. In connection with this, it is necessary to examine the contents of the criminal case file to establish the involvement of Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov in the actions of Mr D. and his accomplices... 5. Inform me about the steps taken ... ...Enclosures: - copy of the authority form - video footage of the meeting of President of Ingushetia Mr Yunus-Bek Evkurov with representatives of the sports community of Ingushetia on 17 December 2012 ...” 45. On 20 January 2013 forensic experts examined the evidence collected from the crime scene (see paragraph 16 above). 46. On 28 January 2013 the investigators decided to grant the request of 18 January 2013 (see paragraph 44 above). However, from the documents submitted it appears that none of the requested measures was taken. 47. On the same date, 28 January 2013, one of the applicants’ lawyers from the UMG, Mr A.R., requested that the investigators take the following steps: “... speak to the Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov’s neighbours to establish the identity of eyewitnesses to the abduction and question them. (According to the information from a resident of North Ossetia, Mr M.Iz., several neighbours stated that they had witnessed the abduction. This information can be found on the website of Kavakzakiy Uzel: http:Kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/21687/); ... check whether during the same time frame other persons were abducted or detained under similar circumstances ... and examine the contents of the relevant criminal case files ...” On the same date the request was rejected by the investigators as the UMG lawyer was not the applicants’ representative in the criminal case. 48. On 28 January 2013 the head of the investigations department overruled the refusal of 24 December 2012 (see paragraph 47 above) and allowed the nine UMG lawyers to represent the applicants in the criminal case. The applicants were informed thereof. 49. On 11 March (in the documents submitted the date is also stated as 25 March) 2013 one of the applicants’ lawyers from the UMG, Mr D.U., requested that the investigators proceed as follows: “... According to Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov’s wife [the second applicant], he was abducted by unidentified persons driving three cars. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that before the abduction, on the way from the gym to the crime scene, Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov was under surveillance. It is also possible to presume that while driving, the abductors used some kind of device to communicate with each other. If the fact of such connections from the same sources at the time of the incident is established in the areas along Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov’s route, then it would allow the identification of the persons who used those means of communication. It would also provide grounds to question them about the reasons for their presence at the scene at the material time and why they were taking the same route as Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov. The taking of such steps would lead to the identification of the persons involved in Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov’s disappearance. Therefore, on the basis of Articles 119 and 120 of the Russian Criminal Procedure Code you are requested to: - establish Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov’s route on 6 December 2012 from the sports club ... to the possible place of his abduction in Mayskiy and the place of the discovery of [his] car; - locate the main telecommunication towers capable of receiving and issuing mobile phone signals along the above route; - obtain from the mobile phone companies the lists of all incoming and outgoing connections, including text messages, made with the technical assistance of the above devices between 7.30 p.m. and 11.30. p.m. on 6 December 2012; - examine the information obtained and establish the mobile service subscribers who were located on the above-mentioned route at the relevant time; - obtain from the agencies carrying out electronic intelligence in Ingushetia and North Ossetia-Alania information concerning the use of radio devices at the relevant time along the above-mentioned route; - identify the users of those devices and question them about the case ...” 50. On 21 March 2013 the Prigorodniy central district hospital provided the investigators with a copy of the registration log of urgent calls for medical assistance on 6 and 7 December 2012. Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov’s name was not indicated therein. 51. On 25 March 2013 the applicants requested that Mr M. Pliyev, member of the Moscow Bar, be allowed to represent them in the criminal case. On 6 April 2013 the request was granted. 52. On 28 March 2013 the request of the applicants’ lawyer was granted (see paragraph 48 above). However, from the documents submitted it appears that the requested measures were not taken. 53. On 2 April 2013 the investigators again questioned the second applicant, who stated that she still had no information concerning her husband’s whereabouts. 54. According to the applicants, on 4 October 2013 the first applicant told her representative at the Court that someone, whose identity she could not disclose out of fear for that person’s life, had informed her that Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov had been abducted by officers of the Federal Security Service (“the FSB”) from Ekaterinburg, Russia, and taken to the capital of North Ossetia-Alania, Vladikavkaz, for unknown reasons. It is unclear whether the applicants passed that information on to the official investigation. 55. According to the applicants, the case-file documents furnished by the Government did not include the list of all the mobile phone communications which had been made in the vicinity of Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov’s alleged abduction obtained by the investigation on 15 March 2013. 56. On 7 December 2012 the investigators questioned the second applicant, whose statement concerning her husband’s disappearance was similar to the applicants’ account submitted to the Court. In addition, she stated that her husband had used mobile telephone number 9-963-174-4448 and that he had neither enemies nor unpaid debts. 57. On the same date, the investigators questioned Mr R.K., who stated that on 6 December 2012 he had been with Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov at the sports club until about 10 p.m. At about 2.30 a.m. on 7 December 2012 the applicants had called him looking for Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov as the latter had not returned home. The witness and Mr I.M. had then assisted the applicants in their search and had gone to the hospitals, morgues and police stations looking for Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov, but without success. The following morning they learnt that Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov’s car had been found. 58. On 7 December 2012 the investigators also questioned the husband of the first applicant, Mr I.Ts., who stated that he had accompanied the first applicant in the search for Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov when the latter had not returned home. Driving around Mayskiy, they had found pieces of broken glass along with a training shoe and a sock. The first applicant had immediately identified them as belonging to Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov. They had then immediately gone to the Mayskiy police station. 59. On the same date, the investigators also questioned a resident of Mayskiy, Ms Z.E., who stated that after 10 p.m. on 6 December 2012 she had been at home when she had heard men shouting outside for about a minute. She had stepped outside and seen two or three vehicles; she had not been able to identify the model or make of the vehicles as it had been dark. The witness thought that it had been a squabble between young men who frequently gathered at the spot to drink alcohol, and returned indoors. 60. On the same date, the investigators also questioned another resident of Mayskiy, Mr M.E., who stated that he had gone to bed early on 6 December 2012 and had not seen the police examining the crime scene outside his house until the following morning. 61. On 8 December 2012 Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov’s mother, Ms Li.B., lodged another complaint concerning the abduction with the investigations department. 62. On the same date the investigators again questioned the second applicant, whose statement was similar to the one she had given on 7 December 2012 (see paragraph 17 above). In addition, she stated that Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov was a professional sportsperson, that in 2012 he had won the European mixed martial arts championship and that he did not have any enemies. 63. On 8 December 2012 the investigators also questioned Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov’s friend, Mr M.M., who stated that he had known Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov since childhood, that they had trained together for fifteen years and that Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov did not have any enemies. In 2011 Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov had participated in a fight with someone, but afterwards the parties to the conflict had settled the issue. The witness stated that he had learnt of the alleged abduction from the applicants and had no idea as to why Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov had disappeared. 64. The investigators questioned Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov’s friend, Mr R.K., who stated that he had seen him in the evening of 6 December 2012 in the gym and that he had not witnessed the alleged abduction. 65. The investigators also questioned Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov’s sisters, Ms F.B. and Ms Lu.B., both of whom stated that they had not witnessed the alleged abduction but had found out about it from a woman living at the corner of Zhebagiyeva Street, according to whom an abduction had been perpetrated by masked men in black uniforms driving three cars. In addition, Ms Lu.B. stated that another resident of that area, Mr M. Be., had confirmed the woman’s story and had added that one of the abductors’ cars had hit Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov’s car from the front and another had blocked it at the back. 66. The investigators also questioned Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov’s aunt, Ms Kh.B., who stated that she had not witnessed the alleged abduction and that she had no explanation for his disappearance. 67. The investigators also questioned Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov’s friend, Mr M.P., a police officer, who stated that at about 11 p.m. on 6 December 2012 he had been driving home when he had seen Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov’s white car with a dent in the front. The car had skidded and had been driven erratically. The witness had then seen two cars, one of which was a silver‑coloured Lada–Priora, following Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov’s car. All of the vehicles had been heading in the direction of the border with Ingushetia. 68. On 9 December 2012 the investigators questioned the second applicant’s neighbour, Ms L.G., who stated that at about 10 p.m. on 6 December she had been at home with her husband when they had heard men yelling and then two cars speeding away. 69. On 9 December 2012 the investigators also questioned Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov’s mother, Ms Li.B., who stated that she had not witnessed the alleged abduction and had no explanation for her son’s disappearance. On the same date the investigators obtained a blood sample from the witness for a comparative examination with the evidence collected from Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov’s car and for inclusion in the regional DNA database. 70. On 12 December 2012 the investigators again questioned the second applicant, who reiterated her previous statements (see paragraphs 17 and 23 above) confirming that she had no explanation for Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov’s disappearance. 71. On 15 December 2012 the investigators questioned a police officer from traffic checkpoint no. 5, Mr A.Ts., who stated that he had been on duty at the station between 4 p.m. and 11 p.m. on 6 December 2012 and that he had not seen anything suspicious. He had no information pertaining to the alleged abduction. 72. On 16 December 2012 the investigators again questioned Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov’s friend, police officer M.P., who reiterated his previous statement (see paragraph 67 above), adding that he could show the investigators the place where he had seen Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov’s car on the night of the disappearance. On the same date, in order to verify the statement, the investigators took the witness to the place where he had seen the vehicle. 73. Between 18 and 23 December 2012 the investigators questioned Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov’s neighbours, Mr M.E., Mr M. Dzh. and Mr I.D., all of whom stated that on the night of the disappearance they had been asleep at home and, therefore, had no pertinent information about it. 74. On 19 December 2012 the investigators questioned the first applicant. Her statement was similar to the account submitted before the Court. She also stated that she had no theories concerning the reasons for her brother’s disappearance. 75. On 20 December 2012 the investigators received the first applicant’s statement concerning the alleged abduction, which she had given to the UMG lawyers (see paragraph 31 above). 76. On 21 December 2012 the investigators again questioned Ms Z.E. who reiterated her previous statement (see paragraph 59 above), adding that she had not been able to hear in what language the men had been shouting on the night of the alleged abduction. 77. On 25 December 2012 the investigators again questioned the second applicant, who stated that Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov had never worked in the police, she had never seen him with a police service identity card and that she had no theories concerning the reasons for her husband’s disappearance. At the same time she stated that she had read on the internet that her husband’s disappearance could have been related to the brawl in June 2012. 78. On 26 December 2012 the investigators questioned Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov’s cousin Mr U.B., who stated that he had not witnessed the alleged abduction, had no information about it or theories concerning the possible perpetrators’ identities. 79. On various dates between December 2012 and February 2013 the investigators questioned Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov’s acquaintances, colleagues and neighbours: Mr I.T., Mr A.E., Mr I.A., Mr A.G., Mr A.Ga., Mr Kh.Ts., Mr M.Ts., Mr V. Dzh., Mr R.Ts., Mr M.I., Mr B.Ts., Mr R.D., Mr M.B., Mr Ta.E., Mr I.Im., Ms N.K., Ms N.Ke., Ms T.K, Mr Z.K., Mr P.Kv. and Mr G.Ts. They stated that they had not witnessed the alleged abduction, had no information about it or any theories concerning the possible perpetrators’ identities. 80. On various dates between January and April 2013 the investigators questioned Mr Akhmed Buzurtanov’s relatives, neighbours and former colleagues Mr Is.B., Mr Ab.B., Ms Z.E., Ms G.P., Mr R.Kh., Mr M.Ko., Mr B.E., Mr R.P. and Mr M.Kh. Their statements concerning the alleged abduction were similar to the applicants’ account submitted before the Court. They also stated that they did not have any theories concerning the possible perpetrators’ identities. 81. From the documents submitted it appears that the proceedings are still ongoing.

5. The applicants were born in 1956 and 1946 respectively. The first applicant lives in Łόdź. 6. The first applicant owns a publishing house named “Westa Druk” which publishes a weekly magazine, Angora, and its supplement for children, Angorka. The second applicant was the editor in chief of the magazine. 7. On 16 May 1999 Angorka published an article referring to an advertising campaign by a company, Star Foods, for its potato crisps. On the first page of the magazine there was a cartoon showing a boy holding a packet, with the name “Star Foods” on it, saying to Reksio – a little dog, a popular cartoon character for children – “Don’t worry! I would be a murderer too if I ate this muck!” (“Nie martw się – też bym był mordercą, gdybym jadł to świństwo!”). Above the cartoon, there was a large heading reading “Polish children shocked by crisps advertisement, ‘Reksio is a murderer’ (Reksio to morderca)”. 8. The article, printed on the second page of the magazine, read as follows: “Recently in Star Foods crisps [packets] stickers appeared which terrified parents and their children: ‘Reksio is a murderer’. In the [packets of] crisps from the company Star Foods, which are stocked on the shelves of almost all shops, stickers appeared recently which terrified parents and children. In the packets there are little pieces of paper bearing the slogan: “Reksio is a murderer”. Before the stickers appeared in the packets of crisps the company ordered a market study. One of the advertising agencies proposed slogans and sayings used every day by teenagers. Children, however, are terrified by those slogans. ... Prepared following ‘the Super Express’” 9. The above quoted article on the second page was accompanied by a small cartoon featuring two cats holding a packet with the word “crisps” on it and the dog Reksio in the background. One cat holds a piece of paper with the slogan “Reksio murderer” apparently taken out from the packet and says to the second cat - “surely, he is sometimes unpleasant, but a murderer?!” (“Owszem, nieraz bywa przykry, ale żeby od razu mordercą?!”). 10. On 2 November 1999 Star Foods (“the plaintiff”) lodged against both applicants a civil claim for protection of personal rights. The company sought an order requiring the defendants to publish an apology in Angora and Angorka for publishing a cartoon discrediting, without any justification, Star Foods products. They further sought reimbursement of their legal costs and payment by the applicants of 10,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) to a charity. 11. On 28 May 2001 the Łόdź Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) found for the plaintiff. The court ordered the applicants to publish apologies as sought in the statement of claim and to pay PLN 10,000 to a charity. The applicants were also ordered to pay the plaintiffs PLN 11,500 to reimburse the costs of the proceedings. The court considered that the cartoon in question had breached the personal rights of the plaintiff and discredited the products of the company. The words used by the applicants had an unambiguous meaning relating to disgust and repulsion and were strongly pejorative. Accordingly, the court concluded that the applicants had overstepped the threshold of permissible criticism, in particular in a magazine aimed at children. The court dismissed the applicants’ arguments that the cartoon had aimed to criticise the advertising campaign run by Star Foods and not their product. It considered that such an attack on the plaintiff’s personal rights could not have been justified even by the argument that their campaign was ill-considered. 12. The applicants appealed against the judgment. 13. On 21 March 2002 the Łόdź Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and ordered the applicants to pay the plaintiffs PLN 2,500 to reimburse the costs of the appellate proceedings. It agreed with the lower court’s assessment that the critical statement had not concerned the style of advertisement adopted by Star Foods. Calling the product of the company “muck” was surely not a critical assessment of their advertising campaign but had been aimed at the product, the brand, and the good name of the company. The statement in question “I would be a murderer too if I ate this muck” contained an obviously negative assessment of the taste and quality of the product. Thus, the applicants’ action aimed to discredit, without justified grounds, the product of Star Foods and as such could not enjoy the benefit of legal protection. The appellate court also observed that the applicants had repeatedly relied on the interests of children to justify their actions, while they themselves had repeated, in the supplement for children, the slogan that in their opinion had had a negative impact on children’s emotions and had terrified them. 14. On 12 December 2002 the Supreme Court refused to examine the cassation appeal lodged by the applicants.

5. The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Kumanovo. He was a surgeon at Kumanovo Hospital. 6. On 17 September 2004 the applicant parked his car in a street in Kumanovo. After he returned, he found a notice of illegal parking under the windscreen wiper. He started his car and went looking for a police officer in order to discuss the issue regarding the ticket (the applicant alleged that there had been no sign there that parking was illegal). When he saw a police car he started following it until it stopped. Two police officers, M.A. and P.J., were inside the car. P.J. was a neighbour with whom the applicant was not on good terms. The parties presented rather conflicting versions of events as to what happened on that occasion. The Government’s account was based on the version of events which had been “correctly and fully established” by the national courts in the criminal proceedings against the applicant (see paragraphs 19-38 below). 7. While following the police car, the applicant signaled to it by flashing his lights. He did not sound the car horn. When he approached the police car, he addressed M.A. However, the two police officers started insulting him. P.J. said “I’ve been looking forward to this ...” P.J. opened the front passenger’s door “hard” and hit the applicant on the legs. Both officers left the car, grabbed the applicant by the shoulders and neck, and started punching him on the back. P.J. kicked and punched him all over the body. He was also hit on the back of the head. As a result, he slumped forward, which allowed P.J. to knee the applicant in the back, causing a fracture of two spinal vertebrae. M.A. also kicked him in the lower part of the back. He was then handcuffed, and while he was putting him into the police car P.J. kneed him in the lower back. During the incident, the applicant asked the officers to stop beating him, because he was in poor health: notably he had a weak heart and had had heart surgery. The incident was witnessed by many people. The applicant was then taken to Kumanovo police station, where the beating continued until he lost consciousness. 8. After an hour, an emergency ambulance was called, which took the applicant to Kumanovo Hospital. He was then transported to Skopje Clinic and subsequently to Skopje City Hospital, where he remained until 28 September 2004. 9. On 17 September 2004 Dr Z.T. from the Kumanovo Hospital examined the applicant and issued a medical report, which stated that the applicant had the following injuries: head contusion, concussion, bruises on the chest and back, and bruises on both arms. The medical report also noted that the applicant was in post-heart-attack condition, and that he had had heart surgery. 10. On the same day, an investigating judge of the Kumanovo Court of First Instance (“the trial court”) agreed to a request from the Ministry of the Interior (“the Ministry”) and ordered an external examination of the applicant’s body (телесен преглед). The order was issued in the context of criminal proceedings instituted against the applicant. The examination was carried out by the Forensic Institute (Институт за Судска Медицина). It took place on 18 September 2004, while the applicant was in Skopje City Hospital. As indicated in the medical report, the applicant stated that he had signaled by flashing his lights and had sounded the car horn to attract the police car’s attention so that it would stop; also that the police officers had beaten him up during his arrest and while they were taking him out of the police car to take him into the police station. The applicant further stated that he had been taken to the cardiology unit at Skopje Clinic and then, in a wheelchair (because he had numbness in his legs), to the emergency unit, where an X-ray examination was carried out on his chest, head and spinal column. He was then discharged from Skopje Clinic. Not satisfied, he went to Skopje City Hospital where, on admission, he complained of headache, other pain and nausea. During the examination by experts of the Forensic Institute, the applicant complained of pain in the back, head and chest. The report noted contusions on the applicant’s head, nose, chest, back, hip and both arms and legs. 11. According to a discharge notice issued by Skopje City Hospital, the applicant was hospitalised between 17 and 28 September 2004. It indicated that the applicant had sustained, inter alia, the following injuries: a compressive fracture of two vertebrae on the lower part of the spinal column as shown by the X-ray examination, concussion, head trauma and contusions on his back, right shoulder and wrist. According to the notice, the applicant had been examined in three hospitals, which had all established the same diagnosis and recommended that he be examined in that hospital. He was advised to remain in bed for four to six weeks. It was also indicated that the applicant was unfit to work. 12. On 8 February 2005 Dr Z.T. (see paragraph 9 above) issued, on the basis of available documentary medical evidence, a medical certificate indicating, inter alia, the following injuries: concussion; head trauma; fracture of two vertebrae; and contusions on the back, chest, and right wrist. In conclusion, the certificate stated: “I think this is a serious bodily injury under the Criminal Code, with permanent reduction of the activities of daily living, as well as consequences of a permanent nature, which would certainly affect the victim’s capacity to work ...” 13. On 10 July 2006 the Forensic Institute submitted to the trial court another expert report that the investigating judge had requested in relation to the applicant’s criminal complaint lodged against P.J. and M.A. (see paragraphs 39-68 below). The Forensic Institute was required to give an opinion about the applicant’s injuries and the way in which they had been inflicted. The opinion was based on extensive medical documentary evidence from the medical examinations that the applicant had undergone between 17 September 2004 (in Kumanovo Hospital, the cardiology and emergency units of Skopje Clinic, and Skopje City Hospital) and 12 October 2005. The Forensic Institute concluded that: “... on the basis of the medical evidence and the examination we carried out [the external examination of 18 September 2004, see above], [the applicant] sustained the following injuries in the fight with the two accused which took place on 17 September 2004: concussion, head trauma, bruises (and/ or lesions) on the nose; chest; hip; right shoulder, forearm and hand; left forearm, elbow and hand; right thigh and lower leg; left lower leg and fracture of the first vertebrae on the lumbar vertebral column ... As a result of the injuries he had sustained (the applicant) was hospitalised between 17 and 28 September 2004. During this time he received conservative treatment. The injuries that [the applicant] sustained ... to the head, body and extremities have been caused as a result of multiple dynamic impacts from a blunt object in the areas mentioned above, and these injuries represent, from the legal point of view, a bodily injury ... it can be concluded that the injuries sustained by (the applicant), notably concussion, vertebral fracture, contusions and bruises to the head, body and limbs, taken in view of their overall impact on the body of the victim, qualify as serious bodily injury that had a considerable, but not permanent, negative effect on vital parts of the body.” 14. On 8 October 2008 a private health institute, M., confirmed certain degenerative changes in the applicant’s spinal column, which were due to two vertebrae having been fractured. 15. On 19 September 2004 P.J. and M.A. submitted to the Ministry reports concerning the force used against the applicant. M.A. stated, inter alia,: “... we were provoked by (the applicant), who used offensive language and kicked the police car ... he spat at us and used offensive language. We asked him to identify himself, but he continued to insult us. We tried to put handcuffs on him, but he resisted actively. He grabbed the fingers of my left hand and bit me. My colleague pushed him away and we handcuffed him.” 16. As regards the force used against the applicant, M.A. noted that “both arms were twisted and the applicant’s leg was kicked.” 17. P.J. stated, inter alia, the following: “both arms were twisted so that handcuffs could be put on, and when the colleague was bitten, (the applicant) was punched in the head”. 18. On an unspecified date, the applicant informed the Department for Control and Professional Standards within the Ministry of the Interior (DCPS) about the incident, and complained that he had been subjected to acts of police brutality. In a reply dated 17 December 2004, the DCPS informed the applicant that he had been reported as having assaulted a police officer on duty. P.J. and M.A., as well as S.H. and V.V., who had been eyewitnesses to the incident of 17 September 2004, were also interviewed. On the basis of evidence obtained from them, the DCPS established that the applicant had used offensive language against P.J. and M.A., had resisted arrest, and had bitten M.A. on the right thumb. As regards the force used against him, the report noted that this had concerned the twisting of his arms and the use of handcuffs, which, as determined by a superior in the Ministry, had been necessary and justified. Accordingly, the DCPS concluded that the police officers concerned had acted in accordance with the law and the rules of the Ministry. 19. On 18 September 2004 the Ministry lodged a criminal complaint with the Kumanovo public prosecutor, accusing the applicant of assaulting police officers in the course of their duties during the incident of 17 September 2004. The Ministry alleged that the applicant, after receiving a parking ticket, had started following the police car, sounding his horn and flashing his lights. After the police car had stopped, he had approached it and started insulting the police officers and kicking the car. The applicant did not comply with the orders of the police officers to calm down, and actively resisted when they tried to arrest him. The applicant also bit M.A. on the right thumb, which was a serious bodily injury. In respect of the thumb injury a medical report of 17 September 2004, signed by Dr M.D., was attached to the criminal complaint. 20. The complaint further stated that the applicant had been examined in Kumanovo police station by Dr Z.L., who had recommended he be sent to Kumanovo Hospital. It was further stated that the medical report of the Forensic Institute that the investigating judge had ordered on 17 September 2004 (see paragraph 10 above), medical reports issued by the cardiology and emergency units of Skopje Clinic, Skopje City Hospital, and medical reports attesting to the injury sustained by M.A., would all be submitted later. The Ministry further asked the court to hear oral evidence from S.H. and V.V. 21. Between 21 and 28 September 2004 the investigating judge heard oral evidence from the applicant, P.J, M.A., S.H., V.V., and Dr Z.T. 22. S.H. stated, inter alia, that: “I know (the applicant), [at the relevant time] he was very upset and he was shouting in a loud voice ... I didn’t hear him use offensive language. The police (officers) left the car and asked (the applicant) to identify himself, but he did not produce any documents. The police officers tried to handcuff him, but he resisted ... I didn’t see the applicant bite the police officer. The police did not use force ... police officers managed to put handcuffs on the applicant, two pairs, they placed him on the rear seat and left. No force was used either by (the applicant) against the police or by the police against (the applicant). He was only resisting ... I emphasise that when I arrived, the door of the police car had been opened ... (the applicant) was not hitting the police car. Because there were a lot of people, I couldn’t see, and don’t know whether the applicant bit the police officer.” 23. V.V. stated, inter alia: “... because the police officers were inside the car, (the applicant) started shouting and hitting the car. The police officers left the car and asked him to identify himself. He said that he was not in possession of an ID, and then the police tried to handcuff him. He started shouting ‘People, help me, look what the police are doing, I have heart problems’. They did not let him go, they managed to handcuff him with two pairs of handcuffs. They put him in the car and brought him to the police station ... there was no hitting on either side, just (the applicant) was shouting ... I didn’t see, and I was standing close by, the applicant bite the police officer.” 24. P.J. stated, inter alia: “... (the applicant) was following us in his car ... he was sounding the car horn continuously and we stopped ... he was banging on the window and kicking the car ... when I opened the door, he spat at me and used offensive language ... M.A. got out of the car and asked him to identify himself. He continued shouting. Then I got out of the car. My colleague grabbed his left arm and twisted it behind his back ... then (the applicant) bit my colleague’s finger ... I grabbed (the applicant) and pulled him towards me ... he continued to kick my colleague; he kicked me as well ... I hit him with my lower arm, but not hard. We managed to handcuff him, he was resisting all the time ... when we placed him on the rear seat of the car, he was kicking, jumping, and moving from one side of the car to the other, because his hands were handcuffed behind his back. He constantly used offensive language, he was very arrogant, aggressive ...” 25. M.A. stated, inter alia: “... (the applicant) bit me on the left index finger (показалец) ... P.J. punched him on the right shoulder and the back of his head, hard, so that there was no need for me to hit him ... then (after they had handcuffed him) I hit him on the left knee and we put him in the car ...(the applicant) was alone on the back seat and he was swaying from one side to another saying that he was ill, that he had had three heart bypasses ... (the applicant) used offensive language against P.J. ... when I left the car, he kicked me on the thigh ...” 26. The applicant stated, inter alia: “... I note that while driving (following the police car) I flashed my lights to get (the police car) to stop, and I sounded the car horn ... P.J. opened the door, which hit me on the knees, and when both [P.J. and M.A.] got out of the car they started hitting me on the neck and shoulder ... I was hit in the chest ... they kicked me all over my body, when they handcuffed me and wanted to push me on to the back seat of the car, one of the police officers said that he had hurt his finger - it seems that he caught his finger in the handcuffs when they tried to put them on me. I didn’t bite him, and a bite cannot provoke a fracture. ... while I was inside the car, they hit me on the legs. When we got to the police station, they literally dragged me ... and started punching me on the back and kicking me ... they put me in a room with my hands tied and they hit me. In that room, I was hit very hard, as a result of which I fell down and lost consciousness ...” 27. Dr Z.T. stated that the available medical evidence indicated that M.A. had a bite wound and a fracture of his left thumb. He further stated: “It is possible that the bite did not cause the fracture, because the typical cause of that type of fracture is a fall on to the finger or a blow.” 28. On the basis of the available evidence, the investigating judge opened an investigation regarding the applicant, but refused to remand him in custody, finding that the applicant could not interfere with the investigation. He noted that the applicant was in poor health, notably that he had had heart surgery, and that two doctors had indicated that the applicant had sustained concussion and a fracture of the spinal column. 29. On 9 November 2004 the public prosecutor indicted the applicant for assault on a police officer in the course of his duties. On 15 December 2004 the applicant objected to the act of indictment, denying that he had assaulted the police officers, hit the police car or used offensive language towards them. He stated that he had been severely beaten in the incident for no reason, and that he had sustained bodily injuries which were confirmed by medical evidence. 30. On 15 November 2004 the public prosecutor requested information from the DCPS as to whether there had been any internal inquiry regarding the use of force against the applicant. 31. On 14 January 2005 the DCPS replied that the force used against the applicant during the incident of 17 September 2004 consisted of twisting his arms behind his back and using handcuffs to subdue him. It also forwarded a copy of the report in which the use of force had been regarded as justified by a superior within the Ministry. Copies of written statements by S.H. and V.V., made to the police on 17 September 2004, were also attached. 32. At a hearing held on 1 June 2005 before the trial court, the applicant stated, inter alia: “... when the police officers handcuffed me, I did not resist ... after they took me into the police station ... P.J. punched me on the back of the head, which had also been done in front of the police station. I was also hit in the eye ... when I approached the police car at the critical moment I noticed that P.J. was sitting in the driving seat. When he opened the window I addressed the other police officer ... [when the trial judge brought the applicant’s attention to his statement given before the investigating judge as to which police officer he had addressed on that occasion, the applicant stated] what I’m saying today is true. The investigating judge probably did not understand what I had said and my health was poor and I was in a difficult psychological state ... During the incident, I neither saw that M.A. was injured nor did I hear him say that he had been injured. I did not take any physical action against him, nor did I assault him.” 33. On that occasion M.A. confirmed that he had been bitten on the left thumb, as he had stated before the investigating judge (see paragraph 24 above). He did not know why the record of his questioning before the investigating judge indicated differently. The applicant objected to M.A.’s statement. 34. During a hearing on 19 October 2005, the trial court rejected the applicant’s request for oral evidence to be taken from Dr M.D. (see paragraph 18 above) as to whether M.A. had sustained an injury to the left or the right hand. The trial court found that an examination of Dr M.D. would not contribute to the establishment of the truth, given that both the hospital records and the medical certificate recorded an identical diagnosis. 35. Following the hearing of 19 October 2005, the trial court found the applicant guilty of assaulting a police officer in the course of his duties, and sentenced him to five months’ imprisonment, suspended for two years. The court established that the applicant had used offensive language against P.J. and M.A. during the incident of 17 September 2004, and had kicked the police car. When P.J. had opened the door of the car, the applicant had spat at him. M.A. had asked the applicant to produce an identity card, which the latter had refused to do. Then M.A. had twisted the applicant’s arm to get him into the car. The applicant had bitten M.A. on the left thumb. P.J. had punched the applicant on the right shoulder and the back of the head, which had caused the applicant to release the thumb. The applicant had then been handcuffed with two pairs of handcuffs. The court also established that the applicant had continued to resist in the police car during his transfer to the police station, by kicking the interior of the car. 36. The applicant appealed, arguing that the evidence regarding the alleged injury sustained by M.A. was inconsistent; that the medical evidence attesting to the alleged thumb injury had been issued in respect of another person with a similar name to M.A., and that the expert evidence regarding M.A.’s alleged injury had been produced on the basis of photographs of the victim’s thumb, without M.A. being examined in person. Lastly, the applicant complained that the trial court had disregarded the medical evidence supporting the injuries that he had sustained in the incident. 37. On 24 March 2006 the Skopje Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s judgment and confirmed the applicant’s conviction, finding no grounds to depart from the established facts and reasoning given by the trial court. 38. By decisions of 16 March and 5 May 2009 respectively, the trial court and the Skopje Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s request for reopening of the proceedings. 39. On 3 February 2005 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the State Prosecutor, charging P.J. and M.A. with several offences: physical assault, serious bodily harm, abuse of office, false testimony, and degrading treatment. On 8 February 2005 the complaint was transmitted to the Kumanovo prosecutor’s office for consideration. 40. On 16 February 2005 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint seeking an indictment of P.J. and M.A. by the Kumanovo public prosecutor for assault and serious bodily harm, as well as for abuse of office. He submitted that during the incident of 17 September 2004 he “had been brutally attacked, insulted and brutally beaten by P.J. and M.A. in the presence of hundreds of people on the street, as well as in front of and inside Kumanovo police station”. He also requested that evidence be obtained from S.H. and V.V. In support, the applicant submitted the medical certificate issued by Dr Z.T. on 8 February 2005 (see paragraph 12 above). 41. On 3 March 2005 the applicant asked the public prosecutor to examine the criminal complaint as soon as possible, together with all evidence that had become available during the investigation of the case. He further enquired why the public prosecutor had not initiated proceedings to have the police officers concerned suspended or fined. 42. On 11 March 2005 the public prosecutor contacted the emergency unit at Skopje Clinic to obtain information as to whether the applicant had undergone an X-ray examination, and if so whether the examination had revealed a spinal fracture. On 6 April 2005 the emergency unit replied that the X-ray examination report had been handed over to the applicant. 43. On 7 April 2005 the public prosecutor informed the applicant that the appropriate authorities had been consulted with a view to obtaining relevant information about the case. 44. The applicant further addressed the public prosecutor on three occasions, alleging obstruction and seeking to have appropriate measures taken. 45. On 20 May 2005 the public prosecutor contacted the director of the emergency unit of Skopje Clinic, asking for an official note to be drawn up by the doctor who had carried out the X-ray examination of the applicant as to whether that examination had revealed a double fracture of the spinal column and whether the applicant had sustained concussion or it had just been a subjective feeling of which he had complained. The letter further requested that the emergency unit submit copies of all relevant medical reports to the public prosecutor. The Government did not indicate whether the emergency unit of Skopje Clinic had complied with this request. 46. On 25 May 2005 the Kumanovo public prosecutor rejected the criminal complaint, finding no grounds that the accused had committed the alleged offences, namely aggravated bodily harm and abuse of office. In the decision, the public prosecutor relied on the statements of S.H. and V.V. given in the criminal proceedings against the applicant and the report of the DCPS of 14 January 2005 (see paragraph 31 above). This decision was served on the applicant on 30 May 2005. 47. In the meantime, without knowing about the rejection of his complaint, on 26 May 2005 the applicant informed the Kumanovo public prosecutor that all relevant evidence, including the discharge notice from Skopje City Hospital, the medical report of his outpatient examination carried out by the Forensic Institute on 18 September 2004, as well as the statements of the accused, the witnesses and the applicant, had already been brought to the attention of the public prosecutor. 48. On 7 June 2005 the applicant, represented by R.C., a lawyer practising in Kumanovo, informed the trial court that he would take over the prosecution as a subsidiary prosecutor, and applied to the investigating judge for an investigation against P.J. and M.A. The applicant described the incident of 17 September 2004 as follows: “... when (the applicant) approached (the police car) ... P.J., who was in the driving seat, pushed the door open hard and hit (the applicant) in the lower part of both legs, then both accused left the car in order to arrest (the applicant). P.J. started punching and kicking (the applicant) all over his body, inflicting numerous injuries, the hardest blow being the one to the back of his head, which caused (the applicant) to lose consciousness and slump down. He was thus in a position that enabled P.J. to knee him in the back, as a result of which he sustained compressive fractures of (two vertebrae), while M.A. kicked him in the lower back. Then they handcuffed his hands behind his back and took him into Kumanovo police station, where they continued to beat him, as a result of which (the applicant) lost consciousness. Medical assistance was required, and (the applicant) was transported to Kumanovo Hospital, from where he was transferred to Skopje Clinic, where he remained for eleven days, following which he was a patient at home and was on sick leave for over five months.” 49. In support of the criminal complaint, the applicant submitted, inter alia, copies of the discharge notice from Skopje City Hospital and of the Forensic Institute report dated 18 September 2004, as well as of “other medical material”. He further requested the court to hear evidence from the accused, S.H., V.V., his wife and son. 50. On 11 July 2005 the trial court forwarded the criminal complaint and supporting documents to the public prosecutor for further consideration, given that the charges concerned serious injury, a crime which was subject to State prosecution. By letter on 14 September 2005 the public prosecutor informed the trial court that the Kumanovo prosecutor’s office had already examined and rejected the applicant’s criminal complaint against the accused, for lack of suspicion that they had committed the alleged offence. Similar information was forwarded on 14 October 2005 to the State prosecutor’s office. 51. In the meantime, on 12 September 2005, the investigating judge, after hearing oral evidence from the applicant, his wife and son and the accused, opened an investigation against P.J. and M.A. on account of reasonable suspicion that they had caused serious bodily injury punishable under the Criminal Code. On 29 September and 13 October 2005 the trial court dismissed appeals by the accused. 52. On 29 September 2006 the applicant, through his lawyer, submitted to the trial court a subsidiary indictment (супсидијарен обвинителен акт) accusing P.J. and M.A. of inflicting grievous bodily harm on him; this was supported by the Forensic Institute medical report of 10 July 2006 (see paragraph 13 above). In the indictment, the applicant reiterated that he had been beaten up by the accused when he had approached their car to discuss the issue of the parking ticket, and that the assault had continued inside the police station. 53. During a hearing held on 22 October 2007, Mr Z.J., a lawyer practising in Kumanovo, whom the applicant had meanwhile appointed to represent him in the case, stated that the applicant’s allegations of police brutality were supported by the medical report of the Forensics Institute, which designated the applicant’s injuries as serious. Since charges of serious bodily injury were subject to State prosecution, he asked for the case file to be transmitted to the public prosecutor for the latter to take over the prosecution. On the same date, the trial court contacted the public prosecutor’s office with a view whether it would take over the prosecution, which that office, by letter of 29 November 2007, refused to do. 54. On 31 January 2008 the trial court heard oral evidence from the accused and the applicant. 55. P.J. stated, inter alia: “... we noticed that (the applicant) was flashing his lights ... and then he started sounding the horn ... the applicant started banging on the window of (the car) and kicking it ... he spat at me ... continued to use offensive language ... we asked him to produce his identity card ... (the applicant) started kicking me and M.A. ... there were people who obviously knew (the applicant), they approached him asking him to calm down, but he pushed them away, as he was not paying attention to them, his behaviour was ferocious ... at one moment (the applicant) pressed M.A. hard against the rear door [of the car] with his body ... and M.A. screamed loudly. I thought it was due to the pressure, but then I saw that M.A.’s thumb was in (the applicant’s) mouth ... I pulled (the applicant) hard towards me to get him away from M.A., and I tried to hit him with my right arm on the back of the head, but (the applicant) slumped forward and my fist and elbow slipped next to his head, which I cannot consider as a blow, but we specified it in our official records as such ... we handcuffed him with two pairs of handcuffs behind his back ...(the applicant) did not stop resisting and assaulting us, kicking us. Handcuffed behind his back, he leaned on (the car) again as before, throwing himself [at the car] and leaning on the car, he was kicking us, we managed to put him in the car with his back on the rear seat of the car. Then he started kicking out hard at the door of the car, and we couldn’t close the door. Then, he lay on the rear seat and hit his head against the other door. He did that intentionally ... the interior of the car was badly damaged. While he was hitting his head against the right rear door and kicking the left door ... [which] we managed to close, he continued kicking the front seats and intentionally banged his head against the front seats and ... the rear seats. When we were trying to arrest him we were aware of his age and tried not [to allow] him to hurt us or himself; we refrained from using more drastic means of coercion, despite the fact that we had batons and we were trained in restraint techniques .... Then we brought him to Kumanovo police station ... and during the whole time he was furiously agitated in the rear seat. Although he was handcuffed, he was banging his head and other parts of his body against the interior of the car ... I did not punch, kick or use any other force [against the applicant] except as I have described in my statement ... My colleague M.A. did not hurt (the applicant), he was just holding him by the arm.” 56. M.A. stated, inter alia: “... My colleague P. and I got out of the car and I asked (the applicant) to produce a driving licence, an ID card or any other document bearing his photo. He continued using offensive language against us and kicked the car. At that moment I took out the handcuffs ... (the applicant) resisted, kicked the car ... jumped up at the car and us, he was acting, so to say, like a lunatic. At that time, my colleague and I did not use any other force apart from twisting his arms and using the handcuffs ... [while they tried to handcuff the applicant], he was moving constantly left and right and throwing himself against the car ... he was kicking the car and hitting his head against the roof of the car, we could hardly manage to put him on to the back seat of the car and close the door. From that moment and until we brought him into the police station ... (the applicant) was throwing himself to left and right inside the car ...” 57. In his statement, the applicant alleged that he had been beaten by P.J. and that M.A. had beaten him during his arrest and immediately before and after they had brought him into the police station. He further stated, inter alia: “... (P.J. and M.A.) stopped the car ... until then, there was no ... communication with the police car, nor were any signals used... [after he was brought into the police station] it took about forty-five minutes before the ambulance arrived ... Then, they immediately transferred me to Kumanovo Hospital ... Then, from Kumanovo Hospital I was taken by ambulance to the cardiology clinic in Skopje ... a doctor instructed that I should be transferred to the surgical clinic in Skopje, because she had noticed bruises on my body ... then I was taken to the emergency unit ... they instructed that I should be taken to Skopje City Hospital. Police officers and inspectors accompanied me at all times ...” 58. On 19 February 2008 the State prosecutor inquired as to why the Kumanovo prosecutor’s office had refused to prosecute, given that the applicant’s injuries were designated as serious by the Forensics Institute. By letter of 7 April 2008 the Kumanovo prosecutor replied that the medical report of the Forensics Institute dated 18 September 2004 (see paragraph 10 above) had not designated the applicant’s injuries as serious. The medical certificate of 8 February 2005 by Dr Z.T. (see paragraph 12 above) had been drawn up much later than 17 September 2004, the date of the incident. 59. At a hearing on 12 November 2008 the applicant’s representative sought a definitive answer from the public prosecutor as to whether he would take over the prosecution. In that connection he stated that it was not an option but a duty of the prosecutor to step into the proceedings, given the fact that the alleged offence was subject to State prosecution. On 18 November 2008 the public prosecutor informed the court that for the same reasons as outlined in its letter of 7 April 2008 (see paragraph 58 above), it would not take over the prosecution against P.J. and M.A. 60. On 24 March 2009 the trial court held a hearing in the presence of the applicant, his representative, the accused and their lawyers. According to the court record of that date, signed by the trial judge and the clerk, the applicant stated: “... I withdraw the subsidiary indictment of 20 September 2006 against the accused (Го повлекувам супсидијарниот обвинителен акт од 20 септември 2006 година провив обвинетите ...) ...” 61. On the same day the trial court stayed (запира) the proceedings, since the applicant had stated, in the presence of his legal representative, that he withdrew the subsidiary indictment. 62. The following day, on 25 March 2009, the applicant objected to the trial court’s decision to withdraw the indictment, and stated: “... I, as a lay person (неука странка), did not understand what the judge asked me, so I said that I withdrew the indictment, since I considered that the prosecution should be taken over by the public prosecutor. I wanted to maintain that right, namely ex officio prosecution through the public prosecutor, given the fact that the case concerns serious bodily injury, an offence punishable under Article 131 (1) of the Criminal Code, which is prosecutable ex officio by the public prosecutor. I therefore ask the court to reinstate the proceedings and to decide on my subsidiary indictment.” 63. In submissions of 26 March 2009 before the trial court, the applicant contested the validity of the statement for withdrawal of the indictment. He stated, inter alia: “... I underline that as a subsidiary complainant, I do not withdraw the subsidiary indictment of 20 September 2006 against the accused... I believe that the prosecution should be taken over by the public prosecutor, I maintain the right [to seek] that the prosecution be taken ex officio because it concerns an offence of causing serious bodily injury ... because the perpetrators of the crime are officials who overstepped their duties. For these reasons, I ask the court to reinstate the proceedings to their previous state and to continue to examine the subsidiary indictment.” 64. On 27 March 2009 the applicant complained to the Macedonian Bar about inactivity on the part of Mr Z.J., his legal representative, at the hearing of 24 March 2009, and asked the Bar to respond so that his case could be reinstated. He further stated: “While I was explaining, specifically while I was complaining about the way in which the trial was being conducted, the trial judge wrote in the court record that I was withdrawing the subsidiary indictment. At that time, I emphasised that I disagreed with that decision noted in the court record. My representative, Mr Z.J., did not react at all to the decision noted in the record [although] I’m a lay person (неук во правото и законите).” 65. Submissions with similar contents were sent on 27 March 2009 to the State Judicial Council (Судски Совет). 66. On 11 May 2009 the applicant, who was no longer represented, appealed against the trial court’s decision, arguing that he had never withdrawn the indictment against the accused. He reiterated that his statement concerned, in substance, his determination that the prosecution should be taken over by the public prosecutor. He further argued that he had complained aloud to the trial judge about the contents of the minutes, but to no avail. He stated that “I am shocked by the flagrantly incorrect interpretation of my statement”. 67. On 24 September 2009 the Skopje Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal as unsubstantiated, and upheld the trial court’s decision. Relying on the court record of 24 March 2009, the court concluded that the applicant, in the presence of his legal representative, had withdrawn the indictment against the accused. In such circumstances, the trial court had correctly decided to stay the proceedings. This decision was served on the applicant on 20 October 2009. The proceedings were accordingly finally concluded. On 29 June 2010 the Supreme Court rejected as inadmissible the applicant’s request for extraordinary review of the decision. 68. By a decision of 15 October 2009 the trial court ordered the applicant to pay the equivalent of 1,400 euros (EUR) for the legal representation of the accused and travel costs. The applicant did not appeal against that decision.

5. The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Rijeka. He is a lawyer by profession. 6. On 7 July 2010 while driving his car near Vrogorac, Croatia, the applicant was stopped by a police officer alleging that he had dangerously overtaken another car and that he had inappropriate tyres on his car. The police officer drew up a report on the incident. 7. On 6 October 2010 the applicant received a penalty notice (obvezni prekršajni nalog) dated 12 July 2010 and issued by the Dubrovnik-Neretvanska Police Department (Policijska uprava Dubrovačko-neretvanska; hereinafter: “the police”) which stated that he had committed the minor offences of dangerously overtaking another car under section 12 of the Road Traffic Safety Act, and driving a car with inappropriate tyres under section 236 of the same Act, fining him with 1,500 Croatian kunas (HRK). The statement of facts, which was printed on a form, stated that the offence had been established by the personal observations of a police officer, who had submitted a report on it. 8. On 7 October 2010 the applicant lodged a request for judicial review, challenging the statement that he had committed the offences and asking to be heard in court. The summary minor-offence proceedings were opened in the Vrgorac Minor Offences Court (Prekršajni sud u Metkoviću, Stalna služba u Vrgorcu). 9. The Vrgorac Minor Offences Court summoned the applicant for questioning on 23 February and 30 March 2011. The applicant did not appear for questioning, excusing his absence on account of professional commitments. He asked to be questioned by the Rijeka Minor Offences Court (Prekršajni sud u Rijeci) since he lived within its territorial jurisdiction. 10. On 3 May 2011 the Vrgorac Minor Offences Court forwarded the entire case file to the Rijeka Minor Offences Court and asked it to question the applicant, thereby also providing the applicant access to the case file. 11. On 17 October 2011 a judge of the Rijeka Minor Offences Court questioned the applicant. The applicant maintained his objection to the penalty notice, arguing that he had not overtaken a car at the time when he had been stopped by the police. He also contended that he had had factory tyres on his car and promised to submit a copy of the relevant documents to support that. He explained that he had no other evidence to put forward. 12. As the applicant failed to submit the documents concerning the tyres on his car within the relevant time-limit, on 28 October 2011 the Rijeka Minor Offences Court returned the case file to the Vrgorac Minor Offences Court. 13. On 21 November 2011 the Vrgorac Minor Offences Court found the applicant guilty of the charges of dangerously overtaking another car and driving a car with inappropriate tyres. The applicant was cautioned, fined with HRK 500 and ordered to pay HRK 100 in court fees. When convicting the applicant the Vrgorac Minor Offences Court relied on the police officer’s report of 7 July 2010 (see paragraph 6 above), holding that the applicant’s defence had not cast any doubt on the findings of the report. 14. On 2 March 2012 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske). He argued that he had never seen the police report on which the verdict was based and that he had had no opportunity to challenge the accusations contained in it. He also complained that the Vrgorac Minor Offences Court had relied solely on the report, without holding a hearing at which he could cross-examine the police officer who had drafted it. 15. On 2 May 2012 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant’s constitutional complaint inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded. The Constitutional Court held: “In his constitutional complaint, the appellant was unable to show that the [Vrgorac Minor Offences Court] in the conduct of the proceedings or in the pronouncement of the judgment had acted contrary to the constitutional provisions concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms or had arbitrarily interpreted the relevant statutory provisions. The Constitutional Court therefore finds that the present case does not raise an issue in respect of the complainant’s constitutional rights. Thus, there is no constitutional law issue in the case for the Constitutional Court to decide on. ...” 16. The decision of the Constitutional Court was served on the applicant on 18 May 2012. 17. On 20 September 2012 the Vrgorac Minor Offences Court forwarded the judgment to the Rijeka Revenue Service (Porezna uprava u Rijeci) requesting that the fine be enforced. The enforcement proceedings are still pending.

4. The applicant was born in 1932 and lives in Skopje. 5. On 5 May 1991 the then Municipal Court of Struga (“the first-instance court”) ruled partly in the applicant's favour ordering the defendant, Mr J.T., to pay him compensation. On 29 December 1992 the then District Court of Bitola overturned the decision and increased the amount of the award. 6. On 1 February 1993 the applicant sought enforcement before the first-instance court by an inventory and public sale of the defendant's (“the debtor”) movable property. 7. According to the applicant, his request for enforcement was granted on 3 February 1993, but no formal decision has been ever served on him. 8. Between 17 April 1993 and 18 April 1994 respectively, the applicant complained to the President of the first-instance court and to the State Judicial Council about the court's inactivity. No answer was provided. 9. On 23 June 1994 an expert determined the amount of the applicant's claim with interest. 10. According to the Government, in May 1999 the enforcement proceedings were terminated as being resolved “in other way” (“на друг начин”) corresponding to the common practice of the courts and extract of the court's registry. No record was made about the termination of the proceedings. In or about March 2000, the case-file was destroyed. 11. According to the applicant, on 13 December 2006 the first-instance court intended to restore the case by requesting him to resubmit relevant documents. The Government did not dispute that assertion.

4. The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Budapest. 5. On 14 March 1997 the applicant was interrogated as suspect of breach of duty and other offences. 6. In the ensuing criminal proceedings, after a remittal, the Budapest Regional Court acquitted the applicant on 5 November 2008. 7. On appeal, the Budapest Regional Court of Appeal upheld the acquittal on 26 November 2009. 8. The applicant lodged a petition for review; but the Supreme Court rejected the motion on 13 December 2010.

9. The applicant was born in 1928 and lives in Druento (Turin). 10. In 1982 the Asti District Court made an order for the compulsory winding up of a commercial partnership formed by the applicant's wife in 1980. 11. On 16 November 1984 the same court made an order declaring the applicant personally bankrupt on the ground that he was a de facto partner. 12. On an unspecified date the trustee in bankruptcy filed a list of the bankrupt estate's debts with the registry. 13. On 21 November 1984 the judge assigned to the case gave the trustee in bankruptcy leave to intervene in proceedings that had been brought by a bank, SPT, for the forced sale of the applicant's house. 14. On 27 November 1984 he gave the trustee in bankruptcy leave to lodge tax appeals with the Tax Commissioners (Commissione Tributaria) in respect of sums claimed by the Turin and Asti tax authorities from the applicant's partnership. 15. Between 15 and 28 December 1984 the judge gave the trustee in bankruptcy permission to withdraw sums from the current account of the bankrupt estate for the payment, inter alia, of fees due to the trustee and an expert. 16. On an unspecified date in 1985 an initial attempt to sell the applicant's house at auction failed. 17. On 26 March 1985 the trustee in bankruptcy lodged a report. On 28 March 1985 the President of the District Court summoned G.Z. to appear in order to establish whether he was a partner of the applicant. G.Z. was heard on 26 April 1985. 18. On 10 June and 6 September 1985 the judge authorised the trustee in bankruptcy to make payments covering, inter alia, an expert's fees and the costs of publication of various notices. 19. On 21 January 1986 the judge gave permission for a lawyer to be instructed to act in the aforementioned proceedings concerning the applicant's house. 20. On 10 March 1986 the judge gave the applicant permission to draw his pension and on 21 March 1986 authorised the trustee in bankruptcy to settle proceedings that had been brought by S.G. for an order for the restitution of certain movables that were part of the bankrupt estate. 21. On 6 August 1986 the judge authorised the trustee in bankruptcy to enter into a loan agreement in respect of a building included in the bankrupt estate. 22. On 19 December 1986 the judge gave permission for a lawyer to be instructed to act in proceedings brought by P.C. contesting the bankrupt estate's liabilities. 23. On 23 March and 3 December 1987 the judge authorised the payment of various costs necessarily incurred in the proceedings. 24. On 16 December 1987 the trustee in bankruptcy sought an order for the replacement of the chairman of the Creditors' Committee following the latter's death. 25. On 22 December 1987 the judge refused permission for the sale by private contract (vendita a trattativa privata) of immovable property from the bankrupt estate on the ground that the Insolvency Act did not permit private sales of immovable property. 26. On 28 December 1987 the judge authorised the payment of a carer's allowance to the applicant's wife. 27. On 21 January 1988 he authorised the trustee in bankruptcy to return the deposit that had been paid on the proposed sale by private contract. 28. On 4 May 1988 the judge granted an application by O.D.S., one of the applicant's partners, for restitution of sums paid by a company, CPI, for services she had rendered. 29. On 28 June and 3 and 17 November 1988 he authorised the payment of advertising costs and taxes incurred on the sale of a building from the bankrupt estate. 30. On 8 February 1989 the judge authorised the payment of part of the fees of the lawyer acting in the proceedings brought by P.C. 31. On 3 March 1989 he authorised the payment of a tax liability and on 2 June 1989 of sums relating to the sale of the aforementioned building. 32. On 15 May 1991 he authorised the payment of the lawyer's fees incurred in the proceedings for the forced sale of the applicant's house and on 7 June 1991 the inclusion of a sum belonging to O.D.S. in the assets of the bankrupt estate. 33. On an unspecified date in September 1991 the trustee in bankruptcy intervened in tax enforcement proceedings (procedura di esecuzione esattoriale) brought by the Druento Tax Collector's Office (Esattoria) for the recovery of sums due on the sale of the applicant's house. Ultimately, the sale did not go ahead; on 13 November 1991 the judge authorised payment of the lawyer who had acted in the proceedings. 34. On 7 December 1991 the judge authorised the part payment of seniority pay (trattamento di fine rapporto) to the applicant. 35. On 28 April 1992 the judge appointed a valuer to value the applicant's assets and on 4 July 1993 authorised the payment of the costs thereby incurred. 36. On 12 May 1994 he appointed a new chairman to the Creditors' Committee at the request of the trustee in bankruptcy (who had made a like request on 16 December 1987). 37. On 10 January 1995 a further attempt was made to sell the applicant's house at auction, without success. 38. On 14 February 1995 the trustee in bankruptcy reported on the state of the proceedings at the judge's request. In particular, he said that all the assets of the bankrupt estate apart from the applicant's house had been sold. He also reserved the right to make a further proposal for the sale of the property at auction. 39. On 3 March 1995, in response to a request by the judge on 17 February 1995, the trustee in bankruptcy explained that there had been no partial distribution (ripartizione parziale) of the assets among the creditors because appeals were still pending before the Tax Commissioners. 40. As the applicant's house had been unlawfully occupied in the interim by D.L. and S.B., the judge ordered their eviction in a decision (decreto di rilascio) of 13 April 1995. On 14 April 1995 he asked the trustee in bankruptcy to produce a draft proposal for the partial distribution of the assets. 41. On 15 May 1995 the trustee in bankruptcy reported that the appeals to the Tax Commissioners had been successful and lodged a draft proposal for the partial distribution of the assets. Two days later he was authorised by the judge to transfer the current account of the bankrupt estate to another bank. 42. On 23 October 1995 the judge ruled that the draft proposal for the partial distribution of the assets could be implemented. 43. The following day D.L. moved out of the applicant's house. However, on an unspecified date S.B., who in the meantime had appealed against the judge's order of 13 April 1995, proposed to settle the dispute by undertaking to purchase the house. 44. On 14 December 1995 the trustee in bankruptcy filed a report. 45. On 6 February 1996 the judge fixed 19 April 1996 as the date for the auction of the applicant's house. 46. On an unspecified date the applicant sought a composition with the creditors. His application was declared inadmissible on 1 April 1996 on the ground that it did not satisfy the conditions laid down by section 124 of the Bankruptcy Act. 47. On 5 April 1996 the applicant asked the judge to refer to the Constitutional Court the question of the legitimacy of the system of proprietorial and personal disabilities to which bankrupts were subject and, in particular, sections 48, 49 and 50(3) of the Bankruptcy Act and Articles 350, 393, 407, 2382, 2417, 2488 and 2516 of the Civil Code. In a decision of 17 April 1996, the judge rejected that application as being manifestly ill-founded, holding that the legislature's decision to give the creditors' proprietorial interests precedence over those of the bankrupt did not entail a violation of the debtor's rights guaranteed by the Constitution. 48. In an application lodged with the registry on 17 April 1996, the applicant sought a stay of the order of 6 February 1996 for the sale of his house. 49. On 19 April 1996 the sale of the applicant's house by auction was adjourned to 21 April, when it was sold. 50. On 22 April 1996 the trustee in bankruptcy resigned. The District Court appointed a replacement the following day, who lodged a report on 11 October 1996. 51. On 3 May 1996 the applicant appealed to the Court of Cassation, with a view to having the order for the sale of his house set aside. According to information he has provided, his appeal was dismissed as being out of time. 52. On 12 December 1996 the judge appointed a valuer to carry out a valuation before title to the applicant's house was transferred to the successful bidder. The transfer was effected by a court order of 7 July 1997. 53. In a decision of 25 September 1998 the judge approved accounts that had been submitted by the trustee in bankruptcy. 54. On 5 October 1998 he authorised payment of the trustee in bankruptcy's fees. 55. On 23 March 1999 he approved the final proposal for the distribution of the assets, noting that the applicant had sufficient means after the sale of his house to honour his debts and bring the bankruptcy to an end. 56. On 17 July 1999 the judge terminated the bankruptcy.

6. The applicant was born in 1970 and is currently serving a sentence in Vicenza Prison in Italy. 7. In 1995 the prosecutor’s office for the city of Durrës charged the applicant with murder on the basis of evidence from the victim’s father, who maintained that he had been told by the victim, before his death, that the applicant was one of the murderers. The investigation in respect of three other suspects had been discontinued. 8. The applicant’s father, when interviewed by the police, stated that the applicant had been travelling to Italy with two other persons on the day when the murder was committed. 9. On 27 November 1996 the applicant, in absentia, was found guilty of murder under Article 76 of the Criminal Code and was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment by the Durrës Court of Appeal. His appeal to the then Court of Cassation was declared inadmissible on 10 March 1997. 10. Following the signature of an authorisation form by the applicant’s father on 10 December 1997, under Article 450 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”), the applicant’s counsel sought judicial review of the Court of Appeal’s judgment by a request bearing the same date. The application for judicial review reached the District Court on 11 December 1997. 11. The judicial review request stated that new evidence had emerged in favour of the applicant. Firstly, from the autopsy report it transpired that the victim had been stabbed in the heart and had died instantly; consequently, from a scientific point of view the victim had not been able to communicate. Secondly, two witnesses stated that they had been travelling with the applicant early in the morning to take the ferry to Italy at the time when the murder had occurred. 12. On 13 December 1997 the applicant authorised the same lawyer, who had already been appointed by his father on 10 December 1997, to represent him in the domestic proceedings. 13. By means of a letter of 26 August 1998 to the district prosecutor, the Directorate of Investigation and Inspection at the Prosecutor General’s Office forwarded the case file of the applicant and added that “the request for judicial review meets the legal requirements (kërkesa për rishikimin e vendimit plotëson kriteret ligjore)”. It requested the district prosecutor to examine objectively the new pieces of evidence to be submitted to the District Court. 14. The district prosecutor, who happened to be the same person who had attended the first trial, attended the hearing and requested the dismissal of the case pursuant to Article 328 (dh) of the CCP, which states that the case may be dismissed “if it transpires that the defendant has not committed the criminal offence or it cannot be proved that he committed the offence.” 15. On 27 November 1998 the Durrës District Court declared admissible the applicant’s application for judicial review. The court, deciding on the merits and after examining the new evidence and taking into account the prosecutor’s office request, quashed the Durrës Court of Appeal’s judgment of 27 November 1996 (see paragraphs 9 above) and acquitted the applicant on 14 December 1998 (“the acquittal decision”). 16. No appeal was lodged against the judgment within the 10 days allowed and it therefore became final on 24 December 1998. 17. On 8 October 1999 the prosecutor at the Durrës Court of Appeal (“the appeal prosecutor”) lodged a request for leave to appeal out of time against the acquittal decision with the Durrës District Court. The appeal prosecutor submitted as the ground for his request that shortcomings on the part of the district prosecutor had been observed. Invoking Article 26 § 1 of the CCP about the resignation of a prosecutor in cases of lack of impartiality, whose content makes reference to the resignation of a judge under Article 17 of the CCP, the appeal prosecutor maintained that the district prosecutor who had attended the first trial proceedings should not have participated in the review proceedings. Article 17 § 1 (c) of the CCP provides that a judge must resign “when he has provided advice or expressed opinion about the subject of proceedings.” 18. The appeal prosecutor contended that the victim’s family, who had been an injured party to the proceedings, had not been informed about the acquittal proceedings in accordance with Article 137 of the CCP. The appeal prosecutor became aware of the acquittal decision on an unspecified date before the end of September 1999, when the victim’s family’s complaint about the acquittal decision was forwarded to other authorities. 19. On 21 October 1999 the Durrës District Court, in the applicant’s absence and in the presence of an officially appointed defence lawyer, despite the existence of a lawyer of the applicant’s own choosing (see paragraph 12 above), granted the prosecutor leave to appeal out of time. 20. On an unspecified date the lawyer officially appointed in the proceedings before the Durrës District Court lodged an appeal with the Durrës Court of Appeal challenging the above-mentioned decision because the applicant had not been notified and the decision had not been served on him in accordance with Article 414 of the CCP. Meanwhile, in accordance with the District Court’s decision of 21 October 1999, the appeal prosecutor filed an appeal against the acquittal judgment. 21. On 15 December 1999 the Durrës Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s officially appointed lawyer’s appeal on the ground that the decision granting the prosecutor’s request for leave to appeal out of time was not subject to appeal by virtue of Article 147 § 5 of the CCP, as it did not put an end to the criminal proceedings. It also rejected the prosecutor’s appeal as it had not been notified explicitly to the applicant in accordance with Article 414 of the CCP. On an unspecified date the prosecutor appealed to the Supreme Court. 22. On 19 April 2000 the Criminal Division of the Supreme Court quashed the Durrës Court of Appeal’s decision of 15 December 1999. It found that the requirements concerning the notification of court decisions to the applicant’s officially appointed lawyer had been satisfied since the applicant was considered a fugitive. Accordingly, the court granted the prosecutor’s request for leave to appeal out of time against the acquittal decision and remitted the case to the Durrës Court of Appeal for a fresh examination. 23. According to the submissions of the appeal prosecutor to the Durrës Court of Appeal, the acquittal had to be considered null and void in so far as the new evidence adduced by the applicant, even if it gave him an alibi, had been submitted too late. Moreover, the prosecutor who had participated in the judicial review proceedings had also taken part in the first trial. Lastly, it was alleged that the applicant’s counsel lacked standing to initiate proceedings for judicial review as the applicant had signed a form of authority two days after the application for judicial review had been lodged. 24. On 18 December 2000 the Durrës Court of Appeal confirmed the reasoning set out in the acquittal decision of 14 December 1998 and dismissed the prosecutor’s appeal. The officially appointed lawyer was notified of the decision. On an unspecified date, citing the same grounds of appeal as he had lodged with the Durrës Court of Appeal, the prosecutor appealed to the Supreme Court, claiming that the acquittal decision was null and void. 25. On 20 June 2001 the Criminal Division of the Supreme Court upheld the prosecutor’s grounds of appeal and, deciding on the merits, quashed the acquittal decision. It held that there had been a breach of the CCP’s provisions relating to the applicant’s counsel’s legal capacity to lodge an application for judicial review on 11 December 1997. It found that he was appointed to act by the applicant on 13 December 1997 i.e. 2 days after he had filed the request with the District Court. The judgment was notified to the officially appointed lawyer. 26. In 2002 the applicant, who from 1999 onwards had been serving a sentence of 16 years’ imprisonment in Vicenza Prison (Italy), imposed by the Italian courts for international drug trafficking, was notified of the Supreme Court’s judgment that had led to the review of his acquittal, following a request by the Albanian authorities for his extradition. 27. On 13 February 2002 the lawyer appointed by the applicant, who had already acted for him in the judicial review proceedings (see paragraph 12 above), lodged an appeal with the Constitutional Court, alleging a violation of the applicant’s constitutional right to a fair trial and a breach of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (a) and (c) of the Convention. 28. In his submissions before that court the applicant maintained that the domestic court proceedings had been unfair on the grounds that neither he nor the counsel of his own choosing had been informed of the institution of proceedings and that he had been deemed to be a fugitive despite the fact that he had appointed a lawyer, whose legal capacity formed the basis of the prosecutor’s grounds of appeal against the acquittal. 29. Moreover, the applicant submitted that in view of the fact that the Albanian authorities had addressed two requests to the Italian authorities for his extradition to Albania, there was reason to believe that the Albanian authorities had had the possibility of giving him notice of the institution of proceedings and of serving the courts’ decisions on him. 30. As to the merits of the proceedings that led to the quashing of his acquittal, the applicant maintained that his counsel’s legal standing was not open to challenge in so far as on 10 December 1997 his father had authorised the lawyer to represent the applicant before the domestic courts in the proceedings for judicial review, and he himself had confirmed that authority on 13 December 1997. 31. On 26 April 2002 the Constitutional Court decided de plano to declare the applicant’s appeal inadmissible as being outside its jurisdiction.

4. The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Bjelovar. 5. On 26 February 1992 the applicant's summer house in Velika Pisanica was blown up by unknown perpetrators. 6. On 24 February 1995 the applicant together with his wife brought a civil action against the State in the Zagreb Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zagrebu) seeking damages. They relied on section 180 of the Civil Obligations Act. 7. On 3 February 1996 the Amendment to the Civil Obligations Act (“the 1996 Amendment”) entered into force. It provided that all proceedings concerning actions for damages resulting from terrorist acts or acts of violence were to be stayed pending the enactment of new legislation on the subject. 8. On 23 February 1996 the Municipal Court stayed the proceedings pursuant to the 1996 Amendment. 9. On 31 July 2003 the Act on Liability for Damage Resulting from Terrorist Acts and Public Demonstrations (“the 2003 Liability Act”) entered into force. 10. Pursuant to the 2003 Liability Act, on 17 February 2004 the Municipal Court resumed the proceedings. On 26 April 2004 it declared the applicant's action inadmissible finding that it no longer had jurisdiction in the matter. 11. The applicant appealed to the Zagreb County Court (Županijski sud u Zagrebu). It appears that the proceedings are currently pending before that court. 12. Meanwhile, on 24 April 2002 the applicant, represented by an attorney, lodged a constitutional complaint about the length of proceedings under section 63 of the Constitutional Court Act. On 7 July 2004 the Constitutional Court accepted the applicant's complaint. Relying on the Court's case law (Kutić v. Croatia, no. 48778/99, ECHR 2002‑II), it found violations of the applicant's constitutional rights to a hearing within a reasonable time and of access to a court. It ordered the Zagreb Municipal Court to give a decision in the applicant's case within a year and awarded him compensation in the amount of 4,400 Croatian kunas (HRK).

4. The applicant was born in 1975 and is detained in Andenne prison. 5. After studying the Koran and Sharia law, the applicant left his country of birth, Morocco, for Syria. He stayed there from 1993 to 2002 and studied Islamic theology and Arabic. During that period he travelled on several occasions to Morocco, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. He also visited Afghanistan twice, in 1994 and 1995, for a few months each time. He carried out military training there and – according to his application – took part in “a training programme for the military leader Hekmatyar”. 6. The applicant returned to Morocco in 2002. Under the surveillance of the Moroccan authorities, he left the country for Saudi Arabia, arriving there in October 2002. He only remained there until 2003 because – he alleged – he was “wanted by both Moroccan and Saudi intelligence services”. 7. The applicant reached Belgium via Turkey in early 2004, with false identity papers. He settled there with his Belgian wife and their son. He lodged an asylum application on 16 June 2004. 8. The applicant was arrested in Belgium on 1 July 2004. He was charged with participating, between 7 January and 2 July 2004, as a leader, in the activity of a terrorist group (the Moroccan Islamic Fighting Group, referred to hereinafter as “GICM” after its French name Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain), and with forgery, conspiring in a leading capacity to commit an offence, handling of stolen goods, use of a false name and illegal entry and residence. 9. It can be seen from the report on the facts submitted on 26 April 2006 by the Federal Prosecutor before the Brussels Court of Appeal (see paragraph 27 below) and that court’s judgment of 19 January 2007 (see paragraphs 29-41 below) that, on 25 November 2002, the administrator-general of the State security service transmitted to the Federal Prosecutor’s office a report noting the presence in Belgium of a group of North African nationals with links to the GICM, made up of individuals who had undergone military training in Afghanistan in camps connected to Al-Qaeda and led by a certain “Shihab”, alias “Abdellah”. A second report dated 24 December 2002 indicated that B. was part of that group. 10. A judicial investigation was opened on 9 January 2003 against persons unknown on a charge of criminal conspiracy. 11. In a third report, dated 28 March 2003, the State security service informed the public prosecutor’s office that a certain O. was the individual known as “Shihab”, and that he had spent time in Afghanistan in 2001, where he had followed paramilitary training. 12. In connection with the investigation into the Casablanca bombings of 16 May 2003, which left about fifty people dead, the Moroccan authorities arrested a number of Islamist militants. During an interview on 8 August 2003, one of them, N., alias Abu Muad, who acknowledged that he was one of the leaders of the GICM and that he had contributed to organising the movement in 2001 in Afghanistan, stated that a certain H. and the applicant had been given responsibilities within the group. He added that after the Western intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 the movement had been split up into small units based in Morocco, France, Belgium, Italy, the United Kingdom and Canada, and that the Belgian unit included H., B. and O. in particular. In view of those statements, and others made by another suspect on 9 August 2003, Morocco issued, on 3 October 2003, an international arrest and extradition warrant in respect of a number of individuals, including the applicant, H. and B., for, in particular, “conspiring to prepare and commit acts of terrorism, and collecting funds to support terrorist action”. 13. On 9 October 2003 the State security service transmitted a fourth report to the investigating judge concerning a certain I., who, on 17 November 2003 reported the loss of his passport to the Moroccan Consulate in Antwerp and applied for a new one. He subsequently stated that he had done so in order to obtain a passport for the applicant to be able to enter Belgium. 14. On 15 March 2004 the State security service issued a fifth report, indicating in particular that B.’s home had been placed under surveillance in the second half of January 2004 and that it was frequented by the applicant, his brother Hassan, O. and H. 15. On 16 March 2004 the Federal Prosecutor’s Office filed additional submissions against persons unknown on a charge of participating in terrorist activity. 16. On 19 March 2004 the federal police arrested H., O. and two other persons, after carrying out searches during which forged passports and Belgian identity cards for foreign residents, among other items, had been seized. 17. In the same period in France, in connection with a judicial investigation against persons unknown, opened on 19 May 2003 on a charge of conspiring to commit acts of terrorism, six individuals suspected of taking part in the GICM were arrested on 4 and 5 April 2004 (three of whom had been named in the Moroccan extradition warrant of 3 October 2003). While they were in police custody, and again before the French investigating judges, the suspects made statements in particular about the international structure of GICM, the military training carried out by some of them in Afghanistan, their meeting in that country with those implicated in the Belgian proceedings, the role played by the latter in the GICM’s international structure and their activities in Belgium. 18. In a report of 1 June 2004, the State security service referred to its surveillance on 12 March 2004 of a snack bar (“Le Village”) in a suburb of Brussels. 19. A second wave of searches took place on 8 June 2004 and four individuals were arrested. 20. On 26 June 2004, B., who had been arrested in the Netherlands on 27 January 2004 on the basis of a Moroccan warrant of October 2003, was extradited to Belgium. 21. I. was arrested on 16 September 2004. Individuals with links to the applicant or to some of his co-defendants were also arrested in Spain in connection with the investigation into the Madrid bombings of 11 March 2004. 22. The last report of the State security service, dated 6 January 2005, indicated that a certain R. might also be linked to the suspects in the case. 23. In a decision of 29 August 2005 the Committals Division (chambre du conseil) of the Brussels Court of First Instance committed the applicant and twelve others to stand trial before the Brussels Criminal Court for, in particular, participation in a terrorist group. On the same day, finding that the applicant had provided evidence of low income, it granted him legal aid so that he could receive a free copy of the entire case file. 24. Documents transmitted by the Moroccan authorities in response to an international letter of request were added to the file after the finalising of the pre-trial proceedings. They were reports of interviews with four of the suspects who were held in Morocco. One of the reports concerned an interview on 14 January 2004 with a certain A., who had been arrested in Saudi Arabia and extradited on that date to Morocco. According to the indications in the Federal Prosecutor’s report on the facts (see paragraph 9 above), A. had stated, in particular, that he had met the applicant, who was a childhood friend of his, in Afghanistan in 1998, and then in 2000 had met the defendant H., while the latter was on a training course in the use of explosives and remote-controlled bombs. A. had added that, in early 2000, the GICM had been re-organised around committees, with the applicant chairing the religious affairs committee and H. being a member of the security committee. He had also explained that he had shared accommodation with the applicant for four months in Kabul in early 2001, in a “GICM guest house” where the group’s leaders would incite them to “go and carry out jihadist operations in Morocco”, and that after the Western intervention in 2001, he had travelled to Morocco, where he had taken part in GICM meetings accompanied, in particular, by the applicant; he had then met up with the applicant again in 2003 in Saudi Arabia. A. had also confirmed the existence of GICM units in France and Belgium, and the fact that B. and O., who he had seen in Afghanistan in 2000 and 2001 respectively, were involved in the Belgian unit. 25. The public prosecutor’s office set the case down for hearing on 3 November 2005 and then on 16 November 2005. The Criminal Court held a total of twenty-five hearings, which lasted from 3 November 2005 to 16 February 2006, when it sentenced the applicant to seven years’ imprisonment and a fine of 2,500 euros (EUR). It also handed down prison sentences and fines against eight of his co-defendants and acquitted the four others. 26. Five of the co-defendants – including the applicant – lodged an appeal, as did the Federal Prosecutor’s Office. 27. The first hearing before the Brussels Court of Appeal was scheduled for 26 April 2006. After briefly questioning the applicant about his identity and the reason for his appeal, the President asked the Federal Prosecutor to give a report on the case. The latter proceeded to read out a report on the facts, extending to several dozen pages, which had been prepared by the Federal Prosecutor’s office (even though, the applicant claimed, the usual practice in Belgian criminal courts was for the report on the facts to be presented by a judge of the Court of Appeal). The Court of Appeal subsequently requested the public prosecutor to give his submissions, without there having been any further examination of the applicant or of witnesses. In view of the voluminous nature of the case file (about a hundred binders containing thousands of pages), the co-defendants submitted in writing that the case should be adjourned until 1 September 2006. As the Court of Appeal denied that request, four of them, including the applicant, decided not to appear. 28. On 15 September 2006, ruling in absentia in respect of the four defendants, the Court of Appeal varied the judgment of 16 February 2006 and sentenced the applicant to eight years’ imprisonment and a fine of EUR 2,500. The applicant and two of his co-defendants applied to have the judgment set aside. (b) Judgment of 19 January 2007 29. Some ten hearings were held between 6 October and 10 November 2006 and on 19 January 2007 the Brussels Court of Appeal confirmed the applicant’s guilt and his original sentence of seven years’ imprisonment and a EUR 2,500 fine. (i) Criminal procedure issues ... 34. The defendants further protested against the addition to the case file of interview reports from France and Morocco. They argued that the statements had been obtained using treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention, adding that, in respect of the interviews conducted in Morocco, they were unlawful under Moroccan law. Invoking their right to a fair trial, they requested the Court of Appeal to remove them from the criminal case file. ... 36. As to the interviews conducted in Morocco, the Court of Appeal first noted that the defendants had not adduced any concrete evidence giving rise to reasonable doubt as to a possible breach of Moroccan law by the police or judicial authorities of that country in the proceedings from which the interview reports in question had emanated. The court found, in particular, that the interview reports recorded the statements in a detailed manner, mentioning the identity of the police officer by whom they were drawn up, the precise duration of the judicial custody periods and the fact that they had been authorised by the relevant public prosecutor. It further found as follows: “... Moreover, the fact of citing in general terms various reports of human rights organisations – admittedly respectable ones – does not adduce any concrete evidence that would be capable of giving rise in the present case to the above-mentioned reasonable doubt as to the violence, torture or inhuman or degrading treatment that was allegedly inflicted on the individuals interviewed in Morocco ... Lastly, it cannot be surmised from those interviews or from the Moroccan court decisions added to the file that ... the above-mentioned persons were questioned or sentenced after an expedited trial for participating in the Casablanca bombings, on the basis of a Moroccan Law of 28 May 2003 on the combating of terrorism that had been applied retroactively in breach both of Article 4 of the Moroccan Criminal Code and of the general principle that criminal legislation cannot have retrospective effect. An examination of the Moroccan court decisions – and more specifically the judgment of the Rabat Assize Court – reveals, on the contrary, that the eight Moroccan defendants had initially been charged with setting up a criminal association for the preparation and commission of acts of terrorism, forgery of passports, and the collection of funds in aid of terrorist actions, on the basis of legislation that was unconnected with the above-mentioned Law of 28 May 2003. It can be seen from the foregoing findings that the interview reports and Moroccan court decisions that were added to the file, with the possibility of being freely challenged by the parties, should not be excluded. In addition, the contradictions allegedly contained in those statements, according to defence counsel’s argument, are not capable of justifying the claim that the individuals who were interviewed and/or tried in Morocco were subjected to any inhuman and degrading treatment or torture. Lastly, the Belgian trial courts are by no means bound by those statements and remain free to decide on their relevance and accuracy.” ... (ii) Examination on the merits 39. In its judgment, the Court of Appeal began by showing that the GICM was a terrorist group within the meaning of Article 139 § 1 of the Criminal Code, explaining that it was an organised association of more than two people, established on a lasting basis, which engaged in concerted action for the purpose of committing terrorist offences covered by Article 137 of the Criminal Code. It observed in particular that the group had set up a coordination committee in Morocco and a number of cells in Europe, which had acted in a concerted manner to commit terrorist offences (in particular, homicide and widespread destruction or damage) with the aim of destroying by violence the fundamental structures of Morocco, so that the caliphate could be restored in that country, and of engaging in a holy war that would spread to other countries. 40. As regards, more specifically, the guilt of the applicant himself, the Court of Appeal first noted that “it [could] be seen with certainty from certain elements of the procedure” that he had taken part in the activity of a terrorist group, within the meaning of Article 140 § 1 of the Criminal Code, by taking a number of initiatives to facilitate transfers of funds that were necessary for the financing of the GICM’s unlawful activities, by circulating information about them and acting as a coordinator between the members of the Belgian and French cells, and that he was aware that such participation would contribute to the commission of a criminal offence. It thus concluded that there were a “number of sufficiently strong presumptions of fact”, with reference to the following evidence: - statements made by individuals interviewed in Morocco and information from the Moroccan authorities; - statements made by individuals interviewed in France; - statements made by the applicant, from which it transpired that he had participated in GICM meetings in Europe; - the fact that the applicant had made “a number of journeys in countries known for radical Islamist opinions developed by certain influential groups”, had “followed paramilitary training in Jalalabad” and had had “numerous contacts with individuals known for their close relations with extremist Islamist cells or active participation therein”; - the applicant’s participation in the extremist activities of Islamist groups that were active on an international scale, based on an international arrest warrant issued against him by the Moroccan authorities in connection with an investigation into terrorist activities, and on the fact that he had fled Saudi Arabia, where he was suspected of taking part in the Riyadh bombings of 12 May 2003, for which an arrest warrant had also been delivered against him; - his participation in training specifically given to Islamist terrorist groups, as inferred from his own statements and those of individuals held in Morocco; - the applicant’s links with other members of the GICM’s Belgian cell. The Court of Appeal then noted that the applicant was one of the GICM’s leaders, a fact that could be sufficiently inferred from the statements taken in Morocco and France and from his role as coordinator for the GICM members in Belgium. 41. Lastly, the Court of Appeal found that “the acts committed by the defendants fell clearly within the context of a movement whose aim was to further, by violence and intolerance, the cause of a radical form of Islam, directly threatening the religious and philosophical pluralism that existed in democratic societies and the fundamental rights of their citizens, such as freedom of thought and freedom of expression”, and that the sanction should be “commensurate with this very serious breach of public safety and democratic order”. In sentencing the applicant, the court added as follows: “... It should be pointed out that the defendant played a major role within the GICM’s religious committee; that he was subsequently responsible for the Belgian and French cells of the GICM, together with the defendant [O]. As has already been mentioned, his duties in the Belgian cell mainly consisted in: directing the collection of funds that would serve to finance the group’s activities after the arrest of [N.]; playing a coordinating role between the members of the Belgian cell and those of the Belgian and French cells; and maintaining contact with numerous members of cells based in other countries. The acts committed by the defendant are clearly of a serious nature because they were committed: by an individual who, in particular, travelled on numerous occasions to Afghanistan, Chechnya, Turkey, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia and Syria to establish international relations between the members of the various cells of the terrorist group; by a professional who followed military training in Afghanistan and training in group leadership and who dispensed religious training as part of the responsibilities entrusted to him within the GICM; by an extremist who has no respect for the physical integrity of others and who is prepared to undermine international public safety, by making possible the use of violent methods to ensure that his opinions prevail. The features of the defendant’s personality, as can be seen from the case file, are a matter of concern. It should be pointed out in this connection that the defendant: has already been known for many years at an international level for his terrorist activities and is also wanted by the Moroccan judicial authorities under an international arrest warrant; resided illegally in Belgium for several months and did not lodge an asylum request with the aliens office until June 2004; cannot prove any means of subsistence and seems to survive only with the support of other members of the terrorist group. ..” 44. As to the argument concerning treatment in breach of Article 3 that had allegedly been sustained by individuals whose statements had been taken in foreign countries, the Court of Cassation took the view that its examination would entail criticism of the factual assessment of the evidence in the case by the trial judge, or a request for verification of such evidence, and that it did not have jurisdiction in respect of such matters. 45. The court further found ... that, as a whole, the applicant had been given a fair trial within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention.

4. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 5. On 7 May 1996 the Commercial Court in Leskovac (Privredni sud u Leskovcu) ordered “Jedinstvo”, a company based in Lebane, to hand over 87,480 kilograms of common salt to the applicant, and pay its legal costs in the amount of 2,850 Yugoslav Dinars (“YUD”). 6. This judgment became final by 8 June 1996. 7. On 21 June 1996 the applicant filed an enforcement request in respect of the judgment. 8. On 24 June 1996 the Commercial Court in Leskovac (“the Commercial Court”) issued an enforcement order against the respondent company (“the debtor”). 9. On 17 October 1996 the Commercial Court adopted a decision stating that the debtor could not deliver the specified amount of common salt and, instead, ordered it to pay to the applicant YUD 218,700. 10. In the meantime, the debtor was transformed into four separate companies - “Holding Jedinstvo”, “Caričin grad” and “8. novembar”, all based in Lebane, and “Agrar” based in Bošnjaca (“the debtors”). 11. On 21 December 1998 the Commercial Court ordered the debtors to pay the applicant YUD 218,700 with statutory interest as of 30 October 1996, plus another YUD 4,850 for legal costs, and ruled that they had jointly assumed the financial obligations of the initial debtor. 12. On 12 February 1999 and 17 September 1999, the Commercial Court and the High Commercial Court in Belgrade (Viši privredni sud u Beogradu), respectively, rejected the debtors' requests for a stay of the enforcement proceedings. 13. On 23 December 1999 the applicant filed a submission with the Commercial Court, seeking the expedition of these proceedings. 14. Mr Marko Momčilović subsequently became the applicant's owner and authorised representative. 15. Throughout this time and during the years that followed, the applicant proposed different means of enforcement, including bank account seizures as well as the auctioning of the debtors' movable and, if needed, immovable assets. It emphasised that, where appropriate, police assistance should be sought. 16. On 11 July 2001, 25 March 2002 and 14 November 2002, respectively, the applicant filed requests to this effect with the Commercial Court and urged that the proceedings be expedited. 17. On 21 February 2004 the applicant sent a complaint, by post, to the Court of Serbia and Montenegro, stating, inter alia, that the debtors still had sufficient assets to pay their outstanding obligation, as the Commercial Court would have otherwise been “only too glad” to declare the enforcement impossible (“sud bi [inače] jedva [do]čekao da [to] konstatuje i obavesti nas kako je nemoguće sprovesti izvršenje”). This complaint, however, appears not to have reached the Court of Serbia and Montenegro. 18. By 18 March 2004 the debtors paid the applicant a total of 838,148.06 Serbian Dinars, the domestic currency having been renamed in the meantime. 19. On 22 November 2004 and 30 November 2004 the applicant complained to the Commercial Court, on 15 December 2004 to the High Commercial Court in Belgrade, and on 2 July 2001 and 15 December 2004 to the Supreme Court of Serbia (Vrhovni sud Srbije), respectively. 20. On 21 January 2005 the President of the Commercial Court informed the applicant that the enforcement proceedings had been hindered by the debtors' employees as well as the police. While the former physically prevented the bailiffs from conducting an inventory of the debtors' movable assets, on several separate occasions, the latter refused to assist the bailiffs in their subsequent attempts to seize those very assets. The President further noted that the most recent refusal of the police to assist the bailiffs occurred on 18 November 2004, which is why the enforcement had to be postponed. Finally, he stated that the proceedings would recommence as soon as the judge handling the case clarified the situation with the head of the local police, and concluded that the refusal of the police to assist the bailiffs in their duties was common in cases involving “discontented workers” engaged in the obstruction of judicial enforcement proceedings.

5. The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Velenje. 6. On 13 August 1996 the applicant was injured in a car accident. The person responsible for the accident had taken out insurance with the insurance company ZT. 7. On 29 December 1997 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against ZT in the Celje District Court (Okrožno sodišče v Celju) seeking damages in the amount of 14,330,442 Slovenian tolars (SIT) (approximately 62,000 euros) for the injuries sustained. 8. Between 1 July 1998 and 18 April 2000 the applicant made seven requests that a date be set for a hearing. 9. Between 20 October 1999 and 23 September 2002 he lodged eleven preliminary written submissions and/or adduced evidence. 10. On 21 September 2000 the court appointed four medical experts to prepare expert reports in the case. 11. Three hearings were held between 21 September 2000 and 17 October 2002. 12. On 17 October 2002 the court decided to deliver a written judgment. The judgment, upholding the applicant’s claim in part, was served on the applicant on 18 November 2002. 13. On 28 November 2002 the applicant appealed to the Celje Higher Court (Višje sodišče v Celju) and requested that the first-instance court to correct its judgment. 14. On 8 July 2003 the first-instance court corrected its judgment as regards legal costs. 15. On 23 December 2004 the Celje Higher Court delivered a judgment allowing the applicant’s appeal in part and amending the first-instance court’s judgment accordingly. The judgment was served on the applicant on 10 January 2005. 16. On 19 January 2005 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court (Vrhovno sodišče). On 7 December 2006 the court delivered a judgment. It partly upheld the applicant’s appeal on points of law and changed the second-instance court’s judgment accordingly. The Supreme Court’s judgment was served on the applicant on 18 January 2007.

5. The applicant was born in 1943 and lives in Šilėnai, in the Šiauliai Region. 6. In June 2000 the Radviliškis Land Department of the Šiauliai County Administration recognised L.S.G.’s right to the restoration of title to 4.07 hectares of land in the Radviliškis area. The plot of land in question had belonged to two other individuals, P.M. and E.M., and had been nationalised by the Soviet regime. 7. Later that month the applicant and L.S.G. signed a notarised agreement by which L.S.G. transferred (perleido) to the applicant the right to the restoration of title to 2.07 hectares of the above-mentioned plot of land. The agreement did not indicate whether the applicant had given any money to L.S.G. in exchange for this right. However, the applicant subsequently claimed (see paragraph 12 below) that she had paid 1,400 Lithuanian litai (LTL; approximately 405 euros (EUR)). 8. On 16 October 2001 the Šiauliai County Administration estimated that the value of the plot of land transferred to the applicant was LTL 2,124 (EUR 615). The Šiauliai County Administration then awarded the applicant the right of title to 1.78 hectares of land of equivalent value. The applicant registered the plot in the Land Registry under her own name. 9. In October 2004 the Special Investigation Service began investigating allegations of fraud, forgery of documents and abuse of office (under Articles 182, 228 and 300 of the Criminal Code) relating to the restoration of property rights by the Radviliškis Land Department. In January 2005 the prosecutor of the Šiauliai Region (hereinafter “the prosecutor”) launched a similar investigation. Subsequently, the two investigations were joined. 10. In May 2008 the prosecutor submitted a request to the Radviliškis District Court for the annulment of the agreement between the applicant and L.S.G. The prosecutor stated that L.S.G. had not had the right to the restitution of P.M. and E.M.’s land and thus could not legally have transferred that right to the applicant. 11. On 11 November 2008 the Radviliškis District Court granted the prosecutor’s request. The court held that L.S.G. had not been P.M. and E.M.’s relative or heir and thus, under the applicable law, had not been entitled to the restoration of title to their land (see paragraph 17 below). Therefore, the court declared the agreement between the applicant and L.S.G. null and void ab initio, confiscated the plot of land from the applicant, and returned it to the State. 12. During the proceedings the applicant claimed that she had paid LTL 1,400 (EUR 405) to L.S.G. for the right of title to the land, and L.S.G. acknowledged that she had received an unspecified sum of money. However, since no such payment had been mentioned in the text of their agreement, the court held that the right of title had been transferred to the applicant for free and did not award her any compensation. 13. On 17 February 2009 the Šiauliai Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the decision of the lower court. The court found that the applicant had not proved that she had paid for the transfer of the right of title. It also noted that under the Civil Code, property which had been unlawfully obtained for free could be confiscated from an owner, irrespective of whether the owner had acquired such property in good faith (see paragraphs 19 and 20 below). 14. On 22 April 2009 the Supreme Court refused to examine a cassation appeal lodged by the applicant on the ground that it did not raise any important legal issues. 15. On 23 January 2009 the prosecutor instituted criminal proceedings before the Šiauliai District Court against S.D., a former official in the Radviliškis Land Department. S.D. was charged with several counts of forgery of documents and abuse of office under Articles 228 and 300 of the Criminal Code. She was accused of, inter alia, having acted together with L.S.G. in forging documents which purported to prove L.S.G.’s right to the restoration of title to certain property, with the aim of selling that right to other individuals. The indictment noted that L.S.G. had received approximately LTL 1,400 (EUR 405) from the applicant in exchange for the right to the restoration of title to the property in question. At the time of the parties’ final submissions to the Court, the criminal case was still awaiting examination before the first-instance court.

4. The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Łódź. 5. On 19 January 2004 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of attempted burglary and assault causing bodily harm. 6. On 21 January 2004 the Sieradz District Court remanded the applicant in custody. The applicant was released from detention on 8 July 2004. 7. On 20 September 2004 the Sieradz District Court acquitted the applicant of attempted burglary and convicted him of assault. It sentenced him to one year’s imprisonment. The applicant appealed. 8. On 8 December 2004 the Sieradz Regional Court upheld the District Court judgment. The applicant lodged a cassation appeal. 9. On 16 August 2005 the Supreme Court dismissed his cassation appeal as manifestly ill-founded. 10. It transpires from the case file that in the period from 12 June 2006 to at least 4 July 2006 the applicant was again remanded in custody in connection with another set of criminal proceedings against him. 11. On 12 June 2006 the applicant sent a request for an application form to the Court. On 29 June 2006 the Court received his request. 12. On 4 July 2006 the Court sent a letter to the applicant containing a copy of the Convention, an application form and two information sheets. The envelope from this letter bears a stamp marked “censored”. The envelope also bears two stamps of the Łódź Detention Centre with the dates 14 July 2006 and 21 July 2006.

6. The applicant was born in 1973 and lived in İstanbul. He died on 14 June 2005. 7. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows. 8. On 7 March 1994 the applicant was taken into police custody in Muş on suspicion of being a member of the illegal PKK (the Kurdistan Workers' Party). On 13 March 1994 he was handed over to the Istanbul Security Directorate for further investigation. 9. On 21 March 1994 the applicant was taken before the investigating judge at the Istanbul State Security Court, who ordered his detention pending trial. 10. By an indictment dated 23 June 1994, the public prosecutor initiated criminal proceedings against the applicant and forty-five other defendants before the Istanbul State Security Court, accusing them, inter alia, of membership of an illegal armed organisation and of involvement in activities that undermined the constitutional order of the State. The prosecution requested that the applicant be sentenced pursuant to Article 125 of the Criminal Code. 11. On 5 May 1999 the Istanbul State Security Court, composed of three judges including a military judge, decided that the applicant's case should be separated from the file as his final defence submissions had not been submitted to the court. 12. On 18 June 1999 the Constitution was amended and the military judge sitting on the bench of the Istanbul State Security Court was replaced by a civilian judge. 13. The case against the applicant continued before the Istanbul State Security Court. In the course of the proceedings the State Security Court rejected the applicant's requests for release, taking into account the nature of the alleged offence and the state of the evidence. 14. On 5 April 2004 the applicant was released pending trial. The case was still pending before the domestic courts when the applicant died on 14 June 2005.

4. The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Bucharest. 5. The applicant worked as chief of the catering division of TAROM company (the Romanian Air Transport company), a State-owned company. In 1990, by a Government decision, the catering branch of TAROM became a new company, CASROM. In 1998 CASROM merged into the COMCHIM company, a private company. In 2004 that company changed its name into ROMAQUA. 6. On 8 February 1990 the applicant was dismissed from his job. He challenged that decision and on 9 November 1992 the Ilfov District Court ordered CASROM to reinstate the applicant in his previous job or in an equivalent post, and TAROM to pay him 154,043 Romanian lei (ROL) as overdue salary for the period February 1990 to September 1992, and also to pay him salary until effective reinstatement. That judgment became final on 28 May 1993. 7. On 6 June 1996 the applicant lodged an action against TAROM and CASROM for payment of salary until effective reinstatement and for bringing the amount of ROL 154,043 up-to-date in accordance with inflation. On 3 February 2005 the Bucharest Court of Appeal, by a final decision, ordered TAROM to pay the applicant that amount indexed to take account of inflation. 8. In March and April 2004, and then in April 2005, the bailiff sought to attach the company's financial assets in several banks in respect of the salaries due. Those seizures were endorsed by the courts. 9. On 28 April 2004 the Bucharest District Court declared that the judgment of 9 November 1992 could be enforced. 10. On 19 May 2004 TAROM lodged an objection to execution, alleging that the applicant's right to request enforcement of that judgment had become time-barred. The Bucharest County Court upheld that request by a final decision of 17 June 2005, declaring that the applicant's right to request enforcement of the judgment of 9 November 1992 was time-barred. 11. On 23 March 2007 the Bucharest County Court dismissed as time–barred an action by the applicant for payment of salaries from 1990 to 1999 and of other pecuniary rights related to his employee capacity. However, on 27 September 2007 the decision was quashed by the Bucharest Court of Appeal and the case sent for fresh consideration. No information on the outcome of the proceedings is available to the Court. 12. On 26 April 2007 the Bucharest County Court dismissed an action by the applicant for payment of salary and connected rights from 1999 onward, for lack of responsibility of TAROM. The court considered that the applicant should have taken action against COMCHIM/ROMAQUA. That judgment became final. 13. On 13 March 1995 the applicant sought comminatory damages from CASROM for non‑compliance with the judgment of 9 November 1992. 14. On 13 June 1996 the Bucharest District Court set comminatory damages of ROL 50,000 per day until the applicant's effective reinstatement. The court held that CASROM had systematically refused to reinstate the applicant. That judgment became final on 9 June 1997. 15. On 5 December 1997 the applicant requested quantification and payment of comminatory damages. 16. On 11 January 1999 the Bucharest District Court upheld his request and set to ROL 69,250,000 the amount corresponding to damage for non-compliance between 5 October and 14 December 1998. On 6 October 1999 Bucharest County Court upheld that judgment. On 16 November 1999 ROMAQUA paid that amount. 17. On 5 June 1999 the applicant sought again quantification and payment of comminatory damages. 18. On 20 December 2000 the Bucharest District Court ordered the debtor to pay ROL 54,627,890, of which ROL 10,467,750 was comminatory damages for 14 December 1998-15 November 1999 and ROL 44,160,140 was indexation of the damages set on 11 January 1999. On 26 April 2001 the Bucharest County Court declared the debtor's appeal null and void for non-payment of court fees. On 21 May 2001 ROMAQUA paid that amount. (b) Action for non-pecuniary damages 19. On 22 October 1999 the Bucharest County Court ordered COMCHIM to pay the applicant ROL 200,000,000 for non-pecuniary damage caused by the refusal to comply with the court orders. 20. On 13 March 2001 the Bucharest Court of Appeal upheld that judgment. 21. On 3 September 2002 COMCHIM paid the applicant ROL 395,900,000, representing the updated above-mentioned amount. 22. However, on 17 December 2002 the Supreme Court of Justice quashed the previous decisions and sent the case back to the County Court. 23. After retrial, on 24 November 2003 the County Court dismissed the action on the grounds that it had been objectively impossible for the debtor to comply with the obligation to reinstate the applicant because of the reorganisation of the company. 24. On 9 June 2004 the Bucharest Court of Appeal allowed an appeal by the applicant, quashed the previous judgment and ordered ROMAQUA to pay the applicant ROL 500,000,000 for non‑pecuniary damages. It considered that the “objective impossibility” had not been proved and that in any case it could not justify non-compliance. That judgment became final on 27 January 2006. 25. On 26 August 2004 Bucharest District Court attached ROMAQUA's financial assets in a bank. On 3 February 2005 the Bucharest Court of Appeal upheld that interlocutory judgment. 26. On 1 September 2004 ROMAQUA paid ROL 500,000,000. 27. On 27 September 2004 ROMAQUA objected to the execution, submitting that it had already paid ROL 395,900,000 and that the execution should have been continued only for the remaining until ROL 500,000,000. On 14 July 2005 the Bucharest County Court, by a final decision, upheld the objection and annulled the execution insofar as it concerned the payment of ROL 395,900,000 in the applicant's favour. 28. According to the applicant, ROMAQUA had not claimed the difference that it had paid. 29. On 8 August 2002 the applicant lodged an action against the Ministry of Justice, seeking pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages for length of the proceedings related to his dismissal. On 4 November 2002 the Bucharest County Court dismissed his action, considering that the Ministry of Justice bore no responsibility for the alleged facts. That judgment became final on 18 March 2004. 30. On 11 June 1993 CASROM invoked the impossibility to reinstate the applicant in a post corresponding to his qualifications and offered him the post of night watchman, which was rejected by the latter. 31. On 6 June 1995 TAROM paid ROL 154,043 for salaries for the period February 1990 to September 1992, as ordered by the judgment of 9 November 1992, as well as ROL 217,563 for salaries until 30 June 1993. 32. On 17 March 1999 COMCHIM reinstated the applicant. 33. On 12 November 2004 TAROM paid ROL 4,235,986,868 for due and updated salaries. 34. On 20 June 2005 the bailiff also received for the applicant ROL 340,000,000 from TAROM, in compliance with the judgment of 9 November 1992, representing salaries from 15 February 1990 to 17 March 1999 indexed. 35. On 1 July 2009 the Bucharest District Court allowed a request by TAROM and ordered the applicant to return the amount of 457,598.68 new Romanian lei (RON). The court considered that TAROM had paid all the debt. The applicant appealed and the proceedings are still pending. 36. In 1991 and then in 1992 the applicant passed two competitions for a post within the Financial Control Office. Following refusal by that institution to employ him, the applicant brought court proceedings. 37. On 14 December 1995 Bucharest District Court ordered the Financial Control Office to employ the applicant as from 20 October 1992 and to pay him ROL 2,000,000 for damages and ROL 100,000 for court fees. That judgment became final on 30 May 1997. 38. In 1999 the courts declared that the judgment had become enforceable and that it could be enforced. However, the applicant was not employed allegedly because he was a collaborator of the former State Security Department (Securitate). By a decision of 25 September 2007 the National Council for the Study of the Archives of the Securitate declared that the applicant had not been a collaborator. 39. On 25 February 2008 the applicant sought again employment with the Financial Control Office. On 27 March 2008 the bailiff enjoined that institution to employ the applicant. However, the Financial Control Office considered that the applicant's right to request enforcement was time-barred. 40. On 9 May 2008 the bailiff certified in an official record the institution's refusal to employ the applicant and considered necessary to apply a pecuniary penalty for delay in enforcement. 41. On 12 May 2008 the applicant brought proceedings against the Financial Control Office, seeking from the court to order that institution to employ him as from 20 October 1992, as ordered by the judgment of 14 December 1995, and to pay him damages. 42. On 16 June 2008 the Bucharest District Court rejected his request to be employed as res judicata. It further held that his right to request enforcement of that judgment was time-barred. 43. On 22 September 2008 the Bucharest County Court allowed an appeal by the applicant, quashed the previous judgment and send the case back for a fresh consideration. On 23 June 2009 the Bucharest Court of Appeal upheld that judgment by a final decision. 44. The proceedings are still pending.

4. The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Caralevë, in the municipality of Shtime (Kosovo). 5. On 28 April 1993 the applicant married F.M., an Albanian national. The couple had a child, I.B., who was born on 20 January 1997. In 1998 the applicant and F.M. separated. 6. F.M., together with her daughter, moved to her parents’ house in Vlora, Albania. 7. On 6 May 1999, using forged documents, the applicant’s wife married another person without being divorced from the applicant. 8. It appears that on 15 September 1999 the Vlora District Court annulled F.M.’s second marriage. On an unspecified date she married H.I., an Albanian national who resided in Greece. 9. During the years that followed F.M.’s third marriage, she frequently travelled to Greece, leaving her daughter for long periods with her parents in Vlora, or taking her to Greece without the applicant’s consent. 10. F.M. and her parents prohibited the applicant from having contact with his daughter. Since his separation from F.M., the applicant has been permitted to see his daughter only twice, in September 2000 and May 2003. 11. On 24 June 2003 the applicant brought divorce proceedings before the Vlora District Court. 12. On 26 June 2003 the applicant requested the Vlora Police District to block his daughter’s passport in view of the fact that his wife was planning to take her to Greece without his consent. 13. Despite the applicant’s requests to the Vlora Police District, it appears that his wife took the child to Greece on 15 January 2004, using an official certificate in which the applicant’s daughter had been registered with the name I.M., using F.M.’s surname. 14. The applicant’s wife was not present at the hearings. The latter’s father testified before the court that his grandchild was in Greece with her mother, who resided there as an economic refugee. 15. On 4 February 2004 the Vlora District Court decreed the parties’ divorce. The court granted custody of the child to the applicant, having regard to the wife’s lack of interest in the child’s life, the instability of her residential arrangements and her long periods of separation from the child. 16. On 19 March 2004 the divorce and custody decisions became final. 17. On 5 April 2004 the Vlora District Court issued a writ for the enforcement of the Vlora District Court’s judgment of 4 February 2004. 18. On 13 July 2004 the Vlora Bailiffs’ Office informed the applicant that it was impossible to enforce the judgment since the child was not in Albania. 19. On 15 August 2004 and 13 January 2005 the applicant applied to the Albanian Ministry of Justice to secure the return of his daughter. 20. On 11 January 2005, when questioned by the bailiffs, F.M.’s father declared that F.M. and the child were living abroad and that he had no news of their whereabouts. The bailiffs went to F.M.’s home on three occasions between January 2005 and May 2005. 21. In May 2005 the Selenice District Police Station informed the bailiffs that F.M. and her daughter were not living in Athens and that F.M.’s father had moved to an unknown address in Tirana. 22. In July 2005 the Bailiffs’ Office informed the applicant that in order to comply with the bilateral agreement between Albania and Greece he had to introduce a request and specify the precise address of the child in Greece. 23. The applicant sent numerous requests to the Albanian authorities, the Greek Embassy in Albania, the Ombudsperson of Albania (Avokati i Popullit) and the Ombudsperson of Kosovo, in order to obtain assistance in securing the enforcement of the custody decision. 24. On 14 August 2004 the applicant initiated criminal proceedings with the Vlora District Court against his former wife, accusing her of child abduction. 25. On 13 October 2004 the Vlora District Court informed the Albanian Ombudsperson that no lawsuit had been filed with it relating to the abduction of the applicant’s daughter. 26. On 15 December 2003 the applicant initiated criminal proceedings against A.C., a Civil Status Office employee. He accused her of falsifying various documents that had enabled F.M. to remove I.B. from Albania, and particularly of forging documents declaring his wife to be unmarried and altering his daughter’s surname. 27. On 26 January 2004 the Vlora District Court decided to discontinue the proceedings. 28. On 22 August 2006 the Government informed the Registry that on 31 March 2006 the Vlora Court of Appeal had repealed the custody judgment of 4 February 2004 on the grounds that F.M. had not been duly informed of the proceedings on the custody of her daughter. The domestic court decided to send the case to the Vlora District Court for a fresh examination and thus the custody proceedings are still pending. 29. On 23 August 2006, following the Registry’s request, the applicant stated that he had neither been informed of the institution of the new proceedings nor about their outcome. 30. The proceedings had been brought by F.M.’s lawyer and held in the applicant’s absence. 31. At present, Albania has not ratified the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. 32. Article 11 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989, ratified by Albania on 27 February 1992, requires States Parties to take measures to combat the illegal transfer and non-return of children abroad. For that purpose, States should promote the conclusion of bilateral or multilateral agreements or accession to existing agreements. 33. This Agreement, signed on 17 May 1993, was ratified by Albania pursuant to Law no. 7760 of 14 October 1993 and by Greece pursuant to Law no. 2311/1995. Articles 2, 3, 23 and 24 of the Agreement provide for the possibility for the Ministries of Justice of both Contracting Parties to cooperate in the recognition and execution in their territories of final judicial decisions given by the authorities of the other Party in civil, family and commercial matters.

4. The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Jarmina. 5. On 14 November 2008 the applicant applied to the Vinkovci Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Vinkovcima) for enforcement of a final judgement by which D.C., the applicant’s former husband, was ordered to pay her alimony. 6. On 18 November 2008 the first-instance court issued a writ of execution ordering D.C. to pay the applicant amounts of 700 Croatian kunas (HRK) together with the statutory default interest for the period starting from 12 July 2007 until the payment, and also the amount of HRK 2,440 together with the statutory default interest starting from 10 June 2008 until the payment on account of costs and expenses. 7. The writ of execution was served on the Vukovar Regional Office of the Croatian Pension Fund (Hrvatski zavod za mirovinsko osiguranje, Područna služba Vukovar) for enforcement. 8. On 29 December 2008 D.C. appealed against the writ of execution and on 20 January 2009 the applicant responded to his appeal. 9. On 12 February 2009 the first-instance court held a hearing at which both parties gave their statements. 10. On 24 February 2009 the first-instance court instructed D.C. to institute separate civil proceedings with a view to declaring the enforcement inadmissible. 11. On 9 March 2009 the applicant appealed against the decision of 24 February 2009. 12. On 24 April 2009 the case-file was forwarded to the Vukovar County Court (Županijski sud u Vukovaru) to decide upon the parties’ appeals. 13. On 19 August 2009 the Vukovar County Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal and returned the case-file to the first-instance court. 14. However, since the Vukovar County Court failed to decide upon the appeal lodged by D.C., the case file was again returned to it and on 7 January 2010 it dismissed D.C.’s appeal. 15. On 26 January 2010 the first-instance court informed the Vukovar Regional Office of the Croatian Pension Fund, that the writ of execution became final and that it should be executed. 16. On 19 February 2010 the first-instance court again asked the Vukovar Regional Office of the Croatian Pension Fund to execute the final writ of execution. 17. On 24 March 2010 the Vukovar Regional Office of the Croatian Pension Fund transferred HRK 15,600 to the applicant’s account; on 15 April 2010 it transferred the amount of HRK 1,200; and on 14 May 2010 the amount of HRK 881.50. 18. Meanwhile, on 7 December 2009 and 14 January 2010 the applicant lodged a request for the protection of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time (zahtjev za zaštitu prava na suđenje u razumnom roku) with the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) complaining about the length of the above enforcement proceedings. In these proceedings the State was represented by the State Attorney’s Office of the Republic of Croatia (Državno odvjetništvo Republike Hrvatske). 19. On 14 September 2010 the Supreme Court examined the case file of the Vinkovci Municipal Court and a submission of the Vukovar County Court, and found that the enforcement proceedings had started on 14 November 2008 and that they were still pending. It considered that the proceedings had not been excessively long and dismissed the applicant’s request. 20. On 6 September 2012 the applicant’s appeal was dismissed by a three-judge panel of the Supreme Court. 21. On 12 December 2012 the applicant’s subsequent constitutional complaint was declared inadmissible by the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske).

4. The applicants were born in 1952 and 1954 respectively and live in Majur. 5. The applicants were employed by “7 Juli”, a company based in Šabac (hereinafter – “the debtor”). 6. On 13 November 2006 the applicant and the debtor concluded a settlement before the Šabac Municipal Court, according to which the debtor was ordered to pay the applicant certain sums in respect to salary arrears and costs of proceedings. 7. On 29 December 2009 the applicant lodged an application for the enforcement of the above court decision with the Šabac Municipal Court. 8. On 31 December 2009 the court allowed the application and issued an enforcement order. 9. On 11 December 2008 the applicant and the debtor concluded a settlement before the Šabac Municipal Court, according to which the debtor was ordered to pay the applicant certain sums in respect to salary arrears and pension and disability insurance contributions. 10. On 7 July 2009 the applicant lodged an application for the enforcement of the above court decision with the Šabac Municipal Court. 11. On 9 July 2009 the court allowed the application and issued an enforcement order. 12. On 21 July 2006 the applicant and the debtor concluded a settlement before the Šabac Municipal Court, according to which the debtor was ordered to pay the applicant certain sums in respect to salary arrears, pension and disability insurance contributions and costs of proceedings. 13. On 7 July 2009 the applicant lodged an application for the enforcement of the above court decision with the Šabac Municipal Court. 14. On 9 July 2009 the court allowed the application and issued an enforcement order. 15. On 14 March 2007 the debtor was privatised. 16. On 10 June 2008 the contract for the sale of the debtor was annulled because the buyer in question had failed to fulfil his contractual obligations. 17. Following the annulment of the debtor’s privatisation 70% of its shares were transferred to the State. 18. As it would appear from media reports, in November 2009 the State sold its shares to a private company. 19. On 14 April 2010 the Valjevo Commercial Court opened the preliminary insolvency proceedings against the debtor. 20. On 1 December 2010 the Commercial Court terminated the insolvency proceedings against the debtor because the creditors and the debtor failed to advance the costs of the insolvency proceedings. 21. In addition, the court ordered the transfer of the debtor’s property to the State. 22. The decision became final on 14 April 2011.

6. The applicant lives in Imst, Austria. 7. The applicant is the co-owner of a plot of land in Lech, Austria which had been designated as building land (Bauland); one building had already been constructed on the land. On 22 July 1987 the Lech municipal authorities informed the applicant that they intended to modify the area zoning plan (Flächenwidmungsplan) and to designate the remaining part of the land as open land (Freihaltefläche) because, being located on a steep slope, they considered that the remaining part was not suitable for construction under the Vorarlberg Regional Planning Act (Raumplanungs‑gesetz). 8. On 6 August 1987 the applicant lodged an application for a building permit in order to construct a hotel on the plot of land at issue. 9. On 14 June 1988 the Lech municipal authorities issued a building prohibition in respect of the applicant's plot of land. 10. The Bludenz District Administrative Authority (“the District Administrative Authority”) (Bezirkshauptmannschaft) held a hearing on 23 September 1988 concerning the applicant's application for a building permit. On 4 July 1991 the Lech municipal authorities extended the building prohibition. 11. On 31 July 1991 the applicant lodged an application for a transfer of jurisdiction (Devolutionsantrag) because the District Administrative Authority had not reached a decision within the statutory six-month time-limit. 12. The Vorarlberg Regional Government (“the Regional Government”) allowed that application on 10 October 1991 but dismissed the applicant's application for a building permit on the ground that the permit would contravene the building prohibition. The applicant lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court. 13. On 19 March 1992 Lech Municipal Council (“the Municipal Council”) issued a decree determining the maximum building density (Baunutzungszahl) for the category of land which included the applicant's land, and on 2 July 1992 it lifted the building prohibition. The applicant thereupon asked the Regional Government to reopen the building permit proceedings. 14. On 28 September 1992 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant's complaint against the decision of 10 October 1991. It found that the building prohibition was lawful. 15. On 29 September 1992 the Regional Government dismissed the request to reopen the building permit proceedings. The applicant lodged a complaint with the Administrative Court. 16. On 28 January 1993 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's complaint. It found that the conditions for reopening the building permit proceedings had not been met. That decision was served on 24 February 1993. 17. The applicant requested a partition of land (Grundstücksteilung) on 26 September 1995, but withdrew this request on 30 April 1996. 18. On 11 November 1996 the applicant lodged a fresh application for a building permit to enable him to carry out construction work on his land. 19. On 26 February 1997 the District Administrative Authority informed the applicant of the Lech municipal authorities' submissions to the effect that the maximum building density laid down by the decree of 19 March 1992 did not allow the construction of another building on his plot of land. The applicant commented on this information. After the Lech municipal authorities had submitted further comments on 6 October 1997, the applicant asked the District Administrative Authority to decide on his application. 20. On 25 June 1997 the Municipal Council adopted a building plan (Bebauungsplan) which amended the decree of 19 March 1992 but left the maximum building density unchanged. On 1 July 1997 the Regional Government approved the building plan. 21. On 28 October 1997 the District Administrative Authority dismissed the applicant's application for a building permit. It found that the maximum building density defined in the building plan did not allow the construction of another building on the applicant's plot of land. On 12 November 1997 the applicant lodged an appeal. 22. The Regional Government dismissed the appeal on 2 June 1998 and upheld the District Administrative Authority's finding. 23. On 16 July 1998 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court and requested an oral hearing. He submitted that the area zoning plan and the building plan were unlawful, and claimed that the Regional Government had refused to allow him to consult the case file in the building plan proceedings. 24. On 7 September 1998 the Lech municipal authorities submitted their observations; on 15 September 1998 the Regional Government did likewise. 25. On 6 October 1998 the applicant's counsel consulted the case file at the Constitutional Court, which, on the following day, forwarded all the case file documents to him. 26. On 8 June 2001 the applicant's counsel asked the Constitutional Court if he could consult further documents concerning the original area zoning plan. 27. On 12 June 2001 the Constitutional Court declined to deal with the complaint because it lacked any prospect of success. It found that, considering the hillside location of the plot of land, its allegedly unlawful designation appeared to be reasonable. 28. Subsequently, the case was transferred to the Administrative Court and on 11 October 2001 the applicant amended his complaint and requested an oral hearing. He submitted that the refusal to issue the building permit had been based on an unlawful area zoning plan and building plan. He requested that a hearing be held and an on-site inspection carried out, and that he be given the opportunity to consult all the documents concerning his plot of land. 29. On 20 March 2003 the Administrative Court dismissed the complaint. It found that the refusal to issue the building permit had been lawful, because the maximum building density for the plot of land at issue had already been exceeded by the construction of the existing buildings. Furthermore, it found that it was not necessary to hold a hearing or to carry out an on-site inspection, because the applicant had merely contested the lawfulness of the area zoning plan and the building plan, which had already been reviewed by the Constitutional Court. That decision was served on 30 April 2003. 30. On 19 January 2005 the applicant applied for a building permit for a private house on the same plot of land. 31. Following a hearing held on 5 August 2005, on 2 September 2005 the Lech municipal authorities granted the application; the decision was served on the applicant's counsel on 5 December 2005.

6. The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Budapest, Hungary. 7. The applicant used to work in the Budapest office of the company “Ars Antiqua Restauro” (“A.A.R.”) registered in Poland. On 17 May 1995 he was dismissed from his job. On 27 May 1995 he lodged a claim for reinstatement with the Warsaw District Court (Sąd Rejonowy). 8. The court held hearings on 27 July and 5 December 1995. On 1 February 1996 the applicant asked the court to issue an interim order to safeguard his claim in the proceedings. On 2 April 1996 the court refused his request. On 14 May 1996 the Warsaw Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) dismissed the applicant's appeal against that decision. 9. On 2 April 1996 the court held a hearing. At the next hearing held on 23 July 1996 the applicant modified his claim. As a consequence, the case was transferred to the Regional Court. 10. The court held further hearings on 5 November and 17 December 1996. It also decided that two witnesses should be heard by two other courts. The witnesses were heard by the Cracow District Court and the Wrocław District Court on 30 June and 3 September 1997, respectively. On 26 November 1997 and 20 January 1998 the Regional Court held hearings. The hearing listed for 2 February 1998 was cancelled. 11. At the hearing held on 7 April 1998 the Regional Court ordered the applicant to specify his claim. On 27 April 1998 the applicant modified his claim. 12. On 27 May 1998 the court stayed the proceedings on the ground that the applicant had not complied with the order of 7 April 1998. 13. Upon the applicant's appeal, on 9 July 1998 the Warsaw Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) quashed the decision of 27 May 1998. 14. On 30 March 1999 the Regional Court ordered the applicant to specify his claim. On 4 April 1999 he submitted his pleading to the court. 15. On 1 June 1999 the court held a hearing. 16. On 9 November 1999 the Regional Court stayed the proceedings because the president of the defendant company, who was its representative, had died. Upon the applicant's appeal the Warsaw Court of Appeal quashed that decision on 28 December 1999. 17. On 27 September 2000 the court again stayed the proceedings, since the defendant company had not yet appointed a new representative. That decision was set aside by the Warsaw Court of Appeal on 21 November 2000. 18. On 15 February 2001, for the third time, the Regional Court stayed the proceedings. On 26 May 2001 the Warsaw Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeal. 19. On 27 August 2001 the applicant's lawyer asked the trial court to appoint a guardian to act on behalf of the “A.A.R.“ 20. On 4 December 2002 the Warsaw District Court appointed a guardian. The proceedings were resumed at a later unknown date. 21. On 11 February 2003 the Warsaw Regional Court gave judgment. The applicant lodged an appeal against this judgment. 22. On 3 December 2003 the Warsaw Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance judgment. 23. The applicant filed a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court. It appears that the cassation proceedings are pending.

4. The applicant was born in 1944 and lives in Prestranek. 5. On 13 November 1996, following a decision on his retirement, the applicant instituted proceedings against his former employer, the Republic of Slovenia, Ministry of Defence, before the Ljubljana Labour and Social Court. The case was initially conducted as a social dispute before the Social Court. 6. On 5 March 1998 the defendant responded to the claim. 7. On 7 December 1999 the court held the first main hearing. 8. On 11 February 2000 the second main hearing was held. 9. On 16 February 2000 the applicant gave a declaration before the court specifying his claim. 10. Following the applicant’s declaration of 16 February 2000, as of 6 July 2000 the case was conducted as a labour dispute and was examined by the Labour Court. 11. On 24 January 2001 the third main hearing was held. At the hearing the applicant amended his claim. 12. On 7 May 2001 the applicant was invited by the court to assist him in amending his claim. 13. On 6 June 2001 the applicant requested the court for an extension of the time-limit for amending his claim. 14. On 8 June 2001 and 11 June 2001 the applicant amended his claim. On 15 June 2001 he submitted further documents to the court. 15. On 11 October 2001 the defendant responded to the claim. 16. Further two main hearings were held on 13 May 2002 and 18 September 2002. On the latter date the applicant orally amended his claim. 17. In January 2003 the applicant amended his claim in writing. 18. On 12 February 2003 a further main hearing was held. On the same date the Labour and Social Court granted a small part of the applicant’s claim and dismissed the remainder of the claim. Both parties appealed. 19. On 16 December 2004 the Higher Labour and Social Court granted the appeals and remitted the case back to the first instance. 20. On 17 January 2005 the Ljubljana Labour and Social Court rejected the applicant’s claim. In a separate order the court ordered the applicant to pay the costs of the proceedings. The applicant appealed against both decisions. 21. On 31 March 2006 the Higher Labour and Social Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal regarding the rejection of the claim, modified the decision on the costs of proceedings and dismissed the remainder of the applicant’s appeal relating to aforementioned decision. 22. On 29 May 2007 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law. The applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. 23. On 4 July 2008 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional appeal.

6. The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Trudolyubove, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (“the ARC”). 7. On 28 November 1998 a criminal case (no. 91241) was initiated into the circumstances under which money was extorted from the I. family. 8. On 2 August 1999 the applicant, a police officer at the material time, was arrested on suspicion of taking part in this crime. 9. On 5 August 1999 the applicant was charged with robbery of the I. family, although no formal case concerning robbery had been initiated and the case on extortion had not been formally terminated. On the same date the Prosecutor of the ARC remanded the applicant in custody for two months. 10. On 7 October 1999 the Prosecutor of the ARC extended the applicant’s detention for three more months, referring to the need to carry out further investigative actions. 11. On 2 January 2000 the Prosecutor of the ARC extended the applicant’s detention for one further month. 12. On 27 January 2000 the Prosecutor General of Ukraine extended the applicant’s detention for six further months. The order concerned extension of detention of thirteen persons, including the applicant, with reference to a different case (no. 8229), which concerned robberies and organisation of a gang by Mr S. P., another policeman. At the material time the applicant had no formal procedural status in this latter case. 13. On 20 March 2000 case no. 91241 and case no. 8229 were joined. 14. On 19 May 2000 the Prosecutors’ Office of the ARC rejected the applicant’s request for release, referring to the need to take further investigative action. 15. During the pre-trial investigation, the authorities questioned some 120 witnesses concerning some thirty-four criminal episodes, carried out some twenty reconstructions of the crime scenes and ordered numerous expert assessments. 16. On 20 July 2000 the investigation was completed and the applicant, along with eighteen other individuals implicated in gang membership, was committed for trial to the Supreme Court of the ARC (subsequently renamed the Court of Appeal of the ARC (hereafter “the ARC Court”). 17. On 4 May 2001, following familiarisation of the defendants with the materials in the case file and completion of other procedural formalities, the ARC Court held a preliminary hearing in the case and scheduled the trial for 5 June 2001. 18. Having held some eighteen hearings between June and December 2001, the ARC Court adjourned the proceedings following a request by one of the defendants that the hearings be recorded, for which the technical means were not available at the time. 19. On 15 May 2002 the ARC Court resumed consideration of the case and held some 150 hearings up to 22 May 2004. 20. According to the applicant, the episode with which he had been charged (the I. family robbery) was examined by the court only in February 2003 in the course of five hearings. 21. On several occasions during the trial stage the applicant unsuccessfully attempted to institute criminal proceedings against investigator D., alleging that she had infringed his right to defend himself by concealing the fact that she had ordered ten expert assessments in the case, the results of which he had discovered only upon the completion of the pre-trial investigation. 22. On an unspecified date the applicant also attempted to institute criminal proceedings against the investigating authorities for unlawfully detaining him. In particular, they allegedly had no regard to his serious illness (pleuritis) at the time of his arrest, had charged him with robbery within the framework of an extortion case, and had obtained an extension of the detention order within the framework of a case in which he had no procedural status at the material time. 23. On 8 November 2002 the Prosecutors’ Office of the ARC refused to institute criminal proceedings, finding however that investigator Ch., who had been in charge of the case at the material time, had infringed Articles 26 and 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure when processing the case file material. In particular, he was obliged to join the cases before seeking an extension of the detention order. 24. On several occasions during his trial the applicant requested to be released from custody on account of alleged illegality of the orders detaining him issued during the pre-trial investigation. The ARC Court rejected his requests, noting that at the material time the initial omissions in case-processing, if any, had been remedied and the seriousness of the charges against the applicant warranted holding him in custody. 25. On 17 November 2004 the ARC court pronounced its judgment (which was presented on some 200 pages), according to which the applicant was convicted of gang membership and of robbery of the I. family and sentenced to six and a half years’ imprisonment. 26. The applicant appealed in cassation, alleging that the trial court had erred in its assessment of the facts and application of the law, and had also not summoned a further witness suggested by him. The applicant also allegedly requested to be represented by Yustis, a public organisation of law students, in his appeal proceedings. This request was refused. 27. On 2 February 2006 the applicant was released from detention as the term of his imprisonment was up. 28. On 16 March 2006 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal in cassation. 29. Following his arrest on 2 August 1999, the applicant was placed in the Saky Temporary Detention Centre (ITU). According to the applicant, he was held in the same cell as serial offenders, in spite of the fact that he was a policeman, and offered no medical assistance for his serious illness (pleuritis). 30. On 9 August 1999 the applicant was transferred to the Simferopol no. 15 Pre-trial Detention Centre (“the SIZO”) and stayed there until his release in February 2006. 31. According to the applicant, the cells in the SIZO were grossly overcrowded, as there was between 1.5 and 1.9 square metres per detainee in a cell. The detainees were confined to their cells for most of the day. Tuberculosis and other infectious diseases were rife among the inmates. Overall, the SIZO had some 230 cells and only twenty-four outdoor yards, which made it impossible to ensure that every detainee had outdoor exercise on a regular basis. The sanitary facilities were inadequate for detainees to keep themselves clean. 32. The Government submitted that throughout his stay in detention the applicant was held in seven different cells, designed for occupancy by up to ten inmates. The space per inmate was between 1.2 and 3.6 square metres. At some point the applicant was held in a single occupancy cell of 8.2 square metres. Each of the cells had a window enabling natural ventilation and penetration of daylight. All cells were equipped with ventilating equipment, water supply and sewerage, a table, chairs, a metal cupboard for food products and a radio. The cells had central heating. In the evenings the cells had electric light, enabling the detainees to read and write without damaging their eyes. Sanitary facilities available in each cell were separated from the living area and each morning the detainees were provided with a disinfectant solution to clean them. The detainees were likewise provided with linen at State expense and had weekly access to bathing facilities. On a daily basis the detainees were taken out for one hour’s exercise in the outdoor yards of the SIZO, where they could also have access to facilities where they could do physical exercises.

7. The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Samara. She is a former chief tax inspector. 8. On 27 August 1998 the applicant was committed to stand trial on charges of abuse of position and concerted extortion of a bribe. 9. On 28 October 1998 the Samara Regional Court delivered its judgment. It found the applicant guilty of fraud committed in concert with another person through use of her official position, an offence under Article 159 § 2 (a) and (v) of the Criminal Code. She was sentenced to a fine of 1,000 minimum wages (approximately EUR 5,000) and prohibited from holding any positions in tax authorities for three years. 10. On 17 March 1999 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the conviction on appeal. Counsel for the applicant was present at the hearing. 11. As no ordinary appeal lay against the appeal judgment, counsel for the applicant introduced an application for supervisory review with the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. He sought a reversal of the judgments passed in the applicant's case in order to redress the violations of the rights of the defence. 12. On 24 February 2000 a deputy president of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation lodged an application for supervisory-review with the Presidium of that court. Although the text of the application has not been made available to the Court, it appears from the Government's submissions that he asked for a recharacterisation of the applicant's offence which, in his opinion, should be qualified as an attempt to commit fraud. 13. On 24 May 2000 the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation examined the application for supervisory review. The applicant and her counsel were not summoned to the hearing and did not attend it. The Presidium heard a report by the judge rapporteur and statements by a deputy Prosecutor General who spoke in support of the recharacterisation. The Presidium found that the offence imputed to the applicant had not been brought to completion. On that ground the Presidium recharacterised the applicant's offence as an attempt to commit fraud (Article 159 § 2 (a) and (v) of the Criminal Code in conjunction with Article 30 § 3). The applicant's sentence remained unaffected. 14. On 29 May 2000 a copy of the Presidium's decision was mailed to the applicant.

4. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows. 5. The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Haskovo. In 1991 the applicant’s husband died, leaving his wife and his brother as his only heirs. 6. On 17 January 1994 the applicant brought an action against her husband’s brother with the Haskovo District Court, seeking partition of their common inheritance. 7. Between March 1994 and February 1995 the court held four hearings. By a judgment of 13 February 1995 it allowed the partition of the second floor of a house, of a garage and a car, determined the parties’ shares and ordered that the use of all the items be granted to the applicant for the course of the proceedings. In the same judgment the court dismissed the action for partition of the first floor of the same house, finding that the first floor belonged solely to the respondent. 8. The applicant filed an appeal with the Haskovo Regional Court, arguing, inter alia, that the District Court should have allowed the partition of the first floor. 9. By a judgment of 22 May 1995 the Regional Court quashed the judgment of the District Court as regards the partition of the house, announced a hearing on the merits and appointed three experts to prepare a report on certain aspects of the partition of the house. 10. Between May 1995 and June 1996 the court held four hearings where, in particular, it examined the expert report and heard the experts. By a judgment of 4 June 1996 the court allowed the partition only of the second floor of the house and determined the parties’ shares. 11. By a judgment of 19 December 1996 the Supreme Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant’s ensuing appeal. 12. On 21 April 1997 the applicant filed a request for reopening of the partition proceedings with the Supreme Court of Cassation which was rejected by a judgment of 16 June 1998. 13. In relation to this phase of the partition proceedings on 16 February 1999 the applicant brought a declaratory action, seeking to establish criminal conduct on the part of the experts, in that by acting with negligence they had presented false reports before the court (a crime under Article 291 § 2 of the Criminal Code). In case such conduct was established, the applicant could have sought reopening of the case. Following proceedings before three instances, by a final judgment of 4 April 2006 the Supreme Court of Cassation dismissed the action. 14. Neither the applicant, nor the Government specify the date on which the second phase of the partition proceedings began before the Haskovo District Court. It appears from the parties’ submissions that it was not later than 16 October 1998. Until December 2001 the court listed nine hearings. One was adjourned for collection of additional evidence, three were adjourned for reasons related to the experts and two more for reasons related to the respondent. During some of the hearings the applicant unsuccessfully requested the court to stay the proceedings in order to await the outcome of the proceedings seeking to establish criminal conduct on the part of the experts. 15. By a judgment of 5 December 2001 the District Court allotted the second floor of the house to the applicant, allotted the garage to the respondent and ordered the applicant to make payment for levelling away the differences in the respondent’s share. 16. The District Court held an additional hearing on 12 April 2002 in respect of the car. By a judgment of 18 June 2002 the court ordered that the car be auctioned off and determined the parties’ shares in this respect. 17. On 22 July 2002 the applicant filed an appeal against the two judgments before the Haskovo Regional Court. By a judicial order of 31 October 2002 the appeal was returned to the applicant, as she allegedly failed to pay the court fee. Upon the applicant’s appeal, by a final decision of 26 June 2003 the Regional Court quashed the order and ruled on the continuation of the proceedings. 18. Following the applicant’s request, on 25 February 2004 the partition proceedings before the Regional Court were stayed in order to await the outcome of the proceedings, seeking a declaration of criminal conduct on the part of the experts (see paragraph 13 above). 19. On 2 November 2006 the court resumed the partition proceedings. Between November 2006 and January 2008 the court held five hearings. The court adjourned the case three times for reasons related to the experts. 20. By a judgment of 28 January 2008 the Regional Court quashed the lower instance judgments and allotted the second floor of the house to the applicant and the garage with the car to the respondent. 21. On 28 February 2008 the applicant filed a cassation appeal. On 10 March 2008 the court ordered the applicant to pay the court fee. The applicant fails to provide information about the course of the proceedings between March 2008 and July 2009. By a final judgment of 5 January 2010 the Supreme Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the lower court’s judgment. 22. Meanwhile, in April 2008 the applicant filed another request for reopening of the partition proceedings in its first phase to the Supreme Court of Cassation which was rejected by a final judgment of 24 June 2009.

5. The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Athens. He is a businessman, who married M.A. on 20 September 2003. At the time of their marriage M.A. was already a member of the Greek parliament (MP). On 24 March 2004 their son was born. 6. At the end of 2004 the applicant's marriage broke down. It was pronounced dissolved by mutual consent by the Athens Court of First Instance on 7 July 2005. 7. The applicant and M.A. concluded an agreement on 14 December 2004 resolving issues of custody and access in relation to their son. These arrangements were endorsed by a formal decision of the Athens Court of First Instance of 20 January 2005 (decision no. 528/2005). In particular, M.A. was to have custody of the child until he came of age, and he was to live with her. The applicant was entitled to open access to his son, subject to the child's needs, and certain minimum periods and days of contact were specified. In fact, he was entitled to see his son every day between 5 p.m. and 8 p.m. 8. On a number of occasions the applicant was unable to have contact with his son in accordance with the provisions of the court's order. 9. On 20 October 2005 the applicant lodged an indictment with the prosecutor of the Athens Court of First Instance based on Article 232A of the Criminal Code. He requested the sum of ten euros by way of nominal compensation for the non-pecuniary damage which M.A.'s breach of decision no. 528/2005 had caused him, reserving his right to seek further compensation before the civil courts. 10. On 24 August 2006 the prosecutor of the Athens Court of First Instance referred the indictment to the prosecutor of the Supreme Court. The matter was referred to the Minister of Justice on 30 August 2006 for onward transmission by him to the President of the Greek parliament, so that leave of Parliament to bring the proceedings could be sought under Article 62 of the Greek Constitution. The file was received by Parliament on 3 October 2006. 11. On 28 November 2006 the Parliament's Ethics Committee gave the opinion that M.A.'s immunity should not be lifted. In its report the Committee considered that “one of the grounds provided for by Article 83 § 3 of Parliament's Regulations applied in this case”. 12. On 6 December 2006, by a majority of 107 votes to 68 following a secret ballot, Parliament, sitting in plenary session, refused to grant leave. No reasons were given for its decision. 13. In the meantime, on 31 March 2005, M.A. had brought criminal proceedings against the applicant for placing a security guard outside her building after having allegedly received telephone calls threatening him and his family. These proceedings were subsequently dismissed both at first instance and on appeal. 14. On 20 December 2005 the Athens Court of First Instance varied the custody arrangements. The court's order made specific provision for the payment of a 1,000-euro fine by M.A. should she breach any of its provisions (decision no. 9599/2005). M.A. has allegedly consistently failed to comply with these revised arrangements. On 20 March 2007 and 26 March 2007 the applicant lodged two further indictments with the prosecutor of the Athens Court of First Instance following alleged breaches of the court's decision. The applicant again sought compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 15. On 9 May 2007 the prosecutor of the Athens Court of First Instance referred the indictment dated 26 March 2007 to the prosecutor of the Supreme Court. The matter was referred to the Minister of Justice on 22 May 2007 for onward transmission by him to the President of the Greek Parliament, so that leave of Parliament could be sought under Article 62 of the Greek Constitution. On 22 May 2008 the Parliament's Ethics Committee decided that the request should be rejected without being placed before the full Parliament for consideration, on the basis that the request for waiver of immunity was substantially the same as the first request.