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6. The applicant was born in 1986 and lives in the Moscow Region. 7. The applicant came to Russia from Uzbekistan in 2010. In 2012 he lost his Uzbek passport. 8. On 20 January 2013 the Karshi Town Interior Department of Uzbekistan put the applicant’s name on the list of wanted individuals, on account of criminal charges brought against him for membership of a religious extremist organisation, attempted overthrow of the constitutional order of Uzbekistan, and terrorism. 9. On 9 June 2013, at the request of the Uzbek authorities, the applicant’s name was added to the Russian federal list of wanted persons. 10. On 31 October 2013 the applicant was arrested in the Moscow Region, where he lived with his wife and two children. 11. On 2 November 2013 the Serpukhov Town prosecutor’s office noticed that the applicant was wanted by the Uzbek authorities and was therefore liable to extradition to Uzbekistan. At the same time, given that the applicant had violated immigration regulations in Russia, the prosecutor’s office ordered that the Serpukhov District Interior Department take measures to ensure his administrative removal to Uzbekistan. 12. On the same day the Serpukhov District Interior Department drew up a report on the commission of an offence under Article 18.8 of the Administrative Offences Code. 13. On 2 November 2013 the Serpukhov Town Court of the Moscow Region found that the applicant had infringed the immigration regulations and was therefore guilty of an offence under Article 18.8 of the Administrative Offences Code. The court ordered the applicant’s administrative removal to Uzbekistan and his detention pending such removal. The applicant was not assisted by counsel during the hearing before the Town Court. 14. On 12 November 2013 the applicant lodged an application for refugee status. He submitted that he was being persecuted in Uzbekistan for his religious beliefs and that he feared torture and ill-treatment in Uzbekistan in the criminal proceedings against him. 15. On 14 November 2013 counsel for the applicant appealed against the administrative removal order of 2 November 2013. He submitted, in particular, that the applicant had lodged an application for refugee status and could not therefore be removed to Uzbekistan as long as that application was pending. He further argued that the applicant would be exposed to a real risk of torture in Uzbekistan. To substantiate the risk of ill-treatment he relied on the Court’s case law and reports by United Nations institutions about widespread ill-treatment in detention facilities. 16. On 28 November 2013 the Moscow Regional Court upheld the administrative removal order on appeal. In reply to the applicant’s argument about pending refugee status proceedings it noted that, pursuant to the Refugees Act, a person who had applied for refugee status could not ‒ indeed ‒ be returned to his country of origin against his will. However, in the present case the applicant had not applied for refugee status immediately after his arrival in Russia. Given that the application for refugee status had been lodged after the administrative removal order had been made, the pending refugee status proceedings could not prevent the applicant’s administrative removal. The applicant’s allegations about the risk of ill‑treatment or persecution for religious beliefs were hypothetical and unsubstantiated. 17. On 22 January 2014 the Moscow Region Department of the Federal Migration Service rejected the applicant’s application for refugee status. 18. On 21 February 2014 the applicant challenged the decision of 22 January 2014 before the Federal Migration Service. He has not yet received any reply. 19. On 6 August 2014 the applicant lodged an application for temporary asylum. It appears that the proceedings are pending. 20. The applicant is currently in detention awaiting administrative removal to Uzbekistan.

10. The applicants were born in 1966, 1973 and 1971 respectively and live in Diyarbakır. 11. The first and the third applicant are lawyers. The first and the second applicants were members of the Human Rights Association and the third applicant was the president of the HADEP Diyarbakır provincial headquarters at the time of the events. 12. Following information received by the gendarmes that there was a meeting related to the PKK in the provincial headquarters of the HADEP (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi-People’s Democracy Party) and the Diyarbakır branch of the Human Rights Association, the police officers at the Diyarbakır Security Directorate, after receiving authorisation from the Diyarbakır Governor’s Office and a search warrant from the judge at the State Security Court upon the request of the public prosecutor at that Court on 27 February 1995, conducted a search on the premises and arrested the applicants together with eleven other persons. 13. On 27 February 1995 the applicants were handed over to the gendarmes at the Diyarbakır Provincial Gendarmerie Command. 14. According to the report drafted by the gendarmerie on 28 February 1995, at the HADEP headquarters, the police seized eight ERNK (National Liberation Front of Kurdistan) and PKK flags, a PKK emblem, sixty-five books and nine VHS videotapes about the PKK, seven audio tapes and documents addressed to the Secretary General of the European Parliament. They also found a pistol on one of the suspects. 15. On 9 March 1995 the applicants were brought before the public prosecutor and the State Security Court. The latter ordered their remand in custody. 16. On 22 March 1995 the public prosecutor at the State Security Court filed an indictment with the latter accusing the applicants and the other suspects of having made propaganda on behalf of the PKK. He requested that the applicants and other detainees be convicted and sentenced for membership of an illegal organisation under Article 168 § 2 of the Criminal Code. 17. On 1 May 1995 the State Security Court, taking into account the charges and the evidence against the applicants, ordered their release pending trial. 18. On 8 April 1996 the State Security Court acquitted the applicants of all charges. It held that the materials found in the search could have been placed there by anyone and that apart from their statements in custody, which the applicants claimed to have given under duress, there was no evidence to convict them. 19. On 16 April 1997 the Court of Cassation upheld the aforementioned judgment. 20. On 26 November 1997 the first applicant filed a petition with the Diyarbakır Assize Court under Law no. 466 pertaining to the payment of compensation to persons unlawfully arrested or detained. On 30 December 1997 the Diyarbakır Assize Court awarded the applicant an amount of compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage to compensate the periods he spent in detention. This decision was upheld by the Court of Cassation on 29 September 1998.

6. The applicant was born in 1960 and is currently serving a prison sentence in correctional colony YuK-25/8, Orenburg Region. 7. On the morning of 7 August 2000 the applicant’s father, an important businessman, was kidnapped from his car in St Petersburg. The abduction was organised by Mr Kervalishvili and Mr Berkadze, known within the Georgian criminal milieu, with a view to receiving a ransom for his life. 8. Mr Kogan, the personal driver of the applicant’s father, managed to escape from the kidnappers. He contacted the police and the applicant’s relatives and told them what had happened. The police immediately started an investigation. 9. On the afternoon of 7 August 2000, having received the information about his father’s abduction, the applicant flew from Israel to Russia. As regards the following events, the parties’ accounts differ. 10. According to the applicant, once he arrived in St Petersburg he went to his office, where he met his brother and a group of his employees. In the presence of an unidentified police officer, the applicant’s brother assured the applicant that the best policemen had been deployed to find and release his father. 11. On the same evening the applicant was contacted by Mr Berkadze (an accomplice to the kidnappers), who offered his services to locate the applicant’s father. On the following morning Mr Berkadze called Ms Margvelashvili from the applicant’s office and asked her to assist in finding the applicant’s father. In exchange, Mr Berkadze offered to facilitate the release of her friends, Mr Dvali, Mr Kakushadze and Mr Grigolashvili, who had been arrested by the police earlier that evening. The applicant spoke to Ms Margvelashvili by telephone as well. He asked for help in finding his father. 12. On the evening of 8 August the applicant’s father was released by his abductors. 13. According to the prosecution authorities’ account, on arrival in St Petersburg the applicant, acting through his bodyguards (namely Mr Kazimirchuk and several others), ordered several unidentified individuals to go to Ms Margvelashvili’s flat on the basis that she had allegedly been involved in the abduction of the applicant’s father, and to kidnap members of her family, in order to exchange them for his father. The information that Ms Margvelashvili might have been implicated in the abduction of the applicant’s father had been received earlier that day from the police officers in charge of the official investigation into the event. 14. Early in the morning of 8 August 2000 the applicant’s men, posing as uniformed police officers, broke into Ms Margvelashvili’s flat, kidnapped Mr Dvali and Mr Kakushadze and took them to the applicant’s office. Ms Margvelashvili and her minor son remained in the flat under the surveillance of two “policemen”. Since Mr Dvali and Mr Kakushadze were unable to indicate the whereabouts of the applicant’s father, the applicant ordered the kidnapping of another person, Mr Grigolashvili, who allegedly knew where the applicant’s father was detained. 15. In the applicant’s office, Mr Dvali, Mr Kakushadze and Mr Grigolashvili were questioned and beaten by six of the applicant’s employees, including Mr Kazimirchuk, the applicant’s chief bodyguard. It appears that the applicant and his brother took part in their questioning and that the applicant hit Mr Grigolashvili in the face at least once. The applicant invited his father’s driver, Mr Kogan, to his office and showed him Mr Dvali, Mr Kakushadze, and Mr Grigolashvili. However, the driver stated that none of those people had taken part in the abduction of the applicant’s father. 16. In the afternoon of 8 August 2000 the applicant called Ms Margvelashvili and threatened her and her son with death if she did not tell him who had been behind the abduction of his father. Fearing for her life and the lives of those detained by the applicant, Ms Margvelashvili, via her friend Ms Avaliani, contacted Mr Kervalishvili, the abductor of the applicant’s father, and informed him of the developments. The latter called the applicant and they agreed to “exchange hostages”. 17. In the evening of 8 August 2000 Mr Kervalishvili released the applicant’s father, and the applicant ordered the release of Mr Grigolashvili, Ms Margvelashvili and her son. 18. As to Mr Dvali and Mr Kakushadze, they had been so badly beaten by the applicant’s men that he ordered that they be killed. Mr Dvali and Mr Kakushadze were suffocated and their bodies were dismembered and buried in an empty water cistern situated on the premises of a service station (garage) belonging to a certain Mr Sidler. 19. In September 2000 Mr Kervalishvili, the leader of the criminal group which had abducted the applicant’s father, left Russia. He moved to Georgia, where he was arrested on suspicion of having killed a policeman and was later charged with other crimes, not related to the events of 7 and 8 August 2000. 20. On an unspecified date in 2000 the Russian police opened a criminal investigation into the abduction of the applicant’s father. However, the investigation was later closed on the ground that Mr Kervalishvili and his group had voluntarily released the applicant’s father. In September 2001 that decision was quashed by the Vyborgskiy District Court of St Petersburg and the proceedings against Mr Kervalishvili were reopened. There is no information available about the results of that investigation. 21. On 11 July 2000 (before the events described above), in connection with an unrelated inquiry carried out by the St Petersburg police, the President of the St Petersburg City Court ordered that the telephone lines at the flats of Mr Grigolashvili and Ms Margvelashvili be tapped. As a result, the police recorded all telephone calls to and from these flats. One of the voices recorded by the police belonged to an unknown man, calling on 8 August 2000 from the applicant’s office, who threatened Ms Margvelashvili with death in connection with the disappearance of the applicant’s father. 22. On 21 September 2000 Mr Tsartsidze, a cousin of the deceased Mr Kakushadze, informed the police of the latter’s disappearance. The prosecutor’s office opened an official investigation into the disappearance of Mr Kakushadze. 23. On 22 September 2000 Mr Grigolashvili was questioned by the investigator. During the questioning he showed the police the place where he had been taken in the morning of 8 August 2000. It happened to be one of the office buildings belonging to the firms owned by the applicant. Mr Grigolashvili told the police that in that building he had been questioned by several persons in connection with the disappearance of the applicant’s father. Mr Grigolashvili had described one of those persons as a Georgian of 30 – 32 years of age who was “a son of Mr Mirilashvili-senior” (for more details see the summary of Mr Grigolashvili’s deposition in paragraph 49 below). 24. On 29 November 2000 the prosecutor’s office received thirteen audiotapes from the police containing recordings of telephone conversations made as part of a surveillance operation at the flats of Ms Margvelashvili and Mr Grigolashvili. These audiotapes contained no recording of the period between 5 p.m. on 7 August and 1.40 p.m. on 8 August 2000. In March 2001 the investigator in charge of the case requested that the police produce the missing recordings, but the police informed him that this part of the recording “had been lost for technical reasons”. 25. Over the following months the investigator questioned a number of other persons, including Ms Margvelashvili and Ms Avaliani. Their written testimonies were added to the case file relating to the disappearance of Mr Kakushadze. 26. On an unspecified date Mr Grigolashvili left Russia and settled in Kutaisi, Georgia. Ms Margvelashvili also moved to Georgia. In November 2000 Mr Grigolashvili was questioned by the Georgian prosecution authorities in connection with the investigation into the disappearance of Mr Kakushadze, at the request of the Russian prosecution authorities. On 5 April 2001 the Georgian prosecution authorities also questioned Ms Margvelashvili within the same criminal proceedings. Both witnesses confirmed the depositions they had made earlier in Russia. 27. In December 2000 Mr Tsartsidze transmitted to the investigative authorities two audiotapes, alleging that they contained a recording of a conversation between him and Mr Grigolashvili, made without the latter’s knowledge, on 19 September 2000. The conversation concerned the events of 7 and 8 August 2000. During the conversation Mr Grigolashvili confirmed, at least in substance, that those who had abducted Mr Dvali, Mr Kakushadze and himself had been acting on the applicant’s orders. 28. On 23 January 2001 the applicant was arrested and placed in custody. He denied his involvement in the abduction and murder of the persons concerned. The applicant requested a confrontation with the witnesses against him, in particular Ms Margvelashvili, Mr Kervalishvili and Mr Grigolashvili, but the investigative authorities rejected that request. 29. On 31 January 2001 the applicant was formally charged with ordering the abduction of Mr Dvali and Mr Kakushadze. 30. On 14 July 2001 the bodies of Mr Dvali and Mr Kakushadze were discovered on the premises of the service station. On 16 July 2001 the investigation ordered the forensic examination of their bodies. 31. On 21 July 2001[1], in order to identify the voice of a man who had telephoned Ms Margvelashvili’s flat on 8 August 2000, the investigator commissioned a phonological analysis of the audiotapes made by the police as part of the surveillance operation. A team of three experts was employed for this purpose. The experts were provided with test audiotapes containing samples of the applicant’s voice. 32. On 9 August 2001 Mr Kervalishvili was questioned by the Georgian prosecution authorities. On 24 January 2002 he was questioned again. He testified that the applicant was behind the abduction of Mr Dvali, Mr Kakushadze and Mr Grigolashvili. 33. On 20 September 2001 the expert team submitted a report on the audio recordings. Two Russian-speaking experts, Mr Koval and Mr Zubov, confirmed that the voice on the audiotapes belonged to the applicant. Ms Kikalishvili, a Georgian-speaking expert, came to the opposite conclusion (the conversation between the man and Ms Margvelashvili was conducted in Georgian, whereas on the “sample” audiotapes the applicant was speaking in Russian). 34. On 5 and 8 October 2001 the applicant was charged with ordering the murder of Mr Dvali and Mr Kakushadze, abducting a third person, Mr Grigolashvili, and threatening Ms Margvelashvili and her child with death. Several other persons were also charged as part of the same criminal investigation, including Mr Kazimirchuk, the applicant’s bodyguard, and Mr Sidler, who, according to the prosecution authorities, had helped to hide the bodies of Mr Dvali and Mr Kakushadze. 35. On 26 February 2002 the applicant, referring to Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention, requested a face-to-face confrontation with the witnesses for the prosecution. In a letter of 15 March 2002 the investigator in charge of his case replied that the applicant would have an opportunity to confront witnesses during the trial. 36. In April 2002 Mr Grigolashvili wrote a letter to the prosecution authorities in Russia and Georgia. In this letter he withdrew his earlier statements concerning the applicant’s involvement in his abduction (see paragraphs 23 and 26 above). On an unspecified date a Deputy City Prosecutor of St Petersburg requested that the Georgian authorities re-examine Mr Grigolashvili, in order to elucidate discrepancies in his earlier testimony to the Russian and Georgian investigative authorities. 37. On 2 April 2002 the prosecution reformulated the charges against the applicant and informed him about that decision. 38. According to the Government, on 3 June 2002 the preliminary investigation was completed. On 5 June 2002 the applicant and his lawyers obtained access to the case file. 39. On an unspecified date the applicant complained to the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Saint-Petersburg about the refusal of the investigative authorities to carry out face-to-face confrontation with Mr Grigolashvili and Mrs Margvelashvili. On 19 June 2002 the court dismissed that complaint. It held that under the Code of Criminal Procedure the investigator was free to decide whether a face-to-face confrontation of a witness with the accused was necessary. It also held that Mr Grigolashvili and Mrs Margvelashvili, as victims of the alleged crimes, were not bound to testify. According to the court, Ms Margvelashvili refused to participate in the face-to-face confrontation with the applicant, whereas Mr Grigolashvili had left Russia out of fear of reprisals from unidentified persons. In such circumstances the decision of the investigator not to hold face-to-face confrontations with the applicant was justified. The defence appealed against that decision. There is no information about the outcome of the appeal. 40. On 25 June 2002 Mr Grigolashvili was questioned by the Georgian authorities (see paragraph 36 above). Mr Grigolashvili testified that he had falsely accused the applicant under threats from Mr Tsartsidze and a relative of the deceased Mr Kakushadze. Mr Grigolashvili was shown a photo of the applicant; after having examined that photo he explained that it was not the men who had questioned and slapped him on the night of the events. His written submissions were transmitted by the Georgian authorities to the Russian prosecution authorities. According to the applicant, those documents were not added to the case file. 41. On 1 July 2002 the defence informed the prosecution that they had finished studying the material in the case file. On 19 July 2002 the City Prosecutor approved the bill of indictment; a copy of that bill was handed to the applicant. 42. According to the indictment, the prosecution charged the applicant with having organised, through his bodyguards, the abduction of Mr Dvali, Mr Kakushadze and Mr Grigolashvili, the illegal detention of Ms Margvelashvili and her minor son, and the murder of Mr Dvali and Mr Kakushadze. 43. Mr Kazimirchuk and several other people who had previously worked for the applicant were also brought to trial as his accomplices. According to the prosecution, on 7 August 2000 the applicant had ordered Mr Kazimirchuk and five other co-accused (Mr Polunin, Mr Demenko, Mr Kuzmenko, Mr Petrov and Mr Mogutov) to find his father’s abductors and bring them to him. In turn, Mr Kazimirchuk and his colleagues had delegated that task to a group of men who remained unidentified by the investigation. Those men, acting as police officers, had kidnapped Mr Dvali, Mr Kakushadze and Mr Grigolashvili and brought them to the applicant’s office. Acting on the applicant’s orders, those unidentified men had also murdered Mr Dvali and Mr Kakushadze. 44. In addition to the charges relating directly to the events of 7 and 8 August 2000, a number of auxiliary charges were also brought by the prosecution against the applicant’s co-accused. Thus, Mr Petrov, one of the applicant’s employees, was charged with illegal possession of ammunition for a firearm. Mr Sidler, who owned the service station where the bodies of Mr Dvali and Mr Kakushadze had been discovered, was charged with concealing a crime. 45. In support of the charges against the applicant, the prosecution authorities referred to the written statements obtained from Ms Margvelashvili, Mr Grigolashvili, Mr Tsartsidze, Ms Avaliani and Mr Kervalishvili in 2000 and 2001 during the official investigation. Their depositions are summarised below. (a) Depositions by Ms Margvelashvili 46. Ms Margvelashvili testified that on the evening of 7 August 2000 a group of men who introduced themselves as police officers had broken into her house and abducted Mr Dvali and Mr Kakushadze. She was left in her house under the surveillance of two intruders. Some time later, on the following morning, the applicant had telephoned her and threatened her and her son with death if she did not say where his father was. The applicant allowed her to speak on the telephone to Mr Dvali and Mr Grigolashvili, who were being held in the applicant’s office. Mr Dvali and Mr Grigolashvili told her that the applicant had threatened them with death if his father was not found safe and unharmed. 47. On 8 August 2000 Ms Margvelashvili contacted Ms Avaliani, her friend, and informed her of the events of 7 August 2000. She asked her to find Mr Kervalishvili, who had organised the abduction of the applicant’s father, and to describe the situation to him. 48. On the evening of 8 August 2000 Mr Grigolashvili was released by the applicant. The applicant then called Ms Margvelashvili and offered an apology for the offensive language he had used the previous night. He also informed her that Mr Dvali and Mr Kakushadze had been released. However, they never returned home. (b) Depositions by Mr Grigolashvili 49. According to Mr Grigolashvili’s statement, on the morning of 8 August 2000 he was abducted by a group of men who claimed to be police officers. He was taken to a building which he later identified as the applicant’s office. There, he was questioned by several people, including, allegedly, the applicant (Mr Grigolashvili was not sure of that person’s identity, since he had never met the applicant and only identified him from a photo). They beat him up and threatened him with death if he did not indicate the whereabouts of the applicant’s father. One of the men forced him to call Ms Margvelashvili and tell her that she should contact the alleged abductors of the applicant’s father in order to save his life and that of Mr Dvali. On the evening of 8 August 2000, after the applicant’s father had been set free, Mr Grigolashvili was released. Before he left, one of the men from the applicant’s office gave him documents belonging to Mr Dvali and Mr Kakushadze. Later Mr Grigolashvili returned the documents to Mr Tsartsidze, the cousin of Mr Kakushadze. (c) Depositions by Mr Kervalishvili 50. Mr Kervalishvili confirmed that on 7 August 2000 his employees, one of whom had been disguised in police uniform, had kidnapped the applicant’s father for the purpose of obtaining a ransom. The applicant’s father was kept in a flat which had been rented for that purpose. On the following day Mr Kervalishvili was approached by Ms Avaliani, who informed him about the abduction of Mr Kakushadze, Mr Dvali and Mr Grigolashvili, and about the threats to Ms Margvelashvili and her son. Mr Kervalishvili then called the applicant and agreed to release his father if the applicant released the three men. During that conversation Mr Berkadze, who had also been involved in abducting the applicant’s father and was at that point in the applicant’s office, confirmed to Mr Kervalishvili that all the hostages taken by the applicant were alive. The applicant also threatened to kill the hostages if his father was not returned safely. (d) Depositions by Ms Dzhimshiashvili 51. Ms Dzhimshiashvili, Mr Grigolashvili’s wife, testified that early on the morning of 8 August 2000 several “policemen” had taken her husband away. In the evening he had returned home; he was seriously injured and she had provided him with elementary medical assistance. He did not tell her what had happened to him; he simply explained that he had been beaten up by the police. (e) Other evidence relied on by the prosecution 52. The prosecution further referred to a verbatim record of the conversation between Mr Grigolashvili and Mr Tsartsidze on 19 September 2000 (see paragraph 27 above), and a verbatim record of thirteen audiotapes made by the police as part of the surveillance operation (see paragraphs 11 and 24 above). 53. The prosecution also relied on the reports by Mr Koval and Mr Zubov, who had identified the applicant’s voice on the audiotapes (see paragraph 33 above). A considerable amount of circumstantial evidence and hearsay witness testimony was also referred to in the indictment. 54. As Mr Sidler, one of the co-accused, was a serving military officer, the case was examined by a military court. On 28 August 2002 the military court held a preparatory hearing. The applicant was present at the hearing; he was assisted by several lawyers. Those lawyers represented him throughout the subsequent proceedings. 55. The trial commenced on 5 November 2002. The court was composed of Mr Popovich, the professional judge, and two lay judges. 56. The applicant and the other co-accused pleaded not guilty. According to the applicant, the abductions in question had been carried out by real policemen, together with Mr Berkadze, who had then decided to shift the blame onto the applicant and his men after Mr Dvali and Mr Kakushadze had disappeared. 57. On 25 November 2002 the applicant’s lawyers questioned Mr Grigolashvili and Ms Margvelashvili in Georgia, in the presence of their lawyers, and through an interpreter. On an unspecified date in 2003 the lawyers also questioned Mr Kervalishvili. A verbatim recording of those questioning was made. The lawyers further obtained written statements by Mr Kervalishvili, Ms Margvelashvili, Ms Dzhimshiashvili and Mr Grigolashvili concerning the events of 7 and 8 August 2000. Those statements were addressed to the Georgian authorities, to the Military Court of Leningrad Command, and to the applicant’s lawyers. In 2003 the defence lawyers submitted the above written testimonies and statements to the Military Court; they were added to the case file. 58. All of the above witnesses withdrew their previous testimony to the police, which had incriminated the applicant. In particular, Ms Margvelashvili explained in her statement of 25 November 2002 that, although she did not speak Russian, she had signed written depositions drafted in Russian by the prosecution authorities. She explained that the “policemen” who had abducted Mr Dvali and Mr Kakushadze from her flat had been led by Mr Berkadze, one of those who had kidnapped the applicant’s father. Ms Margvelashvili testified that the man who had called and threatened her in the morning of 8 August 2000 was not the applicant but Mr Berkadze. 59. In his written submissions of 25 November 2002 Mr Grigolashvili indicated that the person who had questioned and beaten him in the applicant’s office had introduced himself as “a son of the kidnapped businessman”, but that it had not been the applicant, and that he had not seen the applicant at all on that day. 60. In his written deposition of 22 March 2002 Mr Kervalishvili declared that everything he had said to the prosecution authorities about the applicant was a lie (cf. paragraph 32 above). 61. The defence lawyers also questioned the applicant’s brother, who lives in Israel and who confirmed the applicant’s account of events. The transcript of that interview was also produced to the court. 62. The defence commissioned an expert analysis of the recording of the telephone conversations at Ms Margvelashvili’s flat. The phonological analysis of the audiotapes submitted by the defence concluded that the recording of the telephone conversations on 7 and 8 August 2000 did not contain the applicant’s voice. This report was admitted by the court as evidence. 63. The court examined two out of the thirteen audiotapes made by the police in the flats of Ms Margvelashvili and Mr Grigolashvili (audiotapes nos. 13462 and 14123), and examined the verbatim records of the remaining eleven audiotapes made by the police. The defence requested access to all thirteen audiotapes in order to be able to compare them with the verbatim record, but the court rejected that request. 64. The defence also requested the court to obtain from the prosecution the recordings made between 5.30 p.m. on 7 August 2000 and 1.40 p.m. on 8 August 2000. The defence stressed that during that period the applicant had had a telephone conversation with Ms Margvelashvili. In its submission, the disclosure of the content of that conversation could have proved his innocence. 65. The defence lawyers asked the court to disclose the materials authorising the telephone tapping of Ms Margvelashvili’s flat and, in particular, the court decision authorising that surveillance. At the hearing of 12 September 2002 Judge Popovich, after having examined briefly a file produced by the State prosecutor, dismissed the request “on the grounds of secrecy”. He explained that he was satisfied with the explanation provided by the prosecution as to the lawfulness of the telephone tapping. It appears that the lay judges did not see the materials submitted by the prosecutor to the presiding judge. 66. On 4 January 2003 the defence repeated their request for the disclosure of the materials authorising the wiretapping. In particular, they sought the disclosure of the request for the wiretapping by the police and the court’s order of 11 July 2002 authorising the wiretapping (see paragraph 21 above). In an interim decision of the same date the court, composed of Judge Popovich and the two lay judges, dismissed that request on the ground that the materials at issue, relating to the operational and search activities of the police, contained State secrets, and therefore could not be shown to the defence. The court referred to subsection 4 of section 12 of the 1995 Operational and Search Activities Act (see “Relevant domestic law” below), which did not provide for the disclosure of the information on such activities of the police to the lawyers. 67. The court questioned a number of policemen involved in the wiretapping of telephone conversations at Ms Margvelashvili’s flat. They submitted that the police had been keeping an eye on Mr Kervalishvili and persons around him, including Ms Margvelashvili, since March 2000. Ms Margvelashvili’s flat had been under surveillance since July 2000, and when the applicant’s father was kidnapped the police had known that Ms Margvelashvili’s friends or relatives might be involved in some way. The witness explained that all telephone conversations within that period had been recorded. However, the recording covering the period between 5.30 p.m. on 7 August 2000 and 1.40 p.m. on 8 August 2000 had been lost “for technical reasons” (see paragraph 24 above). (ii) Identification of voices 68. On 25 December 2002 the court started the examination of the expert report of 20 September 2001 by Mr Koval and Mr Zubov. The applicant insisted that the conclusions of the above-mentioned two experts were wrong, and that the man’s voice on the audiotapes did not belong to him. Further, he claimed that the translation from Georgian was inaccurate. 69. On 29 January 2003 the court questioned the experts who had prepared the report, Mr Koval and Mr Zubov. They testified that at the request of the investigator they had analysed four audiotapes. They had not detected any traces of editing on those audiotapes. In their view, the voice on five recordings belonged to the applicant. 70. The presiding judge asked Mr Koval whether he had worked with the Georgian language before. Mr Koval replied that, for the purposes of a phonological analysis, knowledge of a particular language was not necessary. He also confirmed that, although the conversation recorded on the audiotapes was in Georgian, he and his colleague only had samples of the voice of the applicant speaking Russian. However, in his opinion that did not make much difference. 71. On 5 January 2003 the applicant asked the court to order an new expert examination of the voices on the audiotapes. The defence submitted that the voice on the audiotape was not the applicant’s but that of another person, allegedly Mr Berkadze. 72. In order to rebut the findings of the expert report relied on by the prosecution, the defence lawyer asked the court to call two phonologists, Ms Rossinskaya and Ms Galyashina. They were summoned to court and on 29 January 2003 they testified that the methods of phonological analysis employed by Mr Koval and Mr Zubov were questionable and that their conclusions were unreliable. In their submission, Mr Koval and Mr Zubov had not used State-approved methods of voice recognition but had relied on their own method, which was unreliable. They produced to the court a report criticising the findings of Mr Koval and Mr Zubov; that report was added by the court to the case file. 73. On 12 February 2003, in view of the contradictory nature of the conclusions reached by Mr Koval, Mr Zubov and Ms T. S. Kikalishvili, the court ordered an additional analysis of the audiotapes. The defence lawyers asked the court to include Ms Galyashina in the expert team, but the court rejected that request on the ground that she had already given her opinion on the subject in the capacity of a “specialist” (специалист). The court assigned four experts, including Mr Koval, the same expert who had drafted the first report, proposed by the prosecution, and Mr Serdyukov, proposed by the defence. Two experts were appointed on the court’s initiative: Mr Yakushev and Ms Kikalishvili (the latter had also taken part in the first analysis). 74. The defence contested the appointment of Mr Koval and Mr Yakushev. The defence cast doubt on the impartiality of these experts, in that Mr Koval’s wife had previously worked for the applicant and had been fired by him, and Mr Yakushev was a member of the Russian security service. 75. On 15 April 2003 the court heard evidence from the experts Mr Koval, Mr Serdyukov and Ms T. S. Kikalishvili. The court also heard two witnesses, namely Mr Bazunov and Mr Korobetskiy. Mr Bazunov confirmed that he had known Mr Koval and his wife since 1999. She had worked at the reception desk at a casino owned by the applicant. In September 1999 she had been fired on the direct orders of the applicant. Mr Bazunov had then called Mr Koval and explained that her dismissal had not been his decision, but that of the applicant. Mr Korobetskiy confirmed the statement by Mr Bazunov about Mr Koval’s wife and her dismissal from the casino. 76. The court refused to discharge Mr Koval and Mr Yakushev. As a result of the new analysis, Mr Koval and Mr Yakushev found that the voice on the audiotape belonged to the applicant. The two other experts came to the opposite conclusion. 77. On 24 June 2003, at the prosecutor’s request, the court ordered a third expert analysis of the audiotapes, with a view to eliminating discrepancies in the earlier findings. The analysis was entrusted to Mr Koval, Mr Yakushev and Mr Serdyukov, who had participated in the previous examination, and two new experts: Mr Kurdiani, a Georgian-speaking expert, proposed by the defence, and an anonymous expert, proposed by the prosecution, whose name was given only as “A. P. Ivanova”. The defence asked the court to disclose the identity of “A. P. Ivanova” or to dismiss her from the expert team, because in such circumstances it was unable to challenge her credentials. 78. The next hearing was held on 25 June 2003. The court and the parties questioned several witnesses, namely the experts Mr Kurdiani, Mr Yakushev and “Ms Ivanova”. The latter was questioned through a system of audio teleconferencing. The applicant was present at that hearing and was able to put questions to the witnesses. The defence challenged Mr Koval, alleging that he was biased, but the court refused to grant their request. 79. On 27 June 2003 the court decided to discontinue the phonological examination of the audiotapes. The court noted that since Mr Kurdiani was a Georgian national he could not be held legally responsible for false testimony and could not therefore act as an expert in the proceedings. The court also observed that the defence lawyers could not ascertain the personal credentials and professional competence of “A. P. Ivanova”. 80. On 2 July 2003 the court declared that the examination of evidence was over and asked the parties how much time they needed to prepare their final submissions. The defence requested one day; the prosecution requested twelve days. The court decided to start hearing the final submissions on the morning of 15 July 2003. 81. On 15 July 2003 at 10 a.m. the prosecutor submitted an additional phonological analysis of the audiotapes prepared by the same anonymous expert, “A. P. Ivanova”. Despite the objections raised by the defence, the court admitted the report in evidence and included it in the case file. However, the court refused to reopen the examination of evidence. The report of “A. P. Ivanova” was added to the case file without examination by the parties. The court rejected a request by the applicant’s lawyers to disclose the contents of the report. At 11.05 a.m. the court discontinued the examination of evidence and proceeded to hear the parties’ final submissions. (iii) Audio recording of a conversation between Mr Tsartsidze and Mr Grigolashvili 82. The court also heard the audio recording of a conversation between Mr Grigolashvili and Mr Tsartsidze, made by the latter (see paragraph 27 above). The court had ordered an expert examination of the recording in order to identify the voices on the audiotapes, but it later cancelled the examination. (b) Witness testimonies read out at the trial 83. Several witnesses for the prosecution, including Ms Margvelashvili, Mr Grigolashvili, Mr Kervalishvili and Ms Dzhimshiashvili, did not appear at the hearing. At the beginning of the trial the court asked the parties whether the proceedings should continue in the absence of the above witnesses. The prosecutor supported the idea of continuing the proceedings in the absence of those witnesses. The applicant’s counsel, Mr Afanasyev, did not oppose the commencement of the proceedings, but asked the court that the witnesses be summoned through the channels of international judicial cooperation. 84. On 12 November 2002 the Military Court of Leningrad Command sent a letter rogatory to the Georgian authorities asking them to assist in summoning several witnesses, namely Mr Grigolashvili, Ms Margvelashvili, Ms Dvali, Ms Dzhimshiashvili and Mr Kervalishvili. On 9 March 2003 the Deputy Minister of Justice of Georgia informed the President of the Leningrad Circuit Military Court that Mr Grigolashvili, Ms Margvelashvili and Ms Dzhimshiashvili were not able to go to Russia to appear before the court. The Deputy Minister also explained that they had all retracted the statements they had previously given to the Russian prosecution authorities. 85. At the hearing of 19 March 2003 the prosecutor requested leave to read out written depositions by Ms Margvelashvili, Mr Grigolashvili, Mr Kervalishvili and Ms Dzhimshiashvili, made to the investigator at the pre-trial stage (see paragraphs 46 – 51 above). The defence objected, referring, inter alia, to Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention. They submitted that the applicant had been deprived of his right to cross-examine witnesses against him. The defence stressed that they had asked the investigator to carry out face-to-face questioning of these witnesses but that the investigator had refused. In those circumstances, the written depositions by those witnesses should have been declared inadmissible. Despite that objection, on 20 March 2003 the court decided to admit the written depositions and to read them out at the trial. (c) Witnesses examined at the trial 86. In the course of the trial the court questioned several other witnesses, in particular Mr Tsartsidze, Ms Avaliani and Mr Kogan. Their testimony can be summarised as follows. (i) Mr Tsartsidze 87. According to Mr Tsartsidze, on 8 August 2000 Ms Margvelashvili called him and informed him of the abduction of Mr Dvali, Mr Kakushadze and Mr Grigolashvili, which, in her opinion, was related to the kidnapping of the applicant’s father a day earlier. 88. On 11 August 2000 Mr Tsartsidze met Mr Grigolashvili, who gave him more details of what had happened to him and to others. Mr Grigolashvili handed over to Mr Tsartsidze documents belonging to Mr Dvali and Mr Kakushadze, explaining that he had received them in the applicant’s office on 8 August 2000. These documents were later seized by the police. 89. On 19 September 2000 Mr Tsartsidze met Mr Grigolashvili again and suggested that he file a complaint with the police about the events of 7 and 8 August 2000. Mr Grigolashvili refused, allegedly for fear of reprisals by the applicant and his family. Knowing that Mr Grigolashvili might refuse to tell the police the true story of his abduction, Mr Tsartsidze recorded their conversation on two audiotapes using a dictaphone. In December 2000 Mr Tsartsidze gave those tapes to the police (see paragraph 27 above). (ii) Ms Avaliani 90. Ms Avaliani testified that on 8 August 2000 her friend Ms Margvelashvili had called her, explained the situation and asked her to find Mr Kervalishvili. Ms Avaliani met Mr Kervalishvili and relayed the information. During their conversation Mr Kervalishvili confirmed that he had masterminded the abduction of the applicant’s father. He then called the applicant and they agreed to exchange the applicant’s father for the hostages taken by the applicant, namely Mr Dvali, Mr Kakushadze, Mr Grigolashvili, Ms Margvelashvili and her son. (iii) Mr Kogan 91. Mr Kogan, the applicant’s father’s driver, who had been present at the time of the latter’s abduction by Mr Kervalishvili’s and Mr Berkadze’s men testified that the applicant’s father had been kidnapped from his car on the morning of 7 August 2000. In the evening the driver was invited to the applicant’s office, where he was shown “three Georgian men” and asked whether he recognised any of the men who had abducted the applicant’s father. He replied that he did not. (iv) Other witnesses 92. Ms Volkova, a former girl-friend of Mr Kakushadze, and her mother, testified that they had heard from other relatives that Mr Dvali and Mr Kakushadze had been abducted on the applicant’s orders. A statement in similar terms was given by Ms M.A. Kikalishvili, a relative of Mr Tsartsidze. 93. Mr Mirilashvili senior, the father of the applicant, testified before the court. He described the circumstances of his kidnapping by Mr Kervalishvili. He also confirmed that Mr Kervalishvili had spoken to his son, the applicant, by telephone. 94. The court heard evidence from a number of policemen who had visited the applicant’s office on 7 and 8 August 2000. The court was told that during the night of 7 August 2000 the applicant had spoken on the telephone with the deputy chief investigator of the Vyborgskiy District of St Petersburg. On the following morning that police officer, together with a colleague, had arrived at the applicant’s office. However, the policemen denied that they had been involved in the abduction of Mr Dvali and others. 95. The court questioned six of the applicant’s employees, who, according to the prosecution, had assisted him in the abduction and murder and had found the men who had abducted Mr Dvali, Mr Kakushadze and Mr Grigolashvili. The applicant’s employees testified that on 7 August 2000 the police had provided them with certain information about the progress of the official investigation. The applicant’s employees also submitted that they had been in permanent contact with the police officers in charge of the investigation throughout 7 and 8 August. However, they all denied that they had been involved in the abduction, beating and murder of the victims. They submitted that they had never instructed anyone to abduct Mr Kakushadze, Mr Dvali and Mr Grigolashvili, or to detain Ms Margvelashvili and her son, and had never received any such instructions from the applicant. They also denied that they had seen the victims in the applicant’s office. 96. The court questioned several other indirect witnesses. However, their statements were not used against the applicant. 97. On 1 August 2003 the Military Court of the Leningrad Command gave judgment in the applicant’s case. 98. The court started by describing the applicant’s own account of the events at issue. However, in the court’s opinion, that account was rebutted by other evidence. In support of that conclusion it referred, firstly, to the statements by Ms Margvelashvili, Mr Grigolashvili, Mr Kervalishvili and Ms Dzhimshiashvili obtained by the investigator and read out at the trial (see paragraphs 46 – 51 and 85 above). In the court’s opinion, those statements confirmed the applicant’s guilt. 99. As to the written statements by Ms Margvelashvili, Mr Grigolashvili and Mr Kervalishvili, submitted by the defence (see paragraphs 57 – 60 above), the court declared that evidence inadmissible as having been obtained in breach of the domestic legislation. The court noted that those persons had already been questioned by the investigator as witnesses. In the court’s view, their subsequent examination by the defence lawyers could not therefore be recognised as “lawful collection of evidence” within the meaning of the domestic legislation. Consequently, the court declared those statements inadmissible. The court further noted that the statement by the applicant’s brother had been obtained by his defence lawyers in accordance with the law. However, the court noted that the veracity of the statement could not be confirmed in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure, namely at an oral hearing before the court. On that basis the court declared this evidence inadmissible. 100. Secondly, the judgment referred to the testimonies of Ms Kikalishvili and Mr Tsartsidze, the relatives of Mr Kakushadze. They testified about what Mr Grigolashvili had told them about the events of 7 and 8 August 2000. Thirdly, the court referred to the recordings of the conversation between Mr Grigolashvili and Mr Tsartsidze, made by the latter in September 2000. Fourthly, the judgment referred to the testimony of Ms Volkova, the former girl-friend of Mr Kakushadze. She testified before the court about what Mr Tsartsidze had told her about the events. Fifthly, the court analysed the testimony of Ms Avaliani, who had heard the telephone conversation between the applicant and Mr Kervalishvili, and who had spoken to Ms Margvelashvili and Ms Kervalishvili about the applicant’s involvement in the abduction of Mr Grigolashvili, Mr Dvali and Mr Kakushadze. 101. Finally, the court referred to the phone calls recorded at Ms Margvelashvili’s flat on 7 and 8 August 2000, The court accepted the conclusions of the experts for the prosecution (Mr Koval, Mr Zubov and Mr Yakushev), who identified the voice on the audiotape as belonging to the applicant, and rejected the findings of the other experts. In particular, the court discounted the arguments of Ms Galyashina, Ms Rossinskaya, Ms Kikalishvili and Mr Serdyukov as unreliable. The judgment contained no reference to the findings of the anonymous expert “A.P. Ivanova”. 102. The judgment also contained references to various other items of hearsay and circumstantial evidence, such as the testimonies of the police officers and reports of the examination of the personal belongings of one of the victims. 103. As a result, the Military Court found the applicant guilty of unlawful entry into a house and the abduction and illegal detention of Mr Grigolashvili, Mr Dvali and Mr Kakushadze, and sentenced him to twelve years’ imprisonment. The applicant was acquitted on other counts, including the charges of murder. The court fully acquitted the applicant’s co-defendants, including Mr Kazimirchuk and Mr Sidler. Mr Petrov was found guilty of illegal possession of firearms. 104. On 11 August 2003 the applicant’s lawyers lodged an appeal against the judgment of 1 August 2003. On 18 September and 21 October 2003 they filed additional written observations with the appeal court. Their grounds of appeal may be summarised as follows. (a) Witnesses’ testimony 105. The defence lawyers indicated that the court had misinterpreted or even distorted the testimony of many witnesses, as well as the content of the telephone conversations recorded by the police. Nothing in Mr Grigolashvili’s and Ms Margvelashvili’s testimony indicated that the applicant had organised the abduction of Mr Dvali, Mr Kakushadze and Mr Grigolashvili. On the contrary, Ms Margvelashvili and Ms Avaliani had on many occasions in their testimony referred to “coppers” and “the nick”, which suggested that the police had been involved in the case. Both Ms Margvelashvili and Ms Avaliani mentioned that the “cops” had arrived at Ms Margvelashvili’s flat in the company of Mr Berkadze, and that it was Mr Berkadze who had called and threatened Ms Margvelashvili with death. The defence also pointed to certain logical discrepancies in the testimony of various witnesses and challenged their credibility. 106. The defence complained that the court had failed to summon Mr Kervalishvili, Mr Grigolashvili, Ms Dzhimshiashvili and Ms Margvelashvili. At the same time the court declared inadmissible written statements by those witnesses, obtained by the defence, in which they had retracted their previous statements to the investigative authorities. The defence also indicated that the court had refused to obtain from the prosecutor’s office the results of the questioning of Mr Grigolashvili, which had been carried out by the Georgian authorities at the request of the Russian prosecution authorities on 25 June 2002. That information had been added to the case file by the prosecution during the trial, without the defence having been informed (see paragraph 40 above). (b) Wiretapping of the telephone line 107. As regards the evidence obtained as a result of wiretapping, the defence complained that they had had no opportunity to challenge its admissibility, because the court had refused to give them access to the materials authorising the wiretapping. The defence further indicated that the prosecution had produced only a selective record of the relevant telephone conversations. Firstly, the defence had had access to only two out of the thirteen audiotapes made by the police, whereas the prosecution had submitted the verbatim record of all thirteen tapes. Secondly, a period of more than twenty hours of wiretapping (between 5 p.m. on 7 August 2000 and 1.40 p.m. on 8 August 2000) was missing, whereas the police had recorded all the conversations which had taken place within that period. In its decision the court had not mentioned the testimony of the police officers involved in the wiretapping operation, which was of crucial importance for the case. 108. The defence also contested the court’s findings as to the identity of the man who had threatened Ms Margvelashvili and her son with death in the telephone conversation of 8 August 2000. The court concluded that the voice on the tape belonged to the applicant. That conclusion was based on the findings by the Russian experts Mr Koval, Mr Zubov and Mr Yakushev. The defence pointed out that those experts did not speak Georgian and had had at their disposal only samples of the applicant’s voice when speaking in Russian; moreover, the impartiality of those experts was open to doubt for the reasons adduced by the defence before the court. The defence further complained that the court had disregarded the opinion of those experts proposed by the defence, had refused to entrust the analysis of the audiotapes to Ms Galyashina and had discharged Mr Kurdiani. In their opinion, the court’s assessment of the contradicting expert opinions was significantly affected by a report by an anonymous expert, “A. P. Ivanova”, to which the defence had had no access during the trial. 109. With regard to the audiotapes recorded by Mr Tsartsidze in September 2000, the defence lawyers indicated that the court had failed to establish whether the recorded voice actually belonged to Mr Grigolashvili. No analysis had ever been carried out to that effect. Moreover, Mr Tsartsidze could not explain to the court why he had handed over to the investigative authorities only copies of the audiotapes, and not the original records. In those circumstances the court ought to have disregarded the contents of those tapes. 110. In addition to the grounds of appeal submitted by the applicant’s lawyers, Mr Grigolashvili, as a victim, lodged a separate appeal against the judgment. Mr Grigolashvili submitted that he had never seen the applicant or spoken to him. According to Mr Grigolashvili, he had spent some time in the applicant’s office on 8 August 2000, but he had not seen Mr Dvali or Mr Kakushadze there. The man who had hit him in the applicant’s office was not the applicant. He submitted that the story he had told Mr Tsartsidze, as recorded on the audiotape, was untrue and that he had recounted it under serious pressure from Mr Tsartsidze, a cousin of the deceased Mr Kakushadze, and his relatives. He had been instructed what to say by Mr Tsartsidze and by the investigators. 111. Ms Margvelashvili, as a victim, lodged a similar appeal. She indicated that her initial statements, referred to by the trial court as evidence incriminating the applicant, had been given under duress. She explained that Mr Dvali and Mr Kakushadze had been arrested at her flat by police officers who were led by Mr Berkadze. Later that night a police officer in uniform had come to her flat and taken documents belonging to Mr Dvali and Mr Kakushadze. On the morning of 8 August 2000 she had spoken to Mr Berkadze by telephone, not the applicant. No one had ever mentioned the applicant’s name in connection with the abduction of Mr Dvali and Mr Kakushadze. She had given testimony against the applicant because she had been persuaded by the investigators that the applicant had ordered the killing of Mr Dvali and Mr Kakushadze, but she now understood that the applicant was innocent. 112. On 5 November 2003 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the conviction in the main, excluding several aspects on formal grounds (in particular, the episode concerning the abduction of Mr Grigolashvili, and the illegal entry into Ms Margvelashvili’s house). As a result, the sentence was reduced to eight years’ imprisonment. 113. Ms Margvelashvili appeared before the appeal court as a victim of the crimes of which the applicant was accused. She repeated the arguments stated in her grounds of appeal. However, the appeal court upheld the findings of the first-instance court, referring again to the written depositions given by Mr Grigolashvili, Ms Margvelashvili and Mr Kervalishvili at the pre-trial stage, the recording of the telephone conversation of 8 August 2000 between Ms Margvelashvili and the applicant, the recording of the conversation between Mr Tsartsidze and Mr Grigolashvili, written and oral submissions by Ms Avaliani and Mr Tsartsidze and certain pieces of circumstantial evidence produced by the prosecution. The court of appeal noted that the wiretapping of the telephone line of Ms Margvelashvili’s flat had been lawfully authorised by the President of the St Petersburg City Court for the period between 7 and 17 August 2000. As regards the depositions submitted by the defence, which were declared inadmissible by the trial court, the appeal court noted that “the trial court [had made] the correct legal assessment” and declared them inadmissible. Further, the appeal court dismissed the complaint regarding the trial court’s failure to summon Ms Galyashina and its discharge of Mr Kurdiani. The appeal court further noted that the first-instance court had not referred to the report prepared by the anonymous expert “A. P. Ivanova” and had not breached any procedural rules by accepting her report. It also noted that the report had been admitted to the case file before the end of the trial. As to the grounds of appeal by Ms Margvelashvili and Mr Grigolashvili, the court of appeal held that “their arguments ... were untenable, since their testimony had been thoroughly examined by the [first instance] court, it analysed them in its judgment, the findings of the [first instance] court are duly reasoned”.

5. The applicant was born in 1976. He is currently serving a prison sentence in Wołów prison. 6. On 23 August 2005 the Kłodzko District Court convicted the applicant of sexual abuse of a minor and sentenced him to five years' imprisonment. The applicant appealed. 7. On 20 February 2006 the Świdnica Regional Court upheld the first‑instance judgment. On a later unknown date the applicant requested that a legal‑aid lawyer be assigned to the case to prepare a cassation appeal. On 10 April 2006 the court allowed his request. The court's decision was served on the applicant on 20 April 2006. 8. By a letter to the court dated 11 May 2006 the lawyer refused to prepare a cassation appeal, finding no grounds for it. This letter was subsequently forwarded by the court to the applicant. 9. On 6 June 2006 the applicant requested the court to assign a new legal‑aid lawyer to the case. In letters to the applicant dated 14 June and 10 July 2006 the court refused to do so. The court referred to the legal-aid lawyer's refusal of 11 May 2006. 10. Neither in the letter accompanying the lawyer's refusal of 11 May 2005 nor in its later letters the court informed the applicant of his further procedural rights. 11. On an unknown date in 2005 the applicant instituted criminal proceedings alleging that correspondence sent by him to courts, prosecutors and other authorities had been destroyed by prison officers. On 22 August 2005 the Kłodzko District Prosecutor refused to institute proceedings in the case. On 30 November 2005 the Kłodzko District Court upheld the decision of the Kłodzko District Prosecutor. 12. On an unknown date in 2006 the applicant, who was serving a prison sentence, filed a request for temporary leave. On 6 July 2006 the Gdańsk District Court dismissed his request. On 15 September 2006 the Gdańsk Regional Court dismissed his appeal as unfounded. 13. On a later date in 2006 the applicant requested the penitentiary judge to grant him another temporary leave. On 9 October 2006 the judge refused his request. On 21 December 2006 the Gdańsk Regional Court dismissed his appeal as unfounded. 14. In 2005 the applicant requested that criminal proceedings be instituted against a judge examining his case, alleging that he had destroyed certain documents from his case file. On 6 December 2006 the Kłodzko District Prosecutor refused the request. On 11 February 2008 the Nysa District Court upheld this decision. 15. In criminal proceedings concerning an assault against the applicant by his fellow-prisoner, on 29 June 2007 the Kwidzyn District Court convicted the accused and sentenced him to 10 months' imprisonment. The court also obliged him to pay the applicant damages in the amount of PLN 8,000.

4. The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Gdansk. 5. On 24 May 1999 the applicant was detained on remand on suspicion of having committed numerous offences, inter alia kidnapping and aggravated robbery. 6. The court based its detention order on a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences and on the severity of the likely penalty, which gave rise to a fear that the applicant would obstruct the proceedings. 7. His pre-trial detention was extended by decisions of 15 July 1999, 20 October 1999, 24 January 2000, 27 June 2000, 10 November 2000, 3 January 2001, 26 March 2001, 30 April 2001, 21 November 2001, 25 April 2002, 16 July 2002, 8 July 2003, 20 January 2004, 13 July 2004, 28 July 2004, 6 August 2004, 20 August 2004, 27 August 2004, 3 September 2004, 12 October 2004, 11 January 2005, 19 July 2005 and 27 October 2005. 8. In all the above-mentioned decisions the courts relied on the same grounds for detention as those given in the first detention order. In some the courts also referred to the complexity of the case, the need to conduct further investigations, the probability of collusion between the applicant and the co-accused and exertion of unlawful pressure on witnesses by the applicant and the fear that the applicant would go into hiding. 9. On many occasions the applicant requested release or that a more lenient preventive measure be applied. Each time his requests were dismissed. 10. The applicant appealed against the decisions extending his detention on several occasions. Only one of his appeals was allowed to the effect that the period of extension of his detention was reduced by two months (the Gdańsk Court of Appeal decision of 17 August 2005). 11. On 24 January 2000 the prosecution service filed with the Gdańsk Regional Court a bill of indictment. The applicant was charged with twelve offences, including aggravated robbery, kidnapping and illegal possession of a weapon. 12. The first hearing planned for 10 April 2000 was adjourned. Subsequent hearings were held on 26 May 2000, 27 June 2000, 7 August 2000, 6 October 2000, 10 November 2000, 3 January 2001, 2 February 2001 and 26 March 2001. The hearing of 17 April 2001 was adjourned. As a consequence of the court’s exceeding the permissible period of the length of intervals between hearings, the proceedings had to be conducted anew. 13. Subsequent hearings were held on 6 June 2001, 8 June 2001, 13 June 2001, 3 July 2001, 18 September 2001, 24 September 2001, 10 October 2001 and 15 October 2001. The hearing of 31 October 2001 was adjourned due to a lay judge’s illness. Subsequent hearings were held on 7 November 2001, 13 November 2001, 20 November 2001, 10 December 2001, 14 December 2001 and 17 December 2001. A hearing of 21 December 2001 was adjourned due to the absence of witnesses. The next hearings took place on 27 December 2001, 7 January 2002, 14 January 2002 and 21 January 2002. 14. On 28 January 2002 the Gdańsk Regional Court convicted the applicant of nine offences, acquitted him of the remaining three and sentenced him to 15 years’ imprisonment. The applicant and other accused appealed. 15. On 9 April 2003 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal quashed the judgment and remitted the case as it found that the judges deciding on the case had not been impartial. 16. The hearings of 22 August 2003, 7 October 2003, 18 November 2003 and 19 December 2003 were adjourned since the applicant had so requested and since one of the accused had been absent. 17. A subsequent hearing was held on 24 February 2004. A hearing of 6 April 2004 was postponed due to the absence of a lawyer representing one of the accused. Hearings were held on 6 July 2004, 28 July 2004, 6 August 2004, 20 August 2004, 27 August 2004, 3 September 2004, 7 September 2004, 12 October 2004, 3 December 2004, 7 December 2004 and 14 December 2004. 18. On 28 December 2004 the Court of Appeal found that the length of proceedings had been excessive in the applicant’s case and awarded him compensation. In its reasoned grounds the court stated that as a result of the fact that the trial court had exceeded the permissible length of time between the hearings of 26 March 2001 and 6 June 2001, the proceedings had to be conducted anew. It also noted that the adjournment of the hearing of 17 April 2001 had been unjustified. 19. Subsequent hearings were held on 11 January 2005, 25 January 2005, 11 February 2005, 18 March 2005, 5 April 2005, 12 April 2005, 17 May 2005, 28 June 2005, 3 July 2005, 19 July 2005, 19 August 2005, 6 September 2005, 11 October 2005, 4 November 2005, 25 November 2005, 9 December 2005 and 20 December 2005. 20. In the course of the proceedings the applicant and other accused lodged numerous requests for exclusion of several judges from the case, hearing of additional witnesses, commissioning expert opinions, transfer of the case to a different court, re‑reading of the bill of indictment, drawing up a new bill of indictment, the appointment of a new legal-aid lawyer, correction of the record of a hearing, etc. 21. On 27 December 2005 the Gdansk Regional Court sentenced the applicant to 15 years’ imprisonment. The reasoned grounds for this judgment are being drawn up. The applicant expressed his intention to lodge an appeal.

4. The applicant was born in 1940 and lives in Athens. 5. On 15 June 1999 he brought an action for declaratory judgment (αναγνωριστική αγωγή) before the First Instance Administrative Court of Athens. In particular, he asked the court to declare that the Welfare fund of the Staff of the Greek Railways Organisation (Ταμείο Πρόνοιας Προσωπικού ΟΣΕ), which is a legal person governed by public law, owed him € 3,901.10. This sum corresponded to an allowance the applicant alleged he was entitled to when he retired. 6. On 30 May 2001 the action was dismissed (judgment no. 3648/2001). 7. On 10 April 2002 the applicant filed an appeal before the Athens Administrative Court of Appeal challenging the court’s findings and its evaluation of the evidence. 8. By judgment dated 11 March 2004 the court dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the findings of the First Instance Court (judgment no. 898/2004). 9. On 8 December 2004 the applicant lodged an appeal on cassation with the Supreme Administrative Court. On 6 November 2007 he withdrew his appeal and a relevant report, to that effect, was delivered by the Supreme Administrative Court on 19 November 2007.

6. The applicants were born in 1932 and 1958, respectively, and live in Hrgovljani, Croatia. 7. On 12 February 1992 the applicants' house in Hrgovljani was blown up by unknown perpetrators. 8. On 9 February 1995 the applicants instituted civil proceedings in the Zagreb Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zagrebu), seeking damages for their destroyed property from the State. 9. On 17 January 1996 Parliament introduced an amendment to the Civil Obligations Act (“the 1996 Amendment”) which provided that all proceedings concerning actions for damages resulting from terrorist acts were to be stayed pending the enactment of new legislation. The new legislation was to be enacted within six months. 10. On 5 February 1996 the Zagreb Municipal Court stayed the proceedings pursuant to the above legislation. 11. On 14 July 2003 Parliament introduced the Act on Liability for Damage Resulting from Terrorist Acts and Public Demonstrations (“the 2003 Liability Act”). 12. On 23 September 2003 the Zagreb Municipal Court resumed the proceedings. 13. On 5 May 2004 the court dismissed the applicants' claim finding that it no longer had jurisdiction in the matter. 14. On 18 June 2004 the applicants appealed against the above decision. It appears that the proceedings are still pending before the second instance court.

5. The first applicant was born in 1976 and the second applicant in 2001 and they live in Zadar. 6. On 23 June 2001 the second applicant married I.M. 7. On 4 September 2001 the second applicant gave birth to the first applicant. 8. Relations between the spouses deteriorated, and in 2006 the second applicant brought a civil action against her husband seeking divorce, custody of, and maintenance for the first applicant. Her husband, I.M., filed a counterclaim, seeking custody of the first applicant. 9. In the period between 5 July 2006 and 7 March 2008 a total of eight criminal complaints were filed against the second applicant and I.M. Most of these complaints were filed against each other directly, but some were filed at the initiative of the police. Three of those eight complaints resulted in criminal proceedings being instituted (two against I.M. and one against both I.M. and the second applicant), the outcome of which is unknown. The remaining five criminal complaints were dismissed, including three in which it was alleged that criminal offences of child abuse and domestic violence had been committed against the first applicant. 10. By a judgment of 24 August 2007, the Zadar Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zadru) (a) granted the second applicant and I.M. a divorce; (b) awarded I.M. custody of the first applicant; (c) granted the second applicant access (contact) rights; and (d) ordered the second applicant to make regular maintenance payments for the first applicant. In so deciding the court relied on the opinion of forensic experts in psychiatry and psychology obtained during the proceedings and on the recommendation of the Zadar Social Welfare Centre (Centar za socijalnu skrb Zadar, “the local social welfare centre”) which participated in those proceedings as an intervener sui generis with a view to protecting the first applicant’s interests. The judgment became final on 2 January 2008. 11. Previously, by a decision of 7 November 2006 the local social welfare centre had ordered a child protection measure of supervision of the exercise of parental authority in respect of the first applicant. The measure was imposed with a view to improving communication between the second applicant and I.M. regarding the first applicant, and also with a view to preventing her from being drawn into their conflict. The measure lasted until 31 August 2008, when it was discontinued. In its decision of 2 September 2008 the local social welfare centre stated, inter alia, the following: “The measure only partly achieved its goal, in that contact with the mother has stabilised. The parents still do not communicate with each other and it is evident that the mother intends to continue with such behaviour. Furthermore, the mother’s cooperation with the supervising officer is not adequate and it is evident that the measure has become futile.” 12. The applicants submit that on 1 February 2011 the first applicant’s father I.M. hit her in the face and squeezed her throat while verbally abusing her. 13. The next day the second applicant took the first applicant to the police to report the incident. The police instructed them to see a doctor and accompanied them to the local hospital, where the first applicant was examined by an ophthalmologist, who diagnosed her with bruising of the eyeball and eye socket tissue. In particular, the ophthalmologist noted: “Clinically discrete haematoma of the left lower eyelid, in resorption. The motility of the eyes is normal, no diplopia [double vision], no clinical signs of orbit fracture. Pupils are normal, lenses [are] in place, transparent, fundus [is] normal on both sides. Dg.: Contusio oc.sin. Haematoma palp.inf.oc.sin. Treatment: cold wraps [compresses] ... Into the eye: Effludimex sol ... Dg: S05.1. Bruising of the eyeball and the eye socket tissue” 14. After examining the first applicant the ophthalmologist filled in a standard form to be submitted to the police, in which he indicated that the injury had been inflicted by a hard blow to the left eye, gave bruising of the left eyelid (haematoma palp.inf.oc.sin.) as his diagnosis, and described the injury as light. 15. The applicants then returned to the police, where they both gave statements. In her statement the first applicant mentioned other instances of physical and psychological violence by her father in the past three years. The relevant part of the police record of the interview conducted with the first applicant reads as follows: “This interview was conducted regarding the violent behaviour of the [child’s] father I.M. [The child] stated that yesterday around 4 p.m., when she was getting ready to visit her mother D.M., she wanted to take a picture frame containing a lock of her hair which her mum had had framed when she had had her first haircut. She put the picture frame underneath her jacket because she knew that her dad would not allow her to take that picture frame to her mum. Then his girlfriend I.P. saw that she had something under her jacket and asked what it was. She replied that it was nothing. Then her father came and took the picture frame from under her jacket and told her that they would talk about it when she came home in the evening. ... In the evening, around 8 p.m., mum took her back to her dad, who brought her into the room and called her a thief, hit her with his hand on the left eye, and started squeezing her neck and pushing her. During this she fell, but did not hurt herself because she fell on a bag which was on the floor. Then she vomited saliva because she felt nauseous from her father’s squeezing her neck. Then [her father’s partner] I.P. came and told her father to calm down, otherwise she [the first applicant] would vomit ... He then left and sat in the living room. She was very afraid and was crying, but nevertheless went to her room and did her homework for the next day. When she woke up in the morning she greeted her father with ‘good morning’ but he did not even look at her and just turned his head away. In the morning she felt slight pain under the left eye where her father had hit her. When she arrived at school she mentioned it to her teacher and her friends P. and A., because she felt the need to confide in someone. Today she went to her mum and told her everything that happened that evening. She was also very hurt when her dad rudely [swore at] her. He often does that, and did so [also] yesterday evening. He also called her a ‘cow’ and told her she was stupid. Because of his rude language she cried a lot thereafter. Dad tells her from time to time [to go to hell] and she does not like swearing, especially when he mentions her mum while doing so. A few months ago the father told her that through his friends he would ensure that she never heard from or saw her mum. She is therefore very afraid of her dad because he can be dangerous. She had seen her dad beating her mum and was therefore afraid that he might beat her the same way too. She states that her father is often rude to her, yelling at her, forcing her to eat food she does not like, and when she does not, grabs her chin and shoves the food into her mouth, which makes her feel sick. He often takes away her mobile phone so she cannot call her mum, and she would like to be in contact with her mum. Once he hit her on the leg with a hairbrush when she would not allow him to brush her hair. He also grabs her arm and squeezes it so hard that she has bruises afterwards. She states that she is very afraid of her dad and would like to live with her mum. Tonight she definitely does not want to go with her father but wants to stay with her mum. She is afraid that her father will beat her and yell at her. He often threatens her by waving his hand at her and saying ‘look at it, look at it’, with the intention of hitting her if she does not listen to him. The father also threatens to cut off her hair, knowing that she likes [her] long hair. He threatens her with that when she is crying for her mum, bites her fingernails or asks for a mobile phone. Dad often tells her that she must not love her [maternal] grandmother, [her mother’s partner] N. or his mum, whereas she loves them all. She further states that each time her mum or [her mother’s new partner] N. buys her something and she brings it to her father’s home he throws all those things into the rubbish. Therefore, she wears the things her mum bought her only when she goes to her mum’s place, as she is not allowed to wear them when she is at her dad’s home. Lastly, she states that she is very afraid of her dad and [particularly] ... that he might do something bad to her mum, because he constantly threatens to do so. The interview was conducted in the presence of a social worker from the Zadar Social Welfare Centre V.C.” 16. The same day the police interviewed I.M. and his partner I.P. The relevant part of the police record of the interview conducted with I.M. reads as follows: “The interview was conducted in the presence of his advocate B.Z., regarding the complaint that he had hit his minor daughter ... In that connection he stated the following: ... [He says that his former wife] does not regularly pay maintenance for [their] daughter ... amounting to 800 Croatian kunas (HRK) per month and up to the present day owes [him] HRK 15,000. [He submits that], sadly, [his former wife] manipulates their daughter ... and uses her so that she rejects everything that bears [his] surname. She even created a Facebook page for her under ... the surname of her current partner ... As regards his relationship with his daughter ..., [he] states that he, as a parent who wants to teach his child to respect work and discipline, has his duties, and that the child has to have certain discipline, [for example] she must not lie to her parents, and may not do whatever she pleases. When [his daughter] comes back from school ... he requires her to do her homework and study. As regards food, [he] states that he wishes [his daughter] to eat healthy and varied food, with fruit and vegetables, rice and meat, and that she does not only eat pizzas, sandwiches and sweets. He also does not like to throw away food and prefers that it is eaten. On 1 February 2011 around 3.50 p.m. [his daughter] was preparing to go to her mother and came into the kitchen to say goodbye. On that occasion [his partner] I.P. noticed that she had something under her jacket ... and asked what it was. [The daughter] replied that it was nothing, even though there was visibly something underneath it. He asked her to open her jacket. [Then they realised] that she had taken a glass picture frame containing the locks of her hair cut off when she was still a baby. [He] then asked her why she had not asked to take it instead of doing it the way she did, stealing from her own house. [The daughter] said that it was for her mum and that if she had asked him if she could take it he would not have allowed it. Then he told her to go to her mum and that they would talk about it later, when she came home. [The daughter] came home at 8 p.m. and they continued their conversation because he wanted to tell her that what she had done was bad and that she should have asked instead of stealing things from the house and taking them to her mother. [His daughter] replied that she wanted [the picture frame] to be at her mother’s place. [He] then reprimanded her for lying to him, saying that what she had done was sad or bad and that she always had to tell the truth because he did not tolerate lies and that all problems would be solved the way they had been solved so far. He admits that he is sometimes a strict parent but that he always behaves in a measured way and with [good] reason, and it is only ever exclusively done with a view to making her behave [better]. Today, on 2 February 2011 [his daughter] was at school in the morning and in the afternoon was having fun with [him] and his [partner] ... Nothing suggested that [she] was in any way distressed by the previous evening’s events. [He] emphasises that all this was fabricated by her mother ... who has a negative influence on [their daughter].” 17. The relevant part of the police record of the interview conducted with I.M.’s partner I.P. reads as follows: “The interview was conducted regarding a complaint that I.M. had hit his minor daughter ... In that connection she stated the following: On 1 February 2011 around 3.50 p.m. [her stepdaughter] was preparing to go to her mother and came into the kitchen to say goodbye to them. On that occasion [I.P.] noticed that she had something under her jacket ... and asked her what it was. [Her stepdaughter] replied that it was nothing, even though there was visibly something underneath her jacket. I.M. asked her to open her jacket. [Then they realised] that she had taken a glass picture frame containing locks of her hair cut off when she was a baby. [He] then asked [his daughter] why she had not asked to take it instead of doing it the way she did, stealing from her own house. [The stepdaughter] said that it was for her mum, and that if she had asked him for it he would not have allowed it. Then he told her to go to her mum and that they would talk about it later, when she came home. [The stepdaughter] came home at 8 p.m. and she and her father continued their conversation, because he wanted to tell her that what she had done was bad and that she should have asked instead of stealing things from the house and taking them to her mother. [The stepdaughter] replied that she wanted [the picture frame] to be at her mother’s place. I.M. then reprimanded her for lying to him, by saying that what she had done was sad or bad and that she always had to tell the truth because he did not tolerate lies and that all problems would be solved the way they had been solved so far. I.P. firmly states that on that occasion I.M. did not hit [his daughter], nor has she ever seen him hitting [her]. She says that I.M. has a temper and sometimes shouts when he considers that something is wrong, but that he is really not prone to physical violence or hitting the children. I.P. notes that [her stepdaughter] is generally very sensitive about her mother and immediately starts crying as regards anything related to her.” 18. After the interviews, the first applicant was returned to her father I.M., following the intervention of an employee of the local social welfare centre. 19. On 19 February 2011 the first applicant was, at the initiative of the second applicant, examined by a psychiatrist at the Psychiatric Hospital for Children and Young People in Zagreb. The relevant part of the psychiatrist’s observations reads as follows: “The child was with the mother at the police station and reported the incident [of 1 February 2011] because the mother, and also the child, claim that this was not the first time that the father has mistreated [the child], although not so much physically as psychologically ... During the interview with the girl it is evident that the child gets very upset at the mention of the father, she is afraid of him, ‘constantly thinks that he will hit her again and would like to stay with mum’. Dad is allegedly constantly threatening that he will ‘cut off her hair if she keeps crying and mentioning mum ...’ he often swears and utters vulgar expressions against the mother;all this was allegedly reported to the police ... (the interview was conducted first with the mother alone and then with the girl, also alone; [the child] talks about it all through tears and while biting her fingernails) .... The girl says that she remembers that ‘she was asked when she was little with whom she wished to live and that she said with dad because she was told that she had to say that, now she regrets it’ (she is crying all the time). The girl otherwise appears to have good intellectual capacity; she functions well outside the family, and is an A-grade pupil. There are no signs of psychotic disorder, and the girl is emphatic in contact except when she gets upset and talks rapidly when the topic of the father and his relationship with her is raised (thus there is an impression of strong fear of the father). Given the complexity of the family situation (the father has remarried and [the child] lives with him, his new wife, her daughter from her first marriage and two small half-sisters, while the mother also has a new partner with whom she has a small son) and the evident traumatisation of the child which has probably already lasted a long time, a psychiatric assessment of the child is recommended. Until then ... I recommend taking the girl to a psychologist ... Dg. Abused child, T 74.8” 20. On 5 March 2011 the second applicant took the first applicant to a psychologist in Zagreb, who, inter alia, made the following observations: “The interviews, which were conducted with the mother alone and separately with the girl, indicate that the child is afraid of her father because he psychologically and sometimes physically abuses her ... The girl ... says that she would gladly live with mum if she could, and that dad speaks badly of mum ... The results show that [the child] is emotionally attached to her mum and thinks that her dad does not love her, is afraid of him, does not trust him, and thinks that it is not fair that dad constantly yells at her even when she is not at fault. Her biggest wish is to live with her mum and her family, and she finds it difficult to return to her dad’s home. She identifies with her mother and thinks that they are very much alike. Findings: [The girl] is a traumatised child with well above-average mental abilities, strong self-control, neuroticism, depressive affect, hypersensitive, anxious with strong inferiority complex. Discrete tremor is diagnosed. I recommend psychological and, if need be, psychiatric counselling.” 21. On 30 March 2011 the Zadar Municipal State Attorney’s Office (Općinsko državno odvjetništvo u Zadru, hereafter “the State Attorney”) informed the second applicant that on the same day it had, concerning the incident of 1 February 2011, indicted I.M. before the Zadar Municipal Court for the criminal offence of bodily injury defined in Article 98 of the Criminal Code (for a more detailed description of the course of those proceedings see paragraphs 35-51 below). 22. On the same day, 30 March 2011, the second applicant instituted civil proceedings before the Zadar Municipal Court seeking reversal of the custody arrangements set forth in that court’s judgment of 24 August 2007 (see paragraph 10 above; for a more detailed description of the course of those proceedings see paragraphs 60-81 below). 23. On 22 April 2011 the second applicant took the first applicant back to the same psychologist (see paragraph 20 above). The psychiatrist made the following observations: “... The interview with [the child] was conducted without her mother’s presence. In contact silent, with depressive affect, cooperative, bites her fingernails, occasionally cries. We again had a conversation about the events of 1 February 2011 during which the child was psychologically and physically abused by her father, and which she in her mother’s presence reported to the police. [The child] says that that was not an isolated incident and that she is afraid of her father because she has continuously, from the moment she started living with him, been exposed to psychological and, from time to time, also physical abuse. She says that on multiple occasions he has threatened that he would hit her if she kept biting her fingernails and that he would take her mobile phone away. Previously she was more afraid of her father’s physical violence than now, but her mother encourages her by telling her not to be afraid and to ‘endure difficult moments’. The child states that she does not like living with her father because he threatens her and tells her that he will beat her. She says that mum loves her more, does not threaten her and is good to her. She uses suppression and ‘forgetting’ as defence mechanisms ... The child states that the father yells at her almost every day, swears, tells her that she is a ‘stupid cow, pig, goat, thief, that she constantly defies him’. She says that this offensive behaviour by her father is rarer since she reported him to the police. [The child] says that the father has threatened her that he will, through ‘his people’, take care that she does not hear from or see her mother. He threatens her that he will cut off her hair if she cries for her mother. The child alleges that her father forces her to eat so that she has to eat everything he puts on her plate and that she sometimes vomits because of that. If she refuses to eat everything the father holds her chin and ‘shoves’ the food in her mouth. If she resists, he smears the food over her face. After she reported him to the police, the father controlled himself for a couple of days, and then again started yelling but then to a lesser degree. He no longer shoves food in her mouth, but she has to eat everything he puts on her plate. Sometimes she has to eat something that she does not like, which the mother never does to her. [The child] is lonely at her father’s home, because she spends time only with her half-sisters; her friends are not allowed to visit in case [the younger half-sister] gets sick. After school the father allows her to meet with friends for half an hour only. She visited one of her friends only once and she did not dare to ask the father for more visits. She thinks that her father is stricter with her than with her older half-sister. I found out that the father speaks badly of the mother and her new partner in front of the child, that she has different clothes at her mother’s and her father’s places, and that the father threw the sneakers she got as a birthday present from her mother and her partner into the rubbish. Asked about her father’s wife, she says that she is better to her than her father: does not force her to eat, has never hit her, helps her with homework, and brushes her hair. The child shows a strong desire to live with her mother because she is emotionally closer to her, and because the mother supports her in difficult moments. She has many friends in her mother’s neighbourhood and is encouraged to spend time with them; she has fun and feels safe with her mother. Asked about [the behaviour of] her mother’s partner towards her, the child says he is good to her and tries to cheer her up, buys her presents, and is fun and pleasant to talk to. To the question whether, if she were to live with her mother, she would be allowed to see her father outside the visiting schedule ordered by the court, she says that it is certain that her mum would allow her to see her father whenever she wished to and states that ‘she would like to move to her mum’s [place] right away and forever’. Findings and recommendations: In order to prevent the development of irreversible psychopathological consequences due to continuous abuse, it is recommended that the child be immediately removed from the family where she currently lives and that custody be awarded to the mother. Psychological and if need be, psychiatric follow-up is also recommended.” 24. On 4 May 2011 the second applicant again took the first applicant to the police to report another instance of abuse by her father, who had allegedly pressured her to change her earlier statements made before the police and the experts. The relevant part of the police record of the interview conducted with the first applicant on that occasion reads as follows: “This interview was conducted regarding inappropriate behaviour of the [child’s] father I.M. [The child] stated that a couple of days ago her dad’s girlfriend I. asked her whether she had visited a certain lady in Zagreb with her mum. She had replied that she had, whereupon I. had asked her what she had talked about with that lady in Zagreb and why she had not said anything about [it] to her dad. She replied that she had forgotten to mention it. After that her father had called her on her mobile phone and asked her to come to his café ... immediately. When she had arrived there he had started yelling at her and asking why she had been saying bad things about him and why she had not told him that she had been in Zagreb ... After that he had told her that she was lying like a dog and told her to get out of his sight. ... Afterwards her dad had kept asking her whether she really wanted to live with her mum and she always replied that she did. A couple of days ago he had told her that she would not live with her mum until she was eighteen years old. [The child] also states that he said that he would report her mum for taking her to a doctor in Zagreb, and that she [the mother] would receive a criminal complaint for [having done] that. He [also] told her that he would now take her to a psychologist and to some other people where she would have to say that he had not hit her and that he was good to her. Today he had again asked her whether she really wanted to live with her mum and she had again replied to him that she did want to live with her mum. This interview was conducted in the presence of the [child’s] mother ...” 25. On 7 May 2011 the first applicant’s father took her to a psychiatrist at the Polyclinic for the Protection of Children in Zagreb, who, after studying the opinions of 19 February, 5 March and 22 April 2011 (see paragraphs 19, 20 and 23 and above) and interviewing the first applicant, in his observations noted, inter alia, the following: “It is evident that [the child] is very burdened by her parents’ conflict and the inadequacy of their mutual communication, which frequently goes through her. The girl shows affection towards, rather than fear of, her father. However, when asked what happened [on 1 February 2011] she did not want to talk about it; she was visibly emotionally burdened so I did not insist on it. She freely expresses her dissatisfaction by saying that she does not like it when her father raises his voice. Asked when that happens, she replies: ‘when I do something bad’. She is functioning well at school, says that she has many friends ... that at her mother’s place she also has friends and likes to go there, but that she feels comfortable at home with her father because she gets on well with ... the daughter of her father’s new partner ... Her mental state is dominated by the emotional burden of her parents’ conflict, high emotional tensions, the need to be close to her mother (whom she wishes to please by being with her) and, in her relationship with her father, by the conflict of loyalties she has been placed in. I am of the opinion that the girl has been drawn into a conflict of loyalties and is very burdened by her parents’ disagreements and conflict, which has resulted in high emotional pressure, anxiety and hypersensitivity. I recommend that the parents undergo family counselling and possibly afterwards also family therapy together with [their daughter].” 26. On 6 June 2011 the father took the first applicant back to the same psychiatrist who, in so far as relevant, noted: “The interview with the girl was conducted alone. [The child] states that she feels good, that she cannot wait for school to end but that she has no difficulties in school. She gets on well with both her father’s wife and her mother’s partner, and regards her half-brother and half-sisters as real siblings. She is still sad about her parents’ differences and their inability to adequately communicate [with each other] and their different parenting styles.” 27. In the course of the above-mentioned custody proceedings (see paragraph 22 above) the court ordered a combined expert opinion from experts in psychiatry and psychology. Accordingly, the applicants and the first applicant’s father were examined by forensic experts of this type at the Neuropsychiatric Hospital in Popovača. As part of the preparation of their opinion each expert conducted interviews, inter alia, with the first applicant. In particular, on 1 July and 28 September 2011 the first applicant was interviewed by each expert; on 2 September 2011 she was interviewed only by the expert in psychiatry. The interviews of 1 July 2011 were conducted without the first applicant’s parents being present, that of 2 September 2011 in the presence of her mother (the second applicant), and those of 28 September 2011 in the presence of her father. 28. The relevant part of the record of the interview of 1 July 2011 with the expert in psychiatry reads as follows: “[The child] states that she always tells the truth, literally always, and that she feels her worst when she is told that she is a liar like her mum. ... She very clearly articulates her emotional bond and closeness with her mother and her wish to live with her. ... [The child] states that she once attempted to talk with her father about living with her mother, but that the conversation ended quickly with him telling her that there would be no discussion about that and that she would stay with him until she was eighteen ... She says that her father is very strict and that he often shouts at and insults her, which makes her embarrassed and scared. The last time he attacked her, because of the picture [frame], I. [her father’s partner] stopped him, and she felt nauseous ... She says that she complained to her mother about her father, which was why she went to the police with her. She was particularly struck when the social worker came to the police [station] and talked to her mother; she heard the social worker say that unless they agreed on where [their daughter] was going to live she would be placed in a children’s home. (The girl cries for a long time afterwards). When asked how it is to live with her father, she states that she would prefer to live with her mother as she is closer to her ...” 29. The relevant part of the record of the interview of 1 July 2011 with the expert in psychology reads as follows: “Dad is so- so. When he is in a good mood, he is good. When he is not [in a good mood] he is not [good]. Once when he forced me to eat I vomited.’ ... ‘Mum is great. Good, fair and does not hit me. She does not threaten me. I do not fight with her that much. I am calmer when I am with my mum, there are not that many fights, I am more relaxed.’ ... She said that she came to the expert assessment ‘because of what dad did to me and because I want to live with my mum. I wanted ... He threatened me ...’ She cried and indistinctly through tears says that her dad smeared food over her face as a joke so she felt ugly and embarrassed. ‘He hit me once ... He said that he did not but that he only made a [threatening] gesture with his finger ...’ After she calmed down we cameng back to the traumatic incident. You started crying? ‘... He did this to me (she demonstrates with her hand round her neck). Dad hit me and I always cry so I almost vomited. [He squeezed me] this hard (she is touching her throat and chin) so that I almost vomited ...’ ‘[He called me a thief] and I said I was not and then he hit me near the eye (she shows the left temple) ... He asked me if I would do that again (she needs to be interrupted because she is speaking indistinctly while sobbing) ... [The next day] ... I told my mum what he had done to me. She told me that we could go to the police and there I told [them what happened] ... The first lady [the policewoman] there was good. The other [the social worker] pulled my hand while saying that I have to go to my dad. I did not want [to go]. She then told me that if mum gets into a fight with dad she will go to jail and I will go into a children’s home (she is sobbing). I had to go with my father. Dad said that we would not talk about that ...’ ‘Yesterday he told me that he had never hit me and that he had not done anything to me and that I should tell the truth. But he did hit me. He also told me that when he smeared the food over my face it was a joke, but I felt embarrassed. He also told me that if I mentioned it he would call [the stepmother and stepsister] to say that it was a joke, which would make me look like a liar. I felt embarrassed and ugly then ... ‘He threatened to cut off my hair if did not stop biting my nails, and to take my mobile phone away.’ ‘Once we were in the car together ... he saw mum with [her new partner] in the next lane. He said that he would put both of them to jail and kill them. He swore at them a lot. He told them many bad things ... The next day or shortly afterwards he said that through his people he would ensure that my mum and me did not see or hear from each other.’ ‘I was at a doctor’s in Zagreb some time ago. He asked me something about school but he seemed bad to me and I did not want to talk to him and I did not tell the truth. After a month we went to him again. I said I wanted to live with my mum but I did not mention that my dad had hit me. Then I was afraid of my dad, and still am because I knew he would say that he had not hit me ...’ ‘Once he hit me when I was little, I do not remember, once ...’ ‘He gets upset when I cannot eat something. When I say something [to justify myself] he asks why I defy him. He used to insult me. He called me a cow, stupid goat. He swore at me. He told me to go to hell ... he said that to me many times. He also told me to fuck off many times ... He told me that my mum was a whore (she is crying) ... ‘Mum tells me that I cannot do certain things. She does not threaten me. Sometimes she raises her voice, but she does it rarely and then I do not do it any more.” 30. The relevant part of the record of the interview conducted on 2 September 2011 with the expert in psychiatry reads as follows: “This interview was conducted with the girl and the mother together in order to observe their mutual interaction. During the interview it is noticeable that the girl is somewhat more withdrawn and serious than during the previous interview ... At some point the girl has a strong emotional reaction. The girl states (while crying) that she would like to celebrate her forthcoming birthday at her mum’s place ... given that she celebrated her last birthday with her father. The mother did not manage to calm the girl completely or ease her frustration. Instead, she herself looked anxious and frustrated, almost lost.” 31. The relevant part of the record of the interview of 28 September 2011 with the expert in psychiatry reads as follows: “This interview was conducted with the girl and the father together in order to observe their mutual interaction. During the interview it is noticeable that the girl is somewhat more withdrawn and deep in her thoughts, and seems restrained ... Asked if she would like to change something, she says that she would like to live with her mum and that she wishes to be able to extend the time she spends with one parent when she wants to stay with that parent longer. While saying that the girl reacts emotionally (she is crying). In the course of it there is no mutual contact between the girl and her father; there is no eye contact, nor is the father trying to calm her. Each [keeps] to themselves, with their eyes fixed forward.” 32. The relevant part of the record of the interview of 28 September 2011 with the expert in psychology reads as follows: “She states in her father’s presence: ‘I would like to live with my mum and decide when visits should take place, to go with my mum or my dad (she is crying). Dad adds: ‘That would be the best ...’ To the direct question whether she asked her dad about it, she replies that she did not. She adds that once she asked her dad [about it] and that he said that she could not go to her mum ...” 33. On 27 October 2014 the first applicant wrote the following in her school essay: “...they all think that they know me but they don’t know even a third of me. They judge me by my success in school, but that isn’t me. They don’t know what is happening, they see me as a happy girl, but I am the opposite of that. I have lived with my dad since I was six years old, and from day one I wanted to go to [live with] my mum ... Dad tells me he won’t let me go until I am 18 ... For some time already I have found comfort in cutting myself ... the scars are no longer visible, only when I play volleyball or some other ball game and when my arm turns red, then they are visible.” 34. Alarmed by the first applicant’s admission of self-harm in the school essay, on 22 November 2014 the second applicant took her to the same psychologist who had examined her on 5 March and 22 April 2011. In her observations the psychologist noted the following: “[The girl] came accompanied by her mother because the mother had learned of [her daughter’s] self-harm, which [the girl] had written about in a school essay ... of 27 October 2014. Interview: Depressive, anxious at the beginning ... verbally fluent. We are talking in the absence of the mother. After the her parents’ divorce, [the girl] lived with her mother. She says that was the happiest period in her life. She had lived with her father since she was six [years old] ... Relations in the family she described as conflictual, she is afraid of her father. She describes emotional blackmail by her [paternal] grandmother and threats and emotional blackmail by her father, as well as occasional abuse by the father, on which there are medical and police reports. She states that when she was six, she [because of being] manipulated and intimidated by her father, stated during the [forensic] expert examination [in the course of divorce proceedings] that she wanted to live ‘fifty-fifty’ [when asked which parent she would like to live with]. She says that her dad told her to say that but that she did not know what it meant. Since the divorce became final she has lived with her father, and has suffered because she has a close and trusting relationship with her mother and her mother’s partner. From that time on she has been expressing the wish to live with her mother, but despite all her statements [to that effect] ... the [relevant] authorities pay no heed ... Thanks to her mother’s support and understanding she is still functional [that is she manages to live normally] but is unhappy because she cannot live with her mother. She says that she is unhappy, that she does not understand why the [relevant] authorities are ignoring her, and that they do not understand how much they are abusing her by not taking appropriate measures. In her school essay (which was presented) she mentions that she cut herself on the arms. Her friend helped her to deal with the scars. When asked why she did that, she replies that it was because she felt helpless in enduring the constant pressure in her father’s family, constant conflicts, inability to manage her own time, and refusal to let her live with her mother, which would make her happy. Other behaviour mentioned in the essay points to the development of an obsessive-compulsive disorder, fear of the dark, anxious-depressive symptomatology, and emotional control disorder. These are not related to puberty but indicate post-traumatic stress symptomatology, emotional disorders caused by constant frustrations, and child abuse ... The girl has for years been burdened by expert examinations, judicial proceedings, interviews at the social welfare centre, and the hope that someone will finally listen to her plea to live with her mother, because since the age of six she has been unhappy because she has to live with her father. She enjoys her mother’s and her mother’s partner’s company, and they are supportive, but she is afraid that she will not be able to live with them for a long time yet. She is unhappy because her father constantly fights with her and does not want her to be happy (as she would be if she lived with her mother). She ‘hates the situation she is in, where she is forced to live with her dad. She wants to become an advocate and she would never allow her child to suffer as she does because she is not allowed to choose with whom ... to live.’ She is introverted, anxious ... Emotional suffering, distrust, depression, fear, guilt, reduced impulse control and problems with facing stress are diagnosed. These symptoms are related to inability to control her desires and to plan and organise. Despite previously established above-average cognitive capacities, a reduced level of openness and a need for new experiences is detected. This is probably because of continuing obstruction of her freedom of action. Despite constant obstructions she is still willing to fight for herself. She is empathic. She has very developed defence mechanisms. However, symptoms of post-traumatic stress are also detected. Conclusion: Elements of strong psychological trauma are diagnosed (post-traumatic stress), which are, according to her statements, the result of frustration caused by the abuse by her father and the authorities who are ignoring her wish to live with her mother, and [which serve] to protect her from suffering and the feeling of helplessness, which she reduces by obsessive-compulsive disorder and by harming herself.” 35. As already mentioned above (see paragraph 21), on 30 March 2011 the State Attorney indicted the first applicant’s father before the Zadar Municipal Court for having committed the criminal offence of bodily injury defined in Article 98 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 86 below) during the incident of 1 February 2011. 36. On 19 April 2011 the court issued a penal order (kazneni nalog), finding him guilty as charged and imposing a fine of HRK 1,820. 37. On 4 May 2011 the first applicant’s father challenged the penal order, arguing that the basis on which it had been issued was false. The court accordingly set aside the penal order, and the proceedings resumed under the rules of summary criminal procedure. 38. The hearing scheduled for 7 May 2013 was adjourned because neither the accused nor the summoned witnesses attended it. 39. At the hearing held on 6 June 2013 the first applicant’s father pleaded not guilty and made a statement. He also proposed that several witnesses be heard. The applicants proposed that they themselves be heard. 40. At the hearing held on 23 July 2013 the court heard the second applicant, one of the police officers who had interviewed the applicants following the incident of 1 February 2011, the first applicant’s schoolteacher, and Z.M., a psychologist who had acted as supervising officer during the implementation of the first child protection measure in respect of the supervision of the exercise of parental authority (see paragraph 11 above). 41. The police officer stated that she had not noticed any visible injuries on the first applicant during the interview with her the day after the incident of 1 February 2011. The first applicant’s schoolteacher had not seen any injuries either. He also testified that he had noticed that the first applicant had seemed sad the day after the incident and that he had talked to her about this; the first applicant had told him on that occasion that her father had not hit her. Z.M., who said that he had spoken with the first applicant some time after the incident in the capacity of a private individual and at her father’s request, testified that the first applicant had told him that her father had yelled at her and that she had been afraid that he would hit her but that he had not. He also stated that as a school psychologist he knew very well how to recognise signs of abuse in children and that the first applicant had not shown such signs. 42. On 25 July 2013 the court decided to obtain an expert opinion from a medical expert on the first applicant’s injuries. 43. The hearing scheduled for 18 September 2013 was adjourned because the summoned witnesses failed to attend it. 44. On 23 September 2013 the expert submitted his opinion, which stated that it was possible, but could not be determined with certainty, that the first applicant’s injury had been sustained during the incident of l February 2011. The relevant part of his opinion states as follows: “The following injury was established [at the time] by medical examination: small haematoma of the left lower eyelid. This injury constitutes a bodily injury. The injury was inflicted by some hard and blunt object. It was inflicted by a single blow of low intensity. The mechanism of the injury could correspond to the course of events as they were described to the doctor by the injured party during the examination (a blow with the hand to the eye). However, it is to be noted that the injury was described by the doctor who performed the examination as a haematoma in resorption, thus in [the process of] disappearing, fading. That normally happens after a certain period of time, for example, several days, after an injury. It would not be common for resorption to already be visible the day after the injury. It follows from the above that the injury could have been inflicted during the incident in question, but that a causal link cannot be established with certainty.” 45. At the hearing held on 24 October 2013 the court heard the other police officer who had interviewed the first applicant on 2 February 2011, the social worker who had been present during the interview with the police, and the doctor who had examined her on that day. 46. The police officer testified that the first applicant did indeed not want to return to her father and that the social worker from the local social welfare centre had indeed told her that they would have to temporarily place her in a children’s home if she refused. She also testified that she had not seen any signs of injury on the first applicant. The social worker testified that she had not noticed any signs of injury on the first applicant either. She also stated that while it was true that the first applicant had not wanted to return to her father, she had changed her mind after they spoke, in the course of which she had not mentioned the alternative of sending the first applicant to a children’s home. The doctor who examined the first applicant stated that resorption of a haematoma occurred more quickly in children and young people. While he excluded the possibility that the injury could have been caused by crying and rubbing the eyes he did not rule out the possibility that it had been caused by, for example, the first applicant being hit by the ball during her volleyball practice. The applicants’ representative reiterated their proposal that the first applicant be heard. 47. In order to decide on that proposal, the court decided to consult the case file concerning the above-mentioned custody proceedings (see paragraph 22 above and 60-81 below). Eventually, the court decided to hear the first applicant via video link on 1 July 2014. 48. However, that hearing was adjourned because on 30 June 2014 the first applicant’s father sought withdrawal of the trial judge; that application was dismissed by the court’s president on 3 July 2014. 49. Since none of the courts in Zadar was equipped with a video link device, the court asked the police authorities to provide it. The police informed the court that it would make available a video-link device on 16 October 2014. Accordingly, the examination of the first applicant was scheduled for that date. 50. However, on 14 October 2014 the police authorities informed the court that they would not be able to provide the device on 16 October 2014. 51. According to the Government, the proceedings are still pending, depending on the availability of the video link device. 52. Meanwhile, on 27 April 2011 the second applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the State Attorney against the first applicant’s father accusing him of the criminal offence of child abuse as defined in Article 213 paragraph 2 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 86 below). In particular, the second applicant argued that he had physically and psychologically abused the first applicant by: (a) in the period between February 2008 and April 2011, inter alia, swearing at her and calling her names, frequently forcing her to eat food she did not like, and force-feeding her when she refused, threatening to hit her, cut off her long hair and ensure that she never saw or heard from her mother, hitting her with a hairbrush on one occasion, among others, and (b) on 1 February 2011 hitting the first applicant several times in the face and squeezing her throat while verbally abusing her, as a result of which she was later diagnosed by an ophthalmologist with bruising of the eyeballs and eye-socket tissue. 53. On 20 June 2011 the State Attorney asked the of the Zadar County Court (Županijski sud u Zadru) investigating judge to: (a) question the suspect, (b) take statements from his partner and from the second applicant and her partner, and (c) order a combined expert opinion from experts in psychiatry and psychology. 54. On 29 September 2011 the State Attorney’s Office itself ordered a combined expert opinion from certain court experts in psychiatry and psychology. On 4 October 2011 it set that order aside after finding that such a combined expert opinion had already been obtained in the context of the above-mentioned custody proceedings (see paragraph 22 above and paragraphs 60-81 below). 55. On 16 January 2012 the State Attorney dismissed the second applicant’s criminal complaint, finding that there were not sufficient grounds to suspect that the first applicant’s father had committed the criminal offence the second applicant had accused him of. In so doing the State Attorney’s Office addressed only the part of her complaint concerning the alleged abuse of the first applicant in the period between February 2008 and April 2011, and not the part concerning the incident of 1 February 2011. After examining the statements made to the police by the suspect and his partner, the second applicant and her partner, psychiatrists’ opinions of 19 February and 7 May 2011, the psychologist’s opinion of 5 March 2011, and the combined expert opinion of 29 December 2011 (see paragraphs 16-17, 19-20 and 25 above and paragraphs 69-70 below), the State Attorney gave the following reasons for his decision: “Analysing the above facts, it follows that the suspect I.M.’s conduct or the conduct of [the second applicant] cannot be regarded as conscious and deliberate emotional or physical child abuse, but rather as inadequate child-rearing practice [ parenting style] and reaction caused by parental conflict over child custody, persistence of long-lasting mutual unresolved conflicts, and limited parenting capacity ... In view of the foregoing ... there is no reasonable suspicion that the suspect I.M. committed the criminal offence he is accused of ...” 56. The first and second applicants then decided to take over the prosecution from the State Attorney as injured parties in the role of (subsidiary) prosecutors. As the Criminal Procedure Act requires that an accused be questioned before being indicted, on 25 January 2012 the applicants asked an investigating judge (sudac istrage) of the Zadar County Court to question the first applicant’s father. 57. By a decision of 9 February 2012 the investigating judge dismissed the applicants’ request, holding that the facts adduced by the applicants did not constitute the criminal offence of child abuse. In so doing he relied on the combined expert opinion of the forensic experts in psychiatry and psychology of 29 December 2011 obtained in the custody proceedings (see paragraphs 69-70 below). The relevant part of that decision reads as follows: “... the conduct cannot be regarded as abuse [because the combined expert opinion] did not confirm the diagnosis of child abuse. This is very strongly indicated by the recommendation that changing the child’s residence is not advisable. Had that diagnosis been established, the recommendation concerning the child’s residence would have certainly been very different.” 58. On 21 February 2012 a three-member panel of the Zadar County Court dismissed an appeal by the applicants against the decision of the investigating judge. The relevant part of that decision reads as follows: “[The child is under supervision] by the [local] social welfare centre. It is therefore evident that if the suspect had behaved in an unseemly or inappropriate manner towards her as a parent that the centre would have reacted. There must have been reasons why the father was awarded care of the child. If there is any change in circumstances that decision could also be changed. According to the expert opinion no elements of abuse were found ...” 59. On 24 May 2012 the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) declared inadmissible a subsequent constitutional complaint by the applicants. It held that the contested decisions of the Zadar County Court were not susceptible to constitutional review. The Constitutional Court served its decision on the applicants’ representative on 3 July 2012. 60. Meanwhile, on 30 March 2011 the second applicant brought a civil action in the Zadar Municipal Court against the first applicant’s father with a view to altering the custody and contact arrangements ordered in the judgment of the same court of 24 August 2007 (see paragraph 10 above). In particular, she sought custody of the first applicant. At the same time the second applicant asked the court to issue a provisional measure whereby it would temporarily grant her custody of the first applicant pending the final outcome of the principal proceedings. 61. The court regarded the second applicant’s civil action as an application for non-contentious proceedings, as it considered that the rules on non-contentious procedure rather than those on regular civil procedure should apply in such matters. It held hearings on 29 April and 16 May 2011. 62. The local social welfare centre participated in those proceedings as an intervener sui generis with a view to protecting the first applicant’s interests. 63. At the hearing held on 29 April 2011, the second applicant’s representative insisted on the provisional measure being issued. The representative of the local social welfare centre stated that the situation in the first applicant’s family was very complex, that her parents had made numerous criminal complaints against each other, and that both parents should be assessed by forensic experts. He also stated that the centre could not at that time make a recommendation as regards the provisional measure requested, because such a recommendation could only be made after completion of the family-assessment procedure by a team of professionals employed at the centre. The second applicant’s representative replied that the centre had been aware of the incident of 1 February 2011 but had taken no action to address the situation in the first applicant’s family. She therefore insisted on pursuing the application for a provisional measure. 64. On 12 May 2011 the local social welfare centre submitted its report and recommendation to the court. In the course of their preparation of this report the centre interviewed the second applicant and the first applicant’s father on 3 and 4 May 2011, visited their homes and requested an opinion from the first applicant’s school. The relevant part of the centre’s report reads as follows. “The allegations of the [child’s parents] who accuse each other of child abuse are impossible to verify, nor can a straightforward conclusion be made only on the basis of interviews with them or on the basis of visits to their families. There is an impression that the parents, burdened by their permanently strained relationship and their own need to live with the child, consciously or subconsciously place themselves and their needs first while disregarding the welfare and the needs of the child. The child protection measure of supervision of the exercise of parental authority was previously ordered in respect of the parents during the divorce proceedings, from 7 November 2006 to 31 August 2008. Given that the already poor communication between the parents has worsened again, which brings about negative tensions which could be harmful for the child’s emotional development, and having regard to the fact that they are again facing court proceedings, the centre is in the process of imposing the same measure with a view to protecting the rights and welfare of [the child] through which [the centre] shall monitor the mother’s and the father’s relationship with the child and [in the implementation of which] they will be advised how to improve communication between them and strengthen their parenting competencies.” 65. The local social welfare centre recommended a combined expert assessment (psychiatric and psychological) of the first applicant and her parents with a view to establishing their parenting abilities and the possible consequences of their behaviour for her physical and mental development. They added that the first applicant’s family situation was complex but that at that moment there was nothing to suggest that it was life-threatening. The relevant part of the local social welfare centre’s recommendation reads as follows. “After conducting the family-assessment procedure ... it was established that the parents express opposing views as regards abuse and neglect of [their child]. [The mother] accuses the father of child abuse [in that] he is abusing the child physically and emotionally, obstructing her contact with the mother, and using inappropriate child-rearing methods. [The father] accuses [the mother] of neglecting the child’s interests by her behaviour [in that] she does not pay child maintenance, does not come to school to consult with teachers or to parents’ meetings and that the child is being manipulated by the mother ... Having regard to the medical documentation at the disposal of the centre, the parties’ submissions, visits made to [the father’s and the mother’s] homes and interviews with them, we recommend that the parents and the child undergo a combined [psychiatric and psychological] expert assessment in order to assess their fitness for further care of [their daughter] and the possible consequences of their behaviour for her psycho-physical development. It is true that the family situation is complex. However, there is no impression that at present [the child’s] life is at risk in her father’s family.” 66. By decisions of 16 May and 6 and 16 June 2011, the court ordered a combined expert opinion from forensic experts in psychiatry and psychology who were to assess (a) the parenting capacities of the second applicant and the first applicant’s father, (b) the first applicant’s condition, and (c) whether the first applicant had been exposed to abuse and, if so, by whom. 67. By a decision of 7 June 2011, the court refused to issue a provisional measure sought by the second applicant (see paragraph 60 above). In so deciding the court examined the ophthalmologist’s report of 2 February 2011, psychiatrists’ opinions of 19 February and 7 May 2011, and psychologist’s opinions of 5 March and 22 April 2011 (see paragraphs 13‑14, 19-20, 23 and 25 above). It also consulted the case file of the criminal proceedings in respect of the bodily injury, and examined the report and recommendation of the local social welfare centre of 12 May 2011 (see paragraphs 64-65 above). It found, in view of the conflicting opinions of the psychiatrists, the penal order against the first applicant’s father which never became final, and the recommendation of the local social welfare centre, that at that point the allegations that the first applicant had been abused by her father were not plausible enough to justify her immediate temporary removal from his custody. In particular, the court held as follows: “... the case was not sufficiently plausibly made that such a measure was necessary to prevent violence or the risk of irreparable harm from materialising, given that at present it remains uncertain and disputed whether [the child] was subjected to abuse by her father or was being manipulated by her mother ...” 68. On 2 March 2012 the Zadar County Court (Županijski sud u Zadru) dismissed an appeal by the second applicant and upheld the first-instance decision. 69. On 29 December 2011 the forensic experts submitted their opinion (see paragraph 66 above) to the Zadar Municipal Court. In their opinion the experts found that both the second applicant and the first applicant’s father had limited parenting abilities and suffered from personality disorders (both of them were emotionally unstable and the first applicant’s father was also narcissistic). As regards the first applicant, the experts found that she was emotionally traumatised by her parents’ separation and their mutual conflict and lack of communication. Instead of shielding her from that conflict, her parents had placed her at the centre of it and manipulated her, sometimes up to the level of emotional abuse. The experts therefore recommended that the first applicant and her parents receive appropriate therapy. They further found that the first applicant was ambivalent towards her father and idealised her mother, whom she viewed as a “friend”, and expressed the wish to live with her. The experts were of the opinion that this desire to be close to her mother could be achieved through (more) extensive contact between the first and the second applicant. If after one year of recommended therapy the first applicant still wished to live with her mother, they recommended that another combined expert opinion be obtained. 70. The experts did not reply to the court’s question whether the first applicant had been exposed to abuse and, if so, by whom (see paragraph 66 above). Their conclusions were (a) that the first applicant should nevertheless continue living with her father for the time being while maintaining extensive contact with her mother; (b) that she and both her parents should undergo treatment and counselling; (c) that the supervision of the exercise of parental authority (the child protection measure imposed by the local social welfare centre, see paragraph 82 below), should be continued; and (d) the first applicant and her parents should be reassessed after a year. In particular, the experts concluded as follows. “We do not find [any] contraindications to [the child’s living with her father. [Our] recommendation is that, for the time being it is not necessary or desirable to change the child’s place of residence, that is to say [the child] should continue living with her father.” 71. Following a request by the second applicant, by a decision of 27 July 2012, the Zadar Municipal Court appointed G.Š., a lawyer practising in Zadar, to act as a special representative for the first applicant and represent her interests in the proceedings, as required by Article 9, paragraph 1, of the European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights (see paragraph 98 below). 72. Following an appeal by the first applicant’s father, on 26 October 2012 the Zadar County Court quashed that decision and remitted the case. It held that the first-instance court had failed to establish whether the interests of the first applicant were indeed in conflict with the interests of (one of) her parents, which was a necessary precondition for the appointment of a special representative. 73. By a decision of 13 November 2012, the local social welfare centre also appointed G.Š. to act as the first applicant’s guardian ad litem pursuant to section 167 of the Family Act (see paragraph 84 below). 74. The Zadar Municipal Court held further hearings in the case on 6 September and 11 December 2012 and 8 March 2013. 75. At the last-mentioned hearing the court heard the experts who had prepared the combined expert opinion of 29 December 2011. Those experts stated, inter alia, (a) that their expert opinion had in the meantime become obsolete, because a year and two months had passed since they had prepared it; (b) that they had not replied to the court’s question whether the first applicant had been exposed to abuse because it was the task of the judicial authorities and not theirs to make that assessment; and (c) that it would be irrelevant which parent the first applicant should live with if her parents both behaved better. 76. By a decision of 30 April 2013, the Zadar Municipal Court dismissed the second applicant’s application for the custody and contact arrangements stipulated in the judgment of 24 August 2007 to be reversed. The second applicant and the first applicant’s guardian ad litem appealed. 77. On 15 November 2013 the Zadar County Court quashed the first-instance decision for incomplete facts and remitted the case to the lower court. It instructed the first-instance court to (a) inquire whether the first applicant’s father’s conviction for the criminal offence of bodily injury against her had become final; (b) assess whether the first applicant was able to understand the importance of the proceedings and, if so, allow her to express her opinion and take her testimony; (c) assess the need to appoint a special representative to the first applicant; and (d) obtain an opinion and recommendation from the local social welfare centre. 78. In the resumed proceedings, on 18 November 2013 the Zadar Municipal Court discontinued the non-contentious proceedings and decided that the proceedings would be continued under the rules of (regular) civil procedure. The court explained that the second applicant’s application for reversal of the custody and contact arrangements set forth in its judgment of 24 August 2007 (see paragraph 10 above) would, if agreed, necessarily entail a new decision on the payment of maintenance by the non-custodial parent, which was an issue that could not be decided in non-contentious but only in regular civil proceedings. That did not mean that procedural acts undertaken thus far had lost their validity or become irrelevant. 79. On 27 February 2014 the second applicant lodged a request for the protection of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time, complaining of the length of the proceedings. 80. On 9 July 2014 the President of the Zadar Municipal Court dismissed the first applicant’s request. 81. It would appear that the proceedings are currently again pending before the Zadar Municipal Court as the court of first instance. 82. Following the incident of 1 February 2011, on 22 September 2011 the local social welfare centre again (see paragraph 11 above) issued a decision ordering the child protection measure of supervision of the exercise of parental authority in respect of the first applicant. The measure was imposed for a period of one year and was, by the centre’s decision of 1 October 2012, further extended for another six months, until 31 March 2014, when it was discontinued. 83. In her final report of 30 March 2014 the supervising officer (a psychologist) summarised the results of the measure in the following terms: “The aim of the measure was to encourage appropriate parental behaviour with a view to preventing and minimising the negative effects of [their] conflictual relationship on the child’s psycho-physical development ... in that sense it was only a question of creating preconditions for adequate communication between the parents, so that currently there is no open conflict (but only because the parents avoid it). In particular, the parents are observing the visiting schedule. They have made concessions to each other from time to time. However, the parents are still in conflict, they still do not communicate, and the majority of their communication goes through the child or through text messages. It is precisely in this way that they are disregarding [her] needs and forcing [her] to deal with something with which she should not be dealing at her age (or at any other age for that matter). Both parents think they are doing what is best for their child, while forgetting that their conflict is the major obstacle to the normal psycho-physical development and functioning of their child ... [The mother] thinks that the child should be with her and that the wish of the child, who also expresses the wish to be with her, should be respected. [The father] thinks that that his role is to protect the child from the mother’s negative influence and ensure stability for her. Those views are O.K., but the only question is how much each of them negatively affects the child by fighting for their own position? For a compromise people need to be ready to partially abandon their position, but they are not ready to do so. In my view, both parents have a good relationship with the child; they [both] try to spend quality time with her. They differ to some extent in their methods and parenting styles ([the mother’s] is permissive and directed at [developing] a friendly relationship with her daughter, which may also be a strategy for ‘winning’ the child, whereas [the father] is more impulsive, with a tendency to give in, and is oriented towards the traditional role of the father, which would not be a problem if the two parents would cooperate ... Neither of them disputes that the role of the other parent is also important for the child, but they both find it important that the child lives with them, believing that in that way they would diminish the harmful influence ‘the other parent has on the child’. This means that the main problem is unresolved parental conflict, and the parents should probably work on that outside the [social welfare] centre. When they are able to talk to each other, and when they realise why and which of their actions are harmful for [the child] (and stem from their personal conflict) then they will be able to function better. In that regard I think that the supervision measure cannot provide a better solution to the problems they have.”

9. The applicant was born in 1932 and lives in Wels. 10. On 4 April 1984 the Wels Regional Court (Kreisgericht) served an arrest warrant on the applicant for suspicion of continued aggravated fraud (gewerbsmäβiger schwerer Betrug) committed since 1 January 1979. The same day the applicant was arrested. 11. On 5 April 1984 the Wels Regional Court ordered the applicant’s detention on remand. 12. On 13 and 17 April 1984 and 7 June 1984 supplementary charges led to the extension of the preliminary investigations against the applicant. 13. On 4 May 1984 the appointed accountancy expert was sworn in. 14. On 28 September 1984 the applicant was released from detention. 15. During the pre-trial phase in 1985 and 1986 more than 60 witnesses were heard, some of them under letters rogatory. On 14 February 1986 the expert submitted a comprehensive opinion, as a result of which further witnesses were heard. 16. On 22 April 1987 the preliminary investigations were closed and the file, which comprised 15 volumes consisting of more than 500 documents, was transferred to the Wels Public Prosecutor’s Office (Staatsanwaltschaft). 17. On 6 July 1987 the Public Prosecutor’s Office preferred the indictment charging the applicant and three co-accused with continued aggravated fraud, and with negligent and fraudulent bankruptcy (fahrlässige und betrügerische Krida). The bill of indictment, which arrived at the Regional Court on 29 July 1987, comprised 143 pages and consisted of 29 counts of aggravated fraud, out of which 10 concerned the applicant; 5 counts of fraudulent bankruptcy, out of which one concerned the applicant; and 4 counts of negligent bankruptcy all concerning the applicant. The major part of the charges as well as further charges relating to various other offences concerned one co-accused, Mr H., a former judge at the Wels Regional Court. The applicant’s and Mr H.’s objections against the indictment were dismissed by the Linz Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht). 18. On 30 May 1988 the Public Prosecutor’s Office requested the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof) that jurisdiction over the case be transferred to the Vienna Regional Criminal Court (Landesgericht für Strafsachen) on the ground that H. had moved to Vienna and that numerous witnesses were residing there. On 9 August 1988 the Supreme Court allowed the transfer. The file arrived at the Vienna Regional Court on 16 September 1988, which set trial hearings for the period between September and November 1989. 19. On 25 September 1989 the Vienna Public Prosecutor’s Office filed a request for transfer of jurisdiction to the Linz Regional Court since it had turned out that H. had not moved to Vienna. The Linz Regional Court was proposed by the Public Prosecutor’s Office on the ground that it was feared that all the judges of the Wels Regional Court could declare themselves biased as the case concerned their former colleague H. In his statement of 13 October 1989 the applicant indicated that he had no objections against this transfer. On 18 December 1989 the Supreme Court allowed the transfer. On 29 December 1989 the Linz Public Prosecutor’s Office requested that a trial hearing be fixed. 20. Subsequently the Linz Regional Court, sitting with two professional and two lay judges, suggested ex officio the re-transfer of the case to the Wels Regional Court, which was refused by the Linz Court of Appeal on 13 June 1990. On 22 June 1990 a first trial hearing was set for 18 December 1990. 21. Between 18 December 1990 and 5 September 1991, the Linz Regional Court, sitting with two professional and two lay judges, held 55 trial hearings involving the applicant and the co-accused, Mr H. Numerous witnesses as well as the appointed expert were heard. On the latter date the Regional Court convicted the applicant of continued aggravated fraud and negligent bankruptcy and sentenced him to 18 months’ imprisonment, 14 of which were suspended on probation. The written version of the judgment, comprising 692 pages, was served on 11 December 1991. The applicant did not appeal. 22. On 7 January 1992 the Public Prosecutor’s Office filed a plea of nullity and an appeal against the sentence with the Supreme Court. The co-accused H. also filed a plea of nullity and an appeal. 23. On 26 November 1992 the Supreme Court, upon H.’s plea of nullity, found that there were legitimate doubts as to the expert’s impartiality and partly set aside the Linz Regional Court’s judgment. Due to the principle of “beneficium cohaesionis”, pursuant to Section 290 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung), the applicant’s conviction was also set aside. The case was referred back to the Regional Court. This judgment was served on the applicant’s counsel on 3 December 1992. 24. On 14 April 1993 the Supreme Court allowed the co-accused H.’s request for transfer of jurisdiction to the Wels Regional Court because the concerns about possible bias did no longer exist. On 16 September 1993 the Regional Court remitted the file to the investigating judge for obtaining a new opinion by an expert in accountancy and for further investigations, including the seizure of further accounting documents. On 14 December 1994 the expert requested the submission of these documents, which he inspected on 6 March 1995. On 7 July 1995 the applicant’s bankruptcy and tax records were submitted to the expert. On 7 November 1996 the first part of the expert opinion arrived at the court and the remainder on 16 April 1997. 25. On 9 August 1997 the file was transferred to the trial court, which, on 1 December 1997, fixed a hearing for 20 January 1998. 26. The Wels Regional Court held hearings on 20, 27 and 29 January 1998 and on 3, 5 and 10 February 1998, following which it decided to separate from the rest of the case the proceedings against the applicant. At the close of the hearing on 10 February 1998 the Regional Court convicted the applicant of negligent bankruptcy and sentenced him to one year’s imprisonment suspended on probation. Both, the applicant and the Public Prosecutor waived their right to appeal. Thus, the judgment became final on 10 February 1998. On 8 March 2001 the written version of the judgment was served on the applicant’s counsel, contrary to Section 270 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides for the service of the written version within four weeks after the oral judgment.

5. The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Krasnoselka, Odessa region, Ukraine. 6. Between 1990 and 2001 the law enforcement authorities of the Odessa region instituted thirteen sets of criminal proceedings on different accounts of murder, rape and robberies committed by several individuals. On 8 May 2000, in particular, the Lyubashivskiy Police Department instituted criminal proceedings concerning the robbery of Mr Sh. 7. On 19 March 2001 the police arrested the applicant on suspicion of the aforementioned robbery of Mr Sh. 8. On 22 March 2001 the Lyubashivskiy District Prosecutor ordered the applicant's detention until 14 May 2001 − on the ground that he might abscond. 9. On 8 May 2001 the prosecutor, without indicating any grounds, extended the applicant's detention until 14 June 2001. 10. On 13 June 2001 the prosecutor further extended the applicant's detention until 19 June 2001. 11. On 20 June 2001 the applicant lodged a request for release with the prosecutor. He maintained that the authorised period of his pre-trial detention had expired on 19 June 2001 and that he was only given access to his case-file on 20 June 2001. 12. On 21 June 2001 the prosecutor rejected his request on the ground that the applicant had been informed that the investigation had been completed on 19 June 2001, after which he was given access to the case file. 13. On 13 July 2001 the Lyubashivskiy Local Court of Odessa region rejected the applicant's complaint about the unlawfulness of his detention after 19 June 2001−on the ground that the time given to an accused for studying his case-file was not to be taken into account. The applicant appealed to the Odessa Regional Court of Appeal but to no avail. 14. On 6 August 2001 the head of the Lyubashivskiy Police Department rejected the applicant's request for his immediate release on the ground that the time given to an accused for studying a case-file was not to be taken into account. 15. On 5 November 2001 the Ananiyvskiy Court held the committal hearing. The court joined the proceedings in the criminal case concerning the robbery of Mr Sh. with those of several other cases (given that the applicant's co-defendants were involved in other cases too (see paragraph 6 above)). The applicant and six others were committed for trial. The court rejected the applicant's complaint about the unlawfulness of his detention having found no irregularities therein. It also maintained his detention without giving any grounds or fixing any time limit. 16. On 15 November and 19 December 2001 the court held hearings in the case. 17. On 20 December 2001 the Ananiyvskiy Court rejected the applicant's request for release on the grounds that he had previous convictions, that he had committed a serious crime and that he might abscond and interfere with the course of justice. The hearing was then adjourned owing to the non-appearance of one of the lawyers. 18. On 7 January 2002 the applicant submitted a complaint about the unlawfulness of his detention with the Ananiyvskiy Court. 19. On 21 January 2002 the Ananiyvskiy Court rejected the applicant's complaint referring to its previous findings during the committal hearings (see paragraph 15 above). The hearing was then adjourned owing to the non-appearance of the aggrieved parties and one of the accused. 20. On 18 February 2002 the applicant lodged an application for release with the court. It was rejected the same day. The hearing was then adjourned owing to the non-appearance of one of the aggrieved parties. 21. On 5 March 2002 the hearing was adjourned due to the failure to bring the accused to the court. 22. On 3 and 4 April 2002 the court held hearings in the case. 23. On 16 May 2002 the court remitted the case against the applicant and several other individuals for an additional investigation. It also maintained the applicant's detention without indicating any reasons or fixing any time-limit. 24. On 8 September 2002 the applicant complained of the unlawfulness of his detention to the prosecutor. By a decision of the same day, the Ananiyvskiy Prosecutor's Office rejected this complaint. The prosecutor noted that a two-month period for the applicant's detention had expired on 20 August 2002 and by that time the additional investigation had already been completed. 25. On 20 May 2003 the criminal case against the applicant and other persons was transferred to the Lyubashivskiy Court. 26. On 26 May 2003 the Lyubashivskiy Court held a committal hearing at which, among other things, the applicant's detention was maintained without an indication of any grounds or any time-limit fixed for its duration. 27. On 18 and 23 June 2003 the applicant lodged applications for release with the court. On these dates the hearings were adjourned owing to the non-appearance of the lawyer of one of the co-defendants. 28. On 26 June 2003 the court held a hearing and remitted the case for additional investigation. It also rejected the applicant's application for release and maintained his detention − noting that it had no grounds to replace it by another preventive measure. 29. On 18 July 2003 the applicant complained to the prosecutor of the unlawfulness of his detention. 30. On 25 July 2003 the prosecutor rejected his complaint with the same reasoning as provided in the decision of 8 September 2002 (see paragraph 24 above). 31. On 19 September 2003 the Lyubashivskiy Court held a committal hearing and decided, inter alia, to maintain the applicant's detention without indicating any reasons or fixing any time-limit. 32. On 21 October 2003 the court held a hearing in the case. 33. On 28 January 2004 the hearing was adjourned owing to the non-appearance of the prosecutor. 34. On 18 February 2004 the court held a hearing. 35. On 6 July 2004 the case was transferred to the Kotovsk Local Court of Odessa region. 36. On 17, 18 and 19 August 2004 the Kotovsk Court held hearings in the case. On the last-mentioned date, the applicant lodged an application for release with the Kotovsk Court stating that he had been detained for a long period of time, that he had been arrested on insufficient grounds and that he had no intention of absconding. The court rejected the application on the ground that the applicant was suspected of committing a serious crime and that he had previous criminal convictions. 37. On 28 October 2004 the hearing was adjourned owing to the non-appearance of two of the co-defendants. 38. On 25 November, 1, 6 and 8 December 2004 the court held hearings in the case. 39. On 13 December 2004 the Kotovsk Local Court of Odessa region found the applicant and six others guilty of several different crimes; in particular, the applicant was found guilty of robbery and sentenced to five years' imprisonment. The court also rejected the applicant's application for release. 40. On 23 March 2005 the applicant made a request for his release, which was rejected at the court's hearing on 29 June 2005 because the applicant had already been sentenced. 41. On 17 January 2006 the Odessa Court of Appeal, in the applicant's presence, upheld the decision of the first-instance court. 42. On 18 March 2006 the applicant finished serving his sentence. 43. On 10 July 2006 the applicant appealed in cassation. 44. On 21 August 2006 the judge of the Supreme Court returned the applicant's cassation appeal without consideration due to non-compliance with procedural requirements and gave him a month to correct the shortcomings. 45. On 27 September 2006 the applicant lodged his new cassation appeal. 46. On 2 November 2006 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant's cassation appeal as being submitted too late.

5. At the time of the events giving rise to the application, Hyde Park (the first applicant) was registered with the Moldovan Ministry of Justice as a non-governmental organisation lobbying, inter alia, for freedom of expression and the right to peaceful assembly. In 2007 its members decided to discontinue the organisation’s registration on grounds of alleged pressure and intimidation by the State. In particular, they complained of the refusal of the Ministry of Justice to register amendments to the organisation’s articles of association, the repeated freezing of its bank account, the arbitrary arrest of its members, attempts to shut down its newspaper, among other things. Several of the organisation’s leaders requested political asylum in western countries. It was decided to continue the organisation’s activity under the same name but without registering it with the State authorities. It was also decided that the new unincorporated association would become the former organisation’s successor. After removal of the organisation from the Government’s list of non-governmental organisations on 2 June 2008, Hyde Park’s activities continued as before on the basis of its new articles of association. The association continued editing its newspaper, its Internet page and continued staging protests and demonstrations. 6. The other applicants are members and supporters of Hyde Park: Oleg Brega, Anatolie Juraveli, Roman Cotelea, Mariana Galescu, Radu Vasilascu, Vitalie Dragan, Angela Lungu and Anatol Hristea-Stan. They were born in 1973, 1988, 1987, 1982, 1983, 1967, 1988 and 1953 respectively and live in Pepeni, Durlesti and Chişinău. 7. On 30 June 2006 the first applicant applied to the Chişinău Municipal Council for authorisation to hold a peaceful demonstration at the junction of Banulescu-Bodoni and Stefan cel Mare streets, not far from the Government building, between 1 and 31 August 2006, to protest against the refusal of the Ministry of Culture to install a monument dedicated to the poet Liviu Rebreanu, donated by the Government of Romania. 8. On 18 July 2006 the Chişinău Municipal Council authorised the holding of a demonstration in writing, but only on 1 August 2006. It stated that it considered that one day of protest was sufficient in order to bring Hyde Park’s concerns to the Government’s attention. 9. On 25 July 2006 Hyde Park challenged the Municipal Council’s decision in court. 10. On 29 August 2006 the Chişinău Court of Appeal found that the Municipality’s refusal had been unlawful, quashed its decision of 18 July 2006 and ordered the Municipal Council to authorise the first applicant to hold a demonstration in front of the Government building between 29 and 31 August 2006. The court ordered that its judgment should come into force immediately. 11. On 30 August 2006 the applicants requested authorisation from the Municipality on the basis of the judgment of 29 August 2006. However, the Municipality refused to comply with the judgment on the ground that it was not final. 12. On the same day at 5 p.m. the applicants started their demonstration at the place indicated in the judgment of the Court of Appeal. At 5.15 p.m. the applicants were approached by a group of police officers who asked whether they had authorisation. The applicants showed them the judgment of the Court of Appeal. From a video which was made by the police and which is part of the domestic case file a police officer can be seen attempting to convince Mr Brega to stop the demonstration. The latter refuses and argues that Hyde Park has a court judgment authorising the demonstration. At the same time Mr Brega speaks through a megaphone declaring that Moldova is a totalitarian State where there is no freedom of speech and that it will have to answer for all its illegal behaviour before the Strasbourg Court. He accuses the police and the State authorities of illegal behaviour. Suddenly, a person wearing a Special Forces uniform attacks one of the Hyde Park members from behind and violently throws him to the ground. The other participants observe the attack and are immediately surrounded by a group of police officers and taken to a police van. Nobody appears to resist and a female voice, apparently one of the participants, calls on somebody not to resist arrest. According to the applicants, two of the participants (Mr Juraveli and Mr D.) were thrown to the ground by Special Forces officers. 13. At the police station, the police officers took the applicants’ belongings including their mobile telephones. The minutes of arrest indicated, inter alia, that the applicants’ belongings had been taken for storage. The applicants were locked in different cells in groups of three or four persons. The two female applicants were put in a separate cell. According to the applicants, they were not allowed to make any telephone calls or to consult a lawyer. The cells were small, humid and dirty. They smelled of urine and faeces. They did not have windows, the electric light was always on and there were only two wooden benches inside. The applicants were held in detention for approximately forty hours during which time they were not provided with any food. They were only provided with water and occasionally taken to a toilet. Only after the intervention of several human rights NGOs and after sixteen hours of detention, were their relatives allowed to bring them food. The Government disputed the applicants’ description of the conditions of detention. 14. On 1 September 2006 at approximately 10 a.m. the applicants were taken to court where their mobile telephones and cameras were returned to them and where they learned about the charges against them for the first time, namely holding an unauthorised demonstration (Article 174 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences (the “CAO”)), resisting arrest (Article 174 § 5 of the CAO) and insulting police officers (Article 174 § 6 of the CAO). After receiving their belongings, the applicants alleged that all the video and audio files concerning the demonstration had been deleted from their telephones by the police. 15. During the proceedings Mr Brega and Ms Galescu requested the court to order an expert evaluation of their mobile telephone records in order to determine whether the police had deleted files from them; however, their request was rejected and the proceedings were adjourned. The applicants were released at noon. 16. On 3 October 2006 the Buiucani District Court continued the administrative proceedings against the applicants and found all of them (except for the first applicant) guilty of holding and participating in an unauthorised demonstration contrary to Article 174 § 1 of the CAO. The court found that after obtaining a favourable judgment from the Court of Appeal, they should have applied to the Municipal Council for authorisation. The court fined each applicant except for Mr O. Brega (the president of Hyde Park at the time) 200 Moldovan lei (MDL). Mr O. Brega was fined MDL 500. All the applicants were acquitted of the charges concerning the insulting of police officers and resisting arrest after the court viewed a video of the arrest made by the police officers and found that there was no justification for bringing these accusations. 17. All the applicants appealed against this decision in so far as it concerned their participation in an unlawful assembly and argued, inter alia, that Hyde Park had applied to the Municipal Council for authorisation on 30 August 2006; however, their request had been dismissed on the ground that the judgment of the Court of Appeal of 29 August 2006 was not yet in force. They also repeated their request to have an expert evaluate their mobile telephone records. 18. On 26 October 2006 the Chişinău Court of Appeal upheld the applicants’ appeal while finding that the applicants’ demonstration was lawful by virtue of the judgment of the Court of Appeal of 29 August 2006 (see paragraph 10 above). The applicants were acquitted of the charges relating to their participation in an unlawful assembly. 19. In the meantime, on 18 September 2006 the applicants lodged a criminal complaint against the police officers who had arrested them. They complained that they had been abused, illegally detained, that their right to privacy of correspondence had been violated, that their right to freedom of assembly had been violated and that they had suffered inhuman and degrading treatment in addition to the refusal to execute the court decisions. 20. Between September 2006 and September 2007 the criminal proceedings initiated at the applicants’ request were dismissed and re-opened four times. On each occasion, the Prosecutor’s Office dismissed the complaint and later the courts, or the hierarchically superior prosecutor, quashed the prosecutor’s decision and ordered a re-examination. The reasons for dismissal were the testimonies of police officers and police witnesses who confirmed the allegations that the applicants had insulted the police and resisted arrest. As to the allegation concerning the tampering with the applicants’ mobile telephones and deleting files from them, the Prosecutor’s Office accepted the testimony of a police officer who confirmed that two mobile telephones had been seized during the applicants’ detention but denied the allegations that somebody had tampered with them. As to the video of the event filmed by the police representatives (see paragraph 12 above), the Prosecutor’s Office argued that it had been lost and that, therefore, it could not be examined. On 27 September 2007 the Rascani District Court quashed the last decision dismissing the applicants’ complaints and ordered a re-examination. After that date, the applicants did not hear any more from the Prosecutor’s Office about the status of their complaint. On 10 January 2008 the applicants wrote to the Prosecutor General’s Office to enquire as to the stage reached in their proceedings, but they did not receive a reply. A copy of that letter with a stamp of the Prosecutor General’s Office on it was annexed to the applicants’ observations. According to them, it was only from the Government’s observations that they learned that their complaint had been dismissed again on 12 November 2007. The Government disputed the applicants’ submissions concerning the letter of 10 January 2008 which the applicants stated they had sent to the Prosecutor General’s Office. They did not dispute, however, the authenticity of the Prosecutor General’s stamp on the copy of that letter. 21. On 1 November 2006 the Supreme Court of Justice examined the appeal on points of law lodged by the Municipal Council against the judgment of the Court of Appeal of 29 August 2006. It quashed that judgment and dismissed the applicants’ action, finding that the Municipal Council’s decision of 18 July 2006 was lawful. The Supreme Court also ruled that the ruling of the Court of Appeal concerning the immediate enforcement of its judgment had been unlawful.

4. The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Ankara. 5. On 17 May 2000 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation. The same day, the applicant was examined by a doctor, who reported that there was no sign of ill-treatment on his body. On 18 May 2000 he was questioned in police custody in the absence of a lawyer. In his police statement, the applicant admitted that he had had military training in Iran but rejected the allegation that he was a member of an illegal organisation. 6. On 21 May 2000 the applicant was again medically examined by a doctor, who stated that there were no traces of ill-treatment on his body. Subsequently, on the same day, the applicant was brought before the prosecutor and the investigating judge at the Ankara State Security Court, still in the absence of a lawyer. Before the public prosecutor, the applicant declared that he had been subjected to “psychological torture” in police custody and refuted his police statement. He acknowledged that he had been to Iran but denied having had military training there. The applicant also gave a statement to the investigating judge. He retracted his police statement but did not mention any allegations of ill-treatment or duress. After the questioning was over, the investigating judge remanded the applicant in custody. 7. On 11 July 2000 the prosecutor at the Ankara State Security Court filed an indictment with that court, charging the applicant with the offence of membership of an illegal organisation, namely the Tevhid-Selam and its sub-group the Kudüs Savaşçıları. A number of other persons were also included in the same indictment and accused of various offences, such as the assassination of a number of prominent journalists and academics in Turkey. According to the prosecutor, the organisation's aim was to establish a religious regime in Turkey similar to that in Iran. 8. On 7 January 2002 the Ankara State Security Court rendered its 152 page-long judgment. The trial court found it established, on the basis of the applicant's police custody statement of 18 May 2000, that he was a member of the illegal organisation. It sentenced him to twelve years and six months' imprisonment under Article 168 of the Criminal Code. In its decision the trial court also examined the applicant's allegation of psychological pressure in police custody. Having regard to the two medical reports drawn up at the time of the applicant's arrest and his release from police custody, which stated that there were no marks of injury on the applicant's body, the court concluded that the applicant had retracted his police custody statement in order to avoid conviction. 9. On 12 November 2002 the Court of Cassation upheld the applicant's conviction. The applicant was released from prison on 10 June 2006.

10. The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Plovdiv. 11. On 11 March 1996 the Plovdiv District Prosecutor’s Office opened an investigation against Mr Hamanov, a bank branch manager, and several others, in connection with a number of financial transactions effected by them (see Yankov v. Bulgaria, no. 39084/97, § 11, 11 December 2003 and Hamanov v. Bulgaria, no. 44062/98, § 11, 8 April 2004). 12. In the course of the investigation Mr Hamanov was accused, inter alia, of having guaranteed on behalf of the bank – without having the right to do so – nine promissory notes issued by companies related to the applicant. 13. On an unspecified date in November 1996, in the course of questioning, Mr Hamanov stated that the applicant had prompted him to guarantee the promissory notes. On the basis of this statement the investigator decided to accuse the applicant of having incited and abetted Mr Hamanov to commit the alleged crime. 14. On 14 November 1996 the applicant was charged under Article 282 §§ 2 and 3 in conjunction with Article 20 §§ 3 and 4 of the Criminal Code (“CC”) with having incited and abetted Mr Hamanov to breach his professional duties with a view to an unlawful gain for himself and others. 15. Eight persons were charged in all. The charges were modified several times in the course of the investigation. 16. During the investigation, which lasted about fourteen months, the investigator heard forty-seven witnesses, examined numerous financial and banking documents, commissioned expert reports, and undertook searches. 17. On 5 May 1997 the investigation was completed and the case file was sent to the prosecutor. 18. On 1 July 1997 the prosecutor submitted to the Plovdiv District Court a thirty-two-page indictment accompanied by twenty binders of documentary evidence. 19. The first hearing took place from 17 to 30 September 1997. The Plovdiv District Court heard the accused as well as several witnesses and experts. Some witnesses did not appear. Both the prosecution and the defence requested an adjournment. 20. The trial resumed on 25 November 1997. The District Court heard several witnesses. Ten other witnesses were absent as they had not been subpoenaed properly and others, albeit subpoenaed, did not show up. The trial was adjourned until 7 January 1998. 21. The trial resumed on 7 and 8 January 1998. The court adjourned it to 9 April, as some witnesses did not appear, and ordered an additional financial report. 22. The hearing listed for 9 April 1998 was adjourned to 6 July and then again to 19 October by reason of the ill health of one of the applicant’s co‑accused. 23. On 19 October 1998 the District Court held its last hearing. It heard the closing argument of the parties. 24. On 30 October 1998 the District Court found the applicant guilty of having incited and abetted Mr Hamanov to guarantee on behalf of the bank, without having the right to do so, nine promissory notes. It sentenced him to six years’ imprisonment and banned him from engaging in financial dealings for a period of nine years. 25. The reasoning of the District Court’s judgment was deposited in the registry of that court on an unspecified date in late January 1999. 26. Several times during the proceedings the case file was unavailable as it would be transmitted to the competent court for the examination of appeals submitted by the applicant’s co‑accused against their detention. In practice, upon such an appeal, the entire case file would be transmitted together with the appeal. 27. Throughout the proceedings the District Court and later the Regional Court sought police assistance to establish the addresses of witnesses and ensure their attendance. 28. On 26 November 1998 the applicant appealed against his conviction and sentence. 29. More than a year later, on 6 December 1999, the Plovdiv Regional Court held its first hearing, which was adjourned to 13 March 2000 because of health problems of the applicant. 30. On 13 and 14 March 2000 the Regional Court resumed its hearing in the case. 31. On 5 June 2000 the Regional Court quashed the lower court’s judgment and remitted the case to the preliminary investigation stage. 32. The Regional Prosecutor’s Office, considering that the Regional Court’s judgment was unclear or erroneous, sought to appeal against it or request its interpretation. There ensued a dispute about the time-limit for such an appeal, which was brought by the prosecution authorities to the Supreme Court of Cassation. On 27 November 2000 that court dismissed the prosecution’s request. 33. Nothing was done in the case thereafter, at least until April 2003, date of the latest information from the parties. At that time the investigation in the applicant’s case was pending before the prosecution authorities. 34. On 14 November 1996 the applicant was arrested and brought before an investigator who decided to detain him. That decision was confirmed the same day by the District Prosecutor’s Office. 35. On an unspecified date towards the end of November or the beginning of December 1996 the applicant applied for release to the District Prosecutor’s Office. He asserted that there was no evidence of him having committed a crime. Also, he had a permanent address and could not obstruct the investigation. 36. On 3 December 1996 the District Prosecutor’s Office dismissed the application on the ground that the applicant had been charged with a serious intentional crime, in which case the law provided for pre‑trial detention. The testimony of two of the witnesses and certain documents indicated that the applicant had engaged in unlawful conduct. The District Prosecutor’s Office also found a likelihood that the applicant would try to hide important documents relating to the facts of the crime of which he was accused. 37. On 4 December 1996 the applicant appealed to the Regional Prosecutor’s Office. He argued that there was no danger of him absconding, as he had a permanent address, nor of him impeding the investigation. 38. The appeal was dismissed on 18 December 1996. The Regional Prosecutor’s Office held that since the applicant had been charged with a serious intentional crime, he had to be detained by virtue of paragraph 1 of Article 152 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“CCP”). He could only be released if the exception of paragraph 2 of that Article was applicable. However, this was not the case, because there was a risk that if released he might impede the investigation by suborning witnesses and hiding documents, regard being had to the complexity of the case, the high number of witnesses to be questioned and the need to organise confrontations between the applicant and certain witnesses. 39. On 20 December 1996 the applicant appealed to the Chief Prosecutor’s Office. He argued that there was no evidence of him having committed a crime and that the Regional Prosecutor’s Office had not relied on any specific facts justifying the conclusion that the applicant might abscond or tamper with evidence. 40. On 17 January 1997 the Chief Prosecutor’s Office dismissed the appeal. It subscribed to the reasoning of the lower prosecutor’s offices, but also relied on the fact that there was another investigation pending against the applicant which, pursuant to Article 152 § 3 of the CCP, barred any possibility for release. That investigation had been opened during the 1980s and in 1997 was still pending without having proceeded to trial. 41. On 18 February 1997 the applicant applied for release, arguing, inter alia, that his state of health was such that detention could be dangerous for him. 42. On 26 February 1997 the applicant was sent to a hospital for a medical examination. 43. On 4 March 1997 the Regional Prosecutor’s Office dismissed the applicant’s request for release on the ground of ill health but ordered his transfer to hospital. It referred to its earlier findings about the reasons for the applicant’s continuing in detention. 44. On 14 March 1997 the applicant applied to the Chief Prosecutor’s Office for release on health grounds. The application was referred to the Regional Prosecutor’s Office. 45. After examining the application, on 25 March 1997 the Regional Prosecutor’s Office ordered the applicant’s release on bail. It relied on the conclusions of the medical experts, noting that the applicant would not be able to maintain the required dietary regime and undergo the necessary medical supervision if he were returned from hospital to the detention facility. In addition, the supervising prosecutor and the investigator had come to the opinion that all documentary evidence had been gathered and the facts of the case had been clarified. Therefore, there was no risk of the applicant tampering with evidence. The investigation was continuing only in view of the fact that there were difficulties in summoning certain witnesses. Finally, there was no indication that the applicant would abscond. As to the fact that another investigation was pending against him, the Prosecutor’s Office found that this should not be used to the applicant’s detriment as the investigation in question had already been pending for more than ten years. 46. On 28 March 1997 the applicant posted bail and was released.

6. The first applicant, RJ Import Roger Jaeger A.G., is a commercial company located in Herrliberg, Switzerland. The second applicant, RJ Import Bucureşti S.A., located in Bucharest, Romania, is a subsidiary company of the first applicant who ownes 51 % of its shares. 7. In 1997 the second applicant concluded with the State-owned company S.C. Craser S.A. (“Craser”) a purchasing contract for industrial equipment. The second applicant paid the price of the contract partly in money partly by buying a debt of the seller. By subsequent commercial transactions the creditor of the debt owed by the second applicant became the first applicant. 8. By a final judgment of 16 April 2002 the Bucharest Court of Appeal annulled the 1997 contract finding that it had been concluded in breach of the law. At an unspecified date the second applicant had returned the equipment to the seller but the latter refused to return the price received. 9. On 22 April 2004 the second applicant requested before the courts the reimbursement of the price paid according to the purchasing contract as well as the value of the investments subsequently incurred with respect to the equipment in question. On 17 November 2004 the Bucharest County Court obliged Craser to pay the second applicant 1,350,000 Swiss Francs as price of the contract, 35,994,375,000 Romanian Lei (ROL) as investments incurred and ROL 5,171,000 as court fees. The judgment became final on 2 December 2004 as it was not appealed against by the parties. 10. On 9 July 2004 the first and second applicants requested before the courts the opening of bankruptcy proceedings against Craser. By a judgment of the Dolj County Court of 3 November 2004 the bankruptcy proceedings were commenced. On 27 April 2005 the Craiova Court of Appeal decided by a final judgment to include both applicants on the list of creditors: the first applicant with the debt it had bought and the second applicant with the amounts awarded by the judgment of 17 November 2004. According to the information submitted by the parties these proceedings are still pending before the domestic courts. 11. Despite the applicants’ efforts, the judgment of 17 November 2004 remained non-enforced to date.

6. The applicant was born in 1922 and lives in Granemore, County Armagh. 7. At about 10.40 p.m., shortly after closing time, on 6 June 1976, a police officer in the Royal Ulster Constabulary (“RUC”) drove a car, stolen by RUC Reserve Constable Laurence McClure, up to the Rock Bar, a public house. The applicant was leaving the bar at that time. He was shot twice in the stomach by McClure, who then placed a 10lb gelignite bomb against the door of the pub. The detonator exploded but the bomb failed to explode. At the later trial a reserve police constable, William McCaughey, stated that shots were fired by his companions at the injured man on the ground and then he fired a number of shots through the window of the bar. Bullet strike marks were later found around the darts board inside the bar, where there had been seventeen people. No-one else was physically injured. 8. The applicant was taken to hospital in an ambulance and police attended the scene, sealing off the area while an army technical officer examined the explosive device and ensured that it was in a safe condition. A Scene of Crime Officer examined the scene, took possession of material associated with the bomb and a gun recovered from a burnt out car found approximately one mile away, which police linked to the attack. Photographs of the bar were taken and maps prepared. 9. The investigation did not close and became active again in 1978, when a Catholic priest Father Hugh Murphy was abducted by loyalist paramilitaries intending to use him as a hostage vis-à-vis the IRA. In the course of the investigation, the police arrested McCaughey, who, in the course of questioning, revealed his part in the abduction of the priest and in a variety of other loyalist paramilitary incidents. McCaughey made allegations incriminating himself and police officer McClure in respect of the Rock Bar attack. McClure was arrested and admitted involvement. Two further serving police officers, Ian Mitchell and David Wilson, also admitted involvement in, or prior knowledge of, the attack on the bar. McCaughey admitted firing the shot which wounded the applicant. 10. The applicant was aware that charges were pending against four police officers. He had been contacted by the police in April 1980 and summoned to appear in Belfast Crown Court on 23 April 1980. He was subsequently advised of various date changes and then that the case was postponed and that he would be contacted. In fact the hearing took place on 30 June 1980. The applicant had not been informed and learned about the outcome on the radio. 11. Three men, McCaughey, McClure and Mitchell, faced charges of attempted murder of the applicant, wounding the applicant with intent contrary to section 18 of the Offences against the Persons Act 1961, attempted murder of the persons inside the bar, causing an explosion contrary to section 2 of the Explosives Substances Act 1883, possession of explosive substances with intent to endanger life or cause serious injury and possession of firearms and ammunition with intent. The three officers pleaded not guilty to the charges of attempted murder; McClure and Mitchell pleaded not guilty to wounding the applicant. The Director of Public Prosecutions (“the DPP”) entered a nolle prosequi in respect of those charges which accordingly were not proceeded with. No reasons were given for this decision. The only person facing a charge concerning the applicant was McCaughey, who received a term of seven years for wounding him. McClure was sentenced to two years' imprisonment for causing an explosion, possession of an explosive substance with intent and possession of firearms and ammunition with intent, all sentences suspended for three years. Another RUC officer, David Wilson, was charged with withholding information contrary to section 5(1) of the Criminal Law (Northern Ireland) Act 1967, based on the fact that he had been aware of the attack beforehand and had not taken any steps to prevent it. 12. With the exception of McCaughey, the other officers received suspended prison terms. In sentencing, Lord Lowry stated inter alia: “... It does not seem realistic to believe that after all that they have endured – some with their careers in ruins, others with their careers in jeopardy- that they require much by way of deterrent or by way of reform, and no proper sentence which I pass will make an impression on terrorists while other members of the police force are no doubt already embarrassed, sufficiently embarrassed and shocked by what has happened in these cases and been seen to happen to their colleagues. ... I must remember that whatever sentence is just it would follow that it would be imposed on a different and lower scale from that appropriate to terrorists, no matter whichever side, whose aim is to achieve their political ends by violence and to attack the very fabric of society.” 13. It had been advanced by the defence and accepted by the trial judge that McCaughey had only aimed to shoot the applicant in the legs and had done so. 14. McClure had also been facing charges in relation to his involvement in the attack on Donnelly's Bar, Silverbridge, in 1975 in which three people had been killed (see application no. 32457/04, Brecknell v. the United Kingdom). These charges were later dropped. 15. In the course of the investigation in 1978, McCaughey made revelations giving rise to investigations in eleven specific cases, some of which were linked in terms of the identities of those involved, the modus operandi or by virtue of the ballistic examinations of weapons used. Nine suspects were arrested in total, including five police officers, and all were eventually charged with offences. 16. One of those implicated was a police officer John Weir who was named as having been involved in the murder of a shopkeeper called Strathearn in Ahoghill in April 1977: he was convicted for that murder in June 1980 and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Government stated that both McCaughey and Weir refused to name the two loyalist paramilitaries also involved with them in the murder unless they received immunity from prosecution. The police and prosecuting authority took the decision prior to the trial not to enter into any process of bargaining with Weir and McCaughey. While both were approached by the police after their convictions to see if at that stage they would give evidence against the loyalist paramilitaries, each again refused to do so unless there was something in it for themselves. The Government stated that during the period in which Weir was detained he was interviewed on a large number of occasions. At no time did he implicate himself or others in any offence other than the Strathearn murder. 17. On 1 February 1993 John Weir was released from prison on licence. In January 1999, he made a statement to a journalist alleging RUC and Ulster Defence Regiment ("UDR") collusion with loyalist paramilitaries from the Portadown area in the mid-1970s. This statement was published in the Sunday Times newspaper in March 1999. It was obtained by the Patrick Finucane Centre, a human rights non-governmental organisation in Derry (“the Centre”). 18. John Weir's statement made detailed allegations about security force collusion with loyalist paramilitaries in a series of incidents. He alleged inter alia that RUC Reserve Constable Laurence McClure had told him that the murder of the Reavey family members was carried out by Robert McConnell, a member of the UDR, Laurence McClure, Johnny Mitchell, another Reserve Constable in the RUC and McClure's brother who was not a member of the security forces. The statement also made links between this incident and other attacks allegedly carried out by members of the security forces, both RUC and UDR, and loyalist paramilitaries. This group used the farmhouse in Glennane owned by James Mitchell, a RUC reservist, as a base from which to carry out attacks on Catholics and nationalists. Other attacks allegedly included the murder of Colm McCartney and Sean Farmer at a bogus vehicle checkpoint in August 1975 (see application no. 34575/04); the attack on Donnelly's Bar in which Trevor Brecknell, Michael Donnelly and Patrick Donnelly were killed (see application no. 32457/04); and the murder of Joseph, Barry and Declan O'Dowd and wounding of Barney O'Dowd (see application no. 34622/04). Weir also linked these attacks to the Dublin and Monaghan bombings in which 33 people were killed in the Republic of Ireland. 19. On or about 10 June 1999, RTE, an Irish television channel, broadcast a television programme that contained allegations of security force involvement in a number of deaths, including that of Trevor Brecknell. Weir made allegations on that programme that members of the RUC and UDR were directly involved in the attack on Donnelly's Bar. A BBC Spotlight programme produced a similar documentary dealing with these allegations. 20. These allegations attracted considerable attention on both sides of the Irish border and became the subject of police investigation in both jurisdictions. The Government stated that the police investigation in Northern Ireland was focussed on determining whether Weir's allegations should be assessed as sufficiently credible to require a full investigation. They obtained from the journalist an edited transcript of the interview with Weir. While his whereabouts were unknown to the RUC, Weir met with senior Irish police officers at the Irish Embassy on 15 April 1999. A copy of his statement was provided by the Garda to the RUC, along with a further statement made by Weir to another journalist dated 3 February 1999. The police analysed the available materials and sought to identify the personalities to be interviewed. It became apparent that some had died and that others, living abroad, could not be traced. A series of seven interviews were conducted, under cautions, between July and December 2001, of those individuals central to Weir's account who could be traced. No charges were preferred. The interviews followed the format of Weir's allegations being put to the interviewee for his or her response. The predominant response was denial of any involvement and claims that Weir had been untruthful. No admissions were made by any interviewee. Interviews were also conducted with less central personalities and with police officers involved in interviewing Weir in 1978. The latter stated that Weir had not mentioned the matters now being alleged. 21. Meetings were held regularly with RUC counterparts in the Republic of Ireland. The RUC co-operated also with the judicial inquiry established in the Republic of Ireland into the Dublin and Monaghan bombings (see the description of the inquiry in the case of Brecknell referred to above). Amongst matters about which the RUC team provided information to the inquiry was ballistics information which linked some of the weapons used to more than one incident. In February 2000 a substantial report was compiled by the RUC for the Garda dealing with Weir's allegations. It profiled Weir and dealt inter alia with a description of the 1978 investigation into McCaughey, Weir and others. It concluded that the investigation would continue but that his credibility was in doubt. According to the Government, despite inquiries being conducted, Weir's whereabouts could not be traced. This report was not disclosed as the investigation was continuing. An internal RUC report dated 27 February 2001 concluded that it would be necessary to interview Weir before any view could be finalised in respect of the credibility of his allegations: such interview was not possible as his whereabouts were not known. The report noted the absence of any previous mention of the allegations before 1999 and that much of what he said was hearsay and speculation. Enquiries made of the British Embassy in Nigeria (where he had a known address) and the criminal intelligence service and others failed to locate Weir. Contact was made with the Garda and the secretariat of the Inquiry into the Dublin and Monaghan bombings without positive result. 22. The Serious Crime Review Team (“SCRT”) was established in March 2004, with responsibilities including the review of all historical murders by way of case assessment for evidential and investigative opportunities. 23. Unlike the other case (Brecknell, Reavey, O'Dowd and McCartney, cited above), the Rock Bar case was not referred to the SCRT. This was because it was not a murder case and there had been four convictions. Nonetheless because of connections with other cases, the case was also referred to the Historical Enquiry Team (HET). The HET director of Investigations, Detective Chief Superintendent James of the London Metropolitan Police Force, took over personal supervision of the investigation which has progressed through the first three of five stages of the HET process (collection of all relevant material; assessment of the investigations to date; review of evidence, with intelligence and open and non-police sources, together with a meeting with the families of the victims of the attack). As a number of investigative opportunities were identified and to be followed up, the case was to continue to be processed by HET, which had been put in touch with Weir by the Centre. The Government submitted that if any evidence of police involvement in the murders was found, the Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland would then become involved. The Government have provided recent information that Weir finally agreed to meet with the HET in Dublin; he refused, however, to make a written statement or to give evidence in court. There has been contact between the police and the applicant, as well as with the Centre acting on behalf of a number of concerned families. In particular, there were meetings in September 2002 with Detective Chief Inspector Paterson, and a meeting with the Chief Constable in June and August 2004; in May 2006, Detective Chief Superintendent James met the applicant together with the person who owned the bar at the time; and there has also been extensive correspondence with the families or their representatives.

4. The applicant, Mr Oleg Choumakov, is a Russian national who was born in 1971. He is currently serving a prison sentence in the Gdańsk Detention Centre. 5. On 29 May 2003 the applicant was arrested by the police on suspicion of robbery and the murder of a taxi driver. 6. On 30 May 2003 the Braniewo District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) decided to remand the applicant in custody, relying on a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences in question and the high probability that a heavy sentence would be imposed on him. The court further considered that there was a risk that the applicant might interfere with the course of the proceedings and bring pressure to bear on witnesses. 7. The applicant's pre-trial detention was subsequently extended on several occasions. 8. On 30 June 2005 the Elbląg Regional Court convicted the applicant and his co‑accused and sentenced them to twenty-five years' imprisonment. The applicant lodged an appeal against the judgment. 9. On 21 December 2005 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal quashed the impugned judgment and remitted the case for fresh consideration. On the same day, the appeal court extended the applicant's pre‑trial detention. 10. The applicant's pre-trial detention was further extended. 11. On 30 April 2007 the Elbląg Regional Court again convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to twenty-five years' imprisonment. The applicant lodged an appeal. 12. On 28 December 2007 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and quashed the impugned judgment. It remitted the case to the Elbląg Regional Court. The court further extended the applicant's detention until 28 June 2008. In addition to the grounds invoked previously, the court found that the applicant and the second co-accused had made an attempt to contact each other illegally and to exchange information about the trial, which justified the finding that the applicant might interfere with the proper course of the proceedings. Moreover, the court found that the co‑accused had contacted the witnesses through other persons. 13. On 30 April 2008 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal dismissed a request by the applicant for release. 14. On 17 June 2008 the Elbląg Regional Court extended the applicant's detention until 30 December 2008, relying on the high probability that the applicant had committed the offence in question. It also noted that he had already been convicted twice by the first-instance court. The court also considered that the likelihood of a severe sentence being imposed on the applicant created a presumption that he would obstruct the proceedings, and that the fact that the applicant had contacted third persons created a presumption that he might tamper with evidence. 15. The applicant appealed against that decision. 16. On 2 July 2008 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal upheld the challenged decision, repeating the grounds invoked by the Regional Court. 17. On 1 December 2008 the applicant's lawyer requested the court to release the applicant from detention and apply a less severe measure, namely police supervision combined with the seizure of the applicant's passport. He relied, inter alia, on the fact that on 29 July 2008 the European Court of Human Rights had given judgment and found that the applicant's detention had exceeded a reasonable time. 18. On 5 December 2008 the Elbląg Regional Court refused the applicant's lawyer's request. The court considered that the grounds for the applicant's detention remained valid and, therefore, the continued detention of the applicant did not violate the procedural guarantees safeguarded by Articles 5 and 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. As regards the Court's judgment, the Regional Court expressed the opinion that neither the Convention nor the Code of Criminal Procedure placed an obligation on the court to release an applicant following a judgment of the European Court of Human Rights. The Regional Court noted that the applicant had been granted 1,500 euros (EUR), which constituted sufficient just‑satisfaction for the violation found. 19. On 22 December 2008 the Elbląg Regional Court again extended the applicant's detention until 30 June 2009. The court copied the reasoning from its own decision of 5 December 2008. 20. On 5 January 2009 the applicant's lawyer appealed. 21. On 21 January 2009 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal upheld the challenged decision. It again repeated the grounds previously invoked by the Regional Court. As regards the judgment given by the Court, it considered that it was of a “declaratory nature” and “did not constitute a source of law but rather an application of the law”. 22. On an unspecified date the applicant's lawyer requested again that a less severe preventive measure be applied to the applicant, namely police supervision combined with the seizure of the applicant's passport. 23. On 13 May 2009 the Elbląg Regional Court refused to grant that request, finding that two expert reports had still to be prepared and the case was a particularly difficult one. It also noted that the applicant, as a foreigner without a fixed address in Poland, might abscond if released. Further, it repeated the same grounds as previously. 24. On 20 May 2009 the applicant's lawyer appealed. He argued, inter alia, that the applicant's professional and family life prior to his arrest had been based in Elblag and that the sole fact that the applicant was a Russian citizen could not be regarded as creating a danger that he might abscond. 25. On 2 June 2009 the Elbląg Regional Court upheld the challenged decision. It relied on the same grounds as invoked previously. 26. On 16 June 2009 the Elbląg Regional Court again extended the applicant's detention for a further six months, that is, until 30 December 2009. It again relied on the same grounds as previously and added that the expert witnesses had to be heard again because “the accused persons [had] again changed their version of events”. 27. On 22 June 2009 the applicant and his lawyer lodged appeals against the further extension of the detention. 28. On 1 July 2009 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal found the appeals partly justified and decided that the applicant's detention should be extended only until 30 October 2009. It noted that the proceedings had “without doubt been considerably lengthy” and considered that the Regional Court should terminate them before the expiry of the detention time-limit. 29. On 13 November 2009 the Elbląg Regional Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to twenty-five years' imprisonment. 30. On 11 March 2010 the applicant's lawyer lodged an appeal. 31. On 27 October 2010 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal upheld the challenged judgment. 32. On 1 September 2008 the applicant lodged a complaint under section 5 of the Law of 17 June 2004 on complaints about a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time (Ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki) (“the 2004 Act”). He sought a declaration that the criminal proceedings against him were lengthy, and compensation in the amount of 10,000 Polish zlotys (PLN). 33. On 28 October 2008 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's complaint (II S 30/08). It considered that there had been no unjustified delays in the proceedings and pointed to the complicated nature of the case.

5. The applicants were born in 1933 and 1949 respectively. The first applicant lives in the village of Shalushka in the Republic of Kabardino‑Balkariya, whilst the second applicant is resident in the village of Pervomayskoe, Stavropol Region. 6. Early in the morning of 13 October 2005 law-enforcement agencies in the town of Nalchik, the Republic of Kabardino-Balkariya, were attacked by a number of heavily armed people, who appear to have been local insurgents. The agencies included the Republican Department of the Ministry of the Interior, Centre T of the Main Department of the Ministry of the Interior, various district departments of the Ministry of the Interior, the Special Purpose Police Unit of the Republican Ministry of the Interior, various checkpoints of the Traffic Police, the Republican Department of the Federal Security Service, the Republican Department of the Federal Service for the Execution of Penalties and the office of the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service. Also, a few privately owned weapon shops were attacked. According to the Government, there were over two hundred and fifty participants in the attack. 7. The ensuing fight between the governmental forces and the insurgents lasted until at least 14 October 2005. 8. The applicants submitted that they were relatives of the persons who participated in the attack and died on 13 and 14 October 2005 or shortly afterwards. 9. The first applicant refers to the death of his son Zamir Mikhaylovich Zalov, born on 13 November 1978, whilst the second applicant refers to the death of her son Murat Abubovich Khakulov, born on 26 March 1978. 10. The Government stated that the authorities had killed a total of ninety-five insurgents in the anti-terrorist operations mounted in response to the attack of 13 October 2005. In essence, they acknowledged that the deceased referred to by the applicants were among those killed by the authorities. 11. It appears that on 13 October 2005 the authorities instituted criminal proceedings no. 25/78-05 in connection with the attack in Nalchik. 12. In the course of the investigation it was established that between 1999 and February 2005 a group of individuals, including A. Maskhadov, Sh. Basayev, I. Gorchkhanov, A. Astemirov, Abu-Valid Khattab and Abu‑Dzeit, had formed a terrorist group. It was this group that organised the attack. Thirty-five law-enforcement officers and fifteen civilians were killed, whilst one hundred and thirty-one law-enforcement officers and ninety-two civilians were injured. Massive damage was done to property. 13. The applicants did not have any procedural status in the criminal proceedings in case no. 25/78-05. 14. It appears that on several occasions the applicants requested various officials, including the prosecutors, to return the bodies of their sons for burial. 15. The requests either remained unanswered or were refused. 16. The applicants were furnished with death certificates in respect of their sons, indicating 13 October 2005 as the date of death in respect of both individuals and 23 January 2007 (in respect of Zamir Zalov) and 7 April 2008 (Murat Khakulov) as the dates of issue. 17. On 13 April 2006 the investigation authority terminated the criminal proceedings in respect of the ninety-five deceased on account of their deaths, having taken an individual decision in respect of each deceased person. Each decision described the degree and character of their individual involvement and concluded that these persons had taken part in the attack and died in the course of the ensuing gunfight. It appears that the deceased referred to by the applicants were among those concerned by this decision. 18. The decision of 13 April 2006 in respect of Zamir Mikhaylovich Zalov stated that his body was located on 13 October 2005 at 127 Malbakhov Street, Nalchik. The investigators found a Makarov pistol containing four cartridges near the corpse and a Makarov pistol containing seven cartridges in his trousers. The deceased held an armed hand grenade in his left hand. The subsequent expert report identified the cause of death as a gunshot wound to the chest, which damaged his heart and caused a massive loss of blood and traumatic shock. 19. In view of the collected evidence, the investigation concluded that at around 9 a.m. on 13 October 2005 the deceased, acting in concert with other participants, carried out a pre-planned and armed attack on an arms shop with a view to capturing arms and ammunition. The attack resulted in the deaths of at least three persons and the wounding of two more. The deceased personally killed one of the victims and ordered the killing of another. 20. The decision of 13 April 2006 in respect of Murat Abubovich Khakulov stated that his body was located on 13 October 2005 in the vicinity of the local premises of the Special Purpose Police Unit of the Republican Ministry of the Interior. The investigators found eighty used bullet cartridges nearby. The subsequent expert report identified the cause of his death as multiple gunshot wounds to the legs, leading to massive loss of blood and traumatic shock. 21. Based on the collected evidence, the investigation concluded that the deceased, along with four other persons, organised and carried out an armed attack on the building of the Special Purpose Police Unit. The deceased took part in the attack for two hours, by shooting at police and passer-bys from an automatic rifle and throwing hand grenades at them. He was later killed when the police returned fire. The attack resulted in the death of one civilian, the wounding of two more and injuries to four police agents. 22. The Prosecutor General’s Office notified the applicants of the above decisions on 14 April 2006, but no copies of the decisions in question were attached to the notifications. 23. According to the Government, ninety-five corpses of the presumed terrorists were cremated on 22 June 2006. From the applicants’ submissions, it appears that they first learned of the cremations from the Government’s observations in the present case. 24. According to the Government, the cremations took place pursuant to a decision not to return the bodies of the deceased to their families, dated 15 May 2006. In contrast to the individual decisions of 13 April 2006, the decision of 15 May 2006 referred to the deceased persons collectively. The decision stated, in particular: “... the head of investigation group ... [official S.], having examined the materials in case file no. 25/78-05, established: ... [that] in the course of the counter-terrorist special operation aimed at tackling the attack, 95 terrorists were eliminated, namely: [the decision names among the deceased the persons referred to by the applicants] At present all forensic expert examinations, including molecular genetic examinations, involving ... the corpses of the deceased terrorists, have been finalised and their identities have been established by way of proper procedure. By decisions of 13-14 April 2006 the criminal proceedings in respect of these 95 persons, who had committed ... the attack on various sites and law-enforcement agents of the town of Nalchik ... was discontinued on account of their deaths, under Article 27 part 1 subpart 2 and Article 24 part 1 subpart 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Pursuant to section 14.1 of the Federal Interment and Burial Act (Law no. 8-FZ): ‘the interment of persons against whom a criminal investigation in connection with their terrorist activities has been closed because of their death following interception of the said terrorist act shall take place in accordance with the procedure established by the Government of the Russian Federation. Their bodies shall not be handed over for burial and the place of their burial shall not be revealed.’ Pursuant to part 3 of Decree no. 164, ‘On interment of persons whose death was caused by the interception of terrorist acts carried out by them’, approved by the Government of the Russian Federation on 20 March 2003, ‘the interment of [these] persons shall take place in the locality where death occurred and shall be carried out by agencies specialising in funeral arrangements, set up by organs of the executive branch of the subjects of the Russian Federation or by organs of local government ...’. [In view of the above, official S. decided to:] 25. The Government alleged that the authorities had notified the applicants of the decision of 15 May 2006, but acknowledged that no copy of that decision had been provided to them. 26. It appears that on several occasions the Prosecutor General’s Office informed the applicants, in substance, of the refusal to return the bodies. It does not appear that the applicants were furnished with a copy of the decision of 15 May 2006. 27. The applicants’ initial attempts to obtain judicial review of the decisions of 13 April and 15 May 2006 were unsuccessful, as the courts refused to examine their arguments. (a) Proceedings before the Constitutional Court 28. The relatives of other deceased participants in the attack contested the legislation governing the interment of terrorists before the Constitutional Court. Their initial complaints were rejected as premature. Eventually, some complaints were accepted for examination. 29. On 28 June 2007 the Constitutional Court delivered a judgment (no. 8-P) in which, in essence, it rejected their complaints alleging that section 14(1) of the Interment and Burial Act and Decree no. 164 of the Government of the Russian Federation of 20 March 2003 were unconstitutional. The ruling stated, in particular, that the impugned legal provisions were, in the circumstances, necessary and justified. The court reached the following conclusions regarding the legitimate aims and necessity of the legislation in question: “... At the same time, the interest in fighting terrorism, in preventing terrorism in general and specific terms and in providing redress for the effects of terrorist acts, coupled with the risk of mass disorder, clashes between different ethnic groups and aggression by the next of kin of those involved in terrorist activity against the population at large and law-enforcement officials, and lastly the threat to human life and limb, may, in a given historical context, justify the establishment of a particular legal regime, such as that provided for by section 14(1) of the Federal Act, governing the burial of persons who escape prosecution in connection with terrorist activity on account of their death following the interception of a terrorist act ... Those provisions are logically connected to the provisions of paragraph 4 of Recommendation 1687 (2004) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on combating terrorism through culture, dated 23 November 2005, in which it was stressed that extremist interpretations of elements of a particular culture or religion, such as heroic martyrdom, self-sacrifice, apocalypse or holy war, as well as secular ideologies (nationalist or revolutionary) could also be used for the justification of terrorist acts. 3.2. Action to minimise the informational and psychological impact of the terrorist act on the population, including the weakening of its propaganda effect, is one of the means necessary to protect public security and the morals, health, rights and legal interests of citizens. It therefore pursues exactly those aims for which the Constitution of the Russian Federation and international legal instruments permit restrictions on the relevant rights and freedoms. The burial of those who have taken part in a terrorist act, in close proximity to the graves of the victims of their acts, and the observance of rites of burial and remembrance with the paying of respects, as a symbolic act of worship, serve as a means of propaganda for terrorist ideas and also cause offence to relatives of the victims of the acts in question, creating the preconditions for increasing inter-ethnic and religious tension. In the conditions which have arisen in the Russian Federation as a result of the commission of a series of terrorist acts which produced numerous human victims, resulted in widespread negative social reaction and had a major impact on the collective consciousness, the return of the body to the relatives ... may create a threat to social order and peace and to the rights and legal interests of other persons and their security, including incitement to hatred and incitement to engage in acts of vandalism, violence, mass disorder and clashes which may produce further victims. Meanwhile, the burial places of participants in terrorist acts may become a shrine for certain extremist individuals and be used by them as a means of propaganda for the ideology of terrorism and involvement in terrorist activity. In such circumstances, the federal legislature may introduce special arrangements governing the burial of individuals whose death occurred as a result of the interception of a terrorist act in which they were taking part. ...” 30. The ruling further noted that the application of the measures prescribed in the legislation could be regarded as justified if proper procedural safeguards, such as effective judicial review, were in place to protect individuals from arbitrariness. The court noted that Articles 123-127 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provided for such review. 31. In sum, the Constitutional Court upheld the impugned provisions as being in conformity with the Constitution but at the same time interpreted them as requiring that the authorities refrain from burying bodies unless a court had confirmed the competent authority’s decision. It reasoned as follows: “... The constitutional and legal meaning of the existing norms presupposes the possibility of bringing court proceedings to challenge a decision to discontinue, on account of the deaths of the suspects, a criminal case against or prosecution of participants in a terrorist act. Accordingly, they also presuppose an obligation on the court’s part to examine the substance of the complaint, that is, to verify the lawfulness and well-foundedness of the decision and the conclusions therein as regards the participation of the persons concerned in a terrorist act, and to establish the absence of grounds for rehabilitating [the suspects] and discontinuing the criminal case. They thus entail an examination of the lawfulness of the application of the aforementioned restrictive measures. Until the entry into force of the court judgment the deceased’s remains cannot be buried; the relevant State bodies and officials must take all necessary measures to ensure that the bodies are disposed of in accordance with custom and tradition, in particular through the burial of the remains in the ground ... or by [cremation], individually, if possible, and to ensure compliance prior thereto with the requirements concerning the identification of the deceased ... and of the time, location and cause of death ...” 32. Judge G.A. Gadzhiyev issued a separate opinion in which he agreed that the impugned provisions were in conformity with the Constitution but held a different view as to how they should be interpreted. The opinion stated as follows: “... if the relevant law-enforcement agencies find, as a result of a preliminary investigation, that a terrorist act has been committed and that a given person was involved, but the criminal proceedings against that person ... are discontinued on account of his or her death following interception of the terrorist act, and if they then conclude that the decision to return the body to the family for burial is capable of threatening public order and peace and the health, morals, rights, lawful interests and safety of others, they are entitled to take a decision refusing to hand over the body and applying special arrangements for burial. At the same time, in the event of a refusal to return the body of an individual whose death occurred as the result of the interception of a terrorist act committed by him, the authorities competent to take a decision concerning the burial must secure compliance with all the requirements concerning the establishment of the deceased’s identity, the time and place of death, the cause of death, the place of burial and the data necessary for the proper identification of the grave (a given location and number). The burial must take place with the participation of the relatives, in accordance with custom and tradition and with humanitarian respect for the dead. The administrative authorities of a State governed by the rule of law must respect the cultural values of a multi-ethnic society, transmitted from generation to generation. ...” 33. Judge A.L. Kononov issued a dissenting opinion in which he described the legislation in question as incompatible with the Constitution. In particular, he noted: “... The impugned norms banning the return of the deceased’s bodies to their relatives and providing for their anonymous burial are, in our view, absolutely immoral and reflect the most uncivilised, barbaric and base views of previous generations ... The right of every person to be buried in a dignified manner in accordance with the traditions and customs of his family hardly requires special justification or even to be secured in written form in law. This right is clearly self-evident and stems from human nature as, perhaps, no other natural right. Equally natural and uncontested is the right of every person to conduct the burial of a person who is related and dear to them, to have an opportunity to perform one’s moral duty and display one’s human qualities, to bid farewell, to grieve, mourn and commemorate the deceased, however he may be regarded by society and the state, to have the right to a grave, which in all civilisations represents a sacred value and the symbol of memory. ...” (b) Subsequent proceedings 34. After the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 28 June 2007 the domestic courts apparently changed their approach and agreed to review the formal lawfulness of the decisions of 13 April and 15 May 2006. The domestic courts still could not review the need for application of the measures set out in section 14 (1) of the Interment and Burial Act and Decree no. 164 of 20 March 2003 in individual cases. 35. The applicants contested the actions of the authorities before the courts. 36. In April 2008, in order to prepare the cases for examination, the presiding judge made repeated requests to the officials of the Prosecutor’s Office, including the Head of the Investigation Committee of the Prosecutor General, seeking copies of the materials relating to the investigation of the deaths of both applicants’ sons. It appears that these requests remained unanswered. 37. By a judgment of 29 May 2008 the Nalchik Town Court of the Republic of Kabardino-Balkariya partly granted the claims of the second applicant in respect of his son. In particular, the court quashed both the decision dated 13 April 2006 to terminate criminal proceedings in respect of the second applicant’s son because of his death and the decision dated 15 May 2006 not to return the body of the second applicant’s son to his family. The court noted that the decision of 13 April 2006 had failed to take account of the new law on terrorism, adopted on 6 March and 27 June 2006, and that therefore the decision of 15 May 2006 had been premature. The court ordered the prosecution authorities to examine the relevant issues afresh. 38. A similar judgment was taken on 3 July 2008 by the Nalchik Town Court of the Republic of Kabardino-Balkariya in respect of the first applicant’s son. 39. The judgments were appealed against by both parties. 40. The Supreme Court of the Republic of Kabardino-Balkariya upheld the judgments on 15 July and 12 August 2008 respectively. 41. The parties have not submitted any information about the subsequent events in the applicants’ domestic cases. 42. According to those relatives of the deceased who took part in the identification of the bodies, for several days following the events of 13 and 14 October 2005 the corpses were kept in the town morgue and other locations in wholly unsatisfactory conditions. In particular, the bodies gave off an intense smell owing to the lack of proper refrigeration and were chaotically piled on top of each other. 43. The applicants did not participate in identification of their deceased relatives in person. 44. The Government submitted that Zamir Mikhaylovich Zalov had been identified by his cousin Z.Kh. on 19 October 2005, whilst Murat Abubovich Khakulov had been identified by his cousin A.R. on 24 October 2005. 45. The Government submitted that the corpses in question had been initially held in the Nalchik morgue. Between 14 and 18 October 2005 the applicants examined the corpses and the clothing. Thereafter the bodies were placed in two refrigerator wagons. On 1 November 2005 the wagons were moved to the town of Rostov-on-Don for molecular genetic examinations and on 22 June 2006 all of the bodies were cremated. Between 13 and 22 October 2005 the person in charge of the identification proceedings was the head of the investigation group, investigator P. From 22 October 2005 he was replaced by investigator S. The Government also acknowledged that immediately after the attack no facilities had been available to keep the bodies. 46. According to the Government’s most recent submissions, the overall amount of human casualties as a result of the events of 13 October 2005 was twelve civilians, thirty-five police and law-enforcement officers and eighty‑seven participants in the attack.

4. The applicant was born in 1944 and lives in Zagreb. 5. In 1982 the applicant, together with her relative A.M, purchased a flat in Crikvenica. The purchase agreement did not contain any provision on the shares of ownership of the flat. 6. On 23 May 1989 A.M. instituted civil proceedings before the Crikvenica Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Crikvenici) seeking declaration of her ownership of two-thirds of the flat. On 29 October 1989 the applicant filed a counterclaim, seeking declaration that she was the owner of seven-eighths of the flat. 7. Following two remittals, on 18 June 1996 the Crikvenica Municipal Court ruled that A.M. was the owner of three-fifths and the applicant of two-fifths of the flat. 8. On appeal, on 8 October 1997 the Rijeka County Court (Županijski sud u Rijeci) upheld the first-instance judgment. 9. On 20 October 1998 the applicant filed an appeal on points of law (revizija) against the County Court’s judgment. On 4 April 2002 the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) dismissed her appeal as ill-founded. The decision was served on the applicant on 13 September 2002.

4. The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Goleniów. 5. The applicant was charged with attempted burglary. On 22 November 2000 the Myślibórz District Court convicted him as charged and sentenced him to 20 months’ imprisonment, taking into account that he was a habitual offender. The applicant appealed. On 6 April 2001 the Gorzów Wielkopolski Regional Court quashed the first-instance judgment and remitted the case. 6. On 20 March 2002 the Myślibórz District Court again convicted the applicant of attempted burglary and sentenced him to 18 months’ imprisonment. The applicant appealed. On 8 July 2002 the Szczecin Regional Court upheld the District Court’s judgment, finding that the correctness of the conviction was borne out by the evidence before the trial court. 7. On 26 September 2002 the applicant’s legal-aid counsel refused to file a cassation appeal in his case for lack of appropriate grounds. Throughout the proceedings, except for the retrial, the applicant was represented by a counsel. 8. In October 2003 the applicant was arrested and charged with aiding and abetting the sale of stolen goods. He was remanded in custody from 7 October 2003 to 5 February 2004. On 19 March 2004 the Szczecin District Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to 18 months’ imprisonment. It took into account that the applicant was a habitual offender. The applicant appealed against the trial court’s judgment. 9. On 13 August 2004 the Szczecin Regional Court upheld the first-instance judgment. The applicant was represented by a counsel. It appears that he did not lodge a cassation appeal against the Regional Court’s judgment. 10. The envelope in which the applicant’s letter dated 4 December 2003 was sent to the Court from the Szczecin Detention Centre bears two stamps that read: “censored” (ocenzurowano) and “Szczecin Detention Centre” (Areszt Śledczy, Szczecin). It appears that the envelope was cut open and subsequently resealed with adhesive tape.

4. The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Pleven. 5. On 3 April 1992 the applicant was appointed general manager of the state-owned company Republika EOOD (“the company”) under a contract executed between him and the Ministry of Industry (“the Ministry”). 6. On 30 June 1995 the applicant signed a new contract with the Ministry pursuant to which he was to remain the general manger of the company until 1998. 7. On 25 July 1995 the Ministry rescinded the latter contract and the applicant had to leave the position of a general manager. 8. Believing the rescission to have been unlawful, on 16 August 1995 the applicant brought an action before the Sofia City Court, seeking remuneration under the contract of 1995. The action was directed against the company as a main defendant and the Ministry of Industry (“the Ministry”) as an additional defendant in the event of dismissal of the action against the company. 9. The number of hearings held between August 1995 and October 1996 is not clear. It appears that a hearing was held in February 1996. 10. For the period between October 1996 and March 2001 the Sofia City Court held hearings on 15 October 1996, 4 February 1997, 28 March 1997, 4 November 1997, 21 April 1998, 30 October 1998, 20 April 1999, 5 October 1999, 15 February 2000, 23 May 2000, 7 November 2000 and 27 March 2001. Four of these hearings were adjourned upon requests of the defendants or because of the absence of experts. 11. In examining the case the court heard the parties and several experts who had to give an estimate of the amount of the applicant’s remuneration. 12. By a judgment of 19 July 2001 the Sofia City Court dismissed the applicant’s action against the company and partially granted it against the Ministry. The court held that a party under the contract of 1995 and the proper defendant in the case before it was the Ministry which had been responsible for rescinding the contract. The Ministry was liable to pay the full amount of the agreed remuneration, which was established to be 5,631.28 Bulgarian levs (BGN), the equivalent of 2,879.23 euros (EUR). The court ordered the Ministry to pay this amount, plus interest and BGN 230 (EUR 117.57) in costs. 13. The applicant and the company did not appeal. 14. The Ministry appealed, contending, inter alia, that it had acted on behalf of the company as a representative of the owner of its capital and that therefore the company was the proper defendant in the proceedings. Moreover, the contract explicitly stipulated that the applicant’s remuneration was to be paid by the company. 15. By a judgment of 30 June 2002 the Sofia Court of Appeal quashed the Sofia City Court’s judgment in so far as it granted the claim against the Ministry. It held that although the contract had been signed by the Minister, the company was a party to it because the Minister had not acted as a head of the Ministry but as a representative of the owner of the capital, appointing the general manager of the company. Therefore, it was the company’s responsibility that had to be engaged. The court, however, was barred from examining the action against the company because neither the applicant, nor any of the other parties had appealed against the dismissal by the Sofia City Court of the action against the company. The judgment of the Sofia City Court had thus become final in respect of the company. 16. The applicant filed a cassation appeal. 17. By a final judgment of 13 January 2004 the Supreme Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal and upheld the judgment of 30 June 2002, finding that the company, not the Ministry, had been party to the 1995 contract. As to the applicant’s argument that the merits of his action against the company had not been examined, the court held that the Sofia City Court had examined and dismissed that action. As the applicant had not appealed, despite the interest to do so, the Sofia Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Cassation were barred from examining the issue again.

8. The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Istanbul. 9. On 26 August 1998 at about 6 p.m. the applicant was arrested in Istanbul by policemen from the Anti-Terrorism Branch of the Pendik Security Directorate on suspicion of aiding and abetting the PKK. Subsequently, the police officers carried out a search of the applicant’s office and of his flat with his permission. The same day at about 10 p.m. the applicant was examined by a doctor, who reported that there were no signs of injury on his body. The applicant was then taken to the Pendik Police Station to be interrogated. 10. On 27 August 1998 the public prosecutor verbally ordered the applicant’s release as there was no evidence against him. Consequently, at about 10.30 a.m. the applicant was handed over to the police officers from the Anti-Terrorism Branch of the Pendik Security Directorate to be released. He was initially taken to the Pendik Hospital where he was examined by a doctor, who stated that there were no signs of ill-treatment on his body. The applicant was then taken to the Pendik Security Directorate building. While he was waiting in a room with window guards, the police officers started preparing the report for his release. The applicant alleged that while he was waiting, the police officers made him drink drugged tea as a result of which he lost consciousness. According to the applicant, when he regained his consciousness, he was in the hospital. He had fallen out the window of the office which was on the fifth floor of the Security Directorate Building. The Government maintained that when the applicant was taken to an office to sign the release report, he had run and jumped out the window. According to the Government, this office, which was solely used by police officers, had no window guards. After the incident, the applicant was immediately taken to the hospital. The medical report of 28 August 1998 indicates that the applicant had several fractures. He had to stay in the hospital for three months before he recovered from his injuries. 11. The same day, the police officers prepared an incident report, drew a sketch map and took statements from eye-witnesses to the event. Police officers Mustafa Sezer, Burhanettin Tekler, Mustafa Yüksel, and İsmail Kaya Horta confirmed that the applicant had jumped out the window of the office which was on the fifth floor of the Security Directorate building. The police further took statements from Mr Ibrahim Nih and Mr Ali Aydın, two civilians, who happened to be in the same office at the time of the incident. They stated that as soon as the applicant entered the office, he had run towards the window and jumped out. 12. The applicant’s statement was taken on the same day at about 5 p.m. He confessed that he had run and jumped out the window at his own will. He stated that he had no complaints against anyone. 13. On 4 September 1998 the applicant’s representative filed a criminal complaint with the Pendik public prosecutor. In his petition, the applicant’s representative maintained that on 26 August 1998 the applicant had been subjected to ill-treatment by three police officers at the Pendik Security Directorate Building during his interrogation, before being taken to the Pendik police station to spend the night. The lawyer stated that one of the police officers was called Sezai Çetin. The applicant’s lawyer further maintained the applicant had been deliberately thrown out the window of the office situated on the fifth floor of the Security Directorate Building. 14. On 9 September 1998 the prosecutor took statements from Sezai Çetin and Ramazan Hokvan, the police officers who had arrested the applicant on 26 August 1998. They denied the ill-treatment allegations. 15. On 23 September 1998 the public prosecutor further took statements from police officers Mustafa Yüksel, Burhanettin Tekler and Mustafa Sezer, who had been on duty on the day of the applicant’s fall from the fifth floor. These officers stated that as soon as the applicant was taken to the office on the fifth floor to sign his release report, he had run towards the window and jumped out. They maintained that the applicant was very nervous and sweating. 16. On 28 September 1998 the public prosecutor took statements from the applicant and his wife. The applicant stated that he had been insulted and threatened while he was in custody at the police station. However he indicated that he had not been subjected to any physical ill-treatment. In particular, he stated that the police officer, Sezai Çetin, who was named by the applicant’s lawyer as one of the officers that had ill-treated the applicant, had in fact been very kind to him during his custody. The applicant explained that on the day of the incident, while he was waiting to be released, he drank a cup of tea and lost his consciousness. He subsequently woke up in the hospital. The applicant stated that he did not remember whether he had jumped or had been thrown out the window. 17. In her statement, the applicant’s wife explained that on 27 August 1998 at about 11 a.m. she had gone to the Pendik Police Station to visit the applicant. At first, the police officers refused to show the applicant to her. She overheard a police officer say to his superior that a liquid had been given to the applicant. She insisted, and the officers allowed her to see the applicant. According to the applicant’s wife, the applicant was lying on the floor, unconscious. 18. On 23 October 1998 the Pendik public prosecutor decided that no prosecution should be brought against the accused police officers on the ground that there was no sufficient evidence in support of the allegations. The public prosecutor concluded that the applicant had tried to commit suicide. 19. On 24 February 1999 the applicant’s representative challenged this decision before the Kadıköy Assize Court. In his petition, the lawyer stated that the applicant had been ill-treated during his custody at the police station. It was alleged that the applicant had been hosed with water, hung from his arms and subjected to electric shocks. The applicant’s representative further complained that the applicant had been deliberately thrown out the window. The applicant’s representative finally maintained that the applicant had lost his consciousness after drinking a cup of tea, which in his opinion had been drugged. 20. On 24 May 1999 the Kadıköy Assize Court, upholding the reasoning of the public prosecutor, dismissed the case. 21. On 12 July 2001 a forensic doctor attached to the Human Rights Foundation delivered a report about the applicant. Referring to the absence of a psychiatric report and a toxic examination, he concluded that the applicant had not been thoroughly examined at the hospital after his fall. He indicated that the applicant had been inscribed in a special recovery programme by the Istanbul Branch of the Foundation.

4. The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Kharkiv. 5. The applicant is the grandmother of a minor P.E. born in 1990. After the death of her daughter, her son-in-law, P.V., did not allow her to see P.E. 6. On 10 January 1997 the applicant instituted proceedings against P.V., seeking permission to see her granddaughter regularly. 7. On 3 December 1999 the Ordzhonikidzevsky District Court of Kharkiv (hereafter “the Ordzhonikidzevsky Court”) allowed the applicant's claim in part. 8. On 18 January 2000 the Kharkiv Regional Court quashed this decision and remitted the case for a fresh consideration. 9. On 7 July 2000 Ordzhonikidzevsky Court found against the applicant. 10. On 5 September 2000 the Kharkiv Regional Court quashed this decision and remitted the case for a fresh consideration. 11. On 20 June 2001 the Frunzensky District Court of Kharkiv allowed the applicant's claim in part. 12. On 9 January 2002 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal quashed this decision and terminated the proceedings and left the applicant's claim without consideration as she had not used the possibility of extrajudicial settlement of the dispute before the Tutelage Board. The applicant was informed that she could re-lodge her claim after exhausting this possibility. 13. On 14 August 2002 the Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal, thereby terminating the proceedings. The applicant received the copy of this ruling by regular mail on 7 October 2002.

4. The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Kharkiv. 5. On 11 April 2000 the Kyiv District Prosecutor’s Office of Kharkiv instituted criminal proceedings in respect of the applicant, along with two other persons, on suspicion of tax evasion and forgery in their capacity of a private company’s officials. 6. On 24 April 2000 the applicant was indicted. 7. Between 30 May 2000 and 30 June 2004 the Kyivskyy District Court of Kharkiv (“the Kyivskyy Court”) considered the case. 8. According to the information provided by the Government, in the course of proceedings the hearings were adjourned twelve times because the presiding judge was busy with another case and seven times at the request of the other co-defendants’ lawyers. In addition, there were five adjournments as the applicant or her lawyer was absent. Finally, hearings did not take place four times because the prosecutor was absent and three times owing to the absence of the witnesses. According to the applicant, however, the judge failed to duly notify the parties of the scheduled hearings on many occasions. Some of the adjournments, according to her, were caused by the judge’s inability to ensure the audio-recording of hearings requested by the applicant. 9. Meanwhile, the applicant lodged numerous complaints with the higher-level courts about the length of the proceedings. As indicated in the reply of the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal to one of her complaints, audio-recording equipment was available only in the appellate court and the first-instance court had therefore to adjust the schedule of hearings accordingly. 10. On 30 June 2004 the Kyivskyy Court, at the prosecutor’s petition and in the presence of the applicant’s lawyer, terminated the proceedings against the applicant as time-barred. 11. On 8 July 2004 this ruling became final.

6. On 18 August 2001, the first applicant, under a false identity and claiming that he was born in 1983, was sentenced by an Austrian court (the Jugendgerichtshof in Vienna) to a suspended term of four months’ imprisonment for a drugs offence relating to the possession of a small quantity of cocaine. 7. He entered Switzerland in November 2001. On 18 January 2002 the competent Swiss authorities declared inadmissible his asylum application, which had been lodged under a false identity. He left Switzerland at an unknown date but returned there on 2 September 2003. 8. On 1 November 2003 the first applicant married a Swiss national who had shortly before given birth to their twin daughters (the third and fourth applicants). By virtue of his marriage he was granted leave to remain in Switzerland (the couple have since got divorced, see paragraph 19 below). 9. On 6 August 2006 the first applicant was arrested in Germany for drug trafficking and sentenced to 42 months’ imprisonment (judgment of the District Court of Cleves (Germany) of 24 November 2006). The competent authorities considered it established that he had attempted to import 55 doses of pure cocaine, with a total weight of 257 grammes, by swallowing the drug (bodypacking). 10. In a decision of 23 August 2007, the Office of Migration for the Canton of Basle-Rural found that the first applicant’s leave to remain had become null and void as, having been held in a German prison where he was serving his sentence, he had been outside Switzerland for over six months. In addition, the Office of Migration took the view that he should not be re-issued with a permit, as the fact that he had been convicted and his family were living on benefits constituted grounds for his removal. 11. Both the first applicant and his wife, in their own names and on behalf of their children, challenged that decision first before the cantonal government, which rejected their appeals, and then before the Basle-Rural Cantonal Court, which also dismissed their appeals in a decision of 14 May 2008. 12. On 5 May 2008 the first applicant was granted early release from the German prison where he had been serving his sentence. 13. In a judgment of 8 January 2009 the Federal Court dismissed an appeal by the applicants at last instance. It pointed out that the first applicant had twice been convicted of drugs offences. It found that the offence of which he had been convicted in Germany carried sufficient weight for it not to be relevant that a sentence imposed in Switzerland might have been slightly less harsh. It further observed that the trafficking in question, concerning more than 18 grammes of pure cocaine, constituted a serious case within the meaning of section 19(2) of the Federal Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances Act, punishable by at least one year’s imprisonment. It further found that the fact that the first applicant had offended on only two occasions was of little relevance for the examination of the case. The court nevertheless admitted that the applicants had been at pains to overcome their reliance on benefits, but also observed that in the meantime they had, on that basis, received a sum which totalled 165,000 Swiss francs (CHF) (about 137,500 euros (EUR)). In addition, it noted that the first applicant had been living with his family in Switzerland only since October 2003 and that he had no real professional activity, even though this was probably connected to the fact that he had tuberculosis. Moreover, the Federal Court took the view that, having regard to the first applicant’s bleak job prospects, re-offending could not be ruled out. It further considered that, as he did not speak German very well and mainly socialised with migrants from his own country, he had not integrated in Switzerland. However, the Federal Court did not deny that the applicants enjoyed a real and close family life. It found that the refusal to grant the first applicant a residence permit would probably affect them badly, especially as they could not be obliged to follow him to Nigeria. As far as the first applicant was concerned, the court took the view that he still had an unbroken family network in that country and that he would be able to re-integrate there quite easily. 14. In a letter of 26 January 2009, the Office of Migration for the Canton of Basle-Rural informed the first applicant that he had to leave Switzerland by 31 March 2009. 15. In a decision of 10 March 2009 the President of the First Section rejected a request for interim measures under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. 16. Between 15 and 17 September 2009 the first applicant was placed in detention pending his removal. 17. On 23 April 2010 the first applicant was officially declared to have disappeared. On 25 September 2010 he was arrested by the authorities of the Canton of Basle-Rural. In a decision of 28 September 2010 the competent court of that Canton confirmed his detention pending removal until 24 November 2010. In the meantime he separated from his wife. The applicant nevertheless allegedly maintained some contact with his children. The detention was subsequently extended. He was released on 25 January 2011. 18. On 25 January 2011 the Federal Office of Migration banned the first applicant from entering Switzerland with effect until 26 January 2020. It was possible for the ban to be temporarily suspended further to a reasoned request and should it be deemed necessary (see paragraph 21 below). In a letter of 21 August 2012 the first applicant’s representatives informed the Court that the decision of 25 January 2011 had become final. They added that the first applicant was still living in Switzerland, but had separated from his wife. They alleged that he did his best to maintain regular contact with his children. 19. In a letter of 31 December 2012 one of the first applicant’s two lawyers informed the Court that he and his Swiss wife had got divorced. The lawyer also explained that he had a third child, a daughter born on 21 August 2012 from a relationship with another Swiss national. He was now living with her and wanted to marry her as quickly as possible. The lawyer attached a copy of a divorce-related judgment from the Liestal District Court dated 27 September 2012, notified to the first applicant’s other lawyer on 2 October 2012. It showed that custody had been awarded to the mother but that the first applicant had access rights in respect of his first two children, limited to one afternoon at least every two weeks. This new information was duly communicated to the parties and they were invited to submit observations (see paragraphs 28 and 36 below).

4. The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Naro-Fominsk in the Moscow region. He is currently serving a sentence of imprisonment in the Ryazan region. 5. On 22 July 1995 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of murder. 6. On 18 August 1995 he was charged with robbery, murder, illegal possession of firearms and false reporting of a crime. On the same date the prosecutor ordered that the applicant be placed in detention. 7. On 27 June 1996 the prosecution authorities submitted the case file to the Moscow City Court (“the City Court”) for trial. On 3 June 1997 and 4 March 1998, at the request of the applicant’s counsel, the City Court referred the case back to the prosecution authorities for additional investigation on account of serious breaches of procedure. The prosecutor did not challenge those decisions. 8. On 4 August 1998 the additional investigative measures were completed and the case was submitted to the City Court for trial. However, on 10 August 1999 the City Court granted a request by the applicant’s counsel to remit, once more, the case for additional investigation. It held that the prosecution authorities had failed to implement the instructions given in its decision of 4 March 1998 and that the applicant’s defence rights had been violated during the investigation. On 24 September 1998 the Supreme Court dismissed the prosecutor’s appeal against that decision. 9. On 20 May 1999 the case was submitted to the City Court for trial, after additional investigation. However, on 3 June 1999 the City Court, at the defence’s request, again referred the case for additional investigation on account of serious procedural breaches. On 22 July 1999 the Supreme Court upheld that decision. 10. On 24 August 1999 the case was submitted to the City Court for trial and the first hearing was scheduled for 24 September 1999. However, on that date the case was adjourned until 1 November 1999 because the applicant’s counsel and the victims had failed to appear. Several hearings were scheduled for November 1999. Two of them were adjourned at the request of the applicant’s counsel. 11. On 22 November 1999 the City Court found the applicant guilty of illegal possession of firearms and acquitted him of the other charges. It sentenced the applicant to three years’ imprisonment and ordered that he be released from serving his sentence and consequently from detention, as by that time he had spent more than four years in detention. The applicant was released in the courtroom. 12. On 13 January 2000 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (“the Supreme Court”) heard the case on appeal. It found, among other things, that the first-instance court had failed to properly assess the evidence in the case. It upheld the applicant’s acquittal on the charge of false reporting of a crime, quashed the remaining part of the judgment of 22 November 1999 and remitted that part of the case for fresh examination to the City Court. 13. On 28 January 2000 the case was sent to the City Court. The first hearing was scheduled for 5 June 2000. However, on that date the case was adjourned until 1 November 2000 because the judge was involved in unrelated proceedings. The hearings of 1 November 2000 and 28 March 2001 were postponed for the same reason. 14. The hearing of 26 July 2001 was adjourned because the applicant’s defence counsel was on annual leave until 18 August 2001. The next hearing was scheduled for 8 October 2001. 15. The City Court heard the case between 8 October and 20 November 2001. During that period, the case was adjourned on three occasions: from 12 to 16 October at the request of the applicant’s counsel, from 26 to 29 October because the witnesses did not appear and from 16 to 19 November at the applicant’s request. The City Court heard evidence from about twenty witnesses and examined several experts’ reports. 16. On 30 November 2001 the City Court found the applicant guilty of illegal possession of firearms, murder and robbery and sentenced him to thirteen years’ imprisonment with forfeiture of property. 17. In December 2001 the applicant and his lawyer lodged their grounds of appeal against that judgment. Between January and April 2002 the applicant was reading the record of the court hearings. On 18 April 2002 he lodged additional grounds of appeal. 18. On 5 June 2002 the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of 30 November 2001.

6. The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Sant Julià de Loria (Andorra). On 15 February 2003 he married a woman with whom he had two children, a boy and a girl, born in 1992 and 2003 respectively. 7. On 31 March 2004 the applicant left the household, the children remaining with their mother. 8. On 18 October 2004, the applicant’s wife introduced a petition for legal separation from the applicant. She sought, inter alia, custody of the children, to which the applicant did not disagree. 9. On 13 June 2005 the applicant and his wife were legally separated. The judge (batlle) reviewing the petition at first instance (“the separation judge”) granted custody of the children to their mother and set up a contact schedule governing the applicant’s contact with his children. 10. On 14 July 2006, during the course of proceedings for the adoption of interim measures, the separation judge granted a motion made by the applicant’s wife to immediately and provisionally suspend the contact schedule until the production of a psychological report by an impartial expert. In taking this decision, the separation judge relied on: several criminal claims introduced by the applicant’s wife against the applicant that suggested extremely troubled relations between the parents that were negatively affecting their children; a psychological report submitted by the applicant’s wife, according to which the troubled relationship between the parents was damaging the mental stability of their son; and a brief submitted by the public prosecutor, in which he proposed conducting a psychological test on both children before giving the applicant access to them. 11. On 20 July 2006 the separation judge confirmed his previous decision of 14 July 2006. The judge relied on a psychological report issued by an impartial expert at his request and on the brief submitted by the public prosecutor in concluding that the contact schedule should remain suspended. The applicant was nonetheless allowed to maintain telephone contact with his children and his wife was warned that she had to facilitate this contact. 12. On 19 December 2006 the applicant’s wife filed a petition for divorce. She also sought custody of the children and that, pending the conclusion of the divorce proceedings, the contact schedule set up by the separation judgment remain suspended. For his part, the applicant agreed with the petition for divorce but also sought custody of the children. He also applied for an interim order restoring the contact schedule set up by the separation judgment in respect of his daughter and establishing a contact schedule under the supervision of a judge and professionals appointed for that purpose in respect of his son. 13. On 22 December 2006 the applicant applied to the separation judge to have the contact schedule set up by the separation judgment restored in respect of his daughter and a contact schedule operating under the supervision of a judge and professionals appointed for that purpose established in respect of his son. On 15 February 2007 the applicant’s wife opposed the application. On 21 February 2007 the public prosecutor argued for the restoration of the contact schedule set up by the separation judgment of 13 June 2005. 14. On 21 February 2007 the judge handling the couple’s divorce (“the divorce judge”) dismissed both the applicant’s request for interim measures and his wife’s request to have the contact schedule set up by the separation judgment suspended pending the rendition of a judgment of divorce. 15. On 2 April 2007 the separation judge ruled on the application of 22 December 2006. He restored the contact schedule set up by the separation judgment in respect of the applicant’s daughter and appointed a psychologist to carry out a psychotherapeutic examination and, if necessary, individualised treatment of both parents and their son with a view to restoring the contact schedule between father and son. In this connection, the judge instructed both the applicant and his wife to deposit 1,500 euros (EUR) each within eight days in security for the cost of the examination. Should the applicant or his wife fail to comply, the judge would order that measures be taken to have the decision enforced. 16. The applicant’s wife appealed against the decision of 2 April 2007 before the High Court of Justice. 17. On 19 June 2008 the High Court of Justice partially reversed the separation judge’s decision. It struck down the appointment of the psychologist but upheld the remainder of the decision. The court stated that, the interim measures having expired, the contact schedule set up by the separation judgment should be restored, without prejudice to the possible interim measures regarding parent-child contact that the divorce judge could order pending the rendition of a judgment of divorce. 18. On 25 June 2008 the applicant applied to the separation judge for enforcement of the decisions of 19 June 2008 and 2 April 2007. The applicant’s wife opposed the application and sought to have the enforcement of those decisions suspended until a judgment of divorce had been delivered. The public prosecutor proposed the suspension of the contact schedule until a psychological examination of both parents and their children had been performed. 19. On 24 July 2008 the separation judge relied on a psychologist’s report dated 28 February 2008 to provisionally suspend the contact schedule set up by the judgment of 13 June 2005 and appointed a psychologist with a view to its eventual restoration. According to the psychologist’s report, contact between the applicant and the children was not desirable until comprehensive treatment of the children had been carried out. 20. The applicant appealed against that decision. He sought to have the decision of 24 July 2008 reversed and that of 19 June 2008 applied. 21. On 21 October 2008, while the applicant’s appeal against the decision of 24 July 2008 was still pending, the judgment of divorce was issued. The divorce judge granted custody of the children to their mother and set up a contact schedule governing the applicant’s contact with the children which was to remain suspended pending the decision of a psychologist, who would be appointed by the court upon enforcement of the judgment. The psychologist was to carry out treatment of the children and, if appropriate, the parents, with a view to restoring contact between the children and their father. The judge relied on several psychological reports that advised against immediate contact between son and father and on the son’s testimony, in which he had expressed his desire not to have contact with his father. 22. The applicant appealed against the divorce judgment, seeking to have it partially reversed. He accepted custody of his son being awarded to his former wife. However, he sought to have the requirement of psychological treatment removed and an award of custody of his daughter in his favour. In the alternative, he requested that a contact schedule conforming to that of the separation judgment be established in respect of his daughter. 23. On 12 February 2009 the High Court of Justice decided upon the appeal submitted by the applicant against the provisional suspension of the contact schedule ordered by the separation judge on 24 July 2008. The court stated that since a judgment of divorce had already been delivered, the separation judgment should be set aside and the content of the divorce judgment enforced. Accordingly, the High Court of Justice expressly deprived the separation judge’s decision of 24 July 2008 of any effect. 24. The applicant then lodged a request for clarification with the High Court of Justice. He requested from the court to clarify whether the decision it had delivered on 19 June 2008 in separation proceedings should be enforced having regard to the fact that the divorce judgment of 21 October 2008 was not yet final nor enforceable. 25. On 23 April 2009 the court dismissed the applicant’s request for clarification. It stated that the applicant’s request had exceeded the scope of a request for clarification of a judgment, and that the judgment in the applicant’s appeal had been clear in any event. It considered he was instead requesting a judicial pronouncement as to the procedural effects of his appeal against the divorce judgment that had set up a contact schedule. This notwithstanding, the court went on to state that pending an appeal with suspensive effect, if this was the case, against a divorce judgment, the content of such a judgment would not be enforceable, but added that previous decisions adopted in separation proceedings would not be enforceable either. In fact, the High Court of Justice stated: “...the suspensive effect of the appeal ... makes it necessary to await the decision of this Chamber before applying the measures established by the judgment appealed against, if that judgment is upheld, or those established by that of this Chamber, if the [divorce] judgment delivered by the [first-instance] judge is reversed”. 26. The applicant submitted an appeal for the annulment of the proceedings, citing Article 10 of the Andorran Constitution (the right to court proceedings). 27. On 28 May 2009 the High Court of Justice dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It found that the applicant’s right to court proceedings had not been infringed by the decision of 23 April 2009, as the court had arrived at the only possible conclusion in the light of the rules of procedure in force. The relevant procedural rules forbade the enforcement of decisions being appealed against with suspensive effect and of decisions rendered in separation proceedings when a judgment of divorce had already been rendered in the case. 28. On 16 June 2009 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal (recurso d’empara) with the Constitutional Court, founding the appeal on his right to court proceedings and to a fair hearing. He contended that the impossibility of enforcing the decision of 19 June 2008, already final, while an appeal was still pending in the divorce proceedings, had denied him a fair hearing. 29. On 23 July 2009, the High Court of Justice decided on the applicant’s appeal against the divorce judgment of 21 October 2008. The court dismissed all of the applicant’s grounds of appeal, instead upholding the judgment in its entirety. 30. On 12 October 2009 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant’s constitutional appeal inadmissible as devoid of constitutional content. The Constitutional Court stated that the decisions of the High Court of Justice had not been arbitrary and that that court had clearly and logically stated that the legal situation would not be definitely settled until the appeal lodged by the applicant against the judgment of divorce had been decided. 31. The applicant lodged a final appeal (recurso de súplica) with the Constitutional Court, which was dismissed on 21 December 2009 in a decision served on 20 January 2010.

4. The eight applicants were born on the dates listed in the Annex and live in Attiki. 5. The applicants are employed as nursing staff in the General Hospital of Athens “Georgios Gennimatas”. 6. On 15 June 1998 the applicants lodged an action against the hospital with the First Instance Administrative Court of Athens seeking the payment of a premium to their salary, ranging between 476,200 drachmas (approximately 1,397 euros) and 720,000 drachmas (approximately 2,112 euros), plus interest. 7. On 31 January 2000 their claim was partially accepted (judgment no. 467/2000). 8. On 14 February 2001 the hospital lodged an appeal. 9. On 27 February 2007 the Athens Administrative Court of Appeal upheld the First Instance court's decision (judgment no. 1754/2007). The applicants were served with the decision on 22 November 2007.

5. The first applicant currently lives in Turkey and the second to fifth applicants live in Stavanger, Norway. 6. The first applicant, a mechanics and a professional driver, is of Kurdish ethnic origin coming from south-east Turkey. He was not a member of any political party but like many other members of his family sympathised with the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party). During the violent conflicts between Turkish authorities and Kurdish people in 1992 and 1993 he lived in the City of Sirnak. The first applicant stated that he had assisted the PKK and that because of several occurrences he felt persecuted by Turkish authorities. Fearing for his life he found it necessary to flee in March 1993. 7. The second applicant, Mrs Naime Kaplan, married the first applicant in the early 1990s. She and the third applicant, their son Azat (born in 1993), continued to live with the first applicant’s parents in Sirnak. After the latter’s house was set on fire, she and the son spent a period as refugees in Iraq. 8. Over a period of more than a year and a half, the first applicant sojourned at several locations in Turkey. He had some contact with his wife and son and applied for visa to visit Denmark, where his older brother had obtained asylum (in 1988). Only the first applicant obtained a visa. In February 1995 he arrived in Denmark and applied for asylum. His wife and son went back to Sirnak, where she gave birth to the couple’s second son, Cemsit, in August 1995 (the fourth applicant). 9. The first applicant’s asylum application in Denmark was refused. He then stayed in several European countries and returned to Denmark where his second asylum application was refused in September 1998. 10. On 23 October 1998 he applied for asylum in Norway. The Directorate of Immigration rejected the application on 30 September 1999. His appeal to the Ministry of Justice was rejected by a decision of 21 January 2000, according to which he was under a duty to leave the country and measures were to be taken to implement this decision. 11. On 7 December 1999 the Sunnhordaland District Court (tingrett) convicted the first applicant on charges of aggravated assault and sentenced him to 90 days’ imprisonment, of which 60 days were suspended. He was found guilty of having inflicted with a kitchen knife a cut in the shoulder of another man which had been mended with three stiches. Even though the extent of the injury was not considerable, the offence was deemed very serious and could easily have had great consequences for the victim. In mitigation, the District Court had regard to its finding that, whilst it was uncertain who had started the row, the victim had gone further than the applicant and had provoked him by hitting his face with his palm and by uttering serious insults against his family. The victim had also withdrawn his criminal complaint against the applicant. The judgment was transmitted to the Directorate of Immigration for consideration of whether there was a ground for ordering his expulsion. 12. On 5 May 2000 the Ministry of Justice refused to revise its earlier rejection (of 21 January 2000) of the first applicant’s asylum application and asked the Stavanger Police to implement the decision. It contained no mention of the judgment of 7 December 1999, but on 5 May 2000 the Ministry also forwarded a copy to the Directorate of Immigration requesting it to assess whether there was a basis for expulsion. The applicant did not leave the country, and the authorities took no specific measures to deport him until he received a warning to this effect issued on 31 October 2006. 13. In 2003 the applicant was fined for driving too fast, and in 2005 and 2006 for driving without a license. 14. The second applicant arrived in Norway with the couple’s two sons and applied for asylum on 24 May 2003, which the Directorate of Immigration rejected on 30 December 2003. The Immigration Appeals Board upheld the rejection on 25 February 2005, stating that unless they left the country voluntarily, the expulsion was to be forcibly implemented, if possible in coordination with that of the first applicant. 15. On 4 August 2005 a daughter of the couple, Rojin, was born (the fifth applicant). 16. Pending amendments to the Immigration Regulations, the Directorate of Immigration decided on 19 September 2006 to stay the implementation of the decision of 25 February 2005 regarding the wife and the sons but in a separate decision, referring inter alia to his conviction of 1999, rejected the first applicant’s request to stay the implementation of the refusal of 5 may 2000 to grant him asylum. 17. Following the warning of 31 October 2006, the first applicant was on 1 November 2006 arrested and detained for two weeks with a view to deportation. On 2 November 2006 the Directorate of Immigration decided, under section 29 of the Immigration Act 1988, to order his expulsion and to prohibit his re-entry in Norway for an indefinite duration. This was because of his criminal conviction and of his long illegal stay and work in Norway. On appeal, the decision was upheld by the Immigration Appeals Board on 2 March 2007. 18. In the meantime, on 1 November 2006, the first applicant requested the Oslo City Court (tingrett) to issue an order that he be granted a residence- and work permit and an interlocutory injunction to stay his deportation pending the outcome of the judicial proceedings. 19. Following a request by the first applicant to the Immigration Appeals Board, the latter granted him on 8 November 2006 a stay of implementation of his expulsion until the City Court had decided on his request for an interim measure to stay his deportation. 20. On 5 July 2007 the Immigration Appeals Board rejected a request to revise its earlier rejection (of 25 February 2005) as there were not sufficient reasons to grant the wife and the children a residence permit on humanitarian grounds. 21. In an appeal of 18 December 2007 the applicants’ lawyer challenged the lawfulness of the decision of 5 July 2007 on the ground that Rojin had been diagnosed as suffering from child autism and had special needs. 22. In the light of this information the parties agreed before the City Court that the immigration authorities should consider the matter anew for all the family members. 23. After having decided on 3 January 2008 not to implement the expulsion with respect to the wife and the children, the Immigration Appeals Board on 28 February 2008 decided (with two votes to one) to alter its decision of 5 July 2007 and granted the second applicant, with the children, a residence- and work-permit under section 8(2) of the Immigration Act 1988 (according to which such a permit could be granted if warranted by weighty humanitarian considerations or particular links to the country, see paragraph 49 below). The majority attached decisive weight to the new information concerning the daughter’s health together with the length of the children’s residence in Norway (four years and nine months in the case of the sons). It also had regard to more recent practice of the Board. The permit was granted for a period of one year and could on certain conditions be renewed, constitute a ground for settlement permit and for family reunification. A prerequisite for the permit was that the wife continued to live in Norway. 24. On 7 April 2008 the Immigration Appeals Board carried out a new assessment of the first applicant’s immigration status. It did not alter its decision of 2 March 2007 upholding the Directorate’s decision of 2 November 2006 to order his expulsion, stating inter alia the following reasons. 25. In the Board’s view, the Directorate could in principle have responded more rapidly with regard to the question of expulsion in connection with the applicant’s conviction. The Directorate had had an occasion to bring this matter up as early as in May 2000, when the Ministry of Justice by a letter of 5 May 2000 forwarded a copy of the judgment with a request for assessment of the question of expulsion (see paragraph 12 above). By the fact that counsel for the applicant was sent a copy of the Ministry’s letter, the applicant had been made aware that the offence could constitute a ground for expulsion. The specific procedural rules concerning expulsion of convicted foreign nationals indicated in principle that a decision to expel should be made as soon as possible after conviction with no further right of appeal or after the serving of a sentence had been commenced (section 126 of the Immigration Regulations of 1990). 26. There was nevertheless nothing to prevent that the offence be taken into account at a later date together with any other factors militating in favour of expulsion in a global assessment. In the Board’s view, it could not be decisive for the applicant’s expulsion from the country pursuant to section 29 (c) of the Immigration Act that his 1999 conviction had not been raised until 2006. In this connection, it referred to the fact that at the date of the Directorate’s expulsion decision the applicant had resided unlawfully in Norway for over six years and had in addition worked without a work permit for large parts of this period. In addition, since his conviction in 1999, he had on three occasions been fined for violation of the Road Traffic Act (on the latter two occasions for driving without a driving license, see paragraph 13 above). Whilst these offences were regarded individually and on principle as being relatively minor, they ought to be viewed in connection with the applicant’s previous conviction for bodily harm, in addition to his failure to respond to the order to leave the country as well as his prolonged unlawful residence and employment throughout several years. These offences, when considered as a whole, indicated a lack of respect for Norwegian law and for Norwegian authorities’ decisions. The Board further observed that intentional or negligent violations of the Immigration Act of 1988 of the nature involved in the instant case in principle constituted a criminal offence (section 47(1)(a) of the Immigration Act of 1988). It reiterated that the legislative bill to Parliament (Ot.prp.nr. 75 (2006-2007)) stated inter alia the following with regard to expulsion on the grounds of violations of the Immigration Act (page 289): “Although such violations [i.e. gross violations of the Immigration Act] normally also may lead to criminal liability, in terms of prosecution costs, it would be advantageous if an expulsion order could be made without requiring a legally enforceable criminal judgment.” 27. On the other hand, the Board altered its decision of 2 March 2007 prohibiting the first applicant to return to Norway indefinitely and limited the prohibition to five years. A decisive consideration for this change was that his spouse and children had been granted a residence permit. The Board observed that as a starting point the first applicant’s expulsion would mean that the family would be split. However, the right of the other family members to reside in Norway did not imply any corresponding duty to do so. The whole family originated from Turkey, where the older children had been born and lived during their childhood. Their family life could in principle be secured either by the whole family moving to Turkey or through the visits of the wife and children of the husband in Turkey. His expulsion was of limited duration and at the expiry of the period it would be possible to apply for a residence permit on family reunification ground. Whether such a permit would be granted would depend on future circumstances. However, an expulsion for five years did not imply a permanent splitting of the family. 28. The Board had particular regard to the daughter’s situation, which was followed up and was to be the subject of measures in Norway, and to the scarcity and low quality of public assistance in Turkey to children suffering from handicaps and other types of illnesses affecting their functional capacities, where assistance to children suffering from autism and their parents was provided primarily by private institutions. Bearing in mind especially the daughter’s interests, the Board had understanding for the fact that the family as a whole did not prefer to return to Turkey. 29. In the light of the above, the City Court discontinued, by decisions of 23 April and 20 November 2008, the proceedings in so far as the spouse and the children were concerned. As regards the first applicant, the City Court found for the Immigration Appeals Board and rejected his request for an interlocutory injunction to stay his deportation, by a judgment and a decision of 23 April 2009. 30. On 10 July 2009 the Borgarting High Court (lagmannsrett) rejected the first applicant’s appeal against the City Court’s decision not to grant an interlocutory injunction, as did the Supreme Court on 1 September 2009. 31. On the other hand, the High Court, by a judgment of 1 March 2010, quashed the Immigration Appeals Board’s decision of 7 April 2008 as being unlawful. 32. The High Court had no doubt, nor was it disputed, that the objective conditions set out in section 29(1)(a) and (c) of the 1988 Immigration Act for ordering the first applicant’s deportation had been fulfilled; the only question was whether the measure would be proportionate as required by section 29(2). In this regard, the High Court observed that his conviction in 1999 for having caused physical injury to a third party with a knife was serious, even though there had been mitigating circumstances and the sentence (90 days of which 60 were suspended) had been relatively short. General considerations of crime prevention suggested that one ought to react to violence of this character. 33. However, the expulsion of a convicted person ought to be effected as soon as possible after the criminal judgment had become enforceable. The fact that more than six years had elapsed before concrete measures had been taken to expel him, which could hardly be due to anything else than a lack of coordination on the part of the immigration authorities, weakened the significance of the judgment. 34. On the other hand, the fact that the first applicant for a number of years had stayed and worked unlawfully in Norway was very serious and was not altered by the authorities’ passiveness. The Board had not incorrectly assessed his attachment to Norway and lack of legitimate expectations of being able to stay there. The fact that his spouse and children had been granted a residence permit would not hinder his expulsion, as this would not in the circumstances be a disproportionate measure vis-à-vis him. Another question was whether his four and half year daughter Rojin with her special care needs ought to be viewed as such extraordinary circumstances as could warrant his being able to stay in Norway. 35. On the evidence the High Court found that Rojin’s chronic and very serious degree of child autism and need for follow-up would affect the other family members strongly in the years to come and entail a burden on them far beyond the normal level. Her functional incapacity meant that she would always be dependent on her parents’ resources. Her mother was exhausted and had a marginal level of functioning. It was the father who had activated Rojin on a daily basis and she was particularly attached to him. Should he be deported it was likely that the disturbance to her development would be aggravated and would cause a further burden to the mother, to the brothers and to others who assumed responsibilities for her. 36. The High Court concluded that the first applicant’s expulsion would expose Rojin to an extraordinary burden that would not be justified by general considerations of crime prevention or immigration policy and would constitute a disproportionate measure. In this context the High Court had regard to the importance of the fact that the residence permit to the mother and the children had so far been limited to one year at a time. 37. The High Court upheld the City Court’s findings that the first applicant had not made it sufficiently probable that he upon return to Turkey would risk such persecution as could justify granting him a refugee status or would otherwise face a real danger of loss of life or exposure to inhuman treatment. 38. Finally, the High Court dismissed the claim for a residence- and work permit from the courts. 39. The State appealed to the Supreme Court (Høyesterett) challenging the High Court’s proportionality assessment under section 29(2) of the 1988 Immigration Act. 40. In its judgment of 26 November 2010 (Norsk Retstidende) (Norwegian Supreme Court Law Reports – “Rt.” p. 1430) the Supreme Court observed inter alia that considerable time had elapsed from the rejection of his asylum application in 2000 until the expulsion decision of 2006 and further to the present review of the case by the Supreme Court. Throughout this time, the first applicant had resided in Norway unlawfully, of which he had also been aware. The time factor could thus not be given particular weight in the assessment. Whilst his residence had naturally resulted in strengthening his attachment to Norway, it had equally aggravated his violations of the Immigration Act. This point of view was particularly valid in a case such as the present one, where the applicant had been aware throughout that he was required to leave the country. 41. Nor had the first applicant had any legitimate expectation of being allowed to remain in the country. Also, his criminal conviction meant that an instruction of 31 August 2006 issued by the Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion to put certain cases in abeyance, notably cases concerning applications for asylum or residence, involving or relating to children, made by persons who had resided in Norway for more than three years, did not apply to the first applicant. 42. The Supreme Court found it established that the first applicant had committed serious violations of the Immigration Act 1988 which of their own clearly constituted a sufficient ground for expulsion. An additional ground were the offences he had committed under Article 229, cf. Article 232, of the Penal Code and, albeit of lesser importance, under the Road Traffic Act. The Immigration Appeals Board had in its decision of 7 April 2008 pointed out that immigration policy considerations then ought to militate strongly in favour of upholding the expulsion order. Also the background – his unlawful stays in other European countries with unsuccessful asylum applications, including once under a false name – was a factor that to some extent went in the same direction. 43. The Supreme Court further observed that the first applicant lacked a legal basis for residing in Norway and therefore ought to leave the country in any event. What the likely outcome could be of an application for residence permit in the current situation could not enter into the consideration of the case. The disputed decision entailed the consequence for him that he would be expelled from the country for a period of five years and he could not apply for a residence- or work permit during this period. Norway’s participation in the Schengen cooperation meant as a rule that an expulsion from Norway also implied a prohibition to enter the entire Schengen Area. In the case of a foreigner, whose unlawful residence had been so extensive and so long and who had been convicted of violence, it could not be said that an expulsion in such circumstances would constitute an extraordinary burden. 44. The interests pertaining to his wife and his two eldest children could hardly speak in favour of making a different assessment than that which applied to the first applicant. They had for many years lived on their own in Turkey. That the first applicant in the event of an expulsion could not come for visit for a period of five years was a normal consequence of expulsion and did not constitute an extraordinary burden. The family life could be maintained by his wife and children travelling to Turkey for shorter or longer periods. 45. The Supreme Court also noted that, whilst the High Court had relied on the consideration that Rojin was suffering from a chronic and serious degree of child autism, the first applicant had submitted a medical statement of 27 October 2010 from which it appeared that her current diagnosis was “unspecified far-reaching developmental disturbance”. The expulsion applied for a period of five years during which the first applicant would not have the opportunity to help his daughter upon visits in the country. As already mentioned, the family contact would instead be maintained through visits in Turkey. Nor in this respect could there be a question of any extraordinary burden. 46. The Supreme Court, having regard the Court’s case-law, notably Darren Omoregie and Others v. Norway (no. 265/07, §§ 57 and 66, 31 July 2008) and the criteria of “exceptional circumstances” and “insurmountable obstacles” relied on there, concluded that the first applicant’s expulsion would not give rise to a violation of Article 8. His expulsion would not constitute a disproportionate measure vis-à-vis the other family members. 47. On 16 July 2011 the first applicant was expelled to Turkey. 48. The second to fifth applicants were granted Norwegian citizenship on 24 January 2012.

8. The first applicant, an Austrian national born in 1960 and living in Vienna, is an editorial journalist at the newspaper “Der Standard”. The second applicant is the owner and publisher of this newspaper. 9. On 26 October 1997 a group of homosexuals, the “Austrian Forum of Gays and Lesbians” (“Österreichisches Schwulen- und Lesbenforum”, ÖSLF) held a demonstration in St. Pölten, at which the editors of the magazine “Der 13. – Zeitung der Katholiken für Glaube und Kirche” (The 13th – Newspaper of Catholics for Faith and Church) took pictures of participants and published them together with an article written by K. D. in its issue of 13 November 1997. That article reflected a negative and hostile position towards homosexual relationships, suggesting, inter alia, that “they [homosexuals] ought to be disciplined 'gender-specifically' with whips and pizzles! (sie gehören 'geschlechtsspezifisch' mit Peitsche und Ochsenziemer zurechtgewiesen)” and that “nazi-methods should be applied to them!” It read further that “homosexuals now crawl like rats out of their holes and are fed 'lovingly' by politicians and church officials”. 10. Subsequently 44 homosexual persons filed a private prosecution (Privatanklage) against the author K. D. for defamation and a compensation claim under the Media Act against the owner and publisher of “Der 13.” 11. On 13 July 1998 the Linz Regional Court (Landesgericht) found that certain passages of the article constituted the offence of insult (Beleidigung) under Section 115 of the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch) and ordered the owner and publisher of “Der 13.” to pay compensation to four plaintiffs who could be identified on the pictures. It dismissed the compensation claim as regards the other plaintiffs and acquitted K. D. The court found that K. D. had not mentioned any of those plaintiffs' name in his article and that it could not be established that he had known that his text would be illustrated by these pictures. On pages 14-15 the judgment contained an excursus about the nature of homosexuality, referring to a book called “Lexicon of love (Lexikon der Liebe)” and the results of an opinion survey on this topic. It read, inter alia, that “in truth, homosexuality includes also the lesbian world and, of course, that of animals”, which was followed by a long passage describing in detail examples of same-sex practices among different animals. 12. Subsequently, politicians and representatives of the Austrian Forum of Gays and Lesbians publicly criticised the deciding judge K.-P. B. for the text and style of this judgment, which was documented in a number of press releases by the Austrian Press Agency (APA) of 13 July, 1 and 2 September 1998, including an article published by “Der Standard” with the title “The judge and the dear cattle (Der Richter und das liebe Vieh)” on 1 September 1998. 13. On 2 September 1998 “Der Standard” published two articles written by the first applicant, whereby the first one referred to the commentary (Kommentar) at issue on page 32, which read as follows: “The punishment chamber (Strenge Kammer) Samo Kobenter It is strange how often the avowed defenders of western values are inclined to adopt draconian methods when they feel them to be jeopardised by people with different beliefs, ideas or lifestyles. If a writer in some odd rag just says he would like to flog gay people or beat them with bulls' pizzles, that would not normally be worth mentioning, other than to say that everyone is entitled to live out his sexual fantasies and obsessions as he pleases, even in words, as long as the objects or subjects of his desires derive as much pleasure from it as he does. Where such matters are being dealt with in court, however, we might expect at the end of the twentieth century that a judge of even minimal enlightenment would, at the very least, deliver a judgment that differs more than somewhat from the traditions of medieval witch trials. A judge in Linz, K.-P. B., has achieved the feat of acquitting a defendant who was given the benefit of the doubt although no doubt was apparent – on the contrary, the judge's reasoning handed the flogger enough arguments to justify the threats of punishment he had made so enthusiastically, even if only in writing. That flies in the face, for a start, of any conception of law which sees the courtroom as more than just a punishment chamber for all possible tendencies. Lending support to a homophobe's venomous hate campaign with outrageous examples from the animal kingdom casts doubt on the intellectual and moral integrity of the judge concerned. The fact that public clarifications are now needed to the effect that homosexuals are not animals prompts concern about the state of this country.” 14. On 18 September 1998 judge K.-P. B. decided that the above-mentioned excursus on pages 14-15 be taken out of the judgment of 13 July 1998. 15. Subsequently disciplinary proceedings were opened against judge K.-P. B. On 20 July 1999 the Innsbruck Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht), acting as disciplinary authority, imposed the disciplinary penalty of a warning. On 20 September 1999 the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof) confirmed this decision. 16. In the meantime, judge K.-P. B. filed a private prosecution against the first applicant for defamation (Üble Nachrede) and a compensation claim under the Media Act against the second applicant on account of the above article published on 2 September 1998. 17. On 29 June 1999 the St. Pölten Regional Court convicted the first applicant of defamation under Section 111 §§ 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code and imposed a fine of ATS 13,500 (EUR 981) on him, suspended on one year's probationary period. It also ordered the second applicant to pay ATS 50,000 (EUR 3633) in compensation to judge K.-P. B. under Section 6 of the Media Act and to publish the judgment. It found in particular that the following statements were capable of lowering judge K.-P. B. in the public esteem, constituting the slanderous reproach that he had violated his obligations under the law and the rules on professional conduct (Gesetzes- und Standespflichten), required of a judge: a) the judgment delivered by the private prosecutor would only differ somewhat from the traditions of medieval witch trials (das vom Privatankläger gefällte Urteil würde sich nur “marginal von den Traditionen mittelalterlicher Hexenprozesse abheben”) and b) that judge K.-P. B. would lend support to a homophobe's venomous hate campaign with outrageous examples from the animal kingdom (und dieser würde “die geifernde Hetze eines Homophoben mit haarsträubenden Belegen aus dem Tierreich stützen”). 18. The Court noted, inter alia, that even if the reasoning of that judgment contained irrelevant annotations, it could not be inferred from it that the private prosecutor K.-P. B. believed that different rights were accorded to homosexuals and heterosexuals, nor that he had compared homosexuals with animals or that he had put them on an equal footing. 19. On 11 November 1999 the applicants appealed against this judgment, claiming that the article at issue criticised exclusively the reasoning of the judgment and not the way in which judge K.-P. B. had conducted the trial. The statements were permissible value judgments based on facts and, thus, protected under Article 10 of the Convention. Arguing that journalistic liberty also allowed a certain degree of exaggeration and even provocation, and considering the public discussion caused by the reasoning of the judgment not only in various media but also among judges, the polemical style of the article was not disproportionate either. 20. On 16 February 2000 the Vienna Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants' appeal and confirmed the Regional Court's judgment. It found that an average reader, interested in the subject-matter, would understand by the first statement that the private prosecutor had grossly violated fundamental procedural rights, such as the principles of impartiality and adversarial hearings, which were regularly breached in medieval witch trials. Thus, this reproach of violating the rules on professional conduct required of a judge consisted in concrete facts, which were not proved true by the records of the trial. The second statement was not only a value judgment, but also insinuated that judge K.-P. B. had sided with the accused K. D. and had, thus, been partial. As it was not mentioned in the article that judge K.-P. B. had impartially conducted the trial and that only certain passages of the judgment were subject to that criticism, the statements could not be considered as value judgments based on facts. Rather, in their context, they were disparaging statements of facts, falling outside the scope of protection of Article 10 of the Convention. Since certain passages of the above judgment proved to be legally superfluous, as affirmed by the private prosecutor's decision of 18 September 1998 taking them out, they could have been subject to (fair) comment.

5. The applicant was born in 1937 and lives in Novocherkassk, a town in the Rostov Region. He is a retired military officer. 6. In August 2004 the applicant brought proceedings against the Military Service Commission of Novocherkassk (Военный комиссариат г. Новочеркасска – “the Commission”) seeking to recover his pension arrears from January 1995 to March 1998 to take account of the increase of the minimum monthly wage. 7. On 15 September 2004 the Novocherkassk Town Court of the Rostov Region granted the applicant's claim and awarded him 252,510.91 roubles (RUR) in arrears. The court held that the judgment should be enforced immediately. The Commission missed the statutory time-limit for lodging an ordinary appeal against the judgment, and it became final on 25 September 2004. 8. The Novocherkassk Town Court of the Rostov Region issued the applicant with a warrant of execution which the applicant submitted to the Commission on 11 October 2004. The Commission, however, did not comply with the judgment of 15 September 2004 and instead filed an application for review of the judgment due to what it considered to be newly discovered circumstances. 9. On 10 February 2005 the Novocherkassk Town Court of the Rostov Region dismissed the Commission's request. 10. In July 2005 the applicant brought proceedings against the Commission in the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Rostov-on-Don seeking to recover his pension arrears from January 1995 to March 1998 relating to a long-service bonus and inflation. 11. On 18 July 2005 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Rostov-on-Don granted the applicant's claim and obliged the Commission to recalculate the applicant's pension from January 1995 to March 1998 in view of the 25% increase of the salary and the variation of the consumer price index in the Rostov Region between 1 February 1995 and 31 December 2004. 12. On 24 October 2005 the amount of RUR 14,038.44 was paid into the applicant's bank account following the judgment of 18 July 2005. 13. On 19 September 2005 the Commission filed an application for supervisory review of the judgment of Novocherkassk Town Court of 15 September 2004, referring to the lack of grounds in domestic law for increasing the applicant's pension, and asked for the stay of enforcement. 14. On 5 October 2005 the Rostov Regional Court examined the above application and decided to obtain the case file. The enforcement proceedings were suspended. The Rostov Regional Court remitted the supervisory review application for examination on its merits by the Presidium. 15. On 12 January 2006 the Presidium of the Rostov Regional Court held a supervisory review hearing. It concluded that the first-instance court had erroneously applied the substantive law and that the matter should have been examined by a district court rather than a town court. On these grounds it quashed the judgment of 15 September 2004 and remitted the matter to the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Rostov-on-Don for a fresh examination. 16. On 15 February 2006 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Rostov-on-Don discontinued the proceedings having considered the dispute at issue to be the same as the one examined by it on 18 July 2005.

7. The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Kursk. 8. The applicant worked as a forwarding agent for a catering enterprise. In January 1999 the enterprise’s director instructed him to sell 10 tonnes of flour. The applicant sold the flour, purchased certain foodstuffs with the money thus raised and paid the transportation expenses. The director refused to accept the foodstuffs and asked the applicant to remit the value of the flour. The applicant sold the foodstuffs but the amount raised was insufficient to cover that value. The applicant offered various other goods in payment of the outstanding amount. The director refused to accept them. It appears that the applicant was subsequently dismissed. In January 2000 criminal proceedings for embezzlement were brought against the applicant. From 25 January 2000 to 4 February 2000 he was held in pre-trial detention. 9. On an unspecified date the applicant fully reimbursed the value of the flour. 10. On 17 May 2000 the Leninskiy District Court of Kursk convicted the applicant of embezzlement. He was given a two-year suspended prison sentence and fined 2,087.25 Russian roubles (RUR), which he paid. 11. The Kursk Regional Court upheld the judgment on 20 June 2000. 12. On 18 July 2001, following an application for supervisory review lodged by the Deputy President of the Supreme Court of Russia, the Presidium of the Kursk Regional Court quashed the sentence and terminated the criminal proceedings against the applicant on the basis that there was no indication that an offence had been committed. 13. On 17 August 2001 the applicant brought proceedings against the Ministry of Finance seeking compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage caused by the criminal proceedings against him, in particular as a result of his detention between 25 January 2000 and 4 February 2000 and his conviction of 17 May 2000. 14. The Leninskiy District Court of Kursk partially granted the claim for damages on 12 November 2001. 15. On 18 December 2001 the Kursk Regional Court quashed the judgment and remitted the case for a fresh examination. 16. The Leninskiy District Court of Kursk partially granted the claim for damages on 10 January 2002. 17. On 14 March 2002 the Kursk Regional Court once more quashed the judgment and remitted the case for a fresh examination. 18. On 16 April 2002 the Leninskiy District Court of Kursk partially granted the claim for damages. The court awarded the applicant RUR 15,000 in damages and RUR 3,700 for costs. The judgment stated: “Under Article 1070 of the Civil Code, damage caused to a citizen as a result of unlawful conviction, unlawful criminal prosecution, unlawful application of detention as a preventive measure ... shall be compensated at the expense of the Treasury of the Russian Federation. ... Under Article 1100 compensation for non-pecuniary damage shall be effectuated irrespective of the fault of the causer of the damage where the damage is caused as a result of unlawful conviction, unlawful criminal prosecution. ... On the foregoing grounds ... the court has decided to award [damages] against the Ministry of Finance in favour of [Mr] Shatunov...” 19. By a final decision of 14 May 2002 the Kursk Regional Court varied the judgment and awarded the applicant RUR 25,000 in damages and RUR 4,700 for costs. 20. On 23 April 2002 the applicant brought proceedings seeking compensation for the fine he had been ordered to pay in the judgment of 17 May 2000. 21. By a final decision of 17 June 2002 the Leninskiy District Court of Kursk granted the claim and ordered the Ministry of Finance to pay the applicant RUR 2,087. 22. On 28 May 2002 the Leninskiy District Court of Kursk issued a writ of execution for recovery of RUR 29,700 from the Ministry of Finance, pursuant to the judgment of 16 April 2002, which had been varied on appeal on 14 May 2002. 23. On an unspecified date the same court issued a writ of execution for recovery of RUR 2,087 from the Ministry of Finance, pursuant to the ruling of 17 June 2002. 24. It appears that the applicant initially sent the writs to the First Department of the Bailiffs’ Service for the Central District of Moscow. In a letter of 5 September 2002 the Ministry of Justice informed the applicant that a writ of execution had been transferred to the Second Department of the Bailiffs’ Service for the Central District of Moscow. It is not clear which of the two writs was referred to in the letter. Nevertheless, it appears that both writs either remained in, or were subsequently returned to, the First Department of the Bailiffs’ Service. 25. The First Department of the Bailiffs’ Service transferred both writs to the Second Department of the Bailiffs’ Service on 22 April 2004. 26. On 1 June 2004 the Second Department of the Bailiffs’ Service returned the writ for recovery of RUR 29,700 to the applicant because it did not meet the statutory requirements. In particular, the date of issue of the writ and the time-limit for its submission for execution had not been indicated. The applicant was also advised that, pursuant to a Government Decree of 9 September 2002, writs against the Treasury of the Russian Federation were to be sent for execution to the Ministry of Finance. It appears that the applicant applied to the Leninskiy District Court of Kursk to have the writ amended. 27. On 5 July 2004 the Second Department of the Bailiffs’ Service transferred the writ for recovery of RUR 2,087 to the Leninskiy District Court of Kursk, apparently because it too failed to meet the statutory requirements. 28. On an unspecified date the Leninskiy District Court of Kursk returned the writ for recovery of RUR 2,087 to the applicant and advised him that it should be sent to the Ministry of Finance. 29. The Leninskiy District Court of Kursk sent the writ for recovery of RUR 29,700 to the applicant on 26 July 2004. 30. In July and August 2004 the applicant sent both writs to the Ministry of Finance. 31. According to the Government, on 27 July 2004 the Ministry of Finance had received the writ of execution for recovery of RUR 2,087. On 6 October 2004 the Ministry of Finance had returned the writ of execution to the applicant, stating that it did not meet the statutory requirements in that the time-limit for its submission for execution had not been indicated and the operative part of the judgment had been cited incorrectly. 32. According to the Government, on 24 August 2004 the Ministry of Finance had received the writ of execution for recovery of RUR 29,700. On 27 May 2005 the writ had been returned to the applicant because it did not meet the statutory requirements. In particular, the time-limit for its submission for execution had not been indicated. Furthermore, the decision of the Kursk Regional Court of 14 May 2002 had not specified that the amount was to be recovered from the Treasury of the Russian Federation. 33. On 2 November 2004 the applicant applied to the Leninskiy District Court of Kursk to have the writ for recovery of RUR 2,087 amended. On 1 December 2004 the writ was again received by the Ministry of Finance. According to the Government, the payment pursuant to the writ had been made by the Ministry of Finance on 5 May 2005. According to the applicant, the writ had never been executed. 34. According to the Government, on 4 July 2005 the writ of execution for recovery of RUR 29,700 had again been received by the Ministry of Finance. However, its defects had not been rectified. For these reasons it had again been returned to the applicant. 35. According to the applicant, neither writ has been executed.

4. The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Istanbul. 5. In May 1992 he was taken into police custody on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation and detained on remand. He was subsequently charged with carrying out activities for the purpose of bringing about the secession of part of the national territory under Article 125 of the Criminal Code and tried before the Diyarbakır State Security Court. 6. On 8 December 1994 the applicant was released pending trial. 7. On 30 March 1995 the first-instance court acquitted the applicant of the charges brought against him. 8. On 29 February 1996 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the Diyarbakır State Security Court. 9. On 25 October 1996 the applicant filed an action for compensation with the Kartal Assize Court against the Treasury, pursuant to Law no. 466. The applicant requested a compensation of 2,000,000,000 Turkish liras (TRL) for his unjustified detention on remand. 10. On 2 December 1996 the Kartal Assize Court requested the Diyarbakır State Security Court to send the documents pertaining to the criminal proceedings against the applicant. In particular, the first-instance court requested that the documents showing the date on which the judgment had become final be sent promptly in order to determine whether the applicant had filed his compensation claim within the statutory time-limit. 11. Between 2 December 1996 and 30 November 1999 the Kartal Assize Court consistently requested the Diyarbakır State Security Court to send the aforementioned documents. 12. On 10 November 1999 the Kartal Assize Court appointed an expert to calculate the pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant due to his deprivation of liberty. 13. On 24 November 1999 the expert submitted his report concerning the amount of pecuniary damage. 14. On 30 November 1999 the Kartal Assize Court awarded the applicant a certain amount of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage to compensate the periods the applicant had spent in police custody and in detention on remand. 15. The applicant and the Ministry of Treasury appealed against the judgment of the Kartal Assize Court. 16. On 5 October 2000 the Court of Cassation held that the amount awarded to the applicant was too low and quashed the judgment of the first‑instance court. 17. On 9 November 2000 the expert appointed by the first-instance court submitted a report concerning the amount of pecuniary damage the applicant sustained as a result of his deprivation of liberty. 18. On 10 November 2000 the Kartal Assize Court awarded the applicant TRL 1,538,492,740 in respect of pecuniary and non‑pecuniary damage. 19. The Ministry of Treasury appealed. 20. On 5 April 2001 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the first-instance court due to a procedural error. 21. On 28 June 2001 the Kartal Assize Court once again awarded the applicant TRL 1,538,492,740. 22. The Ministry of Treasury appealed. 23. On 8 November 2001 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the Kartal Assize Court.

4. The applicants were born in 1951, 1959, 1952 and 1953 respectively. All four are Ukrainian nationals and reside in the town of Smila, in the Cherkassy region, Ukraine. 5. On 8 February 1999 the third and fourth applicants were arrested. They were remanded in custody and charged with smuggling. 6. On 30 March 1999 criminal proceedings were instituted against the first applicant for tax evasion. On 8 May 1999 new charges of smuggling were brought against him. On 10 May 1999 he was arrested and remanded in custody. 7. On 14 July 1999 criminal proceedings were instituted against the second applicant for forging documents and tax evasion. The second applicant gave an undertaking not to abscond. 8. Later, given the common factual and legal background of the above criminal cases, they were joined. 9. The first, third and fourth applicants remained in pre-trial detention until 14 July 2000, 7 June 1999 and 5 July 2000 respectively. 10. On 30 September pre-trial investigation was terminated and the criminal case was sent to the Smila Court. 11. On 12 October 1999 the court started considering the case. 12. On 21 April 2000 it remitted the case for additional investigation. 13. On 16 May 2000 the Cherkassy Regional Court quashed that decision and remitted the case to the first-instance court. 14. On 11 September 2000 the Smila Court acquitted the applicants. 15. On 17 October 2000 the Cherkassy Regional Court, following an appeal by a local prosecutor’s office, quashed that judgment and remitted the case for fresh consideration by the Cherkassy District Court. The applicants were ordered not to leave their place of permanent residence. 16. Between 14 December 2000 and 22 February 2001 the Cherkassy District Court held six hearings. No hearings were scheduled between 22 February and 2 August 2001. 17. On 2 August 2001 the Cherkassy District Court suspended the proceedings as the fourth applicant had absconded. It ordered the prosecutor’s office to put the fourth applicant on the list of wanted persons. 18. During this period, the first and second applicants submitted repeated requests to the Cherkassy District Court and the Cherkassy Regional Court of Appeal for their case to be examined separately from that of the fourth applicant. 19. In a letter of 3 March 2003, the Cherkassy District Court indicated, in particular, that the authorities had failed to take necessary measures to find the fourth applicant. It ordered the Prosecutor of Smila, the Prosecutor of the Cherkassy Region and the officials of the Cherkassy Department of the Interior to issue a separate indictment concerning the first and the second applicants and to take measures to find the fourth applicant. 20. On 23 April 2003, in the course of the court hearing, the prosecutor’s office submitted an amended indictment in respect of the first applicant and discontinued the tax evasion proceedings against him. 21. On 14 May 2003 the fourth applicant appeared before the court. 22. On 11 November 2003 the Cherkassy District Court acquitted the second applicant. It convicted the other applicants and gave them a three-year suspended prison sentence. The applicants were ordered not to leave their place of permanent residence. 23. The judgment was appealed against by the third and fourth applicants and by the prosecutor. 24. On 28 November 2003 the same court declared an appeal by the third and fourth applicants inadmissible as it had been lodged out of time. 25. On 13 April 2004 the Cherkassy Regional Court of Appeal allowed in part the appeal by the prosecutor and rejected the objections of the first and second applicants. It slightly amended the judgment of 11 November 2003. 26. On 22 March 2005 the Supreme Court quashed the ruling of 28 November 2003. 27. On 6 September 2005 the Cherkassy Regional Court of Appeal dismissed appeals by the third and fourth applicants and upheld the judgment of 11 November 2003. 28. On 17 November 2005 the first, third and fourth applicants withdrew their cassation appeals against the judgment of 11 November 2003, and on 24 January 2006 the Supreme Court terminated the cassation proceedings.

5. The applicants were born in 1944 and 1945 respectively and live in the village of Dospey. 6. The applicants are the parents of Angel Georgiev, who died on 26 December 1993, aged 23. 7. In the criminal proceedings related to Angel Georgiev’s death, the national courts established the relevant facts as follows. 8. On the evening of 25 December 1993 the applicants’ son was with friends of his in a bar in the town of Samokov. At some point an argument and a fight erupted between Angel and his friends and another group, one of whom was K.S. O.V., who was working as a security guard in the bar, attempted to separate the two groups, but was himself beaten up. The two groups went on to another bar, where there was another argument. The two groups then left. 9. O.V. gathered friends of his, who took several cars and started searching the streets for the people who had beaten him up. They found Angel Georgiev’s group, walking home. O.V. and his friend B.G. were among the first to get out of the cars. O.V. went first for Angel Georgiev’s brother, who ran away, while at the same time B.G. hit Angel Georgiev with a wooden plank. Angel fell to the ground, but managed to stand up again, and was then attacked by O.V. The two of them struggled briefly, until O.V. drew back, saying that Angel had stabbed him in the abdomen. O.V. was then taken by his friends to a hospital, and Angel ran away. 10. During that time K.S. and his friends had also been driving around the area. They heard people fighting in the distance and approached them. They saw somebody, who turned out to be Angel Georgiev, lying on the ground. First they kicked him repeatedly, but then became aware that he had been seriously wounded. They fled the scene, leaving him lying on the ground. 11. Angel Georgiev’s body was found by his brother the following morning, 26 December 1993, at the place where he had been left by K.S. and his friends, namely about 200 metres away from the scene of the struggle with O.V. Next to the body lay the pocket knife with which Angel had stabbed O.V. as found later by the investigation and the national courts. There were shoeprints and car-tyre tracks around the body. 12. A post-mortem report showed that the applicants’ son had been lethally stabbed in the back. The blow had been administered while he had been standing, with considerable force. For some time thereafter, he had still been capable of moving and even running. He had died as a result of a hemorrhage in the chest cavity. There were other wounds and bruises on his face and head, which were unrelated to the cause of death. 13. Criminal proceedings in connection with Angel Georgiev’s murder were opened on 26 December 1993. 14. The place where his body had been found was inspected on the same day. 15. In the weeks that followed many of the participants in the events were interviewed by the investigating authorities. Some of them were interviewed again in 1997, after the prosecutor supervising the case had found that the relevant circumstances had not been adequately established. 16. On 28 December 1993 and 9 February 1994 respectively, the investigator in charge of the case charged K.S. and O.V. with Angel’s murder. K.S. was remanded in custody from 28 December 1993 to 2 March 1994, and O.V. from 9 February to 8 March 1994. The two accused were questioned on numerous occasions. K.S. denied having killed Angel Georgiev. O.V. initially confessed to having stabbed the victim but then withdrew his confession, explaining that K.S. had asked him to make it. On 13 May 1996 the investigator organised a confrontation between the two accused in order to clarify their versions of the events. 17. The investigator in charge of the case commissioned several reports by medical and other experts. 18. On 24 June 1994 the applicants were presented with the evidence collected thus far and given a chance to comment on it. On several subsequent occasions they were again given an opportunity to acquaint themselves with the case file and to comment. 19. In June and December 1994, January and November 1996, and then in December 1997 the investigator in charge of the case sent the case file to the prosecution, proposing either to stay the proceedings or to indict K.S. and O.V. However, each time the supervising prosecutor remitted the case, considering that further evidence needed to be collected, or that the procedural rights of the two accused had not been respected. In particular, on 9 December 1996 the prosecutor ordered the detailed questioning of the participants in the altercation, with a view to establishing their position, actions and observations during the incident. The prosecutor also instructed the investigating authorities to identify the owner of the knife discovered in the proximity of the victim’s body and which knife had been apparently used by the victim to stab O.V. This latter instruction was subsequently repeated in another prosecutor’s ruling of 29 January 1998. In 1996 the prosecutor replaced the investigator dealing with the case. 20. Once the preliminary investigation was completed in 1999, the prosecutor indicted K.S. and O.V. and they were brought before a court. 21. At a court hearing on 9 June 1999 the applicants joined the proceedings as private prosecutors and civil claimants. 22. In a judgment of 5 June 2000 the Sofia Regional Court found O.V. guilty of murdering the applicants’ son, sentenced him to thirteen and a half years’ imprisonment and ordered him to pay damages to the applicants. On the grounds, among others, that the victim’s blood had been found on O.V.’s clothes, it concluded that O.V. had stabbed him in the back during the short struggle between the two of them. Moreover, B.G. had seen a knife in O.V.’s hands at an earlier point, and it had not been shown that any of the other participants in the fight had had a knife. 23. The Regional Court considered that there was no evidence that K.S. had in any way caused Angel Georgiev’s death, and accordingly acquitted him. 24. O.V. lodged an appeal against that judgment. The decision to acquit K.S. entered into force, as it had not been challenged by the prosecution or the applicants. 25. On 30 April 2002 the Sofia Court of Appeal quashed the lower court’s judgment, finding that O.V.’s conviction had been impermissibly based on assumptions. It acquitted him and disallowed the applicants’ civil claim, noting, in particular, that it had not been established that when he had attacked Angel Georgiev, O.V. had been in possession of the knife which had allegedly been seen earlier. It was also significant that the knife used to stab Angel Georgiev had never been found. In addition, none of the eyewitnesses to O.V.’s struggle with Angel Georgiev had seen him stab the victim. As O.V. had himself been stabbed by Angel, the struggle between the two of them had been brief. O.V. had then left the scene and had been taken to hospital. It was thus possible that the applicants’ son had been stabbed by someone else after O.V.’s departure, or even before that, as the post-mortem and other medical reports showed that after having been fatally stabbed, Angel had still been capable of moving and participating in the fight. The victim’s blood had also been discovered on K.S.’s clothes, and it might have been discovered on the clothes of other participants in the fight, had they been seized and inspected during the initial investigation. Accordingly, there could be different plausible versions of the facts preceding Angel Georgiev’s death, which meant that O.V.’s guilt had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. 26. Following an appeal by the prosecution, on 6 February 2003 the Supreme Court of Cassation quashed the above-mentioned judgment and remitted the case, finding that the lower court had not duly taken into account the incriminating evidence, in particular the presence of the victim’s blood on the accused’s clothes. 27. In a judgment of 8 April 2003 the Sofia Court of Appeal once again acquitted O.V. and dismissed the applicants’ civil claim. It again found that it had not been established beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had fatally stabbed the applicants’ son. It pointed out that it had not been shown that during the struggle with Angel, O.V. had had a knife, as none of the eyewitnesses had seen him brandish, pick up or use one. If he had had a knife at that time, it was unclear what had happened to it after the stabbing. As to the blood on O.V.’s clothes, it could be explained by the fact that B.G. had already hit Angel in the face with a wooden plank, which had provoked bleeding. One of the other participants in the fight could have stabbed the applicants’ son. It was significant in that regard that when K.S. and his friends arrived at the scene, the fight was still going on. Lastly, the Court of Appeal noted that the prosecution had also faced difficulties in establishing who had stabbed the applicants’ son, and had thus indicted two persons, O.V. and K.S., leaving to the courts the “choice” as to which of the two was guilty. 28. The applicants and the prosecution appealed against the above‑mentioned judgment. On 18 March 2004 the Supreme Court of Cassation quashed it and remitted the case. It found this time that there had been breaches of the procedural rules. 29. In a judgment of 7 April 2005 the Sofia Court of Appeal acquitted O.V. once again and dismissed the applicants’ civil claim. It found that there was no conclusive evidence that the accused had committed the offence. 30. The applicants and the prosecution again lodged appeals on points of law. 31. In a judgment of 18 May 2006 the Supreme Court of Cassation quashed the lower court’s judgment and remitted the case. It considered again that the Court of Appeal had not sufficiently accounted for the fact that there had been traces of the victim’s blood on the accused’s clothes and that B.G. had stated that before the fight he had seen the accused holding a knife. 32. In a judgment of 11 January 2007 the Sofia Court of Appeal acquitted O.V., finding that in view of the evidence collected, more than one conclusion could be drawn as to who had fatally stabbed the applicants’ son. The Court of Appeal noted that the victim had apparently already been bleeding when he had exchanged blows with O.V., because B.G. had already hit him with a plank, which could explain why O.V.’s clothes were smeared with the victim’s blood. In addition, none of the witnesses had seen O.V. stab the victim and the knife used for the murder had never been found; moreover, B.G.’s statement that he had seen O.V. holding a knife was not convincing, as it contradicted his other statements. It was thus possible that someone else had stabbed the applicants’ son; no definite conclusion could be drawn in that regard, since during the preliminary investigation it had not been established whether anyone else had had a knife, the clothes of the other people involved in the fight had not been examined, and the investigating authorities had not carried out a more extensive search of the area where the fight had taken place in order to locate the knife which had caused the lethal wound. Lastly, it appeared that even at the stage of the preliminary investigation it had been difficult to establish who had dealt the fatal blow to Angel Georgiev; that is why the prosecution had indicted two persons, even though it had been clear that the young man had died as a result of a single stab in the back. 33. The applicants and the prosecution lodged appeals on points of law against that judgment. 34. In a final judgment of 28 June 2007 the Supreme Court of Cassation upheld the lower court’s judgment, endorsing its reasoning.

5. The applicant was born in 1931 and lives in Wrocław. 6. In 1997 the applicant instituted civil proceedings in which he asked for the division of his late parents’ marital property. The applicant’s mother died in the 1960s and he was her heir. The applicant’s father died in 1992 and his second wife inherited after him according to his last will. The applicant claimed that his parents’ marital property included a collection of 300 valuable paintings worth approximately 460,000 Polish zlotys (PLN). The applicant’s father’s second wife contested the fact that the paintings belonged to the estate in question and submitted that they were her own assets. 7. On 23 December 1997 the applicant was exempted from court fees. 8. In 2001 the other party to the proceedings, the second wife of the applicant’s late father, died and her daughter joined the proceedings as her heir. 9. On 17 July 2003 the Wrocław District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) decided of its own motion to order the preparation of an expert opinion regarding the value and origin of the paintings allegedly acquired during the applicant’s parents’ marriage. The court found that the applicant described many of the paintings, some of which had been in the possession of the other party and whose existence and ownership had been contested, as belonging to his parents. The assessment of his submissions required special knowledge concerning the authors of the paintings, their description and authenticity. It had thus been impossible to assess those issues without the assistance of an expert. The court considered that since the applicant had initiated the proceedings he should bear the costs of the opinion and ordered him to pay PLN 5,000 (approximately 1,200 euros (EUR)) as an advance on the costs of the expert opinion. 10. On 21 August 2003 the applicant applied for an exemption from court fees. He submitted that he was a pensioner and was receiving an old‑age pension of PLN 550. His unemployed wife and her mentally handicapped brother, the latter receiving PLN 400 in invalidity benefit, were both in his sole charge. The applicant explained that although he had been represented by a lawyer of his choice, the latter had not received any payment but had agreed to accept a certain percentage of the award received at the end of the proceedings. 11. On 12 January 2004 the Wrocław District Court dismissed his application. The court acknowledged the applicant’s difficult financial situation. However, it considered that since the beginning of the proceedings in 1997 he should have saved money for the purpose of paying the future court fees. The court calculated that by putting aside between ten and twenty percent of his income the applicant could have saved up PLN 5,000 since 1997. 12. The applicant’s lawyer appealed against this decision, explaining at length the difficult financial situation of the applicant’s family. He submitted that 75% of the family’s monthly income went on rent for their flat, monthly charges and the costs of medicines for the applicant and his wife’s brother. The remaining sum of money did not allow for any savings; in fact, it was not sufficient for the applicant to support himself and his family; they had been surviving with the financial help of their friends and relatives. 13. On 15 April 2004 the Wrocław Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) dismissed the appeal. The court underlined the fact that the applicant had already benefited from an exemption from the court fees for lodging his civil claim, thus it had not been justified to expect the State Treasury to cover further costs for the applicant. 14. On 18 November 2004 the Wrocław District Court gave a decision in the applicant’s case in which it divided the property in question. The court found that the estate in question consisted only of a wardrobe and a grandfather clock. The applicant was awarded the latter and ordered to pay the other party PLN 2,225 and to reimburse them PLN 14,400 for the costs of the proceedings. With regard to the issue of the expert opinion concerning the paintings that had been described by the applicant as having been acquired during his father’s first marriage, the court found: “The consequence [of the applicant’s failure to pay the court fees for the expert opinion] was to omit this evidence as the court had established that this evidence was not necessary to reach a decision in the instant case – it was not the only piece of evidence on which it could base its finding. Producing this evidence was in the applicant’s own interest, as he had borne the burden of providing evidence of the elements of the estate that belonged to his parents and was his mother’s inheritance. The assessment of other evidence collected in the case leads to unequivocal conclusion that the marital property in question did not include any of the known and existing paintings of the disputed collection.” 15. The applicant’s lawyer appealed against the decision in particular as regards the court’s assessment that the paintings had not belonged to his parents’ estate. 16. The court ordered the applicant to pay court fees for his appeal in the amount of PLN 4,649. The applicant appealed against this decision and applied to be exempted from court fees. 17. On 22 April 2005 the Wrocław District Court, composed of the same judge who had given the decision on the merits in the applicant’s case, dismissed his application. The court found that the applicant’s financial standing had not changed since 2004 when his application for exemption from the court fees for the expert opinion had been dismissed. Moreover, he had not incurred any expenses afterwards as he had failed to pay for the expert opinion. Thus, in the court’s opinion the applicant should have saved enough money to pay the future costs of the proceedings. 18. The applicant’s lawyer appealed against the decision. 19. On 7 July 2005 the Wrocław District Court partly allowed the appeal and exempted the applicant from fees exceeding PLN 600 (approximately EUR 150). The court considered that a total refusal to exempt the applicant from court fees for pursuing his appeal would deprive him of the possibility to pursue his claim before the second-instance court. It found however that the applicant would be able to pay the sum of PLN 600 without harming his own well-being or that of his family. It based its finding on the fact that the applicant’s monthly income was PLN 700 and the family’s income had also included his wife’s brother’s monthly benefit of PLN 450. 20. Since the applicant failed to pay the court fees for proceeding with his appeal, on 19 September 2005 the Wrocław District Court rejected the appeal.

4. The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Gdańsk, Poland. 5. On 16 July 2004 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of robbery. On 17 July 2004 the Gdańsk District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) ordered that the applicant be remanded in custody until 16 October 2004. It found that there were reasonable grounds – in particular, evidence from witnesses – for suspecting him of the offence charged. The court further noted that the applicant was liable to a statutory maximum sentence of at least 12 years’ imprisonment. It also found that there was a risk that the applicant might tamper with evidence. 6. On 11 October 2004 the Gdańsk District Court prolonged the applicant’s detention until 16 January 2005. It considered that the reasons for keeping him in detention were still valid and the need to secure the proper conduct of the investigation justified holding him in custody. It referred to the likelihood of a severe sentence of imprisonment being imposed on the applicant. It also found that there was a risk that the applicant might tamper with evidence, given the nature of the charges against him and the fact that he had acted with other co-accused. 7. The applicant’s detention was subsequently prolonged by the District Court on unspecified dates. The courts’ decisions were based on Article 258 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which lists grounds for pre-trial detention, such as, the risk that an accused will abscond or go into hiding or a justified fear that an accused will attempt to induce witnesses or co-defendants to give false testimony or to obstruct the proper course of proceedings by any other unlawful means. 8. On 27 October 2005 the Gdańsk District Court convicted the applicant of two counts of robbery and sentenced him to 3 years and 6 months’ imprisonment. The applicant appealed. 9. On 26 September 2006 the Gdańsk Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) upheld the impugned judgment. 10. The applicant did not lodge a cassation appeal. 11. The applicant’s letter to the Court dated 24 November 2004 bears a stamp marked “censored” (cenzurowano), “the prosecutor” (prokurator) followed by an illegible signature. It appears that the envelope in which that letter was sent had been cut open and subsequently resealed with adhesive tape. According to the postmark the letter was posted on 8 December 2004. 12.The application form submitted by the applicant and dated 13 January 2005 bears a stamp marked “censored” (cenzurowano), “the judge” (sędzia) followed by an illegible signature. The envelope bears a stamp confirming that the applicant’s letter was received for dispatch by the prison administration on 18 January 2005. However, according to the postmark the letter was not posted until 31 January 2005. It also appears that the envelope was cut open and subsequently resealed with adhesive tape.

5. The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Tomsk. 6. The regional security service (the “FSB”) suspected the applicant and F. of involvement in a number of crimes including extortion and kidnapping. On an unspecified date the FSB agents received information indicating that the applicant and F. had beaten Ch. to death. They accordingly informed the investigator from the regional prosecutor’s office who was in charge of the investigation into Ch.’s death. The investigator asked the officers to arrest both suspects. 7. On 25 May 2006 the FSB officer D. telephoned the applicant and asked him to come over to the FSB premises to make a photocopy of his passport. 8. On the same day M., a friend of the applicant’s, drove the applicant to the FSB office. The applicant entered the FSB premises at about noon. M. waited for him for about two hours and then drove off. 9. At the FSB premises the applicant was taken to office no. 320 and handcuffed. According to the applicant, in the office the FSB officers had started kicking and punching him, urging him to confess to Ch.’s murder. They had stuffed a cloth into his mouth to stifle his cries. From time to time they had put a bag over his head to suffocate him. The beatings had lasted several hours. During that time the applicant did not received any food. Before the investigator’s arrival, the officers had let the applicant wash the blood off his face and clean up his clothes. 10. At 10.54 p.m. of the same day, 25 May 2006, the investigator in charge of the criminal case drew up the record of the applicant’s arrest at the FSB premises. According to the arrest record, the applicant was arrested at 12.30 p.m. on the same day. The document contained the following statement made by the applicant: “I have nothing to do with Ch.’s murder; [I] have no comments as regards [my] arrest.” 11. After the questioning the FSB officers took the applicant to the temporary detention centre in the regional police department. The officers on duty at the centre refused to admit the applicant because he appeared to be injured. The FSB officers then took the applicant to a hospital, where he was examined by a doctor. The doctor documented the following injuries on the applicant’s body: “contusion of the right side of the chest, the right knee joint and the soft tissue of the head”. 12. On 26 May 2006 the applicant was taken back to the temporary detention centre. On the same day he was transferred to remand prison no. IZ-70/1. Upon arrival, the applicant was examined by a paramedic who documented the following injuries: two yellowish bruises on the right shoulder joint measuring 2 by 3 cm and a pinkish semi-round bruise on the right wrist. The applicant informed the officer on duty that his injuries had been inflicted by FSB officers. 13. On 28 May 2006 the applicant complained to the prison doctor about a pain of medium intensity in the lower ribcage. The doctor examined the applicant, diagnosed him with a contusion of the right side of the chest and prescribed treatment. 14. On 31 May 2006 the governor of the remand prison, referring to the applicant’s allegations that he had been beaten up while in the FSB custody, forwarded the relevant documents to the prosecutor’s office. 15. On 27 June 2006 a military investigator, Ts., questioned the applicant about his injuries. The latter refused to make any statement in this regard. 16. On 3 July 2006 Ts. found the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment unsubstantiated and decided not to institute criminal proceedings into the matter. The relevant part of the decision reads: “[On 25 May 2006] at about 12.30 p.m. [the applicant] reported to [the FSB premises]. [Officer V.] took [the applicant] to office no. 320 ... . V. noticed that [the applicant] was limping and had a small abrasion on his forehead. In office no. 320 he handcuffed [the applicant] for security reasons until the arrival of the investigator from the prosecutor’s office, and in order to prevent any potential resistance. No other restraint equipment was used on the applicant. ... [On 26 May 2006] [the applicant] was transferred to remand prison no. IZ-70/1 where a paramedic documented his injuries – contusions on the right side of the chest and soft tissue of the head. [The applicant] explained ... that the injuries had been inflicted on him by FSB officers [at the FSB premises] on 25 May 2006. However, he provided no detail as to the circumstances under which he had sustained the injuries. Nor did he give the names of the alleged perpetrators. ... The [applicant’s allegations] should be viewed critically as he was angry with the officers who arrested him. Having regard to the above, it should be concluded that officer V. did not use any force [against the applicant] and did not abuse his official capacity.” 17. On 7 July 2006 the applicant received a copy of the decision of 3 July 2006. He did not at that moment in time take any further action. 18. On 2 July 2007 the applicant was found guilty of manslaughter by the District Court and sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment (see paragraphs 29-32 below). Thereafter, on 12 September 2007, the applicant submitted an appeal to the Military Court of the Tomsk Garrison against the decision of 3 July 2006 not to institute criminal proceedings in respect of the alleged ill-treatment (see paragraph 16 above). He submitted that officer V. had witnessed the beatings but had not taken part in them. He further claimed that he had refused to make any statement about the beatings earlier for fear of retaliation by the FSB officers. 19. On 21 September 2007 the Military Court upheld the decision of 3 July 2006. The court noted that the applicant had not previously complained about the beatings, had not co-operated with the military investigator who had conducted the inquiry into the matter and had challenged the decision of 3 July 2006 after more than a year’s delay. The court also pointed out, addressed to the head of the FSB Department, that the record of the applicant’s arrest had been prepared ten hours after the actual arrest, in contravention of the applicable rules of criminal procedure which require such records to be prepared within three hours. On 22 January 2008 the Military Court of the North-Siberian Command upheld the decision of 21 September 2007 on appeal. 20. According to the Government, following the court’s ruling of 21 September 2007, the FSB Department conducted an internal inquiry. The officers responsible for the belated recording of the applicant’s arrest were subjected to disciplinary sanctions. 21. On 1 October 2007 the applicant lodged another complaint with the Tomsk military prosecutor’s office, again seeking criminal prosecution of the FSB officers who had, allegedly, subjected him to ill-treatment on 25 May 2006. 22. On 30 October 2007 military investigator K. refused to institute criminal proceedings against the alleged perpetrators. The refusal was not based on the fact that the issue had already been examined (see paragraphs 14-20 above). The investigator relied on the statements made by the FSB officers, who denied the applicant’s allegations and claimed that they had not used force against him while he was in their custody. The investigator summarised his conclusions as follows: “... In the light of the evidential material relating to the present inquiry, it should be concluded that there is insufficient information showing that a crime was committed. The [applicant’s] allegations concerning the use of force against him by the FSB officers [and] the medical documents certifying [his] injuries are an insufficient basis on which to institute criminal proceedings. Besides, it is apparent from the minutes of the [applicant’s] trial that [he] alleged that the FSB officers had used force against him so that he could claim that his statement about the circumstances of the case had been obtained through coercion, even though that statement was supported by other evidence collected in the course of investigation. Accordingly, the [applicant’s] allegations about the use of force against him should be viewed critically.” 23. On 19 February 2008 the first deputy military circuit prosecutor decided to refer the applicant’s complaint for an additional inquiry. He stated that the decision of 30 October 2007 had been premature and unsubstantiated. He also pointed out the following shortcomings regarding the inquiry: “The inquiry failed to establish the origin of the [applicant’s] bodily injuries. The investigator did not question the individuals who could have confirmed that [the applicant] did not have any injuries prior to his arrival at the FSB premises. [The investigator] did not question [the FSB security guards who had been on duty at the FSB premises on 25 May 2006] about the applicant’s injuries. The investigator failed to verify whether the applicant’s arrest and detention at the FSB premises had been in compliance with the applicable regulations.” 24. On 5 April 2008 military investigator K. issued a new decision refusing to institute a criminal investigation into the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment. Following the supervising prosecutor’s instructions (see paragraph 23 above), the investigator conducted an additional inquiry. He questioned the applicant, M. and the FSB security guards who had been on duty at the FSB premises on 25 May 2006. He summarised their statements as follows: “[The applicant] ... reiterated his earlier explanations as to how the FSB officers had used force against him. He explained that he had not had any injuries prior to his arrival at the FSB premises, that he had not visited any medical institutions and that he had not undergone any medical examination prior to his arrival at the FSB premises. M., an acquaintance of his, had given him a lift to the FSB premises. ... M. ... stated that he had known [the applicant] for a long time ... . On 25 May 2006 he had given [the applicant] a lift to the FSB premises. He had not seen any injuries on the [applicant’s] face. [The applicant] had worn clothes and had not taken them off in his presence, so he was unable to say if [the applicant] had had any injuries on the parts of his body covered by the clothes. After [the applicant] had entered the FSB premises, he had waited for him for about two hours and then left. Each of [the FSB guards] Voyt. and T. stated that ... they did not know [the applicant]. ... [On 25 May 2006] they had not seen any persons with bodily injuries at the FSB premises. During their shift they saw no individuals with injuries [enter] the FSB premises. They had no recollection of seeing [the applicant] enter the FSB premises. Having examined the evidential material collected in the course of the additional inquiry and the material obtained earlier, it may be stated that there is no evidence which would unambiguously confirm that the applicant had not had any injuries prior to his arrival at the FSB premises ... . M.’s statement that [the applicant] had not had any injuries prior to his arrival at the FSB premises cannot be taken into account as M. has known [the applicant] for a long time and might corroborate the [applicant’s] allegations in view of their relationship.” 25. On 15 October 2008 the head of the military investigating unit quashed the decision of 5 April 2008 and ordered a further inquiry into the applicant’s allegations. He considered the decision to be premature and unsubstantiated in view of the investigator’s failure (1) to question potential witnesses who could have confirmed that the applicant did not have any injuries prior to his arrest and detention and (2) to determine whether the applicant’s detention on the FSB premises on 25 May 2006 had been lawful. 26. On 22 October 2008 investigator K. again refused to institute criminal proceedings against the FSB officers. He summarised his findings as follows: “As regards the [applicant’s] detention at the FSB premises by officers Ch. and V. on 25 May 2006 using handcuffs and their failure to provide him with any food and to draw up a record of his arrest ... , [the trial court] examined those facts and found them to amount to a serious violation of the [applicant’s] rights as set out in the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure ... . However, Ch. and V.’s actions are not liable to criminal prosecution and do not disclose any constituent elements of the offence. When questioned ... , [the applicant] reiterated his allegation about the circumstances of the use of force by the FSB officers against him and suggested that his [brother] D. and a Ms I. should be questioned. Both D. and I. ... submitted that [the applicant] had not had any injuries in May 2006 before going to the FSB premises and that he had not taken part in any fight the day before. The statements ... given by D. and I. cannot be taken into account because they are both biased and would support the [applicant’s] allegations if asked to do so by him. Furthermore, according to D., I. did not see [the applicant] [on the day] when he left to go to the FSB premises; at that time she was at her own place of residence ... . Nevertheless, I. claimed that [on that day] she had been at [the applicant’s home] and had not seen any injuries on him. [The applicant] ... stated that, when he had left to go to the FSB premises, I. and D had been [at his place]. These contradictions may indicate that D. and I.’s statements as regards the absence of injuries on [the applicant’s] body were also false ... . ... M.’s statement that [the applicant] did not have any bodily injuries prior to his arrival at the FSB premises cannot be taken into account. M. has known [the applicant] for a long time. He may now be supporting the [applicant’s] allegations because of their relationship. It is apparent from ... the arrest record of 25 May 2006 that [the applicant] did not make any statement concerning the origin of the injuries in the presence of his lawyer and the investigator ... . ... [The applicant] only started complaining about ill-treatment after his conviction ‒ a fact which casts reasonable doubt on the veracity of [his] allegations. Therefore, his statements cannot serve as justification for opening a criminal investigation against FSB officers. ... At the inquiry stage, a forensic medical examination to determine the time and nature of the injuries cannot be conducted for the lack of any legal basis. At the same time, according to the opinion of the medical forensic expert Mel., who had studied the medical documents concerning the [applicant’s] injuries, the yellowish colour of one of the bruises shows that [the applicant] might have sustained it some five to seven to nine days prior to the medical examination. ... Although the pinkish colour of another bruise indicates that it might have been sustained no later than three days before the examination, this one bruise would not be commensurate with the intensity of the alleged beatings and the number of persons involved in beating the [applicant]. Furthermore, from the explanation provided by the forensic medical expert it is apparent that the possibility of the bruise having been sustained more than three days before [the medical examination] should not be ruled out. The expert could not assess the contusions [sustained by the applicant] for the lack of objective criteria necessary for such assessment. Even though the medical documents examined in the course of the present inquiry contain information about the [applicant’s] injuries, [they] do not prove that the injuries were caused by actions of FSB officers at the FSB premises. Furthermore, it is apparent from the statements given by FSB officers V. and Ch. that [the applicant] was limping when he arrived at the FSB premises. This fact could signify that [the applicant] had sustained the injuries prior to his arrival at the FSB premises in circumstances not disclosed by him. ... In the light of the evidential material collected in the course of the inquiry, it must be acknowledged that there is not sufficient evidence indicating that a crime has been committed in respect of [the applicant]. The [applicant’s] complaint ... together with the medical documents confirming that [the applicant] had certain injuries which he had, in part, sustained prior to his contact with the FSB officers and which, in part, he might have sustained prior to his arrival at the FSB premises, cannot be deemed to constitute sufficient grounds for instituting criminal proceedings. In this connection, it should be noted that the inquiry has established circumstances that cast doubt on the veracity of the [applicant’s] allegations.” 27. On 22 December 2008 the head of the military investigating unit quashed the decision of 22 October 2008, due to procedural irregularities. The investigator K. had failed (1) to specify the constituent elements of the offence which he had been unable to establish in the course of the inquiry and (2) to specify the names of the alleged perpetrators. 28. On 31 December 2008 the investigator K. issued another decision refusing to institute criminal proceedings in response to the applicant’s complaint. On 25 February 2009 the supervising prosecutor found the decision lawful and well-founded. 29. On 26 May 2006 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Tomsk remanded the applicant in custody pending investigation on suspicion of murder. On an unspecified date the applicant was formally charged with manslaughter. He remained in detention during the investigation and trial. 30. On 2 July 2007 the District Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to eight years’ imprisonment. 31. On 15 May 2008 the Tomsk Regional Court quashed the applicant’s conviction on appeal and forwarded the matter for fresh consideration. 32. According to the applicant, on 19 June 2009 the District Court found him guilty of battery and sentenced him to 140 hours of compulsory labour. Moreover, it relieved the applicant from serving a sentence due to the statute of limitations. The applicant was released on the same day.

5. The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Ljubljana. She has suffered from a psychotic disorder for a number of years and has been admitted to psychiatric hospitals for treatment several times since 2000. The present case concerns two consecutive periods of confinement in such hospitals between July 2005 and January 2006. 6. On 10 July 2005 the applicant’s family physician received a telephone call from the local police informing him that the applicant had broken into an unoccupied house, apparently with the intention of sleeping there, and that they were having trouble communicating with her. He referred her to the Idrija Psychiatric Hospital, a public healthcare institution, indicating that she was disturbing the environment and behaving psychotically. 7. On the same day the applicant was admitted to the closed ward of the Idrija Psychiatric Hospital. On admission, she signed a consent form for confinement and psychiatric treatment. In her exchange with the hospital staff, the applicant said that she was “possessed by energetic and physical people sent to her through the lens of cameras operated by President Bush”. The psychiatrists treating her diagnosed her with schizophrenia and noted that she exhibited “delusional interpretations and perceptual anomalies as well as features of depersonalisation and derealisation”. The applicant was started on medication consisting of 10 mg of Moditen three times a day, three Akineton tablets a day, 5 mg of Apaurin three times a day, and an ampoule each of Haldol and Akineton a day. No mention was made in her medical records of her having refused to take any medication. 8. On 11 July 2005 the applicant started to ask how long she would have to stay in the hospital and told the psychiatrists that she would resist. The hospital notified the Idrija Local Court of her confinement, indicating the reasons given by the family physician for referring her to the hospital. 9. On 13 July 2005 the Idrija Local Court appointed a lawyer, I.R.P., to represent the applicant in proceedings it had commenced in her respect. It also scheduled a confinement hearing for 15 July. A notification of the hearing, addressed to the applicant, was sent to the hospital; however, it is not clear when or whether it was received by the applicant. 10. On 15 July 2005 a hearing was held regarding the applicant’s confinement. The applicant and one of the psychiatrists treating her were heard. The psychiatrist stated that the applicant had apparently been living in a garage and had broken into a house, and that she had been found wandering around and had been psychotic and uncontrollable. The applicant stated that she would rather be at home, that she did not understand why she had been taken to the hospital, but that other people she named, including a former politician, might have more of an idea. She provided an account of the events which had taken place prior to her confinement, in which she made no mention of having broken into a house. She also stated that she missed her father, and that she had been taking medication while at home. 11. In the weeks that followed, the applicant continued her treatment and, according to the medical records, also continued to agree to therapy. On 4 August 2005 the Haldol was replaced with Leponex and the dosage of Apaurin was reduced to 5 mg a day. Eventually, the applicant was taken off the Apaurin altogether. 12. Meanwhile, on 30 July 2005 the applicant gave D.P., a lawyer from Ljubljana, power of attorney. She told the representative that she was receiving treatment against her will, but was afraid to refuse it for fear that medication would be administered to her by force. 13. On 2 August 2005 the applicant’s representative D.P. notified the hospital that the applicant did not consent to her medical treatment and requested the Idrija Psychiatric Hospital to inform the applicant of her treatment and its side effects. She also pointed out that the applicant had the right to express her own free will and to refuse the treatment if she so wished. 14. On 5 August 2005 the applicant, through her representative D.P., lodged a constitutional complaint against the “material act” of her involuntary confinement and an application for a review of the constitutionality of section 49 of the Health Services Act, and of sections 70 to 81 of the Non-Contentious Civil Procedure Act. She alleged, inter alia, that she was unable to effectively enforce her right to judicial review in the involuntary confinement proceedings, as no formal decision had been rendered until that time. She therefore argued that the Constitutional Court should examine the alleged violations of her human rights committed through the “material act” of her confinement, as any other interpretation would constitute a breach of her right to judicial review within the meaning of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. In addition, she requested that the disputed legislation be repealed with immediate effect, and that she be released from the hospital pending a decision on her confinement. 15. On 6 August 2005 D.P. wrote to the hospital again, asking it to stop forcibly administering medication to the applicant. 16. On 8 August 2005 the applicant was transferred from the closed to the open ward of the Idrija Psychiatric Hospital. On the same date the Idrija Local Court was informed of the applicant’s transfer and terminated the proceedings regarding her confinement. 17. On 12 August 2005 the applicant was discharged from the Idrija Psychiatric Hospital at her own request. In this regard, it was noted by her psychiatrists that she no longer exhibited any manifestly psychotic symptoms, but that she should continue medical treatment to prevent herself from having a psychotic relapse with violent outbursts. The final diagnosis listed in the applicant’s medical records was disorganised (hebephrenic) schizophrenia. 18. On 15 September 2005 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s constitutional complaint of 5 August 2005 against her involuntary confinement in the Idrija Psychiatric Hospital for failure to exhaust the available remedies. It also rejected a further constitutional complaint she had lodged on 21 August 2005 relating to her confinement in the Ljubljana Psychiatric Hospital on the same grounds (see paragraph 19 below). It found that these complaints had been lodged even before the first-instance decisions on the involuntary confinement were rendered. As regards the applicant’s application for a review of the provisions of the Non-Contentious Civil Procedure Act, the Constitutional Court reiterated its findings in an earlier decision (no. U-I-60/03) that the thirty-day time-limit for issuing a court order for confinement could be too long (see paragraph 64 below). However, it was not possible to repeal the disputed legislation with immediate effect, as that would leave a sizeable gap in the legal system, so the application was dismissed. 19. On 15 August 2005 the applicant was taken to the emergency medical services by the police. On arrival, she stated that she was being “raped by the police, the emergency medical technicians, everybody”. The emergency physician referred her to the Ljubljana Psychiatric Hospital, a public healthcare institution, where she was taken by ambulance. It was noted in her admission record that her speech was dissociated and that she exhibited signs of paranoia and megalomaniac delusions. Under the heading “the degree of the patient’s rejection of hospitalisation” the emergency psychiatrist circled the statement that the applicant “accepted hospitalisation owing to the situation (the staff being present)”. Under the heading “the need to use compulsory measures on patients rejecting hospitalisation” the psychiatrist circled the statement “negative attitude, no compulsory measures necessary”. It is evident from the applicant’s medical records that during the first days of her admission, she was restless, talkative and unable to follow the activity programme. She spent the first two days of her treatment in the admission ward. 20. As of 17 August 2005 the applicant was placed in the closed ward. Based on her medical records, it appears that she remained talkative but found it somewhat difficult to engage in meaningful discussion. She still exhibited delusions of persecution and was convinced that her father had bribed the doctors and the police to keep her in the hospital. She was also convinced that the garage where she had been living was bugged by the CIA. On 19 August 2005 the applicant was visited by her representative D.P. 21. The applicant was given thirty drops of Haldol three times daily, three Akineton tablets a day and 2 mg of Lorsilan three times a day. The Haldol was subsequently replaced with 10 mg of Moditen three times a day. In the latter stages of her treatment, the applicant received Lorsilan and 100 mg of Leponex three times a day. Eventually, the applicant was only treated with Leponex. During the treatment she often complained of various physical pains and discomfort, in particular painful muscle spasms and toothache. 22. On 21 August 2005 the applicant informed the Ljubljana Local Court of her confinement and lodged an application for an interlocutory order that her medical treatment be discontinued and that she be released from the hospital pending a final decision on the matter. On the same day the applicant also lodged a constitutional complaint against the “material act” of her confinement and an application for a review of the constitutionality of section 49 of the Health Services Act and of sections 70 to 81 of the Non-Contentious Civil Procedure Act. The applicant’s notification of involuntary confinement was received by the local court on 22 August 2005. 23. On 23 August 2005 the Ljubljana Local Court appointed a lawyer, P.C., to represent the applicant in the involuntary confinement proceedings. On the same day a hearing was held which took twenty-five minutes. The applicant’s court-appointed representative was present, but, according to the applicant, did not participate actively. At the hearing, the applicant was examined by an expert from another healthcare institution, who immediately upon examination submitted an opinion stating that the applicant’s narrative showed signs of a paranoid delusional system which had probably lasted for a long time and to which she was uncritical. She considered that the applicant needed treatment in a closed ward for up to one month. 24. Based on this expert opinion, the Ljubljana Local Court ordered that the applicant be confined in the closed ward of the Ljubljana Psychiatric Hospital until 23 September 2005. 25. On 24 August 2005 the applicant’s application for an interlocutory order was dismissed by the Local Court on the grounds that personality rights could not be protected by injunctive relief. 26. On 27 August 2005 the applicant was visited by her court-appointed lawyer P.C., who wanted her to give him the power of attorney. According to the applicant’s medical records, the psychiatrist on duty was informed of the visit and gave his consent for the applicant to sign the document. 27. On 2 September 2005 the applicant appealed against the Ljubljana Local Court’s order regarding her continued confinement and the dismissal of her application for an interlocutory order. 28. On 3 September 2005 the applicant spoke to the then head of the hospital, complaining that there was no reason for her to remain there. She also stated that she did not understand why she was on medication, although she did confirm that she was taking Akineton as part of her outpatient treatment. 29. According to the Government, which relied on her medical records, later that day the applicant was transferred to the open ward of the Ljubljana Psychiatric Hospital. The applicant, however, maintained that the transfer took place on 4 September 2005. On 6 September 2005 the applicant’s representative D.P. notified the Ljubljana Local Court of the applicant’s transfer. 30. During the course of her stay in the open ward of the hospital, on 7 September 2005 the applicant was allowed by her psychiatrist to withdraw some of the money she had received as social assistance. In addition, on 13 September she was permitted to recover her clothes. She was allowed to leave the hospital premises for a few hours several times during her stay, on 20, 23 24, 27 and 28 October, and 9, 11, 13 and 30 November 2005. Her psychiatrists noted that she was disciplined in her outings and always returned to the hospital at the designated time. 31. On 9 September 2005 the Ljubljana Higher Court allowed the applicant’s appeal against the Ljubljana Local Court’s decisions of 23 and 24 August 2005 and remitted the case to the first-instance court. The higher court pointed out that the court’s reasoning lacked reference to the decisive factors which would indicate that it was necessary to deprive the applicant of her liberty. As regards the dismissal of the applicant’s application for an interlocutory order, the higher court rejected the lower court’s interpretation that no legal basis existed for an interlocutory order for the protection of the applicant’s personality rights. The court also pointed out that the applicant’s request for her medical treatment to be stopped warranted separate consideration. 32. On the same day the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against the Ljubljana Higher Court’s decision and a request for a procedure to be initiated for the review of the constitutionality of section 49 of the Health Services Act and of sections 70 to 81 of the Non-Contentious Civil Procedure Act. She insisted that remitting her case to the first-instance court without ordering her release from the hospital had violated her right to personal freedom. 33. As already stated (see paragraph 18 above), on 15 September 2005 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s constitutional complaints of 5 and 21 August 2005 against both periods of her confinement. 34. On 22 September 2005 the applicant lodged a supervisory appeal with the Ministry of Justice regarding the proceedings before the Ljubljana Local Court. On 5 October the Ministry informed the applicant that the local court had set the date of the hearing for 11 October 2005. The summons to the hearing was sent to the applicant’s home address. 35. On 7 October 2005 the father of the applicant, I. M., informed the local court that he had been served a summons addressed to the applicant for a hearing scheduled for 11 October 2005. The judge agreed to allow the applicant’s father to attend the scheduled hearing. 36. On 10 October 2005 the applicant’s representative D.P. informed the local court that the summons to the hearing of 11 October was unclear as to whether the representative herself had been summoned, or whether the applicant had been summoned by way of her representative. In addition, she proposed that a new summons be served in which the reasons for the hearing be set out. 37. The next day the applicant’s court-appointed representative P.C., the applicant’s father I.M. and her chosen representative D.P. were present at the hearing. D.P. proposed that the hearing be rescheduled since the applicant had not been properly summoned. She also informed the local court that the applicant was being held in the open ward of the Ljubljana Psychiatric Hospital but that the hospital was refusing to release her, or to discontinue her medical treatment. On the same date the local court appointed another expert to give an opinion on the applicant’s condition. 38. On 12 October 2005 the Ljubljana Local Court again ruled on the applicant’s application for an interlocutory order concerning the termination of her medical treatment and her immediate release from the psychiatric hospital. Contrary to the reasoning of the Ljubljana Higher Court’s decision of 9 September 2005, the application was again dismissed on the grounds that no legal basis existed for an interlocutory order for the protection of a person’s personality rights. The applicant appealed against this decision. 39. On 14 October 2005 the applicant requested that the judge sitting on the case be removed on the grounds, inter alia, that he had refused to adjourn and reschedule the hearing of 11 October despite the fact that she had not been properly summoned. Furthermore, she alleged that the judge had violated her right to privacy by allowing her father to attend the hearing. She also requested that the appointed expert be withdrawn. She further requested the court to decide on her immediate release and to exclude her father from the proceedings. On 26 October 2005 the applicant’s request for the withdrawal of the judge was dismissed. 40. On 2 November 2005 the Ljubljana Local Court amended its decision of 12 October 2005 by also including in its operative part the dismissal of the applicant’s application that her father be prevented from participating in the hearing. 41. On 10 November 2005 the Ljubljana Higher Court again allowed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of 12 October 2005 and remitted the case to the first-instance court. It reiterated that a valid legal basis did exist for an interlocutory order for the applicant’s release from the psychiatric hospital and that her request for her medication to be stopped deserved separate consideration. Moreover, the court took note of information in the case file that the applicant had meanwhile been transferred to the open ward. Accordingly, it pointed out that the rules of non-contentious procedure regarding involuntary confinement only applied to closed wards of psychiatric hospitals. It ordered the lower court to examine the question of whether the conditions for continuing the non-contentious proceedings still applied. Otherwise, the applicant was supposed to apply for injunctive relief against infringement of her personality rights. 42. On 14 November 2005 the applicant, through her representative D.P., lodged an appeal against the decision of 2 November 2005 on the dismissal of the application concerning her father’s participation in the hearing. The court-appointed representative P.C. responded to the appeal lodged by D.P., arguing that it should be dismissed. On 21 November 2005 the Ljubljana Higher Court upheld the decision of 2 November 2005. 43. On 30 November 2005 the Ljubljana Local Court sent a letter to the Ljubljana Psychiatric Hospital, requesting information about when the applicant had been transferred to the open ward. 44. On 8 December 2005 the local court received a reply from the hospital stating that the applicant had been transferred to the open ward on 3 September 2005. 45. On 12 December 2005 the Ljubljana Local Court terminated the proceedings regarding the applicant’s involuntary confinement in the psychiatric hospital because of her transfer to the open ward. 46. Meanwhile the applicant renewed contact with her father, who arranged for her to spend some weekends at his home. Arrangements were subsequently made for the applicant to move in with him after her release from the hospital. 47. On 12 December 2005 the applicant and her father visited the Sežana Social Work Centre, where the applicant declared that she wished her father to act as her guardian in financial and health matters, and her father declared himself willing to provide her with a home and to assume responsibility for her medical treatment and finances. A record was made of the applicant and her father’s declarations and they were informed that they could address any possible disagreements regarding the arrangement to the centre. 48. On 15 December 2005 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s constitutional complaint against the decision of 9 September 2005 and her application for constitutional review (see paragraph 32 above) for lack of legal interest. It observed that the applicant was no longer confined in the closed ward of the psychiatric hospital. 49. On 22 December 2005 the applicant lodged an appeal against the decision of 12 December, stressing, inter alia, that her transfer to the open ward of the hospital did not change the fact that she was confined there against her will. She also complained about the lack of an effective remedy. Moreover, she pointed out that no decision had been made regarding the necessity of her confinement and that she had not been informed of the grounds on which her continuing confinement was based. She further lodged an application for her court-appointed representative P.C. to be taken off the case for failure to act in her interests. 50. On 5 January 2006 the Ljubljana Higher Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It held that, since the applicant had been placed in an open ward, the rules of non-contentious procedure were no longer applicable. The court referred the applicant to the rules of contentious procedure, under which it was possible to apply for injunctive relief against infringement of personality rights. 51. On 19 January 2006 the applicant was released from the Ljubljana Psychiatric Hospital. The diagnosis listed on her release form was paranoid schizophrenia. 52. On 23 January 2006 the Ljubljana Local Court rejected the applicant’s application for an interlocutory order owing to the fact that the proceedings on the merits had been terminated. 53. On 14 February 2006 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against the decision of 5 January 2006. She invoked, inter alia, Article 5 of the Convention, and maintained that the fact that she had been placed in the open ward did not imply that she was held there voluntarily. She alleged that any attempt on her part to leave the hospital, while in the open ward, could result in her being brought back to the hospital by force and placed back in the closed ward, as in practice the transfer to the open ward constituted a privilege enjoyed by compliant patients. In this regard the applicant pointed out, relying on section 49 of the Health Services Act (see paragraph 58 below), that the legal basis for involuntary admission and treatment in a psychiatric hospital did not specify in which ward patients are to be placed. She also pointed out that psychiatric hospitals were not required to notify the competent courts of patients’ possible readmission to the closed ward in cases such as her own, where they had already been transferred to the open ward while the order of confinement was still in effect. In her opinion the provisions on involuntary confinement in a psychiatric hospital and the related procedure were still applicable and she was entitled to obtain a decision on the lawfulness of her earlier confinement. 54. On 13 April 2006 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s appeal on points of law on the grounds that the applicant lacked legal interest, since the confinement proceedings had been terminated and she had been released from the hospital. 55. On 6 July 2006 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against the Supreme Court’s decision to reject her appeal on points of law in connection with the Higher Court’s decision of 5 January 2006 and the Ljubljana Local Court’s decision of 12 December 2005 to terminate the proceedings regarding her involuntary confinement in the Ljubljana Psychiatric Hospital. She reiterated the complaints made regarding her stay in the open ward of the Ljubljana Psychiatric Hospital and those relating to the alleged breaches of procedural rules in the confinement proceedings. Further, she pointed out that she was entitled to obtain a decision on the merits with regard to her complaints, having regard to the importance of her constitutionally guaranteed right to personal liberty. 56. On 27 February 2008 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint against the Supreme Court’s decision as unfounded, and rejected her complaint against the Higher Court’s decision on the grounds that it had been lodged out of time. The court pointed out that the lodging of an inadmissible appeal on points of law had not suspended the time-limit for lodging the constitutional complaint.

4. The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in the town of Pechora, Komi Republic. 5. On 27 March 1997 the applicant was dismissed from her post of accountant in a private company TOO SIAP (“the company”). She sued the company claiming reinstatement in her post, non-pecuniary damages, salary arrears and unpaid allowances (child allowance, annual leave allowance and maternity allowance). According to the applicant, she lodged her statement of claim (apparently concerning pecuniary claims) with the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Ryazan on 22 September 1995. The Government claimed that the proceedings started on an unspecified date in 1997. In October 1997 she moved to another town. According to her, she informed the court of her new address. 6. On 24 November 1997 the District Court decided to process her pecuniary claims separately. By a judgment of 25 November 1997, the District Court ordered the applicant’s reinstatement in her post and awarded her 500,000 Russian roubles (RUB)[1] in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The applicant was not present at the hearing. The judgment was not appealed against and became final on 5 December 1997. A copy of the judgment was sent to the applicant on 22 December 1997, apparently to her previous address. Another copy was sent on 28 May 1998 to her new address. The applicant received it in June 1998. It appears that neither copy was accompanied by a writ of execution. 7. In November 1998 and then in June 2001 the applicant enquired about the state of proceedings regarding the pecuniary claims. It appears that these requests remained unanswered. 8. Apparently in April 2002 the applicant learnt that the case file regarding her pecuniary claims had been lost by the court registry. On 30 November 2002 she asked the district court to restore the file, which was done on 14 February 2003. On 28 October 2003 the judge decided to process separately the applicant’s claims for maternity allowance, annual leave allowance and salary arrears. By a judgment of the same date, the court granted her claims for child allowance arrears. 9. On 19 January 2004 the District Court granted in part the applicant’s claims for salary arrears, maternity allowance and annual leave allowance. No appeal was lodged and the judgment became final. 10. Upon the applicant’s request, on 28 September 2004 the Presidium of the Ryazan Regional Court quashed the judgment on supervisory review and ordered a re-examination of the claims. 11. In the resumed proceedings, on 14 June 2005 the District Court granted the applicant’s claims. On 22 July 2005 the judge rectified technical errors in this judgment. The applicant was awarded RUB 557,483 in unpaid salary; RUB 48,960 in annual leave allowance; and RUB 76,163 in maternity allowance. It appears that the judgment of 14 June 2005 and the decision of 22 July 2005 were not appealed against and became final. 12. It appears that on an unspecified date the applicant instituted a separate set of civil proceedings against the company. The applicant submitted that by a judgment of 18 December 2006 the District Court granted her claims against the company. The applicant did not substantiate the existence of these proceedings by any documentary evidence. 13. It appears that in October 1998 the applicant learnt that the company director refused to reinstate her and to pay her compensation in accordance with the judgment of 25 November 1997 (see paragraph 6 above). Thus, in November 1998 she wrote to the President of the District Court asking for enforcement of the judgment in her favour. She renewed her request in May 2001. Apparently, she received no replies to the above letters from the District Court. 14. However, by a letter of 12 October 2001 the regional bailiffs’ office informed the applicant that there was no record of any enforcement proceedings against the defendant company. In December 2001 the applicant complained about the situation to the Supreme Court of Russia, which re-directed the matter to the Ryazan Regional Court. In February 2002 the Regional Court informed the applicant that no writ of execution had been issued with the judgment of 25 November 1997 because the applicant had not requested such a writ or sought to enforce the judgment. 15. Upon the applicant’s request, on 4 April 2002 the District Court issued a duplicate of the writ of execution. The court established that in 1997 no writ of execution had been issued due to a mistake by the court registry, which had not complied with the RSFSR Code of Civil Procedure (see paragraph 24 below). 16. Enforcement proceedings were then opened on 19 June 2002. Having established that the defendant company had changed its address, in October 2002 the bailiff identified its new location and owners. Having received no information about the progress in the enforcement proceedings, on 18 February 2003 the applicant again complained to the President of the District Court. Upon her complaint, on 31 March 2003 the District Court established that the bailiff had failed (i) to seek judicial authorisation to change the defendant company in the enforcement proceedings to its successor, OOO SIAP, and (ii) to inform the applicant of the progress of the proceedings. 17. On 22 December 2003 the bailiff service informed the applicant that they had not been able to identify any property or assets belonging to the debtor; although it was registered with the tax authority, the company had not been present at the address given to the bailiff service. On 5 March 2004 the District Court changed the defendant company to OOO SIAP. 18. On an unspecified date, the Russian authorities opened criminal proceedings against the company’s director Mr L for failure to enforce the judgments in the applicant’s favour. In May 2004 he was questioned by the bailiff and stated that his company had ceased its business activity in 2001 and that he could not liquidate it because he was no longer in possession of the company seal and the articles of incorporation. On 9 June 2004 criminal proceedings against Mr L were discontinued. According to the Government, on an unspecified date Mr L was fined in relation to the non-enforcement of the judgment of 25 November 1997. 19. It appears that on an unspecified date the bailiffs’ office joined the enforcement files in respect of the judgment of 25 November 1997 and a new judgment dated 28 October 2003 in the applicant’s favour (see paragraph 8 above). 20. In February and April 2004 the bailiff invited the applicant to advance costs for organising a search for the assets of the debtor that could be used to fulfil the obligation stemming from the above judgments. The applicant refused. In May 2004 the bailiff wrote to the applicant stating that no search was needed as the debtor carried out no business activity and had no bank accounts or property. 21. It appears that on an unspecified date, the bailiffs’ office joined the enforcement files in respect of the above two judgments and a new judgment of 14 June 2005 in the applicant’s favour (see paragraph 11 above). 22. In June 2005 the applicant was informed that the debtor had no funds or assets which could be seized for enforcement purposes. 23. On 16 March 2007 the debtor was removed from the register of legal entities due to its liquidation. On 14 May 2007 the District Court granted the bailiff’s request and discontinued the enforcement proceedings in respect of the judgment of 25 November 1997.

5. The applicant was born in 1937 and lives in Chişinău. 6. The applicant has lived in her house since 1950. Her house is situated in a courtyard with two other private houses. According to a document issued by the Chişinău General Directorate for Architecture and Urbanism (a subdivision of the Chişinău Municipality) on 8 December 1998, there is only one common entrance into the courtyard and a single access serving houses nos. 10 and 14 (the latter being the applicant’s house). 7. In 1992 one of the applicant’s neighbours (D.) built a fence around her own house which, according to the applicant, included a part of the area left for common use by the owners of the three houses in the courtyard. The fence blocked the applicant’s access to the only entry into the courtyard, and she was only able to reach her house through a gate left in the fence. 8. In 1998 D. replaced the fence with a bigger one and did not leave any opening for the applicant to go through. On 19 October 1998 the applicant’s son-in-law (S.) came to visit her and discovered the new fence. At the request of his mother-in-law he demolished part of the fence in order to create an unobstructed passage to the applicant’s house. 9. At D.’s request, criminal proceedings were initiated against S. On 2 February 1999 the Centru District Court acquitted him. The court noted statements made by several neighbours and an expert from the Chişinău Land Registry, as well as the certificate issued on 8 December 1998 (see paragraph 6 above), according to which the courtyard had been reserved for common use by the owners of all three houses and that there was only one access to the applicant’s house, now blocked by the newly built fence. The court found that D. had built the fence unlawfully and blocked the applicant’s access to her own house, and that the actions of S. to free the passage to the house had been dictated by strict necessity. No appeal was lodged and the judgment became final. 10. In reply to a complaint by the applicant, on 2 May 2000 the Chief Architect of Chişinău informed her that, following an on-site visit, he had established that the territory on which the applicant’s and D.’s houses were situated had been in common use and that, accordingly, the access to the applicant’s house was also in common use. This was confirmed by a map annexed to the letter. The Department added that no decisions had been adopted which could have provoked disputes between the applicant and D. 11. On 18 May 2000 the Chişinău municipal council decided to sell D. a plot of land around her house, which included the common access road. On 16 June 2000 the council and D. concluded a contract for the sale of land. 12. Following a complaint by the applicant, on 5 July 2001 the same authority amended its decision of 18 May 2000 by reducing the surface of the plot of land sold to D., in order to resolve the dispute between D. and the applicant and to secure access to the applicant’s house. 13. D. challenged the municipality’s decision of 5 July 2001 in court. On 15 April 2002 the Chişinău Regional Court annulled the decision of 5 July 2001 as unlawful. The court found that, according to a letter from the municipality’s finance department dated 11 September 2000, the access road to the applicant’s house had not been included in the plot of land sold to D. 14. In a separate court action, on 6 December 2001 the municipality initiated court proceedings, asking for modification of the contract of sale of land to D. It claimed that the plot of land had mistakenly included the common access road used to access the applicant’s house. 15. In January 2002 the applicant initiated court proceedings against D. and the municipality, asking for the annulment of all decisions taken in favour of D. since 1992, including the decision of 18 May 2000, and of all contracts between the two parties. She also noted that the fence built by D. had blocked all access to her house and had even left her without a water supply, which had previously been secured via a water pipe ending in the common courtyard, now situated on D.’s land. The applicant asked for an order to remove all obstacles to her use of the house and to determine the manner of common use of the access by all the owners of the houses in the courtyard. The two court actions were joined. 16. On 19 November 2002 the Centru District Court rejected the requests of the applicant and the municipality. The court found that the applicant had sufficient space to use her house and that, since the water pipe ran through the land owned by D., the applicant could only ensure access to water with D.’s agreement. It decided to discontinue the applicant’s request to annul the decision of 18 May 2000, since its lawfulness had already been confirmed by the final judgment of the Chişinău Regional Court on 15 April 2002. 17. On 13 January 2003 the Chişinău Regional Court quashed the lower court’s judgment and ordered a full re-hearing of the case. 18. On 19 February 2004 the Centru District Court struck the applicant’s action out of its list due to her failure to appear in court when summoned. That decision was quashed by the Chişinău Court of Appeal on 8 April 2004 because there was no evidence in the file that the applicant had been summoned. 19. On 8 July 2004 the Centru District Court rejected the applicant’s and the municipality’s requests. It stated, inter alia, that the applicant had unobstructed access to her house, without giving any details. It also repeated the reasons it had given in its judgment of 19 November 2002 regarding the applicant’s access to water. The court refused to annul the contract for the sale of land concluded between D. and the municipality on 16 June 2000, given that it was based on the municipality’s decision of 18 May 2000, a decision previously confirmed as lawful. 20. On 7 October 2004 the Chişinău Regional Court upheld that judgment. It essentially repeated the lower court’s reasons regarding the lawfulness of the contract for the sale of land. 21. In her appeal on points of law the applicant referred, inter alia, to her inability to fully enjoy her property right over the house, the access to which was blocked by the fence built by D. She claimed that the contract of 16 June 2000 had been concluded in breach of the law. The applicant asked for the annulment of the contract and the demolition of the fence in order to secure unobstructed access to her house. 22. On 22 December 2004 the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the applicant’s appeal, in her absence. The court acknowledged the confirmation by the Chief Architect of Chişinău of 2 May 2000, after he had visited the relevant courtyard, that the land and access road in question were in fact in common use. However, in the absence of any decision by the Chişinău Municipality expressly reserving that land for common use, the Chief Architect’s opinion could not serve as a ground for annulling the lower court’s judgments. Therefore the lower courts had correctly decided that the land sold to D. had not been land in common use. 23. The court also found that the applicant had been summoned to the hearing but had failed to appear without giving plausible reasons. The applicant claims that she was not summoned. The judgment of 22 December 2004 was final.

6. The applicant was born in 1966. After his release from detention in 2008 the applicant resided in the town of Perm. 7. The applicant arrived in Russia from Uzbekistan in 2002 or 2003. He was arrested on 11 August 2003 in the town of Perm in relation to criminal proceedings against him (see paragraph 25 below). 8. During his admission to Perm detention centre no. 1 in August 2003 the applicant had a check-up and was questioned about his past illnesses. According to the documents submitted by the Government, since the 1990s the applicant had been suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis and had received treatment in Uzbekistan. According to the applicant, in 1995 and 1998 he had pneumonia and had no pulmonary tuberculosis before his arrest in August 2003. 9. The applicant had a chest fluorography examination in the detention centre and was examined by a chest physician who prescribed treatment (such as ethambutol and B6 vitamin) in relation to his tuberculosis. On 18 August 2003 a blood sample from the applicant was submitted for HIV testing (an “enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay”). An additional similar test and a confirmatory test (“western blot”) were carried out on 3 and 4 September 2003 respectively. 10. The case file contains a document dated 9 September 2003 which appears to be the record of the HIV-related initial physical examination (involving, inter alia, vital signs, lymph nodes, skin, thorax and lungs). The applicant’s weight was 73 kg. The reference to the HIV stage is not legible. The next check up was scheduled for February 2004. The Government also submitted the applicant’s “epicrisis” record for 2003, which indicates HIV stage 2Б under the domestic classification (see paragraph 29 below). It is indicated in the record that during 2003 the applicant did not request any treatment or medication. Another document entitled “Plan for treatment in 2003” indicated that the applicant was to be examined in February 2004. This document did not specify any treatment, including HIV-related medication. 11. It can be seen from the typed copy of the applicant’s medical file that on several occasions in late 2003 and early 2004 he was examined by a chest physician who maintained his medication in relation to tuberculosis. 12. After the closure of the criminal proceedings against him (see paragraph 25 below), in June 2004 the applicant was transferred to prison no. 12 in the Perm region. Subsequently, he also spent periods of time in prison no. 9, as well as in the psychiatric and other units of the hospital for detainees (August - October 2004, February - March 2005, July 2005 and several months in 2006 and 2007). The applicant was treated, inter alia, for tuberculosis, gonorrhoea, haemorrhoids, hepatitis C, a psychiatric condition, and in relation to acts of self-mutilation. 13. In particular, in September 2004 the applicant was admitted to tuberculosis hospital no. 7 in relation to the progression of his infection with the hepatitis C virus. He had a number of blood tests, such as a full blood count (including leukocytes, erythrocytes, and lymphocytes), a urine test, a chest fluorography, an X-ray and an abdominal ultrasound scan, and was examined by a chest physician and a neurologist. It appears that, although scheduled, a consultation by an infectious disease specialist was not provided. It is indicated in one of the documents submitted by the Government that the applicant’s weight dropped to 60.5 kg in September 2004. However, it can be seen from the record of a check-up done on 1 October 2004 that his weight was then 70 kg. This record mentions HIV stage 2 or 3 (not clearly legible). The next check-up was scheduled for April 2005. 14. The Government submitted a handwritten medical document (which appears to relate to 2004) bearing the stamp of prison no. 9 and indicating HIV stage 3A. 15. It appears that in April 2005 the applicant was examined by an infectious disease specialist who prescribed laboratory testing for bilirubin and some laboratory tests in relation to liver function. The record of a check-up of the applicant of 25 July 2005 indicates HIV stage 2Б. The next check-up was scheduled for 25 January 2006. 16. In July 2005 the applicant complained that he was not being provided with adequate medical treatment in relation to his diseases, in particular as regards his HIV infection. The Kizel prosecutor’s office in charge of the supervision of prisons examined the applicant’s complaint and stated that the applicant had been provided with medical care free of charge, and that he had been regularly admitted to a medical facility and had consultations by infectious disease specialists. The prosecutor’s office also mentioned that no funds had been allocated to prison no. 12 for out-patient treatment of HIV-positive detainees in 2005 and thus the relevant medication had not been available there. 17. In March 2006 the applicant was again hospitalised and his discharge certificate refers to HIV stage 3. In July 2006 he had a periodic check-up; the record indicates HIV stage 3 (corrected from “4”). 18. In July 2006 the applicant complained about the issue of medical care to the Federal Department for the Execution of Sentences. This authority stated in reply that an infectious disease specialist had concluded that antiretroviral therapy (ART) was not necessary. Another similar complaint was examined in August 2006 by the Kizel prosecutor’s office in charge of the supervision of prisons. Dismissing the applicant’s complaint, this authority mentioned that prison hospital no. 9 had facilities for carrying out an immunological assessment, should it be prescribed for the applicant. So far there had been no indications for such an assessment. 19. In September 2006 the Medical Office of the Regional Department for the Execution of Sentences examined and dismissed the applicant’s further complaint relating to his HIV treatment. They stated that the applicant had received the necessary testing and medication, as well as consultations by specialist doctors, including an infectious disease specialist. They indicated that a decision on immunological assessment had to be taken by a medical professional. The applicant’s illnesses and their staging had not, at the relevant time, required ART. 20. Between October 2006 and May 2007 the applicant was kept in hospital no. 7 in the Perm region, on account, in particular, of the aggravation of his pulmonary tuberculosis. According to the Government, in October 2006 the applicant failed to comply with unspecified recommendations made by the regional centre for the prevention of and fight against AIDS and infectious diseases (“the AIDS centre”). 21. The applicant had a check up in January 2007; the record indicates HIV stage 4Б. In March 2007 he underwent an immunological assessment. It appears that he started a highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART) regimen in April 2007. In early 2008 the regimen was adjusted. 22. The applicant sought early conditional release. By a judgment of 4 September 2008 the Solikamsk Town Court of the Perm Region granted his application and ordered his release, considering that his continued detention was not necessary for the purposes of his “correction”. The applicant was released soon thereafter. The court ordered him to report to the supervising authority and not to change his place of residence without prior notice to that authority. 23. According to the applicant, the administration of the detention facility told him that he had fifteen days to leave Russia or he would be deported. 24. According to the Government, in October 2008 and January 2009 the applicant attended the AIDS centre, where he confirmed that he was taking medication. 25. On 15 April 2004, rejecting the applicant’s plea of self-defence, the Leninskiy District Court of Perm convicted the applicant of causing injuries to one person and causing fatal injuries to another person. The court sentenced the applicant to six years and one month of imprisonment. On 25 May 2004 the Perm Regional Court upheld the judgment. The applicant made submissions through a videoconferencing facility from the remand centre. 26. The applicant served his sentence of imprisonment from June 2004 to September 2008, when he was released (see paragraphs 12 and 22 above).

4. The applicants were born in 1947 and live in Litomyšl and České Budějovice respectively. 5. On 26 September 1994 the applicants instituted restitution proceedings in the Žďár nad Sázavou District Court (okresní soud). 6. Received on 30 September 1994, the court sent the action on 31 October 1994 to the defendants for their observations. On 29 November 1994 and 25 January 1995 respectively, it requested the Land Registry (katastr nemovitostí) to provide it with supplementary documents. 7. On 22 February 1995 the District Court requested the applicants to complete their action in order to reflect the facts revealed by the Land Registry’s documents. The applicants complied on 14 March 1995. The next day, the court requested the Land Registry to provide additional documentation. 8. On 6 April 1995 it invited the applicants to substantiate the defendants’ liability to be sued (pasivní legitimace). 9. On 24 April 1995 the applicants requested the District Court to include a fourth defendant in the proceedings. The court had therefore to obtain information about this new defendant from the Register of Companies (obchodní rejstřík). 10. On 19 September 1995 it invited one of the defendants to submit written observations. On 23 October 1995 the court received the applicants’ proposal to modify their restitution action. The same day, it admitted the new version of the action. 11. A hearing scheduled for 12 April 1996 was adjourned at the applicants’ request until 4 June 1996. 12. On 25 April 1996 the court received observations from one of the parties to the proceedings. 13. One of the applicants did not attend the hearing of 4 June 1996 which was then adjourned sine die in order to produce the evidence suggested by the parties. 14. On 20, 21, 24, 25 and 27 June, 17 July and 4 September 1996, the District Court received documentary evidence. 15. In a judgment of 1 October 1996 the District Court dismissed the applicants’ restitution action. 16. On 18 October 1996 the applicants appealed. On 23 October 1996 they motivated their appeal, which was forwarded to the Brno Regional Court (krajský soud) on 12 December 1996. 17. On 22 November 1999 the Regional Court, having requested further evidence on 3 November 1996 and having held a hearing on 15 November 1999, modified the first instance judgment. 18. On 29 December 1999 the case file was returned to the District Court and, on 3 January 2000, the Regional Court’s judgment was sent to the parties. 19. On 3 March 2000 the applicants filed a constitutional appeal (ústavní stížnost), claiming that Articles 1 (equality of all), 3 (prohibition on discrimination) and 11 § 1 (right to property) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (Listina základních práv a svobod) had been violated. 20. On 12 April 2000 the Supreme Court (Nejvyšší soud) dismissed the appeal which the applicants had lodged on points of law (dovolání) on 4 February 2000. 21. On 17 May 2000 the Constitutional Court (Ústavní soud) invited the applicants to remove certain shortcomings in their appeal. The applicants complied on 2 June 2000. On 20 June 2000 the court dismissed the applicants’ constitutional appeal.

5. The applicant was born on 30 April 1980 and lives in Belgium. 6. On 29 September 1995 a certain Mr Özcan Atik was arrested on suspicion of membership of the PKK[1]. The following day the applicant was arrested in Istanbul upon information allegedly given to the police by Mr Atik. According to that information, the applicant was a member of the PKK. Following his arrest the applicant was placed in police custody. 7. The applicant was questioned by police officers on 5 October 1995. In a written statement prepared by the police and signed by him, the applicant was quoted as having stated that he was a member of the PKK and that he had had a number of meetings with several of its members, including Özcan Atik. One day Özcan Atik had told the applicant that he had asked a certain Menderes Koçak to provide financial assistance to the PKK but that Mr Koçak had refused. Özcan Atik had then asked the applicant to help him set fire to a vehicle owned by Mr Koçak. This they had done one evening with the help of two other persons. The applicant also added that had he not been arrested, he would have taken part in further activities on behalf of the PKK. 8. On 7 October 1995 Mr Koçak identified Mr Atik and another person as the persons who had asked him to give money to the PKK. He did not know whether it had been the same two persons who had subsequently set fire to his vehicle and shop. 9. On 9 October 1995 police officers took the applicant and three other persons, including Mr Atik, to the street where Mr Koçak’s vehicle had been set on fire. 10. On 12 October 1995 the applicant and 21 other persons who had been arrested as part of the same police operation were taken to the Istanbul branch of the Forensic Medicine Institute, where they were examined by a doctor. According to the medical report drawn up the same day, the applicant’s body did not bear any signs of ill-treatment. 11. The same day the applicant was taken to the Istanbul State Security Court, where he was questioned by a prosecutor and then by a judge who ordered his detention in prison pending the introduction of criminal proceedings against him. In the statement drawn up by the prosecutor the applicant was quoted as having stated that he was a sympathiser but not a member of the PKK. He had set fire to the vehicle together with three other persons. In the statement drawn up by the judge, however, the applicant was quoted as having stated that he had set fire to the vehicle on his own. 12. When questioned by the police, and subsequently by the prosecutor and the judge, the applicant was not represented by a lawyer. 13. On 27 November 1995 the prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court filed an indictment with that court, charging the applicant and fifteen other persons with the offence of carrying out activities for the purpose of bringing about the secession of part of the national territory. According to Article 125 of the Criminal Code in force at the time, the punishment stipulated for this offence was the death penalty (see Relevant Domestic Law and Practice below). 14. A preparatory hearing was held on 18 December 1995 by the Istanbul State Security Court (hereinafter “the trial court”). One of the three judges on the bench was an army officer. 15. At the first hearing, held on 27 February 1996, the applicant was present but not represented by a lawyer. 16. During the second hearing, held on 1 March 1996, the applicant was still not represented by a lawyer but was questioned by the trial court. The applicant told the trial court that his childhood friend Özcan Atik had told him one day that he had been selling newspapers and that one of his customers had refused to pay. Mr Atik had then suggested “teaching that customer a lesson”. One night the applicant and Mr Atik had arrived outside a big building. Mr Atik had poured some petrol on the street outside the building from a jerry can and set fire to it. The applicant himself had not set fire to any vehicle and he did not know Menderes Koçak. 17. The applicant also told the trial court that, while detained in police custody, he had been given electric shocks, sprayed with pressurised water and beaten with a truncheon; the soles of his feet had also been beaten. He had then signed the statements implicating him in the offences with which he was subsequently charged. As regards the statements taken from him by the prosecutor and the judge on 12 October 1995, the applicant stated that the prosecutor and the judge had only asked him his date of birth; he had not made any statements before them. The applicant also denied that the police had taken him to the place where he had allegedly set fire to a vehicle (see paragraph 9 above). The applicant’s request for release was rejected by the trial court the same day. 18. During the third hearing held on 18 April 1996, a lawyer representing some of the applicant’s co-accused informed the trial court that she would also be representing the applicant. During the same hearing Menderes Koçak also gave evidence as a witness and stated that Özcan Atik had never asked him to give money to the PKK. A vehicle owned by him had been set on fire but he did not think Özcan Atik had done it. 19. The applicant was subjected to a limited visiting regime in the prison and did not have the opportunity to have open visits with his family. 20. The applicant did not attend four of the subsequent six hearings held at two-monthly intervals. Requests for his release made by his lawyer were all rejected by the trial court. The lawyer argued that there was no evidence against the applicant other than that obtained under ill-treatment. 21. In the course of the 10th hearing, which was held on 29 May 1997 in the applicant’s absence but with the attendance of his lawyer, the prosecutor asked the trial court to try the applicant for the offences of membership of an illegal organisation and causing damage to property, and not for the offence with which he was charged in the indictment (see paragraph 13 above). The trial court rejected the request for the applicant’s release. 22. The applicant’s lawyer did not attend the 11th hearing held on 17 July 1997. During the 12th hearing, on 26 August 1997, the lawyer argued that, on account of the testimony given to the trial court by Mr Koçak on 18 April 1996 (see paragraph 18 above), there was no evidence showing that the applicant had committed the offences with which he was charged. 23. The lawyer did not attend the 13th hearing, held on 2 October 1997, because she had other business before a Labour Court. The applicant made his own defence submissions and repeated his allegations of ill-treatment in police custody. He also asked to be released. This request was rejected by the trial court. 24. On 17 October 1997 the trial court found the applicant guilty of membership of an illegal organisation and of setting fire to a motor vehicle, and sentenced him to nine years, eight months and ten days’ imprisonment. The trial court considered that the statements given by the applicant in police custody and the statements given by his co-accused showed that the applicant was a member of the illegal organisation and that he had set fire to the vehicle. 25. The applicant appealed. On 12 March 1998 the Court of Cassation quashed the applicant’s conviction. The case was remitted to the trial court for a retrial. 26. On 11 September 1998 the trial court held a preparatory hearing in the retrial. One of the three judges on the bench was a military officer. 27. Eight hearings were held between 27 October 1998 and 30 December 1999. The applicant’s lawyer attended only one of these hearings, that on 18 March 1999, whereas the applicant attended two hearings. During the 5th hearing, held on 15 July 1999, the military judge was replaced by a civilian judge in accordance with the legislation which had entered into force in the meantime (cf. Öcalan v. Turkey [GC], no. 46221/99, §§ 2-54, ECHR 2005‑IV). 28. On 18 November 1999 a police chief informed the trial court that, contrary to the allegations, no vehicle belonging to Menderes Koçak had been set on fire. 29. A 9th hearing was held on 21 March 2000. The applicant was present but his lawyer was not. During the hearing Menderes Koçak gave evidence before the trial court and stated that his vehicle had not been burned. No one had asked him to give money to the PKK. When asked by the trial court to explain the inconsistencies between the statement he had made to the police on 7 October 1995 (see paragraph 8 above) and his testimony, Mr Koçak stated that he had not told any such things to the police; he had had to sign whatever was written in the statement drafted by the police officers. 30. During the same hearing the applicant reiterated that he did not know Mr Koçak and had not set fire to any vehicle. He pointed out that he had been arrested at the age of 15 with no evidence against him, and asked to be released. This request was rejected by the trial court. 31. The applicant but not his lawyer attended the 10th hearing, held on 23 May 2000. 32. In the course of the 11th hearing, held on 25 July 2000 in the absence of the applicant’s lawyer, the trial court was presented with a letter drafted by the applicant’s cell-mates. The letter states that “[the applicant] has serious psychiatric problems. His treatment is being overseen by a psychiatric hospital in Istanbul. He is unable to live without the assistance of others and his health is deteriorating. As such, he is unable to attend the hearings and he refused to attend today’s hearing. We felt the need to send you this letter because we have found out that his lawyer has not been attending the hearings”. 33. According to a medical report prepared by the prison doctor on 24 July 2000 which was appended to the cell-mates’ letter, the applicant had been taken to a psychiatric hospital on 2 June 2000 and returned to the prison on 11 July 2000. 34. The applicant’s mother also attended this hearing and informed the trial court of the applicant’s serious psychiatric problems. She asked for the applicant to be released from the prison. During the same hearing the prosecutor asked the trial court to acquit the applicant of the charge of arson (Article 516 § 7 of the Criminal Code) but to convict him of the offence of membership of an illegal organisation (Article 168 of the Criminal Code). 35. Nevertheless, the trial court ordered the applicant’s continued detention in prison and referred him to a psychiatric hospital with a view to establishing whether he had the necessary criminal capacity (doli capax) at the time of the alleged commission of the offence. 36. On 7 August 2000 the prison doctor reported on the problems which the applicant had been suffering in prison. According to this report, the applicant had attempted suicide in June 1999 by taking an overdose. In August 1999 he had set himself on fire and suffered extensive and serious burns. He had spent three months in hospital where he was treated for his injuries. During that time in hospital he had also received medication for depression. Following his return to the prison his treatment for the burns had continued for five months. His body still bore burn marks. 37. On 2 June 2000 the applicant’s psychological health had deteriorated and he was taken to hospital, where he stayed for a month and a half. His health had deteriorated even further following his return from the hospital and he was now refusing to speak to anyone. 38. The prison doctor concluded in his report that the situation in the prison was not compatible with the applicant’s treatment. The applicant needed to spend a considerable time in a specialised hospital. 39. During the 12th hearing, held on 10 October 2000, Ms Mükrime Avcı, one of the applicant’s legal representatives named above (see paragraph 2), submitted a power of attorney to the trial court and informed that court that she was taking over the applicant’s representation. Ms Avcı argued in her written observations submitted to the trial court the same day that the applicant had only been 15 years old at the time of his arrest. Turkey was a Party to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 40 § 3 of that Convention recommended that the States Parties establish procedures and institutions specifically for children charged with criminal offences. Indeed, juvenile courts existed in Turkey. However, the applicant had been charged with an offence falling within the jurisdiction of State Security Courts and, as such, the domestic law prevented him from being tried by a juvenile court. Had the applicant been tried before a juvenile court, he would not have been kept in police custody for 12 days, a lawyer would have been appointed to represent him and his case would have been concluded within a short time. 40. The lawyer added that the ill-treatment to which the applicant had been subjected in police custody, coupled with his long detention in prison, had been too much to bear for a child of his age. He had attempted to take his own life on two occasions. He was still suffering from serious psychiatric problems and he found it difficult to attend the hearings. The lawyer asked for the applicant to be released so that he could receive medical treatment. 41. The lawyer also informed the trial court that the applicant had not been taken to the hospital despite the court order of 25 July 2000 (see paragraph 35 above). The same day the trial court ordered the applicant’s release from prison on bail. 42. The applicant attended the 14th hearing, held on 13 March 2001 and informed the trial court that, although he had gone to the hospital for a medical examination, the hospital authorities had refused to examine him as he had no official letter of referral. The trial court issued a new order of referral. 43. The applicant was examined at a psychiatric hospital on 25 April 2001. According to the report pertaining to that examination, other than the two instances referred to above (see paragraph 36), the applicant had made another attempt to kill himself, by slashing his wrists, in September 1998. The extensive burn marks on his arms and body were still visible. His psychological complaints had started during his detention in prison and had worsened in the course of the time he spent there. Between 2 June 2000 and 11 July 2000 he had been treated in hospital for “major depression”. His psychological problems were now in remission. It was concluded in the report that the applicant had not been suffering psychological problems at the time of the commission of the offence and that his current mental state did not affect his criminal responsibility. 44. In its 16th hearing, held on 22 May 2001, the trial court acquitted the applicant of the arson charge but found him guilty of membership of an illegal organisation and sentenced him to eight years and four months’ imprisonment. The trial court stated that the statements made by the applicant in police custody, and then before the prosecutor and the judge at the end of his police custody, had been decisive in reaching the conclusion that he was a member of the illegal organisation. In those statements the applicant had described the “various activities” in which he had been involved. The trial court also concluded that the applicant had been involved in the printing and distribution of illegal leaflets. 45. The applicant appealed. On 13 March 2002 the prosecutor at the Court of Cassation submitted his written observations to that court and asked for the applicant’s conviction to be upheld. These observations were not communicated to the applicant or to his lawyer. 46. In her detailed appeal submissions the applicant’s lawyer pointed out that the only evidence put forward by the prosecution in support of the allegation that her client was a member of the illegal organisation had been the allegation concerning the burning of a vehicle. As established by the trial court, however, no such incident had occurred and the owner of the vehicle had made no such complaint. There was no place in the Turkish legal system for abstract concepts such as “various activities” (see paragraph 44 above). For any activity to be relied on in evidence, it should have been set out clearly and supported with adequate evidence. Furthermore, the trial court’s judgment was silent as to why and how it was concluded that the applicant had been involved in the printing and distribution of the illegal organisation’s leaflets. The lawyer also reiterated her arguments concerning the applicant’s age and her references to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (see paragraph 39 above). 47. On 20 May 2002 the Court of Cassation upheld the applicant’s conviction. 48. According to the information provided to the Court by the applicant’s lawyer, in 2002 the applicant left Turkey for Belgium, where he was subsequently granted refugee status.

5. The applicants were born in 1946 and 1938 respectively and live in Kazichene. 6. On 27 May 1998 their son, Mr Rosen Stoyanov, born in 1967, a parachute instructor in the Bulgarian Army, died when performing a parachute jump from a Mi-17 helicopter during a training exercise of the Ministry of the Interior's Special Anti-Terrorism Squad. 7. Six paratroopers were scheduled to jump on that day. Before getting into the helicopter they were examined by a doctor who confirmed that they were physically fit. The helicopter took off at 1 p.m. and several minutes later reached a height of about 1,100 metres. Immediately before the start of the parachute jumps Chief Sergeant T., in charge of the jumps, instructed the helicopter's pilots to speed up. The pilots responded “You have it”. It is unclear what the exact speed thus reached was, because, as it was established later, the helicopter's device recording the parameters of the flight had not been loaded with a tape. 8. One of the paratroopers, Mr G., jumped first. Immediately after the jump, his body was thrust back by the air stream and his head passed about 20 centimetres from the left rear tyre of the helicopter. 9. The applicants' son jumped four seconds later. Immediately after the jump, his head hit the left rear tyre of the helicopter and he became unconscious. His body fell freely and hit the ground. 10. Four seconds later the next paratrooper, Mr V., jumped. His head also hit the left rear tyre of the helicopter and he became unconscious. Sixty to seventy metres from the ground he regained consciousness and attempted unsuccessfully to open his parachute. His body also hit the ground. 11. After the accidents with the applicants' son and Mr V. the parachute jumps stopped and the helicopter landed. The two bodies were located soon afterwards. 12. On 27 May 1998 the Ministers of the Interior and Defence appointed a ten-member commission to investigate the reasons that had led to the fatal accident. The commission, which included paratroopers, doctors and other experts, conducted inspections, interviewed witnesses and examined documents. On 6 June 1998 it presented an interim report proposing, with a view to establishing properly the circumstances of the accident, that an experiment with a dummy being thrown from a helicopter at different speeds be carried out and that the helicopter's manufacturer be asked for additional technical information. However, it appears that none of these actions was taken. 13. On 24 June 1998 the commission submitted its final report. It established that after Chief Sergeant T. had instructed the crew to speed up (see paragraph 7 above), the helicopter had increased its speed from about 150 to about 200 km/h. This estimation was based on ground control data. 14. Furthermore, the commission established that the helicopter, which was built in 1986, had been in a good state of technical repair, and that its equipment had been functioning well during the fatal flight. The three members of the crew were experienced and qualified. The commission established that up to 27 May 1998 Mr Rosen Stoyanov had performed 450 parachute jumps, 112 of which were from a Mi-17 helicopter. Mr V. had performed 178 jumps, 120 of which were from a Mi-17 helicopter. 15. The commission concluded that the accident had been caused by “the inappropriate speed of the helicopter and the position of the paratroopers' bodies at the time of jumping, not in conformity with that speed”. Additionally, the accident had been due to: “1) incomplete coordination between the helicopter's crew and the paratroopers; 2) shortcomings in the preparation and conduct of the flight on the part of the helicopter's crew; and 3) shortcomings in the organisation and the conducting of the parachute jumps on the part of the Ministry of the Interior's Special Anti-Terrorism Squad.” 16. The commission criticised the failure of the officials responsible for the organisation of the flight to load the helicopter's recording device with a tape (see paragraph 7 above), which was against the rules. 17. Furthermore, the commission criticised Chief Sergeant T.'s failure to communicate to the crew the exact speed he needed when he requested them to speed up. Neither had the speed at which the jumps were to be performed been indicated by the officer in charge of the training (he had remained on the ground) before the helicopter took off. 18. The commission recommended various measures for the prevention of similar accidents in the future, mostly concerning the training of paratroopers and flight preparation. It is unclear whether any of them were put into practice. 19. On 30 June 1998 the commission's report was affirmed by the Minister of Defence, but not by the Minister of the Interior. Subsequently, the document was extended to the prosecuting authorities who investigated the deaths of Mr Stoyanov and Mr V. (see below). 20. On 27 May 1998 the Sofia military regional prosecutor's office opened a preliminary investigation into the accident. (a) Initial investigative actions 21. A post-mortem examination of the bodies of the applicants' son and Mr V. was carried out on 28 May 1998. It concluded that the death had been caused by “numerous traumas incompatible with the maintenance of life”. There were no traces of alcohol or poison in the blood. 22. Nor were any traces of alcohol or poison found in the crew members' blood. 23. Colonel O., the flight captain, was questioned on 28 May 1998. He stated that the helicopter had been checked and found to be in good technical repair just before the flight. Furthermore, he stated that after Chief Sergeant T. had asked the pilots to speed up he had increased speed from 130 to 150 km/h. After the first three paratroopers had jumped, he had been told to land as two of the paratroopers' parachutes had not opened. 24. Senior Sergeant A., the flight engineer, was questioned on 1 June 1998. He also testified that the helicopter's speed at the time when the parachute jumps had started had been 150 km/h. The speed and the height had not changed during the jumps. When jumping from the helicopter, Mr G. had plunged energetically and Mr Rosen Stoyanov and Mr V. had not, which, in Senior Sergeant A.'s view, had been the reason for the fatal accident. 25. On 29 May 1998 Mr G., who had jumped before Mr Stoyanov, testified that immediately after jumping he had felt an unexpectedly strong air stream. 26. Chief Sergeant P., who had been on board the helicopter, was questioned on 29 May 1998. He explained that he had seen Mr G.'s head pass about 20 centimetres from the helicopter's left rear tyre and then Mr Rosen Stoyanov and Mr V. hit the tyre. Because of the force of the blow, Mr Stoyanov's body had turned several times in the air. 27. Lieutenant D., who had also been in the helicopter, testified that he, too, had seen Mr Rosen Stoyanov's head hit the tyre. Captain C., who had also been on board, described the position of Mr G.'s body immediately after he had jumped as “totally abnormal”. 28. Chief Sergeant T., who had been in charge of the jumps and had been scheduled to jump after Mr V., was questioned on 29 May 1998. He explained that he had not seen Mr Rosen Stoyanov and Mr V. hit the tyre but had become aware of the abnormal position of Mr V.'s body and had not jumped. He had not noticed any change in the speed, height or direction of the helicopter during the parachute jumps. 29. During the first several weeks after 27 May 1998 the investigator in charge of the case examined other witnesses, conducted inspections and collected documentary evidence. 30. On 28 May 1998 he appointed the members of the internal inquiry commission of the Ministries of the Interior and Defence (see paragraphs 12-19 above) as experts in the criminal proceedings, with the task of determining the cause of the two paratroopers' deaths. Since the experts failed to submit a report within the months that followed, on 25 November 1998 a prosecutor from the Sofia military regional prosecutor's office stayed the proceedings. (b) Subsequent developments 31. On several occasions in 1999 and early 2000 the Sofia military regional prosecutor's office sent letters to the Ministries of the Interior and Defence requesting that their officials appointed as experts prepare and submit a report for the purposes of the criminal proceedings. 32. On 18 April 2000 the criminal proceedings were resumed and the prosecutor in charge of the case appointed a new group of experts from the National Military University in Dolna Mitropoliya, with the task of assessing the reasons for the deaths of the applicants' son and Mr V. 33. On 25 April 2000 the experts submitted their conclusions, specifying that the information they had been given was insufficient, there being no data on the exact parameters of the flight, and also that they were not experts in parachuting; therefore, they were not able to draw up a formal expert report. 34. The experts considered that the helicopter's speed at the time of Mr Rosen Stoyanov's and Mr V.'s jumps had been between 150 and 170 km/h. However, in their view, the speed was not related to the fatal accident, which had instead been caused by the two paratroopers' jumping technique; this had not been in compliance with the respective instructions for performing parachute jumps. 35. In July and October 2000 the Sofia military regional prosecutor's office sent new letters to the Ministries of the Interior and Defence requesting again that the experts appointed on 28 May 1998 (see paragraph 30 above) draw up a formal report. 36. On 17 November 2000 the Ministry of Defence experts submitted their report. The group included four paratroopers and a doctor. The Ministry of the Interior experts did not sign the document. 37. On the basis of ground control data, the Ministry of Defence experts established that the helicopter's speed at the time of Mr Rosen Stoyanov's and Mr V.'s jumps had been 210 km/h. The experts were of the opinion that Mr Stoyanov and Mr V. had not committed any errors when jumping from the helicopter, but pointed out that they did not possess the expertise to assess whether the helicopter's crew had committed any errors that might have led to the tragic accident. The experts noted that the two paratroopers' parachutes had been well packed and in good repair and that the weather conditions at the time had not affected the flight. (c) Discontinuance of the criminal proceedings 38. On 4 February 2002 a prosecutor from the Sofia military regional prosecutor's office discontinued the criminal proceedings. Relying on witness testimony and the conclusions of the National Military University experts (see paragraph 34 above), he found that the helicopter's speed and course of flight did not change significantly during the parachute jumps and were not related to the fatal accident. He accepted that sufficient data could not be collected to assess whether the helicopter's crew had committed any errors and that the applicants' son and Mr V. had not complied with the respective instructions on performing parachute jumps. 39. On an appeal by the applicants, on 6 August 2002 the Sofia Military Court quashed the prosecutor's decision. On 28 November 2002 the Military Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's findings. It held that the prosecutor had breached the procedural rules and that the conclusions of the National Military University experts, on which his decision had been based, could not serve as valid evidence in the case. 40. After the case was remitted to the prosecution, some of the witnesses were re-examined. On an unspecified date Chief Sergeant T., who had been in charge of the parachute jumps, explained that when he had instructed the helicopter crew to speed up he had meant a speed of about 150 km/h, as was usual. He had become aware later, apparently from the conclusions of the internal inquiry, that the speed had been above 200 km/h. He considered that this, coupled with a possible minor side inclination of the helicopter, which would have shifted the position of the left rear tyre vis-à-vis the paratroopers' bodies, had been the reason for the accident with the applicants' son and Mr V. 41. On 13 May 2003 a prosecutor from the Sofia military regional prosecutor's office requested the Ministers of the Interior and Defence to nominate seven experts in aerodynamics, aviation, meteorology and parachuting to be appointed experts in the criminal proceedings and draw up a new expert report. He received no reply. 42. On 16 June 2003 the prosecutor appointed another group of experts – a physician from the Military Medical Academy and five lecturers from the Air Transport Department of the Technical University in Sofia – with the task of assessing the reasons for the two paratroopers' deaths on 27 May 1998. 43. The experts submitted their report on 25 July 2003. They considered it scientifically impossible for Mr Stoyanov and Mr V. to have hit the helicopter's left rear tyre; in their view those blows had been “made up”. The experts considered that the two paratroopers had wrongly estimated the distance to the ground and had failed to open their parachutes in time; this had led to their deaths. Furthermore, the paratroopers had failed to comply with the relevant instructions on the position of their bodies at the time of jumping. The speed and course of the helicopter had not been related to their death. 44. On 10 June 2004 a prosecutor from the Sofia military regional prosecutor's office once again discontinued the criminal proceedings. In his decision, he referred to the expert report of 25 July 2003 and its conclusion that the applicants' son and Mr V. had not in fact hit the left rear tyre of the helicopter (see paragraph 43 above). However, he also mentioned the witness testimony indicating that these impacts had happened (see paragraphs 26-27 above). He failed to examine the apparent controversy between those two groups of evidence and to indicate which version he found plausible. He merely concluded, after describing the evidence collected in the case, that there was no appearance of a crime. 45. Upon appeal by the first applicant, on 30 June 2004 the prosecutor's decision was upheld by the Sofia Military Court. Examining the evidence collected in the case, that court dismissed the conclusion of the expert report of 25 July 2003 (see paragraph 43 above) that Mr Stoyanov and Mr V. had not hit the helicopter's left rear tyre; it considered that in this regard the testimony of the other participants in the flight was reliable. Nevertheless, the domestic court accepted the experts' conclusion to the effect that Mr Stoyanov and Mr V. had not positioned themselves correctly when they jumped. It concluded that this had been the reason for their hitting the tyre and falling to the ground. Accordingly, it upheld the prosecution's conclusion that no offence had been committed in the case. 46. Soon after their son's death, the applicants sought the compensation provided for in section 249(2) of the Armed Forces Act 1995 (see paragraph 49 below). As they had not received that sum by 2003, they brought a claim. They sought the compensation provided for in section 249(2) of the Armed Forces Act, plus interest, as provided for in section 250 (ibid.). 47. While the proceedings were pending, the Bulgarian Army paid up the compensation due, which was in the amount of 8,316.48 Bulgarian levs (BGN), the equivalent of approximately 4,300 euros (EUR). Therefore, in a judgment of 6 July 2004 the Sofia District Court only awarded the applicants the interest accrued, in accordance with section 250 of the Armed Forces Act, which amounted to BGN 427.58, the equivalent of EUR 220. That judgment was not appealed against and entered into force. 48. In September 2003 the applicants also sought indemnification from the company with which their son had been insured by the Bulgarian Army. They claimed a sum of about BGN 3,000, the equivalent of EUR 1,540. However, that indemnification was refused as they had failed to claim it within the statutory three-year time-limit from the date of their son's death.

9. The first applicant, an Austrian citizen born in 1921 and residing in Vienna, is the chief editor and publisher of the newspaper “Neue Kronen‑Zeitung”. The second applicant, a limited partnership (Kommanditgesellschaft) is the owner of this newspaper. The third applicant is a limited company, the general partner (Komplementär) of the second applicant. The second and third applicants have their places of business in Vienna. 10. The applicants belong to a large media group which at the relevant time was in strong competition with another media group represented by Mr Michael Graff, a lawyer practising in Vienna. Besides his profession as a lawyer, Mr Graff was from 1982 to 1987 secretary general of the Austrian People’s Party (Österreichische Volkspartei) and, from 1983 to 1995, a Member of Parliament for that party. Between 1987 and 1995 he was the Chairman of the Parliament’s Legislative Committee (Justizausschuß). From 1989 to July 1995 he represented the applicants’ competitor in several proceedings concerning unfair competition against companies belonging to the applicants’ media group. 11. In 1989 several Austrian laws were amended by the Extended Pecuniary Limits Amendment Act (Erweiterte Wertgrenzen-Novelle). The Government Bill (Regierungsvorlage) had also provided for an amendment to Section 359 § 1 of the Enforcement Act (Exekutionsordnung), a section which is of particular relevance for the enforcement of injunctions. The Government Bill had envisaged raising the fines that could be imposed for non-compliance with injunctions from ATS 50,000 per enforcement order to ATS 80,000 per enforcement order. 12. Under the chairmanship of Mr Graff, the Legislative Committee dealing with the Government Bill proposed a different version, namely that a maximum fine of AS 80,000 could be imposed for each request for enforcement (Exekutionsantrag) instead of for each enforcement order issued by the Enforcement Court. In its report of June 1989, the Legislative Committee pointed out that the fine had to be multiplied by the number of requests for enforcement, if only one decision combining several requests was taken. This proposal was adopted by Parliament on 29 June 1989 and published as Article XI of the Extended Pecuniary Limits Amendment Act, Federal Law Gazette 1989/343 (Erweiterte Wertgrenzen-Novelle 1989, BGBl. 1989/343). 13. Four years later, in June 1993, the following article written by the first applicant under the pseudonym “Cato” was published in the “Neue Kronen-Zeitung”: “Moral 93 Before Roland Dumas became the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, he was one of Europe’s most famous and most successful lawyers. He administered the gigantic estate of Picasso; he represented Kreisky and an Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs when the latter found himself in a bad situation. Dumas took it for granted that he had to give up his law firm when he became a member of the government. In every democracy of the world this course of action is followed. Only Mr Graff, who is obviously thick-skinned, does not intend to comply with these moral concepts. It so happened that at the time when Mr Graff was presiding Parliament’s Legislative Committee, a law was amended which brought about big advantages for the newspaper publishers whom Mr Graff represented as a lawyer. In order to ensure that in such cases no suspicion, not even one that has no objective justification, can arise, there exists the wise rule of incompatibility; a lawyer is not allowed to take part in the adoption of laws which lead to advantages for his clients. Also the Austrian People’s Party thought that way and they decided to appeal to Mr Graff’s conscience. In vain! It is very telling for the present situation of the Austrian People’s Party that it cannot convince Mr Graff. The other parties will be only too pleased, when it becomes so flagrantly evident how powerless the Austrian People’s Party is vis-a-vis one of their officials who has his own moral concepts. Mr Graff was even allowed to present his disreputable attitude on our monopoly-television. Mr Graff thought that it would be a sign of fear to the ‘Kronen Zeitung’ if he had to resign from the Legislative Committee. The People’s Party does not have to fear the ‘Krone’ but its voters, who will continue turning away from it if the party shows itself incapable of establishing order within its own ranks; how could one then possibly trust that it would succeed in doing this in the State ... Cato.” <German> “Moral 93 Roland Dumas war, bevor er Frankreich’s Außenminister wurde, einer der bekanntesten und erfolgreichsten Rechtsanwälte Europas. Er verwaltete zum Beispiel das gigantische Erbe Picassos, vertrat Kreisky und einen österreichischen Außenminister, als dieser in eine arge Affäre geraten war. Für Dumas war es ganz selbstverständlich, daß er sein Rechtsanwaltsbüro aufgeben mußte, als er in die Regierung eintrat. Überall in der Welt wird dies in Demokratien so gehalten. Nur der offenbar mit einer Büffelhaut ausgestattete Rechtsanwalt Dr. Graff denkt nicht daran, sich nach solchen Moralbegriffen zu richten. So kam es, während er im Justizausschuß des Parlaments den Vorsitz hatte, zur Veränderung eines Gesetzes, wodurch der Zeitungsverlag, den Graff rechtsanwaltlich vertritt, große Vorteile hatte. Damit in solchen Fällen nicht ein bestimmter Verdacht entstehen kann, der keineswegs begründet sein muß, gibt es eben die weise Regel der Unvereinbarkeit; ein Anwalt darf nicht an der Entstehung von Gesetzen beteiligt sein, die seinen Mandanten Vorteile bringen. Das dachte man auch in der ÖVP, und man entschloß sich, Graff ins Gewissen zu reden. Vergeblich! Es sagt einiges über den Zustand der ÖVP aus, daß sie sich gegen Graff nicht durchsetzen konnte. Den anderen Parteien kann es nur recht sein, wenn sich in so brutaler Offenheit zeigt, wie ohnmächtig die Volkspartei gegenüber einem Funktionär ist, der seine eigene Moral hat. Sogar in unserem Monopol-Fernsehen durfte er seine anrüchige Haltung vertreten. Graff meinte, es würde nur Angst vor der ‘Kronen Zeitung’ signalisieren, berufe man ihn im Justizausschuß ab. Nicht vor der ‘Krone’ braucht die ÖVP Angst zu haben, sondern vor ihren Wählern, die sich weiter von ihr abwenden werden, wenn sie sich als unfähig erweist, in der eigenen Partei Ordnung zu machen; wie sollte man da das Vertrauen haben, es könne ihr im Staat gelingen ... Cato.” 14. On 7 June 1993 Mr Graff brought injunction proceedings under Section 1330 of the Austrian Civil Code (Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) against the three applicants before the Vienna Commercial Court (Handelsgericht). He requested that the applicants be prohibited from stating or repeating that he “does not intend to comply with moral concepts existing in democracies all over the world, namely that one has to give up one’s law firm if one becomes a member of the government, (M.G. had never been a member of the government), and/or that he has taken part in the adoption of laws which have brought about advantages for his clients, and/or that he has been allowed to present his disreputable opinion on television”. He also requested that the statement be retracted and that this retraction be published in the “Neue Kronen-Zeitung”. 15. On 9 July 1993 the Vienna Commercial Court issued a preliminary injunction (einstweilige Verfügung) against the applicants prohibiting them from reiterating the impugned statements. The applicants’ appeal against this decision was to no avail. 16. On 9 September 1994 the Vienna Commercial Court granted a permanent injunction. It ordered the applicants not to repeat the impugned statements and to retract the statements in one edition of the “Neue Kronen‑Zeitung”. It found that the applicants’ statements amounted to an insult and therefore fell to be considered not only under Section 1330 § 2 of the Austrian Civil Code, but also under the first paragraph of Section 1330. In that case the onus of proof shifted to the applicants who had to prove the truth of the impugned statements. The court pointed out that all the statements contained in the article were statements of fact which the applicants had failed to prove. 17. The court found that the statement contained in the first paragraph of the newspaper article was an insult, within the meaning of Section 1330 § 1 of the Civil Code, because Mr Graff was accused of ignoring or neglecting moral, democratic standards and had therefore acted immorally. This statement contained the implicit allegation that Mr Graff had become a member of the government. However, the allegation was untrue because Mr Graff had never been a member of the government. 18. The court further considered that the statement in the second paragraph of the newspaper article expressed the suspicion that Mr Graff had abused his position as a Member of Parliament. The proposed evidence that should prove the truth of this allegation, namely the amendment of Section 359 § 1 of the Enforcement Act, was insufficient because the applicants had not even contended before the court that the amendment served the exclusive interest of Mr Graff’s client. In fact this amendment had an objective basis, concerned both competing media groups and had no distorting effect on competition. 19. In respect of the third statement according to which Mr Graff’s attitude was disreputable, the court found that this statement again contained the allegation that Mr Graff had acted immorally because he had exercised two incompatible activities. The court therefore concluded that the applicants could not successfully rely on Article 10 of the Convention, because the interference with the applicants’ rights under this provision was justified in order to protect Mr Graff’s good reputation, which could be prejudiced by such untruthful statements. 20. On 20 October 1994 the applicants appealed. They submitted that the Commercial Court had not sufficiently taken into account a written statement by E.S., an employee of the second applicant, which the applicants had submitted. According to this written statement, Mr Graff had requested the amendment to the Enforcement Act in order to impose a fine for each request for execution, thus exploiting one of the applicants’ weak points. The applicants were the owners of several monthly magazines. Unlike daily newspapers, these magazines were therefore usually on the market longer. If one of the applicants’ magazines, for instance, had violated the Unfair Competition Act (Bundesgesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb), Mr Graff, as the legal representative of the competitors, had immediately obtained a preliminary injunction and had filed almost daily requests for enforcement. He had counted on the fact that the applicants could, in the long run, not afford to pay the fines, or that they could not afford the cost of withdrawing the relevant issue of the monthly magazine from distribution. Under the previous legal situation, several requests for enforcement would be combined in one decision, and the applicants had only had to pay one fine of AS 50,000 for them. Under Section 359 § 1 of the Enforcement Act in its amended form, however, the fines were multiplied by the number of requests and, consequently, increased dramatically. 21. Furthermore, the applicants complained that the Commercial Court had failed to take sufficient account of a written statement by their lawyer, S.R., and had refused to hear this person as a witness. He would have given evidence of a telephone conversation on 12 June 1989 between himself and Mr Graff in which the latter had complained that his requests for enforcement had not been successful and had not reaped the expected fines. He continued that this would require changes in the pecuniary limits and the system of fines. The applicants also submitted that the impugned article constituted a criticism of Mr Graff’s behaviour as a politician and was therefore protected by the freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention. 22. On 15 December 1994 the Vienna Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) dismissed the applicants’ appeal. It found that the Commercial Court had correctly taken the necessary evidence and assessed the relevant facts. The applicants had not even argued before the Commercial Court that Mr Graff had been a member of the government or that the amendment of the Enforcement Act had served the exclusive interests of Mr Graff’s client. Instead they had merely argued that Mr Graff, in his function as Chairman of the Legislative Committee, had been involved in the making of laws which created advantages for his client. The applicants therefore should have proved that Mr Graff had been a member of the government and that he had manipulated the enactment of laws to the exclusive advantage of his client. The evidence proposed by the applicants, however, had been insufficient to prove such allegations. Moreover, the contested statements were not value judgments, but (political) criticism based on alleged facts. Such criticism was only acceptable if the underlying facts were true. Since the applicants had failed to prove the truth of these facts, they could not rely on Article 10 of the Convention. 23. On 9 March 1995 the Supreme Court rejected as inadmissible the applicants’ extraordinary appeal on points of law (außerordentliche Revision). Referring to its previous case-law, the court pointed out that disparagement by means of untrue statements, even if made in the course of political debate, went beyond acceptable (political) criticism and could not be justified by a weighing of interests or by invoking the right to freedom of expression. This decision was served on the applicants on 10 April 1995.

7. The applicants were born in 1954 and 1960, respectively, and live in the city of Kirovograd, Ukraine. 8. Until 1998 the applicants served as career officers in military unit A-425. In 1998, the applicants retired. 9. Upon retirement, the applicants were entitled to different types of compensation and payments. As these entitlements went unpaid, they instituted proceedings in the Cherkassy Garrison Military Court against military unit A-0425 for their recovery. 10. On 13 August 1998 the court found for Mr Svintitskiy and awarded him UAH 2,376.37[1]. 11. On 24 September 1998 the court found for Mr Goncharov and awarded him UAH 670[2]. 12. These court decisions were not appealed and came into force. The execution writs were sent to the Kirovograd Bailiffs' Service for enforcement. 13. Between March 1999 and March 2000 the applicants lodged numerous complaints with the local departments of justice and defence and with the local prosecutor's office about the non-enforcement of the judgments in their favour. 14. By letter of 6 September 1999, the head of the economic department of the Ministry of Defence informed the applicants that the judgments in their favour remained unenforced due to the lack of sufficient funding from the State Budget. 15. By letter of 12 January 2000, the Kirovograd District Prosecutors' Office informed the Mr Svintitskiy that the judgment in his favour could not be enforced due to the lack of funds of the debtor, and the impossibility of attaching the debtor's property since it belonged to the State. 16. On 1 August 2001 the judgment in favour of Mr Goncharov was enforced in full. 17. On 17 September 2001 the judgment in favour of Mr Svintitskiy was enforced in full.

6. Following the financial crisis in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as well as the collapse of the banking system in Serbia in the 1990s, in 1998 and 2002 the respondent State adopted specific legislation accepting the conversion of foreign currency deposits in certain banks, including Vojvođanska banka, into a public debt. The legislation set the time-frame (2016) and the amounts, including interest, to be paid back to the banks' former clients. It also explicitly provided, inter alia, that any foreign currency-related judicial proceedings were to be discontinued (for details concerning the relevant domestic law see paragraphs 20-27 below). 7. The applicant was born in 1926 and lives in Subotica, Serbia. He is retired and receives a pension in the net amount of approximately 250 Euros (“EUR”) monthly. 8. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 9. On a number of separate occasions, the applicant deposited a certain amount of his foreign currency savings with the Subotica branch of Vojvođanska banka, a bank based in Novi Sad. 10. In 1991 the said bank refused to release the applicant's funds. 11. On 21 July 1993 the applicant filed a civil claim, seeking the release of his foreign currency deposits with the interest stipulated. 12. On 27 September 1993 the Municipal Court in Subotica ruled partly in favour of the applicant and ordered the bank to pay him: (i) 15,584.41 German Marks (“DEM”), on account of his foreign currency savings; (ii) 37,460,000,000 Yugoslav Dinars (“YUD”), for his legal costs[1]; and (iii) the statutory interest due in respect of the latter as of 27 September 1993. 13. On 20 March 1996 the District Court in Subotica upheld this judgment, adding that the respondent bank should also pay interest on the sum of DEM 15,584.41 which had been awarded. In particular, this interest was to be paid as of 1 January 1993, based on the DEM sight deposit rate (kamata na štedne uloge po viđenju). 14. On 2 October 1996 the Supreme Court rejected the respondent's appeal on points of law (revizija) and confirmed the District Court's judgment. 15. On 24 April 2001 and 26 September 2001, respectively, the applicant filed two separate requests with the Municipal Court in Subotica, seeking enforcement of the above judgment by means of a bank account transfer. 16. On 2 April 2002 the Municipal Court rejected those requests, stating that, under the relevant domestic legislation, all judicial enforcement proceedings aimed at the collection of foreign currency deposits had to be discontinued. 17. On 30 March 2004 the bank confirmed that the applicant's foreign currency savings had been converted into a public debt in the amount of EUR 8,740.18. 18. As of 1 March 2007 the applicant was still owed EUR 6,652, having in the meantime, in several instalments and on various grounds, been reimbursed a total of EUR 2,088.18. 19. There is no information in the case file whether the applicant received any payments thereafter.

4. The applicant was born in 1939 and lives in Tyumen, the Tyumen Region. He is of Chechen origin. 5. In 1993 he bought a two-room flat measuring 44.4 square metres in Groznyy, the capital of the Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation. As a result of a military operation in Chechnya the applicant's housing was destroyed. 6. On 4 July 2003 the Russian Government adopted a Decree laying down the procedure for payment of compensation to citizens who had lost their housing or property situated on the territory of the Chechen Republic. 7. The Decree established a fixed compensation in the amount of 300,000 Russian roubles (RUR) for any destroyed housing. 8. On 4 November 2003 the Tsentralnyy District Court of Tyumen granted the applicant's claim against the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation and awarded him RUR 300,000 for the loss of housing. The judgment was not appealed against and entered into force on 20 November 2003. 9. On 27 November 2003 the Tsentralnyy District Court of Tyumen issued a writ of execution. 10. On an unspecified date the applicant and his representative requested the authorities to initiate criminal proceedings against the officials of the Ministry of Finance for the failure to enforce the judgment of 4 November 2003. 11. In 2005, following the request by the Department of Investigation and Administrative Practice of the Federal Bailiffs' service, the applicant and his representative went to Moscow and submitted written explanations as regards their complaints against the officials of the Ministry of Finance. 12. On 7 December 2005 the judgment of 4 November 2003 was enforced in full.

5. The applicant was born in 1977 and is serving a prison sentence in the Kemerovo Region. 6. On an unspecified date the prosecution authorities opened an investigation into the activities of an organised criminal gang that had committed a series of murders and other crimes. The applicant was one of the suspects. 7. On 1 August 2006 the Naberezhnyye Chelny Town Court, Republic of Tatarstan, authorised a search of the applicant’s flat. According to the applicant, he unsuccessfully complained about the court’s search order to the town prosecutor on 20 March 2009. 8. On 19 August 2006 the applicant was arrested and informed of the court order of 1 August 2006. His flat was searched on the same day. 9. On 20 August 2006 the prosecutor’s office appointed counsel N. to represent the applicant. On the same date the Town Court authorised the applicant’s detention pending investigation. In particular, the court noted as follows: “[The applicant] is suspected of involvement in serious crimes which present a heightened danger to public order and entail a custodial sentence exceeding two years ... The court considers that, if released, [the applicant], who does not have a permanent place of residence in Naberezhnyye Chelny and who knows where the witnesses reside, might abscond or otherwise interfere with the establishment of the truth.” 10. On 12 October 2006 the Town Court extended the applicant’s detention until 18 February 2007. The court refused to release the applicant pending investigation, noting as follows: “The investigator requests that the [applicant’s] detention be extended. ... If released, [the applicant] might abscond, continue criminal activities, put pressure on witnesses or otherwise interfere with the administration of justice. Having heard the defendant and his lawyer, who asked the court to dismiss the request, and the prosecutor who considered that it should be granted, and having studied the materials of the case, the court finds that the investigator’s request is substantiated and should be granted.” 11. On 14 November 2006 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tatarstan upheld the decision of 12 October 2006 on appeal. 12. On 12 January 2007 counsel K. replaced counsel N., who had asked to be withdrawn. 13. On 13 February 2007 the Town Court extended the applicant’s detention until 27 April 2007. The court held as follows: “... [the applicant] is charged with very serious offences which present a heightened danger to public order and entail a custodial sentence exceeding two years. This criminal case is of extreme complexity. The reasons justifying the [applicant’s] remand in custody have not ceased to exist. The time-limit for the preliminary investigation has been extended until 27 April 2007. A number of investigative activities involving [the applicant] are pending. [The applicant] might abscond or commit new crimes [if released].” 14. On 20 March 2007 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tatarstan upheld the court order of 13 February 2007 on appeal. 15. On 24 April 2007 the Town Court further extended the applicant’s detention until 27 July 2007. The court reiterated verbatim the reasoning of 13 February 2007. 16. On 17 July 2007 the Town Court extended the applicant’s detention until 18 August 2007, noting as follows: “[The applicant] is charged with a number of serious offences. His involvement in the crimes he has been charged with is supported by the materials submitted. The circumstances underlying the [applicant’s] remand in custody have not ceased to exist.” 17. On 26 July 2007 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tatarstan extended the applicant’s detention until 27 October 2007, referring to the gravity of the charges against the applicant and the risk that he might abscond or re-offend. On 4 October 2007 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the decision of 26 July 2007 on appeal. 18. On 21 May 2007 the applicant started reading the case file, which comprised twenty-five volumes and concerned twelve defendants. On 15 October 2007 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tatarstan held that the applicant could not be released pending study of the case file, noting that he might abscond, put pressure on the parties to the criminal proceedings against him or re-offend, and extended the applicant’s detention until 27 January 2008. On 10 January 2008 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the decision of 15 October 2007 on appeal. 19. The applicant’s detention pending study of the case file was further extended on 16 January 2008 until 19 February 2008. Referring to the reasons indicated earlier to justify the applicant’s detention, the court held that he could not be released. It appears that on an unspecified date the decision of 16 January 2008 was quashed by the Supreme Court of Russia on appeal. The matter was remitted for fresh consideration and on 24 January 2008 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tatarstan extended the applicant’s detention pending study of the case file until 27 April 2008. The applicant communicated with the court via video link. 20. On 9 February 2008 the applicant started studying three additional volumes of the case. He was provided with a photocopying machine and a digital camera. On 19 February 2008 the prosecutor’s office asked the Town Court to set a time-limit for the applicant to study the case file. The applicant asserted that he would need five additional days to complete the study. The court granted him three additional days. 21. On 24 April 2008 the Supreme Court of Russia quashed the decision of 24 January 2008 on appeal. The court noted that the applicant should have been granted time to study the request lodged by the investigator asking for an extension of the applicant’s detention. The court further indicated that the applicant should remain in custody pending consideration of the matter by the lower court. It appears that on 21 May 2008 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tatarstan authorised the applicant’s detention pending study of the case file until 19 February 2008. On 23 July 2008 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the decision of 21 May 2008 on appeal. 22. On an unspecified date the prosecutor’s office completed the investigation and forwarded the case file to the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tatarstan. Counsel A. was appointed to represent the applicant. On 24 April 2008 the Supreme Court fixed the preliminary hearing of the matter and ordered that the applicant remain in custody pending trial. On 25 June 2008 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the decision of 24 April 2008 on appeal, after having heard the applicant, his counsel and the judge rapporteur. 23. On 2 June 2008 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tatarstan opened a jury trial against the applicant and eleven other defendants. 24. On 25 September 2008 the jury delivered a guilty verdict in respect of the applicant on charges of membership of a criminal gang, illegal possessions of firearms, infliction of bodily injuries, kidnapping and murder. 25. On 3 October 2008 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tatarstan authorised an extension of the applicant’s detention until 10 January 2009 pending sentencing. On 25 November 2008 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the decision of 3 October 2008 on appeal. 26. On 15 October 2008 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tatarstan sentenced the applicant to sixteen years’ imprisonment. 27. On 18 June 2009 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the applicant’s conviction on appeal. 28. On 7 November 2012 the Presidium of the Supreme Court of Russia quashed the appeal judgment of 18 June 2009 by way of a supervisory review for the appeal court’s failure to ensure the presence of the applicant’s lawyer at the appeal hearing and remitted the matter for a new appeal hearing. The parties did not inform the Court of the outcome of the proceedings. 29. Following his arrest on 19 August 2007, the applicant was placed in detention in a remand prison. On numerous occasions between 2006 and 2009 the applicant was transferred to and detained in the Naberezhnyye Chelny temporary detention unit in connection with the investigation and trial. 30. According to the Government, the applicant was detained at the temporary detention centre during the following periods: - from 20 August to 6 September 2006; - from 11 to 13 and from 18 to 27 October 2006; - from 8 to 18 December 2006; - from 10 to 19 January 2007; - from 5 to 14 February 2007; - from 28 February to 9 March 2007; - from 14 to 19 March 2007; - from 4 to 9 and from 20 to 25 April 2007; - from 16 to 23 May 2007; - from 30 May to 9 June 2007; - from 29 June to 9 July 2007; - from 11 to 18 and from 25 to 30 July 2007; - from 1 to 10 August 2007; - from 31 August to 10 September 2007; - from 3 to 17 October 2007; - from 2 to 12 and from 16 to 21 November 2007; - from 12 December 2007 to 8 January 2008; - from 11 to 18 January 2008; - from 24 January to 1 February 2008; - from 4 to 8 and from 11 to 27 February 2008; - from 3 to 5 March 2008; - from 4 to 9 and from 16 to 18 April 2008; - from 15 to 24 June 2009; - from 6 to 22 July 2009; - from 22 to 29 December 2009. 31. The Government were unable to indicate the exact numbers of the cells in which the applicant had been detained. Nor could they submit information on the population of the temporary detention centre at the time of the applicant’s detention. They provided the following overview of all the cells in the temporary detention centre: Cell no. Cell surface, square metres Number of sleeping places 1 32. There were no individual beds in the cells. The inmates had to share sleeping platforms. All the cells were equipped with a functioning ventilation system. All the cells had two windows, except for cells nos. 4 and 19, which had one window. Each window was covered with two metal grilles which did not prevent access to daylight. The cells were lit with 100-watt electric bulbs. The toilet in each cell was located at least 1.5 metres away from the dining table and the nearest sleeping place. It was separated from the living area of the cell by a 1.2-metre high brick wall. 33. The cells were disinfected once every three months. Inmates received three meals a day. The applicant did not have the opportunity to take daily outdoor exercise. He spent a certain amount of time outside the cell participating in investigative activities, taking showers, visiting doctors and meeting with his lawyer. He consulted a medical practitioner thirty-three times. 34. In June 2008 the temporary detention centre was completely refurbished. The electrical wiring and other equipment, toilets, water supply, ventilation and sewerage systems were replaced. The sleeping platforms were replaced with individual beds. The brick walls separating the toilets from the living areas of the cells were removed and new metal cabins were installed. New window frames were also installed. 35. According to the applicant, he was always detained in overcrowded cells. In particular, at least twelve inmates were detained in cells nos. 1, 12, 16 and 22, and at least nine were detained in cells nos. 2, 3 and 13. 36. There was no ventilation or access to daylight. The electric lighting was constantly on. Each cell was lit with a 60-watt electric bulb. 37. The distance between the toilet and the nearest sleeping places was between 0.2 and 0.5 metres. The wall separating the toilet from the living area of the cell was 0.5-metres high and offered no privacy to the person using the toilet. 38. The applicant was never taken out of the cell to participate in investigative activities. Meals were provided once a day. The food rations were insufficient; no meat, fish, fruit or vegetables were served. The applicant was not given bed sheets. 39. On 21 February 2007 the deputy town prosecutor dismissed the applicant’s complaint about the conditions of his detention in the temporary detention centre, noting as follows: “In the course of the inquiry [the head of the temporary detention centre] submitted that, in order to bring the premises of the temporary detention centre into compliance with the federal legislation, it should be subjected to reconstruction and refurbishment. The maximum capacity is 110 persons. However, following the amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation requiring that suspects and defendants be present at court hearings, the average daily population has drastically increased to 140 persons. ... Every day the police book in 4-5 new inmates. Accordingly it is impossible to provide every detainee with an individual sleeping place. Furthermore, on 13 February 2007 ... 42 newly arrived inmates were booked in. As a result, the population of the temporary detention centre rose to 171 persons. There were eight inmates detained in cell no. 3 ... . This number does not exceed the capacity of the cell.” 40. On 27 March 2007 the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Tatarstan replied to a complaint lodged by the applicant about the conditions of his detention in the temporary detention centre. In particular, the letter read as follows: “... the complaints about the conditions of detention communicated by [the applicant] at the hearing of the [Town Court] on 7 February 2007 should be considered substantiated in part. However, the allegation that there was an intent on the part of [the head of the temporary detention centre] to deliberately create such conditions of detention has not been substantiated. I would also inform you that in 2008 it is planned to allocate monetary funds for capital refurbishment and reconstruction of the temporary detention centre that would bring the conditions of detention in the temporary detention centre into compliance with the applicable legislation of the Russian Federation.” 41. On 10 July 2007 the applicant and six other inmates detained in cell no. 2 of the temporary detention centre complained to the town prosecutor about overcrowding in the cell where they were detained. The applicant did not inform the Court of the prosecutor’s response to the complaint, if any.

5. The applicant company is a bank incorporated under the laws of Germany and is located in Stuttgart. 6. In 1994 the applicant company had acquired real estate consisting of land, parts of which are designated as agricultural land, and a house in Tyrol. The land was subsequently sold to the company “de Vos Hotelbetriebs GmbH” (hereinafter “de Vos”), a limited liability company incorporated under Austrian law that was active in the hotel business. The contract was signed by the parties on 4 and 20 September 1996 respectively. 7. On 23 September 1996 de Vos notified the transaction to the Real Property Transactions Authority (Grundverkehrsbehörde). Under the Tyrolean Real Property Transaction Act (Grundverkehrsgesetz), transactions concerning certain categories of real estate are subject to approval by the said authority. 8. On 6 May 1997 de Vos filed a request for transfer of jurisdiction (Devolutionsantrag) to the Tyrolean Real Property Transactions Commission (Landes-Grundverkehrskommission) as the Real Property Transactions Authority had failed to decide on the case within thesix-month period provided for by law. 9. In its decision of 16 October 1997, the Real Property Transactions Commission refused to authorise the transaction. This and subsequent decisions of the Real Property Transactions Commission were served on both de Vos and the applicant company. 10. On 9 February 1998 de Vos complained to the Constitutional Court. 11. On 26 February 2001 the Constitutional Court set aside the Real Property Transactions Commission's decision of 16 October 1997 and referred the case back to it. 12. On 29 November 2001 de Vos filed a request for transfer of jurisdiction to the Tyrol Regional Government, which the latter rejected on 31 January 2002 for lack of jurisdiction, holding that there was no higher authority to which jurisdiction could be transferred after the Real Property Transactions Commission. 13. On 20 February 2002 the Real Property Transactions Commission refused authorisation of the transaction as regards certain parts of the real estate; it granted the transaction as regards other parts of the property. 14. On 25 April 2002 de Vos complained to the Constitutional Court about the refusal to authorise the transaction with regard to parts of the real estate. 15. On 1 March 2005 the Constitutional Court set aside the decision refusing authorisation. 16. In January 2008 the parties were asked whether there had been any essential changes regarding the facts. In the end of May 2008 the applicants were asked to submit their comments on the question whether the land in issue was being used for agricultural purposes. On 9 July 2008 the Real Property Transactions Commission again refused to authorise the transaction regarding parts of the real estate. 17. On 26 August 2008 de Vos complained to the Constitutional Court; the case is still pending before that court.

4. The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Moscow. 5. The applicant inherited a house in the Moscow Region from Ms B.M. in her will. On an unspecified date he moved into it. 6. In 1990 B.S., the stepson of B.M., brought an action against the applicant for recovery of the property in issue, claiming that his inheritance rights had been breached and that the will was illegal. 7. The matter was considered repeatedly by the courts and on 23 May 1997 the Khimky Town Court (“the Town Court”) granted B.S.’s claims. The applicant lodged a supervisory-review complaint. 8. On 23 June 1998 the Presidium of the Moscow Regional Court quashed the judgment of 23 May 1997 for breach of procedural law and remitted the matter for fresh consideration. It appears the property was subject to an interim injunction which was still maintained by the court. 9. Three hearings fixed for between 7 October 1998 and 18 May 1999, were adjourned owing to both the applicant’s and plaintiff’s failure to appear. 10. Hearings scheduled for 9 July 1999 and 16 October 1999 were postponed owing to the applicant’s failure to appear. 11. Seven hearings fixed for between 16 November 1999 and 11 July 2000 were adjourned owing to the third parties’ and the plaintiff’s failure to appear, and the need to collect additional evidence. 12. On 12 May 2000 the Town Court dismissed the applicant’s applications for the civil proceedings to be discontinued and the interim injunction lifted. The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision which was upheld on 30 May 2000. 13. On 11 July 2000 the Town Court dismissed B.S.’s claims. 14. On 10 May 2001 the Moscow Regional Court (“the Regional Court”) quashed the judgment of 11 July 2000 on appeal and remitted the matter for fresh consideration. 15. Three hearings fixed for between July and December 2002 did not take place owing to the applicant’s failure to appear, and one was held as planned. 16. A hearing scheduled for 15 March 2002 was adjourned until 24 April 2002 owing to the applicant’s failure to appear. 17. A hearing scheduled for 24 April 2002 was postponed until 4 June 2002 owing to the judge’s involvement in other proceedings. 18. A hearing was held as planned on 4 June 2002. The court rejected the applicant’s application for the discontinuation of the proceedings. 19. Of eleven hearings fixed for between September 2002 and August 2004, three were adjourned owing to the applicant’s failure to appear. 20. On 4 August 2004 the trial court held a hearing in the applicant’s absence and granted B.S.’s claims. According to the applicant, he had not been duly summoned to that hearing. 21. On 18 October 2004 the Moscow Regional Court upheld the judgment of 4 August 2004 on appeal. The applicant brought a supervisory‑review complaint. 22. On 16 March 2005 the Presidium of the Moscow Regional Court quashed the judgments of 4 August and 18 October 2004 by way of supervisory review for breach of material and procedural law, and remitted the matter for fresh consideration. The hearing was listed for 30 May 2005. 23. The hearing of 30 May 2005 was adjourned owing to the third parties’ failure to appear. 24. A hearing scheduled for 28 June 2005 was postponed until 1 August 2005 as the plaintiff was ill. 25. On 1 August 2005 the Town Court held a hearing and left B.S.’s action without examination owing to his failure to appear without valid reasons. 26. On the same date the applicant requested the trial court to lift the injunction. On 15 August 2005 his request was granted. 27. On 31 March 2006 B.S. informed the Town Court that he had failed to attend the hearing because of illness and asked it to quash the decision of 1 August 2005. 28. Of four hearings fixed for between May and July 2006, two were postponed owing to the applicant’s failure to appear and two were held in his absence. According to the applicant, he was not duly summoned to those hearings. 29. On 29 June 2006 the Town Court quashed the decision of 1 August 2005. 30. On 27 July 2006 the Town Court decided to discontinue the civil proceedings. The court found that B.S. had no legal standing under domestic law to challenge the legality of B.M.’s will because his rights and interests had not been affected by the impugned will: he was not related by kinship to Ms B.M. and was not listed in her will. 31. On 26 October 2006 the Regional Court upheld that decision on appeal.

6. The applicant is a Ukrainian national who was born in 1972. He is currently serving a prison sentence in Berdychiv. 7. On 27 October 2004 the body of Ms V. was found on a deserted street in Simferopol. V. had suffered numerous knife wounds. 8. On 28 October 2004 the police obtained an expert opinion that a fingerprint found on the cover of V.’s notebook could possibly belong to the applicant (whose fingerprints were stored in the police database). The police also discovered that some of V.’s belongings, including a mobile telephone and one earring, were missing. 9. On 29 October 2004 several officers from the Simferopol Kyivsky District Police arrived at the applicant’s home (some 120 kilometres away from Simferopol), inspected it, seized some of the applicant’s clothes and took him to the police station in Simferopol. 10. No formal record of the applicant’s arrest was drawn up. 11. On 29 and 30 October 2004 the applicant was questioned as a witness about V.’s murder and the theft of her belongings. 12. On 30 October 2004 he confessed that on 27 October 2004 he had come to Simferopol from his village to enjoy himself and had decided to murder a passer-by in order to steal her belongings. He had stolen V.’s mobile telephone, which he had lost on his way back home, and had killed her with a kitchen knife he had been carrying with him. 13. On 31 October 2004 the applicant was questioned as a suspect. Before the questioning session, the applicant was informed that he was suspected of having committed the murder of V. within the meaning of Article 115 § 1 of the Criminal Code of 2001 and that as a suspect he had right to legal assistance, which he waived in writing. 14. On the same date the applicant underwent a medical expert assessment, according to which he had not sustained any injuries in the period from 29 to 31 October 2004. 15. Again on the same date an undertaking not to abscond was selected as the preventive measure to be used in the applicant’s respect. 16. According to the applicant, it was not until 1 November 2004 that he was released from custody under the undertaking not to abscond. 17. During the afternoon of 1 November 2004 the applicant was arrested in Simferopol on charges of breaching the public order (through swearing, spitting and vagrancy) and detained for ten days as an administrative punishment, pursuant to a decision of the Simferopol Zaliznychnyy District Court. 18. On 4, 9 and 10 November 2004 the applicant, held in administrative detention, was further questioned concerning the murder and robbery. Before each of the questioning sessions the applicant signed waivers of his right to legal representation. 19. On 11 November 2004 the Simferopol Kyivsky District Court remanded the applicant in custody as a preventive measure in connection with the criminal proceedings against him. 20. On 16 November 2004 lawyer E. was admitted to the proceedings to represent the applicant. However, according to the applicant, the lawyer did not visit him until 26 December 2004 and no questioning of the applicant took place in his presence. 21. On 12 January 2005 the charges against the applicant were reclassified in law from those of simple murder within the meaning of Article 115 § 1 of the Criminal Code of 2001 to those of murder for profit (an aggravated form of murder) under Article 115 § 2 of the Code. 22. On 10 February 2005 a new lawyer, R., was admitted to the proceedings to replace lawyer E. 23. On 28 February 2005 the applicant was indicted with having robbed V. and having murdered her for profit within the meaning of Article 115 § 2 of the Criminal Code. On the same date he was questioned for the first time as an accused in the presence of lawyer R. During the questioning session, the applicant retracted his initial confessions and pleaded innocent. He maintained that he had not left his village on the day of V.’s murder and had previously confessed to the murder under pressure from the police, who had detained him unlawfully, threatened and ill-treated him. 24. On the same date the prosecutor’s office refused to institute criminal proceedings into the alleged breaches of the applicant’s rights, having found that there was no case to answer, and declared the case in respect of V.’s murder and robbery ready for trial. 25. On 5 April 2005 the Court of Appeal of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (hereafter “the ARC Court”), acting as a first-instance court, convicted the applicant of armed robbery and murder for profit and sentenced him to fifteen years’ imprisonment. 26. On an unspecified date the ARC Court also issued a separate ruling noting that there was no record of the applicant’s arrest on 29 October 2004. 27. The applicant appealed in cassation against his conviction. He alleged that his confessions given in October and November 2004 should have been excluded from the body of evidence for having been taken in breach of applicable procedural guarantees. In particular, those statements had been taken during the applicant’s unlawful detention. He maintained that he had been held at the police station between 29 October and 1 November 2004 without any procedural records having been drawn up. On 1 November 2004 the applicant had been released. However, almost immediately afterwards he had been arrested under the false pretext of breaching the public order and subsequently detained. This tactical move had enabled the police to question him at any time and, in the absence of a lawyer, apply pressure on him to obtain self-incriminating statements to best suit their purposes. 28. The applicant next stated that the above-mentioned confessions had been obtained in breach of his right to legal representation. In particular, while he had been brought to the police station specifically in connection with the suspicion that he had killed V., initially he had only been questioned as a witness. Furthermore, the applicant had been initially charged with simple murder under Article 115 § 1 of the Criminal Code, a charge which enabled a suspect to waive his right to a lawyer. In the meantime, the scope of the accusation had clearly been pointing to “murder for profit”. This charge fell within the ambit of Article 115 § 2 of the Criminal Code, which could result in a life sentence and so entailed mandatory legal representation of a defendant and allowed no waivers of this right. The investigation had purposefully delayed reclassifying the charges in order to exert unlawful pressure and extract confessions from the unrepresented applicant. 29. The applicant also maintained that without his initial confessions the prosecution would have collapsed, as the other evidence had been contradictory and patchy. 30. On 21 July 2005 the Supreme Court of Ukraine quashed the applicant’s conviction and remitted the case for additional investigation. It noted, in particular, that the trial court should have verified more carefully whether the applicant’s confessional statements had been admissible evidence. In particular, as appeared from the case file, these statements had been obtained during the applicant’s detention between 29 October and 10 November 2004. Part of this detention was covered by an administrative detention decision and part was not covered by any records. In these circumstances, the applicant’s allegations concerning the ulterior motives in detaining him should have been carefully investigated. The Supreme Court also found that the evidence of the applicant’s involvement in the crime had been contradictory and needed to be reassessed, with various discrepancies being reconciled. 31. On 18 November 2005 the ARC Court again found the applicant guilty of armed robbery and murder for profit under Article 115 § 2 of the Criminal Code. It relied on various pieces of physical, forensic, and witness evidence, as well as on the applicant’s confessions given at the beginning of the investigation. The court concluded that there were no reasons to exclude these confessions from the body of evidence. In particular, according to the medical evidence, no injuries had been inflicted upon the applicant by the police and there was no other evidence of his ill-treatment. The court further found that on 29 October 2004 the applicant had been taken to the police station in connection with the suspicion that he had committed a crime of violence and had duly been questioned first as a witness and then as a suspect. It also noted that the applicant, informed of his rights as a suspect, had voluntarily waived his right to legal representation. As at the material time the applicant had been suspected of simple murder, which could not lead to a life sentence, such a waiver had been compatible with applicable law. The ARC Court then sentenced the applicant to fifteen years’ imprisonment. 32. On 16 March 2006 the Supreme Court of Ukraine dismissed a further cassation appeal brought by the applicant and upheld the ARC Court’s judgment of 18 November 2005.

4. The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Wrocław, Poland. 5. On 30 November 1999 the applicant was arrested by the police. 6. On 2 December 1999 the Wrocław District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) decided to detain the applicant on remand in view of the reasonable suspicion that he had been drug trafficking. 7. On 17 February 2000 the Wrocław Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) decided to prolong the applicant’s pre-trial detention. It found that the strong suspicion against the applicant, the severity of the expected penalty, and the need to secure the proper course of the investigation, justified holding him in detention. 8. On 17 May and 6 June 2000 the Wrocław Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny), upon an application by the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor (Prokurator Okręgowy), further prolonged the applicant’s pre‑trial detention. It reiterated the original grounds for keeping him in custody and added that the complexity of the case and the large number of co‑accused justified the fear that, once released, the applicant would attempt to influence witnesses or abscond. 9. On 17 August 2000 the applicant was indicted before the Wrocław Regional Court. 10. On 20 November 2000 the Wrocław Regional Court held a hearing at which it further prolonged the applicant’s detention until 31 January 2001. The court gave the following reasons: “The majority of the adduced evidence has not yet been taken, and it is impossible to do this by 30 November 2000.” 11. At the hearing held on 15 January 2001 the trial court again prolonged the applicant’s detention until 31 March 2001 giving the following reasons: “The grounds on which the detention on remand was ordered are still valid. At the same time it is impossible to consider all the evidence before the end of the period for which the detention had been previously prolonged; that is by 31 January 2001.” 12. At the hearings on 22 June and 20 August 2001, the Wrocław Regional Court prolonged the applicant’s detention, repeating the justification given in both previous decisions. 13. Subsequently, as the length of the applicant’s detention had reached the statutory time-limit of 2 years laid down in Article 263 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Kodeks postępowania karnego), the Regional Court applied to the Wrocław Court of Appeal asking for the applicant’s detention to be prolonged beyond that term. On 14 November 2001 the Court of Appeal granted the request. 14. The applicant’s numerous applications for release and appeals against decisions concerning the prolongation of his detention were to no avail. 15. On 11 April 2002 the Wrocław Regional Court convicted the applicant and sentenced him to four years’ imprisonment. 16. The applicant apparently did not appeal against this judgment and it became final. On an unspecified later date the applicant was released from prison. It appears that in 2005 the applicant remained in detention in connection with another set of criminal proceedings against him. 17. On 31 May 2000 the Registry received the applicant’s first letter to the Court of 4 April 2000. On the top of the first page of the letter there is a handwritten note: censored (ocenzurowano) and an illegible signature. The envelope in which the letter was delivered bears signs of having been opened and then resealed: one side had been cut open and then resealed with adhesive tape. The envelope bears a handwritten note: R[egional] P[rosecutor] Wrocław (P.O. Wrocław) and a stamp: Wrocław Detention Centre 2000‑04‑10 (Areszt Śledczy we Wrocławiu). The letter had been posted on 27 April 2000. 18. On 25 August 2005 the applicant complained that the Court’s letter of 27 July 2005 had been censored by the authorities. The original of that letter, submitted by the applicant, is marked on the reverse side with a blue stamp “censored” (cenzurowano).

6. The applicant was born in 1942 and lives in Achkhoy-Martan, Chechnya. 7. The applicant was married to Mr Alaudin Ayubovich Gandaloyev, born in 1938. They had two sons, Emir and Muslim Gandaloyev. Alaudin Gandaloyev worked as a forester in the Achkhoy-Martan district and had never been suspected of participation in illegal armed groups. 8. In the morning of 17 September 2003 Emir Gandaloyev drove his father to the forest in his GAZ-2401 (Volga) car. At about 9.30 a.m. they arrived at their destination point near the village of Yandi (formerly called Orekhovo), in the Achkhoy-Martan district of Chechnya. There they met Alaudin Gandaloyev’s colleague, Mr Viskha Badayev. The foresters had been working in this part of the forest assigning directions for lorries carrying firewood since the beginning of September 2003. 9. At about 9.45 a.m. three armed men wearing camouflage uniforms came out from the woods and, in unaccented Russian, ordered the Gandaloyevs and Viskha Badayev to produce their identity papers. Emir Gandaloyev reached for his wallet that he had left in the car and heard a machine-gun burst. Then he felt a gun barrel pressed against his neck. One of the armed men ordered him in Russian to prostrate himself. After that Emir Gandaloyev heard another machine-gun burst and four or five single gunshots. He looked under the car and saw his father’s arm prostrated. He concluded that Alaudin Gandaloyev and Viskha Badayev had also been forced to the ground. 10. At that moment Emir Gandaloyev heard one of the armed men telling the others: “This is the driver”. The men threw the papers on the ground and left in silence. Emir Gandaloyev rose and saw his father and Viskha Badayev lying on the ground. The two foresters were covered with blood, their identity documents were scattered around. Emir Gandaloyev put his father’s body into the car and drove away. 11. Having driven for some time, he saw some Chechen police officers and told them what had happened. The policemen then reported the incident to the Achkhoy-Martan inter-district prosecutor’s office (“the inter-district prosecutor’s office”). 12. Later the same day a doctor of the Achkhoy-Martan central district hospital examined Alaudin Gandaloyev’s body. According to the certificate issued by the doctor on 22 October 2003, there were a large open gunshot wound in the front temporal area of the skull and numerous closed gunshot wounds in the body and its extremities. The certificate stated that the death of Alaudin Gandaloyev had been caused by those wounds. 13. On 29 September 2003 the Civil Registry Office of the Achkhoy-Martan district issued a death certificate to the effect that Alaudin Gandaloyev had died on 17 September 2003 in the village of Yandi of the Achkhoy-Martan district. 14. In support of her account of the events the applicant submitted copies of the following documents: witness statement of Emir Gandaloyev, two statements concerning Alaudin Gandaloyev’s employment record and his salary, Alaudin Gandaloyev’s death certificate, a medical statement describing Alaudin Gandaloyev’s wounds, a character reference for Alaudin Gandaloyev and the newspaper article concerning the killing of Alaudin Gandaloyev and Viskha Badayev (see below). 15. The Government submitted that “at about 10 o’clock on 17 September 2003 two corpses of employees of the Achkhoy-Martan forestry agency, Mr V. Kh. Badayev and Mr A. A. Gandaloyev, were discovered on the outskirt of the village of Gekhi [the name of the village was stated incorrectly] in the Achkhoy-Martan district of Chechnya. Both corpses had gunshot wounds as the signs of a violent death. It was established that this crime had been committed by three unidentified armed men in camouflage uniform and masks. The three men had emerged from the woods and approached A. Gandaloyev and V. Badayev, who were on duty patrolling the forest. The armed men had asked the foresters to produce their identity papers. After that they had fired several shots from a close distance, lethally wounding the foresters and had then disappeared into the woods.” 16. Between 17 and 19 September 2003 the radio station “Chechnya Svobodnaya” (Чечня Свободная) broadcast an announcement concerning “the elimination of two rebel fighters, Viskha Badayev and Alaudin Gandaloyev”. 17. On 24 September 2003 a local newspaper “Stolitsa Plus” (Столица плюс) published an information note from the Regional Executive Headquarters for Coordination of the Counter-Terrorist Operation in the Northern Caucasus (“the Headquarters”) based on the latter’s daily field report. One of the paragraphs read as follows: “...Federal forces and law-enforcement agencies continue undertaking measures aiming at providing safety to residents of the Republic, suppression of criminal activities of illegal armed groups and those who assist them. Machine-gun fire was opened from the woods at a unit of federal forces not far from the junction of the roads leading to the villages of Orekhovo and Stariy Achkhoy in the Achkhoy-Martan district. As a result of the return fire two rebel fighters were eliminated; their corpses were found during mopping-up of the outskirts of the forest. It was established that those eliminated had been active members of illegal armed groups: Badayev Viskha, born in 1958, and Gandaloyev Alaudin. The following items were seized at the scene: AK-74 5.45 machine-guns – 2 items, magazines for AK-74 – 4 items, F-1 [grenades] – 8 items, 5.45 cartridges – 275 items. The corpses were handed over for burial to residents of the Stariy Achkhoy village.” (b) Information submitted by the Government 18. The Government referred to the witness statement of the head of the Headquarters, officer Sh. According to the officer, information concerning the killing of the two “rebel fighters” on 17 September 2003 had been received from a field report on the activities of the United Group Alignment (Forces) of the Russian military forces in the Northern Caucuses for 17-18 September 2003. 19. On 17 September 2003 the inter-district prosecutor’s office instituted an investigation into the murder of Alaudin Gandaloyev and Viskha Badayev under Article 105 § 2 of the Russian Criminal Code (aggravated murder). The case file was given number 44073. 20. On 2 October 2003 the applicant’s other son, Muslim Gandaloyev, requested the inter-district prosecutor’s office to take the following investigative measures: to seize from the radio station a record of the announcement of Alaudin Gandaloyev’s killing; to demand that the Headquarters disclose their sources of information disseminated in the information note and prosecute those responsible for the defamation; to establish which unit of federal troops had killed the two “rebel fighters” and interrogate certain persons, including the forestry employees, as witnesses. He also requested the investigators to find the weapons and the ammunition allegedly seized at the crime scene and have them evaluated by an expert. 21. On 5 October 2003 Muslim Gandaloyev complained to the Chechnya prosecutor’s office about the defamation of his father and requested that the Headquarters’ information note be refuted, those responsible for its dissemination be identified and prosecuted, the machine-guns allegedly seized at the crime scene be found and their evaluation be carried out by an expert. He also requested the prosecutor’s office to establish which federal military unit had been involved in the incident. 22. On 17 October 2003 the Chechnya prosecutor’s office forwarded Muslim Gandaloyev’s letter to the inter-district prosecutor’s office ordering that it be included in the investigation file in criminal case no. 44073 and that the facts complained of be verified. 23. On 24 October 2003 the inter-district prosecutor’s office granted the applicant the status of victim in criminal case no. 44073. 24. On 28 October 2003 the inter-district prosecutor’s office informed Muslim Gandaloyev that an investigation into the murder of Alaudin Gandaloyev and Viskha Badayev by “three unidentified armed men wearing camouflage uniforms and masks” had been opened and that a number of investigative measures had been taken. In particular, they mentioned that requests had been sent to branches of the Russian Ministry of the Interior, the Federal Security Service (the FSB) and the military prosecutor’s office “with a view to obtaining information concerning the perpetrators of the murders of Gandaloyev and Badayev”. 25. On 29 October 2003 the investigation in criminal case no. 44073 was transferred to the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102 (“the unit military prosecutor’s office”) in Khankala, where it was given number 34/33/0625-03. The applicant was not informed about this decision. 26. On 15 January 2004 the applicant requested the inter-district prosecutor’s office to admit her to the criminal proceedings as a civil party and grant her permission to access the investigation file in criminal case no. 44073. 27. On 4 February 2004 the inter-district prosecutor’s office replied to the applicant stating that the investigation into her husband’s murder had established the involvement of military servicemen in the crime. Therefore, on 29 October 2003 the investigation in criminal case no. 44073 had been transferred to the unit military prosecutor’s office. 28. On 18 February 2004 the applicant wrote to the unit military prosecutor’s office requesting that she be admitted to the criminal proceedings as a civil party and be informed of the progress in the investigation into her husband’s murder. 29. On 30 March 2004 the unit military prosecutor’s office examined the applicant’s request and granted it in part. The decision refused to admit the applicant to the proceedings as a civil party for the reason that she had failed to submit the necessary documents; at the same time the decision did not specify in which part the applicant’s request had been granted. On the same date the prosecutor’s office informed the applicant about its decision and noted that investigative measures were being taken to solve the crime in criminal case no. 34/33/0625-03. 30. On 22 April 2004 the unit military prosecutor’s office transferred the investigation into the murder of A. Gandaloyev and V. Badayev back to the inter-district prosecutor’s office. The applicant was not informed of this decision. 31. On 17 May 2004 the inter-district prosecutor’s office suspended the investigation in case no. 44073 owing to the failure to identify the perpetrators. On 18 May 2004 they informed the applicant about the decision and noted that notwithstanding the suspension of the investigation, measures were being taken to solve the crime. 32. On 8 June 2004 the inter-district prosecutor’s office resumed the investigation in criminal case no. 44073; on 18 June 2004 it informed the applicant of this decision. 33. On 8 July 2004 the inter-district prosecutor’s office suspended the investigation in criminal case no. 44073 owing to the failure to identify the perpetrators and informed the applicant of the decision. It also noted that investigative measures were being taken to solve the crime. 34. On 5 August 2004 the applicant complained to the inter-district prosecutor’s office about the lack of information concerning the investigation in criminal case no. 44073 and requested to be provided with access to the investigation file. She stated that the absence of information about the investigation precluded her from appealing against the actions of the investigative authorities. In her letter the applicant also questioned the effectiveness of the criminal investigation by pointing out the excessive length of the investigation and the transfer of the criminal case file from the military prosecutor’s office back to the inter-district prosecutor’s office in spite of the involvement of representatives of federal forces in her husband’s murder. 35. On 13 August 2004 the inter-district prosecutor’s office informed the applicant that she was not allowed to access the case file prior to completion of the investigation into her husband’s murder. 36. On 23 November 2004 the inter-district prosecutor’s office resumed the investigation in criminal case no. 44073. It is unclear what investigative measures were taken in the investigation after the last reopening of the criminal proceedings. 37. In December 2007 the applicant was informed about the suspension of the criminal investigation into her husband’s murder owing to the failure to identify the perpetrators. According to the applicant she has not received any information about the investigation in criminal case no. 44073 ever since. (a) Court proceedings against the investigators 38. On 20 August 2004 the applicant complained about the investigators’ actions to the Achkhoy-Martan District Court of Chechnya (“the District Court”) and requested that the decisions to suspend the investigation in case no. 44073 and dismiss her request for access to the case file be found unlawful, that the inter-district prosecutor’s office be obliged to resume the investigation into her husband’s murder and that she be provided with access to the investigation file. 39. On 24 November 2004 the District Court rejected the applicant’s complaint. It stated that the refusal to provide the applicant with access to the case file had not been unlawful since under domestic law the victim of a crime had no right of access to the case file prior to the completion of the criminal investigation, and the investigation into the murder of Alaudin Gandaloyev was still in progress. As to the reopening of the investigation, the court stated that taking into consideration that on 23 November 2003 the inter-district prosecutor’s office had reopened the criminal proceedings, the applicant could participate in the investigation by lodging requests aimed at improving the effectiveness of the investigation and the taking of additional investigative steps. The court’s decision also stated as follows: “....The interim prosecutor of the Achkhoy-Martan inter-district prosecutor’s office submitted at the hearing that...the investigation in the criminal case had collected sufficient information about the involvement of military servicemen in the crime; in this connection the investigation had been transferred to the military prosecutor’s office in accordance with the rules of jurisdiction. ...on 22 April 2004 the case had been returned [by the military prosecutor’s office] to the Achkhoy-Martan inter-district prosecutor’s office. The Achkhoy-Martan inter-district prosecutor’s office undertook all possible measures to carry out an objective and thorough investigation and solve the crime. However, as it is necessary for the investigation to verify the main theory about the involvement of military servicemen [in the crime], further investigation in the criminal case is possible only by the military prosecutor’s office. He [the prosecutor] believes that the applicant should not have complained to the court about the Achkhoy-Martan inter-district prosecutor’s office as the latter had undertaken all investigative measures prescribed by law and had obtained sufficient information about the involvement of the military servicemen [in the crime]....in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure the criminal case had been transferred to the military prosecutor’s office, but the latter had returned it... ... On 22 April 2004 criminal case no. 44073 was returned by the military prosecutor’s office to the Achkhoy-Martan inter-district prosecutor’s office, where after a number of investigative steps, the investigation was suspended...owing to the failure to identify the perpetrators...” 40. The Government submitted additional information about the investigation into the murder of Alaudin Gandaloyev. However, they did not submit to the Court the witness statements, forensic and ballistic reports or a number of other documents to which they referred in their submission. The list of documents submitted by the Government is provided below (see paragraph 72 below). 41. On 17 September 2003 the inter-district prosecutor’s office opened a criminal investigation into the murder of A. Gandaloyev and V. Badayev under Article 105 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (aggravated murder); relatives of the victims of the crime were informed about the decision on the same date. 42. On 17 September 2003 an investigator, K., conducted the crime scene examination and the examination of the corpses. As a result, two bullets and six bullet casings were collected and included as evidence in the investigation file. 43. On 22 September 2003 the investigators questioned an employee of the Achkhoy-Martan forestry agency, Mr S.M., who stated that in May 2003 a note with threats had been found in the agency’s building. 44. On 22 September 2003 the investigators questioned another employee of the Achkhoy-Martan forestry agency, Mr M. D., who stated that in the middle of May 2003 he had found a dead rabbit next to the agency’s building and a note on the door containing threats against the agency’s employees and demands not to patrol the forest. The note was handed over to the agency’s administration. 45. On 22 September 2003 the investigation collected the threat note. According to the Government, its relevant part stated “...Gandaloyev... if we see you and your people once again ... you will not return from there”; the note was included in the investigation file. 46. On 24 September 2003 the local newspaper “Stolitsa Plus” published the Headquarters’ information report concerning the killing of two active members of illegal armed groups, Alaudin Gandaloyev and Viskha Badayev, who had supposedly opened fire on a unit of federal forces, and the seizure of weapons and ammunition from the crime scene. According to the Government, this publication provided the investigation with grounds to suspect that federal servicemen could have been involved in the murder of A. Gandaloyev and V. Badayev. 47. On 29 September 2003 the investigation questioned witness Emir Gandaloyev who stated that his father A. Gandaloyev had worked as a forester for 40 years. At about 8 a.m. on 17 September 2003 he and his father had driven in a GAZ-2401 (Volga) car to the outskirts of the Yandi village where his father had been working with his colleague V. Badayev. The two colleagues were talking when three masked men in camouflage uniforms armed with machine-guns appeared from the woods and requested identity papers. Alaudin Gandaloyev showed them his forester’s identity document. Emir Gandaloyev was going to get his identity documents from the car when he heard a series of shots from a machine-gun and was ordered to lie on the ground. One of the men pressed a machine-gun against his head. After that the witness heard more shots. Immediately after the three men left, Emir Gandaloyev found his father dead with numerous gunshot wounds; V. Badayev was also dead. At a crossroads next to Achkhoy-Martan the witness met police officers and told them about the events. The Government did not submit a copy of the witness statement. 48. On 24 October 2003 the applicant was granted the status of victim in criminal case no. 44073. 49. On 29 October 2003 the investigation was transferred from the inter-district prosecutor’s office to the unit military prosecutor’s office where the case file was attributed the number 34/33-0625-03. 50. The Government submitted that on an unspecified date the deputy head of the Temporary Operational Troops of the Ministry of the Interior in the Northern Caucasus (“the Operational Troops”) (the Government did not provide any information concerning the officer’s identity or service rank) had provided the investigation with an information statement to the effect that the newspaper’s information about the killing of the two rebel fighters A. Gandaloyev and V. Badayev had been based on a field report of federal forces and law-enforcement agencies. According to the Government, this document had stated that A. Gandaloyev and V. Badayev had opened fire at a group of officers from the Achkhoy-Martan district department of the interior (the Achkhoy-Martan ROVD), the district military commander’s office and the OMON (the special task force unit) from the Tver region; that the corpses of the two men had been discovered at the scene, that there had been information concerning their involvement in the activities of illegal armed groups and that an AKM machine-gun had been seized from the scene of the shooting. 51. On 18 February 2004 the unit military prosecutor’s office questioned Mr K., an officer of the Chechnya Forensics Expertise Centre who stated that he had participated in the examination of the scene of the murder of A. Gandaloyev and V. Badayev and that the only items collected from the crime scene had been bullets and bullet casings. 52. On an unspecified date prior to March 2004 the investigators conducted a forensic evaluation of Alaudin Gandaloyev’s body, which established numerous penetrating gunshot wounds to his head, chest and stomach. 53. On 10 March 2004 the military prosecutor’s office of the United Group Alignment extended the time-limit for the investigation in criminal case no. 34/33/0625-03. The document stated that the following measures had been taken in the investigation into the murder of A. Gandaloyev and V. Badayev: “- examination of the corpses of A. Gandaloyev and V. Badayev; - crime scene examination; - five ballistic evaluations; - examined and added to the investigation file evidence relevant to the case; - the following twelve persons questioned as witnesses... - two forensic examinations of the corpses of A. Gandaloyev and V. Badayev; - Kh. Badayev and L. Gandaloyeva were granted the status of victim in the criminal case and questioned; - character references were collected for A. Gandaloyev and V. Badayev; - examples of cartridges used by military unit no. 6844 were obtained; - responses to information requests received [from law-enforcement agencies]; - the decision was taken to conduct an expert criminal-science evaluation;” It also stated that it was necessary to conduct the following actions: “- identify persons involved in the killing of A. Gandaloyev and V. Badayev; - obtain results of the expert criminal-science evaluation; - conduct other investigative actions aimed at completion of the criminal investigation...” 54. On 23 March 2004 the unit military prosecutor’s office questioned the head of the Headquarters, officer Sh. According to his account, he had prepared the daily information notes based on the information provided by local law-enforcement agencies and other power structures. He stated that there had been a record in a registration log concerning the discovery of the corpses of A. Gandaloyev and V. Badayev, but no record about their killing as a result of a shooting. 55. On 23 March 2004 the unit military prosecutor’s office questioned the head of a military unit, officer I., who had submitted that on 17 September 2003 his military unit had not conducted special operations in the Achkhoy-Martan district. 56. On an unspecified date the head of the Headquarters of the Northern Caucasus Military Circuit provided an information statement to the effect that servicemen of the Ministry of Defence had not conducted special operations in the Achkhoy-Martan district of Chechnya on 17 September 2003. 57. On 9 April 2004 the unit military prosecutor’s office again questioned the head of the Headquarters, officer Sh. He stated that the information note about the killing on 17 September 2003 of the two rebel fighters had been based on the field report by the Temporary Operational Troops of the Ministry of the Interior in the Northern Caucasus concerning their activities on 17-18 September 2003. 58. On the same date the unit military prosecutor’s office refused to initiate criminal proceedings against the head of the Headquarters, officer Sh., under Article 129 of the Criminal Code (slander), owing to the lack of corpus delicti. The applicant’s family was informed of this on the same date. 59. On 22 April 2004 the investigation into the murder of A. Gandaloyev and V. Badayev was transferred from the unit military prosecutor’s office back to the inter-district prosecutor’s office as the theory of the involvement of federal servicemen in the crime had not been confirmed by the investigation. 60. On 27 April 2004 the inter-district prosecutor’s office questioned officer V., a senior investigator of the Sunzhenskiy district department of the interior (the Sunzhenskiy ROVD). He stated that at about 10 a.m. on 17 September 2003 their police station had received information about the discovery of the corpses of A. Gandaloyev and V. Badayev. Upon arriving at the crime scene, he had found the corpse of V. Badayev; the corpse of A. Gandaloyev had been taken away by E. Gandaloyev, who had witnessed the murder. Nothing other than bullets and bullet casings had been collected at the crime scene. 61. On 30 April 2004 the inter-district prosecutor’s office questioned an employee of the forestry agency, Mrs L.D., who stated that she had found out about the murder of her colleagues A. Gandaloyev and V. Badayev from fellow villagers. She had no information as to who could have committed the crime. Four other employees of the forestry agency, Mrs R.B., Mr M.D., Mr A. Kh. and Mr T.U. provided the investigation with similar statements. 62. On 17 May 2004 the inter-district prosecutor’s office suspended the investigation owing to the failure to identify the perpetrators. On 18 May 2004 the applicant was informed of this. 63. On 8 June 2004 the inter-district prosecutor’s office resumed the investigation and informed the applicant. 64. On 8 July 2004 the inter-district prosecutor’s office suspended the investigation owing to the failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicant was informed of this decision on the same date. 65. On 9 May 2007 the present application was communicated to the Russian Government and a copy of the investigation file concerning the murder of the applicant’s husband was requested. 66. On 7 August 2007 the inter-district prosecutor’s office refused to submit the investigation file in criminal case no. 44073 to the European Court of Human Rights. The document referred to the information obtained from the Prosecutor General’s office and stated that the investigation was still in progress and that disclosure of the documents would be in violation of Article 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, since the file contained information of a military nature and personal data concerning witnesses or other participants in the criminal proceedings. 67. According to the Government, prior to September 2007 the investigators had conducted a number of ballistic evaluations of the bullets and bullet-casings collected at the scene of the murder. According to the Chechnya Expert Evaluations Department, these samples did not match the weapons from their database; the samples were transferred for further expert evaluation to the federal bullet and shell-casing repository. The expert evaluations also established that these bullets and bullet casings were not identical to the ones used by military unit no. 6844. 68. The Government submitted that neither the investigation in criminal case no. 44073 nor those of any law-enforcement agencies in Chechnya, including the Chechnya FSB and the Achkhoy-Martan ROVD, had obtained any information about the involvement of A. Gandaloyev and V. Badayev in the activities of illegal armed groups. 69. The Government stated that the investigation into the murder of A. Gandaloyev and V. Badayev had been verifying the theory of the involvement of members of illegal armed groups in the crime. Two facts supported this theory: firstly, members of illegal armed groups had threatened the foresters in May 2003; secondly, the two foresters had been shot when they produced their identity documents. 70. The Government further stated that the investigation had been suspended and resumed on a number of occasions. The last decision concerning the suspension of the criminal investigation, owing to the failure to identify the perpetrators, was taken on 30 November 2007, but the operational-search measures aimed at solving the crime were under way. The Government submitted that although these operational-search measures had failed to identify the perpetrators of the crime, the investigation had not obtained any proof of the involvement of State agents in Alaudin Gandaloyev’s murder. 71. From the Government’s submission it follows that on 1 February 2008 the inter-district prosecutor’s office resumed the investigation in criminal case no. 44073. 72. The Government did not submit to the Court the documents to which they referred in their submission. Despite a specific request by the Court the Government did not disclose most of the contents of criminal case no. 44073, providing only copies of the following documents: a) Decision concerning the opening of criminal case no. 44073, dated 17 September 2003; b) One letter informing the applicant about the opening of the criminal case, dated 17 September 2003; one letter informing her about the reopening of the investigation, dated 8 June 2004, and two letters informing her about the suspension of the investigation in criminal case no. 44073, dated 18 May 2004 and 8 July 2004. c) Decision to grant extension of the time limits for the investigation in criminal case no. 44073, dated 10 March 2004. d) Three investigators’ decisions to take up criminal case no. 44073; e) Letter, dated 9 April 2004, informing the applicant about the refusal to initiate criminal proceedings against officer Sh. owing to the lack of corpus delicti; f) Decision, dated 7 August 2007, concerning the refusal to submit the investigation file in criminal case no. 44073 to the Court. The Government stated that the submission of further documents from the investigation file in criminal case no. 44073 would violate Article 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as they contained information relating to the addresses and personal data of participants in the criminal proceedings.

8. The applicant was born in 1936. At the time of the introduction of her application she was living in Larnaca. 9. In 1996 the Cyprus Motorcycle Federation (CMF) organised a demonstration aimed at protesting against the Turkish occupation of the northern part of Cyprus. On 2 August 1996 a group of over one hundred Cypriot and other European motorcyclists set off from Berlin and made their way through Europe to Cyprus. Tensions arose when the authorities of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (the “TRNC”) announced that, should the demonstration take place, they would be organising “counter-rallies”. The President of the Republic of Cyprus made a special plea to the motorcyclists to disperse peacefully. 10. Notwithstanding this, on 11 August 1996 a group of motorcyclists and other civilians proceeded to various points along the United Nations (UN) buffer zone. Violent clashes took place between the demonstrators, the counter-demonstrators and the “TRNC” forces. One of the Greek-Cypriot demonstrators, Anastasios Isaak, was beaten to death in Dherynia. The events concerning the killing of Mr Isaak were brought to the attention of the Court in the context of application no. 44587/98 (Isaak and Others v. Turkey). In its judgment of 24 June 2008 the Court held, inter alia, that there had been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention in respect of the killing of Anastasios Isaak and in respect of the failure to conduct an effective investigation into the circumstances in which he had died. 11. On 14 August 1996 the applicant attended the funeral of Anastasios Isaak, who was a friend of her son, in Paralimini. 12. After the funeral, a number of people went to the vicinity of the site where the events had taken place to pay their respects. The applicant's son, daughter and son-in-law were among those persons. The applicant remained outside the UN buffer zone near Dherynia, close to the Greek-Cypriot National Guard checkpoint, and observed the events. 13. Tension arose between the Greek-Cypriot demonstrators and the “TRNC” authorities. One of the demonstrators, Solomos Solomou, crossed the Turkish-Cypriot ceasefire line and started to climb a flagpole. He was shot and later died from his injuries. The events concerning the killing of Mr Solomou were brought to the attention of the Court in the context of application no. 36832/97 (Solomou and Others v. Turkey). In its judgment of 24 June 2008 the Court held, inter alia, that there had been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention in respect of the killing of Solomos Solomou and in respect of the failure to conduct an effective investigation into the circumstances in which he had died. 14. Immediately after the shooting of Mr Solomou, the applicant saw soldiers firing their weapons in the area under the control of the Turkish armed forces. As a result, a number of people were wounded, including two British soldiers from the UN Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the applicant. The latter was hit by one bullet in the abdomen. She collapsed and was taken to Larnaca Hospital. She was operated on but lost one of her kidneys. 15. The applicant claimed that her life had been put in serious danger and had been saved only because she had received prompt medical attention. Even after the introduction of her application she was still suffering from her injuries, as a result of which she could not obtain employment and was under great psychological stress. 16. The applicant underlined the following passages from UNFICYP's press release on the events surrounding the demonstration of 14 August 1996: “By 14.20 hours, some 200 Greek Cypriots were inside the UN buffer zone, but UNFICYP was in control of the situation. The demonstrators were being rounded up and moved out of the UN buffer zone. The main group of Greek Cypriots were no closer than about 30 metres from the Turkish forces ceasefire line. ... At about that time, a Greek-Cypriot male, later identified as Solomos Spyrou Solomou, broke free from the main group [of demonstrators] and ran towards the Turkish-Cypriot checkpoint. He was chased by two UNFICYP soldiers, who caught up with him at the guard post, but the demonstrator broke free again and began to climb the flagpole which was flying the Turkish flag just inside the Turkish-Cypriot checkpoint. The UNFICYP soldiers were pursuing him a few feet behind. Solomou was some 3 metres off the ground ... when he was shot by a Turkish or Turkish-Cypriot soldier and fell to the ground with blood flowing profusely from his neck (the autopsy later revealed that Solomou was hit by five bullets). Turkish or Turkish-Cypriot soldiers then proceeded to fire some 25 to 50 rounds indiscriminately into the crowd inside the buffer zone. The whole incident was witnessed by the UNFICYP Force Commander and the Commanding Officer of the Austrian Battalion who were in the UN buffer zone some 35 metres from the Turkish forces ceasefire line. They observed uniformed Turkish or Turkish-Cypriot military personnel kneeling down and firing in the direction of the demonstrators inside the UN buffer zone. As a result of the indiscriminate shooting by Turkish or Turkish-Cypriot soldiers, two British UNFICYP soldiers were shot from behind and two Greek-Cypriot civilians were also hit by gunfire. Three were inside the buffer zone and one of the civilians, who sustained a serious gunshot wound to the abdomen, was standing outside the UN buffer zone close to the National Guard checkpoint. .... The Force Commander of the UNFICYP accompanied by the Chief of Staff met with the Commander of the Turkish forces in Cyprus late in the afternoon of 14 August to strongly protest the totally unwarranted use of force by Turkish or Turkish-Cypriot military personnel which resulted in the killing of Solomou and in injuries to two peacekeepers and two civilians.” 17. In his report on the same events, the UN Secretary-General stated, inter alia: “On 14 August ... some 200 Greek Cypriots entered the buffer zone at Dherynia and approached the Turkish forces' ceasefire line. Most were stopped by UNFICYP and were about to be moved out of the buffer zone when one demonstrator broke free from the main group [of demonstrators] and ran towards a Turkish-Cypriot checkpoint closely pursued by UNFICYP soldiers. While attempting to climb a flagpole flying a Turkish flag just behind the Turkish forces' ceasefire line, he was shot five times from the Turkish/Turkish-Cypriot side. In addition, Turkish and/or Turkish-Cypriot uniformed personnel proceeded to fire some 25 to 50 rounds indiscriminately into the crowd inside the buffer zone. As a result, two British UNFICYP soldiers and two Greek Cypriots were wounded ... The situation in Cyprus deteriorated in the last six months. There was violence along the ceasefire lines, including unnecessary and disproportionate use of lethal force by the Turkish/Turkish-Cypriot side, to an extent not seen since 1974.” 18. The applicant's heirs produced four medical certificates (in their original Greek version and in a translation into English) assessing the injuries sustained by Mrs Georgia Andreou and describing the treatment which had been administered to her. 19. The first certificate, issued on 3 September 2008 by Dr K. Papakiriakou, director of the surgical department of Larnaca General Hospital, reads as follows: “Based on the hospital's medical records of Georgia Andreou (ID number 18700), aged 59, she was admitted at the Emergency Room of the Larnaca General Hospital on 14/8/1996 due to being shot during a protest in Derinia. She reported that the Turks opened fire and she was shot by a bullet in her back. The patient was wounded by a semiautomatic weapon in her abdominal area and was in shock. She went to surgery very urgently on 14.8.1996. During the surgery, it was found: 1) Wound on the navel coming from the right kidney area 2) Large amount of blood in the abdominal area with hematoma 3) Right kidney damage 4) Penetration of the large intestine 5) Wound on the backside of the right side of the liver 6) Hematoma of the pancreas Due to the above, she underwent: 1) Removal of the right kidney 2) Removal of the pancreatic holder 3) Stitching of the liver 4) Colostomy 5) Wound care Her post-surgery experience was extremely difficult and during the post-surgery period she developed pleuritis on the left side. She was also assessed by Dr Veresies where she was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress and depression. She was discharged on 2/9/1996. On 30/9/1996 the patient was readmitted to the hospital due to her colostomy. She went under surgery on 2/10/1996 due to her colostomy. She also went under surgery on 11/10/1996 due to intestinal rupture where a right semicolectomy was conducted and intestine anastomosis. She was discharged from the surgery department on 21/10/1996.” 20. A second report was issued on an unspecified date by Dr A. Poullos, who stated: “The deceased Georgia Andreou was repeatedly admitted to the pathological Department of Larnaca General Hospital after several brain strokes or side effects of previously inflicted brain strokes. As written in her medical folder, she was admitted a total of 7 times in this department at Larnaca General Hospital. It is concerned a familiar high blood pressure patient who was under medical care with reducing blood-pressure medication. The brain strokes resulted in lack of power on her left side, epileptic seizures and psychotic behaviour. The last and critical episode reoccurred on 18/11/2005 after a serious endoencephalic bleeding. She died on 29/11/2005.” 21. Dr Giorgos Miliotis, a private practitioner, issued on 8 September 2008 a report entitled “Medical History of Georgia Andreou”. This document reads as follows: “Based on my personal memories, she reported nephrectomy on her right side and colectomy after a medical wound from an automatic rifle in 1996. She is a mother of two children. She did not smoke and did not drink. She visited me for the first time on the 5th of September 2001 with symptoms of depression, phobias and paranoid feelings of being chased. Based on the clinical interview, I did not notice any pathological findings. I prescribed Seroxat 20 mg. On the next visits (25/9/01 and 9/11/01) I noticed a slight improvement of her depression and I recommended the continuation of the medication. On the 12th of December 2001 she visited me complaining of abdominal pain and constipation. The patient underwent a form of colonoscopy where her previous semicolectomy was identified but without any other pathological findings. Therefore, I determined that the symptoms were due to a malfunction of the intestine due to her previous colectomy. I prescribed Spasverin and Magnesia S. Pellegrino. On 8/7/2002, I prescribed medication for acute laryngitis and pharyngitis. On 7/8/2002, she complained of pain of her right hypochondrio with the movement of her body. She underwent an ultrasound where a small metallic element was detected on the right side of her liver, possibly due to the bullet from the gun. On 4/3/03 I noticed a relapse of her depression. I recommended the continuation of her medication. On 18/11/03 she complained of swelling of her eyelashes. On 30/6/2004 she complained of lack of energy and bodily power due to a change of her anti-depressants from another colleague (keep in mind that throughout this whole period, the patient was being seen by other colleagues at the Larnaca General Hospital). The last assessment I made was done on 15/11/2004 with a new relapse of her depression. I recommended the starting of Seroxat 20 mg again.” 22. The last certificate was issued on an unspecified date by Dr Kiriakos Veresies. It reads as follows: “Subject: Georgia Andreou, DOB 06/12/1936. The above lady was transferred to Larnaca General Hospital after being wounded from a gunshot that she received from Turkish individuals during the events at Derinia on 14/08/1996. She underwent surgery. On the 17th of August 1996, I was called by her treating doctors as the psychiatrist of the General Hospital to assess her because they noticed that she was being quiet, reserved and negative concerning communicating with her family, friends and medical personnel. During the clinical interview, she seemed frightened from the events that occurred and very troubled by the surgery and the side effects. I believe there was an intense stressful reaction as well as indication of anxiety and depression. I administered anti-anxiety and anti-depressant medication and sleep-aids for her troubled sleep. After her dismissal from the hospital, I continued seeing her as an outpatient in Larnaca and Paralimni. She exhibited depression with indication of phobias. Her sleep was disturbed and she developed panic attacks that were very hard to deal with and treat. The events of the shooting were being revisited in her mind and her narration of the stressful, scary and painful events stigmatized her until her death. Mrs Georgia was under medication management and psychiatric care without significant improvement until the end of her life.”

5. The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Ljubljana. 6. The applicant served his prison sentence in the closed and semi-open sections of Ljubljana prison and in the open section Ig, Ljubljana prison. 7. In the period between 19 May 2009 and 1 July 2009 he was held in the closed section: in cell 117, measuring 17.66 square metres (not including a separate 1.68 square metre sanitary facility) shared with three to five other inmates and with 2.66 to 3.99 square metres of personal space and in cell 2 measuring 16.18 square metres (not including a separate 1.7 square metre sanitary facility) shared with two to four other inmates and with 2.9 to 4.8 square metres of personal space. 8. In the period between 2 July 2009 and 31 October 2009 he was held in the semi-open section: in cell 139, measuring 19.36 square metres (not including a separate 1.76 square metre sanitary facility) shared with two to four other inmates and with 3.5 to 5.8 square metres of personal space and in cell 146 measuring 16.89 square metres (not including a separate 1.76 square metre sanitary facility) shared with two, three or four other inmates and with 3 to 5 square metres of personal space. 9. In the period between 1 November 2009 and 18 February 2010 he was held in the open section Ig in cell 1, measuring 41.64 square metres (not including a separate 13.90 square metre sanitary facility) shared with three to seven other inmates and with 3.5 to 6.9 square metres of personal space. 10. As regards the general characteristics of the cells in the closed and semi-open sections, material conditions inside the cells, sanitary conditions and health care, see the judgment in Štrucl and Others v. Slovenia, nos. 5903/10, 6003/10 and 6544/10, §§ 21 to 32, 20 October 2011. 11. As to the out-of-cell time in the closed section, the Court found in the aforementioned judgment that sentenced prisoners in the closed section of the prison were locked up in their cells and were only able to leave them if they applied for certain activities, most of which were to take place in the recreation room. There was, however, only one 50‑square-metre recreation room per floor, which was to be used by ten inmates at most (Štrucl and Others § 86). 12. As to the out-of-cell time in the semi-open section, the Government submitted that the cell doors in the semi-open section of the prison were unlocked, except from 9.45 p.m. (on Fridays, Saturdays and before holidays from midnight) until 6.00 a.m. (on Saturdays, Sundays and during holidays until 8.30 a.m.). During this time prisoners could move freely in the corridor (35.7 square metres), living quarters of co-prisoners or in the indoor or outdoor exercise areas, in accordance with prison rules. The Government contended that this regime had been in place for several years. 13. As to the open section, cells were open twenty-four hours per day and prisoners could, except when sleeping, move around freely, inside the open section (in a dining room, classroom, recreation room) and in outdoor areas (a park and sports ground). Further, the prisoners were allowed to exercise for four hours per day, they could do shopping in a shop outside the prison, their visits were unsupervised and their correspondence with people from outside the prison and the use of a telephone were not limited and supervised. The open section had a capacity for twenty seven prisoners in five cells. The prisoners shared sanitary facilities with five showers, five washbasins in the lavatory, three toilets on the ground floor and four toilets on the first floor of the section and a laundry room with a washing machine and a drier, which prisoners could freely use. Prisoners in the open section were also entitled to unsupervised visits outside prison for five hours during weekends, unsupervised leave and annual leave if working in Ljubljana prison. 14. As regards the cell temperature, the data provided by the Government showed that the average temperature in the cells in the late afternoon (5- 5.30 p.m.) in the second half of July and August 2009 had been approximately 28oC, exceeding 30oC on seven days.

4. The applicant was the principal of a secondary school in Orel. 5. On 21 December 1998 the prosecutor of Orel initiated criminal proceedings for misappropriation against an unknown person, in which the applicant was questioned as a witness. 6. On 20 April 1999 the preliminary investigation was suspended due to the applicant's illness. 7. On 22 August 1999 the above decision was quashed for lack of lawful grounds, and the investigation resumed. 8. On 20 September 1999 the applicant was charged with misappropriation. An undertaking not to leave his place of residence was imposed on him at the same date. 9. On 21 September 1999 the applicant was invited to study the case file, which he continued to do till 4 October 1999. 10. On 8 October 1999 the case file was received by the Zheleznodorozhnyy District Court of Orel (“the District Court”). The first hearing did not occur until 17 December 1999 due to the applicant's illness and his legal counsel's other commitments. 11. On 17 December 1999 and 26 May 2000 the District Court granted the prosecutor's motions, the first one supported and the second one opposed by the applicant, to remit the case for additional investigation on account of a violation of procedural time-limits and incomplete examination of the case. Both decisions were set aside on appeal by the Orel Regional Court (“the Regional Court”) on 18 January 2000 and 11 July 2000, respectively, and the case was remitted to the District Court for fresh examination. 12. From 11 July to 4 September 2000 the prosecutor kept the case file, while, according to the Government, deciding whether to bring an application for supervisory review of the Regional Court's decisions. 13. No hearings were held between 14 and 30 November 2000 due to the applicant's illness. 14. On 25 December 2000 the District Court again took a decision, upheld by the Regional Court on 6 February 2001, to grant the prosecutor's motion to remit the case for additional investigation. The applicant objected to the motion. 15. On 26 July 2001 the investigation authorities returned the case file to the District Court. A hearing was scheduled for 6 September 2001. 16. Between 6 September 2001 and 28 March 2002 five hearings were adjourned following the applicant's request to summon certain witnesses, and one hearing was adjourned to let the applicant's legal counsel study the case file. Two hearings did not take place due to the applicant's illness. 17. On 27 March 2002 the applicant waived his counsel alleging that the latter had not had enough time to study the case file. 18. On 28 March 2002 the District Court convicted the applicant as charged and gave him a suspended sentence of three years' imprisonment. The judgment was upheld on appeal by the Regional Court on 23 April 2002. 19. On 24 April 2002 the applicant lodged an application for supervisory review of the conviction. 20. On 28 November 2002 the Presidium of the Regional Court quashed the conviction by way of supervisory review on account of a violation of the applicant's right to prepare his defence and right to legal assistance and remitted the case to the District Court for fresh examination. 21. On 6 January 2003 the District Court fixed a hearing for 20 January 2003. The applicant appealed. 22. Between 20 January and 8 April 2003 the case file stayed at the Regional Court while the applicant's appeal was being examined. 23. Between 8 April 2003 and 2 February 2004 nine hearings did not take place due to the applicant's illness and his counsel's other commitments. Four hearings were adjourned following the applicant's request to summon certain witnesses. 24. On 9 February 2004 the District Court acquitted the applicant. 25. On 30 March 2004 the Regional Court overturned the acquittal on appeal on account of incorrect assessment of evidence and application of the law and remitted the case to the District Court for fresh examination. 26. On 26 April 2004 the hearing was adjourned to reissue the civil claimant's counsel's expired power of attorney. 27. Between 6 May and 26 July 2004 two hearings were adjourned to accommodate the applicant's schedule, summon certain witnesses and settle some formalities, and other two hearings were adjourned to let the applicant choose a new legal counsel and to give the latter time to study the case file. 28. No hearings were held in August and September 2004 because the defence witnesses' attendance could not be secured. 29. Between 22 October and 26 November 2004 three hearings were adjourned to grant the applicant time to study the case file and to prepare his last statement, and to summon certain witnesses at both parties' requests. 30. On 26 November 2004 the District Court terminated the proceedings in respect of a part of the charge for lack of corpus delicti, found the applicant guilty of abuse of office and relieved him of criminal liability as time-barred. 31. On 25 January 2005 the Regional Court set the conviction aside and terminated criminal proceedings against the applicant for lack of corpus delicti. The applicant was apprised of his right to bring proceedings for compensation of the damage incurred by the criminal proceedings against him. 32. On 24 April 2007 the Regional Court took a final decision to grant in part the applicant's claims for compensation for pecuniary damage resulting from lost wages, the cost of legal assistance and medical care and awarded him 30,847 roubles. 33. On 1 August 2007 the Regional Court in the final instance awarded the applicant 300,000 roubles as compensation for non-pecuniary damage sustained as a result of unlawful prosecution.

6. The applicant was born in 1981 and lives in Lüneburg. 7. The applicant is an anti-nuclear and environmental activist. She has repeatedly used her climbing skills to draw public attention to her protest. 8. On 6 November 2008 around 11 a.m. the applicant and three further persons belonging to the Robin Wood organisation, an environmental protection group, climbed on the arch of a railway bridge. The group fixed banners expressing protest against the transport, by train, of radioactive waste from La Hague, France, to the interim storage facility in Gorleben, scheduled from 7 to 9 November 2008. The members of the group refused to have themselves roped down by the police, who had dissolved their assembly. They were finally roped down by Federal Police’s mountain rescue team. The police then arrested only the applicant at 2.40 p.m. while the other three participants remained at liberty. They further seized the banners and the climbing equipment. 9. On 6 November 2008 at 5.30 p.m. the Lüneburg District Court, having heard the applicant and the Lüneburg police, ordered the applicant’s detention for preventive purposes under section 18 § 1 no. 2 of the Lower Saxony Public Security and Order Act (Niedersächsisches Gesetz über die öffentliche Sicherheit und Ordnung, see paragraph 42 below). That detention was to last until the arrival of the “castor”[1] containers in Dannenberg train station and until 10 November 2008, 0.00 p.m. at the most. 10. The District Court found that the applicant, who had been represented by counsel throughout the proceedings before the domestic courts, and three further persons had let themselves down on a rope on a railway bridge. They had unrolled banners protesting against the castor transport. A commuter train had to be stopped because its passage would have put the protesters at risk. 11. The District Court considered that the applicant’s detention was indispensable in order to prevent the imminent commission of a regulatory offence of considerable importance to the general public, as required by section 18 § 1 no. 2 of the Lower Saxony Public Security and Order Act. There was a risk that the applicant would block the forthcoming transport of the castor containers scheduled from 7 to 9 November 2011 by a climbing action. Thereby, she would commit regulatory offences under the Railway Construction and Operation Act (Eisenbahn-Bau- und Betriebsordnung) and the Assembly Act (Versammlungsgesetz) which would be dangerous to the public. That risk was also imminent in the applicant’s case as she was known for expressing political protest, including protest against the transport of castor containers, by climbing actions and for being ready to breach the law in that context. 12. On 7 November 2008 at 9.15 p.m. the Lüneburg Regional Court, having heard the applicant in person at 2.10 p.m., dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the District Court’s decision. 13. On 9 November 2008 at 5.25 p.m. the Lüneburg District Court quashed the order of 6 November 2008 for the applicant’s detention for preventive purposes and ordered the applicant’s immediate release. 14. The District Court found that, having regard to the applicant’s deteriorating state of health, there was no longer a risk that the applicant would commit a criminal or regulatory offence of considerable importance to the general public, as required by section 18 § 1 no. 2 of the Lower Saxony Public Security and Order Act, in the context of the transport of castor containers to Gorleben. Moreover, her continued detention was no longer proportionate in these circumstances. The District Court noted that medical doctor C., who had visited the applicant in detention on the latter’s request, had confirmed that the applicant suffered from serious rheumatism which necessitated her to move continuously and was in a poor mental condition. Her detention in Braunschweig Police Station, with little possibility to move, had already led to her joints having stiffened. The doctor had explained that she was not in a position to assess the applicant’s fitness for detention, but that it appeared excluded that the applicant would be capable of carrying out a climbing action in the days to come. 15. The applicant was released on the same day at 6.32 p.m. 16. Following her arrest on 6 November 2008 at 2.40 p.m. the applicant, having been found by a doctor of the Federal Police not to suffer from any health problems, was brought before the Lüneburg District Court which ordered her detention at 5.30 p.m. Following the District Court’s decision, the applicant was accompanied home by the police officers from 5.45 p.m. to 6.45 p.m. in order to enable her to take her own clothes and medication. She was detained in a cell in the Lüneburg Police Station from 7 p.m. onwards until 7 November 2008 at approximately 1.40 p.m., when she was brought to the Lüneburg Regional Court. The applicant’s small cell, equipped with a mattress and a chair, was lighted at least via a ventilation slot and by electric light. 17. Between the end of the hearing of the applicant by the Lüneburg Regional Court on 7 November 2008 at around 3 p.m. and its decision at 9.15 p.m. on that day, the applicant essentially stayed in the office area of the Lüneburg Police Station. She went outside for a walk on the banks of the Ilmenau river with the police officers three times during that period. 18. Following the Regional Court’s decision, the police decided to transfer the applicant to the Braunschweig Police Station which was considered being better equipped for police custody. When the applicant complained about breathing problems during the journey, the police called an ambulance. When both the ambulance crew and a police doctor had found that the applicant did not suffer from health problems, the transfer was continued in the ambulance. 19. The applicant was detained in the Braunschweig Police Station from 8 November 2008, 2.10 a.m. until her release on 9 November 2008 at 6.32 p.m. Her cell was equipped with a bed, an empty desk, a chair and an open cupboard and had a barred window with frosted glass. In the corridor of the detention wing, which she had to pass to go to the toilet, photographs of shackled persons were exposed. These included a picture of a person subject to ankle and hand cuffs, with both cuffs being tied together by a chain in the person’s back lying on a mattress on the ground. 20. During the applicant’s detention in the Braunschweig Police Station, the light in her cell remained switched on throughout the applicant’s first night in that cell. The applicant had climbed on the cupboard in her cell and passed the night thereon, failing to comply with the police’s order to descend. The applicant was taken out for a walk on the premises of the Braunschweig Police Station, which did not dispose of a closed courtyard, on 8 November 2008 from 2.20 p.m. until 3.02 p.m., being loosely shackled to a female police officer. On 9 November 2008 the applicant was allowed to stay outside on those premises from 12.22 p.m. until 12.35 p.m., without being shackled; she climbed on a tree on that occasion. The applicant was supplied with writing material on 8 November 2008. She was further allowed to receive three visits from a friend and two from her doctor C. She was also allowed to telephone her lawyer and her partner several times. 21. On 15 July 2009 the Lüneburg District Court dismissed the applicant’s action of 8 November 2008 under section 19 § 2 of the Lower Saxony Public Security and Order Act (see paragraph 43 below) against the Lüneburg police for a finding that both the order for her detention and the conditions of its execution had been unlawful. 22. As regards the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention the District Court, endorsing the findings of fact made by the Regional Court in its decision of 7 November 2008 (see paragraph 12 above) as well as its reasoning, confirmed that the detention had complied with section 18 § 1 no. 2 of the Lower Saxony Public Security and Order Act. 23. As regards the execution of the detention order against the applicant, the District Court considered that the manner in which the detention had been enforced had been lawful and had complied, in particular, with the provisions of the Police Custody Regulations (Polizeigewahrsamsordnung, see paragraph 45-49 below). 24. The District Court noted that the detention order was executed in the detention wing of the Lüneburg Police Station until 7 November 2008 and subsequently in the detention wing of the Braunschweig Police Station. 25. As to the applicant’s complaint that her detention cells did not have windows, but only ventilation slots, the District Court considered that the equipment of the detention cells had complied with no. 15 of the Police Custody Regulations (see paragraph 49 below) and that there had been enough light. The recommendations of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) were irrelevant here. The photographs of shackled persons exposed in the detention wing of the Braunschweig Police Station may have been tasteless, but did not render the applicant’s detention unlawful as a result of intimidation. 26. Moreover, there had not been a breach of the right to sufficient night’s rest provided by no. 12 of the Police Custody Regulations (see paragraph 48 below). In Lüneburg, some noise made by a ventilator may have made it more difficult for the applicant to fall asleep, but the police was not obliged to be considerate of individual sensitivities. The fact that the light had remained switched on all night in Braunschweig had been a consequence of the applicant’s own behaviour. She had insisted spending the night on the cell’s cupboard the height of which was 1.90 metres. The light had therefore been necessary for her own protection. It had not been possible for the police to guarantee that, in case the applicant had fallen down from the cupboard, they would notice it immediately otherwise. According to the District Court, the applicant could ask herself whether she would have preferred having been shackled for her protection instead. 27. Furthermore, the court noted that on 8 November 2008 the applicant had been outside on the premises of the Braunschweig Police Station from 2.20 p.m. until 3.02 p.m. She had to be shackled as, being an excellent climber, there had been a risk that she would climb on trees or buildings and abscond. The applicant had not, therefore, been “taken for a walk like an animal” on the parking. On 9 November 2008 the applicant had been outside from 12.22 p.m. until 12.35 p.m. She had not been shackled and had been allowed to climb on a tree. She had not objected to returning to the detention wing afterwards. 28. The District Court further considered that the applicant had failed to substantiate that her state of health in detention had deteriorated in a manner so as to render her detention disproportionate already prior to the District Court’s decision of 9 November 2008 ordering her release. There had not been a written and impartial medical report proving the applicant’s allegation in that respect. The doctor who had visited the applicant in detention and had persuaded the then competent District Court judge to order her release had probably been a sympathiser. 29. On 28 October 2009 the Lüneburg Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the District Court’s decision of 15 July 2009. 30. As to the legality of the applicant’s detention, the Regional Court, endorsing the findings in its decision of 7 November 2008, confirmed that the applicant’s detention as such had complied with section 18 § 1 no. 2 of the Lower Saxony Public Security and Order Act. 31. The Regional Court further confirmed that the conditions of the applicant’s detention, albeit onerous for the applicant, had complied with the applicable legal provisions and had not been so unacceptable as to render the execution of her detention unlawful. 32. As regards the applicant’s detention during the first night in the detention cell in the Lüneburg Police Station, the Regional Court found that the cell had been uncomfortable, but had complied with no. 15.1 of the Police Custody Regulations in the version then in force (see paragraph 49 below). In that police station there were no detention cells suitable for a deprivation of liberty lasting several days. Despite this, the police had convincingly explained that transporting the applicant to and back from Braunschweig for the hearing before the Regional Court the following day would have restricted her even more in her liberty of movement. Furthermore, she had not complained to the police about the noise at night emanating from a ventilator. 33. Moreover, the Lüneburg police had taken care of the applicant’s well-being after her hearing before the Regional Court (on 7 November 2008 from 2.10 p.m. until 2.50 p.m.) while they waited for the Regional Court’s decision until approximately 9 p.m. with the applicant in an office in the Lüneburg Police Station in that they had taken her outside three times. 34. As regards the applicant’s subsequent detention in the Braunschweig Police Station, the Regional Court noted that the applicant arrived at that station on 8 November 2008 at 2.10 a.m. after the crew of the ambulance called by the police and a police doctor had confirmed her fitness for detention despite the breathing difficulties she had informed the police of. The Regional Court further confirmed the District Court’s finding that the pictures of shackled persons in the corridor of the detention wing – which included a photograph of a person subject to ankle and hand cuffs – may have been tasteless. However, it had neither been shown that the pictures had been put up to intimidate prisoners nor that the applicant had been intimidated in a considerable manner by them. Moreover, the court considered that it had been lawful for the police to leave the light switched on during the night. It noted that the applicant had climbed on a cupboard measuring 1.90 metres and had failed to descend on the police’s request. By choosing not to descend her by force and by leaving the light on instead the police had respected as much as possible the applicant’s right to liberty. 35. As regards the applicant’s right to stays outside during her detention in Braunschweig, the Regional Court, endorsing the findings of the District Court in this respect, found that the right provided by no. 10 of the Police Custody Regulations (see paragraph 46 below) to be allowed to stay outside for 45 minutes per day in so far as the staffing and infrastructural situation permitted had not been breached. Shackling the applicant to a female police officer on 8 November 2008 had been necessary in order to prevent the applicant from absconding. The applicant, an excellent climber, had previously shown that she was not ready to comply with the police’s orders and there had not been a closed courtyard as in prison. On 9 November 2008 the applicant had not been shackled during her time outside and had been allowed to climb on a tree. She had also been able to move within her cell in order to alleviate ailments resulting from her rheumatism. 36. As regards the applicant’s right to receive visits in detention, the Regional Court observed that under no. 11 of the Police Custody Regulations (see paragraph 47 below), such visits were permitted in so far as they did not endanger the purpose of the detention and were authorised by the police. The said provision had to be read in conjunction with section 20 § 4 of the Lower Saxony Public Security and Order Act (see paragraph 44 below). The Regional Court noted that the Braunschweig Police had received some 200 telephone calls of sympathisers of the applicant, some of whom had insulted the police, which had considerably disturbed the execution of the applicant’s detention. It had not been unlawful in these circumstances for the police not to permit visits by persons who had presented themselves at the police station without having lodged a request for a visit. In any event, the applicant had been visited by three persons while in detention, in addition to the two visits by her doctor, C., who had prescribed her necessary medication and had brought a couple of magazines. Her right to receive visits had not been unlawfully restricted in these circumstances. 37. The Regional Court’s decision was served on the applicant’s counsel on 6 November 2009. 38. By submissions dated 1 December 2009 the applicant, represented by counsel, lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court against the decision of the Lüneburg District Court of 6 November 2008, confirmed on appeal by the Lüneburg Regional Court on 7 November 2008, and against the decision of the Lüneburg District Court of 15 July 2009, confirmed on appeal by the Lüneburg Regional Court on 28 October 2009. She argued, in particular, that her right to liberty, the principle of proportionality and her right to freedom of assembly and of expression had been violated by her long illegal detention in unreasonable conditions in order to prevent insignificant regulatory offences. Her complaint was registered under file no. 2 BvR 2794/09. 39. In a letter dated 18 August 2010 addressed to the applicant in person, the Federal Constitutional Court informed the applicant that her constitutional complaint of 1 December 2009 against the decisions of the Lüneburg District Court of 15 July 2009, confirmed on appeal by the Lüneburg Regional Court on 28 October 2009, in so far as the decisions concerned the conditions of her detention, had been registered under file no. 2 BvR 1779/10. 40. On 24 August 2010 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the applicant’s constitutional complaint against the above‑mentioned four decisions in so far as these decisions concerned the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention, without giving reasons (file no. 2 BvR 2794/09). The Federal Constitutional Court’s decision was served on the applicant’s counsel on 21 September 2010. In her letter to the Federal Constitutional Court dated 3 October 2010 the applicant’s counsel, referring to the two file numbers assigned to the applicant’s constitutional complaint, the letter of 18 August 2010 and the decision of 24 August 2010, asked for a progress report; she was informed that it was not possible to indicate when a decision on the complaint under file no. 2 BvR 1779/10 would be taken. 41. On 30 May 2012 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the applicant’s constitutional complaint against the decision of the Lüneburg District Court dated 15 July 2009, confirmed on appeal by the Lüneburg Regional Court on 28 October 2009, without giving reasons (file no. 2 BvR 1779/10). The decision was served on the applicant’s counsel on 18 June 2012.

3. The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Şırnak. 4. On 8 June 2004 the applicant, an artillery captain at the Turkish Armed Forces, brought a case before the Supreme Military Administrative Court against the Ministry of Defence for the annulment of his transfer to a different garrison. 5. In their pleadings the Ministry of Defence argued that the applicant’s transfer had been lawful and submitted certain confidential documents in support of their arguments for the Supreme Military Administrative Court’s examination under Article 52 (4) of Law no. 1602. These documents were not communicated to the applicant. 6. On 15 February 2005 the Supreme Military Administrative Court held that the applicant’s appointment had not been contrary to law and rejected his request. In taking this decision the Supreme Military Administrative Court relied on, inter alia, the confidential documents submitted by the Ministry of Defence by virtue of Article 52 (4) of Law no. 1602. 7. On 26 April 2005 the applicant’s rectification request was rejected by the Supreme Military Administrative Court.

4. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Narva. 5. In 1983 the applicant married N. The marriage was dissolved on 7 February 1997. 6. On 26 May 1997 N. lodged an action with the Narva City Court (linnakohus), requesting that the joint property, including an apartment, be divided. 7. On 30 January 1998, the Narva City Court scheduled a preliminary hearing for 12 February 1998. However, on 11 February 1998 the applicant requested that the hearing be postponed as his lawyer had to participate in a hearing of a criminal case at the same time. The City Court adjourned the hearing. A new preliminary hearing was scheduled for 19 August 1998. On the same day, N. requested that the hearing be adjourned because of her lawyer's absence. She requested that the hearing be scheduled for a date after 10 September 1998. The third preliminary hearing took place on 13 October 1999 and a trial hearing on 31 August 2000. On 11 September 2000 the court delivered the judgment by which the marital property was divided. According to the City Court, the apartment was in the ownership of an apartment cooperative (korteriühistu, kooperatiiv). The applicant and N. had possessed a share in the cooperative. The City Court considered the sum they had paid for the share as a part of the joint property. 8. On 5 June 2001, after an appeal by N., the Viru Court of Appeal (ringkonnakohus) quashed the rulings of the City Court and referred the case back to it. The Court of Appeal noted, inter alia, that the actual market value of the apartment at the time of the division of the property (as opposed to the construction costs) had to be taken into account for the determination of the value of the property. 9. A hearing before the Narva City Court, scheduled for 13 June 2002, was adjourned in order to enable the parties to adduce additional evidence. In September, the parties submitted additional pleadings. On 10 October 2002 the Narva City Court, following a hearing, delivered the judgment. It found that the applicant and N. had not been the owners of the apartment during their marriage. They had owned a share in the apartment cooperative. The City Court decided that the share had to be divided between the applicant and N. 10. N. lodged an appeal with the Viru Court of Appeal, which, on 28 January 2003, quashed the City Court's judgment. It found that the apartment had been acquired by the applicant and N. jointly during their marriage. According to an expert opinion the current value of the apartment was 119,337 kroons (EEK) (corresponding approximately to 7,700 euros (EUR)). Proceeding from the above, the Court of Appeal divided the property. According to the judgment, the applicant had to pay EEK 61,698.5 (approximately EUR 3,900) to N. 11. On 16 April 2003 the Supreme Court (Riigikohus) refused the applicant leave to appeal.

4. The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Košice. 5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows. 6. In 1998 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against an individual. 7. On 9 June 2000 the Košice I District Office of Investigation commenced an investigation against the latter in relation to damage allegedly caused to the applicant. 8. On 22 June 2000 the Košice I District Office of Investigation heard the applicant who in his statement claimed damages of 220,000 Slovakian korunas (SKK). 9. The accussed was indicted before the Košice I District Court on 26 September 2000. 10. Between October 2000 and June 2002 the District Court scheduled nineteen hearings. Nine hearings were adjourned on the ground of the failure of the accused or his attorney to appear, whereby in some cases the reasons for their absence were not supported by any evidence. Four hearings had to be adjourned due to one of the chamber's member's illness and two hearings were adjourned due to absence of a witness. 11. On 17 December 2001 the District Court joined the proceedings with a different criminal case concerning the same accused. 12. On 5 June 2002 the District Court convicted the accused of an offence and ordered him to pay SKK 220,000 to the applicant in compensation for damage. 13. On 30 October 2002 the court of appeal quashed the first-instance judgment. 14. In the subsequent period from February 2003 until February 2006 twelve hearings were scheduled out of which ten had to be adjourned due to absence of the accused or his attorney. At several hearings both the attorney and the accused failed to inform the court of the reasons for their absence. 15. On 1 July 2005 the President of the Košice I District Court, in reply to the applicant's complaint of the length of the proceedings, admitted that the proceedings had lasted a long time, which was due to absence of the accused and illness of one member of a chamber. However, the President found that there were no subjective delays attributable to the court. 16. On 10 November 2005 the District Court requested an expert opinion relating to the state of health of the accused with regard to his ability to attend a hearing. 17. On 22 February 2006 a hearing took place at which the accused refused to give a statement. 18. On 4 April 2006, after the accused had failed to appear before the court for the hearing scheduled for 27 March 2006, the District Court issued a warrant for his arrest. 19. On 19 April 2006 the warrant was quashed since the accused had proved that he had been ill at the time of the hearing. 20. On 22 May and 21 June 2006 the District Court adjourned the hearing as the attorney of the accused and the accused failed to appear. 21. From June 2006 until October 2006 the District Court sent several inquiries to the doctor of the accused including a request for a second expert opinion relating to the state of health of the accused with regard to his ability to attend a hearing. 22. On 15 October 2007 a hearing took place. On 15 November 2007, after the accused had failed to appear before the court for the hearing scheduled for 7 November 2007, the District Court issued a new warrant for his arrest. 23. On 25 January 2008 the accused was remanded in custody. 24. On 12 March 2008 the accused was found guilty of fraud and ordered to pay an amount of money in compensation for damage to the injured parties including the applicant. The prosecutor appealed. 25. On 23 October 2008 the Košice Regional Court dismissed the appeal. 26. On 18 August 2005 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant's complaint about the length of the proceedings before the Košice I District Court. The Constitutional Court found that the right under Article 48 § 2 of the Constitution to a hearing without unjustified delay did not extend to the applicant's claim for compensation filed in the context of criminal proceedings against a third person. Furthermore, it was open to the applicant to submit his claim to a civil court. Article 48 § 2 of the Constitution would apply to such civil proceedings.

5. The applicants are Russian nationals who, at the material time, lived in various districts of the Chechen Republic. They are close relatives of individuals who disappeared after being unlawfully detained by servicemen during special operations. In each of the applications, the events concerned took place in areas under the full control of the Russian federal forces. The applicants have had no news of their missing relatives since the alleged arrests. 6. The applicants reported the abductions to law‑enforcement bodies and official investigations were opened; however, the proceedings were repeatedly suspended and resumed, and have remained pending for several years without achieving any tangible results. The investigations have consisted mainly of requests for information and formal requests for operational-search measures to be carried out by counterparts in various parts of Chechnya and other regions of the North Caucasus. The requests received either negative responses or none at all. 7. From the documents submitted, it appears that the relevant State authorities were unable to identify the State servicemen allegedly involved in the arrests or abductions. 8. In their observations, the Government did not challenge the description of the circumstances of the abductions as presented by the applicants; however, they stated that there was no evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that State agents had been involved in the incidents. 9. Summaries of the facts in respect of each individual application are set out below. Each account is based on statements provided by the applicants and their relatives and/or neighbours to both the Court and domestic investigative authorities. The personal details of the applicants and their missing relatives, and some other key facts, are summarised in the Appendix I. 10. The applicant, Ms Maret Nazyrova, was born in 1968 and lives in Gekhi in the Urus-Martan district of the Chechen Republic. She is the sister of Mr Badrudi Nazyrov, who was born in 1973. 11. On 20 April 2000, during the daytime, Mr Nazyrov and his friend, Mr Said-Selim Aguyev, were at the applicant’s house in Gekhi when a group of about thirty to forty armed servicemen from the Police Special Task Unit (Отдел милиции особого назначения (ОМОН)) (hereinafter “the OMON”) comprised of servicemen from the Perm Region arrived at the settlement in several vehicles. Some of them were wearing balaclavas. They cordoned off the area and ordered the residents to stay inside. About fifteen servicemen broke into the applicant’s house and searched it. Then they beat up the applicant’s brother and his friend, pulled their T-shirts over their heads, put them into UAZ-type minivans and took them to the Urus‑Martan military commander’s office. The applicant and a number of local residents witnessed the events. 12. The Perm OMON unit was stationed on the premises of an orphanage in the vicinity of the applicant’s house. At the material time, two brothers of the Kuznetsov family were in charge of the OMON unit. It appears that they were involved in the abduction as they were not wearing masks and could therefore be identified by the applicant. The following day the military commander’s office accepted a food package for Mr Nazyrov, but the next day the servicemen denied that he had ever been detained on their premises. 13. The applicant has not seen Mr Nazyrov since the abduction on 20 April 2000. 14. The above account is based on witness statements provided by the applicant and copies of documents from the investigation file furnished by the Government. 15. From the documents furnished by the applicant and six pages of documents from criminal case no. 24074 submitted by the Government, information about the ensuing official investigation can be summarised as follows. 16. On 4 May 2000 Mr Nazyrov’s father, Mr Sh.N., reported the abduction to the Urus-Martan military commander’s office and the Urus‑Martan military prosecutor’s office, stating that his son had allegedly been taken to the Urus-Martan military commander’s office with Mr Aguyev, and that the two men had been detained as the latter had had no identity documents on him. 17. On or around 14 May 2000 the abduction report was forwarded to the Urus-Martan temporary police department (Временный отдел внутренних дел (ВОВД)) (hereinafter “VOVD”) and from there to the Urus-Martan district prosecutor’s office. 18. On 16 May 2000 the Urus-Martan district prosecutor’s office returned the complaint to the VOVD stating that it had been submitted “prematurely”. 19. On 17 May 2000 investigators from the VOVD refused to initiate criminal proceedings into the abduction. 20. On 25 November 2000 the Urus-Martan district prosecutor’s office overruled the refusal and opened criminal case no. 24074. The decision stated that the applicant’s brother had been detained “during a special operation, the lawfulness of which has not been confirmed”. 21. From the documents submitted, it appears that between November 2000 and January 2007 the investigation was suspended and no investigative steps were taken. The applicant was not informed thereof. 22. It appears that on an unspecified date in January or February 2007 the investigation was resumed at the request of the applicant and on 2 February 2007 she was granted victim status in the criminal case. 23. On 1 March 2007 the investigation was suspended. The applicant was informed thereof. 24. On 21 August 2008 the applicant complained to the Urus-Martan Town Court that the investigation into the abduction was protracted and asked for it to be resumed. 25. On 9 September 2008 the court rejected the applicant’s complaint, as the investigation had been resumed on 1 September 2008. 26. On 30 September 2008 the investigation was again suspended. The applicant was informed thereof. 27. From the documents submitted, it appears that the investigation is still pending. 28. The applicant, Ms Satsita Babuyeva, was born in 1958 and lives in Grozny, the Chechen Republic. She is the wife of Mr Muma Babuyev, who was born in 1958. 29. At the material time, Mr Babuyev worked as a driver for the Department of Technological Equipment (Управление производственно-технологической комплектации (УПТК)) based on the premises of the main military base of the Russian federal troops in Khankala, Chechnya. On the morning of 30 August 2002, on his last day of work, he went there with the applicant to the military base to collect a year’s salary arrears. The couple arrived at the checkpoint at the entrance to the base at about 10 a.m. The applicant’s husband went inside, while she was told to wait for him at the entrance. 30. The applicant spent the entire day waiting for her husband but he never came out. In the evening she had to return home. She spent the next two days at the checkpoint waiting for him but to no avail. On 2 September 2002 she managed to speak to a woman from the admissions office who issued entrance passes to the military base. She confirmed that on 30 September she had issued a pass for Mr Babuyev. She had also made one for him for 1 September 2002 but he had not picked it up, which meant that he must have remained inside and not left the premises. The applicant’s husband has been missing ever since. 31. The above account is based on statements provided by the applicant and copies of documents from the investigation file. 32. The Government submitted copies of a small number of documents from criminal case file no. 52112 opened into the disappearance of Mr Babuyev, covering the period between September and November 2002. The relevant information may be summarised as follows. 33. On 22 September 2002 the applicant reported her husband’s disappearance at the military base to various authorities. Her statements concerning the circumstances of the incident were similar to the account she submitted to the Court. 34. On the same date the Grozny city prosecutor’s office initiated a criminal investigation into the events, under Article 126 § 1 of the Criminal Code (kidnapping). The case file was given the number 52112. The relevant parts of the decision read as follows: “...On 30 August 2002 [Muma Babuyev] went to the military settlement of Khankala in Grozny to collect his salary arrears; other employees of [the department] saw [him] on the premises... [He] did not exit the premises and did not return home...” 35. On 16 October 2002 the applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case. 36. On 21 October 2003 the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102 informed the applicant that further to her complaints, they had conducted a prosecutor’s inquiry into her husband’s disappearance which had not established the involvement of military servicemen in the incident. 37. On 22 November 2002 the investigation was suspended. The applicant was not informed thereof. 38. On an unspecified date in April and on 18 May 2003 the applicant reported her husband’s unlawful arrest and subsequent disappearance to the Chechnya Prosecutor’s office and requested its assistance in the search for him. 39. On 2 October 2003 the Main Military Prosecutor’s office informed the applicant that their inquiry had not established the involvement of military servicemen in her husband’s disappearance. 40. On 2 November 2004 the Staropromyslovskiy District Court of Grozny declared Mr Babuyev missing at the request of the applicant. 41. On an unspecified date between 2004 and 2009 investigators replied to requests by the applicant for information by providing her with a statement to the effect that the investigation into her husband’s abduction was in progress but his whereabouts had not yet been established. 42. On 10 September and then on 3 November 2009 the applicant asked the investigators to inform her of the progress of the investigation and for access the case file. No replies were given to these requests. 43. On 4 August 2011 the investigation was resumed at the request of the applicant. From the documents submitted, it appears that it is still pending. 44. The applicants are Mr Adam Kagermanov, who was born in 1971 (“the first applicant”) and Ms Zura Yakhayeva (also spelled Yakhyayeva), who was born in 1977 (“the second applicant”). The applicants, who live in Gekhi in the Urus-Martan district of the Chechen Republic, are the brother and niece of Mr Ruslan Kagermanov (“Mr Kagermanov ”), who was born in 1963. 45. The applicants’ family home consisted of four dwellings with a shared courtyard. Mr Kagermanov lived alone in a separate dwelling. At the material time, Gekhi was under curfew. At around 4 a.m. on 4 February 2002 the first applicant learnt from a family member that Mr Kagermanov had been abducted earlier that night by a group of armed servicemen, who had arrived at his home in a Ural lorry and broken down the door. The neighbours had heard the abductors driving off in the direction of Urus‑Martan. The applicant thought that his brother had been taken by State servicemen, as at the time many young men had been abducted in a similar manner during curfew hours. In addition, local residents had seen servicemen driving armoured personnel carriers (APCs) in the vicinity that night. 46. Later that morning the applicants found Ural lorry tyre tracks and footprints of military boots in the snow next to Mr Ruslan Kagermanov’s dwelling. 47. At around 10 a.m. about fifty to sixty Russian servicemen in several APCs and Ural lorries arrived at the Kagermanov family home. They blew up Mr Kagermanov’s household small oil refinery in his backyard and searched the premises. According to the applicants, the servicemen had carried out a sweeping-up operation in the area and had searched other houses with oil refineries. 48. The applicants have not seen Mr Kagermanov since 4 February 2002. 49. The Government did not furnish any documents from the investigation file. From the documents submitted by the applicants, the steps taken by the investigative authorities may be summarised as follows. 50. On 4 February 2002 Mr Kagermanov’s mother, Ms P.K., reported her son’s abduction by military servicemen to the Urus-Martan district prosecutor’s office. 51. On 18 February 2002 the Urus-Martan district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 61023. 52. On unspecified dates in February 2002 investigators questioned the applicants, who both stated they had discovered that Mr Kagermanov had disappeared at about 3.20 a.m. on 4 February 2002. They had found the entrance to his home broken down, footprints of military boots, his belongings scattered around and his broken watch indicating 3.10 a.m. on the floor. The applicants further stated that at about 10 a.m. the same morning a group of fifty to sixty Russian military servicemen in several APCs and Ural lorries had arrived at their house, searched it and destroyed Mr Kagermanov’s oil refinery. 53. In February and March 2002 investigators questioned the applicants and their family members. The statements received were similar to the account furnished by the applicants to the Court. 54. On 18 April 2002 the investigation was suspended. The applicants were not informed thereof. 55. On 4 May 2009 the second applicant requested access to the investigation file. Her request was refused by the investigators on 9 June 2009. 56. On an unspecified date between June and August 2009 she requested victim status in the criminal case. On 11 August 2009 the investigators granted this request and questioned her. Her statement was similar to the account she submitted to the Court. 57. On 18 August 2009 the investigators questioned the first applicant, whose statement was similar to the account he submitted to the Court. 58. On various dates in August 2009 the investigators also questioned the applicants’ relatives and neighbours, Mr Z.K., Ms R.G., Mr M.I. and Ms P.K., whose statements were similar to those of the applicants. No new information was obtained. 59. On 25 August 2009 the investigators examined the crime scene. No evidence was collected. 60. On 11 September 2009 the investigation was suspended. The applicants were informed thereof. 61. On 15 September 2009 the second applicant complained to the Achkhoy-Martan District Court that the investigation had been ineffective and requested access to the investigation file. 62. On 12 October 2009 the second applicant’s complaint was partially allowed by the Achkhoy-Martan District Court. It noted, inter alia, that for seven years, between 2002 and 2009, the proceedings had been dormant and no tangible steps had been taken by the investigators. The court instructed the investigators to provide her with access to the case file. 63. From the documents submitted, it appears that the investigation is still pending. 64. The applicant, Ms Khedi Tchapanova, who was born in 1974, lives in Nice, France. She is the wife of Mr Eduard Zaynadinov (also spelled Zainadinov), who was born in 1974. 65. According to the applicant, her husband was an active member of illegal armed groups between 1994 and 1996 and then between 1999 and 2000. During the more recent period, the applicant and her two children lived in Shali. In January and February 2000 Russian servicemen regularly visited their dwelling. They searched for firearms and asked the applicant questions concerning her husband’s whereabouts. Fearing for her family’s safety, the applicant moved to the “Kavkaz” neighbourhood in Shali. In June 2002 her husband joined them there. On 24 June 2002 servicemen in APCs took him from his home. He was released a week later. 66. Between 3 and 4 a.m. on 30 July 2002 a group of armed servicemen in balaclavas broke into the applicant’s flat in Shali. They pulled a plastic bag over Mr Zaynadinov’s head and took him to an unknown destination in an APC. 67. Several days later the servicemen returned to the applicant’s house. They searched the premises and asked her about her husband’s involvement in illegal armed groups. During the search they found a list of members of illegal armed groups and a number of identity documents, as well as firearms hidden in the garden. 68. The applicant has not seen Mr Zaynadinov since 30 July 2002. In 2007 she moved to France. 69. The Government submitted copies of seventeen pages of documents from criminal case file no. 59229 opened into the abduction of Mr Zaynadinov. The information concerning the criminal proceedings as submitted by both parties may be summarised as follows. 70. On 6 August 2002 the Chechnya prosecutor’s office forwarded the abduction report lodged by Mr Zaynadinov’s father, Mr A.Z. to the Shali district department of the interior (Шалинский районный отдел внутренних дел (РОВД) (hereinafter “ROVD”). 71. On 6 September 2002 investigators questioned Mr A.Z., who stated that at about 3 a.m. or 4 a.m. on 30 July 2002 armed men in camouflage uniforms had arrived in two APCs at their house. They had broken in and checked some identity documents. Afterwards they had taken his son outside, put him into one of the APCs and driven off. 72. On 7 September 2002 two of the applicant’s neighbours (their names were illegible on the documents submitted) stated that on the night of 29 July 2002, they had been woken up by the sound of women crying. They had gone outside and had seen their neighbours on the street and several APCs driving off. They had then learnt that Mr Zaynadinov had been abducted. 73. On 16 September 2002 the Shali district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 59229 into the abduction and informed the applicant thereof. 74. On 16 November 2002 the investigation was suspended. The applicant and her relatives were not informed thereof. 75. On 10 June 2004 the Shali ROVD replied to a request by the applicant for information stating, amongst other things: “ ... in connection with the abduction of Mr E. Zaynadinov, the Shali district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 59229... the police operational search unit opened search file no. 71373 and has been taking measures to search for Mr E. Zaynadinov, whose whereabouts as of 10 June 2004 have not yet been established [...]” 76. According to the applicant, on 16 November 2004 she had to leave the Chechen Republic out of fear for her and her children’s lives. Since January 2007 she has resided in France. 77. On 16 May 2007 the Shali Town Court declared Mr Zaynadinov missing. 78. On 18 March 2008 Mr A.Z. asked the investigators to provide him with copies of documents from the investigation file. His request was granted on 19 March 2008. 79. On 28 October 2008 the Shali Town Court declared Mr Zaynadinov dead at the request of the applicant’s representative. 80. On 12 December 2011 the investigation was resumed further to a complaint by the applicant’s relatives. 81. On various dates in December 2011 and then in February 2012 the investigators questioned several of the applicant’s relatives and neighbours and examined the crime scene. No new information was obtained. 82. On 13 February 2012 the investigation was again suspended. From the documents submitted, it appears to be still pending. 83. The applicant, Ms Ayna (also spelled Aina) Alkhotova, was born in 1975 and lives in Grozny, the Chechen Republic. She is the wife of Mr Ayndi (also spelled Aindi) Diniyev, who was born in 1971. 84. At the material time Grozny was under curfew. The applicant and her husband resided in a block of flats at 186 Pugacheva Street in the Staropromyslovskiy district of Grozny. 85. At about 1 a.m. on 16 August 2003 a group of about ten to fifteen armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas arrived at the flats in three grey UAZ vehicles and an APC. They broke into the applicant’s flat, quickly searched it, dragged Mr Ayndi Diniyev outside, forced him into one of their vehicles and drove off through checkpoint 24 in the direction of the city centre. 86. The applicant has not seen her husband since his abduction on 16 August 2003. 87. The above account is based on a statement provided by the applicant and copies of documents from the criminal case file. 88. On 18 August 2003 the applicant reported her husband’s abduction to the Staropromyslovskiy ROVD stating, amongst other things, that the abductors had arrived in three UAZ minivans and an APC without registration numbers. 89. On 18 August 2003 investigators from the Staropromyslovskiy district prosecutor’s office (“the prosecutor’s office”) examined the crime scene. No evidence was collected. 90. On the same date the investigators questioned the applicant and her relatives, Mr R.E. and Ms M.A., whose statements concerning the incident were similar to the account the applicant submitted to the Court. 91. On 29 August 2003 the prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 50094 into the abduction of Mr Diniyev. 92. On 22 September 2003 the investigators questioned the applicant’s mother Ms M.A., whose statement was similar to the account the applicant submitted to the Court. 93. On 22 September 2003 the applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case and questioned. Her statement was similar to her earlier statement of 18 August 2003. In addition, she stated that she would not be able to identify any of the abductors as their faces had been covered. 94. On 29 October 2003 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicant was not informed thereof. 95. On 7 December 2004 the Staropromyslovskiy District Court of Grozny declared Mr Diniyev missing. 96. On 12 May 2005 the investigation was resumed. 97. On 28 May 2005 the investigators again questioned the applicant, who reiterated her earlier statements. 98. On 12 June 2005 the investigation was suspended again. The applicant was not informed thereof. 99. On 8 April 2008 the Leninskiy inter-district investigations department in Grozny replied to a request by the applicant for information and provided her with copies of two documents from the investigation file. 100. It appears that on 20 August 2010 she was again granted victim status in the criminal case at her request. 101. On 1 June 2011 the supervising prosecutor criticised the investigators for their failure to take basic steps and ordered that the investigation be resumed. On 7 June 2011 the proceedings were resumed. 102. On 24 June 2011 the investigators again questioned Mr E.R. and the applicant, who reiterated their earlier statements. In addition, the applicant stated that about a month prior to the abduction unidentified armed men had robbed her mother-in-law and had even fired several shots at her. 103. On 7 July 2011 the investigation was suspended. 104. On 14 July 2011 the applicant complained to the Leninskiy District Court of Grozny that the investigation of the abduction had been ineffective and asked for the proceedings to be resumed. On 2 August 2011 the court rejected the applicant’s complaint as the investigation had been resumed earlier the same day. 105. On 2 September 2011 the investigation was suspended again and then resumed on 23 April 2012. 106. The criminal proceedings are still pending.

6. The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Edineţ. 7. Following the applicant's unlawful detention for three days and then his acquittal, on an unspecified date in 2002 he brought an action against the Edineţ Department of Finances, seeking compensation for wrongful prosecution. 8. On 3 December 2002 the Edineţ District Court ruled in favour of the applicant and ordered the defendant to pay him 11,739 Moldovan lei (MDL) (the equivalent of 850.04 euros (EUR) at the time). On the same date the District Court issued an enforcement warrant. The judgment was not appealed against and after fifteen days it became final and enforceable. 9. On 11 June 2003 a Bailiff of the Edineţ District sent the enforcement warrant to a Bailiff of the Râşcani District. 10. In May 2006, after the case had been communicated to the Government, the judgment was enforced.

5. The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Klaipėda. 6. At birth the applicant was registered as a girl with a clearly female name under the rules of the Lithuanian language. 7. The applicant submitted that from an early age he had become aware that his “mental sex” was male, thus acknowledging the conflict between his mental and genital gender. 8. On 18 May 1997 the applicant consulted a microsurgeon about the possibilities of gender reassignment. The doctor proposed that the applicant first consult a psychiatrist. 9. From 4 to 12 November 1997 the applicant attended Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital for tests on his physical and psychological condition. 10. On 16 December 1997 a doctor at the Vilnius University Hospital of Santariškės confirmed the applicant’s chromosomal sex as female, and diagnosed him as a transsexual. The doctor also advised that the applicant consult a psychiatrist. 11. On 23 January 1998 the Vilnius University Hospital of Raudonasis Kryžius opened a medical file on the applicant. The applicant gave his name in a masculine form under the rules of the Lithuanian language, and his medical file referred to him as being of male gender. An entry of 28 January 1998 in the medical file included a recommendation that the applicant pursue hormone treatment with a view to eventual gender reassignment surgery. Thereafter, a two-month course of hormone treatment was officially prescribed for the applicant. Moreover, it was recommended that the applicant consult a neurosurgeon, who subsequently performed breast removal surgery on him (see paragraph 19 below). 12. On 12 November 1998 the applicant, using his original name and surname, wrote a letter to the Ministry of Health seeking clarification of the legal and medical possibilities for gender reassignment. He stated that he was determined to undergo this procedure. 13. On 17 December 1998 an official of the Ministry of Health replied that a working group had been set up by the Minister of Health with a view to analysing the questions pertaining to gender reassignment, and that the applicant would be duly informed about the conclusions of that group. 14. Before the Court, the applicant claimed that he had received no further communication from the Ministry of Health. 15. On 13 May 1999 a doctor at Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital confirmed that the applicant, referred to by his original name, had attended the hospital from 4 to 12 November 1997, and that he had been diagnosed as a transsexual. 16. The applicant submitted that in 1999 his general medical practitioner had refused to prescribe hormone therapy in view of the legal uncertainty as to whether full gender reassignment could be carried out, leading to the new identity of a transsexual being registered in accordance with domestic law. Thereafter the applicant continued the hormone treatment “unofficially”, as it was considered at that time that such treatment should be followed for two years before the full surgical procedure could be performed. 17. On an unspecified date in 1999 the applicant requested that his name on all official documents be changed to reflect his male identity; that request was refused. 18. On an unspecified date in 1999 the applicant enrolled at Vilnius University. Upon the applicant’s request, the university administration agreed to register him as a student under the male name chosen by him (bearing the initials P.L.). The applicant asserted before the Court that the decision of the University was exceptional and purely humanitarian, as the laws applicable at the material time clearly required his registration under his original female name, as indicated on his birth certificate and passport. 19. From 3 to 9 May 2000 the applicant underwent “partial gender reassignment surgery” (breast removal). The applicant agreed with the doctors that a further surgical step would be carried out upon the enactment of subsidiary laws governing the appropriate conditions and procedure. 20. On an unspecified date in 2000, with the assistance of a Lithuanian member of parliament, the applicant’s birth certificate and passport were changed to indicate his identity as P.L. The forename and surname chosen by the applicant for this new identity were of Slavic origin, and thus did not disclose his gender. The applicant could not choose a Lithuanian name or surname as they are all gender-sensitive. However, the applicant’s “personal code” on his new birth certificate and passport – a numerical code comprising the basic information about a person in accordance with the Lithuanian civil-registration rules – remained the same, starting with the number 4, thus disclosing his gender as female (see paragraphs 28‑29 below). 21. The applicant stressed that he therefore remained female under domestic law. This was confirmed, inter alia, by the fact that, on the Vilnius University degree certificate he had received after successfully graduating in 2003, his “personal code” remained the same and denoted him as a female. As a result, he claimed that he faced considerable daily embarrassment and difficulties, as he was unable, for example, to apply for a job, pay social security contributions, consult medical institutions, communicate with the authorities, obtain a bank loan or cross the State border without disclosing his female identity. 22. The applicant submitted a copy of an article by the Baltic News Agency (BNS) of 17 June 2003, quoting a statement by the Speaker of the Seimas on the Gender Reassignment Bill (put before Parliament on 3 June 2003 – see paragraph 30 below). It was mentioned in the article that certain members of parliament had accused the Minister of Health, who was a plastic surgeon, of having a personal interest in the enactment of the law. The article also mentioned that certain members of the Social Democratic Party had urged the enactment of the law as it was required by the imminent entry into force of the provisions of the new Civil Code on 1 July 2003. The article referred to the opinion of experts that there were about fifty transsexuals living in Lithuania. It was mentioned that certain Vilnius and Kaunas surgeons were properly equipped and qualified to carry out gender reassignment surgery, the cost of which could be between 3,000 and 4,000 Lithuanian litai (approximately 870 to 1,150 euros), excluding the cost of hormone therapy. The article stated that a number of persons had already applied for gender reassignment, but that the surgery could not be fully completed in the absence of adequate legal regulation. It was presumed that some of the Lithuanian transsexuals had thus been obliged to go abroad for treatment. 23. In an article by the BNS on 18 June 2003 about a meeting between the Prime Minister and the heads of the Lithuanian Catholic Church, the Prime Minister was quoted as saying that it was too early for Lithuania to enact a law on gender reassignment, and that there was “no need to rush” or “copy the principles that exist in one country or another”. The article stated that the Catholic Church had been among the most ardent opponents of such legislation. At the same time, the Prime Minister conceded that the government were obliged to prepare a Gender Reassignment Bill in view of the entry into force of Article 2.27 § 1 of the new Civil Code on 1 July 2003. 24. The applicant submitted that since 1998 he had been in a stable relationship with a woman and that they had lived together since 1999.

7. The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Zejtun. 8. By Act III of 2002 the Maltese Parliament introduced the right to legal assistance at the pre-trial stage. However, the law only came into force in 2010 by means of Legal Notice 35 of 2010. Prior to this Legal Notice Maltese law did not provide for legal assistance during the pre-trial investigation and specifically during questioning, whether by the police or by a magistrate in his investigative role. Before questioning, however, suspects would be cautioned, that is, informed of their right to remain silent and that anything they said could be taken down and produced as evidence. At the time, no inferences could be drawn by the trial courts from the silence of the accused at this stage. 9. Statements taken by the police could be confirmed on oath before the Court of Magistrates, in which case the person was entitled to be assisted by a lawyer. 10. On 30 April 2009 the Executive Police were authorised by the duty Magistrate to execute a search and arrest warrant relative to residence F. 11. On 1 May 2009 the search was carried out and it yielded the discovery of five bags of heroin (925.26 grams, 35 % purity), 755 euros (EUR) in two separate bundles, electrical weighing scales and a number of plastic bags with the corners missing. 12. On 2 May 2009 Mr Dimech was arrested and, after being cautioned about his right to remain silent, was questioned in the absence of legal assistance on suspicion of drug trafficking. He made a statement in which he admitted to certain facts but denied others. In a nutshell he explained that the 800 grams of heroin found in his possession during a search at his house were being kept as a guarantee against a sum of money he was owed, and that he had known that he would be given the drug as a guarantee when he lent the money. He admitted that he had hidden the drug in his fridge and stated that his partner had had nothing to do with it and was unaware of it. He denied, however, that the drugs were his and also denied that he ever used or sold drugs. His signed statement also indicated that he had made the statement voluntarily, without threats or promises, that it was the truth and that he did not want to change anything in it. 13. A magisterial inquiry (under Maltese law known as an inquiry relating to the in genere) was held on 13 May 2009 and the Inquiring Magistrate drew up the procès verbal. On 20 May 2009 the applicant was arraigned in court and the procès verbal as well as his statement referred to above were produced as evidence against him. During the committal proceedings the Court of Magistrates as a Court of Criminal Inquiry also collected further evidence including witness testimony and documentary evidence. 14. On 8 July 2010 a bill of indictment was issued against the applicant by the Attorney General. 15. During the criminal proceedings the applicant requested the Criminal Court to refer his complaint regarding the lack of legal assistance during the investigation and questioning to the constitutional jurisdictions. On an unspecified date the court granted the request and referred the case. 16. The applicant claimed a breach of his right to a fair trial on account of the lack of legal assistance during the investigation and questioning. 17. By a judgment of 10 January 2012 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence, opting to take cognisance of the case on the merits despite the fact that the proceedings were still pending, found a violation of the applicant’s right to a fair trial in so far as he had not been assisted by a lawyer when making a statement to the police before he had been charged, and ordered that the Criminal Court take note of this breach in considering all the evidence. It noted that the voluntary nature of the statement, together with the caution as to the right to remain silent, did not suffice to make up for such a failing, when it could not be said what the applicant would have done had he been assisted by a lawyer. 18. Both the Attorney General and the applicant appealed to the Constitutional Court. By a judgment of 26 April 2013 the Constitutional Court took cognisance of the merits of the case despite the fact that the proceedings were still pending, and reversed the first-instance judgment. Reiterating its previous findings in other domestic judgments, it noted that the right to legal assistance was not meant to be a formality which, if not complied with, gave the accused a means to defend himself. That right served as a guarantee that every statement made by a person during questioning was made freely, in full knowledge of the right to remain silent, and without threats or promises, violence or other abuse. A breach of the right to a fair trial as a result of a lack of legal assistance during questioning occurred when a statement was taken abusively and without the guarantees of legitimacy, and not solely because of the lack of legal assistance. It followed that the sole fact that the applicant had made a statement, including both admissions of guilt and denials, in the absence of a lawyer could not ipso facto entail a violation of Article 6 of the Convention. In the Constitutional Court’s view, other circumstances such as the particular vulnerability of the individual being questioned had to exist in order to conclude that the absence of legal assistance breached the right to a fair trial. The Constitutional Court could not agree with the first-instance court that Article 6 of the Convention provided for the right to a lawyer without any consideration of the age, maturity and tainted criminal record of the accused as well as the nature of the accusations against him. A correct interpretation of Salduz v. Turkey ([GC], no. 36391/02, ECHR 2008) had to be made in the light of the circumstances of that case, where Mr Salduz had indeed been in a vulnerable position when he had made the statement. The ratio of the right was precisely that, and not to allow a guilty person to go scot-free because of the failure to comply with a formality which lacked any real or grave consequences. The same exceptional and extreme circumstances had been present in other cases decided by the ECtHR such as Panovits v. Cyprus (no. 4268/04, 11 December 2008) and Płonka v. Poland (no. 20310/02, 31 March 2009), and cases decided by the domestic Constitutional Court such as The Police vs Alvin Privitera of 11 April 2011 and The Police vs Esron Pullicino of 12 April 2011. Even in the Salduz case the Court had held that such a violation arose only if the fairness of the trial was compromised. The Court had stated in that context that “Article 6 – especially paragraph 3 thereof – may be relevant before a case is sent for trial if and so far as the fairness of the trial is likely to be seriously prejudiced by an initial failure to comply with its provisions” (§ 50). This, according to the Constitutional Court, was probably the reason why the Grand Chamber had not embraced the more categorical approach suggested by Judge Bratza in his concurring opinion. 19. The Constitutional Court considered that in the present case the applicant had admitted that he had not been pressured into making the statement, and thus there had been nothing illicit and abusive in the taking of such a statement. It followed that the element of vulnerability found in the Salduz case was missing. Moreover, it had not been shown that the applicant had suffered prejudice as a result of the lack of legal assistance to the extent that there was an objective danger that he would not be given a fair trial. 20. In the absence of any such violation, no remedy was required, nor was there any need for the court to examine the appeal entered by the applicant. 21. The applicant’s trial by jury was due to start on 23 October 2013. 22. On 20 September 2013 the applicant filed an application with the Criminal Court requesting it to suspend the trial by jury on the basis of a new set of constitutional proceedings which he had lodged (alleging a violation of Article 7) and on the basis of the proceedings pending before this Court. 23. On 23 September 2013 the Criminal Court acceded to the request.

4. The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Kharkiv. 5. On 5 May 2000 the Dzerzhynskiy District Court of Kharkiv (Дзержинський районний суд м. Харкова) awarded the applicant 4,489.02 hryvnyas (UAH)[1] against her former employer, the Frunzenskiy District Municipal Renovation Company (Державне комунальне ремонтно-будівельне підприємство з ремонту житлового фонду Фрунзенського району м. Харкова) in salary arrears and other payments. 6. This judgment was not appealed against, became final, and the enforcement proceedings were instituted to collect the judgment debt. 7. On 16 June 2000 the Kharkiv City Council (Харківська міська рада) ordered liquidation of the debtor-company and on 22 September 2000 the enforcement writ was transferred to the liquidation commission. 8. On various occasions the applicant complained to the State authorities about the failure of the debtor-company to pay her the judgment debt and was informed that the collection of the debt was not possible on account of the debtor-company's lack of funds. The judgment remains unenforced to the present date.

9. The applicants, Abdurrahman Çelik and Kasim İmret were born in 1958 and 1947 respectively and live in Batman. 10. On 17 May 1998 the applicants, accused of acting as couriers for the PKK, were arrested by police officers from the Batman Security Directorate. 11. Prior to their detention in police custody, the applicants were examined by a doctor who found that they did not bear the marks of any injury. The applicants were then taken to the Batman Security Directorate where they were detained and questioned. 12. On 18 May 1998 the public prosecutor authorised the applicants' continued detention until 20 May 1998. 13. On 18 and 20 May 1998 the applicants were again examined by two doctors who found that there was no evidence that the applicants had been ill‑treated. 14. The applicants allege that they were subjected to various types of torture and inhuman treatment during their detention in police custody. They claim they were blindfolded and immersed in high pressure cold water. They had to stand naked and electric shocks were administered to various parts of their bodies including their sexual organs. They state that their testicles were squeezed and that their hands and legs were tied. They were severely beaten and deprived of food and water and prevented from using toilet facilities. They were also kept in isolation, subjected to unbearable noises, insulted and threatened with death. From time to time, police officers applied medication to their injuries. 15. On 20 May 1998 the applicants were brought before the Batman public prosecutor and then before the Batman Magistrates' Court (Sulh Ceza Mahkemesi). According to a protocol dated 20 May 1998 signed by six police officers, the applicants bumped into each other while they were getting out of the police car and Abdurrahman Çelik fell. It is to be noted that the applicants deny the authenticity of this protocol. 16. Both before the public prosecutor and the Batman Magistrates' Court the applicants denied the veracity of the statements that had been taken from them by the police and stated that they had been subjected to ill-treatment during their detention in police custody. The judge of the Batman Magistrates' Court observed that there was a violet-coloured bruise around Abdurrahman Çelik's left eye. She also noted the applicants' allegation that their statements were incorrect and had been obtained under duress. The Batman Magistrates' Court ordered the applicants' detention on remand. 17. On the same day the applicants were taken to the Batman prison. 18. On 21 May 1998 the applicants were examined by the prison doctor, Dr. T. D., who noted that there were marks on Abdurrahman Çelik's body resulting from the physical violence inflicted on him. He reported the following in respect of Abdurrahman Çelik: “There is a bruise of 3 cm underneath the left eye. Furthermore, there are two petechial lesions on both right and left inguinal areas.” 19. In respect of Kasım İmret, Dr. T.D. noted that the latter's body did not bear any injury resulting from physical violence. The doctor further reported the following regarding Kasım İmret: “There is a scar of 0,5 cm in diameter on the left side of the lower lip on the exterior.” 20. On the same day, the applicants filed petitions with the Batman Magistrates' Court and requested the latter to annul the order for their detention on remand. They emphasised, inter alia, that the statements taken by the police were false as they had been signed under duress 21. On 15 July 1999 one of the applicants, Abdurrahman Çelik was examined by a commission of medical experts from the Izmir Chamber of Doctors (tabipler odası). According to the report drafted by the commission, the applicant suffered somatic and psychological problems. The commission opined that the medical findings were a result of physical ill-treatment inflicted on the applicant. 22. On 12 June 1998 the public prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court filed a bill of indictment charging the applicants under Article 169 of the Criminal Code with aiding and abetting the members of the PKK. 23. On 27 July 1998 the applicants' representative filed a petition with the Diyarbakır State Security Court, alleging that the applicants had been tortured while in detention at the Batman Security Directorate. He requested the court to order the Batman Prison Administration to send the prison doctor's medical reports of 21 May 1998. 24. On 29 July 1998 the Batman prison administration submitted copies of the medical reports to the office of the Batman public prosecutor who transferred them to the Diyarbakır State Security Court. 25. On 13 August 1998 the Diyarbakır State Security Court held the first hearing against the applicants. Before the court, the applicants denied the charges and stated, inter alia, that they were forced to sign statements while blindfolded at the Batman Security Directorate. They also denied the veracity of the content of these statements. 26. The Diyarbakır Security Court read out the medical reports of 21 May 1998 drafted by the doctor of the Batman prison and asked the applicants' representative to make comments if he wished. The representative submitted that he had no objections to their contents. He further added that there was no evidence against the applicants other than the statements taken by the police at the Batman Security Directorate and that these statements were inadmissible as evidence against the applicants given that they had been obtained through ill-treatment. With reference to the medical report of 21 May 1998, the applicants' representative formally requested the court to initiate a criminal investigation (suç duyurusu) against the police officers responsible for the ill-treatment of the applicants and against the doctor who examined them following their release from police custody, for failing to note their injuries in his medical report of 20 May 1998. 27. The Diyarbakır State Security Court dismissed the request of the applicants' representative. It decided that the applicants had to lodge their complaints themselves with the local public prosecutor's office. It further decided that that there was no ground for the continued detention of the applicants and ordered their immediate release. 28. On 4 February 1999 the Diyarbakır State Security Court acquitted the applicants. The court held that there was no evidence against the applicants, other than the statements taken at the Batman Security Directorate which was insufficient to ground a conviction. 29. On 11 November 1999 the International Law and Foreign Relations Directorate of the Ministry of Justice sent a letter to the public prosecutor's office in Batman informing the latter about the applicants' allegations before the European Court of Human Rights. 30. Following the letter of 11 November 1999, the Batman public prosecutor initiated a preliminary investigation into the applicants' allegations. He took statements from the accused police officers who denied the charges against them. The police officers alleged that the applicants sustained their injuries on account of the crowd in the prison vehicle while they were being taken to the Batman Magistrates' Court. 31. On 15 February 2001 the Batman public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Batman Assize Court (Ağır Ceza Mahkemesi) charging nine police officers, who were on duty at the Batman Security Directorate at the relevant time, with inflicting ill-treatment on the applicants. The charges were brought under Article 243 § 1 of the Criminal Code. The defendants were accused of ill‑treatment of the applicants in order to obtain a confession from them. The public prosecutor however stated in the indictment that there was not sufficient evidence against the police officers which could prove that the applicants had been ill-treated in police custody. 32. The Batman Assize Court held thirteen hearings in the case against the police officers between 16 February 2001 and 22 May 2003. The court heard oral evidence from the accused police officers, the witnesses and the applicants. 33. On 22 May 2003 the Batman Assize Court acquitted the accused police officers holding that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the accused had ill-treated the applicants in police custody. 34. On 25 June 2003 the Batman Assize Court's judgment became final.

4. On 1 December 1994 the applicant took up the post of executive director of the Bulgarian Publishers' Association (“the association”). On 30 September 1996 she was dismissed. 5. On 21 November 1996 the applicant filed an action for wrongful dismissal against the association. She sought reinstatement and damages. 6. In a judgment of 4 June 1997 the Sofia District Court held that the applicant's dismissal had been unlawful. It accordingly ordered her reinstatement and awarded her damages. 7. On 23 June 1997 the association appealed. 8. On 26 June 1997 the Sofia District Court instructed the association to pay the court fees for the appeal within a seven‑day time‑limit. These instructions were served on the association on 27 October 1997. 9. On 28 November 1997 the Sofia District Court discontinued the proceedings, holding that the association had not paid the fees in due time. 10. The decision to discontinue the proceedings was served on the association on 16 March 1998. On 20 March 1998 it appealed against it to the Sofia City Court, arguing that the fees had in fact been paid on time. On 8 May 1998 the Sofia City Court allowed the appeal, agreeing that the fees had been paid within the specified time-limit. On 25 May 1998 the case was returned to the Sofia District Court for further processing. 11. On 29 May 1998 the Sofia District Court instructed the association to indicate the grounds of appeal together with the new evidence to be gathered, as well as to present the written evidence on which the appeal was based. These instructions were not served on the association's counsel. According to the applicant, the court's server returned them, noting that the concierge of the building in which the counsel's office was purportedly situated had informed him that the counsel's office was in fact not there. On 1 July 1998 the Sofia District Court ordered the decision to be re‑served on the counsel. It is unclear whether its order was complied with. 12. On 19 April 1999 the Sofia District Court rescinded its ruling of 29 May 1998 and decided to process the appeal without further particulars by the association. Accordingly, a copy of the appeal was served on the applicant's counsel the same day and on 29 April 1999 the case was sent to the Sofia City Court. 13. On 18 May 1999 the Sofia City Court instructed the association to specify within fourteen days the grounds of appeal and the evidence to be gathered, as compulsory under an intervening amendment of the Code of Civil Procedure. According to the applicant, an attempt to serve these instructions on the association on 27 May 1999 failed, because the court's process server did not find it at the specified address. The instructions were served on 2 May 2000. 14. On 12 January 2001 the Sofia City Court, finding that the association had not complied with its instructions, discontinued the proceedings. Its decision was served on the applicant on 17 January 2001 and on the association on 5 February 2001. Neither of them appealed against it. Accordingly, the judgment of the Sofia District Court of 4 June 1997 entered into force in February 2001.

5. The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Kharkiv. 6. On 22 November 2001 B.’s body affected with injuries was found in his apartment. On the same date the Dzerzhinsky District Police of Kharkiv instituted a criminal investigation into the incident. 7. On 23 November 2001 A. reported to the police that he had witnessed the applicant beating B. on the head with a frying pan at a party in B.’s apartment. He further confessed that after B. had fallen to the floor unconscious, he and the applicant had taken valuables and left. 8. On 26 November 2001 the police drafted a bill of indictment charging the applicant with B.’s murder. Unable to establish the applicant’s whereabouts and question him, they subsequently put him on the “wanted” list. 9. On 5 December 2001 the investigation obtained a decision to remand the applicant in custody from the Dzerzhinsky District Court of Kharkiv (hereafter “the District Court”). In its decision, the court referred to the gravity of the charges against the applicant, his recent criminal record and his disappearance after the incident with B. 10. On 8 December 2001 the investigating authorities added to the case file a letter of confession addressed by the applicant to the President of the District Court and dated 26 November 2001. In this letter the applicant explained, in particular, that he had partied with A. and B. in B.’s apartment and a fight had started between A. and B., during which the applicant had escaped. 11. On 4 February 2002 the applicant was arrested. On the same date he signed the arrest record (протокол), stating that he had been detained pursuant to the decision of the District Court of 5 December 2001, on suspicion of murder. According to the applicant, he was not apprised of the content of the decision of 5 December 2001. He presented no documents in evidence that he had lodged any relevant requests or complaints before the commencement of the trial. 12. On 18 February 2002 the applicant was presented with a new bill of indictment drafted on that day, according to which he was charged with murdering B. and theft from his apartment. 13. On 28 February 2002 the case was transferred to the District Court for trial. 14. On 1 March 2002 the Dzerzhinsky District Prosecutors’ Office of Kharkiv modified the indictment, having substituted the murder charge with that of infliction of grievous bodily injuries resulting in death. 15. On 7 March 2002 the District Court held a preparatory hearing and scheduled the case for trial for 17 April 2002. According to the Government, at the preparatory hearing the District Court upheld the decision to keep the applicant in custody, having found no grounds for his release. The copy of the decision taken by the District Court on that date provided by the parties contains no reference to any ruling concerning the applicant’s release or continuing detention. 16. Between March 2002 and February 2003 the District Court scheduled some nine hearings; however, none of them took place. On five occasions the hearings were rescheduled on account of the judge’s inability to hear the case (sickness, vacations or being occupied in other proceedings). On other occasions the hearings were adjourned to accommodate procedural requests made by the parties or on other grounds. 17. On 17 and 18 February 2003 the District Court held the first hearings and adjourned the proceedings until 18 March 2003 in order for the expert who had examined B.’s corpse to be summoned. 18. Between March 2003 and June 2004 the court scheduled some ten hearings. Seven of them were adjourned or rescheduled on various grounds, including failure of the prosecutor or the witnesses to appear; failure of the detention-facility authorities to bring the defendants to the hearings; granting of the parties’ motions for additional time to study the case-file; and ordering further investigative activities and an expert assessment. 19. On 14 June 2004 the District Court remitted the case for additional investigation, referring to various procedural and substantive shortcomings in the pre-trial investigation. The court further ordered, without providing any reasoning, that the applicant remain in custody. 20. On 12 October 2004 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal (hereafter “the Court of Appeal”) annulled this decision and remitted the case back to the trial court. The court further ordered that the applicant remain in custody, without expounding on the reasons for his detention. 21. On 7 February 2005 the District Court allowed the applicant’s request for additional time to familiarise himself with the case-file materials and established a schedule for him to do so. It rejected the applicant’s request to be provided with photocopies of the case-file materials. 22. On 22 March 2005 the applicant requested that the case be transferred to another judicial panel, alleging numerous procedural irregularities in the conduct of the proceedings. In particular, he complained that the present panel had ignored the fact that his detention had been in breach of applicable law. Namely, the decision to place the applicant in custody had been taken in his absence and following his arrest he had not been brought before a judge to present his case, in contravention of the provisions of Article 165-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Ukraine (hereafter “the CCP”). Further, contrary to the requirements of Article 165-1 of the CCP, he had not been provided with a copy of the decision to remand him in custody, and had not been afforded an opportunity to appeal against it. In addition, according to Article 148 of the CCP, the investigative authorities had to either present him with an indictment by 14 February 2002 or release him on that date. However, the bill of indictment in the applicant’s respect had only been drawn up on 18 February 2002. From 14 February 2002 onwards the applicant had therefore been held in custody arbitrarily. The applicant also complained that the District Court had refused to provide him with photocopies of various case-file materials at his request. 23. On 31 March 2005 the District Court rejected the applicant’s request, having found that it had not been based on law. It further ruled, without providing reasoning in response to the applicant’s arguments, that there had been no reasons to release him from custody. On 19 April 2005 the court rejected a further analogous request from the applicant without expounding on his arguments concerning the lawfulness of his detention. 24. On 12 April 2005 the applicant requested the District Court to renew the time-limit for appealing against the decision of 5 December 2001 to remand him in custody, alleging that he had not been apprised of this decision within the time-limit normally allowed for the appeal. 25. On 21 April 2005 the applicant inquired with the District Court about the status of the consideration of his request and on 26 April 2005 re-lodged it anew. 26. By letter of 27 May 2005 G., the Judge presiding over the applicant’s case, notified him that his requests had been received and added to the case file and that they would be taken into account in adjudicating his case. 27. On 18 July 2005 the applicant’s advocate complained to the District Court that the applicant had been detained in violation of Article 165-1 of the CCP and requested his release. 28. On the same day the District Court ruled, without providing any reasoning, that there were no reasons for releasing the applicant. 29. Between November 2004 and July 2005 the District Court held some five hearings in the case and on 25 July 2005 convicted A. and the applicant of infliction of grievous bodily injuries on B. and theft from his apartment and sentenced the applicant to ten years’ imprisonment. 30. On 28 July 2005 T., the applicant’s mother and his defence in the criminal proceedings, complained to the Kharkiv Regional Qualification Commission of Judges about the unlawfulness of the applicant’s detention, the lack of a response to his relevant complaints by the District Court and its refusal to provide her with photocopies of documents from the applicant’s case file in order to submit a case to the Court. On 2 August 2005 she was informed that the Commission was not competent to consider her complaints. 31. On 12 October 2005 the District Court found that the applicant and his representatives had been protracting the consideration of the case on appeal by repeated requests to familiarise themselves with the case-file materials, and gave them five more days to finish. 32. On 16 November 2005 the applicant’s mother complained to the President of the District Court about the refusals to provide her with photocopies of documents to be submitted to the Court. She specified the particular pages of the case-file to be copied (some sixty pages in total) and expressed her willingness to pay for the copies made using the court’s equipment. As an alternative, she requested permission to take the case file off the court premises, if need be, in presence of a court employee, to order copies from a commercial copier. 33. On 2 December 2005 the President of the District Court informed the applicant’s mother that the applicable law did not entitle the parties’ representatives to obtain photocopies of case-file documents. 34. On 23 December 2005 G., the Judge presiding over the applicant’s case, advised him in a letter that he had been granted twenty more days to study the case file, following which the case would be transferred to the Court of Appeal. She noted that, according to the case-file materials, the applicant and his representatives had already had three rounds of familiarising themselves with the case-file. 35. On 9 January 2007 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of 25 July 2005 and remitted the case for a fresh consideration, referring primarily to procedural omissions in announcing the modified charges to the defendants. 36. Between 9 February and 11 April 2007 the applicant and A. familiarised themselves with the case-file materials. On 11 April 2007 they signed affidavits specifying that they had familiarised themselves with the case-file in full. 37. On 30 March 2007 the applicant’s mother requested the District Court for permission to use portable equipment to photocopy material from the case-file. 38. On 5 April 2007 the District Court noted in a letter that a similar request had already been granted to her and that T. had already used the copying equipment as she had wished. It further confirmed that she could continue using the copying equipment to copy material from the case file as needed. 39. On 11 April 2007 the District Court rejected the applicant’s request to be released from custody pending trial lodged on 21 February 2007. The court found that this request had been premature, as the case had been at the preparatory stage following its remittal from the Court of Appeal, and that the applicant had not been precluded from re-lodging his request during the trial. 40. On 21 August 2007 the District Court rejected a further request by the applicant to be released, having found that his detention had been in compliance with Article 148 of the CCP. It further noted, referring to the same grounds as mentioned in its decision of 5 December 2001 (the gravity of the charges, the applicant’s prior criminal record and his absconding at the beginning of the proceedings), that there had been no reasons for releasing the applicant. 41. On 7 September 2007 the District Court convicted the applicant and A. of having inflicted grievous bodily injuries on B. and theft from his apartment, sentenced the applicant to five year seven month and three days’ imprisonment and immediately released him from custody, as he had already served the term to which he had been sentenced.

4. The applicant was born in 1925 in Bucharest and lives in Le Cannet (France). 5. In 1952, under Decree no. 92/1950 on nationalisation, the State took possession of a building located at 16 Negustori Street in Bucharest which belonged to the applicant's parents, Romanian citizens and members of the Jewish faith. 6. On 18 September 1998 the applicant lodged an action to recover possession of the property with the Bucharest District Court. The action was directed against Bucharest local council, the Rental Property Administration Department (Departamentul de administrare a fondului locativ) and the State company Titan, which managed such properties. He alleged that, under Decree no. 92/1950, property belonging to certain social categories had been exempt from nationalisation and that his parents had belonged to one such category. 7. In a judgment of 24 June 1999 the court allowed the action on the ground that the State had taken possession of the property without any valid title. It ordered the defendants to restore the building and the adjoining land to the applicant. 8. Following an appeal by the Bucharest mayor's office acting on behalf of the local council, the Bucharest County Court upheld the decision of the first-instance court in a judgment of 6 December 1999. 9. The mayor's office lodged a further appeal with the Bucharest Court of Appeal, which in a final judgment of 21 June 2000 declared the appeal inadmissible for failure to give reasons. 10. In a decision of 25 September 2000 the mayor of Bucharest ordered the return of the building to the applicant. 11. On 9 November 2000 the applicant, accompanied by a bailiff, went to the building with a view to taking possession and found that it was occupied by the United States Peace Corps under a lease concluded with the State company Locato, which managed the buildings placed at the disposal of diplomatic missions in Romania. 12. On 14 November 2001 the applicant brought an action against Locato and the United States Peace Corps seeking the setting-aside of the lease and an order requiring the Peace Corps to vacate the building. 13. In a judgment of 30 May 2001 the Bucharest District Court dismissed the action. It observed that in 1992, by a government decision, ownership of the building had been transferred from the Bucharest mayor's office to the company managing the buildings used by diplomatic missions in Romania. That company had been letting the building to the United States Peace Corps since 1993. The latest lease, which had been concluded on 12 January 1999 and set the rent at 4,907 United States dollars (USD) per month, was due to expire on 31 March 2002. Taking the view that Locato had proper authority to manage the building, the court held that the disputed lease was valid. 14. In a judgment of 5 November 2001 the Bucharest County Court, on an appeal by Mr Hirschhorn, set aside the impugned decision and allowed the applicant's action. The County Court observed that in its final judgment of 24 June 1999 the Bucharest District Court had held that the State had appropriated the building without any valid title. Taking the view that the State could not dispose of a property which did not belong to it, the court set aside the lease and ordered the eviction of the tenant organisation. Locato appealed on points of law. 15. On 21 December 2001 the bailiff was authorised by the Bucharest District Court to evict the tenant organisation under the decision of 5 November 2001. On 31 January 2002 he directed Locato to comply with the decision. 16. In a letter of 6 February 2002 Locato informed the bailiff that the building was the property of the State and that the tenant organisation had diplomatic immunity. That being so, it considered that enforcing the eviction order would be inappropriate and liable to damage Romania's image internationally. 17. On 11 and 20 February 2002 the bailiff went to the building but was refused entry by a representative of the United States Peace Corps on the ground that the Peace Corps was a United States governmental organisation which had diplomatic immunity and could not therefore be evicted. 18. On 25 February 2002 the bailiff wrote to the President of the Bucharest Court of Appeal informing him of the difficulties encountered in enforcing the judgment of 24 June 1999 and the decision of the mayor of Bucharest, as Locato and the United States Peace Corps were invoking diplomatic immunity. The letter included the following passage: “Given the applicability of certain international law conventions in situations such as this, we would be grateful if you could consider the possibility – and inform us accordingly – of taking specific enforcement measures, in view of the fact that the writ of execution is supposed to take effect and that the appeal by Locato against the Bucharest County Court judgment of 5 November 2001 is pending before your court and has been set down for hearing on 26 February 2002.” 19. On 4 March 2002 the President of the Bucharest Court of Appeal replied to the bailiff's letter and informed him that his concerns had been looked into by an inspecting judge, whose report he forwarded to the bailiff. The report indicated that under the Vienna Convention of 18 April 1961 the property of diplomatic missions was inviolable. As the immunity from jurisdiction extended to enforcement procedures, the inspecting judge concluded that the applicant could not regain possession of his building, and asked the bailiff to advise him to apply for compensation corresponding to the value of the building on the ground that it was not possible to have the judgment of 24 June 1999 enforced. 20. Meanwhile, on 20 February 2002, the applicant, who lives in France, sent a fax to the registry of the Court of Appeal stating that he was dispensing with the services of his lawyer and requesting an adjournment of the hearing scheduled for 26 February so that he could instruct a replacement. 21. At the hearing of 26 February the Court of Appeal refused the request for an adjournment, taking the view that the applicant had had sufficient time to appoint a new lawyer. However, it adjourned delivery of the judgment, first until 5 March and then until 12 March 2002, in order to allow the applicant to submit conclusions in writing. 22. In a final judgment of 12 March 2002 the Civil Division of the Bucharest Court of Appeal, sitting as a bench of three judges, allowed Locato's appeal on points of law and dismissed the applicant's action. It confirmed the validity of the lease, finding that it had been entered into in good faith since, although the company had not in fact been the owner of the building in question at the time of signature of the lease, it had appeared to be. 23. On 21 March 2002 the Bucharest District Court rejected a complaint by the applicant against the bailiff alleging that the latter had failed to take action to enforce the judgment of 24 June 1999. The court observed that the bailiff had gone to the building but had been informed that the United States Peace Corps enjoyed immunity from jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court held that the bailiff could not be said to have failed to enforce the judgment in question. 24. On 9 August 2001, on the basis of Law no. 10/2001 on the rules governing immovable property wrongfully nationalised by the State between 6 March 1945 and 22 December 1989 (“Law no. 10/2001”), the applicant requested that Locato return the property to him. His request was rejected by a decision of 9 October 2001. 25. The applicant appealed against that decision to the Bucharest County Court and requested that Locato be evicted from the building. He argued that the building belonged to him by virtue of the judgment of 24 June 1999. 26. In a judgment of 13 May 2002 the County Court allowed the claim for restitution of the building but rejected the eviction request on the ground that the Peace Corps was not a party to the proceedings. Locato appealed on points of law. 27. By a governmental decision (no. 533) of 30 May 2002, Locato became the State Diplomatic Property Management Agency (Regia autonoma Administratia patrimoniului protocolului de Stat – “the Agency”). The applicant's property continued to appear in the lists attached to that decision as State property managed by the Agency. 28. By judgment of 31 March 2004 the Bucharest Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and dismissed the applicant's claim on the ground that Mr Hirschhorn had not adduced evidence either that title to the building had passed to him as his parents' heir or that he had failed to be compensated contrary to the agreement concluded in 1959 between France and Romania concerning property formerly owned by French citizens and nationalised by the Romanian State. 29. An appeal on points of law by the applicant is currently pending before the High Court of Cassation and Justice. 30. In an action to recover possession lodged with the Bucharest County Court on 15 August 2002, the applicant requested that the Agency return the building, that the lease concluded with the Peace Corps be set aside and the latter evicted, and that the rent received by the Agency under the lease be paid to him. 31. By judgment of 17 February 2003 the County Court declared the action inadmissible on the ground that the applicant could not lodge an ordinary action to recover possession while the action based on Law no. 10/2001 was still pending. 32. The applicant appealed to the Bucharest Court of Appeal, which upheld the judgment on 29 October 2003. The applicant then lodged an appeal on points of law with the High Court of Cassation and Justice. The latter, in a judgment of 7 July 2005, allowed the appeal and remitted the case to the Bucharest Court of Appeal. The proceedings are still pending. 33. The Agency was reorganised by Government Decision no. 60 of 21 January 2005. The applicant's building is still on the list of State-owned properties managed by the Agency. 34. Although the lease concluded with the United States Peace Corps expired on 31 March 2002, that organisation continues to occupy the building. The Government have not provided any details as to the legal basis for the occupancy. 35. The documents supplied by the applicant show that he has paid all the taxes and duties due on the building. However, in 2004 and 2005 the Agency also paid taxes and duties into the local budget in respect of the building.

4. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in the village of Zhodino, the Minsk Region of Belarus. 5. The applicant is a former employee of the municipal enterprise Teplovodokanal in the town of Neryungri (Муниципальное предприятие «Управление «Тепловодоканал» г. Нерюнгри). Before her retirement she filed a claim for salary arrears with the Labour Disputes Board (Комиссия по трудовым спорам) of Teplovodokanal. 6. On 19 January, 3 February and 18 May 1998 the Labour Disputes Board found in the applicant's favour and awarded her salary arrears totalling 96,684.67 Russian roubles (RUR). The decisions became final immediately as no appeal lay against them. On the basis of the decisions in the applicant's favour, specific enforcement documents – certificates from the Labour Disputes Board (удостоверения Комиссии по трудовым спорам) – were issued. On 20 May 1998 the applicant forwarded the certificates to the bailiffs' service with a view to execution. 7. The decisions of the Labour Disputes Board of 19 January, 3 February and 18 May 1998 were enforced in full by 5 January 2001. As their execution had been delayed, the applicant filed court claims against her former employer requesting index-linking of the awards. 8. On 16 March 2001 the Neryungri Town Court of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutiya) granted her claims in part and awarded her RUR 30,084. On the same date a writ of execution was issued. Later the applicant appealed against the judgment as she was not satisfied with the amount of the award. 9. On 4 May 2001 the bailiffs' service instituted enforcement proceedings in respect of the writ of execution of 16 March 2001. Three days later the bailiffs' service levied execution on the debtor's account. 10. The judgment of 16 March 2001 was upheld on appeal by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutiya) on 11 July 2001. 11. On an unspecified date the bailiffs' service closed the enforcement proceedings on the ground that the salary arrears had been paid to the applicant on the basis of the Labour Disputes Board certificates. 12. On 27 April 2002 the Neryungri Prosecutor's Office informed the applicant that it had submitted a request for supervisory review of the bailiffs' service's decision to close the enforcement proceedings, since they concerned not the payment of the salary arrears, but their index-linking pursuant to the judgment of 16 March 2001. 13. The enforcement proceedings were reopened on 1 March 2006. 14. On 9 March 2006 the bailiffs' service transferred the sum of RUR 30,084 to the applicant by postal order. 15. The enforcement proceedings were closed on 4 May 2006. 16. On 17 May 2006 the post office transferred the sum of RUR 30,084 back to the sender because the applicant had refused to take receipt of it. 17. On 7 July 2006 the bailiffs' service again transferred the sum of RUR 30,084 to the applicant by postal order. It appears that the applicant again refused to accept it.

5. The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in the town of Novomyrhorod, Ukraine. 6. On 28 February 2005 L. burgled a house belonging to Zh., stealing fifty metres of cable, five aluminium cooking pots, a sewing machine, two religious icons and some scrap metal. On the same day L. sold several of the items (allegedly the cooking pots, the sewing machine and some metal corner brackets) to the applicant, who paid him 40 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH ‒ at the material time around 5.50 euros (EUR)). 7. On 4 March 2005 the Novomyrhorod District Police Department (Новомиргородський районний відділ Управління Міністерства внутрішніх справ України в Кіровоградській області) instituted criminal proceedings into the theft of Zh.’s property. 8. On 22 March 2005 the Novomyrhorodskyy District Court issued a warrant to search the applicant’s house, following a request to that end by an investigating officer of the Novomyrhorod District Police Department. The court noted that it was reasonable to suspect from the investigating officer’s request that some of the property stolen from Zh.’s house had been hidden in the applicant’s house, since the applicant had refused to help the police with their inquiries in that regard. 9. According to the applicant, on 24 March 2005 ten men in civilian clothing entered the yard of her house and told her that they were police officers and were carrying a warrant for the search of her house. They did not produce any proof of identity. The applicant was shown the warrant of 22 March 2005 but was not told which particular items she had to surrender to the police. The police officers verbally abused her and one of them took away her walking stick and pushed her. She fell to the ground and injured her knee. Since 2002 the applicant has been registered as category one (перша група інвалідності) disabled and, according to her, cannot walk without a stick. In support of her application, she submitted a medical certificate from 2007, which states that she is unable to walk unaided. She alleged that after being pushed to the ground she had no choice but to crawl after the police officers. Once inside the house, one of the police officers told the applicant that they were looking for a sewing machine and 100 metres of cable. By contrast, in a complaint made on 12 May 2005, the applicant stated that the police officer had told her they were looking for cooking pots and metal brackets (see paragraph 19 below). According to the applicant, the police officers seized six cooking pots, two axes and six metres of metal corner brackets. While conducting the search, they had torn a small door off a mirrored cabinet, broke furniture, ripped wall-hanging rugs, threw the applicant’s books and medication on the floor, and rummaged through her personal correspondence. 10. As part of her application, the applicant submitted a photo allegedly taken inside her house after the search. It shows the room in a complete mess; a small door has been torn off a mirrored cabinet, some furniture appears to be broken and medication is strewn across the floor. 11. According to the search record (протокол обшуку) which was drawn up by a police officer, B., and signed by two witnesses, K. and R., and S. (described on the record as “a person present during the search”) but not the applicant, the police officers had been looking for “a sewing machine, cooking pots, metal corner brackets and [illegible]”. Five aluminium cooking pots and several metal corner brackets had been seized. The search had been conducted between 10.20 a.m. and noon. It was noted that “no statements or remarks were made”. One of the copies of the search record made available to the Court does not indicate clearly what time the search finished. 12. The Government submitted a copy of a statement made by K., who was questioned on 24 March 2005 between 12.20 p.m. and 12.40 p.m. He stated that on that day at 10 a.m. he had been invited by police officers to witness a search of the applicant’s house. She had refused to surrender the items asked for, saying that she had sold the sewing machine. She had behaved aggressively and had sworn at the police officers. 13. The Government also submitted undated statements made by F. and G., police officers who had conducted the search with B. They contended that they had not broken any furniture and had not left the property in a mess. The wording of both officers’ statements is identical. In a separate document, F. made a further statement to the effect that the applicant had behaved very aggressively and had tried to hit the police officers with a stick. There had been an axe in one of the rooms but somebody had removed it from the applicant’s reach. According to F., the applicant had complained about the police officers because she had been ashamed of purchasing stolen goods and her neighbours had found out about it. She had wanted to “redeem” herself by accusing the police of unlawful behaviour. 14. According to witness statements of 25 March 2005 made by Kh. and Bi. (it is unclear whether they were the applicant’s acquaintances or relatives), when they had arrived at the applicant’s house at an unspecified time on 24 March 2005, her belongings and medication had been all over the floor, the door of a mirrored cabinet had been torn off, and there had been various items scattered everywhere “so it had been impossible to enter a room without stepping on something” and “everything had been turned upside down”. The applicant had been in a “critical condition” so they had called her an ambulance. The applicant had told Bi. that the mess had been created by the police officers. Bi. stated that he had realised that the applicant “had been beaten up by somebody”. Kh. stated that the applicant had told him that she had been pushed to the ground. 15. At 4.25 p.m. on 24 March 2005 an ambulance was called for the applicant. It was noted in the patient report form that the applicant had been previously diagnosed with ischaemia, atherosclerotic cardiosclerosis, encephalosclerosis and a post-stroke condition. She was given nitroglycerin and various other types of medication. The exact reason why the ambulance was called out was not mentioned. 16. On 26 March 2005 the applicant consulted a doctor and complained about an injury to her left knee. 17. On an unidentified date she and her son, D., complained to the Novomyrhorod District Prosecutor’s Office about the search of her house, alleging that unnecessary force had been used against her. 18. On 7 April 2005 the prosecutor refused to institute criminal proceedings following the applicant’s son’s complaint, finding that the police officers had informed the applicant about the warrant of 22 March 2005 and had requested her to surrender the stolen goods but that she had refused. During the search, some of the goods stolen from Zh.’s house had been recovered. According to B., F. and K., nobody had pushed the applicant to the ground or had injured her. 19. On 12 May 2005 the applicant complained about the district prosecutor’s decision to the Kirovohrad Regional Prosecutor’s Office. In particular, she complained that only the statements made by the police officers and K. (who had arrived together) had been taken into account, while the investigating officers had disregarded statements of those who had visited the applicant and had seen what state her house had been in after the search. The applicant reiterated her previous complaints but, contrary to her earlier statement, alleged that B. had informed her that the police had been looking for cooking pots and metal corner brackets. Those items, as well as two axes, had later been seized. In reply, the applicant was informed that the decision of 7 April 2005 remained valid. 20. On 4 October 2005 S. gave evidence that one of the police officers had pushed the applicant and she had fallen to the ground. According to S., he had helped her to stand up and sat her down on a chair. On two further occasions S. stated that “one of the police officers had taken the applicant’s stick away and had pushed her to one side” because she had threatened to injure the police officers with it. The applicant had then fallen down and hurt her knee. 21. On 27 October 2005 a forensic medical examination was carried out on the applicant by an expert, who had been requested to establish the seriousness of her injuries. It was concluded that, according to her medical records of 25 March 2005, the applicant had sustained light bodily injuries (a bruise on the inner part of her left knee measuring 6 x 6 cm) and had been suffering from headaches and dizziness. It also concluded that the injury in question could have been caused on the date indicated by the applicant. It was also noted that the applicant had been suffering from the after-effects of a stroke which had happened in 1993. In her explanations the applicant stated that she had been pushed to the ground by a police officer on 24 March 2005. 22. On 23 November 2005 in the course of criminal proceedings instituted following the burglary of Zh.’s house, the court found that the items seized from the applicant on 24 March 2005 had been returned to their lawful owner. L., who was found guilty of theft, gave evidence that S., his acquaintance, had sold the stolen goods on to the applicant. 23. On 12 January 2006 the Novomyrhorodskyy District Court, following a complaint by the applicant, quashed the decision of 7 April 2005 and remitted the case to the authorities for further investigation. It found that only the applicant’s son’s complaint had been answered but not the applicant’s. The court indicated that S., who had been present during the search, had alleged that one of the police officers had used force on the applicant. That information, as well as other complaints by the applicant, had not been properly answered, namely that some of the people present during the search (in particular a police officer Rd. and a witness R.) had not been questioned, that two axes had been seized from her property, and that the search had been conducted in an inappropriate manner. 24. Between January 2006 and March 2009 the prosecutor’s office refused to institute criminal proceedings on ten separate occasions following complaints by the applicant. Its refusals were based on the fact that K. and the police officers had all said that no force had been used on the applicant and that her property had not been damaged or unlawfully seized. The refusals were subsequently quashed by more senior prosecutors or by the court, and the case was remitted to the authorities for further investigation. The court noted on several occasions that the investigation authorities had failed to answer the applicant’s complaints about her injuries and the inappropriate manner in which the search had been conducted. The further investigations ordered by the court or the prosecutor lasted between ten and thirty days, each being terminated by a decision not to institute criminal proceedings. 25. In a decision of 13 March 2009 the prosecutor’s office again refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers. The prosecutor concluded that no axes had been seized from the applicant. Witnesses and police officers had been questioned. They stated that the applicant had behaved aggressively and had refused to sign the search record. They also said that no force had been used on the applicant and that they were unsure how the applicant’s injuries had come about. 26. On 1 February 2010 the Novomyrhorodskyy District Court quashed the prosecutor’s decision of 13 March 2009 and remitted the case to the authorities for further investigation. The court noted that on several occasions during the course of the investigation, the prosecutor had ordered the authorities to identify everyone who had participated in the search, to properly interview K., R., Zh. and L., to check whether the police officers had thrown the applicant’s belongings out of the cupboards, and to take other steps. However, those instructions were not complied with. Moreover, despite the photograph submitted by the applicant and her requests for witnesses Do. (who also visited the applicant after the search), Kh. and Bi. to be questioned, they were not interviewed and there was no evaluation of the available evidence in this regard. 27. On 10 February 2010 the Novomyrhorod District Prosecutor’s Office again refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers for lack of evidence. In reaching its decision, the prosecutor referred to the evidence given by K. and the police officers, who had stated that the applicant had behaved aggressively but that nobody had used force on her. It was established that five police officers, B, F., G., Rd. and Sa., had conducted the search. B., F. and G. were subjected to further questioning. They maintained that no axes had been seized. L. stated that he and S. had sold some of the stolen items on to the applicant. It was further noted that all the police officers and witnesses who had participated in the search had undergone formal interviews. They did not know how the applicant’s injuries had been sustained. The police officers maintained that they did not damage any of the applicant’s furniture or leave her house in a mess. It was impossible to question or re-examine a number of witnesses since, for example, K. could not be located and Zh. had died. It was also impossible to question Do., Kh. and Bi. since their whereabouts were also unknown. The applicant did not appeal against that decision.

4. The applicant was born in 1946 and lives in Essex. 5. His wife died on 27 February 2000 having no children. 6. On around 4 April 2000 the applicant applied for benefits equivalent to those to which a widow, whose husband had died in similar circumstances to those of his wife, would have been entitled, namely a Widow’s Payment and a Widow’s Pension, payable under the Social Security and Benefits Act 1992 (“the 1992 Act”). He was informed on 25 April 2000 that the Benefits Agency was unable to accept his application as a valid claim because there was at that time no legislation providing an equivalent of the widows’ benefits concerned to widowers. He was told that he had no right of appeal since his claim had not been considered by a decision-maker. 7. In or around September 2000 the applicant made a claim for Widow’s Bereavement Tax Allowance (“WBA”) to the Inland Revenue for the years 2000-2001. On 5 October 2000 he was informed that his claim could not be accepted because there was no basis in domestic law allowing widowers to claim this benefit. 8. On 24 November 2000 the applicant re-applied for WBA and on 28 November 2000 the Inland Revenue replied confirming its decision and asking the applicant if he wished to appeal. 9. On 30 November 2000 the applicant made a further claim for WBA which was rejected on 25 December 2000. 10. On 3 January 2001 the applicant wrote to the Inland Revenue asking for his appeal claim to be left open pending a domestic decision on the matter. 11. The applicant received incapacity benefit in the sum of GBP 240.80 per month.

10. The applicant is a civil servant in the Ministry of National Education. At the relevant time she was on secondment to the Bureau for the primary education of Greek children abroad, in the city of Stuttgart. On 2 June 1998 she filed a criminal complaint for perjury and defamation against S.M., with an application to join the proceedings as a civil party, but without claiming compensation. S.M., a civil servant in the same Ministry, was the applicant's immediate superior. She alleged in particular that, in connection with an administrative investigation opened against her, S.M. had stated that she did not observe working hours and did not get on well with her colleagues. 11. On 26 September 2001, when the case was heard before the Athens Criminal Court, the applicant reiterated her civil-party application, claiming 1,000 drachmas (about 3 euros) and adduced her arguments. On the same day, the Athens Criminal Court acquitted S.M. of the charges against him, finding that the applicant's allegations were unsubstantiated. In particular, after examining all the evidence, the court considered that the offending remarks had been truthful and that it had not been the defendant's intention to defame or insult the applicant (judgment no. 74941/2001). 12. On 5 August 2002 this judgment was finalised and entered in the register of the Criminal Court. 13. On 24 September 2002 the applicant requested the public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation to lodge an appeal on points of law against the Athens Criminal Court's judgment no. 74941/2001, under Article 506 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. She alleged, in particular, that the judgment did not contain sufficient reasoning. 14. On 27 September 2002 the public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation returned the applicant's letter with the following handwritten comment on the actual request: “There are no legal or well-founded grounds of appeal to the Court of Cassation”.

4. The applicants were born in 1949 and 1956, respectively, and live in Koszalin. 5. On 1 August 1997 the applicants filed a claim with the Koszalin District Court against a housing co-operative concerning the amount of maintenance fees to be fixed in respect of their apartment building. 6. On 24 November 1998 the proceedings were stayed pending the termination of parallel proceedings relating to the alleged nullity of an amendment made to the co-operative’s statute. The Koszalin District Court resumed the proceedings on 7 March 2003. 7. On 13 May 2003 a hearing was held. The court requested the Koszalin Regional Court to provide the case-file of the proceedings relating to the alleged nullity of an amendment made to the co-operative’s statute. 8. On 16 June 2003 the Koszalin District Court decided to stay the proceedings at the applicants’ request. They were resumed, upon the applicants’ request, on 17 November 2004. 9. Hearings were subsequently held on 23 February, 11 August, 22 September, 10 November and 9 December 2005. 10. On 30 January 2006 the Koszalin District Court decided to admit an expert opinion. On 6 June and 16 August 2006 the expert requested prolongation of the time-limit for submission of the opinion. 11. On 6 September 2006 the court summoned the expert to submit the opinion within 7 days. 12. In 2007 the District Court held 7 hearings. 13. 18 October 2007 the Koszalin District Court gave a judgment in the case. 14. The judgment was quashed on 27 February 2009 by the Koszalin Regional Court and the case remitted for re-examination. 15. The proceedings are currently pending before the first-instance court. 16. On 30 November 2005 the applicants lodged a complaint under the Law of 17 June 2004 on complaints about a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time (Ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki) (“the 2004 Act”). On 6 January 2006 the Koszalin Regional Court dismissed the applicants’ complaint, finding that the trial court could not be held responsible for any delays and that the proceedings had been prolonged as it had been necessary to stay them.

4. The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Bucharest. 5. On 1 September 1999 the Romanian Copyright Office (“ORDA”) suspended the applicant from work for gross misconduct, that is, suspicion of fraud, malfeasance in public office and document destruction. A criminal complaint was further filed by ORDA with the prosecution authorities on 14 September 1999. 6. On an unspecified date in November 2000 the applicant complained about the protraction of the investigation. His complaint was admitted on 10 November 2000 by the Public Prosecutor’s Office as no procedural act had been carried out until that date. The prosecuting authorities were instructed to deal with the complaint within reasonable delays. 7. On 21 February 2001 the Public Prosecutor’s Office with the Bucharest District Court no. 1 (“the Prosecutor”) decided to initiate the criminal prosecution against the applicant. 8. By a subsequent decision of 31 January 2002 the Prosecutor rejected the initiation of prosecution in respect of the applicant as his conduct did not meet the statutory essential elements of the prosecuted offences. ORDA contested this decision before the Higher Ranking Prosecutor. 9. On 6 March 2002 the contestation was allowed and the criminal prosecution was resumed. 10. Subsequent to the examination of evidence (hearing of four witness testimonies and examination of few documents, without the commission of any expert study), the Prosecutor decided on 8 May 2002 to discontinue the investigation in respect of the applicant. The decision was challenged by ORDA before the Public Prosecutor’s Office with the High Court of Cassation and Justice. 11. On 6 March 2003 the contestation was allowed and the impugned decision was quashed. The case was reopened for further investigation before the prosecuting authorities. 12. On 23 July 2003 the Prosecutor decided to discontinue the investigation against the applicant in respect of the charges of fraud and malfeasance in public office. At the same time, an administrative fine was imposed for charges of document destruction. 13. The decision was upheld before the Higher Ranking Prosecutor and became final on 17 October 2003. 14. Subsequent to the decisions to discontinue the criminal prosecution against him, the applicant requested to resume his work at ORDA. Following the latter’s refusal, the applicant brought two sets of labour litigations against his employer on 22 February 2002 and on an unspecified date in 2003 respectively. 15. On 15 April 2003 the Bucharest County Court dismissed the first action. It ruled that the applicant could not resume work since the decision to discontinue the criminal investigation had not been final at that time. Later on the applicant was reinstated to a different position at ORDA. Shortly afterwards, the employment contract was voluntarily terminated. 16. The second action was allowed by way of a final decision. On 6 July 2006 the Court of Appeal of Bucharest awarded the applicant the retroactive payment of wages he had been entitled to.

4. The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in London. 5. On 1 April 1998 the applicant, who is a journalist, distributed a leaflet concerning the conscientious objector Mr O.M.U, outside the Ankara State Security Court. He also handed the leaflet to the public prosecutor at the Ankara State Security Court together with a petition stating that he should be prosecuted for having committed a crime. 6. The leaflet, entitled “Freedom to think - an initiative against the crime of thought” contained the press release issued by O. M. U on 1 September 1995. The latter had been previously convicted and sentenced on account of this press release. The relevant parts of the leaflet are as follows: Preface and Epilogue: “... For the purpose of defending the free expression of every kind of thought, we who have signed as publishers, convey this 'convicted' text to the people, regardless of its contents and the question whether or not we share its contents, even though some of us do not agree with some lines in it...' The press release of O. M. U: “Good morning, Today's press conference is not organised by the Izmir Association of the Opponents of War. The responsibility for this conference rests exclusively with me. As you know, the case, which was brought before the Ankara Military Court of the Office of the Chief of Staff where I was allegedly accused of committing the crime of 'inciting others to evade military service', was concluded on 29 August. ... The army, unable to deal with us through judicial methods, think that they can draw the opponents of war away from the public view. First of all, I am not a deserter; I am a 'conscientious objector'. I neither intend to do military service nor desert. There is no reason to desert, because I defend the principle that people should exercise their right not to do military service without having to go into hiding. As to the papers given by the Recruitment Office...I am going to burn them right now before your eyes... I am not a soldier and I never will be. Of course, I am aware that I will be summoned for military service, but until I am summoned, whenever that may be there will be no changes to my lifestyle. They can find me here and take me by force. But I will resist to the end in the barracks, and I am underlining that I will refuse to do military service in any shape or fashion.” 7. On 1 April 1998 the public prosecutor at the Ankara State Security Court took the applicant's statement in which the applicant reiterated the content of his petition. He maintained that, by publishing and distributing the above-mentioned leaflet, he had committed the same offence for which O. M. U. had been convicted. He contended that he agreed with the contents of the leaflet. He further pointed out that there were judgments of the European Court of Human Rights which referred to conscientious objectors. He claimed that the leaflet was not intended to dissuade people from doing military service or to incite them to desert. He further stated that in the Netherlands conscientious objectors did not do their military service, but were given other jobs. He commented that maybe in the future the same would also be true for Turkey. He concluded that his aim was to obtain the abolition of compulsory military service in Turkey. 8. On 4 June 1998 the military public prosecutor at the General Staff Court in Ankara filed a bill of indictment, accusing the applicant of inciting others to evade military service. He requested that the applicant be convicted and sentenced under Article 155 of the Criminal Code and Article 58 of the Military Penal Code. 9. On an unspecified date, the criminal proceedings against the applicant commenced before the General Staff Court in Ankara. During the proceedings the applicant reiterated his previous submissions. In particular, he claimed that he was a defender of freedom of expression and challenged the independence and impartiality of the court. 10. On 9 March 1999 the court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to two months' imprisonment and to a fine of 1,520,000 Turkish Liras (TL) (approximately 3.5 Euros (EUR) at the time of the events). In its reasoning, the court held that it had competence to deal with the case pursuant to the Constitution and domestic law and that there was no ruling of the European Court of Human Rights which had concluded that military courts were extraordinary courts. As regards the merits, the court considered that, by distributing the leaflet containing the press release which led to O. M. U's conviction and by handing the leaflet to the public prosecutor and asking the latter to take legal action, the applicant's actions were deliberate and that he had committed the offence knowingly and willingly. The court, relying on Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution, Article 10 § 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 29 § 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, affirmed that freedom of expression and the free dissemination of ideas was not an absolute right. Citing relevant articles of the Criminal Code, it reasoned that the provisions under which the applicant was charged pursued the aim of eliminating threats to the unity of the country, national security and sovereignty. The court observed that Article 155 of the Criminal Code was in accordance with international law and that the applicant's case fell within the scope of Article 155 of the Criminal Code. 11. On 19 April 1999 the applicant appealed to the Military Court of Cassation. In his appeal, the applicant, relying on Articles 6 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, contended that he should not have been tried by a military court and that the act which he had committed could not be considered to be an offence. 12. On 25 May 1999 the Military Court of Cassation upheld the decision of the General Staff Court. In its decision the court, referring to domestic law and the jurisprudence of the Court, held that the military courts had jurisdiction and competence to try the applicant and, after having assessed the contents of the leaflet, concluded that the judgment given by the General Staff Court was in accordance with the law. 13. On 17 July 1999 the applicant left Turkey in order to avoid imprisonment.

5. The applicant was born in 1960 and is currently in Aachen Prison. 6. Since 1981 the applicant has been convicted seven times of offences including assault and dangerous assault, theft, joint serious robbery, coercion and sexual coercion. He was notably found guilty in 1984 of assaulting in a humiliating manner and over a period of several days another man locked up in the same cell, and of forcing him to take part in oral sex. 7. On 22 July 1991 the Duisburg Regional Court convicted the applicant of dangerous assault combined with joint coercion, with sexual coercion, with joint extortion and coercion and with attempted sexual assault committed in 1990. It sentenced him to six years' imprisonment and ordered his preventive detention under Article 66 § 1 of the Criminal Code (see paragraphs 22-23 below). The Regional Court found that the applicant, partly acting jointly with others and acting with diminished criminal responsibility due to drug consumption, had assaulted a man who had allowed the applicant to share his apartment using objects including shoes, belts, scissors and cigarettes, had forced him to let the applicant masturbate into his mouth, to eat rubbish and grass and to withdraw money from his account for the applicant. Moreover, the applicant had beaten up another prisoner locked up in the same cell several times and had attempted to force the other man to perform sex acts on him. Having consulted a medical expert, the Regional Court found that the applicant, acting with full criminal responsibility, had a tendency to commit offences against the physical integrity and property of others by violence and was therefore dangerous to the public. 8. The applicant served his full prison sentence. He was then placed in preventive detention, for the first time, on 4 January 1997; he had thus served ten years in preventive detention by 3 January 2007. The continuation of the applicant's preventive detention was ordered by the Arnsberg Regional Court in 1999, 2002 and 2004. Since March 2006, the applicant's preventive detention is executed in Aachen Prison. 9. On 25 October 2006 the Arnsberg Regional Court ordered the continuation of the applicant's preventive detention beyond ten years. It found that there was still a risk that the applicant, owing to his criminal tendencies, might commit serious offences resulting in considerable psychological or physical harm to the victims if released (Article 67d § 3 of the Criminal Code; see paragraph 27 below). 10. Relying on the report submitted by a psychiatric expert, M., the Regional Court found that on account of his psychotherapeutic treatment, the applicant had made progress in the course of his detention. He no longer attempted to solve conflicts by violence and now abused alcohol and drugs less than before. He now had a stable heterosexual identity and felt guilty about his offences. However, he still lacked social skills, including the capacity to resolve conflicts himself, and had no social contacts outside prison. He was therefore liable to commit further thefts, robberies and dangerous assaults if released. He first had to be prepared for release through relaxations in the conditions of his detention. 11. By a decision of 19 December 2006, which the applicant received on 8 January 2007, the Hamm Court of Appeal, endorsing the reasons given by the Regional Court, dismissed the applicant's appeal. It added that, contrary to the applicant's view, his continued preventive detention for a period exceeding ten years on the basis of Article 67d of the Criminal Code, as amended in 1998, was constitutional. 12. On 31 January 2007 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court. He argued that the continuation of his preventive detention beyond ten years, resulting from the application of the amended Article 67d § 3 of the Criminal Code, which had entered into force after he had committed his offences, violated his right to liberty and the prohibition of retrospective punishment under Article 2 § 2 and Article 103 § 2 of the Basic Law and Article 5 § 1 and Article 7 § 1 of the Convention. 13. On 20 February 2007 the Federal Constitutional Court, without giving further reasons, declined to consider the applicant's constitutional complaint (file no. 2 BvR 270/07). 14. On 16 October 2008 the Aachen Regional Court ordered the continuation of the applicant's preventive detention as, owing to his criminal tendencies, he was still liable to commit serious offences resulting in considerable psychological or physical harm to the victims. The psychiatric expert which the court had consulted and the conclusions of whom the court had endorsed, had found that the applicant no longer suffered from a serious personality disorder and that there was no longer a high risk that the applicant committed further sexual offences. However, prior to a successful completion of relaxations in the conditions of his detention, the applicant was still liable to commit serious offences. 15. On 1 June 2010 the Aachen Regional Court refused to declare the applicant's preventive detention terminated in view of the Court's findings in the case of M. v. Germany. It found that the courts responsible for the execution of sentences had to apply Article 67d § 3 of the Criminal Code, being the law in force which could not be interpreted in compliance with the Convention, and that it was for the legislator to execute the Court's judgment. 16. On 30 July 2010 the Cologne Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeal against the Regional Court's decision of 1 June 2010, endorsing the reasons given by the Regional Court and referring to the reasons given in its own decision of 14 July 2010 (file no. 2 Ws 428/10; see paragraph 30 below). 17. On 13 September 2010 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to terminate the applicant's preventive detention by way of an interim order (file no. 2 BvR 1940/10). It found that the applicant's constitutional complaint was not manifestly ill-founded and would have to be examined on the merits. Weighing the consequences of granting an interim order against those of refusing such an order, it found that the public interest in security outweighed the applicant's interest in his liberty, having regard to the seriousness of the offences the applicant was liable to commit if released. 18. The applicant is currently still in preventive detention.

6. The particulars of the applicants appear in Appendix 1. 7. After 1948, when the communist regime had been installed in the former Czechoslovakia, the housing policy was based on a doctrine aimed at the restriction and abolition of private ownership. 8. Some residential houses were confiscated and some owners of residential houses were compelled to transfer their property to the State for no or inadequate compensation. Those owners who were not formally deprived of the ownership of their residential housing were subjected to restrictions in the exercise of their property rights. 9. As regards flats in residential houses, tenancies were replaced by the “right of lasting use”. 10. The Flats Management Act 1964, which was in force until 1 January 1992, entitled public authorities to decide on the right of use of flats. Special regulations governed the sums which the users had to pay. On 1 January 1992 “the right of lasting use” was transformed into a tenancy with regulated rent. 11. After 1991 some residential houses were restored to their former owners; however, flats in these houses were mostly occupied by tenants with regulated rent. 12. Under the relevant law (for details see “Relevant domestic law and practice” below), owners of residential houses in a position similar to that of the applicants in the present case have been obliged to accept that all or some of their flats are occupied by tenants while charging no more than the maximum amount of rent fixed by the State (“the rent-control scheme”). Despite repeated increases in the maximum rent which the domestic law entitles house owners in this position to charge, that amount has remained below the level of rent chargeable for similar housing let on the principles of a free-market economy. 13. In situations similar to that of the applicants, the owners of residential houses had practically no means of terminating tenancies and evicting tenants without providing them with “housing compensation”. Furthermore, owners were not allowed to transfer ownership of a flat rented by an individual to any third person other than the tenant. 14. The Government of the Slovak Republic have dealt with the issue of rent control on several occasions as indicated below. 15. Documents of the Ministry of Construction and Regional Development indicate that, by 20 January 2009, registration forms had been submitted by tenants in respect of 923 flats where rent control was applied. 2,311 persons lived in those flats, the average surface area of which was 71.38 square metres. The documents indicate that it was envisaged that substitute accommodation would be made available to the persons concerned by the planned reform so long as this was justified by their social situation. 76.5% of the tenants thus registered lived in flats located in Bratislava. 16. On the basis of those data, the authorities estimated that the rent‑control scheme concerned approximately 1,000 flats, that is, 0.24% of rented flats in houses that existed in 1991 and 0.06% of the inhabited housing facilities which were available in Slovakia in 2001. 17. The applicants are owners or co-owners of residential buildings in Bratislava and Trnava to which the rent-control scheme applies, or has applied, (further details are set out in Appendix 2). They obtained the ownership of the flats by various means, such as restitution, donation or inheritance from their relatives to whom the flats had been restored in the early 1990s. In two cases the applicants purchased further shares of ownership from the other co-owner, the Bratislava Municipality. Mr Dobšovič and Ms Dobšovičová (applicants listed in points 6 and 7 of Appendix 1) purchased the flats from individuals in 2005. The majority of the other applicants acquired ownership in the course of the 1990s. In the meantime, the rent-control scheme has ceased to be applicable to several of the flats concerned. 18. The applicants maintained that the rent to which they are, or were, entitled for letting their property is far below the maintenance costs for their houses and disproportionately low compared with similar flats to which the rent-control scheme does not apply. 19. The parties submitted the following information as regards the impact of the rent-control scheme on the applicants. 20. Initially, and by way of example, the applicants pointed out that the controlled rent in respect of a flat with a surface area of 72.56 square metres was 71.50 euros (EUR) per month, which corresponds to EUR 0.99 per square metre. However, the monthly free-market rent in respect of such a flat was approximately EUR 830, that is EUR 11.40 per square metre. 21. The applicants further relied on the opinion of an expert provided at their request on 19 July 2010. It set out the difference between the free‑ market rent and the controlled rent in respect of a residential house located at Trenčianska St. in Bratislava-Nivy for the period from 1993 to 2010 (for further details see Appendix 3). 22. Following the Court’s decision to declare the application admissible, the applicants submitted voluminous opinions of experts concerning their properties. 23. The opinion of expert I. no. 51/2012 of 26 April 2012, which the applicants relied on by way of example, concerns a residential house where rent control applied to five out of the eight flats. It was situated on Tallerova St. in Bratislava – in the Staré Mesto district – and several applicants are co‑owners of the flats concerned (see also Appendix 4). The opinion indicated that the relevant legislation allowed for regulated rent which corresponded, on average, to 0.69% of the acquisition value of a flat in 1994. That ratio was 0.79% in 2001 and 1.96% in 2011. 24. According to expert opinion no. 51/2012, the regulated rent amounted to 2.2% of the free-market rent in 1993. In 2002 it corresponded, on average, to 4.5% of the free-market rent, and in 2011 the average regulated rent corresponded to 14.3% of the free-market rent. The applicants submitted that the other opinions concerning their properties were in line with that conclusion. The above opinion contains the following valuation of the flats concerned for the period from 1 January to 31 March 2012: Flat no. Monthly market rent EUR/m2 Monthly controlled rent EUR/m2 Percentage controlled/ market rent 1 25. As regards the maintenance costs of their properties, the applicants submitted that most of them did not have sufficient means to ensure renovation and maintenance of the houses because of low incomes under the rent-control scheme. They relied on the expert opinions which determined the “cost-based rent” in respect of the houses owned by them, namely, the rent calculated on the basis of the current technical value of the buildings and on the costs necessary for their ordinary and adequate periodic maintenance, while taking into account the gradual wear and tear of the buildings. Thus according to expert opinion no. 51/2012, the regulated rent amounted to 3.3% of the “cost-based rent” in 1993. In 2002 it corresponded, on average, to 5.3% of the “cost-based rent”, and in 2011 the average regulated rent corresponded to 26.4% of the “cost-based rent”. 26. With reference to the experts’ conclusions, the applicants maintained that they had suffered pecuniary damage on account of the application of the rent-control scheme to their property. This was determined as the difference between the free-market rent applicable to similar dwellings and the controlled rent which the applicants were allowed to charge throughout the period of ownership and application of the rent-control scheme. The damage which the individual applicants claimed to have suffered is specified in Appendix 5. 27. The Government initially submitted the opinion of a different expert, drawn up in 2010, according to which the average free-market monthly rent for flats comparable to those of the applicants in the municipality of Bratislava-Staré Mesto was between EUR 6.13 and 6.48 per square metre. In the broader centre of Trnava the free-market rent was between EUR 3.37 and EUR 3.87 per square metre at that time. 28. In response to the detailed expert opinions submitted by the applicants, the Government first submitted an opinion by the Forensic Engineering Institute in Žilina. It pointed to errors in several of the expert opinions, challenged the methods applied by the experts and their standing to determine the amount of profit lost by the applicants. The view was expressed that direct comparison with dwellings where the rent-control scheme did not apply was the most appropriate method for determining the damage suffered by the applicants. 29. Subsequently, the Government submitted an opinion drawn up by the Forensic Engineering Institute in Žilina on 15 November 2012. It indicated that lack of statistical data for the overall period of rent control prevented the flat owners’ lost profit from being determined in an objective manner. In order to establish appropriate compensation for the applicants, it was therefore appropriate to use a methodology similar to determination of compensation for tolerating an easement over the property. Among other data, the opinion indicated that, under the regulation in force between 1964 and the end of June 1992, the rent in respect of a three-room flat corresponded to EUR 0.08 per square metre. As from 1 July 1992 a 100% increase was applied. 30. By means of comparison, the opinion established that, in 2012, the monthly market rental value of flats in Bratislava varied between EUR 4.71 and EUR 5.97 per square metre depending on the location, number of rooms and equipment. It amounted to EUR 4.51/4.52 in respect of one/two-room flats in Trnava. At the same time, the rental value of the applicants’ flats under the rent‑control scheme was between EUR 1.20 and 1.60 in most cases, the extreme and exceptional values being EUR 0.45 and EUR 2.21 in Bratislava. In Trnava the controlled rent of the applicants’ flats varied between EUR 1.24 and EUR 1.60 in 2012. In determining the rental value of the applicants’ flats in 2012 a 40% increase was applied (as provided for by Law no. 260/2011 in 2011 and 2012). The relevant data are set out in Appendix 4 (columns A – F). 31. According to the expert opinion, appropriate compensation payable to the applicants should be calculated as the difference between the net monthly income (profit) which they were able to obtain for renting their flats under the rent-control scheme and the net monthly income (profit) which could be drawn from letting comparable flats at the market price. The calculation is based on (i) the technical value of the flats in 2012, (ii) their rental value (both on the free market and under the rent-control scheme) in 2012; (iii) duration of application of the rent-control scheme; (iv) the ownership share of individual applicants; and (v) the marginal interest rate of the European Central Bank. The amounts of compensation to which the individual applicants are entitled in accordance with the above method of calculation for the period covered by the opinion are set out in Appendix 4 (column G).

5. The applicants are: (1) Ms Aset Umarova, who was born in 1959; (2) Ms Laura Alkhastova, who was born in 1981; (3) Ms Luiza Umarova, who was born in 1983; (4) Mr Ibragim Umarov, who was born in 1987; (5) Mr Said-Ibragim (also spelled as Sayd-Ibragim) Umarov, who was born in 1991; and (6) Ms Larisa Umarova, who was born in 1985. The applicants live in Achkhoy-Martan, Chechnya. The first applicant is the wife of Khamzat Umarov, who was born in 1956; the second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth applicants are his children. 6. At the material time Achkhoy-Martan was under the full control of federal military forces. Checkpoints were located on the roads leading to and from the settlement. The area was under curfew. Military units of the 58th Russian army were stationed in the fields next to Achkhoy-Martan. At the time, Khamzat Umarov was working as the head of the State Roads Administration in Achkhoy-Martan. 7. On the night of 29 July 2001 (in the documents submitted the date was also referred to as 30 July and 31 July 2001) the applicants and Khamzat Umarov were at home, at 29 Sadovaya Street in Achkhoy-Martan. That night the applicants’ friend, Mr S.I., who worked for the Danish Refugee Council, also stayed at the house. 8. At about 4 a.m. on 30 July 2001 the first applicant was woken up by a noise coming from outside. She heard what sounded like someone trying to quietly open the gates to their yard. When the applicant asked in Chechen: ‘Who’s there?’ she heard no response. Then her husband, Khamzat Umarov, looked out from the window and told her that there were Russians with flashlights. 9. The men outside demanded that the applicants open the gates. The first applicant told them that they would wake up the children and asked them to return in the morning. In response, the men forced the gates open and a group of about twenty to twenty-five men in camouflage uniforms rushed into the yard. Approximately fifteen men ran into the house. The rest remained outside. Some of them went into the yard of the applicants’ neighbours, the family of Ms R.Z., and ordered the neighbours to stay inside. Some men remained in the street and kept ordering other neighbours to get back inside. 10. All of the intruders were equipped with flashlights and armed with automatic weapons (винторез). They forced the applicants into different rooms; two of them guarded the first applicant. Some of the men were wearing masks; those without masks were of Slavic appearance. The men spoke unaccented Russian. The applicants thought that they were Russian military servicemen. 11. After breaking into the house the intruders talked amongst themselves about their search for ‘two men’. The first applicant thought that the officers were talking about her husband and Mr S.I. After the servicemen found the room which the two men were in, they rushed into it and searched it for five or six minutes. After that the servicemen took Khamzat Umarov and Mr S.I. outside. The first applicant followed them. Two UAZ vehicles were parked in the street. One of the vehicles had an antenna and a portable radio transmitter on the roof. The officers put Khamzat Umarov in one of the cars, but left Mr S.I. behind. Immediately afterward both cars drove away in the direction of Lenina Street, where the Achkhoy-Martan District Department of the Interior (“the ROVD”), the Achkhoy-Martan Temporary District Department of the Interior (“the VOVD”) and the Achkhoy-Martan Department of the Federal Security Service (“the FSB”) were situated at the time. 12. Mr S.I., who had been left by the abductors in the street, returned to the house and told the applicants that the abductors had threatened to shoot him if he followed them. (b) The subsequent events 13. Immediately after the abductors were gone, the first applicant managed to call the VOVD. An officer there told her to call the ROVD and gave her their number. Then the first applicant called the ROVD and informed the officers there of the abduction. The officers told her that there was no need to worry, as Khamzat Umarov was not the only man who had been detained that night. After that, the applicant was told to come to the ROVD in the morning as the area was under curfew at night. 14. In the morning the first applicant told her husband’s relatives about what had happened and they went together to the ROVD, where they were told that Khamzat Umarov had not been arrested by their officers and that he was not detained on their premises. On the same day, 30 July 2001, the applicants lodged written complaints about the abduction of Khamzat Umarov to a number of local law-enforcement agencies, including the ROVD, the FSB and the Achkhoy-Martan Inter-District Prosecutor’s Office (“the district prosecutor’s office”). 15. On 31 July 2001 a number of residents of Achkhoy-Martan gathered in front of the FSB’s office. They blocked the road and demanded to speak with the officials. At some point the head of the office came out from the building and spoke with the crowd. He told the applicants and their fellow villagers that Khamzat Umarov must have been taken away by officers of the 58th Russian army, whose units were stationed in the fields next to the settlement. The officer promised the crowd that he would find out Khamzat Umarov’s whereabouts. 16. After that, the head of the Achkhoy-Martan District administration, Mr B., and the head of the ROVD, officer K., arrived at the FSB’s premises and asked the residents to go home. Having spent two days next to the FSB building, the crowd left on 1 August 2001. 17. About a month later a group of employees of the Danish Refugee Council visited the applicants’ home together with a number of journalists. 18. Within a certain period of time, starting from the end of August 2001, military servicemen searched the applicants’ house on several occasions. 19. On 22 November 2001 military servicemen took away Khamzat Umarov’s brother, Mr Ramzan Umarov, who has not been seen since. 20. In support of their application the applicants submitted the following documents: a statement by the first applicant dated 16 September 2008; three statements by the applicants’ neighbours, Ms L. Kh., Ms R. Zh. and Ms R. G., all dated 28 July 2008; and copies of the documents received from the authorities. 21. The Government did not challenge the version of events presented by the applicants. At the same time, they stated that no special operations had been carried out in Achkhoy-Martan between 29 and 30 July 2001. 22. On 30 July 2001 the first applicant complained about the abduction to the district prosecutor’s office. In her complaint she stated that the abductors had been in camouflage uniforms and masks, that they had spoken unaccented Russian and had threatened her and her children with firearms. 23. On 10 August 2001 the district prosecutor’s office informed the applicants that their inquiry had established that Khamzat Umarov had not been arrested by local law-enforcement agencies and that he was not detained in the local temporary detention centre. 24. On 28 August and 10 September 2001 the Chechnya prosecutor’s office forwarded the applicants’ complaint about the abduction to the district prosecutor’s office for examination. 25. On 4 and 14 September 2001 the district prosecutor’s office instructed the VOVD to take operational-search measures to establish the whereabouts of Khamzat Umarov. 26. On 9 September 2001 investigators from the VOVD questioned the applicants’ neighbour, Mr A., who stated that on the morning of 30 July 2001 he had found out that Khamzat Umarov had been abducted by military servicemen earlier the same morning. 27. On 9 September 2001 the investigators questioned the first applicant, who described the circumstances of her husband’s abduction by military servicemen. 28. On 25 January 2002 (in the documents submitted the date was also referred to as 2 and 28 January 2002) the district prosecutor’s office instituted an investigation into the abduction of Khamzat Umarov under Article 127 § 2 of the Criminal Code (unlawful deprivation of liberty). From 27 April 2002 onwards, the investigation was based on Article 126 § 2 of the Criminal Code (aggravated abduction). The case file was given the number 63008. 29. On 25 January and then on 8 February 2002 the investigators again questioned the first applicant, who provided a detailed description of the abduction and stated that the abductors had been armed with machine guns, had spoken unaccented Russian and that some of them had worn masks. 30. On 28 January 2002 the investigators questioned another of Khamzat Umarov’s brothers, Mr Ru. Umarov, who stated that he had not witnessed the abduction and had learnt about it from his relatives. 31. On 26 February 2002 the first applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case. 32. On 6 March 2002 the Zavodskoy and the Oktyabrskiy ROVD in Grozny and the Grozny ROVD informed the investigators that they did not have information concerning either Khamzat Umarov’s whereabouts or his detention on their premises. 33. On 25 March 2002 the investigators suspended the investigation of the criminal case for failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicants were not informed thereof. 34. Between March 2002 and March 2005 the investigation of the criminal case was suspended. 35. On 28 March 2005 the supervising prosecutor ordered that the investigation be resumed as the investigators had failed to take basic steps, including verification of the involvement of military servicemen in the abduction, identification of the abductors’ vehicles and questioning of witnesses to the events. The applicants were not informed of this decision. 36. On 29 March 2005 the investigators examined the crime scene. No evidence was collected. 37. Between the end of March and the end of April 2005 the investigators questioned twenty of the applicants’ neighbours and relatives, all of whom gave similar statements to the effect that in the summer of 2001 Khamzat Umarov had been abducted by armed masked men and that later, in the autumn of 2001, his brother Ramzan had been also taken away by unidentified perpetrators; neither of them had returned home. 38. On 28 April 2005 the investigators suspended the investigation of the criminal case for failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicants were informed thereof. 39. On 10 September 2007 the supervising prosecutor criticised the investigation, stating that it was incomplete, and ordered that it be resumed owing to the need to take investigative steps. On 19 September 2007 the investigation was resumed. 40. On 24 September 2007 the investigators again granted the first applicant victim status in the criminal case and questioned her. A copy of her statement was not furnished by the Government. 41. On 17 October 2007 the investigators again questioned the brother of Khamzat Umarov, Mr Ru. Umarov, who reiterated his previously given statement. 42. On 19 October 2007 the investigation was again suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicants were informed thereof. 43. On 17 March 2008 the supervising prosecutor criticised the investigation, stating that it was incomplete, and ordered its resumption owing to the need to take investigative steps. 44. On 20 April 2008 the investigation of the criminal case was again suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicants were informed thereof. 45. On 1 June 2008 the supervising prosecutor criticised the investigation, stating that it was incomplete, and ordered that it be resumed owing to the need to take investigative steps. 46. On 20 June 2008 the investigators again questioned the brother of Khamzat Umarov, Mr Ru. Umarov, who reiterated his previously given statements. 47. On the same date the investigators asked the Chechnya FSB to inform them whether they had any information about Khamzat Umarov and whether he had been suspected of membership in illegal armed groups. A reply in the negative was received. 48. On 25 June 2008 the investigators questioned the head of the criminal search division of the Achkhoy-Martan ROVD, Mr S.-M. Sh., who stated that he had no information about the whereabouts of Khamzat Umarov and that the latter had not been involved in a blood feud or suspected of illegal activities. 49. On 1 July 2008 the investigation of the criminal case was again suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicants were informed thereof. 50. On 21 January 2009 the supervising prosecutor criticised the investigation, stating that it was incomplete, and ordered that it be resumed owing to the need to take investigative steps. 51. On 10 February 2009 the investigators questioned Mr S.Kh., who stated that in 2001 he had been the head of the Achkhoy-Martan village administration. The witness denied that in 2001 the head of the Achkhoy‑Martan VOVD had confirmed to him that Khamzat Umarov had been detained on their premises for questioning. 52. On 17 February 2009 the investigators again questioned the brother of Khamzat Umarov, Mr Ru. Umarov, who reiterated his previously given statements. 53. On 21 February 2009 the investigation of the criminal case was again suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicants were informed thereof. 54. On various dates between 2002 and 2008 the investigators forwarded a number of information requests to various law-enforcement agencies and hospitals, asking whether Khamzat Umarov had sought medical help, whether his corpse had been discovered in their districts, whether he had crossed state borders and whether the agencies had information about his whereabouts or detention on their premises. Replies in the negative were received. 55. The materials submitted indicate that the investigation of Khamzat Umarov’s disappearance has been suspended on at least six occasions and subsequently resumed due to the investigators’ failure to take necessary steps. It has not been completed to date. The applicants have not been informed of the progress of the criminal proceedings other than of their suspension and reopening. 56. In reply to a request made by the Court, the Government furnished the partial contents of criminal case no. 63008, running to 534 pages. The copies of the documents provided had double numbering. According to the applicants, the Government failed to submit a copy of a number of important witness statements proving their allegations. The applicants also expressed their doubts as to the authenticity of the witness statements allegedly made by their neighbours and fellow villagers, submitting that those individuals had not resided at the addresses indicated by the investigators (see paragraph 37 above). The Government did not comment on this part of the applicants’ submissions. 57. On 1 April 2008 the applicants complained to the Achkhoy-Martan District Court (“the district court”) of a lack of effective investigation of the criminal case. They argued that Khamzat Umarov had been abducted by federal military servicemen and that the six-year investigation of his kidnapping had failed to produce any results. The applicants asked the court to order an effective and thorough investigation, and to order the resumption of the proceedings and the taking of necessary investigative measures. 58. On 10 April 2008 the district court refused to examine the applicants’ complaint, stating that on 17 March 2008 the district prosecutor’s office had resumed the investigation of the criminal case.

5. The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Zawiercie. 6. In 1993 the applicant married A.N. In 1994 they had a son, D. Subsequently, the applicant and A.N. separated. Since their separation, they have been living in the same town and in the same street. 7. On 3 September 1996 the Zawiercie District Court issued an interim contact order. According to its terms, the applicant was allowed to visit the child every Tuesday and every first Saturday and third Sunday of the month, between 4 p.m. and 6.30 p.m. 8. Between 29 September 1996 and 5 October 1997 the Zawiercie police intervened on 12 occasions in order to facilitate the applicant's contact with his child. These interventions took place at A.N's place of residence and it would appear that on all these occasions the applicant was able to see the child. 9. On 27 May 1997 the Katowice Regional Court dissolved the applicant's marriage. It awarded parental rights to A.N., limited the applicant in the exercise of his rights and ordered that D.'s permanent residence be with his mother. The applicant was allowed to participate in decisions about the child's education and health. 10. On 1 September 1997, 5 May 1998 and 18 May 1999 the applicant made applications for fines to be imposed on A.N. under Article 1051 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He subsequently withdrew the applications. 11. On 4 March 1998 the District Court modified the access arrangements to allow the applicant to take his son for two weeks' holiday between 1 and 15 July. 12. Between 1 June 1998 and 28 January 1999 the Zawiercie police intervened on nine occasions in order to facilitate the applicant's contact with D. It appears that only on one of these occasions was the applicant unable to see D., as the child stated that he had not wished to see his father. 13. On 15 April 1999, on the applicant's motion, the Zawiercie District Court ordered A.N to allow the applicant's contact with the child on pain of a 100 PLN fine. 14. Between 18 April 1999 and 8 June 1999 the police intervened on eight occasions in order to enforce the applicant's contacts with his son. 15. On 9 December 1999 the applicant and his ex-wife concluded a court settlement concerning the applicant's visiting right. According to its terms the contacts were to be enforced under supervision of a court appointed guardian in order to protect D.'s well-being. 16. However, the mother failed to comply with the access arrangements. On 5 January 2000 the applicant asked the Zawiercie District Court to impose a fine on A.N. for failure to comply with the settlement. On 9 March 2000 the District Court ordered A.N. to make the child available for a visit (by 1 May 2000), on pain of having to pay a fine. 17. On 28 April 2000 the applicant lodged yet another request for a fine to be imposed on A.N. On 19 December 2000 the District Court dismissed that request. The court obtained reports from two experts including a psychologist and heard evidence from several witnesses. It considered that A.N had not turned the child against his father. It noted that the child had not wished to attend the meetings with his father. Moreover, because of the forced contacts, in particular the two-week holiday in 1998, D. started suffering from anxiety and fear. The court also made reference to the fact that the applicant had proposed not to have any contacts with the child for 5 years if A.N did not claim maintenance payments for that period. The applicant's further appeal was dismissed by the Katowice Regional Court on 28 February 2001. 18. Meanwhile, on 21 February 2000 the applicant filed a motion for amendment of the divorce decree in the part relating to parental rights. On 18 October 2000 the Zawiercie District Court dismissed his application. 19. The applicant appealed, and on 28 December 2000 the Katowice Regional Court gave a decision granting custody to the applicant and ordering that D.'s permanent residence be with his father. The mother was allowed to participate in decisions concerning the child's education and choice of profession. 20. On 29 December 2000 A.N. filed an application with the Zawiercie District Court to be granted sole custody of D. 21. On 23 August 2001 the District Court returned the applicant's request to impose a fine on A.N. since he had failed to pay the required court fee. His subsequent interlocutory appeal was dismissed on 15 November 2001. 22. On 12 October 2001 the Zawiercie District Court modified the decision of 28 December 2000. The court held that A.N. should be granted full custody over D. and that D.'s place of residence should be with his mother. The applicant was allowed to decide jointly about the child's education and choice of profession. 23. A further appeal lodged by the applicant was dismissed by the Czestochowa Regional Court on 19 December 2001. The court held that the applicant had not had a good relationship with his child and that the boy was afraid of him. The court stressed that the applicant could not have successfully claimed custody over D. since his son fled from him whenever he had seen him. 24. Meanwhile, the applicant asked the court to hand D. over to him. On 27 June 2001 the District Court gave an interim decision and held that while the custody proceedings were pending the child should stay with his mother. On 31 January 2002 the District Court refused to hand D. over to the applicant. 25. On 15 March 2002 the Zawiercie District Court dismissed the applicant's motion to impose a fine on A.N. for obstructing his access to the child. 26. On 6 October 2005 the applicant again requested that D. be restored to him. On 14 October 2005 the Zawiercie District Court refused his request. The applicant did not appeal against that decision. 27. On 16 December 2005 the applicant filed an application to be granted full parental rights. His application was dismissed by the Zawiercie District Court on 28 July 2006. The court held that D. had been living with his mother, with whom he had very close relations, and it was in the child's best interest to leave him with her. The court referred to the child's (then 12 years old) own statements that his mother had not obstructed his contact with the applicant. It was D. himself who had avoided contact with his father. The court further noted that between 2001 and 2005 (when A.N filed a claim for increase of maintenance payments) the applicant had not attempted to contact his son and to exercise his visiting rights. Their contact was limited to occasional meetings on the street, since they lived nearby. The applicant's appeal against this decision was dismissed on 27 September 2006 by the Czestochowa Regional Court. 28. On 24 March 2006 the applicant asked the court to impose a fine on the mother for obstructing his contacts with D. On 22 June 2006 the District Court dismissed his request. The applicant did not appeal against that decision.

6. The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Łódź. 7. On 21 November 1997 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of receiving and selling stolen goods. 8. On 22 November 1997 the Łódź District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) ordered that the applicant be detained on remand until 21 February 1998. The court referred to the strong probability of the applicant’s guilt and to the high risk of his hindering the proper conduct of the proceedings. The court also emphasised that it was likely that the applicant, if released, would go into hiding. 9. By a decision of 24 February 1998, the Łódź District Court prolonged the applicant’s detention on remand until 21 September 1998. The court considered that the reasons for which the detention had been ordered continued to exist. The decision was served on the applicant on 25 February 1998. 10. The applicant appealed, claiming that keeping him in custody between 21 February 1998 and 24 February 1998 had been unlawful since there had been no valid judicial decision authorising his detention. 11. On 25 March 1998 the Łódź Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) dismissed the applicant’s appeal as unsubstantiated. However, the court altered the decision of 24 February 1998 and prolonged the applicant’s detention on remand until 30 June 1998, finding that the case had not been complex and that the evidence against the applicant pointed to his guilt. 12. In a letter of 28 April 1998, the Łódź District Court admitted its mistake and confirmed that there had been no valid judicial decision authorising the applicant’s detention on remand between 21 February 1998 and 24 February 1998. It added that this period would be deducted from any sentence of imprisonment eventually imposed on the applicant. 13. On 5 June 1998 the Łódź District Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to 3 years’ imprisonment.

4. The applicant was born in 1929 and lives in Maastricht, the Netherlands. 5. In May 1995 a certain A.Š. broke in and occupied the applicant’s summer house in Sabunike near Zadar. Following the applicant’s successful civil action, on 8 October 2001 A.Š. vacated the house. 6. On 3 February 1996 the Amendment to the Civil Obligations Act (“the 1996 Amendment”) entered into force. It provided that all proceedings concerning actions for damages resulting from terrorist acts or acts of violence were to be stayed pending the enactment of new legislation on the subject. 7. On 20 March 1999 the applicant brought a civil action against the State and the County of Zadar (Županija Zadarska – “the County”) with the Zadar Municipal Court seeking damages. He argued that the State and the County were liable for A.Š.’s breaking into his house and the ensuing damage. In particular, the applicant sought compensation for the rent lost due to the prolonged inability to let the house to tourists and for the value of the stolen movable property. 8. On 25 May 2000 the Municipal Court dismissed the applicant’s claim. It found that A.Š.’s act was not to be qualified as an act of violence for which the State or the County was liable. Accordingly, there was no need to stay the proceedings pursuant to the 1996 Amendment. The applicant appealed. 9. On 17 April 2002 the Zadar County Court quashed the first-instance judgment and remitted the case. It found that the subject-matter of the case was to be considered an act of violence for which the State or the County was liable. Accordingly, it instructed the Municipal Court to stay the proceedings pursuant to the 1996 Amendment. 10. On 30 April 2002 the Municipal Court stayed the proceedings. 11. On 31 July 2003 the Act on Liability for Damage Resulting from Terrorist Acts and Public Demonstrations (“the 2003 Liability Act”) entered into force. 12. Pursuant to the 2003 Liability Act, on 15 February 2005 the Municipal Court resumed the proceedings and scheduled a hearing for 11 April 2005.

6. The first applicant was the mother of the second and third applicants. The fourth applicant is the second applicant’s daughter. 7. In 1968 the first applicant and her husband purchased from the State a three-room apartment which occupied the first floor of a two-storey building in Plovdiv. Its area was approximately 95 square metres. They also acquired a share in the plot on which the building was constructed and a share in the yard. 8. The whole property had become State owned by virtue of the nationalisations carried out by the communist regime in Bulgaria in 1947 and for several years afterwards. 9. In the years after 1968 the first applicant and her husband made improvements to the property and constructed an annex of 34 square metres and a garage in the yard. 10. On 29 September 1992, shortly after the adoption of the Restitution Law, the former pre-nationalisation owners brought proceedings under section 7 of that law against the first applicant and her husband. 11. Following the death of the first applicant’s husband, on an unspecified date the second and third applicants became co-owners of the property. The proceedings continued against the first, second and third applicants. 12. The District Court held nine hearings and examined witnesses and documentary evidence. Two adjournments, which caused a delay of approximately five months, were requested by the plaintiffs, the pre-nationalisation owners. 13. On 30 January 1995 the Plovdiv District Court found that the 1968 transaction was valid and rejected the claim. 14. On appeal, on 14 July 1995 the Plovdiv Regional Court upheld the lower court’s judgment. The courts examined and rejected the plaintiff’s allegation that the apartment had been acquired through abuse of official position. 15. On 20 May 1996 the Chief Public Prosecutor submitted to the Supreme Court a request for review. 16. On 22 July 1997 the Supreme Court of Cassation, to which the case was transferred following a reform in the judicial system, accepted the request and, considering that the lower courts had not examined all arguments of the plaintiffs, quashed their judgments and referred the case for a fresh examination. 17. In the renewed proceedings, on 21 July 1998 the Plovdiv District Court again rejected the plaintiffs’ claim against the first, second and third applicants. The plaintiffs appealed. 18. On 12 July 1999 the Plovdiv Regional Court quashed the lower court’s judgment, declared the 1968 contract null and void and restored the plaintiffs’ ownership of the first floor and the share in the plot and the yard. By final judgment of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 21 June 2000 that decision was upheld. The courts found that a relevant document had been signed by the Deputy Minister of Architecture and Building Planning instead of by the Minister personally and concluded that as a result the first applicant and her husband had not validly acquired the property in 1968. 19. The applicants, including the fourth applicant who apparently lived in the apartment at issue for an unspecified period, refused to leave the property. 20. In 2002 Mr and Mrs P., the persons to whom the restored owners had sold the property in February 2002, brought a rei vindicatio action against the four applicants. The statement of claim did not mention the garage. 21. In May 2002 Mr and Ms P. demolished the garage and built a new one. The applicants complained to the prosecuting authorities, who considered that the dispute was of a civil nature and had to be decided in court. 22. On 24 October 2002 the Plovdiv District Court delivered its judgment. It ordered the applicants to vacate the property. 23. As regards the annex, the court noted the absence of authorisation for its construction but decided that the rei vindicatio claim was futile as the applicants no longer possessed the annex, Mr and Mrs P having occupied it. The court rejected the claim on that ground. 24. As regards the garage, the court made remarks to the effect that it must be considered State owned, but did not rule on the issue, as Mr and Mrs P. had not claimed the garage. 25. Ensuing appeals by the applicants were unsuccessful. It appears that they vacated the first-floor apartment in January 2003. The proceedings ended with a final decision on 9 February 2004. 26. In 2000 it became possible for the first, second and third applicants to obtain partial compensation from the State, in the form of bonds which could be used in privatisation tenders or sold to brokers. The applicants did not make use of this opportunity within the relevant two-month time-limit, which expired in August 2000. In August 2006 they requested compensation bonds, arguing that a legislative amendment adopted in 2006 should be interpreted as renewing the time-limit. The regional governor refused. Ensuing appeals submitted by the first, second and third applicants were rejected by a final judgment of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 23 October 2008. The courts considered that the legislative amendment at issue did not give rise to a new entitlement to compensation bonds and therefore did not affect the relevant time-limit. 27. In 2005 Mr and Mrs P. brought an action against the second applicant, seeking compensation for the fact that she had failed to vacate the property in 2002. These proceedings ended on 10 July 2006. The second applicant was ordered to pay approximately 4,600 Bulgarian levs (BGN) in compensation (the equivalent of approximately 2,350 euros (EUR)).

5. The applicant was born in 1965 and is currently detained in Nowogród Prison. 6. Since 20 June 2003 the applicant has been serving an eight-year prison sentence imposed by the Poznan Regional Court following his conviction for rape. 7. He was previously held in Goleniów Prison. On several occasions he requested to be served meat-free meals on account of his religious dietary requirements. He submitted that he was a Buddhist and that he adhered strictly to the Mahayana Buddhist dietary rules which required refraining from eating meat. 8. On 19 January 2006 the prison dermatologist recommended that the applicant be placed on a meat-free diet in view of his health problems. For three months he was granted a “no pork” diet (PK diet) that included very little meat and was also applied to six Muslims detained in the Goleniów Prison. 9. On 20 April 2006 a doctor who examined the applicant considered that there were no medical grounds to continue granting the PK diet to the applicant. Consequently, the diet was discontinued. The applicant objected and threatened to go on a hunger strike. 10. On 27 April 2006 the applicant asked the District Prosecutor to institute criminal proceedings against the employees of Goleniów Prison. The applicant claimed that despite having requested on several occasions to be provided with a meat-free diet, he was receiving meals containing meat products. Since he could not eat meat for religious reasons he depended on food parcels from his family. He was forced to accept the meals and then throw them away. The refusal to accept them would have been regarded as a decision to start a hunger strike and would have entailed disciplinary punishment. On 13 June 2006 the Goleniów District Prosecutor discontinued the criminal proceedings in respect of the applicant's allegations. 11. On 3 July 2006 the Buddhist Mission in Poland sent a letter to the prison authorities supporting the applicant's request for a meat-free diet. They submitted that the Mahayana Buddhists had a serious moral problem when they were forced to eat meat. According to the rules, a Mahayana Buddhist should avoid eating meat to cultivate compassion for all living beings. They further asked the authorities simply to eliminate meat products from the applicant's meals. 12. On 17 July 2006 the applicant requested the Director of Goleniów Prison to be served meat-free meals in view of his religious dietary requirements. He noted that the PK diet contained meat products and therefore it did not satisfy his needs. The applicant's request was refused on 16 October 2006. That decision did not contain any reasons. 13. On 21 August 2006 and 31 August 2006 the applicant asked the Goleniów District Prosecutor to institute criminal proceedings against the prison guards. He alleged that there had been an interference with his religious convictions, in particular as the guards had referred to the Buddhist Mission in Poland as “a sect”. They had also thrown religious publications belonging to the applicant into a toilet. On 19 August 2006, after receiving a family visit, he was ordered to undergo a body search. The applicant took off his clothes except for his underwear, whereupon the prison guard allegedly touched his private parts. He was further ordered to squat and other prison guards ridiculed him. 14. On 29 October 2006 the Goleniów District Prosecutor refused to institute criminal proceedings against the persons concerned. It considered that the applicant's allegations were unfounded. The applicant was entitled to exchange correspondence with the Buddhist Mission in Poland and he could also telephone them. In addition, he was entitled to a diet that roughly corresponded to his religious requirements. However, the prosecutor stressed that as the applicant was kept in a single cell, there were no witnesses to the alleged ill-treatment by the prison officers and it was impossible to establish whether the events described by the applicant had actually taken place. 15. On 13 October 2006 the District Court dismissed the applicant's interlocutory appeal against the decision of 13 June 2006. The court held that the applicant, when refusing to accept meals containing meat, had referred to his alleged vegetarianism. The court considered that there was no information in the prison files showing that the applicant was a vegetarian, and in addition for 3 months he had agreed to the PK diet even though it was not a completely meat-free diet. 16. On 14 November 2006 in reply to the applicant's further complaints, the Szczecin Regional Prisons Inspector informed the applicant that the only special diet available in Goleniów Prison was the “PK” diet. That diet, with the exception of pork, consisted of various meat products, namely beef and poultry, as well as fish. A meat-free diet was not available in that prison. 17. On 20 November 2006 the Szczecin Prisons Inspector, in reply to yet another complaint from the applicant, again confirmed that the only special diet which took into account religious beliefs was the PK diet. In addition, he explained: “A convict has a right to change religion while serving a prison sentence and to profit from freedom of religion if he/she feels like that. However, this does not mean that the prison authorities are obliged to provide an individual with special food in order to meet the specific requirements of his faith. The question of food related to religion or cultural background should not lead convicts to manipulate the prison authorities in order to secure personal advantages.” 18. On 14 December 2006 the Goleniów District Court dismissed the applicant's interlocutory appeal against the decision of 29 September 2006. 19. On 25 June 2007 the Buddhist Mission in Poland again sent a letter to the Director of Goleniów Prison asking him to provide the applicant with a meat-free diet. 20. In a complaint lodged with the Szczecin Regional Court on 3 September 2007 the applicant argued that the diet he had been granted in Goleniów Prison did not take into account his religious beliefs. 21. On 3 December 2007 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant's complaint. The court held that the applicant had been granted a special diet since 18 July 2006. It further noted that given the technical conditions in the prison kitchen, the transporting of meals and understaffing in the kitchen, it was not possible to provide each prisoner individually with food in conformity with his or her religious dietary requirements. The court also confirmed that meals without pork were prepared. 22. In March 2009 the applicant was transferred to Nowogród Prison. On 2 May 2009 he applied to be served meat-free meals in view of his religious dietary requirements. The applicant's request was refused on 13 May 2009. 23. On 12 August 2009 in reply to the applicant's complaint, the Ombudsman informed him that the prison authorities had not been obliged to prepare special meals taking into consideration different dietary requirements. In addition, since the applicant was the only Buddhist in this prison, it would have put too much strain on the prison authorities.

4. The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Hajdúsámson. 5. On 2 May 1989 the applicant filed for divorce. She also requested the division of the matrimonial property. 6. After having pronounced the parties’ divorce in a partial decision, having held several hearings and obtained the opinions of experts, on 9 November 1994 the Debrecen District Court adopted a decision on the property. This was reversed by the Hajdú-Bihar County Regional Court on 20 June 1996. On 24 June 1997 the Supreme Court’s review bench quashed this decision and remitted the case to the second-instance court. 7. In the resumed second-instance proceedings, the Regional Court held a hearing and quashed the District Court’s decision on 27 October 2000. 8. In the resumed first-instance proceedings, on 5 June 2001 the District Court adopted a new decision concerning the property. This was reversed by the Regional Court on 23 November 2001. 9. On 10 November 2004 a three-judge panel of the Supreme Court’s review bench examined the respondent’s petition for review on the merits. It held that the taking of evidence in the case had been comprehensive and without a fault and that the applicant’s petition did not disclose a breach of the relevant law. It therefore upheld the Regional Court’s judgment.

9. The applicants, D.P. and J.C., who are sister and brother, are United Kingdom nationals, born in 1964 and 1967 and living in London and Nottingham, respectively. 10. The applicants’ mother married the applicants’ father in 1964. The first applicant was born on 26 November 1964. Three more sisters were born, T., A. and J. The second applicant, who was J.’s twin, was born on 1 November 1967. 11. The social services of the local authority, Nottingham County Council, were involved with the family from 1967 concerning problems largely connected to severe financial difficulties. In January 1968, the applicants’ mother was sent on “a holiday for tired mothers” and the second applicant and his twin were placed in care for seven months. From July 1967, practical and financial assistance was provided to the family. In June 1968, they were provided with a council house. In 1969, there were indications that the applicants’ father was beating their mother. Allegations later emerged that the father had inflicted physical abuse on the children during this period. 12. In 1970, both parents were committed to prison for six months for electricity meter offences. The first applicant and T. stayed with their maternal grandmother, while the second applicant and two sisters were taken into voluntary care. A. was discharged to the mother’s care on her release from prison. 13. On 20 July 1971, in matrimonial proceedings, the mother was given custody of the applicants and their siblings. The court ordered that the first applicant, T. and A. be subject to the supervision of the local authority under matrimonial supervision orders, pursuant to section 2(1)(f)ii of the Matrimonial Proceedings (Magistrates Court) Act 1960. As the second applicant and J. were still in the voluntary care of the local authority, they were not made subject to supervision orders. 14. The second applicant and J. remained in voluntary care until 19 November 1971 when reunited with their mother. Social services carried out frequent visits to the family thereafter. 15. On 5 January 1972, the mother gave birth to a son M. from a brief relationship. 16. While one medical report noted that the second applicant had suffered from a soiling problem from a very young age and that it had become daily after the birth of M., the social services records gave attention to this problem from 30 April 1973. 17. On 11 February 1974, in the parents’ divorce proceedings, the matrimonial supervision order was varied to include the second applicant and J. 18. According to the applicants, the relationship between the mother and N.C. began in February-March 1974, though he had been acting as a babysitter for the mother for some time previously. N.C. was five years younger than the mother, who was about 28 years old at this time. They were married in September 1974. Social service records noted that the general standards in the home improved following N.C.’s arrival and that the children seemed to be accepting him as a substitute father. Positive comment was made on N.C. adjusting well to the role of husband and father, and that the mother was benefiting from his support in finding more time for the children. It was observed that the second applicant was very wary of N.C. and that his soiling problems were continuing. 19. In 1975, the social services involvement centred on the family’s financial difficulties and the second applicant’s soiling. He was admitted twice to hospital as an in-patient in that connection in 1975 and 1976. 20. During the period from 2 January 1975 to 28 August 1975, there were 46 visits from the relevant social worker. It was noted that N.C. had been supportive of the mother during her pregnancy and had strengthened his relationship with the children and their trust in him. M. was perceived as benefiting from his stabilising influence and J. had grown to rely on him. A. and the first applicant were noted as showing some resentment of N.C. as a permanent authority figure. The first applicant was seen however as having become more lively, with fewer illnesses and learning to trust N.C. The second applicant, alone among the children, had shown no physical improvement, was suffering teasing and taunting at home and at school, and continued to be wary and jealous of N.C. These perceptions were confirmed by different social workers, education officers and health workers. 21. It was noted that the second applicant had stopped soiling during a three-month stay in hospital. When he returned home in about November 1975, the soiling recommenced. The social worker discussed this with the mother and N.C. and considered that it was probably linked to the stress within the home. N.C. was facing charges of arson and there were fears that he would be sent to prison. In January 1976, following discussions at the school, the social worker noted that the second applicant was not soiling himself regularly at school, but rather on the way home from school. 22. On 16 June 1976, the social worker noted, following an arranged holiday: “I was able to inform [N.C. and their mother] of the girls’ excellent behaviour on holiday. This obviously pleased the couple who, despite all their faults, care greatly for their children... N.C. is such a caring figure in this house. I feel a child of his own will some how repay his devotion to his stepchildren.” 23. In mid-1976 N.C. was convicted of arson and sentenced to 9 months’ imprisonment. The social worker observed that the children were extremely upset at his imprisonment. At a multi-disciplinary meeting concerning the second applicant on 23 September 1976, his problems were considered by a team including teachers, psychiatrists, health workers and hospital staff. The notes indicated that no direct cause of the second applicant’s problems was identified and that his mother was considered to be “less caring” than she should be. 24. N.C. returned to the family in December 1976, at about the same time that the second applicant returned from a period in hospital. A new social worker attached to the family commented favourably on N.C.’s conduct, witnessing him cooking a meal for the children and making coffee for everyone. 25. The second applicant continued to receive out-patient treatment from the health service and had monthly psychiatric treatment. The detailed records which exist show no mention or suspicion of child abuse. The soiling had again stopped during his stay in hospital in 1976. It started again when he was at home. 26. On 29 September 1977 S., the daughter of N.C. and the mother, was born (the mother had suffered a series of miscarriages before this birth). Financial difficulties continued for the family, which social services sought to resolve. They continued to monitor the well-being of the children. Particular consideration was given to the second applicant’s continued soiling, though in December 1977 it was observed to have become more infrequent. On 10 November 1977, it was recorded that the second applicant was being bathed by N.C. as he was very averse to washing himself properly. 27. A report of 8 March 1978 noted that J., who was attending a group for young people organised by the social services, was causing concern as her sexual awareness was possibly greater than “normal” in a child of her age. 28. On 29 June 1978, the social worker was called urgently to the children’s school after the children had told the teacher that N.C. had hit them and their mother had knocked the baby on the floor. The incident was investigated. No physical injury was found, and N.C. and the mother had talked about the stress which they had been under. No further action was taken. 29. In August 1978, the case was transferred to another social worker Mr C. who remained with the family until August 1981. His diary for 4 October 1978 noted that he had spoken to the second applicant alone and sought to get him to explain why he had a soiling problem. “He was unable to answer properly but said that he knew he wanted to go to the toilet but for reasons he couldn’t explain he didn’t make the effort. ... [The mother and N.C.] have tried a variety of methods to attempt to modify his behaviour... The only time success has been achieved is when he has been removed from home and obviously this accounts for some suggestions [from the headmaster] that maybe the answer is for him to be removed on a more permanent basis. As stated previously [the mother and N.C.] are very against this and I would prefer to consider all the alternatives before suggesting his removal. In any case, without the consent of his parents it is extremely unlikely that the soiling problem would sufficiently constitute reason for taking him into care.” 30. The records of Mr C. with the family and its individual members made no mention of any reference to sexual abuse. In his statement of 9 September 1999, he had no recollection that the first applicant made any complaint to him. His notes record three examples of conversations during this period: “11.10.78 [The first applicant] had refused to go to school today and I spoke to her about this. I do not feel that there was any real problem about it other than [the mother and N.C.] allowing her to get away with it.” “7.12.79 [the first applicant] claimed that she did not want to go to school because [N.C.] was always getting on to her.” “12.6.80 Talked to [the first applicant ] alone and she was very critical of the way [the foster parents] treated her... After talking to her it became evident that she had recently been home and they had asked her to go back; this was obviously playing on [her] mind and causing her to be increasingly critical of [her foster parents] ...[She] was insisting that she wanted to go back home...” 31. The first applicant was truanting frequently during this period. On 28 May 1980, she was placed in care at both her and her parents’ request. The application for her to be taken into voluntary care signed by Mr C. stated: “The ... family have a long history of contact with the social services department and much support has been given over a number of years. The problems presented are very much part of a total family situation which lacks a depth of relationship and stumbles from crisis to crisis. The symptoms of this situation are that the children (6) present individual problems including incontinence and school truancy and the family are stigmatised within their community as a “problem family”. Efforts have been made by myself and other workers to improve matters, including a “family group” meeting on a weekly basis, but progress is slow and the basic problems remain. Whilst these efforts will be maintained it is considered that [the first applicant] the eldest is now beyond the control of her parents and this is not likely to improve. She is rebelling against her parents and family by constantly truanting from school and frequently staying out until a late hour. I am convinced that her behaviour is very much tied to her unhappiness in the family and feel that a foster placement would allow her to return to an acceptable level of behaviour which she is more than capable of achieving.” 32. The first applicant stayed in foster care for less than a month and on 20 June 1980 was returned at her own and her parents’ request. 33. On 7 July 1980, an incident occurred in the family home, in which A. alleged that she had been hit by her parents during a “great family row”. The mother asked the social services to take her into care, along with the second applicant and J. It was decided in the end to place A. with foster parents and leave the others in the family home. The second applicant and J. were noted as being insistent that they remain at home. A. returned home at her own request and that of her mother and N.C. in September 1980. 34. On 10 November 1980, there was an incident when the first applicant ran away from home because of a family row. She returned the next day. 35. The matrimonial supervision order in respect of the first applicant expired on 26 November 1980 when she reached sixteen years of age. 36. On 12 December 1980, the mother and N.C. had a second child, a son W. 37. From some time at the end of April 1981, the first applicant’s boyfriend, A.T., began to live in the family house. 38. On 29 May 1981, there was an incident reported to the social services when N.C. hit J. Though N.C. admitted that he had caught her on the cheek, he stated that he had not intended to hit her on the face – he had swiped at her in anger as she had been extremely cheeky. As J. was not marked from any injury on the face, the matter was not pursued further. 39. Care proceedings were instituted in respect of A. due to her non-attendance at school. In November 1981, she went to live with her father, where her attendance improved and the proceedings were dropped. 40. On 13 November 1981, the Education Welfare Officer contacted the social services about the second applicant and his twin J. who were “practically hysterical”. The social worker talked to the second applicant in the absence of N.C. and the mother but “without a degree of success”. He arranged to talk to him and his sister alone the next day and told them that if they had problems they should let him know. They mentioned to him some matters, e.g. they were picked on at school and their mother had borrowed money from them (their earnings from a paper round). They promised to go to school and inform him if they had any problems. 41. On 27 November 1981, the social services attended the family home following a call from N.C., alleging that the second applicant and J. had been smashing up the house. It appeared that the first applicant’s boyfriend, A.T., had been fighting with J. Potato knives and pieces of wood had been thrown. It was agreed to place the second applicant and J. in voluntary care. 42. On 29 November 1981, the second applicant and J. ran away from the foster home to the family home. They were returned to the foster home. 43. On about 30 November 1981, N.C. left the family home. 44. On 4 January 1982, the second applicant and J. returned home. 45. On 27 January 1982, the second applicant was placed in a children’s home at the mother’s request. 46. The social services noted N.C.’s return in February-March 1982. 47. In or about March 1982, the first applicant gave birth to a son, the father of whom was her boyfriend A.T. 48. On 23 April 1982, the matrimonial supervision order in respect of the second applicant and J. was varied to a care order. In a report of 2 February 1982 to the court, the social services had described the family situation as follows: “This family have been known to the Local Authority since 1967 and throughout this time have had numerous complex problems... N.C. has always accepted that his role with the children was difficult but he did provide a great deal of support to [the mother] and has tried to help her through the many difficulties that a large family inevitably produce. N.C. has not worked on a regular basis for some time, although he has shown on occasions that he is prepared to work hard over long periods... [N.C. and the mother] appear to have developed a pattern of life which stutters from one crisis to another, but on 30 November 1981 N.C. decided that he could not stand the situation any longer so he left the family home. He did, however, return for a few days in an attempt to reconcile his marriage, but the behaviour and attitude of [the second applicant and J.] towards him was so bad that he returned to his lodgings. N.C. visited his wife regularly and helped to the best of his ability to assist and support his wife... The family seem unable to break out of the trap of financial hardship and this coupled with the relationship difficulties between N.C. and the older children created a weak foundation on which to build a strong family situation. The family have received much support from our department, and others, to strengthen family relationships and advice on financial matters but success has been limited and there is often difficulty in maintaining the status quo. The family have rent arrears of over £1,000 together with gas and electricity arrears. At the present time our department is negotiating with the Electricity Board to try and prevent the supply from being disconnected yet again. In order to encourage the children to relate better to one another and to their parents, they were involved in various group situations supervised by our department. They have invariably shown themselves to be pleasant, co-operative children, who respond to the individual attention lacking at home. Last year a social worker ran a group for the whole family in an attempt to encourage them to work on improving their family relationships and also their relationship with the wider community in which to an extent they are stigmatised. This met with some success but at the end of the group the situation quickly reverted back. ... [The second applicant and J.] have followed the pattern of their two elder sisters for their school attendance has deteriorated... [N.C. and the mother] found themselves unable to make them attend school and their behaviour at home became intolerable so much so that on 27 November 1981 [the mother] asked our department to receive [them] into Voluntary Care for a period of six months. The twins were placed with foster parents ... They started to truant the following week... The mother ... became very depressed and according to [the mother], the neighbours and [the first applicant] the twins took full advantage of their mother’s illness and ran riot in the house and were not adverse to throwing items at the other residents. The situation became so bad that on 27 January 1982 [the mother] telephoned our office and pleaded with us to take the children because she had no control over them whatsoever and was frightened in case she struck out and hurt them. Our department agreed to her request and on visiting the house the twins ran from the house. They were found shortly afterwards and placed separately in childrens’ homes... N.C. believes that if [the second applicant and J.] are not at home there is a good chance that he and [the mother] could reconcile their marriage... The twins could be capable of persuading their mother to take them out of Voluntary Care and the situation would, as on past experience, revert to non school attendance and breakdown of the family unit. [The first applicant] will hopefully be given the tenancy of a council house after the birth of her baby in March and with the twins in care it would seem more likely that [N.C. and the mother] would be able to care for the three younger children in a satisfactory manner. It is for these reasons that our department is asking for the supervision order on [the second applicant and J.] to be varied to a matrimonial care order. This action would ensure that the twins could not manipulate their mother and also have a period of stability both socially and educationally.” 49. Pursuant to the care order, the second applicant remained in the children’s home where he was recorded as making reasonably good progress. He was spending alternate weekends in the family home. 50. In a report dated 13 December 1982 on the second applicant in the children’s home, it was noted that there was no feedback from him on the home situation or how he was relating at home, the second applicant giving no insight into the structure or lifestyle there. An entry in the social services records noted on 14 March 1984 that the second applicant was not happy about going home at weekends but the reason was not known. In an interview with the social worker in the children’s home in April 1984, it was recorded that he would not say why he did not want to go home or if he had problems there. The social worker told him that no-one could help him unless he shared his problems. Other entries in the records indicated that on 8 April 1984 he returned after having had a good weekend at home and that when he went home at Easter he requested permission to extend his stay. 51. In January 1984, M. was made subject of a care order due to his non-attendance at school and placed with foster parents. 52. On 30 April 1984, N.C. was convicted of theft and sentenced to six months’ imprisonment. 53. On 4 June 1984, the second applicant went home on a trial basis. 54. In August 1984, N.C. was released from prison. 55. On 20 September 1984, the care order was discharged on the second applicant. 56. During 1984, the first applicant married. In 1986, the second applicant went to live with her. 57. During 1992, S. (aged fourteen) gave birth to a baby H. and allegations were made that N.C. was the father, though S. in her statements denied this and told the social services that the father was a boy her own age. The social services had been informed of the pregnancy by the mother in April 1992. 58. In November 1992, A. informed a social worker that she had been sexually abused by N.C. from the age of 10 to 17 years. On 26 November 1992, she gave a statement to the police. The police also interviewed J., the second applicant and other family members. A. stated, inter alia, that during a row she and J. had once told her mother about the abuse in N.C.’s presence. N.C. and their mother responded by hitting them. In her statement, J. recalled that the abuse was never discussed between the children and that “it was almost accepted that it happened”. She had tried to drop hints to their mother but did not tell her what was happening as she felt that she would be rejected. She used to misbehave hoping that her mother would give her attention and listen to her. The mother claimed that she had never seen or heard of any abuse occurring. S. denied that N.C. had acted inappropriately with her. 59. The first applicant initially refused to give a statement. In the Child Protection Case Conference minutes of 22 February 1993, it was recorded that though she admitted to having been sexually abused by N.C. she was adamant that she did not wish to become involved or make a formal statement. 60. On 19 February 1993, N.C. was interviewed by the police. He was charged with counts of rape, indecent assault and of inciting the second applicant to assault J. and J. to assault the second applicant. 61. On 22 February 1993, an Initial Child Protection Case Conference placed S., H. and W. on the Child Protection Register. It noted that the allegations of abuse in the home had come to light on 4 November 1992 when a health worker informed the social services of A.’s disclosures of abuse by N.C. It now appeared that at least four of the children had been abused by N.C. The mother had told the social services that J. was a liar and denied that any of the children had disclosed any sexual abuse to her. An Education Officer was noted as stating that he had always been of the opinion that any abuse was physical, and a social worker recalled A. telling him that N.C. had used totally inappropriate/sexualised language to the children. These entries also appeared: “In the opinion of [B.H.], from reading the files, it would appear that there have been many concerns about the behaviour of the children within the family which may indicate abuse.” “[G.T.] the officer in charge of the Spring Street Family Centre reported that [A.] had discussed issues of sexual abuse with a social work student some years previously but nothing specific was noted in the records. ...” 62. On 31 January 1994, the social services were informed by the second applicant that N.C. had been staying with the mother and visiting the house regularly in breach of bail conditions. N.C. was arrested the next day and remanded in custody. 63. On 16 February 1994, the first applicant made a statement to the police. 64. Around 22 March 1994, N.C. admitted the allegations made by both applicants. On 25 May 1994, he pleaded guilty to 2 counts of attempted rape and 3 counts of indecent assault (on A., J. and the second applicant). He was sentenced to 9 years’ imprisonment, for which one attempted rape and 2 indecent assaults on the first applicant were also taken into consideration. 65. According to their statements, the applicants had suffered the following abuse: The first applicant 66. From 1972, when she was about eight, to about 1980, the first applicant was sexually abused on a regular basis by N.C. This occurred once a week usually on Saturdays (when her mother went out) and on any other occasion when she and N.C. were alone in the house. N.C. regularly required the first applicant to masturbate him. On at least two occasions he required her to place a nail in the end of his penis. He used to bath her (and her sisters) until the age of thirteen and during that time he was touching her (and her sisters) in her vagina and breasts. He raped her at the age of 14. At the age of 15 he forced her to take his penis into her mouth and then forced her to have sexual intercourse with him. The abuse continued until about 1980 when the first applicant’s boyfriend moved into the family home. 67. The first applicant claimed that she was acting against her will and she felt grossly humiliated in her own eyes. She stated that she was too afraid to tell her mother. When the first applicant, for example, made an attempt on her life in front of her mother after she was raped by N.C., her mother responded by simply laughing. The first applicant did not complain of the rape knowing that this would entail a gynaecological examination. The second applicant 68. From about 1978, when he was about ten, the second applicant was sexually abused by N.C. on a regular basis, i.e. on Friday, Saturday or Sunday evenings when his mother was out. This continued until January 1981 (though according to a psychiatric report the second applicant claimed that he was sexually abused from the age of six to sixteen), when the second applicant, at the age of fourteen, began absenting himself from school. He was taken into voluntary care by the local authority because his mother was unable to cope and placed in a children’s home. Even then, however, the second applicant was sexually abused during weekend visits at home. N.C. would masturbate the second applicant and tell him to masturbate him. On occasions N.C. would require the second applicant to touch his twin sister J. on the vagina and would require J. to masturbate the second applicant. The second applicant did this unwillingly and because N.C. threatened him that there would be trouble if he did not. The second applicant did not report to his mother for fear of not being believed and from fear of N.C. The applicants’ mother, although it was not clear whether she was aware of N.C.’s conduct, did not take any interest when the children were distressed. The second applicant continued to be abused until he began to live independently. The health of the applicants 69. Both applicants suffered extreme humiliation from the activities in which they were required to engage. Both had extreme difficulty in reporting the matter to the police and were only able to reveal the full extent of the abuse after several statements. Both applicants have suffered long term depression and trauma as a result of the abuse and have submitted psychiatric reports in respect of this. As a consequence of her abuse, the first applicant has been diagnosed as suffering from depression on and off throughout her life, which on occasions could last for months. She suffered from a personality disorder associated with feelings of low self esteem, anxiety, anger, aggression, social phobia and to some degree agoraphobia. She has had nightmares for most of her life and has experienced suicidal thoughts. Over the past few years she has suffered from irritable bowl and migraine headaches which have been diagnosed as being partly due to stress suffered because of her abuse as a child. She has been attending weekly counselling since January 1994. 70. The second applicant has also suffered psychological problems as a result of his treatment which were exacerbated after the police investigation into his sexual abuse. His personality has been adversely affected. He experienced mood swings and suffers from anxiety, anger and aggression. He had little enjoyment of life and, as a consequence of his condition, he had less energy and found it hard to concentrate. He experienced difficulty in forming relationships. He has suffered from epilepsy since the age of 19 which is said to complicate his psychological condition. The second applicant has various minor criminal convictions for theft and like offences prior to 1993 which could, it is argued, be a result of the abuse suffered. Information given to the social services 71. The applicants claimed that they had informed the social services of the abuse as follows. 72. For the first time, in 1978, both applicants and their sisters told the visiting social worker that their stepfather hit them. On another occasion during 1978, the first applicant reported to the new social worker, Mr C., that she and the second applicant were being assaulted by their stepfather. On that occasion the applicants’ mother was asked by the social services whether any abuse was taking place but denied the allegations. No action was taken by the social services department. 73. After continued sexual assaults, the first applicant states that on one of her regular meetings at the social worker’s office she was asked why she was being difficult at home and running away. She told them that N.C. was hitting her and doing “other things” to her and she wanted to leave home. The first applicant stated that N.C. raped her on 16 September 1978, which was the day her half sister, S., was born. She claims that the social services did not believe her when she told them of the “things” that were going on and thought that she was jealous of the birth of the baby. 74. During the police investigation, the second applicant states that he was informed by the police for the first time that there was information on the social services files which indicated that the social services department had been aware of the sexual abuse in N.C.’s household. Attempts at redress at a domestic level 75. On 5 May 1994, the second applicant made an application to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, as a victim of a crime, which made him an offer of compensation of 1,500 pounds sterling (GBP), which he accepted. On 12 July 1994, the first applicant also made an application to the Board which made her an offer of compensation of GBP 3,000 which she did not accept. 76. On 24 June 1994, the second applicant’s solicitors wrote to the social services department asking for information about the files relating to him. On 13 July 1994, solicitors for the first applicant wrote to the social services department complaining of the abuse and requesting information. They were referred to solicitors for the local authority’s insurers. On 27 September 1994, the applicants’ solicitors wrote to those solicitors complaining that the “Local Authority failed to protect both of our clients from persistent abuse in particular perpetrated by [N.C.].” 77. On 11 October 1994, the applicants applied for legal aid. The Legal Aid Board refused legal aid on 24 October 1994, finding that there were no reasonable grounds for taking proceedings. The appeal against the refusal was dismissed on 9 February 1995. 78. In or about February or March 1995, the second applicant approached the local authority personally with a complaint, and was told that he could see his social services file with third party information removed. Two days later, this offer was withdrawn. 79. On 21 March 1995, the local authority solicitors wrote to the first applicant’s solicitors: “We regret that the principle of Public Interest Immunity means that the Council will be unable to voluntarily disclose information relating to your client.” 80. On 29 September 1995, the local authority solicitors wrote a similar letter in relation to the second applicant’s complaints. 81. On 23 February 1996, legal aid was granted to the second applicant for counsel’s advice in respect of an action against the local authority. 82. On 19 August 1996, the second applicant brought proceedings in Nottingham County Court claiming damages for negligence and breach of statutory duty under the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 and/or the Child Care Act 1980 by the local authority and the social workers employed by them, acting as their servants and agents because they failed inter alia: – to carry out a proper investigation of the complaints now or of the alleged abuse at the time, – to remove him from the care of N.C. and his mother. The second applicant alleged that the local authority owed him a duty of care, had acted in breach of that duty and breached their statutory duty, causing him loss and damage. He claimed breach of statutory duty in that the local authority failed to grant him access to the records held by them, contrary to section 1 of the Access to Personal Files Act 1987. 83. The local authority applied to strike the case out on the basis that the second applicant had no reasonable cause of action. 84. On 20 January 1997, the application was struck out by the District Judge as disclosing no cause of action following the cases of X. and Others v. Bedfordshire County Council ([1995] 3AER 353) and H v. Norfolk County Council ([1997] 1 FLR 384), in which it was held that there was no cause of action in negligence or for breach of statutory duty against a local authority in respect of any alleged failure by the local authority to discharge its statutory duties relating to child care. 85. In the light of the decisions of X. and Others v. Bedfordshire County Council and H v. Norfolk County Council and the judgment of Nottingham County Court, counsel advised both applicants that they could not pursue domestic proceedings against the County Council. 86. In or about September 1997, the local authority gave the second applicant sight of edited extracts from the social services files. 87. In an affidavit dated 9 September 1999, the social worker, Mr C., stated that he had no recollection of having any conversation with the first applicant in which she had said that N.C. had sexually abused her. He remembered the family very well, and when he left the area in 1981 he did not recall that any accusations of sexual abuse had been made. He had made detailed running records of his involvement with the family and if there had been any suggestion of sexual abuse by N.C. he was confident that it would be in those records.

8. The applicants teach as temporary staff at the polytechnic school in Piraeus (Τεχνολογικό Εκπαιδευτικό Ίδρυμα Πειραιά) on the basis of private-law contracts. On 22 October 1992 they sued their employer for a supplement to their salary, as research allowance (ερευνητική χορηγία - hereinafter “the benefit”), that had been granted by ministerial decision no. 2023080/2538/0022/SHET.2057/1989 to “those teaching at polytechnics”. They served their action (επίδοση αγωγής) to the school on 27 October 1992. 9. The applicants relied on a number of decisions by the Court of Appeal in Piraeus granting the benefit in question to academic staff of the polytechnic school with the applicants’ status. Their action was one of several actions pending before the Piraeus courts at the time. 10. On 30 September 1993 the single-member first instance civil court (Μονομελές Πρωτοδικείο) of Piraeus considered that the applicants were entitled to the benefit. It awarded GRD 600,000 to applicant no. 1, GRD 570,000 to each of applicants nos. 2-5, GRD 380,000 to each of applicants nos. 6 and 7, GRD 300,000 to each of applicants nos. 8-12, GRD 450,000 to each of applicants nos. 13-20, GRD 330,000 to each of applicants nos. 21-23 and GRD 210,000 to applicant no. 24. The court also held that the applicants should be awarded legal interest on the above‑mentioned sums from the date when they served their action to the school, namely from 27 October 1992. 11. On 11 February 1994 the school appealed. 12. On 31 August 1994 Parliament enacted Law no. 2233/1994. Article 2 § 2 of that law provided the following: the ministerial decision of 1989, according to its true meaning, concerned only permanent staff; any claims that had not been recognised by final decisions were statute-barred; all pending court cases were discontinued. 13. On 19 July 1995 the Court of Appeal of Piraeus upheld the school’s appeal (decision no. 1001/1995). The court considered that Article 2 § 2 of Law no. 2233/1994 “is truly interpretative and has retroactive effect (Article 77 § 1 of the Constitution)”, and that “it clearly results from these provisions that the temporary staff of the polytechnic schools are not entitled to the benefit provided for by the ministerial decision [of 1989]”. The court continued: “Moreover... Articles 4 and 22 of the Constitution ... provide for equal pay for work of equal value rendered ... However, the principle of non-discrimination ... is relented when the differentiation in the pay for work of equal value is imposed by reasons of general public and social interest. Such a reason, which justifies the fixing by the legislator of a different pay among employees who render ... the same work, exists when the ones work on the basis of public law contracts and the others on the basis of private law contracts, i.e. when each group belongs to a different category, ruled by a different legal status entailing different ... rights and obligations. Therefore the judgment under appeal which ... considered that [the applicants] as temporary staff of the school ... working on the basis of private law contracts, are entitled to receive the benefit ... was wrong and did not interpret correctly the law, which was in fact interpreted by the ensuing (truly) interpretative Law no. 2233/1994, and thus the doubt which was created due to its ambiguity has been removed. In view of the fact that by virtue of that law the benefit is given only to permanent staff and not to temporary staff ... like [the applicants], the constitutional principle of equal pay for work of equal value is not violated, given that this deviation is imposed by the general public and social interest, because a full equation of the pay of these different categories of working people would overrule the basic principle of free negotiation of the employment conditions in the public sector ...” 14. On 20 June 1996 the applicants appealed in cassation relying, inter alia, on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 15. On 25 July 1997 the Court of Cassation considered that the 1994 law simply interpreted the 1989 ministerial decision, did not have the purpose of resolving the litigation and did not interfere with the applicants’ rights under the Convention. It rejected their appeal (decision no. 1328/1997).

5. The applicant was born in 1963 and lived in Voronezh until his arrest. He is now serving his sentence in the correctional colony in the town of Semiluki, Voronezh Region. The applicant is a former military officer. 6. On 12 July 2001 the bodies of two military officers were found at the checkpoint of a military unit. The officers had been brutally killed with an axe. The service gun of one of the officers had been stolen. 7. Four days later, on 16 July 2001, the applicant was arrested on suspicion of two counts of murder. He was taken to the Sovetskiy District police department in Voronezh where police officers allegedly spent several hours beating him up. According to the applicant, policemen offered him contaminated alcohol. While under the influence of alcohol he signed a statement confessing to the murder of the military officers. 8. Later on 16 July 2001 the applicant was placed in the Police department temporary detention centre. As follows from a letter sent by the head of the detention centre to the applicant’s lawyer on 21 November 2001, on admission to the centre the applicant was examined by a doctor, who recorded bruises on his nose and under both eyes. The doctor also noted that the injuries had been acquired prior to the applicant’s admission to the centre and that the applicant had not requested any medical assistance. 9. On the same day the applicant, questioned as a suspect in the murder investigation, complained to a military prosecutor that he had written the confession statement under violent duress by the police officers. The applicant, supported by his lawyer, Ms Bautina, requested the investigator to authorise a medical examination for him. 10. On 20 July 2001 a senior military prosecution investigator and a doctor examined the applicant in the presence of two attesting witnesses. According to the applicant, a police officer who had taken part in the beatings on 16 July 2001 escorted him to that medical examination and observed it. The senior investigator drew up a report, which in the relevant part read as follows: “The examination established: ... fading bruises on the skin of the median third of the both shoulders, a fading bruise on the left infrascapular region, ([the bruise] was inflicted three to seven days ago). There is a subconjunctival haemorrhage in the pericorneal zone of the right eye ...” 11. On 19 December 2001 the case was committed for trial to the Military Court of the Fourth Circuit. 12. At the hearing on 4 July 2002 the applicant complained to the Military Court that he had been beaten up after his arrest and that the confession had been extracted from him under torture. In particular, the applicant stated that on 16 July 2001 he had been taken to the police department where three policemen had struck him and kicked him in the face and stomach. They had also thrown him against a wall several times. He had had no choice but to write that confession. After he had signed the statement, he had been given some vodka. A military prosecutor had questioned him in the presence of his lawyer and he had renounced the confession, alleging that it had been extracted under duress. On 20 July 2001 he had written another confession statement. The applicant stressed that he had not been beaten up, but he had been afraid that torture would have been applied if he had not confessed. 13. On 16 July 2002 the Military Court of the Fourth Circuit found the applicant guilty of two counts of manslaughter and theft of a weapon and sentenced him to fifteen years’ imprisonment. The Military Court excluded the applicant’s confession made on 16 July 2001. In particular, it held as follows: “Having examined [the applicant’s] complaints that between 16 and 25 July 2001 he was beaten up by police officers of the Sovetskiy District police department of Voronezh, who allegedly kicked and hit him on the head, face and body, and threw him against a wall, the court finds as follows. Witnesses, Mr B., Mr N., Mr P., Mr Y., Mr V., Mr S., [and] Mr O., testified that they had not used physical force or psychological pressure against [the applicant] when he had been kept in the Sovetskiy District police department in Voronezh and no one had beaten [the applicant] up in their presence. An official investigation carried out by the Internal Security Division of the Voronezh Regional police department did not establish as fact that the applicant had been beaten up by police officers of the Sovetskiy District police department of Voronezh. However, as it follows from the statement of the head of the temporary detention centre of the police department in Voronezh, on 16 July 2001, on admission to the centre [the applicant] was diagnosed with haematomas on his nose and under his left and right eyes. In such circumstances, the court accepts that before his admission to the temporary detention centre physical force was used against [the applicant], but it was not applied to the extent described by [the applicant] at the court hearings. Having regard to the above-mentioned matters and taking into account that on 16 July 2001, after writing the confession, [the applicant] was offered some vodka, the court excludes the confession statement from the evidence which confirms [the applicant] as guilty of the murder of [the victims]. As regards the confession statement and the interviews conducted on 20, 21 and 23 July 2001, [the applicant] stated at a court hearing that he had written that confession voluntarily, had answered the investigator’s questions and had described his actions during an investigation experiment in the presence of his lawyer, Ms Bautina; physical and psychological pressure had not been applied to him. The applicant and his lawyer did not make any complaints or representations about any unlawful methods of criminal investigation. The court did not establish any data showing that on 20, 21 and 23 July 2001 [the applicant] had been pressurised, either physically or psychologically, by the investigating authorities into making those statements.” 14. The applicant appealed against the conviction, arguing, inter alia, that the trial court had not properly addressed his complaints of ill‑treatment. He also asked the appeal court to ensure his presence at the appeal hearing. 15. On 10 January 2003 the Military Section of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the judgment of 16 July 2002. Having addressed the applicant’s argument as regards the beatings by the police officers after his arrest, the Supreme Court held as follows: “At the same time the [Military] Court made the correct assessment that there had been a violation of procedural norms by the police officers when they received a confession statement from [the applicant] on 16 July 2001; [the Military Court] rightly excluded [the confession statement] from evidence in the case. Moreover, [the police officers V., K. and A.], who had seen [the applicant] directly after his arrest, stated in open court that the applicant had no injuries on the face and no police officers had hit the applicant... A [police officer], Mr Sh. who had participated as a specialist during an investigating experiment on 23 July 2001, ... had not noticed any injuries on the applicant’s face.” The applicant’s lawyer attended the appeal hearing; however, the applicant was not summoned to it. 16. In the meantime, as follows from documents submitted by the applicant, on an unspecified date his father, acting in the applicant’s interest, complained to various prosecution, police and military authorities that the applicant had been severely beaten up by the police officers after the arrest. 17. The Internal Security Division of the Voronezh Regional police department opened an internal inquiry into the complaints, which resulted in a finding of no criminal conduct in the officers’ actions. In May 2002 the applicant’s father was informed of the results of the inquiry. At the same time he was notified of the transfer of his complaints to the Military Court, which was to examine the criminal case against the applicant. The police authorities reasoned that under Russian law, after the applicant had been committed to stand trial, the trial court had exclusive jurisdiction over any complaints related to the case. The applicant’s father received a similar response from the Prosecutor General’s office. 18. The Government argued that the first complaint of ill-treatment had only been lodged by the applicant’s father with the Internal Security Division of the Ministry of Internal Affairs a month after the judgment of 16 July 2002. The Government did not support their assertion with any evidence. They also did not produce any document from the file of the investigation into the applicant’s alleged ill-treatment, despite the Court’s direct request to that effect. 19. On 8 August 2002 an investigator of the Sovetskiy District Prosecutor’s office refused to institute criminal proceedings in connection with the applicant’s complaints of ill-treatment. Having examined the results of the internal police inquiry, the investigator found that on 15 July 2001, while preventing the applicant’s attempt to commit suicide, his fellow officer had hit the applicant on the ear. Having studied a record of the medical examination of the applicant on his admission to the temporary detention centre on 16 July 2001 (see paragraph 8 above), the investigator concluded that the injuries on the applicant’s face “could have been caused by the applicant’s fellow officers” during the prevention of the attempted suicide. The reasoning of the two-page decision was founded on statements by the police officers who had questioned the applicant on 16 July 2001 and had disputed any use of violence against him, and the applicant’s father, who had insisted that the applicant had been beaten up at the police department. All these statements were received during the internal police inquiry. 20. The applicant appealed against the decision of 8 August 2002. On 27 March 2003 a deputy prosecutor of the Sovetskiy District in Voronezh dismissed the complaint, noting that the investigator had carried out a full inquiry and that his conclusions had been based on “the objective analysis of sufficient and corroborating evidence”. 21. On 28 April 2003 the Sovetskiy District Court of Voronezh quashed the decision of 27 March 2003 on the ground that the investigator’s inquiry had been incomplete. It noted that the investigator had not questioned the applicant’s fellow officers and thus his conclusion that the applicant’s injuries had been caused by them had not been based on any evidence. 22. A deputy prosecutor of the Sovetskiy District annulled the decision of 8 August 2002 and sent the case for an additional inquiry. 23. On 17 November 2003 the prosecutor’s office once again dismissed the applicant’s complaint, having found no prima facie case of ill-treatment. That decision was quashed on 4 February 2004 and the case was sent for an additional inquiry. 24. On 6 February 2004 the senior investigator of the Sovetskiy District Prosecutor’s office refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers. The decision was based on the same evidence as the decision of 8 August 2002 and on a statement by the applicant’s fellow officer, Mr L., who had admitted hitting the applicant on the ear. The senior investigator also noted that “the applicant was serving his sentence and was attempting to call into question the trial court’s findings.” 25. Having found that the previous inquiry into the applicant’s ill-treatment complaints was incomplete, on 24 August 2007 the Voronezh Regional Prosecutor’s Office reopened an investigation into the events of 16 July 2001. The new round of inquiry was closed on 3 September 2007 in the absence of any evidence of criminal conduct on the part of the police officers. However, the decision of 3 September 2007 was quashed by a higher-ranking prosecutor and a new round of investigation commenced. That round resulted in the decision of 17 October 2007, by which the complaints of ill-treatment were found to be unsubstantiated. 26. On 13 December 2007 the acting deputy head of the Investigating Department of the Sovetskiy District Prosecutor’s office quashed the decision of 17 October 2007. The deputy head noted that that decision was unlawful and the inquiry was incomplete. The new round of investigation was, among other things, to lead to identification and questioning of military officers who had allegedly prevented the applicant’s attempted suicide on 15 July 2001. It appears that the investigation is now pending.

4. The applicant was born in 1983 and lives in Bursa. 5. The applicant had been previously convicted of burglary on 21 March 2001 and his prison sentence had been commuted to a fine. 6. On 11 January 2002 at approximately 12.40 a.m. the applicant was arrested, together with a friend, and taken into custody on suspicion of having committed several burglaries. The arrest was effected on the basis of incriminating information received regarding the applicant and his friend. 7. Later, at approximately 2.40 a.m., the applicant was examined by a doctor, who noted a 2 x 2 cm graze on his left shoulder and a graze under his right knee. 8. It appears that at some point the applicant and his friend confessed[1] to committing a number of burglaries and, as a result, on 11 and 12 January 2002, were required to participate in a number of reconstructions of events. According to the record drafted by police officers and signed by the applicant, the latter indicated one by one the houses and other premises he had broken into, the times of the incidents, the methods used to enter the buildings and the exact amount of goods which had been stolen from each place. 9. On 11 January 2002 the police heard evidence from the applicant's father. It appears from Mehmet Duman's police statement and the seizure report drafted on that day that the applicant's father helped the police recover two stolen guns, one from his own basement and another near a bus stop, on the basis of information he had received from a certain Mr H.P., who had participated in burglaries with his son. 10. On 12 and 13 January 2002 the police heard evidence from the owner of one of the guns and the person to whom the suspects had sold it. 11. In the meantime, on an unspecified date, the applicant signed a pre‑printed form explaining the rights of arrested persons, including the right to remain silent and the right to legal assistance. 12. On 13 January 2002 the applicant was questioned by two police officers in respect of five incidents he had confessed to during the reconstruction of events. According to the verbatim records signed by the applicant, he was reminded of his legal rights, including his right to remain silent and his right to legal assistance. 13. On the same day the applicant's friend was also questioned. He admitted committing two offences with the applicant. The statements provided by him regarding these incidents were worded in similar fashion to the applicant's statements. 14. Between 11 January and 14 January 2002, the police heard evidence from the owners of the houses and businesses which had been robbed. It appeared that some of the owners had not made any prior complaints to the police about the burglaries committed in their houses. 15. On 14 January 2002 the police returned a watch found on the applicant's friend to its owner. 16. On 14 January 2002, on the release of the applicant from police custody, the Bursa Forensic Medicine Institute issued a medical report indicating that no signs of beating or violence had been observed on his body and that the applicant did not have any complaints. 17. On the same date the Bursa Magistrates' Court heard evidence from the applicant. According to the minutes of the hearing he was reminded of his legal rights and his statements to the police were read out to him and accepted by him. He further stated that, at that juncture, he did not remember with whom and where he had committed the burglaries. The reports and other documents in the case file were read out to him. The applicant did not contest their veracity. 18. On 21 February 2002 the Bursa public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment against the applicant with the Bursa Criminal Court, accusing him of having committed five burglaries. 19. At the hearing held on 28 February 2002, the applicant retracted his earlier statements, claiming that when he had given evidence to the Bursa Magistrates' Court he had been in custody for more than six days, during which time he had been electrocuted, hosed and beaten with a stick in order to force him to confess to the offences. The applicant claimed that he did not remember how he had been brought before the Bursa Magistrates' Court and that before the judge he had just sat there while the verbatim record was written, which he had not signed. The court heard evidence from the other accused and five complainants, who all stated that the accused had accepted the accusations during the reconstruction of events. 20. In the hearing held on 25 April 2002, the prosecutor submitted his opinion on the merits. The applicant's legal representative submitted that some of the evidence in the case file had been unlawfully obtained. 21. At the hearing held on 2 May 2002, the applicant reiterated that he did not accept the charges against him. When asked about the medical reports, the reports of the reconstruction of events and the arrest and seizure form, the applicant submitted that he had nothing to say. 22. On 9 May 2002 the Bursa Criminal Court, relying on the evidence in the case file and, in particular, on the statements made by the applicant and Mr I.Ö. before the police and the Magistrates' Court, found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him in total to nine years, two months and five days' imprisonment. 23. On 27 May 2002 the applicant appealed against the trial court's judgment. In particular, he claimed that there was no evidence to demonstrate his guilt and that his statements to the police had been written in accordance with the complainants' testimonies. The applicant submitted that he had not been reminded of his legal rights under Article 135 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that his statements before both the police and the Magistrates' Court had not been given of his own free will. In part of his appeal petition the applicant submitted that he had not been in a fit condition to give a statement before the Magistrates' Court since he had been exhausted from the torture, coercion and duress he had been subjected to in police custody. 24. On 26 September 2002 the Court of Cassation, relying on Article 318 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, dismissed the applicant's request for an oral hearing and upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. The opinion of the principal public prosecutor submitted to this court was not communicated to the applicant. 25. On 16 December 2002 the decision of the Court of Cassation was returned to the registry of the Bursa Criminal Court. 26. A request by the applicant dated 26 December 2002 for a rectification of the Court of Cassation's judgment was dismissed by the principal public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation on 19 February 2003. 27. On 17 December 2004 the Bursa Criminal Court, taking into account the relevant provisions of the new Criminal Code (Law no. 5237), ordered the applicant's release from prison. By an additional judgment dated 29 June 2005 the first-instance court adjusted the applicant's sentence in accordance with the provisions of the new Criminal Code (Law no. 5237).

6. Mr Shahin Vrioni, the applicant in application no. 35720/04, is an Albanian national who was born in 1925 and lives in Albania. Mr Gherardo La Francesca, Mr Dario La Francesca and Mr Oliver Vrioni, the applicants in application no. 42832/06, are Albanian and Italian nationals who were born in 1946, 1950 and 1974 respectively and live in Italy. Mr Shahin Vrioni represented himself and the other applicants in the domestic courts’ proceedings. 7. In 1950 a plot of land measuring 1,637 sq. m belonging to the applicants’ ancestor, was confiscated by the then Albanian authorities without compensation. 8. On 1 July 1991 the Italian Embassy in Albania purchased two buildings in Tirana bordering on the property confiscated from the applicants’ grandfather. The transaction was concluded through an inter-State agreement validated by means of note verbale exchanges between the two governments. The note verbale did not contain any information as to the transfer of title to the surrounding or adjacent plots of land. The relevant property titles were not entered in the Tirana Property Register. 9. The Albanian Government subsequently used the income from the transaction to purchase the premises of the Albanian Embassy in Rome. 10. Under the Property Restitution and Compensation Act (“the Property Act”), the applicants lodged two applications in 1996 and 1999, respectively, with the Tirana Property Restitution and Compensation Commission (Komisioni i Kthimit dhe Kompensimit të Pronave – “the Commission”), claiming title to their deceased grandfather’s property. 11. On 18 March 1996 and 14 December 1999 the Commission recognised the applicants’ title to two plots of land measuring 1,100 sq. m. and 537 sq. m. respectively. The Commission held that it was impossible for the applicants to have the whole original plot of land allocated to them. It decided to restore to the applicants a vacant plot of land (një truall i lirë) measuring 1,456 sq. m., which was situated within the occupied grounds of the Italian Embassy, and ordered the authorities to pay compensation in respect of a plot of land measuring 181 sq. m. Moreover, it ordered that the applicants’ title to the property be entered in the Tirana Property Register. 12. The applicants were also issued with two certificates of property registration by the Registry Office: registration no. 4373, dated 1 June 1996, and registration no. 420, dated 28 December 1999. 13. On an unspecified date in 1996, having regard to the fact that, according to the note verbale of 1991, the Italian Embassy had title to one of the buildings only, but not to the occupied plot of land, the applicants requested the Embassy to return their property which it was occupying without title. 14. On 27 November 1996 the Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, having regard to the applicants’ property claims to the plot of land adjacent to the Embassy’s buildings, offered mediation to the Italian Embassy with a view to entering into civil agreements with the applicants. 15. On 16 August 1997 the Italian Embassy in Albania, in reply to the applicants’ request for recovery of their property, informed them that their property claims to the plot of land situated within its premises had to be settled with the Albanian authorities. 16. On 1 October 1997, following a request by the applicants, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed them that by virtue of the note verbale exchanges of 1991 the Italian Embassy in Albania had full ownership of the buildings and adjacent land. Moreover, it referred the applicants to the Albanian authorities as competent to determine any claims for compensation that the applicants might submit. 17. On 2 May 1997, following a civil action brought by the applicants against the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Tirana District Court (“the District Court”) found that the Italian Embassy was occupying the applicants’ property without title and, being unable to take action against a diplomatic mission, ordered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to facilitate the applicants’ recovery of their property and also to pay them compensation amounting to 21,607.50 United States dollars. 18. On 27 January 1998 the Tirana Court of Appeal, (“the Court of Appeal”), quashed the District Court’s judgment and remitted the case to a different bench of the District Court for fresh consideration. According to the Court of Appeal, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which had represented the Albanian State in the agreement relating to the transfer of the property to the Italian Embassy, could not be the defendant party in the proceedings in so far as the Ministry of Finance was the competent body to represent State interests in domestic proceedings. The applicants appealed against the Court of Appeal’s judgment to the then Court of Cassation. 19. On 17 June 1998 the Court of Cassation quashed the Court of Appeal’s judgment and remitted the case to that court for a fresh examination. 20. On 29 January 1999 the Court of Appeal, re-examining the case, found that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could not be held liable in this connection and designated the Italian Embassy, which was occupying the applicants’ property without title, as the liable entity in relation to the property. It quashed the District Court’s judgment of 2 May 1997 and remitted the case to the same court for fresh consideration. 21. On 20 June 2000 the District Court dismissed the applicants’ grounds of appeal, finding that the Commission’s decisions of 18 March 1996 and 14 December 1999 had been unlawful, as they were in breach of section 4 of the Property Act. 22. The District Court found that the applicants’ disputed plot of land, even though there were no buildings on it, constituted an integral part of the Italian Embassy’s premises. Thus, the District Court declared null and void the Commission’s decisions and held that the applicants were entitled to receive compensation for the original properties in one of the forms laid down in section 16 of the Property Act. 23. On 31 October 2001 the Court of Appeal quashed the District Court’s judgment and remitted the case to a different bench of the Court of Appeal, in accordance with Article 467/a of the Code of Civil Procedure, as it had noted irregularities in the proceedings in the lower courts. 24. On 29 October 2002 the Court of Appeal, having duly given notice of the hearings to the opposing parties, namely the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Tirana Commission, the Ministry of Finance and the Italian Embassy in Albania, declared null and void the Commission’s decisions of 18 March 1996 and 14 December 1999. It held that all applicants were entitled to receive compensation in lieu of the original property in one of the forms provided for by law in respect of the plot of land measuring 1,456 sq. m. Consequently, all applicants were to receive compensation in accordance with the Property Act for the totality of the 1,637 sq. m. of land. Moreover, the Court of Appeal found that, in so far as the property was an integral part of the Italian Embassy’s premises, it could not be considered a vacant plot of land within the meaning of section 4 of the Property Act (see paragraph 31 below). 25. On 15 June 2004 the Supreme Court, which had replaced the Court of Cassation after the Albanian Constitution’s entry into force on 28 November 1998, following an appeal by the applicants, upheld the reasoning of the Court of Appeal’s judgment of 29 October 2002. 26. On an unspecified date in 2004 the applicants lodged an appeal with the Constitutional Court under Article 131 (f) of the Constitution, arguing that the Tirana Court of Appeal’s judgment of 29 October 2002 and the Supreme Court’s judgment of 15 June 2004 were unconstitutional. 27. The appeal was declared inadmissible by the Constitutional Court on 13 January 2005 by a bench of three judges. It found that the applicants’ constitutional complaint concerned the assessment of evidence, which fell within the jurisdiction of the lower courts, but was outside its own jurisdiction. 28. The relevant international provisions have been set out in Treska v. Albania and Italy (dec.), no. 26937/04, ECHR 2006‑... (extracts) and Manoilescu and Dobrescu v. Romania and Russia (dec.), no. 60861/00, §§ 38-39, ECHR 2005‑VI.

8. The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Nicosia. 9. He was accused of rape and committed for trial before an Assize Court. 10. At the commencement of the hearing of the case before the Assize Court, the defence requested discovery of a number of relevant documents in the prosecution’s possession. The defence further requested that a forensic examination of the complainant’s knickers be carried out and that swabs taken from her vagina be analysed. The prosecution objected. After hearing argument from both sides, the Assize Court granted the requests on 19 March 1998. This order was made pursuant to the provisions of Articles 12(5)(b), and 30.2 of the Cyprus Constitution, Articles 6 §§ 1 and 3 b) of the Convention and the notion of a fair trial as developed in the recent case-law of the English courts. The Assize Court also relied on Article 7(1) of the Cyprus Law of Criminal Procedure, Cap. 155, as amended. 11. The Attorney General immediately applied for judicial review of the order by means of a writ of certiorari. The grounds invoked were lack of jurisdiction and error of law on the face of the record. The application was made ex parte and it came before Justice Artemides, a member of the Supreme Court. He granted leave and suspended the enforcement of the order. Thereafter, on 15 May 1998, after hearing the parties, Justice Artemides granted the application and quashed the Assize Court’s order for excess of jurisdiction. 12. The applicant’s appeal (no. 10227) against this decision was heard by the plenary of the Supreme Court consisting of nine judges. The judges included Justice Gavrielides who, as it transpired towards the end of the subsequent trial, had been actively involved in the investigation that preceded the filing of the indictment against the applicant, in his capacity as senior attorney attached to the Legal Service of the Republic, i.e. the prosecution. However, at the time of the hearing of the certiorari appeal, the defence had been unaware of this fact and, therefore, no objection was taken to his participation in the proceedings. Neither the prosecution nor Justice Gavrielides referred to the matter. 13. On 24 September 1998 the appeal was dismissed by a majority of 7 to 2. Justice Gavrielides was part of the majority. 14. In the course of the subsequent proceedings before the Assize Court, the prosecution provided several of the documents which the defence had previously requested. However, it objected to the defence having an opportunity to carry out forensic tests. The applicant claims that the latter was of the utmost importance for his defence since Vaseline was found on the knickers which the prosecution and the Assize Court treated as strong corroborative evidence of his guilt. 15. The applicant was found guilty by the Assize Court on 10 March 1999 and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. He appealed against his conviction to the Supreme Court. The appeal (no. 53/99) was referred to a division of the Supreme Court consisting of three judges. The first ground of appeal concerned Justice Gavrielides’ participation in the certiorari proceedings, in violation of the applicant’s right to a fair trial by an independent and impartial tribunal. The appeal was accompanied by a plea, followed by a petition, that the certiorari judgment of the Supreme Court of 24 September 1998 be vacated having regard to the principles enunciated in a recent decision of the House of Lords in the case of R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and others ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 2) (1999). Vacation of the said judgment was a precondition for the determination of the applicant’s first ground of appeal. 16. At the beginning of the appeal hearing, it was pointed out to the defence that the court could not review the validity of a previous judgment of the Supreme Court in the context of an appeal. The defence then filed a separate petition to the plenary of the Supreme Court to vacate its previous judgment. The hearing of the appeal was accordingly adjourned pending the determination of the petition. 17. The petition was examined by the plenary of the Supreme Court consisting of nine judges, including the three judges before whom the applicant’s appeal was pending. The court was presided over by Justice Artemides. An objection to the participation of Justice Artemides was taken by the defence given his previous involvement in the case. It was claimed that his participation at this stage would render him a judge in his own cause and offend against the rule of impartiality. However, the objection was rejected. 18. The application to vacate was dismissed on 19 July 1999 by a majority decision delivered by Justice Artemides, on the ground that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to re-open the proceedings and examine the validity of its previous judgment. 19. Following dismissal of the petition, the hearing of the appeal was resumed. The appellate division of the Supreme Court indicated to the defence that, in view of the dismissal of the application to vacate, the first ground of appeal was left in a vacuum. The defence was then left with no option but to withdraw this ground of appeal as it could no longer be determined. 20. A hearing of the remaining grounds of appeal which the applicant had made then followed. The hearing was completed on 2 November 1999, and judgment was reserved. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on 18 January 2000, thereby re-affirming the applicant’s conviction.

5. The applicant was born in 1934 and is currently detained in a psychiatric hospital in Bayreuth. 6. On 27 July 1994 the Freyung District Court convicted the applicant of three counts of sexual abuse of children and gave him a cumulative suspended sentence of eight months' imprisonment with probation. The applicant was found to have sexually abused a nine-year-old girl on three occasions in the spring of 1993. As confirmed by an expert, the applicant suffered from a pathological mental disorder such that diminished criminal responsibility (Article 21 of the Criminal Code) could not be excluded. On 10 December 1997 this sentence was remitted. 7. On 16 March 1999 the Passau Regional Court convicted the applicant of two counts of rape and gave him a cumulative sentence of three years and six months' imprisonment (two years and nine months for each count of rape). The Regional Court found that the applicant had raped twelve-year-old S. twice within two weeks by use of force in the summer of 1986. It was reported by a psychiatric and a psychological expert that the applicant suffered from a continuous cerebral decomposition, due to which his criminal responsibility was diminished. 8. According to the Regional Court's finding of facts, the applicant had had an extra-marital relationship with S.'s mother A. since 1980. Since then he had sexually abused S., then aged seven, at least once a week. Since 1982 he had had himself sexually satisfied also by P., A.'s elder daughter, then aged fourteen. These offences were time-barred when the victims reported them to the prosecution authorities. In the summer of 1982 the applicant persuaded fifteen-year-old P. to have sexual intercourse with him in exchange for his paying the family's electricity bill. P., who had initially consented, then asked the applicant to stop due to severe pain caused by the intercourse and resisted heavily, whereupon the applicant raped her by use of force. The prosecution of this offence was discontinued in view of the two counts of rape of which the applicant was convicted. 9. The Regional Court did not examine whether preventive detention was to be ordered against the applicant because the relevant Article 66 § 3 of the Criminal Code was not applicable to offences which, as was the case for those of which the applicant was found guilty, had been committed prior to 31 January 1998 (section 1a § 2 of the Introductory Law to the Criminal Code, see paragraph 41 below). 10. The applicant served his full sentence of three years and six months' imprisonment until 13 April 2002. Some two and a half months prior to that date, on 28 January 2002, the applicant was informed by the psychologist of Bayreuth prison that he could possibly be detained beyond that date under the Bavarian Act for the placement of particularly dangerous offenders very liable to reoffend (“Bavarian (Dangerous Offenders') Placement Act”) of 1 January 2002 (see paragraphs 43-46 below). 11. On 10 April 2002 the Bayreuth Regional Court, sitting as a chamber responsible for the execution of sentences composed of three professional judges, having heard the applicant and his counsel as well as the representatives of Bayreuth prison and two medical experts, ordered the applicant's placement in prison for an indefinite duration under sections 1 and 2 of the Bavarian (Dangerous Offenders') Placement Act (see paragraphs 44-45 below). 12. The Regional Court found that the applicant was liable to be placed in prison under section 1 § 1 of that Act. He had served a sentence imposed following his conviction for two counts of rape, the offences being serious enough to meet the requirements of Article 66 § 3 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 41 below). The Regional Court further subscribed to the views expressed by both a psychological and a psychiatric and psychotherapeutic expert, who, in their reports dated 22 March 2002 and 1 April 2002 respectively, had found that following the applicant's conviction, new facts had evolved during his detention which warranted the conclusion that the applicant currently posed a serious threat to the sexual self-determination of others. It noted that the applicant had failed to participate in any therapeutic measure to address his sexual problems which had led to his offences and, by denying his offences in prison, had made any therapy pointless. Moreover, due to his organic personality disorder, which led to a continuous decomposition of his personality, the applicant was no longer able to reflect on his possibly deviant sexual behaviour and to discern limits. Statistically, his advancing age also increased his interest in children as substitutes. 13. The Regional Court further noted that neither the applicant's placement in a psychiatric hospital (Article 63 of the Criminal Code – see paragraph 50 below) nor his preventive detention (Article 66 of the Criminal Code – see paragraphs 36-38 below) had been ordered (section 1 § 2 of the Bavarian (Dangerous Offenders') Placement Act). Moreover, the applicant had not been placed in a psychiatric hospital under the Bavarian Act on the Placement in an Institution of Mentally Ill Persons and Their Care of 5 April 1992 (see section 1 § 3 of the Bavarian (Dangerous Offenders') Placement Act and paragraph 51 below). In fact, the Bayreuth Health Office had refused to request the applicant's placement in a psychiatric hospital under the latter Act after the applicant had served his prison sentence. 14. Taking into consideration the experts' findings, the Regional Court found that there was a high risk that the applicant might re-offend. Not least because of his limited faculties, there was a concrete danger that reactions of his victims would result in his committing very serious offences. 15. The Regional Court stated that it considered the Bavarian (Dangerous Offenders') Placement Act to be constitutional. 16. On 3 May 2002 the Bamberg Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeal as ill-founded. Endorsing the reasons given by the Bayreuth Regional Court, it found that the applicant was liable to be placed in prison pursuant to section 1 of the Bavarian (Dangerous Offenders') Placement Act. In particular, as had been convincingly shown by two experts, there was a considerable risk of recidivism. 17. According to the Court of Appeal, the Bavarian (Dangerous Offenders') Placement Act was constitutional. It struck a fair balance between the applicant's interest in his liberty and the public interest in security. There was no breach of the principle of legitimate trust (Vertrauensgrundsatz), as the applicant had been informed in writing by the prison authorities that it was necessary for him to undergo therapy. Nor did the Act violate the prohibition on being punished twice for the same offence, as it was not his past offences, but the risk of his re-offending in the future which was decisive for his placement. Furthermore, the Bavarian legislature had the legislative power to pass the Act in question. 18. The applicant subsequently lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court against the decisions of the Bayreuth Regional Court of 10 April 2002 and the Bamberg Court of Appeal of 3 May 2002. He argued that his detention was illegal because the Bavarian (Dangerous Offenders') Placement Act was unconstitutional, notably as the Bavarian legislature had not had the power to legislate on the subject-matter in question. Moreover, the provisions of the Act violated the prohibition of punishment without law and human dignity as they treated him as a mere “disturbing object”. (a) The Federal Constitutional Court's judgment 19. On 10 February 2004 the Federal Constitutional Court, having held a hearing, partly allowed the applicant's constitutional complaint (no. 2 BvR 834/02), together with that of another complainant (no. 2 BvR 1588/02), Mr F. Oberländer, who was the applicant in application no. 9643/04 before this Court. It found unanimously that the Bavarian (Dangerous Offenders') Placement Act, as well as another comparable Act, the Saxony-Anhalt (Dangerous Offenders') Placement Act, were incompatible with Article 74 § 1 no. 1 read in conjunction with Articles 70 § 1 and 72 § 1 of the Basic Law (see paragraph 52 below) as the Länder did not have the power to enact the legislation in question. 20. According to the Federal Constitutional Court, the area covered by the Länder statutes regulating the placement of offenders in detention after they had served their prison sentence – so-called retrospective preventive detention (nachträgliche Sicherungsverwahrung) – fell within the concurrent legislative powers of the Federation as it involved criminal law within the meaning of Article 74 § 1 of the Basic Law. The term “criminal law” in connection with the question of power to legislate covered the regulation of all, even subsequent, repressive or preventive penal responses by the State which used the offence as a connecting factor, which were aimed exclusively at offenders and which were factually justified by the original offence. This interpretation was compatible with the fact that measures of correction and prevention, such as preventive detention, were not to be classified as “penalties” to which the prohibition of retrospective punishment under Article 103 § 2 of the Basic Law applied. The objective of this latter provision, laying down a fundamental right, was different from that of a provision on legislative competence such as Article 74 of the Basic Law. Retrospective placement in prison under the (Dangerous Offenders') Placement Acts enacted by the Länder was very similar to preventive detention under the Criminal Code, both in relation to the applicable procedure and in relation to its nature, and had been authorised in order to complement the measures of correction and prevention under the Criminal Code by the possibility of a preventive detention which had not been ordered in the judgment of the sentencing court. The Länder therefore did not have the power to make laws on the placement of criminals in detention because the Federation exhausted its concurrent legislative power in this area. The court thus disagreed with the submissions of the Federal Government, which had taken the view that the Länder had legislative competence to regulate the subject-matter at issue. 21. The Federal Constitutional Court found that placement in prison for an indefinite duration or for indefinitely renewable periods after an offender had served his full prison sentence constituted a particularly serious interference with the offender's right to liberty as protected by Article 2 § 2 of the Basic Law. It stressed that in order for the long-term deprivation of liberty ordered independently of a person's guilt to remain proportionate, it was necessary for it to be dependent on the prior commission of a serious offence. Moreover, the courts ordering placement in detention had to make their prognosis of the offender's dangerousness based on a comprehensive assessment of his offences and personality. 22. The Federal Constitutional Court, by a majority of five votes to three in this respect, further found that the fact that the Länder did not have power to legislate did not result in the contested statutes being void. Instead, they were merely declared incompatible with the Basic Law and the Constitutional Court ordered their continued application until 30 September 2004. Until the expiry of that transitional period, the applicant's detention was covered by the decision of the Bayreuth Regional Court, based on the (Dangerous Offenders') Placement Act, which remained applicable. 23. The court argued that the Federal Constitutional Court Act did not prescribe that a statute found to be unconstitutional was void under all circumstances, pursuant to section 95 § 3, first sentence, of the Federal Constitutional Court Act (see paragraph 55 below). The Act also allowed a mere declaration of incompatibility with the Basic Law pursuant to section 31 § 2 of the Federal Constitutional Court Act (see paragraph 54 below). Under the Federal Constitutional Court's case-law, a mere declaration of incompatibility and a limited continued application of the unconstitutional statute was possible if the immediate invalidity of the contested law removed the basis for protection of paramount interests related to the public good, and if the result of weighing those interests against the fundamental rights affected was that the interference had to be accepted for a transitional period. 24. In the instant case, there was a paramount interest in protecting the public against offenders who had been found by at least two experts and by courts to currently pose a considerable danger to the life, physical integrity, freedom or sexual self-determination of others. In the event of the statutes being declared void, persons who were extremely dangerous would have to be released without the federal legislature having taken the decision imposed upon it – because it mistakenly assumed it had no power to do so – as to whether it was necessary to enact federal legislation. Such federal legislation on retrospective preventive detention could be compatible with the Basic Law if it applied only in limited circumstances. 25. The public interest in effective protection from dangerous offenders could, in exceptional circumstances, outweigh the interest of the offender concerned by the unconstitutional Act in his personal liberty as guaranteed by Article 2 § 2 of the Basic Law. For the interference with the right to liberty to be proportionate, it was, however, necessary for the transitional period, during which the Federal Constitutional Court's order of continued application of the unconstitutional Acts served as the basis for the detention of the offenders concerned, to be short. Moreover, the criminal courts which had ordered placements on the basis of the impugned Acts had to re-examine without delay whether the placements complied with the reasoning set out in the Federal Constitutional Court's judgment. In particular, they had to base their placement decisions on a properly reasoned expert's opinion as to the dangerousness of the offender in question, in the light of his personality and the offences committed. Furthermore, they were authorised to order that the offender's placement be executed in a psychiatric hospital (Article 63 of the Criminal Code) if the offender's reintegration into society could better be furthered thereby, as prescribed by Article 67a § 2 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 39 below). (b) The dissenting judges' view on the statutes' continued applicability 26. According to the partly dissenting opinion of three judges, the unanimous finding of the Senate that the impugned Acts were unconstitutional should have led to their being declared void. As a consequence, the complainants would have had to be released. During the transitional period, the complainants were therefore detained without a legal basis. 27. The minority argued that by ordering the continued application of an Act which it had found to be unconstitutional, the Federal Constitutional Court took responsibilities which, in accordance with the principle of separation of powers, were for the legislature to assume. Moreover, by ordering a continued application of the Länder statutes, it suggested that the Federal legislature authorise subsequent preventive detention, a measure which the Federation, when reforming the provisions on preventive detention in 1998 and 2002, had deliberately chosen not to introduce. The minority of judges stressed that there were numerous other, less intrusive instruments available to the courts, police and social authorities to avert the dangers posed by dangerous convicts on their release. 28. In the minority's submission, the court's order that the Länder statutes continued to apply was also incompatible with Article 104 § 1 of the Basic Law (see paragraph 53 below). According to that Article, a person's liberty could only be restricted by virtue of a statute enacted by Parliament and only in compliance with the forms prescribed therein. The Federal Constitutional Court's order that the statutes continued to apply was, on the contrary, based on customary law and, being a court order, did not justify the deprivation of liberty. The minority further stressed that section 31 § 2, second sentence, of the Federal Constitutional Court Act, according to which a decision of the Federal Constitutional Court had force of law, was applicable only to a declaration that a statute was void and no longer applied, and not to a declaration, based on that court's case-law, that an unconstitutional statute continued to apply. 29. Lastly, the minority took the view that the court's order of continued application of the Länder statutes disregarded the prohibition on the enactment of laws with retrospective effect. After serving the sentence imposed on them by the criminal courts, offenders had a legitimate expectation of release. 30. On 16 December 2003 the Bayreuth Regional Court decided to suspend for one year the applicant's placement in prison pursuant to its order dated 10 April 2002. It instructed him to reside in an old people's home in Zell and not to leave the home without the permission of his custodian (Betreuer). Having regard to the findings of a psychiatric expert, the Regional Court found that the applicant's placement in the psychiatric department of an old people's home sufficiently averted the dangers he posed for the sexual self-determination of others. 31. On 3 March 2004 the applicant was again detained in Bayreuth prison under a detention order issued under the Bavarian (Dangerous Offenders') Placement Act that day. 32. On 26 March 2004 the Bayreuth Regional Court revoked the suspension of the applicant's placement in prison. It found that the applicant had repeatedly sexually harassed several old women suffering from dementia in the old people's home where he had been living. By this behaviour, the applicant had shown that he still posed a serious threat to the sexual self-determination of others. 33. On 5 July 2004 the Bayreuth Regional Court ordered that the applicant's placement under the Bavarian (Dangerous Offenders') Placement Act, read in conjunction with the judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court of 10 February 2004, was to be executed in a psychiatric hospital in order to further his reintegration into society. On 28 July 2004 the applicant was transferred to Bayreuth psychiatric hospital. 34. On 10 June 2005 the Passau Regional Court ordered the applicant's subsequent preventive detention under Article 66b § 1 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 48 below) which was to be executed in a psychiatric hospital. On 23 March 2006 the Federal Court of Justice quashed that order and remitted the case to the Passau Regional Court. 35. On 14 June 2007 the Hof Regional Court, having regard to the acts committed by the applicant in the old people's home (sexual harassment of persons incapable of resisting), ordered the applicant's placement in a psychiatric hospital under Article 63 of the Criminal Code. In view of that decision, the prosecution then applied to discontinue the proceedings concerning the applicant's subsequent preventive detention that were pending before the Passau Regional Court.

5. The applicant was born in 1946. 6. The applicant lived in a house in Plovdiv situated in the same yard as the house of Ms N.K. The applicant’s family had bad relations with Ms N.K.’s family. 7. On 27 July 1996 a quarrel erupted in the yard between Ms N.K., accompanied by friends of hers, and the applicant, accompanied by some relatives. The quarrel grew into a fight between the two groups. According to the applicant, one of Ms N.K.’s friends entered the applicant’s house to prevent her husband from calling the police. Allegedly, one of Ms N.K.’s friends had a gun and threatened to kill the applicant. 8. On 27 July 1996 the applicants filed a complaint with the Plovdiv district public prosecutor’s office describing the events of the same day and requesting that Ms N.K. and her companions be prosecuted. In September 1996 the Plovdiv district public prosecutor’s office opened criminal proceedings. However, until August 1999 it did not take any investigative action. 9. In August and September 1999 the prosecuting authorities questioned the applicant and several other witnesses. 10. On an unspecified date Ms N.K. was charged with having threatened the applicant and having, together with other persons, forcibly entered into her house. 11. On 9 August 1999 the applicant filed with the investigator in charge of the case a civil claim against Ms N.K., seeking 3,000 Bulgarian levs (BGN) in non-pecuniary damages. On the same day, by a decision of the investigator, the applicant was formally admitted as a civil party in the criminal proceedings. 12. Between 1999 and 2004 the Plovdiv district public prosecutor’s office discontinued the criminal proceedings against Ms N.K. on two occasions, finding that she had committed no publicly prosecutable offences. However, on both occasions its decisions were quashed upon appeals by the applicant, either by the Plovdiv appellate public prosecutor’s office or by the Plovdiv District Court, which remitted the case for further investigation. During that period the prosecuting authorities questioned several more witnesses. 13. On 3 June 2004 the Plovdiv district public prosecutor’s office discontinued the proceedings once again, on the ground that the time-limit for prosecuting the offences Ms N.K. had been charged with had expired. That decision was upheld by the Plovdiv District Court on 25 June 2004.

6. The applicant, Mr Rudolf Yakovych Myrskyy, is a Ukrainian national who was born in 1932 and lives in Lviv. He is a Doctor of Philosophy and a political science professor, who also holds leading positions in the Holocaust International Centre, the Association of National Minorities in the Lviv Region, and the International Anti-Fascist Congress. 7. In March 1999 the applicant took part in a round table organised by the association “For Inter-Ethnic Peace and Concord in Ukraine” on the occasion of the International Week against Racism. 8. On 26 March 1999 the newspaper Ukraine and the World Today (Україна і світ сьогодні) published selected excerpts (compiled by its journalist Mr L.) from statements by certain participants, including the applicant, under the headline 'Judaeophobia at the political level?' ('Юдофобія на рівні політики?'). One of the arguments ascribed to the applicant read as follows: “Unfortunately, judaeophobia may be observed not only in social behaviour, but also in politics. For example, the self-styled Party of Ukrainian Unity [«Партія української єдності»], which professes the aim of instilling in people an ideology and a psychology of national extremism, is kicking off its activities in Lviv.” 9. On 28 April 1999 thirteen members of the founding committee of the Party of Ukrainian Unity brought defamation proceedings against the applicant and the newspaper's editorial office before the Zaliznychnyy District Court of Lviv (“the Zaliznychnyy Court”). They alleged, in particular, that the applicant's statement, as cited above, was untruthful, defamatory and injurious to their honour, dignity and reputation, as well as debasing the future party's image. The plaintiffs sought a public disclaimer and apologies by the applicant and the editorial office, as well as compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 10. On 11 August 1999 the court requested the plaintiffs to specify their claim concerning the non-pecuniary damage and to submit additional documents, which they did on 27 October 1999. 11. On 21 June 2001 the court further requested the plaintiffs to submit some other documents concerning the party's registration. 12. On the same date the judge dealing with the case sent the defendants a copy of the above claim for comments. The same letter informed them that the hearing of the case was scheduled for 9 July 2001. 13. According to the judge's explanation given to the applicant in July 2003 on the latter's request, the claim remained unexamined during the period from 28 April 1999 to 2 October 2001 “due to the pre-judicial preparations”. It was also noted in the aforementioned letter that the judge, by virtue of his status, was under no obligation to provide the applicant with further explanations. 14. The applicant objected to the claim, contending that the impugned sentence was the journalist's own interpretation of his words taken out of context. Relying on his right to freedom of expression enshrined in Article 34 of the Constitution, the applicant submitted that during the round table he had expressed his view of a political scientist as regards an emerging political force. He also brought to the attention of the court several publications concerning the foundation of the Party of Ukrainian Unity in Lviv, which had appeared in the local newspapers in 1998-99 and which contained, according to him, an indication of that party's extremist trends. 15. The Zaliznychnyy Court heard one of the round table's organisers, who stated that the journalist had paraphrased and edited the applicant's original statement to make it appear harsher. 16. Mr L., who had prepared the impugned publication, was questioned as a witness and submitted that it was a verbatim record of the applicant's statement made at the round table. He noted however that the audio tape had been destroyed on the expiry of the one-year statute of limitations period established for bringing defamation proceedings. 17. During the hearings some of the plaintiffs used the word “yid” referring to Jews, which the applicant found pejorative and protested against its usage. The court allowed his complaint and directed the plaintiffs to avoid using that term. 18. By a judgment of 7 March 2002 the court allowed the plaintiffs' claim in part. It considered it established, firstly, that the impugned statement had indeed been made by the applicant, and, secondly, that it had been untruthful and defamatory. The court ruled as follows: “To oblige R. Myrskyy and the editorial office of the newspaper Ukraine and the World Today to publish (...) a disclaimer worded as follows: “The statement of Rudolf Myrskyy published in the article 'Judaeophobia at the political level?' of 26 March 1999: “For example, the self-styled Party of Ukrainian Unity, which professes the aim of instilling in people an ideology and a psychology of national extremism, is kicking off its activities in Lviv” is untruthful. The editorial office and the author sincerely regret having published it and offer their apologies to the founders of the Party of Ukrainian Unity”. 19. The court held that publication of the aforementioned disclaimer and apologies would constitute sufficient compensation to the plaintiffs for any non-pecuniary damage sustained. 20. On an unspecified date in July 2002 the court issued additional reasoning to the above judgment, which reflected its findings as follows. 21. Having examined the statute and the programme of the party in question, the court noted the absence of any provisions inciting racial hatred or disparaging attitudes towards national minorities and held that the applicant's statement was inconsistent with the true facts and therefore injurious to the plaintiffs' dignity and reputation. 22. Furthermore, the court made reference to the testimony of Mr L., who claimed to have reproduced the impugned statement literally and without omission. It also referred to some extracts from a book co-authored by the applicant, which contained arguments similar in style and wording to the statement complained of. 23. Regarding the applicant's allegation that his words had been misrepresented and that they were a value judgment, the court “assessed them critically, having regard to the explanations given at the hearing by the witness [Mr L.] and to the assessment of the other evidence adduced”. 24. Finally, with regard to the background publications in other newspapers invoked by the applicant, the court concluded that they could not be considered as providing basis for absolving him from his responsibility in the examined defamation case. 25. The applicant appealed. He also subsequently lodged some comments on the minutes of the hearings before the first-instance court, which were allegedly dismissed in his absence. 26. On 9 September 2002 the Lviv Regional Court of Appeal found against the applicant, upholding the judgment of 7 March 2002 and reproducing almost literally its reasoning. 27. The applicant brought a cassation appeal, in which he argued that his statement had been a value judgment made in the context of a free political debate He submitted that the mentioned value judgment had a factual basis, as the extremist tendencies had indeed been shown by the plaintiffs in some publications (which he had invoked earlier) and by their usage of the pejorative term “yid” during the hearings. Lastly, the applicant brought to the attention of the cassation court the fact that the plaintiffs' claim had been stayed without any procedural steps in the first-instance court for more than two years, which had led to the loss of a crucial piece of evidence (the audio tape of the round table). 28. On 12 October 2002 the disclaimer and apologies were published in the newspaper Ukraine and the World Today in enforcement of the judgment of the Zaliznychnyy Court of 7 March 2002. 29. On 31 March 2003 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's cassation appeal as unsubstantiated.

5. The applicant lives in St Oswald. 6. The applicant is a medical practitioner. He has an individual contract (Einzelvertrag) with the Lower Austrian Health Insurance Board (Niederösterreichische Gebietskrankenkasse). 7. In two submissions to the Joint Arbitration Committee (Paritätische Schiedskommission) dated 7 September 1998 and 5 October 1998, the applicant demanded payment for laboratory tests carried out in the first and second quarters of 1998. The claims against the Lower Austrian Health Insurance Board amounted to 8,022.41 euros (EUR) and EUR 6,603.81, respectively. 8. The Lower Austrian Health Insurance Board claimed that the applicant had not participated in the test series for quality checking of laboratory parameters in 1997, and refused to pay for the tests. 9. The applicant argued that he had participated in the quality checks in previous years with positive results and had – as previously – submitted the relevant samples for the period in question. 10. The Joint Arbitration Committee held an oral hearing and on 25 February 1999 it dismissed the applicant’s claim of 7 September 1998. 11. The applicant appealed against that decision to the Regional Appeals Commission (Landesberufungskommission). 12. On 17 May 1999 the applicant filed an application for transfer of jurisdiction (Devolutionsantrag), requesting a decision on his submission of 5 October 1998 from the Regional Appeals Commission, as the Joint Arbitration Committee had failed to decide within the statutory six-month time-limit. 13. The Regional Appeals Commission held a hearing and rejected both of the applicant’s claims. The decision was dated 24 August 1999, and was served on the applicant on 7 July 2000. 14. The applicant complained about this decision to the Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof). On 27 November 2000 the Constitutional Court set aside the decision for violation of the right to a fair hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. It noted that one of the assessors of the Regional Appeals Commission had negotiated the clause on remuneration for laboratory tests on behalf of the Lower Austrian Medical Association (Ärztekammer für Niederösterreich), and thus the tribunal could not be regarded as impartial and/or independent. 15. An amendment to the Social Insurance Act (Allgemeines Sozialversicherungsgesetz) entered into force on 1 September 2002; it provided for changes in the composition of, inter alia, the Regional Appeals Commission. 16. The newly composed Regional Appeals Commission held a hearing on 15 May 2002, during which the applicant gave evidence. 17. On 24 March 2003 the applicant requested that the decision be served on him. As the Regional Appeals Commission did not react, the applicant repeated his demand on 18 July 2003. 18. The applicant was summoned to another hearing by a newly composed Regional Appeals Commission on 26 November 2003. During that hearing the entire subject was examined anew. Apparently the Regional Appeals Commission reached a decision on the same day. It dismissed the applicant’s claims, finding that he had failed to participate in the required tests and had therefore not complied with the conditions for payment of the laboratory tests. The Regional Appeals Commission did not find any reasons to doubt the lawfulness of the underlying provision of the Remuneration Regulation (Honorarordnung). The decision was served on the applicant’s counsel on 30 November 2004. 19. On 15 December 2004 the applicant complained to the Constitutional Court claiming that the Regional Appeals Commission lacked independence and impartiality. The former rejected the applicant’s complaint in a decision of 27 September 2005. It observed that the members of the Regional Appeals Commission were not bound by any instructions. They were independent and impartial unless special circumstances, for instance the fact that one member of the Regional Appeals Commission had been involved in the negotiation of the general agreements, gave rise to legitimate doubts about that member’s independence and impartiality. Such special circumstances had not been shown by the applicant in the present case. The mere fact that the assessors were members of Regional Medial Associations or Regional Health Insurance Boards which had provisions with the same content in their general agreements, did not suffice to cast doubt on the independence and impartiality of the Regional Appeals Commission. The decision was served on counsel on 29 November 2005.

5. The applicant was born in 1970 and lived until his arrest in Krasnodar. 6. In 2004 the applicant had two operations: a retinal laser coagulation of the left eye and amputation of toes of the right foot. In the same year, unsuccessful surgery led to the entire loss of sight in the applicant’s right eye. Two years later, he underwent a kidney transplantation. In August 2007 he was admitted to Krasnodar Regional Clinical Hospital no. 1 where he underwent a number of tests and received treatment for diabetes. 7. In 2008 the applicant’s hip joints were replaced with prostheses in the Heidelberg Town University Clinique in Germany. As follows from a letter issued on 22 July 2008 by the head of the Clinique Medical Service, the applicant was required to make multiple monthly visits to the Clinique for check ups and medical treatment. The first such appointment was scheduled for August 2008. 8. Extract no. 46707 of the applicant’s medical record drawn up on 22 December 2008 by a medical commission in Krasnodar Regional Clinical Hospital no. 1 reads as follows: “[The applicant]... is a disabled person [officially recognised as having a] 1st degree disability; [he] underwent inpatient treatment from 12 to 22 December 2008. Clinical diagnosis: subcompensated type 1 insular diabetes, severe state. Diabetic micro- and macroangiopathy. Diabetic glomerulosclerosis. End stage chronic renal failure, terminal stage. Diabetic retinopathy of both eyes; retinal detachment of the right eye. Dysmetabolic encephalopathy. Gastroenteropathy. Myelotoxic anaemia. Polyneuropathy. Polyserositis. Diabetic foot. Condition after amputation of the 4th and 5th toes on the right foot. Allotransplantation of a donor kidney (November 2006). Permanent immunosuppression therapy. Osteochondritis deformans juvenilis of hips. Condition after total hip replacement. Acute respiratory disease. Because of his main illness and associated complications, the state of the patient’s health is serious ... ... The patient was informed about the seriousness of his condition and was warned that if he failed to comply with the strict fluid balance, diet, mandatory lab control, [and in the absence of] strict and regular use of medicines (particularly the immunosuppressive drugs) kidney transplant rejection and diabetes could occur.” 9. On 1 February 2009 the Novorossiysk Town Investigative Department of the Krasnodar Regional Prosecutor’s Office instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant on suspicion of involuntary manslaughter. 10. Eleven days later, the applicant was arrested. According to the prosecution authorities, on 1 February 2009 in a local restaurant the applicant, a prominent criminal leader, organised an assault in which five individuals were severely injured. One of the victims died as a result. 11. On 14 February 2009 the applicant’s detention on remand was authorised and he was placed in temporary detention facility no. 5 in Krasnodar. The facility occupied the ground and last floors of a four-storey building constructed in 1938. The administrative offices and technical facilities were located on the ground floor of the building while the cells were located on the fourth floor. The building was not equipped with a lift. 12. On the applicant’s admission, the acting director of the facility issued a report allowing the applicant to have a number of objects usually prohibited for detainees. The list included a wheelchair, a glucometer, a tonometer, specific medicines, disposable masks, napkins, an additional mattress and a cushion for the wheelchair. 13. A week later the applicant was charged with having organised aggravated involuntary manslaughter. 14. On 21 February 2009 the applicant’s lawyers lodged a request with a senior investigator of the Krasnodar Regional Investigative Department, asking for the applicant to be transferred to a specialised prison medical facility and to have him examined by a number of medical specialists practising in the Krasnodar Region. They alleged that the detention facility was unequipped to accommodate the applicant’s needs. In support of their request the lawyers relied on medical certificates issued prior to the applicant’s arrest and argued that the applicant was a seriously ill person whose state of health was bound to deteriorate drastically in the conditions of the detention facility. 15. The investigator dismissed the request on the same day, finding that prison doctors had examined the applicant on his admission to temporary detention facility no. 5 and had found him fit to be detained in a regular detention facility and to participate in investigative procedures. The investigator also stressed that the applicant was under constant medical supervision by prison doctors and that he received medical advice from other qualified and experienced medical specialists. According to the investigator, the applicant received the medicines necessary to maintain his health. 16. On 24 February 2009 the head of the Krasnodar Regional Nephrological Centre (hereinafter – the Centre), assisted by another doctor from the Centre, examined the applicant. They found that, in addition to the illnesses listed in extract no. 46707 drawn up on 22 December 2008, the applicant suffered from gonarthrosis, cardiac dropsy, secondary hyperparathyroidism, hyperuricaemia, hypercholesteremia, viral hepatitis type C and chronic cytomegalovirus [salivary gland virus] infection. The doctors also concluded that the applicant’s diabetes was in the decompensation phase. They laid down a long list of recommendations to be followed, medical tests and examinations to be performed and drug regimens to be complied with, indicating, inter alia, the frequency and dosage of each medicine prescribed to the applicant. 17. In March 2009 the applicant’s lawyers, relying on extensive medical evidence, including extract no. 46707 from the applicant’s medical history, complained to the Oktyabrskiy District Court about the investigator’s refusal to admit the applicant to a prison hospital. On 6 March 2009 the lawyers amended their claims, citing paragraph 9 of Decree no. 54 issued by the Government of the Russian Federation on 6 February 2004, by virtue of which individuals suffering from diabetes whose 24-hour dose of insulin exceeds 60 units may be relieved from serving sentences in correctional institutions. The counsel argued that the applicant’s 24-hour regimen required 71 insulin units and therefore his detention in a regular detention facility ran contrary to the domestic legal requirements. 18. The applicant’s medical history, submitted by the Government, shows that on 5 March 2009 he refused to submit to blood glucose level testing and to take an evening dose of prescribed medicines, including insulin, arguing that his treatment was inadequate. Between 6 and 20 March 2009 the applicant occasionally refused to take an increased dosage of medicines, complaining about side-effects such as nausea and fatigue. 19. On 10 March 2009 a medical assistant of temporary detention facility no. 5 issued a medical certificate describing the applicant’s health. The relevant part of the certificate read as follows: “[The applicant] does not have any complaints at the time of the examination. ... 2. Objective examination data: At the time of the examination [the applicant’s] state of health is satisfactory [and] corresponds to his existing illnesses ... 3. Diagnosis: subcompensated type 2 insular diabetes; serious condition; [the applicant is receiving] insulinotherapy. Allotransplantation of a donor kidney (November 2006). 4. Conclusion: no restrictions to [the applicant’s] detention in temporary detention facility ...” The applicant submitted that no medical tests or analyses had been performed during the examination on 10 March 2009. A simple observation by “three women wearing white coats” had resulted in a finding that his illnesses were not an obstacle to his detention in the detention facility. 20. On 11 March 2009 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Krasnodar dismissed the lawyers’ complaint, repeating verbatim the text of the investigator’s decision of 21 February 2009. In addition, the District Court noted that a medical commission had confirmed the applicant’s diagnoses but noted that he did not need urgent medical assistance and that his state of health did not preclude his participation in investigative procedures. The District Court concluded that the applicant could be effectively provided with medical assistance and treatment in the temporary detention facility. 21. The applicant’s lawyers appealed. 22. On 20 March 2009 the applicant went on a hunger strike and refused to take his medicines, notifying the authorities that the hunger strike was his last attempt to draw their attention to his situation. Three days later the applicant’s lawyers asked a senior prosecution investigator to authorise a complex medical examination of the applicant by specialists of the Health Ministry of the Krasnodar Region and to transfer him to a prison hospital. Similar requests were sent by those lawyers to various domestic authorities. The lawyers also complained about the conditions of the applicant’s detention, in particular the absence of daily outdoor recreation and physical exercise due to the impossibility for the applicant to descend in his wheelchair from the fourth floor of the detention facility, where his cell was, to a recreation yard. 23. As follows from the applicant’s medical record, on 24 March 2009 he resumed taking the prescribed medicines and stopped his hunger strike. Between 10 and 29 April 2009 the applicant again refused to take his medicines, complaining of a rapid deterioration in his health and an absence of adequate medical attention. 24. On 22 April 2009 the Krasnodar Regional Court upheld the decision of 11 March 2009, endorsing the District Court’s reasoning. 25. A week later a medical commission comprising medical specialists of the detention facility and doctors from the Centre examined the applicant and issued the following report: “Having studied the health complaints, the medical history, objective data and results of the medical examination ..., the commission is bound to confirm that [the applicant’s] kidney transplant has been rejected as a result of his refusal to take prescribed immunosuppressants. The commission’s attention was drawn to the fact that despite numerous discussions about the consequences of such a refusal, [the applicant] firmly continued refusing to take the above-mentioned medicines. He also stated that he would refuse any treatment provided in detention facility no. 5 in respect of any complications arising from his refusal [to take the medicines]. [The applicant] stated that he had refused to take medicines prescribed by the doctors from the Centre because he considered that he had not received effective medical assistance in respect of his complaints about toothache, pain in the area of his hip replacements and problems with his eyes. In an efficient manner, [the applicant] was once again informed that the deterioration of his health was entirely due to his intentional refusal to take the medicines (immunosuppressants) prescribed by the specialists from the Centre and did not result from any other illnesses. The commission’s conclusion is as follows: Type 2 insulin diabetes in an advanced form, [the patient is receiving] insulinotherapy. Diabetic nephropathy, nephroangiosclerosis, chronic renal failure [in the end stage], condition after the donor kidney transplant (2006). Kidney transplant rejection crisis on 28 April 2009 caused by an intentional refusal to take immunosuppressants. Diabetic proliferative retinopathy, condition after surgery on the retinal detachment of the right eye, partial massive hematopsia of the left eye, condition following laser coagulation of the left eye. Diabetic angiopathy of the vessels of the lower extremities, diabetic foot, condition following the amputation of the fourth and fifth toes of the right foot. Condition following complete hip replacement (2008). Morbid obesity (extreme condition). [The applicant] was offered an outpatient course of the haemodialysis which is to be administered by specialists from the Centre with special medical equipment in [detention facility] no. 5. He was also notified that his refusal to take [medicines], irrespective of his decision to undergo haemodialysis, would lead to a full rejection of the transplant. Following this discussion [the applicant] gave his firm consent to undergo haemodialysis [and] a subclavian insertion and to take medicines in accordance with the course of immunosuppressants prescribed. Due to the fact that [the applicant’s] eyesight is very poor, a text of the document confirming his consent to undergo haemodialysis [and] a subclavian insertion and to take medicines in accordance with the course of immunosuppressant treatment prescribed was prepared and read out in the presence of the members of the commission and was signed by [the applicant].” 26. On 30 April 2009 the applicant had his first session of haemodialysis which was performed in a specially equipped room on the ground floor of facility no. 5. The haemodialysis was carried out by specialists from the Centre, as the prison doctors were not licensed to perform the procedure. According to medical documents provided by the Government, the applicant received haemodialysis at least once every two days, with each session lasting from four to six hours. Prison medical personnel examined the applicant daily, recording his blood pressure, body temperature and blood glucose level, monitoring the fluctuation of his body weight (between 149 and 136 kilograms), controlling his intake of insulin, adjusting the drug regimen to meet his needs, and so on. The medical documents show that the applicant frequently underwent various X-ray exams and ultrasound scans, and was taken to the Centre and a civil hospital for clinical testing and examinations by various medical specialists. He also underwent a number of minor operations involving insertion and replacement of catheters and endured lengthy procedures, lasting for hours at a time, required to administer medicines intravenously. The medical personnel of the detention facility consulted specialists from the Centre on a daily basis, including its head, for advice on adjusting the applicant’s treatment to the changes in the state of his health and to his complaints. 27. In the meantime, on 9 April 2009 the Oktyabrskiy District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 12 June 2009, having considered that the gravity of the charges, as well as the applicant’s liability to abscond, re-offend and obstruct justice warranted such an extension. On 12 June 2009 his detention was extended for an additional two months, until 12 August 2009, with the District Court using identical reasoning to that in its decision of 9 April 2009. The detention order of 12 June 2009 became final on 8 July 2009 when the Krasnodar Regional Court concluded that the District Court had correctly linked the applicant’s liability to abscond and interfere with the investigation to the gravity and the character of the charges against him. 28. On 11 August 2009 the Oktyabrskiy District Court again extended the applicant’s detention for an additional two months, finding that the gravity of the charges against him, information about his personal history and his liability to abscond warranted the extension. Having heard a prison doctor and studied medical certificates issued by the medical personnel of the detention facility, the District Court also found that the applicant’s state of health was stable and did not preclude his detention in the temporary detention facility. The decision was upheld on appeal on 26 August 2009. 29. On 24 September 2009 the applicant’s scheduled haemodialysis session was interrupted due to the breakdown of the catheter. The catheter could not be replaced until the following day, when haemodialysis was resumed. On 5 October 2009 an ophthalmologist from the microsurgical department of the Regional Clinical Hospital, having examined the applicant and studied his medical history, found that given the deterioration of the applicant’s eyesight surgery had no prospects of success. 30. On 9 October 2009 the Oktyabrskiy District Court examined an investigator’s request for a further extension of the applicant’s detention until 24 November 2009. Having accepted the investigator’s request, the District Court ruled as follows: “[The applicant] organised a particularly serious criminal offence, as a result of which [the] victim ... died and serious health damage was caused to Mr P. and Mr V. Following an examination of [the applicant’s] personal history, it was established that on 20 June 1994 the Prikubanskiy District Court of Krasnodar had found him guilty of criminal offences proscribed by Article 218 § 2 and Article 224 § 1 of the RSFSR Criminal Code; the record of the criminal conviction had expired; previously [he] had been charged on a number of occasions with having committed criminal offences proscribed by Article 163 § 2 [and] Article 330 § 3 of the Russian Criminal Code; he was absolved from criminal responsibility on the basis of amnesty acts. Taking into account the information pertaining to [the applicant’s] personal history and having regard to the serious nature of the criminal offence committed by [the applicant], the investigation rightfully considers that, if released, [the applicant] will take active steps to influence witnesses, victims and other parties to the criminal proceedings, and that [he] will destroy evidence or, by other means, obstruct the objective investigation in the case. Moreover, [the applicant] may flee the territory of the Russian Federation to avoid criminal responsibility, rendering his criminal prosecution impossible. In this connection, the investigator concluded that there were no grounds to change the preventive measure [applied to the applicant] to one which did not involve him being isolated from society and being detained ... The defence lawyers and [the applicant] argued against the investigator’s request. [They] considered that the investigation had not put forward any item of evidence showing that [the applicant] could influence the witnesses and victims or [that he] could obstruct the investigation in any other way. [They] asked to take into account the impossibility for [the applicant] to continue being detained as he was very ill and relied on a wheelchair for mobility. He had a kidney transplant which functioned poorly and underwent haemodialysis four times a week. [They] asked for the applicant to be provided with adequate medical assistance in a medical facility under doctors’ supervision. Having studied the material presented [and] having heard the parties to the proceedings, the court finds that it is necessary to extend [the applicant’s] detention as [the applicant] is charged with having organised a particularly serious criminal offence, there is sufficient information to conclude that, if released, he may abscond during the investigation and trial or [he] may obstruct the criminal proceedings by other means. The investigator has still to perform a number of investigative procedures in the case. The information about the circumstances of the case which were presented to the court, the gravity of the charges, [and] the personal history of the accused, who has been criminally charged before [and] who is the breadwinner for a minor child, confirm the court’s conclusion that it is impossible to change the preventive measure [applied to the applicant] to a more lenient one. The court is of the opinion that detention is the sole preventive measure corresponding to the requirements of the criminal proceedings and ensuring the thoroughness and objectivity of the pre-trial investigation having regard to the particular seriousness of the criminal offence committed by [the applicant]. The court was not provided with material evidence showing the presence of extenuating circumstances which could have been taken into account by the court when it determined the issue of the extension of [the applicant’s] detention.” 31. On 19 October 2009 the head of the Centre examined the applicant and issued the following conclusion: “[his] condition corresponds to the severity of the main and concomitant illnesses, in general [it] is stable and relatively satisfactory”. 32. The applicant’s lawyer requested a senior investigator of the Krasnodar Regional Investigative Department to transfer the applicant to a prison hospital, arguing that his health had continued to deteriorate in the absence of adequate medical assistance. Three days later the senior investigator dismissed the request, stating that the deterioration of the applicant’s health was the direct result of his refusal to accept medical assistance and to follow the recommendations given by the medical personnel of the detention facility. The senior investigator also noted that the current state of the applicant’s health was stable and did not call for his admission to a prison hospital. 33. Having decided to obtain an independent expert opinion on the applicant’s state of health, his lawyers submitted available medical records, including those drawn up in the detention facility, to the State-owned Scientific Research Institute of Transplantology and Artificial Organs in Moscow (hereinafter – the Institute). 34. On 12 November 2009 they received a letter from the head of the Kidney and Liver Transplants Department of the Institute, which, in so far as relevant, read as follows: “... it is impossible to make a firm conclusion about [the applicant’s] state of health on the basis of the medical documents presented. However, it is plainly evident that at the present time the kidney transplant is not functioning and the patient’s life is supported by the haemodialysis prescribed. The non-functioning transplant may have to be removed if it is a source of intoxication. Another kidney transplantation is not warranted. Having regard to the severity of the [applicant’s] primary and corresponding illnesses, the presence of the non-functioning transplant, and [the applicant’s] detention in the temporary detention facility in the absence of adequate clinical instrumental laboratory control, there is a real risk that acute complications leading to [the applicant’s] death will develop. A full examination, preferably in a hospital, is advisable to determine the further course of medical treatment to be taken, namely, the provision of medicines and potential surgery.” 35. On 20 November 2009 the Oktyabrskiy District Court authorised a further extension of the applicant’s detention until 24 January 2010, finding that the grounds warranting his detention, including the gravity of the charges and the applicant’s liability to abscond, had not changed. The District Court concluded that the defence lawyers’ arguments pertaining to the applicant’s health did not outweigh the grounds calling for his detention. 36. On 3 and 15 December 2009 the District Court examined the lawyers’ requests for the applicant’s release and for his transfer to a medical institution respectively. Both requests were dismissed as the District Court considered that the applicant was receiving sufficient medical assistance in detention facility no. 5. A similar request for the applicant’s placement in a prison hospital was dismissed by the senior investigator on 16 December 2009. 37. In the meantime, on 9 December 2009 the applicant was examined by a cardiologist and a phlebologist from civil hospitals. He was diagnosed with ischemic heart disease, diabetic angiopathy and thrombosis of the lower extremities. Treatment was prescribed. A week later the applicant again experienced problems with the intravenous catheter, making it impossible for him to complete the haemodialysis scheduled for that day. In the following week, urgent consultations between the medical personnel of the detention facility and specialists from the Centre took place for the purpose of finding a solution to the problem. On 25 December 2009 four leading medical experts from the Centre and a civil hospital performed surgery on the applicant in the detention facility with a view to installing a twenty-centimetre central vein catheter. Following a number of unsuccessful attempts, the doctors were finally able to insert it. Three days later the applicant refused to undergo haemodialysis, complaining of pain in the area of the catheter insertion and extreme fatigue and weakness. On the following day, given the serious deterioration of his health, the applicant agreed to go down to the ground floor to undergo haemodialysis. The applicant’s medical records show that whenever his catheter malfunctioned and was replaced, he was provided with a course of antibiotics to prevent infection. 38. On 25 December 2009 a prison physician examined the applicant and issued a medical certificate describing his state of health. The relevant part of the certificate reads as follows: “Since the beginning of his detention in [detention facility no. 5] the patient has been under constant medical supervision; the level of glucose in his blood (before every meal), blood pressure, fluid balance, body temperature and other indicators are monitored daily. An examination of all the relevant biochemical blood parameters, including at cyclosporine level, and all additional medical examinations authorised by medical specialists (ultrasound scanning of the heart, vessels, abdominal cavity, kidneys ..., adrenal glands, bladder and prostate; X-ray examinations of the chest and hip joints, and electrocardiogram) are performed whenever necessary, but no less than once a week. On a number of occasions the patient has been examined by medical specialists (an endocrinologist, a urologist, a surgeon, a traumatologist-orthopaedist, an ophthalmologist, a vascular surgeon and a cardiologist) from municipal health institutions. The patient is under ongoing supervision by doctors from the Nephrological Centre, who perform scheduled outpatient haemodialysis three or, if necessary, four times a week. On a number of occasions [the applicant] was examined by a specialist in kidney transplantology – Professor Ya., Doctor of Medicine, in the detention facility; [Dr Ya.] is also constantly informed of the results of the clinical supervision, and of complex biochemical and other examinations. Medical specialists regularly organise consultations with Dr Ya.’s participation (the most recent one [took place] on 15 December 2009); the course of future medical treatment and necessary diagnostic measures are determined during [those consultations]. The patient is also under constant supervision by an endocrinologist; the level of glucose in his blood is measured daily before every meal; a log is kept of the dosage of glycaemia [and] insulin [he receives]; [and] consultations about the insulin dosage regimen take place. During his detention in [detention facility no. 5] [the applicant] constantly violated his dietary regimen [and] refused to keep a “dietary diary”; on a number of occasions [he] refused to take insulin and medicines; after 10 April 2009 he completely refused to take immunosuppressive medicines, which are necessary for his kidney transplant to function. [The applicant] willingly and knowingly impaired his health, despite regular discussions about the necessity of renewing the course of the immunosuppressive medicines and the patient’s awareness of the consequences of his refusal of the treatment ... As a result of those actions [the patient’s] kidney transplant stopped functioning and since 30 April 2009 [he] has been undergoing permanent haemodialysis, despite the fact that he has resumed taking medicines and begun complying with the [recommended] dietary regime. The haemodialysis is performed by specialists of the Regional Nephrological Centre in a special cell in [detention facility no. 5]. [The applicant] is afforded an opportunity to rest for the necessary period of time in a special armchair after each scheduled session of haemodialysis. After the glucose level in his blood has been checked ..., with the warders’ help and in the presence of a medical specialist [the applicant] ascends a staircase to his cell with the wheelchair. When ascending the staircase in small steps being held by the arms, [the applicant] rests in his wheelchair after every 2 or 3 flights of stairs for as long as necessary. If necessary, the above-mentioned parameters are measured. On the upper floor of the detention facility building [the applicant] is taken to his cell in the wheelchair, where he is examined by medical personnel if necessary. ... Medical specialists – an endocrinologist, ophthalmologist, traumatologist-orthopaedist, vascular surgeon and specialists of the Nephrological Centre – consider that at the present time the patient’s health is stable, despite his existing serious chronic illness. [The applicant’s] health does not at present call for urgent medical assistance or inpatient treatment. The necessary medical and diagnostic procedures prescribed by medical specialists are performed in corpore and timeously. Therefore, the deterioration of [the applicant’s] health was entirely caused by his willing and knowing actions. The administration of the detention facility and the medical unit of the detention facility, with the participation of medical specialists in the fields connected to [the applicant’s] illnesses, implemented an entire set of medical measures necessary to maintain [the applicant’s] health and to eliminate the consequences of his wilful actions. As a result of those measures [the applicant’s] state of health is stable and does not preclude his detention in [detention facility no. 5].” 39. In January and February 2010 the applicant received haemodialysis at least once every two days. On 14 January 2010 a surgeon was called in to examine the applicant in response to his complaints of severe pain in the right knee, which intensified during physical activity. The applicant was diagnosed with degenerative arthritis of the right knee joint and prescribed treatment. On 22 January 2010 he underwent another replacement of the catheter in the detention facility. Another replacement was carried out in the detention facility a month later. 40. In the meantime, in the beginning of January 2010 the prosecution authorities closed the investigation and transferred the case file to the trial court. On 21 January 2010 the Oktyabrskiy District Court scheduled the first trial hearing and held that the trial proceedings were to be conducted in camera because the applicant and his five co-defendants had criminal records and were liable to threaten witnesses and other parties to the proceedings. The District Court also examined the lawyer’s petition for the applicant’s release and dismissed it, finding that the applicant’s health did not preclude his detention on remand and concluding that “the preventive measure applied in respect of [the applicant] should remain unchanged”. However, it agreed to call two medical experts proposed by the defence to determine whether the applicant was in need of a complex medical examination or any specific medical procedures. 41. The applicant’s lawyers appealed, arguing that the applicant’s detention after 24 January 2010 had been unlawful, as the District Court had failed to extend his detention officially and its decision to dismiss the request for the applicant’s release could not substitute a proper detention order. 42. At the hearing on 28 January 2010 the lawyers again asked the District Court to release the applicant as there were no grounds for his continued detention. They also argued that the time-limit for the applicant’s detention had expired on 24 January 2010 and that his detention after that date had been unlawful as it was not covered by a proper legal order. A prosecutor lodged a counter-claim, asking to extend the applicant’s and his co-defendants’ detention until 11 July 2010. The District Court accepted the prosecutor’s request and collectively extended the applicant’s and his co-defendants’ detention until 11 July 2010, noting that there were no grounds for their release. 43. On 17 February 2010 the Krasnodar Regional Court upheld the decision of 28 January 2010, having dismissed the argument that the applicant’s detention between 24 and 28 January 2010 had been unlawful. While acknowledging that on 21 January 2010 the District Court had examined the matter at the applicant’s lawyer’s request, the Regional Court reasoned that the examination constituted a de facto extension of the detention. 44. On 18 May 2010 the Oktyabrskiy District Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to eleven years’ imprisonment. 45. As follows from the applicant’s medical history submitted by the Government, since March 2010 the applicant has fully complied with the prescribed course of drug treatment and has occasionally failed to adhere to the dietary recommendations of the prison’s medical specialists. He occasionally refused to submit to examinations by medical specialists from the Centre and civil hospitals, citing extreme weakness, fatigue and his poor state of health as reasons for those refusals. In the second half of April 2010 the amount of haemodialysis was intensified, becoming a daily procedure. As follows from the applicant’s medical history, the only days when he did not have haemodialysis were the days on which trial hearings took place. In May 2010 the applicant was examined by a surgeon, an ophthalmologist, a urologist and an endocrinologist, who, having confirmed the previous diagnosis and having noted no major changes in the applicant’s state of health, concluded that it did not preclude his detention in facility no. 5. 46. According to the Government, since the first day of his detention the applicant had lodged at least thirty complaints with the director of the detention facility concerning the conditions of his detention and quality of medical care. He had also lodged numerous similar complaints with various State authorities, including the prosecutors’ offices and the Federal Security Service. In particular, the Government provided a copy of the applicant’s complaint of 29 May 2009 in which he informed the director of his refusal to continue haemodialysis in view of his inability to continue to endure the “inhuman treatment” accompanying that procedure. He asked to notify his relatives of his wish to be buried in Yerevan. The complaint bears a handwritten note by the facility director stating that a discussion with the applicant had resulted in his consent to go on with the treatment. The applicant’s repeated complaints to the facility director regarding his inability to descend the stairs for his haemodialysis sessions either resulted in the applicant agreeing to continue the haemodialysis or the director’s promise to consult engineers on the subject of equipping the facility with a mechanism which would allow the applicant to descend and ascend the stairs more easily. One of the applicant’s complaints to State authorities brought a response from the Federal Supervision Service for the Health and Social Development Sectors. By a letter of 17 August 2010 the acting director of the service informed the applicant that “the performance of ... haemodialysis either in a temporary detention facility or in a correctional colony does not have any legal basis”. 47. Another certificate provided by the Government shows that during the entire period of the applicant’s detention he was taken for a walk in the recreation yard of the facility twice: on 16 and 17 May 2010. The Government alleged that the applicant had consistently refused to leave the cell to be taken for a walk. 48. The applicant provided the Court with an expert report issued on 21 May 2010 by two leading forensic medical experts. Having studied his complete medical history, the experts concluded as follows: “... as a result of his main illness (insular diabetes) [the applicant’s] central nervous system, cardiovascular system, visual organs, kidneys, stomach [and] thyroid body were damaged. Progress of type-one insular diabetes is, usually, gradual; [however, it becomes] more rapid if stress or other illnesses are present ... [The applicant’s] body movement is restricted as he suffers from osteochondrosis of the whirl bones and has undergone a complete hip replacement. [The applicant’s] hepatitis C ... and chronic Wyatt’s syndrome substantially aggravate his main illness. ... the severity of the [applicant’s] main and concomitant illnesses, his non-functioning renal transplant, and his detention in facility no. 5 in the absence of proper clinical, instrumental and laboratory supervision make the risk of development of lethal complications very real. The fact that [the applicant] suffers from the listed illnesses leads to the conclusion that he is in need of constant supervision and treatment by medical specialists which could only be provided in specific hospitals ... It is virtually impossible for [the applicant] to receive the required [medical care] in the conditions of detention facility no. 5 ... Type-one insular diabetes and chronic renal failure in the terminal stage, from which [the applicant] suffers, are included in the List of Illnesses Precluding [a detainee] from Serving a Sentence, as adopted by Decree no. 54 on 6 February 2004 by the Government of the Russian Federation.” The experts were also under impression that the medical personnel caring for the applicant had “deliberately understated the seriousness of [his] condition and [had] deliberately amended [the] diagnosis previously confirmed by specialised clinical medical facilities”. 49. On 5 July 2010 the applicant was sent to serve his sentence in correctional colony no. 2 in the Astrakhan Region. On arrival at the colony he was immediately admitted to the prison hospital. However, two days later, given the assessment of his state of health by the prison doctors, the applicant was transferred to the resuscitation department of the Aleksandro‑Mariinskiy Regional Clinical Hospital where he started receiving daily haemodialysis and extensive insulin and immunosuppressive therapy. Having examined the applicant on 6 August 2010 the medical commission, comprising a number of medical specialists, including those from the colony hospital, issued a report which, in its relevant part, read as follows: “The general condition of the patient is serious ... The patient suffers from obesity of the third degree – he weighs over 130 kilograms; it is clearly insufficient to [treat him] with haemodialysis as an out-patient three times a week; on days when haemodialysis is not performed [the applicant] suffers from excessive hydration, hyperpotassemia, and increasing uremic intoxication, which can only be treated with haemodialysis in the conditions of a resuscitation department in a hospital. Given the severity of his main illness, [the applicant’s] excessive body weight (insufficient haemodialysis) haemodialysis often has to be performed urgently outside the schedule ... in the conditions of the resuscitation department. The most appropriate schedule [for the applicant] is daily haemodialysis in the resuscitation unit. The presence of a non-functioning transplant requires regular instrumental control (ultrasound exams ...), examinations by a transplantologist, adjustment of dosage of immunosupressants, [and] a well-timed decision concerning the removal of the transplant. The presence of the haemodialytic catheter in the external jugular vein requires constant care with the aim of preventing infection and thrombosis of the life‑supporting vascular access for haemodialysis. Given the fact that [the applicant] underwent a complete hip replacement with an endoprosthesis he is unable to move without assistance and to care for himself which, in its turn, requires that [the applicant] should be permanently assisted by carers.” The commission’s conclusion was that the applicant was suffering from illnesses which should preclude his serving the sentence, as declared by the Government’s Decree no. 54 of 6 February 2004. 50. The colony director applied to the Leninskiy District Court of Astrakhan seeking the applicant’s release given his inability to serve the remaining part of his sentence. The director’s request was supported by the medical personnel of the colony hospital, the head of the Astrakhan Town Haemodialysis Centre and the head of the endocrinology department of the Aleksandro-Mariinskiy Regional Clinical Hospital. The doctors argued in open court that the applicant could not stay in the colony and should be permanently admitted to a hospital for life-supporting therapy. 51. On 25 August 2010 the District Court dismissed the request for release, having found that the applicant’s health problems partly resulted from his own careless decisions not to take medicines on certain occasions. The Court also took into account that the applicant was receiving full medical assistance and that he had only served a month and a half of his long-term sentence.

4. The applicants were born in 1948 and 1955 respectively and live in Glinica. 5. On 27 November 1995 the first applicant lodged a claim for payment of compensation for the seizure of his property. On 13 May 1998 the Katowice Regional Court gave judgment. On 24 June 1999 the Katowice Court of Appeal partly remitted the case. On 6 November 2003 the Katowice Regional Court gave judgment. The first applicant appealed. On 9 June 2004 the Katowice Court of Appeal upheld that judgment. According to an assessment made by two lawyers, a cassation appeal lacked any prospects of success. 6. In a letter of 5 December 2004 the first applicant informed the Court that he did not intend to make use of the remedies provided by the Law of 17 June 2004 (Ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki) (“the 2004 Act”). 7. On 25 November 2002 the applicants filed an action against the State Treasury with the Gliwice Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy). They claimed compensation for the unlawful annulment of a contract by a public official. 8. On 27 December 2002 the Gliwice Regional Court ordered that the applicants rectify certain formal shortcomings in their statement of claim. 9. On 18 November 2003 the Court dismissed the applicants’ request to be exempted from court fees. The applicants appealed. On 19 February 2004 the Katowice Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) quashed the Regional Court’s decision and exempted the applicants from court fees. 10. On 24 March 2004 the Gliwice Regional Court found that it did not have the competence to deal with the subject-matter and referred the case to the Katowice Regional Court. 11. The first hearing in the case was held on 26 January 2005. 12. On 16 May 2007 the Katowice Regional Court gave judgment and granted the applicants’ claim in part. 13. Both parties lodged appeals against the first-instance judgment. 14. On 8 November 2007 the Katowice Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals. 15. It appears that both parties lodged cassation appeals and the case is pending before the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy). 16. On 21 December 2004 the applicants lodged a complaint under section 5 of the 2004 Act. They particularly referred to the Gliwice and Katowice Regional Courts’ inactivity between the date the claim had been filed with the Gliwice Court and the date the first hearing had been scheduled. They sought just satisfaction in the amount of 20,000 Polish zlotys (PLN), that is, PLN 10,000 each. 17. On 10 March 2005 the Katowice Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants’ complaint. The court held that the 2004 Act had legal effect as from its entry into force on 17 September 2004. It found that during the relevant part of the proceedings, there had been no inactivity or undue delay on the part of the authorities. In that connection, the court held that there had been no breach of the right to a fair trial within a reasonable time in the period after 17 September 2004.

5. The applicant was born in 1991 and lives in Kharkiv. 6. On 16 May 2008 the applicant was arrested by police officers G. and B. of the drug crimes unit and taken to the Kharkiv City Police Department (“the police station”). 7. Officer G. drew up a report following the search of his personal effects, according to which a package containing a substance, later determined to be marijuana, was found on the applicant. The report, indicating that it was drawn up at 6.25 p.m. on 16 May 2008, was signed by the applicant and attesting witnesses L. and T. 8. According to the Government, when officers G. and B. began drawing up the above-mentioned report at the scene of the applicant’s arrest, the applicant attempted to escape. The officers then handcuffed him. The applicant was then taken to the police station where he and the attesting witnesses were questioned. At 10.05 p.m. the applicant was released having signed a note affirming that he had no complaints against the police. 9. According to the applicant, at the police station he was ill-treated to make him confess. In particular, he alleged that he was threatened with rape, kicked and hit on the head and torso, and threatened with weapons. He was subjected to a “Palestinian hanging”; with his hands cuffed behind his back he was raised to the height of one or one and a half metres and then dropped face down on the floor. He lost consciousness several times. When she arrived at the police station, the applicant’s mother found him with bruises on his face, a swollen chin and marks of handcuffs on his wrists. 10. At the police station the applicant wrote two notes addressed to the police dated 16 May 2008. In an “explanatory note” the applicant stated that he had acquired some marijuana for personal use and had had it when the police had stopped him. The applicant further stated that he had not been physically or psychologically pressured. In a separate note he stated that he had no complaints against the police and undertook to appear when summoned. 11. At 11.10 p.m. on 16 May 2008 an ambulance arrived at the police station and the applicant was examined by a paramedic, F. The paramedic noted in her report that the examination was completed at 11.40 p.m. According to the report, the applicant had no complaints and nothing abnormal was detected. According to the applicant, the head of the drug crimes unit, officer O.D., was present during this examination and spoke with the paramedic afterwards. 12. Following the applicant’s examination at the police station he and his mother went to the Kharkiv Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior (“the Regional Directorate”), where they arrived at about 11.45 p.m. on 16 May 2008, and where the applicant lodged a complaint accusing police officers of ill-treatment. 13. Officer O.D. followed the applicant to the Regional Directorate and arranged for him to be examined by the medical expert on duty there. 14. At 00.47 a.m. on 17 May 2008 forensic medical expert A.P. examined the applicant at the Regional Directorate. According to his report, finalised on 29 May 2008, the expert had been called upon to determine the presence and seriousness of any bodily injuries. The applicant said to the expert that the police had grabbed him by the neck and arms at the time of the arrest and had handcuffed him. He complained of a headache and pain in his shoulders. The report recorded a haematoma of 1.5 cm in width on the applicant’s neck, a haematoma of 2 x 1.5 cm on the inner side of his left shoulder, and two strip-like bruises on his left wrist. The expert took the view that the injuries could have been inflicted on the date and under the circumstances described by the applicant, and that the bruises on his wrist could have been caused by handcuffs. 15. At 3.46 p.m. on 17 May 2008 the applicant sought medical aid at the Kharkiv City Hospital (“the hospital”) where he was diagnosed with concussion and contusion of the soft tissues of the head and the rib cage. Hospitalisation was recommended but the applicant refused. 16. On 19 May 2008 the applicant was examined by Dr M. at the Neurology, Psychiatry and Drug Addiction Institute of the Academy of Medical Sciences of Ukraine. He was diagnosed with a brain concussion of medium seriousness and numerous bruises on his arms, shoulder blades and spine. 17. On 17 May 2008 the applicant’s mother lodged a criminal complaint with the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor’s Office (“the KRPO”) against the police officers. She alleged that excessive force had been used to arrest her son and that he had then been tortured, humiliated and threatened with rape at the police station. 18. On 21 May 2008 the KRPO requested an examination of the applicant and his medical documentation by forensic medical experts. On 29 May 2008 medical experts I.D. and I.P. examined the applicant and his medical documentation. 19. In the course of pre-investigation enquiries in respect of the allegations of ill-treatment, the KRPO obtained statements (written explanations) from a number of individuals. In particular, in his written explanation, Mr S.D., who had witnessed the applicant’s arrest, stated that at about 6.15 p.m. on 16 May 2008 a stranger, without introducing himself, had grabbed the applicant by the scruff of his neck or by the shirt collar and, threatening him with a gun, pulled him to a car. He and another stranger had then grabbed the applicant by the arms, searched him and put him into their car. Officers G. and B. stated that at the time of arrest the applicant had attempted to flee and had been handcuffed. They and officer O.D. insisted that the applicant had not been ill-treated in any way. Attesting witnesses L. and T. confirmed the statements by the police and stated that the applicant had attempted to flee while the search report was being drawn up. He had then been caught and handcuffed. 20. In his written explanation given to the KRPO on 28 May 2008 the applicant stated, in particular, that immediately after having stopped him a police officer had hit him on the head, stomach and ribs with the handle and muzzle of his gun. He had then been pulled by the arms to a police car. At the police station the police officers had pulled down his trousers and threatened him with rape, had subjected him to a “Palestinian hanging”, and dropped him to the floor, causing him to lose consciousness. When his mother had arrived at the police station entrance hall she had seen him with a bruised and swollen chin, haematomas and bruises on his head, arms and body. 21. On 6 June 2008 the KRPO, referring to the above-mentioned evidence, refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers for lack of a corpus delicti in their actions. The KRPO found that the applicant’s handcuffing was the only instance of the use of force in respect of the applicant and that it had been lawful under the Police Act of 20 December 1990 (“the Police Act”). The applicant’s injuries recorded at 00.47 a.m. on 17 May 2008 were consistent with the police officers’ statements concerning the applicant’s arrest and handcuffing. The KRPO also stated that the applicant’s and his mother’s allegations were not supported by any objective data other than their own statements. The applicant’s mother appealed. 22. On 24 June 2008 the applicant, in a written explanation to the Kharkiv Moskovskyy District Prosecutor’s Office (“the MDPO”), largely confirmed his earlier statements and added that in the police car on the way to the police station the police officers had repeatedly hit him on the head and torso. 23. On 4 July 2008 forensic medical experts completed their report requested by the KRPO on 21 May 2008 and based on their examination of the applicant on 29 May 2008. They noted that the applicant had complained to them that he had been hit with a gun on the head and torso during his arrest and then ill-treated at the police station. The experts recapitulated that at the time of previous medical examinations the applicant had had a brain concussion, haematomas on his neck and left shoulder, and bruises on his left wrist. They were of the opinion that the injuries were consistent with the applicant’s statements as to their origin. 24. On 12 August 2008 the Kharkiv Chervonozavodskyy District Court set aside the KRPO’s decision of 6 June 2008 and remitted the materials for additional inquiry. The court held, in particular, that the KRPO’s enquiries had failed to explain the applicant’s injuries recorded at 00.47 a.m. on 17 May 2008. 25. On 19 January 2009 the Kharkiv Moskovskyy District Court (“the District Court”), in the course of examination of a criminal case against the applicant for possession of drugs, ordered the MDPO to conduct, by 19 February 2009, an investigation into the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment. 26. On 16 February 2009 (apparently due to a clerical error the text of the decision indicates 16 February 2008 as its date) the MDPO refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers on grounds similar to the KRPO’s decision. The applicant’s mother appealed. 27. On 30 March 2009 the District Court set aside the decision of 16 February 2009 and remitted the materials for additional inquiry. The court found, in particular, that the MDPO’s decision had fully replicated the KRPO’s decision of 6 June 2008, had not explained the reasons for which the MDPO had accepted the police officers’ version of events and had failed to explain how the applicant’s handcuffing could explain all his recorded injuries. 28. On 22 October 2009 the MDPO refused to institute criminal proceedings on grounds similar to the earlier decisions. It informed the District Court that by this decision it complied with the court’s ruling of 19 January 2009. The applicant’s mother appealed. 29. On 27 November 2009 the District Court set aside the decision of 22 October 2009 and remitted the materials for additional inquiry. The court held, in particular, that the pre-investigation enquiries had collected sufficient information that a crime had been committed. Further investigation into the origin of the applicant’s injuries required such investigative steps as a confrontation between the applicant and the police officers and a reconstruction of events, which could not be conducted within the framework of pre-investigation enquiries without the institution of criminal proceedings. 30. In the course of the subsequent round of pre-investigation enquiries the MDPO again obtained written explanations from the police officers and the attesting witnesses, who largely repeated their previous statements. 31. On 12 May 2010 the MDPO, referring to the evidence gathered, refused to institute criminal proceedings on grounds similar to the earlier decisions. The applicant’s mother appealed. 32. On 14 June 2010 the District Court set aside the decision of 12 May 2010 and remitted the materials for additional inquiry, holding that the MDPO had failed to comply with the court’s previous instructions. 33. In the course of the subsequent round of pre-investigation enquiries the MDPO obtained written explanations from several individuals. Dr M. stated, in particular, that the applicant’s injuries she had recorded on 19 May 2008 could have been sustained from 16 to 18 May 2008. The applicant’s mother largely repeated her allegations and stated that she and the applicant had travelled from the police station to the Regional Directorate in a neighbour’s car which had been followed by officer O.D.’s car. 34. On 25 June 2010 the MDPO refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers on grounds similar to the earlier decisions, referring in addition to the explanations collected in the course of the latest round of pre-investigative enquiries. The MDPO stated that the District Court’s rulings of 27 November 2009 and 14 June 2010 had been impossible to comply with since investigative actions indicated by the court could only be conducted once criminal proceedings had been initiated and not at the stage of pre-investigation enquiries. The applicant’s mother appealed. 35. On 27 August 2010 the District Court set aside the decision of 25 June 2010 and remitted the materials for additional inquiry. The court held in particular that the MDPO had failed to resolve the contradictions in the medical evidence. The MDPO had also failed to resolve the contradictions between the applicant’s, witness S.D.’s, and the police officers’ accounts of the circumstances of the use of force during the applicant’s arrest, which, in the court’s opinion, could explain the documented injuries. 36. In the course of the subsequent round of pre-investigation enquiries the MDPO obtained written explanations from paramedic F. She stated that she had not seen any signs of injury on the applicant on 16 May 2008. She had not been pressured by the police. The applicant himself had not voiced any complaints, but his mother had said that her son had been beaten up. She also stated that she was not a specialist in forensic medicine and could not speculate as to the origin of injuries which had been documented later. 37. On 18 October 2010 the MDPO requested an opinion of a forensic medical specialist on a number of questions concerning the applicant’s injuries, in particular whether his injuries, as recorded in the available medical documentation, could have been inflicted between 11.50 p.m. on 16 May 2008 and 00.47 a.m. on 17 May 2008. 38. On 25 October 2010 the MDPO refused to institute criminal proceedings. The MDPO noted, in particular, that the District Court, in the rulings of 27 November 2009, 14 June and 27 August 2010, had indicated the need to conduct certain investigative actions, namely confrontation between the applicant and the police officers and reconstruction of events with the participation of the applicant and forensic experts. The MDPO stated that these instructions had been impossible to comply with since such actions could only be conducted once criminal proceedings had been initiated and not at the stage of pre-investigation enquiries. The MDPO also stated that the applicant’s injuries recorded at 00.47 a.m. on 17 May 2008 were consistent with the police officers’ statements concerning the applicant’s arrest and handcuffing. 39. On 15 February 2011 the KRPO informed the MDPO that its decision of 25 October 2010 had been a “mere copy” of the decision of 25 June 2010 and had failed to comply with the District Court’s ruling of 27 August 2010. The KRPO directed the MDPO to fully comply with the District Court’s instructions. According to the Government, the MDPO had then conducted a new round of pre-investigation enquiries and as a result the decision of 25 October 2010 was allowed to stand. 40. On 28 February 2011 a forensic medical expert produced a report in response to the MDPO’s request of 18 October 2010 and based on the medical evidence available in the case file. The expert stated, in particular, that it could not be ruled out that the applicant’s documented injuries could have been inflicted between 11.50 p.m. on 16 May 2008 and 00.47 a.m. on 17 May 2008. The expert also took the opinion that the diagnoses of contusion of the soft tissues of the head and of the rib cage, numerous bruises of arms, shoulder blades and spine which had been noted by the hospital staff on 17 May 2008 and by Dr M. on 19 May 2008 had not been confirmed by objective forensic medical information or the results of any tests, and for these reasons could not be taken into account in the forensic medical analysis. 41. According to the applicant, he had first learned about the MDPO’s decision of 25 October 2010 from the Government’s observations in the present case. 42. On 23 July 2012 the applicant’s mother challenged the decision of 25 October 2010 before the District Court. 43. At the time of the most recent communication from the applicant the proceedings before the District Court were pending.

8. The applicant was born in 1951 and is currently detained in Eysses Prison, Villeneuve-sur-Lot. 9. He was held in police custody from 25 to 27 September 1994, on suspicion of having sexually assaulted his stepdaughters. He made a full confession and, at the end of the period in police custody, he was charged with rape and aggravated sexual assault. He was detained on remand. 10. On 21 April 1995, under questioning by the investigating judge, the applicant retracted his confession; on 5 May 1995 he denied all the accusations made against him. He said that he had taken valium while in police custody and claimed that this drug could have impaired his mental faculties. 11. On 7 September 1995 the investigating judge extended the detention order. By an order of 22 December 1995, he rejected an application by the applicant for release. In a judgment of 9 January 1996, the Indictment Division of the Bordeaux Court of Appeal upheld the order. On 30 April 1996 the Court of Cassation dismissed an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant. The Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation which ruled in that judgment was composed of Mr Le Gunehec, President, a reporting judge and six other judges, including Mr Guilloux and Mr Le Gall. 12. On 9 February 1996 the parties were informed that the investigation was complete. By a judgment of 2 July 1996 the Indictment Division committed the applicant to stand trial at the Gironde Assize Court. 13. The applicant appealed on points of law and put forward two grounds in support of his appeal: the first alleged that the Indictment Division had failed to comply with the procedural rules necessary for the effective exercise of the rights of the defence, as set out in Article 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, concerning the parties' access to the case file before the hearing; the second concerned a lack of sufficient reasoning in the order committing him for trial, and noted that it did not set out the facts on which the charges were based or explain why the alleged offences were classified as they were. 14. The Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation delivered a judgment dismissing the appeal on 12 February 1997. The Division which ruled on the appeal was composed of Mr Guilloux, acting as president in the absence of the incumbent president who was unable to attend, Mr Le Gall as reporting judge, and six other judges. 15. In a judgment of 3 April 1998, the Gironde Assize Court convicted the applicant and sentenced him to nineteen years' imprisonment and suspended his civic, civil and family rights for ten years. 16. On that same date the applicant lodged an appeal with the Court of Cassation, in which he raised six points of law. The first alleged a violation of Article 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, on the ground that the Assize Court had not stated by what majority of votes the sentence had been imposed; the second concerned a failure to comply with the principle that hearings must be oral and, in particular, with Article 347 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which in principle prevented the court proper and the jury from deliberating with the case file before them; in his third point, the applicant complained of a violation of Article 379 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which prohibited the content of statements being mentioned in the official record, unless the presiding judge decided otherwise; the fourth and fifth points concerned the wording of the questions put to the jury; the final point alleged a breach of the rights of the defence, on the ground that the accused had not spoken last on the question of the withdrawal of parental responsibility. 17. The applicant was provisionally granted legal aid but, in a decision of 8 April 1999, the Legal Aid Office refused his request on the ground that “no arguable ground” of appeal on points of law could be made out against the judgment of 3 April 1998. 18. In a judgment of 9 June 1999, the Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant's appeal on points of law. The Division was composed of Mr Gomez, President, Mr Guilloux, reporting judge, and Mr Le Gall, judge. 19. On 7 July 1999 the President of the Court of Cassation dismissed an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant against the Legal Aid Office's decision.