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5. The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Zaporizhzhya. 6. On 4 January 1994 the Leninskyy District Court of Zaporizhzhya ordered the applicant’s former husband, S., to pay her child maintenance in respect of their daughter, who was living with the applicant. 7. According to a bailiff’s report of 24 January 2006, the outstanding arrears to the applicant at that date were 7,546 Ukrainian hryvnias ((UAH), at the time equivalent to about 1,200 euros (EUR)), of which UAH 2,052 (about EUR 330) was owed for 2005. The bailiff’s calculations were based on the average salary indicators in the district where S. lived, since he had been unemployed at the time. 8. On 1 April 2006 the same bailiff issued a fresh report, assessing the total amount of the arrears at 31 March 2006 at UAH 667.50. The sum owed for 2005 was assessed at UAH 480. The bailiff recalculated the earlier established amount on the basis of a tax return submitted by the applicant’s ex-husband for the last quarter of 2005, which showed that he had earned UAH 3,000 for that period. Viewed as his actual earnings for the whole year, that amount was lower than the average salary, which would have otherwise been taken as a basis for the arrears’ calculation. 9. On 4 April 2006 the report of 1 April 2006 was served on the applicant, who had ten days to challenge it. 10. On 11 April 2006 the applicant sought to challenge the accuracy of the report before the Khortytskyy District Court of Zaporizhzhya (“the Khortytskyy Court”). 11. On 24 May 2006 the Khortytskyy Court allowed her application and invalidated the impugned report as erroneous. It concluded that the bailiff had had no reasons to depart from the earlier calculation, since the tax return submitted by S. concerned only the last quarter of 2005. In the absence of any appeal, the ruling became final. 12. On 6 June 2006 the bailiff issued another report, according to which the outstanding child maintenance arrears owed to the applicant at that date were UAH 7,671 Ukrainian hryvnias, of which UAH 2,358 was owed for 2005. 13. On 29 June 2006 the bailiff reassessed the arrears owed by S. to the applicant, concluding that they were UAH 6,606 at 1 June 2006 (as S. had made some payments during that year), of which UAH 2,358 was owed for 2005. 14. On 19 October 2006 the Bailiffs’ Service terminated the child maintenance enforcement proceedings because on 2 October of that year the applicant’s daughter had reached the age of majority. The bailiff assessed the outstanding arrears at 2 October 2006 at UAH 8,637.32 (equivalent to about EUR 1,300 at that time); the sum owed for 2005 remained unchanged (UAH 2,358, equivalent to about EUR 330). Neither the applicant nor her former husband challenged this assessment. 15. On 26 January 2006 the applicant lodged a civil claim against S. for penalties to be imposed on him for late child maintenance payments. She relied on the bailiff’s report of 24 January 2006 (see paragraph 7 above). 16. On 16 March 2006 the court adjourned its hearing on the applicant’s request with a view to summoning the bailiff who had issued the aforementioned report. S. did not object to that, but submitted that he had requested recalculation of the arrears owed to the applicant. 17. On 3 April 2006 the Khortytskyy Court allowed the applicant’s claim in part and awarded her UAH 141.58 (about EUR 22) in penalties to be paid by her former husband. It based its calculation, in so far as the arrears for 2005 were concerned, on the bailiff’s report of 1 April 2006 (see paragraph 8 above), which had been presented by the bailiff at the hearing on 3 April 2006. Having regard to the bailiff’s explanations as to the reasons for the recalculation, the court held that the aforementioned report took precedence over the report of 24 January 2006 relied on by the applicant. According to the minutes of the hearing, the applicant did not object to the completion of the examination of the case on the merits, but insisted that the court should rely on the report adduced by her. 18. On 12 April 2006 the applicant appealed, claiming that the court had wrongly relied on the report of 1 April 2006, which she had only become aware of on 3 April, the day the court had given judgment. She further pointed out that the report in question had not been formally served on her until the following day (4 April 2006) and that she had challenged it in accordance with the established procedure (see paragraphs 9 and 10 above). 19. On 23 May 2006 the Zaporizhzhya Regional Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) upheld the Khortytskyy Court’s decision of 3 April 2006. It held, without giving further details, that the first-instance court had rightly relied on the bailiff’s report of 1 April 2006. 20. The applicant appealed in cassation for the decisions of 3 April and 23 May 2006 to be quashed and a fresh examination of the case to be carried out. She complained that the courts had disregarded, without any explanation, the key piece of evidence adduced by her – the bailiff’s report of 24 January 2006. It had not been challenged by any of the parties and was final. She reiterated the arguments of her appeal as regards the bailiff’s report of 1 April 2006 (see paragraph 18 above), pointing out that her complaint about that report had been successful and that it had been invalidated on 24 May 2006. 21. On 21 November 2006 the Supreme Court, sitting in a single-judge formation, rejected her request for leave to appeal in cassation. Its reasoning was limited to a statement that the cassation appeal was unfounded, and that its arguments did not warrant any verification of the case file materials in accordance with Article 328 § 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure (see paragraph 29 below). 22. On 21 November 2006 the applicant lodged with the Khortytskyy Court a civil claim against her former husband, seeking recovery of the child maintenance arrears as assessed by the bailiff on 19 October 2006 (see paragraph 14 above), with an inflationary adjustment and additional penalties. 23. On 22 January 2007 the court found against the applicant. It held that the Bailiffs’ Service had already determined the outstanding arrears S. had to pay (UAH 8,637.32 – see paragraph 14 above), and that the applicant was not entitled to any further indexation or penalties. 24. Following an appeal by the applicant, on 26 April 2007 the Court of Appeal quashed that decision and ordered the applicant’s former husband to pay her UAH 4,964 in arrears (equivalent to about EUR 740). As regards the arrears owed for 2005, it relied on the Khortytskyy Court’s decision of 3 April 2006 based on the bailiff’s report of 1 April 2006 (see paragraphs 8 and 17 above). 25. The applicant appealed in cassation. She argued that the final amount of outstanding child maintenance arrears owed to her by S. at 2 October 2006 was UAH 8,637.32 (equivalent to about EUR 1,290). The applicant emphasised that none of the parties had ever challenged the accuracy of that calculation. The appellate court had nevertheless chosen to rely on the bailiff’s earlier report of 1 April 2006, which had been invalidated by the Khortytskyy Court on 24 May 2006 after she complained. 26. On 19 July 2007 the Supreme Court, sitting in a single-judge formation, rejected her request for leave to appeal in cassation. Its reasoning was identical to that given in the ruling of 21 November 2006 (see paragraph 21 above). 27. On 28 April 2006 the applicant lodged a civil claim with the Khortytskyy Court, seeking an increase of the child maintenance to be paid by her former husband from that date onwards. 28. On 20 June 2006 the court allowed her claim in part and assessed the amount of monthly child maintenance at UAH 165, to be paid from 3 May until 2 October of that year, the date their daughter reached the age of majority. No appeal was lodged and the decision became final.

6. The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Helsinki. 7. On 16 February 1995 the applicant wrote an article which criticised the business transactions and financial affairs of the Student Association of the University of Helsinki (to be called “HYY” hereinafter). The article was published in a magazine called “Uusi Ylioppilaslehti” which is a publication mainly distributed to the students and professors of the University of Helsinki and others interested in questions concerning the Student Association and the University. On 7 August 1995 HYY and some others mentioned in the article requested the police to investigate whether the applicant had defamed them. 8. On 13 September 1995 the applicant was interrogated by the police for the first time for approximately one hour. On 13 February 1996 the police received another request for investigation which was related to a further alleged defamation in November-December 1995. In the context of this investigation, the applicant was heard on 2 May 1996 and the investigation was completed on the same day. 9. On 20 June 1996 a local prosecutor decided not to prosecute the applicant for either of the alleged offences. However, as a result of an extraordinary appeal (kantelu, klagan) of 22 July 1996 by the complainants the County Prosecutor of Uusimaa ordered, on 17 January 1997, that the applicant be charged with an offence. On 27 January 1997 another local prosecutor brought defamation charges against the applicant before the District Court (käräjäoikeus, tingsrätt) of Espoo. Charges were brought and a summons was served on the applicant on 31 January 1997. 10. There were eight hearings before the District Court on 17 April 1997, 15 and 17 September 1997, 25 November 1997, 3 December 1997, 21 January 1998 and 26 February 1998, respectively. Both parties requested an adjournment on four occasions. On 7 April 1998 the District Court issued its judgment, finding the applicant guilty of defamation. Fines or other penalties were not imposed but the applicant was ordered to pay compensation for some non-pecuniary damage and part of the complainants’ legal expenses. 11. The applicant appealed to the Court of Appeal (hovioikeus, hovrätt) of Helsinki in May 1998. On 22 December 1998 he submitted to the appellate court two missing pages of one appendix and on 30 March 1999 his lawyer’s invoice on legal aid. 12. On 27 June 2000 the Court of Appeal overturned the District Court’s judgment and acquitted the applicant of all charges by two votes to one. It found that the applicant had a right to discuss the financial affairs of HYY publicly and to raise the issue among the students and other interested parties. Having a right to use his freedom of speech in this respect, the applicant had not committed an offence. 13. No appeals were made to the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen) and the judgment gained legal force on 28 August 2000.

6. The first applicant was born in 1982 and lives in Furstenfeld, Austria. He is the father of the second applicant, who was born in 2006 and lives at an unspecified address in Romania. 7. On 13 April 2004 the first applicant married a Romanian citizen, K.T. The marriage was concluded in Salzburg, Austria. On 15 February 2006 their daughter, the second applicant, was born. The parents had joint custody of the child under Austrian law. They lived in Salzburg. 8. On 1 February 2008 K.T. and the first applicant separated. On 25 February 2008 K.T. filed a divorce petition with the Salzburg authorities. The first applicant lodged a counter petition on 25 March 2008. 9. On 29 January 2008 K.T. filed for an interim injunction against the first applicant, seeking his removal from the family home on the ground of his violent behaviour. On 8 February 2008, the Salzburg District Civil Court granted the interim injunction for a period of three months. Criminal proceedings were also initiated against the first applicant for infliction of bodily harm. 10. On 1 February 2008 K.T. lodged an action for temporary sole custody of the second applicant throughout the divorce proceedings. At the end of September 2008, while the proceedings for the award of custody were pending before the Austrian courts, K.T. left for Romania together with the second applicant. The first applicant was not informed of the departure, even though at the time the spouses had joint custody of the second applicant. 11. In the meantime, on 25 July 2008 the Salzburg District Criminal Court acquitted the first applicant of inflicting bodily harm. The Salzburg Public Prosecutor reserved the right to initiate criminal proceedings against K.T. for perjury. 12. On 25 November 2008, the Salzburg District Civil Court granted the first applicant temporary sole custody of the second applicant until the finalisation of the divorce proceedings. The court relied, inter alia, on expert opinion which concluded that the first applicant was better suited to have custody. K.T. does not appear to have appealed against the judgment. 13. Currently, the divorce proceedings between the first applicant and K.T. are pending before the Romanian courts. 14. On 30 September 2008 the first applicant submitted a request for the return of the second applicant to Austria under Article 3 of the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“the Hague Convention”). He argued that the second applicant had been removed from Austrian territory in breach of the joint custody held by the spouses at the time of the removal. On 7 October 2008 the Austrian authorities submitted the request to the Romanian Ministry of Justice (“the Romanian Ministry”), the Central Authority responsible for the obligations established under the Hague Convention. 15. On 28 October 2008, at the request of the Romanian Ministry, the General Police Department (Inspectoratul General al Poliţiei) confirmed that the second applicant was living with her mother, in Romania, at her grandparents’ home. Furthermore, on 3 November 2008 the Department for Social Services and Child Protection (Departamentul General de Asistenţă Socială şi Protecţia Copilului) drafted a report in relation to the second applicant. The report mainly mentioned K.T.’s statements concerning her situation in Austria, her reasons for departure as well as the maternal grandparents’ declarations concerning their commitment to provide housing and financial support to the second applicant indefinitely. It was also mentioned that the second applicant did not appear to be an abused or neglected child and that she was very attached to her mother and her maternal grandparents. The report concluded that the second applicant had appropriate living conditions, both from a material and emotional point of view. 16. On 5 December 2008 the Romanian Ministry instituted proceedings on behalf of the first applicant before the Bucharest County Court. By a judgment of 28 January 2009, communicated on 28 May 2009, the Bucharest County Court found in favour of the first applicant, ordering the return of the second applicant to Austria. The Bucharest County Court held that the request fell under Article 3 of the Hague Convention and that none of the exceptions provided for under Article 13 applied. 17. K.T. appealed. She submitted several pieces of evidence, including declarations of her parents as witnesses given before a Romanian Court in the context of the divorce and custody proceedings. She further submitted a welfare report drafted by the Custody Service within the Timişoara City Hall (Serviciul de Autoritate Tutelară din cadrul Primariei Municipiului Timişoara). The report included information on K.T.’s family situation, living conditions, and K.T.’s declarations in relation to the circumstances of her living and departing from Austria. Finally, the report recommended that K.T. were awarded the custody over the second applicant. 18. By a final judgment delivered on 8 July 2009, and rendered in written form on 17 September 2009, the Bucharest Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on points of law, holding that the return of the second applicant to Austria would expose her to physical and psychological harm, within the meaning of Article 13 § 1 (b) of the Hague Convention. On the merits, the Bucharest Court of Appeal held that the first applicant had shown violent behaviour towards K.T., as the Salzburg District Civil Court had maintained when granting K.T. the interim injunction of 8 February 2008. The Bucharest Court of Appeal further held that the first applicant had breached the restraining order in September 2008, which determined K.T. to come to Romania. Finally, the domestic court reasoned that even if there was no evidence of a violent behaviour of the first applicant towards the child, this could be inferred from his behaviour towards K.T. and from K.T.’s departure to Romania. The Salzburg District Civil Court’s judgment of 25 November 2008 was set aside on the ground that by that time K.T. and the second applicant had already left Austria. 19. Throughout the domestic proceedings, the Romanian Ministry informed the Austrian authorities of the progress of the Hague Convention proceedings. The information included the date of the hearings and whether or not an appeal had been lodged. From the evidence adduced to the case file, it appears that the Romanian Ministry did not have any direct contact with the first applicant in connection with the Hague Convention proceedings. 20. The relevant provisions of the Hague Convention, which entered into force in respect of Romania on 30 September 1992, read, in so far as relevant, as follows. Article 3 “The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where – a) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and b) at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention. The rights of custody mentioned in sub-paragraph a) above, may arise in particular by operation of law or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or by reason of an agreement having legal effect under the law of that State.” Article 4 “The Convention shall apply to any child who was habitually resident in a Contracting State immediately before any breach of custody or access rights. The Convention shall cease to apply when the child attains the age of 16 years.” Article 6 “A Contracting State shall designate a Central Authority to discharge the duties which are imposed by the Convention upon such authorities. [..]” Article 7 “Central Authorities shall co-operate with each other and promote co‑operation amongst the competent authorities in their respective State to secure the prompt return of children and to achieve the other objects of this Convention. In particular, either directly or through any intermediary, they shall take all appropriate measures – [..] f) to initiate or facilitate the institution of judicial or administrative proceedings with a view to obtaining the return of the child and, in a proper case, to make arrangements for organizing or securing the effective exercise of rights of access; [..]” Article 11 “The judicial or administrative authorities of Contracting States shall act expeditiously in proceedings for the return of children. If the judicial or administrative authority concerned has not reached a decision within six weeks from the date of commencement of the proceedings, the applicant or the Central Authority of the requested State, on its own initiative or if asked by the Central Authority of the requesting State, shall have the right to request a statement of the reasons for the delay. If a reply is received by the Central Authority of the requested State, that Authority shall transmit the reply to the Central Authority of the requesting State, or to the applicant, as the case may be.” Article 12 “Where a child has been wrongfully removed or retained in terms of Article 3 and, at the date of the commencement of the proceedings before the judicial or administrative authority of the Contracting State where the child is, a period of less than one year has elapsed from the date of the wrongful removal or retention, the authority concerned shall order the return of the child forthwith. The judicial or administrative authority, even where the proceedings have been commenced after the expiration of the period of one year referred to in the preceding paragraph, shall also order the return of the child, unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment. Where the judicial or administrative authority in the requested State has reason to believe that the child has been taken to another State, it may stay the proceedings or dismiss the application for the return of the child.” Article 13 “Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the judicial or administrative authority of the requested State is not bound to order the return of the child if the person, institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that – a) the person, institution or other body having the care of the person of the child was not actually exercising the custody rights at the time of removal or retention, or had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention; or b) there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation. The judicial or administrative authority may also refuse to order the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views. In considering the circumstances referred to in this Article, the judicial and administrative authorities shall take into account the information relating to the social background of the child provided by the Central Authority or other competent authority of the child’s habitual residence.” Article 20 “The return of the child under the provisions of Article 12 may be refused if this would not be permitted by the fundamental principles of the requested State relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.” 21. Council Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and matters of parental responsibility (“the Regulation”), in so far as relevant reads as follows: Preamble (17)“In cases of wrongful removal or retention of a child, the return of the child should be obtained without delay, and to this end the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 would continue to apply as complemented by the provisions of this Regulation, in particular Article 11. [...]” Article 11 “1. Where a person, institution or other body having rights of custody applies to the competent authorities in a Member State to deliver a judgment on the basis of the Hague Convention [..], in order to obtain the return of a child that has been wrongfully removed or retained in a Member State other than the Member State where the child was habitually resident immediately before the wrongful removal or retention, paragraphs 2 to 8 shall apply. [...] 3. A court to which an application for return of a child is made as mentioned in paragraph 1 shall act expeditiously in proceedings on the application, using the most expeditious procedures available in national law. Without prejudice to the first subparagraph, the court shall, except where exceptional circumstances make this impossible, issue its judgment no later than six weeks after the application is lodged. 4. A court cannot refuse to return a child on the basis of Article 13 (b) of the [...] Hague Convention if it is established that adequate arrangements have been made to secure the protection of the child after his or her return. 5. A court cannot refuse to return a child unless the person who requested the return of the child has been given an opportunity to be heard. 6. If a court has issued an order on non-return pursuant to Article 13 of the 1980 Hague Convention, the court must immediately either directly or through its central authority, transmit a copy of the court order on non-return and of the relevant documents, in particular a transcript of the hearings before the court, to the court with jurisdiction or central authority in the Member State where the child was habitually resident immediately before the wrongful removal or retention, as determined by national law. The court shall receive all the mentioned documents within one month of the date of the non-return order. 7. Unless the courts in the Member State where the child was habitually resident immediately before the wrongful removal or retention have already been seized by one of the parties, the court or central authority that receives [a copy of an order on non-return pursuant to Article 13 of the Hague Convention and of the documents relevant to that order] must notify it to the parties and invite them to make submissions to the court, in accordance with national law, within three months of the date of notification so that the court can examine the question of custody of the child. [..]”

4. The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Kórnik. 5. On 20 June 2000 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of several offences of mugging and extortion committed as part of an organised criminal group. 6. On 22 June 2000 the Choszczno District Court remanded him in custody, relying on the reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offences in question. It also considered that keeping the applicant in detention was necessary to ensure the proper conduct of the proceedings, given the risk that he might tamper with evidence or induce witnesses to give false testimony, particularly in view of the fact that another suspect had not yet been arrested. The court also stressed the severity of the likely sentence and the serious nature of the charges. 7. Several other members of the same criminal group were subsequently detained and charged in connection with the investigation against the applicant. 8. The applicant’s appeal against the detention order, like his further appeals against the decisions extending his detention and all his subsequent, numerous applications for release and appeals against refusals to release him, was unsuccessful. In his applications and appeals he relied, inter alia, on his personal circumstances, in particular the need to secure care for his elderly parents. He also argued that his confessions to offences of which he was suspected had not been taken into consideration. 9. Between 20 July 2000 and 5 August 2000 the applicant served a prison sentence which had been imposed on him in other criminal proceedings. 10. In the course of the investigation, the applicant’s detention was extended on several occasions, namely on 19 September 2000 (to 20 December 2000), 19 December 2000 (to 20 March 2001), 16 March 2001 (to 20 June 2001), 19 June 2001 (to 31 December 2001), 28 December 2001 (to 31 May 2002) and 29 May 2002 (to 18 July 2002). In all their detention decisions the authorities relied on a strong suspicion, supported by evidence from witnesses and his own testimony, that the applicant had committed the offences in question. They attached importance to the grave nature of those offences and the likelihood of a severe sentence of imprisonment being imposed on the applicant. They further considered that the need to ensure the proper conduct of the investigation, especially the need to obtain fresh evidence from experts and witnesses, justified holding him in custody. 11. On 28 June 2002 the Gdańsk Regional Prosecutor lodged a bill of indictment with the Gdańsk Regional Court. The applicant was charged with robbery, deprivation of liberty, burglary and possession of firearms and ammunition without a licence. There were 39 defendants in the case, all charged with numerous offences committed in an organised criminal group. 12. On 4 April 2003 the trial court held the first hearing. It subsequently held several hearings in the case. 13. During the court proceedings the Poznań Court of Appeal further extended the applicant’s detention pending trial on several occasions, namely on 11 July 2002 (to 18 January 2003), 16 January 2003 (to 18 April 2003), 10 April 2003 (to 18 October 2003) and 25 September 2003 (to 18 April 2004). The court, extending the applicant’s detention beyond the two-year period laid down in Article 263 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, reiterated the grounds previously given for the applicant’s detention. Relying on Article 263 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure it also underlined the complexity of the case owing to the number of defendants and volume of evidence to be obtained from many sources, coupled with the fact that in the course of the investigation new suspects had been identified. 14. On 20 January 2004 the applicant was released from pre-trial detention. 15. On 13 August 2004 the Gorzów Wielkopolski Regional Court gave judgment. The applicant was convicted as charged and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. 16. The applicant appealed. 17. On 16 November 2005 the Poznań Court of Appeal upheld the first‑instance judgment. 18. The applicant lodged a cassation appeal (kasacja) with the Supreme Court. The proceedings are still pending. 19. On 21 July 2003 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court contesting all the prerequisites of Article 263 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the strength of which the Poznań Court of Appeal had given a decision extending his pre-trial detention beyond the two-year period. He claimed that the provision contravened the right to liberty guaranteed by the Polish Constitution. 20. On 24 July 2006 the Constitutional Court, considering the joint constitutional complaint of two complainants including the applicant, gave a judgment (no. SK 58/03). It found one aspect of Article 263 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure unconstitutional in so far as it allowed the Courts of Appeal to extend pre-trial detention beyond the period of two years “if deemed necessary in connection with other important obstacles (in the pre-trial proceedings) which could not be overcome.” The Constitutional Court reasoned that “the overruled provisions restricted the enjoyment of constitutional rights and freedoms in such an imprecise and arbitrary manner that they violated the core of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms”. Referring to other grounds of extraordinary extensions of pre-trial detention under Article 263 § 4, namely suspension of criminal proceedings, prolonged psychiatric observation of the accused, prolonged preparation of an expert opinion, evidence gathering in a particularly complex case or a foreign country, and intentional protraction of proceedings by the accused, the Constitutional Court stated that although these criteria were to some extent vague as well, their constitutionality could be secured through their precise definition which was formulated through practice and had to make reference inter alia to the well-established case-law of the European Court as regards violations of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention. By virtue of the Constitutional Court’s decision, Article 263 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the extent it had been found to be unconstitutional would cease to have effect six months after publication of the said judgment in the Polish Journal of Law.

5. The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Baku. 6. The opposition group Ictimai Palata was planning a demonstration to be held on 19 June 2011 in Baku. On 9 June 2011 the organisers – consisting of several members of that group – gave prior notice to the relevant authority, the Baku City Executive Authority (“the BCEA”), informing it of the date, time, place and purpose of the demonstration. According to the notice, the assembly was scheduled to take place from 5 p.m. to 7 p.m. on 19 June 2011 at the square in front of the Narimanov Cinema in Baku. 7. The BCEA refused to authorise the holding of the demonstration at the place indicated by the organisers and proposed another location on the outskirts of Baku. 8. Nevertheless, the organisers decided to hold the demonstration in one of the central areas of Baku, namely, near the Puppet Theatre on Seaside Boulevard. 9. According to the applicant, the demonstration was intended to be peaceful and was conducted in a peaceful manner. The participants were demanding free and fair elections, democratic reforms, freedom of assembly, and the release of persons arrested during some previous demonstrations. 10. The applicant attended the demonstration, but shortly after it had started the police started to disperse it. The applicant was arrested at around 6.10 p.m. during the dispersal operation. He claimed that he had been arrested and taken to a police car by plain-clothed persons. According to the official records, he was arrested by police officers Z.H. and J.M. He was taken to police station No. 9 of the Sabail District Police Office. 11. Police officers Z.H. and J.M. stated the following in a report (raport) submitted to a superior police officer: “... at around 6.10 p.m. we were on duty ... when Mammadov Gafgaz Suleyman oglu, whose identity was established later, was attempting to hold an unlawful demonstration. We demanded that he stop his illegal actions, [he] deliberately disobeyed [and] continued his actions, and for that reason we brought him to the [police station] ...” 12. According to the applicant, he was questioned at the police station. 13. At 6.50 p.m. on the day of the arrest, an “administrative-offence report” (inzibati xəta haqqında protokol) was issued by police officer H.H. in respect of the applicant. The report stated that by deliberately failing to comply with the lawful order of the police during the demonstration, the applicant had committed an administrative offence under Article 310.1 of the Code of Administrative Offences (“the CAO”). 14. The applicant refused to sign the report, which contained a pre‑printed text declaring that “[the arrested person] was familiarised with the report, the reasons for his or her arrest and his or her rights under Articles 371, 400.2, 401.1.6, 401.1.7 of the CAO of the Republic of Azerbaijan were explained”. 15. Subsequently, police officer H.H. prepared an “administrative-arrest report” (inzibati qaydada tutma haqqında protokol), stating that: “... the [applicant] was subjected to administrative arrest at 8 p.m. on 19 June 2011 ... in order to ensure issuance of an administrative-offence report, to ensure a correct and timely examination of the case, [and] to ensure the execution of decisions, in accordance with Articles 396.1.2 and 398 of the CAO.” 16. According to the applicant, he was never served with a copy of the administrative-offence report or with other documents in his case file. He was not given access to a lawyer after the arrest or while he was kept in police custody. 17. On 20 June 2011, the day after his arrest, the applicant was brought before the Sabail District Court. 18. According to the applicant, he refused the assistance of a State‑funded lawyer and insisted on hiring a lawyer of his own choice, but the judge disregarded his request. His representation by that lawyer was ineffective and of a formalistic nature. The hearing was very brief and members of the public, including human rights defenders and journalists, were not allowed to attend, even though the court had not taken a formal decision to close the hearing to the public. 19. The applicant stated before the court that he was not guilty of disobeying a lawful order of a police officer and that he had participated in the demonstration because he had a constitutional right to freedom of assembly. 20. According to the record of the hearing provided by the Government, in response to the judge’s question whether the police officers, before arresting him, had issued a relevant notice about dispersal of the demonstration, the applicant gave the following answer: “There were a lot of police officers and they were demanding that we disperse. But their demand was not lawful because we were exercising our right. Instead of calling on us to disperse, the responsibility of the police should have been to ensure our security.” 21. The only witness questioned during the court hearing was police officer Z.H., who testified as follows: “At around 6.10 p.m. on 19 June 2011 ... we noticed that [the applicant], together with a group of other people, was attempting to hold an unauthorised demonstration by shouting out slogans, and ... asked them to observe silence. However, [the applicant] continued his actions, disobeying our requests ...” 22. According to the record of the hearing, the State-funded lawyer stated that the applicant was not guilty and asked the court to take into consideration the applicant’s age and the fact that he had children. 23. The court found that the applicant had failed to stop participating in the unauthorised demonstration. The court convicted him under Article 310.1 of the CAO and sentenced him to five days’ “administrative” detention. 24. The applicant lodged an appeal before the Baku Court of Appeal, arguing that his conviction was in violation of his rights because the demonstration in which he had participated had been peaceful. He also complained that his arrest had been unlawful and that the hearing before the first-instance court had not been fair. He urged the Baku Court of Appeal to quash the first-instance court’s decision. 25. The applicant was represented before the Baku Court of Appeal by a lawyer of his own choice. 26. On 24 June 2011 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the decision of the first-instance court, stating that its findings had been correct.

7. The first applicant was born in 1942 and the second applicant was born in 1944. They both live in Wrocław, Poland. 8. On 19 May 1994 the applicants, employees of the Wrocław Technical University (Politechnika Wrocławska) and members of a trade union, were informed by their employer that as from 1 September 1994 their employment contracts would be modified and that they would be transferred. 9. On 24 May 1994 the applicants sued the Wrocław Technical University in the Wrocław-Śródmieście District Court (Sąd Rejonowy), seeking the annulment of the employer's decisions. The court joined their actions. 10. As a result of the applicants' refusal to accept the proposed changes to their employment contracts, they were dismissed from their jobs with effect from 31 August 1994. Subsequently, the applicants modified their claims and filed actions for reinstatement with the Wrocław-Śródmieście District Court. 11. On 15 September 1994 the court held a first hearing in the case. It imposed a fine on the defendant for having failed to appear before the court. The court held hearings on 20 October and 6 December 1994, and 10 January 1995. The hearing listed for 27 January 1995 was cancelled because the judge rapporteur was ill. 12. On 24 February 1995 the court held a hearing and heard evidence from the parties and witnesses. On 10 March 1995 the second applicant asked the court not to fix hearings on Wednesdays and Fridays, since she would not be able to appear before the court. At the hearing held on 1 June 1995 the court heard evidence from other witnesses. On 16 June 1995 the court ordered that the case file be obtained from the Wrocław-Śródmieście District Prosecutor (Prokurator Rejonowy). 13. On 6 July, 28 September and 7 December 1995, and 5 January 1996 the court held hearings. 14. On 16 January 1996 the District Court gave judgment. The applicants appealed. 15. On 16 April 1996 the Wrocław Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) held a hearing. On 30 April 1996 the Regional Court quashed the first-instance judgment and remitted the case. 16. The hearing before the District Court listed for 31 July 1996 was adjourned because the defendant's lawyer had failed to appear before the court. On 4 October 1996 the court held a hearing and heard evidence from a witness. The hearing listed for 5 December 1996 was adjourned because a witness had not appeared before it. 17. On 7 February 1997 the District Court gave judgment and ordered that the applicants be reinstated. The defendant appealed. 18. On 27 January and 28 April 1998 the Wrocław Regional Court held hearings. On 9 July 1998 the court ordered the defendant's lawyer to produce certain documentary evidence. 19. On 17 September 1998 the court adjourned a hearing because a summoned witness had not appeared before the court. On 26 November 1998 the court held a hearing and heard a witness. 20. On 10 December 1998 the Regional Court gave judgment. It set aside the first-instance judgment in respect of the applicants' reinstatement and awarded them compensation for unlawful dismissal. 21. The applicants lodged their cassation appeals with the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy). On 15 October 1999 the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the Regional Court and remitted the case. 22. On 9 May and 5 September 2000 the court held hearings. At the hearing held on 28 November 2000 the applicants challenged two judges of the Regional Court. On 12 December 2000 the court dismissed their request as unfounded. 23. Subsequently, on 2 February 2001 the applicants challenged seven judges of the Wrocław Regional Court. On 15 March 2001 the court dismissed this request as unfounded. Another hearing was held on 26 June 2001. 24. At the hearing held on 5 July 2001 the Regional Court gave judgment. 25. On 28 September 2001 the applicants lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court. 26. On 5 December 2002 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicants' cassation appeal. The judgment is final.

4. The applicant was born in 1917 and lives in Rome. 5. She is the owner of four flats in Rome, which she had let to P.C., G.F. and R.R., E.T. and S.A.. 1) Proceedings against P.C. and then his widow M.L. 6. In a writ served on the tenant on 19 November 1990, the applicant informed him of her intention to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1991 and summoned him to appear before the Rome Magistrate. 7. By a decision of 3 May 1991, which was made enforceable on 15 May 1991, the Rome Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 December 1992. 8. On 1 February 1993, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 9. On 17 February 1993, she served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 7 April 1993. 10. Between 7 April 1993 and 18 November 1999, the bailiff made twenty-three attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 11. On 15 December 1999, the applicant recovered possession of the flat. 2) Proceedings against G.F. and R.R. 12. In a registered letter of 14 September 1989, the applicant informed the tenants that she intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 30 April 1990 and asked them to vacate the premises by that date. 13. In a writ served on the tenants on 19 November 1990, the applicant reiterated her intention to terminate the lease and summoned them to appear before the Rome Magistrate. 14. By a decision of 3 May 1991, which was made enforceable on 17 May 1991, the Rome Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 3 May 1992. 15. On 19 October 1992, the applicant served notice on the tenants requiring them to vacate the premises. 16. On 18 December 1992, she served notice on the tenants informing them that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 8 January 1993. 17. Between 8 January 1993 and 6 October 1999, the bailiff made twenty-four attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 18. On 10 January 2000, the applicant recovered possession of the flat. 3) Proceedings against E.T. 19. In a writ served on the tenant on 19 November 1990, the applicant informed him of her intention to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1991 and summoned him to appear before the Rome Magistrate. 20. By a decision of 3 May 1991, which was made enforceable on 15 May 1991, the Rome Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 December 1992. 21. On 1 February 1993, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 22. On 17 February 1993, she served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 7 April 1993. 23. Between 7 April 1993 and 24 November 2000, the bailiff made thirty-two attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 24. On 15 December 2000, the applicant recovered possession of the flat. 4) Proceedings against S.A. and then his widow M.B. 25. In a writ served on the tenant on 20 July 1990, the applicant informed the tenant of her intention to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 30 June 1991 and summoned him to appear before the Rome Magistrate. 26. By a decision of 17 January 1991, which was made enforceable on 15 April 1991, the Rome Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 30 April 1992. 27. On 19 October 1992, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 28. On 19 December 1992, she served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 8 January 1993. 29. Between 8 January 1993 and 6 October 1999, the bailiff made twenty-five attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 30. On 4 February 2000, the applicant recovered possession of the flat.

6. The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Dębica. 7. The applicant was a party to civil proceedings concerning division of co-ownership of a certain plot of land. The proceedings were instituted in 2001. On 12 February 2003 the Lwówek Slaski District Court awarded the plot to a certain M.K. and ordered that a certain amount should be paid to the applicant. 8. On 9 October 2003 the Jelenia Góra Regional Court partly amended the first‑instance decision increasing the amount awarded to the applicant and dismissed the remainder of his appeal. 9. On 14 October 2003 the applicant requested to be served with written grounds to that judgment. On 12 December 2003 the court served him with them and the thirty‑day time‑limit for lodging of a cassation appeal started to run. 10. By a letter of 12 December 2003, served on the court on 18 December 2003, the applicant requested that a legal‑aid lawyer be assigned to the case to prepare a cassation complaint. On the same day the court requested the applicant to submit a statement of his financial situation in order to be able to examine his request. 11. On 6 January 2004 the Jelenia Góra Regional Court granted the applicant's request for legal aid. On 13 January 2004 the Wałbrzych Bar Association assigned a legal‑aid lawyer to the case. 12. On 16 and 20 January 2004 the applicant and the lawyer had a telephone conversation. In a letter to the lawyer dated 20 January 2004 the applicant explained in a detailed manner the legal context of the case and the reasons for which he was of the view that a cassation complaint offered prospects of success. 13. In a letter to the court dated 22 January 2004 the lawyer explained in detail why she saw no grounds on which to prepare a cassation complaint in the applicant's case. 14. On 3 March 2004 the legal-aid lawyer sent a copy of his opinion to the applicant. It was served on the applicant on 8 March 2004. On 8 March 2004 also the court sent the lawyer's opinion to the applicant. 15. On 30 August 2007 the applicant requested the Lwówek Slaski District Court to exempt him from costs of making copies of documents in the case-file. On 6 September 2007 the Lwówek Slaski District Court dismissed the applicant's request as unfounded. The court established that the applicant owned property of 4,16 ha and the proceedings had ended in 2003 so he had enough time to collect founds for that purpose. On 12 October 2007 the Jelenia Góra Regional Court dismissed the applicant's interlocutory appeal.

5. The applicants were born in 1958 and 1931 respectively and live in Beryozovka, the Odessa region. The first applicant is a farmer who specialises in arable crops. The second applicant is his mother, a pensioner. 6. On 24 January 2001 the first applicant was stopped by tax police officers when driving a lorry leased from his mother. On checking the lorry the officers discovered 500 kilos of wheat, 1,400 kilos of flour and 3,000 kilos of wheat middlings for which the applicant had no proper documents. The police officers drew up a report on an administrative offence and seized the lorry and the load pending adjudication of the case by the court. 7. On 26 January 2001 the Trostyanets District Court (the “District Court”) found that the first applicant had transported the property of a third person for sale without a relevant business permit and was therefore guilty of unlawful business activity (an administrative offence). The District Court fined the applicant 51 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH) and ordered the confiscation of the flour and wheat middlings. It further held that the 500 kilos of wheat were not subject to forfeiture as they belonged to the first applicant. 8. According to the applicants, after the judgment of 26 January 2001 they applied on several occasions to the Trostyanets Town Tax Office (the “Tax Office”), requesting that the lorry and the wheat load, which were not covered by the confiscation order, be returned to them. Their requests were rejected however. 9. On an unspecified date the confiscated products were sold and the funds were transferred to the State budget. 10. On 19 June 2001 the President of the Vinnytsya Region Court (subsequently renamed as the Vinnytsya Regional Court of Appeal), following an extraordinary review, quashed the judgment of 26 January 2001, stating that the conviction of the first applicant and the imposed penalties had been unsubstantiated. He therefore closed the case. 11. On 15 August 2001 the Tax Office returned the lorry and the wheat load to the applicants. According to the applicants the wheat load had deteriorated significantly and the lorry was damaged when returned. 12. On 3 January 2002 the applicants lodged a claim with the Vinnytsya Region Court of Appeal against the District Court and the Tax Office seeking damages for the wrongful conviction; for the groundless seizure and lengthy detention of their property; and for the deterioration of their property when in charge of the Tax Office. They claimed in particular that the Tax Office unlawfully retained the lorry and the wheat load despite the fact that those objects were not covered by the confiscation order; and that the lorry and the wheat load had significantly deteriorated when returned. 13. On 20 January 2002 the Vinnytsya Regional Court of Appeal declared the claim inadmissible, stating, in particular: “According to Article 62 of the Constitution, compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage caused in the course of the administration of justice can be paid by the State to a person who has been groundlessly sentenced provided that the judgment in a criminal case has been quashed as unfair. However, even in such a case the damage is compensated by the State, and not by a court or a judge. Therefore, the court (or judge) as a body (or individual) administering justice cannot be a defendant in civil litigation, as the law provides another mechanism for correcting mistakes and irregularities committed in the course of the administration of justice.” The court did not give any reasons why the part of the applicants’ claim submitted against the Tax Office could not be considered by the court. 14. By a letter of 23 March 2002 the Deputy Chairman of the State Tax Administration confirmed to the first applicant that he could claim compensation for damage, allegedly inflicted by the Tax Office, by filing a relevant civil suit with a court. 15. On an unspecified date the State Tax Administration, having made an internal inquiry, established that the Tax Office had failed to take the necessary steps to return to the owners the lorry and the wheat load in time. It further concluded that disciplinary measures were needless since the relevant official had retired. 16. On 7 May 2002 the applicants lodged with the Supreme Court a cassation appeal against the decision of 20 January 2002, contending that the refusal to consider their claim against the District Court and the Tax Office had been unlawful. 17. On 21 August 2002, following their request of 5 August 2002, the Tax Office reimbursed to the applicants the value of the confiscated products. 18. On 15 November 2002 the Supreme Court rejected the applicants’ cassation appeal against the decision of 20 January 2002, finding that there had been no procedural irregularities. The applicants were not present at the hearing. By a letter of 10 December 2002 the Supreme Court informed the applicants of that decision.

8. The applicants have been indicted on various charges of terrorism in the United States of America. They are the subject of three separate sets of criminal proceedings in the United States federal courts. The first set concerns the first applicant, Mr Ahmad, and the third applicant, Mr Ahsan. The second set of proceedings concerns the second applicant, Mr Aswat, and the fourth applicant, Abu Hamza. The third set of proceedings concerns the fifth applicant, Mr Bary, and the sixth applicant, Mr Al Fawwaz. 9. The details of each indictment are set out below. On the basis of each indictment, the United States Government requested each applicant’s extradition from the United Kingdom. Each applicant then contested his proposed extradition in separate proceedings in the English courts. 10. The indictment against the first applicant was returned by a Federal Grand Jury sitting in Connecticut on 6 October 2004. It alleges the commission of four felonies between 1997 and August 2004: conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists; providing material support to terrorists; conspiracy to kill, kidnap, maim or injure persons or damage property in a foreign country; and money laundering. On 28 June 2006, a similar indictment was returned against the third applicant, save that the charge of money laundering was not included. For both indictments, the material support is alleged to have been provided through a series of websites, one of whose servers was based in Connecticut. The charge of conspiracy to kill, kidnap, maim or injure persons or damage property in a foreign country is based on two allegations: first, that the websites exhorted Muslims to travel to Chechnya and Afghanistan to defend those places; and second, that classified US Navy plans relating to a US naval battle group operating in the Straits of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf had been sent to the website. The plans are alleged to have discussed the battle group’s vulnerability to terrorist attack. 11. The indictment against the fourth applicant was returned on 19 April 2004 by a Federal Grand Jury sitting in the Southern District of New York. It charges him with eleven different counts of criminal conduct. These cover three sets of facts. 12. The first group of charges relates to the taking of sixteen hostages in Yemen in December 1998, four of whom died during a rescue mission conducted by Yemeni forces. The indictment charges the fourth applicant with conspiracy to take hostages and hostage taking and relates principally to his contact with the leader of the hostage takers, Abu Al-Hassan, before and during the events in question. 13. The second group of charges relates to the conduct of violent jihad in Afghanistan in 2001. The indictment alleges that the fourth applicant provided material and financial assistance to his followers and arranged for them to meet Taliban commanders in Afghanistan. In this respect, four counts of the indictment charge him with providing and concealing material support and resources to terrorists and a foreign terrorist organisation and conspiracy thereto. A further count charges him with conspiracy to supply goods and services to the Taliban. 14. The third group of charges relates to a conspiracy to establish a jihad training camp in Bly, Oregon between June 2000 and December 2001. Two counts charge the fourth applicant with providing and concealing material support and resources to terrorists and providing material support and resources to a foreign terrorist organisation (Al Qaeda); a further two counts charge him with conspiracy to the main two counts. 15. On 12 September 2005, a superseding indictment was returned which named and indicted the second applicant as the fourth applicant’s alleged co-conspirator in respect of the Bly, Oregon charges (thus charging the second applicant with the same four counts as those faced by the fourth applicant in respect of the Bly, Oregon conspiracy). On 6 February 2006 a second superseding indictment was returned, which indicted a third man, Oussama Abdullah Kassir, as a co-conspirator in respect of the Bly, Oregon charges. 16. Mr Kassir was extradited to the United States from the Czech Republic in September 2007. On 12 May 2009, Mr Kassir was convicted on five counts relating to the Bly, Oregon jihad camp conspiracy. He was also convicted of a further six counts relating to the operation of terrorist websites. On 15 September 2009, after submissions from Mr Kassir and his defence counsel, the trial judge sentenced Mr Kassir to the maximum permissible sentence on each count. As a life sentence was the maximum permissible sentence on two of the counts, Mr Kassir had effectively been sentenced to a term of life imprisonment. 17. In 1999 a Federal Grand Jury sitting in the Southern District of New York returned an indictment against Osama bin Laden and twenty other individuals, including the applicants, inter alia alleging various degrees of involvement in or support for the bombing of the United States embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998. 18. The fifth applicant is charged with four counts: conspiracy to kill United States nationals, conspiracy to murder, conspiracy to destroy buildings and property, and conspiracy to attack national defence utilities. 19. The sixth applicant is charged with two hundred and eighty-five counts of criminal conduct, including over two hundred and sixty-nine counts of murder. 20. The first applicant was arrested in London on 5 August 2004. On 23 March 2005, the United States Embassy in London issued Diplomatic Note No. 25. Where relevant, the note provides: “Pursuant to Article IV of the Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Government of the United States hereby assures the Government of the United Kingdom that the United States will neither seek the death penalty against, nor will the death penalty be carried out, against Babar Ahmad upon his extradition to the United States. The Government of the United States further assures the Government of the United Kingdom that upon extradition to the United States, Babar Ahmad will be prosecuted before a Federal Court in accordance with the full panoply of rights and protections that would otherwise be provided to a defendant facing similar charges. Pursuant to his extradition, Babar Ahmad will not be prosecuted before a military commission, as specified in the President’s Military Order of November 13, 2001; nor will he be criminally prosecuted in any tribunal or court other than a United States Federal Court; nor will he be treated or designated as an enemy combatant...” 21. Similar Diplomatic Notes were provided in respect of the other applicants in the course of their respective extradition proceedings. 22. At the extradition hearing before the Senior District Judge, the first applicant argued, inter alia, that, notwithstanding the Diplomatic Note, the risk of the death penalty being imposed remained since he could be tried on a superseding indictment. He further argued that he remained at risk of being designated as an “enemy combatant” pursuant to United States Military Order No. 1 and that he remained at risk of extraordinary rendition to a third country. He also argued that there was a substantial risk that he would be subjected to special administrative measures whilst in detention in a federal prison, which could involve, among other measures, solitary confinement in violation of Article 3 and restrictions on communication with lawyers in violation of Article 6 of the Convention. 23. In a decision given on 17 May 2005, the Senior District Judge ruled that the extradition could proceed and that, inter alia, the first applicant’s extradition would not be incompatible with his rights under the Convention. The Senior District Judge found that, on the basis of the Diplomatic Note, there was no risk that the death penalty would be imposed, that the applicant would be designated as an enemy combatant, or subjected to extraordinary rendition. The Senior District Judge found the application of special administrative measures to be the greatest ground for concern but concluded that, having regard to the safeguards accompanying such measures, there would be no breach of the applicant’s Convention rights. 24. The Senior District Judge concluded as follows: “This is a difficult and troubling case. The [first applicant] is a British subject who is alleged to have committed offences which, if the evidence were available, could have been prosecuted in this country. Nevertheless the Government of the United States are entitled to seek his extradition under the terms of the Treaty and I am satisfied that none of the statutory bars [to extradition] apply.” Accordingly, he sent the case to the Secretary of State for his decision as to whether the first applicant should be extradited. 25. On 15 November 2005, the Secretary of State (Mr Charles Clarke) ordered the first applicant’s extradition. The first applicant appealed to the High Court (see paragraphs 29 et seq. below). 26. On 7 August 2005 the second applicant was arrested in the United Kingdom, also on the basis of an arrest warrant issued under section 73 of the Extradition Act 2003, following a request for his provisional arrest by the United States. 27. The Senior District Judge gave his decision in the second applicant’s case on 5 January 2006. He concluded that none of the bars to extradition applied, and sent the case to the Secretary of State for his decision as to whether the second applicant should be extradited. 28. On 1 March 2006, the Secretary of State ordered his extradition. The second applicant appealed to the High Court. 29. The first and second applicants’ appeals were heard together. In its judgment of 30 November 2006, the High Court rejected their appeals. The High Court found that, according to the case-law of this Court, solitary confinement did not in itself constitute inhuman or degrading treatment. Applying that approach, the evidence before it – which included an affidavit from a United States Department of Justice official outlining the operation of special administrative measures – did not “begin to establish a concrete case under Article 3”. 30. The first and second applicants applied for permission to appeal to the House of Lords. This was refused by the House of Lords on 6 June 2007. 31. The United States formally requested the extradition of the third applicant on 15 September 2006. The extradition hearing started on 20 November 2006 on which date the Senior District Judge determined that the third applicant was accused of offences for which he could be extradited. The case was then adjourned for evidence and argument, inter alia as to whether the third applicant’s extradition would be compatible with his Convention rights. The hearing resumed on 19 March 2007. By now bound by the High Court’s judgment in respect of the first and second applicants, the Senior District Judge found that the third applicant’s extradition would be compatible with the Convention. He accordingly sent the case to the Secretary of State for his decision as to whether the third applicant should be extradited. 32. On 14 June 2007, the Secretary of State (Dr John Reid) ordered that the extradition could proceed. The third applicant appealed against this decision to the High Court and also sought judicial review of the alleged failure of the Director of Public Prosecutions for England and Wales (“the DPP”) to consider whether he should instead be tried in the United Kingdom. He relied on guidance agreed between the Attorney General of the United States and his United Kingdom counterparts for handling criminal cases with concurrent jurisdiction between the United Kingdom and the United States (see paragraph 63 below). 33. On 10 April 2008 the High Court dismissed the third applicant’s human rights appeal, relying on its ruling in respect of the first and second applicants. In the same judgment, it also dismissed his application for judicial review, finding that the guidance had no application to the third applicant’s case. The guidance only applied to cases where there had been an investigation of the case in the United Kingdom and the DPP had been seized of the case as prosecutor. 34. On 14 May 2008 the High Court refused to certify a point of law of general public importance which ought to be considered by the House of Lords and also refused leave to appeal to the House of Lords. 35. The United States requested the fourth applicant’s extradition on 21 May 2004. He was arrested in London on 5 August 2004. 36. The extradition proceedings were adjourned when he was convicted of offences in the United Kingdom and sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment (see Mustafa (Abu Hamza) v. the United Kingdom (no. 1) (dec.), no. 31411/07, 18 January 2011). The extradition proceedings resumed when the criminal appeals process was concluded. a. The District Court proceedings 37. When the case came before the Senior District Judge for his decision as to whether the extradition could proceed, the fourth applicant argued, inter alia, that his extradition would give rise to a real risk of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention since he would be likely to be detained in a “supermax” detention facility such as the United States Penitentiary, Administrative Maximum, Florence, Colorado (“ADX Florence”). In this connection, he also relied on his poor health, specifically his type-two diabetes, his high blood pressure, the loss of sight in his right eye and poor vision in his left, the amputation of both his forearms (which frequently led to infections through abrasions), psoriasis on much of his body, hyperhydrosis (excessive sweating). A violation of Article 3, he claimed, would also result from the imposition of special administrative measures. 38. The Senior District Judge, in his ruling of 15 November 2007, rejected all these submissions. In respect of detention at ADX Florence the Senior District Judge found that the fourth applicant’s poor health and disabilities would be considered and, at worst, he would only be detained there for a relatively short period of time. The Senior District Judge was also not satisfied that special administrative measures would be applied to the fourth applicant but even if they were, he was bound by the ruling of the High Court in respect of the first and second applicants. Having concluded that none of the bars to extradition applied, the Senior District Judge sent the case to the Secretary of State (Ms Jacqui Smith) for her decision as to whether the fourth applicant should be extradited. She ordered his extradition on 7 February 2008. The fourth applicant appealed to the High Court against the Secretary of State’s decision and against the decision of the Senior District Judge. b. The High Court proceedings 39. Before the High Court, the fourth applicant again relied on his submission that conditions of detention at ADX Florence would not comply with Article 3. He also argued that the length of the possible sentence he faced in the United States would be contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. 40. The High Court gave its judgment on 20 June 2008, dismissing the fourth applicant’s appeal. In relation to Article 3, the High Court found that, if convicted, the fourth applicant would be sentenced to very lengthy terms of imprisonment and that, in all likelihood, a life sentence would be imposed. It found that this, of itself, would not constitute a breach of Article 3. On the question of the compatibility of detention at ADX Florence with Article 3, the High Court relied in particular on the understanding of the prison warden, Mr Robert Wiley, to the effect that if, after a full medical evaluation, it was determined that the fourth applicant could not manage his activities of daily living, it would be highly unlikely that he would be placed at ADX Florence rather than at a medical centre. Accordingly, there was no risk of a violation of Article 3 on this ground. However, the High Court added: “[T]he constitution of the United States of America guarantees not only ‘due process’, but it also prohibits ‘cruel and unusual punishment’. As part of the judicial process prisoners, including those incarcerated in Supermax prisons, are entitled to challenge the conditions in which they are confined, and these challenges have, on occasions, met with success. ... We should add that, subject to detailed argument which may be advanced in another case, like Judge Workman [the Senior District Judge], we too are troubled about what we have read about the conditions in some of the Supermax prisons in the United States. Naturally, the most dangerous criminals should expect to be incarcerated in the most secure conditions, but even allowing for a necessarily wide margin of appreciation between the views of different civilised countries about the conditions in which prisoners should be detained, confinement for years and years in what effectively amounts to isolation may well be held to be, if not torture, then ill treatment which contravenes Article 3. This problem may fall to be addressed in a different case.” 41. The fourth applicant then applied to the High Court for a certificate of points of law of general public importance and for leave to appeal to the House of Lords. On 23 July 2008, the High Court refused both applications. 42. The United States Government requested the fifth and sixth applicants’ extradition from the United Kingdom in July 1999 and September 1998 respectively. a. The initial extradition proceedings 43. At his committal hearing before the District Court, the sixth applicant contended that extradition was only permitted within the terms of the 1972 USA-UK Extradition Treaty for offences committed within the jurisdiction of the requesting State, and not when that State exercised jurisdiction over extra-territorial offences. He further argued that there was “insufficient evidence” to prove a prima facie case, which was a requirement for extradition under the Treaty. As part of that submission, he sought to have excluded two anonymous witness statements, which had been provided by two informants, “CS/1” and “CS/2”, and which the United States Government relied upon as part of their case against him. It was later revealed that CS/1 was a Mr Al-Fadl who had given evidence against the certain of the applicants’ co-defendants during their trial in the United States. 44. In his ruling of 8 September 1999, the District Judge rejected these submissions. He considered that the proper construction of the Treaty did not prevent the exercise of jurisdiction over extra-territorial offences. The District Judge was also satisfied that there were real grounds for fear if the identities of CS/1 and CS/2 were revealed. Thus, their anonymous witness statements could be admitted as evidence of a prima facie case. He further found that there was a case for the sixth applicant to answer. 45. The sixth applicant appealed to the High Court by way of an application for a writ of habeas corpus. The application was dismissed on 30 November 2000. The High Court held that it was necessary to show that the crime in respect of which extradition was sought was alleged to have been committed within the actual territory of the United States. The High Court was, however, satisfied that three overt acts alleged by the United States of America could be relied on to found territorial jurisdiction in the United States, namely (a) the setting up and operating of a secure telephone line in the United States by the sixth applicant through an organisation called MCI; (b) the purchase by the sixth applicant of a satellite phone system in the United States and (c) the issuing, in pursuance of the conspiracy of fatwas and jihads, allegedly prepared with the concurrence of the sixth applicant in the United States and elsewhere. The High Court also found that the District Judge had not erred in admitting the evidence of CS/1 or in finding that there was a prima facie case against the sixth applicant. It did not consider it necessary reach any conclusions in respect of CS/2, judging CS/1’s evidence to be “far the most significant”. 46. While the sixth applicant’s appeal was pending before the High Court, a committal hearing before the District Court was held in respect of the fifth applicant. The District Judge gave his ruling on 25 April 2000 in which he reaffirmed the rulings he had made in respect of the sixth applicant and found that there was also a prima facie case against the fifth applicant. 47. The fifth applicant also appealed to the High Court and, on 2 May 2001, a differently constituted court dismissed his appeal. Again the High Court found that the District Judge had not erred in admitting the anonymous evidence of CS/1; that there was sufficient evidence against the fifth applicant for the extradition to proceed, and that the United States had jurisdiction to try him. 48. Both applicants appealed to the House of Lords. Their appeals were dismissed on 17 December 2001. The House of Lords found unanimously that the High Court had erred in its finding in respect of jurisdiction: it was sufficient that the offence for which extradition was sought was triable within the United States and an equivalent offence would be triable in the United Kingdom. Accordingly, the applicants were liable to extradition to the United States if a prima facie case of conspiracy to murder was established. This was the case for each applicant. b. The Secretary of State’s decision, the United States’ assurances, and the fifth and sixth applicants’ appeal to the High Court 49. Between November 2001 and December 2005 there then followed voluminous representations by the fifth and sixth applicants to the Secretary of State as to why they should not be extradited to the United States. 50. In the course of these exchanges, on 19 April 2002 the President of the United States designated the sixth applicant as a “specially designated global terrorist”, which had the effect of placing him on a list of persons maintained by the United States Department of the Treasury and available on its website. This was done pursuant to Executive Order 13224 which enables the American assets of any person so designated to be blocked. 51. Subsequently, on 13 April 2004, the United States Embassy in London issued Diplomatic Note No. 018, which gave assurances that the United States Government would neither seek nor carry out the death penalty against the fifth and sixth applicants. It also gave assurances that they would be tried before a federal court and that they would not be prosecuted by a military commission or designated as enemy combatants. On 18 January 2008, the United States Embassy issued Diplomatic Note No. 002, which assured the United Kingdom Government that, if either applicant were acquitted or completed any sentence imposed or if the prosecution against them were discontinued, the United States authorities would return the men to the United Kingdom, if they so requested. 52. The Secretary of State (Ms Jacqui Smith) rejected the fifth and sixth applicants’ representations on 12 March 2008. She found that assurances given by the United States in the Diplomatic Note of 13 April 2004 could be relied upon and thus that the fifth and sixth applicants were not at risk of the death penalty, indefinite detention or trial by a military commission. 53. The fifth and sixth applicants also contended that they would not receive a fair trial in the United States owing to the unavailability of defence witnesses and evidence, adverse publicity, the possible imposition of special administrative measures before trial, and the sixth applicant’s designation as a global terrorist. The Secretary of State found none of these claims amounted to a “flagrant denial of justice” such as would act as a bar to extradition. 54. The Secretary of State accepted that there was a real possibility that they would be sentenced to life imprisonment if convicted but, relying on the House of Lords’ judgment in R (Wellington) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (see paragraphs 64–72 below), found that this would not amount to a breach of Article 3 of the Convention. 55. The Secretary of State also considered that the conditions of the fifth and sixth applicants’ detention in the United States would not violate Article 3 whether they were subjected to “special administrative measures” before trial or detained at ADX Florence after trial. In the fifth applicant’s case, this conclusion was not affected by the fact that he suffered from a recurrent depressive disorder. There was also no risk that either applicant would be tortured, that evidence obtained by torture would be adduced at trial, or that they would be at real risk of torture as a result of extraordinary rendition or refoulement to a third State. 56. The fifth and sixth applicants sought judicial review of the Secretary of State’s decision in the High Court. Before the High Court the applicants submitted that, if convicted, they would be detained at ADX Florence in violation of Article 3 of the Convention. In rejecting that contention, Lord Justice Scott Baker, delivering the judgment of the court on 7 August 2009, found that the decisions of the United States federal courts in Ajaj, Sattar and Wilkinson v. Austin (see paragraphs 109 and 110 below) demonstrated that there was effective judicial oversight of “supermax” prisons such as ADX. The fifth and sixth applicants would also have the possibility of entering ADX’s “step down program” (see paragraphs 84–88 below). He concluded: (1) It is reasonably likely that the claimants will be subjected to [special administrative measures] and will be held in ADX Florence following trial. (2) Neither [special administrative measures] (see Ahmad and Aswat) or life without parole (see Wellington) cross the article 3 threshold in the present case. Although near to the borderline the prison conditions at ADX Florence, although very harsh do not amount to inhuman or degrading treatment either on their own or in combination with [special administrative measures] and in the context of a whole life sentence. (3) Whether the high article 3 threshold for inhuman or degrading treatment is crossed depends on the facts of the particular case. There is no common standard for what does or does not amount to inhuman or degrading treatment throughout the many different countries in the world. The importance of maintaining extradition in a case where the fugitive would not otherwise be tried is an important factor in identifying the threshold in the present case. Had the claimants persuaded me that there was no prospect that they would ever enter the step down procedure whatever the circumstances then in my view the article 3 threshold would be crossed. But that is not the case. The evidence satisfies me that the authorities will faithfully apply the criteria [for entry to the program] and that the stringency of the conditions it imposes will continue to be linked to the risk the prisoner presents. Further, there is access to the US courts in the event that the [Federal Bureau of Prisons] acts unlawfully.” 57. In respect of the fifth applicant’s submission that his recurrent depressive illness would deteriorate if extradited, the High Court considered that, to the extent that this affected his fitness to stand trial, this was a matter for the United States’ authorities and, if he were convicted, the fifth applicant’s mental health would be an important factor in deciding whether he should be sent to ADX Florence. 58. The High Court also rejected the fifth and sixth applicants’ submissions that they were at real risk of violations of Articles 3, 6 and 14 of the Convention by virtue of the imposition of special administrative measures, relying on its previous judgment in respect of the first and second applicants (see paragraph 29 above). Having regard to the Diplomatic Note of 18 January 2008, the High Court found that there was no real risk of refoulement to Egypt or Saudi Arabia by the United States. The High Court was also satisfied that the United States would honour the assurances it had given in the Diplomatic Note of 13 April 2004. The mere fact that the sixth applicant had been designated as a global terrorist by the President of the United States did not mean he was at risk of a flagrant denial of justice within the meaning of Article 6: the designation added little to what was already known about him; it would be made clear to the jury at any trial what had to be proved as regards the indictment. 59. The High Court also rejected the applicants’ submission that they should be tried in the United Kingdom, finding that this was neither viable nor appropriate and that any connection with the United Kingdom was “tenuous indeed”. 60. Although the High Court refused leave to appeal to the United Kingdom Supreme Court, it certified two questions of general public importance. The first question was whether prison conditions at ADX Florence were compatible with Article 3; the second question was whether the relativist approach to Article 3 adopted by the majority of the House of Lords in Wellington should apply where the issue under Article 3 was one of the compatibility of prison conditions with Article 3. 61. On 16 December 2009, the Supreme Court refused permission to appeal. II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW ON ARTICLE 3 AND EXTRADTITION 62. At the material time, the applicable bilateral treaty on extradition was the 1972 UK – USA Extradition Treaty (now superseded by a 2003 treaty). Article IV of the 1972 treaty provided that extradition could be refused unless the requesting Party gave assurances satisfactory to the requested Party that the death penalty would not be carried out. 63. Guidance for handling criminal cases with concurrent jurisdiction between the United Kingdom and the United States of America was signed on 18 January 2007 by the Attorney General of the United States of America, Her Majesty’s Attorney General and also, for its application to Scotland, by the Lord Advocate. It sets out a series of measures that prosecutors in each State should take to exchange information and consult each other in such cases and to determine issues which arise from concurrent jurisdiction. A case with concurrent jurisdiction is defined as one which has the potential to be prosecuted in both the United Kingdom and the United States. 64. The United States requested the extradition of Ralston Wellington from the United Kingdom to stand trial in Missouri on two counts of murder in the first degree. In his appeal against extradition, Mr Wellington argued that his surrender would violate Article 3 of the Convention, on the basis that there was a real risk that he would be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment in the form of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. 65. In giving judgment in the High Court ([2007] EWHC 1109 (Admin)), Lord Justice Laws found that there were “powerful arguments of penal philosophy” which suggested that risk of a whole-life sentence without parole intrinsically violated Article 3 of the Convention. He observed: “The abolition of the death penalty has been lauded, and justified, in many ways; but it must have been founded at least on the premise that the life of every person, however depraved, has an inalienable value. The destruction of a life may be accepted in some special circumstances, such as self-defence or just war; but retributive punishment is never enough to justify it. Yet a prisoner’s incarceration without hope of release is in many respects in like case to a sentence of death. He can never atone for his offence. However he may use his incarceration as time for amendment of life, his punishment is only exhausted by his last breath. Like the death sentence the whole-life tariff is lex talionis. But its notional or actual symmetry with the crime for which it is visited on the prisoner (the only virtue of the lex talionis) is a poor guarantee of proportionate punishment, for the whole-life tariff is arbitrary: it may be measured in days or decades according to how long the prisoner has to live. It is therefore liable to be disproportionate – the very vice which is condemned on Article 3 grounds – unless, of course, the death penalty’s logic applies: the crime is so heinous it can never be atoned for. But in that case the supposed inalienable value of the prisoner’s life is reduced, merely, to his survival: to nothing more than his drawing breath and being kept, no doubt, confined in decent circumstances. That is to pay lip-service to the value of life; not to vouchsafe it.” However, and “not without misgivings”, he considered that the relevant authorities, including those of this Court, suggested an irreducible life sentence would not always raise an Article 3 issue. 66. Wellington’s appeal from that judgment was heard by the House of Lords and dismissed on 10 December 2008. Central to the appeal was paragraph 89 of this Court’s judgment in Soering v. the United Kingdom, 7 July 1989, § 89, Series A no. 161, where the Court stated that considerations in favour of extradition: “.. must also be included among the factors to be taken into account in the interpretation and application of the notions of inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment in extradition cases.” 67. A majority of their Lordships, Lord Hoffmann, Baroness Hale and Lord Carswell, found that, on the basis of this paragraph, in the extradition context, a distinction had to be drawn between torture and lesser forms of ill-treatment. When there was a real risk of torture, the prohibition on extradition was absolute and left no room for a balancing exercise. However, insofar as Article 3 applied to inhuman and degrading treatment and not to torture, it was applicable only in a relativist form to extradition cases. 68. Lord Hoffmann, giving the lead speech, considered the Court’s judgment in the case of Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, § 81, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑V, in which the Court stated that: “It should not be inferred from the Court’s remarks [at paragraph 89 of Soering] that there is any room for balancing the risk of ill-treatment against the reasons for expulsion in determining whether a State’s responsibility under Article 3 (art. 3) is engaged.” Lord Hoffmann stated: “In the context of Chahal, I read this remark as affirming that there can be no room for a balancing of risk against reasons for expulsion when it comes to subjecting someone to the risk of torture. I do not however think that the Court was intending to depart from the relativist approach to what counted as inhuman and degrading treatment which was laid down in Soering and which is paralleled in the cases on other articles of the Convention in a foreign context. If such a radical departure from precedent had been intended, I am sure that the Court would have said so.” For Lord Hoffmann, paragraph 89 of Soering made clear that: “...the desirability of extradition is a factor to be taken into account in deciding whether the punishment likely to be imposed in the receiving state attains the ‘minimum level of severity’ which would make it inhuman and degrading. Punishment which counts as inhuman and degrading in the domestic context will not necessarily be so regarded when the extradition factor has been taken into account.” He went on to state: “A relativist approach to the scope of article 3 seems to me essential if extradition is to continue to function. For example, the Court of Session has decided in Napier v Scottish Ministers (2005) SC 229 that in Scotland the practice of ‘slopping out’ (requiring a prisoner to use a chamber pot in his cell and empty it in the morning) may cause an infringement of article 3. Whether, even in a domestic context, this attains the necessary level of severity is a point on which I would wish to reserve my opinion. If, however, it were applied in the context of extradition, it would prevent anyone being extradited to many countries, poorer than Scotland, where people who are not in prison often have to make do without flush lavatories.” 69. A minority of their Lordships, Lord Scott and Lord Brown, disagreed with these conclusions. They considered that the extradition context was irrelevant to the determination of whether a whole life sentence amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment. They found no basis in the text of Article 3 for such a distinction. Lord Brown also considered that the Court, in Chahal and again in Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201/06, ECHR 2008‑..., had departed from the previous, relativist approach to inhuman and degrading treatment that it had taken in Soering. He stated: “There is, I conclude, no room in the Strasbourg jurisprudence for a concept such as the risk of a flagrant violation of article 3’s absolute prohibition against inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (akin to that of the risk of a ‘flagrant denial of justice’). By the same token that no one can be expelled if he would then face the risk of torture, so too no one can be expelled if he would then face the risk of treatment or punishment which is properly to be characterised as inhuman or degrading. That, of course, is not to say that, assuming for example ‘slopping out’ is degrading treatment in Scotland, so too it must necessarily be regarded in all countries (see para 27 of Lord Hoffmann’s opinion)... the Strasbourg Court has repeatedly said that the Convention does not ‘purport to be a means of requiring the contracting states to impose Convention standards on other states’ (Soering, para 86) and article 3 does not bar removal to non-Convention states (whether by way of extradition or simply for the purposes of immigration control) merely because they choose to impose higher levels or harsher measures of criminal punishment. Nor is it to say that a risk of article 3 ill-treatment, the necessary pre-condition of an article 3 bar upon extradition, will readily be established. On the contrary, as the Grand Chamber reaffirmed in Saadi at para 142: ‘[T]he Court has frequently indicated that it applies rigorous criteria and exercises close scrutiny when assessing the existence of a real risk of ill-treatment . . . in the event of a person being removed from the territory of the respondent State by extradition, expulsion or any other measure pursuing that aim. Although assessment of that risk is to some degree speculative, the Court has always been very cautious, examining carefully the material placed before it in the light of the requisite standard of proof . . . before . . . finding that the enforcement of removal from the territory would be contrary to article 3 of the Convention. As a result, since adopting the Chahal judgment it has only rarely reached such a conclusion.’” Therefore, for Lord Brown, if a mandatory life sentence violated Article 3 in a domestic case, the risk of such a sentence would preclude extradition to another country. 70. However, despite these different views, none of the Law Lords found that the sentence likely to be imposed on Mr Wellington would be irreducible; having regard to the commutation powers of the Governor of Missouri, it would be just as reducible as the sentence at issue in Kafkaris v. Cyprus [GC], no. 21906/04, ECHR 2008‑.... All five Law Lords also noted that, in Kafkaris, the Court had only said that the imposition of an irreducible life sentence may raise an issue under Article 3. They found that the imposition of a whole life sentence would not constitute inhuman and degrading treatment in violation of Article 3 per se, unless it were grossly or clearly disproportionate. Lord Brown in particular noted: “Having puzzled long over this question, I have finally concluded that the majority of the Grand Chamber [in Kafkaris] would not regard even an irreducible life sentence—by which, as explained, I understand the majority to mean a mandatory life sentence to be served in full without there ever being proper consideration of the individual circumstances of the defendant’s case—as violating article 3 unless and until the time comes when further imprisonment would no longer be justified on any ground—whether for reasons of punishment, deterrence or public protection. It is for that reason that the majority say only that article 3 may be engaged.” Lord Brown added that this test had not been met in Wellington’s case, particularly when the facts of the murders for which he was accused, if committed in the United Kingdom, could have justified a whole life order. However, Lord Brown considered that, in a more compelling case, such as the mercy killing of a terminally ill relative, this Court “might well judge the risk of ill-treatment to be sufficiently real, clear and imminent to conclude that extradition must indeed be barred on article 3 grounds”. 71. Finally, Lord Hoffmann, Lord Scott, Baroness Hale and Lord Brown all doubted Lord Justice Laws’ view that life imprisonment without parole was lex talionis. Lord Hoffman, Baroness Hale and Lord Brown did not accept his premise that the abolition of the death penalty had been founded on the idea that the life of every person had an inalienable value; there were other, more pragmatic reasons for abolition such as its irreversibility and lack of deterrent effect. Lord Scott rejected the view that an irreducible life sentence was inhuman and degrading because it denied a prisoner the possibility of atonement; once it was accepted that a whole life sentence could be a just punishment, atonement was achieved by the prisoner serving his sentence. 72. Wellington’s application to this Court was struck out on 5 October 2010, the applicant having indicated his wish to withdraw it (Wellington v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 60682/08). 73. Section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights provides that the Charter guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it “subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” Section 7 provides: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.” Section 12 provides: “Everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.” 74. In United States v. Burns [2001] S.C.R. 283, Burns and another (the respondents) were to be extradited from Canada to the State of Washington to stand trial for murders allegedly committed when they were both eighteen. Before making the extradition order the Canadian Minister of Justice had not sought assurances that the death penalty would not be imposed. The Supreme Court of Canada found that the remoteness between the extradition and the potential imposition of capital punishment meant the case was not appropriately considered under section 12 but under section 7. However, the values underlying section 12 could form part of the balancing process engaged under section 7. The extradition of the respondents would, if implemented, deprive them of their rights of liberty and security of person as guaranteed by section 7. The issue was whether such a deprivation was in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. While extradition could only be refused if it “shocked the conscience” an extradition that violated the principles of fundamental justice would always do so. The court balanced the factors that favoured extradition against those that favoured seeking assurances that the death penalty would not be sought. The latter included the fact that a degree of leniency for youth was an accepted value in the administration of justice, even for young offenders over the age of eighteen. The court concluded that the objectives sought to be advanced by extradition without assurances would be as well served by extradition with assurances. The court held therefore that assurances were constitutionally required by section 7 in all but exceptional cases. 75. In United States of America v. Ferras; United States of America v. Latty, [2006] 2 SCR 77, the appellants were to be extradited to the United States to face charges of fraud (the Ferras case) or trafficking of cocaine (the Latty case). The appellants in the Latty case had argued that, if extradited and convicted they could receive sentences of ten years to life without parole and this would “shock the conscience”. In dismissing the appeals, the Supreme Court affirmed the balancing approach laid down in Burns to determining whether potential sentences in a requesting state would “shock the conscience”. The harsher sentences the appellants might receive if convicted in the United States were among the factors militating against their surrender but they had offered no evidence or case-law to back up their assertions that the possible sentences would shock the conscience of Canadians. The factors favouring extradition far outweighed those that did not. 76. Article 7 of the ICCPR where relevant provides that “no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” The Human Rights Committee’s most recent general comment on Article 7 (No. 20, of 10 March 1992) states the Committee’s view that: “States parties must not expose individuals to the danger of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment upon return to another country by way of their extradition, expulsion or refoulement.” (see also Chitat Ng v. Canada, CCPR/C/49/D/469/1991, 7 January 1994; A.J.R. v. Australia, CCPR/C/60/D/692/1996, 11 August 1997). 77. Article 3 § 1 of the 1984 United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“UNCAT”) provides: “No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.” 78. Article 16 § 2 provides: “The provisions of this Convention are without prejudice to the provisions of any other international instrument or national law which prohibits cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment or which relates to extradition or expulsion.” 79. The above guidelines (adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 11 July 2002) contain the following provisions on refoulement and extradition: “XII. Asylum, return (‘refoulement’) and expulsion ... 2. It is the duty of a State that has received a request for asylum to ensure that the possible return (“refoulement”) of the applicant to his/her country of origin or to another country will not expose him/her to the death penalty, to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The same applies to expulsion. XIII. Extradition 3. Extradition may not be granted when there is serious reason to believe that: (i) the person whose extradition has been requested will be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment...” 80. Article 19 § 2 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides: “No one may be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” 81. ADX Florence, a so-called “supermax” prison, is one of a number of detention facilities at the Federal Correctional Complex, Florence, Colorado. The parties have provided a great deal of evidence in respect of conditions of detention at ADX and general facilities at FCC Florence. The applicants have also submitted general evidence on “supermax” prisons and their effects on prisoners. The evidence submitted may be summarised as follows. 82. The Government submitted a series of declarations, which had been prepared specifically for the present proceedings by officials at FCC/ADX Florence. Thereafter, in reply to a series of questions put by the Court in respect of the number of inmates entering ADX’s “step down program”, two further letters were provided by the United States Department of Justice (see paragraphs 93–97 below). a. The declarations 83. Mr Louis J. Milusnic, the associate warden of ADX, outlined the regime which was in place at the special security unit (H Unit) for inmates who were subjected to special administrative measures. All cells were single occupancy, had natural light and measured 75.5 square feet (approximately 7 square metres). Showers were not in-cell but on a shared range. 84. Inmates in H Unit were part of the special security unit program, which had three phases that inmates could work through. In phase one, the “baseline” phase, inmates had two non-legal telephone calls per month, five social visits, access to a commissary list and art and hobby craft items, and escorted shower time three times a week. They had ten hours per week of out-of-cell recreation time (increased from five hours per week in September 2009). As of November 2010, twelve inmates were in phase one. In phase two, conditions were the same save that three non-legal telephone calls per month were permitted, the commissary list was expanded and inmates were permitted to go to the shower unescorted, five times per week. Eleven inmates were in phase two. In phase three, group recreation was permitted five days a week (for a minimum of one and a half hours per day, in groups of four) and the number of non-legal telephone calls increased to four. Inmates ate one meal together and engaged in recreational activities together for one and a half hours per day. Access to showers was unrestricted and the commissary list was further expanded. Four inmates, who had all been convicted of terrorist activity, had progressed to phase three. Advancement through the phases was authorised by a Program Screening Committee, whose six-monthly reviews the inmate attended. The Committee’s task was to determine whether an inmate could function with additional privileges without posing a security or safety risk. Advancement was subject to various factors including good conduct, participation in programmes recommended by the Unit, positive behaviour and respectful conduct and positive overall institutional adjustment. 85. Recreation alternated daily between outside and inside recreation. Outdoor recreation took place in adjacent individual recreation areas, which allow an inmate full visual access to the recreation yard and other inmates. Conversations could be carried on in a normal tone of voice and most inmates spent the majority of their recreation time talking to other inmates. Each individual outdoor area measured 12 feet by 20 feet (approximately 3.66 metres by 6 metres) and contained pull-up bars and footballs. Individual indoor areas measured 14 feet by 10 feet. Recreation had only been cancelled once in thirteen months for security reasons. 86. There was no limit on inmates’ correspondence with family members and special administrative measures could be modified to allow correspondence beyond the immediate family. There were also no limits on correspondence with legal representatives and access to a law library for up to two hours at a time. Inmates received a free, daily copy of USA Today. They had access to fifty television channels and seven FM radio channels. They could speak to inmates in adjacent cells using the air ventilation as a voice conduit. They had regular contact with prison staff – a member of the Unit Team visited every inmate every day – and there were visits from medical, education, religious service and psychology staff, including two Arabic speakers. Inmates could request to speak with an officer at any time. 87. Mr Milusnic also outlined the criteria and procedures for placement at ADX Florence. An inmate either had to: (i) create a security risk at other correctional facilities; or (ii) as a result of his or her status, be unable to be safely housed in the general population of another institution. Referral to ADX was initiated by the staff at the inmate’s current institution. If the warden of that institution, the relevant regional director and the Bureau’s designation centre all concurred, a hearing took place. The inmate was given written notice at least twenty-four hours prior to the hearing. After the hearing, a report with a recommendation was prepared and given to the inmate. The final decision was taken on the basis of the report by an Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, with the possibility of appeal to the chief of the designation centre and thereafter the Office of the General Counsel. 88. Ms Patricia Rangel is the Unit Manager for the General Population Units at ADX. She provided two declarations. Her first declaration outlined the Federal Bureau of Prisons procedures for review of the status of inmates. There was an initial classification upon arrival at a new Bureau institution, which took place at a meeting attended by the inmate and which defined, inter alia, the work and educational programmes the inmate would follow, his or her release plans, and security/custody levels. Thereafter, there were six-monthly program reviews (including progress review reports, which were signed by the inmate and the Unit Manager) and more detailed, three-yearly progress reports, which were also made available to the inmate. In her declaration Ms Rangel also outlined the different levels of security in ADX units and the step down program. The units followed a “stratified” system of housing from General Population Units to the Intermediate, Transitional and Pre-Transfer Units. It would take an inmate a minimum of thirty-six months to work through the system: the minimum stay in each unit was twelve months in a General Population Unit, six months in Intermediate, six in Transitional and twelve in Pre-Transfer. Specific conditions in each unit were as follows. General Population Unit cells were 87 square feet (8 square metres) plus a sallyport (exit area) of 17 square feet. Showers were within the cells. There was a window with natural lighting and inmates could control the lighting in their cell via a dimmer switch. Lights on the range were switched off at night, but, as in all federal prisons, were briefly turned on for three cell counts during the night. Meals were delivered in-cell. Inmates received two fifteen minute telephone calls and up to five social visits per month. It was possible and permissible for inmates to talk to each other in their cells via the ventilation system or during their out-of-cell recreation. Inmates had ten hours out-of-cell exercise each week in single-cell recreation areas, some of which were grouped together on large recreation yards. Ms Rangel gave the sizes of the two types of outdoor individualised recreation areas as 240 square feet and 315 square feet (22 and 29 square metres). The size of the indoor areas was 389 square feet (36 square metres). Recreation privileges could be restricted for violations of rules and regulations. Restrictions on outdoor recreation were in three-month increments (three months for a first offence, six for a second offence and so on). Intermediate Unit cells were 75.5 square feet and did not have a sallyport or shower. There was a window with natural lighting; cell doors faced out onto a range. Inmates were assigned to a group of eight inmates with whom they recreated. Meals were provided to inmates one group at a time, meaning each group was allowed out of their cells to collect their meals in the range. Inmates received three fifteen-minute telephone calls and up to five social visits per month. Showers stalls were on the range, where inmates could shower any time they were out on the range. Transitional Units had similar conditions to Intermediate Units save that inmates were assigned to groups of sixteen inmates. They received twenty‑one hours of out-of-cell recreation per week in their assigned group on the range or in a large recreation yard. Meals were consumed in groups on the range. Inmates were unrestrained when out of their cells. They received an extra fifteen-minute telephone call per month and could leave the unit unrestrained but escorted to purchase items from the commissary. The Pre-Transfer Unit was located at another penitentiary at FCC Florence. As in the Intermediate and Transitional Units, inmates ate their meals and recreated within their assigned group. They received twenty-four and a half hours’ out-of-cell recreation time per week, and five visits and three hundred minutes of telephone calls per month. In the General Population, Intermediate and Transitional Units, access to television, radio and books, contact with prison staff and rules on correspondence were as outlined by Mr Milusnic. The rules governing the step down program were set out in an “institution supplement”, which had been updated in September 2009. An inmate’s placement in and advancement through the step down program were reviewed every six months, subject to the minimum periods in each unit, set out above, and other criteria such as participation in defined programmes, positive behaviour and overall institutional adjustment. According to the updated supplement, mitigation of the original reason for placement at ADX Florence was no longer a factor which was considered, but the Step Down Screening Committee, which made decisions on advancement, could have regard to the initial reasons for placement at ADX and other safety and security factors. The final decision was one for the Warden. Any negative decision had to be reasoned (unless providing reasons would pose a threat to individual safety or institutional security) and was subject to appeal through the Bureau’s administrative remedy programme. Since the implementation of the updated supplement, there had been a 56% increase in movement of inmates from the four General Population Units to the Intermediate Unit and a 135% increase in movement from the Intermediate to the Transitional Unit. Inmates had also completed the programme and been transferred out of ADX Florence. This included Arab-Muslim inmates. 89. Mr Christopher B. Synsvoll is the Department of Justice Supervising Attorney at FCC Florence. His declaration outlined the application of special administrative measures. These measures were rare: of 210,307 Federal Bureau of Prison inmates, forty-one were subjected to them; twenty-seven of the forty-one were in H Unit at ADX Florence. Special administrative measures could be challenged through the Bureau’s administrative remedy programme, which led to a review of the need for the measures and which involved consultation with other agencies such as the FBI. This process had, on occasion, led to the modification of certain special administrative measures such as allowing greater communication for inmates with the outside world. 90. The psychologist assigned to ADX Florence, Dr Paul Zohn, outlined the psychological and psychiatric care available at the prison. The preference was to treat inmates with mental health problems in situ rather than in hospitals where this was possible. Care was provided by one psychiatrist and two psychologists who made regular rounds through the housing units at ADX. Various treatment programs were available and inmates who needed psychotropic medication were seen regularly by a psychiatrist. Contrary to assertions previously made by the applicants, video-conferencing was not ordinarily used to assess an inmate’s mental health. The main mental health disorders such as bipolar affective disorder, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder and schizophrenia would not preclude a designation to ADX and could be managed successfully there. Conditions of confinement were largely determined by security needs and would be modified based on mental illness only if the inmate’s mental status warranted such a change. However, if necessary, inmates could be referred to one of the Bureau’s Psychiatric Referral Centers for acute psychiatric care. Inmates who would be considered “seriously mentally ill” would not be housed at ADX but at a Referral Center. All new inmates at ADX received an initial psychological evaluation and, if necessary, follow-up assessment and treatment planning. Thereafter, the psychological department monitored any treatment needs such as medication or modification to an inmate’s housing, work or program assignment. 91. The prison chaplain at ADX, Michael S. Merrill, stated that an imam was available to inmates four days a month and would speak to inmates at their cell door. The chaplain had also significantly expanded the Islamic section of the religious library at the prison, which included 158 Arabic language books. There were also 320 videos and DVDs on Islam. The Religious Services Department provided Islamic-faith programming through its closed-circuit television channel, including four to five days of Sunni Muslim programming on Friday and recitations of the Qur’an on Friday and Saturday evenings. Inmates had access to a halal diet; special arrangements were made for meals during Ramadan. Although there could be no formal congregational prayer for any faith group, Muslim inmates could perform the Azan (call to prayer) and the Salat (five daily prayers) in their cells; they could also have access to prayer rugs, prayer oil, prayer beads and religious headgear in their cells. 92. Ms Roxana Mack, the Assistant Supervisor of Education at ADX, stated that H unit inmates had access to approximately 900 books with no limit on the number of books an inmate could borrow. They had access to a law library for two hours at a time, including access to electronic databases. There were also educational courses. b. The Department of Justice’s letters 93. In the course of proceedings before the Court, the respondent Government were asked to provide information as to: (i) how long inmates in the Special Security Unit program had spent at ADX and how long they had been in each phase of the program; (ii) how many inmates were in each phase of the step down program; (iii) how long each inmate had spent at ADX and how long they had been in each phase of the program; and (iv) how many inmates had completed the program, how long they had spent at ADX and how long they had been in each phase of the program 94. The questions were forwarded to the United States authorities. By letter dated 26 September 2011, the Department of Justice stated that there were 252 inmates in ADX’s General Population Unit. The Special Security Unit program could house up to 32 inmates. There were 17 inmates in phase I, nine in phase II and six in phase III. For the step down program, 32 inmates were in J Unit, 32 in K Unit and 25 in D/B Unit. The Department of Justice stated that the Bureau of Prisons obligations under United States law prevented disclosure of information as to the length of time inmates had spent at each stage of the two programs. 95. By letters dated 29 September and 7 October 2011, the Section Registrar clarified that the questions put by the Court were not intended to obtain information on specific inmates but rather to provide meaningful assistance as to: the length of time an inmate was likely to spend at ADX before being admitted to either program; how long he was likely to spend in each phase of either program; and how long he was likely to spend in either program before transfer out of ADX. 96. On 24 October 2011 the Agent of the Government of the United Kingdom replied, forwarding a letter of the same date from the Department of Justice, which set out the results of a statistical analysis conducted by the Bureau of Prisons. The analysis was based on a random sample of thirty inmates selected from the General Population at ADX and/or each phase of the step down program. On the basis of that sample, an inmate was likely to spend three years at ADX before being admitted to the Step Down or Special Security Unit programs. The likely times in each phase were: nine months in intermediate, eleven months in transition and nine months in pre-transfer. Thus, an inmate was likely to spend three years in General Population followed by two years and five months progressing through either program. 97. The Department of Justice’s letter of 26 September 2011 also stressed that, while generally inmates who were subject to special administrative measures were housed in the Special Security Unit, it was possible for such inmates to be housed at other prisons. Furthermore, if special administrative measure were vacated for an inmate at ADX, he could be transferred from ADX to other prison. This had occurred for seven of the thirteen inmates whose special administrative measures had been vacated. 98. The applicants submitted general evidence as to the effect of solitary confinement on prisoners and specific evidence as to the prison regime at ADX Florence. 99. The applicants also provided a report by a psychiatrist, Dr Terry Kupers, which had been prepared specifically for the present proceedings. He considered that a supermax prison regime did not amount to sensory deprivation but there was an almost total lack of meaningful human communication. This tended to induce a range of psychological symptoms ranging from panic to psychosis and emotional breakdown. All studies into the effects of supermax detention had found such symptoms after sixty days’ detention. Once such symptoms presented, it was not sufficient to return someone to normal prison conditions in order to remedy them. If supermax detention were imposed for an indeterminate period it also led to chronic despair. Approximately half of suicides in United States prisons involved the 6‑8% of prisoners held in such conditions. The effects of supermax conditions were worse for someone with pre-existing mental health problems. There was also evidence of solitary confinement leading to a range of physical illnesses. Dr Kuper’s conclusions were supported by a number of journal articles by psychologists and criminologists, which the applicants provided.[1] 100. The specific evidence on ADX Florence included a series of statements by Professor Laura Rovner, Director of the Civil Rights Clinic at the University of Denver, which had acted for a number of prisoners at ADX Florence. Professor Rovner’s statements were based on her experience of ADX, the evidence of her clients, and various affidavits which had been prepared for litigation in the federal courts regarding ADX Florence. Her latest statement, of 27 May 2011, responded to the six declarations submitted by the Government. Her statement, and the other evidence provided by the applicants, may be summarised as follows. 101. Professor Rovner recalled that one of the former wardens of ADX had publicly described the prison as “a clean version of hell”. Professor Rovner stated that, despite the evidence set out in the six declarations, conditions at ADX Florence had not changed significantly in the last two years. Solitary confinement for long periods continued. One lawyer, Mr Mark H. Donatelli, had conducted a survey which had found that at least forty-three inmates of ADX Florence had spent eight years or more in “lock-down” conditions there and at previous prisons. Contact with staff could be as little as one minute per day. Some prisoners were placed on “single recreation status”, meaning no one else was permitted to be in adjoining recreation cells at the same time. Recreation privileges could be terminated for minor infractions: one prisoner was denied outdoor exercise for sixty days for trying to feed crumbs to birds. When he challenged this sanction through the grievance process, it was increased to ninety days. Upon further appeal he was told that the decision was not punitive but a managerial strategy to impress upon him the importance of adhering to institutional procedures. Indoor recreations were little more than cages with a single pull-up bar for exercise. There was nothing to do in outdoor recreation cages save to pace up and down. There was limited visibility – all that could be seen was the sky through chain linking. Recreation was frequently cancelled owing to staff shortages. The evidence also showed that, despite the consensus in the medical profession that prisoners with mental illnesses should not be held in solitary confinement, ADX continued to house seriously mentally ill prisoners, including those with severe schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. Several inmates were too sick to communicate properly with their representatives; a report had been received of one prisoner who was too ill to write, but was living a cell that he had covered in six inches of rubbish and faeces. Several prisoners had stated in witness statements prepared for litigation in the United States courts, that there were mentally ill prisoners at ADX Florence who, because of their conditions, screamed all night, making sleep difficult for others. General medical facilities were also inadequate: there were only two doctors for 3,200 inmates at FCC Florence, and only basic healthcare needs were met. There were also reports from Human Rights Watch which indicated that force feeding of hunger strikers took place in an unnecessarily punitive and painful way. Religious services were extremely limited – one Muslim inmate had only seen an imam three times – and one inmate in a general population unit had received an incident report for intoning the Azan. Books and educational activities were also limited. For inmates, particularly those subjected to special administrative measures, telephone calls, and social visits were highly restricted and subject to monitoring. Contact with other inmates was generally prohibited and, when they were not, communication between cells could only be carried out by yelling, which was prohibited. Visits were limited to one adult visitor at a time, with no physical contact, and required fourteen days’ written notice. Evidence in cases brought by inmates who had been subjected to special administrative measures indicated that letters could be limited to three sheets of paper per week and certain family members could be refused clearance to write to or speak with an inmate. Special administrative measures could also mean that an inmate was prohibited from watching news channels on television, from receiving recent newspapers or any Arabic publications whatsoever; one inmate received his newspaper with whole sections removed. International telephone calls were expensive and liable to disruption. Despite the adoption of objective criteria for placement at ADX, it remained the case that all those subjected to special administrative measures or convicted of terrorism offences were liable for placement, regardless of their security risk or their disciplinary record in other institutions. The placement hearing was window dressing: one hearing officer had carried out one hundred hearings and never found an inmate to be unsuitable for placement. There was evidence of hearings taking place post facto, in some cases many years after the transfer to ADX had been carried out. Inmates also received only twenty-four hours’ notice of a hearing and did not have the right to legal representation. There was evidence that hearing officers did not read all of the evidence submitted and based their decisions on unreliable evidence. Inmates did not see all the evidence against them. Professor Rovner also provided declarations by Arab Muslim clients, in which they stated that they had never been told the reasons for their placement at ADX and had been sent there after 9 September 2011, despite years of good conduct in other, much less restrictive prisons, both in the United States and elsewhere. Although there had been an increase in the number of admissions to the step down program, the fact remained that many inmates were spending significant periods of time in solitary confinement prior to admission, despite having met the criteria for admission for years. Four clients of the Clinic had only been admitted to the program after periods of between seven and thirteen years in solitary confinement and only then after commencing litigation against the Bureau of Prisons. Another two clients had never been admitted, despite their clean disciplinary records and despite periods of eight to nine years at ADX. Even after the changes to procedures governing entry to the program, an inmate’s original crime continued to serve as the basis for placement at ADX; thus it was possible for an inmate to be unable to sufficiently mitigate the original reason for placement and so gain admission to the program. Moreover, if an inmate had never been told the reasons for his placement, he could not know what he had to do to gain admission to the program. The program required three years to complete and a prisoner needed one year of clear conduct in general population before being eligible for step down. Even eligibility for the program did not mean that a prisoner would be allowed into it. Conditions in the first phase of the step down program did not differ significantly from general population units. According to one inmate, Mr Rezaq, lockdowns occurred frequently in J Unit, which meant inmates were confined to their cells, and could last days or even weeks. Inmates could also be removed from the program at any time without explanation or due process, even for the most minor infractions. Some had been removed from the program without receiving an incident report or were removed after receiving a report for an incident for which they were soon found not guilty. Yet, following such removals, they were either denied re-admission to the program or forced to spend years going through it again. The Bureau itself had estimated that only 5% of inmates progressed though the program in the minimum three years. Even successful completion of the step down program might only result in a transfer to a “communications management unit”, such as those housed at USP Terre Haute or USP Marion, where conditions remained restrictive. According to Professor Rovner, it was difficult to dispute the evidence provided by the Government on special administrative measures (owing to restrictions contained in the measures themselves) but, on the basis of public information, she was able to state that the effect of the measures could amount to solitary confinement, even if an inmate was not detained at ADX. The indefinite prolongation of special administrative measures meant that certain Arab-Muslim inmates had spent between five and thirteen years in solitary confinement both before and after trial. Challenging such measures was impossible for inmates without access to legal representation. Legal aid was not available and, even if pro bono legal representation was obtained, the Department of Justice could still refuse to give the lawyers the necessary clearance; this had happened to her Clinic. 102. The applicants also relied on two letters from Human Rights Watch. The first, dated 2 May 2007 to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, followed a tour the organisation had been given of ADX Florence. The letter expressed concerns that a number of prisoners convicted of terrorism offences had been sent to the prison based on the nature of their crimes and, despite good conduct since their arrival, had remained in general population units and thus outside the step-down programme for up to nine years. The letter made suggestions for improvement in respect of recreation, mail, telephone use, the library. It also noted that progress was to be made on better meeting prisoners’ religious needs, such as the provision of a full-time imam and commended the educational programmes available through the prison’s television system. In the letter Human Rights Watch expressed serious concerns as to prisoners’ inability to do any meaningful exercise in the indoor and outdoor recreation areas, owing to the size of these areas and the lack of any proper equipment. The letter urged the prison authorities to investigate reports of retaliation against prisoners who were on hunger strike in the form of transfer to harsher cells. The letter also said that Human Rights Watch was extremely concerned about the effects of long-term isolation and highly limited exercise on the mental health of prisoners and criticised reports of rushed consultations between prisoners and psychologists, as well as the fact that evaluations were carried out via closed circuit television. 103. The applicants obtained a second letter from Human Rights Watch, dated 21 August 2008, which stated that Human Rights Watch considered conditions at ADX violated the United States’ treaty obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the United Nations Convention against Torture. It was unremarkable that “minor adjustments” had been made to the regime but it remained in essence one of “long-term and indefinite incarceration in conditions of extreme social isolation and sensory deprivation”. 104. The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution provides, inter alia, that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted. 105. The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to provide humane conditions of confinement, to ensure inmates receive adequate food, clothing shelter and medical care, and to take reasonable measures to guarantee their safety (Farmer v. Brennan 511 US 825 (1994). Only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation (Wilson v. Seiter 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991); Rhodes v. Chapman 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). A serious deprivation is necessary, because routine discomfort is part of the penalty inmates pay for their crimes (Hudson v. McMillan 503 US 1 (1992); Sandin v. Conner 515 US 472 (1995)). Thus, in order to establish that a deprivation violates the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner must satisfy: (i) an objective test by demonstrating a sufficiently serious deprivation; and (ii) a subjective test by showing that the conditions of confinement involve the deliberate imposition of pain or deliberate indifference to it (Wilson, cited above). 106. In Hutto v. Finney 437 US 678 (1978), the Supreme Court upheld a lower court order limiting periods of punitive isolated confinement to thirty days, in circumstances where the lower court had found that conditions in the prison in question amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. The court recognised that confinement in an isolation cell was a form of punishment which was subject to scrutiny under Eighth Amendment standards but rejected the submission that indeterminate sentences to punitive isolation always constituted cruel and unusual punishment. 107. Lower federal courts have found that whether an extended term of solitary confinement violates the Eighth Amendment will depend on the particular facts of each situation, including the circumstances, nature and duration of the confinement (DeSpain v. Uphoff 264 F.3d 965 (10th Cir. 2001)). Although they have recognised that prolonged conditions of solitary confinement may cause significant psychological damage (Davenport v. DeRobertis 844 F.2d 1310, 1313 (7th Cir. 1988)), the lower courts have, for the most part, rejected Eighth Amendment claims arising either from conditions of solitary confinement or from periods of confinement to cells for twenty-two or twenty-three hours per day (see, inter alia, Five Percenters 174 F.3d 471 (4th Cir. 1999); In re Long Term Admin. Segregation 174 F.3d 464 (4th Cir. 1999); Anderson v. County of Kern 45 F.3d 1310 (9th Cir. 1995); Peterkin v. Jeffes 855 F.2d. 1021 (3d cir. 1988); Smith v. Romer 107 F.3d 21 (10th Cir. 1997)). However, in Ruiz v. Johnson 37 F. Supp 2d 855 (1999), the highest level of administrative segregation in the Texan prison system was found to reach levels of psychological deprivation that violated the Eighth Amendment. There, the court found there had been deliberate indifference to a systemic pattern of extreme social isolation and reduced environmental stimulation. The objective test was found to have been met in respect of three prisoners who had been in solitary confinement for between twenty-nine and thirty-five years: Wilkerson v. Stalder 639 F. Supp. 2d 654 M.D.La., 2007. 108. Lower courts outside the Tenth Circuit (which has jurisdiction over ADX Florence) have ruled that solitary confinement of prisoners with pre-existing serious mental illness can be sufficiently harmful to violate the objective test laid down in Wilson, cited above: see Jones ‘El v. Berge 164 F. Supp. 2d 1096 (2001) (concerning Wisconsin’s “supermax” prison) and Madrid v. Gomez 889 F. Supp 1146 (1995) (concerning detention at Pelican Bay State Prison, California). However, the subjective test laid down in Wilson may not be satisfied unless a plaintiff can show that prison officials attributed any deterioration in his mental state to the conditions of his confinement. Negligence in this respect does not suffice; deliberate indifference is required (Scarver v. Litscher 434 F. 3d 972 (7th Cir. 2006)). 109. The Fifth Amendment protects against deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of law. In the context of prison discipline, due process rights are triggered by an atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life (Sandin v. Conner, cited above). This will include transfer to a “supermax” security prison (Wilkinson v. Austin 545 US 209 (2005)). In Wilkinson, the court upheld a system which gave notice of the reasons for placement in the supermax prison, an opportunity to reply and multiple levels of review. Periodic review of administrative segregation is also required to ensure that it is not used as a pretext for indefinite confinement (Hewitt v. Helms 459 US 460 (1983)). Sandin has been interpreted by the Tenth Circuit as requiring prisoners to show that their conditions of confinement deviate substantially from the baseline accepted treatment of prisoners (Estate of DiMarco v. Wyoming Department of Corrections 473 F. 3d 1334 (10th Cir. 2007)). This test was found not to be satisfied by fourteen months’ solitary confinement in DiMarco because the prisoner in question had been provided with the ordinary essentials of prison life. 110. In Sattar v. Gonzales 2009 WL 606115 (D.Colo.2009) the United States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed a challenge to conditions of detention at ADX Florence and to the imposition of special administrative measures. The plaintiff had limited contact with his family and attorneys and so the court found that the “severe limitations of ADX confinement” did not amount to the necessary deprivation required by the objective test. A constitutional challenge to the imposition of special administrative measures at ADX was also dismissed by the District Court in Al-Owhali v. Holder 1011 WL 288523 (D. Colo. 2011); the case is now the subject of an appeal. In Georgacarakos v. Wiley, 2010 WL 1291833 (D.Colo. 2010) the District Court found that detention at ADX for five years did not amount to atypical and significant hardship, given the availability of social visits and phone calls, the opportunity to converse with other inmates in the recreation areas, and the possibility of transfer out of ADX via the step down program. Georgacarakos was recently followed in Matthews v. Wiley 744 F. Supp. 2d 1159 (D. Colo. 2010). In Magluta v. United States Federal Bureau of Prisons, 29 May 2009, the District Court held that the plaintiff’s allegation that detention at ADX had led to a significant deterioration of his mental condition failed to satisfy the objective test in Wilson cited above. The plaintiff had not shown that conditions at ADX, even if lonely or uncomfortable, failed to provide basic human necessities; ADX was a prison and confinement was “intended to punish inmates, not coddle them”. 111. In Hill v. Pugh 75 Fed. Appx. 715 (10th Cir. (2003)) United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected an Eighth Amendment claim that ADX conditions were cruel and unusual. The plaintiff was isolated in his cell twenty-three hours a day for five days a week and twenty-four hours the remaining two days. However, his minimal physical requirements of food, shelter, clothing and warmth had been met and so the conditions showed neither an “unquestioned and serious deprivation of basic human needs” nor “intolerable or shocking conditions”. Similar conclusions were reached in Jordan v. the Federal Bureau of Prisons 191 Fed. Appx 639 (10th Cir. 2006), Ajaj v. United States 293 Fed.Appx. 575 (10th Cir. 2008). 112. In Rezaq, et al. v. Nalley, et al, the plaintiffs brought Eighth Amendment claims concerning their placements at ADX at various dates between 1997 and 2003. The District Court granted the Bureau of Prisons’ motions for summary judgment: 2010 WL 5157317 (D. Colo. 2010); 2010 WL 5464294 (D. Colo. 2010). The court, following the recommendations of the Magistrate Judge, found that the plaintiff’s terrorist backgrounds and convictions provided a legitimate penological interest for transferring them to ADX, particularly when only thirty-five of the two hundred and six inmates in federal prisons with international terrorism convictions had been assigned to ADX. The plaintiffs’ conditions of confinement there were not so extreme as to be atypical and significant. The conditions were also different from those in Wilkinson v. Austin (see paragraph 109 above) in that ADX offered more opportunities for outdoor exercise, interaction with other inmates and educational programmes. There was also insufficient evidence of significant mental harm: there was no evidence that one of the plaintiff’s depression could be attributed to ADX; the remainder of the plaintiffs’ emotional problems were typically experienced by prisoners. Finally, owing to the availability of periodical reviews and the step down program, confinement at ADX was not indeterminate. The plaintiffs have appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, though they have all been transferred out of ADX. 113. In Silverstein v. Federal Bureau of Prisons 704 F Supp. 2d 1077 (2010), before the District Court the plaintiff alleges that he has been held in solitary confinement at ADX Florence and other institutions since 1983. The Bureau of Prisons has sought summary judgment in its favour in respect of the plaintiff’s claims. A decision is awaited; a six-day jury trial was set to begin on 23 January 2012. 114. The Council of Europe Guidelines on human rights and the fight against terrorism contain the following provision: “XI. Detention 1. A person deprived of his/her liberty for terrorist activities must in all circumstances be treated with due respect for human dignity. 2. The imperatives of the fight against terrorism may nevertheless require that a person deprived of his/her liberty for terrorist activities be submitted to more severe restrictions than those applied to other prisoners, in particular with regard to: (i) the regulations concerning communications and surveillance of correspondence, including that between counsel and his/her client; (ii) placing persons deprived of their liberty for terrorist activities in specially secured quarters; (iii) the separation of such persons within a prison or among different prisons, on condition that the measure taken is proportionate to the aim to be achieved.” 115. The European Prison Rules (contained in Recommendation Rec(2006)2 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to Member States) where relevant, provide as follows: Security “51.1 The security measures applied to individual prisoners shall be the minimum necessary to achieve their secure custody. 51.2 The security which is provided by physical barriers and other technical means shall be complemented by the dynamic security provided by an alert staff who know the prisoners who are under their control. 51.3 As soon as possible after admission, prisoners shall be assessed to determine: a. the risk that they would present to the community if they were to escape; b. the risk that they will try to escape either on their own or with external assistance. 51.5 The level of security necessary shall be reviewed at regular intervals throughout a person’s imprisonment.” Safety 52.1 As soon as possible after admission, prisoners shall be assessed to determine whether they pose a safety risk to other prisoners, prison staff or other persons working in or visiting prison or whether they are likely to harm themselves. 52.2 Procedures shall be in place to ensure the safety of prisoners, prison staff and all visitors and to reduce to a minimum the risk of violence and other events that might threaten safety. 52.3 Every possible effort shall be made to allow all prisoners to take a full part in daily activities in safety. 52.5 National health and safety laws shall be observed in prisons. Special high security or safety measures 53.2 There shall be clear procedures to be followed when such measures are to be applied to any prisoner. 53.3 The nature of any such measures, their duration and the grounds on which they may be applied shall be determined by national law. 53.4 The application of the measures in each case shall be approved by the competent authority for a specified period of time. 53.5 Any decision to extend the approved period of time shall be subject to a new approval by the competent authority. 53.7 Any prisoner subjected to such measures shall have a right of complaint in the terms set out in Rule 70. Requests and complaints 70.1 Prisoners, individually or as a group, shall have ample opportunity to make requests or complaints to the director of the prison or to any other competent authority. 70.3 If a request is denied or a complaint is rejected, reasons shall be provided to the prisoner and the prisoner shall have the right to appeal to an independent authority.” 116. The 21st General Report of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, 10 November 2011, addressed solitary confinement, which it defined as whenever a prisoner is ordered to be held separately from other prisoners or was held together with one or two other prisoners. The Committee observed: “[Solitary confinement] can have an extremely damaging effect on the mental, somatic and social health of those concerned. This damaging effect can be immediate and increases the longer the measure lasts and the more indeterminate it is. The most significant indicator of the damage which solitary confinement can inflict is the considerably higher rate of suicide among prisoners subjected to it than that among the general prison population.” The report therefore urged States to minimise the use of solitary confinement. It should be proportionate and, the longer it was used, the stronger the reasons for it had to be. It should be lawful and subject to accountability, with the fullest possible reasons given and records kept. It should be necessary and non-discriminatory. It should never be imposed as part of a sentence and, if imposed as a disciplinary sanction, the maximum period should be fourteen days. In that period, a prisoner should have at least one hour’s outdoor exercise per day and other appropriate mental stimulation. The report also stated that the Committee’s recommended procedural safeguards should be rigorously followed where administrative solitary confinement was used for preventative purposes, including periodical and external reviews which considered, among other things, whether some of the restrictions imposed were strictly necessary. In such situations, prisoners should have an individual regime plan which attempted to maximise contact with others. Resources should also be made available to attempt to reintegrate the prisoner into the main prison community. For material conditions in solitary confinement, the Committee stated that the cells used should meet the same minimum standards as those applicable to other prisoner accommodation. These included a cell of no less than six square metres, proper cell furnishings, adequate natural and artificial light, heating and ventilation, and sufficiently large exercise areas to allow genuine exertion. The Committee also stated that medical personnel should never participate in decisions on solitary confinement and should report to the prison director whenever a prisoner’s health was put seriously at risk by solitary confinement. 117. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has found that isolation could in itself constitute inhuman treatment, and a more serious violation could result for someone with a mental disability (Victor Rosario Congo v. Ecuador, case 11.427, 13 April 1999). In Montero Aranguren et al (Detention Center of Catia) v. Venezuela, judgment of 5 July 2006, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights stated: “...solitary confinement cells must be used as disciplinary measures or for the protection of persons only during the time necessary and in strict compliance with the criteria of reasonability, necessity and legality. Such places must fulfil the minimum standards for proper accommodation, sufficient space and adequate ventilation, and they can only be used if a physician certifies that the prisoner is fit to sustain it. (footnotes omitted)” 118. Isolation for twenty-three hours a day in a two by two metres cell with ten minutes of sunlight per day was found by the United Nations Human Rights Committee to violate Article 7 of the ICCPR in Polay Campos v. Peru, CCPR/C/61/D/577/1994, 6 November 1997. 119. In its recommendations to State parties, the United Nations Committee against Torture has recommended that: - solitary confinement be strictly and specifically regulated by law and applied only in severe circumstances, with a view to its abolition (Conclusions and Recommendations in respect of Luxembourg, CAT/C/CR/28/2, at paragraph 6(b)); - there should be adequate review mechanisms relating to the determination and duration of solitary confinement (Conclusions and Recommendations in respect of Denmark, CAT/C/CR/28/1 at paragraph 7(d)); - solitary confinement for long periods of time may constitute inhuman treatment (Conclusions and Recommendations in respect of Switzerland, A/49/44, paragraph 133). 120. The United Nations Special Rapporteur for Torture has found that isolation for twenty-two to twenty-four hours per day may amount to ill-treatment and, in certain instances, torture (Interim Report of 28 July 2008, A/63/175, at paragraphs 77-85). The report included a copy of the Istanbul statement on the use and effects of solitary confinement, which was adopted at the International Psychological Trauma Symposium in December 2007. The statement included the following on the effects of solitary confinement: “It has been convincingly documented on numerous occasions that solitary confinement may cause serious psychological and sometimes physiological ill effects. Research suggests that between one third and as many as 90 per cent of prisoners experience adverse symptoms in solitary confinement. A long list of symptoms ranging from insomnia and confusion to hallucinations and psychosis has been documented. Negative health effects can occur after only a few days in solitary confinement, and the health risks rise with each additional day spent in such conditions. Individuals may react to solitary confinement differently. Still, a significant number of individuals will experience serious health problems regardless of the specific conditions, regardless of time and place, and regardless of pre-existing personal factors. The central harmful feature of solitary confinement is that it reduces meaningful social contact to a level of social and psychological stimulus that many will experience as insufficient to sustain health and well being.” 121. In his Interim Report of 5 August 2011, A/66/268, the current Special Rapporteur for Torture found that where the physical conditions and the prison regime of solitary confinement caused severe mental and physical pain or suffering, when used as a punishment, during pre-trial detention, indefinitely prolonged, on juveniles or persons with mental disabilities, it could amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and even torture. The report highlighted a number of general principles to help to guide States to re-evaluate and minimise its use and, in certain cases, abolish the practice of solitary confinement. He stated that the practice should be used only in very exceptional circumstances, as a last resort, for as short a time as possible. He further emphasised the need for minimum procedural safeguards, internal and external, to ensure that all persons deprived of their liberty were treated with humanity and respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.

4. The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Istanbul. 5. The applicant was a shopkeeper. On 14 January 1999, following a complaint made by an individual, Y.G., the applicant was arrested by three police officers in civilian clothes and taken to a police station on suspicion of robbery. On the same day, the applicant was examined by a doctor at the Haseki Hospital, who noted no signs of injury to his body. 6. At the police station, the applicant was forced to sign self-incriminating statements. When he refused to do so, he was beaten up. More specifically, he was blindfolded, stripped naked, insulted, hosed with water, beaten, and subjected to falaka (beating on the soles of the feet). 7. According to a police report dated 16 January 1999, the applicant banged his head on the walls of his cell and punched himself in the stomach. 8. On 17 January 1999 the applicant was released from police custody. Before he was released, he was taken to the Bakırköy Branch of the Forensic Medicine Institute for a medical examination. According to the medical report prepared by the Forensic Medicine Institute, there were several injuries on the applicant’s body and it was noted that he was unfit to work for seven days. The medical report revealed that the applicant had a 20x15 cm reddish purple bruise on the right shoulder blade, another 20 cm reddish purple bruise on the left shoulder blade, a 13x14 cm purple bruise on the left side of his waist, a 5x2 cm purple bruise on the right side of his waist, a 16x6 cm purple bruise around the navel, and several other small bruises. 9. At night on the same date, the applicant went to the emergency department of the American Hospital. The doctor who examined him noted in his report that the applicant had complained that he had been subjected to ill-treatment whilst in police custody. According to the report, the applicant had a 30x5 cm bruise on the right shoulder blade, two bruises measuring 40x5 cm and 30x5 cm on the left shoulder blade and a 25x7 cm bruise around the navel. 10. On 18 January 1999 the applicant was further examined at the Marmara University Hospital. It was noted that the applicant was unable to work for two weeks, as he was suffering from psychological trauma caused by having been ill-treated in police custody. 11. On an unspecified date, the applicant filed a criminal complaint with the Bakırköy public prosecutor and alleged that he had been ill-treated whilst in police custody. He requested the identification and prosecution of the police officers responsible. 12. By an indictment dated 22 June 1999, the Bakırköy public prosecutor initiated criminal proceedings in the Bakırköy Assize Court against three police officers, accusing them of ill-treatment of the applicant under Article 243 of the Criminal Code. The applicant joined the proceedings as a civil party. 13. During the trial, the court heard evidence from the accused officers and the applicant. 14. On 28 December 2001 the Bakırköy Assize Court, on the basis of the evidence in the case file, found the three police officers guilty of ill-treating the applicant. The court found it established that the police officers had intentionally ill-treated the applicant to extract a confession. It therefore sentenced each of the accused to a year’s imprisonment under Article 243 of the former Criminal Code and banned them from public service for three months. Having regard to the attitude of the police officers during the trial, the court then reduced their sentence to ten months’ imprisonment. Furthermore, the court decided to suspend their sentences pursuant to Section 6 of Law No. 647 on the basis that they did not show any likelihood of reoffending. 15. On an unspecified date, one of the convicted police officers filed an appeal against the decision of the Bakırköy Assize Court. However, on 1 December 2003 the Court of Cassation rejected his appeal, as he had failed to submit his request in time. 16. Subsequently, on 17 November 2004 the applicant initiated proceedings before the Istanbul Administrative Court, claiming compensation. On 13 October 2005 the Istanbul Administrative Court rejected the applicant’s case, holding that he had failed to bring his case within the one-year time-limit following the decision of the Bakırköy Assize Court dated 28 December 2001. The applicant’s appeal against this decision was rejected by the Supreme Administrative Court on 30 January 2008. 17. According to the information in the case file, the applicant is still being treated for psychological problems because of the ill-treatment he suffered in 1999.

5. The applicant was born in 1974. He is at present being held at the Edouard Toulouse Hospital in Marseilles. 6. The applicant suffers from behavioural disorders and was alternately kept in prison and hospital psychiatric wards between 1996 and 2004. He suffers from chronic schizophrenic psychosis, with hallucinations, delusions and aggressive and addictive behaviour. 7. On 21 May 2005 the applicant was sent to Toulon-La Farlède prison after causing damage in Chalucet psychiatric hospital, where he had asked to be admitted. As a result, on 30 June 2005 he was sentenced to twelve months' imprisonment, of which ten months were suspended. On his arrival at the prison he allegedly set fire to his mattress. He was placed under psychiatric observation, then made to share a cell with another detainee, who was known to have psychiatric problems. 8. On 16 August 2005 a fire broke out in the applicant's cell. Both detainees suffered serious injuries. With burns on 65% of his body, the applicant's cell mate died from his injuries on 6 December the same year. 9. At a hearing on 9 September 2005 the applicant stated that he “could not remember exactly how his mattress caught fire”, and that he “suffered from schizophrenia, heard voices and saw strange things”, but that “everything was better at the moment”; he added “I feel freer since the fire in my cell... everything has become clearer in my head. I can say that everything is calm now”. 10. On 17 October 2005 the applicant was placed under judicial investigation for arson resulting in total unfitness for work for more than eight days, and placed in detention pending trial. He denied the charge, claiming that he had no recollection of the events leading up to the fire because he had been on medication at the time. On 7 December 2005 the public prosecutor's office made an application for the additional charge of arson aggravated by constructive manslaughter to be preferred against the applicant. 11. On 30 January 2006, in execution of an order of the investigating judge of 28 December 2005, Dr F., an expert at the Aix-en-Provence Court of Appeal, carried out a psychological examination of the applicant in the psychiatric unit at Les Baumettes prison in Marseilles, where he had been held since December 2005. The relevant passages from the report submitted on 1 March 2006 read as follows: “The onset of the disorder at the age of about 22 ... heralded in a process of gradual marginalisation for this young adult during which he alternated periods of hospital treatment, voluntary or otherwise, incarceration, training courses and homelessness. He has lived in this way for the last ten years, caught up in his illness, with no place in society ... From the legal standpoint, his convictions bear witness to bouts of violence and excessive drinking, which he says had stopped prior to his incarceration ... During the examination, Mr G. came across as a man with a schizoid personality, an introvert with no interest in the outside world, save for a few recurring scenes in which he sees himself as a victim. Be that as it may, and whatever part he may have played in the case, Mr G. needs regular, long-term psychiatric support. While he is in prison, therefore, it is preferable that he be held in a medical unit, as he was when we met him.” 12. Two subsequent psychiatric examinations carried out respectively on 21 February by Professor A. and on 6 June 2006 by Dr G. confirmed the existence of chronic hebephrenic schizophrenia manifested in behavioural disorders and aggressive and addictive conduct. The first expert concluded that the offences in issue were related to the psychiatric disorders and that the applicant's judgment had been disturbed at the time, and that “the subject appears difficult to cure or rehabilitate, and requires neuroleptic treatment in strong doses combined with regular supervision or even placement in a UMD” (a difficult patients' unit: UMDs are psychiatric hospital wards specialised in the treatment of dangerous mental disorders, including patients committed under Article D. 398 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, or “CCrP”, see paragraph 35 below). The second expert found that it was not possible to say for sure that the applicant's behaviour was the result of his mental illness, and that there was no way of telling whether, at the material time, he had been suffering from a psychological or neuropsychological disorder which destroyed, affected, or diminished his discernment or his ability to control his actions within the meaning of Article 122-1 of the Criminal Code, and that he would require specialised care even after his release. 13. On 14 June 2006 the applicant's lawyer wrote to the investigating judge requesting his client's release. He argued that the applicant was known to suffer from psychiatric disorders, even prior to his incarceration, and could not be held criminally responsible. He went on to say “it is therefore difficult to see what purpose his incarceration might serve in that regard, especially as the offence with which he is charged occurred in prison. It appears, therefore, that prison is not the right place for my client. His place is clearly in a hospital environment. I believe it is the duty of the prosecuting authorities and possibly the prefecture to assume their responsibilities in this regard in the event of his release ...”. 14. By an order of 27 June 2006, the request for the applicant's release was rejected because according to Dr G.'s report a criminal penalty would not be inappropriate in the applicant's case, and pre-trial detention was the only means of preventing pressure being put on the witnesses, ensuring that the accused remained at the disposal of the judicial authorities and putting an end to the disturbance to public order. 15. On 7 August 2006 Dr G. examined the applicant again, “to determine whether his alleged losses of memory were real or invented and, if they were real, to determine the possible cause or causes (regard being had to the treatment he was following, for example). He submitted his report on 25 August 2006. In it he concluded that it was not possible to say for certain whether the alleged memory losses were real or invented, but they were definitely not caused by the mental disorder he had long been suffering from; they might, on the other hand, be related to (sedative) side effects of the psychotropic drugs used to treat him. 16. The applicant's lawyer asked for a second opinion, but his request was rejected by an order of 17 October 2006. 17. On 19 February 2007 an order was issued for the applicant's indictment and committal for trial before the Assize Court. On 1 March 2007 he appealed. His lawyer argued that at the time of the events that had led to his incarceration the applicant had been confined to a psychiatric institution; on arriving there he had tried to commit suicide by fire, and yet the prison authorities had taken no steps to ensure his safety and that of his fellow detainees. He maintained that his client was not criminally responsible and requested his release, whereupon the prosecuting authorities would be able to request his administrative detention. On 19 March 2007 the principal public prosecutor at the Aix-en-Provence Court of Appeal requested confirmation of the applicant's indictment and committal for trial before the Assize Court. 18. The applicant was placed in the regional psychiatric unit (RPU) at Les Baumettes prison from 30 April to 12 June 2007, from 15 June to 10 August 2007, from 31 August to 15 November 2007, and from 26 November 2007 to 14 March 2008. From 10 au 31 August 2007, when going through a period of anxiety scarcely compatible with detention in the RPU, the applicant was once again placed by the authorities in a specialised hospital under Article D. 398 of the CCrP. 19. In the interim, on 12 October 2007 an expert report by Dr G. found that the applicant had indeed been suffering from psychological or neuropsychological disorders at the material time, although it was not certain whether this had “destroyed, affected, or diminished his discernment or his ability to control his actions within the meaning of Article 122-1 of the Criminal Code”. 20. By a judgment of 17 December 2007 the Aix-en-Provence Court of Appeal gave a prison warder a two-month' suspended prison sentence for having inflicted violence on the applicant that resulted in one day's total unfitness for work. The warder had slapped him for refusing to be placed in a cell in which a detainee had started a fire and which he would have to share with a detainee with suicidal tendencies. 21. By a judgment of 22 January 2008 the investigation chamber of the Aix-en-Provence Court of Appeal upheld the order for the applicant's indictment and committal for trial before the Assize Court. 22. The applicant was compulsorily admitted to hospital from 14 to 31 March 2008, from 8 to 28 July 2008 and from 27 August to 28 October 2008. He was placed in the regional psychiatric unit at Marseilles-Baumettes prison from 31 March to 8 July 2008, from 28 July to 27 August 2008 and from 28 October to 31 December 2008. ... 23. By a judgment of 13 November 2008 the Var Assize Court sentenced the applicant to ten years' imprisonment and declared him civilly liable for the prejudice suffered by the civil parties. The applicant and the prosecution appealed against that judgment, on 21 and 24 November 2008 respectively. After the sentence was pronounced the applicant was taken back to the RPU at Les Baumettes prison. 24. On 31 December 2008 the prefect ordered the applicant's compulsory hospitalisation in Edouard Toulouse Hospital. On 28 January 2009 his detention there was extended for three months, until 30 April 2009, for the raisons stated in a medical certificate of 27 January 2009 mentioning that the applicant “has displayed increased anxiety in the last few days, and his old delusions (of grandeur and of being a father) have resurfaced”. It appears from the file that the applicant was again placed in the prison psychiatric unit from 17 to 27 March 2009 and from 1 April to 15 May 2009. 25. On 25 March 2009, while in the prison hospital, the applicant applied to be released, relying on Article 3 of the Convention. He argued that his constant moves back and forth between prison and hospital amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment. He explained that when his condition deteriorated to the point where it was no longer compatible with detention, he was placed in hospital, and when he recovered his “stability” he was sent back to prison until his condition deteriorated again. He considered that his return to prison constituted a form of torture. Lastly, he argued that the decision to put him back in normal detention at Les Baumettes was absurd considering his extreme vulnerability vis-à-vis the other detainees and the danger to his safety. By a judgment of 14 May 2009 the investigation chamber of the Aix-en-Provence Court of Appeal rejected his request: “There is no medical evidence that G.'s state of health is currently incompatible with detention, considering that his compulsory hospitalisation in an approved establishment on several occasions since he was placed in detention, followed by his return to prison, were strictly based on his health needs, in conformity with the provisions of Article D 398 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and did therefore not amount to inhuman or degrading treatment, and certainly not to torture as alleged; It should also be noted that the charges against G. concern criminal acts that caused an exceptional, persistent disturbance to public order that his release would be likely to rekindle, namely the destruction by fire of a prison cell resulting in the death of a fellow prisoner; Regard being had to the length of the sentence incurred, the guarantees that the accused will appear in court are uncertain in so far as he has no fixed abode and no job and is a repeat offender, having already been convicted of arson; In addition, his release would probably disrupt the normal course of the proceedings and the establishment of the truth, bearing in mind the oral nature of the proceedings, and the execution of the sentence in the event of a conviction; Detention is therefore necessary before the hearing as a precaution, the obligations under judicial supervision, however strict they may be, being insufficient with regard to the aims pursued.” 26. From 15 to 29 May 2009 the applicant was again committed to hospital under Article D. 398 of the CCrP. ... 27. By a judgment of 22 September 2009 the Bouches-du-Rhône Assize Court ruled, on appeal, that the applicant lacked criminal responsibility: “It has been found by a majority of at least ten votes that [the applicant] ... intentionally destroyed a prison cell ... and in so doing caused the death of a fellow prisoner; It has further been found by a majority of votes that [the applicant's] criminal responsibility at the time was diminished within the meaning of Article L 122-1 of the Criminal Code.” The Assize Court ordered the applicant's compulsory admission to hospital under Article 706-135 of the CCrP (see paragraph 34 below), as he “suffer[ed] from a psychiatric disorder that require[d] treatment and [could] jeopardise the safety of others, in particular on account of the unpredictability of his actions linked to his serious mental illness”.

5. The applicant was born in 1975. He resides in Kosovska Mitrovica in Kosovo[1], where he is employed as a police officer with the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia (Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova Republike Srbije, hereinafter “the Ministry”). 6. The facts, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7. On 24 January 2000 and 17 July 2003 respectively, the Serbian Government adopted two decisions whereby, inter alia, all of its employees who resided and worked in Kosovo were to be paid double salaries. 8. On 31 January 2000 the Ministry issued a decision stating that the police officers in question were entitled to have their salaries increased by between 2.5% and 4.5%, depending on the circumstances. 9. In reality, the applicant only received the increase approved by the Ministry, amounting to significantly less than the doubling of his salary envisaged by the Government. 10. On 29 August 2006, therefore, the applicant filed a civil claim against the Ministry with the First Municipal Court (Prvi opštinski sud) in Belgrade, seeking payment of the difference between the salary increase received and that granted by the Government. The applicant further requested the payment of unspecified amounts on account of the related pension and disability insurance contributions. 11. On 23 July 2007 the First Municipal Court ruled in favour of the applicant and ordered his employer to pay: i. 145,821.60 Serbian dinars (“RSD”) (approximately 1,760 Euros (“EUR”) at the relevant time) in respect of the difference between the salary received from 1 July 2003 to August 2006 and that granted by the Government, plus statutory interest; ii. the extra pension and disability insurance contributions for the above period in respect of this additional salary to the relevant State fund; and iii. RSD 39,532 (approximately EUR 477) for his legal costs. 12. On 19 December 2007 the District Court (Okružni sud) in Belgrade reversed that judgment and rejected the applicant’s claim. In its reasoning the District Court held, inter alia, that the applicable domestic regulation was contained in the decision of the Ministry adopted on 31 January 2000. This judgment was served on the applicant on 29 January 2008. 13. Many of the applicant’s colleagues (hereinafter “the plaintiffs”) had lodged separate claims with the District Court concerning the same issue, some of which were successful while others were unsuccessful: in seventy-three other judgments rendered between 25 January 2006 and 1 October 2008, the same District Court ruled in favour of the plaintiffs, notwithstanding the fact that their claims were based on the same facts as those in the applicant’s case and concerned identical legal issues. In its reasoning in these other cases, the District Court held, inter alia, that the plaintiffs’ salaries had to be paid in accordance with the Serbian Government’s decisions of 24 January 2000 and/or 17 July 2003. 14. Of the seventy-three judgments mentioned above, in fifty cases the respondent lodged appeals on points of law (revizije) with the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Srbije, see paragraphs 21 and 24 below). In the remaining twenty-three cases, however, the respondent lodged no such appeal, apparently in the light of the statutory threshold (see paragraph 22 below). 15. The Government provided examples of relevant case-law adopted by the Supreme Court, in particular six separate judgments, of which one had been issued on 3 July 2008 and the remaining five between 25 December 2008 and 1 October 2009. In each case, deciding upon appeals on points of law, the Supreme Court had ruled against the plaintiffs, albeit with somewhat different reasoning compared with that employed by the District Court. In particular, the Supreme Court had held, inter alia, that the Government’s decision of 17 July 2003 was not directly applicable. 16. In the meantime, on 23 September 2008, the Civil Division (Građansko odeljenje) of the Supreme Court held a meeting which was meant to resolve the issue of how to rule in all cases like the applicant’s (see paragraph 26 below). In the minutes of this meeting, it was noted, inter alia, that in two cases registered in 2008 where appeals on points of law had been considered, the Supreme Court had in fact confirmed the lower courts’ rulings in favour of the plaintiffs (Rev II 429/08 and Rev 623/08). The meeting, however, was ultimately adjourned pending the outcome of a case which had been brought before the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Srbije) concerning the abstract review of the constitutionality of the Government’s decision adopted on 17 July 2003. On 16 April 2010 the Constitutional Court held that the impugned decision was unconstitutional. 17. In eighteen separate cases the plaintiffs thereafter lodged their appeals with the Constitutional Court (ustavne žalbe), but, according to the information contained in the case file, these proceedings are all still pending. 18. The applicant was not entitled to lodge an appeal on points of law since the value of his claim was below the threshold of 500,000 dinars. He did not attempt to obtain constitutional redress.

4. The applicant was born in 1965 and he is currently detained in the Diyarbakır Prison. 5. On 12 March 1995 the applicant was taken into police custody on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation. 6. On 10 April 1995 he was brought before a single judge of the Diyarbakır State Security Court who ordered his detention on remand. In the course of the proceedings before the court, the applicant denied the statements that he had signed while he was in police custody. 7. On 13 April 1995 the chief public prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court filed a bill of indictment with the latter charging the applicant and sixteen other suspects, under Article 125 of the Criminal Code, with carrying out activities for the purpose of bringing about the secession of part of the national territory. 8. In the course of the criminal proceedings, the Diyarbakır State Security Court held thirty hearings and heard seventeen witnesses. 9. On 3 June 1999 the Diyarbakır State Security Court composed of two civilian judges and a military judge, convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to death under Article 125 of the Criminal Code. Taking into account the applicant's conduct during the trial, the death penalty was commuted to a life sentence. 10. On 4 June 1999 the applicant appealed against the judgment of the State Security Court. 11. On 21 February 2000 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the State Security Court. 12. On 5 May 2000 the Court of Cassation's decision was deposited with the registry of the Diyarbakır State Security Court.

4. The applicant was born in 1936 and lives in Skopje. 5. The applicant worked as General Manager of a bank, “K.B.” (“the bank”). 6. On 25 April 1996 the Governor of the National Bank (“the Governor”) issued an order preventing the applicant from working as the bank’s General Manager and from exercising other duties associated with special responsibilities for an indefinite period of time (“the order”). The order was based on findings as to the applicant’s unlawful business conduct and irregularities in the bank’s operation under his management. On 22 May 1996 the Council of the National Bank (“the Council”) dismissed the applicant’s appeal and confirmed the order. 7. On 12 September 1996 the Supreme Court allowed the applicant’s appeal on points of law (управен спор) submitted on 29 May 1996 and annulled the Council’s decision. It found that the position of general manager of a bank was not associated with special responsibilities and accordingly the order should not have been issued in respect of the applicant. 8. On 13 November 1996 the Constitutional Court upheld the applicant’s actio popularis and declared section 52 § 14 of the National Bank Act, under which the Governor had been entitled to take other measures (apart from those explicitly mentioned) if necessary, unconstitutional. 9. On 18 June 1997 the Constitutional Court declared the provisions of the National Bank Act, in accordance with which the Council decided upon appeals against the Governor’s decisions, unconstitutional. It found that the Governor’s participation in and chairing of the Council when the latter decided against his decisions given at first instance had been contrary to the constitutional principle of two-instance decision-making. 10. On 9 June 1997 the plenary session of the Supreme Court (општа седница) granted the public prosecutor’s request for the protection of legality (барање за заштита на законитоста) and quashed the Supreme Court’s decision of 12 September 1996. The court referred in its decision to the National Assembly’s authentic interpretation of section 70 of the Banks and Savings Institutions Act (Закон за банки и штедилници), according to which the manager of a bank was to be considered “a person with special responsibilities”. 11. On 4 February 1998 the Supreme Court, relying on the Constitutional Court’s decision of 18 June 1997, accepted the applicant’s appeal and annulled the Council’s decision of 22 May 1996. 12. As the Council allegedly remained inactive, the applicant requested the Supreme Court to decide his case on the merits instead of the Council. 13. On 1 September 1998 the Council, sitting without the Governor, dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the latter’s decision. On 18 November 1998 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s request to decide his case on the merits instead of the Council. 14. On 7 July 1999 the Supreme Court granted the applicant’s appeal and annulled the Council’s decision. It found that the Council had established the facts incompletely and violated procedural rules. 15. On 26 August 1999 the Council dismissed the applicant’s appeal again. 16. On 6 September 1999 the applicant lodged a fresh appeal with the Supreme Court. 17. On 2 December 1999 the Supreme Court allowed the applicant’s appeal and annulled the Council’s decision of 26 August 1999 and the order of 25 April 1996. It found that the Governor and the Council had wrongly established that the applicant had abused the monetary system. On 19 February 2001 the plenary session of the Supreme Court granted the public prosecutor’s request for the protection of legality and quashed that decision. It found that the facts had been re-established without a hearing. 18. On 11 September 2003 the Supreme Court finally dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It based its decision, inter alia, on the Banks and Savings Institutions Act of 1993, in accordance with which the National Bank supervised the lawfulness of a bank’s operation and accordingly had been authorised to prevent, fully or partially, persons with special responsibilities from exercising their duties. It also referred to section 50 § 2 of the National Bank Act of 1992 and ruled that the latter had lawfully prevented the applicant from working as General Manager of the bank due to irregularities in the operation of the bank under his management. 19. On 26 December 2003 the applicant unsuccessfully requested the public prosecutor to lodge a request with the Supreme Court for the protection of legality. 20. On 25 May 2000 the newly appointed General Manager of the bank dismissed the applicant as having fulfilled the conditions for his retirement. 21. On 27 June 2000 the bank’s Executive Board (“the Board”) dismissed the applicant’s objection. 22. On 4 June 2000 the applicant brought a civil action challenging his forced retirement. He argued that he had not met the statutory conditions for entering retirement. 23. On 2 July 2001 the Skopje Court of First Instance granted the applicant’s claim and annulled the bank’s decisions. It gave the ruling after it had obtained an expert report concerning the applicant’s period of employment. 24. On 6 September 2001 the bank appealed. On 6 December 2001 the Skopje Court of Appeal quashed the lower court’s decision and ordered a retrial. 25. On 6 December 2002 the Skopje Court of First Instance granted the applicant’s claim again and annulled the bank’s dismissal decisions. None of the scheduled hearings were adjourned upon the applicant’s request. 26. On 13 November 2003 the Skopje Court of Appeal allowed the bank’s appeal of 4 February 2003 and quashed the lower court’s decision. 27. On 14 October 2005 the Skopje Court of First Instance dismissed the applicant’s claim. In the course of those proceedings, that court sought information from different institutions about the applicant’s period of employment. On 1 September 2004 it also appointed an expert to draw up a report in that connection and ordered those institutions to allow her access to the relevant documentation. The expert report was produced in March 2005. On 23 March 2006 the Skopje Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance court’s decision. 28. On 29 May 2006 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law (ревизија) with the Supreme Court. The proceedings are apparently still pending. 3. Civil proceedings concerning the applicant’s removal from the position of General Manager of the bank (“the third set of proceedings”) 29. On 29 July 1996 the Board removed the applicant from the position of General Manager of the bank. On 9 October 1996 the Board dismissed the applicant’s objection and terminated his contract with the bank. 30. On an unspecified date in 1996, the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the decisions of the Board. 31. On 29 November 1996 the Skopje Court of First Instance partially allowed the applicant’s claim and annulled the Board’s decisions. The court dismissed the applicant’s claim concerning the termination of the contract. 32. On 17 September 1997 the Skopje Court of Appeal granted both parties’ appeals and quashed the lower court’s decision. 33. On 27 April 1998 the Skopje Court of First Instance dismissed the applicant’s claim concerning his removal and rejected his claim related to the termination of his contract. 34. On 2 June 1999 the Skopje Court of Appeal ruled partly in favour of the applicant, namely, it accepted his appeal concerning his removal and dismissed it in respect of his contract. 35. On 19 January 2000 the Skopje Court of First Instance granted the applicant’s claim and annulled the Board’s decisions related to his removal (“the court order”). That decision was upheld by the Skopje Court of Appeal’s decision of 19 April 2000. 36. After the Board had refused the applicant’s request to “reinstate his status prior to his removal” (воспоставување на правната состојба како пред разрешувањето), the applicant instituted enforcement proceedings claiming reinstatement and payment of salary arrears. 37. On 27 October 2000 the Skopje Court of First Instance dismissed the applicant’s request as the court order had not provided for his reinstatement. 38. On 22 January 2001 the Skopje Court of Appeal allowed the applicant’s appeal and remitted the case for re-examination, arguing that the court order had had a retrospective effect. 39. On 12 February 2001 the Skopje Court of First Instance dismissed the applicant’s claims for his reinstatement and for payment of salary arrears. 40. On 26 April 2001 the Skopje Court of Appeal upheld the lower court’s decision and dismissed the applicant’s appeal. By a letter of 9 September 2005, the Skopje Court of First Instance stated that there was no evidence in the file attesting that a copy of that decision had been served on the applicant or his counsel. 41. By an application of 10 July 2001, the applicant unsuccessfully requested the public prosecutor to lodge a request with the Supreme Court for the protection of legality (барање за заштита на законитоста). His application was refused on 31 August 2001. On 12 September 2001 that notification was allegedly served on the applicant.

4. The applicants were born in 1942 and 1980 respectively and live in Moscow. 5. The first applicant is the second applicant's mother. On 19 September 1991, she filed a court action on behalf of her son against the second applicant's schoolmate claiming damages for battery. 6. On 24 October 1991 the Krasnogvardeyskiy District Court (“the District Court”) initiated proceedings in this connection. 7. On 27 February 1998 the District Court examined her action and partly granted it. The court ordered the defendants jointly to pay RUR 1,500. 8. Unhappy with the amount of award, the first applicant appealed against the judgment of 27 February 1998 to the City Court on 27 February 1998. 9. On 10 June 1998 the first applicant filed supplementary appeal arguments. In June 1998 the Moscow City Court quashed the judgment of 27 February 1998 and remitted the case to the first instance court for a fresh examination. 10. The first applicant submits that from September 1998 to February 2000 the hearings in her case were rare, mostly due to the unavailability of judges, and that each time they took place the District Court failed properly to notify her. 11. According to the Government, on 10 July 1998 the case was transmitted to a judge of the District Court who scheduled the hearing for 15 September 1998. This hearing was adjourned due to the judge's illness until 27 October 1998. The case was adjourned due to the judge's involvement in a different set of proceedings on 29 December 1998, 29 January 1999 and 24 March 1999. 12. On the latter date the first applicant requested a forensic examination to be carried out. The request was granted and the hearing scheduled for 14 May 1999. 13. Thereafter the case was adjourned repeatedly due to the judge's involvement in other proceedings, in particular on 20 July, 12 October 1999 and 12 January 2000. 14. It appears that on an unspecified date the second applicant attained his majority and by decision of 4 February 2000 the first applicant was replaced in the proceedings by the second applicant. Due to one of the defendant's absence, the case was adjourned until 2 March 2000. 15. On 2 March 2000 the District Court ordered another forensic examination and suspended the proceedings accordingly. 16. By decision of 9 June 2000, upon the second applicant's motion, the District Court amended the list of question put before the expert body and on 5 July 2000 the case-file was transferred to the expert body. 17. On 2 April 2001 the proceedings resumed and the hearing was scheduled for 16 April 2001. 18. On 16 April 2001 the District Court examined the case on the merits and ordered the second applicant's school to pay non-pecuniary damages of RUR 10,000 to the second applicant as well as to cover his dental prosthesis expenses. 19. The parties appealed against this judgment but some time later the applicants retracted their appeal. 20. According to the applicants, the first instance judge erred in fixing the amount of stamp duty in the appeal proceedings for one of the defendants and it took the judicial authorities several months (between June and October 2001) to rectify this mistake. 21. The Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 16 April 2001 on appeal on 14 November 2001. 22. The judgment of 16 April 2001, as upheld on appeal on 14 November 2001, was enforced in full on 6 June 2002.

4. The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in the village of Krichka, the Ivano-Frankivs'k region of Ukraine. 5. In 1987 the applicant's family was placed on the waiting list to receive an apartment from the State. By 1990 the applicant was first on the housing list. Nevertheless, the Executive Committee of the Dzvinyach Village Council, by a decision of 12 October 1990, gave an available apartment to another person. The applicant instituted proceedings in the Ivano-Frankivs'k Regional Court against the executive committee of the Village Council, challenging its decision. 6. On 30 August 1991, the Ivano-Frankivs'k Regional Court found for the applicant and ordered the Village Council to assign the disputed apartment to the applicant. On 30 October 1991, the Supreme Court of Ukraine upheld the decision of the Regional Court. 7. In 1996, as the judgment in her favour remained unenforced, the applicant requested the Bogorodchansky District Court to change the manner of enforcement and to order the Village Council to build her a house. On 7 October 1996, the court satisfied the applicant's request and changed the manner of execution accordingly. 8. In 1997, as the judgment was still unenforced, the applicant requested the same district court to change the manner of execution again and to award her the pecuniary equivalent of the disputed apartment. On 16 June 1997, the Bogorodchansky District Court satisfied the applicant's request and awarded her UAH 29,600[1] in compensation. 9. On 28 December 2000, the Head of the Bogorodchansky District Department of the State Bailiffs' Service issued an order to freeze all the current bank accounts of the Village Council in order to secure the payment of the judgment debt in the applicant's favour. 10. On 26 January 2001, the Dzvinyach Village Council challenged the order of 28 December 2000 in the Bogorodchansky District Court. The enforcement proceedings were accordingly suspended. 11. On 12 February 2001, the Bogorodchansky District Court found in part for the Village Council and quashed the order of the Bailiffs' Service with respect to two principal accounts containing the budget funds for social payments, salaries, etc. By the same decision the court allowed the other accounts of the debtor to be frozen. 12. The applicant lodged a protest with the Deputy Chairman of the Ivano-Frankivs'k Regional Court to challenge this decision. The Deputy Chairman rejected her protest by his letter of 20 April 2001. On 8 October 2001, the panel of three judges of the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected the applicant's request for leave to appeal under the new cassation procedure. 13. On 21 November 2002 the court decision of 16 June 1997 was enforced in full and the Bailiffs ended the enforcement proceedings.

5. The applicant was born in 1975 and is now serving his sentence in the Tula Region. 6. At about 11.30 a.m. on 10 April 2003 the cashier desk of the Petelino psychiatric hospital in the Tula Region was robbed by three men armed with a submachine gun and a sawn-off shotgun. Two police patrols arrived at the scene less than five minutes later. 7. The police officers who apprehended the applicant described the events in the following manner. Officer B. stated, in particular (his statement to the investigator is dated 17 June 2003): “I saw three men cross the motorway and disappear behind the forest shelter belt ... I started running across the forest to intercept the criminals. At that moment I heard a burst of submachine gun fire. As I emerged out of the forest, I saw two men in front of me who later turned out to be [the applicant] and D. [The applicant] wore light-blue jeans and a dark jacket, and D. wore dark tracksuit bottoms. [The applicant] carried a Kalashnikov submachine gun with no butt, and D. had a sawn-off rifle ... I told the criminals to freeze, drop the guns and offer no resistance. [The applicant] and D. ... crossed the motorway. Then I shot a few rounds in burst mode in the direction of the criminals but above their heads and told them again to freeze. D. fell on the roadside, and the rifle flew out of his hands... [The applicant] turned around, saw the police car and fired several shots in its direction. Then he slipped and fell. I ran up to him, pointed my gun at him and told him to stop resistance and drop the weapon. The muzzle of his submachine gun was pointed at my face, so I kicked the gun out of his hand and used physical force on him in accordance with section 12 of the Police Act ... After the apprehension, we took them all to the Shatskoye police station. During the arrest I saw that [the applicant] shot at the patrol car ... [because] he wanted to stop the chase and run away from the police ... During the arrest we had to use physical force on [the applicant], D., and Sh. because they actively resisted us. As a result, they sustained injuries but I cannot say what injuries and where because they were covered in mud.” 8. Officer M., in his statement to the investigator made on 11 April 2003, testified as follows: “Three men were running some seventy metres ahead of us ... One of them – the one who was a bit taller, in light-blue jeans and black jacket – turned to us and fired a burst from his submachine gun in our direction ... [Officer B.] fired two shots at the running men ... The men had already crossed to the roadside in the direction of Novomoskovsk ... The man in blue jeans and black jacket fired a burst at the police car and started going down towards the forest but slipped and fell on his back. He held the submachine gun in front of his chest and pointed it at [Officer M.] who had also pointed his submachine gun at him and told him to drop his weapon ... I ran up to [Officer B.] and told the man in blue jeans to throw the gun away. The man reclined on his back and put the gun aside. I kicked it away and, using martial arts, bent his arm behind his back, led him away and put him on the ground where handcuffs were applied to him. [Officer Shch.] and I stayed next to the detained men ... [The third man] was also detained but I did not see him because he was brought directly to the Shatskoye police station where the other men were also taken ...” 9. On the same day Officer S. testified in the same vein: “... one of the men who were running ahead of us – the one who was taller and wore blue jeans and black jacket – turned around and fired a shot in our direction. Then I realised that the men were armed ... The men had already crossed to the roadside in the direction of Novomoskovsk ... The man in blue jeans and black jacket fired a burst at the police car and started going down towards the forest but slipped and fell on his back. He held the submachine gun in front of his chest and pointed it at [Officer M.] who had also pointed his submachine gun at him and told him to drop his weapon ...” 10. It appears from Officer Shch.'s statement of 15 July 2003 that he had also taken part in the applicant's arrest: “... As we arrived at the Tula-Novomoskovsk motorway, I saw one of the criminals – Kapanadze, as I learnt later – point a submachine gun wrapped in something blue at the patrol car and fire a burst in the direction of our car. I jumped out of the car and began shooting at Kapanadze and D. who was running after Kapanadze. They were crossing the motorway... Kapanadze ran to the forest and I attempted to cut him off, [Officer B.] was following me. [Officer B.] and I ran up to Kapanadze at the same moment, he pointed his gun at my boss, while continuing to run but slipped and we arrested him. Then we dragged him to the motorway and I stayed with the criminals ... During the arrest it was necessary to use physical force on Kapanadze, D. and Sh., in accordance with section 13 of the Police Act because they offered resistance ...” 11. The applicant and two other men were brought to the Shatskoye police station in the Leninskiy district of the Tula Region. 12. The applicant submitted that he had been brought to an office on the first floor. Two riot-squad (OMON) and operational officers (Mr G.) had been present in the room. They had accused the applicant of having shot a police officer while trying to get away. After Mr G. had left the room, the riot-squad officers had begun punching and kicking the applicant who had had his hands cuffed behind his back. Mr G. had later come back to the office and dealt the applicant several blows with a chair leg. 13. At 8 p.m. on 10 April 2003 the investigator carried out a visual examination of the applicant's person in the presence of two attesting witnesses and a chemistry specialist. It was observed that the applicant's face was covered with a “grey and black substance”. There was a swelling on his left cheek and some thick substance similar to clotted blood on one leg. The anterior side of the applicant's body showed no visible injuries, but the upper right region and centre of his back were covered with bruises. Other bruises were located on his left thigh and right shin. 14. Later on that day the officers took the applicant by car to the temporary detention ward of the Leninskiy district police station. According to him, the beatings continued in the car and the policemen stamped on his bare hands and kicked him in the face. They also insulted him and ridiculed his Georgian name. 15. It appears that, further to the applicant's complaints about ill-treatment at the police station, the investigator Mr M. commissioned a further medical examination of the applicant. 16. On 15 April 2003 the forensic expert recorded multiple abrasions and bruises on the applicant's face, including his right and left eyelids, nose, left cheek, left temple, left ear, the front of his thorax, his shoulders and shoulder-blades, left thigh, right knee and shin, and a swelling in the right occipital region of his head (report no. 1140). The expert determined that the injuries had been caused by the impact of hard blunt objects no earlier than seven days before the examination. 17. On 18 April 2003 the applicant was transferred from the Leninskiy district police station to remand centre no. IZ-71/1 in Tula. On arrival at the remand centre he was examined by a doctor. According to the medical certificate of the same date, the applicant had a bruised right eye and right thigh. He asked the director of the remand centre to forward his complaint about ill-treatment by the police to the Tula regional prosecutor. 18. On 2 May 2003 the investigator Mr Bu. of the Leninskiy district prosecutor's office issued a decision refusing to institute criminal proceedings in respect of the alleged ill-treatment. The decision referred to the statements by the arresting officers Mr B. and Mr Shch., who claimed that the applicant had actively resisted arrest and that they had used physical force on him. The operational officers Mr L. and Mr A. from the Shatskoye police station stated that upon their arrival at the station the detainees had not presented any visible injuries because they had been covered in dirt and dust. The officers denied that they had exerted any physical or mental pressure on the detainees. On the basis of that evidence, the investigator concluded that the applicant's injuries must have been lawfully caused during his arrest. 19. It appears that the decision of 2 May 2003 was set aside by the supervising prosecutor who ordered an additional inquiry. 20. On 28 July 2003 the investigator Mr Bu. issued a new decision refusing to institute criminal proceedings. The text of the decision was identical, word for word, to that of the decision of 2 May 2003. 21. The applicant complained to the Leninskiy district prosecutor that Mr Bu. was not able to carry out an independent inquiry because he had been present at the police station on 10 April 2003 and witnessed the beatings. On 13 and 18 September 2003 the deputy Leninskiy district prosecutor informed him that his allegations had already been examined by the investigator Mr Bu. and found to have been unsubstantiated. 22. The applicant also complained to the Prosecutor General and the Tula regional prosecutor. On 4 March 2004 the regional prosecutor asked the Leninskiy district prosecutor to examine the matter. 23. On the following day the deputy Leninskiy district prosecutor issued a decision refusing to institute criminal proceedings in respect of the applicant's allegations of ill-treatment. The deputy prosecutor referred to the statements by the investigator Mr Bu., another investigator Ms I., and the operational officers Mr Shch. and Mr M. from the Shatskoye police station. They denied having exerted, or having seen anyone exert, any mental or physical pressure on the detainees. The deputy prosecutor concluded that the injuries had been caused during the arrest and that the applicant's allegations of ill-treatment had been made “for the purpose of avoiding criminal responsibility for the crimes”. 24. In the meantime, the trial court called Officers B., M., S., and Shch. and the investigator Mr Bu. to the witness stand and asked them to describe the circumstances of the co-defendants' arrest. At the hearing on 2 September 2004 Officer Shch. stated that the defendants had not offered any resistance during the arrest and that they had been immediately handcuffed. He denied using any physical force during the arrest and pointed out that the applicant had been dirty but had had no visible injuries. Officer B. submitted that no physical force had been employed by himself or by his subordinates. He had merely twisted the applicant's arms and handcuffed him. Officer S. confirmed that, once on the ground, the defendants had ceased to resist arrest and that there was no attempt to punish them after the arrest. Officer M. testified that one of the defendants had been handcuffed, and the others' hands had been tied with belts. The investigator Mr Bu. said he was unable to remember any injuries on the defendants. At the hearing on 4 November 2004 Officers A. and Z. testified that the applicant had borne no visible injuries on his arrival to the police station. 25. The applicant complained to a court that the prosecutor's decision of 5 March 2004 had not been notified to him. He also submitted that the decision was unlawful because the existing medical evidence convincingly showed that he had been a victim of ill-treatment. He sought leave to appear in person before the court. By an interim decision of 20 October 2004, the Leninskiy District Court of the Tula Region refused the applicant leave to appear, finding that the applicant's written submissions were sufficiently detailed. 26. On 15 November 2004 the Leninskiy District Court dismissed the applicant's complaint. It found that a copy of the decision of 5 March 2004 had been sent to the correspondence department of the remand centre and that the contested decision was lawful and justified because it had been “founded on the findings of a complete, comprehensive and objective inquiry into the accused's allegations”. The District Court did not refer to the applicant's factual submissions or medical evidence. 27. The applicant filed an appeal. He asked the Regional Court to obtain the attendance of his counsel Mr R. during the examination of the appeal. 28. On 26 January 2005 the Tula Regional Court upheld, in summary fashion, the District Court's judgment. The applicant was neither present nor represented at the appeal hearing. 29. On 19 July 2005 the Uzlovaya Town Court convicted the applicant and his co-defendants of four robberies and sentenced him to ten years' imprisonment. On 25 January 2006 the Tula Regional Court upheld the conviction on appeal.

5. The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Rome. 6. A.C., the applicant's aunt, was the owner of a flat in Rome, which she had let to C.R. 7. In a registered letter of 10 May 1985, A.C. informed the tenant that she intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 30 April 1986 and asked her to vacate the premises by that date. 8. In a writ served on the tenant on 10 July 1985, A.C. reiterated her intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Rome Magistrate. 9. By a decision of 14 November 1985, which was made enforceable on the same day, the Rome Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 May 1986. 10. On 29 May 1986, A.C. served notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises. 11. On 24 July 1986, she informed the tenant that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 5 August 1986. 12. Between 5 August 1986 and 20 November 1998, the bailiff made thirty-six attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as A.C. was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 13. In the meanwhile, on 9 November 1998, A.C. died and her nephew, the applicant, inherited the apartment. 14. On 22 July 1999, pursuant to Law no. 431/98, the tenant asked for a suspension of the enforcement proceedings. 15. After that, on an unspecified day of 1999, the applicant became party to the national proceedings. 16. The enforcement proceedings were suspended first until 30 May 2000 and then until 16 November 2000. 17. On 30 January 2001, the tenant spontaneously left the premises and the applicant recovered possession of the flat.

10. The applicant is a French national who was born in 1990 and lives in France. 11. In the applicant’s submission, she is a devout Muslim and she wears the burqa and niqab in accordance with her religious faith, culture and personal convictions. According to her explanation, the burqa is a full-body covering including a mesh over the face, and the niqab is a full-face veil leaving an opening only for the eyes. The applicant emphasised that neither her husband nor any other member of her family put pressure on her to dress in this manner. 12. The applicant added that she wore the niqab in public and in private, but not systematically: she might not wear it, for example, when she visited the doctor, when meeting friends in a public place, or when she wanted to socialise in public. She was thus content not to wear the niqab in public places at all times but wished to be able to wear it when she chose to do so, depending in particular on her spiritual feelings. There were certain times (for example, during religious events such as Ramadan) when she believed that she ought to wear it in public in order to express her religious, personal and cultural faith. Her aim was not to annoy others but to feel at inner peace with herself. 13. The applicant did not claim that she should be able to keep the niqab on when undergoing a security check, at the bank or in airports, and she agreed to show her face when requested to do so for necessary identity checks. 14. Since 11 April 2011, the date of entry into force of Law no. 2010‑1192 of 11 October 2010 throughout France, it has been prohibited for anyone to conceal their face in public places.

4. The applicant was born in 1941 and lives in the city of Kyiv, Ukraine. 5. On 23 August 1996 the applicant instituted proceedings against his former employer, the State Institute for Electric Welding, in the Leningradsky District Court of Kyiv (“the District Court”) challenging his dismissal and claiming payment of salary arrears and compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 6. In the period from August 1996 to 25 February 1998 the applicant's case was considered by the courts at two levels of jurisdiction. 7. The last hearing in 1998 was held by the District Court on 25 February 1998. Then the case file was lost. On 31 May 2000 the District Court resumed the proceedings. 8. On 9 June 2000 the District Court ordered reconstruction of the case file. 9. On 26 July 2001 the District Court partly allowed the applicant's claims. 10. On 14 March 2002 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal quashed that judgment and remitted the case to the first-instance court for fresh consideration. 11. On 17 October 2002 the District Court partly allowed the applicant's claims. 12. On 23 January 2003 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of 17 October 2002 and found against the applicant. 13. On 15 April 2003 the Supreme Court gave a final decision in the applicant's case by which it dismissed his appeal in cassation. 14. The applicant tried to review his case under extraordinary procedure, but his efforts were to no avail. 15. In March 2005 the applicant instituted proceedings against the President of the State Institute for Electric Welding in the Svyatoshin District Court of Kyiv challenging the orders issued by his former employer under which he had been dismissed. On 31 March 2005 the court declined to consider his claims on the ground that the same claim had already been considered by the domestic courts and there had been a final decision in that respect. 16. On 12 May 2005 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal upheld this ruling. 17. According to the applicant's submissions, in June 2005 he lodged an appeal in cassation against the rulings of 31 March 2005 and 12 May 2005 with the Supreme Court. The applicant did not inform this Court about the outcome of the cassation proceedings.

5. The first applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Helsinki. The applicant company has its seat in Helsinki. 6. The applicants, a publisher and a publishing company, wrote and published, together with the former girlfriend of the Prime Minister at the time, an autobiographical book about her relationship with the Prime Minister. The book described a period of nine months in their lives from the point of view of the girlfriend, a single mother. The Prime Minister had earlier divorced his wife. The book described the dating couple’s life and their intimate interaction. The book was published on 19 February 2007. The Prime Minister held office from June 2003 to June 2010 when he stepped down. 7. On 5 October 2007 the public prosecutor brought charges under Chapter 24, section 8, of the Penal Code against the first applicant and the girlfriend for having disclosed information about the Prime Minister’s private life (yksityiselämää loukkaavan tiedon levittäminen, spridande av information som kränker privatlivet). He also requested that the proceeds of the crime received by the applicant company be ordered forfeit to the State in accordance with Chapter 10, section 2, of the Penal Code. The Prime Minister concurred with the charges brought by the public prosecutor against the first applicant. He also pursued a compensation claim against the first applicant which was joined to the criminal charges. The girlfriend has lodged a separate application with the Court (see Ruusunen v. Finland, no. 73579/10). 8. On 15 February 2008 the book was withdrawn from sale. 9. On 5 March 2008 the Helsinki District Court (käräjäoikeus, tingsrätten), after having voted, dismissed the charges against the first applicant and rejected the request that the proceeds of the crime received by the applicant company be ordered forfeit to the State. It found that the book disclosed a lot of information about the Prime Minister’s private life but that he had already widely disclosed information about his family and habits as well as about his relationship with the girlfriend. Even though he himself had published an autobiography in 2005, had given several interviews, ran a blog and even permitted photographs to be taken at his home, he was known as a politician who strictly controlled his public image. The book also contained some information which had not previously been disclosed to the public. In this respect the court found that these new details only completed the information the Prime Minister had disclosed earlier. It was never suggested that the facts disclosed were not true. The book covered a period of nine months in the girlfriend’s and the Prime Minister’s private life. The court found that the girlfriend had the right to recount her private life. She also described the Prime Minister, his actions and family in a compassionate manner. The court found that, even though the information disclosed in the book had no direct relevance to the Prime Minister’s political functions or his hierarchical position in the State, it had relevance as far as the Prime Minister’s person was concerned. The Constitution required that ministers were “known to be honest and competent”. Moreover, the book described a situation in which two different realities of present day Finnish society met: a wealthy party leader and Prime Minister on the one hand, and a single mother with everyday money problems on the other hand. The court found that the fact that the girlfriend was writing about her life and her relationship with one of the highest authorities in the country did not restrict but in fact widened her freedom of expression. When weighing the freedom of expression against the protection of private life, the court found that the need to resort to criminal liability decreased when the disclosed information became more widely known. Criminal liability was the last resort in guiding human behaviour and its use had to be proportionate. The court could therefore not hold that the publication of the applicants’ book was a criminal act. Moreover, as the first applicant had obtained an opinion from a lawyer before publishing the book, he could not be regarded as having acted with intent and could not therefore be considered as a perpetrator. 10. By letter dated 18 April 2008 the public prosecutor appealed to the Helsinki Appeal Court (hovioikeus, hovrätten). The Prime Minister also appealed. 11. On 10 February 2009 the Helsinki Appeal Court convicted the first applicant for disseminating information violating personal privacy and sentenced him to 60 day-fines, in total 840 euros. He was ordered to pay the Prime Minister 1,000 euros plus interest for non-pecuniary damage and 9,344 euros plus interest for his costs and expenses before the District Court and the Appeal Court. The proceeds of the crime, 4,260 euros, were ordered forfeit to the State. The applicant company was to receive 4,000 euros as compensation for its costs and expenses before the District Court. The court found that the passages in the book concerning the Prime Minister’s intimate dating and his children’s feelings and behaviour unnecessarily violated the core areas of his protected private life. He had not previously disclosed these details of his private life in the media. The fact that he had disclosed some parts of his private life, the protection of which was, due to his status, much narrower than a private person’s, did not mean that he could not benefit at all from any protection of his private life. He had thus not waived his right to the protection of private life, nor implicitly consented to the disclosure of information concerning details of his private life. Even though the girlfriend had the right to write about her private life, disclosure of intimate details of another person’s private life always required his or her consent. The aim of the applicants’ book had been to discuss matters of private life and it had no relevance to the Prime Minister’s political functions or his hierarchical position in the State. Nor had it any relevance to the assessment of his personal qualities, such as any lack of honesty and judgment, as the relationship fell within the core areas of his private life and had no relevance to his position as Prime Minister. Moreover, the first applicant could be held as a perpetrator even though he had obtained a legal opinion about the book before its publication. His acts had been intentional. 12. By letter dated 14 April 2009 the applicants appealed to the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen), requesting that the court establish a precedent in the case as the court had not yet in its case-law assessed freedom of expression in the context of an autobiography. 13. On 11 June 2009 the Supreme Court granted the applicants leave to appeal. 14. On 16 June 2010 the Supreme Court, after having held an oral hearing, upheld the Appeal Court’s conviction but quashed the forfeiture in respect of the first applicant and reduced the costs and expenses to be paid to the Prime Minister for the proceedings before the District Court and the Appeal Court to 6,000 euros plus interest. The first applicant was ordered to pay the Prime Minister 4,500 euros plus interest for his costs and expenses before the Supreme Court. The applicant company was to receive 2,000 euros as compensation for its costs and expenses before that court. In particular, by referring extensively to the Court’s case-law, the Supreme Court gave a more narrow scope to the Prime Minister’s private life than the Appeal Court. The court found that information about the Prime Minister’s sex life and intimate events and his children’s feelings and behaviour had not been disclosed to the public before. The fact that some details of his private life had been disclosed before did not mean that they could not fall within the scope of criminal liability under Chapter 24, section 8, of the Penal Code. The Prime Minister had not waived his right to protection of private life in these respects, nor had he given his consent to their publication by consenting to the use of his photograph on the cover of the book. The court considered, contrary to the Appeal Court, that the information about how and when the Prime Minister had met the girlfriend and how quickly their relationship had developed had had relevance to general public discussion as these issues had raised the question of whether in this respect he had been dishonest and lacked judgment. Also the information concerning the great differences in the standard of living between the girlfriend and the Prime Minister, his lifestyle, the data protection concerns and the protection of the highest political authorities in general had had relevance to general public discussion. The court found also that disclosure of information about the Prime Minister’s children was not conducive to causing him damage, suffering and contempt as the girlfriend had only given her own interpretation of the children’s attitudes. However, the only references which, according to the court, had illegally disclosed information about the Prime Minister’s private life were the information and hints about the sex life and intimate events between the girlfriend and the Prime Minister. The court enumerated in particular seven parts of the book which contained information about the start of the sex life in the beginning of their relationship, descriptions of their brief and passionate intimate moments as well as giving massages to each other, and accounts of their sexual intercourse. The court found that such information and hints fell within the core area of private life and their unauthorised publication was conducive of causing the Prime Minister suffering and contempt. It was thus necessary to restrict the applicants’ freedom of expression in this respect in order to protect the Prime Minister’s private life.

5. The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Cantemir. 6. On 3 March 2008 the Cantemir District Court found the applicant guilty of unlawfully appropriating money (1,400 Moldovan lei (MDL)) collected by her community to fund certain celebrations. She was ordered to pay a fine of 600 conventional units (each such unit being equal to MDL 20; overall MDL 12,000 (approximately 775 euros (EUR) at the time) and was barred from holding public office for two years and a half. 7. On 7 July 2008 the Cahul Court of Appeal partly upheld that judgment, relying on a different paragraph of the Criminal Code, but preserving the sentence. That judgment was upheld by the Supreme Court of Justice in a final judgment of 26 November 2008. 8. The applicant asked for an extension of the payment period as she did not have the money, being a single mother with an underage child and, at that time, experiencing difficulties with a pregnancy, for which she received hospital treatment during the period between 1 September 2008 and 3 February 2009. The court accepted her request and allowed her a two-month extension. However, the applicant failed to pay the fine by this new deadline. 9. On 20 February 2009 a bailiff from the Cantemir enforcement office asked the Cantemir District Court to replace the fine with detention owing to the applicant’s failure to pay. The applicant, who was not represented by a lawyer, asked the court to replace the fine with unpaid community service stating that she would try to pay the fine before the end of the year. On the same day the court accepted the bailiff’s request and ordered the applicant’s detention for twelve months (one month for every 50 conventional units - see paragraph 14 below), noting that the law prohibited imposing a community service order on pregnant women such as the applicant. 10. The applicant was arrested on the same day and imprisoned. According to her submission, her underage child was left at home without supervision. On 21 February 2009 her lawyer appealed against the sentence. 11. On 12 March 2009 the Cahul Court of Appeal accepted the lawyer’s appeal and quashed the lower court’s decision, sending the case for retrial by the Cantemir District Court. It found that the applicant had not been given legal representation during the hearing of 20 February 2009, even though that right was guaranteed by law and she had expressly requested it. Therefore, the lower court had “committed a serious violation of the rules of criminal procedure, which is the basis for annulling the decision ...”. The court noted in the operative part of its decision, inter alia, that the applicant was to continue being kept in detention. 12. On 25 March 2009 the applicant’s lawyer lodged a request with the Cantemir District Court for an urgent examination of the case, stating that the fine had been paid in full on 12 March 2009 and enclosing a payment order as proof. He claimed that his client was therefore being detained illegally. 13. On 31 March 2009 the Cantemir District Court accepted the applicant’s lawyer’s request and discontinued the proceedings initiated by the bailiff. The applicant was released on that day.

6. The applicant was born in 1932 and lives in Ożarów Mazowiecki, Poland. 7. Since 1969 the applicant had been receiving a monthly pension from the State Insurance Company (Państwowy Zakład Ubezpieczeń). It appears that in 1987 the company stopped the payments. 8. On 10 May 1993 the applicant lodged with the Pruszków District Court (Sąd Rejonowy w Pruszkowie) an action for payment against the State Insurance Company. The applicant also requested a revaluation of the amount of the pension which would reflect the inflation. 9. It appears that the first and the second hearing, scheduled for 24 May and 2 June 1993, were adjourned because of the absence of the defendant. 10. From 9 September 1993 to 26 February 2001 the District Court listed twenty-three hearings. Most of them were adjourned. It also obtained four expert opinions. 11. On 12 March 2001 the Pruszków District Court gave judgment. It partly allowed the applicant’s claim and increased the amount of his pension. 12. On 6 December 2001, on the applicant’s appeal, the Warsaw Regional Court upheld that judgment.

4. The applicant was born in 1980 and is currently detained in Simferopol pre-trial detention centre (the “Simferopol SIZO”) awaiting his extradition to Belarus. 5. The applicant has already been convicted twice in Belarus for drug-related offences. The second time, in 2004, he was sentenced to four years' and three months' imprisonment. After having served part of his sentence, he was granted early release. 6. On 1 April 2006 the Sovetskyy District Police Department of Minsk instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant on suspicion that he had illegally purchased a psychotropic substance (Section 328 § 1 of the Belarus Criminal Code). 7. On 12 June 2006 the Belarus authorities issued an international arrest warrant for the applicant. 8. On 29 September 2008 the Head of the Sovetskyy District Police Department of Minsk sent a request to the Crimea Police Department for the applicant to be arrested and detained pending extradition to Belarus. 9. On the same day the applicant was arrested by officers of the Zheleznodorozhnyy District Police Department of Simferopol. 10. On 30 September 2008 the Zheleznodorozhnyy District Court of Simferopol (the “District Court”) ordered the applicant's detention for forty days pending his extradition to Belarus. 11. On 17 October 2008 the Deputy General Prosecutor of Belarus requested the General Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine to extradite the applicant to Belarus. The request contained the following assurances: that the applicant would not be prosecuted for a crime committed prior to extradition without the consent of the General Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine; that he would not be removed to a third country without the consent of the General Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine; that he would not be subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; that after the termination of the criminal proceedings or after serving his sentence, if one was imposed, the applicant would be free to leave Belarus; and that the applicant would not be prosecuted for political, racial, religious or ethnic reasons. 12. On 26 October 2008, during a meeting with his lawyer, the applicant signed a power of attorney for the purpose of bringing his case to the Court. 13. On 28 October 2008 the applicant was questioned by the assistant prosecutor of the Zheleznodorozhnyy Prosecutor's Office as to whether he or his lawyers had made any claims or complaints to the State authorities or institutions alleging violation of his rights and freedoms. The applicant replied that his lawyer had told him to ask for an authority form and explained that he would be further defended by the Kharkiv group of lawyers, which intended to lodge a complaint with the “European Commission on Human Rights”. He said that he had signed no other documents and made no complaints or petitions to any other institutions. If his lawyers had done so, he would learn about it later. The minutes of this interview also mentioned that the applicant was informed of his right to remain silent under Article 63 of the Constitution. 14. On the same date, 28 October 2008, the President of the Chamber indicated to the Ukrainian Government, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, that they should not extradite the applicant to Belarus. 15. On 7 November 2008 the General Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine informed the Government's Agent that no decision on the applicant's extradition would be taken prior to the examination of his case by the Court. 16. The same day the District Court ordered the applicant to be detained pending his extradition to Belarus, without indicating any time-limit for such detention. 17. On 20 November the Crimea Court of Appeal upheld the decision of 7 November 2008, stating that the applicant had been lawfully detained pending his extradition. 18. On 26 December 2008 the District Court rejected the applicant's lawyer's request to change the preventive measure in respect of his client. The applicant appealed against this decision. By letter of 16 January 2009, the Deputy President of the Crimea Court of Appeal replied to the applicant that the appellate court had previously examined his appeal concerning lawfulness of detention and would not examine the same issue again. The applicant is still in detention.

6. The applicant was born in 1974. According to the latest information available to the Court, he lives in Istanbul. 7. The applicant arrived in Turkey in 2006. The parties are in dispute as to whether he entered the country legally at the time. 8. On 4 or 6 November 2009 the applicant was apprehended in Edirne while trying to flee to Greece illegally. Following brief periods of detention at İpsala Gendarmerie Command and Tunca Foreigners’ Admission and Accommodation Centre (“Tunca Accommodation Centre”), he was transferred to Gaziosmanpaşa Foreigners’ Admission and Accommodation Centre (“Gaziosmanpaşa Accommodation Centre”) in Kırklareli, with a view to being deported. The exact date of his transfer is unknown to the Court; while the applicant claimed that he had been transferred on 9 November 2009, the Government maintained that the transfer had taken place on 11 November 2009 without, however, presenting any documents in support of their submission. 9. It appears that throughout his stay at Gaziosmanpaşa Accommodation Centre, the applicant made numerous attempts to seek asylum, all of which were allegedly ignored by the national authorities, until he was able to get in touch with a lawyer. On 27 July 2010 he lodged a new asylum request through his lawyer, which was admitted by the domestic authorities for processing. 10. On 1 September 2010 the lawyer requested the applicant’s immediate release from Gaziosmanpaşa Accommodation Centre in two separate letters sent to the Kırklareli Governor’s Office and the Ministry of the Interior, claiming thqsat his detention in prison-like conditions had no basis in domestic law and also contravened Article 5 of the Convention. 11. On 24 September 2010 the applicant was granted asylum seeker status by the Ministry of the Interior, along with a temporary residence permit in Kırklareli, valid until the completion of the asylum procedure. 12. On 27 September 2010 he was released from Gaziosmanpaşa Accommodation Centre. 13. Following his release, on 30 September 2010 the applicant went to Istanbul instead of staying in Kırklareli as ordered. On 1 October 2010 he was arrested on suspicion of attempted burglary and placed in police custody at Şehit Tevfik Fikret Erciyes district police station in Fatih, Istanbul (“Fatih police station”). On the same day, he was interrogated by the Fatih public prosecutor and the Fatih Magistrates’ Court, which ordered his release. The relevant decision was not made available to the Court. 14. Despite the court order for his release, the applicant was taken back to Fatih police station, where he was placed in a holding cell in the basement. 15. On 4 October 2010 the applicant’s lawyer visited him at the station and requested his release. He was, however, informed that this would not be possible as there was an order for his deportation. 16. On 7 October 2010 his lawyer went to Fatih police station once again, to visit the applicant and to inspect the conditions of his detention. According to the lawyer’s notes, there were two cells with iron bars in the basement of the station where the applicant was being held, both of which measured approximately 2 x 4 m. On the day of his visit, the applicant was sharing a cell with approximately ten other foreigners, all of whom were sitting on the floor with their backs against the wall and sharing three blankets between them. There were similarly ten to twelve people in the other cell. There was a small vent in the wall measuring approximately 30 x 50 cm, which let in very little light. There was also a pile of rubbish outside it. During their meeting, the applicant also gave a detailed account of his detention conditions, which the lawyer noted as follows. The number of detainees in the cell varied between seven and fifteen. There were no beds, and there was no room for more than three people to lie down at the same time. They were only provided with three blankets and four small pillows to share, and there was no heating. The cell, which also lacked natural light and sufficient ventilation, was always cold and there was no provision for outdoor exercise. The food provided was also insufficient; they had to pay to receive more. It appears that the lawyer brought the applicant and some of the other detainees sandwiches after the meeting, as they had complained of being hungry. 17. On 9 October 2010 the applicant was transferred to Kumkapı Removal Centre pending his deportation, apparently because the basement of Fatih police station was flooded. 18. On 12 October 2010 Fatih police station was inspected by the Fatih public prosecutor, who found the detention facility to be in compliance with the standards set out in the relevant regulations without, however, going into any details about the specific conditions in his brief report. 19. On 19 October 2010 the applicant was conditionally released from Kumkapı Removal Centre and instructed to go to Kırklareli, after it became apparent that he had already been granted a temporary permit to reside there in September 2010. 20. It appears that following his release from Kumkapı Removal Centre, the applicant went to Edirne instead of going to Kırklareli as instructed. On 12 November 2010 he was apprehended in Edirne close to the Greek border while attempting to flee to Greece once again. He was placed back in Gaziosmanpaşa Accommodation Centre. 21. During a headcount conducted on 1 December 2010, officers at Gaziosmanpaşa Accommodation Centre noticed that the applicant was intoxicated and behaving rowdily. He was therefore separated from the other detainees and escorted to the management office. According to the Government, as one of the officers was unlocking the door to the management office, the applicant collapsed unexpectedly in the corridor and hit his face on a radiator. The impact caused heavy bleeding in his left eye, and he started throwing up, in a semi-conscious state. According to the applicant, however, he did not fall but was forcefully pushed by one of the officers against the radiator and was severely beaten up once he landed on the floor. 22. The applicant was then taken to the Kırklareli State Hospital, where it appears he was diagnosed with alcohol poisoning. Following some initial medical treatment, on 3 December 2010 he was admitted to the ophthalmology department of the Trakya University Hospital, where he underwent an operation on his left eye, as well as various related treatments. He was discharged on 23 December 2010. The medical report drawn up on the day of his discharge indicated that he had been admitted to the ophthalmology department with symptoms of pain, reduced vision and exophthalmos in the left eye, which he had stated had been caused by a blow to his eye. He was diagnosed with widespread corneal erosion and a retrobulbar haemorrhage. He was also found to have an orbital floor fracture caused by the blunt trauma to his eye, for which he underwent an operation. 23. In the meantime, the Kırklareli public prosecutor had initiated an investigation into the incident of 1 December 2010 of his own motion. According to the documents in the case file, on 2 December 2010 he took a statement from a caretaker working at Gaziosmanpaşa Accommodation Centre, who had witnessed the applicant suddenly collapse while the two officers escorting him had been unlocking the door. 24. Moreover, on an unspecified date, the police took a statement from the applicant in hospital, who at the time alleged that he had lost his balance because he had been pushed by an officer. 25. Following his discharge from hospital, the applicant was taken to Şehit Hayrettin Yeşin police station in Kırklareli on 23 December 2010 to give a statement, in the presence of his lawyer, regarding the injury he had sustained on 1 December 2010. The applicant stated that he had no complaints of ill-treatment and that he had lost his balance and fallen over because he had been intoxicated at the time. He was subsequently told he was free to leave, but was ordered to stay in Kırklareli in accordance with his residence permit. 26. On 21 January 2011 the Kırklareli public prosecutor decided not to bring any charges in relation to the applicant’s injury in the light of his statement of 23 December 2010. 27. In the meantime, the applicant went to Istanbul after being released from detention on 23 December 2010, despite being specifically ordered to remain in Kırklareli. On 28 December 2010 he lodged a criminal complaint with the Fatih public prosecutor against the police officers who had allegedly ill‑treated him at Gaziosmanpaşa Accommodation Centre. He argued, in particular, that following the headcount on the evening of 1 December 2010 he had been taken to the management office, where one of the officers had grabbed him by the collar and tossed him against the wall, as a result of which he had hit his eye on the radiator and passed out. He claimed that he had not told the truth at Şehit Hayrettin Yeşin police station, as he had been warned by an officer that his detention would be prolonged if he pressed charges. 28. When the public prosecutor subsequently summoned him to make a statement, the applicant stated that he had previously misrepresented the facts as he had been scared, without giving any more details as to why. He added that he had also been severely beaten up by the officers after he had collapsed onto the floor, and admitted that he had been drinking kolonya (citrus cologne), mixed with a soft drink, prior to the incident. 29. On 31 January 2011 the Fatih public prosecutor issued a decision to the effect that he had no jurisdiction (görevsizlik kararı) in respect of the applicant’s complaints, and referred the matter to the Kırklareli public prosecutor. 30. On 8 April 2011 the Kırklareli public prosecutor took statements from two of the suspected police officers and three witnesses, also police officers. The two suspects denied the applicant’s allegation that they had attacked him. All of the witnesses corroborated that the applicant had been very drunk on the relevant day, and one of them, who had been at the scene of the incident, stated that the applicant had fallen over without anyone having pushed him. 31. On 9 September 2011 the Kırklareli public prosecutor issued a decision not to prosecute because of insufficient evidence. Referring to the inconsistency between the applicant’s statements, the public prosecutor stressed that although the applicant had stated that he had been scared to tell the truth at Şehit Hayrettin Yeşin police station on 23 December 2010, there had been no reason for him to be scared, particularly because he had made his statement in the presence of his lawyer. 32. The applicant did not object to the decision of the Kırklareli public prosecutor, despite being entitled to do so before the Edirne Assize Court. 33. On 18 May 2011 the applicant’s request for asylum was rejected by the Ministry of the Interior, as he had failed to comply with the requirements to be granted asylum seeker status as set out in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (“the Geneva Convention”) and the Turkish Asylum Regulation.

7. The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in St Petersburg. 8. In February 1995 the applicant, a former naval officer, joined an environmental project conducted by Bellona, a Norwegian non-governmental organisation, to work on a report entitled “The Russian Northern Fleet – Sources of Radioactive Contamination” (“the report”). 9. On 5 October 1995 Bellona’s Murmansk office was searched by the Federal Security Service (ФСБ РФ – “the FSB”). The FSB seized the draft report, interrogated the applicant and instituted criminal proceedings on suspicion of treason, since the draft report allegedly contained information, classified as officially secret, concerning accidents on Russian nuclear submarines. 10. On 20 October 1998 the applicant’s trial on a charge of treason through espionage and a charge of aggravated disclosure of an official secret began before St Petersburg City Court. After four days of hearings, the case was remitted for further investigation on 29 October 1998. The court considered that the indictment was vague, which impaired the applicant’s defence and prevented the court from carrying out an examination on the merits. It also found that the investigation file left open the question whether the report contained any official secrets as such, and that it did not contain a “proper and complete” expert evaluation of possible public sources of the information in question or of the estimated damage. The court ordered the prosecution to conduct an additional expert examination into the possibility that the applicant had obtained the disputed information from public sources and to take other steps to complete the investigation. 11. On 3 November 1998 the prosecution appealed against this decision, claiming that the case was clear enough for determination by a court and that there was no need for further investigation. 12. On 4 February 1999 the order for further investigation was upheld by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (“the Supreme Court”). 13. On 23 November 1999 the St Petersburg City Court resumed the applicant’s trial on the same charges. 14. On 29 December 1999 the St Petersburg City Court acquitted the applicant on all the charges, having found that the applicant had been prosecuted on the basis of secret and retroactive decrees. 15. The prosecution appealed. 16. On 17 April 2000 the Supreme Court upheld the acquittal. The court found that the charges were based on secret and retroactive decrees which were incompatible with the Constitution. The acquittal thus became final. 17. On 30 May 2000 the Procurator General filed a request with the Presidium of the Supreme Court to review the case in supervisory proceedings (протест на приговор, вступивший в законную силу). He challenged the judgment on the grounds of wrongful application of the law governing official secrets, the vagueness of the indictment – which had led to procedural prejudice against the applicant – and other defects in the criminal investigation, in particular the lack of an expert report as to whether the disputed information had originated from public sources. He called for a reassessment of the applicable law and of the facts and evidence in the case file, and for the case’s remittal for fresh investigation. 18. On 13 September 2000 the Presidium of the Supreme Court dismissed the Procurator General’s request and upheld the acquittal. While it acknowledged that the investigation had been tainted with flaws and shortcomings, it found that the prosecution could not rely on them in calling for a remittal, as it had been entirely within the prosecution’s control to redress them at an earlier stage in the proceedings. Moreover, the Presidium pointed out that the investigation authority had earlier been required to remedy exactly the same defects as those relied on in the request to quash the acquittal. It observed that on 29 October 1998 the court had expressly instructed the investigating authority, inter alia, to conduct a study of information in the public domain in order to ascertain whether the applicant could have obtained the disputed data from public sources. 19. On 17 July 2002 the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation examined the applicant’s challenge to the laws which allowed supervisory review of a final acquittal. 20. In its ruling of the same date, the Constitutional Court declared incompatible with the Constitution the legislative provisions permitting the re-examination and quashing of an acquittal on the grounds of a prejudicial or incomplete investigation or court hearing or on the ground of inaccurate assessment of the facts of the case, save in cases where new evidence had emerged or there had been a fundamental defect in the previous proceedings. 21. The Constitutional Court’s judgment stated, inter alia: “... Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention provides that the right not to be tried or punished twice does not prevent the reopening of the case in accordance with the law and criminal procedure of the State concerned, if there is evidence of new or newly discovered facts, or if there has been a fundamental defect in the previous proceedings, which could affect the outcome of the case. It follows ... that, subject to the above requirements, the national legislation may provide for a system by which a case may be reopened and a final judgment be quashed, and may specify where, depending on the case, a procedure for reopening on the grounds of new or newly discovered evidence or a supervisory review should apply. Any exemption from the general prohibition on resuming proceedings to the detriment of the acquitted or convicted person may be justified only in exceptional circumstances, where a failure to rectify a miscarriage of justice would undermine the very essence of justice and the purpose of a verdict as a judicial act and would upset the required balance between the constitutionally protected values involved, including the rights and legitimate interests of convicted persons and those of the victims of crime. In the absence of any possibility of reversing a final judgment resulting from proceedings tainted by a fundamental defect that was crucial for the outcome of the case, an erroneous judgment of this type would continue to have effect notwithstanding the principle of general fairness ... and the principle of judicial protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. 3.2. Under the [Constitution and the Convention] any possibility provided for at national level of quashing a final judgment and reviewing a criminal case must be subject to strict conditions and criteria clearly defining the grounds for such review, given that the judgment concerned is already binding and determinative of the individual’s guilt and sentence. However, the grounds for review of final judgments provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure [of 1960] go beyond these limits. When establishing a procedure for the review of final convictions and, especially, acquittals ... definite grounds should have been formulated to ensure that such a procedure would be implemented with sufficient distinctness, precision and clarity to exclude its arbitrary application by the courts. In failing to do so, [the legislature] misapplied the criteria which derive from [the Constitution] and Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the quashing of final judgments in criminal cases ... Furthermore, [the power] of a supervisory instance to remit a case for fresh investigation where it concludes, through its own assessment of evidence, that the previous investigation has been prejudicial or incomplete, is incompatible with the constitutional principles of criminal procedure and with the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence, in that it gives the prosecution an unfair advantage by providing it with additional opportunities to establish guilt even after the relevant judgment has become operative. It follows that a court of supervisory instance cannot quash a final acquittal only on the ground of its being unfounded ... Accordingly, the prosecutor is not entitled to request the supervisory review of such a judgment on the ground that it is unfounded ...”

4. The applicants were born in 1972 and 1968 respectively. They were serving their prison sentences at Bergama prison at the time of the application. 5. The applicants were arrested and taken into police custody by police officers at the Anti-terror branch of the İzmir Security Directorate on 7 and 9 September 1996 respectively. 6. On 19 September 1996 the İzmir State Security Court ordered the applicants’ remand in custody. 7. On 22 October 1996 the public prosecutor at the İzmir State Security Court filed a bill of indictment with that court and accused the applicants and fifteen other suspects of membership in an illegal organisation, namely the TIKB (Turkish Revolutionary Communist Union - Türkiye İhtilalci Komünistler Birliği). He requested that the applicants be convicted and sentenced under Article 168 § 2 of the Criminal Code and Article 5 of Law no. 3713. 8. On 24 December 1997 the İzmir State Security Court convicted the applicants as charged and sentenced them to twelve years and six months’ imprisonment. 9. On 24 November 1998 the Court of Cassation held a hearing and upheld the judgment of the first-instance court.

4. The applicant was born in 1970 and is serving a sentence in Batman prison. 5. In April 2000 the applicant was taken into police custody on suspicion of being a member of Hizbullah, an illegal organisation. He claimed to have been arrested on 4 April 2000, whereas according to the arrest report he was taken into custody on 7 April 2000. His first medical examination upon his arrest was, however, carried out on 6 April 2000. 6. The examination was carried out by a doctor at the request of the police. According to the medical report issued in respect of the applicant, it was conducted prior to his detention in police custody. The report stated that there was old scar tissue measuring 3 cm on his upper right wrist. The doctor also noted that there were no signs of violence on the applicant’s body. 7. On 9 April 2000 a second medical report was drafted, according to which the scar tissue mentioned in the medical report of 6 April 2000 was 2.5 cm long. 8. On 10 April 2000 the applicant was questioned by the police without a lawyer being present. According to the document containing his statements to the police, he acknowledged being a member of Hizbullah. 9. On 11 April 2000, at the end of his detention in police custody, the applicant was once again examined by a doctor. According to the report, there were no signs of violence on his body. 10. On the same date the applicant was brought before the public prosecutor and, subsequently, a judge, who questioned him and recorded his statements. On both occasions he denied the veracity of his statements to the police, claiming that he had signed them under duress. The judge remanded him in custody. 11. On 3 May 2000 the public prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court filed an indictment against the applicant and a number of other individuals. They were charged with being members of Hizbullah under Article 168 of the former Criminal Code. 12. On 27 June 2000 the Diyarbakır State Security Court held the first hearing on the merits of the case, at which the applicant gave evidence. He maintained, inter alia, that while in police custody, he had been beaten and given electric shocks to his genitals. He also told the court that he had been taken into police custody on 6 April 2000. 13. On 2 July 2001 the applicant once again maintained before the first‑instance court that his statements to the police had been obtained under torture. 14. In 2004 State Security Courts were abolished. The case against the applicant was transferred to the Diyarbakır Assize Court. 15. On 11 October 2004 the applicant was released pending trial. 16. On 25 October 2005 the case against the applicant and his co‑accused was joined with another case brought against a number of other people charged with being members of Hizbullah. 17. Between 11 October 2004 and 13 February 2008 the applicant did not attend court, although during this period his lawyers attended some hearings on his behalf. 18. On 13 February 2008, during the final hearing in the case, the applicant’s lawyer contended that the court should not base its judgment on the applicant’s statements to the police, as they had been made under duress. 19. On the same day the Diyarbakır Assize Court convicted the applicant of being a member of an illegal organisation and sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment. The court noted that he had alleged that he had been tortured in police custody. It nevertheless based its judgment on the statements the applicant and a number of the other accused had made to the police, and documents found in the applicant’s house at the time of his arrest. 20. On 24 June 2009 the applicant’s lawyer lodged an appeal against the judgment of 13 February 2008, which did not refer to any of the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment while in police custody. 21. On 30 September 2009 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment. 22. On 1 December 2009 the applicant began serving his sentence. 23. On 25 October 2010 he filed a petition with the Batman public prosecutor’s office, requesting that an investigation be initiated into his ill‑treatment while in police custody in April 2000. 24. On 1 December 2010 the applicant gave statements to the Batman public prosecutor. He maintained that he had not been taken into police custody on 6 April but on 4 April 2000, and that he had been subjected to torture while detained. He requested that both the police officers on duty at the relevant time and the doctors who had issued the medical reports be prosecuted. 25. On an unspecified date the Batman public prosecutor requested the Diyarbakır branch of the Forensic Medical Institute to examine the applicant and provide an opinion as to whether his allegations of torture were well‑founded. 26. On 2 December 2010 a doctor from the Diyarbakır branch of the Forensic Medical Institute conducted the examination. The applicant told the medical expert that he had been hung by his wrists in police custody, and that they had been bruised at the material time. The doctor drafted a detailed report comparing the results of the three medical reports issued in April 2000 and containing his opinion. He considered that the term “old scar tissue” should not have been used in the reports issued in 2000, since such scars did not fade for a long time. In this connection, the doctor noted that he could not see any such scar when he examined the applicant in 2010. In sum, the doctor considered that had the scar observed during the medical examinations in 2000 been an “old scar”, it would still have been observed during the examination of 2010. He also noted that the reports issued in April 2000 had not described the type, colour or any other features of the scar. Lastly, he recommended that the applicant undergo an examination at the Forensic Medical Institute in Istanbul with a view to establishing whether he had been suffering any psychiatric problems as a result of the alleged torture. 27. On 28 November 2011 the Batman public prosecutor decided not to prosecute the officers on duty at the Batman police station at the relevant time or the three doctors who had issued the medical reports on 6, 9 and 11 April 2000. The public prosecutor noted that the statutory time-limit provided in Article 102 of the former Criminal Code (which had been in force in 2000 for prosecutions for torture) was ten years, and that the applicant had lodged his complaint after this time-limit had expired. It was accordingly concluded that the investigation was time‑barred. 28. On 19 December 2011 the applicant objected to that decision. 29. On 23 January 2012 the Midyat Assize Court dismissed his objection and the decision was upheld. 30. On 8 January 2001, while the applicant was in custody, his hip was broken while he was playing volleyball. He had surgery twice. 31. In medical reports dated 16 April, 24 May and 26 September 2002, doctors from the Dicle University Faculty of Medicine concluded that for him to make a full recovery, he would need to have a hip replacement. 32. On 23 December 2002 and 13 January 2003 the applicant filed petitions with the Batman public prosecutor, requesting immediate surgery and complaining of a delay in treatment. 33. On 6 February 2003 the applicant’s father submitted another petition to the Ministry of Justice requesting immediate intervention. 34. A prosthetic hip was implanted after four consecutive operations carried out on unspecified dates in 2003 or 2004. On 22 October 2004 the applicant was declared unfit for military service because of the prosthesis.

4. The applicants were born in 1964 and 1958 respectively. They live in the village of Mesker-Yurt, Shali District, in the Chechen Republic. 5. The first applicant was married to Mr Viskhadzhi Shatayevich Magamadov, born in 1962; they are the parents of five children. The second applicant was married to Mr Khaskhan[1] Shakhtamirovich Mezhiyev, born in 1963; they are the parents of three children. At the material time the two couples lived in neighbouring houses in Mesker-Yurt. 6. Between 13 and 14 November 2002 Khaskhan Mezhiyev stayed overnight at Viskhadzhi Magamadov’s home. The men slept in the main house. The first applicant, her children and her brother-in-law slept in an annexe to the Magamadovs’ family house. 7. At 5 a.m. on 14 November 2002 the first applicant woke up and heard the sound of gates opening. Shortly after that a group of unknown armed men entered her room. They wore camouflage uniforms and body armour; some of them wore masks. They did not identify themselves. The first applicant believed that they were servicemen of the Russian federal troops because they had Slavic features and spoke Russian without any accent. One of the servicemen shouted at the first applicant, using swearwords freely. The men examined the room where the first applicant, her children and brother-in-law slept and, having realised that there were no adult men in it, left. The first applicant looked out of the window and noticed in the courtyard about ten servicemen surrounding the main house. 8. In the meantime Viskhadzhi Magamadov, a practising Muslim, was performing his prayer in the main house. The servicemen entered his room and pushed him down to the floor. Then they forced Viskhadzhi Magamadov and Khaskhan Mezhiyev out to the courtyard and ordered them to run barefoot towards two armoured personnel carriers (“APCs”) parked nearby. The APCs’ registration numbers were covered with mud. 9. The first applicant tried to follow her husband but the servicemen blocked her way. Eventually she went out of the annexe to the courtyard. 10. The servicemen threw Viskhadzhi Magamadov and Khaskhan Mezhiyev on the ground and hit them with rifle butts. Then they put the two men into the APCs and drove away. 11. When the first applicant entered the main house, she discovered that there had been a search as there was a mess in the house and the floor was covered with scattered sugar. 12. The applicants have had no news of Viskhadzhi Magamadov and Khaskhan Mezhiyev since 14 November 2002. 13. The Government disagreed with the applicants’ account of events. They argued that the second applicant had not witnessed her husband’s abduction and concluded that it was doubtful that the kidnapping had taken place at all. 14. Shortly after the events of 14 November 2002 the applicants started to search for their husbands. They repeatedly contacted various official bodies, both in person and in writing, informing them that their husbands had been apprehended on the night of 13 to 14 November 2002 and trying to establish the whereabouts and fate of those missing. In particular, they applied to the prosecutors’ offices at different levels, the Ministry of the Interior of the Chechen Republic, the Plenipotentiary Representative of the Russian President in the Southern Federal Circuit, the Federal Security Service (“FSB”), the Russian Ombudsman and the Russian State Duma, describing in detail the circumstances of their husbands’ abduction. In their efforts the applicants were assisted by the SRJI. The official bodies forwarded the majority of the complaints to the prosecutors’ offices for investigation. 15. On 22 November 2002 the Shali district prosecutor’s office (“the district prosecutor’s office”) instituted an investigation into the disappearance of Viskhadzhi Magamadov and Khaskhan Mezhiyev under Article 126 § 2 of the Russian Criminal Code (aggravated kidnapping). The case file was given the number 59263. The decision read as follows: “At about 5 a.m. on 15 November 2002 unidentified armed men wearing camouflage uniforms [who had arrived] in two APCs surrounded the house at 28 Shkolnaya Street in the village of Mesker-Yurt and seized [Mr] Mezhiyev and [Mr] Magomadov. After that [Mr Mezhiyev and Mr Magomadov] were placed in the APCs and taken away in an unknown direction.” 16. On 22 January 2003 the district prosecutor’s office stayed the investigation in case no. 59263 for failure to identify those responsible. The second applicant was informed of the suspension by letter of 29 January 2003. 17. On 26 March 2003 the military prosecutor of military unit no. 20116 (“the unit prosecutor’s office”) informed the applicants that military personnel had not been implicated in Viskhadzhi Magamadov and Khaskhan Mezhiyev’s abduction. 18. On 6 April 2003 the applicants requested the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic and the district prosecutor’s office to resume the investigation and to admit them to the proceedings as victims. On 11 April 2003 the district prosecutor’s office replied that their application concerning the search for their husbands “apprehended by unidentified servicemen of law enforcement bodies of the Russian Federation” had been included in the investigation file in case no. 59263 and stated that the applicants would be informed of any progress in the investigation. 19. On 7 July 2003 the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic quashed the decision of 22 January 2003 on suspension of the investigation, reopened the proceedings in case no. 59263, ordered that the district prosecutor’s office take all requisite investigative measures to resolve the crime and informed the applicants accordingly. 20. On 15 July 2003 the Main Military Prosecutor’s Office forwarded the second applicant’s letter to the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic. 21. On 1 August 2003 the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic sent letters identical to the one of 7 July 2003 to each of the applicants. 22. On 4, 11 and 18 August 2003 the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic forwarded the second applicant’s letters to the district prosecutor’s office. 23. On 15 August 2003 the Department of the FSB of the Chechen Republic informed the first applicant that her husband had not been detained by FSB officers, that he had not been suspected of any crimes and that the FSB was taking the necessary steps to establish his whereabouts and to identify those responsible for his disappearance. 24. On 23 August 2003 the Ministry of the Interior of the Chechen Republic forwarded the second applicant’s letter to the Shali district department of the interior (“ROVD”) and ordered the facts complained of to be verified and procedural steps taken if necessary. 25. On 1 September 2003 the district prosecutor’s office informed the applicants that the investigation into their husbands’ kidnapping was in progress. 26. On 20 September 2003 the military prosecutor’s office of the United Group Alignment (“the UGA prosecutor’s office”) forwarded the first applicant’s complaint to the unit prosecutor’s office and ordered it to conduct an inquiry. 27. On 20 January 2004 the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic informed the applicants that “on 26 October 2003 the investigation in the criminal case [had been] suspended pursuant to Article 208 § 1 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure (due to failure to identify the alleged perpetrators)” and that “[o]n 20 October 2003 the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic [had] resumed the investigation and investigative measures aimed at identification of the perpetrators and establishment of [the applicants’] relatives whereabouts [were] being taken”. 28. On 14 February 2004 the district prosecutor’s office informed the first applicant that the investigation had been resumed on 2 February 2004 and that investigative measures were being taken. 29. On 28 April 2004 the district prosecutor’s office informed the first applicant that the investigation in case no. 59263 was under way. 30. On 20 May 2004 the UGA prosecutor’s office informed the unit prosecutor’s office that its letter of 20 September 2003 remained unanswered, forwarded a copy of the first applicant’s complaint for the second time and ordered an inquiry. 31. On 4 June 2004 the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic forwarded a complaint lodged on behalf of the second applicant by Civic Assistance, a regional NGO based in Moscow, to the district prosecutor’s office. 32. On 11 August 2004 the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic informed the second applicant that her complaint lodged with Civic Assistance had been included in the investigation file in case no. 59263 and that investigative measures were being taken to establish her husband’s whereabouts. 33. On 5 November 2004 the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic forwarded to the district prosecutor’s office a complaint lodged by the SRJI on behalf of the applicants for examination and requested that case no. 59263 be investigated more energetically. 34. On 6 July 2005 the unit prosecutor’s office informed the first applicant that they had no information on her husband’s whereabouts. 35. On 8 and 11 July 2005 the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic forwarded the first applicant’s requests for assistance in the search for her husband to the district prosecutor’s office. 36. On 22 August 2005 the district prosecutor’s office informed the second applicant that the investigation in case no. 59263 had been suspended on 2 March 2005. 37. On 27 August 2005 the UGA prosecutor’s office informed the second applicant that she should send her further queries to the district prosecutor’s office or to the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic. 38. On 15 September 2005 the district prosecutor’s office informed the first applicant that the investigation had been suspended. 39. On 8 November 2005 the SRJI requested an update on the progress in the investigation in case no. 59263 from the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic. In reply they were informed that the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic had resumed the investigation on 28 October 2005. 40. On 9 November 2005 the district prosecutor’s office informed the applicants that the investigation had been suspended on 30 October 2005. 41. On 19 January 2006 the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic informed the second applicant that she had been granted victim status and questioned on 22 November 2002 and that the investigation had been suspended. 42. On 15 November 2002 the second applicant complained to the district prosecutor’s office of her husband’s kidnapping by unknown men. 43. On 22 November 2002 the district prosecutor’s office instituted an investigation of Viskhadzhi Magamadov and Khaskhan Mezhiyev’s abduction under Article 126 § 2 of the Russian Criminal Code (aggravated kidnapping). The case file was assigned number 59263. On the same date the second applicant was granted victim status and questioned. She submitted that her husband had gone to his neighbour’s home and then been taken away by unidentified armed men in two APCs. 44. On 27 November 2002 the district prosecutor’s office sent requests for information to the ROVD, the department of the FSB of the Shali district, a military prosecutor’s office, the military commander of the Shali district, the information centre of the Ministry of the Interior of the Chechen Republic, the remand prisons in the Chechen Republic and operational and search bureau no. 2 (“ORB-2”). In reply they were informed that the police, the FSB and the military had not carried out any operations in respect of Viskhadzhi Magamadov and Khaskhan Mezhiyev, that the two men had not been arrested or detained and that the State agencies had no information on the whereabouts of the missing men. 45. On 10 December 2002 the district prosecutor’s office granted the first applicant victim status in case no. 59263 and questioned her. The first applicant submitted that her husband had been unemployed. In the evening of 14 November 2002 Khaskhan Mezhiyev had come to visit her husband. At about 5 a.m. on 15 November 2002 the first applicant had been awakened by noise coming from the courtyard and seen armed men in camouflage uniforms, some of whom had worn masks. The men had entered the house in which her husband and Khaskhan Mezhiyev had been sleeping, taken them outside and brought them to the APC. 46. On 22 January 2003 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify those responsible. 47. On 2 February 2004 the district prosecutor’s office resumed the investigation in case no. 59263 and informed the applicants accordingly. 48. At some point the investigation was suspended. It was resumed on 30 September 2005 and again suspended on 30 October 2005. 49. On 23 July 2006 the district prosecutor’s office refused to institute a criminal investigation into the first applicant’s allegations that the armed men who had kidnapped her husband had sprayed an unknown fluid in her face for the reason that the first applicant had sustained no bodily injuries. 50. The district prosecutor’s office questioned a number of witnesses. Neither the witnesses nor the victims alleged that Viskhadzhi Magamadov and Khaskhan Mezhiyev had been beaten at the time of their abduction. 51. The Government submitted that the investigating authorities had sent a number of queries to various State bodies and had taken other unspecified investigative measures. 52. The investigation failed to establish the whereabouts of Viskhadzhi Magamadov and Khaskhan Mezhiyev. The investigating authorities sent requests for information to the competent State agencies and took other steps to have the crime resolved. The investigation found no evidence to support the involvement of servicemen of the military or law enforcement agencies in the crime. 53. On 15 May 2007 the district prosecutor’s office resumed the investigation in case no. 59263 and informed the applicants accordingly. 54. The Government further submitted that the progress in the investigation was being supervised by the Prosecutor General’s Office. According to the Government, the applicants had been duly informed of all decisions taken during the investigation. 55. Despite specific requests by the Court the Government did not disclose most of the contents of the investigation file in case no. 59263, providing only copies of decisions to suspend and resume the investigation and to grant victim status, as well as of several consequent notifications to the relatives. Relying on the information obtained from the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Government stated that the investigation was in progress and that disclosure of the documents would be in violation of Article 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, since the file contained information of a military nature and personal data concerning the witnesses or other participants in the criminal proceedings.

5. The applicant, Mr Mykola Mykolayovych Pelevin, is a Ukrainian national who was born in Rostov-on-Don in 1938 and who currently resides in L'viv. 6. On 22 July 1999 a private dispute arose between the applicant and M.M.E. (a private person) over access to the attic of a building. As a result the applicant inflicted bodily injury on M.M.E. with an axe. 7. On 18 August 1999 M.M.E. instituted a private prosecution (приватне обвинувачення) against the applicant before the Zaliznychny District Court of L'viv and claimed compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 8. On 7 June 2000 the applicant sought to institute criminal proceedings against M.M.E. before the Zaliznychny District Court of L'viv for inflicting minor bodily injury. 9. On 13 July 2000 the Zaliznychny District Court of L'viv, in particular Judge U.P.F., instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant. He also decided that M.M.E. should be granted victim status in these proceedings. 10. On 9 June and 3 August 2000 and 27 April 2001 the applicant applied to the President of the Zaliznychny District Court of L'viv, seeking the withdrawal of Judge U.P.F. from his case. The applicant submitted, inter alia, that Judge U.P.F. had not allowed him to use the Russian language in court, in particular to put questions to witnesses. On 18 October 2000 and 27 April 2001 the President of the Zaliznychny District Court of L'viv dismissed the applicant's request as unsubstantiated. 11. On 18 May 2001 the Zaliznychny District Court of L'viv refused the applicant's request to institute criminal proceedings against M.M.E and his family members on suspicion of inflicting minor bodily injury on the applicant in May 2000. The applicant appealed against this decision. On 25 December 2001 the L'viv Regional Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeal. 12. On 21 June 2001 the Zaliznychny District Court of L'viv found the applicant guilty of inflicting minor bodily injury and of arbitrary behaviour in July 1999, sentenced him to an administrative fine and released him from criminal liability because of his advanced age, on the basis of the amnesty law in force at the time. It also ordered the applicant to pay M.M.E. compensation for non-pecuniary damage and legal costs in the amount of 2,406 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH). The court also acquitted M.M.E. of inflicting minor bodily injury on the applicant. The applicant was allowed to submit his oral plea to the court in Russian. According to the record of the court hearings, the applicant did not lodge a request for leave to use the Russian language, nor did he request the assistance of an interpreter. 13. The applicant lodged an appeal against the judgment of 21 June 2001. On 25 September 2001 the L'viv Regional Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeal as unsubstantiated. In the proceedings before the first-instance court and the court of appeal the applicant was assisted by a lawyer practising in L'viv (a licensed advocate). 14. On 16 March 2002 the applicant lodged an appeal in cassation with the Supreme Court. In his appeal the applicant relied on Articles 383 - 387 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which governed the examination of criminal cases within the ordinary cassation review proceedings. In his appeal he mentioned that he had not been able to participate effectively in the proceedings because he had not been allowed to use Russian while putting questions to the witnesses and had not been provided with the assistance of an interpreter. 15. On 9 April 2002 a judge of the Supreme Court V.S., by a letter and without taking any procedural decision, refused to institute extraordinary review proceedings (перегляд в порядку виключного провадження) in the applicant's case. 16. On 13 June 2003 the Supreme Court, on the decision of Judge K.M., assumed jurisdiction over the appeal in cassation and decided to institute cassation proceedings in the applicant's case. 17. On 31 July 2003 the Supreme Court examined the applicant's appeal in cassation on merits and dismissed it within the ordinary review proceedings. The Supreme Court held its hearing in the absence of the applicant and in the presence of the prosecutor and victim in the criminal case.

6. The applicant was born in 1958. He lived at the Baikonur space launch site in Kazakhstan which is rented by, and under the administration of, the Russian Federation and is under joint Kazakh-Russian jurisdiction. 7. From December 1983 to January 2004 the applicant served as a military officer in the Soviet (later Russian) Army at the Baikonur site. On 8 April 1986 he received security clearance and was granted access to information concerning rocket test launches, including the military unit responsible, launch parameters and test results, which were classified as top secret. 8. On 1 September 1999 the applicant signed a standard contract concerning access to State secrets, which provided in the relevant part as follows: “Pursuant to the State Secrets Act and other normative regulations concerning the protection of State secrets, of which I am aware, I take upon myself an obligation to keep confidential any information constitutive of State secrets and accept a temporary restriction on my rights which may affect: 9. By an order of 21 May 2004, the applicant retired from the military upon reaching the age limit. His service travel document was taken away from him and destroyed. 10. On 24 November 2004 the applicant asked the passports and visas service of the Baikonur police department to issue him with a travel passport (заграничный паспорт). 11. On 11 May 2005 the passports and visas service sent him a notice which stated that his right to leave the Russian Federation had been temporarily suspended until August 2009 “on the basis of recommendation no. 9/196 of 16 February 2005 and the decision of the command of military unit 11284”. According to the information submitted by the Government, the applicant was last exposed to secret information on 16 December 2003 and the restriction on his right to travel was due to expire on 16 December 2008. 12. The applicant complained to a court. He submitted that, lacking a travel document, he was unable to return to Russia from Kazakhstan or go to the Kaliningrad Region, which is the Russian exclave between Poland and Lithuania on the Baltic Sea. 13. On 24 May 2005 the Military Court of the 26th Garrison rejected the applicant's complaint. It found that the refusal to issue a travel passport had been lawful because the applicant had previously had knowledge of State secrets during his service in the military. Access to State secrets had not been granted to him against his will, and he had received a pay rise on that ground. Furthermore, the applicant did not need a travel document to return to Russia or to go to the Kaliningrad Region, his identity document (общегражданский паспорт) was sufficient for these purposes. 14. On 1 July 2005 the Third Circuit Military Court upheld, on an appeal by the applicant, the judgment of 24 May 2005. 15. The applicant sued the military commander of the Russian Space Forces, claiming that he should have received full title to his service flat on his retirement. 16. On 5 October 2004 the Military Court of the 26th Garrison dismissed the action as having no grounds in domestic law. On 10 December 2004 the Third Circuit Military Court upheld the judgment on appeal.

11. The applicant was born in 1944 and lives in Viareggio (in the province of Lucca). He is a judge. 12. At the time he lodged the application, he was acting president of the La Spezia District Court. On 23 November 1993, following an inquiry by the General Inspectorate for the Ministry of Justice, the Minister of Justice instituted disciplinary proceedings against the applicant on account of his membership of a Masonic lodge affiliated to the Grande Oriente d'Italia di Palazzo Giustiniani. The Minister accused him of having been a Freemason from 1981 until March 1993 and of having thereby breached Article 18 of Royal Legislative Decree no. 511 of 31 May 1946 (see paragraph 18 below). 13. In a decision of 10 October 1995, the disciplinary section of the National Council of the Judiciary (Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura) found that the applicant had committed the offences of which he was accused and gave him a reprimand (censura). It stated that from 1982 onwards it should have been possible to “have a clear idea of the loss of integrity resulting from membership of the Freemasons ... because of the degeneration brought about when a number of people came together within the P2 lodge with plans to take control of the public authorities and subvert democratic institutions, and because of the collusion of certain Masonic lodges with the Mafia and organised crime”. The disciplinary section added that the directives issued by the National Council of the Judiciary on 22 March 1990 and 14 July 1993 (see paragraphs 21 and 22 below), which emphasised – the second one in particular – the substantial conflict between membership of the Freemasons and membership of the judiciary, were to be seen in the context of such developments. The decision also stated that it was contrary to disciplinary rules for a judge to be a Freemason, for the following reasons: the incompatibility between the Masonic and judicial oaths, the hierarchical relationship between Freemasons, the “rejection” of State justice in favour of Masonic “justice” and, lastly, the indissoluble nature of the bond between Freemasons, even in the case of a member who wished to leave the organisation. The disciplinary section of the National Council of the Judiciary stated, lastly, that the applicant's alleged ignorance of the institutional debate on Freemasonry merely served to confirm the existence of conduct punishable under Article 18 of the 1946 Legislative Decree. In its opinion, such conduct was characterised by a lack of diligence, caution and wisdom in dealing with a situation that posed a threat to the values protected by that Article. 14. On 5 January 1996 the applicant appealed on points of law to the Court of Cassation. In the three grounds of his appeal he alleged a breach of Article 18 of the Constitution, challenged the arguments used in support of the finding that judicial office was incompatible with membership of the Freemasons, and complained that no reasons had been given for the conclusion that a judge would be discredited by belonging to the Freemasons. 15. On 2 February 1996 the Ministry of Justice lodged a cross-appeal. The Court of Cassation, sitting as a full court, examined the case on 19 September 1996 and, in a judgment of 20 December 1996, dismissed the applicant's appeal. It held, firstly, that the application of Article 18 of the Constitution was limited by the constitutional principles of the impartiality and independence of the judiciary, principles which should be taken to prevail over the right to freedom of association. The Court of Cassation further held that the disciplinary section of the National Council of the Judiciary had based its decision mainly on the directive of 14 July 1993 in which the Council had emphasised that judicial office was incompatible with membership of the Freemasons. 16. The applicant maintains that his career has been at a standstill since the disciplinary section's decision: he was declared unsuitable for a post as judge of the Court of Cassation; furthermore, the judicial council for his district stated that, because of the reprimand, it was unable to give an opinion on his suitability for a post as president of a district court. Lastly, the applicant states that he has been transferred to Sicily; however, he has not produced any evidence that that decision was linked to the sanction imposed on him.

7. The applicants were born in 1929, 1952, 1950 and 1949 respectively and live in the Nový Jičín region. 8. On 18 December 1991 the first applicant and her husband claimed restitution of their real property – a house with land – under the Land Ownership Act, alleging that in May 1985 they had been forced to sell it to the State, represented by the former Federal Ministry of National Defence (federální ministerstvo národní obrany), on terms that had been imposed on them. At the date of the entry into force of the Land Ownership Act, the property was managed by the Military Repair Enterprise (“the defendant”), the authority that was obliged to return the property to them, pursuant to section 5(1) and (2) of the Act. 9. The restitution claim was dealt with by the Nový Jičín Land Office (pozemkový úřad). 10. On 18 September 1992 the Nový Jičín Geodesy Centre (středisko geodézie) issued a survey plan in respect of the land. The plan was, however, found to be incomplete by the Land Office. 11. On 26 September 1993 the first applicant's husband died, and their three children joined the proceedings as his legal successors. In a medical report of 29 March 1994 it was stated that the premature death of the first applicant's husband was directly linked to an illness which had started after he had been forced to leave the house and to abandon his property. 12. On 22 February 1994 the Nový Jičín Land Registry (katastrální úřad) issued a new comparative plan of the land. Four other documents issued on 15 May, 3 June and 8 June 1994 were also included in the file. Two survey plans, issued at the request of the defendant and the Land Office, were produced on 11 November 1994 and 26 January 1995 respectively. 13. On 12 September 1995 the Land Office, having assessed the material in the file and having heard evidence from five witnesses who had been involved in the negotiations for the sale of the applicants' property, including Mr R., who was the defendant's lawyer, declared that the applicants were the owners of a major part of the property. It found that the contract of sale had been concluded under duress on strikingly unfavourable terms, within the meaning of section 6(1)(k) of the Land Ownership Act. 14. The Land Office established, among other things, that, contrary to the law then in force, the first applicant and her husband had not been considered parties to administrative proceedings which had resulted in the adoption of a decision on 20 March 1984 on the location of a construction site. It also established that the purchase price had been determined by an expert, in accordance with Decree no. 128/1984. 15. On 26 October 1995 the defendant, represented by Mr R., appealed against the administrative decision to the Ostrava Regional Court (krajský soud), which on 9 July 1996 carried out an inspection of the site. 16. In their observations on the defendant's appeal, the applicants challenged, inter alia, the statement by Mr R., who had legally represented the defendant in the past and was acting again as its lawyer in the restitution proceedings. 17. On 9 July 1996 a meeting took place at the site. 18. On 20 August 1996 the Regional Court quashed the decision and remitted the case to the Land Office for further consideration. It stated that the existence of grounds for restitution of the property under section 6(1)(k) of the Land Ownership Act had not been sufficiently established. 19. On 13 May 1997 the Land Office again decided, having taken into account further documentary evidence submitted by the first applicant and having re-examined two witnesses, that the applicants were the owners of the property. It examined in detail the circumstances of the sale of the property. It noted, inter alia, that the first applicant's husband had headed the defendant's personnel department and that the defendant had needed his property for the construction of a heating plant and, subsequently, a production unit. It further noted that the first applicant's husband had not been threatened with dismissal or the loss of his job in the event of his refusal to conclude the contract of sale. 20. Nevertheless, the Land Office held that the lengthy negotiations for the sale of the applicants' property or its expropriation, which had started in 1977, had seriously interfered with the lives of the first applicant and her husband, and that the circumstances in which these negotiations had been carried out had undoubtedly affected the health and mental state of the first applicant's husband. 21. The Land Office noted lastly that, according to the record of the negotiations dated 2 February 1977, the first applicant and her husband had agreed to the sale on condition that, inter alia, they would be provided with two three-room flats with garages, and that a one-room apartment in a day- care home would be placed at the disposal of the first applicant's mother. However, in addition to the price to be paid for the applicants' property – which could have been, but had not been, increased by 20% as allowed by Decree no. 128/1984 – the first applicant and her husband had been granted a two-room flat in 1983. Furthermore, a three-room apartment had been made available to their son. In addition, it was noted that the first applicant and her late husband had lived in the house for thirty-four years and that the benefit they had derived from the adjacent land, which they had used for agricultural purposes, had considerably improved the family's economic and social situation. 22. On 16 June 1997 the defendant appealed against that decision. On 1 August and 1 September 1997 respectively the applicants and their legal representative submitted their observations on the defendant's appeal. 23. On 10 April 1998 a bench of the Regional Court, after holding a hearing on 6 April 1998 and receiving the applicants' further comments concerning the case on 8 April 1998, quashed the administrative decision, finding that the Land Office had not proved to its satisfaction that the sale had been carried out under duress. The court considered that it was not necessary to examine whether the contract of sale had been concluded on terms unfavourable to the applicants. It held that, although the Land Office had reached its decision on the basis of the fully established and accurate facts of the case, it did not share its legal opinion. 24. The court noted that from the witnesses' statements and from the documentary evidence which it had supplemented by means of the report of 12 December 1985 on the professional activities of the first applicant's husband, the first proposal for the purchase of the applicants' property had been made in 1977 at a time when the defendant had needed part of the land for the construction of a heating plant. The court observed that on 2 February 1977 the owners had provisionally agreed to the sale and had imposed certain conditions which had to be satisfied before the construction work could be started. Moreover, they had stipulated that the sale had to be completed before the end of 1978. At that time, both the former owners were employed; the first applicant's husband was employed by the defendant in a senior post and was politically active. Their economic and social situation was such that it did not create a basis for a state of duress. Moreover, the negotiations carried out with a view to concluding the contract of sale had lasted eight years as a result of the owners' continuous disagreement as to the fulfilment of the conditions they had imposed and the purchase price, which had finally been increased by 86,000 Czech korunas (CZK) (2,867 euros (EUR)). 25. The court also noted that the purchaser had proved that it had made efforts to meet the owners' requirements when, for instance, it had urged that a telephone line be speedily installed in one of the new flats, had paid the telephone connection fees and had assigned the flats to them even before the contract of sale had been signed. The purchaser had only come up with the suggestion of expropriating the applicants' property after several years of unsuccessful negotiations. 26. Finally, the court did not find any causal link between the contract concluded in 1985 and the health problems of the first applicant's husband, which had begun in 1986 (a year after the contract had been signed), and his subsequent death in 1993. 27. The case was remitted to the Land Office, which issued a fresh decision on 15 June 1998. In accordance with the opinion of the Regional Court, by which it was bound by virtue of Article 250 (r) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Land Office ruled that the applicants were not the owners of the property because the contract of sale had not been concluded under duress, within the meaning of section 6(1)(k) of the Land Ownership Act. The Land Office considered that it was therefore unnecessary to examine whether the contract of sale had been concluded on strikingly unfavourable terms within the meaning of the same provision. 28. On 10 December 1998 that decision was upheld by the Regional Court. 29. On 15 February 1999 the applicants lodged a constitutional appeal (ústavní stížnost) against the Regional Court's judgments of 10 April and 10 December 1998 and the Land Office's decision of 15 June 1998. The applicants alleged a violation of Articles 11 (protection of property rights) and 36 § 1 (right to judicial protection) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (Listina základních práv a svobod). They challenged the assessment of the evidence and the Regional Court's incorrect interpretation of the notion of “duress”. They also criticised the failure of the Regional Court to assess properly the notion of “strikingly unfavourable terms” in section 6(1)(k) of the Land Ownership Act. 30. On 3 March 1999 a judge rapporteur (soudce zpravodaj) invited the Regional Court and the parties joined to the proceedings – the Land Office, the Military Repair Enterprise and the Land Fund (Pozemkový fond) – to submit written observations on the applicants' constitutional appeal. 31. In letters of 11 and 25 March 1999 respectively, the Land Fund and the Land Office waived their status as joined parties. 32. On 7 April 1999 the Military Repair Enterprise submitted its written observations, expressing the view that the applicants' constitutional appeal should be dismissed. 33. In its written observations of 9 April 1999, the Regional Court recapitulated the case-law to the effect that the Constitutional Court was not superior to the general courts and that it was not entitled to interfere with their decisions unless and in so far as they might have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Constitution. It further referred to the reasoning in its judgment of 10 December 1998, and noted that the constitutional appeal had been lodged outside the sixty-day time-limit in so far as it was directed against the Regional Court's judgment of 10 April 1998. 34. On 16 April 1999 the judge rapporteur asked the Regional Court and the Land Office to forward their case files, which they did. 35. On 10 May 2000 the Constitutional Court (Ústavní soud), without holding a public hearing, declared that the constitutional appeal had been lodged outside the sixty-day time-limit in so far as it was directed against the Regional Court's judgment of 10 April 1998 and was unsubstantiated in so far as it concerned the same court's judgment of 10 December 1998. The Constitutional Court included the written observations of the defendant and the Regional Court on the applicants' constitutional appeal in its summary of the facts. It stated, inter alia, that it was for the competent national authorities to examine whether there had been duress on the basis of all the relevant circumstances of the case. It observed in this connection that it could not examine issues falling within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. The court, recapitulating briefly the reasoning of the national authorities involved in the case, did not find unconstitutional the Regional Court's conclusion that the hypothesis that the applicants had been under duress during the contractual negotiations was excluded by the fact that they had imposed certain conditions on which they were willing to conclude the contract with the State, and that someone acting under duress would have concluded the contract on any terms. 36. According to the Government, it appears from the Constitutional Court's case file that on 27 June 2000 the first applicant inspected the documents included in the file and was provided with copies of the written observations submitted by the Regional Court and the Military Repair Enterprise.

4. The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Dębno, Poland. 5. In 1989 the applicant was injured in a traffic accident. Later, a medical board assessed his disability as being of the first degree (serious) and he was granted a disability pension. The applicant also applied to PZU S.A., an insurance company, for a monthly allowance compensating him for his loss of ability to work (renta uzupełniająca). The company refused his request. 6. On 14 May 1991 the applicant sued PZU S.A. in the Gorzów Wielkopolski Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki), seeking an award of a monthly allowance. On 23 November 1992 the court partly granted his claim. The applicant appealed. 7. On 19 May 1993 the Poznań Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) partly quashed the contested judgment and remitted the case. 8. The Regional Court held hearings on 13 January and 25 August 1994. At the hearing held on 27 October 1994 the applicant modified his claim. On 24 March 1995 the trial court asked the applicant to specify his claim. On 9 May 1995 the applicant submitted to the court his modified statement of claim. 9. The court held hearings on 8 June 1995, 7 December 1995 and 29 February 1996. On 5 April 1996 the court ordered an expert opinion. It was submitted to the court on 31 May 1996. On 17 July 1996 the court ordered an opinion from yet another expert. The expert submitted it to the court on 27 July 1996. 10. The court held a hearing on 20 February 1997. The hearing scheduled for 22 May 1997 was cancelled. On 15 December 1997 a supplementary opinion was submitted to the court. 11. Further hearings were held on 29 January 1998 and 20 April 1999. On 17 June 1999 yet another supplementary expert opinion was submitted to the court. On 4 November 1999 the court held a hearing. 12. On 18 November 1999 the Regional Court gave judgment and dismissed the applicant’s claim. The applicant appealed. On 13 June 2000 the Poznań Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance judgment. The judgment is final.

10. The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Oslo. 11. On 24 June 1993 the applicant was charged under Articles 192 and 195 of the Criminal Code (straffeloven) with the sexual abuse of a minor, G., born in December 1979, during the period from 1986 to 1990. Under these provisions he was charged with having, on one or several occasions, threatened to hit G. if she cried out, and/or having held her tight, whereupon he had introduced his penis into or pointed it towards her sex and/or made her masturbate him. At the time, G.’s father was cohabiting with the applicant’s mother. The alleged offences were said to have occurred in the applicant’s home when the child visited her father. 12. Criminal proceedings were instituted before the Eidsivating High Court (lagmannsrett) which heard the case between 16 and 18 February 1994, including G.’s compensation claim of (up to) 110,000 Norwegian kroner (NOK) for non-pecuniary damage, made under section 3-5 of the Damage Compensation Act 1969 (skadeerstatningsloven), and joined to the trial in accordance with Article 3 of the 1981 Code of Criminal Procedure (straffeprosessloven). By a judgment of 18 February 1994, the High Court, noting that the jury had answered the questions concerning criminal guilt in the negative, acquitted the applicant of the charges. Moreover, it decided to reject G.’s compensation claim. 13. G. subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court (Høyesterett) under the rules of the 1915 Code of Civil Procedure (tvistemålsloven) against the refusal to award compensation. The Supreme Court then ordered the taking of oral evidence by the Oslo City Court (byrett). Evidence was taken between 26 and 30 June 1995, 18 and 20 October 1995, 20 November 1995 and 3 January 1996, during which time more than twenty witnesses were heard. 14. In the appeal proceedings before the Supreme Court, G.’s lawyer requested that documents produced in the context of the criminal case be submitted as evidence to the Supreme Court. These included records of the judicial examination of G., medical certificates, letters and witness statements given to the police in connection with the criminal proceedings. The applicant’s lawyer, relying on Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, objected to this request. 15. By a decision of 29 May 1996, the Supreme Court authorised the documents from the criminal case to be joined to the case file in the compensation proceedings. Its decision included the following reasons: “In their pleadings, the lawyers for the parties have dealt extensively with the issue under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. The only question for the Supreme Court to determine is whether the submission of the criminal-case documents in the civil case would as such violate this Convention provision. The question as to the significance of this provision for the decision on the compensation claim falls to be considered in connection with the decision on the merits of the appeal. The use of documents from the criminal case as evidence in this case does not in my view fall foul of the requirement in Article 6 § 2 ... The submission of the documents does not as such imply that the acquittal in the criminal case is open to doubt. The statement in the Sekanina case, which the lawyer for the defendant has referred to, must be read in its context. The ruling cannot be perceived as a general procedural bar against the production of the case documents from criminal proceedings in a later case. Furthermore, I should like to add that, although this is not decisive for my view on the issue under Article 6 § 2, both parties were given the usual opportunity to supply evidence in connection with the taking of evidence by the Supreme Court. In my view, the request for submission of the criminal-case documents in question must therefore be granted.” 16. The Supreme Court examined the case under the rules of civil procedure. After hearing the parties and a large number of witnesses, the Supreme Court, in a judgment of 5 June 1996, ordered the applicant to pay NOK 75,000 to G. in compensation for non-pecuniary damage, under section 3-5(1)(b) of the Damage Compensation Act. 17. The first voting judge, Mrs Justice Gjølstad, stated on behalf of a unanimous court, inter alia: “In so far as the appeal concerns the merits, two general questions arise, namely the relationship to the acquittal in the criminal case (see Article 6 § 2 of the Convention) and the requirement of proof in such cases. Under Chapter 29 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, civil compensation claims may ... be made in criminal proceedings by the prosecution or by the injured party. This arrangement is intended to make it easier for the injured party to have a civil compensation claim examined, but it does not preclude the possibility of making such a claim in separate civil proceedings instead. Contrary to what followed from the old Code of Criminal Procedure, it is not a condition for the examination of civil compensation claims that the accused person should have been convicted in respect of the charge. Thus, it is in principle possible to either reject or uphold a civil compensation claim, irrespective of the decision concerning criminal liability. This has its background in the fact that the injured party, who does not enjoy rights as a party in the criminal case, should not forfeit his or her compensation claim as a result of an acquittal in the criminal case. Although it will hardly be a frequent occurrence that the decision on the civil compensation claim goes in a different direction from that on criminal liability, this may happen for various reasons. Amongst others, the requirement of evidence for the criminal and the civil consequences of an action ... is different. By Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, a person who is charged with a criminal offence is to be deemed innocent until proved guilty. The presumption of innocence applies even after an acquittal (see in this connection the Sekanina case and the decision reported in Norsk Retstidende 1994, p. 721, dealing with the significance of the presumption of innocence in a case concerning the right of the accused to compensation after an acquittal). However, in my opinion it must be clear that the said provision cannot constitute an obstacle for a person injured by an act to claim compensation from the alleged perpetrator, even though the latter has been acquitted of a criminal offence, and that the court in such a case can rely on a finding that the defendant has in fact committed the act in relation to which he has been acquitted. Even assuming that the Convention provision applies to the treatment of such claims, it has not been infringed as long as no disagreement or doubt has been expressed with regard to the decision on criminal liability. I cannot see that the arrangement under Norwegian criminal procedural law, whereby it is possible to have civil compensation claims determined after an acquittal, gives rise to any particular problems in relation to Article 6 § 2 [of the Convention]. Moreover, in the case at hand, it is above all the High Court’s decision concerning compensation which has been brought before the Supreme Court under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.” 18. As regards the requirement of evidence, Mrs Justice Gjølstad noted that under the law on compensation the test was normally the balance of probabilities. However, bearing in mind the burden which an allegation of reprehensible conduct might have for the defendant and the serious consequences it might have for his or her reputation, the requirement as to the strength of the evidence had to be stricter than that which applied to the test of the balance of probabilities. Nevertheless, the requirement could not be as strict as that which applied for establishing criminal liability. In a case of the kind under consideration, the test had to be whether on the balance of probabilities it was clearly probable that the alleged abuse had been committed. 19. In dealing with the particular facts of the appeal concerning compensation, the Supreme Court had regard to the video recording of the judicial examination of the alleged victim in the criminal proceedings before the High Court. The Supreme Court did not share the High Court’s view that the evidentiary value of the video recording was diminished by certain misgivings concerning the lack of synchronisation of sound and picture when shown to the High Court. Those shortcomings had been remedied before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court also had regard to evidence taken by it from this person, which deviated slightly from the judicial examination before the High Court. It further had regard to the statements of an expert witness and the statements of a therapist who had treated the alleged victim. Considering the evidence as a whole, Justice Gjølstad found that the evidence satisfied the standard of proof, establishing that sexual abuse had occurred and that, on the balance of probabilities, it was clear that the applicant was the abuser. Accordingly, there was a basis for awarding the victim compensation under section 3-5(1)(b) of the Damage Compensation Act. However, Justice Gjølstad emphasised that this decision was taken independently of the decision in the criminal case and that it did not undermine the acquittal. Finally, as regards the amount of compensation, she observed, inter alia, that she based her assessment on her finding that several infringements had occurred and that, even though their extent was not possible to ascertain with precision, there had been serious violations involving a certain use of force or threats, as a result of which G. had sustained damage.

11. The applicant was born in 1940 and lives in Rome. 12. He is a journalist by profession and on 21 November 1993 he published in the Italian daily newspaper Il Giornale an article about Mr G. Caselli, who was at that time the Principal Public Prosecutor in Palermo. The article was entitled “Caselli, the judge with the white quiff” and subtitled “Catholic schooling, communist militancy like his friend Violante – Are the charges against Andreotti the start of a new Sogno case?”. 13. In the article the applicant, after referring to the proceedings brought by Mr Caselli against Mr G. Andreotti, a very well-known Italian statesman accused of aiding and abetting the Mafia (appoggio esterno alla mafia) who has in the meantime been acquitted at first instance, expressed himself as follows: “In the last few days Giulio Andreotti has told an Israeli newspaper that he fears he is to be eliminated. If I may be permitted to begin with a digression, I wonder why he was talking to a foreign paper rather than the Italian press. He’s not the only one. It’s getting to be an epidemic. During the same period the industrialist Carlo De Benedetti chose an English newspaper in which to say that Italy is his Siberia. Even Bettino Craxi, when he feels like uttering threats or complaints, generally does so via the Spanish papers. This might be a form of gratuitous snobbery. But it might also be a victimisation syndrome of the type ‘We’re foreigners in our own country and are obliged to raise our voices abroad in order to make ourselves heard at home.’ That’s what Andreotti is suggesting when he adds that he feels like an exile and the victim of a plot, but he doesn’t exactly know what kind of plot. Those who have seen him recently say that he’s pale, his pointed ears are drooping and he’s bent forward to the point of being hunchbacked. He’s worried about his wife Lidia, who’s been plunged in a kind of cataleptic trance since that fateful 27 March. That was the day when the official notification that he was under investigation – a document running to some 250 typewritten pages – turned the most well known Italian politician into the number one godfather of the Sicilian Mafia. Now Andreotti is bewildered. He tries to understand but he can’t. He thinks there must have been some sort of spur-of-the-moment conspiracy. But the antibody that’s eating away at him has been there for some time. It’s been cultured for years in precisely those religious environments that Andreotti likes best. While he was already dominating Rome in the 1950s Giancarlo Caselli, the Principal Public Prosecutor in Palermo, author of the 250 pages which have annihilated him, was learning his lessons at the school of the Salesian brothers in Turin. Giancarlo was a fine, studious boy. Turin is full of people like that because it’s a rainy city and the houses have no balconies to watch the street from, so there’s nothing else for a boy to do but get his head down over his books. That’s why the place specialises in the mass-production of intellectuals. From Bobbio to Conso, the Minister of Justice. It’s a puritan brotherhood. The more Giancarlo progressed towards self-knowledge the heavier his complex about his father weighed on him. The father was a very worthy man but only the chauffeur of a captain of industry. While driving he breathed in the air of the bourgeoisie and then he blew it out again over his son. The boy decided that when he grew up he would pass over to the other side of the fence. No longer subservient like dad, but keeping the upper hand. At university, he drew close to the PCI [the Italian Communist Party], the party which exalts the frustrated. When he was admitted to the State legal service he swore a threefold oath of obedience – to God, to the Law and to via Botteghe Oscure [formerly the headquarters of the PCI, now those of the PDS – the Democratic Party of the Left]. And Giancarlo became the judge he has remained for the last thirty years – pious, stern and partisan. But he cannot really be understood without a mention here of his alter ego Luciano Violante, Caselli’s twin brother. Both from Turin; the same age – 52; both raised by the Catholic teaching orders; both communist militants; both judicial officers; and a deep understanding between them: when Violante, the head, calls, Caselli, the arm, responds. Luciano has always been one step ahead of Giancarlo. In the mid-1970s he indicted for an attempted coup d’état Edgardo Sogno, a former member of the Resistance, but also an anti-communist. It was a typical political trial which led nowhere. Instead of facing a judicial inquiry, Violante found that his career began to take off. In 1979 he was elected as a Communist MP. And ever since then he has been the via Botteghe Oscure’s shadow Minister of Justice. Today he’s the chairman of Parliament’s anti-Mafia committee, the great choreographer of the to-ing and fro-ing of the pentiti [criminals-turned-informers] and the PDS’s strongman. While Violante was climbing the ladder, Caselli had turned into a handsome figure with the shock of prematurely white hair he’s so proud of. If he goes away anywhere, even on a short trip, he always takes his hairdryer with him. During breaks in proceedings he pats his quiff into place on his forehead and pushes his hair over his ears. Afterwards, as you will have noticed on TV, he moves his head the bare minimum, so as not to ruin his handiwork. Vain – he’s vain. When Giancarlo was a member of the National Council of the Judiciary, from 1986 to 1990, his colleagues used to make fun of him, saying ‘Under his hair there’s nothing there’. That’s true up to a point, as a comment on his narcissism and his ideological blinkers. But it’s not true as regards his intelligence, which cannot be faulted. So far, as can be seen, there’s nothing to suggest that one day Caselli’s and Andreotti’s paths would cross. Apart from his spell at the National Council of the Judiciary, Giancarlo continued to live in Turin. He was a judge in the public eye and in the first line of the battle against terrorism. It was he who obtained the confession of Patrizio Peci, whose evidence as a witness for the prosecution devastated the Red Brigades. In the meantime, the PCI set in motion its strategy for gaining control of the public prosecutors’ offices of every city in Italy. That campaign is still going on, as the PDS has picked up the baton. The whole thing was the product of two linked but very very simple ideas Violante had. The first idea was that if the Communists could not manage to gain power through the ballot box, they could do so through the courts. There was no shortage of material. The Christian Democrats and the Socialists were nothing but thieves and it would be easy to catch them out. The second idea was more brilliant than the first: the opening of a judicial investigation was sufficient to shatter people’s careers; there was no need to go to the trouble of a trial, it was enough to put someone in the pillory. And to do that it was necessary to control the entire network of public prosecutors’ offices. And that was the start of Tangentopoli. The Craxis, De Lorenzos and others were immediately caught with their hands in the till and destroyed. But Andreotti was needed to complete the picture. More cunning than the rest, or not so greedy, the sly old Christian Democrat nearly always avoided getting caught up in corruption cases. It was at that precise moment that Giancarlo was getting ready to leave the rain of Turin for the sun of Palermo. A campaign of unsubstantiated allegations saw off the incumbent public prosecutor Giammanco, who crept away with his tail between his legs. And at the start of this year the handsome judge was able to take Giammanco’s place and finally place Violante’s seal on the Palermo prosecution service. Before he took up his new post Caselli was summoned to the Quirinale [the President’s official residence]. President Scalfaro, knowing the type, was concerned. When he had Caselli in front of him he said: ‘Do whatever you think is right, but be objective.’ Once in Palermo his fate and Andreotti’s, which had remained separate for years, became intertwined. Less than two months later the senator-for-life was suddenly accused of belonging to the Mafia. The file was an implausible rag-bag containing statements by pentiti, old and new documents and information given by the same old Buscetta [a pentito] to Violante and the anti-Mafia committee, now used by Caselli as evidence in a kind of game of ping-pong between the two twins. To cut a long story short, even the most long-lived brontosaurus in the Palazzo [i.e. Palazzo Madama – the Senate-House] was destroyed, thanks to the principle that an accusation is sufficient to destroy anyone. In April Caselli flew off to the United States, where he met Buscetta. He offered the informer 11,000,000 lire a month to continue to cooperate. Buscetta could still be useful to him during the investigation, even if the outcome was no longer of much importance. The result sought had already been achieved. What will happen next is already predictable. In six to eight months’ time the investigation will be closed. But Andreotti will not be able to resurrect his political career. What a stroke of luck. Caselli, on the other hand, will be portrayed as an objective judge whose duty obliged him to prosecute but who realised he had been in the wrong. He will become a hero. And that, if there is a God, cries out for vengeance.” 14. On 10 March 1994, acting on a complaint by Mr Caselli, the judge responsible for preliminary investigations committed the applicant and the manager of Il Giornale for trial in the Monza District Court. The applicant was accused of defamation through the medium of the press (diffamazione a mezzo stampa), aggravated by the fact that the offence had been committed to the detriment of a civil servant in the performance of his official duties. 15. At the trial on 10 January 1996 the civil party asked for the report on the evidence given by Buscetta to the New York judicial authorities and a copy of the Italian weekly newspaper l’Espresso in which that evidence had been published to be added to the file. The defence asked for two press articles concerning Mr Caselli’s professional relations with the pentito Buscetta to be added to the file and for the complainant to be required to give evidence. In an order made on the same day the District Court refused these requests on the grounds that the documents in question were not relevant to the object of the proceedings (defamation) and that there was no point taking evidence from Mr Caselli in view of the tenor of the article written by the applicant. 16. On the same day, applying Article 57, Article 595 §§ 1 and 2 and Article 61 § 10 of the Criminal Code and section 13 of the Press Act (Law no. 47 of 8 February 1948), the District Court sentenced the manager of Il Giornale and the applicant to fines of 1,000,000 and 1,500,000 Italian lire (ITL) respectively, payment of damages and costs in the sum of ITL 60,000,000, payment of the civil party’s costs and publication of the judgment in Il Giornale. In its reasoning the District Court included the following considerations: “... The author of this article, taking as his theme the case against Senator Giulio Andreotti, gave a biography of the complainant in terms which emphasised his cultural background and above all his ideological leanings – allegedly close to the PCI (now the PDS) – contending that these leanings had decisively influenced [the complainant’s] professional activity to the extent of making him the instrument of a grand design of that party, namely to take control of the judicial organs, particularly the public prosecutors’ offices. Mr Perna stressed the long-standing friendship between the complainant and the MP Violante, asserting that the latter acted as the head in a strategy where Mr Caselli was the arm. He added to his summary biography phrases with a particularly striking literal meaning such as: ‘When he was admitted to the State Legal Service he swore a threefold oath of obedience – to God, to the Law and to via Botteghe Oscure. And Giancarlo became the judge he has remained for the last thirty years – pious, stern and partisan.’ He accused Mr Caselli of having managed ‘the Andreotti investigation’ in furtherance of a grand political design hatched by Violante on behalf of the PCI/PDS, which was to break up by judicial process the dominant political class at the time, so that the favoured party could take power by non-electoral means. He suggested that the charges against Mr Andreotti, the last politician of any standing not to have been laid low by the ‘clean hands’ [mani pulite] inquiries in progress, should be seen in the context of that exploitation of the investigation. ... The defamatory nature of the article ... is absolutely manifest, given that the text categorically excluded the possibility that Mr Caselli might be faithful to the deontological obligations of his duties as an officer in the State legal service and denied that he possessed the qualities of impartiality, independence, objectivity and probity which characterise the exercise of judicial functions, an activity which the complainant was even alleged to have used for political ends, according to the author of the article. In the present case exercise of the right to report current events cannot be pleaded as an extenuating circumstance, Mr Perna not having adduced the slightest evidence in support of his very serious allegations. Nor can he rely on exercise of the right to comment on them – a right which would certainly be enjoyed by a journalist who, in reporting court proceedings, criticises this or that measure – given that the offending assertions in the article amount to nothing more than an unjustified attack on the complainant, which foully besmirched his honour and reputation. ...” 17. The applicant appealed. Relying on the freedom of the press, and in particular the right to report and comment on current events, he contended, among other arguments, that what he had written about Mr Caselli’s political leanings was true and that the court could have verified that by agreeing to take evidence from the complainant himself; that Caselli and Violante were indeed friends; and that it was likewise true that Caselli had used the help of the pentito Buscetta in the proceedings against Andreotti, and, as the representative of the State, had paid him sums of money, all pentiti being remunerated by the Italian State. Describing himself in addition as an opinion columnist (opinionista), he asserted that he had not intended to give a biography of Caselli but rather to express his critical opinions, in a figurative and forceful way. More precisely, he had made critical judgments, which were admittedly more or less well founded and with which readers might or might not agree, but which were explicitly derived from the factual premise, namely Caselli’s political activity. Lastly, he demanded that evidence be taken from the complainant and from certain journalists and figures in Italian politics who, like Mr Caselli, had been Communist Party militants. In particular, he asked for evidence to be taken from Mr S. Vertone and Mr G. Ferrara and for press articles on interviews in which the two men had confirmed the complainant’s active political militancy to be added to the file. In particular, in an interview published in the daily newspaper Corriere della Sera on 11 December 1994, extracts from which were quoted in the applicant’s appeal, Mr Vertone had stated, inter alia, that the complainant was a brave man of great integrity but that he was influenced by the cultural and political model of communism, that his relations with the former Communist Party had been very close and that he had later all but joined the party. In an interview given to another daily newspaper, La Stampa, which published it on 9 December 1994, Mr Ferrara had asserted that he had taken part in dozens of political meetings with Caselli and Violante among others during the 1970s in the Turin federation of the former Communist Party. He had gone on to say that although Caselli, a man of integrity, had done good work against terrorism as an officer of the State legal service, he was heavily politicised and should therefore avoid speaking like a tribune of the people. 18. In a judgment of 28 October 1997 the Milan Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal, ruling as follows: “... the statements noted in the charges ... are undeniably seriously damaging to the reputation of the injured party. They go further than casting doubt – as the charges say – on Mr Caselli’s loyalty to the country’s institutions, his faithfulness to the principle of legality, his objectivity and his independence; they categorically deny that he possesses those qualities and even attribute to him, among other accusations, instances of conduct which constitute disciplinary and criminal offences.” The Court of Appeal held that it was evident that the article essentially referred to facts, some of which were not in the least defamatory and were therefore not relevant to the decision to be taken. “In particular, the following elements are undeniably facts (not judgments), and one of the appeal pleadings (from lawyer D’A.) refers to them as such: (i) Giancarlo Caselli’s political leanings; (ii) the friendship between Mr Caselli and MP Violante; (iii) the information that as public prosecutor in Palermo Mr Caselli used the statements of the criminal-turned-informer Buscetta in the investigation concerning Mr Andreotti, and the information that the same Buscetta, like other pentiti, is paid by the State. Those elements are facts and in itself merely stating them is not in the least defamatory; they are therefore not relevant to the decision this Court has to take. That seems quite obvious as regards the last two pieces of information above, but is also true of the first (Giancarlo Caselli’s political leanings), since the State guarantees not only freedom of thought and the freedom to express thoughts but also the freedom of association in political parties. It is therefore not relevant to try to ascertain what political beliefs Giancarlo Caselli holds and whether or not he expressed them in specific circumstances (and at all events outside the judicial sphere and the performance of his duties) since that information could not in any case be considered defamatory in itself... There is therefore no basis for the request that the proceedings be reopened, firstly so that Giancarlo Caselli can be heard as a witness, and secondly to obtain the production of the press articles of Saverio Vertone and Giuliano Ferrara, but also so that witness evidence can be taken from them, once again on the subject of [Caselli’s] political militancy or at any rate of [his] ... political participation in the PCI/PDS. First of all, that information, as has already been said, is barely touched upon in the article, and in the second place it cannot in any event be regarded as damaging to the complainant’s reputation and accordingly does not need to be verified.” 19. Other facts imputed to the complainant were, on the contrary, undeniably defamatory. First of all, there was the oath of obedience, which, beyond its symbolic import, bore the precise accusation that Mr Caselli had given a personal and lasting undertaking to “obey”, in the course of his duties, the law, his religious beliefs and “the instructions of the leaders” of a political party. The Court of Appeal continued: “The remainder of the article, which gives a highly defamatory account of Mr Caselli’s alleged obedience to the Communist Party, confirms that the journalist was not expressing judgments or personal opinions but imputing specific conduct to Mr Caselli. Further on the article asserts (i) that Mr Caselli is Mr Violante’s twin brother, ... (ii) that the PCI ... set in motion a strategy of seizing control of all the public prosecutors’ offices in Italy by applying two of the MP’s ideas, the first being to gain power ... by using the judicial machine and the second to resort simply to opening a judicial investigation ... in order to destroy the careers [of political opponents] since there was no need to go to the trouble of a trial, it was enough to put someone in the pillory. It is in that context that the journalist referred to two actions by Giancarlo Caselli: his request for a transfer to the Palermo public prosecutor’s office and subsequent appointment to the post of public prosecutor there and his notification to Mr Andreotti that he faced prosecution for belonging to a Mafia-type organisation. ... The journalist Perna did not therefore express opinions or judgments but attributed to the complainant Giancarlo Caselli in a highly defamatory manner conduct and acts about which – and here we can only repeat what the District Court said – he did not adduce a scrap of evidence; he did not even seek to prove his case, as his lawyers argue that he was merely expressing opinions. ... The journalist [having] attributed specific acts to public prosecutor Giancarlo Caselli without verifying his assertions in any way and in a totally gratuitous manner, his conduct cannot be explained by errors or misunderstandings, but only as a deliberate act. That is confirmed by the literal content of the whole article, in which the person of Giancarlo Caselli is constantly and subtly denigrated, even though a few positive remarks are skilfully mixed in with the attacks. ... The content of the whole article shows that there was no unintentional fault on the defendant’s part but that he was fully aware that he was damaging another’s reputation and even that he intended to do so.” 20. In a judgment of 9 October 1998, deposited with the registry on 3 December 1998, the Court of Cassation upheld the Court of Appeal’s judgment, ruling that it was quite correct both as regards the merits and from the procedural point of view. “... Contrary to what has been alleged, the requests for leave to adduce evidence filed by the defence were interpreted in accordance with their exact significance and probative value and were rightly refused because they were totally devoid of relevance to the decision. The appeal written and signed jointly by the defendant Perna and his lawyer Mr Caiazza contains a request for the proceedings to be reopened, with a view, firstly, to ‘taking witness evidence from the civil party’, in particular ‘about the forms and modalities of his militancy, or at least of his political participation in the activities of the PCI/PDS during the period when he was already a public prosecutor, and about all the other points which offended the complainant’. The absolutely vague and irrelevant nature of the request is manifest in the light of the tenor of the phrases used by Mr Perna (in whose article the allusion to Mr Caselli’s militancy is by no means limited, as Mr Caiazza argued in the grounds of appeal, to the assertion that Mr Caselli associated himself with the Communist Party while he was at university, an assertion which would, incidentally, not constitute an insult); the article set out to give a detailed account of the forms taken by that militancy by imputing certain acts to Mr Caselli with the aim of proving that his militancy existed. Consequently, either this point remains vague or the problem is resolved by trying to make the complainant admit the facts noted in the charges, with the result that the burden of proof is shifted away from [Mr Perna and Mr Montanelli]. ... Moreover, the ‘direct witnesses’, Giuliano Ferrara and Saverio Vertone, are mentioned in connection with the above point [the forms taken by the complainant’s militancy]; what has just been said about the vagueness and irrelevance of that point therefore applies equally to those persons. Furthermore, giving further details about facts of which they had direct knowledge would have had no bearing on the trial since these were assertions which the trial court did not consider offensive and to speak of this as exculpatory evidence is accordingly meaningless. Lastly, Mr Caselli’s militancy within the PCI has nothing to do with the specific facts attributed to him, and therefore with his alleged oath of obedience to via Botteghe Oscure (to which, however, this ground of appeal makes no allusion), with the relations between Caselli and Violante and above all with an alleged link with Buscetta. Apart from the procedural aspect of the question, it should be stated at the outset that even the argument that the content of the article was not objectively offensive is absolutely devoid of foundation, as the judgment given by the trial court was justified in every respect as regards the offensive nature, for a man even more than for an officer of the State legal service, of imputations of specific facts implying a lack of personality, dignity, independent thought, coherence and moral honesty, and conduct signifying explicitly that there have been instances of dereliction of professional duty. ... The trial court’s reasoning on the extenuating circumstances of the right to report current events and the right to comment on them is also correct, as evidenced by an appropriate statement of the reasons which was free of mistakes in law and errors of logic. No link can be established, and moreover no link was established by the Court of Appeal, between the personality [of Mr Caselli] and an alleged right to report current events exercised through the offensive imputation of facts which have not been proved to be true and play no informative role. The essential point in the judgment is its categorical exclusion of the idea that the article expressed a critical judgment, hence the rejection of the plea that the right to freedom of expression constituted an extenuating circumstance. And in fact it is precisely by virtue of this comparative parameter and of its accessory powers of cognition that this court must repeat that the reasons given [by the Court of Appeal] are immune to criticism: the article is quite clearly a bare list of acts and conduct imputed to Mr Caselli in which there cannot be seen, even in veiled form, the slightest contribution to thought which might be regarded as a critical judgment, or even the attempt at irony which is said to be hidden in the elusive ‘caustic phrases’ referred to in the grounds of appeal. As the Court of Appeal concluded, this case was not about respect for the limits of formal propriety. It follows from all of the foregoing considerations that, as it is impossible to speak of critical comment, there is no cause to expatiate about exercise of the right to comment, still less about the extenuating circumstance of gross negligence in the exercise of the right to comment or about the hypothetical exercise of that right. ...”

5. The applicant was born in 1940 and lives in Warsaw. 6. The case concerns criminal proceedings against former police officers (Milicja Obywatelska) who faced charges in connection with the assassination, in May 1983, of Grzegorz Przemyk. The victim’s mother, Barbara Sadowska, was at that time a well-known opposition activist. The applicant is the victim’s father. 7. Criminal proceedings were instituted in 1983 against the police officers, charging them with beating the victim to death. In 1984 I.K. and other individuals were acquitted. 8. On 29 June 1990 the Warsaw Regional Court re-opened the trial and quashed the acquittal, finding that the original proceedings had been seriously defective, essentially because of the authorities’ tampering with the evidence, and that the assessment of the evidence by the court had been fundamentally flawed. The court ordered the prosecution to carry out the investigation again. 9. On 29 June 1991 an indictment against I.K. and two other individuals on charges of battery, punishable under Article 153 § 1 of the 1969 Criminal Code, was brought before the Warsaw Regional Court. On 4 November 1991 that court remitted the case back to the prosecuting authorities, finding that there had been serious deficiencies in the investigation. 10. On 25 March 1993 the prosecution lodged an indictment against I.K. and two others, former police officers A.D. and K.O., with the Warsaw Regional Court, charging them with the offence punishable under Article 153 § 1 of the 1969 Criminal Code. The applicant had the status of auxiliary prosecutor in the proceedings (oskarzyciel posiłkowy). The case remained dormant until 22 May 1995, when the first hearing in the case was held. 11. By a judgment of 4 April 1997 the Warsaw Regional Court acquitted I.K. It convicted A.D. as charged and sentenced him to four years’ imprisonment. It further reduced the sentence to two years as a result of the Amnesty Act 1990. K.O. was found guilty of destroying evidence in 1990. All the parties, including the applicant, appealed against that judgment. 12. On 22 May 1998 the Warsaw Court of Appeal quashed the judgment insofar as it concerned I.K. and remitted the case. At the same time, it acquitted K.O. and upheld, in essence, the conviction of A.D. The applicant lodged a cassation appeal against this judgment with the Supreme Court in so far as it concerned K.O. Lawyers representing A.D. also appealed against the judgment. 13. On 22 September 1999 the Supreme Court dismissed both appeals. 14. The trial against I.K. started anew. The first hearing was scheduled for 18 April 2000. On 19 June 2000 the Warsaw Regional Court acquitted I.K. The applicant appealed. 15. The acquittal was upheld by the Warsaw Court of Appeal on 17 January 2001. The court held that the offence with which I.K. had been charged had become prescribed on 1 January 2000, when the ten‑year prescription period provided for by Article 9 of the Transitional Provisions of the 1967 Criminal Code (see paragraph 32 below) had elapsed. It was of the view that that period could not be prolonged by the further five years provided for by Article 102 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 30 below) because the prescription period had started to run in 1983 when the proceedings had been instituted for the first time. The provision of Article 9 of the Transitional Provisions to the Criminal Code (see paragraph 32 below) had no effect on the running of that period. The applicant and Prosecutor General appealed against that judgment. They submitted that the judgment had been in breach of substantive law in so far as the court had found that criminal liability in respect of the offence had become prescribed. The Prosecutor General argued that the crime had to be characterised as a communist crime which was not subject to prescription at all. 16. On 12 September 2001 the Supreme Court quashed the judgment of 17 January 2001 and remitted the case. The court held that the Court of Appeal had erred in the interpretation of the provisions of the Code concerning the prescription of criminal liability. In particular, it had been wrong in its interpretation of Article 102 of the Criminal Code and in holding that the prescription period had started to run in 1983. Such an interpretation would make it impossible to pursue proceedings in respect of persons who, acting as agents of the State, had committed crimes before 1 January 1990 but had subsequently been acquitted before that date because the authorities had found it politically expedient to find them not guilty. This interpretation would defeat the purpose of the provisions themselves, which were designed to bring to justice perpetrators of such crimes by way of extending the relevant prescription periods. 17. On 29 January 2002 the Warsaw Court of Appeal, having reconsidered the case, quashed the judgment of the Warsaw Regional Court of 19 June 2000 acquitting I.K. It was of the view that the first-instance court had seriously erred in its assessment of the evidence and, as a result, had failed to establish the facts of the case properly. It remitted the case. It noted, in passing, that it shared the view of the Supreme Court as to the prescription period applicable to the offence concerned expressed in its judgment of 12 September 2001. 18. The trial started anew. The first hearing was scheduled for 5 June 2003. Fourteen hearings were held from that date until 19 January 2004. On the latter date the Warsaw Regional Court acquitted I.K. The prosecutor and the applicant appealed. 19. By a judgment of 16 June 2004 the Warsaw Court of Appeal allowed both appeals, quashed the acquittal and remitted the case. It was of the view that the first‑instance court had failed to take certain evidence crucial for the proper assessment of the case. In particular, it had failed to organise a confrontation between the accused and some of the witnesses, police officers present at the scene of the offence, and the principal witness, C.F., the victim’s friend who had been arrested together with him in May 1983, in the manner prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure. The applicant had been right in submitting that the facts of the case had not been properly established. The court further observed that the first-instance court had failed to assess the evidence in a logical and comprehensive manner. As a result, it had wrongly had recourse to the principle of in dubio pro reo, which was only to be applied where there were insurmountable difficulties in establishing the facts. 20. The trial started anew on 29 November 2004. It lasted four years. Twenty-seven hearings were held. Four hearings were adjourned for various reasons. 21. On 27 May 2008 the Warsaw Regional Court found I.K. guilty as charged and sentenced him to eight years’ imprisonment. However, it reduced the sentence to four years’ imprisonment on the basis of the Amnesty Act 1989. 22. The judgment was appealed against by the defence. 23. On 14 December 2008 the Warsaw Court of Appeal requested the Supreme Court to answer a legal question (pytanie prawne) as to whether the offence of battery, punishable under Article 157 § 1 of the Criminal Code, had become time‑barred. It observed, inter alia, that Article 105 § 2 of the Criminal Code provided that offences of wilfully causing serious bodily harm committed before 1 January 1990 by persons acting as agents of the communist State were not subject to prescription. However, it was not clear whether the offence of battery with which I.K. had been charged and which had caused serious bodily harm was covered by this provision. 24. By a decision of 23 September 2009 the Supreme Court refused to give a reply to that question, finding that it was not necessary for the determination of the case. It remitted the case to the Court of Appeal. 25. On 14 December 2009 the Court of Appeal quashed the first‑instance judgment and discontinued the proceedings, having found that the offence had become time-barred on 1 January 2005. It held that the offence of battery was not covered by the provisions of Article 105 § 1 of the Criminal Code. Only intentional offences expressly listed in that provision by their statutory names were not subject to prescription. 26. On 2 February 2010 this judgment was challenged by way of an appeal on points of law lodged by the Prosecutor General (Prokurator Generalny), i.e. by the Minister of Justice at the material time. It was submitted that a flagrant error of interpretation of substantive law had been committed by the appellate court, in that it had accepted that an intentional offence of battery committed by a State agent in connection with and during the exercise of public functions prior to 1 January 1990 could become time‑barred. 27. By a judgment of 28 July 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed the cassation appeal. It held that the Court of Appeal’s interpretation of the substantive law as to whether the offence of battery could become time‑barred was correct. The relevant provision listed offences which were not subject to prescription by their names used in the Criminal Code, not by their results. Hence, even though battery could result in serious bodily harm, the offence of battery was not covered by this provision, while the offence of “causing serious bodily harm” was. The court further observed that after the proceedings against I.K. had started to be conducted by the bodies of the democratic State after 1989, they had failed to sustain a conviction on the criminal charges during a period of over twenty years. This failure had mainly resulted from various steps taken immediately after the events by the communist authorities in order to make it impossible to establish the facts and the perpetrators of the crime and to thwart attempts to determine their criminal liability. The inability to determine I.K.’s liability in the case had to be regarded, having regard both to the length of the proceedings and to their final outcome, as “a failure of the justice system” (“porażka wymiaru sprawiedliwości”). The written grounds for this judgment were served on the applicant’s lawyer on 7 October 2010. II. PARLIAMENT’S RESOLUTIONS CONCERNING THE CASE 28. On 16 May 2013 the upper house of Parliament (Senat) adopted a resolution to commemorate the applicant’s son as a victim of martial law rule (uchwała Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w sprawie uczczenia pamięci Grzegorza Przemyka – ofiary stanu wojennego). It read, inter alia: “Thirty years ago, on 12 May 1983, officers of the then Militia arrested in Warsaw Old Town a high school graduate, young poet Grzegorz Przemyk. He was subsequently savagely beaten up by the militia officers and by agents of the riot-control police [known at that time as ZOMO] at the nearest police station at Jezuicka Street. On 14 May 1983 he died in a hospital. Subsequently, at the orders of highest State and [communist] party authorities, evidence was fabricated with a view to assigning the responsibility for his death to medics of the emergency services, while evidence pointing to the guilt of the militia officers was suppressed. As a result, the medics were arrested and Grzegorz Przemyk’s family and friends suffered various forms of harassment. The perpetrators of that murder evaded responsibility. Even when the country had become independent, it proved impossible to adjudicate on the case and impose sentences on them. Parliament condemns the perpetrators and instigators of that political murder.” 29. On 22 May 2013 the lower house of Parliament of Poland (Sejm) adopted an identical resolution.

6. The applicant was born in 1923 and lives in Warsaw. 7. He is the owner of a plot of land in Legionowo. Apparently, since 1990 construction works without the required permit have been carried out by the applicant’s neighbour, B.G., on his plot of land which adjoins the applicant’s property. 8. On 9 December 1993 B.G. requested the Mayor of Legionowo (Urząd Miejski w Legionowie) to grant him a building permit for a garage to be used for repairing lorries. 9. The Mayor of Legionowo found that the garage adjoining the applicant’s property had already been constructed without the required building permit and on 3 February 1994 ordered its demolition (przymusowa rozbiórka). 10. On 14 February 1994 B.G. lodged an appeal, submitting that he had already been granted a building permit which had subsequently been quashed. 11. On 29 June 1994 the Warsaw Regional Office (Urząd Wojewódzki) upheld the challenged decision. 12. On 18 July 1994 B.G. lodged an appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court (Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny). 13. On 22 September 1994 the Supreme Administrative Court ordered that enforcement of the Warsaw Regional Office’s decision be stayed pending the examination of B.G.’s appeal. 14. On 8 February 1995 the applicant, as a party to the administrative proceedings, requested the Supreme Administrative Court to dismiss the appeal and to uphold the challenged decision. 15. On 22 January 1996 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the contested decision and the previous decision of 3 February 1994 and the proceedings were restarted. The court found that the administrative organs had not exhaustively examined all the circumstances of the case, in particular whether the construction in question constituted a danger to persons or property or whether it had a deleterious effect on the sanitary or other conditions of the surroundings. 16. On 10 February 1999 the Mayor of Legionowo (Prezydent Miasta Legionowa) imposed on B.G. an obligation to acquire a building permit by 30 June 1999. 17. On 25 February 1999 the applicant appealed against that decision and requested the Mazowsze Governor (Wojewoda Mazowiecki) to issue a demolition order. 18. On 23 August 1999 the Mazowsze Governor quashed the contested decision and remitted the case. 19. On 14 September 1999, following amendments to the provisions governing the powers of the administrative authorities, the President of Legionowo transferred the case to the Legionowo Local Inspector of Construction Supervision (Powiatowy Inspektor Nadzoru Budowlanego). 20. On 26 May 2000 the Legionowo Local Inspector of Construction Supervision gave a decision ordering demolition of the garage, finding that it had been constructed illegally and contrary to the local zoning plan (plan zagospodarowania przestrzennego). 21. On 12 June 2000 B.G. appealed against that decision. 22. On 20 January 2001 the applicant complained to the Chief Inspector of Construction Supervision (Główny Inspektor Nadzoru Budowlanego) of inactivity on the part of the administration. He referred to his appeal of 12 June 2000 lodged against the decision of the Legionowo Local Inspector of Construction Supervision of 26 May 2000 and requested the acceleration of the proceedings. 23. On 3 April 2001 the applicant again complained to the Chief Inspector of Construction Supervision of inactivity on the part of the administration. He referred to his previous complaint and stated that he had been informed that his appeal would be examined in February. 24. On 27 April 2001 the Chief Inspector of Construction Supervision, finding the applicant’s complaint of inactivity well-founded, set a time-limit of 14 days for the Mazowsze Regional Inspector of Construction Supervision (Wojewódzki Inspektor Nadzoru Budowlanego) to examine the applicant’s appeal. 25. On 29 May 2001 the Mazowsze Regional Inspector of Construction Supervision quashed the contested decision and remitted the case to the first-instance authority. 26. On 2 January 2002 the Legionowo Local Inspector of Construction Supervision, as the authority of first instance, ordered B.G. to carry out works to bring the construction in line with the relevant provisions. 27. On 17 January 2002 the applicant appealed against that decision and requested a demolition order. 28. On 28 February 2003 the Mazowsze Regional Inspector of Construction Supervision upheld the challenged decision. 29. On 2 April 2003 the applicant appealed against that decision to the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court (Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny). 30. On 11 October 2004 the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court quashed the challenged decision and the previous decision of the Legionowo Local Inspector of Construction Supervision. 31. On 12 September 2005 the Legionowo Local Inspector of Construction Supervision again ordered B.G. to carry out construction works within three months of the date of the decision and to obtain a building permit. 32. On 27 September 2005 the applicant appealed. 33. On 16 January 2006 the Mazowsze Regional Inspector of Construction Supervision upheld the contested decision. 34. On 15 February 2006 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court, submitting that the construction works had been carried out illegally and demanding that a demolition order be issued. 35. On 10 July 2006 the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. 36. It appears that the applicant did not lodge a cassation appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court.

5. The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Velenje. 6. On 1 September 1992 the applicant was working as a safeguard and a security officer at a swimming pool in Velenje. He was brutally beaten by three individuals. The applicant’s employer had taken out insurance with the insurance company ZT. 7. On 30 August 1995 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against ZT, the attackers and the parents of the attackers who were minors, in the Celje District Court (Okrožno sodišče v Celju) seeking damages in the amount of 3,400.000 tolars (approximately 14,200 euros) for the injuries sustained. Between 7 January 1998 and 11 March 2002 the applicant lodged eight preliminary written submissions and/or adduced evidence. On 12 and 21 December 2000 he requested that a date be set for a hearing. Of the six hearings held between 2 October 1998 and 22 May 2002 none was adjourned at the request of the applicant. During the proceedings the court appointed two medical experts, a neurologist and an orthopaedist. The court also sought an additional opinion from one of the appointed experts. At the last hearing the court decided to deliver a written judgment. The judgment, upholding the applicant’s claim in part, was served on the applicant on 28 August 2002. 8. On 11 September 2002 the applicant appealed to the Celje Higher Court (Višje sodišče v Celju). All other parties to the proceedings cross-appealed. On 19 November 2003 the court allowed the appeals and remitted the case to the first-instance court for re-examination. The decision was served on the applicant on 23 December 2003. 9. On 14 January 2004 the first-instance court held a new hearing on a re-examination of the case. On 18 February 2004 a medical expert was appointed, but was replaced by a new expert on 6 May 2004. On 18 July 2005 the applicant lodged preliminary written submissions. The proceedings are still pending.

5. The applicants are all Hungarian nationals who live in Budapest (for details, see Annex). 6. In December 1985 the brother of three applicants (Ms Klára Zsolnay, Mr István Zsolnay and Mr György Zsolnay) brought an action against his siblings before the Pest Central District Court, requesting the court to establish his ownership on a real estate. In 1986, the respondents submitted a counter-claim against the plaintiff. 7. On 26 September 1990 the District Court gave interlocutory judgment, establishing that the plaintiff had acquired ownership of part of the property. On 10 March 1992 the Budapest Regional Court suspended the proceedings, pending the adjudication of the counter-claims submitted by the respondents. 8. In the resumed proceedings the District Court delivered an interlocutory judgment concerning the ownership proportions on 21 November 1996. On appeal, the Regional Court suspended the proceedings, pending the adjudication of the counter-claims, on 8 May 1997. 9. The applicants’ counter-claims were dismissed by the District Court on 11 December 1997. This judgment was partly reversed on appeal on 29 September 1998. The Supreme Court upheld the first-instance decision while remitting some claims on 3 November 1999. 10. On 29 June 2000 the fourth applicant, Mrs István Zsolnay joined the proceedings on the respondents’ side. 11. On 23 January 2001 the applicants’ motion for the disqualification of a judge was dismissed. 12. On 14 May 2003 the District Court gave a partial judgment. This was reversed in part on appeal on 19 January 2005 and upheld by the Supreme Court on 17 February 2006. 13. Regarding the remainder of the claims, the District Court found partly for the applicants on 7 July 2006. The Budapest Regional dismissed the respondents’ counter-claim on 27 April 2007.

5. The applicants were born in 1976 and 1971 and live in Åminnefors and Kotka respectively. 6. The applicants were serving their prison sentence in Riihimäki Prison. The first applicant had been convicted of aggravated drug offence, aggravated theft and firearms misdemeanour, and sentenced to an imprisonment of two years and eight months. He started to serve his sentence in Riihimäki Prison in early 2004. The second applicant had been convicted of attempted manslaughter and sentenced to an imprisonment of four years and three months. He started to serve his sentence in Riihimäki Prison approximately in November 2003. 7. After an unsupervised meeting with his family, the first applicant was put in isolation from 13 to 16 November 2004 as he was suspected of having concealed unlawful substances inside his body. The second applicant was isolated from 9 to 16 May 2004 on returning to the prison after leave. 8. While in isolation, the applicants had to give up their normal prison clothing and to wear overalls which covered them from feet to neck and were “sealed” by prison staff with plastic strips. The applicants were not able to remove the overalls by themselves. When they needed to use the toilet, they had to call the guards to escort them there and to remove the overalls. According to the first applicant, the first time the guards did not come quickly enough and he had to relieve himself in the overalls. 9. On his second day in isolation, the second applicant was given laxatives without any prior medical consultation but with his consent. When they took effect, the second applicant called for a guard to take him to the toilet but it took a long time for the guard to arrive and the applicant had to defecate in the overalls. He claims that afterwards he had to put the same dirty overalls back on and was not provided with the possibility to wash. 10. The applicants claimed that they were not allowed to wash during the whole time in isolation. The dirty overalls apparently caused skin irritation in the first applicant and broke the skin of the second applicant. 11. In February 2005 the applicants reported the matter to the police. 12. On 25 January 2007 the public prosecutor pressed charges against the Riihimäki Prison director and two chief guards for breach of official duty (virkavelvollisuuden rikkominen, brott mot tjänsteplikt) because they had failed to respect the applicants’ human dignity during their isolation. In addition, the applicants pressed charges for coercion (pakottaminen, olaga tvång) and defamation. 13. On 15 June 2007 the Riihimäki District Court (käräjäoikeus, tingsrätten), after having held an oral hearing in the presence of the applicants and several witnesses, dismissed all charges against the accused. It found that the use of overalls was acceptable because of the need to control and prevent smuggling of drugs and other substances into prison. It was not intended that a prisoner defecate in them, but defecation took place in separate, supervised toilets. The use of overalls as such did not have any effect on how quickly a prisoner could be taken to a toilet. The use of overalls was not meant to humiliate the prisoners and did not restrict their privacy any more than the isolation itself did. The use of overalls was thus not as such a measure which would have degraded the applicants. They had not been expected, let alone coerced, to defecate in the overalls: the first applicant had done so of his own will as a protest against the use of overalls while the second applicant, as a legally isolated prisoner, needed to be taken to a separate toilet which he did not reach on time. There was no evidence that the guards had delayed their response to the calls of the applicants. It had not been shown that the applicants did not have the possibility to wash whenever necessary. 14. By letter dated 5 July 2007 the applicants appealed to the Kouvola Appeal Court (hovioikeus, hovrätten). 15. On 30 September 2008 the Kouvola Appeal Court accepted the conclusions of the District Court and upheld its judgment. It found that the purpose of the use of overalls was to prevent the smuggling of drugs into prison. Concealing drugs in the body could also cause significant health risks to the prisoner. The court found that it had not been shown that the use of overalls had any effect on how quickly a prisoner was taken to a toilet. Moreover, it found, by referring to the case-law of the Court, that the suffering and humiliation caused by the use of overalls did not exceed the inevitable suffering and humiliation caused by the legal isolation itself. The rights of prisoners were not restricted more than what was necessary for the purposes of isolation and the use of overalls cannot therefore be regarded as violating human dignity. 16. By letter dated 1 December 2008 the applicants appealed to the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen). 17. On 4 November 2009 the Supreme Court refused the applicants leave to appeal.

8. The applicant was born in 1938 and currently resides in Dnipropetrovs’k. 9. On 5 September 1938 the Troika tribunal of the Department of the NKVD[1] of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in the Dnipropetrovs’k Region (Трійка Управління Народного Комісаріату Внутрішніх Справ УPСР по Дніпропетровській області) resolved that the applicant’s father was a “socially harmful element” after a purported robbery (“соціально шкідливий елемент”), and sentenced him to 5 years’ imprisonment in a correctional labour camp. 10. The applicant’s father died on 26 March 1976. 11. On 28 March 1980 the Dnipropetrovs’k Regional Court quashed the resolution of 5 September 1938 of the Troika tribunal upon the protest lodged by the prosecutor of the Dnipropetrovs’k Region. It also terminated the proceedings in the case. In particular it found that: “... there is no evidence of ... robbery... ... the investigation in the case was conducted in grave violation of the rules of procedural law. No criminal proceedings in the case were initiated; the [applicant’s father] was not charged; there was no indictment in the case. In the course of the investigation of the case, the elementary rights of the accused were not respected (the right to defend oneself, etc.). In such circumstances the resolution of the Troika has to be annulled and the proceedings in the case shall be terminated on the basis of an absence of any corpus juris in his actions ...” 12. On 29 May 1980 the Dnipropetrovs’k Regional Court issued written notice to the applicant that the proceedings in his father’s case had been terminated and that the Troika’s resolution of 5 September 1938 had been annulled. 13. On 24 February 1997 the Commission on Rehabilitation of the Dnipropetrovs’k Municipal Council requested the President of the Dnipropetrovs’k Regional Court to provide information concerning the conviction of the applicant’s father on 5 September 1938, as the notice of 29 May 1980 contained insufficient information about it. The Commission was also requested to state whether the father’s conviction had been politically motivated. 14. On 4 March 1997 the Deputy President of the Dnipropetrovs’k Regional Court issued written notice to the Commission on Rehabilitation of the Dnipropetrovs’k Municipal Council that: “... by a resolution of the Dnipropetrovs’k Regional Court of 28 March 1980, the resolution of the Troika has been annulled and the proceedings in the case terminated due to the lack of proof of guilt.” 15. From March 1997 until May 2000, the applicant unsuccessfully appealed to the Deputy President of the Dnipropetrovs’k Regional Court and the President of that court, and wrote to the Supreme Court of Ukraine, claiming the untruthfulness of the notice and asking that it be reworded, since it did not correspond to the resolution of Dnipropetrovs’k Regional Court of 28 March 1980 and, accordingly, his father’s memory had been defamed. He also sought initiation of criminal proceedings against the Deputy President of the Dnipropetrovs’k Regional Court. 16. On 8 August 1997 the Deputy President of the Criminal Division of the Supreme Court remitted the applicant’s complaint about the notice of 4 March 1997 to the President of the Dnipropetrovs’k Regional Court for consideration on the merits. He also requested that the notice be rectified and that a public apology be presented to the applicant. 17. By letters sent to the applicant by the Supreme Court of Ukraine on 26 September and 24 December 1997, the applicant’s claim was rejected as being unfounded. In particular, on 24 December 1997, the Deputy President of the Supreme Court of Ukraine recognised that the applicant’s father had been rehabilitated; the former also confirmed that he had been convicted for political reasons. On 8 September, 10 September 1997 and 22 April 1998, the President of the Dnipropetrovs’k Regional Court refused to annul the written notice or to reword it. 18. On 1 April 2000 the applicant lodged complaints with the Zhovtnevy District Court of Dnipropetrovs’k to have the refusals of the Deputy President declared unlawful, and to rebut the information contained in the aforementioned notice of 4 March 1997. He also sought compensation for moral damage. 19. On 2 June 2000 the Zhovtnevy District Court of Dnipropetrovs’k refused to examine the applicant’s claims on the ground that they fell outside the court’s jurisdiction, as they concerned the actions of a judge in the course of the administration of justice. 20. On 20 July 2000 the Deputy President of the Dnipropetrovs’k Regional Court remitted the applicant’s request to extend the time-limit for lodging his cassation appeal to the Zhovtnevy District Court of Dnipropetrovs’k. 21. On 27 July 2000 the Zhovtnevy District Court of Dnipropetrovs’k extended the term for lodging an appeal in cassation with the Dnipropetrovs’k Regional Court, as the applicant had not been informed until 7 July 2000 about the ruling of 2 June 2000, and would therefore have been unable to comply with the time limit for appeal in cassation. 22. The Government submitted that on 27 July 2000 the Zhovtnevy District Court notified the applicant that his case would be heard on 14 August 2000 in the Dnipropetrovs’k Regional Court. The applicant alleges that he did not receive this notification. 23. The case file arrived to the Dnipropetrovs’k Regional Court on 7 August 2000. 24. On 14 August 2000 the Dnipropetrovs’k Regional Court, in the absence of the applicant, upheld the decision of 2 June 2000. 25. The applicant’s complaints, lodged with the President of the Dnipropetrovs’k Regional Court, for the initiation of a supervisory review of the decision of the Dnipropetrovs’k Regional Court, including a complaint about the lack of a public hearing in the consideration of his case before that court, were rejected on 24 October 2000 as being unsubstantiated. The President of the Dnipropetrovs’k Regional Court informed the applicant that the lack of a public hearing before the Regional Court had not been an obstacle to that court’s examination of the matter, the applicant having been duly informed about the date and place of the hearing, of which he had been notified on 27 July 2000. 26. On 4 September 2003 the President of the Dnipropetrovs’k Regional Court of Appeal issued a written notice to the applicant informing him that, on 28 March 1980, the Presidium of the Dnipropetrovs’k Regional Court had quashed the resolution of the Troika of the Department of the NKVD of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in the Dnipropetrovs’k Region of 5 September 1938 in respect of Mr G.I. Strizhak (the applicant’s father), and that the proceedings in the case were terminated on the basis of an absence of any corpus juris in the actions of his father. It also stated that Mr G.I. Strizhak had been declared to have been sentenced unlawfully, and rehabilitated. 27. In January 2002 the Commission on Rehabilitation of the Zhovtnevy District Council in Dnipropetrovs’k refused to declare that the applicant was also “rehabilitated” (реабілітованим) in view of the quashing of the conviction of his father. They also rejected his request to issue a special identification card in that respect (посвідчення реабілітованого). In particular, they stated that the applicant had failed to provide information as to the place of his and his mother’s residence after the conviction of his father in 1938. 28. In March 2002 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Zhovtnevy District Court of Dnipropetrovs’k against the Commission on Rehabilitation, seeking to declare their refusal to declare him rehabilitated unlawful. 29. On 20 November 2002 the Zhovtnevy District Court of Dnipropetrovs’k rejected these complaints as being unsubstantiated. This judgment was upheld on 10 February 2003 by the Dnipropetrovs’k Regional Court of Appeal, and on 1 April 2004 by the Supreme Court.

5. The applicants are: 6. The applicants live in the Vargashinskiy District, Kurgan Region. They are members of two families originally from Chechnya: the first and second applicants are married and the third to fifth applicants are their children; the sixth to seventh applicants are married and the eighth to tenth applicants are their children. The Antayev family (the first to fifth applicants; the first applicant family) have lived in the Kurgan Region since 1979; the Vashayev family (the sixth to tenth applicants; the second applicant family) have lived in the Kurgan Region since 1998. 7. The applicants submitted that attitudes towards the Chechen minority had worsened after 2000, when the second armed conflict in Chechnya had started. 8. On 8 March 2006 the third and eighth applicants had a fight with Mr A.B. in the settlement of Prosekovo. The third applicant was injured in the hand and Mr A.B. took him to the hospital. On 27 March 2006 the Kurgan regional forensic bureau noted knife wounds on the third applicant’s hand, which were classified as passing damage to health. According to the applicants, both parties to the conflict decided not to contact the authorities in this regard. As is apparent from subsequent questioning, the Antayev family had asked Mr A.B. to pay them 50,000 roubles (RUB) by way of compensation for their expenses, while Mr A.B. offered RUB 10,000. 9. In March 2006 the Vargashinskiy District Department of the Interior (ROVD) questioned Mr A.B. about threats to his life by the third and eighth applicants and opened criminal investigation file no. 388644 under Article 119, paragraph 1 of the Criminal Code (threat to life or health). It does not appear that anyone was charged or found guilty within this set of proceedings. In May 2007 Mr A.B. submitted a statement to the Court alleging that the police had used threats to force him to lodge a complaint against the first applicant family. 10. On 24 March 2006 the investigator in charge of the case issued urgent search warrants at both applicants’ families’ homes, referring to the possible presence of firearms. On 25 March 2006 that decision was found lawful by the district court. 11. On 24 March 2006 the first applicant family were at home at 4 Zarechnaya Street, in the Verkhnesuyerskoye settlement in the Vargashinskiy District. At about 1 p.m. three vehicles – a Gazel minibus, a black Volga and a VAZ-99 – arrived at their house. According to the applicants, about 20 men from various law-enforcement agencies got out of the vehicles. Some of them were wearing military uniforms and masks, others were dressed in civilian clothes. The applicants later identified Mr E.K. and Mr V.G. from the Regional Police Department for Combating Organised Crime (RUBOP), Mr. A.K., deputy head of the Vargashinskiy ROVD, Mr. N.P. and Mr U. from the Vargashinskiy ROVD. The RUBOP servicemen carried automatic weapons and hand pistols. Mr N.P. was in charge of carrying out the search. 12. According to the applicants, no search warrant or other document was produced by the police. The fourth and fifth applicants were in the courtyard; the policemen beat them there and said “Why don’t you go to Chechnya, to fight us there?” 13. The servicemen wearing masks and Mr E.K. entered the house. Mr E.K. grabbed the second applicant by the hand and pushed her towards the sofa in order to handcuff her; she fell to the floor and felt severe pain in her back. The first applicant was also punched in his back and legs by Mr E.K. 14. The third applicant was in the house. He had his sweater pulled over his head and was handcuffed. The servicemen beat him inside the house, then pulled him to the yard and beat him there in front of his brothers and then took him to the barn. According to the applicants, the third applicant’s pants were removed and he was threatened that his genitals would be “pulled off with a wire”; he was then thrown into manure and beaten. 15. According to the applicants’ statements, the servicemen mocked the third, fourth and fifth applicants saying that they would not be able to “beget more Chechens”. They also forced them to shout humiliating comments. They referred to the events in the village of Chastoozerye, where in 2002 two local residents of Chechen origin had been injured by unidentified persons (see application no. 18114/06, Amadayev v. Russia). 16. The second applicant saw that the fourth applicant, who suffered from epilepsy, had been brought into the house and was lying on the floor; he was very pale. The second applicant was not allowed to give him medicine. 17. The search of the Antayevs’ house lasted for about two hours. At some point Mr E.K. announced that he had found a cartridge from a gun. The second applicant alleged that she had seen him taking it out of his pocket. 18. The search record of 24 March 2006 drawn up by the ROVD officers mentioned two attesting witnesses and bore their signatures, as well as signatures by the third applicant indicating that he had been informed of his rights and obligations prior to the search and after it had been completed. No remarks or objections were noted in the record. The record listed one 7.62 mm calibre cartridge for an automatic gun which had been found in a drawer in the kitchen, 36 videotapes and eight items of printed material in a foreign language. The copy of the record is partly illegible, but it appears that after the discovery of the cartridge the third applicant, in the presence of two witnesses, stated that he had no knowledge of it. 19. As is apparent from subsequent documents, in April 2006 eleven videotapes were returned to the first applicant. 20. After the search, the first and third applicants were taken by the police to the offices of the local administration, where they were questioned separately for about one hour in relation to the criminal investigation concerning threats to Mr A.B. They then returned home. 21. A relative of the Vashayevs’ arrived from Kurgan and took the second, third and fourth applicants to hospital. 22. According to the certificates issued by the Vargashinskiy district hospital in September 2007, the second applicant remained at the hospital from 24 March to 11 April 2006. She was diagnosed with “acute osteochondrosis [degenerative disc disease], two-sided lumbar-sacral radiculitis, post-traumatic coxalgia, hypertension of the second degree and stress”. The third applicant remained at the hospital from 24 March to 1 April 2006. He was diagnosed with “contusion of soft tissue in the thoracic-lumbar area”. The fourth applicant was examined on 24 March and left the hospital on 25 March 2006. He suffered from “contusion of soft tissue in the abdomen”. 23. The applicants argued that the extent of their injuries was more serious and that the first and fifth applicants had also suffered beatings. Further details of their injuries were recorded by the forensic experts in the course of the criminal investigation (see below). 24. According to the certificate issued by the Kurgan Medical Centre for spinal trauma correction, the second applicant was treated there between 15 June and 6 July 2006. She was diagnosed with a displaced fracture of the tail bone (coccyx), resulting from the fall on 24 March 2006. On 22 June 2006 the second applicant was successfully operated on her spine. 25. The applicants submitted their own statements to the Court dated August 2006 describing these events; they also referred to the documents submitted by them and collected during the criminal investigation. Gelani Vashayev’s son Mr Sh.V., who had taken the members of the first applicant family and then his own relatives to hospital on 24 and 25 March 2006, also submitted a statement dated May 2007. Two journalists, Mr A.D. and Ms G.P., the editor-in-chief of the district newspaper Mayak, submitted written statements dated April and May 2007, in which they described their futile attempts to obtain information from the police and the local hospital about the incident. 26. On 24 March 2006 at around 4 p.m., the eighth and ninth applicants were returning home. Outside their house situated at no. 102 Belovo settlement, they saw a Gazel minibus, a Volga and a grey VAZ 99. In the courtyard of their house they saw about five men, some of them wearing camouflage military uniform and masks and carrying automatic weapons. Other men were wearing civilian clothes and were armed with pistols. The men did not identify themselves or produce any papers. 27. The men ordered these two applicants to stand with their faces to the wall, pulled their caps over their eyes and beat them. According to the applicants, the men told them that they should go back to Chechnya and uttered other ethnically motivated insults. 28. The men entered the house, where the sixth, seventh and tenth applicants were waiting. The sixth applicant was handcuffed. The seventh applicant was told that she had given her sons a bad upbringing and that they should leave the village. 29. The search record of 24 March drawn up by the ROVD officers mentioned two attesting witnesses and bore their signatures, as well as signatures by the seventh applicant attesting that she had been informed of her rights and the reason for the search prior to its commencement and that she had no remarks or objections at the end of it. The record listed one hunting gun and seventeen cartridges. In relation to the gun and cartridges the seventh applicant explained that they belonged to her son Mr Sh.V., who had put them in his bedroom about five months earlier. In another bedroom an unloaded hand pistol was found. Two knives in cases, two penknives and two self-made knives were found amongst clothing. The seventh applicant offered no explanation regarding these items. Finally, fourteen videotapes were collected. 30. The eighth applicant was then put into the Gazel and taken to the Vargashinskiy ROVD. According to him, on the way there he was beaten in his groin with rifle butts and a rope was pulled around his neck. As a result of the strangulation attempt, the eighth applicant lost consciousness on several occasions. He was also insulted and told that he “would not be able to beget more Chechens”. 31. At the ROVD the eighth applicant was questioned and signed a statement about the events in Prosekovo (see paragraph 8 above), without access to medical or legal assistance. 32. He was released at around midnight. Mr Sh.V. took him to hospital (see below). 33. The applicants submitted written statements by the eighth and ninth applicants, produced in August 2006, and testimony by their neighbour Mrs Ye.L., who had witnessed the beatings and insults administered to the eighth and ninth applicants on 24 March 2006. They also referred to the statement by the sixth applicant’s son, Mr Sh.V., mentioned above (see paragraph 25). 34. On 28 March 2006 the applicants lodged seven individual complaints with the Vargashinskiy District Prosecutor’s Office (“the district prosecutor’s office”). They alleged, in particular, that the policemen had beaten and humiliated them on 24 March 2006. On 7 April 2006 the investigator of the district prosecutor’s office refused to bring any charges under Article 286, paragraph 2 (a) and (b) of the Criminal Code (abuse of authority), on account of lack of evidence of a criminal act. Referring to the results of the preliminary inquiry, the decision stated: “On 24 March 2006, further to the complaint lodged by Mr A.B., the Vargashinskiy ROVD opened a criminal investigation under Article 119 of the Criminal Code [threat of murder]. Mr A.B. pointed out [the third applicant] as the person who had committed the crime... Pursuant to the internal instructions, on the same day the commanding officers of the ROVD transmitted this information to the RUBOP of the Kurgan Region, because the suspect was of Chechen ethnic origin. In order to provide security during the investigative measures and for operative support, servicemen of the RUBOP and special police force of the Regional Department of the Interior were sent to the Vargashinskiy district. The servicemen’s personal data is at present classified. The commanding officers took immediate investigative measures in the Prosekovo settlement, at the scene of the crime. Immediately thereafter the investigator, with the agreement of the commanding officers of the ROVD, decided to proceed with the searches ... at the places of residence of [the third applicant] ... and [the eighth applicant]. ... the commanding officers and servicemen of the ROVD, RUBOP and special police forces went to carry out the searches ... Mr [N.P.] from the ROVD was in charge of the searches. During the search at the Antayevs’ house, after the policemen had shown them the search warrant and invited them to surrender unlawful items voluntarily, [the third and fourth applicants] mounted active resistance to the search and prevented examination of some pieces of furniture. For this reason, two servicemen of the special police force took them out into the courtyard and placed them near the VAZ 2101 car, together with [the fifth applicant]. The servicemen of the ROVD, special police force and attesting witnesses remained in the house and proceeded with the search, while the remaining special forces’ servicemen held positions around the house. No unlawful actions or acts of physical violence were perpetrated by the servicemen against any members of the Antayev family. Towards the end of the search all members of the family were moving around the house freely. All items collected during the search were duly noted and securely sealed. The search of the Vashayevs’ house in Belovo followed the same pattern, in line with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. [The sixth applicant], his wife [the seventh applicant] and daughter [the tenth applicant] were inside the house, while [the eighth and ninth applicants] were in the courtyard. ... No one from the Vashayev family was hurt by the police officers. ... The applicants’ arguments alleging abuse of power by the police are therefore refuted by the information collected. This follows from the written explanations produced by the servicemen of the Vargashinskiy ROVD, including senior officers, servicemen of the RUBOP and the special police force. The servicemen’s explanations are consistent and non-contradictory. Each of them was questioned in relation to the actions of his colleagues which he had witnessed. None mentioned any abuses of power by their colleagues, while stressing the absence of justification for the alleged wrongdoing. The witnesses who had been present during the searches also rebutted the applicants’ allegations about the abuse of power, including those who had stayed outside the Antayevs’ house. Both attesting witnesses had moved around the Antayevs’ house freely and, given the layout of the premises, must have seen and heard the events in the courtyard. However, as is apparent from the witnesses’ explanations, they did not notice any unlawful conduct by the policemen. [The conclusions of the forensic report issued by the expert of the Kurgan Regional Forensic Bureau] were overturned by a commission of the [same office] ... The commission described [the eighth applicant’s] injuries recorded on 25 March 2006 as ‘not entailing consequences for [the applicant’s] health’. Based on the above, and also on the explanations given by servicemen of the ROVD as to the absence on [the body of the eighth applicant] and other members of the Vashayev and Antayev families of injuries resulting from the policemen’s actions, the district prosecutor’s office looks critically upon the forensic reports ... about beatings recorded for [the first to fifth and eighth applicants]. The inquiry established with a sufficient degree of probability that the circumstances of these beatings were contradictory and no connection with the searches has been established.” 35. As a result of the applicants’ complaints against the above decision, on 5 May 2006 the deputy to the Kurgan Regional Prosecutor opened criminal investigation file no. 388743 under Article 286, paragraph 3 (a) of the Criminal Code (abuse of power committed with the use of violence or with a threat of use of violence). On the same date both applicant families were informed accordingly. 36. On 12 May 2006 the district prosecutor’s office was put in charge of the case. In response to a request from the Court, the Government submitted in July 2012 a copy of most of the documents from criminal investigation file no. 388743 (which comprised over 1,280 pages). The relevant documents may be summarised as follows. 37. It is apparent that in May 2006 eight applicants (the first to sixth, eighth and ninth applicants) were granted the status of victims in the proceedings. 38. In the course of the proceedings in 2006 and 2007 the applicants were questioned on numerous occasions, first as witnesses and then as victims. They confirmed their statements about the circumstances of the searches, the beatings and the humiliating treatment. In particular, the members of the Antayev family described that on 24 March 2006 a group of about ten men wearing civilian clothes and about six military men had arrived at their house. The “civilians” were armed with hand pistols, and the military men carried automatic guns and were wearing camouflage uniforms, bulletproof vests, helmets and masks. The men had ordered them to lie down on the floor, had handcuffed the men and had beaten and kicked them; the second applicant was pushed and fell backwards against a sofa; Mr N.P. had kicked the first applicant while the military men had taken the fourth and fifth applicants into the courtyard and beaten them there. 39. The members of the Vashayev family submitted that after 2 p.m. on 24 March 2006, the sixth, seventh and tenth applicants had been at home, while the eighth and ninth applicants were out foraging for hay. The members of the family who had stayed at home had been forced to lie on the floor by armed men wearing masks, but were then allowed to stand up by the men wearing civilian clothes who carried out the search. The sixth applicant had been handcuffed at first, but later his handcuffs were removed. The two sons of the sixth and seventh applicants, the eighth and ninth applicants, were stopped by armed men when they returned home and were made to stand with their legs and hands apart against the wall, with their hats pulled down over their eyes. Several “military men” wearing masks and civilian clothes had punched and kicked them and beaten them with their rifle butts. The sixth, seventh and tenth applicants went into the courtyard when the search in the house was over, and had witnessed the eighth and ninth applicants being beaten. Then the eighth applicant was put in a Gazel vehicle where he was again kicked and a rope placed around his neck and tightened, as a result of which he had lost consciousness. 40. The criminal investigation file contains several forensic expert reports issued by the Kurgan Regional Forensic expert bureau (“the forensic bureau”). The first one, expert report no. 2133 dated 25 March 2006, reported that the eighth applicant had suffered the following injuries: extensive bruising on the back of the head caused by a blunt object and not entailing consequences for the applicant’s health, and three circular bruises around the neck resulting from strangulation attempts. This had caused asphyxia resulting in temporary loss of consciousness and haemorrhages in the eyeballs, which constituted a serious injury. The report was issued upon the applicant’s request. 41. Other reports below were issued on 28 March 2006 in response to the investigator’s orders. They concluded that the injuries had been caused by blunt objects and did not entail lasting damage to the victims’ health. 42. Expert report no. 60 concluded that the fourth applicant had been hit in the abdomen, resulting in bruising. 43. Expert report no. 61 found that the third applicant had bruises over the lumbar area, on both sides. 44. Expert report no. 62 concluded that the eighth applicant had haematomas on the left side of his neck and the left side of the chest. 45. Expert report no. 63 described the second applicant’s injuries as bruising of the upper lip, right upper hand, left shoulder and left leg. 46. Expert report no. 64 found that the fifth applicant had contusions on the lower part of the left leg. 47. Expert report no. 65 noted that the first applicant had bruising over the left side of his chest. 48. In May 2006 the experts of the forensic bureau issued their formal conclusions that the injuries could have been received at the time and in the circumstances as alleged. 49. In addition, the experts examined the records of the Vargashinskiy district hospital. On the basis of the records, they concluded that the examination of the ninth applicant at the hospital on 24 March 2006 had not revealed any injuries (he had complained of pains in the chest area); the examination of the sixth applicant revealed bruises on the right side of his chest. As is apparent from the applicant’s signatures, they were made aware of these conclusions in January 2007. 50. In respect of the second applicant’s complaint about spinal trauma, on 15 November 2006 the experts also examined copies of her medical records from the hospitals. The documents showed that in May 2006 the second applicant had sought medical assistance in relation to a fracture of the tail bone (coccyx). She was operated upon in June 2006. The exact date of the fracture could not be established; this injury should be regarded as moderately serious. 51. By February 2007 the investigation had established the identities of the police officers who had taken part in the searches on 24 March 2006. According to the documents contained in the file, the group headed by Mr N.P. included three other Vargashinskiy ROVD officers, six officers from the Kurgan Regional RUBOP, including Mr E.K. and Mr V.G., and six officers from the regional special police force unit. 52. The case file contains five notes about the events of 24 March 2006 written by the special police force officers, in which they stated that, while providing assistance during the search of the Antayevs’ house in Verkhnesuyerskoye, they had had to physically restrain the inhabitants of the house, who had resisted the execution of the search and had refused to let the policemen enter and carry out their duties. Four men – the first, third, fourth and fifth applicants – had thus had to be restrained by force and handcuffs had had to be put on them. 53. All officers and servicemen who took part in the searches were questioned in the course of 2006. They denied that they had made the applicants lie on the floor, or pulled their clothes over their heads or beaten them. 54. In particular, Mr N.P. from the Vargashinskiy ROVD, who had been in charge of the searches, stated on 15 May 2006 that on 24 March 2006 Mr A.B. had lodged a complaint with the ROVD that the third and eighth applicants had threatened to murder him. On the same day, the criminal investigation under Article 119 of the Criminal Code had been opened. In response to internal instructions from the Ministry of the Interior, the local police had informed the Kurgan RUBOP about all criminal investigations involving ethnic Chechens. On the same day, officers from the Kurgan RUBOP arrived at the ROVD. They were accompanied by six members of the special police force, in order to ensure the safety and security of the search procedures. They had travelled together to Prosekovo, where the investigator issued two search orders, the first for the Antayevs’ family house in Verkhnesuyerskoye. During both searches, the members of the special police force had run into the house first. Mr N.P. had served the search order on the first applicant, who had signed and dated it. The first applicant’s wife and three sons had also been at home at the time. They were invited to surrender weapons and illegal objects, but they denied having any such items. Then the search had started, and the members of the family had tried to interfere. They shouted and prevented the police officers from entering the rooms. Because of this, the officers from the special police force had escorted the first and second applicants’ three sons – the third to fifth applicants – into the courtyard. No one had hit the applicants. The search ended with the finding of one cartridge for an automatic rifle, literature in a foreign language, and a number of videotapes. Mr N.P. had remained in the house the whole time and had thus not witnessed the events in the courtyard. The first and third applicants had then been taken by one of the police officers to meet the investigator at the village administration’s offices, while the rest of the group went to the Vashayevs’ family house. There Mr N.P. had shown the search order to the seventh applicant and invited her to surrender illegally stored items, such as weapons. When the applicants denied having any such things, the police had started the search. The proceedings were conducted in a correct and polite manner, and no one had been beaten or otherwise injured. The search resulted in the finding and seizure of a smoothbore rifle and cartridges for it, a handgun of foreign manufacture, home-made knives and knives with long blades, and fourteen pirated VHS tapes. During the search the witness had not seen the events in the courtyard, but when he walked out, no one had been using violence on the applicants. He also noted that during the searches both families had behaved emotionally, and had shouted and vowed to lodge complaints. 55. The head of the Vargashinskiy ROVD, Mr I.K., stated on 15 May 2006 that he had been informed on the evening of 24 March 2006 that both searches had taken place in a calm manner, without any problems. The head of the ROVD criminal department, Mr A.K., explained that he had participated in the search at the Antayevs’ house and had seen their three sons in the courtyard, guarded by the special police force near the police car. The servicemen explained that the sons had obstructed the execution of the search. The three had been put in handcuffs, which Mr. A.K. later removed, and he had remained with them outside. At some point the fourth applicant had felt unwell and the witness had asked Mr A.Sh. to take him into the house to get treatment. After that he had accompanied the first and third applicants to the offices of the local administration, where the questioning had taken place. The applicants had not displayed any signs of ill-treatment or beatings. 56. On 16 May 2006 the investigators questioned Mr A.Sh., a policeman with the Vargashinskiy ROVD. He stated that he had not participated in the search of the Antayevs’ house and had entered it only after one of the officers had told him to take the fourth applicant from the police Gazel vehicle into the house to treat him with medicine. Witness A.Sh. accompanied the fourth applicant into the house and then travelled by car to the offices of the local administration. About twenty minutes later he had returned to the Antayevs’ house and observed that the applicants were in good health, with no signs of ill-treatment. He had then accompanied the group to the Vashayevs’ house, which he likewise did not enter. He had remained by the fence, where he met the ninth applicant and talked to him until the search ended. The ninth applicant had appeared to be in good health and neither he nor any other family members had displayed signs of ill-treatment. 57. The police also questioned six officers from the Kurgan RUBOP, including Mr E.K. and Mr V.G. They stated that the searches had proceeded calmly, except when the first applicant’s two sons, the fourth and fifth applicants, had to be escorted out of the house because they objected to the search. 58. Six officers from the regional special police force confirmed their presence during the searches on 24 March 2006. Their involvement had been limited to ensuring the security of the investigative measures. At the Antayevs’ house they had escorted two young men, the first applicant’s sons, out of the house and put handcuffs on them because they had interfered with the search. At the Vashayevs’ family house they had not applied force to anyone, nor had they put handcuffs on anyone. Furthermore, they had not hit or used physical force on anyone, had not made anyone lie on the floor or covered anyone’s head with clothes or hats, and they had not noticed that any of the applicants had injuries. 59. On 16 May 2006 the attesting witness for both searches, Mrs O.P., stated that both had been initiated by a number of the special police force officers – who were wearing masks and were armed with automatic weapons – running into the houses. At the Vashayevs’ house the witness had seen one man being led out, with his pullover over his head, and being stood up against the police vehicle with his legs apart. When she had entered the house, the men of the house were lying on the floor face down, with their hands behind their heads, while the woman was sitting on the sofa. The men were then allowed to stand up; they walked around the house and, initially, they had voiced their objection to the search. The search at the Antayevs’ family home had proceeded in a similar manner. She had seen Mr A.Sh. and the ninth applicant talking by the fence; she had also seen the eighth applicant in the Gazel where he had been talking to a man dressed in civilian clothes. No one had been hit or hurt. 60. The other attesting witness, as well as several local residents questioned by the police, had not witnessed any ill-treatment of the applicants on 24 March 2006. 61. It is apparent from the list of documents in the criminal investigation file that in 2006, in the course of the investigation, over 30 face-to-face confrontations were conducted between the applicants and the officers of the Vargashinskiy ROVD and the RUBOP who had taken part in the searches. In addition, over a dozen identification sessions were carried out involving both the victims and the officers. 62. The case file contains records of the face-to-face confrontation on 5 June 2006 between the applicants and the police officers. On the one hand, the first, second, seventh and ninth applicants, and on the other hand Mr N.P. – who had been in charge of the operation – recounted their different and irreconcilable versions of events. The first applicant stated during the confrontation that Mr N.P. had kicked him once in the chest; the second applicant confirmed this statement. During another confrontation the first applicant insisted that Mr A.Sh. had beaten the fourth and the fifth applicants, while Mr. A.Sh. denied this. The fourth applicant also stated that he and his brother, the fifth applicant, had been beaten by Mr A.Sh. Other face-to-face confrontations with police officers contained similar statements. 63. On 9 August 2006 the first and fourth applicants identified one of the RUBOP officers, Mr A.O., as a person who had participated in the search in their house; the fourth applicant identified Mr V.G., also a RUBOP officer, as the person who had hit him during the searches. 64. Also on 9 August 2006, the first applicant stated, during questioning, that he disagreed with the way the face-to-face confrontations and identification parades had been carried out. The record of the questioning, which the first applicant refused to sign, contains his allegations that these events had been arranged so as to exclude the individuals who had beaten them, and that the members of both families refused to attend them in the future. The case file also contains the investigator’s reports of 9 August and 10 September 2006 and 24 April 2007 which record that the first applicant’s behaviour had been hostile and that he had stated his disagreement with the manner in which the investigation was being conducted. 65. On 15 August 2006 during a face-to-face confrontation, the fifth applicant identified Mr V.G. as the person who had beaten his brothers, the third and fourth applicants. Mr V.G. denied this. Also on 15 August 2006, the fourth applicant identified Mr E.K., a RUBOP officer, as the person who had hit him in the back and neck. 66. On 24 August 2006 during a face-to-face confrontation, the second applicant identified Mr E.K. as the person who had beaten her sons and husband and had pushed her onto the floor. Mr E.K. denied that he, or other officers, had used violence. He also denied that he had taken the gun cartridge out of his pocket, insisting that he had found it in a kitchen drawer. On 18 December 2006, after the confrontation with the second applicant, the applicants’ representative noted that the investigator had refused to put a number of questions to ROVD officer Mr U. and had failed to record in full the second applicant’s statements about her son’s beatings. 7. The applicants’ attempts to access the file, complaints about the conduct of the investigation and interim procedural decisions 67. The applicants submitted that during the questioning they had been threatened by the investigators, openly or covertly. Moreover, the investigator had refused to record certain statements, especially ones relating to the ethnically motivated nature of the attacks. 68. On 5 July 2006 both applicant families wrote to the Kurgan Regional Prosecutor, seeking an update on the investigation into their complaints of racial insults and injuries. 69. On 17 August 2006 the first and second applicants complained to the Vargashinskiy prosecutor of bias on the part of the investigator. They referred to the threats made by him to the victims. They also argued that since the ROVD officers had been directly implicated in the alleged events, the victims were at risk of further abuse and asked for the suspects to be arrested. The first applicant stressed, in particular, that the investigator had refused to record the statements made during questioning about the ethnic insults directed at them, in particular at the third applicant and the eighth and ninth applicants, who had been told that they “would not be able to beget more Chechens”. 70. On 24 August 2006 the district prosecutor’s office dismissed a request by the applicants’ representative to obtain access to the criminal case file. 71. On 28 August 2006 the applicants’ complaint regarding the investigator was rejected by the district prosecutor. 72. On 6 November 2006 the applicants’ representative lodged a complaint with the Kurgan Regional Prosecutor concerning the failure to take the necessary steps to investigate the crime and to look into its ethnically motivated nature. The complaint stated that the face-to-face confrontations and the questioning of the victims had been used to exert pressure on the applicants and noted that the investigator had failed to react to the threats made to the victims by those conducting the search. On 23 November 2006 the district prosecutor’s office rejected this request as unfounded. 73. On 5 February 2007 the district prosecutor’s office suspended the investigation for the first time owing to the failure to identify the alleged perpetrators. The eleven-page document summarised the steps taken so far and indicated that all the men who had taken part in the searches had been identified and questioned. At least some of them had been identified by the victims as the persons who had hit them. The document nevertheless concluded that –while certain evidence supported the applicants’ allegation of ill-treatment – it appeared impossible to reconcile the inconsistencies in the witnesses’ statements with the results of the face-to-face confrontations and identification parades, which was necessary in order to identify the police officers to be charged. This decision was quashed on 6 April 2007, in response to a complaint by the applicants. 74. On 13 May 2007 the district prosecutor’s office again suspended the investigation owing to the failure to identify the alleged perpetrators. In this decision it was held that the applicants’ statements had been inconsistent and that they had refused to take part in additional identification parades and face-to-face confrontations. It concluded: “The criminal file contains sufficient evidence that [the first to fifth, sixth and eighth applicants] were injured by police officers during the searches. ... The results of the forensic expert reports and the victims’ statements could serve as evidence [as to] where, how many times, by what means and by which officers the victims were hit on 24 March 2006 during the searches. However, the victim statements submitted during the questioning and the confrontations are mutually contradictory in part, and in parts are refuted by other evidence collected. ... [T]his gives rise to a critical attitude to these testimonies and undermines trust in [the victims]. In addition, the [special police force] officers were wearing masks, making it impossible to determine which of them hit which victim, where exactly and how many times. The special police officers deny that they beat the victims. The above makes it impossible to determine levels of individual guilt and to bring charges against any members of the Vargashinskiy ROVD, the RUBOP or [the special police force].” 75. On 21 May 2007 that decision was set aside by the district prosecutor’s office in response to a complaint by the applicants. The investigation was resumed and several other police officers were questioned. On 28 June 2007 it was again suspended, for reasons similar to those quoted in the decision of 13 May 2007. The document concluded: “The file contains sufficient evidence that [the first to fifth, sixth and eighth applicants] were injured by police officers during the searches. However, given the inconsistencies in their later testimonies, it could not be established with certitude that the injuries were indeed caused by any particular officer and in the circumstances as described by the victims”. 76. According to the information submitted by the Government along with their observations in July 2012, in June 2012 that decision was quashed and the investigation was resumed by the Kurgan Regional Directorate of the Investigative Committee. No documents relating to this latest stage of proceedings have been submitted and it does not appear that it has produced any results. 77. On 19 December 2006, pursuant to Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the applicants lodged a complaint concerning the actions of the district prosecutor’s office with the Vargashinskiy District Court. In their complaint the applicants alleged that the opening of the investigation had been delayed, that it had failed to take into account the ethnically motivated nature of the attack, despite the consistent testimonies to this effect, that the investigator had shown bias and threatened the victims, that their complaints to the district prosecutor’s office had been futile, that they had not been allowed access to most of the documents in the case file, that no one had been charged with any crime and that all servicemen implicated in the events had been questioned only as witnesses. The applicants requested that the prosecutor’s office be ordered to replace the investigator and to ensure proper supervision, in addition to reviewing the complaints about the ethnically motivated nature of the attack. 78. On 9 January 2007 the Vargashinskiy Distrct Court partly dismissed the applicants’ request and partly refused to consider it on the merits. In respect of the alleged failure to investigate the ethnically motivated nature of the crime and the investigator’s bias, the court found that these issues fell within the prosecutor’s professional discretion. The applicants appealed, referring in particular to the lack of investigation of the ethnically motivated nature of the crime. 79. On 27 March 2007 the Kurgan Regional Court upheld the decision of 9 January 2007.

5. The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Cheboksary. 6. On 20 September 2002 the applicant was charged with manslaughter, an offence under Article 111 § 4 of the Criminal Code. The charge was based, in particular, on the investigator’s interviews with Mr M., Mr O. and Mr I., eyewitnesses to the incident. 7. Mr M. and Mr O. stated that on 28 August 2002 they and their friend Mr S. had had a fight with three strangers. Mr S., drunk, had kicked a red VAZ car which was passing by. The driver and two passengers had emerged from the car and the driver had hit Mr S. twice in the face. Seven or eight people had then joined in with the strangers and started to hit them. Mr M., Mr O. and Mr. S. had all lost consciousness. On the next day, 29 August 2001, Mr S. had been found lying in the street by a passer-by and had been taken to hospital, where he had died from the wounds received during the fight. 8. During subsequent interviews with the investigator, Mr M. and Mr O. changed their testimony slightly, stating that Mr S. had fallen immediately after the driver had hit him in the face. They had not seen whether Mr S. had been hit by any of the other persons involved in the fight. 9. Mr I. stated to the investigator that on 28 August 2002 he had been sitting in a bar. He had seen a red VAZ car stop near the bar and three people get out of it. Two of them had entered the bar, while the driver had approached a group of three people outside. They had started to argue and then to fight. He had left immediately. 10. The trial started on 21 January 2003 before the Kalininskiy District Court of Cheboksary. The applicant pleaded not guilty. He admitted that on 30 August 2002 he had had a quarrel with three strangers. He had hit one of them twice in the chest and retreated to a nearby bar. He had seen the men leave the scene. He insisted that the incident had happened on 30 August 2002 rather than on 28 August 2002. He was sure of the date because he had taken his mother to the tax office on that day. He requested the court to hear the tax inspector, Ms Sh., who could confirm that his mother had paid her taxes on 30 August 2002. His request was rejected on the ground that a statement by Ms Sh. would not be relevant. 11. Several witnesses attended the trial. One of them stated to the court that he had seen the applicant in the bar during the evening of 28 August 2002. He had not, however, seen the fight. Another witness testified that during the evening of 28 August 2008 he had seen Mr M. with bruises on his face, and that on the next day Mr O. had told him that he, Mr M. and Mr S. had been beaten up by three strangers. Mr S.’s wife and brother testified that they had seen Mr S. for the last time on the morning of 28 August 2002. Another witness told the court that he had found Mr S. badly injured and unconscious in the street not far from the bar one morning at the end of August 2002. Another witness stated that during the evening of 28 August 2002 he had driven three men to a bar in his red VAZ car. Another red VAZ car had been parked near the bar and three persons had been standing nearby talking among themselves. He had overheard them saying that they had hit someone who had kicked the wheel of their car. Some time before that, he had seen a man carrying another man. 12. The trial court also examined an expert medical report submitted by the prosecutor. The finding of the medical experts was that Mr S. had died of a craniocerebral injury. They also recorded numerous bruises on his head and body and found that he had received no fewer than nine blows. 13. Finally, a police report stating that Mr S. had been discovered lying in the street on 29 August 2002 was also examined. 14. The witnesses Mr O., Mr M., and Mr I. did not attend the trial. On 21 January 2003 the Kalininskiy District Court ordered bailiffs to ensure their appearance in court on 22 January 2003. 15. It can be seen from the bailiff’s report of 22 January 2003 that between 7.45 and 9.35 a.m. on that day he visited the addresses for Mr O. and Mr I. provided during the preliminary investigation. It was confirmed by the new occupants of the flat that Mr O. no longer lived at that address. Mr I. was at work and the bailiffs left the summons to appear with his daughter. 16. On 22 January 2003 the witnesses did not attend. The applicant insisted that the court obtain their attendance. The Kalininskiy District Court adjourned the hearing until 3 February 2003 and again ordered the bailiffs to ensure the witnesses’ appearance in court. 17. It can be seen from the bailiffs’ reports dated 31 January and 3 February 2003 that Mr O. no longer lived at the address indicated in the case file, as confirmed by the owner of the flat. They visited Mr O.’s mother, who stated that her son lived in Cheboksary but that she did not know either his home address or the address of his employer. According to Mr M.’s mother, Mr M. lived on the university campus in Cheboksary. When the bailiffs visited the campus, Mr M. was not at home. They left the summons to appear with the campus guard. According to Mr I.’s daughter, Mr I. was at his country house. She agreed to pass the summons onto him. 18. The witnesses did not attend the hearing of 3 October 2003. The Kalininskiy District Court ordered the bailiffs to ensure the witnesses’ appearance in court on 7 February 2003. 19. The bailiffs’ report dated 7 February 2003 states that on that day the bailiffs visited the addresses for Mr I. and Mr O. provided during the preliminary investigation. According to his daughter, Mr I. was on a business trip outside the Chuvashiya Republic and she did not know when he was to return. Mr O. no longer lived at the address indicated in the case file. 20. On 7 February 2003 a new decision was issued by the Kalininskiy District Court, ordering bailiffs to ensure the witnesses’ attendance on 11 February 2003. 21. On 10 February 2003 the bailiffs went again to Mr I.’s address and discovered that he had not yet returned from his business trip. They then went to the address for Mr O. indicated in the case file and the new occupants of the flat told them for a fourth time that Mr O. had moved out. The bailiffs then visited Mr O.’s mother, who told them that she did not know her son’s address in Cheboksary. They also visited Mr M.’s mother, who stated that her son did not live with her. 22. On 11 February 2003 the witnesses did not attend. The prosecutor asked for the transcript of the statements given by Mr O., Mr M., and Mr I. to the investigator to be read out. The applicant and his counsel did not object. The transcript was read out. On the same day, the Kalininskiy District Court ordered the bailiffs to ensure the witnesses’ attendance on 12 February 2003. 23. On 12 February 2003 the bailiffs went to the addresses for Mr I. and Mr O. indicated in the case file. Neither of them was at home. The bailiffs noted in their report of the same date that in any event it had long been known that Mr O. did not live at that address and that Mr I. was on an extended business trip. 24. At the hearing of 12 February 2003, the applicant insisted that the court obtain the attendance of Mr O., Mr M., and Mr I., and objected to the termination of the trial as long as those witnesses had not been questioned. The Kalininskiy District Court nevertheless decided to terminate the trial on the ground that all attempts to obtain the attendance of the witnesses had been unsuccessful. 25. On 13 February 2003 the Kalininskiy District Court of Cheboksary convicted the applicant of manslaughter, finding that his guilt was sufficiently established by the statements made by Mr O., Mr M., and Mr I. during the pre-trial investigation, the statements of the other witnesses made during the trial, and the medical and police reports. The court rejected the applicant’s arguments that he had hit Mr S. on the chest rather than on the head and that Mr S. had left the scene uninjured, finding that they were refuted by the testimony of Mr O. and Mr M., who had witnessed the incident. The applicant was sentenced to eleven years and six months’ imprisonment. 26. In his grounds of appeal the applicant complained, in particular, that the District Court had not secured the attendance of Mr O., Mr M., and Mr I. at the trial. He submitted that he had been misled into agreeing to the reading out of the transcript of their statements to the investigator. The judge had not warned him that the reading out of the transcript would substitute for the questioning of the witnesses in court. Throughout the trial he had insisted that those witnesses should be questioned. He had also objected to the termination of the trial as long as the witnesses had not been questioned. 27. On 26 February 2003 the Kalininskiy District Court held that Mr O., Mr M., and Mr I. had not been questioned in court because, despite the efforts of the bailiffs, they could not be traced. In such circumstances it was permissible for the witnesses’ statements made at the pre-trial stage to be read out at the trial by virtue of Article 281 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 28. On 27 March 2003 the Supreme Court of the Chuvashiya Republic upheld the judgment on appeal. The appeal court remained silent on the issue of the attendance of witnesses.

10. The applicant was born in October 1984 and currently lives in Bulgaria. 11. In November 1990, at the age of six, the applicant lawfully entered Austria together with his parents and two siblings. Subsequently, he was legally resident in Austria. His parents, who were lawfully employed, acquired Austrian nationality. The applicant attended school in Austria. 12. In late 1998 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant. He was suspected of, inter alia, having broken into cars, shops and vending machines; having stolen empties from a stock ground; having forced another boy to steal 1,000 Austrian schillings from the latter’s mother; having pushed, kicked and bruised this boy; and of having used a motor vehicle without the owner’s authorisation. 13. On 8 March 1999 the applicant was granted an unlimited settlement permit (Niederlassungsbewilligung). 14. On 7 September 1999 the Vienna Juvenile Court (Jugendgerichtshof) convicted the applicant on twenty-two counts of aggravated gang burglary and attempted aggravated gang burglary (gewerbsmäßiger Bandendiebstahl), forming a gang (Bandenbildung), extortion (Erpressung), assault (Körperverletzung), and unauthorised use of a vehicle (unbefugter Gebrauch eines Fahrzeugs), offences committed between November 1998 and June 1999. He was sentenced to eighteen months’ imprisonment, thirteen of which were suspended on probation. The sentence was accompanied by an order to undergo drug therapy. 15. On 11 February 2000 the applicant was arrested and further criminal proceedings were opened against him relating to a series of burglaries committed between June 1999 and January 2000. The applicant and his accomplices were suspected of having broken into shops or restaurants, where they stole cash and goods. On 11 February 2000 the Vienna Juvenile Court remanded him in custody. 16. On 25 May 2000 the Vienna Juvenile Court convicted the applicant on eighteen counts of aggravated burglary and attempted aggravated burglary, and sentenced him to fifteen months’ imprisonment. When fixing the sentence the court noted the applicant’s confession as a mitigating circumstance, and the number of offences committed and the rapid relapse into crime after the last conviction as aggravating circumstances. It also observed that the applicant, though still living with his parents, had completely escaped their educational influence, had repeatedly been absent from home and had dropped out of school. It further noted that the applicant had failed to comply with the order to undergo drug therapy. Consequently, the suspension of the prison term imposed by the judgment of 7 September 1999 was revoked. Following the Vienna Juvenile Court’s judgment, the applicant served his prison term. 17. On 3 January 2001 the Vienna Federal Police Authority (Bundespolizeidirektion), relying on section 36(1) and 2(1) of the Aliens Act 1997 (Fremdengesetz), imposed a ten-year exclusion order on the applicant. Having regard to the applicant’s convictions, it found that it was contrary to the public interest to allow him to stay in Austria any longer. Considering the applicant’s relapse into crime after his first conviction, the public interest in the prevention of disorder and crime outweighed the applicant’s interest in staying in Austria. 18. The applicant, assisted by counsel, appealed. He submitted that the exclusion order violated his rights under Article 8 of the Convention as he was a minor who had come to Austria at the age of six, his entire family lived in Austria and he had no relatives in Bulgaria. He also referred to section 38(1)(4) of the Aliens Act 1997, pursuant to which an exclusion order could not be issued against an alien who had been lawfully residing in Austria from an early age. 19. By a decision of 19 July 2001, the Vienna Public Security Authority (Sicherheitsdirektion) dismissed the appeal. It confirmed the Federal Police Authority’s finding. 20. On 17 August 2001 the applicant lodged complaints both with the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof) and the Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichthof). He stressed that he had come to Austria at the age of six, had attended school in Austria and could not speak Bulgarian. He had no relatives or other social contacts in Bulgaria. He also stressed the fact that he was still a minor. 21. On 18 September 2001 the Administrative Court dismissed the complaint and found that the exclusion order was justified under Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. It observed that the applicant had come to Austria only at the age of six, whereas – according to its constant case-law – section 38(1)(4) of the Aliens Act 1997 prohibited an exclusion order only in respect of aliens who had been legally resident from the age of three or younger. Considering the gravity and number of offences committed by the applicant, the fact that the first conviction had rapidly been followed by a second one and the severity of the penalties imposed, it found that the exclusion order did not constitute a disproportionate interference with the applicant’s rights under Article 8, despite his lengthy residence and family ties in Austria. 22. By a decision of 19 September 2001, the Constitutional Court suspended the effects of the exclusion order pending its decision. 23. The applicant was released from prison on 24 May 2002 not having benefited from early release. According to the information given by counsel at the hearing, the applicant finished school during his prison term and helped in his father’s transport business after his release. 24. On 25 November 2002 the Constitutional Court declined to deal with the applicant’s complaint for lack of prospects of success. 25. In December 2002 a number of unsuccessful attempts were made to serve an order on the applicant to leave Austria. 26. On 18 August 2003 the Vienna Federal Police Authority issued a fresh order requiring the applicant to leave Austria. 27. On 14 October 2003 the order was served on the applicant at his parents’ address and subsequently the Vienna Federal Police Authority ordered his detention with a view to his expulsion. He was arrested on 27 November 2003. 28. On 22 December 2003 the applicant was deported to Sofia. According to information given by counsel at the hearing, the applicant did not commit any further offences in Bulgaria and has found employment there. 29. At the hearing, the Government informed the Court that the exclusion order will expire on 3 January 2011, that is ten years after its issue (see paragraph 17 above).

4. The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Warsaw. 5. On 22 June 2005 the Katowice Appeal Prosecutor (Prokuratur Prokuratury Apelacyjnej) charged the applicant with fraud and dealing in stolen goods committed in an organised criminal group. 6. On 29 June 2005 the Katowice District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) remanded the applicant in custody in view of the reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offences in question. It further considered that there was a risk that he would obstruct the proper conduct of the investigation. The court also stressed the likelihood that a heavy penalty would be imposed on him. 7. In the course of the investigation the applicant’s detention was extended regularly by the Katowice Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) and the Wrocław Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny). The courts repeated the grounds originally given for his detention. The applicant appealed unsuccessfully against the subsequent decisions. 8. On 13 and 30 October and 6 December 2005 the applicant lodged unsuccessful applications with the Appeal Prosecutor for his detention to be lifted and replaced by another preventive measure. 9. On 14 February 2006 the Wrocław Court of Appeal did not extend the applicant’s pre-trial detention. The court prohibited the applicant from leaving the country and ordered police supervision. 10. The applicant submits that despite the Court of Appeal’s decision to release him he was kept in detention until 17 February 2006, the date when new charges were laid against him and the Katowice District Court remanded him in custody in another set of proceedings. 11. On 17 February 2006 the Katowice Appeal Prosecutor charged the applicant with armed robbery, hostage taking and fraud committed in an organised group. 12. On the same date the Katowice District Court remanded the applicant in custody in view of the reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offences in question. It further considered that there was a risk that he would obstruct the proper conduct of the investigation. It referred to the complexity of the case and the large number of persons involved. The court also stressed the likelihood that a heavy penalty would be imposed on him. The applicant unsuccessfully appealed against the decision. 13. On 24 February and 30 May 2006 the applicant lodged applications with the Prosecutor of Appeal for his detention to be lifted and replaced by another preventive measure. He referred to his state of health and the deterioration of his family relationships. On 24 March and 5 June 2006 respectively the Prosecutor of Appeal dismissed his applications. 14. On 8 May 2006 the Katowice Regional Court extended the applicant’s detention. The court repeated the grounds previously given by the District Court. 15. Subsequently, in the course of the proceedings the applicant’s detention was extended regularly by the Katowice Regional Court and the Katowice Court of Appeal. The courts repeated the grounds originally given for his detention. The applicant appealed unsuccessfully against the subsequent decisions. 16. In the meantime, on 13 July 2006 and 22 January 2007 the applicant lodged applications with the Appeal Prosecutor requesting permission to call his daughter. Respectively, on 24 July 2006 and 5 February 2007 the Prosecutor refused his requests, referring in his decisions to the prohibition on using telephone and other communication devices by persons in pre-trial detention. 17. On 30 October 2007 the Katowice Regional Court sentenced the applicant to four years’ imprisonment and ordered his release. It appears that he was released on the same day. 18. The proceedings are still pending before the appellate court. 19. The applicant submitted that during his detention his correspondence with the Registry had been censored by the authorities. He produced a Court envelope sent on 25 October 2006, which bears the following stamp: “Censored, date ...” (Cenzurowano, dnia ...) and an illegible signature. It appears that the envelope had been cut open and subsequently resealed with adhesive tape. 20. He also produced a Court letter dated 27 March 2007, which bears a stamp: “Prosecutor of the Appeal Prosecution Office in Kraków delegated to the Katowice Appeal Prosecution Office, W. M.” (Prokurator Prokuratury Apelacyjnej w Krakowie del. Do Prokuratury Apelacyjnej w Katowicach, W. M.), a handwritten “date ..., censored” (Ocenzurowano) and an illegible signature. The envelope in which the letter was delivered bears the following stamp: “Censored, date ...” It appears that the envelope had been cut open and subsequently resealed with adhesive tape. 21. On 9 May 2007 the Court received a letter from the applicant dated 14 March 2007. It bears the following stamp: “Prosecutor of the Appeal Prosecution Office in Kraków delegated to the Katowice Appeal Prosecution Office, W.M.” (Prokurator Prokuratury Apelacyjnej w Krakowie del. do Prokuratury Apelacyjnej w Katowicach, W.M.), a handwritten “date..., censored” (Ocenzurowano) and an illegible signature.

5. The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Budapest. 6. In July 2000 the applicant and her husband bought a flat which was part of an undivided shared property with one lot register number. Two thirds of the flat were registered in the applicant’s name and the rest in her husband’s name. Upon their subsequent divorce, an agreement was concluded by the applicant and her former husband on the division of the matrimonial property. According to this agreement, the applicant was to acquire the entirety of the property by buying his part of the flat. 7. In April 2005 the applicant entered into an unregistered partnership with Mr. Gy.B. He paid the former husband’s share of the apartment, and later officially acquired ownership of this part of the flat by virtue of a sales agreement concluded with the former husband on 17 January 2006. 8. Gy.B. made certain renovations to the property, creating two separate apartments. While the work was being carried out, the applicant moved into Gy.B.’s house with her children. She left him several times, after which she always returned to him. 9. In March 2006 the applicant moved back into her apartment. Gy.B. had his own keys to the flat and slept there regularly. Later, on an unspecified date, he moved into the apartment to live with the applicant. Upon his request, the Central Document Bureau registered his place of residence at the applicant’s address on 24 November 2006. 10. Barring some short periods of separation, their relationship lasted until about January 2007. Following this date, however, Gy.B. continued to stay in the jointly owned apartment against the applicant’s wishes. 11. On 5 April 2007 Gy.B. sold his part of the flat to a third party. However, he later initiated proceedings against the buyer, challenging the validity of the sales agreement. These proceedings are still pending (see paragraph 28 below). 12. Meanwhile, the relationship between the applicant and Gy.B. deteriorated, resulting in regular disputes involving mutual verbal and physical assaults. 13. A medical report dated 27 October 2005, the first in the case, notes contusions of the applicant’s left ring-finger, left lower arm and left ankle. On 1 February 2008 the Budapest XX/XXI/XXIII District Court established that these injuries had been the result of assaults initiated by the applicant, to which Gy.B.’s reaction was considered lawful self-defence. It found the applicant guilty of disorderly conduct and released her on parole. This judgment became final in the absence of an appeal. 14. Between this event and August 2010, twelve more medical reports were delivered, all of which recorded contusions, mostly on the applicant’s head, face, chest and neck, with an expected healing time of eight to ten days. 15. On 8 December 2006 the applicant filed a criminal complaint against Gy.B. for rape. On 16 April 2008 he was acquitted by the District Court. It found that the applicant’s allegations were not credible and therefore Gy.B.’s guilt could not be established with the required certainty. This judgment became final in the absence of an appeal. 16. A medical report of 25 June 2007 states that the applicant’s left little finger had been violently broken, with a healing time of six to eight weeks. In connection with this event, criminal proceedings were initiated against both the applicant and Gy.B. On 19 May 2009 the District Court found Gy.B. guilty of assault, and the applicant guilty of grievous bodily harm. Gy.B. was released on parole for one year, the applicant for three years. No appeal was filed against this judgment. According to the findings of fact, Gy.B. had started verbally insulting the applicant and then assaulted her. The police had intervened and called on Gy.B. to cease the assault. However, as soon as the police had left, he had continued beating the applicant. The following day the dispute had continued with mutual insults. Gy.B. had poured water on the applicant, who had picked up a kitchen knife and lightly stabbed it in the air several times in Gy.B.’s direction. In self-defence, Gy.B. had grabbed the blade of the knife. The applicant had nevertheless pulled it out from his hand, cutting his hand and causing him an injury with a healing time of eight to twelve weeks. 17. On 22 April 2008 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against Gy.B. for assault before the District Court. On 11 June 2008 the court held a reconciliatory meeting where she further requested the District Court to issue a restraining order against him due to the regular abuse. On 18 December 2008 a hearing was scheduled concerning the request for a restraining order. However, the applicant did not attend due to a public transport strike planned for that day. The first hearing finally took place on 10 April 2009. The following hearing was to be held on 12 October 2009. However, it was postponed upon Gy.B.’s request. On 8 January 2010 the District Court finally delivered a decision concerning the request for a restraining order. In its reasoning, the court stated: “... There were, or are, five sets of criminal proceedings pending before this court between the accuser and the accused. In the course of the proceedings conducted so far, the court has established that the bad relationship which has developed between the parties can be imputed to both parties. ... The court heard both the accuser and the accused at the preparatory hearing, established that the conditions set down by the law had not been met, and therefore dismissed the accuser’s request. ...” 18. This decision was upheld on appeal by the Budapest Regional Court on 18 February 2010. According to the court: “... The reasons for the first-instance court’s decision are correct. Section 138/A(2) clearly defines the conditions where restraint, as a coercive measure, may be ordered. These circumstances were examined one by one and quite thoroughly by the first-instance court, which came to the conclusion that the conditions for a restraining order had not been met. The second-instance court agrees with these reasons and therefore upholds the decision. ...” The criminal proceedings against Gy.B. for assault are still pending before the first-instance court. 19. On 11 June 2008 the Budapest XX/XXI/XXXIII District Prosecutor’s Office discontinued the investigations initiated against Gy.B. for harassment. According to the applicant’s criminal complaint, he was jealous and had threatened to kill her and anyone she let into the flat. She also claimed that on several occasions he had tried to suffocate her with a pillow. The Prosecutor’s Office established that there was animosity between the parties and that the applicant’s allegations alone were not sufficient to prove the commission of any crime. 20. According to the applicant, on 18 December 2009 Gy.B. inflicted contusions on her back, chest and wrist in the course of a fight. On that day, she lodged a criminal complaint against him with the Budapest XX/XXIII District Police Department for insult and assault. Criminal proceedings against an unknown individual were initiated for grievous bodily harm. However, on 14 July 2011 the investigation was discontinued, as a forensic medical report established that the injuries were not serious enough. 21. On 7 January 2010 the applicant lodged another criminal complaint against Gy.B. for several alleged assaults committed in December 2009 and January 2010. Gy.B.’s psychiatric examination was ordered. Due to his lack of co-operation, the expert could not form an opinion about his mental state. These investigations are pending. 22. On 12 January 2010 the District Court acquitted Gy.B. of the charges of assault allegedly committed on 3 October 2007, in the absence of sufficient evidence. This judgment was upheld on appeal by the Regional Court on 1 June 2010. 23. A medical report of 15 April 2010 records that the applicant suffered brain concussion and lost consciousness following physical abuse resulting in injuries with a healing time of ten to twelve days. She was kept in hospital for two days. Following this event, another dispute arose between the cohabitees, leading to assault on 26 April 2010. 24. On 3 May 2010 the applicant therefore lodged another criminal complaint with the District Police Department against Gy.B., who also lodged a criminal complaint in connection with the same events. The cases were joined. On the same day the applicant also requested the court to issue a restraining order in respect of Gy.B. based on section 138/A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The request for a restraining order was dismissed on 10 June 2010. According to the reasoning: “... At the preparatory hearing the court heard both the accused and the accuser and established that the conditions set by law – in particular the phrases “particularly in view of the nature of the criminal act ... and the relationship between the accused and the aggrieved party” [sic] had not been met, therefore the accuser’s request was dismissed.” 25. The Regional Court upheld the first-instance decision on 16 July 2010. It found: “... Several criminal proceedings were initiated or are pending against the parties, and the inobservance of cohabitation rules is typical in respect of both parties. No evidence has arisen in the present proceedings that the proceedings would be hampered by [Gy.B.] influencing or intimidating the aggrieved party. The risk of recidivism is supported in respect of both parties by the previous proceedings, but the ordering of a coercive measure only in respect of one party – in the present case against Gy.B. – is not justified due to the involvement of the aggrieved party. ...” 26. The District Court delivered judgment on 6 July 2011. It found both the applicant and Gy.B. guilty of assault and ordered them to pay a fine. It established that on the first occasion it had been the applicant who had initiated the assault and Gy.B. had acted in legitimate self-defence. On the second occasion, it had been Gy.B. who had initiated the fight and the applicant had acted in legitimate self-defence. 27. In sum, the applicant requested the help of the authorities on many occasions, lodging criminal complaints for assault and harassment. Gy.B. also lodged several criminal complaints against the applicant. On four occasions, Gy.B. was acquitted of the charges (see paragraphs 13, 15, 22 and 26 above). On five occasions the applicant did not wish to continue the proceedings or failed to prosecute privately and the court thus discontinued them. Gy.B. was found guilty of assault on two occasions (see paragraphs 16 and 26 above), released on parole and ordered to pay a fine. Two other sets of criminal proceedings for assault are pending against him (see paragraphs 18 and 21 above). The applicant was also found guilty on several occasions (see paragraphs 13, 16 and 26 above) of disorderly conduct, grievous bodily harm and assault, respectively. Three investigations against her – for grievous bodily harm, harassment and theft – were discontinued. Criminal proceedings for trespass are pending against the applicant (see paragraph 35 below). 28. On 3 November 2005 Gy.B. initiated civil proceedings before the Regional Court against the applicant, requesting the court to acknowledge the renovation and building he had carried out in the apartment. Upon his request, the proceedings were suspended on two occasions, from January 2006 until June 2006 and from 30 April 2008 until 19 November 2008, pending the outcome of separate proceedings initiated against third parties for the annulment of the sales agreement. The applicant’s appeal against the suspension was dismissed on 19 November 2008. 29. Meanwhile, on 9 August 2006 the applicant initiated civil proceedings against Gy.B. before the District Court, requesting the court to establish the ownership of the apartment. On 2 March 2007 the proceedings were suspended until the termination of the proceedings mentioned in paragraph 28 above. No appeal was submitted against the suspension. 30. Upon a criminal complaint lodged by the applicant on 29 November 2006, regulatory offence proceedings were also initiated before the Budapest XX District Mayor’s Office against Gy.B. for trespass. On 2 August 2007 the proceedings were discontinued, as Gy.B. was, at that time, registered as the property’s owner in the land register. The applicant’s complaint against the decision was dismissed on 23 August 2007. The applicant did not seek to prosecute privately. 31. In March 2007 Gy.B. changed the locks on the apartment but did not provide the applicant with keys. Therefore, the applicant requested the protection of her possession from the Budapest XX District Notary. On 13 August 2007 the Notary found for her and ordered Gy.B. to provide her with keys to the apartment. 32. On 11 May 2007 the applicant changed the locks on her door in an attempt to prevent Gy.B. from re-entering the apartment. On the same day he arrived with police officers who obliged her to provide access to him, as his registered place of residence was the apartment. 33. On 19 March 2008 the applicant requested the District Notary to delete her address as the place of residence of Gy.B. and to order him to leave the apartment. However, as it was not the competent authority to do so, the notary dismissed her request without an examination on the merits, on 2 June 2011. Moreover, as Gy.B. was actually living in the apartment, the deletion of her address as his place of residence was not possible. The applicant did not lodge an appeal against that decision. 34. Further to this, on 9 April 2008 the applicant initiated civil proceedings before the District Court, requesting the court to order Gy.B. to leave the apartment. The proceedings are still pending, the court having suspended them on 5 September 2008 pending the outcome of the property dispute between Gy.B. and the applicant mentioned in paragraph 28 above. 35. On 2 August 2010 the applicant again changed the locks on the doors in order to prevent Gy.B. entering the apartment. The District Police Department initiated criminal proceedings against her for trespass. The applicant lodged a complaint in this connection, which was dismissed on 6 September 2010.

6. The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Turku. 7. At the end of 1995 the applicant was questioned by the police about suspected dishonesty as a debtor. Subsequently, charges were brought against him. The trial before the Helsinki District Court (käräjäoikeus, tingsrätten) involved 47 days of hearings. The court received testimony from the defendants, the complainants and over 40 witnesses. On 29 May and 10 June 1998 the prosecution presented documentary evidence, including some documents drawn up by a Mr G., who was working off-shore for a bank and who, in answer to a letter rogatory sent by the National Bureau of Investigation (keskusrikospoliisi, centralkriminalpolisen) to the Guernsey authorities, had produced documents (including “notes for archives” pertaining to meetings on 3 and 22 June 1993 and charts) related to a plan to transfer funds. 8. On 29 January 1999 the applicant was convicted of four counts of dishonesty as a debtor and four counts of aggravated tax fraud. He was sentenced to four years and two months' imprisonment. The District Court judgment ran to 163 pages. In short and in so far as relevant, the court found on the basis of, inter alia, the testimonies of J.S., S., the applicant and his brother and the documentary material, including the documents obtained from the Guernsey authorities, that the applicant and his brother had discussed the planned transfers of assets with G. It also found that the documentary evidence pertaining to the off-shore companies and the transfer of moneys proved that the assets acquired from the sale of the “bank group I.” had been transferred via companies specified in G.'s charts to trusts, the beneficiaries of which the brothers had appointed. As both brothers had been present during the negotiations with G. on 3 June 1993 and the plan to transfer funds had been proved to have materialised, the court found that they had acted together in, inter alia, removing the funds from Finland. 9. The applicant appealed to the Helsinki Court of Appeal (hovioikeus, hovrätten). In his grounds of appeal he submitted, inter alia, that the documents drawn up by G., resident in Guernsey, who had not been questioned during the pre-trial investigations or heard as a witness before the District Court, should not have been taken into account as he had not had a possibility to respond to that important evidence. 10. In its decisions of 23 and 24 October 2000 the Court of Appeal refused, as being unnecessary, the request of the applicant's co-accused brother that G. be heard as a witness. It stated that it would provide further reasons in its judgment. 11. On 31 October 2000 the Court of Appeal held a preparatory hearing. The applicant's brother unsuccessfully renewed the request for G. to be heard as a witness. 12. The first hearing took place on 8 November 2000. The parties and altogether 22 witnesses gave oral evidence, of whom three were fresh witnesses. The hearing of 27 other proposed witnesses had been rejected. 13. On 30 March 2001 the Court of Appeal convicted the applicant of six counts of dishonesty as a debtor, four counts of aggravated tax fraud and five counts of aiding and abetting accounting offences. It sentenced him to five years and eight months' imprisonment and ordered his immediate detention. He also lost his military rank. 14. As regarded the reasons for not hearing G. as a witness, the court held, inter alia, that: “The Court of Appeal notes that no request to hear G. as a witness was made in the District Court although the documents relating to the plan to transfer moneys from the “bank group I.”, had been presented at the hearings of 29 May and 10 June 1998 ... Also [the applicant's brother, who was a co-defendant] relied, as written evidence, on [some] documents drawn up by G. without requesting that G. be heard as a witness ... The documents allegedly drawn up by G. have not been drawn up for the purposes of the pending proceedings. The import of the documents can be assessed without hearing him as a witness. The question whether it is necessary to hear him as a witness depends solely on whether such a hearing could produce relevant new information. In assessing this question the Court of Appeal takes into account the fact that in the District Court G. was not proposed as a witness and the fact that the parties have been provided with an opportunity to put forward all their opinions concerning the content and reliability of the documents during the trial. The Court of Appeal notes that the documents in question have been requested by the public prosecutor and the National Bureau of Investigation by sending letters rogatory to the Guernsey authorities. The Court of Appeal does not have any reason to suspect that the documents were drawn up by someone other than G. ... The documents clearly indicate that there has been a deliberate conspiracy to transfer the assets acquired from the sale of the “bank group I.” to companies established abroad and to invest the moneys. The transfer of assets has been conducted, as later explained in detail in chapter 6.2.2, by order of ... [the applicant and his co-accused brother]. The question whether G. himself thought that he was involved only in legal investment activities is therefore not relevant. The documents drawn up by G. are however relevant in assessing ... [the applicant's and his co-accused brother's] possible guilt of the offence of dishonesty as a debtor ... As becomes manifest in the reasons given in considering the charges, the Court of Appeal has not however decided the matter basing itself entirely on the documents in question. The court has instead assessed the value of the documents in an overall context, [in Finnish kokonaisyhteydessä] in which G. cannot have anything relevant to say. The Court of Appeal has heard witness S., as requested ... about the events relating to the documents. The testimony of S., which in [the applicant's brother's] opinion proves the content of the discussions with G., has thus been taken into account ... The Court of Appeal holds that the requirements of a fair trial do not require that G. be heard as a witness either.” 15. The Court of Appeal judgment ran to 325 pages. In so far as relevant, the court principally endorsed the District Court's evaluation of the evidence. 16. The applicant sought leave to appeal. On 5 December 2001 the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen) refused leave to appeal.

7. On 28 December 1994 the Vlora Commission on Property Restitution and Compensation (“the Commission”) recognised the applicant’s and other heirs’ inherited title to a number of plots of land measuring 46,750 sq. m, of which 900 sq. m were restored to them. As the remaining plot of land was occupied, the Commission decided that the applicant and the other heirs would be compensated in one of the ways provided for by law in respect of 45,850 sq. m. The Commission could not determine the boundaries of a plot of land measuring 13,750 sq. m and did not decide on the recognition of the applicant’s inherited property rights. 8. On 8 March 2011 the Court delivered its judgment in the case of Eltari v. Albania, no. 16530/06 as regards the authorities’ failure to pay compensation in respect of a plot measuring 10,500 sq. m, which was part of the Commission decision. 9. To date, no compensation has been paid. 10. On 21 March 1996 the Lushnjë Commission recognised the applicants’ inherited property rights over a plot of land measuring 576 sq. m. Since the plot of land was occupied, the applicants would be compensated in one of the ways provided by law. The applicants submitted that they were the remaining heirs of the above plot of land in respect of which the Court had already delivered the judgment in the case of Hamzaraj v. Albania (no. 1) (no. 45264/04, 3 February 2009). 11. To date, no compensation has been paid to the applicants. 12. On 18 May 1995 the Tirana Commission recognised the applicants’ inherited property rights over a plot of land measuring 1,000 sq. m. It ordered that the plot of land should be entirely restored to the applicants. On 11 February and 14 December 2000 the Tirana District Court and the Tirana Court of Appeal amended the Commission decision and ordered that the applicants would be compensated in one of the ways provided for by law of which 200 sq. m were restored to them. Since the remaining plot of land measuring 800 sq. m was occupied, the applicants would be compensated in one of the ways provided by law. 13. To date, no compensation has been paid. 14. On 13 September 1996 the Tirana Commission recognised, amongst others, the applicants’ inherited property rights over a plot of land measuring 16,500 sq. m. Since the plot of land was occupied, the applicants would be compensated in one of the ways provided by law. 15. To date, no compensation has been paid. 16. On 25 October 1995 the Tirana Restitution and Compensation of Properties Commission (“the Commission”) recognised, amongst others, the applicants’ inherited property rights over a plot of land measuring 150,000 sq. m of which 29,700 sq. m were restored to them. Since the remaining plot land measuring 120,300 sq. m was occupied, the applicants would be compensated in one of the ways provided by law. 17. To date, no compensation has been paid. 18. On 10 December 1999 the Korçë Commission recognised the applicants’ inherited property rights over a plot of land measuring 11,000 sq. m of which 10,100 sq. m were to be compensated in one of the ways provided by law. 19. To date, no compensation has been paid. 20. On 23 October 1996 and 24 April 1998 the Korçë Commission recognised the applicant’s inherited property rights over a plot of land measuring 9,950 sq. m. Since the plot of land was occupied, the applicants would be compensated in one of the ways provided by law. 21. To date, no compensation has been paid. 22. On 7 July 2006 the Tirana Commission recognised the applicants’ inherited property rights over a plot of land measuring 800 sq. m. Since the plot of land was occupied, the applicants would be compensated in one of the ways provided by law. 23. To date, no compensation has been paid. 24. On 28 February 1995 the Tirana Commission recognised the applicant’s inherited property rights over a plot of land measuring 335 sq. m of which 162 sq. m were restored to him. Since the remaining plot land measuring 173 sq. m was occupied, the applicant would be compensated in one of the ways provided by law. 25. To date, no compensation has been paid. 26. On 28 February 1995 the Tirana Commission recognised the applicants’ inherited property rights over a plot of land measuring 910 sq. m of which 630 sq. m were restored to them. Since the remaining plot land measuring 280 sq. m was occupied, the applicants would be compensated in one of the ways provided by law. 27. To date, no compensation has been paid. 28. On 21 December 1995 and 22 April 1996 the Berat Commission recognised the applicant’s inherited property rights over a plot of land measuring 3,435 sq. m of which 130 sq. m were restored to him. Since the remaining plot land measuring 3,305 sq. m was occupied, the applicant would be compensated in one of the ways provided by law. 29. To date, no compensation has been paid. 30. On 10 August 2007 the Agency for Restitution and Compensation of Property (“the Agency”), which had replaced the Commission, recognised the applicant’s inherited property rights over a plot of land measuring 14,400 sq. m located in Vlora. Since the plot of land was occupied, the applicant would be compensated in one of the ways provided by law. 31. To date, no compensation has been paid.

5. The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Tyczyn. 6. The applicant is married and has children. Until 27 January 2000 she had been employed and paid social security contributions to the State. On 1 March 2000 the applicant was granted the right to a disability pension for a period of one year, effective from 28 January 2000. 7. On 29 January 2001 the applicant filed an application with the Rzeszów Social Security Board (Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych) to be granted the right to an early-retirement pension for persons raising children who, due to the seriousness of their health condition, required constant care, the so-called “EWK” pension. 8. Along with her application for a pension, the applicant submitted, among other documents concerning her son’s health condition, a medical certificate issued by a specialist medical centre on 20 October 2000. The certificate stated that the child (born in 1991) suffered from bronchial asthma, allergic rhinitis and faulty posture, and that he was in need of his parent’s constant care. 9. On 14 February 2001 the Rzeszów Social Security Board (“the SSB”) issued a decision granting the applicant the right to an early‑retirement pension as of 1 January 2001 in the net amount of 433 Polish zlotys (PLN), together with a child benefit in the amount of PLN 240. The pension was twice reassessed and in June 2002 it amounted to PLN 487 net. 10. On 8 May 2002 the Rzeszów Social Security Board asked the Main Social Security Board’s doctor (Główny Lekarz Orzecznik) to inform it whether the applicant’s son required the permanent care of a parent. On 20 June 2002 the doctor stated, on the basis of the medical documents, that the child could not be considered as ever having required such care. 11. On 17 July 2002 the Rzeszów Social Security Board issued simultaneously two decisions in respect of the applicant. By virtue of one decision, the payment of the applicant’s pension was discontinued as of 1 August 2002. By virtue of the other decision, the Board reopened the proceedings, revoked the initial decision granting a pension and eventually refused to award the applicant the right to an early-retirement pension under the scheme provided for by the 1989 Ordinance. 12. The applicant appealed against the respective decisions divesting her of the right to an early-retirement pension. She submitted that she should receive the benefit because her child required constant care, as confirmed by the medical certificate attached to the original application for a pension. Moreover, the applicant alleged that the revocation of her retirement pension was contrary to the principle of vested rights. 13. On 4 March 2004 the Rzeszow Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) dismissed the appeal. The Regional Court acknowledged that according to the medical expert appointed by the court the applicant’s son required constant care due to his chronic bronchial asthma. However, the applicant had discontinued her employment in January 2000 not in order to take care of her sick child but because she had been granted a disability pension. Consequently, the domestic court held that the applicant had been rightfully divested of her right to a pension under the scheme provided by the 1989 Ordinance as she had not satisfied the requirement of necessary permanent care. 14. The applicant further appealed against the first-instance judgment. 15. On 2 July 2004 the Rzeszów Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) dismissed the appeal. 16. On 14 December 2004 the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy) refused to entertain the cassation appeal lodged by the applicant. 17. Following the social security proceedings the applicant was not ordered to return her early-retirement benefits paid by the Social Security Board, despite the revocation of her right to the early-retirement pension. 18. The applicant submitted that after the withdrawal of the EWK pension she had been unemployed. She had not received unemployment benefit or any other benefits. In reply to the Government’s submissions, the applicant argued that her daughter, who indeed had been employed since 2006, lived in a separate household. 19. The Government submitted that after the revocation of the EWK pension the applicant had been registered in the Regional Labour Office as an unemployed person. Subsequently, between 22 March 2005 and 29 February 2008, between 24 June 2008 and 30 June 2009 and as from 10 July 2009 onwards, the applicant had been receiving an agricultural disability pension. The total net amount of that pension paid until 31 August 2010 had been PLN 33,186 (approximately PLN 550 monthly). Moreover, the applicant and her husband owned a farm of 0.69 hectares. The applicant’s daughter, born in 1985, had been employed since 2006. 20. In addition, the Government submitted information as regards the various types of social benefits available in Poland. However, they did not specify which of those benefits, if any, were available in the applicant’s situation. 21. Under the relevant laws currently in force, it appears that the applicant will qualify for a regular retirement pension in 2020. 22. Some 130 applications arising from a similar fact pattern have been brought to the Court. The majority of the applicants form the Association of Victims of the SSB (Stowarzyszenie Osób Poszkodowanych przez ZUS) (“the Association”), an organisation monitoring the practices of the Social Security Board in Poland, in particular in the Podkarpacki region. 23. Out of all applications lodged with the Court about twenty-four applicants decided not to lodge a cassation appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal given in their case. 24. One hundred-and-four applicants lodged cassation appeals against the final judgments given in their cases. The Supreme Court entertained and dismissed on the merits fifteen appeals. In eighty-one applications the Supreme Court refused to entertain cassation appeals on the ground that they did not raise any important legal issues or require the Supreme Court to give a new interpretation to legal provisions which raised serious doubts or gave rise to ambiguity in the jurisprudence of the domestic courts. In the remaining eight cases cassation appeals were rejected for failure to comply with various procedural requirements.

5. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Maribor. From 1991 to 1997 he lived with M.P. in an extramarital relationship. On 14 December 1993 the latter gave birth to their daughter, P. 6. In 1997 the applicant and M.P. separated and, with the assistance of the Maribor Social Work Centre (hereinafter “the Centre”), concluded an agreement determining the amount of child maintenance to be paid by the applicant for his daughter. Another agreement was concluded on 23 February 1998 setting up a provisional contact schedule governing the applicant’s contact with P. for the period from 24 February to 13 April 1998. 7. Having been unable to come to an agreement with M.P. as to a more permanent contact schedule, on 24 February 1998 the applicant asked the Centre to issue an order determining his contact rights. He sought contact with P. every Tuesday afternoon, every second Thursday afternoon, every other weekend, one week during the winter holiday and one month during the summer holiday. 8. It appears that, as of 13 April 1998, M.P. stopped letting the applicant have contact with P. 9. The first hearing in the case was scheduled for 18 June 1998 and subsequently adjourned at the request of M.P., who informed the Centre that she was taking holiday during the period in question. 10. On 14 June 1998 M.P. sent another letter to the Centre informing them that she would be living abroad in the period between 1 July 1998 and 31 August 1999 for the purposes of her doctoral studies. She requested that the contact proceedings be suspended during that period. 11. Further to the applicant’s objection to M.P.’s request for the suspension of the proceedings, the Centre’s social workers paid three visits to M.P.’s address in Maribor in order to establish whether she was still living in Slovenia. However, M.P. was not found at home on either occasion. 12. On 30 July 1998 the Centre sent a request to M.P.’s employer, Maribor University, to provide the address of her foreign residence. 13. On 26 August 1998 the applicant sought an interim order granting him contact with P. 14. On 4 September 1998 the Centre received a reply from Maribor University stating that M.P. was studying in Graz, Austria, but that they were unaware of her address. However, the university offered to serve M.P. with the summons to attend a hearing. The Centre scheduled a hearing for 22 October 1998, but the university was unable to reach M.P. and the hearing was adjourned. 15. On 29 October 1998 the Centre issued an interim order setting up a provisional contact schedule between the applicant and P. According to the order, the applicant was to have contact with P. once a month and for a week during both the winter and summer holidays. The applicant was supposed to pick up his daughter at M.P.’s permanent address in Maribor and bring her back to the same address. 16. Another hearing was scheduled for 10 December 1998 and subsequently adjourned, as the university was again unable to serve M.P. with the summons. 17. On 12 January 1999 Maribor University provided the Centre with the address of the Austrian university where M.P. was studying. The Centre thus sent the interim order of 29 October 1998 and a summons for a hearing scheduled for 11 February 1999 to M.P. at the address of that institution. 18. On 24 February 1999 M.P. appealed against the interim order of 29 October 1998, arguing that the provisional contact schedule could not be implemented, as she and her daughter were temporarily living in Graz, Austria. 19. On 1 March 1999 the Centre rejected M.P.’s appeal as out of time, whereupon she appealed to the Ministry of Labour, Family and Social Affairs (hereinafter “the Ministry”). 20. On 28 April and 18 June 1999 the Centre submitted the applicant’s requests for the enforcement of the interim order to the Maribor Administrative Unit. On 24 August 1999 the requests were granted; however, on 16 September 1999 M.P. appealed, claiming that the decision had not been correctly served on her. She also objected to the contents of the interim order. 21. On 27 September 1999 the Ministry upheld M.P.’s appeal against the interim order, quashed the order and remitted the issue of the provisional contact schedule for a fresh examination by the Centre. The Ministry found that the service of the interim order and the summons to the hearing of 11 February 1999 had not been effected in accordance with the rules of administrative procedure. The Ministry pointed out that in the event that a party was absent or lived abroad, he or she had to be invited to appoint a representative authorised to receive his or her official mail. As to the merits of the matter, the Ministry found that the facts of the case had not been duly established, owing to the difficulty of communicating with M.P. 22. On 7 October 1999 the Centre sent the Ministry’s decision, along with a request to M.P. to appoint a representative authorised to receive her official mail, to the Slovenian Embassy in Austria. The Embassy requested M.P. to collect the decision and the letter; however, she refused to do so. Subsequently, on 1 March 2000, M.P. was served with the documents at her workplace in Graz. 23. Meanwhile, on 5 January 2000 the Ministry also upheld M.P.’s appeal against the decision on the enforcement of the interim order. The case was remitted to the Maribor Administrative Unit and the enforcement proceedings were subsequently stayed as a result of the quashing of the interim order. 24. On 15 March 2000 M.P. informed the Centre of the address of her representative authorised to receive her official mail. 25. On 6 June 2000 M.P. submitted a proposal regarding the contact schedule between the applicant and P., and on 12 June 2000 the applicant made a counter-proposal. On 30 June 2000 the Centre invited M.P. to provide certain information regarding her daughter’s residence, living conditions and education. On 19 July 2000 M.P. sent a reply to the Centre, without, however, providing the requested information on P. On 21 July 2000 the Centre again invited M.P. to provide the information, to which she responded on 14 August 2000, but again failed to provide answers to the Centre’s questions. 26. On 29 September 2000 the Centre held a hearing in the applicant’s presence. M.P., however, did not attend, although a summons had been correctly served on her authorised representative. The applicant reiterated his request for the setting up of a contact schedule between him and P. 27. On 5 October 2000 the Centre issued an order granting the applicant contact with P. every Tuesday afternoon, every first weekend of the month and a few weeks during the winter and summer holiday periods. According to the order, an appeal against the contact schedule would not have a suspensive effect. 28. On 22 November 2000 M.P. appealed against the order before the Ministry. 29. On 4 and 28 December 2001 and on 23 January 2002 the applicant requested that the contact schedule be enforced. 30. On 13 March 2002 the Maribor administrative unit rejected the applicant’s request for enforcement, stating that the order of 5 October 2000 was unenforceable as the Centre had failed to specify the place at which the applicant was to pick up and drop off his daughter. Subsequently, on 10 June 2002 the Centre informed the applicant that the order could not be supplemented with the required information, as M.P.’s appeal against it was pending before the Ministry. 31. On 19 July 2002 the Ministry upheld M.P.’s appeal against the order of 5 October 2000, confirming the reasoning of the administrative unit that the order was unenforceable. Moreover, the facts of the case had still not been properly established. The case was remitted to the Centre with the instruction to acquire information on M.P.’s and P.’s place of residence, P.’s schooling and her afternoon activities. 32. On 30 September 2002 the Centre invited M.P. to provide them with the information requested by the Ministry in their decision of 19 July 2002. She did not reply. 33. On 27 February 2003 the Centre contacted the Ministry for Foreign Affairs with a view to finding the address of M.P. and P. On 7 May 2003 the Centre was informed that the Slovenian Embassy in Austria had been unable to obtain such information. 34. On 16 May 2003 the Centre addressed a request for assistance in obtaining the information on M.P.’s and P.’s address to the Ministry. As no reply was received, the Centre requested assistance again on 28 May 2004. 35. Further to legislative changes by which on 1 May 2004 the courts acquired jurisdiction to decide on issues relating to rights of contact, in June 2004 the applicant instituted proceedings before the Maribor District Court. At the District Court’s request, the applicant supplemented his application on 3 August 2004. 36. The Maribor District Court scheduled a hearing for 6 October 2004; however, M.P. was unable to attend and only the applicant appeared in court. He complained that M.P. was in the habit of evading the proceedings and that, as a result, he had not seen P. for six years. 37. On 5 January 2005 M.P. informed the Maribor District Court that she and P. had not resided at their Slovenian address for a number of years and that she had kept that address only for the purpose of receiving mail. However, she failed to provide her address in Austria. M.P. proposed that the Slovenian courts relinquish their jurisdiction in the matter in favour of the Austrian courts. 38. On 13 July 2005 the applicant sent a letter to the Graz Youth and Family Office asking them for help in re-establishing contact with P. He explained that M.P. had been preventing him from having contact with his daughter and had evaded the proceedings conducted by the Centre and the Maribor District Court. He also attached a letter he had written to P., with photos of him and his family. The applicant’s letter was handed over to M.P. by a social worker on 6 October 2005. 39. The Maribor District Court scheduled another hearing for 14 November 2005, but since M.P. had not been served with a summons to attend, the hearing was adjourned. Scheduling further hearings, on 2 November 2005 the Maribor District Court asked the Graz District Court for Civil Matters to serve a summons on M.P. in accordance with Council Regulation (EC) No. 1348/2000 of 29 May 2000 on the service in member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters. The court also attempted to serve the document on M.P. through the Slovenian Embassy in Austria. However, its attempt was unsuccessful; both the embassy and, on 12 January 2006, the Graz District Court for Civil Matters notified the Maribor District Court that M.P. did not appear to be living at the indicated address. The Maribor District Court continued sending mail to M.P.’s address in Maribor. 40. On 13 December 2005 the Maribor District Court again asked the Graz District Court for Civil Matters to serve a summons on M.P. in Austria. The mail was delivered to her at the Graz District Court for Civil Matters on 7 March 2006, after the Graz court had obtained information on M.P.’s address from the Registration Office and two unsuccessful attempts had been made to serve the summons at her home address. 41. Meanwhile, on 9 December 2005 the Maribor District Court requested the Graz District Court for Civil Matters to obtain a report on P.’s situation from the Graz Youth and Family Office. It appears that the request was sent to the Austrian court on 23 March 2006 and received by the District Court for Civil Matters on 29 March 2006. The latter submitted it to the Youth and Family Office on 30 March 2006. The social worker in charge of the case requested three times to meet with M.P. and P. in order to prepare the report, but without success. It appears that M.P. did not attend the first two meetings for work-related reasons. On the last occasion M.P. replied that she and her daughter would be spending the next few months abroad. On 7 July 2006 the Graz Youth and Family Office reported back that M.P. had refused to cooperate. A further request for a report was submitted on 28 September 2006. On 20 October 2006 the Youth and Family Office notified the District Court for Civil Matters that M.P. could not be reached because she was abroad at the time. On 15 November 2006 the latter court sent a reply to the Maribor District Court, which received it on 4 December 2006. 42. On 7 February 2007 the Maribor District Court held a hearing and on the same day issued an order setting out a contact schedule. M.P. did not attend the hearing; however, she informed the court that P. did not wish to have contact with the applicant. The court ruled that the applicant could visit P. every two weeks by picking her up at M.P.’s home. The court found that there were no objective reasons for P. to refuse contact with her father and that she had been influenced by M.P.’s negative attitude towards the applicant. It also criticised M.P.’s conduct and her “uncooperative attitude”. 43. M.P. appealed against the contact order. 44. On 5 July 2007, on the applicant’s proposal, the Maribor District Court issued an enforceable interim order allowing him contact with P. every two weeks, whereby once a month he was to visit her at her address in Austria and the other time P. was to visit him in Slovenia. Following an objection on the part of M.P. in which she stated that she was unwilling to take P. to Slovenia, on 21 January 2008 the Maribor District Court modified the interim order so that visits could take place only in Graz. M.P. was ordered to comply with the terms of the order, subject to a fine of 200 euros (EUR) for each breach. 45. On 1 September 2007 the applicant saw P. for the first time in more than nine years. They had contact again on 6 October 2007. On the latter occasion, P. left after less than an hour, after which she refused to see the applicant again, although he attempted to see her on at least two more occasions. 46. On 15 May 2008 the Maribor Higher Court dismissed an appeal lodged by M.P. against the contact order of 7 February 2007. Consequently, the order became final. 47. Meanwhile from April to June 2008, the applicant requested five times that a fine be imposed on M.P. for failure to comply with the interim contact order (3 April 2008, 15 April 2008, 23 April 2008, 16 May 2008 and 11 June 2008). 48. On 12 June 2008 the applicant requested for the sixth time that a fine be imposed on M.P. On 11 September 2008, the Maribor District Court explained to the parties that the contact proceedings had been concluded by a final decision and the Maribor Local Court was competent to decide on the enforcement of the contact order. The District Court referred the applicant’s further request for enforcement of 3 October 2008 to the Local Court. Subsequently, the applicant lodged another three requests for enforcement on 29 December 2008, 25 March 2009 and 27 March 2009. 49. Meanwhile, on 10 February 2009, the applicant lodged a supervisory appeal under the Right to Trial without Undue Delay Act (hereinafter “the 2006 Act”) with a view to accelerating the enforcement proceedings. 50. On 3 March 2009, the Maribor Local Court imposed a fine in the amount of EUR 600 on M.P. for not complying with the contact order. On 4 March 2009 the President of the Maribor Local Court, in the context of the proceedings in respect of the 2006 Act, informed the applicant of the decision taken the day before. On 1 April 2009 the applicant replied that none of his other requests had yet been resolved. 51. M.P. having appealed against the fine, on 28 July 2009 the Maribor Higher Court set aside the impugned order, stating that a deadline should have first been set for M.P. to comply with the contact order. On 23 April 2010 the Maribor Local Court invited the applicant to supplement his request for enforcement. On the basis of that request, a new enforcement order was issued on 2 November 2010, ordering M.P. to allow contact between the applicant and P., subject to a fine in the amount of EUR 500. M.P. appealed against the order. 52. On 4 September 2012 the Maribor Local Court quashed all the enforcement acts executed until that date and dismissed the applicant’s request for enforcement, finding that since the contact between the applicant and P. was to take place in Austria, the Austrian courts had jurisdiction to decide on the enforcement. 53. On 30 September 2008 P. lodged a request with the Graz-West District Court seeking suspension of the applicant’s contact rights. 54. On 11 November 2008 P. gave a statement before the District Court, alleging that throughout the period in which she had been living in Austria the applicant had not wished to have any contact with her and had made no attempts to see her. She further maintained that he had not obtained a court order setting out a contact schedule until 2007. Two visits had been carried out. However, since he had been criticising M.P., she had refused to have any further contact with him, and she had repeatedly told him so. P. also said that she had no relationship with her father and that she was afraid that he would take her to Slovenia. 55. The applicant made a statement before the Maribor District Court on the basis of a letter rogatory submitted by the Austrian authorities. On 27 March 2009 the Graz-West District Court suspended his contact rights. It found that P. had consistently expressed her wish not to have contact with the applicant and concluded that contact against her wishes would not be in her interest. The court also found that M.P. had not obstructed contact and that the applicant had stated in the proceedings that he would respect P.’s wish not to have contact with him. 56. On 31 August 2009 the Graz Regional Civil Court dismissed an appeal lodged by the applicant, finding that there was no indication that P. had been manipulated by M.P. or was not expressing her wishes freely. 57. On 21 June 2008 M.P. asked the Graz-West District Court to increase the monthly child maintenance from EUR 137 to EUR 250 on the grounds that P.’s needs, as well as the general cost of living, had increased since 1997 when she and the applicant had concluded the maintenance agreement. 58. On 12 February 2009 the court, taking into account the financial situation of both parents, allowed M.P.’s request. 59. An appeal lodged by the applicant was dismissed by the Graz District Court for Civil Matters on 7 August 2009. 60. During the proceedings, the applicant sent a number of letters to the courts in Graz complaining that the court documents were in German, which he did not understand, and requesting that the issue be decided by the Slovenian authorities.

4. The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Ankara. 5. On 19 July 1995 the applicant was taken into police custody by officers from the anti-terror branch of the Ankara Security Directorate in the course of an operation carried out against an illegal organisation, namely the DHKP/C (Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front). 6. On 31 July 1995 the applicant was brought before a judge who ordered his detention on remand. 7. On 16 August 1995 the public prosecutor at the Ankara State Security Court filed a bill of indictment charging the applicant as well as twelve other persons with membership of an illegal organisation, an offence defined in Article 168 § 2 of the Turkish Criminal Code. 8. On 5 June 1997 the Ankara State Security Court convicted the applicant of aiding and abetting the members of the DHKP/C, an offence defined in Article 169 of the Criminal Code, and sentenced him to two years and six months’ imprisonment. 9. The applicant appealed against the judgment. 10. On 17 April 1998 the Court of Cassation upheld the Ankara State Security Court’s judgment. 11. On an unspecified date the applicant was released from detention.

5. The applicants are: (1) Ms Zalina Vitayeva, who was born in 1982; (2) Ms Yakhita Kudayeva, who was born in 1959; and (3) Mr Murad Kudayev, who was born in 2002. The applicants live in Grozny. The first applicant is the wife of Magomed-Emi (also known as Magomed-Emin, Magomed or Zema) Kudayev, who was born in 1982; the second applicant is his mother; and the third applicant is his son. 6. At the material time the applicants and Magomed-Emi Kudayev lived in one household at 63-65 Ippodromniy Lane in the Leninskiy district of Grozny. The household consisted of several dwellings around a yard. Magomed-Emi Kudayev and the first and third applicants lived together in one dwelling with a separate entrance. The second applicant and a number of other relatives, including Magomed Kudayev’s grandparents, lived in the other dwellings. Magomed Kudayev was a fourth year student at the Grozny Oil Institute. He worked as an unarmed security guard for a private company. At the material time the area was under curfew. 7. On the evening of 27 March 2004 the applicants, their relatives and Magomed-Emi Kudayev were at home. At about 11.45 p.m. the first applicant heard a noise and looked out of the window. She saw a group of about ten armed masked men. The men were fairly short and were wearing camouflage-coloured jackets and black trousers as well as green camouflage outfits. The applicant thought that they were military servicemen. One of them was not particularly tall and was of a rather heavy build. He spoke unaccented Russian and was wearing a camouflage jacket and camouflage trousers. The applicants thought that this man was Russian, whereas the rest of the intruders were Chechens as they spoke Russian with an accent. 8. Having woken up her husband, the first applicant went to the door. One of the men asked her: “Where is Zelimkhan?” Magomed Kudayev answered that it was he. Then a man ordered him in accented Russian to get dressed and follow them. The men did not ask for any documents. When the first applicant asked where they were taking her husband, one of the intruders pointed his gun at her and ordered her to go into another room. Meanwhile the second applicant, who had been alerted by the noise, entered the room. Some of the men entered the dwelling of Magomed Kudayev’s grandparents. When Magomed Kudayev’s grandfather asked the intruders what they were looking for, one of them answered in Chechen that they would find what they were looking for. 9. The second applicant kept asking the men about the reasons for her son’s arrest, but she did not receive any explanation. The Russian man ordered the others to hurry up and take Magomed Kudayev away. Next, the men put Magomed Kudayev’s hands behind his back and took him outside, where they grabbed Magomed Kudayev and quickly carried him from the yard to two UAZ vehicles parked in the street. Both vehicles had tinted windows; one of them had an antenna and the other one was a minivan (“Таблетка”). 10. The second applicant attempted to follow the intruders and threw a rock at them. In response they opened fire with their guns. Magomed Kudayev asked them not to shoot at the household premises. The men quickly placed Magomed Kudayev in the minivan and drove away. 11. Immediately after the abduction, alarmed by the shooting, a number of neighbours gathered at the applicants’ house. One of the applicants’ acquaintances, who worked at the Leninskiy district department of the interior (“the ROVD”), immediately drove to the ROVD to bring an investigator over. 12. About 20 minutes after the abduction, officers from the Leninskiy ROVD arrived at the scene. The applicants described the intruders’ vehicles, and one of the police officers told them that he had overheard on the police radio that two cars matching their description had passed through the checkpoint located on the road to Khankala and that the cars had ignored the soldiers’ attempts to stop them. (b) Subsequent events 13. On the following day, 28 March 2004, an investigator from the Leninskiy ROVD took statements from the applicants, their relatives and neighbours. The crime scene was examined and a few spent bullet cartridges were collected as evidence. According to the applicants, the investigator told them that servicemen from the “Vostok” (East) battalion, a military unit staffed by Chechens under the command of Mr S. Ya., had most probably been involved in the abduction. 14. About five or six days after the abduction, a young man visited the first applicant and asked whether she was Zalina, the wife of Zema. After the applicant confirmed that, he told her that he worked at the base of the Vostok battalion in Vedeno, Chechnya, that Magomed Kudayev had been taken to the base, and that she should contact its commander, Mr S. Ya. in Gudermes, Chechnya, before her husband was killed. 15. The applicants and their family members went to Gudermes twice to have a meeting with Mr S. Ya. but the base’s guards did not allow them to see him. 16. About three weeks after the abduction, Magomed Kudayev’s uncle was approached by a Mr A.G., who told him that his nephew, Mr Ya. Ge., had been abducted on 6 April 2004, that his nephew had been detained in the same place as Magomed Kudayev for about eight days, and that both detainees had had sacks pulled over their heads and had been handcuffed. Sometimes the sacks had been removed and the detainees had been able to see each other. They had been detained in a pit-like basement in a bathhouse. The building had had electricity and natural light had penetrated through cracks in the walls. The detainees had been fed. They had heard dogs barking and the noise of helicopters, gunfire and calls for prayer, which they had thought were coming from a mosque situated nearby. Several days later Mr Ya. Ge. had been released with the assistance of Mr A.G.’s brother, Mr Kh. G. During his release Mr Ya. Ge. had noticed two domes located not far away from the detention place. 17. The applicants asked Mr A.G. to assist them in the release of Magomed Kudayev. Mr A.G. promised that he would speak to his brother, Mr Kh. G., about that. For three months the applicants and their relatives waited for any information about Magomed Kudayev. Then Mr A.G. told them that his brother could not establish Magomed Kudayev’s whereabouts. 18. In November 2004 the first applicant met Mr Ya. Ge., who at the time was working in the Vostok battalion. According to him, Magomed Kudayev was probably still in detention at the battalion’s base in Vedeno. 19. According to another man, Mr R., who used to work in the Vostok battalion in Vedeno, Magomed Kudayev had been detained there for seven months and after that he had been transferred elsewhere. 20. In 2005 the applicants’ relative spoke to Mr V.P., the head of the criminal search division of the Chechnya Ministry of the Interior (“the MVD”), who confirmed that a group of investigators had visited the pit in Vedeno and had confirmed that Magomed Kudayev had been detained there. 21. In support of their statements the applicants submitted the following documents: a statement by the first applicant, dated 15 February 2006; a statement by the second applicant, dated 21 August 2006; a statement by the applicants’ neighbour Ms L.D., dated 1 October 2006; a statement by the applicants’ neighbour Ms R.M., dated 12 November 2006; a statement by Mr A.G., dated 24 November 2006; a statement by the applicants’ neighbour Mr Kh. M., dated 24 November 2006; and four hand-drawn maps of the applicants’ household and its premises. 22. The Government did not challenge the facts as presented by the applicants. 23. On 28 March 2004 the applicants reported Magomed Kudayev’s abduction to a number of local law-enforcement authorities, including the ROVD. 24. On 8 April 2004 the Chechnya military commander’s office forwarded the applicants’ report of the abduction to the Leninskiy district military commander’s office of Grozny (“the district military commander’s office”) for examination. 25. On 13 April 2004 (in the documents submitted the date was also referred to as 27 March 2004 and 14 June 2004) the Leninskiy district prosecutor’s office (“the district prosecutor’s office”) instituted a criminal investigation into the abduction of Magomed Kudayev under Article 126 § 2 of the Criminal Code (aggravated kidnapping). The case file was given number 30028 (in the documents submitted it was also referred to under the numbers 30024 and 20130). 26. On 30 April 2004 the investigators granted the second applicant victim status in the criminal case. 27. On 13 May 2004 the Chechnya prosecutor’s office informed the applicants that the district prosecutor’s office had instituted an investigation into the abduction and that operational-search measures were underway. 28. On 25 May 2004 the Chechnya MVD informed the applicants that they had collected information concerning the abduction and that this information had been forwarded to the district prosecutor’s office. 29. On 20 or 22 December 2004 the first applicant reported her husband’s abduction to the Chechnya military commander. She described its circumstances and stated that four days after the events in question she had met a man who had told her that Magomed Kudayev had been detained in Vedeno and that she was supposed to ask the commander of the Vostok battalion, Mr S. Ya., in Gudermes for his release. She further stated that three weeks later she had spoken with a man who had told her that his relative, a young man, was detained for eight days with Magomed Kudayev in a half-ruined old bathhouse building. He further told her that the detainees had heard dogs barking and the noise of helicopters, calls for prayers, conversations between the guards and had also heard their nicknames, such as “Bandit” (Bandit), who had been a tall man, “Tigr” (Tiger), “Beliy” (White) and “Tikhiy” (Quiet). The applicant pointed out that this young man had been released with the assistance of Mr Kh. G., who lived in the Shelkovskoy district of Chechnya. 30. On 24 December 2004 the district prosecutor’s office informed the applicants that even though their investigative measures had failed to establish the whereabouts of Magomed Kudayev, operational-search measures were underway. 31. On 25 December 2004 and then on 21 February 2005 the Chechnya military commander forwarded the first applicant’s requests for assistance in the search for her husband to the district military commander’s office. 32. On 18 March 2005 the district prosecutor’s office informed the applicants that they had examined a previous complaint by them of 15 March 2005 and that they had instructed the ROVD “to identify the woman named Tamila and to arrest her”. 33. On 27 May 2005 the military prosecutor of the United Group Alignment (“the military prosecutor of the UGA”) forwarded the second applicant’s request for assistance in the search for her son to the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102. 34. On 3 August 2005 the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102 informed the applicants that the investigation into the abduction of Magomed Kudayev had been suspended and that the investigators had not established the involvement of military servicemen in the crime. 35. On 27 September 2005 the military prosecutor of the UGA again informed the applicants that the investigation had not established the involvement of military servicemen in the abduction of their relative and that the investigation of the criminal case had been suspended. 36. On 12 and 14 October 2005 the investigators informed the applicants that the investigation of the criminal case had been suspended on 8 March 2005 for failure to identify the perpetrators. 37. On 13 October 2005 the Chechnya prosecutor’s office forwarded the applicants’ report of the abduction to the district prosecutor’s office for examination. 38. On 28 November 2005 the Chechnya department of the Federal Security Service (“the Chechnya FSB”) informed the applicants that they had not detained Magomed Kudayev and had no information concerning his whereabouts. 39. On 7 December 2005 and again on 1 February 2006 the criminal search division of the temporary operational group of the Ministry of the Interior in Khankala, Chechnya, informed the applicants that they had no information concerning the arrest and detention of Magomed Kudayev by law-enforcement agencies in Chechnya and that they had forwarded the applicants’ request for assistance in the search for Magomed Kudayev to the Chechnya MVD. 40. On 27 December 2005 and again on 16 January 2006 the department of military counterintelligence of the FSB informed the applicants that they had no information concerning the whereabouts of Magomed Kudayev and that the security forces of the North Caucasus were taking measures to establish his whereabouts. 41. On 23 June 2006 the Chechnya MVD informed the applicants that they had forwarded their request for assistance in the search for Magomed Kudayev to the ROVD. 42. On 27 February 2007 the Chechnya prosecutor’s office informed the applicants that: they had failed to establish the whereabouts of Magomed Kudayev; on 6 January 2006 the investigation of the criminal case had been suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators; on 24 February 2007 the investigation had been resumed; and that the Chechnya prosecutor’s office had ordered the investigators to take a number of investigative steps. 43. On 2 April 2007 the investigators informed the applicants that on the same date they had suspended the investigation of the criminal case for failure to identify the perpetrators. 44. On 25 August 2007 the Chechnya prosecutor’s office informed the applicants that the investigation of the criminal case had been resumed on 20 July 2007 upon the order of the supervising prosecutor. 45. On 20 August 2007 the investigation of the criminal case was suspended for failure to establish the identities of the perpetrators. The applicants appealed against this decision (see paragraph 105 below). 46. On 15 July 2008 the Chechnya MVD informed the applicants that they were taking operational-search measures to establish Magomed Kudayev’s whereabouts. 47. On 1 November 2008 the Chief Military Prosecutor’s office informed the applicants that they had forwarded their complaint of 21 October 2008 to the military prosecutor’s office of the UGA. 48. On 9 November 2008 the Prosecutor General’s office informed the applicants that they had forwarded their complaint to the Chechnya prosecutor’s office. 49. On 4 June 2009 the Main Information Centre of the Russian Ministry of the Interior (“the Russian MVD”) informed the applicants that they had no information concerning Magomed Kudayev. 50. On 16 June 2009 the Envoy on Human Rights and Freedoms in Chechnya complained on the applicants’ behalf to the district prosecutor’s office about the lack of information concerning the criminal investigation. No reply was given to this complaint. 51. The applicants did not receive any further information concerning the official investigation of their relative’s abduction. 52. On 29 March 2004 investigators from the district prosecutor’s office examined the crime scene at the applicants’ household. One bullet and five spent cartridges were collected from the scene. 53. On 13 April 2004 (in the documents submitted the date was also referred to as 13 April 2002) the district prosecutor’s office opened a criminal case in connection with Magomed Kudayev’s abduction. According to the text of the decision, the investigators received the information about the abduction from the ROVD on 29 March 2004. 54. On 13 April 2004 the investigators ordered an expert ballistics evaluation of the evidence collected from the crime scene. 55. On 8 May 2004 the forensic assessment office provided the investigators with its report concerning the results of the expert evaluation. According to its conclusion, the bullet and the cartridges could have been fired from industrially produced AK-47 machine guns. 56. On 19 April 2004 the investigators questioned the applicants’ neighbours, Mr Kh. M. and Ms M. Kh. Both of them stated that at about 11.40 p.m. on 27 March 2004 they had heard screaming coming from the applicants’ household. The witnesses had gone out to the street. There they had found out that unidentified armed men in camouflage uniforms and masks had opened fire and had taken away Magomed Kudayev. 57. On 19 April 2004 the investigators questioned the applicants’ neighbour, Mr R. Kh., who stated that at about 11.30 p.m. on 27 April 2004 he had heard screaming coming from the applicants’ household. He had gone outside, where had found out that unidentified armed men in camouflage uniforms and masks had opened fire and had abducted Magomed Kudayev. The abductors had arrived in two UAZ vehicles, one of which had been a minivan. 58. On 24 April 2004 the investigators granted victim status to Ms Z. Kh., the grandmother of Magomed Kudayev, and questioned her. She stated that the abductors, who had been armed and who had been dressed in camouflage and black uniforms, had arrived at the house in two UAZ vehicles, one of which had been a minivan. They had spoken unaccented Chechen and Russian. The abductors had said that they had been looking for Zelimkhan. When Magomed had told them that was him, they had not asked for identity documents and had simply taken him outside. The first and second applicants had asked the abductors not to take their relative away. But the men had ignored their pleading and the women had then started throwing rocks at them. In response the abductors had opened fire and had gone away, taking Magomed Kudayev with them. 59. On 30 April 2004 the investigators granted the second applicant victim status in the criminal case and questioned her about the circumstances of the abduction. The second applicant’s statement concerning the events was similar to the one given by Ms Z. Kh. 60. On 30 April 2004 the investigators granted the first applicant victim status in the criminal case and questioned her about the circumstances of the abduction. She stated that at about 11.45 p.m. on 27 April 2004 she and her family members had been at home when a group of about nine or ten men in camouflage, black uniforms and masks had come into their courtyard. The group had arrived in two UAZ vehicles, one of which had been a minivan. The intruders had been armed with machine guns and at least one of them had spoken Chechen. The men had asked about Zelimkhan and Magomed had confirmed that was him. Then the men had taken him outside. They had neither searched the house nor asked for identity documents. The first and second applicants had begged the men not to take Magomed-Emi away but the abductors had ignored their pleadings. Then the first applicant had started throwing rocks at them. In response the abductors had opened fire and had left. 61. On various dates in the spring 2004 the investigators sent a number of queries to various district prosecutors’ offices and departments of the interior in Chechnya, asking them to provide information concerning the whereabouts of Magomed-Emin Kudayev or discovery of his corpse. 62. On 5 June 2004 the investigators questioned Magomed Kudayev’s classmates, Mr O.S. and Mr G.G., both of whom provided positive character references for him. 63. On 13 June 2004 the investigation of the criminal case was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 64. On 31 January 2005 the supervising prosecutor overruled the decision to suspend the investigation as premature and unfounded. The prosecutor’s decision criticised the deficiencies in the investigation and pointed out the following: “... the investigators failed to question Mr R. Kh., Mr Kh. Kh., Ms M. Kh. and Mr Kh. M., all of whom had witnessed the crime. Besides [that], a number of other people who had witnessed the events and could describe the abductors’ vehicles had not been questioned either. Registration numbers of the abductors’ vehicles had not been identified... other investigative steps had not been taken...” 65. On 8 February 2005 the investigation of the criminal case was resumed. 66. On 15 February 2005 the investigators again questioned Ms Z. Kh., who stated that about eight months prior to being questioned – that is, in June or July 2004 – a young man had arrived at the applicants’ house. He had informed the applicants that he had been detained with Magomed Kudayev for about two weeks in Vedeno, in a place resembling an abandoned bathhouse. According to the man, at first Magomed Kudayev had been tortured with electricity, but the abductors had subsequently changed their attitude and had treated the applicants’ relative better. 67. On 17 February 2005 the investigators questioned the head of the traffic police division of the Leninskiy ROVD, officer S. Kh., who stated that in the spring of 2002 Magomed Kudayev had been their trainee for three months. According to the witness, Magomed Kudayev had made a negative impression by violating the code of discipline and arguing with his superiors. 68. On 22 February 2005 the investigators questioned the applicants’ neighbour, Mr Kh. Mu. He stated that on the night of the abduction he had heard cars driving by in the street and had then heard gunfire. He had gone outside and had seen two UAZ vehicles driving away in the direction of the city centre. He and his neighbours, Mr R. and Mr A., had gone to the Grozny traffic police department and to the special task force group of the Chechnya Ministry of the Interior (“the OMON”). Both bureaus informed them that the vehicles had not driven into their premises. The witness and his neighbours had not been able to obtain any information concerning Magomed Kudayev’s whereabouts. 69. On 3 March 2005 the investigators again questioned the second applicant. She stated that about eight months prior to being questioned, in the summer of 2004, a young man named Mr Ya. Ge., who had been around twenty years old, had arrived at her house and had told her that he had been detained with Magomed Kudayev for eight days. The detention place had reminded him of an abandoned bathhouse and had been located in Vedeno. At the beginning of his detention, the guards had tortured Magomed Kudayev with electricity and had beaten him. They had asked Magomed Kudayev about members of illegal armed groups (‘ваххабиты’) and ammunition. According to Mr Ya. Ge., he had been abducted and had been detained by servicemen from the Vostok battalion, and he had been released with the assistance of Mr Kh. Ge., who had served in the battalion and whose call sign had been “Uragan” (Storm). 70. On 8 March 2005 the investigators suspended the investigation of the criminal case for failure to identify the perpetrators. 71. On 6 December 2005 the supervising prosecutor overruled the decision to suspend the investigation as premature, unsubstantiated and unlawful. The prosecutor pointed out a number of the investigators’ failures including the following: “...Ms Z.G., who had witnessed the abduction, was not questioned by the investigators; Magomed Kudayev’s mother-in-law was not questioned about the circumstances of the visit of the young man who had been detained with Magomed Kudayev; The investigation file contains information concerning the abduction of Magomed Kudayev by servicemen of the Vostok battalion. However, the investigators did not take any measures to verify this information; The investigation file does not contain the results of the comparative ballistics expert’s evaluation of the bullet and the cartridges collected from the crime scene...” 72. On 6 December 2005 (in the documents submitted the date was also referred to as 24 December 2005) the investigation of the criminal case was resumed. 73. On an unspecified date in January 2006 the investigators questioned the applicants’ relative, Ms R.V. She stated that in April 2004 a woman had approached her on the street, had told her that her son had been detained with Magomed Kudayev for five days in the same basement in Vedeno and had gone on to state that her son had been released afterwards and taken to Gudermes. The woman had asked Ms R.V. not to tell anyone about the conversation as her son could be killed for sharing such information. 74. On 24 January 2006 (in the documents submitted the date was also referred to as 6 January 2006) the investigators again suspended the investigation of the criminal case for failure to identify the perpetrators. 75. On 24 February 2007 the supervising prosecutor overruled the decision to suspend the investigation as premature, unsubstantiated and unlawful and ordered that it be resumed. The prosecutor again pointed out a number of the investigators’ failures including the following: “...it is necessary to carry out the prosecutor’s orders given on 6 December 2005; to take steps to verify the applicants’ theory of the involvement of servicemen of the Vostok battalion stationed in Vedeno ... in the abduction of Magomed Kudayev; ... [and] to question Mr Ya. Ge., whose statement could play a significant role in the investigation...” 76. On 5 March 2007 the investigators requested that military unit no. 44822 inform them whether the Vostok battalion was stationed in Vedeno and, if so, what its address was. 77. On 6 March 2007 the investigators again questioned the second applicant. She stated that about a month after Magomed Kudayev’s abduction a man had arrived at her house. He had introduced himself as the uncle of Mr Ya. Ge. and had told her that his nephew Mr Ya. Ge. had been detained with Magomed Kudayev in an abandoned bathhouse. Both detainees had been subjected to beatings and had been tortured with electricity. Two months after the meeting (at the beginning of the summer of 2004), the applicant managed to personally speak with Mr Ya. Ge., who had told her that when he had been taken to the detention place Magomed Kudayev had been already there. The two men had been detained in an abandoned bathhouse for about a week or so. He and Magomed Kudayev had been subjected to beatings and to torture, and they had been handcuffed and blindfolded all the time. Their abductors had demanded that the men confess to membership in illegal armed groups. Mr Ya. Ge. had stated that both he and Magomed Kudayev had been abducted by servicemen from the Vostok battalion stationed in the Vedeno area. Sometime later, towards the end of November 2004, a female relative of the applicants met Mr Ya. Ge. He had told her that in August 2004 several young men had been abducted by the battalion’s servicemen but that one of them had been eventually released and had told him that in August 2004 he had been detained in the same detention cell as Magomed Kudayev in Vedeno. 78. On 12 March 2007 the investigators questioned Mr Ya.Ge., who stated that in April 2004 he had been abducted from his house by unidentified men who had arrived in an UAZ vehicle. The abductors had put a mask over his head, had put him into the car, had driven for about an hour and a half and had arrived at “a base”. The witness had been taken to an abandoned bathhouse in the Vedeno district and had been handcuffed to a metal bar in a room measuring three by four square metres. Two days later he had been taken to another room in the basement, where he had been detained for four days with a young man named Magomed. During the detention both men had been handcuffed to pillars inside the room. Magomed had told the witness about his family in Grozny and that he had been a student at the Oil Institute. The abductors, who had been wearing masks, had beaten both detainees with bludgeons, rifle butts and tortured them with electricity. One of the abductors had had the call sign “Beliy” and he had been from Shali, Chechnya. During the beatings the abductors had questioned both detainees about members of illegal armed groups and about ammunition. After four days in detention the witness had been released. The abductors had threatened to kill him if he told anyone about the detention. Mr Ya. Ge. had not seen Magomed ever since. 79. On the same date Mr Ya. Ge. identified Magomed-Emi Kudayev from a photograph as the man with whom he had been detained in the Vedeno district in the spring of 2004. 80. On 13 March 2007 the investigators informed the second applicant about the results of the ballistics expert’s evaluation of the evidence carried out in the spring of 2004. 81. On 14 March 2007 the investigators again questioned the first applicant, who stated that in the summer of 2004 she and the second applicant had gone to Grebenskaya, Chechnya, to meet with Mr Ya. Ge. He had told them that he had been detained with Magomed Kudayev for about six days in an abandoned bathhouse; that their abductors’ call signs had been Beliy, Tikhiy, Tigr and Bandit; and that he had been released but Magomed had remained in detention. 82. On 15 March 2007 the investigators requested that Operational‑Search Bureau no. 2 of the Ministry of the Interior in the Southern Federal Circuit (ОРБ-2 ГУ МВД РФ по ЮФО) (“ORB-2”) identify and summon for questioning the “former serviceman of the Vostok battalion with the call sign Beliy and residence in Shali”. 83. On an unspecified date in March 2007 ORB-2 replied to the investigators that they were taking measures to identify the serviceman with the call sign Beliy. 84. On 27 March 2007 the investigators questioned district police officer L.D., who stated that Magomed Kudayev had been abducted at about 4 a.m. on 28 March 2004 by unidentified men who had arrived in UAZ vehicles and who had spoken unaccented Chechen. 85. On 1 April 2007 the investigators refused to open a criminal case against Ms “Tamila” because they had failed to identify her. The text of the decision included the following: “... a woman who had introduced herself as Tamila had told Ms Ya. Kudayeva [the second applicant] that she had been working at the Chechnya FSB and had then taken USD 5,000 from the applicant [to secure] the release of Magomed Kudayev. She had told the applicant that she would bring her son over in three days. ... the investigation was neither able to identify Tamila nor [ascertain whether] the unlawful acquisition of the applicant’s money by her [had taken place]...” 86. On 2 April 2007 the investigators again suspended the investigation of the criminal case for failure to identify the perpetrators. 87. On 1 May 2007 the Vedeno district department of the FSB informed the investigators that despite their operational-search measures the whereabouts of the former serviceman of the Vostok battalion with the call sign Beliy could not be established. 88. On 20 July 2007 the supervising prosecutor overruled the decision to suspend the investigation, doing so on the basis of numerous “serious shortcomings” in the proceedings. The text of the decision included the following: “... the investigators should take the following steps: - making a plan of the investigative steps to be taken; - carrying out in full the orders given by the supervising prosecutor on 24 February 2007...; - request that the ROVD identify the witnesses to the abduction from the residents of the nearby houses and organisations... question [the applicants’] neighbours... take measures to identify the perpetrators and establish Magomed Kudayev’s whereabouts; - forward requests to district prosecutors’ offices in Chechnya to find out whether they opened criminal cases in connection with the discovery of a corpse with features similar to those of Magomed Kudayev; - take other investigative measures ... in order to take a lawful and substantiated decision in [respect of] the criminal case...” 89. On 20 July 2007 (in the documents submitted the date was also referred to as 6 August 2007) the investigation in the criminal case was resumed and the applicants were informed about it. 90. On 20 August 2007 the investigation in the criminal case was again suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicants appealed the suspension of the proceedings to the local court (see paragraphs 104 and 105 below). 91. On 7 June 2008 the supervising prosecutor overruled the decision to suspend the investigation as “unlawful and premature” and ordered that the proceedings be resumed. The text of the decision included the following: “....it is necessary for the investigation to question the relatives of Mr Ya. Ge. about the circumstances of his abduction, detention and subsequent release... to eliminate contradictions in the information concerning the time of Magomed Kudayev’s abduction ... to request information concerning the abduction or detention of Mr Ya. Ge. from law-enforcement agencies in the Vedeno district ... to check whether federal and local databases of missing persons contain any information concerning Magomed Kudayev ... to take more active steps in order to identify the perpetrators of the abduction and verify whether servicemen of the Vostok battalion stationed in Vedeno were involved in the crime...” 92. On 7 June 2008 the investigation in the criminal case was resumed. 93. On 30 June 2008 the investigators forwarded a number of requests to various law-enforcement agencies in Chechnya, asking them to provide information concerning any possible detention of Magomed Kudayev on their premises, discovery of his corpse or any criminal proceedings pending against him. 94. On 7 July 2008 the investigation in the criminal case was again suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 95. On 9 December 2008 the supervising prosecutor again overruled the decision to suspend the investigation as “unlawful and premature” and ordered that the proceedings be resumed. The text of the decision stated that the investigators had failed to carry-out in full the orders given to them by the supervising prosecutor on 20 November 2008. 96. On the same date the investigation in the criminal case was resumed. 97. On 11 and 20 December 2008 the investigators requested that the ROVD assist them in carrying out the supervising prosecutors’ orders. 98. On 8 January 2009 the investigation in the criminal case was again suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 99. On 29 October 2009 the investigation was resumed until 29 November 2009. The investigators prepared a list of steps to be taken in order to solve the crime. 100. According to the Government, the investigation has failed to establish the whereabouts of Magomed-Emi Kudayev or to identify the perpetrators of his abduction. The law-enforcement agencies of Chechnya never arrested or detained Magomed-Emi Kudayev on criminal or administrative charges and did not carry out a criminal investigation in his respect. No special operations were carried out in respect of the applicants’ relative. 101. According to the documents submitted by the Government, the investigation was suspended and resumed on seven occasions. The supervising prosecutors had criticised the investigation’s deficiencies and had ordered a number of important steps to be taken without delay. 102. According to the Government, the applicants had been duly informed of all decisions taken during the investigation. 103. Despite a specific request by the Court, the Government did not disclose the full contents of criminal case file no. 30028, providing only “a part” of the documents amounting to 170 pages. The Government did not specify the reasons for their failure to provide the remaining documents. 104. On an unspecified date in March or April 2008 the second applicant complained of the ineffectiveness of the investigation of criminal case no. 30028 to the Leninskiy District Court in Grozny (“the District Court”). She stated that the investigators had suspended the investigation on 20 August 2007 without having taken a number of necessary investigative measures and requested that the investigation be resumed. 105. On 25 April 2008 the District Court allowed the applicant’s complaint in full.

5. The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Košice. 6. In 2000 a cooperative sued the applicant’s mother for termination of a tenancy agreement in respect of a flat in which she lived with the applicant and the latter’s daughter. It was argued that the tenant had failed to pay the rent and service charges. In her reply the defendant explained that she was an immobile invalid, and that her daughter had taken care of her for twenty years and was unemployed. They were in financial need and unable to pay the rent. 7. The defendant authorised the applicant to represent her at hearings before the Košice I District Court on 15 January 2002 and 17 May 2002. Subsequently, the District Court examined the case in the presence of the applicant who attended hearings but had no authority to represent her mother. 8. On 9 September 2004 the District Court allowed the action with reference to Article 711 § 1 (d) of the Civil Code. It ordered the applicant’s mother and the other persons living with her to move out of the flat within fifteen days after they have been provided with substitute accommodation. The court held it established that the tenant had failed to pay the rent for a period exceeding three months. 9. The applicant’s mother appealed on 8 November 2004. She described her and her daughter’s difficult situation. At the hearing the applicant submitted that a substantial part of the debt had been paid in the meantime. 10. On 26 April 2005 the Košice Regional Court upheld the first‑instance judgment. With reference to the reasons for that judgment the Regional Court held that the District Court had established the relevant facts and had applied the relevant law correctly. 11. On 24 June 2005 the applicant’s mother filed an appeal on points of law. She subsequently appointed a lawyer to represent her in the proceedings. 12. In the appeal on points of law it was argued that the applicant’s mother had been prevented from protecting her rights at first-instance as the court had proceeded with the case at several hearings without having duly summoned her. The Regional Court had not redressed the shortcomings in the first-instance proceedings. The applicant’s mother relied on Article 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure and maintained that the District Court had not complied with its obligation to inform her of the possibility of having a lawyer appointed to represent her in the proceedings. She also argued that the courts had made their decision in disregard of Article 712b of the Civil Code. 13. On 24 February 2006 the applicant’s mother died. The applicant joined the proceedings as a defendant on 13 August 2007. 14. On 25 October 2007 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on points of law. It noted that the applicant had been authorised to represent her mother at two hearings, that she had attended further hearings and could have thus informed her mother, who had been the defendant, of the date when they took place. Furthermore, the first-instance court had sent summonses to the applicant’s mother, for example, for the hearing scheduled for 9 March 2004. Similarly, she had been summoned to a hearing before the court of appeal held on 26 April 2005 but had neither appeared nor excused her absence. The Supreme Court concluded that the lower courts had not prevented the applicant’s mother from exercising her rights. 15. On 19 February 2008 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint in which she alleged a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in the above-mentioned proceedings leading to the Supreme Court’s decision of 25 October 2007. She argued, among other things, that her mother had not been duly summoned to hearings before the District Court and that both that court and the court of appeal had decided arbitrarily in that they had failed to examine the facts of the case in the light of Article 712b in conjunction with Article 879c of the Civil Code. 16. On 6 May 2008 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint manifestly ill-founded. It found that the Supreme Court’s decision was neither arbitrary nor otherwise contrary to Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 17. In February 2009 the cooperative which owns the flat initiated proceedings before the Košice I District Court with a view to having the applicant removed from the flat. The proceedings are pending.

5. The applicant is a Ukrainian national who was born in 1956 and currently resides in Lysychansk, Ukraine. 6. In 1997-1998 the applicant worked as a miner for the State-owned Lysychansk Mine-Construction Company (Shakhtobudivel’ne Upravlinnia; the “LSU”). 7. The Government submitted that from 1997 onwards the LSU experienced financial difficulties and therefore the salaries were paid to its employees irregularly. On 24 July 1997 the Lysychansk State Tax Inspectorate informed the Bailiffs’ Service that the LSU’s property was in a tax lien. 8. In October 2000 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Lysychansk City Court against the LSU seeking to recover the salary owed to him. 9. On 2 November 2000 the Lysychansk City Court allowed his claims and ordered the LSU to pay the applicant UAH 4,857.53[1] in compensation. 10. On 14 November 2000 the Lysychansk City Bailiffs’ Service instituted execution proceedings in respect of the judgment of 2 November 2000. 11. On 23 November 2000 the bailiff passed a resolution collecting an enforcement fee from the debtor and joining the enforcement proceedings in the applicant’s case to the combined enforcement proceedings no. 4/2 of 1 September 2000 that concerned other creditors of the mine. 12. On 1 July 2001 the Lysychansk City Bailiffs’ Service informed the applicant that his judgment could not be executed due to the LSU’s lack of funds. 13. On 28 November 2003 the LSU paid the applicant UAH 4,857.53, in compliance with the judgment of 2 November 2000. 14. On 1 December 2003 the Lysychansk City Bailiffs’ Service terminated the proceedings as the judgment had been enforced in full. 15. On 21 January 2004 the applicant informed the Court that he had been paid the sum of UAH 6,665[2] in compensation for salary arrears, which sum included the judgment debt of 2 November 2000.

8. The applicant is a Turkish national of Kurdish origin, resident in Diyarbakır. She is the wife of Mr Ali Tekdağ (A.T.), who disappeared in Dağkapı (Turkey) on 13 November 1994. 9. The facts surrounding the disappearance of the applicant's husband are disputed. 10. The applicant's version of events is set out in Section 1 below. The Government's version is set out in Section 2. A list of the documents submitted by the parties and a summary of statements by the witnesses whose testimonies were heard by the Court's delegates at hearings conducted in Ankara are provided in Part B. 11. On 13 November 1994 at about 11.00 a.m. the applicant and her husband A.T. went shopping in the village of Küçükkadı, in Diyarbakır. When they got off the bus at Dağkapı A.T. told the applicant that he had to attend to something and that she should wait for him for about five minutes. He went off in the direction of the bus station. 12. A.T. returned less than two minutes later but, instead of coming to meet the applicant, he walked right past her without looking at her. When she called out to him, he said: “Don't come near me!”, made signs with his hands and walked into a street nearby. He was being followed by people with walkie-talkies and long-barrelled guns. 13. There was gunfire and everyone, the applicant included, threw themselves to the ground. When the firing stopped, plain-clothed policemen arrived on the scene. They took A.T. into a nearby building and a few minutes later took him away in a white minibus. A.T. was bleeding from a head wound received when he threw himself to the ground. There was a military vehicle parked in front of a bank near the scene, but the soldiers inside did not intervene. A salesman called Mr Necmettin was an eyewitness to the incident. 14. The applicant has not seen her husband since he was taken away by the police on that day. She alleges that a witness, Mr Seyfettin Demir, saw A.T. in custody at the Diyarbakır Headquarters of the Rapid Intervention Force while he himself was being held there and that in November 1994 other witnesses had seen A.T. in custody but were afraid to testify. 15. On 16 November 1994 the applicant petitioned the Principal Public Prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court for news of her husband, but was turned away by the police. She continued to submit petitions every day for thirty days until she was at last taken to see the Principal Public Prosecutor, Mr Bekir Selçuk. 16. The applicant reported her husband's disappearance to Mr Selçuk who said he would deal with the matter. When she returned a few days later, he said he had yet to obtain information. The applicant explained that, according to an article in Özgür Gündem newspaper, witnesses had seen her husband in prison but they were afraid to testify. She indicated that Seyfettin Demir was, however, willing to make a statement. Mr Selçuk replied that he wanted to know the names of the other witnesses, adding that the security forces could not have abducted her husband. 17. After forty days the applicant met the provincial governor Mr Doğan Hatipoğlu and explained the situation to him. Mr Hatipoğlu said he would make enquiries. When the applicant returned a few days later, he said he did not have the means to conduct an investigation. 18. Some time later the applicant, accompanied by her daughter Nuran (aged 21), went back to see Mr Selçuk, who denied that her husband had been taken into custody and said that A.T. was responsible for numerous illegal acts. Mr Selçuk said that if A.T. had been taken into detention he would bring charges against those responsible. 19. A.T. had previously been taken into custody by the Turkish security forces 19 times, on 17 of which he had been put in prison. He had changed his identity and assumed the name Mehmet Aslan to avoid being recognised, arguing that the police detained him whenever they saw the name “Tekdağ”. 20. About seven months after A.T.'s disappearance, policemen raided the applicant's house. 21. The first written request for an investigation into A.T.'s disappearance was signed by his mother and dated 5 January 1995. The request was addressed to the Provincial Governor of Diyarbakır, who forwarded it to the State of Emergency Bureau, which sent it to the Diyarbakır Police Headquarters. The latter issued a reply on 9 January 1995 denying that A.T. had been taken into custody. 22. A letter from the Public Prosecutor's Office at the Diyarbakır State Security Court to the Ministry of Justice indicated that the applicant had been told that A.T. had never been taken into custody and that she would have received a written reply if she had asked for one in writing. 23. A.T.'s illegal change of identity could indicate that he was still using a false identity and had joined the PKK terrorist organisation. 24. The applicant's daughter was arrested on 7 November 1995 on charges of aiding and abetting the PKK. An investigation into the death of the applicant's brother showed that he had been assassinated by the terrorist group Hizbullah. 25. On 21 January 1996 the Evrensel newspaper published some news, issued by an anonymous source, according to which A.T. had been allegedly murdered while in the custody of the Armoured Brigade barracks in Silvan. The editor of the newspaper, interrogated on this point by the Public Prosecutor of Silvan, refused to disclose the identity of the source. 26. The main investigation file concerning A.T.'s disappearance contains 108 documents, including instructions by the judicial authorities to the security forces to investigate, information provided by the security forces to the public prosecutors, and judicial decisions. 27. The parties submitted various documents concerning the investigation into A.T.'s alleged abduction. The main documents of relevance are as follows: (a) The applicant's further applications to the authorities 28. The applicant reiterated her allegations in two further documents: (i) A statement of 11 February 1995 regarding the disappearance of her husband; (ii) A statement of 22 March 1997 sent to the European Commission of Human Rights. (b) Documents from the domestic investigation 29. The main file on the investigation into A.T.'s disappearance is the Diyarbakır Public Prosecutor's preliminary investigation file no. 1998/130. It contains 108 documents. The six previous investigation files, which were finally incorporated into this file, are as follows: (i)the Diyarbakır Public Prosecutor's office file no. 1996/748 (this investigation ended with a decision of no jurisdiction ratione loci); (ii)the Silvan Public Prosecutor's office file no. 1996/70 (this investigation ended with a decision of no jurisdiction ratione loci); (iii) the Diyarbakır Public Prosecutor's office file no. 1996/6950 (this investigation ended with a decision of no jurisdiction ratione loci); (iv) the Silvan Public Prosecutor's office file no. 1996/685 (this investigation ended with a decision to discontinue the prosecution); (v)the Silvan Public Prosecutor's office file no. 1996/286 (this investigation began following the Ministry of Justice's intervention and ended with a decision of no jurisdiction ratione loci); (vi) the Diyarbakır Public Prosecutor's office file no. 1996/7840 (this investigation ended with a decision of no jurisdiction ratione loci); (vii) the Silvan Public Prosecutor's office file no. 1996/286 (the investigation was reopened and ended with a decision of no jurisdiction ratione loci). The main documents in the investigation file concerning A.T.'s disappearance are as follows: (i) the Diyarbakır Security Directorate's letter of 9 January 1995 to the Governor's office in Diyarbakır; (ii) the Diyarbakır Security Directorate's letter of 8 March 1995 to the Governor's office in Diyarbakır; (iii) the Diyarbakır Security Directorate's letter of 8 March 1995 to the Principal Public Prosecutor in Diyarbakır; (iv) the Diyarbakır Security Directorate's letter of 20 March 1996 to the Principal Public Prosecutor in Diyarbakır; (v) the Diyarbakır Provincial Gendarme Commanding Oficer's letter of 31 March 1996; (vi) the Diyarbakır Principal Public Prosecutor's decision of 11 April 1996 to discontinue the criminal proceedings; (vii) the Silvan Public Prosecutor's letter of 6 May 1996 to the public prosecutor in Diyarbakır, which states: “Further to the investigation conducted by our public prosecutor's office in connection with the person named Ali Tekdağ, who is alleged to have been taken into custody in Diyarbakır on 13.11.1994, then taken to the Silvan Armoured Brigade Base and killed in custody, and in connection with the allegations contained in Hatice Tekdağ's attached application to the European Commission of Human Rights, 1- please identify the police officers who were on guard duty at the Refah Party Diyarbakır Provincial Branch Office on the date of the incident and interview them about what they know or saw regarding the allegations; and 2- interview the person named Seyfettin Demir, who is in Diyarbakır E-Type Prison as a convict or remand prisoner, about what he knows or saw regarding the allegations, and send the reply to this request to the principal public prosecutor's office. 06.05.1996. Three enclosures.” (viii) the Silvan Public Prosecutor's letter of 21 June 1996 to the public prosecutor in Diyarbakır, which states: “We ask you again to please report further to our letter sent under the same number and dated 06.05.1996, requesting that the police officers on guard duty at the Refah Party Diyarbakır Provincial Branch Office be interviewed about what they know or saw in connection with the person named Ali Tekdağ, who is alleged to have been taken into custody in Diyarbakır on 13.11.1994, then taken to the Silvan Armoured Brigade Base and killed in custody, and that the person named Seyfettin Demir, who is in Diyarbakır E-Type Prison as a convict or remand prisoner, be interviewed about what he knows or saw regarding the allegations, and for the completed request to be returned to us.” (ix) the Diyarbakır Principal Public Prosecutor's decision declining jurisdiction and transferring the file to the Principal Public Prosecutor in Silvan; (x) Public Prosecutor no. 31618's letter of 6 September 1996 to the Diyarbakır Police, Public-Order Section, which states: “This is a letter requesting that (1) the complainant whose full identity is given below be summoned to your office and, in view of her allegation in the enclosed letter entitled “To the Human Rights Project” that her husband has disappeared and has been seen by persons in custody, asked the full names and addresses of those persons; (2) since in the same letter the complainant alleges that Seyfettin Demir, who saw the complainant's husband while in custody, is in Diyarbakır E-Type Prison, that this person be summoned as a witness and interviewed in connection with the enclosed petition. Complainant, Hatice Tekdağ. Address... Seyfettin Demir, in Diyarbakır E-Type Prison as a convict or remand prisoner.” (xi) the Diyarbakır Public Prosecutor's letter of 18 September 1996 to the E-type Prison in Diyarbakır which states: “To the E-Type Prison Warden's Office, Diyarbakır. Please arrange for Seyfettin Demir, who is on remand at the E-Type Prison of our province, to be produced in connection with the investigation.” (xii) Public prosecutor no. 36866's letter of 6 February 1998 to the Diyarbakır Police, Public-Order Section ; (xiii) Public Prosecutor no. 36866's letter of 13 April 1998 to the Diyarbakır Police, Public-Order Section; (xiv) Public Prosecutor no. 36866's letter of 27 September 1999 to the Diyarbakır Police, Public-Order Section; (xv) Public Prosecutor no. 29010's letter of 15 October 1999 to the Security Directorate in Diyarbakır; (xvi) Mr Rana Yılmaz's letter of 5 November 1999 to the Diyarbakır Public Prosecutor, Mr Hasan Şakrak; (xvii) Public Prosecutor no. 39945's letter of 9 November 1999 to the Principal Public Prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court; (xviii) Public Prosecutor no. 38172's letter of 10 February 2000 to the Diyarbakır Security Directorate; (xix) Public Prosecutor no. 39945's letter of 29 March 2000 to the Diyarbakır Public-Records Office; (xx) Public Prosecutor no. 39945's letter of 29 March 2000 to the Principal Public Prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court. 30. The Court held a hearing in Ankara on 13 and 14 October 2000 and took oral evidence from nine witnesses. 31. The applicant repeated her previous statements. As regards her allegation that she had been intimidated by State agents on account of her application, she said she could not identify or describe the persons who had raided her house at night. She thought they were plain-clothed police officers. 32. Mr Bekir Selçuk was the Principal Public Prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court at the time. He did not remember having met A.T. or having carried out an investigation into his disappearance. He said that no incident involving gunfire such as the one described by the applicant had been referred to him or to his office on the date of the alleged incident. He found it inconceivable that members of the security forces would detain someone without informing the public prosecutor. During his two meetings with the applicant, he had merely informed her that her husband had not been taken into police custody in connection with a case that was being dealt with by his office. 33. Mr Hasan Şakrak was the Public Prosecutor in Diyarbakır who had been in charge of the case since 1999. It was he who had conducted the investigation into the disappearance of A.T. and into the alleged intimidation of the applicant by police officers. His investigation file only contained testimonies from the applicant and her daughters, Yasemin and Remziye, in which they made no references to the other people who had allegedly witnessed both incidents. Mr Şakrak said that a large part of the documents concerning A.T. had never been handed over to him. He had never heard of Seyfettin Demir and the documents concerning Mr Demir were not in his investigation file. 34. Mr Ramazan Sürücü was the Director of the Anti-Terrorism Branch of the Diyarbakır Police Headquarters at the time. He had no idea what role Seyfettin Demir had played in A.T.'s disappearance. He denied that A.T. had been taken into custody by his unit. He also stated that A.T.'s brother had been abducted and killed by Hizbullah and that his team had caught the killers. 35. Mr Ahmet Duran Alp was the head of the Rapid Intervention Force at the time. There were approximately 400 uniformed officers in these units. He said he had never heard of A.T. 36. Mr Necmi Çakar was the head of the Interrogation Unit of the Anti-Terrorism Branch in Diyarbakır, under Mr Ramazan Sürücü's orders. He said that A.T. had been taken into custody on various occasions and interrogated in connection with his links to the PKK. Mr Çakar knew that members of Hizbullah had murdered A.T.'s brother. He said that officers from the Interrogation Unit could use ordinary police cars and vehicles, including minibuses, with civilian number plates. 37. Mr Hasan Şenay was the Deputy Director of the Police Headquarters in Diyarbakır. He had signed two letters to the applicant, indicating that A.T. had not been taken into police custody at the alleged time (the letters were not produced by the Government to the Court). The letters were consistent with the information contained in the police custody registers that were sent to the Headquarters by all the police departments. 38. Mr Kürşat Kılıçarslan was a sergeant and head of the Pirinçlik Gendarme Station at the time. His deputy's name was G. Alp. It was gendarme practice to take statements from persons connected with incidents that occurred in their area of jurisdiction. The witness had no idea who A.T. was and did not remember the name. 39. Mr Münir Büyükelçi was the Public Prosecutor in Silvan, and had for a certain period been responsible for the investigation into A.T.'s disappearance. He had taken a number of steps to elucidate the facts. He had taken statements from the complainants and from the editor of the Evrensel newspaper on A.T.'s alleged murder while in the custody of the Armoured Brigade barracks in Silvan. Mr Büyükelçi said that he had begun a serious in-depth investigation but, having received no replies to his queries, he had transferred the file to the Diyarbakır Public Prosecutor. By letters of 6 May 1996 and 21 June 1996, he had invited the Diyarbakır Public Prosecutor's Office to trace the police officers who had been on guard duty at the Refah Party office situated near the scene of the incident and the main witness, Seyfettin Demir. He had not received any notification that action had been taken further to his requests. It became clear from his statement that the information about Seyfettin Demir, who was recorded as being in prison in Diyarbakır in 1994, had never been transmitted to him. Furthermore, he had not taken any steps to hear testimony from possible witnesses to the event, such as residents of the district where the incident had occurred. Mr Büyükelçi was asked to examine the investigation file which was produced on the spot by the Government, and through his explanations, it became apparent that the Government had not submitted to the Court large parts of the investigation file.

8. In 1986 the applicant took part in the emergency operation at the Chernobyl nuclear plant. As a result he suffered from extensive exposure to radioactive emissions. The applicant underwent medical examinations which established the link between his poor health and his involvement in the Chernobyl events. He was consequently granted status of a disabled person and awarded a monthly pension and a special allowance from the State, to be adjusted once a year in line with the minimum subsistence amount (величина прожиточного минимума). 9. At a certain moment in 2001 the social security authorities ceased to increase regularly the amounts of pension and allowance, paid to the applicant in connection with his disability. Instead, he started to receive his pension in a fixed amount (2,800 Roubles), which was less than he expected. Presuming that this practice was illegal, the applicant brought proceedings against the regional social security office (“the defendant”) claiming the increase of the monthly allowance and pension in line with the increase of the minimum subsistence amount during the relevant period. 10. On 21 January 2003 the Bataysk Town Court of the Rostov Region (“the Town Court”) rendered a judgment ordering the increase of the monthly allowance due to the applicant in line with the increase of the minimal subsistence amount in the Rostov Region. In re-calculating the amount of the applicant's pension the court applied the multiplier of 1.92 based on the data provided by the regional committee on statistics. As a result, the monthly pension of the applicant increased to 5,376 Roubles. The court ordered the defendant to pay the applicant the recalculated amount as from 1 January 2002 less the sums already paid. 11. The defendant appealed challenging, among other things, the multiplier of 1.92 applied by the first-instance court. 12. On 16 April 2003 the Rostov Regional Court (“the Regional Court”) upheld the judgment of 21 January 2003 in full. The enforcement proceedings were opened. 13. On 13 May 2003 the defendant appealed to the Regional Court by way of supervisory review seeking to quash the judgment of 21 January 2003, as upheld on 16 Aril 2003. 14. On 30 June 2003 the judge rapporteur refused to initiate the supervisory review proceedings and to remit the case for examination on the merits to the Presidium of the Rostov Regional Court (“the Presidium”). 15. On 14 July 2003 the defendant complained to the President of the Regional Court about the judgment of 21 January 2003, as upheld on appeal, and the judge rapporteur's decision of 30 June 2003 rejecting their previous application for supervisory review. They also requested that the enforcement proceedings be suspended pending the examination of the new supervisory review appeal. 16. On 6 August 2003 a judge of the Regional Court requested the case-file from the court of first instance. On 24 October 2003 judge B. of the Regional Court initiated the review of the judgment of 21 January 2003, as upheld on 16 April 2003. The decision of 24 October 2003 referred in detail to the arguments adduced by the defendant but offered no explanation as to the grounds for overruling the judge rapporteur's decision of 30 June 2003. The case was transferred to the Presidium for the examination on the merits. 17. On 4 November 2003 the applicant was informed about the date and venue of the hearing of his case by the Presidium. 18. On 4 December 2003 the Presidium quashed the judgment of 21 January 2003, as upheld on appeal, stating that the first instance court's calculation of the minimum subsistence amount, based on the multiplier of 1.92, had been insufficiently supported by evidence. The Presidium also noted that the first instance court had misinterpreted the domestic law. The case was remitted to the first instance court for a fresh examination. 19. On 25 December 2003 the Bataysk Town Court examined the case anew. In the course of the proceedings the court established that the allowance should have been multiplied by 1.25 in 2002 and by 1.26 for 2003. The applicant maintained that he accepted this multiplier. 20. As a result, the court held that the amount of pension due to the applicant for 2002 was 3,125 Roubles per month. In 2003 the pension of the applicant should have amounted to 3,937.5 Roubles per month. The court ordered the social security authorities to compensate the applicant for previous underpayments and, starting from 2004, pay him 3,937.5 Roubles monthly, with subsequent indexation. 21. On 14 January 2004 the Bataysk Town Court rendered an additional decision in the above case aimed at correction of an arithmetic error in the calculation of the amount awarded to the applicant. 22. The above decisions of the Town Court were not appealed against and became final. On 28 January 2004 the social security authorities transferred to the applicant's account the amount awarded by the court for previous underpayments.

5. The applicant was born in 1941 and resided in Kazincbarcika. He died in March 2004. 6. On 2 September 1994 the applicant brought an action in the Miskolc Labour Court against his former employer, a joint-stock company. He requested the court to hold that his employment contract had been terminated unlawfully, that he should be reinstated and that the agreement with the employer company to buy his shares from him be annulled. 7. After a hearing on 30 November 1994, on 15 February 1995 the Labour Court discontinued the proceedings partly because the applicant’s action had been submitted outside the statutory time-limit, and partly because it had no competence in the case. 8. On 11 May 1995 the Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County Regional Court quashed part of the first-instance decision and appointed the Kazincbarcika District Court to deal with the applicant’s civil law claim. 9. On 16 February 1996 the Supreme Court accepted the applicant’s petition for review and remitted the labour law aspects of the case to the Labour Court. 10. Meanwhile, on 25 April 1995 the applicant instituted proceedings, seeking the payment of damages, additional wages and other benefits. After a hearing on 6 December 1995, on 28 March 1996 the Labour Court ordered that this action be joined to the original proceedings which were to be resumed pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision. 11. After hearings on 17 May and 7 June 1996, on 3 July 1996 the Labour Court gave a partial judgment. It stated that the company had terminated the applicant’s employment unlawfully and ordered it to reinstate him. 12. On appeal, on 28 November 1996 the Regional Court quashed the first-instance partial judgment and dismissed the applicant’s claim concerning the termination of his employment. 13. In the proceedings concerning the remainder of the case, on 8 April, 4 September and 2 November 1997, the Labour Court held hearings. On 16 December 1997 it accepted part of the applicant’s claims for additional wages and outstanding benefits, but dismissed the remainder. 14. On appeal, on 2 April 1998 the Regional Court considered the first-instance judgment to be a partial decision and confirmed its contents. It held that the Labour Court had failed to examine some of the applicant’s claims, and that in this respect the proceedings were to be continued. 15. In the resumed first-instance proceedings, on 15 June 1998 the Labour Court transferred part of the applicant’s claims to the competent Kazincbarcika District Court. After a hearing on 13 January 1999, on 3 February 1999 it dismissed the applicant’s action. 16. On 14 December 2000 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. 17. On 18 April 2002 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s petition for review.

4. The applicant was born in 1932 and lives in Tula. 5. In 1999 the applicant inherited a flat. On 19 August 1999 Mr L., the grandson of the testator, brought an action against the applicant seeking invalidation of the will and transfer of the title to the flat. Judge A. of the Zarechinskiy District Court of Tula adjourned the examination of the action until 10 October 1999, ordering Mr L. to pay a court fee. 6. After the fee had been paid, the District Court fixed a preliminary hearing for 19 July 2000. At that hearing it ordered a post-mortem forensic psychiatric examination of the testator to establish whether she had been competent to make a will. The proceedings were stayed until 27 September 2000. According to the Government, the examination was not performed as the case file did not contain the materials necessary for the experts to carry out their inquiry. 7. No hearings were held between October 2000 and 27 June 2001. 8. On 27 June 2001 the case was assigned to judge P., who held a preliminary hearing on 16 July 2001. At that hearing the parties asked the District Court to obtain the attendance of certain witnesses. The Government submitted that the next hearing had not been scheduled to take place until 25 October 2001 because the presiding judge had to study the parties’ requests. 9. On 25 October 2001 the District Court, at Mr L.’s request, again ordered a post-mortem psychiatric examination of the testator and stayed the proceedings. The expert examination was performed on 30 December 2002. Three months later the District Court resumed the proceedings. 10. The hearing fixed for 27 March 2003 was postponed until 14 May 2003 to allow the applicant’s representative to lodge requests. 11. On 14 May 2003 the Zarechinskiy District Court adjourned the proceedings because Mr L. had died on 28 April 2003 and it was necessary to identify his heirs or legal successors. The proceedings were resumed on 3 December 2003 and a hearing was scheduled for 18 December 2003. 12. Of the four hearings listed between 18 December 2003 and 1 June 2004, two were adjourned because the applicant’s representatives defaulted, one was rescheduled because the claimant’s lawyer did not attend and one was postponed because a witness did not attend. 13. On 1 June 2004, at the request of the applicant’s lawyer, the District Court authorised an additional post-mortem psychiatric examination of the testator. The experts completed the examination on 17 November 2004. The District Court received the case file with the expert report on 13 January 2005. 14. Due to judge P.’s resignation, the case was assigned to judge D., who fixed the first hearing for 4 March 2005. That hearing and the subsequent hearings on 6 and 11 April 2005 were postponed because the claimant’s lawyer was ill. 15. On 7 June 2005 the District Court once again stayed the proceedings to identify Mr L.’s heirs. In the meantime, judge D. resigned and the case was assigned to judge M., who resumed the proceedings on 1 November 2005 and fixed the first hearing for 15 November 2005. Ms S. joined the proceedings as the claimant. 16. Of the fourteen hearings scheduled between 15 November 2005 and February 2007, five hearings were adjourned either because the applicant and her representatives defaulted or she filed applications for the examination of additional evidence, six hearings were postponed because Ms S. and her lawyer did not attend, two hearings were rescheduled at Ms S.’s request and one hearing was adjourned because the claimant’s witness defaulted. 17. On 7 February 2007 the District Court dismissed the action in full. On 2 August 2007 the Tula Regional Court upheld the judgment. 18. According to the applicant, her numerous complaints to various State bodies about the excessive length of the proceedings were futile. In particular, on 14 November 2005 the applicant received a letter from the acting President of the Tula Regional Judicial Qualification Board. He noted that “no unjustified procrastination in the civil case ha[d] been established”.

6. The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Bucharest. 7. He is a doctor with substantial experience, having been a general practitioner for more than eighteen years. In this capacity, he currently has his own private practice, with two employees. He also teaches at the Bucharest Faculty of Medicine and has authored several works in the field of general medicine. 8. In 2006 the applicant graduated from law school; one year later, he registered to become a lawyer, after having passed the annual entrance examination organised by the Bucharest Bar. On 18 December 2007 the Bucharest Bar issued a decision validating the results of the examination and declaring that the applicant was admitted to the Bar. 9. The Bucharest Bar further decided on 14 February 2008 to register the applicant as a trainee lawyer (avocat stagiar) as of 15 February 2008. A two-year traineeship period being an obligatory condition for obtaining a licence to practise as a lawyer, the applicant signed a traineeship agreement (contract de colaborare) with the B.P. private law firm. On 15 February 2008 the Bar approved the applicant’s traineeship within the firm. 10. On 13 March 2008 the applicant submitted a request to the Dean of the Bucharest Bar to be allowed to pursue his two-year traineeship (stagiu) in compliance with section 17 of Law no. 51/1995 regulating the legal profession, notwithstanding the fact that he simultaneously had his own private medical practice. He considered that “the medical profession was not incompatible with the dignity of the legal profession or the lawyers’ rules of conduct within the meaning of Rule 30 of the Rules governing the Legal Profession”. On 20 March 2008, applying section 14 (b) and section 53 (2) (e) of Law no. 51/1995, the Bucharest Bar rejected the applicant’s request. In its decision the Bar held: “the applicant’s request to practise simultaneously as a lawyer and as a doctor is dismissed, and the applicant must consequently opt for one of the two professions.” 11. On 21 April 2008 the applicant contested that decision before the National Bar Association. He challenged the reason for the dismissal of his request, which, citing section 14 (b), referred to ineligibility to practise as a lawyer for anyone who already pursued a “profession that infringes the dignity and the independence of the legal profession or is contrary to good morals”. He contended that his professional CV, including a Ph.D. in medicine, a career of teaching at the university and the authorship of several books on medicine, could on no account infringe the dignity of the legal profession. At the same time, he pointed to the fact that he was neither an employee nor a trader, as proscribed by the legislation regulating the activities of lawyers. On 18 June 2008 the National Bar Association upheld the Bucharest Bar’s decision, this time on the basis of section 15 of Law no. 51/1995, which enumerated “exhaustively” the professions that were compatible with the profession of lawyer (see “Relevant domestic law” below). As the practice of medicine was not specified among those professions, the applicant’s request was dismissed. 12. That decision was contested before the Bucharest Court of Appeal. In its reply to the applicant’s submissions, the respondent argued, firstly, that the combined interpretation of sections 14 and 15 of the Law led to the conclusion that no other profession could be practised in parallel with that of a lawyer, except for those restrictively enumerated under section 15; furthermore, the practice of two liberal professions at the same time was not permitted by the law, nor was it desirable, in view of the fact that each liberal profession required 100% dedication on the part of the person practising it. 13. On 20 January 2009 the court allowed the applicant’s claims, holding that section 14 (b) was not applicable, in so far as “the profession of doctor does not impinge on the independence of the profession of lawyer”. The court further held that any restriction on practising a profession must be expressly and unequivocally prescribed by law, which was not the case in this instance. Moreover, the Romanian Constitution protected the right to work, which could not be subject to any limitations, with a few exceptions expressly enumerated in section 53, such as national security reasons, protection of public order, health and public morals or protection of individual rights and freedoms, none of which was applicable in the applicant’s case. Furthermore, the prohibition on practising as a lawyer while also practising as a doctor was not included in the text of section 14 (b) of Law no. 51/1995, which referred only to professions that infringed the dignity and the independence of the legal profession or were contra bonos mores. The court further held that section 15 of the Law did not contain an exhaustive list of the professions compatible with the profession of lawyer, in spite of the National Bar Association’s interpretation of that provision to the effect that if the medical profession was not included in the text among the compatible professions, this meant, by converse implication, that it was not compatible with the profession of lawyer. The incompatible professions were enumerated exhaustively in section 14, and the profession of doctor was not among them. The assertion that practising a liberal profession required total dedication and implicitly a lot of time on the part of the practitioner could not be taken into consideration for the assessment of the lawfulness of the decisions taken by the local and national Bars; not having enough time to devote to clients’ cases had nothing to do with the independence of the legal profession. The court thus confirmed the applicant’s right to practise both professions simultaneously, annulling the Bars’ decisions. 14. The National Bar Association appealed against that judgment to the High Court of Cassation and Justice. It argued that while section 14 of the Law listed the professions that were incompatible with the profession of lawyer in a generic manner, giving examples, section 15 regulated, strictly and restrictively, the exceptions that were allowed, among which the profession of doctor was not mentioned. At the same time, the simultaneous practice of both professions infringed the principle of the independence of lawyers. In wanting to practise both professions, the applicant demonstrated only his extreme mercantilism, as he “minimised the importance of these professions, treating them as mere sources of income”. 15. On 24 June 2009 the High Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the applicant’s request, holding that the combined interpretation of sections 14 and 15 led to the conclusion that the list of compatible situations was exhaustive and thus section 15 referred to the only professions that by law were compatible with that of a lawyer; the High Court pointed out that even if the provisions of Rule 30 of the Rules governing the Legal Profession, relied on by the applicant in his defence, also enumerated other situations of incompatibility and compatibility, they were of inferior rank to a law and therefore they could not contradict those of the law itself.

5. The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Bolshaya Markha in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutiya). 6. In 1994 the applicant founded an individual enterprise “Pyramid” (Частное Индивидуальное Предприятие «Пирамида»). 7. On 15 March 1999 he signed an agreement with a State-owned maintenance company “Department of housing and communal services of Yakutsk” according to which the applicant's company undertook to perform certain construction works for the company. Upon the completion of the works, the maintenance company refused to pay. Following a financial dispute, the parties signed a friendly settlement, according to which the maintenance company owed the applicant's company 43,517 RUR (~ EUR 1,609). 8. This settlement was confirmed by a judgment of the Commercial Court of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutiya) delivered on 11 June 2002, and became enforceable. 9. On 25 March 2003 the bailiffs informed the applicant about the impossibility to enforce the settlement because the maintenance company lacked funds. On 26 March 2003 they closed the enforcement proceedings. 10. The applicant contested the bailiffs' decision before the Commercial Court of the Republic of Sakha but on 11 July 2003 his application was left without consideration due to the failure to comply with the procedural requirements. 11. Meanwhile the State-owned maintenance company changed its structure and became a municipal maintenance company (Муниципальное учреждение «Дирекция единого заказчика»). 12. In March 2004 the applicant retired, liquidated his enterprise and closed its accounts.

5. The applicants were born in 1954 and 1956 respectively and live in Bełchatów, Poland. 6. The applicants bought a second-hand car on 19 July 1992. 7. Their car was seized by the German Border Guard on 13 April 1993, as it appeared that it had been stolen. 8. On 15 April 1993, at the second applicants' request, the Radom District Police instituted criminal proceedings against R.G., a car dealer from whom the applicants had bought the car. 9. On 14 July 1993 the second applicant informed the Radom District Prosecutor (Prokurator Rejonowy) that he wished to join the proceedings as a civil party and asked the prosecution to forward his civil claim to the court together with the bill of indictment. 10. The Radom District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) convicted the accused on 19 August 1993. 11. The Radom District Prosecutor forwarded the applicant's claim to the Radom District Court on 27 August 1993. Since the criminal proceeding had already been terminated, the criminal court could not deal with the claim. Accordingly, it referred the claim to the Civil Division of the Radom District Court on 17 June 1994. 12. On 15 November 1994 the President of the Radom District Court informed the applicant that his statement of claim and accompanying documentary evidence had been lost. He asked the applicant to provide copies of documents in order to reconstruct the case-file. 13. On 7 December 1994 the District Court found that it was not competent to deal with the claim and referred the case to the Radom Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki). 14. On 16 January 1995 the second applicant asked the court to exempt them from payment of the court fees. The court partly granted his request on 2 February 1995. 15. On 27 February 1995, at the applicant's request, the court issued an interim order to secure his claim. 16. On an unspecified date the second applicant appointed the first applicant as his representative. From then on she took part in the proceedings. 17. The first hearing before the Regional Court was set down for 17 May 1995. 18. The court held hearings on 28 June and 13 September 1995. They were adjourned because witnesses, J.N. and J.M., had failed to appear. 19. At the hearing on 30 October 1995 the court imposed fines on J.N. and J.M. 20. The court held hearings on 4 December 1995, 27 March and 12 April 1996. 21. A hearing scheduled for 3 July 1996 was adjourned due to the defendant's absence. 22. On 21 August 1996 the court held a hearing. 23. The proceedings were stayed on 27 November 1996 because the criminal proceedings against J.N. and J.M had been instituted in the meantime. 24. On 21 March 1997 the court, at the applicants' request, called J.N. as a co-defendant. 25. On 18 September 1997 the court stayed the proceedings for the same reasons as above. They were resumed on 15 October 1998. 26. A hearing scheduled for 1 December 1998 was adjourned because both parties had failed to appear. 27. At the hearing on 18 December 1998 the court ordered that an expert report on the value of the disputed car be obtained. The report was submitted to the court on 27 January 1999. 28. The next hearing took place on 15 February 1999. 29. On 18 February 1999 the Radom Regional Court allowed the applicants' claim.

6. The applicants, United Kingdom nationals and husband and wife, were born in 1972 and 1976 respectively, and live in Oldham. 7. The applicants had a daughter M. born on 24 July 1998. 8. On 26 September 1998, M. screamed with pain when picked up by the maternal grandmother. The parents and grandmother took M. to the hospital. The triage nurse made a note of information given by the family. That note stated that the mother, rather than the grandmother, had “yanked” M. 9. An X-ray showed a displaced slightly-comminuted fracture of the midshaft of the femur. While it was noted that there was no history of metabolic bone disease in the family, it was not noted that the parents were first cousins, an incident relevant to a possible genetic condition. Neither the mother nor grandmother spoke much English; no Pushtu interpreter was provided. A consultant paediatrician, Dr Blumenthal, interviewed the parents and grandmother early in the morning the next day, again without an interpreter. He noted that none of them appeared to know how the injury had occurred. He concluded that it was an inflicted injury and told the parents this. 10. The police were informed. The parents were interviewed on 27 September 1998 by a social worker. He was unable to communicate with the mother due to language difficulties. 11. On 28 September 1998 the health visitor for the family was interviewed and stated that she had had no concerns about the family. 12. On 29 September 1998 the police interviewed the parents with an interpreter present. 13. On 30 September 1998, a social worker interviewed the family again and indicated that medical opinion was clear that M. could not have been injured by being picked up in the manner described by the grandmother. She warned that without a convincing explanation for the injury a child protection conference would have to be called. 14. On 14 October 1998, in light of the doctor’s conclusion of non-accidental injury (NAI), the Child Protection Conference decided to seek a second opinion but that meanwhile an interim care order should be obtained. Such care order was issued and parental responsibility given to the local authority on 16 October 1998. 15. On 23 October 1998, M. was discharged from hospital into the care of her aunt. The parents were allowed supervised contact. 16. The parents obtained legal advice and jointly instructed an expert, with M.’s guardian, inter alia, to clarify whether tests had been carried out to exclude brittle bone disease. However no further tests were carried out at this stage. 17. On 23 December 1998, the County Court judge found that the mother and grandmother were liars and knew more about the injury than they were prepared to reveal (they had given evidence through an interpreter which they allege was suspect) and that as the father was convinced of the innocence of his wife, he was disqualified as a person capable of protecting M. He ordered M. to be placed in care. M. remained with her aunt who lived a few hundred yards from the family home. 18. On 29 March 1999, M. sustained a second injury in her aunt’s care. Bilateral femoral fractures were found and following further tests she was diagnosed with osteogenesis imperfecta (“OI”, commonly known as brittle bone disease). Professor Carty and Dr Paterson were consulted at this time by Dr Blumenthal and inter alia did not find any ground for reaching a diagnosis of OI in preference to a non-accidental injury at the time of the first injury. 19. After discharge from hospital, M. returned home in April 1999. 20. On 17 June 1999, the care order was discharged and M. returned to her parents. In her report to the court dated 14 June 1999, M.’s guardian ad litem noted, inter alia, that this had been a particularly perplexing case, in which a diagnosis of non-accidental injury in respect of the first injury had appeared to be the most likely explanation while not fitting with the other information, essentially positive, which had emerged about the family. She also noted that all the experts agreed that medical evidence available to the court at the time of the interim care order was as complete as it could be at that time and that a diagnosis of bone disorder could not have been made at the time of the first injury. 21. The entire local community were aware that the family had been suspected of harming M. and the family had been extremely shocked and shamed. Rumours had spread to Pakistan that the mother had been put in prison. The parents’ relationship with M. and with the grandmother were severely affected and disrupted as a result of events. 22. On 24 September 2001 the parents brought claims for negligence and breach of their Article 8 rights against the hospital trust and the consultant paediatrician. 23. On 4 December 2002, the High Court found no duty of care was owed to the parents and that the Human Rights Act 1998 (“HRA 1998”) did not apply to events before it came into force on 2 October 2000. The parents appealed. 24. Leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal was granted. Two other cases raising similar issues were considered at the same time. 25. On 31 July 2003, concerning the parents’ claims in the three cases, the Court of Appeal held as regards allegations under Article 6 that no violation of this provision was involved, referring to Strasbourg judgments (Z. and Others v. the United Kingdom ([GC], no. 29392/95, ECHR 2001‑V and T.P. and K.M. v. the United Kingdom ([GC], no. 28945/95, ECHR 2001‑V). It found that while domestic law now recognised that there was a duty of care in relation to children, whose best interests were always paramount, there was a potential conflict of interest between the child and the parents, as it would always be in the parents’ best interests for the child not to be removed. Where consideration was being given to whether child abuse justified measures, a duty of care could be owed to the child but not to the parents. It upheld the rulings of the various County Court judges as a result. 26. After a hearing on 31 January and 1 and 2 February 2005, the House of Lords gave judgment on 21 April 2005. They affirmed the orders made by the first-instance judges and Court of Appeal. Lord Nicholls, in his judgment with which the majority agreed, found inter alia: "70. There are two cardinal features in these cases. One feature is that a parent was suspected of having deliberately harmed his or her own child or having fabricated the child’s medical condition. The other feature, which is to be assumed, is that the ensuing investigation by the doctors was conducted negligently. In consequence, the suspected parent’s life was disrupted, to a greater or lesser extent, and the suspected parent suffered psychiatric injury. 71. It is the combination of these features which creates the difficult problem now before the House. In the ordinary course the interests of parent and child are congruent. This is not so where a parent wilfully harms his child. Then the parent is knowingly acting directly contrary to his parental responsibilities and to the best interests of his child. So the liability of doctors and social workers in these cases calls into consideration two countervailing interests, each of high social importance: the need to safeguard children from abuse by their own parents, and the need to protect parents from unnecessary interference with their family life. 72. The first of these interests involves protection of children as the victims of crime. Child abuse is criminal conduct of a particularly reprehensible character: children are highly vulnerable members of society. Child abuse is also a form of criminal conduct peculiarly hard to combat, because its existence is difficult to discover. Babies and young children are unable to complain, older children too frightened. If the source of the abuse is the parent, the child is at risk from his primary and natural protector within the privacy of his home. This both increases the risk of abuse and means that investigation necessitates intrusion into highly sensitive areas of family life, with the added complication that the parent who is responsible for the abuse will give a false account of the child’s history. 73. The other, countervailing interest is the deep interest of the parent in his or her family life. ... Interference with family life requires cogent justification, for the sake of children and parents alike. So public authorities, should, so far as possible, cooperate with the parents when making decisions about their children. Public authorities should disclose matters relied upon by them as justifying interference with family life. Parents should be involved in the decision-making process to whatever extent is appropriate to protect their interests adequately. 74. The question raised by these appeals is how these countervailing interests are best balanced when a parent is wrongly suspected of having abused his child. Public confidence in the child protection system can only be maintained if a proper balance is struck, avoiding unnecessary intrusion in families while protecting children at risk of significant harm... Clearly health professionals must act in good faith. They must not act recklessly, that is without caring whether an allegation of abuse is well-founded or not. Acting recklessly is not acting in good faith. But are health professionals liable to the suspected parents if they fall short of the standard of skill and care expected of any reasonable professional in the circumstances? Are they exposed to claims by the parents for professional negligence? ... 75. In considering these questions the starting point is to note that in each of these three cases... the doctors acted properly in considering whether the claimant parents had deliberately inflicted injury on the child in question. The doctors were entitled, indeed bound to consider this possibility. Further, having become suspicious, the doctors rightly communicated their suspicions to the statutory services responsible for child protection. That is the essential next step in child protection... 76. In each case the suspected parent was eventually cleared of suspicion. In one case this was after ten days, in the other cases after much longer periods. The second point to note is that, essentially, the parents’ complaints related to the periods for which they remained under suspicion. In each case the parent’s complaint concerns the conduct of the clinical investigation during these periods; the investigation, it is said, was unnecessarily protracted. The doctors failed to carry out the necessary tests with appropriate expedition. Had due care and skill been realised from the outset, the doctors’ suspicions would have been allayed at once or much more speedily than occurred, and, in consequence, the parents would have been spared the trauma to which they were subjected. Thus the essence of the claims is that the health professionals responsible for protecting a suspected child victim owe a person suspected of having committed a crime against the child a duty to investigate their suspicions, a duty sounding in damages if they act in good faith but carelessly. 77. Stated in this broad form, this is a surprising proposition. In this area of the law, concerned with the reporting and investigation of suspected crime, the balancing point between the public interest and the interest of a suspected individual has long been the presence or absence of good faith... 78. This background accords ill with the submission that those responsible for the protection of a child against criminal conduct owe suspected perpetrators the duty suggested. The existence of such a duty would fundamentally alter the balance in this area of the law. It would mean that if a parent suspected that a babysitter or a teacher at a nursery or school might have been responsible for abusing her child, the doctor would owe a duty of care to the suspect... 79... <Counsel> did not contend for such a broad proposition... His submission was more restricted.... That the health professionals’ duty to exercise due professional skill and care is owed only to the child’s primary carers, usually the parents, as well as the child himself. ... 80. My initial difficulty... is that the distinction between primary carers, to whom the duty would be owed, and other suspects to whom it would not, is not altogether convincing. It is difficult to see why, if a health professional owes no duty to a childminder or teacher suspected of abuse, he should nonetheless owe such a duty to a parent suspected of abuse. An erroneous suspicion that a childminder or school teacher had been abusing a child in his or her care can be very damaging to him or her. ... 81. There is, however, one major difference between parents and childminders or school teachers,. In the case of a parent suspicion may disrupt the parent’s family life. ... So the crucial question ... is whether this potential disruption of family life tilts the balance in favour of imposing liability in negligence where abuse by a parent is erroneously suspected... ... 85. In my view the Court of Appeal reached the right conclusion on the issue... Ultimately the factor which persuaded me that, at common law, interference with family life does not justify according a suspected parent a higher level of protection than other suspected perpetrators is the factor conveniently labelled ‘conflict of interest’. A doctor is obliged to act in the best interests of his patient. In these cases the child is his patient. The doctor is charged with the protection of the child, not with the protection of the parent. The best interests of a child and his parent normally march hand-in-hand. But when considering whether something does not feel ‘quite right’, a doctor must be able to act single-mindedly in the interests of the child. He ought not have to have at the back of his mind an awareness that if his doubts about intentional injury or sexual abuse prove unfounded he may be exposed to claims by a distressed parent. 86. ... the seriousness of child abuse as a social problem demands that health professionals, acting in good faith in what they believe are the best interests of the child, should not be subject to potentially conflicting duties when deciding whether a child may have been abused, or when deciding whether their doubts should be communicated to others, or when deciding what further investigatory or protective steps should be taken. The duty to the child in making these decisions should not be clouded by imposing a conflicting duty in favour of parents or others suspected of having abused the child. ..."

5. The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Tarnow. 6. On 16 July 2003 a television station, S.Tar TV Malopolska Telewizja Kablowa (hereafter “S.Tar TV”), and two individuals, Mr G. J. and Mr J. R., lodged with the Tarnow District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) a private bill of indictment against the applicant, charging him with several counts of defamation. 7. On 24 May 2004 the Tarnow District Court found the applicant guilty of five offences of defamation under Article 212 of the Criminal Code and acquitted him of the remaining charges. The applicant was ordered to pay a fine of 2,000 Polish zlotys (PLN), PLN 500 to a charity, and to reimburse the private prosecutors PLN 1,000 for the costs of the proceedings. 8. The court found him guilty of damaging the good name of S.Tar TV in that, between April 2002 and July 2003, through a means of mass communication, namely the Internet portal www.uczciwosc.org.pl, and by sending letters to the Tarnow Regional Prosecutor, the National Broadcasting Council (Krajowa Rada Radiofonii i Telewizji), the Minister of Justice, Bishop W. Sworc, and priests from several Tarnow parishes, he had made untruthful statements, in particular that S.Tar TV had been broadcasting pornographic material. 9. Secondly, the applicant was found guilty of disseminating, on the above-mentioned Internet site, inaccurate information about one of the journalists working for S.Tar TV, Mr G. J., which had debased the victim in the eyes of the public and had undermined public confidence in him: public confidence was necessary for his profession. The court referred to statements published by the applicant to the effect that the victim had “lacked objectivity and closely collaborated with the incompetent President of Tarnow, Mr M. Bień, and his political godfather, the Civic Platform’s Member of Parliament, Mr A. Grad.” 10. Thirdly, the applicant was convicted of disseminating, through the same Internet site, information to the effect that Mr J. R., another journalist employed by S.Tar TV, had provided viewers with inaccurate information, implying that the applicant had been pushing for the dismissal of the Tarnow President. 11. The fourth charge on which the applicant was convicted consisted of making statements during a session of the Tarnow Municipal Council, in full knowledge that the session was being broadcast by S.Tar TV, which were inaccurate and damaging to the station’s good name. The statements in question included allegations that the station had been presenting one-sided information on city issues and had received money from the local authorities to present information in support of the latter’s “official line”. 12. Finally, the applicant was found guilty of disseminating inaccurate information aimed at debasing Mr G. J. and undermining public confidence in him, by stating, in the presence of 100 people, that he had been responsible for manipulation of the media and was one of the greatest manipulators of cable television. 13. The applicant was acquitted of the charge of making statements during a session of the Tarnow Municipal Council, which was broadcast by S.Tar TV, claiming that it was not objective and behaved in a totalitarian manner. The applicant was also acquitted of the charge that he had disseminated a leaflet entitled ‘Demonstration in Tarnow’” in which he made inaccurate statements to the effect that S.Tar TV had obtained a substantial sum of taxpayers’ money following an agreement with the city council. 14. On 14 September 2004 the applicant lodged an appeal against the judgment. 15. On 19 November 2004 the Tarnow Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) allowed the appeal in part. The court acquitted the applicant of three charges of defamation of S.Tar TV and Mr J. R. However, the court agreed that the applicant had defamed Mr G. J. on two occasions, namely during the demonstration and on his Internet site. The court further decided to conditionally discontinue the proceedings for a probationary period of one year, as it had established that the guilt and social danger of the act committed by the applicant were not significant. The court ordered the applicant to pay PLN 500 to a charity and the private prosecutor’s costs in the proceedings, in the amount of PLN 1,420. In setting the payment the court took into account the fact that the applicant had no previous convictions and had regard to his financial standing. 16. The appeal court considered that the nature and context of the statements regarding S.Tar TV had not exceeded the boundaries of permissible criticism. The court found that the applicant had acted in the public interest, that his statements were not defamatory and that they did not therefore constitute an offence under the Criminal Code. As regards the applicant’s conviction for defamation of Mr J. R., the court quashed it and considered that there had been no evidence of an offence. 17. With regard to the part of the judgment which it upheld, concerning the defamation of Mr G. J., the court established that on 11 April 2003 the applicant had organised a demonstration against corruption, incompetence and poverty, which involved about 200 people. During the demonstration he pointed at Mr G. J., a journalist working for S.Tar TV, who was filming the event. The description of the subsequent events as established by the Regional Court and the latter’s conclusions, read: ...“[the applicant pointing at Mr G. J.] described him in the following words: ...’this is the person responsible for manipulation’... ‘this person is called [Mr G. J.] [and] is one of the greatest information manipulators of cable TV’... ‘down with [him] (precz)!’...Some time later, on [his Internet site] there appeared a notice about the demonstration which included the following statements: ... ‘during the demonstration local journalists, including Mr G. J. from Tarnów cable TV, on account of [the latter’s] lack of objectivity and tight collaboration with the incompetent President of Tarnow, Mr M. Bień, and his political godfather the Civil Platform’s MP, Mr A.Grad, was booed (“wygwizdany”) by Tarnow inhabitants... These were the statements which [the victim] considered defamatory. The legal analysis of these statements and the circumstances in which they were made allow the conclusion that the [applicant’s] behaviour fulfilled the criteria of the offence set out in Article 212 §§ 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code. In the Regional Court’s assessment it is beyond doubt that the term ‘manipulation’ has a highly negative connotation in the common understanding (in the Polish reality this is also caused by the negative experiences of the mass media before 1989).With regard to the process of transmitting information, this term means either telling direct untruths or presenting events in such a way as to make it impossible to see them as they are in reality – which also [amounts to telling] untruths. The same is true with regard to the term “collaboration”, which means direct cooperation with an imposed authority, and is linked with servility and being at the latter’s disposal... Thus, to make a charge against a journalist of participating in manipulation or collaboration with the city’s authorities, or directly calling him an ‘information manipulator’ and stating that he was booed on account of his lack of objectivity, could indisputably debase him in the eyes of the public and undermine the public confidence necessary for his profession. Society expects from the mass media and their representatives independence, objectivity, and a true description of those events which are interesting to the public. In conclusion, it is established that [the applicant’s] behaviour was verbally aggressive, had features typical of a personal attack, and was obviously aimed at debasing Mr G. J. in the estimation of those present at the demonstration....” 18. The court also dismissed the applicant’s submissions that his statements were a value judgment. It considered that even if they could be considered value judgments, they were not in any event supported by facts. The court established that the basis of the applicant’s statement was events which had taken place during the applicant’s campaign for the post of Tarnow’s President, which had its epilogue in the Regional Court’s decision of 25 October 2002. The latter court found that S.Tar TV, but not Mr G. J., had made inaccurate statements regarding the applicant. During the election campaign S.Tar TV had broadcast a debate between the candidates; however, every time the applicant took the floor a notice appeared to the effect that the applicant had not given permission for his views to be presented to the voters; this was not true. In reality, the applicant had not agreed to the particular conditions for his presentation as proposed by S.Tar TV. However, Mr G. J. was merely a camera operator and had no influence on the station’s policy or on the broadcasting of the inaccurate information about the applicant. 19. The Regional Court considered therefore that the applicant should have limited himself to the comment that Mr G.J. “was a representative of the institution which had transmitted inaccurate information”. 20. On 16 December 2004 the Tarnow Municipal Council dismissed the applicant from his post as Vice-President of the Municipal Council. The Council considered that the applicant had been involved in unworthy conduct damaging its image by, in particular, insulting other people and constantly fighting and stirring up conflict. The Council referred to several court cases in which the applicant had been involved.

5. The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Baku. 6. The applicant is an independent journalist who at the relevant time was working for the Gündəlik Azərbaycan newspaper. 7. At the time of the events described below, criminal proceedings were pending against the editor-in-chief of the newspaper for publication of certain articles. 8. The applicant regularly authored articles in which he criticised the Government’s security and defence policies, as well as the activities of various senior military officers. 9. On 20 April 2007 an article entitled “Comrade General, I am ready to ransack the army” (“Yoldaş general, ordunu çapıb-talamağa hazıram”) and signed by the applicant was published in the Gündəlik Azərbaycan newspaper. In the article the applicant criticised a colonel in the army (F.M.), accusing him of corruption and illegal activities. 10. On the same day the applicant was present at the hearing held in the Yasamal District Court as part of the criminal proceedings instituted against Eynulla Fatullayev, the editor-in-chief of the Gündəlik Azərbaycan newspaper. Following the hearing, the Yasamal District Court convicted Eynulla Fatullayev of defamation and sentenced him to two and half years’ imprisonment (see Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan, no. 40984/07, 22 April 2010). 11. At around 5.45 p.m. on 20 April 2007 the applicant left the Yasamal District Court building and went to the offices of the newspaper. 12. At around 11.45 p.m. on 20 April 2007, when the applicant left the newspaper office, he was subjected to a violent attack by two men. The applicant was hit several times on head with a hard blunt object. He was also punched by his aggressors. 13. Having heard the applicant’s screams, his colleagues came out of the office. At that moment, the assailants left the scene of the incident by car. 14. The applicant was immediately taken to hospital where, owing to the gravity of his injuries, he received in-patient treatment for a period of seven days. It appears from the medical certificate issued by the doctor who examined him that the applicant arrived at the hospital at 1.45 a.m. on 21 April 2007 and left the hospital on 28 April 2007. The applicant was diagnosed with cranial injury and contusions on the upper lip. 15. On 23 April 2007 the Yasamal District Police Office instituted criminal proceedings under Article 132 (beating) of the Criminal Code in connection with the attack on the applicant. 16. On 25 April 2007 the investigator questioned the applicant in hospital. It appears from the record of the questioning that the applicant described in detail the circumstances of the attack, giving a detailed physical description of his assailants. He further stated that he had seen one of his assailants before, on 20 April at the Yasamal District Court. He also stated that on the same day at around 10 p.m. his colleagues had seen the assailants in the vicinity of the newspaper office. As to the investigator’s question whether he had an ongoing dispute with anyone, the applicant answered that he had had a dispute with T.C. (the person who had instituted the criminal proceedings for defamation against the editor-in-chief of the Gündəlik Azərbaycan newspaper), who had threatened him verbally and in the media. At the end of the questioning, the applicant stated that, as he had authored articles relating to the activities of the Ministry of Defence, the attack on him could have been organised by officials of that Ministry. 17. On 1 May 2007, while watching a video recording of a court hearing in the criminal proceedings against the editor-in-chief of the Gündəlik Azərbaycan newspaper, the applicant recognised one of his two assailants. This person (N.R.) was a police officer from the Yasamal District Police Office. The applicant’s colleagues also recognised N.R. as the person whom they had seen standing outside the newspaper office on the day of the attack. 18. The applicant immediately informed the investigator of the identity of N.R., requesting an official identity parade and the questioning of his colleagues as witnesses. The applicant also submitted that, as one of the assailants was a police officer, he suspected F.M. of being the person behind the attack. He therefore asked the investigator to check whether F.M. had called N.R. by telephone prior to or on the day of the attack and to obtain video recordings from the security cameras situated in the vicinity of the scene of the incident. 19. In the meantime, in an interview published on 3 May 2007 in the newspaper Üç Nöqtə, the Minister of Internal Affairs was questioned about the attack on the applicant. He made the following statement: “We have the information that this incident is an act of sabotage and had been organised by Uzeyir Jafarov [the applicant] himself.” In reply to a journalist’s suggestion that Uzeyir Jafarov had already provided the police with some facts concerning the attack, the Minister stated: “Uzeyir Jafarov may give a lot of things to the police. If he has the facts, he can give them. But it is up to the investigation to establish whether his allegations are true or not.” The Minister did not reply to the journalist’s further question as to what measures would be taken if it was established that the assailant was a police officer. 20. On 3 May 2007 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Prosecutor General complaining of the police authorities’ failure to conduct an effective investigation. He asked the Prosecutor General to remove the investigation from the police and to order the prosecution authorities to conduct an effective investigation. In this connection, he submitted that as one of the assailants was, in his view, a police officer from the Yasamal District Police Office, an investigator from the same police office could not carry out an effective investigation. 21. On 8 May 2007 the applicant was examined by a forensic expert, who found numerous injuries on his head and upper lip. The expert also concluded that these injuries caused minor harm to the applicant’s health. 22. Following the forensic examination, the criminal proceedings were continued under Article 128 (deliberate infliction of minor injury to health) of the Criminal Code. 23. On 13 June 2007 the investigator in charge of the case sent a letter to the applicant which reads: “In reply to your request of 3 May 2007, you are informed that the investigation instituted in connection with the attack on you on 20 April 2007 is pending, but it has not yet been possible to identify the assailant. At the same time, you are informed that N.N., the police officer from the Yasamal District Police Office, was not prosecuted because it had not been established that he had inflicted bodily injury on you.” 24. On 23 June 2007 the investigator issued a decision suspending the criminal proceedings in connection with the attack on the applicant. The investigator substantiated the decision by the fact that, although all possible investigative steps had been taken, it had not been possible to determine who had assaulted the applicant. The relevant part of the decision reads: “During the investigation the necessary investigative actions were taken, some persons were questioned as witnesses, U. Jafarov was questioned and granted victim status. However, it has not been possible to identify the person who committed this act. Therefore, taking into consideration that the two-month investigation period of the criminal case ends on 23 June 2007, it is appropriate to suspend the criminal proceedings until the perpetrator has been identified.” 25. The applicant was not informed of the decision suspending the investigation. 26. On 1 October 2007 the applicant lodged a new complaint with the Prosecutor General. The applicant complained of the investigator’s failure to conduct an effective investigation, claiming a violation of the rights protected under Articles 3 and 10 of the Convention. In this connection he complained that, although he had informed the investigator that one of his assailants was, in his view, the police officer N.R., no action had been taken by those conducting the investigation. In particular, the investigator had failed to arrange an identity parade including N.R., to question his colleagues as witnesses, and to order a face-to-face confrontation between him and N.R. and between his colleagues and N.R. The applicant also complained about the statements made by the Minister of Internal Affairs, noting that the police could not conduct an effective investigation after the Minister of Internal Affairs had stated that the applicant had staged the attack on himself. 27. The Prosecutor General’s Office forwarded the applicant’s complaint to the Yasamal District Police Office by letter on 31 October 2007. 28. On 14 December 2007 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Yasamal District Court. Relying on Articles 3 and 10 of the Convention, he maintained that one of his aggressors had been a police officer and complained that the domestic authorities had failed to carry out an effective investigation in this respect. He reiterated his previous complaints, noting that the investigator had failed to arrange an identity parade including N.R., to question his colleagues as witnesses, and to order a face-to-face confrontation between him and N.R. and between his colleagues and N.R. He also submitted that the investigator had failed to obtain video recordings from security cameras situated in the vicinity of the scene of the incident and to check F.M.’s telephone calls. He further argued that the State had failed to comply with its positive obligations under Article 10 of the Convention, since ‒ although he had been attacked because of his journalistic activity ‒ the State had failed to protect him as a journalist and to prosecute his aggressors. 29. At the subsequent hearing before the court the applicant learned of the investigator’s decision of 23 June 2007 suspending the criminal proceedings. 30. On 27 December 2007 the Yasamal District Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint, finding that he should have complained to the prosecutor and not to the court concerning the actions of the investigator. 31. On 11 January 2008 the applicant appealed against this decision, reiterating his previous complaints. He also complained about the decision to suspend the investigation, noting that the investigator had failed to take appropriate procedural steps with the aim of identifying the perpetrators. 32. On 28 January 2008 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the Yasamal District Court’s decision of 27 December 2007.

4. The applicants are brothers, who were born in 1941, 1933 and 1937 respectively and live in Cluj-Napoca. 5. In 1950, a property situated in Cluj-Napoca, 15-17 Someşului Street, which was the property of the applicants’ parents, was seized by the State under Decree no. 92/1950 on nationalisation. The property was made up of ten apartments and appurtenant land. 6. On 31 January 2001 the Cluj Court of Appeal, by a final decision, allowed an action by the applicants, annulled the seizure as being unlawful and ordered restitutio in integrum. 7. Although they had judicial recognition of their property right, the applicants were not able to recover possession of Apartments 5 to 9 because the State had sold them in 1996-1997 to the then tenants under Păduraru v. Romania, no. 63252/00, § ..., ECHR 2005‑... (extracts) Law no. 112/1995. 8. On 12 July 2001 the applicants claimed restitution in kind of the property under Law no. 10/2001 governing immovable property wrongfully seized by the State. So far they have not received any answer. 9. On 6 December 2002 the Cluj Court of Appeal, by a final decision, upheld in part an action by the applicants to declare the sale by the State of Apartments 5 to 9 null and void. The court declared the sale of Apartments 8 and 9 null and void, striking the third parties off the Land Register, on the ground that the sale was made after the entry into force of Government Decision no. 11/1997 prohibiting the sale by the State of property to which it had no lawful title. As for Apartments 5 and 6, it considered that the third parties had made the purchase in good faith. 10. On 16 December 2002 the applicants took possession of Apartments 1-4, 7 and 10 and of 1,490 sq. m of appurtenant land.

9. On 23 September 1992 the applicants lodged an action with the Michalovce District Court. They claimed compensation, under the Extra-Judicial Rehabilitations Act, for both real and movable property which had been taken away from their late father. 10. On 20 January 1993 the District Court submitted the action to the defendant authority for comments. On 6 April 1993 the defendant authority submitted its observations in reply. 11. On 28 April 1993 the District Court adjourned the case and requested the applicants to specify the legal provisions on which their claim was based and to submit further documentary evidence. On 24 May 1993 the applicants submitted further documents. They specified the provisions of the Extra-Judicial Rehabilitations Act on which their action was based on 3 September 1993. 12. On 16 September 1993 the District Court heard the applicants. 13. On 5 October 1993 the judge inspected the real property in question in the presence of the parties. The judge also heard a witness. 14. On 8 November 1993 the applicants withdrew their claim concerning compensation for movable property. On 15 December 1993 the District Court discontinued the proceedings in respect of that claim. This decision became final on 11 February 1994. 15. On 14 April 1994 the court heard two witnesses. 16. On 27 April 1994 the judge visited the real property in question and heard two witnesses and an expert. 17. On 11 May 1994 the applicants proposed that the court hear three witnesses. In September 1994 they requested the court not to proceed with the case between 20 October and 1 November 1994 due to the absence of their lawyer. 18. On 7 March 1995 the District Court heard three witnesses and invited the parties to explore the possibility of settling the case. On 18 May 1995 the applicants informed the judge that they were not opposed to her intention to order an expert opinion with a view to evaluating the property should the attempt to settle the case fail. On 29 June 1995 the defendant ministry refused to accept the applicants’ claims. 19. On 11 October 1995 the Michalovce District Court dismissed the action. The judgment was served on the parties on 1 and 4 December 1995 respectively. 20. On 15 December 1995 the applicants appealed. The defendant authority submitted its observations in reply on 29 January 1996, and on 20 February 1996 the case file was submitted to the appellate court. 21. On 6 March 1996 the applicants submitted further arguments to the appellate court. 22. On 7 October 1997 the Košice Regional Court upheld the first instance judgment. 23. On 7 January 1998 the applicants lodged an appeal on points of law. They challenged the lower courts’ conclusions and complained that the Regional Court had not appointed an expert with a view to establishing the value of the property. 24. On 21 April 1998 the Supreme Court rejected the appeal on points of law. It found that the refusal to order an expert opinion was not a relevant reason for quashing the second instance judgment and held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the appellate court’s finding on the merits.

6. The applicant was born in 1930 and lives in Warszawa. 7. In 1962 the applicant was injured in a train accident. Her injury caused her permanent disability and she was unable to continue her employment. 8. As from 1963 the applicant was in receipt of a monthly supplementary disability pension from the Central Direction of the State Railways (CDOKP: hereinafter “the State Railways”). By a decision of 15 March 1993 the State Railways reduced the applicant's supplementary pension, considering that she had reached pensionable age. The applicant objected to this decision. 9. On 16 February 1994 the State Railways lodged a motion with the Warsaw District Court in order to have the amount of the applicant's pension fixed. The court held three hearings, respectively on 10 May, on 7 July and on 26 September 1994. 10. By a judgment of 6 October 1994 the Warsaw District Court dismissed the claim and ordered the State Railways to pay the pension in the sum which it had hitherto paid her, considering that the applicant's reduced earning power had to be taken into account. 11. On 23 November 1994 the State Railways lodged an appeal with the Warsaw Regional Court. 12. By a decision of 19 January 1995 the Warsaw Regional Court quashed the judgment of 6 October 1994 and ordered that the case be remitted to the Warsaw District Court for reconsideration. 13. On 19 September 1995 the first hearing was held before the Warsaw District Court. New expert evidence was ordered to be taken in September 1996. The expert report was submitted to the court in May 1998. The next hearing was held on 12 January 1999, but both the plaintiff's representative and the applicant's legal representative appointed by the court under the legal aid scheme failed to attend. 14. By a judgment of 4 January 2000 the Warsaw District Court dismissed the appeal of the State Railways and ruled that the applicant's pension should not be reduced. 15. On 7 April 2000 the State Railways lodged an appeal against this judgment. On 4 July 2000 the Warsaw Regional Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the reasoning of the first-instance court.

4. The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Dąbrowa Górnicza, Poland. 5. On 15 October 1998 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having committed fraud. 6. On 16 October 1998 he was brought before the Tarnowskie Góry District Court (Sąd Rejonowy), which ordered that he be remanded in custody until 15 January 1999. The court considered that the applicant’s detention was justified by the existence of strong evidence against him, the gravity of the charges and the severity of the anticipated penalty. His two alleged accomplices were subject to police supervision. 7. On 29 October 1998 the Tarnowskie Góry District Prosecutor (Prokurator Rejonowy) refused the applicant’s application for release. He considered that keeping him in detention was necessary because an investigation was pending and the police still needed to collect evidence against him. The Katowice Regional Prosecutor (Prokurator Okręgowy) upheld that decision on 20 November 1998. 8. On 8 January 1999 the District Court prolonged the applicant’s detention until 15 April 1999. It referred to the interests of the pending investigation, such as the need to obtain additional evidence. On 27 January 1999 the Katowice Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) dismissed the applicant’s appeal against that decision. 9. In the course of the investigation the applicant filed numerous applications for release. They were dismissed by the District Prosecutor, who found that the reasons for the applicant’s detention had not ceased to exist. 10. On 30 March 1999 the prosecutor lodged a bill of indictment against the applicant and two other defendants with the Tarnowskie Góry District Court. The applicant was indicted on several charges of fraud and forgery of documents. 11. On an unspecified date the applicant asked the District Court to release him in view of his bad health. He maintained that he suffered from high blood pressure. 12. On 21 March 1999 the court refused the application. It found that the applicant’s health condition allowed him to remain in detention and that his case “did not disclose any of the grounds for release” provided by Article 259 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The court based its view on the opinion of a prison doctor. 13. On 12 April 1999 the court again prolonged the applicant’s detention until 15 October 1999. It considered that it was justified by the existence of strong evidence against him and the gravity of the charges. The Katowice Regional Court upheld that decision on 27 October 1999. 14. The trial began on 13 August 1999. The District Court held 8 hearings and heard 23 witnesses. On 15 October 1999 the court prolonged the applicant’s detention until 15 April 2000, relying on the grounds previously given. 15. The applicant repeatedly asked the Tarnowskie Góry District Court to release him in view of the state of his health. Each time, the court repeated the reasons it had previously given, finding that the original grounds for the applicant’s detention were still valid and that he had failed to adduce any arguments which would weigh in favour of his release. It also found that keeping the applicant in detention would not endanger his health, as it was possible for him to obtain medical treatment in the detention centre. 16. The District Court convicted the applicant as charged on 17 March 2000. It sentenced him to 4 years’ and 6 months’ imprisonment. The applicant appealed. 17. On 18 July 2000 the Katowice Regional Court partly amended the first-instance judgment and changed the legal qualification of the offence. It upheld the remainder of it.

5. The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Szczecin. 6. On 20 March 2003 the Krakow District Court ordered the applicant's detention on remand. The court referred to the fact that the evidence collected in the case indicated a high probability that the applicant had committed fraud and money laundering while acting in an organised criminal gang. It further stressed that it was impossible to establish the applicant's domicile and it appeared that he resided outside the country. 7. On 22 July 2003 the Kraków Appeal Prosecutor issued an international wanted notice for the applicant. 8. On 16 September 2004 the Kraków Regional Court issued an European Arrest Warrant for the applicant. 9. On 8 March 2005 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of fraud and money laundering committed while acting in an organised criminal gang. 10. On 10 March 2005 the Krakow District Court remanded the applicant in custody. The court stressed that the evidence collected in the case indicated a high probability that the applicant had committed the offences in question. In addition, it referred to the need to secure the proper course of the proceedings as there was a fear that the applicant would attempt to avoid the trial and also influence witnesses. 11. During the proceedings the applicant's detention was extended on 7 June, 2 September, 5 December 2005 and 7 March 2006. The court referred to the reasons previously given. 12. On 23 June 2006 a bill of indictment against the applicant and twenty three co-accused was lodged with the Kraków District Court. It appears that only two other co-accused were remanded in custody. The applicant was charged with various counts of fraud, money laundering, and organising and leading a criminal group. The bill of indictment comprised 1,092 pages and the prosecutor requested to hear evidence from 200 witnesses. 13. On 28 June 2006 the Kraków District Court extended the applicant's detention. The court relied on the reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offences in question. It attached importance to the likelihood of a severe sentence of imprisonment being imposed on the applicant and the risk that he would attempt to obstruct the proceedings. 14. On 12 July 2006 the applicant lodged an appeal against this decision. He claimed that the investigation of the present case had already been terminated. In addition, he stressed that he had reported himself voluntarily to the District Prosecutor on 8 March 2005. It appears that his appeal was dismissed at a later, unknown date. 15. During the trial, the courts further extended the applicant's detention on several occasions, namely on 27 September 2006 (to 30 December 2006), 21 December 2006 (to 8 March 2007), 2 March 2007 (to 8 September 2007) and 6 September 2007 (to 8 March 2008). The courts repeated the grounds previously given for the applicant's continued detention. They attached importance to the likelihood of a severe sentence of imprisonment being imposed on the applicant and the risk that he would obstruct the proceedings. 16. The applicant's further appeals against some of the decisions extending his detention and all his subsequent applications for release and appeals against refusals to release him were unsuccessful. 17. On 10 November 2006 the Kraków District Court considered itself not competent to examine the case and decided to refer it to the Zielona Góra District Court. The applicant appealed against this decision. It was upheld by the Kraków Regional Court on 29 December 2006. 18. On 29 March 2007 the Zielona Góra District Court referred the case back to the Kraków District Court. It argued that the Kraków District Court had already acquainted itself with the case file and, in addition, two of the co‑accused were allegedly involved in bribery of judges in the Zielona Góra region. On 12 June 2007 the Supreme Court refused to refer the case to the Kraków District Court and ordered the Zielona Góra District Court to proceed with the examination of the case. 19. On 21 June 2007 the Zielona Góra District Court applied to the Poznan Court of Appeal for permission to refer the case to the Zielona Góra Regional Court because of its complicated nature. The case was referred to the Zielona Góra Regional Court on 17 July 2007. 20. The first hearing in the case was held on 19 November 2007. 21. At a hearing held on 20 December 2007, the applicant asked to be released on bail. The Zielona Góra Regional Court considered that the applicant could be released providing that he paid 2,000,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) bail by 28 December 2007. The applicant paid the required sum and was released from detention on 24 December 2007. On 29 January 2008, on a prosecutor's appeal, the Poznan Court of Appeal decided to place the applicant back in detention. The court held in particular that the applicant was charged with organising and leading a criminal group and there was a risk that he would obstruct the proceedings. It further referred to the likelihood of a severe sentence of imprisonment being imposed on the applicant. On 7 February 2008 the applicant was placed in a detention centre. 22. On 7 March 2008 the Zielona Góra Regional Court released the applicant on bail of PLN 2,000,000. It further prohibited the applicant from leaving Poland. 23. The criminal proceedings against the applicant are pending.

4. The applicants were born in 1958, 1978 and 1980, respectively, and live in Rijeka. 5. On 7 August 1995 the first applicant’s husband - the second and third applicant’s father - was killed by an unidentified member of the Croatian Army, during a military operation. 6. On 4 June 1998 the applicants instituted civil proceedings in the Rijeka Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Rijeci) seeking damages from the State. They based their claim on section 180 of the Civil Obligations Act. 7. On 6 November 1999 Parliament introduced amendments to the Civil Obligations Act (“the 1999 Amendments”). The amended legislation provided that all proceedings for damages against the State for the acts of members of the Croatian Army and the police in the performance of their official duties during the Homeland War in Croatia were to be stayed. 8. On 14 November 2001 the Rijeka Municipal Court stayed the proceedings pursuant to the above legislation. The applicants’ appeal against that decision was dismissed by the Rijeka County Court (Županijski sud u Rijeci) on 25 September 2002. 9. On 14 July 2003 Parliament passed new legislation on the liability of the State for damage caused by members of the Croatian Army and police in the performance of their official duties during the Homeland War (“the 2003 Liability Act”). 10. On 13 October 2004 the applicants’ proceedings resumed.

4. The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in the village of Aleksandrovskoye in the Stavropol Region of the Russian Federation. 5. On 2 October 1997 the Commercial Court of the Sverdlovsk Region granted the applicant's civil action against the penitentiary facility AB-239 of the Ministry of Justice and awarded the applicant 75,623.60 Russian roubles (RUR) in arrears and RUR 82,838.91 in interest. 6. The judgment was not appealed against and became final on 2 November 1997. 7. On 3 March 1998 enforcement proceedings were instituted but the judgment was not enforced because the facility lacked funds. The enforcement proceedings were closed and re-opened on several occasions. The most recent decision by which the enforcement proceedings were discontinued was taken on 30 March 2001. 8. On 26 November 2002 the facility paid the applicant RUR 75,623.60. On 12 February 2004 it paid the remainder of the judgment debt, that is RUR 82,838.91. 9. On 30 December 2005 the Sverdlovsk Regional Treasury paid the applicant RUR 99,555.58 as compensation for depreciation of the amount of RUR 75,623.60 in the period from June 1997 to November 2002. According to the Government, that compensation was assessed at the annual rate of 24%.

10. The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Dällikon (Canton of Zürich). By his own account, he is a lorry driver. 11. On 14 March 1997 a military doctor declared him unfit for military service as he was suffering from type 1 diabetes (diabetes mellitus). 12. On 22 February 1999 the applicant was also exempted from the civil protection service. 13. On 8 September 2000 that exemption was lifted and in October that year the applicant was assigned to the Dübendorf Civil Protection Reserve in the Canton of Zürich. According to the Government, it is unclear from the file whether the applicant was given any tasks to carry out in a civil protection capacity. The applicant alleges that he volunteered on several occasions, but because of staff cutbacks in the Canton of Zürich he was never called to do any civil protection duty. 14. On 9 August 2001 the Zürich cantonal authorities responsible for the military-service exemption tax sent him an order to pay the tax for 2000, in the amount of 716 Swiss francs (CHF) (approximately 477 euros (EUR)), based on his taxable income that year (CHF 35,800 – approximately EUR 23,866). 15. In a letter of 11 September 2001, the applicant challenged the tax demand, considering that he was being discriminated against. He pointed out that he had always stated his readiness to do military service. 16. On 20 September 2001 the federal tax authorities informed the applicant that all Swiss men who did not suffer from a “major” disability were required to pay a tax in order to be exempted from military service. They explained that a disability was considered “major” if the degree of physical or mental disability was at least 40%. They considered that further examinations were needed in order to determine whether the applicant’s disability met that requirement. 17. When he examined the applicant on 14 May 2002, a doctor from the Zürich University Hospital found that in most cases the type of diabetes the applicant suffered from did not make people unfit for work. 18. In another expert medical examination on 5 May 2003, a military doctor found the applicant’s physical disability to be less than 40%. 19. By a decision of 15 July 2003, the Zürich cantonal authorities responsible for the military-service exemption tax decided, based on the findings of the medical examination and the expert examination of 14 May 2002, that the applicant did not qualify for exemption from the tax as his degree of invalidity was less than 40%. The applicant challenged that decision and the authorities confirmed it on 5 August 2003. 20. The Federal Tax Appeals Board for the Canton of Zürich upheld that decision on 7 November 2003. It considered that in adopting the criteria set out in section 4(1)(a) of the Federal Military-Service Exemption Tax Act of 12 June 1959 (see “Relevant domestic law and practice”, paragraph 30 below) Parliament’s intention had not been to generally exempt all people with disabilities from the obligation to pay the tax in question. In the applicant’s case the medical examination of 14 May 2002 had shown that his disability was not a major one and that his condition was highly unlikely to be an obstacle in his future career. Thanks to medical progress, patients with the applicant’s type of diabetes could live quite normal lives these days and practise almost any line of work. That being so, the people concerned were not considered to have disabilities for the purposes of section 4(1)(a) of the Federal Military-Service Exemption Tax Act. The Board further found that the applicant had failed to demonstrate that his condition, and in particular the need to administer himself four insulin injections a day, prevented him from working. Lastly, the Board did not consider that the distinction between major disabilities and other types of disability amounted, as the applicant alleged, to discrimination. 21. On 19 December 2003 the applicant filed an administrative complaint with the Federal Court. He claimed, in particular, that he was a victim of discriminatory treatment in so far as, on the one hand, he had been required to pay the exemption tax and, on the other, he had not been allowed to do his military service even though he had always stated his readiness to do it. 22. On 5 February 2004, when invited by the Federal Court to submit observations on the admissibility and merits of the complaint, the federal tax authorities recommended its rejection. 23. In a judgment of 9 March 2004, the Federal Court rejected the complaint. Based on the findings of the expert examination of 14 May 2002, it held that the applicant did not have a major physical or mental disability within the meaning of section 4(1)(a) of the Federal Military-Service Exemption Tax Act. Accordingly, he did not qualify for exemption from the tax. The Federal Court also pointed out that although the medical examination showed that the type of diabetes the applicant had was unlikely to prevent him from holding a normal job, the particular constraints of military service nevertheless obliged the authorities to declare him unfit. 24. The Federal Court explained that the aim of the law was to provide a system of compensation between those citizens who did their military service and those who were exempted from it for whatever reason. The tax in issue was meant to replace the effort and inconvenience of military service. As to the complaint of discrimination, the court explained that it was for reasons of equality that the law did not provide for a blanket exemption for all people with disabilities. 25. The Federal Court considered that the cantonal authorities had merely correctly applied the law and that it was not the court’s role to change the law. 26. It also held that the fact that the applicant had always declared his willingness to do military service and felt fit to do it as a professional driver did not make any difference, as the law provided for no alternative for someone in his situation but to pay the exemption tax.

5. The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in the town of Makyyvka, the Donetsk region. 6. The applicant is an employee of the State Joint Stock Company “Mine Zuyevska”. 7. In 2000 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Khartsyzk Town Court against his employer seeking recovery of salary arrears and compensation. 8. On 6 November 2000 the court found for the applicant and ordered the company to pay him UAH 860.90 (around 142 euros – “EUR”). The judgment was not appealed against and became final on 17 November 2000. 9. On 6 December 2000 the Zhdanivskyi Local Bailiffs’ Service instituted enforcement proceedings. 10. According to the Government, by two instalments of 16 and 18 September 2003, the full amount awarded by the judgment was transferred to the applicant’s bank account. The applicant did not contest this fact. 11. In 2001 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Khartsyzk Town Court against his employer seeking recovery of salary arrears and higher sums of disability benefits, which had been allegedly incorrectly calculated by the defendant. 12. On 7 May 2001 the court found in part for the applicant. The court ordered the company to pay the applicant UAH 975.94 (around 161 euros – “EUR”) in salary arrears and UAH 590 (around 98 euros – “EUR”) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage, and rejected the applicant’s claim for higher sums of disability benefits. 13. The applicant did not appeal in cassation against this judgment, as he did not trust the higher judicial authorities.

7. The applicant was born in 1939 in Tbilisi, Georgia. She was a citizen of the former USSR and continued to hold its citizenship until 31 December 2000; thereafter she became a stateless person. The applicant lives in Moscow. 8. On 25 December 2000 the applicant applied to the passport department at the “Filevskiy Park” police station in Moscow for residence registration. She produced her USSR passport, a consent form signed by the flat owner and certified by the housing maintenance authority, an application form for residence registration, a document showing payment of housing maintenance charges and an extract from the residents’ list. 9. The Director of the passport department refused to process the application for residence registration. He told the applicant that she could not be registered because she was not a relative of the flat owner. 10. The applicant insisted on a written refusal. She was given a printed form on which a checkmark was placed next to the statement “failed to provide a complete set of documents”. It was not specified which documents were missing. 11. On 15 January 2001 the applicant challenged the refusal before the Dorogomilovskiy District Court of Moscow. She submitted that there had been no legal basis for a restriction on her right to obtain residence registration in the flat, expressly provided to her for that purpose by its owner, and that the registration authorities had no discretion in granting residence registration once the appropriate documents had been produced, as had been the case. 12. On 12 February 2001 the Director of the passport department filed his observations on the applicant’s claim. He contended that the applicant did not have Russian citizenship and that she had originally come from Georgia. Georgian citizens were required to have an appropriate visa to enter Russia, which the applicant could not produce, and, in any event, the registration of foreign citizens was a matter for the Ministry of the Interior’s local visa departments. 13. On 13 February 2001 the Dorogomilovskiy District Court of Moscow ruled on the applicant’s claim. A representative of the flat owner stated before the court that the applicant had been living in the flat since 2000 and that the owner had no objections to her registration. The court dismissed the applicant’s claim, giving two reasons for its decision. 14. Firstly, referring to the provisions of the Civil and Housing Codes regulating the joining of family members and other persons to existing municipal-tenancy agreements and emphasising the absence of a family relationship between the applicant and the flat owner, the court ruled that the matter should be examined not as a challenge to the State official’s refusal to grant registration, but rather as a civil action for determination of the applicant’s right to move into the flat. 15. Secondly, the court held that the applicant had failed to prove her Russian citizenship or to confirm her intention of obtaining it and pointed out that “a treaty” between Russia and Georgia provided for visa-based exchanges. 16. The judgment concluded as follows: “Given that the applicant failed to produce information confirming her right to move into the flat in question, information on [her] citizenship and the lawfulness of [her] entry into the Russian Federation, the Court accordingly dismisses her claim.” 17. On 5 March 2001 the Dorogomilovskiy District Court of Moscow confirmed certain amendments to the hearing record, as submitted by the applicant’s representative. In particular, the record was to reflect the applicant’s statements about the non-applicability of municipal-tenancy provisions to her situation, given that the flat had been in private ownership, and about the flat owner’s consent to her residence. 18. On 19 March 2001 the applicant’s representative filed a statement of appeal. He submitted, in particular, that the District Court had incorrectly referred to the applicant’s Georgian citizenship and to a visa requirement for her entry into the Russian Federation, since the applicant had never held Georgian citizenship and, in any event, the residence regulations applied uniformly to all persons lawfully residing within the Russian Federation, irrespective of their citizenship. He indicated that the District Court had failed to advance any justification for the restriction on the applicant’s right to choose her residence. He also contended that the District Court’s reliance on tenancy provisions had been invalid because the flat owner had had clear title to the flat and there could be no dispute as to the applicant’s right to move in, since she had the flat owner’s explicit consent. 19. On 2 August 2001 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment. It reiterated the District Court’s findings that the applicant’s claim had to be dismissed because she had failed to prove her Russian citizenship or an intention to obtain it and because she had failed to provide any documents confirming her right to move into the flat in question. The City Court did not address the arguments advanced by the applicant’s representative in the grounds of appeal.

5. Ms Borovská and Mr Forrai (“the first and third applicants”) were born in 1948 and 1927 respectively, and live in Košice. 6. Ms Buzová (“the second applicant”) was born in 1937 and also lived in Košice. On 17 April 2014 the Court received a letter from the applicants’ lawyer informing it that, on 27 October 2013, the second applicant had died and that the inheritance proceedings were pending. 7. This application and three others (nos. 18803/10, 42812/10 and 44019/11) concern the regularisation of the relationship between ownership and use of real property located in the cadastral area of Košice-Sever. 8. Certain land in that area was expropriated in the 1980s by the (then socialist) State and a public sports centre was built on it. The sports centre comprises buildings and various other facilities, such as a tennis court, a grandstand, a water station and paved areas. 9. After the post-1989 political, constitutional and legal changes, litigation took place with a view to resolving various property claims made by the original owners (or their legal successors) against the entities that owned or operated the sports centre or various parts of it. 10. The land concerned is divided into a number of plots with various owners, many of whom are linked by family relations and history, and who had the same legal representation in the above-mentioned proceedings. Their lawsuits followed a similar pattern, but sometimes had varying results. They included the following proceedings. 11. The applicants in the present case are successors in title to a plot of land in the above-mentioned area, having inherited their title from the original owner, who died in 1959. 12. On 22 August 1994 the applicants lodged an action against the owner of a sports centre seeking to obtain a court order for the removal of the constructions on the land. The principal line of argument was that the expropriation decision of 24 February 1984 was invalid in law. The applicants were therefore the lawful owners of the land in question, in particular plot no. 10610 (recorded on sheet no. 1460 in the “old” records), and the defendant had no lawful title to have the constructions on the applicants’ land. 13. The action was subsequently amended to state that, alternatively, the applicants sought a judicial ruling establishing an easement on their land for the benefit of the owner of the sports centre in return for financial compensation payable to the applicants. It was also extended to two more defendants: the municipality concerned and a private company. 14. The action was examined and determined at first instance by the Košice I District Court (Okresný súd). In its judgment (rozsudok) of 11 August 2008, the District Court acknowledged that (i) the expropriation of 1984 was legally ineffective on account of procedural flaws; (ii) as a consequence the applicants were the owners of the land in question; (iii) the constructions on it had been built without a valid legal title in so far as the land was concerned; and (iv) the applicants were entitled to seek redress under general civil law, that is to say Article 135c of the Civil Code (Law no. 40/1964 Coll., as amended), which was not subject to any statute of limitation, unlike the special legislation on restitution, which contained specific time-limits (see paragraph 24 below). 15. The District Court further held that, for practical reasons, it was out of the question to regularise the situation by establishing that the applicants were the owners of the constructions and ordering them to pay the current owners financial compensation. Furthermore, in the circumstances, it was likewise not practical to order the physical removal of the constructions in question. 16. However, contrary to the applicants’ assertions, the District Court found that no easement could be established on the land. The bone of contention was the legal nature of the constructions concerned. Unlike in construction law, in civil law these constructions could not be considered as “buildings” (stavba) in legal terms. An easement over land could only be established for the benefit of the owner of a building in the given sense. In that connection, the court relied on Article 135c § 3 of the Civil Code (Law no. 40/1964 Coll., as amended) (see paragraph 21 below). The court also noted that it was bound by the legal classification of the applicants’ claim and concluded that, since the constructions on their specific plots of land were not buildings, the claim had to be dismissed. 17. The applicants challenged the first-instance judgment by means of an appeal (odvolanie) to the Košice Regional Court (Krajský súd). They argued in particular that the District Court had failed to appreciate that the property in question was part of a large complex serving a single purpose, that a number of claims had been raised in respect of that property, that those claims had been fully or partly successful, that the legal nature of the claims was identical to those raised by the applicants; and that the only difference was the technical parameters of the specific plots at stake. The applicants pointed out specifically that, in its judgment in case no. 15C 251/94, the District Court had established an easement in respect of plots of land comprising the sports centre on which similar constructions had been built, exactly as claimed by the applicants in the present case. The court had made no distinction between plots with and those without “buildings” on them (see paragraphs 25 et seq. below). 18. On 11 February 2010 the Regional Court, sitting in chambers, dismissed the applicants’ appeal and upheld the first‑instance judgment, albeit on different grounds. It concurred with the District Court that the expropriation of 1984 was legally ineffective. As a consequence, the State was to be considered as having appropriated the land in question without legal title within the meaning of section 6(1)(p) of the Act on adjustment of ownership rights in respect of land and other agricultural property (Law no. 229/1991 Coll., as amended – “the Land Ownership Act”). The restitution of land in such circumstances fell under the regime of the said legislation and any claims for it had had to be lodged by 31 December 1992 at the latest (see paragraphs 22 et seq. below). The Regional Court observed that the applicants had failed to pursue that course of action and held that asserting their property rights under general civil law, as the applicants had done, was not permissible. The applicants’ argument concerning the differing judicial practice went unanswered. The Regional Court’s judgment became final and binding on 16 March 2010. 19. On 5 May 2010 the applicants lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ústavný súd) under Article 127 § 1 of the Constitution (Constitutional Law no. 460/1992 Coll., as amended). They considered the dismissal of their action arbitrary and alleged that their rights under, inter alia, Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (access, fairness, adequate reasoning) and the constitutional equivalent of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 had been violated. Among other things, they argued that – on the specific facts – their case fell outside the purview of the restitution laws cited in the Regional Court’s judgment and that the existence of the restitution laws as leges speciales did not exclude the application of the rules on protection of property rights under the Civil Code as a lex generalis. In addition, the applicants submitted that judicial practice had varied. They referred to the District Court’s judgment in case no. 15C 251/94 and its judgments in a number of other cases concerning the same sports centre, in which the application of general civil law in an identical context had been accepted. Although they had raised this specific argument before the Regional Court, the latter had taken no position on it and its reasoning had been generally inadequate and arbitrary. Moreover, the applicants emphasised that it had been sixteen years since the introduction of their action, a protracted period for which they bore no responsibility. They considered that, therefore, any case-law that may have meanwhile been established should not be detrimental to them. 20. On 3 June 2010 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded. It observed that it was not a court of further appeal against decisions of the ordinary courts. It cited extensively from the Regional Court’s judgment, finding no constitutionally relevant unfairness, arbitrariness or irregularity in it. The applicants’ argument concerning the differing judicial practice went unanswered. The decision was served on the applicants’ lawyer on 30 July 2010.

5. The first applicant, Mr Leopold Oklešen, is a Slovenian national who was born in 1947 and lives in Novo Mesto. The second applicant is a private enterprise called Leopold Oklešen Cemetery and Funeral Services s.p. (Pokopališko pogrebne storitve Leopold Oklešen s.p.) located in Novo Mesto. 6. The second applicant, which was owned, legally represented and run by the first applicant, had held a valid licence issued by Chamber of Crafts (obrtno dovoljenje) for the provision of funerals, landscaping and maintenance of exterior surfaces (zunanja ureditev) since 6 March 1995. The licence confirmed that the second applicant was in compliance with section 9 of the Crafts Act (see paragraph 22 below). The second applicant used to provide all funeral services in Novo Mesto municipality, including preparing and transporting remains, obtaining the necessary documents, arranging cremations, selling funeral items (coffins, funeral wreaths, flowers and so on) and organising ceremonies. It appears that funerals represented an important, if not the main, part of the activities of the second applicant. 7. In September 2000 a Decree on the provision of public utility as regards cemetery and funeral activities, management of cemeteries and funeral ceremonies in Novo Mesto Municipality (“the 2000 Decree”, see paragraphs 24-25 below) came into force. Subsequently, the Novo Mesto Municipal Enterprise (Komunala Novo Mesto, “KNM”) was entrusted with the provision of such services in the municipality's area. 8. According to KNM's website (http://www.komunala-nm.si/, consulted on 3 September 2007), KNM provided services concerning, inter alia, digging and organising graves, obtaining documents concerning the deceased, preparation and storage of remains, funeral home leasing, organisation and performance of funeral ceremonies and services and transportation of remains. 9. By a letter of 1 March 2002, KNM warned the second applicant to comply with the 2000 Decree. This implied, according to KNM, that “all activities relating to those deceased (...) who are to be buried in cemeteries managed by KNM should be carried out solely by KNM!” 10. On 19 April 2002, further to the second applicant's request, Novo Mesto Municipality explained that the second applicant was not eligible to provide funeral services because of the restrictions set out in the 2000 Decree, the 1993 Public Utilities Act and the Cemetery and Funeral Services and Cemetery Management Act (“the 1984 Cemetery and Funeral Act”). The Municipality further stated that the Constitutional Court decision no. U-I-48/97 had confirmed that funerals should be a mandatory public utility (see paragraphs 26-27 below). 11. On 25 November 2002 the second applicant submitted a request to the Constitutional Court for a review of the constitutionality and legality (pobuda za oceno ustavnosti in zakonitosti) of the 2000 Decree, in particular sections 1 and 16. While section 1 provided, inter alia, that funerals should be provided by a public utility, section 16 established that a provider of a public utility, namely a public-law enterprise, should be contacted in the event of a death and should be responsible for transport of the remains. 12. In its request, the second applicant argued that funeral provision should be in the free market, and requested the Constitutional Court to issue an injunction against the 2000 Decree. The second applicant further stated that, following the adoption of the 2000 Decree, KNM had obtained a monopoly in this field and did not allow it to transport remains to cemeteries. It submitted that the 2000 Decree had been introduced with the intention of closing down its successful business. 13. On 1 April 2004 the Constitutional Court rejected the second applicant's request, referring to its earlier decision no. U-I-48/97 (see paragraphs 26-27 below) finding that section 2 of the 1984 Cemetery and Funeral Act was in conformity with the Constitution. The above-mentioned provision read together with section 68 of the 1993 Public Utilities Act determined that the funeral services belonged to the mandatory public utilities. These rules were binding on the Novo Mesto Municipality, which was required to implement them. 14. According to the applicants, as a result of the above situation the second applicant has been unable to provide the core funeral services since the implementation of the 2000 Decree and has lost a large proportion of the clientele due to the 2000 Decree's restrictions. 15. The second applicant continued to operate until 2006. For illustration of the effects of the 2000 Decree's restrictions on the applicants' earnings, it would appear from the first's applicant's tax forms concerning the second applicant's activity, that his taxable income was calculated as follows: in 1998, it was approximately 15,000 euros (EUR), in 1999 it was EUR 26,000, in 2000 it was EUR 39,000 and in 2001 it was 27,000. After the implementation of the 2000 Decree, his taxable income was approximately EUR 17,000 in 2003, EUR 28,000 in 2005 and EUR 18,000 in 2006. 16. On 7 August 2006 the second applicant was removed from the Slovenian register of enterprises. The first applicant retired in November 2006.

9. The applicant, who was born in 1956, was living in Otlubahçe village at the time of the alleged events giving rise to this application. The facts of the case are in dispute between the parties and may be summarised as follows. 10. Until October 1994 the applicant lived in Otlubahçe, a village of Ovacık district in Tunceli province, in the then state-of-emergency region of Turkey. In 1994, terrorist activity was a major concern in this area. Since the 1980s a violent conflict had been going on in the region between the security forces and sections of the Kurdish population in favour of Kurdish autonomy, in particular members of the PKK (Workers’ Party of Kurdistan). The inhabitants of the applicant’s village were suspected of “aiding and abetting terrorists”; and accordingly they were strictly and frequently controlled by the gendarmes stationed near the village. 11. On 5 October 1994 the security forces surrounded the applicant’s village and assembled the residents in the village square. Using curse words, they told them that the village would be evacuated at once with no possibility of return. The applicant took what he was able to carry with him and left the village. Immediately after the evacuation, the soldiers set the houses and the crops on fire. 12. The applicant moved temporarily into a prefabricated State disaster housing complex close to Ovacık. 13. Following the impugned events the applicant filed a petition with the Ovacık Public Prosecutor’s office complaining about the burning down and forced evacuation of his village by gendarmes. 14. As the case concerned an investigation into alleged acts of the security forces, the Ovacık Public Prosecutor issued a decision of non‑jurisdiction and referred the petition to the office of the District Governor in Ovacık in accordance with the Law on the Prosecution of Civil Servants (Memurin Muhakematı Kanunu). 15. The District Governor sent a letter to the Ovacık Gendarmerie Headquarters and requested information about the applicant’s allegations. 16. In a letter of 1 November 1994 the Gendarmerie Commander informed the District Governor that the security forces had not burned any house during their operations in the area. Accordingly, the Ovacık Administrative Council issued a decision to discontinue the criminal proceedings against the gendarmes. 17. On 25 October 1995 the Ovacık District Governor sent a letter to the applicant. Relying on the Ovacık Gendarmerie Commander’s letter of 1 November 1994, he explained that he was unconvinced by his allegations. He further explained that pursuant to the established case-law of the Supreme Administrative Court (Danıştay), no inquiry was possible unless the identity of the accused civil servant were specified. He therefore stated that the authorities would not initiate an investigation into the alleged events. 18. The applicant did not receive this letter. He learned of the Ovacık Public Prosecutor’s decision of non-jurisdiction and the Ovacık Administrative Council’s decision from his fellow villagers. 19. In 1994 members of the PKK started a propaganda campaign for the organisation in the villages of Ovacık district. They kidnapped young men from these villages and forced them to join the organisation. The PKK militants issued threats against the villagers and harassed them. The inhabitants of the villages left their homes as a result of the pressure exerted by the PKK. 20. The investigation carried out by the authorities revealed that the applicant’s village had not been burned by the security forces but by terrorists wearing military uniforms. In his statements to the investigating authorities, the applicant failed to specify the identity of the perpetrators of the alleged crime. 21. The parties submitted various documents with a view to substantiating their claims. These documents, in so far as they are relevant, can be summarised as follows. 22. The Human Rights Foundation is a non-governmental organisation with its head office in Ankara, Turkey. Its 1993 Report stated that, from 1990 to 1993, more than 913 villages and hamlets had been evacuated. The 1993 Report maintained that village evacuations had accelerated in 1993, mostly targeting the villages whose inhabitants refused to serve as village guards. 23. The 1994 Report of the TIHV argued that the Government’s policy was to claim that the evacuations and eventual destructions were caused by PKK terror, poverty and the forces of nature. According to the same report, some 50 to 60 villages were burned down in each of the provinces subject to the emergency rule. 24. The 1995 Report maintained that more than 400 villages had been evacuated in 1995. According to the 1996 Report, the State-of-Emergency Regional Governor once mentioned that a total of 918 villages and 1,767 hamlets had been evacuated for various reasons, although never admitting that evacuations had been carried out by security forces. 25. The 1997 and 1998 Reports described the Government’s policy of evacuating villages as a systematic “internal security operation” applied throughout the 1990s. (b) Excerpts from “Burned-down / Evacuated Villages and Migration”, a book published by the Human Rights Association 26. The excerpts gave a comprehensive list of burned-down and/or evacuated villages from February 1990 to January 1999. The list did not make any reference to Otlubahçe as having been evacuated and destroyed. 27. The excerpts contained several articles reproduced from a daily newspaper Ülkede Gündem, relating to the evacuation of villages and its detrimental effects on the displaced persons. The articles stressed that numerous villagers had filed petitions with the State authorities, complaining that their villages had been burned down by security forces. 28. The articles also emphasized that the Government’s public declarations, which appeared to allow displaced villagers to return to their villages, were unreliable. Whenever villagers had attempted to do so, they were physically denied access to their villages. (c) The report of 14 January 1998 of the Turkish Grand National Assembly’s Commission of Inquiry on the measures to be taken in order to address the problems of the persons displaced following the evacuation of settlement units in east and south-east Anatolia. 29. This report was prepared by a Commission of Inquiry composed of ten members of parliament. According to the report, in 1993 and 1994 the inhabitants of 905 villages and 2,923 hamlets were evicted and forced to move to other regions of the country (p.13). 30. The report included a statement by Mr Doğan Hatipoğlu, a former governor of Diyarbakır. Mr Hatipoğlu explained that, during his office, occasional village evacuations by military authorities were brought to his attention. He stated that – although very rarely – he had received complaints about village burnings. According to Mr Hatipoğlu, it was inconceivable to assert that all the villages were vacated due to PKK coercion. He alleged that the Government had failed to take the necessary measures for a healthy resettlement of displaced persons (p.13). 31. The report also referred to the “Human Rights Report – Turkey”, prepared and submitted to the Commission of Inquiry in 1995 by Mr Yavuz Önen, the chairman of the Human Rights Foundation. This latter report dedicated a chapter to immigrants and evacuated villages. It argued that, in 1995, the practice of evacuation of villages and hamlets was widespread. Many houses in villages were either destroyed or made uninhabitable. People were forced to emigrate from the region and pressure was exerted on the inhabitants until they left their villages. In early 1995 there was practically no village or hamlet inhabited except those whose inhabitants agreed to become village guards (p.19). 32. The report of the Commission of Inquiry also referred to the speech delivered at the Turkish Grand National Assembly by Mr Salih Yıldırım, a deputy from Şırnak, on 3 June 1997 on the question of evacuated villages. Mr Yıldırım stated, inter alia, that the villages were evacuated either by the PKK, in order to intimidate those who opposed it, by the authorities since they were unable to protect the villages, or because the inhabitants of those villages refused to become village guards or were suspected of having aided the PKK (p. 20). 33. In conclusion, it was recommended in the report that the inhabitants of the settlement units should be re-housed in the provinces, districts or central villages – rather than hamlets – close to the area where they used to live and that necessary economic measures should be taken with a view to providing employment to the inhabitants of the region, priority being given to the immigrants. 34. This report aims at indicating the property owned by the applicant. Following an investigation carried out by the authorities it appeared that the applicant owned a house and a plot of land measuring 19,506 metres square according to the records of the land registry office. He has another plot of land measuring 31,000 metres square according to the municipal registry office. It was estimated that the applicant could derive 816,000,000 Turkish liras’ income from his lands. The applicant does not have any registered trees. According to the official records, he did not have any commercial activity given that he did not pay any tax. (b) Halit Şaylı and Hasan Süzgün’s statements dated 10 March 2004, taken by two gendarmes 35. The witnesses are two inhabitants of Otlubahçe village in Ovacık province. Their statements were taken in order to determine the situation of the applicant who had lodged an application with the Court. The witnesses stated that the applicant lived in Pulur neighbourhood of Ovacık. The witnesses also noted that there was no electricity, school or telephone in Otlubahçe.

4. The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Piekary. 5. On 2 March 2008 the applicant was arrested by the police under the suspicion of having participated in an organised criminal gang trading in women and deriving profits from prostitution. 6. On 13 March 2008 the Poznan District Court decided to detain the applicant on remand (file no. III K 278/08). 7. The applicant’s pre-trial detention was subsequently extended by the Poznan Regional Court on 2 September, 25 August and 1 December 2008. 8. In 2009 his pre-trial detention was further extended on 17 February and 27 May. 9. On 12 August 2009 the applicant and ten other co-accused were indicted before the Poznan Regional Court (file no. Ap V Ds. 37/09). 10. On 25 May 2010 the Poznan Court of Appeal decided to extend the applicant’s pre-trial detention. In addition to the reasonable suspicion against the applicant, the court relied on the risk of his going into hiding, especially since he had been avoiding arrest for one-and-a-half years. Moreover, the court relied on the severity of the penalty that might be imposed and a risk that the applicant would interfere with the proper course of the proceedings. The court finally considered that the criminal proceedings had been very complex as the case involved eleven co-accused charged with a dozen offences each. 11. The applicant’s appeal against this decision was dismissed on 29 June 2010. 12. Afterwards the applicant’s pre-trial detention was extended on 19 August, 26 October, and 21 December 2010. All decisions were unsuccessfully appealed against by the applicant. The court in particular relied on the severity of the possible penalty and on the fact that the applicant acted in an organised criminal gang. In the last of the above listed decisions the Court of Appeal considered that the risk of a severe sentence should no longer be a valid ground for the applicant’s very lengthy pre-trial detention. However, the other grounds, namely risk of his interfering with the proper course of the proceedings and going into hiding, were still valid grounds for his continued detention. 13. On 24 March and 26 May 2011 the Poznan Court of Appeal further extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention. 14. On 8 September 2011 the Poznan Court of Appeal decided that the applicant could be released on bail in the amount of 70,000 Polish zlotys (PLN). 15. On 12 October 2011 the applicant paid the bail and was released from detention. 16. On 6 June 2012 the Poznan Regional Court convicted the applicant and sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment (file no. XVI K 45/10). The judgment is not final as the applicant lodged an appeal against it.

5. The applicant was born in 1942 and lives in Vilnius. 6. The applicant’s son, A. Česnulevičius (“A.Č.”), was serving a prison sentence in Pravieniškės High-Security Prison No. 1 (Pravieniškių 1-oji sustiprintojo režimo pataisos darbų kolonija, hereinafter “Pravieniškės Prison”). On 4 August 2000 at about 10 p.m. A.Č. was found in the living quarters of Block 5 of the prison, showing signs of having been beaten. As noted in the transcript of a recorded conversation between A.Č. and the guard on duty, A.Č. refused to make a written statement explaining the circumstances of the incident, even though asked to do so by the guards. He also refused to be checked by a doctor, although the guards pointed out that A.Č. had injuries on his face and that he should see one. To prevent A.Č. from possibly being beaten up again, the prison guards locked him in solitary confinement (Baudos izoliatorius) until the morning. In the morning, the prison governor asked A.Č. to explain the circumstances of the incident. A.Č. claimed that he had no enemies, had not had any disputes with anyone and that some unknown prisoners could have beaten him up by accident. The prison governor ordered A.Č. to return to his living quarters in Block 3. 7. On 4 August 2000, A.G., a guard at Pravieniškės Prison, submitted a written report to the prison governor. A.G. wrote that “on 4 August at 10:10 p.m. during a patrol of the zone, in the staircase of Block 5, on the second floor, two masks made out of knitted caps were found. Holes were cut in the middle of the caps. Next to the masks a metallic bar was found, about 40 centimetres long and 2.5 centimetres thick”. 8. On the same date another prison guard, A.K., informed the prison governor in writing: “on 4 August at 10:10 p.m. during a patrol of the zone, noise was heard in Block 5. When we were going towards Block 5 by the staircase, two masks made of caps and a metallic bar were found. After going up [the stairs ...] prisoner A.Č. was found beaten”. 9. The Government submitted a copy of a report by the prison governor to the director of the Prisons Department dated 8 August 2000. The prison governor wrote that when he had arrived at work on 5 August 2000, he had found A.Č. in an isolation cell. The warden who had been on duty had explained that on 4 August at 10 p.m. A.Č. had been detained in Block 5, where he had got into a dispute with other prisoners. The director had then questioned A.Č., asking who had attacked him or whom he suspected of doing so. A.Č. had stated that he had been beaten by two convicts whom he could not identify. He had not had any enemies and had got along with everyone; the attack had been accidental. A.Č. had asked the governor to be moved to Block 8, where he knew another inmate. The governor had explained to A.Č. that he would take a decision on that request on Monday 7 August 2000. The governor had offered A.Č. the possibility to stay in solitary confinement or in the facility’s medical unit. A.Č. had explained that he had no complaints and had categorically refused the governor’s offers. Then the governor had “explained to A.Č. what he should do should similar accidents happen again”. 10. When questioned by prosecutors on 5 October 2000, Ž.K., a nurse at Pravieniškės Prison, stated that at about 9 a.m. on 5 August 2000, when she was on duty, A.Č. had come to see her. He had had two surface wounds on the calf of his left leg. He had been wearing a tracksuit. She had bandaged the two wounds. A.Č. had told the nurse that he had fallen down and injured himself. He had also said that he had no other injuries. The nurse also testified that A.Č. had not had any injuries on his hands, face or other exposed body parts. Responding to a question from the prosecutor as to whether she had noted down A.Č.’s injuries in his medical file, the nurse replied that the wounds were surface wounds and only serious injuries were to be noted in medical files. 11. On the night of 5 August 2000 A.Č., having again moved to different sleeping quarters of his own accord, was asleep in Block 13. Around midnight he was beaten by other inmates who wore cloth masks. 12. When giving a statement to the prosecutors on 5 October 2000, T.L., a nurse on duty at Pravieniškės Prison on 6 August 2000, stated that on that date at around 8:30 a.m. A.Č. had come to the prison’s medical unit and had asked her to bandage his leg, on which had been several wounds of less than 1 centimetre in length. When the nurse had questioned A.Č. about the source of the wounds, A.Č. had said that he had injured himself when playing football. The nurse also testified that A.Č. had not had any injuries on his face, hands or back. She had not recorded the wounds in A.Č.’s medical file because “records are not kept for simple bandaging”. Responding to a question from the prosecutor about the probable cause of the injuries, the nurse replied that she thought A.Č. could have fallen on small stones. 13. On 6 August 2000 at about 5 p.m. A.Č., while in Block 13, was once again attacked and beaten by other inmates. In a written statement he gave on the same date to the prison governor, A.Č. stated that the perpetrators had been unknown young men who had worn masks at the time of the attack. A.Č. refused to institute criminal proceedings. 14. On the same day, A.S., another guard in Pravieniškės Prison, informed the prison governor in writing that “on 6th August at 5:30 p.m. I saw that two prisoners were heading towards the medical unit [carrying] prisoner A.Č., [whose] leg [was] bleeding”. 15. When questioned on 5 October 2000 by the prosecutors, nurse T.L. also testified that on 6 August 2000 at about 5:30 p.m. A.Č. had been brought to the medical service, this time by two other inmates. A.Č. had not wanted to say what had happened. Nonetheless, the nurse had found fresh wounds. A.Č. had been bleeding heavily from a deep stab wound on one of his knees. The nurse had attempted to stop the bleeding. Being unsuccessful, she had decided to take A.Č. to the Prisons Department’s Hospital. She had also noticed that A.Č. had an injury on one of his fingers, but had seen no other injuries. 16. On 6 August 2000 A.Č. was taken to the Prisons Department’s Hospital in Vilnius and operated on there. As his state of health deteriorated, the following day he was taken to the emergency department of Vilnius University Hospital, where he died half an hour after arrival. He was twenty-two years of age. 17. The Government submitted a court-ordered medical expert report, no. 77 dated 16 October 2000, commissioned by the Kaišiadorys District Prosecutor. The three forensic experts who authored the report stated that the medical aid provided to A.Č. at Pravieniškės Prison had been timely and “in accordance with the abilities of the nurse on duty”, and that A.Č. had been referred to the Prisons Department’s Hospital on time. The experts noted that at the Prisons Department’s Hospital the applicant had received a timely diagnosis, but that the diagnosis had not been thorough (nepilna) because multiple instances of soft-tissue bleeding and bleeding under the skin had not been identified. Given that the doctors had failed to identify A.Č.’s serious condition and possible traumatic-haemorrhagic shock, A.Č. had not received the necessary intensive anti-shock treatment. The experts also noted that it was impossible to establish who had treated A.Č. at the Prisons Department’s Hospital, because the doctors’ signatures on the relevant records were illegible and many doctors’ stamps (antspaudai) were missing from A.Č.’s records. As to the cause of A.Č.’s death, the experts noted that failure to provide adequate medical treatment at the Prisons Department’s Hospital had allowed the above-mentioned complications that had caused death to develop faster. However, it was not possible to state that even if all proper medical actions had been taken, the life of the applicant’s son would have been saved. 18. On 10 August 2000 the forensic experts issued a report on the causes of A.Č.’s death. They established that A.Č. had died on 7 August 2000, at around 9 p.m., from multiple injuries. In particular, he had received no less that five blows to his head, two blows to his neck, one blow to his back, one blow to his stomach, ten blows to his hands and sixteen blows to his legs. According to the experts, all those beatings happened within one to three days of A.Č.’s death. 19. On 16 January 2001 the State Medical Audit Inspectorate issued a report on the speediness, accessibility and quality of the health care delivered to A.Č. at the Prisons Department’s Hospital. The expert panel concluded that A.Č. had died of traumatic shock and fat embolism that had developed because of multiple body lesions. The doctor on duty at Pravieniškės Prison on 6 August 2000, M.P., had not fully evaluated A.Č.’s condition, had not diagnosed traumatic shock and had not ordered anti-shock treatment. The same mistakes had been made by the doctor, P.J., who had been the doctor on duty at the Prisons Department’s Hospital. In addition, P.J. had not had a licence to perform surgery on individual patients and thus had not had the right to engage in medical practice. The panel also established that the medical records of the Prisons Department’s Hospital had been managed improperly. The medical experts concluded, nonetheless, that it was not possible to categorically state that timely and fully comprehensive medical help could have avoided the applicant’s death, as fat embolism may develop as a result of trauma that does not involve shock or regardless of an adequate and high standard of treatment. 20. On 8 August 2000 the Kaišiadorys District Prosecutor’s Office started a pre-trial murder investigation. As appears from the materials submitted by the parties, the Kaišiadorys District Prosecutor subsequently suspended the pre-trial investigation at least five times because the suspects could not be identified. The applicant and his lawyer appealed against the decisions ordering the suspension of the investigation. 21. On 19 October 2000 the police commissioner for Kaunas City provided the Kaišiadorys District Prosecutor with a list of ten names of inmates at Pravieniškės Prison. The police commissioner wrote that it had been established by an operational search that “the [ten individuals] took part in the beating of A.Č., causing his death”. 22. On 8 November 2000 the Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the Kaišiadorys district updated the Regional Prosecutor’s Office in Kaunas as to the progress of the criminal investigation into the death of the applicant’s son. The deputy chief prosecutor wrote: “The inmates detained in Blocks 5 and 13 have been interrogated with a view to establishing the possible circumstances of the event. During the [interviews] with the inmates, panic [and] fear of explaining the circumstances of the events could be felt. For example, one of the inmates said during [his interview] that “I would rather kill myself than testify”. According to the inmates, they do not feel safe in the prison because they live in dormitories with unlocked doors and the freedom of movement of other inmates is not restricted. At night up to fifteen officers remain working at the prison. The interrogation situation being so, it was expedient to isolate the [established] suspects temporarily from the living area of the prison. The prison governor has asked me to inform him of the [names of the] suspects identified during the pre-trial investigation. I have submitted a list of suspects to him, indicating that it was expedient to isolate them. (...) The prison governor has put the suspects into closed premises. These actions by the prison administration have given positive results – three inmates have agreed to give evidence [on the condition that] their [identities are kept] secret. The investigation in this case [has been] complicated because the inmates are avoiding giving evidence about the circumstances of the event by all means [possible]. This is explained by the fact that the “unwritten rules” created by the inmates themselves are valid amongst them. The inmates obey these rules at any price. One of such rules is that open communication with law-enforcement officers is not allowed. At this time, there is not enough evidence to bring charges against the suspects identified.” 23. On 8 February 2001 the Kaišiadorys District Prosecutor suspended the pre-trial investigation on the basis of Article 218 § 1 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see the Relevant domestic law part below). 24. The applicant objected to the way the investigation of the case was being conducted and complained in writing to the Kaunas Regional Prosecutor’s Office. He noted that his son had been beaten “not somewhere in the forest or on the street at night, but in a State institution – Pravieniškės Prison”. He asserted that the guards on duty should have known which block his son had been in at the time of incident, whom he had communicated with, where he had slept and so forth. It should have been easy to establish which guards had been on duty at the time of the events. The applicant stated that he did not understand whether the district prosecutor’s office was incapable of finding or unwilling to find the individuals who had murdered his son. 25. On 2 May 2001 the Kaunas Regional Prosecutor found that not all necessary investigative actions had been performed with a view to bringing the culprits to justice. The decision to suspend the investigation was quashed. The regional prosecutor noted that at that time eleven individuals had been identified as being of interest to the investigators and witnesses, whose identity had been made confidential, had named those eleven individuals as possible perpetrators of the crime. Even so, the investigators had not pursued that lead. 26. The regional prosecutor also noted that another criminal case concerning A.Č.’s death had been opened on charges of negligently performing official duties [by doctors] (Article 288 of the Penal Code). Numerous forensic expert reports had been commissioned in that case. One report had been drafted with the participation of V.L., a doctor who had himself treated A.Č. before his death. The prosecutor had determined that a person having a personal interest in the outcome of the expert report concerning A.Č.’s death was not appropriate to act as an expert in relation to the preparation of that report, because it was hard to believe that he would remain objective when evaluating the cause of A.Č.’s death. A likelihood existed that such a person would deliberately exaggerate the importance of A.Č.’s injuries and underplay the influence of the doctors’ actions on the eventual outcome, A.Č.’s death (sąmoningai sumenkins sužalojimus ir sumenkins gydžiusių gydytojų veiksmų įtaką mirčiai). As a result, in order to objectively establish the effect that the injuries sustained in Pravieniškės Prison, on one hand, and the doctors’ actions, on the other hand, had had upon A.Č.’s death, a new forensic expert examination was necessary. 27. The regional prosecutor noted that a number of expert examinations had been performed, as part of which human hair and blood had been tested. However, the conclusions reached by those examinations had been vague and based on probability (nekonkrečios ir tikimybinės). The methodology used had been inappropriate, therefore new expert reports were to be commissioned. 28. The regional prosecutor observed that the suspects, who had also been injured at the relevant time, had been questioned in a superficial manner. The investigators had accepted “standard answers about [having been injured when playing] football” as sufficient. It was indispensible to interrogate each person who had been injured at the time of the events, to question them in detail about the time, place and circumstances in which their injuries had been sustained, as well as to identify who else could corroborate the “football version”. 29. Lastly, the regional prosecutor noted that the pre-trial investigation had been suspended without any orders having been given to the police in respect of further actions to be performed. Moreover, the execution of earlier orders had not been supervised properly. Only after the above actions, as well as other possible searches, police interviews and related actions, were performed could a procedural decision in the case be adopted. 30. On 28 March 2002 the Kaišiadorys District Prosecutor again suspended the pre-trial investigation because the identities of the individuals who ought to be charged with A.Č.’s murder could not be established. 31. On 10 May 2002 the applicant appealed against the above decision to the Kaunas Regional Prosecutor. He argued that the investigation had been superficial. The applicant noted that his son had been beaten for a prolonged period, but the Pravieniškės Prison authorities had not taken appropriate steps in response. The applicant pointed out that on 4 August 2000 the guards had found a metal bar and two masks and had apprehended three identified inmates who had run out of the area where his son had been. Moreover, a witness whose identity had been made confidential had named the people who had beaten his son. For the applicant, there had been sufficient evidence to charge those individuals with the murder of his son and to transfer the case file to court. By refusing to put the case before a court, the Kaišiadorys District Prosecutor’s Office had simply stalled the investigation, which had meant that the individuals who had killed his son would never be punished. 32. On 13 June 2002 the Kaunas Regional Prosecutor quashed the decision to suspend the investigation and reopened it. The regional prosecutor took notice of the applicant’s complaints and again established that not all investigative actions had been performed. The prosecutor noted that eleven suspects had been identified and that four confidential witnesses had implicated them. He observed, nonetheless, that a person may not be charged on the basis of anonymous witnesses’ testimony, because doing so would be a breach of his or her defence rights. That being so, the regional prosecutor noted that a substantial period of time had passed since the crime had taken place. It was therefore necessary to verify whether the people who had been questioned as anonymous witnesses had already finished serving their sentences, and determine whether it would be appropriate to (i) remove the cloak of confidentiality from them, (ii) rely on their statements when bringing charges, and (iii) perform other investigative actions. The Kaunas Regional Prosecutor also observed that although a number of forensic reports had been commissioned, they had been contradictory. Another expert examination by a panel of experts was therefore necessary. 33. On 4 September 2002 the applicant wrote to the Attorney General’s Office, complaining that the investigation had been stalled and that the guilty parties had not been brought to justice. 34. The Attorney General’s Office referred the complaint to the Kaunas Regional Prosecutor. On 10 October 2002 the latter concluded that there was no evidence that their earlier orders had not been followed or that the investigation had been biased or superficial. It was not possible to bring charges on the basis of anonymous witnesses, because doing so would breach the accused’s defence rights. Given that the evidence gathered so far was not sufficiently conclusive to assemble a case, the applicant’s complaint had to be dismissed. The cover letter of the decision specified that “in accordance with Article 234 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the applicant had five days to appeal against [the] ruling to a higher prosecutor or the courts”. 35. By a ruling of 7 October 2002, the Vilnius City Prosecutor discontinued the criminal proceedings concerning the charges of negligent performance of official duties (Article 288 of the Penal Code), having failed to find negligence in the actions of the doctors who had treated A.Č. 36. On 19 November 2002 the applicant lodged another complaint with the Attorney General’s Office. He reiterated his earlier arguments about the investigation into the beatings at Pravieniškės Prison being ineffective. The applicant asked the Attorney General to take over the investigation and to verify the lawfulness of the decision to stop the investigation, arguing that the regional prosecutor’s office had merely been making a pretence of work (tik atsirašinėja) and had not taken any concrete steps. 37. In response to the applicant’s complaints, on 3 December 2002 the Kaunas Regional Prosecutor wrote that the investigation had not been suspended. On the contrary, a new expert report was being carried out, as well as other actions to identify the individuals who had beaten his son. The prosecutor specified that the applicant’s wife had already been granted the status of victim in the proceedings. He also noted that the regional prosecutor had ordered the Chief Prosecutor for the Kaišiadorys District to grant such status to the applicant as well. After the applicant had been granted victim status, he would have the rights flowing from that status. The decision stipulated that “should the applicant disagree with the conclusions of the Kaunas Regional Prosecutor, he may appeal against [the] decision to a higher prosecutor or to the Kaunas City District Court”. 38. On 16 December 2002 the Kaišiadorys District Prosecutor suspended the investigation, on the grounds that the persons who had attacked the applicant’s son could not be identified. The prosecutor noted that the anonymous witnesses had been questioned on 9-13 December 2002, but had refused to allow their statements to be made public. They had also refused to testify in court. 39. On 10 February 2003 the Kaunas Regional Prosecutor upheld the above decision. The prosecutor also ordered the district prosecutor’s office to conduct constant monitoring of the situation. 40. The Government submitted that in August 2005 one anonymous witness had been questioned again as to additional detail, but had provided no new information relevant to the case. 41. Together with his responses to the Government’s observations on the admissibility and merits of the case, the applicant submitted a letter from the Kaunas City Police Commissioner dated 12 October 2001, stating that the Kaunas City police authorities had received information that in February 2001 another inmate in Pravieniškės Prison, C.A., had been beaten. The supervisor on duty that day had allowed C.A. to enter Block 2 of the prison. Three identified inmates of that unit had subsequently beaten C.A. near the staircase of the prison’s medical unit. The warden had not informed anyone from the prison administration of the circumstances of the event. C.A. had subsequently died. 42. In 2004 the applicant, who believed that he was eligible for compensation for non-pecuniary damage he had sustained, instituted proceedings against the Republic of Lithuania, represented by the Ministry of Justice, in the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court. He argued that the prison authorities had been responsible for ensuring the safety of his son while the latter was detained. The applicant disagreed with the suspension of the investigation into the murder. In his opinion, the authorities had stopped trying to identify the perpetrators of the crime. The applicant claimed that, because of the loss of their son, his wife had fallen ill and had died in October 2001. The applicant himself had been recognised as having a second-degree disability. 43. On 7 October 2004 the court found that the lawsuit had been filed against the wrong defendant and that the Ministry of Justice did not have responsibility for ensuring the safety of prisoners. The court also noted that the State officials had not failed to act as required, and dismissed the lawsuit as ill-founded. 44. The applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court. The court agreed with the conclusions of the lower court that there was no evidence establishing the responsibility of State officials (whether officials of the Ministry of Justice or of Pravieniškės Prison) regarding the murder of the applicant’s son. Therefore, in a ruling of 26 January 2005, the Supreme Administrative Court found in favour of the State. 45. The applicant started judicial proceedings against the Republic of Lithuania, this time represented by Pravieniškės Prison, seeking compensation for non-pecuniary damage. The applicant relied on the same grounds as during the first set of proceedings. On 27 June 2005 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s claims, finding that his son’s murder could not be attributed to any deficiencies in the prison officials’ actions. In the opinion of the court, A.Č. had been killed not as a result of any unlawful actions by the authorities, but as a result of the deliberate actions of unidentified persons. No causal link existed between the actions (or inaction) of the prison authorities and the death of the applicant’s son. Therefore, the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court concluded that no grounds existed for civil liability on the part of the State and dismissed the applicant’s claim for compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 46. The applicant appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court. By a ruling of 28 October 2005 the court agreed with the conclusion of the lower court that A.Č. had been killed by unidentified persons, and found no link between the actions (or inaction) of the prison authorities and any non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant. More specifically, the court found that Article 70, part 1, point 3 of the Prison Code, on which the applicant had expressly relied, and which provided that one of the purposes of accommodating detainees separately or in isolation was to help ensure their safety, was a legal norm of a general nature and therefore did not directly govern prison officials’ activities. For these reasons, the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal.

4. The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Dnipropetrovsk. 5. On 9 March 1995 he instituted defamation proceedings in the Amur‑Nyzhnyodniprovskyy District Court of Dnipropetrovsk (“the District Court”) against Mrs M., a local official. 6. On 27 March 1996 the court returned the applicant’s claim unexamined. On 19 September 1996 it also returned unexamined the applicant’s appeal against the above ruling. 7. On 4 May 1998, following the objection lodged by the Deputy Head of the Supreme Court, the Dnipropetrovsk Regional Court quashed the ruling of 27 March 1996 and remitted the case for fresh examination. 8. On 19 October 1999 the District Court delivered a judgment. On 20 December 1999 the Regional Court extended the time-limits for the applicant to lodge an appeal in cassation against the above judgment, quashed it and remitted the case for fresh examination. 9. On 15 September 2006 the District Court partly allowed the applicant’s claim and ordered Mrs M. to pay him certain amounts in non‑pecuniary damage. 10. On 10 October 2006 the applicant appealed against the above judgment. On 19 October 2006 the Court of Appeal requested him to rectify the appeal in accordance with the procedural requirements. Following that, on 17 January 2006 it rejected the appeal as unsubstantiated. 11. On 17 March 2007 the applicant appealed in cassation. On 5 April 2007 the Supreme Court requested him to rectify the appeal in cassation in accordance with the procedural requirements. Following that, on 26 June2007 it rejected the appeal in cassation as unsubstantiated. 12. In the course of the proceedings the applicant several times specified his claim. Eight hearings were adjourned due to the applicant’s, his representative’s or both parties’ failure to appear or following the applicant’s representative’s request, which protracted the proceedings by eight and a half months approximately. 13. Thirteen further hearings were adjourned due to the respondent’s or her representative’s failure to appear, absence of the judge or for unspecified reasons. Between 23 October 2003 and 14 July 2006 the proceedings were suspended due to the respondent’s sickness.

4. The applicants, Mihajlo Atanasovic, Slavko Atanasovski and Savka Milanovska, are nationals of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, who were born in 1937, 1945 and 1926 respectively, and live in Kumanovo, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 5. By judgments of the then Kumanovo Municipal Court (Општински суд во Куманово) of 7 December 1988 and 17 May 1989, the applicants obtained parts of the movable and immovable property of Mr S.A., the father of the first and the second applicants. 6. In 1989 the applicants instituted proceedings to divide the property of Mr S.A. On 22 November 1990 the Kumanovo Municipal Court decided the applicants’ claim and divided the property at issue. Mr S.A. was also ordered to pay certain amounts to each of the applicants, in compensation for the movable property that was awarded only to him. 7. As Mr S.A. did not comply, the applicants instituted enforcement proceedings before the Kumanovo Municipal Court. 8. On 20 March 1991 the Kumanovo Municipal Court ordered public sale of certain items belonging to Mr S.A. to satisfy the applicants’ claims. 9. On 17 September 1991 the Kumanovo Municipal Court accepted Mr S.A.’s objection that the interest had been miscalculated and ordered a new calculation. 10. On 15 December 1991 Mr S.A. passed away. On 10 March 1992 the court stayed the enforcement proceedings pending the decision as to the succession to Mr S.A.’s estate. 11. By a decision of 21 May 1993, delivered in separate succession proceedings, the Kumanovo Municipal Court determined five heirs of Mr S.A.’s estate: the first and second applicants and their three brothers – Mr S.K., Mr K.I. and Mr C.I. Each of the heirs obtained equal parts of their late father’s estate. 12. On 22 December 1993 the applicants asked the Kumanovo Municipal Court to continue the enforcement proceedings against one of their brothers, Mr C.I. The applicants argued that Mr C.I. should take over his late father’s debts towards them as he had allegedly been in possession of Mr. S.A.’ s estate before his death and had benefited from it. 13. On 20 March 1994 the court granted the applicants’ request and approved the enforcement of their claims against Mr C.I. 14. On 9 May 1994 the Kumanovo Municipal Court upheld Mr C.I’s challenge and stayed the enforcement proceedings. The court decided to continue the proceedings against all five heirs for the execution of the third applicant’s claims only. The first and the second applicants were thus named debtors and the third applicant - the sole creditor. 15. On 14 December 1995 the then Skopje District Court (Окружен суд во Скопје) upheld the applicants’ and Mr C.I.’s complaints. It quashed the lower court’s decision and ordered a retrial. It, inter alia, instructed the lower court to examine the case on the basis of section 144 of the Law on inheritance whether and, if so, to what extent, Mr C.I. owed sums of money to the applicants. It also instructed the lower court to establish whether the amount of the debt was correctly calculated. 16. No further actions were taken by the Municipal Court of Kumanovo. 17. On 9 December 1998 the applicants requested the Kumanovo Municipal Court to resume the enforcement proceedings and to re-evaluate their original claims. They received no reply to their request.

5. The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Voronezh. 6. In August 1998 the applicant deposited 40,000 US dollars (USD) for three months with a private bank “SBS-AGRO” (hereafter – “the Bank”). Following the Bank’s refusal to return the deposit, the applicant sued the Bank for the deposit, interest and compensation for non-pecuniary damage. According to the Government, the Bank’s refusal to return the deposit was caused by a major financial crisis which had occurred in the Russian Federation in the summer of 1998 and which had led to the Bank’s inability to return money to its more than 1.2 million creditors. 7. In September 1998 the Central Bank of Russia adopted a programme aimed at the protection of deposits made by private individuals with private banks. In line with measures adopted, the Bank signed an agreement with the Russian Savings Bank. Under the terms of the agreement, the Bank transferred its liabilities to the Russian Savings Bank which, in its turn, undertook to repay deposits made in US dollars at the exchange rate of 9.33 Russian roubles for 1 US dollar. On 28 December 1998 the Bank, through a division of the Russian Savings Bank, paid the applicant 373,204 Russian roubles (RUB). 8. On 10 March 1999 the Zheleznodorozhniy District Court of Voronezh found that the applicant had not consented to the liability transfer. However, taking into account that he had already been repaid a part of the deposit, the District Court ordered that the Bank should repay the applicant USD 30,919.40 and that it should also pay him annual interest starting from the date of the pronouncement of the judgment. The District Court dismissed the claim for compensation for non-pecuniary damage. The judgment was not appealed against and became final on 22 March 1999. A month later the Moscow bailiffs’ office instituted enforcement proceedings. 9. On an unspecified date the Presidium of the Voronezh Regional Court, acting on an application for a supervisory review, quashed the judgment of 10 March 1999 and sent the case for a fresh examination. 10. On 29 February 2000, following the re-examination of the applicant’s action, the Zheleznodorozhniy District Court awarded him USD 20,841.68 in main debt, interest thereon and USD 2,853.73 in compensation for damage. That judgment was not appealed against and became final. 11. By the end of March 1999 over 2,000 enforcement claims were pending against the Bank, with an additional 70-80 claims added every week. 12. On 16 August and 15 September 1999 the Central Bank of Russia declared a moratorium until 17 November 1999 on the execution of all creditors’ demands against the Bank. On 16 November 1999 the management of the Bank was taken over temporarily by the “Agency on Restructuring of Lending Agencies” (hereafter – “the ARKO”), set up by the State in accordance with the Law on Restructuring of Lending Agencies (hereafter - “the Law”). On 16 November 1999, in accordance with the Law, a moratorium was set for enforcement of all creditors’ demands against the Bank for a year. This period was prolonged by the ARKO on 17 November 2000 for another six months, until 17 May 2001. 13. On 8 May 2001 the Moscow Commercial Court had approved the text of a tripartite friendly settlement involving the Association of the Bank’s Creditors, the Bank and the ARKO. The text of the friendly settlement was adopted at the general meeting of the Association of Creditors on 9 February 2001 by a majority of votes. The friendly settlement substantially limited the Bank’s liability to its creditors. 14. On 3 July 2001 the Constitutional Court found unconstitutional the legislative provision that allowed the ARKO unilaterally to extend the moratorium for another six months, and ruled that such decisions should be subject to judicial control. 15. Seven days later the Basmanniy District Court of Moscow ordered that the bailiffs should discontinue the consolidated enforcement proceedings against the Bank in respect of liabilities which had arisen before 16 November 1999. 16. On 23 July 2001 the Moscow bailiffs’ office discontinued the consolidated enforcement proceeding against the Bank and returned writs of execution to the courts which had issued them. On 29 September 2001 the bailiffs informed the applicant that the enforcement proceedings against the Bank had been discontinued. 17. The applicant asked the ARKO to confirm that he had been recognised as a creditor of the Bank and to inform him about future meetings of the Bank’s creditors. On 11 September 2001 the ARKO notified the applicant that he had not been registered as a creditor of the Bank. The ARKO requested the applicant to send the documents showing the Bank’s liability to him. The applicant fulfilled the ARKO’s request. 18. On an unspecified date the applicant sued the ARKO and the Central Bank of Russia for damages. He claimed that the ARKO had not recognised him as a creditor of the Bank, that he had not participated in the friendly-settlement negotiations and that he had not been able to recover his money from the Bank. The applicant insisted that the respondents should repay him the Bank’s debt. 19. On 17 December 2001 the Zheleznodorozhniy District Court held that the Central Bank and ARKO were responsible for the applicant’s inability to obtain payment of the judgment debt and that the refusal to recognise the applicant as a Bank’s creditor was unlawful. The District Court ordered that the ARKO should repay the applicant USD 30,919.40 of the Bank’s debt. 20. On 9 January 2002 the ARKO informed the applicant that he had been registered as the creditor of the Bank and the terms of the friendly settlement of 8 May 2001 were applicable to him although he had not been able to negotiate them. The applicant was also informed that according to the terms of the friendly settlement he would not be paid the judgment debt. 21. On 19 February 2002 the Voronezh Regional Court upheld the judgment of 17 December 2001. The Regional Court again confirmed that the terms of the friendly settlement could not be applied to the applicant and the fact that the draft of the settlement had been published in the press did not imply that the applicant had agreed to the terms of that document. 22. According to the Government, the applicant applied for a supervisory review of the judgments of 17 December 2001 and 19 February 2002. It appears from the case file that the Voronezh Regional Prosecutor lodged an application for a supervisory review, arguing that the judgment of 17 December 2001, upheld on appeal on 19 February 2002, was erroneous in that the applicant’s claims had been accepted. The prosecutor submitted that the terms of the friendly settlement should have been applied to the applicant’s claims against the Bank and thus his action against the ARKO should have been dismissed. 23. On 15 May 2002 the Presidium of the Voronezh Regional Court, by way of supervisory-review proceedings, quashed the judgments of 17 December 2001 and 19 February 2002 and remitted the case for a fresh examination. The Presidium noted that the District and Regional courts erred in assessing the facts of the case and that the terms of the friendly settlement should be applicable to the applicant because the information about the general assembly of the Bank’s creditors and the draft of the friendly settlement had been published in the press. 24. On 2 July 2003 the Zheleznodorozhniy District Court made a new judgment in the applicant’s favour and awarded him USD 30,919.40, relying on the same line of arguments as in its previous judgment of 17 December 2001 and citing the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. That judgment was also quashed on appeal by the Voronezh Regional Court. The case was again sent for re-examination on 13 November 2003. 25. On 20 December 2004 the Zheleznodorozhniy District Court of Voronezh again issued the judgment in the applicant’s favour, although reducing the amount of the award to USD 20.841,68. The judgment was quashed by the Voronezh Regional Court and the proceedings were discontinued because the ARKO had ceased to exist as a legal entity.

6. The applicant was born in 1964. He is currently serving a prison sentence. 7. On 22 March 2000 the applicant was arrested. On 24 March 2000 he was remanded in custody by the Gliwice District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) on suspicion that he had killed his mother. His pre‑trial detention was subsequently extended by the Katowice Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) on 19 June 2000, by the Katowice Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) on 6 September 2000, by decisions of the Gliwice Regional Court of 5 March and 13 July 2001, and by decisions of the Katowice Court of Appeal of 13 March, 29 May, 10 July and 28 August 2002. 8. The domestic courts justified the applicant’s pre‑trial detention in its initial phase by the existence of strong evidence against him and the likelihood that a severe penalty would be imposed, as well as by the need to secure the proper course of the proceedings. During that time, an autopsy, a number of unspecified biological tests and an inspection of the crime scene were carried out. At the later stage of the applicant’s detention, the authorities referred to the severity of the sentence likely to be imposed on him. In addition, they emphasised that the investigation could not be completed for reasons beyond the prosecutor’s control, namely delays in obtaining expert reports and in viewing the applicant’s testimony recorded on video tape. 9. From 17 December 2001 until 2 January 2002 the applicant was concurrently serving a sentence of sixteen days’ imprisonment, imposed on an unspecified date by the Zabrze District Court in another criminal case. 10. The applicant’s minor sons and his wife were witnesses in the investigation. In May 2002 the prosecutor decided that a psychologist should be present when the younger son was to be interviewed by the prosecution. Apparently the older son was also interviewed by the prosecutor on an unspecified date. The applicant submitted that his wife and two sons were not allowed, for an unspecified period, to communicate with him in writing or to visit him in prison. The prosecution relied on Article 217 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences (see paragraph 30 below). 11. The applicant was indicted on 20 November 2000. In the proceedings before the first- and second-instance courts he was represented by a legal-aid lawyer. 12. On 14 August 2002 the Gliwice Regional Court convicted the applicant of murder and sentenced him to twelve years’ imprisonment. 13. On 19 December 2002 the Katowice Court of Appeal upheld that judgment. A copy of the judgment was served on the applicant on 17 January 2003. 14. On 21 February 2003 the Katowice Court of Appeal appointed a legal‑aid lawyer for the purposes of the cassation proceedings. 15. A copy of the judgment of 19 December 2002 was served on the legal-aid lawyer on 3 March 2003. 16. By a letter of 20 March 2003 the lawyer informed the Katowice Court of Appeal that, in her opinion, a cassation appeal in the applicant’s case lacked prospects of success and that she therefore refused to prepare and lodge one with the Supreme Court. By a letter of 27 March 2003 the Katowice Court of Appeal informed the applicant of the lawyer’s refusal and, further, that no other legal-aid lawyer would be appointed for the purpose of lodging a cassation appeal in his case. 17. The court’s letter was served on the applicant by the prison administration on 1 April 2003.

4. The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in the village of Suponevo, in the Bryansk Region. 5. The applicant has been the editor of a weekly newspaper, Bryanskiye Budni (Брянские будни), since he founded it in 1999. 6. In 2003 a leaflet was distributed in Bryansk and the Bryansk Region concerning a member of parliament (MP), Mr Shandybin, who was going to stand in the forthcoming elections. The leaflet read as follows: “Enough of telling fairy tales!!! Let us turn to the facts! Read the Israeli weekly newspaper Beseder. The fortune of the member of the State Duma Vasiliy Shandybin is estimated by the newspaper at 13,123,400 dollars!! You do not believe it? Where does the money come from??? Vasiliy Shandybin charges 1,000 US dollars for a letter with the letterhead of a member of the State Duma, and 5,000 dollars for an MP's inquiry concerning a delicate matter!!! Lobbying on behalf of Vladimir Bryntsalov's interests in the State Duma – 300,000 dollars per year. The profit from trading in medicines and from the sale of overpriced medicines to the Bryansk Region – 600,000 dollars per year. Vote for our fellow countryman Vasiliy Shandybin and you will surely turn him into a billionaire!!!” 7. The leaflet was either quoted or its contents were described in a number of newspapers including Desnyanskaya Pravda (Деснянская правда) of 8 October 2003 and Komsomolets Bryanska (Комсомолец Брянска) of 14 October 2003 and internet news sites, including posts on www.news.nashbryansk.ru, www.gazeta.ru, www.vlasti.net and www.sem40.ru of 3 October 2003, a post on www.sobesednik.ru of unspecified date in October 2002 and a post on www.globalrus.ru of 20 October 2003. The applicant has provided copies of the newspaper articles and printouts from the internet sites. 8. On 9 October 2003 in Bryanskiye Budni no. 206 (no. 41) the applicant published an article entitled “Vasya and Israel” (“Вася и Израиль”). The article reads as follows: “Vasya was slandered. Ivanych. Shandybin. The hand reaches for an axe. Revenge! For our workers' conscience! The circulation of the leaflet distributed through towns and villages, according to Vasiliy himself and his associates, is half a million copies, and it says that Shandybin scraped up a fortune of more than 13 million dollars. An angry rebuff of this allegation was made by the Bryanskaya Pravda. He did not take it, says Pravda, Bryntsalov did not chuck him 300,000 dollars for assistance in the sale of medicines either, and 5,000 bucks for an MP's inquiry is unheard of. Actually, when we are talking about Vasya, it is appropriate to say that one should not look a gift horse in the mouth. Vasya gave medical equipment as a present to two outpatient clinics, and it is impossible to count how many music boxes he gave to schools and orphans' homes. It is clearly improper to ask the donor where he got the money for all these goods. The benefactors paid for Shandybin's pretty haircut, and he justly distributed the catch among those in need. If there are doubts, they are caused by the unsightly history of Russian 'parliamentarism'. Recently, in connection with the events of 1993, we were reminded how cynically Yeltsin bought MPs who had not yet decided which side of the barricades to run to. He promised them a rich piece of cake, and they slyly ran for this piece, swallowing their spittle. Zhirinovskiy's party was accused of bribery many times, but all our elected representatives take [bribes] (except Vasya, of course), if we mean not only money but also greyhound puppies: favours from Western patrons, from Khodorkovskiys or Abramovichs residing in Russia. And this is a serious school, a school of venality. This is why the accusation against Shandybin in the clandestine leaflet fell on fertile ground. Whether Vasiliy Ivanovich took bribes or not, he will have to account for all his colleagues, for the fact that he has sat next to venal MPs in the venal Duma for many years. In a way, the retribution is legitimate. Who is the author? He is closer to the body of Vasiliy Ivanovich than the MP himself thinks. Of course, the easiest answer is: the one who intends to stand against him in the same electoral district. We have no doubts that Vasya's ill-wishers from this camp will scribble too, but the leaflet containing a reference to the Israeli source was in fact made in a different camp. Which one? Remember who recently visited Israel. Thus, nominally these forces are Shandybin's allies, but effectively they consider him a serf. And serfs need to be reminded from which barn they originate, so that they do not put on airs and are obedient. Unfortunately, Shandybin is looking for ill-wishers in the wrong camp. They should be searched for among the people who cover themselves with red rags. Their handwriting is recognisable. Their latest provocation in the press was, in fact, a supplement to Bryanskiye Budni. They published a fake edition of Budni that criticised the opposition to Lodkin, inter alia, to test their undercover printing works. Although the editors lodged an official complaint, the law-enforcement authorities did not try to find the publisher. And now here is a new volley, and surely not the last one, from the underground regional committee [of the Communist Party].” 9. On 15 October 2003 the Election Committee of the Bryansk Region issued a decree declaring that the applicant's article was intended to agitate the electorate and to encourage a negative attitude towards Mr Shandybin. The applicant appealed to a court against the decree. 10. On 26 November 2003 the Bryansk Regional Court found that the decree was unlawful. The court held: “...[T]he article was published on 9 October 2003 ... before the election campaign had started ... [T]he article contains information about the distribution of a leaflet saying that V.I. Shandybin had made a fortune of more than 13 million dollars, and speculations by the author concerning the existence of this money and its sources. The contents of the leaflet are not quoted in the article. The text of the article contains neither information about the forthcoming elections to the State Duma ..., about V.I. Shandybin as a candidate for the State Duma, his political views and ideas, nor agitational calls to vote for or against V.I. Shandybin or other candidates. ... [Mr] Fedchenko stated at the hearing that in the article he had not sought to agitate but had merely stated his opinion concerning the distributed leaflet and the information contained therein. The [defendant] did not produce any proof to the contrary ...” 11. The Election Committee of the Bryansk Region appealed. 12. On 18 February 2004 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the judgment. 13. On 20 October 2003 Mr Shandybin brought an action for defamation against the applicant in the Bryanskiy District Court of the Bryansk Region and sought damages in the amount of 500,000 Russian roubles (RUB). He claimed, in particular, that the following passages were untrue and damaging to his honour and reputation: “Shandybin scraped up a fortune of more than 13 million dollars.” “He did not take it, says Pravda, Bryntsalov did not chuck him 300,000 dollars for assistance in the sale of medicines either, and 5,000 bucks for an MP's inquiry is unheard of.” “Thus, nominally these forces are Shandybin's allies, but effectively they consider him a serf. And serfs need to be reminded from which barn they originate, so that they do not put on airs and are obedient.” 14. On 31 May 2004 the Bryanskiy District Court found for the claimant. The court held: “...[T]he article Vasya and Israel as a whole, as well as particular phrases and words (the subject of the dispute) in it, are strongly indicative of a negative judgment and contain direct emotional judgments which constitute insulting attacks and indirect judgments. ...[T]he [first] assertion as such, in the context of the article, is insulting, and damaging to the honour and dignity of the claimant and ... to his reputation. The defendant failed to prove the contrary. The claim is well-founded. ...The author ironically uses [slang words] in the [second] assertion so as to give it a cynical, insulting character and describes the claimant in negative terms. The assertion is beyond the limits of civilised communication and is in breach of moral standards. Accordingly, the claimant's assertion ... concerning the disparaging character of the above quotation is well-founded. ...The [third] assertion has an emotionally expressive tone of contempt and humiliation and presents the [MP] to the readers in a negative light, as a person capable of doing bad things for society. If used metaphorically, the words are disapproving in tone. The claimant has grounds to perceive the assertions as insulting and slanderous. The court considers this information damaging to the honour, dignity and reputation of the claimant.” 15. The court held the applicant liable for RUR 5,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage sustained by the claimant. The applicant was also ordered to provide Mr Shandybin with an opportunity to publish his response in Bryanskiye Budni. The applicant appealed. 16. On 1 July 2004 the Bryansk Regional Court reversed the judgment in the part relating to the publication of the claimant's response in Bryanskiye Budni and upheld it in the remaining part. The court found that since Mr Shandybin had not applied directly to Bryanskiye Budni for the publication of the response within a year of the publication of the defaming information, under Sections 45 and 46 of the Law on Mass Media he was estopped from applying to a court in this respect. The court further held: “On the basis of the evidence described in the judgment the [first-instance] court reached the correct conclusion that the assertions at issue did not correspond to the truth and discredited the honour, dignity and reputation of the claimant.”

6. The first applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Piatra-Neamţ (Romania); the second was born in 1972 and lives in Jakobstad (Finland). They are both journalists. 7. In 1995 the first applicant set up the limited corporation Tele M, whose registered purpose was the production and broadcasting of radio and television programmes. The first applicant was the majority shareholder and manager. The company obtained broadcasting licence no. 246/1997 and was granted television operation rights for the Neamţ region. 8. In 1999 the first applicant set up the private limited liability company Radio M Plus, whose main registered purpose was the production of audiovisual programmes. The first applicant was its sole shareholder and manager. A change in share capital in 2000 reduced his interest to 20%. 9. The first applicant’s intention was to separate the television activities from those of radio broadcasting, with Radio M Plus dealing solely with the latter. Pending the change in audiovisual legislation which would enable the assignment of the radio-broadcasting licence (amendment finally adopted on 8 August 2002), the relevant activities were divided between Radio M Plus, which produced the radio programmes, and Tele M, which was responsible for broadcasting. The equipment necessary for the radio activity (including broadcasting) belonged to the company Radio M Plus. 10. In January 2002 the television station Tele M broadcast two documentaries; one concerned a protégé of I.T. who was wanted by the police, and the other was about one of I.T.’s business ventures, namely a hotel where traces of mercury had been found in food. In the first applicant’s submission, after those two documentaries I.T. threatened to make his companies insolvent as a result of inspections by the financial authorities. According to the information provided by the first applicant, I.T. was at the time a member of parliament affiliated to the party in power, and was referred to in the press as a “local baron”. 11. On 25 January 2002 the local financial authorities of Piatra-Neamţ attempted to carry out an unannounced inspection at the head offices of Tele M. In view of the first applicant’s opposition, he was fined by the financial authorities. The fine was, however, subsequently annulled, because it had been imposed, according to the applicant, in breach of the statutory provisions which required giving 15 days’ notice to the company concerned before an inspection could be carried out. An inspection was subsequently carried out, however, and the authorities found that the company owed significant amounts to the State budget. An agreement for the staggered repayment of the sums due was entered into with the first applicant. In his submission, the inspection had followed a request made by I.T. to V.M., who was head of the local public finance directorate and who, at the time, was an associate of I.T. in a number of commercial companies. 12. The first applicant explained that, having regard to the high amount of the aggregate debt and the fact that it was repayable immediately, and in order to avoid insolvency, he had been persuaded to sell his majority interest in the company Tele M. to I.T. and to the company I., which belonged to the wife and son of V.M. He thus ceased to be a shareholder on 1 August 2002. On the same day the applicant was dismissed from his duties as manager of the company. 13. On the same day, the company Radio M Plus, of which the first applicant was still the manager, and the company Tele M, set up a partnership for the production and broadcasting of radio programmes. Under the partnership agreement, Tele M was to provide movable and immovable property, programmes, licences and contracts, whilst Radio M Plus was to provide specialised equipment, financial resources and programmes, and was to take charge of the management. In accordance with the technical broadcasting permit of 16 September 1998, issued by the Communications Ministry, the radio station Radio M Plus was to broadcast from its head office at 80, Stefan cel Mare, Piatra-Neamţ. 14. In a decision of 2 August 2002, the company Radio M Plus appointed the first applicant as manager of the partnership. The radio activities were located on the second floor of the building at 80, Stefan cel Mare, Piatra-Neamţ, which housed studios for production and for radio broadcasting, and one for guests. 15. The second applicant was the radio station’s editor and, from 1 October 2002, its programme director. 16. From 2 October 2002, following certain disagreements between the representatives of the two above-mentioned companies, the applicants were denied access to the radio station’s newsroom by representatives of Tele M. 17. On 16 October 2002 the applicants brought urgent proceedings seeking a right of access to the radio station’s newsroom. 18. In a decision of 6 December 2002 the Neamţ County Court upheld the applicants’ claim and ordered Tele M to give them access to the newsroom of Radio M Plus, at 80, Stefan cel Mare, Piatra-Neamţ. This decision was upheld at last instance by the Bacău Court of Appeal, on 11 March 2003. The courts noted, in particular, that the head offices of Radio M Plus and Tele M were located in the same building and that the companies were therefore entitled to make use of it for their activities. They concluded that the barring of the applicants from the radio’s newsroom by Tele M. constituted an unlawful action that was likely to cause prejudice to the activities of the radio station, in which the applicants held the posts of manager and editor, respectively. 19. On 7 January 2003, on the applicants’ request, the Piatra-Neamţ Court of First Instance ordered the enforcement of the Neamţ County Court’s decision of 6 December 2002. 20. On 14 January 2003 a bailiff accompanied the applicants to the radio station’s head office. The representative of the company Tele M denied the applicants access to the second floor of the building, explaining that the newsroom had been transferred to the ground-floor of the building, to a room where they were received. Only the bailiff was able to visit the rooms on the second floor where the special equipment was located. 21. On 18 March 2003 the applicants reiterated their request for the enforcement of the final decision of 6 December 2002, as in the meantime an appeal by the defendant against that decision had been dismissed. 22. A fresh attempt at enforcement took place on 12 May 2003, but was unsuccessful. On that occasion, the bailiff noted that the decision to be enforced was clear and that it was not necessary to initiate court proceedings in order to clarify the meaning and scope of its operative provisions. 23. On 24 January 2003, on account of their inability to exercise their profession as journalists, following the refusal by Tele M to allow them access to the radio’s newsroom, the applicants filed a criminal complaint with the public prosecutor for opposition to the enforcement of a final decision. On 8 July 2003 the public prosecutor at the Piatra-Neamţ Court of First Instance gave a decision discontinuing the proceedings, finding that the dispute actually concerned the implementation of the partnership agreement signed on 1 August 2002. On 30 January 2004 the Principal Public Prosecutor confirmed the discontinuance. 24. On 23 February 2004 the applicants lodged an urgent application requesting the courts to order Tele M to comply with the partnership agreement of 1 August 2002 and, for that purpose, to hand over to them any radio production and broadcasting equipment that was necessary for the implementation of that agreement. They further sought an order that the company be fined 2 million Romanian lei (ROL) per day of non-compliance. 25. In a final decision of 12 October 2004 the Sibiu County Court dismissed the application, finding that it concerned the merits of the question of the performance of the agreement rather than a temporary or urgent situation justifying an immediate injunction. 26. On 25 October 2004 the company Tele M returned to the company Radio M Plus the equipment of which the latter was the owner. 27. On 25 March 2005 the first applicant filed a criminal complaint with the Piatra-Neamţ Court of First Instance against the shareholders and managers of Tele M for refusing to allow him access to the newsroom and to the equipment necessary for radio programmes, thus preventing him from exercising his profession as journalist. On 27 June 2007 the first applicant was informed that his criminal complaint had been referred to the public prosecutor at the Piatra-Neamţ Court of First Instance, which had opened criminal proceedings against three managers of the company Tele M for embezzlement. He was not kept informed of subsequent developments in the proceedings. 28. The Court has not been informed whether the applicants have brought civil-law proceedings for the performance of the partnership agreement of 1 August 2002 between the companies Radio M Plus and Tele M. 29. In their written observations of 9 June 2008 the Government informed the Court as follows: “According to the information notified by the bailiff N.T., he was unable to pursue the enforcement procedure, in view of the subject-matter of the claim – enforcement of an obligation ‘to perform’ – and the legal nature of the premises, and, moreover, having regard to the fact that the writ of execution did not precisely stipulate the location of the newsroom of Radio M Plus SRL or describe its composition. In those conditions, the bailiff stated that he was not competent to go beyond the above-mentioned legal framework.” 30. On 30 January 2003 the National Audiovisual Council (the “NAC”) ordered the company Tele M to terminate the assignment of audiovisual licence no. 246/1997 as provided for under the partnership agreement of 1 August 2002 and to ensure that its situation became lawful within thirty days, in view of the fact that the said agreement was in breach of the new Audiovisual Act (law no. 504/2002), which prohibited the exploitation of an audiovisual licence by anyone other than its legal beneficiary. There is no evidence in the file to show whether the order was followed by a decision by the NAC to withdraw the licence in accordance with the above-mentioned law. 31. However, on 9 June 2003, the company Tele M once again assigned the rights to audiovisual licence no. 246/1997 to a third company. In a decision of 14 November 2003 that company obtained a broadcasting permit, for the purpose of which it was to use a transmitter belonging to the company Radio M Plus. Nevertheless, it can be seen from the case file that, in a decision of 20 November 2003, the NAC temporarily suspended the licence assignment until the finalising of the dispute that had in the meantime arisen between the two companies. It was only on 9 November 2004 that the third company secured the right to use a new transmitter. 32. According to an NAC certificate of 4 June 2008, issued at the request of the Romanian Government’s Agent, the company Radio M Plus held audiovisual licence no. 524, dated 17 May 2004, for the city of Târgu-Neamţ in respect of the radio station of the same name, and a broadcasting licence of 5 May 2005 issued by the National Regulatory Authority for Communications. The company also held two audiovisual licences obtained in 2004 for two television stations, which were authorised to broadcast in the cities of Piatra-Neamţ and Roman, respectively. Audiovisual licence no. 246/1997 issued for the radio station Radio M Plus belonged to the company Tele M Invest. The NAC concluded that the radio station Radio M Plus had not carried on any radio broadcasting activity in 2002-2004. 33. In October 2002 the second applicant published an article in the national newspaper România liberă about the various businesses run by I.T. 34. From November 2003 onwards the first applicant became the director of the regional weekly newspaper Lumea Nemţeanului. The second applicant was appointed as its editor-in-chief. According to the information provided by the applicants, the weekly had to close after five issues because of pressure exerted on the companies that distributed the newspaper and those with which it had signed advertising agreements.

5. The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Riga. 6. On 3 March 2004 criminal proceedings were initiated against the applicant for Internet fraud. 7. In the course of the pre-trial investigation the applicant underwent two inpatient psychiatric examinations. On both occasions the applicant was found to have full mental capacity (pieskaitāms). 8. On 3 October 2006 the Riga City Vidzeme District Court found the applicant guilty and gave him a suspended six-month prison sentence. The applicant and his counsel appealed. 9. Taking into account that during the hearing of the appeal court of 9 January 2007 the applicant was said to have “behaved aggressively towards the advocate and the prosecutor [and] in the course of the subsequent hearings [had] made illogical and disjointed statements”, on 13 March 2007 the Riga Regional Court decided to request an outpatient psychiatric assessment. 10. On 27 April 2007 a psychiatrist found that the applicant was suffering from chronic paranoid schizophrenia and that his participation in court hearings was therefore “unhelpful” (nav lietderīga). The psychiatrist recommended that the applicant undergo outpatient treatment. 11. On 18 June 2007 a single judge of the Riga Regional Court decided to initiate proceedings with a view to applying a compulsory measure of a medical nature. Taking into account that “the nature of [the applicant’s] illness [did] not permit him to take part in court proceedings”, it was decided that the case would be examined in the applicant’s absence, with the participation of a prosecutor, defence counsel, a legal representative for the applicant and an expert psychiatrist. The applicant’s mother was named as his legal representative. 12. The applicant’s mother did not attend the following hearing on 19 September 2007. She had sent the court a letter stating that she would be unable to attend court hearings due to ill-health. She also expressed her belief that her son had legal capacity and was able to express his own point of view. During the hearing the prosecutor suggested that D.A., a psychiatrist responsible for the applicant’s medical treatment, could better serve as his legal representative, a suggestion which was approved by the court with the consent of the applicant’s counsel and the expert psychiatrist. 13. The subsequent hearing on 16 October 2007 was attended by D.A., who described the applicant as “chaotic”, “contemptuous” and as having “delirious fantasies”. She considered that he should be ordered to undergo involuntary outpatient psychiatric treatment. She explained that if the applicant did not take medication he did not become aggressive, but became “a burden on society”. At the conclusion of the hearing, the defence counsel, D.A. and the prosecutor all agreed that an additional inpatient psychiatric assessment ought to be carried out, which was ordered by the court. 14. The inpatient assessment was completed on 27 November 2007 and the applicant was diagnosed with episodic paranoid schizophrenia with increasing residual symptoms (paranoīda epizodiskas norises šizofrēnija ar pieaugošām reziduālām parādībām). It was concluded that at the time he had committed the incriminated acts, he had been unable to control his actions. It was therefore recommended that he be relieved of criminal liability. 15. On 18 February 2008 the Riga Regional Court decided to relieve the applicant of criminal liability and imposed a compulsory measure of a medical nature – outpatient treatment in a medical institution. It held that such a measure best corresponded to the non-violent nature of the applicant’s actions and to his state of health. It appears that this decision was not appealed against and entered into force on 11 March 2008. The Riga City Vidzeme District Court was named as the court responsible for supervising enforcement of the Regional Court’s order. 16. On 1 March 2007 criminal proceedings were initiated against the applicant for fraud. On 15 March 2007 the police received information that he was registered (atrodas uzskaitē) as an outpatient of a psychiatric hospital. 17. On 8 October 2007 the applicant was informed that he was a suspect. On the same day, referring to the psychiatric assessment of 27 April 2007 (see paragraph 10 above), the police decided to request an additional forensic psychiatric assessment of him. 18. The applicant underwent such an assessment. A report dated 29 October 2007 established that he was suffering from chronic paranoid schizophrenia and was therefore unable to take responsibility for his actions or control them. Because of this he was deemed unable to participate in the pre-trial investigation of the criminal case against him or to give adequate statements during the investigation. The expert report recommended that a compulsory measure of a medical nature be ordered – outpatient psychiatric treatment in a medical institution. 19. The prosecutor in charge of the case against the applicant decided to pursue proceedings with a view to applying a compulsory measure of a medical nature. After receiving information from the psychiatric hospital that in the first set of proceedings the applicant’s legal representative was D.A., on 7 February 2008 the prosecutor decided to allow D.A. to again take on that role. 20. On 19 August 2008 a hearing of the applicant’s case was held in the Riga Regional Court. The panel consisted of judge I.Š. and two lay judges. The applicant was represented by a lawyer A.Ā. A prosecutor, an expert psychiatrist and D.A. also attended the hearing, but the applicant was not present. According to the applicant, he had not appointed A.Ā. or anyone else as his defence counsel. 21. D.A. stated to the court that the applicant had: “obsessive thoughts concerning various acts of a legal nature. I believe that if he had an opportunity to arrive at any office, if he had an access to a computer, he would be capable of committing repeated criminal acts. ... I consider that [the applicant] could be a danger to society and that he should receive treatment”. 22. The court also heard the testimony of the expert psychiatrist G.S. who had produced the expert report of 29 October 2007 (see paragraph 18 above). G.S. explained to the court that at the time the expert report was drawn up she had not been aware that the applicant had previously been involved in other criminal proceedings in which he had been found to be in a state of mental incapacity (nepieskaitāms) and that he “was continuing [his] criminal activity”. She considered that nobody could control whether the applicant was taking medication and therefore recommended that he undergo involuntary inpatient treatment. 23. The applicant’s defence counsel indicated to the court that, given the applicant was continuing to commit crimes while ill and taking into account his mental state, it was necessary to order his inpatient treatment in a psychiatric hospital. The prosecutor agreed. 24. In a decision dated 20 August 2008 the court held that the applicant had to be relieved of criminal liability. It also considered that he posed a danger to society and ordered his inpatient treatment in a psychiatric hospital. A copy of the decision was sent to D.A. on 25 August 2008. 25. The decision was not appealed against in time and became final on 2 September 2008. 26. On 12 September 2008 the decision was sent to a psychiatric hospital in Riga for enforcement. 27. It is not clear when the applicant first received a copy of that decision. The Government provided copies of two not entirely legible handwritten pages, which allegedly came from the applicant’s medical records, and which appear to indicate that on 19 August 2008 (the day before the Regional Court’s decision was pronounced) the applicant had been informed of the court’s decision to order his involuntary inpatient treatment and had expressed his frustration with that decision. The applicant appears to claim that he never received a copy of the decision. 28. On 9 September 2008 the applicant requested the Riga Regional Court to revoke the compulsory measures of a medical nature imposed on him “in full”. However, the wording of his letter only referred to the decision of 18 February 2008 (see paragraph 15 above). In a response given on 16 September 2008 judge I.Š. observed that the applicant was not complaining about the decision of 20 August 2008, which had become final on 2 September 2008, and therefore returned his complaint letter to him. 29. On 13 March 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Riga Regional Court against “the decision of 19 August 2008”. Since he received no reply, on 26 March 2009 he inquired as to its progress. In a letter of 9 April 2009 judge I.Š. “once again” explained to the applicant that he had been represented in court by D.A., who had not lodged an appeal. The decision had therefore become final. The letter further informed the applicant that he did not have the locus standi to lodge an appeal. On 14 April 2009 the applicant received a letter from another judge of the Riga Regional Court, D.T., who explained to him that only D.A. could lodge an appeal in his name. 30. On 9 April 2009 judge I.Š. sent the decision of 20 August 2008 to the police with a request that it be enforced. 31. On 2 October 2009 judge I.Š., acting pursuant to section 607(4) of the Criminal Procedure Law (see paragraph 46 below) requested an assessment of the applicant’s mental health in order to decide the question of whether to continue applying the compulsory measure of a medical nature. 32. On 8 October 2009 the director of the psychiatric hospital invited the Regional Court to examine whether it was necessary to continue applying the compulsory measure of a medical nature to the applicant and forwarded to it the report of a medical panel dated 20 August 2009. The panel had found that the applicant had regularly attended the hospital, but had done so “without any inner motivation and without any understanding of his illness or of the necessity to take medication”. It was concluded that the applicant suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and that despite treatment with medication, there was no evidence of any stable improvement to his psychiatric health or that he was in remission. It was recommended that the applicant be ordered to continue outpatient treatment. 33. It does not appear that the Regional Court took any decision pursuant to section 607(4) of the Criminal Procedure Law. 34. On the evening of 22 October 2009 several police officers entered the applicant’s flat and took him to a psychiatric hospital in Riga. According to the applicant, on 26 October 2009 doctors at the hospital informed him that he had been brought in on the basis of a decision of the Riga Regional Court. 35. On 29 October 2009 judge I.Š. sent a request to the psychiatric hospital for a report on the state of the applicant’s mental health, in order to examine the question of whether it was necessary to continue involuntary inpatient psychiatric treatment pursuant to section 607(4) of the Criminal Procedure Law. The letter indicated, inter alia, that the applicant had not been admitted to hospital any earlier than on 22 October 2009 “for reasons unknown to the court”. 36. On 31 October 2009 the applicant addressed a petition to the Supreme Court. He indicated that he had been undergoing outpatient psychiatric treatment in line with the recommendations of panels of medical specialists that had been adopted in September 2008 and in February and August 2009. He requested the Supreme Court to quash the decision which had apparently ordered his admission to the psychiatric hospital (the contents of which were unknown to him). Lastly, the applicant pointed out that he had not been present at the court hearing during which the question of the deprivation of his liberty had been decided and that he had had no lawyer representing him there. 37. The applicant received a reply dated 5 November 2009 from judge I.Š., who explained that his treatment as an outpatient between the adoption of the decision on 20 August 2008 and 22 October 2009 had been erroneous (nepamatota). As regards the decision of 20 August 2008 the judge explained that the applicant’s interests had been represented by D.A. and A.Ā., neither of whom had appealed against the decision. It had therefore become final. 38. In the meantime, on 3 November 2009 a panel of three medical specialists issued a report, finding that the applicant’s health had “changed notably, characterised by symptoms of delirium against a background of reduced affection”. The report recommended that the applicant be ordered to continue involuntary inpatient treatment in a psychiatric hospital. 39. On 15 November 2009 the applicant sent a complaint to the Supreme Court against the “decision” of judge I.Š. contained in her letter of 5 November 2009. He pointed out that after the decision of 20 August 2008 had been adopted in his absence and without him being represented by a lawyer, he had been complying with the terms of that decision by being treated in a psychiatric hospital from September 2008 onwards. The applicant asked the Supreme Court to quash the decision on the basis of which the police had detained him and taken him to the psychiatric hospital on 22 October 2009. He repeated his allegation that he was not and had never been represented by a lawyer. The response he received to the complaint again came from judge I.Š., which was sent on 23 November 2009, and was worded almost identically to the response she had sent previously. 40. On 28 December 2009 the Riga Regional Court decided to continue the applicant’s involuntary inpatient treatment. The decision was amenable to appeal. The applicant received it on 11 January 2010. No appeal was lodged. 41. The applicant was released from the hospital on 7 June 2010 on the basis of a decision of the Riga Regional Court of 27 May 2010 ordering his treatment as an outpatient.

11. The applicants reside in Ireland and are women over 18 years of age. 12. The facts, as submitted by the applicants, are summarised immediately below. The Government’s position was that these factual submissions were general, unsubstantiated and untested either by a domestic court, or through any other form of interaction with the Irish State, and they made further factual submissions as regards each applicant (summarised at paragraphs 115-18 and 122 below). 13. On 28 February 2005 the first applicant travelled to England for an abortion as she believed that she was not entitled to an abortion in Ireland. She was nine and a half weeks pregnant. 14. She had become pregnant unintentionally, believing her partner to be infertile. At the time she was unmarried, unemployed and living in poverty. She had four young children. The youngest was disabled and all four children were in foster care as a result of problems she had experienced as an alcoholic. She had a history of depression during her first four pregnancies, and was battling depression at the time of her fifth pregnancy. During the year preceding her fifth pregnancy, she had remained sober and had been in constant contact with social workers with a view to regaining custody of her children. She considered that a further child at that moment of her life (with its attendant risk of post-natal depression and to her sobriety) would jeopardise her health and the successful reunification of her family. She decided to travel to England to have an abortion. 15. Delaying the abortion for three weeks, the first applicant borrowed the minimum amount of money for treatment in a private clinic and travel from a money-lender (650 euros (EUR)) at a high interest rate. She felt she had to travel to England alone and in secrecy, without alerting the social workers and without missing a contact visit with her children. 16. She travelled back to Ireland by plane the day after the abortion for her contact visit with her youngest child. While she had initially submitted that she was afraid to seek medical advice on her return to Ireland, she subsequently clarified that on the train returning from Dublin she began to bleed profusely and an ambulance met the train. At a nearby hospital she underwent a dilation and curettage. She claims she experienced pain, nausea and bleeding for weeks thereafter but did not seek further medical advice. 17. Following the introduction of the present application, the first applicant became pregnant again and gave birth to her fifth child. She is struggling with depression and has custody of three of her children whilst two (including the disabled child) remain in care. She maintained that an abortion was the correct decision for her in 2005. 18. On 17 January 2005 the second applicant travelled to England for an abortion believing that she was not entitled to an abortion in Ireland. She was seven weeks pregnant. 19. The second applicant became pregnant unintentionally. She had taken the “morning-after pill” and was advised by two different doctors that there was a substantial risk of an ectopic pregnancy (a condition which cannot be diagnosed until six to ten weeks of pregnancy). She was certain of her decision to travel to England for an abortion since she could not care for a child on her own at that time of her life. She waited several weeks until the counselling centre in Dublin opened after Christmas. She had difficulty meeting the costs of the travel and, not having a credit card, used a friend’s credit card to book the flights. She accepted that, by the time she travelled to England, it had been confirmed that the pregnancy was not ectopic. 20. Once in England she did not list anyone as her next of kin or give an Irish address so as to be sure her family would not learn of the abortion. She travelled alone and stayed in London the night before the procedure to avoid missing her appointment as well as the night of the procedure, as she would have arrived back in Dublin too late for public transport and the medication rendered her unfit to drive home from Dublin airport. The clinic advised her to inform Irish doctors that she had had a miscarriage. 21. On her return to Ireland she started passing blood clots and two weeks later, being unsure of the legality of having travelled for an abortion, sought follow-up care in a clinic in Dublin affiliated to the English clinic. 22. On 3 March 2005 the third applicant had an abortion in England believing that she could not establish her right to an abortion in Ireland. She was in her first trimester of pregnancy at the time. 23. Prior to that, she had undergone three years of chemotherapy for a rare form of cancer. She had asked her doctor before the treatment about the implications of her illness as regards her desire to have children and was advised that it was not possible to predict the effect of pregnancy on her cancer and that, if she did become pregnant, it would be dangerous for the foetus if she were to have chemotherapy during the first trimester. 24. The cancer went into remission and the applicant unintentionally became pregnant. She was unaware of this fact when she underwent a series of tests for cancer, contraindicated during pregnancy. When she discovered she was pregnant, the applicant consulted her General Practitioner (GP) as well as several medical consultants. She alleged that, as a result of the chilling effect of the Irish legal framework, she received insufficient information as to the impact of the pregnancy on her health and life and of her prior tests for cancer on the foetus. 25. She therefore researched the risks on the Internet. Given the uncertainty about the risks involved, the third applicant travelled to England for an abortion. She maintained that she wanted a medical abortion (drug-induced miscarriage) as her pregnancy was at an early stage but that she could not find a clinic which would provide this treatment as she was a non-resident and because of the need for follow-up. She therefore alleged she had to wait a further eight weeks until a surgical abortion was possible. 26. On returning to Ireland after the abortion, the third applicant suffered complications as a result of an incomplete abortion, including prolonged bleeding and infection. She alleges that doctors provided inadequate medical care. She consulted her own GP several months after the abortion and her GP made no reference to the fact that she was visibly no longer pregnant.

7. The applicant is a United Kingdom national, who was born in 1944 and is currently serving a sentence of imprisonment in HMP Maidstone. 8. The applicant and his wife frequently travelled between various European countries. On 16 April 1997, the Chief Constable of South Wales authorised the installation of covert recording devices at the applicant's cottage and this was carried out on 23 April 1997. Authority for a further 28 days' surveillance was granted on 14 May 1997. 9. Over 160 hours of tapes were obtained between the period of 25 April to 9 June 1997, on which latter date the applicant and his wife were arrested. The transcripts of the taped conversations made up the bulk of the case against the applicant. 10. At trial, the applicant's defence alleged that the recorded discussions, which occurred while he and the others concerned were under the influence of drugs, were “drug-crazed ramblings” and challenged their admissibility. A “voir dire” took place from 28 May to 1 June 1998, during which the defence made submissions concerning the procedure for authorisation of the surveillance and seeking inter alia to exclude irrelevant or prejudicial material under sections 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE). By agreement, the transcript evidence was reduced from five to two files and an agreed schedule was adopted by all counsel concerning the occasions on which the conversations occurred at the same time as drug taking. In summing up to the jury at the conclusion of the trial, the judge directed their attention to the fact that the supposedly incriminating statements taped at the cottage were or may have been the product of the participants' intoxicated state and that it was for them to assess whether despite the drugs the defendants were expressing rational, genuine thoughts, real ideas, plans or arrangements. 11. On 15 June 1998, the applicant was convicted of charges inter alia of conspiracy to import controlled drugs and possession of controlled drugs in connection with importation of marijuana and cocaine from overseas. He was sentenced to a total of fifteen years' imprisonment. A confiscation order was imposed on him on 24 September 1998 in the sum of 50,169.18 pounds sterling (GBP). 12. On 10 November 1999, a single judge of the Court of Appeal refused an extension of time to appeal against sentence and refused leave to appeal against conviction, noting that no satisfactory or sufficient reason had been given for the 11 month delay in lodging the application. The applicant's renewed application was refused by the Court of Appeal on 17 October 2000.

5. The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in the village of Berezhinka, Ukraine. 6. At 3 p.m. on 6 February 2003 the applicant was arrested in an apartment rented by his acquaintance and alleged accomplice D., and taken to a police station. At the police station he was allegedly handcuffed, beaten and according to the applicant, had his nose broken. 7. On the same day between 9 p.m. and 10 p.m. the applicant was questioned. He admitted to having robbed an apartment. 8. Criminal proceedings for robbery were instituted against the applicant; it is unclear whether this was done before or after his arrest. It was noted that on 6 February 2003 at around 12.20 a.m. the applicant, together with some other individuals, had threatened K. with a knife and taken 12,800 United States dollars (USD) from her. 9. The Government submitted that the applicant was in fact arrested on 7 February 2003. 10. On 10 February 2003 the Dniprovskiy District Court of Kyiv (“the Dniprovskiy Court”) ordered that the applicant be placed in pre-trial detention on the grounds that he was accused of committing a serious crime and could abscond or hinder the investigation if at liberty. 11. On 1 April 2003 the same court extended the term of the applicant’s detention until 7 June 2003 since “there were no grounds for the applicant’s release and his detention was necessary for carrying out further investigations (expert examinations etc.)”. 12. Between May 2003 and September 2007 the criminal case against the applicant was presented to the court for consideration but referred back for further investigation on five subsequent occasions (18 June 2004, 11 February and 10 June 2005, and 6 February and 5 September 2007). On the first occasion (18 June 2004) the court decided that the applicant’s case could not be considered separately from the cases of Kr. (another alleged accomplice of the applicant) and D., and that further investigative measures such as a reconstruction of events and confrontations between the accused and the witnesses should be carried out. On each occasion the court also decided that the applicant should remain in pre-trial detention. 13. On 11 December 2006 and 15 January 2007 the Dniprovskiy Court denied the applicant’s requests for release. The court held, without elaborating further, that the applicant was accused of committing a serious crime and, if released, could “continue his criminal activity”, abscond or hinder the investigation. 14. On 30 May 2008 the same court again referred the case back for further investigation. On 4 September 2008 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal quashed that decision and remitted the case to the first-instance court. The court also decided that the applicant should remain in pre-trial detention. 15. On 18 February 2009 the Dniprovskiy Court rejected the applicant’s request to have P. as his legal representative on the basis that he did not hold an advocate’s licence. The decision was not subject to appeal. 16. On 3 September 2009 the Dniprovskiy Court, upon a request by the prosecutor, ordered a forensic psychological and psychiatric examination of the applicant. In her request the prosecutor stated that the applicant had behaved aggressively and improperly. The court noted that on numerous occasions the applicant had actively interrupted a court hearing, giving instructions as to who should be cross-examined and what evidence should be considered. When his requests were rejected, he began to shout and swear. The applicant was removed from a courtroom on two occasions. 17. In order to carry out a forensic examination the applicant was allegedly detained in a special ward of a psychiatric hospital. According to an expert report dated 20 October 2009, the applicant had no mental illnesses either at the time of the report or when the crime was allegedly committed. 18. On 1 March 2010 the Dniprovskiy Court sentenced the applicant to eight and a half years’ imprisonment for robbery committed together with other persons. The criminal cases against each defendant were considered separately. The applicant was represented by his mother and by a lawyer, Da. In court the applicant denied committing the offence and refused to answer any questions. The court referred to his statements, given at the investigation stage of the proceedings, in which he had made a partial confession. In particular, on 6, 7, 9, 13 and 16 February 2003 the applicant had stated that at the material time he had been working in a flower shop run by D. Kr., who also worked in the shop, had told him that K. (D.’s acquaintance) had been keeping a lot of money at home and that he proposed to rob her. On 6 February 2003 the applicant followed K.’s son home from school. When K. opened the door to let her son in, the applicant threatened her with a knife and took USD 12,800 from her. At that time another witness, T., was also in the apartment. On leaving, the applicant lost a balaclava he was wearing. He joined Kr., who was waiting for him in a car, and they split the money. Kr. gave him USD 4,155 and told him that D. should be given USD 4,000. 19. Some of the statements were given in the presence of the applicant’s lawyer, Ka. They were further confirmed by confrontations held between the applicant, D. and other witnesses. 20. In court K.’s statements were read out. T., A. (a woman who saw a man running out of K.’s house and losing his balaclava), M., and Kr.’s wife were all cross-examined as witnesses. A. said that she could not recall the man’s face but described his clothes and other features such as age and height. M. gave evidence that at around 3 p.m. on 6 February 2003 the police arrived at the apartment she rented with D. The applicant and D. left together with some police officers. At around 8 p.m. the police officers returned and seized the applicant’s bag in which there was the sum of USD 4,155. Kr.’s wife told the court that her husband Kr. was missing and that she did not know of his whereabouts. 21. The court also noted that the applicant had complained of ill-treatment by the police. In particular, the applicant stated that his initial statements had been given under duress and that he had changed them as soon as there was no longer a threat to his life and health. Referring to a decision by the prosecutor of 27 March 2008 and subsequent court judgments (see paragraphs 33-35 below), the court found the applicant’s complaints unsubstantiated. The court also noted that the applicant had been provided with appropriate medical assistance whilst in detention. 22. Lastly, the court indicated that on 11 February 2005, 10 June 2005, 6 February 2007 and 5 September 2007 the criminal case had been referred back by the court for further investigation for non-compliance with the court’s instructions of 18 June 2004, in particular, the failure to institute criminal proceedings against D. and Kr., who was currently missing. On 23 October 2008 D. had signed an undertaking not to abscond as she was pregnant. The criminal case against D. was under investigation. 23. On 6 August 2010 and 1 November 2011 respectively the Kyiv City Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Ukraine upheld the applicant’s sentence. 24. On 26 March 2011 the applicant was released on probation. 25. According to the applicant, during the period between August 2003 and April 2004 (December 2004 according to the Government) he complained that police officers had subjected him to physical and psychological abuse and had misappropriated his gold ring, mobile telephone and clothes. 26. On 28 December 2006 the Dniprovskiy District Prosecutor’s Office (прокуратура Дніпровського району в м. Києві), having considered a complaint by the applicant forwarded to it by the court, refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers. Police officers P.A. and P.S. were questioned. They denied any ill-treatment of the applicant. 27. On 26 June 2007 the Dniprovskiy Court, in the applicant’s presence, overturned that decision and referred the case back for further examination. In court, the applicant did not complain of having been ill-treated but said that police officers had stolen his belongings (clothes, mobile telephone and a ring). The court noted that it should be established at what point the applicant’s belongings had been seized and under which circumstances. 28. On 12 July 2007 the prosecutor’s office again refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers. 29. On 30 August 2007 that decision was overturned by the Kyiv City Prosecutor’s Office (прокуратура м. Києва) which referred the case back for further examination. It was noted that the instructions of the Dniprovskiy Court of 26 June 2007 had not been complied with. 30. On two occasions between September 2007 and January 2008 the prosecutor’s office refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers but these refusals were set aside by a senior prosecutor. 31. On 30 January 2008 the Dniprovskiy District Prosecutor’s Office again refused to institute criminal proceedings. The applicant stated that the police officers “had resorted to violence” and had misappropriated his mobile phone and a revolver. The police officers gave evidence that neither they nor the other police officers had subjected the applicant to ill-treatment. It was noted that there was no medical evidence to suggest that the applicant had sustained any injuries. 32. On 17 March 2008 the Dniprovskiy District Prosecutor’s Office reversed its decision of 30 January 2008. 33. On 27 March 2008 the prosecutor’s office again rejected complaints by the applicant. It was established that there was no medical evidence in support of his allegations. 34. The applicant appealed against that decision to the Dniprovskiy Court. He complained that there had been no legal right for the police to seize his personal belongings. He also stated that he had been “beaten, tortured and subjected to physical and psychological abuse” without giving any further details. 35. On 3 June 2009 the prosecutor’s decision of 27 March 2008 was upheld by the Dniprovskiy Court. The court held that the applicant’s complaints had been properly examined and were unsubstantiated. On 2 September 2009 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal upheld the decision of 3 June 2009. On 17 January 2010 the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected the applicant’s request for leave to appeal on points of law since copies of court judgments submitted by the applicant had not been properly certified. 36. The applicant submitted to this Court three undated photographs as part of his evidence. On the first and third photos his nose appears to be straight; on the second one it is bent. The applicant also submitted a medical certificate stating that in April 2011 he had been diagnosed with post‑traumatic nasal deformation which impeded his breathing. On 15 April 2011 the applicant had his nasal bones repositioned. 37. Between 26 February 2003 and August 2010 the applicant was detained in the SIZO no. 13. Upon his arrival the applicant was examined by a doctor, to whom he did not mention anything about any injuries. 38. The applicant stated that he had been detained in a cold and damp cell infested by cockroaches. The bedding was dirty and torn, and the toilets and sink were filthy. The applicant submitted photos on which it could be seen that the cell was dirty and that there were dark brown stains on the ceiling and walls. 39. On 19 November 2007 the applicant’s mother complained to the head of the SIZO medical ward that the applicant was suffering from headaches and a pain in his right kidney, both of which needed treatment. She also alleged that on 6 February 2003 the applicant had been “tortured and beaten by police officers”. 40. On 21 December 2007 the applicant was examined by a urologist. He was diagnosed with chronic pyelonephritis and crystalluria, and was recommended outpatient treatment. 41. In January 2008 the applicant complained about the conditions of his detention to the Ministry of Health of Ukraine. 42. By letter of 12 March 2008 the Kyiv Department of Execution of Sentences informed the applicant that he had been detained in a cell measuring 52.06 square metres with eighteen other people. The cell had a toilet which was separated from the main living area by a one-metre-high partition. The cell was disinfected once a week. The bedding was in a reasonable condition. Insulation had been added to the windows and the cell (no. 10) had been refurbished. 43. On 17 March 2008 the applicant was examined by a general practitioner. It was concluded that his state of health was satisfactory. 44. On 21 May 2008 the applicant was examined by a cardiologist and an ophthalmologist. No pathological conditions were discovered. On 28 May 2008 he was examined by a urologist in Kyiv City Hospital no. 3. It was concluded that the applicant did not need any specialist treatment. 45. On 30 May 2008, following complaints by the applicant, the Department of Execution of Sentences concluded that the conditions of the applicant’s detention met the current legal requirements. The applicant was detained together with three other people in cell no. 40, which measured 9.9 square metres. The applicant was permitted to shower once a week. In May 2008 there was a disinfection and clean-up of rodent-infested areas. It was noted that the maximum capacity of the SIZO was 2,850 persons; however, on some days there were nearly 3,200 detainees. The applicant received the requisite medical assistance. 46. In a letter of 2 June 2008, the Kyiv City Prosecutor’s Office informed the applicant that he had been detained in cell no. 10 together with sixteen other detainees. The cell measured 49.59 square metres. 47. On 4 June 2008 the applicant, following a letter from the Court, asked the head of the SIZO to provide him with copies of documents from his case file and copies of his medical records. 48. According to the Government, on 17 June 2008 the SIZO sent a copy of the applicant’s medical records to his mother. The Government also submitted a copy of a statement written by the applicant dated 17 October 2008 on which he confirmed having received “copies of medical documents (six pages)”. 49. On 23 July 2009 the applicant’s lawyer, Da., complained to the SIZO administration that the applicant had lost 8-10 kilograms in weight in a two-week period and had severe stomach pains. He requested that the applicant be diagnosed and given appropriate medical treatment. It is unclear whether that complaint was ever addressed. 50. The applicant lodged numerous unsuccessful complaints challenging the decision to institute criminal proceedings against him and requesting that criminal proceedings be instituted against various authorities. 51. By letter of 16 April 2012 the applicant submitted to the Court that police officers and prosecutors had contacted him requesting that he appear as a witness in the criminal proceedings against Kr. and D. The applicant also alleged that police officers had threatened to institute new criminal proceedings against him if he did not withdraw his application to the Court. 52. A visit to Ukraine by a delegation of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment and Punishment (“the CPT”) took place from 9 to 21 September 2009, during which the delegation inspected the Kyiv SIZO. 53. The relevant parts of the CPT report read as follows: “100. ... With an official capacity of 2,950 places, on 8 September 2009 the establishment was holding 3,440 inmates ... 101. The vast majority of the cells holding male prisoners were seriously overcrowded (for example, 52 prisoners in a cell measuring some 50 m² and containing 40 beds; 32 prisoners in a cell measuring 33 m² and containing 20 beds). ... Because of the human mass, ventilation was almost non-existent and the cells were very hot and stuffy. The level of hygiene was also highly unsatisfactory: in some cells the delegation saw cockroaches, and prisoners also referred to the presence of mice and rats. The in-cell sanitary installations (a partitioned toilet and sink) were generally in a decrepit state and were clearly not sufficient for the numbers of inmates held in the larger cells. The negative consequences of the deplorable material conditions described above were compounded by the fact that some prisoners had spent lengthy periods of time at the SIZO .... In the CPT’s view, the combination of negative factors to which a large number of prisoners were subjected at the Kyiv SIZO (overcrowding, appalling material conditions and levels of hygiene, and practically non-existent activity programmes) could easily be described as inhuman and degrading treatment. ... 106. In the light of the above remarks, the CPT recommends that at the Kyiv SIZO: ... - strenuous efforts be made to decrease the overcrowding and to distribute prisoners more evenly amongst the available accommodation, the objective being to offer a minimum of 4 m² of living space per prisoner; - measures be taken to ensure, as a matter of priority, access to natural light and adequate ventilation in prisoner accommodation; - efforts be made to renovate the prisoner accommodation and ensure an adequate level of hygiene; - prisoners be guaranteed access to adequate quantities of essential personal hygiene products and cleaning products for their cells ...”

4. The applicant was born in 1928 and lives in Budapest. 5. On an undetermined date between December 1990 and October 1992, the applicant brought an action in trespass against her neighbour in the Pest Central District Court. 6. Between 19 October 1993 and 17 November 1998 the District Court held nine hearings, repeatedly instructed the applicant to submit better particulars of her claims and appointed a legal-aid lawyer. On the latter date it dismissed the applicant’s action, holding that the disturbance that had been caused by maintenance works on some pipes crossing through the applicant’s plot was of a reasonable extent and justified by the rights under the neighbour’s easement. 7. On 19 November 1999 the Budapest Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. 8. On 16 March 2000 the applicant filed a petition for review. 9. On 26 June 2002 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s petition for review, holding that the first and second instance judgments had been delivered according to the law. This decision was served on the applicant’s lawyer on 17 October 2002.

9. The first and third applicants were born in 1967 and the second applicant was born in 1995. 10. The first applicant and the third applicant are two women living in a stable relationship. The second applicant is the third applicant’s son and was born outside marriage. His father has recognised paternity and his mother has sole custody of him. The applicants have been living in the same household since the second applicant was about five years old and the first and third applicants care for him jointly. 11. On 17 February 2005 the first applicant and the second applicant, represented by his mother, concluded an agreement whereby the second applicant would be adopted by the first applicant. The applicants’ intention was to create a legal relationship between the first and second applicants corresponding to the bond between them, without severing the relationship with the child’s mother, the third applicant. 12. The applicants, aware that the wording of Article 182 § 2 of the Civil Code (Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) could be understood to exclude the adoption of the child of one partner in a same-sex couple by the other partner without the relationship with the biological parent being severed, requested the Constitutional Court to declare that provision unconstitutional as discriminating against them on account of their sexual orientation. In the case of heterosexual couples, Article 182 § 2 of the Civil Code allowed for second-parent adoption, that is to say, the adoption by one partner of the child of the other partner, without the latter’s legal relationship with the child being affected. 13. On 14 June 2005 the Constitutional Court rejected the request as inadmissible under Article 140 of the Federal Constitution. It noted that the competent District Court, in deciding whether to approve the adoption agreement, would have to examine the question whether or not Article 182 § 2 of the Civil Code allowed second-parent adoption in the case of a same-sex couple. Should the District Court refuse to approve the adoption agreement, the applicants remained free to submit their arguments regarding the alleged unconstitutionality of that provision to the appellate courts, which in turn could bring the issue before the Constitutional Court if they shared the applicants’ view. 14. Subsequently, on 26 September 2005, the applicants requested the District Court to approve the adoption agreement, to the effect that both the first and the third applicants would be the second applicant’s parents. In their submissions they explained that the first and second applicants had developed close emotional ties and that the second applicant benefited from living in a household with two caring adults. Their aim was to obtain legal recognition of their de facto family unit. The first applicant would thus replace the second applicant’s father. They noted that the second applicant’s father had not consented to the adoption, without giving any reasons for his position. Furthermore, they alleged that he had displayed the utmost antagonism towards the family and that the court should therefore override his refusal to consent under Article 181 § 3 of the Civil Code, as the adoption was in the best interests of the second applicant. In support of their submissions, the applicants attached a report from the Youth Welfare Office which confirmed that the first and third applicants shared the day-to-day tasks involved in caring for the second applicant and the overall responsibility for his upbringing, and which concluded, while expressing doubts as to the legal position, that the award of joint custody would be desirable. 15. On 10 October 2005 the District Court refused to approve the adoption agreement, holding that Article 182 § 2 of the Civil Code did not provide for any form of adoption producing the effect desired by the applicants. Its reasoning reads as follows: “Ms ..., the third applicant, has sole custody of her minor son ..., who was born outside marriage. [She] shares a home in ... with her partner ... (the first applicant) and with ... (the second applicant). An application to the courts made jointly on 12 October 2001 by the child’s mother and her partner for partial transfer of custody of [the child] to the mother’s partner, so that the two women could exercise joint custody, was dismissed with final effect. Under the terms of the adoption agreement of 17 February 2005 for which approval is now sought, the first applicant, as the partner of [the child’s] mother, agreed to adopt the child. The applicants seek court approval of the adoption such that the relationship with the biological father and his relatives under family law would cease to exist while the relationship with the biological mother would remain fully intact. They request the courts to override the refusal of consent by the child’s father. The application, which is aimed de facto at securing joint custody for the biological mother and the adoptive mother – who lives in a same-sex relationship with her – fails on legal grounds. Article 179 of the Civil Code provides for adoption either by one person or by a married couple. Only under certain strict conditions may a married person adopt a child on his or her own. Under the second sentence of Article 182 § 2 of the Civil Code, the legal relationship in family law ­– above and beyond the legal kinship itself – ceases only in respect of the biological father (the biological mother) and his (her) relatives, if the child is adopted only by a man (or a woman). In so far as the relationship with the other parent remains intact subsequently (that is, after the adoption), the court declares it to have been severed in respect of the parent concerned, subject to his or her consent. Article 182 of the Civil Code was last amended in 1960 (Federal Gazette 58/1960). On the basis of the unambiguous wording of this provision and the undoubted intentions of the legislature at that time it must be assumed that, in the event of adoption by one person, the legal relationship with the biological parent of the same sex as the adoptive parent ceases to exist, while the relationship with the parent of the opposite sex remains intact (see also Schlemmer in Schwimann, ABGB ... I § 182, point 3). Only in this scenario does the law allow the courts to declare the latter relationship – which is unaffected by the adoption per se – to have been severed. The arrangement sought by the applicants, whereby [the child] would be adopted by a woman and the relationship with his biological father, but not with his biological mother, would cease, is therefore incompatible with the law. In the court’s view, the interpretation of this legislative provision in conformity with the Constitution – which, needless to say, is required – does nothing to alter this finding. It is correct to state that, according to the settled case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, issues concerning sexual orientation fall within the scope of protection of the right to private and family life (Article 8 [of the Convention]). It is also true that, according to the Court’s case-law, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is fundamentally incompatible with Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention. It should be noted, however, that the European Court has also consistently ruled that the Council of Europe member States are to be allowed a margin of appreciation in this regard, which is correspondingly broader the less common ground there is amongst member States’ legal orders. In paragraph 41 of its judgment in Fretté v. France (no. 36515/97, ECHR 2002-I), the European Court expressly stated that, in the sphere of the right of homosexuals to adopt, member States had to be afforded a wide margin of appreciation as the issues concerned were subject to societal change and in a state of transition; however, this margin of appreciation was not to be interpreted as giving States carte blanche to exercise arbitrary power. The issue whether a member State provides the possibility for two persons of the same sex to establish a legal relationship with a child on an equal footing is therefore a matter for the State itself to decide, subject to the limits laid down in Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. In the view of this court no such possibility exists under Austrian law as it currently stands, even when the law is interpreted, as it is required to be, in conformity with the Constitution. The arrangement sought by the applicants would require an amendment to the legislation; it could not be authorised by means of an ordinary court decision interpreting Article 182 of the Civil Code in a manner running counter to the unambiguous wording of that provision. For these reasons the court dismisses the application for approval of the adoption agreement.” 16. The applicants appealed. Referring to Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention, they argued that Article 182 § 2 of the Civil Code was discriminatory in that it led to an unjustified distinction between different-sex and same-sex couples. So-called second-parent adoption was possible for married or unmarried heterosexual couples but not for same-sex couples. The present case had to be distinguished from Fretté, cited above, which had dealt with adoption by a single homosexual. By contrast, the present case concerned a difference in treatment between different-sex and same-sex couples. 17. Having regard to the Court’s judgment in Karner v. Austria (no. 40016/98, ECHR 2003‑IX), the difference in treatment between unmarried heterosexual couples and same-sex couples was particularly problematic. Only a few European States allowed second-parent adoption in same-sex couples; the majority of States reserved second-parent adoption to married couples, and there was a consensus that unmarried different-sex couples and same-sex couples should not be treated differently. The difference complained of did not serve a legitimate aim: in particular, it was not necessary in order to protect the child’s interests. There was research to show that children developed just as well in families with homosexual parents as in families with heterosexual parents. What was important was not the parents’ sexual orientation but their ability to provide a stable and caring family. The applicants requested the appellate court to quash the District Court’s decision and to grant their request of 26 September 2005 or, alternatively, to refer the case back to the District Court for a fresh decision. 18. The Regional Court, without holding a hearing, dismissed the applicants’ appeal on 21 February 2006. In its decision it described a number of related sets of proceedings (concerning visiting rights for the second applicant’s father as well as his maintenance obligations, and the proceedings in which the first and third applicants had tried unsuccessfully to obtain joint custody of the second applicant). The Regional Court observed that it had doubts as to whether the third applicant could represent her son in the proceedings, as there was a potential conflict of interests. It went on to state as follows: “Further examination of this issue is, however, objectively unnecessary, as, in the view of this court – as set out below – approval of the adoption agreement should in any event be refused in this case without the need for further investigation, and was indeed refused by the first-instance court, with the result that the effective representation of the child in the proceedings is not at issue. As far back as the decision on the application for a partial transfer of custody of [the child] to [the mother’s partner], the courts reviewing the case observed that, while Austrian family law contained no legal definition of the term ‘parents’, it was nevertheless abundantly clear from the provisions of Austrian family law as a whole that the legislature intended that a parental couple should consist, as a matter of principle, of two persons of opposite sex. The legislation therefore provided first and foremost for the biological parents to have custody, or the biological mother in the case of a child born outside marriage. Only where this was not possible did the law provide for other persons to be awarded custody of a child. If the biological parents (father and mother) were present, it was unnecessary to award custody to another person, even if, from a purely factual viewpoint, that person had a close relationship with the child (compare OGH, 7 Ob 144/02 f). The courts stressed that no discrimination against persons in same-sex partnerships could be inferred from this legal stance, but that the provisions of family law were based, in line with the biological reality, on the presence of a couple made up of parents of opposite gender. In this court’s view, these considerations also apply to the issue under examination here, namely the approval of the adoption of a minor child by the same-sex partner of one of the child’s parents. Here also, it is unnecessary to create an additional ‘legal parent’ where both the child’s opposite-sex parents are present. The aim is in no sense to discriminate against the same-sex partnership of the child’s mother; however, where both the opposite-sex parents are present, there is simply no need for a provision enabling one of the parents to be replaced by the same-sex partner of the other. The adoption of a minor child is fundamentally designed to create a relationship akin to that which exists between biological parents and their children. The file in the present case shows that the biological father has regular contact with his child, with the result that the child maintains a meaningful relationship with both his opposite-sex parents. In these circumstances, however, there is no need to replace either of the biological parents with the same-sex partner of the other parent by authorising the child’s adoption. The case-law concerning contact rights for parents also generally and indisputably recognises that, according to the available psychological and sociological findings, it is of particular importance for the child’s subsequent development that adequate personal contact be maintained with the parent with whom he or she is not living (see, inter alia, EFSlg 100.205). Accordingly, the legislation goes so far as to confer a right on the child to have personal contact with the parent not living in the same household (see, inter alia, OGH, 3 Ob 254/03 z). It is likewise beyond dispute that, for a minor child to thrive, it is highly desirable that he or she should have a personal relationship with both – opposite-sex – parents, in other words, with both a female (mother) and a male (father) caregiver, and that efforts should be made to that end (compare, inter alia, EFSlg 89.668). At least a minimum degree of personal contact between the child and both parents is therefore greatly to be desired and is generally made a requirement in the interests of the child’s healthy development (compare OGH, 7 Ob 234/99 h). These considerations also clearly militate against authorising the adoption of a child by the same-sex partner of one of the parents if that has the effect of severing the family-law relationship with the other parent. As stated above, this legal position in no sense amounts to discrimination against people in same-sex partnerships. On this point the first-instance court, in the reasoning of the impugned decision, correctly pointed to the settled case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, according to which sexual orientation falls within the scope of protection of private and family life (Article 8 of the Convention), with the result that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is fundamentally incompatible with Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention. However, the first-instance court also correctly pointed out that national legal systems must be afforded a margin of appreciation in enacting legislation, a margin which is correspondingly broader where there is no clear consensus between member States’ legal systems in the sphere in question. While noting that the margin of appreciation must not be interpreted as giving States carte blanche to make arbitrary decisions, the first-instance court observed that it must be construed very generously in the sphere of the right of homosexuals to adopt, as these were issues which were subject to societal change. In the context of this assessment, the Austrian legal system made no provision for the adoption of a child by the same-sex partner of one of the parents. The appellants have adduced no convincing arguments to indicate that the provisions in force amount to discrimination against same-sex partners. Even in the case of heterosexual couples, the only legal relationship that may be severed when a partner’s child is adopted is the relationship between the child and the parent of the same sex as the adoptive parent. In such cases the child therefore continues to have two opposite-sex parents and caregivers. This state of affairs, which is important for the child’s development, does not however apply in the event of his or her adoption by the same-sex partner of one of the parents; there is therefore no evidence of an unjustified difference in treatment in this regard. Furthermore, in the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights cited by the appellants (see Karner v. Austria, [cited above]), the Court reiterated that a difference in treatment of people living in a same-sex relationship was to be considered discriminatory only if it had no objective and reasonable justification, that is if it did not pursue a legitimate aim, or if there was not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised. The Court would thus regard a difference in treatment as compatible with the Convention only where very weighty reasons had been put forward. Particularly compelling reasons therefore had to be advanced to justify any difference in treatment based on sexual orientation. However, the Court also explicitly acknowledged in this regard that protection of the ‘traditional family’ was, in principle, a weighty and legitimate reason which might justify a difference in treatment by the national legislature. At the same time, it found that the aim of protecting the family in the traditional sense was rather abstract and that a broad variety of concrete measures could be used to implement it. Compelling reasons had to be given for excluding people living in homosexual relationships from the scope of application of certain legal provisions. In the case in question, which concerned the right of a deceased person’s same-sex partner to succeed to a tenancy, the Court found that no such reasons had been given. Nevertheless, the judgment in question does not lend any support to the appellants’ arguments in the present case. On the basis of the right – recognised by the Court – to include measures in the national legal system to protect the ‘traditional family’, the stance taken in the Austrian legal system whereby, as a matter of principle and in accordance with biological reality, a minor child should have an opposite-sex couple as parents, has to be respected. Hence, in the view of this court, the decision by the legislature not to provide for a child to be adopted by the same-sex partner of one of the parents, with the result that the relationship with the opposite-sex parent is severed, unquestionably pursues a ‘legitimate aim’. Likewise, it cannot be said that ‘no reasonable relationship of proportionality’ exists between this aim and the means employed. This legal situation is not based – contrary to the appellants’ assertions – on ‘the prejudice of the heterosexual majority towards the homosexual minority’, but is merely designed to ensure that minor children have regular contact with both a female and a male parent while they are growing up. This aim must be respected in just the same way as the decision of the child’s mother to live in a same-sex partnership. Thus, there is no apparent justification for depriving the child of his family-law relationship with his parent of the other sex. However, that is precisely what the child’s mother and her partner sought in the present case and have continued to seek since the lodging of the appeal. Accordingly, in view of these overall considerations, the present appeal should be dismissed. The ruling on the admissibility of an appeal on points of law is based on sections 59(1)(2) and 62(1) of the Non-contentious Proceedings Act. While it is true that the Supreme Court already issued one decision in the instant case, that decision concerned the lawfulness of the (partial) transfer of custody of the child to the mother’s same-sex partner. As regards the issue now to be determined, however, namely whether the adoption of a child by the same-sex partner of one of the parents is lawful, no specific and express Supreme Court rulings exist on the subject to date, to the best of this court’s knowledge. For that reason the present decision is of considerable importance in terms of the unity of the law, legal certainty and development of the law.” 19. The applicants lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court. They submitted that Article 182 § 2 of the Civil Code as applied by the courts led to a difference in treatment between different-sex and same-sex couples in cases where one partner wished to adopt the other partner’s biological child. While heterosexual couples (including unmarried ones) could establish an additional parent-child relationship between the child and its parent’s partner, this was impossible for same-sex couples, as the same-sex partner would replace the biological parent. Thus, any meaningful kind of second-parent adoption was excluded. The Regional Court had sought to justify this difference in treatment by referring to the aims of protecting the family in the traditional sense and allowing the child to grow up with both a male and a female caregiver. However, the Regional Court had not shown that the exclusion of same-sex families from second-parent adoption was necessary to achieve that aim. Recent studies showed that same-sex couples were just as capable of raising children as different-sex couples. Moreover, the present case did not concern the question whether the second applicant should or should not grow up in a same-sex family. He was already part of a de facto same-sex family. The question therefore was whether it was justified to deny legal recognition to the relationship between him and the first applicant. It had not been shown to be necessary to distinguish between unmarried heterosexual and same-sex couples. Finally, the applicants maintained that in many European States second-parent adoption was reserved to married couples. They asserted that where a State chose, as Austria had, to allow second-parent adoption in unmarried couples, it was not free to make a distinction on the basis of sexual orientation. 20. On 27 September 2006 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on points of law lodged by the applicants. It held as follows: “[The minor] is the biological child of the third applicant, Ms ..., and of Mr ..., born on ... The child’s mother has sole custody. She shares a home in ... with her partner (the first applicant) and with [the child]. The applicants applied for court approval of an adoption agreement entered into on 17 February 2005 by the first applicant and the minor child, represented by his mother, under the terms of which the first applicant agreed to adopt the child. However, the agreement provided for the first applicant to take the place not of the child’s mother but of his biological father. The applicants sought court approval of the adoption such that the relationship with the biological father and his relatives under family law would cease to exist while the relationship with the child’s biological mother would remain fully intact. They requested the courts to override the refusal of consent by the child’s father. The first-instance court refused the application, taking the view that Article 182 of the Civil Code reflected the legislature’s clear intention that, in the case of adoption by one person, the legal relationship with the parent of the same sex as the adoptive parent should cease to exist and the relationship with the opposite-sex parent should be preserved. Only in this scenario, according to the first-instance court, did the law allow the courts to also declare the latter relationship, which was not affected by the adoption per se, to have been severed. In the view of the first-instance court, the arrangement sought by the applicants, whereby [the child] would be adopted by a woman and the legal relationship with his biological father but not with his biological mother would cease, was incompatible with the law. This interpretation was in conformity with the Constitution and in particular with Articles 8 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights. According to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, member States had a particularly wide margin of appreciation in the sphere of adoption by homosexuals, as these issues were subject to societal change and were in a state of transition. The question whether a member State provided the possibility for two persons of the same sex to create a legal relationship with a child on an equal footing was therefore a matter for the State itself to decide, subject to the limits laid down in Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. The arrangement sought by the applicants was not possible under Austrian law. The appellate court upheld the decision of the first-instance court, taking the view that the law was clearly based on the premise that the term ‘parents’ necessarily referred to two persons of opposite sex. This was reflected in the law on custody, which as a matter of principle gave priority to the biological parents over other persons. The same considerations applied in the sphere of adoption law. Here too the legislative provisions were based, in line with the biological reality, on the presence of a couple made up of parents of opposite gender. Where both the opposite-sex parents were present, there was no need for a provision enabling one of the parents to be replaced by the same-sex partner of the other; this did not reflect any wish to discriminate against same-sex partners. In the sphere of contact rights it was also recognised beyond dispute that, for a minor child to thrive, it was highly desirable that he or she should have a personal relationship with both – opposite-sex – parents, in other words with both a female (mother) and a male (father) caregiver. At least a minimum degree of personal contact between the child and both (biological) parents was to be desired and was generally made a requirement in the interests of the child’s healthy development. These considerations too could be applied in relation to adoption. The appellate court also endorsed the first-instance court’s view that there was no discrimination against same-sex partners from the standpoint of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. A difference in the treatment of persons living in a same-sex relationship was to be regarded as discriminatory only if it had no objective and reasonable justification, in other words, if the rule in question did not pursue a legitimate aim or if there was no reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised. Differences in treatment were found to be compatible with the Convention where weighty reasons had been put forward. The Austrian legislature pursued one such legitimate aim in seeking to ensure that children, as they were growing up, had the regular contact with both a male and a female parent which their development required. That aim was to be accorded the same respect as the mother’s decision to live in a same-sex partnership. There was no justification, however, for depriving a child of the relationship under family law with his or her parent of the other sex. The appellate court ruled that leave to appeal on points of law should be granted since no case-law existed on the issue of the lawfulness of the adoption of a child by the same-sex partner of one of his or her biological parents. The applicants’ appeal on points of law is admissible for the reasons given by the appellate court. It is nevertheless unfounded. Article 179 § 2 of the Civil Code provides that the adoption of a child by more than one person is permissible only where the adoptive parents are a married couple. Legal commentators have concluded from this that adoption by more than one person of the same sex (whether simultaneously or consecutively) is prohibited (see Schwimann in Schwimann, Civil Code § 179, point 6, and Hopf in Koziol/Bydlinksi/Bollenberger, § 179, point 2, both cited by the Vienna Regional Civil Court, 27 August 2001 – EFSlg 96.699). The second sentence of Article 182 § 2 of the Civil Code governs the effects produced in the event of adoption by one adoptive parent. If the child is adopted only by an adoptive father (an adoptive mother), the ties of kinship cease only in respect of the biological father (the biological mother) and his (her) relatives. It is quite clear from the materials (ErlBem RV 107 BlgNR IX. GP, 21) that this provision should be construed to mean that the non-proprietary legal ties are severed only with the biological parent who is being replaced by an adoptive parent of the same gender. In explicit terms, this means that the child cannot, for instance, be deprived of his or her biological father if he or she is being adopted just by a woman (see also: Schwimann in Schwimann, op. cit., § 182, sub-paragraph 3; Stabentheiner in Rummel I § 182, sub-paragraph 2). Contrary to the applicants’ assertion, this provision is not to be construed extensively in the way that they argue, nor does there exist an unintended legislative gap which therefore needs to be filled by analogy. According to the materials (op. cit., 11), the chief aim of adoption is to promote the well-being of the minor child (the protective principle). Adoption should constitute an appropriate means of entrusting to suitable and responsible individuals the care and upbringing of children who have no parents, those who come from broken homes or those whose parents, for whatever reason, are unable to provide their children with a proper upbringing or may not even want their children. However, this aim can be achieved only when the adoption allows the situation in a biological family to be recreated as far as possible. The case-law (6 Ob 179/05z) also makes clear that the tie between the child and the adoptive parent is to be understood as a social and psychological relationship, akin to that between biological parents and their children. The model for the child-parent relationship in the context of adoption of minors is informed by the specific social and psychological ties that exist between parents and young people approaching adulthood. In addition to the socially typical ties of physical and personal proximity (shared household, care for the child’s physical and psychological needs by its parents), these encompass emotional ties comparable to the love between parents and their children, and a specific role for the parents as mentors and role models. Article 182 § 2 of the Civil Code imposes a general prohibition (that is, not just in the case of same-sex partners) on adoption by a man as long as the ties of kinship with the child’s biological father still exist, and by a woman where such ties still exist with the biological mother. Under Article 182 § 2, therefore, a person who adopts a child on his or her own does not take the place of either parent at will, but only the place of the parent of the same sex. The adoption of the child by the female partner of the biological mother is therefore not legally possible. Contrary to the applicants’ view, this provision also survives the test of compatibility with the Constitution (fundamental rights perspective). In the case of Fretté [cited above], the European Court of Human Rights was called upon to examine whether the authorities’ refusal to authorise the adoption of a child by a homosexual man amounted to discrimination. In its judgment of 26 February 2002, the Court found that adoption meant ‘providing a child with a family, not a family with a child’. According to the Court, it was the State’s task to ensure that the persons chosen to adopt were those who could offer the child the most suitable home in every respect. Not least in view of the wide differences in national and international opinion concerning the possible consequences of a child being adopted by one or more homosexual parents, and bearing in mind the fact that there were not enough children to adopt to satisfy demand, States had to be allowed a broad margin of appreciation in this sphere. A refusal to authorise adoption by a homosexual would not be in breach of Article 14 of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 8 if it pursued a legitimate aim, namely the protection of the child’s best interests, and did not infringe the principle of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved. The applicants have not demonstrated, nor is there any other evidence to suggest, that the provisions of Article 182 § 2 of the Austrian Civil Code overstep the margin of appreciation accorded by the European Court, or that they infringe the proportionality principle. The Supreme Court is therefore in no doubt as to the compatibility of this provision with the Constitution, which is called into question by the applicants. In view of the legal impossibility of the adoption it is also not necessary to further examine whether the conditions for overriding the father’s refusal to consent, as an exceptional measure under Article 181 § 3 of the Civil Code, have been met.” The judgment was served on the applicants’ counsel on 24 October 2006.

9. The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Diyarbakır. He was a student at the Medical Faculty of the Diyarbakır Dicle University at the time of the events described below. 10. On 4 April 1997 the applicant was arrested and placed in custody by police officers from the Diyarbakır Security Directorate. He was accused of membership of an illegal organisation, the YEKBUN (Kurdistan United People’s Party). 11. The police officers interrogated the applicant in relation to his alleged involvement in the YEKBUN. The applicant alleged that he had been subjected to ill-treatment by the officers during the interrogation which caused an oedema, a bruised nose and a broken tooth. According to the Government, the applicant’s injuries occurred when, due to lack of sleep, he inadvertently fell and hit his nose on a sink. 12. On 6 April 1997 the applicant signed a statement according to which he hit his nose on a sink while washing his face. The applicant claims that he was forced to sign the statement. He was then taken to the Diyarbakır State Hospital and examined by Dr. R.C. who noted the following: “An oedema and an ecchymosed lesion as a result of trauma have been identified on the nose. ...” 13. On the same day, the applicant was brought before the Diyarbakır State Security Court. Before the court, he denied being a member of an illegal organisation. He stated that he had been subjected to various forms of ill‑treatment during his detention in police custody and that the statement which he had signed did not reflect the truth of what had happened to him. The court ordered his release pending trial. 14. On 8 April 1997 the applicant filed a criminal complaint with the chief public prosecutor’s office in Diyarbakır against the police officers who had allegedly ill-treated him. The chief public prosecutor ordered that the applicant be examined by a medical expert from the Forensic Medicine Institute. On the same day, he was examined by a forensic medical expert. The expert’s report stated the following: “... There is an abrasion of 1 x 0,5 cm on the left side of the tip of the nose. Furthermore, there is a minimal fracture on the front of the 8th of the lower teeth. There is no danger to the individual’s life. However, the injuries render him unfit for work for two days.” 15. On 15 April 1997 the Diyarbakır public prosecutor issued a decision of non-jurisdiction in respect of the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment and referred the investigation file to the Diyarbakır District Administrative Council in accordance with the Law on the Prosecution of Civil Servants (Memurin Muhakematı Kanunu). 16. On 13 June 1997 the Diyarbakır State Security Court acquitted the applicant of the charges against him. The court took note in its judgment of the applicant’s statement that he had been interrogated by police officers under duress. 17. On 26 June 1997 the Diyarbakır Administrative Council decided that, due to lack of evidence, the police officers who had allegedly ill‑treated the applicant should not be prosecuted. 18. On 6 August 1997 the applicant filed an objection with the Supreme Administrative Court against the decision of the Diyarbakır Administrative Council. He also lodged a petition with the Diyarbakır Administrative Council and requested a copy of the investigation file. He received no response to his petition. 19. On 14 May 1999 the Supreme Administrative Court confirmed the Administrative Council’s decision of non-prosecution. 20. On 26 July 1999 the Supreme Administrative Court’s decision was served on the applicant.

4. The applicants were born in 1965, 1973, 1967, 1971, 1966 and 1970 respectively. The first applicant was in Mardin prison and the remaining applicants were in Diyarbakir prison at the time of their applications to the Court. 5. The applicants were all arrested and taken into custody on suspicion of membership of Hezbollah. They were subsequently remanded in custody. 6. However, at the request of the Governor of the State of Emergency Region and the public prosecutor, pursuant to Article 3 (c) of Law-Decree no. 430, which allowed them to take further measures within the framework of the state of emergency, a single judge at the State Security Court authorised the applicants’ return from prison to the Anti-terror branch of the relevant Security Directorate for further interrogation for a duration not exceeding ten days. 7. All the applicants save for the first applicant returned to prison before the ten day period was over. In respect of the first applicant, a single judge at the State Security Court extended, on 5 August 2002, his detention at the Security Directorate for another ten days. The applicant’s lawyer objected. His objection was accepted by the State Security Court and the first applicant returned to prison. 8. The details are indicated in the table below: APPLICATION NO. NAME OF THE APPLICANT DATE OF REMAND IN CUSTODY DATE OF TRANSFER TO THE SECURITY DIRECTORATE DATE OF RETURN TO PRISON 33412/01 Ekrem Zerey 26/07/2002 26/07/2002 09/08/2002 30229/02 Rıfat Demir 07/12/2001 08/12/2001 10/12/2001 30229/02 Mehmet Garip Özer 07/12/2001 08/12/2001 10/12/2001 30229/02 Ahmet Şahin 07/12/2001 08/12/2001 10/12/2001 30263/02 Ahmet Durmaz 07/12/2001 08/12/2001 17/12/2001 30263/02 Davut Şahin 07/12/2001 08/12/2001 17/12/2001

7. The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Łódź. 8. On 4 April 1994, at 2.40 a.m. officers of the Polish Border Guards (Straż Graniczna) arrested a certain A.I., a German national of Polish origin, on suspicion of having stolen a car “Mercedes 200E” in which he was travelling to Belarus. The arrest took place after a routine control of his documents on the Polish-Belarusian border. The officers, having learnt that the car had been hired from the company “Sixt-Budget” in Germany, and having found that, according to their records, A.I. had previously several times crossed the Polish-Belarusian border driving different cars, asked the Kołbaskowo Border Guards (a check-point at the Polish-German border) to inquire whether the car was being sought by the German police. It was soon confirmed that since 2 April 1994 the German police had been looking for that car, which had been reported as having disappeared. A.I. was later taken into police custody and brought to the Sokółka District Police Station (Komenda Rejonowa Policji). 9. On 5 April 1994, at 8 a.m., the applicant and a certain J.S.-T., a national of the United States of America, reported to the Sokółka District Police Headquarters. They presented a copy of the contract concluded by J.S.-T. with the “Sixt-Budget” company, from which it appeared that she had hired the car in question for the period from 2 to 10 April 1994. 10. On the same day the applicant was arrested. Subsequently, A.I., J.S.‑T. and the applicant were questioned by the police as suspects. A.I. was charged with aiding and abetting an unknown person to sell a stolen car. The applicant was charged with aiding and abetting a car theft. J.S.-T. was charged with attempted car theft. 11. A.I. did not confess. He stated that he took odd jobs as a driver at the Świecko border station (on the Polish-German border). He admitted that he had intended to bring the car to Belarus but denied knowing anything about the theft of the car. He maintained that a woman, whose first name was “Elżbieta” and for whom he had already worked, had hired him to drive the car in question from Łódź to Belarus, i.e. to the Minsk airport. He had been paid 500 Deutsche marks (DM) for that service. On 3 April 1994, at about 5 p.m. he had met “Elżbieta” in Łódź. She had been accompanied by another woman resembling a Philippine national. She had handed over to him the car, its documents and the keys. 12. The applicant did not confess and stated that he had known J.S.–T. for some 8 years. He had met her in Łódź on 3 April 1994. She had come in a “Mercedes” that had been hired. They had decided that they would drive the applicant’s car in Poland and she had left the “Mercedes” in a guarded car park. On the same day A.I. had asked him to lend him his car. The applicant, having first asked J.S.-T. for her permission, had lent him the “Mercedes” hired by her. He had handed the car documents and keys to A.I. Later, he had driven J.S.-T. to her friend, P.M. On 4 April 1994, at about 8 p.m., A.I.’s father had come to the applicant’s home and had told him that A.I. had been arrested when crossing the border since it was suspected that the car in question had been stolen. The applicant had informed J.S.–T. and P.M. of what had happened and the three of them had come to the Sokółka District Police Station to present the car documents and explain the situation. 13. J.S.-T. did not confess and stated that, together with P.M., she had flown to Frankfurt am Main from San Francisco on 2 April 1994. She had hired the car in question at Frankfurt airport. She had crossed the Polish border in Zgorzelec (“Goerlitz” in German) and had met the applicant there, as had been arranged previously. The applicant, P.M. and she had gone to Łódź. They had arrived there at about 10-11 a.m. The applicant had taken the car and the car documents from her in order to park it in a safe place. On 4 April 1994 at about 11 p.m. she had learnt from the applicant that the car had been seized by the police as having been stolen and that they had to go to Sokółka to explain the situation. J.S.-T. denied having given the applicant any permission to use or to lend the car. She maintained that she did not know either A.I. or a woman called “Elżbieta” and that she had not been at the Świecko border station. 14. A.I and the applicant were subsequently confronted with each other. A.I. maintained his version of events, refused to give any further evidence and asked the prosecution to hear evidence from the owners of the car. The applicant denied handing over the car to A.I. He explained that J.S.-T. had done it. She had been accompanied by an unknown woman and P.M. He stated that J.S.-T. had asked him to find her a driver who could deliver the car to Minsk or Vilnius. He had recommended A.I. to her and had helped her to contact him. 15. On 6 April 1994 the applicant was remanded in custody until 5 July 1994. On the same day he was heard by the prosecutor. He did not confess. In contrast to what he had originally stated, he maintained that he had not known J.S.-T. before the events in question. He had previously known only P.M, who had called him from the USA to tell him that he would be coming to Poland on a tourist tour. The next day P.M. had called him from Łódź and they had fixed a meeting. Only then had the applicant met J.S.-T. for the first time. P.M. and J.S.-T. had come in the “Mercedes”. They had asked the applicant to deliver the car to Minsk or Vilnius. P.M had said that J.S.-T. had been the owner of the car. The applicant had told them that he could not deliver the car but promised to give them the name of a person who would do so. To this end, he had gone to A.I.’s home and told him of their proposal. A.I. had provisionally agreed. He had arranged a meeting. They had met at a car park. P.M. had come in company with J.S.‑T. and a woman called “Elżbieta” or “Ewa”. The applicant had introduced A.I. to them. A.I. and the latter woman had gone to the car. The applicant had not, however, been present when they had been talking and when the keys and documents had been handed over to A.I. Nor had he known anything about the payment for A.I. He had learnt from A.I.’s father that A.I. had been arrested. Subsequently, he had called P.M. and complained to him of what had happened. He had reminded P.M. and J.S.‑T. that they had claimed that the car had not been stolen and asked them to report to the Sokółka District Police Headquarters and explain the situation. They had gone to Sokółka on 5 April 1994. During the conversation with the police officers P.M. had left in the applicant’s partner’s car. 16. On 6 April 1994 the prosecutor ordered that J.S.-T. be detained on remand. She refused to testify. 17. On 6 April 1994 A.I. testified before the prosecutor. He did not confess. He stated that on 3 April 1994 the applicant had come to his father’s home in Łódź and had offered him payment for driving a car, hired by the applicant’s acquaintance, to Minsk. He had agreed. They had later met at the car park next to the railway station. The applicant had been in the company of two women: a woman with, in his words, a “foreigner’s look” and “Elżbieta”, the woman that he had some time earlier met at the Świecko border station. He had been given the car documents and keys. They had agreed to pay him DM 500. He had been assured by the applicant and J.S.‑T. that the car had been lawfully in their possession. On the same day, after obtaining A.I.’s testimony, the prosecutor ordered that he be remanded in custody. 18. On 22 April 1994 the applicant was released on bail. 19. On 5 May 1994 J.S.-T. decided to testify in the presence of her lawyer and an interpreter. She confessed. She stated that she had flown to Frankfurt am Main from the USA together with her friend, P.M. She had hired the car in question for the period from 2 to 10 April 1994. P.M. had proposed a visit to Poland. She agreed. On 2 April 1994, at 8.30 p.m. they had arrived in Łódź. When they had been parking the car, they had met the applicant. She had not known him before. P.M. had introduced him as a friend of his. The applicant had come with them to P.M.’s home. He had proposed “doing business”, that is to say, taking the car to a former Soviet Union country with the help of a “trustworthy person” in order to sell it and, afterwards, report a “theft” to the police. P.M. had protested but she had agreed. The applicant had gone to find such a “trustworthy person” and had later rung her to inform her of a meeting place. She had gone there with P.M. The applicant had waited with an unknown man. She had given the car, its documents and the keys to that man. On 4 April 1994 the applicant had informed her that the driver had been arrested. He had said that they should “save this man” and asked her to go with him to explain that what had happened had been a “mistake”. P.M. had gone with them to Sokółka as an interpreter. J.S.-T. admitted that she had given false testimony on 5 April 1994. She stated that she regretted it. 20. On 6 May 1994 the Sokółka District Prosecutor released J.S.-T. on bail. The prosecutor had regard, inter alia, to J.S.-T.’s confession and the fact that all necessary evidence had already been obtained. On the same day J.S.‑T. left for the United States and, since then, her whereabouts have been unknown. 21. On 9 May 1994 the Sokółka District Prosecutor appointed two experts in psychiatry in order to establish whether the applicant could be held criminally responsible for his acts. On 16 June 1994 the Choroszcz Psychiatric Hospital informed the prosecutor that the applicant had failed to appear for his examination. By a letter of 22 June 1994 the applicant was informed by the prosecutor that his failure to undergo a psychiatric examination might be treated as an attempt to obstruct the proceedings. On an unspecified later date the applicant underwent the examination in the Choroszcz Psychiatric Hospital. On 8 August 1994 the psychiatric experts submitted their report to the prosecutor. 22. On 21 September 1994 the District Prosecutor laid additional charges against the applicant. On the following day the applicant and A.I. were summoned to give evidence. They refused to testify. On the same day the applicant was given access to the case file. On 23 September 1994 the prosecutor terminated the investigation against the applicant, A.I. and J.S.‑T. 23. On 3 October 1994 the Sokółka District Prosecutor (Prokurator Rejonowy) filed a bill of indictment with the Łódź Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki). J.S.-T. was charged with attempted car theft. The charge was formulated in the following way: “... that on 3 April 1994 in Łódź, acting together with [the applicant] and A.I. and with intent to appropriate a “Mercedes- Benz 200E” car valued at 850,000,000 [old] Polish zlotys, which was entrusted to her under a rental agreement concluded with the company “Sixt-Budget” in Germany, instructed through [the applicant] A.I. to deliver [that car] to the C[ommonwealth of] I[ndependent] S[tates] with a view to selling it but she did not complete the offence because, on 4 April 1994, A.I. was arrested on ... the Polish border when driving the car in question...” 24. The applicant was charged with handling stolen goods of a significant value. The charge was formulated as follows: “... that on 3 April 1994 in Łódź, acting together and in agreement with A.I. assisted J.S.-T. to sell a “Mercedes-Benz 200E” car registered under number MUD 9552 and valued at 850,000,000 [old] Polish zlotys ...[and, in particular] knowing that the car had been obtained by crime, hired A.I. to deliver that car to the C[ommonwealth of] I[ndependent] S[tates] ...” 25. A.I. was charged with handling stolen goods of a significant value. The charge was phrased as follows: “... that on 3 April 1994 in Łódź, acting together and in agreement with [the applicant] assisted J.S.-T. to sell a “Mercedes-Benz 200E” car registered under number MUD 9552 and valued at 850,000,000 [old] Polish zlotys ... [and, in particular] knowing that the car had been obtained by crime, took it over from [the applicant] in order to deliver it to the C[ommonwealth of] I[ndependent] S[tates] ...” 26. On 10 January 1995 Łódź Regional Court severed the charge against J.S.‑T. from the case and stayed the proceedings against her. 27. On 10 February 1995 the trial began. A.I. was heard first. He pleaded not guilty and refused to testify before the court. He confirmed the statements he had made in the investigation but explained that it had been the applicant who had contacted him with J.S.-T. He added that he had met J.S.-T. for the first time at the car park where she had given him the car, its documents and the keys. She had been in the company of “Elżbieta”, for whom he had worked previously. A.I. further admitted that, when giving evidence for the first time, he had not revealed certain facts. 28. The applicant also pleaded not guilty and gave evidence. His testimony was consistent with that given on 6 April 1994. He confirmed the statements he had made during the confrontation with A.I. on 5 April 1994. However, he departed from the statements he had made during the first questioning on 5 April 1994. 29. On 19 May 1995 the Regional Court asked, apparently for the second time, the Embassy of the United States of America in Warsaw for information on whether J.S.-T. indeed lived at the address she had supplied to the prosecution. The Regional Court emphasised the urgent nature of its enquiry. In its reply of 2 June 1995, the Consular Department of the Embassy informed the Regional Court that, according to their knowledge, J.S.‑T. was not at the time staying in Poland. 30. Later, the Regional Court heard evidence from A.I.’s father and M.A., the officer who had arrested A.I. on the border. The applicant’s partner was also called as a witness but she refused to testify. 31. The Łódź Regional Court held hearings on 31 March, 16 May and 3 July 1995. On the latter date the Regional Court acquitted the applicant and A.I. The reasoning for the verdict read, in so far as relevant: “In the course of the trial it was established that J.S.-T. was not residing in the territory of Poland (see the letter of the Consular Department of the Embassy of the United States of America, p. 482). For that reason, the statements that she had made in the investigation were read out as witness testimony. Assessing the above-mentioned testimony as well as the remaining material before it, this court has found the following: The whole structure of the bill of indictment was in principle based on J.S.-T.’s confession that she had made in the investigation. On account of mistakes committed already at the investigative stage and having regard to general guarantees [for a defendant] laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure, it has to be considered that this evidence does not suffice to find the defendants guilty of the offences with which they were charged. Even without questioning the prosecutor’s decision to release J.S.-T. ... which, in the context of the letter from the Consular Department of the American Embassy appears to have a dubious basis, it is impossible not to question the statement made in the reasoning for that decision, namely that the evidence collected was [at that time] complete. In passing, it should be noted that the inquiries were still under way and the investigation itself was terminated on 23 September 1994. Having regard to the material gathered up to that stage, including evidence given by [J.S.-T.] it was simply necessary to confront [her] with her co-suspects, in particular with [the applicant]. That, however, was not done and, for all practical reasons, could not be done at the trial stage. Had it been done, it would have been possible to clarify a number of facts which, maybe even in J.S.-T.’s absence, would have enabled [the court] to determine properly the charges against the other defendants. For procedural reasons, J.S.-T.’s statements are to be considered as witness testimony and as such are to be assessed. Yet when assessing [her statements], it must be taken into account that they do not have the quality of [witness] testimony given under pain [of being criminally liable for perjury] but are the statements of a suspect with all the consequences thereof, including the possibility that J.S.-T., for the reasons only known to herself, did not tell the truth or the whole truth. Moreover, this part of the evidence was not heard directly by the court and this, for obvious reasons, made it impossible for it to verify and assess fully [her statements]. Assessing this evidence from the point of view of its credibility, it cannot be said to have the quality of consistency from the beginning of the proceedings. In view of the foregoing, this court, finding it impossible for it to verify this evidence, cannot rely on it to conclude that the defendants’ guilt has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. It must also be noted that this evidence concerns mainly [the applicant]. There is no direct indication that A.I., when crossing the border..., knew that the car had been obtained by crime. ... The testimonies of both defendants cannot be considered credible because they [changed their statements], although in their final version presented at the trial they were closely consistent. ... However, the defendants’ and, in particular, A.I.’s guilt is not obvious even on the basis of their testimonies. ... Having regard to the foregoing and to the fact that there is no convincing and trustworthy evidence of the defendants’ guilt, this court has acquitted them. ...” 32. The Sokółka District Prosecutor appealed on 11 October 1995, alleging in essence that the trial court had wrongly assessed the evidence of the defendants. 33. On 19 January 1996 the Łódź Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) quashed the acquittal and remitted the case to the Sokółka District Prosecutor. It ordered that a further investigation be carried out. 34. On 30 April 1996 the applicant’s defence counsel was notified that the applicant would be given access to the case file on 17 May 1996. On 16 May 1996 the applicant requested the Sokółka District Prosecutor to give him access to the case file in another part of the country. The applicant did not appear before the prosecutor when summoned. On 29 May 1996 the prosecutor decided to stay the investigation. On 4 June 1996 the prosecutor ordered that the applicant be detained for a period of 7 days in view of his failure to appear before the investigating authority. The prosecutor also issued a wanted notice in respect of the applicant. On 11 June 1996 the applicant appealed against the detention order. On 9 September 1996 he was arrested. On 13 September 1996 the applicant was brought before the Sokółka District Prosecutor and was given access to the case file. He was released later on that same day. 35. In the meantime, the applicant, on his own, tried to establish the whereabouts of J.S.-T. through the Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Los Angeles. On 7 October 1996 the Consul wrote to him a letter, which read, in its relevant part: “... we should inform you that we cannot help you because the supplied address of the person you search for does not exist in the San Francisco address directory (on 40th street there are no such low numbers and the postal code concerns another state). You are asked to check the address once again; perhaps the correct address is in the Sokółka District Court’s possession. If the person that you search for has changed her address we will certainly not be able to find her because in the United States there are no registers of residents and no duty to register one’s place of residence. ...” 36. The charge against A.I. had earlier been severed from the case and he had already been charged separately, although before the same court. On 16 October 1996 the Białystok Regional Court convicted A.I. of handling stolen goods and sentenced him to 1 year of imprisonment and a fine. That judgment became final on an unspecified later date. 37. On 31 October 1996 the Sokółka District Prosecutor filed a new bill of indictment against the applicant with the Białystok Regional Court. The applicant was charged with handling stolen goods of a significant value. The charge was phrased as follows: “... that on 3 April 1994 in Łódź, acting together and in agreement with A.I. assisted J.S.‑T. to sell a “Mercedes-Benz 200E” car registered under number MUD 9552 valued at 850,000,000 [old] Polish zlotys ...[and, in particular] knowing that the car had been obtained by crime, hired A.I. to take that car abroad...” The prosecution called the following witnesses: A.I. (at that time detained on remand), J.I. (A.I.’s father who had already been heard at the original trial), B.P. (the applicant’s partner who had already refused to testify at the original trial), M.A. (the officer of the Border Guards who had stopped A.I. on the border and who had already been heard at the original trial), P.P. (an officer of the Border Guards), and G.O, M.J., T.M. and Z.D. (police officers from the Sokółka District Police). 38. On 19 November 1996 the Białystok Regional Court transmitted the case for examination by the Łódź Regional Court. On 31 January 1997 that latter court requested the Łódź Court of Appeal that the case be transmitted back to the Białystok Regional Court. On 11 February 1997 the Court of Appeal ruled that the case should be examined by the Łódź Regional Court. 39. The Łódź Regional Court held hearings on 23 April and 2 June 1997. On the latter date the Regional Court gave judgment. It convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to 18 months’ imprisonment suspended on probation for 3 years and a fine of 2,000 new Polish zlotys (PLN). The reasoning for the judgment read, in so far as relevant: “On 2 April 1994 J.S.-T., who had a permanent residence in San Francisco, hired a Mercedes 200 E from the Sixt-Budget company in Frankfurt. The car was hired for a period from 2 to 10 April 1994. The rental agreement included a ban on driving the car to the countries of Eastern Europe, Denmark [and] Italy (p. 13). On 3 April 1994 J.S.-T. accompanied by a P.M. arrived at Łódź in the hired car. In Łódź they met the defendant Jan Gossa, an acquaintance of P.M. The defendant proposed to take the car abroad to former USRR, where it would be sold. He [the defendant] stated that he knew a person who was willing to drive the car. The amount received from the sale was to be shared. On the same day the defendant put J.S.-T. in contact with A.I. The meeting took place in the car park, where J.S.-T. handed the car documents to AI. AI left the car park in the “Mercedes” (statements of J.S.-T., pp.93-94). On 4 April 1994 at 2.40 a.m. A.I. arrived at the Kuźnica Białostocka road border check-point and attempted to cross the Polish-Belarusian border in the Mercedes 200 E. During the border control the officers of the Border Guards decided to check if the car was being searched for in Germany. They were alerted by the fact that A.I. declared that he was travelling as a tourist to Moscow and Sochi, but did not have any luggage. In addition, after having verified internal records, it was established that he [A.I.] had previously crossed the border driving a different car. On 4 April 1994 at 1.40 p.m. information was received from the Kołbaskowo border check-point that the car was appropriated to the detriment of the Sixt-Budget rental company (p.7). The value of the Mercedes amounts to approximately PLN 85,000. It was returned to the company, which on 4 April 1994 had notified that the car was appropriated. By a final judgment of the Białystok Regional Court of 16 October 1996 ... A.I. was convicted of the offence specified in Article 215 § 2 of the Criminal Code, consisting in the fact that on 3 April 1994 in Łódź he had assisted J.S.-T. in selling a “Mercedes-Benz 200E” car registered under number MUD 9552 valued not less than 85,000 PLN to the detriment of the company Sixt-Budget GmbH, in that knowing that the car had been obtained by crime he took it with a view to driving it abroad and was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment and a fine of PLN 5,000 (case file no. III K 132/96). The defendant Jan Gossa did not confess to the act with which he had been charged. He refused to give evidence before the court, and thus the court revealed his statements made during the investigation. ... The court did not consider the applicant’s statements credible. He was questioned on few occasions and [each time] he made differing statements. Those statements vary in essential respects: as to acquaintance with J.S.-T., as to contacts with her and as to reasons for handing the car to A.I. If the applicant’s evidence given at the [original] trial that he had had nothing to do with the attempted taking of the “Mercedes” abroad was to be considered credible, then the defendant would have had no reasons to provide, directly after his arrest, false information, [which was] different from the version [of events] which he had eventually presented. The court, when determining the facts of the case, considered credible the statements made by J.S.-T, questioned as a suspect, on 5 May 1994. In those statements, J.S.-T. had presented in detail her contacts with the defendant and A.I. Her statements are logical and convincing. She was questioned in the presence of an interpreter and her lawyer. She had unrestrained freedom to express herself. The facts stated by her do not only incriminate the defendant and A.I., but they also confirm her guilt. Those statements do not lose their credibility on account of the fact that they differ from J.S.-T.’s statements made directly after her arrest, namely that the defendant without her consent had lent the car to his friend. He [the defendant] had the car keys because he had parked the car in the car park. That version of events, although similar with the defendant’s first statement, is not credible. A.I. saw the rental agreement when taking the car. A.I. has lived in Germany for 8 years and could not have any difficulties in understanding the clause in the agreement which forbade driving the car to the countries of Eastern Europe. J.S.-T. also knew the content of the rental agreement, and thus was aware of this ban. The next assertion of the defendant and A.I. that the latter was to drive the car to Minsk or Vilnius on her [J.S.-T.’s] instructions did not find any support in the evidence. A.I. at the time of his arrest on the border had stated that his destination was Moscow or Sochi, so completely different destinations [from those previously referred to]. In the light of the evidence obtained in the case the applicant’s guilt does not raise any doubts. It was the defendant who was the mastermind of the sale of the car abroad. The amount received from the sale was to be shared. The defendant was fully aware that J.S.-T. was not the owner of the car. She resided permanently in the United States. She drove to Łódź in the hired Mercedes which was registered in Germany. J.S.-T. was a party to the rental agreement and she gave her consent to the sale of the car. She also handed over the documents and the car keys to A.I. to whom she had been directed and put in contact with by the defendant. A.I. was to drive the car abroad. At the moment of the handing of the car to A.I. it was appropriated to the detriment of the Sixt-Budget company, the owner of the car. The defendant’s actions constituted [the offence specified in] Article 215 § 2 of the Criminal Code. The defendant, acting together and in agreement with A.I. assisted J.S.-T. in selling a “Mercedes-Benz 200E” car registered under number M-UD 9552 valued not less than 85.000 PLN ... [and, in particular] knowing that the car had been obtained by crime, hired A.I. to take that car abroad...” 40. The applicant and the prosecutor appealed. The applicant alleged a breach of his defence rights and of a number of procedural provisions. He stressed that he had been deprived of any opportunity to challenge the statements of J.S.-T. made before the prosecutor and to cross-examine her. He also maintained that the authorities had made no real attempt to secure the attendance of that witness before the court. 41. On 13 November 1997 the Łódź Court of Appeal upheld the conviction but partly altered the sentence imposed. It raised the fine originally imposed to PLN 6,000. The reasoning for that judgment read, in so far as relevant: “... The alleged breach of [the applicant’s] procedural rights cannot be upheld. The legal grounds for declining to hear J.S.-T. before the court are laid down in Article 337 §§ 1 and 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Under that provision, the court may – even if the parties object – decline to take measures to summon a witness and confine itself to reading out the records of statements previously given by him or her as a defendant or suspect. The application of that provision is an exception to the rule of the direct examination of witnesses and does diminish the accused person’s defence rights, in particular in situations where there has been no prior confrontation between him and a witness whose testimony is later read out. It must however be stressed that Article 337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not oblige the court to exhaust all possibilities of producing a witness from abroad at the trial, even if he or she resides in a neighbouring country. ... Of course, the trial court is empowered, apart from the application of the measure under Article 337..., to make efforts to ensure the direct examination of a witness from abroad. But those efforts make sense only if there are prospects of success. It is known – also to the author of the appeal – that the [previous] attempts made by the court in that respect were futile and that future ones would fail. As early as 1995 the Regional Court asked the Embassy of the United States of America for information as to whether J.S.-T. lived at the address that she had supplied. The reply was evasive and should be interpreted as a refusal to furnish any information on that matter. A further confirmation of the firmness of that position is found in the letter of the Polish diplomatic service (see the letter of the Consul General of the Republic of Poland in Los Angeles, p. 482). A pre-condition for securing an appearance of a witness from abroad is that the authority conducting the proceedings knows his or her address. Bearing in mind the obligation to observe all procedural rules attached to summoning a witness from a foreign country, a summons cannot be sent if his or her address is unknown or if it is clear that the address is false. It that context, it should be recalled that the applicant’s “private” enquiries were to no avail (see ... the letter of 7 October 1996...). In conclusion and having regard to the grounds for the appeal, the [trial] court would not have been able to satisfy the requirement of the “proper and effective summoning of the witness J.S.-T. for the trial”. Consequently, this argument is ill-founded and, indeed, this court could have stopped at this point because the appellant’s further arguments do not concern the court’s actions but the actions of the investigative authorities and, also, the appellant does not challenge the logic of the conclusion reached by the trial court. Yet there is a need to make the following remarks. First of all, J.S.-T. was released because she put up bail of PLN 10,000. Until that time, that is to say, for a month, she was in custody. The [applicant] was treated in the same way but on more favourable conditions: he was released after 17 days and the security in question was PLN 8,000. Secondly, evidence obtained under Article 337 must be assessed with a particular thoroughness. The assessment of J.S.-T.’s testimony must be very careful, not least because she was charged with theft of the car in question and supplied a false address. The Regional Court, did, however, manage the task. The best proof is the fact that the [appellant] does not even try to challenge the arguments relating to J.S.-T.’s testimony, which are presented in the reasoning of the contested judgment. It can only be recalled that the trial court took notice of the circumstances surrounding the last questioning of J.S.-T. (by the prosecutor and in the presence of her lawyer) and of the importance of those statements for her criminal responsibility. The court of first instance did not overlook the fact that those statements differed from the previous ones. There is no material proof to conclude that her statements incriminating [the applicant] were made in consequence of her agreement with the investigating authority and, in particular, that they were the price for her release. If her release can be looked on from this angle, the price for her release – although lawful – was the security in question. Apart from the above-mentioned arguments of the trial court, there is one more reason to believe J.S.-T. and not to believe [the applicant]. His subsequent statements differ in respect to a number of principal points, points that were enumerated by the trial court. That court rightly noted that [the applicant], when questioned for the first time, had no reason to present a version of events that differed from those later presented. That was decisive for the trial court when, in making a choice between [the applicant’s] statements and the last version presented by J.S.-T., it rejected his testimony. She also changed her statements but she had an interest in concealing the truth. Yet, if [the applicant] was not in any criminal conspiracy with other persons involved in the case, he had no reason to conceal the true circumstances capable of showing that he was not involved in the activities of those persons. The applicant’s letter to the court dated 17 July 1997 reinforces the conclusions reached by the Regional Court rather than supporting his own credibility. A new circumstance emerges [from that letter], namely that the car in question was to return from Minsk (so, it was to return to Poland and then to Frankfurt am Main, where it had been hired) with medicines for P.M. So, there was no car theft, and therefore no assistance in selling property obtained by crime. Multiplying different versions results in none of them being considered credible. Two further, significant elements should be added to the arguments of the trial court. A.I., when heard by the prosecutor on 6 April 1994, said, among other things, that “... [the applicant] came and offered me to get paid – he asked whether I would drive a “Mercedes” to Minsk since his acquaintance was to deliver a hired car there.” [That] witness both earlier and in the present case, in [the applicant’s] presence, confirmed those statements and [the applicant] did not object. [The applicant] himself stated that he suggested A.I. as a driver because he had a German passport. Of course, [the applicant] knew of the arrival of the car on German licence plates. If one combines all these facts which, given [the applicant’s] more than average intelligence and the fact that his decisions are well considered (see the psychologist’s report, pp. 138-139) presented [him] with an exceptionally easy task, it must be concluded that [the applicant] had full knowledge and fulfilled all elements [i.e. had the necessary actus reus and mens rea] for the offence in question. Since, for all the above reasons, the assessment made by the court of first instance was compatible with the [principles laid down in] Article 4 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and consistent with the principles of logical thinking and common sense, no grounds for allowing the [applicant’s] appeal have been found. ...” 42. On 9 December 1997 the applicant was served with the written grounds of the judgment of the Court of Appeal. On 6 January 1998 he filed a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy), alleging a breach of Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention in that he had been deprived of an opportunity to examine, or have examined, the principal witness against him. 43. On 18 December 1998 the applicant wrote to the Supreme Court and asked for a hearing date to be fixed. On 23 December 1998 the Supreme Court replied as follows: “... acting on the President of the Section’s instruction, I should inform you that dates for hearings are fixed depending on the date on which a given cassation appeal has been lodged with the Supreme Court and that, at present, the [average] period between the date of the filing of a cassation appeal and the date of a hearing amounts to some 2 years and 6 months. Given that your ... cassation appeal was received at the Supreme Court’s registry on 19 February 1998, it will be heard not earlier than in 2000.” 44. The Supreme Court examined the cassation appeal on 1 December 2000 and dismissed it as being obviously groundless. It decided, pursuant to Article 535 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, not to provide written grounds for its decision.

4. The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Bratislava. 5. On 3 September 1996 the applicant filed an action with the Bratislava II District Court. He claimed reimbursement of a purchase price. 6. On 4 May 2005 the Constitutional Court found that the applicant's right to a hearing without unjustified delay had been violated, awarded him the equivalent of 1,782 euros (EUR) at that time as just satisfaction, ordered the court concerned to avoid any further delay in the proceedings and to reimburse the applicant's legal costs. 7. On 30 May 2006 the district court delivered a judgment. 8. On 31 October 2007 the Bratislava Regional Court, on the defendant's appeal, quashed the first-instance judgment and remitted the case for further examination to the district court. 9. On 22 September 2009 the district court delivered a judgment. Following the defendant's appeal, the proceedings are pending before the Regional Court.

5. The applicants were employed as police officers. They were all charged with the commission of various criminal offences. They were dismissed from the police force pursuant to Article 45 of the Ministry of Interior Act 1991 which was in force at the time. Subsequently, all the applicants were acquitted. However, their dismissals remained in force. They unsuccessfully challenged their dismissals in civil proceedings before the national courts. 6. On 26 April 2004 a criminal complaint was lodged against the first applicant with the Jagodina District Court (“the District Court”). He was reported to have instigated his superior, the second applicant, to abuse his power. He was arrested the same day and criminal proceedings were instituted against him. 7. On 26 April 2004, simultaneously with the initiation of criminal proceedings, the Ministry of Interior instituted disciplinary proceedings against the applicant. He was suspended from the police force on the same day, pending the decision of the Disciplinary Court. 8. On 5 May 2004 the Ćuprija Municipal Prosecutor charged the applicant for alleged instigation to abuse of power. 9. On 7 June 2004 the competent directorate of the Ministry of the Interior rendered a decision by which the applicant was dismissed from the police force. The decision noted that criminal proceedings had been instituted against the applicant and that Article 45 of the Ministry of Interior Act 1991 which was in force at the time of the dismissal could be applied. The applicant lodged an appeal against this decision. On 16 July 2004 the Minister, acting as a second-instance administrative body, rejected his appeal, confirming the dismissal. 10. On 27 August 2004 the disciplinary proceedings against the applicant were stopped without any decision on the merits. The Disciplinary Court concluded that the applicant had already been dismissed from the police force as a result of the initiation of the criminal proceedings against him and that this fact rendered the disciplinary proceedings redundant. 11. On 29 November 2004 the Ćuprija Municipal Court (“the Municipal Court”) acquitted the applicant. The Prosecutor appealed against this decision. On 29 March 2005 the District Court confirmed the Municipal Court’s decision and the applicant’s acquittal became final. 12. Shortly after the applicant’s acquittal in the criminal proceedings, he instituted civil proceedings in which he requested the annulment of the above decisions on dismissal. On 10 March 2006 the Municipal Court accepted the applicant’s claim and ordered the Ministry of Interior to reinstate him in his former post. The court held that the formulation of Article 45 of the 1991 Ministry of Interior Act left broad discretionary powers to the Ministry of Interior to dismiss its employees even when no criminal responsibility was attributable to them. It concluded that this legal solution “most certainly left the possibility of abuse of this authority.” It also observed that the applicant had been acquitted in criminal proceedings instituted against him. Finally, the court noted that the applicant had been dismissed without any determination of his disciplinary responsibility but solely through the use of the discretionary power given to the Ministry by Article 45 of the 1991 Ministry of Interior Act and without any further reasoning. 13. The Ministry of the Interior appealed against this decision. On 2 November 2006 the District Court upheld the decision and reasoning of the Municipal Court. 14. The Ministry of the Interior lodged an appeal on points of law before the Supreme Court. On 25 April 2007 the Supreme Court quashed the District Court’s decision and decided that the applicant’s dismissal was lawful. According to the Supreme Court, the Ministry of Interior had used its discretionary power under Article 45 of the Ministry of Interior Act 1991 in accordance with the law. It concluded that the applicant’s acquittal in the criminal proceedings and the absence of a decision on the merits in the disciplinary proceedings were irrelevant to his dismissal. It also held that the lower courts had overstepped the limits of their authority in considering the necessity, proportionality and correctness of the dismissal decision. 15. On 26 April 2004 a criminal complaint was lodged against the second applicant with the District Court. He was alleged to have committed the crime of abuse of power. He was arrested the same day and criminal proceedings were instituted against him. 16. On 26 April 2004, simultaneously with the initiation of the criminal proceedings, the Ministry of Interior instituted disciplinary proceedings against the applicant. He was suspended from the police force on the same day, pending the decision of the Disciplinary Court. 17. On 5 May 2004 the Municipal Prosecutor charged the applicant with alleged abuse of power. 18. On 7 June 2004 the Ministry of Interior rendered a decision by which the applicant was dismissed from the police force. The reasoning of the decision was identical to that in the case of the first applicant. The applicant appealed against this decision. On 19 July 2004, the second-instance administrative body confirmed the decision. 19. On 27 August 2004 the disciplinary proceedings against the applicant were stopped without any decision on the merits for the same reasons as in the case of the first applicant. 20. On 29 November 2004 the Municipal Court acquitted the applicant. The prosecutor lodged an appeal which was dismissed on 29 March 2005 by the District Court. It confirmed the Municipal Court’s decision and the applicant’s acquittal became final. 21. The applicant instituted civil proceedings after the acquittal, in which he requested the annulment of the above decision on dismissal. On 25 April 2005 the Municipal Court accepted the applicant’s claim and ordered the Ministry of Interior to reinstate him in his previously held post. The reasoning of the court was the same as in the case of the first applicant. 22. The Ministry of the Interior appealed against this decision. On 8 July 2005 the District Court upheld the decision and reasoning of the Municipal Court. 23. The Ministry of the Interior lodged an appeal on points of law. On 27 March 2007 the Supreme Court quashed the above decisions on the same grounds as in the case of the first applicant. 24. On 19 October 1999, the Vranje District Prosecutor lodged an indictment with the Vranje District Court (“the District Court”) against the third applicant for the alleged unauthorised possession of weapons and ammunition. On 17 December 1999 the Vranje District Court found him guilty as charged and sentenced him to one year of imprisonment. 25. On 14 June 2000 the Ministry of Interior rendered a decision by which the applicant was dismissed from the police force with the same reasoning as in the case of the first and the second applicants. The applicant appealed. On 13 July 2000 the second-instance administrative body confirmed the above decision. No disciplinary proceedings were instituted against the applicant. 26. On 6 November 2001 the Supreme Court confirmed the applicant’s conviction in criminal proceedings. The applicant lodged a request for the re-opening of the proceedings, which was granted. On 2 September 2005 the Vranje District Court acquitted the applicant. The Prosecutor appealed against this decision. On 22 February 2006 the Supreme Court confirmed the acquittal. 27. Shortly after the applicant was acquitted in the criminal proceedings, he instituted civil proceedings in which he requested the annulment of the 14 June 2000 decision on dismissal. 28. On 18 October 2006 the Vranje Municipal Court accepted the applicant’s claim and ordered the Ministry of the Interior to reinstate the applicant in his previously held post. The Ministry of the Interior appealed. On 7 February 2007 the Vranje District Court quashed this decision, giving essentially the same reasons as in the decisions of the Supreme Court delivered in the cases of the first and the second applicant. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. On 3 August 2007 the Supreme Court upheld the District Court’s decision. 29. In the criminal proceedings against the third applicant, another police officer, G.M. was a co-defendant. G.M. was charged with the same crime as the applicant and was acquitted. He is still employed as a police officer. 30. The third applicant also instituted a separate set of civil proceedings in which he requested compensation for non-pecuniary damage related to his unlawful detention, stress sustained in prison and the loss of reputation caused by the imprisonment. On 10 October 2008 the Gnjilane Municipal Court partially accepted the applicant’s claim and awarded him 780,000 dinars (RSD), (approximately 6,330 euros (EUR)). On 18 December 2008 the Gnjilane District Court partially upheld this decision, decreasing the awarded amount to RSD 530,000 (approximately EUR 5,640). The awarded sum was paid to the applicant accordingly.

4. The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Wiśniowa, Poland. 5. On an unspecified date in 1989 the applicant’s father lodged an application with the Myślenice District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) for distribution of the inheritance from his late wife. The applicant was a participant in the proceedings. 6. Between October 1989 and December 1992 the court held four hearings. 7. On 19 February 1993 the court ordered that expert evidence be obtained. 8. On 26 May 1993 four of the participants challenged the expert opinion. 9. On 2 November 1994 the applicant submitted her own proposal to the court for distribution of inheritance. 10. On 15 November 1994 the expert submitted his new opinion. 11. At a hearing on 19 January 1995 the court proposed that the participants conclude a friendly settlement. Only two of the participants accepted the court’s proposal. 12. At a hearing on 23 March 1995 the court ordered that new expert evidence be obtained. It also ordered the participants to pay an advance to cover the costs of the preparation of an expert report.. 13. On 17 September 1997 the court decided that, as the participants had failed to comply with the order of 23 March 1995, the costs of the preparation of expert opinions would be temporarily covered by the court. 14. Between 17 January 1996 and 16 July 1998, J.M., one of the participants in the proceedings, unsuccessfully challenged the presiding judge four times. 15. On 2 October 1998 and 4 March 1999 the court appointed experts to prepare opinions on agriculture and forestry. The experts submitted their reports on 12 November 1998 and 21 March 1999 respectively. 16. On November 1999 the court held a hearing. 17. On 30 November 1999 the Myślenice District Court gave judgment. 18. On 27 March 2000 the Kraków Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) dismissed the applicant’s appeal. 19. On 28 June 2001 the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy) refused to deal with her cassation appeal.

4. The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Piešťany. 5. On 31 December 1992 the applicant filed an action with the Nitra District Court. Under the Land Ownership Act 1991 she claimed compensation for agricultural property and livestock which had been transferred to a co-operative in 1951. 6. In March 1997, January 2002 and May 2005 issues of a procedural nature were determined by the court of appeal. 7. In September 2007 the Government informed the Court that the proceedings were pending before the District Court. No information is available about further developments in the case. 8. On 30 December 2005 the Constitutional Court found that the District Court had violated the applicant's right to a hearing without unjustified delay. The decision stated that the proceedings had been pending for 12 years. During that period not a single hearing had been held with a view to taking evidence and establishing the facts relevant for the determination of the applicant's action. Such situation was not justified by the complexity of the case. The applicant had contributed to the length of the proceedings in that, upon the court's instruction of 3 June 1993, she had completed her action on 10 March 1997 and had not informed the District Court that, in the meantime, she had initiated proceedings with a view to establishing which person was obliged under the relevant law to pay compensation to her. 9. As to the conduct of the District Court, unjustified delays in the proceedings exceeded 8 years. Furthermore, the District Court had failed to proceed in an effective manner, whereby the proceedings had been protracted. The Constitutional Court pointed to (i) the insufficient instruction of the applicant about essentials of her action and (ii) the decisions of the Regional Court of September 1997 and January 2002 to quash the District Court's decisions. 10. The Constitutional Court awarded SKK 100,000 (the equivalent of 2,574 euros at that time) to the applicant as compensation for non-pecuniary damage. It ordered the District Court to avoid any further delay in the proceedings and to reimburse the applicant's costs.