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5. The applicant, a medical doctor by profession, was born in 1967. She currently lives in Celje, Slovenia, having lived in Šabac, Serbia, at the material time. 6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7. On 2 September 1997 the applicant and her neighbour P.V. confronted each other in front of their houses following a verbal conflict between P.V. and the applicant’s mother. While the applicant allegedly shouted obscenities at him, P.V. allegedly punched her in the face, causing her to fall down and lose consciousness. The medical records from the emergency ward showed that the applicant had sustained a number of injuries to her head. She was released from hospital the next day upon her own request. 8. On an unspecified date, the applicant lodged a criminal complaint (krivičnu prijavu) in respect of this event. 9. On 16 September 1997 P.V. and his wife brought a private criminal action (privatnu krivičnu tužbu) against the applicant for insult and defamation (zbog uvrede i klevete) and against both the applicant and her mother for making serious threats (zbog ugrožavanja sigurnosti). 10. On 2 March 1998 the Šabac Public Prosecutor filed a bill of indictment (optužnicu) against P.V. with the Šabac Municipal Court for the crime of severe bodily injuries (zbog nanošenja teških telesnih povreda). 11. On 20 March 1998 the Municipal Court joined the two sets of proceedings. 12. At some point in 2000 the applicant lodged a civil compensation claim within the criminal proceedings (istakla imovinsko-pravni zahtev). 13. Between 14 April 1998 and 31 May 2000 a total of thirteen hearings were held or adjourned. 14. At the hearing of 11 January 2000 a medical expert stated that, based on the available documentation, on 2 September 1997 the applicant had sustained a concussion as well as a contusion. She had also continued receiving medical treatment for another two months. 15. On 15 June 2000 the Municipal Court convicted both the applicant and P.V. as charged and sentenced them to a fine and four months imprisonment, respectively, both sentences suspended for a period of one year. The court instructed the applicant to pursue her civil claim in a separate civil suit. The applicant’s mother was acquitted. 16. On 20 June 2001 the Šabac District Court quashed the convictions and ordered a new trial, but upheld the acquittal. 17. On 12 January 2004 a new hearing was scheduled for 25 February 2004. 18. On 25 February 2004 the Municipal Court terminated the proceedings against the applicant as time-barred, while the proceedings against P.V. continued. 19. On 2 April 2004 the main hearing started anew due to changes to the composition of the bench. Following the applicant’s testimony, the proceedings were adjourned for an indefinite period, as the Municipal Court had to obtain certain missing medical documentation. 20. At the next hearing of 18 May 2005, the Municipal Court heard P.V., as well as three witnesses. The court further decided to request the Belgrade Forensic Medicine Institute to give its opinion as regards the applicant’s bodily injuries allegedly sustained at the material time. No new hearing was scheduled. 21. On 19 December 2005 the Municipal Court received the relevant medical opinion dated 16 September 2005. The opinion stated that the attack had caused the applicant severe bodily injuries (loss of consciousness, a concussion and a contusion of the zygomatic bone). 22. On an unspecified date the Municipal Court scheduled the next hearing for 22 May 2007. This hearing, however, was further adjourned on two separate occasions, because of P.V.’s or the trial judges’ absence. 23. On 11 July 2007 the Municipal Court dismissed proposals for the examination of additional witnesses. On the same occasion the defendant requested that the entire trial bench be replaced by another. The case-file was subsequently forwarded to the President of the court for a decision. 24. On 5 September 2007 the Municipal Court terminated the proceedings against P.V. as time-barred. 25. The applicant never filed a separate civil compensation claim in respect of the underlying incident. 26. In 2008 the applicant and her family moved to Slovenia.

5. The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Prilep. 6. In a number of administrative proceedings, the applicant challenged the lawfulness of administrative decisions related to the construction and operation of a petrol station that was located a few metres from his home. He also brought criminal charges against the state officials who took the relevant decisions and against the manager of the petrol station. 1. The incident (a) The applicant’s version of events 7. On 30 January 2001 at 8.20 p.m. the applicant, accompanied by his wife and Mr P.N., went to the Prilep police station to report the possibility of a fire and explosion at the petrol station as a result of alleged improper handling of petrol stocks at the time. Upon their arrival, they had parked their car in front of an access ramp on the street in front of the police station. At the warden’s request, the applicant had moved his car to a car park situated behind the “Lipa” hotel. After the applicant had entered the police station, the same officer had pushed him backwards. In his initial submission, the applicant stated that a gun had also been pointed at his head. Seven or eight police officers had arrived at the scene and had assaulted him, grabbing him by his arms, legs and hair and throwing him against the stairway. They had continued hitting and beating him all over his body. During the beating, the police officers had used offensive language. (b) The Government’s version of events 8. The Government submitted that the applicant had parked his car in front of the entrance of the Prilep police station on a street on which no traffic and parking had been allowed. They further maintained that he had failed to move his car despite having been ordered to do so by the police officers on duty. The applicant had then entered the police station without identifying himself. He had ignored the officers’ verbal order that he leave the building. He had actively resisted when police officers took him out of the station. 9. A medical certificate (“the first certificate”) issued on 30 January 2001 at 9.15 p.m. indicated that the applicant had sustained several bodily injuries which did not qualify as grievous. A tranquilliser was prescribed. That certificate did not specify the possible origin of the injuries, their timing or the way in which they had been inflicted. 10. After communication of the case, the applicant obtained another medical certificate issued on 11 May 2006 by the Prilep Hospital which described the applicant’s injuries, noted on the first certificate, in the following terms: slight redness on the right temple, a scratch on the right ankle and a toe. In addition, it was noted that his right elbow and the left side of his hip were tender. 11. After communication, the applicant also obtained a forensic expert report of 23 May 2006 concerning his post-incident trauma. That report, which was based on the medical records and the applicant’s statement, indicated that, after the incident, the applicant had a bruise on his left elbow, a scratch on his left shinbone and bruises on his face below his left eye and on his left hip. 12. No court decision about the incident at issue has been given against the applicant. 13. On 30 January 2001 the applicant asked the Sector to investigate the incident. On 23 August 2001 the Sector drew up a report giving a factual account of the incident. It established that the applicant had been taken out of the building after he had ignored the officers’ verbal order to that effect. He had actively resisted the police officers and he had behaved in an arrogant manner. It found that there had been no abuse of power by the police in their attempts to subdue the applicant. It further stated that on 6 February 2001 an application for misdemeanour proceedings had been submitted against the applicant under the Act on minor offences against public order. That application indicated, inter alia, that policemen had grabbed the applicant by his arms and taken him outside the police premises. 14. On an unspecified date, the applicant brought before the public prosecutor criminal charges against Mr P.R., a police officer who had allegedly participated in the incident, for having ill-treated him while on duty. It cannot be established whether the applicant complained about other policemen as well. 15. The Government stated that on 9 March 2001 the public prosecutor requested that additional inquiries be made by the Ministry of the Interior (“the Ministry”). The latter submitted an official report about the incident in reply. No evidence was submitted in support of that assertion. 16. On 15 May 2001 the public prosecutor rejected the applicant’s complaint, arguing that the alleged offence was not considered to be a crime that could be prosecuted upon his motion. It was established that on 30 January 2001 the applicant had parked his car in front of the entrance of the Prilep police station, blocking the police cars’ way. He had shouted at police officers and threatened to set the petrol station on fire. Mr P.R. and Mr K.N., another police officer, had ordered the applicant to move his car. After having questioned Mr P.R. and other police officers, including Mr P.N., who had been present at the scene at the time, the public prosecutor established that Mr P.R. had not ill-treated the applicant, nor had the latter been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment. No gun had been pointed at him by Mr P.R. or by any other police officer. It was finally concluded that Mr P.R. had not committed the offence complained of or any other prosecutable act. 17. On 22 May 2001 the applicant lodged a subsidiary criminal complaint against Mr P.R. and four other unidentified police officers with the Prilep Court of First Instance (“the trial court”). He complained that he had been shouted at, insulted, beaten and dragged across the floor and that as a result he had sustained light bodily injuries and bruises. He requested that the trial court hear statements from him, his wife and Mr P.N., who had been an eyewitness to the incident, as well as from Mr K.N. 18. On 20 June 2001 the trial court requested that the applicant make his complaint more specific by providing the names of the unidentified police officers. 19. On 26 June 2001 the applicant informed the trial court that he was unable to discover the identities of the remaining police officers. He pointed out that one of them had been a warden and the other a guard at the time of the events. He further maintained that the trial court could officially request information about their identities and that he would easily be able to confirm it afterwards. 20. On 2 July 2001 the trial court rejected the applicant’s subsidiary complaint as incomplete, namely because he had not identified the remaining four police officers. No comment was made as to the charges against Mr P.R. 21. On 1 August 2001 the applicant appealed against that ruling, arguing that the trial court had failed to investigate his allegations, and that he had no effective way of discovering the identities of the police officers concerned but that he would be able to identify them in a line-up. 22. On 7 November 2001 the Bitola Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s ruling. 23. On 25 December 2001 the public prosecutor informed the applicant that there were no grounds for lodging a request for the protection of legality with the Supreme Court.

5. The applicant was born in 1968 and is currently serving a prison sentence in Sokal Prison no. 47 in the Lviv region. 6. In February 2000 the applicant was detained on suspicion of several counts of robbery and a murder. He claimed that he had been beaten by the police. 7. On 13 September 2000 the Zaporizhzhya Regional Court (“the Zaporizhzhya Court”), sitting as a court of first instance, found the applicant guilty as charged. It sentenced him to life imprisonment for murder and considered that the prison terms for the other crimes were absorbed by the life sentence. The court dismissed the applicant’s allegation of ill-treatment as unsubstantiated. 8. On 21 December 2000 the Supreme Court of Ukraine upheld the judgment. 9. On 30 October 2009 the Supreme Court reviewed the applicant’s case under an extraordinary procedure and commuted his sentence to fifteen years’ imprisonment. It reasoned that life imprisonment had not been listed as a possible penalty in the Criminal Code on the date when the murder for which the applicant had been sentenced had been committed. 10. On 6 December 2001 the applicant was transferred to Vinnytsya Prison no. 1, which had a section for life prisoners, to serve his sentence. That prison is located some 700 kilometres from Zaporizhzhya, where the applicant had been living before his detention and where his mother lived. The train journey from Zaporizhzhya to Vinnytsya takes from twelve to sixteen hours. 11. On numerous occasions the applicant and his mother, Mrs Kapiton, who acted on his behalf as his representative under a power of attorney, asked the State Department of Ukraine for the Enforcement of Sentences (“the Prison Department”) to transfer the applicant to a prison closer to his home to make it easier for her to visit him. They drew attention, in particular, to the long travel time from Zaporizhzhya to Vinnytsya by public transport, which was very burdensome for Mrs Kapiton given her advanced age (born in 1938) and poor health (she had been officially certified “second-degree” (medium) disabled). 12. On 10 June and 15 September 2004 the Prison Department replied to the applicant’s mother that her request had been rejected, since “in accordance with the legislation in force, convicted prisoners must serve their entire sentence in the same prison”. 13. On 29 October 2004 Mrs Kapiton arrived at Vinnytsya Prison to visit the applicant. During the visit she fainted and was provided with medical assistance for low blood pressure. Her meeting with the applicant was not resumed once she had recovered, on the recommendation of a medical professional. 14. On many subsequent occasions Mrs Kapiton continued to contact various authorities on her own and the applicant’s behalf, requesting his transfer to a prison closer to his home to enable her to visit him. She always enclosed with her requests the medical certificate confirming her disability and her doctor’s advice not to travel outside the Zaporizhzhya region. 15. All Mrs Kapiton’s requests were rejected. On numerous occasions (on 2, 12 and 18 November 2004, and on 12 February, 21 and 24 March 2005) the Prison Department repeated its previous reasoning, referring to the legal requirement that prisoners must serve their entire prison term in the same establishment. 16. On 17 March 2006 the Prison Department informed the applicant’s mother that her request could not be granted because no places were available for life prisoners in establishments closer to Zaporizhzhya. 17. On 3 May 2006 the Prison Department wrote to the applicant’s mother again, informing her that the applicant was supposed to serve his entire sentence in the same prison and that, in any event, there were no places available in prisons closer to his home. 18. On 7 August 2006 the Prison Department further notified the applicant that, in accordance with unspecified regulations, persons convicted of aggravated murder were usually detained in prisons located outside the region in which the crime had been committed. 19. On 16 November 2006, 8 August 2007 and 24 March 2009 the Prison Department reiterated, in reply to the repeated requests of the applicant’s mother for his transfer, that “under the legislation in force, convicted prisoners must serve their entire sentence in the same prison”. 20. On 1 December 2009, following a review of the applicant’s sentence (see paragraph 9 above), the Prison Department’s regional commission on prisoner distribution, allocation and transfers examined his case. It decided that he would be held in a maximum-security prison, in ordinary accommodation. Pursuant to that decision, on 10 December 2009 he was transferred to Sokal Prison no. 47 (a maximum-security prison) located in the Lviv region, around 1,000 kilometres from Zaporizhzhya. The train journey from Zaporizhzhya to Lviv takes from nineteen to twenty-three hours. 21. On an unspecified date Mrs Kapiton complained to the Prison Department that that transfer was unfair, as Sokal Prison was even further away from the applicant’s home address. 22. On 17 February 2010 the administrative commission of Sokal Prison examined the applicant’s request that the level of security of his prison regime be reduced from high to medium security. It was noted that, under the Code on the Enforcement of Sentences, a prisoner could be transferred from a high to a medium-security prison if he had already served more than half of his sentence and if he had been manifesting good behaviour as an indication of his willingness to improve. However, the applicant had been disciplined eleven times and was not therefore eligible for such a transfer. Accordingly, his request was rejected. It remained open for him to challenge that decision before the regional commission of the Prison Department. 23. On 17 April 2010 the Prison Department’s regional commission on prisoner distribution, allocation and transfers rejected the applicant’s request for transfer to a prison in the Zaporizhzhya region. As noted in the minutes of its meeting, the applicant had been disciplined twelve times. 24. On 26 April 2010 the Prison Department further informed Mrs Kapiton that its appeal board had rejected the applicant’s request for transfer to a medium-security prison in the Zaporizhzhya region, and that decision would be reviewed only if his conduct improved. 25. The applicant’s mother then requested the applicant’s transfer to a prison in the Donetsk or Lugansk region (neighbouring the Zaporizhzhya region). 26. On 17 November 2010 the Prison Department appeal board rejected her request. As noted in its meeting report, the applicant had been disciplined fifteen times and had received no incentives. 27. The applicant suffers from ingrowing eyelashes of the left eye, which have to be removed periodically. His mother made a general allegation, without providing any factual details, that he had been hit in his left eye following his arrival at Vinnytsya Prison. No further information is available as to the duration and origin of the above-mentioned condition. 28. As regards the medical treatment for the ingrowing eyelashes, the applicant’s submissions to the Court were limited to his mother’s general statement, which she had made on two occasions, in November 2005 and April 2010, that the responsibility for the condition lay with the authorities and that, although the ingrowing eyelashes were regularly removed, the applicant felt pain and discomfort in his left eye. 29. On an unspecified date in 2005 the applicant’s mother complained to the prosecutor’s office that the applicant’s eye problem was connected to his alleged beating by prison guards following his arrival at the prison in 2001. 30. On 5 and 25 April 2005 the Vinnytsya Prosecutor’s Office responded that there was no basis for launching a criminal inquiry into that complaint. In particular, the applicant had not requested a medical examination or assistance on account of any injuries inflicted on him. Furthermore, according to the testimony of other prisoners who had arrived at the prison together with the applicant, they had not experienced or witnessed any beatings. The prosecutor also noted that the applicant’s condition was under constant medical supervision. In particular, he had his ingrowing eyelashes removed by a qualified ophthalmologist on a regular basis. No other health-related complaints had been recorded. 31. According to extracts from the applicant’s medical file provided by the Government, the applicant had had his ingrowing eyelashes removed on 21 January, 26 March, 9 July and 13 December 2004, as well as on 1 August 2005 and 4 January 2008. Furthermore, on 30 June 2010 and 6 April 2012 he had refused medical examinations and treatment. 32. The applicant and his mother, acting on his behalf, complained to the prosecution authorities and the Prison Department about the routine monitoring of his correspondence by the prison administration. 33. The prosecutor’s response was that the applicant’s correspondence was subject to monitoring under the legislation in force; however, there had been no instances of withholding letters or seizing objects which the prisoners were allowed to keep. 34. On 7 July 2003 the Vinnytsya Regional Prison Department wrote to the applicant’s mother, in reply to her complaint regarding, in particular, the interference with his correspondence, that on 11, 16 and 23 April 2003 the prison administration had “withheld some letters written by [the applicant], because their content did not comply with the requirements of the Instruction on Review of Prisoners’ Correspondence”. 35. On 3 October 2006 the Prison Department informed the applicant’s mother that no correspondence had been withheld from the applicant and that since the beginning of the year he had sent fifty-one letters and had received twenty-four recommended letters and thirty-eight standard letters. There had been no complaints from the applicant himself regarding his correspondence. 36. On 14 November 2006 the applicant made a written statement that he had no complaints against the prison administration. 37. On 21 November 2006 the Vinnytsya Regional Prosecutor’s Office wrote to the applicant’s mother informing her that the applicant had sent fifty-six letters, had received seventy-two letters, and that he had had fifteen paid telephone conversations. 38. On 12 May 2008 the applicant made a written statement that he had no complaints concerning the work of the prison official in charge of the monitoring of prisoners’ correspondence. 39. On 19 June 2008 the applicant asked the prison administration to allow him to make a telephone call on 24 June 2008 instead of a short-term private meeting to which he was entitled. According to a hand-written note on the request, apparently added by a prison official, the applicant’s last private meeting had been on 26 December 2007. 40. On 27 July 2009 the applicant asked the prison administration to allow him to make a telephone call on 3 August 2009. As noted on the request, he had last made a telephone call on 3 May 2009. 41. According to the official records, during the period from 16 August 2002 to 30 September 2009 the Vinnytsya prison administration dispatched sixty-nine letters from the applicant.

5. The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Słupsk. 6. On 5 November 2000 the applicant filed a claim for payment against a housing co‑operative of which she was a member. By a judgment of 27 February 2001 the Słupsk Regional Court dismissed the claim. The judgment was upheld on 7 September 2001 by the Gdańsk Court of Appeal. On 21 November 2001 the applicant was served with that judgment together with its written grounds. 7. On 10 December 2001 she filed a request with the Słupsk Regional Court to be granted a legal-aid lawyer for the purpose of lodging a cassation appeal. Her request was subsequently forwarded to the Gdańsk Court of Appeal as the Słupsk court lacked jurisdiction to deal with it. The request was allowed by a decision of 17 December 2001. 8. On 18 December 2001 the decision of 17 December 2001 was served on the local Bar Association. At the same time the Gdańsk Court of Appeal informed the Bar about the date on which the applicant had been served with the second-instance judgment. On 3 January 2002 the Bar Association informed the applicant that a legal-aid lawyer had been assigned to her case. By a letter of 19 January 2002 to the court the lawyer refused to lodge a cassation appeal, finding no grounds to do so. The letter read: “Having examined the file in detail, I have not found grounds for lodging a cassation appeal. The judgment given on 7 September 2001 by the Court of Appeal did not breach any provisions of substantive law. Nor were any provisions of procedural laws violated during the proceedings. The findings of fact made by the courts show without any ambiguity that the applicant had never had the right to a co-operative apartment which could be assimilated to ownership. She had admitted, both before the first-instance and the appellate court, that at the time of the exchange of apartments she had been aware that her right was only assimilable to the rights arising out of a rental contract. (...) It had been open to her to take steps in order to have her right transformed into an ownership-like right, but she had not done so. Hence, the first instance court was right in finding that the defendant housing co-operative was not obliged to pay compensation to the applicant. The appellate court accepted these findings. In these circumstances, a cassation appeal would not offer any prospects of success.” 9. On 23 January 2002 the applicant requested the Gdańsk Court of Appeal to assign a new legal-aid lawyer to her case. 10. On 29 January 2002 the court informed the applicant that she should file a request with the Bar Association for a new lawyer to be appointed. On 4 February 2002 the applicant accordingly submitted her request to the local Bar Association. 11. By a letter of 19 February 2002 the Bar Association dismissed the request, having found that the applicant's previous legal‑aid lawyer had been entitled to refuse to draft a cassation complaint. 12. On 4 March 2002 the applicant again requested the court to assign a legal‑aid lawyer to the case. On 15 March 2002 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal informed the applicant that the refusal to lodge a cassation appeal could not justify assigning a new lawyer for the same purpose.

5. The applicant was born in 1975 and is currently serving a life sentence in a prison in Turkey. 6. On 18 July 1995 the applicant was arrested in Istanbul on suspicion of killing a person on behalf of the PKK[1]. The same day he was placed in police custody, where two statements were taken from him by police officers. 7. On 31 July 1995 he was brought before a prosecutor and a judge, who questioned him further. The judge remanded the applicant in custody pending the introduction of criminal proceedings against him. 8. On 2 August 1995 the prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court filed an indictment with that court, accusing the applicant and five other persons of carrying out activities for the purpose of bringing about the secession of part of the national territory. He sought the death penalty under Article 125 of the Criminal Code. 9. Criminal proceedings began before the Istanbul State Security Court (“the trial court”) on 30 October 1995. 10. During the 31st hearing held on 28 February 2001, the applicant’s lawyer requested the trial court to release the applicant on bail. In the request the lawyer also referred to a number of judgments adopted by the European Court of Human Rights in cases concerning Article 5 of the Convention. The request for release was refused by the trial court. The objection lodged against the refusal was also rejected on 9 May 2001. 11. On 17 April 2002 the applicant was found guilty as charged and sentenced to death. The death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment on 24 September 2002. An appeal lodged by the applicant against his conviction was dismissed by the Court of Cassation on 10 June 2003.

4. The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Bytom. 5. On 21 October 2002 the applicant was arrested. By a decision of 24 October 2002 the District Court in Wodzisław Śląski remanded him in custody on charges connected with organised crime. It had regard to evidence gathered by the prosecuting authorities which indicated that the applicant had committed the offences concerned. The applicant appealed, to no avail. 6. The same court subsequently extended the applicant's detention by decisions of, inter alia, 10 July and 7 October 2003 and 7 March 2004, until, respectively, 15 October 2003, 19 January and 19 July 2004. The court relied on the evidence gathered in the case which pointed to the likelihood of the applicant's guilt. It was also of the view that the applicant, if released, could hinder the proper course of the investigations and judicial proceedings by exerting pressure on witnesses and by colluding with his co-accused. It noted that many persons appeared to have been involved in the commission of the offences concerned and that it was therefore necessary to obtain a considerable amount of evidence. It also had regard to the applicant's criminal record. 7. On numerous other occasions the prosecuting authorities refused to release the applicant, relying on the same arguments and referring to the evidence gathered in the investigation. 8. On an unspecified number of occasions the applicant was allowed to see his wife during his detention. Between 15 December 2002, the date on which the applicant's wife gave birth to a son, and 21 November 2003 the applicant saw her and his son on at least three occasions. 9. On 30 September 2003 the prosecuting authorities lodged a bill of indictment with the Wodzislaw Śląski District Court. The applicant was charged with multiple counts of fraud. 10. On 11 December 2003 the court ordered that the applicant should serve a prison sentence imposed on him by a final judgment given in another criminal case concurrently with the present detention. 11. Hearings in the case were held on 7 January, 18 February and 25 October 2004. On the latter date the applicant was convicted as charged. 12. The applicant submitted envelopes of two letters sent to him by the Court on 15 January 2004 and 30 March 2004. The envelope of the first letter bears the stamp “Censored (cenzurowano) – the Wodzisław Śląski District Court – Date”, signed with an illegible signature. The envelope of the second letter bears the full official stamp of the Wodzisław Śląski District Court and a handwritten note “censorship” (cenzura), accompanied by a handwritten date, 9 April 2004.

5. The applicants were born in 1971, 1962, 1966 and 1965 respectively. The second applicant is currently detained in Plovdiv Prison. The third applicant lives in Nicosia, Cyprus. The remaining applicants live in the village of Stryama in Bulgaria. 6. On 6 and 12 May 1992 the police in Rakovski opened two investigations into several thefts of sheep and goats. Between 13 and 19 May 1992 the applicants submitted written explanations admitting to having committed the thefts. 7. The proceedings remained dormant until January 2002 when a police investigator questioned several witnesses and commissioned two expert reports concerning the value of the stolen animals. Between 21 and 24 January 2002 the investigator brought charges against the four applicants. 8. On 15 March 2002 the first and third applicants were questioned before a judge. 9. In November 2003 the investigation was concluded and on 8 December 2003 the applicants were indicted for theft. On 1 June 2004 they entered into a plea agreement with the prosecution, accepting short suspended sentences. At a hearing held on the same day the Plovdiv District Court affirmed the agreement and discontinued the proceedings. Its decision was final.

5. The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Schalchen. 6. On 8 September 1999, the Salzburg Federal Police Authority (Bundespolizeidirektion) issued fifteen preliminary penal orders (Strafverfügung) against the applicant for infringements of the Motor Vehicle Act (Kraftfahrgesetz) and EU Regulations No. 3820/85 and 3821/85. On 23 September 1999, the applicant lodged objections (Einspruch) to all fifteen orders. 7. On 27 December 2000, the Salzburg Federal Police Authority issued six penal orders (Straferkenntnis) against the applicant. On 16 January 2001, the applicant lodged appeals against all six penal orders with the Salzburg Independent Administrative Panel (Unabhängiger Verwaltungssenat). 8. On 4 December 2001, after having held an oral hearing, the Salzburg Independent Administrative Panel sentenced the applicant to pay a fine of a total amount of 21,500 Austrian Schillings (ATS) (approx. 1,562 Euros (EUR)), and to contribute ATS 6,450 (approx. EUR 469) to the costs of the first and second instance proceedings. It discontinued the proceedings concerning one of the penal orders. On 24 January 2002, the applicant lodged a complaint with the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof) against that decision. 9. On 12 September 2006, the Administrative Court quashed the appeal decision. 10. On 3 January 2007, the Independent Administrative Panel issued a fresh decision and quashed four of the penal orders. As concerns the remaining penal order, it sentenced the applicant to pay a fine of EUR 210, and to contribute EUR 21 to the costs of the proceedings. It took into account the length of the proceedings as a mitigating circumstance when determining the amount of the fine. 11. On 6 February 2007, the applicant lodged a complaint pursuant to Article 144 of the Federal Constitution with the Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof). He complained about the length of the proceedings and lack of an effective remedy and asked for just satisfaction. 12. On 10 June 2008, the Constitutional Court refused to deal with the complaint on the grounds that it did not raise an important legal question. 13. On 30 July 2008, the applicant applied for his complaint to be referred to the Administrative Court, which was done on 8 August 2008. On 3 September 2008, the Administrative Court requested him to specify his complaint. He provided the supplementary information on 6 October 2008. 14. On 24 October 2008, the Administrative Court refused to deal with the complaint pursuant to Section 33a Administrative Court Act, because the fine imposed did not exceed EUR 750. The decision was served on the applicant’s counsel on 17 November 2008.

4. The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Košice. 5. On 13 September 1999 the applicant lodged an action with the Košice I District Court in which he claimed distribution of marital property. 6. On 3 November 2006 the Constitutional Court found that the District Court had breached the applicant’s right to a hearing within a reasonable time. It granted 60,000 Slovak korunas (that sum was equivalent to 1,650 euros (EUR) at that time) to the applicant as just satisfaction, ordered the District Court to avoid further delays in the proceedings and to reimburse the applicant’s costs. 7. On 20 January 2010 the Constitutional Court found that the District Court had again breached the applicant’s right to a hearing within a reasonable time in the period subsequent to the first judgment of the Constitutional Court. It granted the applicant EUR 1,500 as just satisfaction and ordered the District Court to reimburse the applicant’s costs. The Constitutional Court confirmed the validity of its order of 3 November 2006 that further delays in the proceedings should be avoided. 8. On 10 March 2010 the District Court heard an expert. On 15 April 2010 it asked a different expert for additional opinion. It was submitted on 11 October 2010. Between 20 April 2011 and 19 August 2011 the District Court held three hearings and obtained additional evidence. On the last mentioned day the court orally delivered a judgment. On 11 November 2011 the judge instructed the District Court’s registry to have the judgment with reasons served on the parties. On 15 November 2011 the District Court delivered a decision rectifying the judgment of 19 August 2011. 9. According to the information submitted by the applicant on 24 February 2012 both parties lodged an appeal and the proceedings are pending.

4. The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Zawada, Poland. 5. The applicant was arrested by the police on 24 June 1999. On the following day the Lubartów District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) ordered his detention on remand for a period of three months on suspicion of armed robbery. It took into account the nature of the offence and the strong likelihood that the applicant would be given a heavy sentence. In addition, it had regard to the fact that the applicant had been previously convicted of a violent crime. 6. On 14 September 1999 the Lublin Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) prolonged the applicant’s detention until 23 December 1999, having regard to the strong suspicion that he had committed the offence in question. It also found that the applicant’s detention was justified, given the gravity of the charge and the severity of the likely sentence. The court further held that the investigation could not be concluded within the period of three months because the applicant had to undergo a psychiatric examination. 7. The applicant underwent a psychiatric examination between 24 September and 1 October 1999. On 18 October 1999 a psychologist and two psychiatrists submitted their report. According to their findings, the applicant was able to understand his acts at the time of the commission of the alleged offence and could participate in the trial. 8. On 29 October 1999 the applicant was additionally charged with theft. 9. On 6 December 1999 the Lubartów District Prosecutor (Prokurator Rejonowy) terminated the investigation. On 8 December 1999 the prosecution filed a bill of indictment with the Regional Court. The applicant and his brother were charged with armed robbery and inflicting minor bodily harm. The applicant was additionally charged with theft. The bill of indictment specified that the applicant was subject to the rules on recidivism as in 1989 he had been convicted of assault with intent to rob and inflicting grievous bodily harm and had been sentenced to four years’ imprisonment. In addition, in 1994 the applicant had been convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. 10. On 21 December 1999 the Regional Court ordered that the applicant be kept in custody until 30 June 2000. It observed that the evidence obtained in the proceedings indicated that there was a strong likelihood that the offences in question had been committed by the applicant. It further considered that continuation of his detention was necessary in order to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings, given the nature of the offence and the severity of the likely sentence in respect of the charge of armed robbery. 11. The applicant’s detention was subsequently prolonged by the Regional Court on 16 June 2000 (until 1 September 2000) and on 30 August 2000 (until 31 December 2000). The court relied on the same grounds as invoked in its earlier decision. 12. The Regional Court held 7 hearings (6 April, 17 May, 16 June, 20 July, 14 September, 16 October and 16 November 2000). On 23 November 2000 it gave judgment. The applicant was convicted as charged and sentenced to 5 years’ imprisonment. The applicant and the prosecution appealed against the Regional Court’s judgment. 13. On 28 December 2000 the Regional Court ordered that the applicant be kept in custody until 28 March 2001. On 14 March 2001 the Lublin Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) prolonged his detention until 29 June 2001. 14. On 5 April 2001 the Lublin Court of Appeal quashed the first-instance judgment and ordered a retrial. 15. It appears that in the course of the retrial the Regional Court ordered that the applicant be examined by a psychiatrist and psychologist. According to their report, at the relevant time the applicant was not suffering from diminished responsibility for his acts, although he was a mentally handicapped person with an unsound personality. 16. The Lublin Regional Court several times prolonged the applicant’s detention. The relevant decisions were given on 12 June 2001 (prolonging his detention until 31 December 2001), on 11 December 2001 (ordering his continued detention until 30 April 2002), on 20 March 2002 (extending his detention until 20 June 2002), on 18 June 2002 (prolonging that period until 18 September 2002) and on 17 September 2002 (ordering his continued detention until 17 December 2002). In all those decisions, the Regional Court relied on the reasonable suspicion that the offences in question had been committed by the applicant, having regard to the evidence obtained in the proceedings. It further found that his continued detention was necessary in order to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings, given the nature of the charges and the severity of the sentence to which the applicant was liable. In the latter respect, the court found that the offence of armed robbery with which the applicant had been charged constituted a serious social danger and that the applicant was a recidivist offender. 17. The applicant’s numerous requests for release and appeals against prolongation of his detention were to no avail. The courts, having regard to the relevant medical and court officers’ reports, did not find any reason which would justify the applicant’s release on the grounds specified in Article 259 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 18. The Regional Court held 7 hearings (8 October and 28 November 2001, and 24 January, 27 February, 20 March, 29 May and 2 October 2002). It gave judgment on 8 October 2002. The applicant was convicted of armed robbery and theft and sentenced to 7 years’ imprisonment. He appealed against that judgment. 19. On 27 May 2003 the Lublin Court of Appeal gave judgment. It acquitted the applicant of theft and upheld the remainder of the Regional Court’s judgment. The applicant lodged a cassation appeal against the Court of Appeal’s judgment. On 21 July 2004 the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy) dismissed his cassation appeal as being manifestly ill-founded.

7. The applicants all live in Limassol. Their dates of birth are indicated in the list annexed to the present judgment. 8. All the applicants claimed to be permanent residents of Famagusta (northern Cyprus), where they had their homes as well as other immovable properties. 9. Upon the 1974 Turkish intervention, the applicants left for southern Cyprus. They claimed that they had been deprived of their property rights, all their property being located in the area which was under the occupation and control of the Turkish military authorities. They had made several attempts to return to their homes and properties in Famagusta, the last occasion being on 23 December 1989, but they had not been allowed to do so by the Turkish military authorities. The latter had prevent them from having access to and from using their houses and properties. 10. In his memorial of 27 May 2003 the applicants' representative stated that applicants nos. 2 to 5, 7 to 14 and 17 to 36 had decided not to pursue their case any further and to withdraw their application. The case was thus to be continued only in the names of applicants nos. 1 (Mrs Soula Zavou), 6 (Mrs Lenia Chrysostomou), 15 (Mrs Anastasia Evengelides), 16 (Mrs Ariadni Evangelides) and 37 (Mrs Maro Pouyourou). 11. Applicant no. 1 (Mrs Soula Zavou) claimed to be the owner of the following immovable properties: (a) Famagusta, Chrysospyliotissa, plot no. 513, sheet/plan 33/12.4.2, block A, registration no. AO-16/10/86; description: house; use: residence, share: whole; (b) Famagusta, Ayios Ioannis, plot no. 320, sheet/plan 33/12.2.3, block A, registration no. AO-16/10/86; description: block of flats; use: commercial-rent; share: 1/5; (c) Famagusta, Ayios Loucas, plot no. 827, sheet/plan 33/11.W.1, block B and plot no. 51, sheet/plan 33/11.W.1, block B, registration no. BO-16/10/86; description: orange grove; share: 3/8. 12. Applicant no. 6 (Mrs Elenitsa (Lenia) Chrysostomou) claimed to be the owner of the following immovable property: Famagusta, Chrysospyliotissa, plot no. 1178, sheet/plan 33/12.6.3, block A; description: two houses; share: ½. 13. Applicant no. 15 (Mrs Anastasia Evangelides) claimed to be the owner of the following immovable properties: (a) Famagusta, Chrisi Akti, plot no. 691, sheet/plan 33/21.1.IV, block A; description: house; use: residence; share: whole; (b) Famagusta, Chrisi Akti, plot no. 693, sheet/plan 33/21.1.IV, block A; description: house; use: rent; share: whole; (c) Famagusta, Salamis, plot no. 1885, sheet/plan 33/3.E.1, block D; description: building site. 14. Applicant no. 16 (Mr Ariadni Evangelides) claimed to be the owner of the following immovable property: Famagusta, Stavros, plot no. 701, sheet/plan 33/13.4.3, registration no. SDD 626/85; description: plot of Land with two houses; use: residence; share: whole. 15. Applicant no. 37 (Mrs Maro Pouyourou) claimed to be the owner of the following immovable properties: (a) Famagusta, Ayios Ioannis, plot no. 264, sheet/plan 33/12.3.4, block C; description: house; use: residence; share: whole; (b) Famagusta, Komi Kepir, plots nos. 532 and 543, sheet/plan 7/46; description: plots of land; use: agriculture; share: whole. 16. In support of their claims to ownership applicant nos. 1, 6, 15, 16 and 37 submitted certificates of affirmation of ownership of Turkish-occupied immovable properties issued by the Republic of Cyprus. They also produced affidavits in verification of their personal status and immovable property rights.

9. The first applicant, Mr Wilson, was employed as a journalist at the Daily Mail by Associated Newspapers Limited. The local branch, or “Chapel” of the second applicant, the NUJ, had been recognised since at least 1912 for the purpose of collective bargaining as regards all aspects of the terms and conditions of employment of its members. 10. On 10 November 1989 the first applicant, in common with other journalists, received the following letter from the editor of the Daily Mail: “Dear Dave, You probably know that the collective bargaining agreement between the Chapel and the Management is due to end on 1 April 1990. The Company has given notice that it does not intend to negotiate a new agreement with the Chapel and that, from that date, the NUJ will not be recognised as a negotiating body. Instead, salaries will be reviewed annually each 1 October as they are already for the senior editors. Departmental heads will make recommendations to me for each individual member of their staff. I will, of course, discuss these with my editors in detail and add my own assessment, as I do now, for merit rises. I shall then implement salary increases. A handbook has been drawn up which contains the benefits and conditions which exist under the current agreement. Each member of staff will be given a new contract which embodies these conditions together with the Handbook. I think it is worth pointing out that the Handbook includes a grievance procedure. All journalists who sign their new contracts before 1 January 1990 will be awarded a 4.5% wage increase backdated to 1 October 1989. As I have said, the next review of salaries will be on 1 October 1990. I would like to point out that, contrary to what is happening on other national newspapers, our new arrangement does not involve any redundancies. Nor any radical changes in the way we produce our papers. I think you should know that the initiative to end collective bargaining has come from the editors, not the management. It is the skill of journalists as individuals that makes our papers. We appoint journalists as individuals and we want to continue to treat them as individuals throughout their whole career here, in order that they and our papers shall prosper. The success of the Daily Mail is based on its team of highly qualified and highly paid journalists. We intend to develop that success and, with it, the careers of our journalists. Yours sincerely, ...” 11. The first applicant refused to sign a new contract, because he objected to its provisions prohibiting trade union activity during working hours and removing his right to be represented by the union and the rights of the union to negotiate with management and be consulted on and agree changes to terms and conditions of employment. In subsequent years Mr Wilson's salary increased, but was never raised to the same level as that of employees who had accepted personal contracts. 12. After 1 April 1990 the employer continued to deal with the NUJ on health and safety issues, but did not recognise the union for any other purpose. 13. The third and fourth applicants, Mr Palmer and Mr Wyeth, were employed by Associated British Ports (“the ABP”) at the Port of Southampton as manual grade employees. They were members of the NURMTW (the fifth applicant). The trade union was recognised by the employer for the purposes of collective bargaining under the terms of a collective agreement. 14. On 8 February 1991 the third and fourth applicants, in common with other manual grade employees, were sent letters in the following terms: “I am writing to advise you that Associated British Ports has decided to offer you a personal contract of employment to take effect on 1 March 1991. You are probably aware that offers of personal contract terms have already been made to Management, Supervisory, Clerical, Technical staff and some Manual Grade Staff at Southampton. In offering personal contracts, the Company is seeking to introduce a system whereby the individual merit and contribution of an employee may be recognised and rewarded. Under the proposed new contract of employment, the level of future pay increases including that due on 1 March 1991, together with other improvements in conditions of service, will be determined by the Company. Wages will relate to the individual's responsibilities and performance together with conditions in the employment market, and the Company's financial position. If you choose to accept a new individual contract then the Agreement with the Trade Unions, which currently forms part of your contract of employment, will no longer apply to you. Your conditions of employment will, however, differ only in limited respects from those which you have at present. The most significant alterations are that you will no longer have the right to be represented by a Trade Union and, in future, your pay will not be determined by the present negotiated wage ranges, i.e., Groups 1 to 4 and Chargehands will no longer apply. Membership of your current pension scheme is entirely unaffected by whether or not you elect for a personal contract; similarly, voluntary severance and redundancy payments are unchanged but your overtime calculator will rise to 100%. As part of your personal contract the Company will pay you an increased wage from 1 March 1991, as advised to you in the attached personal letter, this new wage is inclusive of your pending March pay review. This new wage has been determined by enhancing your present wage after first consolidating the following items of pay which will be discontinued under the personal contract terms:– Allowances, e.g. Height, tool, allowances, etc., Holiday bonus and higher grade duty payments. These items are being consolidated into the personal wage you are being offered and therefore become part of your pensionable pay. Overtime will be offered as and when necessary. There will be no contractual overtime. Under the new terms there will be a single annual review on 1 April, the first review being on 1 April 1992. Staff on personal contracts will be paid monthly by Bank Credit Transfer (BACS). If you accept a personal contract, the Company will, if you so wish, provide private medical insurance by paying for membership of a Corporate Health Plan with Private Patients Plan (PPP) for yourself. Your spouse and children may be included in this cover if you choose to pay the appropriate additional subscription. Full details are enclosed with this letter. ... The Company believes that the offer you are being made represents a significant improvement in your terms and conditions of employment. I hope therefore that you will decide to accept this offer. You should, however, clearly understand that you are free to reject it. ...” The average pay increase offered to manual grade employees who accepted personal contracts was 10%. 15. The third and fourth applicants refused to sign personal contracts. Their pay and conditions of employment for 1991/92 were decided on a collective basis following negotiations between the union and the employer. They received an increase of pay and allowances of 8.9% and were not offered private medical insurance. 16. In 1992 the employer gave notice that it was terminating the collective agreement and de-recognising the union for all purposes. 17. The remaining applicants, Mr Doolan and the others, were all employed by the ABP at the Bute Docks in Cardiff and were members of the fifth applicant trade union, which was recognised by the employer for the purposes of collective bargaining. On 19 April and 19 July 1991 employees were sent letters offering them personal contracts with pay increases. In return, the employee had to relinquish all rights to trade union recognition and representation, and to agree that annual increases and other terms and conditions would no longer be negotiated by the union on his behalf. 18. The applicants refused to sign personal contracts and, as a result, received only a 4% annual pay increase on their basic rate of pay. Those employees holding the same positions as the applicants who accepted personal contracts received a pay increase which was approximately 8% to 9% greater than that awarded to the applicants. 19. In 1992 the employer gave notice that it was terminating the collective agreement and de-recognising the union for all purposes. 20. The individual applicants all separately applied to the Industrial Tribunal complaining that the requirement to sign the personal contract and lose union rights, or accept a lower pay rise, was contrary to section 23(1)(a) of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 (“the 1978 Act” – see paragraph 27 below). 21. In the proceedings brought by Mr Wilson, Mr Palmer and Mr Wyeth, the Industrial Tribunal found in favour of the applicants. The employers successfully appealed to the Employment Appeal Tribunal, and the applicants appealed to the Court of Appeal. 22. The Court of Appeal found for the applicants on 30 April 1993 (judgment reported as Associated British Ports v. Palmer and Others; Associated Newspapers v. Wilson [1994] Industrial Cases Reports 97). In Palmer and Others it was accepted in the Court of Appeal that, in discriminating against the employees who refused to sign personal contracts, the employer had taken “action (short of dismissal)” against them, within the meaning of section 23 of the 1978 Act. The court held that the concept “being ... a member of an independent trade union” in section 23 involved more than simply holding a union membership card, and included making use of the essential services provided by the union, such as collective representation. In offering pay increases to those who revoked their right to be represented by the union, the employer had intended to induce employees to abandon collective bargaining and thus to achieve greater flexibility and bring an end to the need to consult the union. In denying the pay rise to those who would not forgo collective representation, the employer had acted with the purpose of penalising union membership, contrary to section 23(1)(a) of the 1978 Act. In Wilson it was accepted that the employer's decision to de-recognise the union from 1 April 1990 was not contrary to section 23, since the de-recognition was aimed at the union as a whole and was not action against any individual employee. The union had no legal sanction against de-recognition or the termination of the agreement on conditions of employment it had negotiated; the only sanction available to it was the threat of industrial action. The employer's purpose in offering a pay rise to those employees who accepted the new terms of employment was to negate the power of the union with a view to bringing an end to collective bargaining. Its purpose in denying the pay rise to the applicant because he refused to abandon collective bargaining was to deter him from being a member of the union. 23. The employers appealed to the House of Lords, which, on 16 March 1995, decided unanimously against the applicants ([1995] 2 Law Reports: Appeal Cases 454). Three of the five Law Lords held that the word “action” in section 23(1) could not be construed as including an omission, so that the withholding of benefits by the employers from the applicants did not amount to “action (short of dismissal)”. In addition, four of the five Law Lords found that the employers' conduct had not been motivated by “the purpose of preventing, ... deterring ... or penalising” union membership, although in Palmer and Others (in the words of Lord Bridge) “it was plain that the employers were seeking by means of an attractive offer to induce their employees voluntarily to quit the union's collective-bargaining umbrella and to deal in future directly with the employers over their terms and conditions of employment”. However, trade unions could offer their members services other than the negotiation of terms and conditions of employment, and membership of a trade union could not therefore be equated with the use of the union's services for collective bargaining. 24. Following the House of Lords' judgment, the applicants withdrew their applications from the Industrial Tribunal, having been advised that they could not succeed. 25. According to United Kingdom law, a “trade union” is any organisation which consists wholly or mainly of workers and has the regulation of relations between workers and employers or employers' associations as one of its principal purposes (section 1 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 – “the 1992 Act”). There is no system of licensing trade unions prior to their recognition for collective bargaining. 26. At the time of the events in question in this case, collective bargaining was a wholly voluntary process. There was no legislation in the United Kingdom which inhibited the freedom of employers to recognise or de-recognise trade unions for the purposes of collective bargaining (the Employment Act 1980, repealing the Employment Protection Act 1975). 27. Section 23(1)(a) of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 provided: “23(1) Every employee shall have the right not to have action (short of dismissal) taken against him as an individual by his employer for the purpose of (a) preventing or deterring him from being or seeking to become a member of an independent trade union, or penalising him for doing so.” This provision was re-enacted as section 146(1) of the 1992 Act. 28. After the Court of Appeal found for the applicants, Parliament enacted section 13 of the Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act 1993 (“the 1993 Act”) to amend section 148 of the 1992 Act by providing that where “the employer's purpose was to further a change in his relationship with all or any class of his employees” then, unless the employer's action was action that no reasonable employer could take, section 146(1) of the 1992 Act would provide no remedy for the employee. 29. Although a strike by employees involves breaches of their respective contracts of employment and calling or supporting a strike by a trade union involves the trade union in committing the tort of inducing a breach of contract of the employees concerned, section 219 of the 1992 Act confers protection where the defendant is acting “in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute” (as defined; see UNISON v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 53574/99, ECHR 2002-I). 30. Article 5 of the Social Charter provides for the following “right to organise”: “With a view to ensuring or promoting the freedom of workers and employers to form local, national or international organisations for the protection of their economic and social interests and to join those organisations, the Contracting Parties undertake that national law shall not be such as to impair, nor shall it be so applied as to impair, this freedom. The extent to which the guarantees provided for in this Article shall apply to the police shall be determined by national laws or regulations. The principle governing the application to the members of the armed forces of these guarantees and the extent to which they shall apply to persons in this category shall equally be determined by national laws or regulations.” 31. Article 6 of the Charter is headed “The right to bargain collectively” and provides: “With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to bargain collectively, the Contracting Parties undertake: (1) to promote joint consultation between workers and employers; (2) to promote, where necessary and appropriate, machinery for voluntary negotiations between employers or employers' organisations and workers' organisations, with a view to the regulation of terms and conditions of employment by means of collective agreements; (3) to promote the establishment and use of appropriate machinery for conciliation and voluntary arbitration for the settlement of labour disputes; and recognise: (4) the right of workers and employers to collective action in cases of conflicts of interest, including the right to strike, subject to obligations that might arise out of collective agreements previously entered into.” 32. In 1995 the Committee of Independent Experts set up under Article 25 of the Social Charter examined section 13 of the 1993 Act with a view to determining whether it was consistent with Article 5 of the Charter and observed as follows (Conclusions XIII-3, Council of Europe, 1996, p. 108): “... the Committee was of the opinion that the wording of section 148(3)(a) was so general that the effect of this provision was that only in exceptional cases would a tribunal be able to rule that the action taken by the employer was unlawful because it violated freedom of association. It considered that this weakening of the protection of freedom of association was not compatible with the requirements of Article 5. It pointed out that 'the Contracting State is obliged to take adequate legislative or other measures to guarantee the exercise of the right to organise, and in particular to protect workers' organisations from any interference on the part of employers' (see most recently Conclusions XII-2, p. 101). It also referred to its conclusion under Article 6 § 2 and its case-law to the effect that where a fundamental trade union prerogative such as the right to bargain collectively was restricted, this could amount to an infringement of the very nature of trade union freedom (see most recently Conclusions XIII-2, p. 269).” 33. In its next report the Committee again insisted “that the necessary measures be taken to repeal [section 13 of the 1993 Act, inter alia]”, commenting (Conclusions XIV-I, 1998, pp. 798 and 800): “The Committee repeats the criticism raised in its previous conclusion with respect to section 13 of the 1993 Act which is in breach of Article 5 of the Charter as it permits employers to take certain measures such as awarding preferential remuneration to employees in order to persuade them to relinquish trade union activities and collective bargaining ...” 34. The United Kingdom has ratified the International Labour Organisation's (ILO) Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (no. 87) and its Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (no. 98). 35. Convention no. 87 provides, inter alia: “Part I. Freedom of Association Article 1 Each Member of the International Labour Organisation for which this Convention is in force undertakes to give effect to the following provisions. Article 2 Workers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall have the right to establish and, subject only to the rules of the organisation concerned, to join organisations of their own choosing without previous authorisation. Article 10 In this Convention the term organisation means any organisation of workers or of employers for furthering and defending the interests of workers or of employers. Part II. Protection of the Right to Organise Article 11 Each Member of the International Labour Organisation for which this Convention is in force undertakes to take all necessary and appropriate measures to ensure that workers and employers may exercise freely the right to organise.” 36. Convention no. 98 provides, inter alia: “Article 1 2. Such protection shall apply more particularly in respect of acts calculated to – (a) make the employment of a worker subject to the condition that he shall not join a union or shall relinquish trade union membership; (b) cause the dismissal of or otherwise prejudice a worker by reason of union membership or because of participation in union activities outside working hours or, with the consent of the employer, within working hours. Article 3 Machinery appropriate to national conditions shall be established, where necessary, for the purpose of ensuring respect for the right to organise as defined in the preceding Articles. Article 4 Measures appropriate to national conditions shall be taken, where necessary, to encourage and promote the full development and utilisation of machinery for voluntary negotiation between employers or employers' organisations and workers' organisations, with a view to the regulation of terms and conditions of employment by means of collective agreements.” 37. The ILO Committee on Freedom of Association has considered section 13 of the 1993 Act in the context of a case of alleged intimidation intended to bring about the de-recognition of two trade unions at a steel works in England, and the absence of any remedy under national law (Case no. 1852, 309th Report of the Freedom of Association Committee, Vol. LXXXI, 1998, Series B, no. 1). The Committee concluded as follows (paragraphs 337 and 341): “337. While bearing in mind that collective bargaining, if it is to be effective, must assume a voluntary character and not entail recourse to measures of compulsion which would alter the voluntary nature of such bargaining, the Committee has considered that the competent authorities should, in all cases, have the power to proceed to an objective verification of any claim by a union that it represents the majority of workers in an undertaking, provided that such a claim appears to be plausible and that if the union concerned is found to be the majority union, the authorities should take appropriate conciliatory measures to obtain the employer's recognition of that union for collective bargaining purposes (see Digest, op. cit., paras. 845 and 824). While noting from the Government's observations that collective bargaining is still an option for the employer, the Committee concludes that, given the facts available in this particular case, [the employer] has by-passed the representative organisation and entered into direct individual negotiation with its employees, in a manner contrary to the principle that collective negotiation between employers and organisations of workers should be encouraged and promoted. The Committee notes with interest the Government's indication that a White Paper on fairness at work, with a focus on union recognition, is being prepared. The Committee hopes that any resulting legislation will have as an effect the encouragement of employer recognition of representative workers' organisations and requests the Government to keep it informed of the progress made in this regard. 341. Finally, as concerns the previous Government's argument with respect to the relevance of section 13 of the [1993 Act], the Committee can only state that, in the absence of a more detailed reply concerning the facts of this specific case based on a thorough and independent investigation, it is not in a position to judge on the relevance of section 13 to the case in question. It would recall however that it was the Government which had raised the matter of section 13 in its initial reply to this complaint and that the conclusions reached by the Committee were based wholly upon its conclusions in a previous case presented against the United Kingdom Government for alleged infringements of trade union rights (see 294th Report, Case no. 1730) wherein it had invited the Government to reconsider section 13 in consultation with the social partners since it considered that this provision could hardly be said to constitute a measure to encourage and promote the full development and utilisation of machinery for voluntary negotiation with a view to the regulation of terms and conditions of employment by means of collective agreements, as provided for in Article 4 of Convention no. 98 (ratified by the United Kingdom). The Committee recalls in this respect that section 13 directs a tribunal, when considering a complaint of action short of dismissal taken by an employer for the purpose of preventing or deterring a worker from being or becoming a member of an independent trade union, to have regard primarily to the employer's purpose to further a change in the relationship with the employees and the Committee had concluded that this section considerably limited the tribunal's competence for determining such action as being in violation of section 146 concerning action short of dismissal (see 294th Report, Case no. 1730, para. 199). The Committee does not consider that the possible effects of section 13 have changed in this respect and it would therefore once again call on the Government to take steps to amend that section so that it ensures workers' organisations adequate protection from acts of interference on the part of the employer and so that it does not result in fact in the discouragement of collective bargaining. It requests the Government to keep it informed in this respect.” The Committee recommended, inter alia, (and its recommendations were approved by the ILO's Governing Body): “(a) Noting with interest the Government's indication that a White Paper on fairness at work, with a focus on union recognition, is being prepared, the Committee expresses the hope that any resulting legislation will have as an effect the encouragement of employer recognition of representative workers' organisations and requests the Government to keep it informed of the progress made in this regard. ... (e) The Committee once again calls on the Government to take steps to amend section 13 of the Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act so that it ensures workers' organisations adequate protection from acts of interference on the part of the employer and so that it does not result in fact in the discouragement of collective bargaining. It requests the Government to keep it informed in this regard.”

5. The applicant was born in 1977 and is currently serving a life sentence in Plovdiv Prison. 6. In the period from 29 December 2002 to 18 February 2009 the applicant was detained in Varna Prison in connection with several sets of criminal proceedings for theft and for murder committed in the course of aggravated robbery. In November 2004 he was sentenced to life imprisonment. 7. On 18 February 2009 the applicant was moved to Plovdiv Prison. According to the applicant, he was initially placed in a cell together with a smoker. On 29 May 2009 he was placed in an individual cell. 2. Civil actions for damages brought by the applicant (a) The first set of proceedings concerning the period from 25 February 2003 to 19 April 2004 8. On 19 April 2004 the applicant brought an action against the Ministry of Justice. He claimed 50,000 levs (BGN) (25,565 euros (EUR)) in damages, alleging that he had suffered distress and humiliation as a result of the poor conditions in which he had been detained in Varna Prison in the period from 25 February 2003 to 19 April 2004. On 25 October 2004 the Varna District Court instructed the applicant to specify and quantify the damage sustained by him as a result of each alleged act or omission of the prison administration. This resulted in the applicant having to split his initial claim into five separate claims of BGN 10,000 (EUR 5,113) each, as follows: (1) for poor sanitary conditions in the prison; (2) for the lack of opportunity to maintain his personal hygiene on a daily basis; (3) for poor living conditions in the cell; (4) for food of poor quality and insufficient quantity; and (5) for inadequate medical services. 9. The District Court questioned several witnesses, gathered written evidence and on 19 January 2007 partly granted the first claim. It established that the applicant had been allowed to leave his cell three times a day for forty-five minutes each time and had had to use a bucket in the cell for his toilet needs outside these periods, in front of other prisoners, which had been upsetting for him. It found that the amount of BGN 100 (EUR 51) would remedy the discomfort experienced by him. As to the remaining four claims, the court noted witnesses’ statements to the effect that there had been no running water in the applicant’s cell, that the cell had been damp and draughty, without a floor covering and with plaster peeling off the walls; the toilets and the canteen had been infested with rats; and the applicant had only been allowed to bathe once every two weeks. However, it held that it had not been proven that these deficiencies had caused any damage to the applicant. The court further considered irrelevant the fact that there had been rats in the toilets and in the canteen, as the applicant had not mentioned rats in his statement of claim. As to the claim concerning the medical services in prison, the District Court established that the applicant suffered from asthma and epilepsy. On the basis of his medical records, it found that he had been examined by a physician at least once a month and had been prescribed treatment. It further noted that on several occasions he had been urged to refrain from smoking but apparently he had not followed this advice. It therefore dismissed this claim as ill-founded. It also dismissed the claim concerning the quality and quantity of food, reasoning that the applicant had failed to adduce any arguments or evidence in this respect. 10. Following an appeal, in a judgment of 20 July 2007 the Varna Regional Court increased the compensation under the applicant’s first claim to BGN 500 (EUR 255) and upheld the remaining part of the judgment of 19 January 2007. It held that while the witnesses had established that the applicant had been embarrassed by the use of the bucket for his sanitary needs, they had not said anything about his feelings towards the other conditions complained of. The applicant appealed further. 11. In a final judgment of 27 April 2009 the Supreme Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of 20 July 2007. It noted that the applicant had failed to show that he had suffered any non-pecuniary damage in respect of the four claims dismissed by the lower courts. (b) The second set of proceedings concerning the period from 20 February 2005 to 15 September 2006 12. In 2009 the applicant brought a further action against the Ministry of Justice, claiming a total of BGN 10,000 (EUR 5,113) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage in connection with the conditions of his detention in Varna Prison. For reasons which have not been substantiated, the claim only concerned the period from 20 February 2005 to 15 September 2006. 13. The Varna Administrative Court heard several witnesses and on 9 December 2009 dismissed the applicant’s action. Its findings about the conditions in Varna Prison were similar to those made by the courts in the previous set of proceedings (see paragraph 9 above). Unlike those courts, however, the Varna Administrative Court held that continuous access to a toilet, running water, ventilation and sufficient natural light were to be provided only where possible. The court based its conclusion on statutory provisions concerning pre-trial detention facilities, finding that they were applicable by analogy to prisons. It further held that it was unproven whether the applicant suffered from any diseases or whether he had sustained any non-pecuniary damage as a result of the conditions in which he had been detained. 14. Following an appeal, in a final judgment of 15 October 2010 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the judgment of 9 December 2009, reasoning that the size of the applicant’s cell had met the legal requirements and that the applicant had not proved that he suffered from any diseases. 15. The applicant submitted six letters and envelopes addressed by him to his lawyer. Half of them were sent from Varna Prison and the other half from Plovdiv Prison. Each envelope was marked or stamped as having been monitored by the prison administration. As noted in a letter from the administration of Plovdiv Prison submitted by the Government, the prison administration, acting in compliance with section 37 of the Regulations for the Implementation of the Enforcement of Sentences Act, routinely opened all envelopes, including those sent to lawyers, to check their physical contents, without reading the text of the letters therein. 16. Shortly after his transfer to Plovdiv Prison in 2009, the applicant complained that he had not been allowed to contact his lawyer by phone. Following an inquiry, in a letter of 2 April 2009 the General Directorate of Enforcement of Sentences at the Ministry of Justice informed him that lawyers were not among the individuals whom prisoners were entitled to contact by phone under section 37a of the Regulations for the Implementation of the Enforcement of Sentences Act. It was further explained that the applicant had been sentenced to life imprisonment and was not involved in any pending proceedings. It appears that the applicant took steps to show that there were indeed criminal proceedings pending against him. Eventually, on 28 May 2009 the applicant’s lawyer was included in the list of individuals whom the applicant was allowed to contact by phone. 17. On an unspecified date in 1999 the investigating authorities in Plovdiv opened an investigation into a number of car thefts. On 21 April 2000 the applicant was placed in pre-trial detention as a suspect. Later on he was charged and questioned. 18. On 16 February 2001 the Plovdiv district public prosecutor’s office filed an indictment against the applicant and three other individuals with the Plovdiv District Court. 19. The District Court scheduled fifteen hearings in the case. Three hearings were postponed because of the applicant’s absence, which caused a delay of about six months; six hearings were adjourned because of the failure of court-appointed experts to appear or for additional expert reports to be obtained; two hearings were postponed because of the failure of one or more of the applicant’s co-defendants, or their lawyers, to appear; and three hearings were adjourned due to the absence of the judge or a juror. In the examination of the case, the court admitted six expert reports and questioned at least thirteen witnesses. 20. In a judgment of 9 December 2003 the District Court convicted the applicant of a number of counts of car theft in complicity with others. 21. Following an appeal, the Plovdiv Regional Court conducted four hearings and questioned several witnesses. One hearing was adjourned because of the non-appearance of a witness, and the other two hearings were adjourned because two of the applicant’s co-defendants were sick. 22. On 3 June 2005 the Regional Court quashed the judgment of 9 December 2003 because of insufficient and contradictory reasoning, and remitted the case. 23. The District Court scheduled ten hearings. Three hearings were adjourned because the judge was on maternity leave, another one, because she had been promoted to a higher court; one hearing was postponed because it was necessary to appoint a State-appointed lawyer for the applicant; and three hearings were adjourned because part of the physical evidence was missing. On 20 December 2007, more than two years after the beginning of the second trial, the District Court terminated the court proceedings and remitted the case to the investigative authorities because it had discovered procedural violations at the pre-trial stage. 24. On 21 February 2008 the district public prosecutor’s office terminated the criminal proceedings against the applicant. On 24 September 2008 the Plovdiv regional public prosecutor’s office quashed the decree of 21 February 2008 and remitted the case for further investigation. On 23 January 2009 the applicant was charged anew and questioned. 25. In a decree of 6 April 2009 the district public prosecutor’s office again terminated the criminal proceedings against the applicant for lack of proof. It appears that the decree was not appealed against and it became final.

5. The applicants, Ms Remka Kačapor (“the first applicant”), Ms Huljka Kačapor (“the second applicant”), Ms Aziza Elezović (“the third applicant”), Ms Senada Dolovac (“the fourth applicant”), Ms Šaha Rizović (“the fifth applicant”) and Ms Muška Crnovršanin (“the sixth applicant”) are all citizens of Serbia who were born in 1972, 1956, 1967, 1969, 1951 and 1950, respectively, and currently live in the Municipality of Novi Pazar. 6. Between 1993 and 2002 the applicants, at that time employed with a “socially-owned company” (društveno preduzeće; see paragraphs 71-76 below), Vojin Popović-Domaća radinost, were all “placed” by their employer on a “compulsory” paid leave scheme “until such time” when this company’s business performance could be “improved sufficiently”. 7. Whilst on leave, in accordance with the relevant domestic legislation, the applicants were entitled to a significantly reduced monthly income, as well as the payment by their employer of their pension, disability and other social security contributions. 8. By 11 November 2002 all applicants had been dismissed. At the same time, however, their employer apparently agreed to pay them 10,000 Dinars (“RSD”) each, as well as to cover their respective social security contributions in exchange for their undertaking not to seek their monthly paid leave benefits. 9. It would appear that the applicants’ employer honoured its former commitment but failed to fulfil the latter. The applicants, therefore, brought six separate civil claims before the Municipal Court (Opštinski sud) in Novi Pazar. 10. On 16 April 2003 the Municipal Court in Novi Pazar (hereinafter “the Municipal Court”) ruled in favour of the applicant and ordered her former employer to pay her: i. the monthly paid leave benefits (naknadu za vreme plaćenog odsustva) due from 1 May 1993 to 16 June 1996 and 25 June 1998 to 31 May 2001, indexed in accordance with the relevant domestic regulations, plus statutory interest; and ii. RSD 8,650 (approximately 140 euros [EUR]) for her legal costs; as well as iii. coverage of her pension and disability insurance contributions (doprinosi za penzijsko i invalidsko osiguranje) due for that period. 11. This judgment became final on 23 June 2003. 12. On 5 February 2004 the applicant filed a request for the enforcement of the above judgment, proposing that it be carried out by means of a bank transfer and the auctioning of the debtor’s specified movable and immovable assets. 13. On 28 April 2004 the Municipal Court accepted the applicant’s request and issued an enforcement order. 14. On 7 February 2005 the Municipal Court ruled in favour of the applicant and ordered her former employer to pay her: i. the monthly paid leave benefits due from 1 April 2000 to 11 November 2002 (RSD 59,672 in all - approximately EUR 745), plus statutory interest; and ii. RSD 20,250 (approximately EUR 252) for her legal costs. 15. This judgment became final on 10 March 2005. 16. On 9 May 2005 the applicant filed a request for the enforcement of the above judgment, proposing that it be carried out by means of a bank transfer and the auctioning of the debtor’s specified movable and immovable assets. 17. On 6 September 2005 the Municipal Court accepted the applicant’s request and issued an enforcement order. 18. On 27 January 2005 and 26 May 2005 the Municipal Court ruled in favour of the applicant and ordered her former employer to pay her: i. the monthly paid leave benefits due from 30 August 2001 to 1 November 2002 (RSD 49,714 in all - approximately EUR 600), plus statutory interest; and ii. RSD 9,750 (approximately EUR 117) for her legal costs; as well as iii. coverage of her pension and disability insurance contributions due from 1 January 1995 to 1 November 2002. 19. This judgment became final on 29 June 2005. 20. On 14 July 2005 applicant filed a request for the enforcement of the above judgment, proposing that it be carried out by means of a bank transfer and the auctioning of the debtor’s specified movable and immovable assets. 21. On 26 September 2005 the Municipal Court accepted the applicant’s request and issued an enforcement order. 22. On 9 December 2004 the Municipal Court ruled in favour of the applicant and ordered her former employer to pay her: i. the monthly paid leave benefits due from 1 June 1994 to 19 August 2002 (RSD 64,711 in all - approximately EUR 837), plus statutory interest; and ii. RSD 7,800 (approximately EUR 100) for her legal costs; as well as iii coverage of her pension and disability insurance contributions due from 1 June 1994 to 11 November 2002. 23. This judgment became final on 28 March 2005. 24. On 19 April 2005 the applicant filed a request for the enforcement of the above judgment, proposing that it be carried out by means of a bank transfer and the auctioning of the debtor’s specified movable and immovable assets. 25. On 26 September 2005 the Municipal Court accepted the applicant’s request and issued an enforcement order. 26. On 24 September 2003 the Municipal Court ruled in favour of the applicant and ordered her former employer to pay her: i. the monthly paid leave benefits due from 1 June 1994 to 31 May 2001, as well as those from 1 June 2001 to 11 November 2002 (RSD 101,887 in all - approximately EUR 1,625, as regards the latter period), plus statutory interest; and ii. RSD 7,800 (approximately EUR 125) for her legal costs; as well as iii. coverage of her pension and disability insurance contributions due for the above periods. 27. This judgment became final on 9 December 2003. 28. On 26 February 2004 the applicant filed a request for the enforcement of the above judgment, proposing that it be carried out by means of a bank transfer and the auctioning of the debtor’s specified movable and immovable assets. 29. On 15 March 2004 the Municipal Court accepted the applicant’s request and issued an enforcement order. 30. On 17 May 2004 the Municipal Court ruled in favour of the applicant and ordered her former employer to pay her: i. the monthly paid leave benefits due from 1 June 1994 to 11 November 2002 (RSD 74,850 in all - approximately EUR 1,050), plus statutory interest; and ii. RSD 16,200 (approximately EUR 227) for her legal costs; as well as iii. coverage of her pension and disability insurance contributions due for that period. 31. This judgment became final on 8 November 2004. 32. On 29 November 2004 the applicant filed a request for the enforcement of the above judgment, proposing that it be carried out by means of a bank transfer and the auctioning of the debtor’s specified movable and immovable assets. 33. On 6 December 2004 the Municipal Court accepted the applicant’s request and issued an enforcement order. 34. On 30 November 2004 and 21 February 2005, respectively, the applicants sent two separate letters to the Ministry of Finance, stating, inter alia, that their former employer (hereinafter “the debtor”): i. had, for the past ten years, deliberately avoided doing business through its official bank accounts; ii. had instead, apparently, engaged in cash transactions or even used other “secret” bank accounts, unknown to the tax authorities; and iii. that, as a result, judicial enforcement by means of a bank transfer had been rendered impossible. Finally, the applicants requested that urgent action be taken to secure the enforcement of their final judgments. 35. On 23 December 2004 the Ministry of Finance (hereinafter “the Ministry”) found that the debtor had failed to pay the total amount of the taxes and social security contributions due. 36. On 12 January 2005 the Ministry ordered the debtor to pay the outstanding sum. 37. On 25 January 2005 the Ministry filed a request for the formal institution of misdemeanour proceedings, stating that the debtor had failed to comply with this order. 38. On 21 March 2005 the Ministry sent a letter to the applicants, noting that their submissions had been duly considered but that, in view of the confidential nature of the information obtained, no details could be disclosed. 39. On 6 June 2005 the applicants sent another complaint to the Ministry, stating that the situation concerning the bank accounts had remained unchanged. 40. On 28 October 2005 the Commercial Court (Trgovinski sud) in Kraljevo (hereinafter “the CCK”) opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor. The effect of this was that the ongoing enforcement proceedings before the Municipal Court were stayed ex lege, in accordance with Article 73 of the Insolvency Procedure Act (see paragraph 70 below). 41. This decision was published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia on 28 November 2005. 42. In December 2005 the applicants duly submitted their respective claims. 43. On 22 December 2005 the insolvency proceedings conducted against the debtor were joined with the insolvency proceedings pending in respect of Vojin Popović-Holding AD, hereinafter “the VPH Company” (see paragraph 56 below). 44. On 23 March 2006 and 8 June 2006, the CCK confirmed the applicant’s paid leave claims, but held that a part of their social security claims were dubious, which is why they were informed that they could bring a separate civil lawsuit in this regard. 45. On 20 July 2006 the High Commercial Court (Viši trgovinski sud) ordered that the insolvency case in question be transferred to the Commercial Court in Užice (hereinafter “the CCU”), the reason apparently being that the CCK had been put under increasing pressure locally. 46. On 8 September 2006 the CCU quashed the decisions adopted by the CCK on 23 March 2006 and 8 June 2006, respectively. It also disjoined the proceedings in respect of the debtor from those pending against the VPH Company. 47. On 26 January 2007, by means of a faxed note, an official involved in the insolvency proceedings informed the applicants that their claims were dubious in view of their “prior undertakings” (see paragraph 8 above). 48. On the same date the applicants informed this official that the final judgments adopted in their favour had already taken these issues into account, but had dismissed them on their merits (see paragraph 9 above). 49. Several days later, the applicants filed a request with the CCU, seeking the confirmation of their claims. 50. On 14 January 2007 the State apparently adopted a formal decision accepting to cover the applicants’ social security contributions. This decision, however, has apparently yet to be served on the applicants. 51. On 20 March 2007 the CCU ordered the valuation of the debtor’s assets as well as their subsequent sale. 52. On 20 April 2007, however, the CCU rejected the applicants’ claims in their entirety. 53. On 14 May 2007 the applicants filed a separate civil suit with the same court, seeking confirmation of their claims as recognised in the final judgments rendered in their favour. 54. On 18 May 2007 the CCU accepted to reconsider the applicants’ claims within the insolvency proceedings. 55. On 28 June 2007 the same court suspended the separate civil suit, pending the imminent re-examination of the applicants’ claims within the insolvency proceedings. 56. As of September 2007, the debtor was incorporated as a limited liability company (društvo sa ograničenom odgovornošću). It was, however, owned solely by the VPH Company, approximately 87% of which was itself socially-owned (u društvenoj svojini; see also paragraph 75 below).

4. The applicants M.Ł and A.Ł were born in 1952 and 1975 respectively. They both live in Warsaw, Poland. 5. On 2 December 1994 the first applicant lodged a claim for maintenance against her ex-husband (“J.Ł”) with the Warsaw District Court (Sąd Rejonowy). 6. On 22 February 1995 the court held a hearing and ordered an expert opinion. It was submitted to the court on 1 April 1995. 7. At a hearing held on 9 June 1995 the trial court refused to issue an interim measure in order to secure the claim. The first applicant appealed. On 3 August 1995 the Warsaw Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) dismissed the appeal. Further hearings were held on 16 January, 16 September and 1 October 1996. 8. On 10 October 1996 the District Court gave judgment. On 7 November 1996 the first applicant filed an appeal. On 25 March, 20 May and 29 September 1997 the Warsaw Regional Court held hearings. On 13 October 1997 it gave judgment and dismissed the appeal. On 5 January 1998 the first applicant lodged a cassation appeal. 9. On 7 October 1999 the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy) gave judgment and remitted the case to the Regional Court. On 22 December 1999 the Regional Court remitted the case to the District Court. On 8 May 2000 the first applicant modified her claim. On 10 May 2000 the District Court held a hearing in the applicant’s case. 10. On 8 June 2000 the District Court refused to issue an interim measure in order to secure the claim. The applicant appealed. On 20 September 2000 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. Subsequent hearings were held on 9 January and 22 February 2001. 11. On 22 January 2001 the President of the Warsaw District Court informed the applicant that he would supervise the case in order to expedite the proceedings. On 29 March 2001 the trial court held a hearing and ordered a joint opinion from three experts. On 10 May 2001 the court changed its previous order and decided that three expert opinions be obtained. 12. On 8 July 2001 the first applicant complained to the President of the Warsaw Regional Court about the delay in the proceedings. On 27 July 2001, in reply to her complaints, the President observed that the proceedings were conducted without any delay. 13. On 7 August 2001 the first applicant challenged an expert opinion. She further requested the court to exclude a certain expert from giving an opinion in her case. On 10 August 2001 the trial court dismissed her request. On 28 August 2001 the first applicant appealed against the decision. On the same date she challenged the impartiality of the presiding judge and requested his withdrawal from sitting in the case. On 7 September 2001 the District Court dismissed her request. The first applicant appealed. 14. Subsequent hearing was held on 7 November 2002. On 15 April 2003 the Warsaw District Court gave judgment. The judgment is final. 15. On 11 May 1993 the applicants lodged a claim with the Warsaw Regional Court, seeking annulment of a contract of sale of real estate. 16. On 1 June 1993 the court exempted the applicants from court fees. On 26 January 1994 the court fixed the date of a first hearing for 9 March. The trial court held hearings on the following dates: 9 March 1994; 2 June 1995; 22 August and 24 October 1997; 29 March, 22 June, 10 October and 26 November 1999. 17. On 10 December 1999 the Regional Court gave judgment and dismissed the claim. The applicants appealed. 18. On 21 June 2000 the Warsaw Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) gave judgment. The applicants lodged a cassation appeal. On 11 July 2002 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. 19. On 16 September 1996 the second applicant lodged a claim with the Warsaw District Court, seeking a higher amount of child maintenance. On 13 November 1996 the first applicant lodged a similar claim acting on behalf of her second daughter – “MA.Ł”. On 9 June 1997 the trial court joined the proceedings. On 27 June 1997 the court gave judgment. The applicants appealed. On 1 April 1998 the Warsaw District Court dismissed the applicants’ appeal and the judgment became final. 20. On 7 November 1994 the first applicant lodged a claim against her ex‑husband - J.Ł. with the Warsaw District Court, seeking a removal of his parental rights over MA.Ł. On 6 February 1994 the first applicant modified her claim. On 3 March 1995 the ex-husband lodged a counter claim (wniosek wzajemny). On 7 November 1996 and 4 April 1997 respectively, the first applicant again modified her claim. 21. In the meantime, the trial court had obtained a number of expert opinions concerning MA.Ł.’s state of health. On 25 May 1997 the court dismissed the first applicant’s claim. On 16 June 1997 the first applicant appealed. On 21 January 1998 the Warsaw Regional Court dismissed the appeal. On 22 July 1998 the applicant lodged a cassation appeal against the judgment. On 25 May 1999 the Supreme Court dismissed the cassation appeal. 22. On 14 December 1993 a bill of indictment was lodged with the Warsaw District Court against J.Ł. He was charged with uttering threats and failure to pay child maintenance. On 14 March 1994 the court allowed the first applicant to take part in the proceedings as an auxiliary prosecutor (oskarżyciel posiłkowy). On 2 December 2002 the Warsaw District Court convicted J.Ł as charged. On 30 October 2003 the Warsaw Regional Court quashed the first-instance judgment and remitted the case. The proceedings are pending before the Regional Court.

4. The applicant was born in 1935 and lives in the village of Kresty in the Tula Region. 5. On 20 October 1993 the applicant sued the Chernskiy District Social Security Services for pension arrears, an increase of his monthly pension and compensation for damage. 6. On 16 December 1993 the Chernskiy District Court accepted the action in full. The judgment was quashed on 1 February 1994 and the case was remitted for a fresh examination. 7. On 15 June 1998 the Chernskiy District Court partly accepted the applicant's action and decided to determine his claim concerning compensation for damage in separate proceedings. 8. The Social Services appealed against the judgment to the Tula Regional Court. The first appeal hearing was fixed for 27 August 1998. However, it was adjourned until 6 October 1998 because the respondent did not attend. 9. On 6 October 1998 the Tula Regional Court quashed the judgment of 15 June 1998 and remitted the case for a fresh examination. 10. The case was assigned to the judge Isayev and the first hearing was fixed for 12 May 1999. That hearing was adjourned upon the parties' request until 23 September 1999. 11. On 23 August 2000 the Chernskiy District Court received the applicant's amended statement of claims. 12. On 24 January 2001 the judge Milyokhin was assigned to the case and on 2 July 2001 he scheduled a preliminary hearing. The following hearing, fixed for 7 August 2001, was adjourned because the representative of the Social Services defaulted. 13. At the hearing of 7 August 2001 the applicant successfully amended his claims and asked to invite the Tula Regional Department of the Social Protection of Population to the proceedings. 14. The following hearing, fixed for 1 November 2001, was adjourned until 14 December 2001 because the respondent defaulted. 15. On 14 December 2001 the Chernskiy District Court stayed the proceedings in the applicant's case to await the outcome of the proceedings before the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation. The Constitutional Court was to give interpretation of the pension legislation applicable to the applicant's case. The decision of 14 December 2001 was upheld on appeal on 12 March 2002. 16. On 12 March 2003 the Chernskiy District Court resumed the proceedings and fixed a hearing for 2 April 2003. That hearing was adjourned until 28 April 2003 to allow the respondent to study the case-file. The applicant once again amended his claims at the hearing of 28 April 2003. 17. Of the five hearings fixed between 28 April 2003 and 30 November 2005, one hearing was adjourned because the respondent defaulted and three were adjourned upon the applicant's request. 18. On 8 December 2005 the Chernskiy District Court dismissed the applicant's action. The judgment was upheld on appeal by the Tula Regional Court on 9 February 2006. 19. On numerous occasions the applicant unsuccessfully complained about the excessive length of the proceedings in his case to the prosecutor of the Tula Region and the Judicial Qualification Board of the Tula Region.

4. The applicant company is the editorial body of a limited liability company called the Ukraina-Tsentr Newspaper and is registered in the city of Kirovograd, Ukraine. 5. In June 2002 the mayoral elections were conducted in the city of Kirovograd. On 12 June 2002, during the election campaign, two press conferences relating to those elections were held at the Ukrainian Independent News Agency (“the UNIAN”). During one of those press conferences, a local Kirovograd journalist, Mr M. accused one of the candidates, Mr Y., of ordering him to be murdered for 5,000 US dollars (USD). The wording of the accusation made by Mr M., as later established by the domestic courts, contained the following paragraph: “He (Mr Y.) went to his friend, the one locally known politician, whom I will not name yet, but if necessary we will provide [his name], we have facts. Upon his request, the other took out five thousand dollars of his money and handed it to his head of security service and said the following, that it is necessary to reserve for me a place in the morgue. So, at present, they “ordered” me for five thousand dollars. Who ordered? I say: [Mr] Y. [full name], I declare it officially.” 6. This information among other news was disseminated by the UNIAN via e-mail and posted on its website. According to the applicant company, it received this information by electronic mail in the following form: “Furthermore, [Mr] M. accused the Kirovograd mayoral candidate and President of the Kirovskiy District Court, [Mr] V. Y., “of ordering him to be murdered”. The journalist reported that for safety reasons he had taken his family away from the region. According to him, all four journalists participating in the press conference addressed the General Prosecutor's Office, the Security Service of Ukraine and the Ministry of the Interior concerning the threats to them and claimed that they had proof of pressure being applied to them”. 7. According to the applicant company, on the same day, the STB TV channel in its Vikna-Novyny news programme disseminated similar information, indicating that Mr M. had also mentioned the sum of USD 5,000 for “ordering him to be murdered”. 8. On 14 June 2002 the applicant company published an article which was titled “The metropolitan tour” in which the above-mentioned press conferences of 12 June 2002 were described. Among other things, the article contained the following paragraph: “[Mr] M. accused [Mr] Y. of 'ordering him to be murdered' and even stated the amount paid for the 'order' – 5,000 US dollars. The journalist stated that for safety reasons he had taken his family away from the region. According to him, all four journalists participating in the press conference addressed the General Prosecutor's Office, the Security Service of Ukraine and the Ministry of the Interior concerning the threats to them. He also claimed that they had proof of the pressure being applied to them.” 9. In August 2002 Mr Y. lodged a civil claim in the Kirovograd Leninsky District Court (the Leninsky Court) against the applicant company and Mr M. complaining that the phrase “[Mr] M. accused [Mr] Y. 'of ordering him to be murdered' and even stated the amount paid for the 'order' – 5,000 US dollars” published by the applicant company was untrue and abased his human dignity. He maintained that that publication had affected his professional and private life and damaged his reputation as an individual, lawyer and politician. Taking the view that the publishing of a correction would not be sufficient, he asked the courts to pay him non-pecuniary damages. Later, Mr Y. supplemented his claim by asking for the statement made by Mr M. during the press conference (see paragraph 5 above) to be found untrue and defamatory. 10. According to the applicant company, its co-defendant, Mr M., asked the court to adjourn the proceedings and on 30 November 2002 asked the Supreme Court to transfer the case to another court. The applicant company supported those requests. In his request to the Supreme Court, Mr M. noted in particular that the plaintiff was the President of the Kirovograd Kirovskiy Local Court and therefore, to ensure the objective and unbiased examination of the case, he asked for the case to be transferred to one of the local courts in Kyiv, the city in which the press conference had taken place. By letter dated 12 December 2002, the Deputy President of the Supreme Court allowed the request in part and ordered the case to be transferred to the Kamyansky Local Court in the Cherkassy region. However, by that time, the Leninsky Court had already examined the case (see the next paragraph), having rejected Mr M.'s request for the case to be adjourned. 11. On 10 December 2002 the Leninsky Court, in a single judge formation (Judge B.) found that the accusations made by Mr M. and the applicant company that Mr Y. had ordered Mr M. to be murdered were contrary to the principle of the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Constitution. The defendants did not prove before the court that the disseminated information was true. The court found the following phrase from the applicant company's article “[Mr] M. accused [Mr] V. Y. 'of ordering him to be murdered' and noted the amount paid for the 'order' – 5,000 US dollars” untrue and defamatory. The court also found that Mr M. had accused Mr Y. of 'ordering' him to be murdered for USD 5,000 during the press conference and that such accusation was also untrue and defamatory. The court noted that, in view of the fact that the two bodies had not drawn up a formal contract between them, the applicant company could not prove that it had received the impugned information officially from the UNIAN. Furthermore, the information published by the applicant company did not correspond to the information disseminated by the UNIAN. For those reasons, the court concluded that the applicant company could not be protected against liability. The applicant company and Mr M. were ordered to pay Ukrainian hryvnias 100,000 (UAH) and UAH 20,000, respectively, in compensation. The court, however, found no liability against the UNIAN, which had been identified as a co-defendant by the court, because the plaintiff had lodged no claims against it and the UNIAN had published a correction. 12. The applicant company appealed against the decision of the first-instance court. It complained, in particular, that Judge B. could not be impartial because Mr Y. was the chairman of the regional council of judges and the deputy chairman of the regional branch of the Union of Lawyers and, as a judge and a lawyer, Judge B. was dependent upon the plaintiff. The applicant company further noted that the court had disregarded the fact that the impugned information had been circulated by electronic mail, had also been freely accessible on the UNIAN website and that such information belonged in the public domain. It also submitted that the plaintiff had not asked it to correct the material and its proposal to publish a correction before the judicial proceedings and during the judicial proceedings had been refused by the plaintiff. 13. On 12 March 2003 the Kirovograd Regional Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the first-instance court but decreased the compensation award. The applicant company was ordered to pay UAH 50,000 in compensation. 14. The applicant company appealed in cassation. 15. On 2 October 2003 the Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the lower courts. 16. On 30 October 2003 the applicant company paid the compensation awarded against it and UAH 2,500 in enforcement fees.

4. The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Mersin. The General Directorate of National Roads and Highways (Devlet Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğü), a State body responsible, inter alia, for motorway construction, expropriated four plots of land belonging to the applicant in İçel in order to build a motorway. A committee of experts assessed the value of the land and the sum so fixed was paid to him when the expropriation took place. 5. Following the applicant’s request for increased compensation, on 22 February 1995 the Mersin Civil Court of First Instance awarded him additional compensation of 204,787,320 Turkish liras (TRL) (approximately 3,900 euros (EUR)), plus interest at the statutory rate applicable at the date of the court’s decision, running from 14 December 1993. 6. On 16 December 1997 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of 22 February 1995. 7. On 16 April 1998 the administration paid the applicant TRL 545,269,000 (approximately EUR 2,020) in additional compensation, together with interest. 8. On 21 January 1998 the decision of the Court of Cassation was served on the applicant.

4. The applicants were born in 1949 and 1953 respectively and live in Kherson. They are former employees of the OJSC “Dnipro” (“the Dnipro,” ВАТ “Дніпро”). At the material time the State owned more than 25% of the Dnipro's shares. The company was therefore subject to the Law of 29 November 2001 “on the Introduction of a Moratorium on the Forced Sale of Property.” 5. On 16 October 1996 the State Property Fund (Фонд державного майна України) ordered the creation of the Dnipro's subsidiary company “Energiya” (the “Subsidiary,” ДП “Енергія”). The applicants were reassigned to the Subsidiary. 6. On various dates the applicants instituted civil proceedings in the Komsomolsky District Court of Kherson (the “District Court,” Комсомольський районний суд м. Херсона) against the Subsidiary for salary arrears and other payments. 7. On 16 January and 18 August 2001 and 11 March 2002, the District Court awarded UAH 5,161.07[1], UAH 2,490.74[2] and UAH 1,167.60[3] respectively in favour of Ms Spas. 8. On 16 January and 16 July 2001 and 11 March 2002, the District Court awarded UAH 6,381[4], UAH 1,728.79[5] and UAH 602.24[6] respectively in favour of Ms Voyna. 9. The judgments given in favour of the applicants were not appealed against, became final and the writs of enforcement were transferred to the Komsomolsky District Bailiffs' Service (“the Bailiffs,” Відділ Державної виконавчої служби Комсомольського районного управління юстиції в м. Херсоні) for enforcement. 10. On 27 April 2001 the Bailiffs attached the Subsidiary's equipment for forced sale. However, the sale was cancelled, as Bailiffs learned that the equipment was formally owned by the Dnipro, held in a tax lien and subject to a moratorium on the forced sale (see paragraph 4 above). 11. On 2 November 2001 each applicant received UAH 300[7] of the awards due to them under the judgments given in their favour. 12. On 4 April 2002 the Kherson Regional Commercial Court (Господарський суд Херсонської області) declared the Subsidiary bankrupt and ordered its liquidation, which was completed by 25 May 2004. 13. The judgments given in favour of the applicants remain largely unenforced.

4. The applicant, a retired military officer, was born in 1930 and lives in Mytilini. 5. On 15 November 1996 the applicant lodged an application with the Army Solidarity Fund (Ταμείο Αλληλοβοηθείας Στρατού) (hereafter “the Fund”) asking for an additional retirement premium, following the amendment of the date of his retirement. On 29 November and 18 December 1996 the Administrative Council of the Fund rejected his application at first instance and on appeal respectively. 6. On 22 January 1997 the applicant lodged a recourse with the Athens First Instance Administrative Court challenging the decisions of the Fund. 7. In a judgment dated 29 May 1998 the Athens First Instance Administrative Court partially upheld the applicant's claim and awarded him 7,739,869 drachmas (GRD) (i.e. 22,714 euros) (judgment no. 5835/1998). 8. On 5 November 1998 the Fund lodged an appeal. 9. On 27 September 2001 the Athens Administrative Court of Appeal accepted the Fund's appeal and quashed the first instance decision, after having concluded that the legal requirements for the award of an additional retirement premium had not been satisfied (judgement no. 4030/2001). The applicant was served with the decision on 25 February 2003. 10. On 11 March 2003 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. 11. On 7 July 2006 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the appellate decision and remitted the case to the Court of Appeal (judgment no. 2034/2006). 12. On 6 June 2008 the Athens Administrative Court of Appeal rejected the appeal lodged by the Fund against judgment no. 5835/1998 of the First Instance Administrative Court (judgment no. 1947/2008). The applicant was served with the decision on 26 May 2009.

9. The applicant was born in 1968 and is currently detained in Batman “E” Type Prison. 10. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 11. On 2 September 1997 the applicant was arrested in Istanbul on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation, namely the PKK. 4,000 German Marks and 2,600 US Dollars in cash were found in his possession. During his questioning at the Istanbul Police Headquarters, the applicant stated that he had joined the PKK in 1992 and that the money found in his possession at the time of his arrest had been given to him by the PKK to obtain a false passport. He also added that he had been trained in Syria and that he had carried out activities on behalf of the PKK in Germany, the Netherlands and France. 12. On 3 September 1997 the applicant’s detention period was extended for two days with the permission of the public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court. 13. On 6 September 1997 the applicant was handed over to the Siirt Police Headquarters in whose jurisdiction the applicant had allegedly committed a number of offences. On the same day the Siirt public prosecutor authorised the applicant’s detention for a further two days. 14. On 7 September 1997 a statement was taken from the applicant by the Siirt Police. The applicant reiterated the confessions he had made in his statement at the Istanbul Police Headquarters. 15. The applicant was subsequently handed over to the Batman Police in whose jurisdiction he had allegedly carried out certain illegal activities. On his arrival in Batman the applicant was given a medical examination by a doctor. No signs of ill-treatment were observed on his body according to the medical report drawn up on 7 September 1997. 16. On 8 September 1997, at the request of the Batman public prosecutor and without the applicant being brought before him, a judge at the Batman Magistrates’ Court in Criminal Matters authorised the applicant’s detention until 12 September 1997. 17. On 11 September 1997 a statement was taken from the applicant by the Batman Police. The applicant gave a detailed account of his involvement within the PKK and of the activities he had carried out on behalf of that organisation. He further described the structure of the PKK in detail. 18. On 12 September 1997 the applicant gave a statement before the Batman public prosecutor. He maintained that his police statements were correct and that he had nothing to add to them. 19. On the same day the applicant was taken before the Batman Magistrates’ Court in Criminal Matters and subsequently remanded in detention. 20. On 2 October 1997 the public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Diyarbakır State Security Court against the applicant and requested the court to sentence him pursuant to Article 168 § 2 of the Criminal Code and Article 5 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act. 21. In the proceedings before the Diyarbakır State Security Court, which was composed of three judges including a military judge, the applicant mainly repeated the statements he had made to the police. 22. In a supplementary indictment submitted to the trial court on 30 May 2000, the prosecutor accused the applicant of carrying out activities aimed at breaking up the unity of the State and removing part of the national territory from the State’s control. He requested the court to sentence the applicant in accordance with Article 125 of the Criminal Code. 23. On 2 November 2000 the Diyarbakır State Security Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to the death penalty under Article 125 of the Criminal Code. Taking into account the applicant’s good conduct during the trial, the death penalty was commuted to a life sentence. 24. The applicant’s appeal against the judgment was rejected by the Court of Cassation on 22 May 2001.

5. The first applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Vecumnieki. The second applicant was born in 1980 and lives in Riga. 6. The facts of each individual case, as submitted by the parties, are summarised below. 7. On 20 January 2005 a judge of the Valmiera District Court issued a detention order authorising the pre-trial detention of the first applicant for a duration of two months. The applicant was suspected of the sale of narcotics and of providing unauthorised objects to imprisoned prisoners. The decision stated that the first applicant’s whereabouts were unknown, that he had absconded from the pre-trial investigation and that there was a risk that he might abscond even after his whereabouts were established. The order was executed on 26 August 2005 when the police arrested the applicant. The applicant appealed. 8. On 16 September 2005 the decision concerning the detention order was upheld by a panel of the Vidzeme Regional Court composed of three judges who were presided over by Judge G.K. The decision stated that the applicant had previously absconded and that, given the seriousness of the charges against him and the fact that he had no permanent place of residence, the court was not persuaded that he would not seek to abscond again. 9. On 5 December 2005 a panel of the Vidzeme Regional Court, composed of two lay judges and presided over by Judge G.K., commenced the adjudication of the applicant’s criminal case. Relying on section 52(4)(1) of the Criminal Procedure Law, which prevented a judge from adjudicating a criminal case if he or she had previously been involved in the criminal proceedings, the defence challenged the participation of Judge G.K. The court, presided by the challenged judge, rejected the challenge, arguing that Judge G.K. had reviewed the applicant’s detention order prior to the enactment of the Criminal Procedure Law[1], so her previous participation in the criminal proceedings could not serve as grounds for her recusal. 10. On 7 December 2005 the Vidzeme Regional Court convicted the applicant of the sale of narcotics and of providing unauthorised objects to imprisoned prisoners. In his appeal the applicant complained, inter alia, that section 52(4)(1) of the Criminal Procedure Law precluded Judge G.K. from adjudicating on his criminal case. 11. On 7 September 2006 the appeal was dismissed by the Criminal Division of the Supreme Court. Concerning the complaint of partiality, the court stated the following: “Judge G.K. reviewed the detention order at the time the Code of Criminal Procedure was in force. The adjudication of this [criminal] case was commenced after the Criminal Procedure Law had come into force, therefore the Court does not recognise a conflict of interests [of the judge] in that it cannot be concluded that G.K. had previously participated in any capacity in the criminal proceedings at issue”. 12. On 24 October 2006, following an appeal on points of law lodged by the first applicant, the Senate of the Supreme Court dismissed the complaint concerning the allegedly unlawful composition of the first-instance court due to the participation of Judge G.K. The Senate upheld the lower courts’ findings that when Judge G.K. had participated in the review of the applicant’s detention order the Code of Criminal Procedure was in force, which authorised a judge to examine a criminal case even if he or she had previously taken decisions concerning preventive measures in the criminal case at issue. Observing that the criminal case was adjudicated on the merits after the new Criminal Procedure Law had come into force, the Senate concluded that Judge G.K. had not participated in the criminal proceedings at an earlier stage in any capacity. 13. On 1 April 2005 the second applicant was detained on suspicion of robbery. On 4 April 2005 a judge of the Rēzekne Court authorised his pre‑trial detention. The second applicant appealed. 14. On 18 April 2005 the second applicant’s appeal was dismissed by a panel of the Latgale Regional Court composed of three judges – J.D. (the presiding judge), D.S., and J.V. The court noted that in his appeal the second applicant had indicated that he had confessed to the offence and that he would not evade the investigation because he had to repay a bank loan. The applicant also indicated his intention to start a family. The court established, inter alia, that the applicant had four prior convictions, including one for robbery. It went on to state: “Despite having served a prison sentence, [the second applicant] does not learn any lessons and is once again suspected of having committed an identical crime. He commits such acts regardless of the considerations included in his own appeal, [such as] a bank loan, an intention to start a family, a permanent job and a place of residence... [The applicant’s] personality and tendency to commit crimes are to be seen as exceptional grounds for [applying pre-trial detention]”. 15. On 4 December 2006 the Rēzekne Court convicted the applicant of robbery and of theft of personal identity documents and sentenced him to a prison term of eight years. The applicant appealed. 16. On 2 February 2007 the applicant’s appeal was examined by a panel of the Latgale Regional Court composed of judges J.V. (the presiding judge), J.D. and D.S., the same judges who had previously examined his appeal against the decision of 4 April 2005. The applicant’s appeal was dismissed. 17. The applicant submitted an appeal on points of law, in which he complained, among other things, about the composition of the appeal court. According to the applicant, the composition had been unlawful because of the three judges’ prior involvement in the same criminal proceedings. He stated that “the court could not be impartial”. 18. On 19 April 2007 a single judge of the Senate of the Supreme Court informed the applicant that his appeal on points of law had not been accepted for adjudication on the merits in the Senate. With regard to the complaint about the composition of the appeal court, the judge referred to an earlier decision of the Senate (see Relevant domestic law and practice, paragraph 27 below) in which no violation of the applicable procedural law had been found in a situation identical to that of the applicant.

6. The applicants were born in 1957 and 1955 respectively and live in Florence. 7. E.M., the applicants’ father, was the owner of a flat in Florence, which he had let to G.B. 8. In a registered letter of 10 October 1988, the applicants’ father informed the tenant that he intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 23 May 1989 and asked him to vacate the premises by that date. 9. The tenant told the owner that he would not leave the premises. 10. In the meanwhile, on 22 February 1989, the applicants’ father died and the applicants inherited the flat. 11. In a writ served on the tenant on 12 December 1990, they reiterated their intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Florence Magistrate. 12. By a decision of 12 February 1991, which was made enforceable on the same day, the Florence Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 January 1992. 13. On 30 January 1992, the applicants served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 14. On 11 March 1992, they informed the tenant that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 24 April 1992. 15. On 4 April 1992, the applicants made a statutory declaration that they urgently required the premises as accommodation for themselves. 16. Between 24 April 1992 and 28 September 2000, the bailiff made fifteen attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicants were never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession. 17. On 12 October 2000, the applicants recovered possession of the flat. 18. On 19 January 2001 the first applicant sued the tenant before the Florence District Court seeking damages for the loss she had sustained as a result of the tenant’s refusal to quit the flat and because of the flat’s bad condition on restitution. On 11 February 2003 the second applicant sold his share in the flat to the first applicant. 19. During the preparation of the case for trial expert evidence was filed and witnesses were heard. 20. In a judgment of 28 May 2003, the text of which was deposited with the registry on 4 June 2003, the Florence District Court allowed the applicant 2,241.47 euros (EUR) for the works to be carried out in the flat and EUR 25,045.89 for the damage sustained on account of the flat’s unavailability, plus interest and the reimbursement of the costs and expenses. 21. On 7 June 2003 the applicant discovered that the former tenant (G.B.) had sold all his real property to members of his family in 2002. On 11 September 2003, the applicant served notice on G.B. to pay the amount owed. On 14 November 2003 the bailiff made a seizure of G.B.’s goods, but only up to an amount of EUR 1,500 because there was nothing more to be seized. 22. On 21 November 2003 G.B. notified the applicant that he had lodged an appeal with the Florence Court of Appeal. On 25 March 2004 the Court of Appeal rejected G.B.’s claim and ordered him to pay the costs and expenses of the proceedings. 23. On 8 October 2004 the company in charge of the auction by order of the Court (“Istituto Vendite Giudiziarie s.r.l.”) informed the judge that it could not have access to the goods seized because the door of G.B.’s flat was closed or he refused to give the goods and asked the judge to grant the assistance of the police on 16 November 2004. The judge granted the assistance on 11 October 2004. 24. On 30 June 2005 the applicant informed the Court that because of G.B.’s insolvency he had managed to recover only the sums G.B. owed him for the costs and expenses.

4. The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Lucca. 5. He is the owner of a flat in Florence, which he had let to A.D.L. 6. In a registered letter of 28 June 1983, the applicant informed the tenant that he intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 30 December 1983 and asked him to vacate the premises by that date. 7. In a writ served on the tenant on 23 December 1986, the applicant reiterated his intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Florence Magistrate. 8. By a decision of 22 January 1987, which was made enforceable on 3 September 1987, the Florence Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 December 1988. 9. On 7 June 1989, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 10. On 5 July 1989, he informed the tenant that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 26 July 1989. 11. Between 26 July 1989 and 20 March 1995, the bailiff made 13 attempts to recover possession. 12. On 20 July 1995, the applicant made a statutory declaration that he urgently required the premises as accommodation for his children. 13. Between 19 October 1995 and 17 April 2002, the bailiff made 11 attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession. 14. In October 2002, the applicant recovered possession of the flat.

5. The applicant is a company limited by shares with its seat in Budapest. 6. By way of assignments for consideration, done in October 2001 and July 2002, the applicant acquired – through intermediaries – the debts of V. Rt and M. Rt from the Tax Authority. The debts consisted mostly of unpaid payroll taxes and social security contributions and originated in the period before 1998. 7. Since the debtors had become insolvent, the applicant brought an action against the State-owned Hungarian Privatisation and State Holding Company (ÁPV Rt) before the Budapest Regional Court in order to recover the assigned claims. Relying on section 328 of the (Old) Companies Act 1988, it argued that ÁPV Rt – the majority owner of the two debtor companies – bore vicarious liability for the outstanding debts. 8. On 25 September 2003 the Regional Court partly found for the applicant. The court awarded some 47.3 million Hungarian forints (HUF) to the applicant, which corresponded to the debts of V. Rt other than the payroll taxes and social security contributions. It dismissed the action in respect of the latter items. The applicant was obliged to pay HUF 9.6 million to the respondent in legal fees. 9. The applicant appealed. It claimed 22,482,500 Hungarian forints (HUF) plus accrued interest on account of the remaining debts of V. Rt and HUF 177,975,985 plus accrued interest on account of those of M. Rt. 10. The Budapest Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance decision on 9 July 2004. The applicant was obliged to pay HUF 3 million as procedural fees. 11. The applicant lodged a petition for review with the Supreme Court in respect of the social security contributions owed by M. Rt. It submitted that their amount altogether was approximately HUF 160 million – a sum including the principal of HUF 84,515,225 – but susceptible to further taking of evidence in resumed proceedings. 12. On 5 April 2005 the Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal's decision. It was satisfied that ÁPV Rt indeed bore vicarious liability in the circumstances. Relying on Uniformity Decision no. 2/2004.PJE, it held however that – pursuant to sections 3(3) and 25(2) of the (Old) Taxation Order Act 1990 – for the impugned social security contributions to be enforceable by the applicant, a decision should have been issued by the Tax Authority establishing the vicarious liability. For want of such a decision, the contributions could not be enforced by the applicant, since the assignment had not conferred any public law powers on it. The applicant was obliged to pay once more HUF 3 million as procedural fee.

4. The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Kharkiv. 5. On 7 February 1994 he lodged a claim with the Kyivskyy District Court of Kharkiv (“the District Court”) against two companies and a local institute, by which he sought to be provided with a flat. 6. On 31 March 1995 the above court partly allowed the claim and ordered the institute to provide the applicant with a flat. On 16 May 1995 the Kharkiv Regional Court upheld that judgment. 7. On 20 September 1995, 26 February 1996, 17 November 1999 and 10 December 2001 the District Court delivered additional judgments in the case. On 17 October 1995, 19 July 1996, 29 September 2000 and 13 March 2002, respectively, the Kharkiv Regional Court and the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal quashed those judgments and remitted the case for fresh examination. 8. On 11 June 2002 the applicant lodged an appeal in cassation against the ruling of 13 March 2002. On 10 March 2003 the District Court requested the applicant to lodge it in accordance with the procedural requirements. Following that, on 3 March 2004 the Supreme Court upheld the ruling of 13 March 2002. 9. On 2 December 2004 the District Court delivered the additional judgment in the case. On 9 February 2005 and 18 January 2008, respectively, the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal and the Lugansk Regional Court of Appeal (the latter court acting as a court of cassation) upheld it. 10. In the course of the proceedings fifteen hearings were adjourned due to the respondents’ failure to appear, due to the illness or absence of a judge or for unspecified reasons. One forensic examination was ordered (between 15 October 1997 and 9 August 1999).

5. The applicant, Mr Ivan Milić, was born in 1966 and lives in Belgrade, Serbia. 6. On 20 June 2002 the Court of First Instance (Osnovni sud) in Podgorica ordered that the applicant be reinstated by the Clinical Centre of Montenegro (Kliničko bolnički Centar Crne Gore), a State-run medical institution. 7. On 4 February 2003 this judgment became final, and on 16 December 2003 it was confirmed by the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud) in Podgorica at third instance. 8. On 23 April 2003 the Clinical Centre of Montenegro informed the applicant that it could not comply with the judgment in question, but would rather seek an alternative solution. 9. On 22 May 2003 the Court of First Instance issued an enforcement order, which decision was confirmed on 26 June 2003. 10. On 19 August 2003 the Clinical Centre of Montenegro concluded an agreement with the Special Hospital in Risan, also a State-run medical institution, whereby the latter accepted the applicant as its employee. 11. On 30 September 2003 the applicant informed the State Prosecutor that he did not approve of this arrangement. 12. On 17 October 2003 the Special Hospital in Risan issued a decision to the effect that the applicant would become its employee as of 30 October 2003. 13. On 20 October 2003 the applicant received this decision. 14. On 21 October 2009, as submitted by the Montenegrin Government, the applicant concluded an Agreement on Termination of Employment with the Clinical Centre of Montenegro whereby his employment had been terminated as from 3 February 2003 and both parties waived any further claims in this regard. 15. On 26 October 2009 the applicant withdrew his enforcement request. 16. On 5 November 2009 the Court of First Instance terminated the enforcement proceedings and all the enforcement activities which had been carried out in that regard. On 17 November 2009 this decision became final. 17. On 6 May 2004, upon the applicant’s separate claim, the Court of First Instance in Podgorica ordered the Clinical Centre of Montenegro to pay the applicant 4,456 euros (“EUR”) for salary arrears for the period between September 2001 and 3 February 2003. This judgment was upheld by the High Court on 5 October 2004. It would appear from the case file that this judgment was enforced on an unspecified date thereafter. 18. On 3 February 2003 the applicant started to work in the Clinical Centre of Serbia for a period of nine months. It would appear from the case file that on an unspecified date thereafter his temporary employment was transformed into a permanent one.

5. The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Budapest. 6. The applicant is a lawyer. In September 2004 the Buda Surroundings District Court ordered the search of her office, in application of section 149 subsections (4) and (5) of the Code on Criminal Procedure, and the seizure of documents concerning one of her clients, A.F., who had been suspected of having been engaged in illegal financial activities. 7. On 20 October 2004 the police searched the applicant's office. The search lasted from 9.45 a.m. until 12.55 p.m. in the presence of a public prosecutor. The applicant herself did not arrive on the premises before 10.25 a.m. 8. The Government claimed that until the applicant's arrival, another lawyer, Dr M., whose practice was in the neighbouring but entirely separate office, had been present. The applicant contended that Dr M. had not been present inside her office under search, nor had she represented her. According to the documents submitted, Dr M. was not formally appointed to defend the applicant's interests, nor did she sign the minutes of the search in such a capacity. Moreover, the parties' submissions diverged as to whether the police seized all the documents stored in the office or only those relating to A.F. 9. Subsequently, the applicant complained about the allegedly unlawful search and the indiscriminate seizure of all documents found. 10. On 5 November 2004 the Public Prosecutor's Office dismissed the applicant's complaint concerning the alleged unlawfulness of the search. The applicant appealed. 11. On 25 November 2004 the District Court ordered the restoration of part of the documents, which were unrelated to the case of the suspect. 12. On 19 May 2005 the Pest County Public Prosecutor's Office reversed the decision of 5 November 2004 and established that the search had been unlawful in that neither the applicant nor a representative had been present. It observed that Dr M. could not be considered a person appointed to represent the applicant's interests; she had not been appointed to this end by the authority in charge. The Office was however of the view that the lawfulness had been restored by virtue of the District Court's decision of 25 November 2004.

8. The applicant Goi Tuquabo-Tekle was born in 1963 and her son Adhanom Ghedlay Subhatu in 1978. Mrs Tuquabo-Tekle’s husband, Tarreke Tuquabo, was born in 1952, and their children Tmnit and Ablel in 1994 and 1995, respectively. These applicants live in Amsterdam. The applicant Mehret Ghedlay Subhatu – a daughter of Mrs Tuquabo-Tekle – was born on 12 November 1981 and lives in Adi Hanso, Eritrea. 9. In 1989, after the death of her first husband and during the civil war, Mrs Tuquabo-Tekle fled from Ethiopia to Norway, where she applied for asylum. She submitted that she had been harassed and detained by the Ethiopian authorities on account of her husband’s activities for the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front. Although denied asylum, she was granted a residence permit on humanitarian grounds in 1990. Her eldest child, Adhanom, had stayed behind in Addis Ababa with a friend of his mother’s, and she had left her other two children, Mehret and Michael, in the care of an uncle and their grandmother (in what subsequently became the State of Eritrea). After permission was granted by the Norwegian authorities for the children to reside with Mrs Tuquabo-Tekle, and with the assistance of those authorities and the UNHCR, her son Adhanom entered Norway in October 1991. It did not prove possible at that time to procure the departure of the other children from Eritrea, but it was Mrs Tuquabo-Tekle’s intention to bring them to Norway later. 10. In June 1992 Mrs Tuquabo-Tekle married Mr Tuquabo, who was living in the Netherlands where he had been admitted as a refugee. On 19 July 1993 Mrs Tuquabo-Tekle and her son Adhanom moved to the Netherlands to live with Mr Tuquabo. Mrs Tuquabo-Tekle was granted a residence permit in order to reside in the Netherlands with her husband on 21 July 1993. Two children, Tmnit and Ablel, were subsequently born to the couple. 11. On 16 September 1997, Mrs Tuquabo-Tekle and Mr Tuquabo filed a request for a provisional residence visa (machtiging tot voorlopig verblijf) for Mehret, in an attempt to have their (step)daughter, who was then fifteen years old, join them in the Netherlands. Such a visa is normally a prerequisite for the grant of a residence permit, which confers more permanent residence rights. 12. On 25 March 1998 the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken) rejected their request. The Minister concluded that there were no grounds to authorise family reunion in the Netherlands since the close family ties (gezinsband) between Mrs Tuquabo-Tekle and her daughter were considered to have ceased to exist and such ties had never existed between Mr Tuquabo and his stepdaughter. Ever since Mrs Tuquabo-Tekle had left Eritrea, Mehret had been living with an uncle and her grandmother; she was deemed to have been integrated into the latter’s family and thus no longer actually belonged to Mrs Tuquabo-Tekle’s family unit (gezin). There was no indication that this situation could not be maintained. Moreover, after marrying Mr Tuquabo, Mrs Tuquabo-Tekle had started a new family unit in the Netherlands to which her daughter had never belonged. Furthermore, the couple had not shown that they had been sufficiently involved with the upbringing and care of their (step)daughter. According to the information available, it was Mrs Tuquabo-Tekle’s parents who had custody of Mehret. 13. On 20 April 1998 Mrs Tuquabo-Tekle and Mr Tuquabo filed an objection (bezwaar) through counsel with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, emphasising that Mehret could no longer lead a normal existence in Eritrea now that she had reached marriageable age and her grandmother had decided that, for that reason, Mehret should stop going to school. There were, moreover, sound reasons why Mrs Tuquabo-Tekle had been unable to bring her daughter to Norway or the Netherlands prior to September 1997. At the time when she had been granted leave to remain in Norway and permission to be joined by her children, contacts with Eritrea were impossible and it was for this reason that only Adhanom, who had been in Ethiopia at the time, was able to go to Norway. In September 1992 Mrs Tuquabo-Tekle had travelled to Eritrea but it had not proved possible to obtain travel documents for Mehret, as there were not yet any official bodies equipped to issue passports in Eritrea and the authorities in Ethiopia refused to do so for Eritrean citizens. The family’s housing situation in the Netherlands had posed a further problem: despite the fact that they had been placed on a waiting list and had been issued with a certificate of urgency (urgentieverklaring), no rental accommodation suitable for a family of two adults and four children was available. Once it had become possible to obtain a passport for Mehret and more spacious accommodation had been obtained, the application for a provisional residence visa was lodged. Moreover, Mrs Tuquabo-Tekle and her husband had been sending money to Eritrea on a regular basis, initially by courier as bank transactions were impossible. 14. On 21 January 1999 the Minister rejected the objection, reiterating that the close family ties between Mrs Tuquabo-Tekle and her daughter had ceased to exist. Mrs Tuquabo-Tekle and her husband had not shown that they had made a substantial parental or financial contribution to Mehret’s upbringing. Furthermore, the couple had not sufficiently shown why, in view of Mehret’s age, she could not remain in the care of her uncle or her grandmother, if necessary supported financially by her family from the Netherlands. The Minister did not find it established that serious attempts had been made to arrange for Mehret to come to the Netherlands as soon as possible: Mrs Tuquabo-Tekle had been legally resident in the Netherlands since July 1993 but the request for Mehret to be allowed to join her had not been lodged until September 1997. Contrary to what the applicants appeared to contend, under the applicable legal provisions a lack of adequate accommodation would not have stood in the way of a provisional residence visa being granted. It appeared that Mrs Tuquabo-Tekle and her husband had let the inexpediency of Mehret’s presence in their cramped accommodation prevail over the desire to reunite Mehret with her mother as soon as possible. Thus, the Minister concluded, the child’s integration into the uncle’s and grandmother’s family could not be considered to have been a temporary measure. 15. On behalf of Mehret, Mrs Tuquabo-Tekle and Mr Tuquabo lodged an appeal against this decision of the Minister, through counsel, with the Regional Court (arrondissementsrechtbank) of The Hague, sitting in Amsterdam, on 16 February 1999. In these proceedings, the Minister of Foreign Affairs argued, inter alia, that from 1994 it had been possible to request and obtain a passport in Eritrea. 16. On 17 January 2000 the Regional Court dismissed the appeal. It held that Mrs Tuquabo-Tekle had failed to show that her close family ties with her daughter had been maintained. It also found that, following her departure in 1989, Mrs Tuquabo-Tekle had no longer exercised parental authority over her daughter in the sense of being intensively involved with her daughter’s upbringing or of taking decisions in this regard. The Regional Court agreed with the Minister of Foreign Affairs that the (step)daughter of Mrs Tuquabo-Tekle and Mr Tuquabo should be deemed to have become integrated into the family of her uncle and grandmother. The Regional Court attached importance to the fact that the couple had only requested to have their (step)daughter join them in the Netherlands on 16 September 1997, and that they had failed to provide any documentary evidence to substantiate their claim that, even after 1994, it had remained impossible to obtain a passport for Mehret in Eritrea. 17. When assessing whether the State’s actions had been in compliance with the requirements of Article 8 of the Convention, the Regional Court addressed the question whether the refusal to grant Mehret a provisional residence visa, as such, constituted a violation of that provision. It pointed out that its task was to strike a fair balance between the interests of the applicants and those of society as a whole (the latter interest being served by a restrictive immigration policy). It found that no obligation for the State to allow family reunion on its territory could be derived from Article 8 of the Convention. It further considered that there were no objective reasons why the family members in the Netherlands could not pursue family life with Mehret in Eritrea. 18. The Regional Court’s decision was final and not subject to appeal.

7. The applicant, the Supreme Holy Council (Висш духовен съвет) of the Muslim Community, headed by Mr Nedim Gendzhev, was the officially recognised leadership of Muslims in Bulgaria, at least between 1995 and 1997. In reality, at the relevant time it was one of the two rival Muslim religious leaderships in Bulgaria. Mr Nedim Gendzhev, a Bulgarian citizen born in 1945 and residing in Sofia, was its leader. He was the Chief Mufti at least between 1988 and 1992 and the President of the Supreme Holy Council at least between 1995 and 1997. 8. At the end of 1989 a process of democratisation commenced in Bulgaria. Soon thereafter some Muslim believers and activists of the Muslim religion in the country sought to replace the leadership of their religious organisation. They considered that Mr Gendzhev, who was the Chief Mufti at that time, and the members of the Supreme Holy Council had collaborated with the communist regime. The old leadership, with Mr Gendzhev as Chief Mufti of Bulgarian Muslims, also had supporters. This situation caused divisions and internal conflict within the Muslim community in Bulgaria. 9. At the end of 1991 a new Government, formed by the Union of Democratic Forces (Съюз на демократичните сили – “the SDS”) and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (Движение за права и свободи – “the DPS”), took office. 10. On 10 February 1992 the Directorate of Religious Denominations (Дирекция по вероизповеданията - “the Directorate”), a governmental agency attached to the Council of Ministers, declared the election of Mr Gendzhev in 1988 as Chief Mufti of the Muslims in Bulgaria null and void and proclaimed his removal from that position. This decision was based on findings, inter alia, that Mr Gendzhev’s election in 1988 had been politically motivated. 11. The Directorate appointed a three-member interim governing body of the Muslims’ religious organisation, considering that that was “the only possible means of preventing the organisational disintegration of the Muslim denomination”. 12. A national conference of Muslims, organised by the interim leadership, took place on 19 September 1992. It elected Mr Fikri Sali Hasan as Chief Mufti and also approved a new statute, which was registered in accordance with sections 6 and 16 of the Religious Denominations Act. After September 1992 the supporters of Mr Hasan obtained full control over the property and activities of the Muslim community. 13. Mr Gendzhev, who claimed that he remained the Chief Mufti, challenged the decision of 10 February 1992 before the Supreme Court. The proceedings ended with a final judgment of 7 April 1993. The Supreme Court, while considering that the impugned decision was not amenable to judicial review, nevertheless commented that the Directorate’s decision to declare Mr Gendzhev’s election null and void had been within its competence. In so far as the impugned decision had also proclaimed “the removal” of Mr Gendzhev from his position of Chief Mufti, this had been ultra vires. However, it was unnecessary to annul this part of the Directorate’s decision as in any event it had no legal consequences. 14. The leadership dispute between Mr Gendzhev and Mr Hasan continued throughout 1993 and 1994. The official position of the Directorate of Religious Denominations remained that Mr Hasan was the legitimate Chief Mufti of the Bulgarian Muslims. At the same time the Directorate apparently sought to “resolve” the dispute through the “unification” of the two factions under a common leadership. 15. On 2 November 1994 the supporters of Mr Gendzhev held a national conference, which proclaimed itself the legitimate representative of Muslim believers. The conference elected a leadership and adopted a statute. Mr Gendzhev was elected President of the Supreme Holy Council. After the conference the newly elected leaders applied to the Directorate for registration as the legitimate leadership of Muslims in Bulgaria. 16. At the end of 1994 parliamentary elections took place in Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Socialist Party (Българска социалистическа партия – “the BSP”) obtained a majority in Parliament and formed a new government, which took office in January 1995. 17. On 22 February 1995 the Deputy Prime Minister issued a decree approving the statute of the Muslim denomination as adopted by the supporters of Mr Gendzhev on 2 November 1994. On 23 February 1995 the Directorate registered the leadership elected at that conference and effectively removed Mr Hasan and his supporters. In the following months the faction led by Mr Gendzhev assumed full control over the property and activities of the Muslim community in Bulgaria. 18. Mr Hasan appealed to the Supreme Court against the decision of the Directorate registering Mr Gendzhev’s leadership. Mr Hasan submitted, inter alia, that the conference of 2 November 1994 had been organised by people outside the Muslim religious organisation presided over by him. Accordingly, they could register their own religious organisation but could not claim to replace the leadership of another. Mr Hasan asked the Supreme Court either to proclaim the February 1995 decision null and void as being contrary to the law or to declare that it constituted the registration of a new religious community, the existing Muslim organisation being unaffected. The State did not have the right, he argued, to impose a single leadership on the Muslims. 19. On 27 July 1995 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. The court stated that under the Religious Denominations Act the Council of Ministers enjoyed full discretion in its decision as to whether or not to register the statute of a given religion. The Supreme Court’s jurisdiction was therefore limited to an examination of whether the impugned decision had been issued by the competent administrative organ and whether the procedural requirements had been complied with. In that respect the decision of February 1995 was lawful. 20. As regards the request for interpretation of the February 1995 decision, it was not open to the Supreme Court, in the context of those particular proceedings, to state its opinion as to whether it had the effect of creating a new legal person, or introducing changes, and whether after this decision there existed two parallel Muslim religious organisations. 21. Following the removal of Mr Hasan, in 1995 the Muslim believers who supported him held their own assembly and re-elected him Chief Mufti, while introducing changes in the organisation’s statute and leadership. Mr Hasan then applied to the Directorate of Religious Denominations for registration of the amended statute and the new leadership. Not having received any response, Mr Hasan appealed to the Supreme Court against the tacit refusal of his application. 22. On 14 October 1996 the Supreme Court delivered its judgment. It noted that in 1992 the Chief Mufti’s Office as represented by Mr Hasan had been duly registered as a religious denomination and had thus obtained legal personality of which it had not subsequently been deprived. Therefore, the Council of Ministers was under an obligation, pursuant to sections 6 and 16 of the Religious Denominations Act, to examine a request for registration of a new statute or of changes in the leadership of the existing religious denomination. Accordingly, the Supreme Court ruled that the Council of Ministers’ tacit refusal had been unlawful and remitted the file to the Council of Ministers, which was required to examine it. 23. On 19 November 1996 the Deputy Prime Minister refused to register the 1995 statute and leadership of the Chief Mufti’s Office as represented by Mr Hasan. He sent him a letter stating, inter alia, that the Council of Ministers had already registered a leadership of the Muslim community in Bulgaria, which was that elected by the November 1994 conference with Mr Gendzhev as President of the Supreme Holy Council. The Deputy Prime Minister concluded that the request “[could not] be granted as it [was] clearly contrary to the provisions of the Religious Denominations Act”. 24. On 5 December 1996 Mr Hasan appealed to the Supreme Court against the refusal of 19 November 1996. 25. On 13 March 1997 the Supreme Court quashed the refusal of the Deputy Prime Minister to register the 1995 statute and leadership headed by Mr Hasan on the ground that it was unlawful and contrary to Article 13 of the Constitution. That refusal was, moreover, “an unlawful administrative intervention into the internal organisation of [a] religious community”. The Supreme Court again ordered the transmission of the file to the Council of Ministers for registration. 26. Despite the Supreme Court judgments of 1996 and 1997 the Council of Ministers did not grant registration to the religious leadership headed by Mr Hasan. 27. In February 1997 the government of the BSP stepped down and an interim cabinet was appointed. At the general elections that followed in April 1997 the SDS obtained a majority in Parliament and formed a new government. 28. The new Deputy Prime Minister and the Directorate of Religious Denominations urged the two rival leaderships, of Mr Hasan and of Mr Gendzhev, to negotiate a unification. 29. On 12 September 1997, in a letter to the Deputy Prime Minister and the Directorate, the religious leadership presided over by Mr Hasan demanded the removal of Mr Gendzhev. 30. On 18 September 1997 the Supreme Holy Council headed by Mr Gendzhev, also in a letter addressed to the Deputy Prime Minister and the Directorate, proposed the holding of a unification conference to be organised by a joint committee composed of representatives of the opposing factions. The Deputy Prime Minister was asked to serve as guarantor of the unification process and to ensure full representation at the conference of all Muslim religious communities. The letter also indicated that the current official leadership presided over by Mr Gendzhev agreed to freeze any movements of staff or disposals of community property pending the conference. 31. On 30 September 1997 the contact groups elected by the rival factions – composed of five members each – signed an agreement to convene a national conference of all Muslim believers. The agreement was also signed by the Deputy Prime Minister and the Director of Religious Denominations. It provided, inter alia: “1. The all-Muslim conference shall be organised on the basis of full representation of the Muslim denomination. It shall not be based on the two existing statutes [of the rival leaderships]. [The] Deputy Prime Minister ... and the Director of Religious Denominations undertake to guarantee the implementation of this principle. 2. ... The [rival groups] undertake not to obstruct the spirit of unification underlying the conference, failing which the Directorate shall take appropriate administrative measures against the persons suspected of [obstruction]. 3. Pending the conference, the [leadership headed by Mr Gendzhev] undertakes to refrain from any administrative decisions, [such as] appointments ... 4. The [leadership headed by Mr Gendzhev] consents to a freeze on all bank accounts ... and declares that pending the conference it will not enter into any transaction ... 32. On an unspecified date the joint committee ruled that the assembly of each local community attending a mosque should elect two delegates to the national conference. It also decided that the minutes of the assemblies’ proceedings had to be entered on a form provided by the Directorate of Religious Denominations and certified by the local mayor. 33. On 6 October 1997 the joint committee decided that the conference should be held on 23 October 1997 and also agreed on the distribution of expenses. 34. Local assemblies for the election of delegates were held on 17 October 1997 throughout the country. The local mayors issued letters certifying the results of the elections. 35. The applicant organisation has submitted copies of two complaints to the Directorate dated 21 October 1997, one by a local religious leader and one by the mayor of a village. The letters stated that persons connected with the DPS had used threats to take possession of the results of the elections of delegates in the two localities concerned. 36. On 21 and 22 October 1997 Mr Gendzhev and those who had signed the unification agreement on behalf of the Supreme Holy Council headed by him wrote to the Prime Minister and the Directorate of Religious Denominations stating that the conference planned for 23 October was not being organised in accordance with the statute of the Muslim religious organisation and that it was therefore unlawful. Those who had signed the agreement of 30 September 1997 stated that they had been forced to do so by the Director of Religious Denominations and declared the withdrawal of their support for that agreement. The letter signed by Mr Gendzhev further described the participation of the Directorate in the preparation of the conference as unacceptable State interference in the Muslims’ internal affairs. 37. On 23 October 1997 more than one thousand delegates attended the conference. Only those whose election had been certified by the mayors were allowed to participate. According to the press, the verification of the delegates’ credentials was carried out by employees of the Directorate of Religious Denominations. Its Director addressed the conference, stating, inter alia, that Mr Gendzhev, who did not attend, had “failed the test”. With these words the Director apparently blamed Mr Gendzhev for having withdrawn from the unification process. 38. According to the applicant organisation, the DPS, a political party with a large majority of ethnic Turks among its members, was involved in the organisation of the conference. The party was allegedly very close to the ruling SDS and was implementing the political decision to replace the leadership of the Muslim community. According to the applicant organisation, about one hundred of the delegates on 23 October 1997 were mayors elected on the DPS ticket. 39. The conference adopted a new statute of the Muslim denomination in Bulgaria and unanimously elected a new leadership comprising six members of the leadership of Mr Hasan and other persons. It appears that no leader of the applicant organisation was among the newly elected leadership. The conference passed a resolution authorising the new leadership to conduct an audit and to seek the prosecution of Mr Gendzhev for alleged unlawful transactions. 40. On 28 October 1997 the Deputy Prime Minister registered the newly elected leadership, relying on sections 6 and 16 of the Religious Denominations Act. The new leadership took over all the organisational aspects and assets of the Muslim community in Bulgaria. 41. Mr Gendzhev, who claimed that he remained the President of the Supreme Holy Council, appealed on its behalf to the Supreme Administrative Court against the Government’s decision to register the new leadership. He claimed that the persons who had signed the agreement for the holding of a unification conference on behalf of the applicant organisation had never been officially authorised to do so; that the conference had been unlawful because of that fact and since those persons had in any event withdrawn; and that the authorities had interfered in an inadmissible manner in the internal affairs of the Muslim community. That was so because the Directorate of Religious Denominations had prepared the forms on which the results of the local elections for delegates had been recorded and also because those results had been certified by the mayors. Furthermore, among the elected delegates there had been a number of persons who were local mayors or active members of one political party, the DPS. Finally, the applicant organisation argued that there had been irregularities and manipulation in the election of delegates. 42. On 4 May 1998 the Supreme Administrative Court held a hearing. It admitted in evidence the material submitted by the applicant organisation but refused its request for a disclosure order against the Council of Ministers. That request apparently concerned documents about the preparation of the October 1997 conference and the election of delegates. The court also refused to hear witnesses. 43. On 16 July 1998 the Supreme Administrative Court, sitting as a bench of three judges, rejected the appeal as being inadmissible. It found that the Supreme Holy Council headed by Mr Gendzhev had no locus standi to lodge an appeal as it had never been validly registered. The registration acts of 22 and 23 February 1995 had been based on a decision by a Deputy Prime Minister who had not, however, been duly authorised by the Council of Ministers to approve the statutes of religious denominations. As a result the Supreme Holy Council headed by Mr Gendzhev had never legally existed and all its acts between 1995 and 1997 were null and void. 44. On an appeal by the applicant organisation, on 9 October 1998 a five-member bench of the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the decision of 16 July 1998 and remitted the case for examination on the merits. The bench noted that by judgment of 27 July 1995 the Supreme Court had found that the 1995 registration of the Supreme Holy Council headed by Mr Gendzhev had been lawful. That finding was final and binding. Therefore, the applicant’s appeal could not be rejected for lack of locus standi. 45. In the reopened proceedings a three-member bench of the Supreme Administrative Court examined the appeal on the merits and dismissed it on 3 May 1999. The presiding judge was the same person who had presided over the previous examination of the case, which had ended with the inadmissibility decision of 16 July 1998. He was also one of the three judges who had delivered judgment on 28 April 1992 in the case concerning Mr Gendzhev’s removal in 1992. 46. The court found that the acts of the authorities did not constitute an interference with the internal organisation of the Muslim community. The decision to hold a unification conference had been taken freely by representatives of the two rival groups. The rules and procedures for the election of delegates and for the holding of the October 1997 conference, including those concerning the results of the local elections for delegates and their certification, had been drawn up by the joint committee. The Directorate of Religious Denominations had contributed to the organisation of the conference purely at the parties’ request. It had acted in accordance with the agreement between the two leaderships and the decisions of the joint committee. The Directorate’s task had been to contribute to and guarantee tolerance and respect in inter-religious relations as well as in the relations between different groups belonging to one and the same religion. The fact that the Supreme Holy Council presided over by Mr Gendzhev had withdrawn at the last minute did not call into question the validity of the conference, which had taken place in accordance with the negotiated rules. It was true that these rules derogated from the statute of the Muslim community as in force at the relevant time but the derogation had been decided upon freely by the two leaderships in order to resolve the conflict within the community. It followed that the impugned act, the decision of 28 October 1997 registering the newly elected leadership of the Muslim community, was in accordance with the law. 47. The applicant organisation submitted a cassation appeal against the judgment of 3 May 1999. It alleged, inter alia, that not all the relevant evidence had been collected and examined. 48. On 15 March 2000 the appeal was dismissed by a five-member bench of the Supreme Administrative Court, which upheld the reasoning of the impugned judgment. It also found that the relevant facts had been clarified and that the additional evidence submitted by the applicant organisation in the cassation proceedings had been the same as that submitted earlier. The applicant organisation was legally represented in the above proceedings. 49. The divide within the Muslim community in Bulgaria continued. It appears that the legitimacy of a community assembly held in November 2000 was disputed by some leaders. Divisions also persisted at local level. In a letter of February 2001, the Directorate of Religious Denominations certified that it had not registered the local leadership of the Muslim community in Plovdiv as two separate local assemblies had elected their leaderships and were in dispute. Similar problems occurred in Haskovo and Russe in the end of 2000 and the beginning of 2001. 50. In July 2004 the Sofia City Court appointed three persons to represent the Muslim community in Bulgaria temporarily, pending judicial proceedings concerning the validity of the election of a new leadership at a national conference held in December 2003.

5. The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Yevpatoriya. 6. On 26 March 2002 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of theft. He was taken to Yevpatoriya Police Base Station No. 8 («Опорний пункт охорони правопорядку № 8»), where the police body-searched him and discovered, in the presence of two attesting witnesses, two packets of opium extract. The record of the search and seizure, which contained a signature appearing to be that of the applicant, indicated that he had admitted having bought those drugs for his own use. However, once the drug seizure was documented, the applicant cut his neck with his key-ring as an indication of protest. The police called an ambulance, which documented the injury as being of a minor nature and provided the applicant with the required aid. 7. The applicant was placed under three-day administrative detention pending clarification of all the circumstances of the supposed drug offence. 8. On the same date he was delivered to the Yevpatoriya Local Police Precinct («РОВД м. Євпаторія»), where, according to the applicant, police officer R. beat him severely. 9. According to the applicant, R. asked him not to raise any complaints in exchange for a promise that the police would turn a blind eye to any future misdemeanours from his side. The applicant accepted this. 10. On 26 March 2002 he was delivered to the Yevpatoriya Temporary Detention Facility, where he was placed in a cell shared by some twelve inmates. According to the registration journal, he arrived there without any visible bodily injuries. During the three days of his detention he did not request or receive any medical assistance. 11. On 29 March 2002 the applicant was released. 12. On 15 April 2002 he complained to a traumatologist in the Yevpatoriya hospital that he was suffering from pain in the chest and was prescribed some antibacterial medication. 13. Having repeatedly sought medical assistance for continuous pain, on 22 April 2002 the applicant was diagnosed with post-traumatic intercostal neuralgia and painful hypodermic indurations from both sides of the rib cage. He told the doctor that he had accidentally fallen down some stairs on 13 April 2002. 14. On 25 April 2002 the applicant was hospitalised with the following diagnoses: right-lung pneumonia concentrated in the inferior lobe, fracture of the middle third of the breastbone and closed fracture of the seventh rib on the right side. He underwent treatment as an in-patient until 8 May 2002. 15. On 22 January 2003 the applicant complained to the Yevpatoriya Town Prosecutor's Office (“the Yevpatoriya Prosecutor”) that on 26 March 2002 he had been beaten up by police officer R., as a result of which he had several rib fractures. He explained the delay in bringing that complaint by the alleged agreement with R. (see paragraph 9 above), which he considered to have been breached. 16. On 29 January 2003 the hospital where the applicant had been treated submitted all the related medical documentation (namely the X-ray films, the medical history sheet and other medical records) to the Yevpatoriya Deputy Prosecutor at the latter's request. As it would be later admitted in the course of the investigation, the content of those documents was never reflected in the investigation paperwork. 17. Overall, in the period from January 2003 to December 2007 the Yevpatoriya Prosecutor refused thirteen times to open a criminal case against R. on the basis of the applicant's complaints. All those refusals were subsequently quashed by the Crimea Prosecutor or by the Prosecutor General as unlawful, premature or groundless. 18. The major investigative steps taken and the omissions indicated by the higher-level prosecution authorities were as follows. 19. In January 2003 the Yevpatoriya Prosecutor questioned police officer R. and the investigator dealing with the applicant's own criminal case, who denied the alleged ill-treatment. 20. In October 2003 the ambulance doctors who had provided the applicant with medical aid on account of the cut to his throat on 26 March 2002 were questioned and noted that he had not raised any ill‑treatment allegations, whereas the cut itself had been an insignificant injury. The therapist who had hospitalised the applicant in April 2002 was also questioned, but could not remember any details. 21. At about the same time it was found out that the medical documentation seized earlier from the hospital was missing. 22. In February 2004 the Crimea Prosecutor criticised his lower-level colleague for not having questioned the applicant and his family members. Among the other omissions he pointed out the failure to conduct a medical forensic examination of the applicant with a view to establishing the nature, date and gravity of the injuries complained of. 23. That criticism was repeated in June, August and November 2004. 24. On 25 November 2004 a forensic medical examination was conducted to clarify which of the applicant's versions concerning the date and origin of his injuries – from the alleged beatings on 26 March 2002 or from the accidental fall on 13 April 2002 – was more plausible. The examination was limited to an analysis of the few medical documents which were available and concluded that both dates were possible for the applicant's injuries at issue, whereas their nature and origin could not be established in the absence of the X-ray films of the material time, as well as the other essential medical documentation (see paragraphs 16 and 21 above). 25. In December 2004 the attested witnesses present at the applicant's arrest on 26 March 2002 stated that they had not witnessed any ill‑treatment. 26. The applicant's mother, who was questioned in January 2005, stated that after his release on 29 March 2002 the applicant had complained that he had been beaten by the police and of pain in the chest. 27. On 4 January 2005 the Crimea Prosecutor instructed the investigator, inter alia, to find the applicant's medical documentation and to question the inmates with whom he had been sharing a cell in March 2002. 28. In February and April 2005 efforts were taken to find the applicant's cellmates. The whereabouts only of four of them were established. Three inmates did not remember the applicant complaining of ill-treatment or being in need of medical aid, whereas the fourth one mentioned that the applicant had complained to him that he had been beaten by the police without giving any further details. 29. On 21 April 2006 the Crimea Prosecutor criticised the investigator for not having undertaken an inquiry in respect of the loss of the applicant's medical documents. In June 2006 such an inquiry was held, but to no avail. The Yevpatoriya Deputy Prosecutor stated that he had handed the documents to his superior, who had retired in October 2003 and whose current place of residence was unknown. 30. On 22 June 2006 another forensic medical examination was held. It confirmed the conclusions of the earlier one, also referring to the absence of the X-ray films as an impediment to more specific conclusions. 31. In January 2007 the applicant was questioned for the first time in the framework of the investigation of his allegation of ill-treatment. The administration of the prison where he was serving his sentence at the time questioned him at the investigator's request. According to the investigation documents, he stated that he had earlier explained his injuries by an accidental fall because he did not want to bring the police officer to criminal liability, without giving any further details. 32. On 9 January 2007 the applicant was X-rayed, as a result of which a consolidated fracture of one rib was confirmed. The film was lost in the course of 2007. 33. On 4 December 2007 the Crimea Prosecutor noted that the investigation had fallen short of meeting any of its or the Prosecutor General's earlier instructions, given on eleven occasions. 34. On 30 January 2008 the third forensic medical examination was held. This time it was based on a visual examination of the applicant and took place in the prison where he was serving his sentence. As the X-ray films both of April 2002 and of January 2007 remained missing and the X‑ray machine in the prison was not operational, the expert made a general conclusion that the applicant might have had his rib broken in April 2002. In any event, it appeared impossible to clearly establish the date, nature and origin of his injuries given the considerable lapse of time. The report contained a general observation that, as a rule, establishing the precise time of a fracture was possible only within a year after it had taken place, as later consolidated fractures appear the same. 35. On 31 January 2008 the Yevpatoriya Prosecutor issued the fourteenth and last decision on the refusal to open criminal proceedings against police officer R. on the basis of the applicant's complaints. It noted that all possible investigative measures had been taken, but had failed to yield any substantiation of the applicant's allegations. 36. On 19 May, 18 November 2008 and 3 June 2009 respectively the Yevpatoriya Town Court (“the Yevpatoriya Court”), the Crimea Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) and the Supreme Court upheld the above ruling. The reasoning of the three courts was confined to a finding that the requirements of Article 99 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had been fulfilled, with no facts established in proof of the applicant's allegation. 37. On 24 July 2002 and 18 March and 23 September 2003 respectively, the Yevpatoriya Court, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court found the applicant guilty of possession of illegal drugs and theft and sentenced him to three years and six months' imprisonment. 38. On 25 November 2002 the applicant was arrested (with the reasons for the delay before his arrest being unclear). 39. On 20 May 2003 the Yevpatoriya Court found the applicant guilty of some fifteen counts of theft committed during October and November 2002 and sentenced him to four years' imprisonment. The final sentence under both verdicts – of 24 July 2002 and of 20 May 2003 – was set at six years. 40. The applicant appealed against the charge of the drug offence. 41. On 2 September 2003 the Court of Appeal rejected the appeal as related to another verdict (of 24 July 2002). 42. On 12 May 2005 the Yevpatoriya Court rejected the applicant's request that his mother be allowed to represent him, referring to the fact that both verdicts against him had entered into force. 43. On 22 November 2008 the applicant was released from prison, having served his sentence in full. 44. In December 2008 he was provided with an opportunity to copy the entire case file. 45. On 4 August 2009 he underwent computer tomography, which revealed old fractures of the breastbone and three ribs.

4. The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Dushanbe. 5. In May 1992 a civil war erupted in Tajikistan when ethnic groups under-represented in the ruling elite rose up against the national government of President Nabiyev. Politically, the discontented groups were represented by liberal democratic reformists and Islamists, who fought together and later organised themselves under the banner of the United Tajik Opposition (“UTO”). By June 1997 fifty to one hundred thousand people had been killed. 6. During the civil war in Tajikistan, the applicant was one of the leaders of the UTO. 7. On 27 June 1997 a peace agreement was signed by President Rakhmonov and the UTO leader. The applicant was appointed as the head of the State Committee for Extraordinary Situations and Civic Defence of Tajikistan. While in office, he was awarded the rank of Major-General. 8. In 1999 the President of Tajikistan appointed the applicant as the director of the unitary enterprise Tajikkommunservis. 9. On 13 September 1999 the applicant was elected chairman of the Democratic Party of Tajikistan. 10. On 4 June 2001 the applicant was appointed as the director of the unitary enterprise Tajikgaz. 11. At some point the applicant openly criticised the President of Tajikistan. 12. On 1 December 2004 the applicant moved to Russia. 13. On 25 November 2004 the Tajik Prosecutor General's Office charged the applicant in his absence with terrorism, gangsterism, unlawful possession of firearms and embezzlement. 14. On 26 November 2004 the Tajik authorities chose placement in custody as a preventive measure to be imposed on the applicant. 15. On 29 November 2004 the applicant was put on an international “wanted” list. 16. On 1 December 2004 the Russian Prosecutor General's Office received a request for the applicant's extradition from the Tajik Prosecutor General's Office. 17. On 9 December 2004 the Russian authorities arrested the applicant on the basis of the request for his extradition. 18. On an unspecified date the applicant was placed in remand prison no. IZ-77/4 in Moscow. 19. On 23 December 2004 the Babushkinskiy District Court of Moscow authorised the applicant's detention pending extradition. 20. On 24 December 2004 the applicant appealed against the first‑instance decision. On an unspecified date the Moscow City Court dismissed the appeal. 21. On 29 December 2004 and 18 January 2005 the applicant requested the Russian Prosecutor General's Office not to extradite him, arguing that the request for his extradition had been filed for purely political reasons. 22. In January 2005 the applicant requested the Department for Migration Affairs of the Moscow Department of the Interior to grant him political asylum. 23. On 1 April 2005 the Russian Prosecutor General's Office dismissed the extradition request by the Tajik authorities for the reason that the applicant had filed an asylum application. 24. On 4 April 2005 the prosecutor's office of the Babushkinskiy District of Moscow ordered the applicant's release from custody. 25. Upon his release on 4 April 2005 the applicant stayed at his friend's flat in the town of Korolev, in the Moscow Region, awaiting examination of his asylum application. 26. In the evening of 15 April 2005 the applicant and his friend, Mr L., were walking a dog. At some point the applicant saw two persons wearing uniforms of the Russian State Inspectorate for Road Safety («ГИБДД», “GIBDD”). He assumed that those men intended to arrest him and told his friend to go home. Then the applicant noticed that the area had been surrounded by twenty-five or thirty men with Slavic features wearing civilian clothes. 27. Without identifying themselves or giving any explanations, the two men in GIBDD uniforms, assisted by several men in civilian clothes, handcuffed the applicant. One of the men hit the applicant on the head and placed him in a car; it drove off. After 400 or 500 metres the car stopped; the men in the GIBDD uniforms took the applicant out and placed him in a minivan. 28. They drove for a while. Eventually the minivan stopped and the applicant was taken outside. The surroundings were unknown to him. The applicant was escorted to a sauna and detained there. The guards beat the applicant. He asked for a lawyer, but in vain. 29. On 16 April 2005 the applicant was taken to a forest. The men who had apprehended him met a group of people and conversed with them there. Having listened to them talking, the applicant assumed that the newly arrived people were servicemen of the Russian law-enforcement agencies. 30. At some point the servicemen put a mask on the applicant's face. They did not identify themselves, nor did they give any explanations of their actions. They spoke unaccented Russian. 31. Later they took the applicant with them and escorted him to an airport. The applicant's identity papers were not checked. While boarding the plane, the applicant heard the servicemen talking to a woman who apparently knew them. During the flight the applicant, still blindfolded, heard no instructions or other information usually conveyed in a civil aircraft. 32. On the morning of 17 April 2005 the aircraft landed at Dushanbe Airport and the applicant was handed over to the Tajik law-enforcement agencies. 33. On 17 April 2005 the applicant was placed in the remand prison of the Tajik Ministry of Security. He was kept in a cell measuring 2.3 x 2 metres. There was an iron bed with dirty bedding. 34. For the first ten days of his detention the applicant was registered under a false last name, “Sobirov”. During that period officers of the remand prison regularly beat the applicant. He had no food except for two pieces of bread per day and some water. He was allowed to use the lavatory only once a day. The applicant was not permitted to go for a walk or to wash himself. 35. On the tenth day of the applicant's detention, officers of the Tajik Prosecutor General's Office told him that he would be killed unless he confessed. The applicant made a self-incriminating statement under pressure. He was given some pills, allegedly of a psychotropic nature. 36. On 25 April 2005 the Tajik Prosecutor General gave a press conference and announced that the applicant had been arrested in Tajikistan on 22 April 2005. 37. On 30 April 2005 the applicant was allowed to see his lawyers for the first time since his arrest. He explained them that for thirteen days he had been kept incommunicado and had lived on bread and water. The lawyers' visits took place in the presence of the prison officials. Unsupervised visits were not permitted. 38. On 5 October 2005 the Supreme Court of Tajikistan convicted the applicant and sentenced him to twenty-three years' imprisonment. 39. On 18 January 2006 the Appeals Board of the Supreme Court of Tajikistan upheld the judgment of 5 October 2005. 40. On 2 May 2005 the Presidium of the Democratic Party of Tajikistan requested the President of Russia, the Russian Prosecutor General's Office and the Russian Ombudsman to clarify the circumstances of the applicant's unlawful extradition. 41. On 3 May 2005 the applicant's relatives requested the Russian Prosecutor General's Office to explain how the applicant had been transferred to Tajikistan. No reply was given. 42. On 30 May 2005 the applicant's lawyers enquired of the Russian Prosecutor General's Office whether any measures had been taken in relation to the letter of 3 May 2005. 43. On 14 June 2005 the applicant's lawyers complained to the Russian Prosecutor General's Office that the applicant's abduction and extradition had been unlawful. 44. On 22 June 2005 the applicant's lawyers complained to the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow about the inaction of the Russian Prosecutor General's Office. The court left the complaint unexamined. 45. On 15 June 2005 the applicant's lawyers complained to the Russian Prosecutor General's Office about the allegedly ineffective investigation into the circumstances of the applicant's unlawful extradition. 46. On 20 June 2005 the Korolev town prosecutor's office refused to institute criminal proceedings in relation to the applicant's kidnapping. 47. On 6 July 2005 the Korolev town prosecutor's office quashed the decision of 20 June 2005 and instituted an investigation under Article 126 § 2 of the Russian Criminal Code (aggravated kidnapping). 48. On 8 September 2005 the applicant's representatives lodged a second complaint with the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow. The complaint was dismissed on 28 September 2005. 49. On 16 September 2005 the applicant's lawyer requested the Korolev town prosecutor's office to demand the Tajik authorities to transfer the applicant to Russia for questioning. On 19 September 2005 the request was dismissed. The applicant's lawyers challenged the prosecutor's decision before the prosecutor's office of the Moscow Region, but to no avail. 50. The applicant himself requested the Korolev town prosecutor's office to question him as a victim in Russian territory. 51. On 6 October 2005 the Korolev town prosecutor's office dismissed the applicant's request. The applicant's lawyers challenged the refusal before a court. 52. On 24 April 2006 the Korolev Town Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the applicant had not been permitted to join the proceedings as a victim. That decision was quashed. On 25 September 2006 the Moscow Regional Court dismissed the complaint at final instance on the ground that the applicant's rights had not been breached. 53. On 12 December 2005 the Moscow City Court dismissed at final instance the complaint about the Russian Prosecutor General's inaction. 54. On 27 March 2006 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow dismissed at first instance the applicant's complaint about the Russian Prosecutor General's Office's inaction. On 23 May 2006 the Moscow City Court upheld the decision. 55. On 6 April 2006 the applicant's lawyers challenged in court the investigators' decision. On 25 September 2006 their complaint was dismissed at final instance by the Moscow Regional Court. 56. In November 2004 two Tajik lawyers filed a complaint with the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) concerning alleged violations of the applicant's rights in the course of the criminal proceedings against him in Tajikistan. 57. On 20 October 2005 the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention of the Office of the UNHCHR put questions on the applicant's detention to the Tajik Government. 58. On 24 November 2005 the Tajik Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in reply to the request by the Office of the UNHCHR, submitted a seventeen‑page document in Russian describing the charges against the applicant and the proceedings against him. The document read, in so far as relevant, as follows: “...[i]n accordance with the Minsk Convention, Mr Iskandarov was arrested by the Russian law-enforcement agencies in Moscow in December 2004. In reply to the Russian Prosecutor General's Office's requests, the Tajik Prosecutor General's Office produced the necessary documents concerning Iskandarov's extradition to the Tajik authorities within the time-limits laid down by the Minsk Convention, as well as comprehensive proof of Iskandarov's guilt in respect of the crimes he had been charged with. After that, the Russian Prosecutor General's Office informed the Tajik authorities that a favourable solution would be found to the question of Iskandarov's extradition. It is noteworthy that on 4 April 2005 the Russian law-enforcement agencies released Mr Iskandarov from custody prior to deciding on his extradition but did not officially notify the Tajik Prosecutor General's Office of the grounds and reasons for the release under the Minsk Convention. Mr Iskandarov was officially extradited to the Tajik authorities by the Russian law‑enforcement agencies and on 17 April 2005 he was placed in the remand prison of the Tajik Ministry of Security.” 59. On 29 September 2006 the Office of the UNHCHR forwarded the letter from the Tajik Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the applicant's Tajik counsel and notified her that, in order to consider the applicant's case during its 47th session, its Working Group expected to receive her comments on it. 60. It appears that the proceedings before the UNHCHR concerning the alleged violations of the applicant's rights in Tajikistan are still pending. 61. On 1 December 2004 the Russian Prosecutor General's Office received a petition for the applicant's extradition from the Tajik Prosecutor General's Office. 62. On 9 December 2004 the applicant was arrested in Moscow. 63. On 17 December 2004 the Russian Prosecutor General's Office received an official request for the applicant's extradition, citing the charges of terrorism, gangsterism, unlawful possession of arms, embezzlement and unlawful hiring of bodyguards. 64. On 1 April 2005 the Russian Prosecutor General's Office refused to extradite the applicant on the basis of Article 19 of the Minsk Convention owing to the fact that he had applied for asylum. 65. On 4 April 2005 the applicant was released from custody. 66. On 6 July 2005 the Korolev town prosecutor's office instituted criminal proceedings in relation to the applicant's abduction under Article 126 § 2 of the Russian Criminal Code (“aggravated kidnapping”). The case was assigned number 27807. 67. The investigation established that at about 11 p.m. on 15 April 2005 the applicant had been walking along a street in the vicinity of the house at 14 Sovetskaya Street, Korolev, and had presumably been kidnapped by unidentified persons. 68. Later it became known that the applicant had been arrested in Dushanbe by the Tajik authorities. 69. The investigators questioned Mr L. and his son and daughter, as well as police officers who had been on duty on the night of 15 April 2005 in the vicinity of Sovetskaya Street and the applicant's son. 70. On 8 July 2005 Mr L. stated that the applicant, a friend of his daughter, had been staying in their home since 12 April 2005. On 15 April 2005 Mr L. had gone outside to walk his dog; the applicant had accompanied him to have a cigarette. Mr L., a non-smoker, had walked in the opposite direction to the applicant. At some point he had stumbled upon two men wearing police uniforms and talked to them for some fifteen minutes. Then he had returned home; the applicant was not there. Mr L. and his daughter, Ms L., had searched for the applicant and checked with police stations but in vain. After a while Ms L. had read on the Internet that the applicant had been arrested in Tajikistan. 71. Ms L. and Mr L.'s son made identical depositions. 72. The investigators checked whether the applicant had been taken away by plane from Chkalovskiy Airport. No proof of this hypothesis was found. 73. On 20 June 2005 the Korolev prosecutor's office granted the applicant victim status in criminal case no. 27807. 74. On 18 July 2005 the Korolev prosecutor's office, pursuant to Articles 4, 5, 7 and 8 of the Minsk Convention, requested the Tajik Prosecutor General's Office to establish the applicant's whereabouts and to question him about his abduction and transfer from Russia. 75. On 24 August 2005 the Russian authorities requested the Tajik Prosecutor General's Office to question the applicant and to allow him to study the decision to grant him victim status. On 29 December 2005 Mr Kh., an investigator of the Tajik Prosecutor General's Office, replied that on several occasions he had visited the applicant in the remand prison of the Tajik Ministry of Security in connection with criminal case no. 27807 but that the applicant had refused to make any statements or to study the decision to grant him victim status. 76. The investigation did not establish that any officers of the Russian law-enforcement agencies had been involved in the applicant's kidnapping. 77. On 3 October 2008 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify those responsible.

6. The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Moscow. 7. Between July and September 2000 the Nikulinskiy District Court of Moscow (“the Nikulinskiy District Court”), composed of one professional judge, Mr Bobkov, and two lay judges, Ms Matuzova and Mr Rubtsov, examined the charges brought against the applicant in connection with a drug-related offence. 8. On 4 September 2000 the Nikulinskiy District Court found the applicant guilty of illegal acquisition and storage of narcotics on a particularly large scale for the purpose of sale and of illegal sale of drugs and sentenced him to eight years’ imprisonment. 9. The applicant and his counsel appealed against the judgment of 4 September 2000 to the Moscow City Court (“the City Court”). They complained, in particular, that lay judge Rubtsov had not been appointed in accordance with the law and had not been independent because he worked as a clerk (секретарь суда) at the Nikulinskiy District Court. 10. On 5 October 2000 the City Court returned the case to the first-instance court and ordered it to look into the applicant’s complaints about the competency of lay judge Rubtsov. 11. The results of the inquiry carried out by the Supreme Court Justice Department in respect of the competency of lay judge Rubtsov to sit in the case were summarised in a report of 17 January 2001, which stated as follows: “...The inquiry established that the Nikulinskiy District Court had at its disposal a copy of the decision of 24 October 1991 of the Gagarinskiy District Council of People’s Deputies of Moscow confirming the results of the additional selection of lay judges of the Gagarinskiy District Court of Moscow as well as a copy of the list of lay judges elected by the staff of the Gagarinskiy District Court, which comprised two persons (Mrs Asharova and Mr Rubtsov) and which had not been properly certified. According to information obtained from the Administration of Moscow and from the Moscow Archives, the originals of the documents on the election of lay judges of the Gagarinskiy District Court had not been kept. Nevertheless, lay judge Rubtsov had been in possession of the card [identifying him as a] lay judge of the Gagarinskiy District Court of Moscow, which had been valid until May 1995. The presidential decrees of 22.03.95 No. 299 and 23.01.97 No. 41, 12.12.98 No. 64, 02.01.00 No.37, and 25.01.00 No.103 extended the terms of office of previously selected lay judges until the adoption of the Federal Law on the selection of lay judges and the compilation of general lists of lay judges.” 12. On 3 April 2001 the City Court examined the case on appeal. It held that the applicant’s guilt of acquisition of drugs for the purpose of sale and the sale of drugs had been proved by the evidence examined during the trial. Regarding the allegedly unlawful composition of the trial court, the appeal court held that the term of office of lay judge Rubtsov had been extended in accordance with the Presidential decrees. The court also noted that the fact that lay judge Rubtsov worked for the court as a clerk did not preclude him from being elected as a lay judge. The City Court reduced the applicant’s sentence to five years’ imprisonment and upheld the remainder of the judgment. 13. On 13 February 2002 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (“the Supreme Court”) reviewed the case under the supervisory review procedure. The Supreme Court held that the applicant’s guilt of acquisition and storage of drugs on a large scale had been established. However, the materials of the criminal case file had not contained any evidence which would allow it to establish with sufficient credibility that the applicant had acquired the drugs for the purpose of sale and that he had sold them. In those circumstances, the applicant’s actions should have been classified as illicit procurement and storage of drugs without intent to sell. 14. The Supreme Court amended the judgment of 4 September 2000 and the decision of 3 April 2001, convicted the applicant of illicit procurement and storage of drugs without intent to sell and sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment. With reference to the Amnesty Act of 26 May 2000, the court ordered that the applicant be released from serving his sentence and, consequently, from custody.

4. The applicants were born in 1939 and 1957 respectively and live in Pavlograd and Slovyansk, Ukraine. 5. By a judgment of 7 June 2001 the Pavlograd Town Court (Павлоградський міський суд) awarded Mr Savinskiy 6,376.66 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH)[1] in salary arrears and other payments to be paid by his former employer, the State company Pershotravenskoye shakhtostroyitelnoye upravleniye-4. 6. By a judgment of 24 December 1997 the Slovyansk Town Court (Павлоградський міський суд) awarded Mr Shevchenko UAH 1,829.89[2] in salary arrears to be paid by his former employer, the Soda Plant (ВАТ «Содовий завод»), a joint stock company in which the State holds at least 25% of the share capital. By a judgment of 17 July 2000 the same court additionally ordered the debtor company to pay Mr Shevchenko UAH 7,173.09[3] in payments owed to him upon retirement. 7. After the above judgments had become final, the relevant departments of the State Bailiffs' Service instituted proceedings to enforce them. 8. Subsequently, the insolvency and later the liquidation proceedings against the debtor companies were instituted and the State Bailiffs' Service terminated the enforcement proceedings. The above-mentioned liquidation proceedings are apparently still pending. 9. The judgments in the applicants' favour remain unenforced.

5. The applicants, Ms Lidiya Musayevna Taziyeva (“the first applicant”), Mr Askhab Musayevich Taziyev (“the second applicant”), Ms Pyatimat Musayevna Malsagova (“the third applicant”), Ms Zareta Musayevna Taziyeva (“the fourth applicant”), Mr Aslan Musayevich Taziyev (“the fifth applicant”), Ms Makka Umarovna Taziyeva (“the sixth applicant”), Ms Milana Aslanovna Taziyeva (“the seventh applicant”), Ms Ayshat Aslanovna Taziyeva (“the eighth applicant”) and Ms Rabiya Aslanovna Taziyeva (“the ninth applicant”), are Russian nationals who were born in 1940, 1966, 1971, 1976, 1979, 1982, 2000, 2001 and 2004 respectively and live in the village of Nasyr-Kort, Ingushetia, Russia. 6. The applicants (a mother, her two daughters, two sons, a daughter-in-law and three grandchildren) lived together in a house in Nasyr-Kort. 7. On 27 December 2005 officers of the Federal Security Service of Russia (“the FSB”) and of the Ministry of the Interior of Ingushetia went to the applicants’ home in a search for Mr Ali Taziyev, another son of the first applicant, whom they suspected of terrorist offences. The force consisted of about 100 armed men in black masks and military uniforms, an armoured personnel carrier, six or seven minibuses and two cars without state identification numbers. Mr Ali Taziyev had been declared dead by a court judgment of 6 July 2001. According to the applicants at the time of their submissions, they have not seen him since 1998. 8. At 6.40 a.m. the armoured personnel carrier broke down the gates of the applicants’ house and entered the courtyard, damaging the fence roof, walls, the vineyard and a parked car. The soldiers ordered the applicants, who mostly did not have daytime clothes on (except for the second applicant, who was at work) to come out of the house. They tied up the fifth applicant and made him move around inside the house and its courtyard, threatening him with a gun and demanding to know the whereabouts of his brother, Mr Ali Taziyev. 9. The women and children of the applicants’ family were made to stay outside in sub-zero temperatures, and were then allowed to go to a neighbour’s house, but only several hours later. Some more hours later the fifth applicant heard the armed men saying on their radio that the information that a fighter was present in the applicants’ house was false. At around 12.30 p.m. the servicemen left, without finding any trace of Mr Ali Taziyev. 10. After the soldiers had left, the applicants (joined by the second applicant) found that furniture, carpets and other items inside the house had been damaged, and that money, jewellery and documents belonging to the third and fourth applicants had disappeared. 11. The applicants took photographs and a video of their house and yard, showing the damage caused. 12. The Government disputed the applicants’ version of the events. In their view, when the security forces had approached the applicants’ house they had explained the purpose of their visit, but the applicants had refused to open the gate. They were therefore obliged to ram it with the armoured vehicle. The applicants had refused to cooperate and had insulted the officers. None of the applicants had been forced to stay outside for a long period without appropriate clothes. The time the women and children had spent outside was no longer than two hours. During the search none of the applicants’ belongings were damaged or stolen. 13. Immediately after the incident the first applicant contacted the local police complaining about this incident, in which State agents had been involved, and requesting an inspection of the house. In a written criminal complaint sent the same day, she complained that property both inside and outside the house had been destroyed, and that money, jewellery and documents had been taken. Throughout the subsequent months the first applicant continued to send letters containing these complaints to numerous other authorities. 14. A person from the Nazran District Prosecutor’s Office came to carry out an inspection the day after the applicant had complained. Photographs were taken recording the condition of the gate to the courtyard, which had been destroyed, the damage to furniture inside the house, and the general disorder in the house. 15. On 28 December 2005 the third, fourth, fifth and sixth applicants were questioned. They described the events, detailing the destruction and loss of their property. 16. On 3 January 2005 local police officers were questioned, and testified that on 27 December 2005 a special security operation had been carried out at the applicants’ house. When one of the police officers had approached the group of heavily armed men in masks, about 100 metres from the applicants’ house, he had been told that they were servicemen conducting a special operation to apprehend terrorists. The police officer had not been given any further information on the nature of the operation and the police had not been allowed to go any nearer to the applicants’ house. 17. On 4 January 2006 a NGO, MASHR, sent a letter to the Ministry of the Interior of Ingushetia, requesting an investigation of the events of 27 December 2005. The letter also stated that the applicants had been held outside the house in freezing weather for several hours. The letter was added to the investigation file of the Nazran District Prosecutor’s Office. A letter with almost identical content was sent to the same addressee on 10 January 2006 by another NGO. This letter is also part of the investigation file. 18. On 7 January 2006 the Nazran District Prosecutor’s Office closed the case, holding that there was no evidence substantiating the applicants’ submissions. 19. On 30 January 2006 the Nazran deputy prosecutor set aside that decision and forwarded the case to the military prosecutor’s office of the United Group Alignment (“the UGA”) for further investigation, on the ground that members of the Federal Security Service of Russia had also taken part in the operation, and only the military prosecutor was empowered to investigate allegations against officers of the FSB. The military prosecutor received the file on 25 February 2006. 20. On 28 February 2006 the military prosecutor closed the investigation, stating that no evidence had been found suggesting that FSB officers had committed any crime. The decision stated that it had not been possible to question the FSB officers, as they had been redeployed back to their regular places of service. It does not seem from the decision that the military prosecutor took any investigative steps. 21. On 6 June 2006 the military prosecutor’s office quashed the decision, considering it premature, and sent the case back for further investigation. It noted that the servicemen had not been questioned, the investigation had failed to ascertain what other agencies had taken part in the operation, and the need or otherwise for the destruction of the property had not been assessed. 22. On 9 June 2006 the military prosecutor again closed the investigation. In addition to his previous decision of 28 February 2006 he noted that the gate to the courtyard had been destroyed because the applicants had refused to open it. 23. On 4 December 2006 the first applicant complained to the prosecutor of Ingushetia that she had not been declared a victim in the investigation concerning the events of 27 December 2005 in which property had been stolen from her house. She also mentioned that she had lodged the present application with the Court, and attached copies of the applicants’ statements sent to the Court. In those documents the complaint was made that they had been forced to stand outside in freezing weather without appropriate clothing, and that the fifth applicant had been threatened at gunpoint. 24. In his reply of 15 January 2007 the military prosecutor, to whom the letter had been forwarded, merely referred to the previous decisions taken in the case. 25. On 27 April 2009 the first deputy military prosecutor of the UGA quashed the decision of 9 June 2006 as premature and remitted the case file for additional investigation. He held that the servicemen who had taken part in the operation had not been identified or questioned, and that the substance of the complaints had been neither refuted nor confirmed. 26. The Court has received no information about this further investigation. 27. On 13 June 2006 the first applicant lodged a court action under Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, complaining of lack of investigation of her complaints of theft and that she had not been formally declared a victim in the proceedings conducted by the Nazran District Prosecutor’s Office. She requested that the Prosecutor’s Office’s inaction be declared unlawful and that it be ordered to conduct an effective investigation and prosecute those responsible for the theft of their property during the house search. She also mentioned that during the search of the house they had been made to stand outside in freezing weather without appropriate clothing for several hours. 28. On 16 August and 4 December 2006 the first applicant complained that no court hearings had been scheduled in her case. 29. On 27 December 2006 the Nazran District Court dismissed her action, noting that the investigation file had been forwarded to the competent military prosecutor. 30. On 28 December 2006 the first applicant appealed to the Supreme Court of Ingushetia, arguing that the search had been conducted by the security forces of both the Federal and the Republic Ministries of the Interior, which had no connection with the military prosecutors. 31. There is no further information about those court proceedings. On 30 July 2009 the applicants informed the Court that they had not yet received any decision on their appeal.

6. The applicants were born in 1947 and 1949 respectively. They are married and had two sons: Lom-Ali Aziyev, born in 1973, and Umar-Ali Aziyev, born in 1974. They all lived in an apartment situated on the second floor of a block of flats at 49 Tukhachevskogo Street, Grozny. 7. During the night of 24 September 2000 the applicants and their sons were asleep at home. At around 1.20 a.m. a group of eight armed men wearing camouflage uniforms and masks and carrying torches entered the applicants’ flat, having broken down the door. The men did not identify themselves. The applicants claimed that the men were members of the Russian military, since they spoke Russian and could move around freely in Grozny during the curfew. 8. The men kicked the first applicant and beat him with machine guns. They aimed their guns at both applicants and ordered them to be silent. 9. Thereafter the men proceeded to the applicants’ sons’ room. Without producing any documents to authorise their actions, the men searched the room and arrested Lom-Ali and Umar-Ali Aziyev. As the applicants’ younger son resisted, he was knocked off his feet, handcuffed and blindfolded. Then the men took away the Aziyev brothers, who only had their underwear on and were barefoot. One of the men also took a pair of shoes and a tape recorder. The second applicant’s attempts to obstruct the detention of her sons failed as the men threatened her with firearms. According to the applicants, the men assured them that they would check their sons’ identities and release them immediately afterwards. 10. In the morning the applicants found their sons’ identity documents on a bedside table in the room. The room was in a mess and a sofa was broken. 11. The applicants submitted that the neighbours had told them later that on that night armed men wearing masks, with torches, had been standing on all the landings of their building, between the first and the ninth floors. One of the women neighbours told them that she had been asked about the Aziyev brothers and that she had replied that they were “good boys”. 12. In support of their statements, the applicants submitted two written accounts signed by five of their neighbours from the building, including Mr R., and one account from a man who lived in the building opposite theirs, about 30 metres away. They confirmed the applicants’ submissions and stated that in the early hours of 24 September 2000 the doors of two flats in that building had been broken down by a group of men wearing training shoes and armed with automatic rifles. They asked the neighbours about the Aziyev family, with whom the neighbours were on good terms. One of the neighbours saw the group of armed men walking afterwards towards the military roadblock at the intersection of Tukhachevskogo and Kaspara Streets. 13. The applicants have had no news of their sons since. 14. The Government did not dispute the circumstances of the Aziyev brothers’ detention as presented by the applicants. They submitted that during the night of 24 September 2000 unidentified persons wearing camouflage uniforms and masks and armed with automatic weapons had arrested the brothers L.-A. and U.-A. Aziyev at 49 Tukhachevskogo Street, apartment no. 79, and taken them away to an unknown destination. The same persons had caused physical injuries to the first applicant. 15. On 24 September 2000, in the morning, the first applicant was taken by his neighbours to Hospital no. 9 and underwent a medical examination. 16. The examination established that he had a craniocerebral injury, an avulsed wound (with detached tissue) in the temple area, a haematoma of the head as well as concussion, temporary blindness, a haematoma of the thorax and the subcutaneous stomach tissue, a haematoma of the scrotum, uraemia, fractured ribs and a contusion of the liver, of the kidneys and of the bladder. 17. The first applicant submitted that he had had to stay in bed for about a month to recover. 18. According to the Government, the first applicant had first notified the authorities of the beatings in February 2001. The first applicant argued that he had talked about his injuries to the investigators who had questioned him on 24 September 2000, and that he had mentioned the beatings in a letter to the prosecutor of the Chechen Republic dated 9 December 2000, a copy of which had been submitted to the Court. 19. On an unspecified date the Grozny Town Prosecutor’s Office (“the Grozny prosecutor’s office”) ordered a forensic medical examination of the first applicant so as to ascertain whether there was a causal link between his injuries and the actions of unknown servicemen who had raided his flat on 24 September 2000 and beaten him. 20. This examination was carried out on 8 February 2001. The report relied on a medical record indicating the results of the medical examination carried out on 24 September 2000 and confirmed that the injuries in question could have been sustained during the period and in the circumstances described by the first applicant. 21. It appears that the first applicant’s allegations were investigated in the context of criminal proceedings brought in respect of the abduction of his two sons and that on 17 December 2003 he was granted victim status in that connection. 22. In 2005 the investigating authorities ordered another forensic medical examination on the ground that the results of the examination of 8 February 2001 were unreliable. On 10 March 2005 experts reported that they had not found any signs of injury to the first applicant’s head, face or body, and that X-ray examinations had not disclosed any damage to the first applicant’s heart, lungs or ribs. With reference to the medical record made in Hospital no. 9 on 24 September 2000 the experts concluded that the injuries complained of by the applicant had been acquired on that date, and that the first applicant had been likely to have sustained those injuries during the period and in the circumstances described by him. The report also stated that there were no objective data to confirm the conclusion of the examination of 24 September 2000 that the applicant had had fractured ribs, concussion and contusions of the liver, of the kidneys and of the bladder. 23. Since 24 September 2000 the applicants have repeatedly applied in person and in writing to various public bodies, including the district office of the Ministry of the Interior (“the ROVD”), prosecutors at various levels, a military commander’s office, the administrative authorities of Chechnya and the Special Envoy of the Russian President in the Chechen Republic for Rights and Freedoms. They have been supported in their efforts by two NGOs: Memorial and the SRJI. In their letters to the authorities the applicants referred to their sons’ detention and asked for assistance and details of the investigation. Mostly these enquiries have remained unanswered, or purely formal replies have been given in which the applicants’ requests have been forwarded to various prosecutors’ offices. 24. The first applicant has also visited a number of detention centres and prisons in Chechnya as well as further afield in the Northern Caucasus, but has received no information as to the whereabouts of his sons. 25. On 29 September 2000 the Grozny prosecutor’s office instituted a criminal investigation into the disappearance of the applicants’ sons under Article 126 § 2 of the Criminal Code (kidnapping of two or more persons by a group using firearms). The case file was assigned no. 12200. 26. On 11 October 2000 the Grozny prosecutor’s office granted the second applicant victim status. According to the Government, she was notified of that decision the same day. From the applicants’ submissions it appears that they were not informed of that decision until May 2003, when they received a copy of it. 27. On 29 November 2000 the Grozny prosecutor’s office suspended the criminal proceedings for failure to establish the identity of those responsible. 28. On 9 December 2000 the first applicant wrote to the public prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic (“the Chechnya prosecutor’s office”) and stated the circumstances of his sons’ detention and of his injuries. He stated that his children had never taken part in the activities of illegal armed groups and asked for the persons who had committed the crime to be identified. 29. In a letter of 19 January 2001 the Chechnya prosecutor’s office informed the applicants that the decision of 29 November 2000 had been set aside. 30. On 1 February 2001 the investigation of the disappearance of Lom-Ali and Umar-Ali Aziyev was resumed. 31. On 1 March 2001 the criminal proceedings in case no. 12200 were adjourned, since no culprits had been identified. 32. On 11 September 2001 the second applicant submitted a complaint to the Chechnya prosecutor’s office. In it she outlined the circumstances of her sons’ detention and mentioned that in June 2001 she had seen a list of persons who had allegedly been detained at the Khankala military base and that the name of Lom-Ali Aziyev, detained on 23 September 2000, had been on that list. 33. In a letter of 19 June 2002, in response to a request from Memorial on the applicants’ behalf, the Chechnya prosecutor’s office stated that the decision of 1 March 2001 had been quashed, and the investigation of the abduction of the Aziyev brothers reopened. 34. In a letter of 30 July 2002 the Chechnya prosecutor’s office informed the applicants of the decision to reopen the criminal proceedings in case no. 12200. 35. According to a letter from the Grozny prosecutor’s office dated 29 October 2002, the criminal proceedings were again suspended on 6 September 2002. 36. In a letter of 17 September 2003 the Chechnya prosecutor’s office informed the applicants that the investigation of the disappearance of their sons had been suspended on 27 July 2003, as the perpetrators had not been found. 37. It appears that some time later the investigation was resumed, as in a decision of 17 December 2003 the prosecutor’s office of the Leninskiy District of Grozny (“the Leninskiy district prosecutor’s office) declared the first applicant to be a victim of crime in case no. 12200. 38. On 22 June 2005 the SRJI, on behalf of the applicants, requested the Leninskiy district prosecutor’s office to give them an update of the investigation of the kidnapping of the Aziyev brothers and to allow the applicants, as victims, access to the investigation file. In July 2005 the district prosecutor’s office replied that the investigation had been adjourned on 28 April 2005 and that all the necessary investigative measures had been taken. The second applicant was invited to access the file at the prosecutor’s office during working hours. 39. On 1 November 2005 the Leninskiy district prosecutor’s office informed the first applicant that the investigation had been resumed. On 1 December 2005 the first applicant was informed that the investigation had been adjourned and of his right to appeal. 40. The applicants submitted that their health had deteriorated significantly since the events of 24 September 2000 and the disappearance of their sons. They presented a number of medical documents, according to which the first applicant was suffering from the consequences of a stroke and the second applicant had chronic hypertension and rheumatological problems. 41. In their observations the Government did not dispute the information concerning the investigation of the abduction of the Aziyev brothers as presented by the applicants. Relying on information obtained from the General Prosecutor’s Office, they referred to a number of other procedural steps taken by the investigation which had not been mentioned by the applicants. However, despite specific requests from the Court and two reminders, the Government did not submit copies of most of the documents to which they referred (see below). 42. With reference to the information provided by the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Government submitted that the investigation of the abduction of Lom-Ali and Umar-Ali Aziyev and the inflicting of injuries to the first applicant by “unidentified masked men in camouflage uniforms with machine guns” had commenced on 29 September 2000. They further submitted that an investigator from the Grozny prosecutor’s office had examined the scene of the incident on 24 September 2000, but “had not found any evidence of crime”. The investigator also questioned the applicants. 43. The first applicant was questioned further on 22 June 2002, 17 December 2003, 21 February and 5 April 2005, and the second applicant was questioned as a witness on 11 October 2000 and 22 June 2002. The applicants were granted victim status on 17 December 2003 and 11 October 2000 respectively. 44. In April 2005 new charges were brought against the same unidentified persons who had stolen the applicants’ property. The Government submitted that in September 2006 the investigation had sent requests to all the district departments of the interior in Chechnya with the aim of establishing the whereabouts of the pair of shoes and video player stolen from the applicants. 45. As the Government stated, the investigation questioned a number of witnesses. On unspecified dates two of the applicants’ neighbours, including Mr. R., testified that during the night of 24 September 2000 “unidentified armed men in camouflage uniforms had burst into their flat, checked their documents and then left”. Mr R. had been additionally questioned in October and November 2006, when the investigation decided that no further criminal investigation would be opened, as the witness had not sustained any damage. 46. In November 2005 and October 2006 the investigation questioned twelve persons, some of them the applicants’ relatives and neighbours. According to the Government, they confirmed the arrest of the Aziyev brothers in September 2000 by unidentified armed men. Apparently, the witnesses were mostly aware of this event by hearsay. According to the Government, it was impossible to find other witnesses in the case. 47. The Government submitted that the investigating authorities had sent a number of queries to various State bodies on 11 October 2000, 3, 10, 11 and 16 February and 23 October 2001, 21 June 2002, 1 December 2003, 14 February and 2 November 2005 and had taken other investigative measures, but did not specify what those measures had been. They also submitted that in April 2005 the investigation had sent requests to all district departments of the interior in Chechnya with the aim of establishing the whereabouts of the Aziyev brothers; however, no relevant information had been obtained. The Government referred to a reply from the criminal police Department of the Ministry of the Interior of Chechnya, which had stated that the two men had not been detained by that body and had not been delivered to the law-enforcement authorities. 48. According to the documents submitted by the Government, between September 2000 and November 2006 the investigation was suspended and resumed on eight occasions, and has so far failed to identify those guilty. In the latest decision to resume the investigation, dated 10 November 2006, the deputy prosecutor of the Leninskiy district prosecutor’s office criticised the progress of the investigation and stated that a number of important investigative steps should be taken without delay. These included the following actions: “ – to collect his sons’ identity documents from [the first applicant]; - to obtain full descriptions of the brothers U.-A. and L.-A. Aziyev; - to question the applicants further in order to find out which language the abductors spoke; - to make a legal assessment of the actions of the persons who unlawfully broke into the apartments of [the applicants] and [their neighbour Mr. R.]; - to question the sister of the two kidnapped men; - to question the inhabitants of the nearby houses in order to find out whether they saw servicemen walking to the checkpoint that night.” The Government further submitted that the progress of the investigation was being supervised by the Prosecutor General’s Office. According to the Government, the applicants had been duly informed of all decisions taken during the investigation. 49. Despite specific requests by the Court the Government did not disclose most of the contents of criminal case no. 12200, providing only copies of decisions to suspend and resume the investigation and to grant victim status, as well as of several notifications to the relatives of the adjournment and reopening of the proceedings. Relying on the information obtained from the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Government stated that the investigation was in progress and that disclosure of the documents would be in violation of Article 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, since the file contained information of a military nature and personal data concerning the witnesses or other participants in the criminal proceedings. 50. On 30 December 2002 the SRJI applied on the applicants’ behalf to the Leninskiy District Court of Grozny (“the District Court”), complaining that the Grozny prosecutor’s office had failed to investigate the disappearance of Lom-Ali and Umar-Ali Aziyev effectively. 51. On 19 May 2003 the District Court dismissed that complaint, having found that the investigating authorities had taken all necessary measures to find the Aziyev brothers and those involved in their abduction. The applicants did not appeal against that decision. In their submissions to the Court they alleged that they had been unable to do so, as they had not been notified of the court session and that the decision in question had been taken in their absence. From the copy of the court decision submitted by the Government it transpires that the first applicant attended the court session.

5. The applicant was born in 1929 and lives in Istanbul. 6. In 1950, in accordance with Law no. 4753 regarding the distribution of lands to farmers in need, a plot of land measuring approximately 165,000 m2 on Maden Island, in the Ayvalık District of the Balıkesir Province, was sold to C.Ç. by the State authorities and registered in his name. 7. In 1968, pursuant to Law no. 6831, the Forest Cadastral Commission conducted a boundary marking exercise (tahdit çalışması) on Maden Island. The purpose of this exercise was to detect the forest areas which had not been included on the cadastral map. The outcome of the evaluation was publicly announced and as no opposition was made, this decision became definitive in 1970. It was concluded that the whole of Maden Island had the characteristics of a forest and it therefore could not be the subject of private ownership. This conclusion was annotated in the title deed registry in 1978. 8. In 1985 C.Ç. signed an agreement with the applicant, promising to sell the land in question. 9. Between 1985 and 1987, the Forest Cadastral Commission conducted an evaluation (aplikasyon çalışması) of the area to detect the lands which had lost their characteristics as a forest and to remove their forest status. The decision was announced on 27 January 1988. It was concluded that the plot of land in question had not lost its characteristics as a forest within the meaning of Article 2 of the Law no.4785. 10. On 20 September 1989 the applicant purchased the land in question and registered it in his name. The proceedings brought by C. Ç. against the Forestry Directorate 11. On 10 June 1988 C.Ç. filed an action before the Ayvalık Civil Court of General Jurisdiction against the Forestry Directorate and the Forestry Ministry, objecting to the Forest Cadastral Commission's decision of 27 January 1988. 12. On 15 June 1989 the Ayvalık Civil Court of General Jurisdiction held that it had no jurisdiction to examine the case and transferred the file to the Ayvalık Cadastral Court. The Forestry Directorate appealed against this decision. On 15 December 1989 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the first-instance court on procedural grounds. The case was remitted to the Ayvalık Civil Court of General Jurisdiction. On 30 May 1990 the court declared that it had no jurisdiction to examine the case and transferred the file to the Ayvalık Cadastral Court. The proceedings resumed before the Cadastral Court on 15 November 1991. 13. On 9 December 1992 the Ayvalık Cadastral Court decided to annul the Forest Cadastral Commission's decision of 27 January 1988 and remove the land's forest status. Furthermore, it ordered that the land be registered in the name of the Treasury. 14. Both parties appealed against the decision. On 15 February 1994 the Court of Cassation quashed the decision of the first-instance court. It held that forests could not be the subject of private ownership and therefore could not be distributed to landless farmers for agricultural purposes. Any property claim over a forest was therefore considered legally invalid. The court found that C. Ç. was not entitled to request the removal of the land's forest status. 15. The case was resumed before the Ayvalık Cadastral Court. On 3 April 1995 the Cadastral Court maintained its initial decision of 9 December 1992. 16. The Forestry Directorate and the Forestry Ministry filed an appeal. On 3 April 1996 the Joint Civil Chambers of the Court of Cassation supported the reasoning of the relevant chamber of the Court of Cassation and quashed the decision of the Ayvalık Cadastral Court. The case file was sent back to the Cadastral Court. 17. On 26 November 1998 the Ayvalık Cadastral Court decided to abide by the decision of the Joint Civil Chambers of the Court of Cassation. It consequently dismissed C. Ç.'s case and held that there was no legal benefit for private persons to act as a plaintiff in cases concerning the revocation of forest status. 18. On 28 May 2001 the Court of Cassation upheld the decision of the Ayvalık Cadastral Court. This decision was served on the applicant on 21 August 2001. The proceedings brought by the Forestry Directorate to annul the registration of title 19. On 12 August 1986 the Forestry Directorate initiated proceedings before the Ayvalık Magistrate's Court against C.Ç. to annul the registration of title and for an order preventing further use of the land by C.Ç. On 23 February 1987 the applicant intervened in the proceedings. On 25 June 1987 the Ayvalık Magistrate's Court decided that it had no jurisdiction to examine the case and transferred the file to the Ayvalık Civil Court of General Jurisdiction. 20. In 1988 the court decided to stay the proceedings as the determination of the case depended on the outcome of the case pending before the Ayvalık Cadastral Court (see paragraphs 11-18 above). 21. Following the decision of the Joint Civil Chambers of the Court of Cassation, the proceedings before the Ayvalık Civil Court of General Jurisdiction resumed (see paragraph 16 above). On 5 June 1998, in view of the decision of the Joint Civil Chambers of the Court of Cassation, the first-instance court held that the plot of land in dispute was designated as part of a forest area and could not be the subject of private occupation. It therefore decided to annul the applicant's title and to register the land in question in the name of the Treasury. The applicant appealed. 22. On 22 May 2001 the Court of Cassation found the applicant's grounds for appeal unfounded and upheld the decision of the first-instance court. This decision was served on the applicant on 23 August 2001.

8. The applicant is a Lithuanian national, born in 1972 and living in Vilnius. 9. In November 1994 the applicant became a suspect in a criminal case of fraud. On 29 November 1994 a search was conducted in his flat in the context of the proceedings. 10. On 14 August 1996 the applicant was charged on five counts, including cheating and embezzlement. On 22 August 1996 he was remanded on bail. There were four other co-accused persons in the case. 11. On 10 September 1996 the pre-trial investigation was concluded. From 10 September 1996 until 14 November 1996 the applicant and the co-accused had access to the case-file. On 18 November 1996 the Deputy Prosecutor General confirmed the bill of indictment. On 20 November 1996 the case was transmitted to the Kaunas City District Court. 12. On 3 January 1997 the Kaunas City District Court committed the applicant for trial. On 23 May 1997 the court ordered further investigations in the case and returned the case-file to the investigators. 13. The prosecution appealed against the above decision, complaining that there was no need for further investigation, and that the trial could proceed. On 26 August 1997 the Kaunas Regional Court rejected the prosecution's appeal, holding that further investigation measures were required. 14. On 26 September 1997 the Prosecutor General lodged a cassation appeal against the decisions of 23 May 1997 and 26 August 1997, stating that there was no need for further investigation, and that the trial should resume. On 29 January 1998 the Court of Appeal examined the prosecuting authorities' cassation appeal. The cassation court quashed the decisions of 23 May 1997 and 26 August 1997, deciding that the trial could be resumed. It transmitted the case to the Kaunas City District Court for a new examination. 15. On 13 October 1998 the applicant was taken to hospital with a stomach illness. 16. On 15 October 1998 the Kaunas City District Court found the applicant guilty on four counts, the applicant's defence counsel being present. He was sentenced to five years' imprisonment. 17. On 16 October 1998 the applicant was transferred from the hospital to the prison on the basis of the judgment of 15 October 1998. 18. Upon the applicant's appeal, on 22 March 1999 the Kaunas Regional Court amended the applicant's conviction insofar as it concerned damages which had been awarded against him. The applicant's sentence was not changed. 19. Upon the applicant's cassation appeal, on 30 September 1999 the Supreme Court quashed the conviction and the appellate decision because of numerous breaches of domestic criminal procedure. The Supreme Court found in regard to the applicant that the findings by the lower courts of his guilt on two counts had not been properly motivated, and that the question of damages against him had not been adequately resolved. The case was returned to the Kaunas City District Court for a new examination to be carried out. The Supreme Court ordered the applicant's release on bail. The applicant was not present during the cassation hearing. He was released on the next day when the decision of the Supreme Court was sent to the prison. 20. On 25 October 1999 the Kaunas City District Court returned the case to the prosecution for further investigations to be carried out. On an unspecified date the investigation was concluded. The applicant's trial is currently pending before the first instance court.

5. The applicants are: 1) Ms Khava Aziyeva, who was born in 1983, 2) Ms Aysha Aziyeva, who was born in 2008, and 3) Mr Abdurrakhman Aziyev, who was born in 2010. They live in Grozny, the Chechen Republic. They are the relatives of Mr Rizvan Aziyev, who was born in 1979. The first applicant is his sister, the second and third applicants are his children. 6. At the material time the applicants and Mr Rizvan Aziyev lived at 23 Gagarina Street, in the settlement of Staraya Sunzha in Grozny. The first applicant’s two other brothers, Mr I.A. and Mr Kh.A., had been convicted for the participation in illegal armed groups and were serving their sentences. 7. In 2005 Mr Rizvan Aziyev was arrested in Irkutsk, Russia, and then convicted for the participation in illegal armed groups. In 2008 he was released upon completion of the sentence. 8. For an unspecified period of time, prior to August 2008, the first applicant was married to Mr A.Kh. who was wanted by the authorities for active membership in illegal armed groups. On 31 October 2009 he had been killed as a result of a special operation carried out by the authorities in Grozny (see application Gaysanova v Russia, no. 62235/09 concerning alleged abduction of the applicant’s daughter Ms Zarema Gaysanova by State agents during that special operation). 9. On 31 October 2009 the applicants and their relatives were at home. Mr Rizvan Aziyev was not there. The applicants’ neighbours in the house across the street (at 20 Gagarina Street) were preparing a wedding dinner; their house was full of guests. 10. In the evening on that date a large group of servicemen in military camouflage or black uniforms arrived in about fifteen UAZ and VAZ model civilian vehicles and cordoned off several streets around the applicants’ house. According to the applicants’ neighbours, the servicemen blocked access to the nearby streets to its residents explaining that they were conducting a special operation. 11. At about 7 p.m. a group of about twenty to thirty armed men arrived at the applicants’ house in Gagarina Street in several vehicles. The men were in military camouflage uniforms, they were armed with automatic rifles, had portable radios and special military ammunition belts. The men spoke Chechen and Russian. The applicants and their relatives thought that these men were police officers. 12. Three of the men went into the applicants’ house whereas the rest remained outside blocking the building and the nearby houses. One of the three men, who was in charge of the group, demanded in Chechen that the first applicant telephoned her brother Mr Rizvan Aziyev and asked him to come home without mentioning that the police were waiting for him. Meanwhile, two other men quickly searched the house. One of the intruders received a phone call on his mobile phone and explained to someone that he was at work. 13. The first applicant called Mr Rizvan Aziyev and asked him to come home as soon as possible. Mr Rizvan Aziyev told her that he would be there in about ten minutes. The man in charge of the intruders’ group stood next to the applicant and listened to the conversation. As soon as the conversation was over he took the phone away from her and went outside whilst one of his colleagues remained in the house. 14. The first applicant looked out from the window and saw that a group of about fifteen other men was standing under the shed in the yard. 15. About twenty minutes later one of the policemen opened the house door and asked his colleague to come out. The first applicant tried to follow the man, but he closed the door from the outside. About two minutes later he opened it and left the yard. Immediately afterwards the first applicant heard several cars starting their engines and driving away from the house. 16. According to the applicants’ neighbour, Ms R.A., she saw Mr Rizvan Aziyev being taken away by the abductors who had waited for him next to the applicants’ house. 17. A number of the applicants’ neighbours and the wedding guests at 20 Gagarina Street witnessed the arrival of the group of the men, who had resembled police officers, to the applicants’ house and Mr Rizvan Aziyev’s removal by them. According to the applicants, the overall duration of the special operation was about half an hour. 18. About an hour after the abduction, the first applicant’s relative Mr A. - M.A. went to the Leninskiy district department of the interior in Grozny (the ROVD) and complained in writing about the arrest of Mr Rizvan Aziyev. The officers at the ROVD denied any involvement into the events. 19. On the same evening, 31 October 2009, an officer who introduced himself as Mr Isa, the district police officer, arrived at the applicants’ house, although neither the applicants nor their relatives had informed him about the events. The officer knew that Mr Rizvan Aziyev had been arrested and asked the applicants and their relatives about him and Ms Zarema Gaysanova (see paragraph 8 above). He denied having any knowledge about the whereabouts of the applicants’ relative but promised to assist the applicants in his release. Next morning the applicants’ relative, Mr A.-M.A., spoke with him. The officer denied having any information concerning Mr Rizvan Aziyev’s whereabouts. Subsequently, the applicants found out that Mr Isa had not been a district police officer but a high-ranking officer of a Chechen law-enforcement agency. 20. The following days the applicants and their relatives complained about the abduction to a number of local law-enforcement agencies. None of them accepted the responsibility for arresting or detaining Mr Rizvan Aziyev. 21. On 5 February 2011 the first applicant watched the video footage of the special operation conducted by the authorities against Mr A.Kh. on 31 October 2009 (see paragraphs 8 and 19 above) and recognised one of the law-enforcement officers who had participated in the special operation against Mr A.Kh. as the commanding officer of the group of the abductors who had taken away Mr Rizvan Aziyev later on the same date. That officer on the video had spoken with the Chechnya Minister of the Interior Mr Alkhanov. It is unclear whether the first applicant informed the authorities thereof. 22. The applicants’ submission concerning the circumstances of the abduction and the surrounding events is based on the statements of the first applicant lodged with the application and the additional statement dated 10 February 2011, the statement of the applicants’ neighbour Mr M.T. dated 4 February 2011, the statement of the applicants’ relative Mr A.A. dated 4 February 2011 and copies of the contents of the investigation file opened in connection with Mr Rizvan Aziyev’s abduction. 23. The Government did not dispute the facts as presented by the applicants. At the same time they pointed out that the abduction had been perpetrated by unidentified armed persons, whose outfits and firearms had been common among ordinary criminals, that the body of Mr Rizvan Aziyev was never found and that the witnesses to the abduction had not been sufficiently precise in the description of the abductors’ appearance. 24. On 1 November 2009 the first applicant complained in writing about the abduction to the Leninskiy inter-district prosecutor’s office (the prosecutor’s office). 25. On 2 November 2009 the investigator from the ROVD forwarded information requests to various district police departments in Chechnya asking whether Mr Rizvan Aziyev’s body had been found and/or whether he had been detained by their agents. 26. On 4 November 2009 a group of investigators from the prosecutor’s office arrived at the applicants’ house and briefly examined the crime scene. They only took photographs of the house and questioned Ms R.A. who stated that she had seen the abductors taking away Mr Rizvan Aziyev (see paragraph 42 below). 27. On 6 November 2009 the investigators again examined the crime scene and collected photos and the passport of Mr Rizvan Aziyev. 28. On 11 November 2009 the Leninskiy district investigating department of the prosecutor’s office (the investigating department) instituted an investigation into the abduction of Mr Rizvan Aziyev under Article 126 § 2 (aggravated kidnapping). The case file was given the number 66093. 29. On 12 November 2009 the interim head of the investigating department ordered that by 30 November 2009 the investigators into the abduction took, amongst others, the following steps: “... the murder of Mr Rizvan Aziyev could have been committed by servicemen of law-enforcement agencies. To investigate the matter fully and thoroughly and identify the perpetrators, it is necessary to ... establish eye-witness to the crime and obtain their information concerning its circumstances and the culprits ...” 30. On 14 November 2009 the investigators forwarded information requests to local hospitals and detention centres asking whether they had any information concerning Mr Rizvan Aziyev. The replies received were in the negative. 31. On 16 November 2009 the applicants’ relatives, Ms Kha.A. and Mr A.-M.A., were granted victim status in the criminal case and questioned (see paragraphs 41 and 44 below). 32. On 16 and 17 November 2009 the investigators reiterated their information requests to various district police departments in Chechnya asking whether Mr Rizvan Aziyev’s body had been found and/or whether he had been detained by their agents. The replies received were in the negative. 33. On 10 December 2009 the deputy head of the Chechnya investigating committee criticised the investigation in the criminal case and ordered that, amongst others, that the following steps be taken: “... to correct the deficiencies of the investigation in the criminal case... it is necessary: - to examine again the crime scene to find such evidence as fingerprints with the participation of the [relevant] forensic expert;... - to obtain list of phone calls made by Mr Rizvan Aziyev ... and the list of all mobile phone calls made in the vicinity of the crime scene between 6 and 8 p.m. on 31 October 2009 and establish the owners of the phone numbers from which they had originated ...” 34. On 15 or 16 December 2009 the investigators again examined the crime scene. No evidence was collected. 35. On 11 February 2010 the investigation in the criminal case was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 36. On 20 April 2010 the first applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case. 37. On an unspecified date between January and April 2010 the investigators obtained a detailed list of connections made from the Mr Rizvan Aziyev’s mobile telephone on the date of the abduction, 31 October 2009. According to the list, after the abduction, text-messages were received by the phone in the vicinity of the town of Argun which was about fifteen kilometres from Grozny. 38. According to the applicants, the investigators did not inform them of the progress in the criminal case. The applicants were able to familiarise themselves with the contents of the investigation file only after having been provided with a copy of its contents furnished by the Government upon the Court’s request to this end made on 27 August 2010. 39. On 4 February 2011 the first applicant complained to the head of the Chechnya investigating department that the investigation of her brother’s abduction was ineffective, stating, amongst other things, the following: “... I familiarised myself with the contents of the criminal case file as a result of which the following has been established: 1. My brother had been detained at about 7.20 p.m. on 31 October 2009. The case file contains the list of his mobile phone connections for that day. According to that list, after the abduction, my brother’s mobile telephone had received a text message while being in Argun. At that time a checkpoint had been functioning on the roads leading from Grozny to Argun. Therefore, the persons who had detained my brother had taken him or his telephone to Argun; they had passed through two checkpoints of the law enforcement agencies. However, there is nothing in the case file showing that the investigators had taken any steps in respect of the staff who had manned those checkpoints on 31 October 2009. 2. On 31 October 2009 the persons who had detained my brother had carried out a special operation in Staraya Sunzha. From the information obtained from the local residents, they had condoned off several streets and had not allowed anyone into the sealed off area.... In addition, these persons had used at least ten vehicles ... from the case file it does not follow that the investigation took steps to verify this information. 3. The investigators, when questioning the local residents, could have asked them not only of the vehicles used by the abductors, but also of the direction in which they had left. However, no such steps have been taken. 4. Mr Rizvan Aziyev had been abducted by a large group of armed persons who had arrived in at least ten vehicles and cordoned off significant area in Staraya Sunzha. Every time if a member or several members of illegal armed groups resurface in Chechnya, the authorities take urgent steps to eliminate them. In my brother’s case, the law-enforcement agencies had failed to take any steps to search for his abductors. They had arrived at the crime scene to inspect it several days later after the crime had been reported to them, in spite of the fact that already in about an hour after the abduction my cousin Mr A.-M.A. had informed the Leninskiy ROVD of the abduction. From this it is possible to conclude that the authorities had known that the persons who had detained my brother, had belonged to law-enforcement agencies. It also follows that the investigation in the criminal case should have questioned law‑enforcement officials responsible for the Leninskiy district in Grozny in order to find out the reasons for their failure to take urgent steps to apprehend the abductors ... 5. The persons who detained my brother on 31 October 2009 had been armed, in camouflage uniforms, had arrived as a large group, driven openly around Grozny and cordoned off large areas in the town. Nonetheless, the law enforcement authorities, having received the information about the abduction, had taken no steps to identify and arrest them. Such circumstances provide me with grounds to believe that my brother had been a victim of the State agents as a result of their special operation. In spite of those clear facts, the authorities had failed to establish the law-enforcement agencies empowered to carry out such operations in the Leninskiy district in Grozny and to questions their servicemen. 6. From the above it follows that the investigation should have obtained information of all special operations conducted in Grozny on 31 October 2009 and their results. From the case file it follows that no such information was requested by the investigators. 7. ... I and my relatives believe that Zarema Gaysanova provided the authorities with information about my brother which served as the basis for his arrest. Of course, Rizvan had known my former husband [Mr A.Kh.]. In connection with this the investigation in the criminal case should verify the theory of my brother’s abduction by the same persons who had abducted Zarema Gaysanova and question the law‑enforcement officer known as Mr Isa who had asked me about Zarema Gaysanova. From the case file it follows that no steps have been taken to follow up on this information. ... In the light of the above, the actions of the investigation in the criminal case which led to failure to take the above and other investigative steps are unlawful and unsubstantiated... On the basis of the above ... I request that you: 1. Recognise as unlawful and unsubstantiated the actions of the investigators in criminal case no. 66093 for the failure to take all of the above investigative steps; 3. Inform me of the results of the examination of this request in accordance with the law...” It is unclear whether any reply has been given to this request. 40. No further information was submitted to the Court on the progress of the proceedings; but from the documents submitted it follows that the investigation is still pending. 41. On 4 November 2009 the investigators questioned the applicants’ relative Ms Kha.A. who provided detailed description of the abduction similar to the applicants’ account submitted to the Court. 42. On 4 or 6 November 2009 (the date is illegible) the investigators questioned the applicants’ neighbour Ms R.A. whose statement was similar to that of the applicants submitted before the Court. In addition, she stated that the abductors had told her in Chechen to get back in the house and stay inside. From the conversation she had overheard between them, the witness had understood that the fair-haired intruder of medium height and solid built in embroidered scullcap (tubeteyka) had been in charge of the group. 43. On 6 November 2009 the investigators questioned the first applicant whose statement was similar to the applicants’ account submitted before the Court. 44. On 6 November 2009 the investigators also questioned Mr A.-M.A. whose statement was similar to the applicants’ account submitted to the Court. 45. On 16 November 2009 the investigators again questioned Ms Kha.A. and Mr A.-M.A., both of whom reiterated their previously given statements. 46. On 23 November 2009 the investigators again questioned the first applicant who reiterated her previously given statement. 47. On 23 November 2009 the investigators also questioned the applicants’ relative and the father of Mr Rizvan Aziyev, Mr L.A., whose statement was similar to the applicants’ account submitted to the Court. 48. On 25 November 2009 the investigators questioned the applicants’ neighbour Ms R.M. whose statement was similar to the applicants’ account submitted before the Court. In addition, she stated that the abductors had spoken Chechen and that she had subsequently learnt from the first applicant that when the abductors had arrived at their house, Mr Rizvan Aziyev had been in a shop in the 3rd district in Grozny. 49. On 16 December 2009 the investigators again questioned Ms Kha.A. and the first applicant both of whom reiterated their previously given statements.

9. The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Skopje, “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. 10. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 11. On an unspecified date the applicant, represented by a lawyer, filed a compensation claim against another private person (“the debtor”). 12. On 17 October 1996 the Real Estate Office in Bar (Služba za katastar i imovinsko-pravne poslove Bar) issued a decision to register a mortgage (založno pravo) on the debtor’s flat in favour of the applicant. 13. On 7 November 1996 the Court of First Instance (Osnovni sud) in Bar ruled in favour of the applicant, ordering the debtor to pay 36,000 German Marks, statutory interest and specified legal costs. This judgment became final on 7 January 1997. 14. On 18 March 1997 the High Court (Viši sud) in Podgorica rejected the debtor’s appeal as having been lodged out of time. 15. On 16 April 1997 the Court of First Instance issued an enforcement order (rješenje o izvršenju) ordering the sale of the debtor’s flat by means of a public auction. 16. On 5 May 2000 the same court established the value of the flat at issue. 17. The public auction, scheduled for 1 September 2000, was cancelled on account of the judge’s absence. No further auctions have been scheduled thereafter. 18. On 31 October 2006 the Court of First Instance stayed the enforcement proceedings (prekida se postupak izvršenja) due to the debtor’s death. On 8 November 2006 this decision was posted on the applicant’s door, after a prior written notice (poslije pismenog obaviještenja rješenje pribijeno na vrata). 19. On 9 September 2009 the applicant wrote to the President of the Court of First Instance, urging that the decision at issue be enforced and asking that any relevant information in that regard be sent to him at his address in Skopje, “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. 20. On 15 September 2009 the applicant was informed that the enforcement proceedings had been stayed on 31 October 2006. 21. On 25 September 2009 the applicant wrote again to the President of the Court of First Instance seeking that the enforcement proceedings be expedited. 22. On 28 September 2009 the applicant proposed that the enforcement proceedings be continued in respect of the debtor’s heirs. 23. On 13 October 2009 the Court of First Instance in Bar invited the applicant to provide the names and the addresses of the debtor’s heirs within three days, in default of which his request would be considered withdrawn. It was further specified that no appeal was allowed against this decision. 24. On 9 December 2009 the applicant appealed. He submitted that he did not know the names and the addresses of the debtor’s heirs, and that it was impossible for him to find this out, especially within three days. He further maintained that the court should have acted pursuant to section 32 of the Enforcement Act and should have found the debtor’s heirs, or, alternatively, should have appointed a temporary representative for them without delay (see paragraph 45 below). 25. On 18 December 2009 the Court of First Instance requested the Real Estate Office in Bar (Uprava za nekretnine, područna jedinica Bar) to provide a property certificate (list nepokretnosti) for the flat at issue. 26. On 28 December 2009 the Real Estate Office provided the requested certificate, which indicated that the new owners of the flat were B.N. and A.N., the registered address of the former being in Serbia. 27. On 21 January 2010 the Court of First Instance rendered a decision to continue the enforcement proceedings, designating B.N. and A.N. as the new debtors. On 3 February 2010 this decision was served on A.N. The delivery to B.N. failed as he appeared not to live at the provided address in Serbia. 28. On 15 April 2010 the Court of First Instance requested the relevant Police Directorate in Serbia to inform it if B.N. had residence there and, if so, at which address. 29. On 16 February 2011 the Ministry of Justice of Serbia informed the Ministry of Justice of Montenegro that B.N. had a permanent residence in Serbia, but that he actually lived in Montenegro. On 8 March 2011 this information was forwarded to the court in Bar. 30. On 13 June 2012 the court in Bar invited the applicant to pay 233.88 EUR “for publishing a notice (oglas) in the media, pursuant to section 94 paragraph 6 of the Enforcement Act” (see paragraph 50 below), in default of which the enforcement would be terminated (obustaviti). 31. On 4 July 2012 the applicant’s objection against the previous decision was rejected as inadmissible. It was specified that, pursuant to section 169 of the Enforcement Act 2011, a notice on sale was to be published in the newspapers (see paragraph 51 below). At the same time, the applicant was informed that on 11 October 2011 another interim measure prohibiting the sale of the flat at issue had been deleted from the register of the Real Estate Office, thus creating the conditions for these enforcement proceedings to be concluded (see paragraph 34 below). 32. There is no information in the case file that the notice on sale was published in the newspapers or that B.N. was served with the enforcement decision of 21 January 2010. The enforcement proceedings would appear to be still pending. 33. On 26 February 2004 the debtor passed away. 34. On an unspecified date in 1997 a private person X instituted civil proceedings against the debtor and another private person. On 7 April 1998 the court in Bar issued an interim measure prohibiting the debtor from selling the flat at issue and ordered that this measure be registered by the Real Estate Office in Bar until these proceedings were concluded. On 10 September 1999 the proceedings ended. On 11 October 2011 the interim measure was deleted, following a relevant order of the court in Bar to that effect. 35. On an unspecified date in 2008 a private person Y filed a compensation claim against A.N. and three other private persons. On 11 March 2009 these proceedings were registered in respect of the flat at issue by the Real Estate Office (zabilježba spora). On 23 October 2009 these proceedings ended by a court settlement of the parties. On 12 October 2011 the court in Bar ordered that the note on the proceedings be deleted from the register of the Real Estate Office. 36. On 24 November 2010 the court in Bar requested the Central Bank to calculate the interest rate applicable to the amounts of 34,891.30 EUR and EUR 104.85 starting from 25 March 2004. On 30 November 2010 the Central Bank informed the court in Bar that the requested amounts were EUR 52,411.59 and EUR 157.49, respectively. 37. There is no information in the case file as to when the applicant’s lawyer ceased to represent him save for the letter of 9 September 2009 in which the applicant asked the courts that all the relevant information be sent to him (see paragraph 19 above).

5. The applicant was born in 1979 and is currently being held in Šķirotava Prison in Rīga. 6. On 13 November 2000 the applicant was arrested and detained. His detention was subsequently extended by different judges. 7. On 9 June 2003 the Kurzeme Regional Court (Kurzemes apgabaltiesa) convicted the applicant of aggravated murder and sentenced him to thirteen years’ imprisonment. 8. On 3 November 2003 the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court (Augstākās Tiesas Krimināllietu tiesu palāta) upheld the judgment of the first-instance court upon the applicant’s appeal. 9. On 13 January 2004 the Criminal Department of the Senate of the Supreme Court (Augstākās Tiesas Senāta Krimināllietu departaments) dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law. 10. The applicant was held at the short-term detention facility in Saldus, which was located in a police station, for the following eight periods:  5 June to 5 July 2002;  5 September to 22 November 2002;  13 to 22 December 2002;  5 to 13 January 2003;  22 to 29 January 2003;  5 to 13 March 2003;  22 March to 13 April 2003; and  13 to 23 May 2003. According to the applicant, the conditions therein had not been appropriate for prolonged periods of detention – they had been unsanitary and had not met basic hygiene standards. He had lacked a mattress and had been required to sleep on a hard surface. He had not received a sufficient amount of food. Moreover, no toothpaste had been provided to him. 11. Before and after his detention in the short-term detention facility in Saldus, the applicant was held in Liepāja Prison, save for a period between 13 and 22 February 2003, when he underwent treatment in the Prison Hospital located in the grounds of Central Prison in Rīga. 12. On 23 May 2003, upon the applicant’s complaint to the Ministry of the Interior, the State Police replied that “indeed we have to agree that the conditions in the short-term detention facility need to be improved”. It was noted that the facility had been opened in 1964 and that “it is currently necessary to reconstruct certain parts of it and to improve it”. They asserted that work had already been started and that sanitary conditions would soon improve. 13. The applicant’s cellmates in Liepāja Prison have written to the Court, stating that following the applicant’s return from the short-term detention facility in Saldus his back and one side had had blue marks on them, which he explained had been caused by his sleeping on a hard surface; fleas and lice had been found on him; and he had told them that the overall sanitary conditions had been terrible. 14. The Government provided no comments in this regard. 15. Following its second visit to Latvia from 25 September to 4 October 2002, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“the CPT”) published a report on 10 May 2005, in which it was stated that: “21. In paragraph 23 of the report on the 1999 visit, the CPT made a number of specific recommendations with a view to improving the extremely poor material conditions of detention in Latvian police establishments. However, the Committee noted with great concern that the facts found during the 2002 visit clearly show that the situation has not improved. Conditions of detention were particularly bad at Daugavpils, Liepāja and Ventspils Police Headquarters, where persons were being held 24 hours per day in overcrowded cells, which were very humid, dirty and poorly ventilated. Hardly any of the cells had access to natural light, and artificial lighting was extremely poor. In all three establishments visited, detainees were obliged to sleep on a wooden platform without mattresses and blankets. They were not given the possibility to wash themselves, had access to toilets only once or twice per day, and for the rest of the time were obliged to use a bucket in their cells to satisfy the needs of nature. No personal hygiene products (e.g. toilet paper) were provided... 22. The CPT’s delegation made an immediate observation in respect of the conditions of detention in these establishments. In their letter of 29 January 2003, the Latvian authorities informed the Committee that ... “[T]he issue about ensuring that the detention centres are provided with mattresses and blankets is currently being resolved”. Further, the Committee would like to receive the Latvian authorities’ confirmation that all persons detained at Daugavpils, Liepāja and Ventspils Police Headquarters (as well as in other police establishments) are now provided with a clean mattress/blankets at night as well as with personal hygiene products and are given the possibility to wash themselves and to have ready access to toilets.”

5. The first applicant was born in 1937; the second applicant was born in 1958. They live in Pervomaysk, Mykolaiv region, Ukraine. 6. On 22 June 1999 the Pervomaysk Court awarded the first applicant 1,410.85 [1]Ukrainian hryvnas (UAH) in salary arrears against the Pervomaysk State department for education. 7. On 2 August 1999 the same court awarded the first applicant UAH 324.34[2] in compensation for recreation leave allowance against the same defendant. 8. On 22 June 1999 the Pervomaysk Court awarded the second applicant UAH 794.60[3] in salary arrears against the Pervomaysk State department for education. On 2 August 1999, the same court awarded the second applicant UAH 274[4] in compensation for recreation leave allowance against the same defendant. 9. In December 2003, the Mykolaiv Regional Department of Justice informed the applicants that the judgments in their favour could not be enforced due to lack of the funds in the State budget, and the property of the debtor could not be attached since it was a public institution. 10. The judgments given in favour of the applicants remain unenforced.

4. The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Krasnystaw. 5. On 28 October 2005 the applicant was detained on remand by the decision of the Puławy District Court (Sąd Rejonowy). 6. The pre-trial detention was subsequently extended by the domestic courts. 7. During the detention the applicant served two prison sentences (of ten and four months respectively), ordered in different sets of criminal proceedings against him. 8. On 6 March 2007 the Puławy District Court convicted the applicant of numerous counts of robbery and sentenced him to three years' imprisonment. 9. On 27 September 2007 the Lublin Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) upheld the judgment of the District Court. 10. On 21 November 2007 the applicant's legal-aid counsel found no grounds for lodging a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy). 11. While detained in the course of the above-mentioned proceedings, the applicant's correspondence was censored on several occasions. 12. All envelopes produced by the applicant bear a stamp that reads: “The Puławy District Court, Censored, date ...” (Sąd Rejonowy w Puławach, Ocenzurowano, dnia...) and an illegible signature. Those envelopes contained the following: a) one letter from the Lublin Oncological Centre (sent on 3 March 2006 and stamped on 15 March 2006); b) one letter from a hospital in Lublin (sent on 10 March 2006 and stamped on 20 March 2006); c) two letters from a sheltered-work factory (the first letter sent on 7 March 2006 and stamped on 20 March 2006; the second letter sent on 11 April 2006 and stamped on 24 April 2006); d) one letter from a bank in Poniatowa (sent on 5 September 2006 and stamped on 18 September 2006); e) one letter from the Opole Lubelskie District Employment Office (Powiatowy Urząd Pracy) (sent on 31 March 2006 and stamped on 11 April 2006); f) three letters from the Lublin Municipal Disability Evaluation Board (Miejski Zespół do Spraw Orzekania o Niepełnosprawności) (the first letter sent on 27 February 2006 and stamped on 6 March 2006; the second letter sent on 26 January 2007 and stamped on 1 February 2007; the third letter sent on 8 March 2007 and stamped on 15 March 2007); g) one letter from the ING Bank (sent on 10 May 2007 and stamped on 22 May 2007); h) three letters from the Lublin Social Security Board (Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych) (the first letter sent on18 April 2006 and stamped on 10 May 2006; the second letter sent on 17 August 2006 and stamped on 24 August 2006; the third letter sent on 20 February 2007 and stamped on 1 March 2007).

8. On 5 July 1990 the applicant's mother filed an action with the Zagreb Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zagrebu) against the Municipality of Črnomerec, Zagreb (Općina Črnomerec) concerning her property rights to a part of an apartment building situated within the area of the above municipality. 9. At the preliminary hearing on 17 January 1991 the defendant disputed the plaintiff’s allegations. On 15 February 1991 the defendant submitted its reply to the plaintiff’s claim. The next hearing took place on 2 February 1993. 10. By decision of 9 November 1994 the Zagreb Municipal Court decided that it had no jurisdiction in the case. On 6 December 1994 the plaintiff appealed against that decision. On 25 September 1996 the case file was transmitted to the Zagreb County Court (Županijski sud u Gradu Zagrebu) as the appellate court. 11. On 15 September 1997 the applicant's mother died and the applicant was proclaimed her only heir. He continued the proceedings instituted by his mother. 12. On 12 May 1998 the Zagreb County Court quashed the first instance decision and remitted the case to the Zagreb Municipal Court. The case was received at that court on 10 June 1998 and was assigned to a judge on 1 January 1999. 13. The next hearing before the Zagreb Municipal Court took place on 21 September 1999. The parties repeated their claims. According to the applicant on 27 October 1999 and 20 January 2000 he requested the court to speed up the proceedings. 14. As the law regulating ownership had been changed, on 2 May 2000 the court invited the applicant to adjust his claim to the changes in law. 15. At the hearing on 19 May 2000 the applicant's counsel submitted the adjusted claim. The court invited the Zagreb Housing Council (Gradsko stambeno komunalno gospodarstvo Zagreb) to submit a list of the flats in the building, the names of the owners and occupiers as well as the legal position of the occupiers and the flats. 16. The next hearing scheduled for 27 June 2000 was adjourned. The court repeated its request to the Zagreb Housing Council. 17. At the next hearing on 12 September 2000 the court invited the parties to file their observations concerning the Zagreb Housing Council’s submissions. The next hearing was scheduled for 6 November 2001. The proceedings are pending before the first instance court.

11. The applicant was born in 1987 and lives in Ludvika. 12. In September 2002, when she was 14 years old, she discovered that her stepfather had hidden a video-camera in the laundry basket in the bathroom, which was in recording mode and directed towards the spot where she had undressed before taking a shower. Immediately after the incident, the film was burned without anyone seeing it. 13. In September 2004, two years later, the applicant’s mother reported the incident to the police. An officially appointed counsel (målsägandebiträde) was assigned to the applicant on 5 October 2004. 14. On 21 October 2005 the public prosecutor indicted the applicant’s stepfather for sexual molestation (sexuellt ofredande) under Chapter 6, Article 7 § 3, of the Penal Code. He was also charged on two counts of sexual molestation of the applicant’s cousin, committed during the spring and summer of 2003 when the cousin was 16 years old, for having caressed her thigh and for having expressed his desire to have sex with her. He was charged on a fourth count of sexual molestation for having allegedly looked through the window of the applicant’s room when she was undressing in the late summer of 2003. 15. On 20 January 2006 the applicant, represented by counsel, submitted a claim for damages of 25,000 Swedish kronor (SEK): SEK 15,000 in compensation for violation of her personal integrity and SEK 10,000 for pain and suffering, to be joined to the criminal proceedings. The applicant based her private claim on “the criminal act for which her stepfather was being prosecuted”, without invoking any specific sections of the Tort Liability Act. 16. The applicant, her stepfather, her mother and her cousin gave evidence before the District Court of Falun (Falu Tingsrätt). The applicant explained that on the relevant day in September 2002, as she was about to take a shower, her stepfather had been doing something in the bathroom. When she discovered the camera, it was in recording mode, making a buzzing sound and flashing. She did not touch any of the buttons. She went to her mother in tears, taking the video-camera wrapped in a towel. H stepfather took the camera from her mother. Subsequently, the applicant saw her mother and stepfather burning a film, but she was not sure whether it was a recording of her. 17. The applicant’s mother confirmed the applicant’s statement and added that she did not know whether anything had been recorded since the film had been burned without her seeing it. She had not reported the incident to the police until 2004, when she had heard that the applicant’s cousin had also experienced incidents with the accused. 18. The applicant’s stepfather explained that he had lived with her mother from 1997 until the autumn of 2003. They had separated on account of the incident in question, among other things. He had wanted to try to film with a hidden camera, but it had been an impulsive act. He was not sure whether the camera had been in recording mode or whether a film had been recorded. The applicant’s mother had burned the film without any of them seeing it. 19. By a judgment of 14 February 2006, the District Court convicted the applicant’s stepfather on all four counts of sexual molestation under Chapter 6, Article 7 § 3, of the Penal Code. As regards the first count of sexual molestation, it found it established that he had had a sexual intention in hiding the camera in the laundry basket and directing it at the part of the bathroom where it was usual to undress. It added that the buzzing sound from the camera heard by the applicant strongly suggested that the camera was switched on and was actually recording. Otherwise, there would have been no point in hiding the camera among the clothes in the laundry basket. The hole in the laundry basket indicated that the strategy was quite refined. Regardless of the fact that, afterwards, no one had verified the contents of the film, it could under the circumstances be considered established that the applicant’s stepfather had actually filmed her while she was naked. 20. The applicant’s stepfather was given a suspended sentence combined with seventy-five hours’ compulsory community service. Moreover, he was ordered to pay the applicant damages in the amount of SEK 20,000. 21. On appeal, by a judgment of 16 October 2007, the Svea Court of Appeal (Svea hovrätt) convicted him on the two counts of sexual molestation committed against the cousin, for which he was given a suspended sentence and ordered to pay sixty day-fines of SEK 50, amounting to a total of SEK 3,000. 22. The Court of Appeal acquitted him on the counts of sexual molestation allegedly committed against the applicant. 23. As to the incident in September 2002, the Court of Appeal found it established that the applicant’s stepfather had put a camera in the bathroom and that he had started the recording before she was about to take a shower. Whether a recording had actually been made, however, was unclear. It was apparent, the court continued, that his motive had been to film the applicant covertly for a sexual purpose. Given that motive, it was also regarded as certain that he had not intended the applicant to find out about the filming. Nor, according to the court, had he been indifferent to the risk that she would find out about it. In assessing whether the act legally constituted sexual molestation within the meaning of Chapter 6, Article 7 § 3, of the Penal Code, the Court of Appeal referred to a Supreme Court judgment (published in Nyatt jurisdiskt arkiv (NJA) 1996, p. 418) concerning a man who had covertly filmed his sleeping girlfriend while he masturbated. The man was acquitted of sexual molestation because he had not intended his girlfriend to find out about the filming. Moreover, in the said judgment the Supreme Court held that the isolated act of filming was not a crime in itself, as in Swedish law there was no general prohibition against filming an individual without his or her consent. Following that line of reasoning, and despite finding that the situation the applicant’s stepfather intended to film was obviously of a sensitive nature as regards her personal integrity and that the violation was particularly serious on account of the applicant’s age and relationship to her stepfather, the Court of Appeal found that he could not be held criminally responsible for the isolated act of filming the applicant without her knowledge. The court noted that the applicant had become aware of her stepfather’s attempt to film her, but that this had not been covered by his intent. 24. The Court of Appeal went on to point out that the act might, at least theoretically, have constituted the crime of attempted child pornography (försök till barnpornografibrott) considering the applicant’s age. However, since no charge of that kind had been brought against the applicant’s stepfather, the Court of Appeal could not examine whether he could be held responsible for such a crime. In conclusion, despite finding his behaviour extremely reprehensible, he was acquitted and the applicant’s claim for damages dismissed. 25. As regards the incident in the late summer of 2003, the Court of Appeal found it established that the applicant’s stepfather had wanted to look at her secretly. Thus, although the court found such behaviour reprehensible, he had lacked the intent that the applicant should see him. 26. On 12 December 2007 the Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen) refused leave to appeal.

8. On 29 January 1998 the applicant did not appear at work at the Electricity Company of Macedonia, a public utility company, despite the instruction of his superior according to which no employee was allowed to take any days off for a week due to the heavy workload. The applicant justified his absence with the fact that he had celebrated a Muslim religious holiday which was a public holiday for the citizens of Muslim faith under the Constitution and the respective law. 9. On 3 February 1998 the disciplinary committee of the company found that the applicant had breached the disciplinary rules and been absent from work without authorisation. The committee decided not to dismiss the applicant but fined him with a 15% cut in his salary for three months. 10. On 12 February 1998 the applicant complained to the second instance committee, arguing that there had been a decision of the Ministry of Labour and Social Politics to the effect that 29 January 1998 had been a public holiday for citizens of Muslim faith. As a member of this religious community, he had informed his superior about his absence the day before. 11. On 27 February 1998 the second instance committee upheld the decision of 3 February 1998, on the ground that the applicant had breached the instruction of 26 January 1998 by which no employee was allowed to take days off because of the heavy workload. 12. On 1 April 1998 the applicant appealed to the Bitola Municipal Court, claiming that his rights set out in Articles 9 and 19 of the Constitution had been breached. In particular, he had been fined only because he had celebrated the Muslim religious holiday and had not come to work on that day, in accordance with the decision of the Ministry of Labour and Social Politics according to which 29 January 1998 was a public holiday for the citizens of Muslim faith. 13. At the hearing before the Bitola Municipal Court the applicant stated that he expressed his religious beliefs individually without going to mosques. 14. On 24 March 1999 the Bitola Municipal Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on the ground that he did not adduce any evidence to prove that he was really of Muslim faith. 15. On 14 June 1999 the Bitola Appellate Court dismissed the applicant’s further appeal. It stated that it was true that religious beliefs were an inner matter for the individual person. However, in the instant case it was to be established whether the applicant’s absence from work was justified. Therefore, it was important to establish the applicant’s religious confession. The lower court was correct in dismissing the applicant’s complaint as the applicant had not proven that he had been a Muslim since he had also celebrated the Christian religious holidays. 16. On 14 April 1998 the applicant was again fined for not having appeared at work on 7 April 1998 at the time of the celebration of another Muslim religious holiday, Bayram. The fine corresponded to 15% of his monthly salary over a six month period. 17. On 8 May 1998 the applicant’s complaint was dismissed by the second instance committee. 18. The applicant complained to the Bitola Municipal Court that the Electricity Company had deprived him of his right to an additional paid public holiday for Muslim citizens although he had stated before the second instance committee that he was Muslim. However, he had not considered it necessary to change his name and surname accordingly and wished to worship on his own. 19. On 27 May 1999 the Bitola Municipal Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The court stated that under the relevant law persons of Muslim faith enjoyed the right to paid religious holidays. However, the applicant had not given any evidence to corroborate his statement that he was a Muslim. He had never been absent from work at the time of the Muslim religious holidays before 29 January 1998. On the contrary, he had celebrated the Christian religious holidays, his parents were Christians and his way of life and diet showed that he was of Christian faith. From his employment contract and insurance it transpired that he had been registered as Macedonian without any mention of being a Muslim. The court held that the applicant was a self-proclaimed Muslim in order to justify his unjustified absence from work. 20. On 27 September 1999 the Bitola Appellate Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on the ground that while it was true that the religious beliefs were an inner matter, he had breached the disciplinary rules and had not come to work. He therefore had to justify his absence and it had been necessary to establish through evidence whether the applicant was truly of Muslim faith. There was however no evidence to this effect, as the applicant, an ethnic Macedonian, had been absent from work during the Christian religious holidays and had celebrated them. Therefore, his absence from work was unjustified. 21. On 18 November 1999 the applicant complained to the Constitutional Court that through disciplinary sanctions and judicial decisions he had been discriminated against because of his religious beliefs. In particular, for unknown reasons the courts had not considered his statement that he was of Muslim faith to be credible and had asked him for further proof. He claimed that he should not be required to produce evidence of his religious beliefs. 22. On 12 July 2000 the Constitutional Court refused to examine the applicant’s allegations in respect of the decisions of 3 February, 27 February, 14 April and 8 May 1998 of the public utility company, the decisions of 24 March and 27 May 1999 of the Bitola Municipal Court and the decision of 14 June 1999 of the Bitola Appellate Court for being lodged out of the two-month time limit provided for in the Rules of the Constitutional Court. 23. The Constitutional Court however examined the applicant’s complaint in regard of the Bitola Appellate Court’s decision of 27 September 1999. It noted that the applicant requested the exercise of rights relating to freedom of religion but that he did not produce any evidence concerning his beliefs and refused to do so. As concerned the initial question as to whether when exercising a right to a paid public holiday based on religion it was enough for a citizen subjectively to assert his faith, it held: “Taking into consideration that the rule of law is fundamental to the constitutional order of the Republic of Macedonia under Article 8, paragraph 1(3) of the Constitution, under which it should be implied that objective legal norms take precedence over subjective will when requesting the exercise of legal rights, and given the viewpoint of the representatives of the Christian and Islamic religions ... (the dean at the Theological Faculty in Skopje and the head of the Islamic community in Macedonia) that there are objective criteria to determine whether a citizen holds Christian and Islamic religious beliefs ... the court held that it was necessary to establish objective facts related to the exercise of a right and to obtain evidence of them in a situation where a right is requested. In line with this, with a view to establishing objective facts to assess whether there was discrimination on religious grounds in this case, the court held a public hearing (on 27 April 2000) and three consultative discussions (on 16 and 25 May and 8 June 2000) and on the basis of their contents, in particular, on the basis of the applicant’s statements, it was established that the contents of his religious belief (even their form) objectively did not correspond to those of the Muslim faith (and its form) on several grounds (for example: a lack of knowledge of the basic most important tenets of the religion through which its essence is expressed ... or of the way in which one ‘joins’ the Muslim faith, etc.)” 24. The court concluded that the applicant had not been discriminated against on the basis of his religious beliefs by the requirement to establish the objective facts and dismissed the complaint.

5. The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Kingisepp, Leningrad Region. 6. On 8 March 2001 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of extortion. 7. In 2001 the applicant complained several times to a local prosecutor about the alleged unlawfulness of his detention. It appears that he never received any reply. 8. On 19 November 2001 the preliminary investigation was completed. 9. On 29 November 2001 the investigator allegedly interrupted the examination of the case file by the applicant and his lawyer. Numerous complaints by the applicant in this respect to the prosecutor’s office were of no avail. 10. On 19 April 2002 the Kingisepp Town Court, following adversarial proceedings in the course of which many witnesses including co-defendants and victims gave evidence, convicted the applicant of extortion and sentenced him to six years’ imprisonment. 11. The applicant and his lawyer appealed against this judgment. On 11 December 2002 the Leningrad Regional Court, having heard the applicant and his lawyer, upheld the judgment of 19 April 2002. According to the applicant, in the courtroom he was kept in a metal cage measuring two or two and a half square metres with ten other defendants, and had no room in the cage to take out his notes and use them. 12. Between 8 and 25 March 2001 and between 26 February and 30 May 2002 the applicant was held in the temporary detention unit of the Kingisepp police department (Изолятор временного содержания г. Кингисеппа) in cells nos. 10 and 11. The applicant stated that cell no. 10 had measured fifteen square metres and had held eight to ten inmates; and cell no. 11 had measured eight square metres and had held four inmates. The detainees had never had exercise outside. The applicant was not allowed to take a shower between 8 and 25 March 2001; between 26 February and 30 May 2002 he took a shower only three times. The ventilation never worked, the windows were covered with metal shutters, and the detainees were not provided with bedding or mattresses. The applicant and other detainees had to use the toilet in front of their cellmates, and they did not have a table to eat at. According to the applicant, these detention conditions led to deterioration of his eyesight and caused hypertension and bronchitis. Furthermore, the detainees never had daily outdoor exercise. 13. The Government confirmed that the inmates had been prevented from taking showers because of maintenance work. No further information on conditions of detention in the temporary detention unit of the Kingisepp police department was provided by the Government. 14. The applicant produced written statements by Mr L. and Mr R., who had been detained in cell no. 10 in the Kingisepp police department in 2002 and 2004 respectively. They confirmed the applicant’s account of the conditions of detention there, namely that the cell measured fifteen square metres and held eight inmates; that the sanitary conditions were terrible and that no shower or daily outdoor exercise had been provided. 15. From 25 March 2001 to 25 February 2002, and then from 30 May 2002 to 8 January 2003, the applicant was held in pre-trial detention facility IZ-47/1, Saint Petersburg, in different cells. 16. The applicant asserted that the cells had been overcrowded. All the cells had measured approximately 8.5 sq m, had had six beds and had accommodated from eight to thirteen inmates. In particular, in cells nos. 428a and 679 the applicant had been kept with twelve other detainees, and in cells nos. 694, 682 and 681 there were ten, nine and eight inmates respectively. The cells had been seriously infested with insects, rats and mice. The applicant had had no separate bed or appropriate bedding, and the inmates had slept in shifts. The cells where the applicant had been held had had no ventilation. As the windows had no glass and had only been covered with metal shutters, in winter the temperature had been extremely low and in summer the cells had been hot, stuffy and damp. There had been insufficient access to daylight. The toilet had been less than one metre from the table and the applicant had had to use it in front of his cellmates. The detainees’ attempts to curtain the toilet were punished by wardens. 17. The Government submitted that the applicant had been held in nine different cells (nos. 258, 448, 933, 428a, 676, 694, 679, 682 and 681). Each cell measured eight square metres. According to the Government, no information on the number of inmates in the cells was available, as the documents had been destroyed. All cells had been equipped with heating, natural ventilation, water supply, daylight and artificial light, and with a lavatory pan. The lavatory pan had been separated from the living area by a wall 1.5 m in height. The inmates had been allowed to take a shower once a week. The applicant had had an individual sleeping place and bedding. He had had one hour’s outside exercise a day. The sanitary conditions and temperature in the cells had been adequate, and the cells had been disinfected on a monthly basis. Furthermore, during the detention period the applicant had had regular medical examinations and received appropriate treatment. 18. The applicant produced written statements by Mr L. and Mr R., who had been detained in detention facility IZ-47/1, Saint Petersburg, in 2002 and 2004 respectively. They confirmed the applicant’s account of the conditions of detention there, namely that the cells were constantly overcrowded and the detainees always slept in shifts. 19. According to the applicant, he had complained numerous times to the courts, the Leningrad Regional Prosecutor’s Office, and the detention facilities management, but either had no reply or had been told “the conditions were the same for all”. He stated that he had submitted at least nine written complaints concerning the inhuman conditions of his detention and had complained verbally every day. 20. According to the Government’s submissions, the applicant had complained about the conditions of detention in the Kingisepp police department on 16 and 27 May 2002 and had received a reply on 31 May 2002 about the impossibility of taking a shower for technical reasons. During the whole period of his detention in IZ-47/1 he had lodged only one complaint with the Kingisepp Court. 4. The conditions of transport between the detention facility and the courthouse and the conditions of confinement at the courthouse (a) Conditions of transport to and from the courthouse 21. On 11 December 2002 the applicant was taken to the Leningrad Regional Court for the appeal hearing. 22. The applicant contended that the conditions of his transport to the courthouse and back to the detention facility on 11 December 2002 had been appalling. He had been transported in a special car, designed for ten to fifteen people, with twenty-five to twenty-seven other detainees. The car had been so crowded that the wardens had not been able to close the door and had had to use force to push the detainees in. They had not been able to move during the journey because of the cramped conditions. 23. The Government submitted that the applicant had been transported in a special prison van equipped for the transport of detainees in accordance with applicable standards and designed for twenty-four people. The Leningrad Regional Court is located 2.8 kilometres from IZ-47/1, and the travel time did not exceed 30 minutes. (b) Conditions of detention at the Leningrad Regional Court 24. The applicant stated that before and after the hearing he had been confined to a small unventilated courthouse cell (комната для задержанных) measuring approximately twelve square metres, together with twelve to seventeen other defendants. There were no windows and people had had to remain standing. The applicant had received no food on the hearing day. 25. The applicant had been brought to the courtroom with ten other defendants. They had all been handcuffed to a steel wire, which surrounded the group (“group handcuffing”). 26. The Government submitted that the detention unit of the Leningrad Regional Court had ten cells, was equipped with a toilet and wash stand and had natural light. The cells had mandatory ventilation and lighting. Handcuffs were used only to convey the applicant to the courtroom and back; there was no “group handcuffing”.

4. The applicant was born in 1939 and lives in the town of Bat-Yam, Israel. 5. On 26 June 2001 the Commercial Court of the Kherson Region commenced bankruptcy proceedings against the State Enterprise “Khersonskyy Sudnobudivelnyy Zavod”, the applicant's former employer. According to the Government, these proceedings are still pending. 6. On 4 December 2002 the Komsomolskyy District Court of Kherson ordered that company to pay the applicant UAH 9,879[1] in salary arrears. 7. On 16 January 2003 the Komsomolskyy District Bailiffs' Service of Kherson instituted enforcement proceedings. 8. By letter of 11 September 2003, the Kherson Regional Department of the Ministry of Justice informed the applicant that the judgment in his favour had not been executed due to the substantial number of enforcement proceedings against the debtor company and that the procedure for the forced sale of assets belonging to it had been blocked by the Law on the Introduction of a Moratorium on the Forced Sale of Property of 29 November 2001. 9. On 6 October 2004 the State Property Fund sold 83.61% of the debtor's share capital to a private company. Under the terms of the sales contract, the latter undertook to pay all the salary-related debts of the debtor company. 10. On 22 June 2005 the full amount of the judgment debt was transferred to the deposit account of the Bailiffs' Service. The applicant was invited to submit his bank account details to the Bailiffs' Service. On an unspecified date the applicant received the full amount of the debt.

9. The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Oberwart/Austria. He is an auditor and tax consultant (Wirtschaftstreuhänder). 10. In December 1989, the Salzburg Tax Office (Finanzamt), in the course of investigations into a large scale fraud relating to the “WEB/IMMAG” group, instituted criminal proceedings against 97 persons, requesting them to submit in writing their comments as suspects. 11. On 14 December 1989 the applicant, who in his professional capacity assisted the “WEB/IMMAG” group, wrote a letter to the Oberwart Tax Office. Therein he asked that his income tax declarations for the years 1985 to 1987 be corrected, so that the losses declared be cancelled, in particular ATS 541,585 for the year 1985; ATS 1 million for 1986 and ATS 220,000 for 1987. He further asked that following a re-calculation of his income, new tax assessment orders be issued. 12. On 27 and 28 December 1989 the Salzburg Tax Office informed the applicant that he was suspected of tax evasion in that he had acted as a sham holder of shares in three cases concerning the years 1985–87. It further invited him to submit his comments in writing. 13. After the applicant's request of 15 January 1990 for an extension of the time-limit had been granted, he submitted his comments on 31 January 1990. 14. Until 29 October 1992 the Salzburg Tax Office for the Audit of Large-scale Companies (Großbetriebsprüfung) examined the “WEB/IMMAG” group. 15. On 22 March 1993 the Salzburg Tax Office requested the Oberwart Tax Office to transmit the applicant's tax file in order to determine the amount of evaded taxes. 16. On 17 May 1993 the Oberwart Tax Office replied to the Salzburg Tax Office that the file could not be transferred because of pending investigations. 17. Following another request for transfer of the file by the Salzburg Tax Office on 23 July 1993, the Oberwart Tax Office, on 24 January 1994, replied that the file had been sent to the Vienna Tax Office for the Audit of Large-scale Companies and could only be transmitted after these investigations had been completed. 18. Upon the Salzburg Tax Office's request of 28 January 1994, the Vienna Tax Office for the Audit of Large-scale Companies transferred the applicant's file on 25 May 1994. 19. On 3 June 1994 the Salzburg Tax Office informed the Salzburg Public Prosecutor's Office of the result of its investigations and requested that the applicant be prosecuted for tax evasion. It noted that the losses declared by the applicant for the years 1985–1989 (ATS 541,585 for the year 1985, ATS 1 million for 1986 and ATS 220,000 for 1987) resulted in tax evasion of ATS 327,016 for the year 1985, ATS 603,552 for 1986 and ATS 148,821 for 1987. Thus, the total amount of evaded taxes was ATS 1,079,389. 20. On 8 August 1994, when interrogated by the Oberwart District Court, the applicant stated that he wished to submit his comments in writing directly to the Salzburg Regional Court by 31 August 1994. On that date and on 30 September 1994, he requested extensions of the time-limit as he had fallen ill. On 27 January 1995 he submitted his comments and observations in writing. 21. On 9 February 1995 the Public Prosecutor's Office preferred a bill of indictment against the applicant charging him with tax evasion of ATS 1,079,389 in that he had made false statements of losses in his income tax forms between 1985 and 1987 (ATS 541,585 for 1985; ATS 1 million for 1986 and ATS 220,000 for 1987). The bill of indictment comprised eleven pages. 22. On 31 March 1995, the presiding judge of the chamber dealing with the applicant's case informed the President of the Regional Court that he considered himself biased since he had been the deputy investigating judge in proceedings against other accused relating to the same case. On 21 June 1995, the President decided nevertheless that the presiding judge should not withdraw from the case. 23. On 4 September 1995 the applicant requested that the trial scheduled for 13 September 1995 be adjourned. This request was granted by the court. 24. On 22 November 1995 the Regional Court convicted the applicant of tax evasion, pursuant to Section 33 § 1 of the Code of Tax Offences (Finanzstrafgesetz). As regards the applicant's argument that he could not be punished because his letter of 14 December 1989 constituted “self-denunciation” of a tax offence resulting in exemption from punishment, the court observed that it had not been made in time because the tax authorities had already discovered the offence, and it had not been sufficiently detailed for the purposes of a “self-denunciation”. 25. On 29 October 1996 the written version of the judgment, comprising twelve pages, was served on the applicant's counsel. Thereupon, on 26 November 1996, the applicant filed a plea of nullity (Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde) and requested that the transcripts of the trial be corrected. On 4 February 1997, after having obtained various statements, the Salzburg Regional Court corrected the transcripts. 26. On 28 May 1997 the Procurator General (Generalprokurator) submitted his observations on the applicant's plea of nullity. 27. On 25 June 1997 the Supreme Court scheduled the hearing on the plea of nullity for 29 July 1997. On that day the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's plea of nullity. This decision was pronounced orally. On 2 October 1997 the written version of the judgment, consisting of twelve pages, was served on the applicant's counsel.

4. The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Świnoujście, Poland. 5. From 1990 until 1992 the applicant worked for a company in Cyprus as a technician for the installation of elevators in a hotel that was under construction at the time. On 1 June 1992 he was seriously injured following a work related accident and was hospitalised for 40 days. 6. The Cypriot Ministry of Labour instituted criminal proceedings against the company that was found guilty of offences relating to the accident by the District Court of Paphos (31 March 1994) and on appeal by the Supreme Court (23 June 1996). 7. On 17 September 1997 the applicant filed compensation proceedings before the District Court of Paphos against his employers (civil action no. 3449/97). 8. Between 28 November 1997 and 23 October 2000 the case was continuously adjourned and no hearing was held. In particular, two adjournments were granted at the request of the applicant, one at the parties’ request and four at the defendants’ request. The adjournments were mainly for procedural reasons, primarily, the submission of pleadings and various applications and objections thereto. Further, there was a delay regarding the medical examination of the applicant by the defendants’ lawyers. 9. The case was also adjourned by the court itself four times in the above period, inter alia, from 18 October 1999 until 14 March 2000 and from 13 April 2000 until 23 October 2000. Furthermore, within this period, two new judges were appointed to the case. 10. The hearing began on 23 October 2000. Subsequently, between 24 October 2000 and 23 October 2001 the case was adjourned a total of ten times: once at the defendants’ request, once due to the absence of the applicant’s lawyer and eight times at the applicant’s request. 11. On 24 October 2001 the hearing of the second application of the applicant for amendment of his statement of claim was held. The judge set 29 November 2001 as the date of delivery of the decision concerning the application. However, the relevant decision was not ready on that date and thus, the case was set sine die. 12. On 23 May 2002 the decision on the application for amendment was delivered and the trial judge also informed the parties that a new judge would be appointed suggesting therefore that the trial should start anew. 13. Between 23 May 2002 and 2 September 2002 the case was adjourned once due to the absence of the applicant’s lawyer. 14. On 2 September 2002 the parties agreed that the case should be tried anew. 15. On 10 September 2002 the case was put before a new judge and the case was set for mention on 27 September 2002. 16. The case was subsequently adjourned twice so that the parties could reach an agreement on a sum to be deposited as security of costs subsequent to an application by the applicant in this respect and an objection thereto by the defendant. On 22 October 2002 the court set the hearing for 4 and 5 February 2003. 17. On 20 February 2003 the judge recorded an out-of-court settlement that was concluded by the parties for the payment of 16,500 Cypriot pounds (CYP) as damages for the injuries sustained by the applicant plus CYP 3,000 for legal costs.

5. The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Velenje. 6. On 10 April 1996 the applicant was injured in an accident at work. 7. On 20 January 1998 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against his employer GVV in the Celje District Court (Okrožno sodišče v Celju) seeking damages in the amount of 5,053,330 Slovenian tolars (approximately 21,060 euros) for the injuries sustained. Between 12 April 2001 and 10 April 2002 the applicant lodged six preliminary written submissions. Between 24 September 1998 and 16 January 2001 he made five requests that a date be set for a hearing. Of the three hearings held between 12 April 2001 and 23 May 2002, none was adjourned at the request of the applicant. During the proceedings, the court appointed a medical expert. The court also sought an additional opinion from the appointed expert. At the last hearing, the court decided to deliver a written judgment. The judgment, upholding the applicant’s claim in part, was served on the applicant on 4 September 2002. 8. On 5 September 2002 the applicant appealed to the Celje Higher Court (Višje sodišče v Celju). On 23 March 2005 the court allowed the applicant’s appeal in part. The judgment was served on the applicant on 26 May 2005. 9. On 22 June 2005 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court (Vrhovno sodišče). The proceedings are still pending.

5. The applicant was born in 1961 and is currently serving a sentence of imprisonment in a prison in Baku. 6. The applicant was a founder of the private Borçalı Bank and of the Borçalı Association. He was also the chairman of the bank’s supervisory board. 7. On 19 April 2004 criminal proceedings were instituted under Article 213 of the Criminal Code (tax evasion) by the Ministry of Taxes in connection with the activities of the Borçalı Association. 8. The applicant responded to the investigator’s calls to testify as a witness within the framework of the above-mentioned criminal proceedings and participated in various investigative steps. 9. In particular, on 16 July 2004 the applicant was questioned by the investigator and on 20 July 2004 a confrontation was carried out between the applicant and another witness. 10. On 21 and 27 July 2004 the applicant was again requested to attend to assist with the investigation; however he failed to comply with the request. 11. On 18 and 26 August 2004 the applicant voluntarily appeared before the investigating authorities and two confrontations were conducted by the investigator between the applicant and two other persons. 12. In the beginning of September 2004, the investigator tried to contact the applicant, but he could not determine his whereabouts. 13. On 14 September 2004 the investigator ordered the applicant’s compulsory participation in the investigation. 14. On 28 September 2004 the applicant appeared before the investigating authority. On the same day the investigator in charge of the case informed the applicant that he was charged under Articles 178 (fraud), 179 (embezzlement) and 313 (forgery by an official) of the Criminal Code. The charges against the applicant were based on the results of a financial audit carried out in respect of the Borçalı Association, and on the statements of various persons with whom the applicant had business relationships within the framework of his activities at the Borçalı Bank and the Borçalı Association. 15. Again on the same day, the prosecutor requested the judge to apply the preventive measure of remand in custody (həbs qətimkan tədbiri) in respect of the applicant. The prosecutor gave as the reasons for requesting that measure the seriousness of the applicant’s alleged criminal acts and the possibility of his absconding from and obstructing the investigation. 16. At the hearing before the court, the applicant and his lawyer submitted that the applicant had never absconded from or obstructed the investigation. They also submitted that the applicant’s failure to comply with some of the requests to assist with the investigation had been due to his state of health, because he had been sick at the time. 17. On 28 September 2004 the judge, relying on the official charges brought against the applicant and the prosecutor’s request for the application of the preventive measure of remand in custody, ordered the applicant’s detention for a period of three months. The judge reasoned the necessity for this measure as follows: “Taking into account that Ismayilov Novruz Binnat oglu has committed a serious crime, the possibility of his absconding from the investigation and illegally influencing persons participating in the criminal proceedings, obstructing the normal functioning of the investigation by hiding or falsification of the items necessary for the prosecution, and that there are sufficient grounds [that he might] fail to comply with calls to attend the investigation without any good reason, or flee from criminal responsibility by other means, ... the preventive measure of remand in custody should be applied in respect of Ismayilov Novruz Binnat oglu.” 18. The applicant appealed against the Khatai District Court’s decision of 28 September 2004, complaining of a lack of evidence that he had committed a criminal offence and lack of justification for the application of the preventive measure of remand in custody. He noted, in particular, that he had always collaborated with the investigating authority before his arrest and that the court had not taken into consideration his family status, state of health or other personal circumstances. The applicant also noted that it would be impossible for him to hide or falsify any document relating to the case, because all the relevant documents had been taken from his office by the investigating authority. 19. On 5 October 2004 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the detention order was justified. The relevant part of the court’s decision reads as follows: “After having examined the arguments of the appeal, heard the lawyer’s submissions in support of the appeal and the prosecutor’s submissions against it, the panel of the court considers that the court’s decision of 28 September 2004 should remain unchanged as it is lawful and justified”. 20. On 16 December 2004, the investigator requested from the Deputy Prosecutor General an extension of the applicant’s detention, because although a number of statements had been obtained and a financial audit of the Borçalı Bank had been conducted by the National Bank and the Ministry of Taxes, more time was needed to complete the investigation. 21. On 23 December 2004 the Deputy Prosecutor General submitted a request to the court for the extension of the applicant’s detention period until 28 February 2005. The relevant part of the prosecutor’s request reads as follows: “The records of the documented audit carried out in this case must be obtained, depending on the conclusions of the audit, certain witnesses must be questioned, confrontations must be conducted, if necessary, accounting and handwriting analyses must be carried out, relevant steps must be taken for the reimbursement of the damage caused, Ismayilov Novruz Binnat oglu must be charged with additional offences in connection with the above-mentioned points, and following the end of these investigative actions, it must be determined which other persons in the circle have committed crimes, and the issue of their responsibility must be decided. In order to carry out the said investigative actions, no less than two months are needed. However, the period of remand in custody in respect of the accused person Ismayilov Novruz Binnat oglu ends on 28 December 2004. Thus, because of the complexity of the criminal case and the need for at least two months for the carrying out of the above-mentioned investigative actions, the period of remand in custody in respect of N. Ismayilov must be extended until 28 February 2004.” 22. On 23 December 2004 the judge at the Khatai District Court, relying on the prosecutor’s request, extended the length of the applicant’s remand in custody by a period of two months, until 28 February 2005. The court decision, which is almost identical in wording to the prosecutor’s request, reasoned the necessity for the extension of the applicant’s detention as follows: “The records of the documented audit carried out in this case must be obtained, certain witnesses, depending on the conclusions of the audit, must be questioned, confrontations must be conducted, if necessary, accounting and handwriting analyses must be carried out, relevant steps must be taken for the reimbursement of the damage caused, Ismayilov Novruz Binnat oglu must be charged with additional offences in connection with the above-mentioned points, and following the end of these investigative actions, it must be determined which other persons in the circle have committed crimes, and the issue of their responsibility must be decided. The period of remand in custody in respect of Ismayilov Novruz Binnat ... ends on 28 December 2004. However, as it will not have been possible to complete the additional investigative actions during this period, I consider that the request must be granted and the period of remand in custody in respect of N. Ismayilov must be extended for a period of two months, that is, until 28 February 2005.” 23. The hearing of 23 December 2004 on the extension of the detention period was held in the applicant’s absence, but in the presence of the investigator. According to the record of the hearing, the applicant was represented by his lawyer (F.A.) and the latter took the floor and stated that he had no objections to the extension of the applicant’s detention. 24. On 27 December 2004, when the record of the Khatai District Court’s hearing of 23 December 2004 was made available to F.A., he made written comments on the record, stating that false information was included in it, as he had not participated in that hearing and had not pronounced in favour of the extension of the applicant’s detention. On the same day he lodged a request with the judge of the Khatai District Court for the rectification of the record of the hearing of 23 December 2004. He submitted, in particular, that he had not been informed of the date and place of that hearing and that he had not participated in it. He argued that the record of the hearing had been falsified. 25. Moreover, it appears from the transcripts of phone conversations of 28 December 2004 between F.A. and a court clerk, between F.A. and the investigator in charge of the case, and between F.A. and the Khatai District Court judge who ordered the extension of the applicant’s detention, that F.A. did not participate in the hearing, as all the above-mentioned persons confirmed it in their phone conversation with F.A. In particular, although the judge acknowledged in the phone conversation that there had been a mistake in the record of the hearing concerning the lawyer’s presence at the hearing, in the same conversation he also refused to officially rectify the record. 26. By a decision of 28 December 2004, the same Khatai District Court judge rejected F.A.’s rectification request, holding that the lawyer had participated in the hearing of 23 December 2004. 27. On 28 December 2004 the applicant appealed against the Khatai District Court’s decision of 23 December 2004 concerning the extension of his detention. The applicant complained that he had not been taken to the court for the hearing and that his lawyer had not been informed of the date and place of the hearing. He further submitted that there was no justification for the extension of his detention period and that the first-instance court had failed to substantiate its decision. On 5 January 2005 he lodged additional submissions in support of his appeal, reiterating his previous complaints and asking the court to deliver a special ruling with regard to the judge of the Khatai District Court in connection with the falsification of the record of the hearing of 23 December 2004. 28. On 6 January 2005 the Court of Appeal left unchanged the Khatai District Court’s decision on the extension of the detention period, finding no reason for quashing it. As to the justification for the extension of the applicant’s detention, the appellate court stated as follows: “The investigating authority considers it necessary that the records of the documented audit carried out in this case must be obtained, some witnesses, depending on the conclusions of the audit, must be questioned, confrontations must be conducted, if necessary, accounting and handwriting analyses must be carried out, relevant steps must be taken for the reimbursement of the damage caused, Ismayilov Novruz Binnat oglu must be charged with additional offences in connection with the above-mentioned points, and following the end of these investigative actions, it must be determined which other persons in the circle have committed crimes, and the issue of their responsibility must be decided. At the stage of the carrying out of the said procedural actions, it is not appropriate to release N. Ismayilov from pre-trial detention. The panel of the court considers that the judge of the first-instance court took into account the seriousness of the crime attributed to N. Ismayilov, the possibility of him influencing persons participating in the criminal proceedings if released, as well as obstructing the normal functioning of the investigation or the court proceedings by hiding or falsification of items necessary for the prosecution, and correctly extended the period of his detention. The decision is lawful and justified.” 29. The appellate court did not examine the applicant’s specific complaints concerning his and his lawyer’s absence from the hearing of 23 December 2004 or the alleged falsification of the record of the above-mentioned hearing. 30. The hearing of 6 January 2005 before the Court of Appeal was held in the absence of the applicant, but in the presence of the prosecutor and the applicant’s two lawyers. 31. On 12 May 2005 the prosecutor in charge of the case filed the indictment with the Assize Court. It appears from the indictment that the applicant had been charged with additional offences on 15 April 2005 and that in the meantime his period of detention had been extended by the Khatai District Court until 28 April 2005. The relevant part of the indictment reads as follows: “... on 28 September 2004 Ismayilov Novruz Binnat oglu was charged under Articles 178.2.2., 178.2.3, 178.3.2, 179.2.1, 179.2.2, 179.2.3, 179.3.2 and 313 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Khatai District Court ordered the application of the preventive measure of remand in custody in respect of him. On 15 April 2005 he was charged with new criminal offences under Articles 178.2.3, 178.3.2, 179.2, 179.2.2, 179.2.3, 179.3.2 and 213.4 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan. His period of pre-trial detention was extended by the Khatai District Court’s decision until 28 April 2005 ...” 32. However, despite an explicit request by the Court that the Government submit all the judicial decisions concerning the applicant’s detention, no copy of the decision extending his detention until 28 April 2005, nor any other copy related to his detention until 31 January 2006, was submitted. 33. On 31 January 2006 the Assize Court convicted the applicant of fraud, embezzlement and tax evasion and sentenced him to nine years’ imprisonment.

5. The applicant was born in 1972. 6. On an unspecified date in 2004 the Gdańsk Regional Prosecutor lodged a bill of indictment against the applicant and other persons with the Gdańsk Regional Court. The applicant was charged with attempted murder committed in the context of organised crime. 7. On 20 August 2004 the Criminal Division of the Gdańsk Regional Court requested the President of that court for the secondment of a judge from the district court, L.M., to the bench appointed to examine the applicant’s case. The following dates for hearings to be held were specified in that letter: 26 October, and 16 and 23 November 2004. 8. By a letter of the President of the Regional Court, dated 23 August 2004, the judge was seconded for the purpose of attending the three hearings requested. The letter referred to the agreement of the board of the assembly of the Regional Court’s judges to the secondment which had been given on an unspecified date. 9. Subsequently, hearings in the applicant’s case were held on these first three dates and then later on 14 December 2004, 25 January, 3 and 15 March, 14 and 19 April, 19 May, 17 June, 12 July and 3 October 2005. 10. By a letter of 10 October 2005 the President of the Criminal Division of the Regional Court requested the President of that court to clarify the terms of Judge L.M.’s secondment, referring to certain doubts as to the time frame within which it was valid. He requested clarification on whether she had been seconded only for the three dates specified in the secondment letter of 23 August 2004 or for the whole examination of the case, until the first‑instance judgment. 11. In his reply of 11 October 2005 the President of the Regional Court stated that Judge L.M. had been seconded with effect from 26 October 2004 until a first-instance judgment was given in the case. 12. On 12 October 2005 the President of the Criminal Division of the Gdańsk Regional Court asked the President of that court to second Judge L.M. to the case for a hearing to be held on 3 November 2005. His request was granted by the President’s letter of 13 October 2005, specifically referring to that date. 13. On 26 October 2006 the President of the Criminal Division of the Gdańsk Regional Court stated in a letter to the President of that court that Judge L.M.’s original secondment had covered the hearings held on: 26 October, 16 and 23 November 2003, 14 December 2004, 25 January, 3 and 15 March, 14 and 19 April, 19 May, 17 June, 12 July and 3 October 2005. 14. Subsequently, there was a change of practice concerning the secondment, in that Judge L.M. was seconded by separate letters of 4 and 14 November 2005 for hearings to be held on 10 and 16 November 2005 respectively. 15. On the latter date the court gave a judgment and found the applicant guilty of attempted murder. 16. The applicant appealed, complaining essentially about various aspects of the admissibility and assessment of the evidence by the first-instance court. 17. On 11 October 2006 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal partly upheld and partly amended the contested judgment. 18. The applicant lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court. 19. In additional pleadings of 6 August 2007 he raised another ground for appeal. He drew the Supreme Court’s attention to the doubts which had arisen during the proceedings as to the correctness of the procedure concerning the secondment of Judge L.M., its time frame and its compliance with the requirements of section 77 of the Law on the Structure of Courts of Law as to the procedural requirements that a secondment had to meet. He argued that it was necessary to examine whether his case had been examined by a tribunal established by law. He indicated that he could not substantiate this ground with further details based on a closer examination of the case file because it had already been forwarded to the Supreme Court. 20. By a decision of 20 September 2007 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. The operative part of the decision read: “1) dismisses the cassation appeal as manifestly ill-founded, 2) holds that the court costs of the cassation proceedings be borne by the appellant.” That decision contained no written grounds.

9. The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Tartu, Estonia. He is the owner of the company AS Giga, with a registered office in Tartu. The company has been involved in reconstructing the public heat supply of the city. 10. On 14 November 1995 the Tartu police initiated criminal proceedings against the head of the Energy Department of the Tartu City Government. The proceedings concerned the alleged abuse of his position in contracting a loan with the Ministry of Finance for reconstructing the city's heat supply in an amount higher than approved and guaranteed by the City Council. In the context of these criminal proceedings the Tartu Public Prosecutor (Tartu prokurör) approved a search of the applicant's company's premises on 14 November 1995 in order to determine whether there were any original bookkeeping documents which might provide information with regard to the unauthorised use of the loan. 11. On 15 and 20 November 1995 the Tartu police searched the company's premises and seized respectively 36 and 50 files of documents, which comprised practically all of the company's bookkeeping records from the years 1994 and 1995. The documents seized were recorded by the files and not individually. The applicant estimates that their total number amounted to approximately 10,000. All seized files were placed in a separate room in the Tartu Police Prefecture for examination by the State auditors, who were assisted by staff of the financial department of the Tartu City Government. 12. On 16 November 1995 the applicant filed a complaint with the Tartu Public Prosecutor alleging that the police search and seizure of documents had been unlawful. On 17 November 1995 he complained also to the State Public Prosecutor (Riigiprokurör), submitting that the wholesale nature of the seizure and the failure to make an individual record of the seized items were inconsistent with the requirements of Articles 139 and 140 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 13. On 22 November 1995 the police informed the applicant that he was free to consult the seized documents at the police station for the continued activities of his company. 14. On 23 November 1995 the Tartu Public Prosecutor instructed the police to make a record of the individual characteristics of the seized documents and to return the documents irrelevant to the criminal investigation. 15. On 24 November 1995, in response to the applicant's complaint, the Tartu Public Prosecutor informed him of his instructions to the police to correct the deficiencies in the recording of documents and pointed out that the police had given the applicant access to the documents with the possibility of making photocopies. The prosecutor also stated that his action was open to appeal to the State Public Prosecutor. 16. On 27 November 1995 the applicant filed a complaint with the State Public Prosecutor. On the same day the police returned to the applicant's company three previously seized files. 17. By a letter of 30 November 1995 the Deputy State Public Prosecutor informed the applicant that he had examined the complaint. He noted that the searches had been approved by the prosecutor, but acknowledged that, due to the large number of documents, their recording had been deficient. He further noted that the Tartu Public Prosecutor had ordered the police to remove the shortcomings. He accepted the measures of the Tartu Public Prosecutor and the reply issued to the applicant on 24 November 1995. It was also noted that the applicant was free to use the documents during their examination by the State auditors. 18. On 10 January 1996 the applicant's company filed a complaint with the Tartu Administrative Court (Tartu Halduskohus) asking it to declare unlawful the measures of the Tartu City Council in connection with the inspection of the company's records as well as the police search and seizure of documents. 19. By a judgment of 13 September 1996 the Administrative Court dismissed both parts of the company's complaint. Regarding the impugned police acts the court found that, according to Article 3 § 2(3) of the Code of Administrative Court Procedure, it lacked competence to deal with complaints which fell under civil and criminal procedure. The Administrative Court could not interfere with criminal proceedings and examine the lawfulness of the acts of the bodies of preliminary investigation. 20. In an appeal against the judgment the applicant argued that the police had abused its powers and that its actions violated the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Constitution and the Convention. 21. On 22 November 1996 the Tartu Court of Appeal (Tartu Ringkonnakohus) confirmed the lack of competence to review police actions in criminal proceedings. It held that in the administrative proceedings it could not be examined whether the police, in effecting the search and seizures, had acted contrary to the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Constitution or the Convention. According to Article 120 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, supervision over the lawfulness of measures taken by the police in the context of criminal proceedings rested with the public prosecutor, not with the administrative court. The Court of Appeal quashed in part the judgment of the first instance court and terminated the administrative proceedings in respect of the complaint concerning the police actions. 22. On 15 January 1997 the Supreme Court (Riigikohus) refused to grant the company leave to appeal. 23. In the meantime, on 23 October 1996, the police decided to return twelve previously seized files. The applicant refused in writing to accept them, stating that their seizure had not been documented and that the act of return did not describe each document individually. On 22 November 1996 these documents were sent to the Tartu City Court (Tartu Linnakohus), where the applicant's criminal case was pending (see paragraph 26 below). The applicant agreed to accept the documents in 1997. Of the 86 files seized from the applicant's company on 15 and 20 November 1995, 28 files have been returned to the company. The applicant estimates that at least 5000 – 6000 documents are still not returned. 24. On 4 December 1995, following the seizure of documents, the Tartu police initiated criminal proceedings against the applicant on the suspicion of having misused his official position in the company. On 22 March 1996 the applicant was formally charged with misusing his position as well as with tax evasion and falsification of documents, but on 28 June 1996 the charge concerning misuse of position was dropped. On 1 July 1996 a further charge of fraud was brought against the applicant. 25. On 31 October 1996 the preliminary investigation was complete and the case was sent to the Tartu City Court for trial. 26. By a judgment of 13 October 1997 the City Court convicted the applicant of the charges and imposed a suspended sentence of 3 years and 6 months' imprisonment. It did find that in seizing of documents from the applicant's company the preliminary investigation authorities had infringed upon the procedural requirements stipulated in Article 140 of the Criminal Code. In particular, they had seized documents which were not relevant as evidence in the criminal case, had failed to record the documents individually and had taken away entire files. This had hampered the preliminary investigation of the case as well as its examination by the court. 27. On 18 October 1997 the applicant lodged an appeal against the judgement with the Tartu Court of Appeal. He contended, inter alia, that the indiscriminate seizure of documents from his company AS Giga on 15 and 20 November 1995 violated his rights of defence since he was deprived of the opportunity to submit necessary documents which were in the hands of the police. 28. By a judgment of 12 January 1998 the Tartu Court of Appeal rejected the applicant's appeal on the procedure and upheld his conviction. As regards the procedure, it found that the seizure of documents was conducted in accordance with the requirements of Article 140 of the Criminal Code. The records contained a description of the seized files, their number and the number of pages therein. The documents were thus sufficiently individualised. 29. On 17 September 1998 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court, challenging his conviction as well as the procedure, claiming that the manner in which the seizure had been carried out had adversely affected his defence rights. 30. On 8 April 1998 the Supreme Court upheld the judgments of the lower courts with regard to the applicant's conviction. It acknowledged that in effecting the seizure of documents the procedural norms were not strictly followed, but found that such infringement was not substantial and did not hinder the thorough, complete and objective examination of the case or prevent the court from rendering a lawful and substantiated judgment. It considered that a detailed description of documents in the record of seizure was necessary only when they were used as evidence in the criminal case.

6. The applicants, Mr V.M. and Mrs G.S.M., and four of their children were born in 1981, 1977, 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2011 respectively and live in Serbia. Their eldest daughter, who was also an applicant, was born in 2001 and subsequently died on 18 December 2011 after the application had been lodged. 7. The applicants are of Roma origin and were born in Serbia, where they spent the greater part of their lives. They explained that they decided to leave their country for Kosovo because of the discrimination and ill‑treatment they had suffered on account of their origin in every sphere: access to the employment market, medical care, schooling difficulties and so forth. 8. The eldest daughter of the first two applicants had been physically and mentally disabled since birth and had suffered from epilepsy. 9. After failing to obtain a more secure situation for themselves in Kosovo, in March 2010 the applicants travelled to France, where they lodged an application for asylum. Their application was rejected by a final decision on 4 June 2010. 10. The applicants stated that in the meantime they had returned to Kosovo, and then to Serbia, in May 2010 owing to the precariousness of their situation in France and their inability to provide for their essential needs. 11. In March 2011, as their situation had not changed, the applicants decided to go to Belgium, where they lodged an asylum application on 1 April 2011. 12. During their interview with the “Dublin” department of the Aliens Office on 4 April 2011 the applicants gave an account of their movements to date and expressed their fears in the event of a return to Serbia. The first applicant stated that he had chosen to seek asylum in Belgium because he had been told that he could obtain better treatment for his disabled daughter there. He said that he was suffering from psychological problems. The second applicant said that Belgium had been the choice of the smuggler. When asked about her health, she replied that she was six months’ pregnant. She also mentioned their eldest daughter’s health problems. 13. The applicants maintained that they had explained the reasons why they refused to return to France, where they had been living in extremely precarious conditions. They submitted that they had not been asked to provide any evidence of having left the territory of the Member States of the European Union (“EU”) or regarding the family members’ state of health. 14. On 12 April 2011 the Belgian authorities sent France requests to take the applicants back on the grounds that the latter had been unable to prove that they had left the territory of the Member States of the EU for Serbia since their stay in France. 15. On 22 April 2011, relying on Article 16(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third‑country national (“the Dublin II Regulation”), France refused to take charge of the applicants on the grounds that the couple were considered to have disappeared since May 2010 because they had not collected the notice of final refusal of their asylum application dated 4 June 2010 and this corroborated their statements to the Aliens Office according to which they had left the Schengen Area in 2010 and re-entered it in March 2011, thus leaving for a period of more than three months. 16. On 2 May 2011 the Belgian authorities asked the French authorities to reconsider their position given that there was no conclusive evidence that the family had left the territory of the Member States for more than three months since their stay in France and the applicants were clearly aware of the rejection of their asylum application in France. 17. On 6 May 2011 France accepted the request to take the family back pursuant to Article 16(1)(e) of the Dublin II Regulation. 18. On 17 May 2011 the Aliens Office issued decisions refusing the applicants leave to remain and ordering them to leave the country for France on the grounds that under Article 16(1)(e) of the Dublin II Regulation Belgium was not responsible for examining the asylum application and that France had agreed to take charge of the family. The decisions indicated among other things that the family, who were originally from Kosovo, “had not furnished evidence of their stay” in Kosovo after staying in France nor any certificates regarding any medical treatment or care in respect of the pregnancy, or concerning the child or the father. Considering that France was a country which respected human rights, had democratic institutions, had ratified the Convention and the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees, and was bound to implement the directives of the European Union on asylum and that if a return were to raise a problem under Article 3 of the Convention, the family could always lodge an application with the Court for interim measures, the Aliens Office considered that the Belgian authorities did not have to use the sovereignty clause provided for in Article 3(2) of the Dublin II Regulation. 19. Accordingly, the applicants were ordered to leave the country within seven days and to report to the French authorities at the border crossing. On the same day the applicants were issued with laissez-passer. 20. On 19 May 2011 the applicants, through their legal representative, contacted the Aliens Office for the purposes of providing it with evidence that they had left the territory of the European Union for more than three months (gynaecologist’s certificates, the second applicant’s health card and proof of enrolment at school of one of their children). 21. On 25 May 2011 execution of the orders to leave the country were extended until 25 September 2011 on account of the fact that the second applicant was soon due to give birth. 22. On 16 June 2011 the applicants lodged an application with the Aliens Appeals Board for the decisions refusing them residence permits and ordering them to leave the country to be set aside and for a stay of execution. They argued that the decisions, with the reasons given therein, had not provided them with the examination required by Article 13 taken together with Article 3 of the Convention (M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], no. 30696/09, § 336, ECHR 2011) of their fears regarding a return to Serbia and of their health problems. Firstly, the reasoning was erroneous and incomplete (error as to their nationality, identifying them as Kosovars instead of Serbs, failure to mention their return to Serbia and their Roma origin). Secondly, they could not be blamed for having failed to provide, during their Dublin interview, documents certifying their health problems and their movements to date or for not having substantiated their fears regarding a transfer to France. Like all Dublin asylum-seekers at that time, when they had attended those interviews they had not been assisted by a lawyer or informed of the documents that they should bring and no document had been requested of them. As they had expressed their fears, the Belgian authorities should have asked the appropriate questions and requested the relevant documents in order to ensure that their return did not infringe their fundamental rights. The applicants also argued that France should not have been determined as the State responsible for examining their asylum applications. Under Article 16(3) of the Dublin II Regulation, the obligations regarding the determination of the State responsible ceased where the third-country national had left the territory of the Member States for at least three months. That was precisely the position the applicants had been in on account of their return to Serbia from May 2010 to March 2011 as certified by the documents subsequently sent to the Aliens Office (see paragraph 20 above). Lastly, they submitted that the Belgian authorities should have used the sovereignty clause or the humanitarian clause both on account of their special vulnerability and of the notoriously difficult situation of the Roma minority in Serbia and of the conditions for the reception of asylum-seekers in France. 23. The hearing before the Aliens Appeals Board took place on 26 August 2011. 24. On 23 September 2011 the applicants unsuccessfully sought a further extension of the order to leave the country pending the outcome of the proceedings before the Aliens Appeals Board. 25. On 27 September 2011 the applicants lodged an application with the Court for interim measures suspending their transfer to France pending the outcome of the proceedings before the Aliens Appeals Board. 26. On 28 September 2011 the Court refused to indicate an interim measure. 27. In a judgment of 29 November 2011 the Aliens Appeals Board ruled on the application to have the decisions refusing residence permits and ordering the applicants to leave the country set aside and for a stay of execution. 28. The Aliens Appeals Board dismissed the ground of appeal regarding the conditions of reception in France and based on the risk alleged by the applicants of being exposed to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. It found as follows: “... the Board cannot but observe that the applicants have failed to show that they encountered difficulties in their dealings with the French authorities regarding access to health care for their child or their conditions of reception as asylum-seekers. They have not adduced so much as a shred of evidence regarding the circumstances of the ill-treatment they have allegedly suffered and have merely asserted in their application, without substantiating this with the slightest evidence that could corroborate the facts, “that they found themselves in an extremely precarious situation at the time of lodging their application for asylum and that their only refuge was a night hostel that they had to leave the next morning”. Moreover, although their daughter’s disability had been specified in the “Dublin form”, the parties have not made any allegation whatsoever before the Aliens Appeals Board of encountering particular difficulties in the reception of asylum-seekers as organised by the relevant French authorities.” 29. The Aliens Appeals Board also criticised the applicants for failing to produce in full the NGO reports that they had cited in support of their application, which had prevented it from checking whether the extracts produced did actually concern France. 30. The Aliens Appeals Board set the decisions aside, however, on the ground that the Aliens Office had not established the legal basis on which it considered that France was the State responsible for examining the applicants’ asylum application. 31. On 23 December 2011 the Belgian State lodged an appeal on points of law with the Conseil d’État against the Aliens Appeals Board’s judgment. It disputed the Aliens Appeals Board’s analysis of the applicable legal basis. 32. In an order of 12 January 2012 the Conseil d’État declared the appeal admissible. In a judgment of 28 February 2013 it rejected it for lack of current interest on the grounds that the operative provisions of the Aliens Appeals Board’s judgment were no longer a source of complaint for the applicants because they had returned to Serbia and had left the territory of the Member States for more than three months with the result that Belgium was relieved of any obligation in the process of determining which Member State was responsible for their asylum application. 33. In the meantime, on 22 September 2011, the applicants had lodged an application for leave to remain on medical grounds under section 9ter of the Aliens (Entry, Residence, Settlement and Expulsion) Act of 15 December 1980 (“the Aliens Act”) on behalf of their eldest daughter. They referred to the extreme precariousness of their position and the discrimination they had suffered as Roms in Serbia and Kosovo. Citing several international reports in support of their submissions, they argued that for that reason they had no guarantee that they would be able to obtain the necessary treatment for their daughter’s health condition. They sought temporary leave to remain pending the outcome of the asylum proceedings they had instituted in Belgium. 34. On 30 September 2011 the Aliens Office declared their application inadmissible on the grounds that the medical certificate of 26 June 2011 (see paragraph 38 below), produced in support of their application to have their residence status regularised, certified the existence of a medical problem and stipulated the treatment considered necessary but, contrary to the requirements of section 9ter § 3, 3o of the Aliens Act, did not specify the degree of seriousness of the condition. 35. The applicants indicated in their observations in reply that they had learnt of the existence of that decision during the proceedings before the Court. 36. On 1 April 2011 the Federal agency for the reception of asylum-seekers (“Fedasil”) assigned the applicants a reception facility as their mandatory place of registration, namely, Morlanwez asylum-seekers’ reception centre. 37. The social worker from the centre took down the following account by the applicants of the conditions of their reception in France: “The family decided to leave France because they had no means of subsistence. They were living in a night shelter which they had to leave in the day. They and the children were out on the streets from 7 a.m. They had to use a pushchair as a wheelchair for S., who is disabled. They had no information of any kind apart from the status of asylum-seeker which had been given to them on their arrival. No doctor, no social worker, no lawyer, no interpreter. They had absolutely no means of communication. They had no idea what they should do or what to expect. S. was not receiving any medical treatment of any kind. When her health deteriorated and she had to be taken to hospital, it was the mother’s sister who drove her to the emergency ward at the hospital and acted as interpreter. Once at the hospital the little girl had [epileptic] fits and her hair fell out. That was what decided the family to return to Serbia”. 38. The eldest daughter was examined on 26 June 2011 by a neuro‑psychiatrist at Jolimont-Lobbes Hospital and a medical certificate was drawn up on that day certifying the child’s disabilities. 39. In that certificate, which was sent to the Aliens Office on 1 July 2011, the doctor noted that the child had “cerebral palsy with epilepsy”, suffered from “severe axial and peripheral hypotonia”, that she could not sit up unassisted and soiled her underwear, that she could not talk and appeared not to understand others. He also noted that the child was taking medicines and that she required physiotherapy and appropriate equipment (orthopaedic braces, seat-brace). Those medical findings were confirmed by a neurological examination carried out on 1 July 2011. 40. The eldest daughter was admitted to hospital on 7 and 8 July 2011 for her epileptic fits and a neurological report drawn up. 41. After the second applicant gave birth on 26 July 2011 the family were assigned a new reception centre on 5 August 2011 in an open centre suitable for families, in Saint-Trond in the province of Limbourg. 42. On 26 September 2011, when the order extending execution of the order to leave the country expired, and as they could no longer benefit from material assistance for refugees, the applicants were removed from the Saint-Trond reception centre. 43. The applicants travelled to Brussels, where voluntary associations indicated a public square in the municipality of Schaerbeek, in the centre of the Brussels-Capital administrative district, where other homeless Roma families were also staying. They stayed there from 27 September to 5 October 2011. 44. On 29 September 2011, through their legal representative, the applicants asked the French-speaking community’s General Delegate to the Rights of the Child to intervene urgently with the national authorities responsible for the reception of asylum-seekers. 45. On the same day the General Delegate sent a letter to the Director-General of Fedasil requesting that accommodation be found urgently. 46. A signed statement by the General Delegate dated 2 October 2011 indicated that he also contacted the municipality of Schaerbeek in an attempt to find urgent accommodation for the family. According to the General Delegate, the municipal authorities stated that they did not have power to make a decision and that it was for the federal authorities to decide, and Fedasil declared that it did not have power on account of the decision taken by the Aliens Office regarding France’s responsibility for processing the asylum request (see paragraph 18 above). Fedasil also stated that the application to the Aliens Appeals Board (see paragraph 22 above) was not of suspensive effect, which was why the reception centre had applied the rules terminating the right to material assistance. 47. On 5 October 2011, following the intervention of the General Delegate, the Secretary of State’s office for Asylum and Migration, Social Integration and the Fight against Poverty instructed Fedasil to designate a reception centre as a matter of urgency. 48. After spending two days at the transit centre of the Woluwe‑Saint‑Pierre municipality, also in the Brussels-Capital administrative district, on 7 October 2011 the applicants were assigned a new reception centre as a mandatory place of registration: the Bovigny reception centre for asylum-seekers in the province of Luxembourg approximately 160 km from Brussels. 49. The Government maintained that the applicants had failed to register at the centre. The applicants, for their part, stated that they had gone there by train and a special bus but had been sent back to Brussels to Fedasil’s Dispatching Department on the grounds that their “annex 26quater [order to leave the country] was invalid.” 50. When they got back to Brussels on 7 October 2011 the applicants got off the train at the Brussels Gare du Nord, where they remained without any means of subsistence and with no accommodation despite the very cold weather for nearly three more weeks until their return to Serbia was organised via a charitable organisation as part of the Fedasil return programme. The applicants left Belgium for Serbia on 25 October 2011. 51. In the meantime, on 12 October 2011, the applicants’ mandatory place of residence had been changed to code 207 “no-show” (see paragraph 81 below) and on 25 November 2011 the applicants’ names were deleted from the waiting register. 52. After their return to Serbia their eldest daughter’s health deteriorated, forcing the applicants to leave the room they had rented on account of the insalubrious conditions. They went to stay with a relative in Novi-Sad and then to the suburbs in Belgrade. 53. The applicants’ eldest daughter was admitted to hospital on 4 December 2011 suffering from a lung infection. She died on 18 December 2011. 54. In a letter to their lawyer of 21 November 2012 the applicants stated that they had been attacked by Serbs on a number of occasions: among other incidents, some men had driven by in a car and broken the windows of their home by throwing stones, and had uttered threats, complaining of their links with the “Belgians” and ordering them to leave Serbia. The first applicant had attempted to defend himself and been beaten up twice by his attackers.

5. The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Biysk, the Altay Region. 6. On 13 October 2003 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of theft and brought to the Priobskiy police station of the Department of the Interior in Biysk (Территориальное отделение милиции «Приобский» Управления внутренних дел по г. Бийску). He was put in the station’s temporary detention facility (ИВС УВД г. Бийска). 7. On 15 October 2003 at midnight the applicant was examined by a medical auxiliary at the temporary detention facility. No injuries were found on him. 8. On the same day the Priobskiy District Court of Biysk ordered that the applicant be remanded in custody. 9. On 21 October 2003 the applicant was charged with theft, and on 24 October 2003 he was transferred to Biysk remand prison IZ-22/2 (учреждение ИЗ-22/2 г. Бийска УФСИН России по Алтайскому краю). It appears that no injuries were found on the applicant on his admission to the remand prison. 10. According to the applicant, from 13 October to 24 October 2003 the policemen of the Priobskiy police station interrogated him about his suspected involvement in an organised criminal group. The applicant alleged to have been ill-treated by the policemen during the interrogations. He contended that the policemen kicked him, used a gas mask to restrict his air supply, and gave him electric shocks. 11. As a result of the alleged intimidation the applicant made a confession statement. The exact contents of the statement were not made available to the Court. According to the Government the applicant’s defence counsel was present when the applicant made his confession statement. The applicant did not claim otherwise. 12. On 22 October 2003 the applicant filed a complaint about ill‑treatment to the Biysk City Prosecutor’s Office. 13. Shortly afterwards the assistant of the Biysk City Prosecutor ordered the applicant’s forensic medical examination. 14. On 5 November 2003 the applicant was examined by a forensic medical expert (report no. 4918). The following injuries were discovered on him: an abrasion in the left lumbar region (measurements illegible on the copy of the report), a deep abrasion on the right shin measuring 7 x 0.3 cm, a bruise on the internal surface of the right knee joint measuring 3 x 4 cm, and a scar on the upper lip mucous membrane measuring 2 cm. The expert concluded that the injuries could have been caused by a blunt, hard object in the period of time between 13 October and 16 October 2003, on account of the nature of the abrasions and scars and the colour of the bruise. The expert further indicated that the above injuries did not cause harm to the applicant’s health. 15. On 13 November 2003 investigator M. of the Biysk City Prosecutor’s Office refused to institute criminal proceedings against the policemen because there was no indication of a criminal offence. The investigator’s decision was based on statements by policemen Kh., Yar. and K., who submitted that the applicant had agreed to go to the police station to be questioned on suspicion of theft and that no force or intimidation had been used on him during the interview, and statements by the investigator dealing with the criminal case against the applicant who submitted that he had questioned the applicant as a suspect in the presence of the applicant’s defence counsel, that the applicant had been subsequently released, that he had had no visible injuries on his body and had not complained about any intimidation by policemen. 16. On 11 May 2004 the Deputy Prosecutor of Biysk annulled the above decision and ordered an additional inquiry into the applicant’s complaints of ill-treatment. A copy of the above decision was not made available to the Court. 17. On 28 November 2004, following an additional inquiry into the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment, chief investigator B. of the Biysk City Prosecutor’s Office refused to institute criminal proceedings against the alleged perpetrators. The decision was based on statements by investigators Kolp. and Gar., statements by police officers Sel., Yud., Petr., Prokh., Ser., Kh., Yar. and K., and a certificate attesting to the fact that from 15 October to 24 October 2003 the applicant was held in the temporary detention facility, that he had had no injuries upon his admission to the temporary detention facility on 15 October 2003 or later upon his admission to the remand prison on 24 October 2003. 18. On 21 March 2005 the Deputy Prosecutor of the Altay Region upheld the above-mentioned decision. 19. The applicant appealed against the decision of 28 November 2004 to the court. 20. On 30 November 2005 the Vostochniy District Court of Biysk held that the decision of 28 November 2004 had been lawful and substantiated. The court noted the following: - Policemen Sel., Yud., Petr., Prokh., Ser., Kh., Yar., K. and G. denied having used physical force or intimidation against the applicant; - Investigators Kolp. and Gar. stated that no physical force had been applied to the applicant during the investigation of the criminal case against him and that no complaints in this respect had been made by the applicant; - According to the certificate issued by the temporary detention facility the applicant had been held at the police station from 15 October to 24 October 2003. He had no injuries on his body when he had arrived at the police station. - According to the certificate issued by Biysk remand prison IZ-22/2 the applicant had had no injuries when he arrived on 24 October 2003. - According to the finding of forensic medical examination no. 4918 of 5 November 2003 the applicant had had an abrasion in the left lumbar region, a deep abrasion on the right shin, a bruise on the right knee joint and a scar on the upper lip mucous membrane. The report noted that the injuries could have been caused by a blunt, hard object in the period of time between 13 October and 16 October 2003, on account of the nature of the abrasions and scars and the colour of the bruise. The injuries were not deemed harmful to the applicant’s health. The court held that the fact that the applicant’s injuries had been confirmed by a forensic medical examination could not serve as a sufficient ground for instituting criminal proceedings against the police officers, since “the expert examination only certified the presence of bodily injuries and did not answer the question as to who had caused those injuries to the applicant and under what circumstances”. 21. The applicant appealed to the Altay Regional Court. He claimed that the refusal to open a criminal investigation had been based exclusively on the statements by the police officers concerned whereas no evidence had been taken from those who had been detained with him and who could have confirmed his account of events. He further insisted that his injuries were confirmed by the forensic medical examination and two videotapes recorded by the police officers in the course of gathering the evidence against him. 22. On 19 January 2006 the Altay Regional Court upheld the decision of 30 November 2005 on appeal. The court noted that the decision of 30 November 2005 had been taken after careful examination and assessment of statements by the individuals who were in a place to know about the circumstances of the alleged beatings, the results of a forensic medical examination, and relevant documents from the temporary detention ward and the remand prison where the applicant had been detained. The court further found that the failure to question the applicant’s cellmates did not mean that the decision of the investigator had been unlawful and unjustified, since the above individuals had not witnessed the alleged beatings and could not therefore have furnished any information about the circumstances of the alleged events. The court went on to say that the fact that the applicant’s injuries were confirmed by the expert did not necessarily imply that the injuries had been caused as a result of resort to physical violence by the police officers. No alternative version, however, was put forward to explain the origin of the applicant’s injuries. 23. On 11 November 2004 the Altay Regional Court, in a jury trial, convicted the applicant of robbery and five counts of theft, and sentenced him to thirteen years’ imprisonment. The following evidence was examined by the jury: the statements by the victims and the witnesses, the applicant’s confession statement made at the pre-trial stage and his further confession statements made at the trial, a statement by one of the applicant’s co-defendants, reports of various examinations (forensic medical examination, crime scene examination, trace examination), and records of the seizure of the victims’ belongings. 24. While examining the issue of the admissibility of the applicant’s confession statement made at the pre-trial stage, the trial court questioned police officers Ser., Sel., Petr., Prokh. and Yud., who denied having used any unlawful methods of investigation on the applicant. It viewed the videotape of a conversation between the applicant and a police officer (date unspecified) and pictures (фототаблица) taken on 21 October 2003 in the course of an investigative procedure, in which no signs of visible injuries could be seen on the applicant. The court further questioned the attesting witnesses who had participated in various investigative procedures with the applicant between 15 October and 13 November 2003 and had not seen any visible injuries on him either. Finally, the court refused the applicant’s request to obtain attendance and question those who had been detained together with him at the temporary detention facility. 25. The applicant appealed, claiming, inter alia, that the jury had found him guilty on the basis of his confession statement, which had been obtained under duress. 26. On 10 February 2005 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the conviction on appeal. 27. On 3 August 2005 the Presidium of the Supreme Court of Russia, by way of supervisory review, modified the qualification of the crimes committed by the applicant and reduced the sentence to twelve years’ imprisonment. 28. After the application was communicated to the Russian Government, in June 2009 the internal security department of the Ministry of the Interior of the Altay Region (Управление собственной безопасности ГУВД по Алтайскому краю) was charged with a further inquiry into the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment. 29. In the course of the inquiry information was received about the possible infliction of the injuries in question prior to the applicant’s arrest. Namely, on 28 September 2003 the Priobskiy police station registered a complaint to the effect that on that date at about 2 a.m. on Martjyanova Street in Biysk unidentified persons caused injuries to Alchagin V. During the inquiry Alchagin V. explained that on 28 September 2003, in a state of inebriation, he had fallen over several times on his way home, thereby sustaining bodily injuries. According to forensic medical examination report no. 4227 the injuries (multiple bruises to the face, head and body) were possibly sustained on 28 September 2003 as a result of a fall from his own height and did not cause harm to his health. Subsequently, Alchagin V. asked for the inquiry to be discontinued. For that reason, on 3 October 2003 a decision not to open a criminal investigation into the matter was issued.

4. The applicants were born in 1937, 1933, 1941 and 1934, respectively, and live in Albania and the United States of America. 5. On 30 December 1994 the Tirana Restitution and Compensation of Properties Commission (“the Commission”) recognised, amongst others, the applicants’ inherited property rights over a plot of land measuring 2,461.97 sq. m and decided to restore the property. Since buildings had been constructed on the land by a third party, the Commission ruled that the third party should pay rent for the land or re-purchase the land pursuant to an agreement to be entered into between the parties. It also recognised the applicants’ right to first refusal of the buildings. 6. On 18 February 1997 the applicants lodged a civil claim with the Tirana District Court seeking the annulment of a 1996 sale contract entered between the State and the third party over two plots of lands measuring 197 sq. m and 195 sq. m, which they claimed to own. The applicants also sought the payment of rent by the third party pursuant to the 1993 Property Act. In the same set of proceedings, the third party lodged a counter action requesting the partial annulment of the Commission decision. 7. On 24 April 2002 the Supreme Court gave a final decision dismissing the applicants’ claims. It also dismissed their right to first refusal as regards the buildings on the plots of land which had been granted by the Commission. It decided that the applicants are entitled to compensation in respect of the plot of land measuring 2,461.97 sq. m to be determined in accordance with the 1993 Property Act. 8. On 22 October 2004 the Constitutional Court, sitting as a full bench, found no violation of the applicants’ right to a fair trial. 9. To date, no compensation has been paid.

8. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Moscow. 9. In 1997 the applicant became pregnant. 10. In the night of 1 August 1997, in the thirty-fifth week of pregnancy, the embryo asphyxiated in the womb. On 4 August 1997 the applicant gave birth to a stillborn baby boy and decided to bury him. 11. On 13 August 1997 the stillbirth was registered by the Chertanovskiy branch of the Civil Acts Registration Service (Чертановский отдел ЗАГС). Mr Z., who had been the applicant's husband until their divorce on 25 March 1997, was entered as the stillbirth's father in the birth certificate (акт о рождении) and in the birth register (книга записей рождений). 12. The applicant submitted that the biological father of the stillbirth had been Mr G., with whom she had been living as man and wife since 1994. Mr G. had expected the child and talked about their future son as his own. They could not, however, file a joint declaration establishing the child's paternity because Mr G. had been placed in a detention facility on 20 June 1997. It appears that the applicant had no access to her partner after that date. On 12 October 1997 Mr G. died in custody. 13. The applicant refused to put her former husband's surname on the stillborn child's tombstone and left it empty. 14. On 10 August 2000 the applicant requested the Chertanovskiy District Court of Moscow to establish Mr G.'s paternity in respect of the stillbirth and amend the child's surname and patronymic name accordingly. In Russian, patronymic names are normally formed from the father's forename and a special ending, -ovich for sons or -ovna for daughters. The applicant relied on Article 49 of the Family Code. 15. On 21 November 2000 the applicant's former husband died. 16. On 16 March 2001 the Chertanovskiy District Court of Moscow gave its decision. It held that the stillborn child had not acquired civil rights, whereas Article 49 of the Family Code only applied to living children. It ordered the discontinuation of the proceedings because “[the applicant's claim] was not fit for examination and determination in the framework of civil proceedings”. 17. On 18 May 2001 the Moscow City Court, on an appeal by the applicant, upheld the decision of 16 March 2001. The court repeated that “the case could not be examined as a civil action because the child had not acquired civil rights”.

5. The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Astrakhan. 6. On 5 September 2003 the applicant gave birth to a daughter out of wedlock. 7. On 11 November 2003 she lodged a claim with the Kirovskiy District Court of Astrakhan against Mr A., with whom she allegedly had been in a relationship since 2000, in order to establish paternity and obtain child maintenance. In the course of the proceedings the applicant was represented by a counsel. 8. On 15 December 2003 the court ordered a DNA test to be carried out. The blood samples were collected in Astrakhan and sent to a specialised institute in Moscow for a forensic genetic examination. According to the expert conclusion submitted on 19 March 2004, the probability that Mr A. was the father of the applicant’s daughter was 99.99%. 9. On 2 June 2004 the court heard the defendant’s representative, who contested the admissibility of the DNA test on account of procedural shortcomings, and the applicant, who insisted on its accuracy; and rejected the applicant’s claim in full. It found that the applicant had failed to support her allegations. With respect to the expert forensic report the court found as follows: “...Blood sampling for the expert report was entrusted to the Bureau of forensic-medical examinations in the Astrakhan Region... According to the Instruction on organisation and production of expert examinations in Bureaus of forensic medical examinations, blood samples must be packed individually... An envelope must be supplied, with identifying information (on the basis of an identity document) and signatures of a medical worker who took the blood samples and two medical workers who were present during this procedure... On the envelopes with the blood samples of Mr A., Ms Kalacheva and Ms K.D. [the applicant’s daughter] there are no data based on the identity documents of the above persons. Moreover, there are only two signatures on the envelopes, one of which belongs to a person who took the blood samples... Taking into account that the blood samples were collected with serious violations of the Instruction..., the court is critical of the expert conclusion, since it cannot exclude the possibility that the blood samples received by the experts were not those collected from the parties.” 10. The court found the other evidence submitted by the applicant, namely a photo showing her with the defendant and a badge in her name, issued by the hostel (where they allegedly met), insufficient to conclude that the defendant was her child’s father. 11. The applicant and her lawyer lodged an appeal against this judgment, claiming that the case should be sent to a fresh examination due to the court’s failure to respect the civil procedural law. On 29 June 2004 the Astrakhan Regional Court upheld the judgment of 2 June 2004. It mentioned that, under civil procedural law, an expert conclusion was not binding on the court, and that in the present case the DNA test, carried out in breach of the relevant procedure, was not corroborated by other evidence. 12. On 20 June 2005 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation rejected an application for supervisory review lodged by the applicant’s lawyer.

4. The applicant was born in 1936 and lives in Vouziers. 5. By a decision of 17 May 1996 the occupational counselling and redeployment board (“the COTOREP”) gave the applicant a 50 to 79% disability rating and issued her with a card certifying that she found it difficult to remain in a standing position. 6. On 6 August 1996, the regional health insurance fund (“the CRAM”) for the North-East region rejected the applicant’s request for a retirement pension as of 1 June 1996 on the basis of her incapacity to work, on the ground that she was not at least 50% disabled. 7. On 13 December 1996 the disability claims tribunal upheld the CRAM’s decision. 8. The applicant appealed to the national tribunal for claims relating to disability and level of insurance coverage for accidents at work (“the CNITAAT”), submitting a number of medical certificates attesting to her state of health and relying on the COTOREP’s decision of 17 May 1996. 9. In a decision of 24 November 1997, the CNITAAT upheld the decision of the disability claims tribunal, stating the following reasons: “The rate of disability comprised between 50% and 79% acknowledged for the purposes of issuing the card certifying that it is “difficult to remain in a standing position” is not calculated using the same assessment criteria as the rate applicable in the present case, so this ground of appeal cannot be upheld; The accredited doctor of the national tribunal for claims relating to disability and level of insurance coverage for accidents at work observes the following: ‘The subject shows signs of preexisting injuries: fracture of the 4th sacral vertebra in 1965, fracture of the left kneecap that was pinned and wired in 1990, fracture of the lower right tibia in 1994. No after-effects in the region of the sacrum are mentioned. The left knee is slightly limited in flexion and shows mild gonarthrosis, and there is lateral calcification of the patella. No after-effects in the left ankle are reported. There is arthrosis of the whole spinal column, with degenerative discopathy at L5‑S1. It is mild arthrosis, not unusual at the subject’s age, with only a slight loss of flexibility of the different segments of the spine. Episodic onsets of sciatica and cervico‑brachial neuralgia are reported in the case history. There are no signs of herniated lumbar disk . There is calcifying periarthritis of the left shoulder, but it does not restrict movement. The same applies to the arthrosis at the base of the right thumb.’ He concludes that: ‘On 1 June 1996 the subject was in a fit state to carry on working without seriously jeopardising her health and, considering her physical and mental fitness for work, did not suffer from a permanent incapacity to work of at least 50%’; In the light of the above medical opinion, the documents in the file and the criteria laid down in Articles L. 351-7 and R. 351‑21 of the Social Security Code, the national tribunal for claims relating to disability and level of insurance coverage for accidents at work decides to uphold the impugned decision ...” 10. The applicant lodged a notice of appeal on points of law on 27 May 1998. In further pleadings her lawyer filed with the Court of Cassation on 23 October 1998, she invoked, inter alia, a violation of “the requirements of the rights of the defence” and of “equality of arms in a fair trial within the meaning of Article 6” of the Convention, in that the report by the CNITAAT’s accredited doctor, drawn up solely on the basis of documents, had not been made available to her or to the doctor she had appointed to submit observations. 11. By a judgment of 2 March 2000 the Employment and Welfare Division of the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant’s appeal in the following terms: “... on the one hand, the accredited doctor instructed, under the terms of Article R. 143‑28 of the Social Security Code then in force, to carry out a preliminary review of the case, simply gives an opinion to the national disability tribunal without submitting an expert report for adversarial discussion by the parties; Without laying itself open to the objection raised in the ground of appeal, the national disability tribunal, in the light of the findings of its accredited doctor and having analysed the different evidence adduced, considered, as it was within its exclusive jurisdiction to do, that Ms Augusto’s disability rate – the COTOREP evaluation of which was not binding on it – was less than 50%, and that the applicant was therefore not entitled to a retirement pension on the ground of incapacity to work; For these reasons, the appeal ... is dismissed.”

4. The applicant was born in 1930 and lives in Banská Bystrica. 5. On 20 February 1992 the applicant filed an action with the Banská Bystrica District Court. She claimed that a joint ownership be terminated in respect of several plots of land and a house. 6. On 6 April 1992 the court summoned the applicant’s advocate and asked him to inform the court whether the applicant maintained her claim. 7. On 18 June 1992 the court held a hearing where it heard both parties and invited them to submit further evidence. The defendant lodged a counterclaim and the court requested him to specify it. 8. On 13 July 1992 and on 2 September 1992 the court asked the State Notary in Banská Bystrica to submit case files concerning three sets of inheritance proceedings in which the applicant had been involved. 9. On 30 November 1992 the applicant amended her action and requested that another person should be joined as a defendant in the case. 10. The court held hearings on 17 December 1992 and on 19 January 1993 respectively. The latter hearing was adjourned as expert examination had to be taken. On 4 April 1993 the court invited the applicant to submit a geometric plan of the relevant plots. 11. In a letter of 21 April 1993, the applicant informed the court that she had brought a criminal complaint against a notary public and requested that the District Court’s proceedings should be stayed pending the outcome of the criminal proceedings. On 21 September 1993 she withdrew her request. 12. On 27 September 1993 the District Court urged the applicant to submit the geometric plan. The applicant did so on 25 April 1994. 13. On 17 May 1994 the applicant amended her action. At a hearing held on 25 October 1994, the court invited her to specify the amended action. On 1 June 1995 the applicant submitted an additional claim challenging the validity of a purchase contract concerning the property in question which had been concluded in 1972. 14. On 13 November 1995 the court held a hearing where it accepted the amendment of the applicant’s action. A further hearing scheduled for 27 November 1995 was adjourned due to the absence of a witness. 15. On 13 December 1995 the District Court delivered an interim judgment declaring the purchase contract of 1972 void. The defendant appealed on 5 March 1996. 16. On 23 April 1996 the Banská Bystrica Regional Court upheld the interim judgment. 17. The District Court held hearings on 29 May 1996 and on 16 July 1996 respectively. The defendant requested that the latter hearing should be adjourned as he intended to appoint a new legal representative. The court granted the defendant’s request and invited him to submit a power of attorney within 20 days. 18. On 2 September 1996 and on 15 October 1996 respectively the court urged the defendant to submit the power of attorney. On 14 January 1997 the defendant submitted the power of attorney together with his comments on the applicant’s action. 19. The court held a hearing on 20 February 1997. On 27 February 1997 the applicant submitted comments on the defendant’s arguments presented at the hearing of 20 February 1997. Subsequently the court invited the defendant to comment on the applicant’s submissions and on the geometric plan submitted by her on 25 April 1994. 20. On 30 April 1997 the court urged the defendant to submit his comments. The defendant did so on 23 May 1997. Following the court’s request of 30 September 1997 to comment on the defendant’s submissions, the applicant informed the court, by a letter of 20 October 1997, that she maintained her claim. 21. On 17 March 1999 the District Court scheduled a hearing for 6 April 1999. At the latter date the case was adjourned as the court decided to visit the site. On 20 April 1999 the applicant submitted further evidence. 22. On 14 September 1999 the court inspected the site. 23. On 3 April 2000 the District Court dismissed the applicant’s action. The District Court’s judgment was served on the applicant on 7 June 2001. Subsequently she appealed. 24. On 9 July 2001 the applicant paid a court fee for her appeal. The case file was transferred to the court of appeal on 9 August 2001. 25. Following a hearing held on 19 September 2001, the Regional Court inspected the site in the presence of both parties on 28 September 2001. 26. On 3 October 2001 the Regional Court upheld the District Court’s judgment of 3 April 2000. The District Court’s judgment became final and binding on 23 November 2001. 27. On 2 September 1999 the applicant claimed before the Banská Bystrica District Court a determination of the joint ownership of real property and its dissolution, as well as compensation. 28. On 18 December 2002 the Banská Bystrica District Court dismissed the action. 29. On 4 September 2003 the Banská Bystrica Regional Court upheld the first instance judgment. Both courts found, with reference to an inheritance decision of 1969, that the property in question had passed into the exclusive ownership of a different person. The Regional Court considered irrelevant the applicant’s argument that her date of birth and personal registration number had been incorrectly mentioned in the relevant documents while the inheritance proceedings had been pending as the State Notary had had no doubt about the correct identification of the applicant and her relation to the testator. 30. In 1940 the house in which the applicant and her parents lived burned down and the family documents including the applicant’s birth certificate were destroyed. The applicant indicated 6 July 1930 as her date of birth in accordance with her mother’s statement. 31. In 1951 the local authority in Tajov delivered a new birth certificate to the applicant indicating that the applicant had been born on 8 July 1930. 32. On 5 March 1997 the District Office in Banská Bystrica delivered a new birth certificate to the applicant according to which she had been born on 6 July 1930.

6. The applicant was born in 1954 and lived in Czarne, Poland. 7. The applicant was arrested by the police on 12 September 2001 on a charge of murder and by a decision of the Bytów District Court of 14 September 2001 he was detained on remand. 8. Subsequently, the applicant’s pre-trial detention was prolonged on several occasions by the Słupsk Regional Court (decisions of 6 December 2001, 2 January 2002, 22 March 2002, 20 December 2002, 18 March 2003 and 16 June 2003). 9. The applicant on several occasions unsuccessfully applied to be released and to have the preventive measure imposed on him changed into a more lenient one. 10. The courts justified their decisions prolonging the applicant’s detention on remand and their refusals to release him by the existence of a reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offence concerned and by the severity of the anticipated sentence. 11. On 22 March 2002 the Słupsk Regional Court convicted the applicant and sentenced him to eight years’ imprisonment. On 5 September 2002 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal quashed the first-instance judgment and remitted the case to the lower court. 12. On 16 September 2003 the Słupsk Regional Court convicted the applicant and sentenced him to seven years’ imprisonment. On 10 February 2004 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal quashed the first-instance judgment and remitted the case to the lower court. 13. On 7 February 2005 the Słupsk Regional Court convicted the applicant and sentenced him to seven years’ imprisonment. On 23 June 2005 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal reduced the sentence to six years’ imprisonment. A cassation appeal against the second-instance judgment was available. 14. On 23 June 2005 the applicant was released because of his health which had prevented him from serving a term of imprisonment. The applicant submitted that from August 2005 he had been examined several times by psychiatrists and that he had been admitted to a psychiatric hospital for short periods on five occasions. He had been diagnosed with nervous depression. 15. On 5 March 2003 the Court received a letter from the applicant dated 9 February 2003. The envelope bore the following stamps: “the Słupsk Regional Court (...)” and “Censored on 18 February” (Ocenzurowano dnia 18.02) and an illegible signature.

4. The applicant, Mr Abdurrahman Şiray, is a Turkish national who was born in 1972 and lives in Siirt. 5. On 20 June 2003 the applicant, who is of Kurdish origin, was arrested in Mardin and taken into police custody with three other individuals on suspicion of acting as a courier for an illegal armed organisation, namely the PKK/KADEK. The applicant was in possession of a false identity card at the time of his arrest. 6. On 21 June 2003 F.A., who was arrested with the applicant on suspicion of attempting to participate in the armed activities of the PKK/KADEK, was questioned at the Nusaybin police headquarters, in the absence of a lawyer. F.A. claimed that he had met the applicant the day before in Batman and that at the time they were arrested in Nusaybin the applicant was taking him to the mountains to join members of the PKK/KADEK. 7. On 22 June 2003 the applicant was taken for questioning at the Nusaybin police headquarters. Before his questioning the applicant signed a form which explained the rights of arrested persons, by which he was informed of the charges against him and his right to remain silent. In his statement, given in the absence of a lawyer, the applicant denied any affiliation with the illegal organisation and contested F.A.’s allegations. He also stated that he was a shepherd and at the time of his arrest he was in the mountains looking for sheep that he had lost. He also explained that he had been carrying a false identity card as he was an army deserter. An interpreter was present during this questioning. 8. A confrontation was held between the applicant and F.A., without any legal assistance. 9. On 23 June 2003 the applicant was brought before the Nusaybin Public Prosecutor, where he reiterated the statement he had made to the police. 10. Later the same day the applicant was also questioned at the Nusaybin Magistrates’ Court in the absence of a lawyer. At the end of that questioning the judge remanded the applicant in pre-trial custody. 11. On the same day the applicant’s co-accused, F.A., also made statements before the Nusaybin public prosecutor and the Nusaybin Magistrates’ Court, in which he repeated his allegations about the applicant. 12. On 7 July 2003 the Public Prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court filed an indictment with that court accusing the applicant of aiding and abetting the PKK/KADEK, and F.A. of membership of that organisation. 13. On 19 August 2003 the Diyarbakır State Security Court held its first hearing, at which the applicant informed the court that he did not have sufficient knowledge of Turkish to follow the hearings. The court bailiff, who spoke Kurdish, was therefore appointed as interpreter. During the hearing, the applicant denied the charges against him, but confirmed that the statements he had made during his detention in police custody were accurate. He explained that those statements, which he had made in Kurdish, had been translated into Turkish by Kurdish-speaking clerks. 14. F.A. was also heard by the State Security Court at the same hearing, with the assistance of an interpreter. F.A. also denied all charges against him, as well as retracting the statements he had made before the police, the public prosecutor and the magistrates’ court. He asserted that those statements had been extracted from him under duress. He further argued that he had made his statements in Kurdish and had no way of knowing whether they had been translated into Turkish accurately. 15. At the sixth hearing, held on 1 April 2004, the applicant’s lawyer requested the applicant’s release, claiming that the only piece of evidence found against him was F.A.’s statements made during the preliminary investigation stage. The applicant’s lawyer further argued that both the applicant’s and F.A.’s statements had been taken unlawfully and without the assistance of an interpreter, despite their inadequate knowledge of Turkish. 16. State Security Courts were abolished by Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, published in the Official Gazette on 30 June 2004. The case against the applicant was therefore transferred to the Diyarbakır Assize Court. 17. On 31 August 2004 the Diyarbakır Assize Court found the applicant guilty as charged and convicted him pursuant to Article 169 of the former Criminal Code and Section 5 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act for aiding and abetting the PKK/KADEK. The applicant appealed. 18. On 14 February 2006 the Principal Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation decided that the case file should be remitted to the Diyarbakır Assize Court for examination, to decide whether the new Criminal Code which had entered into force on 1 June 2005 (Law no. 5237) had provisions which would be more favourable for the applicant. The case was thus once again examined by the Diyarbakır Assize Court in view of the recent legislative changes. 19. On 11 May 2006 the Diyarbakır Assize Court once again convicted the applicant of aiding and abetting the PKK/KADEK, under Article 169 of the former Criminal Code and Section 5 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, and sentenced him to four years and six months’ imprisonment. The assize court held that under the new Criminal Code the act of aiding and abetting an illegal organisation constituted the offence of membership of an illegal organisation and thus carried a higher sentence. It stated that the applicant was therefore being convicted under Article 169 of the former Criminal Code, which was more favourable to him than the corresponding provisions of the new Criminal Code. In delivering its judgment, the first-instance court mainly relied on the statements made by F.A. in respect of the applicant during the preliminary investigation stage. 20. On 22 December 2008 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the Diyarbakır Assize Court.

5. The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Jelgava. 6. It appears that in an unrelated incident on 23 June 2000 the applicant broke his spine. He underwent surgery to have a metal implant inserted into his back for support. It appears that following the operation he could move unaided. He was certified as being Category 2 disabled. 7. On 17 December 2002 a note was made for the first time in the applicant’s medical records that he could not move without a wheelchair. 8. On 23 January 2003 the applicant was certified as being Category 1 disabled (the most severe level of disability). His disability was reassessed on two further occasions, 13 February 2004 and 22 February 2006. 9. On 10 September 2001 at approximately 3 p.m., two traffic police officers, E.Š. and O.Ž., attempted to stop the applicant, who had exceeded the speed limit in Rīga and appeared to be driving under the influence of alcohol. He failed to stop on their instructions and continued driving. The police officers set out to follow him out of the city onto the Rīga-Jelgava motorway. They eventually overtook the applicant’s car and pulled it over to the side of the road until it came to a halt. Both vehicles were by then next to an apartment building on a residential street in Jaunolaine. 10. According to the Government, both police officers then saw a firearm in the applicant’s inner left jacket pocket, and proceeded to push him to the ground using unspecified restraint techniques (speciālie cīņas paņēmieni) and handcuffed him. They then called the local police to the scene to collect evidence. The applicant was breathalysed on the spot and then taken to a police station in Olaine. 11. The applicant did not agree with the Government’s version of events concerning his possession of a firearm. He submitted that the police officers had kicked him in the back several times, hurting him badly, before finding out that he was disabled. He alleged that when he had invited them to verify his documents, which were in his wallet in his car, the officers had planted a firearm on him in an attempt to evade criminal liability for having assaulted a disabled person. The applicant denied having had the firearm. He maintained that if he had been keeping a firearm, he would have disposed of it during the car chase. 12. On 11 September 2001 the applicant was taken to a public hospital in Rīga (Rīgas 1. slimnīca), where an X-ray of his spine was carried out. His state of health was described as being “post-spinal fixation”. The fixing screws that held the metal implant supporting his spine in place had been broken. He also suffered from a spinal contusion and lower back pain. Lastly, it was noted that a consultation with a specialist was necessary. 13. On 11 September 2001 at 5.40 p.m., the applicant was transferred to a specialist traumatology and orthopaedics hospital in Rīga (Traumatoloğijas un ortopēdijas slimnīca). He told a specialist that the day before he had been fleeing from the police. Some officers had stopped him, had pulled him out of the car and had pushed him to the ground, which had led to his back making a hyperextensive movement, in other words, it had bent too far backwards. The applicant complained of lower back pain on his right side and said that he was unable to move his right leg because of the pain. Following an examination by a specialist, the applicant was diagnosed with the following: i) a hyperextension injury and contusion to the lower back; ii) a transverse process fracture (resulting from rotation or extreme lateral bending) to the L3 vertebra, iii) a compression fracture (flexion fracture pattern) to the L1 vertebra, previously fused by transperpendicular fixation surgery, the metal implant having become dislodged and screws in the Th12 and L3 vertebrae having been broken, and iv) intoxication. An X‑ray revealed that the fracture to the applicant’s L1 vertebra had been fused and fixated with rods and eight screws. Four screws in the applicant’s Th12 and L3 vertebrae had been broken. The metal implant had become dislodged. While at the hospital, the applicant received various types of medication. 14. On 12 September 2001 the applicant was discharged from the hospital for outpatient treatment with recommendations to continue taking medication and to wear a fixating belt. 15. On 12 September 2001 at 7.15 p.m., the applicant was transferred to Rīga Central Prison. Upon admission, he was examined by a doctor, who noted the diagnosis of the specialist hospital and placed the applicant in the surgical ward of the Prison Hospital located within the grounds of the prison. The applicant’s overall state of heath was described as satisfactory. 16. On 14 September 2001 the applicant complained of severe lower back pain and said that he could not lift his right leg or walk. His state of health was described as moderately severe. A procaine blockade (an anaesthetic which affects the peripheral nervous system) was administered to him. 17. On 19 September 2001 a further procaine blockade was administered to the applicant. 18. On 21 September 2001 his pain lessened and he could stand up and walk. On the same day an X-ray was carried out and no injuries other than those noted by the specialist hospital (see paragraph 13 above) were found. An X-ray of his lungs was also carried out, the results of which were clear. 19. On 25 September 2001 the applicant had cold-like symptoms and complained of lower back pain. He also said that he could not feel his right thigh. Treatment was prescribed to him for an acute respiratory illness. 20. On 26 September 2001 an infiltration in the applicant’s right hip was detected. His fever had been caused by the post-injection infiltration. Over the following two days, the applicant was consulted by a neurologist and a psychiatrist. 21. On 28 September 2001 a surgical procedure was carried out to relieve the applicant’s pain, which continued to persist after that date and until 9 October 2001. On the latter date the applicant’s overall state of health was described as satisfactory and he could walk again. 22. On 10 October 2001 the applicant was discharged from the Prison Hospital, but remained in custody. 23. On 10 September 2001, after the applicant was taken to the police station in Olaine, both traffic officers were questioned by an inspector of the Olaine police within the criminal proceedings concerning the firearm charge (see paragraph 33 below). 24. E.Š. was the first to make a statement, on 10 September 2001 between 10 and 10.30 p.m. His version of events was as follows. In a residential area in Jaunolaine, he had taken the applicant by the hand and had made him step out of the car. Both he and his colleague had seen a firearm in the applicant’s inner left jacket pocket. They had both proceeded to push him to the ground and to handcuff him. His colleague, O.Ž., had taken the firearm out of the jacket pocket. They had then called the local Olaine police, who had arrived and had confiscated the firearm. The local police had also found a bullet in the car the applicant had been driving. Lastly, the police officers breathalysed the applicant and found that he had been under the influence of alcohol. 25. In addition, in a report to his superior, which was drafted on the same day, E.Š. noted that restraint techniques had been used on the applicant because a firearm and bullets had been found in his inner left jacket pocket. 26. O.Ž. made his statement on 10 September 2001, between 10.40 and 11.15 p.m. His evidence was very similar to that of his colleague. He also stated that they had both seen the firearm in the applicant’s jacket and had pushed the applicant to the ground and had handcuffed him. O.Ž. had then taken the firearm and the local police had confiscated it. He also noted that the applicant had been under the influence of alcohol. He had found out later that the local police had also found a bullet in the car. 27. In addition, in a report to his superior, which was drafted on the same day, O.Ž. noted that when he had seen the firearm, he had taken it out of the applicant’s jacket. He added that the applicant had been handcuffed for around forty minutes as he had been behaving aggressively. Lastly, he mentioned that the applicant had agreed to be breathalysed on the spot. 28. The applicant was first questioned by the inspector of the Olaine police on 11 September 2001 at 9.50 a.m. He submitted that he had been ill‑treated upon his arrest and said that he was not in a position to make a statement because he felt severe back pain. He mentioned the fact that he had previously undergone spinal surgery. At 10.15 a.m. the interview was terminated and the applicant was then taken to hospital (see paragraphs 12 et seq.). 29. During his subsequent questioning by prosecutor J.D., on 21 September 2001 (see paragraph 37 below), the applicant maintained his allegation that he had been ill-treated upon arrest. 30. On 9 November 2001 an expert commenced the forensic medical examination, which had been ordered on 10 October 2001 by prosecutor J.D. It appears that it was completed on 15 November 2001, when report no. 46-4528 was issued. The examination was based on the applicant’s medical records from the public and specialist hospitals, as well as his records from the Prison Hospital (see paragraphs 12 to 22 above). It appears that the applicant was not examined in person. The expert concluded that the applicant had not sustained any injuries. In reaching that conclusion, the expert noted that she had not taken into account the first diagnosis made by the specialist hospital that the applicant had “a hyperextension injury and contusion to the lower back” (see paragraph 13 above) because: “[I]t [was] not confirmed by objective clinical symptoms or by visible bodily injuries, but rather was based on the applicant’s complaints relating to the dislodging of the metal implant following osteosynthesis surgery and [the dislodging] cannot be regarded as bodily injuries on the grounds of instructions concerning the forensic medical examination.” 31. She had also not taken into account the second diagnosis made by the specialist hospital that the applicant had “a fracture to the L3 vertebra” (see paragraph 13 above) as it had been an old fracture and had not been connected to the events of 10 September 2001, a fact confirmed by a specialist’s opinion of 15 November 2001. It appears that the results of the opinion were not made available to the applicant. 32. On 27 November 2001 prosecutor J.D. decided to refuse the institution of criminal proceedings. Her decision was worded as follows: “The materials regarding [the applicant’s] complaint that officers O.Ž. and E.Š. had assaulted him during his arrest on 10 September 2001 have been separated from the criminal case file. In their witness statements, O.Ž. and E.Š. categorically denied that they had assaulted the applicant. None of the officers had assaulted him. Furthermore, according to forensic report no. 4528, dated 9 November 2001, no injuries were found on the applicant’s body. The fracture to the applicant’s L3 vertebra was not taken into account for the purposes of the forensic report, because it was old and was not connected to the injuries of 10 September 2001. In the circumstances, the actions of E.Š. and O.Ž. do not contain the elements of a criminal offence and there is no basis on which to institute criminal proceedings. Considering the above, and in accordance with section 5 and section 212 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is decided: 33. On 10 September 2001 the Olaine police instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant in connection with the illegal acquisition and storage of a firearm. It appears that while at the police station, the applicant was breathalysed for a second time. 34. On the same date an initial forensic examination of the firearm took place, which had been ordered by the Olaine police. Three further forensic examinations followed in the same month. The examination reports included a note stating that the firearm and a bullet had been confiscated from the car the applicant had been driving. The examinations revealed that there had been no fingerprints on the firearm and that the applicant’s jacket had not contained any traces of firearm oil, which had been found on the firearm. 35. On 12 September 2001 the Rīga Regional Court (Rīgas apgabaltiesa) remanded the applicant in custody. He appealed against the order to no avail. 36. On 18 September 2001 the case file was sent to the relevant prosecutor’s office in Rīga (Rīgas rajona prokuratūra). 37. On 21 September 2001 prosecutor J.D. charged the applicant with the illegal acquisition and storage of a firearm. He denied the charge, saying that the police officers had ill-treated him and had then planted the firearm on him. 38. On 8 October 2001 a confrontation took place in which prosecutor J.D. cross-examined the applicant and both traffic police officers; the applicant’s counsel was present. O.Ž maintained statements he had previously made on 10 September 2001 (see paragraph 26 above). The applicant submitted that during his arrest, O.Ž. had pulled him out of the car by his hand, had pulled his hands behind his back and had pushed him to the ground. When he had tried to turn around, an officer had started kicking him in his shoulders and arms. One of the officers had put his feet on his back. He alleged that he had been kicked some five or six times. He had told the officers about his disability and had invited them to verify his documents, which had been in his car. One of the officers had gone to his car and had found his disability certificate. The other officer, who had remained with his feet on his back, had then kicked him again. Afterwards, he had been ordered to stand up and put on his jacket, which had prior to that been in his car. He had been ordered to empty his pockets and had then felt an object similar to a firearm in his inner left pocket, which he had taken out and immediately dropped on the ground. The officers had then asked him if he had found everything, and he had noticed another object of a rectangular shape in the same pocket, which he had also dropped on the ground, which had turned out to be an ammunition clip (aptvere). He had then been handcuffed, breathalysed and handed over to the Olaine police. 39. On 8 October 2001 prosecutor J.D. cross-examined the applicant and E.Š, who maintained statements he had made on 10 September 2001 (see paragraph 24 above); the applicant’s counsel was present. The applicant submitted that during his arrest, he had been kicked some five or six times in his back and arms, and that one of the officers had been standing or kneeling on his back while the other officer had handcuffed him. While in this position, he had made them aware of his disability and one of the officers had proceeded to verify his documents. After some time, they had made him stand up and put on his jacket, which had prior to that been in his car. The officers had searched him and he had felt an object similar to a firearm in his inner left pocket, which he had taken out and immediately dropped on the ground. The officers had then asked him if he had found everything and he had noticed another object of a rectangular shape in the same pocket, which he had also dropped on the ground. 40. On 10 October 2001 prosecutor J.D. decided to order a forensic medical examination to determine the injuries sustained by the applicant. In her decision, she noted that the applicant’s statements suggested that the police officers had pulled him out of the car, had pushed him to the ground and had kicked him no less than five times in the back, shoulders and arms. In addition, she noted that the applicant had submitted that one of the officers had been standing on the exact spot where he had had his injury. She also noted that the applicant had been Category 2 disabled and at the time of the arrest had been under the influence of alcohol. The decision to order the forensic examination was received by the competent forensic authority on 8 November 2001. 41. On 22 October 2001 the applicant was released pending trial in connection with the firearm charge, but was remanded in custody in relation to other charges (see paragraph 48 below). 42. On 5 November 2001 prosecutor J.D. decided to separate the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment from his criminal case file (see, as concerns the investigation, paragraphs 23 et seq. above). In her decision, she noted that the applicant had been arrested on 10 September 2001 for a traffic offence, and that the police officers had found a firearm in his jacket pocket. She also noted the applicant’s submissions about his alleged ill‑treatment and the fact that the traffic officers had denied the allegations. Lastly, she noted that although a forensic medical examination had been ordered, it had not yet been carried out. As it was her view that the results of the examination would not affect the qualification of the applicant’s offence, she separated the materials concerning the alleged ill-treatment from the case file and sent them to the Olaine police for additional review. 43. There is no information available as to whether any review was carried out by the Olaine police. 44. On 8 November 2001 prosecutor J.D. sought the advice of an expert to answer the question “Would the driver of a BMW 535 driven on wet tarmac at a speed of 200 to 230 km/h lose control, if a window is opened, either manually or electronically, to throw something out?” The expert concluded that it was possible in both situations, but that it would be more difficult if the window was opened manually, which was less likely to be the case for the model of car mentioned. 45. On 20 November 2001 prosecutor J.D. issued the final bill of indictment concerning the firearm charge against the applicant. 46. On 22 November 2001 and 8 January 2002 prosecutor J.D. examined the applicant’s request for the criminal proceedings against him to be terminated on the grounds that he was innocent, his guilt not having been proven, and because the firearm did not belong to him. She rejected the request on the basis that the applicant’s guilt had been proven by the case materials in their entirety. There were therefore no grounds to terminate the criminal proceedings. 47. Meanwhile, on 17 September 2001, the Jelgava police instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant in connection with the bodily injury and rape of a minor girl that had taken place on 9 September 2001. 48. It appears that on 22 October 2001 the applicant was remanded in custody in connection with those charges. 49. On an unspecified date the case was sent to the relevant prosecutor’s office in Jelgava (Jelgavas pilsētas prokuratūra). 50. On 28 November 2001 the final bill of indictment was issued concerning the bodily injury and rape charge against the applicant. 51. A trial took place from 24 May to 4 June 2002, and on the latter date the Jelgava Court (Jelgavas tiesa) found the applicant guilty of both (the firearm and the bodily injury and rape) charges and, taking into account his state of his health, sentenced him to five years and six months’ imprisonment, into which a previous suspended prison sentence was also incorporated. 52. As concerns his arrest on 10 September 2001, the applicant told the court that he had been fleeing from the police. He submitted that two police officers had pulled him out of the car in Jaunolaine, had pushed him to the ground and had handcuffed him. While lying down on the ground, he had been kicked hard several times in his back. He then had felt a sharp pain in his back, had told the officers about his disability and had invited them to verify his documents, which they had done. The officers had then made him stand up and put on his jacket, which until then had been lying on the passenger seat. Afterwards, one of the officers had ordered him to empty his pockets. He had felt a gun in his pocket and had immediately dropped it on the ground. The officers had then requested all the contents of his pockets to be emptied. When he had felt another object in his pocket, which had turned out to be an ammunition clip, he had dropped that on the ground as well. 53. As concerns the firearm, the applicant submitted that it had not been his. It had either been planted on him by the police officers in an attempt to evade criminal liability for having assaulted a disabled person, or by someone who had put it in his pocket the day before (during the events surrounding the bodily injury and rape charge). 54. The trial court did not give credence to the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment by the police officers on the grounds that the forensic examination had concluded that the applicant had not sustained any bodily injuries (see paragraph 30 above). 55. O.Ž. was the only traffic police officer to give evidence before the trial court and relied on his cross-examination with the applicant (see paragraph 38 above). O.Ž. testified that on pulling the applicant out of the car in Jaunolaine, his jacket had opened and O.Ž. had seen an object similar to a firearm in the applicant’s inner pocket. For that reason he had been pushed to the ground using force and handcuffs had been put on him. O.Ž. had then taken the firearm out of the applicant’s inner pocket and had put it on the bonnet of the car. The local police had then been called. 56. In examining the officer’s evidence, the trial court found it consistent and unvaried throughout the preliminary investigation and the trial. They further relied on evidence given by an officer of the Olaine police during the pre-trial investigation, who stated that when he had arrived at the scene the firearm had been on the bonnet of the car and a bullet had been found inside. 57. On 21 October 2002, following an appeal by the applicant, the Zemgale Regional Court (Zemgales apgabaltiesa) upheld the judgment of the trial court. 58. The applicant subsequently lodged an appeal on points of law, but on 2 December 2002 this was dismissed by the Senate of the Supreme Court (Augstākās tiesas Senāts) in a preparatory meeting. 59. From 12 September to 10 October 2001 the applicant was held in the Prison Hospital located within the grounds of Rīga Central Prison. His medical care during that period is described above (see paragraphs 15 to 22 above). 60. In addition, he was also held in the Prison Hospital during the following periods: ‑ from 15 November to 3 December 2001; ‑ from 19 to 27 December 2001; ‑ from 17 to 25 January 2002; ‑ from 22 December 2002 to 13 January 2003; ‑ from 17 January to 7 February 2004; and ‑ from 17 to 24 January 2006. 61. It appears that between the periods of hospitalisation prior to his conviction, he was detained in the prison itself. 62. In the meantime, on 10 October 2001 the applicant’s lawyer applied to a prosecutor seeking permission for the applicant to be transported from the prison to the Commission for Health and Working Capacity Examination (Veselības un darbaspēju ekspertīzes komisija). On 13 November 2001 that prosecutor informed the lawyer that under Regulation of the Cabinet of Ministers no. 358 (1995), transport to the Commission was only permitted for convicted prisoners. Its doctors were not permitted to visit detainees awaiting trial in Rīga Central Prison. 63. On 19 August 2002 the applicant was transferred to Liepāja Prison to serve his sentence, where he remained until 13 December 2002. Upon admission, he requested that he be provided with mobility assistance. He immediately received crutches. By the end of August, with the help of a donation by the local Red Cross, he received a wheelchair. 64. On 13 December 2002 the applicant was transferred to Pārlielupe Prison to continue serving his sentence. He was held in that prison until 27 October 2003, save for a period of twenty-two days when he was in the Prison Hospital (see paragraph 60 above). 65. On 9 April 2003 the local social services in Jelgava (Jelgavas sociālo lietu pārvalde) informed the applicant that a wheelchair had been ordered for him and would be delivered accordingly. 66. On 27 October 2003 the applicant was transferred to Valmiera Prison to continue serving his sentence. He was held in that prison until 21 April 2006, save for two periods of twenty-one and seven days respectively when he was in the Prison Hospital (see paragraph 60 above). 67. In the prison the applicant was placed in “the open living area” (atklātā dzīvojamā zona) in a unit for convicted prisoners with health problems. The applicant shared his cell with another inmate. 68. The facilities in Valmiera Prison were adapted for the applicant’s needs to the following extent: ‑ he was allowed to have his meals delivered to his cell instead of having to go to the canteen; ‑ he was allowed to attend sauna once a week at special times; ‑ every day from 6 a.m. to 10 p.m. he could stay in the open area in his unit and have access to fresh air; ‑ a ramp was installed so that he could access the outdoor yard; ‑ toilets were adapted for his needs; ‑ he was exempted from social work and from every day check‑ups; ‑the staff of the medical unit visited him in his cell so that he did not need to go to the unit himself. 69. On 29 January 2004 a computerised tomography (CT) scan of the applicant’s spine was carried out at a specialist clinic in Rīga. On two further occasions the applicant was examined at a public hospital in Valmiera. 70. On 2 August 2005 the applicant complained to the National Human Rights Office (Valsts cilvēktiesību birojs) about the conditions of his detention in Valmiera Prison and the adequacy of his medical support. As he had become paraplegic, he could not access the sanitation facilities (including the toilets and shower), library, shop or meeting and telephone rooms. He was also unable to go outside for walks. The applicant complained that he needed two operations, one so that he could walk again and the other to remove the metal implant supporting his spine. On 12 August 2005 his complaint was forwarded to the Prisons Administration (Ieslodzījuma vietu pārvalde). 71. On 2 September 2005 the Prisons Administration replied to the applicant and the National Human Rights Office that his complaints concerning the medical unit of Valmiera Prison were unsubstantiated. The Category 1 disability certificate had been granted to the applicant from 13 February 2005 to 28 February 2006. He had correctly noted himself in his complaint that such surgery could not be performed in Latvia. Furthermore, the medication necessary for acute conditions was available in the medical unit of Valmiera Prison. 72. On 7 September 2005 the National Human Rights Office sent the Prisons Administration a repeated request seeking a comprehensive review of the applicant’s complaints as it had not been done. In particular, answers were required concerning the applicant’s medical and social care and social integration in the prison. 73. On 21 September 2005 the Prisons Administration replied, adding to its previous letter that the applicant had failed to approach the medical staff in Valmiera Prison as concerns the surgery he allegedly needed. It stated that only doctors could ascertain if, where and when the applicant needed surgery and under which circumstances. According to the information in its possession, at that time no real possibility had existed for such surgery to be performed in Latvia. At the same time, it had been aware that the operations requested had not been urgent. The applicant had also been advised to actively engage in therapeutic/remedial gymnastics (ārstnieciskā fizkultūra). As concerns his social care, under domestic law there was no such care in prisons for the disabled and, accordingly, the administration of Valmiera Prison could not appoint someone to assist the applicant. The prison staff did not include social workers. Lastly, it was noted that as far as possible the administration of Valmiera Prison had facilitated the applicant’s life in prison, for example, by exempting him from participating in daily check‑ups. 74. On 12 October and 7 December 2005 the National Human Rights Office requested further information from the Prisons Administration and the Ministry of Justice concerning social care for disabled prisoners. 75. On 27 January 2006 the National Human Rights Office informed the applicant that, according to the information provided by the Ministry of Justice, domestic law did not contain any provisions for social care for prisoners with disabilities. However, new regulations concerning the issue were in the process of being drafted. 76. On 21 April 2006 the Valmiera District Court (Valmieras rajona tiesa) conditionally released the applicant prior to completion of his sentence (atbrīvot nosacīti pirms termiņa) ten months and seventeen days early, on the grounds that he had served three-quarters of his sentence, had not breached the prison regime (his disciplinary punishments had been removed), had a Category 1 disability and had received a satisfactory reference from the administration of the prison. 77. It appears that the applicant’s medical records contain information received from the State Probation Service in Jelgava suggesting that after his release, the applicant had been seen walking around the city of Jelgava on his own legs and drinking. 1. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 13 December 2006 (Resolution A/RES/61/106) 78. The Convention entered into force on 3 May 2008, was signed by Latvia on 18 July 2009 and ratified on 1 March 2010. The relevant parts provide: Article 2 - Definitions “For the purposes of the present Convention: ... ‘Reasonable accommodation’ means necessary and appropriate modification and adjustments not imposing a disproportionate or undue burden, where needed in a particular case, to ensure to persons with disabilities the enjoyment or exercise on an equal basis with others of all human rights and fundamental freedoms; ...” Article 14 - Liberty and security of the person “2. States Parties shall ensure that if persons with disabilities are deprived of their liberty through any process, they are, on an equal basis with others, entitled to guarantees in accordance with international human rights law and shall be treated in compliance with the objectives and principles of this Convention, including by provision of reasonable accommodation.” 79. In Interim Report of 28 July 2008 (A/63/175), the then UN Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Mr Manfred Nowak, noted as follows: “50. ... Persons with disabilities often find themselves in [situations of powerlessness], for instance when they are deprived of their liberty in prisons or other places ... In a given context, the particular disability of an individual may render him or her more likely to be in a dependant situation and make him or her an easier target of abuse ... ... 53. States have the further obligation to ensure that treatment or conditions in detention do not directly or indirectly discriminate against persons with disabilities. If such discriminatory treatment inflicts severe pain or suffering, it may constitute torture or other form of ill-treatment. ... 54. The Special Rapporteur notes that under article 14, paragraph 2, of the CRPD, States have the obligation to ensure that persons deprived of their liberty are entitled to ‘provision of reasonable accommodation’. This implies an obligation to make appropriate modifications in the procedures and physical facilities of detention centres ... to ensure that persons with disabilities enjoy the same rights and fundamental freedoms as others, when such adjustments do not impose disproportionate or undue burden. The denial or lack of reasonable accommodation for persons with disabilities may create detention ... conditions that amount to ill-treatment and torture.” 80. The relevant extracts from the 3rd General Report (CPT/Inf (93) 12; 4 June 1993) by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“the CPT”) read as follows: e. Humanitarian assistance “64. Certain specific categories of particularly vulnerable prisoners can be identified. Prison health care services should pay especial attention to their needs.” ... iv) prisoners unsuited for continued detention “70. Typical examples of this kind of prisoner are those who are the subject of a short‑term fatal prognosis, who are suffering from a serious disease which cannot be properly treated in prison conditions, who are severely handicapped or of advanced age. The continued detention of such persons in a prison environment can create an intolerable situation. In cases of this type, it lies with the prison doctor to draw up a report for the responsible authority, with a view to suitable alternative arrangements being made.” g. Professional competence “76. To ensure the presence of an adequate number of staff, nurses are frequently assisted by medical orderlies, some of whom are recruited from among the prison officers. At the various levels, the necessary experience should be passed on by the qualified staff and periodically updated. Sometimes prisoners themselves are allowed to act as medical orderlies. No doubt, such an approach can have the advantage of providing a certain number of prisoners with a useful job. Nevertheless, it should be seen as a last resort. Further, prisoners should never be involved in the distribution of medicines. 77. Finally, the CPT would suggest that the specific features of the provision of health care in a prison environment may justify the introduction of a recognised professional speciality, both for doctors and for nurses, on the basis of postgraduate training and regular in-service training.” 81. Recommendation no. R (98) 7 of the Committee of Ministers of 8 April 1998 concerning the ethical and organisational aspects of health care in prison, provides, in so far as relevant: III. The organisation of health care in prison with specific reference to the management of certain common problems 82. Recommendation CM/Rec (2012) 5 of the Committee of Ministers of 12 April 2012 on the European Code of Ethics for Prison Staff, provides, in particular: IV. Guidelines for prison staff conduct 20. Prison staff shall ensure the full protection of the health of persons in their custody and, in particular, shall take immediate action to secure medical attention whenever required. 21. Prison staff shall provide for the safety, hygiene and appropriate nourishment of persons in the course of their custody. They shall make every effort to ensure that conditions in prison comply with the requirements of relevant international standards, in particular the European Prison Rules. 22. Prison staff shall work towards facilitating the social reintegration of prisoners through a programme of constructive activities, individual interaction and assistance.” 83. The European Prison Rules, adopted on 11 January 2006, are recommendations of the Committee of Ministers to member States of the Council of Europe as to the minimum standards to be applied in prisons. States are encouraged to be guided in legislation and policies by those rules and to ensure wide dissemination of the Rules to their judicial authorities as well as to prison staff and inmates. The relevant parts read as follows: Hygiene “19.1 All parts of every prison shall be properly maintained and kept clean at all times. 19.2 When prisoners are admitted to prison the cells or other accommodation to which they are allocated shall be clean. 19.3 Prisoners shall have ready access to sanitary facilities that are hygienic and respect privacy. 19.4 Adequate facilities shall be provided so that every prisoner may have a bath or shower, at a temperature suitable to the climate, if possible daily but at least twice a week (or more frequently if necessary) in the interest of general hygiene. 19.6 The prison authorities shall provide them with the means for doing so, including toiletries and general cleaning implements and materials.”

5. The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Baku. 6. The applicant worked as an inspector at the Baku Audit Department (Bakı şəhəri üzrə Nəzarət-Təftiş İdarəsi - “the Department”) of the Ministry of Finance (“the Ministry”). On 1 May 1997 the applicant was dismissed from his job by an order of the Ministry for unsatisfactory work performance. 7. The applicant lodged an action against the Ministry, claiming unlawful dismissal. By a judgment of 23 February 1998 the Sabayil District Court allowed the applicant's claim, ordering his reinstatement in his previous job. Moreover, the court ordered the Ministry to pay the applicant his unpaid salary in an unspecified amount for the period from 1 May 1997 (date of dismissal) to 23 February 1998 (date of delivery of the judgment). No appeals were lodged against the judgment of 23 February 1998 within the time-limits specified by law and, pursuant to the domestic law in force at the material time, it entered into legal force ten days after its delivery. 8. Despite the applicant's numerous demands and the fact that the writ of execution had been sent several times to the Ministry for execution, the competent authorities did not take any measures to enforce the judgment. 9. By a letter of 18 January 2000 the Ministry informed the applicant that, upon the reorganisation of the Ministry, the Department had been abolished by an internal order of 28 January 1999 of the Ministry and that therefore it was not possible to reinstate him in his previous job. 10. On 14 November 2002 the applicant lodged an action against the Ministry, seeking compensation for non-execution of the judgment of 23 February 1998. On 17 January 2003 the Nasimi District Court delivered a judgment in the applicant's favour. The court noted that the judgment of 23 February 1998 was still in force and awarded the applicant 4,704,000 Old Azerbaijani manats (AZM, approximately 920 euros (EUR)) as his unpaid salary calculated from 23 February 1998 to 17 January 2003 (date of delivery of this judgment). This amount was calculated on the basis of the applicant's previous average salary. 11. On 17 February 2003 the applicant appealed against the judgment of 17 January 2003, claiming a higher amount of compensation. In the meantime, it appears from the case file that the Ministry requested the Court of Appeal to suspend the proceedings due to the Ministry's cassation appeal lodged with the Supreme Court against the judgment of 23 February 1998. After the Ministry's above-mentioned request, the proceedings before the Court of Appeal were formally suspended. 12. By a judgment of 10 May 2006 the Court of Appeal upheld the first‑instance court's judgment, noting that the amount of compensation had been calculated correctly. On 15 March 2007 the Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal's judgment. 13. On 28 January 2009 the judgment of 17 January 2003 was executed and the applicant received the amount awarded by the judgment (approximately EUR 920). 14. On 8 April 2009 the Ministry executed the judgment of 23 February 1998: the applicant was reinstated in his previous post and an amount of AZN 9,155.12 (approximately EUR 9,063) was paid to him as compensation for lost earnings, in addition to compensation awarded by the judgment of 17 January 2003.

5. The applicant was born in 1925 and lives in Triesenberg. 6. On 25 and 27 February 2000 a land development plan (Zonenplan) was adopted by referendum in the Municipality of Triesenberg. According to that plan, two plots of land owned by the applicant fell within a zone in which the construction of buildings was not authorised. 7. By submissions of 28 March 2000 the applicant, who was represented by counsel throughout the proceedings, lodged an objection with the Municipality of Triesenberg. She contested the lawfulness of the land development plan, which she considered in breach of her right to equality and to protection of her property and requested that the plots of land in question be designated as building land. 8. On 15 November 2000 the Municipality of Triesenberg dismissed the applicant’s objection. It found, in particular, that the applicant’s plots of land were not fully developed for lack of complete water installations. Her real property had not been classified as building land in the municipality’s land development plan at issue, which was the first land development plan ever adopted for the area in question, for reasons of protection of the environment and of the landscape as the plots of land were situated outside the area inhabited throughout the year. It had been justified to treat the area in which the applicant’s plots of land were situated in a different manner than three areas which were fully developed and on large parts of which buildings had already been erected. 9. The decision was issued and sent to the applicant on 22 January 2001. 10. On 27 and 28 April 2004 the Liechtenstein Government dismissed the complaint made by the applicant on 7 February 2001 about the municipality’s decision. They considered the land development plan to be lawful. Endorsing the reasons given by the municipality, they argued, in particular, that even if the applicant’s plots of land may have been building land under the provisional building rules of 1983, the applicant did not have a claim that her plots of land, which were not fully developed, should be designated as building land in the municipality’s first land development plan. That plan defined the use of the real property covered by it for the first time in accordance with the law. The citizens of Triesenberg had been aware that there would be a land development plan, as prescribed by law, in the future and the authorities had not undertaken to designate the applicant’s plots of land as building land. The Government considered that it had not been necessary to hear the parties in person or to inspect the property in question as the relevant facts were clear from the applicant’s submissions and the documents relating to the land development plan. 11. On 14 May 2004 the applicant lodged a complaint against the Government’s decision with the Liechtenstein Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof). She requested the Administrative Court to obtain certain documents concerning the land development plan from the municipality, to hold a public oral hearing, to designate her plots of land as building land or to grant her compensation for her factual expropriation and to declare the referendum adopting the land development plan void. The applicant further asked the court to question several witnesses whose submissions would show that the referendum had been manipulated. 12. On 2 June 2004 the Municipality of Triesenberg submitted observations to which the applicant replied on 12 June 2004. 13. On 14 June 2004 the Municipality of Triesenberg submitted further documents and photographs on the court’s request. The court informed the applicant thereof and further obtained the Government’s file and extracts from the land register on the plots of land in question. 14. On 30 June 2004 the Administrative Court, without having held a public oral hearing, dismissed the applicant’s complaint. 15. The Administrative Court found that there was nothing to indicate that Triesenberg’s land development plan as submitted to the citizens and as adopted by referendum had breached the applicant’s legitimate expectations that her real property be designated as building land. Even assuming that, as alleged by the applicant, prior to the referendum on the land development plan, officials of the municipality had raised her hopes that the applicant’s plots of land could be designated as building land at some point in the future, it was clear that in the land development plan to be adopted by referendum, those plots of land were not designated as building land. Therefore, it was not necessary to take the evidence offered by the applicant or to hold a public oral hearing. 16. Having regard to the documents submitted by the applicant, there was also no proof that the referendum of 25 and 27 February 2000 had been unlawfully manipulated. 17. On 26 August 2004 the applicant, who was from then on represented by counsel, lodged a constitutional complaint with the Liechtenstein Constitutional Court against the decision taken by the Administrative Court. 18. The applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention that despite her express request and despite the fact that none of the authorities previously involved in the proceedings had held an oral hearing, the Administrative Court had refused to take evidence in an adversarial manner in an oral public hearing, contrary to its practice in comparable cases. In particular, it had not examined the witnesses she had named. Instead, that court had taken a lot of evidence and had obtained observations and replies only in a written procedure. 19. Referring to her complaints made before the Administrative Court, she further complained under Article 6 of the Convention about the procedure of adoption of the land development plan in Triesenberg. Relying on Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 to the Convention, she also argued that the unlawful land development plan had disproportionately interfered with her property rights. 20. The applicant requested the Constitutional Court to hold an oral hearing. 21. In its reply to the applicant’s observations, the Administrative Court confirmed that, contrary to previous proceedings before it in which Triesenberg’s land development plan had been at issue, it had indeed not held a public oral hearing in the applicant’s case. It argued that the situation of the plots of land concerned was commonly known and clearly shown on the photographs in the file and that the applicant had been given the opportunity to comment on the few documents obtained by it in writing. Moreover, in proceedings concerning land development, it did not, as a rule, hold public oral hearings. 22. On 15 May 2006 the Liechtenstein Constitutional Court held a public hearing. The composition of the court subsequently changed, without a new hearing being held despite the applicant’s request. 23. On 4 November 2008 the Constitutional Court, in its deliberations in private, decided to dismiss as inadmissible the applicant’s request to declare void the referendum of 25 and 27 February 2000 on the land development plan in the Municipality of Triesenberg as the applicant had failed to lodge a separate complaint in respect of that referendum with the Government. It further rejected the remainder of the applicant’s complaints as ill-founded. It found, however, ex officio that the applicant’s right to a hearing within a reasonable time under the Liechtenstein Constitution and Article 6 § 1 of the Convention had been violated in the proceedings before it as the proceedings had been too long. It ordered that therefore, Liechtenstein was to bear the applicant’s costs of the proceedings, amounting to statutory lawyer’s fees of some 2,960 Swiss francs (CHF), and the court costs, amounting to CHF 1,700 (file no. StGH 2004/58). 24. The Constitutional Court’s judgment, served on the applicant’s counsel on 14 April 2009, gave the following reasons. (a) Lack of a public oral hearing before the Administrative Court 25. As regards the applicant’s complaint that the Administrative Court had failed to hold a public oral hearing, the Constitutional Court found that under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which the applicant could rely on in the proceedings before it, as a rule, an oral hearing had to be held. 26. However, when ratifying the Convention, Liechtenstein had made extensive reservations concerning, inter alia, the publicity of hearings as prescribed by Article 6 § 1. That reservation was to be considered as complying with Article 57 of the Convention. Even though some of the statutes to which the reservation applied had been changed in the meantime, such as the Constitutional Court Act, the reservation concerning the publicity of the proceedings has not been withdrawn. 27. In determining whether the proceedings before the Administrative Court complied with the Constitution, the Constitutional Court found that the National Administrative Justice Act (Gesetz über die allgemeine Landesverwaltungspflege) of 21 April 1922 (see paragraph 36 below) was applicable to the proceedings before the Administrative Court. It considered the reservation made by Liechtenstein in relation to Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, as far as, inter alia, that Act was concerned, to be valid. Therefore, the requirement of a public hearing, and thus the requirement of an oral hearing under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention did not apply to the proceedings before the Administrative Court. 28. The Constitutional Court noted, however, that under its recent case‑law, the principle of a public hearing had to be considered as a vital aspect of the right to a fair trial and was thus part of the foundations of a democratic State governed by the rule of law. The applicant could be understood to have also complained about the lack of a fair trial as she had complained under Article 6 of the Convention that the Administrative Court had refused to take evidence in an adversarial manner in the course of a public oral hearing. The right to a fair trial under Article 6 § 1 was not covered by any reservation made by Liechtenstein when ratifying the Convention and was also protected by the Liechtenstein Constitution. The European Court of Human Right’s case-law on the scope of the right to a fair trial under Article 6 therefore had to be taken into account in the proceedings at issue. 29. The Constitutional Court noted that under Article 100 § 4 of the National Administrative Justice Act (see paragraph 36 below), the Administrative Court had discretion in deciding whether or not to hold an oral hearing, but it had to exercise that discretion in accordance with fundamental procedural rights. The Administrative Court had argued that an oral hearing had not been necessary because the applicant’s submissions, even if correct, did not warrant the conclusion that the land development plan was unlawful. In the proceedings before the Constitutional Court, the Administrative Court had further argued that the situation of the plots of land concerned had been commonly known and clearly shown on the photographs in the file. 30. The Constitutional Court agreed that the Administrative Court had been in a position to determine all factual and legal questions by having regard to the parties’ written observations and the documents contained in the file. Moreover, the legal question whether in the course of the referendum on the land development plan the principles of good faith and of the protection of legal interests had been respected and whether the referendum had been manipulated had not been complex. 31. Therefore, having regard to the principles developed in the Strasbourg Court’s case-law concerning a public oral hearing (the court referred, in particular, to Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland, 24 June 1993, Series A no. 263; Speil v. Austria (dec.), no. 42057/98, 5 September 2002; and Vilho Eskelinen and Others v. Finland [GC], no. 63235/00, ECHR 2007‑IV), the applicant’s right to a fair trial had not been violated by the Administrative Court’s refusal to hold a public oral hearing. The Administrative Court had thus exercised its discretion under Article 100 § 4 of the National Administrative Justice Act in accordance with fundamental procedural rights. (b) The remainder of the applicant’s complaints 32. The Constitutional Court considered that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies in relation to her further complaints under Article 6 and Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 of the Convention because she had not submitted these complaints to the lower authorities and the Administrative Court. 33. The Constitutional Court further argued that, in any event, the land development plan had not breached the applicant’s right to property. The failure to designate the applicant’s plots of land as building land in the municipality’s first land development plan did not deprive her of a possession, but merely regulated the use of her real property. There were also no exceptional circumstances indicating that the applicant’s real property had to be designated as building land and she could not, therefore, claim compensation. 34. Moreover, the Constitutional Court found that the applicant’s complaint under Article 6 about the procedure of adoption of the land development plan in Triesenberg was ill-founded, in particular because the applicant had had access to the Administrative Court, an independent and impartial tribunal with full jurisdiction on both facts and law under Article 100 § 2 of the National Administrative Justice Act (see paragraph 36 below).

5. The applicant was born in 1931 and lives in Kraków. 6. The applicant’s son-in-law, J.D., owns a construction company. In 2002 he built a villa for Z.W., a prominent politician, former prosecutor and deputy in the Polish parliament. 7. On 4 April 2003, the applicant wrote a letter to E.J. – the chief editor of a television programme (“Sprawa dla reportera”). She stressed in particular: “For 6 months Z.W. has owed 240,000 Polish zlotys to a small construction company. On 15 November [2002] he moved into a villa built by this company and until today, 4 April 2003, he has not paid a cent. No one can help us. The deputies from the “Law and Justice” Party (Prawo i sprawiedliwość) do not reply to our letters, they are silent because how could they touch the great W. They believe in his lies and fibs, no one is persuaded that he owes 240,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) to poor, hard working people (...). My son-in-law had contacts with different investors, but this is the first time in his life that he met such a greedy and mendacious person. He never expected such dishonesty from a public person – a deputy from the Law and Justice Party. This is why he [Z.W.] managed to trick him out of such a significant sum.” 8. In a second letter, dated 2 June 2004, addressed to the President of the board of the Polish Television, the applicant expressed the view that the media forgot about small enterprises that went bankrupt as they could not afford to pay the costs of civil proceedings. She further stated that: “Z.W. managed to deceive and ruin three [...] Polish companies and to successfully intimidate their owners and employees.” 9. Z.W. was informed about both letters by Polish Television journalists, who asked him for his comments. 10. On 8 July 2004 Z.W. lodged a private bill of indictment against the applicant. He charged the applicant with defamation. In particular, Z.W. submitted that in the letters sent to Polish Television on 4 April and 2 June 2004 the applicant had wrongly alleged that he had not paid J.D.’s company. The applicant had also referred to his using words indicating dishonesty, deceitfulness and fraudulent actions on his part. 11. The applicant was tried by the Kraków District Court. On 31 August 2006 she was convicted of defamation under Article 212 § 1 of the Criminal Code. The criminal proceedings against her were conditionally discontinued and she was ordered to pay PLN 1,000 to Z.W. She was also ordered to publish a written apology. In addition, the applicant was ordered to reimburse PLN 300 to Z.W. for the costs of the proceedings. 12. The trial court held that the content of the letter and in particular the expressions used, such as “liar”, “greedy and mendacious person”, “dishonest” could have resulted in Z.W. losing the public trust necessary for his political career. The background of this case was a civil dispute between Z.W and J.D. over the villa that the latter had built. The court noted that both parties had their arguments, more or less justified, but it was not the court’s role to adjudicate on this conflict, since its final outcome was already before a civil court. The court further referred to expert evidence (several opinions) obtained in the criminal and civil proceedings from which it appeared that indeed part of Z.W.’s allegations against J.D. as regards the quality of the construction works was substantiated. More importantly, the villa was not a faultless construction as claimed by the applicant and her family. 13. The court further held that it was impossible to accept that the words used by the applicant were true. They gave the applicant’s private opinion about Z.W., which had no objective justification in the facts of the case. In addition, the court noted that the applicant could not have been mistaken about the genuineness of her statements as she was well aware of the civil dispute between J.D. and Z.W. The court also observed that the evidence before it had not confirmed in any way that three companies had been ruined. 14. In the court’s opinion the applicant’s letters formed an unjustified personal attack on Z.W. The applicant consciously circulated untrue facts concerning an alleged non-compliance with a financial obligation between Z.W. and J.D. The allegations concerned the private life of Z.W. and therefore could not be protected in the same way as statements concerning his political activities. 15. The applicant appealed against her conviction. On 24 January 2007 the Kraków Regional Court partly upheld the first-instance judgment. However it ordered the applicant only to publish an apology and reimburse Z.W.’s costs. The court referred to the reasons given by the District Court. It considered that the applicant’s allegations were not true and the applicant had been aware of this. Furthermore, she had not acted in the public interest but had presented her personal negative and unsubstantiated opinion of Z.W. 16. On 21 April 2004 J.D. lodged with the Kraków Regional Court a claim against Z.W. and his wife seeking payment of 40,492 Polish zlotys for the works carried out by his company. 17. On 22 June 2004 the Kraków Regional Court in a summary procedure (postepowanie uproszczone) ordered Z.W. and his wife to pay J.D. the requested sum together with interest. 18. On the defendants’ appeal the case was transferred to the ordinary procedure. 19. On 10 June 2008 the Kraków Regional Court gave judgment and dismissed J.D.’s claim. The court held that the plaintiff’s claims were unsubstantiated since, as proved by expert opinions, the construction works carried out by his company had been faulty. In addition Z.W. had had to spend about PLN 100,000 in order to repair the building. The court concluded that Z.W could have requested to have this amount offset against J.D.’s claim. 20. On 28 November 2008 the Kraków Court of Appeal upheld the first‑instance judgment and dismissed J.D.’s claim.

5. The applicant was born in 1967 and lived in St Petersburg until his arrest. He is now serving his sentence in a correctional colony in Omsk. 6. On 4 October 1999 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of fraud. Two days later he was charged with aggravated robbery. On the following day the St Petersburg City Prosecutor authorised his detention, finding that the applicant was liable to reoffend, pervert the course of justice and abscond, as he was charged with a particularly serious criminal offence, had been living unregistered in St Petersburg and in 1995 had been placed on the wanted persons' list owing to his absconding from an investigation into aggravated fraud. The prosecution authorities used the same grounds while further extending on 25 October and 17 December 1999 and 23 June 2000 the detention of the applicant and his eight co-defendants. 7. On 12 May 2000 the applicant was charged with organisation of a criminal enterprise, twelve counts of robbery, unlawful possession of a weapon, theft of a weapon, forgery of documents, fraud, aggravated theft and intentional destruction of property. On 7 September 2000 he was committed to stand trial before the St Petersburg City Court. 8. On 6 October 2000 the St Petersburg City Court fixed the first trial hearing for 24 October 2001 and, without providing any grounds, held that the applicant should remain in custody. The Government, relying on a letter drafted on 17 July 2007 by the acting first deputy of the St Petersburg City Court President, stressed that it had been impossible to schedule the first trial hearing for an earlier date because the City Court judges had been overburdened with cases. In particular, 502 cases were pending before twenty judges. 9. The first hearing fixed for 24 October 2001, as well as the following one listed for 27 November 2001 had been adjourned because the presiding judge was participating in other unrelated proceedings. The hearing fixed for 10 January 2002 was rescheduled because a co-defendant was ill and two counsel failed to appear. The hearing on 25 January 2002 also did not take place owing to the absence of free courtrooms. 10. Between 29 January and 18 March 2002 the City Court held eighteen hearings. Of four hearings fixed between 18 March and 25 September 2002, two were postponed because the presiding judge was participating in other proceedings and two were rescheduled because two co-defendants and a lawyer were ill. 11. On 1 July 2002 a new Code of Criminal Procedure became effective. On the same day the St. Petersburg City Court extended the applicant's and his co-defendants' detention until 30 September 2002, holding that they were charged with especially serious criminal offences and were liable to reoffend, pervert the course of justice and abscond. The defendants and their lawyers were not present at the hearing. 12. On 7 October 2002 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation quashed the decision of 1 July 2002, finding that the City Court had not summoned the defendants and their lawyers. 13. On the following day the City Court re-examined the detention issue and retrospectively extended the applicant's detention for three months, until 30 September 2002. It held that the applicant and his co-defendants were charged with serious criminal offences and that if released they could pervert the course of justice, reoffend or abscond. The City Court did not cite any factual circumstances supporting its conclusion of the defendants' liability to interfere with the proceedings, to commit another offence or escape the trial. 14. The two trial hearings fixed for 23 October and 11 November 2002 were adjourned because counsel was ill. The following hearing was scheduled for 28 November 2002. 15. On 23 December 2002 the Supreme Court quashed the decision of 8 October 2002 in respect of the applicant and ordered a re-examination of the detention issue. It noted that the applicant's lawyer had been summoned to the hearing on 8 October 2002. However, he had been ill and unable to attend. The Supreme Court, reiterating that the City Court had accepted the reason for the lawyer's absence as valid, concluded that in such circumstances it should have adjourned the examination of the detention matter in respect of the applicant. 16. The City Court once again re-examined the detention matter on 24 December 2002 and retrospectively extended the applicant's detention until 30 September 2002, referring to the same grounds as in the previous detention orders. 17. The applicant and his lawyers, including retained counsel, Mr R., appealed against the decision of 24 December 2002. 18. On 11 March 2003 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's appeal against the decision of 24 December 2002 because no procedural or substantive violations had been established and refused to examine the statement of appeal submitted by Mr R. because the latter did not attend the appeal hearing. 19. In the meantime, on 25 September and 26 December 2002 the St Petersburg City Court, using collective orders, extended the detention of all co-defendants, including the applicant, until 30 December 2002 and 30 March 2003, respectively. The reasons for the extensions were identical to those that had been given in the previous detention orders. Both detention orders were upheld by the Supreme Court on 9 December 2002 and 12 March 2003, respectively. The Supreme Court found no violations of substantive and procedural law. 20. Between 28 November 2002 and 13 March 2003 the City Court scheduled twenty-six hearings, of which six were postponed to obtain attendance of witnesses and victims, seven were adjourned owing to counsel's illness or inability to attend, four were rescheduled because defendants were not brought to the court-house from the detention facility and one was fixed for a later date to allow defendants to study new materials presented by the prosecution. 21. On 13 March 2003 the St Petersburg City Court extended the applicant's and his co-defendants' detention until 30 June 2003. It noted that the defendants were charged with particularly serious criminal offences, certain “episodes of criminal activity” had not yet been examined in open court and the defendants were still liable to abscond and pervert the course of justice. The trial hearing fixed for 13 March 2003 was rescheduled for 2 April 2003. On 26 May 2003 the Supreme Court examined the grounds of the applicant's appeal against the decision of 13 March 2003 and upheld the decision. 22. Between 2 April and 24 June 2003 the City Court listed twenty-nine hearings, of which two were postponed because the defendants were not transported to the court-house, two hearings were adjourned owing to the prosecutor's or counsel's illness and one was rescheduled because victims and witnesses failed to appear. 23. On 24 June 2003 the St Petersburg City Court extended the applicant's and his co-defendants' detention, holding that they were charged with serious criminal offences and were liable to abscond. It appears that on an unspecified date the detention order was upheld by the Supreme Court. 24. At the hearing on 25 June 2003 the applicant unsuccessfully asked the St. Petersburg City Court to invite his non-marital partner as a “public defender” in the proceedings. 25. Of four hearings fixed between 26 June and 7 July 2003, three were adjourned due to a lawyer's illness. 26. On 7 July 2003 the St Petersburg City Court held that another lawyer should be appointed to replace the frequently ill counsel. The new lawyer was afforded ten days to study the case file. 27. On 14 July 2003 the applicant complained to the City Court that he had been ill-treated in a detention facility. The City Court referred the complaint to the St. Petersburg City Prosecutor, who on 11 December 2003 dismissed it as unsubstantiated and informed the applicant of his right to appeal against that decision to a higher-ranking prosecutor or a court. No appeal followed. 28. According to the applicant, on the day of a court session reveille was at 5 or 6 a.m. Inmates were brought to a small room of 6 square metres where they were kept for several hours. The room was cold in winter. It was dirty and poorly lit. At about 9 a.m. transportation of inmates to the courthouse began. Inmates were placed into an overcrowded van and transported in inhuman conditions for many hours; the van called in on the way at several courthouses until the inmates reached their destination. The inmates received no food for the entire day. 29. On 21 July 2003 the St Petersburg City Court found the applicant guilty of aggravated robbery and fraud and sentenced him to twelve years' imprisonment. The City Court discontinued the proceedings in respect of the remaining charges either because the prosecution had dropped the charges or the limitation period had expired. It based its one hundred and thirty-four-page judgment on statements by numerous witnesses, victims and defendants who had been heard in open court, material evidence and expert opinions. The City Court, with the applicant's consent, read out statements by three witnesses who had not been heard in open court. Those statements were made during the pre-trial investigation. The applicant was represented by retained counsel who had assisted him throughout the criminal proceedings and a court-appointed lawyer. 30. On 15 January 2004 the Supreme Court examined the appeals lodged against the judgment of 21 July 2003. It discontinued the proceedings in respect of the fraud charges because the limitation period had expired and upheld the remaining conviction. The Supreme Court reduced the applicant's sentence to eleven years' imprisonment. 31. On 21 June 2007 the Kuybyshevskiy District Court of Omsk, having established that the applicant “had definitely taken his first steps on the road to improvement”, authorised his release on probation. The management of the correctional colony supported that finding. The applicant was released on 4 July 2007, after the decision of 21 June 2007 had become final. 32. From 14 October to 10 December 1999 the applicant was detained in facility no. IZ-47/1 in St Petersburg, commonly known as Kresty. On 10 December 1999 he was transferred to facility no. IZ-47/4 in St Petersburg, where he was kept until 3 April 2004. 33. According to the applicant, the general conditions of his detention in those facilities were similar. Relying on written statements by his former fellow inmates, he argued that he had been detained in three different cells in facility no. IZ-47/1 and ten different cells in facility no. IZ-47/4. The cells had six sleeping places and housed from eight to twenty-five inmates. Given the lack of beds, inmates slept in shifts. The sanitary conditions were unsatisfactory. The lavatory pan was not separated from the rest of the cell. At no time did inmates have complete privacy. Anything the applicant happened to be doing – using the toilet, sleeping – was subject to observations by warders or inmates. The cells were infected with bedbugs and lice but the administration did not provide any insecticide. Windows, measuring 0.6 square metres, were covered with thick metal bars that blocked access to natural light and fresh air. The bars were only removed in February 2003. In addition, only four cells had glazed windows. It was extremely cold in winter and was hot, stuffy and excessively damp in summer. There was no artificial ventilation. Inmates had an hour's daily exercise. On his admission to a detention facility he was given a mattress and a thin blanket. The food was of poor quality. Inmates were allowed to take a shower three times a month. The applicant contracted several infectious skin diseases. Medical assistance was not provided as the facilities lacked necessary medicines and encouraged inmates' relatives to bring them. 34. The Government, relying on certificates issued in July 2007 by the directors of the detention facilities, submitted that in facility no. IZ-47/1 the applicant had been detained in three different cells measuring 7.6 square metres and equipped with six sleeping places. In facility no. IZ-47/4 he stayed in nine different cells, measuring from 6.6 to 30.5 sq. m. On days when the applicant was to be transferred to a courthouse for trial hearings he was taken to “gathering cells” which measured 6.6 square metres. The Government did not provide information on a number of sleeping places in the cells in which the applicant had been kept in facility no. IZ-47/4. They also stressed that no information on the number of inmates in the both facilities was available as the documents had been destroyed. However, according to the Government, the applicant had an individual sleeping place at all times. 35. Citing the information provided by the directors of the facilities, the Government further submitted that the cells received natural light and ventilation through windows which had been glazed. Cells in facility no. IZ-47/1 had one window 1 metre wide and 1.1 metre long. The smaller cells in facility no. IZ-47/4 were equipped with one window and the bigger cells had two windows of the same size of 0.88 square metres. At the inmates' request window glass was removed in summertime and put back in when the temperature outside decreased. The windows were covered by thick bars with “eyelashes”, that is, slanted plates approximately two centimetres apart welded to a metal screen. In compliance with the recommendations of the Russian Ministry of Justice issued on 25 November 2002, the latter construction was removed from the windows on an unspecified date in 2003. The cells had ventilation shafts. The heating system in the both detention facilities functioned properly. The cells were equipped with lamps which functioned day and night. Each cell was equipped with a lavatory pan, a sink and a tank with potable water. The pan was placed 1.5 metres from a dining table and was separated from the living area by a partition. Inmates were allowed to take a shower once a week. Each inmate was given at least fifteen minutes to take a shower. The cells were disinfected. The Government, relying on the information provided by the director of the facility, further stated that the applicant was given food “in accordance with the established norms” three times a day. As follows from medical documents presented by the Government, since his placement in detention facility no. IZ-47/4 the applicant gained 21 kilograms, weighing 85 kilograms in December 1999 and 106 kilograms in May 2004. According to the Government, detainees including the applicant were provided with medical assistance. They had regular medical check-ups, including X-ray examinations, blood tests, and so on. In November 1999 the applicant requested medical assistance, complaining of pain in the right elbow. A preliminary diagnosis of osteoarthritis was made. However, further medical examinations and specific tests did not confirm that diagnosis. The Government further insisted that the applicant's allegations that he had contracted skin diseases were false. They supported their submissions with a copy of the applicant's medical record and various medical certificates.

4. The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Yerevan. 5. In February and March 2003 a presidential election was held in Armenia, during which the applicant was involved as an authorised election assistant (վստահված անձ) for the candidate representing the People’s Party of Armenia (PPA), who was the main opposition candidate in the election. Following his defeat by the incumbent President, the PPA candidate challenged the election results in the Constitutional Court, which on 16 April 2003 recommended that a referendum of confidence in the re-elected President be held in Armenia within a year. 6. As the April 2004 one-year deadline approached, the opposition stepped up its campaign to challenge the legitimacy of the re-elected President. At the end of March 2004 two main opposition groups – the Justice Alliance, consisting of nine parties, including the PPA and the National Unity Party – announced their intention to start a series of demonstrations demanding the resignation of the re-elected President. 7. The applicant alleges that from February 2003 until his arrest in April 2004 he was repeatedly harassed because of his political activity. In particular, the police frequently called him to the police station without any reasons and demanded that he stop his political activities and support for the opposition. 8. On 30 March 2004 criminal proceedings no. 62201704 were instituted under Article 301 and 318 § 2 of the Criminal Code (CC) against representatives of the Justice Alliance on account of making calls for a violent overthrow of the government and change of the Armenian constitutional order and of publicly insulting government representatives. 9. On 8 April 2004 the applicant was handing out leaflets to people at a marketplace in Yerevan, inciting them to attend a demonstration to be held in the capital on 9 April 2004. The leaflets had the following content: “Fellow countrymen It is not possible any more to continue this way. On 9 April at 4 p.m. in Freedom Square we will start our struggle which aims to establish a lawful government in Armenia. The future of our homeland depends on the participation of each of us. National Unity PartyJustice Alliance” 10. The applicant was stopped by two police officers, G.D. and G.A., who demanded that he accompany them to a police station. It appears that this happened at around 1 p.m. 11. According to the applicant, they arrived at the police station at around 1.30 p.m. At the police station he was placed in a waiting room with a glass wall next to the corridor, where he spent about ten hours. During this period he noticed several people behind the glass wall pointing at him as if to identify him. He had no access to a lawyer during this period. 12. It appears that at some point the applicant was transferred to a prosecutor’s office where from 8.55 to 9.05 p.m. and from 9.30 to 10.05 p.m. two confrontations were held between him and two witnesses, M.M. and N.S., respectively, who worked at the marketplace. The relevant records stated at the outset that there had been substantial contradictions between the statements of these witnesses and the applicant, who at this stage was also involved as a witness. 13. Witness M.M. stated during the confrontation that earlier that day, at around 2 p.m., he had noticed the applicant handing out leaflets and saying something to people at the marketplace. Then the applicant had approached him and given him a leaflet, saying that “the day after it would be the end of the government and the government would be changed and that they would put an end to the government and sort them out”. 14. Witness N.S. stated that the applicant had approached him at around 1 p.m. and given him a leaflet, saying that he should “come to the demonstration where they would crush and overcome”, after which the applicant left. 15. The applicant denied having handed out any leaflets or made any such statements. 16. At 10.30 p.m. an arrest record was drawn up which noted that eye-witnesses had stated that the applicant had handed out leaflets and made calls for a violent overthrow of the government. The applicant again denied these allegations. 17. On the same date the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan granted the investigator’s motion to have the applicant’s flat searched. This decision stated that there were sufficient grounds to believe that written calls, leaflets, plans and projects to overthrow the government and change the constitutional order violently and to insult representatives of the government publicly, as well as firearms, ammunition and other objects and documents relevant to the case, could be found in the applicant’s flat. 18. On 9 April 2004 the investigator invited a legal aid lawyer, H.I., to represent the applicant’s interests. According to the relevant record, the applicant agreed that his interests be represented by lawyer H.I. 19. On the same date from 10.30 to 11.10 a.m. the applicant’s flat was searched in the presence of two attesting witnesses but no items were found. 20. From 1.05 to 2.25 p.m. the applicant was questioned as a suspect in the presence of lawyer H.I. The applicant again denied all the allegations. 21. On 10 April 2004 the applicant was formally charged within the scope of criminal proceedings no. 62201704 under Article 301 of the CC. This decision stated: “...[the applicant], having received from [the district office] of the National Unity Party leaflets concerning the demonstration to be held on 9 April 2004 at 4 p.m. on Freedom Square with the aim of “establishing a lawful government in Armenia”, distributed these leaflets to citizens and made calls to overthrow the government and change the constitutional order violently. On 8 April 2004 at around 1 p.m. [the applicant] was caught by police officers while he was handing out the leaflets and a total of 24 leaflets were confiscated from him. Thus, [the applicant] has made calls to overthrow the government and change the constitutional order violently, namely he has committed an offence envisaged under Article 301 of the [CC].” 22. The applicant and his lawyer signed this decision which, inter alia, stated that the nature of the charge had been explained to the applicant. The applicant once again gave his consent to be represented by lawyer H.I. He was then questioned as an accused in the presence of his lawyer. The applicant submitted that the nature of the charge was clear to him but denied having distributed leaflets or made any calls at the marketplace. 23. On the same date the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan granted the investigator’s motion, dated 6 April 2004, to have the applicant detained. 24. On 21 April 2004 a confrontation was held between the applicant and another witness, V.Z., who apparently also worked at the marketplace. He identified the applicant as the person who had approached him on 8 April 2004, handed him a leaflet and told him to attend a demonstration on the following day during which a struggle to change the government would begin and that the authorities were unlawful and had to be changed. The applicant again denied having distributed leaflets or made any calls and submitted that witness V.Z. had been forced by the police to make false submissions. This confrontation was held in the presence of lawyer H.I. 25. On 6 May 2004 another confrontation was held between the applicant and arresting police officer G.D. who submitted that on 8 April 2004 at around 12 noon, having noticed that the applicant was distributing leaflets at the marketplace, they had approached him and asked to have a look at the leaflets. Having read what the leaflets said, they asked the applicant to come with them to the police station for clarification. The applicant denied these allegations. This confrontation was held in the presence of lawyer H.I. 26. On 7 May 2004 another confrontation was held between the applicant and the second arresting police officer, G.A., who made submissions similar to those made by police officer G.D. The applicant submitted in reply that police officer G.A.’s statement was true and that he had not told the entire truth in his previous submissions. The applicant admitted that he had distributed the leaflets at the marketplace but denied having said anything or made any calls for a violent overthrow of the government. He submitted that he regretted his actions and requested to be released from detention. This confrontation was held in the presence of lawyer H.I. 27. On the same day the applicant was again questioned as an accused in the presence of lawyer H.I., during which he made similar submissions and pleaded partly guilty. 28. Later that day lawyer H.I. filed a motion with the General Prosecutor’s Office, seeking to have the applicant released from detention. He submitted that the applicant was known to be of good character, had a permanent place of residence, was a pensioner and would not abscond or obstruct the proceedings if freed. Furthermore, he had no criminal record, had pleaded guilty and regretted his actions. 29. It appears that on unspecified dates two other witnesses, O.V. and S.K., were also questioned in connection with the applicant’s case. Witness O.V. stated that a tall person had been distributing leaflets at the marketplace on 8 April 2004. When handing him a leaflet, he said that a struggle aimed at establishing a lawful government in Armenia would begin at the demonstration of 9 April 2004. He further incited everybody to participate in the struggle, topple the government and make a coup. Witness S.K. stated that a tall elderly person had handed him a leaflet at the marketplace on 8 April 2004 and incited him to join the struggle, eliminate the current government, topple them by force and establish a new order. 30. The applicant alleged, which the Government did not dispute, that throughout the entire investigation his lawyer had never met or spoken with him in private, while in detention, to provide legal advice. Furthermore, the lawyer even failed to satisfy his request to be provided with a copy of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 31. On an unspecified date the applicant’s case was brought before the Avan and Nor Nork District Court of Yerevan which started its examination on 31 May 2004. The applicant submitted before the District Court that he wished to be represented by lawyer H.I. 32. The examining judge noted at the outset that the witnesses had been duly notified but had failed to appear and inquired about the opinion of the parties. The prosecutor submitted that they had to be compelled to appear. The lawyer made a similar submission on the ground that it was impossible to examine the case without the witnesses. The judge agreed and adjourned the hearing until 2 June 2004. 33. At the hearing of 2 June 2004 four witnesses appeared, witnesses N.S. and M.M. and police officers G.D. and G.A.. 34. Witness N.S. admitted that he was seeing the applicant for the second time, the first time being on 8 April 2004 at the prosecutor’s office. He further submitted that about a month before he was at work at the marketplace when somebody had approached and given him a leaflet, adding that “tomorrow at 1 p.m. there would be a demonstration on Freedom Square”. The person handing out the leaflets was tall and had grey hair. He gave the leaflet and said “come at this hour, we will crush, shatter and conquer”. Witness N.S. submitted that he had understood from these statements that the demonstrators wanted to change the government. In reply to the applicant’s lawyer’s questions, witness N.S. submitted that he was not familiar with that person and he could not say for sure if it was the applicant who had given the leaflet and made the statements. He was sure though that he had seen the applicant at the prosecutor’s office. Witness N.S. explained that he had stated at the prosecutor’s office that he had not seen who was distributing the leaflets, to which they replied that it had been the applicant. In reply to the judge’s question as to why he had stated unequivocally during the investigation that it was the applicant who had distributed the leaflets and made the above statements, witness N.S. submitted that he had said so because he had been told at the prosecutor’s office that it was the applicant who was distributing leaflets in the area of the marketplace. He further submitted that he could not remember who it was, but people around him said that it was the applicant, so he said the same. 35. Witness M.M. submitted that at some point in May he was at the marketplace when the applicant, who was distributing leaflets, approached him and invited him to a demonstration in order to “turn over” the government. The applicant then left. Witness M.M. further confirmed his pre-trial statement and asked to rely on it. He also confirmed that the person distributing the leaflets, like the applicant, had grey hair and a white shirt and was tall. 36. Police officer G.D. submitted that he was on duty at the marketplace with police officer G.A. where they noticed a person who was handing out leaflets. They approached him and brought to the police station, where he was identified as the applicant. They could not hear what he was saying to the vendors. In reply to the applicant’s lawyer’s questions, police officer G.D. said that he personally did not hear any calls from the applicant. Nor did any of the vendors tell him that the applicant had made calls. 37. Police officer G.A. made similar submissions. 38. The examining judge then announced that he had received an official letter from the police stating that witness S.K. had not been found at his place of residence, that witness O.V. was absent from his place of residence and lived elsewhere, and that the court’s decision ordering the appearance of these witnesses, in its part concerning witness V.Z., had not been executed for reasons not communicated to the court. The prosecutor requested that the pre-trial statements of these witnesses be read out. The applicant and his lawyer consented, after which the statements were read out. 39. The applicant was then examined, during which he admitted that he had distributed leaflets but denied having made any calls for a violent overthrow of the government. 40. Thereafter the trial entered its final stage of pleadings. The prosecutor made a speech, followed by the applicant’s lawyer and the applicant himself. The lawyer, in particular, made the following speech: “I find that the defendant must be acquitted”. 41. On the same date the District Court found the applicant guilty as charged and imposed a one year suspended sentence, ordering at the same time the applicant’s release from detention under a written undertaking not to leave his place of residence. The District Court found, in particular, that: “On 8 April 2004 [the applicant] received leaflets from the Avan and Nor Nork district office of National Unity Party concerning a rally to be held on 9 April 2004 at 4 p.m. on Freedom Square, distributed them to persons working and involved in trade in the area of the seventh market situated in [Nork] and made public calls inciting to a violent overthrow of the government and the constitutional order. In particular, when handing out leaflets to [N.S., M.M., V.Z., O.V. and S.K.], he incited them to participate in the rally telling them ‘You must come by all means, we will crush, overcome, put an end to the government and sort them out, we will make a coup, we will violently overthrow the current government and establish a new order’” 42. In support of its findings the District Court relied on the statements of witnesses N.S., M.M., V.Z., O.V. and S.K. As regards, in particular, the statements made by witness N.S. in court, the District Court dismissed them as unreliable and admitted his statements made during the confrontation of 8 April 2004. The District Court justified this decision by the fact that the statements made by witness N.S. during the confrontation had been unequivocal. Thus, according to the entirety of the witness statements relied on by the District Court, the applicant had made the following calls while handing out the leaflets and inciting people to attend the demonstration: “we will crush and overcome” (witness N.S.), “the government will be changed and we will put an end to the government and sort them out” (witness M.M.), “a struggle will start at the demonstration aimed at changing the government and establishing a lawful one”, “the current government will be overthrown and a new one will be established”, “the current government is unlawful and has to be changed” (witness V.Z.), “the government has to be overthrown and a coup has to be made” (witness O.V.) and “the current government has to be eliminated and violently overthrown and a new order has to be established” (witness S.K.). 43. On 14 June 2004 the applicant lodged an appeal, which he apparently drafted himself. In his appeal the applicant submitted that during the investigation he had pleaded guilty only to distributing leaflets, which in any event was not an offence, but he had never made any calls for a violent overthrow of the government. He was not a member of any political party, had never participated in demonstrations or had links with the parties organising them. The applicant further complained about the fact that the statements made by witnesses N.S. and M.M. in court, which were favourable for him, had been considered unreliable, while other witnesses, being ashamed of their false statements, had failed to appear in court. He argued that the statements of those witnesses who had not been examined in court should not have served as a basis for his conviction. The applicant lastly stated that the arresting police officers had not heard him make any calls. Thus, he had been convicted on the basis of statements of two or three witnesses who had seen him for the first time at the prosecutor’s office. 44. On 29 June 2004 the proceedings commenced before the Criminal and Military Court of Appeal. The applicant submitted before the Court of Appeal that he wished to be represented by lawyer H.I. and pleaded not guilty. Lawyer H.I. also claimed that the applicant was not guilty and asked the court to acquit him. 45. At the hearing of 30 June 2004, following the applicant’s examination, the presiding judge announced that it was necessary to summon and examine witnesses O.V., V.Z. and S.K. He further stated that he had telephoned all three witnesses on the previous day. O.V.’s wife replied that about a month before he had gone to Russia for work and his whereabouts were unknown. V.Z.’s wife replied that he had gone to another region for work and that she had no further information about him. S.K.’s relatives replied that he had left Armenia for work. The Court of Appeal decided, taking into account that the attendance of the above witnesses was indispensable, that they be compelled to appear. This task was assigned to the local police department. The hearing was adjourned until 6 July 2004. 46. At the hearing of 6 July 2004 the presiding judge announced that, according to the police, the witnesses were absent from their places of residence. The police had promised to provide further information in writing. In reply to the presiding judge’s question, the parties did not object to proceeding with the hearing and requested that measures be taken to ensure the attendance of the witnesses at the next hearing. 47. At the hearing of 7 July 2004 the presiding judge informed the parties that an official letter had been received from the police informing that witnesses O.V., V.Z. and S.K. were absent from their places of residence. While reading out that letter, the presiding judge noticed that the police had visited the wrong address as far as witness V.Z. was concerned. The prosecutor then requested that their statements be read out. Lawyer H.I. submitted that the witnesses in question had made defamatory statements against the applicant during the investigation which lacked credibility and it was therefore necessary to bring them to court with the help of the police. The applicant joined his lawyer’s request and asked that the witnesses in question appear in court and also present their identity documents. The Court of Appeal decided that, since a wrong address had been indicated in the decision ordering V.Z.’s appearance in court, it was necessary to inform the police of the correct address. As regards witnesses O.V. and S.K., the former was in Russia, while the latter was out of town. This was also confirmed by the telephone calls made by the presiding judge. The Court of Appeal found that, in such circumstances, there were no reasons to doubt the veracity of the police information and announced that it would read out and examine the pre-trial statements of those witnesses. The statements would then be analysed in the deliberation room and an assessment would be made as to their credibility, since the evidence examined in court was sufficient to allow such an assessment. The Court of Appeal then proceeded to read out the statements in question. The applicant submitted that their statements did not concern him since there had been many tall, grey-haired men at the marketplace. The investigating authority had never arranged his identification by those witnesses and their statements were therefore false. 48. At the hearing of 12 July 2004 the presiding judge announced that an official letter had been received from the police, according to which witness V.Z. indeed resided at the correct address but nobody answered the door during their visit. The presiding judge announced that, not being satisfied by the information contained in the police letter, he personally called V.Z.’s home and became convinced that nobody was there because nobody answered the telephone. The prosecutor requested that the statement of witness V.Z. be read out in court, while both the applicant and his lawyer submitted that the statement of witness V.Z. lacked credibility and requested that it be disregarded. The court then proceeded to read out the statement. 49. At the same hearing the applicant filed a motion with the Court of Appeal dispensing with the services of lawyer H.I. He submitted that the lawyer had not taken any steps to defend his interests and to prove his innocence. The lawyer had never come to visit him in detention despite the requests he had made to the administration of the detention facility. Furthermore the lawyer, without his knowledge, had filed a motion on 7 May 2004 seeking his release, in which the lawyer stated that he had pleaded guilty despite the fact that he had never pleaded fully guilty, thereby acting to his detriment and assisting the prosecution in substantiating the charge against him. The applicant claimed that he had found out about this motion only during the appeal proceedings. He further claimed in his motion that he had pleaded guilty to distributing leaflets because he was not aware that such act did not constitute an offence. He realised this only following his release from detention because no copy of the Criminal Code had been provided to him by either the investigator or his lawyer while in detention, despite his numerous requests. The applicant lastly claimed that the case against him had been fabricated. He submitted that, while sitting behind a glass wall at the police station, he was shown to some people who later became witnesses and made false statements against him. Some of them he was not able to examine and only two of them appeared in court. One of those two retracted his pre-trial statement, while the second one, because of giving a false statement, was even ashamed to look him in the eyes and was only able to mumble a confirmation of his pre‑trial statement. 50. The applicant stated at the same time that it was his personal choice to dispense with the services of his lawyer. The Court of Appeal decided to grant the applicant’s motion and to allow him to defend himself in person. The lawyer was then asked to leave the courtroom. 51. On the same date the Criminal and Military Court of Appeal adopted its judgment upholding the applicant’s conviction. In doing so, the Court of Appeal referred to the statements of witnesses N.S., M.M., O.V. and S.K. and of police officers G.D. and G.A. As regards the statement of witness V.Z., the Court of Appeal found that it should not have formed a basis for the applicant’s conviction because that witness had failed to appear in court despite a court order. The Court of Appeal further rejected the applicant’s claim that he had only distributed leaflets but not made any calls for a violent overthrow of the government. In doing so, the Court of Appeal stated that five witnesses had testified that the applicant had made such calls. Furthermore, the police officers had arrested him while he was handing out the leaflets. In the light of the overall sufficiency of evidence, the fact that witnesses O.V. and S.K. had failed to appear in court could not put into doubt the applicant’s involvement in the act and his guilt. The criminal element in his actions lay in the making of calls inciting violent seizure of power and change of the constitutional order. Those calls were public and aimed at a big group of people. Since he made such calls at a marketplace during the daytime, they were audible to the public. The fact that they were perceived as calls inciting to a violent overthrow of the government was confirmed by the witness statements. 52. The Court of Appeal further dismissed the applicant’s complaint about lawyer H.I., stating that the applicant’s right to defence had been ensured by the investigating authority, he had chosen his position regarding the charge against him without any outside pressure and he had not previously made any complaints about the lawyer. Furthermore, the fact that the nature of the charge was clear to the applicant was evident from the records of investigative measures. He had certified this with his signature in the presence of his lawyer. 53. On 14 July 2004 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law in which he raised arguments concerning the witnesses against him and the alleged failure of lawyer H.I. to provide effective legal assistance, similar to those raised in his complaint of 12 July 2004. He also added that the witness statements against him had been fabricated under police pressure. The witnesses in question were people trying to make a living by working at the market, so if they had refused to follow police orders they would have been immediately expelled from the market. 54. On 6 August 2004 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant’s appeal. In doing so, the Court of Cassation found that both witnesses M.M. and N.S. had made statements implicating the applicant. As regards the legal representation, the applicant had agreed that lawyer H.I. defend his interests and the lawyer had properly done so. 55. By a letter of 11 November 2004 the head of staff of the Armenian Bar Association informed the applicant, in reply to his complaint, that lawyer H.I. had lawfully carried out the applicant’s defence and had not done anything illegal. The motion of 7 May 2004 had been filed upon the applicant’s and his relatives’ request.

4. The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Poltava. 5. In August 1991 the applicant with her minor son moved to Poltava from their town found to be contaminated as a result of the Chornobyl nuclear disaster. They were housed in a State hostel. 6. In June 1992 the applicant was placed on a waiting list for obtaining free housing as a victim of the Chornobyl disaster. 7. In July 2000 the applicant instituted proceedings at the Zhovtnevyy District Court of Poltava (“the Zhovtnevyy Court”) against the local authorities seeking allocation of a free flat. 8. On 28 February 2001 the Zhovtnevyy Court ruled that the applicant should be provided with free housing under the conditions prescribed by law and according to her place in the waiting list. 9. On 29 March 2001 the Poltava Regional Court (since June 2001 – the Poltava Regional Court of Appeal, hereinafter – “the Poltava Regional Court”) upheld this judgment. 10. On 23 May 2002 the Supreme Court quashed the above ruling for some procedural shortcomings and remitted the case for fresh examination to the appellate court. 11. On 27 June 2002 the Poltava Regional Court rejected the applicant’s appeal again. 12. Between July 2002 and April 2003 the courts at two levels considered the admissibility of the appeal in cassation lodged by the applicant. In April 2003 she submitted a rectified appeal in cassation with the Supreme Court. 13. On 11 December 2003 the Supreme Court started the proceedings. 14. On 12 May 2005 it rejected the applicant’s appeal in cassation as unsubstantiated. 15. On 26 February 2002 the applicant instituted administrative proceedings in the Zhovtnevyy Court against the Poltava City Council seeking free housing as a matter of priority. 16. From 8 July 2004 to 29 June 2005 these proceedings were stayed at the applicant’s request, pending the outcome of the first set of the proceedings. 17. On 8 February 2006 the Zhovtnevyy Court rejected the claim as being without basis. The applicant appealed. 18. On 15 May 2006 the Poltava Regional Court allowed her appeal in part. It quashed the impugned judgment and remitted the case for fresh examination to the first-instance court, having held however that it fell to be examined under the civil rather than the administrative procedure. 19. On 28 November 2007 the Higher Administrative Court quashed the aforementioned ruling and remitted the case to the appellate court with a conclusion that it was civil and not administrative. 20. On 5 August 2009 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal (“the Kharkiv Regional Court”), to which the case was referred on an unspecified date, found against the applicant. 21. On 2 February 2011 the Higher Administrative Court upheld the lower courts’ decisions.

4. The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Diyarbakır. 5. On 19 January 1994 the applicant was arrested and taken into police custody by officers of the Diyarbakır security police in connection with an investigation into an illegal organisation. 6. On 7 February 1994 the applicant was brought before the Diyarbakır public prosecutor and then the investigating judge, who remanded the applicant in custody. 7. By an indictment dated 17 March 1994, the public prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court initiated criminal proceedings against the applicant and a number of others, accusing him, inter alia, of carrying out activities for the purpose of bringing about the secession of part of the national territory under Article 125 of the Criminal Code. 8. On 30 July 1997 the Diyarbakır State Security Court convicted and sentenced the applicant to life imprisonment, pursuant to Article 125 of the Criminal Code. 9. The applicant appealed. On 1 March 1999 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the first-instance court on procedural grounds and remitted the case to the Diyarbakır State Security Court. Following constitutional amendments introduced on 7 May 2004, the State Security Courts were totally abolished. Subsequently, the applicant’s case was resumed before the 6th Assize Court of Diyarbakır. 10. Throughout the whole proceedings the applicant regularly requested his release whereas the trial courts rejected his requests. On 20 October 2005 the applicant noted that he had already been detained for a period of more than eleven years and reiterated his request. Relying on the accusations against the applicant, the existence of strong evidence against him and the content of the case file, the 6th Assize Court of Diyarbakır refused his request again. The applicant appealed. On 25 October 2005 the 4th Assize Court of Diyarbakır dismissed the appeal without further reasoning. 11. On 9 March 2007 the 6th Assize Court of Diyarbakır convicted the applicant and sentenced him to life imprisonment. On 7 March 2008 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment.

4. The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Yakutsk. 5. On 1 October 1999 the Yakutsk Town Court of Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic allowed the applicant’s claim against the Yakutsk Town Administration for provision of housing. The Town Court ordered that the administration: “...provide Mr Kuksa and his family members with living premises that meet sanitary and technical requirements”. 6. The judgment of 1 October 1999 was amended on appeal by the Supreme Court of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic on 14 September 2000. The Supreme Court ordered that the administration: “...provide Mr Kuksa and his family members with well-equipped living premises in a stone building constructed after 1994”. 7. On 22 December 2000 the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic, by way of supervisory-review proceedings and upon the applicant’s request, amended the judgment of 14 September 2000 and ordered that the administration: “...provide Mr Kuksa with a three-room well-equipped flat in a new stone block of flats”. 8. The judgment entered into force on the same day. 9. In November 1999 the bailiffs’ service opened enforcement proceedings and in February 2000 charged 17 flats belonging to the Yakutsk Town Administration. 10. On 31 May 2000 the Yakutsk Town Court, upon the complaint from the Town Administration, quashed the bailiffs’ charging order. 11. After the decision of 31 May 2000 had been quashed on appeal and the case had been remitted for a fresh examination, the Yakutsk Town Court reconsidered the matter and discontinued the proceedings. 12. In December 2000 the bailiffs charged 7 flats of the Town Administration and deposited them with the administration’s creditors. The applicant was not among them. The bailiffs also fined the Town Administration for its failure to enforce the judgment in the applicant’s favour. Those decisions were quashed by the Yakutsk Town Court, upon the administration’s appeal. 13. On an unspecified date liquidation proceedings were instituted against the Yakutsk Town Administration and in February 2003 the bailiffs sent the writ of execution to the liquidation commission. 14. At the time the application was lodged with the Court, the judgment of 1 October 1999, as amended on 22 December 2000, remained unenforced because the Town Administration possessed no available housing or financial resources to purchase a flat. 15. On 14 November 2005 the Ministry of Building of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic offered the applicant to purchase a three-room flat at the Ministry’s expense. Four days later the applicant bought a three-room flat and submitted a copy of the contract to the Government of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic. 16. On 22 November 2005 the Ministry of Finance of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic paid the purchase price to the construction company and on 6 December 2005 the company provided the applicant with keys to the flat and he and his family members moved into it.

4. The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Wrocław. 5. On an unspecified date the applicant’s father J.R. married M.K., his second wife. On 22 December 1994 they made a will before a notary, appointing each other sole beneficiaries of their wills. They both had children from their previous marriages. 6. On 21 March 1995 M.K. died. On 7 September 1995 her daughter K.C. applied for a declaration of acquisition of M.K.’s estate on the basis of a handwritten will made on 7 May 1990 by K.C. in the name of her mother. J.R. requested a declaration of acquisition of the estate on the basis of the will made in 1994. 7. On 19 February 1996 J.R. died. On 7 April 1997 the Radom District Court declared that his four children had acquired his estate. 8. The proceedings concerning the estate of M.K, carried out by the Radom District Court, were stayed because of J.R.’s death and later resumed on 8 September 1997 with the participation of his heirs. The will of 1990 proved to be null and void because it had not been made by the testator herself. Since some of the participants disputed the validity of the will of 1994, the court appointed an expert in psychiatry, who submitted his opinion over two months later. 9. On 29 September 1998 the Radom District Court allowed a request of a party to appoint an expert in neurology. 10. On 27 November 1998 a witness failed to appear in court; he was fined and heard by the court on 23 December 1998. At the same hearing the court appointed an expert in neurology, who submitted his opinion a month later. 11. On 28 May 1999 the court heard the expert witness and the parties. The applicant requested that three parties be examined by courts at their places of domicile – in Wrocław, Kamienna Góra and Zawiercie. The last testimony taken this way was delivered to the Radom District Court in November 1999. 12. On 28 October 1999 the applicant requested the court to admit as evidence an opinion to be prepared by the Institute of Psychiatry of the Jagiellonian University in Kraków. 13. The Institute in Kraków, after an exchange of correspondence with the court, refused to prepare the expert opinion. The request to issue an opinion in the case was subsequently addressed to the Medical Academy Institute in Wrocław. The Institute also refused to accept the assignment, but it was eventually obliged to do so by the court on 20 June 2000. 14. The opinion issued by the Institute was subsequently challenged by the party K.C. Following her request the court decided to examine the experts with the judicial assistance of the District Court in Wrocław. Their testimonies were submitted on 3 April 2001. 15. K.C. requested the court to admit further evidence from experts in psychiatry and graphology. The court allowed the requests on 9 September 2001. On 1 October 2001 it requested the Institute of Psychiatry in Warsaw to prepare an opinion in the case. On 5 November 2001 the Institute informed the court that it would not be able to prepare it before June 2002. The court accepted this date. 16. On 14 February 2002 the Institute informed the court that it would not be able to issue the opinion before December 2002 or even later. On 20 February 2002 the court notified K.C., but not the other parties, of this situation. On 8 April K.C. accepted this new date. 17. On 7 November 2002 the court admitted K.C.’s request to examine the relations between J.R. and his children. 18. On 9 January 2003 the Institute finally submitted the opinion. 19. A hearing scheduled for 11 March 2003 was adjourned as K.C had informed the court on the same day that she was ill. Hearings scheduled for 28 April, 28 May and 19 August 2003 were adjourned at the requests of K.C.’s lawyer, which were made to the court shortly before the hearings. K.C. informed the court that she intended to change her lawyer. 20. Her new lawyer requested that the psychiatric opinion of the Warsaw Institute be supplemented by adding details of the testator’s stay in a hospital, in the orthopaedics department. The court ordered K.C. to pay the relevant fee and adjourned the case. After an exchange of correspondence which continued until 6 February 2004, the hospital informed the court that M.K. had never been a patient there. 21. On 23 September 2003 the applicant’s lawyer requested an opinion of an expert in graphology on the 1990 will. The court admitted the motion and requested the applicant to pay the relevant fee. The applicant failed to pay, maintaining that this evidence was irrelevant for her and for the case since it had already been established that the will was null and void. 22. On 6 February 2004 K.C. informed the court that her lawyer had been suspended from practice. She requested an adjournment of the hearing to enable her to appoint a new lawyer. She also requested that an expert be appointed to compare signatures on the wills, in particular the signature on the notarial will. 23. On 14 April 2004 the court decided not to allow the expert evidence requested by K.C. since she had not paid the relevant fee. 24. The hearing scheduled for 4 June 2004 was adjourned as K.C.’s new lawyer was ill. 25. On 13 August 2004 the court quashed its decision to request a supplementary medical opinion. 26. On 6 September 2004, at K.C.’s request, the court quashed its decision of 14 April 2004 and appointed an expert in graphology. 27. A hearing was held on 11 January 2005. 28. On 10 February 2005 an expert in graphology submitted her opinion. 29. A hearing was held on 29 March 2005. The court refused ‑ following the applicant’s objection – another request by K.C. for new evidence to be taken. 30. On 12 April 2005 the Radom District Court delivered a decision by which it declared that M.K.’s estate had been acquired by the applicant’s father J.R. on the basis of the 1994 will. 31. The applicant requested written grounds for this decision, which were served on her on 13 June 2005. The proceedings were terminated. 32. On 6 September 2004 the applicant lodged a complaint under the 2004 Law of 17 June 2004 on complaints about a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time (Ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki) (“the 2004 Act”), alleging excessive length of proceedings. 33. On 26 November 2004 the Radom Regional Court found that the proceedings taken as a whole had not been excessively long. However, certain parts of them had indeed been affected by undue delays. The court pointed to the inactivity of the District Court when the submission of an expert opinion had been delayed. The Radom Regional Court also criticised the fact that the lower court had failed to discipline the plaintiff’s lawyer, who had failed to attend hearings. It further stressed that the District Court had adjourned several hearings without giving sufficient reasons. The court also instructed the lower court to schedule a hearing within twenty-one days. 34. The Regional Court further observed that the case had been complex and that the parties had made numerous requests for evidence to be taken and that those circumstances had had a considerable bearing on the total length of the proceedings. Bearing this in mind, although it found that the length of the proceedings had been excessive, the court concluded that the applicant was not entitled to just satisfaction under the provisions of the 2004 Act. 35. On 18 February 2005 the applicant lodged a second complaint under the 2004 Act. On 24 February 2005 the Radom Regional Court rejected the complaint as it had been lodged within twelve months of the previous complaint (see Relevant domestic law below).

8. The applicant was born in 1932 and lives in Otepää. 9. On 2 September 1977 he married a woman with whom he already had a son, born in 1962. On 3 February 1993 their son died. 10. On 3 February 1994 the applicant's wife filed with the Valga County Court (Valga Maakohus) an action for divorce and division of marital property, which included agricultural assets. 11. On 23 February 1994 the applicant filed against her an action for division of the inheritance of their son. The inheritance consisted of a house with adjacent buildings and two cars. 12. On 12 April 1994 the claims were joined by the court. 13. On 21 April 1994 the County Court held a hearing in the case and scheduled a further hearing for 24 May 1994. 14. On 9 May 1994 the County Court ordered, at the request of the applicant's wife, attachment of the property in order to ensure its preservation pending the resolution of her civil action. The attachment was carried out by the court's bailiffs on 10 and 26 May 1994. 15. On 24 May 1994 the applicant was taken into custody in connection with the criminal proceedings instituted against him (see below). 16. Following his release from custody on 20 December 1994 the applicant filed, on 5 April 1995, an application with the County Court requesting that his civil case be transferred to another court alleging that the judge and the court were not impartial. 17. On 25 April 1995 the County Court imposed a fine on the applicant for having used insulting language in respect of the court both in his transfer application and at the hearings. 18. On 28 April 1995 the applicant requested that he be exempted from the fine. On 3 May 1995 the judge hearing the case withdrew. On 26 May 1995 the applicant informed the court that he had lost confidence in it and requested that all members of the court step down. 19. By a decision of 30 May 1995 the County Court dismissed both his requests. The decision was confirmed by the Tartu Court of Appeal (Tartu Ringkonnakohus) on 27 December 1995. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court (Riigikohus) was refused on 13 March 1996. 20. On 3 June 1996 the applicant filed an action for divorce. 21. On 12 March 1997 and 30 September 1997 the judges of the Valga County Court withdrew from examining the applicant's and his wife's civil actions. In their decisions it was noted that that the applicant's written submissions, in particular that of April 1995, were disrespectful of the court and hampered an objective examination of the cases. 22. On 29 October 1997 the cases were transferred by a higher court to the Viljandi County Court (Viljandi Maakohus) which on 3 November 1997 scheduled a hearing for 10 February 1998. On that day the hearing was adjourned as the parties failed to appear before the court. The applicant had not informed the court of the reasons for his failure to attend. His wife could not attend as she was hospitalised from 19 January 1998 until 6 February 1998. 23. On 4 March 1998 the applicant asked the court to set a hearing date. 24. On 24 August 1998 the hearing was adjourned since, according to a medical certificate presented to the court, the state of health of the applicant's wife did not allow her to take part in it and it was not possible to decide on the divorce request without her presence. 25. On 29 September 1998 the applicant requested the court to hear the case without the presence his wife and to inquire whether she would agree to this. In response to its inquiry of 8 October 1998 about the condition of health of the applicant's wife, the court was informed that she had still to receive treatment. 26. On 30 November 1998 the applicant's lawyer requested that the court fix a hearing date. 27. On 16 February 1999 the applicant's wife asked for the adjournment of a hearing scheduled for 22 February 1999 as her state of health had deteriorated and she needed to be hospitalised. At the hearing on 22 February 1999, despite the applicant's request to proceed with the case, the court decided that the presence of the applicant's wife was necessary. Accordingly, it adjourned the hearing. 28. On 16 March 1999 the applicant's wife requested a higher court to transfer the case to the Tartu County Court, apparently because it was closer to her place of residence. Her request was refused in April 1999. 29. By a judgment of 1 December 1999 the Viljandi County Court dissolved the marriage between the applicant and his wife. At the applicant's request it allowed him additional time to modify and specify his property claim, which he submitted to the court on 21 January 2000. 30. In the continuing proceedings concerning division of property a hearing scheduled for 4 September 2000 was adjourned at the request of both parties who wanted to call certain witnesses. A hearing on 20 September 2000 was also adjourned as the parties requested that additional witnesses be heard. 31. On 14 November 2000 the applicant unsuccessfully requested the removal of the judge. 32. A hearing took place on 20 November 2000. 33. By a judgment of 4 December 2000 the Viljandi County Court rejected the applicant's ex-wife's action for division of marital property for lack of proof that such property existed and accepted part of the applicant's claim concerning the inheritance of their son. The inheritance was divided up so that the applicant was to receive one of the cars and his ex-wife the rest of the property. 34. On 20 December 2000 the applicant, being dissatisfied with the way the inheritance was divided by the court, filed an appeal against the judgment with the Tartu Court of Appeal which, on 30 April 2001, quashed in part the County Court judgment and remitted the claim concerning the division of inheritance to it for a new examination. On 4 December 2001 the applicant's former wife filed a counteraction claiming part ownership of the house left by their son. She also requested the County Court to take an interim measure ordering the applicant not to dispose of the property pending the outcome of the proceedings. By a decision of 18 March 2002 the County Court allowed the request. On 25 March 2002 the applicant replied in writing to his ex-wife's claim. 35. On 27 March 2002 the County Court held a preliminary hearing. It requested the parties to submit additional evidence by 20 May 2002 and scheduled a further hearing for 20 June 2002. As the applicant's former wife could not submit the requested evidence by the set date for health reasons, she requested an extension of the time-limit. On 23 and 28 May 2002 the applicant filed further observations. 36. On 19 June 2002 the applicant's ex-wife requested a postponement for one month of the hearing scheduled for the following day due to her illness. 37. On 20 June 2002 the County Court decided to adjourn the case for an indefinite period. 38. In September 2002 the applicant and his ex-wife filed further observations 39. On 2 December 2002 the County Court held another preliminary hearing where it heard 7 witnesses. As the parties requested that additional witnesses be heard the court scheduled a further hearing for 2 April 2003. 40. At the hearing on 2 April 2003 the County Court heard 3 more witnesses. Each party requested however the hearing of another witness from their side, who both lived in different towns and were of poor health and advanced age. The court allowed their request and adjourned the examination of the case until these witnesses were heard. 41. The applicant's former wife's witness was to be heard on 25 April 2003 in Otepää. However, the date did not suit the witness and her questioning was postponed. On 15 May 2003 the Viljandi County Court requested that the applicant's witness be examined by the City Court in Tallinn where the witness was living. In its request the County Court noted that a difficulty with the case was that it involved circumstances dating back several decades, complicating the collection of evidence. 42. On 20 May 1994 the Valga police, acting upon an application of the applicant's wife alleging ill-treatment by her husband, initiated criminal proceedings against the applicant for having caused his wife grievous bodily harm. 43. On 24 May 1994, pursuant to a court order, the applicant was taken into custody. On 1 June 1994 the applicant was additionally charged with assault in respect of two other persons as well as unlawful possession of a firearm. 44. On 2 July 1994 the applicant was ordered to undergo a psychiatric examination and to be committed to a hospital. The examination took place from 1 September 1994 until 2 November 1994 in the Tallinn Psychiatric Hospital which declared him mentally fit. 45. The applicant was released from custody on 20 December 1994 and on 15 May 1995 the criminal proceedings against him were discontinued on the ground that the acts committed by him did not amount to a criminal offence and that the assault victims did not wish to pursue the charges. 46. Upon his release from custody in December 1994 the applicant discovered that some of his property, which had been placed in his wife's care following the court order of 9 May 1994, had gone missing. On 30 November 1995 the applicant filed with the Tartu City Court (Tartu Linnakohus) a civil action against the Government claiming compensation for damage suffered as a result of his unlawful detention. In particular, he claimed moral damages for his arrest and placement in a psychiatric hospital as well as damages for lost property and for the loss of profit he would have made from his farming activities. 47. By judgment of 2 May 1997 the City Court allowed in part the applicant's lawsuit. It rejected the applicant's claim concerning the loss of property items on the grounds of lack of proof that the loss was due to the actions or omissions of the authorities. It noted that it was the applicant's wife who had been left in charge of the common property and that the proceedings for its division were still pending. It also rejected the claim concerning loss of profit. 48. On 27 January 1998 the Tartu Court of Appeal upheld the judgement of the first instance court concerning the loss of property items. It revoked the judgment with respect to the claim of loss of profit and remitted it to the City Court for a new consideration. It also reduced the amount of moral damages payable to the applicant. On 22 April 1998 the Supreme Court refused to grant the applicant leave to appeal. 49. Subsequently, the applicant filed new claims for damages against the Government in connection with his arrest and loss of property. Proceedings in respect of these claims were all terminated on the grounds that the matter had already been decided by a final judgment. 50. The applicant also brought civil proceedings against the judge who had authorised the attachment of property on 9 May 1994, the police investigator involved in his criminal case and his wife, claiming compensation for damage caused to the property by their unlawful acts. On 18 December 2000 the Võru County Court (Võru Maakohus), in order to establish a list of the applicant's property and the extent of possible damage, suspended the proceedings pending the entry into force of the judgment of the Viljandi County Court concerning the division of marital and inheritance property between the applicant and his wife.

6. The first applicant, who was born in 1970, is a journalist by profession. At the relevant time she was employed at Trud, a leading national daily newspaper, as a journalist and deputy editor in the newspaper’s criminal department. In 2007 or 2008 she started working for 24 Hours, another leading national daily newspaper. 7. The second applicant was born in 1942. At the relevant time he was Trud’s editor‑in‑chief. 8. On 30 May 1996 the press service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs announced the arrest of N.T., a former employee of the Ministry and of the National Investigation Service. The press release specified that he had been detained and charged under Article 387 of the Criminal Code 1968 with abusing his office with a view to obtaining pecuniary gain, which had led to serious negative consequences. In particular, it stated that he had misappropriated, concealed and used secret official documents. The investigation against him was ongoing. The same day this information was relayed to many newspapers by the Bulgarian Telegraph Agency. 9. Shortly after receiving the news, the first applicant went to the premises of the Sofia Regional Military Prosecutor’s Office, where, along with journalists from other newspapers, she tried to obtain more information about the case. Around noon, in line with the established practice at that time, a military prosecutor showed up before the journalists to make a statement about the case and answer questions. In addition to the information in the press release, the prosecutor said that a bag with secret documents had been found during a search of N.T.’s home, that N.T.’s wife had also been implicated in the affair, and that by using those documents, which contained information about the State‑owned metallurgical plant “Kremikovtsi”, N.T.’s wife had engaged in lucrative business ventures involving metals. 10. The next day several national newspapers ran stories about the case. The applicant also covered it in an article which appeared in the 31 May 1996 issue of Trud. It bore the caption “Private company’s shady iron business discovered”, the headline “Former police officer arrested over bag with secret documents”, and the applicant’s byline, and read: “A former officer was arrested after the metropolitan police found in his home a bag with secret documents, it became clear yesterday. [N.T.], former officer of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and investigator in the National Investigation Service, was put behind bars for misappropriating, concealing and using secret documents, the [Ministry] announced yesterday. He has been charged under Article 387 § 3 of the Criminal Code with abusing his office with a view to enriching himself, which has led to serious negative consequences. The law provides for up to ten years’ imprisonment if the accused is found guilty. The documents that [N.T.] took relate to the operations and the business of the ‘Kremikovtsi’ metallurgical plant, the law enforcement people said. He gave the secret information to his wife, who had a private iron‑trading company. Her business thus thrived and she amassed a substantial capital, the initial investigation found. The arrest took place about ten days ago, the Palace of Justice specified. The handcuffs clicked on [N.T.]’s wrists three days before he was set to become a practising lawyer. Originals of secret documents, obtained by him probably while an operative of the former 8th district police department, were found during a search of his home. The whole family of [N.T.] was implicated in the affair, say persons close to the investigation. The detainee’s father used to be the head of the 3rd district police department, but it is unclear whether he was aware of his son’s deeds. [N.T.] formerly worked as an investigator in one of the district investigation services in Sofia for about a year. On paper he quit of his own free will last year. In reality, he was asked to go because he lacked the requisite qualities for the office he occupied, said people from the National Investigation Service yesterday. The ‘National Security’ service of the [Sofia Regional Police Department] and the Military Prosecutor’s Office are making additional inquiries to uncover [N.T.]’s criminal activities, said the [Ministry]’s press service yesterday. The investigation has been entrusted to the Sofia Military Prosecutor’s Office.” 11. On 22 August 1996 Trud published another article entitled “The Prosecutor’s Office won’t let former officer out of arrest”. The article was authored by the first applicant but did not bear her byline. It read as follows: “The former Ministry of Internal Affairs officer and investigator [N.T.], who was detained at the end of May this year on charges of misappropriating, concealing and using secret documents, will remain in detention, we learned yesterday. His [detention] was upheld in a prosecutor’s decision issued yesterday, said to the Bulgarian Telegraph Agency the lieutenant colonel [N.G.] of the Military Prosecutor’s Office. [N.T.] was charged under Article 387 § 3 of the Criminal Code with abuse of office. A bag with secret documents relating to the business of the ‘Kremikovtsi’ metallurgical plant was found during a search of his home. [N.T.] obtained them while an operative of the former 8th district police department. He gave the information to his wife, who had a private iron‑trading company. Before the investigation she said that she had carried out only one transaction.” 12. In the following years the prosecuting authorities brought N.T. to trial six times, but each time the Sofia Military Court referred the case back for rectification of procedural errors. Eventually, on 1 October 2003 the court discontinued the proceedings under a newly introduced rule of criminal procedure allowing accused persons to seek discontinuance of the proceedings against them if the case had not proceeded to trial for more than two years after the bringing of charges (for more details on that rule, see Dimitrov and Hamanov v. Bulgaria, nos. 48059/06 and 2708/09, §§ 38‑41, 10 May 2011). 13. On 27 May 1999 N.T. brought a civil claim against the two applicants and Trud’s publisher, Media Holding AD. He alleged that the two articles had defamed him by making injurious and untrue allegations which had not been based on a proper journalistic enquiry. They had affected gravely both him and his family. He sought compensation for non‑pecuniary damage in the sum of 5,000,000 old Bulgarian levs (BGL)[1], plus interest, in respect of the first article, and BGL 5,000,000, plus interest, in respect of the second article. He also claimed costs. 14. The Sofia City Court held four hearings, one of which was adjourned because the two applicants had not been properly summoned. In a judgment of 21 July 2000 it dismissed N.T.’s claim. It found that the first applicant, like many other journalists, had based her article on reliable official sources. This excluded any wrongful conduct on her part. The second applicant was therefore not liable either. 15. N.T. appealed. The Sofia Court of Appeal held a hearing on 26 January 2001. On 13 February 2001 it upheld the lower court’s judgment. It found that at the time when the two articles had been published there had not existed any statutory rules governing journalistic enquiries. Journalists, including the first applicant, had been bound to adhere to the de facto rules of the profession. The first applicant had not breached those rules in researching the two articles. She had used many independent sources to elucidate the facts covered in both articles. She had based her allegations on information from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Bulgarian Telegraph Agency, and a statement made by a public prosecutor. Both she and the second applicant had thus fulfilled their professional duties, which excluded any negligence on their part. Strict liability in tort did not exist under Bulgarian law. 16. N.T. appealed on points of law. The Supreme Court of Cassation heard the appeal at a hearing held on 28 May 2002. On 14 August 2002 it quashed the Sofia Court of Appeal’s judgment and remitted the case. It found that that court, whose task had not simply been to review the first‑instance court’s judgment but to decide the case de novo, had not gathered all available evidence – in particular evidence relating to the identity of the public prosecutor cited in the first article and any evidence concerning the truthfulness of the second article – and had not properly analysed it. Its findings that the allegations in the articles were true did not correspond to the material in the case. The cassation court went on to say that in order to determine whether or not the applicants were liable in tort the court of appeal should have ascertained the truth or the falsity of the assertions made in the two articles, because the right to freedom of expression could not be used to infringe the reputation of others. 17. On remittal, the Sofia Court of Appeal held three hearings. At the second of those, which took place on 19 May 2003, the court decided to stay the proceedings pending the outcome of the criminal proceedings against N.T. None of the parties appealed against that decision. After criminal proceedings against N.T. came to an end in October 2003 (see paragraph 12 above), the court decided to resume the examination of the case, and held a hearing on 19 April 2004. 18. In a judgment of 27 July 2004 the Sofia Court of Appeal allowed N.T.’s claim. It ordered the two applicants and Media Holding AD to pay him 2,500 new Bulgarian levs (BGN), plus interest, in non‑pecuniary damages in respect of the first article. The court also ordered the second applicant and Media Holding AD to pay N.T. BGN 2,500, plus interest, in non‑pecuniary damages in respect of the second article. Lastly, the court ordered the two applicants and Media Holding AD to pay N.T. BGN 700 in respect of costs. It specified that they were jointly liable to pay those amounts. 19. The court held that in preparing the articles the first applicant had acted tortiously because she had not followed the customary rules governing journalistic enquiries. Those rules required that any information, even that coming from official sources, be checked against at least two independent sources. The first applicant had not done that with regard to the information received from a public prosecutor whose identity she had been unable to establish. The resulting articles had contained defamatory and injurious statements about N.T. and his family which went beyond the information in the press release issued by the authorities: that the “business of [the applicant’s wife had] thrived and she [had] amassed a substantial capital”, that the “whole family [had been] implicated in the affair”, and that the authorities had found “a bag with secret documents relating to the business of the ‘Kremikovtsi’ metallurgical plant”. By writing and publishing unverified defamatory allegations about N.T. the applicants had acted in breach of the general duty under section 45 of the Obligations and Contracts Act 1951 (see paragraph 24 below) not to infringe the rights of others. They could have anticipated the damaging result of their actions and could have averted it by taking additional steps to verify the accuracy of the statements in the articles. They had not done so, and had therefore acted negligently. The second applicant had been under a duty to do so by virtue of his position as the newspaper’s editor‑in‑chief, especially with regard to an article that did not bear a byline. As for the first applicant, she had made untrue and uncorroborated injurious remarks and allegations about N.T.’s personal and professional life, without taking into account the negative consequences that could flow from them. Media Holding AD was vicariously liable for the applicants’ actions. 20. The court determined the quantum of the award in equity, as required under section 52 of the Obligations and Contracts Act 1951 (see paragraph 24 below). It took into account Trud’s circulation, the number of potential readers and the degree of moral suffering sustained by N.T. 21. The applicants appealed on points of law, arguing, among other things, that the court of appeal’s judgment was in breach of Article 10 of the Convention. On 11 November 2004 a three‑member panel of the Supreme Court of Cassation refused to hear their appeal. It observed that N.T. had brought two claims of BGN 5,000 each. Those claims had been triable at first instance not by the Sofia City Court, but by the Sofia District Court. By accepting to hear the case, the Sofia City Court, which had the rank of a regional court, had in effect exercised its powers under Article 80 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1952 to take up and examine at first instance a case falling within the jurisdiction of one of the district courts in its region (see paragraph 25 below). That had in turn led to an appellate judgment by the Sofia Court of Appeal. Had the procedure ran its normal course, the case would have been examined at first instance by the Sofia District Court and on appeal by the Sofia City Court. The case thus fell within the ambit of Article 218a § 1 (a) of the Code (see paragraph 26 below), with the result that no appeal lay against the Sofia Court of Appeal’s judgment. 22. On an appeal by the applicants, in a final decision of 12 January 2005 a five‑member panel of the Supreme Court of Cassation upheld the three‑member panel’s decision. It fully agreed with its reasoning and went on to say that the examination of the case at second instance by the Sofia Court of Appeal due to the irregular manner in which the proceedings had unfolded in terms of which court had jurisdiction could not render a judgment concerning claims of up to BGN 5,000 amenable to appeal on points of law. The threshold for lodging such an appeal was primarily a function of the amount in dispute. It could not be circumvented through the application of Article 80 § 2 of the above‑mentioned Code and the resulting examination of the case at first instance by the Sofia City Court.

4. The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Edirne. 5. At the material time, the applicant was the owner and editor of a local newspaper published in Trabzon, the Özgür Karadeniz (“The Free Black Sea”). 6. On 15 January 1995 the applicant was taken into police custody on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation. 7. On 20 January 1995 he was brought before a judge who ordered his detention on remand. 8. On 10 March 1995 the public prosecutor at the Erzincan State Security Court filed a bill of indictment against the applicant, along with twenty-one other persons. The applicant was accused of membership of an illegal organisation, the DHKP-C (the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party- Front). According to the indictment, following his arrest, the applicant's house was searched by police officers who found illegal periodicals, newspapers, books and a bullet. The public prosecutor also alleged that the applicant had published a newspaper containing propaganda in support of the DHKP-C, participated in illegal demonstrations, put up posters, distributed leaflets supporting the DHKP-C and carried out activities in the Karadeniz University for the recruitment of new members for the illegal organisation. 9. On 13 March 1995 the applicant was transferred to the Erzurum special type prison. 10. On different dates in 1995, five other criminal proceedings were brought against the applicant before various courts, with charges of disseminating separatist propaganda and incitement to hatred and hostility through the medium of his newspaper. 11. The cases against the applicant and his co-accused were subsequently joined before the Erzincan State Security Court. 12. Following promulgation of the Law no. 4210, which abolished the Erzincan State Security Court and established the Erzurum State Security Court, in 1997 the Erzurum State Security Court acquired jurisdiction over the case and the case-file was sent to it. 13. On 27 November 1998 the Erzurum State Security Court convicted the applicant under Article 168 § 2 of the Criminal Code of membership of an illegal organisation, namely the DHKP-C. The court found that two articles published in Özgür Karadeniz on 15 November 1994 and 1 March 1995 contained separatist propaganda and incitement to hatred. It further found it established that the applicant had participated in illegal demonstrations, put up posters, distributed leaflets supporting the DHKP-C and carried out activities in the Karadeniz University for the recruitment of new members for the illegal organisation. The court sentenced the applicant to twelve years and six months' imprisonment. 14. On 18 November 1999 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of 27 November 1998 in respect of the applicant. 15. On 29 May 2004 the applicant was conditionally released from prison.

5. The applicants were born in 1975 and 1978 respectively and live in Istanbul. 6. On 1 September 2001 at about 7 p.m. the applicants went to the Milli Egemenlik Park in Bakırköy (Istanbul) to attend a meeting, namely the so-called “peace festivities” organised by the Bakırköy branch of the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi). While they were about to enter the park, the applicants were stopped and searched by the police. The officers found fifty-three copies of a bulletin in a black plastic bag. As the applicants appeared suspicious, the police officers arrested them. The applicants were allegedly beaten up, insulted and threatened with death during their arrest. In particular, two police officers applied pressure to their necks from behind and made them lie down. Following the arrival of two more police officers, they dragged both applicants along the ground, kicked and slapped them and put them in a police car. Once in the car, the police officers continued to punch and slap them, hit them with wooden sticks, insult and threaten them. One of the police officers first sat on the head of Sevil Ulaş and then hit her against the roof of the car. When the applicants asked where they were being taken, one of the officers said: “We are taking you to a stream where your corpses will be found”. 7. However, according to the arrest and seizure report drafted by two police officers, the applicants were arrested because they had been acting suspiciously. The report further stated that the applicants had resisted the police officers, and had self-inflicted certain scratches and bruises on their bodies during the incident. In particular, Umar Karatepe had hit his elbow on the wall of the park and Sevil Ulaş had bruised her left elbow whilst resisting getting into the police car. The applicants refused to sign this report. 8. On the same day at about 8 p.m. the applicants were taken to the Bakırköy State Hospital for a medical examination. The doctor who examined the applicants drafted a provisional report. She observed that the first applicant had two scratches on his right elbow and a bruise on his back. As for the second applicant, the presence of a bruise on her left elbow was noted. 9. On 2 September 2001, at about 1 a.m., the applicants were taken to the Bakırköy State Hospital once again. The same doctor examined the applicants and reiterated her earlier findings in her report. Following this medical examination, the applicants were released. 10. On 3 September 2001 the Bakırköy Forensic Institute delivered its final report in respect of the applicants. It was stated that the first applicant had several bruises and scratches on his body. In particular, the doctor noted the presence of bruises measuring 3x1 cm, 0.5x0.5 cm, 2x1 cm and 0.5x0.3 cm on the right elbow, a scratch of 2 cm below the bruises described above, an ecchymosis of 6x3 cm on the inner part of the right arm, an ecchymosis of 1x2 cm in the middle inner part of the right biceps, a scratch of 3 cm on the right waist area, two ecchymosis of 1,5x1 cm and 0,3x0,3 cm on the inner middle part of the left biceps and a bruise of 2x2 cm on the inner part of the left elbow. 11. In respect of the second applicant, the doctor noted the presence of a 3x3 cm swelling in the right occipital temporal region. The report further concluded that both applicants were unfit to work for three days. 12. Again on 3 September 2001 the applicants filed a criminal complaint with the Bakırköy Public Prosecutor. They complained that the police officers had used excessive force during their arrest. They also stated that a person called Ö.U. had been an eyewitness to the events. Sevil Ulaş complained that in the course of her arrest she had received blows to her head and upper part of her body, that her head had been banged against the window, that her hair had been pulled and that these assaults by police officers had continued in the police car. Umar Karatepe alleged that he had been kicked and slapped during his arrest and that he had been beaten up in the police car on the way to the police station. 13. In his preliminary investigation report dated 28 December 2001, a senior police lieutenant, acting as the investigator, found that the complainants had shouted political slogans, such as “human dignity will defy torture” and that they hated the police because they had been arrested and detained on a number of occasions in the past and that the medical reports did not indicate the presence of any bruises which could have been caused by ill-treatment. Furthermore, considering that the police officers denied the allegations against them, the investigator concluded that there was no evidence on which to commit the accused for trial. 14. On 28 December 2001, relying on the investigator’s above report prepared in accordance with Article 5 of Law no. 4483, the Bahçelievler District Governor decided not to authorise the prosecution of the accused police officers. The applicants filed an objection against this decision. 15. On 9 April 2002 the Istanbul Regional Administrative Court set aside the District Governor’s decision of non-authorisation on the ground that the investigation into the applicants’ allegations was inadequate. The court noted that the investigator had failed to take evidence from the complainants and their witnesses. It therefore asked the District Governor’s office to conduct a new investigation. The District Governor appointed M.A., a police lieutenant, as the new investigator. 16. Between 30 May 2002 and 14 July 2002 M.A. conducted his investigation into the applicants’ allegations of ill-treatment. Having heard the applicants, police officers and an eyewitness named by the applicants, he found that the medical reports merely indicated the presence of scratches on the arms and hands of the complainants and that there was no indication of physical violence. He therefore concluded that the applicants’ allegations were not corroborated by evidence and that therefore no permission should be given for prosecution of the accused police officers. 17. In view of the investigator’s above-mentioned conclusion, on 15 July 2002 the Bahçelievler District Governor refused authorisation for the prosecution of the accused police officers. 18. On 7 October 2002, referring to the Bahçelievler District Governor’s decision, the Bakırköy Public Prosecutor issued a non‑prosecution decision in respect of the accused police officers. The applicants appealed against this decision. 19. On 17 December 2002 the Eyüp Assize Court dismissed the applicants’ appeal. This decision was notified to the applicants on 26 February 2003.

5. The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Kozubnik, Poland. 6. On 24 February 2001 the applicant was arrested by the police. 7. On 28 February 2001 the Żywiec District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) decided to detain the applicant on remand in view of the reasonable suspicion that he had been involved in drug trafficking and drug production as a member of an organised gang. 8. On 21 May and 18 August 2001 the Bielsko-Biała Regional Court decided to prolong the applicant's pre-trial detention. The court relied on the reasonable suspicion against the applicant and on the severity of the penalty that might be imposed, which made it probable that he would obstruct the proceedings. 9. In 2001 the applicant on at least four occasions unsuccessfully requested the prosecutor to release him from detention. 10. On 20 December 2001 the applicant's pre-trial detention was prolonged by the Katowice Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy). The court relied on the severity of the sentence that might be imposed and held that keeping the applicant in detention was justified by the need to secure the proper conduct of the investigation. 11. On 13 February and 17 April 2002 the Regional Court further prolonged the applicant's detention reiterating the grounds originally given for his detention and adding that the measure was necessary given the complexity of the case. 12. The applicant's appeals against both decisions were dismissed on 27 March and 22 May 2002 respectively. 13. Subsequently, on 24 July and 25 September 2002, the Katowice Court of Appeal prolonged the detention of the applicant and 12 co‑accused. The court considered that the strong suspicion against the accused of having committed serious offences while acting in an organised gang made it probable that they would obstruct the course of the proceedings. It found that Article 258 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure established a presumption to the effect that the likelihood of a severe penalty being imposed on the accused might induce them to obstruct the proceedings. With regard to the applicant, the court underlined the risk of a heavy sentence being imposed on him. 14. On 22 November 2002 the applicant and 15 co‑accused were indicted before the Bielsko-Biała Regional Court. 15. On 27 November 2002 the pre-trial detention of the applicant and 14 other persons was further extended. The Katowice Regional Court considered the risk of the accused tampering with evidence high, basing itself on the fact that they had been charged with being members of an organised criminal gang. 16. The applicant appealed against this decision but on 8 January 2003 the Katowice Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) dismissed his appeal. 17. As the length of the applicant's detention had reached the statutory time‑limit of 2 years laid down in Article 263 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Kodeks postępowania karnego) the District Court made several applications to the Katowice Court of Appeal for the applicant's detention to be prolonged beyond that term. On 8 January 2003 the Court of Appeal granted the application. The court justified its decision with reference to the reasonable suspicion that the accused had committed the offences and the complexity of the case which concerned an organised criminal gang. The court also held that the measure was justified by the severity of the sentence to which the accused were liable and by the risk that they would interfere with the course of the proceedings. 18. On 17 March 2003 the applicant, again unsuccessfully, requested the court to lift his pre-trial detention. 19. On 6 August 2003 the Court of Appeal prolonged the applicant's detention on remand. The court noted, however, that although the bill of indictment had been lodged eight months previously, the trial court had not yet started to examine the merits of the case. As regards the need to prolong the applicant's detention, the court noted as follows: “...The [Regional Court] rightly pointed to Articles 249 § 1 and 258 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to justify the continuation of the detention on remand in order to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings, and there is no need to discuss that further. It should be underlined that, given the number of co-accused and the type of offences they had been charged with, the present case is particularly complex. Therefore, it is necessary to prolong further the detention in order to carry out the proceedings, in particular to take evidence from 16 accused and 11 witnesses... It should also be noted that, as the proceedings advance, the Regional Court should consider whether it was still necessary to extend the [detention on remand] with respect to all the accused.” 20. The first hearing was held on 13 November 2003. In total, the trial court held 36 hearings. 21. On 17 December 2003 the Court of Appeal further prolonged the applicant's detention. The court pointed to the complexity of the case and the advanced stage of the proceedings before the trial court. 22. On 18 March 2004 the applicant repeated his request to lift the detention on remand. 23. On 23 June 2004 the Katowice Court of Appeal further prolonged the applicant's pre-trial detention relying in particular on the complexity of the case and the large number of co-accused. 24. On 24 August and 13 October 2004 the court dismissed subsequent requests to lift the applicant's pre-trial detention. 25. On 16 December 2004 the Bielsko-Biała Regional Court gave judgment. It convicted the applicant and sentenced him to 4 years and 6 months' imprisonment. On the same date the court decided to lift the applicant's detention. 26. The applicant lodged an appeal. 27. On 26 January 2006 the Katowice Court of Appeal upheld the judgment as regards the sentence of imprisonment imposed on the applicant. It appears that the applicant did not lodge a cassation appeal. The judgment is final.

5. The applicant was born in 1968 and is currently serving a life sentence in prison. 6. The applicant completed five years of secondary school. In 1992 he was convicted of murder and theft. In 2000 he was released. 7. On 5 February 2004 the Hlobyne District Prosecutor’s Office, the Poltava Region (“the Hlobyne Prosecutor’s Office”), opened an investigation in connection with the murder of R., an elderly single woman who was found suffocated in her house in the village of Gradyzk with her hands and legs tied up. A forensic medical expert noted the injuries on R.’s corpse, including broken ribs. 8. On the same date, the Svitlovodsk Inter-District Prosecutor’s Office, the Kirovograd Region (“the Svitlovodsk Prosecutor’s Office”), opened an investigation in connection with the murder of Ya., another elderly single woman. Ya. was found dead in her house in the village of Pavlivka with her hands and legs tied up. The forensic medical expert concluded that Ya. had died due to a pneumothorax which had been caused by serious injuries, including numerous broken ribs and a fracture of the chest. 9. On 20 May 2004 the investigation in connection with the murder of R. was suspended, as no suspects could be identified. 10. On 29 May 2004 an investigator from the Svitlovodsk Prosecutor’s Office arrested B., a woman who was living with the applicant, on suspicion of having murdered Ya. After B. had her rights explained to her, she asked to be provided with a lawyer. A legal-aid lawyer was admitted to the proceedings the same day and assisted B. during the first questioning session. When questioned, B. confessed that she and the applicant had visited an elderly woman and that the applicant had beaten up and tied up that woman, after which he had searched the house for money. B insisted that the applicant had forced her to go with him on that day and that she had been afraid of refusing to follow his orders. 11. On 31 May 2004 the investigator from the Svitlovodsk Prosecutor’s Office arrested the applicant on suspicion of having murdered Ya. He was provided with a legal-aid lawyer, H., that same day. 12. According to the applicant, following his arrest, he was beaten up by the police with the purpose of making him confess to the crime. 13. On 1 June 2004 the applicant was questioned for the first time on account of Ya.’s murder. Assisted by his lawyer, the applicant stated that B. had pushed the elderly woman to the floor and had tied her up while he had been looking for money. 14. On the same date, B. and her lawyer participated in a reconstruction of the crime committed in respect of Ya. in the village of Pavlivka. B. showed those present where in the house the applicant had beaten and tied up Ya. 15. On 3 and 8 June 2004 the Svitlovodsk District Court, the Poltava Region, ordered, respectively, that the applicant and B. be held in custody. 16. On 9 June 2004 the applicant was charged with the murder of Ya. He was further questioned in the presence of his lawyer. The applicant admitted that he and B. had visited Ya. but denied that he had inflicted any injuries on the victim. 17. On 14 June 2004 the applicant and his lawyer participated in a reconstruction of the crime committed in respect of Ya. in the village of Pavlivka. Upon arriving at the village, the applicant failed to identify the house where the elderly woman had lived, claiming that he could not remember which house it was. 18. On 24 August 2004 the applicant was allegedly beaten up with the purpose of extracting a confession. 19. On 31 August 2004 an investigator from the Hlobyne Prosecutor’s Office received operative information from police officers that the applicant and B. could have murdered R. He resumed the investigation in respect of R.’s murder and decided to question the applicant. 20. On the same date and in the presence of his lawyer, the applicant denied any involvement in the murder of R. and refused to answer any questions. He demanded that another lawyer be appointed to represent him. 21. Following that questioning, the applicant and B. were escorted to the Hlobyne Temporary Detention Centre pending further investigation. 22. On 2 September 2004 the investigator from the Hlobyne Prosecutor’s Office appraised B. of her rights. B. stated that she wished to be assisted by another legal-aid lawyer from then on. 23. On 3 September 2004 the investigator from the Hlobyne Prosecutor’s Office questioned B. in the presence of a new legal-aid lawyer. B. stated that, before the incident with Ya., the applicant had forced her to visit R., another elderly woman. The applicant had beaten up, tied up, and suffocated R. and had taken money and jewellery. B. repeated these statements during a reconstruction of the crime. This investigatory action was carried out in the presence of her lawyer. 24. On 6 September 2004 the criminal proceedings concerning the two murders were consolidated into one criminal case. 25. On 9 September 2004 the applicant was provided with another legal-aid lawyer, V.M. When questioned on the same date in the presence of the lawyer, the applicant claimed that B. had killed R. 26. On 29 September 2004 the investigator granted the applicant’s request to have a new legal-aid lawyer appointed and appointed D., a lawyer with twenty years of experience, to act as the applicant’s defence counsel. 27. On 4 November 2004 the investigator from the Hlobyne Prosecutor’s Office started an investigation in respect of the attempted murder and robbery of M.M., another elderly woman. The investigator found that on 25 January 2004 the applicant and B. had entered M.M.’s home, pushed her to the floor and started to beat her. They had tied up her hands and had covered her with a mattress and other things, had taken money and had left, assuming that M.M. had died. However, after a while M.M. had come around and had called neighbours for help. This criminal case was joined to the consolidated proceedings against the applicant and B. 28. In November 2004 the investigation was completed and the case file was referred to the Poltava Regional Court of Appeal (“the first-instance court”) for trial. 29. On 6 January 2005 the first-instance court committed the applicant and B. for trial. 30. On 3 February 2005 the first-instance court adjourned the trial, as the defendants’ lawyers failed to appear. The court ordered that the regional bar association provide the defendants with legal‑aid lawyers. 31. On 14 February 2005 the first-instance court again adjourned the trial, as the applicant’s lawyer did not appear. 32. On 17 February 2005 the first-instance court resumed the trial in the presence of the applicant’s and B.’s lawyers. 33. During the trial the applicant and B. each stated that the other had been the perpetrator of the murders, both trying to reduce their own role in the events. The applicant admitted tying up M. and R. with a rope and beating R. He occasionally denied B.’s statements that he had tied up Ya. At one of the court hearings M.M. identified both defendants as those who had attacked and robbed her. The defence lawyers attended the hearings and put questions to the defendants, victims and witnesses. 34. On 21 November 2005 the first-instance court found that the applicant and B. had committed the aggravated murders of Ya. and R., the attempted murder of M.M., and the robberies of those victims. It also found B. guilty of theft. It sentenced the applicant to life imprisonment and B. to fifteen years’ imprisonment and ordered the confiscation of all of the defendants’ property. The first-instance court based its judgment on expert opinions and documentary, oral, and material evidence, including the self-incriminating statements given by B. and the applicant during the pre-trial investigation and the trial. In its judgment, the first-instance court also noted that the applicant suffered from a slight learning disability, which, however, had not affected his mental capacity to be aware of his actions and control them when committing the crimes. 35. On 19 December 2005 the applicant appealed in cassation, claiming that the first-instance court had misinterpreted the facts, had not questioned all the witnesses and had disregarded violations of his defence rights. B. did not appeal in cassation. 36. On 14 February 2006 the applicant supplemented his cassation appeal, claiming that he had been subjected to ill-treatment at the investigation stage. He complained that he no longer had legal representation, which had made it difficult for him to prepare his cassation appeal properly. 37. On 16 March 2006 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s cassation appeal as unsubstantiated, noting that the findings of the first-instance court were well-founded and properly corroborated by the evidence, including the defendants’ self-incriminating statements; no procedural violations had been found in the case. The Supreme Court held a hearing in the presence of the prosecutor and the applicant, who was not represented by a lawyer. 38. On 11 September 2006 the applicant complained to the General Prosecutor’s Office, claiming, in particular, that after his arrest he had been beaten up and tortured by police officers during the following ten days with the purpose of making him confess to a crime which he had not committed; and that in August 2004 he had been beaten up again with the same purpose. By a letter of 9 November 2006 the General Prosecutor’s Office informed the applicant that his complaint was unsubstantiated.

4. The applicant was born in 1944 and lives in Košice. 5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows. 6. In an action of 19 July 1991 filed with the Košice II District Court the applicant sought the distribution of her and her former husband's matrimonial property. 7. The District Court held a number of hearings and obtained evidence including an expert opinion. The Košice Regional Court dealt twice with a challenge of bias against the District Court judge and once with the applicant's appeal against a decision to pay an advance for the costs of an expert opinion. 8. On 23 January 2007 the District Court determined the merits of the case. Both the applicant and the defendant appealed. The District Court transmitted the case to the court of appeal on 9 January 2008. The court of appeal quashed the first-instance judgment on 8 July 2009 and remitted the case to the District Court for a new determination. 9. On 10 May 2006 the Constitutional Court found that the Košice II District Court had violated the applicant's right under Article 48 § 2 of the Constitution to a hearing without unjustified delay. The applicant by her conduct had contributed to the length of the proceedings. The District Court was responsible for delays totalling 6 years and 8 months during the period subsequent to 15 February 1993 which fell within the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. 10. The Constitutional Court awarded 100,000 Slovakian korunas (SKK) to the applicant as just satisfaction in respect of non-pecuniary damage. It also ordered the District Court to avoid any further delay in the proceedings and to reimburse the applicant's legal costs.

5. The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Minusinsk. 6. On 28 December 2001 the Tomsk Regional Court found the applicant guilty of membership of an organised criminal group, several counts of attempted aggravated murder, intentional destruction of property and arms possession and sentenced him to fourteen years’ imprisonment, which he was sent to serve in correctional colony no. 2, Tomsk Region. Proceedings concerning conditions of detention 7. On 11 November 2004 the applicant brought an action with the Asino Town Court, complaining of various violations of his rights by the administration of correctional colony no. 2. In particular, he complained that on a number of occasions in 2003 and 2004 the director of the correctional colony had ordered him to be placed in a punishment cell, which had entailed a serious worsening of the general conditions of his detention and limitation or deprivation of his rights as a detainee. The applicant also argued that the colony authorities had unlawfully seized his writing utensils, and had forbidden him to use the colony library and to purchase newspapers, magazines and books. He further alleged that they had not allowed him to have meetings with counsel and to make paid phone calls to his relatives, counsel and the European Court of Human Rights. His biggest grievance, however, was that the administration had refused to post his complaints to various authorities in Russia and had monitored or even intercepted his correspondence with the Court. The applicant also requested that the Town Court ensure that he could be present at a court hearing during the examination of his complaint. 8. Following a number of refusals by the Town Court to grant the applicant’s request, and the subsequent revocation of those decisions by the Tomsk Regional Court, on 3 October 2006 the Asino Town Court granted leave to bring an action for an examination on the merits, and set a preliminary hearing for 6 October 2006. Subsequent hearings were held on 12 and 30 October 2006. The applicant was not informed of either of those hearings. In fact, on 17 October 2006 he was transferred to another correctional colony in the town of Verkhneuralsk, Chelyabinsk Region, more than 1,500 km from his previous place of detention. 9. On 26 January 2007 the applicant was transferred to detention facility no. 77/2 in Moscow. 10. On 12 February 2007 the Asino Town Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint, having found that either the restrictions on the applicant’s rights had been lifted following an inquiry by prosecution authorities or they had been warranted by the applicant’s placement in the punishment cell, in view of numerous instances of unlawful behaviour on his part, such as refusal to keep his cell tidy, destruction of colony property, and so on. The applicant was not brought to the hearing. Representatives of the colony administration attended the hearings before the Town Court and made oral submissions. 11. By a separate decision issued on 12 February 2007 the Asino Town Court responded to the applicant’s request to be present at the hearings. In particular, the Town Court held as follows: “[The applicant], having been convicted by the judgment of 28 December 2001 of the Tomsk Regional Court, is currently serving his sentence. It appears from the case file materials that he was transferred outside the Tomsk Region. [The applicant] lodged a complaint about the actions of the head of [correctional colony no. 2], Tomsk Region...; accordingly, his complaint is being examined by the Asino Town Court within the civil procedure. The Execution of Sentences Act of the Russian Federation, in force at the material time, does not provide for an opportunity to transfer convicts to [ensure] their participation in court hearings in civil cases; therefore it is impossible for the court to ensure [the applicant’s] presence at the hearings in the present civil case.” 12. The applicant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the Town Court had unlawfully refused to ensure his presence at the hearings, despite the fact that the majority of the circumstances in dispute were exclusively within his personal knowledge and it was important for the Town Court to hear both parties to the proceedings, the applicant and the administration. 13. At a hearing on 22 May 2007, held in the applicant’s absence, the Tomsk Regional Court upheld the judgment of 12 February 2007, endorsing the Town Court’s reasoning, including that on the subject of the applicant’s attendance.

4. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 5. The applicant was born in 1975 in Pakistan. He entered the United Kingdom on 5 October 1978, when he was three years old, as a dependant of his father. He was granted indefinite leave to remain. He was educated in the United Kingdom and spent his formative years there. 6. On an unidentified date in 1993 he was found guilty of the theft of an insurance document. On an unidentified date in 1998 he was fined following a conviction for the use of a forged banker’s draft. 7. On 22 January 2003 he was convicted by a Crown Court of involvement in the importation of a class A controlled drug. The conviction related to the attempted importation of 2.5 kilograms of heroin with an estimated street value of GBP 210,470.00. The applicant pleaded guilty. In his sentencing remarks the judge noted that he was not the principal in the criminal activity but concluded that he was a “knowledgeable, able and willing assistant”. He was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment but he was released on 3 April 2006 because of his good conduct in prison. 8. On 2 May 2006 the Secretary of State for the Home Department served on the applicant a notice of decision to make a deportation order pursuant to section 3 (5) of the Immigration Act 1971. The Secretary of State regarded as particularly serious those offences involving violence, sex, arson and drugs. Therefore, in view of the nature and severity of the applicant’s offence, the Secretary of State concluded that his removal from the United Kingdom would be necessary in a democratic society for the prevention of disorder and crime and for the protection of health and morals. 9. The applicant appealed to an Immigration Judge. He indicated that he had been in the United Kingdom since he was three years old and was not familiar with the culture in Pakistan. All of his immediate family were in the United Kingdom. His mother and his siblings were all in poor health and he was the main person who kept the house clean. His mother had diabetes and a heart condition. His siblings suffered from asthma and/or eczema. The applicant suffered from ulcerative colitis for which he received treatment in the United Kingdom. He therefore submitted that his removal would be disproportionate in the circumstances and would violate his rights under Article 8 of the Convention. 10. On 9 August 2006 an Immigration Judge dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the deportation order. He agreed that the applicant’s deportation would be conducive to the public good and that the crime he had committed was sufficiently serious to warrant deportation. With regard to the applicant’s family life in the United Kingdom, he found that it did not go beyond the natural ties of affection. In particular, he noted that the family had managed to cope without the applicant while he was in prison. He also found that the applicant would be able to adapt to life in Pakistan. He relied on the fact that he was an unemployed, single man of 28 years of age who, apart from having ulcerative colitis, was in good health. It was accepted that he could speak Punjabi. Moreover, the Immigration Judge observed that the medical evidence suggested that the applicant’s attendance at hospital for treatment of his ulcerative colitis had been inconsistent and he could therefore continue to attend hospital sporadically in Pakistan. 11. On 22 August 2006 the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal made no order on his application for reconsideration. A Senior Immigration Judge noted that the applicant had been sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment for his involvement in the importation of heroin and the Tribunal was entitled to find that this was a very serious matter and sufficiently serious of itself to warrant deportation. 12. On 8 November 2006 the High Court dismissed his application for reconsideration of the Immigration Judge’s decision as it did not disclose any arguable error of law and an appeal would have no real prospect of success. 13. On 4 August 2008 the applicant’s representative wrote to the Home Office, indicating that the applicant had been receiving death threats from one of his co-defendants in the drugs offence. The co-defendant was believed to be living in Pakistan. The applicant therefore submitted that if returned there was a real risk that his life would be in danger. He further submitted that in view of his mother’s ill health, if he were deported then in all likelihood he would not see her again. 14. On 11 September 2008 the Secretary of State for the Home Department advised the applicant that he would not consider the new representations as a fresh claim for asylum. In particular, the Secretary of State noted that the late asylum claim damaged the applicant’s credibility as the first threatening phone call was allegedly received in 2006. 15. In a letter dated 13 November 2008 the applicant advised the Court that his British girlfriend was pregnant and due to give birth to their child on 16 December 2008. He submitted a statement by his girlfriend, in which she confirmed that she was pregnant and stated that she had been in a relationship with the applicant since August 2005. On 16 April 2009 the applicant advised the Court that his girlfriend had given birth to a baby girl. He subsequently submitted a birth certificate, which named him as the father.

6. The applicants were born in 1953 and 1962 respectively and live in Baku, Azerbaijan. 7. According to the applicants, on 5 September 1998 at about 4 p.m. the police entered their house, searched it and seized their belongings. The police officers searched the applicants, handcuffed them and took them into the police car. On the way to the car the police officers allegedly struck the applicants on the neck and back with gun butts and shouted obscene words at them. The police officers also aimed their guns at the applicants and shouted that “all dark-faced Caucasians should be killed”. The applicants were taken to Nizhnevartovsk police station no. 1. They were not informed about the reasons for their arrest. 8. The first applicant was held at Nizhnevartovsk police station no. 1 for more than twenty-four hours. He was allegedly not given any food or drink, and was not allowed to go to the toilet or sleep. The police officers hit him several times on the neck and threatened to kill him. On 6 September 1998 he was placed in a temporary detention centre. 9. As to the second applicant, three hours after the arrest he was transferred to Nizhnevartovsk police station no. 4. On the way there the police officers allegedly beat him on the head many times. In the morning of 6 September 1998 the second applicant was transferred to Nizhnevartovsk police station no. 3, where he was held until the next morning. He was not allowed to sleep and was not given any food. On 7 September 1998 the second applicant was placed in a temporary detention centre. 10. According to the Government, the applicants were arrested on 6 September 1998. On the same day they were placed in the temporary detention centre of Nizhnevartovsk. 11. On 9 September 1998 the prosecutor of Nizhnevartovsk authorised the applicants’ detention. 12. On 15 or 16 September 1998 the applicants were charged with the attempted murder of the mayor of Nizhnevartovsk. 13. During the investigation the applicants were allegedly repeatedly ill‑treated by police officers, who sought to make them confess. In particular, the officers threatened to kill the applicants and their relatives. They kicked the first applicant in the stomach and kidneys, put a gas-mask on him and made him inhale cigarette smoke, put plastic bags on his head and blocked access to the air until he fainted, and raped him with a truncheon. The first applicant alleged that as a result of the ill-treatment his ears had bled and he had urinated blood. 14. The second applicant contended that the police officers had beaten him on the head, and in the stomach and kidneys, put a plastic bag on him and suffocated him, put him handcuffed on the floor and stepped on his back. They had also put a gas-mask on him and made him inhale cigarette smoke. On several occasions in September 1998 the police officers had blindfolded him and put him on the floor of a police car. The police officer Mr Sh. had pushed his head against the floor with his feet. He had been taken to a cemetery where the police officers ill-treated him and threatened to kill him. They had put a gun against his head and shot blanks. 15. On 14 September 1998 the second applicant was taken to Nizhnevartovsk police station no. 1, where he was allegedly beaten up by four drunken police officers until he lost consciousness. They also threatened to sodomise him with a truncheon. 16. On 15 and 17 September 1998 the applicants confessed to the attempted murder. However, once questioned in the presence of counsel they retracted their confessions. 17. On 25 December 2001 the applicants were released on an undertaking not to leave the town. 18. On 13 August 2002 the criminal proceedings against the applicants were discontinued. The investigator noted that the confessions had been given without the benefit of legal assistance and that the applicants had complained about ill-treatment. As they had indeed received injuries during the investigation, their confessions were not reliable evidence. There was no other evidence against them. 19. The first applicant submitted his medical records from remand centre no. IZ-68/5 of Nizhnevartovsk. 20. It appears from the records that upon his arrival at the remand centre on 6 October 1998 the first applicant was examined by a doctor. The doctor found no injuries. 21. On 19 October 1998 the first applicant complained to the facility doctor about headaches, aches in his left wrist, wrist swelling and a hearing impediment. He also repeatedly complained about his aching spine. 22. On 5 April 1999 the first applicant was X-rayed. The examination revealed that he had a deformed spinal disc, possibly as a result of trauma. 23. On the same day the doctors noted old abrasions on the first applicant’s wrists, oedema of the wrists and fingers, and a sprained left wrist. He was diagnosed with a post-traumatic spinal osteochondrosis and periarthritis of the shoulder joint. 24. On 4 July 2001 the first applicant was diagnosed with post-traumatic spondylitis (inflammation of a spine vertebra ). 25. In January 2002, after his release, the first applicant was examined by doctors who diagnosed him with a post-traumatic cataract, post-traumatic arthritis of the left wrist, and deformation of a spinal disc, possibly of traumatic origin. They also suspected a wrist fracture. 26. It appears from the second applicant’s medical records that on 30 October 1998 he arrived at remand centre no. IZ-68/5 of Nizhnevartovsk. He was examined by a doctor, who found no injuries. He was again examined on 8 December 1998 and on an unspecified date in February 1999. No injuries were noted. 27. Between 1999 and 2002 the applicant regularly complained to the facility doctor about headaches and dizziness. His medical records do not contain any indications that those symptoms were of traumatic origin. 28. In January 2002, after the release, the second applicant was diagnosed with post-traumatic encephalopathy (a brain disease). 29. On an unspecified date the first applicant asked the prosecutor’s office of Nizhnevartovsk to initiate criminal proceedings against the police officers who had ill-treated him. 30. On 19 October 1998 the first applicant was examined by a medical expert. The expert noted a bruise on his right knee, abrasions on his forehead, right knee and wrists, sprained fingers on both hands, and a left shoulder sprain. 31. On 20 November 1998 the prosecutor’s office of Nizhnevartovsk refused to initiate criminal proceedings. Despite his repeated requests, the applicant was not served with a copy of the decision. 32. On 11 June 1999 the prosecutor’s office of the Khanty-Mansiysk Region set aside the decision of 20 November 1998 and ordered an additional inquiry. 33. On 25 June 1999 the prosecutor’s office of Nizhnevartovsk refused to initiate criminal proceedings. The parties did not submit a copy of that decision. 34. On 20 August 1999 the first applicant was examined by a medical expert, who found no traces of ill-treatment. 35. Between 1999 and 2002 the first applicant filed many complaints with prosecutors of different levels describing the details of the ill-treatment and the injuries sustained. In particular, he complained about his sprained left arm and aching spine. He asked to initiate criminal proceedings against the head of the Nizhnevartovsk police station, his deputy and the subordinate police officers. 36. In October 2002 the Interior Department of the Khanty-Mansiysk Region conducted an internal inquiry. The investigator questioned one of the police officers of the Nizhnevartovsk police station, who denied beating the first applicant. It was not possible to interview the other police officers who had arrested and questioned the applicant, as they had been dismissed from the police and moved to another region of Russia. Nor was it possible to question the head of the Nizhnevartovsk police station or his deputy as they were on annual leave. 37. The investigator also questioned the first applicant’s co-detainees, who testified that they had seen marks of beatings on the first applicant’s body and heard him complaining of ill-treatment. One of the warders of the temporary detention centre in which the first applicant had been held also stated that he had seen numerous bruises on the first applicant’s skin. 38. On 23 October 2002 the Interior Department of the Khanty-Mansiysk Region found that the evidence was contradictory and that an investigation and a medical expert’s examination were necessary to verify the first applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment. The materials of the inquiry were forwarded to the prosecutor’s office of the Khanty-Mansiysk Region. 39. On 26 October 2002 the prosecutor’s office of the Khanty-Mansiysk Region refused to initiate criminal proceedings with reference to the decision of 25 June 1999. The prosecutor noted that the first applicant had not submitted any new information. 40. The applicant complained to the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation. 41. By letter of 9 January 2003 the Prosecutor General’s office informed the applicant that the decision of 26 October 2002 had been set aside and that criminal proceedings had been opened. 42. On 26 May 2003 the prosecutor’s office of the Khanty-Mansiysk Region recognised the first applicant as a victim. In his decision the prosecutor noted that “the inquiry had established that [the first applicant] had indeed been subjected to violence during the investigation in criminal case no... in which he had been a defendant”. 43. On 5 June 2003 the criminal proceedings were suspended because it was not possible to identify the perpetrators. 44. The first applicant complained about that decision to the prosecutor’s office of the Khanty-Mansiysk Region. On 9 March 2007 a deputy prosecutor of the Khanty-Mansiysk Region confirmed the decision, finding that it had been lawful. 45. According to the second applicant, from the date of his arrest and until 8 February 1999 he had no access to legal assistance and was not allowed to send any correspondence. He was therefore prevented from lodging a complaint about ill-treatment. From February 1999 onwards he repeatedly complained about ill-treatment to the prosecutor’s office of Nizhnevartovsk. He described the details of the ill-treatment and named the police officers who had beaten him. He asked the prosecutor’s office to appoint a medical expert to examine him and to initiate criminal proceedings against the police officers. Copies of those complaints were seized by the detention facility officials in April 1999. 46. In reply to the second applicant’s complaints, on 24 February 1999 the prosecutor’s office of Nizhnevartovsk ordered a medical expert’s examination. 47. On 6 and 7 May 1999 the second applicant was examined by medical experts, who found no traces of ill-treatment. 48. By letter of 28 May 1999, the prosecutor’s office of the Khanty-Mansiysk Region informed the applicant that an inquiry had not revealed any evidence of ill-treatment. 49. On 10 November 1999 the prosecutor’s office of Nizhnevartovsk refused to initiate criminal proceedings. The parties did not submit a copy of that decision. 50. The second applicant continued to complain about ill-treatment to the prosecutor’s officers at various levels. 51. On 29 June 2003 the Nizhnevartovsk prosecutor’s office for a second time refused to initiate criminal proceedings concerning the second applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment. The prosecutor noted that the second applicant had had no injuries and the police officers in charge of the criminal case against him had denied beating him. 52. The second applicant challenged the decision before the Nizhnevartovsk Town Court. He complained that the prosecutor’s office of Nizhnevartovsk had not questioned his co-detainees who had seen marks of beatings on him. 53. By letter of 1 September 2003, the prosecutor’s office of the Khanty‑Mansiysk Region informed the second applicant that the decision of 29 June 2003 had been set aside and an additional inquiry had been ordered and that the second applicant was not entitled to receive information about the outcome of the inquiry as his procedural status was that of a witness. 54. According to the Government, between 5 September 1998 and 25 December 2001 the applicants were repeatedly transferred between the temporary detention centre of Nizhnevartovsk and remand centre no. IZ‑86/1 in Nizhnevartovsk. It was not possible to establish the periods of their detention in each of those facilities, as the registers for that period had been destroyed on expiry of the statutory storage time-limit. For the same reasons it was not possible to describe in detail the conditions of detention in each cell. The Government, however, submitted certain documents outlining the general conditions of detention in each of those facilities. (a) The temporary detention centre of Nizhnevartovsk 55. It appears from an undated report by the Ministry of the Interior, submitted by the Government, that the applicants were intermittently held at the temporary detention centre of Nizhnevartovsk in 1998 and 1999. They were detained in cells nos. 4 and 8. Cell no. 4 measured 6.5 sq. m and housed two to three inmates, while cell no. 8 measured 13.6 sq. m and housed ten to eleven inmates. The cells were not equipped with a lavatory bowl and had no running water. There was forced ventilation and central heating in the cells. The average temperature inside was 19 to 21ºC. The lighting level met the statutory norms. Inmates were provided with bedding, tableware, food and drinking water. The cells were cleaned every day. Inmates took daily outdoor exercise. The temporary detention centre had a medical unit. It was not possible to establish whether the applicants received medical treatment because the medical records had been destroyed on expiry of the statutory storage time-limit. The report stated, in conclusion, that the conditions of the applicants’ detention did not meet the requirements of the Detention of Suspects Act. 56. The same information is contained in the report of 19 April 2007 prepared by the Interior Department of the Khanty-Mansiysk Region and produced by the Government. 57. Further, it appears from sanitary inspection reports of 1998, 2000 and 2007 submitted by the Government that the temporary detention centre of Nizhnevartovsk did not meet the statutory sanitary norms. In particular, it was overcrowded and the number of bunks was insufficient, the inmates were not provided with clean bedding, the lighting level was below the statutory minimum, two showers out of the three available were out of order, the walls were shabby, the cells were not equipped with wash basins, the ventilation was insufficient and the disinfection was irregular. 58. The Government also produced a certificate issued by the head of the temporary detention centre of Nizhnevartovsk on 16 April 2007. The certificate indicates that the temporary detention centre is always overpopulated. Although the designed capacity is for thirty-four persons, the temporary detention centre houses fifty inmates on average. The cells have no running water and are not equipped with lavatory bowls. Inmates use aluminium cans to relieve themselves. The cans are emptied every morning into a pit in the walking yard. 59. Finally, the Government submitted black and white photographs of cells nos. 4 and 8. The photographs show bare concrete walls and windows covered with thick metal grills and shielded by wooden plates. Cell no. 4. has two two-tier wooden beds with mattresses. Cell no. 8 has a plank bed covered with blankets which occupies the entire cell with the exception of a narrow passage of about 0.5 m in width. Both cells have shelves with tableware. There are also large aluminium cans in the cells. No other equipment is visible. (b) Remand centre no. IZ-86/1 in Nizhnevartovsk 60. According to certificates of 14 September 2007 issued by the remand centre management and produced by the Government, the first applicant was held in cells nos. 4 and 6, while the second applicant was held in cells nos. 26, 27, 30 and 31. Cell no. 4 measured 17.3 sq. m and housed four inmates on average. Cell no. 6 measured 21.5 sq. m and housed five inmates on average. Cell no. 26 measured 18.2 sq. m and housed four inmates on average. Cell no. 27 measured 17.8 sq. m and housed four inmates on average. Cell no. 3 measured 15.8 sq. m and housed four inmates on average. Cell no. 31 measured 14.1 sq. m and housed three inmates on average. It was not possible to submit confirming documents as they had been destroyed on expiry of the statutory storage time-limit. 61. It can be seen from the same certificates that inmates suffering from contagious diseases were held separately from healthy inmates. All inmates had separate bunks and were provided with bedding and tableware. Inmates were allowed to take a shower once a week and had an hour-long daily walk. They were provided with hot food three times a day. They were also supplied with drinking water. They received adequate medical care on demand. All cells were equipped with forced ventilation. Inmates could also open the windows to air the cells. The cells were sufficiently lit by electric lamps. There was a lavatory bowl and cold-water taps in each cell. The lavatory bowls were separated from the living area by a partition. All cells had central heating. The average inside temperature was 18 to 25ºC. Inmates were allowed to have two family visits per month. The above information was confirmed by written affidavits of 14 September 2007 by the remand centre officials. 62. According to the applicants, they were repeatedly held at the temporary detention centre of Nizhnevartovsk for long periods of time. They were held together with detainees suffering from tuberculosis, HIV and other contagious diseases. Food was distributed once a day. No medical assistance was provided. During the entire detention period the relatives were not allowed to visit the applicants. They were also prohibited from going outside into the exercise yard. Their sister complained to the prosecutor’s office of Nizhnevartovsk about the ban on visits and on outdoor exercise. By letters of 15 December 1998 and 23 March 1999, a deputy prosecutor of Nizhnevartovsk confirmed that family visits and outdoor exercise were not allowed to the applicants. 63. The applicants described cells nos. 4 and 8 in which they had been held as follows. Cell no. 4 was equipped with four bunks. It housed five to nine inmates. Cell no. 8 measured about 18 sq. m. It accommodated fourteen to twenty-six inmates. It was equipped with a plank bed of 2 metres by 2.5 metres. As it could not accommodate all the inmates, some of them had to sleep on the floor. Inmates were not provided with bedding. There was no lavatory bowl and inmates used a metal bucket to relieve themselves. The bucket was filthy and was not separated from the rest of the cell by any partition. Both cells were extremely stuffy and smoky. They were infested with cockroaches, lice and rats. The inmates were allowed to take a cold shower once a week. The first applicant was not treated for hypertension, prostatitis or skin diseases. 64. On 26 August 1999 counsel for the first applicant complained to the prosecutor’s office of the Khanty-Mansiysk Region that the first applicant had been held in inhuman conditions. In particular, his detention at the temporary detention centre for almost a year violated the Detention of Suspects Act in accordance with which no one could be held at a temporary detention centre for more than ten days in a month. The first applicant was not provided with bedding, had no outdoor exercise and was deprived of medical assistance. It appears that he did not receive a reply. 65. In November 2003 the first applicant sued the local office of the Ministry of Finance for compensation in respect of pecuniary and non‑pecuniary damage incurred through unlawful prosecution and detention, the allegedly inhuman conditions of detention and ill-treatment. He described the details of his ill-treatment and the conditions of his detention at the temporary detention centre. Finally, he asked for compensation for the loss of earnings and for his property that had been seized or destroyed by the police. 66. On 24 March 2004 the Nizhnevartovsk Town Court of the Khanty‑Mansiysk Region partly allowed the claims. It awarded the first applicant 751,632.68 Russian roubles (RUB) for the loss of earnings (the amount was established on the basis of a certificate from the employer showing his salary before the arrest), RUB 20,000,000 in compensation for the non-pecuniary damage sustained as a result of unlawful detention, the inhuman conditions of detention “which [were] well known to be incompatible with sanitary and hygienic norms” and damage to his reputation, and RUB 180,725 for legal costs and expenses. The court rejected his claims for compensation in respect of ill-treatment as unsubstantiated. It also rejected his claims for compensation for the seized or destroyed belongings, because he had not proved his ownership. 67. On 14 October 2004 the Khanty-Mansiysk Regional Court held, on appeal, that the first applicant had not proved that the conditions of his detention had been inhuman or that there had been any damage to his reputation. Therefore, it reduced the amount of compensation for non-pecuniary damage to RUB 500,000 (about 13,945 euros). It further quashed the award for the loss of earnings because the tax authorities had no data about the amount of his salary before the arrest. It upheld the remainder of the judgment. 68. The second applicant also sued the local office of the Ministry of Finance. He submitted the same claims as the first applicant. 69. On 12 March 2004 the Nizhnevartovsk Town Court of the Khanty‑Mansiysk Region partly allowed his claims. It awarded the second applicant RUB 619,444.34 for the loss of earnings, and RUB 20,000,000 in compensation for the non-pecuniary damage sustained as a result of the unlawful detention, the inhuman conditions of detention “which [were] well known to be incompatible with sanitary and hygienic norms” and the damage to his reputation. The court rejected the remainder of his claims for pecuniary damage as unsubstantiated. 70. The second applicant appealed. In particular, he complained that the first-instance court had not awarded him any compensation for ill-treatment. 71. On 10 June 2004 the Khanty-Mansiysk Regional Court held on appeal that the second applicant had not proved that he had been ill-treated, that the conditions of his detention had been inhuman or that there had been any damage to his reputation. Therefore, it reduced the amount of compensation for non-pecuniary damage to RUB 600,000. It further reversed the award for the loss of earnings because the tax authorities had no data about the amount of his salary before the arrest. It upheld the remainder of the judgment. 72. On 10 December 2004 the Presidium of the Khanty-Mansiysk Regional Court considered the award excessive and reduced the compensation for non-pecuniary damage to RUB 200,000 (about 5,360 euros).

5. The applicants were born in 1964 and 1972 respectively. The first applicant’s whereabouts are unknown. The second applicant lives in Tyumen. 6. The applicants are members of Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami. 7. Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (The Party of Islamic Liberation – hereinafter “Hizb ut-Tahrir”) is an international Islamic organisation with branches in many parts of the world, including the Middle East and Europe. It advocates the overthrow of governments and their replacement by an Islamic State in the form of a recreated Caliphate. Hizb ut-Tahrir first emerged among Palestinians in Jordan in the early 1950s. It has achieved a small, but highly committed following in a number of Middle Eastern states and has also gained in popularity among Muslims in western Europe and Indonesia. It began working in Central Asia in the mid-1990s and has developed a committed following inside Uzbekistan, and to a lesser extent in neighbouring Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan. 8. On 14 February 2003 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation found fifteen organisations, including Hizb ut-Tahrir, to be terrorist organisations and prohibited their activity in the territory of Russia. It held a hearing in camera which was attended by a representative of the Prosecutor General’s office, but not the organisations’ representatives. The part concerning Hizb ut-Tahrir reads in its entirety as follows: “The Party of Islamic Liberation (‘Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami’) is an organisation that pursues the aims of overthrowing non-Islamic governments and of establishing Islamic rule on an international scale by reviving a ‘Worldwide Islamic Caliphate’, in the first place in the regions with a predominantly Muslim population, including Russia and other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Its main methods and activities include Islamic militant propaganda, combined with intolerance towards other religions, active recruitment of supporters, and activities aimed at promoting schism and disunity in society (primarily proselytism with massive financial support). It is banned in several Middle East and Commonwealth of Independent States countries (Uzbekistan).” 9. On 18 June 2003 the Supreme Court rejected as out of time the appeal submitted by one of the banned organisations. It found it established, on the basis of the evidence submitted by the Prosecutor General’s office, that the information about the decision of 14 February 2003 had been published in the mass media in February 2003. The fact that the organisation had not learned about that decision until 28 April 2003 was irrelevant. There had therefore been no reason to extend the time-limit for appealing. 10. On 28 July 2006 a list of organisations declared to be terrorist organisations by the Russian courts was for the first time published in the official periodical Rossiyskaya Gazeta. The list included, among others, the organisations declared to be terrorist organisations by the Supreme Court’s decision of 14 February 2003, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir. 11. On 13 February 2004 the first applicant was arrested. On 25 March 2004 criminal proceedings were instituted against him and his partner Ms D. They were accused of being members of Hizb ut-Tahrir and were charged with aiding and abetting terrorism, founding a criminal organisation and using forged documents, offences under Article 205.1 § 1, Article 210 § 1 and Article 327 § 3 of the Criminal Code. 12. When questioned by the investigator, the first applicant admitted to being a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir and living in Russia under a false name and with forged identity documents. According to him, Hizb ut-Tahrir was a political organisation with a strict hierarchical structure and the aim of establishing the Caliphate through “velvet revolutions”, first in Muslim lands and then in other traditionally non-Muslim countries. It did not resort to, or call for, violence. Its members viewed Islam as a political ideology rather than a religious belief. The first applicant’s main activity consisted in talking to people in an attempt to persuade them to join Hizb ut-Tahrir. He distributed Hizb ut-Tahrir’s literature and explained its ideology. He had succeeded in recruiting five or six people who formed the Moscow section of Hizb ut-Tahrir under his leadership. He gave instructions to the members of his section and was also responsible for maintaining contacts with other local sections of Hizb ut-Tahrir. He knew that the organisation had been banned in Russia and therefore the members of his section had pseudonyms. 13. His partner Ms D. gave similar evidence. She affirmed that Hizb ut‑Tahrir was not a terrorist organisation. 14. The investigator also obtained statements from several witnesses. The witnesses stated that the first applicant and Ms D. had attempted to persuade them to become members of Hizb ut-Tahrir and had supplied them with Hizb ut-Tahrir’s literature. They gave the leaflets and brochures received from the first applicant to the investigator. Some of the witnesses testified that the first applicant had urged them to fight the unfaithful, including with weapons, and they had the impression that he had called for assistance to Chechen guerrillas. One witness also stated that the first applicant had advocated the establishment of sharia on the territory of Russia. 15. The first applicant’s flat was searched and guidelines on the use of weapons, explosives and poisons were found there. 16. In September 2004 the case was sent for trial before the Moscow City Court. 17. The first applicant pleaded not guilty. He admitted his membership of Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami and confirmed his previous description of its activities and ideology. He insisted that it was not a terrorist organisation and that it condemned any use of violence. He repudiated in part his previous statement, stating that it had been given under pressure, and denied any attempts to persuade people to join Hizb ut-Tahrir. He further stated that the guidelines found in his flat had been planted by the police. 18. The first applicant’s partner Ms D. denied being a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir and stated that she had not known about its being banned in Russia. 19. The trial court then questioned witnesses called by the prosecution, who confirmed the statements they had given during the investigation. 20. Finally, the trial court examined the leaflets and brochures distributed by the first applicant. 21. On 11 November 2004 the Moscow City Court found the first applicant guilty of aiding and abetting terrorism, founding a criminal organisation and using forged documents (Article 205.1 § 1, Article 210 § 1 and Article 327 § 3 of the Criminal Code). Referring to the witness testimony, the first applicant’s statements to the investigator and documentary evidence, the court found it established that the first applicant, being a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir, had founded a local section of that organisation and, in the period from 1999 to February 2004, had recruited new members and distributed the organisation’s literature. The court analysed the contents of the leaflets and brochures distributed by the first applicant and found that they proclaimed the superiority of Islam over other religions and political ideologies, such as communism and capitalism, and advocated intolerance towards non-Muslims. They also rejected democratic principles as incompatible with the rules of sharia. They declared war on governments which were not based on Islam and called for their overthrow, including by violent methods. They urged members of Hizb ut-Tahrir to take part in the sacred war (jihad). By stating that jihad was not a defensive war but a struggle to expand the Islamic State, which had to be carried out even if the “unfaithful” did not attack Muslims, the documents in question openly advocated and glorified warfare in the name of Allah. They also stated that such countries as the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France and Russia were enemy States and that war had to be declared against any State that occupied Muslim lands. Citizens of the above enemy States should not be allowed to enter Muslim states and it should be permitted to kill them and take their property if they were not Muslims. Referring to the contents of the above-mentioned leaflets and brochures, the contents of the guidelines on the use of weapons, explosives and poisons found in the first applicant’s flat and the Supreme Court’s decision of 14 February 2003, the court concluded that the local section of Hizb ut-Tahrir founded by the first applicant was a terrorist organisation. The court also found it established that the first applicant had known about the Supreme Court’s decision of 14 February 2003. His actions had therefore amounted to incitement to participate in the activities of a terrorist organisation, punishable under Article 205.1 of the Criminal Code, and to founding of a criminal organisation, punishable under Article 210 of the Code. 22. The court sentenced the first applicant to eight years’ imprisonment. 23. In his submissions on appeal the first applicant stated that he had never called for or resorted to violence. Nor had he been involved in any terrorist activities. His conviction for spreading Islamic ideology had breached his right to freedom of speech and opinion. He also argued that the trial court had incorrectly interpreted the religious terminology contained in Hizb ut-Tahrir’s literature. Given that the trial judge did not have sufficient knowledge of religious matters, an expert opinion should have been ordered. Finally, the first applicant submitted that he had had no knowledge of the decision of the Supreme Court banning Hizb ut-Tahrir as that decision had never been officially published. 24. On 13 January 2005 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the conviction on appeal. 25. On 2 May 2007 the Udorskiy District Court of the Komy Republic decided to bring the applicant’s sentence into conformity with the recent amendments to Article 205.1 of the Criminal Code. It found that incitement to participate in the activities of a terrorist organisation was no longer classified as adding or abetting terrorism in the new version of Article 205.1 (see paragraph 55 below). The court therefore decided to set aside the conviction under Article 205.1 and reduce the first applicant’s sentence to seven years and four months’ imprisonment. On 3 July 2007 the Supreme Court of the Komy Republic upheld that decision on appeal. 26. On 10 June 2011 the first applicant finished serving his sentence. He is now facing extradition proceedings to Uzbekistan, where criminal proceedings are pending against him in relation to his membership of Hizb ut-Tahrir. On 14 December 2012 he disappeared from Moscow and his current whereabouts are unknown. 27. On 18 June 2004 criminal proceedings were instituted against the second applicant and eight other persons by the Tyumen regional prosecutor’s office. They were accused of being members of Hizb ut-Tahrir and charged with aiding and abetting terrorism, an offence under Article 205.1 § 1 of the Criminal Code, and founding and membership of an extremist organisation, an offence under Article 282.2 §§ 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code. 28. When questioned by the investigator, the second applicant admitted to being a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir and, since the beginning of 2003, the leader of its local sections in Tyumen and Tobolsk. Their aim was to establish the Caliphate in the Middle East. He had learned that the organisation had been banned in Russia in the course of his interview with the police in the autumn of 2003. The meetings of the local sections had all been held in secret. He had chaired the meetings, had admitted new members, had distributed Hizb ut-Tahrir’s literature and had explained its ideology. He had also been responsible for maintaining contacts with the Moscow section of Hizb ut-Tahrir. 29. His co-defendants gave similar evidence. They confirmed the second applicant’s leadership position and his regular contact with other local sections of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Russia. During their regular and secret meetings they had read Hizb ut-Tahrir’s literature and discussed its aims, among which had been recruitment of new members and dissemination of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s ideology among the population through media publications and distribution of leaflets. The issues they had discussed during the meetings were often political rather than religious. Members of the organisation had to give an oath, pay contributions and obey orders by the leaders. They considered themselves part of the international organisation Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami. Some of them stated that they knew that the organisation had been banned in Russia. 30. The investigator also obtained statements from several witnesses. The witnesses stated that the defendants had attempted to persuade them to become members of Hizb ut-Tahrir and had supplied them with the organisation’s literature. 31. The defendants’ flats were searched and multiple copies of Hizb ut‑Tahrir’s literature and leaflets were found there. Some of those leaflets criticised the authorities’ decision to ban Hizb ut-Tahrir and the ensuing arrests and criminal proceedings against its members. It was also discovered that documents containing Hizb ut-Tahrir’s texts and information about its activities were stored on the hard disk of the second applicant’s computer and several floppy disks. 32. In June 2005 the case was sent for trial before the Tobolsk Town Court of the Tyumen Region. All defendants, including the second applicant, repudiated their previous statements, stating that they had been given under duress, and pleaded not guilty. 33. They admitted to being followers of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s ideology but denied being members of the organisation. They had gathered regularly and openly to read Islamic texts and discuss religious issues. All the texts had been printed out from the Internet and none of them had been banned or recognised as extremist. They had never planned or participated in any terrorist activities, nor had they incited others to commit terrorist acts. They were opposed to violence and strived to achieve their aim, namely establishment of the Caliphate, through ideological and political struggle. 34. The trial court then questioned witnesses called by the prosecution. Some of them confirmed the evidence they had given during the investigation, while the others repudiated their previous statements. 35. The court also listened to audio recordings and watched video recordings of the defendants’ meetings. During the meetings the defendants discussed the ideology and aims of Hizb ut-Tahrir, its structure and the methods employed by it. The second applicant and his assistant had been the principal spokesmen. They had instructed the others that orders should be immediately obeyed and had warned that those who refused to obey would be punished. They had also explained that the local section’s main activities were to be proselytism, involvement of new members and establishment of contacts with high-ranking State officials. During one of the meetings the defendants had discussed the possibility of obtaining arms and explosives and committing terrorist acts. During another meeting the second applicant’s assistant had stated the following: “‘I am astonished why you have Jews here, why you have so many of them accumulated?’ ‘We have overseers in two towns, I mean our supporters. The criminal world supports us. Hizb supports us. In our town the [criminals] support us.’ ‘You should have hate, fury... You should be a wolf, you should attack. You should not be afraid of burying someone in asphalt, when someone is assaulted you should join in, you should make a contribution to violence. You should be like that. Jews are foul people, they act in an underhand way. They will not carry out an attack themselves, they will hire someone. They are sly and rich, they control the town thanks to their money.’” 36. The court further examined the contents of the Internet site maintained by Hizb ut-Tahrir and the literature found in the defendants’ flats. 37. Finally, the court examined expert reports submitted by the prosecutor. A panel composed of experts in religious, political and linguistic matters examined the literature found during the search of the defendants’ flats and the audio and video recordings. The experts concluded that the documents and recordings contained religious and political propaganda on behalf of Hizb ut-Tahrir. Some of them contained radical fundamentalist statements accepting and advocating the use of violence and armed struggle in the form of jihad. Therefore, there were reasons to consider that Hizb ut‑Tahrir’s literature was extremist in nature and that its dissemination amounted to pro-terrorism propaganda. The documents under examination advocated the idea that all existing States and governments were illegitimate as they were not based on Islam and called for their overthrow, including by violent methods, for the universal Islamisation of mankind and for the establishment of a “Worldwide Islamic Caliphate”; in other words, they called for a coup d’état and the forcible taking over of the government in all countries. The experts noted that although the documents did not indicate clearly the methods by which the organisation’s aims were to be achieved and did not openly call for the commission of terrorist acts, they unambiguously rejected any possibility of the organisation’s participation in the democratic political process. It followed, in the experts’ opinion, that its aim of taking over governments could only be achieved through the use of violence. The documents also contained ideas promoting the superiority of Muslims over adherents of other religions and consistent calls for confrontation between Islamic fundamentalists and all others. They were capable of creating hostility and disunity in society. Finally, the linguistic experts found that the documents under examination were highly manipulative and capable of influencing the mind and the will of the reader. They employed professional manipulation techniques. Thus, they twisted the meanings of some words, for example interpreting “terrorism” as acts of violence against Muslims only, while the same acts against adherents of other religions were described as sacred war against non-believers (jihad). 38. The trial court questioned one of the experts, who confirmed his findings. He added that Hizb ut-Tahrir was an extremist organisation that was intolerant towards other religions. It called for violence against non-believers, which might be interpreted as incitement to terrorism. 39. The experts called by the defence disputed the above findings. One of the experts, a co-president of the Council of Muftis of Russia, stated to the court that Hizb ut-Tahrir was not a terrorist organisation and was not involved in the commission of any terrorist acts. Its ideology was utopian and unrealistic. Its main activity was Islamic proselytism. According to its texts, the Caliphate was to be established by peaceful methods. Another expert also testified that the members of Hizb ut-Tahrir were not violent and did not present any danger to national security. 40. On 3 October 2005 the Tobolsk Town Court found the second applicant and his co-defendants guilty as charged. Referring to the witness testimony, the defendants’ statements to the investigator, the audio and video recordings of the defendants’ meetings and the expert opinions, the court found it established that since the beginning of 2003 the defendants had been members of Hizb ut-Tahrir. That organisation had been declared to be a terrorist and extremist organisation and banned by the Supreme Court. Given that the Supreme Court’s decision had been duly published, that the second applicant had been informed about its contents in December 2003 in the course of his interview with the police in connection with a similar criminal case and that leaflets criticising that decision and the ensuing arrests and criminal proceedings against members of Hizb ut-Tahrir had been found in the defendants’ flats, the Town Court found it established that the defendants knew about the Supreme Court’s decision banning Hizb ut‑Tahrir. Despite that fact, they had not stopped their activities as members of Hizb ut-Tahrir and had continued to hold secret meetings, recruit new members and distribute the organisation’s literature. The documents distributed by the defendants were extremist as they advocated violence, rejected the rule of law and encouraged hatred towards adherents of other religions. Their actions had therefore amounted to founding and membership of a banned extremist organisation, punishable under Article 282.2 of the Criminal Code, and to incitement to participate in the activities of a terrorist organisation, punishable under Article 205.1 of the Code. 41. The court sentenced the second applicant to five years and six months’ imprisonment for the offence under Article 205.1 and to two years’ imprisonment for the offence under Article 282.2. The aggregate sentence was fixed at six years’ imprisonment. 42. In his submissions on appeal the second applicant stated that he had never committed any terrorist acts or been involved in any terrorist activities. He and his co-defendants had gathered to read Islamic literature and to discuss religious issues. His conviction had therefore violated his rights under Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the Convention. 43. On 12 January 2006 the Tyumen Regional Court upheld the conviction on appeal. 44. Information on the nature and activities of Hizb ut-Tahrir is scarce and contradictory. The most comprehensive report was prepared by the International Crisis Group in 2003. The report, entitled “Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizb ut-Tahrir”, reads, as far as relevant, as follows: “Hizb ut-Tahrir is not a religious organisation, but rather a political party whose ideology is based on Islam. It aims to re-establish the historical Caliphate in order to bring together all Muslim lands under Islamic rule and establish a state capable of counterbalancing the West. It rejects contemporary efforts to establish Islamic states, asserting that Saudi Arabia and Iran do not meet the necessary criteria. According to Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Islamic state is one in which Islamic law – Sharia – is applied to all walks of life, and there is no compromise with other forms of legislation. Hizb ut-Tahrir claims to reject violence as a form of political struggle, and most of its activities are peaceful. In theory, the group rejects terrorism, considering the killing of innocents to be against Islamic law. However, behind this rhetoric, there is some ideological justification for violence in its literature, and it admits participation in a number of failed coup attempts in the Middle East. It also has contacts with some groups much less scrupulous about violence. But despite the allegations of governments, there is no proof of its involvement in terrorist activities in Central Asia or elsewhere. Government responses have been contradictory and often ineffective. In much of the Middle East, the organisation is banned from acting openly, and many of its members have been imprisoned. Central Asian governments have taken particularly harsh stances, with Uzbekistan leading the way by arresting and sentencing thousands of members to long prison terms. In some other Muslim countries, such as Indonesia, Hizb ut-Tahrir acts more or less openly, as it does in much of Western Europe ... The party’s writings elaborate three stages of political struggle, based on its interpretation of the historical mission of the Prophet Mohammed in establishing the first Islamic state: The First: The stage of culturing; this involves finding and cultivating individuals who are convinced by the thought and method of the party. This is necessary in order to formulate and establish a group capable of carrying the party’s ideas. The Second: The stage of interaction with the Ummah (wider Muslim community) in order to encourage the Ummah to work for Islam and to carry the Da’wah (message) as if it was its own, and so that it works to establish Islam in life, state and society. The Third: The stage of taking the government and implementing Islam completely and totally, and carrying its message to the world. The first stage is the most important in present party activity and one of the keys to its longevity. It is based on finding appropriate members and moulding them to its thinking... The second stage involves: ‘Collective culturing of the masses ... through organising lessons in the mosques, conferences, lectures, places of public gathering, newspapers, books and leaflets...’ Hizb ut-Tahrir is very effective at spreading its views through wide publication of books and leaflets in multiple languages and a network of well-run websites that provide access to most of the party’s literature. Through these two stages of political work, Hizb ut-Tahrir claims that it can develop mass understanding of its ideas (although not necessarily mass membership), and most importantly that it can persuade influential figures in politics, the military and elsewhere to act in accordance with its program and aims. The party actively attempts to recruit well-educated members of society, particularly those in positions that allow them to influence popular opinion. Getting from this position – wide acceptance of ideas, and some influence on those who are capable of influencing policy – to establishment of an Islamic state is the essence of the third stage of political struggle. It is this stage, the actual seizure of power, and the establishment of the Islamic state, that is most murky in the literature. In most of its writings Hizb ut-Tahrir rejects participation in parliamentary democracy, or any alliances with other political parties to gain power... There is little doubt about Hizb ut-Tahrir’s disregard for democracy. It rejects the concept as a Western, anti-Islamic invention and is not interested in acting as a party within an open political system. A recent publication claims: ‘Democracy ... is considered a kufr [unbelievers] system, it is in clear contradiction with the Qu’ran and Sunnah’ ... It is widely reported that Hizb ut-Tahrir, both in Central Asia and beyond, eschews violence to achieve its ends. Some human rights activists have argued that it is essentially a peaceful group that operates only in the realm of ideas and propaganda. It has never been proven to have been involved in any violence in Central Asia, and in its other global activities it has generally pursued its aims through peaceful propaganda. It is strongly opposed to U.S. policy in the Middle East, but does not call for terrorist actions against America. Indeed, it claims to be opposed to terrorist activity and asserts that the killing of innocent civilians is against Islamic law. Its literature is straightforward, claiming that ‘... military struggle is not the method of re-establishing the Khilafah’ ... Yet the view that Hizb ut-Tahrir is opposed to political violence per se is mistaken. The situation is much more nuanced than most researchers allow ... One scholar explains: ‘... in practical terms an-Nabhani argued that a regime could be brought down through acts of civil disobedience such as strikes, noncooperation with the authorities or demonstrations, or through a procession to the palace or presidential residence, provided that the movement enjoys exclusive control and leadership ... Alternatively, it could be toppled through a military coup executed by forces that have agreed to hand over power to the movement.’ However, Hizb ut-Tahrir argues that as a political party it does not undertake any physical or violent actions. So how can it justify involvement in a military coup? ‘Hizb ut-Tahrir itself eschews the use of force [but] ... internal sources argue that groups pledging the party their back-up can use arms ... if society stands against the regime its removal even by military force does not constitute an act of violence: this would be the case only if the party were to kill its opponents to arrive in power, for example.’ ... What this means in practice is not certain, but it could clearly be interpreted as seeking military assistance from other groups, should members be experiencing considerable harm, or in the broadest sense to establish the Caliphate. In this way, the party remains committed to its intellectual and political struggle but does not rule out seeking assistance from other groups, including some that will take military action on its behalf ... The party’s interpretation of jihad is also somewhat confused at first glance ... A member in Kazakhstan explained: ‘There are two types of jihad: the physical and the spiritual. The physical jihad will come after the establishment of the Caliphate. The spiritual is for now’ ... Although the main jihad is not expected until the Caliphate is introduced, this does not mean that Muslims should not fight defensive wars. Thus, Muslims, Hizb ut-Tahrir members included, are enjoined to fight against an invader if attacked ... There is much loose rhetoric about jihad in party leaflets, which does not always underline these distinctions. And there is clearly some potential for a defensive jihad to be interpreted in a very broad fashion. But the main thrust of Hizb ut-Tahrir thinking seems to have remained intact: the jihad will come when the Caliphate is established ... Historically, the party’s record provides no evidence of it being involved in terrorist activity against civilians, or in military actions against U.S. or Western interests. But there is good evidence of its involvement in a series of failed coups and attempts to overthrow governments in the Middle East. Some of the evidence for these incidents is disputed, but it seems clear that Hizb ut-Tahrir was involved in an attempted coup d’état in Jordan on several occasions in the late 1960s and early 1970s. It was also accused of involvement in an attack on the military academy in Egypt in 1974, interpreted by the government as preparation for a coup. Far from denying involvement, party representatives admit that, ‘It is no secret that Hizb ut-Tahrir has been involved in a number of failed coup attempts in the Middle East’ ... Thus while it seems clear that ideologically and practically Hizb ut-Tahrir cannot be classified as a terrorist group, it is willing to persuade militaries to overthrow their governments, and in certain cases be involved in such military coups itself. Should it ever come to power, its willingness to use violence as an Islamic state would be more certain: it consistently emphasises that the duty of the Islamic state is to carry out military campaigns to free Muslim lands from the rule of ‘unbelievers’ and to wage war against Israel ...” 45. The report goes on to describe the position of Hizb ut-Tahrir in western Europe: “According to the Hizb ut-Tahrir leader in Sweden, Fadi Abdullatif, the party is growing by actively recruiting second-generation Muslim immigrants ... The party’s popularity among Muslims in the West has continued to grow, providing it a strong organisational, and possibly financial, base. Germany became the first Western state to ban Hizb ut-Tahrir in January 2003, citing its anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli propaganda. However, the German authorities did not provide any evidence of links between it and terrorist groups. German security forces carried out further raids on known activists, now working illegally, in May 2003. In Denmark the party has also garnered support among immigrants. In March 2003 its leader, Fadi Abdullatif, was convicted of breaking anti-racism laws, after he handed out leaflets allegedly calling for Jews to be killed. The group claims the quotes were taken out of context. The government has apparently considered banning the party, which according to media reports has about 100 members. In the UK Hizb ut-Tahrir remains very active, particularly in London and in towns with major Muslim populations such as Birmingham, Bradford and Sheffield. It has been notably successful in recruiting students, although it has been banned from many university campuses, because of its anti-Semitism, alleged threatening behaviour towards students of other faiths, and public objections to homosexuality ...” 46. Human Rights Watch notes in its 2004 report “Creating Enemies of the State. Religious Persecution in Uzbekistan”: “Hizb ut-Tahrir renounces violence as a means to achieve reestablishment of the Caliphate. However, it does not reject the use of violence during armed conflicts already under way and in which the group regards Muslims as struggling against oppressors, such as Palestinian violence against Israeli occupation. Its literature denounces secularism and Western-style democracy. Its anti-Semitic and anti-Israel statements have led the government of Germany to ban it ... Some in the diplomatic community, in particular the U.S. government, consider Hizb ut-Tahrir to be a political organization and therefore argue that imprisoned Hizb ut-Tahrir members are not victims of religious persecution. But religion and politics are inseparable in Hizb ut-Tahrir’s ideology and activities ... Even if one accepts that there is a political component to Hizb ut-Tahrir’s ideology, methods, and goals, this does not vitiate the right of that group’s members to be protected from religion-based persecution ... Hizb ut-Tahrir’s designation as a nonviolent organization has been contested. Hizb ut-Tahrir literature does not renounce violence in armed struggles already under way –in Israel and the Occupied Territories, Chechnya, and Kashmir – in which it views Muslims as the victims of persecution. But Hizb ut-Tahrir members have consistently rejected the use of violence to achieve the aim of reestablishing the Caliphate, which they believe will only be legitimate if created the same way they believe the Prophet Muhammad created the original Caliphate, and which can occur only as a result of gradual ‘awakening’ among Muslims ...” 47. Another report on Hizb ut-Tahrir’s activities, entitled “Whether Hizb ut-Tahrir is an extremist organisation?”, was published on 20 October 2005 by SOVA Centre for Information and Analysis, a Russian non‑governmental organisation. The report states, in particular, that following the Supreme Court’s decision of 14 February 2003 banning Hizb ut-Tahrir, many of its members were charged with aiding and abetting terrorism, membership of a criminal organisation, membership of an extremist organisation or unlawful possession of arms. The first applicant was the first to be convicted at final instance. Many other convictions followed thereafter. 48. The report further states that the analysis of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s literature reveals that that organisation openly and unequivocally rejects democratic principles and political freedoms, such as freedom of religion and freedom of thought, declaring that they are contrary to Islam. Moreover, the literature declares that it is justified to use violence to fight democracy. However, it affirms that such violence will be used only after the establishment of the Caliphate and the commencement of jihad. Although there are two commonly accepted meanings of this term in Islam, Hizb ut‑Tahrir’s literature almost always means holy war when speaking of jihad. Many countries, such as Israel and the United States of America, are declared to be enemy States which should be fought against already, including by violent methods. Hizb ut-Tahrir, however, does not directly call upon its members to participate in that fight. Hizb ut-Tahrir expresses its support to Chechen separatists, even though it condemns terrorist acts against the civil population committed on Russian territory, at the same time denying the possibility of involvement of Chechen separatists in such acts. It should be also noted that Hizb ut-Tahrir does not use the term “terrorism” in its common meaning, considering any violent acts against enemy States, including those that would be normally classified as terrorist acts, to constitute part of holy war. The report cites Hizb ut-Tahrir’s document entitled “The Islamic rule on hijacking aeroplanes”, which states that it is justified to hijack civil aeroplanes of enemy States and kill their passengers because the citizens of such States and their property constitute legitimate war targets. That document was deleted from Hizb ut-Tahrir’s website several years ago, but no statements disavowing its contents have ever been made by the organisation’s leadership, which gives cause to believe that it has been deleted for the purposes of secrecy. As regards the means for the establishment of the Caliphate, Hizb ut-Tahrir’s literature is not clear on this point. It is certain that the organisation rejects the possibility of participation in parliamentary elections or any other democratic process in order to come to power. There remains the possibility of a coup d’état committed by more or less violent methods. The Caliphate must, however, first be established on traditionally Muslim territories, which do not include Russia. Accordingly, the report concludes that Hizb ut-Tahrir is not planning any coup d’état in Russia and its activities there are limited to proselytism. 49. Finally, the report notes that some of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s documents, including those that can still be found on the organisation’s Russian website, contain anti-Semitic propaganda, glorification of suicide bombers in Israel and calls for violence against Jews and for the destruction of Israel. It thus concludes that Hizb ut-Tahrir is an extremist organisation stirring anti-Semitic hatred and advocating violence. The report recommends, however, that the Supreme Court’s decision banning Hizb ut-Tahrir should be annulled and that prosecution of individuals on the mere ground of their membership of that organisation should be stopped. It considers it advisable that only those of the organisation’s members who have made statements advocating hatred or violence should face criminal or other proceedings. 50. A report entitled “Hizb ut Tahrir al Islami (Islamic Party of Liberation)”, published on 15 April 2007 by the European research project Transnational Terrorism, Security, and the Rule of Law (TTSRL), financed by the European Commission, reads as follows: “Hizb ut Tahrir al Islami (Islamic Party of Liberation) presents itself as ‘a political party whose ideology is Islam, so politics is its work and Islam is its ideology ...’ ... In their own eyes, Hizb ut Tahrir (for short) is a political group and not a priestly one ... It is a trans-national party or movement that claims to try to achieve its political goals without the use of violence and has branches in about forty countries, including both Islamic and Western countries. In the Islamic world they are, for instance, active not only in the Middle East, but also in Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the former Soviet republics in Central Asia. In almost all of these countries, Hizb ut Tahrir is perceived as a threat to the state or even as a terrorist organisation. In the Western world, Hizb ut Tahrir has a presence in, among others, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, Australia, the United States and Canada. To these countries, Hizb ut Tahrir presents a particularly difficult challenge since it holds radical Islamist views, but openly only advocates peaceful change. Nonetheless, in a number of EU member states, the party is regarded as one that secretly does support the idea of a violent jihad and/or has been involved in anti-Semitic incidents ... The organizational structure of Hizb ut Tahrir is rather complex ... The identities of Hizb ut Tahrir’s current leader and senior officers have not been mentioned in reliable open sources. Concrete issues at the level of different national branches are in the hands of national leaders, where the scope and content of the activities within the branches greatly differ. A general distinction can be made between countries in which the party is permitted to operate freely, and countries in which Hizb ut Tahrir is prosecuted. In Uzbekistan, for instance, [Hizb ut Tahrir] is organized in a secretive and hierarchical pyramid structure made up of many five-person cells whose members, after they have completed training averaging about two months, form their own groups or ‘halka’ - also of five to six members. Other sources speak of three-person cells... In EU member states, the branches of Hizb ut Tahrir are organized like most political parties and have a hierarchical structure with a national leader, local groups and the possibility of membership for anyone who supports the party’s ideas. In addition, the European branches of the party also consist of study groups, the above-mentioned ‘halkas.’... From the beginning, Hizb ut Tahrir’s leadership decreed that members should not participate in terrorist activities. This message has been continuously reverberated. There are, however, many allegations of links between the party and terrorist organisations. It should be stressed that none of these allegations are backed by concrete evidence ... There are, nonetheless, possible indirect links between Hizb ut Tahrir and terrorist groups and individuals. In Britain, three men, who in 1995 were arrested and charged with conspiring to assassinate the Israeli ambassador, were reported to have been in possession of Hizb ut Tahrir literature and to have helped organize Hizb ut Tahrir meetings in Manchester ... Another man, Muhammad Babar – who is linked to the seven men currently on trial in London on charges of planning terrorist attacks between January 2003 and April 2004 – has stated that he became a member of Hizb ut Tahrir and another radical group, Al Muhajiroun, while at the university, when he became angered by the Gulf War ... In the above mentioned cases, as well as in most cases, those behind the allegations only point at involvement in Hizb ut Tahrir activities while studying, the possession of Hizb ut Tahrir materials, and other rather indirect relations between suspects of terrorism and the party. More serious are the allegations that connect the party to the other radical group mentioned above, Al‑Muhajiroun, established in 1995 as a splinter group that broke off from Hizb ut‑Tahrir. According to leader Omar Bakri Muhammad, the two groups initially split because Hizb ut Tahrir was ‘too soft’ ... His group has been accused of recruiting young Muslims in Britain to fight abroad in places such as Kashmir, Afghanistan and Chechnya ... Despite the above-mentioned allegations, authorities in the EU have not yet formally accused Hizb ut Tahrir for having links with terrorist organisations. In addition, there are no official reports that members have joined or become involved in the global jihad movement. However, it should be noted that some counties do see the organisation as a possible or potential threat to democracy and the rule of law ... Unlike more traditional Islamic parties, Hizb ut Tahrir refuses to be involved in local politics, making it impossible for regional leaders to co-opt the group. Although Hizb ut Tahrir describes itself as a political party, it does not want to participate in elections or want to be part of coalition governments ... The process towards the utopian Islamic Caliphate is viewed more as a social or intellectual process rather than a political one. For the above-mentioned intellectual struggle and intellectual transformation, Hizb ut Tahrir focuses primarily on highly educated Muslims. The method is the so‑called Islamic da’wah through which society can be transformed into an Islamic one. Within the EU, the concrete translation of this concept is distributing leaflets at universities and near mosques, or to organise meetings on current political and social issues, such as the situation in Iraq, the cartoon issue in Denmark and Guantanamo Bay ... Although the method of da’wah seems very theoretical and impractical in relation to the stated goal, it cannot be denied that the party has managed to attract tens of thousands of Muslims in Europe who believe in its method ... As mentioned above, Hizb ut Tahrir has branches in some forty countries, in a number of which the party is considered a terrorist organisation. Within the EU, where religiously inspired political parties enjoy relatively greater freedom than they do anywhere else, only Germany has outlawed Hizb ut Tahrir ... ... [Many] questions remain open with regard to the nature of this party and its impact on society and how to deal with its spreading of anti-Semitic, anti-Western and non-democratic ideas and sentiments ... A case-study on an organisation such as Hizb ut Tahrir as part of an overall large research project on counter-terrorism might suggest prematurely that Hizb ut-Tahrir falls in the category of labelled terrorist organisations, or at least belongs to a group of organisations that pose a serious threat to our democratic society. However, such qualifications cannot be given to Hizb ut-Tahrir without serious reservations. The question can even be raised whether such qualification is fit for this organisation at all. Although, in its philosophy Hizb ut-Tahrir has anti-democratic tendencies, it also rejects the idea of violent jihad to achieve their goal of a caliphate. Most allegations on the terrorist connection of the organisation or some of its members point at rather indirect links, are not based on solid sources, or should by their numbers be assessed as mere coincidences. On the other hand, experience shows that organisations such as Hizb ut-Tahrir are ‘very smart in walking the very fine line between propaganda and incitement to terrorism’, according to Paul Wilkinson, director of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St Andrews ... However, outlawing this organisation without a proper cause might have the opposite effect. It is therefore important to monitor with prudence and to act on facts instead of allegations.” 51. Hizb ut-Tahrir’s aims and principles, as well as the details of what an Islamic state would look like, are outlined in a range of literature produced by the organisation. In particular, it has prepared a Draft Constitution which sketches the major provisions of an Islamic State (wording as in the original): 1. Basic principles and government structure Article 1 “The Islamic ‘Aqeedah [creed] constitutes the foundation of the State. Nothing is permitted to exist in the government’s structure, accountability, or any other aspect connected with the government, that does not take the ‘Aqeedah as its source. The ‘Aqeedah is also the source for the State’s constitution and Sharia canons. Nothing connected to the constitution or canons is permitted to exist unless it emanates from the Islamic ‘Aqeedah.” Article 7 “The State implements the aHkaam Sharia [divine rules] on all citizens who hold citizenship of the Islamic State, whether Muslims or not, in the following manner: a. The aHkaam Sharia is implemented in its entirety, without exception, on all Muslims. b. Non-Muslims are allowed to follow their own beliefs and worships. c. Those who are guilty of apostasy (murtadd) from Islam are to be executed according to the rule of apostasy, provided they have by themselves renounced Islam. If they are born as non-Muslims, i.e., if they are the sons of apostates, then they are treated as non-Muslims according to their status as being either polytheists (mushriks) or People of the Book. d. In matters of food and clothing the non-Muslims are treated according to their religions within the limits allowed by aHkaam Sharia. e. Marital affairs (including divorce) among non-Muslims are settled in accordance with their religions, but between non-Muslims and Muslims they are settled according to the aHkaam Sharia. f. All the remaining Sharia matters and rules, such as: the application of transactions, punishments and evidences (at court), the system of ruling and economics are implemented by the State upon everyone, Muslim and non-Muslim alike. This includes the people of treaties (mu’aahid), the protected subjects (ahludh dhimmah) and all who submit to the authority of Islam. The implementation on these people is the same as the implementation on the subjects of the State. Ambassadors and envoys enjoy diplomatic immunity.” Article 19 “No one is permitted to take charge of ruling, or any action considered to be of the nature of ruling, except a male who is free (Hurr), i.e. not a slave, mature (baaligh), sane (‘aaqil), trustworthy (‘adl), competent; and he must [be a Muslim].” Article 21 “Muslims are entitled to establish political parties to question the rulers and to access the positions of ruling through the Ummah [Muslim community] on condition that the parties are based on the ‘Aqeedah of Islam and their adopted rules are aHkaam Sharia [divine rules]; the establishment of such a party does not require a license by the State. Any party not established on the basis of Islam is prohibited.” Article 24 “The Khaleefah is deputised by the Ummah with authority to implement the Sharia.” Article 26 “Every mature male and female Muslim, who is sane, has the right to participate in the election of the Khaleefah and in giving him the pledge (ba’iah). Non-Muslims have no right in this regard.” Article 31 “There are seven conditions needed in the Khaleefah... They are to be a male, Muslim, free (Hurr), mature (baaligh), sane (‘aaqil), trustworthy (‘adl) and able (qaadir).” 52. The Draft Constitution further indicates that all highest Government officials, the chief judge and the judges of the Court of the Unjust Acts (the court which settles disputes between the citizens and the State) must be male and Muslims. Muslim women are allowed to become lower-level officials and judges (Articles 42, 49, 67, 69, 87). Non-Muslims may be appointed only to technical and administrative official positions (Article 97). 53. The Draft Constitution further continues: Article 101 “The members of the Majlis al-Ummah [people’s assembly] are those people who represent the Muslims in respect of expressing their views to the Khaleefah when consulted. Non-Muslims are allowed to be members of the Majlis al-Ummah so that they can voice their complaints in respect to unjust acts performed by the rulers or the misapplication of the Islamic laws.” Article 102 “The members of the Majlis al-Ummah are elected by the people.” Article 104 “Consultation (Shoora) and the mashoora are the seeking of views in absolute terms. These views are not binding in legislation, definitions, intellectual matters such as discovering the facts and the technical and scientific matters. However they are binding when the Khaleefah consults in other practical matters and actions that do not need scrutiny or research.” Article 105 “All citizens, Muslim or not, may express their views, but Shoora is a right for the Muslims only.” 2. Jihad and the army Article 56 “Jihad is a compulsory duty (farD) on all Muslims. Military training is therefore compulsory. Thus, every male Muslim, fifteen years and over, is obliged to undergo military training in readiness for jihad...” 3. Legal status of women Article 109 “Segregation of the sexes is fundamental, they should not meet together except for a need that the Sharia allows or for a purpose the Sharia allows men and women to meet for, such as trading or pilgrimage (Hajj).” Article 110 “Women have the same rights and obligations as men, except for those specified by the Sharia evidences to be for him or her. Thus, she has the right to practice in trading, farming, and industry; to partake in contracts and transactions; to possess all form of property; to invest her funds by herself (or by others); and to conduct all of life’s affairs by her.” Article 111 “A woman can participate in elections ... and elect, and be a member of the Majlis al-Ummah, and can be appointed as an official of the State in a non-ruling position.” Article 113 “Women live within a public and private life. Within their public life, they are allowed to live with other women, maHram males [males forbidden to them in marriage] and foreign men (whom they can marry) on condition that nothing of the women’s body is revealed, apart from her face and hands, and that the clothing is not revealing nor her charms displayed. Within the private life she is not allowed to live except with women or her maHram males and she is not allowed to live together with foreign men. In both cases she has to restrict herself with the rules of Sharia.” Article 118 “The custody of children is both a right and duty of the mother, whether Muslim or not, so long as the child is in need of this care. When children, girls or boys, are no longer in need of care, they are to choose which parent they wish to live with, whether the child is male or female. If only one of the parents is Muslim, there is no choice for the child is to join the Muslim parent.” 4. Taxes Article 139 “Zakaah [property tax] is collected from Muslims on their properties...” Article 140 “Jizyah (head-tax) is collected from the non-Muslims (dhimmis). It is to be taken from the mature men if they are financially capable of paying it. It is not taken from women or children.” 5. Education Article 165 “The Islamic creed constitutes the basis upon which the education policy is built. The syllabi and methods of teaching are designed to prevent a departure from this basis.” Article 166 “The purpose of education is to form the Islamic personality in thought and behaviour. Therefore, all subjects in the curriculum must be chosen on this basis.” Article 170 “Arts and crafts may be related to science, such as commerce, navigation and agriculture. In such cases, they are studied without restriction or conditions. Sometimes, however, arts and crafts are connected to culture and influenced by a particular viewpoint of life, such as painting and sculpting. If this viewpoint of life contradicts the Islamic viewpoint of life, these arts and crafts are not taken.” Article 172 “The state’s curriculum is only one, and no curriculum other than that of the state is allowed to be taught. Private schools provided they are not foreign, are allowed as long as they adopt the state’s curriculum and establish themselves on the State’s educational policy and accomplish the goal of education set by the State. Teaching in such schools should not be mixed between males and females, whether the students or the teachers; and they should not be specific for certain deen [religion], madhab [schools of Muslim law], race or colour.” 6. Relations with other States Article 177 “It is absolutely forbidden for any individual, party, group or association to have relations with a foreign state...” Article 184 “The state’s relations with other states are built upon four considerations. These are: ... 3. States with whom we do not have treaties, the actual imperialist states, like Britain, America and France and those states that have designs on the State, like Russia, are considered to be potentially belligerent states. All precautions must be taken towards them and it would be wrong to establish diplomatic relations with them. Their subjects may enter the Islamic State only with a passport and a visa specific to every individual and for every visit, unless it became a real belligerent country. 4. With states that are actually belligerent states, like Israel, a state of war must be taken as the basis for all measures and dealings with them. They must be dealt with as if a real war existed between us – whether an armistice exists or not – and all their subjects are prevented from entering the State.” Article 186 “The State is forbidden to belong to any organisation that is based on something other than Islam or which applies non-Islamic rules. This includes international organisations like the United Nations, the International Court of Justice, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and regional organisations like the Arab League.”

7. Between 4 July 1998 and 1 April 1999 a series of robberies and burglaries took place in the Coventry area. As a result of their investigations, the police considered that there were some nine persons involved in the commission of these offences, including the applicant and his three co-defendants. The police had difficulty obtaining evidence against those who they thought were responsible, and therefore decided to seek authority from the Chief Constable for the West Midlands to carry out a covert operation (“Operation Brassica”). The operation was to be carried out by arresting the suspects in groups, on suspicion of having committed different offences, and detaining them together in a police cell which had been specially fitted with covert audio equipment. It was hoped that the suspects would discuss the reasons for their arrest and that their ensuing conversation would be incriminating. On 17 May 1999 the Chief Constable gave authority for Operation Brassica to take place. 8. The applicant and two others were arrested on 20 May 1999. Their conversations whilst in police detention were recorded on 21 and 22 May 1999. Further covert recordings took place on 16 and 17 June 1999. The tapes formed the basis of the prosecution against the applicant. 9. The trial judge held a “voir dire” on the admissibility of the tapes. Counsel for the applicant argued that the methods of obtaining the evidence violated Articles 5, 6 and 8 of the Convention, and that they should therefore be excluded under section 78 or section 76 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE). The tapes were ruled admissible on 13 March 2000. During the course of his ruling, the trial judge rejected the defendants' argument that the circumstances of obtaining the evidence were oppressive and the tapes should therefore be excluded under section 76 of PACE. In considering section 78 of the Act, the trial judge said: “I find that no mala fides exist in this case and that the Chief Constable acted throughout in good faith. Although I find the decision of the Chief Constable was not in accordance with a strict interpretation of the guidelines [Home Office Guidelines on the Use of Police Surveillance Equipment], it does not mean that his authority to use a bugging device or devices is no longer of importance. Of course it is. It is a very important factor which I have to take into account in deciding to exercise my discretion under section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act.” 10. He went on to consider the points raised under the Convention, saying: “There is no doubt that when the defendants were arrested the main plan was that the covert operation would be put into effect, and to do this all the defendants involved should be in the cells at the same time. However, the matter has to be taken in stages and then considered jointly. Firstly, did the police have power to arrest and was the arrest lawful? The evidence before me was that the police had information that the accused had committed some or other of the crimes which they were investigating. They not only had the right but the duty, in my judgment, to arrest and investigate the further evidence ... As I have indicated already, the police clearly hoped that the covert bugging operation would bear fruit and if it did not the relevant defendant would have to be released. They were not arresting to create evidence but in the hope that evidence would be forthcoming. The wording of Article 5(1)(c) does not readily read with the English system and was clearly designed for taking an accused before a magistrate for investigation. But it obviously is intended to be adjusted to the specific system of member states. I find that there is no breach of Article 5.” [6G-7D] 11. On the question of Article 6, the trial judge said: “It has to be borne in mind but requires no specific findings from me at this stage.” [7E] 12. In considering Article 8, he said: “A man in a police cell is entitled to privacy just as much as a man sitting at his fireside in his own home. In fact it may be argued that his right should be greater. He is after all innocent until proved guilty and he is in a vulnerable situation. Any bugging of his cell to intrude on his private conversation with another person would, prima facie, amount to an invasion of his privacy and as such a breach of Article 8.1. However, it can perhaps be argued that whilst he is in a cell he not only does not have to say anything but if in fact he is free of guilt there is nothing that he can say. If, on the other hand, he is guilty then he does not deserve the same right of privacy as anyone else. The weight of his loss of privacy is another matter which I may take into account. ... the main point which I have to decide is as to whether or not the intrusion to privacy was 'in accordance with the law'. There is no statute which provides for lawful bugging of police cells nor to prohibit such an action. There are however numerous cases where it has been considered and adopted. In fairness, if bugging is done it should not be done haphazardly and certainly does not bestow on police officers unfettered power. It is to this end that, in 1984, the Home Office issued the Guidelines for the Use of Police Surveillance Equipment. As I have already said, these are merely guidelines, they are certainly not statutes. The actions of the police and the decision of the Chief Constable have to be considered together with all the other matters which have to be taken into consideration. On the basis of all those matters, I have to consider in which way I should exercise my discretion under section 78.” [7G-9A] 13. Applicant's counsel suggested five safeguards that should have been afforded to the accused if the bugging was to be lawful. The trial judge said: “I have considered each one of these matters and have rejected them all. If they were to be required in each case, no covert listening would ever be realistic or possible. As I have indicated already, such evidence can in serious cases such as this be very important and is, in my judgment, not objectionable. [9F] In the exercise of my discretion under section 78, I will allow the tapes to be used in evidence.” 14. None of the defendants gave evidence at trial. 15. The applicant together with three others was convicted on 20 July 2000 of various robbery and firearms offences. He was sentenced to a total of 8 years' imprisonment. 16. The applicant and his three co-defendants appealed to the Court of Appeal, submitting, inter alia, that the tapes should not have been admitted in evidence. 17. Lord Woolf CJ gave the judgment of the Court of Appeal on 13 February 2002, dismissing the appeal. As regards the admissibility of the tapes in evidence, the Court of Appeal considered the alleged violations of the Convention. It decided that there had been a violation of Article 8 because the surveillance was not conducted according to law. Lord Woolf CJ said: “This is because of the lack of any legal structure to which the public have access authorising the infringement. If there had been such authorisation there would have been no breach.” [§ 65] He went on to say: “The non-compliance with Article 8 does not, however, mean that the tape-recordings cannot be relied upon as evidence. ... It is the responsibility of the Government to provide remedies against this violation of Article 8. However, the remedy does not have to be the exclusion of the evidence. The remedy can be the finding, which we have now made, that there has been a breach of Article 8 or it can be an award of compensation. The European Court of Human Rights recognises that to insist on the exclusion of evidence could in itself result in a greater injustice to the public than the infringement of Article 8 creates for the appellants. The infringement is, however, a matter which the trial judge was required to take into account when exercising his discretion under section 78 of PACE.” [§§ 66-67] 18. As regards Article 5 of the Convention, the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant's argument on the basis that the arrests were for a lawful purpose as well as to enable the surveillance to take place, and the appellants were not therefore unlawfully deprived of their liberty. Lord Woolf CJ said: “The fact that the police were operating in accordance with a strategy designed to obtain additional evidence by covert recording does not turn lawful arrests into unlawful arrests.” [§ 68] 19. The argument that the admission of the tapes in evidence prevented the defendants from receiving a fair trial was also rejected. Lord Woolf CJ said: “51. The complaints of the appellants with regard to the decision of the judge are not to the relevance of the contents of the tape. They were clearly highly relevant. Instead it is argued that the way the evidence was obtained was contrary to PACE. The submission is not so much based on a contravention of the language of PACE. The allegation is that the surveillance took place contrary to the spirit of the relevant Codes of Practice ... 52. ... On the evidence there were proper grounds for the arrests and ignoring the fact that the police were working to an overall plan, there was nothing improper about the purpose for which the arrests took place. 53. .... As already indicated it was not suggested that the Chief Constable gave his authority other than in good faith. In addition whether or not the Guidelines applied to what happened in the police cells, the police considered that they were appropriately applying the Guidelines and entitled to act as they did. ... 54. Here the trial judge came to the conclusion that the Guidelines had not been complied with ... because of the requirement in the Guidelines for normal methods of investigation to have been tried and failed or be unlikely to succeed if tried ... 55. In coming to this conclusion, the trial judge may have been unduly rigorous in his approach because the object of the exercise was not to obtain evidence against one or other of the suspects in relation to a particular offence but to obtain the evidence which would enable the police to bring to justice those who were involved in the conspiracy to carry out numerous robberies in the Coventry area. Viewed in this way, it was Sergeant Fairfield's evidence that 'other policing means had failed.' ... ... 58. We are far from satisfied that when the Guidelines were formulated, they were intended to apply to surveillance of the sort that took place here of those in custody in police cells. However, even if the Guidelines were not intended to apply to suspects already in custody, as there was no alternative guidance published, we consider that it was reasonable for the Chief Constable to apply the Guidelines by analogy, unless they conflicted with PACE. ... This was a situation where the police were responding reasonably and proportionately to a very serious threat to the safety of the public and law and order and so were entitled to seek evidence not only of individual wrongdoing but of a conspiracy to commit armed robbery. ... 59. More difficult is the issue whether the surveillance in cells is inappropriate treatment of those in police custody who are intended to be protected by the safeguards contained in PACE and the Codes. ... the surveillance is not directly in conflict with any provision of PACE or the Codes ... 60. We have no doubt that it is highly desirable that a statutory code should be established for the surveillance of the sort that occurred here ... but our conclusion is that it is not contrary to the spirit of PACE or the Codes for there to be covert taping of what is said in the cells.” 20. Lord Woolf CJ went on to adopt the conclusions reached in other cases that there was no unfairness in admitting such taped evidence where there was no suggestion that the confessions were oppressively obtained or other than wholly reliable. As regarded the complaints under the Convention, he observed: “Article 6 for the purposes of the present case does not add anything to section 78. If there was no unfairness caused by the tapes being relied upon in evidence then there is no breach of Article 6.” [§ 69] 21. The Court of Appeal certified a question for consideration by the House of Lords concerning use of evidence obtained by an arrest for the purpose of eavesdropping on the defendant. 22. On 30 May 2002, leave to appeal to the House of Lords was refused.

5. The applicants, a daughter (the first applicant) and a mother (the second applicant), were born in 1993 and 1967, respectively, and live in Niš. 6. On 6 May 2003 M.D., the first applicant's father, filed a claim with the Municipal Court (Opštinski sud) in Niš, seeking the dissolution of his marriage to the second applicant. 7. On 12 February 2004 the applicants jointly filed a counterclaim (protvtužba), requesting that M.D. be ordered to pay monthly child maintenance to the first applicant. 8. On 18 January 2005 the Municipal Court: dissolved the marriage; awarded custody of the first applicant to the second applicant; regulated M.D.'s access rights; ordered him to pay monthly child maintenance; and decided that each party should bear its own costs. 9. Due to the Municipal Court's failure to properly serve this judgment on the applicants, the latter, who had clearly continued living at the same address, only managed to file an appeal against it on 27 April 2007. 10. On 18 September 2007 the District Court (Okružni sud) in Niš quashed the Municipal Court's judgment in so far as it concerned the maintenance sought and ordered a retrial. 11. Having held four separate hearings, on 26 December 2007 the Municipal Court ruled partly in favour of the applicants. In so doing, it ordered M.D. to pay monthly child maintenance, as well as the costs incurred by the applicants. 12. On 26 February 2008 this judgment was upheld by the District Court on appeal.

4. The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Warsaw. 5. The applicant’s family owned a plot of land with a surface area of 1,454 sq. m. situated in the centre of Warsaw, at the junction of Jerusalem Avenue and Marszałkowska Street. The applicant is one of the heirs of the owners of that property. 6. By virtue of the Decree of 26 October 1945 on the Ownership and Use of Land in Warsaw (“the 1945 Decree”) the ownership of all private land was transferred to the City of Warsaw. 7. On 30 September 1948 the applicant’s family filed an application for the grant of the right of temporary ownership (własność czasowa) of the plot of land pursuant to section 7 of the 1945 Decree (“the 1948 application”). On 14 September 1953 the Board of the Warsaw National Council (Prezydium Rady Narodowej) refused the application and ruled that, consequently, the ownership of all the buildings located on the plot of land at issue be transferred to the State. On 25 January 1954 the Minister of Municipal Administration (Minister Gospodarki Komunalnej) upheld that decision. 8. In the meantime, the Law of 20 March 1950 on the Local State Administration entered into force on 13 April 1950. According to section 32 § 2 of that Law, the ownership of all property previously held by the local governments was transferred to the State. 9. In 1955 the State constructed the Metropol Hotel on the part of the plot which was formerly owned by the applicant’s family. 10. On an unspecified date the plot of land formerly owned by the applicant’s family was divided into two separate parts. 11. Following the re-establishment of the local government in Poland, on 27 May 1990 the ownership of the first part of the original plot of land was transferred to the City of Warsaw by operation of the law. That part, with a surface area of 818 sq. m., constituted a part of a larger plot no. 39 with a surface area of 4,163 sq. m. The second part of the plot with a surface area of 636 sq. m remained with the State and was administered by the Warsaw District Office (Starostwo Powiatu Warszawskiego). 12. It appears that in July 2002, subsequent to the entry into force of the Law of 15 March 2002 on the status of the Capital City of Warsaw, the ownership of the second part of the original plot was transferred to the City of Warsaw. 13. On 29 June 1993 the Board of the Union of Warsaw Municipalities (Zarząd Związku Dzielnic Gmin Warszawy) issued a decision declaring that as of 5 December 1990 the “Syrena” Warsaw Tourist Company was granted the right of perpetual use of the plot of land no. 39 with a surface area of 4163 sq. m located at no. 45 Jerusalem Avenue. On the strength of the same decision the ownership of the buildings attached to that plot, including the Metropol Hotel, was transferred to the “Syrena” company against the payment of a fee. On the relevant date the company was owned by the City of Warsaw. 14. On 1 October 1992 S.P., another heir of the applicant’s family and acting on their behalf, filed with the Minister of Planning and Construction (Minister Gospodarki Przestrzennej i Budownictwa) an application for annulment of the administrative decisions refusing the grant of temporary ownership. On 24 March 1993 the Minister quashed the decisions of the Board of the Warsaw National Council of 14 September 1953 and the Minister of Municipal Administration of 25 January 1954. Consequently, the competent administrative authorities were required to rule on the 1948 application for the grant of the right of perpetual use, which replaced the former temporary ownership. The applicant and other heirs of the previous owners were, as their legal successors, the parties to the subsequent proceedings. 15. Following the above decision, on 14 July 1994 the Minister of Planning and Construction awarded the applicant and other heirs compensation in the amount of PLZ 12,764,569,000. It appears that that decision has not been enforced. 16. On 29 April 1995 the Minister of Planning and Construction instituted ex officio proceedings with a view to having his earlier decision of 24 March 1993 annulled. On 9 July 1996 the Minister declared the decision of 24 March 1993 null and void. On 20 July 1996 the applicant and S.P. made an application to the President of the Office for Housing and Urban Development (Prezes Urzędu Mieszkalnictwa i Rozwoju Miast) for reconsideration (wniosek o ponowne rozpatrzenie sprawy) of the decision of 9 July 1996. On 28 February 1997 the President of that Office upheld the decision of 9 July 1996. The applicant appealed against that decision and the earlier decisions of the Minister of Planning and Construction to the Supreme Administrative Court (Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny). On 15 May 1997 the Supreme Administrative Court ordered that the enforcement of the decision of 28 February 1997 be stayed. 17. On 11 December 1998 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed both contested decisions, considering that there were no grounds on which to hold that the decision of 24 March 1993 could be declared null and void. As a consequence of that judgment, the 1948 application for the grant of the right of perpetual use filed by the applicant’s family had yet to be examined. 18. Initially, the applicant was a party to two sets of proceedings concerning the grant of the right of perpetual use of land which were conducted separately before the Board of the City of Warsaw (subsequently the Mayor of Warsaw) and the Warsaw District Office. That situation stemmed from the fact that the plot of land formerly owned by the applicant’s family had been divided into two separate parts which were respectively owned by the City of Warsaw and the State. As from July 2002, following amendments to the relevant laws, the City of Warsaw became the sole owner of the entire plot of land in question and the relevant proceedings were conducted exclusively before the Mayor of Warsaw. 19. On 11 June 1996 the Board of the City of Warsaw (Zarząd Miasta Stołecznego Warszawy) decided ex officio to stay the proceedings until the termination of the proceedings instituted by the Minister of Planning and Construction in 1995 (see paragraphs 16-17 above). The applicant appealed against that decision. On 29 August 1996 the Warsaw Local Government Board of Appeal (Samorządowe Kolegium Odwoławcze) quashed the decision of 11 June 1996. 20. On 19 August 1997 the applicant wrote a letter to the Board of the City of Warsaw, inquiring about the progress in the proceedings following the decision of the Board of Appeal of 29 August 1996. He demanded an explanation about the delays in the proceedings. 21. On 12 November 1997 the Board of the City of Warsaw decided to discontinue the proceedings, considering that they had become devoid of purpose. It observed that the 1948 application for the grant of the right of perpetual use had been already dismissed, and that the application for the annulment of the latter decision had failed. The applicant appealed against that decision. 22. On 24 March 1998 the Local Government Board of Appeal quashed the impugned decision and remitted the case for re-examination. 23. On 19 June 1998 the applicant filed with the Board of Appeal a complaint about the inactivity of the Board of the City of Warsaw. 24. On 14 July 1998 the Board of the City of Warsaw stayed the proceedings pending the termination of the proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court concerning an appeal against the decision of the President of the Office for Housing and Urban Development of 28 February 1997. 25. On 13 August 1998 the Warsaw Local Government Board of Appeal ordered the Board of the City of Warsaw to issue a decision in the case by 30 September 1998. 26. On 16 January 1999, following the Supreme Administrative Court’s judgment of 11 December 1998, the applicant requested the Mayor of Warsaw to grant him the right of perpetual use. 27. In January 1999 the Mayor of Warsaw began negotiations with the applicant and other heirs of the former owners with a view to renouncing their claims to the plot of land at issue in exchange for an alternative plot. On 23 March 1999 the applicant and other heirs accepted the Mayor’s proposal. However, on 29 April 1999 the Deputy Mayor informed them that he had to withdraw from the negotiations as there were grounds on which the 1948 application could be dismissed. 28. On 1 June 1999 the Board of the City of Warsaw refused the application. It observed that the plot of land of specific surface and shape, which had been the subject of the application, was not in existence at the time of the issuing of the present decision. Moreover, it noted that on part of the plot of land formerly owned by the applicant’s family, the State had constructed the Metropol Hotel. Thus, it considered that it was not possible to delimit the plot of land which was the subject of the application. In addition, the Board of the City of Warsaw noted that the “Syrena” company had been granted the right of perpetual use of the plot of land which partly overlapped with the plot of land at issue by virtue of a decision of 29 June 1993. 29. On 21 June 1999 S.P., one of the heirs of the applicant’s family, lodged an appeal against the decision of the Board of the City of Warsaw. 30. On 10 February 2000 S.P. lodged with the Supreme Administrative Court a complaint about the inactivity of the Warsaw Local Government Board of Appeal. 31. On 1 June 2000 the Warsaw Local Government Board of Appeal upheld the Board of the City of Warsaw’s decision of 1 June 1999. 32. On 30 June 2000 S.P. lodged an appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court against that decision. 33. On 15 September 2000 the Supreme Administrative Court discontinued the proceedings on the complaint about the inactivity of the Warsaw Local Government Board of Appeal, given that the latter authority had issued its decision on 1 June 2000. 34. On 27 February 2002 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the Board of Appeal’s decision of 1 June 2000 and the earlier decision of the Board of the City of Warsaw. It considered that section 7 of the 1945 Decree laid down two requirements which had to be met in order to grant the right of perpetual use of land, i.e. the filing of the application in time and the compatibility of the intended use of the land with the local development plan. The Supreme Administrative Court observed that the relevant application had been lodged in time. However, the administrative authorities had not at all examined the second requirement laid down in the 1945 Decree, but had instead based their decisions on grounds which were not provided in the relevant law. Lastly, the Supreme Administrative Court instructed the administrative authorities to examine the heirs’ intentions as to the use of the land at issue. It further emphasised that if the intended use was compatible with the local development plan, the administrative authorities were under an obligation to grant the application. 35. It appears that in July 2002, subsequent to the entry into force of the Law of 15 March 2002 on the status of the Capital City of Warsaw, the ownership of the second part of the plot formerly owned by the applicant’s family was transferred to the City of Warsaw. Consequently, the proceedings concerning the grant of the right of perpetual use in respect of the entire property of the applicant’s family were conducted before the Mayor of Warsaw. 36. On 13 August 2002 the Board of the City of Warsaw informed the applicant and other heirs that due to the complex nature of the case a decision would be issued by 30 November 2002. 37. On 25 April 2003 the applicant lodged with the Warsaw Local Government Board of Appeal a complaint about the inactivity of the Board of the City of Warsaw. 38. On 30 May 2003 the applicant informed the Board that he intended to use the plot of land at issue in accordance with the local development plan. 39. On 9 December 2003 the Mayor of Warsaw, who in the meantime had assumed the competences of the Board of the City of Warsaw, issued his decision in the case. He refused the application, considering that the use of the plot by the heirs of the former owners would not be compatible with the local development plan adopted on 9 February 1993. In particular, the Mayor found that one part of the plot at issue was designated partly for walkways and green areas, and partly for the junction of Jerusalem Avenue and Marszałkowska Street which was an important area for public transport in the whole city centre. In respect of the other part of the plot at issue, the Mayor considered that the Metropol Hotel stood on it and that it was not feasible to detach from the existing larger plot a part which was owned by the applicant’s family. He also had regard to section 31 of the Land Administration Act (ustawa o gospodarce nieruchomościami) which provided that in the case of a plot of land with a building situated on it, the grant of the right of perpetual use of the plot was to be effected with the simultaneous acquisition of the buildings located on the plot. However, the building of the Metropol Hotel was owned by the “Syrena” company and could not be split so as to reflect the borders of the estate formerly owned by the applicant’s family. Furthermore, the application could not be granted because the right of perpetual use of the plot of land which partly overlapped with the plot at issue, had been awarded to the “Syrena” company on the strength of the decision of 29 June 1993. 40. On 24 December 2003 the applicant appealed. 41. On 24 February 2004 the applicant lodged with the Supreme Administrative Court a complaint about the inactivity of the Warsaw Local Government Board of Appeal. 42. On 12 May 2004 the Local Government Board of Appeal quashed the Mayor’s decision of 9 December 2003 and remitted the case. On 9 June 2004 S.P. requested the Mayor to accelerate the proceedings. 43. On 25 June 2004 the Supreme Administrative Court discontinued the proceedings on the complaint about the inactivity of the Warsaw Local Government Board of Appeal, given that the latter authority had issued its decision on 12 May 2004. 44. It appears that on an unspecified date the Mayor of Warsaw stayed the proceedings pending the conclusion of the administrative proceedings concerning the grant of the right of perpetual use of land for the benefit of the “Syrena” company (see paragraphs 54-59 below). It appears that the proceedings are pending. 45. On 5 February 1999 the applicant requested the Warsaw District Office to grant him the right of perpetual use of the plot of land owned by the State Treasury. On 11 March 1999 he lodged with the Warsaw Governor (Wojewoda Warszawski) a complaint about the inactivity of the Warsaw District Office. 46. On 23 March 1999 the Warsaw District Office asked the Board of the City of Warsaw to provide the relevant documents concerning the status of the property at issue. On 10 May 1999 the relevant documents were submitted to the District Office. On 25 May and 16 June 1999 the District Office requested the Warsaw-Centre Municipality to submit some additional documents. 47. On 9 July 1999 the applicant filed with the Warsaw Governor a second complaint about the inactivity of the District Office. On 9 August 1999 the District Office requested the Warsaw-Centre Municipality to provide information relating to the use of the plot of land at issue as provided in the local development plan. The requested information was submitted on 17 August 1999. 48. On 30 August 1999 the Warsaw Governor ordered the Warsaw District Office to issue a decision in the applicant’s case within one month. On 8 October 1999 the District Office informed the applicant that due to the complex nature of the case a decision would be issued by 15 January 2000. 49. On 4 January 2000 the Warsaw District Office refused to grant the right of perpetual use in respect of the plot owned by the State Treasury, considering that that plot had been designated in the local development plan for public use. The applicant appealed against that decision. 50. On 7 September 2000 the Warsaw Governor upheld the decision of the Warsaw District Office. S.P. lodged an appeal against the decision of the Governor with the Supreme Administrative Court. 51. On 12 March 2002 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the Warsaw Governor’s decision of 7 September 2000 and the earlier decision of the Warsaw District Office as they had been issued in breach of section 7 of the 1945 Decree. It considered that the use of the plot of land at issue by the successors of the former owners would not be incompatible with the local development plan. 52. On 7 June 2002 the Warsaw District Office informed the applicant that it would not be possible to conclude the proceedings within the time-limit specified in Article 35 of the Code of Administrative Procedure due to the need to undertake further examination of the application. 53. It appears that in July 2002 the ownership of the plot held by the State was transferred to the City of Warsaw by operation of the law. Consequently, the proceedings concerning the grant of the right of perpetual use of land in respect of the entire property of the applicant’s family were conducted before the Mayor of Warsaw (see paragraphs 35-44 above). 54. On 10 May 1996 S.P., one of the heirs, filed with the Board of the City of Warsaw an objection against the auction for the sale of shares in the “Syrena” company. 55. On 17 September 1996 the applicant made an application to the Warsaw Local Government Board of Appeal for annulment of the decision of the Board of the Union of Warsaw Municipalities of 29 June 1993 (see paragraph 13 above). On 31 October 1996 the Board of Appeal refused to institute the proceedings. On 20 November 1996 the applicant filed an application for reconsideration of that decision. On 30 December 1996 the Board of Appeal decided to stay the proceedings until the termination of the proceedings pending before the Minister of Planning and Construction (see paragraphs 16-17 above). On 7 October 1997 the Board of Appeal quashed its earlier decision of 31 October 1996. On 26 November 1997 it refused that application. The applicant filed an application for reconsideration of the matter. On 17 September 1998 the Board of Appeal quashed its earlier decision and refused to institute proceedings for the annulment. The applicant appealed against that decision to the Supreme Administrative Court. 56. On 19 November 1998 the Supreme Administrative Court stayed the proceedings pending the termination of the proceedings concerning the application for annulment of the Minister of Planning and Construction’s decision of 24 March 1993. The proceedings were resumed on 27 September 2002. On 11 December 2002 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the decision of the Board of Appeal of 17 September 1998 on procedural grounds. Consequently, the Board of Appeal had to examine the applicant’s application for annulment again. 57. On 20 June and 20 December 2003 the applicant requested the Board of Appeal to expedite the proceedings. 58. On 10 December 2003 the Board of Appeal quashed its earlier decision of 26 November 1997 and declared null and void the decision of the Board of the Union of Warsaw Municipalities of 29 June 1993 granting the right of perpetual use of the plot of land no. 39 to the “Syrena” company. It considered that the decision of 29 June 1993 had been issued in a flagrant violation of the rights of the heirs of the former owners, as their application for the grant of the right of perpetual use was pending at the material time. It further observed that the heirs’ claims to the plot of land formerly owned by their family had to be examined prior to the decision on the use of land by the “Syrena” company. 59. On 5 July 2004 the Local Government Board of Appeal reopened the proceedings at the request of the “Syrena” company. On 9 December 2004 it refused the “Syrena” company’s request to quash its earlier decision of 10 December 2003. That decision was upheld on appeal on 18 April 2005. It appears that those proceedings are pending.

4. The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in the town of Neryungri in the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic. 5. On 11 July 2003 the Neryungri Town Court accepted the applicant's claim against the Government of the Russian Federation and awarded her 72,967 Russian roubles (RUR, approximately 2,110 euros) in compensation for a special-purpose settlement order by the terms of which the Government was to provide her with a car in exchange for payments extracted from the applicant's salary and benefits related to her employment in the Far-Northern Region of Russia. The judgment was upheld on appeal on 25 August 2003 by the Supreme Court of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic. 6. The Neryungri Town Court issued the applicant with a writ of execution which she submitted to the Ministry of Finance in November 2003. 7. At the time the application was lodged with the Court the judgment of 11 July 2003, as upheld on appeal on 25 August 2003, remained unenforced. 8. According to the Government, on 31 March 2006 the Federal Treasury of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic successfully initiated a supervisory review of the judgment of 11 July 2003. 9. On 24 August 2006 the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic reviewed the judgment of 11 July 2003, as upheld on appeal on 25 August 2003, and ordered that the Ministry of Finance should pay the applicant RUR 33,201.49 (approximately 980 euros) . 10. Enforcement proceedings were instituted in respect of the judgment of 24 August 2006. The applicant did not submit any information concerning the outcome of those proceedings.

7. The applicant was born in 1936 and lives in Kamień Pomorski, Poland. 8. The applicant was a manager of the Kamień Pomorski health resort. On 14 May 1990 he filed an action with the Szczecin Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki), in which he requested that a certain A.P. (“the defendant”) be ordered to stop spreading information damaging to the good name of the applicant and to retract in the press his defamatory statements. 9. Subsequently, the court held hearings on 2 July and 5 September 1990. 10. On 3 October 1990 the court held a hearing. It heard a witness and decided to stay the proceedings until the completion of proceedings concerning the applicant’s dismissal from the position of manager. On 27 December 1991 the dismissal proceedings were terminated. 11. On 30 January 1992 the applicant requested the court to resume the defamation proceedings. On 7 December 1992 the trial court resumed the proceedings. 12. On 5 March 1993 the court adjourned a hearing, because of the lack of the defendant’s pleadings in the case file. 13. On 11 August 1993 the applicant extended his claim. 14. On 21 October 1994 the court held a hearing. 15. On 6 December 1995 the court adjourned a hearing at the defendant’s request. 16. On 24 January 1996 the court closed the examination of the case and announced that the judgment would be delivered on 7 February 1996. On 6 February 1996 the court reopened the examination of the case and decided that the defendant would be heard in Kamień Pomorski. On 19 February 1996 the court heard the defendant. 17. On 28 February 1996 the Szczecin Regional Court gave judgment. It ordered the defendant to retract his statements concerning the applicant in certain newspapers at his own expense. 18. On 8 August 1996 the applicant received a copy of the judgment. Subsequently, the defendant lodged an appeal against that judgment. 19. On 12 November 1996 the Poznań Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) held a hearing and on 21 November 1996 it gave judgment. The court quashed the judgment of the Szczecin Regional Court and remitted the case for re-examination. 20. Despite numerous complaints by the applicant and his lawyer, the Szczecin Regional Court listed no hearing until 12 May 1999. On 12 January 1999 the applicant’s lawyer complained to the President of the Poznań Regional Court about the delay in the proceedings. In a reply of 27 January 1999, the President of the Regional Court admitted that the complaint was justified. 21. On 12 May 1999 the court held a hearing. 22. On 28 June 2000 the Szczecin Regional Court held a hearing. It heard the applicant and adjourned the examination of the case for the purpose of hearing the defendant before the Kamień Pomorski District Court. The defendant was heard on 25 August 2000. 23. The next hearing was listed for 29 December 2000. The court closed the examination of the case and informed the parties that the judgment would be delivered on 12 January 2001. On 26 January 2001 the court gave judgment and dismissed the applicant’s claim. On an unspecified date, in the second half of 2001, he appealed against the judgment. 24. It appears that the proceedings are pending.

5. The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Cimişlia. 6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7. From 1986 the applicant was employed by the Bureau of Architecture, Projects and Production of the Chief Architect of Cimişlia Region (“the Cimişlia Bureau”), a State service. In 1993 the Bureau adopted new by-laws, which were approved by the Ministry of Architecture and Construction. Under these by-laws, the Bureau was registered as an independent legal person with the rights of a State company and governed by the Regulations of State companies. It was created within the organs of local public administration and on the basis of municipal property but was financed exclusively from the income it generated from selling a variety of services to the local administration and to the population. 8. On 16 December 1999 Lăpuşna County Council decided to merge several bureaux, including the Cimişlia Bureau, into one service at the County level. The Lăpuşna Bureau thus became the legal successor of the Cimişlia Bureau in which the applicant had worked. Before this merger, the Cimişlia Bureau decided to reduce the number of personnel employed and as a result the applicant was made redundant by an order of 29 December 1999. 9. On 12 January 2000 he acknowledged the dismissal notice in writing, as requested by law. In accordance with the relevant labour legislation, he requested redundancy payments (namely redundancy compensation worth one month's average salary, his average monthly salary during the three months when he would be looking for a new job, payment for unused leave for 1999 and payment of his salary for December 1999 and part of January 2000). 10. The employer refused to pay because it had set aside no money for redundancy payments. According to a certificate issued by the Cimişlia employment office on 9 June 2000, the applicant had been unemployed from 21 January 2000 to the date of the issue of the certificate. 11. The applicant initiated court proceedings, claiming redundancy payments, namely one month's salary on dismissal, the continuing payment of his salary for the three subsequent months when he would be looking for another job and monetary compensation for untaken leave. On 5 July 2000 the Cimişlia District Court partly accepted his claims. He appealed and the Cahul Regional Court quashed that judgment, ordering a full re-hearing of the case. 12. On 27 April 2001 the Cimişlia District Court rejected all his claims as unfounded. 13. On 14 August 2001 the Cahul Regional Court upheld that judgment. It found, among other things, that the applicant had missed the two-month deadline for making his claim against the Cimişlia Bureau, since the decision to reorganise the bureau had been published in January 2000 and the complaint had been lodged in May 2000. 14. Notwithstanding the fact that the applicant had missed the above-mentioned time-limit, on 26 April 2002 the Court of Appeal examined the substance of his appeal and upheld the judgment of the Regional Court. The court reasoned that no compensation was due because the Cimişlia Bureau, in which the applicant had worked, was self-financed; it had not set aside any resources for compensation but had distributed all the money obtained from its activity to its employees, after paying taxes. Since it had been an independent legal person, its legal successor, the Lăpuşna Bureau, could not be held liable for any outstanding debts. The court also found that the applicant had not offered any new services after October 1999 and thus could not claim his salary for November-December 1999. He had been warned in April 1999 of impending dismissal and instructed to complete all outstanding work by 29 December 1999. Finally, the court found that he had not registered with the Lăpuşna employment office as unemployed and could therefore not claim redundancy compensation.

5. The applicant was born in 1940 and lives in Stavropol. 6. At the material time the applicant and her husband lived in a three-room apartment in a block of flats at 4 Prospekt Revolyutsii in the city of Grozny, the Chechen Republic. The applicant submitted a housing warrant (ордер) confirming her right to live in the apartment. She did not submit any documents proving that she had a title to the flat. 7. In early October 1999 a military operation was launched in the territory of the Chechen Republic. 8. According to the applicant, on 4 January 2000 the block of flats at 4 Prospekt Revolyutsii was hit by a missile fired by the Russian armed forces during an attack on Grozny. The applicant’s flat and all her belongings were destroyed. It does not appear that the applicant witnessed the destruction. 9. On 6 January 2000 the applicant, her husband and other residents were sheltering from a bombardment in the basement of their block of flats. At around 10 p.m. an intoxicated man armed with a machine gun came down to the basement and started shooting, with the result that the applicant’s husband and three other persons were killed. The applicant managed to escape. According to her, the name of the man who shot her husband was Khalid. He had lived for some time in their block of flats and during the bombings she had met him in the basement on several previous occasions. 10. On the next day the applicant buried her husband’s body and the bodies of the others killed in the shooting in the courtyard. It does not appear that an autopsy was performed or any photographs taken. 11. On 21 June 2000 a local registry office certified the death of the applicant’s husband. On the same date a housing authority issued the applicant with a certificate confirming that her flat “was destroyed and burnt completely during the military actions on 4 January 2000”. The certificate contained no other information relating to the destruction. The applicant did not submit any documents which would indicate the cause of the destruction of the block of flats at 4 Prospect Revolutsii, or any photographs of the site of the destruction. 12. According to the Government, the applicant’s written complaint concerning her husband’s murder was received by the Zavodskoy District Department of the Interior of Grozny on 17 February 2000. On 27 February 2000 the acting prosecutor of Grozny opened an investigation into the case under Article 105 (2) (aggravated murder) of the Russian Criminal Code. The case file was assigned the number 12005. 13. On the same day the applicant was granted the status of victim of a crime and questioned. She reiterated her account of the events of 6 January 2000 and described the appearance of the alleged murderer. 14. In the Government’s submission, on 27 February 2000 the investigation authorities also inspected the scene of the incident in the applicant’s presence. The Government did not produce any report on that inspection. 15. On 23 April 2000 the proceedings in case no. 12005 were suspended for failure to establish the identity of the alleged perpetrator. The applicant was informed in writing that the proceedings had been adjourned on 27 [rather than 23] April 2000. 16. On 7 June 2000 the criminal proceedings were reopened. According to the Government, on the same date, upon the applicant’s request of 31 May 2000, the investigator in charge ordered the exhumation of the corpses of those killed on 6 January 2000, including the applicant’s husband. The exhumation and forensic examination were carried out on the next day. 17. On 7 July 2000 the investigation was stayed as it was impossible to establish those responsible. It does not appear that there was any investigative activity between 7 July 2000 and 10 December 2001. 18. On the latter date the decision of 7 July 2000 was set aside and the proceedings in criminal case no. 12005 were resumed, the applicant being notified in a letter of 12 December 2001. 19. On 14 January 2002 the investigation into the killing of the applicant’s husband was again suspended in the absence of information concerning those responsible. It appears that the applicant was not informed of that decision until 14 October 2002, when the Grozny prosecutor’s office stated in their letter that the criminal proceedings instituted on 27 February 2000 in connection with the killing of the applicant’s husband had been suspended on 14 January 2002 for failure to find the alleged perpetrators, and that the search for those responsible was under way. 20. In a letter of 13 May 2002 the Department of the Ministry of the Interior for the Southern Federal Circuit notified the applicant that the investigation in connection with her husband’s murder had been commenced on 17 [rather than 27] February 2000, that the case had been given the number 12005 and that the suspect in the case, Ismailov Kh. S., had been an officer of the Ministry of the Shariat State Security [a security service established when the former President of Chechnya, Aslan Maskhadov, had been in power]. The letter stated that the suspect was presently on the federal wanted list. 21. It does not appear that any investigative activity took place between 14 January 2002 and 21 April 2005. 22. On the latter date the criminal proceedings in case no. 12005 were re-opened. The applicant was informed of this decision on the same date. 23. On 22 May 2005 the investigating authorities stayed the criminal proceedings on account of their inability to establish the alleged perpetrator and apprised the applicant of their decision on the same date. 24. It does not appear that any investigative activity took place between 22 May 2005 and 8 December 2006. 25. On the latter date the investigation was resumed. The investigating authorities informed the applicant of that decision in a letter of 8 December 2006. According to the Government, the conduct of the investigation was being supervised by the Prosecutor General’s Office. 26. In the Government’s submission, apart from the applicant, the investigating authorities also questioned seven witnesses. One of them, the applicant’s neighbour who had helped her to bury the bodies, gave oral evidence similar to the applicant’s account, whereas the others did not provide any relevant information. According to the Government, the investigating authorities also sent a number of queries to “competent bodies”. In particular, such queries were sent on 28 February, 17 April and 11 July 2000, 10 January 2002 and 4 May 2005. 27. The Government also submitted that the investigation had obtained information that the murder of the applicant’s husband and other victims had been committed by Khalid (Khazir) Ismailov, who had been an officer of a security service established when the former President of Chechnya, Aslan Maskhadov, had been in power. During the investigation, an address of Khalid’s acquaintance had been established, but the house at that address had proved to be deserted. The investigators also verified the possible involvement of a number of persons with the surname “Ismailov” in the killing of 6 January 2000, but that had brought no positive result. 28. On 20 July 2001 the applicant issued civil proceedings against a number of Federal Ministries before the Leninskiy District Court of Stavropol (“the District Court”). In her written submissions to the court the applicant sought damages in respect of her husband’s death. She also stated that the block of flats in which she lived had been destroyed by a missile and asked the court to award her compensation for the destroyed flat and belongings that had been in the flat. As can be ascertained from a copy of her written submissions, the applicant enclosed copies of her passport, the marriage certificate, the death certificate, the housing warrant, a letter from a local authority, and certificates from the housing authority. 29. By a default judgment of 3 December 2001 the District Court allowed in part the applicant’s compensation claim for her husband’s death and awarded her 20,000 Russian roubles (RUB). 30. As regards the applicant’s compensation claim concerning the destruction of her property, the court noted that under Article 1069 of the Civil Code of Russia the State was liable only for damages caused by its agents’ actions which were unlawful. It further found that the actions of the Russian federal troops in Chechnya had been lawful, as the military operation in Chechnya had been launched under Presidential Decree no. 2166 of 30 November 1994 and Governmental Decree no. 1360 of 9 December 1994, both of which had been found to be constitutional by the Constitutional Court of Russia on 31 July 1995. 31. The court further stated that the applicant had submitted no evidence proving a causal link between the defendants’ actions and the damage sustained by her, since the military actions had been carried out by both parties to the conflict. Therefore the destruction of the applicant’s possessions could not be imputed to the defendants. 32. The court further held that under Article 1079 of the Civil Code of Russia damage inflicted by a “source of increased danger” (источник повышенной опасности) was to be compensated for by the person or entity using that source, unless it was proven that the damage had been caused by force majeure or through the fault of the affected person. However, in the court’s view, the applicant’s reference to the above Article was unfounded, as weapons and military equipment, in the circumstances of the present case, could not be regarded as a “source of increased danger”, since they had been used strictly for the purposes they were designed for and under the firm control of the relevant personnel. Moreover, the applicant had not adduced any evidence which would enable the court to establish the type and ownership of the weapon which had destroyed the applicant’s housing. 33. The court also noted that the applicant had submitted no documents confirming the value of her lost property. It noted in this respect that witness statements obtained during the hearing only enabled it to establish the existence of the possessions in the applicant’s flat prior to the destruction and the fact that those possessions had been new. The court made no findings regarding the applicant’s property rights in respect of the destroyed flat. 34. The applicant’s claims for compensation for non-pecuniary damage could not be granted either, in the absence of any fault or unlawful actions on the part of the defendants. In view of the above, the court concluded that there were no grounds for granting the first applicant’s compensation claim for the destroyed property. 35. It does not appear that the applicant ever sought the first-instance court’s assistance in obtaining evidence relating to the weapon that had destroyed her housing. In her appeal against the judgment of 3 December 2001 the applicant did not complain of her inability to obtain the evidence in question. 36. On 30 January 2002 the Stavropol Regional Court upheld the first-instance judgment on appeal. 37. On 30 January 2002, following the decision of the Stavropol Regional Court, the judgment of 3 December 2001 became final and binding. 38. According to the applicant, at some point the District Court issued a writ of execution and sent it to the Ministry of Finance for execution on 30 April 2002. 39. In the Government’s submission, the writ of execution was received by the Ministry of Finance on 24 November 2004. 40. On 16 March 2006 the Ministry of Finance sent the applicant a letter inviting her to indicate the details of her bank account to enable the said Ministry to transfer the judgment debt to her. 41. The applicant provided the necessary information on 5 May 2006. 42. On 30 October 2006 the full amount due pursuant to the judgment of 3 December 2001 was transferred to the applicant’s bank account. 43. In October 2006, at the communication stage, the Government were invited to produce a copy of the investigation file of case no. 12005 instituted in connection with the killing of the applicant’s husband and other persons on 6 January 2000. Relying on the information obtained from the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Government refused to submit a copy of the entire file, stating that the disclosure of the documents would be in violation of Article 161 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure since the file contained personal data concerning the witnesses. They, however, produced a number of documents from the file, which can be summarised as follows. (a) Documents relating to the conduct of the investigation and informing the applicant of its results. 44. By decisions of 27 February 2000 the Grozny prosecutor ordered that criminal proceedings be instituted in connection with the killing of the applicant’s husband and three other persons by a man named Khalid using a machine gun on 6 January 2000 and that an investigative group be organised for the investigation. 45. By a decision of 27 February 2000 the investigator in charge declared the applicant the victim of a crime. 46. By a decision of 15 March 2000 an investigator of the Grozny prosecutor’s office took up the case. 47. By a decision of 23 April 2000 the investigator in charge suspended the proceedings in case no. 21005. The decision stated that the term established for the preliminary investigation had expired, that all possible investigative actions had been carried out, but that it was impossible to establish the identity of the alleged perpetrator. The decision did not list the actions that had been taken during the investigation. 48. In a letter of 23 or 28 [the hand-written date is unclear] April 2000 the applicant was informed that the investigation in case no. 12005 had been stayed, as it was impossible to establish the identity of the person responsible. 49. On 7 June 2000 the Grozny prosecutor ordered that the investigation be resumed, citing “the necessity of carrying out investigative actions”. He did not indicate which particular actions should be taken. By a decision of the same date an investigator of the Grozny prosecutor’s office took up the case. 50. A decision of 10 December 2001 of the first deputy prosecutor of Grozny ordered that the investigation in criminal case no. 12005 be resumed. It stated, in particular, that “...the investigation ... [had been] extremely superficial and was limited to carrying out several investigative actions and to including in the materials of the case file reports of investigating officers on the performed work and the results”. It went on to say that the decision of 7 July 2000 by which the investigation had been suspended for failure to establish the alleged perpetrator had been premature, before all investigative steps had been taken, and should be quashed. The decision of 10 December 2001 further listed a number of investigative steps that should be taken during an additional investigation. 51. In a letter of 12 December 2001 the Grozny prosecutor’s office informed the applicant in reply to her query that the criminal proceedings had been suspended on 7 July 2001 [apparently a misprint, the correct date is 2000] in the absence of any persons identifiable as the perpetrators. The letter went on to say that a study of the case file had shown the preliminary investigation into the circumstances of the death of the applicant’s husband to have been superficial, and that the proceedings had therefore been resumed on 10 December 2001 and the investigator in charge had been instructed to carry out an additional investigation. 52. By decisions of 14 December 2001 an investigator of the Grozny prosecutor’s office took up case no. 12005 and requested that 14 January 2002 be fixed as the term of the preliminary investigation. 53. On 14 January 2002 the investigator in charge ordered that the proceedings be stayed, as “during the additional investigation it [had been] impossible to establish those responsible”. The decision did not specify whether any investigative steps had been taken, or if so, what they were. 54. By a decision of 21 April 2005 a deputy prosecutor of the Zavodskoy District prosecutor’s office set aside the decision of 14 January 2002 and ordered that the investigation in case no. 12005 be reopened. The decision stated that “the investigation [had been] carried out superficially, haphazardly and unprofessionally” and that “the decision [of 14 January 2002] suspending the preliminary investigation [had been] premature and unfounded, without all the circumstances of the serious crime committed having been studied”. The prosecutor thus ordered that the decision of 14 January 2002 be set aside, given, in particular, the fact that the prosecutor’s instructions of 10 December 2001 had not been complied with. The decision did not list any particular investigative actions to be performed. 55. On 22 April 2005 an investigator of the Zavodskoy District prosecutor’s office took up the case, and on the same date informed the applicant of the reopening of the investigation. 56. By a decision of 22 May 2005 the investigator in charge stayed the investigation on account of the failure to establish the alleged perpetrator. The decision stated that during the additional investigation a query had been sent to the Ministry of the Interior of the Chechen Republic with a view to establishing the alleged perpetrator’s whereabouts, and that, upon receipt of a reply to that query, a request was sent to the Shali district prosecutor’s office with a view to organising interviews with persons having personal details similar to those of the alleged perpetrator. The decision did not indicate whether any other steps had been taken. A letter of the same date informed the applicant of this decision. 57. By a decision of 8 December 2006 a deputy prosecutor of the Zavodskoy district prosecutor’s office ordered that the decision of 22 May 2005 be set aside and the proceedings in case no. 12005 reopened. The decision stated, in particular, that the decision to suspend the investigation had been unfounded and that the investigator in charge had failed to take all measures which could be taken in the absence of a person identifiable as a perpetrator. The decision further listed investigative measures that should be taken during an additional investigation. On the same date an investigator of the Zavodskoy district prosecutor’s office took up the case and informed the applicant of the reopening of the proceedings. (b) Documents relating to investigative actions 58. A report on the exhumation dated 8 June 2000 contains a detailed description of the site of the burial and the exhumed bodies. 59. In June 2000 (the date is unclear) forensic medical experts drew up reports on the results of the examination. The report drawn up in respect of the body of the applicant’s husband attested the presence of gunshot wounds to the head and neck. 60. On 19 June 2000 the investigator in charge sent a query to the Prosecutor General’s Office in an attempt to find out whether any criminal proceedings had ever been brought against Khazir (Khamed) Ismailov, aged 43, who had been an officer of the security services established by rebel fighters, and if so, to obtain his full personal details and photographs, or in the absence of photographs to have people who might have known him questioned. (c) Transcripts of witness interviews 61. During an interview of 27 February 2000 the applicant re-stated the circumstances of the incident of 6 January 2000. She described in detail the appearance of Khalid, the man who, according to her, had shot her husband and three other persons. She stated that he was of Chechen origin and, since December 1999, had shared a flat in their block of flats with another man of Chechen origin, who had been their neighbour. Both of them had been armed with machine guns. She further stated that on the night of the incident Khalid had come down to their basement in a drunken state and shot her husband and three others with his machine gun. She had managed to hide in a dark corner of the basement. Immediately after the incident the applicant ran to a neighbouring block of flats where rebel fighters had been quartered and told them about the killing. According to her, they had taken Khalid out of the basement and started beating him with the butts of their machine guns and had promised her that they would commit him for trial. On the following day, with the assistance of her two neighbours, the applicant had buried those killed near their block of flats. On the same day in the courtyard she had seen Khalid armed with a machine gun. 62. One of the neighbours who had helped the applicant with the burial stated in her witness interview of 27 February 2000 that she had learnt about the killing of the applicant’s husband and three others from the applicant. She gave oral evidence similar to that of the applicant and added that during the burial a man who had described himself as the former head of a security service established by rebel fighters had said that he knew Khalid and indicated the approximate vicinity of Khalid’s residence. 63. Transcripts of witness interviews held on 20 and 21 May 2005 reveal that the investigating authorities questioned three persons who were born in 1966, 1971 and 1983 and had the surname Ismailov and the first names of Khalid or Khazir. All of them stated that they had not been in Grozny during the period in question, did not know the man described by the applicant, and had no information regarding the incident of 6 January 2000. 64. Transcripts of witness interviews on 8 and 9 December 2006 reveal that the investigating authorities questioned six persons, apparently the applicant’s neighbours. They all stated that they did not know, and had no information about, the man described by the investigators. 65. The Government also adduced the transcript of a hearing held by the Leninskiy District Court of Stavropol on 3 December 2001. According to this document, both the applicant and her legal counsel, Mr V. Tretyakov, attended the hearing. It is clear from this document that both parties to the proceedings received explanations in respect of their rights and obligations, in particular, those established by Article 50 of the Code of Civil Procedure (see paragraph 67 below). The transcript further reveals that the court heard both parties, the applicant having made statements similar to her written submissions to the court, and then four witnesses, who described the belongings that had been in the applicant’s flat prior to the destruction. The witnesses did not indicate the value of that property. As can be seen from the document, neither the applicant nor her representative had any questions, nor filed any motions. It is also clear that the court examined the following pieces of evidence: a copy of the marriage certificate, a copy of the passport, a housing warrant, a copy of the death certificate, an extract from a medical history card, two certificates, two letters, a copy of an identity document, parties’ written submissions, and summons.

4. The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Istanbul. She is a journalist/columnist and author of a number of books. 5. In 2003 the applicant wrote a series of articles in a daily newspaper, Vatan, criticising certain provisions of the draft criminal code prepared by the commission established for the drafting of a new Criminal Code (“the Commission”) proposing reduced sentences for certain offences committed against women and children, inter alia, honour killings and rape. 6. On 19 October 2003 an article entitled ‘Obsessed Professor’ written by the applicant was published in Vatan. The article read as follows: “I can already guess what will happen after this article. The professor in question will reach for the phone and ask why I am writing such things. Not to me but to a male writer or manager at the newspaper. That is how he did it last time. It appears that he does not like to speak with female journalists. Anyway he believes that all crimes intentionally committed against women and children and even those committed with bare hands should receive reduced sentences. Rape, violence and murder must have a number of mitigating circumstances and if those circumstances exist then sentences should be reduced to ten to fifteen years. For example those who rape children should get away with a lenient sentence if that little girl also “wanted it”. The rapist should be freed so that such incidents continue to plague us. In my article entitled “are the women in parliament alive?” published two days ago, which I had ended with a note “to be continued”, I objected to the unjust, unfair and out-of-date articles contained in the new draft Turkish Criminal Code and pointed out that similar reductions in the penalties which currently exist in the Criminal Code had led to the killing of young girls and women one after another. The remainder of the article could not fit into my diminishing column space, due to advertisements, and as a result was delayed (it seems that I will have to devise a new coding system so that you can understand me in a few words). However, we can say that all things happen for a reason and it was good that it was delayed. As I was asking myself why no parliamentarian - at least no female parliamentarian - apart from AKP parliamentarian N.Ç., contested this proposal, CHP Adana parliamentarian G.E. called me to explain that they were working intensively on this issue. She said that all women parliamentarians, irrespective of their party background, will act together. Here is solidarity to be proud of! It is difficult to understand why Prof. Dr. S.D. (full name is cited in the original article) is so obsessed and has a discriminatory attitude as regards criminal provisions concerning women and children. We witnessed the same attitude during the reform of the Civil Code. I think instead of having elderly legal scholars we should now have young lawyers working at the Justice Commissions. Those who are in touch with world developments and who are aware that discriminatory attitudes have become out of date. Prof. S.D., with his way of thinking which reflects his 80 years, stands alone. In fact, he left the Justice Commission meeting after an argument broke out with the members of parliament when he insisted on his views. In fact he should have thanked them. If this draft had been accepted in its original form, who would know how many generations of children, women and families would remember him? How they will remember him, he can guess. Therefore...I consider it to be a great opportunity that the Turkish Criminal Code will be re-examined by us before it is discussed and criticised by the European Union.” 7. On 4 November 2003 Prof. Dr. S.D., the president of the Commission (“the plaintiff”), brought a civil action for compensation against the applicant, the editor-in-chief of the newspaper and the publishing company (“the defendants”) before the Şişli Civil Court of First Instance on the ground that certain remarks in the article above constituted an attack on his personal rights. 8. Before the first-instance court the defendants maintained, inter alia, that the aim of the article in question had not been to insult the plaintiff but to criticise various provisions of the draft Criminal Code. In this connection, they considered that the words used in the impugned article were not insulting. They emphasised that the article was truthful in that the impugned provisions in the draft Criminal Code were subject to virulent criticism by many others, including ministers. In support of their arguments the defendants submitted to the court, inter alia, a number of published articles written by various academics, journalists, and people from NGOs, criticising the controversial provisions of the draft Criminal Code. 9. On 26 February 2004 the Şişli Civil Court of First Instance ordered the applicant, the editor-in-chief of the newspaper and the publishing company jointly to pay compensation to Prof. Dr. S.D. in the amount of 10,000,000,000 Turkish liras (TRL), plus interest at the statutory rate applicable from the date of the legal action. It also ordered the publication by the newspaper of a summary of its judgment. 10. In its decision, the court stated, inter alia, that the press had a certain privileged position, as it had the competence and responsibility to provide information, educate, enlighten and direct the public by following up incidents, investigating, assessing and diffusing. However, like all freedoms the privilege and freedom of the press were not without limits. In this connection, it referred to the limitation imposed on the press by the relevant articles of the Constitution, the Civil Code and others in so far as they concerned respect for personality rights. 11. The court referred to the following passages: “It is difficult to understand why Prof. Dr S.D. is so obsessed and has a discriminatory attitude as regards criminal provisions concerning women and children. We witnessed the same attitude during the reform of the Civil Code. I think instead of having elderly legal scholars, we should now have young lawyers working at the Justice Commissions. Those who are in touch with world developments and who are aware that discriminatory attitudes have become out of date. Prof. S.D., with his way of thinking which reflects his 80 years, stands alone. “ 12. It considered that the above passages qualified the plaintiff as an obsessive and a backward person and a bigot who discriminated against women and did not talk to women, and thus insulted him. There was therefore an attack on his personality rights. 13. The court noted, inter alia, that the plaintiff, who was known as “the professor of professors”, was an internationally recognised legal scholar who had written thousands of articles, translations and jurisprudential analyses. 14. It considered that the article in question had affected the plaintiff negatively in his life, as it was a savage and aggressive attack on a person who, inter alia, had made a great contribution to the establishment, development and execution of the contemporary legal system. 15. In addition, the court referred to the emails submitted by the defendants to note the degree of hatred of the public towards the plaintiff and other members of the Commission as a result of the publication. 16. The court therefore decided that there was a need to award compensation to the plaintiff, the amount of which it determined on the basis of, inter alia, the economic and social status of the parties and the nature of the infringement before it. 17. The defendants appealed. In particular, they maintained that the court had failed to take into account their evidence demonstrating the public outcry against the draft proposal, and had refused their request for a video recording of a television programme the plaintiff had appeared on after he had lodged his compensation claim to be admitted in evidence. 18. On 14 September 2004 the Court of Cassation rectified the judgment in so far as it concerned the order to publish a summary of the judgment in the newspaper, and upheld the remainder of the judgment. 19. The defendants’ request for a rectification of its decision was dismissed by the Court of Cassation on 14 March 2005. 20. On 26 October 2003 an article entitled ‘If you can’t escape, enjoy it’, written by the applicant, was published by Vatan. The article read as follows: “We are going through such times and witnessing such unbelievable events and discussions that no-one can escape their duties. In particular, those who, due to their jobs, have a first-degree debt to the next generation. Journalists, lawyers, educators, non-governmental organisations, and, particularly, women. Working women. In my article published on Saturday and entitled ‘The Virginity Crisis’ I referred to Prof. Dr. D. So.’s remark (full name is cited in the original article) “if a rapist marries his victim then his sentence should be reduced. All men want to marry virgins” and emphasised, once again, that some members of this commission responsible for the new draft needed psychological treatment. When I was writing those lines I had not yet heard D. So.’s later remark “If I had been raped, I would have married him”. Having heard this I believe that certain people should be urgently locked up in a clinic. When the degree of their illness has reached such a level as to cause severe harm to society this is essential. This unhealthy mentality will cause harm to thousands of women and children (every day we read in the papers about eight to twenty perverts raping young girls and women in every corner of Turkey) and will incite ignorant, unemployed and sick people to commit crimes. By demolishing the concept of crime and punishment, in short, justice, they will create an unhappy and anarchic country where tragic events will be heard of one after another and people will be unbalanced and unhealthy. Prof. (I don’t want even to say it) So. and some other members of the Commission are trying to make the weird Turkish joke of “If you can’t escape it, enjoy it”, which cannot even be imagined in contemporary societies, into a reality. As they try to reduce the sentences given for rape, reports of rapes of children and young girls are increasing. Perverts crowd the entrances of schools. A scandal is taking place in respect of the Turkish Criminal Code. This scandal, like the headscarf crisis at the reception given by the President and others, will cast a shadow over the 80th anniversary of the establishment of the Republic. Tonight at Habertürk [private television channel] female writers are going to discuss all these shadows on ‘Press Club’. They called from Habertürk yesterday, but since I am not fully recovered I am not sure if I can make it. But as a journalist, who has been actively involved in women’s rights issues with relevant ministries together with non-governmental organisations for the past fifteen years, and who has written much on issues such as non-discrimination and the headscarf problem, I wish it dearly. In a country where even professors have this mentality, and in order to prevent the harm that it will cause, it has become imperative to discuss everything openly.” 21. On 4 November 2003 an article entitled ‘The Never-Ending Virginity Battle” written by the applicant was published by Vatan. The article focused critically on the statements made by Prof. Dr D.So. on a television programme called ‘Press Club’. 22. On 24 December 2003 Prof. Dr. D.So., a member of the Commission and advisor to the Minister of Justice, brought a civil action for compensation against the applicant, the editor-in-chief of the newspaper and the publishing company (“the defendants”) before the Ankara Civil Court of First Instance, on the ground that certain remarks in the articles published on 26 October 2003 and 4 November 2003 constituted an attack on his personal rights. 23. On 30 November 2004 the Ankara Civil Court of First Instance ordered the applicant and the publishing company jointly to pay compensation to Prof. Dr. D.So. of TRL 12,000,000,000 for the article of 26 October 2003 and TRL 3,000,000,000 for the article of 4 November 2003, together with interest at the statutory rate from the date of publication of the articles. The case was dropped in so far as it concerned the editor-in-chief. 24. In its decision the court held, inter alia, that freedom of the press was limited by protection of honour and reputation of persons. It considered that when criticising turns into unfair badmouthing, insulting and demeaning language, the objective boundaries of criticism are exceeded and abuse of rights occurs. In this connection, the court held that the following principles had to be respected: truthfulness, public interest, topicality and interconnectedness between the thoughts and the words used and the aim sought. 25. The court, while underlining the importance of different opinions and ideas and the usefulness of criticism, held, inter alia, that in the instant case the author had implied, in her article of 26 October 2003, that the plaintiff was stupid, unhealthy and mentally ill and that she considered that he was not apt to be a professor. 26. The first-instance court referred to the following passages: “...In my article published on Saturday and entitled ‘The Virginity Crisis’ I referred to Prof. Dr. D. So.’s remark “if a rapist marries his victim then his sentence should be reduced. All men want to marry virgins” and emphasised, once again, that some members of this commission responsible for the new draft needed psychological treatment. When I was writing those lines I had not yet heard D. So.’s later remark “If I had been raped, I would have married him”. Having heard this I believe that certain people should be urgently locked up in a clinic. When the degree of their illness has reached such a level as to cause severe harm to society this is inevitable. This unhealthy mentality will cause harm to thousands of women and children (every day we read in the papers about eight to twenty perverts raping young girls and women in every corner of Turkey) and will incite ignorant, unemployed and sick people to commit crimes. Prof. (I don’t want even to say it) So. and some other members of the Commission are trying to make the weird Turkish joke of “If you can’t escape it, enjoy it”, which cannot even be imagined in contemporary societies, into a reality.” 27. It further referred to a part of the applicant’s column entitled ‘Saying of the Day’, in which she cites the famous saying, her choice of the day, which read: ‘Never argue with stupid people, they drag you down to their level, and beat you with experience.” 28. It further held that the applicant had expressed similar remarks in her article of 4 November 2003 and that these remarks constituted an attack on the plaintiff’s personality rights. 29. The defendants appealed. In particular, they maintained that the articles had been written on the basis of statements given by the plaintiff to the media. In this respect, they submitted that the article of 26 October 2003 had been written following the publication of an interview with the plaintiff on 25 October 2003 in another newspaper, namely Milliyet, and the article of 4 November 2003 after the plaintiff’s statements made on a television programme on 2 November 2003. 30. On 25 April 2006 the Court of Cassation, by a majority vote, quashed the judgment of the first-instance court. 31. As regards the statements contained in the applicant’s article of 4 November 2003 it held that the article concerned a discussion programme in which the plaintiff had taken part, and that it had criticised the mentality behind the drafting of the Turkish Criminal Code and the statements of the plaintiff which had been reported by the press. It therefore considered that that article did not infringe the plaintiff’s personality rights. 32. As to the article of 26 October 2003, the court held that the limits of permissible criticism had been exceeded in some parts of the article and that therefore the decision of the first-instance court was correct. However, having regard to the circumstances, especially the status of the plaintiff and the aim of the publication, it found the compensation awarded by the domestic court excessive. 33. One of the judges Mr M.U. partially dissented. In his dissenting opinion, he held, inter alia, that the plaintiff had given rise through his own statements to the criticisms expressed in the article of 26 October 2003, and that therefore he could be expected to tolerate heavy criticism. He considered that the limits of permissible criticism had not been exceeded in the case. 34. Following the Court of Cassation’s ruling, the first-instance court dismissed, on 12 December 2006, the compensation claim as regards the article published on 4 November 2003 and awarded the plaintiff 8,000 new Turkish liras (TRY)[1] in respect of compensation for non-pecuniary damage for the article published on 26 October 2003. 35. The defendants appealed. 36. On 10 May 2007 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. It dismissed the defendants’ request for a rectification of its decision on 26 November 2007.

5. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Istanbul. 6. On 29 October 2003, while attempting to participate in a demonstration in the form of “a press conference” held on Istiklal Street in the Beyoğlu district of Istanbul, the applicant was arrested, together with some 50 to 60 other participants, by police officers at approximately 4.10 p.m. The applicant alleged that the police officers had used disproportionate force to disperse the crowd and to arrest the demonstrators, whereas the Government claimed that the demonstrators had resisted the police and had refused to disperse. 7. Following her arrest the applicant was taken to hospital for a medical examination. The doctor who examined her reported that there were no signs of injury on the applicant's body. The doctor noted, however, that the applicant complained of pain in her right upper arm. 8. On the same date, at 7.30 p.m., the applicant was questioned by the Beyoğlu public prosecutor. The applicant informed the public prosecutor that she had been subjected to ill-treatment by the police, who had used disproportionate force during her arrest. She claimed that she had attended the meeting, organised by a group called “the Peace Mothers' Initiative”, as the President of the Istanbul Human Rights Association, and that she had been arrested by the police for no reason. She stated that she had merely exercised her legal rights and that she had not breached the Meetings and Demonstration Marches Act (Law no. 2911). 9. The applicant was released from police custody on the same day, after being questioned by the Beyoğlu public prosecutor. 10. On 6 November 2003 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Beyoğlu public prosecutor against the police officers who had been involved in the incident and had arrested her. She complained, inter alia, of the unlawfulness of her arrest and the excessive use of force by the police during the arrest. 11. On the same date the applicant was referred to the Istanbul branch of the Forensic Medical Institute by the Beyoğlu public prosecutor. The doctor who examined the applicant noted a 2 x 6 cm ecchymosis on the back of her left leg and concluded that the injury rendered the applicant unfit for work for five days. The doctor further noted that the applicant was suffering from pain in her right shoulder and right arm. 12. On 12 November 2004 the Beyoğlu public prosecutor issued a decision not to prosecute the police officers who had been on duty at the press conference of 29 October 2003. Relying on the incident report prepared by the police officers, the public prosecutor noted that, despite warnings by the police, the demonstrators, who had gathered illegally without obtaining permission and had disturbed public order by blocking the pedestrian zone and tramway, had refused to disperse and the police had therefore been obliged to use some degree of force to disperse them and restore public order. The public prosecutor considered that the force used by the security forces had been in line with section 24 of the Meetings and Demonstration Marches Act and had been justified in the circumstances. In the public prosecutor's opinion, the applicant's injuries were the result of a proportionate use of force which did not amount to ill-treatment or abuse of authority. 13. On 23 December 2004 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Istanbul Assize Court against the above-mentioned decision of the public prosecutor. She claimed that on 29 October 2003 police officers had beaten her during her arrest, causing injuries rendering her unfit for work for five days, as corroborated by the medical report from the hospital. She further alleged that the participants had not blocked the tramway or pedestrian traffic. She therefore asked the Assize Court to order the prosecuting authorities to bring charges against the police officers. 14. On 30 December 2004, having regard to the content of the file and the reasons given by the Beyoğlu public prosecutor, the Istanbul Assize Court dismissed the applicant's appeal. 15. The Istanbul Assize Court's decision was served on the applicant on 16 February 2005. 16. In the meantime, on 7 November 2003, the Beyoğlu public prosecutor had brought charges against thirteen demonstrators, including the applicant, for violation of the Meetings and Demonstration Marches Act. In her defence submissions before the court, the applicant claimed that, in participating in the demonstration, she had merely been exercising her democratic rights. 17. In a judgment dated 19 December 2006, the Beyoğlu Assize Court acquitted the applicant and her co-accused of the above-mentioned charges. The court held as follows: “[It] was alleged that the accused had breached the Meetings and Demonstration Marches Act on the day of the incident. Having regard to the content of the case file, there is no convincing evidence indicating with sufficient certainty that the accused committed the alleged offence. It appears from the incident report that the security forces took measures following an intelligence report that the Peace Mothers' Initiative, Gök-Der, Tuad and Yakay-Der associations were to hold a demonstration in front of the post office in the Galatasaray district. After the gathering of the group (demonstrators), the chair of the association Yakay-Der stated that they would stage a sit-in in front of the Galatasaray post office. Following a police warning [that the meeting was unlawful], the demonstrators told the police that they would make a press statement and then disperse. However, the police teams did not release the group and continued to keep them within a circle; they then arrested them without giving a proper warning that could be heard by everyone (no evidence was provided to substantiate the assertion that a warning was given). For these reasons, no evidence was adduced to indicate that the accused committed the alleged offence in contravention of the said Act and that [their action] went beyond the exercise of their democratic rights. It is thus considered that the actions of the accused were merely an exercise of their democratic rights [to freedom of assembly]. The [accused] are therefore acquitted of the charges brought against them...”

5. The applicant was born in 1972 in the vicinity of Jaffna in the north of Sri Lanka. She currently lives in Ellebæk, Denmark. She is of Tamil ethnicity and Hindu. 6. The applicant's parents died in 1978 and 1983. 7. On 27 March 2004, she married a Sri Lankan man who had lived in Denmark since 1986 and who returned to Colombo to attend the wedding. 8. On 30 January 2005, under the rules on family reunification, the Aliens Authorities (Udlændingestyrelsen) granted the applicant a residence permit to join her husband in Denmark. Accordingly, on 16 March 2005 the applicant entered the country on a valid passport issued on 11 February 2004. 9. Less than a year later, on 31 January 2006, the Aliens Authorities decided to withdraw the applicant's residence permit on the ground that the applicant and her husband had separated. This decision was confirmed by the Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs (Ministeriet for Flygtninge, Indvandrere og Integration) on 6 October 2006 and the applicant was ordered to leave Denmark no later than 9 November 2006. The applicant did not challenge this decision before the ordinary courts. 10. On 1 November 2006 the applicant applied for asylum in Denmark. In support of her application she submitted that her marriage had been arranged, and that once she had arrived in Denmark her husband had taken her passport and been abusive by beating her and depriving her of food. After four months, she had fled to a women's shelter. By a judgment of 17 October 2005 her husband was convicted of abuse and sentenced to 40 days' imprisonment. Her passport had been returned. Subsequently, on one occasion when she had seen him on the street, he had threatened to kill her. He came from a wealthy family in Colombo with good connections to the authorities and the military and she was afraid that he had told the Sri Lankan authorities about her five years between 1988 and 1994 as a soldier for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, hereafter the LTTE. She had participated and been injured in battle. Having contracted malaria, in 1995 she had had to leave the organisation. Between 1995 and 1999, she had moved around because of the instability in the country. In 1999 she had settled in Colombo where she had worked as a carer for an elderly gentleman. In January 2004 she had met her husband and agreed to marry him to secure her future. She had a sister in Sri Lanka but had heard no news from her since the tsunami in 2004. She had no other relatives in her home country. 11. By a judgment of 21 June 2007 the applicant was convicted for two incidents of malicious damage to her husband's car and flat, and sentenced to six day fines. 12. On 28 June 2007 the Aliens Authorities rejected her application for asylum. It found that the grounds invoked by the applicant were not such that she would face a real risk of persecution or ill-treatment if returned to Sri Lanka. 13. On appeal to the Refugee Appeals Board (Flygtningenævnet), the applicant explained, among other things, that her mother died when she was five years old and her father died when she was eight years old. After her father's death she had been sent to a boarding school. She could only stay at school until she turned 16. She did not have any relatives or others with whom she could stay. When she was 16 years of age, she had joined the LTTE. She had been in combat on five occasions when she was between 16 and 18 years old and had been hit by shell splinters. Consequently she had a small shell splinter under the skin by her left eye and part of one finger was missing. The LTTE had accepted that she leave the organisation after she contracted malaria. She married on 27 March 2004, in Colombo. Her husband was an ethnic Tamil resident in Denmark. Prior to her entry into Denmark she became pregnant. Her spouse's family took her to a clinic and forced her to have an illegal abortion. Her spouse's family treated her very badly prior to her entry into Denmark. Her spouse was an alcoholic and beat her every day. After she left her spouse, he had threatened to have her sent back to Sri Lanka where she would end up in the street. If she were to return to her country of origin she feared her former spouse's family who lived in Colombo. She had neither family members nor a place to stay in Sri Lanka. Her former spouse's family had a good relationship with the Sri Lankan army. She also feared the authorities, should she return to Sri Lanka, as persons who had been attached to the LTTE were not allowed to leave the country without the permission of the authorities. She feared that her former spouse would inform the Sri Lankan authorities about her return and that she would be arrested at the airport as a result. On the basis of her scars the authorities would be able to conclude that she had been attached to the LTTE. 14. By a decision of 13 August 2007, the Refugee Appeals Board refused to grant the applicant asylum. It first noted that the applicant had arrived in Denmark on a passport which was still valid and that she had had no problems with the authorities before she left Sri Lanka. 15. The fact that she had been a member of the LTTE at a very young age could not in itself justify the granting of asylum. Moreover, she had not held any prominent position in the organisation and her attachment to the LTTE ended after she had developed malaria. She had had no problems with the LTTE since she left in 1995 and she had not in any way attracted attention to herself. 16. Finally, the applicant's problems with her former husband were of a private nature and there was no indication that the Sri Lankan authorities would be unable or unwilling to help and protect her if necessary. 17. In conclusion, the Refugee Board therefore found that on her return to Sri Lanka she would not run any particular risk of persecution within the scope of section 7(1) of the Aliens Act, or any real risk of outrages within the scope of section 7(2) of the Aliens Act. 18. On 6 November 2007 the Refugee Appeals Board rejected the applicant's request to reconsider the case finding that no new essential information or aspects had been added to the case. The fact that on 21 October 2007 the UNHCR had requested the Refugee Appeals Board to suspend the return of Tamils from northern and eastern Sri Lanka had not given rise to a general suspension of the return of ethnic Tamils to northern and eastern Sri Lanka, and the Board did not find either that it should give rise to a postponement of the time-limit for the applicant. 19. By a court order of 16 November 2007 the applicant divorced. It appears that shortly thereafter the applicant married a Singhalese man who lived in Denmark. Their daughter was born on 5 September 2008. 20. In the meantime, on 2 April 2008, the applicant again requested a reopening of her asylum case. In support she referred to the fact, inter alia, that the Sri Lankan authorities had issued a birth certificate to her in October 2007. Her friends had arranged for the certificate to be issued and had subsequently sent it to her in Denmark. The authorities in Sri Lanka were thus aware of what she had told the Danish authorities in connection with her asylum application. She also referred to the fact that she had contracted a Hindu marriage with a Singhalese man during her residence in Denmark. She finally referred to her pregnancy and to having been hospitalised in Norway on 9 or 10 March 2008 due to dehydration. By a letter of 9 April 2008 she added that she had fled the LTTE in 2002 and hidden with her future husband's brother in Vavuniya. From there she had gone to Colombo to stay with her future husband's sister. Subsequently, she heard that on several occasions members of the LTTE had approached her brother-in-law in order to find her. Furthermore, the LTTE had detained one of her brother-in-law's children for three months. She had only learned about this later on. Finally, her former spouse refused to return her national identity papers to her; instead, he had passed her identity card to the Sri Lankan army. She had received this information recently. Consequently, the military was waiting to arrest her in Sri Lanka where she was wanted. If she succeeded in going to Vanni she would be arrested by the LTTE. 21. On 14 April 2008, the Refugee Appeals Board again refused to reopen the asylum case, finding that no essential new information or aspects had been added in relation to the information which had been available when the case was considered by the Board in the first place. The Refugee Appeal Board did not find it probable that the Sri Lankan authorities had become acquainted with the applicant's statements given to the Danish immigration authorities since that information was private and covered by the regulations of the Criminal Code (straffeloven) concerning the professional secrecy of public authorities. The fact that the applicant was pregnant and had married in Denmark had no bearing on her asylum case and therefore could not lead to a different evaluation of the matter. Her statement about recently having learnt that her former brother-in-law had been approached by the LTTE seemed unreliable, notably because during the original asylum case hearing before the Refugee Appeals Board she had stated that she left the LTTE because she had developed malaria. Consequently, this “new” information could not be taken into account. The Refugee Appeals Board could not take into account either the statement that her former spouse had passed on her identity card to the Sri Lankan authorities as this information had been submitted at a very late date and seemed fabricated for the occasion. Her problems with her former spouse were of a private law nature and thus could not lead to a different evaluation of her asylum case. 22. By letter of 25 April 2008, once more the applicant requested that her case be reopened and submitted in support thereof a letter from the European Court of Human Rights to the United Kingdom dated 23 October 2007 requesting the latter to suspend the return of all Tamils to Sri Lanka, and an e-mail of 16 April 2008 concerning the suspension of deportation cases in Switzerland on the basis of the above-mentioned letter. 23. On 28 April 2008, the Refugee Appeals Board again refused to reopen the asylum case. It stated that it was acquainted with the letter of 23 October 2007 but found that the letter alone could not bring about a general suspension of cases concerning Sri Lankan nationals of Tamil ethnicity. Nevertheless, the letter and the UNHCR's recommendations formed part of the background material on Sri Lanka which was available to the Refugee Appeals Board and which was a constituent part of the basis for the Board's decisions. 24. On 28 April 2008, upon the applicant's request, the Court of Human Rights decided to apply Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, indicating to the Government that it was in the interests of the parties and the proper conduct of the proceedings that the applicant should not be expelled to Sri Lanka pending the Court's decision. 25. On 10 June 2008, the Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs refused the applicant's application for a residence permit on humanitarian grounds under section 9b(1) of the Aliens Act. 26. On 11 February 2009 the applicant's passport expired. 27. On 29 April 2009, referring to the deterioration in the security situation in Sri Lanka and UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the international Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Sri Lanka from April 2009, the applicant requested that the Refugee Appeals Board reopen her asylum case. 28. On 11 June 2009, anew, the Refugee Appeals Board refused her request, concluding as follows: “... In April 2009, the Refugee Appeals Board received the UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Sri Lanka from April 2009, which have been included in the background material of the Refugee Appeals Board. In addition, the Refugee Appeals Board has subsequently added the following reports to its background material: Human Rights Watch, War on the Displaced, Sri Lankan Army and LTTE, Abuses against Civilians in the Vanni, February 2009; United Kingdom, Home Office, UK Border Agency, Country of Origin Information Report - Sri Lanka, 18 February 2009; U.S. Department of State, 2008 Human Rights Report: Sri Lanka, 25 February 2009; United Kingdom, Home Office, UK Border Agency, Operational Guidance Note - Sri Lanka, April 2009; and United Kingdom, Home Office, UK Border Agency, Operational Guidance Note, April 2009. It should be noted in that respect that the Refugee Appeals Board makes its decisions in asylum proceedings upon a concrete and individual assessment of the individual asylum-seeker's statement about his asylum motive compared with the background information available at any time about the conditions in the asylum-seeker's country of origin. It should also be noted that, as appears from NA. v. the United Kingdom, no. 25904/07, § 127, the Refugee Appeals Board places substantial emphasis on the information of the UNHCR Position Papers about the situation in Sri Lanka. The Position Papers are necessarily broadly phrased and contain general descriptions about the varying risks for each of Sri Lanka's ethnic groups. The views expressed in the Position Papers cannot in themselves be conclusive evidence for the assessment by the national authorities or the European Court of Human Rights of the risk for ethnic Tamils returning to Sri Lanka. The Refugee Appeals Board observes that the general conditions for ethnic Tamils from northern Sri Lanka, including single women, do not in themselves justify asylum. It should be noted in that connection that the European Court of Human Rights stated in NA. v. the United Kingdom (quoted above, § 125 that, in the assessment of the Court, the deterioration in the security situation and the increase in human rights violations in Sri Lanka did not create a general risk to all Tamils returning to Sri Lanka. The Court further observed in § 128 that both the assessment of the risk to ethnic Tamils of certain profiles and the assessment of whether individual acts of harassment would cumulatively amount to a serious violation of human rights could only be made on an individual basis. Your statement to the effect that your client may risk having an explanatory problem upon her arrival at Colombo as a consequence of the scars acquired by her in connection with military operations against the government forces does not lead to a revised assessment of the case. In this respect, the Refugee Appeals Board refers to the Danish Government's written observations of 5 January 2009 stating that your client had not been detained or subjected to outrages or to other acts contrary to Article 3 of the Convention before her departure as opposed to the applicant in NA. v. the United Kingdom. Nor had your client been recorded by the authorities in connection with detention, or photographed, fingerprinted or anything else so that the authorities might be presumed to know of her, and therefore your client could not be considered to be at risk of being subjected to outrages or other acts contrary to Article 3 of the Convention upon her arrival at Colombo Airport in the same way as the applicant in the above judgment. Nor does your statement about your client's affiliation with the LTTE until 2002 and not, as originally stated, until 1994, when your client left the LTTE because she contracted malaria, lead to a revised assessment of the case. It should be noted in that connection that the new information appeared at a very late stage of the asylum proceedings after your client had been refused asylum, having had several opportunities to provide this information without having done so. The Refugee Appeals Board still finds that there is no reasonable explanation for her changed statement. In that connection, the Refugee Appeals Board has also placed some emphasis on the fact that your client only applied for asylum in Denmark almost one year and eight months after her entry into Denmark and only after her residence permit under the family reunification rules had been revoked and she therefore had to leave Denmark. Concerning your statement about your client suspecting her former spouse or his family of having disclosed information to the Sri Lankan authorities about her, it should be noted that the Refugee Appeals Board finds that it has not been rendered probable that the Sri Lankan authorities have gained knowledge of your client's statements to the Danish immigration authorities. In this respect, it should be noted that the information given by your client in connection with the asylum proceedings is comprised by the rules of the Danish Criminal Code on the duty of confidentiality of public authorities. The fact that your client was married at a religious ceremony in Denmark and has given birth to a daughter is not relevant under asylum law and thus does not lead to a revised assessment of the case either. Against this background, the Refugee Appeals Board fully relies on its decisions of 13 August 2007, 6 November 2007 and 14 and 28 April 2008. No time-limit for departure is fixed as, on 29 April 2008, the Refugee Appeals Board suspended your client's time-limit for departure for the time being.” 29. On 16 June 2009 the Refugee Appeals Board decided to suspend the examination of asylum cases concerning Tamils from northern Sri Lanka, including the applicant's case. 30. On 16 December 2009, on the basis of the most recent background information concerning Sri Lanka including, inter alia, a Memorandum of 26 October 2009 prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Refugee Appeals Board decided to review the suspended cases, including the applicant's case. 31. On 12 March 2010 the Refugee Appeals Board refused to reopen the applicant's case as it found that the most recent general background information would not lead to a revised assessment of the case. More specifically in its letter to the applicant's representative it stated as follows: The Refugee Appeals Board observes that as her asylum motive your client has stated, inter alia, that, in case of return, she fears outrages committed by the LTTE because she left without permission. She also fears the Sri Lankan military forces. Due to the injuries incurred by her during military operations, she fears that the Sri Lankan army will suspect her of being a member of the LTTE. Moreover, your client fears that her former family-in-law, with whom she is on bad terms and who live in Sri Lanka and have good connections with the Sri Lankan military forces, have informed on her to the Sri Lankan authorities and that she will therefore be unable to enter the country without becoming an object of interest to the authorities. Her former spouse living in Denmark has her ID card, and she fears that he will travel to Sri Lanka and do something that may harm her. Finally, your client has stated that, as a single woman without family or social network, she will be unable to manage in her country of origin. By decision of 13 August 2007 the Refugee Appeals Board stated, inter alia, that your client had left Sri Lanka in possession of her own national passport without problems and that she had not, prior to her departure, been subjected to outrages or the like of a nature to warrant asylum. The Board found that the fact that your client was affiliated with the LTTE as a child soldier when very young did not in itself warrant granting asylum. In that connection, the Refugee Appeals Board emphasised the length of the time passed and the fact that your client was deemed not to have made herself stand out in any way. Moreover, the Board found that the general situation for single women in Sri Lanka could not justify granting a residence permit under section 7 of the Aliens Act. The Board observed that your client's problems with her former spouse were of a private law nature and therefore recommended that she seek the protection of the authorities in case of conflicts. The Board finally found that it had not been rendered probable that your client would be unable to seek the protection of the authorities and that therefore the information on her former family-in-law could not lead to a revised assessment. The Refugee Appeals Board still finds that your client's fear of the LTTE and the Sri Lankan authorities and the conflict with her former family-in-law do not warrant a residence permit under section 7 of the Aliens Act. In that connection, the Refugee Appeals Board refers to your client's statement during the asylum proceedings to the effect that she did not have any problems with the LTTE at any time prior to her departure, including in connection with her leaving the LTTE. On the contrary, she stated that the LTTE accepted her leaving the organisation. The Board observes that several years have passed since your client left the LTTE, and therefore the Board cannot find as a fact that former LTTE members would pursue her because she had left the country without permission from the LTTE. Additionally, the Sri Lankan military forces defeated the LTTE in May 2009. Moreover, it appears from the background information available to the Board that it is hardly likely that former low-ranking members of the LTTE or persons who have previously supported the LTTE will risk reprisals from the LTTE, see United Kingdom: Home Office, Operational Guidance Note, Sri Lanka, August 2009. The possibility that as an ethnic Tamil from northern Sri Lanka your client risks being questioned and investigated by the authorities upon entry into her country of origin does not lead to a revised assessment of the case under asylum law. The individuals at particular risk of being detained and investigated upon entry in Colombo are young Tamils, men in particular, from northern and eastern Sri Lanka; those without ID; those not resident or employed in Colombo; and those recently returned from the West, see United Kingdom: Home Office, Report of Information Gathering Visit to Colombo, Sri Lanka 23 - 29 August 2009. Similarly, although your client risks being detained at the airport, the Refugee Appeals Board finds that this cannot warrant asylum. In that connection, the Board refers to your client's statement during the asylum proceedings to the effect that she was an ordinary, rank-and-file member of the LTTE and that she has not had any conflicts with the Sri Lankan authorities at any time, or been registered in any way. She departed lawfully from Sri Lanka in possession of her own Sri Lankan national passport for the purpose of family reunification in Denmark. Moreover, several years have passed since your client carried out activities for the LTTE. Against that background, the Refugee Appeals Board finds that it has not been rendered probable that the Sri Lankan authorities would take a special interest in your client upon return, regardless of her scars. In this connection, the Refugee Appeals Board refers to the fact that it appears from the background material available to the Board that, in general, individuals who have supported the LTTE on a lower level are not of interest to the authorities. Thus, generally, only high-profile members of the LTTE who are still active and wanted, or individuals wanted for serious criminal offences are of interest to the authorities, see United Kingdom: Home Office, Operational Guidance Note, Sri Lanka, August 2009, and Home Office, Report of Information Gathering Visit to Colombo, Sri Lanka 23‑29 August 2009. Your client has also stated that her former family-in-law has good connections with the Sri Lankan army and that she has reason to believe that the family has informed on her to the Sri Lankan authorities. The Board does not consider this information a fact. The information is thus not substantiated in detail, and your client has not given a more accurate account of which member of her former family-in-law is involved and when that member has allegedly spoken to the authorities about your client. Nor does the Refugee Appeals Board find that the fact that your client's former spouse has taken your client's ID card from her, and that she will have to have her national passport renewed and might thereby attract attention to herself, can lead to any other assessment. As in the previous decisions in the case, the Refugee Appeals Board still finds that the general situation in Sri Lanka is not of such nature as to warrant in itself the grant of a residence permit under section 7 of the Aliens Act. Thus, the Refugee Appeals Board fully relies on the decisions of 13 August 2007, 6 November 2007, 14 April 2008, 28 April 2008 and 11 June 2009. Against that background, the Board still finds that it has not been rendered probable that, in case of return to Sri Lanka, your client would be at concrete and individual risk of persecution as covered by section 7(1) of the Aliens Act, or that your client would be at a real risk of outrages as covered by section 7(2) of the Aliens Act. It should be noted that your client's time-limit for departure is still suspended until further notice on the basis of the request of 28 April 2008 from the European Court of Human Rights. If your client's lawful stay in Denmark lapses, she must leave the country immediately, see section 33(1) and (2) of the Aliens Act. As appears from the decision of the Refugee Appeals Board of 13 August 2007, your client may be forcibly returned to Sri Lanka if she does not leave voluntarily, see section 32a, cf. section 31, of the Aliens Act.

4. The applicant was born in 1919 and lives in London. 5. The applicant claimed to be the owner of four tenements in Malta. Before the Court he produced a statement made on 19 July 2006 by a notary public, which reads as follows: “I the undersigned Dr. Paul Pullicino, Notary Public, do hereby certify that in virtue of a secret will made on the 4th day of October, 1966, by Charles Edwards, and published by me on the 9th November, 1996, Major Joseph John Edwards [the applicant] was nominated and appointed by his father, the late Mr Charles Edwards as his sole universal heir and Testamentary Executor of his estate to whom he bequeathed 21/25ths undivided parts of tenements situated at numbers 96 to 100 Tonna Street, Sliema, - of which 2/25ths had been inherited by his wife from her late brother Sir Augustus Bartolo and the further 16/25ths purchased by him from her brother's family in the mid 1950's – all of which were owned in common with the remaining 4/25ths undivided and equal parts owned by four further members of the Bartolo family residing somewhere in South America, the administration of which had been passed on to him by their eldest brother Captain Albert Borg Falzon who had been their family administrator until he emigrated from Malta on the 4th June, 1956.” 6. In March 1941 the four tenements were requisitioned for the purpose of providing housing for homeless people. The requisition order was served on the applicant's ancestor, Mr Charles Edwards. Further correspondence about the premises was addressed to Mr Charles Edwards, as trustee of the estate of the late Sir Augustus Bartolo. 7. On 2 June 1949 a judicial letter was sent to Mr Charles Edwards “as owner” of the premises, demanding recognition of the tenants. He replied that he was only the trustee of the estate and could not therefore recognise the tenants. This position was confirmed in a court application of 14 July 1949. 8. The top floor of one of the tenements was allocated to Mr P. and his family, while family S. had been allotted the ground floor. The requisition of this tenement, composed of two floors, was contested on the ground that the ground floor provided the only access to a field, which belonged to the same owner and which had not been requisitioned. After these tenants had been recognised, on 16 December 1949 the premises were derequisitioned. 9. The premises were again requisitioned on 18 July 1957 from Mr Charles Edwards. They were derequisitioned on 5 March 1963. 10. On 10 September 1975 a fresh requisition order concerning the same tenement was issued to Mr. Charles Edwards. The authorities instructed that family P. be allotted both floors. The housekeeper, who was in correspondence about the matter with the applicant (Mr Joseph John Edwards), handed over all the keys of the tenement. 11. On 14 November 1975 the applicant wrote to the Housing Department asking for reconsideration of the order of 10 September 1975. He reiterated the argument concerning access to the field. The Department acknowledged receipt of this letter but did not reply to it. On an unspecified date in 1976, an amended requisition order, including the field adjacent to the applicant's tenement, was issued. 12. The applicant alleged that he had sought the assistance of the Minister of Housing and of the Attorney General in order to restore the situation and that on further meetings with the authorities he had been made to believe that the situation would be remedied. However, this had not been the case and he did not obtain any satisfaction. 13. On 28 March 1996 the applicant instituted proceedings before the Civil Court (First Hall) against the Director of Social Accommodation. He alleged that the requisition order of 10 September 1975 had been issued as a result of an abuse of power and was therefore null and void. He also claimed an infringement of his right to the enjoyment of his property as guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 by reason that the requisition order had not been made in accordance with the public interest and that he had not received adequate and appropriate compensation. 14. In a judgment of 3 October 2003, the Civil Court dismissed the applicant's claim. It declared that the tenement should be considered 'quid unum' and therefore as a single entity, including the field. It also found that the applicant's submission that the requisition order had been made in excess of power was unsubstantiated. 15. The Civil Court held that the existence of a public interest should be assessed in the light of the particular features of each individual case. In the applicant's case, the requisition was aimed at ensuring a fair distribution of homes. The benefit enjoyed by the son of Mr P. and his family, who were still using the tenement as a place of habitation, was far superior to that of the applicant. In fact, the latter made sporadic use of the garden or field, which, according to certain witnesses, was used as a rubbish dump. 16. The Civil Court furthermore observed that the applicant had brought his complaints twenty years after the issuing of the requisition order and that during this period he had apparently accepted the rent that he was being paid. This rent had been established by the Land Valuation Officer and had the applicant wanted to review the amount of the rent he could have applied to the Rent Regulation Board. 17. The Civil Court found that it had no jurisdiction to deal with the alleged violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 since the requisition order had been issued in 1975. According to Article 4 of Chapter 319 of the Laws of Malta, the Convention could not be applied retroactively and thus only breaches which occurred after 30 April 1987 fell within the jurisdiction of the domestic courts. 18. The applicant appealed to the Constitutional Court. 19. He observed that had the tenement been a single entity, this should have been the case from the original requisition order made in 1941. However, the field only became accessory to the tenement according to the 1975 requisition order. The applicant moreover claimed that the tenant was making use of the land to further his gardening hobby, which could not be considered an essential part of his accommodation needs. The applicant recalled that he had been deprived of his property for almost thirty years and complained about the amount of rent (28 Maltese Liras (MTL) per year – approximately 67 euros (EUR)), which he considered to be ridiculous in comparison with the market value of the property. 20. In a judgment of 25 February 2005, the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant's appeal. 21. It held that the applicant's tenement should be considered one whole property, especially since the only access to the field was through the ground floor. Furthermore, the applicant had never made any serious attempt to question this and had kept unreservedly receiving the rent due. In any case, if he had not been satisfied with the amount of the rent, the applicant should have applied to the Rent Regulation Board, thus using the ordinary remedy available in such circumstances. 22. The Constitutional Court found that the applicant's claim regarding a violation of his right to the enjoyment of property was inadmissible ratione temporis as the requisition order had been issued and executed before 1987. However, since the complaint concerning the absence of adequate compensation referred to a continuing situation, the Constitutional Court went on to consider its merits. 23. It recalled that the applicant had always accepted rent from the tenants, which meant that there was a regular lease between the two. The Constitutional Court held that the Government enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation in assessing what was in the public interest and which measures were proportionate to the aims sought to be achieved. It quoted van Dijk's and van Hoof's book Theory and Practice of the European Convention stating that social and economic policy in the field of housing constituted an aim in the general interest. 24. Finally, the requisition and the amount of rent were in accordance with the Strasbourg case-law. The Constitutional Court referred, on these points, to the cases of Pine Valley Developments and Others v. Ireland (judgment of 29 November 1991, Series A no. 222), Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden (judgment of 23 September 1982, Series A no. 52), The Holy Monasteries v. Greece (judgment of 9 December 1994, Series A no. 301-A) and James and Others v. United Kingdom (judgment of 21 February 1986, Series A no. 98).

6. The applicants were born in 1968 and 1966 respectively and live in Ștefan Vodă. They are husband and wife. 7. On 4 May 2000 the first applicant was giving birth to a child. The head of the obstetrics and gynaecology department of the Ştefan-Vodă regional hospital, Mr B., performed a Caesarean section on her. During the procedure he removed her ovaries and Fallopian tubes, without obtaining her permission. As a result of the operation, the first applicant, who was thirty-two at the time, suffered an early menopause. 8. Since 2001 the first applicant has been having medical treatment designed to counteract the effects of the early menopause, including hormone replacement therapy. According to her doctors, she has to continue such treatment until she is between fifty-two and fifty-five years old, after which further treatment will be required. 9. According to a neurology report dated 5 November 2001, the first applicant was suffering from astheno-depressive syndrome and osteoporosis. On 18 February 2002 the doctors found that the first applicant experienced hot flushes, neurosis and frequent heart palpitations. On 8 May 2002 she was diagnosed with asthenic neurosis. 10. According to the results of an examination carried out by a medical panel on 18 March 2003, the removal of the first applicant’s ovaries and Fallopian tubes had been unnecessary and the surgery had resulted in her being sterilised. 11. On 26 July 2006 a psychiatrist and a psychologist established that the first applicant was suffering from long-term psychological problems and that she continued to show signs of post-traumatic stress disorder. 12. On 15 March 2005 the Căuşeni District Court convicted B. of medical negligence which had caused severe damage to the health and bodily integrity of the victim. He was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment, suspended for one year. The court referred to medical reports and found, inter alia, that B. had failed to inform the applicants of the sterilisation until ten days after the event. The first applicant’s ovaries could have been preserved, but B. had failed to do so. 13. On 11 May 2005 the Bender Court of Appeal upheld that judgment. 14. On 2 August 2005 the Supreme Court of Justice quashed the lower courts’ judgments and adopted its own judgment, finding B. guilty but absolving him of criminal responsibility because the limitation period for sentencing him had expired. 15. On an unknown date in March 2007 the applicants started civil proceedings against the Ştefan-Vodă regional hospital and B., claiming compensation for the damage caused, comprising 9,909 Moldovan lei (MDL – approximately 587 euros (EUR) at the time) for pecuniary damage, MDL 1 million (EUR 59,740) for the first applicant and MDL 100,000 (EUR 5,974) for the second applicant in respect of non-pecuniary damage, and MDL 2,700 (EUR 160) for legal costs. They also sought a court order for the hospital to provide the first applicant with free treatment for as long as her condition required, as prescribed by her doctors. The applicants’ lawyer provided detailed explanations and evidence in support of each of these claims, including various medical reports, the cost of medical consultations, laboratory analyses and treatment undertaken by the first applicant, and the findings of the criminal courts in the case against B. 16. On 18 September 2007 the Căuşeni District Court accepted the applicants’ claims in part, referring to the findings of the criminal courts and the medical evidence in the file. It ordered the hospital to provide the first applicant with the requisite medication until the year 2020. The court also awarded MDL 1,119 (EUR 69) to the applicants for pecuniary damage, as well as MDL 5,000 (EUR 306) to the first applicant and MDL 1,000 (EUR 61) to the second applicant in respect of non-pecuniary damage. In this latter connection, the court found that B. had voluntarily compensated the applicants for the pecuniary losses they had incurred and that awarding sums as large as those claimed by the applicants would have seriously affected the activities of the (State-owned) hospital. 17. On 24 January 2008 the Chişinău Court of Appeal partly quashed that judgment, increasing the award for non-pecuniary damage to the first applicant to MDL 10,000 (EUR 607) plus MDL 1,237 (EUR 75) for costs. The court observed that, under the applicable legal provisions, the size of an award of compensation for non-pecuniary damage was to be determined by taking into consideration the circumstances of the case, including the nature and seriousness of suffering caused to the victim, the degree of guilt of the person who had caused the suffering, and the degree to which such compensation could bring about just satisfaction for the victim. The court referred to the findings of the criminal courts in the case against B., as well as the first applicant’s medical reports (see paragraph 10 above). 18. The applicants lodged an appeal on points of law, arguing inter alia that the lower courts had not given sufficient reasons for making such a nominal award, which had not offered them redress for the violation of their rights. They referred to the various medical reports confirming that, besides the long-lasting psychological effect on the first applicant resulting from being permanently sterilised without her knowledge or consent, she continued to suffer from health problems which required constant medical treatment. 19. In a final judgment of 24 September 2008 the Supreme Court of Justice upheld the judgment of 24 January 2008, essentially repeating the arguments of the lower court. 20. The award in the applicants’ favour was enforced in March 2009.

5. The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Riga. 6. The applicant, at the time of the material events, was working for the national television broadcaster Latvijas televīzija (“LTV”). She was a producer, reporter and host of the weekly investigative news programme De facto, aired in prime time every Sunday night. 7. On 10 February 2010 the applicant received an e-mail from a person who called himself “Neo”, revealing that there were serious security flaws in a database maintained by the State Revenue Service (Valsts ieņēmumu dienests – “the VID”). Allegedly, these flaws made it possible to access the data stored in the Electronic Declaration System (Elektroniskā deklarēšanas sistēma – “the EDS”) without breaching any security protocols. In support of his allegations, “Neo” attached some examples of the data which he had downloaded in this manner (for example, salaries of LTV employees), the veracity of which the applicant could confirm. The applicant concluded that the data were genuine and that, most probably, there was a serious security flaw in the system. She then proceeded to inform the VID of a possible security breach. 8. “Neo” did not reveal his identity to the applicant during their e-mail correspondence. He told her that there were more data which showed that the austerity measures in the public sector did not affect the highest-paid State officials. It transpired during their correspondence that “Neo” did not wish to reveal his identity. 9. On 14 February 2010 the applicant, acting in her capacity as a journalist, announced during the broadcast of De facto that there had been a massive data leak from the EDS. She reported that the information concerned the income, tax payments and personal identity details of public officials, as well as private individuals and companies. 10. One week after the broadcast, “Neo” started to publish data through his Twitter account concerning the salaries paid at various public institutions, at State and municipal levels; in some cases the names of the officials were included, and in others only the salaries were published. The information received wide media coverage. On 18 April 2010 he stopped publishing it. 11. On 10 February 2010, upon an application by the VID, criminal proceedings were instituted concerning the data leak. 12. On 19 February 2010 the police went to LTV to take evidence from the applicant as a witness in the criminal proceedings. They asked for a transcript of the 14 February 2010 broadcast, as well as access to the e-mail correspondence with “Neo”. The applicant declined to disclose the identity of her source or any information which could lead to its disclosure, referring to the right of non-disclosure as set forth in section 22 of the Law on Press and Other Mass Media. 13. On the same date another journalist was also asked to disclose the identity of his journalistic source, as he had had a public communication with “Neo”, which had been aired during another television broadcast. He refused to testify since he did not consider that his source had done anything wrong. 14. According to the Government, on 11 May 2010 the investigating authorities established that two of the IP address which had been used to connect to the EDS, had been used by a certain I.P. It was also established that I.P. had made several phone calls to the applicant’s phone number. 15. On 11 May 2010, at about 6.55 p.m., I.P. was arrested in connection with the criminal proceedings; he was released from custody a few months later. 16. On 12 May 2010 a police investigator informed the investigating judge that on the previous day four urgent searches had taken place at I.P.’s home, work and other premises. She also informed the judge of an urgent search at the applicant’s home (see paragraph 21 et seq. below). She then requested, under section 180, paragraph 5 of the Criminal Procedure Law, that the lawfulness of and the grounds for those searches be examined. 17. On 14 May 2010 the investigator ordered a technical examination of the data storage devices that had been seized at the applicant’s home on 11 May 2010. According to the Government, all these devices were handed over to the relevant examination body within the State Police in two sealed bags. These packs remained unopened until 17 May 2010, when an expert opened them; their packaging or seals were not damaged. On 17 and 18 May 2010 the expert copied all the information from the data storage devices onto another computer using a special software programme. On 19 May 2010 he sealed the bags and handed them back to the investigator. On 21 May 2010 the data storage devices were returned to the applicant. 18. On 15 June 2010 the technical examination was completed and, according to the Government, the information that had been copied was destroyed. 19. The criminal proceedings against I.P. concerning the data leak appear to be pending at the pre-trial investigation stage. 20. On 11 May 2010 the investigator drew up a search warrant, which was authorised by a public prosecutor the same day. The relevant parts of the warrant read as follows: “It transpires from the case materials that [I.P.] was using mobile phone number ... at the material time. According to the information provided by the [mobile phone service provider], on 6 July 2009, the registered date of the first attempt to download a nonexistent EDS XML file, and also on 8 July 2009 and 28 October 2009, the established dates on which separate EDS XML files were downloaded via the anonymous ‘TOR’ servers, subscriber ... made outgoing calls to the subscriber with number ... . Periodic communication took place until 14 February 2010, when it ceased completely. According to the call history printouts, on several occasions both subscribers were served by the same electronic communications base stations, indicating the possibility that the subscribers met. It was established that [the applicant], identity code ..., residing in ..., was using the phone number ... . The facts and circumstances established in connection with the criminal proceedings taken together serve as grounds for the conclusion that at the time the criminal offence was committed [the applicant] had frequent communication with [I.P.] and might possibly have information about the unlawful activities of [I.P.] connected with the illegal downloading of EDS XML files, and also on the processing, storage and distribution of these files, his accomplices and other information in connection with the criminal proceedings. Taking into account that the case materials give reasonable grounds to consider that at [the applicant’s home] there might be data storage devices that contain the XML files illegally downloaded from the EDS database and any derivatives thereof, software for processing these files, information about the obtaining and distribution of these files and other documents and items containing information about the crime that could serve as evidence in the criminal proceedings, it is necessary to carry out the search under the urgent procedure to prevent the destruction, concealment or damaging of such evidence. On the basis of sections 180(3) and 337 (2)(2) of the Criminal Procedure Law: DECIDED: 1. to search [the applicant’s home] with a view to finding and seizing documents and data storage devices containing XML files illegally downloaded from the EDS database and any derivatives thereof, software for processing these files, information about the obtaining and distribution of these files and any other items containing information about the crime under investigation.” 21. On 11 May 2010, from 9.34 to 10.30 p.m., the police conducted a search at the applicant’s home. 22. According to the applicant, upon her return home that night a plain‑clothes policeman approached her in the stairwell and, without identifying himself, physically prevented her from closing the doors. Only then did he present a search warrant and proceed to conduct the search together with two other officers. During the search the following data storage devices were seized: a personal laptop, an external hard drive, a memory card and four flash drives. According to the applicant, these devices contained a large body of her personal data as well as most of her work-related material. 23. The Government did not contest the applicant’s version of the events. 24. On 12 May 2010 the investigating judge retrospectively approved the search warrant of 11 May 2010 in the form of an “approval” written on that warrant. No reasons were given. 25. On 14 June 2010 the President of the first-instance court, upon a complaint by the applicant, upheld the investigating judge’s decision and concluded that the search was lawful and that the evidence obtained was admissible in the criminal proceedings. No hearing was held. She examined the applicant’s written complaints, the criminal case file and the investigator’s written explanation. The relevant part of the decision, which was final, reads: “Having considered the impugned decision of the investigating judge on its merits, I find it to be in compliance with the legal norms and the actual state of affairs. ... The investigator has taken sufficient actions to protect the rights of [the applicant] as a journalist. In particular, she assigned police officers to question [the applicant] as a witness, and [the applicant] used her right not to disclose her source. According to the domestic case-law, in most cases the court imposes an obligation on journalists to disclose sources of information only in cases when, purely objectively, there are no other options for solving or preventing a crime or in cases when any further crimes would substantially harm public and national-security interests. In the present proceedings, although the unlawful processing and uncontrolled dissemination of the personal data of several thousand, even hundreds of thousands of people is considered a substantial violation of the rights of the general public, the investigating authority did not apply to the investigating judge for an order to disclose the information source ... because ... it was decided not to pursue any investigative activities that would concern journalists, in line with the principle of proportionality and the rights of non-disclosure ... Accordingly, as the material in the case file shows, the further investigation focused on other leads, and the probable suspect was established by processing and analysing the records of the EDS, that is, with no disclosure of a journalist’s source. ... There is no reasonable ground to believe that the search at [the applicant’s] home was performed for the purpose of identifying the source of the information, because the aim of the search was to find the XML files downloaded from the EDS database and any derivatives thereof, software for processing these files and information about the obtaining and distribution of the files, and to stop any further unlawful dissemination of personal data. ... The present criminal proceedings were opened in connection with facts directly relating to the exchange of information in electronic form and therefore it is important to take into account the specific features of cybercrime, where the preservation, acquisition and recording of evidence in electronic form is delicate owing to the fact that such evidence can be modified or destroyed very quickly; it is also important to take into account the mens rea of the crime. ... I find that in this particular case the search under the urgent procedure was admissible. ... Since [the applicant] is an in-house and not a freelance journalist, there are no grounds to assume that material directly related to her professional activity would definitely be stored at her home, especially if she herself did not indicate that this was the case. If any such indications had been given, the investigating judge would have had grounds to evaluate such facts. ... In view of the above, I find that the 12 May 2010 decision by the investigating judge is justified and lawful and there are no grounds to revoke it; I am also of the opinion that there are no reasons to consider that the results of the actions under consideration are void. At the same time it should be explained to [the applicant] that any complaints of alleged breaches during the search or other investigative activities ought to be submitted in accordance with the procedure laid down in section 337 of the Criminal Procedure Law ...” 26. On 21 May 2010 a senior prosecutor replied to the applicant’s complaints about the investigator’s decision to conduct the search, its authorisation by the supervising prosecutor and the police officers’ actions while carrying it out. He stated that he could not examine the grounds for the search; these had in any case been examined by the investigating judge and the President of the court. 27. Moreover, he found that on 11 May 2010 the supervising prosecutor had lawfully authorised the search warrant. As to the return of the seized items, the matter was to be discussed with the competent investigating authority. Finally, a note was added that the applicant could lodge a complaint against the senior prosecutor’s reply with another branch of the prosecutor’s office. 28. The Internal Security Bureau of the State Police (Valsts policijas Iekšējās drošības birojs), of its own motion, examined the police officers’ conduct during the search. On 20 July 2010 the applicant was informed that no breaches of either the Criminal Procedure Law or the general principles of police officers’ ethics had been found. 29. On 13 May 2010 the Ombudsman opened an inquiry into the search at the applicant’s home with a view to ascertaining whether the search had interfered with her freedom of expression and whether the domestic authorities had had sufficient regard to the assessment of the limitations imposed on the freedom of the press. 30. On 28 September 2010 he delivered his opinion, which was not binding on the domestic authorities. He examined not only whether the alleged violation of the applicant’s freedom of expression had taken place, but also whether there was an effective monitoring system in the country in that regard. As concerns the alleged interference with freedom of expression, and proportionality, he noted the following [emphasis as in the original]: “The protection of journalistic sources is provided for under section 22 of the Law [on Press and Other Mass Media] ... This does not mean the absolute immunity of a journalist in criminal proceedings, but the necessity to respect journalists’ professional interests and legal guarantees. The decision of the competent investigating authorities to search the applicant’s place of residence was based on the information made public in the De facto broadcast. According to the list of objects searched, it was important to secure the evidence and to clarify how the journalist had received the information about the data “leak” from SRS EDS, and who was guilty. The wording used in the search warrant – “information about the obtaining and distribution” – clearly demonstrates the purpose of the competent investigating authorities to identify the journalistic source. That being so, the activities of the competent investigating authorities in the particular case concern[ed] the protection of journalistic sources and thus interfere[d] with the journalist’s freedom of expression. At the same time, the protection of journalistic sources is not absolute and may be restricted in certain cases in the public interest. This means that the competent investigating authorities, when taking a decision affecting a journalist, should evaluate the aspects of restriction of freedom of expression and the proportionality of such action - is the disclosure of such information truly necessary? Or maybe there are reasonable alternative measures, as specified in Principle 3 of the Recommendation [No. R(2000) 7]. [Reference to sections 12, 154, 179 and 180 of the Criminal Procedure Law] Therefore, there is a legal basis for disclosure of journalistic sources, for searches and also for the lawful and proportionate restriction of human rights in criminal proceedings. It follows that such restrictions are prescribed by law. To assess the proportionality of those restrictions and the possibility of applying less harmful alternative means of achieving the aim, the Ombudsman asked the responsible authorities whether, for the purpose of obtaining information from the journalist, there had been sufficient grounds to opt for an emergency search out of all options offered by the [Criminal Procedure Law], rather than for a disclosure order under section 154 of the [Criminal Procedure Law]. [The prosecutor’s office] replied that the purpose of the search had been to substantiate and obtain evidence in criminal proceedings, and not to identify the journalistic source, which was already known to the police; that was why disclosure under section 154 of the [Criminal Procedure Law] was not ordered. The prosecutor’s office held the view that it had no right to give any opinion on the validity of the investigative action, since the activities of the investigating judge who approved the search had been examined by the President of the court. The court substantiated the need for a search under the urgent procedure by the fact that in criminal proceedings involving a flow of electronic documents it was necessary to take into account the specifics of cybercrimes, where the preservation, obtaining and recording of electronic evidence was rather delicate because such evidence could be altered and destroyed very quickly and irreversibly. Such a statement should be considered critically, since the officers of the State Police turned to the applicant with the request to provide information on her source on 19 February 2010, but the search under the urgent procedure was carried out on 11 May 2010. The materials submitted by the State authorities and the court to the Ombudsman do not contain any evidence of attempts by the journalist to continue unlawfully processing and further distributing the data, or to destroy such information. The need to conduct the search under the urgent procedure has also not been explained in the assessment provided by the court, if the materials of the case provided sufficient basis to consider that the applicant most likely knew, supported or participated in the crime under investigation by simultaneously using the information for journalistic purposes. If the competent investigating authority had such information at the time of making the decision on conducting the search, it is not clear why the police did not apply the status of a suspect to the journalist before the search and did not search the journalist’s place of work. It is considered established that the decision of the court is based upon assumptions, and in reaching the decision the court has not respected the status of the journalist, whose immunity and protection against disclosure of the information source are established in the law. Consequently, it can be concluded that by approving the search warrant issued by the competent investigating authority under the urgent procedure, the supervising prosecutor and the court made no critical assessment of the need for and validity of those actions. The Ombudsman has reservations as to whether a search at the applicant’s home under the urgent procedure was actually the most reasonable means of putting a stop to the disclosure of information at that point in the proceedings. In order to ensure compliance with the key principles of criminal proceedings established under section 12 of the [the Criminal Procedure Law], the competent investigating authority should have given more careful consideration to whether the information necessary for the investigation could have been obtained by means less harmful to the interests of the person.” His final conclusions were as follows: “Freedom of expression includes the right not to disclose journalistic sources. Only a court, observing the principle of proportionality, may order the disclosure of an information source to protect the essential interests of private individuals or society. By conducting the search in [the applicant’s] home, purportedly in search, among other things, of information about the obtaining and distribution of the EDS database XML files, the competent investigating authority – in securing the evidence and disregarding the requirement to have a court order – discovered the identity of the applicant’s source. In authorising the search warrant issued by the investigator under the urgent procedure, the supervising prosecutor and the court failed to effect a critical examination of the urgency and the necessity of such a measure and did not sufficiently evaluate the threat to freedom of expression. Accordingly, the freedom of expression and the right not to disclose journalistic sources enshrined in the Constitution and binding international treaties have been violated. Since the legally protected immunity of a journalist in criminal proceedings is not incorporated in [the relevant chapter of the Criminal Procedure Law] and the domestic case-law shows that the competent investigating authorities do not pay sufficient attention to it, it would be advisable to initiate a discussion on [legislative] amendments [to the relevant provision of the Criminal Procedure Law]. In all likelihood the law should specify that it is prohibited to perform investigative activities involving journalists on premises belonging to them if there are reasonable grounds to consider that this might restrict the scope of the rights guaranteed to journalists.” 31. Several international instruments concern the protection of journalistic sources, including the Resolution on Journalistic Freedoms and Human Rights, adopted at the 4th European Ministerial Conference on Mass Media Policy (Prague, 7-8 December 1994) and the European Parliament’s Resolution on the Confidentiality of Journalists’ Sources (18 January 1994, Official Journal of the European Communities No. C 44/34). 32. Recommendation No. R (2000) 7 on the right of journalists not to disclose their sources of information was adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 8 March 2000 and states, in so far as relevant: “[The Committee of Ministers] Recommends to the governments of member States: 3. to bring them in particular to the attention of public authorities, police authorities and the judiciary as well as to make them available to journalists, the media and their professional organisations. Appendix to Recommendation No. R (2000) 7 Principles concerning the right of journalists not to disclose their sources of information Definitions For the purposes of this Recommendation: a. the term ‘journalist’ means any natural or legal person who is regularly or professionally engaged in the collection and dissemination of information to the public via any means of mass communication; b. the term ‘information’ means any statement of fact, opinion or idea in the form of text, sound and/or picture; c. the term ‘source’ means any person who provides information to a journalist; d. the term ‘information identifying a source’ means, as far as this is likely to lead to the identification of a source: i. the name and personal data as well as voice and image of a source, ii. the factual circumstances of acquiring information from a source by a journalist, iii. the unpublished content of the information provided by a source to a journalist, and iv. personal data of journalists and their employers related to their professional work. Principle 1 (Right of non-disclosure of journalists) Domestic law and practice in member States should provide for explicit and clear protection of the right of journalists not to disclose information identifying a source in accordance with Article 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter: the Convention) and the principles established herein, which are to be considered as minimum standards for the respect of this right. Principle 2 (Right of non-disclosure of other persons) Other persons who, by their professional relations with journalists, acquire knowledge of information identifying a source through the collection, editorial processing or dissemination of this information, should equally be protected under the principles established herein. Principle 3 (Limits to the right of non-disclosure) a. The right of journalists not to disclose information identifying a source must not be subject to other restrictions than those mentioned in Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. In determining whether a legitimate interest in a disclosure falling within the scope of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention outweighs the public interest in not disclosing information identifying a source, competent authorities of member States shall pay particular regard to the importance of the right of non-disclosure and the pre‑eminence given to it in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, and may only order a disclosure if, subject to paragraph b, there exists an overriding requirement in the public interest and if circumstances are of a sufficiently vital and serious nature. b. The disclosure of information identifying a source should not be deemed necessary unless it can be convincingly established that: i. reasonable alternative measures to the disclosure do not exist or have been exhausted by the persons or public authorities that seek the disclosure, and ii. the legitimate interest in the disclosure clearly outweighs the public interest in the non-disclosure, bearing in mind that: • an overriding requirement of the need for disclosure is proved, • the circumstances are of a sufficiently vital and serious nature, • the necessity of the disclosure is identified as responding to a pressing social need, and • member States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in assessing this need, but this margin goes hand in hand with the supervision by the European Court of Human Rights. c. The above requirements should be applied at all stages of any proceedings where the right of non-disclosure might be invoked. Principle 4 (Alternative evidence to journalists’ sources) In legal proceedings against a journalist on grounds of an alleged infringement of the honour or reputation of a person, authorities should consider, for the purpose of establishing the truth or otherwise of the allegation, all evidence which is available to them under national procedural law and may not require for that purpose the disclosure of information identifying a source by the journalist. Principle 5 (Conditions concerning disclosures) a. The motion or request for initiating any action by competent authorities aimed at the disclosure of information identifying a source should only be introduced by persons or public authorities that have a direct legitimate interest in the disclosure. b. Journalists should be informed by the competent authorities of their right not to disclose information identifying a source as well as of the limits of this right before a disclosure is requested. c. Sanctions against journalists for not disclosing information identifying a source should only be imposed by judicial authorities during court proceedings which allow for a hearing of the journalists concerned in accordance with Article 6 of the Convention. d. Journalists should have the right to have the imposition of a sanction for not disclosing their information identifying a source reviewed by another judicial authority. e. Where journalists respond to a request or order to disclose information identifying a source, the competent authorities should consider applying measures to limit the extent of a disclosure, for example by excluding the public from the disclosure with due respect to Article 6 of the Convention, where relevant, and by themselves respecting the confidentiality of such a disclosure. Principle 6 (Interception of communication, surveillance and judicial search and seizure) a. The following measures should not be applied if their purpose is to circumvent the right of journalists, under the terms of these principles, not to disclose information identifying a source: i. interception orders or actions concerning communication or correspondence of journalists or their employers, ii. surveillance orders or actions concerning journalists, their contacts or their employers, or iii. search or seizure orders or actions concerning the private or business premises, belongings or correspondence of journalists or their employers or personal data related to their professional work. b. Where information identifying a source has been properly obtained by police or judicial authorities by any of the above actions, although this might not have been the purpose of these actions, measures should be taken to prevent the subsequent use of this information as evidence before courts, unless the disclosure would be justified under Principle 3. Principle 7 (Protection against self-incrimination) The principles established herein shall not in any way limit national laws on the protection against self-incrimination in criminal proceedings, and journalists should, as far as such laws apply, enjoy such protection with regard to the disclosure of information identifying a source.” 33. For the precise application of the Recommendation, the explanatory notes specified the meaning of certain terms. As regards the terms “source” and “information identifying a source” the following was set out: “c. Source 17. Any person who provides information to a journalist shall be considered as his or her ‘source’. The protection of the relationship between a journalist and a source is the goal of this Recommendation, because of the ‘potentially chilling effect’ an order of source disclosure has on the exercise of freedom of the media (see, Eur. Court H.R., Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, 27 March 1996, para. 39). Journalists may receive their information from all kinds of sources. Therefore, a wide interpretation of this term is necessary. The actual provision of information to journalists can constitute an action on the side of the source, for example when a source calls or writes to a journalist or sends to him or her recorded information or pictures. Information shall also be regarded as being ‘provided’ when a source remains passive and consents to the journalist taking the information, such as the filming or recording of information with the consent of the source. d. Information identifying a source 18. In order to protect the identity of a source adequately, it is necessary to protect all kinds of information which are likely to lead to the identification of a source. The potential to identify a source therefore determines the type of protected information and the range of such protection. As far as its disclosure may lead to an identification of a source, the following information shall be protected by this Recommendation: i. the name of a source and his or her address, telephone and telefax number, employer’s name and other personal data as well as the voice of the source and pictures showing a source; ii. ’the factual circumstances of acquiring this information’, for example the time and place of a meeting with a source, the means of correspondence used or the particularities agreed between a source and a journalist; iii. ’the unpublished content of the information provided by a source to a journalist’, for example other facts, data, sounds or pictures which may indicate a source’s identity and which have not yet been published by the journalist; iv. ’personal data of journalists and their employers related to their professional work’, i.e. personal data produced by the work of journalists, which could be found, for example, in address lists, lists of telephone calls, registrations of computer-based communications, travel arrangements or bank statements. 19. This list is not necessarily exhaustive. Paragraph c has to be read and interpreted in a manner which allows an adequate protection of a source in a given case. The decisive factor is whether any additional information is likely to lead to the identification of a source.” 34. Section 22 of the Law on Press and Other Mass Media (likums “Par presi un citiem masu informācijas līdzekļiem”) lays down the principle of non-disclosure in Latvian law. The mass media have a right not to disclose sources of information (paragraph 1). An order to disclose a source of information may be made only by a court, after considering proportionality, for the protection of the essential interests of private individuals or society (paragraph 2). 35. Section 154 of the Criminal Procedure Law (Kriminālprocesa likums) sets forth the circumstances when a journalist or an editor is under obligation to disclose a source of information. Such an order may be made only by a court (paragraph 1). The investigating judge, upon an application by an investigator or a public prosecutor, hears the parties and examines the material in the case file (paragraph 2) and assesses the proportionality of the measure (paragraph 3). The decision is amenable to judicial review by a higher-court judge, under a written procedure, whose decision is final (paragraph 4). 36. Section 180 of the Criminal Procedure Law lays down the procedure for issuing a search warrant. Under the ordinary procedure, the investigating judge or court authorises the search upon an application by the competent investigating authority (procesa virzītājs), having examined the case file (paragraph 1). Under the urgent procedure, when a delay could allow the relevant documents or objects to be destroyed, hidden or damaged or the person to abscond, the search warrant may be issued by the competent investigating authority. Authorisation by a public prosecutor is necessary for a search warrant issued by the investigator (paragraph 3). A search warrant issued under the urgent procedure has to be submitted on the following day to the investigating judge, who then examines the lawfulness of and the grounds for the search; if an investigative action is unlawful, the investigating judge declares such evidence inadmissible in the criminal proceedings and decides on further action in relation to the evidence (paragraph 5). 37. Section 337 of the Criminal Procedure Law lays down the procedure for submission of complaints. A complaint shall be addressed to and lodged with the authority that is competent to decide on it; it can also be submitted to an official whose action or decision is contested (paragraph 1). A complaint about an action or decision by an investigating judge shall be forwarded for examination to the President of the court (paragraph 2, part 4). When examining a complaint, the President of the court has to decide on merits; his/her decision is final (paragraph 4). 38. Section 12 of the Criminal Procedure Law provides as follows: Section 12 - Human rights guarantees “1. Criminal proceedings shall be performed in compliance with internationally recognised human rights, without imposing unjustified criminal procedural obligations or disproportionate interferences with a person’s private life. 2. Human rights shall be restricted only for public safety reasons and only in accordance with the procedure specified by this Law, regard being had to the nature and danger of the criminal offence. 3. The application of security measures depriving people of their liberty, and the infringement of the inviolability of private premises, or of the confidentiality of correspondence and means of communication, shall be allowed only with the consent of an investigating judge or court. 4. Officials involved in the conduct of criminal proceedings shall protect the confidentiality of private life and of commercial activities. The relevant information shall be obtained and used only if such information is necessary to establish the truth. 5. An individual shall have the right to request the exclusion from the criminal case of information concerning ... his or her private life ... if such information is not necessary for the fair resolution of the criminal proceedings.” 39. On 13 May 2010 the Latvian Parliament (Saeima) adopted legislative amendments to the effect that all public institutions were to make available on the internet information about the salaries paid to their officials. These amendments took effect on 15 June 2010.

4. The applicant, who was born in 1971, lives in Ankara. 5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6. On 12 November 1991 the applicant was arrested and placed in police custody by police officers from the Ankara Security Directorate on suspicion of his involvement in the activities of an illegal organisation, namely the TDKP/GKB (Turkish Revolutionary Communist Party / Young Communist Union). 7. On 19 November 1991 the applicant gave a statement to the police, allegedly under duress and confessed that he had been involved in certain illegal activities organised by the TDKP/GKB. 8. On 25 November 1991 the public prosecutor at the Ankara State Security Court questioned the applicant in relation to his involvement in the TDKP/GKB. The applicant denied the content of his written statement of 19 November 1991 and alleged that it had been taken under duress. 9. On 26 November 1991 the applicant was brought before a single judge of the Ankara State Security Court, who after taking his statement ordered his release. 10. On 30 December 1991 the public prosecutor at the Ankara State Security Court filed an indictment against the applicant and fourteen other defendants, accusing them of membership of an illegal organisation. The prosecution requested that the applicant be convicted and sentenced pursuant to Article 7 § 1 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act. 11. On 13 April 1993 the Ankara State Security Court, composed of three judges including a military judge, convicted the applicant as charged. The court held that there was sufficient and satisfactory evidence to disclose that he had committed the alleged offences. It accordingly sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment. Both the applicant and the public prosecutor appealed. 12. On 8 February 1994 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the first instance court on the ground that the applicant should have been convicted under Article 168 § 2 of the Criminal Code on account of his membership to an illegal organisation. 13. On 16 March 1994 the Ankara State Security Court, to which the case had been remitted, held its first hearing and asked the accused persons to submit their final observations. On 27 May 1994 the applicant submitted his final observations and denied the charges against him. The court held thirty-three more hearings after this date, in search of one of the accused persons, who was on the run. 14. On 27 November 1997 the Ankara State Security Court applied the decision of the Court of Cassation and sentenced the applicant to twelve years and six months’ imprisonment under Article 168 § 2 of the Criminal Code 15. On 17 September 1998 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant’s request for appeal.

5. The applicant was born in 1977 and is currently serving his prison sentence in Kemerovo. 6. On 19 November 2008 the applicant was convicted of several counts of attempted drug trafficking. He was sentenced to ten years and six months’ imprisonment and sent to correctional colony no. 43 in Kemerovo. 7. Prior to his arrest the applicant was diagnosed with hepatitis C. 8. Following his arrival at the correctional colony, the applicant underwent a medical check-up, which did not reveal any diseases. 9. Sometime later the colony administration received a certificate from a civil hospital attesting that the applicant was suffering from hepatitis C. On the following day he was prescribed hepatoprotectors. 10. In December 2009 the applicant started experiencing severe pain in the knees. Following a large number of complaints, he was examined on 29 June 2010 by a colony doctor. The doctor suspected that he might have rheumatoid polyarthritis and deforming osteochondrosis of the knee joints and recommended an X-ray examination. 11. In August 2010 the applicant was transferred to a prison hospital in correctional colony no. 5. Following medical examinations by a physician, a neurologist and an ophthalmologist, and an X-ray, he was diagnosed with an articular syndrome which the doctors concluded was linked to his hepatitis C. No serious pathology was detected. The applicant was prescribed treatment with hepatoprotectors. His complaints of severe pain in the joints were not addressed. 12. The applicant and his relatives complained to various prison authorities of the lack of proper medical assistance. The replies received by the applicant were almost identical in wording: the officials stated that the medical examinations of the applicant, including an X-ray examination, and his consultations in the prison hospital, had not revealed any articular pathology. They stressed that the prison medical personnel were trained and equipped to address the applicant’s health problems. They also said that an in-patient check-up in the prison hospital of colony no. 5 had been scheduled for the applicant in December 2010 or early 2011. 13. The applicant asked the administration of his colony to authorise a forensic medical examination or to admit him to a prison hospital for an in‑depth examination and treatment. He also complained that the medical unit of the correctional colony was not equipped to address his health problems. The applicant’s relatives supported his request, having also asked that he be held in the colony in Rostov, close to his home. They argued that they had been unable to travel across the country to see him and could not provide him with assistance or medicines as the colony in which he was detained was too far away. They requested the applicant’s transfer to a hospital in view of his poor state of health. 14. On 9 April 2012 the applicant was taken from the correctional colony in Kemerovo to a temporary detention facility in Rostov-on-Don to take part in court hearings related to a supervisory review of his conviction. His transfer from Kemerovo to Rostov lasted two months and included several transit destinations: the towns of Mariinsk, Chelyabinsk, Samara, Saratov and Voronezh. On arrival at each of those towns the applicant was taken from the train to a temporary detention facility. According to the applicant, he spent hours on the road carrying a heavy bag with his belongings. He also had to wait for hours for admission to each facility, in great pain but without any opportunity to rest, sit or lie down. His condition started to deteriorate following the transfer. According to the Government, the distance that the applicant had to walk carrying his bag never exceeded 15 metres. During the transfer the applicant was always provided with a sleeping place and never asked for medical assistance. 15. In response to complaints from the applicant’s relatives, on 1 August 2012 the head of detention facility no. 1 in Rostov sent a letter to the applicant’s mother informing her that a request for admission to tuberculosis hospital no. 1 had been sent by the medical unit of the detention facility. However, three days later the applicant was transported back to correctional colony no. 43 in Kemerovo. The long transit once again led to the deterioration of the applicant’s condition. On arrival at the colony the applicant complained of severe pain, but his complaints were to no avail. 16. On 4 October 2012 the applicant was seen by a prison doctor. On the same day, he was placed in a punishment cell because a mobile phone had allegedly been found in his cell and he had been declared “a persistent offender of the internal order”. The applicant submitted that it had been extremely cold in the punishment wing and that he had not been given any warm clothes. He stressed that that situation had led to a further deterioration in his health, with the pain in his joints becoming unbearable. His requests for medical assistance were ignored. 17. The applicant and his relatives complained to a large number of authorities that the applicant was not being provided with any medical attention. One of those complaints brought a response from the Kemerovo regional prosecutor’s office. In a letter of 12 November 2012 a senior prosecutor from the office informed the applicant’s mother that an examination in the prison hospital of correctional colony no. 5 had been scheduled for the applicant at the end of 2012 to determine whether he was suffering from an illness affecting the joints. The Kemerovo Regional Ombudsman sent a similar response. 18. At the end of October 2012, in response to the applicant’s continuous complaints of pain in the joints, his admission to the colony medical unit was authorised. He started receiving an anti‑inflammatory drug to relieve the pain in his joints and to ameliorate his condition. The applicant submitted that the drug had had no effect. 19. On 6 December 2012 the applicant was transferred to the therapy ward of the regional prison hospital. He was seen by a surgeon, an ophthalmologist, a cardiologist and a neurologist. The Government insisted that specialists from the regional ophthalmological hospital and the regional cardiology clinic, as well as from the Regional Centre for Protection from AIDS “were involved in the consultations”. A complex examination including an ultrasound scan revealed that he was suffering from multi-level osteochondrosis, which was chronic and recurrent and at a moderately acute stage. He was also diagnosed with osteoarthrosis of the knee joints, a soft tissue disorder of the shoulder, and lumbodynia (pain in the lumbar area). It was recommended that he receive active supervision in the detention facility and treatment, twice a year, with vitamins, metabolites, anti-inflammatory drugs and chondroprotectors. He was also prescribed exercise therapy and self-massage with various ointments. The doctors recommended that the applicant should avoid lifting heavy objects and should not be subjected to the cold. In addition, they compiled a complex chemotherapy regimen in the event that his illness reached an acute stage. 20. The applicant submitted that while at the hospital he had also complained of pain in his pelvis, elbows and ankles. However, no examination of those areas was conducted. 21. Having undergone treatment in the hospital, on 21 December 2012 the applicant was discharged in a satisfactory condition. Upon his arrival at colony no. 43 he was prescribed a chondroprotector, a hypotensive drug and vitamins. 22. Three weeks after his discharge from hospital the applicant was sent back to Rostov. He was forced to take the same route as in April-May 2012. The applicant stressed that he had been unable to follow any of the recommendations made by the doctors of the prison hospital. He had to carry a heavy bag with his personal belongings and had to stay for hours in cold premises or outside without any possibility of lying down or sitting, save for directly on the ground. According to the Government, the distance that the applicant had to walk carrying his bag never exceeded 15 metres. During the transfer the applicant was always provided with a sleeping place and never asked for medical assistance. 23. The applicant again started experiencing severe pain in the joints. He also had pain during urination. His requests for medical care were ignored by the doctors of temporary detention facility no. 61/1 of Rostov. Late on 20 February 2013 the applicant was taken to a prison hospital for an urgent consultation with an urologist. However, given the late hour he could only be seen by the on-duty doctor, who recorded his complaints, diagnosed acute prostatitis and recommended his examination by a specialist. The applicant was sent back to the detention facility. 24. Two days later the applicant was transported back to the correctional colony in Kemerovo, despite his mother’s requests to postpone the transfer on account of his poor state of health. Throughout the month-long trip from Rostov to Kemerovo the applicant persistently complained of the deterioration in his health and his inability to bear the pain caused by the cold and the requirement to carry a heavy load. No measures were taken. 25. On 27 March 2013, following the applicant’s arrival at correctional colony no. 43, he was prescribed a chondroprotector, a hepatoprotector, a hypotensive drug and vitamins. On 15 April anti-ulcer and anti‑inflammatory drugs were added to his regimen. 26. Between 22 May and 13 June 2013 the applicant underwent inpatient treatment at the prison hospital of correctional colony no. 5. The doctors confirmed the earlier diagnosis and also found the applicant to be suffering from first-degree coxal osteoarthritis. 27. On 18 June 2013 following his return to the colony the applicant was prescribed vitamins, hypotensive drugs, a chondroprotector and a hepatoprotector. 28. On 4 December 2013 the applicant was examined by a medical panel, which found that his diseases posed no risk to his life. 29. On 23 December 2013 the doctors suspected that the applicant might have infiltrative tuberculosis in his left lung. Between 23 December 2013 and 5 February 2014 he was kept in a quarantine ward together with two other infected prisoners without receiving any treatment. He was then sent to prison hospital no. 16 in Kemerovo, where he has remained ever since. Referring to the hospital’s poor reputation as regards respect for prisoners’ rights, the applicant’s representative requested that the applicant be sent to another facility, but to no avail. 30. On 28 November 2013 the applicant complained to a court, under Chapter 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure, of the lack of medical care in correctional colony no. 43. He claimed that his health complaints had been systematically ignored, that his condition had deteriorated in detention and that he had not been receiving the treatment prescribed to him in December 2012. He also submitted that he had not been allowed to take the medication provided to him by his relatives. 31. On 22 January 2014 the claim was dismissed. Having cited in detail a copy of the applicant’s medical file provided by the administration of the colony, the court briefly concluded that the applicant’s claims were unsubstantiated. Relying on a statement by the colony’s representative, the court found that the applicant had never asked the administration to allow him to take drugs other than those he was provided with by the prison staff. 32. The applicant’s appeal against the decision of 22 January 2014 was rejected on 2 July 20014 by the Kemerovo Regional Court. 33. The applicant provided the following description of his current condition, corroborated by written statements from two of his fellow inmates. He stated that his illness was at an acute stage, and he was suffering from constant severe pain in the joints. He was rapidly losing weight: he weighed 58 kg while being 174 cm tall. The pain was affecting all of his joints, making movement almost impossible. He could not sleep or walk without painkillers. The only medicaments provided (an anti‑inflammatory drug and a chondroprotector) were ineffective for the treatment of an illness such as his, especially given its advanced stage. His request for a copy of his medical record in order to consult an independent specialist had been refused by the administration of the correctional colony, who said that they had no means to pay for a copy of his record.

4. The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Budapest. 5. In the context of an inheritance dispute, two civil proceedings were brought against the applicant. 6. On 2 July 1990 Mr J.F.J. brought an action against the applicant before the Budapest XVIII/XIX District Court challenging her status as an heiress. On 10 November 1993 the District Court dismissed the action. 7. On 12 July 1990 Mrs T.K. brought another action against Mr J.F.J., Mr F.J. and the applicant before the Pest Central District Court. 8. On 4 September 1990 the District Court held a hearing and requested the parties to submit motions. 9. On 26 October and 12 December 1990 the District Court held hearings. At the hearings some of the parties did not appear since the District Court had failed to summon them in accordance with the procedural rules. A hearing scheduled for 8 February 1991 was re-scheduled. 10. On 10 April and 20 June 1991 the District Court held hearings. On the latter date it stayed the proceedings pending the outcome of the proceedings before the XVIII/XIX District Court. In the latter proceedings, on 24 November 1992 the court held a hearing. On 27 May 1993 the District Court appointed an expert. On 10 November 1993 the court dismissed the plaintiff's claim. The judgment became final on 15 April 1994. 11. At the plaintiff's request, on 13 October 1994 the Pest Central District Court resumed its proceedings. Subsequently, another judge was appointed to hear the case. 12. On 24 January 1995 the District Court held a hearing. At the hearing the plaintiff withdrew her action in respect of Mr J.F.J. and Mr F.J. 13. On 18 May 1995 the District Court discontinued the proceedings in respect of Mr J.F.J. and Mr F.J. and ordered the applicant to submit further documents. 14. On 26 October 1995 the District Court delivered a judgment and partly admitted the plaintiff's claims. The applicant appealed. 15. On 20 June 1996 the Budapest Regional Court held a hearing and delivered a judgment which was pronounced on 27 June 1996. It partly quashed the District Court's decision and remitted the case to the first-instance court. 16. In the resumed proceedings, on 30 January, 28 February, 24 June and 18 November 1997, the District Court held hearings. Subsequently, another judge was appointed to hear the case. On 30 January 1998 the District Court heard three witnesses. 17. On 22 July 1998 the District Court appointed a real-estate expert. Subsequently, yet another judge was appointed to hear the case. On 23 June 1999 the District Court held a hearing. 18. On 1 July 1999 the District Court delivered a judgment. The applicant appealed. In the appeal proceedings, the hearings scheduled for 10 February and 6 July 2000 were re-scheduled due to the illness of one of the judges. 19. On 16 May and 26 October 2000 the Regional Court held hearings. On the latter date it delivered a judgment which was pronounced on 2 November 2000.