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6. The applicant who was born in 1923 and lives in Terebna. 7. In 1949 the applicant and her parents had been persecuted by the communist authorities. Their property was confiscated and they were exiled to Siberia. In 1989 they were rehabilitated. 8. On an unspecified date in 2003 the applicant brought an action against the Edineţ Department of Finances, seeking compensation for the confiscated property. 9. On 24 December 2003 the Edineţ District Court ruled in favour of the applicant and ordered the defendant to pay her 63,885 Moldovan lei (MDL) (the equivalent of 3,901 euros (EUR) at the time). The judgment was not appealed against and after fifteen days it became final and enforceable. 10. On 23 February 2004 a Bailiff received the enforcement warrant. 11. The judgment has not been enforced to date.

11. The applicant is a foundation existing under the laws of Turkey whose purpose is to provide educational facilities at the Greek Orthodox High School in Fener, Istanbul. It operates in accordance with the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty, which afforded protection to old foundations providing public services for religious minorities. It is one of a number of foundations dating from the Ottoman era. After the proclamation of the Republic it fell under Law no. 2762 of 13 June 1935, by virtue of which it obtained legal personality. In 1936, in accordance with section 44 of that Act, the applicant foundation filed a declaration indicating its aims and its immovable property. 12. On 10 October 1952 the applicant foundation acquired, by way of donation, title to part of a building situated in Istanbul. That acquisition was based on a certificate issued on 3 October 1952 by the Governor of Istanbul. The relevant part of that certificate read as follows: “Fener Rum Erkek Lisesi Vakfı is a legal entity authorised to acquire immovable property by virtue of the Foundations Act. It is run by an administrative board consisting of ... Further to a request of 3 October 1952 by the Beyoğlu Land Registry, the present document is issued for the purposes of the transaction concerning immovable property located at ... by virtue of section 2 of the Land Registry Act [Law no. 2644 of 29 December 1934 on the Land Registry – see paragraph 27 below].” 13. The immovable property in question was subsequently registered at the Land Registry. The applicant foundation duly paid property taxes in respect of its property. 14. Similarly, on 16 December 1958, the applicant foundation acquired, by purchase, co-ownership of another part of the same building. On 15 November 1958 the Governor of Istanbul had issued the certificate required by section 2 of the Land Registry Act, again indicating that “Fener Rum Erkek Lisesi Vakfı [was] a legal entity authorised to acquire immovable property by virtue of the Foundations Act”. The applicant’s title to that property was accordingly registered at the Land Registry and the relevant property taxes were duly paid. 15. On 15 July 1992 the Treasury lodged an application with the District Court of Beyoğlu (Istanbul) seeking the annulment of the applicant foundation’s title to the above-mentioned immovable property and the registration thereof in the name of the former owners, by virtue of the established case-law of the Court of Cassation. In support of its application, it argued in particular that the applicant did not have the capacity to acquire immovable property. In addition, given that the property in question was not mentioned in its declaration of 1936, an instrument regarded as the legal foundation constitution (vakıfname) of those establishments in accordance with the case-law of the Court of Cassation, the applicant was not entitled to obtain the relevant title. The Treasury therefore requested that the property be re-registered in the name of its former owner. 16. On 19 December 1994, further to a request from the District Court, an expert in cartography and land surveys filed a report on the case. Referring to the case-law of the combined civil divisions of the Court of Cassation, as established on 8 May 1974 (see paragraph 28 below), he observed that foundations belonging to religious minorities as defined by the Lausanne Treaty which had not indicated in their constitution a capacity to acquire immovable property were precluded from purchasing or accepting gifts of such property. Consequently, the real estate of such foundations was limited to the property indicated in their constitutions, which had become final with the declarations of 1936. In conclusion, the expert considered that the applicant foundation’s title should be annulled, as it lacked the capacity to acquire immovable property, and that the property in question should be re-registered in the name of its former owners. 17. Before the District Court, the applicant foundation objected to the characterisation given to the 1936 declarations by the Treasury. It contended in particular that these declarations had been required by the State for the registration of the assets and income of foundations and that they could not be regarded as constitutive instruments. It further argued that such foundations did have the capacity to acquire property, by virtue of the Land Registry Act. 18. In a judgment of 7 March 1996 granting the request of the Treasury, the District Court ordered both the annulment of the applicant’s title and the re-registration of the property in the name of the former owners. It found in particular as follows: “As the Treasury stated, the defendant foundation did not indicate in [its] declaration of 1936 ... its [disputed] acquisitions by way of donation and purchase. Thus, as observed in the expert’s report, those acquisitions are devoid of legal basis and must accordingly be struck out of the land register and re-registered in the name of the former owners.” 19. On 17 April 1996 the applicant foundation appealed to the Court of Cassation. It relied in particular on its right to the peaceful enjoyment of its possessions under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Its appeal was dismissed on 11 June 1996. 20. On 9 December 1996 the Court of Cassation dismissed an application by the applicant foundation for rectification of the judgment of 11 June 1996. 21. On 16 October 2000 the applicant foundation submitted a request to the Directorate-General of Foundations (the “Directorate”) for the amendment of its constitution. It sought a new constitutive instrument that would grant it the capacity to acquire immovable property. The request was rejected on 20 October 2000. In the grounds for its decision, relying on the judgment of the combined civil divisions of the Court of Cassation of 8 May 1974, the Directorate observed that the 1936 declarations by foundations of religious communities were to be regarded as the “constitutive instruments” of those establishments and that amendment of those constitutions was impossible for reasons of public policy. 22. The Government argued that the striking-out of the applicant’s title from the land register did not take place until 2002. In this connection they referred to a decision taken by the Beyoğlu Municipal Council on 13 March 2001 whereby the applicant foundation, as owner, together with its tenant, had been fined for adding an additional storey onto the building without authorisation.

5. The applicant was born in 1980 and lives in Baku. 6. On 15 November 2007 there was a bomb explosion in Moscow. Criminal proceedings were instituted in connection with this explosion and on 13 December 2007 the applicant was charged with unlawful possession of explosive materials under Article 222.2 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. 7. On 21 December 2007 the Preobrazhensky District Court, Moscow City, ordered the application of the preventive measure of remand in custody in respect of the applicant and issued an arrest warrant. 8. On 26 December 2007 the arrest warrant was sent to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (“the MIA”) of Azerbaijan. 9. It appears from a letter of 30 October 2008 signed by the head of the Criminal Investigation Department of the MIA that following the transfer of the arrest warrant to the Azerbaijani authorities the police contacted the applicant, who was in Azerbaijan, sometime in January 2008. The applicant came voluntarily to the MIA and submitted that he had no link with the explosion in question. The MIA established that the applicant was an Azerbaijani national and decided to transfer his statement to the relevant Russian authorities. At the request of the Russian authorities, on 31 January 2008 the applicant was again questioned at the MIA with the participation of two Russian police officers about his possible involvement in the explosion. Following a two-hour interrogation, no action was taken against the applicant and he left the premises of the Ministry. 10. On 30 June 2008 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Organised Crime Department (“the OCD”) of the MIA about an alleged misappropriation of his property by a certain E.H. and others. Dissatisfied with the progress in the case, the applicant subsequently lodged complaints with various State authorities about the failure of the OCD to investigate his complaint. 11. On 18 September 2008 the applicant was summoned to the OCD and on arrival there he was arrested. The applicant was not allowed to contact his family or a lawyer, and his arrest was not documented. 12. As the applicant’s family had no information about his whereabouts, on 21 September 2008 they lodged a criminal complaint with Khatai District Police Station No. 36 related to the applicant’s disappearance, and submitted a photograph of him to the police. 13. On 22 September 2008 the OCD informed the applicant’s family by telephone that the applicant had been arrested and detained in the temporary detention facility of the OCD. 14. On 24 September 2008 the applicant’s brother was allowed to visit him in the temporary detention facility of the OCD. However, the applicant’s family was not informed of the reasons for the applicant’s arrest and detention. 15. On 26 September 2008 the applicant’s family contacted a lawyer for the applicant’s defence and at around 10 a.m. on 27 September 2008 a contract was concluded between them. 16. At around 3 p.m. on 27 September 2008 the lawyer went to the OCD and tried to meet the applicant. However, the lawyer was informed that he could not meet the applicant without the authorisation of the investigator. The lawyer immediately sent telegrams to the MIA, the Prosecutor General’s Office and the Ombudsman complaining that he had been prevented from meeting the applicant. 17. At around 9 p.m. on 27 September 2008 the applicant was brought before a judge of the Narimanov District Court who ordered his detention on remand (see paragraph 22 below). His lawyer was not informed about the hearing; the applicant was represented by a State-appointed lawyer. 18. While detained in the temporary detention facility of the OCD, he was during the period from 18 September to 2 October 2008 forced to change his statement in the criminal case concerning the misappropriation of his property by E.H. and others. 19. As regards the criminal complaint lodged by his family (see paragraph 12 above), by letter of 2 October 2008 the head of Khatai District Police Station No. 36 informed the applicant’s family of the investigator’s refusal to institute criminal proceedings in connection with his disappearance. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows: “On 21 September 2008 citizen B. Nagiyev lodged a complaint with Khatai District Police Station No. 36, stating that his brother, Nagiyev Asif Najaf oglu [the applicant], born in 1980, left his home at around 1.15 p.m. on 19 September 2008 and has not returned. Citizen B. Nagiyev also made a statement confirming the content of his complaint. A report was prepared and transferred to Khatai District Police Station No. 36 in connection with the search for Asif Nagiyev [the applicant]. During the search, all the police stations in Baku were instructed and other measures were taken. During the search, non-official information was received indicating that Asif Nagiyev had been arrested by the OCD of the MIA because he was wanted in Russia. An enquiry in this regard was sent to the OCD, but no response has yet been received. The whereabouts of A. Nagiyev have not yet been clearly established. Taking into account that there is no evidence that a crime has been committed, institution of criminal proceedings in connection with this subject should be rejected.” 20. The applicant was arrested at around noon on 27 September 2008. The relevant part of the official record of the applicant’s arrest (cinayət törətmiş şəxsin tutulması barədə protokol) of 27 September 2008 reads as follows: “... At around noon on 27 September 2008, Nagiyev Asif Najaf oglu [the applicant], whose identity was established later, born on ... and in ... was arrested in the district of Narimanov in Baku and taken to the department. It was established during questioning there that on 21 December 2007 Nagiyev Asif Najaf oglu was charged under Article 222.2 (unlawful possession of explosive materials) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation by the Moscow City Prosecutor’s Office ... an arrest warrant was issued, and the application of the preventive measure of remand in custody was ordered ... Nagiyev Asif Najaf oglu was transferred to the temporary detention facility of the OCD ...” 21. It appears from the extracts from the logbook of the OCD’s temporary detention facility submitted to the Court by the Government that the applicant arrived at the detention facility at 4 p.m. on 27 September 2008 following a decision of a Narimanov District Court judge. 22. On 27 September 2008 a judge of the Narimanov District Court, relying on the Russian court’s detention order of 21 December 2007, ordered the application of the preventive measure of remand in custody in respect of the applicant for a period of two months. At the hearing the applicant was represented by a State-appointed lawyer. The judge relied on the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCrP”) of the Republic of Azerbaijan relating to detention with a view to extradition when she ordered the applicant’s detention. The judge justified this measure as follows: “Taking into account the fact that Nagiyev Asif Najaf oglu committed a less serious criminal offence and, if released, would obstruct the objective functioning of the investigation by absconding from it, I consider it necessary to confirm the decision of 21 December 2007 of the Federal Court of Preobrazhensky District, Moscow City, to apply the preventive measure of remand in custody in respect of him for a period of two months. In fact, according to Article 495.1 of the CCrP of the Republic of Azerbaijan, upon receipt of a request for extradition of a person and a copy of a detention order in respect of him from the competent authority of a foreign State, the prosecuting authority of the Republic of Azerbaijan to which the request is addressed may, if necessary, take measures in compliance with the provisions of this Code to have the person arrested and detained before a decision on extradition is taken.” 23. Following a series of complaints to the various domestic authorities, on 8 October 2008 the applicant’s lawyer was provided with a copy of the record of the applicant’s arrest and the Narimanov District Court’s decision of 27 September 2008. 24. On an unspecified date the applicant appealed against the Narimanov District Court’s decision of 27 September 2008, claiming that his arrest and detention had been unlawful. In particular, he submitted that he had been unlawfully arrested on 18 September 2008 and that there were no criminal proceedings pending against him in Azerbaijan. He further argued that as he was an Azerbaijani national he could not be extradited to a foreign State, which followed from Article 53 of the Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan and Article 13 of the Criminal Code. He also submitted that his arrest and detention had not been carried out in accordance with domestic and international law, since no official request accompanied by the relevant documents for his detention and extradition was ever submitted by the Russian authorities. The applicant’s lawyer also submitted a request for restoration of the time-limits for lodging an appeal. In this connection, the lawyer stated that although at 10 a.m. on 27 September 2008 the applicant’s family had appointed him as a lawyer for the applicant’s defence, he had not been informed of the Narimanov District Court’s hearing, which was held at around 9 p.m. on 27 September 2008. He further noted that he had been provided with a copy of the detention order only on 8 October 2008. 25. On 3 November 2008 the Narimanov District Court granted the request for restoration of the time-limits for lodging an appeal and forwarded the applicant’s appeal to the appellate court for examination. 26. On 7 November 2008 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the Narimanov District Court’s decision of 27 September 2008 without considering the applicant’s specific complaints. 27. On 27 November 2008 the Narimanov District Court granted the prosecutor’s request for the extension of the applicant’s detention for a period of two months, relying on Article 159 of the CCrP concerning the extension of detention periods pending criminal proceedings. In its decision, the court noted that as the applicant was an Azerbaijani national he could not be extradited to a foreign State, and for this reason the Azerbaijani Prosecutor General’s Office had requested the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office to transfer the applicant’s criminal case to the Azerbaijani authorities. The court thus justified the extension of the applicant’s detention period by the fact that more time was needed for the submission of relevant documents relating to the applicant’s case from the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office to the Azerbaijani authorities. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows: “As the extradition of Nagiyev Asif Najaf oglu to Russia is impossible because he is a citizen of the Republic of Azerbaijan, a request was sent to the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office for the criminal case to be transferred to the Azerbaijani Prosecutor General’s Office for the criminal inquiry to be continued in the Republic of Azerbaijan. Taking into account the fact that more time is needed for the transfer of the criminal case relating to the accused Nagiyev Asif Najaf oglu from the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office to the Azerbaijani Prosecutor General’s Office, but that the detention period of Nagiyev Asif Najaf oglu ends on 27 November 2008, I consider the request justified in order to ensure the criminal prosecution of Nagiyev Asif Najaf oglu in the future and to prevent him from absconding from the court proceedings. Taking into account the above-mentioned matters and relying on Articles 159, 448 and 454 of the CCrP, I decide that the detention period of Nagiyev Asif Najaf oglu born on ... and in ... must be extended for a period of two months, until 27 January 2009.” 28. The applicant appealed against this decision, claiming that the extension of his detention was unlawful. He noted in particular that although the court had relied on Article 159 of the CCrP concerning the extension of detention periods pending criminal proceedings when it ordered the extension of his detention, there were no criminal proceedings pending against him in Azerbaijan, and therefore his detention could not be extended on this basis. He also submitted that the court had failed to justify the extension of his detention, and that his continued detention was in breach of the relevant international conventions. The applicant further reiterated the complaint concerning his unlawful detention from 18 to 27 September 2008 in the OCD, noting that the main reason for his detention was his complaint concerning misappropriation of his property by E.H. and others. In this connection he disputed the content of the official record of his arrest, stating that his family could not possibly have known about his arrest at 10 a.m. on 27 September 2008 and concluded a contract with his lawyer for his defence, if he had been arrested at noon on 27 September 2008 as indicated in the official record. 29. On 5 December 2008 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The appellate court made no mention of the applicant’s particular complaints. 30. On 12 December 2008 the applicant lodged a request with the Narimanov District Court, asking the court to replace his remand in custody with the preventive measure of house arrest. He claimed, in particular, that his detention had not been justified and that there was no reason for his continued detention. In support of his request, the applicant pointed out that he had a permanent place of residence and that there was no risk of his absconding from or obstructing the investigation. 31. On 19 December 2008 the Narimanov District Court dismissed the request. 32. On 27 January 2009 the Narimanov District Court extended the applicant’s detention for a period of one month, relying on Article 159 of the CCrP concerning the extension of detention periods pending criminal proceedings. As to the justification for the extension of the applicant’s detention, the court relied on an almost identical wording as that of the court’s decision of 27 November 2008. 33. On 29 January 2009 the applicant appealed against this decision, reiterating his previous complaints. He noted in this regard that the domestic courts had ignored his complaint concerning his unlawful detention in the temporary detention facility of the OCD from 18 to 27 September 2008. He further stated that although the Russian authorities had never submitted any extradition request or a request for institution of criminal proceedings against him in Azerbaijan, he had been detained in breach of the domestic and international law. In particular, he referred to Article 497.1 of the CCrP, which provides that a person arrested with a view to extradition must be released if no official request for his extradition is received by the Azerbaijani prosecuting authority within forty-eight hours of his arrest. 34. On 2 February 2009 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance court’s decision. The appellate court made no mention of the applicant’s specific complaints. 35. On 27 February 2009 the Narimanov District Court again extended the applicant’s detention for a period of one month. The court’s decision was almost identical in its wording to the decisions of 27 November 2008 and 27 January 2009. 36. On 2 March 2009 the applicant appealed against this decision. He reiterated that the domestic courts had ignored his complaint concerning his unlawful detention in the temporary detention facility of the OCD from 18 to 27 September 2008. He further stated that it was not legitimate for the domestic courts to order the extension of his detention on the ground that more time was needed for the transfer of relevant documents from the Russian authorities to their Azerbaijani counterparts. 37. On 10 March 2009 the Baku Court of Appeal granted the applicant’s appeal and ordered his release. The appellate court quashed the Narimanov District Court’s decision of 27 February 2009, holding that the first-instance court had erred in extending the applicant’s continued detention. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows: “It appears from the OCD’s decision of 22 September 2008, concerning an operational-search measure and which was added to the case file, that a decision concerning an operational-search measure in respect of Nagiyev Asif Najaf oglu, who was wanted for a crime committed in Russia, was taken. The record of the applicant’s arrest, drawn up by ..., indicates that Nagiyev Asif Najaf oglu was arrested on 27 September 2008. In accordance with the requirements of Article 495.1 of the CCrP of the Republic of Azerbaijan, upon receipt of a request for extradition of a person and a copy of a detention order in respect of him from the competent authority of a foreign State, the prosecuting authority of the Republic of Azerbaijan to which the request is addressed may, if necessary, take measures in compliance with the provisions of this Code to have the person arrested and detained before the decision on extradition is taken ... In accordance with paragraph II of Article 53 of the Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan, a citizen of the Republic of Azerbaijan may under no circumstances be extradited to a foreign state. In accordance with Article 13 of the Criminal Code, a citizen of the Republic of Azerbaijan who has committed a crime on the territory of a foreign state shall not be extradited to that foreign state ... In accordance with the requirements of Article 75 of the Convention on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Matters of 13 January 2004, if a request for extradition, as provided for in Article 67 of the Convention, and accompanying documents were not transferred within forty days of the date of arrest of the person arrested, the person must be immediately released. It appears that A. Nagiyev has been in detention for five months and thirteen days, or one hundred and sixty-three days, and that during this period no additional material concerning him was sent from the Russian Federation to the Azerbaijani authorities ... Therefore, taking into account the above-mentioned findings, the panel of the court considers that the appeal of the lawyer must be granted and that the Narimanov District Court’s decision on extension of A. Nagiyev’s detention period must be quashed.”

5. The applicants were born in 1975, 1964, 1982, 1976, 1983, 1978, 1961, 1947, 1955, 1975, 1979, 1953, 1952 and 1976 respectively and live in Ankara. 6. On 31 July 2000 the applicants, together with several other persons, gathered in a public park in Ankara in protest against F-type prisons and the events which had occurred in Bergama Prison (violent clashes had taken place between the detainees and security forces on 27 July 2000). The participants wanted to read out a press statement in order to express their concerns about F-type prisons and the events in Bergama Prison. Police officers warned the crowd over a megaphone that the demonstration was illegal under Law no. 2911 on Meetings and Demonstration Marches. The group ignored the police warning. The police officers then arrested twenty-four persons, including the applicants, and took them into custody. It appears from the newspaper articles submitted by the applicants that the police officers used force in order to disperse the protesters. As a result, some of the protestors were injured and a number of them were arrested by the police officers. 7. According to the arrest report, drawn up and signed by the police officers, the applicants were demonstrating with protest banners in their hands. After having warned them to desist, the police arrested the protesters who continued demonstrating. It was also noted in the arrest report that three police officers, who had been injured during the clash with the demonstrators at the time of the arrest, had had to be taken to hospital. The medical reports stated that the police officers were unfit for work for two days. 8. On 31 August 2000 the Ankara Public Prosecutor filed an indictment with the Ankara Criminal Court of First Instance against the applicants and nine others, charging them with having taken part in a demonstration in a public place, without the permission of the authorities, contrary to Law no. 2911. 9. The applicants alleged that the police officers had been armed during the hearings before the trial court and had verbally harassed the defence lawyers. Moreover, the police officers had obtained a copy of the reports and statements in the case file even though they were not a party to the proceedings. The applicants' request to include these facts in the record of the hearings was dismissed. 10. On 5 July 2001 the Ankara Criminal Court of First Instance acquitted some of the accused but convicted the applicants on the basis of the evidence given by them and by witnesses. The court found that the applicants had ignored the police warning that their meeting was illegal and that they had to disperse. The police had had to use force in order to arrest the applicants. Furthermore, having examined the applicants' defence submissions, the court considered that the applicants had indirectly confessed to the crime (tevil yollu ikrar) by admitting that they had gathered in the park in order to protest against F-type prisons and the events in Bergama Prison. It then sentenced Rıza Altuntov to a fine, taking into account the fact that he was a minor at the time of the incident (seventeen and a half years old), whereas it sentenced the other applicants to one year and three months' imprisonment. It decided to suspend enforcement of the applicants' sentence, under section 6 of Law no. 667, with the exception of Alaattin Uğraş, Sinan Cem Uzunget and İsmail Temizyürek. 11. On 7 March 2002 the applicants appealed to the Court of Cassation against the judgment of the first-instance court. The written opinion of the Chief Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation was not transmitted to the applicants. 12. On 19 December 2002 the Court of Cassation upheld the decision of the first-instance court.

5. By a decision of 25 August 1995 the Social Insurance Authority in Kraków awarded a pension to the applicant. It was to be paid to him for a period beginning on 1 May 1993. 6. Under the applicable provisions of domestic law, the Military Pensions Office was competent to make payments to the applicant, but it failed to do so. In a letter to the Office dated 16 October 1995, the Director of the Social Insurance Authority confirmed the applicant’s entitlement to a military pension. 7. As the Military Pensions Office still refused to make payments, apparently considering that the 1995 decision was not in conformity with the law, the applicant lodged an action with the Kraków Regional Court on 8 November 1995, complaining about the Office’s failure to pay. In its pleadings, the Office argued that the decision had been given in breach of substantive provisions of the applicable social insurance laws. It further indicated that it had informed the Social Insurance Authority about its doubts as to the lawfulness of the decision. Subsequently, the Authority had summoned the applicant to undergo an additional medical examination. As the applicant had failed to comply with the summons, payment of a part of his pension had been stayed with effect from 1 May 1996. 8. By a judgment of 4 March 1999 the court allowed the applicant’s action. It ordered the Military Pensions Office to pay the amount of pension due for the period from 1 May 1993 to 1 May 1996. It noted the decision staying payment of the applicant’s pension. However, it stressed that the decision given on 25 August 1995 had not been appealed against and, as a result, had become final. The Office was therefore bound by it. There were no grounds for not paying the applicant the amounts due for the years 1993‑1996. The court was not competent to re‑examine the lawfulness of the 1995 decision in the proceedings before it. 9. The Military Pensions Office appealed. It reiterated that, in its view, the 1995 decision had not been in compliance with the substantive law. 10. On 28 November 2000 the Kraków Court of Appeal upheld the judgment, finding that the first-instance court had correctly found that it had not been empowered to re-examine the lawfulness of the 1995 decision. It further reiterated that this decision had to be complied with by the Office. 11. On 29 November 2000 the applicant reiterated his request to have the amounts due paid to him, but to no avail. Subsequently, the Military Pensions Office lodged a cassation appeal against this judgment with the Supreme Court. 12. On 1 and 22 March 2001 the applicant complained to the Ministry of Defence and to the Prime Minister about the Office’s failure to pay him the pension. 13. By a decision of 16 May 2002 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal lodged by the Office, finding that it had failed to comply with the relevant procedural requirements. 14. In December 2002 the Military Pensions Office paid the applicant the amounts in arrears together with statutory interest.

5. The applicant was born in 1934 and lives in Sombor, Serbia. 6. On 13 August 2003 the applicant, an animal welfare activist, joined in a rescue operation of stray dogs from a dog pound in Sombor. Following a fight between the applicant and M.M., the police arrested the applicant. He spent the night at the Sombor Police Station. 7. On 14 August 2003 the police lodged a criminal complaint against the applicant accusing him of causing actual bodily harm to M.M. The applicant was taken to the investigating judge. He complained that he had been kicked and punched at the Sombor Police Station. The judge recorded injuries on the left auricle and left eye, but took no action in that regard. The applicant was then released. Later that day he obtained a medical certificate indicating injuries on his left auricle and left eye. 8. On 27 August 2003 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against L.J. and another, unidentified, police officer who had been on duty at the material time (it later turned out that it was Z.K.). 9. On 29 August 2003 the public prosecutor directed the Sombor Police Station to take statements from the applicant and the police officers who had been on duty on the night of 13/14 August 2003. On 11 September 2003 one of the officers belonging to that unit questioned the applicant. The applicant repeated what he had said to the investigating judge on 14 August 2003. On the same day, L.J., Z.K. and three other police officers from their unit made written statements. They stated that the applicant had been offensive but that no force had been used against him. 10. On 13 October 2003 the investigating judge took statements from the applicant, L.J., Z.K. and four other police officers from their unit. They all repeated what they had stated on 11 September 2003. No questions were put to them. On 21 October 2003 the investigating judge heard a medical expert who stated that the applicant’s injuries had most likely been caused by three punches. The investigating judge again did not put any questions. 11. On 4 November 2003 the public prosecutor decided not to prosecute as there remained uncertainty as to whether the applicant had sustained his injuries during the fight between him and M.M. or at the police station. 12. On 14 November 2003 the applicant notified the Sombor Municipal Court that he intended to take over the prosecution, but he formally started a subsidiary prosecution against L.J. and Z.K., by lodging a bill of indictment, on 13 April 2004. 13. The Sombor Municipal Court held four hearings in this case: on 12 January 2005, 27 May 2005, 17 October 2005 and 1 February 2006. It heard the applicant, the defendants, seven other officers from their unit, a medical expert, M.M. and seven other witnesses. One of the defendants and several other police officers from his unit maintained that the applicant had arrived at the station with facial injuries. In contrast, M.M. and several witnesses to his fight with the applicant stated that no injuries had been sustained by the applicant during that fight. 14. On 1 February 2006 the Sombor Municipal Court acquitted L.J. and Z.K. as there remained uncertainty as to whether the applicant had sustained his injuries during the fight between him and M.M. or at the police station. On 29 December 2006 the Sombor District Court upheld that judgment. 15. On 24 June 2008 the Sombor Municipal Court found the applicant guilty of causing actual bodily harm to M.M. The applicant appealed and on 30 September 2009 the criminal proceedings against him were discontinued as statute-barred. 16. No prosecution was instituted against M.M. with regard to the facial injuries allegedly sustained by the applicant during the fight between them.

4. The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Celje. 5. On 15 September 1995 the applicant was taken into police custody on suspicion of committing “extortion and blackmail” and “causing a public danger”. 6. On 17 September 1995 the applicant was brought before an investigating judge of the Celje District Court (Okrožno sodišče v Celju), who opened a judicial investigation against him and remanded him in pre-trial detention. 7. During the judicial investigation proceedings, it was reported in several newspaper articles that the applicant had committed a number of criminal acts. 8. The judicial investigation against the applicant was discontinued on 2 October 1995 for lack of evidence and the applicant was released on that day. 9. On an unspecified date, and in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Act, the applicant lodged a request with the Ministry of Justice for compensation in respect of the damage sustained. On 30 October 1996 the Ministry offered to pay the applicant 75,000 Slovenian tolars (SIT – approximately 310 euros (EUR)), which the applicant did not accept. 10. On 16 October 1996 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of the Interior in the Celje District Court seeking compensation in the amount of SIT 4,000,000 (approximately EUR 16,500) for non-pecuniary damage. He also requested to be exempted from payment of court fees. 11. On 2 February 1999 the court held a hearing. 12. In addition, on 6 July 2000 the applicant was arrested on charges of drug trafficking. He remained in pre-trial detention until 26 September 2000 when the Celje District Court found him guilty as charged. 13. A hearing in the civil proceedings scheduled for 28 September 2000 had to be postponed because of the applicant's detention. Subsequently, a hearing was held on 5 December 2000. 14. As regards the criminal proceedings, on 10 April 2001 the Celje Higher Court (Višje sodišče v Celju) allowed the applicant's appeal against the first-instance court's judgment and remitted the case for re-examination. On 9 October 2001 the applicant was acquitted. On an appeal by the public prosecutor, the judgment was upheld by the Celje Higher Court on 9 April 2002. 15. Moreover, in 2000 and 2001, the applicant was accused of drug trafficking in two other sets of criminal proceedings. The proceedings were discontinued as the public prosecutor withdrew the bills of indictment. 16. On 10 June 2002 the applicant filed written submissions in the civil proceedings which he had instituted on 16 October 1996 before the Celje District Court and increased the amount of his compensation claim. 17. The court held a hearing on 15 October 2002. The applicant did not appear at that hearing. 18. On 15 November 2002, after a hearing, the Celje District Court handed down a judgment in which it awarded the applicant SIT 1,500,000 (approximately EUR 6,250). Both parties appealed. 19. On 11 November 2004 the Celje Higher Court allowed the defendant's appeal and reduced the amount of the award to SIT 1,200,000 (approximately EUR 5,000). That judgment became final. 20. On 2 July 1999 the Krško Public Prosecutor's Office requested the Krško District Court (Okrožno sodišče v Krškem) to open a criminal investigation against the applicant and two other individuals for drug trafficking. 21. According to the Government, the applicant was not available to the prosecuting authorities during the investigation stage, although he had promised the police in a telephone conversation that he would report for questioning. In addition he had not accepted the summons – substitute notification had thus been served on 28 July 1999. The investigating judge issued two orders for the applicant to appear before the court, but to no avail. 22. On 4 November 1999 the Krško Public Prosecutor's Office indicted the applicant and two other individuals in the Krško District Court, accusing the applicant of drug trafficking. 23. On 30 September 1999 the court ordered the applicant's arrest and issued an arrest warrant. 24. At a hearing held on 11 November 1999, the applicant's proceedings were separated and transferred to the Celje District Court. However, they were eventually transferred back to the Krško District Court. In addition, the proceedings directed against the other two individuals were joined to the applicant's proceedings. 25. On 6 July 2000 the applicant was arrested and taken into police custody. 26. The court held hearings on 12 July, 6 September, 18 October, 15 November and 7 December 2000. 27. On 8 December 2000 the court pronounced a judgment finding the applicant guilty and sentencing him to four years' imprisonment. The court ordered that the applicant remain in detention until he started serving his sentence. 28. The applicant appealed to the Ljubljana Higher Court (Višje sodišče v Ljubljani). The court allowed the appeal on 11 April 2001 and remitted the case to the first-instance court for re-examination. The court also ordered the applicant's release. 29. A hearing was scheduled for 1 September 2003 but later postponed since one of the accused could not be summoned. Hearings scheduled for 15 April and 26 May 2005 were also postponed. 30. The court held hearings on 17 June, 8 September and 27 September 2005. 31. Another hearing scheduled for 27 October 2005 was adjourned because two defendants did not appear. Further hearings were then held on 8 December 2005 and 24 January 2006. 32. After a hearing on 9 March 2006, the court handed down a judgment in which it acquitted all three defendants. 33. The public prosecutor lodged an appeal. 34. The proceedings are pending before the Ljubljana Higher Court.

8. The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in the city of Simferopol, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (Ukraine). 9. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 10. The full name of the applicant, a Ukrainian citizen of Russian origin, is, in Cyrillic, “Дмитрий Владимирович Булгаков” (Dmitriy Vladimirovich Bulgakov). Dmitriy is the first, or given, name; Bulgakov is the surname, while Vladimirovich is the “patronymic” (otchestvo in Russian, po-bat'kovi in Ukrainian) - in other words, a second given name, derived from the father's given name and the appropriate gender suffix. 11. The applicant was born on the territory of former Soviet Belorussia. His birth certificate was issued in the Russian language. On 21 September 1990, by then living on the territory of former Soviet Ukraine, the applicant received his first Soviet passport (паспорт гражданина СССР), issued in Russian and Ukrainian. According to the applicant, in the Ukrainian version, his name and patronymic were transliterated from Russian as “Дмітрій Владіміровіч” (Dmitriy Vladimirovich). According to the Government, the applicant's name and patronymic could not appear in the Ukrainian version other than in its Ukrainian form – “Дмитро Володимирович” (Dmytro Volodymyrovych), since the rules at that time knew no exceptions. (However, neither party could submit any document to prove their assertions, because no archives or copies of that passport exist any longer). 12. In 1993 the applicant lost his passport and, given a lack of new Ukrainian passport forms, he was issued with a special temporary identity certificate drafted in Russian. 13. In December 1997 the applicant applied for and received a Ukrainian citizen's internal passport (паспорт громадянина України) from the Directorate General of the Ukrainian Ministry of the Interior in the Crimea (Головне управлiння Мiнiстерства внутрiшнiх справ в АР Крим, “the Directorate”). Page 2 of this document is drawn up in Ukrainian, and the applicant's given name and patronymic appear in their Ukrainian form “Дмитро Володимирович” (Dmytro Volodymyrovych). However, on page 3 of the passport, which is in Russian, his whole name is written in its original Russian form. 14. In June 1998 the applicant applied to the Directorate for a Ukrainian citizen's passport for travel abroad (паспорт громадянина України для виїзду за кордон; an “external passport”). It appears from the case file that, when submitting his application, the applicant was obliged to complete and sign a form on which he gave his given name as Dmytro. This “Ukrainianised” form of his given name (“ДМИТРО / DMYTRO”) appears on the first page of the passport, which is in Ukrainian and English; there is no mention of the patronymic. The applicant challenged this “Ukrainianisation” by means of an internal appeal, submitted to the management of the Directorate's local branch, which dismissed it. 15. In July 1998 the applicant appealed to the Kievskiy District Court, Simferopol. He submitted that there had been a violation of his right to the integrity of his given name, and asked the court to order the authorities to issue him with a new passport and to pay him 1,700 hryvnas for non-pecuniary damage. 16. After adversarial proceedings, the court dismissed the appeal in a judgment of 16 August 1999. The judgment noted that the disputed spelling complied with the relevant regulations, which stated that all entries on the first page of an external passport were to be in Ukrainian and English. The court also noted that all of the principal entries in such a passport were to follow the model of the corresponding entries in the internal passport issued to the same person. On the first page of his internal passport, the applicant's given name had been entered as Dmytro; accordingly, this spelling was also to be used in the external passport. In addition, the court pointed out that the applicant himself had written his given name as Dmytro on the passport application form; consequently, his objections were unfounded. 17. The applicant appealed to the Crimea Supreme Court. He vehemently denied that he had used the form Dmytro on the application form. In his opinion, this was a manifestly erroneous finding by the court of first instance, since he had, without question, indicated that his given name was Dmitriy and not Dmytro. 18. In a judgment of 2 February 2000, the Crimea Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the findings of the court of first instance. 19. The applicant subsequently made several applications to the prosecution service and the President of the Crimea Supreme Court for supervisory review of the final decision, all of which were dismissed. 20. In April 2000 the applicant submitted an internal appeal to the head of the Directorate's local branch. He challenged the fact that his given name and patronymic had been translated into Ukrainian; in particular, he alleged that, even on the Ukrainian page of the passport, these ought to have appeared in their original form merely transliterated into the Ukrainian alphabet, not replaced by their Ukrainian equivalents. Consequently, according to the applicant, his name ought to have been written on page 2 of the passport as “Дмiтрiй Владiмiровiч” (Dmitriy Vladimirovich), since the Cyrillic grapheme 'И' reads as [i] in Russian but as [y][1] in Ukrainian. The appeal was dismissed. 21. In June 2000 the applicant lodged an application with the Kievskiy District Court of First Instance, Simferopol, for an order requiring the authorities to issue him with a new passport in which his given name and patronymic would be written in their original form on both the Russian and Ukrainian pages. In his submissions he emphasised, inter alia, that he belonged to the Russian minority and that consequently, under section 12 of the National Minorities Act, he was entitled to use the original, Russian form of his name. According to the applicant, when entering his given name and patronymic on page 2 of the passport, the authorities would have been entitled to transliterate them into the Ukrainian alphabet, but they had not been entitled to replace them with Ukrainian equivalents. 22. After adversarial proceedings, the Court of First Instance dismissed the appeal as unfounded. The judgment noted that the disputed passport had been drawn up in compliance with the Passports of Ukrainian Citizens Order, which stated that the holder's personal data were to appear “in Ukrainian and in Russian”. Finally, the court pointed out that page 3 of the passport had been drawn up in Russian, and that all the elements of the applicant's name appeared on it in their original form; accordingly, there had been no violation of the applicant's fundamental rights. 23. The applicant appealed against this judgment to the Crimea Supreme Court which, in a judgment of 30 August 2000, also dismissed his appeal. In the Supreme Court's opinion, the provision by which the holder's personal data were to appear “in Ukrainian and in Russian” indeed meant that the given name, patronymic and surname were “to comply with the requirements of the Ukrainian language, in application of the rules governing literary translation”. Like the Court of First Instance, the Supreme Court added that there had been no violation of the right to the integrity of one's name in the present case, since all the entries on page 3 of the passport had been in Russian. 24. As with his external passport, the applicant made several applications to the prosecution service and the President of the Crimea Supreme Court for a supervisory review of the final decision. These appeals were all dismissed.

5. The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Migieşti. 6. The applicant is a tradesman specialised in installing roof drainage systems. In May – June 2008 he accepted money from four different people in exchange for installing drainage systems in their houses. However, he failed to carry out the required work and declared that he no longer had the money, promising to return it later. 7. In the early morning of 29 September 2008 he was arrested by the police and brought to Râşcani Police Station in Chişinău, on the grounds of having committed the administrative offence of insulting a police officer. He was allegedly forced to return the money which he had taken from B. I. for installing a roof drainage system on his house. According to the applicant, he had not managed to finish the work on that installation when B. I. asked for the money to be returned and also involved his relatives who worked at Râşcani Police Station in order to intimidate the applicant and obtain full repayment. 8. On 1 October 2008 B. I. made a complaint to the police, according to which the applicant had defrauded him by accepting money and refusing to return it, while having failed to carry out any work. On 4 October 2008 a criminal investigation against the applicant was initiated. 9. On an unspecified date one of the applicant’s relatives paid 500 euros (EUR) to B. I., who signed a statement to the effect that he no longer had any claims against the applicant. 10. On 6 October 2008 the prosecutor asked the Râşcani District Court to order the applicant’s detention for ten days. The applicant was accused of defrauding B. I. by accepting 8,000 Moldovan lei (approximately EUR 560 at the time) in May 2008 as payment for installing a roof drainage system, but failing to carry out any work. He was also accused of two similar offences, but no details other than the case numbers were given. Details were given at subsequent court hearings. A hearing was scheduled for the same day at the Râşcani District Court. 11. The applicant’s lawyer was not able to read the prosecutor’s request until immediately before the hearing and was not given a copy at that time. He did not see any other documents being submitted to the investigating judge to substantiate the prosecutor’s request and no documents were shown to the defence or discussed by the investigating judge at the hearing. 12. During the hearing of 6 October 2008 the lawyer informed the court of the payment of EUR 500 to B. I. The prosecutor present at the hearing declared that there was no evidence of any repayment of the monies to B. I. The lawyer then asked that B. I. be heard in order to confirm that payment. The court did not take any formal decision in respect of B. I. and the latter was not heard before the court adopted its decision. During the same hearing, the applicant submitted that he had been arrested on 29 September 2008. The prosecutor confirmed that, stating that the applicant had been arrested on an administrative charge and then arrested again as a suspect in the criminal proceedings. The applicant’s lawyer argued that since his client was suspected of having committed a crime, he should have been arrested in accordance with the criminal procedure. The court did not react in any way to this argument, confining its reasoning to the applicant’s detention after 4 October 2008. 13. In his decision of 6 October 2008 the investigating judge of the Râşcani District Court granted the prosecutor’s request and ordered the applicant’s detention pending trial for ten days. The reasons given were that: “the act of which [the applicant] is accused is considered a minor crime, which is a legitimate ground for detention pending trial; the character, degree of harm and circumstances of the crime constitute sufficient grounds for supposing that [the applicant] will interfere with the normal course of the investigation; the materials submitted to the court clearly confirm that there is a reasonable suspicion that [the applicant] committed a minor crime, and there are sufficient grounds to prevent [the applicant] from hindering the establishment of the truth and from absconding from the investigating authority; the materials in the file confirm the reasonable suspicion that [the applicant] might reoffend, as it follows from the information obtained by the investigating authority during the operational phase of the investigation that [the applicant] may have committed other similar offences; ... [the applicant] has no stable income and works periodically, there is no information about his financial status and his state of health is not incompatible with detention; [the applicant] and his lawyer did not submit any evidence in support of their statements; ...” 14. The applicant’s lawyer appealed, complaining of the applicant’s de facto arrest on 29 September 2008 and his detention thereafter, and of the lack of legal assistance available to the applicant until 6 October 2008. He submitted that the lower court had not dealt with that complaint. He also informed the court of the fact that he had only read the prosecutor’s request at the hearing of 6 October 2008 and had not had time to properly prepare for that hearing. Besides the prosecutor’s request, no other document had been submitted to the court or shown to the defence to substantiate the need for the applicant’s detention. Nor had the prosecutor referred to any additional documents or other evidence during the hearing. The applicant had asked the first-instance court to hear a witness, who could have confirmed that the applicant had had a contract with B. I. and that B. I.’s relatives in the police had threatened the applicant if he refused to return the money for the ongoing work, but the court had refused to hear the witness without giving any reasons. Moreover, the judge had relied on grounds which had not been mentioned by the prosecutor, thus showing bias towards the prosecution. The lawyer relied on Article 5 of the Convention and referred to the absence of any evidence to support the prosecutor’s request for the applicant’s detention pending trial, including the absence of any judgment or other evidence concerning the other similar offences allegedly committed by his client. In the lawyer’s opinion, there had been no reason to believe that the applicant would abscond or interfere with the investigation. Relying on Article 3 of the Convention, the lawyer also complained of the inhuman conditions of his client’s detention. 15. On 10 October 2008 the Chişinău Court of Appeal rejected the appeal as unfounded, referring to similar grounds as those referred to by the lower court, including that the applicant had allegedly committed other similar offences “as [could] be seen from the criminal file”. 16. On 13 October 2008 the prosecutor asked for an extension of the applicant’s detention pending trial for thirty days. He referred to three separate occasions on which the applicant had been accused of having accepted money for installing roof drainage systems but had failed to do so, including in respect of B. I. 17. On the same day the investigating judge of the Râşcani District Court granted the request and ordered the applicant’s detention pending trial for thirty days. The court noted that “... a serious crime has been committed for which the law provides a penalty of more than two years’ imprisonment; there has been no compensation for the pecuniary damage caused; there are reasons to believe that [the applicant] could abscond or interfere with the normal and objective course of the investigation; the grounds on which the initial detention was ordered remain valid.” 18. The applicant’s lawyer appealed, relying on the same grounds as in his previous appeal. He added that his client had told the lower court that he owed no debt to B. I., whom he had reimbursed fully. Moreover, the lawyer had read the prosecutor’s request only immediately before the hearing of 13 October 2008. No documents other than the prosecutor’s request had been examined by the court during the hearing or shown to the defence. The lawyer added that the applicant had a stable home life, had two children to support and had not been previously convicted of any offence. He again complained of his client’s inhuman conditions of detention, both at the Râşcani Police Station and at the General Police Department (“the GPD”, see paragraph 22 below), and relied on Article 3 of the Convention in that regard. 19. On 21 October 2008 the Chişinău Court of Appeal rejected the appeal, relying on the same grounds as those referred to by the lower court. 20. On 11 November 2008 the Râşcani District Court ordered the applicant’s release. The court found that “... [the applicant] is accused of having committed a crime for which the law provides punishment [through] alternatives [to imprisonment]; he did not abscond from the investigating authority; he has a permanent residence and two children.” 21. On 8 May 2009 the Râşcani District Court found the applicant guilty of fraud and sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment, suspended for one year. In his submissions to the court the applicant acknowledged having taken money from B. I. in May 2008. After a while, he had manufactured the relevant items but had not been able to install them because of personal family circumstances obliging him to remain home with his children. The court found that he had taken money from three other people in May – July 2008 and had also failed to carry out the work which he had undertaken to do for them. 22. According to the Government, the applicant had been detained for one night at the Râşcani Police Station on 29 September 2008 and had then been transferred to the General Police Department (Comisariatul General de Poliţie or “the GPD”), where he had been detained until 11 November 2008. 23. The applicant described his conditions of detention at the Râşcani Police Station as follows: he had been held in a cell without a bed or any other furniture; there had been no ventilation, toilet or running water in the cell; he had not been given any food and had had to beg for it from other detainees; the cell had been overcrowded and many detainees had smoked, exposing the applicant to passive smoking; and the cell had been damp. 24. According to the applicant, at the GPD he had been placed together with seven other people in a cell measuring 12 square metres. The cell had been dirty and infested with parasitic insects and rats. There had been no furniture in the cell, and the detainees had slept directly on the floor, in their own clothes. The cell had been damp and very cold. A low-intensity lamp, covered by a metal sheet, had been switched on twenty-four hours a day and there had not been a window in the cell. The toilet had not been separated from the rest of the cell, offering no privacy. Due to the large number of people using it, the toilet had been occupied most of the time and had smelt bad. The applicant had not been given any personal hygiene items, clean clothes or bed linen. He had had to continually wear the clothes in which he had been arrested. The applicant had received little food, which had been of a very bad quality (a cup of warm water in the morning and evening and boiled vegetables with warm water for lunch). Even though he had had a stomach ulcer and high intracranial blood pressure, he had not received any medical assistance. He had been detained in such conditions for twenty-four hours a day, without any right to take exercise or to take part in recreational activities.

9. The applicant, born in 1959, was an Egyptian national at the time of the events complained of. He has since obtained Netherlands nationality and, as far as the Court is aware, is at present living in the Netherlands. 10. The applicant first arrived in the Netherlands in 1985. That year he met Ms R., a Netherlands national. On 16 January 1987 a daughter, S., was born to the couple, who were not married and were not living together. By a decision of 12 February 1987, the Deventer District Court judge (kantonrechter) appointed the applicant as the auxiliary guardian (toeziend voogd) of S., Ms R. as her mother ipso jure being her guardian (voogdes). 11. At some time in or around August 1987, the applicant moved in with Ms R. and their daughter in the house of Ms R.’s mother. They lived together for about a year. 12. The applicant went to the Middle East in July 1988 and stayed there for some two and a half years. During this time, contact between the applicant on the one hand and Ms R. and S. on the other was limited to the exchange of some letters. 13. The applicant returned to the Netherlands in early 1991. The applicant states that he saw S. every two weeks until 1993. Despite the applicant’s repeated requests, Ms R. refused to give him permission to recognise (erkennen) S. 14. Ms R. contracted a terminal illness. On 9 June 1993 she made a will in which she expressed the wish that, after her death, her brother Mr H.R. should have guardianship of her daughter, S. In January 1994 the applicant instigated summary injunction proceedings (kort geding) before the President of the Zwolle Regional Court (arrondissementsrechtbank), seeking an order for Ms R. to give him permission to recognise S. On 25 January 1994 the President gave a judgment refusing to grant the injunction sought. The President considered that Ms R. had not abused her power to withhold permission to the applicant’s recognition of S., since the change of surname which such recognition would entail for S. could not be deemed to be in her best interests. However, the President added by way of obiter dictum that it was important for both the applicant and his daughter that contacts between them be continued. The President therefore thought it desirable that S. spend every other weekend with her father. 15. In a further, supplementary will dated 7 February 1994 Ms R. stated that she had agreed with another of her brothers, Mr J.R., that after her death S. would be placed with his family. Ms R. further stated that it was her express wish that the applicant should not visit her daughter as this would seriously disrupt the life of the family in which S. was to be raised. Ms R. also expressed the opinion that it would be contrary to the best interests of her daughter if the applicant were to obtain access to S. According to Ms R., the applicant had no fixed abode, no residence permit, no employment and no financial means; he would only use the care for his daughter as a pretext for obtaining a residence permit in the Netherlands and thus be entitled to social-security benefits. Prior to her illness, the applicant had not shown much interest in S., nor had he contributed financially to S.’s upbringing. 16. Ms R. died on 15 February 1994. In conformity with her wishes, her brother, Mr H.R., was granted guardianship of S. and she was placed in Mr J.R.’s family. The applicant saw S. once every three weeks under an arrangement with the R. family. 17. Following Ms R.’s death, the applicant requested the Deventer Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages (ambtenaar van de burgerlijke stand – “the Deventer Registrar”) to draw up a deed of recognition and to enter this into the register of births. By a letter of 18 February 1994, the Deventer Registrar notified the applicant of his refusal to do so, being of the opinion that Egyptian law, which did not provide for the recognition of children, applied. 18. On 28 February 1994 the applicant lodged a request pursuant to Article 1:29 of the Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek) with the Zwolle Regional Court asking that the Deventer Registrar be ordered to draw up the deed of recognition and enter it in the appropriate registers. Although the Regional Court agreed with the applicant that Netherlands law applied, it nevertheless refused to grant the request on 19 October 1994. It considered that, when alive, Ms R. had always withheld her permission for the applicant’s recognition of S.; it had not been established that there was family life within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention; following Ms R.’s death somebody other than the applicant had been granted the guardianship of S.; and S. was, moreover, not living with the applicant. 19. Meanwhile, in June 1994, the applicant requested the Maastricht Regional Court to grant him access to S. every other weekend, as had been recommended by the President of the Zwolle Regional Court. He submitted that Mr H.R. was frustrating his right to regular and undisturbed access to his daughter. At the hearing in those proceedings on 3 October 1994, Mr H.R. and Mr J.R. stated that there was not and never had been family life between the applicant and S.; that the applicant only wanted regular access to S. in order to obtain a residence permit; that S. was settling into her new family; that S. called Mr J.R. “Daddy”; that S. did not enjoy the applicant’s visits; and that she did not trust him. In reply, the applicant stated that S. was very important to him; that the late Ms R. had been heavily influenced by her overbearing mother; that unbeknownst to Ms R.’s mother the applicant had continued the relationship with Ms R. after they had stopped living together; and that it was Ms R.’s mother who had told S. not to call the applicant “Daddy”. 20. At the conclusion of the hearing the Regional Court, being of the opinion that there was “family life” between the applicant and S., decided provisionally that the contacts between the applicant and S. were to continue at the offices of the Child Welfare Board (Raad voor de Kinder-bescherming), and that it would take a decision based on a report to be drawn up by that organisation. 21. The applicant lodged an appeal with the Court of Appeal (gerechtshof) of Arnhem against the decision of the Zwolle Regional Court not to order the Deventer Registrar to draw up a deed of recognition. He argued that Ms R.’s refusal to consent to his recognition of S. no longer had any effect after her death. That being so, there was no call for the courts to go into the question whether or not there existed family life between the applicant and S. Should the Court of Appeal nevertheless be of the opinion that it ought to examine this question and that a balancing exercise as required by Article 8 of the Convention was called for, the applicant submitted that he was the natural father of S.; that not only had there been a meaningful relationship between Ms R. and himself, they had also lived together as a family for some time and they had contributed equally to the care and upbringing of S. The applicant also referred to his request lodged with the Maastricht Regional Court to have his rights of access to S. increased. While he conceded that during the mother’s lifetime an unwanted recognition might have constituted a disproportionate interference with her private and family life, after her death only the interests of the applicant and the child remained to be balanced against each other, and there were no weighty interests on the side of the child which militated against recognition. 22. The applicant lastly submitted that it had been his desire from the outset to obtain guardianship (voogdij) of S. after her mother’s death and that S. should live with him. In order for a request for a change of guardianship to stand any chance of success, the applicant ought first to have recognised his daughter. The applicant urged the Court of Appeal to deal with his request speedily as he was being threatened with expulsion, the Deputy Minister of Justice (Staatssecretaris van Justitie) not accepting that there was family life between the applicant and S. Recognition would serve to confirm officially the natural ties between father and daughter. 23. At the hearing before the Court of Appeal on 8 December 1994, the applicant submitted, inter alia, that he had always done everything possible to ensure S.’s happiness but that Ms R.’s family had never accepted him. However, the relationship between S. and him was very strong. 24. In a decision of 17 January 1995 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It held that the explicit refusal of Ms R. to consent to the applicant’s recognition of S. had not ceased to have effect after her death, as she had stated in her will that she maintained the refusal which she had considered to be in the best interests of S. 25. The Court of Appeal further found that, even assuming that family life had at one time existed between the applicant and S., that tie had been broken by subsequent events. The contacts which had taken place between the applicant on the one hand and Ms R. and S. on the other had been so sparse and irregular, and so devoid of mutual commitment, that they could no longer be regarded as constituting family life. The Court of Appeal went on to hold, however, that even if it had to be assumed that family life still existed, the interests of the child should be its foremost consideration. These interests would be best served by allowing S. to grow up in the family where she had been placed after the death of her mother and in accordance with her mother’s explicit last wishes, and where she received the care she needed. The recognition intended by the applicant was aimed at bringing about a change in this situation and, for that reason, could not be held to be in the best interests of S. The Court of Appeal found that this was all the less so as the applicant had never had the care of S., had not previously indicated that he actually wished to care for her and, in addition, had not substantiated his claim that he would be able to discharge his duty of care in a responsible manner. Moreover, recognition would mean that S. would automatically take the applicant’s surname, whereas she now had the same surname as the other members of the family in which she was growing up. 26. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad), arguing, inter alia, that the Court of Appeal had been wrong to hold that the refusal of Ms R. to consent to the applicant’s recognition of S. could still have effect after her death. Moreover, the relevant legal provisions did not require that, in order for the natural father to recognise a child following the death of the mother, there should be family life between them. In any event, contrary to what the Court of Appeal had found, there was family life between the applicant and S., so that the Court of Appeal’s finding on this point was incomprehensible. 27. According to the applicant, the Court of Appeal had also been wrong to hold that it would be in the best interests of S. to be raised in Mr J.R.’s family. The legislature had, on the contrary, deemed that recognition by the natural father would serve a child’s interests in a case such as the present where the mother had died. Moreover, recognition as such would not entail any changes in the child’s living arrangements. Such changes could only be brought about if the applicant were to file a request for a change in the guardianship arrangements, in which event the interests of the child could be assessed at that time. Finally, the applicant submitted that the Court of Appeal could not have properly assessed what was in the best interests of S. without having sought the opinion of the Child Welfare Board. 28. By a decision of 8 December 1995, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on points of law. It agreed with the applicant that Ms R.’s refusal to consent to his recognition of S. – to which she had been entitled, such a right having been provided by law in order to protect the interests of mothers in her position – was no longer valid after her death. The Court of Appeal had given additional reasons for its decision not to order the Deventer Registrar to draw up a deed of recognition, even assuming that family life did exist. This reasoning, in the view of the Supreme Court, was sufficient in itself to support the Court of Appeal’s decision. In this regard the Supreme Court pointed out that, as a result of a valid recognition, legally recognised family ties (familierechtelijke betrekkingen) would be created between the child and the person who had recognised the child. This far-reaching consequence meant that recognition could affect interests of the child which were protected by Article 8 of the Convention. Although recognition could serve these interests, it could similarly harm them. Article 8 had thus required the Court of Appeal to balance the applicant’s interest in having the relationship between himself and S. confirmed as a legally recognised family tie, assuming that this relationship constituted family life, against the interest of the child in continuing to live with the legal family in which she had lived ever since her mother had died, and to keep that family’s surname. The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeal had adequately acquitted itself of this task. 29. Given that the applicant had never made a secret of the fact that he intended to obtain guardianship of S. and to have her live with him, the Court of Appeal had been correct to take into account S.’s interest in not having her residence with Mr J.R.’s family threatened by the outcome of further legal proceedings. Finally, the legal provisions in force had not required the Court of Appeal to seek advice from the Child Welfare Board, and it had been up to the Court of Appeal itself to determine whether or not it needed such advice. 30. During and following the proceedings before the Supreme Court, a change in S.’s living arrangements occurred; the Supreme Court was unable to take these new circumstances into account as, pursuant to Article 419 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering), it was bound by the facts as established by the Court of Appeal and contained in the case file. 31. In September 1995 S. returned to live with her maternal grandmother. According to the Child Welfare Board, one of the reasons for this was the distress caused to the family of her uncle, Mr J.R., by the applicant’s seeking access to S. On 31 January 1996 the Child Welfare Board requested the juvenile judge (kinderrechter) of the Amsterdam Regional Court to issue a supervision order (ondertoezichtstelling) in respect of S. During a hearing on 21 February 1996, the juvenile judge stated that for the time being it would be best if S. stayed with her grandmother, but that there should be contact between the applicant and S. and that the applicant’s future role in the life of S. should be further examined. On 6 March 1996 the juvenile judge issued a supervision order and appointed a family guardian (gezinsvoogd). 32. On 6 November 1996 the Deventer Registrar refused to comply with a new request from the applicant to draw up a deed of recognition and enter it in the register of births. The applicant again turned to the Zwolle Regional Court, submitting that the circumstances leading to the rejection of his first request had changed as S. was no longer living with her uncle. He further stated that he was concerned about his daughter’s well-being in view of the advanced age of the grandmother and the latter’s overbearing character. Moreover, the applicant submitted that he was capable of looking after S. himself. 33. The Regional Court rejected the applicant’s request on 26 May 1997. It considered that the change in S.’s living arrangements had been brought about by the juvenile judge and could not be held to be to the detriment of S. Moreover, the persons responsible for the care and upbringing of S. were in receipt of assistance as a result of the supervision order. The change in the living arrangements could therefore not, as such, alter the result in the balancing exercise that had been carried out by the Arnhem Court of Appeal. Noting that the applicant was still attempting to obtain guardianship of S., the Regional Court finally considered that the recognition of S. by the applicant would not be in her best interests. 34. The applicant did not file an appeal against the Regional Court’s decision of 26 May 1997. 35. Following the entry into force of the Law of 6 April 1995, which abolished the institution of auxiliary guardianship, the applicant is no longer S.’s auxiliary guardian. 36. The applicant, who since the events complained of has taken Netherlands nationality, has married another woman by whom he has a son.

9. The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Vilnius. 10. The applicant was suspected of having committed various fraudulent offences between October 1992 and October 1993. In 1994 criminal proceedings on three counts of cheating, suppression of documents and false accounting were instituted against him. As the applicant had absconded from the investigation, on 21 November 1994 the prosecutors declared him a wanted person. 11. On 24 September 1996 the applicant was arrested in Moscow on an extradition request by the Lithuanian authorities. He was extradited to Lithuania on 30 December 1996. 12. On 31 December 1996 the Šiauliai City District Court ordered the applicant's detention on remand until 31 January 1997 on suspicion of his suppressing documents. The court referred to the dangers of the applicant absconding and committing further offences. On 24 January 1997 the court extended the term to 31 March 1997, on 28 March to 31 May 1997 and on 30 May to 13 June 1997. 13. On 5 June 1997 the case was transmitted to the Šiauliai City District Court. On 6 August 1997 the court committed the applicant for trial. On the same date the court also authorised the applicant's detention, stating that his remand must remain unchanged. No term of the detention was specified. 14. On 10 September 1998 the Šiauliai City District Court convicted the applicant of cheating and suppressing documents but acquitted him of false accounting. He was sentenced to five years' imprisonment and his property was confiscated. The court ordered him to pay 615,264 Lithuanian litai (LTL) of damages in favour of a bank. 15. On 2 March 1999 the Šiauliai Regional Court amended the first instance judgment insofar as it concerned the damages against the applicant, reducing the amount to 476,000 LTL. 16. Upon the applicant's cassation appeal, on 29 June 1999 the Supreme Court quashed the above decisions and returned the case for a new first instance examination. No question relating to the applicant's remand in custody was mentioned by the Supreme Court in the decision. 17. On 30 July 1999 the Šiauliai City District Court ordered the applicant's detention on remand until 1 September 1999 on suspicion of his having cheated and suppressed documents. The court referred to the danger of the applicant absconding. The District Court also noted that on 29 June 1999 the Supreme Court had not ruled on the applicant's remand. On 31 August 1999 the term of the applicant's detention was extended until 15 November 1999. On 15 November 1999 the term was extended until 31 December 1999. On 30 December 1999 the Šiauliai District Court extended the term of the applicant's remand in custody “until a court judgment would be taken in the case”. 18. On 6 March 2000 the Šiauliai District Court convicted the applicant of suppressing documents and acquitted him of cheating. 476,000 LTL were awarded against the applicant in damages in favour of a bank. The sentence of five years' imprisonment was reduced by one third due to an amnesty law. The applicant was released in the courtroom as he was deemed to have already completed his sentence because of the time he had spent on remand. The court also ordered his release on bail, with home arrest, until the entry into force of the judgment. The applicant and his lawyer were present during the hearing. 19. On 4 May 2000 the Šiauliai Regional Court rejected the applicant's appeal. On that date the conviction took effect for the purposes of domestic law and the bail constraints ceased. The applicant and his representative were present at the appeal hearing. 20. On 24 October 2000 the Supreme Court examined the applicant's cassation appeal. The court amended the lower decisions, reducing the applicant's sentence to three years' imprisonment. The applicant and his defence counsel were present before the Supreme Court. That decision was final. 21. From 2 January 1997 until 22 September 1999 the applicant was held at the Šiauliai Remand Prison (Šiaulių tardymo izoliatorius). From 22 to 28 September 1999 he was held at a Kaunas police custody centre. On 28 September 1999 he was again detained at the Šiauliai Remand Prison until his release on 6 March 2000. 22. The applicant gave the following account of the detention conditions at the Šiauliai Remand Prison: Living space for one prisoner amounted to 1.5 square metres. The applicant states that he lived and slept in cells of less than 20 square metres where from 10 to 15 inmates were held. There was an open toilet in each cell. They lacked ventilation and had a strong smell due to the inmates' smoking and toilet use. The cells were very humid and cold, particularly during the winter. The insufficiency of the living space was aggravated by the scarce time for strolling in the prison yard (one hour daily). Prison bedding was in an awful and dirty condition. All washing had to be done by hand in a sink in the cell. There was a constant lack of hot and cold water. The applicant had access to a shower only once in 15 days. Food was prepared and served in awful conditions. Only 6 LTL per day were allocated for an inmate's catering. 23. The Government provided the following account of the applicant's detention conditions at the Šiauliai Remand Prison: From 2 January 1997 until 24 August 1998 the applicant was held at the cell no. 11 of the prison which accommodated 11 detainees at the time. The overall capacity of the cell was 16.65 square metres, i.e. 1.51 m² per detainee. From 24 August 1998 until 22 June 1999 he was held in the cell no. 86 which accommodated 9 inmates. The cell's capacity was 17.78 m², i.e. 1.98 m² per detainee. From 22 June 1999 until 28 December 1999 the applicant was held in the cell no. 87 which accommodated 10 inmates. The capacity of cell was 19.7 m², i.e. 1.97 m² per detainee. From 7 January 2000 until 12 January 2000 he was held in the cell no. 37 which had 4 inmates, including the applicant. The cell's capacity was 7.68 m², i.e. 1.92 m² per detainee. From 12 January 2000 until 3 March 2000 the applicant was held in the cell no. 34 which accommodated 2 inmates. The capacity of the cell was 7.9 m², i.e. 3.95 m² per inmate. The cells had toilets separated by 1.2 metres-high partitions. The cells also had windows, and the ventilation and lighting were adequate. Inmates were allowed to smoke, but persons could apply to the prison administration to be transferred to a no-smoking cell upon request. In 1997 the sanitation facilities were renovated. In 1998 a new heating system was installed. After the renovation in 1999-2000 of the prison bath, possibilities were afforded for each detainee to use the bath once a week. In 2000 industrial laundry facilities were procured, therefore allowing for adequate washing of inmates' clothes and bedding. 24. The applicant alleged that his letters to the European Commission of Human Rights of 12 and 13 October 1998, and to the European Court of Human Rights of 28 March, 13 July, 26 August, 5, 8 and 17 November, 26 December 1999, 15 and 30 January, 2, 7, 9, 13, 21, 25 and 29 February, 2 and 5 March 2000 had been censored by the administration of the Šiauliai Remand Prison. 25. The applicant also alleged that the letters addressed to him by the Registry of the European Court of Human Rights of 17 November 1998, 21 April, 9 and 10 August, 8 October, 14 December 1999, 17 January 2000, 1, 21 and 23 February, 3 and 9 March 2000 had been opened up and read in his absence by the administration of the Šiauliai Remand Prison.

4. The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Tver, a town in the Tver Region. In 1997–2003 he was engaged in two sets of civil proceedings. 5. The applicant sued a municipal maintenance enterprise for its failure to repair a leaking roof in his house. On 17 November 1997 the Central District Court of Tver ordered the enterprise to repair the roof by 15 December 1997. This judgment became binding on 27 November 1997. According to the Government, this judgment was enforced on 15 December 2000. According to the applicant, this judgment has not been enforced to date. 6. In 1998–2001 bailiffs several times terminated the enforcement proceedings considering that the enterprise had repaired the roof, but the applicant asserted that the roof still leaked, and courts ordered the bailiffs to resume the enforcement. 7. In June 2000 the applicant sued several defendants (among them the Ministry of Justice – the authority responsible for the bailiffs) for their failure to enforce the judgment. After one first-instance and one appeal hearing, on 23 December 2002 the District Court found that the bailiffs should not have terminated the enforcement proceedings, ordered them to resume the proceedings, and awarded the applicant 5,000 Russian roubles by way of non-pecuniary damages against the Ministry of Justice. This judgment became binding on 18 February 2003 after an appeal hearing. The appeal court stated that the damages were to be paid by the Treasury. 8. On 18 February 2003 the applicant renounced the resumption of the enforcement proceedings because he had been frustrated by their past inefficiency. On this ground, on 6 May 2003 the bailiffs decided not to resume the enforcement proceedings. 9. On the Treasury’s request, on 30 May 2003 the Presidium of the Tver Regional Court quashed the judgment of 23 December 2002 in the part concerning the damages. The Presidium found that the courts below had misinterpreted material law on non-pecuniary damages and that the bailiffs had not been responsible for the leaks. The applicant was absent from this hearing. According to him, he had not been summoned. According to the Government, he had been informed about the time and place of the hearing by a letter of 18 May 2003. 10. In separate proceedings the applicant sued the Savings Bank for its failure to restore the purchasing power of his deposits. He asked the court to hear the case in his absence. 11. On 5 September 2003 the Gagarinskiy District Court of Moscow held against the applicant. In his appeal of 22 September 2003, the applicant asked for the case to be heard in his absence. In a corrigendum of 23 September 2003 the applicant asked for the case to be heard in his presence. 12. On 3 November 2003 the District Court informed the applicant about the time and place of the appeal hearing. 13. On 24 November 2003 the Moscow City Court rejected the appeal. The applicant was absent from this hearing.

9. On 17 November 1980 police officers from the Ankara Security Directorate arrested the applicant on suspicion of membership of an illegal armed organisation, the Dev-Yol (Revolutionary Way). 10. On 20 February 1981 the Ankara Martial Law Court (sıkıyönetim mahkemesi) ordered the applicant’s detention on remand. 11. On 26 February 1982 the Military Public Prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Martial Law Court against the applicant and 722 other defendants. The Public Prosecutor accused the applicant, inter alia, of membership of the Dev-Yol, whose object was to undermine the constitutional order and replace it with a Marxist-Leninist regime. The prosecution sought the death penalty under Article 146 § 1 of the Turkish Criminal Code. 12. On 14 December 1988 the Ankara Martial Law Court ordered the applicant’s release pending trial. 13. In a judgment of 19 July 1989 the Martial Law Court convicted the applicant of membership of the Dev-Yol. It sentenced the applicant to 16 years’ imprisonment under Article 168 § 1 of the Turkish Criminal Code, permanently debarred him from employment in the civil service and placed him under judicial guardianship. 14. As the applicant’s sentence exceeded 15 years’ imprisonment, his case was automatically referred to the Military Court of Cassation (askeri yargıtay). 15. Following promulgation of the Law of 27 December 1993, which abolished the jurisdiction of the Martial Law Courts, the Court of Cassation (yargıtay) acquired jurisdiction over the case and on 26 December 1994 the case file was transmitted to it. 16. On 27 December 1995 the Court of Cassation quashed the applicant’s conviction on the ground that he should have been convicted of the offence under Article 146 § 1 of the Turkish Criminal Code. It referred the case to the Ankara Assize Court (ağır ceza mahkemesi). The criminal proceedings are still pending before the latter court.

3. The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Bursa. 4. In 2004 the General Directorate of Highways seized a plot of land belonging to the applicant without any formal expropriation, for the construction of a highway. The applicant brought an action before the Karacabey Civil Court to obtain compensation for the de facto expropriation of his property. He requested 5,500 Turkish liras (TRY) as compensation from the court and reserved his right to increase this claim in due course. 5. On 15 June 2006 the Karacabey Civil Court awarded the applicant TRY 5,500 as compensation for the de facto expropriation of his land, as requested, plus interest. The applicant initiated execution proceedings before the Bursa Execution Office to obtain that amount (file no. 2009/2810). 6. On 13 March 2007 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. 7. The applicant subsequently brought an additional action (“ek dava”) before the Karacabey Civil Court to obtain further compensation for his land in the light of the expert report obtained during the previous proceedings, which had valued the land at a rate higher than that initially requested by him. 8. On 24 May 2007 the Karacabey Civil Court awarded the applicant TRY 36,896.75, plus interest. The applicant initiated another set of execution proceedings before the Bursa Execution Office to obtain the amount awarded (file no. 2007/6187). 9. On 16 October 2007 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the Karacabey Civil Court. 10. On 23 March and 13 November 2009 the administration paid TRY 8,920 and 53,081 respectively. According to the information provided by the applicant, there has been no outstanding debt in the execution files.

9. The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Belfast, Northern Ireland. 10. Around 7.25 p.m. on 12 February 1989 the applicant's husband, solicitor Patrick Finucane, was killed in front of her and their three children by two masked men who broke into their home. She herself was injured, probably by a ricochet bullet. Patrick Finucane was shot in the head, neck and chest. Six bullets had struck the head and there was evidence that one or more of these had been fired within a range of 15 inches when he was lying on the floor. The day after the murder, 13 February 1989, a man telephoned the press and stated that the illegal loyalist paramilitary group the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) claimed responsibility for killing Patrick Finucane – the Provisional Irish Republican Army (Provisional IRA) officer – not the solicitor. 11. Patrick Finucane represented clients from both sides of the conflict in Northern Ireland and was involved in a number of high-profile cases arising from that conflict. The applicant believed that it was because of his work on these cases that prior to his murder he had received death threats, via his clients, from officers of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and was targeted for murder. Patrick Finucane had been threatened occasionally since the late 1970s. After acting for Brian Gillen in a case concerning maltreatment in RUC custody, the threats apparently escalated, and clients reported that police officers often abused and threatened to kill him during interrogations at holding centres such as Castlereagh. On 5 January 1989, five weeks before his death, one of Patrick Finucane's clients reported that an RUC officer had said that the solicitor would meet his end. On 7 January 1989 another client claimed that he was told that Patrick Finucane was “getting took out” (murdered). His death came less than four weeks after Douglas Hogg MP, then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, had said in a committee stage debate on the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Bill on 17 January 1989: “I have to state as a fact, but with great regret, that there are in Northern Ireland a number of solicitors who are unduly sympathetic to the cause of the IRA.” 12. After the shooting, the applicant's house was cordoned off by the RUC and a forensic examination of the scene conducted by experts. Photographs were taken and maps prepared. A scene of crimes officer examined the car believed to have been used by those responsible for the shooting and which had been found abandoned. 13. On 13 February 1989 a consultant in pathology conducted a post-mortem examination. 14. A “major incident room” was set up at the Antrim Road police station. Many suspected members of the UFF were detained and interviewed about the murder. 15. On 4 July 1989 the RUC found one of the weapons believed to have been used in the murder. On 5 April 1990 three members of the UFF were convicted of possessing this and another weapon and of membership of the UFF. The weapon had been stolen from the barracks of the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR – a locally recruited regiment of the British army) in August 1987, and in 1988 a member of the UDR was convicted of this theft. 16. In or around September 1990 the police found firearms in the attic of William Stobie's flat. The latter was arrested. He was, according to the applicant, questioned about the Finucane murder from 13 to 20 September 1990. A journalist had allegedly interviewed William Stobie and had told the police about the interview but declined to make a statement. The applicant alleged that William Stobie denied to the police any direct involvement in the shooting but admitted that he was the quartermaster for the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), supplying weapons and recovering them after use. He is also reported as having told the police that he had been acting as an informer for Special Branch for the past three years. A decision was taken on 16 January 1991 not to prosecute William Stobie in connection with the Finucane case, apparently on the ground that there was insufficient evidence. On 23 January 1991 it was decided not to proceed with two arms charges against William Stobie. The prosecution adduced no evidence and he was acquitted. 17. The inquest into Patrick Finucane's death opened on 6 September 1990 and ended the same day. Evidence was heard from RUC officers involved in investigating the death, as well as from the applicant, two neighbours and a taxi driver whose car had been hijacked and used by those responsible for the shooting. The applicant was represented by counsel, who was able to question witnesses on her behalf. After giving evidence, the applicant wanted to make a statement concerning the threats made against her husband by the RUC but was refused permission to do so by the coroner on the ground that it was not relevant to the proceedings. 18. Forensic evidence showed that the victim had been hit at least eleven times by a 9 mm Browning automatic pistol and twice by a .38 Special revolver. Detective Superintendent (D/S) Simpson of the RUC, who was in charge of the murder investigation, gave evidence that the Browning pistol was one of thirteen weapons stolen from Palace army barracks in August 1987 by a member of the UDR who was subsequently jailed for theft. These weapons found their way into the hands of three members of the UFF who were convicted of possession of the weapons and of membership of the UFF. However, the police were satisfied that those individuals had not been in possession of the weapons at the time of Patrick Finucane's murder. 19. According to the evidence given by D/S Simpson at the inquest, the police had interviewed fourteen people in connection with the murder, but had found that, although their suspicions were not assuaged, and they remained reasonably certain that the main perpetrators of the murder were among the suspects, there was insufficient evidence to sustain a charge of murder. None of the fourteen persons had any connection with the security forces. D/S Simpson further stated that none of the suspects had any connection with the security services. He rejected the claim made by the UFF that Patrick Finucane was a member of the Provisional IRA. 20. The inquest heard evidence that the murderers had used a red Ford Sierra car with the registration no. VIA 2985, which had been hijacked by three men from a taxi driver, W.R., shortly before the murder. D/S Simpson stated that he did not think that the hijackers had carried out the murder and that the precision of the killing indicated that the murderers had killed before. He had heard that a death threat had been made in front of a prisoner who was a client of the deceased. He had also seen parts of a report by a group of international lawyers. This had been investigated by the Stevens inquiry team (see below), with whom he liaised closely. Although he did not know who had been interviewed, as the Stevens inquiry was separate from the murder investigation, he said that no evidence had been found substantiating the allegation. On further questioning, he said that he had only read the report by the international lawyers that lunchtime and was unaware of the existence of material linking the security forces to Patrick Finucane's death. 21. On 14 September 1989 the Chief Constable of the RUC appointed John Stevens, then Deputy Chief Constable of the Cambridgeshire Constabulary, to investigate allegations of collusion between members of the security forces and loyalist paramilitaries (the Stevens 1 inquiry). 22. While, according to the applicant, it was claimed by the RUC at the inquest that John Stevens had also investigated her husband's death, the Government state that the inquiry was prompted by events other than the shooting of Patrick Finucane. 23. On 5 April 1990 John Stevens submitted his report to the Chief Constable of the RUC. While the full report was not made public, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland made a statement to the House of Commons on 17 May 1990 in which he declared, inter alia, that as a result of the inquiry ninety-four persons had been arrested, fifty-nine of whom had been reported or charged with criminal offences. He stated that while the passing of information to paramilitaries by the security forces had taken place, it was restricted to a small number of individuals and was neither widespread nor institutionalised. Any evidence or allegation of criminal conduct had been rigorously followed up. No charges had been laid against members of the RUC, but John Stevens had concluded that there had been misbehaviour by a few members of the UDR. He had made detailed recommendations aimed at improving the arrangements for the dissemination and control of sensitive information. 24. As a result of the Stevens inquiry, Brian Nelson, who had worked as an undercover agent providing information to British military intelligence and who had become the chief intelligence officer of the UDA, an illegal loyalist paramilitary group which directed the activities of the UFF, was arrested. At his trial, the British authorities claimed that he had got out of hand and had become personally involved in loyalist murder plots. Originally, he faced thirty-five charges, but thirteen were dropped and he was eventually convicted on five charges of conspiracy to murder, for which he was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. During the Stevens inquiry, members of the team had interviewed him. According to the Government, he had denied any complicity in the murder. 25. In prison, Brian Nelson allegedly admitted that, in his capacity as a UDA intelligence officer, he had himself targeted Patrick Finucane and, in his capacity as a double agent, had told his British army handlers about the approach at the time. It was also alleged that he had passed a photograph of Patrick Finucane to the UDA before he was killed. Loyalist sources further alleged that Brian Nelson had himself pointed out Patrick Finucane's house to the killers. These allegations were transmitted in a BBC Panorama programme on 8 June 1992 and the transcript of the programme was sent to the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). 26. Following the Panorama programme, the DPP asked the Chief Constable of the RUC to conduct further inquiries into the issues raised in the programme. In April 1993 John Stevens, then Chief Constable of the Northumbria Police, was appointed to conduct a second inquiry (the Stevens 2 inquiry). According to the Government, he investigated the alleged involvement of Brian Nelson and members of the army in the death of Patrick Finucane (see, however, John Steven's press statement, paragraph 33 below). The applicant stated that no member of the inquiry team contacted her or her legal representative, or any former clients of Patrick Finucane, about the death threats made prior to the murder. 27. On 21 January 1995 John Stevens submitted his final report to the DPP, having submitted earlier reports on 25 April 1994 and 18 October 1994. On 17 February 1995 the DPP issued a direction of “no prosecution” to the Chief Constable of the RUC. 28. In answer to a parliamentary question published on 15 May 1995, Sir John Wheeler MP said that the DPP had concluded that there was insufficient evidence to warrant the prosecution of any person, despite Brian Nelson's alleged confession. He refused to place copies of Mr Stevens' three reports in the House of Commons library, claiming that police reports were confidential. 29. On 11 February 1992 the applicant issued a writ of summons against the Ministry of Defence and Brian Nelson, claiming damages on behalf of the estate of the deceased, herself and other dependants of the deceased. It was alleged that the deceased's murder had been committed by or at the instigation of or with the connivance, knowledge, encouragement and assistance of the first defendant and by the second defendant, who was at all material times a servant or agent of the first defendant. It was also alleged that the first defendant had been negligent in the gathering, recording, retention, safe-keeping and dissemination of material concerning the deceased, and in the warning, protection and safeguarding of the deceased. 30. The applicant's statement of claim was served on 8 December 1993 and the defence of the Ministry of Defence on 29 December 1993. In its amended defence of 11 October 1995, it was admitted that Brian Nelson had acted as agent for and on behalf of the Ministry of Defence but it was claimed that if he had had any information about the proposed attack on Patrick Finucane he had not communicated it to the ministry as he was required to do. 31. On 22 January 1998 the applicant served further and better particulars of her case and a request for further and better particulars of the Ministry of Defence's case. She served a list of documents on 8 April 1998. On 20 May 1999 a supplemental list of documents, certified by an affidavit sworn by the Permanent Under Secretary of the Ministry of Defence, was served on the applicant. The applicant requested copies of those documents, which were provided on 20 July 1999. The applicant then asked to inspect the originals but was informed on 21 October 1999 that the Ministry of Defence did not have them. 32. On 12 February 1999 the Government stated that at a meeting between the applicant and Dr Mowlem, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, a paper was handed over to Dr Mowlem which, it was claimed, contained new material relating to the murder of Patrick Finucane. This paper was passed on to John Stevens, now Deputy Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, who had been appointed by the Chief Constable of the RUC to conduct an independent investigation into the murder of the applicant's husband (the Stevens 3 inquiry). 33. On 28 April 1999, at a press conference, John Stevens stated: “... in September 1989 ... I was appointed ... to conduct the so-called 'Stevens inquiry' into breaches of security by the security forces in Northern Ireland. This commenced after the theft of montages from Dunmurry Police Station. This inquiry resulted in 43 convictions and over 800 years of imprisonment for those convicted. My subsequent report contained over 100 recommendations for the handling of security documents and information. All of those recommendations were accepted and have been implemented. This 'Stevens 1' inquiry was followed by a 'Stevens 2' inquiry in April 1993 ... At the request of the DPP I was asked to investigate further matters which solely related to the previous inquiry and prosecutions. [The then RUC Chief Constable] referred to our return as 'tying up some loose ends'. At no time, either in Stevens 2 or in the original Stevens 1 inquiry did I investigate the murder of Patrick Finucane ... However, those inquiries through the so-called double agent, Brian Nelson, were linked into the murder of Patrick Finucane. [The] Chief Constable of the [RUC] has now asked me to conduct an independent investigation into the murder of Patrick Finucane. I am also investigating the associated matters raised by the British Irish Rights Watch document 'Deadly Intelligence' and the UN Commissioner's Report. ...” 34. On or around 23 June 1999 charges were brought against William Stobie for the murder of Patrick Finucane and against Mark Barr, Paul Givens and William Hutchinson for offences of possession of documents containing information useful to terrorists. 35. It was reported by the Committee for the Administration of Justice that on being charged William Stobie made the following statement: “Not guilty of the charge that you have put to me tonight. At the time I was police informer for Special Branch. On the night of the death of Patrick Finucane I informed Special Branch on two occasions by telephone of a person who was to be shot. I did not know at the time of the person who was to be shot.” 36. William Stobie's solicitor told the court that his client was a paid police informer from 1987 to 1990 and that he had given information to the police on two occasions before the Finucane murder which was not acted upon. He also stated that, at his client's trial on 23 January 1991 on firearms charges, the prosecution had adduced no evidence and his client was acquitted. The bulk of the evidence against his client had, he alleged, been known to the authorities for almost ten years. 37. On 26 November 2001 it was reported in the press that William Stobie's trial had collapsed when the Lord Chief Justice returned a verdict of not guilty in the absence of evidence. The prosecution had informed the court that the key witness, a journalist, was not able to give evidence due to serious mental illness. 38. On 12 December 2001 William Stobie was shot dead by gunmen, shortly after receiving threats from loyalist paramilitaries. 39. Further arrests were reported as having been made by officers in the Stevens inquiry in March 2002, with persons being questioned in relation to the Finucane murder. 40. On 24 October 2001 the government announced in Parliament that, amongst the measures proposed to the Irish government in the context of the Good Friday Agreement, was the proposal for the United Kingdom and Irish governments to appoint a judge of international standing from outside both jurisdictions to undertake an investigation into allegations of security force collusion in loyalist paramilitary killings, including that of Patrick Finucane. In the light of the investigation, the judge would decide whether to recommend a public inquiry into any of the killings. 41. On 17 April 2003 John Stevens submitted his report to the DPP. A nineteen-page overview with recommendations was made public. It included the following: “4.6. I have uncovered enough evidence to lead me to believe that the murders of Patrick Finucane and Brian Adam Lambert could have been prevented. I also believe that the RUC investigation of Patrick Finucane's murder should have resulted in the early arrest and detection of his killers. 4.7. I concluded that there was collusion in both murders and the circumstances surrounding them. Collusion is evidenced in many ways. This ranges from the wilful failure to keep records, the absence of accountability, the withholding of intelligence and evidence, through to the extreme of agents being involved in murder ...” He stated that his inquiries with regard to satisfying the test for prosecution in relation to possible offences arising out of these matters were continuing.

8. The applicant was born in 1937 and lives in Athens. 9. Between 13 July 1953 and 15 October 1957 the applicant paid contributions to the Fund of Typographers and Graphic-Arts Employees (Ταμείο Τυπογράφων και Μισθωτών Γραφικών Τεχνών) for 1136 working days. Between 1 February 1979 and 31 December 1980 the applicant paid contributions to the Social Security Foundation (Ίδρυμα Κοινωνικών Ασφαλίσεων) for 86 working days. Between 1 January 1981 and 30 July 1981 the applicant paid contributions to the Social Security Fund for Technical Staff working in the Athens Press (Ταμείο Ασφάλισης Τεχνικών Τύπου Αθηνών) for seven months. Between 1 August 1981 and 31 May 1988 he paid contributions to the same fund for five years, ten months and 18 days. 10. Then the applicant requested to be put on retirement under sections 18 § 2 and 10 § 1 of Law No. 1186/81. On 16 December 1988 the Director of the Social Security Fund for Technical Staff working in the Athens Press decided that the applicant was entitled to the pension provided for those who had worked for five to ten years (section 10 § 1 (a)). 11. The applicant appealed against this decision considering that, under the relevant legislation, the Fund should also have taken into consideration the working days in respect of which he had paid contributions to the Fund of Typographers and Graphic-Arts Employees and the Social Security Foundation. His appeal was rejected by the Board of the Social Security Fund for Technical Staff working in the Athens Press sometime in 1989. 12. On 19 April 1989 the applicant challenged this decision before the First Instance Administrative Court of Athens. On 28 February 1990 the court considered that sections 18 § 2 and 10 § 1 of Law No. 1186/81 were provisions of an exceptional nature. As a result, there was no room for applying the legislation concerning the taking into consideration of working days in respect of which contributions had been paid to other funds. 13. On 20 July 1990 the applicant appealed against this decision. His appeal was rejected by the Administrative Court of Appeal of Athens on 10 April 1992. 14. On 2 July 1993 the applicant appealed in cassation. He argued that if the contributions he had paid to other funds were not taken into account, his property rights would be violated, in breach of the Constitution. 15. At first, the hearing was set down for 11 April 1994 but it was adjourned because the lawyers of the Athens Bar Association were on strike. A new hearing was set down for 21 November 1994 but it was continuously postponed. The hearing was finally held on 25 May 1998. 16. On 9 June 1998 the Council of State rejected the applicant’s appeal referring to a number of previous decisions to the effect that the legislation concerning the taking into consideration of working days in respect of which contributions had been paid to other funds did not apply in cases of provisions that create exceptional rights to a pension.

4. The applicant was born in 1972. 5. On 24 May 2005 the police instituted criminal proceedings against him on suspicion of fraud. Subsequently, additional charges were brought against the applicant (unlawful acquisition of a vehicle, money laundering and forging documents). Since 6 September 2005, he has remained in detention on remand. 6. Following the completion of the pre-trial investigation, on 24 March 2006 the case was transferred to the Solomyanskyy District Court of Kyiv, which on 24 November 2008 delivered a judgment. 7. On 27 April 2010 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal quashed that judgment and remitted the case for fresh examination to the Solomyanskyy Court, before which the proceedings are still pending. 8. According to the Government, in the course of the proceedings fifty four witnesses and four victims were interrogated, questioned or confronted, some of them repeatedly. This took the authorities about three months in total. Seven forensic examinations were ordered and lasted for about five months in total. Nine hearings were adjourned due to the applicant’s and two other co-defendants’ representatives’, victims’ and witnesses’ failure to appear. The applicant disagreed stating that his representative had not been informed of the hearings which he had not attended. One hearing was adjourned on the applicant’s request. Thirty further hearings were adjourned, mainly because the defendants were not escorted to the court, due to the witnesses’ or prosecutor’s failure to appear or because the judge was absent. On several occasions the courts issued compulsory summonses for witnesses.

4. The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in the village of Tri Protoka in the Astrakhan Region. 5. On 6 December 2003 the applicant was dismissed from his position in a private company. He sued his former employer claiming reinstatement in the position and damages. 6. On 11 March 2004 the Krasnoyarskiy District Court of Astrakhan rejected his claims. 7. On 8 June 2004 the Astrakhan Regional Court set it aside on appeal, reinstated the applicant in his position and awarded him 157,427.98 Russian roubles (RUB) of outstanding salary, RUB 5,000 of non-pecuniary damages and RUB 4,000 of legal fees. The appeal judgment became final and enforceable on the same date. 8. On 28 June 2004 the defendant company lodged an application for supervisory review of the appeal judgment of 8 June 2004. On 12 July 2004 the local public prosecutor, who had earlier participated in the proceedings, lodged a similar application. 9. On 3 August 2004 a judge of the Astrakhan Regional Court referred the case to its Presidium. 10. On 18 August 2004 the Presidium of the Astrakhan Regional Court, having heard the parties and the prosecutor, quashed the appeal judgment of 8 June 2004 and reinstated the judgment of 11 March 2004, on the grounds that the appeal court had made wrong findings of fact.

5. The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Budapest. 6. The applicant, a historian, specialises in the functioning of the secret services of dictatorships, comparative studies of the political police forces of totalitarian regimes and the functioning of Soviet-type States. He has published several works in this field. 7. With a view to publishing a study concerning the functioning, in the 1960s, of the Hungarian State Security Service of the Ministry of the Interior, on 21 September 1998 the applicant requested the Ministry to grant him access to certain documents deposited with it. 8. His request was denied on 10 November 1998; the Ministry made reference to a decision of 29 October 1998 classifying the documents as State secrets until 2048. 9. On 10 December 1998 the applicant brought an action against the Ministry, basing his claim on section 21 of Act no. 63 of 1992 on the Protection of Personal Data and the Public Nature of Data of Public Interest. Claiming a right of unrestricted access to the documents, he submitted that the data he sought were necessary for the purposes of his ongoing historical research. 10. On 19 January 1999 the Budapest Regional Court found for the applicant, granting him access to the documents for research purposes. It observed that the documents in question had indeed been classified during the Communist era. However, according to section 28(2) of Act no. 65 of 1995 on State and Service Secrets, they would have had to have been characterised as such again before 30 June 1996. Since this characterisation had not taken place, the documents had lost their classified nature ipso iure by 1 July 1996, irrespective of the decision of 29 October 1998. 11. On 20 April 1999 the Supreme Court rejected the respondent’s appeal as it had been introduced outside the statutory time-limit. 12. On 1 November 1999 the Ministry proposed access to the applicant if he signed a confidentiality undertaking. 13. On 10 October 2000 the applicant requested the enforcement of the judgment, arguing that the respondent’s imposition of a condition of confidentiality was unacceptable. On 21 December 2000 the enforcement procedure was initiated and an enforcement order issued. In its reasoning, the Budapest Regional Court observed that the respondent did not have the right to require confidentiality from the applicant as a precondition to the access granted by the enforceable judgment. 14. On 21 November 2001 the Supreme Court upheld on appeal the decision of 21 December 2000 but deleted from the reasoning the confidentiality observation. 15. Meanwhile, on 12 June 2001 the Ministry brought an action with a view to having the enforcement proceedings terminated. On 25 February 2002 the Pest Central District Court dismissed the action, holding that the respondent’s proposal of 1 November 1999 was unsatisfactory and that, therefore, the initiation of enforcement proceedings had been lawful. On 15 October 2002 the Regional Court dismissed the Ministry’s appeal. 16. On 29 October 2002 the Ministry issued the applicant with a permit for access to documents, but restricted him from publishing the information thus acquired to the extent that “State secrets” were concerned. 17. In the absence of a permit granting unrestricted access to all the documents concerned, the court found that there had not been compliance with the enforcement order, and on 23 June 2003 the Ministry was fined 100,000 Hungarian forints (HUF) (approximately 400 euros (EUR)). 18. On 18 December 2003 all but one of the documents were transferred to the National Archives and thus became public. 19. A further enforcement fine of HUF 300,000 (approximately EUR 1,200) was imposed on 22 October 2004 in respect of the one remaining classified document. The Ministry filed an objection, arguing that the document was no longer at its disposal since it had been transferred to the Archives of the Ministry of Defence on 6 February 2004. 20. On 26 January 2005 the District Court dismissed the respondent’s objection, holding that a change in the physical whereabouts of the document did not exempt the Ministry from its obligation to grant the applicant access. 21. On 10 June 2005 the District Court dismissed the Ministry’s request to have it established that the Archives were its successor in the matter. 22. On 24 January 2006 the Regional Court quashed the decisions of 22 October 2004, 26 January 2005 and 10 June 2005, and remitted the case to the first-instance court. 23. On 21 April 2006 the District Court again dismissed the Ministry’s request to have it established that the Archives were its successor in the matter. However, on 4 July 2006 it observed that the newly founded Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development was indeed the successor. On 20 October 2006 it rejected the new Ministry’s request to have the proceedings interrupted pending the succession arrangements. 24. On 5 June 2007 the Regional Court dismissed the new Ministry’s appeals against the decisions of 21 April, 4 July and 20 October 2006. The Ministry’s petition for a review by the Supreme Court was to no avail. 25. To date, the applicant has not had unrestricted access to the remaining document in question.

4. The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Budapest. 5. On 28 February 1995 the Budapest Regional Court ordered the liquidation of a co-operative, of which the applicant was a shareholder. 6. On 1 March 1995 the Regional Court appointed a liquidator and invited the creditors, including the applicant, to submit their exact claims. 7. On 19 May 1995 the shareholders established a “creditors’ group” in order to enforce their claims jointly. 8. On 26 July 1995 the applicant and other creditors challenged the liquidator’s decision to quash an earlier resolution of the co-operative’s president to terminate, in extraordinary dismissal proceedings, certain employment contracts with the co-operative. The proceedings concerning this problem were later separated. 9. On 20 January 1996 the court issued a decision on the classification of certain securities or claims held by the members. The creditors’ group appealed. On 4 July 1996 the Supreme Court quashed the decision. The subsequent re-classification was accepted by 485 creditors and refused by 157, and was finally confirmed by the Supreme Court on 18 June 1997. 10. On 30 March 1998 the liquidator submitted his final report. It was upheld by the court on 28 July 1999. The report dealt with altogether 1,253 claims, of which 581 were accepted. 11. On 7 October 1999 the creditors’ group appealed against the decision upholding the final report. The court rejected this objection. However, on 21 June 2001 the Supreme Court quashed this decision and remitted the question to the Regional Court. In the resumed proceedings, hearings were held on 10 October 2002 and 6 November 2003. 12. On 5 December 2003 the objection against the final report was dismissed by the Regional Court. On 12 July 2004 the Supreme Court quashed this decision in its part concerning the closing balance sheet and remitted this issue to the Regional Court. 13. A further hearing took place on 5 May 2005. 14. On 18 May 2005 the court rejected various objections concerning the liquidator’s decisions. On 9 December 2005 an appeal against this decision filed by the applicant – who had in the meantime become president of the creditors’ group – had not yet been adjudicated. 15. Meanwhile, a new final report was filed on 14 July 2005 and a legal-aid lawyer was appointed for the applicant. 16. The liquidation proceedings are apparently still pending.

7. The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Trapani. He is an oil producer. 8. On an unspecified date criminal proceedings were brought against the applicant, who was charged with attempted extortion, attempted arson and arson, and (under Article 416 bis of the Criminal Code) with being a member of a mafia-type criminal association based in Sicily. 9. By an order of 12 July 1999, the Palermo preliminary investigations judge (giudice per le indagini preliminari), considering that there were “substantial indications” of the applicant’s guilt, remanded him in custody. As to the existence of special requirements (esigenze cautelari) justifying his detention pending trial under Article 274 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the preliminary investigations judge observed that on account of his involvement in a criminal organisation the applicant had contacts which might enable him to reoffend, abscond, or pervert the course of justice. Moreover, given that the applicant had also been charged with the offence provided for under Article 416 bis of the Criminal Code, the requirements referred to in Article 274 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were to be presumed to have been met unless there was proof to the contrary. 10. The applicant appealed against the order of 12 July 1999. 11. By an order of 2 August 1999, the division of the Palermo District Court responsible for reviewing precautionary measures (“the Specialised Division”), finding that the preliminary investigations judge had not correctly assessed the evidence of the applicant’s guilt, set aside the order of 12 July 1999 and ordered the applicant’s release. 12. The public prosecutor’s office appealed on points of law. It alleged in particular that the Specialised Division had given the reasons for its decision in an illogical and contradictory manner. 13. The Court of Cassation set the case down for a hearing on 15 February 2000. No summons to appear was served on the applicant or his lawyer. 14. The hearing was held on the scheduled date. 15. In a judgment of 15 February 2000, the Court of Cassation quashed the order of 2 August 1999, finding it to have been illogical and contradictory. It remitted the case to the Specialised Division, indicating the legal principles to which the Division should adhere. 16. The Specialised Division set the case down for a hearing on 4 April 2000. On that date Mr Oddo sought leave to produce additional evidence. He also argued that the judgment of 15 February 2000 was null and void as he had not been informed of the date of the hearing. He alleged that Article 627 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provided that grounds of nullity that had not been examined previously could not be submitted before the court to which the case was remitted, breached the rights of the defence. Consequently, he requested that the provision in question be waived. 17. The Specialised Division agreed to the inclusion of the new evidence requested by Mr Oddo. Relying on Article 627 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it dismissed the objection that the judgment of 15 February 2000 was null and void. 18. On 13 April 2000 the Specialised Division upheld the preliminary investigations judge’s order of 12 July 1999 in respect of two of the charges and set aside the remaining provisions. 19. The applicant was then arrested and remanded in custody. 20. On 15 May 2000 the applicant appealed to the Court of Cassation, again claiming that the judgment of 15 February 2000 was null and void, and alleging that Article 627 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was unconstitutional and breached the rights of the defence. 21. In a judgment of 11 December 2000, the Court of Cassation, considering that the decision appealed against had been logically and properly reasoned, dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law. It considered manifestly ill-founded the objection that Article 627 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was unconstitutional. 22. In the meantime, in a judgment of 20 July 2000, the Palermo preliminary hearings judge (giudice dell’udienza preliminare) had convicted the applicant. The length of the sentence is not known. 23. The applicant lodged an appeal. 24. In a judgment of 17 May 2001, the Palermo Court of Appeal acquitted the applicant on the ground that he had not committed the offences with which he had been charged (per non aver commesso il fatto). 25. The public prosecutor at the Palermo Court of Appeal lodged an appeal on points of law, which was dismissed in a judgment of 23 May 2002. The applicant’s acquittal thus became final.

6. The applicant was born in 1956. At the time the application was lodged he lived in Elgoibar (Gipuzkoa). 7. At the time of the events, the applicant was spokesperson for Sozialista Abertzaleak, a left-wing Basque separatist parliamentary group in the Parliament of the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country. 8. On 21 February 2003, following an order issued by central investigating judge no. 6 of the Audiencia Nacional, the premises of the daily newspaper Euskaldunon Egunkaria were searched and then closed, on account of the newspaper’s alleged links with the terrorist organisation ETA. Ten persons were arrested, including the newspaper’s senior managers (members of the board and the editor-in-chief). After spending five days in secret detention the persons concerned complained that they had been subjected to ill-treatment in police custody. 9. On 26 February 2003 the President of the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country received the King of Spain at the opening of an electricity power station in the province of Biscay. 10. At a press conference held the same day in San Sebastián, the applicant, as spokesperson for the Sozialista Abertzaleak parliamentary group, outlined his group’s political response to the situation concerning the newspaper Euskaldunon Egunkaria. Replying to a journalist he said, with reference to the King’s visit to the Basque Country, that “it [was] pathetic”, adding that it was “a genuine political disgrace” for the President of the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country to be inaugurating the project with Juan Carlos of Bourbon and that “their picture [was] worth a thousand words”. He went on to say that inaugurating a project with the King of the Spaniards, who was the Supreme Head of the Civil Guard (Guardia Civil) and the Commander-in-Chief of the Spanish armed forces, was absolutely pitiful. Speaking about the police operation against the newspaper Euskaldunon Egunkaria, he added that the King was in charge of those who had tortured the persons detained in connection with the operation. He spoke in the following terms: “How is it possible for them to have their picture taken today in Bilbao with the King of Spain, when the King is the Commander-in-Chief of the Spanish army, in other words the person who is in charge of the torturers, who defends torture and imposes his monarchical regime on our people through torture and violence?” 11. On 7 April 2003 the public prosecutor lodged a criminal complaint against the applicant for “serious insult against the King” within the meaning of Article 490 § 3 of the Criminal Code read in conjunction with Article 208, on account of his remarks made on 26 February 2003. 12. In the proceedings before the Basque Country High Court of Justice, which had jurisdiction to try the applicant because of his status as a member of parliament, the applicant argued that his remarks had constituted political criticism directed against the Head of the government of the Basque Country. He added that to say that the King of Spain was the Supreme Head of the Civil Guard did not imply any intention to undermine dignity or honour; it was merely a statement of the political reality in the Spanish State, where the King exercised supreme command over the armed forces. The applicant further argued that there was no insult or attempt to dishonour in saying that the Civil Guard had tortured the persons detained in connection with the closure of the newspaper Euskaldunon Egunkaria because that was the reality, and proceedings had been instituted in that connection before the Madrid investigating judge no. 5. Numerous public figures had also commented on the subject. In sum, the applicant, as a politician, had sought to express political criticism in the context of freedom of expression, one of the foundations of the rule of law and democracy. He pointed out in that regard that politicians had greater freedom of manoeuvre when it came to informing society about matters of public interest. 13. In a judgment of 18 March 2005, the High Court of Justice found the applicant not guilty of the charges against him. After stating that his remarks had been “clearly offensive, improper, unjust, ignominious and divorced from reality”, the court found as follows: “... This is not an issue concerning the private life of the Head of State but one of rejection of the ties of political power deriving from the hereditary nature of the institution which he personally symbolises. ... [C]riticism of a constitutional institution is not excluded from the scope of the right to freedom of expression; in this case the latter has the status of a constitutional right which takes precedence over the right to honour. The Constitution does not guarantee the right to freedom of expression solely in relation to certain points of view that are considered correct, but in relation to all ideas, subject to the limits which it lays down ...” 14. The High Court of Justice summed up as follows: “[T]he [applicant’s] remarks were made in a public, political and institutional setting, regard being had not only to the speaker’s status as a member of parliament but also to the authority to which they were addressed, namely the State’s highest judicial authority, and to the context of political criticism of the [Head of the government of the Basque Country] for his official hospitality in receiving His Majesty King Juan Carlos I in the wake of the closure of the newspaper [Euskaldunon] Egunkaria and the detention of its senior managers, and the latter’s public allegations of ill‑treatment. This context is therefore unconnected to the innermost core of individual dignity protected by law from any interference by third parties.” 15. The public prosecutor lodged an appeal on points of law, arguing firstly that the law protected the honour of the King as a specific individual possessed of personal dignity, who had been the object of the offence of insult, and secondly that the law was aimed at ensuring respect for the symbolic content of the institution of the Crown as established by the Spanish Constitution and “represented by the Head of State, the symbol of its unity and permanence”. The seriousness of the offence could be inferred from the fact that the legislature had sought to afford increased protection to the dignity of the King, including vis-à-vis other public authorities (Articles 496 and 504 of the Criminal Code). Furthermore, the inviolability of the King, as proclaimed in Article 56 § 3 of the Constitution, demonstrated the unique position occupied by the Crown in the system of the 1978 Spanish Constitution. That constitutional position highlighted the disproportionate nature of the vexatious and insulting remarks made by the applicant. In the view of the public prosecutor, who referred several times to the case-law of the Strasbourg Court, it was clear that the King had been performing official duties and that he was a figure in the public eye; however, that did not deprive him of the right to respect for his honour. In that regard, the public prosecutor pointed out that Article 20 § 1 (a) of the Constitution did not protect a supposed right to proffer insults. Drawing a parallel with the special protection to be afforded under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention to the judiciary, the public prosecutor further argued that the same protection should be afforded to the Head of State, who was the “symbol of the unity and permanence of the State” and was above party politics, from the “destructive and baseless attack” constituted by the applicant’s remarks. Lastly, in the public prosecutor’s view, the applicant’s remarks could be said to amount to “hate speech” within the meaning of the Court’s case‑law, given the existing situation with regard to terrorist attacks. 16. In two judgments delivered on 31 October 2005, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the lower court, making several references to the Court’s case-law. It sentenced the applicant to one year’s imprisonment, suspended his right to stand for election for the duration of the sentence and ordered him to pay costs and expenses, on the ground of his criminal liability for the offence of serious insult against the King. The Supreme Court considered the impugned remarks to have been value judgments rather than statements of fact. The remarks, described as “ignominious” by the lower court, had expressed contempt for the King and the institution he represented, affecting the innermost core of his dignity by accusing him of one of the most serious manifestations of criminal conduct in a State governed by the rule of law. The exercise of the right to freedom of expression had therefore been contrary to the principle of proportionality and had been unnecessary, overstepping the limits beyond which criticism could be deemed to be hurtful or upsetting. The Supreme Court further observed that the context in which the remarks had been made did nothing to alter their offensiveness. Firstly, the proceedings relating to the complaints of ill-treatment of the persons detained in connection with the operation against the newspaper Euskaldunon Egunkaria had been discontinued for lack of evidence. Secondly, the impugned remarks could not be construed as a reaction or response to a political debate with the King. In view of the seriousness of the insulting comments and the fact that the applicant had deliberately expressed them in public, the Supreme Court sentenced him to one year’s imprisonment. 17. Judge P.A.I. issued a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the comments complained of had been of a political nature, in view of the applicant’s status as a member of parliament and the context in which they had been made, namely the King’s visit to the Basque Country and the attitude of the Head of the government of the Basque Country in that regard. The judge agreed with the Basque Country High Court of Justice that the remarks had not targeted the King’s private life or his personal honour but had been directed solely at his institutional role as Commander-in-Chief of the Spanish armed forces. The applicant had not claimed that the King was responsible for actual acts of torture, only that he was strictly liable as Head of the State apparatus. The judge pointed out that the limits of freedom of expression were wider with regard to institutions since the latter did not possess honour, an attribute that was confined to individuals. 18. The applicant lodged an amparo appeal with the Constitutional Court alleging, inter alia, a breach of his right to freedom of expression (Article 20 § 1 (a) of the Constitution) and of his right to freedom of ideas (Article 16 of the Constitution). 19. In the applicant’s view, the Supreme Court’s judgment had incorrectly weighed the competing interests at stake, as the comments complained of had not contained any insulting or vexatious expressions, had been directed principally against the President of the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country rather than the King of Spain and, in any event, had reflected the reality of the situation and had not referred to the King’s private life or his attitudes. The statements in question had not been disproportionate in the context in which they had been uttered, namely the warm welcome extended to the King of Spain by the government of the Basque Country in the wake of the closure of the daily newspaper Euskaldunon Egunkaria and, in connection with that closure, the detention of several individuals who had stated before the courts and the Basque Parliament that they had been tortured. 20. In a decision (auto) of 3 July 2006, served on 11 July 2006, the Constitutional Court declared the applicant’s amparo appeal inadmissible as manifestly devoid of constitutional content. The Constitutional Court noted at the outset that the right to freedom of expression did not encompass a right to proffer insults. It pointed out in that connection that the Constitution did not prohibit the use of hurtful expressions in all circumstances. However, freedom of expression did not protect vexatious expressions which, regardless of their veracity, were offensive and ignominious and were not pertinent for the purpose of conveying the opinions or information in question. 21. The Constitutional Court considered that the weighing of the competing rights at stake had been carried out in an appropriate manner by the Supreme Court, as the latter had concluded that the impugned remarks had been disproportionate, while taking into account the context in which they had been made, the public nature of the act, the public interest in the subject in question (the use of torture) and the fact that the persons targeted (a politician and the King) were public figures. In the Constitutional Court’s view, there was no denying the ignominious, vexatious and derogatory nature of the impugned remarks, even when directed against a public figure. That finding was all the more valid with regard to the King, who, by virtue of Article 56 § 3 of the Constitution, was “not liable” and was a “symbol of the unity and permanence of the State”. Regard being had to his role as “arbitrator and moderator of the lawful functioning of institutions”, the King occupied a neutral position in political debate. This implied that he was owed institutional respect of a kind that was “substantively” different from that due to other State institutions. The Constitutional Court stated as follows: “... [I]n a democratic system which recognises freedom of ideas and freedom of expression, the fact that [the figure of the King] is characterised in this way does not shield him from all criticism ‘in the exercise of his duties or on account of or in connection with them’ ...; however, such criticism may not extend to attributing acts of public authority to the King – which, as indicated above, is prohibited by the Constitution – as a pretext for gratuitous attacks on his dignity or public esteem.” 22. Lastly, the Constitutional Court held that the applicant’s remarks, on account of their obviously derogatory nature, had clearly gone beyond what could be considered legitimate. It agreed with the Supreme Court that the remarks had expressed open contempt for the King and the institution he embodied, affecting the essential core of his dignity. Hence, such statements could manifestly not fall within the exercise of the right to freedom of expression. 23. In a decision (auto) of 15 May 2006, the Basque Country High Court of Justice ordered that enforcement of the applicant’s sentence be stayed for three years. According to the Government, his sentence was remitted on 16 July 2009. 24. The applicant was imprisoned on 8 June 2007 after the Supreme Court upheld a judgment of the Audiencia Nacional of 27 April 2006 sentencing him to fifteen months’ imprisonment for publicly defending terrorism. 25. He is currently in pre-trial detention in connection with other criminal proceedings.

5. The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in the town of Aleksin in the Tula Region. 6. On 18 May 1999 the applicant sued his former employer, a private company, for reinstatement, wage arrears and compensation for damage. The acknowledgment of receipt card indicated that the Aleksin Town Court had received the statement of claim on 21 May 1999. According to the Government, the applicant introduced the claim in August 1999. 7. On 5 January 2000 the Aleksin Town Court dismissed the claim. The judgment was quashed on 20 April 2000 by the Tula Regional Court and the case was remitted for a fresh examination. 8. In December 2000 the Aleksin Town Court told the defendant company that the first hearing had been fixed for 16 January 2001, and asked it to produce certain employment-related documents. The letter did not contain any indication whether the applicant had been summonsed. According to the applicant, he was not notified of the hearing of 16 January 2001. It appears from the list of events attached to the Government's memorandum that the case-file only contained a copy of summonses sent to the Aleksinskiy District Prosecutor who had been a third party in the proceedings. 9. The Aleksin Town Court fixed the following hearing for 9 February 2001. According to the Government, the parties were duly informed thereof. The applicant argued that the summonses had not been served on him. 10. On 9 February 2001 the Aleksin Town Court discontinued the proceedings. The relevant part of the decision read as follows: “In the preparatory part of the hearing [the court] established that the plaintiff had not asked for an examination of his case in his absence and that he defaulted on the second summons, whereas the representative of the defendant... does not insist on the examination of the case on the merits. Having studied the case-file and heard the prosecutor who considered that the proceedings should be discontinued, the court finds it necessary, under Articles 220, 221 § 6 of the RSFSR Code on Civil Procedure, to discontinue the proceedings.” The decision was amenable to appeal within ten days. 11. According to the Government, on 19 February 2001 the Aleksin Town Court sent a copy of the decision to the applicant. The Government produced a copy of the covering letter accompanying the decision. The applicant claimed that he had not received the letter of 19 February 2001. 12. In May 2001 the applicant complained to the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation about the excessive length of the proceedings in his case. The Supreme Court readdressed the complaint to the Tula Regional Court. 13. On 12 September 2001 the President of the Tula Regional Court sent a letter to the Aleksin Town Court. The letter read as follows: “I am sending you the complaint of Mr Gorbachev which was received from the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. [He complains] about your court's lengthy failure to examine his action... for reinstatement, payment of wage arrears and compensation for non-pecuniary damage after the Tula Regional Court quashed the judgment of 5 January 2000 of your court on 20 April 2000. [I ask you] to take immediate measures to determine the dispute.” The applicant received a copy of the letter of 12 September 2001. 14. According to the Government, on 24 October 2001 officials of the Aleksin Town Court attempted to serve the applicant with a copy of the decision of 9 February 2001, however, he refused to countersign a record showing that the decision had been served on him. The Government indicated that this fact had been orally confirmed by the President of the Town Court. According to the applicant, he was not served with the decision either by mail or in person. 15. On 30 October 2001 the Aleksin Town Court sent a letter to the applicant and the President of the Tula Regional Court informing them that on 9 February 2001 the proceedings in the applicant's employment dispute had been discontinued. According to the applicant, he did not receive that letter. 16. On 29 November 2001 the applicant complained to the Tula Regional Court that the proceedings in his case were excessively long. On 11 December 2001 the Tula Regional Court readdressed the complaint to the Aleksin Town Court “in order to examine and respond”. 17. On 8 January 2002 the President of the Aleksin Town Court sent a letter to the applicant. A copy of that letter was also sent to a deputy President of the Tula Regional Court. The letter read as follows: “Further to your complaint no. 22-5538 of 11 December 2001 lodged before the Tula Regional Court, the [Aleksin Town] Court informs you that by the decision of 9 February 2001 of the Aleksin Town Court the proceedings concerning reinstatement, payment of wage arrears and compensation for non-pecuniary damage were discontinued in accordance with paragraph 6 of Article 221 of the RSFSR Code on Civil Procedure. A copy of the decision advising you, in particular, of the right to appeal against it, was sent to you on 19 February 2001. However, you did not appeal against that decision by way of cassation or supervisory review after a copy of that decision had been delivered to you personally on 24 October 2001. Your complaint is therefore unsubstantiated.” The applicant submitted that he had not received that letter. 18. On 12 January 2002 the applicant complained to the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation that the Aleksin Town Court was delaying the examination of his action. The Supreme Court sent the complaint to the Tula Regional Court. 19. On 7 March 2002 the President of the Tula Regional Court sent letters to the President of the Aleksin Town Court and the applicant. The President noted that it had received the applicant's complaint concerning the excessive length of the proceedings related to his employment action. The President urged the Town Court to take measures to examine the applicant's action as soon as possible. 20. On 22 March and 5 April 2002 the President of the Aleksin Town Court sent letters to the applicant and the President of the Tula Regional Court. He insisted that on 9 February 2001 the proceedings had been discontinued, that a copy of that decision had been sent to the applicant on 19 February 2001 and that it had also been delivered to him personally on 24 October 2001. The applicant alleged that he had not received those letters. 21. On 29 March 2002 the applicant sent letters to the Constitutional and Supreme courts of the Russian Federation, the Tula Regional and Aleksin Town courts. The letters, in the relevant part, read as follows: “On 4 December 2001 the Supreme Court of Russia received my complaint about the unjustified procrastination in the examination of civil cases in the Aleksin Town Court. The first-instance judgment of 5 January 2000 was quashed by the judgment of the appeal court on 20 April 2000. Almost two years have passed, but the civil case is not re-examined... My complaints were readdressed to the Tula Regional Court and then to the Aleksin Town Court. I received letters of 12 September 2001, 7 March 2002 from the Regional Court. [The letters] state that 'immediate measures should be taken for examination of the case' and 'measures should be taken to examine the case as soon as possible'. No concrete response was received from the Aleksin Town Court... The courts of the Russian Federation take every possible step to procrastinate for indefinite period the examination of my civil cases... to force me to withdraw my actions... I would like to ask you to transfer the examination of my civil actions to another court in the town of Tula or to the Tula Regional Court” 22. In April 2002 the Supreme Court readdressed the applicant's complaint of 29 March 2002 to the Tula Regional Court. On 10 April and 14 May 2002 the President of the Tula Regional Court again sent letters to the Aleksin Town Court and the applicant. The Regional Court noted that the applicant had complained about the lengthy failure to examine his case. It urged the Aleksin Town Court to examine the applicant's claim as soon as possible. Copies of these letters were sent to the applicant. 23. On 15 May 2002 the President of the Aleksin Town Court sent letters to a deputy President of the Tula Regional Court and the applicant, informing them that the applicant had failed to appeal against the decision of 9 February 2001 and that his complaints were therefore unsubstantiated. The applicant claimed that he had not received that letter. 24. On 22 May 2002 the President of the Aleksin Town Court sent letters to the applicant and a deputy President of the Tula Regional Court. The letters read as follows: “Further to your request of 29 March 2002 the Aleksin Town Court of the Tula Region informs you that on 9 February 2001 the proceedings... concerning reinstatement were discontinued under paragraph 6 of Article 221 of the RSFSR Code on Civil Procedure. A copy of the court's decision was sent to the plaintiff on 19 February 2001; subsequently, on 24 October 2001 a copy of the decision of 9 February 2001 was made available to the plaintiff by personal delivery against his signature; an entry to that effect was made in the case-file. However, at the material time, the plaintiff did not appeal against the decision by way of cassation or supervisory review. The complaint is therefore unsubstantiated.” 25. According to the applicant, he did not receive any letters from the Aleksin Town Court. 26. On 13 February 1999 the applicant lodged before the Aleksin Town Court a defamation action against the Aleksin Town Council. The statement of claim was sent to the Town Court by registered mail. The list of enclosures bearing a stamp of the Aleksin post office showed that the applicant's letter included three copies of the statement of claim and copies of responses from the prosecutor's office. The acknowledgment of receipt card shows that on 19 February 1999 the Aleksin Town Court received the statement of claims with enclosures. 27. The Government, relying on a certificate prepared by the Aleksin Town Court, claimed that no defamation action had been lodged by the applicant between 1999 and 2005. 28. In 1999 to 2002 the applicant complained to various domestic officials that the Aleksin Town Court had failed to decide on his claim. 29. On 7 March and 10 April 2002 the Tula Regional Court asked the Aleksin Town Court to take necessary steps to examine the merits of the applicant's defamation action as soon as possible. The applicant received copies of these letters. 30. The applicant did not receive any response from the Aleksin Town Court.

5. The applicant was born in 1972 and lived until his arrest in the town of Ishim in the Tyumen Region. He is now serving a life sentence in the Vladimir OD-1/T-2 detention facility, known as Vladimirskiy Tsentral. 6. On 17 June 2003 the applicant was transferred to Vladimirskiy Tsentral to serve the first ten years of his sentence of life imprisonment. It appears that he was among 150 new inmates who had arrived at Vladimirskiy Tsentral in the summer of 2003 and one of five detainees sentenced to life imprisonment. On admission to the prison the applicant was examined by a prison doctor who found no injuries on his body. 7. In July 2003, at the request of the acting head of Vladimirskiy Tsentral, a group of officers of a special-purpose unit of the Vladimir Regional Directorate for the Execution of Sentences arrived at the prison for the purpose of “accompanying inmates in outdoor exercise, to shower rooms, and so on”. 8. On 11 July 2003, at approximately 10.30 a.m., an officer of the special-purpose unit, Mr L., ordered the applicant and two other inmates to leave their cell. The applicant provided the following description of the subsequent events. 9. According to the applicant, he complied with Mr L.’s order, stepped out into a corridor, stood with his face to the wall and put his hands above his head on the wall as required by internal prison regulations. Six other warders were in the corridor at the time. Mr L. started kicking the applicant and hitting him with a rubber truncheon. The applicant submitted that he had asked for an explanation but in response he had received an additional three blows to the neck with the rubber truncheon. The applicant fell to the floor and Mr L. continued hitting him with the rubber truncheon on the head, back, stomach and legs. The applicant crawled to the wall in an attempt to dodge the blows. He sat near the wall and tried to cover his head with his hands. Mr L. kicked him a number of times, ordering him to get up and go outside for exercise. When the applicant refused Mr L. shoved him into the cell and took the applicant’s inmate, Mr Li., outside for exercise. The applicant asked for medical assistance. Twenty minutes later Mr L. again entered the cell and began hitting the applicant in the face and head using his fists and the rubber truncheon. Mr L. knocked out the applicant’s front tooth when he cut a finger on his left hand. Trying to escape, the applicant jumped on to a bunk, where Mr L. continued hitting him on the legs. Mr L. grabbed the applicant by his clothes, dragged him to a punishment cell and locked him up. 10. The applicant felt dizzy and called for a doctor. A nurse came to the punishment cell and the applicant complained to her that Mr L. had beaten him up. He showed the nurse his injuries and complained that he was not feeling well. Half an hour later Mr L. took the applicant out of the punishment cell and dragged him back to his own cell, continuing to hit and kick him. 11. The Government, relying on written statements by prison warders, including Mr L., submitted that on 11 July 2003 the applicant and two fellow inmates had resisted the warders’ attempt to take them outside for exercise. In particular, the applicant had grabbed Mr L. by his uniform, had threatened him with violence, and had tried to hit the other warders. Considering the applicant’s conduct as an offence, the warders hit him a number of times with rubber truncheons to put a stop to his unlawful behaviour. The Government stressed that truncheons had been used in strict compliance with requirements of the Penitentiary Institutions Act (see paragraph 29 below). The blows were only administered to the applicant’s hips and buttocks. The force was used for a very short period of time (ten to twelve seconds) with the intention of causing the least possible damage to the applicant’s health. 12. Immediately after the incident an entry was made in the prison log recording the confrontation between the warders and inmates and the use of special measures (rubber truncheons) in response to inmates’ violence. The applicant was also examined by a prison nurse who recorded an elongated bruise on the right side of his lumbar region. The nurse concluded that the bruise measuring fifteen to five centimetres “did not present any danger to life or health”. The nurse treated the applicant’s injury with iodine and applied a cold compress. 13. In the aftermath of the events on 11 July 2003 Mr L. made a report which read as follows: “[I] inform [you] that on 11 July 2003 at 10.50 a.m., when inmates sentenced to life imprisonment were being taken for outdoor exercise, I, officer... L., used a rubber truncheon... on a detainee, [the applicant], in compliance with Article 30 of the [Penitentiary Institutions Act]. The rubber truncheon was used because [the applicant] refused to comply with lawful orders of the administration and attempted to use physical resistance by grabbing my uniform. The rubber truncheon was not applied to vital body parts.” Two warders who had witnessed the incident wrote an identical report, adding that the applicant did not need medical assistance. 14. In the evening of 11 July 2003 the applicant experienced severe pain in the stomach and asked for a doctor. On hearing the applicant’s complaints of severe headache, stomach pain, dizziness and vomiting, a medical assistant, Mr M., examined the applicant and gave him an injection of aminasin, suspecting that the applicant could have concussion. He also gave the applicant a painkiller. Mr M. noted that the applicant had numerous abrasions and bruises on the stomach, waist and chest and recommended an examination by a surgeon. 15. On 14 July 2003 the applicant again applied for medical assistance, complaining of headache, dizziness, vomiting, loss of appetite and pain during urination. Ms B., a prison doctor, specialist in dermatology and venereology, examined him on the same day and discovered numerous bruises, each measuring approximately ten centimetres in diameter, “on the [applicant’s] torso, upper part of the back, [and] upper and middle parts of the right thigh”, and a swelling of the left cheek and of the left hip and knee. Ms B. noted that the applicant’s left hip and knee had a hyperaemic appearance and that the applicant was walking differently, favouring his left leg. The doctor also discovered that the applicant was missing a part of the upper corner tooth on the left side. She was unable to establish however when the tooth had been broken, as there were no injuries to the mucous membrane of the applicant’s lips and cheeks. Two days later an analysis of the applicant’s urine sample established no pathology, thus eliminating the possibility of a kidney injury. 16. In the meantime, on 14 July 2003 the applicant lodged a complaint with a prosecutor’s office, providing a detailed account of the events of 11 July 2003. The applicant also asked for an expert medical examination. 17. On 30 October 2003 a deputy of the Vladimir Town Prosecutor issued a one-page decision refusing to institute criminal proceedings against Mr L. The entire decision read as follows: “[The applicant] is serving his sentence in Vladimir OD 1/T-2 detention facility. He was sentenced to life imprisonment on condition that he serve the first ten years of the sentence in prison. On 11 July 2003, a convict, [the applicant], was taken for outdoor exercise: he defied the orders of the detention facility staff, tried to resist physically, and grabbed [warders] by their clothing. In these circumstances a special measure – a rubber truncheon – was used against [the applicant]. No traumatic injuries leading to health damage were caused. [The warders] drew up the required reports concerning the application of the special measure to [the applicant]. The special measure – a rubber truncheon – was applied to [the applicant] in accordance with Article 30 of the Federal Law “On facilities and bodies executing criminal sentences of imprisonment”. On the basis of the above stated and applying Article 25 § 1.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation, [the deputy prosecutor] finds that [the request] for institution of criminal proceedings as a result of injuries being received by [the applicant] should be dismissed because [there is no indication] of a criminal offence.” The deputy prosecutor’s decision was based on statements by six warders, Mr K., Mr Ku., Mr A., Mr P., Mr Ko. and Mr B., collected on 30 October 2003. In particular, two warders submitted that during an attempt to take inmates for outdoor exercise on 11 July 2003, a rubber truncheon had been used against a number of inmates sentenced to life imprisonment, including the applicant, because they had refused to comply with lawful orders. Two warders explained that the applicant had attempted to resist physically by “taking up a position as if ready to throw a punch”. The remaining warders stated that the applicant had refused to submit to a body search, had “diverged from the route” and had intended to throw a punch. 18. On 24 December 2003 the Frunzenskiy District Court of Vladimir quashed the decision of 30 October 2003 and authorised an additional inquiry. The District Court noted that the applicant had asked the prosecutor’s office to interview his fellow inmate, Mr Li., who had witnessed the beatings on 11 July 2003, the medical assistant, Mr M., who had examined the applicant in the evening of 11 July 2003 and had recorded his injuries, and the warder, Mr L., who had beaten the applicant up. However, the prosecutor’s office had not complied with the applicant’s request. The District Court also held that the decision of 30 October 2003 was only based on statements by the warders, that the prosecutor’s inquiry was “incomplete and subjective” and that the prosecutor had unlawfully refused to institute criminal proceedings applying Article 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure, although that Article only provided for such a refusal in the event of a friendly settlement. 19. On 2 March 2004 the deputy prosecutor of the Vladimir Town Prosecutor’s office once again refused to institute criminal proceedings against Mr L. In addition to the statements previously taken from the six warders, the deputy prosecutor based his three-page decision on statements by Mr L. and the medical assistant, Mr M. In particular, Mr L. informed the deputy prosecutor that on 11 July 2003 he and several other warders had attempted to take the applicant outside for daily exercise. The applicant had refused, had threatened the warders, including Mr L., and had taken up a boxing stance, trying to hit Mr L. In response Mr L. had used a rubber truncheon. He had hit the applicant on the buttocks and the middle part of the thighs. Mr L. insisted that he had only used the rubber truncheon; he had not kicked the applicant and had not hit him in the head or stomach. The medical assistant, Mr M., stated that he had been called to the applicant on 11 July 2003 at approximately 8.00 p.m. The latter had complained of headache, stomach pain, nausea and vomiting blood. Mr M. had not seen any blood. He had examined the applicant and recorded numerous abrasions and bruises. The applicant had been provided with medical assistance and had been prescribed a consultation with a surgeon. Mr M. noted that he had not diagnosed concussion. He had not noticed a broken tooth. The deputy prosecutor also interviewed the applicant’s fellow inmate, Mr Li., who corroborated the applicant’s version of events. However, the deputy prosecutor was not convinced by Mr Li.’s testimony because “it was only corroborated by the applicant’s statements and was rebutted by the materials of the inquiry”. 20. The applicant appealed to a court against the decision of 2 March 2004. 21. On 1 April 2004 the Frunzenskiy District Court of Vladimir quashed the deputy prosecutor’s decision and ordered an additional investigation. The District Court noted that the deputy prosecutor had not interviewed the applicant or the nurse who had examined him after the beatings and had not analysed the statements given by Mr L. and Mr M., although those two persons had given contradictory statements as to “the localisation and character of the injuries” sustained by the applicant. 22. On 19 April 2004 a deputy prosecutor of the Vladimir Town Prosecutor’s office dismissed the applicant’s complaint, finding that Mr L.’s actions had been lawful. In addition to the statements by Mr L., the warders and medical assistant, Mr M., included in the decision of 2 March 2004, the deputy prosecutor based its decision on the medical record issued on 11 July 2003 by the nurse and on statements by the doctor, Ms B., who had examined the applicant on 14 July 2003. Ms B. confirmed her conclusions made in the medical report on 14 July 2003. Relying on the medical record and the statements by Ms B., the deputy prosecutor found that the applicant could have sustained those injuries before or after the events on 11 July 2003. Furthermore, the deputy prosecutor held that the applicant’s statements regarding the broken tooth were false because “a part of the upper incisor (резец), and not a part of a tooth (зуб) was missing from his mouth” and his lips and cheeks had not been injured. 23. The applicant appealed to a court against the decision of 19 April 2004. 24. On 13 May 2004 the Frunsenskiy District Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint, finding that the rubber truncheon had been used lawfully in response to the applicant’s behaviour and that there had been no indication of a criminal offence in Mr L.’s actions. 25. The applicant did not agree with that decision and appealed to the Vladimir Regional Court. 26. On 17 September 2004 the Vladimir Regional Court, endorsing the reasons given by the District Court, held that the prosecutor’s office had completed its inquiry following the applicant’s ill-treatment complaint and had made lawful conclusions. The Regional Court upheld the decision of 13 May 2004.

5. The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Baku. 6. The applicant was deputy chairman of the Popular Front Party. He stood in the elections to the National Assembly of 6 November 2005 as a candidate of the opposition bloc Azadliq. He was registered as a candidate by the Constituency Electoral Commission (“the ConEC”) for the single‑mandate Sabail Electoral Constituency no. 29. 7. There were a total of thirty-two polling stations in the constituency, twenty-nine of which were ordinary polling stations. Polling Station no. 30 was set up on the premises of a temporary detention centre so that persons detained there could vote. Polling Stations nos. 31 and 32 were set up shortly before the elections exclusively for military servicemen belonging to two military units stationed within the constituency. Those military units were permanently stationed in the Bayil and Badamdar suburbs of Baku. 8. According to the minutes of the ConEC meeting of 29 September 2005, a copy of which was submitted by the Government, on that date the ConEC decided, inter alia, to appoint members to the precinct (polling station) electoral commissions (“the PEC”) for Polling Stations nos. 31 and 32. It appears from the minutes that five out of six members of each PEC in question were military officers or personnel of those military units, with the exception of one member nominated to each PEC by an opposition party. In each PEC, three of the five “military members” were nominated by the ruling party. According to the applicant, prior to the proceedings before the Court, he had never been provided with the full text of the minutes of the ConEC meeting of 29 September 2005. 9. The official election results in the constituency showed that the applicant had received an overall total of 3,454 votes and finished in second place. Of those votes, 3,301 had been cast in Polling Stations nos. 1 to 29 and 153 had been cast in Polling Stations nos. 30, 31 and 32. 10. The winning candidate (M.) received an overall total of 3,661 votes. Almost half of those, a total of 1,816 votes, had been cast in Polling Stations nos. 30, 31 and 32. Of those, 1,369 votes, which constituted over a third of his total vote count, had been cast in the polling stations (nos. 31 and 32) created exclusively for military voting (779 and 590 votes respectively). 11. On 8 November 2005 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Central Electoral Commission (“the CEC”) alleging a number of violations of electoral law in his constituency. He requested that the election results in Polling Stations nos. 30, 31 and 32 be invalidated. He complained, inter alia, of the following: (a) that the setting up of Polling Stations nos. 31 and 32 exclusively for military voting was in breach of Article 35.5 of the Electoral Code, which required that military servicemen should vote in ordinary polling stations and which stipulated that special military polling stations should be set up only in exceptional circumstances. In this case, there were no such exceptional circumstances and the personnel of each military unit in question should have voted in one or more of the several ordinary polling stations already located within very short walking distances of their barracks; (b) that the PECs of Polling Stations nos. 31 and 32, consisting mostly of military officers, had acted as if they were accountable to the Ministry of Defence and not the superior electoral commissions, and that two of the duly appointed PEC members, nominated by the opposition, had been denied access to the polling stations; (c) that in the three “closed” polling stations (nos. 30, 31 and 32) the elections had been unfair, and military servicemen and detainees had voted under coercion. It was noted by observers in Polling Stations nos. 31 and 32 that high-ranking military officers had pressured military servicemen to vote for M. Similarly, undue pressure had been put on detainees in Polling Station no. 30. As a result, M. received about as many votes in those three “closed” polling stations as in all twenty-nine of the other (ordinary) polling stations of the constituency (where he had clearly lost to the applicant by a large margin), which allowed him to pull slightly ahead in the overall vote count. The results of the voting in the three “closed” polling stations and their effect on the election clearly showed that the election had been rigged in favour of the candidate supported by the ruling party. 12. In support of the above complaints, the applicant submitted copies of written observations made by several observers at those polling stations. 13. On 21 November 2005 the CEC issued a decision invalidating the election results in Polling Stations nos. 20 and 21 of Sabail Electoral Constituency no. 29, having found that the electoral law had been breached in those polling stations. It did not provide any details as to the exact nature of those breaches. That decision did not affect the overall election results in the constituency. The CEC’s decision did not mention the applicant’s complaints concerning Polling Stations nos. 30, 31 and 32. 14. On 24 November 2005 the applicant lodged an appeal against the CEC decision, reiterating the complaints that he had made before the CEC. During the Court of Appeal hearing, a representative of the CEC argued generally, without addressing any of the applicant’s factual arguments in detail, that the elections in Polling Stations nos. 30, 31 and 32 had been lawful and that there were no grounds for invalidating the votes cast in those polling stations. 15. On 26 November 2005 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s complaint, finding that he had failed to substantiate his allegations. In particular, the judgment read as follows: “Under Article 14.2 of the CCP, the court may examine, and rely on, only the evidence submitted by the parties. Despite the requirement of the above-mentioned Article, the claimant, H.H. Karimov, and his counsel, [S.T.], have not been able to produce before the court any reliable evidence in support of the allegations made in the claim. Under Article 77.1 of the CCP, each party must prove the facts to which it refers as a basis for its claims and objections. Under Article 217.4 of the same Code, the court may rely in its judgment only on the evidence examined at the court hearing. Having regard to the above, the court does not find any grounds for upholding the claim and rejects as unsubstantiated [the applicant’s] claim against [the CEC] requesting the invalidation of the election results in Polling Stations nos. 30, 31 and 32 of Sabail Electoral Constituency no. 29 ...” 16. The applicant appealed to the Supreme Court, reiterating his complaints. 17. On 30 November 2005 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, essentially on the same grounds as the Court of Appeal. 18. On 1 December 2005 the Constitutional Court confirmed the election results in the majority of the electoral constituencies, including Sabail Electoral Constituency no. 29.

4. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Voronezh. 5. The applicant is in receipt of welfare payments for her child. In 2000 she brought civil proceedings against a local welfare authority, claiming arrears in those payments. 6. On 25 December 2000 the Levoberezhny District Court of Voronezh awarded the applicant 10,017.45 Russian roubles (RUR). This judgment entered into force on 6 January 2001. 7. On 23 January 2001 a writ of execution was issued and sent to the bailiffs. 8. On 26 July 2001 the bailiffs discontinued the enforcement proceedings in respect of the judgment of 25 December 2000 and returned the writ of execution to the applicant, as the debtor had insufficient funds. 9. On 26 April 2002 the applicant requested the Department of Justice of the Voronezh Region to ensure the enforcement of the judgment in her favour. 10. By letter of 7 May 2002 the Department of Justice of the Voronezh Region invited the applicant to re-submit the writ of execution to the bailiffs. 11. In January – February 2004 the applicant was paid the amount due pursuant to the writ of execution.

6. The applicant was born on 14 July 1946 and lives in Skopje. 7. On 22 January 2008 the Parliament of the respondent State passed the Additional Requirement for Public Office Act (Закон за определување дополнителен услов за вршење на јавна функција – hereafter “the Lustration Act”), which entered into force eight days later. 8. The Lustration Act introduced non-collaboration with the State security services in the period between 2 August 1944 and 30 January 2008, the date of the Act’s coming into force (hereafter “the screening period”), as an additional requirement for the holding of public office. In other words, collaboration with the State security services in that period became an impediment to holding public office. 9. All incumbent public officials and candidates for public office were required to submit a statement that they had not collaborated with the State security services in the above screening period (hereafter “the declaration”). The Lustration Act was to apply for five years from its entry into force (hereafter “the temporal scope”). 10. The Lustration Act also provided for the establishment of a Facts Verification Commission (Комисија за верификација на факти – hereafter “the Lustration Commission” or “the Commission”), which had to be set up within sixty days of the Act’s entry into force. Its task was to examine the veracity of the public officials’ declarations. The members of the Commission were elected by Parliament on 15 January 2009. The Commission became operational in late March 2009. 11. On 22 May 2009 amendments to the Lustration Act entered into force, adding several provisions primarily in respect of the functioning of the Lustration Commission and the status of its members. Also, the temporal scope of the Lustration Act was extended, from the five years initially envisaged following the Act’s entry into force, to ten years following the election of the Commission. 12. On 27 January 2010, following petitions for abstract constitutional review, the Constitutional Court accepted the initiative and decided to institute proceedings to review the constitutionality of several provisions of the Lustration Act, including the one extending the screening period (see paragraph 8 above) beyond the date of adoption of the current Constitution of the respondent State (17 November 1991). It also suspended application of those provisions until it had decided on their compatibility with the Constitution. 13. Fierce debate ensued, in which a number of politicians severely criticised the Constitutional Court’s decision in the media (see the European Commission’s Progress Report of 9 November 2010 in paragraph 109 below). For example, on 29 January 2010 the coordinator of the ruling party’s Parliamentary group made the following statement: “Having in mind that the Constitutional Court’s current composition was appointed during the political zenith [of the former President of the Republic], [the ruling party] believes that cancelling lustration’s scope of application after 1991 has one goal only: to prevent the Lustration Commission and the citizens of Macedonia from learning whether [the former President of the Republic and his party] officials, who controlled the secret services, actually used those structures against their political opponents.” 14. On 4 March 2010 the same MP stated: “We are convinced that the Constitutional Court wants to harness Macedonian democracy and keep it hostage [bound up] in the web woven by secret service collaborators. People from the secret services are striking back, together with their collaborators who continued to ‘snitch’, violate human rights, destroy people’s lives and wage war against political opponents, even after 1991.” 15. By a decision of 24 March 2010 the Constitutional Court invalidated certain provisions of the Lustration Act as unconstitutional. In particular, that court held that to extend the screening period beyond 17 November 1991, the date of adoption of the present Constitution, was unconstitutional. In other words, it was incompatible with the Constitution to provide collaboration with the State security services after that date as an impediment to the holding of public office. 16. Some other provisions were also held contrary to the Constitution, namely those providing for the publication of collaborators’ names in the Official Gazette, automatic lustration in cases where no declaration had been submitted, and those making it possible to introduce collaboration as an impediment to membership of governing bodies of political parties, civic organisations and religious communities by internal regulations of such non-State entities (see paragraphs 69-71, 78 and 81 below). 17. On the same date, 24 March 2010, the applicant, as the President of the Constitutional Court at the time, made the following statement to the media, in which he, inter alia, commented on the Parliament’s written response to the petitions for constitutional review in the proceedings before the court: “The response is seventeen pages long and provides arguments on the necessity to pursue lustration, motives behind the [Lustration] Act’s adoption, implementation procedure and the like, but my impression is that no legal arguments were presented ... I believe that the response should be made public. For example, Parliament, in its response, states ‘in constitutional and legal terms, one cannot contest the Act’s temporal scope’.... That cannot be considered a legal argument.” 18. By a decision of 29 September 2010 the Lustration Commission established that the applicant had submitted a false declaration and that accordingly he did not meet the additional requirement for public office (the course of the proceedings in the applicant’s case and the surrounding circumstances are described in detail in paragraphs 24-58 below). 19. On 25 February 2011 the Lustration Act was amended for the second time, and certain provisions that were similar to the invalidated ones were reintroduced. The provision delimiting the screening period in which the collaboration with the State security services was an impediment to the holding of public office was re-worded in such a way that the end-date remained open. The personal scope of the application was extended to cover former officials and officers in organisations performing duties of a public nature requiring them to submit declarations of non-collaboration. 20. On 28 March 2012 the Constitutional Court again invalidated several provisions of the Lustration Act, as amended by the 2011 Amendments (see the preceding paragraph 19 above). In so doing, the Constitutional Court held that its earlier decision (see paragraph 15 above) had been circumvented in view of the content of those amendments. 21. On 17 July 2012 the Lustration Act was repealed by the entry into force of the new Lustration Act (Закон за определување на услов за ограничување за вршење на јавна функција, пристап на документи и објавување на соработката со органите на државната безбедност). In 2014 the Constitutional Court refused to institute proceedings for abstract constitutional review of the new legislation. 22. While the 2008 Lustration Act was in force the Lustration Commission established in a total of eleven cases that the declarations on non-collaboration were false, and that therefore the person who had submitted them did not meet the additional requirement for public office. Apart from the applicant, who was the only incumbent official whose declaration was found to be false, those cases concerned eight former officials and two journalists. 23. On 1 September 2015 the Act Repealing the 2012 Lustration Act (Закон за престанување на важење на законот за определување на услов за ограничување за вршење на јавна функција) entered into force. According to the Act the Lustration Commission is allowed to complete, within two years, any ongoing proceedings in which a decision has already been issued, but may no longer institute new ones. Pending lustration proceedings in which the Commission has not issued a decision must be discontinued. Section 3 of the Act provides that a person in respect of whom the Commission has established that he or she has collaborated with the State security services is banned from holding public office for the period of five years from the time the Commission’s decision to that effect becomes final. 24. The applicant was a judge of the Constitutional Court between 2003 and 2011, when he was dismissed as a result of the lustration proceedings described below (see paragraphs 25-58). The applicant’s case was the first lustration case in the respondent State. During the lustration proceedings and at the time of his removal from office (see paragraph 56 below) the applicant was also the President of the Constitutional Court. 25. On 3 September 2009, the applicant, as a public official, submitted to the Lustration Commission a declaration of non-collaboration with the security services, as prescribed by section 6 of the Lustration Act (see paragraph 67 below). 26. On 5 July 2010 the Commission, by a letter classified as confidential, requested the State Archive to provide it with direct access to all the data, files and documents available in respect of the applicant. 27. On 12 and 22 July 2010 the State Archive informed the Commission that a personal record of the local branch of the secret police of the former Yugoslavia (hereafter “SFRY”) existed in respect of the applicant, and invited the Commission to consult the documentation. 28. On and around 15 September 2010, various media, despite the confidential nature of the proceedings before the Lustration Commission, reported that the Commission had allegedly identified a judge of the Constitutional Court as a collaborator with the State security services. In the following days the media continued to speculate that the identified collaborator was actually the President of the Constitutional Court. 29. During its deliberations held in private on 16 September 2010, the Lustration Commission found that the applicant’s declaration had not been in conformity with the evidence at its disposal. The applicant was notified of the Commission’s findings on 21 September 2010 with a note classified as “strictly confidential” (строго доверливо). He was also instructed that, under the Lustration Act, he could, within five days, submit oral or written observations to the Commission’s findings. The applicant replied and requested a public session on 24 September 2010. 30. On 22 September 2010 the daily Utrinski vesnik published an article entitled ‘Judge asks to speak publicly about being a ‘snitch’’. The relevant part of the article reads as follows: “Utrinski ‘unofficially’ learns that a Constitutional Court judge allegedly sinned during his high-school days, in the capacity of a member of a branch of an organisation called ‘United for Macedonia’ that was advocating unification of ethnic Macedonian territories. Once discovered, under pressure from the police, he was forced to disclose the names of the organisers.” 31. On 23 September 2010 the Commission notified the applicant that the session would be held on 27 September, that it would be public “when classified information was not being used” and that he could access the entirety of the classified documentation at the Commission’s disposal for one hour before the session. 32. On 24 September 2010, in an open letter broadcast in the media and addressed to “opponents of the lustration”, the Prime Minister of the respondent State (signed in his capacity as president of the governing party) stated, inter alia, that the Commission had publicly revealed that a member of the Constitutional Court had been a collaborator with the State security services and that it was now crystal clear that the collaborator sitting in the Constitutional Court, nominated by the former president of the Republic, and controlled by other centres of power, had invalidated a number of the legislative reforms of his Government. The letter was a response to his political opponents, who claimed that he was hindering the lustration process. The Prime Minister described their strategy in the following terms: “Attack the [ruling party] to [protect] the Constitutional Court, whose member the [Lustration] Commission had publicly declared a collaborator with the secret services. Accuse [the Prime Minister] of hindering the lustration [process] so that [he] would not accuse you of it becoming crystal clear that the secret services’ collaborator in the Constitutional Court scrapped a whole range of [the Prime Minister’s] reforms, and that [the Prime Minister] would not pose a question why [the former President of the Republic] nominated as judge of the Constitutional Court that person who was a collaborator with the [secret] services, and what is that centre of power which still controls the ‘collaborator’.” “Нападни го ВМРО-ДПМНЕ, за да го затскриеш Уставниот суд за чиј член Комисијата јавно се изјасни дека бил соработник на тајните служби. Обвини го Груевски дека ја кочи лустрацијата, за да не те обвини Груевски дека стана кристално јасно дека соработник на тајни служби од Уставниот суд му сруши цела палета на реформи и за да не постави прашање зошто Бранко Црвенковски го предложи за судија на Уставен суд тоа лице кое било соработник на службите и кој е тој центар на моќ кој се уште го диригира ‘соработникот’.” 33. On 24 September 2010 the applicant objected to the imposed time constraints regarding his access to the classified documents in the possession of the Commission (see paragraph 31 above). The Commission, in its turn, immediately informed him that he could consult his personal record compiled by the secret police of the SFRY at the State Archive as well as the documents at the disposal of the Commission, in the coming days until the session. The applicant consulted the documents at the Commission on the same day. 34. Those were the documents forming the applicant’s personal record compiled by the local branch of the SFRY secret police. The record contains around fifty pages of typed reports and forms. It appears from the record that the applicant was on 27 and 28 March 1964 interrogated by the secret police in connection with his involvement in a high-school nationalist group, and was registered as a collaborator under the pseudonym “Lambe”. The “proposal for registration” of 19 May 1964, signed by an inspector, I.K., states that the applicant was approached about collaboration with the secret police and that “he gladly agreed to it, [saying] that he would do anything for the [security] service, as long as his father and the school do not find out”. A “questionnaire” with a handwritten date of 10 February 1965, states, inter alia, that the applicant was recruited on the ground of “compromising material” and that he had not received any material benefit in exchange for his collaboration. That the applicant was recruited on the ground of compromising material is also noted in another questionnaire of 10 January 1968 where, next to the pseudonym “Lambe”, there is a handwritten note “and Lamda”. The record contains a number of reports of various dates between 1964 and 1966, composed mostly by the inspector who relied on “Lambe” as a source of information, about conversations and statements of some high-school and university students on certain political and social issues at the time. “Lambe” provided the information mostly verbally; only a few reports in the file are based on his letters (which were not in the file). There are also copies of two payment receipts dated May and December 1965 and a proposal of 1983 for deregistration of the collaborator “Lamda”. The deregistration referred to a person with the applicant’s name but who in the 1970s was a student at the Technical Faculty, and who in 1983 was working in the municipal branch of the Communist Party. 35. On 27 September 2010 the Commission held a public session on its premises, in a meeting room of around twenty square metres. A large number of media representatives were present. 36. During the session, the applicant denied the Commission’s initial findings, calling into question the veracity of his declaration. He disputed the authenticity of the documents the Commission relied on, as he had neither composed nor signed them, and claimed that the reports contained therein had been forged, or taken from others’ and added to his personal record. He further denied the authenticity of the signatures on the two payment receipts, which indicated that he had received money for his collaboration. He alleged a confusion regarding the two different collaboration pseudonyms (“Lambe” and “Lamda”) appearing in the file, and the identity behind them. He also claimed that the episode from the time when he had still been a minor and had been coerced into having contact with the secret police, due to his involvement with a high-school nationalist group, had been misused. 37. On 28 September 2010 the Constitutional Court responded to the Prime Minister’s statement of 24 September 2010 (see paragraph 32 above) by means of an open letter. The relevant part of that letter reads as follows: “The Constitutional Court finds that this attack is the culmination of the continual attacks on the Constitutional Court. The court therefore points out that the Prime Minister went beyond powers conferred on him by the Constitution, because he has no right to assess the legitimacy of decisions taken by the Constitutional Court, but rather [was obliged] to ensure their unhindered implementation. The court considers that his actions indicate [either] profound ignorance, or total disrespect for the constitutional order, to the point of undermining it. Using a single [pending] case ... to stigmatise a collective body reminds us of events from the past that must not be repeated in a democratic society.” 38. By a decision of 29 September 2010 the Commission held that the applicant’s objection to its initial findings of 16 September 2010 (see paragraph 29 above) was not in accordance with the information available, and that consequently he did not fulfil the additional requirement for holding public office. The decision was based on the applicant’s personal record, and contains a list of twenty-two documents. It summarised the contents of the documents and stated that the applicant had begun collaborating in 1964 and had been deregistered in 1983, that he had provided information on students whose activities were monitored by the security service for political reasons and that, as evident from the two payment receipts, he had in 1965 been paid for the collaboration. The relevant part of the Commission’s decision reads as follows: “... From the data available in the personal record compiled by the [secret police of the SFRY] it was established that in the rubric ‘collaboration relationship’ it is stated that [the applicant] is a collaborator of the [secret police] recruited on the ground of compromising material. It was further established that [the applicant] started his collaboration with the [secret police] as early as 1964 as a high-school student who, when it was proposed to him that he be registered in the collaborators’ network, stated that ‘he gladly accepted the collaboration and would do anything for the service’, and that he was allocated a pseudonym under which he later delivered all the information to the [secret police]. In 1965 he officially became a collaborator of the [secret police]. In the documentation, in ten reports drafted by the Internal Affairs Unit in Strumica, on a number of pages, [the applicant] under his pseudonym appears as a source giving information about his schoolmates, which [information] was used by the [secret police] as operational material on the activities of high-school youth in Strumica. From four reports, it is apparent that also later on, as a student in Skopje, he gave information about students of various faculties, of which in the personal record there are five reports concerning a number of individuals whom the [secret police] monitored and had information that they were dissatisfied with the authorities in view of their weak interest in the situation of the Macedonians in the Aegean [in Greece] and Pirin [in Bulgaria] Macedonia, as well as for various wrongs committed against Macedonians in the western part of Macedonia. From the personal record it was also established that in 1965 the sums of 10,000 and 20,000 [Yugoslav] dinars had been paid to him. His collaboration officially ended in 1983 when he was employed in the Municipality of Karpoš and was deregistered from the active collaboration network. The Commission took into account the oral observations provided by [the applicant], in which he expressed his disagreement with the Commission’s findings. The Commission considers all this information and the files and documents contained in the [applicant’s] record relevant. [It further] considers that that the [applicant’s] declaration [of non-collaboration] submitted to the Commission is not in line therewith [the information, files and documents] and that therefore [the applicant] does not meet the additional requirement for public office in accordance with section 2(1) [and] section 4(4) of the [Lustration] Act.” 39. The Commission’s decision was served on the applicant on 30 September 2010 and classified as “strictly confidential”. 40. In an exchange of correspondence on 1 October 2010 the applicant requested that the Commission provide him with a copy of the file for the purposes of seeking a judicial review of its decision. The Commission informed him that they only had copies (препис), but that the originals were available in the State Archive; they advised him to look for them there. Upon the applicant’s request of the same day, the State Archive, either on the same day or on 4 October 2010, provided him with a copy of his personal record. 41. On 5 October 2010 the applicant pointed out inconsistencies between the files provided to him by the State Archive, the inventory of the documents contained in his record, and the documentation the Commission relied on in its decision. The State Archive responded that they had simply received the personal record as it was, and had listed the documents therein by title without inspecting their contents, as they had not been authorised to do so. Finally, they invited the applicant to consult the contents of his personal record under their supervision. 42. On 8 October 2010 the applicant brought an action for judicial review in the Administrative Court against the Commission’s decision. He complained that the proceedings before the Commission had been unfair and of errors of fact and law. In particular, he complained that the session before the Commission had been held without Rules of Procedure having been adopted, which the Commission should have done ex lege before commencing the proceedings. The public session had not been, as initially planned, followed by proceedings in camera (see paragraphs 31 and 35-36 above), and he therefore had not had an opportunity to fully present his arguments concerning the classified information in the file. 43. The applicant further objected that the time-limit for the preparation of his appeal had been effectively reduced, since he had received the copies of the documents from the State Archive only on 5 October 2010 (see paragraphs 40-41 above), and that there had been obvious discrepancies between the files of the State Archive and the ones of the Commission that he had earlier had access to. The applicant denied the authenticity of the documents in his personal record and suggested obtaining an opinion from an expert in graphology (графолошко вештачење) as regards the signatures on the two payment receipts by comparing them with the letters he had allegedly sent to the inspector of the secret police, to which letters reference was made in the record but which were not available in the file. He also submitted that his identity had been confused with that of the person behind the pseudonym “Lamda”, given that in 1983 he was already a law graduate and was working for the Skopje City administration and thus was not working at the municipal branch of the Communist Party, nor had he ever studied at the Technical Faculty as the record indicated (see paragraph 34 above). He proposed additional evidence, asked that a public hearing be held, and requested leave to invite an expert assistant (стручен помагач), in particular, a certain Mr I.B., a university professor of State security and intelligence and retired staff member of the SFRY secret police, with a view to clarifying the methods and practices of those police concerning the opening and the maintenance of records. 44. In its reply, the Commission firstly listed and made reference to twenty-two documents, and then also mentioned “forty-seven written documents”, on which it based its decision. The Commission’s reply was classified as “strictly confidential”. 45. On 26 October 2010 the Administrative Court held a public hearing in the presence of the applicant and the President of the Commission. The Commission lodged an objection about the Administrative Court’s competence ratione materiae to examine the case. 46. On 2 November 2010 the court held another hearing, at which the Commission withdrew its objection regarding the court’s jurisdiction (see the preceding paragraph 44 above), the expert assistant I.B. (see paragraph 43 above) gave his testimony and the evidence was examined. The public was excluded from the part of the hearing in which confidential material (the applicant’s personal record) was under consideration. 47. By a judgment of 8 November 2010 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s action. In its judgment, this court listed twenty-seven documents, and found the Commission’s files identical to the originals received from the State Archive. The Administrative Court held that the Commission had neither been authorised nor obliged to determine the authenticity of certain evidence that could only be established by an expert opinion (вештачења) in criminal proceedings. It also held that the Commission did not conduct any adversarial proceedings and could admit as fact only the records compiled by the State security services. The applicant’s proposal to obtain an expert opinion with a view to checking the authenticity of the signatures on the payment receipts was rejected. The Administrative Court concluded that it had been immaterial (беспредметно) to determine whether the payments had been received by the applicant, as other (non-pecuniary) benefits could suffice for someone to be deemed a collaborator in terms of the Lustration Act. The judgment also took into account the testimony of the expert assistant I.B. Parts of the judgment were classified as “strictly confidential”. 48. The presiding judge was a certain Ms L.K., who was shortly afterwards, in March 2011, promoted to the newly established High Administrative Court. 49. The relevant part of the Administrative Court’s judgment reads as follows: “... The plaintiff’s [the applicant’s] representative reiterated the arguments advanced in his action for judicial review, and expanded on them by stating that the Commission’s decision was ill-founded ... [He argued that] the Commission had not assessed the written evidence, because there was none. [In particular,] there was no statement from the plaintiff that he had agreed to collaborate with the [secret police], there was no written consent from him in this regard, and there was no written decision of the [secret police] in which the plaintiff’s consent to collaboration was accepted. Moreover, the Commission had made only a mechanical analysis by quoting and paraphrasing the documents available in personal record no. 12736 and on that basis had reached the wrong conclusion, failing to establish the facts ... In view of the complexity of the case and for the purposes of clarification, the [Administrative] court, upon a proposal of the plaintiff, heard I.B. from Skopje in the capacity of an expert assistant (стручен помагач). The court also consulted (изврши увид) and compared the plaintiff’s personal record available in the State Archive with the copy of the same record delivered to the plaintiff. The court, having assessed the [plaintiff’s] arguments in the statement of claim, the [Commission’s] reply [thereto], and the submissions made by the expert assistant I.B., [and] having examined the impugned decision within the scope of the action and in terms of section 37 of the Administrative Disputes Act, found: The action is ill-founded ... According to section 10 of the [Administrative Disputes] Act, the administrative decision could be contested if the law was wrongly applied ... or if the proceedings which preceded the contested decision were not conducted in accordance with the rules of procedure, and in particular, if the facts were not established correctly, or if the facts were established correctly but assessed wrongly ... According to section 4(4) of the [Lustration] Act, collaboration, within the meaning of that Act, is conscious, secret, organised and continuous cooperation and activity with the State security services, established by a written document, in the a capacity of a secret collaborator or secret informant (hereafter ‘secret collaborator’) with a view to collecting information ... regarding certain persons, in violation of [their] basic rights and freedom on ideological-political grounds, as a result of which a material gain or other benefits in employment or career advancement had been obtained [by the collaborator] ... Relying on the above, the court found that the Commission, acting within its competence ... and after having correctly conducted the fact-verification proceedings, made a lawful decision ... It appears from the files that the plaintiff, on the basis of a written document, consciously, secretly, continuously and in organised way collaborated with the [secret police], which collected information that were subject to processing, storage and use ... Such collaboration is apparent from the reports ... which could be found in the original personal record kept at the State Archive. Having in mind that the Commission only checks the facts concerning collaboration or non-collaboration with the State security services, and given that this [fact-verification procedure] is not an adversarial procedure, the records created by the services and their legal predecessors are to be accepted as facts [thus as reliable evidence] ... In this court’s assessment, the argument that the plaintiff was prevented from active participation in the proceedings before the Commission ... is ill-founded, since the Commission provided him with access to all the evidence. Regarding [the plaintiff’s] argument that ... the Commission’s session had been held without Rules of Procedure [having been adopted beforehand] ... this court finds it irrelevant ... The Rules are an internal regulation of the Commission and [thus only] regulate its internal functioning ... and not the fact-verification procedure [which] is prescribed by the [Lustration] Act. This court finds ill-founded [the plaintiff’s] complaint that he had not been given an opportunity to contest the [factual findings of the Commission]. [He argued in particular that] ... the [Commission’s] session had ended after its first part, at the moment when he had expressed his disagreement with the ‘facts’ [underlying] the [Commission’s] findings ... in respect of which he had [also] made written submissions. [In his view] the Commission was obliged to hold a hearing, and not to treat the case as if no observations had been provided in accordance with section 29. [Such complaints] have no support in the evidence available in the file. As evident from the file, the Commission on 27 September 2010 held a public session in the part in which no classified information was under consideration. Having in mind that earlier, on 24 September 2010, the plaintiff had consulted the files and familiarised himself with their content, he had had the opportunity to provide his own observations at the session. The court also finds ill-founded the plaintiff’s argument that the reports [contained in his personal record], in legal terms, could not be relied on to establish the facts, since they had many shortcomings, both formal and substantive, in particular none of the ten reports had been signed by an authorised person of the [secret police], no letter allegedly sent by the plaintiff had been appended to the reports, ... none of these reports had been entered in the official records of the [secret police], and all reports quote ‘Lambe’ as a source of information, while the Commission [cites] another pseudonym, ‘Lamda’. [The court finds that argument by the plaintiff ill-founded because] the operation of the [secret police] was clarified by the expert assistant at the public hearing, who explained that it had had its own operational methodology for the purpose of gathering information, that was then subject to further processing, collection and use ... The court finds that assessment of the methodology of the [former secret police] is not in the competence of the Commission. The court did not accept the plaintiff’s complaints that he was recruited as a collaborator while still a minor, because it is apparent from the evidence that he entered into collaboration and gave reports as an adult. The court finds ill-founded the [plaintiff’s] arguments about errors of fact, [in particular those where he complains] that the Commission did not take any evidence to establish whether the signatures on the payment receipts were identical with each other as well as with the plaintiff’s signature, which could have been easily established by obtaining an opinion from an expert in graphology, those whereby he calls into question the authenticity of the reports he received from the State Archive and [the veracity of] of their content, those [where he argues] that ... the [secret police] registered him as a collaborator on the basis of bogus (спакувани) reports which were planted (подметнати) in his file and that he was not aware of nor had he consented to that [registration], as well as that there were obvious misinterpretation of the facts, since the file on a minor oppressed for his Macedonian nationalism had been transformed into the personal record of a secret collaborator. This [the court’s dismissal of these complaints] comes as a result of the fact that the Commission, after checking and verifying the data that was made available to it, correctly established that the plaintiff ... had been registered as a secret collaborator ... The Commission was establishing the facts was neither authorised nor legally bound to take evidence to establish the facts that could be established only through expert reports in criminal proceedings. ... The procedure is not adversarial and the records of the services of the former system are to be accepted as genuine [, meaning as reliable] evidence. The plaintiff in his submissions pointed to possible criminal offences which, in addition to the Criminal Code, are also sanctioned by sections 36 and 37 of the [Lustration] Act. The proceedings before the Commission do not bar the plaintiff from initiating other proceedings in which he could prove his allegations. On the other hand, after checking the plaintiff’s personal record, the court established that only a few reports were delivered in writing, and that most of the reports were provided through direct contacts. In view of the above the court did not grant the request ... for the letters written by the plaintiff mentioned in [some] reports drafted by the inspector of the State security service to be obtained with a view to obtaining an opinion from an expert in graphology on the signatures and the handwriting on the payment receipts. It is also immaterial whether payments were made or not, since this is only one of the conditions for establishing that collaboration took place, bearing in mind that section 4(4) of the [Lustration] Act, when stipulating what is considered collaboration, states that [not only] material gain [but also] other benefits or career advancement [may suffice].” 50. In his appeal of 25 November 2010 to the Supreme Court, the applicant reiterated his earlier arguments and expressed misgivings about the overall fairness of the proceedings and errors of fact and law. He pointed out that the number of pages and the inventory of the documentary evidence quoted in various acts produced by the State authorities had differed. He further complained that the Administrative Court had completely misinterpreted the submissions made by the expert assistant, and annexed an additional written statement by I.B. He also objected to the Administrative Court’s finding on the Commission’s powers, and complained that the Administrative Court had therefore failed to fully establish the facts, and had not ordered any expert opinion to establish or otherwise the authenticity of the documents and signatures on the payment receipts. The Commission submitted a reply to the applicant’s appeal, whereupon the applicant provided a response to the Commission’s reply. 51. By a judgment of 2 March 2011 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the judgment of the Administrative Court. The Supreme Court stated, inter alia, that it had checked the “original documentation” and concluded that the facts had been correctly established. It further addressed and analysed the applicant’s remaining complaints, and concluded that they were of no relevance and could not produce a different outcome. As for the authenticity of the documents, including the signatures on the receipts, the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s arguments, finding that no formal procedures existed at the time when these documents were produced. 52. Judge V.S. – who would later be appointed a judge of the Constitutional Court to fill the vacancy caused by the applicant’s dismissal (see paragraph 57 below) – sat in the panel and, according to the applicant, also acted as a rapporteur (известител) in the case. 53. The relevant part of the Supreme Court’s judgment reads as follows: ... From the evidence taken during the proceedings, primarily the reports in the personal record established in respect of the appellant, it can be indisputably concluded that he, on the basis of a written document, consciously, secretly, continuously and in an organised manner collaborated with the [former secret police]. Relying on the statements of the secret collaborator – the appellant – the [secret police] gathered information that was processed, stored and used by the [secret police] ... In such a way, the human rights of those people [who were then followed by the State security service] were violated on political or ideological grounds. Bearing in mind the definition of collaboration contained in the [Lustration] Act, the Administrative Court correctly concluded that the appellant had at the material time the status of a secret collaborator or informant. The arguments adduced in the appeal regarding discrepancies between the data obtained from the State Archive and those relied on by the Commission, whereby the appellant disputes the authenticity of the evidence, are ill-founded. In the Supreme Court’s opinion, the facts established by the first-instance court are correct and complete, as they are based on careful and thorough assessment of every piece of evidence separately and of all the evidence taken together ... Assessing the complaints regarding the facts, the Supreme Court also checked the original documentation and finds these complaints ill-founded, since the appellant did not submit any evidence that could call into question the facts as established by the first-instance court. The Supreme Court finds irrelevant in respect of the possibility of a different outcome the complaints that the applicant was not a collaborator but an oppressed person on whom a political file was opened because of ideas he had, as a minor during high-school days, on the independence of the Macedonian people. Specifically, the appellant was as a high-school student initially registered by the [secret police] for hostile activities and Macedonian nationalism. However, he continued to collaborate with the service and was approached about being registered in the network of collaborators. In 1965 the appellant was officially registered as a collaborator, when he had already reached the age of eighteen. From the documents available it is apparent that the applicant collaborated with the State security services as an adult. The appellant’s submissions that he never consented to collaboration and that there is no evidence of registration or deregistration, could not lead to factual findings different from those already established by the first-instance court. According to the expert assistant’s statement at the public hearing before the Administrative Court, the consent of the collaborator was in no way needed, given the secrecy of the procedure. The proposal for deregistration is in the name of Trendafil Ivanovski, with an identical file number to that under which he had been registered as collaborator. These data correspond with what is already recorded in various documents and about which there is no doubt that they refer to the appellant. According to the Supreme Court, these data could not be disregarded just because the pseudonyms do not match. The complaints that the reports composed by the [secret police], based on the information provided by the appellant, could not be regarded as [reliable evidence], are ill-founded. The Supreme Court finds that the procedure for receiving information was not strictly formalised. The reports were, as clarified by the expert assistant, usually given verbally. From the above, it is apparent that to be considered as genuine, it was not necessary that the content of the record, or of the report composed by an authorised person of the [secret police], be supported by a written statement by the collaborator. The appellant denies the authenticity of his signature on the payment receipts. The Supreme Court finds that, in a situation in which no rules (правилник) for payment existed, given that, as stated by the expert assistant, the payments were usually made in cash, it would suffice to have the name of the collaborator mentioned as a recipient [of the money], to conclude that material gain was obtained. As the first-instance court correctly and fully established the decisive facts it also correctly applied the substantive law when it dismissed the appellant’s action.” 54. The applicant was served with the Supreme Court’s judgment on 9 March 2011. 55. On 11 March 2011, the Commission concluded that its decision of 29 September 2010 had become final. 56. On 11 April 2011, relying on the Lustration Act and the Commission’s conclusion of 11 March 2011, the Parliament acknowledged that the applicant had not fulfilled the additional requirement, and accordingly dismissed him from the office of judge of the Constitutional Court, despite the experts’ debates about the constitutionality of such an action. On the same day, the Parliament’s decision was published in the Official Gazette. 57. On 14 April 2011, during its last session before early elections, the Parliament appointed Judge V.S. (see paragraph 52 above) as a judge of the Constitutional Court to the position vacated by the applicant’s dismissal. 58. The proceedings were closely followed by the international community present in the respondent State, and were referred to in various reports, most notably the European Commission’s Progress Report of 9 November 2010, which states that the ongoing lustration proceedings against the applicant “have raised concerns about pressure on the independence of the judiciary” (see paragraph 109 below). The United States Department of State Human Rights reports of 2010 and 2011 also made references to the applicant’s case and the tensions between the Government and the Constitutional Court. 59. Meanwhile, on 8 March 2011 the Commission filed a criminal complaint with the Skopje Public Prosecution Office against the applicant alleging that by submitting a false declaration of non-collaboration with the State security services he had committed the criminal offence of submitting false evidence defined in Article 366a of the Criminal Code (see paragraphs 79 and 97 below). 60. On 29 April 2011 the public prosecutor dismissed the criminal complaint, finding no elements of the offence in question. In her reasoning, the public prosecutor held in particular that in the proceedings before the Commission evidence was not taken or assessed in an adversarial manner or in accordance with the principle of immediacy, as only the official records of the State security services were used as relevant for the outcome of the proceedings. The applicant’s declaration thus did not constitute evidence but an act giving rise to the lustration proceedings.

4. The applicant was born in 1933 and lives in Łódź, Poland. 5. In 1983 the Government decided to construct the Polish Mothers' Memorial Hospital (“the hospital”) in Łódź, the largest obstetric and paediatric hospital in the country. At the same time the Citizens' Council (“the Council”) of the hospital was established. It was responsible for fund-raising and oversight of the hospital's construction. The applicant served as a secretary general of the Council. 6. On 16 February 1991 the Łódź Regional Prosecutor charged the applicant and three other members of the Council with embezzlement of the hospital funds. 7. On 13 July 1992 the Regional Prosecutor lodged a bill of indictment with the Łódź Regional Court against the applicant and three other co-accused. 8. On 12 November 1992 the Regional Court sent the case back to the prosecution service for additional investigation. The prosecution appealed unsuccessfully against that decision. On 31 December 1992 the Regional Prosecutor discontinued the investigation in respect of certain charges. 9. On 14 December 1993 an amended bill of indictment against the applicant and two other defendants was lodged with the Łódź Regional Court. The applicant was charged with embezzlement of funds allocated to the Council. 10. The Regional Court held 11 hearings on the following dates: 16 and 17 May, 4 and 5 October 1994; 4 and 17 January, 14 February, 20 March and 12, 26 and 27 April 1995. It heard an unspecified number of witnesses and experts. Seven hearings were adjourned, including two on account of the judge's illness and one at the prosecutor's request. Other hearings appear to have been adjourned due to the failure of certain witnesses to appear. 11. On 4 May 1995 the Regional Court acquitted the applicant. The prosecution appealed against that judgment on 22 August 1995. 12. A hearing before the Łódź Court of Appeal scheduled for 14 February 1996 was adjourned since one of the judges could not be present. On 15 March 1996 the Court of Appeal quashed the acquittal and remitted the case. 13. A hearing scheduled for 10 January 1997 had to be adjourned on account of the illness of H.A. (one of the defendants). On 14 March 1997 the Regional Court stayed the proceedings on that ground. On 13 August 1997 the proceedings were resumed, after the Regional Court had obtained additional medical reports concerning H.A. 14. A hearing before the Regional Court scheduled for 6 October 1997 had to be adjourned due to the illness of I.C., one of the defendants. On 18 November 1997 the Regional Court made a severance order in respect of the proceedings against I.C. 15. The Regional Court held three hearings on the following dates: 26 March, 25 May and 4 June 1998. Four hearings had to be adjourned due to the applicant's absence. Three of those related to the fact that the applicant had had a heart attack and had to be hospitalised. One hearing was adjourned since the judge was on leave. 16. On 27 November 1998 the Regional Prosecutor requested the trial court to discontinue the proceedings. The applicant's lawyer supported that request. 17. On 30 December 1998 the Regional Court discontinued the proceedings against the applicant, pursuant to Article 17 § 1 subparagraph 2 of the new Criminal Code, which entered into force on 1 September 1998. It held that the acts with which the applicant had been charged did not constitute an offence under the new Criminal Code. 18. The applicant did not appeal against that decision. 19. The applicant also submits that throughout the trial many press articles had been published which showed him in a negative light and had had a bearing on the principle of the presumption of innocence.

5. The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Soroca. 6. The applicant works as a technician for a State telephone company. On 9 June 2005 she called R. over the phone and they arranged for the applicant to visit R. at her house situated on Viilor str. no. 15/36 in Soroca in order to verify the functioning of the phone line installed there. Some twenty minutes later when she came to R.’s home, she was met by R. who, according to the applicant, started shouting at her and calling her names. 7. The applicant called the police from her mobile phone, but was told that she needed to go to the police station in person in order to make a written complaint. She decided to go back to her workplace and told her superior about the incident, but was advised to forget about it. She was told that R. had already called her superior to complain about an alleged assault on her by the applicant. 8. R. complained to the police that the applicant had assaulted her on 9 June 2005. According to R.’s complaint, the applicant had entered her apartment situated on Viilor str. 15 apartment 36 without authorisation and started ripping the phone lines off the wall and insulting her with offensive language. The applicant had then gone to the cellar and destroyed the phone socket and phone lines. She had been extremely irritated and one could smell alcohol on her breath. Finally, she had hit R. in the face and left. R.’s husband wrote a similar complaint, also noting Viilor str. 15 as being the address of the apartment where the incident had taken place. 9. On 11 July 2005 the local police filed a report confirming that the applicant had committed an administrative offence by insulting R. The report attested that on 9 June 2005 the applicant had entered R.’s apartment without authorisation, insulted her with offensive language and then hit her in the face, causing her physical harm. 10. On 26 July 2005 the Soroca District Court found the applicant guilty of the administrative offence of hooliganism. 11. On an unknown date the Bălţi Court of Appeal sent the case for a rehearing. 12. The applicant submitted statements from five companies she had visited on 9 June 2005, all confirming that she had been polite and not under the influence of alcohol that day, which contradicted R.’s statements concerning the applicant’s aggressiveness and alcohol consumption. She also submitted a certificate confirming that no repair of the phone lines at R.’s home or office had been asked for on 9 June 2005 or thereafter, and evidence that after her alleged visit phone calls had been made from both phone lines. That proved, in the applicant’s opinion, that the statements in R.’s complaint concerning the ripping out of the phone line and phone socket had been untrue. She submitted further evidence proving that her company had a contract to service the phone line installed at R.’s place, that she had been asked to verify a number of phone lines on 9 June 2005, including that at R.’s place, and evidence of the applicant’s call to the police on 9 June 2005. 13. On 19 December 2005 the Soroca District Court found the applicant guilty of the administrative offence of insult (injuria). The decision was an almost word-for-word copy of that adopted on 26 July 2005 and reads as follows in its entirety: “Decision concerning the administrative offence under Article 471-1 of the Code of Administrative Offences, 19 December 2005 Judge [V. N.] of the Soroca District Court, having examined the case concerning the administrative offence regarding [the applicant, her address and workplace], has found: On 9 June 2005 at 12.20 p.m. [the applicant] entered [R.’s] apartment situated on Mateevici str. 1, apartment 42 without authorisation and started shouting and calling her names, thus denigrating [R.’s] honour and dignity, therefore committing the administrative offence provided for in Article 473 (1) of the Code of Administrative Offences. The allegation that [the applicant] hit the victim has not been confirmed. In view of the above, relying on [relevant procedural provisions of the Code of Administrative Offences], the court decides: To impose a fine on [the applicant] in the amount of ten conventional units amounting to 200 [Moldovan] lei. This decision may be appealed against within 10 days to the Bălţi Court of Appeal”. 14. In her appeal in cassation the applicant submitted that there was no evidence whatsoever that she had ever been in R.’s apartment at Mateevici str. or shouted at her. The court had not given any ground for the decision such as a document, witness statement or anything other than the statements by R. and her husband. Moreover, she had visited R. at her address at Viilor str. no. 15 and not at Mateevici str. no. 1 as stated in the decision. Finally, the court had disregarded Article 37 of the Code of Administrative Offences (see below), according to which no administrative penalty could be imposed after three months from the date on which the offence had been committed. 15. On 8 February 2006 the Bălţi Court of Appeal upheld the lower court’s decision. The court’s decision started by stating that: “By its decision [of 19 December 2005] the [lower court] imposed an administrative penalty on [the applicant] because on 9 June 2005 she insulted [R.] in her apartment situated on Mateevici str. in Soroca, thus denigrating [R.’s] honour and dignity.” It then summarised the applicant’s appeal. The court further found that the lower court had properly applied the procedural law by summoning the parties and explaining their rights to them and by verifying all the circumstances of the case. It correctly dismissed the part of the complaint that the applicant had hit R., since during the court hearing R. herself had denied having been hit. The court reduced the fine to 136 Moldovan lei (8.80 euros (EUR)), using a slightly different manner of calculating the amount of the fine. That decision was final. Its text was accessible at the Soroca District Court, where it arrived on 20 February 2006.

5. In 1951 the State authorities took more than three hectares of land from a relative of the applicants. No compensation was paid to the owner. 6. The applicants unsuccessfully claimed restitution of the land under Law no. 503/2003. In particular, in a judgment of 13 December 2006 the Supreme Court held, in a review of the decisions made at lower levels of jurisdiction, that the land had been formally transferred to the State pursuant to Ordinance 15/1959. Section 3 of Law no. 503/2003 did not include such a situation as grounds for restitution of property. The applicants could have claimed restitution of the land earlier, under Law no. 403/1990, but they had not done so. 7. On 23 April 2007 the applicants lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court. They alleged a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, and also of their constitutional right to own property. 8. In particular, the applicants argued that the land had been expropriated without compensation. It was therefore liable to restitution under section 3(1)(m) and (n) of Law no. 503/2003, irrespective of the fact that that law contained no reference to Ordinance 15/1959. They referred to the Supreme Court’s judgment 3SžoKS 130/2005 of 9 June 2006, which found that a situation similar to that of the applicants fell under Law no. 503/2003. 9. On 25 October 2007 the Constitutional Court dismissed the complaint (decision III. ÚS 287/07). It held that the Supreme Court had given sufficient reasons for its judgment, which was neither arbitrary nor otherwise contrary to the constitutional principles. It was not for the Constitutional Court to review the way in which ordinary courts interpreted and applied the law unless it resulted in a breach of the Constitution. 10. The decision was served on 18 December 2007.

6. The applicant was born in 1982 and lives in Luduş, Mureş County. 7. According to the applicant, on 30 April 2001 his employer, I.N., reported informally to two police officers, N.D. and C.B., that some money had been stolen from his house and that he suspected the applicant of the theft. The two officers rushed to arrest the applicant in the street, handcuffed him in front of other people and then took him to the police station by car. There, the applicant was kept handcuffed and the police agents hit him continuously, forcing him to confess that he had stolen the money. The applicant signed a confession. 8. Afterwards he was taken, still handcuffed, to his parents’ house, where the police agents performed a search. They found 1,000,000 Romanian lei (RON), which they seized and handed over directly to I.N. 9. According to the applicant, during the search of the house the two police agents continued to hit him in front of his parents and tried to get him to reveal where the rest of the money was hidden. As he refused to do so, he was taken back to the police station, where he was hit again until I.N. took pity on him and asked the two agents to release him. He then took the applicant back to his house, where he declared in front of those present: “I took Ilie out of the police station and brought him home. He had been so severely beaten by the police that I felt pity for him.” 10. On 2 May 2001 following an official complaint about the theft lodged by I.N., the applicant was again taken to the police station, where, it was alleged, the abuse continued. 11. On 8 October 2001 the applicant gave a statement before Luduş Police concerning the accusations of theft against him. He retracted his previous confessions and accused the two police officers, N.D. and C.B., of beating and threatening him on 30 April and 2 May to make him confess. He lodged a complaint against them for abuse of position and wrongful arrest without a legal basis. 12. On 13 December 2001 the prosecutor attached to the Luduş District Court sent the applicant’s complaint to the Military Prosecutor’s Office at the Târgu-Mureş Military County Court. The complaint was subsequently lodged with the Military Prosecutor’s Office attached to the Bucharest Military County Court, to be examined under Article 266 § 2 of the Criminal Code. The said provision prohibits the use of promises, threats or violence to obtain statements from a person under criminal investigation. 13. Before the military prosecutor, two witnesses declared that they did not know anything about the case and had not witnessed the events. One witness declared that he had seen the applicant being hit by the police officers and arrested. Another witness, a neighbour who saw the applicant being taken to the police station, declared that one of the police officers had hit the applicant and pushed him into the car like a “bag of potatoes”. The accused police officers and I.N. denied having hit or threatened the applicant. 14. On 12 June 2002 the military prosecutor dismissed the criminal complaint against the two police officers. The prosecutor noted that the applicant did not put forward any medical evidence and considered it “hard to believe that the victim wouldn’t have gone to the forensic doctor, if he had injuries”. He also noted that the applicant had failed to make a complaint against the police officers. The prosecutor lastly noted that the witnesses’ statements were contradictory. He concluded that it could not be established with certainty whether the police officers had done what they were accused of. 15. The applicant lodged a complaint against that decision with the superior prosecutor. He claimed that only four witnesses had been heard during the investigation, whereas two of the most important witnesses he had put forward – his parents, in front of whom he had been beaten – had not been questioned. He also complained that he or his lawyer had not been allowed to participate in the interviews and had thus had no opportunity to question the witnesses in order to clarify the contradictory statements. He also argued that the local authorities had exercised pressure on the witnesses so they would not reveal the truth about what had happened. 16. On 7 July 2003 the applicant was informed by a summary letter that his complaint had been dismissed. The applicant subsequently lodged a judicial complaint against the prosecutor’s decision with the Cluj Military Court. 17. Following the demilitarisation of the police by Law no. 218/2002 on the Organisation and Functioning of the Police (“the Police Functions Act 2002”) and Law no. 360/2002 on the Status of Police Officers (“the Police Officers Act 2002”), the case was sent to the Târgu-Mureş Court of Appeal which, on 10 September 2004, ruled that the complaint was ill-founded. 18. The Court of Appeal based its decision exclusively on the statements given during the criminal investigation, as it refused the applicant’s request for witnesses to be re-examined. It noted the contradiction in evidence, but considered that in the absence of any new written evidence and given the lack of medical evidence, it could not conclude with certainty that the accused had committed the acts in question; it therefore upheld the prosecutor’s decision. 19. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, arguing that the lower court should not have relied exclusively on the evidence adduced by the prosecutors, but should have heard witnesses directly and ordered supplementary investigative measures to clarify the contradictory statements. 20. On 24 November 2004 the High Court of Cassation and Justice dismissed the appeal and thus upheld the contested decision. It considered that as long as the criminal proceedings against the applicant were still pending (see paragraph 21 below), it was not possible to undertake parallel criminal investigations against the individuals who had conducted the investigation against the applicant. It further considered the contested decision to be lawful and well founded. 21. On 5 November 2002 the applicant was indicted for theft of money from I.N.’s house. 22. On 1 March 2005 Luduş District Court acquitted the applicant. In the course of these proceedings, the applicant maintained that the confession signed by him on 30 April 2001 had been made because of violence and pressure inflicted on him by the investigating officers and I.N. The district court found that the house search and the seizure of the money had been unlawful and all the evidence adduced under those circumstances had to be struck from the records. Based on statements from different witnesses, it further held that on 30 April 2001 the applicant had been subjected to acts of violence and that the confession signed by him had been made under duress from the police officers and I.N. The judgment was upheld by a decision of the Mureş County Court of 3 October 2005 and by a final decision of the Târgu-Mureş Court of Appeal of 18 January 2006. 23. It also appears from the case file that the money seized from the applicant’s parents’ house was returned to them by virtue of a decision of the prosecutor of 11 June 2002.

4. The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Diyarbakır. 5. On 10 August 1999 the Diyarbakır Provincial Private Administration Office (Diyarbakır Il Özel Idare Müdürlüğü) expropriated the plots of land belonging to the applicant in Diyarbakır. A committee of experts assessed the value of these plots of land and this amount was paid to the applicant when the expropriation took place. 6. On 20 October 1999 the applicant brought an action before Diyarbakır Civil Court of First Instance, requesting increased compensation. 7. On 22 January 2002 the Diyarbakır Civil Court of First Instance awarded the applicant additional compensation of 118,212,590,355 Turkish liras (TRL) (approximately 97,861 euros (EUR)) plus interest at the statutory rate applicable at the date of the court's decision, running from 8 October 1999. 8. On 12 March 2002 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. 9. On 15 March 2002 the administration paid the applicant a total sum of TRL 281,371,870,000 (approximately 237,519 euros (EUR)).

3. The applicant was born in 1946 and lives in Hřensko. 4. On 3 July 1992 the Děčín District Court (okresní soud) granted the applicant’s action and declared the North-Bohemian Gas Company’s (Severočeské plynárny) immediate termination of his employment in 1989 null and void. 5. On 14 October 1997 the applicant lodged an action for loss of wages against his former employer in the Ústí nad Labem District Court[1]. On 10 December 1997 he paid court fees. 6. On 25 September 1998 the District Court discontinued the proceedings due to the applicant’s alleged withdrawal of his action. 7. On 30 November 1998 the Regional Court, upon the applicant’s appeal of 23 November 1998, quashed this decision and remitted the case to the District Court for further consideration. 8. A hearing held on 9 April 1999 was adjourned sine die with a view to verifying information presented at the hearing. 9. On 25 October 1999 the applicant’s case was transmitted to another judge because of the long-term illness of the original judge. 10. On 4 October 2000 the applicant’s legal representative, upon the court’s telephoned request, submitted supplementary documents. 11. On 15 January 2001 he was requested to present other documents. As the applicant’s legal representative did not do so, the court urged him to comply on 9 April 2001. He complied on 14 May 2001. 12. On 13 June 2001 the defendant submitted its written comments. 13. On 28 August 2001 the District Court’s vice-president, upon the applicant’s complaint, acknowledged the delay in the proceedings. 14. As the judge dealing with the applicant’s case had left on maternity leave on 8 October 2001, another judge was appointed. On 15 November 2001 the District Court vice-president requested the new judge to deal with the case speedily. She renewed her request on 1 October 2002. On 31 October 2002 the vice-president appointed another judge to deal with the case due to the long-term illness of the previous judge. 15. In the meantime, on 9 August 2002, the applicant had asked for referral of his action to the Liberec District Court, considering that the latter would deal with the action without delay. On 10 March 2003 his legal representative was invited to clarify his client’s request. On 7 April 2003 the lawyer replied and, on 18 April 2003, he paid court fees concerning the referral. 16. On 7 May 2003 the applicant’s request was sent to the defendant which, on 29 May 2003, expressed its disagreement. 17. On 20 June 2003 the Ústí nad Labem Regional Court (krajský soud) decided that the applicant’s action would not be transferred to the Liberec District Court. 18. On 4 September 2003 the vice-president of the District Court again urged the judge to continue to deal with the case. 19. Two hearings were held, on 7 November 2003 and 6 February 2004. A hearing which was to be held on 14 May 2004 was adjourned sine die on 2 April 2004, as the judge was ill. On 20 September 2004 another judge was appointed, who fixed the next hearing for 5 January 2005.

5. The applicant was born in 1981 and resides in Moscow. 6. In September 2009 the applicant arrived in Russia from Uzbekistan and settled in the Moscow Region. Until December 2009 he was officially registered with the Russian migration authorities in Moscow. According to the Government, he subsequently resided without formal registration in the Moscow region. According to the applicant, he always complied with the legal requirement for registration at one’s place of residence. 7. In the meantime, on 20 November 2009 the Uzbek authorities charged the applicant in absentia under Articles 159 § 3(b) and 244-2 § 1 of the Uzbek Criminal Code, which punish calls to overthrow the constitutional order of Uzbekistan and involvement in religious, extremist, separatist and other banned organisations (see paragraphs 78-79 below). The applicant was accused of being member of a group called Warriors of Islam which, apparently, had been prohibited in Uzbekistan and had been classified as an extremist religious organisation by the Uzbek authorities. It is stated in the information note sent by the Uzbek authorities to their Russian counterparts that this group was a faction of the Islamic Party of Turkestan (formerly called the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan), which had been banned in Uzbekistan. 8. The Uzbek decision listing the charges against the applicant reads as follows: “... [The applicant] was actively engaged in spreading propaganda in the Navoi region. These activities were aimed at securing the confidentiality of information relating to the group’s actions, securing strict compliance with the orders issued by the group’s supporters, ensuring the return [of society] to the roots of Islam and making everyday life based solely on the rules of the Koran. His activities were also aimed at political and armed struggle against those who oppose the [group’s] ideas and [those] who are treated as enemies of Islam. His propaganda activities had the goal of uniting all Muslims and creating the united State of the “Islamic Caliphate” governed by rules of Shariah; [all the] while considering the democratic changes in Uzbekistan [brought about] by means of laws wrong and [illegitimate]. In particular, [the applicant] participated in the activities of “communes” run by his group in the Navoi region. Having joined others in an organised criminal group, he studied printed material produced by the group’s supporters. He was active in spreading propaganda among people having no stable opinion, encouraging them to join the group and promoting the group’s ideas. All these had as their subsequent aim the overthrow of the constitutional order ... Also, in 2008 together with his accomplices within the group [the applicant] participated in the group’s meetings, [which were] aimed at the armed overthrow of the constitutional order ...” 9. On 20 November 2009 the applicant’s name was put on a wanted list. 10. By a decision of 23 November 2009 the Navoi Town Court of Uzbekistan ordered the applicant’s detention and that he be held in remand centre no. 7 in the town of Kattakurgan. 11. According to the applicant, in November 2009 he called his relatives in Uzbekistan and learnt that he was wanted by the Uzbek authorities on criminal charges. 12. In April 2010 the applicant requested that the regional migration authority grant him refugee status. The applicant was given a certificate confirming that his application for refugee status was being processed. 13. The applicant submitted to the migration authority that he had left Uzbekistan because of numerous arrests since September 2009 in the village of Talkok, where he had been residing at the time. Several people had been arrested on various charges, for instance in relation to drug trafficking. The applicant also affirmed that: he was not a member of any political or religious organisation; he had not taken part in any opposition movement; and he had not distributed any political or religious literature. Lastly, he stated that he feared returning to Uzbekistan, where he would be placed in detention. 14. On 21 May 2010 the applicant was arrested and detained in relation to the criminal proceedings pending against him in Uzbekistan (see paragraph 19 below). It is unclear whether the applicant amended – in any significant manner – his refugee application on account of the circumstances relating to these proceedings and the Uzbek extradition request. 15. By a decision of 5 July 2010 the migration authority rejected the refugee application in the following terms: “The applicant has not presented any facts concerning his fear of political or religious persecution. He indicated during the interview that he did not know of any political parties and that he had not been a member of any religious or non-governmental organisations; he had not been the victim of any violent incidents. Having regard to the reasons for his departure from Uzbekistan, it does not appear that he was persecuted on account of his political views or religious beliefs. The applicant is of the Islamic faith, which is the dominant religion in his country. Nothing prevents him from praying and going to a mosque. He is not involved in any political activity. Also, regarding the allegation concerning the arrests in September 2009 and that the applicant had been ordered to go to a police station, it does not appear that any repressive measures were taken against him. The Federal Migration Authority (FMA) has provided the following information concerning the political, social, economic and migration situation in Uzbekistan: 80% of the population are Sunni Muslims. The FMA has no facts in its possession regarding persecution on religious or political grounds. Article 31 of the Uzbek Constitution and other laws provide for civic rights and freedoms for all citizens, irrespective of their ethnicity, religious beliefs or political views. The Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations Act contains clear rules concerning religious organisations, their interaction with the State and fully guarantees the right to manifest one’s religion, alone or in community with others ... Uzbekistan has ratified, without reservations, all six main UN treaties concerning human rights and regularly submits reports to the competent agencies of the United Nations. In total, Uzbekistan has ratified over sixty international treaties relating to human rights. Uzbekistan is not a party to the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees and its Protocol. However, in November 1999 they signed the Charter of European Security, thus undertaking to protect refugees. In 1996 Uzbekistan became a party to the UN Convention against Torture. There can be various understandable reasons compelling a person to leave the country of his origin, but only one qualifies [that person to fall within] the notion of refugee. The expression “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted” makes all other reasons irrelevant. The applicant has not adduced convincing grounds for leaving his country of nationality for reasons which would fall within the scope of section 1 § 1(1) of the Refugees Act ...” 16. On 8 July 2010 the migration authority dispatched a letter notifying the applicant of the refusal. The letter also indicated that the refusal could be challenged before the FMA or a court and that in the absence of other legal grounds for staying on the territory of Russia the applicant would have to leave it. Apparently, the applicant received this letter but did not apply for judicial review. 17. Instead, in October 2010 the applicant requested that the migration authority grant him temporary asylum in Russia (see paragraph 44 below). The migration authority rejected this request on 20 December 2010. The applicant did not challenge this refusal before a court. 18. In March 2012 the applicant lodged a new application for temporary asylum. On 5 June 2012 the migration authority granted the applicant temporary asylum in Russia, considering that it was necessary in order to provide a legal basis for his continued presence in Russia and Russia’s compliance with the Court’s indication under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Such temporary asylum should remain in force until delivery of the final judgment by the Court and, in any event, no longer than until 5 June 2013. 19. The applicant was arrested in the town of Krasnogorsk in the Moscow Region on 21 May 2010. The actual circumstances leading to the applicant’s arrest remain unclear. The arrest record reads as follows: “Identity document: an information document concerning the search for the religious extremist (passport details); a document concerning a pending application for refugee status ... Grounds and reasons for arrest: [the applicant] is subject to an arrest warrant procedure; a detention order [has been] issued by [an Uzbek] court ... {In pre-printed letters} I have been informed that under Article 46 of the Code of Criminal Procedure I am entitled to know the accusation against me, ... to have legal assistance from the moment indicated in Article 49 §§ 2 and 3.1 of the Code, to have meetings in private with counsel before my first questioning ... I have been informed that I am suspected of offences directed against the constitutional order of Uzbekistan and [of the] creation of a criminal community ...” The record bears the applicant’s signature and a note by him saying that he had read the documents and had no comment on them. 20. On the same date, the Russian authorities contacted their Uzbek colleagues, informing them of the applicant’s arrest and seeking confirmation of the Uzbek authorities’ intention to request the extradition of the applicant. That same day, the Uzbek authorities submitted a document requesting the applicant’s detention to the Russian authorities. 21. The applicant also signed, apparently on 22 May 2010, another document entitled Notification of rights to the suspect. On the same date, the applicant was interviewed by a deputy town prosecutor and confirmed to him in writing that he had been informed of his rights not to incriminate himself and to have the assistance of an interpreter. He waived the assistance of an interpreter, stating that he could read, speak and understand Russian. 22. On 23 May 2010 the Krasnogorsk Town Prosecutor ordered the applicant’s detention, doing so with reference to the Uzbek detention order of 23 November 2009 and Article 61 of the 1993 Minsk Convention (see paragraph 75 below). 23. According to the applicant, after his arrest his procedural rights were not explained to him and he was unable to have the assistance of a lawyer until some time later. In the applicant’s submission, on 10 June 2010 the staff of the detention facility where he was being kept refused to allow lawyer L. to visit him, stating that he had no formal authorisation for that visit from the Krasnogorsk Prosecutor’s Office. 24. On 28 June 2010 the Prosecutor General’s Office received a formal extradition request from the Uzbek authorities, which contained the following statement: “We guarantee that, as required under Articles 16, 17 and 24 of the Uzbek Code of Criminal Procedure, [the applicant] will not be subjected to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; the extradition request is not aimed at persecuting him for political reasons, [or] on grounds relating to race, religious beliefs or nationality. In compliance with Article 66 of the [Minsk] Convention he will not be surrendered to another country without Russia’s consent ... Since 1 January 1998 the death penalty has been abolished in Uzbekistan ...” 25. On 29 June 2010 the Krasnogorsk Town Prosecutor considered the applicant’s detention again and ordered, without specifying the duration, the applicant’s detention under Article 466 § 2 of the CCrP (see paragraph 56 below). 26. On 20 July 2010 the town prosecutor applied to the Krasnogorsk Town Court, seeking authorisation of the applicant’s continued detention. By a decision of 21 July 2010 the Town Court confirmed the lawfulness of the prosecutor’s previous decisions ordering the applicant’s detention. Referring to Articles 109 and 466 § 1 of the CCrP, the court extended the applicant’s detention “until 21 August 2010 to amount in total to three months” (apparently, counting from the date of the applicant’s arrest). Lawyer B. was present at the detention hearing and acted as counsel for the applicant. 27. Before the expiry of the previous detention order, on 13 August 2010 the acting town prosecutor sought an extension of the applicant’s detention because the extradition proceedings were still pending. On 27 August 2010 the Town Court extended the applicant’s detention until 21 November 2010. Lawyer P. was present at the detention hearing and acted as counsel for the applicant. 28. Before the expiry of the previous detention order, the regional prosecutor sought an extension of the applicant’s detention. On 18 November 2010 the Town Court extended the applicant’s detention until 21 February 2011, to amount in total to nine months. Lawyer S. was present at the detention hearing and acted as counsel for the applicant. 29. On 18 February 2011 the Town Court examined an extension request from the regional prosecutor and extended the applicant’s detention until 21 May 2011, to amount in total to twelve months. Lawyer M. was present at the detention hearing and acted as counsel for the applicant. 30. Apparently, no request for participation in the above court hearings concerning the applicant’s detention had been submitted by lawyer L. The transcripts of the above hearings do not contain any request from the applicant to appoint L. or to dismiss the appointed lawyers for any reason. 31. On an unspecified date, lawyer L. started to represent the applicant in the extradition proceedings. 32. On 16 May 2011 the Moscow Regional Court examined submissions from L. and extended the applicant’s detention until 21 November 2011, concluding that, if at large, the applicant would flee justice. The court also noted that the Court had made an indication under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, thus (temporarily) preventing enforcement of the extradition order which had become final on 17 March 2011. The applicant appealed. On 7 July 2011 the Appeal Section of the Regional Court upheld the detention order. Apparently, the applicant did not lodge a cassation appeal. 33. On 21 November 2011 the acting town prosecutor ordered the applicant’s release from custody due to the expiry of the maximum eighteen-month statutory period of detention. The applicant was released on the same day. 34. In the meantime, on 5 October 2010 the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office issued an extradition order in respect of the applicant. The order indicated that there were no obstacles to extraditing the applicant under Russian law and the international treaties binding Russia. 35. According to the applicant, the Krasnogorsk Prosecutor’s Office did not allow his lawyer L. access to the extradition file until 12 October 2010, and, even after the lawyer was granted access to the materials in question, he was unable to obtain a copy of the extradition order. It appears that the applicant complained of these matters to higher prosecutor’s offices on several occasions. 36. In a letter of 26 November 2010 the Moscow Region Prosecutor’s Office replied to the applicant’s lawyer, stating that his complaints against the detention centre and the Krasnogorsk Prosecutor’s Office had been examined and resolved. In particular, he had been authorised to meet with the applicant and obtain access to the materials concerning the extradition proceedings. The letter also stated that the applicant’s lawyer could receive the extradition order of 5 October 2010 from the applicant, or make a copy at his own expense from the extradition file. 37. In a letter of 30 November 2010 the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office informed the applicant’s lawyer that his complaints against the Krasnogorsk Prosecutor’s Office and the detention centre were being examined. The extradition order of 5 October 2010 was enclosed with this letter. 38. The applicant challenged the extradition order before the Moscow Regional Court, stating that he had not been involved in the offences imputed to him, and, at the time of his departure from Uzbekistan, his name had not been on a wanted list. 39. On 25 January 2011 the Regional Court held a hearing and heard submissions from the applicant and his lawyer, L. The Regional Court confirmed the extradition order in the following terms: “The Uzbek extradition request is in compliance with the European Convention on Extradition and Article 58 of the Minsk Convention ... The case file contains assurances from the requesting State that the extradition request does not aim at persecuting [the applicant] for political reasons, [or] on grounds relating to race, religion or nationality. The Uzbek authorities have given guarantees that in the event of his extradition [the applicant] would not be subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; he would be prosecuted only for the offences mentioned in the extradition request ... The migration authority has dismissed [the applicant’s] application for refugee status ... He has not sought judicial review of this refusal ... He has not sought judicial review of the refusal of temporary asylum ... The allegation concerning human-rights violations in Uzbekistan has been examined by this court. The general and political situation in that country has also been taken into consideration ... However, the [applicant’s] allegation in itself is not a reason for granting his challenge to the extradition order ... The extradition request contains a statement that [the applicant] was/is not being persecuted for political reasons or on grounds relating to race, religion or nationality and that he would not be subjected to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. [The applicant] and his lawyer have not adduced any objective reasons which would allow [this court] to doubt the assurances made by the Uzbek authorities ... When examining [the applicant’s] applications for refugee status and temporary asylum, the authorities established he had not adduced any well-founded reasons [to the effect] that he had left his country for reasons relating to fears of being persecuted on account of his race, religious beliefs, nationality or his belonging to a specific social group or due to his political views ...” 40. On 17 March 2011 the Supreme Court of Russia rejected the applicant’s appeal and upheld the decision of 25 January 2011, largely relying on the reasoning of the first-instance court.

8. The applicant was born in 1959 and is currently staying in a custodial clinic in the Netherlands. 9. Between 1975 and 1995, the applicant was convicted nineteen times of theft, criminal damage, assault and aggravated assault. On 21 January 1997 the Arnhem Regional Court (arrondissementsrechtbank) convicted the applicant of assault and assault occasioning grievous bodily harm committed in 1996. Having found that at the time of the commission of the offence the applicant was able to understand the unlawful nature of his acts but that his mental faculties were so poorly developed that he could only be held responsible for these offences to a limited degree, the Regional Court sentenced the applicant to fifteen months' imprisonment in combination with an order for his confinement in a custodial clinic (hereafter a “TBS order” - terbeschikkingstelling met bevel tot verpleging van overheidswege). 10. On 16 September 1997 the Arnhem Court of Appeal (gerechtshof) upheld the Regional Court's judgment of 21 January 1997. 11. Although the applicant had initially filed an appeal in cassation with the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) against the judgment of 16 September 1997, he withdrew this appeal on 5 February 1998 when, after having served his prison sentence, the TBS order took effect. However, he was not transferred to a custodial clinic but was held in pre‑placement detention in an ordinary remand centre (huis van bewaring). 12. On 7 August 1998, the applicant filed an appeal with the Appeals Board (beroepscommissie) of the TBS Section of the Central Council for the Administration of Criminal Justice (Centrale Raad voor Strafrechtstoepassing) against the apparently automatic prolongation by three months of the six-month period of pre‑placement detention referred to in Article 12 of the Act on confinement to a custodial clinic of persons subject to a TBS order (Beginselenwet verpleging ter beschikking gestelden; hereinafter referred to as “the 1997 Act”). He submitted that this six-month period had expired, that he had not received written notification from the Minister of Justice that his pre‑placement detention would be extended by three months and, apparently, that the procedure for selection and placement in a custodial clinic in his case had not yet started. 13. Between 11 September and 11 November 1998 the applicant stayed in the Dr. F.S. Meijers Institute for the purpose of selection and subsequent placement in a custodial clinic. 14. On 5 November 1998 the applicant filed a further appeal with the Appeals Board against the second apparently automatic prolongation of his pre‑placement detention by three months. He requested the Appeals Board to suspend the second prolongation request. 15. On 10 November 1998 the Minister of Justice filed written submissions with the Appeals Board in response to those filed by the applicant. 16. On 11 November 1998 the President of the Appeals Board rejected the applicant's request to suspend the further execution of the Minister's decision of 2 November 1998 to prolong the applicant's pre‑placement detention in the remand centre by three months. Taking into account the fact that the applicant, at the time of the decision, had spent eight months awaiting placement in a custodial clinic and that, according to the medical report of 15 October 1998, there was no apparent urgent medical need for his placement in a custodial clinic, the President found no pressing interest which required the suspension of the Minister's decision. 17. On 28 January 1999 the applicant filed an appeal against the third apparently automatic prolongation by three months of his pre‑placement detention. On 15 February 1999 the Minister informed the applicant that he could not yet be admitted to a custodial clinic and that his pre‑placement detention had been prolonged by a further period of three months, i.e. from 31 January to 30 April 1999. 18. On 10 March 1999, after a hearing held on 19 January 1999, the Appeals Board gave its decision on the applicant's appeals against the first and second automatic prolongations of his pre‑placement detention. This decision, in so far as relevant, reads: “1.The challenged decisions '1.1 The Minister had not extended by 4 August 1998 the period within which the appellant should have been placed in a custodial clinic for persons subject to a TBS order. Pursuant to Article 12 § 3 of the [1997] Act ... , this failure is to be considered a decision to prolong this period. 1.2 The Minister had not extended by 2 November 1998 the period within which the appellant should have been placed in a custodial clinic for persons subject to a TBS order. Pursuant to Article 12 § 3 of the [1997] Act ..., this failure is to be considered a decision to prolong this period. ... 3.The facts ... The appellant's TBS order took effect on 5 February 1998. Since then, he has spent a transitory period in the G. remand centre awaiting placement in a custodial clinic. By letter of 2 September 1998 the Minister informed the appellant that he could not yet be placed in a custodial clinic and that the transitory period (passantentermijn) pending his placement in a custodial clinic had, for the time being, been ipso jure prolonged by three months from 4 August 1998 to 2 November 1998 ... On 16 October 1998 the appellant was heard by a penitentiary adviser. By letter of 2 November 1998 the Minister informed the appellant that he still could not be placed in a custodial clinic and that his pre‑placement detention pending his admission to a custodial clinic was to be prolonged further from 2 November 1998 to 31 January 1999. The appellant was admitted for selection purposes between 11 September 1998 and 11 November 1998 to the Dr F.S. Meijers Institute in Utrecht. He was selected for the custodial clinic X in Y. The Utrecht District Psychiatric Service has provided a medical statement dated 15 October 1998 on the appellant's mental condition, which has been supplemented by a report of 16 October 1998. 4. The parties' submissions ... The [applicant's] lawyer further considers, relying on the learned observation by a commentator on the [Bizzotto v. Greece] judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 15 November 1996, Netherlands Law Reports (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie) 1998, no. 203, that there is already a violation of Article 5 of the Convention when the six-month delay is exceeded. ... [The Minister], as to the [applicant's] reliance on Article 5 of the Convention, points out that the TBS order serves in the first place for the protection of society and, in the second place, for the treatment of the person concerned. According to the Supreme Court's case-law, the execution of a TBS order in a remand centre is not an unlawful deprivation of liberty. Where a reproach can be made of the fact that the 'treatment aspect' is lacking, liability for damage arises. If an appeal is declared well-founded by the Appeals Board, the 'treatment aspect' is also lacking and imputable as from the relevant expiry date. 5. The assessment ... 5.2.1 The following must be first stated in assessing the appeal. On the basis of the history of the enactment of Article 12 of the [1997] Act ..., it must be assumed that it has been the intention of the legislature that a lack of capacity in the custodial clinics may in principle give the Minister reason to prolong by three months, as often as necessary, the period of six months set out in the first paragraph of this provision within which a person subject to a TBS order must be placed in a custodial clinic. A decision by the Minister to prolong this period on grounds of lack of capacity does not, therefore, constitute an automatic ground for declaring the appeal well-founded. ... 5.2.3 ... in examining appeals filed by persons subject to a TBS order against decisions of the Minister to prolong the transitory period, the Appeals Board must at least have at its disposal information to be supplied by or on behalf of the Minister in relation to: – the available capacity or the lack of capacity in custodial clinics at the time of taking the decision to prolong the transitory period, as well as a prognosis on this for the three months' period following the decision; – an indication of the average duration of transitory stays in remand centres of persons subject to a TBS order at the time when the decision to prolong the transitory period was taken; – the pro justitia report in relation to the mental condition of the person concerned who is subject to a TBS order, and a statement by a doctor on the question whether the person concerned, in view of his mental condition, is able to stay any longer, on a transitory basis, in a remand centre. 5.2.4 The Minister is obliged, prior to the expiry of the transitory period referred to in Article 12 of the [1997] Act ..., to take a decision on the prolongation of this period and, in doing so, to comply with the procedural regulations set out in Article 53 § 2 (a) of the [1997] Act ... – the obligation to hear – and Article 54 § 2 of the [1997] Act ... – the obligation to inform. These regulations are of essential importance for the legal position of the person subject to a TBS order and the Minister is therefore obliged to comply with these regulations in the decision-making process concerning the prolongation of the transitory period. ... 5.3 The argument based on Article 5 of the Convention fails. The detention of a person subject to a TBS order in a remand centre is, after all, based on the judicial decision in which the TBS order has been imposed, whereas Article 9 § 1 (b) of the [1951] Prisons Act (Beginselenwet Gevangeniswezen) provides that 'remand centres are intended for the accommodation of all others lawfully deprived of their liberty by a judicial decision ... for as long as their admission to another suitable place is not possible'. 5.4.1 In so far as the appeal is directed against the prolongation of the transitory period for placement from 4 August 1998 until 2 November 1998, the Appeals Board considers as follows: 5.4.2 It has appeared from the examination of the present case that the Minister did not, prior to the expiry of the delay for placement, take a decision to prolong that delay. Nor has the appellant been heard on this subject in a timely manner. The Minister's reliance on the exception contained in Article 53 § 4 (a) of the [1997] Act ..., as regards refraining from hearing requests of an urgent nature, fails. This provision is not applicable as in the present case there was no sudden event requiring an immediate measure and thus no opportunity to hear the person concerned. The Appeals Board is of the opinion that it follows ... that the appeal is well‑founded and that the ... Minister's [implied] decision to prolong the transitory period must be quashed on formal grounds. 5.4.3 The Appeals Board considers that the appellant must be provided with some compensation for the uncertainty in which he was kept as a result of the Minister's conduct referred to in 5.4.2. The Appeals Board fixes this compensation, having heard the view of the Minister, at 100 Netherlands guilders (NLG). 5.4.4 As the Minister, regarding the prolongation at issue, has not sent separate written notification to the appellant, but did inform the appellant, by written notification of 2 November 1998, of the further prolongation of the transitory period after he had been heard on that matter, the Appeals Board will not order the Minister to take a new decision in respect of the period referred to in 1.1. but will examine whether there are also material grounds for quashing the ... decision. Further reference is made to the considerations set out in 5.6. 5.5.1 In so far as the appeal is directed against the prolongation of the transitory period for placement from 2 November 1998 until 30 January 1999, the Appeals Board considers as follows: 5.5.2 It has appeared from the examination of the present case that the Minister did not, prior to the expiry of the delay for placement, take a decision to prolong that delay. The Appeals Board is of the opinion that it follows ... that the appeal is well‑founded and that the ... Minister's decision to prolong the transitory period must be quashed on this formal ground. 5.5.3 The Appeals Board considers that the appellant must be provided with some compensation for the uncertainty in which he was kept as a result of the Minister's conduct referred to in 5.5.2. The Appeals Board fixes this compensation, having heard the view of the Minister, at NLG 100. 5.6 It has been sufficiently established from the examination of the present case that, as a result of a lack of capacity, the appellant has still not been placed in a custodial clinic. It has also been sufficiently established that the Minister, in his decision on this matter, has not deviated from his policy to determine the order of placement in a custodial clinic chronologically according to the date on which the TBS orders in respect of the appellant and other [like] persons ... took effect. 5.7 The total duration of the appellant's stay in a remand centre [awaiting placement in a custodial clinic] ... has not yet been so long that these decisions to prolong the transitory stay, balancing all relevant interests, must be regarded as unreasonable or inequitable. 5.8 It appears from the medical statement of the Utrecht District Psychiatric Service of 16 October 1998 that the appellant's mental condition at that moment was such that a further stay in the remand centre should be regarded as irresponsible. Although the Appeals Board considers it highly desirable that the Minister, as regards subsequent prolongation decisions, should submit on each occasion updated medical reports, it finds, in respect of the present appeals, that the medical report drawn up shortly before the second prolongation suffices. From the report on the selection examination in the period between 11 September 1998 and 11 November 1998 (falling partly within both of the prolongation periods challenged), it does not appear that the detention was unsuitable during the period of admission to the Dr F.S. Meijers Institute. 5.9 The Appeals Board is of the opinion, having regard to the above considerations, that the decisions challenged are not in violation of the substance of the [1997] Act ..., and that the period within which the appellant should be placed in a custodial clinic had to be prolonged from 4 August 1998 to 2 November 1998 and from 2 November 1998 to 31 January 1999. 5.10 As the decisions challenged must be quashed on formal grounds, the Appeals Board rules, pursuant to Article 66 § 3 (b) in conjunction with Article 69 § 5 of the [1997] Act ..., that its decision in respect of the prolongations of the transitory period should replace those which were challenged. ...” 19. No further appeal lay against this decision. 20. On 22 April 1999 the Minister of Justice decided to prolong the applicant's pre‑placement detention by a further period of three months as from 1 May 1999. The applicant filed an appeal against this decision on 4 May 1999 with the Appeals Board. 21. The applicant was admitted to a custodial clinic on 17 May 1999. 22. On 15 June 1999, following a hearing held on 19 April 1999, the Appeals Tribunal quashed the Minister's decision to prolong the applicant's pre‑placement detention from 31 January to 30 April 1999 on formal grounds, namely the Minister's failure to comply with the procedural regulations under Article 53 § 2 (a) and Article 54 § 2 of the 1997 Act. Finding also that the total duration of the applicant's pre‑placement detention could not be regarded as having been so long that, balancing all relevant interests, it should be considered unreasonable or inequitable, and having found no indication that the applicant's mental condition required a priority placement in a custodial clinic, the Appeals Board did not find that the impugned decision should be quashed for being in material breach of the 1997 Act. It decided that the applicant's pre‑placement detention should be prolonged until 30 April 1999. The Appeals Tribunal decided to replace the Minister's decision with its own decision to prolong the applicant's pre‑placement from 31 January to 30 April 1999. It awarded the applicant compensation in an amount of NLG 100 in respect of the procedural shortcomings in the Minister's decision. 23. In so far as the applicant had claimed that his pre‑placement detention was contrary to Article 5 of the Convention, the Appeals Board held: “The argument based on Article 5 of the Convention fails. After all, the pre‑placement detention in a remand centre of a person subject to a TBS order is based on the judicial decision in which the TBS order has been imposed whereas, according to Article 9 § 1 (b) of the 1951 Prisons Act, as in force until 1 January 1999, casu quo Article 9 § 2 (f) of the [new 1999] Prisons Act as in force as from that date, persons subject to a TBS order can be held in a remand centre for as long as their admission to a place suitable for them is not possible. Under Article 12 of the 1997 Act, the duration of such a stay in a remand centre can, after six months, be prolonged by periods of three months.” 24. On 11 November 1999, after a hearing held on 17 September 1999, the Appeals Board ruled on the applicant's appeal of 4 May 1999. Having found it established that, contrary to Article 53 § 2 of the 1997 Act, the applicant's view had not been heard prior to the taking of the decision, the Appeals Board considered that, on this procedural ground alone, the impugned decision had to be quashed. In addition, it found that, also on material grounds, the decision of 22 April 1999 had to be quashed as at the expiry of that prolongation decision the applicant would have spent more than fifteen months in pre‑placement detention. A delay of more than fifteen months, balancing all relevant interests, should be regarded as unreasonable and inequitable. It awarded the applicant compensation of NLG 100 on account of the procedural shortcomings and NLG 1,250 for the sixteen days he had spent in pre‑placement detention on the basis of the decision of 22 April 1999. 25. On 18 February 2000 the Arnhem Regional Court (arrondissementsrechtbank) extended the applicant's TBS order by two years. An appeal by the applicant against this decision was rejected by the Arnhem Court of Appeal on 13 November 2000. No further appeal lay against this decision.

6. The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Peseux, Switzerland. 7. On 7 January 2003 the Slovakian police arrested the applicant. On 8 January 2003 the Regional Office of the Judicial Police in Nitra accused her of forgery and attempted fraud. She and another person were suspected of having attempted to cash two cheques for more than seven million pounds sterling (GBP) and 1,800,000 United States dollars (USD) in November 2002. Those cheques were considered to have been forged. 8. The applicant denied involvement in any unlawful action. She maintained that the cheques had been issued by foreign investors interested in a business activity which she had been planning to launch in Slovakia. She further argued that the British bank concerned had never contested the validity of the cheque in pounds sterling. 9. On 12 January 2003 the Nitra District Court remanded the applicant in custody with effect from 7 January 2003. Her detention was considered necessary as there was a risk of her absconding within the meaning of Article 67 § 1 (a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The judge considered it relevant that the applicant was a foreign national and that she risked a prison term of between ten and fifteen years for the offences in issue. Reference was also made to Article 67 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The District Court heard the applicant and referred to the statement of the applicant's co-accused and available documentary evidence. 10. On 27 June 2003 the District Court extended the applicant's detention to 7 January 2004. It held that, in addition to the above-mentioned grounds, her detention was also necessary as she might influence witnesses or otherwise hamper the investigation within the meaning of Article 67 § 1 (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In particular, important witnesses had to be heard in Spain whom the applicant had contacted by phone and fax prior to her detention. The District Court found no delays in the investigation and noted that the authorities of the United Kingdom, Spain and the United States of America had to be asked for assistance. 11. On 30 June 2004 the District Court extended the applicant's detention until 7 November 2004. As the Spanish authorities had not complied with the requests for legal assistance it had been impossible to complete the investigation. It risked being jeopardised if the applicant was released. 12. On 28 October 2004 the Banská Bystrica Regional Court granted a further extension of the detention, until 7 January 2005. That decision was justified by the fact that the General Prosecutor's Office had requested the assistance of the Spanish authorities in obtaining witness statements and that those statements had not yet been submitted. The statements were necessary to establish the relevant matters in respect of which the statements of the accused differed. Reference was also made to the applicant's nationality, the serious nature of the offence of which she was accused and the risk that she might influence witnesses if released. The Regional Court relied on Articles 67 §§ 1(a), (b) and 2 of the Court of Criminal Procedure. 13. On 22 December 2004 the Supreme Court extended the applicant's detention until 7 July 2005. It noted that no procedural steps had been taken between May and December 2004. That was, however, due to the absence of a reply from the Spanish authorities. The Supreme Court expressed the view that the applicant's detention was strictly necessary until 7 July 2005 only and that the preliminary proceedings should be completed before that date. 14. On 19 May 2005 the applicant lodged a request for release, with reference, inter alia, to Article 5 §§ 1 (c), 3 and 4 of the Convention. She argued that the reasons invoked for her detention had fallen away and requested that the court dealing with the request hear her. 15. On 1 July 2005 the Nitra District Court dismissed the request. With reference to the applicant's arguments, the evidence and the statements of witnesses and the applicant's co-accused it considered that the accusation of the applicant was justified and that the reasons for her detention, as specified in the earlier decisions, persisted. In particular, the applicant might influence witnesses and the law foresaw a minimum penalty exceeding eight years' imprisonment for the offence imputed to her. 16. The District Court decided in camera. Its decision was served on the applicant's counsel on 29 July 2005 and 19 October 2005. The applicant lodged a complaint on 29 July 2005 and again on 20 October 2005. On 3 November 2005 the Nitra Regional Court dismissed the complaint. 17. In the meantime, on 8 July 2005 the applicant and her co-accused were indicted before the Nitra Regional Court. On 18 July 2005 that court dismissed the applicant's request for release. It pointed to the applicant's nationality and the heavy penalty for the offence of which she was accused. It had been established in the course of preliminary proceedings that in her correspondence the applicant had attempted to influence witnesses. The Regional Court's decision was served on counsel for the applicant on 29 August 2005. The applicant lodged a complaint. On 29 September 2005 the Supreme Court dismissed that complaint. 18. In parallel, on 27 June 2005 the Prosecutor General petitioned for a further extension of the detention of the applicant and her co-accused, until 7 October 2005. The applicant contested that request. She stated, in particular, that all witnesses had been heard and that her foreign nationality did not in itself justify her deprivation of liberty. She argued that the case was not complex and that there had been delays in the proceedings. 19. On 6 July 2005, the Supreme Court extended the applicant's detention until 7 October 2005. It noted that the applicant was accused of having attempted to cash two forged cheques and that the suspicion against her and her co-accused persisted. It invoked the risk of the applicant's absconding with reference to the heavy penalty for the offences imputed to her and the fact that she was a foreign national. Her detention was therefore necessary within the meaning of Article 67 § 1(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 20. The Supreme Court further admitted that witnesses had been heard. Nevertheless, the applicant's detention within the meaning of Article 67 § 1(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure remained necessary as the file contained correspondence, which had been written by the applicant or addressed to her, indicating that she had attempted to influence the investigation in the case. The criminal activity imputed to the accused persons was inseparable. There was a risk that they could influence each other or witnesses even at the trial stage of the proceedings. No particular delays in the proceedings had been established; the relevant procedural steps had been delayed for objective reasons. The Supreme Court decided in camera in accordance with the relevant law. 21. On 14 September 2005 the Nitra Regional Court petitioned the Supreme Court for a further extension of the applicant's detention. It was argued that the reasons for her and her co-accused's detention still existed and that the proceedings risked being jeopardised if they were released. On 26 September 2005 the applicant's counsel submitted written observations on that request. She argued that there had been no progress in the case following the indictment and that the length of the proceedings and her detention was excessive. The applicant also requested that the Supreme Court hear her. 22. On 29 September 2005 the Supreme Court, at a meeting held in camera, extended the applicant's detention until 30 June 2006. It based its decision on the fact that the applicant was a foreign national and held that the indictment indicated that her prosecution was justified. Both the applicant and her co-accused were foreign nationals residing abroad. Considering also the heavy penalty set down in law for such offences, their detention was justified within the meaning of Article 67 §§ 1(a) and 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Specific reasons for which it had been earlier concluded that the accused might influence witnesses and hamper the proceedings persisted. Reference was also made to the Supreme Court's decision on the applicant's request for release given on the same day (see paragraph 17 above). 23. The Supreme Court further noted that the case was complex from both the factual and the legal point of view. The file comprised nearly eight hundred pages. Given the short period of time which had lapsed after the filing of the bill of indictment, the Regional Court had not yet had sufficient time to prepare the main hearing and decide on the case. The above extension by nine months of the period of the applicant's detention should suffice to bring the criminal proceedings to a close. 24. On 21 December 2005 the Nitra Regional Court returned the case to the public prosecutor for further investigation. It decided that the applicant should remain in custody. 25. On 1 February 2006 the Supreme Court quashed the Regional Court's decision in the part ordering the case to be returned to the public prosecutor. In particular, it did not consider relevant the argument that the file, to the extent that it concerned the applicant's co-accused, had to be translated into French. The Supreme Court ordered the Regional Court to examine the charges against the applicant and her co-accused and dismissed their complaint against the decision ordering their continued detention. 26. The applicant was released on 18 May 2006 following the below‑mentioned order of the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 36). She returned to Switzerland. 27. The main hearing in the criminal proceedings was scheduled for 13 and 14 June 2006. The applicant was absent for health reasons. The Regional Court decided to deal with the charges against her in a separate set of proceedings. 28. On 22 October 2007 the applicant informed the Regional Court that she insisted on the charges against her being determined in her presence and that she still could not attend a hearing for health reasons. 29. On 30 November 2007 the Nitra Regional Court discharged the applicant's co-accused and ordered his release. On 10 January 2008 the Supreme Court quashed that judgment and returned the case to the public prosecutor for further investigation. The Supreme Court noted that witness statements included in the file were contradictory. The facts of the case had not been sufficiently established. In particular, the public prosecutor had proceeded erroneously in that he had abstained from having a witness examined in Switzerland prior to the filing of the bill of indictment on 8 July 2005. Such evidence could have shed light on the matter. 30. On 1 April 2008 the Regional Court returned the applicant's case to the public prosecutor for further investigation, with reference to the Supreme Court judgment of 10 January 2008. Subsequently the charges against the applicant and her co-accused were again examined jointly and the authorities of the United Kingdom, Switzerland and the Czech Republic were asked for assistance. 31. On 13 October 2009 the applicant informed the investigator that she was unable, because of serious health problems, to undergo a cross‑examination with a witness scheduled for 30 October 2009. 32. In January 2010 the Slovakian authorities decided to request their British counterpart to hear a representative of the bank concerned as a witness. The proceedings are pending. 33. On 8 September 2005 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court. She specified that she sought the finding of a breach of Article 5 §§ 1 (c) and 5 of the Convention in the proceedings leading to the Supreme Court's above-mentioned decision of 6 July 2005. In the reasons for her complaint the applicant also invoked Article 5 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention. She argued that there had been no relevant reasons for her continued detention, that she had not been released, that the Supreme Court had neither heard her nor had it addressed the arguments which she had submitted in writing, and that she had been informed of the decision in issue on 13 July 2005 only. 34. On 28 September 2005 the Constitutional Court rejected the complaint as being manifestly ill-founded. It held that neither the way in which the Supreme Court had proceeded nor the conclusion which it had reached were contrary to the applicant's rights under Article 5 §§ 1 and 5 of the Convention a breach of which she had formally alleged. In particular, the Supreme Court had examined the circumstances of the case and concluded, for reasons which the Constitutional Court considered to be relevant and sufficient, that her continued detention was still necessary within the meaning of the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. (b) Complaint of 25 November 2005 35. On 25 November 2005 the applicant lodged a second complaint with the Constitutional Court. She alleged a breach of Article 5 §§ 1 (c), 3 and 4 of the Convention in the proceedings leading to the Supreme Court's decision of 29 September 2005 to extend her detention to 30 June 2006. In particular, the applicant argued that there had been no relevant reasons for her continued detention, that it had lasted an excessively long time, and that the Supreme Court had not heard her. The applicant requested the Constitutional Court to order reimbursement of the costs of her legal representation in the constitutional proceedings, which amounted to 7,414 Czech korunas (CZK), plus value-added tax. 36. In a judgment of 17 May 2006 the Constitutional Court held that the Supreme Court had breached the applicant's right under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention in that it had failed to hear her prior to its decision of 29 September 2005 to extend her detention. It quashed that decision, ordered the Supreme Court to release the applicant immediately and to reimburse 5,302 Slovak korunas (the equivalent of CZK 3,918) in respect of the costs of her legal representation. In view of this conclusion the Constitutional Court considered the examination of the applicant's other complaints unnecessary.

4. The applicants were born in 1931, 1961, 1964, 1928 and 1927 respectively and live in Banjol, Croatia. 5. In 1963 the Communist authorities nationalised a plot of land on the island of Rab, owned by the fourth and fifth applicants and a certain J.Š., who was the first applicant’s husband and the second and the third applicants’ father. In 1964, a restaurant was built on the site. It appears that the land, which had been transferred into social ownership, was subsequently given to the company I. for its use. 6. During the process of privatisation of the company I. the land was included as part of its share capital. However, a number of shares were reserved to serve as compensation for former owners of nationalised property which formed part of the company’s share capital. On 20 June 1994 the Croatian Privatisation Fund (Hrvatski fond za privatizaciju) gave its consent to the privatisation of the company, which on the basis of that decision subsequently became the owner of the land in question. 7. On 11 October 1996 the Croatian Parliament passed the Act on Compensation for, and Restitution of, Property Taken under the Yugoslav Communist Regime (Zakon o naknadi za imovinu oduzetu za vrijeme jugoslavenske komunističke vladavine, Official Gazette nos. 92/96, 92/99 (corrigendum), 80/02 (amendments) and 81/02 (corrigendum) – “the Denationalisation Act”) which enabled former owners of nationalised or confiscated property, or their heirs in the first line of succession to seek either restitution of or compensation for the property taken. The Act entered into force on 1 January 1997. 8. On 16 June 1997 the applicants, relying on the Denationalisation Act, instituted administrative proceedings before the regional office of the state administration in Rab, as the competent first-instance administrative authority. Initially they asked to be awarded shares in the company I. as compensation for the above plot of land. It would appear that they subsequently sought restitution in kind. 9. On 24 March 2003 the Rab regional office issued an interim decision granting the applicants state bonds in compensation for the property taken. The exact amount of compensation was to be determined after the enactment of the relevant subordinate legislation. On 22 December 2003 the Ministry of Finance adopted the Ordinance on the Criteria for the Determination of Compensation for Construction Land and Business Premises Taken under the Yugoslav Communist Regime (Pravilnik o mjerilima za utvrđivanje naknade za oduzeto građevinsko zemljište i poslovni prostor, Official Gazette no. 204/03, 03/04 – “the Ordinance”), which entered into force on 1 April 2004. 10. On 18 April 2003 the applicants appealed to the Ministry of Justice against the first-instance decision asserting in the main that they were seeking the restitution of the plot of land in question rather than compensation for it. 11. As a result of the fact that the Ministry of Justice did not render a decision on their appeal within the statutory time-limit of sixty days, on 24 September 2003 the applicants brought an action for failure to respond (tužba zbog šutnje administracije, see paragraph 31 below) in the Administrative Court (Upravni sud Republike Hrvatske). 12. On 23 June 2004 the applicants lodged a constitutional complaint under section 63 of the Constitutional Court Act. They complained about the length of the above administrative proceedings and requested the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) to order the Administrative Court to decide on their action within three months. 13. On 27 October 2004 the Administrative Court passed a judgment ordering the Ministry of Justice to decide on the applicants’ appeal of 18 April 2003 within thirty days. 14. On 8 December 2004 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicants’ constitutional complaint of 23 June 2004 and served its decision on their representative on 17 December 2004. It examined only the length of the proceedings before the Administrative Court between 24 September 2003 and 23 June 2004, when the constitutional complaint was lodged. It held, consequently, that the length of proceedings, which had lasted for only nine months, could not be considered excessive. 15. The applicants, having taken the view that the Ministry had failed to comply with the Administrative Court’s judgment of 27 October 2004 within the time-limit indicated, initially urged the Ministry to do so on 6 December 2004 (see paragraph 35 below) and on 17 December 2004 requested the Administrative Court to decide on their appeal, that is to say, act as a court of full jurisdiction and issue its own decision in substitution for that of the Ministry (see paragraph 36 below). 16. On 9 March 2005 the Administrative Court declared the applicants’ request inadmissible as being premature. It found that its judgment of 27 October 2004 had only been served on the Ministry on 9 November 2004 and that therefore the applicant’s request of 6 December 2004 urging the Ministry to decide on their appeal had been submitted too early. 17. On the 15 February 2006 the Ministry of Justice reversed the first-instance decision of 24 March 2003 and dismissed the applicants’ request of 16 June 1997 in its entirety. 18. The applicants then brought an action before the Administrative Court challenging that decision. It appears that the proceedings are still pending before that court. 19. On 29 February 2000 the applicants filed with the Croatian Privatisation Fund a petition to declare null and void (prijedlog za proglašavanje rješenja ništavim) its decision of 20 June 1994 (see paragraph 6 above) – an extraordinary remedy available under the Administrative Procedure Act (see paragraph 29 below). They argued that they had not been given the opportunity to participate in the proceedings leading to that decision. 20. As the Fund did not give a decision on the applicants’ petition within the statutory time-limit of sixty days, on 27 June 2000 the applicants brought an action for failure to respond in the Administrative Court (see paragraph 32 below). 21. On 28 July 2000 the Fund dismissed the applicants’ petition as it considered it to be a petition for the reopening of the proceedings. 22. Shortly afterwards, the applicants modified their action of 27 June 2000 and challenged the Fund’s decision of 28 July 2000 maintaining that they had not requested the reopening of the case but had challenged the Fund’s decision of 20 June 1994 on its merits. 23. On 12 September 2002 the Administrative Court found for the applicants and quashed the Fund’s decision of 28 July 2000. The case was remitted to the Fund. 24. On 23 January 2003 the Fund dismissed the applicants’ petition finding that the arguments adduced by the applicants did not constitute grounds to declare the decision of 20 June 1994 null and void. The applicants once again brought an action in the Administrative Court. 25. On 14 October 2004 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicants’ action endorsing the reasons given by the Fund in its decision of 23 January 2003. 26. On 31 January 2005 the applicants lodged a constitutional complaint against the Administrative Court’s decision. 27. On 18 October 2007 the Constitutional Court dismissed their complaint.

6. The applicants are: 1) Mr Balaudy Dokayev, born in 1945, 2) Ms Koku Khamidovna Dokayeva, born in 1953, 3) Ms Rosa Talkhigova, born in 1974, 4) Ms Razet Dokayeva, born in 1996, 5) Ms Dinara Dokayeva, born in 2003, 6) Mr Timur Dokayev, born in 2000, 7) Ms Maymont (also spelled as Maymut) Askhabova, born in 1933, 8) Ms Maryam Bakarayeva, born in 1963, 9) Mr Khalid Askhabov, born in 1956, 10) Mr Leytche Dubayev, born in 1953, 11) Ms Aysara Dubayeva, born in 1957. The applicants are three families who live in Grozny, Chechnya. The first applicant family consists of six persons (applicants 1-6). The first applicant is married to the second applicant. They are the father and the stepmother of Isa Dokayev (also spelled Dakayev), who was born in 1969. The third applicant is his wife; the fourth and fifth applicants are his daughters and the sixth applicant is his son. The second applicant family consists of three persons (applicants 7-9). The seventh applicant is the mother of Ruslan Askhabov, who was born in 1962. The eighth applicant is his wife and the ninth applicant is his brother. The third applicant family consists of two persons (applicants 10-11). They are married and are the parents of Isa Dubayev, who was born in 1981. The applicants’ relatives have been detained and subsequently disappeared. 7. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 8. Isa Dokayev, the third applicant and their two minor children lived at 37 Zabolotnogo Street, in the Oktyabrskiy district of Grozny, Chechnya. At the material time the third applicant, Ms Rosa Talkhigova, was pregnant with their third child, the fifth applicant. On the night of 10 December 2002 they were all at home, along with Ruslan Askhabov and Isa Dubayev, who were Isa Dokayev’s guests that night. The house was located not far from the Oktyabrskiy district department of the interior (the ROVD), the military commander’s office and the local administration. Military checkpoints manned by Russian federal servicemen were located on the roads leading to and from Grozny; the area was under curfew. 9. At about 2.30 a.m. on 10 December 2002 five or six masked men in white camouflage uniforms, armed with machine guns and pistols, rushed into Isa Dokayev’s house. At the entrance they shot the applicants’ dog. They opened fire in one of the rooms and shot up a TV set. The men neither identified themselves nor produced any documents. They were equipped with portable radios. They spoke Russian without accent, were drunk and swore. The applicants believed that the intruders were Russian military servicemen. 10. The servicemen ordered the third applicant to stay in her room. Through the half-open door she saw her husband lying down on the kitchen floor with a soldier standing over him and pointing his machine gun at him. The soldier was kicking Isa Dokayev in the back, swearing at him and saying that he should be quiet, otherwise “it would get worse”. Ruslan Askhabov and Isa Dubayev were also lying on the floor. All three men had their hands tied and black sacks placed over their heads. 11. The children woke up with the sound of shooting and started crying. From the kitchen floor Isa Dokayev asked his wife to calm them down. When the third applicant tried to leave her room one of the servicemen threatened to shoot her if she tried to open the door again. The servicemen kept swearing at her. When the third applicant asked where the servicemen were taking her husband and his guests, one of the officers replied: “We will run a computer check on them and tomorrow at 9 a.m. they will be back home”. 12. The servicemen ransacked the house. After they had left the third applicant discovered that some of her family’s personal documents had disappeared, including Isa Dokayev’s passport, employment records and documents for his car. She also noticed that the fourth and sixth applicants’ birth certificates were gone, as well as some of her jewellery. 13. In the morning of 10 December 2002 the third applicant and Isa Dokayev’s brother Ramzan Dokayev discovered empty alcohol bottles in the yard and boot prints on the snow. They followed the footprints until they turned into tyre tracks leading to the Oktyabrskiy ROVD. 14. In the morning of 10 December 2002 the second and third applicant families found out about the abduction of their relatives from the first applicant family. 15. In support of their statements the applicants submitted the following documents: two witness accounts provided by the third applicant, dated 23 November 2004 and 17 June 2005; a witness account by the eighth applicant dated 16 June 2005 and a hand-drawn plan of Isa Dokayev’s house and its premises dated 15 June 2005. 16. The Government did not challenge most of the facts as presented by the applicants. According to their submission, “at about 2 a.m. on 10 December 2002 unidentified armed persons entered the house at 37 Zabolotnogo Street in Grozny, where, threatening murder, they kidnapped Isa Dokayev and the employees of the Oktyabrskiy ROVD Isa Dubayev and Ruslan Askhabov and [also] took away their service guns”. 17. Since 10 December 2002 the applicants have repeatedly applied in person and in writing to various public bodies. They have been supported in their efforts by their representatives. In their letters to the authorities the applicants referred to their relatives’ detention and asked for assistance and details of the investigation. The applicants submitted some of the letters to the authorities and their replies to the Court. These documents are summarised below. 18. At about 8 a.m. on 10 December 2002, at the applicants’ request, representatives of the ROVD visited Isa Dokayev’s house. They collected cartridge cases left from the shooting. 19. On 16 December 2002 the Grozny town prosecutor’s office (“the town prosecutor’s office”) instituted an investigation into the disappearance of Ruslan Askhabov, Isa Dubayev and Isa Dokayev under Article 126 § 2 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (aggravated kidnapping). The case file was assigned number 52161. In the documents submitted to the Court by the applicants the criminal case file is also referred to under the numbers 52158, 40084 and 19045. 20. On 8 January 2003 the town prosecutor’s office granted Isa Dokayev’s brother, Mr M. D., victim status in criminal case no. 52161. 21. On 18 January 2003 the ROVD informed Mrs B. A., a relative of Ruslan Askhabov, that the town prosecutor’s office had initiated an investigation into the abduction of Ruslan Askhabov and that the search for him was under way. 22. On 6 April 2003 the seventh and eleventh applicants wrote to the military commander’s office of the Oktyabrskiy district of Grozny (“the district military commander’s office”) requesting assistance in the search for their abducted relatives. The applicants stated that their relatives had been abducted by five military servicemen in white camouflage uniforms who spoke Russian without an accent. 23. On 17 June 2003 the military prosecutor’s office of the United Group Alignment (the military prosecutor’s office of the UGA) forwarded the seventh applicant’s request for assistance to the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102. 24. On 7 July 2003 the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102 informed the military prosecutor’s office of the UGA that the investigation in criminal case no. 52158 had not established the involvement of Russian military servicemen in the abduction of Ruslan Askhabov, Isa Dubayev and Isa Dokayev. 25. On 16 July 2003 the seventh applicant again wrote to the military prosecutor’s office of the UGA with a request for assistance in the search for Ruslan Askhabov and Isa Dubayev. In her letter she stated that the abduction had been carried out by five men in camouflage uniforms. 26. On 22 July 2003 the military prosecutor’s office of the UGA informed the tenth applicant that his request concerning the search for Isa Dubayev had been forwarded for examination to the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102. The letter also stated that the military prosecutor would investigate the possible involvement of Russian military servicemen in the abduction of Isa Dubayev. 27. On 5 September 2003 the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102 informed the tenth applicant that the investigation in case no. 52161 had not established the involvement of Russian military servicemen in the abduction of Isa Dubayev. 28. On 21 October 2003 the Chechnya department of the Federal Security Service (the Chechnya FSB) informed the seventh applicant that they were taking measures to identify the perpetrators of Ruslan Askhabov’s abduction. The letter further stated that Ruslan Askhabov was not suspected of committing a crime and that there were “no lawful grounds for his detention”. 29. On 21 November 2003 the ROVD informed the applicants’ relative that in connection with the abduction of Ruslan Askhabov, the Oktyabrskiy district prosecutor’s office (the district prosecutor’s office) had opened criminal case no. 40084. 30. On 25 February 2004 the seventh applicant once again wrote to the military prosecutor of the UGA with a request for assistance in the search for Ruslan Askhabov. In her letter she stated that her son’s abduction had been carried out by five military servicemen in white camouflage uniforms who spoke unaccented Russian. 31. On 11 March 2004 the military prosecutor’s office of the UGA informed the seventh applicant that the enquiry conducted by the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102 had not established the involvement of Russian federal forces in the abduction of Ruslan Askhabov. The letter further stated that on 9 April 2001, in connection with the abduction of Ruslan Askhabov, the Urus-Martan district prosecutor’s office had opened criminal case no. 19045 under Article 127 § 2 of the Criminal Code (unlawful deprivation of liberty). 32. On 12 March 2004 the interim Chechnya military commander forwarded the seventh applicant’s request for assistance to the district military commander’s office and the Chechnya Ministry of the Interior. 33. On 28 April 2004 the district prosecutor’s office informed the eighth applicant that on 28 November 2003 the investigation in criminal case no. 52158 had been suspended owing to the failure to identify the perpetrators. 34. On 5 August 2004 the military prosecutor’s office of the UGA forwarded the seventh applicant’s request for assistance in the search for Ruslan Askhabov to the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102. 35. On 20 September 2004 the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102 informed the seventh applicant that neither the investigation nor additional enquiry had confirmed the involvement of Russian federal forces in the abduction of Ruslan Askhabov. 36. On 23 December 2004 the seventh applicant wrote to the district prosecutor’s office requesting to be provided with information concerning the status of the investigation in criminal case no. 52158. 37. On 28 December 2004 the district prosecutor’s office informed the seventh applicant that the investigation in criminal case no. 52158 had been resumed. 38. On 21 February 2005 the third applicant wrote to the town prosecutor’s office and requested to be informed which prosecutor’s office had been investigating her husband’s abduction. She requested to be granted victim status in the proceedings and that the investigation be conducted in a thorough and effective manner. 39. On 22 February 2005 the seventh applicant wrote to the district prosecutor’s office. She stated that the abduction of her husband had been carried out by a group of armed masked military servicemen in white camouflage uniforms. The applicant requested to be provided with information concerning the results of the investigation. In particular, she requested that the representatives of the Russian federal forces who had participated in special operations in Grozny on the night of 10 December 2002 be questioned by the investigators. She also requested that those who had been in charge of the security operations be identified and questioned. 40. On 24 March 2005 the Chechnya prosecutor’s office informed the third applicant that on an unspecified date the district prosecutor’s office had resumed the investigation into her husband’s abduction. 41. On 25 April 2005 the district prosecutor’s office granted the third applicant victim status in criminal case no. 52158. 42. On 19 May 2005 the seventh applicant wrote to a number of law enforcement agencies, including the Chechnya MVD, the Chechnya prosecutor’s office and the military prosecutor of the UGA, and requested assistance in the search for her missing relative. In her letters she stated that he had been abducted by five armed military servicemen in white camouflage uniforms. 43. Early in 2003 the third applicant lodged a claim with the Oktyabrskiy district court of Grozny seeking to have her husband Isa Dokayev declared a missing person. On 30 March 2004 the district court granted her claim and declared Isa Dokayev missing person as of 10 December 2002. On 16 August 2004, upon the third applicant’s request, the district court acknowledged the paternity of Isa Dokayev in respect of the fifth and sixth applicants. 44. On 10 December 2002 Isa Dubayev’s relative, Mr Sch. B., complained to the Bureau of the Special Envoy of the Russian President in Chechnya for rights and freedoms (the Envoy), stating that Isa Dubayev had been abducted on 10 December 2002 by Russian military servicemen who had arrived in two APCs and a UAZ car. The Envoy forwarded this complaint to the district prosecutor’s office for examination. 45. On 10 December 2003 (it appears that the date should be stated as 10 December 2002) an officer of the ROVD conducted a crime scene inspection at 37 Zabolotnogo Street, Grozny. As a result, two 5.45 mm calibre bullets, one 7.62 mm cartridge case and one bullet which was stuck in the TV set were collected from the scene. About a year and a half later, on 15 April 2005, the investigators conducted a second examination of the crime scene at 37 Zabolotnogo Street. As a result, it was established that the house had been abandoned; nothing was collected from the scene. 46. On 16 December 2002 in connection with the abduction of the applicants’ relatives, the district prosecutor’s office instituted an investigation under Article 126 § 2 of the Criminal Code (aggravated kidnapping). The case file was assigned number 52158. According to the Government, the criminal case was opened upon the report of an operational officer of the ROVD dated 30 December 2002 stating that “on 10 December 2002 unidentified men in white camouflage clothing, armed with automatic weapons, broke into the house at 37 Zabolotnogo Street, where, using weapons and threats of murder, they forcibly took away the employees of the Oktyabrskiy ROVD Ruslan Askhabov and Isa Dubayev and their service weapons. The perpetrators also forcibly took away the owner of the house, Isa Dokayev, and some items of his property”. At the same time, according to the Government’s memorandum, in connection with the abduction of the applicants’ relatives, on an unspecified date the district prosecutor’s office also opened criminal case no. 52161. 47. On 2 January 2003 the investigators ordered a ballistic expert evaluation of the bullets and cartridge cases collected from the crime scene. According to the expert’s report of 15 January 2003, the cases and bullets were prefabricated and could have been fired from a 5.45 mm weapon or a Kalashnikov machine gun. 48. On 8 January 2003 the district prosecutor’s office received the applicants’ complaint about the abduction of Ruslan Askhabov, Isa Dubayev and Isa Dokayev. On the same date, 8 January 2003, the tenth applicant and Isa Dokayev’s relative were granted victim status in the criminal proceedings. 49. On 20 January 2003 criminal cases no. 52161 and no. 52158, opened in connection with the abduction of Isa, Dokayev Ruslan Askhabov and Isa Dubayev, were joined in one criminal case. The case file was assigned the number 52158. The Government further stated “criminal case no. 40084 has nothing to do with criminal case no. 52158” and “no criminal case under no. 19045 is being investigated by the prosecutors’ offices in Chechnya”. 50. On 9 and 21 January 2003 and other dates, the investigators forwarded forty requests to various law enforcement agencies in Chechnya, including the departments of the interior, the prosecutors’ offices, the military commanders’ offices of different levels and the detention centre in Vladikavkaz, Northern Ossetia. The investigators requested to be informed whether these agencies had detained the missing men and whether the latter had been suspended of involvement in illegal activities. According to the responses, the missing men had not been detained on criminal or administrative charges; they had never been prosecuted or put on the wanted list; they had not been suspected of participation in illegal armed groups and their corpses had not been found. 51. On 27 January 2003 Ruslan Askhabov’s aunt, Mrs B.A., was granted victim status in the criminal case and questioned about the circumstances of his abduction. She stated that on 11 December 2002 she had found out from Isa Dokayev’s wife that her nephew had been abducted together with Isa Dubayev and Isa Dokayev. According to Isa Dokayev’s wife, at about 2 a.m. on 10 December 2002 she had heard their dog barking. Then she had heard shots and the dog had stopped barking. When she had tried to go outside, she had heard another shot and a bullet had stuck in the TV set. After that a group of about five men in white camouflage cloaks and masks had broken into the house. They had made all those present in the house line up along the wall and had taken Ruslan Askhabov, Isa Dubayev and Isa Dokayev away to an unknown destination. 52. On 4 November 2003 the district prosecutor’s office received the complaint about the abduction of Isa Dubayev (see paragraph 44 above). On the same date the investigators requested from the Ministry of Defence to inform them whether any special operations had been carried out in the Oktyabrskiy district of Grozny on the night of 10 December 2002. According to the response, military units of the Ministry of Defence had neither participated in special operations on 9-10 December 2002 nor detained the missing men. 53. On an unspecified date the investigators questioned the third applicant, who had stated that on the night of 10 December 2002 she and her husband Isa Dokayev had been at home. Two employees of the ROVD, Ruslan Askhabov and Isa Dubayev, had stayed in their house that night. The witness had gone to bed at about 11 p.m.; her husband and his guests had stayed up watching TV. At about 2 a.m. she had heard their dog barking, then machine-gun fire and then the dog had stopped barking. Isa Dokayev had run to the door where he had been met by a group of unidentified armed men in white camouflage clothing. When the men had seen Isa Dubayev’s service machine gun, they had run outside and started shooting at the house. Isa Dokayev had shouted to the men to stop the shooting as children were sleeping in the house. Then the men ordered him to throw the machine gun out of the window. After the applicant’s husband had done so, five armed men had entered the house. They spoke unaccented Russian among themselves. The men had tied the hands of the applicant’s husband and of Ruslan Askhabov and Isa Dubayev behind their backs with adhesive tape. Then they had put black plastic bags over the men’s heads and had taken the three men into different rooms. After that the intruders had demanded the keys of Isa Dokayev’s VAZ-21099 car, which was parked in the yard. They had unsuccessfully tried to start the car. After that the armed men had taken Isa Dokayev, Isa Dubayev and Ruslan Askhabov away. 54. On an unspecified date the investigators questioned Isa Dokayev’s neighbour, Mr A. Kh., who stated that on the night of 10 December 2002 he had been sleeping in his house, when at about 2 a.m. he had heard some noise, but had not paid attention to it. The next morning he had found out that a group of unidentified armed men had taken away his neighbour Isa Dokayev and two employees of the ROVD. 55. On unspecified dates the investigators questioned the colleagues of Ruslan Askhabov and Isa Dubayev, Mrs N.B., Mr S.D. and Mr B.K. Mrs N.B. stated that she had worked with Ruslan Askhabov from 2000 to December 2002. At the time of his abduction he was working at the passport and visa service of the ROVD; his colleagues rated him positively. The witness found out about his abduction from the colleagues. Witnesses Mr S.D. and Mr B.K. provided similar statements and stated that they had worked in the ROVD with Ruslan Askhabov and Isa Dubayev, and that the two men had been rated positively by their colleagues. 56. According to the Government, the investigation in criminal case no. 52158 had been suspended on several occasions owing to the failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicants or their relatives had been duly informed about the suspensions and the resumptions of the investigation. Although the authorities had failed to establish the whereabouts of the missing men or the perpetrators of their abduction, the investigation was still in progress. 57. The Government stated that “according to the information in our possession today, no special operations were conducted in Grozny, Chechnya, on 9-10 December 2002; representatives of the State did not detain Isa Dokayev, Ruslan Askhabov and Isa Dubayev”. 58. The Government also submitted that on 30 March 2004 the Oktyabrskiy district court of Grozny had declared Isa Dokayev a missing person and on 16 August 2004 the same court had acknowledged the paternity of Isa Dokayev in respect of the fifth and sixth applicants. 59. Despite specific requests by the Court the Government did not disclose any documents from criminal case no. 52158. They stated that the investigation was in progress and that disclosure of the documents would be in violation of Article 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, since the file contained personal data concerning the witnesses or other participants in the criminal proceedings.

4. The applicant, Mr Andrey Gabdrakhmanovich Karimov, is a Ukrainian national, who was born in 1968 and lives in the Yastrebki village, the Autonomous Republic of the Crimea (the “ARC”). 5. On 11 December 1996 the Prosecutor of the Chervonogvardiysky District of the ARC (the “Prosecutor of the ARC”) initiated a criminal investigation after the discovery of a corpse of an unidentified person near the Chervonogvardiysky village of the ARC. Subsequently, that person was thought to be someone called Sasha. 6. On 14 December 1996 the Chervonogvardiysky District Prosecutor's Office (the “CDPO”) detained the applicant on suspicion of having murdered Sasha. 7. On 17 December 1996 the Chervonogvardiysky District Prosecutor charged the applicant with murder. He also decided to detain the applicant on remand as there was a risk of him absconding and impeding the investigation in the case. 8. On 25 December 1996 the jurisdiction over the investigation into the murder was transferred to the Nyzhnyogirsky District Prosecutor's Office (the “NDPO”). 9. On 7 March 1997 the Nyzhnyogirsky District Prosecutor issued a bill of indictment against the applicant charging him with murder under the influence of alcohol. 10. On 7 April 1997 the case was remitted to the court for examination on the merits of the charges brought against the applicant. 11. On 2 June 1997 the Nyzhnyogirsky District Court of the ARC (the “Nyzhnyogirsky Court”), composed of the President of that court judge K., sentenced the applicant to eight years' imprisonment following his conviction for murder. The applicant lodged a cassation appeal against this decision with the Supreme Court of the ARC. 12. On 17 July 1997 the Supreme Court of the ARC quashed the judgment of 2 June 1997 and remitted the case for additional investigation due to a lack of corroborating evidence of the applicant's guilt. It also ruled that the applicant, who suffered from mental retardation (oligophrenia) was not legally represented in the course of criminal investigation brought against him. 13. On 10 November 1997 the person called Sasha re-appeared and was questioned by the NDPO. 14. On 20 November 1997 the NDPO released the applicant on condition that he did not leave his place of residence. 15. On 28 November 1997 the prosecution was terminated due to the absence of corpus juris delicti in respect of the applicant's acts. The investigation also revealed that the applicant stole two ducks from Ms M. (a private person) for a total value of UAH 30. The investigation into theft of private property was also terminated due to the “change of circumstances”. 16. On 10 March 1998 the NDPO stayed the criminal investigation in the case due to their inability to identify the person who had committed the murder. 17. On 21 February 2000 the Deputy Prosecutor of the ARC quashed the decisions of 28 November 1997 and 10 March 1998 and remitted the case to the CDPO for a preliminary investigation in accordance with the territorial jurisdiction. It also resolved that the applicant should be involved in the proceedings as being suspected of murder. 18. On 22 February 2001 the Prosecutor's Office of the ARC terminated the criminal investigation due to the absence of any corpus juris delicti in respect of the applicant's acts. 19. On 21 January 1998 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Nyzhnyogirsky Court seeking compensation for damage caused by his unlawful prosecution, detention and conviction. 20. The Government alleged that on 23 June 1998 the President of the Nyzhnyogirsky Court (judge K.), who also heard the applicant's criminal case and convicted the applicant on 2 June 1997 (see paragraph 12 above) requested the applicant to provide a certified copy of the resolution terminating criminal investigation in his case and information with regard to his salary from the last place of employment. 21. On 26 June 1998 the court informed him of the initiation of the proceedings in the case. 22. On 5 July 1999 a judge P. of the Nyzhnyogirsky Court assumed jurisdiction over the applicant's claims. It also ordered the Prosecutor's Office that dealt with the applicant's criminal case to provide a number of documents to it. 23. On 28 October and 4 December 1999 the applicant increased the amount of compensation claimed and requested the court to order the State Treasury, local Departments of Finance of the Nyzhniogirsky and Chervonogvardeysky State Administrations to appear as respondents in the case proceedings. 24. On 5 July and 19 November 1999, 17 April and 18 May 2000 the court ordered the prosecution to transfer the applicant's criminal case file to it. The prosecution partly complied, providing copies of certain documents from the case file. Some of the materials were provided on 3 August 2000 only. 25. On 21 February 2000 the prosecution resumed the investigation of the case (see paragraph 17 above). 26. On 24 February 2000 the President of the Supreme Court of the ARC instructed the President of the Nyzhnyogirsky District Court to ensure that the case proceedings were expedited. 27. On 2 June 2000 the compensation claims were transferred to a different judge (judge Ku.) within the same first instance court. 28. On 6 June 2000 the Deputy President of the Supreme Court requested the President of the Nyzhnyogirsky District Court to expedite examination of the applicant's case. 29. On 9 June 2000 the court invited the parties to a meeting about the case. However, the Chervonogvardiysky District Prosecutor failed to appear. 30. On 23 June 2000 the Acting President of the Supreme Court of the ARC requested the President of the Nyzhniogirsky Court to ensure that the proceedings in the applicant's case were conducted without any delays. 31. On 5 and 24 July 2000 the court requested the prosecution to provide it with the information concerning the criminal investigation into the circumstances of the case. 32. On 28 July 2000 the prosecution informed the court that the criminal investigation was still pending. 33. On 31 July 2000 the President of the Supreme Court of the ARC ordered the President of the Nyzhniogirsky Court to transfer the case-file to the Dzhankoy Court. 34. As a result, on 7 August 2000 the Nyzhnyogirsky Court suspended the compensation proceedings, pending the outcome of the criminal investigation against the applicant. On 27 September 2000 the Supreme Court of the ARC upheld this decision. 35. The applicant requested the Supreme Court to remit the case to a different court, alleging that the Nyzhnyogirsky Court judges, who were subordinate to judge K., who in 1997 heard the criminal case brought against the applicant and convicted him (see paragraph 11 above), manifested bias in examining his claims. 36. On 15 August 2000 the Deputy President of the Supreme Court instructed the President of the Supreme Court of the ARC, in view of the applicant's allegations of bias, to transfer the case to a different court for examination on its merits. On 23 August 2000 the Supreme Court of the ARC instructed the Nyzhnyogirsky Court to remit the case to Dzhankoy Court for examination as to the merits. 37. On 28 November 2000 the case-file had been returned from the Supreme Court of the ARC to the Nyzhnyogirsky Court. 38. On 12 December 2000 the Dzhankoy Court received the case to rule on the jurisdiction over it. The case-file was again returned to the Nyzhnyogirsky Court for further examination. 39. The case-file was again remitted to the Dzhankoy Court where it was received on 28 April 2001. Hearings were scheduled for 24 May, 18 and 19 June, 10 and 27 July, 9 and 30 August 2001. However, none took place, since the Prosecutor's Office (still one of the respondents in the case) failed to appear before the court or to send its representative. 40. On 28 September and 9 October 2001 the Dzhankoy Court postponed the hearings in the case due to the failure of the respondents to appear before it. On 28 September 2001 the court held that the Crimean authorities of the State Treasury, the Prosecutor's Office and the Department of Justice should be respondents in the case. 41. On 12 and 28 December 2001 the applicant failed to appear before the court. On 28 December 2001 the court terminated examination of the case due to the applicant's failure to appear before it. That decision was quashed by the Court of Appeal of the ARC and the case had been remitted for a new examination to the same court on its merits. 42. On 1 October 2002 the applicant changed the respondents in his case to the State Treasury in the ARC, the ARC's Prosecutor's Office and the Department of Justice in the ARC. 43. On 14 October 2002 the case was remitted to the Central District Court of Simferopil, due to a change of jurisdiction because of the modification in the respondents, who were all situated in this district. 44. Hearings were scheduled for 2 and 20 December, 15 January, 17 and 25 February 2003. However, the representative of the Department of Justice of the Crimea failed to appear before the court and therefore the hearings were postponed. 45. The hearings on 17 and 25 February 2003 were ignored by the Prosecutor's Office, as was the hearing on 15 January 2003 by the Department of Justice. As a result, the consideration of the merits of the case was postponed again. 46. On 25 February 2003 the representative of the Department of Justice informed the applicant that it considered the State Treasury to be a respondent in the case. 47. On 5 March 2003 the applicant informed the Court that the next hearing was scheduled for 20 March 2003. 48. On 25 March 2003 the court allowed the requests for rectification of the respondent to the State Treasury of Ukraine from the Main Department of the State Treasury in the ARC. 49. On 24 April 2003 the court again changed the respondent in the case from the Main Department of Justice in the ARC to the State Judicial Administration of the ARC. 50. The proceedings in the case were adjourned on 19 May and 9 June 2003 due to the change of the respondents. 51. On 9 June 2003 the Central District Court of Simferopil allowed the applicant's claims for compensation. In particular, the court found that the law enforcement authorities acted unlawfully in the course of criminal proceedings instituted against the applicant. Furthermore, the court ruled that the applicant had been unlawfully detained and sentenced for a serious offence. It awarded the applicant UAH 12,000 in compensation. 52. The applicant did not agree with the amount of compensation awarded to him and on 20 June 2003 lodged an appeal with the Court of Appeal of the ARC by which he sought UAH 1,000,000 in compensation. 53. On 25 July 2003 his appeal had been rejected and the applicant was allowed to rectify the shortcomings in his appeal. 54. On 16 September 2003 the court of appeal adjourned the hearing to 6 October 2003. 55. On 3 November 2003 the Court of Appeal of the ARC allowed the applicant's appeal in part and awarded him UAH 50,000 in compensation. 56. On 24 December 2003 the Pechersky District Bailiffs' Service of Kyiv issued a check to the applicant for an amount of the award and thus the judgment given in the applicant's favour had been enforced.

7. The applicant was born in 1927 and lives in Nicosia. 8. The applicant claimed that until 1974 she had been permanently residing in a house she owned at 33, 28th October Street, Kyrenia (northern Cyprus). She also owned a garden at Kazafani and three fields with trees at Karmi (in the locality known as “Horteri Chomatovounos”), all in the District of Kyrenia. 9. According to the applicant, her house had a surface-area of 190 square metres, with three large drawing rooms, a spacious dining room and kitchen, four bedrooms, two bathrooms, a storeroom and verandas. It was surrounded by a 753 sq. m garden and furnished mainly with period antiques and luxury items. 10. In support of her claim to ownership, the applicant produced copies of the relevant certificates of ownership of Turkish-occupied immovable properties issued by the Republic of Cyprus. According to these documents, the applicant's properties were registered as follows: (a) Kyrenia/Pano Kyrenia, plot no. 45, sheet/plan 12/21.1.12, registration no. C1703, house with garden; (b) Kyrenia/Kazafani, plot no. 95/1/1, sheet/plan 12/22W2, garden/orchard; area: 2,351 sq. m; (c) Kyrenia/Karmi, plot no. 222, sheet/plan 12/27E2, field; area: 3,138 sq. m; (d) Kyrenia/Karmi, plot no. 282, sheet/plan 12/27E2, field; area: 1,650 sq. m; (e) Kyrenia/Karmi, plot no. 291/1, sheet/plan 12/27E2, field; area: 2,264 sq. m. 11. Since the 1974 Turkish intervention, the applicant has been deprived of her properties, which were located in the area under the occupation and control of the Turkish military authorities, who prevented her from having access to and using her properties. II. THE DEMONSTRATION OF 19 JULY 1989 12. On 19 July 1989, the applicant joined an anti-Turkish demonstration in the Ayios Kassianos area in Nicosia in which the applicants in the Chrysostomos and Papachrysostomou v. Turkey and Loizidou v. Turkey cases (see below) also took part. 13. According to an affidavit sworn by the applicant at Nicosia District Court on 10 April 2000, the demonstration of 19 July 1989 was peaceful and was held on the fifteenth anniversary of the Turkish intervention in Cyprus, in support of the missing persons and to protest against human- rights violations. The applicant and other women had planned to gather in the grounds of the Ayios Kassianos School and to stage a sit-in in protest against the occupation of the northern part of the island. They also asked the Bishop of Kitium to conduct a service in the St. George's Chapel, which was located near the school. 14. When the applicant arrived, the school grounds were filled with a group of mostly young women, who were singing. The applicant stood near a water tank. She noticed the presence of UN soldiers and Turkish policemen armed with batons. 15. The UN officers invited the demonstrators to leave the premises. However, within a matter of seconds, the Turkish policemen had rushed towards them. Some of the women were grabbed by their clothes and hit with guns and batons. The applicant herself was hit and pushed. She received what she described as a “terrible blow in the right leg beneath the tibia”. She realised she had been hit with a sharp object, namely a bayonet wielded by a Turkish soldier. Her leg started to bleed profusely and she felt herself drifting into unconsciousness. She shouted: “Help, help, please, I am losing my leg”. Some demonstrators put her on a stretcher and she was taken by ambulance to Nicosia General Hospital. 16. At the hospital, her wound was stitched internally and externally. She was told to take ten days' absolute rest. For the next six months, the applicant suffered considerable pain in her leg. She could not walk or even put weight on the leg and was forced to use crutches. She experienced pain with changes in the weather. She continued to have problems climbing stairs and the scar on her leg remained visible. 17. As many years had passed since the demonstration, three of the witnesses who saw the wound being inflicted (two friends and the editor of a local newspaper) had already died. However, an affidavit sworn by a witness, Mrs Olga Nicolaidou, corroborated her version of events. 18. In support of her claim of ill-treatment, the applicant produced a medical certificate issued on 27 March 2000 by Doctor Stelios Georgiou, a specialist orthopaedic surgeon practising in Nicosia, which reads as follows: “The [applicant] was injured on 19.7.1989 by Turks following an attack on women near Ayios Kassianos in Nicosia in the Ayios Kassianos Primary School. The findings of the examination were: Injury to the right lower limb of the upper third of the tibia with an open wound about 9cm long. The wound was caused with a sharp object. Treatment of the patient and its course: 19. The Government alleged that the applicant had participated in a violent demonstration with the aim of inflaming anti-Turkish sentiment. The demonstrators, supported by the Greek-Cypriot administration, were demanding that the “Green Line” in Nicosia should be dismantled. Some carried Greek flags, clubs, knives and wire-cutters. They were acting in a provocative manner and shouting abuse. The demonstrators were warned in Greek and English that unless they dispersed they would be arrested in accordance with the laws of the “TRNC”. The applicant was arrested by the Turkish-Cypriot police after crossing the UN buffer zone and entering the area under Turkish-Cypriot control. The Turkish-Cypriot police intervened in the face of the manifest inability of the Greek-Cypriot authorities and the UN Force in Cyprus to contain the incursion and its possible consequences. 20. No force was used against demonstrators who did not intrude into the “TRNC” border area and, in the case of demonstrators who were arrested for violating the border, no more force was used than was reasonably necessary in the circumstances in order to arrest and detain the persons concerned. No one was ill-treated. It was possible that some of the demonstrators had hurt themselves in the confusion or in attempting to scale barbed wire or other fencing. Had the Turkish police, or anyone else, assaulted or beaten any of the demonstrators, the UN Secretary General would no doubt have referred to this in his report to the Security Council. 21. In his report of 7 December 1989 on the UN operations in Cyprus, the UN Secretary General stated, inter alia: “A serious situation, however, arose in July as a result of a demonstration by Greek Cypriots in Nicosia. The details are as follows: (a) In the evening of 19 July, some 1,000 Greek Cypriot demonstrators, mostly women, forced their way into the UN buffer zone in the Ayios Kassianos area of Nicosia. The demonstrators broke through a wire barrier maintained by UNFICYP and destroyed an UNFICYP observation post. They then broke through the line formed by UNFICYP soldiers and entered a former school complex where UNFICYP reinforcements regrouped to prevent them from proceeding further. A short while later, Turkish-Cypriot police and security forces elements forced their way into the area and apprehended 111 persons, 101 of them women; (b) The Ayios Kassianos school complex is situated in the UN buffer zone. However, the Turkish forces claim it to be on their side of the cease-fire line. Under working arrangements with UNFICYP, the Turkish-Cypriot security forces have patrolled the school grounds for several years within specific restrictions. This patrolling ceased altogether as part of the unmanning agreement implemented last May; (c) In the afternoon of 21 July, some 300 Greek Cypriots gathered at the main entrance to the UN protected area in Nicosia, in which the UN headquarters is located, to protest the continuing detention by the Turkish-Cypriot authorities of those apprehended at Ayios Kassianos. The demonstrators, whose number fluctuated between 200 and 2,000, blocked all UN traffic through this entrance until 30 July, when the Turkish-Cypriot authorities released the last two detainees; (d) The events described above created considerable tension in the island and intensive efforts were made, both at the UN headquarters and at Nicosia, to contain and resolve the situation. On 21 July, I expressed my concern at the events that have taken place and stressed that it was vital that all parties keep in mind the purpose of the UN buffer zone as well as their responsibility to ensure that that area was not violated. I also urged the Turkish-Cypriot authorities to release without delay all those who had been detained. On 24 July, the President of the Security Council announced that he had conveyed to the representatives of all the parties, on behalf of the members of the Council, the Council's deep concern at the tense situation created by the incidents of 19 July. He also stressed the need strictly to respect the UN buffer zone and appealed for the immediate release of all persons still detained. He asked all concerned to show maximum restraint and to take urgent steps that would bring about a relaxation of tension and contribute to the creation of an atmosphere favourable to the negotiations.”

5. The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Chişinău. 6. The applicant is a shareholder in a private company (M.). On 20 July 1999 she and five other shareholders initiated court proceedings against a company (L.) which also held shares in M., asking for the annulment of a number of contracts and decisions adopted by the shareholders' association. 7. On 10 January 2001 the Grigoriopol District Court allowed the claims made by the plaintiffs in part. No appeal was lodged and the judgment became final fifteen days later. 8. The applicant sought enforcement of the judgment and claims that a number of measures were taken with a view to having it enforced. 9. In a letter signed 30 November 2001 (but apparently lodged with the court on 6 December 2001) L. appealed against the judgment of 10 January 2001. L. claimed that it had not received a copy of the judgment until the middle of November. The representative for the applicant and the other five plaintiffs asked the court to reject the appeal as lodged out of time and argued that, in his opinion, L. had known about the judgment of 10 January 2001 since April 2001. He submitted, in particular, that on 25 May 2001 he had personally handed a copy of the judgment to L.'s president in the presence of all the shareholders. 10. On 30 April 2002 the Chişinău Regional Court allowed L.'s appeal in part, without taking any decision in respect of the fifteen-day time-limit for lodging an appeal. 11. In an appeal in cassation, the applicant emphasised L.'s failure to lodge its appeal within the time-limit set by law. 12. On 11 July 2002 the Court of Appeal sent the case back to the Chişinău Regional Court for a decision on the payment of court fees. 13. On 3 September 2002 the Chişinău Regional Court decided that the applicant and the other plaintiffs were to pay the court fees. 14. On 28 January 2003 the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant's appeal in cassation and upheld the judgment of 30 April 2002. 15. At the applicant's request, on 14 April 2003 the Deputy Prosecutor General lodged a request with the Supreme Court of Justice asking for the reopening of the case. One of the reasons given was that, in lodging its appeal on 6 December 2001, L. had missed the fifteen-day time-limit for lodging an appeal and had also failed to comply with the statutory requirement to apply to the court for a decision holding that the reasons for missing the time-limit were acceptable. Moreover, the Chişinău Regional Court had examined the case in the applicant's absence, depriving her of her procedural rights. 16. On 4 June 2003 the Supreme Court of Justice granted the request and ordered a rehearing of the case by the Court of Appeal. It noted that L. had lodged its appeal on 6 December 2001, outside the time-limit for lodging appeals. The court also noted that the examination of the appeal in the absence of the applicant's representative had amounted to a failure to respect the rights of all the parties to the proceedings, “especially given that a new judgment was adopted”. 17. On 24 September 2003 the Chişinău Court of Appeal rejected L.'s appeal against the judgment of 10 January 2001. The court found that L. had missed the fifteen-day time-limit for lodging an appeal. Even if L. had stated the truth when it declared, in its appeal, that it had not found out about the judgment of 10 January 2001 until the middle of November 2001, it should have lodged its appeal by the end of November, and not on 6 December 2001 as it had done. Moreover, no reasons had been adduced to convince the court that the time-limit had been missed for acceptable reasons. 18. On 3 March 2004 the Supreme Court of Justice quashed the judgment of 24 September 2003 and ordered a rehearing, finding that the lower court had not taken the correct procedural decision in respect of its finding that the time-limit had been missed by L. The court also noted that under domestic law the fifteen-day time-limit started running – for parties not present when the court read out the judgment – from the date when a copy of the operative part of the judgment was served on the parties. There was no evidence in the case file that L. had been shown the contents of the judgment of 10 January 2001. 19. On an unspecified date thereafter, L. lodged a request with the Court of Appeal for a decision considering as acceptable the reasons for missing the fifteen-day time-limit for lodging the appeal. 20. On 17 June 2004 the Chişinău Court of Appeal granted that request, finding that there was no evidence that L. had seen the operative part of the judgment before November 2001. On the same day the court dismissed L.'s appeal and upheld the judgment of 10 January 2001. L. appealed. 21. On 11 November 2004 the Supreme Court of Justice quashed the judgments of 10 January 2001 and 17 June 2004 and adopted a new judgment, allowing L.'s appeal and rejecting all of the applicant's claims. 22. The court noted that the applicant was not present at the hearing but that she and the other participants had been properly summoned. The applicant claims that she never received a summons. The judgment of 11 November 2004 was final.

6. The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Rózsaszentmárton. 7. In 1991 the applicant was diagnosed with manic depression. On 27 May 2005 he was placed under partial guardianship. Although this measure was based on the Civil Code which deals with the pecuniary and certain personal relations of citizens (see paragraph 12 below), it nevertheless also attracted the application of Article 70(5) of the Constitution (see paragraph 11 below) to the applicant, excluding him from the right to vote. In the underlying court decision it was noted that he took care of himself adequately but sometimes wasted money in an irresponsible fashion and was occasionally aggressive. The applicant did not appeal against this decision. 8. On 13 February 2006 the applicant realised that he had been omitted from the electoral register drawn up in view of the upcoming legislative elections. His complaint to the Electoral Office was to no avail. 9. The applicant further complained to the Pest Central District Court. On 9 March 2006 this court dismissed his case. It observed that, under Article 70(5) of the Constitution, those under guardianship could not participate in elections. This decision was served on the applicant's representative on 25 April 2006. 10. In the meantime, legislative elections took place on 9 and 23 April 2006, in which the applicant could not participate.

4. The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Nyírtelek. 5. In May 2000 the applicant brought an action in compensation against a hospital before the Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg County Regional Court. She claimed that her son’s death in October 1999 was due to his inefficient treatment by the hospital’s doctors. In March 2001 the Regional Court gave judgment, finding that no causal link have been proven between the respondent’s alleged omissions and the death. This conclusion was upheld by the appellate bench of the Supreme Court on 29 January 2003. 6. On 19 February 2003 the applicant requested the re-opening of the case, which was dismissed by the Regional Court, without an examination on the merits, on 7 May 2003. On appeal, the Budapest Court of Appeal reversed the first-instance judgment and remitted the case to the Regional Court on 3 September 2003. 7. On 7 May 2004 the Regional Court suspended the proceedings pending the determination of criminal proceedings initiated against the doctors and the general practitioner for reckless endangerment resulting in death. The Budapest Court of Appeal, however, established that it had not been necessary to await the outcome of the criminal proceedings, as the subject matter of the two proceedings is different. It therefore ordered the continuation of the civil proceedings on 15 October 2004. 8. On 23 February 2007 the Regional Court gave judgment. On appeal, the Debrecen Court of Appeal quashed this judgment and remitted the case to the first-instance court on 17 January 2008. 9. In the resumed proceedings the Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s action, which was upheld by the Court of Appeal on 8 July 2010. The applicant submitted a petition for review with the Supreme Court, which was dismissed on 30 March 2011.

5. The applicant was born in 1941 and lives in Baku. 6. The applicant was the sole owner and director of Nail Commercial Firm (“the Company”), established on 2 March 1992 in Baku. It appears from the case file that the Company was registered on 22 January 1993 and, that, according to the company's charter, the applicant was its sole founder. 7. By an order of the Baku City Executive Authority (“the BCEA”) of 7 February 1996, the Company was granted the right of use of a plot of land in Baku for constructing and operating a health centre. On 25 May 1998 the Company was granted an additional plot of land adjacent to the original one. The total area of land granted to the Company comprised 0.75 hectares (“the Plot”). 8. The Company obtained all necessary construction permits and authorisations and paid all relevant fees. However, it did not start any construction work. 9. In 1998 the Plot was occupied by another private company, called Ruslan, which commenced construction of a shopping centre on the Plot. 10. After writing several letters of complaint to the BCEA and the police, the Company brought an action against the Khatai District Executive Authority (“the KDEA”) and Ruslan, asking for protection of its right of use of the Plot. On 29 October 1998 the Economic Court (acting as a first‑instance court) rejected the Company's claim. The court found that Ruslan had occupied the Plot illegally. However, the court noted that, due to the fact that a substantial amount of construction had been carried out on the site, it was impracticable to demolish the buildings constructed by Ruslan. Therefore, the court held that the buildings illegally constructed by Ruslan were to be confiscated in favour of the State, while the BCEA was ordered to grant the Company another plot of land of similar value. 11. Following a series of appeals by the Company, on 31 May 2001, the Economic Court (acting as an appeal court) quashed the judgment of 29 October 1998 and granted the Company's claim. The court ordered the demolition of buildings constructed by Ruslan and restoration of the Company's right of use of the Plot. No cassation appeals were lodged against this judgment and it entered into legal force. 12. It appears from the case file that the applicant applied to various authorities complaining that the judgment of 31 May 2001 had not been enforced. 13. On 29 January 2002 the Economic Court issued a special decision (xüsusi qərardad), instructing the Khatai District Prosecutor's Office to institute criminal proceedings against those responsible for the non‑enforcement of the judgment. 14. Upon a request by the Company, on 1 July 2003 the Economic Court issued a special decision interpreting the operative part of the judgment of 31 May 2001. The court clarified that the Plot must be vacated by any third parties, that access to the Plot must be restricted and that the illegally constructed buildings must be demolished by the KDEA. Thereafter, the Plot was to be transferred to the Company. 15. In August 2003 the Khatai District Department of Judicial Observers and Enforcement Officers informed the Economic Court that the enforcement of the judgment was impossible due to the KDEA officials' refusal to demolish the illegally constructed buildings. 16. On 11 September 2003 the Economic Court issued a special decision instructing the Khatai District Prosecutor's Office to institute criminal proceedings against the relevant KDEA officials. On 17 October 2003 the Khatai District Prosecutor's Office refused to institute criminal proceedings. 17. In the meantime, the KDEA requested the President of the Supreme Court to reopen the proceedings and have the judgment of 31 May 2001 reviewed by the Plenum of the Supreme Court. By a letter of 20 October 2003 the President of the Supreme Court rejected this request, finding no grounds to reopen the proceedings. 18. It appears from the case file that in the meantime the Ministry of Economic Development (“the MED”) had issued ownership certificates to third parties in respect of the Plot. On an unspecified date in 2005, the applicant lodged a lawsuit against the MED and those persons asking the court to declare void all the ownership certificates issued in respect of this Plot. On 23 December 2005 the Khatai District Court dismissed the applicant's claim. After a series of appeals by the applicant, on 18 November 2008 the Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance court's judgment. The Court of Appeal noted that, as the Plot had been sold at auction to a third party in 1999 when it belonged to the State pursuant to the judgment of 29 October 1998, the ownership certificates issued by the MED were in accordance with the relevant law. On 10 March 2009 the Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal's judgment. 19. At the time of the latest communication with the applicant, the judgment of 31 May 2001 had not been enforced.

5. The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Warsaw. 6. On 22 March 1993 the applicant's mother lodged with the Warsaw Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) a claim for a declaration that a notarial deed was null and void (in the framework of inheritance proceedings). The action was instituted against five defendants. 7. On 30 September 1993 the proceedings were stayed. 8. On 15 January 1994 the applicant's mother died. On 10 January 1995 the applicant confirmed that she wished to continue the proceedings in her stead and requested that the proceedings be resumed. 9. On 22 October 1996 the court refused to resume the proceedings, stating that the applicant had failed to comply with the court's order to produce the inheritance decisions concerning the defendants. 10. The applicant lodged numerous requests for the resumption of the proceedings, to no avail. She submitted that the courts had refused to serve on her the requested decisions, since she was not the defendants' relative. 11. On 20 September 2004 the proceedings were eventually resumed on the applicant's request. 12. On 16 November 2004 the court held a hearing. 13. On 13 April 2005 the court stayed the proceedings. The applicant did not lodge an appeal against this decision. 14. The applicant lodged two motions for the resumption of the proceedings. They were dismissed by the court on 23 October and 15 December 2006. The applicant lodged an appeal against the second decision. 15. On 23 October 2007 the Warsaw Court of Appeal amended the decision of 15 December 2006 and resumed the proceedings. The court held that the decision of 13 April 2005 was ill-founded since there were no legal grounds for staying the proceedings. 16. On 22 October 2008 the court held a hearing. 17. On 23 October 2008 the Warsaw Regional Court gave judgment dismissing the applicant's plea as unfounded. On 3 December 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal. It appears that the proceedings are still pending. 18. On 30 July 2007 the applicant lodged with the Warsaw Court of Appeal a complaint under section 5 of the Law on 17 June 2004 on complaints about a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time (Ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki) (“the 2004 Act”) which entered into force on 17 September 2004. She sought a ruling declaring that the length of the proceedings before the Warsaw Regional Court had been excessive. She asked for the acceleration of the proceedings and an award of just satisfaction in the amount of 10,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) (approx. 2,500 euros (EUR)). 19. On 6 September 2007 the Warszawa Court of Appeal dismissed the complaint. The court held that on 17 September 2004, the date on which the 2004 Act had entered into force, the proceedings in the case had been stayed. Therefore, in the court's opinion, there was no undue delay on the part of the trial court. The court further found that after the resumption of the proceedings on 20 September 2004 there had been no inactivity for which the Regional Court could be held responsible.

5. The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Belgorod. 6. The applicant is a businessman and a former controlling shareholder of a private company OAO “Restoran Belgorod”. According to the applicant, in 1997 a number of third persons produced a fake sales contract in respect of his shares in the company, as well as a fake register of the shareholders. They then tried to gain control over the company. Thereafter the matter was brought before the domestic courts. 7. On 27 April 1998 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Belgorod, presided by judge B., dismissed the applicant's action to have the sale annulled and the register of shareholders declared fake and illegal. The court refused to order a forensic examination of the evidence, including a copy of the register of shareholders and the registrar's book of records, which the applicant had claimed were fake, and having admitted and considered them, rejected the applicant's action as groundless. 8. On 10 September 1998 that judgment was upheld on appeal by the Belgorod Regional Court. 9. On 18 September 1998, at the applicant's request, a police investigator initiated criminal proceedings for fraud against a number of third persons. On 28 October 1998 the investigator ordered an expert examination of the documents which the applicant had claimed were fake in the proceedings presided over by judge B. 10. On 4 and 12 November 1998 the respective examinations were completed. They confirmed that the copy of the register of shareholders and the registrar's book of records had been tampered with and that some of the entries had been fraudulently deleted or altered. 11. It appears that on 22 November 2001 the criminal investigation was discontinued. 12. Thereafter the case was repeatedly suspended and resumed. 13. The latest decision to resume the proceedings was taken on 5 September 2002. The outcome of the investigation is unclear. 14. On 23 March 2000 the applicant wrote a letter to the Prosecutor of the Belgorod Region with a copy to the Prosecutor General of Russia, alleging that in the course of the proceedings in his case in 1998 judge B., “acting in the exercise of her duties, had committed a crime by delivering a deliberately unjust decision knowingly based on incorrect and sometimes even openly forged documentary evidence”. The letter set out the applicant's views on the circumstances of his case, referred to the outcome of forensic examinations carried out by the investigator in the criminal case and requested the responsible officials to bring criminal proceedings against judge B. 15. Identical letters were sent to the President of the Belgorod Regional Court and the head of the Judiciary Qualification Board on 12 May 2000. 16. In response to the letter of 23 March 2000, on an unspecified date the President of the Belgorod Regional Court and judge B. requested the Regional Prosecutor's office to bring criminal proceedings against the applicant for libel. 17. By decision of 6 April 2000 an investigator instituted proceedings against the applicant for libel. 18. On 27 September 2000 the applicant was questioned as a witness and stated that judge B. had received bribes. 19. On 18 May 2001 those proceedings were discontinued because of an amnesty law. 20. On an unspecified date judge B. sued the applicant for defamation, claiming 75,000 roubles (RUB - approximately 3,000 euros (EUR)) in damages and seeking an order for the retraction of the impugned statements. 21. By judgment of 7 June 2002 the Sverdlovskiy District Court of Belgorod granted the claims in full. The court noted that the judicial decision taken by judge B. remained in force and that the applicant had used all possible remedies against it by instituting appeal proceedings. Without examining the form or accuracy of the statements made by the applicant in his letter and having refused his requests for the admission of evidence, the court concluded that the applicant had defamed judge B. It ordered the applicant to send the Prosecutor General of Russia, the Prosecutors of Belgorod and the Belgorod Region, the President of the Belgorod Regional Court and the Judiciary Qualification Board of the Belgorod Region a letter retracting his previous allegations against judge B. The court also awarded judge B. RUB 75,000 (approximately EUR 3,000) in non-pecuniary damages. 22. On appeal, the applicant argued that the court had failed to examine whether his letter to the relevant authorities could constitute dissemination of information within the meaning of the applicable law, that the inaccuracy of his allegations had been presumed and he had been refused a chance to prove them and that the first instance court had failed to require from judge B. any proof of actual harm resulting from the letter. The applicant also objected to the use of the statements which he had made during the interview with the investigator of the libel case. 23. On appeal the Belgorod Regional Court reduced the award of damages to RUB 20,000 (approximately EUR 800) and upheld the rest of the judgment on 10 September 2002. 24. By a final decision of 18 November 2003 the Belgorod Regional Court rejected the applicant's action to annul the transfer of his property to a number of third persons. 25. By a judgment of 4 February 2003 the Oktyabrskiy District Court rejected his application to annul a lease agreement between the applicant and a certain commercial entity.

5. The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Muğla. 6. The applicant is a member of the Haber-Sen, a trade union formed by public employees. He is also a member of the Confederation of Public Employees’ Trade Unions (Kamu Emekçileri Konfederasyonu – “KESK”). 7. On 29 October 1997 the applicant was arrested in Muğla and taken to the Anti-Terrorism Branch of the Muğla Security Directorate on charges of having insulted a police officer. He had allegedly attempted to resist arrest. During his detention in police custody, the applicant was allegedly beaten up, slapped and threatened with death by the police officers. 8. On the same day, the applicant was taken to the Emergency Service of Muğla State Hospital, where he was examined by a doctor. In his report, the doctor indicated the presence of hyperaemia on the applicant’s cheeks and another red mark measuring 10 cm x 10 cm on his back. The doctor concluded that the injuries in question (hyperaemia) would heal in three days and would not render the applicant unfit for work. 9. On 30 October 1997 the applicant was brought before the Muğla Public Prosecutor and the Muğla Magistrates’ Court respectively, where he complained that he had been beaten up and threatened with death during his detention in police custody. He was subsequently placed in pre-trial detention. 10. On 11 November 1997 the applicant underwent a new medical examination at Muğla State Hospital by a surgeon, who stated in her report that there were healing wounds and haematoma caused by a blunt object on the applicant’s shoulder blades. 11. On 12 November 1997 another doctor at the Muğla State Hospital examined the applicant and stated in his medical report that there was no sign of physical violence on his body. 12. On 25 November 1997 the applicant filed a complaint against the police officers who had allegedly ill-treated and insulted him. 13. According to a photo identification report dated 12 January 1998, the applicant was shown photos of forty-five police officers from the Anti‑Terrorism Branch of the Muğla Security Directorate and identified the six police officers who had ill-treated and threatened him. 14. Between 14 and 19 January 1998 senior police officers, who had been appointed as investigators, took statements from the six police officers who had allegedly ill-treated the applicant. The police officers all denied the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment. They claimed that the applicant had made slanderous allegations in an attempt to waste their time and to demean the police force. The applicant also made statements to the senior police officers and claimed that he had been slapped, insulted and threatened with death by six police officers. 15. On 2 March 1998 the Muğla Chief Public Prosecutor delivered a decision of non-prosecution in respect of the applicant’s allegations that he had been insulted and threatened while in police custody. On the same day, the public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Muğla Criminal Court against six police officers, accusing them of ill-treatment under Article 245 of the Criminal Code. 16. On 10 March 1999, the Muğla Criminal Court decided to stay the proceedings against the accused police officers and transferred the case file to the Muğla Provincial Administrative Council to obtain authorisation to bring criminal proceedings against the officers pursuant to the provisions of the Law on the prosecution of civil servants. 17. On 10 February 2000 the Muğla Provincial Administrative Council decided not to authorise prosecution on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to indicate that the police officers had inflicted ill‑treatment on the applicant. 18. On 3 March 2000 the applicant appealed against the Muğla Provincial Administrative Council’s decision. He argued that the conclusion that there was no evidence proving ill-treatment was ill-founded and unjust in view of the medical reports, which clearly indicated that he had been beaten up during his detention in police custody. 19. Meanwhile, a disciplinary investigation was also conducted against the six police officers in question. However, on 2 May 2000, relying on the conclusion reached by the Provincial Administrative Council, the Police Disciplinary Board of the Muğla Governorship decided to terminate the investigation against the accused police officers. 20. On 21 December 2000 a law (Law no. 4616) on conditional release was enacted. This law provided for the suspension of proceedings or execution of sentences in respect of crimes committed before 23 April 1999 and for which the maximum penalty did not exceed ten years’ imprisonment. 21. On 10 February 2000 the Supreme Administrative Council decided to suspend the criminal proceedings against the accused police officers pursuant to Law no. 4616. The applicant appealed against this decision. 22. On 15 January 2002 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the Supreme Administrative Council’s decision.

5. The applicant was born in 1971 and is serving a sentence of imprisonment in the Irkutsk Region. 6. In November 1999, July 2000 and September 2000 criminal inquiries were opened following discoveries of the dismembered bodies of women (victims K., Ok. and A., Os.). 7. On 22 August 2000 the applicant was questioned in the presence of counsel in relation to an accusation of rape by victim G. On 15 September 2000 the case was discontinued for lack of a corpus delicti, in view of the apparently consensual nature of the relations. (b) Interrogation on 3 February 2001 8. Thereafter, on 3 February 2001 a Ms F. accused the applicant of rape and unlawful deprivation of liberty. It appears that on 3 February 2001 the applicant either came to the Barnaul police or was arrested with regard to that complaint. The applicant explained that he had consumed alcohol with the victim at his home on the previous evening, but denied any sexual assault. It appears that, having been apprised of his procedural rights, including the right to legal assistance, he waived this latter right. He was then questioned but apparently made no further statement. The investigator ordered his placement in custody and asked the administration of the temporary detention centre to ensure that the applicant, then a State official (a driver in a sobering-up centre), be kept separately from other detainees (see also paragraphs 43 and 44 below). According to the applicant, on the same date he was refused permission to contact his family in order to retain counsel. The case against the applicant was entrusted to four investigators in view of the case's “complexity and the large amount of work to be done”. On the same day, the investigator heard a Ms S. in relation to the accusations against the applicant. 9. In addition to the investigators, on 4 February 2001 investigator P. of the Altay Regional Prosecutor's Office requested the police department to assign officers for a “series of operational and search measures” to verify whether the applicant had been involved in recent cases concerning the disappearances of female students from a local university (see also paragraphs 14 and 25 below). 10. According to the applicant, after his arrest he asked to be represented by Mr K., an advocate at the local bar association. It appears that the investigator decided that K. could not represent the applicant, given a potential conflict of interest arising from the fact that at the time K. already represented a Mr P. According to the applicant, however, P. retained K. as counsel not earlier than on 19 February 2001. (c) Further questioning and the applicant's confessions 11. On 6 February 2001 investigator A. listed charges against the applicant in relation to victim F. The applicant was informed of his right to remain silent and his right to legal assistance and admitted his guilt “in part”. He did not want to be represented by the on-duty legal-aid lawyer and thus required adjournment until the following day in order to be represented by (unspecified) counsel retained by his parents. 12. According to the applicant, his mother first learnt about his arrest on 6 February 2001 from his girlfriend, who in turn had learnt about it from a relative, a former law-enforcement officer. When the applicant's mother came to the investigator's office, she was reassured that the applicant did not wish other counsel. She was later told that the applicant was satisfied with the services of counsel D. According to the Government, the applicant's mother first learnt about the applicant's arrest on 4 February 2001. 13. On 7 February 2001 the investigator appointed D. as legal-aid counsel, the applicant's objection notwithstanding. The applicant reiterated his wish to be represented by counsel retained by his parents and remained silent. He was still refused permission to receive visits from them or to contact his family, on the ground that it would adversely affect the conduct of the investigation. As can be seen from the interrogation record, this interview with the investigator was held from 3.15 to 3.20 p.m. However, according to the visitors' logbook, the investigator saw the applicant from 2.44 to 5.06 p.m. on that day. 14. According to the applicant, he was daily questioned in relay for up to twelve hours by investigators and police officers in the temporary detention centre until 2 March 2001. Only the leading officer's name was noted in the visitors' logbook. According to the applicant, he was beaten up by officers who used techniques leaving no traces. In order to obtain confessions, officers also proffered threats against the applicant's next of kin, suggesting, for instance, that they would allow publication of an article in a local newspaper mentioning the names of the applicant's brother and girlfriend; that they would carry out searches in their flats; that they would stage his suicide with the aid of cellmates. On unspecified dates, the applicant was allegedly beaten up by his cellmates, who had been instructed to induce him to make admissions. The applicant subsequently accused the officers of ill-treatment (see paragraph 33 and 42 below). 15. Thus, the following interviews took place: On 8 February 2001 - by officers, from 4.10 to 5.15 p.m.; On 9 February 2001 - by officers, from 11.50 a.m. to 1.35 p.m. and from 5.20 to 7.40 pm. On the same date the authorities re-opened the proceedings concerning the alleged rape of G. (see paragraph 7 above). On 10 February 2001 – by officers, from 11.15 am to 3.20 p.m.; On 12 February 2001 – by the investigator, from 3 to 4.10 p.m. 16. On 13 February 2001 investigators A. and Sh. had access to the applicant from 10.25 a.m. to 12.25 p.m. and from 3.05 to 7.35 p.m. In his written statement the applicant confessed to a sexual assault against F. and the double murder of A. and Ok. in July 2000. The applicant was questioned from 5.30 to 7.25 p.m. in the presence of counsel D. During that interview, the content of Article 51 of the Constitution was explained to the applicant, and he confirmed that he understood it. He also confirmed he was willing to give testimony and endorsed his earlier confessions on the same day, stating that his admissions had been voluntary and were due to the fact that “he could no longer bear the burden”. According to the applicant, counsel D. was present only from 7.30 to 7.35 p.m. 17. The applicant was questioned by the investigator on 15 February 2001 from 5.27 to 6.57 p.m. According to the Government, at this interview the applicant confirmed his admission in respect of victim F, in the presence of counsel D.. 18. On 17 February 2001 the applicant was questioned by officers from 10.20 a.m. to 1 p.m. 19. On 18, 20 and 26 February 2001 the applicant confessed to several offences. According to the applicant, on each occasion he was brought to the principal investigator after questioning by officers, and signed the record. The events during the relevant period can be described as follows: On 18 February 2001 investigator A. visited the applicant from 12.30 to 2.10 p.m. The applicant was questioned in the presence of counsel D. from 12.30 to 12.50 p.m. about the double murder. In reply to the investigator's question, the applicant stated that he had not committed any other murders. On 19 February 2001 the applicant was questioned by officers from 2.35 to 4.13 p.m. On 20 February 2001 the applicant was questioned by police officers from 10 a.m. to 3.30 p.m. The applicant made a written statement concerning the murder of K., indicating that “the confession was voluntary without physical or psychological duress”. 20. Subsequent interviews (without the presence of counsel) were as follows: On 21 February 2001 the applicant was questioned by the investigator from noon to 3.30 and by (an) officer(s), from 3.15 to 5.25 p.m.; On 22 February 2001 – by (an) officer(s), from 11.40 a.m. to 2.35 p.m.; On 23 February 2001 – by the investigator, from 11.43 a.m. to 2.35 p.m.; On 24 February 2001 – by officers, from 12.15 to 1 p.m.; On 26 February 2001 the applicant was questioned by officer(s) from 9.50 a.m. to noon and by the investigator from 5 to 6.40 p.m. The applicant made a written statement confessing to the murder of victim Os. 21. As transpires from the visitors' register, on 27 February 2001 the investigator saw the applicant from 11.33 a.m. to 1.07 p.m., while police officer S. saw him from 5.05 to 5.55 p.m. on the same day. The photo identification lasted from 1.10 to 1.15 p.m. in the presence of counsel D. 22. Visits continued thereafter in March and April 2001 (see also paragraph 28 below). 23. According to the applicant, after his mother had read in the local newspaper that he had admitted to serious grave crimes, she realised that she had been misled by investigator A. and retained counsel S. (see below). (d) Admission of counsel S. and further proceedings 24. On 6 March 2001 the applicant was allowed for the first time to see his privately-retained counsel, Mr S. The applicant retracted and sought exclusion of all previously-collected evidence, including his confessions, as obtained under compulsion and without effective legal advice. 25. On 11 April 2001 police officer S. reported back to investigator P. that, following the order of 4 February 2001, a series of “operative measures” had disclosed the applicant's involvement in the murders of Ok., A., K. and Os. At the same time, no connection was established in relation to the disappearances of female students. The report mentioned that the applicant was still being investigated. 26. On 23 April 2001 the applicant was placed in solitary confinement after an altercation with cellmates. 27. During the preliminary investigation a large number of forensic reports were prepared and more than fifty persons were heard as witnesses; many of them gave oral testimony during the trial. Searches were conducted in the applicant's flat and a number of documents were seized. 28. Counsel S. complained that the applicant continued to be visited by police officers who, in his view, were not authorised to deal with the criminal case. On 31 May 2005 the investigator issued an order stating that only four investigators, including himself, were authorised to have meetings with the applicant. When questioned about their activities, the above officers explained to the investigator that they had been assigned the task of verifying whether there might be a link between the applicant and the disappearances of female students other than those already investigated. 29. Upon counsel's complaint, in June 2001 the investigator ordered an inquiry concerning the injuries to the applicant's face, caused on 23 April 2001, and whether he had complained about any ill-treatment. Investigator P. also informed the applicant that the investigators had not been aware that various officers had had meetings with the applicant in the temporary detention centre or the remand centre. 30. In October 2001 the investigator reported to the trial prosecutors' department that the activities carried out by the assigned officers did not permit the conclusion that the applicant had been involved in other criminal offences. 31. The case against the applicant was scheduled for trial before the Altay Regional Court. The applicant admitted in substance the charges in relation to Ms F. He argued that his intercourse with G. had been consensual; that he had no link to the other four persons (victims K., Ok., Os., A.); and that his pre-trial confessions in that connection had been obtained through ill-treatment and psychological pressure on the part of the police officers. In support of his allegation of duress the applicant provided the trial court with an extract from the visitors' logbook of the temporary detention centre for the period from 4 February to 23 March 2001. During that period the applicant received visits from various officers and investigators. 32. The trial court dealt with the applicant's allegations of ill-treatment, confession under duress and the alleged violation of his right to legal assistance during the preliminary investigation. The court heard investigator A., who confirmed that the applicant could not be represented by counsel “named by him” (possibly meaning Mr K.) because at the time the latter represented Mr P. The investigator also confirmed that the applicant was not allowed to receive visits from his mother, in order to prevent them from tampering with evidence and perverting the course of the investigation. The trial court upheld that argument, referring to the applicant's mother's attempt to hand over a message to the applicant asking him to remain silent and to possibly plead temporary insanity. 33. The trial court rejected the allegation of ill-treatment, relying on medical reports dated 3 and 14 February 2001 and considering that the admissions were thus “truthful”. The court heard some of the officers who visited the applicant in detention, and concluded that they had been empowered to question the applicant in relation to the cases for which he was being investigated and also other cases. The court also heard a Mr M., who had been detained with the applicant in March 2001. Mr M. stated that the interrogations of the applicant had spanned the entire day and the applicant had returned to the cell “exhausted”; there had been no traces of violence on him. 34. On 22 November 2001 the Regional Court convicted the applicant of several counts of rape and murder, and sentenced him to twenty-four years' imprisonment. 35. Regarding the applicant's conviction for raping G., the trial court held that “despite the applicant's retraction of his earlier admission, his guilt was proven by the victim's deposition”. The court also referred to several witness statements and medical evidence. 36. In finding the applicant guilty of the rape and unlawful deprivation of liberty of victim F., the trial court relied on the applicant's own admissions reiterated at the trial, the victim's deposition, statements by witnesses who saw the victim escaping from the applicant' flat, and medical expert reports. 37. In finding the applicant guilty of murdering victim K., the court relied on the applicant's pre-trial confession, his interview with the investigator in the presence of counsel D. and the applicant's identification of the victim by a photograph. The trial court considered that the above statements were collaborated by three witness statements as regards the victim's clothes on the day of the murder, the inspection record of the crime scene and the medical expert reports. 38. The trial court convicted the applicant of murdering Ok. and A. on the basis of the applicant's pre-trial admissions, his interview with the investigator in the presence of counsel D. and the applicant's identification of the victim by a photograph. The trial court considered that the above statements were collaborated by the other available evidence. 39. The applicant's conviction for murdering Os. was based on the applicant's pre-trial confession, which the court considered to be “truthful”, despite his retraction. The court held that the applicant could not have learnt the details of this crime from another source. 40. Having heard the prosecution and counsel S., on 22 May 2002 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the trial judgment. The appeal court considered that there had been no violation of the defence rights since on 3 February 2001 the applicant had been apprised of his rights to remain silent and to legal assistance. The applicant had signed the record and had waived the right to counsel. From 7 February 2001 the applicant had been represented by counsel D. who attended all investigative measures relied up by the trial court. The appeal court noted that the applicant's pre-trial admissions had revealed circumstances which had not been previously known to the investigative authorities. For instance, as regards victim K., the applicant had given descriptions of the victim and her clothes, and had referred to circumstances concerning her character and way of life. The information supplied by the applicant was then confirmed by statements from various persons heard as witnesses at the trial. Thus, as regards victim Ok., her mother confirmed that the hairpin seized at the applicant's flat belonged to her late daughter. The other physical evidence, taken together, also refuted the allegation that the applicant had not been involved in the murders. 41. After the trial, the applicant sought the institution of criminal proceedings against the principal investigator in his criminal case, alleging forgery of evidence. On 27 December 2004 and 17 January 2005 the Regional Prosecutor's Office refused that request. The applicant unsuccessfully challenged this refusal in the courts. 42. The applicant also sought the institution of criminal proceedings against the officers who had interrogated him in February 2001, alleging ill-treatment. On 14 December 2004 the investigator in the Regional Prosecutor's Office refused to prosecute the officers. This decision was upheld by the higher prosecutor on 31 January 2005. On 19 May and 23 June 2005 the Regional Court took final decisions upholding the district courts' decisions declining jurisdiction in relation to the applicant's complaint about the decision of 14 December 2004. In separate proceedings, on 7 July and 13 October 2005 the Regional Court decided in the final instance that the applicant's complaint about the decision of 31 January 2005 was not amenable to court review. 43. The applicant was kept in the temporary detention centre of the Barnaul Department of the Interior (ИВС УВД г. Барнаула) from 3 February to 2 March 2001, and from 13 to 23 March 2001. Together with other four detainees, he was kept in a cell measuring six square metres. The applicant slept on the floor because no bed, mattress or bedding was provided. The cell was not heated; the ventilation and light were poor. The toilet was not separated from the living area. Food was distributed once a day. The applicant remained all the time in his cell since no outdoor activity was allowed. The applicant was refused permission to have visits or other contact with his family. 44. The applicant subsequently indicated that the levels of heating and humidity in the cell had been unacceptable; he had been given a cup of tea and a piece of bread in the morning and, at times, soup and porridge in the afternoon; he had had no access to a shower and no items for personal hygiene. (b) The Government's account 45. In the temporary detention centre the applicant was kept in cell no. 15, measuring eight square metres, together with another inmate. A toilet was separated from the main area. The applicant, like other detainees, was provided with a bed and a mattress. Although no bedding was provided, detainees were allowed to use their own bedding. The applicant was also given various items for personal hygiene and allowed to have a shower once per week. The cell had adequate lighting, ventilation and heating systems. The applicant was allowed one hour of outdoor exercise per day, was properly fed and allowed to receive food parcels from his relatives or family. He had access to drinking water. The applicant made no complaints about his detention in the temporary detention centre until December 2004. 46. The applicant's initial description of the conditions of his detention in Barnaul remand centre no. 22/1 reads as follows. The applicant was placed in a cell situated in the basement of the building. The number of inmates in his cell substantially exceeded the design capacity. The cell had a small window, which was not glazed but was instead covered with metal shutters, barring access to natural air and light. The internal light was poor. The toilet was not separated from the main area. The cell was infested with cockroaches. The applicant slept on the floor. The unheated cell was extremely damp. The quality of food was unsatisfactory. During family visits and outdoor activity the applicant remained handcuffed. 47. The applicant subsequently amended his account, indicating that he had been kept in the remand centre from 3 to 12 March 2001, and between 24 March 2001 and 27 June 2002. In the most recent period of his detention he had been alone in cell no. 122 measuring 4.1 square metres in the basement of the remand centre. During that period, the unheated cell was extremely damp; there was no ventilation. The quality of food was unsatisfactory. No bedding was provided. The cell window was not glazed; it was covered with metal shutters, barring access to natural air and light. The internal light was poor. The toilet was not separated from the main area. (b) The Government's account 48. According to the Government, the applicant was kept in Barnaul remand centre no. 22/1 from 2 March 2001 to 6 April 2002 and from 7 to 27 June 2002. Between April and June 2002, the applicant was kept in a Chelyabinsk remand centre. 49. The Government explained that the relevant logbooks had been destroyed due to the expiry of the retention period. Thus, with reference to affidavits from Mr M, the remand centre governor, the Government affirmed that from 3 to 23 March 2001 the applicant was kept in cell no. 212, measuring 16.9 square metres; from 24 March to 25 April 2001 – in cell no. 190, measuring 16 square metres; from 26 April 2001 to 6 April 2002 – in cell no. 122, measuring 4.5 square metres; and from 7 to 27 June 2002 – in cell no. 118, measuring 4.3 square metres. The applicant shared cells nos. 190 and 212 with two or three other detainees; upon his request, he was detained alone in cells nos. 122 and 118. The latter cells were situated on the ground floor and had windows measuring 0.36 square metres. In compliance with the national legislation in force at the time, the windows were covered with metal shutters, which, however, did not bar the normal access of air and light into the cell. 50. Mr M confirmed that as of 24 July 2007 the above cells had proper lighting, ventilation and heating systems, water supply and toilet facilities. The Government supplied photographs showing the interior of the above cells. 51. In reply to the applicant's complaint, on 30 January 2002 the Prosecutor's Office of the Altay Region admitted that his handcuffing on one occasion had been unlawful. 52. In December 2004 the applicant complained about the conditions of his detention to various public authorities. On 19 January 2005 the Prosecutor's Office acknowledged that the cell windows in Barnaul remand centre had been covered with metal shutters but rejected the other allegations as untrue. 53. On 1 February 2005 the Regional Department of the Interior accepted that some (unspecified) complaints concerning the applicant's detention in the temporary detention centre “had been confirmed”. On 14 July 2005 the Tsentralniy district prosecutor's office forwarded the applicant's renewed complaint for examination by the Regional Department of the Interior. 54. The applicant brought proceeding against the Tsentralniy district prosecutor's office on account, inter alia, of their alleged failure to examine his complaint and to bring the conditions of detention into compliance with the law. Having examined the matter under Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 59 below), on 16 January 2006 the Tsentralniy District Court of Barnaul rejected his claim. On 16 March 2006 the Altay Regional Court set aside this decision and remitted the matter to the district court. The court held that the first-instance court should have examined why the applicant had been detained in the temporary detention centre for one month. On 29 March 2006 the District Court decided that the prosecutor had failed to examine the applicant's complaint about his lengthy detention in the temporary detention centre. 55. In the meantime, on 27 February 2006 the Regional Prosecutor's Office informed the applicant that the cells in the temporary detention centre had plank beds, toilet facilities and normally housed four to five persons; no bedding was provided to detainees. It is unclear whether the above reply concerned the year 2006 or the period complained of by the applicant. 56. It appears that, having examined the applicant's complaints about the conditions of his detention, on 5 September 2006 the district prosecutor's office refused to initiate criminal proceedings under Articles 285 and 286 of the Criminal Code, concerning abuse of power by a public official.

6. The applicant was born in 1982 and lives in Rankweil. 7. The applicant is a member of the “Bund Evangelikaler Gemeinden in Österreich”, which became a registered religious community (eingetragene Bekenntnisgemeinschaft) under the Registered Religious Communities Act 1998 (Bundesgesetz über die Rechtspersönlichkeit von religiösen Bekenntnisgemeinschaften) on 11 July 1998. 8. From 2000 to 2001 the applicant attended the one-year course of the St Chrischona theological seminary (Bibelschule) in Switzerland. Since then he has been giving religious instruction to the youth and has been working as a municipal preacher (Prediger). 9. On 27 September 2000 the applicant filed a request with the Federal Minister for Internal Affairs (Bundesminister für Inneres) for recognition as a conscientious objector (Zivildiensterklärung). 10. On 16 November 2000 the Minister for Internal Affairs recognised the applicant as a conscientious objector. Accordingly, he was exempted from the duty to perform military service but liable to perform civilian service (Zivildienst). 11. On 20 December 2000 the applicant requested the Minister of Internal Affairs to apply section 13a § 1 of the Civilian Service Act in conformity with the Constitution and to exempt him from the obligation to perform civilian service. He submitted that this provision exempted members of recognised religious societies who performed specific services relating to worship or religious instruction from the obligation to perform civilian service, whereas he, as a student of the theological seminary St. Chrischona, had a comparable clerical position within a registered religious community, namely the “Bund Evangelikaler Gemeinden in Österreich”. Consequently, he should be also exempted from civilian service. 12. On 18 January 2002 the Minister of Internal Affairs dismissed the applicant's request. The decision referred to the findings of the Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof) in a decision of 11 November 1998, in which it had held that exemption from the obligation to perform civilian service under section 13a of the Civilian Service Act merely applied to members of recognised religious societies and could not be extended to members of registered religious communities. 13. On 13 March 2002 the applicant filed a complaint with the Constitutional Court. 14. On 7 October 2002 the Constitutional Court declined to deal with the complaint for lack of prospects of success. 15. On the applicant's request the Constitutional Court transmitted his complaint to the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof). 16. On 18 February 2003 the applicant supplemented his complaint. On 18 March 2003 the Administrative Court, referring to the above-mentioned decision of 11 November 1998 by the Constitutional Court, dismissed the complaint. This decision was served on the applicant's counsel on 9 April 2003.

6. The applicant was born in 1948 in the Lerik Region, Azerbaijan, and currently lives in The Hague, the Netherlands. 7. Until 1988 the applicant was the deputy director of a transport warehouse in the city of Lenkoran, Azerbaijan. In 1988 he joined a political party and began his political career. When the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh broke out, he joined the national army and became one of its commanders. In the summer of 1993, at the time of the outbreak of a civil and political confrontation in the country, he returned from Nagorno‑Karabakh to his native Lenkoran. 8. In June 1993 the applicant put forward a proposal for an autonomous political formation in the south of Azerbaijan which would, in addition to Lenkoran itself, incorporate several adjacent regions. The central authorities considered this idea unacceptable. On 7 August 1993 the applicant, together with his supporters, proclaimed the creation of the so-called “Talysh-Mugan Autonomous Republic” (“Talış-Muğan Muxtar Respublikası”) within the Republic of Azerbaijan. The applicant was elected its “President”. At the same time, he attempted to take charge of the military units located in Lenkoran, as well as to depose and arrest some regional public officials appointed by the central authorities. Following this, certain public disorder evolved, during which several people were killed. 9. At the end of 1993, the applicant was arrested and detained in the detention centre of the Ministry of National Security. The investigation against him led to accusations of, inter alia, high treason and use of armed forces against the constitutional institutions of the State. 10. In September 1994 the applicant, along with three other detainees, absconded from the detention centre. The applicant went into hiding until August 1995 when he was finally caught and arrested for the second time. 11. According to the applicant, at all times while in pre-trial detention, he was subjected to various forms of ill-treatment. He was not allowed to see a doctor. Under the threat of his wife's arrest and criminal prosecution, he was compelled to give self-incriminating testimony. His close friends and relatives, including his wife and son, were also subjected to persecution and physical ill-treatment by the authorities. Fearing further persecution, his wife and son left the country and sought asylum in the Netherlands. 12. The applicant's criminal case was examined by the Military Chamber of the Supreme Court (Ali Məhkəmənin Hərbi Kollegiyası) sitting in first instance. He was tried together with six other accused persons. On 12 February 1996 the applicant was convicted of high treason (twelve years' imprisonment with confiscation of property), misappropriation of official power (two years' imprisonment), illegal deprivation of liberty (three years' imprisonment), unauthorised possession of weapons (five years' imprisonment), absconding from custody (two years' imprisonment), and creation of illegal armed units (death penalty with confiscation of property). By way of a merger of sentences, the applicant was sentenced to death and confiscation of property. Being a decision of the highest tribunal, this judgment was final and was not subject to appeal at the material time. 13. Following the conviction, in June 1996 the applicant was transferred to the 5th Corpus of Bayil Prison designated for convicts sentenced to death. Despite the existence of the death penalty as a form of punishment under the criminal law applicable at that time, the Azerbaijani authorities had pursued a de facto policy of moratorium on the execution of the death penalty since June 1993 until the abolition of the death penalty in 1998. 14. On 10 February 1998 Parliament adopted the Law on Amendments to the Criminal Code, Code of Criminal Procedure and Correctional-Labour Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan in Connection with the Abolition of the Death Penalty in the Republic of Azerbaijan, which amended all the relevant domestic legal provisions, replacing the death penalty with life imprisonment. The penalties of all the convicts sentenced to death, including the applicant, were to be automatically commuted to life imprisonment. 15. Despite this new penalty, the applicant was kept in the 5th Corpus of Bayil Prison (the former “death row”) up to January 2001. According to the applicant, the conditions of imprisonment in the Bayil Prison were harsh and inhuman, and beatings frequently occurred. He suffered from various serious diseases and could not get necessary and adequate medical treatment (see section C. below). In January 2001 he was transferred to the Gobustan High Security Prison (Qobustan Qapalı Həbsxanası; hereinafter “Gobustan Prison”) for prisoners serving life sentences. 16. In 2000 a new Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter “CCrP”) and new Criminal Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan were adopted. Before the new CCrP's entry into force on 1 September 2000, on 14 July 2000 Parliament passed a transitional law allowing the lodging of an appeal under the new CCrP against the final judgments delivered in accordance with the old criminal procedure rules. 17. Shortly after this, at the time of Azerbaijan's admission to the Council of Europe, the applicant was recognised as a “political prisoner” by independent experts of the Secretary General (in the experts' relevant reports the applicant's name was spelled as “Alikram Gumbatov”, possibly following the Russian transliteration of his name). Azerbaijan has made a commitment to either release or give a re-trial to all persons identified as “political prisoners” by these experts. 18. Following the reform of the domestic criminal and criminal procedure law in 2000 and in the light of Azerbaijan's undertaking before the Council of Europe to review the cases of “political prisoners”, on 20 December 2001 the Prosecutor General filed an appellate protest (apellyasiya protesti) with the Court of Appeal, requesting the court to allow the re-examination of the applicant's case. On 24 January 2002 the Court of Appeal upheld this request and allowed an appeal to be lodged against the Supreme Court's judgment of 12 February 1996. 19. On 29 January 2002 the applicant lodged his appellate complaint with the Court of Appeal. He asked the court to initiate a new investigation into the case, to hold a public hearing in an ordinary courtroom with the participation of media representatives and officials of foreign organisations, to obtain the attendance and examination of certain witnesses, and to evaluate the political events in the Lenkoran region in 1993. On 23 April 2002 the Court of Appeal decided to grant the applicant's requests for a new investigation and a public hearing, but dismissed the remaining requests. 20. The hearings on the merits were to be held at the detention centre of the Ministry of Justice. However, on 13 May 2002 the Court of Appeal changed the location of the hearings to Gobustan Prison since, as explained by the court, repair works were being carried out in the Ministry's detention centre. The applicant protested against this decision by refusing to attend any court hearings held in Gobustan Prison. On 14 May 2002 the Court of Appeal ordered his compulsory attendance. 21. The Court of Appeal's hearings on the merits took place in Gobustan Prison, which was equipped with a courtroom with a separate deliberation room, the total surface area of which was 150 square metres. According to the Government, this courtroom contained about 50 seats for observers. 22. The parties were in disagreement about the actual distance between Gobustan Prison and Baku (45 kilometres according to the Government and 75 kilometres according to the applicant). No regular public transportation from Baku to the prison was available. Because of the prison's strict access regime, persons wishing to attend the hearings as observers had to ask the presiding judge for permission to attend the hearing. The presiding judge, in turn, applied to the prison authorities with a request to grant such persons access to the prison. Observers who were granted access to the hearings were subject to a body search before entering the prison's courtroom. 23. The Court of Appeal held more than twenty hearings and examined testimonies from more than 60 witnesses, of which the statements of six persons, given during the first-instance trial, were read out during the hearings. 24. In the course of the appellate proceedings, the applicant submitted a number of petitions in which he, inter alia, challenged the impartiality of the court, requested that the court permit audio and video recording of the hearings, that the hearings be held in public and away from the high security prison, and that testimonies of additional witnesses and other additional evidence be admitted. The majority of these petitions were rejected by the Court of Appeal. 25. On 10 July 2003 the Court of Appeal delivered its final judgment concerning the applicant's criminal case. The Court of Appeal revoked the previous judgment of 12 February 1996 in its part concerning the confiscation of the applicant's property. The Court of Appeal, however, upheld the applicant's conviction and sentenced him to life imprisonment, pursuant to the criminal law applicable at the time the crimes were committed, but subject to the amendments introduced by the Law of 10 February 1998. 26. The applicant lodged an appeal in cassation with the Supreme Court. In his appeal, he complained, inter alia, that the Court of Appeal had breached material and procedural rules of domestic law, that the trial held in Gobustan Prison had not been public and fair, and that the life‑imprisonment sentence had been unlawful. 27. By a decision of 5 February 2004, the Supreme Court rejected the applicant's cassation appeal. The court retained the penalty of life imprisonment, but partly modified the Court of Appeal's judgment by re‑qualifying the underlying offence under Article 279.3 of the new Criminal Code of 2000, instead of applying the old Criminal Code of 1960 as amended by the Law of 10 February 1998. As to the applicant's complaint concerning the alleged lack of publicity of the appellate proceedings, the Supreme Court found that this complaint was unsubstantiated, as all necessary measures had been taken to ensure the possibility for independent observers to attend the trial. 28. The following account has been drawn up from the medical records submitted by the Government, inasmuch as the information contained therein was discernible. (a) Before 15 April 2002 29. After his arrest in August 1995, the applicant was detained in the temporary detention facility of the Baku City Police Office until 7 November 1995. No medical examinations were carried out on him during this time. 30. On 7 November 1995 he was transferred to Investigative Isolator No. 1 and detained there until 28 December 1995. On 8 November 1995 he was examined by a physician who noted that the applicant did not have tuberculosis and that no injuries could be observed on his person. The applicant also informed the physician that he had had two heart attacks in 1992. 31. From 28 December 1995 to 3 June 1996 the applicant was held in the detention facility of the Ministry of National Security. It appears that, during this period, he requested to see a physician several times and complained about heartaches, chest pains and worsening of eyesight. However, no serious diseases were diagnosed. 32. According to the applicant, in the Bayil Prison, where he was imprisoned from June 1996 to January 2001, he was at various periods held in one cell together with five other prisoners whose names were Ismail Bashirov (or Behbudov), Akif Gasimov, Hafiz Hajiyev, Azad Guliyev and Surgay. These persons were already seriously ill with tuberculosis and have all died since then. 33. Throughout 2006 the applicant complained several times of chest pains. In February-March 1997 the applicant was examined several times by a prison doctor and diagnosed with several ailments such as stenocardia, diffuse bronchitis and asthenia. He was 175 centimetres tall and weighed 55 kilograms around that time. 34. On 22 April 1997 the prison doctors diagnosed the applicant with pulmonary tuberculosis. On 23 April 1997 he underwent an X-ray examination which confirmed the diagnosis of “focal tuberculosis of the left lungs”. He was prescribed various medicines, including streptomycin, rifampicin, haemodez, multivitamins and vitamin B. A subsequent medical examination carried out on 15 April 1998 revealed that the disease was still active. On 7 September 1998 it was observed that the disease went into remission. 35. On 19 May 1999 the applicant was diagnosed with “tuberculosis in the remission phase” and prescribed isoniazid, rifampicin and multivitamins. On 7 September 1999 he was prescribed streptomycin and rifampicin. 36. In February 2000 the applicant was visited by representatives of the Helsinki Citizens Assembly who expressed their concern about the applicant's state of health and requested the authorities to take necessary measures. After this, on 16 March 2000, another medical examination by the prison doctors revealed the reactivation of tuberculosis and the necessity of in-patient treatment for the applicant. On 20 March 2000, the applicant was hospitalised in the Specialised Medical Establishment No. 3 for prisoners suffering from tuberculosis, located in the Bina settlement of Baku. 37. According to the applicant, he was ill-treated by the hospital's doctors and started receiving medical treatment only on 26 March 2000. The treatment was based on the World Health Organisation's DOTS (Directly Observed Treatment, Short-course) programme. The applicant was treated with isoniazid, ethambutol, rifampicin, streptomycin, pyrazinamide and multivitamins. On 18 May 2000 the applicant was judged to be “clinically recovered”, as the symptoms of tuberculosis were found to be mostly resolved. On 19 May 2000 the applicant was checked out of the hospital and returned to his prison cell. The actual duration of the applicant's in-patient treatment in the hospital comprised 49 days. 38. On 27 January 2001, after his transfer to Gobustan Prison, the applicant complained to the prison doctor about breathlessness, headaches, sweating, coughing and chest pains and was prescribed certain medications such as isoniazid, rifampicin and others. On 15 June 2001 the applicant was diagnosed with “focal tuberculosis of the left lungs in the consolidation phase” and streptococcal impetigo (a skin infection) and prescribed with medication treatment for the impetigo. On 16 July 2001 new medications were prescribed and it appears that the skin infection was subsequently cured. 39. On 11 February 2002 the applicant was diagnosed with chronic bronchopneumonia and chronic enterocolitis. (b) After 15 April 2002 40. From 23 April to 3 May 2002 the applicant was on a hunger strike protesting against the alleged unfairness of the proceedings in the Court of Appeal. During this time he was visited by a doctor on a daily basis. 41. On 5 May 2002, following his complaints about pain in his back, he was diagnosed with radiculitis and prescribed treatment with mustard plasters. On 10 May 2002 the applicant was diagnosed with “neurocirculatory dystonia of hypertonic type” and prescribed captopril, adelphan, papaverin, dibazol and other medication. 42. On 22 May 2002 he was examined by a phthisiatrician and complained about coughing, secretion of large amounts of phlegm, headaches, fever and general weakness. He was diagnosed with acute chronic bronchitis and prescribed kanamycin, biseptol, vitamin B and other medication. 43. On 14 November 2002, while the appellate proceedings were underway, the applicant's lawyer wrote a letter to the President of the Court of Appeal, claiming that the applicant's health condition had deteriorated and asking that a medical examination of the applicant be arranged. On 28 November 2002 the applicant was examined by three prison doctors who noted in their report that they did not establish any deterioration in the applicant's condition. 44. On 3 December 2002, pursuant to the same request, the applicant was examined by several prison doctors with the participation of specialists from the Medical Department of the Chief Directorate for Execution of Court Judgments (“CDECJ”), which at the material time was the subdivision of the Ministry of Justice. The applicant was diagnosed with “focal tuberculosis in the consolidation phase”, atherocardiosclerosis and internal haemorrhoids. The doctors concluded that neither out-patient nor in-patient treatment were required and advised the applicant to go on a diet and take warm sitz baths (a type of bath in which only the hips and buttocks are soaked in water), without specifying the type of diet and frequency of sitz baths. According to the applicant, prisoners had no access to hot water in their cells in Gobustan Prison and were allowed to take a hot shower once a week. 45. On 20 December 2002 the applicant was examined by a prison doctor who deemed his condition satisfactory and considered that there was no necessity for in-patient treatment. 46. On 4 January 2003 the applicant was medically examined following his complaints about general weakness, chest pain and headaches. He was diagnosed with ischemia, atherocardiosclerosis and stenocardia and prescribed several types of medication, including corvalol and aspirin. 47. On 9 February 2003 the applicant complained about pain in the anal area and was diagnosed with haemorrhoids. 48. On 18 February 2003 the applicant's lawyer made another request for a medical examination. This request was repeated on 27 February 2003. By a letter of 6 March 2003, the Head of the Medical Department of CDECJ, Mr K. Dadashov, responded that the applicant had been examined on 5 March 2003, that his condition was satisfactory, that in-patient treatment was not required and that he was receiving adequate symptomatic out‑patient treatment. 49. On 3 April 2003 the applicant was diagnosed with hypertension and bronchopneumonia, and prescribed a number of medications. 50. On 11 June 2003 the applicant was examined by an independent physician of the Azerbaijani Cardiology Centre who diagnosed him with hypertension, chronic bronchitis and osteochondrosis and prescribed several types of medication. 51. On 25 December 2003, having examined the applicant's medical records, the Head of the Medical Department of CDECJ, issued a medical report (the “CDECJ Report”), in which he expressed his medical opinion on the applicant's state of health. 52. Most of the CDECJ Report consisted of a detailed summary of the applicant's medical record in prison during the period from April 1997 to December 2003. The report mentioned the medical examinations carried out and the treatment prescribed on each occasion. The CDECJ Report stated that each disease had been treated with due care and, when necessary, the applicant had been provided with proper medication and other appropriate treatment, including the in-patient treatment for tuberculosis. The report suggested that, as a result of such treatment, the applicant's state of health had improved. In conclusion, it was stated that, by the time of issuance of the report, the applicant's state of health was satisfactory and that he needed neither out-patient nor in-patient treatment. 53. Pursuant to another request of the applicant's lawyer to provide urgent medical attention to the applicant, the applicant was examined by the doctors of CDECJ and the Ministry of Health on 10 June 2004. It was observed that he had atherocardiosclerosis, moderate changes in the myocardium, focal tuberculosis in the hardening phase, and residual signs of a craniocerebral trauma. The doctors decided that the applicant's condition was satisfactory and he needed neither in-patient nor out-patient treatment. 54. Upon the applicant's request, on 5 March 2004 the Chairman of the Medical Commission of the Azerbaijani National Committee of the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly issued an independent medical expert opinion (the “HCA Opinion”) based on the applicant's medical records. The expert noted that, in general, as a result of irregular and inappropriate medical examinations, the applicant had been given chaotic and insufficiently substantiated diagnoses and that the prescribed out-patient and in-patient medical treatment had been totally ineffective. 55. Specifically, the expert held that the belated initial detection of tuberculosis and imprecise diagnosis had led to the aggravation of the disease. Instead of the necessary etiopathogenetic therapy, the applicant had been given inadequate symptomatic treatment during a period of three to four months before he was finally diagnosed with tuberculosis, resulting in the progressive character of the disease. 56. The treatment given during the period from 1997 to 2000 did not correspond to any standards of active tuberculosis treatment, including the standards for the DOTS programme. As a result, until April 1998, the disease actually progressed and affected larger areas of the applicant's lungs. Although in September 1998 it was noted in the medical records that the disease went into remission, this fact was not clinically confirmed. As a result of such inappropriate treatment, in March 2000 the applicant's condition deteriorated and required hospitalisation. The in-patient treatment did not correspond to the standards of the DOTS programme, as it was shorter than required and the medicines were under-dosed. The necessary continuation phase of the DOTS treatment was not carried out after the applicant was checked out of the hospital. 57. The expert further noted that the treatment subsequent to the applicant's hospitalisation was also inadequate. In particular, after the medical examination of 27 January 2001, he was prescribed certain medicines based solely on his complaints and without a diagnosis. The dosage of medicines and term of treatment were arbitrary. Moreover, it was not realistically possible to follow certain types of prescribed treatment, such as a diet and sitz baths, in the prison conditions. 58. The expert also noted that, because of the applicant's strict imprisonment conditions, he was deprived of the opportunity to receive urgent medical aid during the daily closure of his wing of the Gobustan Prison from 7:00 p.m. to 11:00 a.m. of the next day. 59. Finally, the expert concluded that, as of the time of issuance of the HCA Opinion on 5 March 2004, due to intermittent arbitrary anti‑bacteriological treatment, the tuberculosis was not cured and appeared to acquire a chronic character with interchanging periods of remission and re-activation. The applicant had not received a precise and clinically confirmed diagnosis as well as any necessary and appropriate medical treatment corresponding to such diagnosis. 60. According to the applicant, as the authorities in Bayil Prison did not allow him to possess any writing material, he was unable to file any written complaints concerning the lack of appropriate medical treatment until he was transferred to Gobustan Prison on 5 January 2001. 61. On an unspecified date in 2001, the applicant made an attempt to file, through a lawyer, a complaint with a first instance court, claiming compensation from the authorities for the damage caused to his health by the allegedly harsh prison conditions and lack of necessary medical treatment. However, according to the applicant, the court refused to accept the complaint without specifying any reason. 62. In February 2004 the applicant filed, with the Sabail District Court, a lawsuit against the Ministry of Internal Affairs, demanding monetary compensation for deterioration of his health in the prison. On 3 March 2004 the Sabail District Court refused to admit the lawsuit, because the applicant failed to designate the Ministry of Finance as a co-defendant. The court noted that, under domestic law, any claim for monetary compensation from the State must be directed against the Ministry of Finance. 63. In March 2004 the applicant filed the lawsuit again, specifically noting the Ministry of Finance as a co-defendant. On 29 March 2004 the Sabail District Court refused to admit the lawsuit for lack of territorial jurisdiction. According to the court, lawsuits against the Ministry of Finance were subject to the territorial jurisdiction of the Nasimi District Court. The applicant challenged this decision in the Court of Appeal. 64. At the same time, he filed a similar lawsuit with the Nasimi District Court. On 13 April 2004 the Nasimi District Court refused to admit the lawsuit on the ground that the applicant had failed to properly formulate and legally substantiate his claim. 65. On 7 May 2004 the Court of Appeal examined the applicant's appeal from the Sabail District Court's decision of 29 March 2004. The Court of Appeal quashed this decision, holding that the Sabail District Court had territorial jurisdiction to examine the case, because one of the co‑defendants, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, was located within that court's jurisdiction. Accordingly, the case was remitted to the Sabail District Court for examination on the merits. 66. 20 October 2004, after the applicant's release and emigration (see section E. below), the Sabail District Court fixed the date of examination of the case as 10 November 2004. 67. According to a copy of the Sabail District Court's decision of 10 November 2004 submitted by the Government, the court decided, in accordance with Articles 259.0.7, 263 and 264 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to “leave without examination” the claim against the Ministries of Finance and Internal Affairs due to failure of both the claimant and the defendants to attend the hearing. The claimant's name was specified as “Huseynov Alakram Alakbar oglu”. It appears that the applicant became aware of the existence of this decision for the first time after the Government submitted its copy to the Court. 68. On 3 September 2004 the President issued a pardon decree releasing the applicant, among 244 other convicted persons, from serving the remainder of his prison sentence. On the same day, the President issued an instructive order granting the applicant's request to terminate his Azerbaijani citizenship. 69. According to the applicant, he made this “request to terminate his Azerbaijani citizenship” under pressure by the authorities in exchange for his pardon and subsequent release. On 3 September 2004 he wrote a letter to the President in which he withdrew his earlier “requests” of such nature which he claimed to have made under pressure. 70. The applicant was released from the prison only on 5 September 2004. He was immediately taken to the airport, where he boarded a flight to the Netherlands. 71. On 9 September 2004 the applicant applied for a residence permit in the Netherlands and was granted such permit on 20 September 2004. 72. The applicant sought medical treatment in the Netherlands. According to the records submitted, during medical examinations in 2004 and 2005, he complained of pains in the chest, shortness of breath, coughing, headaches, dizziness and concentration disturbances. It appears that, as of June 2006, the applicant still continued to be tested for tuberculosis.

9. The applicant is a multinational company specialising, inter alia, in the wholesale of petrochemical products, as was Neste at the time of relevance to the case. 10. In light of submissions lodged by another company in the field – Suomalainen Energiaosuuskunta (“SEO”) – the Competition Office (kilpailuvirasto, konkurrensverket), on 11 October 1993, initiated proceedings before the Competition Council (kilpailuneuvosto, konkurrensrådet), requesting that Neste be ordered to cease abusing its dominant position on the Finnish market for motor engine fuel. In the view of the Competition Office the reductions in Neste's wholesale prices discriminated against some of its clients, thereby violating the 1992 Act on Competition Restrictions (laki kilpailunrajoituksista, lag om konkurrensbegränsningar 480/1992). The Competition Office therefore requested that Neste be ordered to cease and desist from applying certain pricing criteria. 11. In a further submission of 11 February 1994 the Competition Office requested that an administrative fine (seuraamusmaksu, påföljdsavgift) be imposed. As a new fact the Competition Office referred to Neste's unwillingness to concede that it had been violating the relevant provisions and accordingly to change the price of fuel sold to SEO. 12. On 16 June 1994 the Competition Council held that Neste had abused its dominant position on the relevant market but found no reason to impose a fine on the company. Neste, SEO and the Competition Office all appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court (korkein hallinto-oikeus, högsta förvaltningsdomstolen). Neste maintained that it did not hold a dominant position on the market in question and in any case had not been abusing it. SEO appealed in so far as the Competition Council had accepted certain of Neste's criteria for price differentiation. The Competition Office contended that a fine should have been imposed. 13. On 9 and 14 September 1994 Neste forwarded to the Competition Office its interpretation of the Competition Council's decision as to the pricing criteria to be applied in light of the latter's decision. On 17 October 1994 the Competition Office replied that its interventions were limited to questions of principle. It could therefore not pronounce itself on Neste's proposed interpretation regarding the acceptable pricing criteria. 14. On 14 and 30 November 1994 Neste again drew the Competition Office's attention to its difficulties in interpreting the Competition Council's decision. 15. In a submission to the Supreme Administrative Court dated 26 June 1995 Neste demanded equality of arms in the proceedings. Reference was made to a telephone conversation between Neste's representative and a legal officer of the Supreme Administrative Court from which it had transpired that a secret memorandum of the Competition Office dated 19 June 1995 had been filed with the Supreme Administrative Court. The memorandum discussed Neste's conduct following the Competition Council's decision. The document had been released to Neste by the Competition Office itself on 22 June 1995 in response to the company's request. 16. In a further submission to the Supreme Administrative Court dated 24 July 1995 Neste challenged the accuracy of the Competition Office's memorandum, including the conclusions drawn. Neste again objected to the Supreme Administrative Court's failure to hear it formally in respect of the Competition Office's observations and apparently other memoranda. 17. By decision of 30 November 1995 (reported in its 1995 Yearbook A, p. 246) the Supreme Administrative Court, without commenting on Neste's procedural objections of 26 June and 24 July 1995, upheld the Competition Council's decision in large part. The court found, inter alia, that Neste, being in a dominant position on the relevant market, could in principle have objectively justifiable grounds for treating its clients differently according to certain criteria. In the case under examination Neste had not, however, shown any convincing grounds for differentiating between its clients on any ground other than on the basis of the volume of fuel purchased. By applying other pricing criteria Neste had accordingly abused its dominant position. 18. Having concluded that a fine should have been imposed on Neste, the Supreme Administrative Court referred the fixing of its amount to the Competition Council. It further ordered that Neste's conduct after 16 June 1994, in respect of which the court had received “substantial new information”, was to be taken into account. The court declined to examine itself what significance should be given to that information. 19. The Supreme Administrative Court's case-file indicates that it deliberated on 22 and 30 May as well as on 14 June 1995. 20. On 4 December 1995 the Competition Council confirmed to the parties that the sole question which remained to be decided was the size of the fine to be imposed on Neste. In January 1996 the Competition Office proposed a fine in the amount of 100,000,000 Finnish Marks (FIM) (approximately 16,819,000 euros (EUR) ). This proposal was rejected by the Competition Council. The Competition Office then filed a new proposal in which the amount of the fine was maintained but on different grounds. 21. In the beginning of 1996 Neste's representative found in the Supreme Administrative Court's case-file a copy of further observations drawn up by the Competition Office and dated 6 March 1995. They bore a stamp indicating that they had been received by the Supreme Administrative Court on 8 March 1995. The Competition Office had forwarded a copy to the Competition Council but not to Neste. The observations sought to refute Neste's arguments by highlighting the salient points of a 1994 decision of the European Commission in the case Texaco v. Norsk Hydro which the Competition Office argued supported the Competition Council's decision of 16 June 1994. The Supreme Administrative Court had not heard Neste in respect of those observations. 22. Following an oral hearing the Competition Council, by decision of 30 October 1996, fixed Neste's fine at FIM 2,000,000 (about EUR 336,000). It noted that Neste's pricing practice from 1 January to 8 February 1993 had clearly discriminated against SEO and had been found to be unlawful under the 1992 Act. While the prohibited pricing practice had not been significant in nature, it had not been so insignificant as to justify a waiver of the fine. 23. As regards Neste's conduct from 17 June 1994 to 30 November 1995 the Competition Council found that it had not deviated to such an extent from its decision of 16 June 1994 as to justify the imposition of a fine. In addition, Neste's attempts to obtain approval of its amended pricing practice had been in vain, since the Competition Office had failed in its obligation to direct and supervise the implementation of that decision. Accordingly, no fine was imposed for Neste's conduct during that period. 24. On 5 July 2000 the Supreme Administrative Court refused, in extraordinary proceedings, the applicant company's request for an annulment of its decision of 30 November 1995 in the ordinary proceedings under the 1992 Act. The court found that no procedural error had taken place and reasoned, inter alia, that in so far as it had ordered that the fine to be imposed on Neste should take account of its conduct between the Competition Council's decision of 16 June 1994 and the court's decision of 30 November 1995, it had not become evident that the court had based itself on material in respect of which Neste had not been heard. Moreover, the court had expressly declined to draw any conclusion as to whether the supplementary information received by it should be taken into account when considering the amount of the fine to be imposed.

9. On 29 December 1967 the first applicant and her husband purchased a forester’s house with a barn and cowshed which they had been renting since 1953. The sale price – 14,703 Czechoslovak korunas (CSK) – was fixed by a surveyor appointed by the landlord, a State enterprise which was also the couple’s employer and which had acquired the house without compensating the former owners, who had been dispossessed of their property in 1948 pursuant to Law no. 142/1947 on revision of the First Land Reform (zákon o revizi první pozemkové reformy). 10. On 30 June 1968 the first applicant and her husband paid the vendor CSK 2,030 under the terms of an agreement giving them the right to make personal use of the land attached to the house. 11. On 23 December 1992, after the entry into force of Law no. 229/1991 (zákon o půdě – “the Land Act”), the son of the persons to whom the forester’s house had belonged until its confiscation in 1948 instituted proceedings in the Příbram District Court (okresní soud) seeking recovery of the property by virtue of section 8(1) of the Land Act. He alleged that the acquisition of the house by the first applicant and her husband had been vitiated by a breach of the regulations in force at the time and that they had enjoyed an unlawful advantage in that the price they had been required to pay had been lower than the property’s real value. He argued that the valuation of the house had been neither objective nor compatible with the legislation then in force. 12. In their defence, filed with the District Court on 12 February 1993, the applicants submitted that the purchase price had been properly calculated in accordance with the provisions applicable at the material time, and pointed out that the contract of sale had been adjudged valid by the Příbram branch of the State notary service (státní notářství), which had registered it. 13. On 7 February 1994 the District Court commissioned an expert opinion to establish whether the 1967 valuation had complied with the regulations then in force. The expert’s report was filed with the court on 30 March 1994. In it the expert stated that after studying the file and the 1967 valuation he had found that “this valuation was not entirely compatible with the legislation in force at the time” and that he had “in addition noted instances of underestimation of area”. He had therefore decided to “carry out a complete revaluation, applying the legislation formerly applicable and taking as [his] basis the state of affairs as described in the course of the proceedings” in order to be able to compare the two valuations and quantify the difference between them. The expert report assessed (a) the inhabitable parts of the property and (b) the non-inhabitable parts, namely the barn and cowshed. With regard to the latter, the expert reported: “... the small barn and the adjoining cowshed were classified as ‘small constructions’, as they served only for the use of the occupier, not for any agricultural activity. That led to an essential difference between the valuation produced ... in 1967 and the present one. My valuation is justified by a written instruction of 1965 relating to Article 7, which provides: ‘The purchase price may also be applied to small constructions used for animal husbandry, provided that this activity does not go beyond the personal needs of the owner and the members of his family.’ The barn is currently used as a toolshed. ... My classification of the two buildings complied with Annex 5 to Decree no. 73/1964 ... I took the barn and cowshed to be possessions in personal ownership, as they were not used for agricultural activities but only for the needs of the owner. If they had been private property the legislation then in force would not have permitted their transfer. Public establishments could sell to individuals only buildings classifiable as properties in personal ownership ... The difference in price for these two buildings, in relation to the 1967 valuation, is nearly CSK 4,600 ...” 14. The applicants pointed out that the expert’s valuation of the inhabitable parts of the premises was practically identical to the 1967 valuation, the difference of CSK 4,600 being solely due to the valuation of the barn and cowshed. They challenged the valuation procedure because it had been based on Decree no. 73/1964, which did not specify the prices applicable in practice to buildings belonging to socialist organisations, and whose Article 7 § 2, they argued, excluded its application to their case. They further submitted that the price difference that had been noted was due in large part to a different assessment of the depreciation to be taken into account for the two buildings in question. 15. After the death of the first applicant’s husband, her son, the second applicant, became the co-owner of the forester’s house. 16. In a judgment of 12 September 1994 the District Court allowed the application by the son of the former owners and decided to transfer title to the disputed property to him, ruling as follows: “After assessing the evidence, particularly the depositions of the parties and the witnesses, the contract of sale registered by the Příbram State notary service on 3 February 1969, the agreement of 30 June 1968 conferring the right to make personal use of the land, ..., the valuation of the house ... made on 20 December 1967 ..., the expert report of 15 December 1992, drawn up in accordance with instructions from [the first applicant] and admitted by the court in evidence, ..., and the expert report on the price of the buildings, drawn up by the court-appointed expert ..., the Court notes that ... the Land Act (Law no. 229/1991) applies, since the dispute concerns transfer of title to buildings intended for forestry production, within the meaning of section 1(1)(c) of the Land Act ... The claimant ... is entitled to claim restitution under the restitution legislation ... The members of the defendants’ family were not leading figures of the former communist regime but simple forestry workers who moved into the house as employees of the enterprise. They agreed to buy it when their employer gave them the opportunity to do so because they had no alternative accommodation. As for the purchase price, they accepted the amount fixed by [the surveyor], which they had no reason to challenge. Nevertheless, it is incontestable that whereas the purchase price of the house should have been fixed at CSK 19,477, it cost them only CSK 14,703. Consequently, the conditions of section 8(1) of the Land Act are satisfied in the instant case because, in 1967, the defendants acquired the property at a price lower than the true value. The difference amounted to a quarter of the true value.” 17. On 11 October 1994 the applicants appealed against the above judgment to the Prague Regional Court (krajský soud). They submitted that at the time when the proposal that they should purchase the house had been made to them they were under threat of eviction. They pointed out that both the surveyor’s report and the contract of sale had been drawn up by the vendor, and that the transaction had been effected in accordance with the legislation then in force – indeed the Příbram State notary service had verified the purchase price before registering the contract. They alleged that the court expert’s report did not constitute sufficient proof that the purchase price had been lower than the price required by the regulations at that time. They accordingly asked the Regional Court to order a new expert report. 18. On 4 January 1995 the Prague Regional Court upheld the first-instance judgment, ruling as follows: “It emerges from the [1994] expert report ... that the valuation made [in 1967] did not comply with the rules in force at the time. ... The barn and the cowshed should have been valued as buildings in personal ownership, since they were not used for agricultural purposes but had been placed at the disposal of the owners of the house. ... According to Regulation 10/1964 of the Ministry of Economic Affairs ... only buildings in personal ownership could be sold to citizens by a socialist organisation. If the regulation then in force and Decree no. 73/1964 had been applied, the purchase price would have been fixed at CSK 19,477. Consequently, the Regional Court upholds the District Court’s finding that the question of the transfer of title must be considered under Law no. 229/1991 ... It has been established that the purchase price was determined by the vendor without the benefit of any expert report ... and that it was lower than the price required by the rules on prices then in force, which is apparent from the [court] expert’s report. As to the appellants’ objection that the contract of sale was registered by the State notary service ... which deemed the barn and cowshed to be buildings in private ownership, it should be noted that this classification was the result of a legal opinion which is not a binding precedent for adjudication of the case ... Moreover, regard being had to the fact that the claimant has already obtained the restitution of 50 hectares of woodland, it is desirable, in accordance with Law no. 229/1991 ..., for the forester’s house to be used for its original purpose.” 19. On 17 March 1995 the applicants appealed to the Constitutional Court (Ústavni soud), submitting that they had purchased the house in accordance with the rules then in force and without any unlawful advantage. They also relied on Article 399 § 2 of the Civil Code, under which a contract of sale could be declared void only when the purchase price was too high. They argued that the Regional Court had deprived them of their property and that accordingly their right to protection of their property under Article 11 § 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (Listina základních práv a svobod) had been infringed. They further complained that they had been deprived of fair and appropriate compensation, contending that although by virtue of section 8(3) of the Land Act a natural person was entitled to reimbursement of the purchase price and the costs reasonably incurred for the upkeep of the property, the sum of 14,703 Czech korunas (CZK) for the purchase price and reimbursement of their costs could never make good the loss of the house. They had been deprived of their title to the property on account of the difference noted between two prices calculated according to two different methods. Moreover, in the judicial proceedings they had not been on an equal footing with the other party, particularly in view of the possibility the claimant enjoyed of consulting the relevant documents. In that connection they relied on Article 37 of the Charter. 20. The applicants also asked the Constitutional Court to stay execution of the Regional Court’s judgment and declare null and void part of section 8(1) of the Land Act. They argued that in so far as the provision in question permitted restitution in the event of “the purchase of immovable property at a price lower than the price required by the regulations on prices then in force”, thus threatening title acquired in accordance with the legislation applicable at the time of purchase, it gave former owners the possibility of challenging the valuation of properties made at the time of their transfer. They asserted that section 8(1) of the Land Act thus caused them prejudice identical to that caused between 1948 and 1989, which the Act was supposed to attenuate. They submitted that it was inadmissible to make natural persons who had acquired property in good faith and in accordance with the legislation applicable at the material time bear responsibility for unlawful decisions or incorrect procedures adopted by the State. 21. On 24 April 1995 the applicants asked the District Court to stay execution of the Prague Regional Court’s judgment, to exempt them from payment of the costs of the proceedings and to reopen the case. In the latter application they based their arguments on an opinion on the question of methodology delivered by the author of an exegesis of the relevant legislation published by the Czech Prices Authority (Český cenový úřad), which in their submission proved unequivocally that the court expert had made a mistake. They also submitted to the District Court documents from the State archives capable of proving what use the disputed property had been put to in the past. 22. On 21 April 1995 people living in the municipality of Hříměždice and other villages sent a petition to the President of the Republic and to Parliament expressing their belief that the human rights guaranteed by the Constitution had been infringed in the applicants’ case. They pointed out that the son of the former owners had recovered possession of a large estate (40 hectares of woodland and 100 hectares of other land), whereas the applicants had lost nearly all their possessions, although they had acquired them in good faith. 23. On 20 June 1995, in response to the petition, an MP sent a written question to the Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister of Agriculture and the Director of the Legislation and Public Administration Office, saying that he wondered whether section 8(1) of the Land Act, which provided for the possibility of restitution in the event of “the purchase of immovable property at a price lower than the price required by the regulations on prices then in force”, was not contrary to the principle of legal certainty, in so far as it made it possible to transfer the responsibility for unlawful acts by the State to individuals who had acted in good faith. He also considered problematical, from the point of view of equality between litigants, legal provisions such as section 21(a) of the Land Act, which guaranteed persons who could claim restitution the right to various forms of assistance or exemption from costs in the judicial proceedings. 24. The Deputy Prime Minister replied on 7 July 1995. He said the doubts expressed were unfounded and pointed out that the Land Act had been framed in such a way as to pose, in addition to the general conditions, three additional tests each designed to exclude the purchasers’ good faith. The fact that the Land Act referred to the legislation in force at the time of purchase could not be considered to impair legal certainty on account of some retrospective effect. 25. On 23 August 1995 the District Court examined at a public hearing the applicants’ application for the proceedings to be reopened. Despite a new expert report submitted by them and drawn up on their own initiative, it refused the application, noting, inter alia, that in the original proceedings neither party had called as a witness the expert appointed by the court and that it was only on appeal that the applicants had asked for the expert evidence to be reviewed. Consequently, the statutory conditions for a retrial had not been met in the instant case. 26. On 27 September 1995 the applicants appealed against the above decision, asserting that they had submitted evidence which it would have been objectively impossible for them to present during the original proceedings. On 26 February 1996 the Prague Regional Court upheld the decision of 23 August 1995, holding that there were no facts, decisions or evidence which it would have been impossible for the defendants to rely on in the initial proceedings. However, it gave leave for an appeal on points of law against its ruling. 27. On 11 April 1996, therefore, the applicants appealed on a point of law to the Supreme Court (Nejvyšší soud). They argued that in the proceedings on their appeal against the judgment which had transferred title they had proposed in vain the commissioning of a second expert report and that the Regional Court’s attitude had prompted them to have a new expert report drawn up on their own initiative. 28. On 13 January 1997 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicants’ constitutional appeal as manifestly ill-founded, ruling as follows: “The alleged violation of Article 11 § 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms must be examined not just from the appellants’ point of view but also from that of the person claiming restitution... The Court refers in that connection to its judgment published under file no. 131/1994 ..., in which it noted that the purpose of restitution was to attenuate infringements of the rights of real-property owners by making reparation for the unlawful act committed at the time of the transfer of the property and by giving priority to the restitution of properties in their original condition. Consequently, the Court cannot find a violation of Article 11 § 1 unless the statutory conditions for restitution are satisfied. ... The annulment sought by the applicants, of part of section 8(1) of the Land Act (Law no. 229/1991), would have limited the right to restitution and would have harmed the interests of a large number of restitution claimants ... The laws on restitution must establish the conditions for redressing wrongs, it being understood that it is for the national courts to examine all the circumstances in the light of the purport and general object of those laws. The reporting judge has established, in the light of all the documents submitted, that the ordinary courts correctly applied the law to the case in allowing the claim for restitution and in deciding that title should be transferred to the claimant ..., as the appellant and her husband had bought the house at a price lower than the price resulting from application of the rules on prices then in force. As regards violation of Article 37 of the Charter, which enshrines the principle of equality between litigants, the Court notes that during the judicial proceedings the courts scrupulously examined both the evidence adduced by the person claiming restitution and the evidence adduced by the defendants. ... Having regard to the circumstances of the case, the reporting judge did not deem it necessary to stay execution of the Regional Court’s judgment, bearing in mind the fact that if the appellants were to be evicted they would be allocated alternative accommodation.” 29. On 24 March 1997 the applicants submitted further grounds for their appeal on points of law (dovolání), observing that all the courts dealing with their case, including the Constitutional Court, had proceeded on the assumption that the report of the court-appointed expert was correct, whereas, among other defects, it had been established on the basis of a directive from the Ministry of Economic Affairs which had no legal validity, and that Decree no. 73/1964 was not applicable to the case. They also drew attention to the fact that, according to the second expert report drawn up at their request, the purchase price they had paid in 1967 was not lower but higher than the price required by the legislation in force at the time of the sale. 30. On 28 April 1997 the Supreme Court declared the applicants’ appeal on points of law inadmissible, pointing out that it could have been admitted in the initial proceedings but could not be in proceedings brought by means of an application for a retrial. 31. The applicants were reimbursed by the Ministry of Agriculture the purchase price they had paid in 1967 and the sum they had paid for the right to make personal use of the land. They thus received altogether CZK 16,733. On the other hand, reimbursement of the costs they had reasonably incurred for the upkeep of the house was put off on account of a disagreement between the applicants and the State over the applicable rate. According to the applicants, the State had announced that it was prepared to pay them CZK 156,646 but had never made the slightest payment, in spite of their request that it do so. The amount must therefore be fixed by the District Court, the applicants having brought an action against the Ministry of Agriculture in April 2000 seeking payment in the sum of CZK 364,430. 32. According to the information supplied by the parties, the new owner of the property has not to date offered the applicants alternative accommodation and they still live in the house. They contended that the new owner had refused to sign a tenancy agreement with them in order to regularise the situation but had brought an action in the District Court seeking payment of arrears of rent in the sum of CZK 28,072 (corresponding to more than CZK 900 per month), plus default interest. Apparently this action led on 31 March 2000 to an order to pay being made against them. When they appealed, two hearings were seemingly held on 27 April and 26 June 2000, and the owner, it would appear, is now seeking a still higher sum, corresponding to a rent of CZK 1,200 per month. The applicants observe that the proceedings they brought in April 2000 in order to determine how much they should be reimbursed for the costs they incurred for the upkeep of the property are still pending. They therefore consider that their position vis-à-vis the public authorities is less favourable than that of the new owner.

4. The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Irpin. 5. On 23 March 2005 the applicant sent to the State Tax Administration a letter in which she complained that the management of the Academy of the State Tax Service, which was under the authority of the State Tax Administration and at which her son had studied before being expelled in 2004, were engaging in unlawful and corrupt activities. 6. The relevant parts of the letter read as follows: “I address you concerning the real situation at the Academy ... [This letter] will concern the flagrantly unfair attitude towards students of the Law Faculty, headed by [S.], to students' parents, with the complete ... support ... of the President of the Academy [M.]... The reason for [addressing you] is a television report, broadcasted on 22 March 2005, concerning the student protest organised by [M.] against [his] dismissal from the post of President of the Academy. I really hope that my letter can influence the course of events. My son, Mr Yaroslav Siryk, [who] had successfully and independently entered the Law Faculty of [the Academy], was expelled from it ... I could not even imagine that the methods described below were applied in a State educational institution ... ... My son missed the beginning of studies because of a severe infectious disease ... Subsequently, I was called [to the Law Faculty] and during a private conversation [S.] told me that [students] like my son could not study at her faculty under the normal conditions, and that if I did not want to have problems with [graduation] I had to agree to additional financial conditions, in particular, to pay her 200 [United States dollars] for every exam, and 50 [United States dollars] for every test ... After my unconditional refusal, my road of sorrows began ... Two or three times a week I was called to the office of the Dean [of the Law Faculty] for numerous [discussions of problems], one of the first of which concerned the checking of [my son's] medical documents ... the [professors] shouted at me, called me a swindler and so on ... Because he had been on sick leave ... and because of the enduring tense discussions with the Dean and the Deputy Dean ... my son did not have normal conditions in which to study... When I tried to enter the office of the Dean in order to discuss that matter, she ... simply ... pushed me out of the office ... And I wrote a detailed complaint to the President [of the Academy] ... (a copy is enclosed) ... [T]he President ordered that my son be allowed additional time to take the winter exams... [H]owever, afterwards arbitrariness on a larger scale began: professors were simply receiving from [S.] and [the Deputy Dean B.] ... categorical instructions not to allow my son to take exams... Those instructions were rigorously complied with, as the staff of the Academy was hired on the basis of personal loyalty towards the management or dependency on the management [of the Academy]: numerous relatives ... close friends ... former students [of the Academy] ... about whose knowledge, competence and work experience it is not possible to speak. It is difficult for them to find another job, therefore they are ready to fulfil any assignments, obey any wishes of the management ... ... [S.] and [B.] became so impudent that together they conducted negotiations with me concerning extra-contractual payments [for my son's studies] at the office of [S.]. In a normal civilised country [people] would have already compared the earnings of the State servants and their standard of living. What [amount of] salary enables the Dean of the faculty [S.] to wear different exclusive imported clothes and diamonds every day?! ... This was the rudeness, extortion and derision which I endured during the educational year at the State institution, having paid a substantial amount of money [for the education]. The most alarming thing in this story is that our case is not the only one ... At the same time [as this was happening to us] ... more than twenty persons were simply kicked out of the Academy in the same way ... the teachers received from the Dean or the Deputy Dean categorical instructions not to allow a particular student to take an exam ... The whole process of the intentional expulsion of certain [students] and the admission of others on a contractual basis is ... a system of extorting of money from the parents devised by the management of the faculty and the Academy ... All the actions of [S.], approved by [M.], demonstrate [their] legal incompetence and ruthless abuse of power, though the old [State] regime generously appraised her 'achievements'; during its last days [the old regime] awarded [S.] the title of Distinguished Lawyer, and the President of the Academy promoted her to First Vice‑President [of the Academy] I hoped the new authorities would sort everything out, but [people like S. and M.] feel perfectly at home under any regime. In addition to the violations described [above], I ask you to look at the following: 1. On what does [the Academy] spend the budgetary funds and the money from [students'] parents? - why does the President of ... [the Academy, in whose possession] there is an expensive 'Mercedes', additionally buy an 'Audi A-8' for [the price of] 800,000 [Ukrainian] hryvnias?! - what is the source of the money and what is the need for the business trips on which [M.] and [S.] constantly go? - what are the earnings [allowing] the State servant [S.] to wear different expensive ... clothes and diamonds every day? - how did [S.] manage to gain her doctor's degree so soon [after] having completed her higher education at the Academy ... - what benefits does [the Academy] receive from the companies of [M's] brother and sister? - on what grounds did the staff of the Academy obtain double salary payments at the end of 2004 ... As regards the activities of those persons during the [Presidential] election [of 2004] ... [M.] and [S.] ... did not let students take part in meetings in support of Yushchenko ... Students were forced ... to vote in the Academy under the supervision of the professors ... According to the parents of students [wishing to enter the Academy], during the [2004] summer admission campaign [M.] ... openly stated that he was collecting money for the [Presidential] election [of 2004] ... The only thing which I wish to try to achieve [is] that my letter helps to restore justice in our small Irpin region ...” 7. In April 2005 Ms S., who was at the time the First Vice-President of the Academy, instituted defamation proceedings against the applicant in the Kyyevo-Svyatoshynskyi District Court of the Kyiv Region. 8. Ms S. alleged that by a letter of 23 March 2005 the applicant had disseminated untrue and defamatory statements about her, and asked the court to order the retraction of the statements. Ms S. also claimed compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 9. The applicant, in her turn, contended that the information contained in the impugned letter was based on facts, some of which could be confirmed by witnesses. She also argued that her statements were, for the most part, value judgments, for which she should not be held responsible pursuant to section 47 of the Information Act. The applicant, relying on the decisions of courts in similar, according to her, defamation cases, also submitted that by her letter of 23 March 2005 she had simply informed the higher authorities about irregularities at the Academy and had not disseminated the statements about Ms S. within the meaning of Article 277 of the Civil Code of 2003. 10. By a letter of 29 April 2005 the applicant requested the President of the Supreme Court to transfer the case to a district court in Kyiv, stating that Ms S's husband worked as a judge in the Irpin Town Court of the Kyiv Region and could influence the outcome of the proceedings before the Kyyevo-Svyatoshynskyi District Court. By a letter of 3 June 2005 the Deputy President of the Supreme Court informed the applicant that her request had been rejected as unfounded. 11. On 25 June 2005 the Kyyevo-Svyatoshynskyi District Court, relying on Articles 277 and 280 of the Civil Code of 2003, ruled in part in favour of Ms S. It found that the applicant had failed to prove her statements that the latter had treated the students and their parents unfairly; that she had demanded from the applicant a payment for every exam and test which the applicant's son had had to sit; that she had been rude or shouted at the applicant; that she had called the applicant a swindler; that she had pushed the applicant out of the office; that she had given instructions to the professors not to allow the applicant's son to take exams; that she had not allowed students to attend the meetings in support of V. A. Yushchenko during the Presidential election; that the actions of Ms S. had demonstrated that she was legally incompetent; and that she had exceeded her powers. 12. The court further held that the above statements had been publicly disseminated, as the letter had been addressed to a legal entity and the applicant could have foreseen that it would be read by more than one person. It also noted that Ms S. had acquainted herself with the text of the letter in the presence of the President of the Academy and representatives of the State Tax Administration. 13. The court declared the above statements to be untrue and defamatory and ordered the applicant to retract them by rescinding the impugned letter. The court also ordered her to pay Ms S. 1,000 Ukrai[1]nian hryvnias (UAH) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 14. On 14 October 2005 the Kyiv Regional Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of the first-instance court in full. 15. On 25 July 2006 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's request for leave to appeal in cassation as unsubstantiated.

8. The applicant was born in 1944 and lives in Prešov. 9. The applicant worked in the State administration of the school system. He occupied a leading post that fell within the purview of section 1 of Act No. 451/1991 Coll. (“the Lustration Act”) which defined some supplementary requirements for holding certain posts in public administration. 10. In January 1992 the applicant’s employer requested, pursuant to section 6 of the Lustration Act, that the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (“the Federal Ministry”) issue a clearance (lustračné osvedčenie) concerning the applicant under section 9 of the Lustration Act (see below). 11. On 19 March 1992 the Federal Ministry issued a negative security clearance. It stated that it was based on section 9 (1) of the Lustration Act and certified that the applicant “[was] registered as a person referred to in section 2 (1) (b) of the Lustration Act”. This provision defined six categories of collaborators of the [former] State Security Agency (Štátna bezpečnosť, “StB”) who, if registered as such in the StB’s files in the period from 25 February 1948 to 17 November 1989, were disqualified from holding certain posts in public administration. The document was served on the applicant on 26 March 1992. 12. The applicant resigned from his post. In 1994 he left his employer completely, having felt compelled to do so. Since then the applicant has been commuting to work in a location remote from his place of residence. 13. The information about who was registered in the StB files in the categories referred to in section 2 (1) (b) of the Lustration Act has been made public in newspapers and, unofficially as well as officially, on the internet. 14. On 25 May 1992 the applicant lodged an action against the Federal Ministry for protection of his good name and reputation under Article 11 et seq. of the Civil Code with the Prague (the Czech Republic) City Court (Městský soud). He claimed that his registration as a collaborator of the StB was wrongful and unjustified. He requested that the Federal Ministry issue a new clearance to the effect that he was not registered as a person referred to in section 2 (1) (b) of the Lustration Act. 15. The City Court subsequently sent a copy of the action to the defendant, invited the applicant to pay the court fee and listed a hearing for 6 August 1992. 16. On 23 July 1992 the applicant filed a request under Article 12 §§ 2 and 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure for a transfer of his action to the Košice Regional Court (Krajský súd). On 29 July 1992 he demanded that the hearing scheduled for 6 August 1992 be cancelled in view of his request for transfer of the action. 17. On 7 August 1992, after the applicant had paid the court fee, the City Court sent a copy of the request of 23 July 1992 to the defendant for comments. On 23 September 1992 the latter objected to the transfer. 18. On 24 September 1992 the City Court submitted the case file to the Supreme Court (Najvyšší súd) of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic for a determination as to which court was to entertain the action at first instance. 19. On 4 November 1992 the Supreme Court ruled that the action fell to be determined by the Regional Court. The case file was sent to it on 13 November 1992. 20. On 16 November 1992 the Regional Court requested the defendant’s observations in reply. In a letter of 25 November 1992 the defendant replied that it had already filed its observations with the City Court. On 10 December 1992 the City Court transferred those observations to the Regional Court. 21. On 18 February 1993 the Regional Court invited the applicant to specify which public body possessed the powers conferred by the Lustration Act in the area of security screening after the dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic on 1 January 1993. On 26 February 1993 the applicant responded that the body currently responsible for security screening in Slovakia was the Ministry of the Interior of the Slovak Republic (“the Slovak Ministry”). It was thus understood that the action was directed against the said Ministry. 22. On 9 March and 8 April 1993 the Regional Court invited the applicant to submit within ten days second copies of the action and of the submissions of 26 February 1993. 23. On 21 April 1993 the Regional Court invited the Slovak Ministry to present its observations in reply to the action. In its response of 6 May 1993 the Ministry primarily contested its standing to be sued in the case, arguing that it had not assumed the authority of the Federal Ministry under the Lustration Act. Relying on Resolution no. 276 of the Government of Slovakia of 20 April 1993 (“Resolution no. 276”), the defendant asserted that the body which had taken over those powers under the Lustration Act was the Slovak Intelligence Service (Slovenská informačná služba – “the SIS”). The Ministry also maintained that under the said resolution the Prime Minister of Slovakia was entrusted with the task of preparing jointly with the Minister of Justice of Slovakia a petition to the Slovak Constitutional Court (Ústavný súd) for a review of the constitutionality of the Lustration Act. 24. On 4 October 1993 the applicant amended his submissions of 26 February 1993 on the ground that the Federal Ministry’s powers under the Lustration Act had devolved to the SIS, against which the action was accordingly directed. 25. On 21 October 1993 the Regional Court invited the SIS to present its observations in reply. The defendant submitted the observations on 16 November 1993 and on 9 December 1993 the Regional Court sent their copy to the applicant. 26. On 9 May 1994 the Regional Court held a hearing at which the applicant modified the subject‑matter of the action in that he sought a judicial ruling declaring that his registration as a person referred to in section 2 (1) (b) of the Lustration Act was wrongful. The applicant further informed the court that he wished to call ex-StB agents P., K. and M. as witnesses. He submitted the addresses of P. and K. and stated that he would submit the address of M. later. The defendant consented to the modification of the action and maintained that the relevant ex-StB documents were held in the archives of the Federal Ministry. The hearing was adjourned with a view to obtaining these documents. 27. On 10 June 1994 the Regional Court sent a letter to the Federal Ministry inviting it to submit copies of the relevant ex-StB documents. The letter was returned unanswered as “undelivered”. 28. On 12 September 1994, on the basis of a treaty of 29 October 1992 between the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic on mutual legal assistance (“the mutual legal assistance treaty of 1992”), the Regional Court sent a letter rogatory to the City Court requesting that it obtain from the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic (“the Czech Ministry”) copies of all ex-StB documents in its possession concerning the applicant. 29. On 27 September 1994 the City Court advised the Regional Court that the request had been submitted to the Czech Ministry, which would reply directly to the Regional Court. 30. In a letter of 3 October 1994 the Czech Ministry informed the Regional Court that all ex-StB documents concerning Slovakia had been transmitted to the Slovak Ministry and that, accordingly, the documents concerning the applicant had to be searched for there. 31. On 12 October 1994 the Regional Court requested that the Slovak Ministry submit within 15 days copies of all ex-StB documents concerning the applicant. 32. The request of 12 October 1994 was answered on 2 November 1994 by the SIS to the effect that, apart from a database in which the applicant was listed as an ex-StB agent, there were no ex-StB materials concerning him in its possession. The defendant relied on a treaty between the governments of the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic on joint usage of information and archives generated by ministries of the interior in the area of internal order and security which had been signed on 29 October 1992 and promulgated in the Collection of Laws under No. 201/1993 (“the treaty of 1992”). The SIS submitted that under this treaty the relevant documents were with the Czech Ministry. The SIS again contested its standing to be sued in the case, arguing that the powers in the area of security screening which had been conferred on it under Resolution no. 276 were limited to 9 months. As this period had already expired, there was presently no official body entrusted with these powers in Slovakia. 33. On 21 December 1994 the Regional Court reiterated its request to the Czech Ministry for copies of ex-StB documents concerning the applicant. On the same day it also addressed a request to the Office of the Government of the Slovak Republic for information as to which authority was currently vested with the powers under the Lustration Act as regards security screening. As no answer had been received, the Regional Court repeated the requests in May 1995. 34. On 22 May 1995 the Office of the Government informed the Regional Court that the question of legal succession in respect of the powers under the Act was not currently addressed in the existing legislation. However, by analogy, the powers of the Federal Ministry had been assumed by the Slovak Ministry. 35. In a letter of 24 May 1995 the Czech Ministry informed the Regional Court that there were no documents concerning the applicant in its archives. Considering the relevant part of the letter of the SIS of 2 November 1994 to be confused, it relied on the Protocol to the treaty of 1992 and maintained that the documents searched for were stored in Slovakia. 36. On 9 August 1995 the Regional Court ordered that the SIS deliver within 20 days copies of all ex-StB documents concerning the applicant which were in its possession. The SIS complied on 24 August 1995 and proposed that the proceedings be discontinued on the grounds of its lack of standing to be sued. The SIS also pointed out that the documents submitted were top secret and that the applicable confidentiality rules had to be observed. 37. Another hearing was held on 11 December 1995. The applicant extended the action by directing it also against the Government of the Slovak Republic, as a collective constitutional body with distinct legal personality. The hearing was adjourned in order for the applicant to re‑submit the extended action in writing. He did so on 13 December 1995. 38. On 15 December 1995 the SIS filed its observations in reply to the extended action. 39. At an unspecified later point the Vice-President of the Regional Court exercised his power under section 2 § 2 of the State Administration of Justice Act of 1992 and assigned the case to another Chamber of that court on the ground that the original Chamber had an excessive workload. 40. On 9 September 1996 the Regional Court allowed the extension of the action against the Government of Slovakia. On the same day it invited the applicant to disclose the address of witness M. 41. In a written submission of 19 September 1996 the Office of the Government asserted that the Government was not the legal successor of the Federal Ministry and possessed no powers under the Lustration Act. It was thus not the correct defendant to the action. 42. On 28 October 1996 the applicant informed the Regional Court that he had no information as to the address of M. and requested that the court itself make an inquiry as to the address. 43. The hearing called for 15 January 1997 had to be adjourned as the representatives of the applicant and the Government did not appear. 44. On 21 April 1997 the Regional Court held another hearing. It made a formal ruling allowing the modification of the subject matter of the action, as sought by the applicant on 9 May 1994. The Regional Court then heard the parties and examined the StB file concerning the applicant. 45. On 21 May 1997 the SIS informed the Regional Court of M.’s address. 46. On 2 July 1997 the applicant submitted a pleading in which he commented on the documentary evidence submitted by the defendant. 47. By letters of 9 September, 20 November and 10 December 1997 the Regional Court requested that the Slovak Ministry discharge witnesses P., K. and M. from the obligation of confidentiality in respect of the subject matter of the proceedings. The Ministry agreed on 29 June 1998. 48. On 13 August 1998 the Regional Court held another hearing at which witnesses P., K. and M. failed to appear. Witness K. apologised for his absence and submitted in writing that he had “no recollection of the applicant and no knowledge that the StB would have ever had any file in respect of him”. The applicant admitted having met K. and M. several times before and after his journeys abroad when they had, respectively, instructed him on how to behave abroad and asked for information about his stay. Their discussions were of a general nature and included the situation at the applicant’s workplace. The applicant also admitted having obtained and provided to K. a list of students who had been preparing for studies abroad, information he considered public in any case. He had never had the impression that he was considered a collaborator and had never been asked to keep his contacts with K. and M. secret. The hearing was adjourned until 24 August 1998 with a view to calling the witnesses again. 49. At the hearing of 24 August 1998 the Regional Court heard M. and K. Witness M. confirmed that he had been in charge of recruiting the applicant as a collaborator. However, if there had ever been any act of formal undertaking to cooperate (viazací akt) on the part of the applicant, M. had not been present at it. He had received the impression that the applicant had not been interested in meeting him. Their conversation had concerned ordinary affairs and the applicant had not submitted any documents. The reports mentioned in the StB file had been drawn up by M. on the basis of his conversation with the applicant. According to M., the applicant had never given any information that was capable of harming any specific person. There had been norms as to how many new agents were to be recruited. As a result, new “recruitments” had frequently been only formal, with the new “agents” conceivably having no knowledge of them. Witness K. claimed to know the applicant only by face. He did not remember having ever met him and denied having ever received any information or documents from him. The applicant’s StB file was partially created by K. In the given period the situation in the StB had been such that, in order to meet their statistical objectives, it was possible for officers to run a file in respect of an “agent” by filing information from their own sources and declaring them as having been obtained from that “agent”. The witness P. did not appear and the court observed that it had been impossible to deliver the summons to him. In response to the court’s request, the parties stated that they intended to adduce no further evidence apart from hearing P. and examining the relevant Internal Guideline of the Federal Ministry of 1972 (“the 1972 guideline”) concerning secret collaboration. 50. On 10 September 1998 the Regional Court ordered that the summons for the forthcoming hearing be served on P. by the police. No service was however actually effected. 51. At a hearing held on 24 September 1998 the SIS submitted the 1972 guideline. As this document was classified, the applicant had no access to it. Apart from proposing to hear P. the parties adduced no other evidence. 52. The Regional Court listed a hearing for 24 February 1999 and ordered that the summons be served on P. by the police. At this hearing P. finally appeared and gave evidence. He acknowledged that he had been the chief district police officer during the relevant period and that he remembered the applicant. However, he could not recollect clearly the details of their collaboration. P. pointed out that the StB’s organisation had been very strict and considered that, if something had been recorded, it must have been true. In contradiction to M., P. considered that it was not possible that the applicant had not known that he was acting for the StB as an “agent”. The applicant submitted that the majority of his foreign travel had taken place before 1984, when he was allegedly acquired as an agent. The contention that he had agreed to collaborate in return for the StB’s support in connection with travel was therefore unfounded. 53. On 19 May 1999, following another hearing held on the same day, the Regional Court dismissed the action. 54. First of all, the Regional Court found that the Government of the Slovak Republic had no standing to be sued in the proceedings and that the correct entity to defend the action was the SIS. The Regional Court considered that the crucial criterion for establishing standing was which entity de facto possessed the ex-StB archives. On the basis of the StB file pertaining to the applicant, the Regional Court established that the applicant had been listed since 1983 as a “candidate for secret collaboration” and as an “agent” of the StB since 1984. For tactical reasons it had been decided not to have the applicant sign a formal undertaking to collaborate. This was permitted under the 1972 guideline. The applicant’s StB file contained only an index indicating which reports and documents he had provided. There was a note that the reports and documents themselves had been officially destroyed in late 1989 when, according to the file, cooperation with the applicant had been terminated. The Regional Court also noted that the applicant had on thirteen occasions travelled abroad to western Europe at the relevant time and that it was then usual for a person to be interviewed by the StB prior to and after such travel. The applicant himself acknowledged having met the StB in connection with his travels. He also admitted having been in contact with K., M. and P. and having unwillingly met with them. However he categorically denied ever having given them any intelligence information. The other witness evidence was contradictory. The Regional Court based its finding on the testimony of P., holding it to be credible and consistent with the case file, and did not accept the testimony of K., observing that it contradicted the applicant’s own submissions. In the light of all the information in its possession, including what was known of the applicant’s intellectual capacity, the Regional Court found that he must have known that he had been meeting StB agents and that their contact had actually amounted to formal collaboration. In so far as the applicant had disputed such a conclusion and asserted that his registration in the StB files had been unjustified, he had failed to prove his case; in particular, he had failed to show that the registration was contrary to the applicable rules. 55. On 6 July 1999 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court. He challenged the credibility of witness P., objected that he had had no access to the 1972 guideline, which was a crucial piece of evidence, and argued that the Regional Court had erred in its factual assessment of the case. 56. On 4 August 1999 the SIS filed its observations in reply to the appeal. On 24 August 1999 the Regional Court transmitted the case file to the Supreme Court for a decision on the appeal. 57. On 26 October 1999, following a hearing held on the same day, the Supreme Court upheld the Regional Court’s judgment. It found that the Regional Court had adequately established the facts of the case and found no logical or other errors in the Regional Court’s assessment of the evidence. The Supreme Court held that the fact that the applicant was registered in the StB files as a person referred to in section 2 (1) (b) of the Lustration Act did not by any means constitute evidence that he had been a conscious collaborator of the StB. In line with established judicial practice, the Supreme Court pointed out that the procedure concerning the issuance of a security clearance under the Act could not amount to a violation of an individual’s good name and reputation. Only unjustified registration in the StB files would amount to such a violation. The Supreme Court considered that it was crucial for the applicant to prove that his registration had been contrary to the rules applicable at the material time and concurred with the Regional Court’s conclusion that the applicant had failed to do so. No appeal lay against this decision.

6. The applicants are members of one family. Mr Maksut Netkaliyevich Tuleshov, born in 1953 (the first applicant), and Mrs Aslganym Kalikovna Tuleshova, born in 1955 (the second applicant), are husband and wife; Mr Viktor Maksutovich Tuleshov, born in 1979, and Mr Sergey Maksutovich Tuleshov, born in 1977, are their sons; Mr Kalik Isayev, born in 1929, is the second applicant's father. They, and three other children of the first and the second applicants, live together in one household in the town of Marx of Saratov Region. 7. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 8. In 1993 Mr Kh bought a house from company B. It was a former shop at 8 Third Avenue, Marx, which Kh intended to convert into a dwelling. The house was free from any third party claim. 9. In 1996 the Marx Town Court of the Saratov Region examined an unrelated commercial dispute between company B and a third party and found that B had failed to perform as stipulated in their contract. The house was listed as pledged property in the contract and the court ordered its sale. Apparently the court was not aware that the house had already been sold to Kh. 10. The sale was administered by the court bailiff. The price was set at 13,600,000 roubles (RUR), the pre-redenomination equivalent of RUR 13,600, or approximately 2,800 US dollars. The first applicant offered to buy the house, and on 12 April 1996 the Marx Town Court approved the sale. This decision took effect on 23 April 1996. The first applicant was registered with the real estate registry (Бюро технической инвентаризации) as the owner of the house. Apparently the first applicant was not aware of Kh's right to the house and Kh was not aware of the sale to the first applicant. 11. On 22 July 1996 the Marx local administration granted a reconstruction permit by virtue of which the first applicant converted the shop into a dwelling of about 78 square metres. He moved into it with seven members of his family including the other applicants. 12. In 1998 Kh seized the Marx Town Court with a property claim in respect of the house and challenged its sale by the bailiff. The first applicant lodged a counterclaim invoking his title to the house. 13. On 28 June 1999 the Marx Town Court found that the bailiff had sold the house to the first applicant unlawfully and declared the sale null and void. It annulled the first applicant's title and ordered his and his family's eviction. The first applicant was awarded RUR 13,600 as reimbursement of the house purchase price by company B and the other party to the contract mentioned in paragraph 9 above, and RUR 113,161 of reconstruction costs payable by Kh. 14. On the same day the applicants were served with an eviction order. 15. The first applicant and Kh appealed. 16. Company B and the other party both failed to pay the amount due to the applicant under the judgment (RUR 13,600) as they became insolvent. 17. On 27 August 1999 the Saratov Regional Court upheld the first instance judgment as to the substance, but reversed the award of the reconstruction costs because such a claim had never been made by the applicants. 18. On 15 November 1999 the Presidium of the Saratov Regional Court quashed on supervisory review the decision of 12 April 1996 by which the sale of the house to the first applicant had been ordered. 19. On 9 August 2000 the Marx Town Court, apparently following the first applicant's request for supervisory review, appointed an expert to assess the market value of the house. The evaluation report issued on the same date estimated it as RUR 245,000 (then an equivalent of about 9,738 euros (EUR)). On 31 August 2000 the Saratov Regional Court rejected the request for supervisory review. 20. On 14 March 2001 the applicants brought proceedings for damages against Kh, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Justice and the Judicial Administration Department. They claimed pecuniary damages of RUR 317,654 including the reconstruction costs (RUR 146,461), the sum of RUR 13,600, i.e. the money which had not been paid by the insolvent debtors, and non-pecuniary damages of RUR 210,000. In support of their pecuniary claims they referred to the expert evaluation of 9 August 2000. The court joined Kh to the proceedings as a co-defendant. 21. On 14 December 2001 the Marx Town Court examined the case. It found that Kh had never authorised the reconstruction works on his premises and, relying on Article 1069 of the Civil Code, held that these expenses were incurred as a result of the authorities' unlawful conduct and must be reimbursed by the State. The first applicant was awarded RUR 89,522 (then the equivalent of about EUR 3,305) to be paid by the Ministry of Finance. In so far as the applicants claimed the reimbursement of RUR 13,600, the court held that the first applicant “had not made sufficient effort to recover the debt” from company B and the other party. The remaining pecuniary and non-pecuniary claims including those by the other applicants were dismissed on the grounds that the applicants had not adduced sufficient proof of the amount they claimed as damages. 22. On 15 February 2002 the Saratov Regional Court upheld the judgment of 14 December 2001. 23. On 26 November 2002 the applicants were ordered to leave the house by 6 December 2002. 24. The applicants challenged the eviction order claiming that the award had not been paid and that no other dwelling had been made available to them. 25. On 9 December 2002 the Marx Town Court of the Saratov Region dismissed the applicants' challenge to the eviction order. This decision was upheld on appeal by the Saratov Regional Court on 17 January 2003. 26. On 27 March 2003 the Marx Town Court of the Saratov Region examined another request by the applicants and adjourned the eviction until 4 April 2003. The applicants appealed claiming that this was insufficient and requested an adjournment until social housing could be allocated. The extension was refused. 27. Between April and July 2003 the applicants were served the eviction order three times, each time with a new deadline. The applicants unsuccessfully challenged the order every time it was served. 28. On 12 September 2003 the bailiff of the Tsentralnyy District Court of Moscow informed the first applicant that the bailiff service was no longer competent to enforce awards against the State. He instructed the first applicant to claim his award under the judgment of 14 December 2001 directly from the Ministry of Finance. 29. On 12 October 2003 the applicants and the rest of the family were evicted from the house. 30. On 19 November 2003 they were granted social housing in a municipal hostel where they have been living since then. For eight family members they were allocated a 45 square metres flat comprising three rooms. The toilet, bathroom and cooking facilities are shared with other flats on the same floor, and the residence has central heating but no gas or hot water supply. The applicants received this accommodation under the terms of a social tenancy and have to pay rent. At present ten family members live in this dwelling. 31. On 18 February 2004 the Ministry of Finance informed the second applicant that the payment due to the first applicant pursuant to the judgment had been suspended because the enforcement documents had been sent to the Ministry's Legal Department “for the inspection of the materials of the [applicants'] court dispute”. It promised to “keep the applicants informed about the outcome of the challenge and its legal assessment”. 32. On 16 November 2004 the Ministry of Finance paid the applicant RUR 89,522 (then the equivalent of about EUR 2,405). 33. On 15 May 2006 the applicants obtained an expert evaluation of the market value of their social housing, which was estimated at RUR 70,000 (then the equivalent of about EUR 2,017).

5. The applicant was born in 1985 and lives in Feres, Greece. 6. The applicant lodged an asylum application in Austria on 5 July 2008. In the course of the interviews that followed, he claimed that his father had been deemed a communist and an infidel in Afghanistan and had been killed by a group of mullahs when the applicant was seven years old. The applicant had then left Afghanistan with his mother and brother and had lived in Pakistan for fifteen years. One of the mullahs had been his father’s brother, who had supported his sibling’s killing as he had wanted to obtain his land. After their mother had died in Pakistan, the applicant and his brother had gone back to Afghanistan to take possession of their father’s land. Their uncle had reminded them of their father’s fate and had sent a group of men to their quarters in the middle of the night, where they had been held and beaten for three days. They had kidnapped the applicant’s brother, who had disappeared and was never seen since. The applicant had been warned again that his life would be in danger if he stayed in the village. The applicant had then left again for Pakistan in November 2007. He had travelled from Pakistan via Iran to Turkey, where he had stayed for six months. With the aid of a trafficker, he had crossed over to Greece by boat, where he had stayed for approximately fifteen days. He had continued to Italy, where he had bought a train ticket to Austria. In Austria, he had been apprehended by police. 7. With respect to Greece, the applicant told the asylum authorities that he had seen thousands of Afghan refugees in Patras, who had been left to their own devices without any access to food, water, accommodation or even sanitary facilities. There had been no access to asylum proceedings, which was why the applicant had decided not to apply for asylum in Greece. He also explained that he had seen many refugees being abused by police. In this context, the applicant’s State-appointed counsellor referred to a paper by the UNHCR entitled “Position on the return of asylum-seekers to Greece under the Dublin Regulation” dated 15 April 2008 (hereinafter the “UNHCR position paper”) and requested that the Austrian authorities make use of the sovereignty clause of Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 (hereinafter “the Dublin Regulation”). 8. On 22 August 2008 the Federal Asylum Office (Bundesasylamt) rejected the applicant’s asylum application, on the grounds that Greece was responsible for examining it in line with section 5 of the 2005 Asylum Act (Asylgesetz 2005) in conjunction with Article 10 § 1 and Article 18 § 7 of the Dublin Regulation. It also ordered his transfer back to Greece. It found that the applicant would not face any real risk of ill-treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention upon his return there. The authority, referring to a number of country reports, did not consider the applicant’s observations about Greece credible. It also stated that the UNHCR position paper welcomed Greece’s reform attempts aimed at strengthening its asylum system. It further noted that a working group had been established, including members of the Greek authorities and UNHCR, to tackle the “most burning” problems with the asylum system. Furthermore, the relevant European directives were binding for Greece. Lastly, the Federal Asylum Office referred to a fact-finding mission conducted by the Swedish Migration Board in April 2008 reacting to harsh criticism voiced by various NGOs. The final report of that mission had concluded that there were no humanitarian or other reasons to refrain from returning asylum-seekers to Greece under the Dublin Regulation. In view of the fact that the asylum authorities of the other EU countries had not stopped transferring asylum-seekers back to Greece, the Federal Asylum Office did not consider it necessary to make use of the sovereignty clause in the present case. 9. On 15 September 2008 the Asylum Court (Asylgerichtshof) dismissed the applicant’s appeal as unfounded. It found that an accumulation of proceedings under the sovereignty clause would endanger the “effet utile” principle of Community law. Furthermore, the Dublin Regulation was based on the assumption that all member States were safe countries, and that a deportation to one of them could not constitute a human rights violation. Therefore, arguments against such a deportation would need to be sufficiently substantiated. It further found that in each of his interviews, the applicant had exaggerated his description of the situation in Greece. Referring to the results of the fact-finding mission of the Swedish Migration Board to Greece in April 2008, the court found that there were no deficiencies in the asylum procedure in Greece, as all twenty-six monitored cases had had access to asylum proceedings there. As regards the present case, the Greek authorities had already stated that the applicant would have had access to asylum proceedings once he returned to Greece. Furthermore, as he had never lodged an asylum application in Greece he was in no position to say whether or not he would have had access to support services there. Again referring to the mission report by the Swedish Migration Board, the court found that the level of support available to asylum-seekers in Greece was acceptable. Furthermore, asylum-seekers were allowed to work in Greece. Lastly, there would be no risk of refoulement. In conclusion, the applicant would not be at a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 upon being returned to Greece. 10. The applicant was transferred to Greece on 20 October 2008. 11. On 7 November 2008 the Constitutional Court (Verfassungs­gerichtshof) declined to deal with the applicant’s complaint for lack of any prospect of success. 12. While in Greece, the applicant reported to his legal representative in Austria that he had been arrested at the airport upon arriving in Athens and detained for three days. After that time he had received a “pink card”, following a very short interview without an interpreter and without being given any legal information. He had moved on to a camp where other Afghan refugees had been living, until it had been destroyed. Subsequently, he had either lived with people who had worked in fields picking crops, or in rooms sharing with twenty other people while searching for work in the cities. He had sometimes been given food or clothes by private individuals, but had received no support from the Greek authorities. 13. For detailed information on proceedings under the Dublin Regulation, see M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece ([GC], no. 30696/09, §§ 65-75, ECHR 2011). 14. Section 5 of the Asylum Act 2005 (Asylgesetz) provides that an asylum application must be rejected as inadmissible if, under treaty provisions or pursuant to the Dublin Regulation, another State has jurisdiction to examine it. When rendering a decision rejecting an application, the authority must specify which State has jurisdiction in the matter. 15. International documents describing the conditions of detention and reception of asylum-seekers and the asylum procedure in Greece are extensively summarized in the judgment in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (cited above, §§ 159-195). In the paragraphs that follow, reference will be made to the documents cited therein. 16. A number of pertinent reports on the situation faced by asylum-seekers in Greece have been freely available from as early as 2005 onwards, such as reports by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) published in December 2006 and February 2008 following visits to Greece examining, inter alia, the detention conditions of foreigners in specific holding facilities (ibid., §§ 160 and 163-64). 17. In October 2007 the German NGO Pro Asyl published a report entitled “The Truth may be bitter but it must be told”, documenting serious human rights abuses against refugees who tried to reach Greece by sea. On 27 February 2008 Amnesty International published a report and recommendations entitled “Greece: no place for asylum-seekers” as regards the conditions of detention for asylum-seekers. In its “Amnesty International Report 2008 – Greece” of 28 May 2008, the NGO stated that “Greece [had] failed to provide asylum to the vast majority who [had] requested it. Migrants [had] suffered ill-treatment, and arbitrary and lengthy detention of asylum-seekers, including children, continued”. 18. That and similar information was complemented by two UNHCR reports, the first of which was dated November 2007 and entitled “Asylum in the European Union. A study of the Implementation of the Qualification Directive”. In its executive summary, the UNHCR observed that the Greek asylum system failed to grant asylum of any kind and rejected applications in a standardised format, without giving individual reasons, and identifying all of the 305 cases examined as concerning “economic migrants without protection needs”. A review of the files was conducted by the authors of the study, who established that in 294 of the cases examined the files did not contain any of the asylum-seekers’ answers to standard questions asked by the interviewing police officers. Furthermore, there was no information in the files regarding the asylum-seekers’ fears of persecution, and in an overwhelming majority of the cases the interviewing police officer had registered the reasons for departure from the country of origin as “economic”. The authors of the study concluded that in view of the insufficient documentation and reasoning, it was not possible to discern legal practice in Greece. 19. The UNHCR position paper of 15 April 2008 undeniably welcomed the steps taken by the Greek Government to strengthen its asylum system as required by international and European standards, just as the Austrian authorities had noted in their reasoning. However, it continued by stating: “26. In view of EU Member States’ obligation to ensure access to fair and effective asylum procedures, including in cases subject to the Dublin Regulation, UNHCR advises Governments to refrain from returning asylum-seekers to Greece under the Dublin Regulation until further notice. UNHCR recommends that Governments make use of Article 3 (2) of the Dublin Regulation, allowing States to examine an asylum application lodged even if such examination is not its responsibility under the criteria laid down in this Regulation”. 20. On 7 February 2008 Norway announced that it would be suspending all transfers of asylum-seekers to Greece. However, on 3 September 2008 the Norwegian Prime Minister told the media that Norway would no longer suspend transfers to Greece under the Dublin Regulation on a blanket basis, but rather that an individual assessment of each case would be carried out (reported in the article “Stuck in a Revolving Door” by Human Rights Watch, November 2008, page 25). 21. On 6 May 2008 the Swedish Migration Board published a report on a delegation’s visit to Greece between 21 and 23 April 2008 (Rapport från besök i Grekland den 21 – 23 april 2008). The report described the increasing challenges faced by the Greek asylum system because of the increasing number of cases it had to deal with in recent years. It referred to problems with the provision of housing for asylum-seekers, and that more often than not they had to arrange housing for themselves. The report concluded by stating that the risk of refoulement was minimal. However, a particular problem had arisen in relation to unaccompanied minors – there was a risk that such asylum-seekers would be placed in a reception unit in Amygdaleza, a closed facility regarded as a radical measure, comparable to placing minors in custody. In the light of the conclusions of the report, the director general’s guidelines of 7 May 2008 (Generaldirektörens riktlinjer avseende tillämpningen av Dublinförordningen i förhållande till Grekland) established that asylum proceedings in Greece were generally acceptable for adults, but that there were problems regarding the reception of unaccompanied minors in relation to the above-mentioned reception facility. The Migration Board therefore decided to maintain its suspension of transfers of unaccompanied minors to Greece.

6. The applicant is of Pashtun origin, was born in 1964 and has been in the Netherlands since 1998. 7. The applicant entered the Netherlands on 3 August 1998 and on 4 August 1998 applied for asylum, submitting the following account in his interviews with immigration officials held on 4 August 1998, 26 August 1998 and 21 March 2000. 8. After completing his elementary education in 1976, the applicant had attended the military academy in Kabul. He had graduated in 1982 and had started working in 1982 with the rank of second lieutenant at an administrative department of one of the directorates of the Afghan security service KhAD/WAD (“Khadimat-e Atal’at-e Dowlati / Wezarat-e Amniyat-e Dowlati”)[1] during the former communist regime in Afghanistan. He had become head of this department – which was responsible for handling confidential documents – in 1988, which function he had continued to hold until the fall of the ruling communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (“PDPA”) in 1992. In 1990 he had been promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel. 9. The applicant’s directorate had been assigned the task of negotiating and concluding agreements with groups that opposed and fought the communist Government, namely the mujahideen. These agreements entailed remunerated cooperation with the ruling PDPA. The applicant had attended meetings between thus “employed” mujahideen commanders and executives of the directorate. During these meetings the performance of such commanders was assessed and decisions were taken on whether or not they should continue to be paid. The applicant had taken minutes at those meetings. He believed that the mujahideen were holding him personally responsible for the discontinuation of their pay where decisions to that effect had been taken. In addition, these mujahideen commanders had never admitted to cooperating with the KhAD and were very keen on keeping this a secret, for which reason they were interested in eliminating the applicant. 10. In 1992, after the fall of Kabul, these mujahideen commanders had come looking for the applicant. They were said to have come to his office and asked for him. The applicant had been informed of this by the president of the directorate he had worked for, who had maintained good relations with the mujahideen and hence had remained in post there. 11. The applicant and his family had fled to Mazar-e-Sharif, where they had led a quiet life until 1997, when various mujahideen groups had come to the city, including those mujahideen feared by the applicant. He had gone into hiding, during which period his house had been searched by the mujahideen. The applicant and his family had then fled to Pakistan. 12. On 15 September 1999, a person-specific official report (individueel ambtsbericht) not concerning the applicant was drawn up by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken). According to this report, torture was systemic in WAD interrogation centres and within the KhAD the loyalty of its staff was carefully controlled. It was considered impossible that persons belonging to the higher management of the KhAD/WAD had not been involved in the implementation of the above methods. This report was taken into account in the applicant’s asylum procedure. 13. The applicant’s asylum claim was also examined in the light of an official report, drawn up on 29 February 2000 by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on “Security Services in Communist Afghanistan (1978-92), AGSA, KAM, KhAD and WAD” (“Veiligheidsdiensten in communistisch Afghanistan (1978-1992), AGSA, KAM, KhAD en WAD”) and concerning in particular the question whether and, if so, which former employees of those services should be regarded as implicated in human rights violations (see A.A.Q. v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 42331/05, §§ 50-52, 30 June 2015). 14. By a decision of 18 July 2000 the Deputy Minister of Justice (Staatssecretaris van Justitie) rejected the applicant’s asylum claim. The Deputy Minister held, inter alia, that serious reasons had been found for believing that the applicant had committed acts referred to in Article 1F of the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“the 1951 Refugee Convention”). 15. Referring to the official report of 29 February 2000 (see paragraph 13 above), the Deputy Minister emphasised the widely known cruel character of the KhAD, its lawless methods, the grave crimes it had committed such as torture and other human rights violations and the “climate of terror” which it had spread throughout the whole of Afghan society, including the army. The Deputy Minister underlined the vague definition of “enemy of the communist regime” used by the KhAD, how it found those enemies through an extensive network of spies, and how all of this led to widespread and often random arrests of suspects. It was also noted that the KhAD was considered to be an elite unit of the communist regime, and that only those whose loyalty was beyond doubt were eligible for recruitment to the service. Furthermore, new recruits were initially assigned to KhAD/WAD sections actively engaged in tracking down “elements that posed a threat to the State”, where – in order to prove their loyalty unequivocally – they were directly involved in the human rights violations the KhAD was associated with. In this regard the Deputy Minister emphasised that every promoted officer had been involved in arrests, interrogations, torture and even executions. 16. Having established, on the basis of elaborate argumentation based on various international documents, that those involved in the KhAD were likely to fall within the scope of Article 1F of the 1951 Refugee Convention, the Deputy Minister proceeded to an analysis of the applicant’s individual responsibility under that Convention. In the light of the above, the applicant’s plea that he had never been involved in any human rights violations and had worked his whole career for one department only was dismissed. In view of the applicant’s career and several promotions, the Deputy Minister excluded the possibility of the applicant not having been involved in human rights violations committed by the KhAD. 17. The Deputy Minister underlined that the application of Article 1F of the 1951 Refugee Convention did not require proof that the applicant had personally committed the alleged crimes; it sufficed that serious reasons existed to consider that the applicant had, or should have had, knowledge of those crimes and that he bore responsibility for them, which responsibility he had voluntarily assumed. In this context the Deputy Minister referred, inter alia, to paragraphs 42 and 43 of “The Exclusion Clauses: Guidelines on their Application” (UNHCR, 1 December 1996), stating: “persons who are found to have performed, engaged in, participated in orchestrating, planning and/or implementing, or condoned or acquiesced in the carrying out of any specified criminal acts by subordinates, should rightly be excluded. ... voluntary continued membership of a part of a government engaged in criminal activities may constitute grounds for exclusion where the member cannot rebut the presumptions of knowledge and personal implication.” 18. The Deputy Minister further referred to a letter of 28 November 1997 sent by the Deputy Minister of Justice to the President of the Lower House of Parliament (Tweede Kamer) stating that Article 1F was also applicable when the person concerned had not himself committed any acts referred to in this provision but had been an active and conscious member of an organisation known for committing war crimes and crimes against humanity. As the applicant had not in any way distanced himself from or resisted the crimes committed by the KhAD, the Deputy Minister concluded that Article 1F was applicable to the applicant’s case. Consequently, the applicant’s asylum request was rejected and Article 1F held against him. 19. The Deputy Minister further found no grounds on the basis of which the applicant would be eligible for a residence permit on compelling humanitarian grounds (klemmende redenen van humanitaire aard). As regards the applicant’s plea under Article 3 of the Convention the Deputy Minister held that, even assuming that a real risk existed of the applicant being subjected to treatment contrary to that provision in Afghanistan, Article 3 did not guarantee a right to residence. The Deputy Minister considered in this context that granting residence to the applicant would conflict with the State’s interest in terms of its credibility on the international stage, particularly regarding its responsibility towards other States. In the Deputy Minister’s view, a situation in which the Netherlands was forced to become a host State for individuals who had elsewhere shocked public and international legal order with acts considered to constitute grave crimes under both Dutch and international law was to be avoided. 20. The applicant’s objection (bezwaar) to this decision was rejected, after he had been heard on it on 16 May 2003 before an official board of enquiry (ambtelijke commissie), on 11 August 2003 by the Minister of Immigration and Integration (Minister van Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie), the successor to the Deputy Minister of Justice. The Minister endorsed the Deputy Minister’s impugned decision and proceeded, in addition thereto, to an analysis of the applicant’s individual responsibility under the 1951 Refugee Convention on the basis of the prescribed and so-called “personal and knowing participation test” and held Article 1F against him. 21. As regards the “knowing” element, the Minister – having regard to the official report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 29 February 2000 (see paragraph 13 above) – found that the applicant had known or should have known about the criminal character of the KhAD. The Minister did not attach any credence to the applicant’s submissions that he had not known about the human rights violations committed by the KhAD. Basing herself on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs official report of 29 February 2000, the Minister held that the commission of human rights violations by the KhAD under the PDPA rule was a fact of common knowledge and that, therefore, it was unthinkable that the applicant would have been ignorant of those acts. The Minister emphasised in this regard the high rank the applicant had held, the long period he had worked for the KhAD and the fact that he had attended meetings with the executives of the Directorate in which he had been employed. The Minister concluded that the applicant had knowingly participated in torture and executions. 22. As regards the applicant’s personal participation in human rights violations attributed to the KhAD, the Minister found, basing herself to a large extent on the same factual information as the Deputy Minister had done in his previous decision, that the applicant had failed to demonstrate that he had not committed such violations himself or that his conduct, or lack thereof, had prevented these violations from being committed. The Minister held, therefore, that the applicant had personally participated in the commission of acts referred to Article 1F of the 1951 Refugee Convention. 23. The Minister did not attach credence to the applicant’s rebuttal, which amounted to his case having to be distinguished from the general situation with regard to the KhAD and its officers as described in the official report of 29 February 2000. The applicant had claimed that he had obtained a desk job not by proving his loyalty to the KhAD in sinister ways – as the official report stated – but rather through bribes. The Minister held that, based on the applicant’s position and description of his tasks (including the processing of high-level classified information), he had attempted to trivialise his activities and had greatly impaired his credibility in consequence. On this point, the Minister relied, inter alia, on Amnesty International’s “Reports of torture and long-term detention without trial” of March 1991, according to which the Directorate in which the applicant had been employed was engaged in systematic torture. 24. The Minister further identified several inconsistencies in the applicant’s declarations and rebuttals, from which it was concluded that his declarations concerning certain of the tasks he stated he had performed were highly implausible. As regards the applicant’s various rebuttals, it was found, in the relevant part, that the burden of proof in terms of Article 1F of the 1951 Refugee Convention was less stringent than in a criminal prosecution (“serious reasons for considering” that the applicant might have been guilty of human rights violations sufficed to render this provision applicable). Taking into account that the applicant had never sought to leave the KhAD or the WAD, for which he had worked for about ten years, in which his last held rank was that of lieutenant-colonel, and in which he had been promoted to head of his department, the Minister concluded that there were no indications that the applicant had been forced or had involuntarily worked for the KhAD/WAD. 25. As regards the applicant’s claim that the official report of 29 February 2000 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not accurate and was based on unreliable sources and that, therefore, it was too general in scope and could not be applied to his case, the Minister held that this report was founded on several acclaimed sources, such as the United Nations Special Rapporteur, Human Rights Watch, numerous Amnesty International reports, and a variety of United Nations publications. 26. The Minister went on to analyse, of her own motion, the applicant’s eligibility for a residence permit for reasons not related to asylum. It was held that no such permit could be issued, since the application of Article 1F of the 1951 Refugee Convention gave rise to “contraindications” against the applicant in terms of his eligibility for other types of residence permit. However, while reiterating that Article 3 of the Convention did not guarantee a right to residence, the Minister considered that it could not be ruled out that the applicant, in the present circumstances, would run a real risk of treatment contrary to that provision if expelled to Afghanistan, for which reason the applicant was not to be expelled. 27. The applicant lodged an objection against the refusal by the Minister to grant him a residence permit for reasons not related to asylum. This objection was rejected by the Minister on 16 January 2004, confirming her impugned refusal. 28. The applicant appealed against the Minister’s decisions of 11 August 2003 and 16 January 2004 before the Regional Court (rechtbank) of The Hague, arguing, inter alia, that the factual underpinning of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs official report of 29 February 2000 contained errors, which had led the Minister to draw incorrect conclusions as to the applicant’s personal and knowing participation in the crimes referred to in Article 1F of the 1951 Refugee Convention. 29. In its judgment of 10 February 2005, the Regional Court of The Hague sitting in Utrecht held that the official reports issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which lay to a great extent at the basis of the Minister’s decisions, had been drafted in an unbiased manner, were accurate and objective, and provided the required insight in the relevant information, and that therefore, the Minister had been entitled to rely on them. In addition, the Regional Court noted that the evaluation of the credibility of facts adduced by asylum seekers fell to a large extent within the Minister’s discretion and could, therefore, only be evaluated marginally by the court. The Regional Court agreed with the Minister on all points as to the latter’s decision to hold Article 1F of the 1951 Refugee Convention against the applicant and, consequently, to refuse him an asylum-based residence permit. As regards the Minister’s separate decision of 16 January, refusing the applicant a residence permit for reasons not related to asylum, the Regional Court adopted a different reasoning, but reached the same conclusion. 30. In respect of Article 3 of the Convention, the Regional Court held, with reference to case-law of the Administrative Jurisdiction Division (Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak) of the Council of State (Raad van State), that the Minister should, wherever possible, avoid creating a situation in which an asylum seeker is refused a residence permit but cannot be expelled to his/her country of origin for reasons based on Article 3 of the Convention. For that reason, the decision should demonstrate that the Minister had examined whether Article 3 of the Convention would lastingly (duurzaam) stand in the way of expulsion to the country of origin and of the possible consequences for the residence situation of the person concerned. This, the Regional Court found, the Minister had failed to do in the present case, for which reason it quashed the Minister’s decision of 11 August 2003 and remitted the case back to the Minister for a fresh decision. 31. After the applicant had once more been heard on 20 May 2005 before an official board of enquiry, the Minister rejected the asylum request anew in a fresh decision of 2 August 2005. In this fresh decision, the Minister limited herself to Article 3 of the Convention. She dismissed the applicant’s fear of returning to Afghanistan as a (former) member of the PDPA and former officer of KhAD, referring to an official report issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in January 2005 and holding that the sole fact that an asylum seeker had been a PDPA member was not enough in itself to render Article 3 applicable in the eventuality of expulsion. The Minister further noted that the mere fact that the applicant had a different political conviction from those currently in power in Afghanistan similarly did not suffice to render Article 3 applicable. The Minister further took into account that the applicant had stated that he was not a known person in Afghanistan. The applicant had no concrete indication that he would be searched for by any group or person. In addition, relatives of the applicant – including his father and brother – were still living in Afghanistan without ever having encountered any problem. 32. The Minister further addressed the applicant’s claim that he had reason to fear certain named mujahideen commanders, who would identify him as the KhAD officer who had not paid them, or paid them less than agreed upon. The applicant had submitted that he had attended meetings – where he had only taken minutes – in the course of which cooperation agreements had been reached between the KhAD and a mujahideen commander. In addition, the applicant had alleged that these mujahideen commanders were keen on ensuring that nobody in present-day Afghanistan would find out that they had cooperated with KhAD in the past, for which reason they were interested in eliminating the applicant. On this point, the Minister held that the applicant had failed to establish these commanders’ whereabouts and current influence in Afghan society. The Minister noted that according to the applicant’s own statements, he did not believe that these individuals occupied high positions in today’s Afghanistan. Furthermore, the Minister considered that the mujahideen commanders were aware of the applicant’s role in those meetings as well as of the identity of the person taking the decisions as regards financial support of the mujahideen, and that it was therefore implausible that they would be after the applicant. Finally, it was underlined that the applicant had been able to stay in Afghanistan until 1997 without any problems. For these reasons, the applicant’s claim that he was being sought by the mujahideen was dismissed as founded on nothing but suspicion and speculation. The claim based on Article 3 was consequently rejected. 33. The applicant appealed anew to the Regional Court of The Hague, arguing, inter alia, that the Minister had erred in finding him guilty of participation in torture under the auspices of the KhAD. In his view, the Minister had disregarded the fact that the applicant had held an administrative position in KhAD which was only concerned with maintaining contacts with the mujahideen and reaching agreements with them. Furthermore, the Minister had been inconsistent in finding, on the one hand, that the applicant had participated in human rights violations, but, on the other hand, that the applicant had not held an important position within the PDPA party. The applicant submitted that it was likely that he was well known enough for his former adversaries, who were now those in power in Afghanistan, to find him and subject him to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. 34. The Regional Court of The Hague sitting in Amsterdam rejected the applicant’s appeal on 12 April 2006. It noted that, according to a general official report on Afghanistan of July 2005 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that some former military officials, members of the police and the KhAD/WAD security services possibly risk falling victim to human rights violations – not only by the authorities but also by the population (victims’ relatives), unless they maintained relations with influential Islamic and political parties or tribes. According to the court, this did not mean that every former KhAD officer ran a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3, and the applicant was thus required to establish the existence of such a risk in the particular circumstances of his case. The Regional Court agreed with the Minister that the applicant had failed to do so, as his claims were found to be merely based on unsubstantiated expectations, including his claimed fear of persecution by the mujahideen commanders who had been paid by the KhAD/WAD. No further appeal lay against this ruling.

7. The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Banja Luka. 8. Between 7 January 1977 and 31 January 1983 the applicant deposited in total 70,140 German marks (DEM) in her savings account at the then State-owned Privredna banka Sarajevo Filijala Banja Luka. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as in other successor States of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (“SFRY”), such savings are commonly referred to as “old” foreign-currency savings, having been deposited prior to the dissolution of the SFRY. The relevant background information on this subject is set out in detail in the Chamber’s decision on the admissibility of the present application (see Jeličić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (dec.), no. 41183/02, ECHR 2005-XII). 9. On 31 December 1991 the balance in the applicant’s account, which included accrued interest, was DEM 235,924 (in the former SFRY, foreign-currency deposits earned high interest). 10. On several occasions in 1992 and 1993, the applicant managed to withdraw in total DEM 9,352, regardless of statutory restrictions which had been introduced in the late 1980s. 11. On 3 October 1997 the applicant initiated civil proceedings against the Banjalučka banka, the legal successor of the Privredna banka Sarajevo Filijala Banja Luka, seeking the recovery of her entire “old” foreign-currency savings and accrued interest. 12. On 26 November 1998 the Banja Luka Court of First Instance established that the balance in the applicant’s account indicated above was DEM 295,274, including accrued interest. The court also found that the applicant had DEM 4,896 in another account at the same bank. The Banjalučka banka was ordered to pay the applicant, within 15 days, DEM 300,170 (approximately 153,475 euros (EUR)), default interest on the above amount at the rate applicable in the country of the currency (namely Germany) from 3 October 1997, legal costs in the amount of 9,076 dinars (approximately EUR 290) and default interest on the last-mentioned amount at the statutory rate from the date of the judgment. 13. On 5 February 1999 the Banja Luka Court of First Instance mistakenly held that the Banjalučka banka had not appealed against the judgment of 26 November 1998 and accordingly issued a writ of execution (rješenje o izvršenju). On 25 February 1999 the Banja Luka Court of First Instance established that an appeal had in fact been submitted. On 4 November 1999 the Banja Luka District Court rejected that appeal and the first-instance judgment of 26 November 1998 therefore became enforceable. 14. Meanwhile, the applicant filed an application with the Human Rights Ombudsperson, who referred the application to the Human Rights Chamber (the human rights bodies set up by Annex 6 to the 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace). 15. On 12 January 2000 the Human Rights Chamber found a violation of Article 6 of the Convention and of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 arising from a failure to enforce the judgment of 26 November 1998. The Human Rights Chamber held the Republika Srpska responsible and ordered it to ensure full enforcement without further delay. 16. After the Banjalučka banka had failed to execute the judgment voluntarily, on 22 March 2000 the competent court sent a fresh writ of execution to the Republika Srpska Payment Bureau (Služba za platni promet Republike Srpske). 17. On 28 July 2000 the Supreme Court of the Republika Srpska rejected an appeal on points of law (revizija) against the judgment of 26 November 1998. 18. On 8 November 2000 the writ of execution was returned to the competent court, execution having been impossible on account of a statutory prohibition (see paragraph 24 below). 19. On 30 January 2001 the applicant converted part of her savings (DEM 20,000) into privatisation coupons under the Privatisation of Companies Act 1998. She subsequently sold those coupons on the secondary market, allegedly for DEM 9,000. 20. On 18 January 2002 the privatisation of the Banjalučka banka was completed and the applicant’s “old” foreign-currency savings became a public debt of the Republika Srpska pursuant to section 20 of the Opening Balance Sheets Act 1998. 21. On 7 March 2002 and 9 February 2004 the applicant converted a further part of her savings (EUR 20,452 in total) into privatisation coupons as before. She subsequently sold those coupons on the secondary market, allegedly for EUR 8,794 in total. 22. On 15 April 2006 Bosnia and Herzegovina took over the debt arising from “old” foreign-currency savings from its constituent units pursuant to section 1 of the Old Foreign-Currency Savings Act 2006. 23. The judgment of 26 November 1998 has not yet been enforced.

4. The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Dnipropetrovsk. 5. On 6 June 2005 he lodged a civil claim with the Amur‑Nyzhnyodniprovskyy District Court of Dnipropetrovsk (“the District Court”) against three companies, by which he sought the cancellation of the car purchase contract and claimed damages. 6. On 30 June 2010 the court partly allowed the claim. 7. On 8 November 2010 the Dnipropetrovsk Regional Court of Appeal upheld the above judgment. On 16 March 2011 the Higher Specialized Civil and Criminal Court quashed the above decisions and remitted the case to the District Court for fresh examination, before which the proceedings are still pending. 8. According to the Government, in the course of the proceedings the applicant specified his claim on eight occasions. Nine hearings in the District Court were adjourned, mainly due to the respondents’ absence or upon their requests or due to the electricity blackouts in the court premises. Following the respondents’ requests, the District Court ordered five expert examinations, which lasted in total for about three years and four months. The applicant additionally informed that on 1 June 2011 the District Court ordered yet another expert examination.

5. The applicant was born in 1966 and is currently being detained in Târgu Jiu Prison. 6. In 1998 the applicant started serving a twenty-five-year sentence for murder. On 23 July 1998 he was placed in Târgu Jiu Prison. Except for short periods of time when he was transferred to other prisons in order to appear before the courts and three occasions when he was hospitalised for a maximum of one day in prison hospitals, the applicant was held in Târgu Jiu Prison. 7. The applicant alleged that the conditions of his detention in Târgu Jiu Prison since his incarceration in 1998 amounted to torture. More specifically, he alleged that he was being held in severely overcrowded cells with thirty-five to forty prisoners, with worn-out furniture and without natural light or ventilation. He further submitted that the cells were full of bed bugs and the food was insufficient and of very poor quality. The applicant also alleged that he was being held in cells with smokers. 8. The applicant lastly alleged that he had become sick as a result of the inhuman conditions to which he had been subjected. He submitted in that connection a medical certificate issued by the prison doctor on 17 March 2014, according to which he was suffering from: chronic cholecystitis, fatty liver disease, chronic venal insufficiency of the legs, type-II diabetes, chronic pancreatitis, gastroduodenitis, lumbar discopathy and impulsive personality disorder. 9. The Government submitted that the applicant had been held for unspecified periods of time in three different cells of the Târgu Jiu Prison infirmary block, which are described below. 10. Cell E 2.2 measured 22.62 sq. m, of which 2.41 sq. m were occupied by a bathroom (20.21 sq. m of remaining space). The cell had five rows of bunk beds and accommodated eight prisoners (2.52 sq. m of personal space, including the space occupied by the beds). Ventilation was ensured by a window measuring 0.97 by 1.45 m. The bathroom had its own window measuring 40 by 45 cm. 11. Cell E 2.3 measured 21.75 sq. m, of which 3.85 sq. m were occupied by a bathroom (17.92 sq. m of remaining space). The cell had four rows of bunk beds and accommodated five prisoners (3.5 sq. m of personal space, including the space occupied by the beds). Ventilation was ensured by a window measuring 0.97 by 1.45 m. The bathroom had its own window measuring 40 by 45 cm. 12. Cell E 2.4 measured 24.05 sq. m, of which 3.36 sq. m were occupied by a bathroom (20.69 sq. m of remaining space). The cell had four rows of bunk beds and accommodated four to six prisoners (between 3.44 and 4.13 sq. m of personal space, including the space occupied by the beds). Ventilation was ensured by a window measuring 0.97 by 1.45 m. The bathroom had its own window measuring 40 by 45 cm. 13. For the rest of the time the applicant was held in non-smoking cells, a description of which is set out below. 14. Cell E 2.5 measured 49.8 sq. m, of which 7.31 sq. m were occupied by a bathroom (42.49 sq. m of remaining space). The cell had twenty-seven beds and accommodated twenty-five to twenty-six prisoners (an average of 1.63 sq. m of personal space, including the space occupied by the beds). The cell had three windows measuring 90 by 109 cm and the bathroom had a window measuring 40 by 45 cm. 15. Cell E 3.4 measured 36.15 sq. m, of which 5.55 sq. m were occupied by a bathroom (30.6 sq. m of remaining space). The cell had eight rows of bunk beds and usually accommodated twenty prisoners (1.53 sq. m of personal space, including the space occupied by the beds). The cell had a window measuring 118 by 158 cm. The bathroom had its own window measuring 110 by 50 cm. 16. Cell E 1.13 measured 48.40 sq. m, of which 9.25 sq. m were occupied by a bathroom and 2.17 sq. m by a storage room (36.98 sq. m of remaining space). The cell had eleven rows of bunk beds and accommodated twenty-five to twenty-nine prisoners (between 1.47 sq. m and 1.27 sq. m of personal space, including the space occupied by the beds). It also had three windows measuring 100 by 125 cm and 100 by 150 cm. The bathroom had its own window measuring 60 by 50 cm. 17. The Government submitted that all of the cells contained adequate furniture and that disinfection operations took place whenever the presence of insects was reported.

4. The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Szczecin. 5. On 7 March 1996 the Szczecin Regional Prosecutor laid charges of large-scale fraud against the applicant. On 17 April 1996 the prosecutor ordered his detention on remand in connection with those charges. He also issued a search and arrest warrant in respect of the applicant. Subsequently, on an unspecified date the prosecution received information that the applicant had left Poland. 6. On 7 October 1996 the prosecutor stayed the investigation due to the fact that the applicant was abroad. On the same day he issued an international search and arrest warrant for the applicant. 7. On 29 November 1996 the applicant was arrested in Germany. 8. On 19 March 1997 the German authorities extradited the applicant to Poland where he was placed in police custody. On 21 March 1997 the Szczecin District Court ordered his detention on remand on suspicion of large-scale fraud. His detention was subsequently prolonged on 16 September and 30 November 1997. 9. On 15 November 1997 the prosecution filed a bill of indictment with the Szczecin Regional Court. The applicant was charged with large-scale fraud to the detriment of the State Treasury. There were two other defendants in the case. 10. The Regional Court held hearings on the following dates: 22 January, 26 and 27 February, 2, 24 and 25 March, 20, 21 and 22 April, 16 June, 14 and 20 July 1998. 11. In the course of his original trial, the applicant lodged numerous unsuccessful applications for release and appealed – likewise unsuccessfully – against refusals to lift the detention. In his applications, he argued that his detention was excessive and had, for all practical purposes, amounted to serving a prison sentence. He asked the courts to release him either on bail or under police supervision, or to accept a guarantee from a responsible person or persons who would undertake to ensure his presence at trial, or to order him to surrender his passport, or to subject his release to all those conditions. 12. On 20 July 1998 the trial court gave judgment. It convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to 9 years' imprisonment and a fine. The court further ordered that the period spent by him in pre-trial detention from 29 November 1996 up to the date of his conviction be set off against the sentence imposed. 13. On 15 April 1999, on an appeal lodged by the applicant, the Poznań Court of Appeal quashed the first-instance judgment and remitted the case. The subsequent proceedings were conducted only against two defendants, including the applicant, as the third defendant had not appealed against the first-instance judgment. 14. On 28 December 1999 the Regional Court joined the proceedings in question to the other set of proceedings. The number of defendants increased to three. 15. The retrial was to begin on 28 March 2000 but was adjourned since one of the defendants had to undergo a psychiatric examination. The next hearing scheduled for 9 May 2000 had to be adjourned due to the illness of a lay judge. The Regional Court held the first retrial hearing on 20 June 2000. Subsequent hearings were held on 12, 18 and 19 July, 22 August, 20, 21 and 28 September, 17 and 18 October, 28 and 29 November and 20 December 2000. 16. In the meantime, on 20 May 1999 the Poznań Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's application for release on bail or under police supervision, or under guarantee by a responsible person or under the condition that he surrender his passport. The court found that there was a considerable likelihood that he had committed the offence with which he had been charged. The court further noted that the applicant had already been detained on remand for some 30 months but it considered that, given that he had previously been sought under an international arrest warrant and that he was liable to a severe penalty, there was a real risk that he might obstruct the proper conduct of the trial. In the court's view, that risk justified his being kept in custody. That decision was upheld on appeal. 17. On 27 May 1999 the Court of Appeal prolonged the applicant's detention pending trial until 30 November 1999. The applicant appealed, invoking, inter alia, Article 5 § 3 of the Convention. He submitted that his right to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial was not respected. He also maintained that his detention was so excessive that it amounted in reality to serving a prison sentence. 18. On 4 August 1999 the Court of Appeal upheld the contested order. Repeating the grounds previously given for the applicant's detention, the court stressed that he had already evaded justice and an international arrest warrant had had to be issued. It considered that the trial had not progressed because of his conduct. In the court's opinion, those circumstances clearly indicated that there was a considerable risk that the applicant, if released, might again upset the proper conduct of the proceedings. Lastly, the court noted that he faced an exceptionally heavy sentence, which had already been shown by the severity of the penalty originally imposed at first instance. 19. On 27 August 1999 the Szczecin Regional Court dismissed an application for release on bail or subject to other guarantees or conditions. The court repeated the grounds previously invoked, attaching particular importance to the fact that he had earlier absconded and had already been sentenced to 9 years' imprisonment. In view of the severity of the sentence to which he was liable, the court considered that neither bail, nor police supervision nor any other guarantee would secure the proper course of the trial. 20. On 16 November 1999 the Regional Court extended the applicant's detention until 30 April 2000, repeating the grounds mentioned in the previous decisions. 21. The applicant appealed, maintaining, among other things, that there was no legal basis for keeping him in custody and that, pursuant to Article 263 §§ 3 and 4 of the 1997 Code, his detention could have been prolonged only by the Supreme Court because it had exceeded the maximum statutory period of 2 years laid down in paragraph 3 of that provision. 22. On 11 January 2000 the Court of Appeal rejected the appeal. It stressed that both the fact that the applicant had earlier evaded justice and the nature of his, in the court's words, “criminal relations” with certain witnesses involved in the case, indicated that detention was the only preventive measure which would effectively secure the proper course of the trial. As regards the legal basis for his detention, the court pointed out that – as had already been mentioned in the previous detention decisions – his detention continued on the grounds listed in Article 258 §§ 1 (2) and 2 of the 1997 Code as there was a risk that he might obstruct the proper course of the trial and a heavy penalty was likely to be imposed on him. Lastly, as to the question of which court was competent to prolong his detention, the Court of Appeal stated that the applicant had misconstrued Article 263 §§ 3 and 4 of the 1997 Code. That provision, the court added, indeed imposed a statutory time-limit of 2 years on pre-trial detention and laid down that only the Supreme Court could prolong it beyond that term. However, that rule applied only as long as there had been no conviction at first instance. Since the applicant had already been convicted at first instance, no time-limit for detention applied to his case, even though his original conviction had subsequently been quashed on appeal. 23. On 4 February 2000 the Regional Court dismissed a further application for release filed by the applicant in January 2000. It reiterated the grounds invoked in the previous detention decisions and added that, in the light of the material before it, there was a considerable likelihood that the applicant had committed the offence with which he had been charged. 24. On 25 February 2000 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant's subsequent application for release. It recalled that it had already ruled on numerous occasions on his detention. Noting that the applicant had not adduced any new relevant circumstances, the court found it unnecessary to address his arguments. 25. On 26 April 2000 the Regional Court prolonged the applicant's detention until 30 October 2000. It considered that the material gathered in the case justified the opinion that the applicant had committed the offence in question. It observed that a severe penalty (up to 9 years' imprisonment) might be imposed on him. Stressing that the applicant had evaded justice at the initial stage of the proceedings, the court also pointed out that his detention served the purpose of securing the proper conduct of the trial. Furthermore, the court found it necessary to extend his detention until 30 October 2000 because the summer holidays were approaching, which, for all practical purposes, meant that the examination of the case would be postponed. 26. On 15 September 2000 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant's further application for release. 27. On 21 September 2000 the applicant requested that the three sets of criminal proceedings conducted against him before the courts in Szczecin, including the proceedings at issue, be transferred to other courts. On 13 October 2000 his request was refused. 28. On 18 October 2000 the Szczecin Regional Court prolonged the applicant's detention until 30 January 2001. It reiterated all the grounds previously given for his detention. The applicant's appeal, based on Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, was rejected by the Court of Appeal on 31 October 2000. 29. On 12 January 2001 the Regional Court extended the applicant's detention until 30 July 2001. Upon the applicant's appeal, the Court of Appeal reduced the prolongation to 23 February 2001. 30. On 22 February 2001 the Regional Court ordered that the applicant be kept in custody until 24 April 2001. It further held that he could be released if he put up bail of PLN 40,000. The applicant appealed. 31. On 15 March 2001 the Court of Appeal quashed the Regional Court's decision. It ordered that the applicant should be released on condition that he put up bail of PLN 30,000 by 30 March 2001. The Court of Appeal further placed the applicant under police supervision and imposed on him a prohibition on leaving the country. 32. On 27 March 2001 the Regional Court ordered the applicant's release as he had paid the bail. He was released on the same day. 33. On 28 March 2002 the Szczecin Regional Court convicted the applicant of large-scale fraud and breach of official secrecy. It sentenced him to a cumulative sentence of 8 years' imprisonment and a fine. The applicant appealed. 34. On 12 February 2003 the Poznań Court of Appeal amended the Regional Court's judgment by reducing the applicant's cumulative sentence to 6 years' imprisonment. The applicant appealed. 35. On 1 March 2004 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's cassation appeal.

5. The first and second applicants were born in 1952 and 1948 respectively and live in Helsinki. The applicant company has its seat in Helsinki. The first applicant is a freelance journalist and the second applicant editor-in-chief of Seura magazine. 6. On 20 December 1996 an article written by the first applicant was published in issue no. 51-52/1996 of Seura magazine. It stated in the headline that the Child Ombudsman in the Mannerheim League for Child Welfare (Mannerheimin lastensuojeluliitto, Mannerheims barnskyddsförbund), which is a non-governmental organisation, had been removed from office (in Finnish: “Lapsiasiamies hyllylle”) and in the text, inter alia, that the Ombudsman (henceforth “X.”) had been transferred to do research work and that she would not be replaced as Ombudsman (“... [hänet] siirretään tutkijaksi, eikä hänelle palkata sijaista lapsiasiamieheksi”). The article also stated that the Ombudsman had no training or experience in research work. The general tone of the article was critical. During the subsequent court proceedings the first applicant argued that when writing it he had relied on information given in a tabloid article published on 11 December 1996. He considered that no reason had emerged to believe that the information contained therein was not true. 7. Issue no. 4/1997 of Seura magazine included a rectification by the press officer of the Mannerheim League for Child Welfare, stating that the information concerning removal from office was groundless. The rest of the rectification stated the following: "[i]n 1995 X. was awarded a grant for three months which she used last autumn. X. will also have three months' research leave in 1997. X will take this leave at a later stage to be agreed upon. "The research leave does not affect X.'s position as the Child Ombudsman in the Mannerheim League for Child Welfare in any way." 8. On 29 October 1997 X. requested the police to investigate the matter. On 28 April and 30 April 1998 the first and the second applicants were questioned by the police. In her concluding statement of 16 December 1998 X. pursued a compensation claim against all the applicants. The pre-trial investigation was completed on 1 November 1998. 9. On 3 April 2000 the public prosecutor preferred charges against the first and second applicants. The next day the case became pending before the Espoo District Court (käräjäoikeus, tingsrätten). X. concurred with the charges brought by the public prosecutor and supplemented the description of the defamation charges. On an unknown date X.'s compensation claim, together with her claim for costs and expenses, was joined to the criminal charges. 10. On 5 May 2000 the District Court invited the parties' written submissions. According to the applicants they were served with the summonses only in November 2000. 11. On 26 May 2003 the District Court held a preparatory hearing. A second preliminary hearing was held on 19 September 2003. 12. The District Court heard the case over three days during the period from 1 to 9 December 2003. It heard thirteen witnesses and received a significant amount of documentary evidence. 13. On 19 January 2004 the District Court gave judgment, convicting the first and second applicants of defamation (painotuotteen kautta tehty julkinen herjaus, offentlig smädelse skett genom tryckalster), sentencing them to forty day-fines, amounting to EUR 240 and EUR 2,360 respectively, and ordering them, together with Yhtyneet Kuvalehdet Oy, the publishing company, to pay non-pecuniary damages to X. in the amount of 5,000 euros (EUR) plus interest and to reimburse two thirds of her costs and expenses, that is, EUR 17,172 plus interest. The reimbursement of costs was only partial, on the ground that X. was considered to have submitted some pieces of evidence which had not been relevant to the case. 14. The District Court's conclusions from the evidence presented were the following: “The defendants being guilty of defamation 1. Allegation concerning the transfer of [X.] to research work Excluding the headline and the caption, the article referred to in the indictment was drafted by [the first applicant]. It was written in the article, in a manner described in the indictment, that [X.] is transferred to do research work. This passage of the article was the basis of the headline, "Child Ombudsman removed from office". It appears from the testimonies of witnesses [I.], [K.-T.], [W.] and [K.] that [X.] had not been transferred to a researcher post but that she had instead undertaken research work and had therefore been on 80% research leave from 1 October to 31 December 1996. On 11 December 1996 Ilta-Sanomat published an article reporting on [X.'s] transfer to research work. The defendants have invoked this article, arguing that it and the article referred to in the indictment had no essential difference and that [X.] has not claimed rectification or filed a criminal complaint on account of the article in Ilta-Sanomat. The District Court holds that there is a relevant difference between reporting that a person will transfer or has transferred to other tasks and reporting that the person has been transferred to other tasks. The latter wording, which [the first applicant] has used in his article, is negative vis-à-vis a person, such is also the headline of the article, which is based on this wording and alleges [X.'s] removal from office. Such a wording suggests that the person in question has committed some misconduct in his or her work or performed it inappropriately and is therefore removed from office and transferred to other tasks due to his or her own fault. In [X.'s] case such a transfer did not take place, and the information given in the article was incorrect. This incorrect information disclosed in the article included a hint that [X.], when performing her work, had been guilty of an act which warranted her transfer to other tasks. This incorrect information was conducive to causing damage to her performance in office and to her success. Furthermore, [X.'s] tasks were not changed at the turn of the years 1996-1997. ... 3. Experience of and training for research work It is stated in the indictment that the article has aimed to strengthen the impression given by it that the transfer of [X.] to research work was due to her poor performance in office, by writing that [X.] has no experience of or training for research work. It has appeared in the matter, also from [X.'s] testimony, that the information about the lack of research experience and training is not false as such. In a manner described in the indictment, this reference is connected to the allegation made in the article that [X.] had been transferred to research work. However, as the allegation of transfer has been found incorrect, the information about [X.'s] lack of research experience and training, truthful as such, has, in the manner described in the indictment, strengthened the erroneous impression given by the article that [X.] had been transferred to other tasks due to her own fault, and even to tasks for which she was unqualified in terms of training and experience. In the context in question, the information violated [X.'s] honour and strengthened the significance of the incorrect information disclosed in the article. 4. Summary The article provided incorrect information about the removal of [X.] from office and her transfer to research work and emphasised the significance of the alleged transfer by stating that [X.] lacks the necessary training and experience. To this extent the article gave the reader the picture that the alleged transfer was due to [X.'s] poor performance of the tasks of Child Ombudsman. The article contained incorrect information which was conducive to causing damage to [X.'s] performance in office and her success. [The first applicant], responsible for the text of the article, and [the second applicant], responsible for the text and the headline of the article, have not verified the information given in the article although it was easily verifiable from the Mannerheim League for Child Welfare, for example from Secretary General [I.]. The information about the transfer of [X.] to research work has been the erroneous conclusion of [the first applicant], and the headline of the article, an aggravated expression highlighting the erroneous allegation, which has been created by the editorial staff on the basis of the said conclusion.” 15. On 23 February 2004 the District Court, on the request of the first and second applicants and X., extended the time-limit for appealing against the judgment until 18 March 2004. The time-limit for filing a counter-appeal was fixed at 1 April 2004. 16. The applicants appealed to the Helsinki Court of Appeal (hovioikeus, hovrätten). In a counter-appeal dated 1 April 2004 X. argued, inter alia, that the appellate court should increase the compensation payable to her. 17. The case was heard over two days, on 13 and 15 June 2006, in the Court of Appeal. On 31 August 2006 it upheld the lower court's judgment. 18. The Court of Appeal's assessment of the evidence was the following: “The Court of Appeal holds that no reason exists to assess the evidence presented in the case differently from the assessment made by the District Court regarding the incorrectness of the article published in Seura magazine. Thus, the article in issue was not truthful to the extent that it alleged that [X.] had been transferred to do research work. Likewise, the headline of the article and the caption under [X.'s] photograph, which were based on the said allegation, were untruthful. The Court of Appeal holds, in line with the District Court, that the article published in Ilta-Sanomat on 11 December 1996, which, according to [the first applicant] was the basis for his article, has not corresponded to the article published in Seura in respect of the parts in issue. According to the headline of the article in Ilta-Sanomat, [X.] has undertaken research work, and according to the text of the article itself, [X.] was transferring to research work. The article also stated that [X.] had agreed on the change to research work more than one year earlier, that [X.] had already started a special study in addition to her daily work as the Child Ombudsman and that the main emphasis of her work would be shifted onto research and that according to [the Secretary General], no replacement was needed for the Child Ombudsman. Although witness [V.] had reported that when writing the article Ilta-Sanomat had thought that there were conflicts behind [X.'s] changeover to research work, the article in the newspaper cannot lead to the conclusion that [X.] was transferred to research work for such reasons. Therefore, [the first applicant] could not have based his allegation about the transfer of [X.] on the article in Ilta-Sanomat. The fact that witness [V.] remembers having read about [X.'s] changeover in some little article in another news publication or in some press release already, is without significance in assessing the liability of [the first applicant]. Further, it has not been substantiated solely on the basis of the testimony of witness [V.] that such a piece of news or press release even existed. Neither has it been clarified that the leaders of the Mannerheim League for Child Welfare were otherwise revising the job description of [X.] as the Child Ombudsman in 1996. Therefore, it is to be considered that [the first applicant], by failing to verify the truthfulness of the allegation of transfer of [X.] to research work, intentionally, against his better knowledge, made a false allegation, which may have subjected [X.] to contempt or caused damage to her livelihood or success. [The first applicant] has submitted that he did not write the headline and the caption of the article in Seura. [The second applicant], too, has submitted that the headline and the caption were written by editorial staff, probably by a subeditor. However, [the second applicant] has admitted that he, as the editor-in-chief, was also responsible for the headline of the article, which the groundless allegation by [the first applicant] made possible. [The second applicant] has submitted in the Court of Appeal that he did not read the article by [the first applicant] in advance or discuss it with him. However, when questioned in the pre-trial investigation, he remembered the incidents better. [The second] applicant has reported in the police investigation on 30 April 1998 that he discussed the article and its truthfulness with [the first applicant] before it was published. No reason exists to doubt the reliability of the testimony given by [the second applicant] in the pre-trial investigation. It has thus been substantiated that [the second applicant] approved the publishing of the article. Therefore, the second applicant has intentionally published the false allegation described above. On the aforementioned grounds and otherwise on the grounds stated by the District Court, it has been substantiated that [the first and second applicants], are guilty of public defamation, against their better knowledge, committed through printed material under Chapter 27, section 1, of the Penal Code in force at the time of the offence, as imputed to them by the District Court. The act also fulfils the essential elements of defamation under the current Chapter 24, section 9, subsection 1, of the Penal Code. Since the offence was committed through mass media, and considering the circumstances mentioned by the District Court in the reasoning for its judgment and the fact that the article gives the picture that [X.] had committed misconduct in work or performed it inappropriately and was therefore transferred to other tasks against her own will, the defamation is also to be considered aggravated when assessed as a whole. Since applying the new law will thus not lead to a more lenient result than the law in force at the time of the offence, the earlier Chapter 27, section 1, of the Penal Code is to be applied. ...” 19. On 30 October 2006 X. and the applicants applied for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen), referring, inter alia, to Articles 6 and 10 of the Convention. Leave was refused on 1 February 2007. Other events 20. Meanwhile, on 11 December 2003 the Mannerheim League for Child Welfare decided to wind up the functions of the Child Ombudsman with effect from 1 February 2004. In a final judgment of 27 October 2006 the Helsinki District Court held that X.'s duties had been unlawfully terminated.

4. The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in St. Petersburg. 5. On 1 March 1994 a State-owned construction company “Lengidroenergospetsstroy” (промышленное строительно-монтажное объединение «Ленгидроэнергоспецстрой», hereinafter “LenGESS”) and a private investment company “Severo-Zapadniy Soyuz” (АОЗТ ТПК «Северо-Западный Союз», hereinafter “SZS”) signed a contract, pursuant to which the LenGESS undertook to build a block of flats in St. Petersburg and the SZS was to finance the construction in part. By way of consideration, the SZS was to receive title to a certain number of flats in the completed construction. In order to raise funds, the SZS collected money from private investors who were to become the eventual owners of the flats. 6. In February 1996 the applicant signed a contract for the purchase of a flat with the SZS and paid the stipulated price in full. 7. It appears that, once the block of flats had been built, the LenGESS refused to transfer the stipulated number of flats to the SZS, claiming that the funding raised by the latter had been insufficient. In December 1997, the SZS sued the LenGESS before the Kuybyshevskiy District Court of St. Petersburg, seeking enforcement of the 1994 contract. 8. On an unspecified date the applicant lodged two statements of claim against the LenGESS with the Vyborgskiy and the Primorskiy district courts of St. Petersburg, seeking a court order upholding his title to a flat. 9. On 19 November 1998 the Primorskiy District Court, on a request by the applicant, stayed the proceedings pending the judgment of the Vyborgskiy District Court. It appears that these proceedings have not been resumed yet. 10. On 24 December 1998 the applicant entered the proceedings before the Kuybyshevskiy District Court as a co-plaintiff against the LenGESS, seeking to obtain title to the flat for which he had paid the stipulated price. 11. On 23 February 1999 the Vyborgskiy District Court, on a request by the applicant, stayed the proceedings pending completion of the proceedings before the Kuybyshevskiy District Court. It appears that these proceedings have not been resumed yet. 12. As hearings before the Kuybyshevskiy Court were repeatedly adjourned, on 25 May 1999 the applicant complained about delays to the president of the St. Petersburg City Court. By a letter of 4 June 1999, the president of the St. Petersburg City Court replied that hearings were adjourned because of a substantial backlog of cases and because the judge to which the case had been assigned had gone on vacation. The president advised the applicant to ask the president of the Kuybyshevskiy District Court to transfer the case to another judge. 13. On 21 June 1999 the applicant requested the president of the Kuybyshevskiy District Court to transfer the case to another judge. On 24 June 1999 the president responded that reassignment was not feasible because of a large number of pending cases and the court's light schedule during the summer. 14. On 30 June 1999 the applicant complained about delays to the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, which forwarded the complaint to the St. Petersburg City Court for consideration. On 24 August 1999 a deputy president of the St. Petersburg City Court dismissed the complaint, noting that the problem of delays had to be solved by the Kuybyshevskiy District Court. 15. On an unspecified date the Kuybyshevskiy District Court fixed a hearing for 24 December 1999, it was subsequently adjourned until 28 February 2000. 16. On 10 May 2000 the Kuybyshevskiy District Court discontinued the proceedings, finding that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim and that the dispute was to be adjudicated by commercial courts. 17. On 29 June 2000 the St. Petersburg City Court granted appeals by the SZS, the applicant and other co-plaintiffs, quashed the decision of 10 May 2000 and remitted the matter to the Kuybyshevskiy District Court for examination on the merits. It also issued a “special finding” (частное определение) concerning the judge of the Kuybyshevskiy District Court to whom the case had been assigned, in which it noted her manifest failure to observe the rules of civil procedure as regards compliance with procedural time-limits. 18. On 17 November 2000, 7 February, 23 March and 1 June 2001 hearings before the Kyubyshevskiy District Court were held. 19. On 28 September 2001 the Kuybyshevskiy District Court of St. Petersburg delivered the judgment. The claims of all plaintiffs were dismissed on the ground that they had never paid any sums directly to the LenGESS. 20. On 9 October 2001 the applicant, among others, appealed against the judgment of 28 September 2001. 21. On an unspecified date the Kuybyshevskiy District Court listed an appeal hearing for 13 November 2001 and sent the case-file to the city court. It appears that the district court had not determined certain issues concerning court fees by 13 November 2001 and for that reason the city court had to adjourn the appeal hearing and send the case-file back to the district court. A new appeal hearing was fixed for 21 March 2002. 22. On 21 March 2002 the St. Petersburg City Court quashed the judgment of 28 September 2001 and remitted the case to the Kuybyshevskiy District Court. 23. On 29 May, 27 June and 14 September 2002 the Kuybyshevskiy District Court held further hearings. 24. Meanwhile, on 10 September 2002 the St. Petersburg Commercial Court opened bankruptcy proceedings in respect of the SZS. 25. On 24 September 2002 the Kuybyshevskiy District Court referred the claim against the LenGESS to the St. Petersburg Commercial Court. It held that the dispute involving legal entities was to be adjudicated by a commercial court. 26. On 3 December 2002 the St. Petersburg Commercial Court discontinued the proceedings, holding that the matter was to be examined in the bankruptcy proceedings initiated on 10 September 2002. 27. On 11 March 2003 the Appeals Division of the St. Petersburg Commercial Court quashed the decision of 3 December 2002 and remitted the case to the first instance division for examination on the merits. 28. On 26 May 2003 the St. Petersburg Commercial Court referred the case to the Kuybyshevskiy District Court, noting that the dispute involved individuals and that it was therefore appropriate for determination by court of general jurisdiction. 29. On 18 August 2003 the Kuybyshevskiy District Court received the case-file. On 6 October and 23 December 2003 hearings were held. 30. On 23 December 2003 the court fixed a new hearing date for 2 March 2004. On the same date the applicant complained about further delays to the president of the Kuybyshevskiy District Court. 31. Between 2 March and 24 December 2004 the Kyubyshevskiy District Court scheduled eight hearings, at least half of them were adjourned for various reasons. 32. The proceedings are still pending before the district court.

5. The applicant is the publisher of a national daily newspaper in the United Kingdom known as The Daily Mirror (formerly known as the Mirror). It is represented before the Court by Mr K. Bays of Davenport Lyons, a solicitor practising in London. 6. On 1 February 2001 the “Mirror” newspaper carried on the front page an article headed “Naomi: I am a drug addict”, placed between two colour photographs of Ms Naomi Campbell, a well-known model. The first photograph, slightly indistinct, showed her dressed in a baseball cap and had a caption: “Therapy: Naomi outside meeting”. The second showed her glamorously partially covered by a string of beads. 7. The article read as follows: “Supermodel Naomi Campbell is attending Narcotics Anonymous meetings in a courageous bid to beat her addiction to drink and drugs. The 30-year old has been a regular at counselling sessions for three months, often attending twice a day. Dressed in jeans and baseball cap, she arrived at one of NA's lunchtime meetings this week. Hours later at a different venue she made a low-key entrance to a women-only gathering of recovered addicts. Despite her £14million fortune Naomi is treated as just another addict trying to put her life back together. A source close to her said last night: 'She wants to clean up her life for good. She went into modelling when she was very young and it is easy to be led astray. Drink and drugs are unfortunately widely available in the fashion world. But Naomi has realised she has a problem and has bravely vowed to do something about it. Everyone wishes her well.' Her spokeswoman at Elite Models declined to comment.” 8. The story continued inside the newspaper with a longer article across two pages. This article was headed “Naomi's finally trying to beat the demons that have been haunting her” and the opening paragraphs read: “She's just another face in the crowd, but the gleaming smile is unmistakeably Naomi Campbell's. In our picture, the catwalk queen emerges from a gruelling two-hour session at Narcotics Anonymous and gives a friend a loving hug. This is one of the world's most beautiful women facing up to her drink and drugs addiction - and clearly winning. The London-born supermodel has been going to NA meetings for the past three months as she tries to change her wild lifestyle. Such is her commitment to conquering her problem that she regularly goes twice a day to group counselling ... To the rest of the group she is simply Naomi, the addict. Not the supermodel. Not the style icon.” 9. The article made mention of Ms Campbell's efforts to rehabilitate herself and that one of her friends had said that she was still fragile but “getting healthy”. The article gave a general description of Narcotics Anonymous (“NA”) therapy and referred to some of Ms Campbell's recently publicised activities including an occasion when she had been rushed to hospital and had her stomach pumped: while she had claimed it was an allergic reaction to antibiotics and that she had never had a drug problem, the article noted that “those closest to her knew the truth”. 10. In the middle of the double page spread, between several innocuous pictures of Ms Campbell, was a dominating picture with a caption “Hugs: Naomi, dressed in jeans and baseball hat, arrives for a lunchtime group meeting this week”. The picture showed her in the street on the doorstep of a building as the central figure in a small group. She was being embraced by two people whose faces had been masked on the photograph. Standing on the pavement was a board advertising a certain café. The photograph had been taken by a free-lance photographer contracted by the newspaper for that job. He took the photographs covertly while concealed some distance away in a parked car. 11. On 1 February 2001 Ms Campbell's solicitor wrote to the applicant stating that the article was a breach of confidentiality and an invasion of privacy and requesting an undertaking that it would not publish further confidential and/or private information. 12. The newspaper responded with further articles. On 5 February 2001 the newspaper published an article headed, in large letters, “Pathetic”. Below was a photograph of Ms Campbell over the caption “Help: Naomi leaves Narcotics Anonymous meeting last week after receiving therapy in her battle against illegal drugs”. This photograph was similar to the street scene picture published on 1 February. The text of the article was headed “After years of self-publicity and illegal drug abuse, Naomi Campbell whinges about privacy”. The article mentioned that “the Mirror revealed last week how she is attending daily meetings of Narcotics Anonymous”. Elsewhere in the same edition, an editorial, with the heading “No hiding Naomi”, concluded with the words: “If Naomi Campbell wants to live like a nun, let her join a nunnery. If she wants the excitement of a show business life, she must accept what comes with it”. On 7 February 2001, the Mirror published, under the heading “Fame on you, Ms Campbell”, a further article mocking Ms Campbell's threatened proceedings, referring to the years during which she thrust “her failed projects like the nauseating book Swan and equally appalling record Love and Tears down our throats”, stating that Ms Campbell was not an artist and that she was “about as effective as a chocolate soldier”, implying that her prior campaign against racism in the fashion industry was self-serving publicity and that “the problem is that Naomi doesn't actually “stand” for anything. She can't sing, can't act, can't dance, and can't write.” 13. Ms Campbell claimed damages for breach of confidence and compensation under the Data Protection Act 1998. A claim for aggravated damages was made mainly as regards the article of 7 February 2001. On 27 March 2002 the High Court (Morland J.) upheld Ms Campbell's claim, following a hearing of 5 days. 14. He described Ms Campbell as an “internationally renowned fashion model and celebrity”. The first issue was whether there had been a breach of confidence and, in that respect, Ms Campbell was required to prove three elements. The first was that the details divulged by the article about her attendance at NA meetings had the necessary quality of confidence about them. Information to the effect that her treatment was regular attendance at NA meetings was clearly confidential: the details were obtained surreptitiously, assisted by covert photography when she was engaged (deliberately “low key and drably dressed”) in the private activity of therapy to advance her recovery from drug addiction. Giving details of her therapy, including her regular attendance at NA, was easily identifiable as private and disclosure of that information would be highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. There existed a private interest worthy of protection. Secondly, it was found that those details were imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence given the sources of the information (either a fellow sufferer of drug addiction or one of her staff). Thirdly, and having heard evidence on the subject, she had demonstrated that the publication was to her detriment and, notably, the publication of her treatment with NA specifically had caused her significant distress and was likely adversely to affect her attendance/participation in therapy meetings. 15. The High Court considered these findings to be in conformity with the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Douglas v Hello! Ltd ([2001] QB 967 §164-168) which had held that there was no watertight division between the concepts of privacy and confidentiality and that the approach to the tort had to be informed by the jurisprudence of Article 8 of the Convention. Citing Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom (22 October 1981, Series A no. 45) it noted that Convention jurisprudence acknowledged different degrees of privacy: the more intimate the aspect of private life which was being interfered with, the more serious the justification required. 16. The High Court adopted the approach of Lord Woolf CJ in A v B plc ([2003] QB 195, see paragraph 88 below) as regards, inter alia, the qualification of the right to freedom of expression by the right to respect for private life guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. 17. The High Court considered at some length the extent to which Ms Campbell had exposed herself and her private life to the media and, in light of this, how to reconcile the demands of Articles 8 and 10. The High Court considered that the applicant had been fully entitled to publish in the public interest the facts of her drug addiction and treatment as Ms Campbell had previously misled the public by denying drug use. “She might have been thought of and indeed she herself seemed to be a self-appointed role model to young black women”. However, the High Court had to protect a celebrity from publication of information about her private life which had “the mark and badge of confidentiality” and which she had chosen not to put in the public domain unless, despite that breach of confidentiality and the private nature of the information, publication was justifiable. The balance of Article 8 and 10 rights involved in the present case clearly called for a remedy for Ms Campbell as regards the publication of the private material. 18. The High Court heard evidence from, inter alia, Ms Campbell as to the impact on her of the publication. It concluded: “Although I am satisfied that Miss Naomi Campbell has established that she has suffered a significant amount of distress and injury to feelings caused specifically by the unjustified revelation of the details of her therapy with Narcotics Anonymous, apart from that distress and injury to feelings she also suffered a significant degree of distress and injury to feelings caused by the entirely legitimate publication by the defendants of her drug addiction and the fact of therapy about which she cannot complain. In determining the extent of distress and injury to feelings for which she is entitled to compensation, I must consider her evidence with caution. She has shown herself to be over the years lacking in frankness and veracity with the media and manipulative and selective in what she has chosen to reveal about herself. I am satisfied that she lied on oath [about certain facts]. Nevertheless I am satisfied that she genuinely suffered distress and injury to feelings caused by the unjustified publication and disclosure of details of her therapy in the two articles of the 1st and 5th February 2002 complained of. I assess damages or compensation in the sum of £2500.” 19. As to her claim for aggravated damages (mainly the article of 7 February 2001), the High Court found that a newspaper faced with litigation was entitled to argue that a claim against it should never have been made and that any complaint should have been made to the Press Complaints Commission. Such assertions could even be written in strong and colourful language and it was not for the courts to censor bad taste. However, since the article also “trashed her as a person” in a highly offensive and hurtful manner, this entitled her to aggravated damages in the sum of GBP 1000. 20. On 14 October 2002 the Court of Appeal (Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers MR, Chadwick and Keene LJJ) unanimously allowed the newspaper's appeal. The hearing had lasted two and a half days. 21. The Court of Appeal noted that Ms Campbell was an “internationally famous fashion model” who had courted, rather than shunned, publicity in part to promote other ventures in which she was involved. In interviews with the media she had volunteered information about some aspects of her private life and behaviour including limited details about her relationships. She had gone out of her way to aver that, in contrast to many models, she did not take drugs, stimulants or tranquillisers, but this was untrue. 22. As to the impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 (“HRA”) on the law of confidentiality, the court observed that it had to balance the rights guaranteed by Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention, noting that freedom of the media was a bastion of any democratic society. 23. As to whether the information disclosed was confidential, the Court of Appeal did not consider that the information that Ms Campbell was receiving therapy from NA was to be equated with disclosure of clinical details of medical treatment. Since it was legitimate to publish the fact that she was a drug addict receiving treatment, it was not particularly significant to add that the treatment consisted of NA meetings which disclosure would not be offensive to a reasonable reader of ordinary sensibilities. While a reader might have found it offensive that obviously covert photographs had been taken of her, that, of itself, had not been relied upon as a ground of complaint. In addition, it was not easy to separate the distress Ms Campbell must have felt at being identified as a drug addict in treatment accompanied by covert photographs from any additional distress resulting from disclosure of her attendance at NA meetings. In short, it was not obvious that the peripheral disclosure of Ms Campbell's attendance at NA meetings was of sufficient significance as to justify the intervention of the court. 24. Relying on Fressoz and Roire v. France ([GC], no. 29183/95, § 54, ECHR 1999‑I), the Court of Appeal considered that the photographs were a legitimate, if not an essential, part of the journalistic package designed to demonstrate that Ms Campbell had been deceiving the public when she said that she did not take drugs and, provided that publication of particular confidential information was justifiable in the public interest, the journalist had to be given reasonable latitude as to the manner in which that information was conveyed to the public or his Article 10 right to freedom of expression would be unnecessarily inhibited. The publication of the photographs added little to Ms Campbell's case: they illustrated and drew attention to the information that she was receiving therapy from NA. 25. Following a hearing of 2 days, on 6 May 2004 the House of Lords allowed Ms Campbell's appeal (Lord Hope of Craighead, Baroness Hale of Richmond and Lord Carswell formed the majority, Lords Nicholls of Birkenhead and Hoffman dissenting) and restored the orders made by the High Court. They delivered separate and extensive judgments. (a) Lord Hope of Craighead 26. Lord Hope began by noting the powerful international reputation of Ms Campbell in the business of fashion modelling, which business was conducted under the constant gaze of the media. He also noted her “status as a celebrity”. He considered that the issues were essentially questions of “fact and degree” which did not raise any “new issues of principle”. In the present case, where the publication concerned a drug addict requiring treatment and, given the fact that disclosure of details concerning that treatment together with publication of a covertly taken photograph could endanger that treatment, the disclosure was of private information. 27. The case gave rise to a competition between the rights of free speech and privacy which were of equal value in a democratic society. In balancing these rights, Lord Hope noted that the right to privacy, which lay at the heart of an action for breach of confidence, had to be balanced against the right of the media to impart information to the public and that the latter right had, in turn, to be balanced against the respect that must be given to private life. There was nothing new about this in domestic law. 28. He examined in detail the latitude to be accorded to journalists in deciding whether or not to publish information to ensure credibility. He noted the principles set out in this respect in this Court's case law (Observer and Guardian v. the United Kingdom, 26 November 1991, § 59, Series A no. 216; Jersild v. Denmark, 23 September 1994, § 31, Series A no. 298 and Fressoz and Roire v. France [GC], no. 29183/95, § 54, ECHR 1999‑I). 29. Having examined the balancing exercise in the Jersild and Fressoz cases, Lord Hope reiterated there was no doubt that the choices made about the presentation of material that was legitimate to convey to the public was pre-eminently an editorial matter with which the court would not interfere. However, choices to publish private material raised issues that were not simply about presentation and editing. Accordingly, the public interest in disclosure had to be balanced against the right of the individual to respect for their private life: those decisions were open to review by the court. The tests to be applied were familiar and were set down in Convention jurisprudence. The rights guaranteed by Articles 8 and 10 had to be balanced against each other, any restriction of those rights had to be subjected to very close scrutiny and neither Article 8 nor Article 10 had any pre-eminence over each other (as confirmed by Resolution 1165 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (“PACE”), 1998). 30. As to the Article 10 rights involved, the essential question was whether the means chosen to limit Article 10 rights were “rational, fair and not arbitrary and impair the right as minimally as is reasonably possible”. In this respect, the relevant factors were, on the one hand, the duty on the press to impart information and ideas of public interest which the public has a right to receive (Jersild v. Denmark, cited above) and the need to leave it to journalists to decide what material had to be reproduced to ensure credibility (Fressoz and Roire v. France cited above) and, on the other hand, the degree of privacy to which Ms Campbell was entitled as regards the details of her therapy under the law of confidence. However, the right of the public to receive information about the details of her treatment was of a much lower order than its undoubted right to know that she was misleading the public when she said that she did not take drugs since the former concerned an intimate aspect of her private life (Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, 22 October 1981, § 52, Series A no. 45). While he acknowledged the great importance of political expression and, indeed, of freedom of expression (constituting one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and the self-fulfilment of each individual, Tammer v. Estonia, no. 41205/98, § 59, ECHR 2001‑I), he considered that no political or democratic values were at stake and no pressing social had been identified (a contrario, Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, 27 March 1996, § 40, Reports 1996 II). 31. As to the competing Article 8 rights, the potential for harm by the disclosure was an important factor in the assessment of the extent of the restriction that was needed to protect Ms Campbell's right to privacy. From the point of Article 8, publication of details of her treatment (that she was attending NA, for how long, how frequently and at what times of day, the nature of her therapy, the extent of her commitment to the process and the publication of covertly taken photographs) had the potential to cause harm to her and Lord Hope attached a good deal of weight to this factor. The fact that she was a “celebrity” was not enough to deprive her of her right to privacy. A margin of appreciation had be accorded to a journalist but viewing details of treatment for drug addiction merely “as background was to undervalue the importance that was to be attached to the need, if Ms Campbell was to be protected, to keep these details private”. It was hard to see any compelling need for the public to know the name of the organisation that she was attending for therapy or the details of that therapy. The decision to publish these details suggested that greater weight was given to the wish to publish a story that would attract interest rather than any wish to maintain its credibility. 32. Lord Hope then considered the covert photographs. It was true that, had he to consider the text of the articles only, he would have been “inclined to regard the balance between these rights as about even”, such was the effect of the margin of appreciation that had to be, in a doubtful case, given to a journalist. However, the text could not be separated from the photographs as the captions clearly linked what might otherwise have been anonymous and uninformative pictures to the main text. In addition, the reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities would regard publication of the covertly taken photographs, linked in that way to the text, as adding greatly to the overall intrusion into Ms Campbell's private life. While photographs taken in a public place had to be considered, in normal circumstances, one of the “ordinary incidents of living in a free community”, the real issue was whether publicising the photographs was offensive in the present circumstances. He reviewed the case-law of the Court (including P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, no. 44787/98, § 57, ECHR 2001 IX and Peck v United Kingdom, no. 44647/98, § 62, ECHR 2003 I) and applied the reasoning in the Peck case. Ms Campbell could not have complained if the photographs had been taken to show a scene in a street by a passer-by and later published simply as street scenes. However, the photographs invaded Ms Campbell's privacy because they were taken deliberately, in secret, with a view to their publication in conjunction with the article and they focussed on the doorway of the building of her NA meeting and they revealed clearly her face. The argument that the publication of the photograph added credibility to the story had little weight, since the reader only had the editor's word as to the truth of Ms Campbell's attendance at a NA meeting. He continued: “124. Any person in Miss Campbell's position, assuming her to be of ordinary sensibilities but assuming also that she had been photographed surreptitiously outside the place where she been receiving therapy for drug addiction, would have known what they were and would have been distressed on seeing the photographs. She would have seen their publication, in conjunction with the article which revealed what she had been doing when she was photographed and other details about her engagement in the therapy, as a gross interference with her right to respect for her private life. In my opinion this additional element in the publication is more than enough to outweigh the right to freedom of expression which the defendants are asserting in this case.” 33. Lord Hope therefore concluded that, despite the weight that had to be given to the right to freedom of expression that the press needs if it is to play its role effectively, there was an infringement of Ms Campbell's privacy which could not be justified. (b) Baroness Hale of Richmond 34. Baroness Hale observed that the examination of an action for breach of confidence began from the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test inquiring whether the person publishing the information knew or ought to have known that there was a reasonable expectation that the relevant information would be kept confidential. This was a threshold test which brought the balancing exercise between the rights guaranteed by Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention into play. Relying also on the PACE Resolution 1165 (1998), she noted that neither right took precedence over the other. The application of the proportionality test, included in the structure of Articles 8 and 10, was much less straightforward when two Convention rights were in play and, in this respect, she relied on the above-cited cases of Jersild v Denmark, Fressoz and Roire v France and Tammer v Estonia. 35. In striking the balance in this case, she noted: “143. ... Put crudely, it is a prima donna celebrity against a celebrity-exploiting tabloid newspaper. Each in their time has profited from the other. Both are assumed to be grown-ups who know the score. On the one hand is the interest of a woman who wants to give up her dependence on illegal and harmful drugs and wants the peace and space in which to pursue the help which she finds useful. On the other hand is a newspaper which wants to keep its readers informed of the activities of celebrity figures, and to expose their weaknesses, lies, evasions and hypocrisies. This sort of story, especially if it has photographs attached, is just the sort of thing that fills, sells and enhances the reputation of the newspaper which gets it first. One reason why press freedom is so important is that we need newspapers to sell in order to ensure that we still have newspapers at all. It may be said that newspapers should be allowed considerable latitude in their intrusions into private grief so that they can maintain circulation and the rest of us can then continue to enjoy the variety of newspapers and other mass media which are available in this country. It may also be said that newspaper editors often have to make their decisions at great speed and in difficult circumstances, so that to expect too minute an analysis of the position is in itself a restriction on their freedom of expression.” 36. However, Baroness Hale considered it not to be a trivial case and defined the particularly private nature of the information the publication of which Ms Campbell contested. It concerned the important issue of drug abuse and, consequently, her physical and mental health. She underlined the importance of, as well as the sensitivities and difficulties surrounding, treatment for addiction and, notably, of the vital therapy to address an underlying dependence on drugs. Moreover, the Court's jurisprudence had always accepted that information about a person's health and treatment for ill-health was both private and confidential (Z v. Finland, 25 February 1997, § 95, Reports 1997‑I). While the disclosed information may not have been in the same category as clinical medical records, it amounted to the same information which would be recorded by a doctor in such records namely, the presenting problem of addiction to illegal drugs, the diagnosis and the prescription of therapy. Baroness Hale therefore began her analysis from the fact - which was common ground - that all information about Ms Campbell's addiction and attendance at NA disclosed in the article was both private and confidential because it related to an important aspect of her physical and mental health and the treatment she was receiving for it. It had also been received from an insider in breach of confidence. 37. As to the nature of the freedom of expression being asserted on the other side, Baroness Hale recalled the main forms of expression which she recorded in descending order of importance: political speech (which included revealing information about public figures, especially those in elective office, which would otherwise be private but was relevant to their participation in public life), intellectual and educational expression as well as artistic expression. However, Baroness Hale found it difficult to see the contribution made by “pouring over the intimate details of a fashion model's private life”. It was true that the editor had chosen to run a sympathetic piece, listing Ms Campbell's faults and follies and setting them in the context of her addiction and her even more important efforts to overcome addiction and such publications might well have a beneficial educational effect. However, such pieces were normally run with the co-operation of those involved and Ms Campbell had refused to be involved with the story. The editor, nevertheless, considered that he was entitled to reveal this private information without her consent because Ms Campbell had presented herself to the public as someone who was not involved in drugs. Baroness Hale questioned why, if a role model presented a stance on drugs beneficial to society, it was so necessary to reveal that she had “feet of clay”. However, she accepted that the possession and use of illegal drugs was a criminal offence and was a matter of serious public concern so that the press had to be free to expose the truth and put the record straight. 38. However, while Ms Campbell's previous public denial of drug use might have justified publication of the fact of her drug use and of her treatment for drug addiction, it was not necessary to publish any further information, especially if it might jeopardise her continued treatment. That further information amounted to the disclosure of details of her treatment with NA and Baroness Hale considered that the articles thereby “contributed to the sense of betrayal by someone close to her of which she spoke and which destroyed the value of [NA] as a safe haven for her”. 39. Moreover, publishing the photographs contributed both to the revelation and to the harm that it might do. By themselves, the photographs were not objectionable. If the case concerned a photograph of Ms Campbell going about her business in a public street, there could have been no complaint. However, the accompanying text made it plain that these photographs were different in that they showed Ms Campbell outside a NA meeting in the company of some persons undoubtedly part of the NA group and they showed the place where the meeting took place, which would have been entirely recognisable to anyone who knew the locality. Photographs by their very nature added to the impact of the words in the articles as well as to the information disclosed. The photographs also added to the potential harm “by making her think that she was being followed or betrayed, and deterring her from going back to the same place again”. 40. Moreover, there was no need for the photographs to be included in the articles for the editor to achieve his objective. The editor had accepted that, even without the photographs, it would have been a front page story. He had his basic information and he had his quotes. He could have used other photographs of Ms Campbell to illustrate the articles. While the photographs would have been useful in proving the truth of the story had this been challenged, there was no need to publish them for this purpose as the credibility of the story with the public would stand or fall with the credibility of stories of the Daily Mirror generally. Baroness Hale added, in this context, that whether the articles were sympathetic or not was not relevant since the way an editor “chose to present the information he was entitled to reveal was entirely a matter for him”. 41. Finally, it was true that the weight to attach to these various considerations was “a matter of fact and degree”. Not every statement about a person's health would carry the badge of confidentiality: that a public figure had a cold would not cause any harm and private health information could be relevant to the capacity of a public figure to do the job. However, in the present case the health information was not harmless and, indeed, as the trial judge had found, there was a risk that publication would do harm: “... People trying to recover from drug addiction need considerable dedication and commitment, along with constant reinforcement from those around them. That is why organisations like [NA] were set up and why they can do so much good. Blundering in when matters are acknowledged to be at a 'fragile' stage may do great harm. 158. The trial judge was well placed to assess these matters. ... he was best placed to judge whether the additional information and the photographs had added significantly both to the distress and the potential harm. He accepted her evidence that it had done so. He could also tell how serious an interference with press freedom it would have been to publish the essential parts of the story without the additional material and how difficult a decision this would have been for an editor who had been told that it was a medical matter and that it would be morally wrong to publish it.” (c) Lord Carswell 42. Lord Carswell agreed with Lord Hope and Baroness Hale. It was not in dispute that the information was of a private nature and imparted in confidence to the applicant and that the applicant was justified in publishing the facts of Ms Campbell's drug addiction and that she was receiving treatment given her prior public lies about her drug use. He also agreed with Lord Hope as to the balancing of Articles 8 and 10 rights and, further, that in order to justify limiting the Article 10 right to freedom of expression, the restrictions imposed had to be rational, fair and not arbitrary, and they must impair the right no more than necessary. 43. Having examined the weight to be attributed to different relevant factors, he concluded that the publication of the details of Ms Campbell's attendance at therapy by NA, highlighted by the photographs printed which revealed where the treatment had taken place, constituted a considerable intrusion into her private affairs which was capable of causing and, on her evidence, did in fact cause her, substantial distress. In her evidence, she said that she had not gone back to the particular NA centre and that she had only attended a few other NA meetings in the UK. It was thus clear, that the publication created a risk of causing a significant setback to her recovery. 44. He did not minimise the “the importance of allowing a proper degree of journalistic margin to the press to deal with a legitimate story in its own way, without imposing unnecessary shackles on its freedom to publish detail and photographs which add colour and conviction”, which factors were “part of the legitimate function of a free press” and had to be given proper weight. However, the balance came down in favour of Ms Campbell. (d) Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead 45. Lord Nicholls began by noting that Ms Campbell was “a celebrated fashion model”, that she was a “household name, nationally and internationally” and that her face was “instantly recognisable”. He noted that the development of the common law (tort of breach of confidence) had been in harmony with Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention so that the time had come to recognise that the values enshrined in Articles 8 and 10 were now part of the cause of action for breach of confidence (Lord Woolf CJ, A v B plc [2003] QB 195, 202, § 4). 46. He found that the reference to treatment at NA meetings was not private information as it did no more than spell out and apply to Ms Campbell common knowledge of how NA meetings were conducted. 47. However, even if Ms Campbell's attendance at meetings was considered private, her appeal was still ill-founded since: “On the one hand, publication of this information in the unusual circumstances of this case represents, at most, an intrusion into Miss Campbell's private life to a comparatively minor degree. On the other hand, non-publication of this information would have robbed a legitimate and sympathetic newspaper story of attendant detail which added colour and conviction. This information was published in order to demonstrate Miss Campbell's commitment to tackling her drug problem. The balance ought not to be held at a point which would preclude, in this case, a degree of journalistic latitude in respect of information published for this purpose. It is at this point I respectfully consider [that the High Court] fell into error. Having held that the details of Miss Campbell's attendance at [NA] had the necessary quality of confidentiality, the judge seems to have put nothing into the scales under article 10 when striking the balance between articles 8 and 10. This was a misdirection. The need to be free to disseminate information regarding Miss Campbell's drug addiction is of a lower order than the need for freedom to disseminate information on some other subjects such as political information. The degree of latitude reasonably to be accorded to journalists is correspondingly reduced, but it is not excluded altogether.” 48. He observed that Ms Campbell's repeated public assertions denying her drug addiction rendered legitimate the publication of the facts that she was a drug addict and in treatment had been legitimate. The additional impugned element that she was attending NA meetings as a form of therapy was of such an unremarkable and consequential nature that its disclosure had also been legitimate. The same applied to information concerning how long Ms Campbell was receiving such treatment given that the frequency and nature of NA meetings was common knowledge. Hence, the intrusion into Ms Campbell's private life was comparatively minor. 49. Lastly, and as to the photographs, Lord Nicholls observed that she did not complain about the taking of the photographs nor assert that the taking of the photographs was itself an invasion of privacy, rather that the information conveyed by the photographs was private. However, the particular photographs added nothing of an essentially private nature: they conveyed no private information beyond that discussed in the article and there was nothing undignified about her appearance in them. (e) Lord Hoffmann 50. Lord Hoffmann began his judgment by describing Ms Campbell as “a public figure” and, further, a famous fashion model who had lived by publicity. He noted that the judges of the House of Lords were “divided as to the outcome of this appeal” but the difference of opinion related to “a very narrow point” concerning the unusual facts of the case. While it was accepted that the publication of the facts of her addiction and of her treatment was justified as there was sufficient public interest given her previous public denials of drug use, the division of opinion concerned “whether in doing so the newspaper went too far in publishing associated facts about her private life”. He continued: “But the importance of this case lies in the statements of general principle on the way in which the law should strike a balance between the right to privacy and the right to freedom of expression, on which the House is unanimous. The principles are expressed in varying language but speaking for myself I can see no significant differences.” 51. There being no automatic priority between Articles 8 and 10, the question to be addressed was the extent to which it was necessary to qualify one right in order to protect the underlying value protected by the other and the extent of the qualification should be proportionate to the need. The only point of principle arising was, where the essential part of the publication was justified, should the newspaper be held liable whenever the judge considered that it was not necessary to have published some of the personal information or should the newspaper be allowed some margin of choice in the way it chose to present the story (referring to Fressoz and Roire v. France [GC], no. 29183/95, ECHR 1999‑I). 52. In this respect, Lord Hoffman considered that it would be: “inconsistent with the approach which has been taken by the courts in a number of recent landmark cases for a newspaper to be held strictly liable for exceeding what a judge considers to have been necessary. The practical exigencies of journalism demand that some latitude must be given. Editorial decisions have to be made quickly and with less information than is available to a court which afterwards reviews the matter at leisure. And if any margin is to be allowed, it seems to me strange to hold the Mirror liable in damages for a decision which three experienced judges in the Court of Appeal have held to be perfectly justified.” 53. Given the relatively anodyne nature of the additional details, the Mirror was entitled to a degree of latitude in respect of the way it chose to present its legitimate story. 54. As to the publication of photographs in particular, Lord Hoffman observed that the fact that the pictures were taken without Ms Campbell's consent did not amount to a wrongful invasion of privacy. Moreover, the pictures did not reveal a situation of humiliation or severe embarrassment (as in Peck v. the United Kingdom, no. 44647/98, ECHR 2003‑I) and had not been taken by intrusion into a private place. There was nothing demeaning or embarrassing about the photographs. They added nothing to what was said in the text and carried the message that the Mirror's story was true. Accordingly, the decision to publish the pictures was within the margin of editorial judgment to which the Mirror was entitled. Although the trial judge found that the publication was likely to affect her therapy, this had neither been pleaded before nor fully explored by the trial judge. 55. The appeal was allowed, the High Court award was restored. Ms Campbell's costs (of the appeals to the Court of Appeal and to the House of Lords) were awarded against the applicant, the amount to “be certified by the Clerk of Parliaments, if not agreed between the parties ...”. 56. Ms Campbell's solicitors served three bills of costs on the applicant in the total sum of GBP 1,086, 295.47: GBP 377,070.07 for the High Court; GBP 114,755.40 for the Court of Appeal; and GBP 594,470.00 for the House of Lords. The latter figure comprised “base costs” of GBP 288,468, success fees of GBP 279,981.35 as well as GBP 26,020.65 disbursements. In the High Court and Court of Appeal, Ms Campbell's solicitors and counsel had acted under an ordinary retainer. But the appeal to the House of Lords was conducted pursuant to a Conditional Fee Agreement (“CFA”) which provided that, if the appeal succeeded, solicitors and counsel should be entitled to base costs as well as success fees amounting to 95% and 100% of their base costs, respectively. 57. On 21 February 2005 the applicant appealed to the House of Lords seeking a ruling that it should not be liable to pay the success fees as, in the circumstances, such a liability was so disproportionate as to infringe their right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention. The applicant did not seek thereby a declaration of incompatibility but argued that domestic law regulating the recoverability of success fees should be read so as to safeguard its rights under Article 10. On 26 May 2005 this appeal was heard by the House of Lords. 58. On 2 August 2005 Ms Campbell's solicitors accepted the applicant's offers to pay GBP 290,000 (High Court costs) and GBP 95,000 (Court of Appeal costs), both amounts being exclusive of interest. 59. On 20 October 2005 the appeal was unanimously dismissed. The House of Lords found that the existing CFA regime with recoverable success fees was compatible with the Convention, but they expressed some reservations about the impact of disproportionate costs. (a) Lord Hoffman 60. Lord Hoffmann observed that the deliberate policy of the Access to Justice Act 1999 (“the 1999 Act”) was to impose the cost of all CFA litigation upon unsuccessful defendants as a class. Losing defendants were to be required to contribute to the funds which would enable lawyers to take on other cases, which might not be successful, but which would provide access to justice for people who could not otherwise have afforded to sue. Therefore, the policy shifted the burden of funding from the State to unsuccessful defendants, which was a rational social and economic policy. 61. While he was concerned about the indirect effect of the threat of a heavy costs liability on the newspapers' decisions to publish information which ought to be published but which carried a risk of legal action, he considered that a newspaper's right could be restricted to protect the right of litigants under Article 6 to access to a court. 62. The applicant maintained that recoverable success fees were disproportionate on the basis of two flawed arguments. The first was that the success fee was necessarily disproportionate as it was more than (and up to twice as much as) the amount which, under the ordinary assessment rules, would be considered reasonable and proportionate. This was a flawed point as it confused two different concepts of proportionality. The CPR on costs were concerned with whether expenditure on litigation was proportionate to the amount at stake, the interests of the parties, complexity of the issues and so forth. However, Article 10 was concerned with whether a rule, which required unsuccessful defendants, not only to pay the reasonable and proportionate costs of their adversary in the litigation, but also to contribute to the funding of other litigation through the payment of success fees, was a proportionate measure, having regard to the effect on Article 10 rights. The applicant did not “really deny that in principle it is open to the legislature to choose to fund access to justice in this way.” 63. The second argument of the applicant was to the effect that it was unnecessary to give Ms Campbell access to a court because she could have afforded to fund her own costs. However, it was desirable to have a general rule to enable the scheme to work in a practical and effective way and that concentration on the individual case and the particularities of Ms Campbell's circumstances would undermine that scheme. It was for this reason that the Court in James and Others v the United Kingdom (21 February 1986, Series A no. 98) considered that Parliament was entitled to pursue a social policy of allowing long leaseholders of low-rated houses to acquire their freeholds at concessionary rates, notwithstanding that the scheme also applied to some rich tenants who needed no such assistance. The success fee should not be disallowed simply on the ground that the applicant's liability would be inconsistent with its rights under Article 10. Thus, notwithstanding the need to examine the balance on the facts of the individual case, Lord Hoffman considered that the impracticality of requiring a means test and the small number of individuals who could be said to have sufficient resources to provide them with access to legal services entitled Parliament to lay down a general rule that CFAs were open to everyone. Success fees, as such, could not be disallowed simply on the ground that the present applicant's liability would be inconsistent with its rights under Article 10: the scheme was a choice open to the legislature and there was no need for any exclusion of cases such as the present one from the scope of CFAs or to disallow success fees because the existing scheme was compatible. 64. However, Lord Hoffman did not wish to leave the case without commenting on other problems which defamation litigation under CFAs was currently causing and which had given rise to concern that freedom of expression might be seriously inhibited. The judgment of Eady J in Turcu v News Group Newspapers Ltd ([2005] EWHC 799) highlighted the significant temptation for media defendants to settle cases early for purely commercial reasons, and without regard to the true merits of any pleaded defence. This 'chilling effect' or 'ransom factor' inherent in the CFA system was a situation which could not have arisen in the past and was very much a modern development. 65. Lord Hoffman considered that the “blackmailing effect” of such litigation arose from two factors: (a) the use of CFAs by impecunious claimants who did not take out insurance to protect themselves from having to pay the winning party's costs if they lost; and (b) the conduct of the case by the claimant's solicitors in a way which not only ran up substantial costs but required the defendants to do so as well. Referring to a recent case where this was particularly evident (King v Telegraph Group Ltd [Practice Note] [2005] 1 WLR 2282), he continued: “Faced with a free-spending claimant's solicitor and being at risk not only as to liability but also as to twice the claimant's costs, the defendant is faced with an arms race which makes it particularly unfair for the claimant afterwards to justify his conduct of the litigation on the ground that the defendant's own costs were equally high” 66. Lord Hoffman endorsed the solution offered by the Court of Appeal in the King case (a “cost-capping” order at an early stage of the action). However, that was only a palliative as it did not deal with the problem of a newspaper risking substantial and irrecoverable costs. Smaller publishers might not be able to afford to take a stand and neither capping costs at an early stage nor assessing them later dealt with the threat of having to pay the claimant's costs at a level which was, by definition, up to twice the amount which would be reasonable and proportionate. While the DCA Consultation Paper (paragraph 101 below) discussed the problem, no legislative intervention had been proposed. 67. Lord Hoffman distinguished between personal injury litigation and defamation proceedings. Personal injury litigation comprised a large number of small claims and the liability insurers were able to pass these costs on to their road user customers with their own solvency not being threatened and the liability insurers had considerable negotiating strength to dispute assessments of costs and to hold up the cash flow of the claimants' solicitors so that both sides therefore had good reasons for seeking a compromise. On the other hand, in defamation cases the reasons for seeking a compromise were much weaker: there was a small number of claims and payment of relatively large sums of costs; some publishers might be strong enough to absorb or insure against this but it had a serious effect upon their financial position; and publishers did not have the same negotiating strength as the liability insurers because there were few assessments to be contested and disputing them involved considerable additional costs. 68. While the objective of enabling people of modest means to protect their reputations and privacy from powerful publishers was a good one, Lord Hoffman considered that it might be that a legislative solution would be needed for the scheme to comply with Article 10 of the Convention. (b) Lord Hope of Craighead 69. Lord Hope agreed with Lord Hoffmann. 70. He underlined the protection to the losing party contained in the CPR and the Costs Practice Directions. Reasonableness and proportionality tests were applied separately to base costs and to the percentage uplift for success fees. However, the most relevant question for a court in assessing the reasonableness of the percentage uplift was “the risk that the client might or might not be successful” (paragraph 11.8(l)(a) of the Costs Practice Directions) and that “in evenly balanced cases a success fee of 100 per cent might well be thought not to be unreasonable”. 71. There remained the question of proportionality. Other than providing that the proportionality of base costs and success fees were to be separately assessed, the Costs Practice Directions did not identify any factors that might be relevant. However, it would be wrong to conclude that this was an empty exercise as it was the “ultimate controlling factor” to ensure access to the court by a claimant to argue that her right to privacy under Article 8 was properly balanced against the losing party's rights to freedom of speech under Article 10. While the losing party would pay the success fee, any reduction in the percentage increase would have to borne by the successful party under the CFA: the interests of both sides had to be weighed up in deciding whether the amount was proportionate. (c) Lord Carswell 72. Lord Carswell agreed with the opinions of Lord Hoffmann and Lord Hope. While “there are many who regard the imbalance in the system adopted in England and Wales as most unjust”, the regimen of CFAs and recoverable success fees was “legislative policy which the courts must accept”. As to whether recoverable success fees, which undoubtedly constituted a “chill factor”, were compatible with Article 10 and a proportionate way of dealing with the issue of the funding of such litigation, it was not really in dispute that the legislature could in principle adopt this method of funding access to justice. 73. The present case turned on whether it was still proportionate when the claimant was wealthy and not in need of the support of a CFA. While it was rough justice, the requirement on solicitors to means test clients before concluding a CFA was unworkable. With some regret, the conclusion was clear. While Lord Carswell was “far from convinced about the wisdom or justice of the CFA system” as it was then constituted, “it had to be accepted as legislative policy”. It had not been shown to be incompatible with the Convention and the objections advanced by the applicant could not be sustained. (d) Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead and Baroness Hale of Richmond 74. Lord Nicholls agreed with the preceding opinions. Baroness Hale also agreed with Lord Hoffman. It was, for her, a separate question whether a legislative solution might be needed to comply with Article 10: this was a complex issue involving a delicate balance between competing rights upon which she preferred to express no opinion. 75. From the date of rejection of this second appeal, the applicant was liable to pay 8% interest on the costs payable. 76. On 28 November 2005 an order for the costs of the second appeal to the House of Lords was made against the applicant. Ms Campbell therefore served an additional bill of costs of GBP 255,535.60. The bill included a success fee of 95% (GBP 85,095.78) in respect of the solicitors' base costs, her counsel having not entered into a CFA for this appeal. 77. The applicant then sought to challenge the proportionality of the costs and success fees claimed in respect of both appeals to the House of Lords. An assessment hearing was fixed for 8 March 2006 before the Judicial Taxing Officers of the House of Lords. 78. On 3 March 2006 the applicant agreed with Ms Campbell's solicitors to pay the sum of GBP 350,000 in respect of the costs claimed in relation to the first appeal, excluding interest and including the success fee applicable to the first appeal. The applicant considered it was unlikely to do better before the Taxing Officers, it wished to avoid accruing interest (8% per day) and further litigation on costs would lead to further costs and success fees. 79. The hearing on 8 March 2006 (before two Judicial Taxing Officers) therefore concerned the costs of the second appeal only, the Taxing Officers noting that the applicant had settled the costs of the first appeal, it “no doubt recognising the inevitability of the position”. A number of preliminary issues were decided by the Taxing Officers including the validity of the CFA, the applicable success fee rate and the proportionality of the base costs billed by Ms Campbell's representatives (and on which that success fee would be calculated). 80. By judgment dated 8 March 2006 the Judicial Taxing Officers found that, in these hard fought proceedings ultimately decided by a split decision of the House of Lords, there was “no doubt” that the success fees (95% and 100%) claimed in respect of the first appeal to the House of Lords were appropriate having regard to the first and second instance proceedings. Since the second appeal to the House of Lords was part and parcel of the first and was clearly contemplated by the parties when they entered into the CFA, the second appeal was covered by the CFA and thus the same success fee. The effect of this was, of course, that the applicant faced a greatly increased bill of costs: however, the applicant lost this issue in the second appeal to the House of Lords. A success fee of 95% for the second appeal to the House of Lords was therefore approved. Relying on Rules 44.4 and 44.5 of the CPR as well as paragraph 15.1 of the Costs Practice Directions as well as a necessity test, the Taxing Officers reduced the hourly rates chargeable by Ms Campbell's solicitors and counsel, thereby reducing the base costs and, consequently, the success fee payable by the applicant. 81. On 5 May 2006 the applicant appealed to the House of Lords arguing that the Taxing Officers judgment was incorrect in so far as those Officers considered that the success fee for the second appeal could not be varied. On 28 June 2006 the House of Lords refused leave to appeal. 82. On 5 July 2007 the applicant agreed to pay GBP 150,000 (inclusive of interest and assessment procedure costs) in settlement of Ms Campbell's costs of the second appeal.

4. Mrs Iryna Mykhaylivna Petrova (“the first applicant”) was born in 1960. Mrs Olena Saveliyivna Chornobryvets (Zhuravlyova) (“the second applicant”) was born in 1963. Both applicants are judges of the Kirovograd Regional Court of Appeal and live in Kirovograd. 5. In November 2002 the applicants lodged claims with the Pechersky District Court of Kyiv against the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Justice and the State Treasury, seeking payment of salary arrears and life-long judicial benefits (long-service bonus and welfare benefits). 6. On 16 December 2002 the court allowed the applicants’ claims and ordered the Ministry of Finances and the State Treasury of Ukraine to pay the applicants, respectively, UAH 6,529.03 and UAH 8,459.36. 7. On 9 July 2003 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal upheld this judgment and it became final. 8. On 11 August 2003 the Bailiffs’ Office of the Pechersky District of Kyiv informed the applicants that they had to address the State Treasury of Ukraine directly. 9. On 26 November and 19 December 2003 the State Treasury informed the applicants that there were no funds available in the State budget to enforce the judgment of 16 December 2002. 10. On 5 November 2004 the applicants received the sums awarded to them by the judgment of 16 December 2002.

5. The applicant is the divorced mother of two children, born in 1991 and 1993. Her children live mostly with their father (the “parent with care”) spending two and a half days per week with her (the “non-resident” parent). Since 1998, the applicant has lived with a woman in what was described during the domestic proceedings as a “close, loving and monogamous relationship characterised by long-term sexual intimacy”. She and her partner own the house they live in as joint tenants. They purchased the property with a joint mortgage, and have held a joint bank account since 2000. 6. The applicant is required to contribute to the cost of her children's upbringing in accordance with the applicable regulations on child maintenance (see paragraph 21 below). On 12 September 2001, the Secretary of State decided that the applicant's maintenance payment should be GBP 46.97 per week, with effect from the previous 13 August. The applicant disputed that decision on a number of grounds, including that it did not make full allowance for her housing costs. On 11 November 2001, the Secretary of State declined to revise his decision. On 18 February 2002, the maintenance assessment was reduced to GBP 12.67 per week, due to changed circumstances unrelated to the applicant's complaint of discrimination. Her complaint thus relates to the period that began on 13 August 2001 and ended on 18 February 2002. 7. The applicant appealed against the initial maintenance assessment. The Appeals Tribunal allowed the appeal on 8 November 2002. The Tribunal considered it appropriate to compare the applicant's situation to that of an individual who was part of a heterosexual couple (married or unmarried), and that there clearly was a difference in treatment in the determination of the child maintenance obligation. It held that the situation came within the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which was not confined to situations in which property was transferred to the State. The direct involvement of the Child Support Agency in the process and its powers of enforcement meant that the responsibility of the State was engaged. The Tribunal found that the Government had not advanced any specific explanation or justification for the difference in treatment, which it therefore held to be discriminatory. It further found that it was possible to provide a remedy to the applicant by re-interpreting the definition of an “unmarried couple” in the applicable regulations so that it included same‑sex couples. 8. The Secretary of State appealed against this decision to the Child Support Commissioner, who rejected the appeal on 1 October 2003. The Commissioner held that “a gay relationship can be a family for the purpose of [A]rticle 8”. He saw no reason, in the context of child support legislation, to distinguish between families according to the sexual orientation of the partners. The purpose of the regulations was to determine the financial obligation of the absent parent, a matter on which his or her sexual orientation should have no bearing. Accordingly, the applicant's situation was within the ambit of the right to respect for family life. He rejected, however, the applicant's argument that the situation also came within the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Turning to Article 14, the Commissioner found that, in the context of child support payments, the applicant's situation was analogous to that of an absent parent living with a heterosexual partner, who, all other things being equal, would have been required to pay around GBP 14 per week instead of almost GBP 47. He considered that the Government had not advanced any justification for treating the applicant differently and therefore ruled that the child support scheme violated the applicant's Convention right under Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8. Concerning the remedy, he disagreed with the approach of the Appeals Tribunal. Instead, since the regulations defined the various terms used by the regulations “unless the context otherwise requires”, he considered that, with the entry into force of the Human Rights Act on 2 October 2000, the “context” now included the absent parent's Convention rights. Therefore, the definition of an unmarried couple (“a man and a woman who are not married to each other but are living together as husband and wife”) did not apply in this situation. 9. The Secretary of State appealed against this decision to the Court of Appeal. By a judgment given on 15 October 2005, that court upheld the Commissioner's decision. Lord Justice Sedley considered that the applicant's previous family life (i.e. the relationship between herself, her former husband and her children) was not within the ambit of Article 8. As for her relationship with her partner, he read the decision of the European Court in Mata Estevez v. Spain (dec.), no. 56501/00, ECHR 2001‑VI as establishing that the question whether same-sex relationships fall within Article 8 is a matter of domestic law. Citing a number of domestic precedents which treated same-sex couples as no different from heterosexual couples in certain contexts, he considered that the applicant's relationship constituted family life for the purposes of the case. Any discrimination against the applicant on the grounds of her sexual orientation called for compelling and proportionate justification. He found that the child support scheme impinged in some significant degree on the family life of the applicant and her partner, bringing their situation within the ambit of Article 8. As the scheme discriminated against the applicant on grounds of her sexual orientation, Article 14 was engaged. He rejected the argument that the scheme came within the ambit of the applicant's private life, since the scheme did not set out to recognise the applicant's sexual orientation. Regarding Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, he considered it unnecessary to decide if it too was engaged, although he doubted that it was. He found that the Government had not provided any acceptable justification for the discrimination against the applicant. He rejected the arguments advanced on behalf of the Secretary of State about the difficulty of correcting a problem that was but one instance of a distinction applied throughout the wider social security system, observing that there was no doctrine of justification by the logistics of reform. As for a remedy, he considered that the appropriate course was to disapply (in effect delete) the definition in the regulations of an unmarried couple so as to eliminate the requirement of heterosexuality. 10. Lord Justice Neuberger held that the child support regulations did, in principle, come within the ambit of Article 8, since they were based on the relationship between the absent parent and his/her children. However, the applicant's complaint concerned a wholly different family unit, i.e. her relationship with her partner. He too rejected the argument that the situation came within the ambit of the applicant's private life, finding that this had not been interfered with. Regarding Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, he accepted that the situation came within the scope of that provision since a possession of the applicant's (money) was being taken away from her under rules that left her worse off than a person in a position identical to hers in all respects save for their sexual orientation. As for the applicant's argument that her relationship came within the concept of family life, he took the view that, the European Court having considered this issue to be within States' margin of appreciation, it was open to the domestic courts to decide the point for the United Kingdom. His conclusion was that, having regard to the relevant House of Lords case-law, same-sex relationships should be treated in the same way as heterosexual relationships for the purpose of Article 8. He further concluded that the relevant provision of the MASC regulations had been enacted out of respect for family life – in this case the relationship between the absent parent and his/her new partner. Accordingly, the applicant's situation came within the ambit of Article 8. He concurred with Lord Justice Sedley that the Government had not provided an adequate justification, and agreed with the proposed remedy. 11. Lord Justice Kennedy reviewed both domestic and Convention case‑law and concluded that the applicant could not rely on the words “family life” in Article 8 in order to say that the facts of her case fell within the ambit of that Article. Nor did the situation come within the ambit of the applicant's right to respect for her private life. Though her relationship with her partner was an aspect of her private life, the applicant had not been penalised on account of it. Her real complaint was that she was unable to take advantage of a benefit that was available to a category of absent parents since she did not come within that category. As regards Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, he found that this provision was not engaged. The child support scheme was concerned with the allocation of assets to discharge an existing obligation. To hold that any situation in which there was a net adverse financial impact on an individual constituted a prima facie deprivation of possessions would be an unacceptably broad interpretation. There would be almost no limit to the circumstances in which that provision would be sufficiently engaged for the purposes of Article 14. 12. The decision of the Court of Appeal was appealed by the Secretary of State to the House of Lords which, in a judgment of 8 March 2006, allowed the appeal, by a majority of four to one. 13. Addressing the question whether the application of the relevant regulations to the applicant came within the ambit of Article 8 of the Convention or Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, Lord Walker (with whom Lord Bingham agreed) observed that: “[t]he Strasbourg case-law does not, and could not, spell out any simple bright-line test for determining how close must be the link between the alleged discrimination and the rights granted by the substantive article.” He rejected the contention that since the concept of respect for private and family life was so wide and multifaceted, any alleged act of discrimination would be within the ambit of Article 8. He considered that, in relation to Article 8, the Strasbourg case-law revealed a more nuanced approach, reflecting the unique feature of Article 8 – the duty of the State to accord respect. Some measures were so intrusive that they plainly failed to respect an individual's private life, whereas less serious interferences would not merely not breach Article 8, they would not fall within its ambit at all. He further noted that the case-law concerning alleged discrimination in relation to the family life limb of Article 8 had concerned measures very closely connected to family life. He was prepared to assume that the applicant, her new partner and their children from their previous marriages should be regarded as a family for the purposes of Article 8. He also accepted that the regulations, inasmuch as they sought to strike a fair balance between the demands arising out of the raising of children and the running of the new household, were intended in a general sort of way to be a positive measure promoting family life. However, the link between them and respect for the applicant's family life was too tenuous to bring the situation within the ambit of the family life limb of Article 8. The link to respect for the applicant's private life was even more remote, in his view. As regards Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, he considered that the obligation to pay maintenance was very different to expropriation and therefore did not come within the ambit of this provision. 14. Lord Walker then considered whether the difference in treatment in same-sex couples in such circumstances was discriminatory. He held that Parliament had acted with reasonable promptness and within its margin of appreciation in the complex and time-consuming process of drafting, adopting and giving effect to the Civil Partnership Act 2004. The United Kingdom may have only followed the lead given by other Member States of the Council of Europe, but it had not been so far behind as to go outside its margin of appreciation. While it could not be argued today that discrimination against homosexuals had ever been justifiable, he thought this a “deeply unrealistic” approach to the issue. For centuries, homosexual couples living together were regarded as quite different to married or unmarried heterosexual couples. Profound cultural changes took time. 15. Lord Bingham described the applicant's complaint about discrimination as “anachronistic”: “By that I mean that she is applying the standards of today to criticise a regime which when it was established represented the accepted values of our society, which has now been brought to an end because it no longer does so but which could not, with the support of the public, have been brought to an end very much earlier. ... If such a regime were to be established today, Ms M. could with good reason stigmatise the regime as unjustifiably discriminatory. But it is unrealistic to stigmatise as unjustifiably discriminatory a regime which, given the size of the overall task and the need to recruit the support of the public, could scarcely have been reformed sooner.” 16. Lord Nicholls took the view that, while this was not its primary purpose, the statutory scheme did demonstrate the respect of the United Kingdom for the non-resident parent's new family life by means of the statutory scheme. It could therefore be said that this feature of the scheme was one of the modalities of the exercise of the right to respect for family life. This would be sufficient to bring the situation within the ambit of Article 8. He then considered the position of same-sex couples. In certain contexts, domestic case-law had established that a same-sex couple was as much capable of constituting a family as a heterosexual couple. In the context of Article 8 of the Convention, however, the concept of “family life” could only have one proper interpretation for all of the Contracting States. The Strasbourg case-law did not yet recognise that the guarantee of respect for family life applied to same-sex relationships and there was no good reason for the courts of the United Kingdom to depart from that position. He rejected the argument that the situation came within the ambit of respect for private life. The statutory formulae set out to respect the new family life of an absent parent who had entered into a heterosexual relationship, and not the private life of each party to that relationship. The statutory scheme was therefore not one of the modalities of the exercise of the guarantee of the right to respect for private life. The nature of the discrimination alleged was not sufficient to engage that provision; otherwise, every case of discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation would be within the ambit of Article 8. He further observed that the applicant had not pointed to any significant impact on her lifestyle. As regards Article 1 of Protocol No.1, he found that the statutory scheme was far outside this provision's scope. The duty to pay child maintenance was very distant from the type of interference the provision was aimed at. While it was accordingly not necessary to consider the issue of justification, he indicated his agreement with the position of Lords Bingham and Walker. 17. For Lord Mance there were two critical issues: whether the applicant's same-sex relationship was to be regarded as family life for the purpose of Article 8; and whether the child support regime impinged sufficiently on that family life for it to be said to fall within its ambit. Regarding the latter issue, his view was that the regime did, “though only just”. The MASC regulations sought to avoid any unduly adverse impact on the absent parent's new relationship and to achieve a fair balance between it and the children's needs. As for the first issue, the European Court of Human Rights had made it clear in May 2001 that same-sex relationships did not fall within the scope of the right to respect for family life. As the applicant's appeal related to a period shortly after that decision (13 August 2001-18 February 2002), her relationship with her partner could not be regarded as a type of family life within the meaning of Article 8. He added that he had little doubt that the Strasbourg Court would see the position in 2006 as having changed very considerably, and that if the issue were to arise before it again, the applicant's relationship could very well be regarded as involving family life for the purpose of Article 8. Great change had taken place across Europe in the intervening time, of which any court would take most careful account. There was no basis for criticising the United Kingdom for delay either in reviewing the relevant laws or in moving to amend them in light of such review. Although from a moral viewpoint discrimination against same-sex couples had never been justified, it was the legal position that was at issue. Until quite recently neither the Strasbourg Court nor the domestic courts would have viewed such relationships as involving family life. It followed that discrimination between these and heterosexual couples did not contravene Article 14 taken with Article 8. In relation to the applicant's private life, he observed that the regulations were not directed at her private life. Any link between them would be as tenuous in the extreme. Regarding Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, he considered it artificial to view child support payments as a deprivation of the absent parent's possessions. The mere fact that there was a net adverse financial impact for the applicant was insufficient. While the scheme was undoubtedly introduced in pursuit of a legitimate social policy, there was no element of expropriation about it. The complaint did not fall within the ambit of Article 1, therefore Article 14 was not engaged. 18. Baroness Hale, dissenting, considered that the appeal should be rejected. She found that the child support scheme, which was one aspect of the State's support for family life, clearly fell within the ambit of the applicant's right to respect for her family life with her children. The scheme was the State's way of enforcing a parent's duty to support their children, which was an obligation in both private and public law. There were many ways that the operation of the scheme could impact upon that family life. It did not have to have so severe an impact as to breach Article 8, but she considered it clear that the scheme fell within the reach of the applicant's right to respect for family life with her children. She observed that if, for example, the scheme treated absent mothers differently to absent fathers, this would be sufficient to engage Article 14. The lack of respect manifested by the scheme for the applicant's relationship did not have to reach such a level of severity as to constitute a breach of Article 8 for Article 14 to come into play. Although the Convention case-law had not yet recognised the relationship between two adult homosexuals as a form of family life within the meaning of Article 8, in this case the applicant and her partner enjoyed family life when their children were with them, and this did not cease when they were apart from them. She further considered that the situation also came within the ambit of the applicant's right to respect for her private life. It was therefore unnecessary to inquire whether Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was engaged. 19. The only justification offered for the difference in treatment was the historical discrimination between the two types of relationship by social security and child maintenance rules. It was now recognised that there was no objective justification. While it had been taken for granted that the protection of the institution of marriage could justify less favourable treatment of the unmarried, it still had to be shown that in order to achieve that aim it was necessary to exclude same-sex couples. This had not been shown. With the Civil Partnership Act, the United Kingdom had moved ahead of many other European States, but this was not an objective justification for not doing so sooner. Racial and sex discrimination had always been wrong, long before this was recognised in law. In the area of gender, the historical and systematic character of discrimination against women could justify some continuing small adjustments in their favour in the benefits system. But this could not apply to sexual orientation – it would mean relying on historical disadvantage and exclusion to justify continued disadvantage and exclusion of the excluded group. It was to be welcomed that Parliament had legislated in this area, but that did not make right what had been done before. She concluded that the applicant had suffered discrimination in the enjoyment of the Convention right to respect for private and family life, and approved the remedy suggested by the Appeals Tribunal.

4. The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Nova Kapela. 5. The applicant’s lorry was forfeited by the Sisak Police Department (Policijska postaja Sisak) on 23 August 1995 in connection with a suspicion held against the applicant of having committed an aggravated theft. The criminal complaint against the applicant was eventually dropped and on 26 February 1996 the police invited the applicant to take delivery of the vehicle. They also noted that the vehicle was not in good working order. For that reason the applicant refused to take delivery of the vehicle. 6. The applicant, represented by a lawyer, instituted civil proceedings on 13 June 1996 in the Zagreb Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zagrebu) against the Ministry of Interior (Ministarstvo unutarnjih poslova Republike Hrvatske, hereinafter “the Ministry”), seeking repossession of the vehicle and damages. 7. After holding a public hearing and hearing the evidence, in its judgment of 2 October 1997 the Zagreb Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zagrebu) ordered the State to return the vehicle to the applicant in good working order within fifteen days after the judgment became final. It found that the applicant’s vehicle was in good working order at the time of its requisition. The Municipal Court also dismissed his claim for damages. The judgment was upheld by the Zagreb County Court (Županijski sud u Zagrebu) on 4 April 2000 and thus became final. Further appeals on points of law lodged by both parties were dismissed by the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) on 23 March 2004. 8. The applicant’s subsequent constitutional complaint was dismissed by the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) on 19 January 2005. 9. The applicant lodged a request for an enforcement order in the Zagreb Municipal Court on 14 June 2000, seeking the enforcement of the above final judgment of 4 April 2000. On 9 October 2000 the Municipal Court issued an enforcement order requiring the applicant’s vehicle to be returned to him in good working order. 10. On 20 December 2000 the applicant withdrew his initial request and asked instead the Zagreb Municipal Court to order the Ministry to pay a penalty for not complying with the enforcement order. On 29 December 2000 the Ministry admitted that it had not complied with the initial enforcement order. In view of the applicant’s new request, the proceedings concerning the enforcement order of 9 October 2000 were terminated on 12 January 2001 and the proceedings upon the applicant’s request for penalty payments continued. 11. On 8 February 2001 the Municipal Court ordered the Ministry to return the vehicle to the applicant within two days, failing which it was to pay the applicant Croatian kuna (HRK) 1,500 for each day of default from that point on. The Ministry lodged an appeal and on 5 March 2002 the appellate court quashed the first‑instance decision, finding that the Zagreb Municipal Court lacked territorial jurisdiction in the matter. The case was transferred to the Sisak Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Sisku), which on 20 May 2002 ordered the Ministry to return the vehicle to the applicant within two days, failing which it was to pay HRK 1,500 for each day of default. The appellate court, however, quashed that decision and ordered the first-instance court to establish whether the parties were willing to settle the case. On 13 November 2003 the Ministry offered a settlement, which the applicant refused. 12. On 23 December 2003 the Sisak Municipal Court ordered the Ministry to comply with the judgement of 4 April 2000 within eight days failing which it was to pay HRK 1,500 for each day of default. This decision was upheld by the Sisak County Court (Županijski sud u Sisku) on 15 July 2004. 13. The parties met on 19 November 2004 in the presence of a court expert who established that the vehicle had been repaired and its value had increased. 14. The parties met again on 25 January 2005 in the presence of a court expert but the applicant refused to accept the vehicle, objecting that it had not been properly repaired. He sought payment of HRK 10,000 and 600 euros (EUR) in order to repair the vehicle and a further HRK 8,000 for its registration. 15. On 23 May 2006 a commission of the Sisak Municipal Court established in the presence of the parties and a court expert that the vehicle still had some defects, which had been in existence when the vehicle was examined on 19 November 2004. The applicant offered a settlement stipulating that the vehicle be driven to his address and that a sum of HRK 15,000 be paid to him for the costs of further repair and the registration of the vehicle. On 4 July 2006 the Ministry agreed to deliver the vehicle to the applicant’s home address, to remove all the remaining defects and pay the applicant a sum of HRK 15,000 for the costs of registration. 16. The Municipal Court held a hearing on 14 July 2006 with a view to assisting the parties to reach a settlement. However, the applicant declined the settlement because the Ministry refused to pay the court penalties ordered by the Sisak Municipal Court on 23 December 2003. 17. On 14 September 2006 a commission of the Sisak Municipal Court established in the presence of the parties and a court expert that the vehicle still had some defects. These were immediately removed, but the applicant nevertheless refused to take delivery. 18. On 2 October 2006 the Sisak Municipal Court ordered that the vehicle be kept by the Ministry in a closed garage at the applicant’s expense, at a rental of HRK 60 per day. The applicant appealed against this decision, arguing that the vehicle had not been properly repaired. On 29 June 2007 the Sisak County Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal finding that the vehicle was in good working order and fit to pass the technical test necessary for its registration. The thus vehicle remained in the possession of the Ministry as the applicant refused to take possession of it. 19. On 22 November 2004 the applicant also sought payment of the court penalties ordered in the Sisak Municipal Court’s decision of 23 December 2003 (see paragraph 12 above) up to 18 November 2004, in a total amount of HRK 454,500 together with costs of HRK 7,808. An enforcement order to that effect was issued on 3 January 2005 and the above amounts were paid to the applicant. 20. In its decision of 20 July 2006, the Sisak Municipal Court ordered the Ministry to pay the applicant HRK 625,500 on account of court penalties for the period between 23 February and 3 May 2006 as well as HRK 7,966.60 for the costs of the proceedings. In its decision of 3 October 2006, the same court ordered the Ministry to pay the applicant HRK 201,000 on account of court penalties for the period between 3 May and 13 September 2006 together with HRK 3,050 for costs. However, on 26 February 2007 the Sisak County Court quashed these orders and dismissed the applicant’s request for the court penalties to be enforced, on the ground that the Ministry had complied with their obligation to return the vehicle in good working order on 19 November 2004, that being the date when a court expert had found that the vehicle had been repaired. 21. On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against the Sisak County Court’s decision of 26 February 2007 arguing that further court penalties had to be paid to him. These proceedings are still pending.

5. The applicants were born in 1954 and currently live in Kyiv. 6. In 1998 the applicants paid Mrs N.T. and Mrs T.T. the purchase price of a house located at D. street in Dnipropetrovsk and moved into it. Instead of registering the transaction in accordance with the applicable law, however, the applicants had the nominal house owners issue an authorization to Mr B., to whom the first applicant owed a debt, allowing him to perform any transactions relating to the house. As a result of the first applicant defaulting on his debt, in September 1999 Mr B. signed this house over as a gift to his daughter, although the applicants continued to live in it. 7. In 1999 Mr B. instituted civil proceedings against the applicants seeking repayment of the debt and various compensatory payments. The applicants lodged a counterclaim, seeking to confirm the validity of their unregistered purchase of the house. By the final decision of 29 August 2007 the claims of both parties were dismissed. 8. Since 1999 the applicants also lodged numerous complaints with law enforcement authorities alleging that they had been deprived of their house and money by gang members and that their lives were in danger on account of threats from Mr B. In support of their allegations, the applicants submitted tapes of their telephone conversations with Mr B., in which he had referred to his organized crime connections. 9. Criminal proceedings were instituted, in which Mr A.Kh., the first applicant’s cousin and a member of the applicants’ household, born in 1957, acted as one of the witnesses. 10. On 3 May 2001 the applicants’ family was provided with police bodyguards to secure their safety in connection with these proceedings. On 1 November 2001 the measure was lifted with reference to the first applicant’s inappropriate behaviour towards the guards. By the final decision of 2 September 2002 the Supreme Court upheld the earlier decisions finding the lifting of the measure lawful. The applicants subsequently made unsuccessful attempts to have the matter reopened. 11. Mr B. was eventually tried, but acquitted of extortion, as the applicants’ tapes were not admitted as permissible evidence. However the applicants insisted on bringing various other criminal actions against him, some of which appear to be currently pending. 12. At 9 a.m. on 30 April 2002 the applicants informed the Zhovtnevyy District Police that they had found Mr A.Kh. dead in his bed in the annex to their house at D. street. 13. On the same day several police officers and medical experts in presence of lay witnesses broke into the annex which was purportedly locked from the inside. A decomposing corpse was found in the bed on its back, with the head on the pillow. The group recorded no traces of a struggle or other evidence suggesting homicide. Pictures of the site were taken; however, they could not be developed on account of a defect in the film. The body was taken to the mortuary. However, as 1 May was a national holiday, the autopsy was not carried out until 2 May 2002. According to the applicants, no precautions were taken to prevent decomposition of the body in the mortuary. 14. Following the autopsy of 2 May 2002, the experts found it impossible to establish the cause of the death as the body had significantly decomposed. They further noted that no broken bones or other visible injuries could be found on the body. Finally, they suggested that the death, which must have occurred on or around 28 April 2002, was likely to have been caused by atherosclerosis of brain and heart vessels. 15. On 20 May 2002 the police decided not to institute a criminal investigation in relation to the death having found no appearance of a homicide. 16. The applicants appealed maintaining that Mr A.Kh. could have been killed late 28 April 2002 by a gang in which Mr B. was involved or by other members of organized crime groups who feared him as an important witness in criminal proceedings, in which the applicants were the aggrieved parties. They noted, in particular, that they had found rubber gloves and a hammer of an unknown origin on the table in his room, which could have been used to murder Mr A.Kh. Furthermore, Mr A.Kh.’s height according to his records had been 196 cm, while the height of the autopsied corpse was recorded as being 177 cm. Finally, Mr A.Kh. had no record of atherosclerosis or any other life-threatening illness. 17. On 4 June 2002 the Dnipropetrovsk Prosecutors’ Office remitted the case for additional investigation. It found, in particular, that in light of the second applicant’s report about having seeing Mr A.Kh. alive on the evening of 28 April 2002, it was strange that his body had decomposed so rapidly. It further noted that a photographic record of the site had not been prepared, the deceased’s medical record had not been checked and the applicants’ assertion that he could have been killed by individuals involved in organized crime had not been investigated. 18. Subsequently on numerous occasions (20 June 2002, 18 July 2002, 21 October 2002, 7 January 2003 and 26 March 2003) the law enforcement authorities refused to initiate criminal proceedings having found no evidence of a homicide. All of these decisions were subsequently annulled by the prosecutors’ office (on 10 July 2002, 27 September 2002, 2 January 2003, 12 February 2003 and 1 October 2003) as having been based on only superficial inquiries. 19. On 22 October 2003 the Zhovtnevyy District Prosecutors’ Office refused to initiate criminal proceedings. Following additional questioning, it found, in particular, that the difference in height could have been due to a clerical error by mortuary personnel. As regards the gloves and the hammer, although certain witnesses had recalled seeing them, these objects were no longer available and it was not possible to determine their origin. Furthermore, although no mention of atherosclerosis or any other life-threatening illness had been found in Mr A.Kh’s medical records, regard being had to the fact that the annex had been locked from inside, no traces of any struggle or disorder had been noticed in the room and no injuries had been found on the body, there was no reason to suspect a homicide. 20. On 6 April 2004 the Zhovtnevyy District Court of Dnipropetrovsk annulled this decision and remitted the case for additional investigation. It referred to several omissions in the preliminary inquiries, such as the failure to measure the body at the site, failure to establish a probable cause of death against the absence of any record concerning atherosclerosis and the superficial examination of the door to the annex. In particular, the results of the investigation stated that the door could only be locked from the inside, while, according to a photographic record of the scene, the door had both a lock and a padlock. 21. On 1 February 2005 the law enforcement authorities refused to institute criminal proceedings. 22. On 21 April 2005 the General Prosecutors’ Office annulled this decision, having found that the circumstances of the case could only be established within the framework of criminal proceedings. The investigation was transferred to the Poltava Regional Prosecutors’ Office. 23. On 10 March 2006 the Prosecutors’ Office discontinued the criminal proceedings having found no evidence of a homicide. It noted, in particular, that due to the lapse of time witnesses could not accurately recall certain details. On the other hand, the witnesses clearly recalled having seen no traces of a struggle or other signs of a homicide. Mr B., implicated by the applicants as being involved in the murder, could not be interviewed as he had moved abroad. His son-in-law denied any family involvement in Mr A.Kh.’s death. The discrepancy in the records concerning Mr A.Kh.’s height appeared to be due to a typographical error by the mortuary registrar. The gloves on the table had been left by one of the medical experts. As regards the hammer, the first applicant had mentioned having taken it together with the gloves and Mr A.Kh.’s linen, but its existence was doubtful as he had refused to surrender these objects without explanation. The investigation further found that the applicants’ hypothesis that Mr A.Kh. had been killed late on 28 April 2002 was improbable, in particular, as the case file records contained a certificate from Mr A.Kh.’s employer that he had undergone a medical test on the morning of 29 April 2002. 24. In June 1999 the first applicant offered the family’s other house, located at V. street in Dnipropetrovsk, as collateral for a bank loan of 200,000 hryvnyas (UAH). In June 2000 the house at V. street was sold in default at a public auction to Mr R.K. In September 2002 Mr R.K. leased it out to Mr S.K., who moved in with his family. 25. The applicants unsuccessfully attempted to secure the criminal conviction of the individuals implicated in the sale and instituted civil proceedings, claiming back the house. As appears from scarce documents presented by the applicants, these proceedings are currently still pending. 26. Pending examination of their proceedings for annulment of the sale, on 15 October 2002 the applicants broke the lock on the door and entered the house with their three acquaintances – Mrs Ch., Mrs S. and Mr O.V. They refused to leave the house at the tenants’ request. An argument and a fight between the tenants and the applicants broke out. The police were allegedly called, but the applicants explained that they were the owners of the house and the police left. Several hours later Mrs Ch. and Mrs S. left, while the applicants and Mr O.V. remained for the night. 27. At about 10 a.m. on 16 October 2002 the tenants called the police again, complaining about the applicants’ and Mr O.V.’s obnoxious behaviour: smoking inside the house, putting pressure on them to leave, threatening them and swearing at them. Several police officers from the special detachment responsible for keeping order in courts entered the premises and ordered the applicants and Mr O.V. to follow them out of the house. The applicants and Mr O.V. protested. The first applicant and Mr O.V. were eventually restrained and handcuffed and the group was brought to the police station. According to the police records, the applicants stayed in the police station from 11 a.m. to 14 p.m. pending the drawing up of a report about an administrative offence. According to the applicants, they stayed in the police station for seven hours. 28. On the same date the first applicant and Mr O.V. stood trial before the Zhovtnevyy Court accused of “malicious resistance to the lawful demands of law-enforcement officers” (an administrative offence). They were accused, in particular, of grabbing the officers by their uniforms, pushing them, threatening and swearing at them in response to their demands to cease disorderly conduct. The court discontinued the administrative proceedings having found that the defendants’ conduct at the house warranted a criminal investigation on account of the possible trespass of the dwelling. The case was remitted to the Zhovtnevyy District Prosecutors’ Office. Subsequently (on 23 October 2002) the Prosecutors’ Office decided not to press charges in relation to the trespass. They found that the defendants’ actions could potentially qualify as infliction of minor bodily injuries on Mr S.K. and vigilantism, which could be prosecuted privately by the aggrieved party. 29. At the same time, following the first applicant’s medical examination of 17 October 2002, he was certified as having sustained light bodily injuries (several bruises and a scratch on a finger), which could have been inflicted on or around 16 October 2002. On 21 November 2002 the second applicant was certified as having sustained in the same period light bodily injuries resulting in short-term health problems (cerebral concussion, for which she had undergone out-patient treatment). 30. The applicants sought to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers for assault and battery, infliction of bodily injuries, disorder, racketeering, abuse of office and premeditated unlawful apprehension and detention. 31. On 14 November 2002 and 17 December 2002 their requests were rejected following preliminary inquiries and the interviews of the parties involved for lack of any evidence suggesting criminal conduct on the officers’ behalf. 32. On 10 October 2003 the Zhovnevyy Court remitted the case for additional investigation. The court found, in particular, that the investigation had only established that the applicants were apprehended for good cause, while having failed to establish how the injuries had been inflicted on the applicants and whether the infliction of these injuries could be justified by the circumstances of the case. 33. On 10 December 2003 the Dnipropetrovsk Regional Court of Appeal upheld this decision. 34. On 3 February 2004 the Prosecutors’ Office refused to initiate criminal proceedings. It found, in particular, that the cerebral concussion as well as other injuries had been sustained in the course of the fight with the tenants on 15 October 2002 and that the force used by the police officers to restrain and arrest the applicants had not been disproportionate. The investigation referred, primarily, to the testimonies of the police officers and other parties involved. In particular, the applicants testified that they had been battered by the tenants on 15 October 2002; the tenants complained that they had been forced to defend themselves against the applicants, who had beaten them; Mrs Ch. and Mrs S. reported having seeing Mr S.K.’s wife beating the second applicant with a slipper on the head and banging her head against the wall. Several other witnesses reported having seen the police officers taking the first applicant and Mr O.V. handcuffed out of the house, while the latter were resisting and swearing. 35. On 24 May 2004 the Zhovtnevyy Court upheld this decision following contested proceedings. On 27 April 2005 the Dnipropetrovsk Regional Court of Appeal rejected the applicants’ appeal. 36. In July 1999 the applicant lent UAH 130,000 to Messrs V. and R., who were leaders of local NGOs. They had requested the loan allegedly for the arrangement of transportation of humanitarian aid (clothes and shoes) donated by a U.S.-based foundation, although according to relevant documentation the donor was responsible for all transportation costs. Subsequently the first applicant was repaid some one third of the loan and given some 4,000 kilos of goods from the humanitarian aid cargo, which he stored in the house at D. Street and subsequently surrendered to the police. 37. In December 1999 the applicants lodged various criminal complaints about having been allegedly defrauded by Messrs V. and R., who had never repaid the sum loaned to them for the transportation of humanitarian aid. Eventually, on 21 April 2000 the Dnipropetrovsk Prosecutor instituted a criminal investigation into the circumstances surrounding the transportation and distribution of the cargo. The alleged perpetrators were questioned in these proceedings as witnesses. 38. Although it appears that no formal charges were brought against Messrs V. and R., on 28 April 2000 the first applicant was admitted in the proceedings as an aggrieved party and eventually (in September 2001) as a civil claimant. The second applicant appears to have been questioned only as a witness. 39. On 30 October 2000 the proceedings were discontinued for lack of evidence of criminal conduct towards the aggrieved party. 40. On 26 December 2000 the General Prosecutors’ Office ordered the resumption of the proceedings. 41. Between April 2000 and February 2004 the investigative authorities interviewed numerous recipients of the aid and officials involved in its distribution; ordered several financial expert assessments, commissioned the collection of information from the U.S.A. donor organization and examined several volumes of documents concerning the distribution of the aid. 42. Messrs V. and R. acknowledged having received the money from the first applicant. However, they alleged that a portion of it had been repaid in cash. The remaining amount was, in their opinion, the price paid by the first applicant for purchasing part of the cargo. The first applicant intended to sell it for profit, in spite of the fact that he had been aware of the statutory ban on selling humanitarian aid and about the official undertaking of the U.S. donor to pay all transportation costs. The applicant had received his part of the cargo in October 1999, so Messrs V. and R. had discharged their civil obligation in his respect. 43. The first applicant, for his own part, disputed the exact amount of cash repaid to him and contended that he had never intended to sell the goods. He had merely agreed to store a portion of the cargo as a guarantee for repayment of the remainder debt. 44. On 10 February 2004 the investigation concluded that the circumstances of the case warranted investigation into Messrs V.’s and R.’s possible abuse of office in handling humanitarian aid. As regards their involvement in defrauding the first applicant, on 11 February 2004 the proceedings were discontinued for lack of evidence of criminal conduct and in view of the private-law nature of the dispute between the parties. Both applicants appealed against this decision. Their appeals were dismissed by the courts of three levels of jurisdiction on 27 May and 20 September 2004 and 24 May 2005 respectively. 45. In the meantime, on 19 July 2005 the proceedings were re-opened pursuant to an order of the General Prosecutors’ Office and finally discontinued on 28 December 2006, essentially on the same grounds as before. The applicants’ appeals against the decision to discontinue the proceedings were rejected by the courts of three levels of jurisdiction. 46. In March 2002 the applicants instituted civil proceedings in the Zhovtnevyy District Court of Dnipropetrovsk seeking various compensatory payments from Messrs V. and R. 47. On 11 April 2006 the Zhovtnevyy Court left their action without consideration referring to the applicants’ numerous failures to appear at the hearings. The court noted, in particular, that the second applicant had appeared only once (on 21 May 2002). Neither applicant had appeared at the hearings scheduled for 4 October, 7 November and 13 December 2005, 20 January, 27 February, 20 March and 11 April 2006, having presented either unsatisfactory or no excuses. In light of all of the above, the court concluded that the applicants had no genuine interest in pursuing their case and left their action without consideration. 48. The applicants appealed. They have not informed the Court about the outcome of the appeal. 49. In September 2003 Mr R. was hospitalised with cerebral concussion and bruises all over his body. On 29 October 2005 a criminal investigation of the incident was discontinued in view of the probability that Mr R., being heavily intoxicated, had fallen from an elevated surface. The applicants demanded the resumption of the investigation, alleging that Mr R. had been battered by gang members in order to prevent his testifying in criminal proceedings related to their property interests. Their appeals were ultimately dismissed by the courts as lacking locus standi. 50. The applicants further contended that the gang members made several attempts to kill them, in particular in June 2002 by way of instigating a traffic accident.

4. The applicants were born in 1967, 1966 and 1994 respectively and live in Kloštar-Ivanić. 5. The applicants allege that on 16 June 2009 at about 9.30 p.m. the third applicant and his brother Z.Ð were attacked in front of the “Yogi” restaurant in Ivanić Grad by a group of six men. The police intervened and took the third applicant and his brother to the Ivanić Grad police station. The third applicant refused to sign the police incident report, which stated that he had 1 g/kg of alcohol in his blood. When, at about 10.30 p.m., the first and second applicants arrived at the police station they found that the third applicant had been beaten up and had blood all over him. 6. When the second and third applicants went to their car, two police officers, one of whom was S.M., approached them. The unidentified police officer opened the door and S.M. pulled the second applicant out of the car, twisting her right arm, punched her in the chest and kicked her in the abdomen. S.M. then kicked the third applicant in the abdomen and seized him by the throat. The second applicant called the Zagreb Police to tell them about the incident, but there was no reaction. 7. After the incident, the applicants and other members of their family went to Ivanić Grad Medical Emergency Centre (Služba hitne medicinske pomoći, ispostava Ivanić Grad), where the doctor refused to record the applicants’ injuries. The applicants and other family members then went to Bjelovar General Hospital (Opća Bolnica Bjelovar), where they were examined at about 2 a.m. It was established that the second applicant had suffered contusions of the chest, head and pelvis (contusio thoracis, capitis et pelveos), while the third applicant had suffered contusions on the head, with abrasions, and on the nose (contusio capitis cum excoriations et contusio nasi). The injuries were classified as minor bodily injuries. 8. On an unspecified date, the first applicant complained to the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (Ministarstvo zdravstva i socijalne skrbi) that his family had not been treated correctly at Ivanić Grad Medical Emergency Centre. On 17 August 2009 S.L., the principal of Zagrebačka County Health Centre (Dom Zdravlja Zagrebačke Županije), submitted his observations to the Ministry, stating that the applicants had pressured the doctor in charge to diagnose injuries, but the doctor had behaved professionally and refused to record injuries that did not exist. (b) The Government’s version of the events 9. The Government alleged that on 16 June 2009 in the evening Z.Ð., a son of the first and second applicants and brother to the third applicant, was having dinner at the “Yogi” restaurant in Ivanić Grad when M.Š., obviously very drunk, approached him, insulted him because of his Roma origin and spat in his food. Z.Ð. left the restaurant, but soon afterwards, at about 9.30 p.m., came back with the third applicant to retrieve his car, which had been parked in front of the restaurant. 10. There was a verbal and then a physical dispute between Z.Ð. and the third applicant on the one side and M.Š. on the other. Z.Ð. and the third applicant were aided by their relatives S.Ð., V.Ð., T.Ð. and B.Ð. The police soon arrived and the conflict then ceased. The participants were taken to the Ivanić Grad police station. 11. At about 10.30 p.m. the same day a small group of Roma, including the first and the second applicants, arrived at the police station in search of M.Š. When the police officers warned them off, they left the police station. However, the second applicant continued to shout in front of the police station, insulting and threatening the police officers. Police officers S.M. and A.B., now dressed in plain clothes as they were no longer on duty, approached the second applicant asking her to calm down, without using any force. The second applicant then left. 12. The applicants had then gone to the Ivanić Grad Medical Emergency Centre, where the doctor was unable to detect any injuries to them. (i) The proceedings concerning the events of 16 June 2009 at about 9.30 p.m. 13. On 16 June 2009 the Ivanić Grad police interviewed Z.Ð., M.Š. and the third applicant, as well as a witness, I.G., a waitress in the “Yogi” restaurant. 14. I.G. stated that at the critical time she had been serving Z.Ð. in the restaurant when M.Š. had approached him, insulted him because of his Roma origin and spat in his food. Z.Ð. had left and had soon come back with three other Roma persons, a man and two women. A dispute, at first verbal and then physical, had ensued. She could not see clearly who had hit whom, but had heard verbal insults from everyone. 15. The third applicant said that after his brother had come home and told him about the abuse by M.Š. at the restaurant, the two of them had returned to the restaurant, since their car had been left there. A group of unknown men, including M.Š., had approached them. The third applicant had started to run home when suddenly somebody had hit him in the back. He had fallen to the ground and the men had continued to beat him all over the body. He had lost consciousness. 16. Z.Ð. also described the incident in the restaurant and said that when he had come back with the third applicant to retrieve his car, which was parked in front of the restaurant, a group of unknown men, including M.Š., had approached them. He and his brother had started to run home. When he got home and saw that his brother was not there, he had gone back to look for him. He had found him in Babonićeva Street. They had telephoned their relatives V.Ð. and S.Ð. and they had all returned to the restaurant, where they had found M.Š., who had immediately started to insult them and then approached them and hit them. They had hit him back. M.Š. had then kicked S.Ð. several times in the belly. The police had then arrived and the fighting had ceased. 17. M.Š. also described the incident in the restaurant, admitting that he had verbally insulted Z.Ð. because of his Roma origin and then spat in his food. He explained that after a few minutes Z.Ð. had come back with his brother and two Roma women. They had started to insult him and then attacked him. He had defended himself by hitting and kicking the attackers. The police had then arrived and the fighting had ceased. 18. On 9 July 2009 the Ivanić Grad police indicted M.Š., Z.Ð., the third applicant, S.Ð. and V.Ð. in the Ivanić Grad Minor Offences Court. On the same day, on the basis of the police report and without holding a hearing, that court found M.Š., Z.Ð., S.Ð. and V.Ð. guilty of: “on 16 June 2009 at about 9.30 p.m. in Kloštar Ivanić, ... in the “Yogi” bar ..., disturbing public order and peace in that the first defendant M. entered the said premises obviously drunk, approached a table where the second defendant Z. was sitting, started to insult him ..., and spat in his food. Immediately after that the second defendant Z. stood up and left the restaurant. After some time, the second defendant Z. came back, together with his brother, the third defendant D., to retrieve his car, which was parked in front of the restaurant. The first defendant M., together with three unknown men, approached them, and then also the fourth defendant S. and the fifth defendant V., who sided with the second and the third defendants and insulted the first defendant and the others ... After the verbal insults, the first defendant M. attacked the fourth defendant S., who is pregnant, and the fifth defendant V., as well as T. and B.Ð. who were in their company, and hit them several times in the belly. The second defendant Z. and the third defendant D. also got involved in the fight with the first defendant M., all hitting and kicking each other. When officers from the Ivanić Grad police station arrived, the defendants stopped disturbing the peace.” 19. The Minor Offences Court issued a minor-offences order finding M.Š. guilty under section 6 of the Minor Offences Against Public Order and Peace Act (Zakon o prekršajima protiv javnog reda i mira), and fined him 1,170 Croatian kunas (HRK). The other defendants were found guilty under Article 13 of the same Act and fined HRK 195. The order in respect of M.Š. became final, while Z.Ð., S.Ð. and V.Ð. objected, and on 17 November 2009 the same court, after having heard the defendants, again found them guilty and issued a warning against them. No appeal ensued. 20. The proceedings in respect of the third applicant were severed since he was a minor. On 22 October 2009 the Minor Offences Court found him guilty of participating in a fight with his brother Z. against M.Š. and a court reprimand was issued against him. No appeal ensued. (ii) The proceedings concerning the events of 16 June 2009 at about 10.30 p.m. 21. On 16 June 2009 the Ivanić Grad police station indicted the second applicant before the Ivanić Grad Minor Offences Court, alleging that on 16 June 2009 at about 10.30 p.m. she had disturbed the peace in Ivanić Grad in that she had approached her husband’s car and shouted and pressed the car’s horn. She had also verbally insulted the police officers at the Ivanić Grad police station, calling them thieves, threatening to burn their houses down and cursing them. 22. On 17 June 2006 the Bjelovar General Hospital submitted a report to the Ivanić Grad police station stating that the second applicant had been seen by a doctor in that hospital on 17 June 2009 at 2 a.m. and that she had sustained contusions to the chest, head and pelvis at the hands of an unknown person; and that the third applicant had suffered contusions on the head, with abrasions, and a contusion on the nose. 23. A medical report of 19 June 2009 shows that ultrasound examination of the second applicant revealed a subcutaneous haematoma in the sacral area measuring 92x74x23 millimetres. 24. On 1 July 2009 the Ivanić Grad police station interviewed M.Šk., a waitress at the “Argentina” bar located near the scene of the incident of 16 June 2009 at about 10.30 p.m. She said that at that time she had been at the terrace of the bar together with two police officers, S.M. and A.B. She had heard noise coming from a nearby car park, the noise of a car horn and shouting. Police officer A.B. had gone to see what was going on. She had heard female voices shouting. Other police officers soon joined him. Shortly afterwards she had heard S.M. shout ”Stop! Police!”. She had gone back into the bar and then come out again. She had seen police officers approaching the car and the situation had calmed down. Soon after that M.S., who lived nearby, had come to the bar saying that the noise had woken him. She had told him not to go there and that the police had already taken care of the situation. She also said that it was not true that the police officers had used force, they had only asked the unknown persons to calm down. 25. On the same day the Ivanić Grad police station interviewed M.S., who said that on 16 June 2009 at about 10.30 p.m. he had been on the terrace of the “Argentina” together with M.Šk. and two police officers from the Ivanić Grad police station, S.M. and A.B. He had heard noise from the nearby car park – someone had been sounding a car horn. Officer A.B. had gone over to see what was going on. The shouting had continued and judging by the voices he had heard he had concluded that they belonged to several women. Police officer S.M. had also gone to the car park. Soon after that he had heard S.M. shout “Stop! Police!”. He had then left the terrace and approached the car park, where he had seen a group of Roma coming from the direction of the police station, talking loudly. One of the women in the group had probably called the Zagreb Police telling them that she had been beaten by two police officers in Ivanić Grad, which was untrue. Soon after that one or two uniformed police officers had appeared and the situation had calmed down. He also said that it was not true that the police officers had used force, they had only asked the unknown persons to calm down. 26. On an unspecified date the second applicant lodged a criminal complaint against the two police officers with the Ivanić Grad Municipal State Attorney’s Office (Općinsko državno odvjetništvo u Ivanić Gradu), on charges of ill-treatment while on duty or in the exercise of services on behalf of a public authority (zlostavljanje u obavljanju službe ili javne ovlasti). She alleged that two police officers, one of whom was S.M., had beaten her and her son and that they had then started to shout. 27. On 12 October 2009 an identification parade was held at the Ivanić Grad police station with five men, one of whom was police officer A.B. The second applicant did not identify any of the men as the perpetrators of the alleged violence against her on 16 June 2009. 28. On 30 November 2009 the Ivanić Grad Municipal State Attorney’s Office dismissed the second applicant’s complaint, finding, inter alia, that she had been unable to identify the alleged perpetrators during the identification parade, and that the surveillance camera at the Ivanić Grad police station had not recorded anything suspicious. The relevant part of the decision reads: “Katica Ðurđevic lodged a criminal complaint against police officer S.M and an unknown police officer from the Ivanić Grad police station for the criminal offence of ill-treatment while on duty or in the exercise of services on behalf of a public authority ... In her criminal complaint she alleges that on 16 June 2009 at about 11 p.m. she and her husband Ðuro went to the Ivanić Grad police station because their sons Z. and Danijel had been taken there. Danijel was covered in blood and she took him out of the police station and they sat in their car parked in front of the police station. While she was lighting a cigarette a police officer opened the car door, grabbed her by her right arm, almost breaking it, dragged her out of the car and kicked her in the chest and belly. S.M., who was with the police officer, took Danijel out of the car, kicked him in the belly, grabbed him by the neck and lifted him against the car. This whole event was recorded by the surveillance video camera, and she suggests that the recording be seen. S.M. said that he was employed as a police officer in the Ivanić Grad police station and that on 16 June 2009 he had been sent to Kloštar Ivanić because [someone was] disturbing the peace. At about 9.45 p.m. he had arrived at the “Yogi” restaurant, where he had found M.Š. sitting in front of the restaurant, obviously drunk, and several persons of Roma origin who were shouting at M.Š. He and other police officers who had arrived saw that there had been a fight between M.Š. and the Roma persons and that M.Š. had hit these persons several times. He had taken M.Š. to the Ivanić Grad police station and then he had gone off duty and left the police station at about 10.15 p.m. to go to the “Argentina” bar. At about 10.30 p.m. he had heard noises and cursing outside the bar ... so he had gone with another police officer to see what was going on. As they approached an “Opel” type car with Dutch licence plates he had heard a woman’s voice shouting even louder and someone was also sounding the car horn, so they had tried to calm them down. They had not calmed down, however, and more police officers had come out of the police station, and he had returned to the bar. He asserted that neither he nor any of the other police officers had used any force against any of the persons present. Danijel Ðurđević said that ... he had been taken to the police station, where he had been told that he had 1 g/kg of alcohol in his blood, which was not true, so he had refused to sign the report. Soon after that his parents had arrived and when he was sitting in their car, parked outside the police station, a man in grey clothes had come and opened the car door, grabbed his mother Katica by the arm, dragged her out of the car and hit her. After that another unknown man in plain clothes had grabbed him by his arms, dragged him out of the car and kicked him in the belly, grabbed him by the neck and pressed him against the car. M.S. said that on 16 June 2009 at about 10.30 he had been in the “Argentina” bar situated next door to the Ivanić Grad police station. The waitress was M.Šk. and there was also another customer, S.M. At one moment he had heard noises and the sound of a car horn coming from the parking lot and S.M. had gone there. He was also curious and had gone out onto the terrace to see what was going on. He had seen a large group of Roma persons coming from the direction of the police station, talking loudly, and one of the women had called the police complaining that she had been beaten by two policemen, which was untrue since M.S. had been standing only a couple of metres away and had seen everything. After that a few more police officers had arrived and the noise had stopped. M.Šk. said that she had been working as a waitress when she heard noise coming from the car park – a car horn and women shouting. She had heard someone shout “Stop! Police!”, and had gone back into the bar. She explained that the police officers had not used any force but had merely asked the persons present to calm down. ... The medical report of 17 June 2009 from Bjelovar General Hospital states that Katica Ðurđević allegedly suffered blows to the chest, head and pelvis, without mentioning visible signs of injuries. The criminal offence of ill-treatment while on duty or in the exercise of services on behalf of a public authority is committed by an official who in the performance of duties on behalf of a public authority ill-treats or insults another person or behaves in a manner which harms his or her dignity. An identification parade was held in the police station but Katica Ðurđević failed to pick out the person who had aggressed her on 16 June 2009 from among the five police officers in the line-up. The Ivanić Grad police station submitted video recordings from the surveillance video cameras for 16 June 2009, which showed no evidence that police officers had beaten Katica Ðurđević or any other person. Neither the information collected nor the video tape indicated that S.M. or any other police officer had hit Katica Ðurđević or ill-treated her in any other manner, and therefore there is no reasonable suspicion that he committed a criminal offence. ...” The second applicant was instructed that she could take over the prosecution and bring charges before the Ivanić Grad Municipal Court within eight days. 29. On 17 December 2009 the second applicant brought charges (optužni prijedlog) against S.M. and an unknown police officer before the Ivanić Grad Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Ivanić Gradu). She alleged that on 16 June 2009 at about 10.30 p.m. the two police officers had beaten her and her son Danijel. On 29 January 2010 the court asked the second applicant to amend her submissions within three days. The second applicant complied. However, on 4 March 2010 the Municipal Court found that the second applicant’s submissions did not take the form required by the Code of Criminal Procedure. 30. The second applicant has seen doctors on several occasions since the alleged incident. On 8 February 2010 she was diagnosed with a mild chronic neural lesion (blaža kronična neuralna lezija). 31. The medical report of 27 October 2008 on the third applicant shows that he complained that he had been hit by a pupil at the school he was attending. He had a deviation of the nasal septum which could be of a post-traumatic character. There were no signs of broken nasal bones. 32. On 19 December 2008 the first applicant complained to the Government that his son, the third applicant, had been constantly insulted and frequently beaten by other pupils because of his Roma origin. 33. An interview with the third applicant was conducted at the Ivanić Grad police station on 12 January 2009. He explained that on an unspecified date in late October 2008, after physical training, he had gone to the changing room to pick up his things. Pupil L.R. had been in front of him. Someone had pushed L.R. and his head had hit the third applicant’s face, hurting his nose. He had reported it to the class teacher, who had sent him to see a doctor. He had not had any other symptoms and the pain had ceased after a few days. 34. On 9 January 2009 the Ministry of Science, Education and Sport asked the school authorities to reply to the first applicant’s allegations of 19 December 2008. The school prepared two reports. The relevant part of the first report, drawn up on 14 January 2009 by the applicant’s class teacher, reads: “... after only two weeks at this school I encountered conflicts between pupils. D. Ðurđević first reported a run-in with another pupil when pupil L.R. unintentionally hit him on the nose with his head because Danijel was standing behind L.R. when L.R. swung his head back. ... Danijel came to me complaining that his nose hurt and told me that L.R. had hit him hard. He made it quite clear that the blow had been unintentional, which other pupils who witnessed the incident confirmed. The next day Danijel complained that his nose still hurt, so I sent him to see a doctor. I also tried to inform the Ðurđević family, but their mobile telephone was switched off. Since it was established that the contact between Danijel and L.R. had been accidental, with no intention of hurting Danijel, I had no reason to punish anyone. This happened on 21, 22 and 23 October 2008. On 22 October 2008, during a break, a verbal and physical conflict involving pupils I.D., M.K., L.R. and D. Ðurđević occurred. From interviews with these pupils I learned that I.D., M.K. and L.R. were playing with a box ... which annoyed Danijel, who wanted to throw the box away, so Danijel and the other pupils started arguing. Pupils I.D., M.K. and L.R. said that after some pushing and shoving Danijel threatened them with physical violence and I.D., M.K. and L.R. answered by swearing at him. Danijel then hit M.K. and L.R. During the following break the pupils reported the incident to me and I reported it to the authorities. A class teacher gave pupils I.D., N.K. and L.R. oral warnings. Pupil D. Ðurđević was given a written warning because he had already had oral warnings. On 16 December, during a break, my pupils came to me to report a fight started by Danijel. They told me that P.G. and D.A. had been standing outside the history classroom talking when Danijel had arrived and kicked P.G.’s bottom. D.A. had asked him why had he done it and Danijel had insulted her. She had returned the insults and entered the classroom. Danijel had followed her in, pressed her against a wardrobe in the classroom, grabbed her by her hair and kneed her in the hip and belly. The pupils had seen Danijel hit her seven times before the boys had managed to separate them. With the help of the history teacher ... Danijel confessed that he had started the fight and explained what he had done ... He confirmed the pupils’ version of events and wrote it all down on paper, as did the girls who witnessed it. He even demonstrated how he had pressed D.A. against the wardrobe and held her while he hit her. I reported the incident to a pedagogue, V.V., who immediately talked to Danijel, D.A. and the pupils who witnessed the incident, then called Danijel’s and A.’s parents and the police. Defectologist A.N. was also informed and set about resolving the situation. I informed the teachers of the incident at their meeting on 19 December 2008 and suggested giving Danijel Ðurđević a written reprimand for causing and participating in verbal and physical conflicts, inflicting bodily injuries on D.A. and violating the school rules by not wearing school slippers, and that suggestion was unanimously accepted. As regards unacceptable behaviour towards pupil Ðurđević, Danijel complained to me on three occasions that other pupils had been teasing him ... about his age and his alleged liking for a pupil in another class. After Danijel’s complaint I warned the pupils concerned and instructed them to avoid verbal conflicts. I also talked to Danijel on several occasions, and he told me that if the teasing continued he would hit the pupils concerned. On the basis of these interviews I concluded that Danijel identified verbal insults with physical violence and considered it appropriate to react to teasing with violence, without showing any remorse. After the incident in December when Danijel inflicted injuries on D.A, the pupils told me that Danijel’s usual reaction to teasing among the pupils included threats of physical violence, swearing and inappropriate comments about a girl pupil from his class, with allusion to her physical attributes and to sexual activity. As an example of his typical behaviour, the pupils mentioned Danijel’s kicking of pupils in passing. He would bend his knee and kick them with a sudden backwards movement of his leg. During our latest conversation the pupils told me that they had been avoiding Danijel for some time, explaining that they had stopped teasing him out of fear that he would put his threats of physical violence into practice. Danijel, on the other hand, has never complained to me that any of the pupils have tried to harm him.” 35. The relevant part of the second report, drawn up on 15 January 2009 by the pedagogue at the same school, reads: “Danijel Ðurđević, has very frequent verbal conflicts with his classmates and sometimes with his teachers as well. The interviews with him reveal that in his opinion the cause of these conflicts is that he ‘wants to have fun and make jokes but the others do not see it that way.’ On innumerable occasions the class teacher, the defectologist and I have explained to him that what he perceives as a joke is not necessarily [seen as such] by others, and that sometimes people are not in the mood for jokes but that does not require a vehement reaction. He is repeating the sixth grade and at the beginning of the school year he said he missed his friends from his former class, but he also promised to be a better pupil, to listen to teachers, me and the defectologist and to refrain from arguing with other pupils. I praised him for that attitude; he showed some improvement in his school work, but the conflicts with other pupils have persisted. Mostly pupils from his class are involved, but sometimes he would go to the class attended by his sister D. and try to solve her problems, in an inappropriate manner, shouting and threatening younger pupils. As regards educational measures, on 23 September [2008] he was issued an oral reprimand by a class teacher and on 28 October 2008 a written warning for fighting with other pupils, of which the parents were informed orally by the class teacher. The other pupils involved in the fighting were given oral warnings while Danijel got a written warning for repeating the unacceptable behaviour for which he had been warned orally on 23 September 2008. On 16 December 2008 during a break ... there was a scuffle between Danijel and pupil D.A. The pupils who witnessed it came to me and the class teacher. [We found] D.A. at the scene, crying, with dishevelled hair, obviously in shock, clutching her belly with both hands. The pupils told us what had happened. I took D.A. to my office and assessed whether an ambulance had to be called. D.A. said that she was frightened and had pains in her head and belly, but that there was no need to see a doctor. She had no external injuries, save for pulled hair and red marks on her belly. Danijel had no injuries, he said that he had hit her because they had said something to him which had made him angry. The parents of both pupils were informed. The Ðurđević parents came immediately, and D.A.’s mother came later ... The Ðurđević parents wanted to talk with D.A. immediately to see what had happened. Since they were shouting and talking at the same time as Danijel, I asked them to calm down and told them that they had no right to question D.A. without her parents being present. As they had been informed about the incident, I told them to go home and that my duty was to report the incident to a welfare centre and the police, and I asked them to take Danijel home. Dissatisfied with what I had said, they reacted inappropriately, especially Mrs Ðurđević, complaining that when Danijel had been insulted there had been no reaction and the police had not been called. They said they would deal with it in their own way. An hour later D.A.’s father came to my office, upset and disappointed that I had not called an ambulance and that the police had not come to the school. At a teachers’ meeting on 19 December 2008 it was decided that a written reprimand would be issued against Danijel for serious physical conflict in which he had inflicted bodily injury. Although this was not his first attack on a pupil at the school and the usual measure would be a harsh reprimand, in view of his overall social condition, which affected his development, a more lenient punishment was issued. It is to be stressed that we regularly talk to Danijel, at his request (at least two or three times a week), and we also provide him with adequate aid in terms of conversations with him, alone and together with other pupils; he receives help with his school work (once I personally cleaned the muddy sneakers he wore to school instead of slippers, because he did not know how to do it). Today he is reported to have punched pupil I.M. on the left cheek because I.M. threw his cap at him. As regards the incident when his nose was hurt on 21 and 22 October 2008 (I do not know the exact date because Danijel cannot remember exactly when it happened), Danijel said in the presence of his parents that he happened to be standing behind a boy who swung his head back because he had long hair, and that his nose had been like that before, which is confirmed by medical documents submitted by the parents ... I would like to stress that in both my personal and my professional capacity I have done a lot to help the Ðurđević parents and their children. Many times the Ðurđević parents have objected that we do not know how to resolve problems with Roma people, alleging that the pupils at school, as well as other people, had been denigrating them. I expressed my regret at such behaviour and stressed that they could not have experienced anything like that from me (which they confirmed), and reassured them that I would certainly react in the event of such behaviour by the pupils, in order to protect their children, and direct the pupils as to the correct attitude to adopt towards the Roma. I could not be held responsible for other people’s reactions because these things are a matter of personal culture. I advised them to tell their older, grown-up children who come to the school to take their younger siblings home to wait outside the school or not to enter the school before the end of classes without registering with a pupil on duty (they would get angry when asked to show their identity cards by pupils on duty, and would go to the classrooms without authorisation). In conversations with them, they have admitted that their children also sometimes use bad language they hear at home, and I think that their complaint that their children are the only ones ill-treated at school is not true. The social services and the police were informed about the supervision of pupils in order to help them with their existential problems. 36. On an unspecified date the second applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the Velika Gorica Municipal State Attorney’s Office (Općinsko državno odvjetništvo u Velikoj Gorici) on charges of bodily harm (tjelesna ozljeda). It appears that this complaint was related to beatings the third applicant had suffered at school. 37. On 24 February 2009 the second and third applicants were invited to the Velika Gorica Municipal State Attorney’s Office for an interview in connection with the incident of 16 December 2008. 38. The medical report of 26 March 2009 indicates that the third applicant claimed that a pupil had hit him in the back with a ball and that he had been beaten by pupils at school and insulted constantly for a week. He alleged that he had pains in his belly and back. There were no visible injuries. He was diagnosed with abdominal contusions (contusio abdominis). The ultrasound examination did not show any injuries. He refused hospitalisation. 39. On 18 September 2009, the first applicant lodged a complaint with an unspecified body against the school authorities who were, in his view, not being proactive in protecting his son, the third applicant, from constant beatings. 40. On 15 December 2009 the third applicant was examined in connection with his headaches by the ophthalmologist in Dubrava Hospital (Klinička bolnica Dubrava). The applicant alleged that he had been beaten up at school and out of school. The doctor requested the opinion of the school authorities and the school psychologist. 41. On 8 February 2010 the third applicant was examined again, and was diagnosed as having serious impairment to the sight in his right eye as a result of a contusion (cephaela gradus gravis post contusionem). The applicant said that he had been beaten up at school and out of school. The doctor observed that there had been no response from the school authorities or the school psychologist and asked once again for their opinion. The third applicant was referred to a neurologist and a brain surgeon. There is no indication that he followed the recommendation. 42. On the same day the Velika Gorica Municipal Court found the third applicant guilty of inflicting bodily harm on D.A. on 16 December 2008 and ordered him to apologise to D.A. and to be placed under strict care and supervision. 43. On an unspecified date the second applicant complained about the violence against the third applicant in school and submitted medical documentation. She alleged that she and the boy’s father had complained to the school about Danijel being beaten by other pupils on many occasions and that nothing had been done. She also alleged that they (the parents) had been thrown out of the school and not allowed to pay insurance for Danijel at the school. She enclosed medical documentation concerning the third applicant dated 17 March 2010, showing that he had been hit on the head on 26 March and 9 December 2009 and 16 February 2010. 44. On 7 April 2010 the school head master drew up a report at the request of the Zagreb Clinic for the Protection of Children. The relevant part of the report reads: “Observations about pupil Danijel Ðurđević ... In the sixth grade [Danijel] has had frequent verbal conflicts with pupils from his class (sometimes also physical conflicts such as pushing, or pulling clothes), and sometimes with teachers as well. The interviews with him reveal that in his opinion the cause of these conflicts is that he ‘wants to have fun and make jokes but the others do not see it that way’. On innumerable occasions the class teacher and professional assistants at school have explained to him that what he perceives as a joke is not necessarily [seen as such] by others and that sometimes people are not in the mood for jokes, but that does not require a vehement reaction. The police intervened for the first time during Danijel’s sixth grade in December 2008, after an serious incident with a pupil. ...Danijel grabbed the girl by the head and kicked her in the belly. After our intervention with the relevant outside services the parents, possibly dissatisfied with our conduct, complained to the Office for National Minorities, which asked for our observations. [the incident when Danijel was hit on the nose is described] ... In December last year Danijel complained about having a headache because ‘he had been hit with an iron bar’. During the interview with him, we learned that the previous day Danijel had been hit by unknown persons ..., out of school, after lessons. He refused our suggestion to call his parents to come to take him home. Instead, he asked for painkillers as he frequently does ... After a few moments he left the school without authorisation, went to see a doctor and returned after an hour with two prescriptions ... On 4 March 2010 the Ðurđević parents were invited to the school to fetch their daughter, who was in sixth grade and who was throwing chairs and benches in her classroom following a verbal conflict with other pupils in her class. When Danijel heard about it, he tried to ‘solve the situation in his way’, by threatening the pupils and teachers (he mentioned a knife). The teachers calmed him down but he had already called his brother or father on a mobile telephone and soon his grown-up elder brother arrived at the school. At the entrance he brushed past the pupil on duty and shouted at him, and opened various classroom doors looking for his sister and brother. One of the teachers ... heard the noise and asked the young man to stop making noise and disturbing classes and told him that he would find his brother and sister. But the brother continued to address the teacher in an inappropriate manner and threatened to ‘take things into his own hands’. The teacher immediately called the police and it is possible that this is incident the Ðurđević parents were referring to in connection with police intervention. Danijel frequently complains to teachers of headaches and asks for pills and permission to leave the classroom. Sometimes he leaves without authorisation or without the teachers’ knowledge. ... In principle we do not give pills to pupils but call the parents to pick up their children and take care of them. Danijel is also complaining less frequently of being insulted by other pupils. We have talked to these pupils and taken educational measures when such incidents continued. It has been noticed lately that Danijel has been refusing schoolwork, has reacted vehemently to advice and would sometimes address the pupils and teachers in an inappropriate manner. I would like to stress that the class teachers informed the parents at parent-teacher meetings of verbal incidents involving individual pupils, and the parents reacted more than correctly and apologised. I would also like to stress that six other Roma pupils attend our school and that they are good pupils and cooperation with their parents is satisfactory for all.”

5. The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Krasnoyarsk in the Russian Federation. 6. The applicant arrived in the Republic of Latvia as a member of the ex-USSR armed forces located in the territory of Latvia. On an unspecified date in the beginning of the 1990s he and Ms B., a Latvian citizen, started living together in de facto partnership. In 1993 a child was born to the applicant and his partner. 7. After the military forces were withdrawn from Latvia, the applicant resided there between 11 June 1993 and 31 March 1994 on the basis of a temporary residence permit. On 31 March 1994, upon the expiry of the residence permit, he left Latvia. 8. Between 1994 and 1997 the applicant visited Latvia three times on the basis of a visa. The validity of the last visa expired on 17 November 1997 but the applicant continued to reside in Latvia illegally. 9. On 19 February 1998 the applicant was apprehended by the police and taken into custody on suspicion of having committed robbery and criminal proceedings were initiated against him and seven co-accused persons. 10. On 20 February 1998 the applicant was brought before a judge of the Ziemeļu District Court of the City of Riga who decided to detain him on remand. The judge filled in a standard form by typing in the date, the names of the court and the applicant and other details of the case. In substantiating the decision, the judge had to choose from and underline the pre-typed text of the standard form. She took into account the severity of the crime the applicant was suspected of, the danger of his possible absconding and the possibility that he could impede the investigation. However, the judge did not underline the pre-typed text as to whether or not a preventive measure should be imposed on the applicant. He did not appeal this decision. 11. On 17 March 1998 the applicant was officially charged with robbery. 12. On 9 April, 11 June, 10 August and 13 October 1998 a judge of the Ziemeļu District Court of the City of Riga, on the request of the prosecutor in charge of investigation, extended the applicant's detention on remand until 19 June, 19 August, 19 October and 12 December 1998 respectively. The applicant was not brought before the judge. The decisions were drafted using a standard form and repeated from one decision to the next the same grounds in the same words, i.e. the severity of the crime the applicant was charged with, the danger of his possible absconding and the possibility that he could impede the investigation. The applicant did not appeal any of these decisions. 13. On 30 October 1998 the prosecutor in charge of investigation and the applicant discussed the possibility of releasing him on bail. 14. On 25 November 1998, according to the prosecutor's permission, the applicant and his partner met in order to discuss the details of the applicant's release on bail without reaching any agreement in this respect. 15. On 10 December 1998, 11 January, 29 January, 20 February and 19 March 1999 a judge of the Ziemeļu District Court of the City of Riga, on the request of the prosecutor in charge of investigation, extended the applicant's detention on remand until 12 January, 29 January, 20 February, 20 March and 20 April 1999 respectively. The applicant was not brought before the judge. The decisions were drafted using a standard form and repeated, from one decision, the same grounds and in the same words, i.e. the severity of the crime the applicant was charged with, the danger of his possible absconding and the possibility that he could impede the investigation. The applicant did not appeal any of these decisions. 16. On 21 April 1999 the applicant was given access to the case file in order to take cognisance of its contents, which he completed on 29 October 1999. 17. On 7 August 2000 the last of the co-accused persons completed the reading of the case file. 18. On 23 August 2000 the investigating prosecutor N. informed all accused persons that the examination of the case file had been completed. The prosecutor, considering the fact that the applicant resided in Latvia illegally, the danger of his possible absconding and the possibility that he could impede the investigation, refused the applicant's request to alter the preventive measure imposed on him. The applicant did not appeal this decision. On the same day the final indictment, drafted by the prosecutor N., was presented to the applicant. 19. On an unspecified date the case was transmitted to the Riga Regional Court for adjudication. 20. During the preliminary investigation the applicant asked the prosecutor in charge of investigation for permission to correspond with his relatives; these requests, using a standard form, were refused as being contrary to the interests of investigation. 21. On 1 February 1999 the applicant asked the prosecutor for permission to meet his partner. His request was refused on 8 February 1999. 22. On 27 June 1999 the applicant asked the prosecutor for permission to exchange correspondence with his parents, who were living in Russia. 23. On 5 July 1999 the prosecutor informed the applicant that he was not allowed to meet his partner or to exchange correspondence with his parents. 24. On 22 July 1999 the applicant asked the prosecutor for permission to exchange correspondence with his relatives and to meet his partner and their child. These requests were refused on 2 August 1999. 25. On 10 August 2000 the applicant asked the prosecutor for permission to exchange correspondence with his mother and his partner. 26. On 16 August 2000 the prosecutor allowed the applicant to exchange correspondence with his mother. 27. On 13 September 2000 a judge of the Riga Regional Court allowed the applicant to exchange correspondence with his partner. 28. The applicant spent the whole period of detention from 19 February 1998 to 19 August 2002 in a remand prison. According to the Instruction on the Procedure of Keeping Suspected, Accused, Detained and Sentenced Persons in Remand Prisons (hereinafter referred to as “the Instruction”), approved by the Minister of the Interior, and Transitional Provisions on the Procedure of Keeping Suspected, Accused, Detained and Sentenced Persons in Remand Prisons (hereinafter referred to as “the Transitional Provisions”), approved by the Minister of Justice, long-term family visits were prohibited in remand prisons. 29. On 4 September 2000 the Riga Regional Court received the case file. 30. On 7 September 2000 a judge of the Riga Regional Court committed the applicant for trial and scheduled the hearing for 13 May – 10 June 2002. The applicant was not summoned. The judge decided to continue his detention on remand without giving reasons. The decision was not subject to appeal. 31. On 4 November 2000 the applicant asked the Riga Regional Court to schedule a separate court hearing in order to determine the date of trial and to reconsider the preventive measure imposed on him. 32. On 20 November 2000 a judge of the Riga Regional Court replied that the trial date had not been set. 33. On unspecified dates the applicant complained to the President of the Riga Regional Court and the Ministry of Justice that his right to trial within a reasonable time had been infringed. On 5 December 2000 the Ministry of Justice notified the applicant that the trial date had not been scheduled. 34. On 28 November 2000 the applicant asked the Riga Regional Court to hold a hearing in his case within a reasonable time. On 8 January 2001 the applicant repeated this request. 35. On 29 January 2001 a judge of the Riga Regional Court replied that the trial date had not been set. 36. On 26 February 2001 the applicant announced a hunger strike to protest against the lack of progress in the proceedings. 37. On 2 March 2001 the Riga Regional Court informed him that the hearing had been scheduled for May 2001 and he discontinued the hunger strike. 38. On 13 March 2001 the Riga Regional Court informed the applicant that the trial had been scheduled for 13 May – 1 July 2002. 39. On 15 March 2001, in reply to the applicant's earlier complaint, the Ministry of Justice informed him that the hearing had been set for 13 May – 1 July 2002. 40. On 27 March 2001 the Riga Regional Court confirmed that the trial date had been scheduled for 13 May – 1 July 2002. 41. On 5 April 2001 the Ministry of Justice confirmed that the trial dates were set for 13 May – 1 July 2002 and not May 2001 as erroneously stated by the Riga Regional Court in its letter of 2 March 2001. The applicant was also informed that, due to the court's case load, it was not possible to begin the trial within the time limit provided for in Article 241 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 42. On 11 April 2001, on the applicant's request of 2 April 2001 to alter his detention on remand, a judge of Riga Regional Court informed him that he had been committed for trial and that there was no reason to alter the preventive measure imposed on him. 43. On 13 May 2002 the Riga Regional court commenced adjudication of the applicant's case. 44. On 16 and 20 May 2002 the Riga Regional court adjourned the hearing as several witnesses did not appear. The court ordered the police to ensure the appearance of these witnesses under constraint. 45. On 11 June 2002 the Riga Regional Court found the applicant guilty of robbery and unlawful ammunition storage. The prosecuting authorities were represented by the prosecutor N. and his colleague. The court sentenced him to four years and six months' imprisonment and, according to Article 24 2 of the Criminal Code, ordered his deportation from Latvia after having served the sentence. The applicant appealed this judgment. 46. On 21 November 2002 the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court acquitted the applicant of the charge of unlawful ammunition storage and quashed the first instance court's sentence in regard to his deportation, upholding the remainder of the first instance court's judgment. The prosecutor N. represented the prosecuting authorities together with his colleague. The applicant did not file an appeal on points of law and thus the judgment became final. 47. On 29 July 2002 the Citizenship and Migration Authority (hereinafter referred to as the “CMA”) took a decision on forced expulsion of the applicant, stating that the applicant, a Russian national, arrived in Latvia on 20 August 1997 on the basis of a visa. It observed that the Riga Regional Court convicted the applicant on 11 June 2002 and ordered his expulsion from Latvia, according to Article 242 of the Criminal Code. The CMA noted that the applicant would be released on 19 August 2002 and decided, in accordance with Article 242 of the Criminal Code, to expel him from the territory of Latvia to the Russian Federation. There was no date indicated in the decision as to when the expulsion should take place. When the applicant took cognisance of this decision, he wrote next to his signature that he objected to his expulsion as he had a family in Latvia. 48. On 19 August 2002 the applicant was released from prison, the time he had spent in detention on remand counting as part of the sentence. On the same date he was transferred to the Detention Center for Illegal Immigrants and thereafter detained at the Center pending his deportation to the Russian Federation. 49. On 29 August 2002 the applicant appealed against the decision of the CMA to the Central District Court of the City of Riga. The court received the appeal on the same day. 50. On the same day the applicant was deported to the Russian Federation. 51. On 3 September a judge of the Central District Court of the City of Riga examined the applicant's appeal of 29 August 2002 and, as it was written in Russian, allowed the applicant until 30 September 2002 to rectify this procedural deficiency. 52. On 3 October 2002 the proceedings were terminated as neither the applicant nor his lawyer pursued the complaint. 53. On 4 September 2003 the applicant and his partner married in Krasnoyarsk in the Russian Federation.

9. The applicant was born in 1931 and lives in Bratislava. 10. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 11. On 17 June 1982 the applicant was served a notice of dismissal from job under Article 46 § 1 (f) of the Labour Code for an especially serious breach of work discipline in that he had been absent from his work for several days without an excuse. 12. On 18 June 1984 the Bratislava III District Court (then Obvodný súd, at present Okresný súd) rejected the applicant’s request for a judicial ruling declaring the dismissal null and void. 13. On 19 November 1985 a three‑judge Chamber of the Bratislava City Court (then Mestský súd, at present Krajský súd) dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the judgment of 18 June 1984. The Chamber deciding on the appeal included judge S. 14. On 12 February 1993 the applicant and his wife took civil proceedings against the legal successor of his former employer before the Bratislava I District Court. They sought the applicant’s rehabilitation under the Extra-Judicial Rehabilitations Act (Law no. 87/1991 Coll. - Zákon o mimosúdnych rehabilitáciách) in respect of his dismissal in 1982. 15. In a judgment of 27 September 1994, following a hearing held on the same day, the Bratislava I District Court considered that the action aimed at obtaining a judicial order to the defendant to issue a formal confirmation that the applicant had been dismissed in 1982 for politically motivated reasons and in violation of fundamental human rights and freedoms within the meaning of section 21 (1) of the Extra-Judicial Rehabilitations Act. The court rejected the action as being unsubstantiated. 16. On 6 December 1994 the applicant and his wife appealed to the Bratislava City Court and, on 10 January 1995, they supplemented the appeal (odvolanie). They argued that the District Court had misinterpreted the action in that it had not been aimed at obtaining a judicial order against the defendant, but at obtaining a declaratory judgment to the effect that the applicant’s dismissal had been based on the grounds referred to in section 21 (1) of the Extra-Judicial Rehabilitations Act. They further complained that the District Court had overlooked the fact that the action had also been brought by the applicant’s wife. 17. On 28 February 1995 the Bratislava City Court quashed the District Court’s judgment of 27 September 1994 and remitted the case to the District Court, holding that the latter had failed to determine the action insofar as it had been brought by the applicant’s wife. 18. On 31 October 1995, following a hearing held on the same day, the District Court again dismissed the action after examining testimonies of the parties, the applicant’s personal file with his former employer and the case‑file concerning the applicant’s proceedings in the 1980s. The District Court found it established that the applicant had been dismissed from his work in 1982 for unauthorised absence for several days, i.e. an especially serious breach of work discipline which had had no political subtext. In so far as the applicant relied on section 21 § 1 (c) of the Extra-Judicial Rehabilitations Act, he had failed to prove that his dismissal had been for reasons of political persecution or in violation of generally recognised human rights and freedoms. The District Court finally found that the applicant’s wife had no cause of action in the case, in that the dismissal did not directly concern her. 19. On 25 January 1996 the applicant and his wife filed an appeal with the City Court and on 2 February 1996 they submitted further particulars of the appeal. They argued that the District Court had misinterpreted the action, incorrectly interpreted and assessed the facts and arbitrarily dismissed the action. 20. On 11 April 1996, following a hearing of the appeal held on the same day, the City Court upheld the District Court’s judgment of 31 October 1995 and granted leave for an appeal on points of law to the Supreme Court. It held that the District Court had adequately established the facts of the case and concurred with its factual and legal conclusions. 21. On 6 August 1996, through his lawyer, the applicant filed an appeal on points of law (dovolanie) with the Supreme Court. He argued that the lower courts had erred in their determination of the facts and law in his case. 22. In reply to the appeal on points of law, the defendant filed observations which however the courts did not transmit to the applicant. 23. On 28 November 1996 a three-judge Chamber of the Supreme Court rejected the appeal on points of law after deliberating in camera. As to the defendant’s observations in reply to the appeal on points of law, the Supreme Court noted that the defendant had invited the Supreme Court to reject that appeal as unfounded since the lower courts’ decisions had been correct and the appeal had produced no new relevant information. The Supreme Court found that the District Court and the City Court had adequately established the relevant facts and fully endorsed their factual and legal conclusions. The Supreme Court further discerned no procedural or other flaws within the meaning of Articles 237 and 241 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court Chamber included judge S. who had been a member of the three‑judge Chamber of the City Court that, on 19 November 1985, had rejected the applicant’s appeal in the proceedings on his dismissal in 1982. No appeal lay against the Supreme Court’s judgment.

6. The applicant was born in 1985 and is currently in Sweden. 7. In December 2009 the applicant arrived in Sweden and applied for asylum and a residence permit. Before the Migration Board (Migrationsverket), he submitted essentially the following. He is an ethnic Uyghur from Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. He had run a business in his home country and had bought goods from his business partner, also an ethnic Uyghur, in China. In August 2009 the business partner had been arrested and since he had been in the possession of a receipt from the applicant, they had both been indicted on suspicion of financially supporting the Uyghur disturbances in China. In September 2009 the applicant had been arrested by the Kyrgyz police. His health had deteriorated while he was in custody and, after his release, he had been hospitalised because of his kidney problems. The doctors had informed him that he needed to have blood dialysis but that there was a two-year waiting list. After having been pressured by the authorities, the doctors had informed the applicant that he would not receive any blood dialysis. Moreover, his family had informed him that the police had come to his house looking for him several times after he had left the country. He suffered from chronic kidney failure and was in need of dialysis three times per week. 8. The Board held a supplementary interview with the applicant in June 2010 where he claimed that, during his detention, the Kyrgyz police had taken his passport, forced him to sign a travel ban and had also ill-treated him. He had been summoned to appear in court a few times and, after the second summons, he had left the country. He had received written summonses but he had not brought them with him to Sweden and he could not contact his family since he feared their telephone was tapped. The applicant further believed that the Chinese authorities had contacted the Kyrgyz authorities and that for this reason he had been refused medical treatment. However, he also claimed that he had been refused treatment already in the spring of 2009, before being called by the police. 9. On 17 June 2010, the Migration Board rejected the application. It first noted that the applicant had failed to submit any written evidence in support of his claims. It further found it noteworthy that central parts of the applicant’s story had only been provided at the supplementary interview and not at the initial interview or in written submissions. It therefore considered that he had escalated the threat against him during the asylum proceedings. The Board further noted that the applicant had submitted contradictory information as to when he had been denied health care. First he had stated that he had been refused dialysis after his detention in the autumn of 2009 while, during the supplementary interview, he had stated that he had been refused treatment already in the spring of 2009. In any event, the Board observed that there had been a regime change in Kyrgyzstan since the applicant had left the country and that there was nothing to indicate that the present regime would have any specific interest in him. Thus, the Board concluded that the applicant was not in need of international protection. 10. As concerned the applicant’s health, the Board noted that the applicant had submitted a medical certificate according to which he suffered from chronic kidney failure secondary to chronic glomerulonephritis and received blood dialysis three times per week. Without the dialysis he would die within two to three weeks. The Board found that, according to the applicant’s own submissions, blood dialysis was available in Kyrgyzstan and, since he had not been found credible, he had also failed to substantiate that he would be denied proper treatment upon return. Consequently, he could not be granted a residence permit and was to be expelled from Sweden. 11. The applicant appealed to the Migration Court (Migrationsdomstolen), maintaining his claims and adding that he had not given contradictory information about the refusal to treat him in Kyrgyzstan. He had been diagnosed during the spring of 2009 and then been informed about the two to three years’ waiting time. However, it was only after his arrest in September 2009 that the doctors told him that he would not receive any dialysis treatment at all. As concerned the regime change, there was no indication that the situation had improved for the Uyghur people. He further submitted new medical certificates confirming his illness and need for treatment. 12. The Migration Court decided to hold an oral hearing during which the applicant added, inter alia, the following. He had been questioned by the police twice. The first time, in September 2009, the police had asked him whether he financially supported the Uyghur disturbances in China and they had beaten him all over his body, including on the kidneys. When he had lost consciousness, the police had become scared and had released him. During the second questioning, the police had confiscated his passport and imposed a travel ban on him. He had later been summoned to court but had not attended. Instead, he had decided to leave the country and had paid a smuggler to help him. After arriving in Sweden, he had been in contact via telephone and internet with friends and family in Kyrgyzstan, who had informed him that the Kyrgyz authorities had been to his house looking for him and that he had received further summonses. In relation to his illness, he claimed that the Chinese would keep searching for him and that he would therefore not receive any treatment in his home country. He also submitted an extract from his Kyrgyz medical record which he had received when he was released from hospital in November 2009 and which he had brought with him to Sweden. 13. On 13 July 2011, the Migration Court rejected the appeal. It noted that the applicant had failed to substantiate his identity but accepted that he came from Kyrgyzstan. It further observed that he had not submitted any written evidence in support of his alleged need for protection for which reason his credibility was decisive for the outcome. However, the court considered that the applicant’s submissions were far-fetched, lacking in detail and that they contained contradictory information. For instance, as concerned the applicant’s submissions that the Chinese authorities suspected him of sponsoring the Uyghur disturbances in China, the court found this improbable since the applicant had had a clear business relationship with the person in China over several years. Moreover, he had submitted contradictory information as to when he had been refused medical treatment and how many times he had been summoned to court. Therefore, the court concluded that the applicant’s submissions were not credible and that he had failed to substantiate that he would be at risk of persecution upon return. 14. As to the applicant’s health, the court noted that it was undisputed that he suffered from chronic kidney failure and that he was in need of regular blood dialysis and medication to survive. Without the dialysis, he would die within a couple of weeks and, apart from regular treatment, the only other solution was a kidney transplant. His state of health was consequently extremely serious. Moreover, the court observed that it was clear that blood dialysis was available in Kyrgyzstan while, according to the applicant, kidney transplants were not carried out. According to the applicant’s own submissions, in the spring of 2009 he had been placed on a waiting list for dialysis and the waiting time had been two to three years. After having been arrested in September 2009, his name had allegedly been removed from the waiting list and he had been refused treatment. However, the court noted that, according to the extract from the applicant’s medical records, he had been hospitalised in Kyrgyzstan because of his kidney disease in April 2009 and again from 27 October to 5 November 2009, on the second occasion with the diagnosis of chronic terminal kidney failure. Since, according to the most recent Swedish medical certificate, a person with such a diagnosis would die within a couple of weeks without blood dialysis, the court concluded that the applicant had received medical care both before and after being arrested by the police. He had thus failed to substantiate that he would not receive adequate treatment within a reasonable time upon return to Kyrgyzstan. 15. Upon further appeal by the applicant, the Migration Court of Appeal (Migrationsöverdomstolen) refused leave to appeal on 24 November 2011. Hence, the expulsion order became enforceable. 16. On 23 December 2011 the applicant lodged his application with the Court and requested it to apply Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. On 18 January 2012, the acting President of the Section to which the case had been allocated acceded to the applicant’s request and indicated to the Government that the applicant should not be expelled to Kyrgyzstan for the duration of the proceedings before the Court. On the same date, the application was communicated to the Government. 17. In view of the Court’s indication to the Government, the Migration Court decided, on 19 January 2012, to stay the enforcement of the expulsion order against the applicant until further notice. 18. In the meantime, on 2 January 2012 the applicant requested the Migration Board to stay the enforcement of the expulsion order as there were impediments to it due his deteriorated health and to grant him a residence permit. He submitted a medical certificate, dated 29 December 2011, by a Chief Physician at the Kidney Medical Clinic of Karolinska University Hospital in Stockholm. It stated that the applicant had had a crisis reaction to the expulsion order against him and had not attended two dialysis sessions. As a result, his health had significantly deteriorated and he had been given emergency dialysis and had also met with a psychiatrist. He had been kept in hospital due to his poor mental and physical health. It would be completely unreasonable to expel him without ensuring that dialysis would be available to him upon return to his home country. 19. On 23 January 2012 the Migration Board rejected the request. It considered that the applicant had invoked no new circumstances concerning his health which could alter the assessment made by the Migration Court in the initial proceedings or which amounted to an impediment to the enforcement of the expulsion order. 20. In September 2012 the applicant again requested the Migration Board to stay the enforcement of the expulsion order and to grant him a residence permit in Sweden since the impediment to the enforcement was permanent. He had been in contact with his family in Kyrgyzstan and, through them, obtained a certificate from the Kyrgyz Ministry of Health, dated 9 July 2012, which confirmed that the applicant had been on the national waiting list for blood dialysis since 27 October 2009. It further stated that due to the lack of dialysis equipment and the increasing number of patients in need of treatment, there was currently no possibility to offer the applicant dialysis within the public health care system in the country. The applicant had also received from his family a certificate, dated 23 December 2011, and issued by the hospital where he had previously been treated, the National Centre for Cardiology and Treatment. It stated that the applicant had been treated at the Centre’s unit for nephrology for glomerulonephritis and final stages of chronical kidney failure. It further stated that due to the lack of equipment he could not go through the programme for dialysis. He had, however, been put on the national waiting list. 21. On 20 November 2012 the Migration Board rejected the request as it found that the new certificates did not alter the assessment made in the initial proceedings and that, consequently, there were no grounds on which to grant the applicant a residence permit. 22. In February 2014 the applicant’s father wrote to the Kyrgyz Ministry of Health requesting that the applicant be given treatment in Kyrgyzstan for his illness. He noted in the letter that he had had to send the applicant to Sweden to save his life but that they wanted him to be treated in Kyrgyzstan. 23. A week later, on 17 February 2014, the Ministry replied to the applicant’s father. However, the reply, which contains no specific addressee, would appear to be rather a request to the Swedish health care system to provide the applicant with proper treatment as it states that, due to the long waiting time and lack of dialysis equipment, it is not possible for them to treat the applicant in Kyrgyzstan and they are grateful for the invaluable contribution to the health care of a citizen of Kyrgyzstan.

6. The first applicant, Ms Dina Yakovlevna Yuditskaya, was born in 1950. The second applicant, Ms Natalya Vladimirovna Yuditskaya, was born in 1979. The third applicant, Mr Aleksandr Viktorovich Kichev, was born in 1966. The fourth applicant, Ms Yelena Robertovna Lavrentyeva, was born in 1958. The fifth applicant, Mr Valeriy Valeryevich Frolovich, was born in 1966. They live in Perm. 7. The applicants are members of the Perm Bar. They are lawyers with the “Biznes i Pravo” law firm. At the relevant time, the firm’s premises comprised a reception area, five offices and a conference room. The first and second applicant shared an office. The fourth applicant and lawyer P. each had an individual office. The third and fifth applicants shared an office with lawyer I.T. Each lawyer had his or her own computer. There was also one more computer shared by all lawyers. 8. On 1 December 2004 a criminal investigation was opened into bribe-taking by court bailiffs. One of the charges involved Kirov Perm Factory (the “Factory”), a State unitary enterprise, and bailiff T. According to the Government, in January 2005 the Factory’s director K. had paid 300,000 roubles (RUB) to a bailiff as a bribe. The actual bagman for the bribe cash had been bailiff T. In order to legalise “the transaction”, T. had asked his brother I.T. to sign a fictitious legal assistance contract with the Factory. 9. On 7 February 2005 I.T. signed a legal assistance contract with the Factory in respect of legal advice on tax and other matters. 10. According to the Government, on an unspecified date the investigator questioned K. and T. Both of them admitted to having been involved in the bribery scheme. 11. On 6 May 2005 the Leninskiy District Court of Perm issued a search warrant authorising a search of the premises of the “Biznes i Pravo” law firm. The entire reasoning read as follows: “On 1 December 2004 a criminal case was opened into [aggravated bribery] against Perm Regional Court bailiffs’ service no. 48. The investigation established that the State unitary enterprise Kirov Perm Factory and the ‘Biznes i Pravo’ law firm had entered into a fictitious contract in order to cover up the bribery. The investigator is seeking authorisation for a search of the premises of the ‘Biznes i Pravo’ law firm with a view to seizing documents that may be relevant to the case. [The court] considers that the investigator’s request is justified and must be granted because there are reasons to believe that documents of the ‘Biznes i Pravo’ law firm may contain evidence relevant to the criminal case.” 12. On 16 May 2005 the investigator conducted a search of the applicants’ premises. The applicants and two attesting lay witnesses were present during the search. 13. According to the applicants, they voluntarily handed over the documents sought by the investigators; nevertheless, all the offices, including those of the applicants who had no relationship with the Factory, were searched. The investigators took away all the desktop and laptop computers and copied the entire contents of their hard disks. The computers were returned one week later. 14. The applicants appealed against the District Court’s decision of 6 May 2005. They submitted that the contract with the Kirov Perm Factory had been signed by I.T. in his personal capacity as a lawyer rather than by the “Biznes i Pravo” law firm and that there had been no grounds to search the entire premises of the law firm. Moreover, the District Court had declared that contract to be fictitious even before a judgment had been handed down. The information held on their computers had been protected by the attorney-client privilege and the search and seizure had amounted to a gross violation of the Advocates Act. 15. On 23 June 2005 the Perm Regional Court dismissed the applicants’ appeal, finding that the search warrant had been lawful and justified. In the Regional Court’s view, the District Court had not found that the contract was fictitious but had merely mentioned that the opinion of the investigation was that it had been fictitious.

7. The first applicant is a limited liability company incorporated under Netherlands law. Its business includes publishing the mass-circulation daily newspaper De Telegraaf. Originally called Uitgeversmaatschappij De Telegraaf B.V., it changed its name to Telegraaf Media Nederland Landelijke Media B.V. on 5 January 2011. 8. The second applicant, Mr Joost de Haas, is a Netherlands national born in 1967 and resident in Bovenkarspel. He is a journalist. 9. The third applicant, Mr Bart Mos, is a Netherlands national born in 1963 and resident in Ridderkerk. He too is a journalist. 10. On Saturday 21 January 2006, the newspaper De Telegraaf published on its front page an article couched in the following terms: “AIVD secrets in possession of drugs mafia Top criminals made use of information By Joost De Haas and Bart Mos Amsterdam, Saturday State secrets (staatsgeheime informatie), obtained from investigations of the Netherlands secret service AIVD [Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, General Intelligence and Security Service] circulate in the criminal circuit of Amsterdam. Complete investigations into the drugs and weapons dealer Mink K., who is labelled ‘a danger to the State’ (staatsgevaarlijk), are thus known to individuals concerned in the criminal world (onderwereld). This appears from documents and statements with which this newspaper has been acquainted. It appears from the documents that the secret service has over a period of years carried out investigations and directed infiltrations relating to Amsterdam drugs criminals. The intervention of the service was prompted by, among other things, strong presumptions of the existence of corruption within the Amsterdam police force and the Public Prosecution Service (openbaar ministerie). For that reason the secret service decided, in the late nineties, to recruit an informant in close proximity to Mink K. According to this informant, corruption was so rampant that liquidations were actually carried out using weapons seized by the police. Threat It appears from the documents that the AIVD considered top criminal Mink K. to be a threat to the legal order, as he reserved millions each year to bribe police and prosecution service officials. In addition, K. was thought to have enormous stocks of weapons at his disposal, including large quantities of semtex and ‘hundreds of anti-tank missiles’. The links which K. was thought to maintain with terror groups such as Hezbollah and ETA were disquieting. The documents have been returned to the AIVD by De Telegraaf. Incidentally, [the Ministry of] Defence yesterday reported the loss of a memory stick containing confidential information of the Military Intelligence and Security Service (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, MIVD).” 11. On an inside page, the same issue carried an article by the same two authors giving details including the informant’s code name and that of a second informant operating in the periphery of the criminal organisation. 12. The following day, Sunday 22 January 2006, De Telegraaf published an article, again naming Mr De Haas and Mr Mos as authors, in which it was suggested that highly secret information concerning the AIVD’s investigations had been made available to criminals including Mink K. 13. In the evening of Sunday 22 January 2006 the public service television broadcaster NOS broadcast an interview with the then Minister of Justice (Minister van Justitie), Mr J.P.H. Donner, on the eight o’clock news. Minister Donner stated the following: “So this is about people who may be involved in the AIVD who publish documents to the outside world in this way. That is what must absolutely be prevented. Of course it is afterwards to be deplored that State secrets find their way into the newspapers. Once again, I also find that De Telegraaf has cited [them] in very general terms and not directly. So as far as that goes, they have been circumspect in their use. But that is quite another matter. My point is that this kind of thing ought not to be made public.” 14. On Monday 23 January 2006 De Telegraaf announced that the AIVD had lodged a criminal complaint concerning the unlawful disclosure of State secrets. The AIVD had reportedly stated that they had no proof that Mink K. had been able to bribe police and Public Prosecution Service officials, and that the documents in question had been leaked by an AIVD member. 15. In the days that followed, De Telegraaf published further material including allegations that Mink K. had had meetings with Government ministers (as well as the latter’s denials). 16. On 24 January 2006 the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (Minister van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties) sent a white paper to the Speaker of the Lower House of Parliament (parliamentary year 2005-06, 29876, no. 11). It was stated that the predecessor of the AIVD, the BVD (Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst, National Security Service), had undertaken an investigation between 1997 and 2000 into allegations of corruption of public officials by Mink K. but that no such cases of corruption had come to light. It was not yet known how and when classified documents pertaining to this investigation had become known outside the BVD/AIVD, although there was thought to be no leak from within the police or Public Prosecution Service. De Telegraaf had reported that the documents, which had been circulating in criminal circles for some time already, had been obtained from criminal contacts and suggested that they had been leaked by serving or former agents of the BVD or AIVD. The documents which De Telegraaf had returned comprised an incomplete collection of raw data from which no conclusions could be drawn. 17. Also on 24 January 2006 the Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services of the Lower House of Parliament was informed by confidential letter about the secret operational particulars of the investigation instituted by the AIVD. 18. The matter gave rise to discussion in the Lower House on several occasions in the course of 2006. At the close of these, the Minister wrote to the Lower House on 20 December 2006. His letter concluded as follows: “There has been what can properly be called a serious incident (Er is sprake van een ernstig incident geweest): a considerable collection of copied documents from a closed working file of the BVD has been taken out of the building in defiance of the rules. Operational AIVD research and research by the National Police Internal Investigations Department (rijksrecherche) indicate that this was probably done by a former BVD staff member, who would have had the opportunity to do so until August 2000. Possibly via third parties, the documents subsequently came into the possession of De Telegraaf, which published information about this in January of this year. I would point out that final conclusions about the way in which these compromising facts took place can formally be drawn only when the proceedings against the suspected former staff member have been brought to a close. The compromised documents provide an insight into the BVD’s operational knowledge levels at that time within the task area of public-sector integrity and in the BVD’s working methods relating to that task area. Damage to investigations in process and the consequences of the working methods then in use (modus operandi) becoming known is relatively limited. Risks to agents and/or informants cannot however be excluded. Where necessary, operational measures have been taken to limit these risks. A reassessment in the light of the security rules in force then and now shows that there is little to be gained from more regulation. Compliance and supervision of compliance with rules and regulations will however need to be strengthened. The updated security plan and internal communication on that subject will so ensure. Technical measures, such as the introduction of new security technology in authorised systems, and measures within the area of personnel management, such as the continuation of sound security investigations and reviews of new and existing staff, will also contribute to a further reduction of security risks. Extreme alertness to signals which might indicate security risks and better (social) control of non-security-conscious behaviour are indispensible in this connection. I also conclude from the investigations that security which will completely prevent deliberate compromising [of secret information] is not achievable. It will never be possible to exclude that staff members who are authorised to take cognisance of State secrets and who deliberately seek to inflict harm will be able deliberately and unauthorised to carry State secrets outside the AIVD buildings by some means or other. There has to be a balance between maximum security and an effective working process. Based on regulation and direction in compliance with regulation, among other things, risks of confidential information being compromised can be reduced to a minimum. Even so, a residual risk as regards the human factor will always exist.” 19. On 26 January 2006 a detective chief superintendent of the National Police Internal Investigations Department (hoofdinspecteur van politie‑rijksrecherche) issued an order addressed to [a subsidiary of] the first applicant for the surrender of “document(s) and/or copy(ies), with State secrets concerning operational activities of the [BVD] and/or the [AIVD].” 20. On 30 January 2006 the first applicant’s legal counsel entered into an agreement with the public prosecutor aimed at protecting the identity of the source of the information set out above for as long as was necessary for the Regional Court to assess whether the surrender order was barred for reasons of source protection. Since the originals of the documents in question (copies had already been returned) might bear fingerprints or other traces capable of identifying this person, they were placed in a container by a notary and sealed, after which the container with the documents was handed over to the investigating judge to be kept in a safe unopened pending the outcome of objection proceedings intended to be brought. 21. The first applicant in fact lodged an objection with the Regional Court of The Hague by post on 23 February 2006 (received at that court’s registry on 28 February). Relying on Article 10 of the Convention, it invoked what it considered to be the journalistic privilege against the disclosure of sources. It argued in this connection, inter alia, that Mr De Haas and Mr Mos had exercised due care in that they had disclosed neither the identity of AIVD members or informants nor that service’s specific modus operandi or the current state of its information. 22. A hearing in chambers (raadkamer) took place on 17 March 2006. The first applicant, in the person of its counsel Mr Le Poole, was informed by the presiding judge of its status of suspect in a criminal case and reminded of its right to refuse to answer questions; the applicants Mr De Haas and Mr Mos attended as interested parties. The first applicant offered to destroy the documents in question. The official record of the hearing contains the following, inter alia: “The public prosecutor again addressed the court and stated, in brief, as follows: - Examining the documents to discover their source is not the first priority, but if the opportunity arises it will certainly be used. - Moreover, it is up to the AIVD to decide whether the documents which are currently held in the office of the investigating judge are indeed all the documents which the applicant may have had in its possession. ... Counsel for the [first applicant] also stated, in brief, as follows: - In view of the protection of the source the [first applicant] cannot afford to risk an examination of the documents. - [The first applicant] has been restrained (terughoudend) in publishing information from these sources [i.e. the documents], it is known in any case that Mink K. has known their content for some time already, so that publication has not led to any serious danger. - In my view the public prosecutor’s comparison with a firearm is inapposite. After all, [the first applicant] offers to destroy the documents immediately and is not interested in possessing them. - [The first applicant] has never had an interest in the content of these documents. The fact that such sensitive AIVD information is circulating in criminal circles is a news item that should be made known. In this sense also [the first applicant] has fulfilled its role as public watchdog in a very circumspect fashion (op zeer omzichtige wijze). The public prosecutor addressed the court once more and stated, in brief, as follows: - The source who supplied the documents to [the first applicant] need not necessarily have been the leak within the AIVD’s organisation. Secret classified documents belonging to the AIVD vanished on a number of occasions over a given period, and the present documents could play a role in this investigation. - It might indeed be possible to determine the identity of the source from an examination of the documents. However, in the context of the investigation into the leak within the AIVD, examination of the documents is not necessary in order to establish the identity of the leak since this can be done simply on the basis of the content of the documents concerned. - The present documents should be returned to the State for the simple reason that they contain secret classified information which should not be circulated in the public domain. Until such time as it is established that the [first] applicant has indeed returned all the documents in its possession to the AIVD, destruction of the documents, as proposed by the applicant, should not be considered. - Moreover, the [first] applicant has not observed complete restraint in relation to the publication of the documents. After all, there is no need to quote from them in order to indicate that they are in criminal hands.” The applicants Mr De Haas and Mr Mos expressed themselves in support of the first applicant. 23. The Regional Court gave a decision dismissing the objection on 31 March 2006. Its reasoning included the following: “The fact that the seized documents may contain fingerprints which may lead the AIVD or the Public Prosecution Service to the [first applicant’s] source or sources does not lead the court to find otherwise. As the [first applicant] has correctly argued, Article 10 of the Convention also comprises the protection of journalistic sources in order to safeguard the right freely to gather news (recht van vrije nieuwsgaring). However, the Regional Court does not consider that that right has been violated in the instant case. The Regional Court stresses that the journalists concerned have not been required to give their active co-operation to the investigation into the identity of the source, but that in the instant case all that has been sought is the handover of material that exists independently from the will of the journalists and which, in addition, is the object of a criminal act. The Regional Court therefore considers that any sanctioning of the Public Prosecution Service’s actions in the present case will not hinder any future exchange of information – albeit perhaps in a different form – between the [first applicant] and its sources.” 24. The first applicant lodged an appeal on points of law (cassatie) with the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad), which on 25 March 2008 dismissed it in a decision containing the following reasoning: “4.5 In considering that the documents seized originate from the AIVD and contain State secret information and are the object of the criminal act proscribed by Article 98c of the Criminal Code, the Regional Court has expressed the fact that the surrender order protects the interest for which that provision was enacted, namely the protection of State secrets. Its subsequent consideration that in the present case the right to protect sources, covered by Article 10 of the Convention, has not been violated, encapsulates the finding that it is a weighty social interest that State secret information should not circulate in public and also that the interference with the right to source protection – which the Regional Court has clearly found to exist, as is not contested in this appeal – is to be considered justified in light of the circumstances of the case. These considerations do not ... disclose an incorrect view of the applicable law, and are not incomprehensible in light of the proceedings in chambers. In so finding, the Supreme Court notes (a) that the case file does not admit of any other conclusion than that the documents seized contain State secret information about operational investigations of the AIVD into possible interaction between the criminal substratum and law-abiding society (verwevenheid van onderwereld en bovenwereld) for the purpose of preventing serious crime, this information being important in connection with the protection of the democratic legal order and liable to endanger national security and the safety of others if made public, and (b) that the objection adduced by the [first applicant] against surrender of the documents has been limited, as regards the measure of probability of disclosure of the source, to its fear that examination of the documents might lead to identification of the source because fingerprints might be found on these papers, in which connection the Public Prosecutor has stated that an examination of the documents, although possible, is not necessary to determine the identity of the leak within the AIVD, that already being possible using the contents of these documents, which are already known to the AIVD.” 25. On 2 June 2006 the applicant’s counsel Mr Le Poole wrote to the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, with a copy to the head of the AIVD, demanding an end to all investigations and to the use of special powers against the second and third applicants, an undertaking to destroy all information so obtained and a further undertaking that any such information should not be used in criminal proceedings against the second and third applicants. 26. On 6 June 2006 the Permanent Secretary (secretaris-generaal) of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, replying on behalf of the Minister, wrote to Mr Le Poole refusing to give such an undertaking. To confirm or deny the use of special powers would entail the disclosure of information on specific AIVD operations, such information having to remain secret in the interests of national security. It was noted in the Permanent Secretary’s letter that questions about the case asked in Parliament had been responded to similarly. 27. On 7 June 2006 the three applicants, joined by Nederlandse Vereniging van Journalisten and Nederlands Genootschap van Hoofdredacteuren (see paragraphs 1 and 4 above), summoned the respondent State to appear before the Provisional Measures Judge (voorzieningenrechter) of the Regional Court (rechtbank) of The Hague in summary injunction proceedings (kort geding). They claimed to be aware that the applicants De Haas and Mos had been subject to telephone tapping and observation, presumably by AIVD agents, from late January 2006 onwards. Such measures, in the contention of the applicants, lacked a legal basis, since the AIVD was using powers granted it by section 6 (2)(a) of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act (Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten – see paragraph 51 below) to carry out duties set out in section 6(2)(c) of that Act. In the alternative, since clearly the target of the measures was the second and third applicants’ journalistic source and not the applicants themselves, basic requirements of subsidiarity and proportionality had been disregarded, the more so since the said two applicants were journalists and therefore entitled pursuant to Article 10 of the Convention to protect their journalistic sources. The applicants also claimed the protection of the second and third applicants’ private and family life, home and correspondence under Article 8 of the Convention. They sought, in essence, a provisional measure in the form of an order for the cessation of all investigations and the use of special powers against the second and third applicants, in so far as these related to the press publications referred to above; the destruction of all data obtained by their use; and an order preventing the AIVD from handing over the data to the Public Prosecution Service for use in criminal proceedings against the second and third applicants. 28. The Provisional Measures Judge gave judgment on 21 June 2006. On a preliminary point, he ruled that the applicants’ claims for provisional measures were admissible in the civil courts since no alternative procedure offering a speedy resolution of the matter or any judicial remedy other than civil proceedings was available in law. Proceeding on the assumption that the AIVD had in fact made use of its surveillance powers – which the respondent had not confirmed or denied – he then went on to hold that such use was contrary to Article 10 of the Convention. He ordered provisional measures largely in the terms requested by the applicants. 29. The State appealed to the Court of Appeal of The Hague. Again refusing to confirm or deny the use of surveillance powers against any of the applicants, they argued that the protection of journalists’ sources was not absolute and any conflict between the protection of journalistic sources and the protection of State secrets should be decided in favour of the latter. They also stated that the first, second and third applicants had gone beyond the needs of informing the public, especially by unlawfully retaining original copies of secret documents the possession of which was in itself a crime and in exposing the AIVD’s use of informants. Moreover, adequate safeguards existed in the form of the Supervisory Board for Intelligence and Security Services (Commissie van toezicht voor de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten, hereafter “Supervisory Board”), two of whose members including the chairman were members of the judiciary; the Supervisory Board exercised supervision on a regular basis but also entertained complaints, and in so doing had access to information denied the civil courts. It was stated that the Supervisory Board had begun investigations into the case at the request of the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. 30. For their part, the applicants appealed on the ground that the Provisional Measures Judge had failed to find the AIVD at fault for misusing powers intended only for use against persons identified as “targets”, that is, who were themselves considered dangerous for national security. 31. The Court of Appeal gave judgment on 31 August 2006. It held that the use of powers of surveillance against the applicants was not per se impermissible, even though the applicants might not be targets themselves. It accepted, in the face of the State’s refusal to declare itself on this factual point, that the first, second and third applicants had made out a credible case that powers of surveillance had been used against them. This interfered with their rights under Articles 8 (private life) and 10, and was unlawful in so far as the use of the powers concerned continued after the identification of a target other than the applicants, to whom moreover the need for source protection apparently did not apply. For the remainder it allowed the State’s appeal; the State was ordered not to hand any materials or copies thereof, obtained with the use of special powers, to the Public Prosecution Service as long as the Supervisory Board had not found those materials to have been lawfully obtained. 32. Both the applicants and the State lodged appeals on points of law with the Supreme Court. 33. The Supreme Court gave judgment on 11 July 2008. Its reasoning included the following: “3.5.3. ... The Court of Appeal was entitled to hold, without violating section 6 of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act, that in view of the danger threatening the effectiveness and integrity of the AIVD as a result of a ‘leak’ within the security service itself, weighty State interests were at stake, and draw the conclusion that the AIVD’s investigations against the journalists were, at least initially, covered by sub-paragraph a. ...” and “3.7.3. ... The Court of Appeal has not overlooked the fact that the interests of the Government invoking one of the exceptions set out in Article 8 § 2 and Article 10 § 2, if they are to justify such an exception, must tip the balance (zwaarder zullen moeten wegen) against the interests in maintaining the rights and freedoms guaranteed by those provisions. ... [The Court of Appeal’s finding] that ‘in view of the importance of the protection of journalistic sources to the freedom of the press in a democratic society and the possible chilling effect (afschrikwekkende werking) which results from the knowledge that the AIVD is using the said special powers against the journalists, ... such use is only justified by an undeniable need in the public interest (onloochenbare behoefte in het algemeen belang)’ unambiguously implies that the Court of Appeal, in applying its test, has had regard to the condition, formulated by the European Court of Human Rights, of an ‘overriding requirement in the public interest’” and “3.7.4.2. Part 2.4.1. [of the applicants’ statement of grounds of appeal] complains that the Court of Appeal misapplied the law in that it did not find, on the sole ground of the extreme reticence in the use of special powers and their duration given the weighty interest of protecting journalistic sources ..., that the interference with Article 10 of the Convention was from the outset not justified by an ‘overriding requirement of public interest’, instead of [finding such to be the case] from the moment the AIVD caught sight of one or more other persons. The protection of journalistic sources thus becomes entirely illusory, since the AIVD, by starting its investigation with the journalist, will always be able to trace (a person leading closer to) the source, so it is argued. This part fails, because it essentially purports to assume that the protection of journalistic sources is absolute. It is not. The protection of journalistic sources reaches its limits in, among other things, the protection of national security and the need to prevent the dissemination of confidential information, as set out in Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. The Court of Appeal, in stressing the importance of ‘extreme reticence in the use of special powers’, was right not to exclude [such measures].” and “3.7.4.3. ... the Court of Appeal sufficiently specified the interest and the danger [involved] by stating, as the aim of the use of the special powers: the prevention of dissemination of the State secrets at issue by tracing the leak and the investigation, possibly also in order to protect the lives of others, of the consequences of publication of these State secrets.” and “3.7.4.5. ... The counter-argument made by De Telegraaf and the other appellants that other means were available, namely that the AIVD might have asked the journalists to name their source, was rejected by the Court of Appeal on the ground, essentially, that the journalists would not have named their source in that case either precisely because they are doing their very best to keep their sources secret. The other defence submitted by De Telegraaf and the other appellants, that the AIVD could have awaited the outcome of the criminal investigation was rejected by the Court of Appeal by pointing out that the criminal investigation and the investigation by the AIVD are entirely unrelated to each other, by which the Court of Appeal meant to express that the two investigations pursue different aims and serve different interests, so that in order to answer the question whether the use of the special powers meets the requirement of subsidiarity the outcome of the criminal investigation is, in principle, irrelevant. ...” and “3.8.5. ... The Court of Appeal has dismissed the primary claim under 2 (B) [i.e. the claim for an order preventing the AIVD from handing over the data to the Public Prosecution Service for use in criminal proceedings against the second and third applicants] because it could not determine which information had and which had not been lawfully obtained – meaning, plainly, on the basis of investigations what ... can be considered still lawful, or no longer lawful, vis-à-vis the journalists – and because it could not be ruled out beforehand that all the information collected had been obtained unlawfully, so that the Court of Appeal could not in reason determine what information ought to be discarded. This ground of the decision is not called into question in the statement of points of appeal, and rightly so, because the Court of Appeal had the latitude in summary injunction proceedings to find and decide thus. It follows that the Court of Appeal has not made its decision dependent on the opinion of the Supervisory Board. ... Moreover, the Court of Appeal’s considerations do not exclude the possibility that De Telegraaf and the other appellants may, after the Supervisory Board has given its opinion, ... yet seek an order or a prohibition as here at issue from the civil courts, if by that time they still have such an interest and if in the opinion of the Supervisory Board (in so far as that opinion is public or made public afterwards in the civil proceedings) provides sufficient factual grounds for a reasoned ruling on such a claim. For that reason the question whether the complaints procedure provided by the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act is an ‘effective remedy’ in the sense of Article 13 of the Convention need not be discussed.” The Supreme Court dismissed both the applicants’ and the State’s appeals. 34. On 15 November 2006 the second and third applicants appeared before the investigating judge (rechter-commissaris) of the Regional Court of The Hague to be questioned as witnesses in criminal proceedings against three individuals suspected of involvement in divulging to the outside world the State secrets here in issue. Both refused to answer certain questions, including at least those questions which would be capable of leading to the disclosure of the identity of the person from whom they had received secret AIVD documents. 35. On 27 November 2006 the second and third applicants were again questioned by the investigating judge and persisted in their refusal. The three defence counsel, present at the time, asked the investigating judge to order the two applicants detained for failure to comply with a judicial order (gijzeling). The investigating judge so ordered. 36. On 30 November 2006 the Regional Court of The Hague, sitting in chambers, ordered the applicants released. It recognised the importance of the protection of journalistic sources, as stated in the case-law of the Supreme Court (see below), and found that no issue of State security could arise since the fact of the documents having become available outside the AIVD had been made common knowledge in the media. 37. The three defendants were put on trial before the Regional Court of The Hague on charges under Articles 98 and 98c of the Criminal Code (Wetboek van Strafrecht) (see below). The applicants have submitted a judgment of the Regional Court of The Hague convicting one of these persons (one H.) at first instance of the crime defined in Article 98 of the Criminal Code, in which it is mentioned that the documents seized from the first applicant were examined by the Netherlands Forensic Institute (Nederlands Forensisch Instituut) but that no traces were found. 38. On 21 June 2006 the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations informed the Lower House of Parliament that he had requested the Supervisory Board to investigate as a matter of urgency the lawfulness of the AIVD’s investigation into the leak. Its task was to cover the entire AIVD investigation into the leaking of secret classified information, including the alleged exercise of special powers in relation to the second and third applicants. 39. On 15 November 2006 the Supervisory Board presented to the Minister a report containing its findings and its advice. This was classified State secret (Stg. Geheim, the second highest classification level for State secrets). The Government quote from it in the following terms: “[Section 9(1) of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act] provides that public servants of the AIVD do not have the power to conduct a criminal investigation. The AIVD is therefore not entitled to employ any special powers with the aim of a criminal investigation. The intelligence service may only use these powers within the context of its own tasks. The areas of attention of the police and the [Public Prosecution Service] on the one hand and of the AIVD on the other hand, are sometimes in line with one another. The investigative services and the AIVD however each have their own approach towards their investigations, they operate from different perspectives. A criminal investigation is aimed at obtaining evidence on behalf of criminal proceedings. An investigation of the AIVD is on the other hand aimed at timely informing the authorities that are competent to act on any threats against the democratic legal system or threats to the security or other vital interests of the state with the purpose of preventing the harming of these interests. In the case of the leaked state secrets, a story covered by De Telegraaf, it is the investigative services’ task to collect information about the question who stole the state secrets at the BVD and which unauthorised third parties keep or kept possession of the leaked material. The investigation by the AIVD has a different focus, owing to the fact that the AIVD investigates to what extent the integrity and effective functioning of the AIVD have been, and possibly still are being, harmed. In case of a leak of this extent it is, moreover, necessary to find out if possibly more documents have been leaked and where these are, in order to identify the damage for current operational investigations and the danger to human sources and staff of the AIVD. Although the AIVD investigation is not aimed at collecting evidence for criminal proceedings, in performing its task the AIVD may come across information that may also be important for the criminal investigation and prosecution of criminal offences. In that case the AIVD based on [section 38 of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act] has the possibility to make available the information to the [Public Prosecution Service] via an official message to the National Public Prosecutor for Counter-terrorism. In the investigation in hand several official messages were issued to the [Public Prosecution Service].” 40. The Government summarise the Supervisory Board’s findings as follows: The exercise of special powers by the AIVD in its investigation into the leaking of secret classified information had been lawful (i.e. necessary and in accordance with the law and with the criteria of proportionality and subsidiarity), save for a few exceptions. The tapping of the telephone of one non-target was not in keeping with the requirement of subsidiarity, and transcriptions had been made of various intercepted telephone conversations that were unrelated to the case and were also of no relevance to the performance by the AIVD of its duties. The Supervisory Board also found some transcriptions of intercepted telephone conversations in cases where the Minister had not yet given consent for electronic surveillance. In addition, it discovered that two telephone numbers that had wrongly been attributed to a target of the AIVD had been tapped. The Supervisory Board concluded that despite these lapses the data that had been provided in the official reports had been lawfully obtained. 41. On 6 December 2006 the Minister transmitted a version of the report cleansed of secret information to the Lower House of Parliament. The forwarding letter (parliamentary year 2006-07, 29 876, no. 19) contains the following: “The AIVD investigation was intended in the first place to make an assessment of the leaked file and any other leaked documents. Within that framework it was considered necessary, among other things, to use special powers against the journalists of De Telegraaf who were in possession of the leaked file. The use of special powers was not intended directly to identify the journalists’ sources but did indirectly interfere with the journalistic right of source protection. The Supervisory Board has tested the lawfulness of the decisions concerned in the light of the applicable laws and delegated legislation and the above-mentioned requirements of necessity, proportionality and subsidiarity. In so doing the Board has taken into consideration all relevant aspects of the case, including in particular those mentioned above. The Board thus concluded that the decisions to use special powers against the journalists were lawful.” and “In my reaction to the supervisory report I have transmitted to your House information which the Supervisory Board has set out in the secret part of its report in accordance with section 8, third paragraph, of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act. This includes the fact, among others, that journalists have lawfully had their telephones tapped. I did not wish to supply this information earlier in the summary injunction and appeal proceedings which have taken place with regard to the present AIVD investigation. My reasons for giving you this information now are connected with the failings found by the Board in the exercise of this special power. Given the interest existing in society for the matter in question and in order to prevent incorrect speculation I consider it necessary that the said facts should be known to the public. I can only provide further operational information concerning the journalists and operational information relating to other persons to the Committee for Intelligence and Security Services (Commissie voor de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten) of the Lower House of Parliament.” 42. On 3 July 2006, that is while the first and second (criminal and civil) sets of proceedings were still pending, the applicants’ counsel Mr De Kemp wrote to the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations giving notice of a complaint concerning the AIVD’s actions relating to the second and third applicants. In accordance with section 83 of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act (see below), the Minister forwarded the complaint to the Supervisory Board. 43. On 6 December 2006 the Minister wrote to Mr De Kemp summarising the Board’s findings and advice and expressing his views on the matter (the report itself was not disclosed to the applicants). His letter included the following: “[Section 6, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph a versus sub-paragraph c] The leaking of classified AIVD information damages the integrity and functioning of that service and can in so doing endanger the national security for which the AIVD labours. The AIVD has therefore, in the opinion of the Board, rightly initiated an operational investigation within the meaning of section 6, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph a of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act. The special powers used The Board considers that the decision to make use of special powers against the journalists of De Telegraaf met the requirements of necessity, subsidiarity and proportionality. In other respects too, the decision to use special powers did not, in the Board’s opinion, give rise to impropriety vis-à-vis De Telegraaf and the other complainants. The Board is of the opinion that the complaint is unfounded on these two main points. The way in which the special powers were used The Board finds that there have been a few lapses (onzorgvuldigheden) in the way in which telephone tapping was resorted to against the journalists. The Board is of the opinion that the way in which this was done should be considered an (implied) part of the complaint of De Telegraaf and the other complainants. After all, the complaint relates to the application of special powers. Such application includes, in the Board’s opinion, the transcription and recording of intercepted conversations. The Board finds that several of the journalists’ conversations have been transcribed and recorded which did not relate to the investigation into the leak within the AIVD and which have no further relevance to the AIVD’s discharge of its duties. Even on initial consideration this ought to have been clear in respect of a (major) portion of these too far-reaching transcriptions. The Board also finds that this information has not been destroyed after having been recorded and considered more closely. The Board advises [the Minister] to declare the complaint well-founded in respect of this [implied] part of the complaint. Adulteration (vermenging) with the investigation headed by the Public Prosecution Service The Board is of the opinion that the use of special powers in the present case fell within the task of the AIVD as set out in section 2, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph a of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act. The special powers have thus not been used for the purpose of the criminal investigation. The Board therefore takes the view that there has been no adulteration of the AIVD investigation with the criminal investigation headed by the Public Prosecution Service. The issuing of official reports (ambtsberichten) in this case cannot lead to the finding that there has been adulteration of tasks and powers between the AIVD and the Public Prosecution Service. After all, this concerns the regular provision of information – which the AIVD has obtained based on its own tasks – to the Public Prosecution Service in accordance with the law in force. The Board advises [the Minister] to declare the complaint ill-founded on this main point. Official reports The Board is of the opinion that the shortcomings found as regards the transcription and recording of the intercepted telephone conversations have no bearing on the lawfulness of the obtention of the information – in so far as these concern (also) the journalists – which have been made available to persons foreign to the service (extern zijn verstrekt) by means of official reports. My view of the matter In view of the findings of the Board and in accordance with the advice of the Board I declare the complaint unfounded on the main points, namely as regards the AIVD’s task under section 6, sub-paragraph 2, sub-paragraph a; as regards the decision to use special powers against the journalists of De Telegraaf; and as regards the adulteration of the investigations of the AIVD and the Public Prosecution Service. An implied part of the complaint, namely the transcription and recording of intercepted telephone conversations, I declare well-founded in part. The recording and transcribing of the conversations was begun one hour too early and the conversations have been partly recorded and transcribed to too great an extent. This has harmed the interests of the journalists because too much information about them has been recorded and this information has been kept by the AIVD for too long. I have not found any circumstances requiring me to deviate from the advice of the Board on any of the parts of the complaint. The information unlawfully recorded (ten onrechte vastgelegde gegevens) have in the meantime been removed and destroyed. In accordance with the Board’s advice, greater reticence will be exercised in future in transcribing and recording telecommunication with journalists should the situation arise. Now that I have stated my view of your complaint, you can, if you so wish, lodge your complaint with the National Ombudsman (Nationale ombudsman) in accordance with section 83 of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act.” 44. On 8 February 2007 the applicants and Nederlandse Vereniging van Journalisten and Nederlands Genootschap van Hoofdredacteuren, through their counsel Mr De Kemp, lodged a complaint with the National Ombudsman asking for an investigation into the AIVD’s conduct. They relied on the views expressed by the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations in his letter to them of 6 December 2006, which in their submission constituted an admission that special powers had actually been used against the second and third applicants. 45. The National Ombudsman replied on 5 March 2007. He pointed out that the applicants’, and indeed the State’s, appeals on points of law were still pending before the Supreme Court and that he was not empowered to investigate conduct that was the subject of proceedings pending in the civil courts. Moreover, once the Supreme Court delivered its judgment the National Ombudsman was bound to take note of the grounds on which it was based. 46. The applicants have not pursued their complaint before the National Ombudsman. 47. The applicants have submitted copies of official reports (ambtsberichten) addressed by the head of the AIVD to the National Public Prosecutor for Counter-terrorism (Landelijke Officier van Justitie Terrorismebestrijding). The copies submitted to the Court bear no dates and identifying information – other than pertaining to the applicants – has been blanked out. 48. The first of these reports names a former member of the BVD, the AIVD’s predecessor, as having been in possession of State secret documents after having left the service and mentions indications that this person has received a considerable sum of money from “criminal circles”. The second names four members and former members of the BVD and the AIVD who might have had access to copies or originals of the documents handed back by the first applicant. The third report states that the second and third applicants have been in contact with persons connected with the international trade in illegal drugs. The fourth states that, according to information from a “reliable source”, the second and third journalists have tried to establish contact with one H. (understood by the Court to be a person suspected of involvement in the disclosure of AIVD information) with a view to publishing an article about him with his photograph.

9. On 12 December 1995 the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Court (oблacний суд) convicted the applicant of the murder of four persons and sentenced him to death and ordered the confiscation of his personal property. 10. On 22 February 1996 the Supreme Court (Верхoвний суд) upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. The applicant was transferred by the authorities in charge of the Isolation Block of the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior (Адміністрація слідчого ізолятору Управління міністерства внутрішніх справ) to one of the cells for persons awaiting execution of their death sentence. 11. A moratorium on executions was declared by the President of Ukraine on 11 March 1997. In judgment no. 11pп/99 of 29 December 1999, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine held that the provisions of the Criminal Code concerning the death penalty were contrary to the Constitution of Ukraine. Death sentences were therefore commuted to life imprisonment pursuant to Act no. 1483-III of 22 February 2000. On 2 June 2000 the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Court commuted the applicant's death sentence to life imprisonment. 12. The facts of the case concerning the conditions of the applicant's detention in Ivano-Frankivsk Prison and the events during his time there were disputed. 13. The facts as presented by the applicant are set out in paragraphs 16 to 19 below. The facts as presented by the Government are set out in paragraphs 20 to 25 below. 14. A description of the material submitted to the Commission and to the Court will be found in paragraphs 26 to 41 below. 15. The Commission, in order to establish the facts in the light of the dispute over the conditions of the applicant's detention and the events which occurred in Ivano-Frankivsk Prison, conducted its own investigation pursuant to former Article 28 § 1 (a) of the Convention. To this end, the Commission examined a series of documents submitted by the applicant and the Government in support of their respective assertions and appointed three delegates to take evidence from witnesses at a hearing conducted at the Ministry of Justice in Kiev on 23 and 26 November 1998, and in Ivano-Frankivsk on 24 and 25 November 1998. The Commission's evaluation of the evidence and its findings of facts are summarised in paragraphs 42 to 57 below. 16. On 12 December 1995 the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Court convicted the applicant of the murder of four persons, sentenced him to death and ordered the confiscation of his personal property. 17. On 22 February 1996 the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. Upon a decision of the Administration of the Isolation Block of the Ministry of the Interior, the applicant was transferred to a cell intended for prisoners awaiting the death penalty. According to the applicant, he was deprived of all his rights. 18. The applicant claimed that the Pre-Trial Detention Act (“the Act”) did not apply to him, since the relevant legislation was an Instruction which operated in secret. Pursuant to the Instruction, the applicant was not taken for an outside walk for more than two and a half years. He could be visited by his mother only once a month, he had been refused visits and, since July 1996, the number of visits had been reduced to one every three months. 19. Following his application for confession sent to the Greek Catholic Bishop of the Ivano-Frankivsk diocese, the clergy approached the investigative isolation unit on this matter. Since September 1997 both he and his mother had been forbidden to send any letters to each other. 20. The Government stated that the legal status and the conditions governing the detention of persons sentenced to capital punishment were set out in the Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure. According to section 8 of the Act, a person sentenced to death was kept in custody away from other prisoners. The cell to which the applicant had been transferred after his sentence had become final complied with the sanitary and hygiene rules laid down in section 11 of the Act: the cell measured 9 square metres, it had a bed, a table, a radio, sufficient natural and electrical lighting, heating, running water and a toilet. 21. The applicant was provided with three meals a day, clothing and footwear of standard type as well as other articles of everyday use. Medical assistance, treatment, prophylactic and anti-epidemic measures were arranged and implemented in accordance with legislation on health protection. 22. According to section 12 of the Act, prior to the sentence being carried out, prisoners sentenced to death were, as a rule, allowed visits from relatives and other individuals not more than once a month, by written permission of the court within whose jurisdiction the case fell. The length of a visit was two hours maximum. After a case had been dealt with by an appellate court, visits by lawyers and legal assistants could be granted by the Head of the Central Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior, the Head of the Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior or his deputy responsible for the isolation block. Visits by defence counsel were granted without any limits as to their number and length. 23. After the first-instance judgment had been given, on 14 December 1995 and 4 January 1996 the applicant's mother and, on 18 December 1995 and 17 January 1996, his solicitor requested permission to visit the applicant. The mother visited the applicant on 14 December 1995 and on 4 January 1996. The applicant's lawyer visited him on 18 December 1995 and on 18 January 1996. During the period from 22 February 1996 to 29 December 1997, the applicant's mother applied for a visit to the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior on 29 February, 15 March, 4 April, 5 and 31 May, 23 September, 18 November and 19 December 1996, 3 and 6 June, 24 September 1997 and 4 January 1998. They were granted permission for visits on 29 February, 19 March, 9 April, 7 May, 7 June, 23 September and 4 December 1996, 4 March, 4 June, 4 September and 4 December 1997 and 4 March 1998. The applicant's solicitors applied for a visit on 12 March, 11 April, 23 September, 2 and 18 December 1996. Permission was granted for visits on 15 March, 29 April, 23 September, 2 and 20 December 1996. 24. Persons sentenced to death were allowed to send an unlimited number of letters. During the period 1995-1998, the applicant sent 24 letters: 16 letters relating to the criminal case and 8 letters to his relatives. On 6 October 1997, for the first time, the applicant applied to the Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior for permission to send letters to his relatives. Thereafter he sent letters to his mother on 3 and 19 November, 9 and 30 December 1997, 19 and 29 January, 16 February, 12 March, 6 April, 6 May, 10 June, 2 July, 6 August, 1 September, 5 October, 4 November and 4 December 1998. He received letters from his relatives on 24 September, 8 and 24 October, 24 November and 25 December 1997, and 14 and 28 January, 5 and 10 February, 13, 16 and 30 March, 6, 9 and 16 April, 6, 12, 20 and 22 May, 3, 17, 22 June, 1, 15, 20 and 30 July, 19, 25 and 31 August, 15 and 17 September, 1, 10, 14 and 22 October, 10, 21 and 23 November and 4 and 17 December 1998. 25. The Government added that the Prosecutor General had conducted a thorough investigation into issues raised in the applicant's and his parents' complaints concerning the application of illegal methods of investigation in the applicant's case, namely torture and brutal and inhuman treatment. The allegations had not been proved and had been found unsubstantiated. In fact, complaints by the applicant and his mother were received on 18 April, 19 and 29 July and 26 August 1996, 31 January, 5 February, 15, 19 and 21 March, 14 and 16 May, 10 June, 16 July 1997, and were answered on 22 April, 24 July, 26 August, 16 September 1996, and on 4 and 7 February, 31 March, 19 and 20 May, 23 June and 23 July 1997. On 19 May 1997 the exchange of letters and the proceedings concerning the complaints filed by the applicant and his mother were terminated pursuant to section 12 of the Act. 26. On 23 October 1998 the applicant's mother submitted a request to the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Prosecutor, the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior and the prison governor. They requested that a medical commission of independent doctors be set up in order to examine the applicant's state of health. She alleged that the inmates had been tortured, which had resulted in a suicide attempt or an attempt on the applicant's life. On 3 November 1998 the applicant's mother was informed by the governor of the prison that her request had been rejected on the grounds that there had been no sign of torture or the use of any other physical violence against the applicant and that his state of health was satisfactory. 27. On 23 and 24 October 1998 the applicant's mother sent a letter to Mrs Leni Fischer, then President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. She complained of torture inflicted on the applicant and one of his fellow-inmates, Poltoratskiy, which had resulted in the applicant's suicide attempt and alleged that they had been taken to hospital and that the applicant had been paralysed. The mother further complained that she had been prevented from seeing the applicant. 28. In a letter of 26 October 1998 the applicant's mother informed the Commission that “in establishment BI 304/199 in Ivano-Frankivsk there was an attempt to execute the unjustly condemned M. Kuznetsov and B. Poltoratskiy illegally, and that the Government tried to conceal this event”. 29. On 26 October 1998 the applicant's mother sent a request to the Regional Prosecutor to set up a medical commission in order to examine the applicant's state of health. She stated that she had been informed that her son's health had been in danger. 30. The prison doctor issued a medical report on 28 October 1998. The report concluded that the applicant did not show any signs of having been beaten or tortured and that his state of health was satisfactory. It was confirmed and signed by the applicant. 31. In his handwritten statement of 28 October 1998 the applicant stated inter alia that no physical violence had been used against him, that he had been treated in a proper way by the prison administration, that his rights had not been violated, that he had no complaint to the prison administration, that he did not think about committing suicide again and that the prison administration had not been involved in his suicide attempt. 32. The Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Directorate for the Execution of Sentences of the Ministry of the Interior issued a report on 29 October 1998 in response to the applicant's mother's complaint about alleged torture and her request for a medical commission of independent doctors to examine the applicant's state of health. The report stated that on 28 October 1998 the applicant had been examined by the prison doctors who had found no signs of physical injuries. It also stated that the applicant denied that he had been tortured. 33. In a letter of 30 October 1998 the Deputy Head of the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior informed the applicant's mother that her complaint concerning torture to which the applicant had allegedly been subjected had been examined and found to be unsubstantiated. A medical examination of the applicant had not confirmed any signs of torture. Accordingly, there was no reason to set up a medical commission to investigate the allegations. 34. In a letter of 2 November 1998 the Ivano-Frankivsk Deputy Regional Prosecutor informed the applicant's mother that her complaint concerning visits to the applicant had been examined and that no violation of the applicant's rights in this regard had been found. 35. In his next letter of 18 December 1998, the Deputy Regional Prosecutor informed the Prosecutor General that there had been several medical examinations of the applicant during the last months in order to establish whether there had been any damage to his state of health caused by the prison administration. The last examination had been carried out on 28 October 1998 with the participation of the staff of the Protection of Health Department of the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior. The examination had established that the applicant had not been treated in a manner which was degrading to his human dignity. 36. On 21 December 1998 the applicant requested permission from the Deputy Head of the Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior, Mr Kmyta, to meet a priest. His request was granted and the applicant met a priest on 26 December 1998. 37. In his letter of 10 January 1999 the prison governor informed the applicant's mother that her son had attempted to commit suicide on 3 September 1998 and that he had been saved. He also said that a copy of the decision on refusal to institute criminal proceedings in connection with her son's suicide attempt had been sent to the Regional Prosecutor. 38. In a decision of 5 March 1999 the Senior Prosecutor rejected a criminal complaint by the applicant's mother's against the Ivano-Frankivsk Deputy Regional Prosecutor. He refused to institute criminal proceedings against the Deputy Regional Prosecutor on the ground that no offence committed by him had been found. He stated inter alia that the Act did not apply to the detention conditions of death row prisoners. These were governed by the Instruction, which was covered by the rules on State secrecy. 39. According to the prison records, the applicant's mother applied to visit the applicant on 24 September 1997, and on 4 and 26 March, 27 June, 27 August, 24 October and 30 November 1998. Permission was given on 7 October 1997, 4 March, 22 April, 1 July, 11 August, 17 November and 11 December 1998 for visits which took place on 4 December 1997 and 4 March, 4 June, 6 July, 11 August and 28 November 1998 and on 5 January 1999. The request of 27 August 1998 was not granted. 40. In an undated document Deputy Head of the Isolation Block, Y.M. Pavlyuk, declared that during the period from 11 September 1997 and 18 December 1998, neither the applicant nor his parents had asked for permission for the applicant to see a priest. He further declared that during this period no member of the clergy had asked for such permission. 41. According to the applicant's medical card, the applicant was found to be suffering from gastritis on 13 May and 16 July 1996. On 31 July, 20 August, 16 September, 1 and 6 November 1996, 10 and 15 January, 23 June, 28 August, 12 September, 30 October and 27 November 1997, 23 January, 1 April, 16 July and 4 December 1998 the applicant was found to be suffering from chronic gastritis. On 3 September 1998 the applicant was hospitalised after his suicide attempt. On 4 September 1998 he returned to prison. Between 4 and 7 September 1998 he was administered medicines. On 7 and 18 September, 1, 18 and 28 October, 9, 19 and 27 November 1998 the applicant was seen by the prison psychiatrist and on 28 October and 4 December 1998 he was examined by the prison doctor. 42. Since the facts of the case were disputed, the Commission conducted an investigation, with the assistance of the parties, and accepted oral evidence taken from nineteen witnesses: the applicant; the applicant's parents; Mr Bronislav S. Stichinskiy, Deputy Minister of Justice; Mr Drishchenko, Deputy Prosecutor General; Mr Dotsenko, Head of the Penitentiary Department of the Prosecutor General's Office; Mr Ivan V. Shtanko, Deputy Minister of the Interior; Mr Petro A. Yaremkiv, governor of Ivano-Frankivsk Prison; Mr Bogdan V. Kachur, prison doctor; Mr Valeriy I. Slobodanyuk, prison psychiatrist; Mr Stanislav V. Prokhintskiy, medical assistant; Mr Yuriy M. Pindus, assistant to the prison governor who was on duty on 3 September 1998; Mr Fedir O. Savchuk, assistant to the prison governor who was on duty on the night of 2-3 September 1998; Mr. Mikhail D. Kozakievich, duty guard on duty on the night of 2-3 September 1998; Mr. Bogdan B. Galyas, duty guard on duty on the night of 3 September 1998; Mr Igor P. Ivashko, deputy prison governor; Mr Yaroslav M. Pavlyuk, Deputy Head of the Isolation Block; Mr Valentin M. Nabiulin, Head of the Department for Supervision over Isolation Blocks and Prisons with the Directorate for the Execution of Sentences; Mr Oleksand V. Kmyta, Deputy Head of the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior; Mr Anatoliy O. Boyko, Head of the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Department for the Execution of Sentences of the Ministry of the Interior. The Commission's findings may be summarised as follows: 43. The applicant gave evidence before the Delegates that he had been beaten on 2 September 1998, because of a note which he had passed to another inmate, Poltoratskiy, while he had been mopping the floor in the corridor on 1 September 1998. He had informed Poltoratskiy about a letter he had received from his parents and about its contents. According to him, he had just wanted to communicate because he had been bored sitting alone in his cell. Next morning, he had been called out and beaten by six or seven masked persons with clubs in the “cinema room” on his back, legs and shoulders but not on his head. 44. The Commission noted that the applicant had written and had signed a statement on 28 October 1998, to the effect, inter alia, that he had been treated in an appropriate manner by the prison administration, that no physical force had been used against him and that he had nothing to complain about. It took into account the fact that before the Delegates, the applicant had denied the contents of his statement and pointed out that the practice of a prison authority to order an inmate to confirm in writing that he had been treated correctly by prison officers raised suspicions. 45. The Commission considered that the applicant's account of his beating contained a number of details and elements which it would not have expected to find in a fabricated story. It noted, however, that there was no record of any occurrence relating to the ill-treatment described by the applicant. The Commission accepted the applicant's statement that he had not complained in order not to make things worse. However, his account of the events was not supported by any oral or written evidence produced before the Commission or its Delegates. It also noted that the applicant's examination on 3 September 1998 and his subsequent medical treatment between 4 and 7 September 1998 had revealed no sign of physical injury from the ill-treatment he had described. There was no record of such in his medical file by the prison doctor, the prison psychiatrist or the medical assistant . 46. On 3 September 1998 the applicant was found hanging in his cell, but was resuscitated. According to his mother, his suicide attempt was either the result of his ill-treatment by the prison administration or an attempt to execute him. The Commission accepted the evidence given by Mr Dorotsenko, Head of the Penitentiary Department of the Prosecutor General's Office, that on 3 September 1998, at 8.48, during a routine inspection the applicant had been found with a noose around his neck made out of a piece of blanket. The prison staff had taken all necessary medical measures to save his life. After that he had been taken to hospital, from which he had returned on the following day. His mother had last seen him in August 1998. The witness said that by his attempted suicide the applicant had violated prison rules, and had therefore been placed in solitary confinement for 15 days. 47. The Commission observed that the applicant's mother's account of the suicide attempt was not completely borne out by the applicant himself who had testified before the Delegates that he had hanged himself because of the beating by prison officers on 2 September 1998. However, he had not recalled any detail relating to the events of 3 September 1998. He had submitted that he had been in a nervous state and could not endure any longer the treatment to which he had been subjected. The Commission noted in this regard that the applicant's account that he had attempted to commit suicide was supported by the testimony given by the prison governor, his two assistants and by the two warders on duty between 2 and 3 September 1998. The statements of these witnesses might not have been totally consistent in every detail. However, the Commission found such differences to be of a minor nature when considered against the detailed, precise and globally consistent accounts presented by them. 48. In this respect the Commission also attached relevance to the fact that the applicant had immediately been given external heart massage and mouth-to-month resuscitation which had saved his life. At the same time, the ambulance had been called and after the applicant had been examined by the ear, nose and throat specialist, he was transferred to the psycho-neurological hospital where he stayed one day. The Commission noted that three days after his return from hospital, the applicant had stated that he had not hanged himself at all. It considered, however, that the applicant had been then in a state of shock and of partial amnesia. Moreover, the testimony of the prison psychiatrist who had examined the applicant in detail stated that the applicant used to say that he could not see what had caused him to commit suicide and that he could not even imagine why he had done it. The Commission therefore found that it could not be considered as established beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant had been subjected to ill-treatment in prison on 2 and 3 September 1998. 49. On 23 October 1998 the applicant's mother requested the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Prosecutor, the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior and the prison governor to set up an independent medical commission in order to examine the applicant's health. She alleged that inmates had been tortured which resulted in a suicide attempt by the applicant or in an attempt on his life. She repeated this request to the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Prosecutor on 26 October 1998, stating that she had been informed that the applicant's state of health was in danger. On 30 October 1998 the applicant's mother was informed by Mr Kmyta, Deputy Head of the Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior, that her complaint concerning the applicant's alleged torture had been examined and found to be unsubstantiated and that the latter's medical examination had not revealed any signs of torture. There was, accordingly, no reason to set up a medical commission to investigate the allegations. On 3 November 1998 the mother was informed by the prison governor that her request had been rejected on the grounds that there was no sign of torture or the use of any other form of physical violence against the applicant and that his health was satisfactory. In a letter of 20 November 1998 to the applicant's mother, the Deputy Regional Prosecutor confirmed that, on 28 October 1998, the applicant had undergone a medical examination which had established that no violation of the applicant's rights in this regard had been found. 50. In the meantime, on 29 October 1998, the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Department for the Execution of Sentences of the Ministry of the Interior had stated in its report, inter alia, that on 28 October 1998 the applicant had been examined by the prison doctors who had found no sign of physical injury. 51. On 18 December 1998 the Ivano-Frankivsk Deputy Regional Prosecutor sent a letter to the Deputy Prosecutor General in which he had stated, inter alia, that there had been several medical examinations of the applicant during the previous months which could have established whether the applicant's health had been damaged as a result of his treatment by the prison authorities. The last examination had been carried out on 28 October 1998, with the participation of the staff of the Protection of Health Department of the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior, and it was found that the applicant had been treated in an appropriate manner. On 10 January 1998 the governor of the prison informed the applicant's mother that the applicant had attempted to commit suicide on 3 September 1998 and that he had been saved. He also informed her that a copy of the decision on refusal to institute criminal proceedings in connection with her son's suicide attempt had been sent to the Regional Prosecutor. The domestic investigations had then ended on 5 March 1999 with a decision by the Senior Prosecutor on the applicant's mother's criminal complaint against the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Prosecutor. The Senior Prosecutor had refused to institute criminal proceedings on the ground that no offence had been established. 52. The Commission found that there were no contemporaneous records giving details of any investigation, which the domestic authorities had carried out into the applicant's mother's allegations of the events on 2 and 3 September 1998. It had not seen a single document proving that an investigation had been carried out by the domestic authorities other than those directly involved in the facts of which the applicant's mother complained. Moreover, although it appeared from the extract of the applicant's medical file and from the evidence given by Mr B.V. Kachur, prison doctor, that the applicant had been under medical care between 4 and 7 September 1998 and had been seen by the prison psychiatrist on 7 and 18 September and 1, 18 and 28 October 1998, the applicant's medical examination with the participation of the staff of the Ivano-Frankivsk Protection of Health Department had been carried out on 28 October 1998, i.e. more than one month after the applicant's alleged ill-treatment. 53. The Commission found that the eight “death row” inmates in Ivano-Frankivsk Prison, including the applicant, were kept in single cells without the opportunity to communicate with other inmates. The applicant's cell measured 2 by 5 by 3 metres. There was an open toilet, a washbasin with one tap with cold water, two beds, a table and a little bench, both fixed on the floor, central heating and a window with bars. The applicant had in his cell some books, onion, garlic, oil, a stock of soap and toilet paper. During the Delegates' visit on 24 and 25 November 1998, the cell had been overheated, particularly in comparison with other rooms in the prison. The light was on 24 hours a day and the central radio was switched off at night. The inmates were frequently observed by prison warders through a spy hole in the door of the cell which deprived them of any kind of private space. The cell was freshly painted, from which the inference may be drawn that conditions had been worse prior to the Delegates' visit. The Commission accepted the applicant's evidence that until May 1998, he had not been allowed to take daily outdoor walks and that the shutters had been removed from the window in his cell in November 1998. The Commission found the applicant's evidence - which was not contested by the Government - persuasive. 54. The Commission further accepted the applicant's mother's evidence that the applicant had been suffering from nervous disorder already before he had been sentenced and detained. On the ground of his mental illness he had been relieved from military service. Moreover, he had been suffering from chronic gastritis. 55. Concerning the applicant's mother's visits, the Commission found that apart from her request of 27 August 1998, all her requests for visits had been granted. The prison records showed that she had applied to visit her son on 24 September 1997 and 4 and 26 March, 27 June, 25 July, 24 October and 30 November 1998. Permission had been given on 7 October 1997 and 4 March, 22 April, 1 July, 11 August, 17 November and 11 December 1998 for visits which had taken place on 4 December 1997 and 4 March, 4 June, 6 July, 11 August, 28 November and 5 January 1999. The Commission pointed out that the mother's requests to visit to the applicant of 24 September 1997 and 26 March 1998 had been granted for 4 December 1997 and 4 June 1998, i.e. about three months after the requests had been submitted. Moreover, two warders had been present during the mother's visits, being authorised to interrupt the conversation if they considered that the mother or the applicant had said anything “untrue”. 56. Regarding the applicant's correspondence, the Commission found that on 6 October 1997 the applicant had applied for the first time to the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior for permission to send a letter to his relatives. Thereafter he had sent letters to his mother on 3 and 9 November 1997, 9 and 30 December 1997, and 19 and 29 January, 16 February, 12 March, 6 April, 6 May, 10 June, 2 July, 6 August, 1 September, 5 October, 4 November and 4 December 1998. He had received letters from his mother on 24 September, 8 and 24 October, 24 November and 25 December 1997, and 14 and 28 January, 5, and 10 February, 13, 16 and 30 March, 6, 9 and 16 April, 6, 12, 20 and 22 May, 3, 17 and 22 June, 1, 15, 20 and 30 July, 19, 25 and 31 August, 15 and 17 September, 1, 10, 14 and 22 October, 10, 21 and 23 November and 4 and 17 December 1998. 57. The applicant gave evidence that his mother had requested permission for a priest to come to see the applicant. However, from the undated document signed by Mr Y.M. Pavlyuk, Deputy Head of the Isolation Block, it appeared that during the period from 11 September 1997 to 18 December 1998, neither the applicant nor his mother nor a member of the clergy had asked for such permission.

8. On 9 December 1985 the applicant, accused of theft and possession of drugs, was arrested and placed in detention on remand. He was released on 21 January 1986. 9. In an order of 27 May 1986, the Ancona investigating judge committed the applicant and fifty-eight other persons for trial before the Ancona District Court. 10. On 2 September 1986 the President of the Ancona District Court scheduled the date of the first hearing for 12 November 1986. 11. In a judgment of 5 March 1987, filed with the registry on 20 March 1987, the District Court acquitted the applicant for lack of evidence (“insufficienza di prove”). A number of his co-accused were sentenced to heavy penalties. 12. The applicant, together with fourteen other accused, lodged an appeal with the Ancona Court of Appeal in order to obtain a more favourable acquittal formula. 13. On 17 February 1988 the case-file was forwarded to the Court of Appeal. 14. The trial hearing, initially scheduled for 16 April 1996, was adjourned until 13 December 1996. 15. In a judgment of the same day, filed with the registry on 10 January 1997, the Court of Appeal acquitted the applicant. This decision became final on 2 February 1997.

7. The applicant was born in 1968 and is serving a prison sentence in Sorda, in the Kirov region. 8. On 9 March 1999 senior police officer U. sent his subordinates, including officers M. and Sh., to arrest the applicant at his flat and take him to the Regional Department of the Interior (УВД Кировской области) for questioning with regard to several cases of theft. According to the applicant, the police officers put him in the back seat of the car, where they started beating him to make him confess to the thefts until he almost lost consciousness. At the police station he was handcuffed and stripped naked in the presence of the police officers and Ms B., an investigator. One of the police officers pulled a knitted hat down over his eyes. Then they pinned him to the table and threatened to rape him with a rubber truncheon. 9. In the evening of the same day the applicant was taken to the Kirov temporary detention facility (ИВС г. Кирова), where he was held for two days. 10. Following the prosecutor’s refusal to authorise the applicant’s detention pending investigation, the applicant was released on 12 March 1999 on a written undertaking that he would not leave town. 11. On 15 March 1999 the applicant was examined by a general practitioner and a surgeon at Severnaya Hospital in Kirov. The applicant complained to the doctors that he had been beaten up by police officers and was experiencing pain in the lumbar region. The excerpt from the applicant’s medical file read as follows: “15 March 1999. On 10 March 1999 [the applicant] was beaten up at the police station. Since then [he] has been bothered by pain in the right lumbar and subcostal region. No dysuria. Satisfactory general condition. Blood pressure measurement 120/80 mmHg. Clear heart beat. Vesicular breathing. Soft abdomen, moderate pain in the right subcostal region. Painful muscle palpation in the right lumbar region. Diagnosis: contusion (ушиб) in the lumbar region?” 12. On 27 April 1999 investigator B. summoned the applicant for questioning in connection with a case of robbery. The applicant denied involvement in the robbery. Despite a refusal by the prosecutor to place the applicant in custody, he was allegedly detained at the police station, where he spent the night sitting on a chair handcuffed to a radiator. 13. After the applicant had been identified by a witness as one of the alleged perpetrators, the prosecutor authorised his detention pending investigation on 28 April 1999. 14. On 29 April 1999 the applicant appointed Ms O., a lawyer, to represent him in the criminal proceedings against him. 15. On an unspecified date the applicant made complaints of ill-treatment to the Kirov Town Prosecutor’s Office. 16. On 21 June 1999 the assistant prosecutor of Kirov Town refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers. The assistant prosecutor based her findings on statements made by the police officers and Investigator B., who denied the applicant’s allegations, and on the applicant’s medical file. In particular, the assistant prosecutor stated as follows: “...On 10 June 1999 the Kirov Town Prosecutor’s Office received a complaint by [the applicant]...in which he alleges that officers Sh. and B. of the Internal Affairs Department used unlawful methods of investigation. In particular, they subjected him to physical and mental pressure to make him confess to the offences he was charged with... [The applicant] contests his guilt and requests to be released from custody. ...Furthermore [the applicant] indicates that on 10 March 1999 he was unlawfully detained... On the way to the [police station] he was beaten, the beatings continued upon arrival, the officers bullied and humiliated him ... Investigator B. was also present ... Officer M. submits that he participated in [the applicant’s] arrest... On the way to the [police station] there was no need for them to apply physical force. [The applicant] had voluntarily agreed to come [to the police station] with the officers. At [the police station] [M.] talked to [the applicant] briefly until Investigator B. was available [to question him]. However, [M.] did not apply physical or mental pressure [to the applicant], he did not humiliate or debase him as he was not personally or professionally interested in finding [the applicant] guilty because [M.] did not know the applicant and the cases he dealt with did not involve [him]. He was only assigned to conduct a search at [the applicant’s] flat. [Senior officer] U. confirmed that he had sent his subordinates, including M., to arrest [the applicant], but had not talked to him himself. According to Investigator B., she was in charge of the criminal case involving [the applicant] ... On 9 March 1999 she ordered his arrest ... He was brought [to the police station] by police officers ... She did not see any injuries on him. Nor did he complain to her that he had been beaten on the way to the [police station]. In her presence none of the police officers of the department had pressured [the applicant physically or mentally] ... The prosecutor refused to authorise his detention and [the applicant] was released on a written undertaking not to leave the town ... According to a report from the temporary detention unit where [the applicant] was held from 9 to 11 March 1999, he did not request medical assistance and did not have any bodily injuries ... An excerpt from the [the applicant’s] medical file states that on 15 March 1999 he consulted a general practitioner complaining that he had been beaten at [the police station] on 10 March 1999... However, it is impossible to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant’s injuries were caused by the police officers. On 10 March 1999 the applicant was held at the temporary detention unit ... and did not ask for medical assistance. Furthermore, he was released from the temporary detention unit on 11 March 1999, but he did not consult [the doctors] until 15 March 1999, that is, four days later. During that period he could have been injured in different circumstances ... The applicant’s allegations are not consistent with the findings of the inquiry. This indicates that the applicant is trying to mislead the prosecutor’s office and the court with regard to his guilt.” 17. The prosecutor also dismissed as unfounded the applicant’s complaint that he was handcuffed on the night of 27 April 1999. 18. In September 1999 the Oktyabrskiy District Court in Kirov opened the trial. The applicant maintained his innocence and alleged, inter alia, that the police officers had used unlawful investigation methods to make him and other defendants confess to the crimes, which resulted in the false testimonies against him given by other defendants. 19. On 23 November 1999 the District Court found the applicant guilty of robbery and theft and sentenced him to twelve years’ imprisonment. The court dismissed the applicant’s allegations that he had been subjected to beatings and unlawful investigation methods while in police custody, stating as follows: “The court cannot accept the allegations made by defendants K., O. and [the applicant] that police officers subjected them to psychological or physical pressure during the investigation. As pointed out earlier, the prosecutor’s office conducted thorough inquiries in respect of the actions of the police officers, and the [defendants’] allegations proved to be unfounded .... Furthermore, the court questioned officers Sh., U., M. and [investigator] B., who had been involved in the criminal investigation. They testified to the court that they had not subjected the defendants to any unlawful treatment. The Court has no reason to doubt their testimonies, given that they... had been warned of their criminal liability for perjury or refusal to testify.” 20. The applicant appealed against his conviction, alleging, in particular, that the police officers had subjected him to ill-treatment. 21. On 22 February 2000 the Kirov Regional Court upheld the applicant’s conviction on appeal. The court did not make a specific ruling on the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment. 22. On 17 August 2000 the applicant lodged a complaint about his conviction and ill-treatment with the Kirov Regional Prosecutor. On an unspecified date he forwarded a similar complaint to the General Prosecutor of the Russian Federation. 23. On 30 August 2000 the First Deputy Regional Prosecutor responded that the applicant’s conviction was in compliance with law. As regards the applicant’s complaint of the ill-treatment, the prosecutor noted as follows: “The [applicant’s] allegations that he had been subjected to physical and psychological pressure lack any substantiation. The Kirov Town Prosecutor’s Office had earlier conducted an inquiry and refused to open a criminal investigation.” 24. On 31 September 2001 the General Prosecutor’s Office informed the applicant that they did not discern any irregularities in the way the courts had determined the criminal charges against him. Nor had “any unlawful methods of investigation” been employed against the applicant.

4. The applicant was born in 1949 and live in Rome. 5. He is the owner of a flat in Rome, which he had let to L.E. 6. In a registered letter of 23 June 1983, the applicant informed the tenant that he intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1983 and asked her to vacate the premises by that date. 7. The tenant told the applicant that she would not leave the premises. 8. In a writ served on the tenant on 5 February 1986, the applicant reiterated his intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Rome Magistrate. 9. By a decision of 4 April 1986, which was made enforceable on the same day, the Rome Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 August 1986. 10. On 21 July 1986, invoking articles 10 and 11 of Law No. 84/82, the tenant asked for a postponement of the eviction proceedings and then the Rome Magistrate ordered that the premises be vacated by 15 May 1987. 11. On 3 July 1987, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises. 12. On 22 July 1987, he served notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 18 September 1987. 13. Between 18 September 1987 and 9 March 2000, the bailiff made fifty-five attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession. 14. In the meanwhile, on 27 February 1991, the applicant made a statutory declaration that he urgently required the premises as accommodation for himself. 15. On 9 July 1999, pursuant to article 6 of Law No. 431/98, the tenant asked the Rome Magistrate to suspend the eviction proceedings. Consequently, the Rome Magistrate suspended the proceedings until 15 January 2000. 16. On 22 March 2000, the applicant sold the flat to the tenant.

4. The applicants were born in 1948 and 1944 respectively and live in Voronezh. 5. In 2000 the applicants each brought a set of proceedings against the welfare office of the Levoberezhnyi District of Voronezh to claim a raise of their pensions by a statutory index ratio. 6. On 10 October 2000 the Levoberezhnyi District Court of Voronezh granted both applicants' claims. It awarded them arrears of 1,123.07 roubles (RUR) and RUR 1,089.51 respectively. Both judgments entered into force on 21 October 2000.[i] 7. On 19 December 2000 the bailiff service instituted enforcement proceedings in respect of the judgments of 10 October 2000. 8. On 27 April 2001 the bailiff service terminated execution proceedings in respect of both judgments of 10 October 2000, which had not been enforced because of the lack of funds on the debtor's accounts. 9. On 30 May 2002, following the applicant's request, the bailiff service instituted new enforcement proceedings in respect of the judgments of 10 October 2000. 10. On 27 June 2002 the bailiff service terminated execution proceedings, again because of the lack of funds on the debtor's accounts. 11. The judgments of 10 October 2000 have not been enforced to date.

4. The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in the town of Nova Kakhovka, Kherson Region, Ukraine. He is a former employee of the State‑owned OJSC “Pivdenelektromash” (“the Company,” ВАТ “Південелектромаш”). 5. The background facts for the case are described in the case of Semenov v. Ukraine (no. 25463/03, §§ 5-8, 13 December 2005). 6. On 5 December 2002 the Nova Kakhovka City Court (Новокаховський міський суд Херсонської області) ordered the Company to pay the applicant UAH 4,393[1] in salary arrears. This judgment became final and the writs of execution were transferred to the Bailiffs' Service. 7. By letters of 26 February 2003 and 15 April 2003, the Bailiffs' Service and the Kherson Regional Department of Justice informed the applicant that the enforcement proceedings had been suspended due to the proceedings of financial rehabilitation of the debtor. 8. On 11 August 2003 the Nova Kakhovka City Court rejected the applicant's complaint about the allegedly unlawful inactivity of the Bailiffs' Service. The court stated that there was no fault attributable to the defendant. 9. On 15 January 2004 the Bailiffs' Service resumed the execution proceedings in the applicant's case. On 23 January and 10 February 2004, it ordered the seizure of the Company's accounts. However, on 27 February 2004 the Kherson Regional Commercial Court, on the trustee's appeal, quashed these decisions because the Bankruptcy Act envisaged the obligatory suspension of enforcement proceedings pending the resolution of a bankruptcy case. 10. The judgment in the applicant's favour remains unenforced.

4. The applicant was born in 1944 and lives in Budapest. 5. From 1 April 1999 until 30 June 2004 the applicant was employed as a civil servant. On 17 June 2005 he brought an action against his former employer before the Pest County Labour Court, challenging his previous civil service grade and claiming payment for outstanding salary, allowance in lieu of untaken leave and compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 6. On 8 July 2008 the court ordered the respondent to pay 1,863,322 Hungarian forints (HUF) (approximately 6,400 euros (EUR)) and accrued interests for outstanding salaries, reward and allowance in lieu of untaken holidays. 7. By its decision of 30 October 2009 the Pest County Regional Court decreased the amount to HUF 1,618,883 (approximately EUR 5,500) and accrued interests. The applicant submitted a petition for review against this decision. 8. On 2 February 2011 the Supreme Court increased the amount payable to the applicant to HUF 1,982,813 (approximately EUR 6,800) and accrued interests. This decision was served on the applicant on 3 March 2011.

4. The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Piddubne, the Lviv Region. 5. On 20 October 1999 the applicant lodged a claim with the Chervonohrad Court against his former employer for re-calculation of monthly allowance for a work-related disease. 6. On 27 March 2001 the court scheduled its first hearing for 2 April 2001 which was subsequently adjourned because of the applicant’s failure to appear. 7. On 5 June 2001 the Chervonohrad Court left the applicant’s claim without examination for his repeated failure to appear before the court. 8. On 28 January 2003 the applicant appealed against the decision of 5 June 2001. He submitted that he had not been summoned to appear before the court and that he had become aware of that decision in January 2003. 9. On 28 July 2003 the Lviv Regional Court of Appeal found that there was no evidence in the case that the applicant had been duly informed of the time and date of the court hearings scheduled for 2 April and 5 June 2001. It quashed the decision of 5 June 2001 and remitted the case for a consideration by the first-instance court. 10. On 1 December 2003 the Chervonohrad Court allowed the respondent’s request for transferring the case to a court of different territorial jurisdiction, the Sokal Court. 11. On 9 January 2004 the Sokal Court received the case. On 25 February 2005 it scheduled its first hearing for 10 March 2005. 12. On 30 December 2005 the Sokal Court rejected the applicant’s claims as unsubstantiated. On 24 January 2006 the applicant appealed against the judgment. 13. On 21 August 2006 the Lviv Regional Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of 30 December 2005. 14. On 18 October 2006 the applicant lodged his appeal in cassation. 15. On 27 December 2007 the Khmelnytsk Regional Court of Appeal, sitting as a court of cassation, dismissed the applicant’s appeal in cassation and upheld the decisions of the lower courts. 16. In the course of the proceedings the hearings were adjourned five times because of either the applicant’s or his representative’s failure to appear or his requests for documents or adjournment of the case.

6. The applicant was born in 1976 and lived before his arrest in the Kaliningrad region. He is currently serving a prison sentence in a correctional colony in the Kaliningrad region. 7. The applicant stood trial on charges of robbery and murder before the Kaliningrad Regional Court (“the Regional Court”). 8. On 10 June 2003 the Regional Court found the applicant guilty of robbery and aggravated murder, and sentenced him to twenty years’ imprisonment with forfeiture of estate. The applicant’s co-defendant, Sh., was found guilty of conspiring to commit robbery, incitement to commit robbery, aiding and abetting, and concealing evidence of murder. 9. Regarding the applicant’s right to appeal against his conviction, the judgment of 10 June 2003 stated as follows: “The judgment may be appealed against to the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation by lodging grounds of appeal with the Kaliningrad Regional Court within ten days of the date of the pronouncement of the judgment. Convicted persons held in detention may appeal against the judgment within the same time-limit, which starts to run from the day when they received a copy of the judgment. If an appeal is lodged, the convicted persons are entitled to apply for participation in the examination of their case by the appeal court.” 10. The record of the hearing before the trial court, which was issued on 16 June 2003, stated as follows: “The procedure for lodging an appeal against the judgment within ten days of its pronouncement was explained [to the parties], as was the procedure for convicted persons to lodge appeals within the same time-limit, starting to run from the date on which they received a copy of the judgment. The right to apply for leave to take part in the examination of the case by the appeal court was also explained”. 11. On 17 June 2003 a copy of the judgment of 10 June 2003 was served on the applicant. 12. On 24 June 2003 the applicant’s co-defendant appealed against the judgment of 10 June 2003 to the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (“the Supreme Court”). He submitted that it was him and not the applicant who had committed the murder, but that the trial court had not verified his version of the events. 13. The Government submitted that on an unspecified date the applicant had appealed against the judgment of 10 June 2003. However, the Regional Court had returned his grounds of appeal to him for correction. In its accompanying letter the Regional Court advised the applicant that his grounds of appeal should comply with the requirements of Article 375 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCrP”). The Government did not provide the Court with a copy of that letter. 14. On 5 July 2003 the applicant, who was detained in Kaliningrad remand prison, submitted a corrected version of his grounds of appeal against the judgment of 10 June 2003. He complained, in particular, that he had not committed the impugned crimes and had an alibi which the trial court had refused to verify; police officers had ill-treated him during the pre-trial investigation to extort a confession from him; and his conviction had been based on statements by witness P. and his co-defendant, Sh., given during the pre-trial investigation under pressure by police officers, and which they had refuted before the trial court. Moreover, Sh. had confessed before the trial court to having committed the murder himself. The applicant asked the appeal court to quash his conviction. When lodging his appeal, the applicant did not expressly state that he wished to take part in the appeal hearing. 15. According to the Government, on 3 November 2003 the Regional Court informed all the participants of the proceedings, including the applicant and his counsel, that the criminal case had been referred to the Supreme Court. 16. On 10 November 2003 the applicant submitted a request to take part in the examination of his appeal by the Supreme Court. On 17 November 2003 the applicant’s co-defendant also applied for leave to take part in the appeal hearing. According to the Government, the Supreme Court received those requests on 26 November 2003. 17. On 26 November 2003 the applicant submitted additional grounds of appeal, which were received by the Supreme Court on 2 December 2003. However, he did not state in his additional grounds of appeal that he wished to take part in the appeal hearing. 18. On 18 December 2003 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (“the Supreme Court”), referring to Articles 375 § 2, 376 and 377 of the CCrP (see Relevant domestic law below), dismissed the requests submitted by the applicant and his co-defendant to take part in the appeal hearing. The Supreme Court held as follows: “... on 10 November 2003 Mr Kozlitin submitted a request to take part in the examination of his criminal case by the appeal court. It follows from the materials of the case that the judgment was delivered on 10 June 2003 and copies of that judgment were served [on the convicted persons] on 17 June 2003. ... on 5 July 2003 Mr Kozlitin submitted his grounds of appeal, in which he did not express his wish to take part in the appeal hearing. On 3 November 2003 the case, together with grounds of appeal submitted by the convicted persons, was forwarded to the Supreme Court of RF [Russian Federation] ... The case arrived at the Supreme Court on 10 November 2003. It was not until 10 and 17 November 2003 respectively that the convicted persons [the applicant and his co-defendant] submitted requests for participation in the appeal hearing. However, their requests should not be granted, since in accordance with Article 375 § 2 of the UPK RF [CCrP] if a convicted person expresses a wish to take part in the examination of his case by the appeal court, he should indicate this in his grounds of appeal. The convicted persons did not indicate in their grounds of appeal their wish to be brought to the Supreme Court of the RF [Russian Federation]. Instead they lodged such requests five months later, when their case had already arrived at the Supreme Court of the RF”. 19. On the same date the Supreme Court examined the appeals lodged by the applicant and his co-defendant against the judgment of 10 June 2003 in their absence. The applicant was not represented at that hearing. The prosecutor was present at the hearing and supported upholding the applicant’s conviction. He requested reclassification of the applicant’s actions in accordance with amendments to the Criminal Code. 20. Having studied the materials of the case, the appeal court found that the trial court had verified Sh.’s version of the events whereby he and not the applicant had committed the murder. However, that version had not been confirmed by the materials of the case. The applicant’s alibi had been verified and had been disproved by the statements of witness Shch., which had also been corroborated by other evidence. Furthermore, the defendants’ complaints of unlawful pressure by the police were unsubstantiated and refuted by evidence in the case. 21. On the same date the Supreme Court reclassified the crimes committed by the applicant. In particular, it excluded a number of aggravating circumstances and amended the applicant’s sentence to exclude forfeiture of his estate. The Supreme Court upheld the rest of the judgment.

15. The applicants, Mr Cumpănă and Mr Mazăre, were born in 1951 and 1968 respectively and live in Constanţa. 16. In decision no. 33 of 30 June 1992, Constanţa City Council, implementing government decision no. 147 of 26 March 1992, introduced a fine for drivers of illegally parked vehicles and entrusted the task of removing, towing away and impounding such vehicles to S.C. CBN, a company based in Constanţa. 17. By order no. 163 of 30 June 1992, the mayor of Constanţa authorised a private company, Vinalex, to perform the services of removing, towing away and impounding illegally parked vehicles. 18. A partnership contract was signed on 16 December 1992 by the city authorities and the company in question, the signatories on behalf of the authorities being the deputy mayor (hereinafter “D.M.”) and the council’s legal expert (“Mrs R.M.”). In a letter of 1 April 1994, the mayor of Constanţa requested Vinalex to cease its activities under the contract and informed it that it was considering terminating the contract. 19. On 12 April 1994 the applicants, who are journalists by profession, published an article in the local newspaper Telegraf, of which the second applicant was the editor, with the headline “Former Deputy Mayor [D.M.] and serving judge [R.M.] responsible for series of offences in Vinalex scam”. The names of the former deputy mayor and of the city council’s former legal expert, Mrs R.M., who had subsequently become a judge, were printed in full in the headline and in the article itself. 20. The article, which appeared under the byline of both applicants, was worded as follows: “In decision no. 33 of 30 June 1992 Constanţa City Council entrusted a commercial company, S.C. CBN S.r.l., with the task of impounding illegally parked vehicles or trailers ... It was the duty of the city authorities’ specialist departments to lay down the practical arrangements for implementing the council’s decision. But things did not turn out that way. Six months after decision no. 33 was adopted, the city authorities, knowingly breaching the provisions of Law no. 69/1991, illegally concluded a partnership contract ... with S.C. Vinalex S.r.l., a company having no connection with the one initially chosen. It is worth noting, however, that the contract in question was signed by the deputy mayor, [D.M.], in place of the mayor, ... and by a certain [M.] instead of the legal expert [M.T.]. By what miracle did S.C. Vinalex enter into a partnership with the city authorities when, in decision no. 33 of 30 June 1992, the city council had authorised CBN S.r.l. to provide a straightforward service? What is striking is that there is no evidence that CBN agreed to give up the task of towing away illegally parked vehicles! ... The crook [D.M.] (the former deputy mayor, now a lawyer) granted Vinalex’s irresponsible employees the power to decide when a vehicle is illegally parked – in other words, to treat citizens and their property with contempt. What form did the fraud take? Sections 89 and 29 of Law no. 69/1991 provide that no partnership contract with a commercial company may be signed without a prior decision by the local council, adopted by a two-thirds’ majority of the total number of councillors. Before a contract is signed, it must be referred to all the local council’s specialist committees for their opinion ... The contract with Vinalex was negotiated and signed illegally, as the signatories based it on the decision [of 30 June 1992], which, as has already been shown, referred to a different company without envisaging any other partnership. Given that the city authorities had already signed four other contracts before that one, the signatories cannot claim ignorance of the law, but only an intentional breach of it! And because any intentional breach of the law pursues an end in itself – generally that of securing material advantages – it is clear that in this case the former deputy mayor, a lawyer by profession, received backhanders from the partner company and bribed subordinates, including [R.M.], or forced them to break the law. The Constanţa Audit Court detected this blatant fraud, which has generated considerable profits for the briber (S.C. Vinalex) ... The offending company [S.C. Vinalex] has never shown that it had adequate means to impound illegally parked vehicles. This explains why large numbers of privately owned vehicles have been damaged and, as a result, thousands of complaints have been made on the subject. Furthermore, the alleged partnership contract was valid for one year, until 16 December 1993. From that date [S.C. Vinalex] no longer had any right to interfere with citizens’ private property! It has nevertheless continued to tow vehicles away and illegally collect money ... It is incomprehensible how the police could have provided it with assistance for the past four months. Let us briefly consider the conduct of the council’s former legal expert, [R.M.], who is now a judge. Either she was ignorant of the law when she signed the contract, in which case it is hard to understand how she can subsequently have been appointed as a judge (delivering justice on the basis of the same laws which she does not know), or she accepted bribes and may continue to do so in future! It is no surprise that the same judge should have been investigated by the Audit Court for a further illegal act, also committed while she was at the city council (as we reported at the time). Ironically, the Court’s president did not take any action against her on the ground that the sum received was not ... large enough. Apparently becoming aware that the matter was likely to be uncovered, the city authorities’ coordination department ... notified S.C. Vinalex in writing of the possibility of the contract being terminated on the following grounds: ... ‘You have not supplied any documents showing that you have purchased the platform-type equipment necessary for carrying out the activity properly’ (as stipulated in clause 3 of the contract ...). In the same letter the city authorities informed S.C. Vinalex: ‘As you have not proved that you have the appropriate equipment, we would assess your contribution to the partnership at the level of your company’s capital, that is 110,000 lei. Your share in the partnership’s net income will have to be recalculated in relation to the parties’ contributions.’ Facts are facts, and the documents in our possession speak for themselves of the illegal Vinalex scam.” 21. The article was accompanied by a photograph of a police car on the scene as an illegally parked vehicle was being towed away, photocopies of extracts from the partnership contract and from Constanţa City Council’s decision of 30 June 1992, and certain passages of Law no. 69/1991 concerning the responsibilities and powers of mayors, prefects and city and county councils. 22. The article was also accompanied by a cartoon showing a man and a woman arm in arm, carrying a bag marked “Vinalex” which was full of banknotes. The two characters were depicted as saying to each other: “Hey, [R.] [diminutive form of Mrs R.M.’s first name], you’ve done a good job there! When I was deputy mayor we made quite a bit, enough to go to America ...” “[D.] [diminutive form of the former deputy mayor’s first name], if you become a lawyer, I’ll become a judge and we’ll have enough to travel round the world ...” 23. In June 1994 the Financial Control Department of the County Audit Court examined a report submitted on 26 May 1994 by several auditors who had conducted a review of Constanţa City Council’s budget for 1992 and had made the following findings: (a) The city council’s decision of 30 June 1992 to award S.C. CBN the contract for towing away illegally parked vehicles had not been justified by any bid submitted in writing by the company or by the company’s aims as set forth in its articles of association. (b) The city council had not given its opinion on the partnership contract signed between the city authorities and Vinalex, and no expert valuation of Vinalex’s assets had been carried out or submitted to the council for approval, contrary to the provisions of the Local Public Administration Act (Law no. 69/1991). (c) The distribution of the proceeds among the parties as agreed in the contract – 70% to Vinalex and 30% to the city council – had not corresponded to the partners’ respective contributions on the date on which the contract had been signed – 76.4% by the city council and 23.6% by Vinalex – resulting in a loss of income for the city council. The Financial Control Department considered it necessary to urge the mayor of Constanţa, as the official responsible for authorising appropriations, to “ensure compliance with the law” as regards the parties’ obligations under the contract and to be more efficient when entering into such partnerships with private entities in future. A formal decision to that effect was adopted on 8 June 1994 by the head of the department. 24. The applicants produced to the Court a report dated 17 March 1994 by the same Audit Court auditors, which likewise referred to the irregularities described in paragraph 23 above in the signing of the partnership contract between the city authorities and Vinalex, and indicated that the contract should be terminated. The applicants did not mention the existence of such a report during the criminal proceedings instituted against them following the publication of the impugned newspaper article. 25. On 14 April 1994, following the publication of the article, Mrs R.M. instituted proceedings against the applicants in the Constanţa Court of First Instance for insult and defamation, offences under Articles 205 and 206 respectively of the Criminal Code. She complained, in particular, of the cartoon accompanying the article, which had depicted her as a “woman in a miniskirt, on the arm of a man with a bag full of money and with certain intimate parts of her body emphasised as a sign of derision”. She submitted that the article, the cartoon and the dialogue between the characters had led readers to believe that she had had intimate relations with D.M., and pointed out that she and the former deputy mayor were both married. 26. At a hearing on 13 May 1994, the court adjourned the case as the applicants were not present and, scheduling a further hearing for 27 May 1994, directed that they should be brought before the court on that date. 27. On 27 May 1994 the second applicant stated at the hearing that, as editor, he assumed full responsibility for what had been published in the newspaper. He explained that cartoons were frequently used in the press as a medium for criticism and that he had not intended to damage the claimant’s reputation. In reply to a question from the court, he admitted having known that, by order of the mayor of Constanţa, Vinalex had been authorised to tow away illegally parked vehicles. He stated, however, that he had not thought it necessary to publish that information. Lastly, he stressed that he did not intend to reach a settlement with the injured party and that he was prepared to publish an article in her favour provided that she could prove that what he had published was untrue. 28. On 10 June 1994 the applicants applied to have the case transferred to a court in another county. They also requested an adjournment of the proceedings, arguing that because the claimant was a judge it was impossible for them to find a member of the Constanţa Bar who would agree to represent them. 29. On an unspecified date the Constanţa Bar, in reply to a question from the court, attested that the applicants had not met with a refusal on the part of all of its members and that, in any event, the matter had not been referred to its executive. 30. On 15 June and 1 July 1994 the court adjourned the case as the applicants were not present. 31. In an interlocutory decision of 21 July 1994, the Supreme Court of Justice ordered the referral of the case to the Lehliu-Gară Court of First Instance. 32. On 15 November 1994 the case was entered on that court’s list of cases for hearing. Public hearings were held on 21 December 1994 and on 25 January, 27 February, 20 March, 17 April and 17 May 1995. 33. On 21 December 1994 and 25 January 1995 the applicants did not attend the hearings, although they had been duly summoned. The court summoned them to appear at the hearings on 25 January and 27 February 1995. The applicants did not comply with the summonses. 34. At the hearings on 27 February and 20 March 1995, representatives of Telegraf applied for an adjournment on behalf of the applicants, who were not present. The court allowed the application. 35. On 20 March 1995 a member of the Bucharest Bar, N.V., agreed to represent the applicants. 36. At the hearing on 17 April 1995 in the morning, N.V. asked the court to consider the case after 11.30 a.m. The court granted his request. However, when it sat to examine the case at 12 noon and, subsequently, at 2.30 p.m. it noted that neither the applicants nor their counsel were present in the courtroom. It accordingly adjourned the case until 17 May 1995. 37. At the hearing on 17 May 1995 the court reserved judgment, after noting that neither the applicants – despite their having been duly summoned – nor their counsel had appeared. In a judgment delivered on the same day, the court found the applicants guilty of insult and defamation – offences under Articles 205 and 206 respectively of the Criminal Code. It sentenced them to three months’ imprisonment for insult and seven months’ imprisonment for defamation, and ordered them both to serve the heavier sentence, namely seven months’ immediate imprisonment. As well as this main penalty, the court imposed the secondary penalty of disqualification from exercising all the civil rights referred to in Article 64 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 58 below). It also prohibited the applicants from working as journalists for one year after serving their prison sentences, a security measure provided for in the first paragraph of Article 115 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 59 below). Lastly, it ordered them to pay Mrs R.M. 25,000,000 Romanian lei (ROL) (equivalent to 2,033 euros at the exchange rate applicable at the material time) for non-pecuniary damage. 38. In stating its reasons for the judgment, the court observed, firstly: “The Court notes that the injured party has always been present, both in the Constanţa Court of First Instance and in the Lehliu-Gară Court of First Instance, whereas the defendants have generally been absent without justification, despite having been lawfully summoned. In support of her prior complaint, the injured party, Mrs [R.M.], sought leave to produce documentary evidence. Mrs [R.M.] submitted a copy of the 12 April 1994 edition of the local newspaper Telegraf, containing the article referred to in her complaint and the cartoon in which she was ridiculed. The Court notes that the defendants and the party liable to pay damages, despite being lawfully summoned, have not attended any hearings, and that only the injured party has been present. The Court notes that the defendants R. Mazăre and C. Cumpănă were informed of the charges against them and of the hearing dates, and that they were assisted by a lawyer of their choosing (who asked the Court first for an adjournment and subsequently for consideration of the case to be postponed until the second sitting, after 11.30 a.m.). The Court observes that the defendant R. Mazăre gave evidence to the Constanţa Court of First Instance at a public hearing on 27 May 1994, and notes the following from his testimony: the defendant considered that it was not compulsory to have studied at journalism college to work as a journalist; he refused to reply when asked whether he had had access to any other documents on which Constanţa City Council’s decision no. 33 had been based; he understood by ‘series of offences’ the fact of committing several offences; he understood by ‘a multiple breach of the criminal law’ the commission of several offences; he considered that the injured party, in signing the contract in her capacity as a legal expert at the city council, had infringed a number of the provisions of Law no. 69/1991; he pointed out that he could not give the precise legal classification of the offences committed by the injured party, as that did not come within his sphere of competence; he stated that he had said everything there had been to say about the injured party in the newspaper article; he submitted that cartoons were used everywhere and maintained that he had not (through the cartoon) damaged anybody’s reputation (specifically, that of the injured party). [The Court] notes that the defendant R. Mazăre stated that he assumed full responsibility for everything published in his newspaper, as its editor; ... that he stated that he was aware of the constitutional provisions on the right of journalists to impart information to the public; that he had read the government decision in its entirety but had not published it for lack of space; that he also stated that he had read the full text of the partnership contract entered into by the city authorities and signed by the injured party, Mrs [R.M.], but that he did not know whether the government decision had referred to partnership contracts; ... that the defendant had been aware that the Vinalex company had been authorised by order of the mayor of Constanţa to provide the service of towing away illegally parked vehicles, but that he had not thought it necessary to publish that information in the newspaper; and, lastly, that he stated: ‘In view of the seriousness of the offences committed, I do not think that it was necessary to discuss the matter with the injured party beforehand. Should any documents prove that my statements are unfounded, I am prepared to publish an article in the injured party’s favour.’ ” 39. With regard to the documentary evidence on which the injured party intended to rely in support of her allegations, the court observed: “Apart from the article published in Telegraf, the injured party, Mrs [R.M.], produced Constanţa City Council’s decision no. 33 – adopted in accordance with government decision no. 147 of 26 March 1992 – in which it was decided to tow away illegally parked vehicles; order no. 163 of 30 June 1992 by the mayor of Constanţa ... authorising the Vinalex company to remove, tow away and impound illegally parked vehicles (‘The conditions for the performance of these services shall be laid down in the partnership contract to be drawn up’); government decision no. 147 of 26 March 1992, in which mayors were empowered to order the removal, towing away and impounding of illegally parked vehicles by duly authorised specialist companies; and order no. 369 of 1 July 1994 by the mayor of Constanţa, in which Vinalex was authorised to provide such services.” 40. With regard more particularly to the article and cartoon in issue, the court held: “... the article, by the defendants R. Mazăre and C. Cumpănă, was directed at the injured party, tarnishing her honour, dignity and public image and injuring her own self-esteem by means of the (written) accusations conveyed through signs and symbols targeted specifically at her. The Court considers that these acts took place, that they are punishable under the criminal law, and that they posed a danger to society, not so much because of their practical effect (physical distortion of outward reality) but above all because of the psycho-social consequences resulting from the provision of misleading or incorrect information to the public, giving rise to inaccurate judgments about facts and individuals, establishing a false scale of values in view of the role and public impact of the media, and causing psychological trauma to the injured party. In making its assessment, the Court has had regard to the particular status of the parties to the proceedings: the injured party, Mrs [R.M.], being a lawyer and a representative of the judiciary, and the defendants, Mr R. Mazăre and Mr C. Cumpănă, being representatives of the media. The Court notes that the defendant R. Mazăre, while realising the seriousness of the acts he had committed, irresponsibly stated that he had been ‘aware of the fact that Vinalex had been authorised by order of the mayor, but did not consider it necessary to publish that order (as well)’... The Court considers that publication of the article in the newspaper cannot have been justified by a ‘legitimate interest’ in that it was not based on actual facts and the provision of accurate information to the public. It concludes that the defendants ... ‘forgot’ the content of Article 30 § 6 of the Constitution: ‘Freedom of expression shall not be prejudicial to a person’s dignity, honour and private life or to the right to one’s own image’, and of Article 31 § 4 of the Constitution: ‘Public and private media shall be required to provide the public with accurate information.’ It follows from the written submissions filed by the injured party ... that it was always her wish that the criminal proceedings be terminated by a friendly settlement, provided that the defendants agreed to retract the allegations made in the article. The Court notes that the injured party is a public figure and that, following the publication of the article, her superiors and the authority above them asked her to explain herself regarding the trial, particularly in view of the fact that she was due to take the professional examination to obtain permanent status.” 41. On an unspecified date the applicants appealed against the first-instance judgment of 17 May 1995. 42. At a hearing on 2 November 1995, the Călăraşi County Court reserved judgment, having noted that the case was ready for decision and that the applicants had not appeared in court, despite having been duly summoned, and had not stated any grounds for their appeal. 43. In a judgment of 2 November 1995, the court, after examining all the aspects of the case against the applicants, as required by Article 3856 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, upheld the first-instance judgment, finding it to have been correct. The County Court’s judgment, sent to the archives on 23 November 1995, was final and binding and no ordinary appeal lay against it. 44. On 10 April 1996 the Procurator-General applied to the Supreme Court of Justice to have the judgments of 17 May 1995 and 2 November 1995 quashed. He submitted the following arguments. (a) The courts’ legal classification of the facts had been incorrect. Pointing out that in the cartoon the applicants had simply highlighted their allegations of corruption on the part of certain city council officials, he accordingly submitted that the facts in issue did not constitute the actus reus of insult as defined in Article 205 of the Criminal Code. (b) The amount the applicants had been ordered to pay in damages had been extremely high and had not been objectively justified. (c) Lastly, the requirements of the first paragraph of Article 115 of the Criminal Code, by which the courts could prohibit persons who had committed unlawful acts from practising a particular profession on account of their incompetence, lack of training or any other ground making them unfit to practise the profession, were not satisfied in the applicants’ case, as there was no unequivocal proof that the applicants were incompetent to continue working as journalists or that their doing so entailed a potential danger. 45. In a final judgment of 9 July 1996, the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the Procurator-General’s application as being manifestly ill-founded, for the following reasons: “It has been established from the evidence adduced in the present case that on 12 April 1994 the accused, R. Mazăre and C. Cumpănă, published an article in the Constanţa newspaper Telegraf entitled ‘Former Deputy Mayor [D.M.] and serving judge [R.M.] responsible for series of offences in Vinalex scam’, in which it was asserted that in 1992, while she was employed as a legal expert at Constanţa City Council, the injured party, Mrs [R.M.], had been involved in fraudulent activities on the part of a commercial company, Vinalex. The Supreme Court further notes that, alongside the above-mentioned article, the accused published a cartoon in which the injured party was depicted in the company of a man carrying a bag full of money on his back, and that this was likely to tarnish the injured party’s honour, dignity and public image. It follows that in publishing the article in Telegraf, the accused attributed specific acts to the injured party which, had their allegations been made out, would have rendered her criminally liable; the two lower courts were therefore correct in finding the accused guilty of defamation under Article 206 of the Criminal Code. The fact that the accused published alongside the above-mentioned article a cartoon in which the injured party was depicted in the company of a man carrying a bag full of money, in such a way as to tarnish her honour and reputation, constitutes the offence of insult as defined in Article 205 of the Criminal Code ...” 46. With regard to the amount which the applicants had been ordered to pay in damages, the Supreme Court held: “... the requirement for the accused to pay 25,000,000 lei for non-pecuniary damage was justified, since it is beyond dispute that in publishing the article on 12 April 1994 in a mass-circulation newspaper, the accused seriously offended the dignity and honour of the injured party.” 47. The Supreme Court held, lastly, in relation to the alleged unlawfulness of the temporary prohibition on the applicants’ working as journalists: “... since the application of security measures in circumstances other than those provided for by law does not feature on the exhaustive list of cases in which the law permits the Procurator-General to apply to have a decision quashed, it cannot form a legal basis for quashing the judgments in issue.” 48. The applicants did not serve the prison sentence they had received in the judgment of 2 November 1995, since immediately after the judgment had been delivered the Procurator-General suspended its execution for eleven months by virtue of Article 412 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 61 in fine below). 49. In a letter of 30 September 1996, the Procurator-General at the Supreme Court of Justice informed the applicants that he had extended the stay of execution until 27 November 1996. 50. On 22 November 1996 the applicants were granted a presidential pardon dispensing them from having to serve their prison sentence. By virtue of Article 71 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the pardon also waived their secondary penalty of disqualification from exercising their civil rights (see paragraph 58 in fine below). 51. It appears from the first applicant’s employment record (cartea de muncă), of which he submitted a copy to the Court, that, following the Călăraşi County Court’s judgment of 2 November 1995: (a) he continued to work for Telegraf as editor of the “Events” section until 1 February 1996, when he was transferred for administrative reasons to the C. company, occupying the same position and receiving the same salary as before; (b) while working for C., he was awarded a pay rise; (c) he ceased to work for C. on 14 April 1997 on account of staff cutbacks by his employer, a ground for dismissal provided for in Article 130 (a) of the Labour Code as worded at the material time; (d) thereafter, he was not gainfully employed until 7 February 2000, when he was recruited on a permanent contract by the A. company as deputy editor. (b) The second applicant 52. Following the final and binding judgment of 2 November 1995, the second applicant continued to work as editor of Telegraf, as indicated in a letter he sent to the Court on 19 January 2000. 53. Between 1 September 1997 and 30 November 1999, while he was a member of the Romanian parliament, the sum of ROL 25,000,000 was deducted from his parliamentary allowance and transferred to Mrs R.M.’s bank account, pursuant to the Lehliu-Gară Court of First Instance’s judgment of 17 May 1995 (see paragraph 37 in fine above). 54. On an unspecified date after that judgment, he was elected mayor of Constanţa, a position he still holds.

5. The applicants were born in 1959 and 1963 and live in the town of Chernyakhovsk in the Kaliningrad Region. They are businessmen and founders of the Pravo Znat newspaper (“The Right to Know”). 6. On 27 April 2001 the applicants' newspaper published an article under the headline “What power costs: part 2” (“Сколько стоит власть-2”). The article gave a detailed account of the wages and benefits received by mid-range employees in the town council. The relevant extract read as follows: “For the sake of clarity, let us look at the elements that make up the wages. Let's take, for example, those of the head of the legal department... In total... 5,805 roubles. Not bad for a twenty-year-old professional who recently graduated from a teachers' college.” 7. Ms P., the head of the legal department, brought a defamation action against the applicants. She submitted that she possessed higher legal education and more than three years of relevant experience, and that the article had harmed her authority in that it had sown doubts as to her professional qualifications. 8. On 13 June 2001 the Chernyakhovsk Town Court of the Kaliningrad Region heard the claim and gave judgment. It found that the applicants had been aware of the identity of the head of the legal department and they had intended to expose a specific person, namely Ms P. The court established that Ms P. had been appointed to her position in September 2000 after having completed a course of higher legal education. It found as follows: “Having indicated in the article the salary of the head of the legal department and having referred to a twenty-year-old professional just out of college, the [applicants] related inaccurate information, given that Ms P., whom the [applicants] described as having graduated from a teachers' college four years previously, was at the material time the head of the legal department and had higher legal education. The article 'What power costs: part 2' implies that municipal employees receive high wages, paid out of the budget, and cites as an example a young professional with college-level education and no work experience. The court considers that such information damages Ms P.'s professional reputation and honour, in that it was disseminated to a large readership and begs the conclusion that the position of head of the legal department is occupied by an employee who lacks the requisite qualifications and work experience, which undermines the authority of the local administration and of Ms P.” The court ordered the applicants to publish a rectification and pay 300 roubles (RUR, 12 euros (EUR)) each to Ms P. 9. On 20 June 2001 both applicants appealed against the judgment of 13 June 2001. They submitted that the information had not been proven to be untrue and that it had not undermined Ms P.'s authority. They also alleged a procedural violation, in that the case had been examined by a formation consisting of one professional judge and two lay judges, one of whom, lay judge Ms Kr., had participated in a previous hearing on 5 February 2001, whereas lay judges could only sit in court once a year and for no longer than fourteen days. 10. On 18 July 2001 the Kaliningrad Regional Court confirmed the judgment of 13 June 2001. It upheld the District Court's findings that Ms P. had graduated from a teachers' college, but noted that this had occurred in 1997 and that, by the time of her appointment, she had also completed higher legal education. The court concluded that the article had been intended to cast a shadow of doubt on Ms P.'s professional fitness and had thus damaged her reputation. As to the alleged procedural violation, the court held that the applicants had not proved that the lay judge in question had sat for more than fourteen days and stated that their allegations had been based on an erroneous interpretation of the Lay Judges Act. 11. On 19 January 2001 the applicants' newspaper published an article by Mr V. under the headline “The army with wet feet” (“Армия с мокрыми ногами”). The article related the living conditions of soldiers in a military unit where almost two hundred men had fallen ill because Mr K., the unit commander, had not provided them with dry footwraps or arranged for a place to dry their boots. 12. Mr K. sued the applicants and Mr V. for the protection of his honour, dignity and professional reputation and claimed compensation for non-pecuniary damage. As evidence of the non-pecuniary damage sustained, Mr K. enclosed a medical certificate issued by a psychiatrist. The certificate was made available to the applicants in their capacity as defendants. 13. On 13 July 2001 the newspaper published a follow-up article “There are different kinds of syndromes. But still no footwraps” (“Синдром синдрому рознь. И без портянок”). The article commented on various aspects of Mr K.'s statement of claim. The relevant part read as follows: “So, our character '...had to visit a psychiatrist on 13 February 2001...'. 'Intellect with no peculiarities', noted the doctor, [who] found that K. had ... moderately pronounced asthenia syndrome and prescribed treatment. Asthenia means impotence, a kind of disease. It means that the commander of the regiment is not quite healthy. Or quite unhealthy?” 14. Mr K. subsequently supplemented his original statement of claim with a complaint about the publication of information on his state of health, which, in his opinion, was an unjustified interference with his right to respect for private life. 15. On 25 September 2001 the Chernyakhovsk Town Court of the Kaliningrad Region gave its judgment. The court established that the facts concerning the mass outbreak of illness among soldiers, described in the article of 19 January 2001, were accurate and dismissed Mr K.'s action in this part. However, it established that Mr K. had referred to his visit to a psychiatrist in his statement of claim, that only a limited number of people had access to the case file, and that Mr K. had not consented to having his diagnosis published in a newspaper. The court concluded that the article of 13 July 2001 violated Mr K.'s personal non-pecuniary rights, namely the right to inviolability of one's private life and personal and family secrets, which was protected by the Constitution. Relying on Article 151 of the Civil Code, it awarded him RUR 1,500 (EUR 55) and RUR 1,000 (EUR 37) against the first and second applicants respectively. 16. On 24 October 2001 the Kaliningrad Regional Court upheld on appeal the judgment of 13 July 2001. The court dismissed the applicants' argument that the public should have been informed of Mr K.'s state of health because he was the commander of a military unit.

5. The applicant organisation is a non-governmental human rights organisation based in Yerevan. 6. On 12 May 2007 a third person, L.G., who was apparently a witness in a murder investigation, died while at a police station. According to the official version, L.G. died in an attempt to escape by jumping out of a second-floor window of the police station. It appears that this event provoked an outcry among Armenian human rights groups and civil society. 7. On 19 February 2008 a presidential election was held in Armenia, which was followed by mass post-election rallies and protests and an intense standoff between the authorities and the supporters of the opposition, resulting in clashes and at least ten persons being killed. 8. On 1 March 2008 a state of emergency was declared by the President of Armenia for a period of 20 days, during which all public assemblies were banned. 9. On 6 May 2008 the applicant organisation applied to the Mayor of Yerevan, notifying its intention to hold a mourning march on the first anniversary of L.G.’s death. The march was to take place on 12 May from 8 p.m. to 9.30 p.m. It was to start at Republic Square and continue through Nalbandyan Street in the direction of the police station. 10. On 8 May 2008 the Mayor decided to ban the planned event, with reference to Sections 9 § 4 (3) and 13 § 1 (3) of the Assemblies, Rallies, Marches and Demonstrations Act (“the Act”), finding: “According to the official opinion of the Police ... of 8 May 2008 ..., the mass public event held on 1 March 2008 turned into mass disorder resulting in human casualties and not all the circumstances of the crime and offenders have been disclosed, and not all weapons and ammunition used [at that event], whose circulation may pose danger to the lives and health of citizens, have been found in the course of the investigation into the criminal case instituted in connection with that fact by the Special Investigative Service of Armenia[. H]ence, it will be impossible to prevent new crimes, if the mass public event [in question] is held. According to the official opinion of the National Security Service ... of 7 May 2008 ..., the National Security Service of Armenia has credible and verified data which show that the mass public event in question, if allowed, will result in undermining national security, public order, and the health and morality of society, in encroachments on constitutional rights and freedoms and in disorder and [new] crimes.” 11. By a letter of 12 May 2008 this decision was posted to the applicant organisation. On the same date the police, who had apparently been informed of the decision of 8 May 2008, prevented the organisers from holding the planned event. 12. On 13 May 2008 the applicant organisation received the letter of 12 May 2008.

4. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 5. On 25 April 2005 the Commercial Court (Trgovinski sud) in Leskovac ruled in favour of a company “KHK” (at that time the applicant company’s mother company – “matično preduzeće”), and ordered GP “Rad” (a company based in Grdelica – “the debtor”) to pay: (i) RSD 20,403,432.58 (EUR 250,515[1]) plus statutory interest as of 28 February 2001; and (ii) RSD 947,142.00 (EUR 11,630) on account of the costs of civil proceedings. 6. On 26 April 2005 the company “KHK” transferred this entitlement to the applicant company. 7. The Commercial Court judgment became final on 24 November 2005 and enforceable on 27 December 2005. 8. On 27 December 2005 the applicant company filed with the Municipal Court (Opštinski sud) in Leskovac requests for the enforcement of the Commercial Court judgment and for an award of the statutory interest on the costs of the civil proceedings in line with Article 35 § 1 of the Enforcement Procedure Act 2004 (see paragraph 25 below). 9. On 19 January 2006 the Municipal Court ordered the enforcement by evaluation and sale of the debtor’s immovable assets and the registration of the enforcement order in the real estate registry. In addition, the court awarded the applicant company the statutory interest on the costs of the civil proceedings as of 25 April 2005 and set the costs of the enforcement proceedings at RSD 69,500 (EUR 790). On 3 October 2007 the Municipal Court partially amended the enforcement order in that the enforcement by sale of some of the land plots was terminated and the costs of the enforcement proceedings were set at RSD 267,150 (EUR 3,400). These decisions became final on 14 December 2007. 10. On 3 June 2008 the enforcement order was registered in the Land Registry (Katastar nepokretnosti) in Leskovac. 11. By 19 December 2008 the Municipal Court established that the value of the debtor’s seized immovable assets was RSD 121,403,430.00 (EUR 1,356,640) and referred a third party, who was disputing the debtor’s ownership in respect of certain plots of land, to institute separate civil proceedings in that respect against the applicant company. 12. By 4 February 2009 the Municipal Court suspended the enforcement in respect of certain plots of land the ownership of which was disputed. 13. On 10 February 2009 the Municipal Court partially amended the decision of 19 December 2008 in that it assessed the value of the debtor’s seized assets at RSD 108,654,410.00 (EUR 1,214,184). On 5 March 2009 the District Court (Okružni sud) in Leskovac quashed this decision and ordered a retrial. 14. On 27 April 2009 the Commercial Court (Privredni sud) in Leskovac instituted the insolvency proceedings (stečajni postupak) against the debtor. 15. By 11 June 2009 the Municipal Court stayed the enforcement proceedings due to the initiation of the insolvency proceedings. 16. On 18 May 2009 the applicant company duly submitted its claim to the Commercial Court within the insolvency proceedings against the debtor, seeking that it be recognized as a secured creditor (razlučni poverilac). 17. On 15 June 2009, at the first creditors’ hearing, attended also by the applicant company, the Assembly of Creditors agreed that the insolvency proceedings should lead to the debtor’s bankruptcy. On 7 September 2009 the Commercial Court initiated the proceedings for the sale of the debtor’s assets. 18. On 24 August 2009 the Insolvency Judge (stečajni sudija) recognized the applicant company’s claim and its secured creditor status. On 24 November 2009 the Insolvency Council (stečajno veće), upon an appeal of the Insolvency Administrator (stečajni upravnik), quashed this decision and referred the applicant company to institute civil proceedings for determination of its status as a secured creditor. 19. On 29 March 2010 the applicant company instituted civil proceedings in this regard. By 1 June 2012 the Commercial Court dismissed the applicant company’s claim as lodged out of time. The applicant company was ordered to pay for the costs of the proceedings in the amount of RSD 485,250.00 (EUR 4,250). It would appear from the case-file that this decision is not yet final. 20. On 15 August 2008 the applicant company lodged a constitutional appeal seeking redress in respect of the impugned non-enforcement. In particular, the applicant company sought that its secured creditor status be recognized and that it be paid the sums claimed in the insolvency proceedings. 21. On 29 March 2012 the Constitutional Court held that the applicant company had suffered a breach of its property right, as well as a violation of the “right to a trial within a reasonable time” with regard to the enforcement proceedings, and dismissed the remainder of the appeal. The court also declared that the applicant company was entitled to non-pecuniary damage in the amount of EUR 600, converted into the national currency at the rate applicable at the date of settlement. 22. Before the insolvency proceedings the debtor company was entirely socially-owned. It has remained to be registered as such in the relevant public registries throughout the insolvency proceedings. 23. The insolvency proceedings are still ongoing.

6. The applicants’ names and other details are indicated in the appended table. All the applicants were active or retired servicemen at the material time. 7. On various dates they sued their employer military units, a military commissioner’s office or the competent federal ministries in courts for payment of monetary sums on account of their service in the military forces or some specific missions undertaken during this service, such as field works (case of Kulkov) or peace-keeping operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina (case of Shelestovskaya), Kosovo (cases of Biserov and others, Dubovov, Davydov and Pyshnograyev) or South Ossetia (case of Kashcheyev). The applicant Doroshok claimed compensation of health damage and severe injuries caused during his military mission in Chechnya. The applicants Sobakar and Sereda claimed a recalculation of their pensions and a compensation of shortfalls in monthly payments made in the past. 8. The domestic courts granted the applicants’ claims (see dates of the judgments and sums awarded in the appended table). The judgments were not appealed against in cassation and became binding and enforceable on the dates indicated in the appended table. However, only one of these judgments was enforced (the judgment of 13 May 2003 in favour of V. Kashcheyev, see paragraph 12 below). All the other judgments, including the second judgment in favour of V. Kashcheyev delivered on 14 July 2006, were not enforced. 9. On various dates the Presidiums of higher courts decided, upon the defendant authorities’ requests for supervisory review, to quash the judgments in the applicants’ favour considering that the lower courts misapplied the material law (see details in the appended table). With the exception of two cases (Kulkov and Shelestovskaya), the higher courts dismissed the applicants’ claims in full by the same decisions. 10. In the case of Kulkov, the Presidium of the Privolzhskiy Circuit Military Court quashed on 18 April 2002 the judgment in the applicant’s favour by way of supervisory review initiated by the President of this court. However, the judgment of 18 April 2002 was itself overruled by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on 11 April 2003 and the first-instance judgment in the applicant’s favour was thus restored. It remained in force until it was quashed for a second time on 25 December 2003 by the Presidium of the Privolzhskiy Circuit Military Court upon application of the defendant military unit. While dismissing the applicant’s claims for field allowance (RUB 70,675), the Presidium upheld the first-instance court’s decision as regards the award of the regional bonus to the applicant (RUB 1,112.33). 11. In the case of Shelestovskaya, the Presidium of the Moscow Circuit Military Court quashed on 7 April 2004 the judgment in the applicant’s favour. However, the judgment of 7 April 2004 was itself overruled by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on 12 August 2004 and the first-instance judgment in the applicant’s favour was thus restored. On 15 September 2004 the Presidium again quashed the latter judgment and awarded the applicant smaller amounts, i.e. RUB 270 in respect special allowance and RUB 250 in respect of legal aid. The Presidium dismissed the remainder of the applicant’s claims. 12. The first of the two judgments, which was delivered in favour of V. Kashcheyev on 13 May 2003 and became enforceable on 26 May 2003, was enforced on 15 September 2005. On 18 June 2007 the Pskov Garnison Military Court awarded the applicant RUB 133,774.30 in respect of compensation for the inflation losses arising from this enforcement delay. On 26 December 2007 the authorities credited the latter amount on the applicant’s account.

5. The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Goričan. 6. As a result of the accident at work, which occurred on 15 February 1988, the applicant was a disabled person. From 1 June 1990 until 30 September 1993, he was in training to qualify for a post suitable for his health problems. After the training, he was not appointed to any post at his employer, the company called EM. On 15 October 1994 he was made redundant. 7. On 24 November 1994 the applicant instituted labour law proceedings against EM in the Celje Labour Court (Delovno sodišče v Celju) contesting the termination of employment. He also sought temporary injunction. On 12 December 1994 the court issued a temporary injunction ordering EM to pay the applicant an advance of his salaries since 1 November 1994. EM appealed to the Higher Labour and Social Court (Višje delovno in socialno sodišče). On 12 January 1995 the court dismissed the appeal. On 6 April 1995 the Celje Labour Court held a hearing and decided to deliver a written judgment. The judgment, upholding the applicant’s claim, was served on the applicant on 13 April 1995. 8. At an undetermined time, EM appealed to the Higher Labour and Social Court. On 9 October 1996 the court allowed the appeal and remitted the case to the first-instance court for re-examination. 9. On 19 September 1997 the applicant requested in the first-instance court that a date be set for a hearing. Of the five hearings held between 27 March and 11 December 1997 none was adjourned at the request of the applicant. The judgment, upholding the applicant’s claim, was served on the applicant on 17 December 1997. 10. At an undetermined time, EM appealed to the Higher Labour and Social Court. On 4 February 1999 the court allowed the appeal in part and remitted the claim to the first-instance court for re-examination. 11. At an undetermined time, EM lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court (Vrhovno sodišče). On 23 November 1999 the court dismissed the appeal. The judgment was served on the applicant on 14 December 1999. 12. On 24 February 2000 the first-instance court held a hearing and appointed a financial expert to calculate the applicant’s loss of income. On 1 February 2001 the court held a hearing and decided to issue a written judgment. The judgment was served on the applicant on 26 February 2001. 13. On 27 February 2001, the applicant appealed against the decision concerning the costs and expenses. On 18 July 2002 the Higher Labour and Social Court dismissed the appeal. The decision was served on the applicant on 3 September 2002.

4. The applicant company is a Portuguese limited liability company. The second and third applicants are the applicant company’s managing partners (see Annex for details). 5. On 17 September 1999 the Porto Criminal Department for Investigation and Prosecution (Departamento de Acção e Investigação Penal) started an investigation into the applicant company’s fiscal activity between 1994 and 1997. 6. Following the investigation, two sets of fiscal criminal proceedings were instituted before the Porto and Barcelos Criminal Courts. 7. On 20 December 1999 the applicants were made defendants (arguidos) in both sets of proceedings. 8. On 5 November 2003 the public prosecutor brought charges (acusação) against the applicant company and third applicant in the Porto Criminal Court for tax fraud in relation to activities dating back to 1997, when the applicant company was registered in Porto. 9. On 27 September 2005 the trial began. The hearing was adjourned to October and then to 27 March 2006 due to the absence of some of the defence witnesses. 10. On the day of the hearing, the applicant company’s and third applicant’s representative resigned. The hearing was adjourned pending his replacement. 11. In June 2006 the applicant company and third applicant gave power of attorney to the same lawyer. 12. On 14 November 2006 the applicants informed the Porto Criminal Court that they had sought a judicial review before the Porto Administrative and Fiscal Court of a tax adjustment applied to them regarding the applicant company’s fiscal activity between 1994 and 1997. 13. On 29 November 2006 the Porto Criminal Court suspended the fiscal criminal proceedings in accordance with Article 50 § 1 of the Legal Framework for Non-Customs Tax Offences (Regime Jurídico das Infracções Fiscais não Aduaneiras – “RJIFNA”). 14. On 19 December 2008 the applicants applied to the High Council of Magistrates (Conselho Superior de Magistratura) for an order to have the criminal proceedings expedited (pedido de aceleração processual). 15. On 5 May 2009 the High Council of Magistrates dismissed their application on the grounds that the delay in the proceedings, under the law, was attributable to the Porto Administrative and Fiscal Court rather than the Porto Criminal Court. The Council pointed out that the applicants should have therefore lodged their expedition application with the High Council of the Administrative and Fiscal Courts. 16. The proceedings are still pending before the Porto Criminal Court. 17. On 28 April 2003 the public prosecutor of the Barcelos Criminal Court brought charges against the three applicants for tax fraud and abuse (fraude fiscal e abuso de confiança fiscal) in relation to activities that had taken place between 1994 and 1996, when the applicant company was registered in Barcelos. 18. On 1 October 2003 the applicants contested the proceedings. On the same date they applied for them to be suspended until a final decision was adopted in relation to the judicial review pending before the Porto Administrative and Fiscal Court (see paragraph 13 above). 19. On 17 November 2003 the Barcelos Criminal Court ordered that the proceedings be suspended in accordance with Article 50 § 1 of the RJIFNA and requested information from the Porto Administrative and Fiscal Court regarding the progress of the judicial review. 20. On 14 December 2006 the Porto Administrative and Fiscal Court informed the Barcelos Criminal Court that the proceedings brought by the applicants against the tax adjustment were still pending. 21. On 23 April 2007 the Barcelos Criminal Court suspended the proceedings until a final decision was adopted by the Porto Administrative and Fiscal Court. 22. On 20 October 2008 the Porto Administrative and Fiscal Court informed the Barcelos Criminal Court that the judicial review was still pending. 23. On 19 December 2008 the applicants applied to the High Council of Magistrates to have the proceedings expedited. 24. On 13 January 2009 the High Council dismissed their application on the grounds that the fiscal criminal proceedings had been suspended in accordance with the law. It also considered that their request should have been made to the High Council of the Administrative and Fiscal Courts. 25. The proceedings are still pending before the Barcelos Criminal Court. 26. On 10 October and 27 October 2006 the applicants instituted proceedings in tort (ação de responsabilidade civil extracontratual) against the State in the Porto and Braga Administrative and Fiscal Courts (case nos. 2533/06.6BEPRT and 1789/06.6BEBRG respectively), claiming damages for the excessive length of the above-mentioned criminal proceedings. 27. According to the latest information received by the Court on 14 February 2014, the proceedings are still pending.

4. The applicant, who was born in 1980, is currently serving her prison sentence in the Gebze Prison. 5. On 8 June 2004 the applicant was arrested together with B.K. by policemen from the Anti-Terrorism Branch of the Kırıkkale Security Directorate. It transpires from the documents in the case file that B.K. was carrying a hidden Kalashnikov rifle which he proceeded to use against the police officers who had approached them to check their identity papers and that, in the ensuing struggle, the applicant and one police officer were injured by gunshot wounds. 6. On the same day at 9.15 p.m., the applicant was examined at the Kırıkkale State Hospital by a doctor who noted two gunshot wounds on the applicant’s left leg. Superficial grazes on her left shoulder blade and back were also indicated in the report. It was concluded that her injuries were not life-threatening. The applicant was subsequently placed in custody at the Kırıkkale Security Directorate, where she was allegedly ill-treated. 7. On 9 June 2004 the applicant was examined by a doctor at the Yüksek İhtisas Hospital. The report indicated that there was a bullet entry hole and an exit hole in her left leg. It was also indicated that there were two or three grazes on the applicant’s back, measuring 3-4 cm. 8. On 10 June 2004 the applicant was once again examined at the Yüksek İhtisas Hospital. According to the report issued at the end of the medical examination, there was a bullet entry hole and an exit hole in the applicant’s left leg, superficial grazes on her back and an old hyperemia, measuring 2 to 3 cm, on her left arm. 9. On the same day, the applicant was transferred to Tokat Gendarmerie Command for further investigation. 10. On 11 June 2004 at 00.35 a.m. the applicant was examined at the Tokat Cevdet Aykan State Hospital by a doctor, who noted a bruise of 0,5 x 1 cm on the applicant’s nose dating back a couple of days, a number of scabbed scratches or bruises on her left shoulder blade, upper left arm and left wrist (dating back a couple of days), a couple of scratches on her lumbar vertebrae (dating back a couple of days), redness corresponding to an old burn wound on her left foot and fingers and two gunshot wounds in her lower left leg. The report indicated that the injuries were not life-threatening. 11. On 12 June 2004 the applicant was once again examined at the Tokat Cevdet Aykan State Hospital. No new physical marks other than those indicated above were observed on her body. 12. On the same day, the applicant was interrogated at the Tokat Gendarme Command, in the presence of her lawyer, and she used her right to remain silent. She was subsequently brought before the Tokat public prosecutor and the Tokat Magistrates’ Court in Criminal Matters respectively. In the presence of her lawyer, she denied the accusations against her. Before the public prosecutor, the applicant further complained that she had been subjected to various forms of ill-treatment while she was held in custody at the Kırıkkale Security Directorate. In this connection, she maintained that she had been forced to walk bare-footed, deprived of sleep, sexually harassed, dragged by her hair, kicked, and that her head had been hit against the wall. The applicant requested the prosecution of those responsible. The court ordered her detention in remand. 13. On 9 June 2004 the Ankara public prosecutor filed an indictment against the applicant and accused her of being a member of the TKP/ML-TİKKO (Turkish Communist Party-Marxist Leninist, Turkish Workers and Peasants’ Liberation Army), an armed illegal organisation, and of undermining the constitutional order of the State in breach of Article 146 of the Criminal Code. 14. On 2 March 2006 the Ankara Assize Court, after having examined the evidence in the case file, convicted her as charged and sentenced her to life imprisonment. 15. The applicant appealed, challenging various documentary and testimony evidence in the case file. In her appeal petition, she referred to her submissions before the investigating judge and the public prosecutor, maintaining that she had been ill-treated at the Kırıkkale Security Directorate. 16. On 26 September 2006 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. This decision was served on the applicant on 5 December 2006. 17. Upon the applicant’s submissions made before the Tokat Magistrates’ Court on 12 June 2004, on an unspecified date, the Tokat public prosecutor initiated an investigation into her allegations of ill-treatment. The public prosecutor subsequently declared lack of jurisdiction and transferred the case file to the Kırıkkale public prosecutor’s office, as the applicant alleged that she had been ill-treated during her custody in Kırıkkale. During his investigation, the Kırıkkale public prosecutor took statements from three police officers, who denied the accusations against them. On 14 July 2004 the public prosecutor issued a decision of non-prosecution. In his decision, the prosecutor referred to the applicant as a member of the armed illegal organisation, the TKP/ML - TİKKO, and stated that she had made this allegation to debase the police officers. The public prosecutor concluded by stating that a copy of the non-prosecution decision should be served on the applicant. 18. The non-prosecution decision of the Kırıkkale public prosecutor was served on the applicant on 18 April 2011. Subsequently, on 29 April 2011 the applicant filed an objection with the Ankara Assize Court. In her petition, she pointed out that the public prosecutor had acted with a preconceived idea that she was a member of an illegal organisation. In this connection, she drew the Assize Court’s attention to the fact that, at that time, the trial against her had been pending and that she had not yet been convicted of being a member of an illegal organisation. The applicant further repeated her allegations of ill-treatment and maintained that during her police custody she had been sexually harassed and beaten by police officers at the Kırıkkale Security Directorate. 19. After examining the merits of the case, on 18 May 2011 the Ankara Assize Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal.

5. The applicants were born in 1959, 1987 and 1990 respectively and live in Chişinău. The first applicant is the mother of the other two applicants. 6. In 1998 the applicants’ family obtained from the first applicant’s employer a three-room apartment in Chişinău for their use. 7. According to the first applicant, she was systematically beaten and insulted by her husband (V.B.). As a result, on 16 January 2007 the first applicant divorced V.B., but they continued living in the same apartment. 8. The beatings continued, as confirmed by seven medical reports between September 2007 and January 2008 attesting to light injuries to the first applicant’s body caused by “blunt objects with a limited surface”. All the reports were prepared at the request of the Centru district police in Chişinău following complaints by the first applicant. The first applicant’s description of the origin of her injuries in all those medical reports was that V.B. had beaten her. 9. On 1 April, 7 August, 7 September and 28 November 2007, as well as on 10 and 29 April 2008 the courts adopted six administrative decisions concerning the above beatings. The first of them terminated the proceedings in view of the parties’ friendly settlement of the proceedings. Another terminated the proceedings because of the expiry of the three-month limitation period for imposing an administrative sanction on V.B. In the four other cases the courts fined V.B. for beating and insulting her, although in one of them the court noted that the first applicant had provoked him. The fines imposed ranged from 140 to 300 Moldovan lei (MDL, the equivalent of, respectively, 8.65 to 18 euros (EUR) at the relevant time). V.B. paid all those fines. It appears from the parties’ statements that on an unknown date the prosecution initiated criminal proceedings against V.B. for attempted rape, but on 14 May 2008 the applicant withdrew her complaint and the proceedings were discontinued. 10. According to a certificate issued by the Centru district police office, V.B. has been registered for supervision by that office as a “family trouble-maker” since 2007. 11. On an unknown date in 2008 the first applicant lodged a civil action against V.B. seeking his eviction from the apartment. She relied on the evidence of V.B.’s violent behaviour. V.B. lodged a counterclaim, asking for the rooms in the apartment to be divided between himself and the rest of his former family. 12. On 23 June 2008 the Centru District Court allowed the first applicant’s action and rejected that of V.B. The court found that V.B. had been violent towards the first applicant and had insulted her in front of their children, as evidenced by the medical reports and court decisions. 13. On 30 October 2008 the Chişinău Court of Appeal upheld that judgment. In addition to the evidence relied on by the first-instance court, the Court of Appeal heard the two young men, who confirmed their mother’s testimony and asked for their father’s eviction. 14. On 20 May 2009 the Supreme Court of Justice quashed the lower courts’ judgments and adopted a new one, rejecting the first applicant’s claims and accepting that of V.B. The court found that the lower courts had erroneously concluded that V.B. had systematically abused the first applicant. It noted that one of the court proceedings in which V.B. had been accused of beating the first applicant had been discontinued after the parties’ settlement of the case, while another had been discontinued because of the expiry of the time-limit for imposing a fine. In one of the remaining four decisions it had been mentioned that the applicant herself had provoked V.B.’s violence. The other three decisions were insufficient to prove systematic violent behaviour. Moreover, it had not been proved that V.B. suffered from alcohol or drug dependency. According to a certificate from the local apartment owners’ association, V.B. had not been known for causing trouble. In addition, V.B. had proposed to the first applicant that they privatise the apartment and sell it so that they could buy separate apartments, but the first applicant had refused. The court also found that the parties could continue living in their apartment and that V.B. could take one of the rooms, leaving the two other rooms to the applicants. There would be no change to the common areas. The judgment was final. 15. Between 11 June 2009 and 5 February 2010 the first applicant spent time in hospital having treatment for tuberculosis. According to a medical certificate issued on 30 August 2011 by the applicants’ family doctor, she is recommended, inter alia, to avoid stress. 16. Following the first applicant’s complaint to the Court V.B. continued behaving violently towards her. On 19 August 2010 he was fined administratively in the amount of MDL 400 (EUR 25.5 at the time) for insulting the first applicant. On the second occasion, after communication of the present application to the respondent Government, V.B. was fined MDL 200 (EUR 12.2) on 29 August 2011 for violence against the first applicant. According to a medical report made on 23 August 2011, the first applicant declared that V.B. had tried to rape her in the evening of 21 August 2011, but had not succeeded because of her resistance. The doctor found injuries on her body, caused by “blunt objects with a limited surface”, as follows: oval haematomas measuring 1.5 x 1 cm and 4 x 3cm on various parts of her arms, the lower part of her left thigh and the middle part of her right thigh, as well as on various parts of both legs. 17. On 1 September 2011 the first applicant requested a court protection order for her and her sons. She described the latest events and the risk of further violence against her, as well as the authorities’ inability or unwillingness to ensure her own and her sons’ physical and psychological safety. In accordance with the provisions of Law no. 45 (see paragraph 21 below) she asked for V.B.’s temporary eviction from the common apartment, without deciding on the ownership of any assets; V.B.’s obligation not to come closer than 200 metres to her or her children and not to contact any of them, as well as not to visit the place of work or study of any of the applicants. 18. On 2 September 2011 the Centru District Court adopted a protection order, valid for three months, agreeing to some of the requests, namely to stay at least 200 m away from the first applicant, not to contact her and not to visit her place of work. The court refused to order V.B.’s temporary eviction from the apartment. It found that he had acted violently against the first applicant, but that “it had not been established that [V.B.] had applied physical and/or psychological violence to [the second and third applicants]”. At the same time, V.B. had no alternative accommodation and in addition his right to use a part of the disputed apartment had been confirmed by a final judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice of 20 May 2009 (see paragraph 14 above). According to the Government, this order was brought to the attention of the local police and V.B.’s behaviour was subsequently monitored. 19. The first applicant appealed, stating that by preserving V.B.’s right to live in the apartment with her the authorities had effectively put her at risk of further ill-treatment. Also, without his removal from the apartment at least temporarily the court’s protection order, in the part concerning V.B.’s staying at least 200 metres away from her, was deprived of any meaning and did not prevent any further ill-treatment or protect her against inhuman and degrading treatment caused by a private individual, despite a positive obligation to do so under the Convention. She added that according to a letter from the Social Assistance department of Chişinău Municipal Council, the apartment in which the first applicant and V.B. lived was composed of three rooms, two of which were suitable for living in, but only one was connected to the heating system. 20. On 2 November 2011 the Chişinău Court of Appeal rejected the first applicant’s appeal, for the same reasons as those relied on by the first-instance court. This decision was final.

5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6. On 19 July 2001 the Parliament of Moldova amended the 2001 Budget Act to allow the Customs Department to postpone by up to three months the levying of taxes on fuel imported into Moldova. In the evening of the same day, the leader of the communist majority in Parliament (Mr V. Stepaniuc) met with the deputy Speaker of Parliament (Mr V. Mişin) for a meal in the restaurant of a luxury hotel in Chişinău. According to the applicant newspaper, sources which preferred to remain anonymous confirmed that the meal had been paid for by “L.”, a major importer of fuel into Moldova. 7. On 24 July 2001 the applicant newspaper published an article entitled “On L.'s money, communists V. Stepaniuc and V. Mişin had a big-time party (chiolhan) at 'Jolly Allon'”. The article, which included pictures of the two MPs next to the text, informed readers about the changes to the Budget Act and about the profits which those changes would bring to a few big fuel importers who had links with the Customs Department, thus allowing unfair competition. The article claimed that the postponement of tax payments constituted a form of credit by the State without interest or guarantees and rejected the explanation for the amendment given by a member of Parliament. One paragraph in the article read: “One needs to note that, in the evening of the same day, at the 'Jolly Allon' (...) hotel, the communists V. Stepaniuc and V. Mişin, putting aside all proletarian decency [pudoare], had a big-time party on the money of the sharks from 'L.'. Could this party be a simple coincidence? We do not know.” The article went on to expose the legislative plans of the communist party and the resulting benefits to big fuel importers at the expense of ordinary workers. 8. On 8 July 2002 Mr Stepaniuc, the leader of the Communist parliamentary faction which had, at the time, 71 votes out of a total of 101 in Parliament, lodged an action against the applicant newspaper, identifying the paragraph cited above as defamatory. He did not pay any court fee when lodging his complaint, nor did he appear in court at any stage of the proceedings or delegate any person to represent him. 9. On 1 August 2002 Judge I.M., the then President of the Buiucani District Court, found that the applicant had essentially stated that Mr Stepaniuc “had voted for laws in the interest of some private companies and then had a party on their money”. It denounced the use of pure rumour as a basis for journalism and found that the applicant newspaper had acted in bad faith. The court took note of the “vehement attack” on Mr Stepaniuc, the large readership of the newspaper and the “degree of moral and psychological suffering” caused. In addition, the court found that Mr Stepaniuc's position as a member of Parliament and leader of a parliamentary faction “increased the degree of moral damage” which led to the imposition of maximum liability. 10. The court accepted Mr Stepaniuc's claim and ordered the applicant newspaper, pursuant to Articles 7 and 7 § 1 of the Civil Code, to publish an apology and to pay the plaintiff the maximum damages allowed by law and the court fees (a total of 3,690 Moldovan lei (MDL), equal to 278 euros (EUR) at the time). According to the applicant newspaper, the court had conducted one hearing which lasted less than 15 minutes and no questions had been put to the applicant newspaper. 11. In its appeal the applicant newspaper submitted that the impugned phrases had amounted to value-judgments which could not be proved and that these opinions had been based on facts, namely the party which had taken place at the hotel in question on the date mentioned in the article, which was not disputed, and the modifications to the law adopted by Parliament. Moreover, in view of the length of time that had passed after the publication of the article, it had been impossible for the applicant to prove that the persons had been seen at the hotel restaurant, where they had had a party, or verify the source of payment for it. The applicant newspaper also argued that Judge I.M. lacked independence and impartiality because he was a friend of Mr Stepaniuc and had been appointed President of the Buiucani District Court by the Communist Party parliamentary group. The majority of the defamation cases between Flux and Mr Stepaniuc had been examined by him personally and his decisions were stereotyped and did not give sufficient reasons. In other defamation cases between Flux and representatives of the Government, Judge I.M. had always ruled in favour of the latter and had awarded them the maximum amount provided for by law. 12. On 30 January 2003 the Chişinău Regional Court found that the applicant newspaper had missed the time-limit for lodging its appeal against that judgment but went on to examine the substance of the case. It upheld the lower court's judgment, finding that its decision had been lawful and reasoned. The court did not respond to the applicant's complaint about the alleged lack of impartiality of Judge I.M. The hearing lasted less than 10 minutes and the applicant newspaper was not asked any questions. 13. In an appeal in cassation the applicant newspaper relied on Article 10 of the Convention and on the distinction which the lower courts had failed to make between value-judgments and factual statements. Moreover, the courts had never heard evidence from the plaintiff, and had not taken into account his public-figure status, which should have limited the scope of interference with the applicant's freedom of expression, or the special role played by the press in a democratic society. Finally, the lower courts had failed to respond to most of the points raised by the applicant. 14. On 1 April 2003 the Court of Appeal upheld the judgments of the lower courts, finding that they had been lawful and corresponded to the evidence in the case. No comment was made about Judge I.M.'s alleged lack of impartiality.

6. The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Krnjak, Croatia. 7. The applicant and his family lived in a family house in Krnjak where he also ran a restaurant. The owner of that property was his father, who died in 1992. In January 1999 the applicant was declared his legal heir. 8. In August 1995 the applicant and his family left for Bosnia and Herzegovina. 9. On 27 September 1995 the Temporary Takeover and Managing of Certain Property Act (“the Takeover Act”) entered into force. It provided that property situated in the previously occupied territories, and belonging to persons who had left Croatia, was to be taken into the care of, and controlled, by the State. It also authorised local authorities (takeover commissions) to entrust such property for temporary use by third persons. 10. On 23 May 1996 the Commission for Temporary Takeover and Use of Property of the Municipality of Krnjak (Komisija za privremeno preuzimanje i korištenje imovine Općine Krnjak – “the Takeover Commission”) entitled a certain V.P. to use the applicant's property temporarily, with a view to running the restaurant. 11. On 15 September 1997 the applicant applied for repossession of his property to the Takeover Commission. He received no reply. 12. In January 1998 the applicant reiterated his request for repossession and sought annulment of the Takeover Commission's decision of 23 May 1996. 13. On 4 June 1998 the Takeover Commission replied, without issuing a formal decision, that it had given no decision concerning the applicant's property and that it had no competence to decide on his repossession request. 14. In June 1998 Parliament adopted the Programme for the Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons (“the Programme for Return”), regulating the principles for their return and repossession of their property. 15. In August 1998 the Act on Termination of the Takeover Act (“the Termination Act”) entered into force. It incorporated and gave legal force to the provisions of the Programme for Return providing that those persons, whose property had during their absence from Croatia been given for accommodation of others, had to apply for repossession of their property with the competent local authorities – the housing commissions. 16. According to the above legislation, on 13 August 1998 the applicant applied for repossession of his property to the Housing Commission of the Municipality of Krnjak (Stambena Komisija Općine Krnjak – “the Housing Commission”). 17. On 31 August 1998 the Housing Commission informed the applicant about the status and degree of the damage to his property and, on 1 December 1998, invited him to prove the ownership of the property in question. The applicant did so in April 1999, once the inheritance proceedings after his late father had ended in January 1999. 18. On 4 October 1999 the Housing Commission set aside the Takeover Commission's decision of 23 May 1996. V.P. appealed. 19. On 14 February 2000 the Municipality of Krnjak, acting as the second-instance administrative authority, dismissed V.P.'s appeal. It also ordered him to vacate the house within 15 days following the receipt of the decision and indicated that otherwise it would bring a civil action against him in the competent municipal court. 20. Since V.P. failed to comply with the order, on 13 March 2000 the Housing Commission brought an action in the Karlovac Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Karlovcu) seeking his eviction from the property in question. 21. On 16 May 2000 that court declared the Housing Commission's action of 13 March 2000 inadmissible since, under the Termination Act, the Municipality did not have competence to decide on V.P.'s appeal. It should have rather sent the case-file to the competent appellate authority in the matter, i.e. to the Karlovac Municipal Court. 22. Following the transfer of the case-file by the Municipality of Krnjak to the Karlovac Municipal Court, on 13 February 2001 that court dismissed V.P.'s appeal against the Housing Commission's decision of 4 October 2000, which thereby became final. 23. On 20 March 2001 the Housing Commission again brought a civil action against V.P. in the Karlovac Municipal Court seeking his eviction. 24. The court held hearings on 6 June, 11 October and 22 November 2001. On the last-mentioned date the applicant joined the proceedings as an intervener (umješač) on the side of the Housing Commission. 25. At the hearing held on 20 February 2002 the court gave judgment accepting the Housing Commission's claim and ordering V.P. to vacate the premises. On 18 March 2002 V.P. appealed. 26. On 4 March 2003 the Karlovac County Court (Županijski sud u Karlovcu) dismissed the appeal and upheld the first-instance judgment, which thereby became final. 27. On 22 March 2003 V.P. lodged an appeal on points of law (revizija). After it was declared inadmissible by the Karlovac Municipal Court on 5 May 2003 and that decision was upheld on 19 May 2003 by the Karlovac County Court, V.P. brought the issue of admissibility of his appeal on points of law to the Supreme Court. It appears that the Supreme Court has so far not given its decision. 28. Since V.P.'s appeal of 18 March 2002 did not suspend the enforceability, on 11 March 2002 the Housing Commission applied to the Karlovac Municipal Court for enforcement of the judgment of 20 February 2002. 29. On 18 April 2002 the court issued a writ of execution (rješenje o ovrsi). V.P. appealed against the writ on 7 May 2002. 30. On 5 March 2003 the Karlovac County Court dismissed the appeal and the writ thereby became final. 31. Meanwhile, on 1 October 2002 the Amendments to the Act on Areas of Special State Concern (“the 2002 Amendments”) entered into force. They transferred the jurisdiction in the matter from the housing commissions (which were abolished) to the Ministry of Public Works, Reconstruction and Construction (Ministarstvo za javne radove, obnovu i graditeljstvo – “the Ministry”). Accordingly, the State, represented by the State Attorney's Office, took over the proceedings from the Housing Commission. 32. On 30 April 2003 V.P. requested the Municipal Court to postpone the enforcement. On 2 September 2003 the court dismissed his request and scheduled an intervention of the bailiff for 1 October 2003. On 12 September 2003 V.P. appealed requesting at the same time transfer of jurisdiction (svrsishodna delegacija) from the Karlovac to the Zagreb Municipal Court. On 15 October 2003 the Supreme Court dismissed his request. 33. On 27 May 2003 the applicant joined the enforcement proceedings as an intervener on the side of the State. 34. The bailiff's intervention scheduled for 1 October 2003 was adjourned pending a decision on V.P.'s request for transfer of jurisdiction and because the State Attorney's Office did not receive the summons. The next intervention was scheduled for 22 December 2003. 35. On 18 December 2003 V.P. filed a new request for postponement of enforcement, which was dismissed. 36. On 23 December 2003 the bailiff evicted V.P. and the applicant repossessed his property. 37. On 6 May 2003 the Ministry invited the applicant to contact its competent regional office in order to negotiate a settlement and receive compensation for the prolonged inability to use his property, in accordance with the 2002 Amendments. 38. The applicant did not reply.

5. The applicant was born in 1984 and lives in Dachne village in Crimea. 6. On 23 March 2004 a massive fight between youngsters took place in the centre of Simferopol in which a number of persons sustained injuries varying from slight to serious. 7. On the same day the applicant was questioned by the police as a witness at the hospital where he had accompanied a friend who had been injured in the fight. 8. In March and April 2004 the applicant was summoned by and appeared before the investigator on a number of occasions. 9. On 28 April 2004 the applicant, having been questioned as a witness by the investigator, was detained on police premises on suspicion of armed hooliganism in respect of the events of 23 March 2004. 10. On 1 May 2004 the Kyivskyy District Court of Simferopol (“the Kyivskyy Court”), in allowing the investigator's application, remanded the applicant in custody and rejected a request by him to be placed instead under an undertaking not to abscond. The court gave as grounds for that decision the seriousness of the charges against the applicant, his mediocre character reference from the university where he was studying, his medical fitness for detention, and the risk that he might abscond or impede the investigation if at liberty. Although the management of the school from which he had graduated two years earlier and the authorities of the village where he had been living before his arrest gave the applicant positive character references, the court decided that they “could not provide grounds for the rejection of the [investigator's] application, as law-abiding behaviour is a requisite for life in society, and not an exception to the rule.” 11. On 5 May 2004, in the Court of Appeal of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (“the Crimea Court of Appeal”), the applicant's lawyer challenged the detention of his client, arguing that the applicant had a permanent place of residence, positive character references, suffered from Vitiligo (a chronic disorder which causes depigmentation in patches of skin) which could worsen in detention, and that he had no criminal record. He further noted that the applicant had always appeared voluntarily before the investigator and that his parents could pay bail for his release. 12. On 18 May 2004 the Crimea Court of Appeal rejected the appeal, referring to the seriousness of the charges brought against the applicant. 13. On 15 June 2004 the Kyivskyy Court extended the term of his detention to 28 August 2004 on grounds of the necessity to complete the investigation, the seriousness of the charges and the inherent risk that the applicant would abscond, influence witnesses or reoffend. 14. On 22 June 2004 the applicant was provided access to the case file. 15. On 16 July 2004 the Crimea Court of Appeal extended his detention to 28 November 2004 following a request by the investigator, who maintained that the other co-accused needed more time to study the case file. The court rejected a request by the applicant to be released under an undertaking not to abscond, on grounds of the seriousness of the charges and the risk that he would abscond. 16. In August 2004 the investigation was completed and the applicant, together with the other co-accused, was committed for trial. 17. On 13 September 2004 the Tsentralnyy District Court of Simferopol (“the Tsentralnyy Court”) held a preparatory hearing during which the applicant again asked to be released under an undertaking not to abscond. He argued that all the evidence in the case had been collected by that time so there was no risk that he might tamper with it, that he had a permanent place of residence and well-established social networks, and that he had never hindered the investigation or attempted to abscond or reoffend. The court rejected the request with a final ruling, finding the preventive measure to be in compliance with the criminal procedural legislation. 18. In a judgment of 29 December 2004 the Tsentralnyy Court found the applicant guilty of armed hooliganism, as well as of deliberately inflicting medium and grievous bodily harm, and sentenced him to eight years' imprisonment. 19. On 22 June 2006 the Crimea Court of Appeal upheld that judgment. 20. On 17 May 2007 the Supreme Court changed it, finding the applicant guilty of hooliganism without the use of arms and of deliberately inflicting medium bodily harm, and reduced the sentence to three years and two months' imprisonment.

4. The applicant, an anaesthesiologist, was born in 1968 and lives in Samsun. 5. The applicant was working at the Kars State Hospital when criminal proceedings were instigated against him for alleged involvement in the activities of an illegal organisation. He was accused together with other suspects of, inter alia, hanging posters and banners in various places in Ankara on behalf of that organisation. Throughout the proceedings the applicant maintained his innocence. In the meantime, Kars State Hospital suspended the applicant pending the criminal proceedings. 6. On 11 September 2001 the Ankara State Security Court, on the basis of the evidence contained in the case file, convicted the applicant under Article 7 § 1 of Law no. 3713 and sentenced him to two years and six months' imprisonment and to a fine. The applicant appealed. 7. On an unspecified date a written opinion of the principal public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation dated 10 December 2001 was submitted to that court. This opinion was not communicated to the applicant. 8. On 27 March 2002 the Court of Cassation held a hearing and upheld the judgment of the first-instance court in respect of the applicant. 9. The applicant's request for a rectification of the Court of Cassation's judgment was dismissed by the principal public prosecutor at that court. 10. The applicant submitted that he had been released from prison in July 2003. 11. By an additional judgment dated 4 May 2004, the Ankara State Security Court, taking into account the amendment to the definition of “terror acts” under section 7 of Law no. 3713 pursuant to Law no. 4928, acquitted the applicant, who had not taken part in any violent activities, and nullified his conviction, together with all its consequences. This judgment became final on 11 May 2004. 12. In the meantime, on 28 February 2002, the Supreme Disciplinary Commission of the Ministry of Health decided to dismiss the applicant from the civil service. The applicant's objection to this decision was dismissed by the administrative court who noted, inter alia, that, according to the disciplinary investigation, the applicant had taken fifteen days leave from 2 June 2000 in pursuit of his illegal activities. The court also noted that the applicant's conviction had become final. This decision was subsequently upheld by the Supreme Administrative Court on 27 December 2005. In his observations the applicant submitted that, despite his acquittal, his request for a retrial had been rejected by the administrative court. However, he did not submit any court decisions. 13. According to an attestation dated 10 September 2007 the applicant is currently employed at Atasam hospital in Samsun.

10. The applicants were born in 1942 and 1955 respectively and were residents of Grozny, Chechnya. The first applicant currently resides in Ingushetia, and the second applicant in the Moscow Region. 11. The facts surrounding the deaths of the applicants' relatives and the ensuing investigation were partially disputed. In view of this the Court requested that the Government produce copies of the entire investigation files opened in relation to the applicants' relatives' deaths. The Court also requested that the applicants produce additional documentary evidence in support of their allegations. 12. The submissions of the parties on the facts concerning the circumstances of the applicants' relatives' deaths and the ensuing investigations are set out in Sections 1 and 2 below. A description of the materials submitted to the Court is contained in Part B. 13. The first applicant lived at 101 Tashkalinskaya Street in the Staropromyslovskiy district of Grozny. After 1991 the first applicant, who is ethnic Ingush, attempted to sell the house and leave because he felt threatened by the situation in Chechnya, but could not find anyone to buy it. During the hostilities in 1994-1996 the first applicant and his family stayed in Ingushetia, and on their return found that all their property had been destroyed or looted. 14. In November 1999 the first applicant left Grozny because of the renewed hostilities. His relatives decided to stay in Grozny to look after their houses and property. They were his brother, Khamid Khashiyev (born in 1952), his sister Lidiya Khashiyeva (born in 1943) and her two sons, Rizvan Taymeskhanov (born in 1977) and Anzor Taymeskhanov (born in 1982). The first applicant's brother lived in the street parallel to Tashkalinskaya Street, at 109 Neftyanaya Street, and his sister lived in the neighbouring house at 107 Neftyanaya Street. 15. The second applicant was a resident of the “Tashkala” quarter in the Staropromyslovskiy district of Grozny. In October 1999 she left the city together with her mother and sister because of the hostilities. Her brother, Adlan Akayev (born in 1953) remained to look after their property and house, located at 24 4-th Neftyanoy Lane. 16. In December 1999 the Russian federal army started an operation to take control of Grozny. Heavy fighting lasted until the end of January 2000, when the central parts of the city were finally taken. The exact date on which the Staropromyslovskiy district of Grozny was taken by the federal forces is somewhat unclear. The applicants submitted, referring to the Government RIA and Interfax news agencies, that by 20 January 2000 the Staropromyslovskiy district was under the Russian federal forces' firm control. Several witness statements produced by the parties indicate that the federal troops were in control of the district as from 27 December 1999. The Government disputed this allegation and referred to two witness statements, allegedly contained in criminal investigation file no. 12038 which suggest that, although troops were present in the district as early as 1 January 2000, they still faced scattered resistance from the Chechen fighters (“boyeviki”). However, no such testimonies are contained in the copy of the file submitted by the Government to the Court, nor are they listed in the list of documents attached to the criminal case-file. 17. At the end of January 2000 the applicants learned that their relatives had been killed in Grozny. On 25 January 2000 the first applicant, his sister Movlatkhan Bokova (maiden name Khashiyeva), and one of their former neighbours from Grozny, Petimat (also spelled Fatima) Goygova, travelled to Grozny to find out more about the state of their relatives. At 107 Neftyanaya Street they found three bodies lying in the courtyard with gunshot wounds and other marks. These were Lidiya Khashiyeva and Anzor Taymeskhanov, the first applicant's sister and nephew, and Adlan Akayev, the second applicant's brother. The second applicant's brother was holding his identity card as Head of the Physics Department of the Grozny Teaching Institute. Other documents were in a shirt pocket: his passport, identity card as researcher for the Grozny Oil Institute and his driving licence. Identity documents were also found on the two other bodies. 18. The first applicant and the women had to return to Ingushetia on the same day, because of the curfew imposed after 5 p.m. There they informed the family of Adlan Akayev, including the second applicant, of his death. Having arranged for transport, on 28 January 2000 they went to Grozny to collect the bodies. Soldiers from a roadblock in the Staropromyslovskiy district accompanied them to the house at 107 Neftyanaya Street and helped them to collect the bodies. The first applicant brought the bodies to the village of Voznesenskoye in Ingushetia, where they were buried on 29 January 2000. 19. The first applicant submits that the bodies of his relatives bore marks of numerous stab and gunshot wounds and bruises, and that some bones were broken. In particular, the body of Lidiya Khashiyeva had 19 stab wounds, her arms and legs were broken and teeth were missing. The body of Anzor Taymeskhanov had multiple stab and gunshot wounds, and his jaw was broken (see § 51 below). 20. On 28 January 2000 the second applicant travelled to Voznesenskoye and saw the bodies of her brother and of the first applicant's relatives. She saw numerous gunshot and stab wounds and traces of beatings and torture on the body of her brother and on the other bodies. In particular, she submits that her brother's body had seven gunshot wounds to his skull, heart and abdominal area. The left side of his face was bruised and his collar-bone was broken (see § 61). 21. Both applicants submit that they did not contact a medical doctor or take photographs of the bodies at that stage due to the state of shock caused by their relatives' violent deaths. 22. On 2 February 2000 the village authorities of Psedakh, Ingushetia, issued a certificate to confirm that the body of Adlan Akayev, brought from the Staropromyslovskiy district of Grozny, was buried on 29 January 2000 in the village cemetery. 23. On 9 February 2000 the second applicant travelled to Grozny. In the courtyard of the house at 107 Neftyanaya Street she picked up machine-gun cartridges and her brother's hat. On the same day she saw five other bodies in a nearby house. All had been shot. She learned that a sixth woman from the same group, Elena G., had been wounded but survived. The second applicant later traced her to Ingushetia. Elena G. informed the second applicant that they had been shot at by soldiers and that she had last seen the applicant's brother alive on the evening of 19 January 2000. 24. On 10 February 2000, the first applicant, together with his daughter and sister, travelled to Grozny again, hoping to find his missing brother and nephew. With help from a local resident they found three bodies lying between nearby garages. These were the bodies of Khamid Khashiyev and Rizvan Taymeskhanov, the first applicant's brother and second nephew. The third body belonged to Magomed Goygov, a neighbour. The first applicant took photographs of the bodies. He then brought a car to transport the bodies to Ingushetia, where they were buried the next day. Goygov's body was collected by his relatives on 11 February 2000 for burial. 25. The first applicant submits that Khamid Khashiyev's body was mutilated, half of his skull was smashed and some fingers had been cut off. Rizvan Taymeskhanov's body was grossly mutilated from numerous gunshots (see §§ 52 and 54). 26. On 10 February 2000 at the first applicant's request, the three bodies were examined by officers of the Nazran Department of the Interior, who reported numerous wounds to the head, body and extremities. The examination took place in the Malgobek town morgue. The officers did not remove the clothes from the bodies, which were frozen. 27. The second's applicant's mother, Isit Akayeva, died on 29 April 2000 at the age of 65 of a heart attack. The second applicant submits that her death was brought about by the news of her only son's death. 28. On 7 February 2000 the Malgobek Town Court in Ingushetia, acting on a motion by the second applicant, certified the death of her brother, Adlan Akayev, which had occurred in Grozny on 20 January 2000. The court based its decision on statements of the applicant and two witnesses. They confirmed that his body had been found in Grozny in the courtyard of the Khashiyevs' house with numerous gunshot wounds and that he had been buried on 29 January 2000 in the village of Psedakh. Following the court's decision, the civil registration office of the Malgobek district in Ingushetia issued a death certificate for the second applicant's brother on 18 February 2000. 29. On 14 March 2000 the office of the Malgobek Town Prosecutor issued a paper to the first applicant certifying that on 10 February 2000 the dead body of his brother, Khamid Khashiyev, had been found in Grozny and that, given the numerous gunshot wounds to the head and body, his brother appeared to have died a violent death. 30. On 7 April 2000 the Malgobek Town Court in Ingushetia, at the first applicant's request, certified the deaths of Khamid Khashiyev, Lidiya Khashiyeva, Rizvan Taymeskhanov and Anzor Taymeskhanov, which had occurred in Grozny, Chechnya, on 19 January 2000. The court based its decision on statements by the applicant and two witnesses. The court noted in the decision that a criminal case had been opened and that an investigation was in progress (there is no evidence that a criminal case had been opened at that time). Following the court decision, the civil registration office of the Malgobek district in Ingushetia issued death certificates for the first applicant's four relatives on 19 April 2000. 31. The Government submitted a copy of investigation file no. 12038, opened on 3 May 2000 by the Grozny Town Prosecutor's Office following a publication entitled “Freedom or Death” in the Novaya Gazeta newspaper on 27 April 2000 about mass murder of civilians by the “205th brigade” in the Novaya Katayama settlement in Grozny on 19 January 2000. The relevant documents, as submitted by the Government, are listed below in Part B. 32. On 27 May 2000 the military prosecutor of military unit no. 20102 (the Russian federal military headquarters in Chechnya) informed the first applicant, in response to a complaint he had made on 5 April 2000 concerning the killing of his relatives, that, after a review by the prosecutor, no decision to open a criminal investigation had been taken for lack of corpus delicti in the actions of federal servicemen. 33. On 6 June 2000 the Malgobek Town Prosecutor informed the first applicant that criminal case no. 20540020, opened on 4 May 2000 into the deaths of Rizvan Taymeskhanov and Khamid Khashiyev, had been transferred on 15 May 2000 to the Republican Prosecutor in Ingushetia. 34. On 30 June 2000 the office of the Chief Military Prosecutor, in response to a request by the Memorial Human Rights Centre for information regarding the investigation into the second applicant's brother's death, forwarded this request to the Military Prosecutor of the Northern Caucasus. 35. On 17 July 2000 the second applicant was informed by a letter from the office of the Chief Military Prosecutor, addressed to the special prosecutor's office in the Northern Caucasus, that a “local prosecutor's office” was investigating the case of her brother's death. 36. On 20 July 2000 the Chief Military Prosecutor, in response to an enquiry from the NGO Human Rights Watch about violations of the rights of civilians in Grozny in December 1999 - January 2000, informed the NGO that the military prosecutors were investigating only one case - that of the murder and injury of two women – which was unconnected with the applicants. That investigation was still ongoing and was being supervised by the office of the Chief Military Prosecutor. 37. In September 2000 the two criminal cases opened at the applicants' requests were joined in the Grozny Town Prosecutor's Office with investigation no. 12038. This investigation was adjourned and reopened several times. The last document in the file submitted by the Government is dated 22 January 2003; in it the Deputy to the Chechnya Republican Prosecutor extended the period of investigation until 27 February 2003. The investigation carried out by the Grozny Town Prosecutor's Office focused on the version initially submitted by the applicants and by all witnesses whose statements had been produced, alleging that the killings were committed by a military detachment. The investigation failed to identify the detachment which was responsible and no one was charged with the crimes (see Part B below for a description of the documents in the investigation file). 38. In November 2000 the Presidium of the Supreme Court in Ingushetia rejected a request for supervisory review (protest) by the Republican Prosecutor, in which he sought to quash the decision of the Malgobek Town Court of 7 February 2000. Another request for supervisory review was made by the Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, and on 1 October 2001 the Supreme Court quashed the decision. The Supreme Court referred to Article 250 of the Russian Code of Civil Procedure, which states that those who request courts to establish facts of legal significance must indicate the reasons for that request. It found that the second applicant had failed to set out the reasons for which she sought “legal certification” of her brother's death. The case was remitted back to the Malgobek Town Court. On 27 November 2001 the Malgobek Town Court decided not to consider the case on the merits, since the second applicant had twice failed to appear for a hearing without valid reasons. The second applicant submits that she was not informed of the new set of proceedings in the Malgobek Town Court and that the summonses were not delivered to her. 39. At the end of 2002 the first applicant applied to a district court in Ingushetia seeking pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages from the Ministry of Finance. The applicant stated that his four relatives had been killed in Grozny in January 2000 by the military. He had found their bodies and had transported them with great difficulty to Ingushetia, where they were buried. A criminal investigation was opened, but failed to establish the servicemen responsible for the killings. Witness Nikolay G. testified to the court that he lived in the Staropromyslovskiy district not far from the applicant's family. In January 2000, about a month after the federal troops had established firm control over the district, he saw the servicemen leading Khamid Khashiyev and two of his nephews towards the garages. They were walking in front of an armoured personnel carrier (APC); armed soldiers were sitting on its hull. Soon afterwards he heard automatic rifle shots from the garages. When he attempted to go there, soldiers threatened him. He also submitted that he was threatened by someone from the prosecutor's office to “keep his mouth shut”. Other witnesses testified about the circumstances in which the bodies were discovered in Grozny, transported to Ingushetia and buried, and about the state of the bodies prior to burial. 40. On 26 February 2003 the Nazran District Court in Ingushetia partially granted the first applicant's claim and awarded him pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages in the amount of 675,000 roubles. 41. The court noted that it was common knowledge that the Staropromyslovskiy district was under the firm control of the Russian federal forces by the material time, and that this did not need to be proved. At that time only federal soldiers were able to travel about town on an APC and to conduct identity checks. That Lidiya Khashiyeva and Anzor Taymeskhanov had been killed during an identity check was corroborated by the fact that their bodies were found in the courtyard of their house with identity documents in their hands. The court further noted that the exact military unit responsible for the killings had not been established by the investigation, which had been adjourned on 8 June 2002. However, all military units were State bodies and therefore pecuniary damage should be paid by the State. 42. The decision was upheld at the final instance by the Ingushetia Supreme Court on 4 April 2003, and on 23 April 2003 the applicant was issued the writ of execution. The decision was not executed immediately because, as the Government submit, the applicant failed to present details of his bank account. On 29 December 2004 the applicant received the award in full. 43. In their submissions on the merits the Government stated that investigative measures continued in 2003. On 18 March 2003 the second applicant was recognised as a victim in the criminal proceedings. On 15 April 2003 additional forensic reports were prepared on the bodies of Khamid Khashiyev and Rizvan Taymeskhanov (presumably, on the basis of the existing descriptions of the bodies). Certain additional witnesses were questioned. The Government did not, however, submit copies of these documents to the Court. 44. The Government submit that the investigation into criminal case no. 12038 found itself in a “deadlock”, since it proved impossible to identify eye-witnesses to the killings. 45. The parties submitted numerous documents concerning the investigation into the killings. The main documents of relevance are as follows: 46. The Government submitted a copy of the investigation file in criminal case no. 12038, which comprises two volumes, and a list of documents contained therein. According to the list, the file contained 130 documents, of which 88 were submitted to the Court. On 7 March 2003 the Court reiterated its request to the Russian Government to submit a copy of the complete investigation file. The Government responded that the documents withheld were not relevant to the circumstances of the present case. 47. The most important documents contained in the file are as follows: a) Decision to open a criminal investigation 48. On 3 May 2000, following the publication of an article entitled “Freedom or Death” in the Novaya Gazeta newspaper on 27 April 2000, the investigator of the Grozny Town Prosecutor's Office opened a criminal investigation under Article 105 (a), (d), (e) and (j) of the Criminal Code “concerning mass murder by the '205th brigade' of civilian population in the Novaya Katayama settlement in Grozny on 19 January 2000”. b) Statements by the first applicant and his sister 49. The case file contains the first applicant's brief statements of facts concerning his relatives' deaths and requests to conduct an investigation, dated 10 February 2000 (addressed to the Malgobek Town Prosecutor) and of 1 March 2000 (addressed to the Russian President). 50. In their further testimonies dated 5 May 2000 the first applicant and his sister Movlatkhan Bokova (born Khashiyeva) gave details concerning the discovery of their relatives' bodies. Both stated that on 25 January 2000 they had travelled to Grozny with Petimat Goygova, their neighbour from Grozny. On Ipronovskaya Street they met a local resident, Viskhan, who told them that their relatives had been taken away by federal soldiers. After discovering the three bodies at 107 Neftyanaya Street they returned to Ipronovskaya Street, where they met a group of soldiers who were taking things from a house and stacking them in a lorry. The first applicant asked the soldiers' help to remove the bodies, but one of them, who introduced himself as the commander, Dima, who was aged about 19 and dressed in camouflage, refused. When the applicant insisted and said that his sister and nephew had been killed, Dima said that the fighters had killed 32 soldiers and that the murders were an act of revenge on their part. The applicant lost his temper and started to curse, but one of the soldiers raised his gun and Movlatkhan stepped forward to protect him, then led him away. Both certified that they could have identified the house and “commander Dima”. They returned to Grozny on 28 January with a car, removed the bodies with the assistance of soldiers from a nearby roadblock and transported them to Ingushetia. 51. Movlatkhan Bokova further testified that she had washed Lidiya Khashiyeva's body before burial, and had seen numerous (about 20) stab and gunshot wounds on her body. Her left arm was broken and front teeth were missing. She further testified that Anzor Taymeskhanov's head bore numerous blow marks and that his jaw had been broken. 52. The first applicant and his sister also testified about their return to Grozny on 10 February 2000. They stated that they again met Viskhan, who told them that their relatives had been led away by soldiers towards the garages. They followed his directions and found three bodies, all frozen to the ground and with heavy wounds to the head. The first applicant took photographs of the bodies at the spot and went to fetch a car. On the same day they delivered the bodies to Ingushetia, where they were buried the following day, on 11 February 2000. They also stated that they had collected cartridges in the yard of 107 Neftyanaya Street which were still in their possession. c) Statement by Raykhat Khashiyeva 53. The first applicant's daughter, Raykhat Khashiyeva, accompanied her father and aunt on their trip to Grozny on 10 February 2000. In her statement of 10 May 2000 she confirmed their accounts regarding the discovery of the bodies of Khamid Khashiyev, Rizvan Taymeskhanov and Magomed Goygov. d) Description of the bodies and forensic expertise 54. An examination of the bodies of Khamid Khashiyev and Rizvan Taymeskhanov was conducted by an investigator from the Malgobek Town Prosecutor's Office in the municipal morgue on 10 February 2000. The bodies were frozen, and the examination was conducted without removing the clothes. On 14 February 2000 two forensic reports were prepared by a forensic expert, based on the investigator's descriptions and without examining the bodies. The report stated that Khashiyev's body had eight gunshot wounds and that his death had been caused by a gunshot wound to the head. Taymeskhanov's body had eight gunshot wounds and his death also appeared to have been caused by numerous gunshot wounds to the head and body. 55. On 7 and 8 May 2000 the Malgobek Town Prosecutor's Office made a report and took photographs of other evidence in the case – identity documents of the deceased persons, photographs of the bodies taken by the first applicant and Rizvan Taymeskhanov's and Khamid Khashiyev's clothes. e) Decision to recognise the first applicant as a victim 56. On 5 May 2000 the first applicant was recognised as a victim in the criminal proceedings and he signed the notification thereof in the Malgobek Town Prosecutor's Office. On 15 June 2000 the same notification was signed at the Grozny Town Prosecutor's Office. f) Statements by local residents 57. On 14 May 2000 U. and Y., two women residents of the Staropromyslovskiy district of Grozny, made statements. Both witnesses confirmed that they had seen the bodies of people who had been shot and that, at the relevant time, the district had been under the control of federal forces. Neither of them had witnessed the executions but referred to the “rumours” that the murders had been committed by federal troops. Both witnesses testified that they had seen soldiers looting abandoned houses in the district. g) Statements by Magomed Goygov's relatives 58. Two female relatives of Magomed Goygov, Petimat Goygova and M., made statements related to the circumstances surrounding the discovery of the bodies of Maryam Goygova, Magomed's mother, on 19 January 2000 at the intersection of Neftyanaya Street and 4th Lane, and Magomed Goygov, on 10 February 2000. Petimat testified that a man from the neighbourhood named Viskhan told her that their relatives had been killed by soldiers from the 205th infantry brigade from Budennovsk, and referred to two soldiers who had told him the same thing – one named Oleg, the other Dima. She also testified that on 21 January 2000, when they were taking Maryam Goygova's body to Ingushetia, they took along a wounded woman, Elena G., who had survived an attack by soldiers on 19 January and who was later taken to the Sunzhenskiy hospital in Ingushetia. h) Evidence related to Yuriy Zh. 59. Several documents refer to a certain Yuriy Zh., whose family had resided at 130 Neftyanaya Street. From the witnesses' testimonies it appears that Yuriy Zh. left Grozny at the end of 1980s, while his parents (or aunt and uncle) lived at the said address. They had been killed in 1997 by Chechen fighters and their house had been occupied. The witnesses referred to “rumours” that Yuriy Zh. was among the soldiers involved in the killings and that he was motivated by revenge. The house at 130 Neftyanaya was destroyed during the fighting. Several requests for information about Yuriy Zh. were sent by the investigators to the military authorities and to the civil authorities of the neighbouring regions, but the answers to these requests were either negative or were not provided by the Government. i) Testimony by Anna Politkovskaya 60. The journalist Anna Politkovskaya, author of the article “Freedom or Death”, was questioned on several occasions by the investigators. She testified that in February 2000 she was in Ingushetia and in the Staropromyslovskiy district of Grozny, where she had interviewed several witnesses of the massacre and the relatives of the deceased. In their interviews, several witnesses had referred to the “205th brigade” as being responsible for the murders. j) The second applicant's statement 61. In her statement by 12 July 2000, addressed to the Chief Military Prosecutor, the second applicant testified that on 25 January 2000 her brother's body had been found in the courtyard of the Khashiyevs' house by Magomed Khashiyev and his sister Movlatkhan. The second applicant saw her brother's body in Ingushetia and noted several gunshot wounds to his face, heart and abdomen. His left collar-bone was broken. His identity card from the Grozny Teaching Institute had been found in his hand, and his passport and other identity documents and two 50-rouble notes were in his pocket. 62. On 9 February 2000 the second applicant travelled to Grozny. In the courtyard at 107 Neftyanaya Street she picked up several cartridges from an automatic weapon and her brother's hat. On the same day the second applicant saw five dead bodies in a nearby garage, belonging to three women and two men. A sixth person from that group, Elena G., had survived the massacre and later told the applicant, who found her in a hospital in Ingushetia, that they were shot on 19 January by soldiers from the 205th brigade from Budennovsk. She also said that she had seen Adlan Akayev and the Khashiyevs in the evening of 19 January 2000 and that they were alive. On the same day she was picked up by the Goygovs, who had come to collect their dead, and taken to Ingushetia to a hospital. On 22 February 2000 the second applicant met with Omar S., who was at the material time living in Grozny, who had heard the members of the military talking in the commendatura of the Staropromyslovskiy district after 20 January that they had shot a “professor”. Omar's story was related in the article “Freedom or Death”. k) Decision to join the investigations 63. On 22 August 2000 the Grozny Town Prosecutor's Office opened a criminal investigation into the killing of the second applicant's brother. On 5 September 2000 this investigation was joined with criminal case no. 12038 related to the mass murder in the Staropromyslovskiy district. On 5 September 2000 the deputy Grozny Town Prosecutor created an investigating group, made up of three investigators, to work on the case. l) Documents relating to identification of the relevant military units 64. On 19 November 2000 the headquarters of the United Group Alignment (UGA) of the Ministry of Defence (based in Khankala) replied to the prosecutor's request and submitted a list of military units identified by five-digit numbers only, which had been deployed in Grozny between 5 January and 25 February 2000. 65. On 4 March 2001 an investigator from the Chechen Republican Prosecutor's Office sent a request to the military prosecutor of military unit no. 20102 (Khankala), asking to identify the exact temporary location of the military units at the relevant time, to identify the commanding officers and retrieve notes referring to operations in the Staropromyslovskiy district. The file reviewed by the Court contained no reply to that request. m) The prosecutor's orders 66. At different stages of the proceedings several orders were produced by the Chechen Republican Prosecutor's Office enumerating the steps to be taken by the investigators. The order of 14 August 2001 listed ten persons whose bodies had been discovered in Novaya Katayama, including the applicants' relatives. On 16 January 2003 the same prosecutor's office ordered the investigators to establish possible places of burial of other civilians, to identify further witnesses and victims and to identify military units possibly responsible for the crimes. 67. A summary of the main steps of the investigation is given in the order by the Grozny Town Prosecutor dated 22 January 2003, which is the last document in the case-file. Criminal investigation file no. 12038 was started by the Grozny Town Prosecutor's Office on 3 May 2000 following the publication of the article “Freedom or Death” about mass murder in the Staropromyslovskiy district. On 4 May 2000 the Malgobek Town Prosecutor's Office in Ingushetia opened a criminal investigation following the first applicant's complaint concerning the killing of his relatives. On 23 July 2000 both criminal cases were joined as no. 12038. On 22 August 2000 the Grozny Town Prosecutor's Office opened a criminal investigation following the second applicant's complaint concerning the killing of her brother. On 5 September 2000 it was joined to criminal case no. 12038. 68. The case was adjourned seven times and the investigation was renewed on eight occasions. The file was transferred four times between the Grozny Town Prosecutor's Office and the Chechen Republican Prosecutor's Office. The document concludes with a list of tasks that should be carried out by the investigation team, including identification of the military units deployed in the Staropromyslovskiy district of Grozny at the relevant dates, identification of the burial places of civilians in the Novaya Katayama settlement, identification of witnesses and the victims of the crimes, etc. 69. The applicants submitted a number of additional documents relating to the circumstances of the killings and discovery of the bodies. The main documents of relevance are as follows: a) Forensic report 70. The applicants submitted a statement by Christopher Mark Milroy, registered medical practitioner, Professor of Forensic Pathology at the University of Sheffield and Consultant Pathologist to the British Home Office. The statement was prepared on the basis of the applicants' submissions concerning the circumstances of their relatives' deaths and of eight colour photographs taken by the first applicant when the bodies of Khamid Khashiyev, Rizvan Taymeskhanov and Magomed Goygov were found. 71. The expert concluded that “the photographs show injuries in keeping with bullets fired from a high velocity rifle. ... High velocity rifles can cause significantly destructive injuries. Those unused to looking at injuries caused by these weapons may mistake the cause of injuries produced by these weapons.” He further listed a number of procedural steps normally taken in an examination of a body of a person who has died in suspicious circumstances. In the expert's opinion, these should include an x-ray of the body to identify and recover the projectiles and detailed examination and photographing of the external injuries, “as the pattern of injuries may indicate whether the victims were shot at close range or they had been tortured”. b) Information from the Office of the General Prosecutor 72. In his letter dated 25 April 2003, Deputy General Prosecutor Mr Fridinsky replied to a request for information sent by Mr Kovalev, a member of the State Duma. The letter contains information relating to the prosecution of army servicemen in Chechnya for crimes committed against civilians. Since the beginning of the “counter-terrorist operation”, 58 indictments have been forwarded to the courts by the military prosecutors and 74 persons have been indicted. Of those, 12 cases concerned murder, 13 – theft, four – abuse of power, five – careless driving of military vehicles, etc. 51 persons were found guilty, of whom seven were officers, 22 were professional soldiers and sergeants, 19 were conscript soldiers and three were non-commissioned officers. In addition, the Chechen Republican Prosecutor's Office brought 17 charges against 29 servicemen of the Ministry of Interior for crimes against the civilian population. From the description attached to the letter it follows that, in the majority of cases, the sentences were conditional or were lifted in application of an amnesty. 73. A number of documents submitted by the applicants relate to the proceedings initiated by them in the domestic courts in order to have the facts of their relatives' deaths established. a) The first applicant's statement 74. On 5 April 2000 the first applicant submitted an application to the Malgobek Town Court in Ingushetia, seeking to have certified the facts of the deaths of his brother Khamid Khashiyev, his sister Lidiya Khashiyeva and his two nephews, Rizvan Taymeskhanov and Anzor Taymeskhanov. The first applicant submitted that his relatives had remained in Grozny during the winter of 1999 – 2000, while he and the rest of the family escaped the hostilities to Ingushetia. On 17 January 2000 the soldiers of the “205th battalion” of the federal army entered Staropromyslovskiy district and “committed outrages”. On 19 January 2000 they entered his sister's household and killed his relatives in a brutal fashion, causing numerous firearms and stab wounds. The first applicant learnt the details of the killings when he attended the funeral of a neighbour, Maryam Goygova. His relatives were buried in Ingushetia. A criminal investigation had been opened and was ongoing. The declaration of deaths was required to obtain death certificates from the civil registration office. b) Transcript of the court proceedings of 5 – 7 April 2000 75. From the transcript of the hearing of 5 April 2000 it follows that the court heard the applicant, who repeated his statement, and two witnesses to the burial from the village of Voznesenskoye. They merely confirmed that the bodies had been brought to Voznesenskoye for burial and that they were aware that the killings had been committed by the federal soldiers. The court issued its decision on 7 April 2000. c) The second applicant's statement 76. On 3 February 2000 the second applicant submitted an application to the Malgobek Town Court, seeking to establish the fact of her brother's death. She submitted that her brother's body had been found in Grozny on 21 January 2000 in the vicinity of his house. His death was caused by numerous gunshot wounds. His body had been brought from Grozny and buried in the village of Psedakh in Ingushetia on 28 January 2000. The court decision certifying his death was required to obtain a death certificate from the civil registration office. d) Transcript of the court proceedings of 7 February 2000 77. From the transcript of the hearing of 7 February 2000 it follows that the court heard the second applicant and two witnesses. The second applicant testified that in November 1999 she and her aunt (her mother's sister) had moved from Grozny to Ingushetia and lived with her mother in the village of Psedakh. Her brother Adlan remained in Grozny to look after the property. On 27 January 2000 Liza Khashiyeva and Raya Khashiyeva came to them and said that three bodies had been found in their family house in Grozny, and that one of them was her brother's. Her relative D. went to Grozny with the Khashiyevs and brought the body back. On 28 January 2000 her brother was buried in Psedakh. 78. Witness D. testified that she was a close relative of the second applicant's mother. On 27 January 2000 they were visited in Psedakh by the Khashiyevs who told them that the body of Adlan Akayev was in the courtyard of their house in Grozny. They identified him by his card from the Grozny Teaching Institute, where he had been the Head of the Physics department. On 28 January 2000 they brought his body to Psedakh and buried him. Another witness from Psedakh confirmed the fact of burial. The court issued its decision on 7 February 2000.

5. The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Odessa. 6. On 27 April 2002, in the course of a police operation, an undercover police officer bought a substantial quantity of cannabis from the applicant. The applicant was immediately arrested in accordance with Article 263 of the Administrative Offences Code for a violation of the drug circulation rules which constituted an administrative offence laid down in Article 44 of that Code. Following a body search and a search of the applicant’s car, the police found further quantities of the drug. 7. On 29 April 2002 the local police office instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant for drug trafficking. 8. On 2 May 2002 the Ovidiopolskyy District Court of Odessa (hereinafter “the District Court”) considered a request by the investigator for the applicant to be placed in pre-trial detention and rejected it. However, it extended the period of the applicant’s arrest up to a total of ten days, ordering the investigative authorities to obtain more information on the identity of the applicant and establish further circumstances justifying his detention pending trial. 9. On 8 May 2002 the District Court ordered the applicant’s pre-trial detention on the ground that the applicant was charged with a serious crime and, if at large, would continue his criminal activity and abscond from the investigation and trial. 10. On 25 June 2002 the District Court extended the period of the applicant’s pre-trial detention until 29 July 2002 as the investigative authorities needed more time to complete the case file, namely, to complete the biological expert examination, to order and carry out a narcotics forensic examination, to question Mr. Sh., who was the witness in the case, to familiarise the applicant with the case file, and to draw up the bill of indictment. The District Court also found that, given the character of the applicant and the gravity of the crime that had been committed, the preventive measure should be left unchanged. 11. On 29 July 2002 the applicant was provided with access to the criminal case file to prepare his defence. 12. On 6 August 2002 the applicant lodged a complaint against the investigation authorities with the District Court, claiming that there had been no legal basis for his detention, in so far as the period of his detention, fixed in the District Court’s decision of 25 June 2002, had expired on 29 July 2002 and had not been extended. This complaint was joined to the criminal case file. 13. On 17 September 2002 the applicant finished studying the case file. 14. On 18 September 2002 the supervising prosecutor approved the bill of indictment and the case file was referred to the District Court for adjudication. 15. On 2 January 2003 the District Court considered the applicant’s complaint of 6 August 2002 in the course of the preliminary hearing and found that the applicant’s detention after 29 July 2002 had been lawful. In particular, the District Court established that during the period between 29 July and 17 September 2002 the applicant had been studying the case file and, in accordance with Article 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, this period was not taken into account in calculating the overall period of his detention pending trial. It further noted that on 18 September 2002 the case file had been referred to the District Court and therefore the applicant’s complaint was unsubstantiated. The District Court did not specify the reasons or legal basis for the applicant’s detention after the case had been referred to the court. At the same hearing the District Court considered that there had been no grounds for changing the preventive measure in respect of the applicant, but did not state this conclusion in the operative part of the decision. The preliminary hearing was held in the presence of the prosecutor; the applicant and his lawyer were absent. 16. According to the Government, on several occasions in the course of the trial, namely 15 July 2003, 22 October 2003, 22 January 2004, 4 February 2004, and 27 April 2004, the District Court considered the applicant’s requests for release and rejected all of them because he was charged with a serious crime and might abscond from the investigation and trial if at liberty. 17. On 12 May 2004 the District Court found the applicant guilty of drug trafficking and sentenced him to six years’ imprisonment, having included in the sentence the period of the applicant’s detention from 27 April 2002. 18. On the same day the District Court issued a separate ruling to the effect that the applicant’s arrest on 27 April 2002 conducted under the Administrative Offences Code had not been lawful since Article 44 of that Code, relied on by the police officers, did not cover drug trafficking and was therefore evidently inapplicable to the applicant, who had been arrested when selling the drug to the undercover agent. The District Court notified the Odessa Regional Police Department of the established violation of the procedural law committed by the police officers and ordered that an internal inquiry into the circumstances of the applicant’s arrest be carried out.

7. The applicant was born in born in 1950. She is a choreographer and lives in Łódź, Poland. 8. On 10 June 1992 at 11 p.m. Mr Andrzej Kern, at that time the Deputy Speaker of the Sejm, made a formal notification of the commission of an offence (zawiadomienie o popełnieniu przestępstwa) to the Łódź Regional Prosecutor, E.S., alleging that the applicant and her husband had kidnapped his 17-year-old daughter, M.K. The applicant submitted that the allegation was false as M.K. had in fact run away from home and had only been accompanied by the applicant’s son who had been her boyfriend for a long time. M.K. had previously run away from home on several occasions because of conflicts with her parents. Prosecutor E.S., who – according to the applicant – was a friend of Mr Kern, immediately instructed the Łódź Deputy Regional Prosecutor E.C. to take charge of the case. 9. On the same day, i.e. 10 June 1992, the prosecutor E.C. signed a warrant authorising the search of the applicant’s flat. The warrant was intended to search the flat for M.K. and for drugs. On 11 June 1992 prosecutor E.C. signed an order allowing the tapping of the applicant’s telephone. 10. On 11 June 1992 at 1 a.m. the applicant’s husband went to his cottage situated in the suburbs of Łódź. He was arrested by police officers who then searched the cottage. Prosecutor E.S. and Mr Kern were present at the scene. Subsequently, the applicant’s husband was taken to the Łódź Regional Police Station, where he was detained overnight. 11. On 11 June 1992 at 4 a.m. police officers searched the applicant’s flat in her presence. However, they did not find either M.K. or drugs. The police officers advised the applicant that her husband had been detained and served her with a summons to report on the same day at 12 noon to the Regional Police Station for questioning. 12. In the morning of 11 June 1992 the applicant’s husband was taken handcuffed to the premises of the regional prosecution service. He was questioned by prosecutors E.S. and E.C.. Mr Kern was present during the questioning. The applicant’s husband was released after the questioning. (b) The detention of the applicant 13. The applicant failed to report for questioning on 11 June 1992. She submitted to the police a letter explaining that she had to care for her daughter who was ill. Subsequently, the applicant failed to report for questioning on 15 and 17 June 1992. On 23 and 24 June 1992 police officers tried to serve a summons on the applicant, but could not find her at her place of residence. 14. On 25 June 1992 prosecutor E.C. charged the applicant with kidnapping and signed an arrest warrant for her. Prosecutor E.C. also charged the applicant’s son with kidnapping. 15. On 29 June 1992 the applicant was taken into custody. She was detained in the Łódź prison hospital, apparently in the psychiatric ward. 16. On 1 and 2 July 1992 the applicant was questioned by prosecutor E.C. She was also confronted with Mr Kern. 17. In the afternoon of 2 July 1992 the applicant was released from detention. (c) The end of the criminal proceedings against the applicant 18. On 30 June 1992 the applicant applied for a transfer of her case to a prosecutor who worked outside the Łódź region. On 4 August 1992 the Ministry of Justice advised her that the application had been allowed and that her case had been taken over by the Poznań Regional Prosecutor R.G. 19. On 16 September 1992 prosecutor R.G. decided to discontinue the criminal proceedings against the applicant and her son. He considered that they had not kidnapped M.K. The prosecutor referred to the statement taken from M.K. who testified that it had been her decision to run away from home and that she had asked the applicant’s son to accompany her. 20. Mr Kern and his wife lodged appeals against the decision to discontinue the criminal proceedings against the applicant and her son, but on 15 February 1993 prosecutor B.M. of the Ministry of Justice dismissed them. The prosecutor considered that the allegations of kidnapping were groundless. (d) The publicity surrounding the case 21. The case concerning the alleged kidnapping of M.K. received wide coverage in the media. 22. In 1993 the applicant stood as an independent candidate in the parliamentary elections. 23. On 22 August 1993 she published an article in the weekly newspaper “Angora”. The first half of the article, which was published in a section entitled “Pre‑election Pranks”, read as follows: “WHY? I am an independent candidate for the Senate, not connected to any ‘networks’, relations or obligations. The fact that I am described in the press and television as ‘a mother-in-law of M. K.’ probably shows that the authors cannot mention names since they use such a euphemism. It is not my achievement and it was not a result of my efforts that we have become a family with Mr Kern. It can be explained by my son and his wife, if it is important ... In order to explain the origin of the idea of standing in the elections to the Senate I have to go back to the events which took place a year ago. At that time, I learned at my cost what the abuse of power meant! The Deputy Speaker of the Sejm at that time, directed by emotions and personal animosities, made the persons responsible for respecting the law – the Regional Prosecutor and his Deputy, and even the Minister of Justice – breach the law because of ‘the solidarity of colleagues’. I was arrested, detained in a psychiatric cell, my flat was provocatively searched for ‘drugs’, my telephone calls were tapped, a car damaged. After such compromising events, a politician of such a calibre in the West would have had to leave. But here he still felt good – and the Sejm decided not to dismiss him! I can imagine what sort of arrangements must have existed in the Sejm to make such a decision! I was so shocked by this that I was ready to go abroad as nothing could be changed. A turning point came when the President dissolved the Parliament. People started to telephone and write letters asking me to stand in the elections. They were saying that the events which had taken place a year ago showed that I could fight. I am convinced that I am not the only one touched by the breaches of the law committed by the representatives of ‘the new democracy’. However, the law is the same for everybody, regardless of whether somebody is in power or is ‘an ordinary man’. This fundamental rule of democracy must be respected!” 24. The second half of the article described the applicant’s ideas about working in the Senate. 25. On 5 September 1993 the applicant published in the same weekly the following article: “ABOUT ME The first years of my professional life were dedicated to art. As a dancer and a choreographer I worked with numerous theatres and cultural centres – both in Poland (among others the Łódź Grand Theatre), and abroad. I also worked as a pedagogue with children and young people. In 1981 I started to run a private business and presently I am a co-owner of a company ‘AVATAR’. I have two children: a 22‑year old son ... and a 6-year old daughter ..., my husband – Jan – is an actor. I did not belong to any political party. I did not participate actively in politics ... In the summer of 1992 events took place which changed my attitude to the world. The abuse of authority, which I experienced, has made it impossible for me to stand idly on the sideline and watch people who should be the guardians of the law, breaking it ruthlessly for the sake of their private interests. After all, precisely that was done to me by the former Deputy Speaker of the Sejm, the former Minister of Justice, the former Regional Prosecutor and his former deputy. It is not by chance that today for some malicious people it is not important that I am an independent candidate for the Senate but only that I can be called the mother-in-law of M. K. [in bold in original]. They are not interested in the fact that a year ago I was arrested groundlessly and imprisoned – purposely! – in a psychiatric cell, that my home was searched on the pretext of ‘looking for drugs’, that after my release I was followed, my telephone calls were tapped and my car damaged, causing me constant mental pressure! All this happened in a country in which a western‑style democracy had just set in! Today the Vice Minister of Justice sees ‘clear pressure brought by the Deputy Speaker Kern on the Łódź prosecution service’, and there are criminal proceedings pending against its former employees. I am a strong person. I have endured... However, I do not want any other innocent person to suffer similar harassment. There must be justice and equality before the law – regardless of whether somebody is ‘the man in the street’ or the Deputy Speaker of the Sejm! I know that I can fight and win! I have remained independent! That is why I have decided to enter the political arena! [in bold in original].” 26. In election broadcasts on the Łódź local radio station on 6, 9 and 15 September 1993 the applicant made the following statement: “A turning-point came last year. You remember that story, it was well-known in the whole of Poland, although I did not cause it. At that time, I realised to my cost what the abuse of power meant. The Deputy Speaker of the Sejm at that time, directed by emotions, made the Regional Prosecutor, his Deputy, and even the Minister of Justice breach the law because of the solidarity of colleagues. I was arrested, detained in a psychiatric cell, my flat was provocatively searched for drugs, my telephone calls were tapped, a car damaged. All this because the daughter of Mister Deputy Speaker decided to spend holidays with my son without her daddy’s permission. Until then I had thought that such behaviour had been possible only in the Stalinist era.” 27. In election broadcasts on the Łódź local television station on 13 and 16 September 1993 the applicant made the following statement: “The abuse of authority, which I experienced, has made it impossible for me to stand on the sideline and idly watch people, who should be the guardians of the law, breaking it ruthlessly for the sake of their private interests. Precisely that was done to me by the former Deputy Speaker of the Sejm, the former Regional Prosecutor and his deputy. Today, there are criminal proceedings pending against them. I am a strong, enduring person, however I do not want any other innocent person to suffer similar harassment.” 28. On 27 September 1993 Mr Kern lodged with the Łódź District Court a private bill of indictment. He charged the applicant with seven counts of defamation (zniesławienie) under Article 178 § 2 of the Criminal Code. In particular, Mr Kern alleged that the applicant had published the above articles and had broadcast the above election statements “in order to debase in the public opinion the Deputy Speaker Andrzej Kern and to expose him to loss of the trust necessary to perform his public and political functions.” (b) The trial 29. The applicant was tried by the Skierniewice District Court between 22 May 1995 and 18 March 1996. On 19 March 1996 she was convicted for having made on television, radio and in the press, between 22 August and 16 September 1993, statements that “Mr Kern directed by emotions, made the Regional Prosecutor, his Deputy, and even the Minister of Justice breach the law because of the solidarity of colleagues” and that “today there are criminal proceedings pending against him”. The trial court considered that her publications and statements constituted a single continuous offence of defamation. By making the above statements, the applicant “defamed Andrzej Kern and made untrue allegations which could have debased the victim in the public opinion and exposed him to loss of the trust necessary to perform the functions of Deputy Speaker of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland and other public functions as well as to work as a lawyer‑advocate”. 30. As regards the first statement that “Mr Kern directed by emotions, made the Regional Prosecutor, his Deputy, and even the Minister of Justice breach the law because of the solidarity of colleagues” the trial court considered that even though Mr Kern personally made a formal notification of the commission of an offence to the prosecutor E.C., nevertheless, the prosecutors E.S. and E.C. acted independently when they made their decisions concerning the applicant’s case. The court noted that it was the right of every citizen to lodge a request to prosecute somebody and, therefore, the applicant’s statement that it constituted “a breach of law for the private interest” had been untrue. The court then examined the merits of the applicant’s allegations that she had been “arrested, detained in a psychiatric cell, [her] flat was provocatively searched for drugs, telephone calls were tapped, a car damaged.” The District Court established that warrants given by the prosecutor to arrest her, search her flat and tap her telephone calls were given in accordance with the law, however, it acknowledged that the prosecutor should have considered other preventive measures then arrest in order to interrogate the applicant. In sum, the court found as unsubstantiated the allegation that Mr Kern suggested, ordered, or in other manner “made the prosecutor to give decision to detain the applicant on remand”. 31. With respect to the statement broadcast on 13 and 16 September 1993 the court observed that: “between 22 August and 16 September 1993 there were no criminal proceedings pending against Andrzej Kern. In fact, the criminal proceedings against him were initiated only on 22 December 1993. On that date he was charged with having committed against M. K. a crime described in Article 168 of the Criminal Code. The victim filed written information about that crime on 11 October 1993 ...” 32. The trial court concluded that there was no evidence that while the applicant made the statements in question she “had a belief based on a well‑founded basis that the allegations were true and that she was defending a socially justified interest”. 33. The applicant was sentenced to eighteen months’ imprisonment suspended for five years. Moreover, the court ordered the applicant to pay for the publication of the judgment in two national dailies and a local newspaper. She was also ordered to make at her own expense, in the newspaper “Angora” and on the Łódź radio and television stations, following apologies: “the allegations made in respect of Andrzej Kern between 22 August 1993 and 16 September 1993 in those media during her election campaign that the criminal proceedings against him were pending and that he had made the Regional Prosecutor, his Deputy and the Minister of Justice breach the law, were untrue.” Finally, the applicant was ordered to reimburse the private prosecutor 800 Polish zlotys (PLN) for the costs of the proceedings and to pay a PLN 75 fee to the State Treasury. (c) The appellate proceedings 34. The applicant appealed to the Skierniewice Regional Court against her conviction. On 18 November 1997 the court gave a judgment in which it upheld her conviction but changed the sentence. The applicant’s prison term was lowered to one year suspended for three years. She was ordered to pay for the publication of the judgment in one national daily and the announcement containing her apologies in the weekly “Angora”. Moreover, the applicant was ordered to reimburse the private prosecutor PLN 480 for the costs of the appellate proceedings and to pay a PLN 90 fee to the State Treasury. 35. The appellate court considered that the trial court’s assessment of facts and legal reasoning were correct. The court stressed that in order to find that there was no office of defamation, all three conditions set out in Article 179 § 2 must be fulfilled jointly. It further stated: “...Turning to the instant case, it should be considered that even if [the applicant] proved that her statements directed against Mr Kern were true or that she had a belief based on a well-founded basis that the allegations were true, that in any event, would not justify the trial court to apply Article 179 § 2. The first‑instance court rightly found that the action of I. Malisiewicz-Gąsior directed against A. Kern was an element of her election campaign, aiming at ‘promoting’ ... her own person, in order to obtain a positive election result...Therefore, [the applicant] could not be said to have been defending a socially justified interest, as she had been trying to achieve her private objective...” 36. Nevertheless, the Regional Court found that the sentence imposed on the applicant by the trial court was too harsh. In this connection the court established as follows: “...The appellate court considers that, in deciding the severity of the criminal measures against the applicant, her particular psychological situation - since the beginning of all criminal proceedings against her - should have been taken into consideration. It is beyond doubt that she could have subjectively felt that the [prosecuting] authorities had been overactive, which was not without influence on her being able to control her emotions and on her motivations.” (d) The cassation appeal 37. The applicant could not afford to hire a lawyer to lodge a cassation appeal and therefore she applied to the Minister of Justice and the Ombudsman to lodge a cassation appeal against her conviction. On 15 December 1998 the Ombudsman allowed her application and filed with the Supreme Court a cassation appeal against the judgment of the Skierniewice Regional Court. 38. The Ombudsman submitted that the courts had failed to take into account evidence pointing to the fact that “the inadequacy of the actions of the police and the prosecution service in respect of herself and her family in the case concerning the kidnapping of M. K. could have led [the applicant] to the justified belief that her allegations concerning Mr Kern had been true and that she had been ‘defending a socially justified interest’”. In this connection, the Ombudsman stated in his appeal that: “Furthermore, the courts’ view that the defendant was not defending a socially justified interest because she was participating in her own election campaign and aiming in the first place to achieve her own private objective is not supported by the evidence which was collected and disclosed at the hearing. The participation in one’s own election campaign cannot be an obstacle to speaking on the subject of ensuring respect for the law by institutions and public personalities. What is more – an election campaign invariably constitutes a period of public statements on important social issues, which certainly include the respect for the law, especially by institutions and persons especially obliged to do so. It is therefore difficult to consider that it was the defendant’s intention to promote herself and not – by using the opportunity to speak publicly – pointing, on the basis of her own experience, to the danger of breaking the law by a public institution as a result of yielding to the pressure of public personalities.” 39. The Ombudsman further submitted that prosecutors E.S. and E.C. had broken the law. He relied on the files on the disciplinary proceedings taken against both prosecutors. 40. Finally, the Ombudsman challenged the courts’ assessment of part of the evidence. (e) The Supreme Court’s decision 41. On 1 December 2000 the Criminal Section of the Supreme Court dismissed the cassation appeal. Its reasoning ended with the following conclusion: “The irresistible conclusion is that the submissions made in the cassation appeal, formally of a procedural nature, concern in fact the allegation of an error in the assessment of facts taken as the basis for the decision and the assessment of evidence, which is not allowed in cassation proceedings. Cassation proceedings cannot be transformed into third-instance proceedings dedicated to further consideration of all aspects of the submissions made in the appeal, which have already been analysed by the appellate court. (...)” (f) The enforcement of the sentence 42. In the meantime, on 24 August and 28 September 2000 the Skierniewice District Court held hearings on the enforcement of the applicant’s prison sentence as she had failed to apologise to Mr Kern. The applicant did not attend the hearings. 43. On 23 October 2000 the Skierniewice District Court decided not to enforce the suspended prison sentence imposed on the applicant.

4. The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Ashtarak, Armenia. 5. In 2003 a presidential election was held in Armenia with its first and second rounds taking place on 19 February and 5 March respectively. The applicant acted as an authorised election assistant (վստահված անձ) for the main opposition candidate in this election. Following the first and second rounds of the election, a series of protest rallies were organised in Yerevan by the opposition parties. 6. On 21 February 2003 the applicant participated in a demonstration held in Yerevan. 7. On 22 February 2003 two police officers went to the applicant’s flat and took him to the Central District Police Department of Yerevan where an administrative case was initiated against him on account of his participation in the demonstration of 21 February 2003. 8. On the same date, several hours later, the applicant was taken to the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan (Երևան քաղաքի Կենտրոն և Նորք-Մարաշ համայնքների առաջին ատյանի դատարան). There he was brought before Judge H. who, after a brief hearing, sentenced the applicant under Article 180.1 of the Code of Administrative Offences (Վարչական իրավախախտումների վերաբերյալ ՀՀ օրենսգիրք – “the CAO”) to 15 days of administrative detention, finding that: “On 21 February 2003 [the applicant] participated together with a group of people in an unauthorised demonstration in Yerevan.” 9. The applicant was taken to a detention facility. 10. The applicant alleged that he had been visited in the detention facility several days later by a Red Cross representative who had brought him a letter from his wife, to which he was not allowed to reply. 11. The applicant further alleged that, on an unspecified date, his wife had verbally requested the District Court to review its decision. She had been notified by a letter of 25 February 2003 that the District Court had no such competence. 12. On 27 February 2003 the applicant’s lawyer lodged an application with the General Prosecutor (ՀՀ գլխավոր դատախազ) requesting him to initiate an appeal against the decision of the District Court. The lawyer, apparently having received by mistake a copy of a decision taken in respect of a person convicted in a different administrative case, H.A., argued that the applicant had been unlawfully found guilty under Article 180.1 of the CAO and deprived of his liberty by a decision taken in respect of another person. 13. On 1 March 2003 the President of the Criminal and Military Court of Appeal (ՀՀ քրեական և զինվորական գործերով վերաքննիչ դատարանի նախագահ) reviewed the applicant’s conviction, finding that: “[The applicant, according to the decision of the District Court, was subjected to administrative detention] ... for the violation of the prescribed rules for organising and holding assemblies, demonstrations, street marches and rallies, namely on 21 February 2003 he participated in an unauthorised demonstration and street march, during which he violated public order. Having familiarised myself with [the applicant’s] appeal and the materials concerning the administrative offence, I find that the penalty imposed on [the applicant] must be changed.” 14. The President changed the penalty to an administrative fine of 1,000 Armenian drams (AMD) (approximately 1.5 euros (EUR) at the material time) and ordered the applicant’s release. On the same date the applicant was released from detention after he had served about seven days of his sentence. 15. By a letter of 4 March 2003 the applicant’s lawyer was informed by the General Prosecutor’s Office (ՀՀ գլխավոր դատախազություն) that, on the basis of the applicant’s appeal, the penalty had been changed and the applicant had been released by decision of the Court of Appeal.