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9. The applicants were born in 1937 and 1947 respectively and live in Plovdiv. 10. The applicants own the first floor of a house with a yard in Plovdiv. In May 1992 the owners of a neighbouring building started reconstructing it without obtaining the necessary permission from the building control authorities. The works were presented as a reconstruction of an existing house, but it seems that in fact the old building was pulled down and replaced by a higher and larger structure. 11. In May and June 1992 the applicants filed complaints with the mayor and the chief architect of the municipality. They alleged that their consent for the construction had not been obtained and that the plan of the new building did not meet the relevant legal requirements. 12. On an unspecified date the municipal authorities ordered the suspension of the construction. The building plan was modified and the modifications were communicated to the applicants. 13. On 7 September 1992 the applicants submitted objections against their neighbours' request for legalisation of the construction. 14. On 19 January 1993 the municipal authorities dismissed the applicants' objections. 15. By a decision of 18 March 1993 the construction was legalised. 16. On 14 June 1993 the applicants appealed against the 18 March 1993 legalisation decision to the Plovdiv Regional Court. 17. At the first hearing, which took place on 15 July 1993, the applicants requested the court to constitute their neighbours as defendants, alongside the municipality of Plovdiv. The court acceded to their request and adjourned the case. 18. The second hearing was held on 23 August 1993. Pursuant to a request by the applicants the court ordered a technical expert report on the question whether the construction had been effected in compliance with the relevant technical rules. 19. The third hearing took place on 29 December 1993. One of the defendants stated that he had not received a copy of the applicants' appeal and requested an adjournment. The first applicant requested a graphological expert report to determine whether a signature appearing in the municipal records, relating to the construction, was in fact his. The court acceded to the parties' requests and adjourned the case. 20. The next hearing was held on 11 April 1994. The court admitted in evidence the technical and the graphological experts' reports and questioned the experts. The applicants' neighbours requested a new technical expert report to be drawn up by three experts. The court agreed and adjourned the case. 21. A hearing listed for 30 June 1994 failed to take place because one of the defendants could not attend. 22. At the next hearing, which took place on 26 October 1994, the three experts presented their report. Finding that they had failed to examine certain relevant documents, the court instructed them to do so and also asked them an additional question, as requested by the defendants. The case was adjourned. 23. The last hearing before the Plovdiv Regional Court took place on 25 January 1995. The court admitted the three experts' report and certain other documents in evidence. It also heard the parties' closing arguments and reserved judgment. 24. In a judgment of 30 June 1995 the Plovdiv Regional Court dismissed the applicants' appeal. 25. On 24 August 1995 the applicants lodged a petition for review with the Supreme Court. 26. Noting that the applicants had not paid the requisite fee, the court instructed them to do so. They paid the fee on 11 September 1995. 27. On unspecified dates in September and October 1995 copies of the petition for review were served on the other parties and on 20 October 1995 the case was forwarded to the Supreme Court. 28. In 1997, following a restructuring of the judicial system in Bulgaria, all administrative cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court were transmitted to the newly established Supreme Administrative Court. 29. A hearing listed by the Supreme Administrative Court for 3 November 1997 failed to take place because the applicants' neighbours had not been duly summoned. 30. On 12 January 1998 the Supreme Administrative Court held a hearing. It heard the parties' arguments and reserved judgment. 31. In a final judgment of 30 March 1998 Supreme Administrative Court reversed the Plovdiv Regional Court's judgment and declared the 18 March 1993 legalisation decision void, as it had not been made by the competent officer. 32. In March 1998 the construction in the neighbouring estate had already been completed. II. THE PROCEEDINGS UNDER SECTION 109 OF THE PROPERTY ACT 33. On 28 April 1993 the applicants issued proceedings against their neighbours at the Plovdiv District Court. They argued that the construction in the neighbouring estate had intruded into their yard and impeded the normal use of their house as it prevented the access of sunlight. The applicants sought a permanent injunction under section 109 of the Property Act requiring their neighbours to restore the situation to what it had formerly been. 34. On 11 October 1993 the Plovdiv District Court, acting pursuant to the motion of the applicants, stayed the proceedings pending the outcome of the proceedings under the Territorial and Urban Planning Act. In 1998, after their completion, the proceedings between the applicants and their neighbours resumed. 35. In a judgment of 11 January 1999 the Plovdiv District Court dismissed the applicants' action. 36. The applicants appealed to the Plovdiv Regional Court. 37. The first hearing before that court took place on 7 June 2000. The court admitted certain documents in evidence and pursuant to the motion of the applicants ordered an expert report to determine the extent to which the construction in their neighbours' plot was interfering with their property. 38. A hearing listed for 27 September 2000 did not take place because the expert was unavailable. 39. The next hearing was held on 4 December 2000. The court heard the expert and admitted his report in evidence. One of the defendants requested the court to ask the expert an additional question. The court acceded to the request over the objection of the applicants, but fined the defendant for having failed to make it in due time. 40. A hearing took place on 1 March 2001. The court heard the expert and admitted his additional report in evidence. One of the defendants requested the court to ask the expert an additional question. The court acceded to the request over the objection of the applicants and adjourned the case. 41. The last hearing before the Plovdiv Regional Court took place on 9 May 2001. The court heard the expert and admitted his additional report in evidence. After hearing the parties' argument, the court reserved judgment. 42. In a judgment of 11 August 2001 the Plovdiv Regional Court reversed the lower court's judgment and allowed the applicants' action. 43. On 18 October 2001 the applicants' neighbours appealed on points of law to the Supreme Court of Cassation. 44. A hearing was held on 12 December 2002. The court heard the parties' argument and reserved judgment. 45. In a judgment of 16 July 2003 the Supreme Court of Cassation quashed the Plovdiv Regional Court's judgment and remitted the case for a fresh examination. 46. A hearing listed by the Plovdiv Regional Court for 24 November 2003 was adjourned because one of the defendants was ill and could not attend. 47. Another hearing, fixed for 16 February 2004, was also adjourned because another defendant was ill and did not show up. 48. At the time of the latest information from the parties (15 March 2004) the proceedings were still pending before the Plovdiv Regional Court. A hearing was listed for 19 April 2004. 49. Following the Supreme Administrative Court's holding that the order legalising the construction of the applicants' neighbours' house was void (see paragraph 31 above), on 11 January 1999 the applicants issued proceedings against, inter alia, the municipality of Plovdiv, claiming damages for the unlawful actions and omissions of the municipality with regard to their neighbours' construction. The Plovdiv Regional Court dismissed the applicants' action, but on appeal, in a judgment of 3 April 2002 the Plovdiv Court of Appeals allowed their claims in full, awarding them 5,000 Bulgarian levs (BGN) each, with interest as from 11 January 1999. The municipality appealed against the judgment to the Supreme Court of Cassation. However, under the relevant rule of the Code of Civil Procedure, that judgment, although subject to appeal, was enforceable. On 20 May 2002 the applicants' lawyer requested the issuing of a writ of execution pursuant to the judgment and on 28 May 2002 such a writ was issued. The writ was presented to the municipality, but as of March 2004 the amount had remained still unpaid. On 5 April 2004 the Supreme Court of Cassation quashed the Plovdiv Court of Appeals' judgment and remitted the case to that court. The proceedings are still pending.

4. The applicants are mother and son. They were born in 1959 and 1994, respectively, and live in Primskovo. 5. On 27 October 1998 the mother (hereinafter referred to as “the applicant”) instituted a labour dispute against her former employer before the Ljubljana Labour and Social Court seeking the payment of wages. 6. Between 19 June 2002 and 12 July 2002 the court held two hearings. A hearing scheduled for 18 October 2002 was postponed on the request of the applicant. She requested a postponement for a period of six months. 7. On 30 July 2004 the applicant received a notice for a hearing scheduled on 14 September 2004. 8. On 14 September 2004 the court held a hearing and issued a decision on suspension of proceedings, because both parties failed to attend. The court found that in the absence of a request for a hearing or any other procedural step within four months the proceedings would be terminated. 9. On 25 October 2005 the court held a hearing. It appears that there was either a request for a hearing or a submission lodged so the proceedings could continue. 10. On 28 March 2006 the court held a hearing and delivered a judgment, rejecting the applicant’s request. She appealed. 11. On 21 September 2006 the Higher Labour and Social Court rejected the appeal. She lodged an appeal on points of law. 12. On 9 January 2007 the Supreme Court rejected the appeal.

5. The applicant was born in 1921 and lives in Novska, Croatia. 6. During the Homeland War, members of the Croatian Army had seized the applicant's vehicle. 7. On 24 January 1994 the applicant instituted civil proceedings in the Zagreb Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zagrebu) seeking compensation for his vehicle from the State. 8. On 3 June 1997 the court gave partial judgment awarding the applicant compensation. 9. Both the applicant and the State appealed. On 25 August 1998 the Zagreb County Court (Županijski sud u Zagrebu) quashed the judgment and remitted the case. 10. On 6 November 1999 Parliament introduced amendments to the Civil Obligations Act (“the 1999 Amendments”). The amended legislation provided that all actions for damages against the State for the acts of members of the Croatian Army and the police in the performance of their official duties during the Homeland War in Croatia were to be stayed. 11. On 17 December 1999 the Zagreb Municipal Court stayed the proceedings pursuant to the above legislation. On 12 December 2000 the Zagreb County Court dismissed the applicant's appeal against that decision. 12. On 14 July 2003 Parliament passed new legislation on the liability of the State for damage caused by members of the Croatian Army and police in the performance of their official duties during the Homeland War (“the 2003 Liability Act”). 13. On 11 November 2003 the applicant's proceedings resumed pursuant to the above legislation. The proceedings are still pending.

5. The applicant was born in 1974 and is currently serving a prison sentence in medical penal institution LIU-58, Sverdlovsk Region. 6. On 23 April 2005 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of murder. He was taken to the police station, where he was allegedly ill-treated by police officers and confessed to murder. 7. On 24 April 2005 the applicant was subjected to a forensic medical examination, which recorded two bruises under his left and right eyes measuring 1 x 2 cm, an abrasion on the middle finger of the left hand measuring 0.5 x 0.8 cm, and an abrasion on the back of the right forearm measuring 0.2 x 2 cm. The expert concluded that the bruises under the eyes could have been inflicted three to five days prior to the examination, and the abrasions of the upper limbs could have appeared one to two days prior to the examination. 8. On the same day the record of the applicant’s arrest was drawn up. The applicant was questioned as a suspect and, allegedly for fear of further beatings, confirmed his previous confession. He was placed in a temporary detention unit. The unit’s medical records show that the applicant had a bruise under his left eye when admitted. They further indicate that the applicant was otherwise in good health. 9. On 26 April 2005 the applicant complained of chest pain. An ambulance was called, and he was found to have a bruised breastbone. 10. On 29 April 2005 the applicant was allegedly beaten again by the police officers in an attempt to make him confirm his previous statements to the investigator. 11. On 5 May 2005 the applicant again complained of chest pain. He was taken to Ozersk Town Hospital. An X-ray examination showed a breastbone fracture. 12. On 6 May 2005 the applicant was transferred to remand prison IZ‑74/3, Chelyabinsk. The facility doctor who examined the applicant on admission entered the breastbone fracture diagnosis of 5 May 2005 in the applicant’s medical records. 13. On 10 November 2005 Ozersk Town Court, Chelyabinsk Region, convicted the applicant, under Article 111 § 4 of the Criminal Code, of intentional infliction of grievous bodily harm on V., causing his death by reckless conduct. The applicant was sentenced to eleven years’ imprisonment. The applicant was represented by a legal-aid lawyer at the trial. 14. The applicant appealed. He asked the appeal court to allow him to attend the appeal hearing in his case, and also expressed the wish to be represented by a lawyer. 15. On 27 April 2006 Chelyabinsk Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal. The applicant was present at the appeal hearing. He was, however, unrepresented. 16. On 16 March 2011 the Presidium of Chelyabinsk Regional Court granted an application for supervisory review by the Chelyabinsk Region Prosecutor and quashed the appeal decision of 27 April 2006. The Presidium found that the applicant’s right to legal representation had been violated in the appeal hearing and remitted the case for a fresh examination before the appellate court. 17. On 21 April 2011 Chelyabinsk Regional Court held a new appeal hearing in the applicant’s criminal case, with the applicant taking part (by video link) and in the presence of his legal-aid lawyer. The Regional Court upheld the applicant’s conviction on appeal and reduced his sentence to ten years and six months’ imprisonment. 18. Meanwhile, in December 2005 the applicant complained of ill‑treatment to the Ozersk Town Prosecutor’s Office. 19. On 26 January 2006 investigator Ch. of the Prosecutor’s Office, relying on Article 24 § 1 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers complained against, for lack of evidence that a crime had been committed. The investigator relied on statements by police officer P. denying that the applicant had been assaulted, extracts from the medical records of the temporary detention unit showing the entries of 24 April, 26 April and 5 May 2005, the applicant’s statements of 2 May 2005 in which he alleged that the bruises had been inflicted during a fight with some teenagers in April 2005, and references to the applicant’s failure to mention the alleged ill-treatment during the examination of the issue of his detention, when he was questioned as a suspect, or when charges were brought against him. 20. On 24 March 2006 the Ozersk Town Prosecutor quashed that decision and ordered an additional pre-investigation inquiry. 21. On 27 March, 17 April and 29 June 2006 and 21 June 2007 the investigator again refused to open a criminal case in connection with the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment. However, on 13 April and 26 June 2006 and 9 June and 2 July 2007 respectively the supervising prosecutor quashed those decisions as unfounded and ordered additional pre‑investigation inquiries. 22. On 6 July 2007 chief investigator P. of the Ozersk Town Prosecutor’s Office refused for the sixth time to order the institution of criminal proceedings, and concluded that the applicant had sustained his injuries prior to his arrest. This decision was based on the following evidence: - the applicant’s explanations of June 2006 (see paragraph 23 below); - explanations by the chief of police Mo., police officers P. and Sh., and the deputy chief of police Yar., who denied having subjected the applicant to any violence; - explanations by prosecutor’s assistant B. and investigator Ma.; - explanations by officers of the temporary detention unit Kh., G. and Akh.; - extracts from the temporary detention unit’s logbooks, including its medical logbook; - the X-ray examinations logbook of Ozersk Town Hospital; - the report of the applicant’s forensic medical examination; - explanations by ambulance doctor S., who examined the applicant at the temporary detention unit on 26 April 2005, and by hospital doctor B., who examined the applicant at the hospital on 5 May 2005; - the applicant’s statements of 24 April-2 May 2005 taken from his criminal file, to the effect that he had received the injuries prior to the arrest during a fight with some teenagers and that he had no complaints against the police officers or the officers of the temporary detention unit in connection with those injuries; - explanations by forensic medical expert Mos.; - documents from the applicant’s criminal file, including the records of his questioning of 24 April, 29 April and 19 July 2005, in which the applicant submitted that he had attacked V. (the victim of the crime of which the applicant had been convicted) in self-defence; - the applicant’s statements made during the trial and his complaints to the prosecutor and the investigator to the effect that he had sustained his breastbone fracture as a result of acts of violence by V. 23. It followed from the applicant’s explanations, in particular, that in early April 2005 he had had a fight with some unidentified teenagers, as a result of which he had received a bruise under his left eye. On 21 April 2005 V. had kicked the applicant twice in the chest area and twice in the face, as a result of which he had had a bruise under his right eye and felt pain in his chest. On 23 April 2005 the applicant was arrested and taken to the police station, where one police officer hit him with something heavy on the nape of the neck and another kicked him in the chest area, as a result of which the applicant felt pain in his chest. On 24 April 2005 one of the police officers hit him on the head at least twice with a 1.5-litre plastic bottle filled with water, which did not result in any injuries. On 29 April 2005 in the investigations office of the temporary detention unit one of the police officers had knocked the applicant to the floor and kicked him at least three or four times on the left side and twice in the stomach and chest. These actions did not lead to any injuries. The applicant could not clarify whether his breastbone fracture had been the result of the actions of V. or of the police officers. 24. On 8 November 2007 the Ozersk Town Prosecutor found the decision of 6 July 2007 lawful and justified. 25. On 19 March 2008 Ozersk Town Court, Chelyabinsk Region, found the pre-investigation inquiry into the applicant’s allegations to be complete and unbiased, and the decisions of 6 July and 8 November 2007 lawful and justified. 26. On 24 June 2008 Chelyabinsk Regional Court upheld the decision of 19 March 2008 on appeal.

7. The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Nicosia. 8. The applicant was born in Peristerona, a village in the District of Famagusta in northern Cyprus. He lived in Famagusta with his family in a four-bedroom apartment with an unobstructed view towards the sea, which he claimed that he owned. This apartment, located at no. 128 of the commercial and touristic main street named Kennedy Avenue, was indicated by no. 703 on a building erected upon a building site with plot no. 937 of block C and sheet/plan 33/21.2.3. It was registered in the name of the applicant under registration no. 1057. 9. The applicant further claimed that at the time of the 1974 Turkish invasion he was the owner of land in Famagusta on which was located an Intercommunal Secondary Grammar school, known as the “Centre of Higher Studies”. This land covered a total area of 6,299 m², on plot no. 900 of block D and sheet/plan 24/59W2. It was registered in the name of the applicant under registration no. D-4840. On this land the applicant had erected a three-storey building, which had a total area of 2,020 m², comprising a basement, ground floor and two vertical floors above it. The applicant submitted that he was the owner and headmaster of the above-mentioned school, the premises of which are now part of the “Eastern Mediterranean University”. 10. In support of his claims to ownership, the applicant produced the following documents: - an agreement reached on 1 September 1968 between a certain G. Nicolaides and Mr Takis Saveriades (a member of the applicant's family) for the sale of an apartment located on the seventh floor of a flat on the Famagusta coast; - a certificate issued on 28 November 2002 by the Department of Lands and Surveys of the Republic of Cyprus stating that the applicant was the owner of a flat without parking space, located in Famagusta, Kennedy Avenue, registered under plot no. 937, sheet/plan 3/21.2.3; - a certificate issued on 11 September 2001 by the Department of Lands and Surveys of the Republic of Cyprus stating that the applicant was the owner of a field with an unregistered building, located in Famagusta, Salaminas Avenue, registered under plot no. 900, sheet/plan 24/59; - a building permit issued on 11 September 1963 concerning plot no. 900, sheet/plan 24/59 11. At the time of the 1974 Turkish invasion, the applicant and his family fled to southern Cyprus. He claimed that since then he had been deprived of his property rights, all his property being located in the area which is under the occupation and the control of the Turkish military authorities. The latter prevented him from having access to and from using and possessing his home and property in Famagusta as well as from practising his profession there.

4. The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in the city of Odessa, Ukraine. 5. In 1991 the applicant became a member of the housing cooperative “Verstatobudivelnyk-2” (“the cooperative”) in order to be provided with an apartment in the dwelling house to be constructed by the latter. At the same time he was employed part-time by the cooperative. 6. By decisions made at a general meeting of the members of the cooperative on 19 May 1999, 30 June 1999 and 29 September 1999 the applicant’s membership of the cooperative was cancelled on the grounds that he had failed to pay his contributions on time. Therefore, the applicant was not provided with the apartment to which he believed he was entitled (“the apartment”). Later it was given to another member of the cooperative, Mr S. 7. In October 1999 the applicant instituted proceedings against the cooperative in the Illichevsk District Court of Odessa requesting the court to declare the above decisions null and void. He also claimed compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 8. Later, the applicant lodged additional claims against the Housing Department of the Odessa City Council, the Odessa Privatisation Agency and Mr S., challenging the latter’s right to own the apartment, seeking the removal of Mr S.’s family and claiming property rights over the apartment. The applicant also claimed payment of the salary arrears from the cooperative, and alleged that his contributions entitled him to a larger apartment. 9. In January 2003 the Illichevsk District Court of Odessa was closed down. On an unspecified date the applicant’s case was transmitted from that court to the Malinovsky District Court of Odessa (“the court”). 10. In the period from October 1999 to 20 October 2003 the domestic courts listed some thirty-nine hearings. Six hearings were adjourned due to the failure of the representative of the cooperative to appear or at his request. Two hearings were adjourned since Mr S. failed to appear. The domestic courts took no steps to ensure the defendants’ presence in the court. Three hearings were adjourned due to the applicant’s failure to appear or at his request. Most hearings were scheduled at intervals from several days to two months. 11. On 20 October 2003 the court allowed the applicant’s claims. 12. On 19 February 2004 the Odessa Regional Court of Appeal (“the court of appeal”) quashed the decision and remitted the case for fresh consideration to the court. 13. On 18 July 2005 the court found against the applicant. 14. On 5 October 2005 the court terminated proceedings concerning payment of the salary arrears and the applicant’s claim for a larger apartment since the applicant had failed to comply with procedural requirements prescribed by Ukrainian law. The applicant did not appeal against this ruling. 15. On 13 December 2005 the court of appeal quashed the judgment of 18 July 2005 and remitted the case for fresh consideration to the court. 16. On 11 July 2006 the court dismissed the applicant’s claims. 17. On 25 May 2007 the court of appeal quashed the judgment of 11 July 2005 and partly allowed the applicant’s claims. 18. In the period from 20 October 2003 until 25 May 2007 the court and the court of appeal listed some fifteen hearings. One hearing was adjourned because of the judge’s illness, one due to Mr S’s failure to appear, one at the applicant’s request. Most hearings were scheduled at intervals from several days to two months. No hearings were scheduled by the court between 20 February 2004 and 29 March 2005. 19. The defendants appealed in cassation. On 5 December 2007 the Supreme Court upheld the judgment given by the court of appeal. 20. On 12 August 2008 the judgment of 25 May 2007 was enforced in full. 21. On an unspecified date in 2008 Mr S. instituted new proceedings against the applicant claiming his property rights over a part of the apartment on the ground that he had carried out certain repair works.

4. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Mińsk Mazowiecki, Poland. 5. The investigation against the applicant started on 30 December 1992. 6. On 31 August 1993 the Mińsk Mazowiecki District Prosecutor (Prokurator Rejonowy) lodged a bill of indictment against the applicant and another person with the Mińsk Mazowiecki District Court (Sąd Rejonowy). She was indicted on a charge of fraud. 7. The first hearing was scheduled for 18 May 1994. Subsequently the court held 5 hearings at intervals ranging from 1 to 9 months. They were adjourned due to the absence of the co-accused or her counsel. 8. At a hearing on 14 January 1997 the court returned the case to the prosecutor for further investigation. 9. On 27 June 1997 the prosecutor lodged a new bill of indictment with the District Court. 10. The court held hearings on 25 March, 21 May, 19 June and 8 September 1998. 11. On 11 September 1998 the court acquitted the applicant. 12. On 12 November 1998 the Mińsk Mazowiecki District Prosecutor appealed against the first-instance judgment. 13. At a hearing on 29 January 1999 before the Siedlce Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) the prosecutor withdrew his appeal. In consequence, the court decided not to examine it.

5. The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Samos. 6. On 17 August 2007 the applicant was arrested in flagrante delicto for receiving a package containing 71 grams of cannabis and remanded in custody. Following his arrest, the applicant’s house was searched. The investigating authorities found and seized a large number of Egyptian and Greek antiquities, including small statues, ancient coins, vessels and fossils. 7. On 18 August 2007 the applicant was brought before the Public Prosecutor of Samos who charged him with having received a package containing drugs. Concerning the antiquities found in the applicant’s house, the Prosecutor decided not to press charges unless new evidence was adduced. 8. On 20 August the investigating judge at the Samos Criminal Court, after questioning the applicant, remanded him in custody with effect from 17 August, the date of his arrest, on the grounds that there were serious prima facie indications that the defendant had committed the drug-related offence and that it was necessary to prevent him from absconding and to make sure that he would not commit further offences. 9. On 24 August 2007 the applicant applied for release on bail. 10. On 10 September 2007 the Indictment Division of the Samos Criminal Court rejected the applicant’s request (decision no. 49/2007). It held as follows: “... [the way that the packet was carefully prepared] reveals a dexterous and studied action, established by the choice of special means for the commission of the crime of drug trafficking, as well as a collective action. Furthermore, during the lawful search of the accused’s house ... a significant number of antiquities were found, including in particular, 41 coins from different periods, a small statue of Apollo, a small bronze statue of Bacchus, an ancient vessel, a fossil in lava from the volcano of Santorin, part of a fresco and numerous Egyptian antiquities, the possession of which demonstrates the perpetrator’s propensity to commit further offences relating to antiquities. In view of the above, there is very serious evidence of the applicant’s guilt and ... his request should be rejected since it is reasonably considered that even the replacement of his pre-trial detention by preventive measures would not be sufficient to ensure his appearance in court and the execution of any judgment the court may deliver.” 11. On 18 February 2008, the Public Prosecutor submitted to the Indictment Division of the Samos Criminal Court his proposal to prolong the applicant’s detention in compliance with Article 287 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 17 below), since the applicant had been in detention for six months. 12. On 7 March 2008 the Indictment Division of the Samos Criminal Court replaced the applicant’s pre-trial detention by preventive measures (decision no. 5/2008). In particular, it held that: “... the prolongation of the applicant’s pre-trial detention is not absolutely necessary since he has a known residence in Samos, and has family and property in Greece, he has not made preparations with a view to absconding, he has never been a fugitive in the past and it is improbable, on the basis of his criminal record and his social and professional status, that he will commit further crimes if he is released. In the light of the above and in view of the applicant’s old age and serious health problems ... the Indictment Division considers that the prolongation of the detention imposes on the applicant a disproportionate burden and that his appearance in court and the execution of any judgment the court may deliver can be ensured by the above preventive measures: (a) prohibition from leaving the country and (b) an obligation to report to his local police station twice a month. ...” 13. Subsequently, the Public Prosecutor laid supplementary charges against the applicant for misappropriation of antiquities. On 28 March 2008 the investigating judge questioned the applicant in that connection. 14. It appears from the case-file that the criminal proceedings against the applicant are still pending before the investigating authorities. 15. The applicant suffers from various health problems, including chronic duodenal ulcer, persistent urinary problems, inguinal hernia (when part of the intestine bulges through a weak area in muscles in the groin, the area between the abdomen and thigh) and degenerative spine disorders. He often complains of hemoptysis (coughing up blood), intense epigastric pain and melena. 16. The applicant was frequently hospitalised in the Prison Hospital in order to undergo medical examinations. On several occasions he was granted leave to be consulted by external doctors and undergo special examinations in Public Hospitals, including gastroscopy, echocardiography and chest X-rays. According to the medical certificates submitted by the applicant and the Government, the results of a number of medical examinations (kidneys, bladder and prostate ultrasound, chest computed tomography, bronchoscopy and heart triplex ultrasound) were imminent. The applicant was prescribed medication for his urinary and gastro-intestinal problems. Concerning the inguinal hernia, surgical treatment was advised.

5. The applicants were born in 1961, 1972, 1985, 1956 and 1962 respectively and live in Malatya. 6. As the facts of the case are in dispute between the parties, they will be set out separately. The facts as presented by the applicants are set out in section B below (paragraphs 7-13). The Government’s submissions concerning the facts are summarised in section C below (paragraphs 14-20). The documentary evidence submitted by the applicants and the Government is summarised in section D (paragraphs 21-41). 7. On 8 March 2005 the applicants took part in International Women’s Day celebrations in the city of Malatya, during which a group comprising hundreds of police officers formed a cordon around the crowd. The police chief warned the participants that no prior permission had been obtained for the gathering. 8. The first applicant, Ms Nihal Pekaslan, who was a spokesperson for the Women’s Democratic Platform, told the police chief that they were exercising their constitutional right and that the applicable legislation required no prior permission. 9. Police officers then dragged a number of persons, including four of the applicants, into waiting police vehicles. In the course of so doing, the police officers sprayed the crowds with tear gas and hit some of them, including the four applicants. 10. The second applicant, Ms Refika Meltem İspir, was not arrested. She was not beaten up, but was sprayed with tear gas. She was accompanied by her eleven-year-old daughter and her mother, both of whom were also sprayed with tear gas. 11. The ill-treatment continued in the police vehicles. Male police officers started squeezing the arms and legs of the detained women. When the women told the police officers that they had no right to behave like that and asked for female police officers to accompany them, they were sworn at. The episode in the police vehicles lasted for approximately twenty minutes. 12. The four applicants were then taken to a police station and subsequently to the Forensic Medicine Institute for a medical examination. According to the medical reports drawn up that day, the four applicants who had been hit by the police officers had a number of injuries on their bodies, rendering them unable to work for periods of between one and three days. 13. Later that same day the four applicants were released from police custody. 14. On 8 March 2005 the applicants took part in International Women’s Day Celebrations in Malatya where three different groups of demonstrators were carrying placards, flags and posters, and holding demonstrations which hindered the flow of traffic. 15. A group of police officers tried to convince the group to disperse, and requested them to hold their demonstrations without impeding the circulation of the traffic. A police chief warned the participants that no prior permission had been obtained for the gathering, but told them that they could carry on with their demonstration on the pavement and walk in an orderly manner without violating public order. Nevertheless, the group, including the applicants, refused to disperse and continued with their demonstration. 16. The police chief made several unsuccessful attempts to tell the participants that the manner in which they were conducting their demonstration was unlawful because they were impeding the flow of traffic. The police chief also told the participants that they could leave their placards – which were too large – and walk on the pavement; the placards would be returned to them later. 17. The group insisted on blocking the street and continued with their demonstration. In spite of the police officers’ warnings and efforts, the group shouted slogans and continued to protest. Meanwhile, ten to fifteen police officers formed a cordon around the participants who had been giving orders to the rest of the demonstrators. The demonstrators inside the police cordon continued to protest, saying that they would not end the illegal demonstration even if they were arrested. 18. Police officers then put a number of persons, including four of the applicants, into the waiting police vehicles by force which could not be considered disproportionate. They were taken to the Malatya Court House. On the way to the court house the applicants insulted the police officers present in the vehicle and tried to provoke them. However, the police officers kept their calm. Female demonstrators were accompanied by female police officers in the vehicle. 19. The remaining members of the group who had not been arrested continued with their demonstration and read out their press release after having complied with the police officers’ request to fold their placards and walk on the pavement. 20. The Government submitted the video footage of the incident to the Court, and argued that the footage supported their submissions summarised above. 21. The following information emerges from the documents submitted by the parties. 22. According to a report signed by eighteen police officers, at 2.00 p.m. on 8 March 2005, police received intelligence that a number of non-governmental organisations were planning to gather at the junction of Milli Egemenlik Street with a view to marching from there to the square outside the post office. The police put in place all necessary security measures at the junction at 11.00 a.m. and the demonstrators began arriving at midday. 23. The police officers unsuccessfully urged the demonstrators not to march with their placards to the square, where a press release was scheduled to be read out. When the demonstrators ignored the police and started marching, thus blocking a main road, the police officers had to use force to arrest the applicants – with the exception of the second applicant, Ms Refika Meltem İspir – and five other demonstrators because they resisted arrest and insulted the police officers. 24. According to another police report drawn up on the same day, the arrested persons behaved in a rowdy manner while they were being transported to the court house in a vehicle. They also insulted the police officers present in the vehicle by shouting things such as “Who do you think you are? You have no right to behave like this. Shame on you, are you going to tell your children that you are torturers?”. 25. The Government submitted to the Court the video footage of the incidents recorded by police officers. However, the part where the police officers used force and arrested the applicants does not feature in the footage. The footage begins with the police officers trying to persuade the demonstrators to leave their placards behind, and then resumes with the demonstrators protesting against the use of force by the police officers and asking for their arrested friends to be released. 26. It can be seen from the footage that before they were arrested the applicants drew the police officers’ attention to a circular issued by the Ministry of the Interior on 11 June 2004. In the circular, a copy of which was made available to the Court by the applicants, the Ministry urges police officers to respect certain rights and freedoms, including freedom of expression and assembly, and reminds them that those rights and freedoms can only be restricted in limited circumstances. In the circular, police officers are also urged to show restraint when faced with demonstrations, and to use their powers to promote the rights of civil society. 27. On the same day the four arrested applicants were examined by doctors at the local branch of the Forensic Medicine Institute. The details of their injuries, as noted in the medical reports, are as follows: Ms Nihal Pekaslan: four ecchymosed areas measuring between one and five centimetres, and grazes on both forearms and on the left hand. Her injuries prevented her from working for three days. Ms Kıvanç Pekaslan: an ecchymosed area measuring 2 x 2 centimetres on the inside of the right arm, which prevented her from working for one day. Mr İbrahim Bozay: two ecchymosed areas, each measuring 1 x 1 centimetre, on the forehead, and two ecchymosed grazes on one of the fingers of the right hand and on the right forearm, measuring 1 x 1 and 2 x 2 centimetres respectively. These injuries prevented Mr Bozay from working for one day. Ms Leyla Bozay: Ms Bozay told the doctor that she had been hit on the nape of the neck and that her hair had been pulled. The doctor observed two ecchymosed areas measuring 1 x 1 and 2 x 1 centimetres on the insides of both arms, which prevented her from working for one day. 28. On 10 March 2005, at 2.40 p.m., the first applicant, Ms Nihal Pekaslan, was examined by another doctor at the Malatya State Hospital, who observed two ecchymosed areas measuring 15 x 15 centimetres on her arms, and various other ecchymosed areas on her knee and hand. According to the doctor, the injuries had been caused some thirty-six to forty-eight hours previously. 29. On 8 March 2005 the second applicant, Ms Refika Meltem İspir, lodged an official complaint with the prosecutor against the police officers who, she alleged, had sprayed her and her daughter with tear gas. On the same day Ms İspir orally informed the prosecutor that she would recognise the police officer who had sprayed her and her daughter with tear gas. When, some thirty-five days later, she was asked by the investigating police officer whether she would be able to identify the police officer responsible, she stated that she had only seen him once and then only for a few seconds, but that had they asked her immediately after the incident she would have been able to recognise him. 30. On 11 March 2005 the remaining four applicants lodged an official complaint with the prosecutor against the police officers allegedly responsible for the ill-treatment. They complained, inter alia, that they had been beaten up and assaulted while exercising their right to freedom of expression and assembly. They also referred to Articles 3 and 10 of the Convention. 31. On 16 March 2005 a police chief in Malatya sent a verbatim transcription of the video footage of the incidents to the Malatya prosecutor. 32. Between 4 April 2005 and 3 May 2005 the Malatya prosecutor took statements from eighteen police officers who had been on duty on the day of the incidents. A police chief told the prosecutor that female demonstrators had attacked the police and that the police had had to use force in response. He maintained that the force used by the police had been proportionate. 33. Four of the police officers told the prosecutor that the demonstrators had blocked the street and that the police had had to arrest them. While they were arresting the demonstrators there had been scuffles and the demonstrators had attacked the police officers with sticks. The police officers had had to use force, as a result of which the demonstrators might have suffered minor injuries. 34. The remaining thirteen police officers’ statements concerned solely the complaints made by the applicants regarding the alleged assaults by male police officers on their way to the court house. These officers denied that the demonstrators had been assaulted in the police vehicles. They also added that the arrested persons had been accompanied by female officers in the vehicles. 35. On 18 April 2005 the prosecutor examined the video footage submitted to his office by the police, and recorded his findings in a report. In the opinion of the prosecutor, the demonstrators had tried to break the police cordon and march. The police officers had not behaved in an arbitrary manner and the use of force by them had not been excessive. 36. On 12 May 2005 the Malatya prosecutor decided not to prosecute the police officers. In his decision the prosecutor stated that the second applicant, Ms İspir, had been unable to recognise the police officer who had sprayed her with tear gas. The prosecutor stated that the applicants had gathered in the area without having sought prior permission. In dispersing the unauthorised demonstration, the police officers had been impelled to resort to the use of force in order to apprehend the applicants because they had resisted arrest and insulted them. In the opinion of the prosecutor, other than the applicants’ unsubstantiated allegations, there was no evidence justifying the prosecution of the police officers. 37. The applicants lodged an objection against the prosecutor’s decision. They argued, in particular, that although they had not resisted arrest, the police officers had proceeded to arrest them by using force. The applicants also maintained that they had tried to exercise their right to freedom of expression, which was guaranteed by the Constitution as well as by Article 10 of the Convention. They also pointed out that, according to the applicable legislation, no prior permission was necessary to hold demonstrations. Moreover, the police officers had acted contrary to the circular issued by the Ministry of the Interior (see paragraph 26 above), and their actions had also been in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. 38. The objection filed by the applicants was rejected by the Elazığ Assize Court on 28 July 2005. That decision was communicated to the applicants in September 2005. 39. On 8 March 2005 four of the applicants – that is, all the applicants with the exception of the second applicant, Ms Refika Meltem İspir – were questioned by the Malatya prosecutor as suspects. They told the prosecutor that before they could even begin their demonstration the police had arrested them without warning and, in the course of doing so, had hit them. They denied that they had insulted the police officers. Lawyers representing the applicants told the prosecutor that the arrests had been arbitrary and in breach of their clients’ fundamental rights and freedoms under the Convention, including the prohibition of torture. The lawyers added that their clients had been exercising their democratic rights and had not committed any offences. 40. On the same day, the Malatya prosecutor filed an indictment with the Malatya Criminal Court of First Instance and brought criminal proceedings against the four applicants, as well as against the remaining five persons who had been arrested together with the applicants, for insulting the police officers and contravening the Meetings and Demonstration Marches Act (Law no. 2911). 41. On 2 June 2005 the Malatya Criminal Court of First Instance acquitted the four applicants and the remaining defendants. It held that there was no evidence to show that the four applicants had put up resistance against the police officers.

3. The applicant was born in 1980 and lives in Istanbul. On 5 March 2003 he was expelled from a military academy as he was found unsuitable to be a student there following a secret security investigation conducted on him and his family. The applicant was not notified of the specific reasons for his expulsion. 4. Subsequently, the applicant asked the Supreme Military Administrative Court to annul the expulsion decision. During the proceedings, he did not have access to the classified documents and information submitted by the Ministry of Defence to the Supreme Military Administrative Court in support of its decision to expel him from the military academy. 5. On 25 February 2004 the Supreme Military Administrative Court rejected the applicant’s request. It stated that information and documents the confidentiality of which was required and necessitated for the performance of military service could not be disclosed to the applicant. The court further emphasised that it was not bound by the classification made by the administration and that it made its own assessment as to whether the confidentiality of the documents was justified in each case. The written opinion submitted by the public prosecutor to the Supreme Military Administrative Court during the proceedings was not communicated to the applicant. 6. The applicant subsequently requested the rectification of the Supreme Military Administrative Court’s decision, arguing that his inability to access the results of the security investigation due to their allegedly confidential nature precluded him from duly defending himself. 7. On 20 May 2004 the Supreme Military Administrative Court rejected the applicant’s rectification request.

5. The applicant is a limited company registered in Sweden. 6. In 1986 the applicant company sued company X. for breach of contract and requested SEK 609,000 in compensation. The District Court (tingsrätten) in Malmö rejected the claim but, upon appeal, the Court of Appeal (hovrätten) of Skåne and Blekinge awarded the applicant company SEK 442,942. Company X. appealed to the Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen) which, in 1992, quashed the Court of Appeal's judgment and upheld the District Court's judgment. Before the District Court and the Court of Appeal, the applicant company was represented by lawyer A. However, after the oral hearing in the Court of Appeal, the applicant company made it clear that it had lost confidence in A., who accordingly resigned from the case. During the proceedings before the Supreme Court, the applicant company was represented by another lawyer. 7. On 7 June 1993 the applicant company sued A. before the District Court of Ängelholm, claiming that she had been negligent while representing it before the District Court and the Court of Appeal. In particular, she had failed to invoke a standard contract (“EÅ 85”) as a ground for their claim. It demanded that A. pay it SEK 1,478,054 (approximately EUR 161,000) in compensation. A. contested the allegations and insisted that she had carried out her assignment with proper care. Both parties, in particular the applicant company, submitted extensive pleadings and documents, and the court held three oral preparatory meetings with the parties. Following each of these meetings, more submissions were made by the parties, and efforts were made to find a theme on which the District Court could issue an interim judgment (mellandom). However, these efforts failed. Furthermore, in submissions to the District Court between September and December 1995, both parties revoked their witnesses, leaving only the applicant company's owner and A. to be heard at the main hearing. 8. On 22 and 23 January 1996 the District Court held an oral hearing on the merits of the case and, on 23 February 1996, it rejected the applicant company's claim. It gave detailed grounds for its judgment. In its conclusion, the court stated, inter alia, that it found that A. had not been negligent in any of the respects referred to by the applicant company. On the contrary, the examination of the case confirmed that A. had carried out her assignment conscientiously and skilfully. 9. On 14 March 1996 the applicant company appealed against the judgment to the Court of Appeal of Skåne and Blekinge. In May 1996 it supplemented its appeal and submitted new evidence which it requested the court to accept. It further requested that the case be remitted to the District Court and that it be granted legal aid. 10. In May 1996 the Court of Appeal rejected the request for legal aid, a decision against which the applicant company appealed. Consequently, the entire case file was sent to the Supreme Court which, in October 1996, upheld the decision and sent the case file back to the Court of Appeal. In October and December 1996, the applicant company made further submissions to the court, which were sent to the other party for comments. 11. An oral hearing was planned for the middle of April 1997, but it was postponed since A. could not attend. 12. In July 1997 the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant company's request to have the case remitted to the lower court, but admitted the new evidence which had been produced as it considered that the applicant company had had a valid excuse for not having relied on such material before the District Court. 13. The Court of Appeal then set a new date for an oral hearing in February 1998. However, it was again postponed, this time because a hearing in a criminal case was given priority. Instead, the hearing was scheduled for the beginning of October 1998. On 25 August 1998 the summons to the hearing was sent to the parties and, on 7 September 1998, the applicant company contacted the court with a request that the hearing be postponed until it could find a lawyer to represent it. It further noted that the court had promised to contact it before setting the date for the hearing, but had failed to do so. Consequently, the court granted the request and ordered the applicant company to inform it, no later than 15 October 1998, about its legal representation. On this date, the applicant company notified the court that its owner would represent it (as he had done all along). The oral hearing was held on 13 and 14 October 1999. 14. On 4 November 1999 the Court of Appeal delivered its judgment. It briefly set out the parties' claims and submissions, but did not expressly refer to the new evidence which the applicant company had been allowed to submit. Under the title “the Court of Appeal's judgment”, it simply held: “The Court of Appeal confirms the District Court's judgment”. 15. Further, it appended the lower court's judgment to its own. 16. On 1 December 1999 the applicant company appealed to the Supreme Court, stating, inter alia, that the proceedings before the Court of Appeal had been of excessive duration and that the judges had been biased against it. In February 2000 the applicant company made further submissions in which it developed its grounds of appeal. 17. On 19 October 2000 the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal. 18. In February 1999 the applicant company complained to the Chancellor of Justice (Justitiekanslern) that the District Court and the Court of Appeal had delayed the proceedings in its case. After having received submissions from the two courts, to which the applicant company replied, the Chancellor of Justice decided, in April 1999, that no further action would be taken in the matter. In its submission, the District Court first noted that since A. worked as a lawyer within its jurisdiction, judges of another court had dealt with the case which had prolonged the proceedings somewhat. It further considered that the circumstances of the case had been special and fairly complicated from a legal point of view, and that the preparations for the main hearing had been demanding. For its part, the Court of Appeal noted, inter alia, that the case had not concerned a complicated matter, but the case file had been voluminous and difficult to grasp. It regretted that the processing of the case had taken so long and that the court had failed to contact the applicant company, as promised, before setting a hearing date in October 1998.

4. In accordance with a contract concluded on 18 February 1987 between the Municipality of Itea and the applicant, the latter undertook the construction of a sewage treatment plant on behalf of the municipality whose cost amounted to 143,036.24 euros. 5. On 24 July 1990 the applicant asked the department in charge of the project (Technical Services of Municipalities and Communities in the Prefecture of Fokida (hereafter “T.S.M.C”) to compile a revised table of costs in order to take into account further work following an amendment of the project. However, no table was created within the determined three-month time-limit, following the applicant’s request. 6. On 29 October 1990 the applicant lodged an objection with the T.S.M.C – a remedy which had compulsorily to be exhausted according to the national legislation before having recourse to a court – challenging the omission of the aforementioned department to compile this table. The objection was rejected by the municipal council of Itea. 7. On 8 February 1991 the applicant lodged an administrative appeal (αίτηση θεραπείας) against the abovementioned decision which was also tacitly rejected by the Prefect of Fokida. 8. On 3 July 1991 the applicant lodged a recourse with the Piraeus Administrative Court of Appeal challenging the implicit rejection of the Prefect of Fokida. 9. In a judgment dated 30 June 1992 the Court of Appeal quashed the decision of the Prefect and the case was remitted to him for a fresh examination (judgment no. 1627/1992). In particular, the appellate court rejected the arguments of the Municipality of Itea according to which the applicant had not complied with the procedural requirement concerning the notification of the appeal to the other party. 10. On 24 November 1992 the Municipality of Itea lodged an appeal on points of law. 11. In a judgment dated 1st April 1996 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed judgment no. 1627/1992 of the Court of Appeal and remitted the case to a different division of the same court (judgment no. 1618/1996). 12. On 24 September 1997, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. It held that the requirement of notification of the appeal had been met and dismissed the case on its merits, observing that the applicant’s claim was contrary to the terms of the contract. 13. On 4 March 1998 the applicant lodged another appeal on points of law with the Supreme Administrative Court. The hearing, which was originally set for 15 March 1999, was subsequently adjourned to 10 December 2001 and then to 3 June 2002. Meanwhile, on 11 February 2002, the case was struck from the first division and transferred to the sixth division of the court. A new hearing date was set for 13 January 2003. Subsequently, between 13 January 2003 and 17 June 2008 the case was adjourned on sixteen consecutive occasions. 14. The hearing took place on the latter date. 15. In a judgment dated 6 October 2008 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the ruling of the appellate court. In particular, it observed that the finding of the Court of Appeal that the procedure had been respected by the mere filing of the administrative appeal to the municipality and the assignment of a registration number without any notification by a bailiff or other public body being necessary was contrary to the law. Subsequently, the Supreme Administrative Court examined the applicant’s recourse de novo and dismissed it as inadmissible because the applicant had not complied with the notification requirement (judgment no. 2757/2008). This judgment was finalised on 29 January 2009.

7. The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Split, Croatia. 8. The applicant and her husband were holders of a specially protected tenancy on a flat in Split where they lived. On 23 December 1993 they divorced and the husband left. 9. On 5 February 1994 I.Š. threw the applicant out of the flat and moved in. 10. On 9 February 1994 the applicant filed an action against I.Š. for disturbance of her possessions with the Split Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Splitu). 11. In separate proceedings before the same court, on 7 March 1994, the applicant obtained a judgment declaring her the sole holder of the specially protected tenancy on the flat. 12. In the proceedings against I.Š. on 11 November 1994 the applicant's claim was granted and the court ordered I.Š. to vacate the flat within eight days from the date when the decision became final. It was established that I.Š. had forcefully broken into the applicant's flat and had been living there without any legal ground. The decision became final on 27 February 1995. 13. Given that I.Š. did not comply with the court's order to vacate the flat, on 1 March 1995 the applicant applied for the execution of the decision to the Split Municipal Court. The execution order was issued on 8 March 1995. 14. On 10 August 1995 the Split Municipal Court invited the applicant to pay an advance for the costs of eviction. On 31 August 1995 the applicant informed the court that she had paid the costs. 15. The court ordered the eviction for 26 November 1996. However, on that date the execution officer of the court established that the family B.B. occupied the flat. 16. On 29 November 1996 the applicant again asked the court to enforce the eviction order. The court scheduled eviction for 15 October 1997. However, the eviction was adjourned because the applicant did not appear. 17. On 30 November 1998 the applicant again asked the court to enforce the eviction order. 18. On 5 February 1999 the court invited the applicant to pay an advance for the costs of eviction. 19. On 1 February 2000 the applicant bought the flat and became its owner. 20. On 2 March 2000 the applicant informed the court that she had paid the costs. 21. On 16 May 2000 the applicant asked the court to speed up the proceedings. 22. The court scheduled eviction for 23 October 2000. 23. However, on 21 September and 8 October 2000, respectively the Association of the Homeland War Invalids (Hrvatska udruga vojnih invalida domovinskog rata) and the Ministry of the Homeland War Veterans (Ministarstvo hrvatskih branitelja Domovinskog rata) asked the court to adjourn the eviction. 24. When on 23 October 2000 an eviction officer of the Split Municipal Court attempted to carry out the eviction order he found a number of war veterans obstructing his attempt. Despite the presence of the police the eviction order was not carried out. 25. On 8 May 2001 the court invited the applicant to once more pay an advance for the costs for eviction. 26. On 18 May 2001 the applicant informed the court that she had paid the costs. 27. The next attempt to carry out the eviction order was scheduled for 8 June 2001, but it failed because a physician invited to assist did not appear. 28. On 26 October 2001 the court scheduled the date for eviction for 20 November 2001. However, the parties agreed that the family B.B. vacate the premises before 20 March 2002. 29. On 21 March 2002 the family B.B. left the flat and the applicant moved in.

4. The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Rab. 5. While working with a circular saw on 16 May 1994 the applicant sustained an injury in the workplace resulting in the loss of two fingers. The injuries were of such a degree that on 29 March 1995 the applicant had to retire and was awarded a disability pension. 6. On 22 September 1995 the applicant brought a civil action against the company, S., in the Rab Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Rabu) seeking damages in connection with the above accident. The applicant subsequently designated company J. as the respondent because he considered it to be the legal successor of company S., which had gone bankrupt and had been erased from the companies’ register in 1996. 7. In a judgment of 15 May 2000 the Rab Municipal Court declared the applicant’s action inadmissible for lack of jurisdiction and referred the case to the Rijeka Commercial Court (Trgovački sud u Rijeci). The applicant appealed and on 4 October 2000 the Rijeka County Court (Županijski sud u Rijeci) quashed the first-instance decision and referred the case to the Crikvenica Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Crikvenici) as the competent court. 8. On 25 October 2002 the Crikvenica Municipal Court gave judgment dismissing the applicant’s claim. The judgment was quashed upon an appeal lodged by the applicant on 29 January 2003 by the Rijeka County Court and the case was remitted to the court of first instance. 9. Meanwhile, on 28 March 2002 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) complaining about the length of the above proceedings. On 13 April 2005 the Constitutional Court found a violation of his constitutional right to a hearing within a reasonable time, awarded him 5,200 Croatian kunas (HRK) in compensation, and ordered the Crikvenica Municipal Court to give a decision in the case in the shortest time possible but no later than twelve months following the publication of the decision in the Official Gazette. The Constitutional Court’s decision was published on 2 May 2005. 10. In the resumed proceedings, on 10 February 2006 the Crikvenica Municipal Court again gave judgment dismissing the applicant’s claim. The applicant again appealed and on 5 July 2006 the Rijeka County Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the first-instance judgment. 11. On 5 September 2006 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law (revizija) with the Supreme Court which was dismissed on 21 February 2007.

5. The applicants are Mr Oleg Yuryevich Kopnin, Mr Yuriy Olegovich Kopnin, Ms Natalya Borisovna Kopnina and Ms Olga Olegovna Kopnina, who were born in 1958, 1986, 1961 and 1983 respectively and live in Stavropol. The first and the third applicants are former husband and wife and the second and the fourth applicants are their children. 6. The applicants lived in a building which the local authority had declared unsuitable for habitation in 1986. In 2003 the local authority declared that the building was at imminent risk of collapse (грозящий обвалом). 7. On 13 May 2004 the Stavropol Oktyabrskiy District Court (“the district court”) acknowledged that the applicants’ flat was unsuitable for habitation. Notably, the district court established that the building was in a critical state and that use of the kitchen and corridor in particular presented a risk, as those parts of the building were liable to collapse at any moment. It consequently ordered the Stavropol City Council (“the Council”) to rehouse them within ten days in accommodation from its temporary housing stock (маневренный фонд – “temporary stock”), and subsequently to provide them with suitable housing in compliance with the applicable legislation. The court also awarded them 500 Russian roubles (RUB) in non-pecuniary damage on the grounds that living in such conditions had caused the applicants physical and mental distress. The judgment was not appealed against and became final on 24 May 2004. 8. On 17 June 2004 enforcement proceedings were initiated and on 14 July 2004 the applicants were offered to be rehoused in a flat from the Council’s temporary stock. This offer was turned down by them on the grounds that the flat offered was unsuitable for habitation. 9. Following their refusal, on 27 September 2004 the enforcement proceedings were terminated by the bailiffs on account of the impossibility of enforcing the judgment, given that the Council had no other available housing or the financial resources to purchase any. 10. On an unspecified date the applicants challenged the bailiffs’ inactivity and their decision to terminate the enforcement proceedings. On 2 December 2004 the district court found that the flat offered by the Council was unsuitable for habitation and did not meet the applicable health and safety requirements and building regulations. As a consequence, the district court quashed the decision of 27 September 2004 to terminate the enforcement proceedings. It also found that the Council’s reference to the lack of other available housing in its temporary stock had no legal value and could not justify non-compliance with a final court judgment. 11. On 25 January 2005 the applicants complained under Chapter 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the Council’s continuing failure to comply with the judgment of 13 May 2004. On the same date the district court dismissed this complaint, on the grounds that it concerned the same parties and subject-matter as the action previously examined on 13 May 2004. The district court consequently indicated that the applicants should have used other remedies, such as compulsory enforcement under the Enforcement Act and Article 315 of the Criminal Code. On 4 March 2005 this decision was upheld by the Regional Court. 12. In March 2005 the Council offered three applicants, Mr Y. O. Kopnin, Ms N. B. Kopnina and Ms O. O. Kopnina, to move to another flat. They refused this offer on the grounds that the property was not compliant with the housing standards introduced by the new Housing Code which had entered into force on 1 March 2005. 13. On 13 April 2005 the applicants lodged a new claim with the district court seeking to oblige the Council to provide them with housing under its programme entitled “Rehousing of residents from derelict housing at risk of collapse in the Stavropol region for the period 2004-2005”. On 28 April 2005 the district court rejected the applicants’ claim. On 17 June 2005 this judgment was upheld on appeal by the Stavropol Regional Court. 14. On 30 May 2005 the applicants lodged another application with the district court. They submitted that the offer made by the Council in March 2005 had been unlawful and asked the court to oblige the Council to provide them with housing that complied with the standards set by the new Housing Code. 15. On 28 September 2005 the first applicant was provided with social housing in accordance with the new Housing Code. 16. On 20 December 2005 the district court approved a settlement agreement entered into between the other three applicants and the Council and terminated the proceedings they initiated in relation to the offer made by the Council in March 2005. On 28 December 2005 the three other applicants were provided with social housing in accordance with the new Housing Code. 17. On 28 March 2006 the sum of RUB 500 awarded in non-pecuniary damage by the judgment of 13 May 2004 was transferred to the first applicant’s bank account.

9. The applicant company is the publisher of a newspaper (Kronenzeitung) with its registered office in Vienna. 10. On 3, 4, 7, 8 and 15 March, as well as on 3 and 16 May and 29 June 1995, the applicant company published, in its Carinthian regional edition (Lokalausgabe), articles on the financial situation of a certain Mr Posch who, at that time, was employed as a teacher and, at the same time, was a member of the Austrian National Assembly (Nationalrat) and the European Parliament. The articles commented on these professional tasks and, in harsh terms, alleged that he received three salaries unlawfully as, according to Austrian law, he was not entitled to a teacher’s salary during his membership of the European Parliament. He was, inter alia, referred to as someone unjustly enriching himself. These articles were accompanied by photographs of Mr Posch. 11. On 18 August 1995 Mr Posch applied for an injunction under Section 78 of the Copyright Act (Urheberrechtsgesetz) to the Klagenfurt Regional Court against the applicant company. He requested that the applicant company be ordered to refrain from publishing his picture in connection with statements describing him as somebody who received his salaries unlawfully and who benefited from unlawful privileges. Furthermore, he requested an order for the publication of the judgment in the applicant company’s newspaper, indicating the grant of damages and the injunction (einstweilige Verfügung). 12. On 21 September 1995 the applicant company filed a statement of defence (Klage­be­antwortung) in which it argued, inter alia, that the publication of the impugned articles had been justified under Article 10 of the Convention. 13. On 10 October 1995 the Klagenfurt Regional Court granted an interim injunction. It found the measure justified because the plaintiff’s interest in prohibiting the publication of his photograph outweighed the applicant company’s interest in the publication of the illustrated articles, in particular as the publication of the pictures per se had no special information value (Nachrichtenwert). 14. On 4 January 1996 the Klagenfurt Regional Court granted the permanent injunction prohibiting the applicant company from publishing the plaintiff’s picture in connection with the above mentioned or similar articles. It dismissed the remainder of the action. The court found that Section 78 of the Copyright Act prohibited publishing a person’s picture if the publication violated that person’s legitimate interests. When considering such interests, account had to be taken of whether the person concerned was known to the public, because the publication of the photographs of unknown persons made it possible to identify them later. The court found that Mr Posch’s face was not generally known, despite his membership of the National Assembly. Therefore, his legitimate interests had been infringed by creating the possibility of identifying him. The applicant company was of course entitled to report on the plaintiff’s activities and financial situation, but there was no legitimate interest in publishing his picture as it had, per se, no information value. Furthermore, it was irrelevant for this specific question whether the content of the articles was true or false. 15. On 8 February 1996 the applicant company appealed. It argued that the court had erred when it found that the plaintiff’s interests outweighed the applicant company’s interests, as the public in Carinthia, who had elected Mr Posch, were interested in his sources of revenue. Therefore the court should have also taken evidence – as had been offered by the applicant company – in order to prove the truth of the articles. Furthermore, the plaintiff was known to the public as he was Carinthian and had participated in several events during the election campaign there. Thus it was incorrect that Mr Posch’s face was unknown. 16. On 9 July 1996 the Graz Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. It found that the publication of the pictures together with the articles had been unnecessary. In any case, the information value of the pictures could not outweigh Mr Posch’s interests. It also confirmed the legal opinion of the Regional Court that, for the purposes of Section 78 of the Copyright Act, it was irrelevant whether or not the publication contained true information. 17. On 15 October 1996 the Supreme Court declared inadmissible the applicant company’s extraordinary appeal on points of law (außerordentlicher Revisionsrekurs). It confirmed the findings of the Court of Appeal, observed that the publication of the plaintiff’s pictures had no additional information value, and therefore concluded that it had been unnecessary. On 4 November 1996 this decision was served upon counsel for the applicant company.

6. The applicant was born in 1934 and lives in Chechen-Aul. 7. He is the sole founder, director and owner of a limited liability company called Voskhod (Общество с ограниченной ответственностью «Восход», “the company”). 8. According to the applicant, at the material time the company owned a mill complex and a petrol station. 9. In late 1999 the Russian Government launched a counter-terrorism operation in Chechnya. 10. On 18 July 2000, during a special operation in the vicinity of the village of Chechen-Aul, servicemen of military unit no. 3660 of the Russian Ministry of the Interior blew up the mill belonging to the company, with the result that it was completely destroyed and the petrol station situated nearby was damaged. 11. In 2000-2001 the applicant complained on behalf of the company to a number of public officials, including the commander of military unit no. 3660, the head of the administration of the Chechen Republic and prosecutors at various levels, about the damage inflicted. 12. On 25 May 2001 the prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102 took a decision to dispense with criminal proceedings in connection with the incident of 18 July 2000. The decision stated that, on the date in question, the servicemen of military unit no. 3660 had been carrying out a special operation in the vicinity of Chechen-Aul, and that, in order to destroy a place which was supposed to be a terrorist arms and ammunition store, and which the terrorists had transformed into a base from which they had strafed a federal checkpoint, the servicemen, following their commanding officers’ order, had blown up the mill complex belonging to the company, with the result that it had been completely destroyed. The decision further stated that the actions of the commanding officers and servicemen of military unit no. 3660 had been based on section 21 of the Federal Law on Suppression of Terrorism (“the Suppression of Terrorism Act”), had been rendered absolutely necessary by unlawful actions of unidentified illegal fighters putting the federal servicemen’s lives in real danger, and had been aimed at eliminating that danger. The decision went on to note that the danger could not have been eliminated by any other means, and therefore the destruction of the company’s property had not constituted a criminal offence. It thus concluded that there had been no evidence of a crime in the servicemen’s actions. The decision also stated that, taking into account the aforementioned circumstances and the fact that the pecuniary damage had been inflicted on a third person who had not performed any actions that would have rendered the infliction of damage absolutely necessary, a question of compensation for that damage should be resolved by a civil procedure. 13. In 2002 the applicant, acting on the company’s behalf, issued proceedings against military unit no. 3660 before the Commercial Court of the Rostov Region. He sought compensation for losses sustained in the amount of 13,483,299 Russian roubles (RUB, approximately 335,000 euros, EUR). 14. On 2 July 2002 the court rendered its judgment. Throughout the judgment the court referred to the mill complex and petrol station as the company’s property. It established the circumstances of the incident of 18 July 2000 as they had been presented by the claimant company and confirmed that the damage inflicted corresponded to the amount indicated in the court claim. In this latter respect, the court based its finding on a working estimate (see paragraph 33 below) and a letter from the State Agency for Construction, Architectural and Housing Policy, according to which the original amount should be adjusted in line with the index of prices in the first quarter of the year 2002. 15. The court further held as follows: “... The military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102 carried out an inquiry into the incident. In a decision of 25 May 2001 reflecting the result of the inquiry it had been established that on 18 July 2000, pursuant to a combat order, servicemen of military unit no. 3660 were pursuing a special operation in the village of Chechen-Aul and its adjacent territory. The materials of the case reveal that the mill belonging to the Voskhod company was a convenient position to direct fire on the outpost of Interior troops stationed nearby, and that the lives and health of the servicemen were put under constant risk as a result. Since section 21 of the Suppression of Terrorism Act permitted deliberate infliction of damage on the legally protected interests of a person, society, or the State, the commanding officers of military unit no. 3660 took a decision on the basis of which the servicemen of that unit blew up the mill complex belonging to the Voskhod company. As a result of the explosion the building was completely destroyed. ... ... In accordance with section 21 of the Suppression of Terrorism Act ..., on the basis of the legislation and within the limits established by it, damage may be caused to the life, health and property of terrorists, as well as to other legally protected interests, in the course of a counter-terrorism operation. However, servicemen, experts and other persons engaged in the suppression of terrorism shall be exempted from liability for such damage, in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation. By virtue of Article 1067 of the Russian Civil Code, damage inflicted in a situation of absolute necessity, and notably for elimination of a danger threatening the tortfeasor or third parties, if the danger, in the circumstances, could not be eliminated by any other means, shall be compensated for by the tortfeasor. Having regard to the circumstances in which the damage was caused, a court may impose an obligation to compensate for such damage on a third party in whose interests the tortfeasor acted, or release from such an obligation, partially or in full, both the third party and the tortfeasor. The court, taking into account the absence of unlawfulness in the defendant’s actions and the fact that those actions were performed in a situation of absolute necessity, holds that they were lawful. Such actions are socially useful as they are aimed at protecting an individual, his rights and freedoms, the interests of society and the State from impending danger. Taking into account the circumstances in which the damage was caused and the fact that [it was inflicted on] a person who had not committed any unlawful acts but had become a victim of a series of accidental events, and having regard to the circumstances of the case, the court releases the person who caused the damage from the obligation to compensate for the losses.” 16. The court thus dismissed the claimant company’s claims in their entirety and ordered the company to pay a court fee in the amount of RUB 100,000 (approximately EUR 2,500). 17. On 29 August 2002 the Commercial Court of the Rostov Region, sitting as an appellate court, upheld the first-instance judgment, having in essence restated its reasoning. In its decision the court described the mill complex and petrol station as the company’s property. 18. On 25 November 2002 the Federal Commercial Court of the North‑Caucasus Circuit (“the Federal Commercial Court”) dismissed the company’s appeal, stating, in particular: “According to certificates issued by the Bureau of Technical Inventory of the Ministry of Housing Maintenance and Utilities and dated 20 March and 13 June 1996 [the mill and the petrol station] are registered in the name of the Voskhod company (зарегистрированы за ООО «Восход») on the basis of decisions of the Chechen-Aul local council dated 26 February 1992 and 26 December 1993 respectively. However, the claimant company has not submitted to this court documents confirming that the mill complex and petrol station were properly transferred into the company’s ownership (переданы на баланс ООО «Восход»), or proof of any other legal grounds for the company to acquire the property title to the mill complex and petrol station. There is no documentary evidence to confirm the condition and value of [the property in question] before it was destroyed. ... The claimant company confirmed [the amount of losses] by estimates of costs for the construction of a new mill complex and petrol station. The Voskhod company did not offer proof that it had acquired the property, or of its value at the moment of destruction, and therefore the court rightly dismissed the claimant company’s action.” 19. The court also upheld the reasoning of the two lower courts, stating, in particular, that the servicemen’s actions had been based on the Suppression of Terrorism Act and relevant presidential decrees and had aimed at restoring constitutional order in the Chechen Republic. It also noted that there had been no evidence in the materials of the case that the servicemen had acted ultra vires or that their actions had been unlawful, and therefore the servicemen should be exempt from responsibility for their actions. 20. Thereafter the applicant, acting on the company’s behalf, sought to have the amount of the court fee imposed on him by the first-instance court reduced. His request was dismissed. 21. Both parties submitted various documents confirming that the applicant was the sole founder, owner and director of the company. 22. A certificate issued by a tax authority confirmed that the company had been registered with that authority on 3 May 2001 and had been given an identification number as a taxpayer. 23. An extract of 1 July 2008 from the Uniform State Register of Legal Entities (Единый государственный реестр юридических лиц) provided various details concerning the Voskhod company. It indicated, in particular, that the company’s principal business activity was the retail sale of motor fuel, and its subsidiary activity was the production of flour, flour blends and pastry preparations for baking. 24. By a decision of 26 February 1992 the local council of the village of Chechen-Aul (“the Chechen-Aul local council”) assigned to the applicant, in his capacity as director of the Voskhod company, a plot of land measuring 300 square metres, and authorised the company to build a petrol station on that plot. 25. A certificate of 13 April 1993 issued by a competent authority attested that the construction of the petrol station had been completed and that that authority had accepted it as commissioned and fully operational. 26. In a decision of 26 December 1993 the Chechen-Aul local council, at the applicant’s request, gave him permission to build a mill complex and assigned him a plot of land measuring 1,500 square metres for that purpose. 27. A certificate of 20 March 1996 issued by the Republican Bureau of Technical Inventory of the Russian Ministry of Housing Maintenance and Utilities confirmed that the mill complex had been registered as the Voskhod company’s property on the basis of the decision of 26 December 1993 by the Chechen-Aul local council. A similar certificate was issued by the Republican Bureau of Technical Inventory on 13 June 1996 in respect of the petrol station. 28. Under a contract of 10 April 1999 the company agreed to purchase various equipment for the mill complex and to pay RUB 125,000 (approximately EUR 3,100). 29. A certificate of 13 December 2005 attested to the State registration of the property title to a petrol station belonging to the Voskhod company. 30. An extract of 18 July 2008 from the Uniform State Register of Rights to Immovable Property and Transactions therewith (Единый государственный реестр прав на недвижимое имущество и сделок с ним) confirmed that the Voskhod company was the owner of a petrol station. Another extract of the same date stated that there was no entry in the aforementioned Register in respect of any property rights of the Voskhod company to any mill complex. 31. A report of 19 July 2000 stated that on that date a commission of the Chechen-Aul local council had examined, at the applicant’s request, the mill complex belonging to the Voskhod company. The commission had established that the mill, which had had a production capacity of 100 tons of flour per day and had consisted of a permanent three-floor building measuring 20 x 30 metres, had been completely destroyed. The report then gave a more detailed description of the damage inflicted. It also stated that the commission had examined the mill complex in May 2000 and had drawn up an evaluation report attesting to some damage inflicted on the building during the previous military actions. The report then certified that the complete destruction of the mill complex, established by the commission on that date, had been carried out by federal forces on 18 July 2000 during a special operation in Chechen-Aul, this being confirmed by objective evidence and witness statements to the effect that representatives of the federal forces had planted explosive devices and then set off explosions in at least eight parts of the mill building. The commission also indicated in the report that the Voskhod company should apply to specialised agencies for assessment of the damage inflicted. 32. By a certificate it issued on 5 November 2008 the Chechen-Aul local council attested that on 18 July 2000 the mill complex with equipment belonging to the Voskhod company had been destroyed and the petrol station had been damaged. 33. A working estimate of repair costs of 15 September 2001 indicated that it was necessary to invest an overall amount of RUB 9,356,308 (approximately EUR 234,000) to restore the mill complex and petrol station. 34. A report of 11 September 2002 drawn up by a State agency of expert examinations stated that this latter authority had, at the applicant’s request, carried out an expert evaluation of the aforementioned estimate of repair costs and established that they should total RUB 13,677,294 (approximately EUR 340,000), taking into account the index of prices in the third quarter of the year 2002. 35. In a certificate of 20 September 2000, issued at the applicant’s request, the Chechen-Aul local council confirmed that on 18 July 2000, the date on which the mill complex belonging to the Voskhod company had been blown up, the federal forces had been carrying out a special operation in Chechen-Aul to blow up oil refining facilities. The operation in question had been conducted by military unit no. 3660. 36. In his explanation given on 27 June 2008 to the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic the applicant confirmed that he was the sole founder, owner and director of the Voskhod company. He further stated that the Chechen-Aul local council in its decision, of 26 February 1992, (see paragraph 24 above), had authorised the company to build a petrol station, that the construction had been completed on 13 April 1993, and that the petrol station had been acknowledged by a competent State authority as commissioned and fully operational (see paragraph 25 above). The applicant pointed out that the company had duly registered the property title to the petrol station with the Bureau of Technical Inventory (see paragraph 27 above), but no documents confirming the formal transfer of the title in respect of the petrol station to the company had ever been drawn up. The applicant also stated that on 26 December 1993 the Chechen-Aul local council had also authorised the company to build a mill complex (see paragraph 26 above). According to him, the construction had been completed in late 1993 [apparently a mistake, should read 1994] and the mill complex started functioning with a production capacity of 100 tons of flour per day. The applicant stated that he had been unable to comply with the procedure whereby a new construction should be accepted by an appropriate State authority as commissioned and fully operational, because of the beginning of military actions in the Chechen Republic at that time. He also stated that the company had registered the property title to the mill complex with the Bureau of Technical Inventory (see paragraph 27 above), but no documents confirming the formal transfer of the title to the mill complex to the company had ever been drawn up. The applicant further claimed, with reference to the contract of 10 April 1999 (see paragraph 28 above), that the company had purchased various equipment for the mill. He went on to state that from late 1999, when the second counter-terrorism operation in the Chechen Republic started, until late 2001, military unit no. 3660 had been stationed on the Voskhod company site, including in the mill complex, and that servicemen of that unit had disassembled the equipment. After military unit no. 3660 had been transferred to another location, the servicemen of that unit had blown up the mill complex building. According to the applicant, prior to the events in question no survey of the petrol station and mill complex had been done. The applicant further referred to an estimate of 15 September 2001 (see paragraph 33 above) and stated that at present the amount necessary to restore the petrol station and mill complex was considerably higher than that indicated in the estimate. 37. In a certificate of 5 November 2008 the Chechen-Aul local council confirmed that for several months, from early 2000 until July 2000, federal servicemen had been stationed within the territory and on the Voskhod company site, of which the applicant was the founder and director.

5. The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Istanbul. 6. On 12 November 1999 he was arrested on suspicion of setting up a criminal organisation, namely the Bilim Araştırma Vakfı (Foundation for Science and Research). On the same day he went through a medical examination at the Haseki Research Hospital. The medical report drafted following that examination noted that there was no sign of ill-treatment on his body. 7. During his time at police custody, on 15 November 1999, the applicant was examined once more, this time at the Şişli Etfal Research Hospital. The second report drawn up there also indicated that there existed no sign of ill-treatment on his body. 8. The applicant was released on 17 November 1999. Immediately after his release, he went through two more medical examinations at two different institutions, namely the Vakıf Gureba Hospital and the Forensic Medicine Institute. The reports drawn up after each examination indicated once again the lack of any sign of ill-treatment on his body. 9. The first three medical reports were issued in respect of the applicant together with some other persons, who were also arrested on suspicion of having committed the same offence. 10. On 11 January 2000 the public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court filed an indictment with that court, accusing the applicant, together with several others, of setting up and running a criminal organisation. Subsequently, on 14 February 2000 the applicant was placed in pre-trial detention. The next day, on 15 February 2000 he was heard by the Bakırköy Criminal Magistrates’ Court and released pending trial. 11. In 2004, following a constitutional amendment, state security courts were abolished and the case was transferred to the Istanbul Assize Court. 12. On 9 May 2008 the Istanbul Assize Court discontinued the proceedings as the statutory time-limit for prosecuting the offence of setting up a criminal organisation had expired. 13. On 28 December 2009 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the Istanbul Assize Court. 14. On an unspecified date in 2000 the applicant filed a complaint, together with the others, against several police officers, claiming that he had been subjected to ill-treatment during his time in police custody. According to his submissions, his testicles had been squeezed and he had been beaten, handcuffed to a chair and insulted. 15. On 26 October 2001 the Beyoğlu public prosecutor issued a decision not to prosecute. 16. On 21 November 2002 the Beyoğlu Assize Court rejected the applicant’s objection to the public prosecutor’s decision. 17. Nevertheless, on 5 March 2004, following an objection filed by one of the other complainants, the same court decided to extend the scope of the investigation and requested medical reports from the Forensic Medical Institute. 18. Subsequently, on 13 April 2005, although the medical reports had not yet been submitted, the court annulled the decision of the Beyoğlu public prosecutor and held that criminal proceedings would be brought against the police officers involved. 19. Accordingly, on 22 June 2005 the Istanbul public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Istanbul Assize Court, accusing the police officers of torture pursuant to Article 243 § 1 of the former Penal Code (Law no. 765) as he considered that provision to be more favourable for the accused. 20. During the course of the proceedings against the police officers, the Head of the Istanbul University Forensic Medicine Department examined the applicant. In her report dated 29 March 2007 she noted that the applicant had complained that, during his police custody in November 1999 and his pre-trial detention in February 2000, his testicles had been squeezed and he had been beaten, insulted and forced to perform physical activities which would overstrain his body. After examining the medical reports which had been issued in respect of the applicant in November 1999, she reported that although those reports had indicated no sign of ill-treatment on the applicant’s body, none of them had been drafted in compliance with the general principles of forensic medicine set forth by the Ministry of Health. In this connection, she stated that each report had been issued in respect of several individuals and it was not clear whether the patients had been under psychological duress at the time or what kind of examinations had been conducted by the doctors. She concluded, therefore, that the reports issued immediately after the applicant’s release from police custody could not be accepted as proof against his allegation of ill-treatment. 21. On 4 August 2010 the Forensic Medicine Institute submitted a report to the Istanbul Assize Court upon the request of the latter. That report maintained that some lesions and problems in the applicant’s meniscus had been found in 2003. It added also that he appeared to be suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder. The report noted however that it was not possible to conclude that those conditions resulted from the alleged ill‑treatment inflicted on the applicant in 1999. 22. On 25 March 2011 the Forensic Medicine Institute drafted another report following the court’s request. According to that report, the first four medical reports, which stated that there was no sign on the applicant’s body, were unclear as each of them had been drawn up in respect of several individuals. 23. The Istanbul Assize Court conducted more than thirty hearings during which it heard the statements of the complainants, the accused and the witnesses. It also evaluated medical reports in respect of each complainant as well as the above-mentioned expert reports. The proceedings are still pending before that court.

5. The applicant, who is a national of the DRC, was born in 1969 and lives in Rotterdam. 6. From September 1992 until January 1994 the applicant resided in Belgium, at which point he returned to Zaire (as the DRC was then called) after having obtained a laissez-passer from the Zairean Embassy in Brussels. 7. In 1994 the applicant was working in Kinshasa, the DRC, as the personal secretary of a prominent member of the opposition party Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social (“UDPS”), who was also the editor of the opposition newspaper NSEMO. In October 1994 the applicant was contacted by unknown men who asked him to help assassinate his boss. The applicant refused, but a few weeks later his boss disappeared and was then found unconscious and badly beaten. He died a few days later in a local hospital. On 20 November 1994 the applicant was arrested and put in prison; he was never shown an arrest warrant. On 25 November 1994 the applicant was transferred to the central Makala prison in Kinshasa. During the interrogations he was told he had been arrested because he had refused to help assassinate his boss. He was also told he would not live to see 1995. The applicant was beaten during the interrogation. On 26 December 1994 the applicant managed to escape with the assistance of a guard who happened to be from the same tribe as the applicant. He stayed in the guard's house while travel documents were arranged and on 6 January 1995 the applicant flew to Belgium. After arriving in Brussels, the applicant was driven to the Netherlands where he requested asylum on 7 January 1995. 8. The applicant was granted a residence permit for the purposes of asylum for an indefinite period (verblijfsvergunning asiel voor onbepaalde tijd) on 2 July 1996 since there were sufficient grounds to believe that he would be persecuted should he return to the DRC. 9. On 27 July 1999 the applicant filed a request for naturalisation. On the basis of this request, the applicant was interviewed by an official from the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst) on 13 October 2000. During the interview the applicant was confronted with the fact that, on 2 January 1997, he had been convicted and sentenced to two years' imprisonment in Belgium for participation in a criminal organisation and possession of cocaine, by the Brussels tribunal de première instance. 10. On 4 October 1999 the applicant married Ms M. with whom he had already had a son who was born on 22 May 1999. Ms M., also a national of the DRC, requested a residence permit for the purpose of staying with her spouse (verblijfsvergunning voor verblijf bij echtgenoot) and the permit was granted to her. 11. By letter of 23 November 2001 the Deputy Minister of Justice (Staatssecretaris van Justitie) notified the applicant of her intention (voornemen) to revoke the applicant's residence permit pursuant to article 35 of the Aliens Act (Vreemdelingenwet), which allows the withdrawal of a residence permit on the basis of a criminal conviction of a certain severity. 12. In her letter the Deputy Minister noted that the applicant had enjoyed legal residence in the Netherlands since 2 July 1996 and that his conviction in Belgium dated back to 2 January 1997. She further concluded that, according to Dutch sentencing guidelines, a sentence of 10 months' imprisonment would have been imposed on the applicant had the offence been committed in the Netherlands. The Deputy Minister concluded accordingly that the length of the sentence, compared to the length of time the applicant had been living in the Netherlands, justified revoking the applicant's residence permit. Considering that the applicant had been granted asylum in the Netherlands, the Deputy Minister held that a forced return of the applicant would have to be in compliance with the non-refoulement principle contained in the UN Refugee Convention. In this regard the Deputy Minister considered that an individual report (ambtsbericht) from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained that there had already been some doubts, given certain inconsistencies in the applicant's story, when he had applied for asylum and that a new individual report had confirmed these doubts created by the inconsistencies. Moreover, since the applicant had left the DRC, regime changes had taken place in that country in 1997 and 2001. The Deputy Minister considered that since the applicant had not shown that he had anything to fear from the new regime, he had not established that he would still face a real and personal risk of persecution in his country of origin. Finally, the Deputy Minister considered that revoking the applicant's residence permit did not constitute an interference with the applicant's right to respect for family life under the Convention since the interests of public order outweighed the interests of the applicant. Furthermore, it had become known that the applicant and his wife had separated, that he had not had any contact with her or their child for some weeks and that there were no indications that he was actively participating in the upbringing of their son. In any event, since the applicant, his wife and their son all had Congolese nationality, there were no objective obstacles for them to continue their family life in the DRC. 13. In his written comments (zienswijze) of 19 December 2001, the applicant disputed the finding that he would have been sentenced to 10 months' imprisonment in the Netherlands for an offence similar to the one he had committed in Belgium. The applicant argued that there was no set indication of the length of a sentence but that the individual circumstances of the person concerned would always be taken into consideration. It was therefore not possible to determine what kind of sentence he would have received had he been tried by a Dutch court. The applicant further submitted that the grounds on which he had been granted his residence permit were still valid and that the reports used by the Deputy Minister in no way detracted from that. A forced return to the DRC would therefore entail a violation of the Convention. The applicant also submitted that he could exercise his family life only in the Netherlands, since his wife and child were living there. 14. On 4 July 2002 the applicant appeared before an official board of inquiry (ambtelijke commissie) and on 24 July 2002 the Minister for Immigration and Integration (Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie, the successor to the Deputy Minister of Justice – hereafter “the Minister”) issued a decision to revoke the applicant's residence permit. The Minister considered that the estimate of a 10-month sentence in the Netherlands for the Belgian offence was indeed correct, as an advisory letter from the prosecutor at the Regional Court of 's-Hertogenbosch (“Den Bosch”) stated that a 10-month sentence would have represented the minimum length of sentence the prosecutor could have sought based on the facts available to him. The Minister further noted that the applicant's statement regarding his arrest in Belgium before the official board of inquiry differed from the original statement he had given during the interviews that were conducted pursuant to his request for naturalisation on 13 October 2000. From these new statements the Minister concluded that the applicant had been fully aware of his actions when transporting the drugs across the border between the Netherlands and Belgium. The Minister further noted that although the applicant had stated during the hearing before the board that he had had no further contact with judicial authorities, he had in fact been convicted of a number of insurance offences as well as violations of the 1994 Road Traffic Act (Wegenverkeerswet 1994). Concerning the risk of persecution that the applicant would face upon his return to the DRC, the Minister considered that the reports of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did disclose discrepancies in the applicant's story. The Minister further considered that it had been concluded in the intention to revoke the applicant's residence permit that the situation in the DRC had changed since the applicant had last been in that country and that he had failed to establish that he would still be at risk of persecution there. A forced return to the DRC would thus not be in violation of the UN Refugee Convention, nor would it be contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. Moreover, the applicant had been convicted of a drugs-related offence. For these reasons the Minister considered that the interests of the State in protecting public order outweighed the interests of the applicant. Finally, the Minister noted that the applicant and his wife (with whom he had been reconciled by then) and child all had Congolese nationality and that there were no objective obstacles for them to continue their family life in the DRC. 15. By submissions of 14 August 2002 and 3 September 2003 the applicant appealed against the decision of the Minister to the Regional Court of The Hague. On 26 February 2004 the Regional Court rejected the applicant's appeal. The Regional Court considered that the Minister had been correct in applying article 35 of the Aliens Act and that the estimated sentence of 10 months' imprisonment, had the offence been committed in the Netherlands, was reasonable as well. The Regional Court further determined that the Minister had been correct in taking notice of the reports from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in finding that the applicant's original story contained inconsistencies. The resulting lack of credibility of the applicant's story was sufficient to show that the applicant would not face a real, personal risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 upon his return to the DRC. The Minister had therefore been entitled to attach more weight to the protection of public order in relation to the interests of the applicant. The Regional Court finally considered that the applicant had failed to establish a possible violation of Article 8. 16. On 22 March 2004 the applicant appealed against the judgment of the Regional Court to the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State (Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State – “the Division”) on essentially the same grounds. The applicant added, however, that according to a letter dated 24 June 1998 from the prosecutor in Den Bosch (which the Minister had neglected to add to the case file and for which the Regional Court had reopened the proceedings so that it could be introduced), the prosecutor in Den Bosch did not have possession of the complete Belgian case file and had thus only been able to estimate the length of the sentence that could be imposed. Furthermore, a judicial sentencing document submitted in the proceedings showed that a similar offence in the Netherlands would attract a custodial sentence of only 8 months and 28 days. A sentence of that duration would not engage the consequences of article 35 of the Aliens Act, meaning that the applicant's residence permit would not be in jeopardy. 17. On 9 June 2004 the Division dismissed the applicant's appeal. The Division considered that the Minister had correctly applied the provisions of article 35 of the Aliens Act in determining the length of imprisonment had the offence been committed in the Netherlands, based on the information obtained from the prosecutor in Den Bosch. In particular, the Division considered that the indication of an 8 month and 28 day sentence applied solely in relation to the possession of cocaine and did not include the charge of participation in a criminal organisation. The remaining grounds of appeal submitted by the applicant were dismissed summarily as not raising any points of law warranting determination. 18. The applicant currently lives in the Netherlands and has since divorced his wife but continues to visit her and their child regularly. 19. After the introduction of the application the applicant informed the Court by a letter of 23 April 2008 that he had spent a number of days in an aliens' detention centre in France after being apprehended there without a valid residence permit.

9. In 1983 the applicant was found to be partially disabled. She continued working. On 2 November 1988 the applicant was obliged to sign an agreement with her employer according to which her contract of employment would expire on 30 June 1989. 10. On 4 September 1989 the Social Security Commission in Bratislava declared the applicant fully disabled as from 1 July 1989. A full invalidity pension was granted to the applicant. 11. On 1 October 1990 her former employer rehabilitated the applicant for the persecution to which she had been subjected in the past. 12. After the entry into force of the Extra-Judicial Rehabilitations Act (see “Relevant domestic law” below) the applicant claimed that her invalidity pension should be increased. She alleged, in particular, that the termination of her contract of employment in 1989 had been due to political persecution within the meaning of Section 21 of the Extra-Judicial Rehabilitations Act. 13. On 5 April 1993 the Social Security Administration dismissed the applicant’s claim on the ground that she had failed to comply with the requirements set out in Sections 21 and 22 of the Extra-Judicial Rehabilitations Act. 14. On 21 March 1995 the Bratislava City Court upheld the decision. The City Court heard the parties and established that the applicant had failed to submit a certificate within the meaning of Section 22 of the Extra-Judicial Rehabilitations Act which was a prerequisite for granting her claim. The City Court noted that separate proceedings concerning this issue were pending before the Bratislava I District Court. It was further stated in the reasons for the judgment that the representative of the Social Security Administration had promised to adjust the applicant’s pension upon the delivery of such a certificate. 15. On 26 March 1996 the Bratislava I District Court ordered the successor of the applicant’s former employer to deliver a certificate pursuant to Section 22(1) of the Extra-Judicial Rehabilitations Act to the applicant. Prior to that the District Court appointed an advocate to represent the applicant at the latter’s request. The applicant received the certificate on 14 October 1996. 16. On 18 October 1996 the applicant again requested the Social Security Administration to adjust her invalidity pension pursuant to the Extra-Judicial Rehabilitations Act. The request was dismissed on 30 October 1996. The decision stated, with reference to Section 24(6) of the Extra-Judicial Rehabilitations Act, that the applicant’s invalidity pension could not be adjusted as her contract of employment had been terminated in the course of the same year when she had acquired the right to an invalidity pension. 17. On 18 November 1996 the applicant challenged the decision before the Bratislava City Court. She also requested the City Court to appoint a lawyer to represent her in the proceedings. She referred to Article 30(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure and explained that her handicap prevented her from coming to the court in person. The applicant further stated that she was indigent and that the case might raise questions of law of a complex nature. 18. In a written submission of 13 January 1997 the Social Security Administration asked the court to uphold the decision challenged by the applicant. This submission was forwarded to the applicant who submitted a written reply on 14 February 1997. The applicant maintained, in particular, that the conclusion of the administrative authority was erroneous and contrary to the pledge which its representative had earlier made (see paragraph 14 above). 19. On 23 January 1997 the Bratislava Regional Court, which took over the case from the former City Court, summoned the applicant to a hearing scheduled for 25 February 1997. A type-written remark on the upper part of the summons read as follows: “We hereby inform you that no compulsory defence is required in the proceedings and that the court cannot, therefore, appoint a defence counsel to assist you. In case that you wish to be represented by a lawyer, you should choose one yourself.” 20. On 14 February 1997 the applicant again requested the Regional Court that a lawyer be appointed to represent her in the proceedings. She explained, in particular, that her health did not allow her to attend the hearing, that her only income consisted of a modest invalidity pension and that she met the requirements for the appointment of a lawyer under the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. She asked the court to notify her of its position on her request “by means and within a period corresponding to the relevant legal rules”. The applicant further requested that the hearing be adjourned as, in her view, the court’s proceeding with the case in her absence would be contrary to her fundamental rights. 21. On 24 March 1997 the applicant informed the Regional Court that her health did not allow her to appear at the hearing scheduled for 1 April 1997. In the letter the applicant stated that a lawyer should be appointed to represent her and complained that her requests to this effect of 18 November 1996 and of 14 February 1997 had not been dealt with. 22. On 1 April 1997 the Bratislava Regional Court upheld the Social Security Administration’s decision of 30 October 1996. The Regional Court noted that the applicant’s contract of employment had been terminated by 30 June 1989 and that she had been declared fully disabled and granted an invalidity pension with effect from 1 July 1989, that is the day following the termination of her employment. The court concluded that her invalidity pension could not be adjusted pursuant to Section 24(6) of the Extra-Judicial Rehabilitations Act. 23. On 24 April 1997 the applicant appealed. She alleged that the Regional Court had decided arbitrarily and that it had disregarded the pledge to grant her claim after the delivery of the certificate made by the representative of the Social Security Administration in the proceedings leading to the City Court’s judgment of 21 March 1995. The applicant further argued that the Regional Court had failed to establish the relevant facts correctly. On 16 June 1997 the applicant submitted further documentary evidence to the appellate court. 24. On 29 September 1997 the Supreme Court upheld the first instance judgment. The Supreme Court reiterated that the applicant had been granted a full invalidity pension as from 1 July 1989, that is the day following the termination of her contract of employment. It therefore considered that the applicant had not suffered any damage which could be compensated pursuant to Section 24(6) of the Extra-Judicial Rehabilitations Act. The Supreme Court pointed out that the representative of the defendant had apparently overlooked the above fact when she had stated that the claim would be granted upon the delivery of the relevant certificate to the applicant. However, that statement had been made in a different set of proceedings and it could not affect the decision on the applicant’s claim in the proceedings under the consideration. The appellate court decided in camera. 25. On 27 November 1997 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. She complained, inter alia, that the appellate court had not held a hearing in the case and had thus prevented her from submitting her arguments. On the same day the applicant requested the Bratislava Regional Court to appoint a representative to her in the proceedings on her appeal on points of law. She explained that the case was complex, that her handicap prevented her from acceding to the court room and that her only income was an invalidity pension amounting to 4,093 Slovakian korunas. The applicant also maintained that her constitutional right to legal protection had been violated in that her request for a lawyer to be appointed had not been processed in due manner. 26. On 27 January 1998 a different chamber of the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law. The Supreme Court found that the applicant had been duly summoned to the hearing before the Bratislava Regional Court held on 1 April 1997 and that she had failed to appear without an excuse. As to the appellate proceedings, the Supreme Court recalled that Articles 250f and 250s of the Code of Civil Procedure permitted the appellate court to decide on the case without hearing the parties. Furthermore, in the course of the proceedings the applicant made proposals as regards the evidence to be taken, she made comments on the case and submitted her arguments to the courts. 27. The Supreme Court further noted that the applicant “had been free to choose a legal representative and to apply for free legal representation”. Since the applicant did not lack legal capacity to act, the courts were not obliged to appoint a lawyer ex officio. The Supreme Court examined the applicant’s appeal on points of law in camera with reference to Article 250s (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure.

9. The first applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Brighton. The facts which gave rise to his application are as follows. 10. While working as a consultant physician in the field of rehabilitative medicine, the first applicant was charged on two counts of indecent assault on two female patients while they were allegedly under hypnosis. The first count in the indictment alleged that he had indecently assaulted a woman called S.T. during a consultation on 3 June 2003. The second count in the indictment alleged that he had indecently assaulted a woman called V.U. also during a consultation, this time on 12 June 2003. 11. For reasons unrelated to the alleged assault, S.T. committed suicide before the trial. However, several months after the alleged assault, she had made a statement to the police. She had also told two friends, B.F. and S.H., that the applicant had indecently assaulted her. 12. On 22 March 2004 a preliminary hearing was held to determine whether S.T.’s statement should be read to the jury. At that hearing, the defence indicated that the defence to each count of the indictment was essentially the same, namely that S.T. and V.U.’s allegations were wholly untrue. The judge at the hearing decided that S.T.’s statement should be read to the jury at trial. He observed that the first applicant was very likely to feel that he had no realistic alternative other than to give evidence in order to defend himself on the second count relating to V.U. Therefore, the reading of S.T.’s statement would not have the effect of making it very difficult for the applicant not to give evidence. The judge also noted that collusion between S.T. and V.U. was not alleged, and so that issue did not need to be investigated by cross-examination of each woman. 13. Having regard to the contents of S.T.’s statement, the judge also observed that it was crucial to the prosecution on count one as there was no other direct evidence of what took place during the consultation on 3 June 2003. He said: “[P]utting it bluntly, no statement, no count one.” He went on to observe that the real issue was whether it was likely to be possible for the first applicant to controvert the statement in a way that achieved fairness to the defendant. The judge found that the first applicant could give evidence as to what had happened during the consultation. It was also the intention of the prosecution to call S.T.’s friends to give evidence as to what she had said to them. There were inconsistencies between their statements and S.T.’s, which provided a route by which S.T.’s statement could be challenged. An expert witness would also be called by the prosecution to give evidence on altered perception during hypnosis and cross-examination of that witness might also serve to undermine S.T.’s credibility. 14. At the trial, once S.T.’s statement had been read, the jury heard evidence from B.F. and S.H., S.T.’s friends. S.T.’s general practitioner also gave evidence as to a letter he had written on S.T.’s behalf to the hospital authorities, which outlined S.T.’s allegations against the first applicant. In respect of the second count, the indecent assault upon V.U., evidence was given by V.U. and by the police officers who had investigated the case. Evidence was then given by two women who alleged that the first applicant had made improper suggestions to them during hypnosis consultations. That evidence was relied on by the prosecution as “similar fact evidence” to support the evidence of S.T. and V.U. As the prosecution had indicated, expert evidence was given as to the effects of hypnosis. The defence was given the opportunity to cross-examine all the witnesses who gave live evidence. The first applicant gave evidence in his own defence. He also called a number of witnesses, who gave evidence as to his good character. 15. In his summing up, the trial judge directed the jury, on two separate occasions, as to how they should regard S.T.’s statement. Firstly, he stated: “It is very important that you [the jury] bear in mind when considering her [S.T.’s] evidence that you have not seen her give evidence; you have not heard her give evidence; and you have not heard her evidence tested in cross-examination [by counsel for Mr Al-Khawaja], who would, undoubtedly, have had a number of questions to put to her.” 16. He later stated: “... bear in mind ... that this evidence was read to you. The allegation is completely denied ... you must take that into account when considering her evidence.” 17. When referring to the evidence of S.T.’s friends, the trial judge reminded the jury that there was an inconsistency between S.T.’s account of the consultation and the account given by S.H. (in her statement S.T. said that the applicant had touched her face and mouth; S.H. gave evidence that it was S.T. herself and not the first applicant who had touched her face and mouth). The trial judge continued: “It is for you to decide the extent to which the evidence of [B.F.] and [S.H.] helps you in deciding whether or not [S.T.] has spoken the truth in her statement. But bear in mind the evidence as to what [S.T.] said to [B.F.] and [S.H.] is not independent evidence as to the truth of her allegations.” 18. The trial judge also instructed the jury that they were entitled to consider the evidence of V.U., and of the other two women who had given evidence as to the improper suggestions made by the first applicant, when deciding whether S.T.’s statement was true. However, the jury firstly had to discount the possibility of collusion between the four women. Secondly, they had to ask themselves whether it was reasonable that four people independently making similar accusations could all either be lying or mistaken or have all suffered similar hallucinations or false memory. If the jury thought that incredible, they could be satisfied that S.T. and V.U. had spoken the truth. The trial judge also directed the jury that the greater the similarity between the allegations, the greater the likelihood that the four women were telling the truth. He added that the jury also had to consider whether the women could have consciously or unconsciously been influenced by hearing of the complaints of the others. 19. In the course of their deliberations, on two occasions the jury asked for clarification of points raised in the statement of S.T. On 30 November 2004, the first applicant was convicted by a unanimous verdict of the jury on both counts of indecent assault. He was sentenced to a fifteen-month custodial sentence on the first count and a twelve-month custodial sentence on the second count, to run consecutively. 20. The first applicant appealed against his conviction to the Court of Appeal. The appeal centred on the pre-trial ruling to admit S.T.’s statement as evidence. It was also submitted that, in his summing up, the trial judge did not give adequate directions to the jury as to the consequential disadvantage of this evidence to the first applicant. 21. The appeal was heard and dismissed on 6 September 2005. In its written judgment handed down on 3 November 2005 the Court of Appeal concluded that the first applicant’s right to a fair trial had not been infringed. With regard to the admission in evidence of the statement of S.T., the court held that it was not necessarily incompatible with Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention. Relying on Doorson v. the Netherlands (26 March 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑II), the court held that the admissibility of evidence is primarily a matter of domestic law. It then found: “25. The important factors in the present case are the following. The witness, S.T., could not be examined on behalf of the [first applicant] because she had died. She was the only witness whose evidence went directly to the commission of an indecent assault on her by the appellant. If her statement had been excluded, the prosecution would have had to abandon the first count. The [applicant] was able to attack the accuracy of [S.T.’s] statement by exploring the inconsistencies between it and the witnesses, [B.F.] and [S.H.], and through the expert evidence relating to ‘altered perception’ under hypnosis. The relevant sections of the 1988 Act [see paragraph 41 below] contained provisions designed to protect defendants, which were properly considered by the judge, before the statement was admitted in evidence. Lastly, the tribunal of fact, here the jury, could and should take proper account of the difficulties which the admission of a statement might provide for the [applicant], which should be provided by an appropriate direction to the jury. 26. Where a witness who is the sole witness of a crime has made a statement to be used in its prosecution and has since died, there may be a strong public interest in the admission of the statement in evidence so that the prosecution may proceed. That was the case here. That public interest must not be allowed to override the requirement that the defendant have a fair trial. Like the court in Sellick [see paragraph 48 below] we do not consider that the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights requires the conclusion that in such circumstances the trial will be unfair. The provision in Article 6 § 3 (d) that a person charged shall be able to [have] the witnesses against him examined is one specific aspect of a fair trial: but if the opportunity is not provided, the question is ‘whether the proceedings as a whole, including the way the evidence was taken, were fair’ – Doorson, paragraph 19 [see paragraph 58 below]. This was not a case where the witness had absented himself, whether through fear or otherwise, or had required anonymity, or had exercised a right to keep silent. The reason was death, which has a finality which brings in considerations of its own, as has been indicated at the start of this paragraph.” 22. Turning to the issue of the trial judge’s summing up, the court stated: “We consider that it would have been better if the judge had stated explicitly that the [first applicant] was potentially disadvantaged by the absence of [S.T.] and that in consequence of the inability to cross-examine her and of the jury to see her, her evidence should carry less weight with them. Nonetheless, in the circumstances of this case it must have been wholly clear to the jury from the directions the judge did give, that this was the purpose of his remarks. We therefore consider that the jury were given an adequate direction as to the consequences of [S.T.’s] statement being in evidence in her absence, and that this is not a factor which might make the [first applicant’s] trial unfair and in breach of Article 6. We should also say that overall the evidence against the [first applicant] was very strong. We were wholly unpersuaded that the verdicts were unsafe.” 23. The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal to the House of Lords but certified that a point of law of general public importance was involved in the decision. 24. On 30 November 2005 the first applicant petitioned the House of Lords on the point of law certified by the Court of Appeal. On 7 February 2006 the House of Lords refused the petition. 25. The second applicant was born in 1975. His application arises from his conviction for wounding with intent. The background to that conviction is as follows. 26. On 19 May 2004, S., a member of the Iranian community living in London, was involved in an altercation with some Kurdish men. The second applicant interposed himself between S. and the Kurdish men in order to protect S. In the small hours of the morning of 20 May 2004, S. and the second applicant met again outside an Iranian restaurant in Hammersmith, London. The second applicant asked S to have a word with him and led him into a nearby alleyway. The men began discussing the earlier altercation. Although S. denied throwing the first punch, he conceded while giving evidence at the second applicant’s trial that he had punched the second applicant. In the fight, the second applicant pushed S. back and, at this stage, S. became aware of a burning sensation in his back, which proved to be the result of three stab wounds to his back. S. and the second applicant had been face-to-face and S.’s account was that he neither saw the second applicant stab him, nor was he aware of the second applicant going behind him or reaching round his back, so as to stab him. 27. During the fight other men were present, including the Kurdish men from the earlier altercation. A friend of S., another member of the Iranian community called T., was there, as were two of T.’s friends and the second applicant’s uncle. S could not say which of the men were behind him. 28. S. saw a knife lying on the ground and he realised that he had been stabbed. In his evidence at the second applicant’s trial (see paragraph 32 below), he stated that he went to pick it up but that either the second applicant or T. had picked it up and thrown it towards the restaurant. S. assumed that it had been the second applicant who had stabbed him. According to S., the second applicant immediately denied this. He told S. to sit down beside him and attempted to staunch the blood flow from S.’s wounds until an ambulance arrived; when it did, he accompanied S to the hospital. At the hospital, the second applicant told the police that he had seen two black men stab S. 29. When witnesses were questioned at the scene, no one claimed to have seen the second applicant stab S. Two days later, however, T. made a statement to the police that he had seen the second applicant stab S. In his statement, T. recounted that, when the second applicant and S. had begun fighting in the alleyway, T. had tried to separate them. He then saw the second applicant hold S. by the neck, hold up the knife and stab S. twice in the back. As T. moved towards the second applicant, the second applicant tried to stab T. in the neck. According to T., the second applicant then dropped the knife and shouted “don’t tell the police”. 30. On 3 November 2004 the second applicant was arrested and taken to Hammersmith police station. In interview, he denied stabbing S. and again stated that two black men were responsible. He was charged with wounding with intent and also with attempting to pervert the course of justice for telling the police, at the hospital and at the police station, that he had seen two black men stab S. 31. On 25 April 2005 the second applicant’s trial began at Blackfriars Crown Court. That day, he pleaded guilty in respect of the charge of attempting to pervert the course of justice but maintained his not guilty plea in respect of the charge of wounding with intent. 32. S. gave evidence for the prosecution. He recounted how he and the second applicant had fought in the alleyway. After a minute he realised that he had been injured in the back. He had not seen who stabbed him. The second applicant had made him sit down and had covered the wound. S. had asked the second applicant who had stabbed him and the second applicant had denied that it was him. When cross-examined, S. accepted that he had not seen the second applicant go behind him and that they had been face-to-face. He also testified that he had heard someone shout to him “Tell him it was the blacks”; the voice did not belong to the second applicant. 33. After S had given evidence, the prosecution made an application for leave to read T.’s statement pursuant to section 116(2)(e) and (4) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (“the 2003 Act”; see paragraphs 43-45 below). The prosecution argued under the 2003 Act that T. was too fearful to attend trial before the jury and that he should qualify for special measures. The trial judge heard evidence from a police officer conducting the case who testified that the Iranian community was close-knit and that T.’s fear was genuine. T. also gave evidence to the trial judge (but not the jury) from behind a screen. He told the judge that he was in fear for himself and his family because of visits and telephone calls he had received, none of which were said to have been from the second applicant. He did not say who had been responsible for the visits and telephone calls. 34. In ruling that leave should be given for the statement to be read to the jury, the trial judge stated: “I am satisfied in those circumstances upon the criminal standard of proof that this witness is genuinely in fear; and I base that not only on his oral testimony, but also upon my opportunity while he was in the witness box to observe him. I therefore have to go on to consider the questions posed in [section 116(4) of the 2003 Act]. Subsection 4(a) requires me to look at the statement’s contents. I have done so. It is submitted by the defence that they may be unreliable; there being some inconsistencies with the evidence that was given by [S.]. There will always be cases, whether it be oral evidence or evidence that is read, where there are inconsistencies. It is always for the jury to come to a conclusion, based upon submissions of counsel and the evidence that they have heard, as to whether the evidence is reliable or not. And they will receive from me the appropriate warning when the time comes as to how they should view that statement. It is further submitted that in looking at the statement, it is a statement of great importance; in that it is from a person who purports to witness the incident and consequently goes to the heart of the matter. In my view, it is precisely this type of witness who is likely to be put in fear, and consequently that must have been what Parliament had in mind when it enacted this particular section. I therefore have to look, having looked at the contents of the statement, to any risk its admission or exclusion will result in unfairness to any party to the proceedings. I am satisfied that there would be an unfairness caused by its exclusion; but I am equally satisfied that no unfairness would be caused by its admission. And in doing so, I have taken into account the words of [the 2003 Act]; in particular how difficult it will be to challenge the statement if the relevant person does not give oral evidence. Challenge of a statement does not always come from cross-examination. Challenge of a statement can be caused by evidence given in rebuttal; by either the defendant, if he chooses to do so, or by any other bystander – and we know that there were some – who were on the street at that time. Consequently I am satisfied that the defendant’s evidence, if he chooses to give it, would be sufficient to rebut and to challenge the evidence that is contained in that statement. I have further considered other relevant factors, and I have also offered to the witness whilst he was in the witness box behind screens the possibility of him giving evidence with the same special measures in place. He told me his position would not change; that he could not give evidence before a jury, and the reason that he could not was because he was in fear. Having taken all those matters into account in those circumstances, I am satisfied that this is the type of case which Parliament envisaged might require a statement to be read.” 35. T.’s witness statement was then read to the jury. Evidence was also given by the doctor who had treated S. at hospital as to the nature of the wound and by a forensic scientist who had tested the blood found on the second applicant’s clothes and confirmed it matched that of S. (though no firm conclusions could be drawn as to how it had been deposited on the clothes). The record of the second applicant’s interview by the police was also tendered by the prosecution (see paragraph 30 above). 36. The second applicant gave evidence in his defence. He stated that he had been present at the earlier altercation with the Kurdish men. When he and S. later met outside the restaurant, he had taken S. by the hand and suggested that they go and talk, but S. had begun to punch him. He had defended himself by grabbing S. by the collar and pushing him. T. had then tried to intervene and a number of other members of the Iranian community had restrained S. T. had been standing between S. and the second applicant and, at this stage, the second applicant noticed the knife on the ground. He had picked it up and thrown it, not knowing at this point that S. had been stabbed. When S blamed him for the stabbing, the second applicant had told him to sit down and had successfully calmed him down. He placed his hand on the wound on S.’s back. S. then appeared to accept that the second applicant had not stabbed him. The second applicant also gave evidence that he had told the police that two black men were responsible because this was what his uncle had told him to say. Finally, the second applicant gave evidence that, before he had been interviewed by the police, T. had told him that he, T., knew that the second applicant had not stabbed S. 37. The judge, in his summing up, warned the jury about the danger of relying on the evidence of T. He stated: “That evidence, as you know, was read to you under the provisions that allow a witness who is frightened, it is not a question of nerves it is a question of fright, fear, for his statement to be read to you but you must be careful as to how you treat it. It is right, as has been pointed out by the defence, that they were deprived of an opportunity to test that evidence under cross-examination. It is right also that you did not have the advantage of seeing the witness and his demeanour in court. You did not have the opportunity for him to think back and say ‘possibly because of things I saw I put two and two together and made five’, as counsel for the defence invites you to say. In other words, you must always be alert to [the fact] that he could put things that he did see together and come to the wrong conclusion. That is a way of examining the statement. You must ask yourselves ‘can we rely upon this statement? Is it a statement which we find convincing?’ It is only, if you are satisfied so that you are sure, that what is in the statement has accurately depicted what happened that night and what the witness saw, that you could rely upon it. That goes for any witness. It is only if you find that the evidence is compelling and satisfies you, so that you are sure, that you act upon it. So you must always ask yourselves ‘is the statement he made reliable?’ You must bear in mind also, importantly, that it is agreed and acknowledged that it is not the defendant who is responsible for putting the witness in fear.” 38. On 29 April 2005 the second applicant was convicted by a majority verdict of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, for which he was later sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment to be served concurrently with a term of fifteen months’ imprisonment for the charge of attempting to pervert the course of justice to which he had pleaded guilty. 39. The second applicant appealed to the Court of Appeal, arguing that the inability to cross-examine T. infringed his right to a fair trial. The Court of Appeal acknowledged that the Crown accepted that T.’s statement was “both important and probative of a major issue in the case ... had it not been admitted the prospect of a conviction would have receded and that of an acquittal advanced”. The court upheld the reasoning of the trial judge, stating that there was available not only cross-examination of other prosecution witnesses but also evidence from the second applicant himself and the potential for evidence from other bystanders in order to prevent unfairness. It was also stated that the trial judge had explicitly warned the jury in detail as to how they should treat this evidence and properly directed them as to how they should consider it in reaching their verdict. Although the second applicant maintained that even a proper direction by the judge could not cure the unfairness, the Court of Appeal held that the jury was informed of all matters necessary to its decision-making process. Leave to appeal on conviction was refused on 24 January 2006. The Court of Appeal did, however, give the second applicant leave to appeal against his sentence and reduced the sentence of nine years’ imprisonment to seven years’ imprisonment.

5. The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Warsaw. 6. At the relevant time the applicant was a member of the Polish parliament. 7. In October 2006 a series of reports appeared in the Polish press in which the applicant’s past was described. It was reported that the applicant had sexually abused students when working as a teacher in the 1980s. The reports in question were published in the Polish daily newspapers Super Express on 20 October and Rzeczpospolita and Gazeta Wyborcza on 23 October, on the internet portal wydarzenia.pl on 20 October, and by the Information Radio Agency on 20 October and the Polish Press Agency on 20, 21 and 22 October 2006. 8. On 30 October 2006 the applicant organised a press conference which was held in the Sejm building. The conference was transmitted by a TV news information channel, TVN24. At the press conference the applicant said: “... of course this was connected with the blackmail to which we were subjected. We already know which journalists cooperated, and with whom, in order to obtain money from us under false pretences. Today this is almost one hundred per cent clear to us. I think that today those three gentlemen already know about that. Those journalists cooperated with the informer who supplied the information on the basis of which the whole matter was disseminated and today, as far as we know, they are being paid for that. I do not yet know how much, some 15 or 20% of the amount obtained...” 9. Following this statement, a journalist from the daily Super Express J.H. commented: “I am the author of this article, J.H., from Super Express. My question concerns the people who inspired me... Maybe you could tell us something else about these familial-financial relationships?” 10. The applicant replied: “I will reply to you. The first complaint will be lodged against you [with the court] tomorrow. After that, three more complaints will be lodged...” 11. On 31 October 2006 the Rzeczpospolita daily published an article entitled “Jan Bestry: I did not commit rape, I will sue Super Express”. According to this article, the Super Express daily had written that in the 1980s the applicant’s employment contract had been terminated without notice because he had sexually abused young girls. The article went on to say that a few days after publication of this story, the TV station TVN reported that the applicant had been convicted in 1982 of having assaulted a woman passenger on a train when working as a train conductor. The article also mentioned that during an interview with Rzeczpospolita the applicant had said: “The disclosure of these matters is in effect a plot in which Super Express was involved”. 12. The author of the article was G.P., who wrote it after interviewing the applicant on the phone. According to G.P. the applicant approved publication of the contents of the article and the statements cited in the article were the statements made by the applicant. 13. However, the applicant denied having spoken to G.P. or having approved any information for publication in the press article. When questioned by the court he said that he had not attempted to have a correction of this article published because he had only found out about it in the course of the judicial proceedings (see paragraph 19 below). 14. On 1 December 2006 the former editor-in-chief of the Super Express daily, T.L., and the publisher of the newspaper, the company Media Express Sp. z o.o., lodged a civil claim against the applicant for the protection of their personal rights. They claimed that the applicant had harmed their good name and credibility by statements he had made at the press conference on 30 October and in the article published by Rzeczpospolita on 31 October 2006. 15. On 29 May 2008 the Warsaw Regional Court granted the claim in part and ordered the applicant to publish an apology for the statements he had made – and which were cited in the article published by Rzeczpospolita on 31 October 2006 – using the following wording: “Jan Bestry apologises to T.L., the former editor-in-chief of the Super Express daily, for unlawful infringement of his personal rights, namely his good name and professional credibility, by alleging in the Rzeczpospolita daily in an article published in issue no. 255 dated 31 October-1 November 2006 under the headline: “Jan Bestry - I did not commit rape; I will sue Super Express” that “the disclosure of the matters referred to in the article is in effect a plot in which Super Express was involved”. 16. The applicant was also ordered to make a similar statement of apology as regards the plaintiff company Media Express Sp. z o.o. and to publish these two statements in a particular way on page four of Rzeczpospolita. 17. The court refused to grant the plaintiffs’ request that the apology also be published in five other dailies and on the TVN channel, finding that such an order would exceed the severity of the infringement committed by the applicant. 18. The court justified its reasoning by finding that the applicant’s statement referring to a “plot” in which the Super Express daily was involved infringed the plaintiffs’ personal rights, and at the same time the applicant had not in any way proved the veracity of his allegations; both at the time the article was published and later, in the course of the civil proceedings, he had failed to demonstrate that the newspaper had in fact been involved in any “plot”. The court concluded that the applicant’s statements, which had been made in public, amounted to “unverified suspicions and accusations addressed to the newspaper”. It further observed that the applicant, as member of the parliament, had “a right to criticise socially negative phenomena” guaranteed to him by the Polish Constitution and by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. However, “while enjoying this right, he may not overstep the limits of permissible criticism by spreading groundless accusations.” 19. The court did not find credible the applicant’s submission at the hearing on 27 May 2008 that he had only found out about the Rzeczpospolita article in the course of the proceedings. The court took the view that, having held a press conference, the applicant would surely have followed the press articles which appeared over the following days concerning the subject matter discussed at the conference. 20. The court dismissed the remainder of the claim, finding that the statements made by the applicant at the press conference on 30 October 2006 could not unambiguously be interpreted as concerning journalists from a specific newspaper, because the applicant had not expressly mentioned any journalist or newspaper by name. 21. Both parties appealed against the first-instance judgment. 22. On 12 February 2009 the Warsaw Court of Appeal amended the challenged judgment insofar as it additionally ordered the applicant to publish an apology for the statements made during the press conference on 30 October 2006. The court examined what was said in the course of the conference and found that the applicant had initially referred to the events of 1980s, and to his work at the school and in the railway company. He had also said: “Everything which was written in Super Express is untrue”. Next, the applicant had spoken about his feelings about the case and about the sources that lay behind the story reported by the “journalists involved in this case”. He stated that: “The first bill of indictment will be lodged with the court against the tabloid’s editor tomorrow. Before the end of the week, three more complaints will be lodged. All [complaints] concern articles in the newspaper discussed”. After further statements referring to events at the school where the applicant had worked and a statement by the applicant’s wife, the applicant made the statement referred to above (see paragraphs 8 and 10), which in turn provoked the reaction by J.H. (see paragraph 9 above). 23. The Court of Appeal concluded that, although the applicant had not specifically mentioned the names of any journalists or newspapers, for the average person it was clear from the context of the statements concerned that the charges of blackmail and obtaining money under false pretences had been directed at journalists from Super Express. 24. The Court additionally ordered the applicant to publish the following apology on the TV Channel TVN 24 on a weekday between midday and 4 p.m.: “Jan Bestry apologises to T.L., the former editor-in-chief of the Super Express daily for unlawful infringement of his personal rights, namely his good name and professional credibility, by making a statement at the press conference on 30 October 2006 which contained the untrue and defamatory allegation that Super Express journalists had cooperated with informers in order to obtain money from Jan Bestry under false pretences and, when publishing articles about Jan Bestry in Super Express, had received a percentage of the money obtained under false pretences. Jan Bestry expresses his regret for having illegally infringed the personal rights of the former editor-in-chief T.L.” 25. The applicant was also ordered to publish, in the same medium, an identical apology regarding the company Media Express sp. z o.o. 26. The applicant lodged a cassation appeal. 27. On 20 April 2010 the Supreme Court refused to examine the appeal, holding that the applicant had not demonstrated that the Court of Appeal had overstepped the limits regarding the assessment of evidence or had infringed the rules of interpretation of the relevant provisions. 28. J.H. lodged a private bill of indictment against the applicant. He claimed that on 30 October 2006 the applicant had slandered him through the mass media at a press conference by making public allegations that he had cooperated with informers in order to obtain money from the applicant. He also requested that the applicant be found guilty of slandering him by giving an interview to the Rzeczpospolita daily in which he had alleged that J.H. had participated in a plot against him. 29. On 27 April 2009 the Warsaw District Court found the applicant guilty of two counts of slander and sentenced him to a fine. 30. The applicant did not appeal against this judgment. 31. The applicant in turn also lodged a private bill of indictment against J.H. He sought a criminal conviction for J.H. on two counts of slander: firstly, for having published an article alleging that the applicant had sexually abused children and secondly for having published, on 27 October 2006, another article under the title: “Woman assaulted by Bestry. He wanted to force her into submission. He was convicted for beating her up”. 32. On 16 October 2012 the Warsaw Regional Court acquitted J.H. on the first count of slander but found him guilty on the second count. 33. The applicant’s lawyer and J.H.’s lawyer both lodged appeals against this judgment. 34. On 3 July 2013 the Warsaw Regional Court amended the first-instance judgment in that it also acquitted J.H. also of the second count of slander, finding that he had not committed an offence because he had merely made public truthful information concerning a person exercising a public function. The court found that J.H had collected sufficient evidence to prove the veracity of the information he had published and therefore could not be found guilty of slander. The court admitted that as regards the second count of slander, J.H. had published information about a criminal conviction which, due to the passage of time, had already been removed from the applicant’s criminal record. However, it considered that the expunging of the applicant’s record had concerned only its criminal and not its civil aspects and that the disclosure of the expunged conviction was permissible if made for the purposes of protecting a “socially protected interest”. 35. The applicant lodged a cassation appeal. 36. On 19 March 2014 the Supreme Court declined to examine the appeal, holding it to be unfounded.

5. The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Bad Berleburg. 6. The applicant has a daughter who was born out of wedlock on 25 July 1997. He lived with the mother of the child from April 1997 until their separation on 29 June 1998. The daughter remained with the mother. 7. Following a request of the applicant for regulation of his contact rights lodged with the Bad Berleburg District Court (Amtsgericht), the parents concluded an agreement on 2 August 1999, pursuant to which the applicant had the right to have contact with the child every Sunday from 2 p.m. to 6 p.m. The last contact between the applicant and his daughter took place on 24 October 1999. 8. In November 1999 the mother and the daughter moved from Bad Berleburg to Stralsund without notifying the applicant. The mother has refused to allow any further contact between the applicant and the child ever since. 9. On 20 January 2000 the applicant lodged a request with the Stralsund District Court for a new regulation of his contact rights on the ground that following his daughter’s move to Stralsund the considerable distance between their respective places of domicile required a review of the relevant stipulations in the agreement concluded on 2 August 1999. The mother objected by written submissions dated 16 February 2000, alleging that following meetings between the applicant and their daughter prior to her move to Stralsund, the latter had shown signs of behavioural disorders. 10. The Stralsund District Court obtained the opinions of the Siegen Wittgenstein District’s and Stralsund Youth Welfare Offices dated 9 and 29 March 2000, respectively stating that the mother alleged that the applicant had sexually abused their daughter on the occasion of previous reunions. 11. On 15 May 2000 the Stralsund District Court held a first hearing. On 18 May 2000 the District Court ordered a psychological expert report, which was rendered on 14 July 2000. The expert opinion did not confirm the mother’s allegations of sexual abuse and recommended a regulation of the applicant’s contact rights in the interest of the child’s welfare. 12. On 14 August 2000 the District Court scheduled a second hearing for 18 September 2000, which was postponed at the request of the mother’s lawyer and finally cancelled following notification by the applicant that he and his lawyer were not able to attend on the rescheduled date. 13. By a letter to the District Court dated 13 October 2000 the applicant pointed out that the mother had meanwhile refused him contact with the child for almost a year, and asked for an indication when a further hearing in the matter would take place. 14. On 26 October 2000 the District Court scheduled a hearing for 16 November 2000, which was postponed to 25 January 2001 at the request of the mother’s lawyer. The District Court heard the parents, the appointed expert, the representative of the Stralsund Welfare Office and an expert witness presented by the mother. 15. By decision of 14 February 2001, the Stralsund District Court held that the suspicion of sexual abuse had not been confirmed and granted the applicant the right to have supervised contact with the child from 9 am to 12 midday every third Friday of the month, in the presence of a representative of the Stralsund Youth Welfare Office. The decision was served on the applicant on 10 April 2001. 16. On 9 May 2001 the mother lodged an appeal with the Rostock Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) asking for the rejection of the father’s right of contact. The applicant objected to the appeal by written submissions dated 28 June 2001 and asked for an extension of his contact rights to two days per month without monitoring. 17. On 12 November 2001 the Rostock Court of Appeal heard the parents and the representative of the Stralsund Welfare Office. 18. By a decision of 20 December 2001 the Rostock Court of Appeal provisionally suspended the execution of the Stralsund District Court’s decision of 14 February 2001 to the extent the applicant had been granted contact rights that went beyond supervised access. It further appointed a curator ad litem to represent the child and decided to obtain a further psychological expert opinion on a possible arrangement regarding the applicant’s contact rights which was ordered on 1 March 2002. The mother, who had meanwhile moved to Berlin with her daughter, refused any contact between the curator ad litem and the child and rejected the expert appointed by the Court of Appeal. 19. On 5 August 2002 the expert rendered an opinion on the basis of an examination of the applicant on which both the mother and the applicant commented by written submissions on 16 September and 16 October 2002 respectively. 20. On 23 October 2002 the Court of Appeal scheduled a hearing for 27 January 2003 that was not attended by the mother or the child due to the latter’s sickness and therefore had to be postponed to 3 March 2003. 21. On 3 March 2003 the Court of Appeal heard the child, the parents, the child’s curator ad litem and the representative of the Stralsund Youth Welfare Office. The mother again refused an examination of the child and herself by the appointed expert. 22. On 19 March 2003 the Court of Appeal specified its decision to take evidence dated 20 December 2001 with a view to obtaining a psychological expert opinion on the question whether there was any indication of sexual abuse of the child by the applicant and whether contact between the applicant and the child was in the interest of the child’s welfare. The Court of Appeal further reconfirmed the appointment of the previously nominated expert. 23. On 15 July 2003 the Court of Appeal scheduled a hearing for 17 November 2003, after three attempts in April, June and July 2003 by the expert to schedule appointments with the mother for an examination had failed. A representative of the Youth Welfare Office as well as the child’s curator ad litem were present at the hearing. At the request of the mother the child’s psychotherapist was heard as a witness. 24. By a decision dated 28 January 2004 the Court of Appeal suspended the applicant’s contact rights until 31 December 2007 and obliged the mother to report to the applicant on the personal development of his daughter. The Court of Appeal held that even though it was not convinced of the mother’s accusations that the child had been sexually abused by the applicant, it was not in the interest of the child’s welfare to grant the father right of contact. It found that the parents’ relationship had completely deteriorated and an enforcement of the applicant’s contact rights against the will of the mother would put even more pressure on the child. 25. On 3 March 2004 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court. 26. On 9 June 2004 the Federal Constitutional Court set aside the decision of 28 January 2004 and remitted the case to the Rostock Court of Appeal. The Federal Constitutional Court found that the applicant’s right to the care and upbringing of his child had been infringed on the ground that the Court of Appeal had not sufficiently taken into account the welfare of the child and the parenting right of the father in its decision. 27. On 3 November 2004 the Court of Appeal again heard the parents, the child’s curator ad litem and the representative of the Stralsund Youth Welfare Office. 28. On 19 November 2004 the Court of Appeal heard the daughter. 29. By decision dated 13 December 2004 the Court of Appeal confirmed its order to obtain an expert opinion dated 19 March 2003 and reappointed the same expert who had previously been nominated and rejected by the mother. It further asked for an opinion by the Berlin-Neukölln Youth Welfare Office which had become locally competent following the mother’s move to Berlin. The opinion was delivered on 18 January 2005. 30. On 8 April 2005 the Court of Appeal rejected a challenge lodged by the mother for bias on the part of the expert on the ground that it had been lodged outside the statutory time-limit. 31. On 11 May 2005 the Court of Appeal instructed the expert to render an opinion on the basis of the exploration of the father and the case file, after having been informed on 4 May 2005 that an attempt by the expert to meet with the mother had failed due to the mother’s objection. 32. On 8 August 2005 and on 11 October 2005 the Court of Appeal inquired why the expert opinion had not yet been finalised. 33. On 14 October 2005 the expert opinion was delivered and served on the applicant on 24 October 2005. According to the findings of the expert there were no substantiated indications that the child had been sexually abused by the father. 34. On 12 January 2006 a further challenge lodged by the mother for bias on the part of the expert was rejected by the Court of Appeal. 35. On 17 January 2006 the Court of Appeal scheduled a further hearing for 14 February 2006, which the mother and child did not attend and which was therefore rescheduled for 17 March 2006. On the occasion of the hearing the child, the parents, the curator ad litem and a representative of the Neukölln Youth Welfare Office were heard. 36. By a decision of 20 April 2006, the Court of Appeal deprived the mother of custody of the child to the extent that her approval of the child’s examination by an expert was concerned, and appointed the Neukölln Youth Welfare Office as the child’s guardian (Ergänzungspfleger) in this respect. The Court of Appeal further obliged the mother to permit the guardian contact with the child and instructed the bailiff to enable such contact, by force if need be. 37. Nevertheless, the mother obstructed two subsequent attempts by the Youth Welfare Office on 26 September and 20 October 2006 to collect the child with a view to bringing her to the expert for examination. 38. On 13 December 2006 the Court of Appeal informed the expert that the examination of the child should be finalised by 31 January 2007. It asked the expert to schedule further dates for a corresponding appointment and instructed the appointed guardian at the Neukölln Youth Welfare Office to see to it that such appointments were implemented. 39. On 9 January 2007 the guardian informed the Court of Appeal that in her opinion a forced meeting with the expert would not be in the interest of the child’s welfare. 40. On 16 January 2007 the expert informed the Court of Appeal that the guardian had not brought the child to appointments scheduled for 9 and 16 January 2007. 41. On 22 January 2007 the child’s curator ad litem pointed out that an examination of the child had been ordered by the Court of Appeal on 19 March 2003 but had still not occurred to this date and denounced the guardian’s refusal to implement the Court of Appeal’s orders. 42. In reply to an inquiry by the Court of Appeal of 23 January 2007, the Head of the Neukölln Welfare Youth Office supported the decision of the guardian not to proceed to an examination of the child by force. 43. By decision of 20 March 2007 the Court of Appeal amended its decision of 20 April 2006 and appointed a new guardian for the child. An attempt by the newly appointed guardian to call for the child on 3 July 2007 was to no avail. 44. On 13 July 2007 the Court of Appeal further amended its decision of 20 April 2006 and obliged all third persons in charge of the child to hand her over to the guardian for the purpose of examination by the expert. 45. On 17 March 2008, following a further move of the mother and daughter to Bad Zwesten-Oberurff, the Court of Appeal appointed a new expert for the child’s examination and the Schwalm-Eder District Youth Welfare Office as a new guardian for the child. 46. A first contact between the guardian and the mother was established on 28 April 2008. Furthermore, the newly appointed expert confirmed by a letter dated 18 June 2008 that the mother had attended a first appointment for examination. 47. On 5 August 2008 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court regarding the lack of an effective remedy as regards the length of the instant proceedings. 48. On 15 December 2008 the expert opinion was submitted to the Court of Appeal who set a deadline of three weeks for comments by the parties. According to the expert, the daughter’s rejection of her father constituted a strategy adopted by the child with a view to handling the tense situation caused by her mother’s conduct. Furthermore, due to the passage of time a scientific clarification of the allegations of sexual abuse was no longer possible. In their written submissions the applicant as well as the Youth Welfare Office asked for an additional assessment in writing by the expert whether and under which conditions contacts between the applicant and his daughter could be established. By a letter of 26 January 2009 the Court of Appeal made the related request and the expert submitted her additional observations to the court on 6 February 2009. The expert found that there was a risk that contact against the daughter’s will would further unsettle her. 49. On the occasion of a hearing on 18 May 2009 the parties and the child’s guardian and curator ad litem were heard. The guardian objected to a forced establishment of contacts between father and daughter. The applicant’s daughter was also heard by the court and objected to having contact with her father. A supplementary expert statement was ordered by the court and submitted on 15 June 2009. In his written observations of 3 July 2009 the applicant contested the expert’s supplementary statements. The expert commented by written submissions of 27 July 2009. A further request by the court for clarification was answered by the expert on 17 August 2009 and was forwarded to the parties for final observations. 50. By a judgment of 25 November 2009 the Court of Appeal amended the decision of the Stralsund District Court dated 14 February 2001 and regulated the applicant’s contact rights for the period until 31 July 2011. It obliged the mother to inform the applicant twice a year in writing about their daughter’s development and to communicate her current address. The applicant was granted the right to send a letter and photos to the child once a month through an independent intermediary to be appointed by the guardian. No further contact rights were granted. Relying in particular on the findings of the expert as well as the guardian and the daughter’s own statements, the court held that for the time being personal contact between the applicant and his daughter against the latter’s will would be contrary to the best interest of the child. The judgment was served on the applicant on 30 November 2009 and has become final.

6. The first and the second applicant were born in 1927 and 1950 respectively. The third and the fourth applicant were born in 1954. The first applicant lives in Józefów and her three daughters in Warsaw, Poland. 7. From 1939 to 1944, Jan Hałka, the first applicant's husband, was a member of the Polish resistance troops of the underground Home Army (Armia Krajowa). In 1944 he was arrested by the NKVD and the Polish political police and imprisoned in a labour camp in Siberia. He was kept in Borowice (former USSR) from November 1944 to February 1946. He died on 17 November 1986. 8. On 8 December 1994 the applicants filed an application with the Warsaw Regional Court for compensation under section 8 § 2(a) of the Law of 23 February 1991 on annulment of convictions whereby persons were persecuted for their activities aimed at achieving independence for Poland (Ustawa o uznaniu za nieważne orzeczeń wydanych wobec osób represjonowanych za działalność na rzecz niepodległego buty Państwa Polskiego) (“the 1991 Act”). 9. In 1996 the first applicant personally went to the court and asked a judge to fix a date for a hearing as soon as possible. She submitted that she was an elderly person and that the court should therefore give priority to her case. 10. In 1998 she again went in person to the Warsaw Regional Court and asked the judge to set a date for a hearing as soon as possible. 11. On 11 May 2000 she sent a letter to the court, asking for a hearing date to be set and for information on the proceedings. She maintained that her previous applications for the proceedings to be accelerated had been to no avail and that the period of total inactivity on the part of that court had exceeded five years. 12. On 1 October 2000 she complained to the Minister of Justice about the lack of progress in the proceedings. 13. On 4 December 2000 the Warsaw Regional Court held a hearing in the applicants' case. On the same date the court gave judgment and awarded the first applicant and her three daughters compensation in the amount of 8,075 Polish zlotys (PLN) each. Since no party appealed within the statutory time-limit of seven days, the first-instance decision became final on 12 December 2000. 14. On 19 March 2002 the Warsaw Regional Court informed the first and the third applicant that they could collect the sums awarded from the Financial Department of the Warsaw Regional Court on 25 March 2002. They did so. It appears from the material produced by the applicants that the second and the fourth applicant have not yet received their share of the compensation awarded.

4. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Budapest. 5. The applicant was employed by a construction co-operative; his duty was to disinfect pieces of wood with chemicals. On account of various illnesses which the applicant alleged were caused by this activity, he suffered a 40% disability. In September 1989 he instituted proceedings in the Budapest Labour Court. He claimed that his diseases had been caused by the chemicals and that his former employer should pay him compensation. On 20 October 1990 the Labour Court dismissed the action. This judgment was quashed by the Budapest Regional Court on 8 January 1992. The case was remitted to the first instance court. 6. In the resumed proceedings, the respondent employer was replaced by its successor. Between 13 October 1992 and 22 February 1994, the Labour Court held five hearings and obtained an opinion from the Institute of Forensic Medicine. On that date it delivered a judgment and dismissed the applicant’s action. On 9 September 1994 the applicant appealed. 7. After a hearing on 6 September 1995, on 28 February 1996 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. 8. Following the applicant’s successful request of 13 August 1996 to have his case re-opened, the Labour Court held hearings on 5 December 1996, and 24 April and 5 June 1997. By 28 September 1998 the opinions of further two experts were obtained. Another hearing was held on 31 March 1999. 9. On 8 September 1999 the Labour Court dismissed the applicant’s action, holding that the respondent was not liable for the applicant’s sickness. 10. On 30 March 2000 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. On 13 October 2000 the applicant filed a petition for review. On 16 January 2001 the Supreme Court appointed a legal-aid lawyer for him. On 3 April it scheduled a hearing for 14 November 2001. 11. On 6 April 2001 the liquidator of the successor to the applicant’s former employer informed the Supreme Court that the respondent had been liquidated on 1 June and deleted from the company register on 7 October 2000. On 10 May 2001 the Supreme Court interrupted the proceedings until the respondent’s successor joined the proceedings. 12. On 18 September 2001 the applicant requested that the liquidator be allowed to join the proceedings as the defendant’s successor. 13. On 7 November 2001 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s request, observing that the liquidator was not the successor. 14. In separate proceedings, on 7 January 2002 the applicant requested that the proceedings resulting in the defendant’s liquidation be re-opened, since he had never been informed of them. On 1 February 2002 the Regional Court’s Economic Collegium dismissed this request. On 28 April 2003 the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal since the request was incompatible ratione materiae with the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and Act no. XLIX of 1991 (“the Insolvency Act”). In its reasoning, the Supreme Court made reference to the fact that, under sections 20 and 82(g) of Act no. CXLI of 2000 on New Co-operatives, the respondent had ceased to exist ipso iure without a successor (section 1(3) of the Insolvency Act).

9. The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Nizhniy Novgorod. At the relevant time he was a police officer in the road traffic department. On 8 September 1998, while off duty, he and his friend F met MS, a teenage girl, in Bogorodsk, in the Nizhniy Novgorod region. The applicant gave MS a lift in his car to Nizhniy Novgorod. 10. On 10 September 1998 MS’s mother informed the Bogorodsk municipal police of her daughter’s disappearance. At 4 p.m. on the same day, the applicant was arrested. F was also arrested and brought to Bogorodsk police station. The applicant and F were questioned by police officers in relation to the disappearance of MS. However, no charge was brought against them. Following the questioning, the police seized the applicant’s identity card and other documents and put him in the detention wing. 11. On the evening of 10 September 1998 the applicant’s superior officer came to the applicant’s cell and forced him to sign a resignation statement backdated to 17 August 1998. 12. On 11 September 1998 the police searched the applicant’s flat, country house, garage and car. They found three gun cartridges in his car. 13. On 12 September 1998 three officers from Bogorodsk municipal police, N, T and D, filed an “administrative offence report” with a judge of Bogorodsk Town Court. The report stated that on the evening of 11 September 1998 the applicant and F had committed a “disturbance of the peace” at the railway station. On the same date the judge sentenced the applicant and F to five days’ administrative detention from 11 September 1998. 14. According to the applicant, while in detention in Bogorodsk police station, he had been repeatedly questioned about the disappearance of MS. He denied any involvement in her disappearance. He said that he had requested a lawyer on many occasions, but that his request had been refused. 15. On 16 September 1998 the police opened a criminal investigation relating to the ammunition found by the police during the search of 11 September 1998 (criminal case no. 68205). By this time the term of the applicant’s administrative detention had expired and the applicant had been placed in custody in connection with the criminal case. He was transferred to another detention centre, under the jurisdiction of Leninskiy police department, who were in charge of the case. 16. The applicant submitted that after his transfer to the detention centre the questioning had become more intensive and even violent. For instance, on several occasions the police officers had slapped him and threatened him with torture in order to extract a confession that he had killed MS. In particular, they had threatened to apply electric shocks to him or place him in a cell with “hardcore criminals” who would kill him if they learned he was a police officer. 17. On 17 September 1998 the applicant was visited by a lawyer hired by the applicant’s mother several days earlier in connection with criminal case no. 68205. According to the applicant, during the conversation with the lawyer he had mentioned that the real reason for his detention was the disappearance of MS. However, the lawyer replied that she could not take on another case that she had not been paid for. The next day, according to the applicant, the police investigator banned all visits by the lawyer to the applicant. 18. Meanwhile, F testified to the police that he had seen the applicant rape and kill MS. He indicated to the investigators the place where they had allegedly hidden the body of MS. A group of policemen went there, but nothing was found. 19. On 19 September 1998 the applicant was questioned at Leninskiy police station in the presence of several police and prosecution officials, including I (the senior police investigator), S (deputy head of the local office of the Ministry of the Interior), MR (the deputy regional prosecutor), the Bogorodsk town prosecutor, and a number of policemen of the Leninskiy police department. 20. The applicant alleged that he had been subjected to torture in order to make him corroborate F’s confession. According to the applicant, while he was sitting handcuffed on a chair, police inspectors K and O had administered electric shocks to his ears through metal clips connected by a wire to a box. The applicant had been tortured several times in this way. The applicant had also been threatened with severe beatings and application of an electric current to his genitals. One of the police officers had told him that the current could cause his tongue to fall back into his throat, from where it could be extracted only by means of a safety pin. 21. According to the applicant, the officials from the prosecutor’s office had not been present in the room where he had been tortured with electrodes. However, he had twice been brought to another room in the police station, where he had been repeatedly questioned by those officials, notably MR. The applicant had complained to MR about the ill-treatment, but the latter had not reacted, and when the applicant again refused to confess to murdering MS, MR had ordered the police officers to take the applicant “back to where he came from”. 22. The applicant submitted that, unable to withstand the torture and left unattended for a moment, he had broken free and jumped out of the window of the second floor of the police station in order to commit suicide. He had fallen on a police motorcycle parked in the courtyard and broken his spine. 23. The applicant, accompanied by inspector K, was immediately taken to Hospital no. 33 of Novgorod Region, where he was examined by Dr M, who established various injuries caused by his fall from the window, affecting in particular his vertebral column and locomotor system. 24. On the same day the applicant was transferred to Hospital no. 39. His mother arrived at the hospital and asked Dr K to include burns to the applicant’s ears in his medical record. However, her request was refused. She also submitted a request to Dr S, who was in charge of the applicant’s case, and to the head doctor of the hospital, asking that the burns be recorded. She received no answer to her requests. 25. On 19 September 1998, the day of the applicant’s fall from the window, MS returned home unharmed. She explained that on the night of 8 September 1998 the applicant had offered her a ride in his car. She had agreed. When they had arrived in Nizhniy Novgorod, he had suggested that she could spend the night at his place, but she had refused and the applicant had let her go. MS had gone to friends living in Nizhniy Novgorod, where she had spent several days, without letting her mother know were she was. 26. On 21 September 1998 the applicant’s detention was formally discontinued. On 22 September 1998 the applicant underwent spinal surgery. He remained in hospital until 3 February 1999. On 25 September 1998 criminal case no. 22346 concerning the alleged rape and murder of MS was closed. However, the applicant became a suspect in another criminal case – no. 22414, in which he was charged with the abduction of MS. 27. On 1 March 1999 the criminal investigation into the illegal possession of the gun cartridges was discontinued, on the ground that at the time of their discovery the applicant had been a police officer and, therefore, had had the right to possess the ammunition. On 1 March 2000 (the Government indicated a different date – 10 May 2000), the case concerning the alleged abduction of MS was also discontinued on the ground that the applicant had freed MS at her request. 28. On 21 September 1998 an investigator from the Leninskiy district prosecutor’s office instituted a criminal investigation into the applicant’s fall from the window of the police station on 19 September 1998 (case no. 68241). 29. The investigator questioned five police officers from the Leninskiy district police who had participated in the questioning on 19 September 1998. They stated that they had not ill-treated the applicant or seen him being ill-treated. The police officers said that, in the course of the interview, inspector K had told the applicant that his friend F had testified to having seen the applicant rape and murder MS, and that it would be wise for him to confess. The interview had then been interrupted for a tea break. While the officers had been busy preparing tea, the applicant had suddenly jumped out of his chair, run to the window, broken the glass and fallen out. 30. The investigator also questioned F, who submitted that no pressure had been exerted on him to make a false statement about the applicant. F stated that he had implicated the applicant out of fear of being accused of bringing about the disappearance of MS. 31. The investigator further questioned Dr K from Hospital no. 39, who had examined the applicant after the accident of 19 September 1998. The doctor confirmed that on the day of the accident the applicant’s mother had mentioned some electrical burns on her son’s ears. However, all the applicant’s injuries had been caused by his fall from the window. According to the medical record, the applicant had no electrical burns to his ears. 32. B, the applicant’s ward-mate in Hospital no. 39, was also questioned by the investigator. B spoke of burns and abrasions to the applicant’s ears which may have been caused by an electrical discharge. B stated that he had worked as an electrician and therefore knew what burns from an electrical current looked like. 33. The investigator ordered a forensic medical examination of the applicant. The forensic report, drawn up on 26 October 1998, stated that the applicant had wounds on the top of his head, scratches on his forehead and bite marks on his tongue. No burns or other traces of the use of electrical current were recorded. 34. On 21 December 1998 the investigator discontinued the criminal proceedings against the police officers for lack of evidence of a crime. The investigator found that the applicant had been arrested on 10 September 1998 in connection with the disappearance of MS. On 11 September 1998 the police had carried out a search of the applicant’s car and found three gun cartridges. On the same day the applicant and F had been released. However, shortly after their release inspector N of the Bogorodsk police had identified certain factual gaps in their written submissions. Inspectors N and D had followed the applicant and found him at the town’s railway station. The applicant had been disturbing passers-by by addressing them with obscene language. As a result the applicant had been arrested again and on the next day made the subject of an administrative arrest for disturbance of the peace. On 16 September 1998 a new criminal case had been opened against the applicant in relation to the gun cartridges found in his car. On 19 September 1998 a detention order had been issued against the applicant on this new ground. On the same day he had been transferred to Leninskiy district police station, where he had been questioned by several police officers, including inspectors K and O. After the interview the applicant had suddenly jumped out of his chair, broken the window and fallen out. He had been brought immediately to Hospital no. 39. On the same day MS had returned home. 35. The investigator referred further to the testimonies of the police officers and Dr K, the medical records of Hospital no. 39 and the forensic medical report of 26 October 1998. He also referred to the opinion of a medical expert, S, which stated that the application of an electrical current might leave burns on the skin. The investigator disregarded the testimony of B on the basis that the latter “had no specialist medical knowledge”. The investigator came to the conclusion that the applicant’s allegations of torture were unsubstantiated, describing them as a “defence mechanism” in response to the situation in which he had attempted suicide. 36. On 25 January 1999 the regional prosecutor’s office reopened the case and handed it to the same investigator for further investigation. On 25 February 1999 the investigator, referring to the same evidence as before and using identical wording, discontinued the proceedings again. He added that the investigative measures referred to by the senior prosecutor in his decision of 25 January 1999 had already been taken in 1998. Given the state of the applicant’s health, it was impossible to carry out new investigative measures, such as confrontations or forensic examinations. 37. On 1 December 1999 the same supervising prosecutor reopened the case and ordered certain additional investigative measures, including a medical examination of the applicant and a confrontation between the applicant and the police officers who had allegedly tortured him. The case was transferred to another investigator. On 24 February 2000 the investigator discontinued the proceedings, basing his decision on the same reasoning as in the decision of 21 December 1998. 38. On 10 March 2000 the same supervising prosecutor reopened the case for the third time and handed over the file to another investigator. 39. This time the applicant’s mother was questioned. She stated that on 19 September 1998 she had arrived at the hospital and had seen that her son’s ears had been injured. She had asked that the injuries be recorded but the request had been refused by the hospital doctor, because “they had been given instructions to that effect”. 40. The investigator also questioned a hospital attendant and four doctors from Hospital no. 39, who all denied that the applicant had had injuries other than those caused by his falling out of the window. One of the patients in Hospital no. 39, where the applicant had been brought after the accident, confirmed that the applicant had told him about the torture with electrodes; however, the patient stated that he had seen no traces of any injuries on the applicant’s ears. F, who had visited the applicant in hospital, stated that the applicant had told him about the torture, but F had seen no signs of torture on him. 41. A further witness, the senior officer of the traffic police department where the applicant had served before his arrest, provided the investigator with a “psychological profile” of the applicant, describing the applicant as having a weak personality. The investigator also obtained the results of a psychological test which the applicant had undergone upon his appointment to the traffic police. The test revealed that the applicant “had a tendency to avoid conflict and was a vulnerable person, susceptible to outside influences”. 42. On 21 July 2000 the proceedings were discontinued. The investigator concluded that the applicant had jumped out of the window of his own will, “driven by his personal assessment of the situation, based on specific psychological features of his personality”. 43. On 10 November 2000 the case was reopened by another supervising prosecutor. F was questioned anew. This time F testified that while in Bogorodsk police station, he had been beaten by inspector A in an attempt to extract a confession to the murder of MS. Between 16 and 19 September 1998 F had been repeatedly questioned in Leninskiy district police station in Nizhniy Novgorod. In the course of the questioning I, the senior police investigator, had slapped and shaken him. I had also mentioned that F would be tortured with electrodes if he did not confess to the impugned crimes. F had also been questioned by MR, the deputy regional prosecutor. On 18 September 1998 F had signed the confession and even located on the map the place where he and the applicant had allegedly hidden the body. 44. After the incident, F had visited the applicant in hospital. The applicant had told him about the torture with electrodes. In reply F had described to the applicant the officer who had threatened him with it, and the applicant had confirmed that this was the same officer who had participated in the questioning of 19 September 1998. Later that year he had recounted this to the investigator in charge of case no. 68241; however, it had been decided not to include these statements in the official record. 45. On 29 December 2000 the investigation was again discontinued by an investigator from the prosecutor’s office. On an appeal by the applicant on 27 March 2001, the Nizhegorodskiy District Court of Nizhniy Novgorod quashed the decision, ordering the prosecution to carry out a further investigation. The court noted, inter alia, that the applicant’s submissions were consistent and detailed, and that the case should be investigated more thoroughly. The court ordered other patients from the hospital where the applicant had been brought after the accident to be questioned. The court also deemed it necessary for the applicant to be examined by an expert in psychiatry and psychology. 46. The proceedings were resumed. This time the prosecution investigator questioned Dr M, who had been on duty in Hospital no. 33, where the applicant had been brought immediately after the accident. The doctor stated that he had not noticed or treated any injuries to the applicant’s ears. The same evidence was reiterated by Dr K and Dr S. They both confirmed that the applicant’s mother had requested them to re-examine the applicant’s ears on several occasions, but that they had not identified any injuries. Five patients from Hospital no. 39 testified that the applicant had told them about being tortured with electrodes, but that they had seen no signs of any injuries on the applicant’s ears. The same testimony was given by F. 47. The investigator also ordered a psychological and psychiatric examination of the applicant. The examination showed that the applicant was mentally sane, but had been traumatised by the accident and had a lasting physical disability as a result of it. At the time of the examination, the applicant’s mental state was characterised by euphoric reactions, amiability, emotionality and dependence on a stronger personality, namely his mother. He did not display any suicidal tendencies. The report stated that it was impossible to draw any conclusions as to the applicant’s mental state at the time of the accident. 48. On 19 May 2001 the proceedings were discontinued by the investigator on the same grounds as before. 49. By letter of 5 August 2002 the Nizhniy Novgorod regional prosecutor’s office informed the applicant that the investigation had been reopened and sent to the Leninskiy prosecutor’s office with relevant instructions for additional investigation. The applicant requested that the prosecution service question V, one of the patients in Hospital no. 39. 50. On 5 September 2002 the prosecution service discontinued the investigation, finding that no criminal offence had been committed and indicating, inter alia, that it had been impossible to find V at his place of residence. The investigator concluded that the applicant’s allegations of torture were supported only by his own submissions, which, in the light of other evidence obtained in the course of the investigation, had been found to be untrue. 51. Knowing that V was disabled and a wheelchair user, the representatives of the applicant contacted V and learned that the execution of the request to question V had been assigned to inspector O, one of the police officers involved in the alleged torture. Inspector O reported that on several occasions he had tried to question V, but had been unable to find him at his address. On 26 September 2002 V explained to the applicant’s representatives that someone introducing himself as an investigator had telephoned him once and said that he needed to question him. V had agreed to make a statement, but the person had never called back. 52. On 28 October 2002 the Nizhniy Novgorod regional prosecutor’s office annulled the decision of 5 September 2002. On 28 November 2002 the Leninskiy district prosecutor’s office discontinued the investigation yet again on the same grounds. The applicant appealed against the decision to discontinue the investigation. By letter of 24 July 2003 the applicant was informed that the Nizhniy Novgorod regional prosecutor’s office saw no reason to overturn the decision to discontinue the investigation. 53. According to the respondent Government, the regional prosecutor reopened the investigation on 6 November 2003 and transferred the case to the Leninskiy district prosecutor’s office. Apparently, by the end of December 2003 the case had been closed again. On 19 January 2004, according to the applicant, the investigation was reopened. On 26 January 2004 the case was transferred from the Leninskiy district prosecutor’s office to the department of the regional prosecutor’s office dealing with investigations into cases of particular importance. 54. F was questioned once more. He testified that while being questioned in Leninskiy district police station in connection with the disappearance of MS he had been beaten by the police officers. They had also threatened to torture him with electrodes. 55. On 19 February 2004 the investigator from that department closed the case again, concluding that no evidence of ill-treatment of the applicant had been obtained and that the actions of the police officers had been lawful. On 4 March 2004 the case was reopened, before being closed again on 4 July 2004. On 3 August 2004 the case was reopened by the regional prosecutor’s office. On 6 September 2004 the case was closed. It was then reopened, and, according to the Government’s submissions, closed again on 20 October 2004. On 22 November 2004 the regional prosecutor reopened the investigation. According to the Government, the deadline for the new investigation was 2 April 2005. 56. On an unspecified date in 2005 the prosecutor’s office brought charges against two policemen, K and SM, who had participated in the questioning of the applicant on 19 September 1998. The case file, together with a bill of indictment, was eventually forwarded to the Leninskiy District Court of Nizhniy Novgorod for examination. 57. In the course of the trial the court questioned a large number of witnesses. Hence, it questioned K, SM, and fifteen other police officers who had participated in the questioning of 19 September 1998 or had been in Leninskiy police station on that day. They all denied that they had tortured the applicant or had heard of any such torture. The court further questioned VK, a former police investigator, who had been in charge of the applicant’s case but had not taken part in his questioning. She testified that she had heard from her colleagues that the applicant had jumped out of the window because he had been tortured with electrodes. 58. The court also heard evidence from the applicant, his mother, F, MS, and the doctors at the hospital where the applicant had been placed after the incident. They confirmed their initial submissions. An expert witness appeared before the court. He testified that in certain conditions electric current might leave no traces on the human body. The court also questioned VZ, who in August 1998 had been brought to Leninskiy police station on suspicion of theft. According to VZ, two policemen had questioned him and then tortured him with electrodes in the same way as the applicant described. 59. The court heard other witnesses and examined exhibits and materials collected in the course of the pre-trial investigation. Thus, the court read out the testimonies of B, V, and S, the applicant’s ward-mates in Hospital no. 39, and examined the results of medical and psychiatric expert examinations of the applicant. The court also examined a piece of paper which had been found during the search of the office where the applicant had been questioned on 19 September 1998. It contained an unfinished passage describing the events of 10 September 1998, when MS had disappeared, under the title “Voluntary confession”. The whole text had been written by the applicant. 60. On the basis of the above evidence the court established that on 19 September 1998 the applicant had been brought to Leninskiy police station, where he had been questioned by several officials from the police and the prosecutor’s office. They had requested him to confess to having raped and murdered MS and to show them where he had buried the corpse. In order to extract a confession from the applicant, police officers K and SM had administered electric shocks to the applicant using a device connected to his ears. The court noted that in his initial submissions the applicant had testified that he had been tortured by inspectors K and O. However, following the identification parade the applicant had identified inspector SM as one of two officers who had tortured him. Unable to withstand the pain, the applicant had agreed to confess, but, left unattended for a moment, had attempted suicide by jumping out of the window. He had fallen on a motorbike parked in the courtyard of the police station and broken his spine. 61. On 30 November 2005 the Leninskiy District Court of Nizhniy Novgorod found K and SM guilty under Article 286 § 3 (a) and (в) of the Criminal Code (abuse of official power associated with the use of violence or entailing serious consequences). They were sentenced to four years’ imprisonment with a subsequent three years’ prohibition on serving in the law-enforcement agencies. According to the information available to the Court, the judgment of 30 November 2005 is not yet final. 62. In the summer of 1999 two activists from a regional human rights NGO (Nizhniy Novgorod Committee against Torture) interviewed several persons about the events of September 1998 complained of by the applicant. Their submissions were recorded on videotape. 63. In those interviews, F stated that he had been arrested on 10 September 1998. While in custody, he had been threatened and slapped several times in order to extract a confession to the murder of MS. On 17 September 1998 he had been questioned by a senior police investigator, I, who had kicked him and threatened to place him in an “underground cell” where he would be beaten and tortured with electrodes until his eyes bled. 64. On 18 September 1998 a short confrontation had been arranged between F and the applicant. F submitted that he had seen bruises on the applicant’s neck. In the evening F had been questioned again, this time in the presence of the deputy regional prosecutor MR and the Bogorodsk town prosecutor, as well as several police officers. MR had threatened to lock F in a cell with “boy-crazy criminals” who would rape him, or to put him in a cell together with tuberculosis-infected detainees. He had also threatened that if F survived in the cell, he would be sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment or death row. 65. F had confessed to raping and killing the girl together with the applicant. At MR’s request, F had named the place where they had allegedly hidden the corpse. An investigating team had been sent to the place in question, but had found nothing. On 20 September 1998, after the girl had come home, F had been released. 66. According to B, the applicant’s ward-mate in Hospital no. 39, after having been brought to the hospital the applicant had told him about the circumstances of his arrest and, in particular, about the torture with electrodes. The applicant had shown B burns on his ears, which looked like “stripped blisters”. According to M, another patient in the hospital, before the applicant had been brought to the hospital the police had warned the personnel that the applicant was a dangerous criminal. The patients had been required to hide all sharp metallic objects. M also recollected that there had been something red on the applicant’s ears, “as if somebody has pulled his ears”. M also remembered that the applicant’s mother had asked the doctors to examine his ears, but that they had replied that everything had been normal. V confirmed that, while in the hospital, he had heard from the applicant about the torture and seen the applicant’s mother asking the doctor to examine his ears. V also confirmed that the applicant’s ears had been injured, but said that it did not look like blisters as far as he could remember. 67. The NGO activists also interviewed L and K, witnesses to the search of the applicant’s car. 68. In December 2000 the NGO activists questioned F once more with a view to clarifying the discrepancies between his evidence in the course of the official investigation and his statements to the NGO activists and the media. F stated that the investigators, while questioning him as part of the official criminal investigation, had disregarded his statements about the deputy regional prosecutor MR’s involvement in the events of September 1998. 69. On an unspecified date in 1998 a prosecutor filed a request for supervisory review of the judgment of 12 September 1998 whereby the applicant had been sentenced to five days’ administrative detention. On 2 December 1998 the President of the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court quashed that judgment. The President noted that the judgment had been based on the information from the police officers at Bogorodsk police station, who had alleged that they had arrested the applicant at the railway station on 11 September 1998. However, at that time the applicant had in fact been detained in custody in connection with the disappearance of MS. 70. On 23 March 2000 a prosecutor instituted criminal proceedings against the three Bogorodsk police officers for making false statements in relation to the alleged arrest of the applicant at the railway station (criminal case no. 310503). A prosecution investigator confirmed that the applicant had not been at the railway station on 11 September 1998, having at that time been detained in custody. However, on 3 November 2000 the charges against the police officers were dropped following a “change in the situation” in view of the fact that one police officer had been dismissed from his job, while the other two had been transferred to other positions within the Ministry of the Interior. 71. The Government stated that on 25 May 2001 criminal case no. 310503 had been reopened by the prosecution service and transmitted to the Pavlovsk town prosecutor’s office for further investigation. On 20 October 2002 the criminal case was closed owing to expiry of the time-limits for criminal prosecution of the police officers. This decision was quashed by the town prosecutor and the case was reopened again. On 1 April 2004 the criminal case against the three police officers was forwarded to the court of first instance together with the bill of indictment. On 27 April 2004 the proceedings were discontinued owing to expiry of the statutory time-limit for criminal prosecution of the defendants. On 19 November 2004 the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court quashed that decision and remitted the case to the court of first instance. According to the respondent Government, the proceedings are still pending. 72. On 19 December 2001 the applicant lodged a civil claim with the Leninskiy District Court of Nizhniy Novgorod, seeking compensation for malicious prosecution, his dismissal from his job, the search of his premises and his detention and ill-treatment by the police. The applicant’s lawyer asked the court to request from the prosecutor’s office case-files nos. 68241, 310503 and 68341. The applicant and his representative maintained that the evidence gathered by the prosecution was necessary to argue the substantive part of the civil suit. On 22 April 2002 the Leninskiy District Court of Nizhniy Novgorod requested the files from the respective prosecutor’s offices. On 6 July 2002 case-file no. 68241 was delivered to the court. It was withdrawn three days later by the prosecutor’s office. On 27 July 2002 the case-file was re-submitted to the court. On 1 August 2002, at the prosecutor’s request, the case-file was returned to the prosecution. On 23 October 2002 the applicant’s representative asked the court to suspend the civil proceedings. 73. The applicant’s notice of dismissal dated 17 August 1998 was annulled, and the applicant was reinstated in his post. The officers responsible for his backdated dismissal were subjected to disciplinary proceedings. However, owing to the applicant’s complete disability, he had to leave the traffic police. 74. The applicant is disabled and receives a pension from the State on that basis. The Government indicated that in connection with the accident he also received a lump-sum insurance indemnity from the State in the amount of 60,302 Russian roubles (about 1,740 euros at the current exchange rate). 75. The applicant produced a report, drawn up on 29 November 2004 by Dr L. Magnutova, a specialist in forensic medicine. The report stated that the applicant suffered from osteomyelitis, his legs were paralysed, he was unable to work and he suffered from severe dysfunction of the pelvic organs and loss of sexual function. He was confined to bed and was in permanent need of a nurse to help him urinate and empty his bowels. The applicant was at risk of sepsis. He required regular hospital examinations, at least two or three times a year.

6. The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Kurgan, the Kurgan region. He is currently serving a prison sentence in the Kurgan region. 7. On 15 November 2001 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of murder of a certain S. and was placed in detention. 8. On 5 February 2002 the Kurgan Town Court, Kurgan Region (“the trial court”) held a trial in the applicant’s case. The applicant confessed to the murder in part. He submitted that during a quarrel with S. the latter had threatened him with an axe and he (the applicant) had stabbed him several times with a knife in order to defend himself. The Town Court found the applicant guilty of premeditated murder under Article 105 § 1 of the Criminal Code (see “Relevant domestic law and practice” below, paragraph 22) and sentenced him to eleven years and three months’ imprisonment. On 5 March 2002 the Kurgan Regional Court (“the appeal court”) quashed that judgment and remitted the case for fresh examination to the trial court having found, in particular, that the latter had not established whether the victim had had an axe in his hands during the quarrel. On the same date the Regional Court remanded the applicant in custody. The applicant was neither present nor represented by a lawyer at the appeal hearing. 9. On an unspecified date the applicant was additionally charged with several counts of theft. A certain Sch. was charged with concealment of the murder of S. Criminal proceedings against Sch. were joined to those against the applicant. 10. On 22 March 2002 the trial court started the examination of both charges against the applicant and the charges against Sch. At the beginning of the hearing the applicant submitted that he had refused assistance from legal aid counsel and that his refusal was not linked to his financial situation. Lawyer M., who had been provided to the applicant, left the courtroom. 11. The applicant pleaded guilty to theft. As regards the charges of murder, he submitted that he had committed the murder in self-defence because during their quarrel S. had threatened him with an axe. The trial court heard the applicant and his co-accused, the mother of S. and several witnesses including witness K. During the questioning of K. the court rebuked the applicant twice for contempt of court and finally, at the prosecutor’s request, removed the applicant from the hearing for putting pressure on the witnesses. The applicant was absent until the end of the hearing of 22 March 2002. In his absence the trial court continued to hear witness K. and heard witness B. According to the applicant, on 22 March 2002 the trial court also ordered to remove from the hearing everybody except for the victims, their representative, witnesses and his co-accused. The examination of the case continued on 25 March 2002 in the applicant’s presence. The trial court heard seven more witnesses and an expert. 12. On 26 March 2002 the trial court found the applicant guilty of theft and premeditated murder and sentenced him to twelve years’ imprisonment. Having regard to the statements by the witnesses, it found, in particular, that S. had had no axe in his hands at the moment of his murder, and, therefore, the applicant’s version of self-defence had been unfounded. It also held that the applicant’s balance of mind had not been disturbed at the moment of the murder. Sch. was found guilty of concealment of murder and was sentenced to one year’s imprisonment. 13. The judgment stated that the applicant could lodge an appeal against it within seven days of the date he received its copy. The record of the hearing stated that the time-limits and the procedure for appealing against the judgment had been explained [to the parties]. 14. On an unspecified date the applicant lodged his remarks on the record of the hearings of 22 and 25 March 2002 with the trial court. He submitted that the record of the hearing had not mentioned exactly when he had returned to the hearing. He also complained that he had not been given the opportunity to read the record of the questioning of witnesses which had taken place in his absence. 15. On 10 June 2002 the trial court admitted the applicant’s remarks to the file. It also found that the applicant had returned to the hearing at 10 a.m. on 25 March 2002, that the testimony given in his absence had been read out to him and that he had been offered the opportunity to question witnesses K. and B., which he had refused. The trial court ordered that the record of the hearings be amended accordingly. 16. The applicant, but not Sch., appealed against the judgment of 26 March 2002. He argued in the first place that the trial court’s conclusion that S. had no axe in his hands had been inconsistent with the facts of the case and the evidence submitted in the trial. His actions should have been re‑characterised as a murder committed as a result of exceeding the limits of necessary defence under Article 108 of the Criminal Code (see “Relevant domestic law and practice” below, paragraph 23), because S. had threatened him with an axe. He further submitted that the trial court had wrongly applied to him a rule on repetition of crimes, which had resulted in a heavier sentence. Finally, he complained that two women had been removed from the hearing of 22 March 2002. In his additional grounds of appeal the applicant submitted that the trial court had removed from the hearing people who had come to support him and left only the relatives and friends of the victims. He requested the appeal court to quash his conviction of premeditated murder and adopt a new judgment. When lodging his appeal the applicant did not expressly state that he wished to take part in the appeal hearing. 17. On 27 June 2002 the applicant received a notification that the appeal hearing would be held on 1 July 2002. The notification stated that personal appearance at that hearing was not obligatory. 18. On 1 July 2002 the appeal court held a hearing in the applicant’s absence. The applicant was not represented at that hearing. The appeal court heard the mother of S. and her representative, who considered that the applicant should be convicted of murder, committed with particular cruelty, and a more severe penalty should be imposed. They asked for the judgment to be quashed and the case remitted for fresh consideration to the trial court. The appeal court also heard the prosecutor. 19. Having studied the materials of the case, the appeal court found, in particular, that the trial court had rightly concluded on the basis of evidence and witnesses’ testimony that S. had no axe and had not represented a serious danger to the applicant. It further confirmed the trial court’s conclusion that the applicant’s balance of mind had not been disturbed when he had committed the murder. The appeal court concluded that the trial court had correctly characterised the applicant’s actions as premeditated murder and had imposed an appropriate sentence. On the same date it upheld the judgment of 26 March 2002 in its totality. 20. It does not appear from the decision of 1 July 2002 that the appeal court verified whether the applicant had been duly informed of the hearing and of the procedure to follow to take part in it, and whether he had expressed a wish to take part in it.

5. The applicant company is a limited liability company which at the material time carried on a business of buying debts. 6. On 14 February 2002 the applicant company instituted civil proceedings before the Wrocław Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) against the Dolnyśląsk Sickness Fund (Dolnośląska Regionalna Kasa Chorych). The applicant company had agreed to buy from four hospitals the debts owed by the Sickness Fund to the hospitals in the amount of 60,000,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) provided that the company won its case against the Fund. The applicant company sought payment of the above-mentioned sum together with interest, which amounted to PLN 89,316,240 (approximately 22,000,000 euros (EUR)). The hospitals claimed that the Fund should be liable for paying the cost of medical treatment that had exceeded the contract that every hospital had negotiated with the Fund but which had been necessarily sustained by them in providing medical services to insured persons. 7. The applicant company also asked for exemption from court fees, submitting that it had been involved in several court disputes in order to claim debts for medical services. 8. On 12 March 2002 the Wrocław Regional Court partly allowed the claim and exempted the company from court fees in excess of PLN 50,000 (EUR 12,000). The court examined the profit generated by the company and found that the assets deposited in its bank account amounted to PLN 50,000. Moreover, in December 2001 the president of the board had received PLN 43,000 as payment for an unknown service. The court thus concluded that the company had been able to pay this amount of court fees without damaging its operation. 9. On 27 September 2002 the Wrocław Regional Court dismissed the action. The court agreed with the arguments of the defendant, who had refused liability for costs in excess of the amounts agreed in the contracts between the Fund and the hospitals. The court established that the contracts had not been renegotiated and had remained valid, which excluded the Fund’s liability for expenses sustained by the hospitals that exceeded the contracts. 10. The applicant company lodged an appeal against the judgment. 11. On 4 November 2002 the Wrocław Regional Court ordered the applicant company to pay a further PLN 50,000 in court fees for pursuing its appeal. On 8 November 2002 the applicant company applied for an exemption from those fees, claiming that the company had already been exempted from fees and should not be ordered to pay any more at the appeal stage. In its supplementary documents the applicant company submitted that the company did not have the required sum of money in its bank account and that previously it had had to borrow from a private individual. The company was small and new on the market, thus it would not be able to obtain a bank loan. In sum it had not been possible for it to pay a further PLN 50,000 and the refusal to exempt it from court fees would amount to a violation of its right to court. 12. On 26 November 2002 the Wrocław Regional Court dismissed the application for exemption from the court fees. The court established that the monthly turnover of the company had reached PLN 30,000 (EUR 7,500) although in its bank account it only had PLN 3,000. The court, in one point of its reasoned decision, found that the company had generated over PLN 230,000 gross income (przychód), but it had then taken this amount to be net profit (dochód). The court also acknowledged that the applicant company had declared costs and expenses in the amount of about PLN 500,000, and thus generated a net loss. In sum, the court concluded that the company must have had other sources of revenue which would make it possible to pay the court fees. 13. The applicant company appealed against the decision, pointing to the difference between gross and net income. The applicant company maintained that it had been generating no profits but high net losses. The sum of PLN 230,000 was gross income, from which costs and expenses should be subtracted to yield the net loss. It had been a mistake on the part of the court to take this sum to be the net profit. 14. On 19 December 2002 the Wrocław Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) dismissed the applicant company’s appeal. The court considered that the applicant company had been conducting its business activity and producing gross income. The fact that the company declared high costs for its activity had not justified exemption from court fees as it had freedom to spend its gross income as it chose. The court fees should be considered as one of the costs of its business activity. 15. On 30 April 2003 the Wrocław Regional Court rejected an appeal by the applicant company on grounds of inability to pay the court fees. An appeal by the applicant company against this decision was dismissed on 30 May 2003. 16. On 16 April 2003 the applicant company lodged a constitutional complaint against the provisions governing the imposition of court fees and exemptions from them. 17. On 3 September 2003 the Constitutional Court refused to hear the constitutional complaint. 18. On 4 February 2004 the Constitutional Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant company against the above decision. 19. The applicant company made another unsuccessful attempt to challenge the constitutionality of the provisions governing court fees. However, on 5 May 2004, the Constitutional Court, in a final decision, refused to hear the second constitutional complaint. 20. On 20 December 2002 the Olsztyn Regional Court dismissed a civil claim for payment lodged by the applicant company against the National Health Fund (Narodowy Fundusz Zdrowia). The applicant company lodged an appeal. 21. On 30 June 2003 the Bialystok Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant company’s appeal. 22. On 14 January 2004 the Supreme Court dismissed a cassation appeal lodged by the applicant company.

4. The applicants were born in 1923 and 1948 respectively and live in I. 5. The applicants are mother and daughter. Until 17 July 2006 they lived together in a house in B. owned by the first applicant. 6. On an unspecified date in 2006 the I. Social Welfare Centre (Centar za socijalnu skrb I. – the “Centre”) instituted proceedings with a view to establishing the first applicant’s right to care outside her family (pravo na skrb izvan obitelji). On 6 July 2006 the Centre appointed its employee Z.J. as the first applicant’s special guardian (poseban skrbinik) in these proceedings on the ground that the first applicant, owing to old age and illness, was unable to undertake acts in these proceedings on her own. It was also stated that her daughter Y, the second applicant, could not adequately care for the first applicant, since she suffered from muscular dystrophy. This decision was served on the second applicant on 12 July 2006. 7. On 11 July 2006 the second applicant submitted a statement to the Centre, stating that she was unable to contribute towards the expenses arising from her mother’s care. 8. An official note drawn up by Z.J. on 16 July 2006 indicates that the second applicant urged that her mother be placed in a home and had entered into a private agreement with the I. Caritas Home for elderly and dependent persons (“the Caritas Home”) in order to place her mother there at her own expense until such time as the decision in the above-mentioned proceedings had been adopted. The first applicant was moved to the Caritas Home. She was placed in a room with three other persons. 9. The agreement, dated 17 July 2006, stipulated that the second applicant was to bear the costs of her mother’s accommodation in the Caritas Home, which in turn would provide the first applicant with accommodation and food, medical care and care for her social needs. In order to stay close to her mother and to be able to visit her frequently, the second applicant moved to her own flat in I. 10. A medical report drawn up on 19 July 2006 indicates that the first applicant was an elderly and disabled person, suffering from psycho-organic changes and dementia, and required the constant (full-day) help and care of another person. 11. On 31 August 2006 the Centre established the first applicant’s right to permanent placement in the Caritas Home from 1 September 2006. She was to cover the costs of her accommodation up to the amount of her pension, and the difference between that amount and the full price was to be paid by the Ministry of Health. The first applicant’s pension was to be paid directly into the Centre’s bank account. 12. On 23 November 2006 Z.J. ceased to be the first applicant’s special guardian. 13. On 18 February 2008 the second applicant asked the Caritas Home to allow her mother single-room occupancy on health grounds. She offered to pay the difference between the costs of such accommodation and her mother’s pension. The Caritas Home informed her that if her mother was placed in a single room she would have to pay the full cost. 14. Since the first applicant was a person in care of the State, Z.J., as the social worker from the Social Welfare Centre with responsibility for the first applicant, drew up a report on 28 February 2008, in which she stated that the first applicant was disoriented and dependent on help from others and that it was impossible to establish contact with her. She suggested that proceedings be instituted with a view to divesting the first applicant of legal capacity, because she was unable to care for her rights and interests. She also stated that the second applicant often behaved strangely, in the sense that she showed constant dissatisfaction and had locked herself in her home, refusing food. 15. On 3 March 2008 the second applicant again asked the Home to allow her mother single-room occupancy on health grounds, stating that her mother needed calm and rest. On 10 March 2008 the Caritas Home informed the second applicant that her mother had been provided with adequate health and other care and that they were waiting for a reply from the Ministry of Health and Social Care on payment for a single-occupancy room. 16. On 25 March 2008 the second applicant urged the transfer of her mother to a single-occupancy room. She also asked the Home to provide her with information on the amount of her mother’s pension in order to pay the difference in the cost of single-room occupancy. 17. On 31 March 2008 the Head Nurse of the Caritas Home drew up an official note stating that over the previous year the second applicant had frequently expressed discontent with regard to the care provided to her mother by nurses, physiotherapist and physicians at the Home; this had disrupted the work of the personnel. She had held an interview with the second applicant, who denied these allegations and was very pleasant in communication with the Head Nurse during the interview. The Head Nurse further stated that the second applicant had been in the habit of visiting her mother twice a day, in the morning and afternoon, staying for a few hours. Over the previous two weeks she had been coming to the front of the Home before the reception’s opening hours and had stayed until the end of working hours; she had stopped communicating with the Head Nurse, but continued to intervene in the dynamics of her mother’s health care and to insult the other patients. 18. In her letter of 1 April 2008 the Directress of the Caritas Home informed the Centre of the above. In her letter of 5 April 2008 the second applicant denied these allegations and reiterated that, owing to her mother’s health, it was necessary to place her in a single-occupancy room. 19. On 8 April 2008 the Caritas Home informed the second applicant that she was free to seek her mother’s placement in a single-occupancy room at her own expense and that the cost of such accommodation was 4,680 Croatian kuna (HRK) per month. On 14 April 2008 the Caritas Home further explained that, in order to place her mother in a single-occupancy room she would first have to terminate her mother’s accommodation on the basis of a decision adopted by the Centre and then apply in writing for her mother’s placement in the Home on the basis of a private contract. 20. On 10 April 2008 the second applicant again sought to have her mother placed in a single room. 21. On 18 April 2008 the Centre informed the second applicant that the price of accommodation in the Caritas Home for persons placed there on the basis of a decision by a social welfare centre was HRK 3,000 per month. This amount had been partly covered by her mother’s pension in the monthly amount of HRK 2,237.80. 22. On 22 April 2008 the Centre invited the second applicant to come to the Centre on 5 May 2008 in order to give a statement in connection with appointing a guardian for her mother in the proceedings to divest her of legal capacity. On 28 April 2008 the second applicant asked the Centre that she be appointed as her mother’s guardian in these proceedings. 23. On 21 May 2008, in a letter to the V. Diocese, the owner of the Caritas Home, the second applicant sought help in placing her mother in a single room. There was no reply. 24. On 27 May 2008 the Caritas Home limited visits to multi-occupancy rooms in the Intensive Care Ward to one hour a day. Visits were allowed in the common premises between 9 a.m. and 7 p.m. in winter and between 9 a.m. and 8 p.m. in summer. 25. It appears that the second applicant did not thereafter pursue the question of placing her mother in a single room. In 2009 the second applicant submitted that she no longer had problems with the Caritas Home’s management and that she was peacefully spending time with her mother. 26. The relevant part of a discharge letter of 28 February 2002 issued by the Varaždin Hospital reads: “The patient was hospitalised at the neurological ward of the V. Hospital owing to a cerebral-vascular accident, brain atrophy and psycho-organic changes. During her stay respiratory difficulties occurred and continuation of treatment in our institution was indicated. ... On admission she was not febrile, was able to move about, communication was possible (kontaktibilna), she was eupneic ..., disoriented in time. ... Conclusion: The patient was hospitalised for exacerbation of chronic bronchitis, post-CVA [cerebral vascular accident] condition and psycho-organic changes. During her stay she was treated with Irumed, Andol and Prazine. Clinical status has improved and she is discharged with a recommendation to continue therapy with Irumed, Andol and Prazine. She is in need of care and the aid of others.” 27. The relevant part of the medical report of 13 December 2005 reads: “The patient has been unable to control her sphincter for three years; she is confused and moves about with difficulty. Today she got lost and became even more confused. Neurological status: psycho-organic syndrome, free neck [movement], no focal neurological excess, she walks with assistance ...” 28. The relevant part of a medical report of 19 July 2006 reads: “The patient is eighty-three years old and in 2000 she suffered an (ischemic) brain stroke. She subsequently developed psycho-organic syndrome, high blood pressure and incontinence. The medical documentation shows that she underwent cataract surgery. In 2002 she was hospitalised in a neurological ward for CVA and was then transferred to the Special Hospital for Lung Diseases in K. ... Examination reveals that she moves about with difficulty but does walk slowly with aid. She answers basic and short questions, but is disoriented in time and space and towards persons. ... Eupneic... Since the patient is an elderly person who moves about with difficulty, has undergone psycho-organically changes [and] suffers from dementia, I consider that she needs the constant care and aid of others.” 29. On 17 April 2008 D.P.D., the first applicant’s niece, was heard in the Centre with a view to appointing her as the first applicant’s guardian. 30. On 16 June 2008 the Centre appointed D.P.D. as the first applicant’s guardian. On the same day the Centre asked the I. Municipal Court to institute proceedings with a view to having the first applicant divested of her legal capacity. The relevant part of the Centre’s submission reads: “Owing to a brain stroke and brain atrophy the respondent has suffered psycho-organic changes, is incapable of independent life and entirely dependent on the help and care of others. In view of the above, this Centre recognised her right to care outside her family and she was accommodated in the Caritas Home for elderly and dependent persons ... in I. The level of the respondent’s social and intellectual functioning is significantly reduced; no communication is possible, she is disoriented and suffers from dementia. In order to protect her [person], her rights and interests it appears reasonable to give her protection through the institution of guardianship. In view of the above, the Centre considers that the respondent is incapable of caring for her own needs, rights and interests and that the conditions for divesting her entirely of her legal capacity under section 159 of the Family Act have been met.” Z.J.’s opinion of 28 February 2008 and medical documentation in respect of the first applicant was enclosed. 31. In a letter to the Centre of 17 June 2008 the second applicant objected that the decision appointing D.P.D. as her mother’s guardian had not been served either on her or her mother. She also objected to statements in the report drawn up by Z.J. on 28 February 2008, enclosed in the Municipal Court’s case file, and in particular to the statements concerning her ability to be her mother’s guardian and alleging that her behaviour had been strange and that she had locked herself in her house and refused food. In particular, she questioned how Z.J. could have established these facts, since she lived alone. She further stressed that she had moved to I. only to be close to her mother and that she had been caring for her mother, while D.P.D. lived in Z. and only occasionally contacted the first applicant by telephone. The first applicant considered that she was the most appropriate person to be appointed as her mother’s guardian. 32. A note from the Caritas Home of 20 June 2008 confirmed that the first applicant had received the decision of 16 June 2008 and had confirmed that fact with her fingerprint. 33. On 24 June 2008 the second applicant informed the Centre that she objected to the institution of the above court proceedings. 34. At a hearing held before the I. Municipal Court on 10 July 2008 in the presence of the Centre’s representative and the first applicant’s guardian D.P.D., a psychiatric report on the first applicant’s mental state was commissioned. D.P.D. stated that Z.J.’s allegations in her report on the first applicant were true and added that the first applicant was bed-ridden, disoriented and completely incapable of autonomous life. She depended on the constant help of others and was unable to feed herself. Her condition was not improving but was expected to deteriorate. She was able to use only one hand, could move it and put food into her mouth, but even that hand was not functional to the extent that she could properly feed herself. D.P.D. suggested that a medical examination of the first applicant be carried out. 35. The psychiatrist submitted his report on the basis of an examination of the first applicant on 18 July 2008 and medical documentation from 2002. The relevant part of the report reads: “For the purposes of this examination the patient was seen by a psychiatrist on 18 July 2008 in the Home where she is placed. I found her lying awake in her bed. It is not possible to establish meaningful verbal contact because she is unable to talk clearly. To my question about her name and where she is from, she incomprehensibly repeats the same word. From her mimics and gestures it is possible to conclude that the patient has preserved a basic idea of herself. Clinical findings on her mental status: General impression: she lies in the typical “embryo” posture – on her side with legs bent in to the knees and drawn towards the chest, the upper body and head bent forward, so that her chin almost touches her knees (posture typical for persons with serious brain damage). Impression: a gravely ill person, completely dependent on the help of others, bed-ridden. Contact: it is obvious that she can hear and understands something, but she is not able to form comprehensible words. It is to be expected that she [has] only a basic idea of herself. During the interview she looks aside with a dull, expressionless look or closes her eyes. When asked something loudly and directly she pays only brief attention to the speaker. Occasionally she mumbles incomprehensibly. General facial expression reveals a mentally impaired person: empty stare and empty facial mimic. Only basic orientation towards self is preserved. Thought functions completely reduced – no thought process. Movement-impaired – central psychomotor damage (brain). No coordination of hands, incapable of feeding herself. Comprehension, understanding and ability to connect causes and consequences of events are completely damaged – non-existent. Gravely reduced overall mental capacity, with only basic idea of herself preserved. She has no idea of relations between persons or of her own interests. Disabled to the extent that she is dependent on help of another person for mere survival. ... Conclusion: Severe impairment of global cognitive ability, with emphasis on memory, thought process, ability to develop new ideas and make conclusions and decisions; impaired motor functions, to the extent that it renders the person so incapable that she is dependent for her survival on the care of another person. Prognosis unfavourable. Incapable of caring for herself and her rights and interests. On medical grounds protection of the person’s interest under guardianship is indispensable; the court is recommended to divest her entirely of legal capacity.” 36. On 14 August 2008 the first applicant submitted a power of attorney, authorising the second applicant to represent her in the proceedings. She signed the letter in her handwriting. 37. The second applicant objected to the psychiatric report in her written submission to the I. Municipal Court, arguing that it was based on five‑year‑old medical documentation and a twenty-minute observation by the psychiatrist and that the conclusions of the report were therefore superficial, imprecise and untrue. She maintained that the first applicant could pronounce words, had good hand movement and was able to sit and dress with help. She also claimed that the psychiatrist saw the first applicant in the afternoon, when the first applicant was tired and drowsy, under the influence of medication and alarmed by the presence of an unknown person and of the Head Nurse of the Home. She also objected to the statement given by D.P.D., and argued that D.P.D. had not even seen the first applicant. 38. The second applicant also requested the withdrawal of the judge conducting the proceedings, alleging bias. 39. On 21 August 2008 the request for withdrawal was declared inadmissible by the President of the I. Municipal Court because the second applicant was not a party to the proceedings. At a hearing held the same day in that court D.P.D. stated that she had no objections to the psychiatric report but noted that there was no medical documentation in respect of the first applicant more recent than 2002. 40. On the same day the I. Municipal Court divested the first applicant of legal capacity. The decision states that the persons present at the hearing were the Centre’s representative lawyer M.G., and the first applicant’s special guardian D.P.D. The relevant part of the decision reads: “The requesting party lodged a request to divest the respondent of her legal capacity, alleging that the respondent, owing to psycho-organic changes caused by a brain stroke and brain atrophy, was incapable of autonomous life. She was entirely dependent on the help and care of others. By a decision of the requesting party her right to care outside her family had been established and she was placed in the Caritas Home for elderly and dependent persons ... in I. Her social and intellectual functioning was significantly reduced, it was not possible to establish contact with her, and she was disoriented and demented. She was in need of protection through the institution of guardianship because she was incapable of caring for her own needs, rights and interests, and therefore all requirements under section 159 of the Family Act for divesting her of legal capacity had been met. The respondent’s guardian ad litem replied that the allegations in the request were true and added that the respondent was bedridden, disoriented and completely incapable of autonomous life. She depended on the constant help of others and was unable to feed herself. Her condition was not improving but was expected to deteriorate. She was able to use only one hand, [and] could move it and put food into her mouth; however, even that hand was not functional to the extent that she could properly feed herself. In view of the respondent’s old age, the guardian suggested that a medical examination of the respondent be carried out. She did not oppose the requesting party’s application. This court consulted the opinion of a social worker (page 2), a birth certificate (page 3), medical records (pages 4-5), a decision of the I. Social Welfare Centre of 26 June 2008 (page 6) and a report by medical expert Š.D., doctor in psychiatry, of 18 July 2008 (pages 21-24). On the basis of the above evidence, this court has found the requesting party’s application founded and has accepted it. This court has established that the respondent is an eighty-three-year-old who suffered a brain stroke, after which she developed psycho-organic syndrome, high blood pressure and incontinence. In 2002 she underwent cataract surgery and was hospitalised at the neurological ward for a CVA [cerebral vascular accident]; she was subsequently placed in the Special Hospital for Lung Diseases in K. on account of exacerbated COLD [chronic obstructive lung disease]. Furthermore, this court has established that the respondent’s entire mental capacity, in particular as regards her memory, thought processes, ability to form new ideas and reach conclusions and decisions, together with her psychomotor functions, is damaged to such an extent that it renders the respondent incapable, so that she is dependent on the help of another person for mere survival. She is incapable of caring for herself, her rights and interests and protecting them, and therefore it is necessary to protect the respondent by means of social care, since the prognosis is unfavourable. This court accepted the report and opinion of the medical expert Š.D., doctor in psychiatry, to which the parties made no objections, because the report is detailed, objective and drawn up in accordance with the rules of the profession.” 41. This decision was not served on the applicants. 42. On 22 August 2008 the first applicant asked the I. Municipal Court that the decision of 21 August 2008 be served on the second applicant. She signed the authorisation with her full name. There was no reply. 43. The first applicant is today still accommodated in the Caritas Home. 44. The relevant part of a discharge letter of 20 December 2006, issued by the psychiatric ward of the V. Hospital, reads: “Brought for treatment by ambulance... there is information that her behaviour has altered since July when her mother, with whom she had lived, was accommodated in a Caritas Home in I. She subsequently locked herself in the house [and] isolated herself from everyone. The relatives who visited her noticed that she had weakened, refused communication and food; she lost a lot of weight, neglected personal hygiene. On admission she appeared as a chronic mental patient, [was] skinny, manic conduct, affectively inadequate... she verbalised fear and the feeling of being threatened, was suspicious and complained of hallucinatory experience. Treatment She has been treated in a closed psychiatric ward with classical pharmacotherapy (Moditen together with Normabel). By the second day following admission and therapy the patient started to take normal meals (first light food and then a regular diet). She has visibly recovered physically. The psychopathology for which she was hospitalised has completely ceased – she has no fears, no psychosis towards her environment, is joyful about every visit and when information has been sought about her. She has good introspection with regard to her physical weakness. She is willing to talk and accept solutions for her life. Optimistic prognosis for further treatment is based on the fact that her first hospitalisation in 1994, which involved deterioration of her mental health and the same clinical picture, was provoked by an external factor, as in the current episode, and in the meantime she has been in good remission, and functioned satisfactorily in society.” 45. On 17 September 2008 the Centre held a hearing with a view of appointing a guardian for the second applicant, since they intended to institute court proceedings divesting her of legal capacity as well. The second applicant objected to the institution of these proceedings and stated that she had not been informed of the grounds for their institution. 46. On 18 September 2008 the Centre appointed a lawyer, N.C., as guardian ad litem for the second applicant in the forthcoming proceedings to divest her too of the capacity to act. The relevant part of the decision reads: “... the case-file of this Centre shows that ... it instituted proceedings to divest Y of legal capacity in a competent court because owing to her illness and altered personality, she is not able to care for her personal needs, rights and interests. ... Y stated that she had no objections with regard to the person [proposed] as her legal representative, but that she considered it entirely unnecessary to appoint a guardian for her and to institute proceedings before a court to divest her of legal capacity.” 47. On the same day the Centre asked the I. Municipal Court to institute proceedings with a view to having the second applicant divested of her legal capacity. The relevant part of the Centre’s submission reads: “From early youth the respondent has suffered from muscular dystrophy, which makes it difficult for her to move about. Since two years ago, when her mother X was placed in the Home for elderly and dependent persons... the respondent has started to behave in a strange manner and once locked herself in her family house in B., refusing food and any contact with her doctor and worried neighbours. ... the medical documentation shows that the respondent was treated in the psychiatric ward of the V. General Hospital in 1994 with a diagnosis of reactive depressive psychosis. There is no evidence that the respondent continued with medical checkups following a check-up in July 1994, when she had received therapy; this shows that she does not see the need to take care of her own health. The attitude of the respondent towards her mother X ... is possessive. At the beginning the Home’s administration tolerated her whole-day visits. As a result of constant objections concerning the Home’s employees as regards care [to her mother] and verbal and sometimes physical aggression, and also the fact that she disturbed other patients, necessitating a police intervention, her visits have been restricted ... The respondent has unrealistic demands concerning her mother (she constantly seeks her placement in a single room, not accepting the explanations given as to why that is not possible). In her contacts with the employees of the institutions involved in the proceedings conducted for the protection of her own rights and interests and those of her mother, she does not see the purpose [of these proceedings], viewing them as planned personal attacks. She has a very low tolerance level, is unable to preserve self-control [and] insults and denigrates the employees. Also, the fact that she often changes her legal representatives, who refuse to provide further services after a short while, shows the respondent’s increasing problem in establishing and maintaining any kind of social relations in everyday life. In view of the above, the Centre considers that the respondent is not capable of caring for her personal needs, rights and interests ...” 48. The second applicant lodged an appeal against the decision of 18 September 2008 to appoint a special guardian for her, arguing that she was capable of taking care of herself and that there was no need to appoint a guardian for her. 49. On 28 October 2008 the second applicant also filed her submissions opposing the request to divest her of legal capacity lodged by the Centre. She argued that it was not correct that she had been suffering from muscular dystrophy since early youth, but that she had had a road accident in 1991, since when she had been using a walking stick. She denied the Centre’s allegations as regards her behaviour over the previous two years. She stressed that she had been taking care of her elderly mother, had placed her in the Caritas Home at her own initiative and then continued to visit her regularly; she also bought a wheelchair for her mother, had been taking her out in the Home’s courtyard, had succeeded in teaching her again how to feed herself and to hold a bottle with water, and provided her with all necessary care. She had also been caring for her own needs, preparing her meals or paying a maid to prepare her meals and clean her flat. She had also been regularly seeing her doctor. In 1994 she had retired and had been hospitalised in a psychiatric ward of the V. Hospital. She had not subsequently seen a psychiatrist since there had been no need and her doctor had not recommended it. She had had regular contacts with others; she was a member of two libraries, had been reading a lot, growing flowers, doing handcrafts and going on short trips. For the purposes of these proceedings she had engaged the services of a lawyer, which showed her ability to care for her interests. 50. On 2 June 2009 the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare quashed the decision of 18 September 2008 on the ground that the same person could not be a legal representative and a special guardian. 51. On 27 July 2009 the Centre issued a fresh decision appointing lawyer I.R. as Y.’s special guardian. The relevant part of the decision reads: “On 18 September 2008 ... N.C. was appointed as a special guardian to Y. in order to represent her in the proceedings with a view of divesting her of legal capacity ... The guardian was also authorised to ... represent her in all personal matters and matters concerning her property, to manage her assets and to take proper care of her person, rights, obligations and wellbeing. ... The Ministry also referred to a wide range of powers given to the special guardian, calling into question the need for such powers. In this connection and on the basis of the evidence presented ... this Centre assessed that the special guardian would properly protect her person, rights and interests, with understanding of the purpose of the proceedings to divest her of legal capacity and the protection provided through the institution of guardianship. It therefore gave [N.C.] the authority to care for [Y.’s] assets, because this Centre is doubtful as to whether Y. is capable of caring for her rights and interests, including her property rights, and has therefore instituted proceedings to divest her of legal capacity, the final decision on which is to be taken by a court. ... N.C. will continue to represent Y in these proceedings on the basis of a power of attorney [given to her by Y] ... ...I.R. is appointed as special guardian for Y ...” 52. On 7 August 2009 the second applicant lodged an appeal against the above decision, arguing that there was no need to appoint a guardian for her or to institute proceedings to divest her of legal capacity because she had been adequately protecting her needs, rights and interests. She explained that she had been caring for her material needs, paying all bills, preparing her meals and maintaining social contacts, as well as regularly seeing her doctor, attending cultural events and visiting her mother. Her way of life did not show in any respect that there was a need to place her under guardianship. It appears that no decision has been adopted upon this appeal. 53. On 30 June 2009 a psychiatric report concerning a telephone interview with the second applicant was submitted to the I. Municipal Court. The relevant part of the report reads: “The respondent is sixty years old. She has been receiving an invalidity pension for some fifteen years. She lives alone in her own flat. She is unmarried [and] has no children. Her physical health is impaired – and that is about all that we can establish without doubt with regard to her physical condition. Owing to the lack of cooperation on the part of the respondent, we have no medical records ... At the outset it should be pointed out that the respondent refused to cooperate. During an interview (organised with great difficulty!) she held a monologue for a whole hour, in which she referred to all the injustice done to her and her mother. She ignored any attempt by the doctor to conduct a dialogue, let alone a structured one. The respondent’s biography or her present life was not addressed. The only thing that happened was her raised voice, rudeness, hostility, a clearly paranoid attitude towards her surroundings, the feeling of being persecuted and a need to defend herself from the institutions that had been interfering with her life, ill-treating her, etc. The expert’s expectation that during a home visit, on her own territory, the respondent would participate in the interview in a more cooperative manner was not met. More than ten telephone calls were not answered. The attempts to find her at her home address were also unsuccessful. After a few weeks she made a telephone call - shouting, accusing, insulting and attacking – in which she did not want to hear any answers. On the basis of all this information and the expert’s personal experience with the respondent, it is easy to conclude that she is a person of a very bizarre mental structure. She suffers from serious emotional disharmony and grave dysphoria and a flood of uncontrolled affective outbursts. In the background, a general paranoid attitude towards her entire surroundings is perceptible, with a fixation on institutions. She is ruled by a feeling that she is exposed to injustice, and to ill-treatment, abuse and systematic denial of her rights. She has succeeded in developing a strong hatred for the employees of the I. Social Welfare Centre and that whole institution. The same is true (maybe even more so) about the Home where her mother is placed. She is argumentative. Her behaviour is often disorganised and chaotic. She has deeply estranged herself from everyone, chased away all good-willed people, broken all threads of cooperation. She is entirely uncooperative and is prone to describe everyone who dares to say or do anything she dislikes as an ignorant person, an adversary, [or] even an enemy. In all that ‘rashomon’ the respondent does not even make an attempt to control herself, does not try to hide her hostility, does not try even for a second to reflect and analyse her own contribution to the situation; she rejects any suggestion that there had been any wrong on her part. She is entirely uncritical and has no introspection; she automatically seeks the guilty parties in her surroundings. She opposes any suggestion that she address problems regarding her own person or her behaviour and threatens [to appeal to] a higher instance. In her entire mental world there is a lot of system, that is, logical concepts – and this would all be fine if that logic were not based on an entirely false, at times even psychotic, basis. ... her entire mental world is of a paranoid nature. In the best case we are speaking of a paranoid personality disorder, that is, the condition of personal derangement in which feelings of insecurity, being exploited and having suffered damage prevail. Without restrictions and with no basis she seeks enemies in her surroundings, people who are against her, who want to exploit her or injure her. She has difficulty in trusting anyone, if that is possible at all. She is mistrustful, negative towards others who are or could become traitors; she sees hidden meaning in everything. Such an attitude warrants constant guard, suspicion and defensiveness. It is difficult to assert that this all amounts to a definitive paranoia, but the respondent – even if she is not in paranoia – is surely approaching it. We stress that paranoia is a real psychotic disorder (that is to say mental derangement) characterised by the development of and fixation on one psychotic thought – usually of a persecuting type – or on several such thoughts which are grouped, interconnected and systematised (connected in a psychotic system). In any case, the respondent is not far from mental derangement, which, unfortunately, she does not see and does not understand and therefore refuses any professional help. Overwhelmed with this personal condition, the respondent most often estimates the world around her entirely wrongly, giving immense importance to trivialities and at the same time ignoring crucial things. By insisting on the irrelevant, she seriously neglects her vital interests and thus directly compromises them. She exhausts her limited resources on irrelevant, sporadic things, thus calling into question her ability to organise her existence, to structure it adequately and to exploit what she has at her disposal in her best interests. Her mental condition is entirely (which still does not mean irreversibly) impaired. She has lost the ability to anticipate and to react and adapt in a preventive manner. Her understanding of the world and her position in it is limited by a feeling of injustice, and is also superficial, wrong and strict. She is incapable of locating herself correctly in the complex, abstract laws of the outside world. She is not capable of recognising the institutional resources at her disposal; even when they are presented to her, she rejects them uncritically, putting herself in a dangerous, unacceptable and miserable position. In her mental condition she has no chance of exploiting outside resources and protecting her rights and interests. She will follow – without caution, without reflection – her first impression and thus immediately puts at risk her economic, material and health interests. At the same time she will ignore favourable outcomes and situations and potential opportunities for improvement. On account of her clearly deeply impaired mental vitality, the respondent is in a perilous condition - her physical, economic, social and health safety is compromised and she has no resources to resist peril constructively and properly. She is not able to participate actively in the outside world and to act in a constructive manner. She is lost in everyday specific situations and exhausts herself in trivialities. Therapeutic possibilities in her condition are still possible. The problem is that the respondent will refuse them categorically and systematically, seeing them as an attack on herself or a sign of grave hostility. The respondent is in a situation which absolutely excludes any possibility for her to take care of her rights and interests and to show responsibility towards her obligations. Her only interest is to confirm her paranoid views – and here she does not spare her mental, financial or institutional resources. In this respect it is not possible to leave her on her own, since that will immediately put her at risk at all levels. Her mental resources have brought her to a critical mental and social situation where it is not to be expected that those same resources could save her. I recommend that the request by the requesting party be accepted and that the respondent be entirely divested of legal capacity. There is no aspect of legal capacity that she could perform responsibly and to her own advantage. It is to be stressed that the above statement could and should be revised in the case of a fortunate outcome, that is, if the respondent starts psychiatric treatment, offers her cooperation in therapy and achieves mental rehabilitation. However, no new assessment of her mental condition ... is recommended for at least one year in view of the nature and gravity of her disorder.” 54. At a hearing held on 25 November 2009 in the I. Municipal Court the second applicant was heard. The relevant part of the written record of the hearing reads: “... the respondent alleges that she is entirely capable of caring for her needs and interests, that she receives a pension and lives in her own flat; her next-door neighbour M.Š. prepares her lunches and sometimes she goes to a restaurant. She further alleges that she is able to address all issues concerning her household and paying her bills. She is seeing her doctor and is able to carry out all administrative and other tasks in the city. She retired fifteen years ago because of a road accident; she is an economist with a high school education. She had enrolled in a law faculty, but had not completed her studies ... She watches television, reads daily newspapers, books, has a wide circle of friends who visit her and sometimes she also visits them; in particular, she is also visited by her relatives. She is a very communicative person and leaves a good impression on others and has never had any problems in communication with others. When her mother was placed in a home, she was overwhelmed by sadness because until then they had been living together. However, she did not lock herself in and she does not know who called the doctors and the ambulance - that happened after a report by the Centre. The discharge letters following her two hospitalisations show that her condition was good and satisfactory. Since 2006 she has not been taking any medication save for her underlying illness, which is muscle weakness (a mild form of paraplegia). Between 9 October and 10 November 2009 she was hospitalised for rheumatic diseases and rehabilitation, in order to maintain her customary condition as regards her ability to walk ... She specifically stresses that she has reacted very badly to the institution of these proceedings to divest her of legal capacity because she considers herself entirely legally capable and healthy and able to care for her rights and interests and fulfil all her obligations as she has already described. To the question what her condition would be if she were divested of legal capacity, she answers that she could not even imagine it... it would be bad, such a decision would lead to depression and exacerbation of her illness; her soul would thus be killed and her whole life as well. She stresses that her condition does not require a guardian ... She stresses further that before these proceedings were instituted she had not been given a chance by the Centre or the expert who prepared a report in these proceedings, to give her own overview of her condition, and therefore she has now explained her situation. She also drew up a six-page statement which she attaches to the case file. ... She stresses further that the guardian did not contact her at all ... ... she also stresses that in her view these proceedings were instituted because the Centre wants to deprive her of her property (a flat in I. and part of a family house in B.) and various other property that she might inherit from her mother, since she has no spouse or children, but only a sister. She alleges that her current situation is such that she is capable of caring for herself, even if her illness were to worsen, so as to choose by herself a person to care for her; she also has enough assets to pay for the care that she wishes. She has been thinking about it and she always tries to find solutions for the future. She wants to continue to live in her own flat and does not wish to leave it. Should she be divested of legal capacity, her condition would worsen; she had seen it happen to others. Then she could be placed somewhere she would not want to be. She does not want to live in a home ... because she is used to her own home ... and wishes to be left in peace ...” 55. On 29 March 2010 the same expert in psychiatry submitted his additional report on the second applicant, in which he repeated his previous conclusions, without any further contact with her. 56. The above court proceedings are apparently still pending.

4. The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Ankara. 5. The applicant is the owner and director of a construction company registered in Turkey, the Mustafa Açıkgöz Construction Company Limited. 6. On 26 April 1993 the applicant concluded a contract with S.K. and F.Ö., in which the applicant undertook to construct a building, comprising flats and shops, on a plot of land in Beypazarı belonging to S.K. and F.Ö. The owners were to transfer the ownership of the plot to the applicant and, on completion of the construction, the applicant was to transfer the ownership of six flats to S.K. and F.Ö. According to the contract, S.K. and F.Ö. were to have three flats each, two of which would be well lit by daylight. 7. On 7 March 1994 S.K. brought a case against the applicant before the Beypazarı Civil Court, claiming that the applicant had constructed the building but had failed to transfer the ownership of the flats to her. S.K. requested that flats nos. 8, 15 and 18 be registered in her name. 8. Twenty-eight hearings were held between 8 April 1994 and 1 May 1997. During the same interval five expert reports were submitted to the court either as to the division of flats and sections of the building or as to the luminosity of the flats. 9. On 1 May 1997 the Beypazarı Civil Court granted S.K.’s request. 10. On 3 December 1997 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of 1 May 1997, holding that the first-instance court had failed to assess the provisions of the contract between the applicant and S.K. correctly and, as a result, had designated the wrong flats. The Court of Cassation considered that the expression “well lit flats” contained in the contract should have been interpreted as meaning flats on the south side of the building. 11. The applicant requested revision of the Court of Cassation’s decision. 12. On 18 May 1998 the revision request was dismissed. 13. The case was subsequently remitted to the first-instance court. 14. Two hearings were held between 18 May 1998 and 24 September 1998. 15. On 18 September 1998 an expert report was submitted to the court indicating that the sunnier flats were nos. 11, 14, 17 and 20. 16. On 24 September 1998 the Beypazarı Civil Court decided that S.K. should be registered as the owner of sections nos. 5, 6 and 8 (whose size was equal to that of a flat), as well as flats nos. 17 and 20. 17. On 7 April 1999 the Court of Cassation again quashed the first‑instance court’s judgment. It considered that the applicant had incurred unjustified loss as a result of that decision. 18. The claimant requested review of the Court of Cassation’s decision. 19. On 2 December 1999 the review request was dismissed. 20. The case was subsequently remitted to the first-instance court. 21. Six hearings were held between 2 December 1999 and 9 October 2000. 22. On 26 May 2000 an expert report was submitted to the court. 23. On 9 October 2000 the Beypazarı Civil Court decided that S.K. should be registered as the owner of sections nos. 1, 3, 5 and 6 (whose total surface was less than that of flats nos. 5, 6 and 8), as well as flats nos. 17 and 20. 24. On 30 April 2001 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of 9 October 2000. 25. The applicant requested review of the Court of Cassation’s decision. 26. On 8 October 2001 the Court of Cassation granted the applicant’s request, annulled its decision of 30 April 2001 and quashed the judgment of 9 October 2000. The Court of Cassation noted that the first-instance court had requested experts to draw up a report and to make proposals as to the division of the flats and sections of the building, and that on 26 May 2000 the experts had submitted a report containing seven proposals. It observed that the court had failed to give the applicant an opportunity to express his preference regarding these proposals. Instead it selected the first one of its own motion, which had had a detrimental outcome for the applicant. The case was subsequently remitted to the first‑instance court. 27. Four hearings were held between 8 October 2001 and 8 July 2002. 28. At the hearing of 11 March 2002, the Beypazarı Civil Court requested the applicant to state his preferred expert proposal, but he failed to respond within the set time-limit. 29. On 8 July 2002 the Beypazarı Civil Court gave judgment and ordered that S.K. be registered in the land register as the owner of sections nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5, as well as flats nos. 17 and 20. 30. On 21 April 2003 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of 8 July 2002.

6. The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Siemirowice. 7. On 7 April 2000 the Wejherowo District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) convicted the applicant of domestic violence and sentenced him to a one‑year period of imprisonment suspended on probation for 4 years. The court found that between June 1998 and October 1999 the applicant had ill‑treated his girlfriend in that he had beaten her and abused her verbally. 8. It appears that the applicant breached the terms of his probation and on 20 September 2002 the Wejherowo District Court ordered that his sentence be enforced. On 2 April 2003 he started to serve it in the Wejherowo Detention Centre. 9. On 18 July 2003 the applicant’s father died. The applicant submits that he immediately asked the prison authorities for leave to attend his father’s funeral. On 20 July the applicant’s girlfriend delivered him his father’s death certificate. 10. On 21 July 2003, a Monday, the applicant made a formal application for leave to attend the funeral, which was to be held on 22 July 2003. 11. On 21 July 2003 the Penitentiary Judge of the Gdańsk Regional Court (Sędzia Sądu Okręgowego Wydziału Penitencjarnego) refused the leave request. The reasons given for the judge’s decision were as follows: “The convicted person’s application cannot be allowed. The grounds relied on [by the applicant] to justify allowing him to leave the prison cannot be considered especially important. Consequently, since the conditions specified in Article 141 § 4 of [the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences] had not been fulfilled, it has been decided as above.” 12. The decision also included an instruction on the possibility to lodge an appeal against the decision with the Gdańsk Penitentiary Court within 7 days of the date of notification of the decision. 13. The decision was notified to the applicant on 22 July 2003. The applicant did not appeal against it as the funeral had already taken place and he considered that his request to leave prison had become without purpose.

5. The applicant was born in 1962 and is currently in prison in Montmédy. 6. Following a complaint lodged on 18 February 1997 by the parents of a young girl, S., the applicant was charged with the rape and sexual assault of a minor under 15 years of age by a person in a position of authority. 7. During the investigation he made several requests for additional investigative measures to be taken, which were refused by the investigating authorities. 8. On 15 April 2003 an investigating judge at the Bar-le-Duc tribunal de grande instance issued an order discontinuing the proceedings in respect of the sexual assault charges, as the limitation period had expired. The judge committed the applicant for trial on a charge of rape of a minor under the age of 15 by a person in a position of authority over the victim. 9. On 30 October 2003 the Meuse Assize Court sentenced the applicant to fifteen years’ imprisonment and stripped him of all his civil, civic and family rights for ten years. 10. The applicant did not appeal against that decision but lodged an application for a retrial, producing a number of documents which he claimed placed his guilt in doubt. 11. On 9 March 2004 Law no. 2004-204 established the national automated register of sex offenders (“the Sex Offenders Register”). 12. On 11 April 2005 the Criminal Cases Review Board rejected the applicant’s application for a retrial. 13. On 28 February 2005 the applicant applied to the Créteil Post‑sentencing Court to have his sentence suspended. On 17 June 2005 the application was refused on the grounds that, according to the expert medical reports, “the applicant’s survival is not in doubt, nor is his state of health incompatible in the long term with detention. Therefore, as matters stand, he does not meet the requirements of Article 720-1-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and is not eligible for the measure in question”. The court pointed out that the applicant’s sentence was due to run until 27 May 2019 and that his criminal record mentioned another conviction for sexual abuse of a minor under the age of 15 by a person in authority (a sentence of six years’ imprisonment and a judicial and social supervision order imposed by the Nancy Court of Appeal on 29 August 2002 for sexual assault of a minor). The court also took into consideration medical reports according to which the applicant suffered from congenital heart disease which made any physical activity impossible. The report advocated his placement under an enhanced prison regime with an individual cell, no exercise or physical activity, a salt-free diet and regular medication. The court also referred to a psychiatric expert report from November 2004 according to which the applicant’s psychological development “appears very limited in so far as he has failed to reflect on his own conduct. He has expressed no feelings of guilt or responsibility for the offences which he denies committing. A course of psychotherapy would help him develop more satisfactory relationships in the future with the people he comes into contact with”. 14. On 13 October 2005 the post-sentencing division of the Paris Court of Appeal upheld this judgment. 15. On 22 November 2005 the applicant was informed by a police officer from l’Haÿ-les-Roses police station that his name was being entered in the Sex Offenders Register on account of his conviction by the Meuse Assize Court, in accordance with the transitional provisions of the above‑mentioned Law of 9 March 2004. The official notification was worded as follows: “I, the undersigned, Mr Fabrice Gardel, hereby acknowledge that I have today been notified of my inclusion in the Sex Offenders Register on account of the [sentence] of imprisonment imposed on 30 October 2003 by the Meuse Assize Court, and that I am accordingly required, under Article 706-53-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to: 1. provide proof of my address: ... Once a year either to the authority managing the register (the Ministry of Justice) ... or to my local police or gendarmerie station ..., during the month in which my birthday falls or during the month of January if my date of birth is not known or not established. ... I expressly acknowledge having been informed that: I have been finally convicted of an offence carrying a sentence of ten years or more. Accordingly, I am required to provide proof of my address by reporting in person every six months. ... I take note of the fact that if I leave the country my obligation to report in person will be suspended for the duration of my stay abroad but that I must continue to provide proof of my address by means of a registered letter with recorded delivery to the authority managing the Sex Offenders Register ... accompanied by documents certifying my address and signed by the local consular authority. 2. declare any change of address within fifteen days at the latest, in the same manner. I acknowledge having been informed: (i) that I must provide proof of my address for the first time within fifteen days of this notification, unless the latter is issued less than two months before the first day of the month of my birth, referred to above, or I am already required to provide proof of my address on an annual basis; (ii) that failure to comply with these obligations is punishable by a term of two years’ imprisonment and a fine of 30,000 euros; (iii) that any breach of these obligations will lead to an alert being issued to the judicial authorities and the police or gendarmerie which may result in my inclusion on the list of wanted persons and may be accompanied by a criminal prosecution; (iv) that, pursuant to Article R. 53-8-13, the proof of address and declaration of change of address provided for by Article 706-53-5 shall take the form of any document less than three months old in my name which gives proof of my home address, such as a bill or invoice; (v) that if the document produced refers to the address of another person, it must be accompanied by a statement written and signed by the latter confirming that I am staying at that address. I further acknowledge having been informed that I have the following rights: (i) under the Data Protection Act and Article 706-53-9, I may obtain a copy of all the information concerning me in the register by applying to the public prosecutor in whose district I am resident; (ii) if the decision forming the basis for my placement on the register was issued by a foreign judicial authority, I may apply to the public prosecutor at the Nantes tribunal de grande instance to have the information in the register rectified or deleted or to have the frequency of reporting reduced to once a year, in accordance with Articles R 53-8-27 et seq.”

8. The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Vienna. He has spent about twenty-eight years of his life in prison. During his prison terms he worked for lengthy periods in the prison kitchen or the prison bakery. As a working prisoner the applicant was not affiliated to the old-age pension system under the General Social Security Act. However, from 1 January 1994 he was affiliated to the unemployment insurance scheme in respect of periods worked in prison. 9. On 8 February 1999 the applicant filed an application for an early retirement pension with the Workers’ Pension Insurance Office (Pensionsversicherungsanstalt der Arbeiter – “the Pension Office”). 10. By a decision of 8 March 1999, the Pension Office dismissed the application on the ground that the applicant had failed to accumulate 240 insurance months, the required minimum for an early retirement pension. A list of the applicant’s insurance periods, running from October 1953 to February 1999, was appended to the decision. According to the list, the applicant had accumulated only 117 insurance months. The list shows lengthy periods during which no contributions were made, in particular from May 1963 to May 1964, from July 1965 to September 1968, from June 1969 to January 1974, from April 1974 to March 1984, from June 1984 to May 1986 and from February 1987 to April 1994. Between May 1994 and February 1999 a number of months, during which the applicant received unemployment benefits or emergency relief payments under the Unemployment Insurance Act, were counted as substitute periods. 11. Subsequently, the applicant brought an action against the Pension Office before the Vienna Labour and Social Court (Arbeits- und Sozialgericht). He submitted that he had been working for twenty-eight years in prison and that the number of months worked during that time should be counted as insurance months for the purpose of assessing his pension rights. 12. On 4 April 2001 the Labour and Social Court dismissed the applicant’s claim. It confirmed that the applicant had not completed the required minimum number of insurance months. Referring to section 4(2) of the General Social Security Act, the court noted that prisoners performing obligatory work while serving their sentence were not affiliated to the compulsory social insurance scheme. According to the Supreme Court’s established case-law (judgment no. 10 ObS 66/90 of 27 February 1990 and judgment no. 10 ObS 52/99s of 16 March 1999), their work, corresponding to a legal obligation, differed from work performed by employees on the basis of an employment contract. The difference in treatment under social security law did not disclose any appearance of discrimination. 13. The applicant, now assisted by counsel, appealed. He argued in particular that the wording of section 4(2) of the General Social Security Act did not distinguish between work on the basis of a legal obligation and work based on a contract. Moreover, he argued that the distinction was not objectively justified. Since 1993, prisoners who worked had been affiliated to the unemployment insurance scheme. In the applicant’s view, there was no reason not to affiliate them to the old-age pension system. 14. On 24 October 2001 the Vienna Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It held that the Labour and Social Court had correctly applied the law. According to the Supreme Court’s established case-law, prisoners performing obligatory work were not to be treated as employees within the meaning of section 4(2) of the General Social Security Act and were therefore not affiliated to the compulsory social insurance scheme. The fact that, since the 1993 amendment to the Unemployment Insurance Act, prisoners were affiliated to the unemployment insurance scheme was not conclusive as regards the question of their affiliation to the old-age pension system. In essence, the applicant raised a question of legal or social policy. However, it was not for the courts but for the legislature to decide whether or not to change the provisions relating to the social insurance of prisoners. In that connection, the Court of Appeal noted that it did not share the applicant’s doubts regarding the possible unconstitutionality of working prisoners’ non-affiliation to the old-age pension scheme. 15. On 12 February 2002 the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof) dismissed an appeal on points of law by the applicant. Its judgment was served on the applicant on 6 May 2002. 16. On 29 January 2004 the applicant completed his last prison term. Subsequently, he received unemployment benefits until 29 October 2004 and, upon their expiry, emergency relief payments (Notstandshilfe). According to his counsel’s submissions at the hearing, the applicant currently receives some 720 euros (EUR) per month (composed of EUR 15.77 per day plus EUR 167 per month in emergency relief payments and EUR 87 as an allowance towards his rent expenses).

4. The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Kharkiv. 5. In 1985 she got married and gave birth to her first daughter. In 1987 she gave birth to her second daughter. 6. The applicant’s relationship with her husband deteriorated and in August 1994 she and her daughters moved into a house rented by her husband in the village of Pisochyn. Her husband visited his daughters from time to time. 7. In late November or the beginning of December 1994 the applicant’s husband took the children back to Kharkiv. The applicant was left alone. 8. On 17 December 1994 the applicant was admitted to Kharkiv Regional Psychiatric Hospital (“the psychiatric hospital”), a State-run institution. According to the medical records, the applicant was brought by ambulance since she was in a reactive state and showed signs of mental disorder. 9. Soon after her admission to the psychiatric hospital, the applicant was diagnosed as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia and given treatment. 10. Between January 1995 and November 1997 the applicant unsuccessfully and repeatedly asked to be discharged from the psychiatric hospital and lodged complaints about her internment. During that time the applicant was provided with neuroleptic treatment. 11. On 7 November 1997 the applicant escaped from the psychiatric hospital and found shelter with some acquaintances. By that time she was divorced. 12. On 23 December 1997, at the applicant’s request, she was admitted to Kharkiv Municipal Psychiatric Hospital for in-patient psychiatric assessment. According to the medical records, during the applicant’s stay in the municipal hospital she did not take any medicine; discussions with psychiatrists were the only treatment. 13. On 4 February 1998 the applicant was discharged from that hospital with the conclusion that her mental health was normal. 14. Subsequently, the applicant re-established contact with her children and started living with them. 15. Following the applicant’s complaint, on 17 February 1998 the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor’s Office instituted criminal proceedings against P., the applicant’s doctor, on suspicion of unlawful placement of the applicant in a psychiatric hospital, an offence under Article 123-2 of the Criminal Code of 1960. 16. On 21 July 1998 an expert panel conducted a forensic psychiatric examination and found that the applicant was not suffering from any mental illness. It further concluded that the applicant’s admission to the psychiatric hospital on 17 December 1994 might have been necessitated by her state of health; however, during her stay in the psychiatric hospital she had been wrongly diagnosed, she had not been assessed comprehensively, and she had not been provided with correct medical treatment from the outset, in December 1994. 17. On 9 October 1998 the expert panel additionally concluded that the applicant could have been discharged from the psychiatric hospital on 17 January 1995 on the basis of her discharge request, since her mental state had not suggested that she had posed a danger to herself or to the others. 18. On 24 February 1999 the applicant was recognised as a civil claimant within the framework of the criminal proceedings. 19. On 25 February 1999 the charges against P. were classified as negligence in the performance of official duties which resulted in grave consequences for the applicant. 20. On 9 April 1999 P. was committed to stand trial in the Kharkivskyy District Court. 21. On 20 June 2000 the case file was destroyed in a fire at the court house. 22. On 24 November 2000 the court remitted the case to the prosecutor’s office for supplementary investigation. 23. On 8 June 2001 the case was referred back to the court. 24. Between June 2001 and June 2002 some hearings were scheduled, but for various reasons none of them took place. 25. On 26 June 2002, in response to a complaint from the applicant, the Kharkiv Regional Department of Justice asked the President of the Kharkivskyy District Court to expedite the examination of the case, considering it to be unreasonably protracted. 26. On 24 February 2003 the Kharkivskyy District Court ordered the investigating authorities to carry out a further psychiatric assessment of the applicant. 27. On 14 April 2004 the investigating authorities ordered a psychiatric assessment of the applicant. 28. On 12 January 2005 the case was referred back to the court without this assessment having been carried out. 29. On 27 April 2005 the applicant, having regard to the fact that the case-file had been destroyed by fire in 2000, lodged another civil claim with the Kharkivskyy District Court seeking damages from P. and the psychiatric hospital for her unjustified psychiatric hospitalisation. 30. On 3 June 2005, at P.’s request, the Kharkivskyy District Court discontinued the criminal proceedings as time-barred. 31. The applicant appealed, alleging, in particular, that the impugned decision had been unlawful and that the examination of the case had been unreasonably protracted by the authorities. She further complained that the trial court had not examined her civil claim. 32. On 22 December 2005 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal upheld the court decision of 3 June 2005. 33. On the same date the Court of Appeal delivered a separate ruling, drawing the attention of the Regional Council of Judges to the omissions by the Kharkivskyy District Court which had resulted in the protracted examination of the applicant’s case. It noted, in particular, that between 8 June 2001 and 3 June 2005 there had been an unjustifiable number of adjournments of the hearings and that there had been an unjustifiable two-year period of inactivity pending a forensic assessment which was never carried out. 34. The applicant appealed on points of law against the decision to discontinue the criminal proceedings, raising the same arguments as in her appeal. She asserted that the courts had failed to determine her civil claim. 35. On 13 May 2008 the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected the applicant’s request for leave to appeal on points of law. 36. In March 2006 the applicant instituted separate civil proceedings against P. and the psychiatric hospital, claiming 10,000 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH) from P. and UAH 90,000 from the psychiatric hospital by way of compensation for the damage sustained as a result of her unjustified hospitalisation. She alleged, in particular, that the three-year stay in the psychiatric hospital had caused her severe mental and physical suffering. She argued that she had constantly felt debased and treated like a deficient human being, whose opinion was of no value. In addition, she had been subjected to involuntary medical interventions. Furthermore, the applicant’s private and family life had been ruined. 37. On 31 January 2007 the Chervonozavodsky District Court of Kharkiv found that on 17 December 1994 the applicant had been admitted to hospital lawfully given the signs of mental disorder. It further found that during her stay in hospital, the applicant’s medical doctor, P., had been at fault for breaching a number of legal provisions governing psychiatric assistance. The court established that the requisite procedures for involuntary hospitalisation had not been followed; by contrast, if the applicant had been hospitalised as voluntarily patient, she ought to have been discharged on the basis of her request (see paragraphs 48-50 below). The court also noted that the applicant had repeatedly asked to be discharged and concluded that she could have been discharged as early as 17 January 1995 on the basis of such a request. The court found that as a result of those breaches of domestic law, the applicant had been wrongly diagnosed and mistakenly treated for a considerable time in the psychiatric hospital. 38. The court further noted that during her wrongful stay in the psychiatric hospital the applicant had been unable to freely exercise her rights or manage her life. It therefore concluded that the applicant had sustained non-pecuniary damage which should be compensated by the psychiatric hospital employing P. In reaching that conclusion, the court also referred to the criminal case against P. and the evidence collected by the investigating authorities in that case. 39. The court awarded the applicant UAH 7,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage noting that, in determining that amount, it had taken into account the length of the applicant’s unjustified stay in the psychiatric hospital, the nature and the scope of physical and mental suffering, the enforced changes in her lifestyle, and the restrictions imposed on her rights as a citizen to freely arrange her life and take care of her own health. 40. The applicant appealed, seeking a higher amount of damages from both defendants. 41. On 19 April 2007 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of 31 January 2007. 42. The applicant did not lodge a further appeal before the Supreme Court.

5. The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Donji Miholjac. 6. On 25 January 1997 the applicant was arrested and brought to a police station where, during a questioning session that lasted four hours, he was beaten by a police officer, M.B. 7. On 28 January 1997 the physician who examined the applicant after the incident filed a criminal report with the relevant police authorities. 8. On 24 July 1997 the Donji Miholjac State Attorney’s Office indicted M.B. before the Donji Miholjac Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Donjem Miholjcu) for the criminal offence of ill-treatment in the exercise of an official duty. 9. By a judgment of 28 October 1997 the Municipal Court found M.B. guilty as charged and sentenced him to three months’ imprisonment but suspended the sentence for a period of one year. The court found, in particular, that the applicant had sustained light bodily injuries, mostly in the form of soft tissue contusions and bruising on the head, elbow and thighs. 10. On 30 December 1997 the Osijek County Court (Županijski sud u Osijeku) dismissed an appeal by the accused and upheld the first-instance judgment, which thereby became final. 11. On 30 October 1998 the applicant brought a civil action against the State in the Zagreb Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zagrebu), seeking compensation for the ill-treatment sustained. He sought a total of 295,000 Croatian kunas (HRK) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. In response, the State, represented by the State Attorney’s Office, replied that the applicant’s claim was excessive. 12. On 10 November 1999 the court obtained an opinion from a medical expert. The expert established that the applicant had sustained the following injuries: several contusions on the head (affecting the vertex and the occipital and temporal lobes), bruising on ears, thighs, the left elbow and the left part of the abdomen. Those injuries had healed completely, with no permanent consequences, and had not resulted in the loss of amenities of life. The expert further found that the applicant had suffered constant severe pain for one or two days, occasional moderate pain for three or four days and occasional mild pain for three or four weeks. During the incident the applicant had also experienced intense, primal fear and, for the next one or two days, residual fear – the intensity of which had gradually subsided and completely disappeared over the three subsequent weeks. 13. In written submissions of 15 June 2001 the applicant’s representative raised his initial claim for compensation to HRK 335,000, of which HRK 300,000 was sought for mental anguish caused by the ill-treatment, HRK 15,000 for physical pain and HRK 20,000 for fear. At a hearing held on 21 June 2001 the applicant’s representative reiterated that claim and, at the same time, withdrew his earlier objections to the expert’s opinion. 14. On 17 September 2002 the Municipal Court gave judgment, whereby it awarded the applicant a total of HRK 14,500 in compensation for non-pecuniary damage sustained by arbitrary deprivation of liberty and ill-treatment, together with statutory default interest running from 17 September 2002 and HRK 3,553.31 in costs. In particular, the court awarded the applicant HRK 5,000 for breach of his reputation and honour, liberty and rights of personality, HRK 4,500 for physical pain and HRK 5,000 for fear. At the same time, it dismissed the remainder of the applicant’s compensation claim (HRK 320,500) and ordered him to pay the State HRK 26,197.87 in costs, which consisted of fees chargeable for the State’s representation by the State Attorney’s Office. 15. In particular, as regards costs, that court established that the total amount of “costs necessary for the conduct of the proceedings”, within the meaning of section 155(1) of the Civil Procedure Act, incurred by the applicant on account of his legal representation by an advocate before that court was HRK 40,070, whereas the State had incurred HRK 27,375 on account of its legal representation by the State Attorney’s Office. As the applicant had only been awarded 4.3% of the total amount of damages sought, he was considered to have successfully claimed that percentage of the damages sought in the proceedings, whereas the State was considered to have successfully defended the remaining 95.7% of the claim. Costs were apportioned in accordance with those percentages, which meant that the applicant was entitled to have HRK 3.553.31 of his costs reimbursed by the State, whereas the State was entitled to have HRK 26,197.87 of its costs reimbursed by the applicant. 16. On 9 May 2006 the Zagreb County Court (Županijski sud u Zagrebu) dismissed an appeal by the applicant and upheld the first-instance judgment. 17. Following an appeal on points of law (revizija) by the applicant, on 24 April 2007 the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) reversed the lower courts’ judgments in part and awarded him a total of HRK 24,000 in compensation for non-pecuniary damage, together with statutory default interest running from 17 September 2002 and HRK 8,300 in costs. In particular, the court awarded the applicant HRK 7,000 for physical pain and HRK 12,000 for fear, whereas the award of HRK 5,000 by the first-instance court for breach of his rights of personality remained unaltered. It dismissed the remainder of the applicant’s claim for damages and ordered him to pay the State HRK 19,000 in costs. 18. On 24 December 2007 the State paid the applicant a total of HRK 32,207.28 pursuant to the Supreme Court judgment. That amount consisted of HRK 24,000 in damages, HRK 18,907.28 in accrued statutory default interest and HRK 8,300 costs, less the HRK 19,000 costs the applicant had been ordered to pay the State. 19. Meanwhile, on 19 October 2007 the applicant, relying on Articles 22 and 23 of the Constitution, lodged a constitutional complaint against the Supreme Court’s judgment, alleging violations of his constitutional right to liberty and the constitutional prohibition of ill-treatment. In his constitutional complaint the applicant wrote, inter alia, as follows: “On 30 October 1998 I instituted civil proceedings for damages against the Republic of Croatia as defendant, the epilogue of which was, after nine years of painstaking litigation, the Republic of Croatia as defendant having to pay me 24,000 [Croatian] kunas for all types of non-pecuniary damage and 8,300 [Croatian] kunas for the costs of the proceedings, whereas at the same time I had to pay the defendant 19,000 [Croatian] kunas for the costs of the proceedings!? ... ... I expected full satisfaction ... and [instead] I was reluctantly awarded only those 24,000 [Croatian] kunas, which, when my obligations concerning the defendant’s costs of proceedings are deducted [i.e. taken into account], comes down to a measly 13,300 [Croatian] kunas. [T]hat is no satisfaction at all but a mockery of the Constitution and the law at my expense as an innocent victim of violence by the authorities... ... By the contested judgment I was after nine whole years of litigation ... awarded compensation in a shamefully small amount as if I had been injured in a road traffic accident by negligence, and not been brutally ill-treated.” 20. On 17 September 2009 the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint and served its decision on his representative on 4 November 2009. In so doing the Constitutional Court examined the applicant’s arguments not only under the two Articles of the Constitution he had relied on in his constitutional complaint, but also under Article 14 paragraph 2 of the Constitution, as it found that from the content of the constitutional complaint it was clear that the applicant also complained of a violation of his constitutional right to equality before the law.

5. The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Sofia. 6. In May 1994 the applicant's mother, Mrs Stoyanova, sixty-three years old and suffering from Altzheimer's disease, was admitted to the Sofia nursing home for elderly persons. The home was located on a busy boulevard in Kniazhevo, a neighbourhood of Sofia. Mrs Stoyanova was placed in the hospital unit, which was staffed with several medical doctors and nurses. According to a medical opinion on Mrs Stoyanova's health at that time, her memory and other mental capacities progressively deteriorated. She needed constant supervision and the nursing home staff had been instructed not to leave her unattended. In the following months, the applicant visited his mother regularly and on occasion accompanied her for medical visits outside the nursing home. 7. During his visit on 2 December 1995, the applicant noticed spots on his mother's skin and reported it to the nurse on duty. 8. The applicant visited again on 4 December 1995, at about 6.30 p.m., but was informed that his mother was missing. Earlier that day his mother had been sent to consult a dermatologist outside the home, accompanied by Mrs V., a medical orderly. According to the explanation given to the applicant, upon their return, at around 11.30 a.m., the medical orderly had left Mrs Stoyanova alone in the yard and had not found her there several minutes later. The nursing home staff had looked for Mrs Stoyanova in the area but in vain. 9. The staff alerted the police approximately two hours after the incident. On the same day, and again on 11 December 1995, the police heard several witnesses to the events and recorded their statements. Some of them explained that they had searched the area immediately upon learning of Mrs Stoyanova's disappearance. 10. On 8 December 1995, Mrs Stoyanova was recorded as a person sought by the police in the region of Sofia and on 22 December 1995 her data were entered in the national list of missing persons. On 11 December 1995 the Sofia police issued a press release containing information about Mrs Stoyanova's physical appearance and an appeal to the public to report any relevant information. It appears that the description of Mrs Stoyanova's appearance contained errors. On 13 December 1995 the area in the proximity of the nursing home was searched unsuccessfully using a police dog. The police also checked the identity of patients admitted to psychiatric clinics during the relevant period. They also verified information according to which, in January 1996, a woman resembling the applicant's mother had spent a night in a monastery. In February 1996 an announcement was broadcast on national television. 11. In the days following his mother's disappearance the applicant himself did what he could to find her. He contacted all those who had last been in contact with her, published calls for witnesses in several newspapers and posted announcements carrying his mother's photograph. 12. The applicant's mother has not been found to date. In 1998 a District Court issued a decision declaring Mrs Stoyanova missing and appointed the applicant as her representative. 13. On 5 July 1996 the applicant filed a complaint with the Sofia District Prosecutor's Office alleging that the administrative and medical staff of the nursing home had been responsible for his mother's disappearance. 14. Nothing was done in the case until December 1997, despite the applicant's numerous complaints to all levels of the prosecuting authorities. 15. In December 1997 the District Prosecutor's Office opened a preliminary investigation into the matter. 16. The applicant participated actively in the ensuing proceedings. He made specific requests for the collection of evidence in respect of the events of 4 December 1995 and the alleged negligence on the part of the nursing home staff. In other submissions, often voluminous, he exposed at length his suspicion that his mother might have been abducted by a criminal gang trading in human organs. 17. On 19 March 1998, after having heard doctor G., the head of the medical staff at the nursing home, the investigator recommended that the investigation be discontinued. On 10 April 1998 the prosecutor followed this recommendation. The investigator and the prosecutor noted that it had not been uncommon in the practice of the nursing home for residents suffering from Alzheimer's decease to be sent for outside examinations by public transport, accompanied by a medical orderly. Also, it had been the normal practice to leave residents in the yard for several minutes, the time necessary to report to the doctor on duty, and then to accompany them to their rooms. The yard had been enclosed by a fence and staff had usually been present in the area. There had been a gatekeeper whose duty had been to check the identity of those entering. Having noted those facts, the investigator and the prosecutor stated that no criminal offence had been committed. 18. The applicant was not informed of the above decision. He became aware of it on 14 December 1998, when he visited the District Prosecutor's Office to inquire about the examination of his complaint. 19. On 8 January 1999 the applicant appealed, insisting that other witnesses be examined, such as the medical orderly who had accompanied his mother, the medical doctor who had sent his mother for an examination and the gatekeeper. 20. On 22 January 1999 the Sofia City Prosecutor's Office quashed the lower prosecutor's decision and referred the case back for renewed investigation. In June and August 1999 the file was transmitted to an investigator. The investigator heard the medical orderly and the gatekeeper. 21. On 12 April 2000 the prosecutor terminated the proceedings. He noted that Ms V., the medical orderly, had left the applicant's mother in the yard for two or three minutes as she had been asked to see a senior medical staff member. At that moment the applicant's mother had left and could not be found. The gatekeeper had stated that she had not seen Mrs Stoyanova. The prosecutor further noted that, in accordance with the relevant job descriptions, it was the medical orderlies' duty to accompany residents and that the gatekeeper's duties did not include responsibility for the residents' safety. On that basis the prosecutor concluded that “there [was] no indication that a staff member had exposed Mrs Stoyanova [to a danger] ...; and, as regards the [possible perpetrator's] mens rea, no wilful conduct could be proven.” The applicant appealed. 22. On an unspecified date the prosecutor's decision of 12 April 2000 was quashed and the case remitted for renewed investigation. In the ensuing investigation it was established that the gatekeeper had not been at the gate when the applicant's mother had been left alone there on 4 December 1995, as the she had left to have tea. 23. On 18 June 2001 the District Prosecutor's Office terminated the proceedings. The decision stated, inter alia: “Ms V. had left [the applicant's mother] alone in the yard, in dereliction of her duty to accompany and assist the seriously ill [residents]. However, her act did not constitute a criminal offence under Article 137 of the Criminal Code. That provision makes punishable the failure to assist a person in a helpless state, in circumstances of a real danger for that person's life, if the perpetrator is aware of the danger but fails to act. Ms V. stated that she had not thought that leaving [the applicant's mother alone] in the yard might result in a danger for her life, as the yard was closed by a fence and a gatekeeper was usually present. The gatekeeper had committed a serious dereliction of her duties as she had left the gate to have a tea. However, the gatekeeper is not criminally liable as she had not understood that [the applicant's mother] was in danger. Ms V. and the gatekeeper have undoubtedly committed disciplinary offences, which should have led to disciplinary sanctions but their behaviour is not criminally punishable.” 24. The applicant was not informed of the prosecutor's decision. Having learned about it, on 29 September 2001 he appealed to the Sofia District Court. 25. On 21 November 2001 the Sofia District Court quashed the prosecutor's decision and referred the case for renewed investigation, considering that there were inconsistencies in the prosecutor's reasoning and that not all relevant evidence had been collected. 26. After having heard additional witnesses, on 15 August 2003 the Sofia District Prosecutor's Office terminated the investigation. The prosecutor noted the following facts that had not been mentioned in earlier decisions: i) it had not been uncommon for elderly residents of the nursing home to scale the fence around the house; ii) there was a second entrance to the yard, used for service cars, which had usually been kept closed by means of a metal bar placed on the inner side of the portal; and iii) order in the nursing home and the duties of its staff were not clearly regulated. The prosecutor stated that in view of the absence of clear rules on the duties of staff in the nursing home it was not possible to draw conclusions as to the criminal liability of staff members. Also, the facts did not disclose a criminal offence under Article 137 of the Criminal Code. The prosecutor also stated that in any event the relevant statutory limitation period for the prosecution of the alleged perpetrators had expired. 27. On an appeal by the applicant, on 20 January 2004 the Sofia District Court upheld the prosecutor's decision of 15 August 2003 as the relevant statutory limitation period for the prosecution of the alleged perpetrators had expired on 4 June 2003. 28. In July 1996, the applicant complained to the prosecution authorities alleging that the police had not taken the necessary steps to search for his mother following her disappearance. The prosecuting authorities examined the matter and, by decisions of 1997 and 1999, refused to open criminal proceedings, considering that the police had acted diligently. 29. On 10 July 1996 the applicant brought before the Sofia City Court a civil action for non-pecuniary damages resulting from his mother's disappearance. He claimed damages from the Ministry of Labour and Social Care and the Sofia municipality (the institutions responsible for the nursing home) on the grounds that the employees of the nursing home had been negligent. He also sought damages from the Ministry of the Interior on the grounds that insufficient efforts had been made to find his mother. The applicant indicated the State Responsibility for Damage Act as the legal grounds for his action. 30. Throughout the proceedings before the Sofia City Court the applicant made voluminous written submissions and numerous requests for the collection of evidence. 31. At the first hearing, on 24 February 1997, the court could not proceed with the examination of the case as one of the defendants had not been summoned. The court ordered the applicant to indicate the full addresses of the Ministry of Labour and Social Care and of the Sofia municipality and stated that failure to comply could lead to discontinuation of the proceedings. 32. Hearings were held on 2 June 1997 and 19 January 1998. The Sofia City Court admitted several documents in evidence and refused to admit other documents. The applicant's request for several witnesses to be examined was refused as it had been unclear and related to facts whose establishment required documentary proof. 33. On 13 April 1998 the representative of the Sofia Municipality, which managed the nursing home, stated that the case did not fall to be examined under the State Responsibility for Damage Act. The representative of the Ministry of the Interior, one of the defendants, stated that the applicant's allegations in reality concerned not the Ministry as a whole but one of its regional units, the Sofia Directorate of Internal Affairs. The court decided to adjourn the hearing and instructed the applicant to submit proof of the locus standi of the Ministry of the Interior. 34. On an unspecified date the applicant requested that the Sofia Directorate of Internal Affairs be added to the action as a further defendant. The request was granted at the next hearing, on 16 October 1998, and the case was adjourned. The court instructed the applicant to submit another copy of the evidence already admitted to the file, to be transmitted to the new defendant. 35. At the hearing on 26 March 1999 the representative of the Sofia Directorate of Internal Affairs stated that the case did not fall to be examined under the State Responsibility for Damage Act as it did not concern the administrative powers of the police. The applicant sought to involve the nursing home as defendant. The court instructed the applicant to prove that the nursing home had a legal personality separate from that of the Sofia Municipality and adjourned the hearing. The court eventually found that the nursing home did not have separate legal personality. 36. The hearing held on 15 October 1999 was adjourned as the court issued a disclosure order against the Sofia police in respect of specific documents. The court rejected the applicant's request to summon witnesses, including the medical doctor on duty on the relevant day. The applicant had stated that the witnesses would testify about the daily regime in the nursing home, the identity of staff members responsible for accompanying the applicant's mother, her state of health on the relevant day and the exact sequence of events following her consultation with a dermatologist. The court held that such facts could only be established on the basis of documentary evidence. 37. On 4 February 2000 the hearing could not proceed owing to a defective summons. 38. The hearing listed for 5 May 2000 was adjourned owing to the prosecutor's absence. 39. On 6 October 2000 the court accepted some of the applicant's requests for the examination of witnesses and adjourned the hearing. 40. The next hearing was held on 2 February 2001. It was adjourned as the nursing home had not complied with a disclosure order in respect of specific documents. One of the summoned witnesses appeared but was not invited to testify. 41. The hearing listed for 4 May 2001 could not proceed as one of the defendants and a witness had not been summoned. The court fixed the next hearing for 12 October 2001. 42. On 12 October 2001 the court heard two witnesses, who were employees of the nursing home. The employee responsible for the relevant unit stated that the staff had been aware of the applicant's mother's illness and her complete lack of orientation. She had been on a “closed regime”. All staff had been aware that she had to be accompanied. Mrs V., the medical orderly who had accompanied the applicant's mother, testified that she had left her for a minute at the gate, next to the gatekeeper's booth. The gate had not been locked. However, the gatekeeper had been there at that time. Mrs V. further stated that she had told the gatekeeper to look after the applicant's mother and that the gatekeeper's statement that she had not seen the applicant's mother had been untrue. 43. The next hearing was on 15 March 2002. The court heard two witnesses and adjourned the examination of the case. One of the witnesses, the gatekeeper at the nursing home, did not appear. Eventually, the court decided to examine the case on the basis of the available material. The last hearing was held on 21 June 2002. 44. On 31 July 2002 the Sofia City Court delivered its judgment. It found that the applicant had no standing to bring an action under the State Responsibility for Damage Act since his mother had not been declared dead and, therefore, the applicant could not claim that he was her heir. The court also stated that it was unclear whether the State Responsibility for Damage Act applied as it only concerned damage resulting from unlawful administrative decisions or unlawful acts of the administration. 45. On 16 August 2002 the applicant appealed. He stated, inter alia, that it was for the courts to decide on the legal characterisation of his claim. Therefore, if the court considered that the claim fell to be examined under general tort law, it should examine it under general tort law. The applicant also reiterated that he was personally affected as he had suffered non-pecuniary damage as a result of his mother's disappearance. 46. By decisions of 21 and 30 January 2003, the Appellate Court, criticising the Sofia City Court's failure to collect relevant evidence, ordered the summonsing of witnesses and the production of other evidence in the appellate proceedings. 47. On 8 July 2003 the Appellate Court ordered the examination of a witness, the gatekeeper. 48. On 13 October 2003 the court heard the former gatekeeper, who had fallen ill, in her home, in the presence of the parties' representatives and a prosecutor. The former gatekeeper stated that on the relevant date she had not seen the applicant's mother. 49. On 15 January 2004 the Appellate Court delivered its judgment. It found that the State Responsibility for Damage Act only concerned damages resulting from administrative decisions or acts in the exercise of administrative functions. The applicant's claim did not concern such decisions or acts and fell to be examined under the general provisions of tort law. For that reason, the Appellate Court annulled the Sofia City Court's judgment and remanded the case for renewed examination by the Sofia City Court. 50. On 13 February 2004 the applicant filed a cassation appeal. On 25 May 2005 the Supreme Court of Cassation rejected the appeal. It found that the Sofia City Court had been wrong to examine the case under the State Responsibility for Damage Act. 51. On an unspecified date the case was transmitted to the Sofia City Court for fresh examination under general tort law. 52. On 7 July 2005 the Sofia City Court instructed the applicant to clarify his claims. 53. On 1 September 2005 the court found the clarifications made insufficient and gave him additional instructions. 54. On 1 February 2006 the Sofia City Court held a hearing. It issued disclosure orders against the nursing home and the Sofia Directorate of Internal Affairs and allowed the collection of other evidence. The hearing was adjourned until 14 June 2006. The proceedings are pending.

3. The applicant was born in 1981 and lives in Diyarbakır. 4. On 14 March 1999 the police carried out an operation against Hizbullah, an illegal organisation, in Mardin. At around 3 a.m. the police raided a flat after receiving information from a certain A.T., who was allegedly a member of Hizbullah. During the search conducted in the apartment, three weapons with their cartridges and three computer hard discs, among other objects, were found. According to information retrieved from one of these hard discs, the applicant was allegedly involved in Hizbullah and had been giving religious lessons to children in the Kuba mosque in Diyarbakır. 5. On 5 June 1999 the public prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court drew up a list of the material seized during the raid in Mardin in order to place it in the custody of the State Security Court. The material included the computer hard discs. 6. On 18 October 1999 at around 8.30 p.m. the applicant was arrested while leaving the Kuba mosque in Diyarbakır along with four other persons. According to the arrest report, he was arrested as part of the investigation being conducted into Hizbullah. 7. On 19 October 1999 the security forces conducted a search of the applicant’s house. According to the house search and seizure report signed by three police officers and the applicant’s father, nine books with religious content and four tapes were found in the apartment. 8. On 25 October 1999 the applicant made statements to the police. According to these submissions, the applicant admitted that he was involved in the activities of Hizbullah. 9. On 26 October 1999 the applicant was examined by a doctor in a health clinic in Diyarbakır, along with four other suspects. The doctor observed no sign of ill-treatment on the applicant’s person. 10. On the same day the applicant was brought before the public prosecutor and subsequently a single judge at the Diyarbakır State Security Court and was questioned about his affiliation to Hizbullah. The applicant maintained that he was not a member of Hizbullah and denied that he had given religious lessons on behalf of this organisation. As regards the books found in his apartment, the applicant contended that he had been a student in an İmam Hatip High School[1] and that he had bought them at a book fair. The applicant contended that he had been blindfolded in police custody and forced to sign the document allegedly containing his statements. 11. On the same day, the judge remanded the applicant in custody. 12. On 2 November 1999 the public prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court filed a bill of indictment against six persons, including the applicant, charging them with membership of Hizbullah under Article 168 of the former Criminal Code and Section 5 of Law no. 3713. 13. On 16 December 1999 the applicant made statements before the first-instance court. He maintained that one of the other accused was his schoolmate and that he did not know the other persons. He stated in this connection that he had no affiliation with Hizbullah. The applicant also denied the accuracy of his police statements, alleging that they had been made under duress. He contended that he had been in the mosque for prayer and that he had not given religious lessons to children there. The applicant lastly submitted that the tapes which had allegedly been found in his apartment did not belong to him. 15. On 17 January 2000 the police carried out operations against Hizbullah in Istanbul. Security forces raided an apartment where three leaders of Hizbullah lived. One of the leaders was killed and two others were captured. The police also found several hard discs containing information about the organisation. On one of these hard discs a personal history form belonging to the applicant was found. 16. On 19 October 2000 the Diyarbakır State Security Court ordered the detention of the applicant in absentia. 17. On 21 July 2001 at 8.15 p.m. the applicant was arrested under the detention order of 19 October 2000 and subsequently detained pending trial. 18. On 8 November 2001 the public prosecutor at the State Security Court made his submissions on the merits of the case. In respect of the applicant, the public prosecutor submitted that he had been involved in the activities of Hizbullah, had given religious lessons to children in the Kuba mosque and had provided a personal history form to Hizbullah, relying on the information contained in the hard discs found during the police operations of 14 March 1999 and 17 January 2000. 19. On 23 March 2002 the applicant’s representative submitted the applicant’s reply to the public prosecutor’s submissions of 8 November 2001. He contended, inter alia, that the personal history form contained in the hard disc found in Istanbul could not be relied on in evidence, as there was nothing to prove that the applicant had given this information to Hizbullah. The lawyer further noted that it was not clear how the hard discs had been seized and that transcription of these discs had not been undertaken by experts. He also maintained that the applicant’s statements to the police could not be used as evidence against him as he had not subsequently reiterated these statements before the judicial authorities. 20. On 16 May 2002 the Diyarbakır State Security Court convicted the applicant of membership of Hizbullah and sentenced him to twelve years and six months’ imprisonment. It noted that, according to the information found in one of the computer hard discs in Mardin, the applicant was giving religious lessons to children and that according to his personal history form found in a hard disc in Istanbul, he was involved in Hizbullah activities in the Aksakal mosque. The court further observed that five persons who had also been accused of membership of Hizbullah had mentioned the applicant in their statements to the police and that books written by the Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, had been found in the applicant’s house. The State Security Court lastly noted that the applicant had accepted, in his statements to the police, that he had had an affiliation with Hizbullah. 22. On an unspecified date the public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation submitted his written opinion (tebliğname) on the merits of the appeal. This opinion was not served on the applicant. 23. On 17 December 2002 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the Diyarbakır State Security Court.

6. The applicant was born in 1961 and currently lives in Qatar. He was married to M. and they had a son, A., born in March 2003 in Bucharest, Romania. 7. Following A.’s birth, M. occasionally worked in Italy for short periods of time, in order to ensure an income for the family. In 2005, after M. had obtained a regular job, the applicant agreed for A. to travel to Italy with his mother. A formal notarial deed of 26 April 2005, submitted to the Court, states that Mr Anghel Aurelian, residing in Bucharest, gave his consent that his under-age son, Anghel A., born in March 2003, residing at the above-mentioned address, travel to the Republic of Moldova and Italy, in the course of the year 2005, accompanied by his mother, Anghel M. The applicant submitted that such agreement had only been given for a limited period of time in order to allow ongoing contact with M. The case file shows that M. challenged this statement, alleging that she had taken the child with her because of the adverse effect that living with his father was having on A.’s development. 8. In January 2006 the applicant travelled to Italy in order to bring A. back to Romania. He claimed that he had found the child living in very poor conditions. M. had resisted the applicant’s requests to take the child back to Romania or alternatively for all of them to move to Qatar, where he had found a job. 9. Once the applicant had returned to Romania, he filed a criminal complaint under Article 301 of the Romanian Criminal Code, alleging that his wife was detaining A. in Italy without his consent. 10. On an unspecified date, the applicant moved to Qatar. On 6 December 2006 he travelled to Italy to visit his son. He alleged that A.’s health and social conditions had worsened. On 13 December 2006 father and son travelled together to Romania. On 8 January 2007 M. joined them. On 15 January 2007 they all travelled to Moldova to pay a visit to M.’s family. On 20 January 2007, M. and A. “disappeared”. The applicant eventually found out that they had returned to Italy. 11. On 9 February 2007, the Romanian Prosecutor General’s Office decided not to institute criminal proceedings against M., as there was insufficient evidence to establish a punishable offence. The applicant contested the afore-mentioned decision on 28 December 2007. It appears that a district court dismissed the challenge as unfounded on 31 March 2008. The applicant filed an appeal with a higher court. No further information has been provided in relation to these proceedings. 12. On 2 April 2007 the applicant applied to the Minister of Justice, designated by Romania as the Central Authority responsible for discharging the duties imposed on Romania by the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“the Hague Convention”). He asked the Minister to assist him in securing the return of his son, whom the child’s mother had, he alleged, wrongfully removed to Italy on 20 January 2007. 13. Following the steps undertaken by the Romanian and Italian authorities in accordance with the provisions of the Hague Convention, the Bologna Prosecutor’s Office initiated return proceedings before the Bologna Youth Court (Tribunale per i minorenni). 14. On 18 June 2007 a hearing took place in the applicant’s presence. The following appears from the hand-written procès-verbal submitted by the Government. Following statements by the applicant and M., the president of the court noted the existence of divorce proceedings brought by M. in Romania, together with an application for custody of the child (objected to by the applicant), which were still pending. He further noted that while the couple had cohabited from 2004 until the end of 2006, the applicant had often been absent during 2006 as he had been working in Qatar. 15. On 5 July 2007 the applicant wrote to the Romanian Minister of Justice, informing him of the conduct of the hearing. The applicant explained that he had not been given the opportunity to challenge the statements made by his wife’s attorney, in particular regarding: (i) the time it had taken the applicant to institute proceedings after the date of the wrongful removal or retention of the child, which according to the applicant had been 20 January 2007 and not – as the court had assumed – January 2006; the result of the court using the latter date was that Article 12 of the Hague Convention came into play, to the effect that after a period of one year a child may not be returned if he has integrated into society; (ii) the contention that the child’s health and psychological problems were imputable to the time he had spent with his father before moving to Italy, which finding had been based on medical documents to which the applicant had had no access; (iii) the allegation that M. had had his consent up to 1 January 2007, the date on which such consent was no longer necessary (Romania having joined the European Union), thus ignoring the notarial deed, which had stated a specific period of consent; and (iv) the fact that M. had changed their son’s residence without his father’s consent, as required by law. The applicant further explained that the Bologna Youth Court was considering custody issues in violation of its competence under the Hague Convention, custody issues being within the exclusive competence of the courts of the country of domicile, Romania. It would, moreover, not decide the case until the Romanian courts had made a decision in the divorce and custody proceedings. He further contested the evaluation of the potential harm for the child in the event of his return to Romania which had been made by the social services, stating that it had only made reference to the biased account of the child’s mother, without any direct evaluation of the relationship between father and son and of the social environment if A. were to live in Romania. The applicant asked the Minister to forward his letter to the competent authority in Italy and to the Bologna Youth Court. 16. By a decision of 6 July 2007, filed with the court registry on 9 July 2007, the Bologna Youth Court refused the application for return. It noted that divorce and custody proceedings were still pending in Romania; that M. had claimed that she and the child had lived in Italy since 2006; and that since June 2006 A. had been known to the Infant Neuropsychiatric Services (“NPI”) of the Parma Local Health Agency (“AUSL”). Moreover, it noted that M. had claimed to have had the required permission from her husband to keep the child in Italy in accordance with a notarial deed of 2005 and that the applicant had contested this on the basis that he had only given permission for A. to travel to Italy for tourist purposes, and that, albeit he had moved to Qatar in 2006, he wanted the child to be with him. In that light, the court considered that there were no grounds for returning A. and that, in view of the relevant international law, it could not be held that the mother had arbitrarily taken A. away from his father as legitimate custodian of the child. The Bologna Youth Court noted that the Romanian authorities had not yet taken a decision on custody, thus the parents had joint custody, and therefore the applicant did not have exclusive custody rights. Moreover, the applicant had consented to A.’s transfer to Italy and had eventually moved to Qatar. Furthermore, the Bologna Youth Court observed that the child had been in Italy for more than a year and was integrated into Italian society, albeit with some problems. In this light, the court considered that psychological harm would ensue as a result of his return. Thus it was not obliged, according to Article 13 of the Hague Convention, to order his return. Indeed, from the social services report ordered by the court, it appeared that A. had arrived at the NPI’s premises, accompanied by his mother, on the advice of his general practitioner and that since then A. had been subject to psychotherapy which included joint interviews with his mother. The doctor entrusted with the report had noted that the need for A.’s psychotherapeutic treatment was due to early and prolonged periods of separation from his parents, frequent changes of residence, and continuous parental conflict. It was therefore necessary to give A. reference points and daily routines. Overall, his psychological condition had been improving, save for a worrying regression following his return from Romania and Moldova in January 2007, from which he had recovered. The decision was notified to the Public Prosecutor on 13 August 2007. 17. On 25 July 2007 the Italian authorities informed the Romanian authorities about the Bologna Youth Court’s decision of 6 July 2007, filed with the court registry on 9 July 2007. 18. On 30 July 2007 the Romanian Ministry of Justice informed the applicant of the decision and told him that it had also requested information from the Italian Ministry of Justice about the available remedies with which to challenge the decision. 19. By letter of 6 August 2007, the Italian Ministry of Justice informed the Romanian Ministry of Justice that the decision could be appealed against through an appeal on points of law to the Court of Cassation, to be lodged within sixty days of the date of the decision – if such rejection was pronounced during a hearing at which the requesting party was present (according to Law no. 64 of 1994) – through an advocate qualified to plead before that court. Alternatively, he could bring an action in accordance with Article 11 of EC Regulation 2201/2003 (“Brussels II bis”). 20. The following day, the Romanian Ministry of Justice informed the applicant of the above and that it had requested further information on the final date to lodge the appeal on points of law and on the applicant’s ability to obtain legal aid. 21. The applicant repeatedly contacted the Romanian Ministry of Justice to obtain the response to those queries, together with the documents which would have allowed him to appeal. 22. On 13 September 2007 the Romanian Ministry of Justice forwarded to its Italian counterpart the applicant’s application for legal aid in order to file an appeal on points of law. The application for legal aid was filed on 25 October 2007. 23. On 29 October 2007 the Council of the Bologna Bar Association granted the applicant legal aid to file an appeal, indicating the Bologna Court of Appeal as the competent court and not the Court of Cassation. It further noted that it was not sure that an appeal was still possible – it being unknown whether the decision had been served, the relevant time-limit could not be calculated. On 30 October 2007 the decision was sent to the Italian Ministry of Justice. 24. By letter of 8 November 2007, the applicant was informed by the Italian authorities that his application had been received on 16 October 2007 and forwarded to the Council of the Bologna Bar Association. No mention was made of the decision of 29 October 2007. 25. According to the documents produced, on 22 November 2007 the decision granting the applicant legal aid was forwarded to the Romanian Ministry of Justice, together with an invitation to inform the applicant, as well as to adduce proof that he had received the decision. It is unknown whether this notification ever reached the Romanian Ministry of Justice, and the information was not transferred to the applicant. 26. On 13 December 2007 upon the applicant’s complaint that he had not been informed of any decision on his application, the Romanian Ministry of Justice urged the Italian authorities to provide an answer. 27. In the absence of a reply, on 3 January 2008 the applicant sent an e-mail to the Romanian Consulate in Rome asking for support in obtaining information on the matter. By letter of 17 January 2008, the General Division of Consular Affairs of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the applicant that a favourable decision on his application had been taken on 29 October 2007 and that it had been communicated to the Romanian Ministry of Justice on 22 November 2007. 28. On 27 January the applicant wrote to the Romanian Consulate again confirming that to date he had not received a copy of the decision and asking it to ascertain who had sent it on behalf of Italy and who had received it at the Romanian Ministry. On 28 January 2008 the Division of Consular Relations forwarded a copy of the correspondence pertaining to his file to the applicant. 29. On 15 February 2008 the Italian Ministry of Justice asked the Council of the Bologna Bar Association to provide, urgently, a list of the advocates qualified to plead the applicant’s appeal within the legal aid scheme. On 19 March 2008 such a list was sent by the Italian authorities to the Romanian Ministry of Justice, which forwarded it to the applicant on 24 April 2008. On 6 May 2008 the applicant wrote to the Italian Ministry of Justice and to the Council of the Bologna Bar Association indicating his choice. 30. On 16 June 2008 the appointed legal aid lawyer (MCA) made a request to the registry of the Bologna Youth Court to view the relevant files. By letter dated 23 June 2008, addressed to the applicant and the Italian and Romanian authorities (apparently faxed on 2 or 8 July 2008 to the Italian authorities, receipt date for all recipients unknown), MCA indicated that she was not in a position to represent the applicant as she was not qualified to plead before the Court of Cassation and, contrary to the indication given by the Council of the Bologna Bar Association, the only available remedy was an appeal to the Court of Cassation under Article 7 of Law no. 64 of 15 January 1994, such appeal to be lodged within sixty days of notification. She also mentioned that, as it did not appear that the applicant had been notified of the impugned decision, the time-limit to appeal in his case would expire one year and forty-five days after the date of the lodging of the decision with the court registry and, therefore, she advised the applicant to appoint an advocate qualified to plead before the Court of Cassation as soon as possible in order to be able to file the appeal. 31. On 15 July 2008, the applicant wrote to the Council of the Bologna Bar Association asking for a list of advocates qualified to plead in cassation proceedings. On 23 July 2008, the applicant received such a list by e-mail and replied indicating the name of his chosen lawyer. 32. On 12 August 2008, the applicant wrote again to the Council of the Bologna Bar Association requesting further contact details (telephone numbers and e-mail address) for his chosen lawyer. He alleged that the information contained in the list was inaccurate and that he had not been able to establish any contact with the lawyer. No reply was received. 33. The applicant eventually obtained the relevant information from personal contacts and on 23 September 2008, he wrote an e-mail to the lawyer, explaining the situation, and asking whether she had been informed of her appointment. The same day, the lawyer replied stating that she had not been informed and requesting the case documents and a copy of the decision granting legal aid, in order for her to decide whether to take up the appointment. The day after, the applicant reached the lawyer by phone and replied to her by e-mail, giving the information and documents requested. 34. On 25 September 2008 the lawyer informed the applicant that the time-limit of one year and forty-five days to appeal against the decision of 6 July 2007 had expired and that, consequently, she was not in a position to assist him.

8. The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Yekaterinburg. 9. On 25 September 1999 the applicant was visiting her acquaintance M. 10. According to the applicant, she stayed overnight to study the Bible and share her religious opinions. On 26 September 1999, M., offended by the applicant's views, called an ambulance to escort her to a mental hospital. Confused by the arrival of the ambulance, the applicant asked M. for an explanation, but was ordered by the medical staff to follow them. 11. According to the Government, the acquaintance had met the applicant in the street the day before and, perplexed by her unusual behaviour, took her home to take care of her. The applicant did not sleep all night long, cried, looked around, called for her mother (who lived in Kazakhstan) and hallucinated. The acquaintance therefore had to call an ambulance. 12. The applicant was taken to the Yekaterinburg City Psychiatric Hospital No. 26. The doctor on duty considered that she was suffering from a grave mental disorder, displaying symptoms of fear, anxiety and disorientation, which rendered the applicant a danger to herself and helpless. The applicant had cried and was uncooperative with the doctor. 13. On 26 September 1999 the hospital applied to a court for approval of the applicant's confinement. 14. Two days later, on 28 September 1999, a medical commission diagnosed the applicant as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia and confirmed that she should be kept in hospital. According to the doctors, once in the hospital, the applicant remained suspicious and distrustful. She did not reveal her emotions or explain the behaviour which had led to her hospitalisation. She accused the medical staff of stealing her belongings. The applicant insisted that her detention had been inspired by her acquaintance who was a member of a religious sect and who had intended to lure her into the sect. Having no trust in the doctors, the applicant refused any treatment. She was untidy, wore three jerseys at once and did not undress for bed. The applicant also refused to wash for fear of catching a cold, and wrote complaints which she hid in her underwear. All that time, according to the medical report, she remained emotionally cold and mannered, whilst repeating herself. 15. On 5 November 1999 the Ordzhonikidzevskiy District Court of Yekaterinburg, after a hearing at the hospital, confirmed that the detention had been necessary as the applicant had suffered from an acute attack of paranoid schizophrenia. In its findings, the court relied on assertions by the hospital that the applicant's aggravated mental condition had put her physical integrity in danger and that she had been delirious. The hospital's representatives also testified that the applicant had been taken to the hospital by the emergency services in a deranged state of mind and that she “had remained awake throughout the night studying the Bible and weeping”. A work colleague of the applicant testified that the applicant “had become uncooperative and filed frequent complaints about her co-workers' alleged prejudices”. 16. The applicant's representative allegedly did not have any access to the report of the medical commission either before or after the hearing, despite his requests. 17. On 11 November 1999 the applicant lodged an appeal against the decision of 5 November. The applicant states that she was unable to file detailed points of appeal as, at that time, the final text of the court decision had not been served on her. 18. On 24 December 1999 the Sverdlovsk Regional Court dismissed the appeal and confirmed that the applicant's detention had been necessary. However, the court established that the applicant no longer needed in-patient treatment as she had a job, was a single mother of a schoolboy and had already spent a considerable time in the hospital.

5. The applicants live in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 6. By seven judgments of different courts of first instance of 18 May 2000, 29 February 2000, 17 December 1999, 24 March 2000, 5 April 2001, 25 April 2000 and 14 November 2001, which became final on 15 June 2000, 13 October 2000, 16 July 2002, 26 July 2001, 25 May 2001, 13 July 2001 and 9 September 2004, respectively, the Republika Srpska (an Entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina) was ordered to pay, within 15 days, the following amounts in convertible marks (BAM)[1] in respect of war damage together with default interest at the statutory rate: (i) BAM 15,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage and BAM 1,776 in respect of pecuniary damage to the Ćosićs and Ms Sanja Alaša; (ii) BAM 16,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage and BAM 2,000 in respect of pecuniary damage to Ms Borka Vođević and Mr Slavoljub Đorđević; (iii) BAM 35,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, BAM 2,000 in respect of pecuniary damage and BAM 1,860 in respect of legal costs to the Paripovićs; (iv) BAM 10,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, BAM 1,500 in respect of pecuniary damage and BAM 403 in respect of legal costs to the Voćkićs; (v) BAM 25,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, BAM 1,500 in respect of pecuniary damage and BAM 3,360 in respect of legal costs to the Simićs and Ms Slađana Migerl; (vi) BAM 14,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, BAM 1,500 in respect of pecuniary damage and BAM 1,400 in respect of legal costs to the Lazićs and Ms Branka Lazić-Marković; and (vii) BAM 26,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, BAM 2,000 in respect of pecuniary damage and BAM 2,009 in respect of legal costs to the Đilas. 7. The Banja Luka Court of First Instance issued writs of execution (rješenje o izvršenju) on 20 December 2001, 8 November 2000, 23 April 2003, 16 November 2001, 24 August 2001, 2 November 2001 and 21 December 2006, respectively. 8. The applicants complained of non-enforcement to the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“the Constitutional Court”). On 20 December 2005 the Constitutional Court found a breach of Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in the cases of the Ćosić, Ms Sanja Alaša, Ms Borka Vođević, Mr Slavoljub Đorđević, the Paripovićs, the Voćkićs, the Simićs, Ms Slađana Migerl, the Lazićs and Ms Branka Lazić-Marković. The applicants did not claim compensation, but even if they had done so, their claim would have most likely been refused (see, for example, the Constitutional Court’s decisions AP 774/04 of 20 December 2005, § 438; AP 557/05 of 12 April 2006, § 195; AP 1211/06 of 13 December 2007, § 79; and AP 244/08 of 8 December 2010, § 37). On 15 April 2009 the Constitutional Court dismissed the case of the Đilas due to the change of circumstances following amendments to the Domestic Debt Act 2004. 9. After the extensive information campaign explaining the available options for the settlement of the Republika Srpska’s public debt (including its debt arising from domestic judgments), between 26 April 2007 and 13 May 2011 some of the applicants informed the authorities that they agreed to be paid only the legal costs in cash and the principal debt and default interest in bonds. Government bonds were then issued on the following dates to the following applicants: (i) on 15 December 2008 to Mr Blagoja Ćosić (the application was lodged on19 July 2006); Mr Goran Paripović, Ms Gordana Paripović, Ms Mara Paripović, Mr Zoran Paripović (the application was lodged on 19 February 2010); Ms Jela Voćkić (the application was lodged on 19 February 2010); Ms Stevanija Simić, Ms Mirjana Simić, Ms Dragana Simić, Ms Slađana Migerl (the application was lodged on 8 March 2010); and Mr Milić Lazić (the application was lodged on 13 February 2009); (ii) on 15 June 2010 to Mr Slavoljub Đorđević (the application was lodged on 10 March 2007); and (iii) on 9 June 2011 to Ms Mara Đilas (the application was lodged on 21 January 2011). 10. Mr Slavoljub Đorđević and Ms Mara Đilas have already sold all of their bonds on the Stock Exchange. 11. Mr Dado Ćosić, Ms Sanja Alaša, Ms Borka Vođević, Ms Branka Lazić-Marković, Mr Zoran Đilas and Mr Željko Đilas were not issued government bonds.

5. The applicant was born in 1968 and is currently serving life imprisonment in Yenakiyeve Prison no. 52. 6. In its judgment of 14 November 2002 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal (“the Donetsk Court”) outlined the factual background of this case as follows. On 22 December 2001 the applicant and an acquaintance, G., stopped a taxi and asked the driver, L., to take them to a destination out of town. According to the applicant, they were planning a robbery and carjacking. The applicant had a knife hidden in his sleeve, which he had prepared in advance, and G. had a rope with him. Once the car reached a forest, the applicant and G. ordered the driver to stop. G. put the rope around the driver's throat while the applicant threatened him with the knife. The applicant got into the driver's seat and drove further into the forest, where they removed L., unconscious by that time, from the car. Later in December 2001 the dead body of L. was found in the forest with multiple stab wounds. 7. After the applicant and G. had unsuccessfully tried to sell L.'s car, it was found and seized by the police on 4 January 2002. 8. The applicant submitted that he had been arrested on 4 January 2002. According to the arrest report, he was arrested on 5 January 2002 on suspicion of the murder of L., which the investigator classified as falling under Article 115 § 1 of the Criminal Code (a premeditated murder). The applicant was recorded in the arrest report as having stated that he had no complaints or requests. The case file also contains a waiver of legal assistance by the applicant dated 5 January 2002. 9. On 8 January 2002 the applicant was examined by a doctor, who found his right wrist to be injured. The applicant explained that he had sustained the injury as a result of a fall during his arrest. 10. As confirmed in a note by the town hospital, on 11 January 2002 the applicant was taken there by the police for an examination of the aforementioned injury. An X-ray revealed that he had a closed fracture of a bone in his right wrist, and the wrist was put in plaster. 11. Between 5 and 16 January 2002 the applicant was held in the Petrovskyy District Police Station of Donetsk (“the police station”), after which he was moved to Donetsk Pre-Trial Detention Centre no. 5 (“the SIZO”). During that period, in the absence of a lawyer and allegedly after being subjected to beatings and threats, the applicant signed a confession, which was further confirmed in the course of a reconstruction of the events. He confessed that, acting together with G. and by their prior conspiracy, he had robbed and murdered L. The applicant admitted, in particular, that he had stabbed L. once with a knife. Later on, apparently after moving to another place of detention, the applicant withdrew his confession to murder, stating that it had been given under duress. He continued, however, to admit to the robbery and carjacking throughout the proceedings. 12. On 16 January 2002 the applicant wrote a note to the investigator, in which he stated that he had injured his wrist on 3 January 2002 after accidentally falling down some stairs. He also stated that he had no complaints against the police. 13. On an unspecified date, after the applicant's confession and after the reconstruction of the events, a lawyer was appointed for him. 14. On 20 May 2002 the Petrovskyy District Prosecutor's Office dismissed as unsubstantiated the applicant's complaint regarding his alleged ill-treatment by the police. The applicant did not challenge that decision. At some stage of the pre-trial investigation the charges against the applicant were reclassified to premeditated murder for profit, robbery, and carjacking, carried out by an organised group. 15. On 14 November 2002 the Donetsk Court, acting as a first-instance court, found the applicant and G. guilty of premeditated murder for profit, robbery, and carjacking, carried out by an organised group, and it sentenced each of them to fifteen years' imprisonment with confiscation of all personal property. As to the applicant's guilt, the court based its findings on the confession he had given at the initial stages of the pre-trial investigation, the testimony given by G. during the pre-trial investigation (although retracted by him at the trial as untruthful), according to which the applicant had stabbed L. once, and the testimony of several persons to whom the defendants had tried to sell L.'s car. The court examined the applicant's allegation of ill-treatment and found it to be no more than defence tactics. The police officer responsible for the applicant's arrest was questioned at the hearing and denied having coerced him in any way. The court noted that the applicant's injury could not be considered evidence of his ill-treatment in custody since he had given several inconsistent explanations as to its cause. 16. The prosecutor appealed against the aforementioned verdict in the part regarding the applicant, considering that it was too lenient given the seriousness of the crimes committed and in the light of the applicant's personality. 17. On 3 April 2003 the Supreme Court allowed that appeal. It quashed the verdict of 14 November 2002 in the part pertaining to the applicant and remitted the case for fresh examination to the same court. 18. On 2 September 2003 the Donetsk Court issued a new verdict with findings concerning the applicant's guilt identical to those it had made before. However, it changed his sentence to one of life imprisonment, referring to the seriousness of the crimes at issue and the personality of the applicant, who had committed the crimes some two months after his release from prison on probation. The court considered the fact that the applicant had repeatedly committed robbery with assault to be an aggravating circumstance. 19. On an unspecified date the lawyer acting on the applicant's behalf appealed. She submitted, inter alia, that the first-instance court had failed to duly examine the applicant's allegation of ill-treatment. On 13 October 2003 the applicant also introduced an appeal in cassation, in which he complained that the trial court had wrongly relied on a confession allegedly extracted by coercion, as well as on G.'s allegedly contradictory statements about him. He noted that as soon as he had been able to gain access to a lawyer after his transfer from the police station to the SIZO he had stopped giving any statements or signing any documents. On 19 January 2004 the applicant added a supplement to his appeal in cassation, complaining that he had not been legally represented during the initial stages of the pre-trial investigation, contrary to Article 45 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and requesting the court not to accept his confession as evidence in the case. Copies of the applicant's appeal in cassation and the supplements to it were submitted to the Court by the Government along with their observations on the admissibility and merits of the application. 20. On 8 April 2004 the Supreme Court upheld the verdict subject to a minor amendment, namely, the removal of the reference to the repeated offence of robbery as an aggravating circumstance, since it had already been included in the classification of the crimes of which the applicant had been found guilty. The Supreme Court noted that the finding of guilt had been “based on evidence obtained in compliance with the requirements of the criminal procedural legislation and which had been explored at the hearings and properly evaluated by the court”. Furthermore, it saw “no indication of any gross violations of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure during the investigation, or any misapplication by the court of the criminal law”. Lastly, the Supreme Court noted that the Donetsk Court had rightly dismissed as unsubstantiated the applicant's allegation that he had incriminated himself under duress. 21. After his conviction the applicant was moved to Yenakiyeve Prison no. 52 to serve his sentence. 22. After complaining that he was suffering from shortness of breath and a sore throat, on 11 February 2008 the applicant was taken to the Donetsk Regional Hospital at Prison no. 124 for a medical examination and treatment. He was diagnosed with chronic pharyngitis, iron deficiency, anaemia and hypertension. Furthermore, the applicant tested HIV-positive and was registered as an asymptomatic HIV carrier at the first clinical stage of the disease according to the WHO classification. 23. In March 2008, after blood tests had confirmed the HIV diagnosis, a doctor specialising in HIV/Aids met with the applicant and explained to him, in particular, that his disease was at such an early stage that no medical treatment was required, and that at a more advanced stage antiretroviral therapy would be considered. 24. Later in March 2008 the applicant was moved back to Prison no. 52, where he continued to serve his sentence.

5. The applicant was born in 1969 and lived, prior to his conviction, in Chelyabinsk. 6. On 29 December 2000 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of double murder. He remained in custody pending the investigation and trial. 7. On 13 September 2001 the Chelyabinsk Regional Court found the applicant guilty of murder, accessory to murder and attempted fraud, and sentenced him to twenty-three years’ imprisonment. The court comprised one professional judge and two lay judges. 8. On 12 April 2002 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the applicant’s conviction on appeal. 9. On 23 July 2004 the applicant lodged a supervisory-review complaint challenging the lawfulness of his conviction. He alleged, inter alia, that the trial court had not been a tribunal established by law, given that the lay judges who considered his case had been appointed to the tribunal in contravention of the applicable legislation. 10. On 22 December 2004 the Kopeysk Town Court of the Chelyabinsk Region reduced the applicant’s sentence by seven months, in compliance with the latest amendments to the Russian Criminal Code. 11. On 29 April 2005 the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation received the case file for supervisory review. 12. On 15 June 2005 the Presidium quashed the judgments of 13 September 2001 and 12 April 2002 and remitted the matter to the Chelyabinsk Regional Court for fresh consideration. Referring to the case of Posokhov v. Russia (no. 63486/00, § 41, ECHR 2003‑IV), the Presidium noted that the lay judges had not been authorised to consider the applicant’s case, which had affected the lawfulness and well-foundedness of the applicant’s conviction. Lastly, the Presidium ordered that the applicant be detained pending a new trial. 13. On 22 July 2005 the Regional Court fixed the preliminary hearing for 1 August 2005 noting that the measure of preventive detention previously imposed on the applicant “should remain unchanged”. The parties did not inform the Court of the outcome of the hearing of 1 August 2005. It appears that it was re-scheduled. 14. On 5 August 2005 the Regional Court held a preliminary hearing of the case. The applicant and his lawyer attended the hearing and made submissions to the court. The applicant asked the court to release him on an undertaking not to leave his place of residence. He noted that he had already served over four years of the earlier imposed prison sentence which rendered the further extension of his pre-trial detention unnecessary. The prosecutor discerned no change in the applicant’s situation that would be in favour of the applicant’s release and asked the court to extend the applicant’s detention pending trial. The court fixed the new trial for 18 August 2005 noting that the measure of preventive detention previously imposed on the applicant “should remain unchanged”. In particular, the court noted as follows: “Deciding on the preventive measure and having heard the parties to the proceedings, the court considers that the remand of the [defendants] in custody during preliminary investigation as a restrictive measure has been lawful and justified. There are no grounds to replace it with a more lenient measure ... in view of the gravity of the charges and the defendants’ character.” 15. On 18 August 2005 the Regional Court opened the trial and on 19 September 2005 it found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to twenty-two years and three months’ imprisonment. The time already served by the applicant was set off against the newly imposed sentence. The court found that the applicant and Sh. had killed V. and Sk. in an attempt to fraudulently obtain the proceeds from the sale of a flat owned by V. The court comprised a single judge. The applicant was represented by a lawyer. 16. On 23 June 2006 the Supreme Court upheld the conviction on appeal. The applicant and his lawyer were present at the hearing and made submissions to the court. On 13 October 2005 the Supreme Court upheld the decision of 5 August 2005 on appeal.

8. The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Riga. 9. In 1997 he decided to move from Latvia to Russia. He negotiated a real estate deal with a Moscow-based agent. 10. On 20 March 1997 the applicant withdrew from his bank accounts 250,000 US dollars (“USD”) in cash and asked his acquaintance, B., to deliver the money to Moscow. 11. B. arrived in the Sheremetyevo-1 airport later the same day. He failed to declare the money at the customs checkpoint and was charged with smuggling. 12. On 13 September 2000, the Golovinskiy District Court of Moscow found B. guilty of smuggling under Article 188-1 of the Criminal Code and sentenced him to two years' suspended imprisonment. With regard to the money, the court said in the operative part of the judgment: “USD 250,000, deposited with the Sheremetyevo Customs Board, are to be forfeited to the Treasury as an object of smuggling.” 13. In his appeal against the judgment, B.'s lawyer submitted that the Golovinskiy District Court had failed to indicate any legal ground for the confiscation order. He argued that the money had been included in the case-file as evidence and that no relevant law provided for its confiscation. Moreover, lawfully obtained assets were to be returned to their owners. B.'s lawyer also claimed that Article 188-1 of the Criminal Code did not provide for such a sanction as confiscation. 14. On 25 October 2000, the Moscow City Court refused the appeal. With regard to the money, the court said: “USD 250,000, which was the object of the smuggling, was rightfully forfeited to the Treasury.” 15. On 1 July 2002 a Deputy President of the Supreme Court lodged an application for supervisory review against the judgments. He claimed that the smuggled money could only be confiscated if proven to have been acquired criminally. 16. On 18 July 2002 the Presidium of the Moscow City Court refused the application on the ground that a Ruling of the Plenary Supreme Court of the USSR issued in 1978 permitted the confiscation of smuggled goods which had been attached to case-files as exhibits. 17. On 15 August 2002 the Deputy President of the Supreme Court lodged another application for supervisory review claiming, among other things, that the Ruling of 1978 was inconsistent with later superseding legislation. However, on an unspecified date the Deputy President of the Supreme Court withdrew his application.

8. The applicant was born in 1912 and lives in Mercato Sanseverino. 9. He is the owner of an apartment in Mercato Sanseverino, which he had let to M.S. in 1974. The lease was due to expire on 31 December 1983, but was extended until 31 December 1987 pursuant to Law No. 392/78. 10. In a writ served on the tenant on 4 September 1986, the applicant communicated his intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Mercato Sanseverino Magistrate. 11. By a decision of 30 September 1986, which was made enforceable on the same day, the Mercato Sanseverino Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 30 June 1989. 12. On 1 August 1991, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 13. On 15 October 1991, he served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 28 October 1991. 14. On 28 October 1991, the bailiff made an attempt to recover possession, which proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was not granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession. 15. On 18 November 1991, the applicant made a statutory declaration that he urgently required the premises as accommodation for his daughter. 16. On 18 February 1992, the bailiff asked the local police to provide their assistance in enforcing the order for possession and at the same time suspended the enforcement proceedings until the assistance would be granted. 17. At the beginning of 1998, the tenant spontaneously vacated the premises.

4. The applicant was born in 1941 and lives in Sosnowiec. 5. By a judgment of 8 August 2006 the Kraków Regional Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against a second-instance administrative decision of 25 August 2005 by which the second-instance authority had refused to acknowledge that the applicant’s ailment was of an occupational character. 6. This judgment was served on the applicant on 25 September 2006. 7. By a decision of 19 October 2006 the court granted legal aid to the applicant. 8. The local Bar Association assigned a lawyer to the case by a decision of 2 November 2006. This decision was served on the lawyer on 8 November 2006. On 13 November 2006 the applicant gave a power of attorney to the lawyer. 9. On 1 December 2006 the lawyer submitted a cassation appeal to the Regional Administrative Court. 10. On 29 December 2006 that court held that the time-limit for lodging a cassation appeal had expired on 25 October 2006, thirty days after the applicant had been served with the judgment. The court rejected the cassation appeal on the ground that under the applicable laws the fact that the party was not represented by a lawyer and requested for legal aid only after having been served with the judgment had no bearing on the running of the time-limit for submitting a cassation appeal. It also noted that the legal-aid lawyer had failed to submit a request for leave to appeal out of time together with the cassation appeal. 11. The applicant’s lawyer appealed. He acknowledged that he had not submitted the request for leave to appeal out of time. However, he was of the view that this omission would not be relevant for the court’s decision to accept the cassation appeal for examination. 12. On 13 April 2007 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the contested decision and shared the legal view expressed by the first-instance court.

6. At the relevant time the first applicant was Chief of Staff of the Ministry of the Interior. He owned an apartment together with his wife until 1980, when they donated it to their son. Thereafter, the first two applicants lived as tenants in a State-owned apartment. 7. On 27 November 1985, the first applicant was granted the tenancy of another State-owned apartment which belonged to the housing fund of the Ministry of the Interior. The apartment had four rooms and covered 132 square metres. 8. On 15 January 1986 the first and the second applicants purchased the apartment from the Ministry. For the purposes of the transaction, the first applicant submitted declarations stating that he lived with his wife, their granddaughter and the second applicant's mother. 9. On 27 January 1992 the first and second applicants transferred the apartment to their son's family (the third and fourth applicants). 10. On 3 June 1992 the Ministry of the Interior brought a rei vindcatio action against the applicants claiming that the 1986 transaction was null and void as being contrary to the relevant provisions on the sale of housing. 11. On 7 October 1992 the Sofia District Court held its first hearing in the case. Noting deficiencies in the claim, the court instructed the plaintiff, the Ministry of the Interior, to amend it. 12. The Ministry did not comply with that instruction until April 1993, which caused the adjournment of the hearings listed for 2 December 1992 and 4 March 1993. 13. The examination of the case thus began on 7 July 1993. Although the fourth applicant had not been properly summoned, her lawyer gave his consent for the hearing to proceed. 14. The hearing listed for 3 November 1993 was adjourned, as the Ministry of Finance, whose participation was mandatory in such cases, had not been summoned. 15. At a hearing held on 2 February 1994 the Ministry of the Interior requested an adjournment to enable them to submit documents pertaining to the 1986 sale. 16. The hearing was resumed on 14 April 1994. The plaintiff introduced an amendment to the claim and sought an order requiring the first two applicants to appear personally and reply to questions regarding their housing situation at the time they had obtained the apartment in question. The court issued that order and adjourned the hearing. 17. On 1 June 1994 the first applicant could not be questioned as he had been taken ill. On 8 July 1994 he was questioned by another judge in the town where he was undergoing medical treatment. 18. The Sofia District Court resumed the examination of the case on 20 September 1994, when the parties made their final submissions. The court reserved judgment. 19. By a judgment of 4 November 1995 the District Court found, inter alia, that the apartment at issue had been larger than permitted by law for a family like that of the first and second applicants. The relevant rules provided that the term “family” could only include the spouses, their minor children and the spouses' parents, if they lived together. At the relevant time, however, the children of the first and the second applicants had reached the age of majority. Their granddaughter could not be considered as a member of the family for the purposes of the housing regulations. Also, it was unclear whether the second applicant's mother had actually lived with the first and second applicants. In these circumstances the family had had two members and had only been entitled to one room. It followed that the 1986 sale-purchase transaction was null and void. As a result, the first and second applicants had never become owners and could not have validly transferred their title to the third and fourth applicants. The court granted the Ministry's rei vindicatio claim. 20. On 30 November 1995 the applicants appealed to the Sofia City Court. On 15 February, 18 April, 10 June, 14 October and 5 December 1996 the hearing could not proceed as the Ministry of the Interior had not been properly summoned. That was due to the fact that the summons receipts had not been filled out properly. The appeal was eventually heard on 27 February 1997. 21. By a judgment of 19 June 1997 the Sofia City Court quashed the lower court's judgment and dismissed the claims of the Ministry of the Interior. It found, inter alia, that while it was true that the first and second applicants had obtained an apartment exceeding their housing needs and thus in violation of the relevant regulations, that fact did not entail nullity ab initio of the sale contract. 22. On 8 August 1997 the Ministry of the Interior submitted a petition for review (cassation) to the Supreme Court, which later became the Supreme Court of Cassation. A hearing was held on 18 November 1998. 23. On 2 February 1999 the Supreme Court of Cassation quashed the Sofia City Court's judgment and upheld the Sofia District Court's judgment, thus granting the rei vindicatio claim. The court held that the provisions regulating the size of apartments on the basis of housing needs, as in force at the relevant time, had established strict rules whose violation entailed nullity ab initio.

10. The case concerns the killing on 19 July 1996 of Mr Angelov and Mr Petkov by a member of the military police who was attempting to arrest them. 11. All the applicants are Bulgarian nationals of Roma origin. 12. Ms Anelia Kunchova Nachova, who was born in 1995, is Mr Angelov's daughter. Ms Aksiniya Hristova, who was born in 1978, is Ms Nachova's mother. Both live in Dobrolevo, Bulgaria. Ms Todorka Petrova Rangelova and Mr Rangel Petkov Rangelov, who were born in 1955 and 1954 respectively and live in Lom, Bulgaria, are Mr Petkov's parents. 13. In 1996 Mr Angelov and Mr Petkov, who were both 21 years old, were conscripts in the Construction Force (Строителни войски), a division of the army dealing with the construction of apartment blocks and other civilian projects. 14. Early in 1996 Mr Angelov and Mr Petkov were arrested for being repeatedly absent without leave. On 22 May 1996 Mr Angelov was sentenced to nine months' imprisonment and Mr Petkov to five months' imprisonment. Both had previous convictions for theft. 15. On 15 July 1996 they fled from a construction site outside the prison where they had been brought to work and travelled to the home of Mr Angelov's grandmother, Ms Tonkova, in the village of Lesura. Neither man was armed. 16. Their absence was reported the following day and their names put on the military police's wanted list. A warrant for their arrest was received on 16 July 1996 by the Vratsa Military Police Unit. 17. At around twelve noon on 19 July 1996, the officer on duty in the Vratsa Military Police Unit received an anonymous telephone message that Mr Angelov and Mr Petkov were hiding in the village of Lesura. On at least one of the previous occasions when he had been absent without leave, it was there that Mr Angelov had been found and arrested. 18. The commanding officer, Colonel D., decided to dispatch four military police officers, under the command of Major G., to locate and arrest the two men. At least two of the officers knew one or both of them. Major G. apparently knew Lesura because, according to a secretary who worked at the town hall and was heard later as a witness, his mother was from the village. 19. Colonel D. told the officers that “in accordance with the rules” they should carry their handguns and automatic rifles and wear bullet-proof vests. He informed them that Mr Angelov and Mr Petkov were “criminally active” (криминално проявени) – an expression used to denote persons with previous convictions or persons suspected of an offence – and that they had escaped from detention. The officers were instructed to use whatever means were dictated by the circumstances to arrest them. 20. The officers immediately left for Lesura in a jeep. Two officers wore uniforms while the others were in civilian clothes. Only Major G. wore a bullet-proof vest. He was armed with a personal handgun and a 7.62 mm calibre Kalashnikov automatic rifle. The other men carried handguns. Three Kalashnikov automatic rifles remained in the boot of the vehicle throughout the operation. 21. The officers were briefed orally by Major G. on their way to Lesura. Sergeant N. was to cover the east side of the house, Major G. the west side and Sergeant K. was to go into the house. Sergeant S., the driver, was to remain with the vehicle and keep watch over the north side. 22. At around 1 p.m. the officers arrived in Lesura. They asked a secretary at the town hall and one of the villagers, Mr T.M., to join them and show them Mr Angelov's grandmother's house. The vehicle drove into Lesura's Roma district. 23. Sergeant N. recognised the house since he had previously arrested Mr Angelov there for being absent without leave. 24. As soon as the jeep drew up in front of the house, between 1 and 1.30 p.m., Sergeant K. recognised Mr Angelov, who was inside, behind the window. Having noticed the vehicle, the fugitives tried to escape. The officers heard the sound of a window pane being broken. Major G. and Sergeants K. and N. jumped out of the vehicle while it was still moving. Major G. and Sergeant K. went through the garden gate, the former going to the west side of the house, and the latter entering the house. Sergeant N. headed towards the east side of the house. Sergeant S. remained with the car, together with the secretary who worked at the town hall and Mr T.M. 25. Sergeant N. later testified that, having noticed Mr Angelov and Mr Petkov escaping through the window and running towards a neighbour's yard, he had shouted: “Stop, military police!” He had pulled out his gun, but had not fired any shots. The two men had carried on running. Sergeant N. had run out on to the street in an effort to intercept them by cutting past several houses. While running, he had heard Major G. shout: “Freeze, military police, freeze [or] I'll shoot!” It was then that the shooting had started. 26. Major G. stated in his testimony: “... I heard Sergeant N. shouting: 'Freeze, police' ... I saw the conscripts; they were running and then stopped in front of the fence between Ms Tonkova's and the neighbour's yards ... I saw that they were trying to jump over the [chain-link] fence, so I shouted: 'Freeze, or I'll shoot!' I released the safety catch and loaded the automatic gun. Then I fired a shot in the air, holding the automatic rifle upwards with my right hand, almost perpendicular to the ground ... The conscripts climbed over the [chain-link] fence and continued to run, I followed them, then I fired one, two or three more times in the air and shouted: 'Freeze!', but they continued running. I again fired shots in the air with the automatic and shouted: 'Freeze, or I will shoot with live cartridges.' I warned them again, but they continued running without turning back. I fired to the right [of the two men] with the automatic after the warning, aiming at the ground, hoping that this would make them stop running. I again shouted 'Freeze!' when they were at the corner of the other house and then I aimed and fired at them as they were scaling the fence. I aimed at their feet. The ground where I stood was at a lower level ... [B]y jumping over the second fence they would have escaped and I did not have any other means of stopping them. The gradient there was a bit steep, [I] was standing on lower ground ... the second fence was on the highest ground, that is why when I fired the first time I aimed to the side [of the two men], as I considered that nobody from the neighbouring houses would be hurt, and the second time I aimed at the conscripts, but fired at their feet. Under Regulation 45 we can use firearms to arrest members of the military forces who have committed a publicly prosecutable offence and do not surrender after a warning, but in accordance with paragraph 3 of [that regulation] we have to protect the lives of the persons against whom [we use firearms] – for that reason I fired at [the victims'] feet – with the intention of avoiding fatal injury. The last time that I shot at the conscripts' feet, I was twenty metres away from them and they were exactly at the south-east corner of the neighbouring yard. After the shooting they both fell down ...They were both lying on their stomachs, and both gave signs of life, ... moaning ... then Sergeant S. appeared, I called him ... and handed him my automatic rifle ...” 27. According to the statements of the three subordinate officers, Mr Angelov and Mr Petkov were lying on the ground in front of the fence, with their legs pointing in the direction of the house from which they had come. One of them was lying on his back and the other on his stomach. 28. A neighbour, Mr Z., who lived opposite Mr Angelov's grandmother, also gave evidence. At about 1 or 1.30 p.m. he had seen a military jeep pull up in front of Ms Tonkova's house. Then he had heard somebody shout: “Don't run, I am using live cartridges.” He had then heard shots. He had looked into the next yard and seen Mr Angelov, whom he knew, and another man leap over the chain-link fence between Ms Tonkova's and another neighbour's yards. He had not seen the man who had shouted as he was hidden from view behind Ms Tonkova's house. Then he had seen Mr Angelov and Mr Petkov fall to the ground and the man who had shot them emerge, holding an automatic rifle. Mr Z. further stated: “The other men in uniform then started remonstrating with [the man who had shot Mr Angelov and Mr Petkov] telling him that he should not have fired, that he should not have come with them. Of those who came in the jeep, only the senior officer fired ... I know him by sight, he has relatives in Lesura.” 29. Sergeant S. stated that on arriving at the house he had remained with the vehicle and had heard Sergeant N. shouting from the east side of the house: “Freeze, police!” He had also heard Major G. shout “Freeze, police!” several times from the west side of the house. Then Major G. had started shooting with his automatic weapon, while continuing to shout. Sergeant S. had then entered the yard. He had seen Major G. leap over the chain-link fence and heard him shouting. He had gone up to him, had taken his automatic rifle and seen Mr Angelov and Mr Petkov lying on the ground next to the fence. They were still alive. At that moment Sergeant K. had come out of the house. Major G. had gone to get the jeep and had reported the incident over the vehicle radio. When they returned, Sergeant N. had appeared from the neighbouring street and helped them put the wounded men in the vehicle. 30. The head of the Vratsa Military Police Unit and other officers were informed of the incident at around 1.30 p.m. 31. Sergeant K. testified that he had entered the house and had been speaking to Mr Angelov's grandmother and another woman when he heard Major G. shouting at Mr Angelov and Mr Petkov to stop. In the house, he had noticed that a window pane in the room overlooking the yard had been broken. He had been on the verge of leaving the house when he heard shooting coming from behind the house. On his way to the yard he had met Major G., who had told him that the fugitives had been wounded. Sergeant K. had then climbed over the chain-link fence and approached the wounded men, who were still alive and moaning. He had found himself holding the automatic rifle, but could not remember how it had come into his possession. He had opened the magazine and seen no cartridges in it. There was only one cartridge left in the barrel. 32. Immediately after the shooting, a number of people from the vicinity gathered. Sergeant K. and Sergeant S. took the wounded men to Vratsa Hospital, while Major G. and Sergeant N. remained at the scene. 33. Mr Angelov and Mr Petkov died on the way to Vratsa. They were pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. 34. Mr Angelov's grandmother, Ms Tonkova, gave the following account of the events. Her grandson and Mr Petkov had been in her house when they had noticed a jeep approaching. She had gone outside and seen four men in uniform. They had all entered the yard. One of them had gone round the house and started shooting with an automatic rifle for a very long time. The other three men were also armed but had not fired any shots. She had been in the yard, pleading with the man who had been shooting to stop. However, he had walked towards the back of the house. Then she had heard shooting in the backyard. She had followed and then seen her grandson and Mr Petkov lying in the neighbours' yard with bullet wounds. 35. According to another neighbour, Mr M.M., all three policemen were shooting. Two of them had fired shots in the air and the third officer – who had been on the west side of the house (Major G.) – had been aiming at someone. Mr M.M. had heard some fifteen to twenty shots, perhaps more. Then he had seen the military policemen go to the neighbouring yard, where Mr Angelov and Mr Petkov had fallen. That yard belonged to Mr M.M. and his daughter. On seeing his grandson – a young boy – standing there, Mr M.M. had asked Major G. for permission to approach and to take him away. Major G. had pointed his gun at him in a brutal manner and had insulted him, saying: “You damn Gypsies!” (“мамка ви циганска”). 36. On 19 July 1996 all the officers involved made separate reports on the incident to the Vratsa Military Police Unit. None of them was tested for alcohol. 37. A criminal investigation into the deaths was opened the same day, and between 4 and 4.30 p.m. a military investigator inspected the scene. In his report he described the scene, including the respective positions of Ms Tonkova's house, the first chain-link fence, and the spent cartridges and bloodstains found there. He indicated that the structure of the first chain-link fence was damaged and the fence had been torn down in one place. 38. A sketch map was appended to the report. It showed the yard of Ms Tonkova's house and the neighbouring yard where Mr Angelov and Mr Petkov had fallen. The places where spent cartridges had been found were indicated. The sketch map and the report gave only some of the measurements of the yards. The gradient and other characteristics of the terrain and the surrounding area were not described. 39. Nine spent cartridges were retrieved. One cartridge was found in the street, in front of Ms Tonkova's house (apparently not far from where the jeep had stopped). Four cartridges were discovered in Ms Tonkova's yard, behind the house, close to the first chain-link fence separating her yard from the neighbour's yard. Three cartridges were found in the yard of the neighbour (Mr M.M), close to the place where the bloodstains were found. The exact distance between those cartridges and the bloodstains was not given. A ninth cartridge was found subsequently and handed in to the military police by Mr Angelov's uncle. There is no record of where it was found. 40. The bloodstains were a metre apart. They were marked on the sketch map as being slightly more than nine metres from the first chain-link fence. The distance between the bloodstains and the second fence that Mr Angelov and Mr Petkov had apparently been trying to scale when they were shot was not indicated. Samples of the bloodstains were taken by the investigator. 41. On 21 July 1996, a pathologist carried out an autopsy. According to autopsy report no. 139/96, the cause of Mr Petkov's death was “a wound to the chest”, the direction of the shot having been “from front to back”. The wound was described as follows: “There is an oval-shaped wound of 2.5 cm by 1 cm in the chest, at a distance of 144 cm from the feet, with missing tissues, and jagged and compressed edges in the area of the left shoulder. There is an oval-shaped wound of 3 cm in the back, to the left of the infrascapular line at a distance of 123 cm from the feet with missing tissues, jagged and torn edges turned outwards.” 42. As regards Mr Angelov, the report found that the cause of death had been “a gunshot wound, which [had] damaged a major blood vessel” and that the direction of the shot had been “from back to front”. It was further stated: “There is a round wound on the left of the buttocks at a distance of 90 cm from the feet ... with missing tissue, jagged walls and edges, and a diameter of about 0.8 cm ... There is an oval wound of 2.1 cm with jagged torn edges and walls turned outwards and missing tissues on the border between the lower and middle third [of the abdomen], at a distance of 95 cm from the feet, slightly to the left of the navel.” 43. The report concluded that the injuries had been caused by an automatic rifle fired from a distance. 44. On 22, 23 and 24 July 1996 the four military police officers, two neighbours (M.M. and K.), the secretary who worked at the town hall, and Mr Angelov's uncle were questioned by the investigator. Mr Petkov's mother was also questioned subsequently. 45. On 1 August 1996 Major G.'s automatic rifle, a cartridge that had been found in it and the nine spent cartridges found at the scene were examined by a ballistics expert from the Vratsa Regional Directorate of Internal Affairs. According to his report, the automatic rifle was serviceable, all nine retrieved cartridges had been fired from it and the last cartridge which had not been fired was also serviceable. 46. A report by a forensic expert dated 29 August 1996 found an alcohol content of 0.55 g/l in Mr Petkov's blood and 0.75 g/l in Mr Angelov's blood (under Bulgarian law it is an administrative offence to drive with a blood alcohol content of more than 0.5 g/l). 47. On 20 September 1996 a forensic examination of the bloodstains found at the scene was carried out by an expert from the Vratsa Regional Directorate of Internal Affairs and they were found to match the victims' blood groups. 48. On 20 January and on 13 February 1997 another neighbour (Mr T.M.) and Ms Hristova (one of the applicants) were questioned. On 26 March 1997 Mr Angelov's grandmother and a neighbour, Z., were questioned. 49. On 7 January 1997 the families of Mr Angelov and Mr Petkov were given access to the investigation file. They requested that three more witnesses, T.M., Ms Tonkova and Z.H. be heard. Their request was granted. The witnesses were heard by the investigator on 20 January and 26 March 1997. The applicants did not ask for any other evidence to be obtained. 50. On 31 March 1997 the investigator completed the preliminary investigation and drew up a final report. He noted that Mr Angelov and Mr Petkov had escaped from detention while serving a prison sentence, and had thus committed an offence. Major G. had done everything within his power to save their lives: he had instructed them to stop and surrender and had fired warning shots. He had aimed at them only after seeing that they were continuing to run away and might escape. He had not sought to injure any vital organs. The investigator therefore concluded that Major G. had acted in accordance with Regulation 45 of the Military Police Regulations and made a recommendation to the Pleven regional prosecutor's office that the investigation should be closed as Major G. had not committed an offence. 51. On 8 April 1997 the Pleven military prosecutor accepted the investigator's recommendation and closed the preliminary investigation into the deaths. He concluded that Major G. had proceeded in accordance with Regulation 45 of the Military Police Regulations. He had warned the two men several times and fired shots in the air. He had shot them only because they had not surrendered, as there had been a danger that they might escape. He had sought to avoid inflicting fatal injuries. No one else had been hurt. 52. When describing the victims' personal circumstances, including details of their family, education and previous convictions, the prosecutor stated in the order that both men originated from “minority families”, an expression mainly used to designate people from the Roma minority. 53. By an order of 11 June 1997, the prosecutor of the armed forces prosecutor's office dismissed the applicants' subsequent appeal on the grounds that Mr Angelov and Mr Petkov had provoked the shooting by trying to escape and that Major G. had taken the steps required by law in such situations. Therefore, the use of arms had been lawful under Regulation 45 of the Military Police Regulations. 54. On 19 November 1997 the prosecutor from the investigation review department of the armed forces prosecutor's office dismissed a further appeal on grounds similar to those that had been relied on by the other public prosecutors. 55. In its country reports of the last few years, the Council of Europe's European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) has expressed concern regarding racially motivated police violence, particularly against Roma, in a number of European countries including Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, France, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. 56. The report on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union and its member States in 2002, prepared by the European Union network of independent experts in fundamental rights at the request of the European Commission, stated, inter alia, that police abuse against Roma and similar groups, including physical abuse and excessive use of force, had been reported in a number of European Union member States, such as Austria, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy and Portugal. 57. In its second report on Bulgaria, published in March 2000, ECRI stated, inter alia: “Of particular concern is the incidence of police discrimination and mistreatment of members of the Roma/Gypsy community. ... [T]he Human Rights Project documents in its Annual Report for 1998 numerous ... cases of police misconduct towards ... Roma ... It cites as the most common violations: use of excessive physical force during detention for the purposes of extorting evidence; unjustified use of firearms ... and threats to the personal security of individuals who had complained against the police to the competent authorities. ... The Human Rights Project notes ... that the majority of complaints filed by this non-governmental organisation on behalf of Roma victims of police violence have not been followed up by the authorities. ... [V]ictims seem unwilling to come forward with complaints, particularly when they are awaiting court sentences ... [There is apparently also] some unwillingness on the part of the authorities to admit that problems of police misconduct do exist. ... ECRI [reiterates its recommendation] that an independent body be set up – acting at central and local level – to investigate police, investigative and penitentiary practices for overt and covert racial discrimination and to ensure that any discrimination perpetrated be severely punished. ... ECRI is concerned at the persistence of widespread discrimination against members of the Roma/Gypsy community in Bulgaria. ... It is reported that local authorities are sometimes involved in the illegal administration of justice as regards Roma/Gypsy communities, often with the silent collusion of local police.” 58. In its third report on Bulgaria, published in January 2004, ECRI stated, inter alia: “[Since ECRI's second report,] there have been no changes in the Criminal Code [to ensure that criminal law provisions fully allow any racist motivation to be taken into account]. ... ECRI recommends that the Bulgarian authorities insert a provision in the Criminal Code expressly stating that racist motivation for any ordinary offence constitute[s] an aggravating circumstance. ... ECRI is concerned about allegations of instances of excessive use of firearms by the police, which have sometimes led to the death of Roma. ... ECRI strongly recommends that the Bulgarian authorities take steps to restrict the use of firearms by the law enforcement agencies to cases where their use is really necessary. In particular, it urges the Bulgarian authorities to amend the law to this end and ensure that international standards are conformed to in practice in this field. ECRI is particularly concerned about the findings ... that the proportion of people of Roma origin who state that they have been subjected to physical violence in police stations is three times higher than the proportion of people of Bulgarian origin. ... So far, the Bulgarian authorities have not set up an independent body to investigate ill‑treatment or acts of discrimination committed by members of the police force. ... ECRI is pleased to learn that a specialised human rights committee was set up in the National Police Department in August 2000 ... Numerous schemes have been launched to provide human rights training for police officers ... ... The Framework Programme for Equal Integration of Roma in Bulgarian Society is unanimously considered, including by Roma representatives, to be well structured and fairly comprehensive ... There is, however, a unanimous feeling within the Roma community and among non-governmental organisations, that, apart from the few initiatives mentioned in this report, the programme has remained a dead letter ... The view in certain quarters is that the government lacks the political resolve to carry through such a programme ... ECRI is very concerned to learn that, four years after the adoption of the Framework Programme, its implementation is still in its early stages. ...” 59. Non-governmental organisations, such as Human Rights Project and Amnesty International have reported in the last several years numerous incidents of alleged racial violence against Roma in Bulgaria, including by law enforcement agents.

4. The applicants were born in 1946 and 1962 respectively and live in London. They were charged with involvement in a money laundering scheme together with a third co-accused, Mr E. 5. On 24 March 2000 the second applicant pleaded guilty at a Crown Court to conspiracy to launder the proceeds of criminal conduct contrary to section 1 of the Criminal Law Act 1977. On 3 April 2000 the first applicant pleaded guilty to the same offence. 6. On 21 June 2000 the prosecution served notice under section 71(1)(a) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (CJA 1988, see paragraphs 40-41 below), as amended by the Proceeds of Crime Act 1995, indicating their intention to seek confiscation orders to recover the proceeds of the applicants’ criminal conduct. 7. On 29 June 2000 counsel for the second applicant requested an early confiscation hearing and counsel for the co-accused, Mr. E., requested a confiscation hearing in September. The trial judge pencilled in a date on the week beginning 30 October 2000, as that was the first occasion on which he would be available. The trial judge further directed that the date would be considered again on the proposed date for sentence, 18 August 2000. 8. On 18 August 2000 the second applicant was sentenced to four and a half years’ imprisonment and the first applicant was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment. Prior to sentence the confiscation hearing was formally postponed until after passing sentence and was fixed for 30 October 2000, outside the six-month period required under section 72A of the CJA 1988. 9. On 30 October 2000 the case was listed for the confiscation hearing with a time-estimate of five working days. The applicants objected that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the confiscation proceedings on the grounds that more than six months had elapsed since their convictions and that the judge had not considered whether there were “exceptional circumstances” warranting the imposition of the confiscation orders outside the statutory time-limit, as required by section 72A (3) of the CJA 1988, as amended (see paragraph 35 below). 10. On 3 November 2000 the trial judge held that he had jurisdiction to hear the confiscation proceedings. It was then agreed by the parties that the confiscation proceedings should be adjourned to await the outcome of a similar case which was due to be heard by the Court of Appeal, R v Steele and Shevki. The confiscation proceedings were adjourned until 5 February 2001. 11. On 21 November 2000 Mr E. was granted leave to appeal against his conviction. On 24 November 2000 both the applicants’ applications for leave to appeal against sentence were refused by a single judge of the Court of Appeal. 12. On 14 December 2000 the Court of Appeal delivered its judgment in R v. Steele and Shevki ([2000] EWCA Crim 70). It found that although adjournments beyond the six-month period prescribed by statute should be avoided, exceptional circumstances such as the unavailability of a judge would not deprive a subsequent confiscation order of its validity. 13. On 31 January 2001 the confiscation proceedings were listed again for mention. Renewal of argument in relation to the Crown Court’s jurisdiction to hear the confiscation proceedings, in light of the Court of Appeal’s judgment in R v. Steele and Shevki, was listed for 8 and 9 March 2001. Following the hearing on 8 March 2001, the judge held that the court retained a common law power to adjourn beyond the statutory six-month time-limit in compelling circumstances such as where there was an illness or the judge was unavailable. In his opinion a statutory postponement citing exceptional circumstances was required only where the purpose of the postponement was to gather further information, and not in the instant case where the issue had been the unavailability of the judge. 14. On 26 and 27 March 2001 the Court of Appeal heard and dismissed Mr E.’s appeal against conviction. On 30 March 2001 the confiscation proceedings were listed again for mention before the trial judge, to notify him of the result of Mr E.’s appeal. At this stage Mr E. was seeking leave to appeal to the House of Lords and was awaiting the decision of the Court of Appeal on his application for leave to appeal. The substantive hearing of the confiscation hearing was again adjourned. 15. On 2 May 2001 the Court of Appeal refused Mr E.’s application for leave to appeal to the House of Lords and declined to find that a question of law of general public importance was involved in the decision. 16. On 12 June 2001 the confiscation proceedings were listed for directions and with the agreement of all parties, the hearing was fixed to begin on 15 October 2001. 17. On 20 September 2001 the confiscation proceedings were again listed for mention at the request of Mr. E. who sought to adjourn the confiscation hearing that was fixed for 15 October 2001. 18. On 26 September 2001 the confiscation proceedings were again listed to consider Mr E.’s application for adjournment. The proceedings were adjourned to 28 January 2002 with a time estimate of three weeks. 19. On 28 January 2002 the Crown Court imposed a confiscation order on the second applicant in the amount of GBP 75,350, to be paid within 18 months of the resolution of any appeal to the Court of Appeal, with a consecutive term of twelve months’ imprisonment to be served in default. 20. On 4 February 2002 the second applicant lodged an application for leave to appeal, challenging the confiscation order on the ground that the Crown Court had no jurisdiction to make it because of the lapse of the six-month period provided by section 72A(3) of the CJA 1988. 21. On 7 February 2002 the Crown Court imposed a confiscation order on the first applicant in the sum of GBP 375,000, to be paid within 18 months of the resolution of any appeal to the Court of Appeal, with a consecutive term of 21 months’ imprisonment to be served in default. 22. On 25 February 2002 the first applicant lodged an application for leave to appeal challenging the confiscation order on the same grounds as the second applicant (see paragraph 20 above). 23. On 12 December 2002 the second applicant obtained a Certificate of Inadequacy from the High Court. This entitled him to return to the Crown Court to seek a reduction of the confiscation order. 24. On 4 February 2003 the second applicant’s case was listed before the Crown Court and the confiscation order was reduced to GBP 30,284, taking into account the Certificate of Inadequacy. 25. On 20 June 2003 the Court of Appeal allowed the applicants’ appeals and quashed the confiscation orders and default sentences of imprisonment. They noted that on 29 June 2000, defence counsel for the second applicant and the co-accused Mr. E. had requested an early hearing at the Crown Court. However, the earliest date that the trial judge would be available was the week beginning 30 October 2000. That date was pencilled in by the trial judge, even though it was “more than four months away”. The Court of Appeal considered that, given the importance attached by Parliament and the courts to the link between confiscation orders and sentencing, a high degree of judicial scrutiny was required before finding exceptional circumstances to justify the imposition of a confiscation order outside the six-month time-limit. In the present case, there was no evidence of any enquiry from 24 March 2000 (when the second applicant was the first to plead guilty) onwards into whether a space could be found for the confiscation hearing during the six-month period. 26. Furthermore, on 3 November 2000, the trial judge had acknowledged with “admirable candour” when finding that he had jurisdiction to hear the confiscation proceedings outside the six-month time-limit that “no enquiry was made of the (applicants) as to the postponement” when the decision to hold the confiscation hearing in the week beginning 30 October 2000 was finally confirmed on 18 August 2000. Neither had there been any analysis of any factors which might amount to exceptional circumstances. The trial judge had also “candidly acknowledged more than once” that there were no exceptional circumstances. The Court of Appeal ultimately found that the failure to address the question as to whether the circumstances could properly be described as exceptional and to make a finding to that effect was fatal to the upholding of the confiscation orders. Though in principle confiscation orders should not be quashed for mere defects in procedure, if the statutory requirement of exceptional circumstances was to be more than a “mere incantation”, enquiry into the circumstances and the possibility and feasibility of a timely hearing were required. 27. On 30 July 2003 the Court of Appeal certified that a point of law of general public importance was involved in the decisions. 28. On 1 April 2004 the House of Lords granted the prosecution leave to appeal against the decisions of the Court of Appeal. 29. On 21 July 2005 the House of Lords reversed the decisions of the Court of Appeal and ordered the latter to re-impose the confiscation orders in respect of both applicants. 30. The House of Lords observed that the core problem before it was whether, as a matter of statutory construction, failure to comply with a statutory time-limit would have the effect of invalidating an act. The fact that Parliament cast statutory requirements in imperative form without expressly specifying the consequences of a failure to comply had caused difficulty and had been the source of a great deal of litigation over the preceding 130 years. A distinction had first evolved between mandatory and directory requirements; where a requirement was mandatory, a failure to comply had the effect of invalidating the act in question but where a requirement was merely directory, a failure to comply did not invalidate the act. Over the years, a further distinction had been made between two types of directory requirements: requirements of a purely regulatory character, where a failure to comply would never invalidate an act, and requirements where a failure to comply would not invalidate an act provided that there was substantial compliance. In London & Clydeside Estates Ltd v. Aberdeen District Council [1980] 1 WLR 182, 189E-190C, however, Lord Hailsham had emphasised that it was within the courts’ inherently discretionary jurisdiction to determine the nature of a particular statutory requirement and to examine the consequences of non-compliance before determining whether Parliament had intended total invalidity. In the later case of Wang v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1994] 1 WLR 1286, the Privy Council followed and applied the dictum of Lord Hailsham in London and Clydeside Estates (cited above). The House of Lords also took into consideration a number of cases in which the Court of Appeal had adopted the same approach, and parallel developments in the courts of New Zealand, Australia and Canada. 31. In the present case, the House of Lords considered that the prime purpose behind the statutory provision for confiscation orders was the recovery of any financial benefit that an offender might have obtained from his criminal conduct. The Law Lords rejected the applicants’ argument that, given the criminal law context, a strict approach to the construction of section 72A of the CJA 1988 should be adopted and instead applied a teleological approach. They noted that section 71(1) of the CJA 1988 imposed a positive duty to proceed with confiscation proceedings and that the time limits under section 72A were linked to the date of conviction rather than sentence. This was considered to be evidence that Parliament’s intention was the early disgorgement of an offender’s criminal gains. Though Parliament had envisaged that courts would make confiscation orders before sentencing, unless they exercised their postponement power under section 72(A)(1), it was of some significance that Parliament considered it more important that a confiscation order should be made than that it should be made before the defendant was sentenced. Though no common law power to adjourn existed, Parliament could not have intended to disable a court from making a confiscation order after sentence merely because the time-limits were not strictly adhered to. 32. In the present case, the Crown Court had postponed its final decision on confiscation orders in good faith. The prejudice to the applicants was not significant and was outweighed by the countervailing public interest in not allowing convicted offenders to escape confiscation for what were no more than bona fide errors in the judicial process. In any event, there would always be the safeguard of judicial review should there be an apparent abuse of process. 33. In October 2005 the Court of Appeal re-imposed the confiscation orders and sentences of imprisonment in default on the applicants.

6. The applicants were born in 1926, 1969, 1925, 1923, 1926, 1937, 1938, 1949, 1953, 1946, 1973, 1975, 1949, 1950, 1953, 1951, 1955, 1957, 1946, 1941, 1944, 1944, 1945, 1946, 1950, 1960, 1955, 1931, 1923, 1926, 1940, 1941, 1943, 1944, 1946, 1925, 1955, 1954, 1930, 1958, 1959, 1954, 1979, 1982, 1987, 1953, 1929 and 1959 respectively. The first thirty-eight applicants live in Malta, the next eight applicants live in the United States of America, the penultimate applicant lives in Canada and the last applicant lives in the United Kingdom. 7. The applicants or their predecessors in title (hereinafter “the applicants”) owned four plots of land of varying sizes. The applicants were notified that their land had been made subject to two declarations by the Governor General dated 13 February 1969 and 20 February 1969, stating that the land would be expropriated for a public purpose. The intended public purpose was the building of the Malta Freeport. The said plots were numbered Plot 2 (16,544 sq.m), Plot 3 (405 sq.m), Plot 41 (6,841 sq.m) and Plot 53 (12,538 sq.m). 8. Following notices to treat of 21 February 1969 and 24 February 1969 respectively, the applicants were offered 3,225 Maltese liras ((MTL) - approximately 7,512 euros (EUR)) for Plot 2, MTL 973,40 (approximately EUR 2,267) for Plot 3, MTL 575 (approximately EUR 1, 340) for Plot 41, and MTL 1,127 (approximately EUR 2,625) for Plot 53. In March 1969 the applicants refused the above-mentioned offers in respect of Plots 2, 41 and 53 and submitted their counteroffers. According to the Government, the applicants accepted the offer in respect of Plot 3; however, the applicants contested this. Subsequently, the Commissioner of Lands (CoL) was required to institute proceedings before the Land Arbitration Board (LAB) (see “Relevant domestic law below”). Although no such proceedings ensued, the CoL gave possession of the four plots of land to the Malta Freeport Corporation. 9. The applicants unsuccessfully requested the CoL to initiate proceedings a number of times; however, the latter did not do so, insisting that he wanted further information in relation to the applicants’ ownership title. The law at the relevant time did not provide for a procedure which would allow the applicants to initiate proceedings for compensation. The initiation of compensation proceedings was an action which could be undertaken only by the authorities, and to which no time-limit applied. However, in the 1990s it had been confirmed that the ordinary courts had the competence, upon a request made by persons in a similar position to the applicants, to set a time-limit for the performance of that obligation, by virtue of Article 1078 of the Civil Code. 10. Thus, on 27 August 1996 the applicants lodged ordinary civil proceedings, requesting the court to order the CoL to initiate the necessary proceedings within an established time frame. 11. On 4 February 2000 the Civil Court upheld the applicants’ request, and ordered the CoL to initiate proceedings before the LAB within three months of that date. It noted that the relevant notices to treat had been issued to all the owners concerned who at the time were still alive. Moreover, it was incumbent on the CoL to establish the identity of the owners of the land and to ensure that they were notified and that the relevant proceedings were pursued properly. No appeal having been lodged, the judgment became final. 12. On 18 April 2000 the CoL instituted compensation proceedings in respect of only two of the plots of land in question (Plots 41 and 53). These proceedings are still pending, as they were suspended sine die, pending the outcome of the constitutional proceedings mentioned below. 13. Compensation proceedings in relation to Plots 2 and 3 had not been initiated by the time the applicants instituted constitutional redress proceedings. However, pending the constitutional proceedings, on 6 February 2003, a schedule of deposit was filed in court, in relation to Plot 2, consisting of MTL 3,225 (approximately EUR 7,512) covering the price of the land and MTL 3,288 (approximately EUR 7,659) as damages for the delay in payment. 14. By that date, only a portion of the four plots of land had been used, the remaining portion remaining unused but earmarked for future expansion. More precisely, most of Plot 2 is currently being developed as a stacking area for containers for the purposes of the Freeport, the remaining 500 sq. m forming part of an area of land conceded on lease by the Freeport Corporation to Medserv Ltd. Plot 3 (consisting of a farmhouse and adjacent rural structures) and Plot 41 are outside the Freeport zone, and are currently in their original state but may be earmarked for future expansion. Plot 53 is almost entirely within the Freeport zone and has been used for that purpose, including the building of roads, except for a piece of land measuring 600 sq.m, which is outside the Freeport zone and is currently in its original state but may be earmarked for future expansion. 15. In consequence, the applicants, who remain uncompensated to date, instituted two sets of constitutional proceedings. 16. In 2002 the applicants instituted proceedings in relation to the taking of Plots 41 and 53, complaining under Article 6 of the Convention of a lack of access to court; a lack of a fair hearing within a reasonable time (in respect of the thirty years before the proceedings started and in respect of the current pending proceedings before the LAB), before an independent and impartial tribunal, the latter in that they considered that the LAB’s constitution did not fulfil the said requirements. They further complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention about the lack of adequate compensation in relation to the taking; in particular, they noted that the law as it stood referred to values applicable at the time of taking. At the final stages of oral submissions they further argued that the taking had not been carried out in the public interest as it had been given to a commercial entity and that the unused land was to be returned according to the Cachia jurisprudence (see relevant domestic law and practice below). 17. On 20 October 2008, the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional jurisdiction found a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, in that the applicants had been denied access to court. Indeed, it was only the CoL who could institute proceedings according to domestic law. The fact that recently the law had been applied to allow the applicants to take up proceedings requesting a court to order the latter to act within a time-limit did not detract from the fact that it ultimately remained the duty of the CoL to take up these proceedings, and the affected individuals had no obligation to solicit such an action. Moreover, even in the event that ownership of land was at issue, it referred to the Civil Court’s earlier reasoning in this respect (see paragraph 11 above) and, moreover, considered that the CoL could have instituted proceedings by means of a curator. It awarded them EUR 100,000 by way of damages and dismissed the remainder of their claims. It held that the taking of the two plots of land which were being used for the Freeport had been in the public interest, the latter being an important economic venture for the country. The fact that it was later privatised did not take away the element of public interest, despite the fact that the deed of expropriation had not yet been finalised. Moreover, the one-tenth of the two plots which was outside the Freeport zone which had remained unused could have been used for future development. It failed to take cognisance of the complaint regarding compensation, holding that this had not yet been determined by the LAB. As to the complaint about the length of the proceedings, namely thirty years for the CoL to initiate proceedings, the court held that apart from the fact that this had been related to the previous complaint under Article 6, the provision referred to proceedings which had already begun and had taken an unreasonable time to be finally decided; therefore it was not applicable in the present case which was still pending. Lastly, since the law had been changed, the composition of the LAB clearly satisfied the Article 6 requirements. 18. On appeal, by a decision of 10 July 2009 the Constitutional Court reversed the said judgment in part. It confirmed that there had been a violation of Article 6 in so far as the applicants had been deprived of access to a court but only from the period starting on 30 April 1987, the date when Malta introduced the right of individual petition. It also considered that there had been a violation of the reasonable time principle between 30 April 1987 and 18 April 2000, the date when the compensation proceedings were initiated. It had regard however to the fact that the applicants were also to blame for not having taken up the civil remedy available to solicit the CoL earlier than they had done. Moreover, no proof had been supplied that the proceedings currently pending before the LAB were not satisfying the reasonable time requirement. 19. The Constitutional Court further found a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. Holding that the public interest had to persist from the date of the taking to the date of the conclusion of the act of expropriation, it considered that even the land which had remained unused had been taken for such a purpose, since the Freeport could reasonably expand to cover such land. Moreover, the privatisation of the Freeport did not detract from the public interest involved. The court further confirmed that it was not in a position to consider the amount of compensation which had yet to be decided by the LAB. However, the fact that the process of expropriation had taken decades had caused the applicants to suffer a disproportionate burden, constituting a violation of the applicants’ property rights. 20. The Constitutional Court reduced the amount of compensation to EUR 20,000, covering moral damage in relation to the said violations and confirmed the rejection of the remaining complaints. 21. In parallel, in 2002 the applicants instituted proceedings in relation to the taking of Plots 2 and 3, with identical complaints to those in case no. 17/2002 (see paragraph 16 above). 22. On 20 October 2008 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional jurisdiction found a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, in that the applicants had been denied access to court, and rejected the remaining complaints on the same ground of the judgment in case no. 17/2002 (see paragraph 17 above). It added however that the present case was a more serious breach of the applicants’ right of access to court, as the CoL had failed to institute proceedings even after he was ordered to do so by a court. It thus awarded the applicants EUR 125,000 by way of damages. 23. On appeal, by a decision of 10 July 2009 the Constitutional Court reversed the said judgment in part. It held that the findings of the Constitutional Court in its judgment in case no. 17/2002, applied in the same way in this case, except for the fact that the violation of the reasonable time principle was in respect of the period from 30 April 1987 to the date of this judgment, since the CoL had not yet instituted the relevant proceedings. It awarded the applicants EUR 27,000 in moral damage. 24. Shortly before and during the constitutional proceedings certain developments took place. Domestic jurisprudence developed by means of the Cachia case (see “Relevant domestic law” below); and the Government announced the privatisation of the Freeport, by conceding it on a long-term lease (of thirty years at the price of one million United States dollars (USD) per year, to be augmented over the years to reach a maximum of USD 15,220,000 per year); the jurisprudence in the Cachia case was overturned; and, in 2002 the law was amended to provide a procedure for an individual to initiate compensation proceedings before the LAB in relation to new and recent expropriations. 25. At the hearing of 5 November 2009 the CoL informed the LAB of the outcome of the constitutional proceedings. However, neither the applicants nor their lawyers were present at that hearing; nor were they present at the subsequent five hearings. On 31 January 2011 the applicants requested an adjournment in order to regularise their position.

4. The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Lugansk. 5. On 26 May 2000, the Leninskyi District Court of Lugansk ordered the State Enterprise “Luganskyi Stankobudivelnyi Zavod” to pay the applicant UAH 1,240.65[1] in salary arrears and other payments. 6. On 8 June 2000 the Leninskyi District Bailiffs’ Service of Lugansk instituted enforcement proceedings. 7. In August 2003 the applicant instituted proceedings in the same court against the Bailiffs’ Service for failure to enforce the judgment in his favour. On 15 May 2001 the court found against the applicant, finding no fault on the part of the Bailiffs. On 18 June 2001 the Lugansk Regional Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the first-instance court. 8. On 1 February 2002 the Bailiffs’ Service informed the applicant that the judgment given in his favour could not be enforced due to the large number of enforcement proceedings against the debtor and the fact that the procedure for the forced sale of assets belonging to the debtor had been suspended because of the moratorium on the forced sale of property belonging to State enterprises introduced by the Law of 29 November 2001. 9. In March 2002 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Leninskyi District Court of Lugansk against the Bailiffs’ Service, seeking compensation for failure to enforce the judgment in his favour. On 7 May 2002 the court rejected his claim as being unsubstantiated. On 8 August 2002 and 9 January 2003, respectively, the Lugansk Regional Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Ukraine upheld that decision. 10. On 27 April 2005 the applicant received the full amount of the judgment debt.

4. The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Ankara. 5. On 21 April 1998 he lodged a case with the Ankara Administrative Court for annulment of a decision to reject his dissertation. 6. On 29 September 2004 the court dismissed the applicant's request. 7. On 2 December 2005 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the judgment of 29 September 2004. 8. On 2 October 2006 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed a request by the applicant for rectification of the judgment. 9. On 7 November 2006 the applicant was notified of the decision dated 2 October 2006.

4. The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Gdynia. 5. On 28 October 1996 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having committed armed robbery while acting in an organised criminal gang. 6. On 30 October 1996 he was brought before the Gdańsk Regional Prosecutor and charged with armed robbery, kidnapping and extortion. On the same date the Gdańsk District Court remanded the applicant in custody in view of the reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offences in question while acting in an organised criminal gang. It held that there was a risk that the applicant might obstruct the proceedings or abscond. It further relied on the severity of the anticipated penalty. 7. Later, several other persons were detained and charged in connection with the same investigation conducted by the Department of Organised Crime of the Gdańsk Regional Prosecutor's Office. 8. On 16 January 1997 the Gdańsk Regional Court prolonged his detention until 28 April 1997. 9. On 16 April 1997 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal ordered that the applicant be kept in custody until 29 July 1997. It relied on the reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences in question and the gravity of the charges. It also had regard to the number of suspects and the need to obtain further evidence. 10. On 16 July 1997 the Court of Appeal extended the applicant's detention until 27 October 1997. It found that there was a reasonable risk that the applicant might go into hiding or obstruct the proceedings. It also relied on the severity of the anticipated penalty. Lastly, it noted that further prolongation of the investigation was not attributable to the prosecuting authorities, but resulted from the fact that further suspects had been identified and arrested. Furthermore, the prolongation was due to a delay in the preparation of some expert reports and the need to request legal assistance from the German authorities. 11. On 17 September 1997 the Supreme Court prolonged the applicant's detention until 31 December 1997. It found that there was a reasonable risk that the suspects might intimidate witnesses, given the nature of the charges against them. It further observed that the investigation could not be terminated on account of the prolonged preparation of an expert report and the need to hear a witness, W.B., who was serving his prison sentence in Germany. 12. On 28 November 1997 the prosecution filed a bill of indictment with the Gdańsk Regional Court. The applicant was charged with, inter alia, armed robbery, kidnapping, extortion and inflicting bodily harm which had been committed while being a member of an armed organised criminal gang. The bill of indictment specified that the applicant was a recidivist offender. There were 16 defendants in the case, all charged with numerous counts of armed robbery and extortion. 13. On 7 January 1998 the Gdańsk Regional Court ordered that the applicant be held in custody until 21 September 1998. In addition to the grounds previously invoked, it relied on the complexity of the case and the number of defendants. 14. On 24 February 1998 the trial court held the first hearing. It subsequently held some 56 hearings in the case. 15. On 17 September 1998 the Regional Court extended his detention on remand until 21 October 1998. 16. On 6 October 1998 the Supreme Court prolonged the applicant's pre-trial detention until 30 January 1999. It observed that the fact that the trial had not been terminated could not be attributed to the authorities, given the volume of evidence and the fact that some hearings had to be cancelled as the defendants' counsel or witnesses had not appeared. It further considered that the applicant had been charged with the commission of the crimes for which he was liable to a sentence of imprisonment exceeding 8 years, and that the circumstances of the case indicated that there was a reasonable risk that the applicant might obstruct the proceedings. 17. On 19 January 1999 the Supreme Court ordered that the applicant and his 9 co-defendants be kept in custody until 30 June 1999. It relied on the fact that witnesses had informed the trial court about having been threatened by the defendants. It also had regard to the severity of the anticipated penalty and the presumption established by Article 258 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Furthermore, the Supreme Court considered that the prolongation of the detention beyond the statutory time-limit of two years was justified by the complexity of the case and the volume of evidence to be heard. In that respect, it also observed that in December 1998 the trial court had been prevented from hearing evidence on account of the absence of two defence counsel. 18. On 2 June 1999 the Supreme Court prolonged the applicant's detention until 31 December 1999. It noted that the trial was being efficiently conducted and that it had not been terminated for reasons which were attributable to the defendants and their counsel. It noted in particular that the defendants had attempted to intimidate witnesses and protract the trial. Further, it had regard to the nature of the charges and the severity of the likely penalty. 19. On 14 December 1999 the Regional Court convicted the applicant of armed robbery, kidnapping, extortion and inflicting bodily harm and sentenced him to 9 years' imprisonment and a fine. 20. Further decisions on the prolongation of the applicant's detention were given by the Regional Court on 21 December 1999 (ordering his continued detention until 30 June 2000) and 21 June 2000 (extending that period until 30 November 2000). 21. On 11 August 2000 the applicant was served with a copy of the Regional Court's judgment. He subsequently appealed against that judgment. 22. On 22 November 2000 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal prolonged the applicant's detention until 31 January 2001. On 17 January 2001 his detention was extended until 31 March 2001. 23. On 6 March 2001 the Court of Appeal held a hearing. 24. On 7 March 2001 the Court of Appeal quashed the first-instance judgment in respect of the applicant and remitted the case for retrial. 25. On 14 March 2001 the Court of Appeal ordered that the applicant and his 11 co-defendants be held in custody until 30 June 2001. Having regard to Article 258 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it observed that the applicant might attempt to obstruct the proceedings given the likelihood of a severe penalty being imposed on him. It also relied on the nature of the charges. 26. On 19 June 2001 the Gdańsk Regional Court held the first retrial hearing. It subsequently held some 20 hearings. 27. On 19 June 2001 the Court of Appeal prolonged his detention until 30 September 2001. It noted that continuation of that measure was necessary in order to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings, given the severity of the anticipated penalty. 28. On 28 September 2001 the Gdańsk Regional Court ordered that the applicant and 11 of his co-defendants be kept in custody until 30 December 2001. It found that the applicant's continued detention was necessary in order to prevent the applicant from interfering with witnesses. On 10 October 2001 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeal against that prolongation. Referring to Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, it observed that the applicant's detention, although undeniably long, was justified by the particular circumstances of the case. In this respect, it emphasised that the applicant had been charged with particularly serious and violent crimes, and thus his continued detention was justified on public interest grounds. 29. On 28 December 2001 the Regional Court prolonged the applicant's detention until 30 March 2002. It held that following the Court of Appeal's instructions most of the witnesses who had given evidence at the original trial had to be heard again. In that case there was a reasonable risk that the defendants might interfere with witnesses. In addition, the court held that given the gravity of the charges and the likelihood that severe penalties would be imposed on them, the defendants might obstruct the proceedings by going into hiding. On 23 January 2002 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal upheld that decision. It considered, inter alia, that the Regional Court had attempted to examine the case within a reasonable time, but there had been significant delays in the trial which were attributable to the defendants or their counsel. In this respect, it pointed out to the obstructive conduct of all the defendants on 18 December 2001 which had prevented the Regional Court from holding a hearing on that day. On the other hand, the Court of Appeal instructed the Regional Court to assess the length of detention of each defendant separately. It pointed out that the further prolongation of the detention of those defendants who were not simultaneously serving prison sentences could not be accepted in the long term. 30. Subsequently, the Regional Court prolonged the applicant's detention on 15 March 2002 (until 30 June 2002) and 21 June 2002 (until 30 September 2002). It invoked the same grounds as in its previous decisions. The applicant appealed against the latter decision. 31. On 31 July 2002 the Court of Appeal altered the Regional Court's decision and ordered that the applicant be released. It underlined that the applicant's detention on remand had been exceptionally long and thus lost its provisional nature. Having regard to the current progress of the trial, the court observed that it was not possible to predict when the proceedings would be terminated. Furthermore, it noted that 7 out of 10 co-defendants were serving long-term prison sentences. 32. Prior to his release, the applicant filed numerous but unsuccessful applications for release and appealed, likewise unsuccessfully, against the decisions prolonging his detention. He maintained that the length of his detention was excessive. 33. It appears that the criminal proceedings against the applicant are still pending. 34. From 27 March 2000 to 15 November 2002 the applicant served a prison sentence imposed on him in a separate set of proceedings.

6. The applicant was born in 1972 and is serving a prison sentence in Tirana Prison in Albania. 7. On the early morning of 5 July 1996 a murder took place in a bar in Kuçovë, committed by two persons wearing motorcycle helmets (kokore). 8. In the evening of the same day, the applicant was arrested on suspicion of premeditated murder while walking on a secondary road. The applicant fitted the description given to the police, namely that one of the perpetrators had long hair. The applicant was placed in pre-trial detention. The other perpetrator of the murder remained unidentified and could not be traced. Witnesses J., K. and L. made statements to the investigation team on that day in the absence of the applicant's counsel. Whereas the content of such statements was not submitted by the parties, it would appear that they implicated the applicant in the commission of the murder. 9. The police searched the route the applicant had travelled and they found a red motorcycle with a flat front tyre a few kilometres away. 10. On 6 July 1996 the prosecutor requested the validation of the applicant's arrest. On 7 July 1996 the Kuçovë District Court ordered the applicant's release for lack of reasonable suspicion and evidence. The applicant was represented by his lawyer A. 11. On 9 July 1996 the prosecutor appealed. 12. On 19 July 1996 the Tirana Court of Appeal quashed the Kuçovë District Court's decision and remanded the applicant in custody. The applicant could not be arrested as he had fled the country after his release on 17 July 1996, fearing a vendetta by the victim's relatives. It would appear that a few years prior to the murder, the victim had murdered the applicant's brother. Minutes of the crime scene investigation and other reports 13. A report on the examination and collection of material evidence of 5 July 1996 (proces-verbal për kqyrjen dhe sekuestrimin e provave materiale) contained information about the finding of seven bullet cartridges at the crime scene which were taken for ballistics examination. It was reported that the perpetrators had been on a red motorcycle and one of them had long hair. 14. A body search report (process-verbal i kontrollit personal) of the applicant, at the time of the arrest, stated that he was found to have “...one belt with a metal stud (me një tokëz metalike).” No other items were recorded in the body search report. 15. Another report on the examination and collection of material evidence contained information about a red Suzuki motorcycle found on the side of the road between Kuçovë and Fier. 16. There is no documented information regarding any developments from 19 July 1996 to 6 January 1997. It appears that on an unspecified date the proceedings were transferred to the Berat District Court (“the District Court”). 17. On 6 January 1997 the applicant was declared a fugitive, following unsuccessful efforts by the police to find him. The court assigned lawyer B. to represent him. 18. All hearings scheduled between 11 January 1997 and 28 October 1998 were adjourned. Two hearings scheduled between 15 February and 2 March 1999 were also adjourned owing to the absence of the prosecutor. No witnesses, including police officers, even though they had been summoned by the court, appeared. No other procedural measures were taken. 19. On 18 March 1999 the District Court decided to continue the proceedings in absentia. It was decided that B. would continue to defend the applicant. On the same day B. requested the court to declare the detention report (proces-verbal i kapjes në flagrancë), the personal search report (proces-verbal i kontrollit personal) and the reports on the examination and collection of material evidence null and void. He maintained that the detention report was forged, had been signed at a later stage by police officers and did not bear the signature of the applicant. Moreover, he suggested that the personal search report and the reports on the examination and collection of material evidence had not been prepared by judicial police officers in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure. No witnesses appeared on that day and no other evidence was considered by the court. 20. At the hearing of 26 April 1999, witness E., a police officer, testified. He stated that the applicant had been arrested at random together with a number of other young people as one of the suspects. While the other youngsters had been released on the strength of recognition assurances provided by the nearby villagers, the applicant had been taken to the police station as no one could vouch for his identity. E. stated that the applicant was carrying a shopping bag. The applicant was not searched by the police at the time of his arrest. He was not aware of any motorcycle such as had been entered into the record in which his name and signature appeared. The applicant's lawyer questioned the witness. 21. At the hearing of 23 June 1999 three witnesses appeared before the court. Witness G. testified that he was working at a petrol station when two people he did not know, who were on a motorcycle and wearing helmets, had enquired from a distance about petrol. He stated that he did not remember the colour of the motorcycle or the helmets. Nor had he noticed any particular details about the persons. He could not observe from a distance whether or not the front tyre of the motorcycle was flat. Witness H. testified that he was three hundred metres away from the crime scene when he saw two people with helmets, one of whom had committed the murder of 5 July 1996. There is no mention that he indicated the applicant as one of the perpetrators. Witness I. testified that while she had been having her morning coffee on the terrace of the café-bar where the crime occurred, she had heard the waitress scream and had run away. She had neither seen anyone behaving conspicuously nor heard the roar of a motorcycle. 22. At the hearing of 30 September 1999 witness F. gave his testimony. As a police officer, he testified that the applicant had been selected at random, following information the police had received on the radio. It was confirmed, on the basis of a statement by the head of a nearby village, that the applicant had been riding a red motorcycle. The red motorcycle was found six or seven kilometres from the place where the applicant had been arrested. The witness testified that he had not participated personally in the search for the applicant. 23. Between 15 October and 14 December six hearings were adjourned. None of the witnesses, including former police officers, appeared, while the applicant's representative was absent from three of them. 24. At the hearing of 23 December, noting the repeated absence of lawyer B., the court assigned lawyer C. to the applicant. The prosecutor stated that the identity of the head of the village, as mentioned in the testimony of witness F. on 30 September, had been discovered, but he was abroad and could not give his testimony before the court. 25. At the hearing of 12 January 2000 the court rejected the applicant's lawyer's request of 18 March 1999, which referred to the invalidity of several reports. It allowed the prosecutor to proceed with the reading out of the statements of J., K. and L., who had never been questioned by the applicant or his representative as regards their statement. The prosecutor and the applicant's representative made their final submissions. 26. On 12 January 2000 the Berat District Court found the applicant guilty of premeditated murder, acting in collusion with others and illegal possession of firearms. The judgment, which was given in absentia, relied on the above reports and testimonies of witnesses E., F., G., H., I. and statements of J., K. and L. The court sentenced the applicant to eighteen years' imprisonment. 27. On an unspecified date the applicant's father was informed of the Berat District Court's judgment. On 25 September 2000 he appointed a lawyer to lodge an appeal against that judgment. On an unspecified date the lawyer lodged an appeal with the Vlora Court of Appeal. According to the Code of Criminal Procedure, the time-limit for lodging an appeal against a district court's decision is ten days. 28. On 24 November 2000 the Vlora Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that it did not comply with the prescribed time-limits. It also noted that the date of notification of the Berat District Court's judgment to the applicant's father could not be determined. 29. Meanwhile, on 29 November 2001 the applicant was extradited from Italy, where he had been arrested on the strength of an extradition order from the Albanian authorities. 30. On 30 November 2001, after being granted leave to appeal out of time, the applicant lodged an appeal against the Berat District Court's judgment. He was represented by D., a lawyer of his own choosing. The applicant complained that the District Court's judgment was not adequately reasoned. He pointed out that none of the witnesses had accused him of having committed the crime of 5 July 1996. He questioned how he could have been identified if he had been wearing a motorcycle helmet. He also objected to the reading out of the statements of witnesses J., K. and L. who had never been questioned or examined before the District Court. 31. On 19 March 2002 the Vlorë Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) upheld the Berat District Court's judgment. It dismissed the applicant's request by relying on the witnesses' testimonies and the reading out of statements, which it found to be valid. Of the three judges who decided the case, two (Gj.G. and A.M.) had been members of the panel which had dismissed the applicant's appeal on 24 November 2000. 32. On 16 April 2002 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court. He complained that the personal search report, the reports on the examination and collection of material evidence taken at the investigation stage, and the reading out of statements of witnesses who had not been questioned during the criminal investigation, were invalid. He also argued that it was impossible for the witnesses to have identified him as the perpetrator of the crime, since the offender had allegedly been wearing a helmet. As regards the charge of the illegal possession of firearms, he claimed that there was no evidence to prove that he had used any weapons. 33. On 25 October 2002 the Supreme Court declared his appeal inadmissible, using standard wording (“the grounds of the appeal fall outside the scope of Article 472 of the Code of Criminal Procedure”). 34. On 8 May 2004 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint. In addition to complaining of the unfairness of trial and appeal proceedings, he also complained that the Court of Appeal's bench of 19 March 2002 was not impartial. 35. On 21 June 2004 the Constitutional Court, sitting as a bench of three judges, declared the applicant's complaints inadmissible. It held that the applicant's complaints did not raise any fair trial issues, but mainly concerned the assessment of evidence, which was the function of the lower courts.

5. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Katowice. 6. On 11 April 1997 the parliament passed the Law on disclosing work for or service in the State's security services or collaboration with them between 1944 and 1990 by persons exercising public functions (ustawa o ujawnieniu pracy lub służby w organach bezpieczeństwa państwa lub współpracy z nimi w latach 1944-1990 osób pełniących funkcje publiczne; “the 1997 Lustration Act”). It entered into force on 3 August 1997. Persons falling under the provisions of the 1997 Lustration Act, i.e. candidates or holders of public office such as ministers and members of parliament, were required to declare whether or not they had worked for or collaborated with the security services during the communist regime. The provisions of the Act extended to, inter alia, judges, prosecutors and advocates. 7. In December 1998 the applicant, who was an advocate, declared that he had not collaborated with the communist-era security services. 8. On 30 March 2004 the Commissioner of Public Interest (Rzecznik Interesu Publicznego) informed the applicant that he had doubts as to the truthfulness of his lustration declaration and invited him for an interview on 19 April 2004. 9. On 12 May 2004 the Commissioner dismissed the applicant's request for access to the case file. 10. On 8 December 2004 the Commissioner applied to the Warsaw Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) to institute lustration proceedings against the applicant on the grounds that he had lied in his lustration declaration by denying that he had collaborated with the secret services. 11. On 20 December 2004 the Warsaw Court of Appeal decided to allow the Commissioner's request and instituted lustration proceedings against the applicant. The applicant was informed that he could consult the case file in the secret registry of the Court of Appeal. 12. On 9 March 2005 the Warsaw Court of Appeal, acting as the first‑instance lustration court, found that between 1987 and 1989 the applicant had been an intentional and secret collaborator with the Security Service and had therefore submitted an untrue lustration declaration. 13. The applicant lodged an appeal in which he maintained, in particular, that the lustration proceedings had been in breach of the Resolution 1096 (1996) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. He also complained that the Commissioner had applied to the court to institute the lustration proceedings after the expiry of the time-limit of six months, calculated from the date he had notified the applicant about his doubts regarding the truthfulness of his declaration. 14. On 10 January 2006 the Warsaw Court of Appeal, acting as the second‑instance lustration court, upheld the impugned judgment. In particular the court established that the time-limit had been of a non‑binding nature and its expiry had not precluded the institution of the proceedings. 15. The applicant lodged a cassation appeal against the judgment. On 22 May 2007 the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy) dismissed his cassation appeal. 16. The applicant was removed from the Bar Association with the result that he is unable to practise as an advocate for a period of ten years in application of the 1997 Lustration Act.

4. The applicant was born in 1946 and resides in the town of Zhovti Vody, Dnipropetrovsk region, Ukraine. 5. On an unspecified date the applicant instituted proceedings in the Zhovtovodskyy Town Court of Dnipropetrovsk Region against his employer, a State-owned company, the Zhovti Vody Construction Department (Жовтоводське управління будівництва), in order to receive salary arrears and other payments. 6. On 21 December 2000 the court found for the applicant and awarded him 5,329.30[1] Ukrainian hryvnias (“UAH”) (Рішення Жовтоводського міського суду). 7. On 19 January 2001 the Zhovti Vody Town Bailiffs' Service (Відділ Державної виконавчої служби Жовтоводського міського управління юстиції) initiated the enforcement proceedings. 8. On an unspecified date the applicant instituted new proceedings in the same court against the same enterprise for further payments and compensation. 9. On 20 February 2002 the court found for the applicant and awarded him UAH 2,093.49[2]. 10. The applicant received UAH 650, but, according to him, the rest of the awards remain unpaid. 11. By letter of 4 April 2003, the Bailiffs' Service informed the applicant that the enforcement proceedings had been stayed because of the bankruptcy proceedings initiated against the debtor by a decision of 27 December 2001 of the Commercial Court of the Dnipropetrovsk Region. The Bailiffs' Service also stated that, according to the Law on the Introduction of a Moratorium on the Forced Sale of Property, on 26 December 2001 a ban on the forced sale of assets belonging to undertakings in which the State holds at least 25% of the share capital had been introduced. 12. By the decree of 5 October 2004 the Ministry of Fuel and Energy of Ukraine liquidated the debtor company.

4. The applicants’ dates of birth and places of residence are given in the Appendix. 5. The applicants stood as candidates in the parliamentary elections of 7 November 2010 and applied for registration as candidates in various single-mandate electoral constituencies (see Appendix). Mr Khalid Bagirov (application no. 17356/11) was nominated by the Karabakh Election Bloc. The other applicants were self-nominated. 6. As the Electoral Code required that each nomination as a candidate for parliamentary elections be supported by a minimum of 450 voters, the applicants on various dates submitted sheets containing the signature of more than 450 voters collected in support of their candidacy to their respective Constituency Electoral Commissions (“ConECs”). 7. Before a decision by a ConEC on registering an applicant as a candidate, the signature sheets and the other registration documents submitted by the applicants had first to be verified by special working groups (işçi qrupu) established by the ConECs. None of the applicants were invited to participate in the examination of their sheets of signatures by the ConEC working groups. 8. The ConECs on various dates (see Appendix) issued decisions to refuse the applicants’ requests for registration as a candidate, after the ConEC working groups had found that some of the voter signatures were invalid and that the remaining valid signatures had numbered fewer than 450. Signatures were found to be invalid on several grounds in each case, including: (a) falsified or repeat signatures (“signatures made repeatedly by the same individuals who had already signed sheets in the name of other individuals”); (b) incorrect personal information on voters (birth date, identity card number, and so on); (c) signatures by persons whose identity cards had expired; (d) signatures belonging to voters registered outside the constituency; (e) uncertified corrections in signature sheets; (f) “withdrawn” signatures claimed to have been obtained “by deceptive means”; and (g) unspecified “other grounds”; and so on. 9. None of the applicants were invited to the ConEC meetings where decisions to refuse their requests for registration were taken. In each case, despite the requirements of the law, all the relevant working group documents (expert opinions, minutes of the meeting, records and tables of results of the examination), as well as the ConEC decision itself, were only made available to the applicants after the decision to refuse their registration had been taken. In many cases, some of the documents were never made available to the applicants or were only made available to them as late as during the subsequent judicial proceedings in the Baku Court of Appeal. 10. Each applicant lodged a complaint with the Central Electoral Commission (“the CEC”) against the ConEC decision. They made some or all of the following complaints: (a) the findings of the ConEC working groups that such large numbers of signatures were invalid had been factually wrong, unsubstantiated, and arbitrary. Some of those findings of fact could easily have been rebutted by simply contacting the voter in question and confirming the authenticity of his or her signature. However, the ConECs had not taken any steps to corroborate their findings with any reliable evidence, such as contacting and questioning a number of voters randomly selected from the group whose signatures were suspected of being false. There were no specialist handwriting experts among the members of the ConEC working groups and therefore their findings on the authenticity of some signatures had been highly subjective and arbitrary; (b) the ConEC decisions to declare the signatures invalid had been arbitrary and in breach of the substantive and procedural requirements of the law. Relying on various provisions of the Electoral Code, the applicants argued that unintentional and rectifiable errors in the signature sheets could not serve as a reason to declare a voter signature invalid. If the errors found could be rectified by making the necessary corrections, the Electoral Code required the ConEC to notify the particular candidate of this within twenty‑four hours and to provide him or her with an opportunity to make corrections in the documents before deciding on his or her registration as a candidate. The ConECs had, however, declared large numbers of signatures invalid in the case of each applicant on the basis of easily rectifiable errors, without informing the candidates in advance and giving them an opportunity to make necessary corrections; (c) the procedure followed by the ConECs had also breached other requirements of the Electoral Code. Contrary to the requirements of Article 59.3, the applicants had not been informed in advance of the time and place of the examination of the signature sheets and their presence had not been ensured. Contrary to the requirements of Article 59.13 of the Electoral Code, the applicants had also not been provided with a copy of the minutes of the examination of the validity of the signature sheets at least twenty-four hours prior to the ConEC meeting dealing with their respective requests for registration. Subsequently, none of the applicants had been invited to the ConEC meetings, which had deprived them of the opportunity to argue for their position; (d) some of the grounds for invalidation were not provided by law and therefore to declare signatures invalid on those grounds had been unlawful. For example, the Electoral Code did not allow the invalidation of a signature merely because the voter’s identity document had recently expired. Likewise, it had been unlawful to invalidate signatures on unspecified and unexplained “other grounds”, because the Electoral Code provided for an exhaustive list of clear grounds for declaring signatures invalid and did not give electoral commissions any discretionary power to introduce any other grounds for that purpose; (e) in some cases, various local public officials and police officers had applied undue pressure on voters or signature collectors to “withdraw” their signatures on the grounds that they had been tricked to sign in the candidate’s favour “by deceptive means”. 11. Enclosed with their complaints to the CEC, some of the applicants submitted statements by a number of voters affirming the authenticity of their signatures. However, those statements were not taken into consideration by the CEC. 12. The CEC arranged for another examination of the signature sheets by members of its own working group. None of the applicants was invited to participate in that examination process. The CEC working group found in each case that large numbers of signatures were invalid and that the remaining valid signatures were below the minimum required by law. 13. In each case, the number of signatures found to be invalid by the CEC working group differed from the number given by the particular ConEC working group, with differences often being significant. Furthermore, in almost every case the grounds for declaring signatures invalid given by the CEC had been different from the grounds given for the same signature sheets by the ConEC. In most cases a certain number of the total signatures were also declared invalid on the grounds that they had “appeared” to have been falsified, that is, “made by the same person in the name of other people” (“ehtimal ki, eyni şəxs tərəfindən icra olunmuşdur”). 14. On various dates, the CEC rejected the applicants’ complaints (see Appendix). None of the applicants were invited to attend the CEC meeting dealing with their complaint. Moreover, in each case, all the relevant CEC documents (including the working group documents) were only made available to the applicants after the CEC decision had been taken, while in some cases such documents were never given to them at all, or were given as late as at the stage of judicial appeal proceedings. 15. On various dates, each of the applicants lodged an appeal with the Baku Court of Appeal against the decisions of the electoral commissions. They reiterated the complaints they had made before the CEC concerning the ConEC decisions and procedures. They also raised some or all of the following complaints concerning the CEC’s decisions and procedures: (a) contrary to the requirements of electoral law, the CEC had failed to notify them of its meetings and ensure their presence during the examination of the signature sheets and their complaints; (b) contrary to the requirements of electoral law, some or all of the relevant CEC documents had not been made available to them, depriving them of the opportunity to mount an effective challenge to the CEC decisions; (c) the decisions of the electoral commissions had been based on expert opinions that had contained nothing more than conjecture and speculation (for example, that the signatures had “appeared” (“ehtimal ki”) to have been falsified), instead of properly established facts; (d) in those cases where the applicants had submitted additional documents in support of their complaints, the CEC had ignored those submissions and failed to take them into account. 16. Relying on a number of provisions of domestic law, and directly on Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, the applicants claimed that their right to stand for election had been infringed. 17. On various dates (see Appendix), the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed appeals by the applicants, finding that their arguments were irrelevant or unsubstantiated and that there were no grounds for quashing the decisions of the CEC. 18. The applicants lodged cassation appeals with the Supreme Court, reiterating their previous complaints and arguing that the Baku Court of Appeal had not carried out a fair examination of the cases and had delivered unreasoned judgments. 19. On various dates (see Appendix), the Supreme Court dismissed the applicants’ appeals as unsubstantiated, without examining their arguments in detail, and found no grounds to doubt the findings of the electoral commissions or of the Baku Court of Appeal.

4. The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Klaipėda. 5. Following a report to the police by two witnesses, D.K. and S.N., on 22 April 1998 a pre-trial investigation was started regarding several crimes. The investigation of other crimes was joined to the case on various dates. Ultimately 11 different crimes were investigated. On 28 April 1998 the applicant's place of residence was searched. On 30 July 1998 the seizure of the applicant's assets was ordered. However, according to the Government, no assets were discovered. On 17 August 1998 the applicant was questioned as a suspect. On 8 September 1999 the applicant was officially informed of the accusations, questioned as an accused and ordered not to leave his place of residence. On 13 August 2001 the public prosecutor again informed the applicant of the accusations against him and questioned him. On 20 August 2001 the investigation was officially concluded and, as of that date until 21 December 2001, the applicant and his co-accused had the possibility to acquaint themselves with the case file. On 29 December 2001 the public prosecutor concluded the pre-trial investigation in the case by issuing the final bill of indictment and transferred the case to the courts. 6. The Government specified that the case file consisted of 10 volumes and concerned 9 victims and 10 defendants facing 11 charges. The Government also submitted that, in the course of the pre-trial investigation, D.K. and S.N. had disappeared in June 1998. They were found abroad and returned to Lithuania in November 1998, but absconded again after June 1999. The authorities later received information that D.K. had been killed in March 2000. S.N. was never found again. 7. On 14 January 2002 the Klaipėda Regional Court set the dates for trial. The court held 39 hearings, 17 of which were adjourned because one of the parties, other than the applicant, failed to be present. Several hearings were postponed because one of the co-accused went missing. On 29 January 2003 the court separated the part of the case which concerned the missing co-accused, and continued the examination of remainder of the case. The hearing of 1 September 2003 was delayed until 15 September 2003 as the applicant's lawyer had died and a replacement had to be organised. On 9 December 2003 the applicant failed to appear at the hearing and it was postponed until 17 December 2003, when it was decided to continue the examination of the case in his absence. The court took into account the fact that the applicant had already submitted his final statement at the hearing of 28 November 2003. 8. On 19 January 2004 the Klaipėda Regional Court sentenced the applicant to five years' imprisonment for an organised burglary with 3 other co-accused. He was acquitted of several charges: two due to a lack of evidence and another for being time-barred. The court examined the testimonies of 7 witnesses and 4 victims, as well as the submissions of the police and other evidence. It found that the applicant had not provided any credible evidence to negate the testimonies of the various witnesses. D.K. and S.N.'s testimonies given during the pre-trial investigation were read out at the hearings. One of the co-accused, M.M., also gave a deposition incriminating the applicant. M.M. was sentenced by the same judgment but he was dispensed from carrying out the sentence on mitigating grounds. 9. On 19 January 2005, after four hearings, the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction of the applicant. The court noted that the applicant's request to question D.K. and S.N. had been dismissed because the former had died and the latter was missing. Their testimonies during the pre-trial investigation were read out during the court hearings in accordance with procedural law and were evaluated in the context of all other evidence and the testimonies of other witnesses. No substantial discrepancies in their submissions existed. The court was able to take into consideration the submissions of these two witnesses, as not only testimony given during hearings, but also that given during pre-trial investigations may be legitimate and relevant for the case under examination. These testimonies were not treated as superior to the other evidence in the case. As regards the submissions of the co-accused M.M., the court also noted that his submissions had been assessed in the context of all other evidence and the relevant procedural rules had been observed. Moreover, there was nothing to put in doubt his mental state and his ability to recollect the facts. The Court of Appeal concluded that the court of first instance had properly assessed all the evidence in the case and clarified the discrepancies. Therefore the case had been thoroughly examined. No bias or unfairness was disclosed in the latter's decision. 10. On 28 June 2005 the Supreme Court, in oral proceedings, dismissed the cassation appeal lodged by the applicant. The court observed that the reading of the testimonies of the two missing witnesses had been justified in the circumstances of the case and had been in accordance with the domestic law. The court also noted that it did not deal with the evaluation of the circumstances of the case as this was the prerogative of the lower courts.

11. The applicant is a United Kingdom national, born in 1971 and living in Bristol. She lives with her two children in a house owned by the local housing association, Solon Housing Association (SHA). 12. The SHA moved the applicant and her children to 50 Concorde Drive in 1994 following a report that she was suffering serious racial abuse at her then current address. 13. Concorde Drive is in the parliamentary constituency of Bristol North‑West. On 17 July 1996, the member of Parliament (MP) for the Bristol North-West constituency, Mr Michael Stern, initiated a debate on the subject of municipal housing policy (and the SHA in particular) in the House of Commons. During the course of his speech, the MP referred specifically to the applicant several times, giving her name and address and referring to members of her family. He commented as follows: “The subject of anti-social behaviour by what newspapers frequently call 'neighbours from hell' has been a staple of social housing throughout the country for some time, and the government are, of course, in the process of taking steps to provide local authorities with the power to do something about such behaviour. Whether authorities such as Bristol will actually use the power is another matter. My reason for raising the subject of 50 Concorde Drive in my constituency and the behaviour of its shifting population is not just to draw attention to another example of neighbours from hell; it is also to note that housing practices by local authorities, which it appeared had been stamped out in the 1970s, are beginning to re-emerge in the voluntary housing movement. ... Solon Housing Association (South-West) Ltd purchased 50 Concorde Drive in my constituency in the early 1990s ... and in early 1994 it moved in as the new tenants [the applicant] and her two children, who are now aged three and six. Her brother, currently in prison, also gives 50 Concorde Drive as his permanent address. ... The Government's own Green Paper, 'Anti-Social Behaviour on Council Estates', published in April 1995, noted: 'Such behaviour manifests itself in many different ways and at varying levels of intensity. This can include vandalism, noise, verbal and physical abuse, threats of violence, racial harassment, damage to property, trespass, nuisance from dogs, car repairs on the street, joyriding, domestic violence, drugs and other criminal activities such as burglary.' Inevitably, the majority – if not all – of these activities have been forced on the neighbours of 50 Concorde Drive during the tenancy of that property and the garage further up the street that goes with it, by [the applicant], her children and their juvenile visitors, who seem strangely reluctant to attend school during normal hours, and even more adult visitors who come to the house at all times of the day and night, frequently gaining entry by unorthodox means such as the bathroom window. Indeed, it is fair to say that there have been times when occupation of the house by the visitors has been more frequent than that of [the applicant]. So far as the garages grouped further along Concorde Drive are concerned – one of the garages automatically comes with the tenancy of No. 50 – complaints consist of numerous youths hanging around, vandalising cars, climbing on and damaging the garage roofs, under the apparent leadership, or at least the spirited concurrence of the [applicant's] family, adult and children, which makes improvement of those garages by other owners a complete waste of time. More seriously, arson inside the garage belonging to No. 50, and the regular destruction of its doors, have led other legitimate users of the garage to park their vehicles elsewhere for safety reasons. But it is the conduct of [the applicant] and her circle which gives most cause for concern. Its impact on their immediate neighbours extends to perhaps a dozen houses on either side. Since the matter was first drawn to my attention in 1994, I have received reports of threats against other children; of fighting in the house, the garden and the street outside; of people coming and going 24 hours a day – in particular, a series of men late at night; of rubbish and stolen cars dumped nearby; of glass strewn in the road in the presence of [the applicant] and regular visitors; of alleged drug activity; and of all the other common regular annoyances to neighbours that are associated with a house of this type.” 14. The applicant denies the truth of the majority of the allegations. The MP has never tried to communicate with her regarding the complaints made about her by her neighbours and has never attempted to verify the accuracy of his comments made in his speech either before or after the debate. Shortly before the debate, the MP issued a press release to several newspapers, including the Bristol-based Evening Post and the national Daily Express. The press release was subject to an embargo prohibiting disclosure until the precise time when the speech commenced. The contents of the press release were substantially the same as those of the MP's speech. The following day, both newspapers carried articles consisting of purported extracts of the speech, although these were based upon the press release. Both articles included photographs of the applicant and mentioned her name and address. The main headline in the Evening Post was: “MP Attacks 'Neighbours From Hell' ” In the Daily Express the headline was: “MP names nightmare neighbour” 15. The applicant was approached by journalists and television reporters asking for her response to the MP's allegations and her comments were summarised in each newspaper the same day, although they were not given as much prominence. 16. The applicant subsequently received hate mail addressed to her at 50 Concorde Drive. One letter stated that she should “be in houses with your own kind, not in amongst decent owners”. Another letter stated: “You silly black bitch, I am just writing to let you know that if you do not stop your black nigger wogs nuisance, I will personally sort you and your smelly jungle bunny kids out.” 17. The applicant was also stopped in the street, spat at and abused by strangers as “the neighbour from hell”. 18. On 7 August 1996 a report was prepared for the SHA by a group which monitors racial harassment and attacks. The report found that “it has now come to the point where [the applicant] has been put in considerable danger as a result of her name being released to the public”. The report recommended that the applicant be re-housed as a matter of urgency. She was re-housed in October 1996 and her children were obliged to change schools. 19. On 2 August 1996 the applicant wrote through her solicitors to the MP outlining her complaints and seeking his comments thereon. The letter was referred to the Office of the Parliamentary Speaker by the MP. The Speaker's representative replied to the MP on 12 August 1996 to the effect that the MP's remarks were protected by absolute parliamentary privilege: “Subject to the rules of order in debate, Members may state whatever they think fit in debate, however offensive it may be to the feelings or injurious to the character of individuals, and they are protected by this privilege from any action for libel, as well as from any other molestation.” This letter was copied and forwarded to the applicant's solicitors in September 1996. 20. Also on 2 August 1996, the applicant's solicitors wrote to the then Prime Minister, Mr John Major, asking that, as leader of the political party to which Mr Stern belonged, he investigate the applicant's complaints and take appropriate action. The Prime Minister's Office replied on 6 August 1996, stating that: “It is a matter for individual Members of Parliament to decide how they deal with their constituents and it is not for the Prime Minister to comment. There is a strict Parliamentary convention that Members of Parliament do not intervene in the affairs of other Members' constituencies and this applies equally to the Prime Minister.”

5. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Šoštanj. 6. On 15 June 1992 the applicant was injured in an accident at work. The applicant’s employer had taken out insurance with the insurance company ZT. On 22 December 1993 the applicant instituted civil proceedings with the Celje Basic Court, Celje Unit (Temeljno sodišče v Celju, Enota v Celju) against ZT seeking damages in the amount of 5,399,253 tolars (approximately 22,500 euros) for the injuries sustained. On 1 April 1994 the court held a hearing and decided to issue a written judgment. The judgment, upholding the applicant’s claim in part, was served on the applicant on 16 May 1994. 7. On 26 May 1994 the applicant appealed to the Celje Higher Court (Višje sodišče v Celju). ZT cross-appealed. On 19 October 1994 the court dismissed both appeals. The decision was served on the applicant on 15 November 1994. 8. On 28 November 1994 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court (Vrhovno sodišče). ZT cross-appealed. On 29 November 1996 the court dismissed the applicant’s appeal, but allowed the ZT’s appeal and reduced the awarded damages. The decision was served on the applicant on 6 January 1997. 9. On 5 March 1997 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. On 26 January 2000 the Constitutional Court (Ustavno sodišče) declared the case admissible and on 7 December 2000, ruling on the merits, dismissed the appeal. The decision was served on the applicant on 28 December 2000. 10. On 18 November 1993 the applicant was injured in an accident at work. The applicant’s employer had taken out insurance with the insurance company ZT. On 27 December 1996 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against ZT in the Celje Local Court (Okrajno sodišče v Celju) seeking damages in the amount of 1,560,000 tolars (approximately 6,500 euros) for the injuries sustained. 11. On 1 June 1997 ZT instituted proceedings in the Celje Local Court (Okrajno sodišče v Celju) against the applicant seeking 500,000 tolars for access payment of damages in the first set of proceedings. 12. On 4 September 1997 the court decided to join the two cases. On 15 March 1999 the applicant requested that a date be set for a hearing. On 15 June 1999 the court held a hearing and decided that it would issue a written judgment. The judgment, upholding the applicant’s claim in part and ZT’s claim in whole, was served on the applicant on 24 June 1999. 13. On 28 June 1999 the applicant appealed to the Celje Higher Court. On 10 May 2000 the court dismissed the appeal. The decision was served on the applicant on 5 June 2000. 14. On 4 July 2000 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court. On 5 April 2001 the court dismissed the appeal. The decision was served on the applicant on 14 May 2001. 15. On 8 June 2001 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. On 18 November 2002 the Constitutional Court declared the case admissible.

9. The applicant was born in 1949 and is currently in Clairvaux Prison. 10. The applicant, who claims to be a revolutionary by profession, was taken into custody on 15 August 1994. He was placed under judicial investigation in connection with a series of terrorist attacks in France and was given a life sentence on 25 December 1997 for the murder of two police officers and an acquaintance on 27 June 1975. 11. He was held in solitary confinement from the moment he was first taken into custody in mid-August 1994 until 17 October 2002, notably in La Santé Prison (Paris). 12. According to his lawyer, this entailed his being held in a 6.84 square metre cell that was run-down and poorly insulated, with an open toilet area. The applicant was prohibited all contact with other prisoners and even prison warders and was only allowed to leave his cell once his fellow inmates had returned to theirs. His sole permitted activity outside his cell was a two-hour daily walk in a triangular area that was 15 metres long and 7.5 metres wide at the base, receding to 1 metre at the vertex. This area was walled in and covered with wire mesh. His only recreational activity was reading the newspapers or watching television on a rented set. The only visits he received were from his lawyers and, once a month, a priest. The prison authorities ignored his requests to be allowed visits from anyone else. Mail intended for the applicant had gone missing, although it had not been officially confiscated, and he had not received a winter jacket that had been brought to the prison for him in October 1999 until 16 February 2000. 13. The Government did not dispute these facts. They said that the cell was lit by natural light, a ceiling light and a reading lamp. None of the members of the applicant’s family had ever applied for permission to visit. Only two requests to visit had been turned down, both from journalists. 14. The documents in the case file show that the applicant has received visits from 58 different lawyers during his time in prison. His current representative, who is also his wife under Islamic law, visited him more than 640 times between 27 June 1997 and 29 April 2002. 15. The parties have produced a series of decisions requiring the applicant to be held in solitary confinement for successive three-month periods. 16. The first was taken when the applicant was first detained (15 August 1994). It consists of a form on which the following boxes were ticked: “Need to prevent communication with one or more other prisoners” and “Undermining of order and discipline in the prison”. There were no observations by the applicant. The same day, a doctor issued a medical certificate stating: “[The applicant’s] health is compatible with solitary confinement. However, he must, if possible, have complete rest for eight days.” 17. A decision dated 3 November 1994 to prolong the applicant’s solitary confinement from 15 November 1994 to 15 February 1995 was approved by the Regional Director’s Office of the Prison Service. The reasons stated were the same, but the applicant made the following observations: “I consider that these solitary-confinement measures, especially the disturbances at night, indicate a desire to harass a political prisoner.” In a medical certificate issued the same day, a doctor “certif[ied] that [the applicant’s] health [was] compatible with his continued solitary confinement”. 18. A decision of 20 January 1995, which was applicable from 15 February to 15 May 1995, cited the same reasons and was approved by the Regional Director’s Office. The applicant refused to sign the notice informing him of the decision. In a medical certificate issued the same day, a doctor “certif[ied] that [the applicant’s] health [was] compatible with his continued solitary confinement for administrative reasons”. 19. A decision dated 25 April 1995, which was approved by the Regional Director’s Office and was applicable from 15 May to 15 August 1995, spoke of the “need to prevent communication with one or more other prisoners” and a “security measure”. The applicant was transferred that day to Fresnes Prison. 20. A proposal to prolong the measure dated 26 July 1995 cited the “need to prevent communication with one or more other prisoners”. On 27 July 1995 a doctor from Fresnes Prison issued a certificate stating: “Health currently compatible with continued solitary confinement.” 21. On 11 August 1995 the measure was prolonged for a period of three months starting on 15 August 1995. 22. On 10 November 1995 a doctor from Fresnes Prison issued a medical certificate stating that the applicant’s health was satisfactory and compatible with solitary confinement. A further proposal to prolong the measure dated the same day referred to “the undermining of order or discipline in the prison”. 23. On 20 November 1995 the measure was prolonged for a period of three months starting on 15 November 1995. 24. A proposal of 24 January 1996 for a further extension referred to “the need to prevent communication with one or more other prisoners”. On 25 January 1996 a doctor from Fresnes Prison issued a certificate stating that the applicant’s health was satisfactory. 25. On 4 March 1996 the measure was prolonged for a period of three months starting on 15 February 1996. 26. On 19 April 1996 a doctor from Fresnes Prison issued a certificate stating that the applicant’s health was compatible with his detention in the segregation unit. On 7 May 1996 the measure was extended for a period of three months commencing on 15 May 1996. A proposal dated 17 April 1996 mentioned a “precautionary or security measure required for one or more of the following reasons: need to prevent communication with one or more other prisoners”. 27. It was not until 31 October 1996 that the applicant was notified of the measure applicable for the period from 15 May to 15 August 1996. He made the following observation: “I do not think it right that I should be asked to sign more than five months late.” 28. On 15 July 1996 the applicant was notified of a measure which referred to the “need to prevent communication with one or more other prisoners” and to “international terrorism”. 29. On 22 October 1996 a doctor from Fresnes Prison issued a certificate stating that the applicant’s health was compatible with his detention in solitary confinement. 30. A decision dated 31 October 1996, which was applicable from 15 November 1996 to 15 February 1997, referred only to the “need to prevent communication with one or more other prisoners”. The applicant made the following observations on the notification slip: “I note that Mr ..., the director, has already replied to these observations, even before I have made them, it is stated below: 07.11.1996 before the Sentence Enforcement Board in the prison. Consequently, the remarks I am required to make have become superfluous. Even so, my solitary confinement is a form of torture.” This measure was authorised by the head of the Prison Service at the Ministry of Justice on 14 November 1996, as were those that followed. 31. On 17 January 1997 a doctor from the Paris Regional Health Authority certified that he had examined the applicant and found his health to be compatible with solitary confinement. 32. A proposal made on 20 January 1997 referred to the “need to protect [the applicant] from the rest of the prison population” and the “need to prevent communication with one or more other prisoners”. The applicant made the following remarks: “I note that I am increasingly subject to this base harassment and am being singled out as a political prisoner. I reject the reasons given for keeping me in solitary confinement.” 33. On 23 April 1997 a doctor from the Paris Regional Health Authority certified that solitary confinement was not contraindicated for the applicant. 34. The following reasons were given for a proposal for a further extension dated 25 April 1997: “Precautionary or security measure for one or more of the following reasons: (i) need to protect you from the rest of the prison population; (ii) need to prevent communication with one or more other prisoners.” The applicant made the following comments: “I have not had a check-up, been weighed or had my blood pressure taken, etc. ... I note that the lower section of the questionnaire has already been filled in, thus making a mockery of the observations which I have been asked to make. Please give me a further complete medical check-up.” 35. A decision of 21 July 1997 referred in addition to “the undermining of order and discipline in the prison” and “potential dangerousness linked to acts of terrorism”. The applicant made the following comments: “I have not had a medical certificate following a medical examination and you are using forged documents which you do not even dare to show me. I request an immediate interview with the governor.” 36. A decision of 13 August 1997 again cited the “need to prevent communication with one or more other prisoners”. 37. On 14 October 1997 a doctor at Fresnes Prison issued a certificate certifying that the applicant’s health was satisfactory. Proposals of 21 October 1997 and 23 January 1998 were in the same terms as the decision of 13 August 1997. On signing the proposal of 21 October, the applicant stated: “I sign under protest against an unjust repressive measure (decision) against a political prisoner held hostage by the French State.” 38. On 23 January 1998 a Fresnes Prison doctor issued a certificate certifying that the applicant’s health was satisfactory. 39. It was followed by a further certificate on 22 April 1998 stating that the applicant was fit enough to remain in solitary confinement and a certificate of 23 July 1998 stating that solitary confinement was not contraindicated. A further certificate drawn up on 21 October 1998 stated that the applicant was in satisfactory health and fit enough to remain in solitary confinement. 40. Proposals made on 22 April, 23 July and 19 October 1998 cited the need for “precautionary and security measures in view of the prisoner’s character and record”. The applicant commented as follows on the proposal of 22 April 1998: “I acknowledge receipt of notice but protest against the renewal of this unjustified measure of vile political repression that has been imposed on me. Please provide me with a copy.” On the proposal of 19 October 1998, he noted: “The signature on this notice by the disloyal deputy director Mr V. further attests to the unfairness of repressive measures imposed by a prison service that acts unlawfully against political inmates such as me.” 41. The measure dated 19 October 1998 referred to “precautionary and security measures in view of the prisoner’s character and record”. 42. On 15 January 1999 a doctor from La Santé Prison issued a medical certificate in which he stated: “The applicant’s health is currently compatible with his continued detention in solitary confinement subject to his receiving psychiatric treatment.” Proposals made on 14 January and 8 April 1999 stated: “The prisoner must remain in administrative solitary confinement on order and security grounds, in view of his character and record and the nature of his court cases.” 43. The Ministry of Justice stated in decisions of 20 January and 20 April 1999: “The character of this prisoner, who is an HSP [high-security prisoner] and objectively dangerous, in particular because of the nature and length of the sentence he faces, justifies his continued solitary confinement on order and security grounds.” 44. On 9 April 1999 the senior doctor at La Santé Prison issued a certificate which read: “The circular of December 1998 on solitary confinement states that the opinion of a doctor will only be sought after a year’s confinement. Last certificate issued on (illegible). I do not, therefore, need to append a certificate regarding prolongation to this note.” 45. On 23 April 1999 another prison doctor certified that the applicant’s health was compatible with his detention or continued detention in solitary confinement. 46. A further certificate dated 20 July 1999 confirmed that the applicant’s health was compatible with his continued detention in solitary confinement. 47. A decision of 22 July 1999 cited the following reasons: “You must remain in solitary confinement for a further period of three months on order and security grounds, in view of your character, your classification as an HSP, and the nature of your convictions and of the cases currently pending.” 48. A decision of 25 October 1999, which took effect on 15 November 1999, read as follows: “It is necessary to prolong your solitary confinement for a further period of three months in order to preserve order and security in the prison in view of your dangerousness, your ability to influence fellow inmates and the risk of your escaping given the substantial aid potentially at your disposal.” The applicant made the following observations: “I note that the infamous masquerade by the Zionist militant Elisabeth Guigou, who runs the French Ministry of Justice on behalf of the imperialist forces that are seeking to reduce France to the level of a suzerain of the United States, continues. To heck with Human Rights and with Law itself. ALLOUHA AKBAR.” 49. On 1 February 2000 the authorities relied on “order and security grounds, in view of your character, your classification as an HSP and the offences for which you have been imprisoned”. 50. The decisions of 27 April, 20 July and 20 October 2000 were couched in identical terms to the decision of 25 October 1999, save that the end of the sentence read “given your access to outside help”. 51. On 13 July 2000 the senior doctor at La Santé Prison issued a medical certificate which read: “I, the undersigned, ... declare that [the applicant] is in quite astounding physical and mental condition after six years in solitary confinement. However, it is not proper for a patient’s doctor to be required to issue a certificate that ought to be a matter for expert opinion. It is very difficult for a doctor to sanction solitary confinement on administrative, rather than medical, grounds.” 52. On 3 October 2000 another doctor issued a certificate in the following terms: “I, the undersigned, ... certify that I have today examined [the applicant]. No clinical examination was carried out. However, in view of his current mental condition, I am unable to give a medical opinion on whether he is fit to remain in solitary confinement.” 53. On 5 January and 23 January 2001 the Ministry of Justice ratified decisions by the governors of Fleury-Mérogis and La Santé Prisons, dated 30 December 2000 and 22 January 2001 respectively, to place the applicant in solitary confinement after previous orders had automatically lapsed following his transfer. 54. The following reasons were stated in the decision of 22 January 2001: “Regard has been had to your personality, your classification as an HSP, the length of your sentence (LI [life imprisonment]), the nature of the offences and your involvement in an international terrorist network. All these objective indicators of dangerousness make your continued solitary confinement necessary on security grounds.” 55. On 20 March 2001 a doctor from La Santé Prison certified that she had seen the applicant but had not been able to carry out a physical examination. She added: “However, in view of his current mental state, I am unable to give a medical opinion on whether he is fit to remain in solitary confinement.” On 28 March 2001 the applicant commented as follows: “I have once again filled in this form, having already done so on 19 March ... I denounce ‘the white torture’ of perpetual solitary confinement which, following the ‘serious provocation of 28 December 2000’, has been aggravated by the obstruction of the fanlight, which now only opens to an angle of 30o (7.5 cm), preventing fresh air getting in. This is on top of the ban on my receiving visits or French lessons, in breach of the undertakings. You are committing a crime of ‘lese-humanity’.” 56. On 28 March 2001 a doctor from the Cochin Hospital practising in La Santé Prison issued the following certificate: “I, the undersigned, ... state that the doctors from the medical service at Paris La Santé Prison are not qualified to judge whether the physical and mental condition of the prisoner Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, who is currently being held in La Santé, is compatible with his continued solitary confinement.” 57. On 22 April 2001 it was decided to prolong the solitary confinement “in order to preserve order and security in the prison in view of your dangerousness, your ability to influence fellow inmates and the risk of your escaping given your access to outside help”. The same reasons were cited in a further extension of 18 June 2001, while a decision of September 2001 was worded in almost identical terms. 58. On 23 May 2001 the doctor in charge of the Outpatient Consultation and Treatment Unit (“the OCTU”) wrote to the governor of La Santé Prison in these terms: “I have met Mr Ilich Ramirez Sanchez ... as I was asked for an opinion on whether there is any contraindication to this patient’s remaining in solitary confinement. Even though Mr Ramirez Sanchez is in reasonable physical and mental condition, strict solitary confinement for more than six years and nine months is ultimately bound to cause psychological harm. It is my duty as a doctor to alert you to these potential consequences so that you may take an informed decision. ...” 59. On 20 June 2001 the doctor who issued the certificate of 20 March 2001 issued a second certificate in similar terms. 60. The following reasons were stated in a decision that was applicable from 22 July 2001: “... in order to preserve order and security in the prison in view of your dangerousness, your ability to influence fellow inmates and the risk of your escaping given your access to outside help.” 61. On 20 September 2001 the doctor in charge of the OCTU issued a medical certificate after examining the applicant “for the purposes of the medical opinion required for continued solitary confinement”. He stated that the applicant presented “a physical and mental condition that was entirely reasonable after seven years in solitary confinement”, adding, however, that this opinion does not constitute an expert opinion, which I am not qualified to give”. 62. The following reasons were given for prolonging the solitary confinement in a decision of 4 October 2001: “It is necessary to prolong your solitary confinement in order to preserve order and security in the prison and to avoid your exerting an influence over your fellow inmates or attempting to escape.” In his observations, the applicant noted in particular: “More than seven years of strict solitary confinement, a ban on receiving visits or French lessons and a steady reduction in the amount of fresh air in the isolation cell from which even the old wooden school desk has been removed all serve to demonstrate the unfairness of the repressive measures that have been taken against a revolutionary political leader who will not be broken.” 63. On 20 December 2001 the measure was renewed for a further three months on the following grounds: “Regard has been had to your character, your classification as an HSP, the length of your sentence (LI), the nature of the offences and your involvement in an international terrorist network. All these objective indicators of dangerousness make your continued solitary confinement necessary on security grounds.” 64. Decisions of 10 January, 25 March and 8 July 2002 read as follows: “It is necessary for you to remain in solitary confinement in order to preserve order and security in the prison and to avoid your exerting an influence over your fellow inmates or attempting to escape. The fact that you have received a life sentence, your classification as a high-security prisoner and the nature of the offences for which you have been prosecuted militate in favour of your remaining in solitary confinement.” 65. On 13 June 2002 an assistant doctor from the OCTU at La Santé Prison issued a medical certificate in the following terms: “I, the undersigned, Doctor ..., an assistant doctor from the OCTU at La Santé Prison in Paris, certify that I have examined Mr Ramirez Sanchez Ilich, who was born on 12/10/49, in connection with a request for him to remain in solitary confinement. From the medical standpoint, the problem posed by prolonged solitary confinement over a number of years is that it may affect the prisoner’s physical and mental health.” 66. On 29 July 2002 the doctor in charge of the OCTU at La Santé Prison provided the Ministry of Health with the following summary of the medical care the applicant was receiving: “This patient, who, as you are aware, is in the segregation unit, receives two mandatory medical visits from a member of the OCTU medical team every week, as required by the French Criminal Code. He is currently in excellent somatic health. I am not qualified to express an opinion on his mental health. In addition, Mr Ramirez Sanchez may on request consult members of the OCTU team independently of the mandatory medical visits to the segregation unit. He has thus been able to consult an ophthalmologist ... and has been prescribed corrective glasses. He has consulted a general practitioner several times independently of mandatory visits to the segregation unit on ... Biological tests are performed regularly. ... The treatment Mr Ramirez Sanchez has been receiving can be equated to comfort treatment: ... It should be noted that Mr Ramirez Sanchez has refused any psychological help from the RMPS [Regional Medical and Psychological Service]. ...” 67. In September 2002 a further decision to prolong the solitary confinement was taken “in order to preserve security and order, which are under serious threat owing to the applicant’s implication in terrorist networks, his dangerousness and the risk of his escaping”. 68. On 17 October 2002 the applicant was transferred to Saint-Maur Prison (département of Indre), where his solitary confinement ended. On 13 May 2003 he lodged a fresh application with the Court, in which he complained of the new conditions in which he was being held and, in particular, of the distance from Paris. 69. In June 2003 a book that had been written by the applicant with the help of a journalist was published under the title L’islam révolutionnaire (“Revolutionary Islam”). 70. On 27 August 2003 the Indre Health Inspector wrote the following letter to the Ministry of Health: “Mr Ramirez Sanchez received a somatic and psychiatric medical examination on his arrival at the prison on 17 October 2002. He has at no stage been placed in solitary confinement in Saint-Maur Prison. As regards his somatic health, Mr Ramirez Sanchez receives the statutory care and may consult the OCTU on request. As to his mental health, he was seen by an RMPS psychiatrist as part of the standard induction procedure. No follow-up was prescribed at the time and the patient has not asked to see a psychiatrist since. He was offered an examination and this took place on 26 August 2003. The RMPS have not recommended any follow-up to that appointment.” 71. On 18 March 2004 the applicant was transferred to Fresnes Prison in the Paris area where he was again placed in solitary confinement. This followed a television programme in which, in the course of a telephone interview with a journalist, the applicant refused among other things to express any remorse for his crimes to the victims on the grounds that there were “no innocent victims”. 72. On 6 August 2004 a doctor at Fresnes Prison issued a medical certificate in the following terms: “I, the undersigned, ... certify that the prolonged period of solitary confinement to which Mr Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, who was born on 12 October 1949, is subject is detrimental to his mental health. Bringing the solitary confinement to an end would go a long way to facilitating the monitoring of a chronic somatic pathology from which the patient has recently started to suffer which requires medical supervision and regular biological tests.” 73. On 20 December 2005 another doctor issued a medical certificate which read: “I, the undersigned, ... regularly see Mr Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, a prisoner in the segregation unit. His continued solitary confinement is damaging his health; it has now lasted for several years and it would appear desirable from the medical standpoint for it to cease.” 74. On 24 January 2005 the applicant was transferred to Fleury-Mérogis Prison and on 24 November 2005 to La Santé Prison. In both institutions he was kept in solitary confinement with the measure being periodically renewed, including on 17 February 2005 (see below). 75. On 30 June and 5 October 2005 the senior doctor at the OCTU at Fleury-Mérogis Prison issued two medical certificates in exactly the same terms: “I, the undersigned, ... certify that Mr Ramirez Sanchez Ilich, who was born on 12 October 1949, has been in my care since his arrival at the prison. The problems which Mr Ramirez Sanchez has had with his physical health are now stable. Mr Ramirez Sanchez continues to make the same complaints about the difficulties of being held in full solitary confinement. Since he does not wish to be treated by the Regional Medical and Psychological Service at Fleury-Mérogis Prison and I am not qualified to determine the impact of the conditions in which he is detained on his mental state, a medical and psychological assessment would be desirable. Certificate issued at the request of the prison authorities and delivered by hand for whatever purpose it may serve in law.” 76. On 5 January 2006 the applicant was transferred to Clairvaux Prison, where he is held under the ordinary prison regime. 77. On 14 September 1996 the applicant lodged an application for judicial review with the Paris Administrative Court, arguing that the decision of 11 July 1996 to place him in solitary confinement should be set aside. 78. In a judgment of 25 November 1998, which was served on the applicant on 26 January 1999, the Paris Administrative Court rejected the application, holding that the impugned decision was an internal administrative measure which the administrative courts had no power to set aside. 79. The applicant lodged an application for an order setting aside, on the grounds of formal invalidity, the decision of 17 February 2005 to keep him in solitary confinement. In a judgment of 15 December 2005, the Paris Administrative Court held as follows. “Although the authorities argue in their defence that the judge responsible for the execution of sentences gave an oral decision on 4 February 2005 in favour of prolonging Mr Ramirez Sanchez’s solitary confinement, there is no evidence in the file to show that the regional director obtained the opinion of the Sentence Enforcement Board before delivering his reasoned report to the Minister of Justice, even though, by virtue of the aforementioned provisions of Article D. 283-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Board is the only body empowered to decide whether solitary confinement should continue beyond a year. It follows that Mr Ramirez Sanchez’s argument that the decision of 17 February 2005 to prolong his solitary confinement was defective and must be set aside is well-founded. As regards the submissions on the issue of compensation. Although the formal invalidity of a solitary-confinement measure constitutes a fault capable of engaging the State’s responsibility, such a fault cannot entitle the person subjected to the measure to compensation for his or her loss if the circumstances of the case were such as to justify in law the decision to place the prisoner in solitary confinement as the alleged loss cannot be considered to have been a consequence of the defect in the decision. The investigation shows that Mr Ramirez Sanchez has been sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of police officers. He has been placed under investigation in connection with various terrorist cases, inter alia, for voluntary homicide and using an explosive device to destroy movable property. The applicant might use communications in Fleury-Mérogis Prison or on the outside to re-establish contact with the members of his terrorist cell or seek to proselytize other prisoners and possibly prepare an escape. That being so, the circumstances of the instant case were such as to justify in law the decision taken to prolong the solitary confinement for a period of three months. The damage alleged by Mr Ramirez Sanchez, which included the loss of contact with other prisoners, cannot, therefore, be considered to have been a consequence of the procedural defect in the decision of 17 February 2005, so that his request for an order requiring the State to compensate him for the damage he claims to have sustained is unfounded. ...”

5. The first applicant is the wife and the second applicant is the mother of Mr Khamzat Tushayev, born in 1959. They live in the village of Duba‑Yurt, the Shalinskiy District, in the Chechen Republic. 6. According to the applicants, since 1996 Khamzat Tushayev had been suffering from a mental disorder. 7. In autumn 1999, before the launching of the military operation in the Chechen Republic, the applicants and Khamzat Tushayev had been residing in the village of Duba-Yurt. At the time when Russian federal troops approached the village and most of its residents left, Mr Tushayev’s brother stayed in the village and joined rebel fighters to resist the federal troops. Although Khamzat Tushayev also stayed behind, he did not join the rebels. 8. In 2000 Khamzat Tushayev left Duba-Yurt together with his brother’s insurgent group and some other residents and joined his family which had meanwhile moved to an adjacent village. By March 2000 federal troops had regained control over Duba-Yurt and Khamzat Tushayev returned there together with his brother and the first applicant. 9. On an unspecified date in 2001 armed men broke into the first applicant’s house. They came in several armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and were looking for Khamzat Tushayev and his brother. After the incident the brothers went into hiding. On several occasions armed men broke into the first applicant’s house, searching for them. During yet another similar incident on 17 February 2002 Mr Tushayev’s brother was allegedly killed while trying to escape. 10. Khamzat Tushayev stayed in hiding until June 2003, fearing reprisals for the fact of his leaving Duba-Yurt together with insurgents. In June 2003 the first applicant learnt from the head of the local administration that Khamzat Tushayev would be amnestied if he surrendered his arms. According to the applicants, he had never had any arms but bought a submachine gun and was provided with a walkie-talkie by an acquaintance who had found it somewhere. 11. On 12 June 2003 Khamzat Tushayev surrendered the gun and the walkie-talkie to the Department of the Federal Security Service in the Chechen Republic (“the Chechen Department of the FSB”). According to a certificate issued by that State authority on 12 June 2003, Khamzat Tushayev declared that he no longer participated in illegal armed groups and had surrendered his arms of his own free will. It was further stated that an inquiry into his case was under way, that he had given an undertaking to appear before the Chechen Department of the FSB for questioning, that his right to freedom of movement had not been restricted, and that, should any law-enforcement authorities arrest him, they were to inform the Chechen Department of the FSB immediately. 12. At the turn of the year 2003 the first applicant and Khamzat Tushayev moved to Grozny. 13. On an unspecified date in March 2006 several persons who did not identify themselves broke into the flat occupied by the first applicant and Khamzat Tushayev and took him away. Eight days later his relatives found out that he was being held at the Shali district police station and that a criminal case (no. 56006) had been opened against him on suspicion of participation in illegal armed groups. On an unspecified date Khamzat Tushayev was released on an undertaking not to leave his place of residence. 14. On 7 June 2006 the first applicant received a call on her mobile phone from a hidden number. A man who introduced himself as “Sergey Aleksandrovich”, an official of the prosecutor’s office of the Leninskiy District in Grozny (hereafter “the Leninskiy district prosecutor’s office”), asked the first applicant to tell her husband that he was to report to the Leninskiy district prosecutor’s office at 10 a.m. on 8 June 2006 in connection with criminal case no. 56006 (also referred to as 56049). When she asked if he could come a week later the man refused, saying that Khamzat Tushayev was already under a very lenient preventive measure – an undertaking not to leave his place of residence. 15. The first applicant was not surprised by the call because she had previously given her phone number to investigator R.Ya. of the prosecutor’s office of the Shalinskiy District (“the Shalinskiy district prosecutor’s office”), who was in charge of the investigation in case no. 56006. According to the first applicant, on several occasions R.Ya. had already summoned Khamzat Tushavev for interviews via her mobile phone. Moreover, an official of the Department of the Interior of the Shalinskiy District had also summoned Khamzat Tushayev for an interview by contacting the first applicant on her mobile and asking her to convey that message to her husband. On all those occasions, after having been interviewed, Khamzat Tushayev had always returned back home. 16. On 8 June 2006 Khamzat Tushayev and the first applicant went to the complex of government buildings in Grozny, the Leninskiy district prosecutor’s office being situated within its secure grounds. According to the applicants, the perimeter of the complex was guarded and it was only possible to enter the premises through a number of check points. At one of the check points an on-duty officer called the Leninskiy district prosecutor’s office and enquired whether Khamzat Tushayev had an appointment and should be issued with an entry permit. Several minutes later the officer called Khamzat Tushayev inside the check point, recorded his passport data and authorised him to pass through. He then showed Khamzat Tushayev the building in which the Leninskiy district prosecutor’s office was situated and at about 10 a.m. the latter passed the check point. The first applicant stayed outside to wait for her husband. 17. On the same day, two hours later, worried about her husband’s absence, the first applicant asked the on-duty officer to call the Leninskiy district prosecutor’s office. After a telephone conversation the officer told her that Khamzat Tushayev had not entered the premises of the Leninskiy district prosecutor’s office and had not been registered at that authority’s own checkpoint. The first applicant waited at the check point until the end of the working day. At about 5 p.m. the on-duty officer told her to leave, which she did. 18. The Government did not dispute the applicants’ description of the events but stated that before the conclusion of the domestic investigation (see below) the circumstances of the disappearance of the applicants’ relative could not be established with sufficient certainty. 19. On 9 June 2006 the first applicant called investigator R.Ya. of the Shalinskiy district prosecutor’s office and told him about the disappearance of her husband. Ya. allegedly told her that she and her husband had visited a “dangerous place” and that she should have called Ya. before going to the Leninskiy district prosecutor’s office. He also said that several departments of the FSB had inquired about Khamzat Tushayev and advised her to complain about his disappearance to the authorities. 20. On the same day the first applicant complained about the disappearance of her husband to the Prosecutor of the Chechen Republic and the acting prosecutor of the Leninskiy District of Grozny. 21. On 9 June 2006 the first applicant applied to the representation of the Memorial Human Rights Centre in Grozny for assistance in the search for her husband. Its members contacted Mrs S. Gannushkina, member of the Human Rights Commission with the President of Russia. She immediately called the acting prosecutor of the Leninskiy District of Grozny, Mr T.M, who told her over the phone that Khamzat Tushayev had not been summoned to the Leninskiy district prosecutor’s office and that he had come there to submit an unspecified complaint. About half an hour after Khamzat Tushayev had been let through the first check point, an on-duty officer from another check point had called T.M. and informed him that Khamzat Tushauev had not passed the second check point. When Mrs Gannushkina’s asked whether it was possible to disappear without leaving any trace from the grounds of the government complex, T.M. stated that it was impossible. 22. On 14 June 2006 the head of the Department for supervision of the investigation of crimes by the prosecutor’s office forwarded the first applicant’s complaint about the disappearance of Khamzat Tushayev to the acting prosecutor of the Leninskiy District of Grozny. 23. On 26 June 2006 the prosecutor’s office of the Staropromyslovskiy District of Grozny (“the district prosecutor’s office”) initiated a criminal investigation into the abduction of Khamzat Tushayev from the grounds of the government complex in Grozny under Article 126 § 1 of the Criminal Code (abduction). The case was given the number 53092. By a letter of 27 June 2006, investigator D. informed the first applicant about the opening of the investigation. 24. On 30 June 2006 the first applicant was granted victim status in connection with the proceedings in case no. 53902. She was notified of that decision on the same day. 25. On 11 July 2006 the deputy prosecutor of the Chechen Republic informed the first applicant that the investigation into the disappearance of Khamzat Tushayev had been entrusted to investigator D. of the district prosecutor’s office and that unspecified investigative and operational measures aimed at establishing the whereabouts of her husband were being carried out. 26. On 11 August 2006 Mrs Gannushkina wrote on behalf of the first applicant to the Prosecutor of the Chechen Republic and investigator D., requesting them to take a number of basic investigative steps, such as interviewing the personnel on duty at the check points on 8 June 2006, verifying the phone number of the person who had called the first applicant on 7 June 2006, identifying the owner of the phone and interviewing that person. It is unclear whether the request prompted any reaction on the part of the authorities. 27. On 25 October 2006 the acting head of the Department for supervision of the investigation of crimes by the prosecutor’s office informed the first applicant that her repeated complaint about the disappearance of her husband had been forwarded to the district prosecutor’s office. 28. According to the first applicant, she often came to the district prosecutor’s office to enquire about the progress of the investigation but never received any meaningful information. During a visit in August 2006 investigator D. had allegedly reassured her that the investigation was “following hard on the heels” of the abductors of her husband and that the suspects were members of the FSB. However, in a conversation which took place on an unspecified date later, D. allegedly told the first applicant that the investigation was very dangerous and that D. himself ran a risk of being killed. According to the first applicant, on an unspecified date D. must have been replaced by another investigator. 29. The Government refused to submit a copy of the entire criminal file no. 53092 opened into the abduction of Khamzat Tushayev, providing only copies of several decisions to open and suspend the investigation, witness’ interview records, the investigators’ requests to various State authorities to provide information on Khamzat Tushayev’s whereabouts and replies to them and some other documents. Some of the documents furnished by the Government are illegible; some are legible only in part. Insofar as the documents submitted by the Government are legible, the information contained in them can be summarised as follows. (b) Opening of the investigation 30. On 26 June 2006 the district prosecutor’s office instituted an investigation into the abduction of Khamzat Tushayev under Article 126 § 1 of the Criminal Code (kidnapping). The decision stated, among other things, that the district prosecutor’s office had received the first applicant’s complaint about the abduction of her husband on 9 June 2006. (c) Interviewing of witnesses (i) The first applicant 31. On 30 June 2006 the first applicant was granted victim status in the proceedings in case no. 53092 and interviewed. She stated that on 7 June 2006 she had received a call from a hidden number on her mobile phone. A man, who had introduced himself as “Sergey Aleksandrovich”, an official of the Leninskiy district prosecutor’s office, had told her that her husband was to come to the district prosecutor’s office to be interviewed. The man had spoken unaccented Russian. When the first applicant had asked him if Khamzat Tushayev could come for interview the following week, the man had insisted on him coming on 8 June 2006, saying that the authorities had already been very lenient on him by applying an undertaking not to leave his place of residence instead of detention as a preventive measure in connection with the proceedings in case no. 56049 concerning his membership of illegal armed groups. 32. On the following day the first applicant and her husband had gone to the complex of governmental buildings. At checkpoint no. 1 they had informed an on-duty officer that Khamzat Tushayev had been summoned to the Leninskiy district prosecutor’s office. The officer had called T.M., the prosecutor of the Leninskiy district, and some five minutes later told them that Khamzat Tushayev would be let through. The first applicant had stayed outside, whilst Khamzat Tushayev had passed the checkpoint where servicemen explained him that the entry to the Leninskiy district prosecutor’s office was near an APC. Some two to three hours later the first applicant had asked the officer on duty to call the prosecutor’s office to ask for her husband. Having called them, the officer had told her that Khamzat Tushayev had not entered the premises of the prosecutor’s office. The first applicant had waited at the checkpoint until 5.30 p.m., but her husband had not returned. 33. On the next day the first applicant had called investigator Ya. of the Shalinskiy district prosecutor’s office and he had assured her that he had not arrested Khamzat Tushayev and had not instructed any authority to do so. Lastly, the first applicant also stated that her husband’s brother had been an active member of illegal armed groups and had been killed in a special operation in 2002. She also submitted that after her husband had been arrested by officers of Operational and Search Bureau no. 2 (ORB-2) in March 2006, he had told her that they had asked him about their daughter, A.T., who had been killed in 2002 in Moscow along with other rebel fighters during the rescue operation of Nord-Ost. 34. When interviewed on 12 February and 25 June 2007, the first applicant confirmed her previous statement concerning the circumstances of the disappearance of her husband. (ii) Servicemen of checkpoint no. 1 35. On 5 July 2006 the investigators interviewed D.D. as a witness. He stated that on 8 June 2006 he had been on duty at checkpoint no. 1 at the government complex and that he did not remember having seen Khamzat Tushayev there. According to D.D., checkpoint no. 1 was located at the entry to the grounds of the governmental complex from the side of the Staropromyslovskoye highway. If a person wished to get access to the Leninskiy district prosecutor’s office, an on-duty officer from checkpoint no. 1 had to call officers at the checkpoint of the district prosecutor’s office. The latter would then call the reception of the district prosecutor’s office and inform them that they had a visitor, following which an official of the prosecutor’s office would call checkpoint no. 1 back and inform them whether they authorised the visitor to enter the premises of the prosecutor’s office. After that an on-duty officer at checkpoint no. 1 had to enter the visitor’s name, as well as the date and time of his entry, in a special logbook and let him through. 36. Serviceman S.S., interviewed as a witness on 6 July 2006, made a statement similar to that of D.D. (iii) Servicemen of the checkpoint at the Leninskiy district prosecutor’s office 37. On 13 July 2006 the investigators interviewed officer V.S. as a witness. She stated that from 9 a.m. on 8 June 2006 she had been on duty at the checkpoint of the Leninskiy district prosecutor’s office. At about 10.10 a.m. servicemen from checkpoint no. 1 had called her and informed her that Khamzat Tushayev had come for an appointment with T.M., the prosecutor of the Leninskiy district. She had called T.M. and he had told her to let Khamzat Tushayev through, following which she had called officers from checkpoint no. 1 and conveyed that information to them. Some two hours later V.S. had received a call from checkpoint no. 1, its servicemen asking whether Khamzat Tushayev had entered the premises of the prosecutor’s office through her checkpoint. V.S. had checked the relevant logbook but found no entries indicating that he had passed through her checkpoint. She had then called T.M. and he had told her that Khamzat Tushayev had not visited him either, of which V.S. had immediately informed her interlocutors at checkpoint no. 1. V.S. also gave to the investigators the names of the colleagues who had been on duty with her on the day of Khamzat Tushayev’s disappearance. (iv) Servicemen of checkpoint no. 102 38. On 6, 9, 15, 16 and 18 July 2006 investigators interviewed as witnesses servicemen S.G., A.P., N.K., I..L., A.N. and M.N., who were on duty at checkpoint no. 102 on 8 June 2006. They stated that their checkpoint was used for entry by officials of the State authorities located in the government complex, such as the Federal Security Service (FSB) or the prosecutor’s office, in possession of special permits, and that other persons wishing to enter the secure grounds were directed to checkpoint no. 1. Persons leaving the government complex would be let through the checkpoint no. 102 if they did not raise suspicions; their documents would not be checked. They also submitted that they did not recognise Khamzat Tushayev in the picture shown to them. (v) Witnesses interviewed in connection with criminal proceedings in case no. 56049 against Khamzat Tushayev 39. On 31 January 2007 the investigators interviewed L.Ts. as a witness. She submitted that she held the post of the senior inspector with the information department of the Ministry of the Interior of the Chechen Republic and that on an unspecified date in April 2006 she had gone, together with members of a film crew, to the Department for the Fight against Organised Crime (“UBOP”) of the Chechen Republic. While the crew had been filming, an UBOP officer had been questioning a group of detained persons, one of whom had been Khamzat Tushayev. The latter had told the officer, among other things, about his daughter, who had participated in the Nord-Ost hostage taking in Moscow. Shortly after the recording L.Ts. had submitted the related recordings, as well as an article about the detained persons, to the Ministry of the Press of the Chechen Republic. However, her article had been published in a newspaper “Stolitsa plyus” (Столица плюс) only on 2 December 2006 and she was not aware of the reasons for that delay. 40. On 2 February 2007 the investigators interviewed R.Ya. as a witness. He stated that on 4 April 2006 he had instituted criminal case no. 56049 against a number of persons, including Khamzat Tuhayev, on suspicion of participation in illegal armed groups. On the same date Khamzat Tushayev and other suspects had been arrested and remanded in custody. Some of the arrested persons had initially stated that Khamzat Tushayev had been an emir of the village of Duba-Yurt but they had subsequently retracted those statements. On 6 April 2006 Khamzat Tushayev had been released on an undertaking not to leave his place of residence. The preventive measure applied to him had been changed because there had not been conclusive evidence of his implication in the imputed crime. On an unspecified date R.Ya. had interviewed Khamzat Tushayev for a second time and on 4 June 2006 he had closed the criminal case against him. R.Ya. specified that he had learnt about the abduction of Khamzat Tushayev from the first applicant and that he had not instructed any one in the Leninskiy district prosecutor’s office to interview Khamzat Tushayev. 41. Police officer A.A., interviewed as a witness on 2 February 2007, submitted that on 3 April 2006 he had participated in the arrest of a number of presumed members of illegal armed groups, including Khamzat Tushayev. A film crew from the Ministry of the Interior had been present and filmed the arrestees. On 4 April 2006 the arrested persons had been transferred to a remand centre. According to A.A., he had no information on the outcome of the proceedings against Khamzat Tushayev and had learnt about his abduction from his wife. 42. Police officer M.-A.D., interviewed as a witness on 6 February 2007, stated that he did not know why information on Khamzat Tushayev’s arrest in April 2006 had been published in December of the same year but that similar situations occurred from time to time owing to a lack of cooperation between the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of the Press of the Chechen Republic. (vi) Other witnesses 43. On 16 June 2006 the investigators interviewed S.M. and I.V. as witnesses. According to their interview records, they resided in the same block of flats as Khamzat Tushayev and his family in Grozny and knew about his arrest in March 2006 by the law-enforcement authorities but had no information concerning his ensuing disappearance. 44. On 6 and 9 July 2006 investigators interviewed S.-Kh.E., V.Sh. and S.E. as witnesses. They stated that they were distant relatives of Khamzat Tushayev and resided in Duba-Yurt. According to them, Khamzat Tushayev had had some psychological problems, but they characterised him as a positive person overall. 45. Witness D.T., interviewed on 18 July 2006, stated that she worked as a nurse in a psychiatric hospital in the village of Samashki. From 11 to 25 April 2006 Khamzat Tushayev had undergone inpatient treatment in the hospital. She specified that his condition had not been serious and that he had been largely in control of his actions. 46. On 27 January 2007 the investigators interviewed T.M., the prosecutor of the Leninskiy district, as a witness. He submitted that on 8 June 2006, when servicemen from the reception of the prosecutor’s office had informed him that servicemen from checkpoint no. 1 were looking for Khamzat Tushayev and it had been revealed that he had not entered the premises of the prosecutor’s office, he had instructed the servicemen in charge of the prosecutor’s office to examine the logbooks of checkpoint no. 1. Having done so, they had reported that the logbook, indeed, contained the data concerning Khamzat Tushayev, including his passport number and confirmed the fact that he had been let through with a view to appearing for an appointment at the prosecutor’s office. However, he had never entered the premises of that authority. The servicemen at the prosecutor’s office had been interviewed and the incident had been reported to the district and the republican prosecutor’s offices. There were no pending criminal cases against Khamzat Tushayev in the Leninskiy district prosecutor’s office, none of its investigators had summoned him for an interview there and there was no investigator named “Sergey Alexandrovich”. (d) Further investigative steps 47. On 9 June 2006 investigator D. of the district prosecutor’s office inspected the crime scene. According to D.’s report of the same date, entry to the grounds of the government complex was possible through a checkpoint (apparently, checkpoint no. 1), equipped with a barrier to control the entry of vehicles. The checkpoint had a special room for the registration of visitors. At about 200 metres distance from the checkpoint, on the grounds of the government complex, was located the building of the military commander’s office of the Leninskiy district of Grozny and near it was located the building of the Leninstiy district prosecutor’s office, the premises of which could only be entered through its own checkpoint. The building of the Chechen Department of the FSB was located near the building of the prosecutor’s office. 48. On 21 June 2006 the Staropromyslovskiy department of the interior (“the ROVD”) informed the district prosecutor’s office that they had established the hidden number from which on 7 June 2006 the first applicant had received a call with an instruction for her husband to come to the Leninskiy district prosecutor’s office for an interview on 8 June 2006. The call had been made at 4.40 p.m. on 7 June 2006 and the number of the caller was 8 928 29 06 28. However, the mobile network provider had refused to furnish information on the owner of the number. 49. On 27 June 2006 investigators of the district prosecutor’s office instructed the Staropromyslovskiy Department of the Interior (the ROVD) to identify possible witnesses to the abduction of Khamzat Tushayev and the personnel who had been on duty at the checkpoint on 8 June 2006 and to summon them to the district prosecutor’s office for interviews. 50. Between 27 June and 15 July 2006 investigators of the district prosecutor’s office requested a number of State authorities, including prosecutor’s offices and departments of the interior of various districts of the Chechen Republic, to provide information on Khamzat Tushayev’s whereabouts, his eventual arrest or detention or on whether they had instituted criminal proceedings against him. It appears that those requests yielded no results. 51. On 14 July 2006 the investigators formally seized the visitors’ logbook from checkpoint no. 1. The decision stated that the preliminary investigation had established that at 10 a.m. on 8 June 2006 Khamzat Tushayev had passed through checkpoint no. 1 and that the checkpoint logbook contained a record to that effect. 52. According to a record of inspection of documents (протокол осмотра документов) of 15 July 2006, page 67 of the visitors’ logbook of checkpoint no. 1, in the section concerning persons who had passed through the checkpoint, contained an entry relating to Khamzat Tushayev in which it was noted that he had passed through the checkpoint at 10.03 a.m. on 8 June 2006. The entry also contained his passport number and indicated that he was going to the prosecutor’s office. The logbook was appended to criminal file no. 53092 on 15 July 2006. 53. On an unspecified date in July 2006 the Ministry of the Interior informed the district prosecutor’s office that the following authorities’ buildings were located in the secure grounds of the government complex in Grozny: the military commander’s office of the Chechen Republic, the military commander’s office of Grozny, the military commander’s office of the Leninskiy district of Grozny, the Chechen Department of the FSB and the 349th special purpose battalion of the 46th special purpose brigade. 54. By a letter of 21 August 2006 the Chechen Department of the FSB replied to the request of the district prosecutor’s office and informed them that its officers had not arrested Khamzat Tushayev on the grounds of the governmental complex. The letter further stated that the Chechen Department of the FSB had arrested Khamzat Tushayev on 5 February 2003 during a special operation and that its officers had seized a submachine gun and several full cartridges for it from his house. On an unspecified date in August 2003 Khamzat Tushayev had been amnestied in relation to unspecified charges. On 3 April 2006 officers of the UBOP had arrested Khamzat Tushayev on suspicion of participation in illegal armed groups along with other persons. At 10 a.m. on 8 June 2006 Khamzat Tushayev had entered the grounds of the government complex in Grozny and had never left those grounds; his whereabouts remained unknown. 55. On 5 September 2006 the investigation in case no. 53092 was entrusted to investigator Kh. of the district prosecutor’s office owing to the departure of investigator D. to the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic. 56. On 6 February 2007 the investigators seized a video recording of the arrest of Khamzat Tushayev and other persons in April 2006 from the archives of the Ministry of the Interior of the Chechen Republic. 57. Between 2 and 12 February 2007 the investigators requested a number of State authorities to inform them whether they had arrested Khamzat Tushayev or had information on his whereabouts. It appears that no relevant information was obtained. 58. On 17 May 2007 the deputy head of the Chechen Department of the FSB informed the military commander of military unit no. 20102 that the unspecified mobile number mentioned in the latter’s request for information was not being used by the personnel of the department. (e) Information relating to the decisions to suspend and resume the investigation 59. On 15 January 2007 the deputy prosecutor of the Staropromyslovskiy District of Grozny set aside the decision of 26 November 2006 to suspend the investigation in case no. 53092 as unfounded and premature. The investigators were instructed to carry out the following investigative measures: compile an up-to-date plan of investigative steps; interview the first applicant on the circumstances of the disappearance of her husband more thoroughly; identify the individuals who had been at checkpoint no. 1 on 8 June 2006 when Khamzat Tushayev had passed through it and interview them as witnesses; establish the manner in which visitors were admitted to the secure grounds of the government complex; interview the prosecutor of the Leninskiy district of Grozny as to the reasons for Khamzat Tushayev’s visit to the prosecutor’s office and the circumstances of his disappearance; establish whether the Leninskiy district prosecutor’s office had investigated any criminal cases against Khamzat Tushayev or had been in possession of any materials which might have prompted it to summon him to it; instruct the military prosecutor to identify the owner of mobile number 8 928 290 06 28, because the materials of case file no. 53092 contained information to the effect that that number had been in use by the personnel of the Chechen Department of the FSB; interview staff of the newspaper “Stolitsa plyus” in connection with their article published on 2 December 2006 and mentioning Khamzat Tushayev and his arrest; identify and interview the UBOP officers who had arrested presumed members of illegal armed groups, including Khamzat Tushayev, in April 2006; and comply in full with the written instructions given by the district prosecutor’s office on 26 June 2006. 60. On 18 February 2007 the investigation in case no. 53092 was suspended owing to the failure to identify the perpetrators. 61. On 21 March 2007 the deputy prosecutor of the Staropromyslovskiy district prosecutor’s office quashed the decision of 18 February 2007 as unfounded and premature and instructed the investigators to take, among other things, the following investigative steps: compile an updated plan of investigative measures; identify the owner of mobile phone, from which the first applicant had received the call instructing her husband to appear at the Leninskiy district prosecutor’s office for an interview on 8 June 2006 and interview that person; and obtain replies to the requests for information from all the relevant State authorities. 62. On 26 April 2007 the investigation in case no. 53902 was suspended because of the failure to identify the perpetrators. 63. On 20 June 2007 the deputy prosecutor of the Staropromyslovskiy district set aside the decision of 26 April 2007 as premature and unfounded. 64. On 20 July 2007 the investigation in case no. 53092 was adjourned because of the failure to identify those responsible. 65. It appears that on an unspecified date case no. 53092 was transferred for investigation to the investigation department of the Investigating committee with the prosecutor’s office of the Russian Federation in the Chechen Republic (“the investigation department”). 66. On 26 May 2009 the deputy head of the investigation department instructed his subordinates in charge of the investigation to take, the following investigative steps: resume the investigation; compile an up‑to‑date plan of investigative measures; locate and interview a certain S.M. and I.V., who had stated on an unspecified date that Khamzat Tushayev had not been abducted; identify and interview the persons who had been at checkpoint no. 1 on 8 June 2006 when Khamzat Tushayev had passed through it; obtain the case file containing a printout of the conversation between the first applicant and the owner of mobile number 8 928 290 06 28, identify and interview all persons to whom that phone number had been registered or who had used or owned it at the material time; establish how visitors entered the grounds of the secure government complex; send a formal request to verify whether an official named “Sergey Alexandrovich” had indeed worked in the Leninskiy district prosecutor’s office and if so, interview him; identify possible eyewitnesses to the abduction of Khamzat Tushayev on the grounds of the government complex. 67. On 3 June 2009 the investigation in case no. 53092 was resumed. 68. According to the Government, the investigation into the abduction of Khamzat Tushayev is pending.

4. The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in İzmir. 5. On 11 April 2000 the İzmir State Security Court ordered the confiscation of the applicant's car on the ground that it had been used during the commission of a crime. The applicant did not wish to surrender his car. 6. On a unspecified date, the İzmir public prosecutor took a statement from the applicant and on 10 July 2001 he filed a bill of indictment with the İzmir Magistrate's Court accusing the applicant of “not obeying the official authorities' order”. He requested that the applicant be punished, pursuant to Article 526 § 1 of the Turkish Criminal Code. 7. On 17 July 2001 the İzmir Magistrate's Court, without holding a public hearing, issued a penal order pursuant to Article 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It decided over the content of the case file and sentenced the applicant to three months' imprisonment and a fine of 35,591,400 Turkish liras (TRL). The court then commuted the imprisonment to a fine and sentenced the applicant to a total fine of TRL 249,139,300[1]. 8. On 13 August 2001 the applicant challenged this decision before the İzmir Criminal Court. He requested that the Criminal Court hold a hearing to examine his appeal. 9. On 24 August 2001, the İzmir Criminal Court upheld the decision of the Magistrate's Court without a hearing, noting that it was in accordance with the law and procedure. 10. The applicant paid the fine in question on 10 December 2001.

4. The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Rostov-on-Don. 5. The applicant is a Russian Army colonel. 6. In September 1998 he was removed from his post. 7. On 2 October 1998 the applicant brought proceedings against his commanding officer claiming reinstatement, payment of salary and service-related benefits, and compensation of non-pecuniary damage sustained as a result of his removal. 8. On 26 October 1998 the Military Court of Rostov Garrison (“the Garrison Court”) dismissed his claims; the judgment was upheld on appeal. 9. In January 1999 a military disciplinary commission issued an appraisal report in respect of the applicant. The commission found that the applicant's performance was unsatisfactory. On this basis in March 1999 he was transferred from active military service to the reserve. 10. On 20 April 1999 the applicant challenged the transfer in court, but to no avail. On 10 November 1999 the Garrison Court dismissed his claim; the judgment was upheld on appeal. 11. On 27 April 2001 president of the Military Chamber of the Supreme Court of Russia granted the applicant's application for supervisory review and brought an extraordinary appeal against the above court decisions. 12. On 22 May 2001 the Military Chamber of the Supreme Court quashed the impugned decisions and remitted the cases for fresh examination. 13. On an unspecified date the Garrison Court joined the above cases. 14. On 21 January 2002 the Garrison Court granted the applicant's claims in part. It quashed the respective decisions of the applicant's superior officers and the appraisal report, reinstated him in his former post and awarded him non-pecuniary damages in the amount of 1,000 Russian roubles (RUB), to be recovered from the Ministry of Defence, and RUB 500 to be recovered from the Chief of the Headquarters of the North-Caucasus Military Command. The claims for pecuniary damages were rejected. 15. On 8 May 2002 the appeal court set aside the judgment in the part concerning rejection of the claims for pecuniary damages and required a new hearing. The remainder of the judgment was upheld. 16. On 27 September 2002 the Garrison Court issued a writ of execution in respect of the part of the judgment that had entered into force and forwarded it to the bailiff service of the Oktyabrskiy District of Rostov‑on‑Don. 17. On 30 January 2003 the applicant was reinstated in his post. The damages in the amount of RUB 1,500 awarded by the judgment of 21 January 2002 remained unpaid. 18. On 19 June 2003 the Garrison Court granted the applicant's claims in part, awarding him RUB 650,510. However, on 11 February 2004 the appeal court overturned this judgment on procedural grounds and ordered the case for re-examination. 19. On 8 April 2004 the Garrison Court granted most of the applicant's claims. The court awarded him RUB 776,247 covering his salary, legal expenses and various service-related benefits due for the period of his necessary absence from work, in particular, compensation for clothing, food ration, sanatoria treatment and a lump-sum premium for 1997. 20. The court also found that the applicant's reinstatement ordered by the judgment of 21 January 2002 had been carried out with a significant delay, and that the applicant had not received RUB 1,500 awarded by the court in compensation of non-pecuniary damage. The applicant was awarded RUB 5,000 as compensation for the delayed enforcement. 21. This judgment was upheld on appeal by the Military Court of North Caucasus Command on 4 August 2004. 22. On 9 April 2004 the applicant received RUB 1,000 due to him under the decision of 21 January 2002. The award of RUB 500 remained unpaid. 23. On 30 August and 1 November 2004 the applicant received the amounts awarded to him by the court judgment of 8 April 2004. 24. The applicant brought proceedings claiming index-linking of the amounts paid to him with a delay. 25. On 28 January 2005 the Garrison Court granted his claims in part, awarding him RUB 2,750 as inflation losses resulted from the delay in the enforcement of the judgments of 21 January 2002 and 8 April 2004. However, without giving any specific reasons the court rejected the applicant's claim in the part concerning the failure to pay him RUB 500. 26. On 25 May 2005 the Military Court of North Caucasus Command upheld the judgment on appeal. 27. On 19 July 2005 the applicant received the amount awarded to him by the judgment of 28 January 2005. It appears that the applicant has not received the award of RUB 500 to date.

6. The applicants were both born in 1980 and are currently serving prison sentences in Burrel Prison, Albania. 7. On 31 March 2001, at dawn, three persons wearing blue and white balaclavas robbed a minibus on the line between Tirana and Kukës. The aggressors were armed with two Kalashnikovs and a knife. Having taken the passengers' money and jewellery, they left the scene without causing casualties. 8. Some hours after the event, the police searched houses near the scene of the crime, including that of Mr Lika (“the second applicant”), where he was having lunch with his father, his brother, B.L., and his friend, Mr Laska (“the first applicant”). 9. The police officers conducted the said search in the absence of the applicants' lawyer. 10. According to the police report of the search, the police found in the pocket of the first applicant's jacket two white T-shirts and a blue cloth, made into balaclavas. Moreover, near the house they found some grenades, but failed to find the stolen goods or the weapons that had been in the possession of the aggressors. 11. The applicants, B.L, and the father were escorted to the police station for questioning. The first applicant requested, but was refused, the presence of his lawyer (H.B). He disputed having had in his possession a balaclava or other form of mask and accused the police of manipulating the evidence. 12. On the same day, the police officers in charge of the investigation proceeded to the identification of persons and items by the victims of the robbery, pursuant to Articles 171 and 172 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“CCP”). The applicants' lawyer was not present. 13. As to the identification of persons, the applicants and B.L., wearing blue and white home-made balaclavas, and two other persons, wearing black balaclavas, were put in a row in the same room in order to be identified. Notwithstanding the fact that the police changed the position of the persons in the room, the victims consistently identified the persons wearing blue and white balaclavas as the aggressors, that is to say the applicants and B.L.. 14. As to the identification of objects, the victims were asked to identify the balaclavas used by the aggressors, choosing among two black balaclavas, two white balaclavas and a blue one. The victims identified the white and blue balaclavas as those worn by the aggressors. 15. At 9.30 p.m. on the same day the applicants and B.L. were arrested on suspicion of armed robbery. They were questioned by the police in the absence of a lawyer, notwithstanding the fact that B.L. was a minor at the time and that the applicants had explicitly requested a lawyer to be present. The first applicant accepted that he had in his possession a white T-shirt, transformed by F.N, a police officer in charge of the investigations, into a home-made balaclava. The second applicant stated that the white T-shirt which had been found in the possession of the first applicant was not his. 16. On 2 April 2001 the applicants and B.L. were charged with one count of armed robbery and one count of illegal possession of arms. On the same day they were questioned by the prosecutor. The first applicant asked to be represented by H.B. The second applicant sought to be defended by counsel. 17. On 29 June 2001 the General Prosecutor's Office (GPO) requested to inspect the criminal investigation file in respect of the second applicant. On 10 September 2001 the GPO consented to the case being committed to trial. 18. On 11 September 2001, the prosecutor committed the applicants and B.L. to trial on charges of armed robbery and illegal possession of weapons. 19. During the hearing of 26 November 2001 before the Puke District Court, (“the District Court”), the applicants contested the charges against them and requested the domestic court to declare null and void the identification carried out by the police of persons and objects, as it had been in breach of the relevant provisions of the CCP. Moreover, they accused the police officers in charge of the investigation of manipulating the evidence against them: the applicants therefore requested the court to summon the police officers as witnesses and to produce at the trial the items considered by the police to be balaclavas, but which were, in their view, simple T-shirts. The applicants requested the domestic court to exclude the illegal evidence against them. As to the charge of illegal possession of arms, the applicants maintained that the investigation had failed to find the weapons used by the offenders during the robbery and it had not been proved that the grenades found had been in their possession. Both applicants were represented by the same counsel, P.Gj. 20. On 24 May 2002 the District Court dismissed the applicants' request to summon the police officers as witnesses, without giving reasons. Notwithstanding the fact that the court noticed certain irregularities during the investigation stage (such as the absence of a lawyer during the applicants' questioning and during the identification of persons and objects), the court found the applicants guilty of armed robbery on the basis of the eyewitnesses' identification of the applicants as the offenders. Moreover, the court found the applicants guilty of illegal possession of two Kalashnikovs and B.L guilty of possession of a knife. No weapons having been found, the applicants' conviction was based on eyewitness statements. The court sentenced the applicants to thirteen years' imprisonment and B.L. to five years' imprisonment. The applicants were ordered to serve their sentences in a high-security prison. 21. On 29 May 2002 the applicants appealed to the Shkoder Court of Appeal, (“the Court of Appeal”), on the grounds that the District Court's judgment was the result of unfair proceedings. They argued that the identification had been conducted in flagrant breach of Articles 171-175 of the CCP as they had worn the same balaclavas during the identification parade. Their lawyers' request about the nullity of the acts concerning identification had been rejected by the trial court. They also stated that none of the material evidence (balaclavas), as requested by themselves, had been produced at the trial proceedings. Moreover, the authorities had failed to find the money and the weapons that had been used in the robbery. 22. On 9 September 2002, the Court of Appeal upheld the District Court's judgment. 23. On 7 October 2002 the applicants appealed to the Supreme Court. They relied on the same grounds of appeal as before the Court of Appeal. They also alleged that both of them had been represented by the same counsel before the lower courts, at a time when there were inconsistencies in their testimonies given during the criminal investigation. 24. On 26 December 2002 the Supreme Court declared the appeal inadmissible as its grounds fell outside the scope of Article 432 of the CCP. 25. On an unspecified date the first applicant lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court about the unfairness of the proceedings. He relied on the same grounds as raised before the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. 26. On 17 September 2004 the Constitutional Court, sitting as a bench of three judges, declared the complaint inadmissible. It held that the applicant's complaints did not raise any fair trial issues, but mainly concerned the assessment of evidence, which was the function of the lower courts. 27. The applicants alleged that they had been ill-treated by F.N. and other police officers during police questioning. They alleged that they had been tied up with ropes, beaten and hosed with cold water during the interrogations. 28. At the hearings of 26 November 2001 before the District Court, the applicants alleged that they had been ill-treated by the police officers in charge of the investigation, in that the latter had attempted to force them to confess to the robbery and to reveal the location of the stolen goods and the arms used. B.L and the applicants gave the same description of the alleged ill-treatment. 29. On 24 May 2002 the District Court rejected the applicants' requests on the ground that they had been submitted outside the six-month time-limit. No legal basis was mentioned in the judgment.

4. The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Zagreb. 5. On an unspecified date the applicant instituted civil proceedings before the Sveti Ivan Zelina Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Svetom Ivanu Zelini) against her former employer, Zelina Agricultural Enterprise (Poljoprivredni kombinat Zelina), challenging her dismissal from work and seeking payment of her salary for the period of her unemployment. The first-instance judgment of 5 December 2000, granting the applicant's claims, awarded the applicant 42,161.47 Croatian kunas (HRK) together with statutory default interest. The judgment was upheld by the Velika Gorica County Court (Županijski sud u Velikoj Gorici) on 15 January 2003. 6. Meanwhile, in a decision of 17 June 2002 the Zagreb Commercial Court (Trgovački sud u Zagrebu) opened bankruptcy proceedings against the applicant's former employer and invited all creditors to submit their claims to the bankruptcy administrator, appointed to the case by the Zagreb commercial Court, within thirty days. This was published in the Official Gazette no. 81/02 of 9 July 2002. 7. Examination hearings before the Zagreb Commercial Court were held on 24 September 2002 and 3 March 2003. 8. On 10 March 2003 the applicant lodged her claim, recognised by a final judgment, with the Zagreb Commercial Court before which the bankruptcy proceedings against her former employer had meanwhile been opened. The applicant argued that, since the civil proceedings she had instituted against her former employer before the ordinary courts (that is to say the competent municipal and county courts) had been pending, she considered that her claim had been adequately secured. In this connection she pointed to the provision obliging the regular courts to discontinue civil proceedings concerning any debtor against whom bankruptcy proceedings had been opened in the meantime. 9. On 16 April 2003 the Zagreb Commercial Court declared the applicant's request inadmissible as lodged out of time. It found that the examination hearing (ispitno ročište) had been held on 24 September 2002 and that after the expiry of three months from that date no further claims could be lodged in the bankruptcy proceedings. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows: “In the bankruptcy proceedings against Zelina Agricultural Enterprise ... examination hearing was held and concluded on 24 September 2002. The above-mentioned creditor submitted her claim on 15 April 2003, outside the three-month period following the first examination hearing. Since the claim was submitted too late, that is to say after the period of three months following the first examination hearing, it is to be dismissed pursuant to section 176 paragraph 4 of the Bankruptcy Act.” 10. In her appeal lodged on 30 April 2004 the applicant stressed, inter alia, that the bankruptcy administrator had failed to comply with her duty under section 173 paragraph 2 of the Bankruptcy Act to include the applicant's claim in the list of claims of all the current and former employees of the debtor company and to submit it for her signature. 11. On 8 July 2003 the High Commercial Court (Visoki trgovački sud Republike Hrvatske) upheld the first-instance decision. In so far as relevant it held as follows: “Under section 54 paragraph 3 of the Bankruptcy Act, in a decision on opening of bankruptcy proceedings a bankruptcy panel is obliged to invite all creditors to submit their claims to the administrator within a fixed time-limit, in accordance with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act. The time-limit for submission of claims has to be fixed to no less than fifteen days and no longer than one month. Claims submitted after the fixed time-limit may be examined at an examination hearing on the initiative of the administrator. Claims submitted after the fixed time-limit which have not been examined at the examination hearing, as well as claims submitted within three months of the first examination hearing but not after the call for the final hearing has been published may be examined at one or more additional examination hearings which are to be scheduled by the administrator pursuant to a proposal made by the creditors who have failed to submit their claims on time, and on condition that they pay in advance and within fifteen days the costs of such a hearing. Claims submitted after the expiry of the time-limit fixed in section 176 paragraph 2 of the Bankruptcy Act are to be declared inadmissible (argument under section 176 paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 of the Bankruptcy Act). The first-instance court acted exactly as described above, in compliance with the Bankruptcy Act, when it declared inadmissible as being lodged out of time the claim submitted by the creditor Ismeta Bačić from Zagreb. The appellant does not dispute that the examination hearing in the bankruptcy proceedings against debtor Zelina Agricultural Enterprise based in Sveti Ivan Zelina was held and concluded on 29 September 2002. The conditions for submitting creditors' claims then ceased to exist and it is therefore of no significance whether the appellant submitted her claim on 10 March or 15 April 2003. In any event it was submitted out of time. The only decision that a court could have adopted in such circumstances is the one pursuant to section 176 paragraph 4 of the Bankruptcy Act that the claim had to be declared inadmissible. Therefore, there has been no wrongful application of the Bankruptcy Act provisions to the appellant's detriment and the impugned decision ought to be upheld in accordance with section 380 paragraph 1(2) of the Civil Procedure Act in conjunction with section 6 of the Bankruptcy Act.” 12. In her subsequent constitutional complaint the applicant argued that the administrator had failed to comply with her duty to inform her of the bankruptcy proceedings and allow her to lodge her claim against her former employer and had thus prevented her from securing the payment of her claim. On 23 March 2006 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant's complaint as being ill-founded. The relevant part of its decision reads as follows: “The impugned judgment and the case file show that [the first] examination hearing in the bankruptcy proceedings against Zelina Agriculture Enterprise based in Sveti Ivan Zelina was held and concluded on 24 September 2002 and that the applicant as a creditor submitted her claim after the first examination hearing, on 15 April 2003. Since the applicant submitted her claim after the time-limit fixed in Section 176 paragraph 2 of the Bankruptcy Act, the first-instance court declared her claim inadmissible as being lodged out of time pursuant to section 176 paragraph 4 of the Bankruptcy Act. The High Commercial Court, in its decision on the applicant's appeal, stressed that the appeal was unfounded and that the Zagreb Commercial Court had correctly applied substantial law when it had declared the applicant's claim inadmissible as being lodged out of time.”

9. The applicants (see paragraph 1), who were born in 1955, 1975, 1977, 1979, 1981, 1985, and 1988 respectively, are the wife and children of the deceased, Cavit Özalp, who was killed in 1995 while he was under custody. Events concerning the death of Cavit Özalp 10. Until 1994, the Özalp family resided in the Serçeler village in Bismil District in province of Diyarbakır. When the security forces started to pressurise the Özalp family members to become village guards, the family moved to Diyarbakır in the spring of 1994. 11. On 21 August 1995 one of the applicants, Mr Hacı Özalp, went back to Bismil to visit the fields that belonged to his family. When he arrived in Bismil, he was stopped by soldiers and questioned about his father, Cavit Özalp. He was subsequently taken to the gendarme command, where he was further questioned about his father. During the interrogation, Hacı told them where they could find Cavit Özalp. 12. On 24 August 1995 Cavit Özalp was taken into custody in Diyarbakır. On the same day, Hacı saw his father in custody however he was not allowed to speak to him. 13. On 26 August 1995 Hacı was released from custody. On the same day, while he was still in Bismil, he was informed by an acquaintance that an incident had taken place in the Kamberli village and that it concerned his father. Consequently, when Hacı went to the Kamberli village to find out more about this incident, he met a villager, called Vehyettin, who told him that his father was dead. 14. On the same day two police officers visited Cavit's house in Diyarbakır and told Hacı's uncle that Cavit had died. 15. On 5 February 1996 the applicants' representatives filed a petition with the public prosecutor attached to the Diyarbakır State Security Court. Referring to the investigation that had been commenced into the death of Cavit Özalp and the decision of non-prosecution that had been delivered by the Diyarbakır State Security Court public prosecutor, the applicants' representatives requested a copy of the arrest and autopsy reports as well as the public prosecutor's decision of non-prosecution. 16. The public prosecutor refused to give these documents and noted at the bottom of the petition the following: “It has been decided [by this office] that no prosecution should be brought about the death of Cevat Özalp [Note: Cavit's name is spelled out as Cevat in the public prosecutor's note.] pursuant to Article 96 of the Turkish Criminal Code. The investigations in order to apprehend the co-activists of Cevat Özalp are still ongoing. A copy of the investigation file could not have been given [to the representatives] in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Constitution, as it would constitute disclosure of the content and the subject matter of the investigation file.” 17. On 24 August 1995 Cavit Özalp was taken into custody by the gendarmes from the Bismil Gendarme District Command on suspicion of membership of the PKK, proscribed as a terrorist organisation. He was suspected of aiding and abetting the PKK terrorists. 18. On an unspecified date Cavit Özalp gave a statement to the gendarmes. He stated that the PKK terrorists were occasionally staying in his house and that he was providing them with food and military equipment such as weapons, clothes and medicine. He further stated that he had dug a shelter with the terrorists on the slopes of a hill near the Pamuk River in the Sarıhüseyin hamlet attached to the Serçeler village to hide some equipment. 19. On 24 August 1995 Cavit Özalp was taken to the Bismil Health Center for medical examination. According to the medical report, there were no signs of ill-treatment on his body. 20. On 26 August 1995 at 4 a.m. the gendarmes conducted a search to find out the location of the shelter that had been mentioned by Cavit Özalp in his statement. Cavit guided the soldiers to the shelter near the Şedat road in the Kamberli village. While protecting themselves in a secure distance, the soldiers asked him to open the cover of the shelter. As he opened the cover, the soldiers witnessed a big explosion, which tore Cavit's body into pieces. The explosives had been placed in the entrance to the shelter by other members of the PKK and the soldiers found weapons, medical equipment and clothes in the shelter. The incident was further reported to the Bismil public prosecutor. 21. On the same day an on-site examination was conducted by the Bismil public prosecutor together with a doctor. According to an onsite body examination, it was established that both legs were severed as a result of the explosion. No other signs of injury were observed on the dismembered body. The doctor decided that it was unnecessary to conduct a full autopsy on the body. Cavit's corpse was then given to Mr Hasip Yılmaz, a member of the Kamberli village assembly. An incident report was further drafted by the gendarmes and was signed by three non-commissioned officers and the village mayor Mr Kütbettin Altunç. 22. On 24 November 1995 the public prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court decided that no prosecution should be brought against Cavit Özalp on account of his membership of the PKK on the ground that he had died on 26 August 1995. 23. On 14 November 1995 the Bismil public prosecutor accused the non-commissioned officer, Mr İlhan Yücel, of failing to take the necessary precautions when Cavit Özalp had been asked to open the cover of the shelter and of causing Cavit Özalp's death through negligence. However, as the public prosecutor did not have the jurisdiction to bring proceedings against the non-commissioned officer, he declared lack of jurisdiction and transferred the case file to the Bismil District Administrative Council. 24. Subsequently, the District Administrative Council appointed a major as a rapporteur to conduct further investigations into the killing of Cavit Özalp. On 15 January 1996 the major took statements from the non-commissioned officers, Mr İlhan Yücel, Mr Yılmaz Öztiryaki and Mr Ömer Karabaş, who had been on site during the incident of 26 August 1995. The officers stated that Cavit Özalp had been taken into custody on suspicion of membership of the PKK and had confessed that he had been aiding and abetting the terrorists, providing them with food, clothes, weapons and medical equipment. The soldiers further stated that Cavit had mentioned a shelter which was used by the terrorists and when he was taken to the site to show the place of the shelter, the gendarmes had positioned themselves far from the shelter to prevent any loss of life. The soldiers explained that Cavit was asked to open the shelter, however he had died as a result of the explosion. The officers finally stated that medical equipment and clothes had been found in the shelter. 25. Basing himself on the statements of the three accused non-commissioned soldiers, the incident and the body examination reports, on 23 January 1996 the rapporteur submitted his report to the District Administrative Council. He concluded that the security forces had taken all the necessary precautions before Cavit Özalp was asked to open the cover of the shelter. The report further stated: “Having regard to the fact that Cavit Özalp had confessed that he had dug a shelter [with the other terrorists] it was presumed that he could have known the place of the shelter and that he could have safely opened its cover himself. After the necessary safety measures had been taken, he had been asked to open the cover. However, he had died in an explosion. The explosives had been previously placed there by the terrorists. Neither the security forces nor Cavit Özalp had noticed the explosives.” 26. The report concluded that the security forces had performed their duty with diligence and it was recommended that no prosecution be brought against the members of the security forces. 27. On 28 February 1996 the Bismil District Administrative Council issued a decision stating that no prosecution should be brought against the members of the security forces. The council concluded that Cavit Özalp had died as a result of the explosion and that the accused members of the security forces had performed their duty with diligence. 28. On 2 April 1996 the Diyarbakır Regional Administrative Court, to which the case had been automatically referred to by law, upheld the decision of the Bismil District Administrative Council. 3. Materials submitted by the parties (a)Arrest report, dated 24 August 1995, drafted by Bismil District Gendarmerie Command; (b)Custody records, dated 24 August 1995 which indicate that Cavit Özalp was taken into custody on 24 August 1995 at about 11 a.m.; (c)Undated statement of Cavit Özalp; (d)Medical report dated, 24 August 1995; (e)Report of incident, dated 26 August 1995; (f)Sketch map of scene of incident, dated 26 August 1995; (g)Autopsy report dated, 26 August 1995; (h)Non-jurisdiction decision of the Bismil public prosecutor's office, dated 14 November 1995; (i)Statements of the three non-commissioned officers, Mr İlhan Yücel, Mr Yılmaz Öztiryaki and Mr Ömer Karabaş, dated 15 January 1996; (j)Non-prosecution decision of the Diyarbakır State Security Court Public Prosecutor, dated 24 November 1995, delivered against Cavit Özalp; (k)Non-prosecution decision of Bismil District Administrative Council, dated 28 February 1996; (l)Decision of the Diyarbakır Regional Administrative Court, dated 2 April 1996, upholding the decision of Bismil District Administrative Council; (m)Petition of the applicants' representatives to the Diyarbakır State Security Court public prosecutor's office dated 5 February 1996 and the subsequent rejection of the public prosecutor; (n)Undated statement of Hacı and Makbule Özalp concerning the application.

5. The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Warsaw. 6. On 6 July 2004 the applicant was arrested by the police on suspicion of having committed, inter alia, several offences of drug trafficking. 7. On 7 July 2004 the Kielce District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) remanded him in custody. It relied on a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences with which he had been charged and on the risk that he might tamper with evidence. Further, the court referred to the severity of the anticipated sentence. 8. The applicant appealed against the detention order. On 10 August 2004 the Kielce Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) upheld the first‑instance decision. It explained that the reasons for his detention were still valid and stressed that the suspicion against him was supported by the fact that the applicant had partly confessed. 9. In the course of the investigation, the applicant’s detention was extended several times. The courts relied on the suspicion that the applicant had committed the offence with which he had been charged. In their decisions, which also concerned several other suspects, the courts stressed the fact that most of the accused – however not the applicant - were acting in an organised group. Further, they referred to the complexity of the case, the fact that many suspects were involved in the case and that some of them had gone into hiding. They stressed that the detention was justified by the need to obtain further evidence, in particular, to obtain expert reports, to take evidence from numerous witnesses and suspects and to confront a witness with suspects. Lastly, the courts relied on the fact that some of the suspects were related to each other. On almost every occasion the courts relied on grounds that did not pertain to the applicant individually. 10. On 20 June 2005 the applicant and thirty three other suspects were indicted before the Warsaw Regional Court. The bill of indictment comprised 180 charges. The applicant was indicted on several charges of drug trafficking. 11. The applicant’s detention was subsequently extended by the Warsaw Regional Court on 27 June and 24 October 2005, 27 January 2006 and later by the Warsaw Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) on 27 June and 15 December 2006, 13 March, 13 July and 12 October 2007. The courts repeated the grounds given in the previous decisions. On an unspecified date in January 2008 the Warsaw Court of Appeal further extended the applicant’s detention, until 3 April 2008. The applicant failed to submit information as to whether there any further decisions had been given extending his detention. On 23 May 2008 the applicant informed the Court that he had been released. 12. It appears that in the course of the proceedings, the applicant made numerous unsuccessful applications for release and appealed, likewise unsuccessfully, against refusals to release him and against decisions extending his detention. The Warsaw Court of Appeal upheld the first‑instance decisions on the following dates: 29 November 2005, 3 March and 8 August 2006, and 3 August and 9 November 2007. 13. On 10 January 2006 the trial court held the first hearing. Between 10 January 2006 and 25 June 2007 it held approximately sixty hearings in the case. 14. It appears that the proceedings are still pending before the first‑instance court.

4. The applicant was born in 1935 and lives in Yerevan. 5. Starting from 1971 the applicant made various deposits in Soviet roubles with the Armenian branch of the USSR Savings Bank. These included: (a) sums of money deposited on three deposit accounts (ժամկետային ավանդ) opened in 1973-1974 amounting to a total of 19,795.30 roubles as of 1 January 1993, sums of money deposited on three 40% offset accounts (40% փոխհատուցման հաշիվ) opened in 1991 amounting to a total of 8,264 roubles as of 1 January 1993, and sums of money deposited on three on-demand accounts (ցպահանջ հաշիվ) opened in 1971, 1977 and 1988, the latter in the name of the applicant's grand-daughter, amounting to a total of 29,384.81 roubles as of 1 September 1993; (b) 23 State internal premium bonds of 1982 (1982 թ. պետական ներքին շահող փոխառության պարտատոմսեր), each worth 50 roubles; (c) four special-purpose State interest-free bonds of 1990 (1990 թ. պետական նպատակային անտոկոս փոխառության պարտատոմսեր): one worth 2,500 roubles entitling the applicant to receive a video recorder, one worth 1,000 roubles entitling her to receive a television set, and two others each worth 200 roubles entitling her to receive two sewing machines; (d) 11 certificates of the USSR Savings Bank obtained in 1990 (ԽՍՀՄ խնայբանկի սերտիֆիկատ), each worth 1,000 roubles. 6. On 5 July 1993 the Government decided to restructure the Armenian branch of the USSR Savings Bank into the State Specialised Savings Bank of Armenia (hereafter, the Savings Bank). Later that month the Soviet rouble was withdrawn from circulation. 7. On 22 November 1993 the Armenian currency, the dram, was introduced, at a rate of 200 roubles to 1 dram. 8. On 26 April 2002 the Convention and Protocol No. 1 entered into force in respect of Armenia. 9. On 21 June 2004 the applicant applied to the Savings Bank seeking to recover her deposits. 10. By a letter of 21 July 2004 the Savings Bank informed the applicant that: “...the question of compensation for deposits made with the Savings Bank in former USSR roubles prior to 1 January 1993 is currently at the centre of attention of the National Assembly and the Government of Armenia. The Decision no. 835 of the Government of Armenia of 8 September 2001, which states that '... the Republic of Armenia assumes responsibility for the future possible indexation of deposits made by citizens with the Savings Bank CJSC in former USSR roubles prior to the currency conversion of 1993', serves as proof of this. As to your inquiry concerning the former USSR State internal premium bonds of 1982 and the certificates, we would inform you that all operations in their respect were stopped by the decision of the Supreme Soviet of Armenia of 10 June 1993, until a final decision is adopted concerning their repayment by the CIS member States. However, no decision or directive was adopted thereafter. As to the redemption of the former USSR special-purpose interest-free bonds given to the Armenian population in 1990, which were planned to be converted into household and domestic goods starting from 1993, this was found not to be feasible by Decree no. 377 of the Government of Armenia of 29 June 1992. For purposes of compensation the Government of Armenia, in its Decree no. 345 of 5 July 1993, decided to index the nominal value of the above [special-purpose interest-free] bonds by 300% and to open a deposit account or to make payments by 1 August 1993, which you failed to do within the said period. As you see, in the above circumstances the Savings Bank has no obligation to make payments in respect of the deposits and securities. The Savings Bank will be able to serve citizens only after a decision is taken by the Government of Armenia concerning the choice of possible compensation alternatives for the deposits and the above securities and their payment.” 11. On 4 August 2004 the applicant lodged a claim with the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan against the Government, seeking to recover her deposits and securities made with the Savings Bank. She requested, in particular, that her savings be returned to her in the currency in which the deposits were made. 12. On 6 August 2004 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan refused to admit the applicant's claim on the ground that: “... the dispute is not subject to court examination, since the National Assembly and the Government of Armenia have not yet adopted relevant laws and decrees concerning the procedure for returning to citizens their deposits made with the Savings Bank of Armenia.” 13. On 13 August 2004 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, arguing that the reasons for the refusal to admit her claim were groundless and seeking to reverse the decision of the District Court. 14. On 27 August 2004 the Court of Cassation decided to dismiss the applicant's appeal. In doing so, the Court of Cassation referred to the grounds for the refusal to admit the applicant's claim and found the District Court's decision to be well-founded.

4. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Tvrdošín. 5. On 27 June 1997 the applicant was dismissed from his job in a private company due to its restructuring. Subsequently the applicant brought proceedings against the company before the Dolný Kubín District Court in which he claimed arrears of salary. The Dolný Kubín District Court granted the applicant’s claim on 3 February 1998. 6. On 31 May 1999 the Banská Bystrica Regional Court declared the defendant company bankrupt. On 28 July 1999 the applicant registered his claim against the debtor in the bankruptcy proceedings. 7. On 13 December 1999 the administrator in bankruptcy asked to be replaced in that function due to serious health problems. On 21 January 2000 the Banská Bystrica Regional Court appointed a new administrator. 8. On 19 October 2000 the Regional Court authorised the administrator to pay outstanding salary to the single remaining employee of the company in bankruptcy. 9. On 6 December 2000 the administrator informed the Regional Court that the means of the company did not suffice to cover his expenses. On 26 January 2001 the Regional Court authorised the administrator to sell several obsolete objects of negligible value with a view to obtaining financial means. 10. On 23 February 2001 a hearing was held before the Banská Bystrica Regional Court. The administrator submitted a report on the debtor company’s property and his activity. The report stated that it was doubtful whether any means could be obtained with a view to satisfying the creditors. At the hearing the court acknowledged that the applicant’s claim in respect of the debtor company was justified. 11. On 19 November 2003 the administrator informed the court that he expected to submit his final report before 31 January 2004. Following the Regional Court’s inquiry of 29 September 2004, the administrator submitted the report on the company’s property on 1 September 2004. It indicated that the financial means obtained in the course of the bankruptcy proceedings did not suffice even to cover the costs and fees of the administrator. 12. On 18 October 2004 the Regional Court quashed the declaration of bankruptcy as the debtor’s property was insufficient. The decision became final on 25 November 2004. 13. In July 1997 the applicant started working in a different company. He was dismissed from his job, due to restructuring of the company, on 28 February 1998. 14. In 1998 the applicant filed an action against the company claiming arrears of salary and a severance payment. On 26 August 1998 the company acknowledged the debt. On 9 September 1998 the Banská Bystrica District Court awarded the equivalent of approximately 750 euros plus default interest to the applicant. The judgment became final on 5 October 1998. 15. On 15 December 1998 the applicant filed a motion with an executions officer and requested enforcement of the sum in issue. On 18 January 1999 the Banská Bystrica District Court appointed the executions officer to enforce the judgment. 16. On 5 February 1999 the executions officer informed the debtor company that enforcement proceedings had been brought against it and that the sum due would be transferred to the applicant from the debtor’s bank account. 17. On 26 April 1999 the applicant concluded a contract with the executions officer on enforcement of the judgment in issue. Article II of the contract provided that the applicant did not have to pay any advance on costs of the execution to the executions officer. Article VIII indicated that the contract could only be modified upon the agreement in writing of both parties. 18. On 30 August 1999 the applicant asked the officer to proceed with the execution or, as the case might be, to confirm that the sum was irrecoverable. 19. On 9 November 1999 the bank informed the executions officer that the sum deposited at the company’s account was insufficient to cover the debt. On 11 November 1999 a different bank informed the officer that the debtor company’s account had been cancelled. 20. The applicant complained about the inactivity of the executions officer to the Ministry of Justice. The Ministry transmitted the complaint to the Slovak Chamber of Executions Officers on 10 April 2000. The Chamber was requested to notify the Ministry of its reply to the applicant within two months. 21. On 24 August 2000 the executions officer requested the applicant to pay, within seven days, an advance on costs of the execution failing which the executions officer would ask the District Court to discontinue the proceedings. Reference was made to Section 197(2) of the Judicial Executors and Enforcement Act. The advance requested amounted to the equivalent of approximately 93 euros. The letter further indicated that the applicant could come to the execution officer’s office on 21 September 2000 with a view to settling any queries. 22. In a letter of 11 September 2000 the applicant replied that, pursuant to the enforcement contract of 26 April 1999, he was not obliged to pay any advance on costs and that no reasons had been given for the request. The applicant stated that he was not opposed to amending the contract provided that it would result in a successful recovery of the debt. 23. On 26 July 2001 the executions officer filed a motion for the proceedings to be discontinued as the applicant had failed to pay an advance on his costs. 24. In a letter of 30 July 2001, the Secretary to the Slovak Chamber of Executions Officers informed the applicant, in reply to his above complaint, that the executions officer in question had acted in compliance with the law. The letter stated, inter alia, that the executions officer had examined the financial situation of the debtor and that he had filed an execution order with the debtor’s bank. As the bank had informed the executions officer that the debtor did not own any property, the sum due could not be enforced. The letter also stated that the officer had warned the applicant’s lawyer in the applicant’s presence, at the moment when the request for execution had been filed, that the execution would not succeed as the debtor no longer carried on any business activity and owned no property. The executions officer’s request for an advance on costs of the execution was in conformity with Section 197(2) of the Judicial Executors and Enforcement Act. 25. On 28 November 2001 the Banská Bystrica District Court granted the request of the executions officer and it discontinued the proceedings. The decision was served on the applicant on 11 January 2002. It stated that no appeal was available against it. 26. The applicant appealed. He alleged that under the contract he had not been obliged to pay any advance on costs of the execution. 27. On 22 March 2002 the executions officer submitted the file together with an explanation to the District Court. The officer maintained that the relevant law entitled him to request an advance on his costs. Furthermore, he had warned the applicant that the execution was unlikely to succeed as the debtor owned no property. 28. On 7 May 2002 the District Court obtained a report from the companies register, and it transmitted the case to the appellate court on 20 May 2002. 29. On 31 May 2002 the Banská Bystrica Regional Court rejected the appeal as being inadmissible as under the relevant law no appeal lay against a decision to discontinue enforcement proceedings on the grounds of the creditor’s failure to pay an advance on costs of the execution. 30. On 29 August 2002 the Registry of the Court asked the applicant for information as to whether he had used the remedy under Article 127 of the Constitution enacted with effect from 1 January 2002. 31. On 9 September 2002 the applicant replied that he had exhausted all available remedies at the time when he had lodged his application in 2000. He maintained that he was not required to use the newly introduced remedy as his case was pending before the Court. At the same time, the applicant admitted that the originally alleged violation of his right resulting from delays in recovering the sums in question still remained and that, in the meantime, new violations had occurred as a result of the subsequent developments in his cases. He referred, in particular, to his submissions to the Court of 21 May 2002.

4. The applicant was born in 1943 and lives in Bardejov. 5. In 1993 the applicant and his wife brought proceedings for determination of ownership in respect of a plot of land. 6. On 18 April 1996 the District Court dismissed the action and, on 19 June 1997, the Prešov Regional Court (Krajský súd) upheld the judgment on appeal (odvolanie). 7. On 20 October 1997 the applicant and his wife appealed on points of law (dovolanie). In the course of the proceedings on this appeal procedural matters such as, for instance, the court fees and legal aid, were determined repeatedly at all levels of jurisdiction. The appeal on points of law concerning the merits of the case is still pending. 8. On 28 May 2004 the applicant lodged a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution with the Constitutional Court (Ústavný súd). He complained of unjustified delays in the proceedings on the appeal on points of law and requested a legal-aid lawyer. The Constitutional Court dismissed the latter request on 30 June 2004, finding that, in so far as the applicant had substantiated his financial situation, there was no ground for granting it. 9. On 24 September 2004 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible on the ground that the applicant had failed to comply with the statutory requirement to have legal representation. 10. On 14 December 1995 the applicant instituted proceedings seeking modification of a certificate of employment. He argued that the period of his employment was in reality one day longer than as shown in the certificate. 11. The action was dismissed by the District Court on 18 February 1999 and, on appeal, by the Prešov Regional Court on 3 December 1999. 12. On 28 January 2002 the Supreme Court (Najvyšší súd) quashed the judgment of 3 December 1999 on an appeal by the applicant on points of law and remitted the matter to the Regional Court for a new determination of the appeal against the judgment of 18 February 1999. 13. On 25 November 2002 the Regional Court upheld the judgment of 18 February 1999. The applicant appealed again on points of law. 14. On 16 December 2004 the Supreme Court declared the appeal on points of law inadmissible since it met none of the existing statutory admissibility criteria. 15. On 23 May 1997 the applicant brought an action against his landlord, a housing co-operative, in the District Court. He first claimed that his rent should be reduced and later modified the claim in that he reclaimed a part of the rent paid. A further attempt by the applicant to modify the claim was declared inadmissible. 16. On 2 October 2001 the District Court granted the action by ordering the defendant to pay an amount of money to the applicant. The applicant appealed, arguing that the District Court had overlooked the modification of his claim. 17. On 28 February 2002 the Prešov Regional Court declared the appeal inadmissible, holding that the applicant lacked grounds for appeal, since his claim had been granted in full. The applicant appealed on points of law. 18. On 24 January 2005 the Supreme Court discontinued the proceedings on the appeal on points of law on the ground that, despite a previous request and warning, the applicant had failed to bring it in line with the applicable procedural requirements. 19. On 15 March 2004 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint about delays in the proceedings and requested a legal-aid lawyer. The Constitutional Court dismissed the legal-aid request, finding that the applicant was not eligible, in view of his material situation, which was well known to the Constitutional Court in connection with the applicant's other submissions to the Constitutional Court. 20. On 24 September 2004 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible on the ground that the applicant had no legal representation. 21. On 18 May 1998 the applicant brought an action against the State, in the person of the Ministry of Justice. He argued that the Ministry had erroneously charged him an administrative fee for an administrative complaint in a previous, unrelated matter and sought damages. 22. The action was dismissed by the District Court on 4 August 1999 and, on appeal, by the Prešov Regional Court on 27 March 2000. 23. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. In the course of the proceedings on this appeal, procedural matters such as the court fees, legal aid and impartiality of judges were determined repeatedly and at all levels of jurisdiction. The appeal on points of law as regards the merits of the case is still pending. 24. On 14 April 2004 the applicant complained to the Constitutional Court of the length of the proceedings and then requested a legal-aid lawyer. 25. The Constitutional Court examined the applicant's financial situation, taking into account, in particular, the amount of social benefits the applicant and his wife were receiving and the amount of just satisfaction the applicant had been awarded recently on three unrelated constitutional complaints. The Constitutional Court concluded, on 30 June 2004, that the granting of legal aid to the applicant was not justified. 26. On 10 September 2004 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant's complaint inadmissible on the ground that he had no legal representation. 27. On 1 October 1997 the applicant and his wife filed a civil action seeking the division and dissolution of the co-ownership of a plot of land. 28. On 24 April 2003 the Bardejov District Court granted the claim and the judgment became final and binding on 11 June 2003. 29. On 11 March 1992 the applicant sent a letter to the Svidník State Notary requesting that the estate of his late mother be determined. He made a similar submission to the District Court on 9 March 1993, following which, on 28 May 1993, the District Court opened the inheritance proceedings and appointed a notary public to deal with the case. 30. Between 8 August 1993 and 23 January 2001 the notary held 12 hearings. A hearing that was held on 3 October 1995 was adjourned at the applicant's request with a view to settling the estate by agreement of the prospective heirs. The hearing held on 23 July 1996 was adjourned in order to examine the applicant's claim that he had changed his name. 31. The applicant failed to appear at six of the above hearings. He excused himself for not being able to attend the hearing of 11 March 1996 one day before that hearing, on account of a clash of scheduled court appearances. Three days before the hearing listed for 9 November 1998 the applicant submitted that he could not appear for health reasons. The applicant also apologised for not being able to attend the hearings of 22 November 1999 and 6 March 2000 three days before those hearings. 32. In the meantime, on 4 January 1994, the notary requested that the applicant submit documentary evidence, which the applicant did only on 4 November 1994, after having been reminded three times. 33. In the course of 1995 the notary obtained several pieces of documentary evidence defining the extent of the estate. 34. On 7 February 2001 the notary held another hearing, following which, on the same day, he determined the case by ruling that the estate passed to the applicant and issuing an order for costs against him. The decision was upheld by the District Court on 9 April 2001 and on appeal by the applicant by the Prešov Regional Court on 26 July 2001. 35. The applicant subsequently lodged an application with the courts for enforcement of the inheritance decision of 7 February 2001. He sought an order requiring the Land Register Administration to register his title to the inherited property. The application was examined twice, at two levels of jurisdiction, and the judicial proceedings in respect of it were finally discontinued, in 2004, on the ground that the enforcement of the decision fell outside the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. The application was consequently transmitted to the Svidník Land Register Administration which was the body which should deal with it. The “enforcement” appears to be still pending there and questions such as, for example, identification of the property under a new referencing system, are being determined. 36. On 11 May 1993 the applicant brought an action for damages in the Bardejov District Court. It was dismissed by the District Court on 20 January 1994 and, on appeal, by the Košice Regional Court on 26 May 1995. 37. On 19 January 1996 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against the Regional Court's judgment. 38. On 16 September 1996 the District Court instructed the applicant to bring his appeal in line with the applicable procedural requirements and to pay the court fees. The applicant replied on 25 September 1996 by asking for an exemption from the obligation to pay the court fees. 39. On 2 March, 2 June and 15 October 1997 the District Court repeatedly requested that the applicant make a declaration in respect of his financial standing, with a view to determining the question of the court fees. In the absence of a relevant response, the District Court finally established the applicant's standing on the basis of the information which the applicant had submitted in the context of other proceedings. 40. On 23 February 1999 the District Court exempted the applicant from the obligation to pay the court fees and appointed him a legal-aid lawyer. 41. On 9 December 1999 the Supreme Court rejected the appeal, as having been lodged after the expiry of the statutory one-month time-limit. 42. On 14 February 1991 the applicant and his wife brought an action against an individual in the District Court for protection of their ownership rights in respect of two plots of land. In the course of the proceedings they identified further defendants and extended the action by seeking protection in respect of another plot and claiming that the defendants should be obliged to remove rubbish from the plots in question. 43. On 31 October 1996 the District Court ordered the defendants to refrain from interfering with the plaintiffs' ownership rights in respect of the first two plots and decided that the remaining claim would be dealt with in a separate set of proceedings (see paragraph 47 below). 44. On 4 March 1998 the Prešov Regional Court upheld the judgment of 31 October 1996 on appeal. It thus became final on 21 August 1998. 45. In 1998 the applicant and his wife requested that the District Court enforce its judgment of 31 October 1996. 46. In the course of the enforcement proceedings a fine was imposed on the defendants for their failure to abide by the above final judgment and the fine was upheld on appeal. The applicant then requested, numerous times, but unsuccessfully, that further fines be imposed. 47. As regards the claim concerning the third plot, which the District Court decided to determine in a separate set of proceedings (see paragraph 43 above), four hearings were held between 4 February and 18 May 1999. Three of them were adjourned owing to the absence of the defendants' representative, one in order for the parties to submit evidence. 48. On 9 June 1999 the District Court held a hearing following which, on the same day, it ordered the defendants to refrain from interfering with the plaintiffs' ownership rights. The court further decided to deal with the remaining claim concerning the prohibition on entering the third plot and the removal of rubbish; in yet another separate set of proceedings. The applicant and his wife appealed. 49. In 1999 the applicant and his wife requested protection of their rights by way of an interim measure. The request was dismissed on 7 April 2000 and, on appeal, on 19 September 2001. 50. On 19 April 2004 the Regional Court quashed the injunction of 9 June 1999 and remitted this matter to the District Court for reconsideration. 51. On 8 August 2004 the applicant challenged the District Court's judge dealing with the case for bias, on the ground that he was responsible for unjustified delays. On 8 September 2004 the Regional Court dismissed the challenge. 52. On 10 December 2004 the defendants submitted a contract to the court under which they had sold their plots to third persons. The District Court adjourned the case and invited the plaintiffs to confirm whether they wished to maintain their claim in these circumstances. 53. On 28 December 2004 the applicant informed the court that the plaintiffs maintained their claim. The proceedings are still pending. 54. On 7 July 2004 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court. He directed the complaint both against the District Court and the Regional Court and challenged unjustified delays in the proceedings files, nos. 7C 107/91 and 4C 1313/98. 55. On 10 October 2004 the applicant supplemented his complaint in that he also claimed a violation of his right under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to enjoy his possessions peacefully, owing to the length of the proceedings. 56. On 28 October 2004 the Constitutional Court invited the applicant to specify his complaint in so far as it was directed against the Regional Court. The applicant failed to do so. 57. On 15 December 2004 the Constitutional Court declared admissible the complaint of the length of the proceedings, in so far as it concerned the District Court, and inadmissible as being unsubstantiated, in so far as it concerned the Regional Court. It also found inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded the complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 58. On 15 March 2005 the Constitutional Court found that the District Court had violated the applicant's right to a hearing without unjustified delay (Article 48 § 2 of the Constitution) and ordered it to proceed with the case expeditiously. The Constitutional Court found that the District Court had been inactive without any justification from 16 November 1995 to 22 July 1996 (a total of nine months) and that there had been several formal errors on the part of the District Court, which had contributed to the total length of the proceedings. The Constitutional Court also found that the applicant's behaviour had significantly contributed to the length of the proceedings, as he had failed to appear at three hearings, had modified his claim several times and had challenged the judge twice (in 1992 and in 2004 respectively). It therefore decided not to award the applicant any just satisfaction in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 59. On 22 December 1995 the applicant's housing co-operative brought an action against him and his wife claiming arrears of rent. 60. On 14 April 1999 the District Court discontinued the proceedings as the plaintiff had withdrawn the action. The Prešov Regional Court upheld the decision on 30 November 1999 on the applicant's appeal. 61. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law and requested a legal-aid lawyer. The request was dismissed with reference to the applicant's financial situation. 62. On 25 May 2005 the Supreme Court declared the applicant's appeal on points of law inadmissible on the ground that he had no legal representation. 63. On 26 March 2004 the applicant complained to the Constitutional Court about unjustified delays in the proceedings before the District Court in connection with the processing of his appeal on points of law. 64. On 5 May 2004 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded. It observed, firstly, that the complaint was directed solely against the proceedings before the District Court, which concerned the appeal on points of law. It further observed that, in the circumstances, the applicant's appeal on points of law had no prospect of success and was bound to fail. Finally, the Constitutional Court observed that burdening the courts with inadmissible and unmeritorious appeals, as in the applicant's case, prevented due administration of justice. In view of these considerations the Constitutional Court concluded that, at the time of its assessment, there was no appearance of a violation of the applicant's right to a hearing without unjustified delay. 65. On 5 March 2001 the applicant brought proceedings against his housing co-operative, claiming that the defendant's rent assessment should be declared null and void. 66. In response to the District Court's request to pay the court fees, the applicant asked for an exemption from the obligation to do so. Having examined the applicant's financial situation, the District Court rejected the request and discontinued the proceedings on the merits, on 1 June 2001. 67. On 14 June 2001 the applicant paid the court fees and the District Court resumed the proceedings. 68. On 22 June 2004 the District Court dismissed the action. The applicant appealed. 69. On 16 September 2004 the District Court discontinued the appellate proceedings as the applicant had failed to pay the court fees for the appeal. The decision became final on 27 October 2004. 70. On 9 May 2004 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court alleging unjustified delays in the action of 2001. 71. On 14 April 2005 the Constitutional Court found that the District Court had violated the applicant's right to a hearing without unjustified delay. It held that the District Court had been inactive without any justification from 17 July 2001 to 13 March 2002 (a total of eight months) and also from 11 April 2002 to 10 November 2003 (a total of seventeen months). It awarded the applicant 20,000 Slovakian korunas[1] (SKK) by way of just satisfaction in respect of non-pecuniary damage and ordered reimbursement of his legal costs. 72. On 10 January 1996 the applicant brought an action against his housing co-operative. He principally sought an order against the defendant to sell and transfer the flat in which the applicant was living to him, under special legislation of 1991. The applicant also sought universal settlement in respect of all outstanding pecuniary and non‑pecuniary claims between himself and the defendant. 73. On 28 January 1999 the District Court dismissed the applicant's claim for the transfer of the flat and discontinued the proceedings concerning the settlement, as the applicant had failed to specify this part of his claim despite repeated requests. The applicant appealed. 74. On 14 February 2000 the Prešov Regional Court upheld the District Court's judgment in so far as it concerned the discontinuation of the proceedings and quashed it in so far as it concerned the dismissal of the principal claim. The latter claim was remitted to the District Court for reconsideration. 75. In the course of the subsequent proceedings various procedural issues such as the court fees and legal aid were examined numerous times at all levels of jurisdiction. The proceedings are still pending. 76. On 3 August 2004 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint alleging a violation of his rights under Article 6 of the Convention and of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in the action of 1996 and requested a legal-aid lawyer. 77. On 10 September and 10 November 2004, respectively, the Constitutional Court dismissed as unfounded the applicant's legal-aid request and declared his constitutional complaint inadmissible on the ground that he had no legal representation. 78. On 3 February 1999 the applicant sued the National Employment Authority before the District Court for an amount of money. The District Court dismissed the claim on 9 September 1999. The applicant appealed and on 10 April 2000 the Prešov Regional Court declared his appeal inadmissible as being lodged out of time. 79. On 7 June 2000 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against the Regional Court's decision. The Bardejov District Court, which dealt with the appeal on points of law prior to its submission to the Supreme Court, invited the applicant to rectify shortcomings in the appeal and to submit a power of attorney. The applicant requested an exemption from the obligation to pay the court fees and asked for a legal-aid lawyer. His requests were rejected by the courts at two instances, with reference to the applicant's financial situation. 80. On 2 September 2004 the Supreme Court discontinued the proceedings, holding that the applicant had failed to comply with the statutory requirement to have legal representation. 81. In November 2004 the applicant complained to the Constitutional Court about unjustified delays in the proceedings before the District Court in respect of his appeal on points of law of 7 June 2000. 82. On 14 April 2005 the Constitutional Court found that the Bardejov District Court had violated the applicant's constitutional right to have the case decided without unjustified delays. The Constitutional Court observed that the District Court had been inactive without any justification from 27 July 2001 until 20 September 2002 (a total of thirteen months) and from 4 November 2002 until 7 January 2004 (a total of fourteen months). The Constitutional Court also found that the applicant's behaviour had significantly contributed to the length of the proceedings, as he had repeatedly sent incomplete applications to the court and the court had had to invite him to rectify the shortcomings in them. It therefore decided not to award the applicant any just satisfaction in respect of non-pecuniary damage. Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court ordered reimbursement of the applicant's legal costs.

4. The applicant was born in 1927 and lives in Cornu. 5. In 1950, the real estate made up of two apartments and the appurtenant land situated in Bucharest, Regina Maria blvd. nos. 36-38, the property of the applicant's parents, was seized by the State under Decree no. 92/1950 on nationalisation. The applicant continued to live in a flat situated in building no. 38 as a tenant of the State. 6. On 15 January 1996 the applicant claimed restitutio in integrum of building no. 38 and compensation for building no. 36. On 15 June 2000, the Bucharest Town Council rejected her demand. The applicant contested the decision before the courts. 7. On 2 March 2001, the Bucharest District Court upheld the applicant's action by a final judgment, declaring void the decision of the Town Council and ordering the administrative authorities to return to the applicant the real estate no. 38, made of three buildings and appurtenant land of 208 m². 8. In 2001, on an unknown date, the applicant claimed from the administrative authorities the restitution in kind of 450 m² of land appurtenant to buildings nos. 36 and 38. By a decision of 12 July 2002, the Bucharest Town Council allowed the application and granted restitutio in integrum of the appurtenant land of 314 m² for no. 36 and 136 m² for no. 38. 9. In spite of obtaining judicial recognition of her property right, the applicant was not able to recover possession of flats nos. 1 and 2 of building no. 38 because on 30 September 1996 the State had sold them to the tenants, under Law no. 112/1995, together with the land appurtenant to each flat. 10. On 6 February 2002, the applicant requested the court to find that the sale by the State was null and void. She considered that the State did not have a right of property, that it had not observed the legal provisions of Law no. 112/1995 and that the purchasers were in bad faith. 11. On 1 February 2005, the Bucharest Court of Appeal, by a final decision, dismissed the request for the rescission of the sale contracts on the ground that the State had complied with the provisions of Law no. 112/1995 and that the tenants had made the purchase in good faith.

4. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Moscow. 5. On 30 April 1998 the applicant bought a building at auction. 6. On 1 July 1998 the former owner of the building, a private company T., lodged an action against the applicant and a private company E., seeking annulment of the results of the auction. 7. On 14 July 1998 and 10 December 1998 the Tsentralniy District Court of Tver (trial court, District Court) upon the motions of the company T. and the applicant issued injunctions prohibiting use and disposal of the building. 8. On 2 November 1998 the trial court ordered the state property management and tax authorities to join the proceedings as third parties. 9. Between 16 November 1998 and 13 January 2000 at least four scheduled hearings were adjourned at the requests of the parties and subsequently the proceedings were suspended for eleven months to resolve the issue whether the acting president of the company E. lawfully acquired his status. 10. On 24 March 2000 the District Court dismissed the lawsuit of the company T. and lifted the injunctions. The plaintiff missed the time-limit for lodging an appeal and further attempts to restore it were unsuccessful. 11. On 5 February 2001 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upon the request of the Deputy Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation annulled the judgment of 24 March 2000 and ordered reconsideration of the case. 12. The District Court received the case file and fixed a preliminary hearing for 10 May 2001. At the following hearing on 4 June 2001 the trial court upon the motion of the company T. issued an injunction prohibiting use and disposal of the building. It was challenged by the applicant without success. 13. On 16 November 2001 the District Court held a conference with the parties and fixed another preliminary hearing. 14. Between 26 December 2001 and 12 September 2002 at least eight hearings were adjourned for various reasons including three times because of the applicant travel abroad, failure to appear for the hearing, order for the applicant to produce documentary evidence. The other reasons included illness of a judge, orders to produce evidence, failure to notify certain parties of the hearing or their failure to appear. 15. On 12 September 2002 the District Court dismissed the case as falling out of jurisdiction; however this decision was annulled by the Tver Regional Court on 14 November 2002. 16. Between 21 January 2003 and 30 May 2003 at least five hearings were adjourned for various reasons including twice for the failure of the parties to appear and once at the request of the applicant. 17. Between 13 July 2003 and 8 December 2003 at least four hearings were adjourned for various reasons including once for the failure of the defendants to appear, twice for the applicant’s travel and medical treatment abroad, and once because the applicant had to produce documentary evidence. 18. On 8 December 2003 the District Court denied the applicant’s motion to lift the injunction prohibiting use and disposal of the building. On 12 February 2004 his appeal against the decision was dismissed by the Tver Regional Court. 19. On 5 March 2004 the hearing was adjourned due to the applicant’s vacation abroad; and on 15 April 2004 due to failure of the plaintiff and the defendants (except for the applicant) to appear. 20. Between 19 May 2004 and 21 June 2005 at least fourteen hearings were adjourned for various reasons, including twice due to the applicant’s travel abroad, once due to his illness, and once due to his request to obtain documentary evidence from the commercial courts. Other hearings were adjourned due to failure of the parties to appear, requests to adjourn the proceedings, change of certain defendants, and amendments to the lawsuit. 21. On 30 June 2005 the District Court discontinued consideration of the lawsuit due to repeated failure of the plaintiff to appear without a valid reason. The plaintiff requested the District Court to resume the proceedings, but the request was denied on 26 September 2005. On 25 November 2005 the plaintiff’s appeal was dismissed by the Tver Regional Court. 22. On 8 December 2005 the District Court lifted the injunction prohibiting the use and disposal of the building.

4. The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Athens. 5. She is employed as a cleaning lady at the General Hospital of Athens “Laiko”. 6. On 17 June 1996 she lodged a civil action with the Athens First Instance Civil Court asking for a sum of 29,151,114 drachmas (GRD) (i.e. 85,739 euros) in respect of unpaid salaries. 7. On 2 October 1997 her action was accepted. This decision was certified (θεώρηση) on 8 July 1998 (judgment no. 2927/1997). 8. On 29 March 1999 the hospital lodged an appeal. 9. On 21 September 1999 the Athens Civil Court of Appeal accepted the appeal and rejected the applicant’s action as unfounded (judgment no. 7938/1999). 11. On 4 December 2001 the Court of Cassation accepted the appeal and remitted the case to a different division of the Court of Appeal (judgment no. 1684/2001). 12. On 20 December 2001 the applicant filed an application before the Court of Appeal asking for a hearing date to be set. The hearing was held on 5 March 2002. 13. By judgment dated 28 November 2002 the Court of Appeal quashed judgment no. 2927/1997 of the Athens First Instance Civil Court and partially allowed the applicant’s appeal (judgment no. 9275/2002). 15. On 24 June 2008 the Court of Cassation partially accepted the appeal and remitted the case to a different division of the Court of Appeal (judgment no. 1394/2008). This judgment was finalised on 5 November 2008. It does not transpire from the case file that these proceedings have been concluded.

5. The applicant was born in 1978 and is currently serving a sentence of life imprisonment in the Kharkiv Pre-Trial Detention Centre (SIZO). 6. In November 2003 the applicant met and started cohabiting with Ms T. 7. On 2 June 2004 Mr D., a relative of Ms T., complained to the police that the applicant had robbed him of 1,100 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH) (equivalent to about 165 euros (EUR)). 8. In late July 2004 (the exact date is unknown) a TV set, an iron and a radio were stolen from the household of Ms G., an acquaintance of Ms T. Ms G. was away on a trip at the time and discovered the theft upon her return home a few days later. As the investigation later established, the theft had been committed by the applicant and Ms T. 9. On 8 August 2004 Mr D. brought another complaint before the police, this time that the applicant and Ms T. had robbed him of UAH 2,700 (equivalent to about EUR 400) and two electric kettles. 10. The three incidents in question took place in the Kharkiv region. The investigations into the incidents were joined into one criminal case against the applicant and Ms T. on suspicion of theft and robbery. At first, the suspects’ whereabouts could not be identified. 11. In August 2004 the applicant was arrested by the Kharkiv police. The exact date of his arrest is unclear. According to the applicant, it was 10 August 2004. He did not, however, specify the time or circumstances of his arrest. As indicated by the investigator in his application for the applicant’s pre-trial detention (see paragraph 13 below), it was 11 August 2004. This was also the date from which the term of the applicant’s imprisonment was calculated according to the verdict of 13 April 2005 (see paragraph 59 below). However, according to the explanations of officers from the Kharkiv Police Department, it was on 12 August 2004, at about 2 a.m. (see paragraph 67 below). Also, as indicated in the verdict of 9 November 2011, the applicant was arrested on 12 August (see paragraph 29 below). There is no copy of the arrest report in the case file before the Court. 12. According to the applicant, the Kharkiv police officers ill-treated him in the Merefa Temporary Detention Facility (ITT) with a view to making him confess to the alleged theft and robberies (for a more detailed account see paragraph 63 below). As a result, the applicant made a statement of confession, allegedly as dictated by the investigator. 13. On 13 August 2004 the Kharkiv District Court – in a hearing which the applicant attended – remanded him in custody pending trial, having allowed an application to that end by the investigator. 14. On the same date the applicant had his procedural rights explained to him and signed a waiver of legal assistance. 15. On 17 August 2004 Ms T. was detained, too. According to her statements, she and the applicant had committed the theft in the household of Ms G. and the second robbery of Mr D. As to the first robbery, Ms T. submitted that, as far as she knew, the applicant had merely borrowed some money from Mr D. on 2 June 2004. 16. On 31 August 2004 the applicant was indicted. 17. On 9 September 2004 the case was referred to the Kharkiv District Court for trial. 18. As the defendants had been transferred to Sevastopol on 20 September 2004 in order to attend the second set of proceedings (see paragraphs 40-62 below), no hearings took place until 11 July 2005. 19. On 11 July 2005 the hearing was adjourned until 8 September 2005, as the court had allowed Ms T.’s request for the appointment of a lawyer. 20. Two more adjournments followed, the second one being until 19 December 2005, owing to the absence of the victims and the witnesses, whose obligatory presence the police were ordered to guarantee. 21. There is no information in the case file on any developments in the first set of proceedings until July 2009. 22. On 24 July 2009 the judge in charge of the case withdrew, apparently owing to the fact that the applicant had initiated proceedings for damages against him in August 2008. The applicant’s claim was eventually dismissed on 7 December 2009. 23. On 9 March 2011 the case was reassigned to another judge. 24. On 26 May 2011 the applicant was taken to the Kharkiv SIZO. 25. On 3, 5, 9 and 12 August 2011 he was given access to the case file. He requested more time, but the court rejected this request as unjustified. It noted that the applicant had been unreasonably slow, studying only about twenty pages per day, and that one such extension had already been granted to him. 26. On 2 September 2011 the applicant sought the replacement of the lawyer appointed for him (it is not known when the applicant started to be represented by a lawyer in this set of proceedings). His request was allowed. 27. Also on 2 September 2011, the applicant submitted at the court hearing that he had been ill-treated following his arrest on 10 August 2004. The prosecutor participating in the hearing considered this to be a serious allegation which had to be duly investigated. He therefore invited the court to instruct the prosecution authorities to investigate the matter. 28. On the same date, the Kharkiv District Court instructed the Kharkiv Inter-District Prosecutor’s Office to investigate the applicant’s allegation of ill-treatment (for more details see paragraph 70 below). 29. On 9 November 2011 the Kharkiv District Court found the applicant guilty of theft and two counts of robbery and sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment to be calculated from 12 August 2004 as indicated in the arrest report. That sentence was absorbed by the sentence of life imprisonment imposed in the judgment of 13 April 2005 (see paragraph 59 below). 30. Relying on the ruling of Kharkiv Inter-District Prosecutor’s Office of 24 September 2011 (see paragraph 71 below), the trial court dismissed as unsubstantiated the applicant’s complaint of ill-treatment in police custody. 31. The applicant appealed. He complained that he had not had sufficient time for studying the case file, that the lawyer appointed by the court had not performed properly, that his father had not been allowed to represent him in the proceedings, and that he had been deprived of his right to submit a final plea as he had not been aware of the hearing date and had not been prepared. He also complained that he had been arrested on 10 August 2004, while the official date of his arrest was recorded as 12 August 2004. The applicant reiterated the allegation that he had been ill-treated by the Kharkiv police following his arrest. 32. The prosecutor also appealed. He argued that the applicant had not in fact been provided with a proper opportunity to submit a final plea, and that this warranted a retrial. 33. On 11, 13, 17 and 19 January 2012 the applicant was given access to the case file. 34. On 19 June 2012 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of 9 November 2011 and remitted the case to the first-instance court for a fresh examination, having found that the applicant had indeed not been allowed to make a final plea. 35. On 7 August 2012, during a hearing in the Kharkiv District Court, the applicant requested that a further investigation be carried out in respect of his complaint of ill-treatment. He noted that he had been forced to confess to the theft and two counts of robbery, as well as the murder of a certain taxi driver. Later, however, the investigator had made him delete the incident regarding the taxi driver from the confession. 36. On the same date, the court asked the Kharkiv Inter-District Prosecutor’s Office to investigate the applicant’s allegation of ill-treatment once again. The investigation results are summarised in paragraphs 73-77 below. 37. On 16 August 2012 the hearing was adjourned owing to the absence of the victims and witnesses. 38. On 22 August 2012 there was a further adjournment until 27 September 2012. 39. The Court has not been informed by the parties of any further developments as regards this set of proceedings. 40. During an unspecified period at the end of July and the beginning of August 2004, the applicant and Ms T. were in Sevastopol for a seaside holiday. 41. On the evening of 2 August 2004 there was a fire in a small country cottage (an illegal construction without electricity) in the village of Katcha, in the suburbs of Sevastopol. The dead body of the owner, Mr P., was discovered on the path leading to the building. His partner, Ms S., was discovered still alive next to his body. She died in the ambulance on the way to hospital (for more details see paragraph 59 below). 42. On 3 August 2004 the Sevastopol police launched a criminal investigation into the matter. 43. It is not known when and why the police started to suspect the applicant. 44. According to the applicant, on 15 August 2004 the Sevastopol police visited and questioned him in the Merefa ITT. He allegedly confessed to the infliction of fatal injuries on Mr P. and Ms S. and to setting their property on fire. There is no reference to the applicant’s statements of that date, or to the fact that he gave such statements, in any of the documents in the case file. 45. On 17 August 2004 Ms T. submitted, during her questioning by the Kharkiv police in respect of the theft and the robberies (see paragraph 15 above), that she and the applicant had been staying in the country house of Mr P. in Sevastopol. Mr P. had asked them to leave, which they did. However, having nowhere to go, the applicant and Ms T. had returned to Mr P.’s house in his absence. Late in the evening he and Ms S. had discovered their presence there, and Mr P. attacked the applicant with a stick. The applicant defended himself with an axe which happened to be at hand. According to Ms T., she had heard sounds of a fight, but did not see what happened next. When leaving the house, she had allegedly dropped the burning petroleum lamp by accident. 46. According to the information note on the criminal proceedings’ progress, prepared by the Sevastopol City Court of Appeal on 5 October 2012, the following events took place during the course of the investigation: -on 18 August 2004 the applicant wrote a confession addressed to the Head of the Nakhimivskyy District Police Department of Sevastopol, and gave explanations regarding the murder; -on 30 August 2004 the applicant was questioned as a witness in respect of the murder of Mr P. and Ms S.; -on 31 August 2004 a criminal case was opened against the applicant on suspicion of the double murder and destruction of property. No documents or further details are available in the case file as regards the above-mentioned investigative measures and events. 47. On 31 August 2004 the Sevastopol Prosecutor’s Office appointed a lawyer, Mr K., for the applicant. 48. On the same date, the charges of double murder and property destruction were officially brought against the applicant, his procedural rights were explained to him, and he was questioned as an accused in the presence of the appointed lawyer. The applicant confessed to having inflicted injuries on the victims and to setting their property on fire, but insisted that he had acted in self-defence and had had no intention of killing them. 49. On 15 September 2004 the Leninskyy District Court of Sevastopol (“the Leninskyy Court”) ordered the applicant’s detention for seventy-two hours with a view to ensuring his availability for the investigative measures associated with this criminal case. 50. On 19 October 2004 the Leninskyy Court, in a hearing which the applicant attended, remanded him in custody as a preventive measure pending trial. On 29 October 2004 the Sevastopol City Court of Appeal upheld that ruling. 51. On 26 October 2004 a new lawyer, Mr Du., was appointed for the applicant, replacing the one representing him earlier. 52. On the same date, the investigator conducted a reconstruction of the crime with the participation of the applicant and his lawyer, two attested witnesses and a forensic expert. 53. On 30 November 2004 the pre-trial investigation was declared complete and the applicant was provided with access to the case file. 54. On 17 January 2005 the Sevastopol City Court of Appeal, sitting as a court of first instance, commenced the trial. The applicant was present at the hearing. 55. On 21 January 2005 another hearing was conducted, at which the applicant lodged the following requests: to have the hearings audio-recorded; to have his father admitted as his representative in the proceedings; and to have the first and second sets of criminal proceedings against him joined into one case. The court allowed only the first request. 56. On 9 February 2005 the applicant complained during the hearing that he had been ill-treated by the Kharkiv police following his arrest on 10 August 2004. 57. On the same date, the court instructed the Sevastopol Prosecutor’s Office to investigate the matter. 58. On 25 February 2005 the Sevastopol Prosecutor’s Office passed this assignment to the Kharkiv Inter-District Prosecutor’s Office. 59. On 13 April 2005 the Sevastopol City Court of Appeal found the applicant guilty of double murder and property destruction and sentenced him to life imprisonment, which was deemed to have started running on 11 August 2004. The court relied, in particular, on the statements of a witness who had seen the applicant and Ms T. in the village of Katcha on the evening on 2 August 2004, those of a witness who had discovered the fire and the victims lying on the path near the burning building, and those of the fire brigade. The court also took into consideration the forensic examination report, according to which the saliva on several cigarette stubs found near the crime scene could have belonged to the applicant, and the forensic medical examinations of the victims. Both victims were found to have suffered multiple fatal blows of considerable strength. At the court hearing, the applicant sought the attendance of the ambulance doctor as a witness who could confirm that Ms S. was still alive when discovered, but he later withdrew that request. The applicant admitted having injured the victims with the back of an axe, but maintained that he had had no intention of killing them and that he had acted in self-defence. He also admitted having set the building on fire, but claimed that his intention was to draw attention to the victims so that somebody could help them. At the same time, the applicant complained that he had confessed due to fear of revenge by the police. The court noted that the applicant had been questioned by the prosecutor in the presence of his lawyer, which meant that there was no pressure on him. It also relied on the ruling of the Sevastopol City Prosecutor’s Office of 15 March 2005 (see paragraph 68 below). 60. According to the applicant, the appointed lawyer had ceased assisting him after pronouncement of the verdict. The case file, however, contains a copy of a cassation appeal prepared on the applicant’s behalf by the lawyer appointed to represent him. The cassation appeal referred to the alleged distortion of the facts of the case. Furthermore, the lawyer submitted that the investigation into the applicant’s complaint of ill-treatment had not been thorough enough. 61. The prosecutor also appealed against the judgment, seeking mitigation of the sentence for the applicant. He submitted that the murder in question had not been premeditated, but had taken place in the heat of a dispute. Furthermore, the applicant had voluntarily confessed, which should have had a mitigating effect on his sentence. 62. On 14 July 2005 the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of 13 April 2005. On 3 March 2006 its ruling was served on the applicant. 63. According to the applicant, following his arrest on 10 August 2004 he had been subjected to ill-treatment by the Kharkiv police. The applicant did not specify the time or circumstances of his arrest. According to him, he had been taken to the Merefa ITT, where several police officers had beaten him with rubber truncheons on his legs and arms, had twisted his arms behind his back while he was handcuffed and had hung him from an iron bar. They had also allegedly twisted his genitals. As submitted by the applicant, he had been in such pain that he fainted several times. He described his injuries as follows: bruises and sores on the forehead, back of the head and around the eyes, a split lip, and bruises on his back and the shoulders. His requests for medical examination and assistance had allegedly been ignored. 64. As further submitted by the applicant, his bruises and sores had healed by the time of his transfer from the Merefa ITT to the Kharkiv SIZO. 65. On 21 August 2004, upon his arrival at the Kharkiv SIZO, the applicant underwent a medical examination, which revealed no injuries. During that examination he complained of periodic headaches. 66. According to the material in the case file, the applicant first complained of ill-treatment during the court hearing on 9 February 2005 (see paragraph 56 above). 67. On 9 March 2005 the Kharkiv Inter-District Prosecutor’s Office delivered a ruling refusing to institute criminal proceedings in relation to the applicant’s allegation of ill-treatment, which it considered unfounded. 68. It appears from the record of the 24 March 2005 hearing of the Sevastopol City Court of Appeal (the first-instance court in the second set of criminal proceedings against the applicant) that on 15 March 2005 there was a further refusal to open a criminal case in respect of the applicant’s allegation of ill-treatment, which was issued by the Sevastopol City Prosecutor’s Office. As noted in the record, the ruling of 15 March 2005 was announced at this hearing and remained uncommented on by the applicant and his lawyer. 69. Following a request by the Kharkiv District Court of 2 September 2011, which was made in the context of the first set of criminal proceedings against the applicant (see paragraphs 26 and 27 above), the Kharkiv Inter-District Prosecutor’s Office carried out further investigations into the applicant’s allegation of ill-treatment and on 24 September 2011 issued a refusal to open a criminal case. It noted, in particular, that at the time of the events the applicant had not lodged any complaint with the prosecution authorities in that regard. 70. The applicant objected to the refusal and was informed that he was at liberty to challenge the ruling before the higher-level prosecution authorities and courts. The applicant did not do so. 71. On 7 August 2012 the Kharkiv District Court again asked the Kharkiv Inter-District Prosecutor’s Office to investigate the applicant’s allegation of ill-treatment (see also paragraphs 35 and 36 above). 72. On 28 August 2012 the prosecutor applied to the court for permission to question the applicant, who at that time was detained in the Kharkiv SIZO. This application was allowed. 73. On 3 September 2012 the applicant was questioned in respect of his allegation of ill-treatment, but refused to make any statements. 74. On 6 September 2012 the Kharkiv Inter-District Prosecutor’s Office again refused to institute criminal proceedings in respect of the applicant’s allegation of ill-treatment. 75. On 20 September 2012 the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor’s Office quashed the rulings of 24 September 2011 and 6 September 2012. 76. On 25 September 2012 the applicant was questioned. He submitted that, following his arrest on 10 August 2004, he had been placed in a basement cell in the Merefa ITT. On 11 August 2004 he had been taken from his cell to a room with a table and two chairs, where he had been beaten by three men: one in police uniform and two others in civilian clothes. The applicant gave a detailed description of their appearance, the way they had ill-treated him and the injuries he had sustained (see paragraph 63 above). He noted that the investigator had not ill-treated him, but had threatened that his beatings would be repeated if he did not cooperate. 77. Also on 25 September 2012 the Kharkiv Inter-District Prosecutor enquired of the Kharkiv SIZO administration whether the applicant had had any injuries when he had arrived at the SIZO in August 2004 and whether any medical assistance had been provided to him. 78. On 27 September 2012 the head of the SIZO medical unit replied that, upon the applicant’s arrival on 21 August 2004, he had been examined by a doctor. The applicant had not had any injuries, was healthy and had raised no complaints. 79. On 27 September 2012 the Kharkiv Inter-District Prosecutor’s Office once again refused to institute criminal proceedings against the Kharkiv police officials in respect of the applicant’s allegation of ill-treatment, having discerned no corpus delicti in their actions. 80. On the same date the applicant was notified of the aforementioned ruling. He was informed that he could challenge it before the higher-level prosecution authorities or courts but he did not do so. 81. The applicant submitted that he had been detained in the Sevastopol ITT from 18 October to 2 November 2004, from 10 November 2004 to 22 January 2005, from 2 to 10 February 2005, and from 18 March to 13 April 2005. 82. According to him, his cell there was severely overcrowded (about thirty inmates instead of the official maximum of eight), lacked natural light and was infested with insects. There was no hot water supply. Detainees were allowed to take showers only once in three weeks. Outdoor walks lasted for twenty minutes and did not take place every day. Furthermore, there was an insufficient number of sleeping places for all detainees, who therefore had to take turns to sleep. The toilet was not separated from the living area. The cell had no table. 83. On 19 June 2009, 10 May 2011 and 25 January 2012 various documents of the Sevastopol ITT for 2004 and 2005 were destroyed upon expiry of the respective time-limits for their storage. 84. Referring to the absence of documents, the Government found it impossible to provide any factual details as to the applicant’s detention in the Sevastopol ITT. 85. The applicant was detained in the Kharkiv SIZO from 21 August to 25 September 2004, from 25 May 2005 to 14 February 2006, and from 26 May 2011 onwards (according to the most recent information as of November 2012). (a) The applicant’s account 86. The cell was located in a semi-basement infested with rodents. It was extremely small, dark and damp, with a concrete floor, no ventilation and no radio. The toilet was not separated from the living area. There was no access to drinking water in the cell and no supply of essential hygiene requisites. The daily walks lasted for forty minutes instead of one hour. (b) The Government’s account 87. The applicant’s cell, like any other cell for detainees serving a life sentence, was located on the first floor. All the cells were equipped with an artificial ventilation system. Rat extermination was carried out twice a year as might be required. In particular, rat extermination had been carried out in November 2011. As regards access to drinking water, in addition to the regular and centralised supply of water to washbasins, each cell was equipped with a 10-litre cooler for boiled water supplied from municipal utilities. All prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment were provided with soap. The daily walks lasted for one hour. 88. The Government relied, in particular, on the Report on the Sanitary and Epidemiological Inspection of the SIZO dated 2 February 2012. In addition to the aforementioned information, it was also noted in the report that the SIZO population comprised 3,230 detainees whereas its capacity was in fact 2,930 persons. The space per detainee was 2.1 square metres. 89. Another report relied on by the Government concerned the tap-water chemical analysis of 29 May 2012. It found the tap water in the SIZO to be fully suitable for drinking. 90. The applicant was detained in the Dnipropetrovsk SIZO from 14 February to 1 March 2006, from 5 to 24 February 2007 and from 12 to 26 May 2011. (a) The applicant’s account 91. The cell was located in a semi-basement and had a concrete floor. The cell was extremely small, dark and damp, without adequate ventilation or access to daylight. The toilet was not separated from the living area and was close to the table. Prisoners were handcuffed during their daily walks and cell searches. The nutrition was poor and did not vary. (b) The Government’s account 92. The applicant was held in several different cells on the ground floor, namely: -cell no. 3 k – 6.3 sq. m (2 beds); -cell no. 03 – 6.3 sq. m (2 beds); -cell no. 05 – 6.3 sq. m ( 2 beds); -cell no. 02 – 6.3 sq. m (2 beds); -cell no. 4 k – 6.4 sq. m (2 beds); -cell no. 14 k – 6.0 sq. m (solitary confinement cell); -cell no. 11 k – 6.1 sq. m (2 beds) 93. Cells for life prisoners had a concrete floor with a painted surface. If inmates did not have bedroom slippers, the SIZO administration provided them. There was artificial ventilation, and the level of humidity was within the standards. The cells had windows and were equipped with functioning electric lamps. Toilets in each cell were separated by a solid partition. Detainees received nutrition in accordance with legally stipulated norms. Handcuffs were used at all times when a life prisoner was taken out of his cell. 94. The Government based their account on the information note issued by the SIZO administration on 20 September 2012.

7. The applicant was born in 1943 and lives in Tel-Aviv. He is currently detained in remand prison IZ-77/4 in Moscow. 8. On 23 February 2001 the Criminal Court of the Manizales District, Colombia (“Juzgado Penal del Circuito de Manizales”) convicted the applicant of a crime provided for by Article 15 of Decree no. 180 (1988), acknowledged as permanent law of Colombia by Extraordinary Decree no. 2266 (1991), (“instruction in and teaching of military and terrorist tactics, techniques and methods, committed with mercenaries and accomplices”) and sentenced him to fourteen years' imprisonment. 9. On 22 June 2001 the Superior Court of the Manizales District, Colombia (“Tribunal Superior de Manizales”) reduced the applicant's sentence on appeal to ten years and eight months' imprisonment, combined with a fine. 10. On 28 February 2001 the Criminal Court of the Manizales District issued an arrest warrant against the applicant on the basis of his conviction. 11. On 28 March 2007 Interpol issued Red Notice No. A-666/3-2007 for the applicant's provisional arrest with a view to extradition. 12. At 6.40 p.m. on 27 August 2007 a group of servicemen of the Russian Ministry of the Interior, assisted by Interpol officers, arrested the applicant in Domodedovo Airport, Moscow. 13. On 28 August 2007 the Moscow prosecutor's office with responsibility for supervision of the implementation of laws on marine and air-borne transport ordered the applicant's placement in custody, pursuant to Article 466 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure (“CCP”), until his transfer to the country which had requested extradition. The decision gave the following reasons for application of a measure of restraint: “Gal Klein Yair is a national of a third State, has no permanent place of residence and employment on the territory of the Russian Federation, and his extradition for the purpose of serving the sentence imposed by the judgment of the District Special Criminal Court of Manizales would be impossible without ensuring [his] placement in custody.” 14. On 31 August 2007 Rossiyskaya Gazeta (“Российская газета”), a federal newspaper, published an article on its website entitled “The Mafia's Teacher Awaits Extradition” (“Учитель мафии ждет экстрадиции”), covering the applicant's story. The article read, in particular: “Having learned of the wanted mercenary's arrest in Moscow, the Vice-President of Colombia Francisco Santos Calderon, stated that 'it should be ensured that this gentleman rots in jail for [his] participation in the training of armed groups'.. The article did not contain any reference to the source of the information on the Vice-President's statement. 15. On 28 September 2007 the Ambassador of the Russian Federation in Bogota informed the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the Russian Prosecutor General's Office had been examining the possibility of extraditing the applicant, on condition that they be provided with a copy of the judgment against the applicant and with certain guarantees. 16. On 4 October 2007 the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs of the following: “Henceforth Colombia, acting on the basis of the reciprocity principle, shall transfer persons wanted by Russian law enforcement agencies to Russia for relevant criminal prosecution or execution of sentences against such persons. Mr Yair Gal Klein shall be provided with an opportunity to appeal against his conviction by the Colombian judicial bodies; Mr Yair Gal Klein shall not be subjected to capital punishment or tortures, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; Mr Yair Gal Klein shall be indicted only in respect of the acts mentioned in the [extradition] request.” 17. On 29 January 2008 the Prosecutor General's Office of Russia ordered the applicant's extradition to Colombia. It was mentioned that the acts for which the applicant had been sentenced were punishable under Russian law and corresponded to the crime provided for by Article 205 § 1 of the Russian Criminal Code (“assistance to terrorist activities”). The sanction established for that crime stipulated imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. The statute of limitations for the execution of sentences established by both Russian and Colombian legislation had not expired. The differences in classification of the crime in the two countries could not be a reason for a refusal to extradite. The applicant had not obtained Russian nationality. The Colombian Government guaranteed that the applicant would not be subjected to ill-treatment. 18. On 6 February 2008 the applicant appealed to the Moscow City Court against the order of 29 January 2008. He contended that, once in Colombia, he might be subjected to ill-treatment. In support of this assertion he stated as follows: “[A]ccording to the UN General Assembly Resolution of 15 March 2006, the human rights situation in Colombia remains extremely tense. As it is stated during the hearing of the UN Human Rights Committee of 20 October 2005, there is a serious escalation of violence directly linked to actions of members of governmental forces. The report contains allegations of those violations by [the] State prosecutor's office”. He also referred to the unstable internal situation in Colombia, caused by the civil war, and claimed that, as a result, the guarantees given by the Colombian Government were insufficient; that the five-year statute of limitation for the execution of sentences under Colombian law, as well as the ten-year statute of limitations for criminal prosecution established by Russian law, had expired in his case; that the Prosecutor General's Office wrongfully relied on the Russian Criminal Code of 1996, which had not been in force at the time of the crime in question; and that there was no extradition agreement between Russia and Colombia. No copies of the General Assembly's Resolution or minutes of the Human Rights Committee's meeting were enclosed with the appeal submissions. 19. On 11 March 2008 the Moscow City Court dismissed the applicant's complaint and upheld the order of 29 January 2008. The ruling stated that the applicant had not been convicted of political crimes and that the statute of limitation under both Russian and Colombian laws had not expired. It was also stated that the Colombian Government had guaranteed that the applicant would have a right to appeal against his conviction and would not be transferred to a third country without the Russian authorities' consent or subjected to ill-treatment. The in absentia criminal proceedings against the applicant had been carried out respecting the principle of a fair trial. Despite the absence of an extradition agreement between the two States, the applicant could have been transferred to the Colombian authorities on the basis of the reciprocity principle. As to the alleged risk of ill-treatment in Colombia, the ruling stated: “It follows from the materials submitted by the requesting State that the crime the applicant had been convicted of is not included in the category of political crimes and that he [the applicant] has not been persecuted for political reasons. Therefore, [the applicant's] allegations that he has been persecuted for political reasons, are unsubstantiated.” 20. On 17 March 2008 the applicant appealed to the Supreme Court of Russia against the first-instance ruling, on the grounds that that the statutes of limitations had expired, that the Russian law had been wrongfully interpreted and that there was no extradition agreement between Russia and Colombia. He also referred to a media statement by the Colombian Vice-President in which he had suggested that the sentence against the applicant had been too mild and thus “shameful”, and that it had to be ensured that the applicant would rot in jail. The applicant further alleged that the civil war in Colombia had been ongoing since 1948 and that it had caused widespread violations of human rights, including those of prisoners. He did not provide any details of the alleged violations. The applicant also claimed that the purpose of his extradition was to have him rot in jail. 21. On 22 May 2008 the Supreme Court of Russia dismissed the appeal for the following reasons. The Colombian Government had given diplomatic assurances that the applicant would not be ill-treated if extradited. They had also stated that conditions of detention in Colombian penitentiary institutions were decent and that Russian officials would have a right to visit those institutions for regular checks. There were no grounds to suspect that the applicant would be ill-treated if extradited. The applicant had not been persecuted on political grounds. According to the Colombian Embassy, officials' media statements could not affect decisions already taken by the judiciary. The Colombian Vice-President was not a hierarchical superior of the judiciary, the Ministry of Justice or the penitentiary service. The applicant's actions were punishable under Russian law in force in 1989-90, which laid down a severer sanction than Article 205 § 1 of the Russian Criminal Code. The appeal ruling read, in particular: “There are no grounds to believe that in the event of extradition Gal Klein Yair would be subjected to torture in Colombia and that the guarantees established by law, including Article 14 of the ICCPR, would not be respected in respect of him. It follows from the materials of an extradition inquiry carried out by the Russian Prosecutor General's Office that no facts of application to Gal Klein Yair of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment in the requesting State have been established. There is no basis to suppose that the person to be extradited would be subjected to such treatment or punishment in Colombia in the future or that he would be subjected to the death penalty. ... The [applicant's] allegations that he was persecuted on political grounds were justifiably considered by [the Moscow City Court] as unsubstantiated.” 22. The appeal ruling of 22 May 2008 became final on the same date. 23. On 26 May 2008 the applicant requested the Court, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, to prevent his expulsion to Colombia. He alleged that he would face a serious risk of ill-treatment if he were extradited. 24. On 27 May 2008 the Court indicated to the Russian Government under Rule 39 that the applicant should not be extradited to Colombia until further notice. 25. On 5 June 2008 the Reuters news agency reported that “Colombia [had] attacked as insulting and flippant on Thursday a decision by the European Court of Human Rights to block the extradition of an Israeli ex-army officer convicted of training illegal paramilitaries.”

10. The applicant, who is of Kurdish origin, was born in 1979 in Syria and is currently living in Northern Iraq. He is married with three children. 11. The applicant left Syria on 7 January 2005 and entered Cyprus illegally on 10 February 2005 after travelling from Turkey. 12. He applied for asylum on 17 February 2005. 13. On 15 October 2007 the applicant married in Cyprus a Kurdish woman from Turkey. His wife had applied for asylum in 2004 when she came to Cyprus with her parents and siblings. 14. The Asylum Service held an interview with the applicant on 1 August 2008. 15. His application was dismissed by the Asylum Service on 13 August 2008 on the ground that the applicant did not fulfil the requirements of the Refugee Law of 2000-2004 (as amended up to 2004), namely, he had not shown a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular group or political opinion or a well-founded fear of serious and unjustified harm for other reasons. The Asylum Service noted that the reason for which the applicant had left Syria was not at all relevant to the conditions set out in Article 3 of the Refugee Law and Article 1 of the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951). Further, the Asylum Service considered that there was no possibility that the applicant would be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment if he returned to Syria. It observed that contradictions had been identified between the applicant’s written application and the statements he had made during his interview which affected the credibility of his claims. In particular, he had given different reasons for leaving Syria in his interview from those given in his application. 16. On 2 September 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Reviewing Authority for Refugees against the Asylum Service’s decision. 17. It appears that on 20 May 2009 the applicant applied for a temporary residence permit. 18. On 5 June 2009 the Asylum Service’s decision was upheld and the appeal dismissed. 19. The Reviewing Authority observed that the applicant had not given the same reasons for leaving Syria in his written application and in his interview. In the former he had stated that he had come to Cyprus “for living” whereas in his interview he claimed that he had left Syria because he had been persecuted by the family of a girl with whom he had eloped and had a sexual relationship. She had been killed by her family and they were after him. The applicant had also claimed that someone else had filled in the asylum application form on his behalf but then had stated that he had filled it in himself. He had also stated that he did not remember the contents of his application. The Reviewing Authority considered that if the applicant’s life was in danger he would have remembered the reasons for which he left Syria and thus what he had written in his application form. As the Reviewing Authority considered that the applicant’s claims were not credible they did not accept the documents he submitted concerning his claim of persecution by the girl’s family. It therefore found that the application was unsubstantiated. 20. The Reviewing Authority concluded by observing that the applicant had not established that he was at risk of persecution if he returned to Syria. Nor did he satisfy the conditions for temporary residence on humanitarian grounds. 21. It appears that his wife’s asylum application was also rejected by the authorities and her appeal thereto was dismissed by the Reviewing Authority on 5 August 2009. 22. On 13 August 2009 the applicant brought a recourse before the Supreme Court (first-instance revisional jurisdiction) under Article 146 of the Constitution challenging the decision of the Reviewing Authority. 23. On 28 August 2009 deportation and detention orders were issued against the applicant and his wife pursuant to section 14 (6) of the Aliens and Immigration Law on the ground that they were “prohibited immigrants” within the meaning of section 6(1)(k) and (l) of that Law (see M.A. v. Cyprus, no. 41872/10, §§ 62-63, ECHR 2013 (extracts)). The applicant was arrested and detained on the basis of these orders. However, as at the time, the applicant had two children that were still infants, his wife was not arrested on humanitarian grounds and the deportation order against her was suspended. 24. On 12 October 2009 instructions were given by the Minister of the Interior to proceed with the deportation of the applicant and his family. 25. By a letter dated 15 October 2009, the Civil Registry and Migration Department informed the applicant that following the negative decision of the Reviewing Authority, his application of 20 May 2009 for a residence permit (see paragraph 17 above) had been rejected and that he was requested to proceed to all necessary arrangements so as to depart from the territory of the Republic of Cyprus at once. 26. By a letter dated 29 October 2009 the District Aliens and Immigration Branch of the Larnaca Police requested instructions from the Ministry of the Interior concerning the deportation of the applicant and his family as it transpired, following consultation with the Syrian Embassy, that it was not possible to issue a permit to the applicant’s wife to enter Syria due to the fact that she did not have a passport. 27. By letter dated 13 November 2009, the NGO “Future World Centre”, complained to the Minister of the Interior and the Director of Social Services, of the living conditions of the applicant and his family and requested that a temporary residence permit be granted to them so they could receive benefits and have access to health care, at least until the Supreme Court gave judgment in the applicant’s recourse. According to the documents in the file this request was rejected. 28. On 10 December 2009 the Minister of the Interior revoked the deportation and detention orders and the applicant was released. According to the documents in the file, it appears that the applicant was requested to formalise his residence in Cyprus but he did not take any steps in this respect. 29. On 7 May 2010 the applicant applied to the Reviewing Authority for the reopening of his file. 30. By letter dated 11 May 2010 the Reviewing Authority informed him that it did not have the competence to take a decision as to the reopening of the file as the recourse proceedings concerning its decision of 5 June 2009 were still pending before the Supreme Court. The applicant had to wait for the Supreme Court to give judgment in those proceedings. 31. The applicant lodged an application with the Court on 14 June 2010. In his application form he stated that on 13 March 2004 he had taken part in a demonstration in his village in Derit. The purpose of the demonstration was to go to Qamishli to show solidarity with the Kurdish demonstrators following the events of 12 March 2004. Following the intervention of the authorities this had not been possible. The applicant stated that the police had attacked the demonstrators killing two persons. After going into hiding for a month in a neighbouring village, the applicant was arrested in Qamishli. He was detained for fourteen days and subjected to ill-treatment. He was subsequently transferred to the central prison of Damascus where he was detained for two and a half months. After bribing the authorities he was released on the condition that he would present himself to the authorities in Damascus every fifteen days. He did not do so, however, out of fear of being detained and tortured again. He subsequently found out that an arrest warrant had been issued against him. He submitted that after these events he had asked the girl he loved to marry him but her family had not consented. She then left her family to be with him. On 29 December 2004 the family managed to track her down. They killed her because she had dishonoured the family and were looking for him. The applicant decided to leave Syria as he feared that he would either be detained or ill-treated by the police or killed by the girl’s family. 32. It appears subsequently that the Reviewing Authority decided to examine the applicant’s request for the reopening of his asylum application despite the ongoing proceedings before the Supreme Court. In his application the applicant relied on a document in Arabic which had been translated into Greek by the Government’s Press and Information Office (“PIO”). The translation had a stamp that the PIO could not guarantee the authenticity of the document. According to the Government, the document was a copy. The applicant, however, stated that he had submitted the original document to the Reviewing Authority the day after his interview. According to the contents of the document, it was from the Department of Civil Security of Al-Hasakah of the Syrian Ministry of the Interior. It was dated 15 May 2005 and was addressed to the Directorate of Immigration and Passports in Damascus. It instructed the latter Service to arrest and surrender four individuals, including the applicant. It stated that all immigration departments and border check controls should be mobilised to prevent these four persons, who were sought by the authorities, from fleeing. 33. The Reviewing Authority held an interview with the applicant on 11 May 2011 and on 26 May 2011 it dismissed the application. 34. In its decision the Reviewing Authority noted that the applicant had stated that the above document had made its way to him from Syria through Lebanon and that he had received it on 10 May 2010. He claimed that it referred to the Qamishli events and that the persons named in it were sought by the authorities for their participation in those events. The Reviewing Authority, however, pointed out that the document made no reference to these events. It considered that the applicant was not aware of the actual contents of the document and had not produced the original document. Furthermore, the translation of the document had been certified by the PIO on 5 May 2010 and therefore had been in the applicant’s hands before 10 May 2010. In addition, the Reviewing Authority noted the contradictions between the first interview with the Asylum Service and his second interview. In the former he had stated that he had left Syria legally but in the latter that he had left illegally, after having bribed officials to secure a passport and leave the country. Furthermore, the applicant had not claimed that he risked political persecution in his asylum application, interview or appeal. Overall, the Reviewing Authority held that the applicant’s claims lacked coherence, were inconsistent and therefore were not credible. 35. The Reviewing Authority concluded that the applicant had not been able to show that he risked persecution on political grounds or that he was eligible for complementary protection. Nor did he satisfy the conditions for temporary residence on humanitarian grounds. 36. On 31 January 2012 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s recourse. The Supreme Court upheld the Reviewing Authority’s decision of 5 June 2009. The court noted, inter alia, that the Reviewing Authority’s conclusions as to the lack of credibility of the applicant’s claims mainly due to the existence of significant contradictions were reasonable. As the applicant’s claims were not plausible, the documents he submitted could not stand alone and substantiate his asylum application. There was therefore no need to give any weight to these documents. Further, the applicant had left Syria for personal reasons and that these did not fall within those provided by the relevant law for granting refugee status. The Supreme Court held that the applicant had failed to substantiate that he was at risk of persecution if returned to Syria. 37. No appeal was lodged against the first instance judgment. 38. In the meantime, on 17 May 2010 the Yekiti Party and other Kurds from Syria organised a demonstration in Nicosia, near the Representation of the European Commission, the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance and the Government Printing Office. They were protesting against the restrictive policies of the Cypriot Asylum Service in granting international protection. About 150 Kurds from Syria, including the applicant, remained in the area around the clock, having set up about eighty tents on the pavement. According to the Government, the encampment conditions were unsanitary and protesters were obstructing road and pedestrian traffic. The encampment had become a hazard to public health and created a public nuisance. The protesters performed their daily chores on the pavement, including cooking and washing in unsanitary conditions. The sewage pits had overflown, causing a nuisance and offensive odours. The public lavatories were dirty and the rubbish bins of the Government buildings were being used and, as a result, were continuously overflowing. Furthermore, the protesters were unlawfully obtaining electricity from the Printing Office. Members of the public who lived or worked in the area had complained to the authorities. The Government submitted that efforts had been made by the authorities to persuade the protesters to leave, but to no avail. As a result, the authorities had decided to take action to remove the protesters from the area. 39. On 28 May 2010 instructions were given by the Minister of the Interior to proceed with the deportation of Syrian-Kurdish failed asylum seekers in the normal way. 40. On 31 May 2010 the Minister requested the Chief of Police, among others, to take action in order to implement his instructions. Further, he endorsed suggestions made by the competent authorities that deportation and detention orders be issued against Syrian-Kurdish failed asylum seekers who had passports and did not have Ajanib or Maktoumeen status and that the police execute the orders starting with the ones issued against the leaders of the protesters. The police were also directed to take into account the policy guidelines and to use discreet methods of arrest. 41. According to the Government, letters were sent by the Civil Registry and Migration Department to a number of failed Syrian-Kurdish asylum-seekers informing them that they had to make arrangements to leave Cyprus in view of their asylum applications being turned down (see M.A., cited above, § 32) 42. From documents submitted by the Government it appears that from 31 May until 7 June 2010 the authorities kept the area under surveillance and kept a record of the protesters’ daily activities and of all comings and goings. In the relevant records it is noted that invariably, between 1.30 a.m. and 5.30 a.m., things were, in general, quiet, and everyone was sleeping apart from those keeping guard. During the above-mentioned period a large-scale operation was organised by the Police Emergency Response Unit, “ERU” (“ΜΜΑΔ”), and a number of other authorities, including the Police Aliens and Immigration Unit, for the removal of the protesters and their transfer to the ERU headquarters for the purpose of ascertaining their status on a case-by-case basis. 43. In the meantime, between 28 May 2010 and 2 June 2010 orders for the detention and deportation of forty-five failed asylum seekers were issued following background checks. Letters were sent by the District Aliens and Immigration Branch of the Nicosia Police to the Director of the Aliens and Immigration Service and the Ministry of Justice and Public Order, containing a short paragraph with information as to the immigration status of each person. This information included the date of rejection of the asylum application or the closure of the asylum file by the Asylum Service, the date of dismissal of the appeal by the Reviewing Authority, where lodged, and the date some of those concerned had been included on the authorities’ “stop list” (a register of individuals whose entry into and exit from Cyprus is banned or subject to monitoring). The letters recommended the issuance of deportation and detention orders. The Government submitted copies of two such letters with information concerning thirteen people. 44. On 2 June 2010, letters were also prepared in English by the Civil Registry and Migration Department informing those concerned of the decision to detain and deport them. The Government submitted that, at the time, the authorities did not know whether those individuals were among the protesters. 45. The removal operation was carried out on 11 June 2010, between approximately 3 a.m. and 5 a.m. with the participation of about 250 officers from the Police Aliens and Immigration Unit, the ERU, the Nicosia District Police Division, the Traffic Division, the Fire Service and the Office for Combating Discrimination of the Cyprus Police Headquarters. The protesters, including the applicants, were led to buses, apparently without any reaction or resistance on their part. At 3.22 a.m. the mini buses carrying the male protesters left. The women, children and babies followed at 3.35 a.m. A total of 149 people were located at the place of protest and were transferred to the ERU headquarters: eighty-seven men, twenty-two women and forty children. Upon arrival, registration took place and the status of each person was examined using computers which had been specially installed the day before. The Government submitted that during this period the protesters had not been handcuffed or put in cells but had been assembled in rooms and given food and drink. It appears from the documents submitted by the Government that by 6.40 a.m. the identification of approximately half of the group had been completed and that the whole operation had ended by 4.30 p.m. 46. It was ascertained that seventy-six of the adults, along with their thirty children, were in the Republic unlawfully. Their asylum applications had either been dismissed or their files closed for failure to attend interviews. Those who had appealed to the Reviewing Authority had had their appeals dismissed. Some final decisions dated back to 2006. A number of people had also been included on the authorities’ “stop list”. Deportation orders had already been issued for twenty-three of them (see paragraph 43 above). 47. The authorities deported twenty-two people on the same day at around 6.30 p.m. (nineteen adults and three children). Forty-four people (forty-two men and two women), including the applicant, were arrested. The persons against whom deportation and detention orders had been issued on 2 June 2010 were detained under these orders. The remaining persons, including the applicant, were charged with the criminal offence of unlawful stay in the Republic under section 19(2) of the Aliens and Immigration Law (see M.A., cited above, § 65). They were all arrested and transferred to various detention centres in Cyprus. The applicant was placed in the Larnaca Police Station Detention facility. Further, on humanitarian grounds, thirteen women whose husbands were detained pending deportation and who had a total of twenty-seven children between them were not arrested themselves. 48. According to the Government the applicant and his co-detainees were informed orally that they had been arrested and detained on the basis that they had been staying in the Republic unlawfully and were thus “prohibited immigrants” (see M.A., cited above, § 62). They were also informed of their rights pursuant to the Rights of Persons Arrested and Detained Law 2005 (Law 163(I)/2005) (see M.A, cited above, § 93) and, in particular, of their right to contact by phone, in person and in private, a lawyer of their own choice. The applicant submitted that he had not been informed of the reasons for his arrest and detention on that date. 49. On the same day letters were sent by the District Aliens and Immigration Branch of the Nicosia Police to the Director of the Aliens and Immigration Service and the Ministry of Justice and Public Order, recommending the issuance of deportation and detention orders. The letters contained a short paragraph in respect of each person with information as to his or her immigration status. This included the date of rejection of the asylum application or the closure of the asylum file by the Asylum Service and the date of dismissal of the appeal by the Reviewing Authority where lodged. Some letters also referred to the date the asylum application had been lodged and the date some of the individuals concerned had been included on the authorities’ “stop list”. The Government submitted copies of letters concerning thirty-seven people (most of these letters referred to groups of people). 50. Deportation and detention orders were also issued in Greek on the same day in respect of the remaining fifty-three people detained (see paragraph 46 above), including the applicant, pursuant to section 14 (6) of the Aliens and Immigration Law on the ground that they were “prohibited immigrants” within the meaning of section 6(1)(k) of that Law. These were couched in identical terms. In respect of two people the orders also mentioned sections 6(1)(i) and 6(1)(l) of the Law. 51. Subsequently, on the same date, letters were prepared in English by the Civil Registry and Migration Department informing all the detainees individually, including the applicant, of the decision to detain and deport them. The Government submitted thirty-seven copies of these letters, including that addressed to the applicant, the text of which was virtually identical, a standard template having been used. The text of the letter reads as follows: “You are hereby informed that you are an illegal immigrant by virtue of paragraph (k). section 1, Article 6 of the Aliens and Immigration law, Chapter 105, as amended until 2009, because you of illegal entry [sic] Consequently your temporary residence permit/migration permit has been revoked and I have proceeded with the issue of deportation orders and detention orders dated 11th June 2010 against you. You have the right to be represented before me or before any other Authority of the Republic and express possible objections against your deportation and seek the services of an interpreter.” 52. The only differences were that some letters referred to illegal stay rather than illegal entry and that the letters issued earlier referred to 2 June 2010 as the date of issuance of the deportation and detention orders (see paragraph 44 above). 53. On the copy of the letter to the applicant provided by the Government, there is a handwritten signed note by a police officer stating that the letter was served on the applicant on 18 June 2010 but that he had refused to receive and sign it. The other letters had a similar note or stamp on them with the same date, stating that the person concerned had refused to sign for and/or receive the letter. In a letter dated 7 September 2010 the Government stated that the applicant had been served on 18 June 2010. In their subsequent observations the Government submitted, however, that this was the second attempt to serve the letters, the first attempt having been made on 11 June 2010, that is, the day of the arrest. 54. The applicant submitted that he had never refused to receive any kind of information in writing. He claimed that it had only been on 14 June 2010 that he had been informed orally that he would be deported to Syria on the same day but that the deportation and detention orders were not served on him on that date or subsequently. He submitted that he had eventually been informed by his lawyer, following the receipt of information submitted by the Government to the Court in the context of the application of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, that deportation and detention orders had been issued against him. 55. From the documents submitted by the Government, it appears that at least another fourteen of the detainees were to be deported on 14 June 2010 (this figure is stated in documents submitted by the Government with no further details). 56. On 10 March 2011 the applicant escaped from Larnaca Police Station Detention facility. The applicant submitted that he fell during his escape and suffered injuries. He went to hospital for treatment and then gave himself up to the police. The Government submitted that the applicant had been found on the same day and was taken to hospital as he had suffered injuries. The applicant remained in hospital until 31 March 2011 and was then transferred back to Larnaca Police Station Detention facility. The police investigation file concerning the applicant’s escape was sent to the Attorney-General who decided not to bring criminal proceedings against him. The applicant submitted that in the context of the investigation, the authorities arrested and detained his wife at the above facility and that their children were placed under the care of the Welfare Services. 57. The applicant was released on 20 April 2011 following revocation of the deportation and detention orders of 11 June 2010 by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior. The applicant submitted that his wife had been released on the same day. The applicant also submitted that he had not been given any information as to his residence status or the conditions of his release apart from having to report to the police once a month. The applicant’s representative sent a number of letters to the authorities in this connection. 58. In the meantime, on 17 January 2011 the applicant filed a habeas corpus application with the Supreme Court claiming that his continued detention from 11 June 2010 had violated Article 15 of Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, “the EU Returns Directive”. The applicant, relying on the Court’s judgment in Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, (Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑V) and the Commission’s report in Samie Ali v. Switzerland (no. 24881/94, Commission’s report of 26 February 1997) also claimed that his detention had breached Article 11 (2) of the Constitution and Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. The application was made on the same grounds as those made by M.A., § 50, cited above). 59. The Supreme Court set the application for directions for 25 January 2011. On that date the Government asked for leave until 1 February 2011 to file, if they decided to do so, an objection to the application. The habeas corpus application was set for directions for the above date. In the end, the Government filed an objection and the application was set for hearing on 10 February 2011. On that date the Government requested the hearing to be postponed as three other similar habeas corpus applications filed were pending before another judge before the Supreme Court and judgment had been reserved (see M.A., cited above, §§ 50-51 and A.H. and J.K v. Cyprus, nos. 41903/10 and 41911/10, § 51, 21 July 2015). The applicant objected. The Supreme Court accepted the request and postponed the hearing until 24 February 2011. Although it acknowledged that this type of application should be tried as quickly as possible, it held that it was in the interests of justice in view of the applications pending before another judge with similar issues, to give some time in the event judgment was given in the other cases. It noted, however, there would be no more adjournments and if the judgments in the other applications were not given by the above date it would proceed with the hearing of the application before it. 60. On 24 February 2011 the parties appeared before the court. Although judgments had been delivered on 23 February 2011 dismissing the other applications, the applicant decided to go ahead and maintain his application. The parties submitted their written addresses and the hearing of the application was held. Judgment was reserved on the same day. 61. On 8 March 2011 the Supreme Court dismissed the application. It adopted the reasoning in the judgments given by the Supreme Court on 23 February 2011 in the other applications (see M.A; cited above, §§ 50-53 and A.H. and J.K., §§ 48-54). 62. The applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court (appellate jurisdiction) on 17 March 2011. Another three appeals were lodged at the same time (see M.A., §§ 54 and A.H. and J.K., cited above, § 55). 63. The applicant sent a letter along with the other appellants dated 13 April 2011 to the Registrar of the Supreme Court requesting that the appeals be fixed for pre-trial within a “short period of time” and then for hearing. 64. The applicant was released on 20 April 2011 (see paragraph 57 above). 65. On 15 July 2011 the Supreme Court informed the applicant that his appeal had been set down for hearing for 12 September 2011. 66. On 7 September 2011 the applicant’s lawyer filed an application for joining the four appeals (see paragraph 62 above). 67. On 12 September 2011 the Supreme Court issued an order joining the appeals and also instructed the parties to file their written addresses. The applicant submitted that on this date the court was informed that he had been released. 68. On 8 November 2011 the applicant filed an application requesting an extension of twenty days for filing his written address. This was filed on 28 November 2011. 69. On 17 March 2012 the appeals were set for directions. 70. On 18 July 2012 the Government filed an application requesting the parties to appear before the Supreme Court and requested a forty-day extension for filing their written address. This was granted and the appeals were set down for hearing on 11 September 2012. 71. In the meantime, the Government filed their written address on 28 August 2012. 72. On 11 September 2012 the hearing was held and judgment was reserved. 73. The appeals were dismissed on 15 October 2012. The Supreme Court held that as the applicant had, in the meantime, been released, the application was without object (see M.A., cited above, § 55). 74. In the meantime, on Saturday, 12 June 2010, the applicant, along with forty-three other persons of Kurdish origin, submitted a Rule 39 request in order to prevent their imminent deportation to Syria. 75. On 14 June 2010 the President of the First Section decided to apply Rule 39, indicating to the respondent Government that the detainees should not be deported to Syria until the Court had had the opportunity to receive and examine all the documents pertaining to their claim. The parties were requested under Rule 54 § 2 (a) of the Rules of Court to submit information and documents concerning the asylum applications and the deportation. 76. On 21 September 2010 the President of the First Section reconsidered the application of Rule 39 in the light of information provided by the parties. He decided to maintain the interim measure in respect of five cases, including the present one. Rule 39 was lifted with regard to the thirty-nine remaining cases (for further details see M.A., cited above, § 58). 77. By letter dated 12 June 2012 the applicant’s representative informed the Court that the applicant had left Cyprus with his family and was living in the Kurdish area of Northern Iraq. 78. On the basis of the above information, on 14 June 2012, the President of the Section, decided to lift the measure indicated under Rule 39. 79. By letter dated 29 June 2012 the applicant’s representative notified the Court that she had established contact with the applicant and that he had informed her that he wished to pursue the application. 80. By fax dated 6 November 2012 the applicant confirmed that he had left Cyprus with his family and was in Northern Iraq. He provided an asylum certificate from UNCHR in Iraq dated 23 September 2012. 81. Rule 39 was also lifted with regard to another two cases in the course of the proceedings before the Court (see paragraph 76 above).

4. The applicant, who is a Croatian national, was born in 1939 and lives in Zagreb. 5. On 30 December 1993 the applicant brought a civil action against a private party in the Zagreb Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zagrebu), seeking payment of a debt and damages related to a breach of contract. 6. In the period before the ratification of the Convention by Croatia (5 November 1997), the court held four hearings. 7. On 16 May 1995 and 8 February 2000 the Municipal Court invited the applicant to specify his claim. Since he failed to comply, the Municipal Court decided on 13 March 2000 that the applicant had withdrawn his action. 8. On 24 March 2000 the applicant lodged a request for restoring the proceedings to the status quo ante (prijedlog za povrat u prijašnje stanje), which the Municipal Court granted on 3 November 2000 and set aside its decision of 13 March 2000. 9. On 24 December 2004 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint about the length of the above proceedings. 10. On 13 April 2006 the Municipal Court adopted a judgment dismissing the applicant’s claim. The applicant appealed against the first-instance judgment to the Zagreb County Court (Županijski sud u Zagrebu). 11. On 1 February 2007 the Constitutional Court found a violation of the applicant’s constitutional right to a hearing within a reasonable time. It also found that the delays in the proceedings in the period before November 2000 were entirely attributable to the applicant while the further delays in the period from 17 September 2001 until 24 December 2004 were attributable exclusively to the inactivity of the Municipal Court. The Constitutional Court awarded the applicant 4,500 Croatian kunas (HRK) in compensation and ordered the County Court to give a decision in the applicant’s case as quickly as possible but in any case within six months following the publication of its decision in the Official Gazette. The Constitutional Court’s decision was published on 7 March 2007. 12. Meanwhile, on 13 February 2007 the County Court quashed the first-instance judgment and remitted the case to the Zagreb Municipal Court before which the proceedings are currently pending.

7. The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in the city of Nizhniy Novgorod. 8. On 7 March 1995 criminal proceedings were brought against the applicant on suspicion of his involvement in a number of economic crimes. 9. From 30 July to 28 October, on 15 November 1996 and on 15 and 16 January 1997 the applicant and his defence team studied the case-file. 10. On 21 April 1997 the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court (“the Regional Court”, Судебная коллегия по уголовным делам Нижегородского областного суда) convicted the applicant of some charges and acquitted him of the rest, sentencing him to one and a half year of imprisonment and the forfeiture of part of his property. 11. The judgment of 21 April 1997 was quashed on appeal by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (“the Supreme Court”, Верховный Суд Российской Федерации) on 17 July 1997. The case was remitted for fresh examination at first instance. 12. Between 30 September and 20 November 1997 the applicant and his counsel were again given an opportunity to study the case-file. 13. On 24 November 1997 the hearings recommenced at first instance. (a) Hearings of 6, 8 and 19 May 1998 and the applicant's request to admit Mrs Moskalenko 14. The applicant's civil defender Mr Chumak and his counsel Mr Kozlov failed to attend the hearing of 6 May 1998. 15. Mr Chumak excused himself by reference to his previous engagements in a different set of proceedings. It appears that Mr Kozlov was undergoing medical treatment in a hospital. 16. In view of their absence, the court adjourned the hearing until 8 May 1998. On 8 May 1998 Mr Chumak and Mr Kozlov were again absent and, despite the applicant's proposal to continue the examination of the case in their absence, the court again adjourned the hearing, this time until 19 May 1998. 17. On 19 May 1998 both the civil defender and counsel Kozlov attended the hearing. 18. According to the transcript, at the hearing the applicant requested the court to admit Mrs Moskalenko as a “specialist in international law”. The court considered the request unfounded and irrelevant as there was no need for advice on international law at that stage of proceedings. 19. According to the applicant, he requested to admit Mrs Moskalenko as a replacement counsel for Mr Kozlov who was present and unfit effectively to participate in the hearing due to his medical condition. 20. From the hearing transcript it does not transpire that either the applicant or his defence counsel objected to the decision rejecting the applicant's request with reference to Mr Kozlov's alleged inability to participate in the further examination of the case on medical grounds. (b) Assessment of the witnesses' statements by the first instance court 21. During the trial the Regional Court heard more than thirty five witnesses in total, both for the prosecution and the defence. 22. The court refused the applicant's requests to call certain witnesses, including the former Regional Governor, the Regional Prosecutor and other officials, and admitted and considered five witness statements taken at the pre-trial stage of proceedings and during the first round of proceedings at first instance without hearing the respective witnesses in person. i. Statements by witnesses R. and B. 23. Two of these witnesses were the Norwegian nationals R. and B. who had both been questioned by the Norwegian National Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime (“the Norwegian authority”, ØKOKRIM) and the Russian investigators in Norway on 20 February 1996. 24. The trial court attempted to secure the presence of these witnesses in person by making an official request to that effect to the Norwegian authorities. 25. By letters of 26 and 27 January 1998 R. and B. refused to appear and give evidence to the court, and on an unspecified date the Norwegian authorities refused to secure their presence at the trial by force. 26. Consequently, the witnesses R. and B. did not attend the trial and the applicant could not cross-examine them. ii. Statements by witnesses P., M. and A. 27. The third witness was a German national P. who gave evidence at the pre-trial stage of proceedings and during the first round of proceedings in 1997. The applicant and his counsel were able to cross-examine him during the first round of proceedings. 28. The trial court unsuccessfully tried to secure his presence but P. was in Germany and could not be found. 29. The fourth and fifth witnesses, the Russian nationals M. and A., were also questioned during the pre-trial investigation and during the trial in 1997. The applicant and the defence team were able to cross-examine them during the proceedings in 1997. 30. From the case-file and the documents presented by the Government it transpires that during the hearings the court summoned these two witnesses and the authorities repeatedly undertook various measures, including questioning the close relatives and the witnesses' connections, with a view to securing their presence at the trial. Apparently these measures proved futile as the witnesses' whereabouts could not be established. (c) Assessment of evidence in foreign languages by the first instance court 31. It appears that the prosecution case contained several documents in English and Norwegian. 32. All documents admitted by the court as evidence were translated either by certified translators or by the staff of the Norwegian embassy. Most of the translations were attached to the case-file prior to the beginning of the first instance hearings, whilst some of them on 24 April 1998 (numbering 28 pages) and 19 May 1998 (16 pages), were submitted already after the beginning of the trial. 33. According to the Government, on one occasion the defence requested translation of a document which had not been used by the prosecution or the court. The request was granted and the necessary translation was made. (d) Assessment of expert examinations by the first instance court 34. The court also admitted a number of expert reports (technical, medical, graphologist and others) which had been ordered by the prosecution during the pre-trial stage of proceedings. 35. It follows from the case-file that the applicant was officially notified of most of the prosecution decisions to carry out expert examinations (counting more than twelve) within a month from the date on which such decisions had been taken. 36. The decisions of 22 December 1995, 18 and 22 January 1996 to carry out expert examinations were served on the applicant on 12 April 1996. The decision to carry out expert examination dated 28 March 1996 was served on him on 16 May 1996. 37. At the time when these decisions were served, both the applicant and his counsel were officially informed about the procedural rights of the accused, including the right to challenge an expert, seek an appointment of a particular person as an expert, adduce further questions, be present during the expert examination in person and make any comments and be informed of expert conclusions. The accused also had an opportunity to make related requests and motions in writing. 38. In respect of the decisions of 28 March and 30 April 1996 to carry out technical examinations, the applicant requested to provide him with copies of some documents. The copies were provided to him on 21 June 1996. As regards the decision of 22 January 1996 to carry out technical examinations, the applicant stated that it “might have been more objective” to carry out that examinations in Moscow or St Petersburg. 39. The copies of the notification reports state that the applicant and his counsel did not make any additional requests and motions. (e) Judgment of 27 May 1998 40. On 27 May 1998 the Regional Court found the applicant guilty on charges of misappropriation, embezzlement, bribery and the attempt not to return money from abroad. 41. According to the judgment, the applicant and a co-accused Mr K., the director of a shipyard “Oka”, had tampered with documents with a view to embezzling the shipyard's property. The director, acting on behalf of the shipyard, was found to have arranged large-scale money transfers under fraudulent contracts with the companies owned by the applicant, whereas the applicant was found to have bribed the director by opening bank accounts in the name of Mr K. in Norway and transferring the stolen money there. Among other things, the applicant was also convicted of having extorted money from a marketplace owned and run by the companies “Zhanto” and “NL TOP”, and from a casino owned and run by a company “Slot”. 42. In total, the court sentenced the applicant to six years' imprisonment and the confiscation of part of his property. The court also upheld civil claims for damages by the shipyard “Oka” and three other companies, “Zhanto”, “NL TOP” and “Slot”. 43. The applicant's conviction was based on various pieces of evidence, i.e. numerous documentary items, including accounting, financial and contractual papers reflecting the operation of sham companies owned and run by the applicant and Mr K. as well as oral and written evidence given by more than thirty-five witnesses and various expert examinations. 44. A copy of the judgment of 27 May 1998 was served on the applicant on 3 June 1998. 45. Later it was discovered that the copy contained errors and misprints. 46. On 8 June 1998 the Regional Court corrected a number of clerical and technical mistakes in the judgment and ordered that the applicant be furnished with the amended version. 47. The applicant claims that he did not receive the amended version. 48. The records in the case-file indicate that the amended copy of the judgment was served on the applicant against his signature on 11 June 1998. (f) Trial records 49. The Government submit that the whole trial was taken down in shorthand and taped and that the respective records were all available to the interested parties, including the applicant and his counsel. 50. On 28 May 1998 the applicant requested to study records, audiotape recordings and shorthand records. 51. The applicant was provided with this opportunity on 10, 11, 15 and 16 June 1998. 52. On the last date a specialist of the Regional Court certified that the applicant had been given access to the trial record, though he had refused to study audio records and shorthand records. 53. On 17 June 1998 a judge of the Regional Court decided that the defence counsel should be given access to the records between 17 June and 23 June 1998. 54. The deadline for filing objections was set on 25 June 1998 accordingly. 55. It does not appear from the case-file that the applicant ever challenged the accuracy of the trial records. (g) Separate rulings of 27 May 1998 56. On 27 May 1998 the Regional Court made a number of separate rulings (частные определения) in the case. 57. In one of these rulings the court noted that there had been breaches of the relevant rules of criminal procedure during the investigation and that these breaches had been remedied during the trial. 58. In particular, the court established that the defendants had been informed about the commissioning of expert reports in the case only after the respective examinations were over. 59. The court considered that this failure did not invalidate the conclusions of the experts' reports and that the applicant had failed to contest the results of the reports during the investigation or during the trial or request additional or repeated examinations to be carried out. 60. The court also noted that a number of documents in the case-file were in foreign languages, but considered that this did not violate the applicant's defence rights because the documents were similar to or copies of other documents in Russian and that in any event all relevant documents had been translated into Russian during the trial. 61. The court further noted that certain statements of witnesses had been admitted as evidence, even though they gave no indication as to the time or place of questioning. To verify the relevant points, these witnesses as well as other witnesses had been questioned in the courtroom on the circumstances of the questioning. 62. The defence appealed against the judgment of 27 May 1998 to the Supreme Court. 63. In their appeal, inter alia, the applicant's counsel contested the admissibility of certain evidence admitted by the court such as expert reports, documents in foreign languages, certain procedural documents, statements of witnesses made during the pre-trial investigation and at the first round of proceedings at first instance, statements of witnesses taken by the Norwegian police, and other evidence obtained in Norway, claiming that were allegedly in breach of the domestic procedural rules. 64. Furthermore, it was stated that the applicant's defence had not had due access to the trial records and the quality of the defence had been impaired by the Regional Court's refusal to admit Mrs Moskalenko as a replacement for a lawyer who was sick. (b) Mrs Moskalenko's motions to adjourn an appeal hearing 65. On 16 June 1998 Mrs Moskalenko joined the defence team. In July and on 10 August 1998 she referred to various difficulties in organising the defence and made several requests to the Supreme Court to adjourn the hearing. 66. She also complained that the applicant had been served neither with the final copy of the judgment, nor with the rulings of 27 May 1998 and that the defence had had no access to the verbatim record and certain volumes of the case-file. 67. On 29 June 1998 the Supreme Court granted one of her requests to adjourn the hearing. The hearing initially scheduled for 29 June 1998 was postponed. 68. Thereafter Mrs Moskalenko failed to appear at the hearing on 30 July 1998. 69. On 10 August 1998 Mrs Moskalenko requested to postpone a further hearing claiming that the defence had not been properly notified of the judgment and separate rulings. 70. In response to her request for adjournment, the Supreme Court ruled that both the defence in general and Mrs Moskalenko in particular had had sufficient time to examine the trial records, study the first instance judgment and prepare for the case at least between 16 June and 30 July 1998 and turned down the request as unfounded. 71. The appeal hearing took place on 10 August 1998. (c) Decision of 10 August 1998 72. On 10 August 1998, in the presence of the applicant's defenders, Mrs Moskalenko and Mr Chumak, and the prosecution, the Supreme Court examined the appeals and, with minor alterations, confirmed the judgment of 27 May 1998. 73. The court concluded that there had been no significant breaches of national procedural law or international standards during the trial. 74. As to the complaints about the handling and assessment of the evidence, the court found that the lower court had properly admitted and considered the evidence in the case and that the conclusions of the lower court had been reasonable and substantiated. It also noted that the defence had been furnished with Russian translations of foreign documents during the hearing. 75. The court further considered that the applicant had been adequately represented throughout the pre-trial investigation and the trial, and that at no time during the proceedings had he been deprived of professional legal advice. 76. In respect of the events of 19 May 1998, the court noted that the applicant's lawyer had never applied for an adjournment of the hearing for health reasons and the Regional Court's refusal to admit Mrs Moskalenko as a further lawyer did not constitute a violation of the applicant's right to defence.

4. The applicant was born in 1934 and lives in Baia Mare. 5. On 1 April 2002 the Maramureş County Court ordered a company I.W., the applicant’s former employer, to reinstate him in his post and to pay him compensation. This decision became final. However, on 30 September 2002 the same court granted I.W.’s request and annulled the 1 April 2002 decision (contestaţie în anulare). It proceeded to re-examine the case and dismiss the applicant’s initial action. The 30 September 2002 decision was drafted on 28 October 2002 and typed up on 30 October 2002. In accordance with the rules of procedure, it was not served on the parties. 6. On 18 December 2002 the applicant requested the Procurator-General to lodge an application with the Supreme Court of Justice for an audit setting aside the decision of 30 September 2002 (recurs în anulare). On 20 March 2003, the Procurator-General refused to act upon the applicant’s request. 7. In a decision of 3 February 2000, which was upheld by a final decision of the Maramureş County Court on 18 May 2000, the applicant’s previous employer, a company called M. was ordered to give the applicant his employment record and to pay him 100,000 Old Romanian Lei (ROL) in legal fees. 8. On an unspecified date, the applicant lodged an application with the Baia Mare District Court to enforce that decision. In its defence, M. claimed that it no longer had the applicant’s employment record and that only the most recent employer (I.W.) was allowed to deliver a duplicate. 9. On 15 February 2002 the application was dismissed. The court found, in particular, that the facts of the case confirmed that it was objectively impossible for M. to deliver the applicant’s employment record, as the document was no longer in its possession. 10. The applicant’s appeal was allowed by the Maramureş County Court in a final decision of 17 June 2002, as amended on 12 September 2002. The court imposed a daily penalty on M. of ROL 350,000 from 3 February 2000 until execution and ordered it to pay the applicant ROL 5,712,000 in legal fees. After noting the arguments used by the court at first‑instance in order to find in favour of the debtor, the appeal court stated, in particular, that: “In so far as an irrevocable decision ordered [M.] to deliver to the complainant his employment record, the impediments to compliance referred to by the first-instance court are irrelevant.” 11. On 10 March 2003 M. filed with the Maramureş County Court a request for the annulment (contestaţie în anulare) of the decision of 17 June 2002, on the ground that the County Court had not examined the evidence confirming its inability to comply. 12. The applicant submitted that M. did not have locus standi to request an annulment, since the extraordinary-appeal procedure was only available to the party who had lodged the ordinary appeal. He also contended that the request should be rejected since M. had invoked the same reasons as before the first-instance court and the appeal court. 13. In a final decision of 26 March 2003, the Maramureş County Court, sitting in a different composition from that of 17 June 2002, allowed the request, and quashed the final decision of 17 June 2002 on the merits and the decision of 12 September 2002 amending it. Consequently, it dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the judgment of 15 February 2002. The relevant parts of the decision read as follows: “The request [for annulment] was lodged by [M.], which was the respondent in the appeal proceedings, within the time-limits set out in Article 313 of the Code of Civil Procedure... The court considers that Article 318 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable, as the appeal court committed a material error, that is, an obvious material error made by omitting important elements or information from the file which had an influence on the solution adopted. When examining the grounds for appeal, the court should have taken into account the evidence, that is, all elements that confirmed the inability to comply, namely the lack of the applicant’s employment record. The court’s conclusion that those impediments are irrelevant contradicts the evidence.”

5. The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Sofia. 6. In 1995 the applicant was appointed as an inspector at the National Security Service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In 2002 he was transferred to the Ministry’s National Security Directorate (the Ministry’s internal structure had been altered in 1997). At that time he had the rank of major. His duties included counter‑intelligence, the recruitment and managing of secret agents, the gathering and dissemination of information from secret sources, secret surveillance, etc. 7. In November 2002 a proposal was made for the applicant’s disciplinary dismissal. The proposal was prompted by an internal investigation which found indications that the applicant had engaged, aside from his duties at the Ministry, in fish farming, and that he had sought to resolve disputes with the persons employed by him by threatening them with his position. It was felt that these activities were incompatible with the duties of an officer of the National Security Directorate and tarnished the reputation of the service. 8. The proposal was not upheld due to the lack of sufficient evidence. 9. On 6 March 2003 the Director of the National Security Directorate sent a letter to the head of the Ministry’s Psychology Institute (see paragraph 33 below). He referred in detail to the above facts and suggested that the applicant be subjected to psychological assessment on the basis of Instruction no. I‑37 (see paragraph 32 below). 10. On 19 March 2003 the Director of the National Security Directorate ordered the applicant to present himself for assessment at the Ministry’s Psychology Institute. 11. The applicant underwent a psychological assessment on 16 April 2003. It consisted of a psychological test, an interview and a polygraph test. 12. The results of the assessment were available on 9 May 2003. The psychologist who had carried it out described the results of his observations and of the polygraph test, and expressed the opinion that the applicant was mentally unfit to work at the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The document was classified and the applicant was not allowed to see it. 13. On 5 June 2003 the Director of the National Security Directorate proposed to the Minister of Internal Affairs to dismiss the applicant from his post under section 253(1)(5) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Act 1997 and regulation 251(1)(6) of the Act’s implementing regulations (see paragraphs 30 and 31 below). In his proposal he described in detail the attempt to dismiss the applicant on disciplinary grounds and the results of the psychological assessment. The applicant was allowed to have sight of the proposal the same day. 14. In an order of 27 June 2003 the Minister of Internal Affairs dismissed the applicant by reference to the legal provisions mentioned in the proposal. 15. The applicant was acquainted with the order on 13 August 2003 and noted his disagreement with the grounds for issuing it. 16. On 26 August 2003 the applicant sought judicial review of the Minister’s order. He argued, inter alia, that it had not been duly reasoned and that the psychological assessment on the basis of which it had been issued had not been objective. 17. In the course of the proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court the Ministry presented a copy of the applicant’s psychological assessment. The proceedings as a whole were then classified, apparently because the case file contained a classified document. 18. The applicant was initially represented by two lawyers. The first of them withdrew from the proceedings because he could not obtain the requisite security clearance to be able to have access to the documents in the case file. The second also withdrew because she did not have enough legal experience to be granted rights of audience before the Supreme Administrative Court. The applicant accordingly retained another counsel who had the requisite experience and security clearance. 19. In her written pleadings counsel for the Ministry submitted, inter alia, that after the applicant had been found mentally unfit for work, under section 253(1)(5) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Act 1997 (see paragraph 30 below), the Minister had been bound to dismiss him from his post. 20. A three‑member panel of the Supreme Administrative Court heard the case on 4 October 2004. Counsel for the applicant argued, inter alia, that the psychological assessment had not been correctly carried out and that its results could not be trusted. Counsel for the Ministry argued, inter alia, that the assessment could not be subjected to judicial scrutiny. 21. In a judgment of 11 October 2004 (реш. № 50 от 11 октомври 2004 г. по адм. д. № С‑65/2003 г., ВАС, V о.), the three‑member panel rejected the applicant’s claim, finding that no breaches of the rules of procedure had occurred in the course of the dismissal procedure. It went on to say that it was not competent to review the results of the psychological assessment carried out by the Ministry’s Psychology Institute. Under the terms of regulation 251(1)(6) of the implementing regulations of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Act 1997 (see paragraph 31 below), such assessments amounted to incontrovertible proof of unfitness for work at the Ministry, and the Ministry’s Psychology Institute was the only body competent to determine that issue. The panel also found no indication that the dismissal order was not in line with the purpose of the law. 22. The applicant appealed on points of law. He challenged, inter alia, the psychological assessment procedure and the independence of the experts who had carried it out. He also contested the three‑member panel’s ruling that the Ministry’s Psychology Institute was the only body competent to carry out such an examination and that the court could not scrutinise the correctness of the Institute’s opinion. In an additional memorial filed on 9 March 2005 he pointed out that in a judgment of 8 February 2005 (see paragraph 35 below) another panel of the Supreme Administrative Court had stated that the assessment of mental fitness for work at the Ministry should be amenable to judicial scrutiny. 23. In a final judgment of 17 May 2005 (реш. № 12 от 17 май 2005 г. по адм. д. № С‑4/2005 г., ВАС, петчл. с‑в), a five‑member panel of the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the appeal. It held, inter alia, that the psychological assessment procedure had been duly followed, and that the three‑member panel had been correct to find that it could not scrutinise the assessment. Its judgment had been given before the judgment of 8 February 2005 which had partly struck down regulation 251(1)(6) of the implementing regulations of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Act 1997 (see paragraph 35 below) and had been based on the wording of that regulation in force before the judgment of 8 February 2005. 24. As the proceedings were classified, the applicant could not obtain copies of the Supreme Administrative Court’s judgments. On 5 December 2005 he asked the court to issue certificates containing the judgments’ operative provisions and indications as to the subject matter of the case. The president of the five‑member panel which had dealt with the case acceded to the request, and on 7 December 2005 the applicant was issued two certificates, one in relation to the three‑member panel’s judgment and another in relation to the five‑member panel’s judgment. 25. In the meantime, on 7 November 2005 the applicant requested the re‑opening of the proceedings. 26. In a judgment of 4 April 2006 (реш. № Я‑63 от 4 април 2006 г. по адм. д. № С‑108/2005 г., ВАС, петчл. с‑в) the Supreme Administrative Court rejected the request. 27. On 30 August 2006 a commission appointed by the president of the Supreme Administrative Court declassified the minutes of the hearings before the three‑member and five‑member panels, as well as their judgments. It did so by reference to regulation 50(3)(2) of the Regulations for the implementation of the Protection of Classified Information Act 2002, which provides that the level of classification must be changed if it has been set incorrectly.

9. The applicants, Chriso Kakoulli, Andreas Kakoulli, Martha Kakoulli and Kyriaki Kakoulli, were born in 1944, 1969, 1972 and 1970 respectively. The first, third and fourth applicants live in Avgorou and the second applicant lives in Paralini. The first applicant is the widow and the other applicants are the children of Petros Kyriakou Kakoulli, a Greek Cypriot who died on 13 October 1996. 10. In the early hours of 13 October 1996 Petros Kyriakou Kakoulli and his daughter’s fiancé, Panikos Hadjiathanasiou, drove to an area called Syrindjieris, situated near the Achna roundabout in the British Sovereign Base Area (SBA) of Dhekelia, to collect snails. After a time, they separated and agreed to meet up at about 7.30 a.m. to return to their village. 11. A villager from Avgorou, Georgios Mishis, who was also collecting snails on the north side of the main road, saw the victim standing in a field approximately 70 metres away from him. He also saw a Turkish soldier approximately 10 metres from Mr Kakoulli pointing his rifle at him and a second Turkish soldier approaching him. Georgios Mishis heard Mr Kakoulli ask the first soldier, in Greek, whether he spoke Greek, to which there was no response. At that moment, the two soldiers caught sight of Mr Mishis and one of them pointed a weapon at him. Mr Mishis then backed away. 12. At this moment Mr Mishis saw an SBA police patrol vehicle on the road and told the driver, Constable Pyrgou, what he had seen. Constable Pyrgou immediately reported the incident to Sergeant Serghiou of the SBA police at Ayios Nikolaos. 13. Shortly after Mr Mishis had seen Mr Kakoulli surrounded by Turkish soldiers, Panikos Hadjiathanasiou, who was searching for Mr Kakoulli, saw him at a distance of approximately 400 metres inside the territory of northern Cyprus. Panikos Hadjiathanasiou then heard the soldiers issue a command in Turkish to stop. Upon hearing these words, Mr Kakoulli remained still and raised his hands above his head. Panikos Hadjiathanasiou saw two Turkish soldiers in combat uniform drop to battle positions on the ground approximately 40 metres from the victim and aim their rifles at him. Immediately afterwards, Panikos Hadjiathanasiou heard a shot and saw Mr Kakoulli fall down. Mr Hadjiathanasiou heard a second shot immediately after the first. 14. A few minutes later, while Mr Kakoulli was still lying on the ground, Mr Hadjiathanasiou saw one of the Turkish soldiers move and fire a third shot at him from a distance of about 7 to 8 metres from where he was lying. 15. Following orders from Sergeant Serghiou of the SBA police, Constable Duru Chorekdjioglou (a Turkish-Cypriot member of the SBA police) and Constable Petros Kamaris (a Greek-Cypriot member of the SBA police) arrived at the Achna roundabout, where they met Panikos Hadjiathanasiou, who explained what had just happened. 16. Constable Duru Chorekdjioglou spoke to a Turkish lieutenant who told him that a Greek Cypriot had entered the territory of northern Cyprus and had been shot by Turkish soldiers. The officer said that the Greek Cypriot was dead. 17. The officer allowed Constable Duru Chorekdjioglou to see the body of the deceased though not to touch or examine it. Constable Duru Chorekdjioglou reported that Mr Kakoulli appeared to be dead. 18. Sergeant Engin Mustafa of the SBA police (a Turkish Cypriot), together with two Turkish soldiers, also visited the scene of the killing and saw the body. The Turkish soldiers told Sergeant Engin Mustafa that Mr Kakoulli had been shot because he had entered “their area” and had refused to obey warnings to stop. 19. Divisional Commander R.H. Weeks of the SBA police, together with Sergeant Engin Mustafa, entered northern Cyprus and spoke with a Turkish officer who told him that Turkish soldiers had shot and killed Petros Kyriakou Kakoulli because he had entered the territory of northern Cyprus and had refused to stop. 20. The same day, Superintendent Mathias Cosgrave and Inspector Richard Duggan of the Irish Civilian Police (IRCIVPOL), part of the United Nations Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP), visited the scene, accompanied by Sergeant Engin Mustafa. They found an investigating team from the Turkish forces already present. 21. Superintendent Anastasiou, Inspector Christou, Sergeant Zonias and Constable Hadjiyasemis of the Republic of Cyprus police visited the area, although not the exact spot where the killing had occurred. 22. Sergeant Xenofontos and Constables Kapnoullas and Aristidou of the Republic of Cyprus police visited the area and prepared a draft location plan. 23. Georgios Mishis was escorted back to the scene of the incident, where he pointed out the various locations, which were then photographed by Constable Aristidou. 24. A Turkish pathologist, Dr İsmail Bundak, carried out an autopsy on the body of the deceased, Mr Kakoulli, at Famagusta General Hospital. According to the Turkish pathologist, the deceased had a wound 5 cm in diameter in his chest, 21.5 cm below his left nipple and 17 cm from the collar bone, two wounds in his back and a wound on his side in line with his right elbow. 25. Dr Bundak concluded that the death had occurred as a result of internal bleeding caused by a shot to the heart. 26. According to the report by Superintendent Cosgrave, during the removal of Mr Kakoulli’s clothes, an object fell from his left boot which was described as a type of garrotte, consisting of two black metal handles attached to a length of wire. In addition, an object described as a bayonet in a scabbard was removed from the body’s right boot. Following the autopsy, the body of Mr Kakoulli was taken to Larnaca Hospital under UN escort. 27. According to the first applicant’s statement to the Republic of Cyprus police, her husband had only a red plastic bucket with him and had no object such as a bayonet or a garrotte, or any other kind of weapon. 28. On 14 October a second autopsy was conducted in Larnaca Hospital by Dr Peter Vanezis. In his preliminary report Dr Vanezis stated that there were three sets of gunshot wounds to the body. The report stated the following: “An entry wound on the right side of the neck, just below the right ear, with an exit wound at the back of the neck. This bullet had left the body without causing any damage to vital organs. A second entry wound on the right side of the trunk and an exit wound on the right side halfway down the back. This bullet appeared to have caused soft tissue damage with minor injury to the lungs but was not fatal. A third entry wound on the left side of the trunk towards the back with a steep upward direction into the body. This bullet had exited from the left side of the front of the chest, causing a large exit wound. This wound was fatal, as it had caused severe damage to the left lung and the heart, resulting in severe internal haemorrhage.” 29. Until the second autopsy was concluded in Larnaca Hospital, IRCIVPOL had sole responsibility for the body. Before that, the body was in the sole custody of the Turkish forces. 30. On 15 January 1997 Dr Vanezis prepared a final report in Glasgow. He concluded that the second set of wounds had been inflicted by a shot fired while Mr Kakoulli had his hand raised and that the third set of wounds were consistent with a shot fired into the body while Mr Kakoulli was lying on the ground or crouching down. 31. The Government maintained that Petros Kyriakou Kakoulli had violated the ceasefire line and had entered the territory of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”). He was warned verbally and by hand gestures. However, he did not stop and continued to run towards the boundary. One of the soldiers approached him and fired warning shots in the air. Petros Kyriakou Kakoulli took no notice of this shot and consequently a second shot was fired at the ground in order to stop him. As he continued to run away, a third round was fired at him below his waist, which apparently caused the fatal wound. The Government referred to the United Nations Secretary-General’s report, which stated: “in a serious incident that occurred on 13 October 1996, a Greek Cypriot was shot three times and killed by a Turkish-Cypriot soldier after crossing the Turkish force’s ceasefire line”. 32. Neither the UN nor the British Sovereign Base authorities carried out an investigation of their own as the scene of the incident was within the territory of the “TRNC”. 33. The Government further referred to various violent incidents which had taken place in the border area and between the ceasefire lines of the two sides between August and October 1996. The United Nations Secretary‑General’s report, submitted to the Security Council on 10 December 1996, stated that the period under review had seen an increase in the level of violence and tension along the ceasefire lines. The tension rose in early August 1996 owing to the Greek-Cypriot demonstrations at the border area and the ceasefire lines. Violent disturbances and riots took place on 11 and 14 August 1996 in the Dherinia area and in the vicinity of Ayios Nikolaos (Güvercinlik), alongside the British SBA. During these events, two Greek Cypriots were killed. On 8 September 1996 two Turkish soldiers on sentry duty were shot with automatic weapons fired from the SBA into the territory of the “TRNC”. One of the soldiers died as a result and the other was seriously wounded. 34. The Government emphasised the fact that Petros Kyriakou Kakoulli had crossed the Turkish-Cypriot ceasefire line into the territory of the “TRNC”, in the same area where the two Turkish soldiers had been shot. There were strong reasons to believe that Mr Kakoulli, who was a retired fireman, would not have crossed into the “TRNC” territory by mistake, particularly at a location where there were signs in Turkish and Greek indicating the border. Mr Kakoulli had been in possession of a garrotte and a bayonet at the material time, which constituted a strong presumption that he had a sinister motive. His act of carrying a bucket apparently to collect snails was a cover for his real motive. 35. The death of Mr Kakoulli had not been a deliberate act, the Government asserted, but an attempt to maintain security in a highly tense environment. The incident had occurred during a period when tension at the border between the north and south of Cyprus was extremely high. Given the circumstances of the dangerous situation created by the Greek-Cypriot authorities, the Turkish soldiers had been fully justified in taking all necessary precautions and using the necessary force in order to remove the danger and threats of the ceasefire being broken and to protect the lives of others. 36. The parties submitted various documents concerning the investigation into the killing of Petros Kakoulli. These documents, in so far as they are relevant, are summarised below. 1.Documents submitted by the applicants (a) Statements taken by the Sovereign Base Areas Police (i) Statement by Panikos Hadjiathanasiou 37. Mr Panikos Hadjiathanasiou is the fiancé of Mr Petros Kyriakou Kakoulli’s daughter. He accompanied Mr Kakoulli to collect snails on the day of the impugned incident. In his statements he claimed, inter alia, the following: “...After the rainfall at my village, I agreed with my father-in-law to go together this morning (13 October) to collect snails. So, today in the morning I set off with my father-in-law in my car, which I was driving. We took a bucket each in which to put snails... At approximately 6.30 a.m. we went to a point on the main Vrysoulles-Dhekelia road near a bridge. I stopped my car under some eucalyptus trees, on the left side of the main Vrysoulles-Dhekelia road, by the former Achna police station. We alighted from the vehicle, we each took our buckets and we proceeded south, towards the Avgorou side to collect snails. Because there were no snails to find, my father-in-law said that we should separate. He proceeded towards the lower side of the hill from the right, while I proceeded towards the left, intending to cover the whole lower side of the hill, and then to meet at the opposite side. The area in question is situated south of the main Vrysoulles‑Dhekelia road. We started walking and I saw my father-in-law following a route in parallel to the main road and passing the bridge that is at the bottom of the hill by the Achna roundabout. As soon he had proceeded about 20-25 metres after the bridge, I lost sight of him as I had proceeded further and the hill was in between us... Before separating, my father-in-law told me that he was intending to go by the UN observation post, which is opposite the former Achna police station. The main Vrysoulles-Dhekelia road is controlled by the British Bases. Approximately between 7.05 and 7.10 a.m., as we had agreed to return to the village, I started calling him, “Father! Father!”, but did not receive any reply. Whilst doing so I was walking towards the hill so I could have a better view and be able to see him. Whilst walking, I heard shouting in the Turkish language coming from the direction of the former Achna police station, which is in the Turkish-occupied area. On hearing the shouting, I ran towards the hill, I climbed it and I could see the surrounding area and the former Achna police station. I saw my father-in-law standing by an acacia tree at the rear of the Achna police station, facing towards the Turkish-occupied area... The distance between myself and my father-in-law was approximately 400-450 metres... He was holding his bucket with his left hand, but nothing in his right... I heard someone shouting at him something like a military command, which consisted of three words that were short and sharp in tone, and I understood the first word to be ‘DUR’. The other two words which I heard had a short interval between them but I did not understand them. On hearing those words, my father-in-law remained still; he left the bucket on the ground, and raised his hands up to the level of his head. Simultaneously, I saw in front of my father-in-law, at a distance of approximately 30‑40 metres, two men dressed in camouflage combat uniform. They were wearing helmets and were carrying ‘G3’-type rifles. They fell to the ground in front of him and, taking up battle position, aimed their rifles towards his chest and abdominal area. As soon as they fell to the ground, I heard a shot and saw my father-in-law kneeling on the ground and then falling down... Once he fell to the ground, I lost sight of him because of the presence of the acacia tree. Immediately afterwards I heard a second shot. Three or four minutes later, while my father-in-law was still on the ground, I saw one of the two Turkish soldiers standing up and, pointing his rifle forwards, proceeding towards the point where my father-in-law was, with his back arched. He approached within a distance of 7-8 metres of him, straightened up, aimed his rifle towards the point where my father-in-law was and fired another shot... At the time of the shootings, I saw that on the road between myself and the place where my father-in-law was shot, there were three Greek Cypriots. One of them was Georghios Mishis from Avgorou... The Turkish soldier, having fired the third shot, retreated to the point where the other soldier was lying on the ground and afterwards, both of them started walking backwards aiming their rifles towards the main road, and disappeared behind the slope at the rear of the Achna police station... I am sure that my father-in-law was shot and murdered at 7.25 a.m., because I saw my watch...” (ii) Statement by Georgios D. Mishis 38. The witness is a fellow villager of Petros Kyriakou Kakoulli. He stated, inter alia: “...Today at about half past five in the morning, and because of the rain during the previous night, I woke up to go and collect snails... I was alone and drove to the Syrindjieris territory situated near the Achna roundabout on the main Vrysoulles-Dhekelia road ... About six o’clock when there was daylight I was walking on the right side of the main road in the direction of the former Achna police station and started collecting snails... Whilst collecting snails I heard a noise to my rear. I turned back and saw my co-villager Petris the fireman, who is the brother in-law of Kykkos Papettas. He was collecting snails as well, holding a bucket... I continued walking up and down up to the fence of the police station and Petris must have been collecting snails in the same area. After three-quarters of an hour from the time we met with Petris, I walked back down the hill for about 2 or 3 acres from the fence of the police station. To my left in the Turkish-occupied area I then saw Petris and, further back down, about 20-30 feet away from where Petris was, a Turkish soldier with his weapon aimed at him. Petris was at that time approximately 300 metres from where I was standing. At the same time another soldier approached from the direction of the Turkish observation post and Petris asked him if he could speak Greek. I heard Petris clearly asking the latter soldier: ‘Do you know Greek?’. The soldier did not say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to him. I then went on to the main road and stopped a car which was approaching from the direction of Vrysoulles and requested the driver to call the police... I told him to call the police because the Turks had captured one of us further down, and pointed out to him the direction where I had seen Petris and the Turkish soldiers... After that I started walking to the right down the road where the eucalyptus trees are, towards Avgorou... After about a quarter of an hour from the time I last saw Petris with the Turks I heard two shots and soon, after a few minutes, maybe five minutes, a third shot. On hearing the two shots I saw in front of me the son-in-law of Petris, namely Panikos, approaching from the direction where the water engine is or just beyond the eucalyptus trees. He said to me that the Turks had shot his father-in-law. The time I heard the third shot, I was together with Panikos and we were just getting ready, before hearing the third shot, to stand up and see if we could see Petris, but because of the third shot we sat down. The first two shots I heard were one after the other whilst the third shot was heard about two to three minutes later...” (iii) Statement by Constandinos Ioannou Ioannou 39. The witness, who lives on the Vrysoulles refugee housing estate, was collecting snails in the same area where Petros Kyriakou Kakoulli met his death. He stated, inter alia: “...At about 7.25 a.m. I heard a shot and within a short period of time another one, coming from the east of the police station in the occupied area. Because at that time I was in a dried-out river, I could not identify what was happening at the police station... When I returned to my car I saw one young person who looked panic-stricken and told me that the Turkish troops had shot his father-in-law on the eastern side of the police station... I forgot to tell you that as I was heading towards my car I heard a third shot coming from the same direction. While I was with this person he told me he was called Panikos and that he lived in Avgorou, also that his father-in-law who was shot by the Turks was called Petros Kakoulli. While talking with Panikos I noticed that at the point where he showed me the Turks had shot his father-in-law there were two Turkish soldiers with camouflage clothing armed with rifles...” (iv) Statement by Police Sergeant Engin Mustafa 40. The witness is a police sergeant at the SBA. On the day of the impugned incident he was on duty at the base. He stated: “...On the same day about at 8 a.m. I was on mobile patrol, dressed in uniform, in a marked police vehicle, in the Ormidia Xylophagou area when I received a message to the effect that there was a border incident around the village of Achna, where a Greek Cypriot had been shot by the Turkish army. I proceeded to the scene, along the Larnaca Famagusta main road by the Achna roundabout. My arrival time was 8.20 a.m... I proceeded about 175 metres north-west, escorted by two Turkish soldiers, where I saw the body of one male person lying face down on the ground, who seemed to be showing no signs of life. He looked to be in his fifties. He was wearing a grey shirt, jeans and wellington boots. There was a red plastic bucket with some snails inside it on the ground to the left of the lifeless person. I now know the name of the deceased to be Petros Kakoulli. I was informed by the Turkish army officer at the scene that the Turkish soldiers had shot the man in question at 7.30 a.m. the same day because he had entered their area and failed to obey when challenged...” (v) Statement by Divisional Commander (East) R.H. Weeks 41. The witness is the Commander of the Dhekelia Division of the SBA Police. He stated, in so far as relevant: “...At 8.50 [on 13 October 1996], I went to the area of the alleged shooting and met with PS Engin Mustafa of the SBA Police. PS Mustafa reported to me that a man, identified as one Petros Petrou Kakoulli, had been shot dead by Turkish soldiers inside the TCA about 175 metres north of Boundary Stone 155... Together with PS Mustafa I entered the TCA and walked to a point about 175 metres to the north of Boundary Stone 155 and some 40 metres to the east of it where I saw the body of a male person laying face down on the ground with his head turned to the right. From the appearance of the body I believed him to be dead, although I was not permitted to touch the body to ascertain if there was any possibility of life. I noted that the body was of a middle-aged male, wearing a white-coloured summer shirt with light-coloured markings around the upper back area, blue denim jeans with a black leather belt and black wellington boots. Lying near the left shoulder of the body was a red-coloured plastic 2 gallon bucket that contained some snails. I could see blood stains on the edges of the shirt emerging from the front of the body as it lay on the ground. There was no sign of blood or wounds on the back of the body. I asked the Turkish NCO if he could tell me what had happened. He told me that at about 7.30 a.m. one of the sentries had seen the deceased moving on foot within the Turkish-controlled area. The sentry challenged the man but he did not stop. The sentry challenged the man a second time but he still did not stop so the sentry shot him twice. The man still managed to move a further 15 to 20 metres to the south and the sentry shot him a third time...” (vi) Statement by Chryso Kakoulli 42. The witness is the wife of the deceased, Mr Petros Kakoulli. She claimed that her husband had left the family house with a bucket to collect snails. She disputed the allegation that her late husband was in possession of a knife and a wire rope and stated that such an allegation must have been advanced to cover up his murder. (vii) Statement by Police Constable M. Pyrgou 43. The witness, a police constable stationed at the SBA Police Station in Ayios Nikolaos, saw a middle-aged person holding a basket, collecting snails on the main road in the direction of Larnaca. This person told the witness that somebody had been arrested by the Turkish forces and asked him to take action. The witness called Sergeant Serghiou at the Ayios Nikolaos Police Station and requested him to dispatch a patrol and also to inform the relevant agencies. (viii) Statement by Police Sergeant Antonios Serghiou 44. The witness is a police sergeant stationed at the SBA Police in Ayios Nikolaos. He was on duty at the time of the killing of Petros Kakoulli. After having been informed, by Police Constable M. Pyrgou, about the arrest of a male Greek Cypriot by the Turkish soldiers, the witness instructed Police Constables P. Kamaris and D. Chorekdjioglou to proceed to the scene and to carry out inquiries and to report back. At 8.15 a.m. Mr Chorekdjioglou informed the witness that the person in question was Petros Kakoulli of Avgorou and that he had been shot dead by Turkish soldiers near Achna within the Turkish-controlled area. (ix) Statement by Police Constable Duru Chorekdjioglou 45. The witness is a police constable stationed at the SBA Police in Ayios Nikolaos. He was on duty at the time of the killing of Petros Kakoulli. On the instructions of Police Sergeant Serghiou the witness went to the Achna roundabout, along with Police Constable Kamaris, to inquire into the arrest of Petros Kakoulli. He stated, in so far as relevant, the following: “...When I walked close to [Border Stone] 155 some [Turkish] soldiers shouted at me to stay away. I replied to them that I was a Turkish SBA police officer. Still they shouted at me to stay away and I then walked back to the edge of the main road and shouted at them again to ask whether the commander was present. They replied that he was not there. They promised to call me back when he arrived at the scene. At 7.55 a.m. they called me and signalled to me to cross the boundary. I walked into the Turkish-controlled area and met with the Turkish lieutenant, who refused to give me his name. I then asked him if he had seen any Greek Cypriot collecting snails in the area. He said that a Greek Cypriot had crossed the boundary into the Turkish-controlled area and had been shot dead by his soldiers. I then asked him again whether he was dead or wounded, to which he replied that he was definitely dead. Then at 8.05 a.m. the army officer showed me the deceased, who was about 150 metres within the Turkish-controlled area. I saw the body from a distance of ten metres lying on the ground in a prostrate position with the head facing west. I saw blood on the left-hand side of the body; it was pale and looked dead...” (x) Statement by Police Constable Petros Kamaris 46. The witness is a police constable stationed at the SBA Police in Ayios Nikolaos. He was on duty at the time of the killing of Petros Kakoulli. On the instructions of Police Sergeant Serghiou the witness went to the Achna roundabout, along with Police Constable Duru Chorekdjioglou, to inquire into the arrest of Petros Kakoulli. On the way to the Achna roundabout the witness met Panikos Hadjiathanasiou, who told him that his father-in-law had been shot dead by Turkish soldiers. He informed his colleagues at the Ayios Nikolaos Police Station and Dhekelia about the impugned incident. (xi) Statement by Superintendent Theofanis Anastasiou 47. The witness is a police superintendent in Nicosia. He was the head of the police squad which visited the scene of the killing of Petros Kakoulli. Following his visit the witness concluded that Mr Kakoulli had been kidnapped by armed Turkish soldiers, transferred into the Turkish-occupied areas and shot dead. He was involved in the preparation of topographical sketches and plans of the scene of the killing and attended the post-mortem examination of the deceased. (xii) Statement by Chief Superintendent Nathanael Papageorgiou 48. The witness was involved in the investigation into the killing of Petros Kakoulli. He stated that Mr Kakoulli had been shot dead by Turkish soldiers while collecting snails 40 metres inside the Turkish-occupied areas. He attended the post-mortem examination of the corpse of Mr Kakoulli at Larnaca Hospital. (xiii) Statement by Police Inspector Marcos Christou 49. The witness is a police inspector in the Famagusta Police Division in the village of Paralimni. He was appointed as the investigator in the case of the killing of Petros Kakoulli. He visited the scene of the killing and supervised the taking of statements in connection with the incident. With reference to the statements of Panikos Hadjiathanasiou and Georgios Mishis, the witness found that Petros Kakoulli had been shot dead by Turkish soldiers while collecting snails in the Turkish-occupied area. He noted that on 14 October 1996, approximately 27 hours after the killing, an autopsy had been carried out on the body of the victim in the presence of Turkish and United Nations officials and that a garrotte, consisting of two metal handles attached to a string of wire, and a 33-centimetre bayonet had fallen down when the boots of the deceased had been removed. (xiv) Statements by Police Constables S. Aristidou and H. Hadjiyasemi 50. The witnesses are specialist photographers attached to the Criminal Investigation Division at the Famagusta Police Division. They took various photographs of the scene of the impugned incident on 14 October 1996. (b) Press releases issued by the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) 51. The UNFICYP issued two press releases on 14 and 16 October 1996 concerning, respectively, the killing of Petros Kakoulli and the deaths occurring in the United Nations Buffer Zone. 52. In the press release of 14 October 1996 it expressed concern that an innocent life, namely that of Petros Kakoulli, had been lost as a result of deplorable and unnecessary force. The UNFICYP qualified the incident as a disproportionate response and stressed that lethal force should not be used by either side against persons who crossed the respective ceasefire lines or entered the United Nations Buffer Zone. It was further noted that the commander of the UNFICYP had requested the commander of the Turkish forces in Cyprus to instruct soldiers under his command not to shoot unless their own lives were threatened. 53. In the press release dated 16 October 1996 the UNFICYP noted that five deaths in as many months in the United Nations Buffer Zone or adjacent to the ceasefire lines underscored the urgent need for arrangements to avoid the recurrence of similar tragic incidents. It further pointed out that these incidents had highlighted the need to ensure that the rules of engagement applied along the ceasefire lines prevented the use of lethal force except in clear situations of self-defence. (c) Post-mortem examination report 54. Dr Peter Vanezis, from the Department of Forensic Medicine and Science at the University of Glasgow, carried out a post-mortem examination at Larnaca General Hospital on 14 October 1996 on the body of Petros Kakoulli. In his report dated 16 October 1996, in which he summarised his findings, Dr Vanezis stated: “The deceased suffered three gunshot wounds to the body as follows: One to the right side of the neck, which entered at a position just below the ear, exited at the back of the neck and did not cause any damage to any vital organs. The second entered through the right side of the trunk and exited at the back at approximately the same level and appeared to have caused soft tissue damage with some minor associated internal injury to the lung, but was not in my view fatal. The third wound was on the left side of the trunk towards the back. It entered the body and its trajectory was steeply upwards into the body at an angle of 45 degrees. It then exited from the left side of the front of the chest, causing a large exit wound. This wound was the fatal wound, causing severe damage to the left lung and the heart with consequent extensive internal bleeding. The first two wounds mentioned were from approximately the same direction and both had approximately horizontal trajectories on entering the body. The third wound was on the other side of the body and had a steep upward trajectory. The position of this wound indicates that the deceased, at the time of receiving this wound, was in a horizontal position either on the ground or crouching. The first two wounds appeared to have been fired at approximately the same time, bearing in mind that their direction and their position on the body are from the same side...” (d) Sketch maps and photos 55. The applicants provided the Court with sketch maps and photographs of the scene of the killing of Petros Kakoulli and with the photographs taken during the post-mortem examination carried out by Dr Peter Vanezis. 56. It is to be noted that Dr Vanezis’s observations concerning the deceased’s body correspond to the photos taken during the post-mortem examination. (e) Newspaper reports 57. Between 14 and 17 October 1996 the daily newspapers Fileleftheros, Agon, Cyprus Mail, Alithia and Simerini reported the killing of Petros Kakoulli. The aforementioned newspapers extensively covered the impugned incident and reported the details of the killing of Petros Kakoulli and the investigation conducted into the impugned incident. 58. The following documents furnished by the Government pertain to the investigation carried out by the “TRNC” authorities into the killing of Petros Kakoulli. (a) Work schedule 59. This document sets out, in chronological order, the course of action taken by the investigating authorities in relation to the killing of Petros Kakoulli. It includes statements by various witnesses, reports, and decisions by the authorities. It appears that the investigation into the death of Petros Kakoulli was mainly carried out by Inspector Ömer Tazeoğlu, who at the relevant time worked at the Legal Branch of the Gazi Magusa Police Directorate. (i) Preliminary investigation 60. Inspector Ömer Tazeoğlu commenced his investigation immediately after he had learned about the death of Mr Kakoulli, namely at 8.45 a.m. He visited the scene of the incident along with five other police constables at 10.45 a.m. on 13 October 1996. He observed that the incident had taken place on a slope about 300 metres to the south of the guard post code-named Haşim 8, which was under the responsibility of the 2nd Infantry Company of the 6th Infantry Battalion. The area was a first-degree military prohibited area where there were warning signs. At the site on the slope a dead person was lying face down. There was a large pool of blood. 61. Having completed his preliminary investigation, Inspector Tazeoğlu established that at 6.45 a.m. on 13 October 1996 Privates Harun Avşar and Rezvan Topaloğluları of the Infantry had begun their guard duties. 10 minutes later, they had seen a person about 300 metres from the guard post inside the military prohibited area. Private Avşar was in possession of a weapon. He had approached the person in question and concluded that he was a Greek Cypriot because he spoke Greek. He had signalled to the person to stop. But the person had attempted to run away towards the border fence. Private Avşar had first fired one shot in the air, one shot at the ground and one shot at his legs. Having seen that the person in question had failed to stop, Private Avşar had aimed at him and fired and killed him. 62. According to the work schedule, Police Constable Osman Pekun took the necessary photographs of the scene of the incident. Police Sergeant Mehmet Deniz drew a plan of the location. Inspector Ömer Tazeoğlu collected five cartridges and took samples from the pool of blood. SBA police officers Engin Çelebi and Bülent Nihat and inspectors and soldiers from the Peace Force visited the location but left without doing anything, given that the incident had taken place within the boundaries of the “TRNC”. At the scene of the incident, the military doctor Ömer Gür examined the body and found two entry holes and two exit holes caused by bullets. The body was then transferred to Gazi Magusa State Hospital for an autopsy. Following the preliminary examination carried out by Dr Sadık Aslansoyu of the State Hospital, the body was put in the morgue and placed under police surveillance. (ii) Post-mortem examination 63. On 14 October 1996 the Gazi Magusa District Court issued an interim order allowing the investigating authorities to carry out a post‑mortem on the body of Petros Kakoulli. The same day at 9.58 a.m. a team comprising Inspector Ömer Tazeoğlu, Assistant Director H. Gurani, Police Sergeants H. Özdoğdu and H. Erkurt, Police Constable O. Pekun and Peace Force officials Major Martin Enk, Sergeant Dalle Robert, Inspector Mathias Cosgrave and Inspector Richard Duggan, as well as Dr İsmail Bundak amd Erdal Özcenk, arrived at the morgue of Gazi Magusa State Hospital. The same day at 10.30 a.m. the body was taken out of the refrigerator by the morgue official Hamza Ulusu and was placed on the post-mortem table in the presence of the aforementioned persons. As the morgue official was removing the boot from the left foot of the body, a garrotte wire (both ends of the laundry wire, which was 68 centimetres long, were attached to a 14.5 cm long iron handle) fell to the ground. The Peace Force officials examined the said object on the spot. Then the Peace Force photographer and Police Constable O. Pekun photographed the object. When the boot was removed from the right foot a bayonet with a brown handle in a scabbard was seen to have been inserted between the right side of the leg and the interior of the boot. In this instance too the Peace Force officials and Police Constable O. Pekun photographed the object. Then the boot was removed and the bayonet and its scabbard measured. The bayonet, together with its scabbard, was 33 cm long. The objects were taken as exhibits. 64. Between 10.30 a.m. and 12.30 p.m. on the same day Dr İsmail Bundak and Dr Erdal Özcenk carried out the post-mortem examination on the body in the presence of the above-mentioned persons. Twelve X-rays of the body were taken. Doctors took two 10 cc blood samples from the chest cavity of the body and placed them in two separate 10 cc containers for examination. They observed a total of four gunshot wounds; two entry wounds and two exit wounds. Police Constable Osman Pekun took fingerprints and palm prints of the deceased for examination. The autopsy examination established that the cause of death was internal bleeding as a result of shots fired by a firearm. The shots had shattered the left ventricle of the heart and the left lower lobe of the lung. Following the autopsy, the body, the photos, X-rays and the belongings of the deceased were handed over to the Peace Force officials. (iii) Statements and reports 65. Between 14 October 1996 and 20 March 1997 statements were taken from SBA officials, Police Constables Temel Aydın, Türkeş Ergüder, Ahmet Bulduklar, Halil Öztugay, Ahmet Ceylani and Osman Pekun, Private Mehmet Deniz and Inspector Ömer Terzioğlu. Furthermore, witness testimonies were obtained from Infantry Private Rezvan Topaloğluları, the non-commissioned officer Sergeant Ali Ogdu, Infantry Lieutenant Necmettin Ateş, Dr Ömer Gür, Dr Sadık Aslansoyu, Dr İsmail Bundak, Dr Erdal Özcenk, the chemist Hatice Kale, Chief Inspector Abdullah Iraz, Inspector Ömer Tazeoğlu and Inspector Ules Gümüsel. 66. In a letter of 3 April 1997 Mehmet Özdamar, who was at the relevant time the Deputy Director and Acting Director of the Legal Branch at the Gazi Magusa Police Directorate, submitted a detailed report about the killing of Petros Kakoulli. Mr Özdamar stated, in so far as relevant, the following: “[Petros Kakoulli], despite the presence of warning signs, secretly crossed into the TRNC territory near border stone no. 155 and advanced 200 metres inside... Infantry Private Harun Avşar first verbally warned Petros Kakoulli and asked him to stop. But the said person attempted to escape by walking away speedily. Following that, Infantry Private Harun Avşar got 10 metres closer to the victim and first fired a single warning shot into the air. When [Petros Kakoulli] continued to run away, Harun Avşar fired another warning shot to the ground. But when he again tried to escape, Harun Avşar fired a single shot in the direction of his legs and then two shots below the waist. Petros Kakoulli was stopped after being shot... During the removal of Petros Kakoulli’s boots, a garrotte wire hidden in the left boot and a 33 cm bayonet hidden inside the right boot were discovered. Both have been seized as exhibits... The ballistic examination revealed that 5 empty cartridges had been fired by a G3 infantry rifle with the serial number 259550. The comparison of the fingerprints of the victim with the fingerprints found on the bayonet which was found in his right boot showed that the fingerprints on the bayonet belonged to the victim... A charge of manslaughter can be brought against someone in the event of a criminal offence or negligence. However, as the testimonies show, Infantry Private Harun Avşar made all the necessary moves to apprehend the person but as a last resort, after giving warnings, opened fire on Petros Kakoulli and shot him. In my opinion, in the light of the existing testimonies, the incident qualifies, under Article 15 (3) (b) and Chapter 154 Article 17 of the Criminal Code, as an act of causing death which does not constitute a criminal offence...” 67. In a letter of 23 May 1997 Osman T. Naim Enginsoy, who was a Deputy Assistant Attorney-General, instructed the Director General of Police to take no further action on the case and to close it. 68. In June 1997 the police authorities decided to classify the case concerning the killing of Petros Kakoulli as “no case” and to discontinue the investigation. (iv) The Coroner’s decision of 25 August 1998 69. Having completed the judicial inquest, the Gazi Magusa district judge concluded that Petros Kakoulli had died of injuries caused by shots fired by Infantry Private Harun Avşar after illegally entering the “TRNC” and failing to obey warnings to stop. (v) Statement by Inspector Ömer Tazeoğlu 70. In his statements concerning the conclusions he had reached at the end of the investigation into the killing of Petros Kakoulli, Inspector Tazeoğlu expressed the view that Private Harun Avşar had acted in accordance with the instructions given to him. Private Avşar had given the necessary warnings and had shot and killed Petros Kakoulli because of the latter’s failure to stop. Inspector Tazeoğlu thus concluded that this was a justified killing since Private Harun Avşar had done what his duty dictated. Inspector Tazeoğlu recommended that the case should be classified as “no case”. (b) Report by Superintendent Mathias Cosgrave of the Irish Civilian Police (IRCIVPOL), UNFICYP, in Pyla, Cyprus 71. This report describes the sequence of events concerning the involvement of IRCIVPOL in the investigation into the killing of Petros Kakoulli. It appears that immediately after the killing of Mr Kakoulli, at 11.15 a.m., IRCIVPOL members including Superintendent Cosgrave and Inspector R. Duggan visited the scene of the incident. The IRCIVPOL members did not investigate the incident but merely observed the conduct of the investigation by the “TRNC” authorities from 13 June to 15 June 1996. (c) Statement by Infantry Private Harun Avşar 72. In his statements to the investigating authorities, Infantry Private Harun Avşar claimed the following, in so far as relevant, in relation to his killing of Petros Kakoulli: “...Today, on 13.10.1996, Rezvan Topaloğluları and I were on guard duty at Haşim 8... After 5-10 minutes from the time we started our shift, we – I and Rezvan Topaloğluları – saw, approximately 300 or 400 metres from our guard post, a person walking inside our territory. This person was walking in a south-north direction, in other words in the direction of a trail we describe as the patrolling trail. We did not know who this person was. As soon as I saw this person I informed Duty Officer Ali Ogdu via the wireless (radio). He told us over the wireless to continue to keep the person under observation. Then I told my companion, Infantry Private Rezvan Topaloğluları: ‘You stay here; I will go and look at this person.’ And, holding my rifle with a loaded magazine attached to it, I came down from Haşim 8 guard post and joined the trail, advancing towards the border fence... After approaching to about 50 metres from the person, I shouted and asked him what he was doing there. Without saying anything the person continued walking on the slope in the direction of the patrolling trail. Until that moment I could not firmly determine whether this person was a Turk or a Greek Cypriot. So I moved closer to him. The distance between us was about 5-6 metres. This person was high on the slope. At that moment, I sensed that the person could well be a Greek Cypriot. The look of the person was one of bad intent and unease. After that, through hand signals I asked him where he was coming from. Initially the person gave no verbal reply, but he signalled with his right hand and indicated the Turkish side and said something in Greek. But I did not understand what he said. When I was sure that the person was a Greek Cypriot, I removed the safety catch of my weapon and aimed at him. At that moment, the person, while speaking in Greek and making hand signals, started coming towards me. Faced with this situation I shouted in Turkish, telling him to stop, and with my left arm I signalled to him to stop. The person did not stop and continued walking towards me. I, for my part, stepped back a few metres and shouted at my colleague Rezvan and told him to inform the exchange about the situation... The guard Rezvan Topaloğluları heard me. Then I again turned my head towards the person. I shouted and warned the person to stop. After that he stopped walking towards me and started walking towards the border fence. I again shouted and warned him to stop. But this person continued walking away in the direction of the fence while moving his arms and hands saying something in Greek. The distance between this person and the border fence was 200 metres. Following that, I went up to the slope to have a better view of him. The person was still walking towards the border fence. I shouted again and asked him to stop. But he went on walking, waving his hands at the same time. After that the distance between the person and me was about 15 metres. At that point I fired a shot into the air. After hearing the firing of the gun the person quickened his steps. After that I turned my weapon in his direction and fired another shot towards the ground. He again failed to stop and further increased his speed. The distance between us at that moment was about 30 metres. When I realised that the person would not heed my warnings and would cross over to the Greek-Cypriot side, that is I would not be able to catch him, I decided to stop the person by shooting and wounding him. Therefore, while he was walking I aimed my gun roughly at his legs and fired. After that the person stopped momentarily. Until that moment I was not sure if my shot had found its target. Following that, and while he was in a walking position, I fired two rounds, aiming at the person. And the person was shot and fell to the ground. Naturally, the person fell on his right side. I realised that the person was shot. But I did not go near him. I thought there could be others hiding in the area. Therefore, I went up to the hilltop and, hiding behind the rock, began observing and monitoring the area. After that I did not hear any sound coming from the said person. The shooting incident took place at around 7.30 a.m. After 10-15 minutes Company Duty Officer Ali Ogdu arrived at the scene of the incident along with a team of soldiers. I told him what had happened. The soldiers took security measures in the area. As I said, I fired five rounds in this incident...” (d) Statement by Infantry Private Rezvan Topaloğluları 73. At the time of the impugned incident Infantry Private Rezvan Topaloğluları was on guard duty along with Private Harun Avşar at Haşim 8 guard post. In his statements to the authorities he mentioned, in so far as relevant, the following: “...Today, on 13.10.1996 at around 6.45 a.m., the duty officer of the company, Non‑commissioned Officer Ali Ogdu, drove Harun Avşar and me to the guard post and we began our guard duties there. Five to ten minutes after the start of our guard duties, we saw a person in civilian dress between our guard post and the border fence and 300 metres away from the post. Immediately after seeing this person my colleague Harun Avşar notified the situation to the exchange via the wireless. However, I am not sure who he talked to. Over the wireless he was told ‘OK, keep an eye on it’. Following that, we continued to keep the person in question under surveillance... This person was approximately 250-300 metres from the border fence inside our territory. After that my colleague told me: ‘I will go and find out who that person is. You stay here and watch...’ The person we saw was to the south of the patrolling trail inside the ‘TRNC’ territory, which was a military prohibited zone. No one is allowed to enter the area where we saw the person without permission... When we first arrived at our post no information was given to us about the presence of a person there. Therefore, we realised that that person could not be someone with permission. As a result, [Harun Avşar] left the post to find out who that person was. Harun left the post holding the G-3 infantry rifle, registered in his name, with one magazine attached to it and another one inside his belt, and directly joined the patrolling trail from the top and crossed the trail in a southerly direction and started walking in the field as if he wanted to get away from the person, but he was going to approach the person from behind. The way he was moving he would prevent the person from escaping or getting closer to the border fence. What I saw from the guard post was this: Harun got closer to the person and the distance between them was about 15 metres. First I saw that person on the slope and Harun was in the field. Then I saw Harun climbing up the slope. I do not know if there was any conversation between the person and Harun; I could not hear them from my post. At that moment, as I was watching them Harun got nearer to the person, about 10-15 metres away. Then I saw Harun Avşar turn towards the guard post and signal by hand and shout, telling me to inform the exchange. Right at that moment I understood that Harun had found out that the person was a Greek Cypriot. At that moment – the time was about 7.35 a.m. – I lifted the telephone receiver in the guard post, while watching them. I saw that the person that Harun was trying to get closer to was starting to walk speedily away and trying to escape. Naturally, that person was walking in the direction of the border fence. Then I saw Harun raise his gun into the air and fire a single shot. But that man was still walking away. This time Harun lowered his gun and aimed at the man, and in a very short period he fired four single shots, and as the man was walking he fell down. Naturally, it was not possible for me to discern how many shots Harun fired at the man and how many shots at the ground. But when the man fell down I realised that he had been shot... Harun Avşar shot that person inside the military prohibited zone...”

5. The applicant was born in 1942 and lives in Celje. 6. On 1 April 1992 the applicant was injured in an accident at work. The applicant’s employer had taken out insurance with the insurance company ZT. 7. On 29 September 1993 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against ZT in the Celje Basic Court (Temeljno sodišče v Celju) seeking damages in the amount of 2,111,949 tolars (approximately 8,800 euros) for the injuries sustained. Before 28 June 1994, the day the Convention entered into force with respect to Slovenia, the court held one hearing and appointed an ophthalmologist. Between 9 September 1994 and 26 November 1996 the applicant lodged four preliminary written submissions and/or adduced evidence. Between 9 September 1994 and 7 May 1996 he made four requests that a date be set for a hearing. Neither of the hearings held on 9 December 1994 and 3 December 1996 was adjourned at the request of the applicant. On 1 January 1995 the Celje District Court (Okrožno sodišče v Celju) gained jurisdiction in the present case due to the reform of the Slovenian judicial system. At the last hearing the court decided to deliver a written judgment. The judgment, upholding the applicant’s claim in part, was served on the applicant on 13 February 1997. 8. On 24 February 1997 the applicant appealed to the Celje Higher Court (Višje sodišče v Celju). ZT cross-appealed. On 26 November 1997 the court quashed the first-instance court’s judgment and remitted the case to the first-instance court for re-examination. The decision was served on the applicant on 8 January 1998. 9. On 11 June 1998 the applicant lodged preliminary written submissions with the Celje District Court. On 22 June 1998 the court held a hearing. The court decided to deliver a written judgment. The judgment, upholding the applicant’s claim in part, was served on the applicant on 24 September 1998. 10. On 2 October 1998 the applicant appealed to the Celje Higher Court. ZT cross-appealed. On 21 April 1999 the court quashed the first-instance court’s judgment and remitted the case to the first-instance court for re-examination. The decision was served on the applicant on 31 May 1999. 11. On 14 June and 23 November 1999 the applicant lodged preliminary written submissions and/or adduced evidence. Neither of the hearings held on 14 June 1999 and 13 December 1999 was adjourned at the request of the applicant. During the proceedings the court sought an additional opinion from the appointed ophthalmologist. At the last hearing the court decided to deliver a written judgment. The judgment, upholding the applicant’s claim in part, was served on the applicant on 9 February 2000. 12. On 14 February 2000 the applicant appealed to the Celje Higher Court against that part of the decision rejecting his claim. On 21 March 2001 the second-instance court rejected his appeal. 13. On 21 May 2001 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court (Vrhovno sodišče). On 13 June 2002 the court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The judgment was served on the applicant on 28 August 2002.

5. The first three applicants, Mr Gheorghe Straisteanu, Ms Natalia Straisteanu and Ms Daniela Straisteanu, are a family of Moldovan nationals who were born in 1954, 1957 and 1986 respectively. The fourth applicant, Codrana-Lux S.R.L., is a limited liability company incorporated in Moldova. Sixty percent of its stock belongs to the first three applicants’ family. 6. The first applicant is a well-known businessman and a former member of the Moldovan Parliament, between 1998 and 2001. He was, inter alia, the founder of the first Moldovan private television company and owned a chain of petrol stations. After the Communist party won the general election in 2001 he retired from politics and had to wind up most of his businesses, including the television station and the petrol business. 7. In May 2001 the fourth applicant bought a plot of land measuring 14.63 hectares from the Onesti Local Council. The land was later sold by the fourth applicant to the first two applicants. Subsequently, the first applicant donated a part of the land to the third applicant and an artificial lake was built on the family’s property. 8. Also in May 2001, the fourth applicant concluded a contract of lease with the Onesti Local Council for a period of ten years concerning a natural lake measuring 5.63 hectares adjacent to the property which it had bought. 9. The first three applicants settled on the above property and developed it with a view to using it for tourism and fishing. According to them, in 2005 Government officials started to exercise pressure on the first applicant to induce him to give up the property. 10. On 20 July 2005 the first applicant was arrested in Chişinău together with his driver. At the police station, he was informed that he and his driver were being accused of carrying out a series of car thefts over the past year in Chişinău. It would appear that several criminal complaints concerning car thefts were joined in a single procedure, while others were joined later (see paragraph 14 below). 11. On 22 July 2005 the Centru District Court issued a detention warrant in the first applicant’s name for a period of ten days. The grounds for detention were that he was suspected of committing a serious offence punishable by more than two years’ imprisonment, that the criminal case was complex, and that he might abscond, hinder the investigation and the finding of the truth. An appeal by the applicant was dismissed and his detention was subsequently extended on the same grounds. 12. On 18 August 2005 Judge A.B. from the same court ordered the applicant’s release. The grounds for release were that there were no reasons to believe that the applicant would abscond or hinder in any way the investigation. However, the prosecuting authorities refused to comply with the order and continued to hold the applicant in detention. They applied a second time for an extension of the detention but Judge A. B. refused again on 19 August 2005 and found that the prosecutor had failed to comply with his previous decision and that therefore the applicant’s detention had been unlawful. The prosecutor refused again to comply with the order of release and ordered his further detention on account of charges of theft from a Volkswagen car, an episode which had not been joined to the main criminal case at that time. On the same date the prosecutor applied to another court, the Râşcani District Court, for a detention warrant. The charges against the first applicant were the same as before and no new reasons for detention were adduced. On 22 August 2005 that court upheld the application and ordered the continued detention of the applicant. It did not give any reasons for detention except that the prosecutor’s application related to another criminal case. 13. On 25 July 2005 the Ministry of Internal Affairs issued a press release which stated that the first applicant was a member of a criminal gang which was robbing car drivers in Chişinău. The major Moldovan media reported on the event the same day. 14. On 24 August 2005 the episode concerning the theft from a Volkswagen car was joined to the main criminal proceedings against the applicant. 15. On 25 August 2005 the applicant appealed against the detention warrant of 22 August 2005. 16. On 29 August 2005 the criminal case in the applicant’s case was remitted to a court for examination and from that date on the applicant was detained without a detention warrant. 17. On the same date the Chişinău Court of Appeal discontinued the appeal proceedings against the detention warrant of 22 August 2005 on the ground that the criminal case had been remitted to a court and that therefore no detention warrant was now needed. His habeas corpus applications were dismissed and he remained in detention until 17 November 2005, when a judge ordered his release. 18. During the first applicant’s detention he was held in the detention facility of the General Police Station (Comisariatul General de Poliţie). According to him, the cells in which he was detained were overcrowded, dark, damp, dirty and hot. There was no natural light, but instead there was a very weak light bulb which was switched on all the time. The ventilation was not working properly and the inmates were allowed to smoke in the cell. The cell was infested with vermin and rats and the inmates were allowed to take showers only once every twenty days with cold water. The cells measured approximately ten or eleven square metres and were occupied by at least eight people at all times. Because of the conditions of his detention the applicant contracted influenza. 19. On 7 September 2005 Amnesty International organised action in support of the first applicant on its web page, stating, inter alia, the following: “Amnesty International is concerned that Gheorghe Straisteanu is being charged on the basis of evidence which has been extracted under torture. Amnesty International has information that a second individual gave evidence after being subjected to torture by investigating officers. However, he reportedly fears that he will be subjected to further ill-treatment if his name is mentioned. The organization is also concerned that Georghe Straisteanu is being detained arbitrarily. On 18 August 2005 the central district court of Chişinău ordered the release of Gheorghe Straisteanu on bail, but police officers immediately re-detained him in the court room and took him back to the temporary detention facility despite the court decision. On 19 August, after his lawyer appealed against this arbitrary detention, the court declared that his detention was illegal. However, police officers again defied the court order and detained him in the court room. On 22 August Gheorghe Straisteanu was sentenced to ten days’ imprisonment by the court of Riscani district in Chişinău. The ten day period was due to expire on 31 August, but the investigating authorities have declared that the investigation is closed and that the case has now been transferred to the court. This effectively prolongs Gheorghe Straisteanu’s detention until the court hearing has been held. Furthermore, Amnesty International is concerned about the conditions in which Gheorghe Straisteanu is being held at the temporary detention facility on Tighina Street. He is currently being held in a cell with ten to 12 other detainees. The only washing facility is a tap and a basin in the cell, and conditions are damp and badly ventilated. Georghe Straisteanu has contracted influenza since he has been in detention and his family report that he has difficulty breathing. He has not been given access to a doctor and he has only been able to receive the medicine that his daughter passed to him when she saw him in court.... Please send appeals to arrive as quickly as possible [to the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Ministry of Internal affairs and/or to Moldovan Embassies abroad]...: · expressing concern for the health of Gheorghe Straisteanu and asking for assurances that he will be given access to the medical care he requires in conformity with the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners; · expressing concern at allegations that some of the evidence that has been used to convict Gheorghe Straisteanu has been extracted from another individual under torture; · urging the authorities not to use any evidence extracted under torture in this case and reminding the authorities that as a party to the UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment they must ensure that any statement which has been made as result of torture is not used as evidence in criminal proceedings; · expressing further concern at allegations that the police did not respect court decisions regarding the illegal detention of Gheorghe Straisteanu and that he was arbitrarily detained by police twice in defiance of court orders; · urging an investigation into the allegations of arbitrary detention and asking for his release if the allegations are found to be correct.” 20. On an unspecified date in October 2005 the President of Moldova, Mr V. Voronin, held a meeting with high ranking officials, among whom was the Prosecutor General, the head of the Anti-Corruption Department, the head of the Cadastral Authority and the prefect of the county where the applicants’ land was situated. During the meeting he expressed great dissatisfaction with the fact that in spite of his clear indications to numerous State bodies, the applicants’ property was still in their possession and had not been returned to the State and a monastery. He gave them a deadline of 17 November 2005 to solve the problem, threatened them with dismissal and left the room, slamming the door. 21. A video of this event was broadcast by a television channel on 4 April 2006 in a programme entitled ‘The President’s working day’ which reported on the busy schedule of the President. A copy of it was sent to the Court by the applicant. 22. According to the applicants, after the first applicant’s arrest their family started to experience harassment from law enforcement bodies such as the Department for the Fight against Organised Crime and Corruption, the police and the Prosecutor’s Office, who intimidated and pressured them to give up their property. While in detention the first applicant was approached by police officers, who proposed that he sell the property in exchange for his release. The second applicant was visited on numerous occasions by people claiming to be representatives of the above bodies. They requested her family to leave the property, failing which she would not see her husband again. The third applicant was contacted on numerous occasions by police officers and investigators in charge of her father’s case and ordered to sell the property. 23. On 25 August 2006 the second applicant lodged a complaint with the Prosecutor General’s Office complaining about the actions of two police officers who had entered her property without any legal basis and ordered her, also in the absence of any legal basis, to take down a billboard at the entrance to the property. 24. On 4 October 2006 the second applicant received a letter from the Prosecutor General’s Office, in which she was informed that the matters described by her had proved to be partially true; however, there were no sufficient reasons to justify the prosecutor office’s intervention. 25. On 26 October 2005 the Prosecutor General filed an action with the Economic Court asking for the annulment of the contract of lease for 5.63 hectares of land concluded between the Onesti Local Council and the fourth applicant in May 2001, on the ground that the Local Council had failed to organise an auction. 26. On an unspecified date the President of the Superior Council of Magistrates and the President of the Supreme Court of Justice, Ms V.S., inquired with the Vice President of the Economic Court, Judge M.M., about the above case. 27. In a letter of 30 October 2005 Judge M.M. wrote to Ms V.S. stating, inter alia, that the case was scheduled to be examined on 8 November 2005 and that she would be dealing with it. It appears that the hearing of 8 November was adjourned. 28. On 14 November 2005 the fourth applicant was sent a registered letter informing it that the hearing in the case was scheduled for 17 November 2005. It appears that the fourth applicant was no longer at the address to which the summons was sent and therefore did not receive the summons. 29. On 17 November 2005 Judge M.M. examined the case in the absence of the fourth applicant and upheld the Prosecutor General’s action relying on Article 50 of the old Civil Code, in force at the time of the conclusion of the lease contract. It found that the Onesti Municipal Council had contravened the law by failing to organise a public auction for the lease of the property. 30. On an unspecified date in January 2006 the fourth applicant appealed against the above judgment and argued, inter alia, that it had not been summoned and that it did not even know about the prosecutor’s application before 25 November 2005. According to the law in force at the time of the conclusion of the lease, there was no obligation to hold an auction. That obligation referred only to sale of land by local authorities, but not to leases. In any event, the action was time-barred. 31. On 19 January 2006 a panel of the Supreme Court of Justice presided over by Judge I.M. dismissed the applicant’s appeal and argued, inter alia, that it had been summoned at the address which appeared in the database of the Registration Chamber, and that therefore the applicant had been legally summoned. The court also found that the local council had been under an obligation to organise an auction before renting out the land in question. The Supreme Court did not refer to the applicants’ objection concerning the Statute of Limitations. 32. On an unspecified date the fourth applicant lodged an action with the Economic Court claiming compensation for the investments it had made in respect of the leased property. It claimed 5,034,304 Moldovan lei (MDL). 33. On 20 February 2006 the Economic Court refused to examine the application because the fourth applicant had not paid the court fees of three per cent of the amount sought. 34. In March and April 2006 the fourth applicant paid a part of the court fees and applied again to the court. It argued that it did not have any more money because all its assets and bank accounts had been frozen by the Prosecutor’s Office. 35. On 20 June 2006 the Economic Court refused again to examine the action on the same grounds. The fourth applicant’s appeal was dismissed. 36. On 10 November 2005 the Prosecutor General brought an action with the Economic Court of Moldova seeking the annulment of the purchase of the plot of land of 14.63 hectares by the fourth applicant from the Onesti Local Council in May 2001 and of all the subsequent contracts by which the property had been transmitted to the first, second and third applicants. The Prosecutor General argued that the Onesti Local Council had acted ultra vires and had committed numerous irregularities in organising the auction, establishing the price of the property and selling the property. 37. The applicants opposed all the Prosecutor General’s submissions. Their main arguments were that the Prosecutor General’s action was time-barred, that they had acquired the property in good faith and that the property could not be expropriated without compensation. At the same time the second and third applicants lodged a counter action in which they submitted that if the Prosecutor General’s action was upheld they should be entitled to compensation for the investments they had made in the development of the property in an amount of approximately 216,000 euros (EUR) and EUR 768,000 respectively. 38. On 11 May 2006 the Economic Court requested the applicants to pay court fees in the amount of three percent of the claimed amounts. The applicants appealed and argued that all their accounts had been seized by the Prosecutor’s Office, that they were unemployed and that they could not pay the court fees. They asked, on the basis of the law on court fees, to be allowed to pay the fees after the adoption of a judgment in the case. 39. On 29 June 2006 a panel of the Supreme Court of Justice presided by Judge I.M. dismissed the appeal. 40. On 2 August 2006 the applicants’ counter action was dismissed on the ground of their failure to pay court fees. The applicants appealed against this decision. However, their appeal was dismissed on 21 September 2006 by a panel of the Supreme Court of Justice presided over by Judge I.M. 41. On 18 December 2006 Judge B.B. from the Economic Court upheld the action lodged by the Prosecutor General, relying on Article 50 of the old Civil Code, in force at the time of the conclusion of the lease contract. Judge B.B. found that the Onesti Local Council had breached the rules concerning the conduct of public auctions, namely that it had failed to observe the rules concerning the advertising of the auction, the composition of the auction commission and the drafting of the auction record. The court did not refer to the applicant’s objection concerning the Statute of Limitations and considered all the prosecutor’s arguments well-founded. It ordered that the parties be put in the same position as they had been prior to the conclusion of the contract. 42. The applicants appealed and argued, inter alia, that they had been punished for errors of the local authorities which were not imputable to them, that the court was not independent and impartial, that the action was time-barred and that the actions against them had been orchestrated by President Voronin, submitting a copy of the video in which the President was shown instructing State officials to take away their property. 43. On 15 February 2007 the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the applicants’ appeal. It held that according to the Code of Civil Procedure claims filed in the State’s interest were exempt from the requirement to observe time-limits. 44. On 3 August 2006 a bailiff came to the applicants’ property, accompanied by the mayor of Tiganesti village, in order to enforce one of the civil judgments concerning the applicants’ property. A quarrel took place between the first applicant and the mayor and two weeks later the latter lodged a complaint with the Prosecutor’s Office, complaining that the first applicant had made death threats against him. In particular, he submitted that during the quarrel the first applicant had said that he would feed him (the mayor) to the fishes. 45. On 21 August 2006 the applicant was arrested and placed in detention. On 23 August 2006 the Straseni District Court issued an order for him to be detained for ten days. That was extended on numerous occasions and the first applicant’s appeals and habeas corpus requests rejected. 46. He was detained in the detention centre of the Straseni Police Station until 24 September 2006 and then in Chişinău no. 13 prison. According to the applicant, the conditions of detention in both detention facilities amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment. 47. The applicant’s detention under the new charges continued until 28 November 2006, when he was placed under house arrest. 48. On an unspecified date in 2007 the first applicant initiated civil proceedings against the Government claiming compensation for poor conditions of detention in 2005 and in 2006 and for detention contrary to Article 5 of the Convention. He relied, inter alia, on the Court’s findings in respect of conditions of detention in Ostrovar v. Moldova (no. 35207/03, 13 September 2005), Sarban v. Moldova (no. 3456/05, 4 October 2005), and Holomiov v. Moldova (no. 30649/05, 7 November 2006) in which the applicants had been detained in the same detention facilities. 49. On 27 June 2007 the Centru District Court dismissed the applicant’s action, upholding the Government’s position and finding that the conditions of detention on both occasions were acceptable. The court accepted several of the applicant’s submissions, such as that his cell window did not have glass for several days, that a person with scabies was placed in his cell on one occasion, that there was no linen or mattresses in the cell, and that there was no sewerage in one of the detention facilities. Nevertheless, it considered that these shortcomings were not sufficient for the application to be upheld, because the applicant did not have to share a bed with the ill prisoner, the latter had been receiving treatment for five days and at the time of his placement in the cell he was no longer contagious. Moreover, the window cell was repaired after only four days and in any event the temperatures at the end of September were usually moderate. In addition, prisoners were allowed to bring their own mattresses and linen. In so far as the complaint under Article 5 was concerned, the court found that there were no civil remedies against the alleged breaches under Moldovan law. This judgment was confirmed by the Court of Appeal on 3 October 2007 and by the Supreme Court of Justice on 7 May 2008. 50. On 18 May 2008 the applicant lodged another action with the Rascani District Court, again claiming compensation for his allegedly unlawful detention between August and November 2005. It appears that his action has not yet been determined. 51. The relevant findings of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT, unofficial translation) read as follows: “Visit to Moldova of 10-22 June 2001: 53. In its report on the 1998 visit (paragraph 56), the CPT was forced to conclude that material conditions of detention in the remand centres (EDPs) visited amounted in many respects to inhuman and degrading treatment and, in addition, constituted a significant risk to the health of persons detained. While recognising that it was not possible to transform the current situation in these establishments overnight, the CPT recommended a certain number of immediate palliative measures to guarantee basic conditions of detention that respect the fundamental requirements of life and human dignity. 54. Unfortunately, during the 2001 visit, the delegation found barely any traces of such palliative measures, in fact quite the opposite. ... 55. One can only regret that in their efforts to renovate these premises - which under the current economic circumstances deserve praise - the Moldovan authorities have paid no attention to the CPT recommendations. In fact, this state of affairs strongly suggests that, setting aside economic considerations, the issue of material conditions of detention in police establishments remains influenced by an outdated concept of deprivation of liberty. 56. Turning to the other EDPs visited across Moldova, with very few exceptions the delegation observed the same types of disastrous and insalubrious material conditions. A detailed description is superfluous, since it has all been highlighted already in paragraphs 53 to 55 of the report on the 1998 visit. In Chişinău EDP, these conditions were exacerbated by serious overcrowding. At the time of the visit, there were 248 prisoners for 80 places, requiring nine persons to cram into a cell measuring 7 m² and between eleven and fourteen persons into cells of 10 to 15 m². 57. The delegation also received numerous complaints about the quantity of food in the EDPs visited. This normally comprised tea without sugar and a slice of bread in the morning, cereal porridge at lunch time and hot water in the evening. In some establishments, food was served just once a day and was confined to a piece of bread and soup. ... ...Concerning the issue of access to toilets in due time, the CPT wishes to stress that it considers that the practice according to which detainees comply with the needs of nature by using receptacles in the presence of one or several other persons, in a confined space such as the EDP cells which also serve as their living space, is in itself degrading, not only for the individual concerned but also for those forced to witness what is happening. Consequently, the CPT recommends that clear instructions be given to surveillance staff that detainees placed in cells without toilets should – if they so request – be taken out of their cell without delay during the day in order to go to the toilet. 59. The CPT also recommends that steps be taken to: -reduce the overcrowding in Chişinău EDP as rapidly as possible and to comply with the official occupancy level; -supply persons in custody with clean mattresses and clean blankets; -authorise persons detained in all EDPs to receive packages from the outset of their custody and to have access to reading matter. In the light of certain observations made, particularly in the EDP of the Chişinău Police Inspectorate, the CPT also reiterates its recommendation concerning strict compliance, in all circumstances, with the rules governing separation of adults and minors.” Visit to Moldova of 20-30 September 2004 41. Since 1998, when it first visited Moldova, the CPT has serious concern for the conditions of detention in the institutions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The CPT notes that 32 out of 39 EDPs have been subjected to “cosmetic” repair and that 30 have been equipped with places for daily walks. Nevertheless, the 2004 visit did not allow lifting the concern of the Committee. In fact, most recommendations made have not been implemented. 42. Whether one refers to the police stations or EDPs visited, the material conditions are invariably subject to the same criticism as in the past. Detention cells had no access to daylight or a very limited such access; artificial light – with rare exceptions – was mediocre. Nowhere did the persons obliged to pass the night in detention receive mattresses and blankets, even those detained for prolonged periods. Those who had such items could only have obtained them from their relatives... 45. As for food ... in the EDPs the arrangements made were the same as those criticised in 2001 (see paragraph 57 of the report on that visit): generally three modest distributions of food per day including tea and a slice of bread in the morning, a bowl of cereals at noon and tea or warm water in the evening. Sometimes there was only one distribution of food per day. Fortunately, the rules for receiving parcels have been relaxed, which allowed detainees with relatives outside to slightly improve these meagre daily portions. 47. In sum, the material conditions remain problematic in the police stations; they remain disastrous in EDPs, continuing in many aspects to amount, for the detainees, to inhuman and degrading treatment.” Visit to Moldova of 14-24 September 2007 II. Institutions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs In so far as the conditions of detention in the police establishments are concerned, it appears that this is the field in which the least progress has been achieved. It is not necessary to enumerate here in detail all the shortcomings observed by the delegation, which are more or less the same as those observed during past visits (and of which the Ministry of Internal Affairs is perfectly aware). ... Numerous persons are still detained overnight in police establishments, in cells which should not be used to detain persons for more than a few hours. It is high time to remedy these problems, in particular by placing accused persons under the supervision of institutions of the Ministry of Justice and building new prisons corresponding to CPT standards and to the norms laid down by the Moldovan legislation.” 52. Article 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, in so far as relevant, states as follows: “(4) Detention takes place on the basis of a warrant issued by a judge for a maximum period of thirty days. The lawfulness of the warrant may be challenged, in accordance with the law, before a hierarchically superior court. The period of detention may be extended only by a court, in accordance with the law, to a maximum of twelve months.” 53. The relevant part of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads as follows: Article 308 (2) The application for a detention warrant... shall be examined without delay by the investigating judge... at the place of the conduct of the criminal investigation, at the place of arrest or at the place of residence of the detainee’s representative. (5) A repeated application for a detention warrant... in respect of the same person and in the same proceedings, after the dismissal of a previous application, shall be possible only if new reasons for detention have appeared. 54. The relevant provisions of the Civil Code, in force at the relevant time, provide: “Article 74 The general limitation period for protection through a court action of the rights of a [natural] person is three years; it is one year for lawsuits between State organisations, collective farms and any other social organisations. Article 78 The competent court ... shall apply the limitation period whether or not the parties request such application. Article 83 Expiry of the limitation period prior to initiation of court proceedings constitutes a ground for rejecting the claim. If the competent court ... finds that the action has not commenced within the limitation period for well-founded reasons, the right in question shall be protected. Article 86 The limitation period does not apply: ... (2) to claims by State organisations regarding restitution of State property found in the unlawful possession of ... other organisations ... and of citizens;”. 55. The relevant provisions of the new Civil Code, in force after 12 June 2003, read as follows: Article 6. The action in time of the civil law “(1) The civil law does not have a retroactive character. It cannot modify or suppress the conditions in which a prior legal situation was constituted or the conditions in which such a legal situation was extinguished. The new law cannot alter or abolish the already created effects of a legal situation which has extinguished or in the process of execution.” 56. In a judgment of 20 April 2005 (case nr. 2ra-563/05) the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the plaintiff’s contentions based on the provisions of the new Civil Code on the ground that the facts of the case related to a period before the entry into force of the new Civil Code and that, therefore, the provisions of the old Civil Code were applicable.

5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6. On 27 February 1995 the applicant filed a civil claim with the Commercial Court (Trgovinski sud) in Belgrade, seeking payment of 34,975 Euros by its former business partners. 7. Following three remittals, the Commercial Court scheduled the next hearing for 13 September 2005 at 11 a.m. 8. On the morning in question, the applicant's lawyer was on unrelated business at the Third Municipal Court (Treći opštinski sud) in Belgrade. The applicant maintains that at 10.30 a.m. his lawyer took a taxi in order to reach the Commercial Court as soon as possible. Some 700 meters before its destination, however, the taxi broke down and the applicant's lawyer had to continue on foot. He ultimately arrived in court at 11.04 p.m., just in time to see the judge finish the dictation of the minutes in the applicant's case to his secretary. One of the lawyers acting on behalf of the respondents was also present. 9. On an unspecified date thereafter the applicant received the Commercial Court's decision (rešenje) dated 13 September 2005, wherein it was stated that neither party had duly appeared before the court, which is why the proceedings had to be terminated (see paragraph 18 below). 10. On 19 September 2005 the applicant requested procedural reinstatement, i.e. restoration of proceedings to status quo ante (see paragraph 16 below). It explained why its lawyer had been late and proposed that the taxi driver, as well as the respondents' counsel, be heard. 11. On 26 September 2005, in the absence of an oral hearing, the Commercial Court rejected the applicant's request (doneo rešenje kojim se odbija predlog), stating that procedural reinstatement could only be granted in a case of force majeure. Moreover, the applicant's lawyer should have acted with greater diligence and left the Third Municipal Court fifteen minutes earlier, which would even have allowed him, after the taxi broke down, to reach the Commercial Court on foot in time for the scheduled hearing. 12. On 3 October 2005 and 7 November 2005 the applicant appealed against the Commercial Court's decisions of 13 September 2005 and 26 September 2005, respectively. 13. On 19 December 2005 the High Commercial Court (Viši trgovinski sud), in the absence of an oral hearing, rejected both appeals. In so doing, it upheld the reasoning of the Commercial Court, added that the applicant had not provided relevant evidence to the effect that the taxi had indeed broken down, and noted that, in any event, “a vehicle defect could not be proved by means of witness testimony” but rather by documentary evidence such as repair receipts. 14. The applicant received this decision on 26 January 2006. 15. On 23 April 2009, in response to the Agent's request, Beotaxi, an association of taxi drivers, explained that, given the usual traffic congestion and the location, a replacement taxi would not have been a viable option for the applicant's lawyer. In any event, the Commercial Court was some 700 metres away, which is why it would have taken their client some 5-7 minutes on foot to reach his destination.

5. The first applicant was born in 1948, the second applicant was born in 1976, the third applicant was born in 1980 and they all live in Slatina. The fourth applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Osijek, and the fifth applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Josipovac. 6. The first applicant is the husband, the second and third applicants are children, and the fourth and fifth applicants are sisters of the late M.B.B., a lawyer who was based in Slatina. 7. M.B.B. represented M.N. in divorce proceedings instituted in December 2001 in the Slatina Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Slatini) against her husband, A.N. 8. A first hearing in those proceedings was held on 12 February 2002, attended by the parties and the lawyer M.B.B. The court heard the parties’ arguments and decided to request a report from the local social services. It then adjourned the hearing until 9 April 2002. 9. According to A.N.’s police records, he had a history of alcohol abuse, violent behaviour and unlawful possession of firearms. In May 1993 the Slatina Police (Policijska Postaja Slatina – hereinafter “the police”) instituted minor offences proceedings against him for beating up his daughter and wife under the influence of alcohol and making serious threats using firearms. On that occasion, the police seized from A.N. a rifle with a dozen bullets and a hand grenade. There is, however, no further information on the outcome of these proceedings. Furthermore, between 2000 and 2002 A.N. was reported three times for family violence and twice for a breach of the peace and public order, and in May 2001 the police lodged a criminal complaint against him with the State Attorney’s Office for making serious death threats to his wife. 10. On 16 October 2000 the Slatina Minor Offences Court (Prekršajni sud u Slatini) found A.N. guilty of the minor offence of family violence and fined him 500 Croatian kunas (HRK). During the proceedings, M.N. explained that the divorce proceedings were pending before the courts and that A.N. had contested them. She also explained that she had ended up in hospital after having been severely beaten by A.N. 11. On 25 July 2001 the Slatina Municipal Court found A.N. guilty of the criminal offence of making serious death threats to his wife and sentenced him to two months’ imprisonment, suspended for one year. 12. According to a police report drawn up on 25 March 2002, M.N., accompanied by A.N., attended the police station on 21 March 2002, alleging that her husband had been harassing her. She made no other complaints of possible threats or violence. She further explained that A.N. had previously beaten her up and had been convicted in the minor offences and criminal courts. She also pointed out that their divorce proceedings were pending and that a hearing was scheduled for 9 April 2002. On the same occasion, A.N. argued that he did not want his wife to see other men. The police officer who interviewed the couple, Ž.J., warned A.N. to stop harassing his wife and instructed them to settle all their disputes in the divorce proceedings. The report also contains a note suggesting that during the interview, A.N. and M.N. showed no signs of aggression, alcohol abuse or agitation. 13. Afterwards, police officer Ž.J. informed his superior officer, M.Kr., of the interview. He was told to make a short note of the event in the logbook and that it was not necessary to draft a report or take any further action. 14. According to further police reports, at around 7 a.m. the following day, A.N. went to a bank in Slatina with the intention of withdrawing all his money. He told a bank employee, D.K., whom he had met before, that they would not see each other again. While speaking to the bank employee, A.N. was in tears. When she asked him what was troubling him, he said that “it will be talked about”. He also shook hands with several other people who then told the bank manager, F.S., to contact the police. F.S. followed A.N. out of the bank and asked him what was troubling him. A.N. responded that he was sick of everything; his wife, who was having affairs with other men, and his son, who was a drug addict, and that he was going to do something and nobody could stop him. 15. At 7.15 a.m. F.S. informed the police of the event, saying that he was afraid that A.N. could do something to himself or others. 16. At 7.17 a.m. an on-duty commanding officer, T.S., sent a patrol of two police officers, M.L. and I.B., to the bank. At the same time he checked A.N.’s police records and saw that he had a violent background. He therefore informed the police chief, M.Ko., who ordered a police patrol to be sent to A.N.’s home address. At 7.38 a.m. M.L. and I.B. were sent to look for him there. 17. The report submitted by police officers M.L. and I.B. indicates that they found A.N. at home. He approached them at the front of his house and said that he was sick of everything, and that he had withdrawn the money for his funeral because he was going to kill himself either that day or the next by jumping under a train, and that there was nothing they could do about it. He also said that he had already written a suicide note, and complained that the day before he had been at the police station because his wife had been seeing another man. The police officers noted in their report that A.N. had appeared sober and had not shown any signs of aggressiveness, and had not mentioned his wife or anybody else or that he might hurt anybody. They therefore advised him that everything was going to be fine and left. 18. Upon their arrival at the police station at 8.06 a.m. the police officers reported on the interview to the on-duty commanding officer M.T., who had taken over from T.S. (see paragraph 16 above) in the meantime. 19. According to a report drawn up by M.T. on 22 March 2002, M.L. and I.B, the police officers who had visited A.N. at his home (see paragraph 17 above), had reported to him that A.N. was contemplating suicide because of his family problems, and that he had mentioned his divorce and said that nobody could stop him. At 8.12 a.m. M.T. informed the deputy police chief for the criminal police, M.B., of the event who instructed him to immediately inform the Slatina Health Centre (Dom zdravlja Slatina – hereinafter “the hospital”) and Slatina Social Care Centre (Centar za socijalnu skrb Slatina). He informed the hospital doctor, I.F., at 8.15 a.m. and the Social Care Centre at 8.18 a.m. The doctor had said that he would see with a nearby psychiatric hospital whether they could admit A.N. for treatment, while an official from the Social Care Centre had said that she had known A.N.’s situation very well and told the police to contact the hospital. 20. Later during the investigation the police found that officer M.T. had falsified his report, as he had actually informed doctor I.F. at 9.40 a.m., not 8.15 a.m. as indicated, and had informed the Social Care Centre at 9.37 a.m., not 8.18 a.m. as indicated (see paragraph 19 above and paragraphs 35 and 46 below). 21. Meanwhile, sometime after 8.00 a.m., A.N. returned to the bank, shouting at F.S. for having called the police. He then went to a nearby bar for a drink and at around 9.00 a.m. went to the police station. He met the on-duty commanding officer M.T. there, and demanded to know why the police had been to see him. M.T. explained that the police had had information that he had been having some problems. A.N. replied that he was going to solve his problems himself and that he was going to do what he intended. He then left the police station. 22. A.N. then went in search of his wife, who started work in a bakery shop at 10 a.m. He waited for her in a nearby street he knew she had to pass when going to work. When A.N. saw her, he approached her and kicked her in the head, knocking her to the ground. He then fired one shot at her and went to leave, but then returned to shoot her a further three times. She survived, despite receiving serious injuries to her head, stomach and arm. 23. After shooting his wife, A.N. went to M.B.B.’s office, which was only some three hundred metres away. M.B.B. was in the office at the time with her secretary and a client, A.R. Immediately upon entering the office A.N. fired a shot in M.B.B.’s direction, but hit her desk. The client attempted to talk him round, but when A.N. threatened to kill him, he ran away. A.N. then attempted to shoot the secretary, who was calling the police, but his pistol jammed and she managed to escape. A.N. then approached M.B.B. and shot her dead by firing three bullets at her, of which two were fatal. 24. In the meantime, some onlookers had informed the police of the incidents and several police units were sent to search for the gunman. 25. At around 10.35 a.m. the police arrived at A.N.’s house and ordered him to surrender and go with them to the station in connection with the investigation into the shootings. He refused, before throwing two hand grenades at the police officers and starting to shoot at them. 26. When special police units stormed into A.N.’s house at around 3.26 p.m., they found him with a self-inflicted head wound, the type of weapon that had been used for the shootings, and a suicide note. He was immediately taken to hospital, but died the next day. 27. On the same day as the incidents occurred, an investigating judge of the Bjelovar County Court (Županijski sud u Bjelovaru) and a Deputy County State Attorney conducted crime scene investigations with the assistance of police forensic scientists. In A.N.’s house the police found another suicide note, a number of different bullets and an empty hand grenade cartridge. They also discovered that the weapon used by A.N. had been reported missing and that its owner had died in 1997. 28. The investigating judge ordered a forensic examination of the bodies which confirmed that M.B.B. had suffered a violent death as a result of the gunshots. 29. During the investigation the police interviewed a number of people who provided information concerning A.N. and the course of the events in which he had killed M.B.B. and attempted to kill his wife. The police drew up reports of the interviews but they were not signed or otherwise attested by the witnesses. 30. According to the police reports, A.N. and M.N.’s children, E.N. and M.B., provided information about the problems in their family and the frequent violent incidents mainly caused as a result of A.N.’s alcohol abuse. The incidents were confirmed by M.N. in her interview with the police. She also stated that he had been angry at her lawyer M.B.B., but had not threatened to kill her. 31. M.B.B.’s secretary described the course of events in which A.N. had attempted to shoot her and killed the lawyer M.B.B., which was also confirmed by the client A.R. who had been in the office at the time (see paragraph 23 above). Another witness, N.M., a waiter in a nearby bar, described how he had heard gunshots and later found M.B.B. dead in her office. 32. The police also interviewed the bank employees D.K. and F.S., who provided information about A.N.’s behaviour in the bank (see paragraph 14 above), and two other witnesses, I.T. and A.K., who had also been in the bank when A.N. was there. The two bank customers stated that A.N. had seemed disturbed and looked as though he had needed some help, but had not said he was going to kill anybody. 33. An acquaintance of A.N., Ž.M., told police that for the past year A.N. had been saying that he was going to kill his wife. After the incidents at issue, A.N. called him and said that he killed his wife and shot her lawyer. Information to that effect was also provided by another acquaintance of A.N., I.Š., who said that when he got drunk A.N. would say that he was going to kill somebody but without specifying whom. On the morning in question he had seen A.N., who had shown him a handful of bullets. 34. A.N.’s brother-in-law, L.Z., stated that A.N. had complained that during a hearing in the divorce proceedings M.B.B. had prevented him from raising all his arguments before the court, and that he should do something about it but without specifying what. He had never mentioned that he was going to kill anybody. His other brother-in-law, F.Z., stated that a couple of days before the incidents his wife Ž.Z. had told him that she had seen A.N., who had told her that he was going to kill his wife and her lawyer, but she had not thought that he had really meant it. This was confirmed by Ž.Z. herself in her statement to the police. 35. During the investigation the police interviewed doctor I.F. who had taken the police’s call to the hospital on the morning of the incidents (see paragraph 19 above). He stated that he had received the call at around 9.40 a.m., not 8.20 a.m. as reported in the media. He also provided evidence to that effect because his telephone had the ability to record times and dates of calls. Based on the information he had received, he had attempted to contact a nearby psychiatric hospital to arrange for A.N.’s possible hospitalisation. However, he had not managed to speak to any of the doctors, as he had been told by a nurse that they had all been in a meeting which she had not been allowed to interrupt. 36. The results of the investigation were submitted to the Slatina Municipal State Attorney’s Office (Općinsko državni odvjetništvo u Slatini) to assess whether the police could be held liable for their actions in connection with the incidents at issue, particularly with regard to the application of section 24 of the Protection of Individuals with Mental Disorders Act. That provision stated that an individual could be admitted to a psychiatric institution where there was a reasonable suspicion that the individual posed an immediate threat to his life or health, or the life or health of others (see paragraph 81 below). 37. On 16 August 2002 the Slatina Municipal State Attorney’s Office issued the following statement: “A.N. was a violent person against whom a criminal complaint had been made for making serious death threats to his wife and on several occasions was reported for the minor offences of family violence, abusive behaviour and inappropriately addressing police officers. On the day in question A.N., without any further elaboration, told police officers that he was going to kill himself because of his family problems. The police officer on duty, M.T., omitted to inform the hospital and Social Care Centre of the whole situation. Had there been coordination between the doctor and social worker, who had known the situation in A.N.’s family better, measures for the prevention of suicide could perhaps have been taken. In the circumstances, at the relevant time the police officers had no reason to treat A.N. as a mentally disturbed person within the meaning of section 24 of the Protection of Individuals with Mental Disorders Act. ...” 38. On 22 March 2005 the applicants, through their lawyer, lodged a criminal complaint against police officer M.T. with the Slatina Municipal State Attorney’s Office, alleging that he had falsified the police records indicating the exact time he had contacted the hospital and Social Care Centre (see paragraphs 19 and 20 above). They also lodged a criminal complaint against police chief M.Ko. for abuse of power and authority, because he had failed to institute criminal proceedings against police officer M.T. 39. On 30 May 2005 the Slatina Municipal State Attorney’s Office rejected the criminal complaints against the police officers on the grounds that their actions did not constitute criminal offences. 40. On 10 June 2005 all five applicants and K.B., the mother of M.B.B., took over the prosecution as subsidiary prosecutors and lodged an indictment against the police officers in the Slatina Municipal Court. 41. During the proceedings police officer M.T. stated that after officers M.L. and I.B. had returned from their interview with A.N. (see paragraph 19 above), they had told him that A.N. had been agitated and had mentioned problems in his family, but had not made any threats. Sometime at around 8 a.m. he had therefore attempted to contact police chief M.Ko. to seek further instructions. After having failed twice to reach M.Ko., who had been out of his office, he had called the deputy police chief for the criminal police, M.B., who had instructed him to contact the hospital and Social Care Centre. He had then telephoned the hospital, but the number he had dialled had not been valid, so he had only managed to get the right number later when he had spoken to doctor I.F. When he had called the hospital for the first time he had written down the exact time on a piece of paper and then later had just taken that time for his report. 42. Doctor I.F. also gave his oral evidence during the proceedings. He testified that after he had received the information from the police about their interview with A.N., he had told the police that he would need to examine A.N. and then decide whether compulsory psychiatric treatment would be necessary. However, the police had not known where A.N. was at the time, so he had told them to find him. Approximately fifteen minutes later the hospital had received information about the shootings. 43. On 3 May 2006 the Slatina Municipal Court acquitted police officer M.T. on the grounds that there had been no evidence that he had deliberately falsified his report. The court also dismissed the charges against police chief M.Ko. on the grounds that the prosecution had become time-barred. 44. The judgment was confirmed on appeal by the Virovitica County Court (Županijski sud u Virovitici) on 21 September 2006. 45. On 18 April 2002 the Ministry of the Interior opened disciplinary proceedings against police officer M.Kr. for failing to report on the interview with A.N. and his wife on 21 March 2002 even though A.N.’s background and the information concerning their relationship warranted that such action be documented (see paragraphs 12 and 13 above). 46. On 27 May 2002 disciplinary proceedings were also opened against police officer M.T. for failing to immediately report the situation concerning A.N. on the morning of 22 March 2002 to the hospital as he had been instructed to do by his superior, and for falsifying his report about the times he had contacted the hospital and Social Care Centre (see paragraphs 19 and 20 above). 47. The first-instance Osijek Disciplinary Panel of the Ministry of the Interior (Prvostupanjski disciplinski sud u Osijeku) found police officer M.Kr. guilty on 10 October 2002 and sentenced him to a 15% reduction of salary, to be applied for one month. 48. On 5 November 2002 the disciplinary panel found police officer M.T. guilty and sentenced him to a 10% reduction of salary, to be applied for two months. 49. On 22 March 2005 the five applicants and K.B. lodged a civil action against the State in the Slatina Municipal Court, seeking damages for the authorities’ failure to protect their relative’s right to life. They relied on section 13 of the State Administration Act, which provides that the State is liable to compensate damage caused to a citizen, legal entity or other party for the unlawful or wrongful conduct of a State authority (see paragraph 83 below). 50. A first hearing was held on 6 July 2005, at which the trial court heard evidence from bank employees F.S. and M.S. 51. F.S. testified that after he had seen A.N. crying, he had asked him what had happened and A.N. replied that it would be talked about. He had then called the police, who arrived soon after. When he had told them what had happened, the police had just replied that they had known A.N. very well. A.N. had appeared totally unstable that morning, which had been noticeable to F.S. because he worked with people. Everybody in the bank had noticed that A.N. had been totally crazy, and F.S. had therefore called the police because he had thought that A.N. was a danger, primarily to himself, and should get medical treatment. When A.N. had entered the bank for the second time he had not calmed down and had been yelling at F.S. for calling the police about him. This version of events was confirmed by M.S. 52. At a hearing on 14 September 2005 the trial court heard evidence from doctor I.F. He testified that on the morning of 22 March 2002 at around 9.45 a.m. he had been informed by the police that A.N. had been behaving strangely and that he might do something bad. The police officer had not however known where A.N. was at the time. Doctor I.F. explained that the usual practice in such cases was to examine the person and then decide whether admission to hospital was necessary. He also specified that the police officer who had called him had said that A.N. could kill somebody or do something bad. This had prompted him to believe that his and the police’s intervention had been necessary, and that A.N. should be taken to the psychiatric hospital. Had the police managed to trace A.N., he would have examined him, because that had been the practice in similar cases and also in cases where somebody had threatened suicide. 53. At the same hearing the trial court questioned police chief M.Ko., who explained that A.N. was known to him because he had once been held at the station for violent behaviour. On the day in question he had given orders to the on-duty commanding officer to send a police patrol to A.N.’s home address and had then left the police station to attend to some other business. He had returned to the police station at around 9.55 a.m. and had been told of the shootings. 54. The next hearing was held on 23 November 2005, where the trial court heard evidence from M.N. She stated that A.N. had previously had a rifle, a handgun and a bomb which had been, at some point, confiscated from him by the police. He would also say that he was saving money to buy a handgun to kill her and two other people, but she had never known exactly whom. A.N. had had a problem with alcohol and when he would get drunk he would be violent. She had called the police on more than a hundred occasions, but sometimes they would come and sometimes they would not. A.N. had contested the divorce and the day before the incidents had threatened to kill her. She had reported that on the same day to the police, but they had done nothing about it. At the same hearing the trial court questioned bank employee D.F., who explained the course of the events in the bank (see paragraph 14 above). 55. A further hearing was held on 18 January 2006, at which the police officers M.L., M.T. and I.B. gave evidence. 56. M.L. testified that on the morning of the incident, he and police officer I.B. had been ordered to go to the bank because A.N. had been there and had been behaving strangely. In the bank, they had met someone who had called the police, who explained that A.N. had gone to the bank, had withdrawn all his money and while in tears had said “it will be talked about”. When M.L. and I.B. had reported on their findings to the on-duty commanding officer, they had been instructed to find A.N. at his home address. They had found him there and interviewed him. A.N. had not been drunk or aggressive. He had said that he was going to kill himself because of problems with his wife and son and that he would do it either that day or the next, and that nobody could stop him. He had appeared normal and calm. They had not searched him because there had been no grounds to take such action, nor had there been any reason to take him to hospital in accordance with the Protection of Individuals with Mental Disorders Act. M.L. also explained A.N. was known to him and that before seeing him, he had been informed by the on-duty commanding officer that he had already threatened to kill his wife. 57. In his statement I.B. confirmed M.L.’s version of events, explaining that the police could take an individual to hospital or a police station and have a doctor examine him, but they had not considered A.N. to be a danger so had not taken any such action. 58. Police officer M.T. stated that when officers M.L. and I.B. had returned from the bank they had said that A.N. had not been drunk or aggressive but merely agitated, and that he had threatened suicide. M.T. had then attempted to contact his superiors and had managed to get in touch with the deputy chief for the criminal police M.B., who had instructed him to inform the hospital and Social Care Centre. He had attempted to contact the hospital several times and at some point had managed to reach doctor I.F, who had said that he would try to find a place for A.N. in a psychiatric hospital. He had also asked where A.N. was, but at the time M.T. had not known. M.T. further explained that he had been familiar with the Protection of Individuals with Mental Disorders Act, which enabled the police to take a mentally disturbed individual to a psychiatric hospital, but he had considered the police to have done everything they could, although with hindsight, it would have been possible to do more, but the police could not have predicted what would happen. He had known that A.N. had a violent background but stressed that he had not been registered as insane. 59. At a hearing on 15 March 2006 the deputy chief for the criminal police M.B. gave his oral evidence. He explained that he had been informed that A.N. had gone to the bank where he had been behaving strangely. Later, he had been informed that the police had interviewed him and that he had appeared calm and normal but had threatened suicide. At around 8.05 to 8.10 a.m. M.B. had instructed the on-duty commanding officer, M.T., to inform the hospital and Social Care Centre. He considered the police to have done everything they could, but there had been no grounds to take any further measures given the findings of the police patrol that had interviewed A.N. at his home. He also explained that the usual practice in similar cases was to inform the hospital, who could call the police if they needed assistance. 60. A further hearing was held on 10 May 2006 at which police officers Ž.J. and T.S. and a customer from the bank, I.T., gave evidence. 61. Ž.J. stated that the day before the incidents M.N. had arrived at the police station followed by her husband A.N. Police officer Ž.J. had interviewed them but had found no grounds for the police to take further action, so he had told them to resolve their marital problems in their court proceedings. M.N. had also mentioned that after A.N. had been handed a suspended sentence, he had stopped making threats and beating her up. Ž.J. had not reported on the interview because his superior officer M.Kr. had not requested it. 62. Police officer T.S. had no specific knowledge about the incident. He had been off-duty at the time although he had, early in the morning, just before leaving the police station, sent a police patrol to the bank to check what had happened there and why A.N. had been behaving strangely. 63. The bank customer I.T. testified that he had seen A.N. in the bank on the morning in question, who had told him that he had been having some problems and that it would be talked about. He had been behaving strangely, as he had been walking around the bank in circles. He had looked nervous, and I.T. had thought that he had been ill and in need of medical attention. 64. On 15 September 2006 the trial court obtained a psychiatric report certifying that the first, second and third applicant and M.B.B.’s mother had all experienced mental suffering after the events. The report was confirmed by the expert at a hearing held on 21 February 2007. 65. On 5 March 2007 the Slatina Municipal Court allowed the civil action and ordered the State to pay damages for failing to protect the life of the applicants’ relative. The trial court held that the State’s responsibility under section 13 of the State Administration Act was objective, and that it was only necessary to establish whether the death had been a result of the unlawful or wrongful conduct of the State authorities. The relevant part of the judgment reads: “... It is not disputed between the parties that F.S. called the police a little after 7 a.m. F.S. informed the police of what had happened in the bank and about A.N.’s appearance. This court fully accepts the statements of F.S., M.S., D.F. and I.T. as credible when they testified about A.N.’s state of mind [in the bank]. They stated that A.N. had appeared totally unstable. The conclusion of the police officers M.L. and I.B. that A.N. had been normal and calm and had not been a danger cannot be accepted as logical. They reached such a conclusion after being informed by A.N. that he had withdrawn the money for [his] funeral, and that he was going to kill himself and nobody could stop him. Taking this into account, [this court considers that] the average person could have reached the conclusion about A.N.’s state of mind referred to by witnesses [F.]S., M.S., D.F. and I.T. The police officers who needed to act with particular diligence should have also reached [this] conclusion about A.N.’s state of mind, which they failed to do. They thus failed to act in accordance with sections 22 (1), 23§(1) and 24 of the Protection of Individuals with Mental Disorders Act ... The defendant considers that there is no connection between the failures of the police and [M.B.B.’s death] and that there is therefore no liability on the Republic of Croatia. This court considers differently. Had police officer M.T. complied with the order of the deputy chief for the criminal police M.B., and informed the hospital and Social Care Centre at 8.15 a.m., as noted in the report, it is highly probable that the outcome would have been avoided, particularly taking into account the statement of witness I.F ... As the liability of the State is objective; it was for it to prove that the damage occurred as a result of a cause which could not have been avoided (vis major), or that the damage resulted exclusively from the actions of the aggrieved party or a third party which could not have been predicted and where the outcome could not have been avoided (section 177(1) and (2) of the Civil Obligations Act). Nothing of [the sort] has been proven by the defendant. ...” 66. The Slatina Municipal State Attorney’s Office, representing the State in the proceedings, lodged an appeal with the Virovitica County Court on 26 April 2007. 67. On 19 November 2007 the Virovitica County Court quashed the first-instance judgment and ordered a retrial on the grounds that the first-instance court had erred in its findings that the liability of the State was objective as it was based on the existence of a fault, namely unlawfulness. That court further found that, irrespective of the fact that A.N. had threatened suicide, there had been nothing requiring police officers M.L. and I.B. to treat the case as particularly urgent and to take A.N. to a psychiatric hospital. It also accepted the police officers’ statements that A.N. had appeared calm during the interview. The Virovitica County Court instructed the first-instance court to question witnesses I.F. and M.T. again to establish what actions doctor I.F. had intended to take, since it was not clear whether he had intended to examine A.N. or just to see whether he could be placed in a psychiatric hospital, as could be inferred from the statement of police officer M.T. 68. In the resumed proceedings, at a hearing held on 27 February 2008, the Slatina Municipal Court heard doctor I.F. and police officer M.T. 69. Doctor I.F. testified that the usual practice in similar cases was to immediately respond at the scene and to examine the person if he or she was available. The medical response team consisted of a doctor, a driver and medical technician and a nurse. They first had to examine the person and then the doctor could decide whether hospitalisation in a psychiatric hospital was necessary. Police intervention was only sought if the person could not be apprehended for the examination. As regards the case at issue, doctor I.F. explained that he had been called by a police officer who had told him that A.N. had been behaving strangely and that he could do something bad. The police officer had not known where A.N. was. Had he known, he would have immediately responded at the scene and examined him. Doctor I.F. also explained that he had to first examine the person and only then he could make a prescription for that person’s admission to hospital. There had been no reason for him to check whether there had been a place in the hospital because it was for the hospital to decide what they wanted to do with his prescription and the person in question. In the present case, the information he had received from the police suggested that it had been necessary to examine A.N. at the scene. 70. Police officer M.T. stated that on the day in question he had informed doctor I.F. that the police had had a person who was seriously disturbed and who should be given an injection in order to calm down. As to his further conversations with the doctor, M.T. stated: “I cannot remember any more what doctor [I.]F. told me when I contacted him. I don’t remember exactly, but I think he told me that he would see whether [A.N] could be placed in the psychiatric hospital and then would ask for police intervention if he needed it. ... I would like to change my statement in the part where I said that doctor [I.]F. was going to first find a place in [the psychiatric hospital] and that he would then consult the police chief. Doctor F. actually told me that he would first examine [A.]N. and that he would call the police if necessary. ... In reply to the question from the defendant’s representative, I cannot explain why I changed my statement as regards what doctor [I.]F. had told me.” 71. On 7 March 2008 the Slatina Municipal Court obtained a police report describing the course of events later on the day of the shooting, and on 9 April 2008 concluded the trial. 72. On 22 April 2008 the Slatina Municipal Court dismissed the civil action as ill-founded, and ordered the applicants to pay HRK 80,700 in costs and expenses. The relevant part of the judgment reads: “... The liability of the defendant is based on the principle of fault (section 154(1) of the Civil Obligations Act). Unlawful conduct is conduct which is contrary to the law or an omission in the application of the law, which is committed deliberately or by accepting that it might cause damage to a third party. ... The purpose of section 13 of the State Administration Act is to provide for the liability of the State where there is a wilful act contrary to the law with the intent of causing damage ... Acceptance [of that outcome] is conduct or an omission of a State official in the performance of his or her official duties where he or she was able to, according to his or her individual capability, take into account the objective requirements with due diligence, and which he or she failed to do. In the particular circumstances, there is no causal link between the damage and the omissions of police officer M.Kr., in his capacity as on-duty commanding officer, to report the day before [the shootings] about M.N.’s complaint that she had been followed by A.N. This court finds nothing to suggest that the police officers who intervened at the bank, and who had had no knowledge of this, would have acted differently even if they had had such information. The plaintiffs also refer to the omissions of police officers M.L. and I.B ... Under section 24 of the Protection of Individuals with Mental Disorders Act the police may, in particularly urgent cases, take a mentally disturbed individual to a psychiatric hospital without prior medical examination, provided there is a reasonable suspicion that the individual poses an immediate threat to his life or health, or the life or health of others ... The events [in the bank] suggest that the police had an obligation to act under section 23 of the Protection of Individuals with Mental Disorders Act and to secure A.N.’s medical examination, after which the doctor could decide whether to take to a psychiatric hospital. But in the particular circumstances police officers M.L. and I.B. could not have been expected to recognise that there was any particular urgency or that A.N. should be taken to a psychiatric hospital without prior medical examination ... The omission of police officer [M.T.] to inform the hospital about A.N.’s behaviour is an irregularity in the performance of his official duties. However, the dispute between the parties is whether there is a causal link between this irregularity and the event ... Even if M.T. had informed the hospital at 8.15 a.m., it is doubtful whether the doctor would have carried out an examination because at that time he had not known where A.N. was. It follows that at the time A.N. was no longer available to the police and according to the evidence [submitted by] F.S. was in the bank sometime between 8.30 and 9 a.m. There is therefore no causal link between the incidents and the omissions of police officer M.T ... “ 73. The first, second and third applicants and K.B. lodged an appeal against the above judgment with the Virovitica County Court, arguing that the State authorities had failed to prevent the killing of their relative, and that in accordance with the relevant domestic law they should have been awarded damages. 74. On 7 May 2009 the Virovitica County Court dismissed the applicants’ appeal and upheld the first-instance judgment. It held, however, that the first-instance court had erred in concluding that at 8.30 a.m. the police had not known A.N.’s whereabouts, because around that time the police had interviewed him at his home. In any event, the police could have informed the hospital immediately after 7.15 a.m. when they had received the call from the bank. Nevertheless, the court held that the police had done everything they could and that it could not be concluded that only intervention by the doctor in the first few hours after the information had been received from the bank would have prevented the incidents. The court also found that, irrespective of A.N.’s violent background and the indications that he was mentally disturbed, he had not acted violently on the day of the incidents or the day before. It was true that police officers M.L. and I.B. had omitted to examine A.N. under section 49 of the Police Act, but he had not been behaving violently, so that omission could not be characterised as an irregularity in their work. Moreover, it was not certain whether A.N. had a gun at the time and therefore it was in doubt whether such a police search could have prevented the incidents. 75. On 29 June 2009 the first, second and third applicants and K.B. lodged an appeal on points of law against the above judgment before the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske). 76. On 11 May 2011 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on points of law as ill-founded and upheld the Virovitica County Court’s judgment. It found that the lower courts had misinterpreted the relevant domestic law by holding that the liability of the State was based on the principle of fault because it was in fact based on the objective principle. It was thus sufficient to establish that there was unlawful or irregular conduct on the part of the State administration and the causal link to the damage thereby caused. In the case at issue, the Supreme Court held that there had been no causal link between the irregular work of the police officers and the killing of the applicants’ relative. 77. On 5 January 2012 the applicants (including the fourth and fifth applicants, who had taken over the proceedings from K.B. following her death on 14 June 2010) lodged a constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) challenging the decisions of the lower courts. 78. On 15 March 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicants’ constitutional complaint, endorsing the reasoning of the Supreme Court. The decision of the Constitutional Court was served on the applicants’ representative on 27 April 2012.

7. The applicant was born in 1964 and is currently detained in HM Prison Brixton. 8. In 1997, there were a series of armed robberies of mini-cab drivers in and around Wolverhampton. Each robbery was carried out in the same way by a person posing as a passenger at night. Each involved violence. The first robbery was committed on 15 April 1997 (for which the applicant was later acquitted). On 17 April 1997, the applicant was arrested and agreed to an identification parade on 15 May 1997. He was released pending the parade. 9. On 30 April 1997, a second robbery, later alleged in count 2 of the indictment against the applicant, was committed. On 1 May 1997, the applicant was arrested in relation to that offence. The applicant again agreed to participate in an identification parade to be held on 15 May and was then released. However, on that date, the applicant did not appear for the identification parade but instead sent a doctor's note stating that he was too ill to go to work. A subsequent identification parade was set for 5 June 1997. Notice to that effect was sent to the applicant's residence. He did not appear for identification on the specified date, stating later that he did not receive such notification as he had changed address. 10. On 27 June 1997, the applicant was arrested on an unrelated matter at which time he gave the address to which the previous notification was sent. 11. On 21 July 1997, a robbery, for which the applicant was charged in count 3 of his indictment, occurred. The applicant was arrested on 1 August 1997 and later acquitted on this count. The applicant agreed to stand on an identification parade scheduled to take place on 11 September. On 3 September, the applicant was interviewed with respect to another unconnected matter and said that he would attend the parade on 11 September. On that date, he did not in fact attend. 12. On the 17 September 1997, the robbery alleged in count 4 occurred, while a further robbery alleged in count 5 took place on 24 October 1997. 13. An important part of the prosecution's case rested almost entirely on the ability of the witnesses to visually identify the perpetrator. For this reason, submitting the applicant to an identification parade was of great importance for the prosecution. Given the failure of the applicant to attend the arranged identification parades, the police decided to arrange a video identification parade. Permission to covertly video the applicant for identification purposes was sought from the Deputy Chief Constable for the West Midlands Police Force under the Home Office Guidelines on the Use of Equipment in Police Surveillance Operations 1984. 14. On 19 November 1997, the applicant was taken from Strangeways Prison (where he was being detained on another matter) to the Bilston Street police station. The prison, and the applicant, had been informed that this was for identification purposes and further interviews concerning the armed robberies. On arrival at the police station, he was asked to participate in an identification parade. He refused. 15. Meanwhile, on his arrival at the police station, he was filmed by the custody suite camera which was kept running at all times and was in an area through which police personnel and other suspects came and went. An engineer had adjusted the camera to ensure that it took clear pictures during his visit. A compilation tape was prepared in which eleven volunteers imitated the actions of the applicant as captured on the covert video. This video was shown to various witnesses of the armed robberies, of whom two positively identified the applicant as involved in the second and fourth robberies. Neither the applicant nor his solicitor were informed that a tape had been made or used for identification parade purposes or given an opportunity to view it prior to its use. 16. The applicant's trial commenced in January 1999. 17. At the outset, the applicant's counsel made an application pursuant to section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 that evidence of the video identification should not be admitted. The judge heard submissions from the prosecution and defence during a preliminary hearing (“voir dire”) on 11 and 12 January 1999. On 14 January 1999, the trial judge ruled that the evidence should be admitted. When shortly afterwards this judge became unable to sit, the new trial judge heard the matter afresh. In his ruling of 26 February 1999, he found that the police had failed to comply with paragraphs D.2.11, D.2.15 and D.2.16 of the Code of Practice, inter alia with regard to their failure to ask the applicant for his consent to the video, to inform him of its creation, to inform him of its use in an identification parade, and of his own rights in that respect (namely, to give him an opportunity to view the video, object to its contents and to inform him of the right for his solicitor to be present when witnesses saw the videotape). However, the judge concluded that there had been no unfairness arising from the use of the video. Eleven persons had been filmed for comparison purposes rather than the required eight and were all within comparative height, age and appearance. Even though the applicant's solicitor was not present to verify the procedures adopted when the witnesses were shown the videos, the entire process had been recorded on video and this had been shown to the court which had the opportunity of seeing exactly how the entire video identification process had been operated. The judge ruled that the evidence was therefore admissible. 18. The trial lasted 17 days, the applicant and 31 witnesses giving live evidence. During the course of it, the applicant discharged all his legal representatives (leading and junior counsel and solicitors) and conducted his own defence as he was dissatisfied with the way his defence was being conducted. In his summing-up to the jury, the trial judge warned the jury at considerable length about the “special need for caution” before convicting any defendant in a case turning partly on identification evidence and told the jury to ask themselves whether the video was a fair test of the ability of the witnesses to pick out their attacker, telling them that if it was not a fair test they should not give much, if any weight, to the identifications and also that if there was any possibility that the police planned a video identification rather than a live identification to put the applicant at a disadvantage, they could not rely safely on the video identification evidence. The jury were also made aware of the applicant's complaints about the honesty and fairness of his treatment by the police and the alleged breaches of the code. 19. On 17 March 1999, the jury convicted the applicant of three counts of robbery and acquitted him of two others. The judge sentenced him to five years' imprisonment. 20. The applicant applied for leave to appeal against conviction, inter alia, alleging that the trial judge had erred in not excluding the evidence obtained as a result of the covert identification video and that the conviction was unsafe due to significant and substantial breaches of the code of practice relating to identification parades. Leave was granted by a single judge of the Court of Appeal. 21. On 3 April 2000, after a hearing at which the applicant was represented by counsel, the Court of Appeal rejected his appeal, finding that the trial judge had dealt with the matter in a full and careful ruling, that he had been entitled to reach the conclusion that the evidence was admissible and that he had directed the jury to give the evidence little or no weight if it was in any way unfair. It refused leave to appeal to the House of Lords. 22. On 14 April 2000, the applicant applied to the House of Lords. It rejected the application. The solicitors claimed that they were informed on 7 July 2000.

4. The applicant was born in 1932 and lives in Bucharest. 5. In 1952, a property situated in Bucharest at 10 Negustori Street and belonging to I.A. was seized by the State under Decree no. 224/1951, following an alleged unpaid debt. I.A.’s only heir was his wife, the applicant being the latter’s sole legatee. The property consisted of a building placed on a 458 sq. m plot of land. The building was divided into five apartments. 6. On 10 July 1996 the applicant requested the authorities to authorise her to recover the whole property and to refrain from selling it to the tenants under Law no. 112/1995. However, on 9 December 1996, 12 March, 30 September and 7 October 1997 and 22 October 1998 the F. company, a State-owned company responsible for the management of property belonging to the State, sold the five apartments with the appurtenant land to the then tenants under Law no. 112/1995. 7. On 5 June 2001 the applicant, in her capacity as legatee of I.A.’s wife, claimed restitution or compensation, under Law no. 10/2001 governing immovable property wrongfully seized by the State, for a plot of 460 sq. m of land and for the constructions on it situated in Bucharest at 10 Negustori Street. It appears from the file that she did not receive any answer. 8. On 6 August 2002 the applicant brought court proceedings to have the sales of the five apartments declared null and void. She considered that the seizure by the State had been unlawful. 9. On 16 June 2003 the Bucharest Court of First Instance dismissed the action, considering that the third parties had made the purchase in good faith, although the authorities were in bad faith since they had sold the property before resolving her request to recover it. The court also acknowledged that the seizure by the State of the whole property had been unlawful and that the applicant was the legatee of I.A.’s wife. However, relying on section 46 § 2 of Law no. 10/2001, it considered that the applicant had not also proved the buyers’ bad faith. 10. Two subsequent appeals by the applicant were dismissed, on 14 October 2003 by the Bucharest County Court and on 11 February 2005 by a final judgment of the Bucharest Court of Appeal.

8. The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Diyarbakır. He was living in Görbeyli village at the time of the alleged events giving rise to this application. The facts of the case are in dispute between the parties and may be summarised as follows. 9. Until April 1994 the applicant lived in Görbeyli, a village of Lice district in Diyarbakır province, in the then state-of-emergency region of Turkey. The village which was situated some 3 km from Lice district comprised approximately eighty households before 1995. In 1995 terrorist activity was a major concern in this area. Since the 1980s a violent conflict had been going on in the region between the security forces and sections of the Kurdish population in favour of Kurdish autonomy, in particular members of the PKK (Workers' Party of Kurdistan). 10. On 5 May 1995, at around 10 a.m., the applicant heard an explosion which seemed to come from a place under the control of the army. Following the explosion a group of reinforcement soldiers from Lice came to the area and entered the applicant's village. The soldiers told the inhabitants that one soldier had died and two soldiers had been injured in the explosion which had been caused by the explosion of a grenade in the hand of a soldier. 11. The soldiers then rounded up the villagers beside the primary school and split them into two groups, one of women and children and the other of the men. They apprehended Süleyman Şanlı, aged 67, in the fields and stripped him naked and inflicted ill-treatment upon him before the villagers. The soldiers then beat the men of the village using clubs. At the same time, another group of soldiers entered the village and started destroying the villagers' possessions. All the windows and doors of their houses were broken. The soldiers took those goods which might be of use to them. In the meantime, the beating of the men continued. Before leaving the village, the soldiers told the villagers that they would return in three days and if the villagers were still there, they would kill them all. As it was spring and their crops were not yet ready for harvest, the inhabitants did not leave the village. They rather set about fixing their houses and other property. 12. On 12 May 1995 the soldiers arrived in the village, they assembled the villagers in the school yard and beat them as before. The soldiers demolished the houses and killed many of the livestock in the village. 13. In the second half of June 1995 the soldiers raided the village again and razed it to the ground, including the vineyards, orchards and forestry. 14. The applicant filed complaints with the offices of the State of Emergency Regional Governor, the Diyarbakır Chief Public prosecutor and the Diyarbakır Provincial Regiment Command. The applicants' fellow villagers' request to return and cultivate their lands was rejected by the authorities. 15. Meanwhile, the applicant has submitted to the Court a report prepared by the Human Rights Association in Diyarbakır, entitled “The Burned and Evacuated Settlement Units”. This report gives the list of villages or settlements which were allegedly evacuated or destroyed by the security forces. The applicant's village appears on this list as having been burned down on 15 May 1995. 16. Another report entitled, “The Destruction of Villages in Southeast Turkey, prepared by Medico International and the Kurdish Human Rights project in June 1996, provides background information on the destruction of villages in South-east Turkey and makes suggestions on the steps to be taken in order to address the immediate humanitarian needs and long term strategies to remedy the problems of internally displaced persons. 17. The applicant has also furnished the Court with photocopies of four photographs showing four houses in ruins allegedly in Sexan (Görbeyli) village. However, it is not possible to determine the exact cause of the current state of these houses from these photos. 18. On 5 June 1995 the applicant and two members of the village elders' council, namely Mehmet Şanlı and Alaattin Altan filed a petition with the Lice Public Prosecutor's office, for submission to the Diyarbakır Chief Public Prosecutor's office, complaining that the security forces had evicted the inhabitants of their village and destroyed their property. They asked the judicial authorities to conduct an investigation into the events and to prosecute those responsible for the destruction of their property. 19. In letters dated 15 December 1995 the Lice Chief Public Prosecutor asked the Lice District Gendarme Command and the Diyarbakır Chief Public Prosecutor to carry out an investigation into the allegations made by the applicant and his two other fellow villagers. 20. In a letter of 23 January 1996 the Diyarbakır Chief Public Prosecutor requested the Security Directorate to summon the complainants to his office in order to hear evidence from them. 21. The investigation conducted by the Security Directorate to find out the address of Alaattin Altan did not yield any result. Halis Aksakal could only be found at the end of four months' search. 22. On 25 April 1996 the Diyarbakır Public Prosecutor took statements from the applicant, who reiterated his allegations and asked the judicial authorities to prosecute the security forces who perpetrated the impugned acts. He further informed the prosecutor that Mehmet Şanlı had returned to his village and that Alaattin Altan worked in Van. 23. Meanwhile, in a letter of 7 February 1996 the Gendarmerie Commander replied to the Lice Chief Public Prosecutor's letter and informed him that, contrary to the allegations, no houses had been burned on 15 May 1996 and that no one had applied to the command with such allegations. 24. On 18 May 1996 the Lice Chief Public prosecutor issued a decision of non-jurisdiction and transferred the case-file to the Lice District Governor's office in accordance with the Law on Prosecution of Civil Servants. Thereupon, Deputy to the Diyarbakır Governor, who was then in charge of the case, asked the Diyarbakır Gendarmerie Command to appoint an investigator to carry out the preliminary investigation. 25. The preliminary investigation was carried out by Captain Hacı İlbas, who was at the relevant time the Gendarmerie Unit Commander in Lice. On 29 July 1996 Inspector İlbas took statements from five inhabitants of Gürbeyli, including the muhtar of the village. The villagers all stated that, on 15 May 1995, following a road block by members of the PKK, a clash had erupted between the security forces and the PKK militants. After the clash, the security forces had carried out a house search in Görbeyli and other neighbouring villages. The witnesses all claimed that the security forces had not inflicted any damage to their property, that no houses had been burned down and that the inhabitants had not been forced to leave the village. Furthermore, they all noted that the complainants, including the applicant, had all been living in Diyarbakır and that they could return to the village if they wished. 26. In his investigation report dated 12 August 1996, Inspector İlbaş concluded that the applicant's allegations were groundless. He found it established that on 15 May 1995 members of the PKK had blocked the Lice-Kulp road and kidnapped one person. Consequently, the security forces had intervened and during the clashes three PKK terrorists had been killed, following which the security forces had carried out searches in the villages in the region with due respect to the citizens. 27. On 10 October 1996, having regard to the inspector's report, the Lice District Administrative Council issued a decision of non-prosecution in respect of the security forces. 28. On 6 March 1997, the Regional Administrative Court upheld the District Administrative Council's decision of non-prosecution.

6. The applicant was born in 1942 and lives in Lahti, Finland. 7. On 18 June 1999 the Krasnoselskiy District Court of St Petersburg (“the District Court”) found that unlawful actions of police officers in 1993 had resulted in harm to the applicant’s health manifesting itself in partial loss of ability to work. This judgment and a supplementary judgment of 11 October 1999 recovered from the State treasury in the applicant’s favour lost earnings up to 1 February 2000 in the amount of 109,751 Russian roubles (RUB) and compensation of non-pecuniary damage in the amount of RUB 10,000. It appears from the applicant’s own submissions that the award was paid to him in 1999. 8. On an unspecified date the applicant brought a new action seeking recovery of lost earnings for the period from 1 February 2000 to 1 March 2005 and further monthly payments to be re-calculated in accordance with the minimum wage, reimbursement of expert fees and compensation for sanatorium treatment. 9. By a judgment of 3 March 2005 the District Court granted his claims in part, however the judgment was reversed on appeal on 18 April 2005, and the case was remitted to the first instance for fresh examination. 10. On 19 September 2005 the District Court again granted the claims in part awarding the applicant lost earnings in the amount of RUB 378,185 and related monthly payments in the amount of RUB 8,911 to be adjusted to the cost of living, RUB 39,585 for sanatorium treatment, and RUB 5,600 as reimbursement of the expert fees. 11. The above judgment was not challenged on appeal. The enforcement documents received by the Ministry of Finance on 25 October 2005 were returned to the applicant in April 2006 due to unidentified inconsistencies in the judgment. 12. On 18 June 2007 the District Court considered the applicant’s application for adjustment of the amounts awarded by the judgment of 19 September 2005. The court rejected the application but clarified the original judgment by specifying that the responsibility for its enforcement lay with the Ministry of Finance. A new writ of enforcement was issued. 13. On 29 January 2008 the judgment of 19 September 2005 was enforced in full. It transpires from the documents submitted by the Government and covering the period between February 2008 and February 2010 that the monthly payments in the amount determined by the District Court on 19 September 2005 were regularly credited to the applicant’s account.

5. The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Kaunas. 6. By letter of 28 May 2002, Kaunas City Police informed the applicant that his permits to keep and carry a firearm for defence purposes as well as a hunting rifle had been revoked because on 19 April 2002 the applicant had been listed in an “operational records file” (policijos operatyvinė įskaita), a database containing information gathered by law-enforcement authorities (see paragraphs 24-26 in 'Relevant domestic law' below). The applicant was informed that he was to hand in these firearms to the authorities and would receive money for them. 7. On 19 September 2002 the applicant requested the Kaunas City District Court to order the removal of his name from the operational records database. The applicant stated that he had only discovered that his name had been so listed from the aforementioned police letter. 8. On 11 October 2002 the Kaunas City District Court refused the applicant's request, finding that he should have brought his claims before the administrative courts. 9. The applicant appealed to the Kaunas Regional Court, arguing that he had never been informed of the reasons for the listing of his name in the operational records file and requesting that it be removed. The applicant also asked the court to order the police to provide him with all the written materials concerning the listing of his name. 10. On 21 October 2002 the Kaunas Regional Court found that it was necessary to decide which court – of general or administrative jurisdiction – was competent to hear the applicant's case. 11. On 29 October 2002 Kaunas city police officials instituted criminal proceedings on charges of theft when acting in an organised group (Article 271 § 3 of the Penal Code). The applicant was charged on 16 November 2002 and placed under house arrest. 12. On 26 November 2002 the special chamber responsible for questions of jurisdiction, composed of the judges of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court, decided that the applicant's case should be examined by the administrative courts. 13. On 27 March 2003 the applicant was charged with covering up a crime committed by others (Article 295 of the Penal Code). In particular, the investigators suspected that in October and November 2002 the applicant had helped to hide stolen cars on the premises of the company where he worked as the director. In his application the applicant maintained that this was not a fresh charge against him but a substitution for the previous charge of theft (see paragraph 11 above). 14. On 27 May 2003 the Kaunas City District Court ordered that the applicant be released from house arrest. 15. On 29 May 2003 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court allowed the applicant's action, holding that the listing of his name in the police file was contrary to the principles of the presumption of innocence and the rule of law. Having reviewed the classified materials submitted by the police, the court found no evidence showing that the applicant had been engaged in any criminal activity. The court also noted the absence of any accusatory judgment against the applicant. On the contrary, testimony to his positive attributes, submitted to the court by environmental protection agencies and non-governmental associations, showed the applicant's goodwill and dedication (principingumą) to protecting nature. For the above reasons, the court ordered the Kaunas police officials to remove the applicant's name from the operational records file. 16. On 12 June 2003 the Kaunas police appealed. They contended that, when listing the applicant's name in an operational records file, the police had respected the applicable rules. In their appeal they observed that the file had been submitted to the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court and that the judges had acquainted themselves with that information. Lastly, the police noted that criminal proceedings on charges of theft had been pending and that the applicant was one of the accused. 17. On 23 July 2003 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the lower court's decision and returned the case for fresh examination. It was noted that the lower court had erred in law and failed to consider certain relevant evidence. The appellate court emphasised that, when adopting a decision, the lower court had to evaluate all the evidence which had been presented at the hearing and to determine which circumstances had been established and which had not. In particular, the lower court had not properly examined the circumstances relating to the criminal proceedings on charges of theft and had failed to evaluate the applicant's procedural position in them. The Supreme Administrative Court stressed that it was indispensable to examine all the circumstances relevant to the dispute over the listing of the applicant's name in the operational records file. 18. On 1 December 2003 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's claim. The court admitted that a person listed in police records could be negatively affected in a number of ways, for example, he could lose the right to carry a firearm or face restrictions when applying for certain jobs. However, the court noted that having examined the “written evidence” in the case, as well as having examined, in the judges' chambers, the operational file on the applicant, the listing of the applicant's name in the police file had been lawful and justified. Whilst acknowledging that it had not been possible to disclose the operational file to the applicant, the court noted, nevertheless, that the applicant had been able to substantiate his claims by providing evidence or by asking the court to obtain the relevant materials when it had not been possible for him to obtain them himself. It concluded that he had not adduced any proof in support of his claim that the listing of his name in the operational file was unlawful. 19. The applicant appealed, noting the lower court's observation that the listing of his name in the police file could entail negative consequences for him. The applicant also submitted that he was an inspector of nature protection (gamtos apsaugos inspektorius) and that he had been attacked by poachers on numerous occasions. Consequently, were the guns to be taken away from him, it would be too dangerous for him to pursue that activity. Furthermore, the applicant alleged that the gun was necessary for defending his family – living in a remote and insecure rural area – and also for his job, as he occasionally transported large sums of money from his company's safe to the bank. 20. The applicant argued that he had had no access to the information which had served as the basis for the listing of his name in the police file. No reasons, except for theories (išskyrus prielaidas) had been disclosed to him. Relying on the above, the applicant submitted that his rights of defence had been breached and that the file on him should be destroyed. 21. On 24 March 2004 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's appeal, upholding the reasoning of the lower court. It noted that, “having evaluated the written evidence in the case and the operational file [which under the Law on State Secrets could not be disclosed to the defence], it had been possible to conclude that the listing of the applicant's name in that operational file had been reasonable and lawful”. 22. On 28 June 2004 the criminal investigation in respect of the applicant on account of suspected theft was discontinued due to statutory limitations.

4. The applicant, Ms Nina Ivanovna Zakharova, is a Russian national who was born in 1957 and lives in Voronezh. 5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows. 6. The applicant’s employer allocated her a flat. However, the flat was unlawfully occupied by other persons. In 1994 civil proceedings were initiated to evict these persons. 7. On 16 November 2000 the Kominternovskiy District Court upheld the applicant’s right to the flat and ordered eviction of unlawful residents. 8. On 17 April 2001 the judgment was enforced and the applicant moved into the flat which was, however, in a state of disrepair. 9. By judgment of 13 May 2002, the Kominternovskiy District Court ordered the housing maintenance service to carry out repairs in the flat. On 3 October 2002 the judgment was upheld on appeal and became enforceable. 10. On 23 October 2003 enforcement proceedings were instituted but the judgment was not enforced. The applicant bought the necessary materials and equipment at her own expense and sued the housing service for compensation. By judgment of 26 April 2004, the Kominternovskiy District Court granted her claim in part and made an award against the housing maintenance service with regard to the costs of the applicant relating to the acquisition of materials for repairs. The court also held that the argument of the housing maintenance service according to which the applicant had hindered the enforcement procedure should be rejected. According to the applicant, the payment was effected without undue delay but it covered only a portion of the actual costs. 11. On 15 December 2003 the applicant lodged a claim against the Ministry of Finance before the Basmanniy District Court of Moscow. She sought to recover compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage incurred through the excessive length of proceedings in the housing dispute. 12. On 21 January 2004 the Basmanniy District Court disallowed the applicant’s claim. Referring to the Constitutional Court’s Ruling of 25 January 2001, the District Court noted that the Parliament had not yet adopted a law determining jurisdiction over claims concerning State liability for the damage caused by a court’s or judge’s failure to adjudicate a case within a reasonable time. For that reason the District Court held, relying on Article 134 § 1 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, that the applicant’s claim could not be examined in civil proceedings. 13. On 2 June 2004 the Moscow City Court upheld the decision to disallow the applicant’s claim. 14. On 22 December 2003 the applicant lodged a claim against the Voronezh Department of the Ministry of Finance and the Voronezh Regional Court before the Leninskiy District Court of Voronezh. She sought to recover compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage incurred through the excessive length of proceedings in the housing dispute. 15. On 15 January 2004 the Leninskiy District Court of Voronezh disallowed the applicant’s claim on the ground that the legislator had not yet determined which courts would be competent to examine claims for compensation by the State of the damage incurred through unlawful judicial actions. 16. On 7 June 2004 the Lipetsk Regional Court upheld the District Court’s decision in the part concerning the rejection of her claim against the Voronezh Regional Court, but remitted the remainder for a new consideration. 17. On 21 June 2004 the Leninskiy District Court returned the statement of claim to the applicant. The applicant did not appeal. 18. On 17 December 1998 the applicant sued her employer for an increase of her salary and payment of arrears. 19. On 11 June 2002 the Tsentralniy District Court of Voronezh rejected her claims. 20. In 1999 the applicant was dismissed and challenged her dismissal before the courts which rejected her claim by a final judgment of 26 April 2001.

6. The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Liepāja. 7. On 1 October 1999 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of aggravated robbery. 8. On 11 April 2002 the Kurzeme Regional Court (Kurzemes apgabaltiesa) convicted the applicant of aggravated robbery and sentenced him to six years and one month’s imprisonment. 9. On 5 June 2002, on the applicant’s appeal, the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court (Augstākās tiesas Krimināllietu lietu palāta) upheld in substance the judgment of the first-instance court. 10. On 20 September 2002 the Senate of the Supreme Court (Augstākās tiesas Senāts) dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law in a preparatory meeting (rīcības sēde). 11. On 23 August 2004 the Jelgava Court (Jelgavas tiesa) decided to apply a pre-release scheme to the applicant and ordered his release before the end of his sentence. 12. On 18 May 2000 the applicant’s wife gave birth to their son. 13. On 16 November 2000 and 20 November 2001 the applicant received two short-term visits from his wife. He also received four short-term visits from his aunt during his pre-trial detention. 14. The applicant was able to receive long-term visits while serving his sentence, starting from 5 October 2002. Until his release on 23 August 2004 the applicant received six long-term visits from his wife; each of these visits lasted for about sixteen hours. 15. According to the Government, the applicant first complained about his dental care on 29 June 2000. A prison doctor prescribed pain relieving medication (Ibuprofen) and advised him to consult a dentist. 16. On 16 August 2000 the applicant complained of toothache to the prison doctor, who prescribed other pain relieving medication (Analgin) and advised him to consult a dentist. 17. On 18 August 2000 the applicant saw a dentist, who discovered that he had dental caries in one tooth. During his examination, the dentist noted that the applicant had two missing teeth and the remains of twenty-one damaged teeth. All in all, he had eight just healthy teeth. The applicant refused the recommended treatment. 18. On 10 August 2001 the applicant again complained of toothache to the prison doctor, who prescribed pain relieving medication (Analgin). 19. On 19 September 2001 the applicant was examined by a psychiatrist, who considered that the applicant’s complaints of headaches were related to his dental cavity problems. The doctor advised him to consult a dentist. 20. On 25 October 2001 the applicant saw the dentist, who diagnosed him as suffering from periodontal disease (loose teeth). Subsequently, four teeth were extracted. 21. On 26 November 2001 the applicant lodged a complaint with the General Inspectorate (Ģenerālinspektora birojs), which at the material time was the institution in charge of organising the execution of criminal sentences and the probation system and was supervised by the Ministry of Justice. His complaint was that he had not been receiving appropriate dental care and that he needed dental prosthetics. The applicant’s complaint was transferred to the Prisons Administration (Ieslodzījuma vietu pārvalde) for examination. 22. On 11 December 2001 the Prisons Administration informed the applicant that, following his requests, a dentist had made several extractions. This service had been free of charge. It had been established that the applicant had eight teeth left. It was presumed that he had not taken appropriate care of his teeth prior to his detention. The applicant was informed that dental prosthetics could be provided only at his own expense and that the Ministry of Finance did not allocate any funds to the Prisons Administration or prisons for this purpose. 23. On 27 December 2001 the applicant submitted a complaint to the Chancery of the President of Latvia (Latvijas Valsts prezidenta kanceleja) about his dental care. The applicant’s complaint was transferred to the Ministry of Justice and from there to the General Inspectorate for examination, which transferred the complaint to the Prisons Administration. 24. On 12 February 2002 the Prisons Administration informed the applicant that he had already received an answer on 11 December 2001 as regards his complaint of 26 November 2001. It reiterated that dental prosthetics could not be provided free of charge in prisons.

4. The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in the city of Mykolaiv, Ukraine. 5. The applicant is a former employer of the open joint-stock company “Avtobaza” (“the company”) situated in the town of Ochakiv, the Mykolaiv region. The State have not held any share in the company since February 1999. 6. On 13 May 1998 the Ochakiv Court ordered the company to pay the applicant UAH 3.176[1] in salary arrears. This judgment was enforced in full on an unspecified date in 2002. 7. While the enforcement proceedings in respect of the above judgment were still pending, the applicant instituted proceedings in the Ochakiv Court against the Ochakiv Bailiffs’ Service and the company claiming compensation for pecuniary damage caused to him due to the non-enforcement of the judgment of 13 May 1998 in due time. 8. On 3 April 2001 the court ordered that the company pay the applicant UAH 2.283[2] in compensation for inflation losses. By the same judgment, the court rejected the applicant’s claims against the Bailiffs’ Service as unsubstantiated. This judgment became final and the enforcement writ was transferred to the Bailiffs’ Service for enforcement. 9. On 8 May 2003 the Bailiffs’ Service terminated the enforcement proceedings on the ground that the company had been declared bankrupt by the decision of the Mykolayiv Regional Commercial Court of 17 December 2002. 10. The judgment of 3 April 2001 remains unenforced. 11. In September 2001, while the enforcement proceedings in respect of the judgment of 3 April 2001 were still pending, the applicant instituted proceedings in the Ochakiv Court against the Ochakiv Bailiffs’ Service seeking compensation for the latter’s failure to act. 12. On 26 November 2002 the court found in part for the applicant and ordered the Bailiffs’ Service to pay him UAH 825[3] in compensation for non-pecuniary damage caused as result of the non-enforcement of the judgment of 3 April 2001. 13. On 12 May 2003 the Ochakiv Bailiffs’ Service terminated the enforcement proceedings in view of their own lack of funds. 14. The judgment of 26 November 2002 remains unenforced.

4. The applicant was born in 1946 and lives in Larnaca. 5. On 1 November 1985 the applicant lodged a civil action (no. 2891/85) before the District Court of Larnaca concerning the payment of the remainder of the price agreed under the contract of sale of his enterprise in South Africa. The total claim was 60,000 South African Rand (ZAR), which was the equivalent of 30,000 Cypriot pounds (CYP) at the relevant time. 6. Between the above date and 1 January 1989 the Court dealt with the submission of the parties’ pleadings and several applications for their amendment, for the purposes of which a number of adjournments or requests for extensions took place. Approximately five adjournments took place in this period, one at the applicant’s request, two at the defendant’s request and two by the court itself. 7. On 20 February 1989 the case was adjourned until 9 June 1989 on the parties’ request. The hearing of the case commenced on that date and was fixed to continue on 26 June 1989 but following an adjournment requested by the applicant it was fixed for 27 September 1989. On the latter date the defendant raised an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Larnaca District Court since the contract between the parties had been concluded in South Africa. The court fixed the hearing in respect of the objection for 14 October 1989. Following two adjournments at the defendant’s request the hearing took place on 10 November 1989. 8. On 30 January 1990 the court dismissed the defendant’s objection pertaining to its jurisdiction and fixed the hearing for 6 March 1990. 9. On 13 February 1990 an appeal (no. 8052) was filed against the district court’s ruling of 30 January 1990, concerning its jurisdiction to try the case. Consequently, the case was taken off the trial list pending the result of the appeal. 10. On 21 February 1990 the defendant was served with a notice by the Registrar of the Supreme Court requesting him to pay the due fee for the preparation of the record of the first instance proceedings. The court’s record was sent by the Larnaca District Court to the Supreme Court on 22 March 1990. 11. On 23 November 1992 the parties were notified by the Chief Registrar of the Supreme Court that the appeal was fixed for hearing on 15 December 1992. On that date however the case was adjourned to enable the applicant to file a cross-appeal. 12. On 27 April 1993 the Supreme Court found that the Larnaca District Court had jurisdiction to try the action and dismissed the appeal. 13. On 7 June 1995 the applicant applied for a date of mention concerning the continuation of the proceedings and the case was fixed for this purpose for 7 July 1995. On that date it was fixed to be heard on 5 December 1995. 14. Between the above date and 20 December 1996 the case was adjourned several times. Approximately three of these adjournments were at the applicant’s request, four at the parties’ request and one at the defendant’s. 15. On 20 December 1996 the Larnaca District Court reserved its judgment. This was delivered on 30 January 1997 dismissing the applicant’s action. 16. On 3 March 1997 the applicant filed an appeal (appeal no. 9912) against the first instance judgment. 17. The notice of the appeal was sent by the Registrar of the Larnaca District Court on 13 March 1997 to the Supreme Court indicating that the file of the case had been given for the purposes of typing the record of the proceedings and that this would be available in ten months due to the excessive volume of work. The record was necessary in order for the appeal to be fixed for hearing. On 2 April 1997 the applicant paid the fee due for the court’s record. 18. On 9 February 1998 the Chief Registrar notified the parties that the appeal was fixed for directions for 24 February 1998. On that date the parties were instructed to file their outline addresses. 19. On 9 November 1998 the Chief Registrar sent a notice to the parties informing them that the appeal was fixed for hearing on 17 December 1998. On that date the parties’ addresses were heard and judgment was reserved. 20. On 26 January 1999 the Chief Registrar of the Supreme Court informed the parties that due to the resignation of one of the presiding judges, the appeal had to be retried. Following two adjournments on the basis of the respondent’s request, the parties’ addresses were heard on 21 June 1999 and judgment was reserved. 21. On 30 September 1999 the Supreme Court delivered its judgment setting aside the first instance decision and ordering a retrial. The costs of both the first instance trial and the appeal were awarded in favour of the applicant. The parties were then notified that the case file had been returned to the Larnaca District Court on 6 October 1999 and they were requested to file an application to that court for the case to be fixed. 22. On 4 February 2000 the applicant applied to the Registrar of the Larnaca District Court requesting that the case be fixed for retrial. 23. On 20 June 2002 an application was lodged by the applicant requesting that the case be fixed for directions. In the relevant court records of 4 July 2002, the court stated that the case should be given priority and that the Registrar should inform the court why the case was not put before it on 4 February 2000 when the applicant had applied for the case to be fixed. In the relevant court records of 5 July 2002, the Registrar noted that the file of the case had been returned to the Supreme Court for the assessment of costs which took place on 4 April 2000 and that it was not known why the case had not been put before a judge. However, the Registrar pointed out that the applicant’s lawyers had not pursued the application for two years. 24. The case was then fixed for 14 and 15 November 2002 but following an adjournment at the defendant’s request it was postponed until 11 and 12 December 2002. On 11 December 2002 the case was settled between the parties with a decision in the applicant’s favour for the amount of CYP 2000 plus the costs and expenses that had been awarded by the Supreme Court.

6. The applicants, Jerzy, Ariadna and Andrzej Plechanow, are Polish nationals who were born in 1953, 1924 and 1955 respectively and live in Warszawa. 7. The applicants’ predecessor owned a plot of land with a residential building situated in Warsaw. The applicants are his heirs. 8. By virtue of the Decree of 26 October 1945 on the Ownership and Use of Land in Warsaw (“the 1945 Decree”) the ownership of all private land was transferred to the City of Warsaw. 9. The applicants’ predecessor requested to be granted the right of temporary ownership (własność czasowa) of the property pursuant to section 7 of the 1945 Decree. 10. On 6 January 1964 the Board of the Warsaw National Council (Prezydium Rady Narodowej) refused the request. The Board also stated that the ownership of all buildings situated on the property had been transferred to the State Treasury. The property was subsequently divided into smaller plots. 11. Between 1975 and 1992 the State Treasury sold several apartments in the residential building (together with shares in the right of perpetual use of the land) to third parties. 12. In 1991, 1994 and 1995 the Warsaw Governor declared that on 27 May 1990 the Warsaw Municipality had acquired ex lege the ownership of the plots of land and the building thereon (with the exception of the previously sold apartments). 13. On 12 March 1997 the Board of the Praga-Południe District of the Warsaw-Centre Municipality adopted a resolution on the basis of which it published a list of flats which could be sold to the tenants. In September and November 1997 they sold two apartments. 14. On 5 March 1998 the Praga-Południe District Office informed the applicants of the above resolution and of the possibility of exercising a right of pre-emption in respect of the remaining flats. The right of pre-emption had been introduced as from 1 January 1998 on the basis of section 34 of the Act of 21 August 1997 on the management of real estates (ustawa o gospodarce gruntami). 15. On 18 March 1998 the applicants informed the municipality that the third applicant would buy the flat he had occupied so far. At the same time they requested that the further sale of other flats be stayed. They enclosed a decision of the Warsaw District Court of 5 March 1991 declaring them to be heirs of F.P., K.P. and P.P. 17. On 30 November 1999 the Local Government Board of Appeal (Samorządowe Kolegium Odwoławcze) declared the decision of 6 January 1964 null and void in respect of part of the property. However, the Board could not annul the decision in respect of the remaining part of the property in question, since the ownership rights to 19 apartments and respective shares in the right of perpetual use of the land had been sold in the meantime to third parties. Thus, in view of the irreversible legal consequences of the 1964 decision, the Board only declared that, in this respect, the decision had been issued in breach of law. 18. The Board noted that the obligations of the Warsaw National Council resulting from a breach of law had been taken over by the Warsaw Municipality. 19. The Board further noted that its decision entitled the applicants to seek compensation for damage caused by the administrative decision having been issued in breach of law. 20. In March 2000 the applicants lodged compensation claims with the Mayor of the Warsaw District (Starosta Powiatu Warszawskiego) and the President of Warsaw in respect of the relevant 19 apartments. 21. On 9 June 2000 the Mayor of the Warsaw District transferred the claim to the Warsaw Local Government Board of Appeal in view of the latter organ’s competence. In November 2000 and December 2000 the Board issued several decisions concerning particular apartments in which it refused to award compensation. 22. On 21 December 2000 the applicants lodged compensation claims with the Warsaw Regional Court against the Warsaw municipality under Article 160 of the Code of Administrative Procedure. 23. On 21 March 2002 the Regional Court dismissed the action. The court acknowledged that the applicants had sustained damage as a result of the 1964 decision (the court heard evidence, including an expert witness, who estimated the loss at PLN 1,025,970). However, the court eventually found that the State Treasury should have been sued instead of the municipality. The court noted that according to the Supreme Court judgment of 7 January 1998 the municipality had the legal capacity to be sued for compensation for damage resulting from an administrative decision issued before 27 May 1990. However, in the court’s view, this interpretation had become obsolete in view of the subsequent interpretation of section 36 of the Local Government (Introductory Provisions) Act of 10 May 1990 (Przepisy wprowadzające ustawę o samorządzie terytorialnym i ustawę o pracownikach samorządowych). 24. On 19 June 2002 the applicants’ lawyer lodged an appeal. He referred inter alia to the Supreme Administrative Court resolution of 15 April 1996, OPK 9/96, which, in his opinion, justified the responsibility of the local government administration in the present case. In this context he also invoked section 36 § 2 of the 1990 Local Government (Introductory Provisions) Act and relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court of 7 January 1998 arguing that the first‑instance court had been wrong to consider the judgment obsolete. 25. On 11 April 2003 the Warsaw Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants’ appeal. The court upheld the lower court’s arguments, finding that the State Treasury should have been sued for damages because the Governor (the State’s administration body) was the legal successor of the National Council. 26. The applicants lodged a cassation appeal. They submitted, inter alia, that the judgment was in breach of relevant substantive law on account of an erroneous interpretation and application of the provisions of the Local Government Act. They also invoked Article 393 of the Code of Civil Procedure arguing that the examination of the cassation appeal was justified because: - the case raised a significant legal issue (i.e. the question to what extent and in respect of which competences the obligations of the national councils had been taken over by communities), and - the need for an authoritative interpretation of provisions which had been interpreted differently in the courts’ case-law (in particular section 36 § 3 of the 1990 Local Government (Introductory Provisions)), and - the need to clarify the inconsistency of the Court of Appeal’s judgment with the case-law invoked by the applicants and the alleged guidance provided by the decision of the Local Government Board of Appeal of 30 November 1999. 27. On 10 December 2003 the Supreme Court refused to entertain the cassation appeal. The decision was taken by a single judge sitting in camera. The written reasons provided as follows: According to Article 393 of the Code of Civil Procedure, when the challenged judicial decision does not manifestly breach the law or the proceedings are not invalid in law (§ 2), the Supreme Court may refuse to entertain a cassation appeal if there is no appearance of a significant legal issue in the case, there is no need for the interpretation of provisions raising serious doubts or causing discrepancies in the courts’ case-law or the cassation appeal is manifestly ill-founded (§ 1). In the present case none of the circumstances set out in Article 393 § 2 was present and consequently the Supreme Court, having considered the grounds set out in § 1, found it justified to refuse to entertain the cassation appeal. 28. On 8 March 2004 the applicants lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court, alleging a breach of their right of access to court and to a fair hearing on account of an erroneous application of Article 393 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 29. On 19 July 2005 the Constitutional Court discontinued the proceedings on the grounds that it had already examined the same issue in its judgment of 31 March 2005 (SK 26/02). 30. On 3 March 2000 the applicants requested the Mayor of Warsaw to grant them the right of perpetual use of the remaining apartments which had not been sold. They relied on the decision of the Warsaw Local Government Board of Appeal of 30 November 1999. 31. On 25 April 2002 the applicants’ lawyer submitted a certificate of the mortgage writer (pisarz hipoteczny) of 24 November 1937 certifying the ownership title of F.P. on that day.

4. The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Mátészalka, Hungary. 5. In proceedings instituted by the applicant, on 12 November 1993 the Supreme Court finally declared that his former employer had terminated his employment unlawfully and granted him severance pay and damages. Simultaneously, on 25 May 1993 the applicant brought an action before the Nyíregyháza Labour Court against the employer claiming pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages. 6. On 15 June 1995 the Labour Court dismissed the applicant’s claims. On appeal, on 26 June 1996 the Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg County Regional Court granted the applicant damages plus accrued interest. 7. On 15 April 1997 the Supreme Court’s review bench quashed the second-instance decision in its part concerning the pecuniary damages, and remitted this aspect of the case to the Regional Court. 8. In the resumed second-instance proceedings, on 29 September 1998 the Regional Court granted damages plus accrued interest to the applicant. This decision was partially quashed by the Supreme Court’s review bench on 8 July 1999 for procedural shortcomings. 9. In the resumed second-instance proceedings, on 29 February 2000 the Regional Court granted some damages plus accrued interest to the applicant and dismissed the remainder of his action. On 29 March 2001 the Supreme Court’s review bench partially quashed this decision as the Regional Court had miscalculated the amount granted to the applicant. 10. In the proceedings resumed for the third time, on 30 October 2001 the Regional Court granted the applicant damages plus accrued interest.

4. The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Čepin. 5. On 29 August 2006 the Osijek Municipal State Attorney’s Office (Općinsko državno odvjetništvo u Osijeku) indicted the applicant in the Osijek Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Osijeku) on charges of fraud and business fraud, claiming that, acting as a director of companies D.L.L. and M.C., he had defrauded companies A. and R. by using fraudulent payment instruments in exchange for goods which his companies received from A. and R. in the period between 10 August 2005 and 13 December 2005 and on 24 April 2006. 6. On 27 October 2006 the trial court commissioned a report from an accounting expert, D.D. 7. On 7 November 2006 D.D. submitted his report to the Osijek Municipal Court. He found that M.C.’s bank account had been frozen at the time when it had engaged in business transactions with company A. He also found that D.L.L.’s bank account had not been frozen at the time of its business transactions with company A., but that its account had been frozen at the time of its business transactions with company R. 8. At a hearing held on 17 November 2006 D.D. gave oral evidence. He confirmed all his findings in the report. The parties made no objections to the report, nor did they put any questions to D.D. The applicant’s lawyer asked that the prosecution submit all documents they had seized from the applicant so that they could be examined by D.D. The trial court requested further documents from the police and two commercial banks. 9. At a hearing held on 12 December 2006 D.D. asked for an additional period to examine the documents submitted by the two banks. 10. At a hearing on 16 January 2007 the applicant’s lawyer reiterated his request that the police be ordered to submit all business documentation they had seized from the applicant concerning companies D.L.L. and M.C. The trial court accepted the request. 11. On 12 February 2007 D.D. submitted an additional report. He reiterated his previous findings and also explained the manner and nature of the business transactions in issue. 12. At a hearing held on 9 March 2007 D.D. gave further oral evidence. The applicant’s lawyer and the applicant put no questions to D.D. and made no objection to his report. 13. On 28 June 2007 the applicant’s lawyer submitted written observations before the Osijek Municipal Court. He commented on the reports drawn up by D.D. in setting out the defence’s arguments. His observations were forwarded to D.D. 14. On 13 July 2007 D.D. submitted written observations in which he expressly reiterated all his previous findings and highlighted certain sentences from his reports. He also disagreed with the conclusions drawn from his reports by the defence. 15. At a hearing held on 18 July 2007 the judge conducting the proceedings presented D.D.’s written observations of 13 July 2007 to the parties and read them out. Two large envelopes containing documents submitted by the police were also presented to the parties and read out in court. The applicant’s lawyer asked the trial court to request information from the Serbian authorities about the applicant’s detention in that country or to examine witnesses Mat.G. and Mar.G., who he stated could confirm that the applicant had been in detention in Serbia between January and mid-February 2006 and that he had therefore been unable to conduct business affairs in the relevant period. He also suggested that these witnesses could confirm that all goods that the applicant’s companies had received from companies A. and R. had been stolen during the applicant’s absence. The applicant’s lawyer made further observations in respect of D.D.’s written observations of 13 July 2007 and asked that he be recalled. In respect of the documents provided by the police, he asked that the trial be adjourned for a period of eight to fifteen days so that they could prepare the defence and also in order that the documentation might be forwarded to D.D. Finally, he asked that another additional witness be heard. The Osijek Municipal Court dismissed all of the defence’s requests on the grounds that all the relevant facts had been sufficiently established. 16. On 20 July 2007 the Osijek Municipal Court found the applicant guilty on three counts of business fraud and one count of fraud. It also revoked the suspension of a sentence given to the applicant in previous criminal proceedings and sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment. In its judgment the court noted: “The parties had no objections in respect of the evidence taken and read out, nor did they make any further requests, and the authenticity of the documents [in the case file] has not been brought into doubt.” 17. On 12 December 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal against conviction. He complained that the defence had not had sufficient time to examine D.D.’s written observations of 13 July 2007 and that they had had no opportunity to examine the documentation provided by the police. He further complained that D.D. had not been recalled and that the witnesses Mat.G. and Mar.G. had also not been heard, although the trial court had not provided any reasons for not hearing these witnesses. He also complained that the suspension of his previous sentence had been revoked, although he had had no opportunity to present arguments in that respect. 18. On 24 January 2008 the Osijek County Court (Županijski sud u Osijeku) upheld the applicant’s conviction but decreased his sentence to four years’ imprisonment. It found that the Osijek Municipal Court had analysed witness statements and other documents in detail and had provided sufficient reasons for the applicant’s conviction. In respect of the complaint about D.D., the Osijek County Court’s judgment reads: “Under Article 331 paragraph 5 of the C[ode] [of] C[riminal] P[rocedure], in respect of crimes punishable by [up to] eight years’ imprisonment, when an expert witness has already been heard before the president of a [trial] panel [and there has been no change in president], the expert’s report can be read out without the agreement of the parties. It is to be noted that the accounting expert submitted his report on 12 February 2007, which [report] was forwarded to the parties. On 28 June 2007 the defence lawyer submitted observations before the court asking that the expert respond to certain questions. The expert then responded to these questions. He therefore had not provided a new report. In his findings he had not amended anything relevant but had only responded to the defence lawyer’s observations. ...” The County Court also found that the suspension of the applicant’s previous sentence had been correctly and lawfully revoked pursuant to Article 69 paragraph 1 of the Criminal Code. It made no observations in respect of the Osijek Municipal Court’s refusal to hear witnesses Mat.G. and Mar.G. and also made no comment on the applicant’s complaint that he had had no opportunity to examine the documentation submitted by the police. 19. On 27 October 2008 the applicant lodged a request for extraordinary review (zahtjev za izvanredno preispitivanje pravomoćne presude) of the County Court’s judgment with the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske), complaining that the defence had not had sufficient time to examine D.D.’s written observations and had had no opportunity to examine the documentation provided by the police, and that the witnesses proposed by the defence had not been heard or D.D. recalled without the trial court providing sufficient reasons. Finally, he complained that the suspension of his previous sentence had been revoked, although he had had no opportunity to present arguments in that respect. 20. On 30 October 2008 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) against the judgments of the Osijek Municipal Court and the Osijek County Court, reiterating the arguments he had adduced before the Supreme Court. 21. On 22 December 2008 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s request for extraordinary review of the County Court’s judgment on the grounds that there had been no violation of any defence rights in the proceedings before the lower courts. 22. On 17 February 2009 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court against the judgment of the Supreme Court by which his request for extraordinary review of the County Court’s judgment had been dismissed. He argued that the Supreme Court had failed to examine all his complaints and that it had failed to remedy the violation of defence rights that had occurred during the proceedings before the lower courts. 23. On 12 March 2009 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint of 30 October 2008 against the judgments of the Osijek Municipal Court and the Osijek County Court. The Constitutional Court found that the criminal proceedings against the applicant had been fair and that the judgments of the lower courts had been sufficiently reasoned and did not disclose any arbitrariness. As to the trial court’s refusal to take the applicant’s further evidence, the Constitutional Court noted that it had been for the trial court to decide which evidence to take and that the applicant had not objected to the evidence that had been read out during the trial. 24. On 26 May 2009 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant’s constitutional complaint of 17 February 2009 against the judgment of the Supreme Court of 27 October 2008 inadmissible on the grounds that it had not been an act by which the applicant’s civil rights or obligations or any criminal charge against him had been determined.

4. The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Arkhangelsk. 5. The applicant lived in a council house under the threat of collapse. As the local authority had failed to resettle the applicant, he brought a civil action. 6. On 18 December 2001 the Lomonosovskiy District Court of Arkhangelsk held for the applicant and ordered the authority to: “provide [the applicant’s] family of four with a well-equipped at of at least 48 m² meeting sanitary and technical standards.” This judgment became binding on 21 January 2002. 7. On the applicant’s request, on 21 June 2002 the district court changed the mode of execution, and ordered the authority to pay to the applicant the price of a new flat. This decision was quashed on appeal, and after a rehearing, the award was increased. On 17 April 2003 the funds were credited to the bailiff’s account. 8. On 28 April 2003 the authority provided the applicant with a flat of 43.1 m², and the applicant agreed to move in. The authority asked the court to order it to pay to the applicant the price of the 4.9 m² shortfall in order to settle the judgment debt, but the applicant objected, and the court dismissed this request. 9. On the bailiff’s request, on 28 April 2005 the district court reverted the mode of execution from monetary to in-kind, and since the applicant had already received the flat, the bailiff closed the enforcement proceedings. On 6 February 2006 the Arkhangelsk Regional Court ordered the enforcement proceedings to resume because the flat received by the applicant was smaller than originally awarded.

4. The applicants live in Miusinsk, the Lugansk region. The first, the third, the fourth, the fifth and the sixth applicants were born in 1943, 1936, 1940, 1950 and 1934 respectively. The second applicant did not specify the date of his birth. 5. On 29 November 2000 the Krasnyy Luch Court (Краснолуцький міський суд Луганської області) awarded the first applicant UAH 286.68[1] against the State Mining Company Novopavlivska (“the Mine,” ДВАТ шахта „Новопавлівська”) in compensation for a delayed salary payment. 6. Additionally, between 2001 and 2004 (see annexed table) each of the applicants obtained a judgment of the Krasnyy Luch Court ordering the Mine to provide him with a certain quantity of coal. 7. All of the judgments given in favour of the applicants became final and the enforcement writs in their respect were transferred to the Krasnyy Luch Bailiffs' Service (“the Bailiffs,” Відділ державної виконавчої служби Краснолуцького міського управління юстиції) for enforcement. 8. On 8 February 2005 the Bailiffs informed the applicants that pursuant to a decision of the Lugansk Regional Commercial Court (Господарський суд Луганської області) of 14 November 2002, the Mine had been declared bankrupt and subjected to a financial rehabilitation procedure that was to continue until 31 December 2007. The Bailiffs further noted that the Mine was not mining any coal, due to the lack of financing from the State. 9. The judgment of 29 November 2000 awarding compensation to the first applicant was enforced on 12 December 2005. The other judgments awarding the applicants coal have not been enforced.

4. The applicants were born in 1925 and 1927, respectively, and live in Lublin, Poland. 5. On 21 May 1993 the applicants' neighbours were granted a permission to construct a shop on the ground floor of their house. The applicants appealed but the decision was upheld on 19 July 1993. 6. On an unspecified date in 1994 the applicants applied to have the decision declared null and void. They submitted that the decision had been issued in violation of the local zoning plan and that the shop had been causing them nuisance. 7. On 11 April 1994 the Minister of Planning (Minister Gospodarki Przestrzennej i Budownictwa) dismissed their application. The applicants appealed. 8. On 22 February 1995 the Chief Building Inspector (Główny Inspektor Nadzoru Budowlanego) allowed the appeal and quashed the impugned decision. 9. The Chief Building Inspector informed the applicants in his letters of 30 December 1995, 30 January, 28 February and 26 March 1996 that the proceedings could not be terminated yet and that he had fixed new time-limits. The Inspector explained that the main reason for the delay had been the necessity to obtain an expert opinion, which had been ultimately submitted on 9 April 1996. 10. On 18 April 1996 the Chief Building Inspector refused to annul the decision of 21 May 1993. The Inspector informed the applicants that the decision was final and that they could lodge a complaint with the Supreme Administrative Court (Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny). 11. On 4 June 1996 the first applicant lodged a complaint against the decision with the Supreme Administrative Court. 12. On 23 April 1998 the Supreme Administrative Court held a hearing and rejected the applicant's complaint as it had been lodged in breach of procedural requirements. The court established that the applicant should have first lodged an appeal with the Chief Building Inspector asking him to reconsider the case. The court further advised the applicant that since the procedural mistake had occurred due to his being wrongly advised by the Inspector in the decision of 18 April 1996, he could apply for leave to appeal out of time. 13. On 25 May 1998 the first applicant appealed to the Inspector to reconsider the case and applied for leave to lodge an appeal out of time. 14. On 4 June 1998 the Chief Building Inspector granted leave to appeal out of time, examined the appeal, and upheld his decision of 18 April 1996. 15. On 30 September 1998 the first applicant lodged a complaint with the Supreme Administrative Court against the decision of 4 June 1998. 16. On 5 October 2000 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the complaint.