Datasets:

Eugleo

/

echr-outcomes

like 0

6. The applicants are from four families. 7. On various dates in the 1990s the employer of the adult male applicants (applicants 1, 3, 5 and 10), the security service of the Ministry of Finance, provided them with accommodation in its dormitory building in Moscow. They were registered as living in the building on a temporary basis. 8. In 2001 the right of operational management in respect of the dormitory building was transferred to the Federal Treasury (“the Treasury”). 9. The adult female applicants (applicants 4, 8, 11 and 13) submitted that they had been residing in the dormitory building with their husbands since their marriages in 2002, 2004, 2003 and 2005 respectively. 10. Between 2003 and 2009 applicants 2, 6, 7, 9 and 12 were born and started living in the dormitory building with their parents. 11. The third and fifth applicants resigned from the security service in 2004 and 2009 respectively, but continued to live in the dormitory building. According to the Government, the first applicant was dismissed from the security service in 2014. The tenth applicant is still employed by the security service. 12. The adult male applicants are registered as living in the dormitory building on a permanent basis. Each family occupies a room in the building. 13. The Government submitted that they had not disposed of any information as regards the exact dates when the applicants had moved into the dormitory building. 14. In 2007 the Treasury brought court proceedings against the adult female applicants, seeking their eviction from the particular rooms which they occupied in the dormitory building. The Treasury submitted that the respondents had moved in unlawfully, without its permission. 15. On 14 September 2007 the Simonovskiy District Court of Moscow (“the District Court”) ordered the eviction of applicants 4, 8, 11 and 13 without providing them with any alternative accommodation. In particular, the District Court established the following: (i) the building in question was federal property; it was used as a dormitory building under the operative management of the Treasury; (ii) the dormitories had been designed for the temporary accommodation of persons during the period of their work, service or studies; (iii) the adult female applicants had been moved into the dormitory building by their husbands when the old Housing Code had been in force, prior to 1 March 2005; (iv) the Ministry of Finance had never issued any decision providing the adult female applicants with accommodation in that dormitory building; (v) no tenancy agreements had been concluded with the adult female applicants’ husbands in respect of the premises which they occupied; (vi) social tenancy agreements could be concluded with people living in dormitory buildings only in the event that the property was liquidated, however such a decision had not been taken in respect of the dormitory building in question. Having regard to the above, the District Court concluded that Articles 53 and 54 of the old Housing Code and Articles 69 and 70 of the new Housing Code, which allowed tenants under a social tenancy agreement to move members of their families into a property, were not applicable to the adult female applicants, and therefore they had to be evicted from the occupied housing without any alternative accommodation being provided. The District Court noted that it had also taken into account that the adult female applicants had been registered as living in various regions of Russia and the Republic of Moldova, where they retained a right of occupation in respect of living premises. 16. On 22 November 2007 the Moscow City Court (“the City Court”) upheld the eviction order. 17. In January 2008 bailiffs instituted enforcement proceedings. In March 2008 those proceedings were terminated, as the creditor recalled the writ of execution. 18. On 5 February 2009 new enforcement proceedings were instituted. However, on 28 August 2009 they were terminated, on the grounds that it was impossible to enforce the writ of execution. 19. In 2009 the Treasury brought new eviction proceedings against the adult female applicants. This time, the Treasury sought to evict them from the dormitory building, regardless of which rooms they were occupying. The Treasury claimed that those applicants had started living on the premises without its permission. 20. The applicants concerned lodged a counterclaim, seeking to have their right to occupy the dormitory building premises recognised. They submitted that they had been residing in the building lawfully as spouses of the persons to whom the housing had been provided, and in any event, under domestic law (Article 20 of the Civil Code, and Articles 31 and 54 of the Family Code (see “Relevant domestic law” below), they had a right to live together with their husbands and children. 21. Local authorities – which had been invited to participate in the proceedings as third parties – were against the eviction of the adult female applicants. They claimed that the applicants who were minors were registered as living in the dormitory building and lived there with their families. The Family Code provided that parents had equal rights, obligations and responsibilities in raising their child, and therefore eviction of the mothers would make it difficult for them to comply with their parental duties. The local authorities asked the District Court to take the interests of the minor applicants into account when making its decision and to dismiss the eviction claims. 22. On 14 April 2010 the District Court ordered the eviction of applicants 4, 8, 11 and 13 from the dormitory building and dismissed their counterclaim. In particular, the District Court referred to its findings in the judgment of 14 September 2007, with reference to Articles 301 and 305 of the Civil Code (see “Relevant domestic law” below), and found that: (i) irrespective of their status as family members of their husbands, the adult female applicants had no right to reside in the dormitory building, since it had been designed as temporary accommodation for persons working for the security service; and (ii) no tenancy agreement on occupying the dormitory building premises had been concluded with their husbands, and therefore the provisions of Article 100 § 5 of the Housing Code, which allowed tenants to be joined by family members, were not applicable to them. The District Court further stated that it had taken into account that the adult female applicants could decide themselves with which parent their minor children should live, especially as they (the adult female applicants) had been registered as living in various regions of Russia and the Republic of Moldova, where they retained a right of occupation in respect of living premises. 23. The adult female applicants appealed against the eviction order. They submitted in particular that the courts had not indicated which rights, freedoms and interests of the claimant (the Treasury) had been breached when their husbands had moved them into the dormitory building, or which rights would be breached if they were allowed to stay living together with their children in the building. They also submitted that, by taking the decision to evict them, the District Court had breached their right to respect for their family life. In particular, they drew the attention of the appeal court to the position of the District Court as regards their minor children’s place of residence, a position which, in their opinion, was in breach of Article 54 of the Family Code (see “Relevant domestic law” below). 24. On 24 November 2010 the City Court upheld the eviction order. The City Court referred to the findings of the District Court in the judgments of 14 September 2007 and 14 April 2010. The City Court found that the District Court had duly assessed the adult female applicants’ arguments and dismissed them on the basis of the applicable domestic law. The City Court further held that the adult female applicants’ argument that the eviction order had de facto prohibited their families from living together had aimed to reassess the conclusions of the judgment of the District Court and, given the fresh conclusion that the District Court had duly assessed the arguments before it, could not serve as a basis for quashing the judgment. 25. It appears that the eviction order has not yet been enforced, and applicants 4, 8, 11 and 13 continue to live in the dormitory building. 26. On an unspecified date the applicants were put on the municipal housing list. 27. On an unspecified date the adult male applicants brought court proceedings against various authorities, including the Government of Moscow and the Government of the Russian Federation, seeking to have their right to occupy the dormitory building indefinitely under a social tenancy agreement recognised. Those applicants brought proceedings on their own behalf, but also in the name of and on behalf of the minor applicants. 28. On 17 August 2011 the District Court granted the claims of the adult male applicants and the minor applicants in part. In particular, the court established that the adult male applicants had been moved into the dormitory building by their employer, the security service of the Ministry of Finance, between 1990 and 1995. Therefore, on the date the new Housing Code had entered into force, they had already worked for the security service for more than ten years. In accordance with the applicable law, the adult male applicants could not be evicted from the residential accommodation which they occupied without being provided with alternative accommodation, and therefore their right to reside there was not limited by the duration of their work contracts and was therefore unlimited in terms of duration. However, the District Court held that the claimants were not entitled to have social tenancy agreements in this respect. 29. On 16 February 2012 the City Court upheld that judgment. 30. On 15 August 2017 the applicants informed the Court of changes in their family situations. In particular, on 28 June 2012 the youngest son of the Popov family, Grigory, was born, and the Ozerov family had twin daughters, Valeria and Maria, on 15 June 2012, and a son, Maxim, on 7 October 2015.

4. The applicants are entrepreneurs who obtained from the local authorities in Leova licences (patenta) to offer services such as selling various types of goods at the local marketplace. All the applicants offered their services on the territory of a private marketplace (L.) situated in the centre of Leova and which had received its licence in 1996. The local authorities authorised the offering of services on the territory of L. from Monday to Saturday. Another marketplace, owned by the State (U.), was open on Sundays, but was situated far from the centre and was inconvenient to many sellers and the population. 5. The applicants and L.’s owners asked the local authorities for a change in work schedule, allowing them to work on Sundays and to have their free day on Monday, as was the case of many similar marketplaces in other towns. However, the local authorities rejected on a number of occasions such a change, invoking various sanitary, public order and other reasons. According to the applicants, the real reason for the refusal was the protection of U.’s interests, since Sunday was the most lucrative day of the week. Accordingly, many private entrepreneurs felt obliged to offer their services also at the State-owned marketplace, thus having to incur additional costs and suffering from the rudimentary conditions of work on the territory of U. 6. On 31 January 2005 the general meeting of entrepreneurs (which included the applicants) decided to ask the local authorities to allow them to work on Sundays and to rest on Mondays. They submitted their request to L.’s owners, who on 8 February 2005 complained to the mayor of Leova, referring to the decision of 31 January 2005 and requesting an authorisation of a change in the work schedule of the marketplace. 7. On 2 March 2005 the Leova city council adopted its decision no. 2.2, rejecting “the requests of citizens of Leova who work on the territory of [L.] and have business licences”. The reasons were that work on Sunday would cause traffic problems and would disturb the nearby population, including a school and a hospital. The decision was printed a stationery with the heading of the mayor’s office. The stamp on the decision was applied by the Leova mayor’s office and bears the date 29 March 2005. 8. On 4 April 2005 the general meeting of entrepreneurs (including the applicants) expressed its disagreement with the decision of 2 March 2005. On the same day the 191 entrepreneurs working on the territory of L., including the applicants, declared a strike and decided to submit an official request for a change in their work schedule. 9. Accordingly, on 4 April 2005 the entrepreneurs submitted their request to the “Leova regional council”. They asked, inter alia, for the annulment of the decision 2.2 adopted by the city council on 2 March 2005 and explained that they had not been offered proper working conditions on the territory of U. 10. On the same date the applicants sent a preliminary request to the Mayoralty of Leova. In it, the applicants made a similar description to that in their complaint made mentioned in paragraph above. They asked for the annulment of decision no. 2.2 adopted by the city council of the Leova Mayoralty. 11. On 6 April 2005 the Leova city council discussed at its meeting the demands of the entrepreneurs and of L.’s administration, made in their request of 4 April 2005. According to the applicants, L.’s director was allowed to address the councillors and spoke about the applicants’ demands. After discussing the issue, the city council adopted its decision no. 3.1 in which it took note of the applicants’ demands and decided that L. was to work in accordance with the decision of the Leova city council no. 2.2 of 2 March 2005. 12. On 12 May 2005 the mayor of Leova replied to the complaint of 4 April 2005. The mayor informed the entrepreneurs that an answer to their demands had already been given by the Leova city council in its decision no. 3.1. of 6 April 2005, “namely that [L.] shall work in accordance with the decision of the Leova city council no. 2.2 of 2 March 2005”. 13. On 28 May 2005 the 191 entrepreneurs, including the applicants, lodged administrative court proceedings, asking for the annulment of the decision of 2 March 2005. They argued that their rights had been affected by that decision and that its aim was the protection of U.’s interests. They annexed copies of the preliminary request addressed to the mayoralty, of their complaint made on 4 April 2005 to the Leova city council, and of the reply of the mayor’s office of 12 May 2005 (see the preceding paragraph). 14. On 5 July 2005 the Leova District Court found in favour of the entrepreneurs. The court established that L.’s activity on Sundays did not cause any kind of sanitary, traffic or other problems and that the decision of 2 March 2005 was contrary to anti-monopoly legislation. It also accepted in full the applicants’ request for compensation for their legal costs of 15,000 Moldovan lei, a sum which they had paid to the lawyer for representing them in this case. The Leova city council appealed. 15. By its final decision of 20 October 2005 the Cahul Court of Appeal quashed the lower court’s judgment and decided to strike out the court action lodged by the entrepreneurs. It explained that the entrepreneurs had submitted their preliminary complaint to the mayor, while the decision which they sought to annul had been adopted by the city council of the Leova mayoralty. Therefore, Article 14 of the Law on administrative proceedings (see paragraph 17 below) had not been observed since the complaint had to be submitted first to the authority which had adopted the impugned decision. The court added that the applicants no longer had the right to complain against the decision of 2 March 2005.

6. The applicant was born in 1934 and lived in Moscow. 7. In June 1998 he deposited 5,187.40 United States dollars in a three‑month account with Russian Credit, a private bank. 8. In August 1998 the country suffered a financial crisis, the rouble fell, and the bank defaulted. In December 1998 the applicant accepted the bank’s offer to settle and close his account in return for the balance in depreciated roubles. By the time the money reached the applicant in March 1999, the rouble had depreciated further. 9. In October 1999 the bank went into external administration and its debt repayments were frozen pending a restructuring. 10. In May 2000 the bank and its creditors negotiated a group settlement of the pre-October 1999 debt and had it approved by the courts. The settlement discharged the bank from fines, penalties, default interest, and damages arising under legislation, contracts with clients, and court decisions. 11. In December 2001 the applicant sued the bank for the loss caused by the exchange-rate fluctuations between the day he had accepted the bank’s offer and the day the money had arrived. The bank objected to that claim on the ground that it had extinguished its obligations by repaying the deposit to the applicant. On 17 April 2002 the Golovinskiy District Court of Moscow awarded the applicant 77,603.50 Russian roubles (RUB)[1]. 12. In May 2003 the applicant filed a writ of execution with a bailiff. 13. On 17 June 2003, on the application of the bank, the District Court terminated the enforcement of its judgment in view of the group settlement. The District Court said: Considering the nature of the legal relationship at issue, the court takes into account the fact that the enforcement proceedings have been instituted with the purpose of collecting from [Russian Credit] the liabilities that had come into existence before 18 October 1999 inclusive and, under the ... terms of the friendly settlement, are related to [the bank’s] restructured liabilities subject to novation on the terms of the friendly settlement approved by a [court decision] that had defined the procedure and terms of the extinction of the liabilities. Pursuant to section 23 § 2 of the Federal Law on Enforcement Proceedings, the conclusion of a friendly settlement between a creditor and a debtor constitutes a ground for the termination of the enforcement proceedings, and therefore the [bank’s] application shall be granted and the [enforcement proceedings] shall be terminated. 14. In July 2003, in reply to the applicant’s query, the bank’s external administrator informed the applicant that his deposit had not been on the books and that under the terms of the group settlement his judgment debt could not be paid. 15. On 14 August 2003 the Moscow City Court upheld the District Court’s decision, finding that the applicant’s individual claim was to be settled with the group claim. The City Court said: When terminating the [enforcement] proceedings the [District Court] has referred to the provisions of section 439 of the Code of Civil Procedure and reached the conclusion that the terms of the said friendly settlement regarding the restructuring of the credit obligations of [Russian Credit] extended also to [the applicant]. The [City Court] agrees with the said conclusion of the [District Court] as based on the provisions of the law and confirmed by the circumstances of the present case.

5. The applicant was born in 1973 and currently lives in Vienna, Austria. 6. In 2002 the applicant purchased a flat in Baku at a location near the Tezepir Mosque, with a living space of 17.6 sq. m. 7. In 2004 the applicant carried out some renovation and construction works at the flat, as a result of which the total area of the flat became 84 sq. m, while the living space increased to 33.6 sq. m. 8. On 7 March 2005 the head of Yasamal District Executive Authority issued an order recognising the fact that by building additional rooms (living rooms, hall, kitchen, mansard, and so on), the applicant had increased the total area of her flat to 84 sq. m. 9. On 3 June 2005 the Baku City Department of Technical Inventory and Registration of Property Rights issued a certificate of title to the applicant certifying that her flat comprised a total area of 84 sq. m, 33.6 sq. m of which was living space and the remainder of which was auxiliary space. 10. In July 2006 the Tezepir Mosque lodged a claim against the applicant with the Yasamal District Court, asking that the applicant be dispossessed of her title to the flat in exchange for monetary compensation, and be evicted from the flat. The Tezepir Mosque argued that the area where the applicant’s flat was located was within the area of works required for the renovation and development of the mosque complex, and that the applicant and her family were the only residents who had refused to relinquish their flat in exchange for the compensation offered to them. The Tezepir Mosque was ready to pay 100,000 United States dollars (USD) in compensation. 11. During the court hearing, the representative of the Tezepir Mosque argued that the market price of comparable flats was USD 500 per sq. m, and that the applicant was only entitled to be paid for the living space of her flat (33.6 sq. m). It appears that, in support of this claim, he submitted copies of some sale announcements published in unidentified issues of the local newspaper. The applicant argued that the total area of her flat was 84 sq. m, that the market value of comparable flats was USD 3,000 per sq. m, and that she would sell her flat only if she was paid USD 252,000. 12. The Yasamal District Court noted that, under Article 157.9 of the Civil Code, private owners could be dispossessed of their title to property for State and public needs, in exchange for compensation. It also referred to an order by the Soviet of Ministers of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (“the Azerbaijan SSR”) dated 22 May 1986 (hereinafter “the order of 22 May 1986”), concerning renovation work on the land of the Tezepir Mosque and the relocation of people residing in that area to other accommodation. It also noted, without referring to any specific decisions, that subsequently the Baku City Executive Committee and its successor, the Baku City Executive Authority, had issued several other decisions on the continuation of the renovation work on that land and the “gradual relocation” of the area’s residents. 13. In deciding the amount of compensation payable, the court found that the area of the applicant’s flat was 33.6 sq. m. It also took note of the Tezepir Mosque’s submissions that, despite the fact that the applicant had purchased a flat which was located on land already allocated to the Mosque and that she had subsequently carried out renovation and construction work in the flat “without obtaining rights to the land” and “without authorisation”, the Mosque had offered to pay her USD 100,000, an amount which exceeded the flat’s market value. The court considered that the proposed amount of compensation was reasonable. 14. By a judgment of 2 August 2006, the Yasamal District Court revoked the applicant’s title to the flat, ordered the Tezepir Mosque to pay her the equivalent of USD 100,000 in Azerbaijani manats, and ordered the eviction of the applicant and her family from the flat. By a separate decision delivered on the same day, the Yasamal District Court also ordered the immediate execution of the judgment. 15. On 27 September and 27 December 2006 the judgment was upheld by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court respectively.

8. The applicant was born in 1960 and died in 2012. 9. On 26 July 2003 the body of a man, Mr Z., was discovered in the applicant’s village in the Nemyriv district of the Vinnytsya Region. 10. On 27 July 2003 the applicant was arrested, ostensibly for the administrative offence of maliciously disobeying a police officer. 11. According to the applicant, he was arrested on suspicion of Z.’s murder, and on 1 August 2003 the police ill-treated him to make him confess to the murder. In particular, he alleges that he was dunked in a vat of heavily chlorinated water, had electric shocks applied to his genitalia, and was beaten and hung by his elbows from a metal rod for a substantial period of time. 12. On 1 and 8 August 2003 a witness, Mr I., was questioned by the police and stated that on the night of the murder he had seen the applicant in the victim’s backyard and that he had then, with blood on his hands, come to his house and told him that he had hit the victim. 13. On 4 August 2003 the applicant, in the absence of a lawyer, confessed to Z.’s murder. 14. On 6 August 2003 he was formally arrested on suspicion of the murder. 15. On 7 August 2003 he was questioned in the presence of a lawyer and retracted his confession as having been given under duress. In view of his allegations the next day the investigator requested a forensic medical opinion concerning his injuries. 16. On 10 August 2003 a forensic medical expert observed a number of injuries on the applicant’s body. The expert noted that the applicant was alleging that he had been tortured. He documented a number of haematomas and abrasions and concluded that they could have been inflicted at the time and in the circumstances alleged by the applicant. 17. On 15 August 2003 a district court judge rejected the investigator’s request to remand the applicant in custody and released him, holding that there was no evidence in the file to show that there was a reasonable suspicion against him and noting his allegation that his confession had been coerced. 18. On 16 August 2003 the applicant was released. Prior to his release he wrote a statement in the presence of the officer on duty at the police station affirming that he had not been ill-treated and had no complaints against the police. 19. From 22 August to 19 September 2003 the applicant underwent a course of rehabilitation treatment in hospital, after being diagnosed with “post-traumatic paresis of the forearm nerves due to compression of both forearms”. 20. On 26 September 2003 the prosecutor’s office refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers for ill-treatment. It was noted that they had denied having ill-treated the applicant, that the applicant had made a statement on 16 August 2003 affirming that he had not been ill‑treated and that the police unit in question had not been equipped with an electric shock device. 21. On 5 February 2004 Ms G., Ms K. and Mr N. made videotaped statements to the investigator to the effect that, in October 2003, the applicant had confessed to them all (on the same occasion) that he had committed the murder. 22. On an unspecified date in 2004 the investigation into the murder was suspended because the perpetrator could not be identified. 23. On 1 February 2007 a certain Ms O., who was in prison, informed the prison authorities that in July 2004, when she had lived in the same village as the applicant, he had confessed to her that he had murdered Z. and had described the circumstances of the murder to her. 24. On 8 February 2007 she repeated her statement to Mr S., an investigator of the Nemyriv district prosecutor’s office. Her statement was video-recorded. 25. The investigation was resumed. 26. On 20 February 2007, based in part on O.’s new evidence, the applicant was again arrested on suspicion of the murder. 27. The applicant stood trial for murder before the Vinnytsya Regional Court of Appeal, sitting as the trial court. 28. O. was examined and cross-examined by the defence in court on 10 October 2007. She confirmed her testimony incriminating the applicant. 29. At a hearing on 12 November 2007 the trial court examined a letter dated 11 October 2007 which O. had sent to the trial court. In it she asked the court to disregard her statements and stated that she had given them under pressure from S., the investigator (see paragraph 24 above). She also asked to be examined again in court. The defence asked for the same. The trial court ordered the prosecutor’s office to investigate O.’s allegations and held that the defence’s application to have her re-examined would be considered after the investigation was completed. 30. The investigation was conducted by the Nemyriv district prosecutor. O., who was still in prison at the time, was questioned. She reaffirmed her incriminating statements as having been made of her own free will and stated that she had written to the trial court because one of the applicant’s lawyers had said, in the course of the cross-examination, that she might be criminally liable for any false statements. S., the investigator who had questioned O. in February 2007, and the two police officers present on that occasion were also questioned and denied that any pressure had been used to compel O. to make a statement. On 6 December 2007 the prosecutor refused to institute criminal proceedings against S. for lack of constituent elements of a crime in his actions. 31. On 11 January 2008 the trial court received another letter from O., in which she retracted her previous letter. The defence again asked that she be called. The trial court refused to recall her as a witness. 32. On 25 February 2008 the trial court convicted the applicant of murder and sentenced him to thirteen years’ imprisonment. It relied on the evidence of the witnesses O., I., G., K. and N. (see paragraphs 29, 12 and 21 above respectively), who had reiterated in court their statements given in the course of the pre-trial investigation. It also relied on the statements of a number of other witnesses who had testified regarding various aspects of the case other than the applicant’s guilt. In the trial court’s judgment the evidence of I., K., G. and O. was mentioned separately, and in that order, as disproving the applicant’s denials of his guilt. 33. As to I.’s statements in particular, the trial court stated that they were detailed and directly pointed to the applicant’s guilt. I. had not only made those statements in the course of the pre-trial investigation and in court but had also reiterated them in the course of face-to-face confrontations with the applicant and another witness in the course of the pre-trial investigation. G. and K. had also reiterated their statements in confrontations with the applicant. 34. As to O.’s evidence, the trial court stated that she had reiterated her pre-trial statement in the course of the trial in the applicant’s presence and that there had been no reason to distrust that testimony. Certain details she had provided coincided with those provided by I. and discovered in the course of a crime scene investigation. As to the retraction of her testimony, the court considered it appropriate to disregard it since the district prosecutor had checked her allegations that her initial statements had been given under pressure, had found those allegations unfounded and had delivered a reasoned decision refusing to institute criminal proceedings. 35. On 24 March 2008 the applicant appealed in cassation. He argued primarily that the trial court had erred in its assessment of the evidence. He also argued, among other things, that the court had unjustifiably refused to recall O. as a witness despite the retraction of her testimony and that a search conducted in his home in 2003  which had apparently not returned any incriminating items  had been unlawful for various reasons, including the fact that at the time it had been conducted he had been in detention being tortured. 36. On 10 July 2008, in a final decision, a panel of three judges of the Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s judgment. It found that the court had correctly assessed the evidence and that there were no grounds to put in doubt its findings. 37. Following a request by the applicant for the proceedings to be reopened, on 21 May 2009 five judges of the Supreme Court asked the plenary formation of the Supreme Court (consisting of all the judges of the court’s criminal and military divisions) to reopen the proceedings in the applicant’s case in view of the exceptional circumstances (see paragraph 42 below), to quash his sentence and to order a retrial. The judges argued, in particular: (i) that there was medical evidence in the file which indicated that the applicant had been seriously ill-treated in 2003, in particular by being hung by his elbows, (ii) that the investigation into his allegations in this regard had been superficial, and (iii) that the trial court had failed to comment on this. The judges also pointed out what they believed to be a number of contradictions in the evidence cited by the trial court in the judgment for the applicant’s conviction. 38. On 5 June 2009 the plenary formation of the court held that the arguments cited by the five judges could only serve as a basis for reopening the proceedings if they had been first investigated by the prosecutor’s office and found to be “newly established circumstances” justifying a reopening (see paragraph 42 below). However, the court observed that the prosecutor’s office had not conducted such an investigation and had not made such a finding. 39. The parties did not inform the Court whether the applicant attempted to initiate, before the prosecutor’s office, an investigation of the type mentioned by the plenary formation of the Supreme Court. 40. In the application, lodged by his initial representative on his behalf on 9 January 2009, the applicant described, in the “Statement of the facts” section of the form, the ill-treatment he had allegedly suffered in August 2003 (see paragraph 11 above). In the “Statement of alleged violation(s) of the Convention and/or Protocols and relevant arguments” part of the form he complained under Article 6 § 2 that his right to be presumed innocent had been breached in that the domestic authorities had relied on evidence obtained unlawfully and under Article 6 § 3 (d) that the domestic courts had failed to re-examine O. after she had retracted her initial testimony. 41. On 1 April 2013 Mr Levytskyy wrote to the Court on behalf of the applicant’s mother concerning the applicant’s death and expressed the mother’s wish to pursue the application in his stead. In his letter Mr Levytskyy provided two arguments concerning the applicant’s mother’s right to pursue the application. Firstly, he stated that the applicant had been convicted on the basis of statements made under torture. Secondly, Mr Levytskyy stated that: “The applicant’s former representative... is a journalist by training. However, this is not why she described in the application the acts of torture but limited the application to a violation of Article 6 of the Convention only, leaving the acts of torture outside of the scope of the application... At the time the application was lodged in 2008-2009 the Court was declaring applications under Article 3 inadmissible where applicants failed to appeal to court against the prosecutor’s office’s decision not to institute criminal proceedings.” Mr Levytskyy went on to describe the Court’s approach to the admissibility of such complaints adopted in Kaverzin v. Ukraine (no. 23893/03, §§ 97-99, 15 May 2012) and asked the Court to allow the applicant’s mother to pursue the application. The change in the Court’s approach to the admissibility of complaints concerning alleged ill-treatment by law-enforcement officers, to which Mr Levytskyy referred, is described in paragraphs 59 and 60 below.

6. Mr Adyan (“the first applicant”) was born in 1991, while Mr Avetisyan, Mr Khachatryan and Mr Margaryan (“the second, third and fourth applicants”) were born in 1993. The first and second applicants live in Yerevan, while the third and fourth applicants live in Tsaghkavan and Kapan respectively. 7. The applicants are four Jehovah’s Witnesses who were found to be fit for military service. 8. In May and June 2011 the applicants were called up for military service. They failed to appear, and instead addressed letters to the local military commissariat (զինվորական կոմիսարիատ) and the regional prosecutor’s office, refusing to perform either military or alternative service. They stated that they were Jehovah’s Witnesses and that, having studied the Alternative Service Act, they had come to the conclusion that, by European standards, the service proposed was not of a genuinely civilian nature since it was supervised by the military authorities. Their conscience did not allow them to work directly or indirectly for the military system. The alternative labour service was known to be organised and supervised by the military authorities because the alternative labour serviceman’s record booklet was marked “Armed Forces of Armenia”, and alternative servicemen were subject to military discipline and penalties and had to register with the military subdivisions of the Armed Forces of Armenia. Furthermore, the law required that they remain at their place of service around the clock, seven days a week, which was akin to house arrest and was unacceptable to the applicants. The requirement to perform military service or the available alternative service violated their rights guaranteed by, inter alia, Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights. For the reasons stated above, their conscience did not allow them to perform the alternative service available in Armenia. The applicants added that they were willing to perform alternative service as long as it was not in any way connected with the military authorities and did not violate their religious beliefs. 9. On 15 June 2011 charges were brought against the second applicant under Article 327 § 1 of the Criminal Code (evasion of regular conscription for military or alternative service). 10. On 6 July 2011 the first and fourth applicants were arrested. 11. On 7 July 2011 the same charges were brought against the first and fourth applicants. Finding the investigator’s applications for their detention substantiated, the Syunik Regional Court decided to detain them. 12. On 28 July 2011 the Criminal Court of Appeal dismissed appeals lodged by the first and fourth applicants against the detention orders, finding, inter alia, that as the alleged offence carried a sentence of more than one year’s imprisonment, that increased the probability that the first and fourth applicants would commit a new offence or evade punishment if they remained at large. 13. On 27 July 2011 the same charges were brought against the third applicant and the Tavush Regional Court decided to detain him at the investigator’s request, finding that there was a reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offence with which he was charged. 14. On an unspecified date his criminal case was sent to court. 15. On 19 August 2011 the Tavush Regional Court decided to set the case down for trial, finding that the “detention was to remain unchanged”. 16. On 24 August 2011 the Criminal Court of Appeal examined an appeal lodged by the third applicant against the detention order of 27 July 2011 and decided to dismiss it, finding, inter alia, that the offence with which he was charged carried a sentence of more than one year’s imprisonment, which increased the probability that he would commit a new offence or evade punishment if he remained at large. 17. In the course of the proceedings before their respective trial courts, the applicants submitted that their opposition to military and alternative service was based on their religious beliefs. The alternative service provided for under domestic law was not of a genuinely civilian nature, as it was supervised by the military authorities. The right to conscientious objection was protected by, inter alia, Article 9 of the Convention. The applicants were willing to perform alternative service as long as it was not supervised by the military and was of a genuinely civilian nature. 18. On 19 July 2011 the Kotayk Regional Court found the second applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to two years and six months in prison. He was taken into custody on the same day. 19. On 27 July 2011 the Syunik Regional Court imposed similar sentences on the first and fourth applicants. 20. On 25 November 2011 the Tavush Regional Court imposed a similar sentence on the third applicant. 21. The applicants lodged appeals against their convictions, arguing that they violated the requirements of Article 9 of the Convention. Their opposition to the alternative service available in Armenia was based on their religious beliefs, as that service was not of a genuinely civilian nature and failed to comply with European standards. It was organised and supervised by the military authorities (section 14 of the Alternative Service Act (see paragraph 28 below)) and was equivalent to non-armed military service, whereas their conscience did not allow them to perform any service supervised by the military authorities. Furthermore, section 17(3) of the Act authorised a military authority to order the transfer of an alternative labour serviceman to another institution, while certain aspects of the service were organised in accordance with military rules (section 18(2) of the Act). Alternative labour servicemen were also required to wear a uniform that resembled a military uniform and to follow orders, and were not allowed to leave their place of service without authorisation. The cover of the alternative labour serviceman’s record booklet (այլընտրանքային աշխատանքային ծառայողի գրքույկ) bore the coat of arms and the words “The Armed Forces of Armenia”, and the monthly allowance paid was the same as that of military servicemen. Moreover, alternative service was punitive in nature as it lasted forty-two months and alternative servicemen were required to stay at their place of service around the clock. They reiterated their readiness to perform a genuinely civilian alternative service and argued that, in the absence of alternative service that complied with European standards and was of a truly civilian nature, their sentences did not pursue a pressing social need and were not necessary in a democratic society. 22. On 2 December 2011 the Criminal Court of Appeal upheld the judgments of the Regional Courts in the cases of the first and second applicants. In the first applicant’s case, the Court of Appeal found as follows: “Having examined the arguments of the defence that the alternative labour service in Armenia does not comply with European standards, is of a military nature and is supervised by the military, the Court of Appeal finds that [the State] ... is taking appropriate measures in respect of the obligations assumed before the Council of Europe as regards, in particular, the enactment and continuous improvement of the legislation concerning alternative service. The Court of Appeal finds it necessary to point out that the Alternative Service Act, the [relevant] Government decrees and [other executive orders] are based on the Armenian Constitution and must therefore be applied in the present case with the following considerations. [Citation of sections 2 and 3(1) of the Act (see paragraph 28 below)] It follows from the above-mentioned provisions that [the State] has made a clear distinction between alternative military service and alternative labour service, and has guaranteed by law the civilian nature of the latter. [Citation of sections 17 and 18(3) of the Act (see paragraph 28 below)] Based on an analysis of the above-mentioned provisions, the Court of Appeal finds it necessary to point out that the fact that the head of the institution [where alternative service is performed] notifies [the local military commissariat] regarding the alternative labour service to be performed by the serviceman, the fact that the serviceman can be transferred to another institution or place and the fact that alternative labour servicemen are discharged from service to the reserve and are registered in the reserve in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law, are not sufficient to conclude that the alternative labour service in Armenia is of a military nature, since ... the type, procedures and conditions of such labour are determined by the heads of the relevant institutions without any interference by the military authorities or their representatives. Furthermore, it is the head of [the relevant] institution who is responsible for the organisation and implementation of the alternative labour service and not the subdivisions of the Armed Forces of Armenia. The argument put forward by the defence that the alternative labour service is supervised by a public authority in the field of defence authorised by the Government of Armenia similarly does not suggest that there is no alternative labour service in Armenia. It must be noted that in reality, servicemen perform the labour service outside the Armed Forces of Armenia and it does not contain elements of military service. The Court of Appeal also finds it necessary to note that an analysis of the Alternative Service Act shows that the specifics of the legal status of alternative labour servicemen are set out in the said Act and the labour legislation of Armenia and they are subjects ... of labour rather than military relations. The preceding conclusion is evidenced also by a number of other provisions of the Act, in particular, the fact that alternative labour servicemen are subordinate only to the heads of the relevant civilian institutions, are obliged to follow only their orders and instructions, and must abide by the internal disciplinary rules of such institutions, while questions relating to the social security of servicemen and their family members are regulated by the legislation on State pensions rather than military laws (sections 19 and 20). It must be noted that Government Decree no. 940-N of 25 June 2004 established the list of institutions where alternative service is performed and the form and the manner of wearing the alternative serviceman’s uniform. Paragraph 2(b) of the Decree stipulates that ‘alternative labour servicemen perform their service in the institutions under the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs’. Pursuant to [Annex 1] to the Decree, ‘the tasks performed by alternative labour servicemen in the said bodies are those of an orderly’. The Government have entrusted the ministers of the bodies in question, as well as the Minister of Defence, with certain responsibilities, such as the provision of clothing, food and financial means to servicemen and other organisational work (paragraph 3 of the Decree). The fact that the Minister of Defence is also involved in the organisation of the alternative service does not suggest that the labour service transforms into military service, since, firstly, the Minister of Defence and certain subdivisions of the Armed Forces are called upon to participate in the organisation of the alternative military service. As regards the fact that the military authorities carry out supervision of labour servicemen together with the heads of the relevant institutions, the Court of Appeal considers that this still does not change the nature of the service performed. Moreover, as already noted above, the type, procedures and conditions of the civilian labour are determined and may be changed only by the head of the relevant institution. ... It must be noted that performing the tasks of an orderly at the relevant medical institutions of Armenia is not only not demeaning, but on the contrary is humanitarian, serves the interests of society and is aimed at preservation of human health and life. The argument put forward by the defence that the alternative labour service is punitive in nature is also unsubstantiated. ... In the light of the above, the Court of Appeal, based on the concrete facts of the case, namely that [the first applicant] has categorically refused to be conscripted to perform alternative labour service, concludes that he has been found criminally liable and sentenced in a justified and fair manner for such actions, and this fact does not contradict ... the case-law of the European Court regarding Article 9 of the Convention.” In the second applicant’s case, the Court of Appeal found that his conviction had been lawful, well-founded and reasoned. 23. On 9 December 2011 and 6 March 2012 the Criminal Court of Appeal adopted judgments in the cases of the third and fourth applicants similar to its judgment in the case of the first applicant. 24. The applicants lodged appeals on points of law, raising the same arguments as in their appeals. 25. On 7, 8 and 17 February and 7 May 2012 the Court of Cassation declared the applicants’ appeals inadmissible for lack of merit. 26. On 8 and 9 October 2013 the applicants were released from prison following a general amnesty, after having served between twenty-six and twenty-seven months of their sentences. 27. Article 327 § 1 provides that evasion of regular conscription for fixed-term military or alternative service, in the absence of legal grounds for exemption from such service, is punishable by detention (defined in this context as imprisonment under conditions of strict isolation) for a period not exceeding two months or imprisonment for a period not exceeding three years. 28. The relevant provisions of the Alternative Service Act of 17 December 2003, which entered into force on 1 July 2004, read as follows: Section 2. Concept and types of alternative service “1. Within the meaning of this Act alternative service is the service that replaces compulsory fixed-term military service. It does not involve the bearing, keeping, maintenance and use of arms, and is performed in both military and civilian institutions. 2. There are two types of alternative service: (a) Alternative military service, namely military service performed in the armed forces of Armenia which does not involve being on combat duty or the bearing, keeping, maintenance and use of arms; and (b) Alternative labour service, namely labour service performed outside the armed forces of Armenia. 3. The purpose of alternative service is to ensure the fulfilment of a civic obligation towards the motherland and society, and it does not have a punitive, demeaning or degrading nature.” Section 3. Grounds for performing alternative service “1. An Armenian citizen whose creed or religious beliefs contradict the performance of military service in a military unit, including the bearing, keeping, maintenance and use of arms, may perform alternative service. ...” Section 5. Duration of alternative service “The duration of alternative military service is 36 months. The duration of alternative labour service is 42 months.” Section 14. Ensuring the implementation of alternative service “Conscription for alternative service is organised and its implementation is supervised by a public authority in the field of defence authorised by the Government of Armenia. ...” Section 17. Procedure for performing alternative labour service “1. A citizen conscripted to perform alternative labour service shall be sent, in accordance with the prescribed procedure, to the institution where he is to perform his alternative labour service. 2. The head of the local institution where the alternative labour service is to be performed shall include the alternative labour serviceman in the institution’s personnel list, decide on the type, procedures and conditions of work, ensuring that he is fully occupied, and notify the local military commissariat thereof in writing within three days. 3. The alternative labour serviceman may be transferred to perform his service in another institution or place upon the order or initiative of the authorised public authority in the field of defence. 4. The alternative labour serviceman shall remain at his place of service around the clock. The place of service is considered to be the area which the institution has the authority to be in charge of, to possess and to use. 5. The alternative labour serviceman may not be appointed to managerial posts or be involved in other activities during his service. 6. The alternative labour servicemen shall be discharged from service to the reserve and registered in the reserve in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law.” Section 18. Responsibilities of the head of the institution where alternative labour service is performed “1. The head of the institution where alternative labour service is performed shall provide the alternative labour serviceman with food, a prescribed uniform, underwear, a sleeping facility, and bedding and personal hygiene items; shall familiarise [the alternative labour serviceman] with the internal rules of work discipline and the specifics of the work to be performed. 2. The head of the institution shall guarantee the alternative labour serviceman’s security at the place of service, oversee the implementation of the service and create the necessary conditions for the serviceman’s rest and family visits, in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Act Establishing the Internal Regulations for Service in the Armed Forces. 3. The head of the institution is responsible for the organisation and implementation of alternative labour service at the institution.” Section 19. Rights and obligations of alternative servicemen “1. An alternative serviceman shall receive the same monthly allowance as that established for a private in compulsory military service. ... ... 4. During their service, alternative servicemen shall uphold the internal rules of service discipline, fulfil their responsibilities and follow the orders or instructions of the relevant head (or commander), wear the prescribed uniform and not leave the place of service without authorisation. ...” Section 20. Social security cover for alternative servicemen and their family members “1. Questions related to social security cover for alternative military servicemen and their family members are regulated by the Social Security of Military Servicemen and their Family Members Act. 2. Social security ... of alternative labour servicemen and their family members shall be implemented in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the State Pensions Act. ...” 29. On 28 April 2011 amendments were proposed to the Alternative Service Act. In the Explanatory Report on the proposed amendments, it was indicated that the Act – introduced for the purpose of fulfilling the obligations assumed by Armenia upon joining the Council of Europe – fell short of international standards. Its main shortcomings included the following: (a) the fact that those performing alternative labour service were under military supervision, which contradicted their religious beliefs. Moreover, military supervision was prescribed in the case not only of alternative military service but also of alternative labour service. It deprived those whose religious beliefs contradicted not only the bearing and use of arms but also any kind of service under military supervision, of an alternative to compulsory military service; and (b) the duration of the alternative service. 30. The amendments in question were eventually passed on 2 May 2013 and entered into force on 8 June 2013. They included the following changes: - section 5 was amended, reducing the duration of alternative military service to thirty months and that of alternative labour service to thirty-six months; - in section 14 a distinction was made between alternative military service, which was to be organised and supervised by a public authority in the field of defence, and alternative labour service, which was to be organised and supervised by a public authority authorised by the Government. The new section 14 further specified that alternative labour service could not be supervised by the military; - section 17 no longer required the head of the institution where alternative labour service was to be performed to ensure that the serviceman was fully occupied. The serviceman’s transfer could be ordered or initiated by the National Commission (see paragraphs 35 and 36 below) as opposed to an “authorised public authority in the field of defence” and he was no longer to be required to stay at his place of service around the clock; - section 18(1) no longer required the head of the alternative service institution to provide the serviceman with food, uniform and other items. In the new section 18(2) the reference to the Internal Regulations for Service in the Armed Forces was removed, and the new text required the head of the institution to ensure that the serviceman’s conditions of work were the same as those of other temporary or permanent employees. Pursuant to the new section 19, an alternative labour serviceman was no longer to receive the same monthly allowance as that established for a private in compulsory military service, but an allowance of up to 30,000 Armenian drams. The obligation to wear a uniform was also removed. 31. Section 4 provides that the term of compulsory military service for privates is twenty-four months. 32. On 2 May 2013 a number of amendments to the Act were passed. They entered into force on 8 June 2013 and included the following amendment: “A person who has committed an offence under [, inter alia, Article 327 of the Criminal Code] motivated by his religious beliefs or views and who is serving a sentence ..., may apply to a court for review of the sentence. The court shall discontinue any criminal proceedings and exempt the person concerned from serving the remainder of the sentence, provided that he applies for alternative service before 1 August 2013 and the authorised body decides to grant the application in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Alternative Service Act.” 33. Pursuant to paragraph 2(b), alternative labour servicemen were to perform their service in various institutions under the authority of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, such as orphanages, retirement homes, mental health institutions, institutions for disabled persons and hospitals. They were to perform the functions of an orderly. Pursuant to paragraph 3, the Minister of Defence, the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs and the Minister of Health were entrusted with providing alternative labour servicemen with clothing, food and financial means. The decree also set out the rules on the uniforms to be worn by both alternative military servicemen and alternative labour servicemen. 34. On 1 August 2013 the decree was amended and made applicable only to alternative military servicemen. 35. The decree established a National Commission to examine applications for alternative service. The commission was composed of the head of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Armenia, as its president, the Military Commissar of Armenia (ՀՀ զինվորական կոմիսար) as its vice-president, the Deputy Minister of Health, the Deputy Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, the head of the Governmental Department for National Minorities and Religious Affairs, and the head of the Governmental Department for Administrative Bodies. 36. On 25 July 2013 the decree was repealed and replaced with Decree No. 797-A, which modified the composition of the National Commission to include the First Deputy Minister of Territorial Administration as its president, the Deputy Minister of Health, the Deputy Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, the Deputy Minister of Education and Science, the Deputy Minister of Defence, the Deputy Chief of Police and the head of the Governmental Department for National Minorities and Religious Affairs. 37. For the purpose of supervising the work discipline of persons conscripted to perform alternative labour service, the Military Commissar of Armenia and the head of the Military Police Division of the Ministry of Defence were ordered: (a) to carry out weekly joint spot checks to verify the presence of persons performing alternative labour service at the institutions located within the territory of the regional military commissariats and their sub-divisions; (b) to report the results of such checks to the head of the General Staff at the end of each month; and (c) to report immediately to the head of the General Staff in the event that any alternative labour servicemen were absent and to take necessary measures to find them. 38. On 28 March 2014 and 27 March 2015 the Court of Cassation examined appeals by two conscientious objectors against their convictions by the lower courts under Article 327 of the Criminal Code (criminal cases nos. KD1/0053/01/12 and GD1/0006/01/13). It found that since their cases met the conditions specified in the Criminal Code Implementation Act, as amended on 8 June 2013, the provisions of that Act were applicable and hence their sentences were to be quashed and the criminal proceedings discontinued for lack of corpus delicti. 39. In his 2008 Annual Report, the Human Rights Defender noted: “The draftees who belong to the Jehovah’s Witnesses explain their refusal to sign up for alternative labour service by the fact that the service is managed and supervised by divisions of the ... Ministry of Defence. For example, the conscription to alternative labour service is conducted by military commissariats, or the ... Defence Ministry’s Military Police [Division] pays regular inspection visits to the institutions where the alternative labour service is being performed, requesting the alternative service personnel to line up and so on. In addition, some recruits expressed complaints that uniforms for alternative labour service personnel had been supplied by the ... Ministry of Defence. According to [section 18 of the Alternative Service Act], the party responsible for the implementation and supervision of alternative labour service shall be the head of the institution where the alternative labour service is ... performed. However, [section 14 of the same Act] states that conscription to alternative service shall be organised and supervised by [an authorised public authority in the field of defence]. Indeed, the ... Ministry of Defence justifies its regular inspection visits [by] the Military Police as [being in] implementation of [section 14] and claims that the purpose of such visits is to verify that alternative service personnel are actually at the places where alternative labour service is ... conducted. Taking this into account, the Human Rights Defender’s Office recommends that changes be made to the legislation so that the responsibility for processing alternative service applications and the subsequent implementation and supervision of alternative service be given to an authorised ... labour and social security body. Thus, rather than registering alternative servicemen in the registries of the military reserve force, which is the current requirement of the ... [Military Liability Act], it is possible to envisage [a register] for citizens who have performed alternative service that is accompanied by a new type of [record booklet] to be established by law (in contrast to the regular military [record booklet]).” 40. The Committee of Ministers noted that “alternative service shall not be of a punitive nature. Its duration shall, in comparison to that of military service, remain within reasonable limits”. 41. The Committee of Ministers recommended that member States should ensure that any limitations on the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion of members of the armed forces complied with the requirements of Article 9 § 2 of the Convention, that conscripts should have the right to be granted conscientious objector status and that alternative service of a civilian nature should be proposed to them. The Explanatory Memorandum to this Recommendation noted, in particular, that the length of any alternative service to be performed by objectors should be reasonable in comparison with the length of ordinary military service. It further noted that the European Committee of Social Rights had deemed alternative service exceeding one‑and‑a‑half times the length of military service to be excessive. 1. General documents Recommendation 1518 (2001): Exercise of the right of conscientious objection to military service in Council of Europe member States 42. PACE recommended that the Committee of Ministers invite those member States that had not yet done so to introduce into their legislation a genuine alternative service of a clearly civilian nature, which should be neither deterrent nor punitive in character. 43. PACE noted that Armenia had undertaken to honour the following commitment: “to adopt, within three years of accession, a law on alternative service in compliance with European standards and, in the meantime, to pardon all conscientious objectors sentenced to prison terms or service in disciplinary battalions, allowing them instead to choose, when the law on alternative service had come into force, to perform non-armed military service or alternative civilian service.” (b) Resolution 1532 (2007): Honouring of obligations and commitments by Armenia 44. As regards Armenia’s commitment to enact legislation on alternative service “in compliance with European standards” and “pardon all conscientious objectors sentenced to prison terms”, PACE noted with disappointment that the current law, as amended in 2005 and subsequently in June 2006, still did not offer conscientious objectors any guarantee of “genuine alternative service of a clearly civilian nature, which should be neither deterrent nor punitive in character”, as provided for by Council of Europe standards. It was deeply concerned that, for lack of a genuine form of civilian service, dozens of conscientious objectors, most of whom were Jehovah’s Witnesses, continued to be imprisoned, since they preferred prison to an alternative service which was not of a truly civilian nature. PACE urged the Armenian authorities to amend the law on alternative service in accordance with the recommendations made by the Council of Europe experts and, in the meantime, to pardon the young conscientious objectors serving prison sentences. 45. In its Second Report on Armenia, adopted on 30 June 2006, ECRI noted: “The overwhelming majority of conscientious objectors in Armenia are Jehovah’s Witnesses. They are thus disproportionately affected by the issue of alternative service. On this point, the Armenian Parliament passed, on 1 December 2003, the [Alternative Service Act] which took effect on 1 July 2004. This law provides for alternative military service of 36 months and an alternative civilian service of 42 months. ECRI notes that alternative civilian service, which lasts longer than actual military service, is carried out under military supervision. ECRI has further been informed that directors of institutions (which include hospitals) where conscientious objectors carry out their duty receive their instructions about the conditions and modalities of their service from the military. Moreover, conscientious objectors are sent to military hospitals for medical treatment, they are largely confined to their place of service and required to wear military uniform. They also receive assignments and changes of assignments which are determined by the military. ... ECRI wishes to point out that the aim of the [Alternative Service Act] was to prevent conscientious objectors from being imprisoned for refusing to carry out military service. However, as a number of people are currently in prison for leaving or refusing to join the alternative civilian service due to the military influence on this service, the aim of the [Alternative Service Act] has unfortunately not been met.” 46. In his report of 9 May 2011 following his visit to Armenia from 18 to 21 January 2011, the Commissioner stated: “The issue of imprisoned conscientious objectors – currently, all of whom are members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses community – has been on the table for many years. Conscientious objectors are not willing to perform an alternative service option which is under the supervision of the military. There is still no alternative to military service available in Armenia which can be qualified as genuinely civilian in nature. The Commissioner strongly believes that conscientious objectors should not be imprisoned and urges the authorities to put in place an alternative civilian service. ... The right to conscientious objection remains an open issue in Armenia. Those asking to perform civilian service on the basis of conscientious objection are mainly members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses community. Over 70 persons are currently imprisoned for their refusal to serve in the army or to perform alternative military service. The conscientious objectors have all been sentenced under [Article] 327.1 of the Criminal Code to imprisonment ranging from 24 to 36 months. The Law on Alternative service was adopted in 2003 and entered into force in 2004. The performance of alternative service remains under the supervision of the military, which constitutes a major obstacle for members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses community on the basis of their religious beliefs. Another issue is the potentially punitive length of the civilian service, which currently amounts to 42 months, while regular military service is 24 months. In this respect, the European Committee of Social Rights of the Council of Europe has found that a period of alternative service which is double the duration of military service is excessively lengthy and contrary to Article 1.2 of the European Social Charter. Under this article, alternative service may not exceed one and a half times the length of armed military service. At their meeting with the Commissioner, officials from the Ministry of Defence expressed readiness to amend the [Alternative Service Act]. In particular, the Minister indicated that on the basis of the amendments, supervision will be exercised by a ministry designated for the implementation of alternative service (labour, health, defence, etc.), thereby suggesting that a genuinely civilian service would be available. The draft Law on Amendments to the [Alternative Service Act] was adopted by the government in April 2011. Conclusions and recommendations ... The Commissioner finds that there is an urgent need to review the [Alternative Service Act] and to develop appropriate mechanisms in order to create a genuinely civilian service option in Armenia. It is also important that the length of the alternative service be adjusted – taking into consideration the duration of military service - in a way that it is not perceived as punitive, deterrent or discriminatory.” 47. In their formal response to the Commissioner’s report, the Government admitted that the exercise of the right to conscientious objection was still flawed in Armenia, and that they intended to introduce further legislative amendments to promote civilian control over alternative service and completely to withdraw military control over such service. That function was to be assigned to a new body composed of representatives of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and strictly civil service officers of the Ministry of Defence. 48. In its Conclusions XIX-1 of 24 October 2008 regarding compliance by Greece with Article 1 § 2 of the European Social Charter (The right to work: effective protection of the right of the worker to earn his living in an occupation freely entered upon), the European Committee of Social Rights noted: “The Committee notes that [the periods of alternative service to replace armed military service] are nearly double the length of armed military service. Admittedly, recognised conscientious objectors are in a better position than they are in countries that do no grant them special status or where refusal to serve is punishable by imprisonment. But even if the state acknowledges the principle of conscientious objection and institutes alternative service instead, it cannot make the latter longer than is necessary to ensure that refusal to serve on grounds of conscience is genuine and the choice of alternative service is not seen as advantageous rather than duty. Under Article 1 § 2 of the Charter, alternative service may not exceed one and a half times the length of armed military service.”

5. The applicant was born in 1984 and lives in Toksovo. 6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7. On 2 October 2009 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of raping K., who was employed at the Vasileostrovskiy District Court in St Petersburg as an assistant to Judge N., and who also was the daughter of that court’s former president, Judge K., who carried on working as a judge at that time. 8. On 4 October 2009 Judge R. of the Vasileostrovskiy District Court remanded the applicant in custody. He rejected a challenge for bias which the applicant’s lawyer raised in respect of the entire composition of the District Court because of a link between the alleged victim and the judges of that court. On 26 October 2009 the St Petersburg City Court upheld the detention order on appeal, rejecting a challenge by the applicant as unsubstantiated. 9. On 30 November 2009 a deputy president of the City Court referred an application by an investigator for an extension order to the Oktyabrskiy District Court for consideration. The District Court granted the application on the following day. On 11 December 2009 the City Court upheld that decision on appeal. However, on 31 March 2010 the Supreme Court of Russia determined that the decision to refer the application to another district court had been invalid, because the City Court’s deputy president had decided on the change of venue of his own initiative without hearing what the defendant’s opinion on that issue was. 10. On 30 December 2009 a further extension was granted by the President of the Vasileostrovskiy District Court, Judge Sh., who again rejected a challenge for bias by the applicant. On 26 January 2010 the City Court upheld the extension order on appeal. By a separate decision of the same date, it upheld the rejection of the challenge in respect of Judge Sh.: “The available material indicates that the court considered the challenge for bias in accordance with the established procedure, and upon review of the parties’ arguments found no grounds for the challenge; the stated grounds fall outside of the scope of Article 61 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as they do not indicate the presiding judge’s interest in any predetermined outcome of the case ... In addition, when considering the challenge in respect of the presiding judge, the court had regard to the opinion of the prosecutor, who declared at the hearing on 30 December 2009 that there were no legal grounds for allowing the challenge ... in particular because the hearing did not touch upon the defendant’s guilt; it was not an examination of the merits of the case, but a hearing [on the remand matter].” 11. On 27 January and 27 February 2010 extension orders were issued by judges of the Kalininskiy District Court, which had territorial jurisdiction over the area where the applicant was detained. Those orders were upheld on appeal on 25 March and 8 April 2010. 12. On 11 March 2010 the case against the applicant was referred to the Vasileostrovskiy District Court for trial and allocated to its President, Judge Sh. On 23 March 2010 Judge Sh. allowed the applicant’s challenge for bias in respect of the entire composition of that court, holding as follows: “It has been established that the injured party in the criminal proceedings [K.] works as an assistant to the Vasileostrovskiy District Court’s Judge [N.], and that her father [Judge K.] is a judge of the Vasileostrovskiy District Court. It follows that circumstances exist leading the defendant and his counsel to believe that [Judge Sh.] and all the judges of the Vasileostrovskiy District Court are, either directly or indirectly, interested in the outcome of the criminal case. In order to ensure an impartial examination of the criminal case, the challenge ... must be allowed and the case referred to the President of the St Petersburg City Court for determination of the territorial jurisdiction.” 13. Continuing the same decision, Judge Sh. extended the applicant’s detention until 12 May 2010. On the last day of the extended period the Presidium of the City Court, by way of supervisory review, quashed the decision of 23 March in part in relation to the detention matter, on the grounds that an extension could not have been granted by a judge who had recused himself. The Presidium extended the applicant’s detention until 12 August 2010. 14. On 15 April 2010 a deputy president of the City Court determined that the trial would be held in the Petrogradskiy District Court. On 31 March 2011 the Petrogradskiy District Court found the applicant guilty of rape and sentenced him to five years and six months’ imprisonment.

5. The applicant was born in 1980 and lives in Vietnam. 6. From 1 March 2012 until 25 July 2012 she was detained at Limassol Police Station pending her deportation. She was deported on the latter date. 7. The applicant submitted that throughout her detention the women’s wing at Limassol Police Station had been overcrowded. As result, most of the time she had shared cells with other detainees. When the applicant had been in a double occupancy cell with two bunks, she had shared the cell with up to four other detainees. They all had to share the two bunks. When the applicant had been in a single occupancy cell, which she had initially estimated to measure about 3 to 3.5 sq. m, she had had to share with another detainee and a mattress of about 1.90 m would be placed on the dirty floor alongside her bed. This left only about 30 cm of free space between the mattress and the bed. The mattresses placed in the cells to accommodate additional detainees were filthy and sleeping on the concrete floor with only one blanket was very uncomfortable. The detainees therefore shared the bunks as they could share two blankets this way, which made it warmer. 8. The cells lacked fresh air. Furthermore, the air-conditioning/heating system did not function properly. In addition to a disruption that had lasted three days in March, there were electrical failures or system failures quite frequently, for up to four hours. During this period the cell temperature would drop to two or three degrees above zero and the detention authorities refused to provide more blankets. For this reason, the applicant had asked S.E. to bring her a blanket and a jumper. The disruption of the air-conditioning system also meant that there was no ventilation and the air became foul with so many women in the wing when the weather was warmer in May and June. 9. The applicant was allowed to go to the courtyard for half an hour per day but only when a guard was available. As there was a shortage of police officers to supervise the detainees, in practice this happened every three days. When police officers were absent they were never replaced and as there was overcrowding at the station the detainees’ exercise time was consequently reduced. The applicant was deprived of fresh air, light and exercise on most days of her detention. 10. The detention authorities refused to provide basic hygiene products. From the very beginning of her detention, the applicant had contacted S.E. by telephone asking him to bring her soap, shampoo, toilet paper and toothpaste. He had continued to regularly provide her with basic hygiene products. 11. Lastly, the applicant submitted that during her detention the food which was provided by an external restaurant was not compatible with her religious beliefs – she did not eat beef – or with her nutritional habits, which involved eating rice and fish on a daily basis. As the food provided often made her sick, S.E. would regularly bring her meals. 12. The Government submitted that throughout her detention the applicant had been detained in the women’s wing at the police station. The wing had eight cells, which could accommodate a total of ten detainees. It had two double occupancy cells which measured 9.99 sq. m (cell no. 27) and 6.48 sq. m (cell no. 28). The remaining eight cells (cells nos. 29-34) were single occupancy cells, each measuring 5.94 sq. m. When it was necessary to place a second detainee in a single occupancy cell or a third detainee in a double occupancy cell, another mattress was placed inside the cell and the additional detainee was provided with, inter alia, sheets and blankets. Additional blankets were provided upon request. 13. The Government provided copies of the station’s daily occupancy records (κατάσταση υποδικών-καταδίκων) indicating the number of detainees (both men and women) held during the relevant period. However, they submitted that no consistent records were kept in relation to the occupancy of particular cells. There was therefore no record as to the precise cells or type of cells in which the applicant had been held. Notwithstanding this, in certain of the daily occupancy records where the cell was recorded, it was consistently noted that the applicant had been detained in cell no. 29. 14. On the basis of the above records, the Government had put together a daily occupancy table for the purposes of the present case concerning the women’s wing. According to the table, it was estimated that between 1 March 2012 and 25 July 2012 the wing had accommodated between eight and twenty detainees per day. That meant that when there were ten detainees, the applicant would have been alone in her cell and would thus have had 5.94 sq. m of personal space. When there were eleven to twenty detainees, it was likely that she had shared a cell with another detainee, and would therefore have had 2.97 sq. m of personal space. It was not, however, possible to estimate the length and frequency of the periods during which the applicant had shared a cell with another detainee. According to the table, during the relevant period there had been fifteen days when there were eight to ten detainees in the wing, three when there were eleven detainees in the wing, and at least sixty-three days where there were between twelve and twenty detainees. The remaining sixty-five days were unaccounted for. 15. There were shared toilets and showers in the wing. There were two toilets, two showers, three washbasins and three mirrors. The detainees were provided with toilet paper and hygiene products (soap, sanitary towels and toothpaste) on a daily basis. There was a central air-conditioning system, which provided either heat or cold air. During the period of the applicant’s detention, the air conditioning was permanently switched on, with the exception of three days in March 2012 when it was under maintenance. Furthermore, each cell had a ventilation system which also operated around the clock. All cells had glass block windows measuring 0.62 m by 0.95 m, which were properly insulated against draughts. The cells had lamps which provided artificial light. 16. Female detainees were allowed to move freely in the open courtyard, which measured approximately 172 sq. m, for four hours per day between 3 p.m. and 7 p.m. 17. On 9 March 2012 and 4 May 2012 S.E. sent letters on behalf of the applicant to the Commissioner for Administration of the Republic of Cyprus (“the Ombudsman”) complaining, inter alia, about the conditions of the applicant’s detention. By a letter dated 20 August 2012 the Ombudsman replied that she had carried out a visit to Limassol Police Station and had submitted a report to the competent authorities with her observations and recommendations. She assured the applicant that her office would continue to closely observe the conditions of detention in that station. 18. On 10 April 2012 S.E. sent a letter on behalf of the applicant to the Independent Authority for Investigation of Allegations and Complaints against the Police (“IAIACAP”) complaining about the conditions of her detention and disputing the lawfulness of her arrest and detention. By a letter dated 6 July 2012 the IAIACAP informed the applicant that, following a preliminary investigation into her complaint, there was no basis for any further steps to be taken. In the actual report by the investigator dated 25 June 2012, in so far as the applicant’s conditions of detention were concerned, it was stated that the heating at the station had been functioning in March 2012, apart from three days when the system had been under maintenance, and that blankets had been provided. 19. In the meantime, S.E. sent a letter dated 4 April 2012 to the President of the Supreme Court of Cyprus informing him of the problems and violations of rights that the applicant had suffered during her detention. The President of the Supreme Court informed the applicant by a letter dated 5 April 2012 that this matter did not fall within his competence. 20. On 8 June 2012 Mr L. Loucaides, a lawyer who had been hired by S.E., sent a letter of complaint to the General Director of the Ministry of Interior about the conditions of the applicant’s detention and the detention itself. As no response was received Mr L. Loucaides sent a follow-up letter on 9 January 2013. This also remained unanswered. 21. On 6 December 2012 the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (“the CPT”) released its report on its visit to Cyprus from 12 to 19 May 2008. 22. The relevant extracts of the report concerning Limassol Police Station read as follows: “5. Conditions of detention 55. However, the delegation observed that some cells at Limassol Police Station had no windows, and, as a result, no access to natural light or ventilation. The CPT recommends that these deficiencies be remedied without delay. ... 56. Once again, the delegation heard consistent complaints about the provision of food, especially as regards quantity, but also as regards quality. Persons remanded in police custody were not provided with food in the evening for the first eight days at Larnaca Central Police Station. For the first 15 days of custody at Pafos and Limassol Police Stations, only cold food was provided, once a day. The CPT recommends that all persons held on police premises are provided with appropriate food at regular intervals (including at least one full meal every day). 57. The CPT has reiterated in the report on each visit to Cyprus that all persons detained longer than 24 hours must be offered the opportunity of one hour of outdoor exercise every day. However, in 2008, outdoor exercise was provided only at Police Prison (Block 10) and Larnaca and Paralimni Police Stations. At Aradippou and Limassol Police Stations, detained persons were offered, at best, access for several hours to a courtyard covered by corrugated plastic sheeting. Thus, outdoor exercise was still not provided at most police establishments, including those which held primarily or exclusively long-term immigration detainees, such as the former Famagusta detention facility in Larnaca and Lakatamia Police Stations. ... The CPT calls upon the Cypriot authorities to ensure that all persons detained in police stations for longer than 24 hours are offered one hour of daily outdoor exercise. 58. Subject to remedying the shortcomings identified above, the existing police detention facilities visited in Cyprus were suitable for accommodating detained persons for short periods of time, i.e. for a few days. However, as the CPT has stressed in the past, police detention facilities will generally remain inappropriate for holding persons for prolonged periods. Indeed, none of the police establishments visited offered the material conditions or the opportunities for activities that persons detained for prolonged periods are entitled to expect. ... At the end-of-visit talks with the Cypriot authorities, the visiting delegation made an immediate observation pursuant to Article 8, paragraph 5, of the European Convention for the prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, requesting that the Cypriot authorities take immediate steps to improve the conditions of detention of persons held in police custody for prolonged periods. The delegation requested to be informed, within three months, of action taken in response to the immediate observation. 59. By letter of 8 September 2008, the Cypriot authorities informed the CPT that remand police custody rarely lasts longer than 16 days, and that, as regards immigration detention, pursuant to a recent decision of the Minister of Interior, he personally examines, on a case-by-case basis, the files of non-EU nationals detained for longer than six months. Where there is no prospect of deportation and the individual has not committed any criminal act, he or she is set free and issued with a 12-month temporary residence/employment permit, after which the case is re-examined. The Cypriot authorities also informed the CPT that a new establishment for the detention of up to 300 aliens was planned for 2012. ... 61. The CPT remains concerned by the persistence of the Cypriot authorities in using unsuitable premises for persons detained pursuant to the aliens legislation, and for prolonged periods. It is certainly positive that the Cypriot authorities state that they intend not to keep aliens in detention for longer than 6 months. However, the fact remains that holding such persons in police stations for months on end is not acceptable. A solution to this problem cannot await the opening of the new aliens centre planned for 2012. The CPT has already described, in its previous report, the standards that accommodation provided to persons detained for prolonged periods under aliens an asylum legislation should meet. The CPT once again recommends that the Cypriot authorities urgently review the conditions in the existing centres designed to hold persons deprived of their liberty under aliens/asylum legislation, in the light of the aforementioned standards, and that they ensure that any additional centres they establish comply with those standards. ...” 23. On 31 July 2012 the Ombudsman released a report on the conditions of detention and the treatment of detainees at Limassol Police Station following a visit carried out on 23 May 2012 by her office. In the report the Ombudsman observed, in so far as relevant to the present case, the following. 24. The station was overcrowded: it could house a maximum of thirty-seven men and ten women but on the day of the visit there had been forty-two men male detainees and nineteen women. It had thus substantially exceeded its capacity. 25. The facilities were old and totally unsuitable for long-term detention and did not provide dignified conditions of detention. Taking into account the CPT’s recommendations, none of the cells were of an adequate size. The hygiene and sanitation facilities, as well as nutrition, were inadequate and although the cell temperature was satisfactory there was no natural light or proper ventilation, contrary to both CPT and United Nations standards (referring to CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1 - Rev. 2010 and the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (1957)). The cells had no windows but just glass blocks which did not allow natural ventilation and light. 26. Furthermore, the Ombudsman observed that although the station’s director had informed her that the detainees had access to hygiene products (for example, toilet paper, soap and shampoo), he had also informed her that in 2012 the budget for these products had been reduced from 3,000 euros (EUR) to EUR 400. This drastic cutback was not in line with the relevant CPT standards and the sum allocated was not enough to cover the needs of all the detainees. 27. Although she had been informed that sheets were sent to the laundry once a week, there had been complaints by detainees that there were not enough sheets to go round and that they were often dirty. Similarly, complaints had been made to her about the cleanliness of mattresses, many of which were placed on the floor because of overcrowding. 28. The centre had an internal courtyard with natural light and ventilation which female detainees could use from 3 p.m. to 7 p.m. In the Ombudsman’s view this was satisfactory as it secured, in line with CPT standards, the detainees’ right to least one hour’s daily exercise. 29. The Ombudsman concluded that the infrastructure of the facilities had serious shortcomings and inadequacies and was not compatible with the fundamental principles for the treatment of prisoners and international standards for detention and imprisonment. In particular, in addition to overcrowding, the shortcomings that existed as to natural ventilation, minimum/basic hygiene conditions and the failure to separate pre-trial detainees from immigration detainees, rendered the centre completely unsuitable for detention, especially for a period exceeding six months. 30. The Ombudsman made recommendations which included the immediate adoption of measures to add a window to each cell, to end overcrowding and the practice of detainees sleeping on mattresses on the floor, to provide personal hygiene products to detainees at any time and to review the budget that was allocated for this purpose.

5. The first applicant, Unifaun Theatre Productions Limited, is a limited liability company which produces theatrical performances in Maltese theatres. The second and third applicants are the two directors of the company. The fourth applicant is the artistic director of the theatrical production known as “Stitching”, a play written by the Scottish playwright Anthony Neilson, originally published in 2002 in the United Kingdom by the publishing house Metheun Drama. The fifth as well as the third applicants are two actors engaged to perform in the mentioned production (as Stu and Abby, the main characters). 6. In October 2008, the first applicant, via the second applicant, decided to produce the play Stitching for the theatre audiences in Malta, and proceeded to obtain the necessary performance licence from the author and his agent. The relevant authorisation was granted to the first applicant by the author and agent of the production following the payment of a fee. 7. On 23 December 2008 the first applicant lodged an application with the Board for Film and Stage Classification (“the Board”), in order for a rating certificate to be issued in terms of the Stage Regulations (see Relevant domestic law). The relevant fee was paid and a clean copy of the script submitted. 8. At the same time, the first applicant entered into a reservation agreement with a theatre for eight dates between 13 February and 1 March 2009 and hired the third, fourth and fifth applicants in connection with the services for such play. 9. On 20 January 2009 the Board issued a certificate (no. 0000043), which was received by the applicants on an unspecified date, stating that the play had been examined by its chairperson (T.F.) and that it was decided that it was “Banned – Banned and disallowed”. No reasons were provided for the decision. Before this Court the Government submitted a further classification certificate with the same conclusion, also dated 20 January 2009, which stated that the classifier was T.F., as well as C.X., A.M. and D.M. (the latter names added by means of an asterisk). The applicants submitted that they had never received the certificate submitted by the Government. The Government explained that the latter certificate was an internal document. 10. On 23 January 2009 the first applicant, via the second applicant, sent an email, followed by a telephone call, to the chairperson of the Board enquiring about the decision. No reasons were provided by the chairperson. 11. On 25 January 2009 the first applicant, via its legal counsel, sent a letter to the chairperson requesting a reconsideration of the decision in terms of Regulation 47 (1) of the Stage Regulations. 12. By means of a letter of 29 January 2009 the Board informed the first applicant, via the latter’s legal counsel, that the original decision was reconfirmed. The letter contained no reasons and did not list the names of the persons who had been involved in the review. 13. On 31 January 2009 another letter was sent to the first applicant by the chairperson. It enclosed a document dated 30 January 2009 addressed “to whom it may concern”, which had been deposited with the Commissioner of Police, containing the reasons why the production was banned, namely: “1. Blasphemy against the State Religion – pages 10 and 17 5. Reference to the abduction, sexual assault and murder of children – page 36 In conclusion, the play is a sinister tapestry of violence and perversion where the sum of the parts is greater than the whole. The Board feels that in this case the envelope has been pushed beyond the limits of public decency.” 14. On 2 February 2009 the applicants filed a judicial protest against the chairperson, in her personal capacity and as Chairperson of the Board, the Commissioner of Police and the Attorney General claiming that the actions of the Board were illegal in so far as they constituted a violation of Article 39 of the Maltese Constitution and Article 10 of the Convention. They considered the defendants responsible for any damage suffered. 15. By 14 February 2009 (the day following what had to be the first performance date), no reply was received to the mentioned judicial protest. In consequence, the applicants called a press conference explaining the situation, noting that they were adhering to the law but that they were determined to perform the play at some stage. 16. In the evening of the same day, the applicants and their legal counsel were summoned for questioning at the Police Headquarters. The applicants were sternly warned by a police inspector that they would face immediate arrest if they attempted to stage the play. 17. Rehearsals for the production carried on unabated. According to the applicants around two hundred persons watched the rehearsals and none of them found the play objectionable. 18. The Board’s decision was not revoked and an invitation to the Chairperson to attend a rehearsal (as members of the Board sometimes did in connection with other performances) remained unanswered. 19. On 3 March 2009 the applicants instituted constitutional redress proceedings complaining that they had suffered a breach of Article 10 of the Convention. They also claimed damage and redress. Complaining under Article 6 they claimed that they did not have a fair hearing before the Board for Film and Stage Classification in so far as they had no hearing and no possibility to make submissions, nor were any reasons for the decision ever communicated to them. They also relied on the relevant provisions of the Maltese Constitution. 20. By a decree of 20 October 2009 the court rejected a request for the production to be shown behind closed doors to the court and the defendants. 21. During these proceedings the court heard several witnesses which it classified as (i) those who acted in the play and had thus read the script and performed it in rehearsals, (ii) persons who watched the rehearsals but did not read the script and (iii) the defendants who read the script but did not watch the rehearsal. 22. The court heard the applicants, four witnesses (who had watched the rehearsals) produced by the applicants, namely, P.M. a consultant psychiatrist, J.S. an educator, child psychologist and actress, K.D. a tourism marketing executive and actor, a priest who was a former film classifier for the Archdiocese of Malta, as well as the author of the play. The latter testified that the play had been performed uninterruptedly in all parts of the world and extensively in Europe, during which time it had collected a number of awards. 23. The author described the play as follows: “A couple called Stewart and Abby, a very normal couple but however a couple who find themselves in relationship difficulties, there have been betrayals, they’re wondering whether to continue with their relationship. Abby discovers that she is pregnant by Stewart and so a large part of the play is concerned with them discussing whether or not to have the child. Ultimately they decide to have the child but they decide to do so in order to save their relationship, one might say for somewhat impure motives, they feel that having this child will keep them together. However their relationship continues to disintegrate and at one point during a fight they are having between themselves when their attention is diverted elsewhere, the child is involved in an accident and then dies. Obviously this is a huge trauma for them and they are driven apart. They come back together again sometime later, maybe a year later and meet and for them their relationship is not quite finished and they come back together in their grief because they are the only other people who understand the depths of their grief. When they come together they can only do so in a perverted fashion, where Abby actually poses as a prostitute. She wants to make their sexual relationship a matter of commerce in order to distance herself from the emotions. What then ensues is a very violent and dark relationship, a kind of a punishment of themselves, confessions of their guilt. Eventually Abby is tipped into clinical mental illness and performs an act of self-mutilation which she believes will restore her to a virginal state, and that is what finally blows apart their relationship. In a final coda Stewart meets Abby sometime later when she has obviously received treatment for her mental illness and has in fact converted to Christianity and both of them decide to go their separate ways.” 24. He further testified as follows: “(Concerning pornographic references) I would not for instance have used real pornographic pictures. I felt that that would be needlessly offensive for people however another director might chose to do so. ... (Concerning women in Auschwitz walking towards death) it should not be an unfamiliar concept that in their grief that couple confess to thoughts, to feelings that they feel guilty about. The play to some extent is about life and about death. When he talks about masturbating and using as his material pictures of women from Auschwitz, this is something that occurs when he is a small child, this occurs when he is a very young child. He says that it is the first time that he masturbated which would imply that it is reasonably early. At that time of life a young man is completely concerned with procreation, with the creation of life and he understands nothing of death, of mortality. So in fact that is what actually that phrase is about, the fact that he is confessing, he is saying I knew nothing about death, I did not look at the atrocity of life, I saw only the nudity. So it’s actually nothing to do with Auschwitz, it’s to do with sexual urges and it’s to do with him, you know small children don’t understand Auschwitz. (In reply to a court’s question concerning the swearing/blasphemy (daagħa)) well that’s not a concept that ever crossed my mind. I’m not a religious person. (Domestic court’s question - Does the script allow the director to put aside certain references to things that could be described by people as hard? Will the text lose by the director leaving it out? ) I dare say that a director could remove one or two swear words but that would all have to be taken on the case by case basis, but largely speaking I would say they would suffer yes because there is a reason why every line is in every one of my plays. There’s a reason for it and I’m happy to stand here and justify them all day. (Domestic court’s question - As far as Stitching is concerned an omission by the director could affect the whole performance?) Yes absolutely.” 25. P.M., a consultant psychiatrist, stated that in his opinion the play was a love story which unfortunately turned very badly. He explained that following the death of their son through their own negligence, the main characters had a relationship based on various fantasies, until the female character became mentally ill. It was a sad story, with however a redeeming feature, in that the two finally manage to get back a balance in their life. He testified that there was nothing pornographic in the story and the bad language was in the context of the emotions being felt by the couple. 26. J.S., a child psychologist, stated that in her opinion the play concerned a tragedy of a couple going through a crisis, which reached its peak when their son had died in an accident. She explained that the couple tried to connect in ways which were not necessarily conventional. She considered that it was a sensitive play that called for a mature audience. In reply to a court’s question concerning a specific part of the text, J.S. replied that she was not shocked because she could not dissociate her female gender from her being a psychologist. 27. The priest (who saw the rehearsal but did not read the script) considered that he would have classified it for wise adults (bil-għaqal). He explained that when a person was suffering she or he “may lose it” and enter into areas which decent people may object to. However, in his view that was the human reality. When one was ready to study illnesses and the suffering of people who were going through pain one must be democratic and tolerant and give society the chance to understand those not living normally. 28. K.D. (who saw the rehearsal but did not read the script) testified that most of the dialogue was between two people who had certain hang-ups and inter personal problems, and who in a quest to get closer, nearly started a competition between them as to who was the more outrageous. Nevertheless, in his view, at some point one could tell that they were flirting with each other despite them being outrageous. 29. The third applicant who was performing as Abby stated that she did not find the play offensive in any way, noting that the emotions were very real and that she felt that it was a love story. She also testified that no pornography was used as props. 30. The applicants also submitted that the script could be purchased and read by any person in Malta, without hindrance. 31. The defendants produced the witness testimony of the members of the Board and other individuals, as explained below. 32. Another priest (who read the script but did not see the play) felt that the script was offensive in various parts and dehumanising. He was annoyed by the blasphemous words and the reference to the Moors murderer, and very annoyed at the reference to the Holocaust. Further, he considered that the woman was being put forward as an object, and while it was possible that it was her choice, he thought she was totally subordinate to the man. 33. T.M. (a member of the Board who only read the script) had no doubt that it would have been better had they watched the theatrical production. He, however, explained that there were instances, such as the one in the present case, where the script was so objectionable, that he did not feel the need to watch it, since the two elements which he objected to (the words concerning Auschwitz and the passage about Fred and Rose Mary West) would always remain objectionable, no matter the way in which they were presented, be it a tragedy or a comedy. They would nonetheless remain offensive to certain sectors of Maltese society or indeed society anywhere. While shock was a legitimate theatrical weapon and may be used repeatedly, one could not offend other people’s sensibilities. Both in the case of the holocaust and that of child murders, humanity was at stake, and the relevant passages offended the sense of decency one individual should have towards another. 34. D.M. (a psychologist and member of the Board) found the script barely credible in so far as it was unlikely that a person would go through so many situations one after the other. While perversions did exist, this couple was being put forward as a normal couple. In his view a normal couple, a couple who went through a normal life experience such as the death of a child, would not react like the characters in the play, who for example, re‑enacted a killing which had greatly marked England. Further the scene concerning Auschwitz desecrated the memory of the persons who suffered. 35. Another witness, a retired Chief Justice and professor of law (who only read the script), examined the play from the point of view of public morals. He considered that certain parts of the play were disgusting, such as that describing Auschwitz, and the blasphemous words. He explained that the word “fuck” combined with the word “God” was unacceptable because it offended public morals, not only that of Catholics, but that of half the world. Thus, in his view those parts had to be deleted from the play. The parts concerning sex and sexual perversions, such as the part where the male figure wanted to pay the female figure to allow him to do certain things, disgusted him, but he considered that certain people could accept that. 36. J.C., the member of the board who confirmed on appeal that the play should be banned considered that, apart from other concerns mentioned by other members of the board, it was not justifiable for a couple to do certain things in public just because they were going through a bad patch. It was not acceptable that a woman had to give her vagina to a man to show him she loved him. In his view, if one were to make the appropriate deletions to the script, there would be nearly nothing left, and he could not find anything positive about it. 37. The Chairperson of the Board testified that there were entire scenes which she considered went against morality and were an affront and atrocious attack on human rights and the dignity of the individual. She was shocked and very annoyed by what she considered to be unadulterated pornography where the woman was becoming the man’s absolute slave. She considered that the play in its entirety, and not one scene here and there, was objectionable and offensive. The fact that the play ended with the couple possibly deciding to have a baby, did not suffice to hold that the play had a positive message, given the preceding eighty (sic) pages. 38. In an eighty-two-page judgment of 28 June 2010, the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence rejected the applicants’ claims. 39. The court considered that the second applicant had no further interest than that of the director of the company, thus it sufficed that the company was an applicant, and he, thus, had no victim status in his own capacity. Nevertheless, the artistic directors as well as the actors were victims of the alleged violation, as persons who were giving life to a script by means of their artistic representation - a theatrical performance which was a form of expression for the purposes of Article 10. 40. It rejected the Government’s objection as to non-exhaustion of ordinary remedies since the applicants’ complaints concerned mainly issues of a constitutional and conventional nature, and thus were best dealt with by the courts of constitutional jurisdiction. For the purposes of the present case, the applicants were complaining of a human rights violation, and therefore an action for judicial review could not be an effective remedy in so far as it could not award the relevant damage, and could not order that the performance go ahead irrespective of the ban. 41. As to the merits, the court made extensive reference to the Court’s case-law, in particular Handyside v. the United Kingdom (7 December 1976, Series A no. 24), Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria (20 September 1994, Series A no. 295‑A) and Wingrove v. the United Kingdom (25 November 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑V) as well as prominent authors in the field of human rights. It considered that the decision of the Board to ban the play had been correct and in accordance with the law and established guidelines. The court, having read the entire script, could not tie the plot which the author wanted to transmit with the means employed to do so. In the court’s view the author did not need to make use of such perversions in order to show the troubled reality of the characters. 42. It considered that the Board was correct to conclude that the play in its entirety was offensive to Maltese society. Indeed the specific scenes referred to, as well as other parts of the play, were an affront to the dignity of the individual, which was an integral part of the civil and moral fabric (tessut) of the country. Even in a pluralistic and democratic society, such as the Maltese one, human dignity could not be trampled on, even if the aim was “presumably” a genuine one. As problematic as the relationship of the couple might have been, one could not make extensive use of vulgar, obscene and blasphemous language to highlight perversions, vilify (ikasbar) the right to life and the right to freedom from inhuman and degrading treatment, and vilify the respect towards a woman’s dignity. It was not acceptable to publicise uncivil behaviour, which broke the law, debased the suffering of women during the holocaust, portrayed women as the object of sexual satisfaction, as well as ridiculed family life and the responsibilities parents have towards their children. A democratic society, while being tolerant, could not permit its values to be turned on their head in the name of freedom of expression. In the court’s view, the stitching of a vagina as an act of sexual pleasure, bestiality, the depravity arising from the thought of a woman eating another woman’s excrement, the pleasure obtained in raping children, the murder of children and sexual intercourse with parents of violated and murdered children, were unacceptable even in a democratic society. The court noted that under Maltese law, blasphemy was a contravention, and a person could not be immune from punishment simply because he or she was acting on stage. The Shoah, the court went on, “was a historical fact where innocent victims underwent unprecedented suffering. Instead of treating this sensitive and delicate subject...with due respect to the dignity of the victims, the character Stu shows only sexual depravity...the author permits the demeaning and humiliation of that tragedy totally out of context and for no other reason than for perversions. No matter how the text of the play is looked at, it runs aground on the reef of the inalienable dignity of the human person, and the court understands that this was the underlying reason for the Board’s decision.” 43. The court rejected their complaint under Article 6 on the basis that the proper procedure had been undertaken, the applicants had been free to put forward their views in their request for reconsideration, which was carried out by another person [not present at first-instance] and no bias had been shown. 44. The applicants appealed the first-instance judgment only in so far as it concerned the merits of their complaints, and asked the Constitutional Court to confirm the judgment in so far as it related to the second applicant’s victim status. By a judgment of 29 November 2012, the Constitutional Court confirmed the first-instance judgment and ordered the applicants to pay all costs. 45. The Constitutional Court noted that the first-court had chosen to exercise its jurisdiction and rejected the defendants’ objection of non‑exhaustion of ordinary remedies, which in the absence of an appeal on the matter had become final. Nevertheless, it noted that the applicants had not instituted judicial review proceedings of the administrative action in question (the Board’s decision); thus they were not complaining that the Board’s decision was based on improper motives or irrelevant considerations. Moreover, the ordinary court, in judicial review proceedings, could have also examined the reasonableness of the decision, taking into account all the circumstances of the case. Thus, the applicants could no longer complain about the Board’s decision ut sic, and people’s opinions on the play were irrelevant given that the applicants considered the decision to be reasonable. 46. As to the constitutional and conventional complaint raised by the applicants, the Constitutional Court held that the existence of the Board did not breach any of the applicants’ rights, and indeed the applicants had not impugned the law establishing the Board. It further considered that freedom of expression had limits and that it was accompanied by duties and responsibilities. Both the Convention and the Constitution provided for inter alia the protection of morals and the reputation and rights of others, and the Maltese Constitution also included public decency, in the relevant provision. 47. The Constitutional Court, having read the script, shared the first‑instance court’s view about various scenes of the play. It considered that such scenes all throughout the play affected the morality and decency of the entire production, and it was within the Board’s competence to assess that in line with the Regulations. The Constitutional Court had no doubt that there were phrases which constituted disparaging and insolent remarks towards more than one belief, towards women and towards the suffering of the Jews in the Second World War. 48. Referring to the Court’s case-law, in particular, Otto‑Preminger‑Institut v. Austria (§ 47) it recalled that those who chose to exercise the freedom to manifest their religion, “must tolerate and accept the denial by others of their religious beliefs and even the propagation by others of doctrines hostile to their faith. However, the manner in which religious beliefs and doctrines are opposed or denied is a matter which may engage the responsibility of the State, notably its responsibility to ensure the peaceful enjoyment of the right guaranteed under Article 9 to the holders of those beliefs and doctrines.” 49. In its view the limits of decency had been breached due to the blasphemy which was an offence under Maltese law and to the vilification of the dignity of a people, of a woman, of children, and of the human being, as well as the extreme glorification of sexual perversion. These instances were so strong that they affected the play in its entirety and prevailed over any genuine aim presumably intended by the play. The court emphasized that the production despised the dignity of the individual, in particular sectors, such as women and children, whether because of their nationality or religion, and opined that even though the main characters were acting in this way because of tension, pressure and depression, such contempt could not be justified as art. In the court’s view while art was a wide concept covering any type of manifestation of expression, it could not include language which was obscene and despised the trauma of a genocide, and which, in itself, was against the laws of the country. For a strong moral message to be portrayed it was possible to cause discomfort and annoy other persons, but not to the extent of insulting them because of their beliefs, their people, or simply because they were a woman or a child. 50. Recalling that it was the duty of the State to protect the morality of the country, the Constitutional Court considered that the Board had fulfilled its duty. What was morally correct depended on the State and the relevant religion, and could not be determined universally. Thus, the fact that the production was performed elsewhere did not mean that it had to also be produced in Malta, particularly in the light of the laws in force in each country. This was precisely why states had latitude in applying certain restrictions on freedom of expression. 51. It further noted that under the laws in force, the Board could ban the play, as opposed to classifying it for a mature audience. In any event it considered that adults, who could chose to watch the play in such a case, would also be deserving of protection, and thus limitations could also be necessary in such cases. It highlighted the states’ duty to preserve the sensitivities of the silent citizen (as opposed to the vociferous ones, who inundated media forums) and considered that no remedy after the performance could heal any harm already done to society. Thus, in the Constitutional Court’s view the Board’s decision was correct, was not capricious or exaggerated, and it corresponded to the need to protect public morality in Maltese society and the rights of others. 52. The Constitutional Court concluded that it was not necessary to watch the play as the script was enough. In the absence of an Article 14 complaint, it was also unnecessary to compare the performance to other performances which had been allowed by the Board. The applicants having refused to make any changes to the text, despite its invitation to do so, the Constitutional Court confirmed that it would remain banned and that there was no breach of Article 10. 53. In connection with their Article 6 complaint, the Constitutional Court held that the applicants did not institute judicial review proceedings and in any event there had been no breach of their rights. Furthermore, in their view there had been no determination of any civil right.

5. The applicant political party has its registered seat in Budapest. 6. On 2 October 2016 a referendum related to the European Union’s migrant relocation plan was held in Hungary. The referendum was initiated by the Government and posed the following question: “Do you want the European Union to be entitled to order the mandatory settlement of non-Hungarian citizens in Hungary without Parliament’s consent?” 7. In the course of the campaign several opposition parties called on voters to boycott the referendum or to cast invalid ballots that would not count in the final tally but could still be interpreted as rejecting the idea of the referendum. On 29 September 2016 the applicant political party made available a mobile telephone application to voters (“the cast-an-invalid-vote app”) where they could upload, and share with the public, photographs taken of their ballots. It also enabled voters to comment on the reasons for how they cast their ballot. The posting and sharing of photographs were anonymous. The application was reported in major online journals. 8. On 29 September 2016 a private individual lodged a complaint with the National Election Commission (Nemzeti Választási Bizottság) about the application. 9. In a decision of 30 September 2016 the National Election Commission found that the application infringed the principles of fairness of elections, voting secrecy, and the proper exercise of rights (rendeltetésszerű joggyakorlás), and ordered the applicant organisation to refrain from further breaches of section 2(1)(a) and (e) of Act no. XXXVI of 2013 on Electoral Procedure and Article 2(1) of the Fundamental Law. Relying on a previous resolution issued in 2014, it held that voters could not treat ballot papers as their own [property], and therefore could neither take them out of the voting booths nor take a photograph of them. It held that taking photographs of ballot papers could lead to electoral fraud. Furthermore, although the principle of secrecy did not create any obligation on the voters’ side, it nevertheless did not entitle them to abuse their situation, bearing in mind that voting secrecy could only be maintained with their cooperation. The Commission concluded that the phone application was capable of discrediting the work of election bodies and tallying systems in the eyes of the public. 10. The applicant sought judicial review of this decision before the Kúria. 11. By a judgment of 10 October 2016 the Kúria upheld the Commission’s decision as to its finding regarding the infringement of the principle of the proper exercise of rights. The Kúria held that the purpose of the ballots had been to enable voters to express their opinion on the referendum question, and that taking photographs of ballots and subsequently publishing them had not been in line with this purpose. A ban on photographs and on publication had not infringed voters’ freedom of expression, since they had been free to express their opinions by casting their ballots and to share with others how they had voted. The Kúria overturned the remainder of the Commission’s decision on the infringement of the secrecy of the electoral process and on the discrediting of the work of the electoral bodies. It found that there was no regulation prohibiting voters from taking photographs of their ballot papers in the voters’ booths and that their identity could not have been revealed through the mobile telephone application. 12. Meanwhile, on 3 October 2016 the same private individual lodged a new complaint with the National Election Commission, in the light of the fact that the applicant political party had activated the “cast-an-invalid-vote app” on 2 October, the day of the referendum. The complainant maintained that by operating the mobile telephone application and by encouraging voters to make use of it, the applicant political party had infringed the principles governing the bona fide and proper exercise of rights, and also the principles of fairness and secrecy of elections. 13. In a decision of 7 October 2016 the National Election Commission reiterated its previous finding that taking photographs of ballot papers had infringed the principle of the secrecy of voters’ ballots, the fairness of elections, and the proper exercise of rights, and fined the political party 832,500 Hungarian forints (HUF – approximately 2,700 euros (EUR)). The Commission supplemented its previous reasoning by noting that the mobile telephone application calling on voters to cast an invalid ballot could have influenced voters and had thus constituted unlawful campaigning. 14. The applicant political party sought judicial review of this decision as well. 15. By a decision of 18 October 2016 the Kúria upheld the Commission’s decision as to the finding of an infringement of the principle of the proper exercise of rights. It explained that the purpose of the ballot papers had been for voters to express their opinion on the referendum question, and any other use of them had constituted a violation of the principle of the proper exercise of rights. The Kúria overturned the remainder of the Commission’s decision as to a violation of the fairness and voting secrecy and the principle of the bona fide exercise of rights. It reiterated its previous finding that the identity of the individual voters had not been revealed, and emphasised that the conduct of the applicant political party had had no impact on the fairness of the referendum. It reduced the fine to HUF 100,000 (approximately EUR 330). 16. The applicant organisation lodged a constitutional complaint against the decisions of both 10 and 18 October 2016. In both complaints the applicant requested the Constitutional Court to “establish that the Kúria’s decision infringed its right recognised in Article IX (1) of the Fundamental Law”. It argued that “under Article 27 of the Act on the Constitutional Court an organisation personally concerned by an unconstitutional judicial decision, after having exhausted all other remedies, may lodge a complaint with the Constitutional Court if the decision on the merits infringed its right ensured by the Constitution. The decision of the Kúria declared the applicant’s conduct unlawful and obliged it to pay a fine, it was the applicant who lodged the petition for review with the Kúria, thus it was individually concerned in the present case...By making the mobile phone application available the applicant reacted to the spreading of social media communication. Citizens regularly share events, thoughts and opinions on internet websites through photos taken with their mobile phones. In the context of elections, this led to the fact that all over the world, voters take photos of their ballot papers and share it through social media. By developing the mobile phone application the applicant wanted to enable voters to share photos of ballot papers (or in case of those who absented from the referendum photos of the activities undertaken instead of voting) and other messages in an anonymous way and exercise their right to freedom of expression in a way that the content of the vote could not be linked to the voter. ...In the applicant’s view the impugned decision, its legal interpretation and the consequences applied by the Kúria infringe its right under Article IX (1) of the Fundamental Law. The conduct of voters taking photos of ballot papers and sharing it with others is an expression of an opinion in public matters and constitutes a conduct falling under the freedom of expression of opinions, and in particular, the most protected aspect of it, a discussion on matters of public interest. Thus, the applicant’s activity, providing a forum for voters to express an opinion is also protected by the Article IX (1) of the Fundamental Law...In the applicant’s opinion, the decision of the the Kúria, by invoking voters’ right to freedom of expression, restrained in fact, the applicant’s own conduct of exercising its right to freedom of expression without any constitutional reason.” The applicant further submitted that, as established by the Kúria, the mobile phone application had not infringed the secrecy and fairness of the voting procedure and it had also not been capable of doing so, since the content of the ballot papers could not be linked to the voters. Thus, it argued that these aims could not serve as a legitimate basis for restricting the right to freedom of expression. In any event, even if the application could have infringed the secrecy of voting, the ban on the application had been disproportionate. 17. The Constitutional Court declared the complaints inadmissible on 24 October 2016, with identical reasoning, on the grounds that the cases did not concern the applicant organisation’s right to freedom of expression. It reiterated the Kúria’s finding that although the case related to the freedom of expression of voters, this had not been infringed by the decision of the Election Commission, which had only found that the method used – that is to say uploading photographs to a mobile application – had not been in compliance with the obligation to exercise voting rights in accordance with their purpose. In the Constitutional Court’s view the applicant political party had merely provided a forum for voters to share photographs of their ballot papers or their intention to abstain from voting, it had did not itself expressed an opinion. Since the applicant political party had only complained about the restriction of voters’ right to freedom of expression, it had not been personally concerned by the decision of the Kúria.

5. The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Split. 6. On 19 May 2011 the applicant and several other individuals (see, for further information, Šoš v. Croatia, no. 26211/13, § 17, 1 December 2015) were arrested on suspicion of drug trafficking and detained under Article 123 § 1(2), (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of collusion, risk of reoffending, and seriousness of charges). 7. During the investigation, an investigating judge of the Split County Court (Županijski sud u Splitu) several times extended the pre-trial detention in respect of the applicant and the other suspects under Article 123 § 1(2), (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of collusion, risk of reoffending, and seriousness of charges). The reasoning of the relevant decisions is outlined in the case of Šoš (cited above, §§ 20 and 23). 8. On 18 August 2011 the investigating judge extended the pre-trial detention in respect of the applicant and the other suspects under Article 123 § 1 (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of reoffending and seriousness of charges). He found that all the relevant witnesses had been questioned and that there was no further possibility of remanding the suspects in detention on the grounds of the risk of collusion. As to the other grounds relied upon for the pre-trial detention, the investigating judge reiterated his previous findings. 9. The investigating judge relied on the same reasons extending the pre-trial detention in respect of the applicant and the other suspects in the further course of the investigation. The reasoning of the relevant decisions is outlined in the Šoš case (cited above, §§ 28, 31, 36 and 41). 10. On 16 May 2012 the applicant and nine other individuals were indicted on charges of drug trafficking in the Split County Court. 11. Following the submission of the indictment, on 18 May 2012 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court extended the pre-trial detention in respect of the applicant and the other accused relying on Article 123 § 1 (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of reoffending and seriousness of charges). His pre-trial detention was extended several times on the same grounds. The reasoning of the relevant decisions is outlined in the Šoš case (cited above, §§ 44, 47 and 52). 12. On 20 February 2013 the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske), acting as a court of appeal, found that the applicant’s detention should be extended only under Article 123 § 1 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of reoffending). It explained that the 2013 amendments to the Criminal Code provided that the offence at issue was punishable by a prison sentence of between three and fifteen years and no longer by long-term imprisonment. It was therefore not possible to remand the applicant on the grounds of the seriousness of the charges since the possibility of imposing a sentence of long-term imprisonment was one of the conditions for extending pre-trial detention under Article 123 § 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (seriousness of charges). 13. On 20 April 2013 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court extended the pre-trial detention in respect of the applicant and the other accused under Article 123 § 1 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of reoffending), without changing its previous reasoning. 14. On 17 May 2013 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court extended the maximum two-year statutory time-limit for the applicant’s pre-trial detention under Article 133 § 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure for a further six months (until 19 November 2013) relying on section 35(2) of the Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organised Crime Act (hereinafter “the OSCOCA”). 15. The applicant appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that section 35(2) of the OSCOCA was inapplicable to his case since he was not detained during the investigation. 16. On 7 June 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on the grounds that the said provision of the OSCOCA made a mistaken reference to Article 130 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It also considered that the cited provision was incomprehensible since, if understood as provided in that Act, it merely repeated paragraph 1 of section 35 of the OSCOCA, which would be obsolete. Instead it should be interpreted in line with the previous abrogated version of the OSCOCA, which in its section 28(3) had provided for a possibility of extension of the overall maximum period of detention for a further six months, which was in the applicant’s case until 19 November 2013. 17. On 18 June 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) reiterating his previous arguments. 18. On 11 July 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint as unfounded, endorsing the reasoning of the Supreme Court. 19. The applicant’s pre-trial detention was extended, under Article 123 § 1 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of reoffending), until the maximum period expired on 19 November 2013, when he was released.

5. The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Luhansk. She has had a first-degree disability since childhood. 6. On 2 April 1998, during her time at the Slavyanoserbskiy Psychoneurological Asylum run by the Luhansk Regional Council (Слав’яносербський психоневрологічний інтернат Луганської обласної ради) (“the asylum”), another patient, B., inflicted grievous bodily harm on the applicant. Her injuries included concussion, a fractured jaw and nose, and numerous cuts on her face. Later she also lost the sight in her right eye and the sight in her left eye deteriorated which, according to the forensic examination report of 25 June 2007, was also due to the trauma sustained by the applicant on 2 April 1998. 7. On 16 September 1998 B. died. 8. On 8 May 1998 the Slavyanoserbskiy district prosecutor’s office of the Luhansk Region (прокуратура Слов’яносербського району Луганської області  “the prosecutor’s office”) refused to institute criminal proceedings against two asylum employees (orderlies), N. and L. When questioned about the incident, the orderlies testified that on the morning of 2 April 1998 they had been cleaning the rooms when they had heard someone crying. They had found the applicant on her bed with her face smashed. Other patients had told N. and L. that B. had beaten the applicant with a mop because she had hit B. The prosecutor noted that (i) B. was “without legal capacity because of a mental disorder” (недієздатна внаслідок психічного розладу) and thus could not be held criminally responsible for assaulting the applicant, and (ii) even though it appeared that orderlies N. and L. had been negligent in their duties (according to the asylum orderlies’ list of duties submitted by the Government they were not allowed to leave patients unsupervised), which could possibly constitute a crime under Article 167 of the 1960 Criminal Code (see paragraph 27 below), they were not considered to be “officials” who could be prosecuted under that provision. 9. On 9 December 2004, within civil proceedings (see paragraphs 11–16 below), the applicant’s representative requested that the first-instance court reopen a criminal investigation into the incident. On the same date the request was rejected. The court noted that the prosecutor’s office had already issued a decision on 8 May 1998, which had not been appealed against. Moreover, B. had died and therefore, in accordance with the law in force, no criminal proceedings could be instituted against her. The ruling was upheld by the Luhansk Regional Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Ukraine on 3 August 2005 and 31 March 2006 respectively. 10. Following the entry into force of a new Criminal Procedure Code, on 26 December 2012 the applicant lodged a complaint with the police, alleging negligence by the orderlies. The complaint was registered and two separate investigations launched into negligent performance of duties by members of the medical or pharmaceutical profession and negligence of duties by officials. On 19 February 2013 both investigations were merged. Several witnesses were questioned including the applicant, her mother and orderly L. The latter testified that she had not seen the incident take place but had later learned that for an unknown reason B. had hit the applicant with a mop left by L. in their room. On 30 June 2013 the proceedings were terminated by a police investigator of the Slyavyanoserbskyy District Police Department (слідчій слідчого відділу Слов’яносербського районного відділу ГУМВС України в Луганській області). That decision was identical to the one of 8 May 1998 (see paragraph 8 above) and referred to the investigator’s findings (i) that B. had been “without legal capacity because of a mental disorder” (недієздатна внаслідок психічного розладу) and thus could not be held responsible for assaulting the applicant, and (ii) that even though it appeared that the orderlies N. and L. had been negligent in their duties, which could constitute a crime under Article 167 (negligence of duties by officials) or Article 140 of the new 2001 Criminal Code (negligent performance of duties by members of the medical profession), they were not considered to be “officials” or “members of the medical profession” who could be prosecuted under those provisions of the law. 11. On 10 February 1999 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the asylum in the Zhovtnevyy Local Court of Luhansk, seeking compensation for non-pecuniary and pecuniary damage (the cost of medications and food expenses incurred while staying in a hospital between 2 and 30 April 1998 and between 18 and 26 May 1998 and the costs of dental prosthesis care). The applicant claimed that following negligence on the part of the asylum employees L. and N. she had been beaten by B. The applicant also indicated that the asylum should not have placed B. in one room with the applicant since B. had been known for her violent behaviour. 12. On 4 May 1999, at the request of a prosecutor, the court launched proceedings to establish the applicant’s legal capacity. Eight days later the consideration of the applicant’s claim for compensation was suspended pending the outcome of the legal capacity proceedings. 13. On 9 October 2002 the legal capacity proceedings were terminated because the prosecutor failed to appear at the hearing. 14. On 19 June 2003 the first-instance court ordered a medical examination of the applicant and the case was forwarded to the Luhansk Bureau of Forensic Medical Examinations. On 19 October 2004 the case was returned to the first-instance court with an expert report confirming that the applicant had sustained grievous bodily harm. 15. On 3 October 2006 the Zhovtnevyy District Court of Luhansk awarded the applicant 30,000 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH) in compensation for non‑pecuniary damage (approximately 4,500 euros (EUR) at the material time). In a court hearing the asylum’s representative submitted that in his view the applicant had initiated the conflict with B. herself and thus there had been no negligence on the part of the asylum’s employees. The court, having listened to the parties and witnesses and having examined the case material, concluded that on 2 April 1998 as a result of a fight between the applicant and B., “who at the material time was found to be without legal capacity” (яка на той момент була визнана недієздатною), the applicant had received injuries. The court expressly noted that those conclusions were not disputed by the parties. The court further referred to the decision of the prosecutor’s office of 8 May 1998 (see paragraph 8 above) and held that harm had been inflicted on the applicant as a result of negligence by the asylum employees (orderlies). Lastly, the court rejected the applicant’s claims for pecuniary damages (compensation for medication, food, loss of income and travel expenses) as not supported by relevant evidence. 16. The applicant lodged an appeal challenging the refusal of the court to award her pecuniary damages but later withdrew it. The decision of 3 October 2006 thus became final and enforceable. 17. On 13 December 2006 the prosecutor’s office sent a demand to the asylum pointing out violations of work safety regulations which required remediation. According to the demand, the applicant’s rights had been violated because there had been no internal investigation into the incident within the statutory time‑limit (of within ten days of the incident). 18. There is no information to suggest that the asylum complied with the demand. 19. On 3 October 2007 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Zhovtnevyy District Court of Luhansk, seeking an acknowledgement that bodily harm had been inflicted on her. The applicant asserted, in particular, that the asylum was avoiding delivering a report on the incident even though it was necessary to establish the facts surrounding the incident and to recover damages for the injuries sustained. 20. On 22 November 2007 the complaint was allowed by the court. Referring to its decision of 3 October 2006, which had become final (see paragraph 16 above), the court established that the applicant had had a fight with B. and had received injuries while at the asylum. 21. On 18 February 2008 the applicant instituted a new set of proceedings against the asylum, seeking compensation for loss of labour capacity and expenses for medications which the applicant permanently needed. 22. On 15 June 2012 the Zhovtnevyy District Court allowed the claim. Referring to its judgment of 3 October 2006 (see paragraph 15 above), the court established that harm had been inflicted on the applicant as a result of negligence by the asylum employees. The court also noted that even though B. had not been declared to be without legal capacity, at the time of the incident both she and the applicant had been under the supervision of the asylum, which should accordingly have been held responsible for the incident. On 23 October 2012 the Luhansk Regional Court of Appeal upheld this decision. 23. On 30 January 2013 the Higher Specialised Civil and Criminal Court of Ukraine, following an appeal by the defendant, quashed the decisions of the lower courts and remitted the case to the first-instance court for fresh consideration. It held that since B. “ha[d] not been declared to be without legal capacity” (не була визнана недієздатною), she had been partially responsible for the incident and thus the lower courts should have considered the extent of her liability. 24. On 27 September 2013 the first-instance court allowed the applicant’s claim in part and awarded her UAH 44,130 (around EUR 4,140 at the material time). The asylum was ordered to pay the applicant each month UAH 779.52 (approximately EUR 71), which was 64% of the monthly minimum wage. The court noted that, according to the court decision of 3 October 2006, harm had been inflicted on the applicant as a result of negligence by the asylum employees. However, since B. had not been officially declared to be without legal capacity and thus had been partially liable for the incident, liability for the incident and damages were divided between the asylum and B. as to 80% and 20%, respectively. No particular grounds for that assessment were given. 25. Both parties appealed against this judgment. The applicant argued that the asylum had been solely responsible for her injuries, referring to the court’s findings on 3 October 2006 (see paragraph 15 above) and 22 November 2007 (see paragraph 20 above). On 18 December 2013 the Luhansk Regional Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of 27 September 2013, noting that “the first-instance court had correctly established the degree of guilt of those who had inflicted harm”. On 17 February 2014 the Higher Specialised Civil and Criminal Court of Ukraine rejected the applicant’s request for leave for appeal as unsubstantiated.

5. The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Kırıkkale. 6. On 25 September 1998 the applicant was arrested by police officers and taken into custody on suspicion of being a member of an illegal organisation. 7. On 30 September 1998 police officers at the Istanbul Security Headquarters took a statement from the applicant in the absence of a lawyer, as a result of the restriction stemming from Law no. 3842. He confessed that he was a member of the organisation in question and gave information about certain activities in which he had participated. 8. On 2 October 1998 a statement was taken from the applicant by the Istanbul public prosecutor. He confirmed the statement he had made to the police. 9. On the same day, the applicant was questioned by the investigating judge in the absence of a lawyer. He confirmed the statement he had made to the public prosecutor, but withdrew the one he had made to the police. The applicant alleged that he had given the statements under duress. The investigating judge ordered the applicant’s pre-trial detention. 10. On 7 October 1998 the public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Istanbul State Security Court, charging the applicant under Article 125 of the former Turkish Criminal Code with being involved in separatist activities against the Republic of Turkey. The criminal proceedings commenced before the Istanbul State Security Court, the bench of which included a military judge. 11. On 12 October 1998 the Istanbul State Security Court held a preparatory hearing and decided that the first hearing would take place on 16 December 1998. 12. On 16 December 1998 the other co-accused, namely G.T., Z.A. and D.P.N.J., gave evidence in person. They did not give any statement in relation to the applicant. 13. On 8 March 1999 the trial court, noting the absence of the accused, decided to adjourn the hearing. 14. At the hearing held on 2 June 1999, the applicant gave evidence in person and stated that he had been forced to sign his previous statements. The applicant retracted those statements while maintaining that he had not been involved in any of the offences attributed to him. At the same hearing, the other co-accused, namely A.B. and B.G. also gave evidence in person. They did not make any statements in respect of the applicant. 15. While the criminal proceedings against the applicant were pending, on 18 June 1999 the Constitution was amended and the military judge sitting on the bench of the Istanbul State Security Court was replaced by a civilian judge. Between 18 June 1999 and 2 September 2002, the trial court consisting of three civilian judges held fourteen hearings on the merits. 16. On 4 August 1999, the State Security Court, composed of three civilian judges, heard evidence from A.S., Ş.K., H.K., S.K., N.Ç., T.G., Ö.Ö. as witnesses, from M.N. as accused and from K.Ö. as a complainant. Two of them made incriminatory statements in relation to the applicant. When asked his comments concerning those statements, the applicant rejected them, maintaining that he had had no connection with the accusations. 17. On 25 April 2001 the public prosecutor read out his observations on the merits (esas hakkında mütalaa) and requested that the applicant be convicted and sentenced under Article 125 of the former Criminal Code. At the same hearing, the applicant’s lawyer requested time to submit the applicant’s defence submissions. 18. On 29 August 2001 the applicant’s lawyer made his defence submissions in relation to the merits of the case. 19. On 27 March 2002 the applicant’s lawyer reiterated his previous defence submissions. 20. On 19 June 2002 the applicant’s lawyer, again reiterated his previous defence submissions. At the same hearing, the applicant stated that he had agreed to his lawyer’s submissions. 21. On 2 September 2002 the applicant and his lawyer presented their closing arguments. On the same day the Istanbul State Security Court convicted the applicant and sentenced him to thirty years’ imprisonment, pursuant to Article 125 of the former Criminal Code. The first-instance court based its decision on several items of evidence, such as the applicant’s statements to the police, the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, documents relating to the organisation which had been found and seized in the course of police operations, and the statements of some co-defendants. 22. On 7 April 2003 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment. On 29 May 2003 that decision was deposited with the registry of the Istanbul State Security Court.

4. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Rustavi. 5. On 6 May 2007 an investigation was opened into a murder. 6. On 24 May 2007 an identification parade was carried out. The eyewitness to the crime identified the applicant’s son, G.T., as the culprit. The latter was arrested and remanded in custody in Tbilisi Prison no. 5. 7. On 18 February 2008 G.T. was convicted of murder and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. 8. On 23 June 2008 an appellate court upheld the conviction and sentence in full. 9. On 28 January 2009 an appeal on points of law by G.T. was declared inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded. 10. Between 24 May 2007 and 7 July 2008 G.T. was detained at Tbilisi Prison no. 5 and Gldani Prison no. 8. No medical complaints were raised by G.T. while he was at those facilities, nor has the applicant suggested otherwise. 11. On 7 July 2008 G.T. was placed in Rustavi Prison no. 2. 12. On 1 December 2008 G.T. complained of ill health. He was examined by a duty doctor, who suspected tuberculosis. 13. On 8 December 2008 a sputum test was performed at the laboratory of the National Centre for Tuberculosis and Lung Disease. 14. On 17 December 2008 the sputum test revealed the presence of tuberculosis bacteria, and a susceptibility test regarding first-line drugs for the treatment of tuberculosis was ordered (“the first susceptibility test”). On the same day a doctor from Rustavi Prison no. 2 diagnosed G.T. with tuberculosis, and recommended that he be transferred to a specialist facility. 15. On 21 December 2008 G.T. was placed in the medical unit of Rustavi Prison no. 2 and enrolled in a DOTS (Directly Observed Treatment, Short-course) programme, the strategy for the detection and treatment of tuberculosis recommended by the World Health Organization. He started receiving conventional, first-line anti-tuberculosis drugs pending the outcome of the first susceptibility test. The programme in question operated at Rustavi Prison no. 2 between 21 December 2008 and 29 January 2009. 16. On 21 January 2009 a doctor noted in G.T.’s medical file that his state of health remained serious despite the treatment, and recommended that he be transferred to a specialist medical establishment. 17. On 29 January 2009 G.T. was placed in a facility in Ksani for prisoners with tuberculosis. The medical note made on that date refers to his tuberculosis as being “multidrug-resistant”, and describes his overall condition as “serious.” G.T. continued to have treatment under the DOTS programme. 18. On 24 February 2009 the results of the first susceptibility test showed that G.T. was resistant to the first-line drugs for the treatment of tuberculosis. Therefore, a second susceptibility test was ordered in respect of the second-line drugs for the treatment of multidrug-resistant tuberculosis (“the second susceptibility test”). 19. On 26 February 2009 G.T. was transferred to the prison hospital in view of a further deterioration in his health. The medical records relating to his time at that facility show that he was suffering from cachexia, and from early March 2009 onwards he complained that he was unable to walk. He continued to receive the previously prescribed anti-tuberculosis treatment with the first-line drugs pending the results of the second susceptibility test. 20. On 10 April 2009 the results of the second susceptibility test were received by the prison hospital, and they demonstrated that the disease was responding to all but one drug out of the second-line drugs. 21. On 24 April 2009 it was decided that G.T. should be enrolled in the DOTS+ programme for the treatment of multidrug-resistant tuberculosis. 22. On 4 May 2009 G.T. started the prescribed treatment. 23. On 19 May 2009 G.T. died of a massive pulmonary haemorrhage. 24. On 19 May 2009 the Investigative Department of the Ministry of Prisons opened a preliminary investigation into premeditated murder. On the same day, a forensic medical examination was carried out to determine the exact cause of G.T.’s death, which confirmed that he had died of a massive pulmonary haemorrhage, a fatal complication of the disease. 25. The investigating authorities questioned the chief doctor of Rustavi Prison no. 2, a doctor from the Ksani facility for prisoners with tuberculosis, and a doctor from the prison hospital. They stated that G.T.’s treatment under the DOTS programme had been adequate. 26. On 13 October 2009 the investigator in charge of the case refused to grant the applicant victim status. He noted that no crime had been committed, as G.T. had died of a natural complication of his tuberculosis. The applicant appealed. 27. On 19 November 2009 a prosecutor from the Chief Prosecutor’s Office who was supervising the investigations carried out by the Investigative Department of the Ministry of Prisons forwarded the applicant’s appeal against the investigator’s refusal to grant her victim status to the director of that department, “for an appropriate response”. 28. On 22 February 2010 the applicant was granted victim status. 29. An undated document signed by the prosecutor instructed the investigator to question experts from the National Centre for Tuberculosis and Lung Disease and obtain records concerning G.T.’s health. 30. On 5 February 2010 two experts from the National Centre for Tuberculosis and Lung Disease were also questioned. They confirmed that G.T.’s treatment under the DOTS programme had been adequate. As regards his involvement in the DOTS+ programme, one of the experts noted that it was only in February and April 2009 that the treatment of multidrug-resistant tuberculosis had become possible in the Ksani facility and the prison hospital respectively. 31. On an unspecified date the investigator sent G.T.’s medical file to the State Regulation Agency for Medical Activities to be assessed. The report issued on 21 May 2010 concluded that a massive pulmonary haemorrhage was a possible lethal complication of tuberculosis. It noted that G.T.’s enrolment in the DOTS programme and later in the DOTS+ programme had been in compliance with the national standards on the treatment of tuberculosis. 32. On 4 June 2010 the preliminary investigation was terminated on account of the absence of a crime. The investigator relied on the forensic evidence to conclude that G.T. had died of a natural complication of tuberculosis, and also relied on witness statements confirming that his treatment had been adequate. 33. On 22 July 2010 the Tbilisi City Court allowed an application by the applicant and ordered that the investigation should be reopened in order for G.T.’s sister to be questioned. His sister had allegedly met a doctor at Rustavi Prison no. 2 before G.T.’s official diagnosis and had given him some strong drugs intended for her brother on the basis of an unsigned and undated prescription. That doctor had not been identified or questioned. 34. On an unspecified date the investigation was reopened. It was closed again on 15 October 2010 after G.T.’s sister had been questioned and after a forensic examination of the unsigned and undated prescription had been carried out to identify whether its author was indeed one of the doctors from Rustavi Prison no. 2. As the handwriting examined in the forensic examination did not resemble the handwriting of any of the doctors at the prison in question, the investigator concluded that G.T.’s sister’s allegations were manifestly ill-founded. 35. The relevant national and international materials concerning the problem of tuberculosis in Georgian prisons at the material time, the treatment of multidrug-resistant tuberculosis in Georgian prisons at the material time, and the World Health Organization Guidelines for the Management of Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis are summarised by the Court in the case of Makharadze and Sikharulidze v. Georgia (no. 35254/07, §§ 44‑48, 22 November 2011). 36. At the material time, the management of prisons, including the provision of medical care to prisoners was a responsibility of the Prison Department of the Ministry of Prisons (see Order no. 60 of the Minister of Prisons approving the Regulations of the Prison Department, 24 February 2009). The Prison Department and the Investigative Department were subordinated to the Minister of Prisons (see Order no. 60, cited above, and Order no. 152 of the Minister of Prisons approving the Regulations of the Investigative Department, 16 April 2009).

5. The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Mykolayiv. 6. The applicant married O. in 2006. The spouses lived in Mykolayiv. On 21 March 2007 their daughter S. was born. In August 2007 the couple separated. O. continued to live with the child at a different address in Mykolayiv and that place of the child’s residence was not, at that time, a matter of dispute between the parents. 7. On 15 April 2009 the Leninsky District Court of Mykolayiv, in response to an application from O., pronounced the couple’s divorce. 8. On 4 June 2009, in response to a claim brought by the applicant against O. concerning hindrance of access to the child, the Leninsky District Court of Mykolayiv granted the applicant rights of access to his daughter. It ordered that the applicant should be granted an opportunity to see his daughter no less than three times a week, including overnight stays with the applicant, the dates and times thereof to be fixed by mutual agreement in advance. 9. On 13 July 2009 the local police examined the applicant’s complaint concerning threats which O. regularly made when the applicant went to see the child, as well as O.’s refusal to let the child stay overnight with him and her restriction on the amount of time which the applicant could spend with the child. The police refused to open criminal proceedings because of the absence of the constituent elements of a criminal offence. 10. In the autumn of 2009 O. and S. moved to Selydove in the Donetsk Region. The distance between Mykolayiv and Selydove is about 600 kilometres by road. In view of that, the applicant initiated civil proceedings asking the court to determine that the child should live with him in Mykolayiv. That claim was dismissed as unfounded by the courts with the final decision being taken by the Higher Specialised Court on Civil and Criminal Matters (“the HSCU”) on 1 August 2011. 11. On 20 October 2009, at the applicant’s request, the Mykolayiv State Bailiffs’ Service opened proceedings for the enforcement of the judgment of 4 June 2009. However, on 22 October 2009 the bailiffs’ decision was quashed since the procedure for enforcement of a court judgment of that kind was not specified by law. 12. On 19 November 2009 the applicant arrived in Selydove, where O. allowed him to see the child for about one hour. On 27 January 2010, when O. and S. arrived for a short stay in Mykolayiv, the applicant attempted to see his daughter, but O. refused to let him take the child overnight. On 20 October 2011 when the applicant arrived in Selydove and attempted to collect the child from the childcare centre, O. arrived and took back the child. The applicant’s complaints to the police on account of those incidents were dismissed because of the absence of the constituent elements of a criminal offence. 13. On 28 March 2012 the applicant submitted to the Selydove State Bailiff’s Service a writ of execution of judgment dated 4 June 2009. On 29 March 2012 the State bailiff opened the enforcement proceedings. On 9 April 2012 in the presence of the applicant, O. and two witnesses, the State bailiff read out the operative part of the judgment of 4 June 2009 and issued a resolution on termination of the enforcement proceedings, considering that the judgment had been fully enforced by so doing. 14. The applicant brought a challenge in the courts against the termination of the enforcement proceedings. The courts upheld the bailiffs’ decision, finding that it had been taken in accordance with the law. The final decision was taken by the HSCU, which on 3 August 2012 dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law. 15. On 20 November 2012 in proceedings concerning child support allowances, the applicant admitted that he took the child to Mykolayiv to live with him for about one or two months per year. 16. In January 2013 the applicant brought a claim for damages against O. for obstructing enforcement of the judgment of 4 June 2009 granting him access rights. The courts dismissed the claim for lack of proof. The final decision in those proceedings, rejecting the applicant’s appeal on points of law, was delivered by the HSCU on 14 June 2013. 17. On 21 June 2013 the Leninskyy Dstrict Police Department in Mykolayiv opened criminal proceedings following the applicant’s complaint that O. had refused to comply with the judgment of 4 June 2009. On 10 December 2014 the police terminated the criminal proceedings because of the absence of the constituent elements of a criminal offence. The applicant challenged that decision in the court. On 1 April 2015 the Leninskyy District Court of Mykolayiv quashed the decision of 10 December 2014 after finding that the investigator had failed to substantiate his conclusion. The criminal investigation was resumed. 18. In 2014 the applicant instituted civil proceedings in Selydove Town Court seeking to determine anew his access rights in view of the impediments caused by O. On 12 January 2014 his claim was dismissed as unfounded. However, on 8 December 2015 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal partly allowed the applicant’s claim. It found that O. had prevented the applicant from properly exercising his access rights and ruled that the applicant should be given the opportunity of spending one month with his daughter during the summer and one week during the winter school holidays every year until she attained the age of majority. 19. On 26 May 2016 the Selydove department of State bailiffs’ service opened enforcement proceedings in relation to the judgment of 8 December 2015. On 10 June 2016 the bailiffs notified O. about the judgment of 8 December 2015. 20. In spring 2014 illegal armed groups associated with two self‑proclaimed entities known as the “Donetsk People’s Republic” and the “Luhansk People’s Republic” started operating in the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions, seizing control of certain parts of those regions by force. Ukrainian Government forces launched a military anti-terrorist operation against them. A ceasefire line was later put in place. Selydove is in the territory controlled by the Ukrainian Government, about twenty-five kilometres from the ceasefire line, and was included in the list of locations where the military anti‑terrorist operation was being conducted. According to information provided by the Government, in April 2014 certain movements of illegal armed groups had been registered in Selydovo, but no active military operations had ever taken place in that area. 21. In August 2014 the applicant lodged a claim with the Selydove Court seeking a declaration that O. was unlawfully failing to cooperate in executing the judgment of 4 June 2009 granting the applicant access rights. He also asked the court to determine that the child’s place of residence should be his home in Mykolayiv. He argued that O. was unemployed and had no source of independent income, and that the child was fully dependent on the child support payments which the applicant was duly making. He also argued that it was dangerous for the child to continue to reside in the proximity of a theatre of armed conflict. Moreover, there was a risk that the conflict might spread to Selydove. In support of the latter assertion the applicant cited media reports according to which representatives of the so-called “Donetsk People’s Republic” were threatening to capture all the territory of the Donetsk Region. 22. On 5 May 2015 the Selydove Court rejected the applicant’s claim. The court established that the applicant was employed and had good references from his employer, and had no recorded mental health or addiction problems. The court quoted a report compiled by the child protection authority in Mykolayiv, according to which the applicant could provide secure, well‑equipped accommodation suitable for a child, and had stable employment and income. However, the applicant had failed to prove that O. had no independent income or had failed to perform her parental duties or was engaged in unlawful or immoral conduct. The court also stated that the applicant had not substantiated the allegation that the child’s life was in danger and the mere fact of anti-terrorist military operations taking place in the region did not prove that risk. 23. On 4 August 2015 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal upheld the Selydove Court’s judgment, finding that the applicant had failed to substantiate the allegations that the child’s place of residence should be changed. 24. On 23 December 2015 the HSCU upheld the lower courts’ decisions. It stated that the Selydove Town Court had correctly established the relevant facts and had properly applied the law. The HSCU agreed with the lower courts’ conclusion that separating the child from the mother had not been justified.

6. The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Istanbul. At the time of the events giving rise to the present application, he was the owner and editor-in-chief of a publishing house, Aram Basım ve Yayıncılık. 7. In August 2003 the applicant’s company published a book entitled Patika – Gerilla Anıları IV (“The Path – Guerrilla Memoirs IV”, hereinafter “the book”). The editor of the book was a certain B.K. The 326-page book consisted of the memoirs of seventeen members of the PKK[1]. The authors of the memoirs described their lives in the PKK camps, in rural areas in both Turkey and Iraq, armed clashes with the Turkish security forces, and their ideology and opinions regarding the situation in Turkey. 8. In September 2003 the public prosecutor attached to the Istanbul State Security Court launched an investigation into the book. On 30 September 2003 he asked that court to order the seizure of copies of the book on the grounds that certain passages on pages 7, 19, 23, 81, 106‑114, 139, 147, 152, 157-177, 203, 273, 277, 317, 321 contained propaganda in favour of the PKK. 9. On the same day a single judge at the Istanbul State Security Court made an interim order for the seizure of copies of the book. The judge considered that the passages referred to by the public prosecutor incited the use of methods of violence and terror, and thus constituted propaganda in favour of the PKK. On 10 October 2003 an application by the applicant to set aside the order of 30 September 2003 was rejected. 10. On 14 October 2003 the Istanbul public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Istanbul State Security Court, charging the applicant with disseminating propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713). The public prosecutor cited a number of passages from pages 7, 19, 23, 81, 106-114, 139, 147, 152, 157-177, 203, 273, 277, 317, 321, and claimed that in those passages members of the PKK were depicted as heroes, and their acts and activities were praised. 11. On 26 March 2004 the Istanbul State Security Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to one year’s imprisonment and a fine. In its judgment, the court referred to a number of passages on pages 19, 21, 81, 105, 106, 107, 108, 110, 113, 114, 134, 135, 139, 147, 163, 189, 197, 203, 273, 274, 277, 317 and 321, and considered that those passages constituted propaganda in favour of the PKK. 12. On 7 October 2004 the Court of Cassation quashed the first-instance judgment holding that the first-instance court should consider the provisions of the new Press Act (Law no. 5187) which had entered into force on 26 June 2004. It then remitted the case file to the Istanbul Assize Court, since, in the meantime, state security courts had been abolished. 13. On 22 July 2005 the Istanbul Assize Court held that it did not have jurisdiction over the case and sent the file to the Beyoğlu Criminal Court. 14. On 5 July 2006 the Beyoğlu Criminal Court also ruled that it lacked jurisdiction. 15. On 19 October 2006 the Court of Cassation decided that the Istanbul Assize Court had jurisdiction over the case and sent the case file to that court. 16. On 29 June 2007 the Istanbul Assize Court once again convicted the applicant as charged. The court sentenced him to ten months’ imprisonment and a fine of 416 Turkish liras (TRY). In its judgment, the court held: “On the basis of the examination of the book in its entirety, it has been observed that the book depicts the activities of members of the PKK-KADEK, the terrorist organisation, and their so-called impressions of the clashes between them and members of the security forces. The book consists of different chapters written by different people. The preface to the book contains the following: ‘Our president Apo[2] states that the outcome of the war is very valuable ... While the history written and life created by bullets drip off pens, guerrillas go beyond the faraway corners of our land with their bags on the backs and their weapons in their hands ... We smile with a picture of war and, with a song, we add new [people] to those who have left us ...’ On page 160, it is stated: ‘We had to change the Anatolian People’s Army for Emancipation in accordance with the needs of the Anatolian people. They did not know us as members of the PKK, and we were not established there. If we went there as the PKK, we could not win their hearts. Therefore, when we first arrived in the Black Sea region, we used the name Anatolian People’s Army for Emancipation. Some people told us that they had never heard of our organisation, and they thought that we were a very good one. Some had difficulties, as they suspected us to be the PKK. We could not explicitly say that we were PKK members. Our president [Abdullah Öcalan] stated that he knew the people of the Black Sea, and advised us to raise consciousness through our attitudes and actions first, and then to tell them that we were PKK members, after they trusted us ...’ On pages 106 and 107, it is stated: ‘... I shared my joy with them by saying “Friends, four vehicles belonging to the enemy were destroyed. They were burned.” That day I forgot about my sleeplessness. I did not think about my tiredness, hunger or thirst as much as I had done before. I had only one wish: engaging in a clash and getting in a good shot with my weapon, which I had not used, although I had had it with me for long time.’ ‘... [He asked] “My friend, is this your first [armed] clash?” I said “yes.” “[Armed] clashes are nice, aren’t they?” “Yes, they are.”‘” 17. The Istanbul Assize Court considered that the above-mentioned passages and certain other passages on pages 19, 21, 81, 105, 108, 110, 113, 114, 134, 135, 139, 147, 163, 189, 197, 203, 273, 274, 277, 317 and 321 praised the armed clashes between PKK militants and the security forces, and those militants’ acts. As a result, the court found that the book did not have any literary value. According to the assize court, the publisher had not aimed to publish a book of memoirs, but had had the intention of disseminating propaganda inciting the terrorist organisation and its militants to violence or other methods of terrorism. 18. On 2 February 2010 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment. The Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of 29 June 2007 on the ground that a pre-payment notice had not been served on the applicant in accordance with section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 and Article 75 of the Criminal Code. 19. On 8 April 2011 the Istanbul Assize Court decided to discontinue the criminal proceedings against the applicant, since the prosecution was time‑barred.

5. The applicants were born in 1975 and live in Târgu-Mureş. 6. At the time of the facts of the present case, the applicants were working as judicial officers at the Mureş County Court (hereinafter “the County Court”). They had held those positions since 29 June 2000. 7. On 18 December 2007, relying on the provisions of the Anti-discrimination Ordinance (Government Ordinance no. 137/2000 on preventing and punishing all forms of discrimination) and of Article 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the Convention, the applicants brought an action in the Mureş County Court seeking compensation equivalent to the “loyalty bonus” (spor de fidelitate) to which they felt they had been entitled in respect of their salary since December 2004. They complained that, although they had met the same requirements as all the other categories of judicial and non-judicial court staff (including judges and ancillary personnel) who had received the loyalty bonus in accordance with Article 4 of Ordinance no. 27/2006 as in force at that time, they had been excluded by Article 16 of the Ordinance from benefitting from that bonus. The action was brought against the applicants’ employer and against the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of the Economy and Finance. 8. In a judgment of 14 February 2008 the County Court allowed the claim. It found that the relevant law created a difference in treatment between the applicants and the rest of the judicial and non-judicial court staff and that there was no justification for that different treatment. The court concluded that Article 14 of the Convention and Article 1 Protocol No. 12 to the Convention were applicable and declared that the applicants had been discriminated against because they had not been awarded the loyalty bonus. The court ordered that the applicants be paid compensation for the discrimination suffered, representing 5% of their monthly salary for the period running from December 2004 until 31 March 2006 and 15% for the period running from 1 April 2006 until the day the discrimination ended. The judgment was immediately enforceable. 9. On 16 and 25 April 2008 the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Finance appealed, arguing in the main that the court had overstepped the limits of its judicial authority and had acted as a “lawmaker” when it had awarded the applicants a right which had not been provided to them by law. On this point, they argued that the Anti-discrimination Ordinance did not apply to the manner in which social relations were regulated by law; it only concerned the applicability in practice of those laws. 10. In a final decision of 30 May 2008 the Târgu Mureş Court of Appeal (hereinafter “the Court of Appeal”) dismissed the appeal as unfounded in so far as it concerned the Ministry of Justice and as out of time in so far as it concerned the Ministry of Finance. It considered firstly that the Anti‑discrimination Ordinance applied to the applicants’ situation and on this point it dismissed the defendant party’s allegations of a breach of the principles of the separation of powers by the courts. It further considered that, in the light of Article 2 of the Anti-discrimination Ordinance and of the Court’s case-law on Article 14, the applicants had proved their allegations of discrimination, particularly that they had been treated differently from individuals in similar situations, without justification. In the court’s view, the protected right at stake was the principle of equality of treatment in the system of remuneration for work. On the merits of the case, the court relied on the laws regulating “confidentiality bonus[es]” (spor de confidenţialitate), noting that the applicants had to respect the confidentiality of the information to which they had access and for this reason concluded that they should be entitled to a “confidentiality bonus”, like other members of the judiciary and ancillary staff. It therefore awarded the applicants such a “confidentiality bonus”. 11. The use of the term “confidentiality bonus” in the court’s decision was brought to the court’s attention on 20 November 2008 by the defendants by means of an extraordinary appeal (subsection C below) and on 27 November by the applicants by means of an application for correction of material errors (subsection B below). 12. Meanwhile, on 14 October 2008 the authorities paid each of the applicants 30% of the amount they were entitled to receive as compensation for the period from December 2004 to July 2008. 13. On 27 November 2008 the applicants lodged an application for correction of material errors in the final decision adopted by the Court of Appeal in their case. They asked in particular that the word “confidentiality” be replaced with the word “loyalty” throughout the whole decision. 14. In an interlocutory judgment of 4 December 2008 the same bench – sitting in camera – of the Court of Appeal allowed the application, without notifying the parties. The court considered that the use of the phrase “confidentiality bonus” stemmed from a technical error and did not affect the reasoning of the judgment. 15. On 20 November 2008 the Ministry of Justice lodged an extraordinary appeal against the final decision of 30 May 2008, claiming that the Court of Appeal had failed to examine the grounds of appeal as stated by the defendants. It pointed out that the subject matter of the dispute was not a confidentiality bonus, as wrongly established by the court, but rather a loyalty bonus. It relied on the provisions of Article 318 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (“the CCP”) (see paragraph 27 below). 16. On 7 January 2009 the applicants, who had received a copy of the defendant party’s submissions, added their observations to the file. They argued that the defendant had failed to observe the time-limits set by law for lodging the appeal. They further argued that all the reasons for appeal had been thoroughly examined by the Court of Appeal, which had resolved the legal matter brought before it, that is to say – the right to compensation for the damage caused by discrimination. They also raised an objection of unconstitutionality of Articles 318 and 319 of the CCP, which in their view, by allowing for an open-ended possibility of lodging the extraordinary appeal, contradicted the right of access to court guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution and by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the latter having been incorporated into domestic law by Article 20 of the Constitution. Their objection was dismissed by the Constitutional Court on 12 May 2009, on the grounds that the said provisions did set the time-limits for the extraordinary appeal and that in any case, the enforcement proceedings were subject to the general statutes of limitation. 17. The Court of Appeal sitting in a different formation held a hearing on 14 October 2009. The applicants were not present, but requested that the extraordinary appeal be decided in their absence. The Court of Appeal ruled that the subject matter of the dispute had been wrongly determined as being an entitlement to a confidentiality bonus. In its view, the matter could not be considered as a simple material error: “It cannot be considered that this is a simple material [or] typographical error, which arose because of the striking similarity between the words ‘confidentiality’ and ‘loyalty’, as it had been adjudged in the interlocutory judgment of 4 December 2008 whereby this court ordered the correction of this material error by replacing the word ‘confidentiality’ with the word ‘loyalty’. The court of appeal referred to a completely different legal matter, which had not been brought before it by the parties, and thus dismissed as unfounded the appeal lodged by the Ministry of Justice without examining the arguments put before it by [the Ministry of Justice] by mistakenly copying the reasoning from a different decision, in which it had examined the issue of awarding a confidentiality bonus.” 18. Consequently, in the same hearing, the Court of Appeal allowed the extraordinary appeal and quashed the final decision. It observed that on 3 July 2008 the Constitutional Court had declared the relevant provisions of the Anti-discrimination Ordinance to be unconstitutional (decisions nos. 818 and 821 of 2008; see paragraph 24 below). It concluded that there were no longer any legal grounds to support the applicants’ action. The Court of Appeal thus allowed the appeal, quashed the judgment rendered by the County Court and rejected the applicants’ initial action. It found as follows: “In their initial action, the [applicants] argued firstly that they had been discriminated against [vis-à-vis] the remaining judicial staff, because they had been excluded from the benefit of the loyalty bonus. They relied on the provisions of Articles 1-6 and 27 § 1 of the [Anti-discrimination Ordinance] and of Articles 5 and 154 § 3 of the Labour Code. The provisions of Articles 27 § 1 as well as those of Article 1 and 2 of the [Anti‑discrimination Ordinance] were declared unconstitutional by Decision no. 821 of 3 July 2008, as well as by Decision no. 818/2008 of the Constitutional Court. According to Article 31 of Law no. 47/1992 on the organisation and functioning of the Constitutional Court, the decisions rendered in verification of the constitutionality of a law are binding on everyone. This means that the provisions of Article 27 § 1 of the [Anti-discrimination Ordinance] can no longer be applied. In these conditions, the first-instance [court’s] decision to allow the [applicants’] action can no longer be justified on these legal provisions which have been declared unconstitutional. Therefore, ... the decision lacks legal basis. For this reason the court will not examine the remaining grounds of unlawfulness, will ... allow the appeal, and will ... reject the action lodged by the [applicants].” 19. The applicants unsuccessfully lodged several extraordinary appeals against that decision, all of which were rejected by final decisions of the Court of Appeal (19 January 2010, 20 January 2010, and 4 February 2010). For instance, on 19 January 2010 the Târgu Mureş Court of Appeal rejected the applicants’ argument that the Ministry of Justice had lodged its extraordinary appeal outside the time-limit set by law.

6. The applicant was born in 1984 and lives in Canada. 7. The applicant’s version of events relating to his encounter with the police, as set out in his application form, is the following. 8. On 27 February 2011, while in front of an automated teller machine (“ATM”), the applicant was attacked from behind by a police officer and was illegally arrested without a warrant. He was then taken to the police station where he was detained for six hours. Throughout his detention his hands were handcuffed behind his back. 9. During this period he was tortured by members of the police with the aim of forcing him to confess to the offence of theft through the use of a forged credit card. The applicant was repeatedly beaten with a wooden stick all over his body and his head until he lost consciousness, beaten with a metallic chair while lying on the floor, punched on the body and face and kicked and punched on the head, nose and mouth, causing one of his teeth to break. He also received blows to the region that the police officers had been informed he had been operated on (the applicant does not give any clarifications in this respect). The above acts were accompanied by death threats. The officers refused to give him his asthma medicine. They also refused to take him to hospital until his lawyer at the time, C.H., intervened. 10. At around 3.30 p.m. the same day, following C.H.’s request, the applicant was taken to hospital because of his injuries. He overheard the police officers telling the doctor that he had fallen to the ground. One of the police officers then took the doctor aside and started talking to him in private. The applicant was not given painkillers by the doctor until the Honorary Consul of Canada in Cyprus (“the Canadian Consul”) visited him. The Canadian Consul asked the attending doctor the reasons for which the applicant had ended up in hospital and was in such a bad condition. The doctor informed her that there was nothing wrong with the applicant and that he had simply examined his pancreas. No other explanation was given. 11. On 27 February 2011 the police were informed by a card payment and processing company of illegal withdrawals with a fake credit card from an ATM of a bank in Limassol. Special Constable G.S. from the police traffic department, who was on motorcycle patrol in the area, arrived at the scene and spotted the applicant in front of the ATM. G.S. was in uniform and wearing a helmet. According to G.S.’s account of the events, he approached the applicant from behind and touched his left shoulder. He then said “police” and asked him, both in Greek and in English, to identify himself. The applicant did not reply but hit him on the head and stomach and then ran away. G.S. chased the applicant, who at some point fell on the pavement and hit his head. A struggle ensued. G.S. did not hit the applicant but merely tried to handcuff him by holding him with his hands and by pushing him. Special Constable P.K. arrived at the scene and assisted G.S. in arresting the applicant. The applicant was arrested for the flagrant criminal offences of assaulting a police officer and resisting lawful arrest (sections 244 (a) and (b) of the Criminal Code, Cap. 154). Two officers of the Crime Prevention Squad (Ουλαμός Πρόληψης Εγκλημάτων – “the CPS”), Special Constable C.S. and Senior Constable S.M., arrived at the scene. According to them, when they arrived they found the applicant and G.S. on the ground. The fake credit card had been retained by the ATM and was subsequently retrieved. 12. After the applicant was handcuffed, he was handed over to C.S. and S.M., who drove the applicant to the police station. 13. Upon arrival at the police station around 9.30 a.m. the above officers handed over the applicant to Constable P.P., who carried out a body search and confiscated objects found on him, including the amount of 10,000 euros (EUR) in EUR 50 notes. The applicant was then transferred to the Economic Crime Investigations Office (Γραφείο Διερεύνησης Οικονομικού Εγκλήματος – “the ECID”) where P.P. passed everything he had found on the applicant on to Constable E.L. The applicant was handed over to Constable F.O., who also carried out a body search. At 10 a.m. F.O. handed over the applicant to Inspector I.S., the head of the ECID. At 11.30 a.m. F.O. returned and kept the applicant under his supervision. At 11.45 a.m. the applicant was allowed to call his lawyer, C.H. At 12 noon F.O. handed over the applicant to Constable M.P., who had been appointed as investigator in the case. 14. Between 1 p.m. and 1.30 p.m. the applicant was interviewed by M.P. with the assistance of an interpreter, S.K. During the interview, only one other officer entered the interview room, Constable A.P. 15. At the end of the interview, around 1.35 p.m., the applicant was taken to the detention facilities in the station where Constable C.T. carried out a body search. He recorded injuries in the applicant’s prisoner record. These were: abrasions on the left part of the applicant’s forehead (αριστερή μετωπιαία χώρα) and left shoulder blade (ωμοπλάτη). The applicant was taken to a cell at approximately 1.45 p.m. 16. The applicant was visited by his lawyer, C.H., from 3.05 p.m. until 3.30 p.m. Before leaving the station, C.H. complained to the head of the detention facility, Sergeant P.H., that the applicant had been ill-treated during his arrest, transfer to the station and questioning. 17. At approximately 3.50 p.m. the applicant was taken to Limassol General Hospital by Constable C.K. and Special Constable D.Y. 18. In the meantime, at 3.30 p.m., the District Court of Limassol issued an arrest warrant on the grounds that there was a reasonable suspicion based on evidence that the applicant had been involved in a number of offences, including, inter alia, various forgery and theft-related offences, assault occasioning actual bodily harm and resisting lawful arrest. At approximately 4.45 p.m. while the applicant was at the hospital he was presented with the arrest warrant and was detained on that basis. The applicant was guarded by officers at the hospital. 19. The applicant was discharged from hospital at 11.20 p.m. and was taken back to the detention facilities at the police station. 20. The next day the applicant was taken to the District Court of Limassol, which ordered his detention on remand for eight days. The court ordered that during his detention the applicant be provided with medical care and treatment and, if need be, that he be taken to hospital. 21. On 8 March 2011 the court extended the applicant’s detention on remand by a further eight days. 22. On 16 March 2011 the court ordered his detention pending trial (see paragraph 64 below). 23. On the day of his arrest, at approximately 4 p.m., the applicant was examined by a pathologist, Dr A.K., at the Emergency Department of Limassol General Hospital. The applicant complained of loss of consciousness after being beaten, dizziness, nausea, a severe headache, neck pain, and a pain in his knee. The pathologist carried out a physical examination. He found that the applicant had a cephalohaematoma (κεφαλαιμάτωμα) in the right temporal region; abrasions in the parietal area; abrasions and mild oedema on his nose; bruising of his lower lip; a broken upper incisor (σπασμένο/διατομή πρόσθιου άνω τομέα οδόντος); a bruise on the left hemithorax with sensitivity and a few abrasions; oedema and abrasions on both wrists (πηχεοκαρπικές αμφώ); a few abrasions on the knees, with no evidence of inflammation; pain during the examination of the movement of the right knee; sensitivity of the upper thoracic vertebra and the upper lumbar spine. The CT scans of the brain, the facial bones and the cervical spine showed no injuries or fractures. There was only loss of neck curve (ευθειασμός αυχένα). Furthermore, the X-ray of the thorax and the right knee did not reveal any fractures or fluid in the thorax or the pneumothorax. A splint was placed on the applicant’s right knee and he was prescribed analgesics. The doctor’s final diagnosis was cranio-cerebral injury (κρανιοεγκεφαλική κάκωση), neck strain (θλάση αυχένα), bruising on the thorax (κάκωση θώρακα), bruising on his knee (κάκωση γονάτου), and a broken tooth (διατομή οδόντος). 24. The applicant was also examined by a general surgeon, Dr C.T. The applicant complained of neck and chest pain, a headache and pain in the thoracic spine. The doctor observed that the physical examination (η αντικειμενική εξέταση) was within physiological limits (εντός φυσιολογικών ορίων). The surgeon ascertained that the applicant had marks from blows, mainly on his chest and face. (b) Subsequent medical examinations (i) Limassol General Hospital 25. On 1 March 2011 the applicant was taken to the Emergency Department of Limassol General Hospital owing to vomiting and dizziness. He was examined by Dr Y.I., who observed that the applicant’s external injuries were still there. The results of the physical and clinical examinations were normal. In his report the doctor stated that the applicant had been discharged from hospital at 7 p.m. “feeling very well”. He referred the applicant for an orthopaedic examination the next day. 26. On 2 March 2011 the applicant was taken back to the hospital for examination by an orthopaedic surgeon, Dr. P.T. The applicant complained that he had been hit; he also complained of pain in the lumbar spine and an injury to the right knee. Dr P.T. did not ascertain any bone damage or neurological symptomatology (νευρολογική σημειολογία). He suggested rest and prescribed analgesics. (ii) Medical examination by a private practitioner 27. On 7 March 2011, following a request by the Canadian Consul, a private practitioner, Dr. S.J – a traumatologist orthopaedic surgeon – visited the applicant at the police station and carried out a medical examination. In his report dated 10 May 2011 he stated, in the original English, as follows: “I visited the patient on the 7th of March 2011 in the central police station of Limassol. He was complaining of multiple injuries causing him severe pain which did not allow him to come to rest especially at night. During my clinical examination carried out on that day, the patient had restriction in motion due to pain especially during maximal flexion and extension of the lower back. He had pain sensation during the palpation of the soft tissue without any external injuries observed. Further he had a bruise measuring 10 x 5 cm at the left side of the chest at the auxiliary line height which gave him pain during palpation, compression and maximal inspiration. Mr Kabbara further had restriction of motion and muscular tension at the cervical spine region without any pathologic neurologic observation. The patient had a loss of half the left upper incisor tooth with no mobility dysfunction of the jaw. Due to the above injury, Mr Kabbara described severe pain especially in the evening which did not allow him to sleep. I prescribed him anti-inflammatory pain killers on a regular basis. If there was no response to the medication I advised him to contact me again.” 28. On 27 February 2011 Special Constable G.S. also went to Limassol General Hospital, where he was examined by a general practitioner, Dr V.D. He complained that, while he had been trying to arrest someone, he had received a punch on the head. As, however, he had been wearing a helmet there had been no bruising. He also complained that he had been kicked in the stomach, had fallen backwards to the ground and hit the right side of his hip. X-rays, scans and tests were carried out and he was diagnosed with a strain (θλάση) of his lumbar spine. The doctor also found that his kidney was not in its normal position. She instructed that G.S. be examined by an orthopaedic specialist and a nephrologist. G.S. was prescribed nine days’ sick leave. 29. On 1 March 2011 the applicant reported the alleged ill-treatment to the High Commission of Canada. 30. On the same day the Canadian Consul visited the applicant while at the hospital with her assistant. The applicant told her that he had been ill‑treated. Her assistant took a written statement from the applicant which reads, in the original English, as follows: “TO CANADIAN AUTHORITIES On Sunday Feb 27 at approx. 9.20 am, I was attacked from a policeman from behind and trying to protect myself, my elbow hit him at Athinon street. Then a number of the policemen (3-4) started kicking me on the head and immobilized me and hand‑cuffed me. I passed out (first time), woke up in a police car and all the way to the Police Station I asked to contact my lawyer and the Canadian Consulate but they refused and they hit me more. At the police station, Mr [G] hit me. They took me upstairs to the Financial Crime Department. I asked again to contact my Consulate or my lawyer and they refused. I was then taken to another room where Mr [M] was. Four policemen walked in and hit me. They took a chair and broke it over my right leg. They also hit me on the head with the chair several times. I fell down and then I was asked where I live. I said I don’t want to say anything without my lawyer. They hit me again and broke my tooth. I was tortured and my human rights were violated. I was also threatened to be killed by high-leveled people. I am now afraid of my life. This continued for about 4 hours until finally I got in touch with my lawyer and sent to the hospital.” 31. On 2 March 2011, in the light of the applicant’s lawyer’s complaint (see 16 paragraph above), the Limassol police appointed an investigating officer, Police Chief Inspector M.M., who was in charge of the Ayios Ioannis police station in Limassol, to conduct an administrative investigation into the applicant’s complaint. 32. On 3 March 2011 the Canadian High Commissioner in Cyprus sent a note verbale reporting the ill-treatment of the applicant to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and requesting that the applicant’s complaint be investigated. 33. An investigation was conducted by M.M. and a report was prepared. M.M. secured copies of written statements contained in the criminal file gathered for the purposes of the criminal proceedings against the applicant (see paragraph 64 below) as well as statements from all the officers who had come into contact with the applicant, directly and indirectly, during his arrest and detention. The statements were not question and answer statements. 34. The applicant refused to provide a written statement claiming that he could not trust the police and informed M.M. that his lawyer and the Canadian Consul had been informed of the details of his ill-treatment. 35. Special Constable G.S., in his statement of 27 February 2011, stated that on that day at around 9.13 a.m. while he had been on motorcycle patrol he had received a message concerning an illegal cash withdrawal from an ATM. He had immediately gone to the bank concerned. On arrival he had spotted an unknown person who had appeared to be withdrawing money from the ATM and putting it in the left pocket of his tracksuit top. G.S. had got off the motorcycle. He had approached the applicant from behind and touched his left shoulder, had said “police” and had then asked the applicant both in Greek and in English to give him his identity card so he would be able to ascertain his identity. The applicant had not replied but instead had turned towards him and attacked him by pushing him backwards with both hands. G.S. had tried to immobilise him. The applicant had then punched his police helmet with his right hand and kicked him in the stomach, causing G.S. to lose his balance. G.S. had fallen backwards on the pavement. The applicant had fled and G.S. had chased him. The applicant, while running, had lost his balance and had fallen to the ground, hitting his face. G.S. had tried to immobilise him and a struggle had ensued between the two. Attempting to resist arrest, the applicant had pushed G.S. and hit him with his hands. Special Constable P.K had arrived at the scene. With his help, and using proportionate force in the circumstances, G.S. had arrested and handcuffed the applicant. He had drawn the applicant’s attention to the law but the applicant had not replied. Two members of the CPS had arrived and he had handed over the applicant to them. G.S. had then gone to the Emergency Department of Limassol General Hospital, where he had been examined by Dr V.D. 36. The most relevant written statements of other officers read as follows: (i) Constable P.P., who had been the first to receive the applicant at the police station, in his statement of 27 February 2011 stated that he had carried out a body search and described what he had found on the applicant, which included EUR 10,000. He did not mention any injuries in his statement. (ii) Constable E.L., who had seen the applicant when Officer P.P. had entered her office to give her the applicant’s possessions, in her statement of 27 February 2011 stated that the applicant had had wounds on his face, his clothes had been messy and his tracksuit trousers had been torn. (iii) Special Constable P.K. who had been on traffic patrol on the day of the events, in his statement of 27 February 2011 stated that when he had arrived at the scene G.S. had been on the ground with an unknown man. G.S. had asked him to pass him the handcuffs so he could handcuff the applicant as he had been resisting arrest. Then he had gone to the ATM and found five withdrawal receipts of EUR 2,000 each, which he had subsequently given to Constable P.P. when they had arrived at the station. He did not mention any injuries in his statement. (iv) Constable C.T., who had received the applicant at 1.35 pm. at the detention centre at the station to put him in his cell, in his statement of 3 March 2011 stated that he had carried out a body search and had noted that the applicant had had an abrasion on the left frontal area (αριστερή μετωπιαία χώρα) and behind the left shoulder. He had locked the applicant in the cell at 1.45 p.m. (v) Sergeant P.H. in his statement of 3 March 2011 stated that he had seen the applicant at 1.35 p.m. when M.P. had brought him to the station’s detention facilities and he had then given instructions to Constable C.T. to carry out a body search. The applicant’s lawyer, C.H, had visited the applicant and at 3.05 p.m. had informed P.H. that the applicant had complained to him that he had been beaten by police officers during his arrest and questioning and had wanted the complaint to be reported. He had also requested that the applicant be sent to the hospital. P.H. had immediately given instructions to this effect and within little time the applicant had been taken to the hospital and the complaint of ill-treatment had been reported. He did not mention any injuries in his statement. (vi) Inspector I.S. in his statement of 11 March 2011 stated that he had noticed that when the applicant had arrived at the station he had had injuries on the face which according to Officer G.S. had been caused when he had tried to arrest the applicant. He had also noticed that the applicant’s clothes had been messy and his tracksuit trousers had been torn. The applicant had not complained to him that he had been hit nor had he been hit by anyone. (vii) Senior Constable S.M. in his statement of 12 March 2011 stated that when he had arrived at the scene G.S. had already arrested the applicant and handcuffed him. S.M. then took the applicant along with Special Constable C.S. in the police car to the police station where at 9.30 a.m. he handed him over to Constable P.P. The applicant had minor abrasions and bruises and his clothes were messy. (viii) Special Constable C.S., who had accompanied the applicant to the police station with Senior Constable S.M., in his statement of 12 March 2011 stated that when he had arrived at the scene G.S. had already arrested the applicant and handcuffed him. He did not mention any injuries in his statement. (ix) Constable A.P., who had seen the applicant during his interview with M.P., in his statement of 14 March 2011 stated that the applicant had had abrasions on his face and that he had been informed by M.P. that this had been caused during his arrest. (x) Constable F.O. in his statement of 15 March 2011 stated that he had carried out a body search and had not found anything suspect (επιλήψιμο) on the applicant. He also stated that the applicant had had wounds on his face and had told him that he had been hit by an officer. Furthermore, his clothes had been messy and his tracksuit bottoms torn. (xi) Constable M.P., who had interviewed the applicant at the station, in his statement of 17 March 2011 stated that the applicant had had abrasions on the face and when he had asked the applicant how the latter had got them, the applicant had told him that he had been hit during his arrest. During the interview, constable A.P. had entered in the room and M.P. had informed him of the applicant’s statement and his injuries. At 1.35 p.m. M.P. had taken the applicant to the detention facilities. 37. According to the findings of the investigator in his report of 26 April 2011, the applicant had been uncooperative from the beginning of his detention and refused to provide a written statement and answer any questions during his interview. He had also refused to cooperate with the investigator himself and to give a statement concerning his ill-treatment allegations. He had told the investigator that he did not trust the police. In view of the above, it could not be excluded that the complaint had been made to further the applicant’s own interests. According to Inspector I.S., who had supervised the applicant’s questioning in relation to the criminal case against him, no member of the police had ill-treated or used any kind of violence against the applicant during his detention and questioning. The only contact the applicant had had with a member of the police had been during his struggle with the police officers when attempting to flee arrest. In his report, the investigator noted that Special Constable G.S. had been injured while trying to arrest the applicant and that he had been put on sick leave by the doctor who had examined him at the hospital. 38. The report concluded that none of the applicant’s allegations regarding ill-treatment had been proven and that the case should be closed. 39. The Limassol divisional police headquarters and the Chief of Police agreed with the conclusions. 40. On 26 May 2011 the Ministry of Foreign affairs informed the High Commissioner of Canada of the findings of the investigation. 41. By a letter dated 14 July 2011 the applicant’s lawyer complained to the Attorney General, requesting that an independent investigation be conducted into his client’s complaint and that the officers responsible be brought to justice. The next day the Attorney General referred the applicant’s complaint to the president of the IAIACAP ordering an investigation. 42. On 20 July 2011 the IAIACAP appointed a lawyer, Mr A.S., as investigator. 43. On 10 October 2011 the investigator prepared a report with a summary of the statements obtained and his findings. 44. In the course of the investigation, the investigator singled out four police officers as suspects. These were G.S., P.K., S.M. and C.S. Statements in the form of questions and answers were obtained from these officers. He also took statements from the applicant and twenty-four other persons, including the officers who had been in touch with or seen the applicant on the day of the alleged ill-treatment, the interpreter, the doctor who had examined G.S., Dr V.D. (see paragraph 28 above) and three of the doctors who had examined the applicant, namely, Dr A.K. and Dr C.T. from Limassol General Hospital and Dr S.J., the private practitioner (see paragraphs 23, 24 and 27 above). 45. The applicant gave a statement to the investigator on 23 August 2011, adopting the content of a handwritten statement he had prepared in June 2011 for his lawyer. In his written statement the applicant alleged that on 27 February 2011 at 9.15 a.m. he had been trying to familiarise himself with the ATM in case he would ever need to use his own cards and check the balance of his account. He had, inter alia, a credit card in his name on him and EUR 10,000, which had been given to him by his lawyer at the time, C.H. This was the cash bail that had been returned from the court in another case against him. At 9.20 a.m. he had been suddenly attacked from behind by someone who had been wearing a helmet and who he had not recognised. This person had not identified himself. The applicant had thought that it had been a robbery. This person had choked him from behind. The applicant had been scared and had defended himself. He had then been attacked by a second person in civilian attire. They had started hitting the applicant on the head and the back with a small wooden stick. The applicant had fallen to the ground and lost consciousness. The officers had woken him up by throwing water on his face. He had woken up in a brown jeep, handcuffed. He had then realised that he had been intercepted by the police. The officers had slapped and punched him on the face and body all the way to the police station. They had been asking him about money and credit cards but had not asked him to identify himself. Nor had they shown him any documents in respect of his arrest and informed him of his rights. They had taken everything he had had on him including his asthma inhalers. They had refused to allow him to talk to his lawyer or with an official from the Canadian embassy. He had been taken to the station at approximately 10 a.m. He had been received by the head of the police, “Mr Y.”, an officer acting as an interviewer, “Mr M.”, and two other officers “Mr P.” and “Mr A.”. In the interview room there had been officers of the CPS and another officer, “V.”. Officer M. had asked him questions. The applicant had refused to reply, saying that he would do so only in the presence of his lawyer. At that point the officer who had attacked him at the ATM had started beating and “torturing” him while he had been unable to defend himself, as he had still been in handcuffs. He had kept asking them to stop and let him contact his lawyer. They had continued to punch and beat him using the same small wooden stick used before (he clarified that this had been a small baseball bat). He had asked for his asthma inhalers and tried to tell them that he had had back surgery. He had been very scared and had started breathing heavily. They had hit him on the back and on his right knee with a metallic chair with blue handles. They had beaten him with that chair and kicked him savagely on the head while asking him questions. The applicant stated that he had lost consciousness for a while and he had woken up after water had been thrown on his face. 46. At approximately 1 p.m. the applicant had called his lawyer; before that they had warned him not to tell him anything. The applicant had spoken to his lawyer and had informed him of the ill-treatment. He had then been taken back to the interview room where the officers had continued to beat him. He had fallen to the floor again with his hands behind his back. One of the officers had stood on his handcuffs while another one had kicked him. Because of the kicks to the head the applicant had become very dizzy, bleeding from his face, nose and mouth. His front tooth had broken from the punches. He had also had a small asthma attack. Although Officer M. had not physically abused him he had not intervened to stop the ill-treatment. Two female officers of the ECID had also witnessed his ill-treatment. The applicant said that he had asked the head of the police to take him to hospital but he had refused. At around 3 p.m. they had taken him to the detention facility in the station. His lawyer had come to visit him and when he had seen the state of him he had made a complaint of ill-treatment to the officers and asked that the applicant be taken immediately to hospital. During his transfer to the hospital the applicant had been punched by one of the two police officers who had been escorting him. The officer had also threatened that his boss Mr Y. would put him in prison if he did not withdraw his complaint. When he had arrived at the hospital at 3.30 pm. one of the officers had lied to the doctor and had told him that he had fallen on his face. The other police officer had then taken the doctor aside and talked to him alone. The doctor had refused to give him painkillers. He had only given those when the Canadian Consul had come to visit him. 47. The applicant alleged that he could identify the individuals responsible for his ill-treatment. 48. In their statements provided to the criminal investigator, the police officers denied ill-treatment and maintained their original version of events. Some of the officers could not remember whether the applicant had had injuries or what type of injuries he had had and therefore were not able to answer the investigator’s questions in this connection. The most relevant statements were as follows: (i) Sergeant P.H., who had made no mention of the applicant’s appearance in his previous statement, in his statement of 26 August 2011 stated that when the applicant had been brought to the detention facilities he had noticed that he had been upset (αναστατωμένος) and red in the face. He had not noticed whether his clothes had been torn. (ii) Constable A.P in his statement of 29 August 2011 stated that he could not remember what type of wounds the applicant had had on his face or whether his clothes had been torn. (iii) Constable P.P., who had not made any mention of the applicant’s appearance in his previous statement, in his statement of 31 August 2011 stated that: “... there were areas which indicated that [the applicant] had fought with someone, without however bearing any external injuries. He had dishevelled hair, his clothes were creased, but not torn, and he was red owing to tiredness, but not owing to blows.” (iv) Constable C.T. in his statement of 31 August 2011 stated that the applicant had had an abrasion on part of left frontal area and on the left shoulder blade. He could not remember if any of the applicant’s clothing had been torn. (v) Constable M.N., who had guarded the applicant from 7.40 p.m. to 10.30 p.m. at the hospital, in his statement of 31 August 2011 stated that he had noticed that the applicant had had various injuries (χτυπήματα) but he could not remember whether they had been on the face or the body. (vi) Constable I.K., who had guarded the applicant from 7.40 p.m. to 10.30 p.m. at the hospital, in his statement of 1 September 2011 stated that the applicant had been in a wheelchair at one point because he had claimed he had not been able to walk and that he had, with the assistance of the other officer guarding him, helped him onto a bed. He had noted that the applicant had had some small scratches on his face and one of the hands. (vii) Constable F.O. in his statement of 5 September 2011 stated that owing to the passage of time he could not remember what type of wounds the applicant had had nor where the tracksuit had been torn. (viii) The interpreter S.K. in her statement of 12 September 2011 stated that she had arrived before 1 p.m. and had translated from 1 p.m.-1.30 p.m. and that the applicant had had a bruise on his face near his eye and his trousers had been torn. In her presence no officer had hit or threatened him. (ix) Inspector I.S. in his statement of 13 September 2011 stated that: “[I]t was like when someone’s face is rubbed against the ground. I think that he had something similar on his hands.” (x) Special Constable P.K. in his statement of 15 September 2017, when asked about whether he had noticed injuries stated that the time of the events, stated that he had been concentrating on helping handcuff the applicant and had not noticed. (xi) Constable M.P. in his statement of 18 September 2011 stated that he could not remember the applicant’s teeth or what type of scratches the applicant had had on his face. (xii) Senior Constable S.M. in his statement of 20 September 2011 stated that: “[The applicant’s] face was red as if he had been running and [he] was short of breath. With regard to the minor-abrasions and bruises, these were definitely not black marks but mild redness.” (xiii) Special Constable C.S., who had previously made no mention of the applicant’s appearance, in his statement of 20 September 2011 stated that: “[The applicant] was to begin with, unkempt, messy as to his clothes, his hair was also tousled (ανακατωμένα) and his face was red. He did not have bruising (μαύρισμα) however, nor did I see scratches.” 49. In his report dated 10 October 2011 the investigator found, taking into account the evidence at hand, that the applicant’s testimony had been unconvincing in many respects and contradicted solid evidence: - his assertions as to what he had been doing at the ATM and why he had had EUR 10,000 in his possession were very difficult to believe. - based on the police officers’ testimony, the investigator noted that on the day of the arrest, the officers who had arrested the applicant had been in uniform and had not had batons as they had been simple traffic officers. - the applicant had been taken to the police station in a white saloon police car; the Limassol CPS did not have brown jeeps. - the applicant had stated that they had taken everything from him in the car yet according to the evidence given by Constable P.P. everything had been taken from the applicant at the station. - the applicant had described a savage beating but had stated that during an interval he had spoken to his lawyer, C.H.. The investigator considered it odd that the officers, knowing that the applicant had spoken to his lawyer, would have continued to beat him after the call as he had alleged. C.H. had refused to give a statement. - all of the police officers denied having ill-treated the applicant, and the interpreter, an independent witness, had stated that during her presence the applicant had not been ill-treated. - the applicant had alleged that the ill-treatment had continued until 3 p.m., but in his prisoner record it had been recorded that he had been taken to a cell in the detention facilities of the station at approximately 1.45 p.m. - the applicant had claimed that the doctor at the hospital had refused to give him painkillers but this had been refuted by Dr A.K. and was in contradiction with the hospital records of Dr C.T. 50. The investigator considered it unlikely that officers of the CPS would have interrogated a suspect for offences under the authority of the another unit, the ECID, and that they would have ill-treated the applicant in the car given the close distance between the scene of arrest and the police station, which was only about 1 to 1.5 km. Furthermore, the description of certain people given by the applicant did not correspond to the officers working for the CPS. On this basis the investigator concluded there had not been police officers from the CPS in the interview room. 51. The investigator also noted that the allegation that the applicant had been beaten and threatened by one of the two officers escorting him to the hospital was surreal as those officers had not been aware of the applicant’s ill-treatment complaint. 52. The investigator pointed out that Special Constable G.S. had not denied the use of force against the applicant: following the applicant’s violent reaction he had pushed the applicant with his hand somewhere between his chest and neck and had also used some wrestling holds (λαβές πάλης) in order to turn him round and handcuff him. Furthermore, when the applicant had tried to flee he had fallen to the ground, hitting his face. This version of events could justify the injuries on the applicant’s face and his right knee but the investigator stated the he could not accept it easily. He stated that he was puzzled by the fact that Constable P.P., who had seen the applicant just before he had been led to the offices of the ECID, had noticed no exterior wounds other than the fact that the applicant was red. This was in line with G.S.’s statement that he had not hit the applicant. 53. Bearing in mind the above, the investigator concluded that G.S. had not used excessive force to arrest the applicant and that neither criminal nor disciplinary proceedings against him were merited. 54. The investigator pointed out that this did not mean that he accepted the facts as described by all the officers as, on the basis of their version of the events, one would expect that the applicant would have had fewer injuries. At the same time, he did not accept the applicant’s version of the facts as on the basis of his version, it would have been expected that he would have had more injuries. 55. The report concluded that there was no concrete evidence justifying criminal or disciplinary charges against any of the officers. The investigator noted that although he had been troubled by the case, the applicant had not helped him in his task, as his account had been full of inconsistencies and improbabilities (απιθανότητες). 56. The investigator transmitted his report and findings to the president of the IAIACAP. The latter prepared a report dated 16 November 2011 adopting the investigator’s findings. He noted, however, that he did not accept the evidence that had been given stating that the applicant did not bear exterior injuries or abrasions, as this was contrary to the findings of the doctors; nor did he accept that the applicant was merely red due to tiredness but not due to blows. Nonetheless, he observed that on the basis of these injuries it could not be concluded that the force used had been disproportionate under the circumstances. He therefore could not suggest that criminal or disciplinary action be taken against the four officers in question. He also considered that even if an identity parade had been held, he doubted that it would have made a difference to the outcome of the investigation, in view of the applicant’s conduct. The struggle between officer G.S and the applicant had been expected (αναμενόμενη) in order for the applicant to avoid arrest at the moment he had been appropriating a large sum of money. 57. The president of the IAIACAP concluded that despite the fact that the quality of the evidence at hand had not been satisfactory, the commission of neither disciplinary nor criminal offences had been established. 58. Both reports and the file of the case were submitted to the Attorney General for a decision. 59. On 13 February 2012 the Attorney General concluded that although a certain degree of force had been used against the applicant, this had been necessary under the circumstances in order to prevent him from fleeing arrest. He concluded on this basis that the prosecution of any member of the police was not warranted and instructed that the file be closed. 60. In his decision he stated that it appeared from the evidence that Special Constable G.S. had asked the applicant, who at the time had been at the ATM machine, for his particulars. The applicant had reacted and had hit the police officer in an attempt to flee. The applicant had explained his behaviour by stating that he had thought it had been a robbery. Special Constable G.S. had, however, been in uniform as had been the officer who had subsequently come to help. 61. The Attorney General further observed that the applicant’s explanations concerning his attempt to flee and the money found in his possession as well as his allegations as to the injuries sustained and his alleged ill-treatment going to and at the police station did not correspond to the reality. Furthermore, his allegation that the doctor who had examined him at the hospital had refused to give him painkillers had been refuted by the doctor. Most of the applicant’s statement appeared to be imprecise and untrue. Special Constable G.S. had not denied the use of force: following the applicant’s violent reaction he had used proportionate force in the circumstances in order to prevent him from fleeing until help arrived. As a result not only had the applicant been injured but the officer himself, who had also had to go to hospital, had been. In addition, the applicant had claimed that he had been tortured by members of the police during his transfer to the police station and before the arrival of his lawyer, C.H. The latter, however, had refused to give a statement. The applicant’s allegations had been disputed by all the members of the police involved. 62. By a letter dated 16 February 2012 the Attorney General informed the applicant of his decision. 63. By a letter dated 7 March 2012 to the Attorney General, the applicant’s lawyer expressed his disappointment concerning the conclusions of the investigation and pointed out that no explanation had been given, at least in respect of the ill-treatment the applicant had been subjected to at the police station while handcuffed and as a result of which he had ended up in hospital. He noted in this connection that the Canadian Consul had ascertained the applicant’s condition whilst the independent medical report by the private practitioner corroborated the applicant’s allegations. Lastly, he informed the Attorney General of his intention to lodge an application with the Court on behalf of the applicant. 64. In the meantime, the applicant was charged with 439 counts of different offences and criminal proceedings were instituted against him before the District Court of Limassol (case no. 4474/11). The charges were subsequently reduced to three, namely theft, assault occasioning actual bodily harm (to Special Constable G.S.) and resisting lawful arrest (sections 20, 255 (1)-(3), 262, 243 and 244 (a) of the Criminal Code, Cap. 154). 65. On 14 September 2012 the court held that the prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and found the applicant guilty on all counts. On 19 September 2012 it imposed sentences of imprisonment of one year, one month and two months respectively for each offence to run concurrently. The time the applicant had already been in detention counted towards the sentence. 66. The court found that the applicant’s testimony had been completely unreliable and unconvincing and that he had made a poor impression as a witness both in terms of the quality of his testimony and his credibility. He had made serious contradictions; his allegations were unsubstantiated, lacked logic and were contrary to hard evidence. It therefore dismissed his evidence as being false. The court also noted that the defence had made claims concerning certain of the prosecution witnesses which, however, it had not put to the witnesses themselves during cross-examination in order to give them the opportunity to at least comment. Similarly, although allegations had been made by the defence against some of the prosecution witnesses, it did not itself provide any evidence in this connection. 67. With regard to the allegations of ill-treatment raised by the applicant, the court pointed out, inter alia, that the applicant had failed to submit a medical report with reference to his alleged injuries and had only produced a receipt for the medical examination by Dr S.J. He had also failed to call Dr S.J. as a witness. His allegations therefore remained completely unsubstantiated. Furthermore, the court pointed out that the CCTV footage contradicted his allegation that he had been attacked at the ATM and that he had not seen that G.S. had been a police officer. The footage showed the applicant in front of the ATM with his body and head turned towards officer G.S., who was also looking at him. G.S. had been in police motorcycle uniform and the word “police” in capitals was on his uniform across his chest. 68. On 27 September 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court (appeal no. 197/2012) against his conviction. This was dismissed on 19 February 2013. 69. With regard to the applicant’s grounds of appeal concerning his alleged ill-treatment, the Supreme Court upheld the findings of the first‑instance court pointing to the complete lack of medical evidence on the part of the defence. It also noted that the Canadian Consul who had visited the applicant in hospital had not been called by the defence as a witness. 70. Following the dismissal of his appeal, the applicant was deported from Cyprus and was put on the authorities’ “stop list” (a register of individuals whose entry into and exit from Cyprus is banned or subject to monitoring). 71. On 9 April 2013 the Attorney General appointed two new investigators to reinvestigate the applicant’s complaints. The Attorney General’s office, upon re-examination of the file, spotted gaps in the investigation and particular omissions and inconsistencies in the reports. Furthermore, his office had been informed by the investigator A.S. that after the conclusion of the investigation, he had had an informal conversation with Inspector I.S, the head of the ECID of the Limassol CPS, who had confided in him that the applicant had been ill-treated while at the police station. 72. The investigators singled out nine officers as suspects: Inspector I.S., Senior Constable S.M., Special Constables G.S., C.S. and P.K, and Constables M.P., A.P., F.O. and E.L. In the course of the investigation, the investigators took statements from forty-nine persons in addition to the nine abovementioned officers. This included all the individuals that had been interviewed by A.S. in the previous investigation, all the doctors that had examined by the applicant, a number of other officers and various individuals who either had personal knowledge of the facts or were suspected of having such knowledge, such as the Canadian Consul and her assistant. They were not able to get into contact with the applicant despite getting in touch with his lawyer. According to the investigators, the applicant’s previous lawyer, C.H., had asked for documents and witness statements in order to give a statement but the investigators considered that this would jeopardise the investigation and the ascertainment of the truth. The investigators did not assent and as a result he did not give a statement. The investigators also obtained documentary and other evidence related to the applicant’s case. These included, inter alia, photographs from the area near the ATM, CCTV footage from the bank relating to the day of the alleged ill-treatment, copies from police diaries kept at the police station and the record of the criminal proceedings before the District Court of Limassol and the Supreme Court. 73. In her statement of 22 April 2013 to the investigators the Canadian Consul submitted that when she had arrived at the hospital on 1 March 2011 the applicant had been in a wheelchair and on a drip and had been in the process of being moved to a bed. She had seen a big bruise on his left shoulder and other bruises on his body. He had had a broken tooth, his right leg had been bandaged and he had not been able to walk. He had had a head injury (χτύπημα) and bruises on the face. The applicant had informed her that he had been ill-treated by police officers during his transfer to and for four hours at the police station in order to force him confess to a crime he had not committed. She had asked to speak to a doctor. The doctor had informed her that there had been nothing wrong with the applicant and that he had been responsible only for examining the applicant’s pancreas. She would have to talk to the doctors who had examined him earlier for further information. She had also asked her assistant to take a statement from him. 74. The Consul’s assistant, in her statement of 3 June 2013 to the investigators, stated that when they had arrived at the hospital the applicant had been in a wheelchair and on a drip. He had then been moved to a bed. He had had injuries on the face and looked injured, but she could not remember the exact injuries and she had not taken notes at the time. One of his front teeth had been half broken and he had had a bandage on his right knee. He had also been on a drip. The applicant had said he had been ill‑treated by the police. The doctor had told the Consul that the applicant had had no severe internal injuries, but had not been able to give her more information as he had only been responsible for examining the applicant’s pancreas. She had taken a statement from the applicant on the Consul’s instructions. 75. A number of the officers interviewed refused to provide answers to the investigators, reconfirmed their previous statements or stated that they could not recall the events. Inspector I.S. denied the occurrence of a discussion between him and the investigator A.S. 76. At the end of their investigation the investigators prepared a lengthy report on the investigation procedure and their findings 77. In their report the investigators pinpointed a number of deficiencies in the investigation of the case from the very beginning on the part of the police and the first investigation by the IAIACAP. In particular, they noted the following. 78. First of all, Inspector I.S., who had at the time been in charge of the ECID, ought to have given instructions that the applicant’s injuries be photographed when he had arrived at the station. This had not been done. Nor had the applicant’s clothes been taken as evidence. If these steps had been carried out, it would have been possible to determine what had really happened. 79. With regard to the administrative investigation, the investigators first of all stressed that such investigations by the police themselves, following complaints that could on the face of it constitute criminal offences, were problematic and that such complaints should be from the very beginning transferred to the IAIACAP. In addition, they observed that there had been a number of omissions in the context of this investigation: the investigator M.M. had failed to ask the officers about the applicant’s injuries and how they had happened; nor had he asked constable P.P., who had been the first officer to receive the applicant at the police station at 9.30 a.m., if the applicant had had any injuries on him at the time; he had merely filed (αρχειοθέτησε) P.P.’s statement; he had also not taken any investigative steps with regard to the applicant’s injuries – he had filed the medical report of the pathologist Dr A.K., which referred to the applicant’s injuries and had not sought to obtain a medical report by Dr S.J., who had visited the applicant in hospital. Lastly, he had not asked for a medical report from Dr V.D., who had examined special constable G.S. 80. In so far as the first investigation by the IAIACAP was concerned the investigators noted that investigator A.S. should have tried to elucidate significant inconsistencies in the applicant’s allegations and statements when he had had the opportunity to do so and when the events had still been fresh. Furthermore, in view of the content of the applicant’s statements, the investigators considered that an identity parade had been called for and, in fact, both the investigator A.S. and the IAIACAP had been under a legal obligation to conduct an identity parade whatever the result. The failure to do so had led to the possible loss of important evidence 81. According to the investigators, the CCTV footage ought to have also been closely examined by investigator A.S. as it showed that the facts as described by Special Constable G.S. as to the way he had approached the applicant at the ATM had been true, thus contradicting the applicant’s version of events up to that point. In the footage G.S. can be seen approaching the applicant from behind; the applicant then turned his head and saw him. G.S can be seen touching the applicant’s left shoulder with his hand. The applicant almost immediately pushed him. The CCTV did not record the rest. 82. Lastly, the investigators expressed their concern about the fact that the investigator A.S had kept the I.S.’s admission to himself and had not informed the IAIACAP or the Attorney General immediately. He had therefore withheld important evidence. (b) With regard to applicant’s ill-treatment allegations 83. The investigators first noted the difficulties they had encountered in their investigation of the case which were mainly attributed to the passage of time as well as the fact that they had been unable to interview the applicant in order to receive further clarifications. 84. After assessing the evidence before them, they concluded that the force used during the applicant’s arrest had not been excessive and had been reasonable and necessary and that it had caused certain injuries especially to the applicant’s face and knee. 85. With regard to the evidence before them, they noted inter alia, the differences between certain of the officers’ statements concerning the state of the applicant and the existence or degree of his injuries. They also pointed out that the doctors who had later examined the applicant at the hospital had found greater injuries than those described by the officers. The doctors had not, however, recorded wounds on the left shoulder blade as had been recorded in the prisoner record by Constable C.T. (see paragraph 15 above and compare to paragraphs 23-25 and 27 above). Furthermore, the Canadian Consul in her statement had described injuries which had not corresponded to those in the medical report of Dr Y.I., who had seen the applicant on the same day as her. 86. The investigators considered that the presumption of ill-treatment under section 6 of Law no. 235/1990 (see paragraph 98 below) was applicable in the case: it was presumed that the person responsible for ill‑treatment was the person in charge of the police station and the questioning for the investigation of the case in relation to which an arrest and/or detention was made unless an explanation was given for the cause of the injuries. Thus, according to the investigators there was sufficient evidence allowing the criminal prosecution of Inspector I.S. The same applied in respect of Constable M.P., who had been accused by the applicant of having been present during his ill-treatment but of not having done anything to stop it and of having ignored his request to be taken to hospital. 87. The investigators did not suggest the criminal prosecution of other members of the police owing to insufficient evidence. They also noted in this connection that some of the officers in question, namely Constables A.P., E.L. and P.P. and Special Constables G.S. and P.K., had given evidence before the District Court and had not been accused of ill-treating the applicant by the defence in the context of these proceedings despite the applicant’s allegations in this connection. Although they considered that disciplinary offences had been committed by various members of the police they had been appointed to carry out a criminal investigation into the case and thus could not deal with these. 88. Lastly, they referred to the findings of the domestic courts in the criminal proceedings against the applicant noting that the applicant had not substantiated his ill-treatment allegations in the proceedings and pointed to the serious inconsistencies in his evidence and the failings by the applicant’s defence counsel. They considered that this fact had to be taken into account when deciding on whether the applicant should be summoned as a witness for the prosecution if it were decided to prosecute any of the officers. 89. On 9 July 2013 the investigators’ report was delivered to the Attorney-General. 90. On 29 November 2013 the file was returned to the investigators with the request that they consult a forensic expert in order to establish how the applicant’s injuries had been inflicted. The investigators were also instructed that questions be prepared and forwarded to the prosecuting authorities in Canada to obtain answers from the applicant. 91. On 10 January 2014 the forensic experts who had been contacted by the investigators concluded that they were unable to establish on the basis of the documents and photos how the applicant’s injuries had been inflicted – whether they had been inflicted by ill-treatment or from another cause such as falling to the ground. They would have been in a better position if they had been called to examine the applicant on the day he had presented with the injuries. 92. In the meantime, on 3 January 2014, the investigators prepared a request for legal assistance by the Canadian authorities, asking that a statement be provided by the applicant. Their questions to the applicant were included in writing. An email exchange followed between the applicant’s lawyer and the Attorney General’s office. It transpires from this that the applicant’s lawyer refused to provide the authorities with the applicant’s address and telephone number, which were necessary for the purposes of the request for legal assistance. He insisted instead that the Cypriot authorities pay for the applicant’s expenses to travel to Cyprus to provide a statement or that the Cypriot authorities go to Canada to see him. As such, the request for legal assistance was not submitted and the applicant was subsequently not called to Cyprus. 93. On 11 June 2014 the Attorney General concluded that the possibility that the applicant’s injuries had been caused by the reasonable force during the applicant’s arrest and/or by the applicant’s fall could not be excluded. Similarly, it could not be excluded that they had been caused by ill‑treatment at the police station. He disagreed with the investigators’ suggestion that the presumption of ill-treatment under section 6 of Law no. 235/1990 (see paragraphs 86 above and 98 below) was applicable as in the circumstances of the case it had not been established that the injuries the applicant had had after his transfer to the police station, had not been present before and/or had not been caused during his arrest. From an examination of all the evidence in the case the Attorney General ascertained that the applicant’s credibility had been irreversibly damaged. He referred, in particular, to the fact that the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment had been dismissed by the Limassol District Court in the criminal case against him. His grounds of appeal had also been rejected by the Supreme Court, including the ground challenging the first-instance court’s findings on this point. In addition, the Attorney General pointed out that the applicant’s version of events had been refuted by other independent and credible evidence. 94. In so far as the investigator in the first investigation had informed the second investigator of the admission of Inspector I.S., this did not have any bearing on the Attorney General’s opinion that the applicant was an unreliable witness. This, in combination with the fact that it had not been clarified which of the officers had allegedly ill-treated him, led to the conclusion that it was extremely difficult to establish the commission of any offences by any of the officers. 95. Based on the above, the Attorney General concluded that the criminal prosecution of any individual was not justified.

4. The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Istanbul. He was the owner and the editor-in-chief of a publishing house, Aram Basım ve Yayıncılık, which published a periodical, Vesta. 5. In 2004 an article written by Mr M.Ş. entitled “On the Kurdish Intellectual” was published in Vesta. 6. On 29 December 2004 the Istanbul public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Istanbul Assize Court, charging the applicant with disseminating propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713). According to the indictment, certain passages of the article depicted the PKK[1] as part of the Kurdish intellectual movement and hence constituted propaganda of the organisation, known for employing violence and terror. 7. On 23 September 2008 the Istanbul Assize Court convicted the applicant of disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 as he had published the article in question in Vesta. 8. In its judgment, the Istanbul Assize Court cited the following passages from the article: “In Kurdish history, there have been moments, in certain periods, during which Kurdish literature and culture developed and shone. In those moments, sparks of thought appeared. However, objectively and without renouncing the past, the conditions of the birth of Kurdish intellectualism are based on the 1970s. In earlier periods, there had only been individual and temporary developments not creating traditions. The political nature of the 20th century, the existence and rise of national liberation movements, the emergence of modern currents in Kurdish politics and, most importantly, the creation of a mass movement, served as the basis for the birth of the Kurdish intellectual. This process was manifested in the figure of the PKK. All political movements before the PKK were rebellious, devoid of political depth, tactical unity, stable path and permanence. The ideological and intellectual superficiality of these revolts and their fierce repression led to the loss of existing knowledge and to falling behind. From this point of view, through political and thoughtful analysis, while being free from the system and alienation, and bearing within it its own cultural identity based on the impoverished Kurdish rustics, [the PKK] allowed the beginning of a permanent and stable political enlightenment process. ... Another characteristic of the PKK movement at the beginning was that it realised that [the previous] abstract and theoretical movements had not led to a solution but deepened the problem. ... The fact that the PKK movement was based on the impoverished Kurdish rustics who were intact and preserved their national identity paved the way for a start favourable for a confident, militant and revolutionary tradition. Yet, the progress of the movement was accompanied by the downfall of the level of quality.” 9. The court considered that the aforementioned passages and the article in its entirety constituted propaganda in favour of the PKK. It hence sentenced the applicant to ten months’ imprisonment and ordered him to pay a fine of 375 Turkish liras (TRY). Taking into account his good behaviour during the trial and his character, the court suspended the pronouncement of his conviction on condition that he did not commit another intentional offence for a period of five years, under Article 231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hükmün açıklanmasının geri bırakılması). 10. On 22 October 2008 the court dismissed an objection lodged by the applicant against the above-mentioned decision.

5. The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Yerevan. 6. The applicant had a daughter, K.M., who was born on 19 November 1985. 7. On 7 September 2007 at 10 p.m. K.M., who was in the early weeks of pregnancy at the time, was at home with her parents and husband when she fainted and began to have convulsions. An ambulance was called, which arrived 40-45 minutes later. 8. Upon arrival, the ambulance doctor, A.G., found K.M. nearly unconscious, with impaired breathing and low blood pressure. According to the applicant, the doctor was told at that point that K.M. was pregnant. A.G. diagnosed a convulsion syndrome, gave K.M. two injections – one of relanium and one of magnesium – and took her to hospital. It appears that neither the doctor nor the nurse nor the driver of the ambulance helped her family carry K.M. downstairs from the eighth floor of the building and put her into the ambulance. Moreover, although K.M. had not regained consciousness after the injections, A.G. chose not to sit beside her during the journey to hospital, but instead sat beside the driver in the driver’s cab. 9. On the same day A.G. and the nurse drew up an ambulance visit record stating that they had arrived seven minutes after receiving the ambulance call and that they had administered only one medical injection, of relanium. 10. On 14 September 2007 K.M. died in hospital without ever regaining consciousness. 11. On the same day the Avan and Nor-Nork District Prosecutor’s Office of Yerevan launched an inquiry into her death and ordered an autopsy, which was also carried out that day. According to its report (forensic medical opinion no. 728), K.M. died from general intoxication of the organism, caused by an impairment of vital brain function, which in turn had been caused by extensive and diffuse thrombosis of neuro-vessels. 12. During the inquiry, the investigator took statements from the medical personnel who had provided assistance to K.M., including A.G., the nurse, and the driver. In particular, in her statement of 14 November 2007 the nurse stated that the doctor had ordered her to administer an injection of magnesium sulphate but that K.M.’s convulsions had continued, after which the doctor had handed her a phial of relanium, which she had injected. In her statement made on the same day A.G. explained that upon arrival they had found K.M. having seizures and that, from talking to her family, she had learnt that K.M. was pregnant. She had then ordered the nurse to inject relanium and, knowing that K.M. was pregnant, she did not inject any other medication and did not take any further measures since she did not consider it necessary in the circumstances. 13. On 26 November 2007 the ambulance nurse and A.G. were questioned again. The nurse stated, in particular, that the fact that only the injection of relanium and not the one of magnesium had been mentioned in the ambulance visit record could possibly be explained by her having forgotten to remind the doctor about the injection of magnesium. A.G. stated, inter alia, that she had ordered the nurse to give two injections. 14. In the course of the inquiry the investigator ordered a forensic medical investigation to be carried out by a panel of experts. According to the results of the opinion (forensic medical opinion no. 89) produced on 14 January 2008, the injection of relanium 2 mg and magnesium 3 g by the ambulance crew had been correct at the given moment, taking into account the patient’s condition − that is to say convulsion syndrome − and the injection of the given quantity of those substances was not contra-indicated. The opinion also stated that K.M.’s medical treatment had been correct and had corresponded to the diagnosis. 15. On 27 February 2008 the investigator decided to reject the institution of criminal proceedings for lack of corpus delicti. 16. On 29 February 2008 the applicant lodged an application with the Avan and Nor-Nork District Prosecutor’s Office of Yerevan, seeking a new forensic medical investigation in which he would be allowed to participate. In particular, he claimed that his daughter had died as a result of negligence by A.G., who had given her two injections of chemical substances, the use of which was contra‑indicated given K.M.’s pregnancy, impaired breathing and low blood pressure. In this respect, the applicant referred to medical instructions on the use of relanium and magnesium and extracts from a medical book, copies of which he attached to his application. The applicant also alleged that the ambulance had arrived belatedly, had lacked essential medical equipment such as an oxygen cylinder, and that the ambulance crew in general had not acted with due diligence. 17. On 3 March 2008 the District Prosecutor’s Office decided to quash the decision of 27 February 2008 and remit the case to the investigator for further inquiry. The decision stated, in particular, that the applicant’s request for an additional forensic medical investigation involving his participation was well-founded. 18. On 5 March 2008 the investigator ordered an additional forensic medical investigation by a panel of experts which was asked to determine the following: “1. The cause of K.M.’s death, whether she suffered from any illnesses from birth ... whether an illness she had suffered from birth could have caused her death or somehow have a causal link to her death. 2. Whether the injection of relanium 2 mg and magnesium 3 g by the ambulance crew was correct, whether the quantity was within that allowed and whether injecting magnesium might have entailed negative consequences. 3. Whether there was any medication (in medical theory, in science) or medical approach the administration of which could have improved K.M.’s condition and whether it should have been administered by the ambulance crew or in hospital. Whether the medical treatment had been appropriate and sufficient or whether omissions had occurred and, if so, who had been responsible for them. 4. K.M.’s transfer to the hospital took about 40 minutes; whether speedier transfer to the hospital would have made it possible to save K.M. 5. Whether K.M.’s five-week pregnancy contributed to the emergence and development of her illness, whether the pregnancy and the illness she was diagnosed with had a direct causal link with each other. 6. K.M.’s hospital record ... contained notes concerning the medical assistance, injections and medication and the doctors who had administered them over seven days. Whether the medical treatment provided had been correct, the injected medication correctly chosen with regard to type and quantity and whether these were permissible or not. If not, which doctor was responsible for errors and finally whether the medical treatment administered had brought about death. 7. The scientific methods on which forensic medical opinion no. 728 and the forensic medical opinion no. 89 of the panel of experts were based, whether these were supported by medical literature and which methods had been applied during previous examinations... 19. On 23 April 2008 the panel of experts delivered its report (forensic medical opinion no. 6), the conclusions of which read as follows: “1 and 8: No information indicating that K.M. had congenital disorders was discovered, according to the medical documents. K.M.’s death resulted from general intoxication of the organism, caused by an impairment of vital brain function, which in turn was caused by extensive and diffuse thrombosis of neuro-vessels. As regards prior diseases resulting in functional disorders which could have brought about the convulsion syndrome, it was impossible to draw any conclusions in the absence of relevant medical documents. 2. Injection of relanium 2 mg and magnesium 3 g by the emergency care specialists was correct in view of the presence of the convulsion syndrome at the given moment. Not injecting magnesium at the given moment could have entailed negative consequences. 3. In the case in question the medical assistance provided by the ambulance crew and in hospital was appropriate and sufficient, without omissions, which is substantiated by the data contained in the medical documents and by the evidentiary material in the case file. 5. K.M.’s five-week pregnancy was not linked to the cause of her death since the pregnancy and the illnesses did not have a direct causal link with each other either. 7. Opinion no. 728 concerning the forensic medical examination of K.M.’s corpse and opinion no. 89 produced by the forensic medical investigation panel are accurate and well‑founded; scientific methodologies were applied: histological examinations of the organs of the corpse were performed, and leading specialists of the Ministry of Health participated in the panel examination. 20. On 25 April 2008 the investigator decided to reject the institution of criminal proceedings for lack of corpus delicti. The decision stated in particular that the relevant members of the medical personnel, including the emergency care specialists who had provided first aid assistance to K.M., had been questioned. It further reiterated the conclusions of the experts reflected in the forensic medical opinions nos. 89 and 6 and stated that the initial medical assistance administered as first-aid and the subsequent hospital treatment provided to K.M. had been performed properly, appropriately and in a timely manner without any errors or omissions. 21. On the same day the investigator lodged a request with the director of the “Emergency Medical Service” State Close Joint Stock Company of the Yerevan Municipality (“the Emergency Medical Service”) seeking to impose an appropriate penalty on the ambulance crew. In particular, the investigator stated that there had been a 40-minute delay before the ambulance arrived and that only one of two injections given to K.M. had been mentioned by the ambulance doctor in the visit record. Furthermore, the process of taking the patient to hospital had been slow and disorganised. The ambulance driver had not carried the patient downstairs and had not assisted in putting her in the ambulance. Instead of sitting beside K.M., whose condition was extremely critical, the doctor had chosen to sit in the driver’s cab next to the driver. The investigator’s conclusion was therefore that the ambulance crew had arrived after a serious delay and had not provided proper medical assistance. 22. On 30 April 2008 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Avan and Nor-Nork District Court of Yerevan concerning the investigator’s decision of 25 April 2008 seeking the institution of criminal proceedings against A.G. and the nurse. The applicant submitted, in particular, that the panel of experts performing the additional forensic medical investigation had not taken due account of his arguments, which had been based on relevant medical literature and Government decrees. He reiterated his arguments with regard to the contra-indication of relanium and magnesium in cases of pregnancy and low blood pressure and the other arguments previously submitted in his complaint lodged with the District Prosecutor’s Office. 23. On 16 May 2008 the medical council of the Emergency Medical Service held a meeting at which the circumstances described in the investigator’s decision of 25 April 2008 were discussed. It appears that the members of the ambulance crew submitted written “explanations” (բացատրություն) in relation to the events of 7 September 2007. As a result, A.G. received a reprimand for serious breach of work regulations and medical ethics. Also, the head of the relevant emergency department was ordered to improve the supervision of employees as regards respecting work regulations, so as to prevent similar occurrences in future, and to examine every such case. 24. On 26 May 2008 the Avan and Nor-Nork District Court of Yerevan dismissed the applicant’s complaint, finding that the inquiry into K.M.’s death had been thorough and adequate. In doing so, the District Court referred to the results of the fresh forensic medical opinion. As regards the late arrival of the ambulance, incorrect completion of the visit record and the doctor’s failure to sit beside the patient during the journey to the hospital, the District Court referred to the fact that A.G. had been reprimanded for poor performance of her duties. 25. On 16 July 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal against this decision with the Criminal Court of Appeal. He argued, in particular, that the District Court had failed to question A.G. and the nurse. Furthermore, the District Court had not adequately addressed their arguments concerning the injection of K.M. with substances that were contra-indicated, given her condition, or the over-dosage thereof which, he alleged, had caused her death. 26. On 4 September 2008 the Criminal Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the decision of the District Court. In doing so, it stated that there was no necessity to summon A.G. and the nurse to testify in court since they had already made statements during the inquiry. As regards the applicant’s arguments with regard to the contra‑indication of medical substances administered by injection to K.M., the Court of Appeal relied on the forensic medical opinions according to which their administration had been correct, taking into account the convulsion syndrome at that moment. 27. On 30 September 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Court of Cassation against the decision of the Court of Appeal. 28. On 30 October 2008 the Court of Cassation decided to refuse the examination of the appeal on points of law (վճռաբեկ բողոքը թողնել առանց քննության) since it had not been lodged by an advocate (փաստաբան) licensed to act before the Court of Cassation, as required by Article 404 § 1 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The applicant claims that he could not afford the costly services of such an advocate.

6. The applicant company operates a popular online news portal in Hungary called 444.hu, which averages approximately 250,000 unique users per day. The online news portal has a staff of twenty-four and publishes approximately seventy-five articles per day on a wide range of topics, including politics, technology, sport and popular culture. 7. On 5 September 2013, a group of apparently intoxicated football supporters stopped at an elementary school in the village of Konyár, Hungary, while travelling by bus to a football match. The students at the school were predominantly Roma. The supporters disembarked from the bus, and proceeded to sing, chant and shout racist remarks and make threats against the students who were outside in the playground. The supporters also waved flags and threw beer bottles, and one of them reportedly urinated in front of the school building. To protect the children, the teachers called the police, took the children inside and made them hide under tables and in the bathroom. The football supporters boarded the bus and left the area only after the police arrived. 8. On 5 September 2013, J.Gy. the leader of the Roma minority local government in Konyár gave an interview, in the company of a pupil of the elementary school and his mother, to Roma Produkciós Iroda Alapítvány, a media outlet with a focus on Roma issues. While describing the events, and referring to the arrival of the football supporters in Konyár, J.Gy. stated that “Jobbik came in[1]” (Bejött a Jobbik). He added: “They attacked the school, Jobbik attacked it”, and “Members of Jobbik, I add, they were members of Jobbik, they were members of Jobbik for sure.” On the same day the media outlet uploaded the video of the interview to Youtube. 9. On 6 September 2013 the applicant company published an article on the incident in Konyár on the 444.hu website with the title “Football supporters heading to Romania stopped to threaten gypsy pupils”, written by B.H., a journalist of the Internet news portal. The article contained the following passages: “By all indications, a bus full of Hungarian football supporters heading to a Romania-Hungary game left a highway in order to threaten mostly Gypsy pupils at a primary school in Konyár, a village close to the Romanian border. According to our information and witnesses’ statements, the bus arrived in the village Thursday morning. The supporters were inebriated and started insulting Gypsies and threatening the pupils. Teachers working in the building locked the doors and instructed the smallest children to hide under the tables. Mr J.Gy., president of the local gypsy [cigány] municipality, talked to us about the incident. A phone conversation with Mr Gy. and a parent has already been uploaded to Youtube.” The words “uploaded to Youtube” appeared in green, indicating that they served as anchor text to a hyperlink to the Youtube video. By clicking on the green text, readers could open a new web page leading to the video hosted on the website of Youtube.com. 10. The article was subsequently updated three times – on 6 and 12 September and 1 October 2016 – to reflect newly available information, including an official response from the police. 11. The hyperlink to the Youtube video was further reproduced on three other websites, operated by other media outlets. 12. On 13 October 2013, the political party Jobbik brought defamation proceedings under Article 78 of the Civil Code before the Debrecen High Court against eight defendants, including J.Gy., Roma Produkciós Iroda Alapítvány, the applicant company, and other media outlets who had provided links to the impugned video. It argued that by using the term Jobbik to describe the football supporters and by publishing a hyperlink to the Youtube video, the respondents had infringed its right to reputation. 13. On 30 March 2014 the High Court upheld the plaintiff’s claim, finding that J.Gy.’s statements falsely conveyed the impression that Jobbik had been involved in the incident in Konyár. It also found it established that the applicant company was objectively liable for disseminating defamatory statements and had infringed the political party’s right to reputation, ordering it to publish excerpts of the judgment on the 444.hu website and to remove the hyperlink to the Youtube video from the online article. 14. The judgment of the High Court contains the following relevant passages: “... The Court established that first defendant J.Gy. violated the plaintiff Jobbik Magyarorszagért Mozgalom’s inherent right of protection against defamation by falsely claiming in his statements given to the second defendant on 5 September 2013 and uploaded to youtube.com, and to the sixth defendant on 7 September and uploaded to haon.hu that the events that had taken place on 5 September 2013 in front of the primary school of Konyár, had been done by the plaintiff party, and that the people who had taken part in it were individuals associated with the plaintiff party. The Court established that the second defendant, Roma Produkcios Iroda Alapitvany; the fourth defendant, I.V., the fifth defendant, Magyar Jeti, the sixth defendant. Inform Média Kft; and the eighth defendant HVG Kiadó Zrt. also violated the plaintiffs inherent right to be protected against defamation as the second defendant uploaded the first defendant’s false statement to youtube.com, and the fourth defendant made it available and disseminated it on romaclub.hu, the fifth defendant on 444.hu, the sixth defendant on haon.hu. and the eighth defendant on hvg.hu. ... The Court obliges the first and second defendants to make the first and second paragraphs of this judgment publicly available within 15 days and for a period of 30 days on youtube.com at their own cost, and for the fourth defendant to make it publicly available on romaclub.hu, the fifth defendant on 444.hu, the sixth defendant on haon.hu, and the eighth defendant on hvg.hu. It also obliges the fifth defendant to delete the link to the first defendant’s statement uploaded to youtube.com in its article "Supporters on their way to Romania stopped by to threaten gipsy students" published on 6 September 2013, within 15 days. Defamation can be realised not only by the stating of a falsehood but also by the publication and dissemination of a falsehood that pertains to another person (see Article 78 § 2 of the Civil Code). When establishing the occurrence of an infringement, it does not matter whether the persons concerned acted in good or bad faith, [but] whether the infringement can be imputable to them or not. With regard to the above mentioned, the Court established that the second, fourth and fifth [the applicant company], sixth and eight defendants also violated the plaintiff’s inherent right to be protected against defamation by publishing and publicly disseminating the first defendant’s defamatory statement. ... The objective sanctions for the violation of inherent rights: Pursuant to Paragraph 1 of Section 84 of the Civil Code, a person whose inherent rights have been violated shall have the following options under civil law, depending on the circumstances of the case: a) demand a court declaration of the occurrence of the infringement; c) demand that the perpetrator make restitution in a statement or by some other suitable means and, if necessary, that the perpetrator, at his own expense, make an appropriate public disclosure for restitution; d) demand the termination of the injurious situation and the restoration of the previous state by and at the expense of the perpetrator and, furthermore, to have the effects of the infringement nullified or deprived of their injurious nature. The above cited sanctions [Article 84 § 1 of the Civil Code] for the violation of inherent rights are objective in nature, [and] therefore are independent from the imputability of the perpetrator or the lack of it. The violation itself forms the basis for the application of an adequate objective sanction. With regard to the above mentioned, the Court established that the defendants violated the plaintiff’s Inherent rights, based on Paragraph 1 a) of Section 84 of the Civil Code. With regard to the restitution in accordance with Paragraph 1 c) of Section 84 of the Civil Code, the Court ordered the defendants - pertaining to the infringement they have realized by their proceedings - to make public in the affected websites the first and second paragraphs of the judgment that contain the establishment of the infringement and at the same time affect the plaintiff and declare the falseness of the statement that was made publicly available. Just as they did so with the first defendant’s declaration that contained untrue statements. Since the plaintiff’s harm can be repaired in the objective sanctions’ circle with the given provision, the Court rejected that part of the plaintiff’s claim that referred to the public dissemination of a declaration with a different content. Based on Paragraph 1 d) of Section 84 of the Civil Code, the Court ordered the fifth defendant to deprive its related report of its injurious nature, but it rejected the same claim the plaintiff submitted against the eighth defendant, since it can be established by the facts of the case that the eighth defendant’s report available on hvg.hu merely links to the report that appeared on the website 444.hu maintained by the fifth defendant, therefore the latter’s deprivation of its injurious nature effectively results in the deprivation of the report on hvg.hu of its injurious nature. The subjective sanctions of violation of inherent rights: Based on Paragraph 1 e) of Section 84 of the Civil Code, a person whose inherent rights have been violated shall file charges for punitive damages in accordance with the liability regulations under civil law. Based on Paragraph 1 of Section 339 of the Civil Code, a person who causes damage to another person in violation of the law shall be liable for such damage. He shall be relieved of liability if he is able to prove that he has acted in a manner that can generally be expected in the given situation. Based on Paragraphs 1 and 4 of Section 355 of the Civil Code, the person responsible for the damage shall indemnify the aggrieved party for non-material damages. The four conjunctive conditions of indemnification of non-material damages are; 1) the violation of law in the violation of inherent rights; 2) imputability; 3) non-material disadvantage; 4) causal link between the violation of inherent rights and the non-material disadvantage. With regard to legal persons, the non-material damage is non-material disadvantage or loss manifested in the assessment of the legal person, and in the adverse changes in its business turnover, in its participation in other relations and in the situation and quality of its existence and operations. The occurrence of the disadvantage can be established not just on the basis of evidence but by publicly known facts as well, based on Paragraph 3 of Section 163 of the Code of Civil Procedure (BH.2001.178.) In the case in question, the Court established it as a publicly known fact that the first defendant’s statement, which presented the plaintiff political party as such that committed an aggressive, threatening and racist event, and which was later on publicly disseminated by the other defendants, caused non-material damage in the assessment of the plaintiff political party. This circumstance is rejected and regarded with disdain by a wide layer of society, and it forces the legal person "associated" with such events to explain and clarify its role (or in this case, the lack of its role). In the case of a political party with parliamentary representation, this kind of non-material damage can especially be caused by such violation of inherent rights committed nearly six months prior to the parliamentary elections. With regard to the first defendant, the Court established the fact of imputability out of the conditions of indemnification for non-material damages.... In the case of the other defendants, the Court did not establish their imputability with regard to the violation of law, and consequently, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s claim for indemnification for non-material damages against the other defendants, as follows: In their own online news websites maintained by the fifth [the applicant company], sixth and eight defendants, the defendants in question published reports that presented the events of 5 September in the most realistic way, and they used the available information channels and forms of control in the expected manner. They presented contradictory information and opinions in an objective manner, remained true to the information and the given opinions. The fact that the defendants also included [Mr J.Gy.’s statements] does not violate the procedure expected from the staff of the press in such a situation [is] not regarded as a deliberately false publication, and therefore does not call for the establishment of whether the employees of the given defendants failed to examine the veracity of the facts, and in relation to this, failed to act with the precision necessary for the responsible practice of the constitutional right to freedom of expression. In contrast with this, it can explicitly be established based on the content of the testimonies and the submitted reports that the employees of the affected defendants acted with the precision necessary for the responsible practice of their work[:] they examined, exposed and presented the veracity of the facts[;] therefore they acted in a manner that would generally be expected from them in the given situation. ...” 15. The applicant company appealed arguing that public opinion associated the notion of “Jobbik” not so much with the political party but with anti-Roma ideology, and the name had become a collective noun for anti-Roma organisations. According to the applicant company, the statement had not had an offensive content regarding the political party, since it had been publicly known that Jobbik had been engaged in hatred-inciting activities. The applicant company also emphasised that by making the interview with the first defendant available in the form of a link but not associating the applicant company with the video’s content, it had not repeated the statements and had not disseminated falsehoods. 16. On 25 September 2014 the Debrecen Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance decision. It held that the statement of J.Gy. had qualified as a statement of facts because it had given the impression to the average audience that the football supporters had been organisationally linked to the political party. The court found that the statement had been injurious to the political party since it had associated the latter with socially reprehensible conduct. As regards the applicant company in particular, it held: “... With regard to the fifth defendant’s [the applicant company’s] reference in its appeal, the court of first-instance correctly established that making a false statement available through a link, even without identifying with it, qualifies as the dissemination of facts. Dissemination (or circulation) is the sharing of a piece of news as a content of thought and making it available for others. Contrary to the fifth defendant’s viewpoint expressed in its appeal, the infringement of law by dissemination occurs even if the disseminator does not identify with the statement, and even if their trust in the veracity of the statement is ungrounded. Making lawful content available in any form qualifies as dissemination; and the disseminator bears objective responsibility for sharing another person’s unlawful statement owing to the occurrence of the sharing. Based on the grammatical and taxonomical interpretation of dissemination defined in Article 78 § 2 of the Civil Code, it occurs by the sharing of information, which makes the given content accessible to anyone. The essence of dissemination is the sharing of information, and owing to the objective legal consequence, it does not matter what the goal of the sharing was, whether the disseminator acted in good or bad faith, nor do the scope of publicity or the gravity of the infringement have any relevance. ...” 17. The applicant company lodged a constitutional complaint under Act no. CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court (“the Constitutional Court Act”) on 1 December 2014, arguing in essence that under the Civil Code, media outlets had objective liability for dissemination of false information, which according to judicial practice meant that media outlets were held liable for the veracity of statements that clearly emanated from third parties. Thus, even if a media organ prepared a balanced and unbiased article on a matter of public interest, it could still be found to be in violation of the law. This would result in an undue burden for publishers, since they could only publish information whose veracity they had established beyond any doubt, making reporting on controversial matters impossible. It argued that the judicial practice was unconstitutional since it did not examine whether a publisher’s conduct had been in compliance with the ethical and professional rules of journalism, but only whether it had disseminated an untrue statement. In the area of the Internet where the news value of information was very short, there was simply no time to verify the truthfulness of every statement. 18. Two of the defendants also lodged a petition for review with the Kúria. The applicant company argued that the second-instance judgment restricted the freedom of the press in a disproportionate manner, as it had only reported on an important issue of public concern, in compliance with its journalistic tasks. It emphasised that, as established by the lower-level courts, its report on the issue had been balanced. It further maintained that the statement of J.Gy. qualified as an opinion rather than a fact. In any event, it had not been engaged in the dissemination but had merely fulfilled its journalistic obligation of reporting. 19. The Kúria upheld the second-instance judgment on 10 June 2015 (served on the applicant company on 4 September 2015), reiterating that J.Gy.’s statements were statement of facts and that the defendants had failed to prove their veracity. Although the term jobbikos was used in colloquial language, in the case at issue J.Gy. had explicitly referred to the political party and its role in the incident. As regards the question of whether the applicant company’s activity constituted dissemination of information the Kúria found: “Both in criminal law and other cases of civil law, the Kúria has taken the legal standpoint ... that dissemination is carried out by sharing or making public any information, as a result of which anyone can have access to the given content. The Internet is only one possible alternative for publishing, it is the forum of dissemination, meaning that information and facts are shared through a computer network. Internet link to one’s own publication serves an appendix; it becomes accessible and readable with a single click. The Civil Code established objective responsibility for the dissemination, irrespective of the good or bad faith of the disseminator. In the Kúria’s view, requiring media outlets not to make injurious statements accessible does not constitute a restriction of freedom of the press or freedom of expression, nor was it an obligation on them which cannot in practice be met.” 20. On 19 December 2017 the Constitutional Court dismissed the constitutional complaint. It emphasised the second-instance court’s finding that providing a hyperlink to content qualified as dissemination of facts. Furthermore, dissemination was unlawful even if the disseminator had not identified itself with the content of the third-party’s statement and even if it had wrongly trusted the truthfulness of the statement. 21. The Constitutional Court also reiterated its previous case-law concerning reporting about public figures’ press conferences, stating that such conduct did not qualify as dissemination if the report was unbiased and objective, the statement concerned a matter of public interest, the publisher provided the source of the statement and gave the opportunity to the person concerned by the potentially injurious statement a possibility to react. In such cases, according to the Constitutional Court, journalists neither made their own statements nor did they intend to influence public opinion with their own thoughts. Therefore, the liability of the press for falsehoods was to be distinguished from situations where the media content was merely defined by the own choices and decisions of the editors and journalists. Specifically, in these situations the aim of a publication was neither to enrich nor to influence public debate with the journalists’ own arguments, but to provide an up-to-date and credible report on the statements of third‑parties participating in public debates. The interest of a public debate required accurate reporting about press conferences. 22. Concerning the present case, the Constitutional Court found that the dissemination of a falsehood did not concern a statement expressed at a press conference. The statement in question had related to a media report about an event which the press had presented according to its own assessment. The press report had summarised information concerning an event of public interest. A press report fell outside the definition of dissemination only if the aim of the publication was to provide a credible and up-to-date presentation of statements of third parties of a public debate. However, in the present case the Kúria found that the aim of the publication had not been the presentation of J.Gy.’s statements, but the presentation of the contradictory information concerning the event. Thus the press report qualified as dissemination.

4. The applicant was born in 1977 and was detained at the Kırıkkale F‑type prison when the application was lodged. 5. On 1 October 2004 the applicant was taken into police custody on suspicion of being member of a terrorist organisation. 6. On 5 October 2004 the applicant was brought before the judge at the Ankara Assize Court who placed him in detention on remand taking into consideration the nature of the offence, the state of evidence and the severity of the envisaged penalty. 7. On 15 March 2005 the Ankara public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Ankara Assize Court, charging the applicant with membership of a terrorist organisation. 8. On 31 January 2008 the Ankara Assize Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to 15 years’ imprisonment. The court ordered the continuation of his detention. 9. On 6 May 2009 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment. The case was accordingly remitted to the Ankara Assize Court for further examination. 10. On 10 November 2009 the 11th Chamber of the Ankara Assize Court held a further hearing, in which both the applicant and his lawyer were present. At the end of that hearing, the court ordered the continuation of the applicant’s detention. 11. On 10 December 2009 the applicant’s lawyer filed an objection against the decision of 10 November 2009. On 21 December 2009 the 12th Chamber of the Ankara Assize Court dismissed this objection without holding a hearing. In delivering its decision, the court took into consideration the written opinion of the public prosecutor, which had not been communicated to the applicant or his representative. 12. On 28 August 2012 the Ankara Assize Court once more convicted the applicant and sentenced him to fifteen years’ imprisonment. 13. On 8 July 2013 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the first instance court.

6. The applicant company has its registered office in Istanbul. 7. Its case before the Court concerns its unsuccessful efforts to have its claims against the Black Sea Shipping Company (“Blasco”), a Ukrainian State-owned company which is subject to bankruptcy proceedings, recognised and satisfied. 8. Blasco is the successor of a Soviet State-owned company which until the late 1980s was one the largest shipping companies in the world and operated hundreds of commercial vessels. Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s Blasco encountered serious legal and economic difficulties, which resulted in the loss of a large proportion of its assets. 9. From October 1996 to April 1997 Blasco, as shipowners, and Columbus − a Liberian company − as charterers, signed time charters for four of Blasco’s ships. In August 1997 the applicant company also entered into a bareboat charter agreement with Blasco for one of its ships. 10. On 13 November 1997 Columbus assigned all of its claims against Blasco, without specifying their origin or amount, to the applicant company. Blasco was informed of the assignment. 11. On 2 December 1997 and 22 October 1998 the applicant company and Blasco signed agreements under which Blasco acknowledged owing certain debts to the applicant company related to services provided to Blasco’s vessels amounting to 3,466,754.93 United States dollars (USD). Of that amount, USD 33,557.29 related to a ship not covered by the above‑mentioned charter agreements and USD 257,531.36 was identified as expenses relating to the settlement of unspecified claims and agency costs. The remainder of the claims had apparently arisen in the context of the legal relationship created under the charterparties. 12. On 20 June 2001 the parties signed another agreement, reducing the overall debt to USD 2,021,370.13, apparently to take into account the fact that one of the ships to which the debt related had in the meantime been transferred to the applicant company in partial settlement. 13. On 25 December 1998 bankruptcy proceedings were initiated in respect of Blasco. They were suspended on 2 July 1999. It appears that they were then reinitiated and discontinued at some point in 2001. 14. On 11 July 2003 a certain Mr P., Blasco’s creditor, initiated bankruptcy proceedings against Blasco in the Odessa Regional Commercial Court (“the Commercial Court”). The notice announcing the initiation of proceedings was published, as required by law, in September 2003. 15. On 29 September 2003 the applicant company lodged an application with the Commercial Court seeking recognition of the debt owed to it by Blasco in the amount stipulated in the agreement of 20 June 2001 (see paragraph 12 above). 16. On 18 November 2004 the Commercial Court rejected the applicant company’s claim without considering it on the merits. It held that it was unsubstantiated and considered that the agreements provided by the applicant company were insufficient proof that it had valid claims. In order to show the latter, the applicant company would need to provide the original documents showing the basis on which the debts had arisen. 17. On 14 March 2005, in an appeal, the applicant company explained that the debt had arisen on the basis of charterparties between it and Blasco in respect of a number of ships. Although under the terms of the charterparties certain costs had to be borne by Blasco as the ship owner, the latter had asked the applicant company to bear those costs and those sums had accordingly become Blasco’s debt. 18. On 15 March 2005 the Odessa Commercial Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) quashed the commercial court’s ruling, holding that − since the claim had been lodged within thirty days of publication of the bankruptcy proceedings notice − it could not be rejected without an examination of the merits but rather had to be examined on the merits and either allowed or dismissed. The case was remitted to the commercial court. 19. On 7 February 2006 the applicant company made written submissions to the Commercial Court explaining the origin of the debt. It explained, in particular, that the claim had its basis in services provided to a number of vessels. 20. On 24 February 2006 the Commercial Court rejected the applicant company’s claims as insufficiently substantiated. It held, in particular, that the actual charterparties on which the claims were supposedly based had not been submitted to the court. 21. On the same day the court ordered the initiation of a financial rehabilitation procedure in respect of Blasco under a court-appointed receiver. Such procedures are governed by the Bankruptcy Act and are aimed at restoring a debtor’s solvency. 22. The applicant company appealed against the rejection of its claim. 23. On 12 August 2008 the Court of Appeal upheld the commercial court’s ruling of 24 February 2006 concerning the applicant company’s claims. 24. On 10 September 2008 the applicant company appealed to the High Commercial Court (“the HCC”). Among other arguments the applicant company further submitted that the courts dealing with its case lacked impartiality. In that connection it referred to a number of letters from the president of the Commercial Court to various executive authorities: (i) A letter to the Ministry of the Economy of 19 January 2006 in which the court president asked the Ministry − which at the time was the body responsible for licensing bankruptcy receivers − for candidates to act as the receiver in the proceedings concerning Blasco. In that letter the court president referred to the instruction of the President to the Cabinet of Ministers, the Prosecutor General and the central bank concerning the audit of the debtor company; (ii) A letter to the Prime Minister of 26 April 2005 in which the court president stated that in the period prior to 2001, when the bankruptcy proceedings were suspended, a major part of the debtor’s assets had been transferred to the Ministry of Transport and certain State-owned and other companies. He complained that in the course of the bankruptcy proceedings the Ministry of Transport and Blasco’s management had failed to provide sufficient information about the debtor’s assets and obligations and that Blasco had been transferring assets to third parties outside of the bankruptcy proceedings. The court president went on to inform the Prime Minister that he had informed the law-enforcement authorities that there were indications that Blasco’s management was engaging in criminal activity, and in particular artificially driving the company into bankruptcy. Blasco’s management and their superiors at the Ministry of Transport were not interested in restoring the debtor’s solvency. The court president accordingly asked the Prime Minister for her intervention in order to compel those officials to comply with the law; (iii) A letter to the President of Ukraine of the same date and with similar content; (iv) A letter to the President of Ukraine of 3 March 2006. In that letter the court president pointed out that the President’s earlier instruction to the Cabinet of Ministers concerning the need to take steps to improve the Blasco situation had not been complied with and that the court had been unable to obtain information from the authorities about the debtor’s assets for more than seven years. In view of those facts the court president invited the President to create a “National Council for the Restoration of Ukraine’s Status as a Seafaring Nation”, which would be tasked with making proposals as to how to return vessels transferred by Blasco to foreign entities or to receive compensation for them. The President’s personal focus on this issue would permit the Ukrainian nation and State to restore their leading role as a seafaring nation among other countries of the world. 25. For the applicant company, the statements in the above letters were evidence of the fact that the Commercial Court had failed to play an active role in protecting the creditors’ interests. The court was addressing the executive authorities as if it were their subordinate, merely reporting to them instead of exercising the function of a body with effective power over the process. The applicant company also pointed out that the decision of 24 February 2006 to initiate a rehabilitation procedure in respect of Blasco (see paragraph 21 above) referred to the instruction of the President of Ukraine in a way that suggested that it was a document that constituted guidance to be followed by the court. 26. On the same day, 23 December 2008, the applicant company also lodged a separate application with the HCC asking it to discontinue the bankruptcy proceedings as they were unfair to the creditors and represented an inadequate tool for protecting their interests and, instead, to recognise the State’s direct responsibility for Blasco’s debts. The applicant company cited examples of transfers of the debtor’s assets prior to the initiation of the bankruptcy proceedings and the letters from the commercial court’s president indicating that similar activities could be continuing. The applicant company accordingly submitted that the State must bear full liability for the entire debt owed by Blasco to the creditors. 27. On 21 January 2009 the HCC allowed the applicant company’s appeal in part, quashed the Court of Appeal’s decision of 12 August 2008, and remitted the case to the Court of Appeal on the grounds that the latter had essentially required the applicant company to comply with the requirements of domestic Ukrainian law concerning record-keeping and submit documentary proof to prove its claims, whereas it should have determined the applicable law and evaluated the claims in that light. 28. The applicant company lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court, asking it to quash the HCC’s ruling, terminate the proceedings and hold the State fully liable for Blasco’s debts. 29. On 2 April 2009 a panel of judges of the Supreme Court refused the applicant company leave to appeal to the full Commercial Chamber of that court. 30. On 27 October 2009 the Court of Appeal allowed the applicant company’s application and recognised its claims against Blasco. However, at the same time it refused to include them in the register of creditors’ claims, holding that the latter had to be done in separate proceedings. The Ministry of Transport appealed, but on 10 November 2010 its appeal was dismissed by the HCC. The ruling of 27 October 2009 then became final. 31. On 27 November 2009 the applicant company applied to have its claims included in the register of creditors’ claims. Following an initial rejection and appeals against that decision, on 11 January 2012 the Commercial Court included the claims in the register. On 8 August 2012 the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the receiver and upheld that ruling. 32. On 22 February 2013 the applicant company requested the withdrawal of Judge B., who was presiding over the bankruptcy proceedings at the time, and all the judges of the Commercial Court. It referred to the correspondence of the court president with the various executive authorities (see paragraph 24 above). In addition, the applicant company stated that the Commercial Court was operating in a building in Odessa that had previously belonged to Blasco. It referred to a newspaper article published in 2001. The article reported Blasco’s then CEO saying, at a press conference, that the company was transferring that building to the court in order to secure the court’s cooperation in accelerating the examination of the company’s cases (see paragraph 42 below). For the applicant company, those circumstances raised doubts as to the Commercial Court’s impartiality. 33. On the same day Judge B. dismissed that request on the grounds that she had only taken over the case in July 2011 and so was not affected by the circumstances referred to by the applicant company, which dated back to 2006 and earlier. Moreover, the judge held that under domestic law it was not possible to request the withdrawal of all the judges of a court, only the judge sitting in the case. 34. On 29 March 2013 the Court of Appeal’s registry received Blasco’s application requesting the court to set aside its ruling of 27 October 2009 to recognise the applicant company’s claims (see paragraph 30 above) in the light of “newly discovered circumstances”. In particular, according to Blasco, the documents sent to Blasco by the prosecutor’s office on 18 October 2012 showed that the claims presented by the applicant company were unfounded. 35. On 15 May 2013 the applicant company requested the withdrawal of the panel of the Court of Appeal considering Blasco’s application for reopening. It mainly focussed on the allegation that the debtor had missed the three-year time-limit for lodging the application (see paragraph 49 below) and that, by examining such a belated request, the court was discriminating against it and favouring a State debtor over a foreign company. 36. On 30 May 2013 the Court of Appeal quashed its own decision of 27 October 2009 in the light of the “newly discovered circumstances”. The court stated that the application had been lodged by Blasco within the statutory three-year time‑limit. On the substance, it found that the applicant company’s claims had been based only on agreements signed by Blasco’s managers between 1997 and 2001 acknowledging certain debts. However, the documents discovered by the prosecutor’s office in 2012 showed that there was no basis in fact for the alleged underlying debt: the applicant company had acquired its claims from Columbus. Columbus’s claims, in turn, had been based on charterparties for Blasco’s vessels (see paragraphs 9 and 10 above). The Court of Appeal found that charterers had presented unsubstantiated bills to Blasco for vessel operating costs which were the charterers’ responsibility to bear. The court concluded that the applicant company’s claims could not be recognised in the bankruptcy proceedings. 37. On 17 June 2013 the applicant company appealed. It argued, in particular, that it had acquired only Columbus’s claims against Blasco and not its obligations vis‑à-vis Blasco. Moreover, the charterparties to which the Court of Appeal referred had been governed by English law and subject to London arbitration. However, the Court of Appeal had failed to establish that Blasco did in fact have valid claims against Columbus under those contracts and, if so, whether it had attempted to settle them through arbitration. Moreover, the circumstances on which the Court of Appeal had based its decision were not really “newly established” as the courts had been aware of them since at least 24 February 2006 (see paragraph 20 above). 38. On 8 October 2013 the HCC dismissed the appeal and upheld the decision of 30 May 2013. The applicant company was served with the earlier decision on 12 November 2013. 39. On 31 December 2013 the applicant company lodged an application for a review of the HCC ruling by the Supreme Court (see the relevant provisions of domestic law in paragraph 47 below). It argued that: (i) the lower courts’ assessment that there were “newly established” circumstances in the case justifying reopening had been erroneous, in particular because Blasco had failed to prove that it had been unaware of the circumstances it had cited as “newly established”; (ii) the courts had erred in their assessment of the evidence in finding that Blasco had not missed the three-year time-limit to request reopening; (iii) the courts’ conclusions concerning the nature and origin of its claims against Blasco had been erroneous as they had not been supported by the evidence in the file; (iv) the HCC had applied the general provisions of the Code of Commercial Procedure concerning evidence and the requirement that judicial decisions be lawful in a divergent manner; (v) the applicant company had been discriminated against in breach of international treaties. 40. On 11 February 2014 an HCC panel declared the applicant company’s application for Supreme Court’s review inadmissible. It held that the HCC’s ruling concerned the question of whether it was appropriate to reopen proceedings in light of the newly established circumstances, which was a matter of procedural rather than substantive law. There were, therefore, no grounds to examine the petition by the Supreme Court (see paragraph 47 below for the relevant provisions of the domestic law). 41. According to the applicant company, it only became aware of the ruling of 11 February 2014 on 15 July 2014. 42. In May 2005 the Commercial Court and the Court of Appeal moved into an office building at 29 Shevchenko Boulevard in Odessa. According to the applicant company, that building used to belong to Blasco and remained on Blasco’s balance sheet. According to a clipping from an Odessa newspaper submitted by the application company, at a press conference in 2001 Blasco’s then CEO stated that, while the bankruptcy proceedings were pending against Blasco, the Commercial Court was looking for new premises. Accordingly, Blasco transferred that building to the court in order to secure the court’s cooperation in accelerating the examination of the company’s cases.

5. The applicants are Russian nationals who at the material time lived either in the Chechen Republic or the Republic of Ingushetia, a region neighbouring Chechnya. They are close relatives of individuals who disappeared in these regions in 2000-2006 after allegedly being unlawfully detained by servicemen. In each of the applications the events took place in areas under full control of the Russian federal forces. The applicants received no news of their missing relatives thereafter. 6. In each of the cases the applicants complained of the respective abduction to law-enforcement bodies and an official investigation was instituted. The proceedings in respect of each case, after being suspended and resumed on several occasions, have been pending for several years without any tangible results having been attained. As can be seen from the documents submitted, no active investigative steps have been taken by the authorities other than their forwarding formal information requests to their counterparts in various regions of Chechnya and the North Caucasus. Further to such requests, the authorities generally reported in respect of each case that the involvement of servicemen in the abduction in question had not been established and that no special operations had been carried out at the relevant time. The applicants also lodged with various authorities requests for information and assistance in the search for their missing relatives but received only formal responses, if any. The identities of the perpetrators have never been established by the investigating authorities. It appears that all of the investigations are still pending. 7. Summaries of the facts in respect of each application are set out below. Each account of events is based on statements provided to the Court and the domestic investigating authorities by the applicants, their relatives and/or neighbours, and other witnesses. The Government did not dispute the principal facts of the cases, as presented by the applicants, but contested the involvement of servicemen in the events in question. 8. The applicants are close relatives of Mr Ilez Khamkhoyev, who was born in 1972. The first applicant is his wife, the second applicant is his sister and the third and fourth applicants are his children. 9. The facts of the present application have already been examined by the Court in Bekova v. Russia (no. 53679/07) in respect of the abduction of Mr Ruslan Yandiyev (see Sultygov and Others v. Russia, nos. 42575/07 and 11 others, §§ 40-80, 9 October 2014). 10. At the material time Mr Ilez Khamkhoyev worked at a construction site located at Moscovskaya Street in Nazran, Ingushetia. At about 9.30 a.m. on 29 September 2005 he was in the workers’ trailer at the construction site when a group of armed men in camouflage uniforms broke into it. Most of the armed men were of Slavic appearance and spoke unaccented Russian. 11. Having broken into the trailer, the armed men immediately started beating Mr Ilez Khamkhoyev and dragged him outside. Two men ‑ Mr M‑A.B. and Mr Ruslan Yandiyev, who were also present at the site ‑ tried to intervene but the armed men took them outside and forced them into their vehicles. They then put Mr Ilez Khamkhoyev, unconscious and bleeding, into the boot of one of the vehicles and drove away with the three men. The abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses. 12. The whereabouts of Mr Ilez Khamkhoyev remain unknown. 13. For the main witness statements and investigative steps taken by the authorities, see Sultygov and Others (ibid., §§ 50-80). 14. On 29 September 2005 Mr M.-B.M. lodged a complaint with the Nazran town prosecutor’s office regarding the abduction of his brother (Mr M.-A.B.), Mr Ilez Khamkhoyev and an unknown third man. The investigators immediately examined the crime scene and found a substance resembling blood on a fragment of broken glass. 15. On 9 October 2005 the Nazran town prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 05560115 into the abduction of Mr Ilez Khamkhoyev, Mr M.-A.B. and Mr Ruslan Yandiyev. 16. On 15 October 2005 the mother of Mr Ilez Khamkhoyev was granted victim status in the criminal case. 17. On 29 December 2005 and 18 September 2006 the investigators questioned the first applicant, who stated that her husband had been abducted by unknown people on 29 September 2005 from his place of work. 18. On an unknown date (apparently in 2008) the first applicant was granted victim status. 19. On 17 April 2007 the investigators informed the first applicant that operational search activities were in progress with the aim of establishing her husband’s whereabouts. 20. On 27 February 2008 the first applicant asked the investigators to inform her of any progress in the proceedings. 21. On 5 April 2008 the investigators again questioned the first applicant. On 14 April 2008 they questioned the second applicant. 22. The investigation into the abduction was suspended and resumed on numerous occasions. It was last suspended on 24 May 2015. The investigation is still pending. 23. The applicant was the wife of Mr Ibragim Idrisov, who was born in 1951. She died on 24 August 2011. Her daughter, Ms Larisa Ibayeva (also spelled as Larissa Ibaeva), who is also the daughter of the disappeared Mr Ibragim Idrisov, expressed her wish to pursue the application. 24. On 27 January 2002 Mr Ibragim Idrisov went to Shali, Chechnya, for a work-related purpose. On the same date servicemen from the Shali district temporary department of the interior (“the VOVD”) arrested him and placed him in a temporary detention ward on the premises of the VOVD police station. His GAZ-2410 vehicle was seized and placed in the station’s inner courtyard. 25. Following Mr Ibragim Idrisov’s arrest the applicant was informed thereof. From 28 January 2002 until 2 February 2002 she visited him regularly in the VOVD, bringing him food and warm clothing. 26. On the morning of 3 February 2002, when the applicant came to visit her husband in the VOVD as usual, she was informed that Mr Ibragim Idrisov had been released the day before, on 2 February 2002. Meanwhile, Mr Ibragim Idrisov’s GAZ-2410 vehicle remained parked on the premises of the VOVD. 27. The whereabouts of Mr Ibragim Idrisov remain unknown. 28. On 11 February 2002 the applicant lodged an official complaint with the Shali district prosecutor’s office requesting assistance in the search for her husband. 29. On 13 February 2002 the Shali district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 59053 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code (abduction). 30. On 20 February 2002 Major A.Sh., the head of the VOVD, issued a report stating that Mr Ibragim Idrisov had been detained on 27 January 2002, placed in the VOVD’s temporary detention ward and then released on 2 February 2002. His vehicle remained on the VOVD premises. 31. On 8 August 2002 the investigators informed the applicant that the proceedings in respect of the criminal case had been suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 32. On 14 January 2003 the investigation was resumed. 33. On numerous occasions between 2002 and 2004 the applicant complained to various law-enforcement authorities about the disappearance of her husband and requested assistance in the search for him. She received letters in reply stating, in particular, that the law-enforcement agencies were taking measures to establish her husband’s whereabouts. 34. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 35. The applicant is the wife of Mr Magomed Dadulagov, who was born in 1951. 36. On 9 December 2003 Mr Magomed Dadulagov was buying sugar at the market in Nazran, Ingushetia when a group of armed men in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas arrived in a grey UAZ-469 (tabletka) vehicle without registration plates. The servicemen forced Mr Magomed Dadulagov into the vehicle and drove off to an unknown destination. His GAZ-2410 vehicle, in which he had driven to the market, also disappeared. The abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses. 37. The whereabouts of Mr Magomed Dadulagov remain unknown. 38. On 31 December 2003 the Nazran town prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 03560091 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code (abduction). 39. The investigators sent several requests for information to the law‑enforcement authorities. The responses contained statements to the effect that no information about Mr Magomed Dadulagov was available. 40. On 8 January 2004 the applicant was granted victim status and questioned. 41. On 15 January 2004 the investigators questioned Mr S., who worked at the market. He stated that on 9 December 2003 a Chechen man had arrived in a GAZ-2410 vehicle and had asked to buy sugar from him. When Mr S. had come out of his kiosk with sugar and change he had seen this man lying on the ground. He had been surrounded by about seven men, some of them wearing balaclavas. One of the assailants had threatened the market tradespeople with a gun and told them all to stand still. Then the assailants had forced the Chechen man into a UAZ-469 vehicle and had left. One of them had got into the driving seat of the above-mentioned GAZ-2410 vehicle and had followed behind the UAZ-469. Some of the abductors had been of Slavic appearance; others had been of Asiatic appearance. They had carried firearms with silencers. In Mr S.’s opinion, this had been a planned operation by the secret services. The next day the son of the abducted man had come searching for him; Mr S. had returned to him the money left by his father. 42. On 31 March 2004 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 43. On several occasions between 2006 and 2010 the applicant complained to various State authorities about the abduction and requested assistance in the search for her husband. Some replies contained statements to the effect that the necessary operational activities were being carried out. 44. On 23 January 2014 a lawyer retained by the applicant sent a request to the head of the Nazran Investigative Committee asking him to provide him with copies of certain case-file documents. On 6 February 2014 he received a reply that the investigation had been suspended on 31 March 2004. 45. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 46. According to the Government, on 25 May 2015 the Shali Town Court of the Chechen Republic (Шалинский городской суд Чеченской Республики), at the applicant’s request, declared Mr Magomed Dadulagov dead. 47. The applicant is the wife of Mr Rizvan Bashayev, who was born in 1962. 48. On 20 December 2000 (in the documents submitted the date was also referred to as 20 February 2001) Mr Rizvan Bashayev left his sister’s house in Grozny and never returned. 49. The whereabouts of Mr Rizvan Bashayev have remained unknown ever since. 50. On 26 January 2001 Zavodskoy District police station in Grozny opened a search file (розыскное дело – no. 102004) in respect of Mr Rizvan Bashayev. It is unclear whether any measures for establishing his whereabouts were undertaken. 51. On an unspecified date in 2002 the Grozny District Court of the Chechen Republic – in response to a request lodged by the applicant – declared her husband missing. The court found, in particular, that Mr Rizvan Bashayev had disappeared on 20 December 2000 after his arrest at a roadblock in the village of Komsomolskoye. The court also referred to the applicant’s statements that she had lodged a complaint with Zavodskoy District police station, whose officers had been searching for her husband, but to no avail. 52. On 29 October 2005 a police officer from Zavodskoy District police station interviewed Ms S., the sister of Mr Rizvan Bashayev. She stated that on 21 December 2001 at around 3 p.m. her brother had come to visit her at the market, where she worked. After having a meal with her at a café, he had left the café to have a smoke but had promised to return. She had not seen her brother since. 53. On 31 October 2005 the Zavodskoy District prosecutor’s office in Grozny opened criminal case no. 41209 under Article 105 of the Criminal Code (murder). 54. On 20 and 23 November 2005 the investigators questioned the relatives of Mr Rizvan Bashayev, who gave statements that were similar to that of Ms S. 55. On 26 November 2005 Ms S. was granted victim status in the criminal case and questioned. 56. On 28 November 2005 the investigators examined the crime scene. 57. On 29 November 2005 the applicant was granted victim status and questioned. 58. On various dates the investigators sent several requests for information to the law-enforcement authorities. Most of the responses contained statements to the effect that no information about Mr Rizvan Bashayev was available. 59. On 31 December 2005 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicant was informed thereof. 60. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 61. The applicants are close relatives of Mr Khizir Galtakov (also spelled as Goltakov), who was born in 1969. The first applicant is his wife; the second, third and fourth applicants are his children. The fifth applicant was the mother of Mr Khizir Galtakov; she died in March 2017. 62. At about 11 p.m. on 17 May 2005 Mr Khizir Galtakov and his friend Mr K. were in the village of Znamenskoye, Chechnya, at the intersection of Shosseynaya Street and the road between Ken‑Yurt and Bratskoye, when a group of about six armed men in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas arrived in a grey UAZ vehicle without registration plates. The men forced Mr Khizir Galtakov into the vehicle and drove off to an unknown destination. 63. The whereabouts of Mr Khizir Galtakov remain unknown. 64. On 18 May 2005 the first applicant informed the authorities of the abduction of her husband and requested assistance in the search for him. A few hours later a task force examined the crime scene. 65. On 28 May 2005 the Nadterechniy district prosecutor’s office in Chechnya opened criminal case no. 49007 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code (abduction). 66. On 1 June 2005 the first applicant was granted victim status and questioned. 67. On 2 June 2005 the investigators questioned Mr K., whose statement concerning the circumstances of Khizir Galtakov’s abduction was similar to the applicants’ submissions to the Court. 68. Over the next few days the investigators questioned several other witnesses who had found out about the events of 17 May 2005, mostly from Mr K. or through hearsay. 69. The investigators also sent several requests for information to the law-enforcement authorities. The responses contained statements to the effect that no information about Mr Khizir Galtakov was available. 70. On 28 July 2005 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicants were informed thereof on 11 January 2007. 71. On 9 September 2008 the Chechnya Ministry of the Interior issued a certificate confirming the circumstances of Mr Khizir Galtakov’s abduction, as described by the applicants. 72. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 73. On 31 October 2008 the Nadterechniy District Court in the Chechen Republic declared Mr Khizir Galtakov a missing person. 74. The applicants are close relatives of Mr Sharudi Obrugov, who was born in 1980. The first applicant is his father and the second applicant is his mother. The third applicant was his brother; he died on 28 May 2011. 75. At about 5 p.m. on 14 August 2002 Mr Sharudi Obrugov was with his friends at the crossroads of Melnichnaya and Lugovaya Streets in Argun when a group of armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas arrived in a white VAZ-2107 car with tinted windows and a Gazel minivan without registration plates. Speaking Russian, the servicemen ordered Mr Sharudi Obrugov and his friends to lie face down on the ground and to put their hands behind their backs. Having searched them and checked their identity documents, the servicemen handcuffed Mr Obrugov, forced him into the minivan and drove off to an unknown destination. 76. Immediately after the abduction, the first applicant went to the Argun military commander’s office, where one of the officers confirmed that his son had been detained by military servicemen. The first applicant also learned from the officer that Mr Sharudi Obrugov had been transferred to the main military base of the Russian federal forces in Khankala. 77. The whereabouts of Mr Sharudi Obrugov remain unknown. 78. On 18 September 2002 the first applicant lodged a complaint with the Argun Town Police Office regarding the abduction of his son. 79. On 1 October 2002 the Argun town prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 78094 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code (abduction). 80. On 19 October 2002 the first applicant was granted victim status. 81. On the same date the investigators questioned Mr I.I. and Mr A.A., two friends of Mr Sharudi Obrugov who had witnessed his abduction. They affirmed the account of events submitted by the applicants. 82. On 25 October 2002 the investigators sent a letter to the Federal Security Service (“the FSB”) asking whether any security operation had been carried out on 14 August 2002 and whether Mr Sharudi Obrugov had participated in any illegal armed groups on the territory of the Chechen Republic. The FSB replied in the negative. 83. The investigators sent several requests for information to the law‑enforcement authorities. Most of the responses contained statements to the effect that no information about Mr Sharudi Obrugov was available. 84. On 1 December 2002 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. It was resumed on 8 May 2003 and suspended again on 8 June 2003. 85. On 2 June 2005 the investigation was resumed. On 20 June 2005 the investigators examined the crime scene and the house where Mr Sharudi Obrugov had lived before his abduction. On 2 July 2005 the investigation was suspended. 86. In 2007 operational search activities aimed at establishing the whereabouts of Mr Sharudi Obrugov were carried out. Police officers interviewed his neighbours and relatives and examined cemeteries, but to no avail. 87. On 19 February 2010 the second applicant requested that the investigation be resumed and that she be informed of any progress in the proceedings. Her request was refused. 88. On 21 May 2010 the second applicant requested the investigators to grant her full access to the criminal case file. Full access was granted. 89. On 9 October 2010 the investigation was resumed. The investigators sent several requests for information to the law-enforcement authorities and questioned Mr A.A., the second applicant and the cousins of Mr Sharudi Obrugov. The investigators also ordered a forensic DNA examination. 90. On 29 November 2010 the investigation was suspended. At the same time, the investigators ordered that operational search activities be carried out, with the aim of establishing the whereabouts of Mr Sharudi Obrugov. 91. On 5 October 2011 the investigation was resumed. The first applicant was granted “civil claimant” status (гражданский истец) in the criminal case. On 6 October 2011 the investigation was suspended. 92. On several occasions between 2002 and 2010 the applicants complained to various law-enforcement authorities about the disappearance of their son and requested assistance in the search for him. In reply they received letters stating that the law-enforcement agencies were taking measures to establish their son’s whereabouts. 93. On 13 January 2012 the NGO Materi Chechni, acting on behalf of the second applicant, asked the head of the Chechen Parliamentary Committee on the search for the Disappeared (Комитет Парламента Чеченской Республики по поиску лиц, без вести пропавших в период проведения контртеррористической операции) for assistance in the search of Mr Obrugov. On 12 March 2012 the investigators replied that operational search activities were being undertaken in order to establish his whereabouts. 94. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 95. On 23 September 2010 the first applicant lodged a complaint with the Shali Town Court challenging the investigators’ decision to suspend the investigation and their failure to take basic steps. On 18 October 2010 the court terminated the proceedings, having found that on 9 October 2010 the investigation had been resumed. On 8 December 2010 the Chechnya Supreme Court upheld the above decision on appeal. 96. The applicants are close relatives of Mr Ayub Bakhayev, who was born in 1979. The first applicant is his mother, the second applicant is his brother, and the third applicant is his sister. 97. At about 1 p.m. on 13 October 2001 Mr Ayub Bakhayev left his home at 25a Melnichnaya Street in Argun to go to the pharmacy. He was heading towards the pharmacy when a group of approximately six armed servicemen in military uniforms and balaclavas arrived in two VAZ-2106 vehicles with registration plates allegedly comprising the digits “680 95 RUS” and “689 95 RUS”. Speaking unaccented Russian, the servicemen threatened passers-by with firearms and warned them to stand still. Then they searched Mr Ayub Bakhayev, forced him into one of the vehicles and drove to the premises of the Argun district military commander’s office. 98. Subsequently, on several occasions, both of the above-mentioned vehicles that had been used by the abductors were seen unrestrictedly entering the premises of the commander’ office. 99. Following the abduction, the applicants went to the commander’s office, where one of the officers confirmed that Mr Ayub Bakhayev had been arrested. 100. The whereabouts of Mr Ayub Bakhayev have remained unknown since the date of his abduction. The abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses, including the first applicant. 101. On 15 October 2001 the applicants informed the authorities of the abduction and requested assistance in the search for their relative. 102. On 20 January 2002 the Argun inter-district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 78009 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code (abduction). 103. On 23 January 2002 the first applicant was granted victim status. 104. On 25 December 2002 the first applicant was questioned. She gave the same account of events as that which she submitted to the Court. 105. The investigators sent several requests for information to the law‑enforcement authorities. Most of the responses contained statements to the effect that no information about Mr Ayub Bakhayev was available, that no security operation had been carried out on 13 October 2001, and that there was no information concerning the VAZ-2106 vehicles. 106. On 20 March 2002 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. Subsequently, it was resumed on 20 November 2002 and again suspended on 30 December 2002. 107. On 28 April 2004 the first applicant lodged a complaint with the Argun town prosecutor, asking that the investigation be resumed. 108. On 7 May 2004 the Argun town prosecutor ordered that the investigation be resumed. The applicant was informed thereof. 109. On 10 June 2004 the investigation was suspended again for failure to identify the perpetrators. 110. In 2007 the Argun Town police station carried out operational search activities aimed at establishing the whereabouts of Mr Ayub Bakhayev. The police questioned the first applicant and several witnesses and sent requests for information to various authorities. 111. On 3 March 2010 the first applicant requested that the proceedings be resumed and that she be informed of any progress in the investigation. In reply, the investigators informed her that the proceedings had been suspended and that operational search activities were in progress with the aim of establishing the whereabouts of her son. 112. On 21 May 2010 the applicant requested that she be granted access to the investigation file. No reply was made to this request. 113. On 7 October 2010 the investigators’ supervisor ordered that the investigation be resumed. 114. On 17 October 2010 the first applicant was questioned again. She gave a detailed account of the circumstances of the abduction of her son that was similar to that which she submitted to the Court. 115. On 19 October 2010 the investigators ordered a forensic examination of the DNA taken from the first applicant’s blood. 116. From 8 until 10 November 2010 the investigators questioned several witnesses, including the applicants’ neighbours. 117. On 15 November 2010 the investigation was suspended and subsequently resumed on 24 June 2011 after the investigators’ superior pointed out several defects in the investigation. The investigators sent several requests for information to State authorities concerning the two above-mentioned VAZ-2106 vehicles and to this end questioned three witnesses about those vehicles; their statements did not provide any pertinent information. 118. On 24 July 2011 the investigation was suspended again. On 5 October 2011 it was resumed; the first applicant was informed thereof. On the same day she was granted “civil claimant” status in the criminal case. 119. On 6 October 2011 the investigation was suspended. 120. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 121. On 23 September 2010 the first applicant lodged a complaint with the Shali Town Court challenging the investigators’ decision to suspend the proceedings and their failure to take basic investigative steps. On 13 October 2010 the court terminated the proceedings, having found that on 7 October 2010 the investigation had already been resumed. On 17 November 2010 the Chechnya Supreme Court upheld the above decision on appeal. 122. The first applicant was the mother of Mr Said-Emin (also spelled as Sayd‑Emi and Sayd-Emin) Ocherkhadzhiyev, who was born in 1967. She died on 2 April 2014. The second applicant, Mr Adam Ocherkhadzhiyev, is the brother of Mr Said-Emin Ocherkhadzhiyev. 123. In January 2000 the Russian federal forces conducted an extensive military operation against members of illegal armed groups in Grozny. The town was subjected to shelling and sweeping-up operations. By the end of January 2000 the central parts of the city, including the Staropromyslovskiy district of Grozny, were under the Russian forces’ control (see Umayeva v. Russia, no. 1200/03, § 79, 4 December 2008, and Khashiyev and Akayeva v. Russia, nos. 57942/00 and 57945/00, §§ 16 and 41, 24 February 2005). 124. On 19 January 2000 Mr Said-Emin Ocherkhadzhiyev left his home in the settlement (поселок) of Katayama in the Staropromyslovskiy district of Grozny, accompanied by the second applicant. They went to the settlement of Michurina in the Oktyabrskiy district of Grozny to visit a relative. A neighbour, Mr S.Kh., joined them. On their way there they came across an armoured personnel carrier (APC) carrying Russian servicemen. The servicemen wore military uniforms, spoke unaccented Russian and were of Slavic appearance. They opened fire and wounded Mr Said-Emin Ocherkhadzhiyev. Meanwhile, the second applicant and Mr S.Kh. managed to hide behind a building and escaped the shooting. The servicemen picked the wounded Mr Said-Emin Ocherkhadzhiyev off the ground, put him into the APC and drove off to an unknown destination. 125. The whereabouts of Mr Said-Emin Ocherkhadzhiyev remain unknown. 126. As soon as the shelling in Grozny was over, the applicants informed the authorities of the abduction and requested that criminal proceedings be opened. 127. On 19 June 2001 the Grozny town prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 17073 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code (abduction). 128. On 27 July 2001 the first applicant was granted victim status. 129. The investigation was suspended and resumed on several occasions. In particular, it was suspended on 19 August 2001 for failure to identify the perpetrators; the applicants were not duly informed of this decision. The investigation was resumed on 24 November 2005 and suspended on 24 January 2006, resumed again on 18 January 2010 and suspended on 28 February 2010, then resumed on 8 November 2010 and suspended again on 8 December 2010. 130. On 10 May 2011 the first applicant lodged a request with the investigating authority for the resumption of the investigation into the disappearance of her son. She also asked the investigators to question the second applicant and Mr S.Kh. 131. On 11 May 2011 the investigation was resumed. 132. On 12 May 2011 the investigators questioned the second applicant, who gave the same account of events as that which he submitted to the Court. In addition, he stated that he had not given testimony earlier because he was afraid of coming to the investigating authorities as a witness to the above-mentioned events. 133. On 14 May 2011 the investigators questioned Mr S.Kh., whose statement was very similar to that of the second applicant. 134. In some of their replies to requests for information lodged by the applicants regarding Mr Said-Emin Ocherkhadzhiyev, the investigators indicated that he had disappeared during a counter-terrorist operation in the Chechen Republic. 135. On 16 May 2011 the investigation was suspended. It was resumed on 19 October 2011 and suspended on 20 October 2011, then resumed on 18 April 2012 and suspended on 8 May 2012. 136. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 137. On 13 January 2010 and 12 August 2010 the first applicant lodged a complaint with the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Grozny challenging the investigators’ decisions to suspend the investigation and their failure to take basic steps. On 7 April 2010 and 22 November 2010 the court rejected that complaint, having found that the decisions to suspend the proceedings had already been annulled and the investigation resumed. On 22 December 2010 the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic upheld the decision of 22 November 2010. 138. The first applicant is the mother of Mr Alikhan Mazhiyev, who was born in 1980. The second and the third applicants are his brother and sister. 139. On 5 April 2003 Mr Alikhan Mazhiyev, the second applicant and a group of about five or six residents of different neighbouring villages went into the mountains nearby the settlement of Ulus-Kert in the Shatoy district of Chechnya to pick wild garlic (allium ursinum). Having finished picking in the evening on the same date, they headed down from the mountains in the direction of the road, where a vehicle was waiting to take them home. Mr Alikhan Mazhiyev walked ahead of the group. Somewhere on the path to the road a group of about ten-fifteen military servicemen stopped Mr Mazhiyev. Having witnessed this, the second applicant and other fellow villagers tried to approach and help Mr Mazhiyev, but the servicemen threatened them with firearms and ordered them to lie down on the ground and stay still. The servicemen were of Slavic appearance; they were wearing paratroopers’ military uniforms and spoke unaccented Russian. All of them were armed and equipped with portable radio sets. After the servicemen had taken Mr Mazhiyev away, the second applicant and the others got up from the ground. They went down the mountain to their vehicle, hoping that Mr Mazhiyev would be waiting for them there, but they could not find him. 140. The next day, the second applicant, together with other relatives, went to a military unit stationed in the village of Dachu‑Barzoy. One of the officers, who introduced himself as Valeriy, informed them that Mr Alikhan Mazhiyev had been detained by military servicemen; those servicemen had brought him to the 45th regiment, which was stationed in the village of Khattuni. 141. The whereabouts of Mr Alikhan Mezhiyev remain unknown. 142. According to the applicants, immediately after the above events they abstained from lodging any official complaints, fearing for their lives and the life of their missing relative. On 29 June 2003 they lodged a complaint with the authorities regarding the abduction, requesting that a criminal investigation be opened. 143. On 29 July 2003 the Vedeno district prosecutors’ office opened criminal case no. 24058 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code (abduction). 144. On 29 September 2003 the investigation was suspended for failure to establish the identity of the perpetrators. The first applicant was informed thereof. 145. On 14 and 28 April 2010 the first applicant requested information about progress in the proceedings. She also asked to be granted access to the investigation file. 146. On 15 June 2010 the military prosecutor’s office of the United Group Alignment informed the first applicant that the investigation file had been lost and that measures were being taken to retrieve it. 147. On 1 July 2010 the acting head of the Shali inter-district investigations department ordered that the criminal case file be retrieved. 148. On 5 July 2010 the applicants were informed that the investigation had been resumed. It was subsequently suspended on 4 August 2010, then resumed on 9 June 2011, suspended on 11 July 2011, then resumed on 13 July 2011 and suspended again on 25 July 2011. 149. On 20 July 2010 the first applicant was granted victim status and questioned. 150. On 21 July 2010 the second applicant was questioned as a witness. He gave the same account of events as that which he submitted to the Court. 151. On the same date, another brother of Mr Alikhan Mazhiyev was questioned as a witness. He had been told of the events of 5 April 2003 by the second applicant. 152. On 22 July 2010 the investigators questioned the third applicant. She confirmed that on the day following the abduction of her brother her relatives had gone to the military unit stationed in Dachu‑Barzoy village. They had been told by the chief serviceman that Mr Alikhan Mazhiyev had been held in the village of Khattuni. 153. The investigators sent several requests for information to the law‑enforcement authorities and to various hospitals. The responses stated that no information about Mr Alikhan Mazhiyev was available. 154. On 2 August 2010 the investigators lodged a request with the head of the Vedenskiy District police station for a properly secured on-site examination to be organised of the area between the settlements of Ulus‑Kert and Selmintauzin. The military commander informed him in reply that such an examination was impossible because the officers of the FSB were carrying out special operations in that area. 155. On 14 April 2011 the first applicant obtained the investigators’ permission to study the case file. 156. On 25 June 2011 the first applicant was questioned again. 157. On 15 July 2011 the investigators questioned a police officer who had been working in the villages of Tevzana and Khatuni since 2001. He stated that in 2003 various units of the FSB, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Defence and the Main Intelligence Service of the Ministry of Defence (6-й отдел ГРУ) in Grozny had been stationed on the outskirts of the village of Khattuni. 158. On numerous occasions between 2003 and 2011 the applicants complained to various law-enforcement authorities about the disappearance and requested assistance in the search for their relative. In reply they received letters stating that their complaints had been examined or forwarded to other authorities for examination and that the law-enforcement agencies were taking measures to establish their relative’s whereabouts. 159. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 160. On 16 May 2011 the first applicant lodged a complaint with the Shali Town Court challenging the investigators’ decision to suspend the proceedings and their failure to take basic steps. On 14 June 2011 the court rejected that complaint, having found that several days earlier, on 9 June 2011, the investigators had resumed the proceedings. On 29 July 2011 the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic upheld the above decision on appeal. 161. The first applicant was the mother of Ms Tumisha (also spelled as Tumishat) Sadykova, who was born in 1959. She died on 22 October 2014. The second applicant is the sister of Ms Tumisha Sadykova. 162. At the material time, Ms Tumisha Sadykova worked at a car wash on Subbotnikov Street in Grozny. A regional department of the Federal Drug Enforcement Agency was located across the street. 163. At about 2 p.m. on 15 March 2006 Ms Tumisha Sadykova and her relative, Mr Kh.Kh., were at the car wash, when a group of about ten armed men in camouflage uniforms arrived in VAZ‑21099 and UAZ-469 vehicles without registration plates. The men forced Ms Tumisha Sadykova and Mr Kh.Kh. into the UAZ vehicle and drove off to an unknown destination. The abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses. 164. Mr Kh.Kh. was released later on the same date somewhere in Grozny (see below). 165. At some point after the abduction, one of Ms Tumisha Sadykova’s colleagues (named Adam) and a relative of the applicants (named Aslanbek) – both of whom assisted the applicants in the search for Ms Tumisha Sadykova – obtained information concerning the possibility of her being released in exchange for money. The two men asked the applicants to give them money in the amount allegedly demanded of them in exchange for Mr Tumisha Sadykova’s release. According to the applicants, they paid the amount requested, but Ms Tumisha Sadykova was not released. As can be seen from the case file, the investigators were subsequently informed of those developments. 166. The whereabouts of Ms Tumisha Sadykova have remained unknown ever since the day of her abduction. 167. On 16 August 2006 the applicants informed the authorities of the abduction and requested that an investigation be opened. 168. On 30 September 2006 the Leninskiy district prosecutor’s office in Grozny opened criminal case no. 50176 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code (abduction). 169. On the same date the first applicant was granted victim status. 170. On 2 October 2006 the first applicant was questioned by the investigators. 171. On 9 and 10 October 2006 the investigators questioned two eyewitnesses to the abduction, Mr L-A.Ch. and Mr R.Kh. Their statements about the events of 15 March 2006 were similar to the applicants’ submissions to the Court. In addition, Mr R.Kh. stated that one of the armed men had asked him in Chechen where the entrance to the café was. 172. On 14 October 2006 and 6 April 2010 the second applicant was questioned. She affirmed the account of the abduction given above. 173. On 8 November 2006 the investigators questioned Mr A.S. (the father of Ms Tumisha Sadykova), who stated in particular that some time after the abduction, two men (a colleague of his daughter named Adam and a relative of his family) – both of whom had been engaged in the search for Ms Tumisha Sadykova – had asked him to hand over to them the amount of money allegedly demanded by way of a ransom for her release. He had paid the amount requested, but Ms Tumisha Sadykova had not been released. 174. The investigators lodged several requests for information with the law-enforcement authorities; those authorities’ responses contained statements to the effect that no information about Ms Tumisha Sadykova was available. 175. On 30 November 2006 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 176. A number of operational search activities aimed at finding Ms Tumisha Sadykova were carried out by police officers in 2010. In particular, on 26 April 2010 they examined the crime scene at the car wash. Those steps yielded no tangible results. 177. On 8 April 2009 a relative of the applicants requested the Chechen Parliament for assistance in the search for Ms Tumisha Sadykova. It is unclear whether any reply was given to this request. 178. On 31 March 2011 the first applicant requested that the investigation be resumed. On 16 June 2011 her request was granted and the investigation was resumed. It was suspended on 16 July 2011 and again resumed on 27 January 2012. 179. On 10 February 2012 the investigators questioned the second applicant. She stated, in particular, that after the first Chechen war, from 1997 until 1999, her sister, Ms Tumisha Sadykova, had worked at the Ministry of Sharia National Security (Министерство Шариатской Государственной безопасности) during the period when Aslan Maskhadov had been President of Chechnya. 180. On 24 February 2012 the investigation was suspended. On 31 May 2012 that decision was annulled by the Leninsky district prosecutor’s office , which pointed out several defects in the investigation. Consequently, on 4 June 2012 the investigation was resumed. 181. On 7 June 2012 Mr Kh.M. was questioned. He stated that in March 2006 he met Ms Tumisha Sadykova at the car wash. During their conversation, an UAZ-469 vehicle had arrived; four armed man in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas had got out of the vehicle. They had demanded in Russian and in Chechen that Mr Kh.M. show them his identity documents. When he had attempted to present his official identification issued by the law-enforcement agency, where he worked, the men had grabbed him and forced him into his VAZ‑21140 car. He had not seen what had happened to Ms Tumisha Sadykova. The men had told him that they would take him to the settlement of Khankala. On their way there they had checked his service identity document over the radio. Having verified that he did in fact work at the law-enforcement agency, the men had stopped the car. An UAZ-469 vehicle had arrived; the men had got out of Mr Kh.M.’s car and told him to stay in his car without moving for about fifteen minutes. Then they had got into the UAZ-469 vehicle and had left. Mr Kh.M. had informed the relatives of Ms Tumisha Sadykova of the circumstances of her abduction. 182. On 8 June 2012 the investigators questioned another witness, Mr B.M., who had seen several armed men forcing Ms Tumisha Sadykova into the UAZ-469 vehicle and Mr Kh.M. into the VAZ-21140 car. The men had spoken Russian and Chechen. 183. On 4 July 2012 the investigation was suspended. On 8 April 2014 that suspension was overruled by the Leninsky district prosecutor’s office. Consequently, on 14 April 2014 the investigation was resumed. 184. The investigator sent several requests for information to various medical institutions. The responses contained statements to the effect that Ms Tumisha Sadykova had not sought medical treatment in those institutions. 185. On 14 May 2014 the investigation was suspended. 186. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 187. On 20 December 2011 the first applicant lodged a complaint with the Leninskiy District Court in Grozny challenging the investigators’ decision of 16 July 2011 to suspend the proceedings. On 27 January 2012 her complaint was rejected, as the proceedings had already been resumed. On 29 February 2012 the Chechnya Supreme Court upheld the above decision on appeal. 188. For a summary of the relevant domestic law and practice and for international and domestic reports on disappearances in Chechnya and Ingushetia between 1999 and 2006, see Aslakhanova and Others v. Russia (nos. 2944/06 and 4 others, §§ 43-59 and §§ 69-84, 18 December 2012).

6. The applicant was born in 1980 and lives in Tbilisi. 7. The applicant was a member and one of the leaders of a group which called itself the National Religious Movement, which was founded in Tbilisi on 11 May 2011. On 26 May 2011 a police officer drew up a report, which stated that he possessed information that twenty-four individuals, including the applicant, were plotting a violent overthrow of the Government of Georgia. According to the report, all the alleged plotters were located at the Kintsvisi Monastery, in the Kareli region. 8. On 30 May 2011 a press release was posted on the website of the Ministry of the Interior (“the MoI”), which said that an armed group of twenty-four people had been detained in Kintsvisi on 26 May 2011. 9. According to the official record of the detention and search of the applicant, which he duly signed, the applicant was placed under arrest at 6.12 a.m. on 27 May 2011 at Tbilisi police headquarters on suspicion of committing an offence under Article 315 § 1 of the Criminal Code (conspiracy or insurrection intended to change the constitutional order of Georgia by violent means). The report, which stated that he had been arrested after being questioned as a witness, also noted that he had bruises in the tailbone area, buttocks and left thigh, and haemorrhages on his left eye, right cheek and his nose. 10. At 12.30 p.m. on the same day the applicant was taken to a pre-trial detention centre, where he underwent a visual examination on admission. The report drawn up thereafter confirmed that he had a swollen blue left eye, haemorrhages on his nose, and bruises in the tailbone area. 11. By a decision of 28 May 2011 a judge, acting at the request of the prosecution, remanded the applicant in custody for fifty-five days. At the detention hearing, the applicant challenged the official report of his arrest and stated that he had been apprehended on 26 May in Kintsvisi, rather than on 27 May 2011 in Tbilisi. His submission disagreeing with the official record of his arrest was, however, dismissed. Relying in particular on the official record of the arrest, duly signed by the applicant, the Tbilisi City Court judge concluded that his allegations of unlawful detention were unsubstantiated. 12. The applicant appealed against his pre-trial detention, maintaining his version of the circumstances surrounding the arrest. In particular, he stated that after having been apprehended in the Kintsvisi Monastery at around 11.30 a.m. on 26 May 2011, he had been transferred to Kareli police station where he had been beaten. He had then been transferred to Tbilisi police headquarters, where after having been physically assaulted again, he had been questioned for about six hours. The applicant maintained that the actual time of his arrest was different from the time of the arrest indicated in the official record. In such circumstances, the time-limit of 48 hours referred to in Article 196 of the CCP (see paragraph 36 below) had been exceeded, rendering his detention unlawful. On 6 June 2011 the applicant’s appeal was rejected by the Tbilisi Court of Appeal as inadmissible. The decision was served on the applicant on 9 June 2011. 13. On 1 June 2011 the defence counsel of the applicant requested, at their own expense, a forensic medical examination of the applicant. On 22 July 2011 the applicant was examined by five medical specialists who concluded that from neurological and traumatological point of view the applicant’s condition was not serious. They noted that the bruises and cuts he had allegedly had on 27 May 2011 according to the report on his visual examination, were not visible. 14. On 15 July 2011, the applicant was additionally charged with unlawful purchase and possession of firearms, an offence under Article 236 §§ 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code. 15. On 21 July 2011 the applicant’s trial started. The applicant reiterated his allegation that he had been detained on 26 May in Kintsvisi and not on 27 May in Tbilisi. He also complained of the physical and psychological abuse to which he had been subjected in Kintsvisi, then in the Kareli police station and finally at Tbilisi police headquarters. In particular, he alleged that he had been punched in the face by one of the officers of the Special Forces in Kintsvisi and then severely beaten by the same officer and several others in the Kareli police station. In Tbilisi he had been subjected to further abuse and psyshological pressure with the prupose of extracting a confession from him. 16. On 12 August 2011 the applicant was convicted as charged and sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment. The judge relying on the official record of the detention and search of the applicant dismissed his submission that he had been arrested in Kintsvisi rather than Tbilisi. The court did not address the applicant’s ill-treatment allegations. 17. The applicant appealed. His conviction was upheld by the Tbilisi Court of Appeal on 22 November 2011. By a decision of 12 March 2012 the Supreme Court of Georgia rejected an appeal by the applicant on points of law as inadmissible. 18. The applicant was released from prison on 13 January 2013 under the Amnesty Act of 28 December 2012. 19. On 28 May 2011 the applicant was transferred to Tbilisi no. 8 Prison. On admission he underwent a visual examination which confirmed bruises and haemorrhages on his body and face (see paragraphs 9-10 above). On 1 June 2011 the prison administration sent a copy of the above report together with the applicant’s complaint about his alleged ill-treatment to the Chief Prosecutor’s Office of Georgia and requested the initiation of proceedings. 20. On 4 June 2011 an investigation was begun under Article 333 § 1 of the Criminal Code into the offence of exceeding official authority. The applicant repeatedly asked to be questioned in that regard, but his requests were ignored by the authorities. On 29 August 2011 he sent a letter to the prosecutor’s office complaining of their inactivity. While maintaining his allegations, he requested that criminal proceedings be initiated against those who had committed unlawful acts against him. In support of his allegations he submitted a photo, allegedly taken during his initial questioning, showing injuries on his face. 21. On 2 September 2011 the applicant was questioned by an investigator at Tbilisi no. 8 Prison. He reiterated his version of events concerning his arrest and subsequent ill‑treatment. He claimed that he had been punched in the face by one of the officers of the Special Forces in Kintsvisi. Then, he had been beaten by several officers in the Kareli police department. One of them, according to the applicant, had been wearing a mask. In Tbilisi two police officers had further subjected him to physical and psychological abuse. 22. The applicant subsequently filed several complaints criticising the lack of progress in the investigation and particularly the fact that his detailed statement had not given rise to a number of further procedural measures. In response to one of his complaints, by a letter of 11 December 2011, he was told that he was not a party to the criminal proceedings in question and hence had no right to lodge any applications or to request that certain investigative steps be taken. 23. During 2012 the Office of the Public Defender of Georgia, acting at the request of the applicant, sent three requests for information to the Office of the Chief Prosecutor of Georgia concerning the investigation into the alleged ill-treatment of the applicant. All three letters remained unanswered. 24. On 18 December 2012 the applicant was questioned again. He confirmed his account of events as given in his statement of 2 September 2011, describing in a more detailed manner his arrest operation and the alleged ill-treatment that followed. He claimed that his beating at the Kareli police department had lasted for about an hour and that among others he had been severely beaten on his coccyx with a rubber truncheon. The applicant also provided a physical description of the officers allegedly implicated in his ill-treatment and claimed that he could identify at least two of them. As to the abuse he allegedly suffered at Tbilisi police headquarters, he claimed that he could identify both of the men involved, as they had body type of a wrestler. They also had, as the applicant could remember, damaged ears, an identifiable feature of wrestlers. 25. On 7 February 2013 the applicant filed a complaint with the Chief Prosecutor of Georgia, criticising the lack of progress in the investigation. That complaint was followed by others to the Minister of Justice, the Chief Prosecutor’s Office and the investigator in charge of the case. 26. On 25 February 2013 the applicant was questioned once again. This time along with providing details of his alleged ill-treatment, the applicant gave the investigator several photographs and a video footage depicting one of the officers of the Special Forces allegedly involved in his ill-treatment. 27. In the meantime, between January and April 2013 the investigator in charge questioned various officials from the MoI, among them police officers of the Kareli police station. They all denied having seen either the applicant or any of the other detainees being ill-treated. The investigator also interviewed the staff of the local emergency service. They confirmed that on 26 May 2011 an ambulance had been called for one of the detainees at the Kareli police station. While examining him they had observed multiple haemorrhages on his back. They had also seen twenty to twenty‑five other detainees at the police station, although they had not witnessed any fact of violence themselves. Within the same period of time, the investigation also questioned the twenty-three co-defendants of the applicant. They all claimed that they had been ill-treated on the day of the arrest by members of the Special Forces. 28. According to the case file, on 3 May 2016 the investigation into the offence of exceeding official authority by the police was transferred from the Shida Kartli Prosecutor’s Office to the Chief Prosecutor’s Office of Georgia. On 13 June 2016 the investigator in charge obtained a medical record from Tbilisi no. 8 Prison, according to which the following injuries were observed on the applicant on 28 May 2011: small bruises on his nose and left eye, large haemorrhages in the area of his buttocks, left thigh and the tailbone. According to the record, the applicant claimed to have sustained those injuries prior to his arrest. 29. In June 2017 the investigator questioned two former high officials of the Kareli police. He also obtained video recordings that were apparently available online in connection with the Kintsvisi operation. 30. On 19 July 2017 the offence under the investigation was reclassified into an offence of exceeding power by using violence, an offence under Article 333 § 3 (b) of the Criminal Code. The responsible prosecutor concluded that there was sufficient medical evidence to show that the applicant and other detainees had sustained various injuries on 26 May 2011. In support of his conclusion he also referred to the statements of the twenty-three co-defendants of the applicant, who had all confirmed the fact of their enduring physical and psychological abuse on the day of the arrest. Most of them, according to the prosecutor, had not voiced their ill-treatment allegations at the initial stage of the investigation out of fear of further abuse and also in exchange for plea bargain that the prosecution had concluded with them. 31. In May 2018 twelve co-defendants of the applicant were questioned again. They provided detailed description of their individual experience of the ill-treatment focusing in addition on the physical description of the officers involved. They claimed that the officers of the Special Forces spoke Megrelian (a Kartvelian language spoken in certain regions of western Georgia). 32. On 25 July 2018 the applicant sent yet another letter to the Chief Prosecutor’s Office complaining of the lack of progress in the investigation. He criticised the fact that despite having consistently maintained that he could identify the officers who had ill-treated him, no arrangements had been made for an identification procedure to be undertaken for over seven years. He also requested that the two investigators who had drawn up the record on his arrest and personal search and who had participated in questioning him on 26 and 27 May 2011 be interviewed, and that further interviews take place with several other officials who had been involved in his arrest. While requesting that a number of other specific investigative measures be undertaken, the applicant again asked the prosecution authorities to grant him victim status and also to reclassify the offence under the investigation from abuse of power (an offence under Article 333 of the Criminal Code) to torture (an offence under Article 144 § 1 of the Criminal Code). The applicant’s letter has apparently gone unanswered. 33. In July-September 2018 some additional investigative acts were undertaken, including the questioning of the medical staff of the Ministry of the Interior and Tbilisi no. 8 Prison, and of clerics from the Kintsvisi Monastery. The latter while confirming having seen the applicant and his entourage assaulted when arrested, also provided information about the appearance of those involved in the arrest operation. They also claimed hearing the officers speak Megrelian. 34. According to the case-file the proceedings are still pending.

5. The applicant was born in 1981 and is currently serving a sentence of imprisonment in Nysa Prison. 6. On 28 May 2001 the Kielce Regional Court convicted the applicant of robbery and sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment. The sentence was amended by the Cracow Court of Appeal on 5 December 2001. The applicant has been serving this sentence since 3 September 2000, with interruptions between 13 January 2003 and 13 January 2005; 31 May 2005 and 17 August 2005; and 13 May 2008 and 30 May 2014. 7. In August 2005 the applicant was charged with murdering an Italian citizen, a certain P.A on 9 August 2005. Allegedly, he had repeatedly hit P.A. on the head, causing brain haemorrhages, swelling of the brain, and consequently P.A.’s death. He was also charged with one count of robbery committed on 8 August 2005 and possession of 0.2327gr of MDMA (commonly known as extasy) on 17 August 2005. 8. On 20 March 2006, after examining the applicant and analysing his medical file from 2000, psychiatrists concluded that he should undergo a psychiatric assessment, in order to determine whether he could be held criminally responsible for this offence. 9. On 27 March 2006 the Katowice Regional Court ordered that the applicant should undergo a psychiatric assessment in a psychiatric facility. The applicant underwent this assessment in the psychiatric ward of Cracow Detention Centre between 12 April and 30 June 2006. In an opinion dated 18 July 2006 (“the 2006 opinion”), two psychiatrists and a psychologist confirmed that he had been suffering from a chronic psychotic disorder of a delusional type related to organic lesions in his central nervous system, and also from a personality disorder (przewlekłe psychotyczne zaburzenia psychiczne o obrazie zespołu urojeniowego u osoby ze zmianami organicznymi o.u.n.; zaburzenia rozwoju osobowości), at the time the offences had been committed, and that he would not have been aware of and could not have controlled his actions. They further recommended that he be placed in a psychiatric hospital, as there was a risk that he could commit similar offences again. In an additional opinion of 12 January 2007 they confirmed their previous findings. 10. On 2 April 2007 the Katowice Regional Court decided to discontinue the proceedings against the applicant, on the basis that he could not be held criminally responsible. It further ordered that he be placed in a psychiatric hospital. 11. On 25 May 2007 the Katowice Court of Appeal quashed that decision and remitted the case. 12. The Katowice Regional Court examined the case at two hearings on 5 and 25 September 2007. On the former date the court heard evidence from the experts who had prepared the opinions. They confirmed their previous findings. T., an expert who spoke on behalf of the team, stated in particular that the experts had excluded the possibility that the applicant was simulating a mental illness. In support of this statement, he noted that the applicant had been medicated and subjected to a psychological personality test, the MMPI (Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory). The results of the test had confirmed that he could not be feigning the symptoms of a mental illness, as a healthy person would have had a very different reaction to those specific medications. The applicant’s lawyer supported the prosecutor’s application for the proceedings to be discontinued. 13. On 25 September 2007 the Katowice Regional Court discontinued the proceedings against the applicant. On the basis of available evidence, the court established that the applicant had committed the offences with which he had been charged. However, as he had been suffering from a mental disorder at the time, he could not be held criminally responsible. The court referred to the experts’ opinions and the evidence which they had given during the trial. It also noted that the applicant had undergone psychiatric treatment since 2000. 14. The applicant did not appeal against that decision, and it became final on 10 October 2007. 15. On 14 March 2012 the Katowice Court of Appeal refused an application by the applicant to reopen the proceedings in the case. The court admitted that, in view of new evidence (see paragraphs 44 and 46 below), it appeared that the applicant had not murdered P.A., and that he had only participated in the robbery. However, even if the proceedings were reopened, they would have to be discontinued in any event, in view of the applicant’s insanity. 16. On 12 December 2007 the Psychiatric Commission on Security Measures (Komisja Psychiatryczna ds. środków zabezpieczająych – “the Commission”) recommended that the applicant be placed in Branice Hospital. The applicant could not be transferred there immediately, as he was serving a sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment imposed in the first set of criminal proceedings against him (see paragraph 6 above). The Katowice Regional Court asked the penitentiary division of the court to change the order in which the sentences would be served, and to apply the security measure first. On 25 April 2008 the court decided that the applicant should first be placed in a psychiatric facility. 17. The applicant was admitted to Branice Hospital on 13 May 2008. 18. A hospital psychologist, in opinions of 23 June and 15 December 2008, 20 May and 5 November 2009, confirmed that the applicant should continue treatment in hospital. In her opinion of 20 April 2010 the expert noted that the applicant could be moved to a less secure hospital. 19. Psychiatrists from Branice Hospital, in opinions of 14 June and 9 December 2008, 19 May and 9 November 2009 and 20 April 2010, also confirmed that the applicant should continue treatment in a psychiatric hospital. In particular, in the opinion of 9 November 2009 the doctors concluded that the applicant was suffering from a delusional disorder related to organic lesions in his central nervous system (zaburzenia omamowo-urojeniowe na podłożu organicznego uszkodzenia o.u.n.). There had been an improvement in his condition following the treatment, however there had been no complete recovery. Accordingly, the applicant’s detention was extended by the Katowice Regional Court on 21 July 2008, 19 January, 22 June and 7 December 2009. Neither the applicant nor his representative appealed against those decisions. 20. On 4 May 2010 the applicant was transferred to Lubliniec Hospital, a less secure institution. 21. On 29 October 2010 experts from Lubliniec Hospital gave an opinion following a periodic review of the applicant’s condition. They noted that the applicant should continue treatment in a more secure facility. Consequently, on 15 November 2010 the Katowice Regional Court again extended the applicant’s detention. 22. In a joint opinion of 26 August 2011, Lubliniec Hospital psychiatrists confirmed that the applicant should continue treatment in a secure facility, as he still posed a serious threat to public order. 23. Between 28 March and 22 May 2012 the applicant underwent a psychiatric assessment in Pruszków Hospital, pursuant to an order made in the course of the third set of criminal proceedings against him (see paragraph 45 below). The relevant experts were asked to assess his mental state when he had allegedly committed other robberies between June and August 2005 (see paragraph 44 below). 24. On 17 June 2012 two psychiatrists and a psychologist gave a joint opinion (“the Pruszków opinion”), which disagreed with the 2006 opinion (see paragraph 9 above). They concluded that the applicant had not been suffering from any mental illness at the time when the offences had been committed (tempore criminis). In their view, the applicant did not have any organic lesions in his central nervous system. Nor did he have a learning difficulty. They agreed that he had a dissocial personality disorder. They noted that, from an early age, the applicant had disregarded the rights and feelings of others, as well as social norms. He also failed to learn from his actions and repeated dysfunctional behaviour. However, they were of the opinion that his condition had significantly improved in recent years. While the risk that he would commit a similar offence was not very high, it could not be excluded that, in difficult situations, he might suffer from reactive disorders. It was therefore recommended that any prison sentence served by the applicant should be served in therapeutic conditions. The opinion was submitted to the Katowice Regional Court on 11 September 2012. 25. Meanwhile, on 20 July 2012 psychiatrists from Lubliniec Hospital, in an opinion following a periodic review of the applicant’s condition (“the Lubliniec opinion”), had noted that the applicant had been diagnosed with delusional disorders related to organic lesions in his central nervous system. During his stay in Lubliniec Hospital, no acute psychotic symptoms had been observed. However, in view of the initial diagnosis and his lifestyle, it was felt that the applicant should continue treatment at a psychiatric hospital, as there was still a risk that he might commit criminal offences of significant harm to the community. 26. At hearings held on 28 August and 24 September 2012 the Katowice Regional Court examined the applicant’s application for release of 24 July 2012. The court heard evidence from Lubliniec experts who had given the opinion of 20 July 2012 (see paragraph 25 above). One of the experts clarified that, in assessing the possible risk of the applicant committing criminal offences, she had relied on the initial diagnosis and his lifestyle (his multiple convictions and the fact that he was young and single with no children). She further agreed with the Pruszków experts’ opinion (see paragraph 24 above) that the applicant suffered from a personality disorder. His personality disorder was characterised by a tendency to manipulate and dominate others, and he was self-centred. These elements constituted a risk that the applicant might commit a criminal offence. The expert was not able to answer the court’s question as to whether the applicant could have simulated a mental illness. 27. On 24 September 2012 the Katowice Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s application to be released from hospital. With reference to the discrepancies between the two expert opinions, the court held that the Pruszków opinion concerned the applicant’s capacity tempore criminis, while the Lubliniec opinion related to his general progress in treatment and his future prognosis. Moreover, the Pruszków opinion had been given with reference to different offences. The court also noted that both sets of experts agreed that the applicant had suffered from a dissocial personality disorder. In view of the above, the court decided to base its conclusion on the Lubliniec opinion and refused to release the applicant from detention. It also held that he should continue treatment in a less secure institution. The applicant did not appeal against that decision. 28. On 28 November 2012 the Katowice Regional Court dismissed a further application by the applicant to be released from detention. It noted that his situation had not changed since the last decision had been given. It further decided to place him in a facility with enhanced security. It referred to a letter in which he had informed the authorities that he had been considering an escape from the psychiatric facility. That decision was upheld by the Katowice Court of Appeal on 22 January 2013. 29. On 31 January 2013 the applicant attempted to commit suicide by overdosing on his medication. 30. On 13 February 2013, the applicant was transferred to Cracow Psychiatric Hospital (a hospital with enhanced security). 31. On 19 May 2013 the applicant sent a letter to the Katowice Regional Court, claiming that he had been simulating mental illness. He submitted that he owned a medical book on psychiatry and had also seen the film “A Beautiful Mind”, which had helped him to act out the symptoms of mental illness. He also informed the director of Lubliniec Hospital that he had been pretending to have a mental illness. However, she told him that many patients made the same claim. 32. Meanwhile, on 19 March 2013, in the context of periodic review proceedings, the Katowice Regional Court had decided to continue the applicant’s detention in a psychiatric facility. The court relied on an expert opinion of 15 March 2013, in which experts from Cracow Psychiatric Hospital had confirmed that the applicant suffered from a dissocial personality and had suffered from a psychotic disorder in the past. They had stressed that there was a risk that the applicant would commit a similar offence of significant harm to the community as a result of his psychiatric condition. In particular, the experts had referred to the fact that the applicant was not critical of the offences he had committed or his medical condition. That decision was upheld by the Katowice Court of Appeal on 16 April 2013. 33. On 27 August 2013, pursuant to Article 203 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences (see paragraph 55 below), psychiatrists from Cracow Psychiatric Hospital submitted an opinion concerning the applicant following a periodic review. They confirmed that he had not been suffering from a mental illness, but had a severe dissocial personality disorder. They also noted that the applicant claimed to have suffered from a brief psychotic disorder in the past. They were convinced that, between June and August 2005, the applicant had been able to recognise the significance of his actions and control his behaviour. However, the experts considered that it was still likely that he would commit similar offences of significant harm to the community again as a result of his psychiatric condition. This risk was not related to a mental illness, but to a severe personality disorder. The applicant was still in need of complex therapy for personality disorders. They experts left the decision as to whether security measures should be continued to the court’s discretion. 34. On 12 September 2013 the experts supplemented their opinion with regard to further questions put by the court. They confirmed that, at the time when the offences had been committed, the applicant had not been suffering from any delusional disorders which could have resulted in a conclusion that he had acted in a state of insanity. They also considered that it was highly likely that he would commit similar offences again. This risk was related to the applicant’s lifestyle, his multiple convictions and his inability to learn social skills, but not to a mental illness. They stated that they could not recommend the applicant’s release. Even if he had not been insane at the time when the offences had been committed, there was still a risk that he would commit further offences in view of his dissocial personality disorder. They further concluded that it was not a medical but a legal issue as to whether the applicant’s detention should be lifted. 35. Subsequently, on an unknown date the applicant lodged an application for release. It was examined by the Katowice Regional Court at two hearings: on 17 October and 8 November 2013. The applicant’s representative and psychiatrists were present. The court heard evidence from experts from Cracow Psychiatric Hospital. They disagreed with the 2006 opinion and confirmed that the applicant was suffering from a dissocial personality disorder. The experts stated before the court that they had not recommended the applicant’s release, as they were aware that they could have been wrong in their assessment. The experts were also not in a position to give a clear answer to the question of whether the applicant could have simulated a mental illness. They submitted a supplementary opinion in which they noted that on 18 October 2013 the applicant had attempted to commit suicide (see paragraph 39 below). In their opinion, in view of the applicant’s fragile state, it was necessary to place him in a hospital with enhanced security. 36. On 8 November 2013 the court refused to release the applicant from detention. The court thoroughly examined diverging psychiatric opinions, in particular the 2006 opinion (see paragraph 9 above) and the opinions of 27 August and 12 September 2013 (see paragraphs 33 and 34 above). Relying on the testimonies obtained from experts, it concluded that there were no grounds to doubt the correctness of the 2006 opinion, especially after such a long lapse of time. The court also examined the question of whether the applicant could have simulated a psychotic disorder, and noted the experts’ diverging views in this respect. It referred to T.’s expert testimony on 5 September 2007 (see paragraph 12 above) and to the testimony given by the Cracow experts on 17 October 2013 (see paragraph 35 above). It also held that the applicant had been detained in several hospitals, and none of the experts who had examined him there had challenged the initial diagnosis. Lastly, it referred to the applicant’s recent suicide attempt. In conclusion, the court held that there was still a risk that the applicant might commit an offence of significant social harm. 37. On 22 November 2013 the applicant’s lawyer lodged an appeal against that decision. He referred to the divergent expert opinions. He also stressed that the applicant had recently been indicted for offences committed in 2005, and that his sanity was not being questioned in those proceedings (see paragraph 45 below). On 25 November 2013 the applicant lodged his own appeal, submitting in particular that he had been simulating a mental illness. 38. The Katowice Court of Appeal examined the applicant’s appeal at two hearings: on 21 January and 11 March 2014. On the latter date, relying on the evidence gathered by the Regional Court, it upheld the decision of 8 November 2013 (see paragraph 36 above). The court referred to the reasons given by the Regional Court and considered that it was still likely that the applicant would commit similar offences again. 39. Meanwhile, on 18 October 2013, the applicant had attempted to commit suicide by injecting himself with a significant dose of insulin. He was transferred to the toxicology ward of Cracow University Hospital, where he was treated for two days. 40. On 20 January 2014 the applicant was transferred to Toszek Psychiatric Hospital. 41. On 30 April 2014, pursuant to Article 203 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences (see paragraph 55 below), psychiatrists from Toszek Hospital submitted an opinion concerning the applicant following a periodic review. They confirmed that he only had a dissocial personality disorder and it was unlikely that he would commit similar offences of significant harm to the community again as a result of his psychiatric condition. They further recommended his release from the psychiatric facility. 42. On 15 May 2014 the Katowice Regional Court appointed a new defence lawyer for the applicant, to replace the one who had resigned, and set a hearing date for 28 May 2014. On the latter date it heard evidence from the experts from the Toszek Hospital. The experts confirmed the findings they had made in the opinion of 30 April 2014. 43. On 30 May 2014 the Katowice Regional Court gave a decision and ordered the applicant’s release from the psychiatric facility. The applicant was released on that date and transferred to Wojkowice Prison in order to serve the remainder of the sentence of imprisonment which had been imposed following the first set of criminal proceedings against him (see paragraph 6 above). 44. On 8 December 2010 the Katowice District Prosecutor charged the applicant with several counts of robbery (carjacking) committed between June and August 2005 (on 23 June, 27 June, 4 July, 5 July and 17 August 2005). Allegedly, the applicant, together with a certain A.I. and one other person, had stolen five cars by using force and intimidating the cars’ drivers (by hitting, kicking and using tear gas). During his questioning, the applicant informed the prosecutor that A.I. had been involved in P.A.’s killing. 45. On 30 January 2012 the Katowice Regional Court ordered the applicant to undergo a psychiatric medical examination at Pruszków Hospital in order to assess his mental state at the time when the alleged offences had been committed. As indicated in paragraph 24 above, the medical opinion given by experts from Pruszków Hospital on 17 June 2012 stated that the applicant had had full mental capacity in 2005. 46. On 25 October 2013 a bill of indictment was lodged with the Katowice Regional Court. A.I. was charged with murdering P.A., and the applicant and a certain T.K. were only charged with theft and several counts of robbery committed in 2005. The trial before the Katowice Regional Court began in 2014. 47. During a hearing on 14 January 2015 the court heard evidence from the Cracow Hospital experts who had prepared the opinion of 27 August 2013. As indicated in paragraph 33 above, they confirmed that the applicant had not been suffering from a mental illness, but had a personality disorder. They were also convinced that, between June and August 2005, the applicant had been able to recognise the significance of his actions and control his behaviour. The experts disagreed with the opinion of 2006 (see paragraph 9 above). 48. On 22 April 2015 the court heard evidence from psychiatrists from Pruszków Hospital who had prepared the opinion of 17 June 2012 (see paragraph 24 above). They confirmed that, in their opinion, the applicant had not been suffering from a mental illness. They further agreed that it was very likely that the applicant had pretended to have symptoms of a mental illness. 49. On 22 May 2015 the court heard evidence from the psychologist who, together with two psychiatrists, had prepared the opinion of 18 July 2006 (see paragraph 9 above). He stated that the applicant could have simulated a brief psychotic disorder (zaburzenia psychotyczne) during the psychological tests. 50. On 20 July 2015 the Katowice Regional Court gave judgment. The court established that the applicant, together with A.I. and a certain T.K. had participated in the assault on P.A.. The criminal proceedings against the applicant were subsequently discontinued due to his insanity. The court further thoroughly examined the applicant’s mental capacity and found that the applicant had had full mental capacity in the relevant period. It convicted A.I. of P.A.’s murder, T.K. of robbery and assault on P.A. and the applicant of several counts of robbery committed on 23 June, 27 June, 4 July, 5 July and 17 August 2005. It also sentenced the applicant to three years’ imprisonment, suspended for seven years. 51. The applicant did not lodge an appeal against that judgment.

6. The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Vigonza (Padua). 7. The applicant met his former partner, K.S., a Hungarian national, in 2008. They began living together in Abano Terme (Italy) and had a daughter, who was born on 15 September 2011. 8. According to the applicant, after the baby was born K.S. began engaging in obsessive behaviour and their relationship deteriorated. 9. In November 2011 K.S. spent a week in Hungary with their daughter. In December of the same year she again travelled to Hungary with the baby. It was agreed that the applicant would fetch them on 30 December and drive them back to Italy. While on his way to Hungary, the applicant was informed by K.S. that she did not intend to return to Italy. 10. The applicant first returned to Italy (without having reached Hungary); he then set off again for Hungary, where (after arriving) K.S. initially denied him access to his daughter. After several days, K.S. allowed the applicant to see the baby and informed him that he could see her again, provided that he agreed to let his daughter stay in Hungary with K.S. and pay 500 euros (EUR) per month in child support. The applicant rejected this proposal and on 9 January 2012 returned to Italy. 11. On 21 February 2012 the applicant lodged an application with the Venice Minors Court requesting that the court strip K.S. of parental authority over their daughter, order the return of the child to Italy and grant him exclusive custody. 12. On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a request with the Pest Central District Court for the child’s return, pursuant to the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (hereinafter, “the Hague Convention”). 13. On 13 September 2012 the Pest Central District Court found that K.S. was keeping the child in Hungary illegally and ordered that she return the child to the applicant’s residence in Italy by 21 September 2012. Alternatively, the child should be handed to the applicant or his proxy in Budapest no later than 24 September 2012. 14. Following an appeal by K.S., on 8 November 2012 the Budapest High Court upheld the decision of the Pest Central District Court and ordered that the child be returned to Italy by 30 November 2012 or to the applicant or his proxy in Budapest by 4 December 2012. 15. Following a further appeal by K.S., that decision was upheld by the Supreme Court on 22 January 2013; nevertheless, the child was not returned to the applicant. 16. An enforcement order based on the second-instance decision of 8 November 2012 was issued on 21 January 2013 against K.S. The bailiff of the Mezőtúr District Court instructed the mother to comply with the final decision and return the child to the applicant within fifteen days and ordered her to pay a fine of 152,400 Hungarian forints (HUF – approximately EUR 490). 17. Criminal proceedings against K.S. were initiated in 2013 by the Padua public prosecutor and a European arrest warrant was issued against her. 18. On 14 January 2013 the Venice Minors Court found that it had jurisdiction to examine the applicant’s case pursuant to articles 8, 10, 11 and 42 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 (see paragraph 49 below), allowed the applicant’s application (see paragraph 11 above), stripped K.S. of her parental authority and, like its Hungarian counterpart, ordered the immediate return of the child to Italy. 19. On 18 January 2013 the preliminary-investigations judge (giudice per le indagini preliminari) issued an arrest warrant against K.S. for the offence of international child abduction. 20. On 23 January 2013 a European arrest warrant was issued against K.S. by the Padua Court. 21. On 15 February 2013 the court bailiff sent a copy of the return order to the guardianship office of Mezőtúr District in order to enable the said authority to serve it on K.S. and to inform her of the consequences of failing to comply with the order. 22. On 28 February 2013 two members of the Mezőtúr guardianship office’s staff attempted to serve the order on K.S.; they were unsuccessful as they were unable to enter her home. As K.S.’s post box was in a locked part of the building, they were not able to leave behind any notification either. They went to the registered address of K.S.’s mother but they could not find anybody there either. They left behind a notification in the post box there informing K.S. of their attempt to enter her home and of the date of the next visit by guardianship office staff. 23. On 4 March 2013 guardianship office staff again visited the registered permanent address of K.S. and the registered residential address of her mother but again failed to serve the enforcement order on her. 24. In March 2013 the Department of International Private Law of the Hungarian Ministry of Justice conducted mediation proceedings through the legal representatives of K.S. and the applicant in order to try to reach an amicable agreement. 25. On 6 March 2013 the Padua public prosecutor lodged by means of a letter rogatory an application with the Budapest Prosecutor’s Office for judicial assistance. The application was dismissed on 29 October 2013 on the grounds that the judgment of the Venice Minors Court (see paragraph 18 above) was not yet enforceable (see paragraph 31 below) and the requirement of dual criminality was not satisfied. 26. On 20 March 2013 the Mezőtúr District Court allowed an application lodged by K.S. for the return order issued by the Budapest High Court (see paragraph 14 above) to be suspended, but this decision was subsequently quashed by the Szolnok High Court on 19 June 2013. On 16 October 2013 the Mezőtúr District Court refused another similar application lodged by K.S. Following an appeal by K.S., the latter decision was upheld by Szolnok High Court on 4 December 2013. 27. On 5 September 2013 the deputy court bailiff, accompanied by police officers and guardianship office staff, visited K.S.’s registered address and the residential address of her mother, but no one answered the door. 28. On 20 September 2013 the bailiff attempted to serve the enforcement order at the same addresses, but with no success, as K.S. and her daughter had absconded. The guardianship office informed the court bailiff that they had no useful information concerning the whereabouts of K.S. and her daughter. 29. On an unspecified date, K.S. lodged an application for the enforcement proceedings to be terminated; that application was refused by the Pest Central District Court on 4 October 2013. That judgment was upheld by the Budapest High Court on 10 December 2013. 30. On 21 January 2014 an international search warrant was issued by the Mezőtúr police. 31. On 17 March 2014 the Szolnok District Court declared the judgment of the Venice Minors Court (see paragraph 18 above) enforceable. On 30 June 2014, following an appeal by K.S, that decision was quashed by the Szolnok High Court. 32. The Mezőtúr district prosecutor’s office ordered an investigation in respect of K.S. concerning the unauthorised custody of a minor and the endangering of a minor on 17 February and 18 March 2014 respectively. 33. On 5 May 2014 K.S. was summoned as a suspect, but she failed to appear. 34. On 19 May 2014 an arrest warrant was issued against K.S. 35. On 5 November 2014 the bailiff unsuccessfully tried to serve the enforcement order on K.S. at her registered residential address. Residents of the area were not able to provide any useful information to the bailiff. 36. Following an appeal by the applicant against the Szolnok judgment of 30 June 2014 (see paragraph 31 above), on 25 November 2014 the Kúria declared the judgment of the Venice Minors Court (see paragraph 18 above) enforceable. 37. On 23 December 2014 the Padua public prosecutor lodged by means of a letter rogatory a further application for judicial assistance and requested that the Padua police be authorised to assist the local judicial police with the execution of the arrest warrant. On 18 March 2015 the Budapest Prosecutor’s Office dismissed this application on the grounds that the conduct described in the criminal complaint could be classified as kidnapping under the Italian Criminal Code, but not under Article 190 of the Hungarian Criminal Code. 38. On 10 and 12 March 2015 staff of the Mezőtúr guardianship office visited K.S.’s registered address and her mother’s home, but their attempts to serve the enforcement order failed. 39. The Government pointed out that several searches and other procedural actions had failed to generate any results. In order to identify K.S.’s place of residence, they had checked the database of the National Health Insurance Fund and requested data from all those of the country’s financial institutions that provided payment services. Moreover they had requested data from the mobile phone companies, the Hungarian State Treasury, the Hungarian tax and customs authorities, and regional and local tax and customs agencies; they had also run checks in the databases of companies providing card services to regular customers in the territory of Hungary. 40. On 13 October 2016 the Mezőtúr District Court, during the criminal prosecution against K.S. for child abduction, heard M.A., the child’s paediatrician. M.A. said that she had visited the child several times over the years. In particular, on 1 September 2016 she had issued a medical certificate which had been required for the child’s enrolment in a kindergarten. 41. By a letter dated 13 December 2016 the Italian Central Authority informed the applicant that the Hungarian authorities were still not able to execute the return order because they had still not identified K.S.’s place of residence. 42. At the hearing of 15 December 2016 the Mezőtúr District Court heard four of K.S.’s relatives, who all stated that K.S. was living in hiding. 43. On 20 April 2017 K.S. was acquitted by the Mezőtúr District Court. The text of this judgment was not produced before the Court. 44. The Mezőtúr Attorney-General lodged an appeal against this judgment with the Szolnok High Court. 45. On 10 May 2017 the Padua public prosecutor lodged by means of a letter rogatory a further application for judicial assistance. This application was dismissed. 46. According to the latest information received by the Court, in February 2018 the criminal proceedings against K.S. were still pending Szolnok High Court and the return order of the applicant’s daughter had not yet been enforced.

5. The applicants were born in 1974, 1973 and 1972 respectively. 6. On 4 May 1995 a group of about fifteen individuals carrying banners from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), an illegal armed organisation, and chanting slogans in favour of the organisation marched in a street in the Küçükçekmece district of Istanbul. The members of the group threw Molotov cocktails at various shops. Several of the shops caught fire and three teenage girls were killed in one of these establishments, namely a shop called Nazlım. 7. On the same day, Mr Canşad (“the first applicant”) was arrested and taken into custody at the Anti-Terrorism Department of the Istanbul Security Directorate. 8. The police obtained evidence from several witnesses. One of those witnesses, a certain A.A., who had been working on the street where the events had taken place, indicated that he had seen a group of about twenty people marching in the streets, chanting slogans and throwing Molotov cocktails at shops, and that the group had dispersed after several shops had caught fire. He further stated that he had seen two individuals: a woman with curly hair wearing a jacket and white jeans, and a short-haired man who was approximately 1.80 meters tall wearing a green jacket and jeans. He added that, having seen the man from afar, he could not describe his face. However, he indicated that he would be likely to recognize the individuals concerned, and that in any event the man had already been apprehended by uniformed police officers. 9. A second witness, a certain Ö.L.A., stated that he had seen an individual dressed in jeans and a green jacket, and that he would not be likely to recognise his face, but the man had been arrested by police officers. 10. A third witness, a certain Y.K., an employee at Nazlım, identified the first applicant as the man who had thrown Molotov cocktails at the shop where she worked, where three people had been killed. In addition, an identification parade was carried out, at the end of which Ö.L.A. and A.A. identified the first applicant as one of the individuals who had thrown Molotov cocktails at that shop. 11. On 11 May 1995 the first applicant was interrogated by the police in the absence of a lawyer, pursuant to section 31 of Law no. 3842, as he was accused of committing an offence falling within the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts. He admitted having had sympathy towards the illegal organisation and having been involved in the march. However, he stated that he had only acted as a lookout at the entrance to the street, and denied having thrown Molotov cocktails. 12. On 15 May 1995 the first applicant participated in a reconstruction of the events (yer gösterme) in the absence of a lawyer. According to the record drafted by police officers and signed by the applicant, he admitted his involvement in the march but denied having thrown Molotov cocktails. 13. On 16 May 1995 the first applicant took part in a photo identification procedure, again in the absence of a lawyer. According to a report drawn up by the police and signed by the applicant, he identified Mr Bingöl (“the second applicant”) as one of the accomplices. 14. The first applicant’s detention was extended until 17 May 1995, with the authorisation of the public prosecutor’s office. On the same day he gave statements to the public prosecutor in the absence of a lawyer. He denied the content of the statements he had given to the police, claiming that his confession had been extorted under pressure and torture. He further stated that he had been arrested near the scene of the incident while on his way to his friend’s home, that he had seen a group of about thirty or forty people, and that he had had nothing to do with the events in connection with which he had been arrested. 15. On the same day, the first applicant was brought before a judge of the Istanbul State Security Court, before whom he reiterated that he had not participated in the rally and had nothing to say about it. The judge ordered the first applicant’s detention and, in the absence of the second applicant, issued a warrant for the latter’s arrest. 16. The second applicant was arrested during an identity check on 27 April 1996 in the town of Genç in the south-eastern part of the country, and was held in custody. He was then handed over to the Istanbul Security Directorate. 17. On 9 May 1996 the second applicant took part in a photo identification procedure in the absence of a lawyer. According to a report drawn up by the police and signed by the applicant, he identified the first applicant. On the same day, he participated in a reconstruction of the events in the absence of a lawyer and admitted having thrown a Molotov cocktail at a shop on 4 May 1995. 18. On 10 May 1996 the second applicant was interrogated by the police in the absence of a lawyer, pursuant to section 31 of Law no. 3842, as he was accused of committing an offence falling within the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts. He gave a detailed account of his activities within the illegal organisation, including his participation in the events of 4 May 1995, and provided the names of various individuals who had also participated in that incident, including that of the first applicant. 19. On 10 May 1996 he was brought before the public prosecutor, where he accepted the statements which he had given to the police and admitted his participation in various activities of the organisation, including those of 4 May 1995. He stated that he had left the organisation and that he wished to have the benefit of Law no. 4959, which provided for amnesty and mitigation of sentence for members of terrorist organisations in exchange for information. That statement was also taken in the absence of a lawyer. Subsequently, he was brought before a judge, where he accepted the previous statements he had given. The judge ordered his detention. 20. The first hearing was held on 27 July 1995. 21. The applicants denied the charges against them during the criminal proceedings before the Istanbul State Security Court. 22. On 29 August 1995 the trial court held a hearing in which, in the absence of the applicants and their lawyers, it heard several witnesses who had been interviewed by the police. Ö.L.A. indicated that, contrary to what was in the statement which he had given to the police, he had not seen anyone sufficiently clearly to be able to identify them. Y.K., an employee at Nazlım, also gave evidence in person, stating that she had seen a man and a woman set fire to the shop and had provided the police with a detailed description of the woman. As for the man, she indicated that she had not seen his face, but she had recognised him at the police station because of his clothes. At the end of the hearing the trial court issued a letter of request asking for evidence to be obtained from A.A. by his giving evidence at a court near his place of residence. 23. At a hearing on 7 October 1997 the trial court read out a statement by A.A. given before the Bursa Assize Court. The content of that statement is not included in the file. At that hearing, counsel for the first applicant requested that A.A. should be heard by the court in the presence of the applicant. In that connection, he stated that his testimony contained significant contradictions. According to the transcript of that hearing, the first applicant did not want to participate in the hearing. 24. At the end of each hearing the trial court decided to continue the applicants’ detention. 25. On 22 October 1998 the applicants were sentenced to death. 26. On 13 May 1999 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment on procedural grounds, without examining the merits of the case. 27. Following the judgment of the Court of Cassation, the proceedings before the trial court started again on 19 September 1999 and the composition of the trial court was changed several times. In addition, the first applicant repeatedly requested that the trial court summon A.A. in order for him to be cross-examined him directly. The trial court rejected his applications. 28. On an unspecified date A.A. sent a letter to the Istanbul State Security Court in which he retracted his previous testimony and stated that he had not identified anyone. That letter was read out at a hearing on 7 February 2002. 29. On 27 February 2002 the trial court sentenced the applicants to death, but commuted this to life imprisonment (müebbet ağır hapis). 30. On 9 October 2002 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment again on procedural grounds, without examining the merits of the case. 31. On 9 March 2004 the Istanbul State Security Court found the applicants guilty of the offence provided for in Article 125 of the Criminal Code and sentenced them to life imprisonment. 32. The applicants appealed against that judgment and alleged, inter alia, that A.A. had not been heard by the trial court in their presence. 33. On 6 December 2004 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicants’ appeal and upheld the trial court’s judgment.

5. The applicants were born in 1956, 1952, 1975, and 1980 respectively. The first applicant lives in Tivat and the second, third and fourth applicants live in Kotor. 6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7. On 1 September 2009 the first and second applicants and the father of the third and fourth applicants instituted civil proceedings against the State, seeking that they be recognised as owners of two plots of land in the coastal zone (u zoni morskog dobra). They submitted, in particular, that the land at issue had been lawfully owned by their father, but that without any legal basis the State appeared as the registered owner thereof in the Real Estate Registry, and that they should be declared owners as their father’s legal successors (kao pravni sledbenici). 8. On 2 March 2010 the Real Estate Administration in Tivat (Uprava za nekretnine, područna jedinica Tivat), acting upon the first applicant’s request, issued a decision allowing the division into two of an adjacent plot of land, a forest in the coastal zone, the registered owner of which at the time was the Municipality. The Municipality remained registered as the owner of one part of it, whereas the other part was registered in the name of the applicants’ predecessor (the father of the first and second applicants, and the grandfather of the third and fourth applicants). 9. On 21 November 2011, after a remittal, the Court of First Instance (Osnovni sud) in Kotor ruled against the first and second applicants and the third and fourth applicants’ father. The court found that the land at issue had indeed been owned by their predecessors, notably their father, grandfather and grand-grandfather, but that they had not proved that they had inherited it when their last predecessor had died in 1997. Notably, the court considered that the land at issue was in the coastal zone and thus State property pursuant to section 4 of the Coastal Zone Act of 1992 and “section 13 and other sections” of the State Property Act (see paragraphs 21 and 24 below), and that the claimants could not claim the right to property in respect of such land. The court made no reference to section 30 of the Coastal Zone Act (see paragraph 22 below). As regards the State’s submission that the land had been nationalised, the court noted that the contents of the decisions relied on by the State could not be clarified. Notably, the State Archive (Državni arhiv) informed the court, on 4 October 2010 and 26 August 2011, that the case files and decisions Dn 428/90 and Dn 615/92, referred to by the State, had not been found in that institution. Finally, the court considered that the Real Estate Administration decision of 2 March 2010 (see paragraph 8 above) was “of no particular influence” (bez posebnog uticaja) given that it related to a different plot of land which was not the subject of these proceedings. 10. In their appeal the first and second applicants and the third and fourth applicants’ father confirmed that the said land had not been in their predecessor’s estate when he died, which was exactly the reason why they had initiated these proceedings. They also submitted that: (a) section 30 of the Coastal Zone Act had never been complied with even though it was indisputable that their predecessor had lawfully owned the land; and (b) the relevant legislation did not prohibit private ownership of land in the coastal zone, and referred to section 4 of the Coastal Zone Act and section 20 of the Property Act 2009 (see paragraphs 21 and 19 below). They reiterated that the adjacent plot of land, also a forest in the coastal zone, was privately owned, by them, and submitted the decision of the Real Estate Administration of 2 March 2010. They maintained that the first-instance court’s reasoning that the said decision was of no influence indicated legal uncertainty, given that the same legal issue was treated differently without any explanation in that regard. 11. On 6 April 2012 the High Court (Viši sud) upheld the first-instance judgment. It found that the land at issue was indisputably forest in the coastal zone, that it was State property pursuant to section 13 of the State Property Act and that the claimants therefore could not claim ownership. The court further held that even assuming that the claimants had had ownership of these plots of land, they had lost it “in accordance with the State Property Act and the Coastal Zone Act. In support of this was also section 30 of the Coastal Zone Act, relied upon by the claimants, which provided that the owners of land in the coastal zone, who had obtained it in a lawful manner before that Act entered into force and which was duly registered in the Real Estate Register as private property, were entitled to compensation in case of an expropriation”. The High Court made no reference to the decision of 2 March 2010 and the status of the adjacent plot of land, or as to whether the claimants could have inherited the land. 12. On 11 October 2012 the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud) upheld the previous judgments. The court made no explicit reference to the adjacent plot of land and the decision of 2 March 2010. It held as follows: “As the real estate at issue is in the coastal zone regime – common resource (dobro od opšteg interesa), the lower courts correctly applied the substantive law when they ruled in the said way. Notably, pursuant to section 4 of the Coastal Zone Act, which had been in force until State Property Act entered into force (Official Gazette of Montenegro no. 21.09), coast is owned by the State and could not be object of the private property. The claimants were wrong to consider that the issue was to be resolved by means of section 30 of the Coastal Zone Act. That provision regulated the rights of the owners of land in the coastal zone who had obtained the property thereof before that Act entered into force by providing that they were entitled to compensation in case of an expropriation [...]. That means that the land did not remain in the private property regime, but became State property by the law itself. Likewise, section 20(2) of the Property Act 2009 is inapplicable to the present case as it cannot be retroactively applied to relations which had arisen before it came into force. Exceptionally, the right to property over a coastal zone can be acquired only after it entered into force.” 13. On 25 December 2012 the first and second applicants and the third and fourth applicants’ father lodged a constitutional appeal. They submitted, inter alia, that it was not true that land in the coastal zone could not be privately owned, as numerous plots of land in that zone were private property, including the plot of land adjacent to the one at issue, which was owned by them. They invoked the right to a fair trial and the right to property, and reiterated the importance of legal certainty. 14. On 23 July 2014 the Constitutional Court dismissed the constitutional appeal. It held that the lower courts’ assessment “was based on a correct application of substantive law and a constitutionally acceptable interpretation thereof, in accordance with Article 6 of the Convention”. As regards Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 the court held that a claim which had been dismissed because the claimants did not meet statutory conditions was not considered a possession that could constitute property rights, and thus there could be no violation of such a right either. This decision was served on 13 October 2014 at the earliest. 15. On 16 December 2014 the third and fourth applicants’ father died, leaving the third and fourth applicants as his heirs. 16. On 27 May 2015 the Supreme Court issued a general legal opinion (načelni pravni stav) relating to the use of land in the coastal zone. In reaching this opinion, the Supreme Court analysed the relevant domestic legislation, including the Constitution, the Coastal Zone Act 1992, the Property Act and the State Property Act. It found, inter alia, that section 20(2) of the Property Act provided that exceptionally coastal zone can be privately owned, while at the same time section 22(3) of the same Act provided that the coast cannot be privately owned. It also found that the conditions under which the coastal zone can be privately owned are not provided for by law (nisu zakonom određeni), “which leaves open numerous questions on practical implementation”. The court concluded that “by analysing [the relevant legislation] it can be concluded that acquiring private property rights in respect of the coastal zone is not possible save in exceptional cases which are not defined by legislation. It can also be concluded that the issue of lawfully acquired rights in respect of the coastal zone is not regulated in a precise and clear manner...”, but that it was a fact that there were lawfully acquired property rights over the coastal zone, as indicated by section 30 of the Coastal Zone Act.

5. The applicant was born in 1982 and lives in St Petersburg. 6. In 1972 the applicant’s grandmother M. was provided with a flat under a social tenancy agreement. Her son, the applicant’s uncle, lived in the flat until his death in November 1998. 7. In 1995 the applicant’s uncle admitted that he was the father of a newborn baby boy A., whose mother was G., and at his request the boy was registered as living in the flat as the grandson of M. 8. In November 1998 the applicant’s uncle died. 9. In December 1998 the applicant moved into the flat with her grandmother and, with the written consent of her grandmother, the authorities registered her as living in the flat as M.’s granddaughter. 10. In October 2004 the applicant and her grandmother brought court proceedings against G., as she was the legal representative of A., who was a minor. Their statement of claim, as far as relevant, read as follows: “My son, Moshkin Yuriy ..., had close relations with the defendant [G.]. In May 1995 she [G.] gave birth to a baby boy, A. Moshkin Yu. M. acknowledged his paternity in respect of his son A., and registered him as living in our dwelling. A., a minor, never moved into our flat, since his mother, the defendant in the present case, lives in a neighbouring apartment building in a three-room flat, together with her parents. ... Moshkin Yuriy, the father of A., a minor, died in November 1998. The charges for the flat increase every year. We, the claimants, have an income which is below the minimum wage. I have been classed as having a second-degree disability, whereas Ansimova Dinara [the applicant] is a student... The defendant does not pay communal charges for her son, who is registered as living in the flat... Taking into account that A., a minor born in 1995, was registered as living in our dwelling but never moved in, he has not acquired any right to those living premises, since registration is an administrative act. In accordance with Article 20 of the Civil Code, the place of residence of minors under the age of 14 is the place of residence of their legal representatives – their parents. A., born in 1995, has acquired a right to the living premises where his mother [G.] lives...” 11. The applicant and her grandmother asked the court to declare that G.’s son had not acquired any right to use the flat. Later, they submitted additional claims, seeking to recover from G. the amounts they had paid for communal charges. In particular, they submitted that G. had started paying charges in April 2005, after they had brought court proceedings against her. They also submitted that they had already accumulated debts for communal charges. 12. G. brought a counterclaim against the applicant and her grandmother, seeking the applicant’s eviction from the flat. She submitted in particular that after the death of her son’s father, the applicant, who had been living in the flat, and her grandmother had changed the locks and had not let her and her son into the flat. She submitted that in 2003 she had got married and that she and her son were now living in her husband’s flat. 13. In October 2005 the applicant’s grandmother died. Following her death, the applicant amended her claims. She asked the court to acknowledge that she was the tenant of the flat and to oblige the district administration to conclude a social tenancy agreement with her. The applicant submitted the following arguments in support of her claims. (a) She had been living in the flat with her grandmother since 1984 and since 1998 had been registered there as M.’s granddaughter. They had lived as a family in a shared household, and she had taken care of her grandmother. On several occasions the authorities had acknowledged that she and her grandmother were a low-income family, and had awarded them a housing allowance. (b) She had renovated the flat at her own expense. (c) G.’s son had been registered as living in the flat, but had never lived there. He had always lived with G. in the three-room flat which she owned. (d) G. had not been paying her son’s share of the charges for the flat. 14. G. also submitted additional claims, seeking to have her son’s entitlement to the flat acknowledged and asking for the applicant to be deregistered from the flat. This time, G. submitted that the applicant had never moved into the flat and had never lived there. 15. On 25 April 2007 the Nevskiy District Court of St Petersburg (“the District Court”) ordered the applicant’s eviction from the flat. The District Court further held that G.’s son had a right of occupation and that the district administration had to conclude a social tenancy agreement with him. 16. On 19 July 2007 the St Petersburg City Court (“the City Court”) quashed the judgment of 25 April 2007 as regards the part concerning the applicant’s eviction and the obligation on the district administration to conclude a social tenancy agreement with G.’s son. The matter was remitted to the District Court for fresh examination. The City Court held in particular that, in coming to the conclusion that the applicant had not proved that she had moved into the flat as a family member of her grandmother and in taking a decision to evict the applicant, the District Court had not made any assessment of the fact that the applicant’s grandmother had initially brought the court proceedings together with the applicant and had never challenged the applicant’s right to occupy the flat. The City Court also pointed out that the District Court had not assessed other evidence submitted by the applicant confirming that she had carried out repair and decoration works in the flat, photographs of the applicant with her grandmother which had been taken in the disputed flat, or other evidence submitted by the applicant. 17. On 5 March 2008 the District Court ordered the applicant’s eviction, following a fresh examination. The District Court found, with reference to Articles 53 and 54 of the Housing Code of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (see “Relevant domestic law” below) that both the applicant and G.’s son were registered as living in the flat as the grandchildren of M., the previous tenant. The court considered that G. had proved that her son had moved into the flat and had lived there for some time, but had not been able to move back because the applicant had not let him in. The court considered that the applicant had not proved that she had moved into the flat as her grandmother’s family member and had shared the same household and taken care of her. The court concluded that the applicant had to be evicted from the flat without being provided with alternative accommodation. 18. The applicant appealed against that judgment. She submitted in particular that the District Court had not made any assessment of the fact that she and her grandmother had initially brought court proceedings together as members of the same family, and that her grandmother had never challenged her right to occupy the flat. Nor had the District Court taken into account her submissions that she had been living in the flat in question since childhood, that her grandmother had asked the authorities to register her as living in the flat, and that in 2000 and 2001 the welfare authorities had declared that they were a poor family. A., a minor, had always lived with his mother G. in a three-room flat which G. owned. 19. On 19 June 2008 the City Court upheld that judgment. The City Court held in particular that in taking its decision in the case, the court of first instance had assessed all the evidence in the case, including the witness testimony, and had reasonably indicated that A. had acquired the right to use the disputed living premises because he had been moved into the flat as a tenant’s family member in accordance with the procedure provided for by law. Therefore, the court of first instance had come to the right conclusion that the claims brought by G., the mother of A., had to be granted. The City Court agreed with the conclusion of the court of first instance that the applicant’s claims had to be dismissed because the applicant had not proved that she had moved into the disputed flat and had shared the same household as the tenant, M., her grandmother. Her registration as living in that flat had been of an administrative nature and had not provided her with any right to live there. In such circumstances, the judgment of the court of first instance had been lawful and duly reasoned. The City Court further held that the grounds of the applicant’s appeal had aimed to reassess the evidence in the case, and that, given the fresh conclusion that the court of first instance had duly assessed the evidence before it, those grounds could not serve as a basis for quashing the judgment. 20. On an unspecified date the applicant was evicted from the flat. 21. In January 2009 the administration of the Nevskiy District of St Petersburg concluded a social tenancy agreement with A. in respect of the flat in question. 22. On 17 February 2009 the applicant was registered as living in a communal flat in which her husband owned a room. 23. On 30 December 2009 the flat from which the applicant had been evicted was transferred to A. by way of privatisation. 24. On 31 December 2009 the applicant, her husband and her daughter were placed on the municipal housing list as persons in need of housing.

5. The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Sofia. 6. The Sofia Municipal Council approved the exchange of a municipal flat for a smaller flat owned and occupied by the applicant in December 2005. However, the mayor of Sofia did not issue the necessary order and did not sign a contract for the exchange, as provided in the applicable rules. The applicant brought judicial review proceedings challenging the mayor’s tacit refusal to act. The Sofia Administrative Court quashed the mayor’s tacit refusal in a judgment of 1 April 2010 and instructed the mayor to issue an order for the exchange of the flats. That part of the judgment became final and enforceable on 19 May 2010. 7. By a decision of 25 March 2010 the Sofia Municipal Council revoked its December 2005 decision approving the exchange of the two properties. The applicant lodged a challenge against that 25 March 2010 decision. In a final judgment of 7 March 2011 the Supreme Administrative Court declared the Council’s decision of 25 March 2010 null and void. 8. On 18 April 2011 the mayor issued a decision explicitly refusing to issue an order for the exchange of the two flats. Following an application by the applicant for judicial review, on 30 March 2012 the Supreme Administrative Court declared that decision null and void as having been issued in breach of the judgment of the Sofia Administrative Court of 1 April 2010. The court also instructed the mayor to issue an order for the conclusion of the exchange agreement. 9. The mayor ordered the flat exchange on 6 March 2013 and the applicant signed a contract for the exchange on 25 June 2013.

5. The applicants were born in 1968 and 1972 respectively and live in Vilnius. 6. On 28 May 2003 L.G. sold a plot of forest land measuring 0.4807 hectares to the applicants. The purchase agreement categorised the land as forest. 7. In February 2005 a registration certificate was issued for the plot of land. It categorised the land as forest and determined special conditions on use of the plot, namely, that restrictions applied to the use of the whole plot and that there were surface water protection zones. 8. On an unspecified date, the first applicant asked the Molėtai District Court to establish as a legal fact that there used to be some buildings on the 0.4807-hectare plot. On 22 September 2005 the Molėtai District Court established as a legal fact that there used to be some buildings (a cattle shed and a storehouse (galvidė ir klojimas) there. The court noted that the first applicant was the owner of a plot of forest land on which construction of new buildings was prohibited, unless it was a reconstruction of a former residential property. The court found that a former residential property had been situated outside the boundaries of the first applicant’s plot but held that if the requested legal fact was established, he would be able to reconstruct the buildings previously sited there (nustačius prašomą faktą, pareiškėjas įgis teisę atstatyti jo valdomame žemės sklype buvusius statinius). A representative from the Utena District environmental protection department of the Ministry of the Environment (hereinafter “the Utena environmental protection department”) had no objections to the establishment of the legal fact. 9. In November 2005 the first applicant asked the authorities to issue him with the relevant documents necessary for construction. The Utena environmental protection department stated that the construction of a building had to comply with the Law on Construction; the existing flora had to be preserved and the method of waste collection had to be decided on. The permanent committee on construction of the Molėtai Municipality verified the documents submitted by the first applicant and recommended that he be issued with a building permit. 10. On 22 November 2005 the Molėtai Municipality issued the first applicant with the documents necessary for construction, in accordance with the domestic regulations, in particular with Government Resolution no. 1608 (see paragraph 49 below). It was indicated that anyone intending to carry out construction work was required to preserve existing flora, and was not allowed to block the shore of the lake or interfere with the existing landscape. 11. On 5 December 2005 the Molėtai Municipality issued the first applicant with a permit to build a summer house (non-residential building). The permit was valid for ten years. 12. In 2007 the plan of the building was specified (the facades were modified) and the amendments were verified by the Utena environmental protection department. 13. In March 2007 the Utena County Administration issued a certificate about the summer house as 97% finished and following that, on 2 April 2007 the house was registered in the Centre of Registers (Registrų centras) as 97% finished. 14. On 2 May 2011 the Ministry of the Environment received a report via a hotline for allegedly illegal construction work. On 10 May 2011 the authorities estimated the distance between the house and the lake at 27 metres, and between the terrace of the house and the lake at 24.5 metres. 15. On 5 August 2011 the prosecutor’s office started court proceedings and asked the domestic courts to revoke the recommendation to grant the first applicant building permission; to annul the building permit and oblige the applicants to demolish the building at the expense of the established guilty parties, that is the applicants, the Molėtai Municipality, and the Utena environmental protection department. The prosecutor claimed that the building permit could not have been issued in accordance with the relevant provisions of domestic law (see paragraphs 39, 42, 43 and 49 below). 16. On 4 June 2012 the Molėtai District Court dismissed the prosecutor’s complaint, holding that the legal facts had been established in September 2005 (see paragraph 8 above). It had not been until 2006 that the Supreme Court had held that the sole fact that the storehouses had been sited on a specific plot of land, without any proof that a residential building had been sited there, did not mean that there had previously been a residential property there (see paragraph 56 below). The District Court further held that in accordance with relevant legislation in force at the time, it was possible to construct new residential buildings in the place of former buildings, as well as to reconstruct existing residential buildings and construct necessary storehouses (see paragraph 49 below). Moreover, it had been established that any construction work in the forest could only be started after having received building permission and in accordance with the relevant plans. That legislation had been repealed after the Constitutional Court had declared that the domestic regulations were in breach of the laws and, by extension, of the Constitution (see paragraph 53 below). The court thus held that the case-law on construction in the forest had been established after the building permit had been issued to the first applicant. The court further held that the applicants had built the building lawfully, there was no evidence as to any negative consequences of the construction for the environment or the public interest. The court also observed that in the applicants’ case it would be unreasonable and unjust to apply the measure established in the Civil Code – to oblige the applicants to demolish the buildings (see paragraph 29 below). Moreover, the court was not convinced that the environment would be restored to its previous state if the buildings were demolished because the demolition would also cause some environmental damage. 17. The prosecutor appealed. On 4 December 2012 the Panevėžys Regional Court allowed the prosecutor’s appeal. The court held that the Molėtai District Court had established as a legal fact that there used to be a cattle shed and a storehouse on the applicants’ plot of land (see paragraph 8 above). A summer house could not be constructed as it did not fall within the category of buildings that could be constructed in the forest. Even the Molėtai District Court had emphasised that the construction of new buildings was prohibited on that plot. The building permit had obviously been issued to the first applicant unlawfully and, in the appellate court’s view, the latter had asked the court to establish a legal fact for the sole purpose of constructing a house. The court also held that neither the Law on Forests nor the Law on Land provided for any exceptions, so the right to construct buildings on the plot of forest land had never existed. The court thus ordered the first applicant to demolish the buildings at the expense of the applicants, the Molėtai Municipality and the Utena environmental protection department. The Court did not explain how the costs of demolition had to be divided between the three parties. 18. The applicants, the Molėtai Municipality and the Utena environmental protection department lodged an appeal on points of law. The applicants claimed that the appellate court had breached the principle of lex retro non agit by assessing the documents, issued in 2005, in view of the ruling of the Constitutional Court of 2006. They also claimed that the appellate court had breached their legitimate expectations to execute their proprietary interests in accordance with the domestic regulation in force at the time. 19. On 27 September 2013 the Supreme Court held that relevant laws provided that the only buildings that could be constructed in the forest were timber storehouses and other buildings for forestry equipment. There were no provisions allowing construction of residential or commercial buildings in the forest. It was in certain cases possible to change the purpose of the land, but as the land in question was situated in a surface water protection zone, any such change was prohibited. The court held that although the applicants referred to the Regulation of Construction on Private Land (see paragraph 49 below, hereinafter the “Regulation”), none of the provisions of that Regulation could be interpreted as allowing construction of the buildings in question. There was no argument that the buildings in question had been constructed where farm buildings had previously been sited, thus the provision of the Regulation allowing construction where residential buildings had previously been sited did not allow the applicants to construct a summer house. The court thus held that the construction had been illegal. As regards the removal of the consequences of illegal construction, the court held that it was crucial to assess the consequences of the illegal construction for the environment and the public interest, the consequences of the demolition of the buildings, the possibility of restoring the environment to its state before the illegal construction, and whether the persons who had acquired property rights had acted in good faith. In cases where the construction was in breach of the territorial planning documents and/or the imperative requirements of environmental protection, heritage protection and protection of protected areas, a decision to legalise the illegal construction could not be taken. The court thus had to assess whether the construction in question should have been carried out at the relevant time. It held that legalisation of the buildings in question was impossible and that demolition had to take place (see paragraphs 46 and 47 below). As to the applicants’ argument that the appellate court had breached the principle of legitimate expectations, the court held that the construction in question had been prohibited by the relevant domestic legislation in force at the time. Even if the applicants had misinterpreted the provisions of the Regulation, the Constitutional Court had found the Regulation to be inconsistent with the law, and, by extension, with the Constitution on 14 March 2006, only three months after the building permit had been issued to the first applicant. The applicants should therefore have been able to understand the consequences of constructing illegally and to avoid them. Although the authorities were partly responsible for the illegal construction, that fact per se did not mean that all illegal construction had to be legalised in order to protect the legitimate expectations and proprietary interests of the owners. The legal regulation established the responsibility of the authorities for the unlawful issue of the construction permit. As a result, the court upheld the decision of the Panevėžys Regional Court (see paragraph 17 above). 20. On an unspecified date the bailiff asked the Molėtai District Court to explain the order to enforce the Panevėžys Regional Court’s decision. On 12 February 2014 the Molėtai District Court dismissed the bailiff’s request because she had failed to provide specific details as to what required clarification. 21. It appears that the applicants asked the bailiff to suspend the execution of the judgment and that their request was refused. 22. On an unspecified date the applicants applied to the Utena District Court to overrule the bailiff’s refusal to suspend the execution of the judgment and to suspend it until the case had been examined at the European Court of Human Rights. On 23 December 2015 the Utena District Court held that domestic law did not oblige the bailiff to suspend the execution of judgments if the applicants had lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights. However, the Code of Civil Procedure provided that there would be grounds for reopening the proceedings if the European Court of Human Rights found that a domestic court decision had breached an applicant’s rights under the Convention or one of its Protocols (see paragraph 32 below). The court held that if the national court’s order to demolish the building was executed, the possibility of reopening the proceedings after a positive outcome for the applicants in the European Court of Human Rights would become complicated. On the other hand, if the European Court of Human Rights adopted a different decision, the demolition of the buildings would still be possible. The court observed that the applicants’ building did not infringe the rights of third persons as it was sited on a plot of forest land that belonged to the applicants. As a result, the Utena District Court suspended the execution of the judgment pending a decision by the European Court of Human Rights. 23. The State Territorial Planning and Construction Inspectorate lodged a separate complaint, but on 15 March 2016 the Panevėžys Regional Court upheld the first-instance decision.

4. The applicant was born in 1968 and was detained in LPU-3, Chelyabinsk. 5. On 14 November 2003 the Saint Petersburg City Court found the applicant guilty of aggravated murder and possession of firearms, and sentenced him to twenty-one years’ imprisonment. On 1 November 2004 the conviction was upheld on appeal. 6. On 28 September 2007 the applicant arrived at medical detention facility no. LPU-3 in Chelyabinsk, where he stayed until 30 October 2007. 7. On 2 October 2007 the applicant was ordered to leave his cell. He entered the corridor, turned to face the wall and took up a spread-eagle position leaning against the wall. Having refused to strip naked for a body search, he was immediately subjected to beatings. A warder hit him a number of times on the buttocks with a rubber truncheon. At the same time another warder started kicking and hitting the applicant on the back and head. Trying to protect himself from more serious harm, the applicant turned and faced his assailants. He raised his arm and inadvertently hit the warder’s face. The beatings intensified and the applicant was pushed to the floor. The warders continued kicking and punching him and hitting him with truncheons. The applicant lost consciousness. A warder dragged him back to the cell and the applicant was left there on the floor. 8. On the same date the applicant was examined by a prison doctor. The doctor found hematomas on his buttocks and documented them in the applicant’s medical records as follows: “Skin hyperaemia on both buttocks, traces of blunt injury, blue hematomas. Moderate pain on palpation.” 9. On 5 October 2007 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant on suspicion of assault on a warder and disruption of order in the detention facility. The prosecution’s case was that on 2 October 2007 the applicant had refused to be subjected to a body search and had waved his hands to prevent the search. Warder B. had warned the applicant about the intention to use force should he fail to comply with the order. In response, the applicant had punched another warder, Mr L., in the face, splitting his lip. 10. On 2 September 2008 the Chelyabinsk Regional Court, by a jury verdict, acquitted the applicant. Having established that he had hit warder L. once and had split his lip, the jury nevertheless concluded that the applicant had caused the injury in an attempt to protect himself. The relevant part of the judgment read as follows: “The jury has established in a verdict that two injuries to Mr L.’s lower lip were caused by [the applicant] with a single punch to Mr L.’s face. [The applicant] had refused to strip naked and to submit his clothes to a check-up, and had asked for a copy of a decision by the head or deputy head of the facility authorising a full body search. [The applicant] who had stayed with his face to the wall, had been subsequently kicked and punched, and hit with rubber truncheons a number of times, at least ten, on various parts of his body, head [and] limbs. [The beating] had been accompanied by verbal assaults. In an attempt to prevent further beatings and to protect himself, [the applicant], while falling down, had turned and taken an aimless swing in the direction of the persons who had continued hitting him.” 11. On 18 November 2008 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the judgment on appeal. 12. After the acquittal had become final, the applicant lodged a complaint with the prosecutor’s office of the Chelyabinsk Region, providing his version of the events of 2 October 2007 and complaining of ill‑treatment. 13. On 28 January 2009 the investigative department of the Metallurgicheskiy District of Chelyabinsk opened a criminal investigation into the events of 2 October 2007 on charges of abuse of power committed with violence. The investigators questioned the applicant along with fourteen witnesses and conducted three cross-examinations. 14. On 28 September 2009 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the alleged perpetrators. 15. On 18 November 2009 the investigation was reopened. 16. On 22 December 2009 the criminal proceedings against the prison warders were discontinued and the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the alleged perpetrators. The investigators had questioned the warders B. and L. mentioned in the acquittal judgment of 2 September 2008, who had testified that they had indeed administered up to six truncheon blows to the applicant’s buttocks because he had refused to go through a body search and had hit warder L. in the face. 17. On 8 November 2012 the criminal proceedings against the warders were reopened. 18. On 19 November 2012 the investigation was suspended again for failure to identify the alleged perpetrators. The investigator analysed the depositions of warders and other witnesses, and the findings of the medical examination of 2 October 2007, and concluded that the applicant had not obeyed the warders’ lawful orders and had been aggressive. Therefore, the use of rubber truncheons had been justified. Moreover, the medical records contained a vague summary description of the applicant’s injuries, which were not life-threatening. Lastly, the jurors’ verdict did not contain any assessment of the warders’ actions or any proof of the warders’ guilt. 19. On 14 November 2013 the prosecutor’s office of the Chelyabinsk Region quashed the decision of 19 November 2012 and reopened the investigation. 20. On 28 February 2014 the criminal proceedings against the warders were terminated. The investigator found that the warders had not abused their powers and had acted in accordance with the law. 21. The applicant’s representative challenged the decision of 28 September 2009, arguing that the jury verdict of 2 September 2008 had already identified the assailants and that there had therefore been no reason to adjourn the proceedings. 22. On 10 February 2011 the Metallurgicheskiy District Court of Chelyabinsk dismissed the complaint, having found as follows: “As follows from the case-file materials, on 28 September 2009 a senior investigator of the investigative department, Mr V., refused to open a criminal case against officers of [medical colony no. 3], Mr M., Mr B. and Mr L., who, as follows from that decision, had lawfully used force against [the applicant]. That decision remains in force. In those circumstances, the decision by which the criminal proceedings were adjourned is lawful and well-founded; there are no grounds to consider it unlawful.” 23. On 9 April 2012 the Chelyabinsk Regional Court quashed that decision on appeal and remitted the case for re-examination. 24. On 1 June 2012 the Metallurgicheskiy District Court of Chelyabinsk held to discontinue the proceedings as the decision of 28 September 2008 had been quashed on 18 November 2009. (b) Challenging of the investigator’s decision of 22 December 2009 and other decisions 25. On an unspecified date the applicant asked the court to declare unlawful the investigator’s decisions of 28 September 2008, 11 November 2008, 22 December 2009 and an opinion of 12 October 2009 justifying suspension of the investigation. He argued that those decisions contradicted each other and sought to conceal the warders’ crime. 26. On 9 November 2012 the Metallurgicheskiy District Court of Chelyabinsk discontinued the proceedings on the applicant’s claim. 27. On 21 March 2013 the Chelyabinsk Regional Court quashed that decision and remitted the case for fresh examination. 28. On 18 April 2013 the District Court allowed the applicant’s claim. It held that the decisions of 28 September 2008 and 22 December 2009 lacked sufficient reasoning, did not contain any references to the jurors’ verdict, and were based only on the testimony of warders. It ordered that the violations found be remedied. 29. The applicant brought a civil action against the prosecutor’s office of the Chelyabinsk Region, the Treasury and the Ministry of Finance, seeking compensation for non-pecuniary damage caused by the unlawful institution of criminal proceedings. He also sought apologies from the implicated officials. 30. On 10 August 2011 the applicant and his lawyer asked the court to consider the case in their absence. 31. On 11 August 2011 the Tsentralnyy District Court of Chelyabinsk awarded the applicant 15,000 Russian roubles (RUB) (353 euros (EUR)) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage and dismissed the remaining claims. The District Court held the hearing in the applicant’s absence. The applicant lodged an appeal against this decision. 32. On 6 February 2012 the Chelyabinsk Regional Court upheld the decision of 11 August 2011 and rejected the applicant’s appeal. The appellate court also noted that as an inmate, the applicant had been duly notified of the court hearing but had failed to attend it.

4. The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Saatli. 5. The applicant was a journalist and worked for the Bizim Yol newspaper at the time of the events described below. 6. Following the publication of a series of articles criticising the activities of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (“the Ministry”) written by the applicant, the head of the Ministry’s administration, R.A., contacted the applicant and asked for a meeting. They met on 11 June 2007, and then on 19 and 20 July 2007 as well. According to the applicant, during these meetings R.A. firstly demanded that he stop writing articles about the Ministry. R.A. also threatened him saying that he should not forget the case of B.H., a journalist who had been heavily beaten in May 2006. However, when R.A. realised that the applicant would continue to write articles about the Ministry’s activities, he proposed him money in exchange for stopping writing the articles. According to the applicant, at the beginning he rejected that proposal, but he later accepted it because of his difficult financial situation. 7. On 24 July 2007 they met again at a restaurant in Baku. During the meeting when the applicant received 3,500 United States dollars from R.A., agents of the Ministry of National Security (“the MNS”) intervened and arrested him. 8. On the same day criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant under Article 311.1 (bribe-taking) of the Criminal Code. 9. On 26 July 2007 the applicant was charged under Article 311.1. 10. On the same day the Nasimi District Court ordered the applicant’s detention pending trial for a period of three months. The judge substantiated the necessity for this measure as follows: “Taking into account the possibility of the accused’s absconding from the investigation, and the character and gravity of the crime attributed to him, I consider it necessary to apply the preventive measure of remand in custody in respect of him.” 11. On 27 July 2007 the applicant appealed against the detention order, claiming that there was no risk of his absconding or obstructing the investigation and that the court had failed to take his personal situation into consideration. 12. On 3 August 2007 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The appellate court did not make mention of the applicant’s particular complaints. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows: “The first-instance court, when deciding to apply the preventive measure of remand in custody in respect of Mushfig Huseynov, has correctly taken into account the character and degree of public dangerousness of the committed crime, the possibility of his absconding from the investigation, and the fact that the sanction provided for the commission of this act is over two years’ imprisonment. Therefore, there is no ground for granting the appeal and quashing the impugned decision.” 13. On 17 October 2007 the prosecutor in charge of the criminal case lodged an application with the court asking for an extension of the applicant’s pre-trial detention for a period of three months. In that connection, he submitted that more time was needed to complete the investigation. 14. On 19 October 2007 the Nasimi District Court granted the prosecutor’s request by extending the applicant’s detention pending trial by three months, until 24 January 2008. The court substantiated the need for the extension by the necessity of additional time to carry out further investigative actions, as well as by the seriousness of the charge and the likelihood that if released he might abscond. It appears from the court decision and the transcript of the court hearing of 19 October 2007 that the hearing was held in the absence of the applicant and his lawyer. 15. On 22 October 2007 the applicant appealed against that decision, claiming that the first-instance court had failed to justify his continued detention and to take his personal situation into account. The applicant did not make any mention of his and his lawyer’s absence from the hearing of 19 October 2007 in his appeal. 16. On 31 October 2007 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Nasimi District Court’s decision of 19 October 2007 was justified. It appears from the appellate court’s decision and the transcript of the court hearing of 31 October 2007 that the hearing was held in the absence of the applicant, but in the presence of his lawyer. 17. On 21 January 2008 the Assize Court found the applicant guilty and sentenced him to six years’ imprisonment. 18. On 4 April 2008 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the applicant’s conviction, but reduced his sentence to five years’ imprisonment. 19. On 29 July 2008 the Supreme Court upheld the Baku Court of Appeal’s judgment of 4 April 2008. 20. On 25 December 2009 the applicant was released from serving the remainder of his sentence after being pardoned by a presidential decree. 21. On 1 August 2007 a television programme concerning the applicant’s arrest on 24 July 2007 was broadcast on a private television channel. It appears from the transcript of the broadcast that the programme began with a narrated section, the transcript of which reads as follows in its relevant part: “Although in the Republic of Azerbaijan, which has chosen to take a democratic development path, all the legislative guarantees and comprehensive conditions have been established for freedom of speech and of the press, it is still possible to encounter members of the press who violate the requirements, established by the Mass Media Act, prohibiting abuse of the freedom of the press and performance of unlawful actions incompatible with journalistic ethics. One of these undesirable members of the mass media is the editor of the Bizim Yol newspaper, Huseynov Mushfiq Tofig oglu – who was accused of having committed serious and especially serious crimes and was convicted of libel and defamation under Articles 147.2 and 148 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan by the Nasimi District Court’s judgment of 25 April 2006 – [he] did not draw conclusions from that and committed an even more serious crime, bribe-taking ...” 22. The programme then showed the video recordings, filmed by the law-enforcement authorities, of the meeting and dialogue between the applicant and R.A., and of the applicant’s arrest by the agents of the MNS when he was taking money from R.A. At the end of the programme the narrator stated that the criminal investigation was ongoing and that the public would be informed of further developments.

5. The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Hamburg. He is the brother of the late Y.C., also a Gambian national, who was born in 1987 and applied for asylum in Austria in 2004. 6. On 4 April 2005, the Vienna Regional Criminal Court (Straflandesgericht) convicted Y.C. of drug trafficking and sentenced him to seven months’ imprisonment. Y.C. began serving his sentence at Vienna‑Josefstadt Prison (Strafvollzugsanstalt). On 2 May 2005 he was transferred to Linz Prison. 7. On 18 April 2005 the Vienna Federal Police Authority (Bundespolizeidirektion) dismissed Y.C.’s asylum application and ordered his expulsion to the Gambia. An appeal lodged by Y.C. was dismissed by the Vienna Federal Asylum Office (Bundesasylamt) on 6 June 2005. He did not appeal against this decision and it became legally binding on 5 July 2005. 8. On 8 September 2005 the Linz Federal Police Authority issued an order for Y.C. to be placed in detention with a view to his expulsion. 9. On 12 September 2005 Y.C. was conditionally released from prison and directly transferred to the Linz police detention centre (Polizeianhaltezentrum – hereinafter “the detention centre”). 10. Upon his admission to the detention centre, Y.C. was examined by a police doctor (Polizeiarzt), who noted that Y.C. was in a good general state and was fit for detention. His weight was recorded at 76.5 kg and his height at 170 cm. Communication between the authorities and Y.C. took place in English. 11. On 26 September 2005 the police doctor, while conducting a routine examination which all detainees have to undergo at two-week intervals, again noted that Y.C.’s state of health was good and recorded his weight at 70 kg. 12. On 27 September 2005 Y.C. went on hunger strike. On 28 September 2005 he informed the authorities thereof. Representatives of Human Rights Association Austria (Verein Menschenrechte Österreich), a non-governmental organisation (NGO) who had already been counselling him since the day of his admission to the detention centre, came to talk to him. On the same day Y.C. was subject to an initial hunger-strike examination (Hungerstreik-Eingangsuntersuchung). Y.C. was handed an information pamphlet on hunger strikes (in English) and was also orally informed by the public medical officer of the possible consequences of a hunger strike. A medical hunger-strike protocol (Hungerstreikprotokoll) was filled out, in which his state of health was described as follows: “Musculature in a good, well-trained state, pronounced muscles of the upper arm, six-pack like someone who practices athletic sports, appears vital, overall.” 13. On the hunger-strike protocol it was noted that at the outset of his hunger strike, Y.C. had weighed 67 kg. On the basis of this, Y.C.’s “critical weight” was calculated at 54 kg (see paragraph 64 below). Under the heading “reasons given for hunger strike”, it was noted that Y.C. “absolutely wanted to be transferred back to cell no. 36”. He had been placed in a different cell because he and his cellmates had allegedly tried to escape from cell no. 36. 14. Daily health checks of Y.C. were subsequently carried out, during which his weight was checked, his blood pressure was taken and his oxygen saturation level was measured. Until 1 October 2005, no anomalies were detected. 15. On 2 October 2005 the public medical officer noted that Y.C.’s tongue was slightly dry, and on 3 October 2005 that his lips were “barky” (borkig). Further, there were occasional comments on the hunger-strike form to the effect that Y.C. resisted examination and was “malingering” (simuliert) – for example, he had “pretended to fall”, “refused to be examined”, “needed to be carried by other detainees”, and “tilted over from [his] chair in an ostentatious manner”. 16. After examining Y.C. during the morning of 4 October 2005, Dr F.G., the police doctor in charge, noted the following: “Pretends to be weak, has to be physically supported by two detainees – therefore weight check not possible. Dry tongue, barky lips. I request a medical assessment by a specialist. Possibly blood test, ionogram.” 17. On 4 October 2005 at 9.30 a.m., Y.C. was taken to Linz General Hospital (Allgemeines Krankenhaus) for examination and an assessment of whether he was fit enough for further detention. Because Y.C. resisted the examination and kicked out at a nurse, his hands and feet had to be shackled by the police officers who had accompanied him to the hospital. According to a report drawn up by the treating doctor on 4 October 2005, it was “not possible to assess the intake of liquids”, “communication [was] difficult” because Y.C. did not speak German, he had “dry lips” and had his eyes “constantly closed”, but “walking [was] possible if [he was] supported”. The hospital further noted that if his general condition worsened, he would have to be force-fed and taken to a psychiatric ward, because he “lashed out from time to time”. Taking his blood for a blood test had been difficult and risky; nevertheless, with the support of the two police officers, who secured Y.C. in a chair in the examination room, the doctor nonetheless managed to take a small amount of blood. After consulting the senior doctor, the treating doctor formally confirmed Y.C.’s fitness for detention and noted the police doctor’s telephone number in order to contact him after obtaining the results of the blood test. 18. Y.C. was subsequently taken back to the detention centre and at around 11 a.m. was placed alone in a security cell (Sicherheitszelle) because of his behaviour at the hospital. His shackles were removed. The security cell did not contain a water outlet, but Y.C. could request a water bottle at any time. A police officer checked on Y.C. every fifteen to thirty minutes. At 12.30 p.m., Y.C., who was lying on the bed, reacted to the police officer’s presence by lifting his head. When the officer next checked, at 12.50 p.m., he was not breathing anymore and had no pulse. At 1.20 p.m. he was declared dead by an emergency doctor who had been immediately called to the scene. The presumed time of death was 12.40 p.m. His weight was recorded at 59 kg. At 1.42 p.m. the blood test results from the hospital examination (see paragraph 17 above) were produced. They indicated that Y.C. had been dehydrated and that he should have been hydrated intravenously and placed in intensive care. 19. In a report of 5 October 2005 the doctor from the hospital noted that Y.C. had been uncooperative during his examination. It had been virtually impossible to take a blood sample as the patient had resisted strongly. At that time nothing had indicated that Y.C.’s physical condition could become life-threatening. In a statement given on 14 October 2005 the doctor described Y.C. as not having been weak at all, rather, he had been physically strong and had steadily resisted treatment with all his might (nach Leibeskräften), using the whole of his body and kicking out with his legs. After examination of his tongue, pulse, respiration, heartbeat and skin, he had observed Y.C.’s dry lips, but had seen none of the other usual signs of dehydration or other abnormalities. He further stated that even as an experienced emergency unit doctor, a rapid and fatal development of Y.C.’s situation had not at all been foreseeable by him. 20. On 4 October 2005, the day of Y.C.’s death, the Linz public prosecutor’s office (Staatsanwaltschaft – hereinafter “the public prosecutor”) instituted a criminal investigation against “unknown offenders” and requested the Linz Regional Court (Landesgericht) to conduct a judicial investigation. The investigating judge ordered that an autopsy be conducted by a sworn and judicially certified expert (beeideter und gerichtlich zertifizierter Sachverständiger); the autopsy was conducted on 5 October 2005. On the same day, the investigating judge, in response to a request made by the public prosecutor, delivered a decision ordering the seizure of the blood samples taken from Y.C., together with the pertinent examination report. 21. On 5 October 2005 the Linz Federal Police Authority submitted a detailed report on the circumstances of Y.C.’s death. 22. On 6 October 2005 the public prosecutor requested the Office for Internal Affairs at the Ministry of the Interior (Büro für interne Angelegenheiten des Bundesministeriums für Inneres – hereinafter the “OIA”) for it to carry out an investigation. The request included that interviews be conducted with: the two police officers who had accompanied Y.C. to the hospital on the day of his death; the police doctor who had examined Y.C. on that day; the doctor at Linz General Hospital who had examined Y.C.; the police officers who had been checking on Y.C. when he was placed in the security cell; and Y.C.’s cellmate. 23. On 12 October 2005 the public prosecutor added to the case file a note regarding a telephone conversation between him and Dr H., the expert who had conducted the autopsy, regarding the preliminary findings of that autopsy. 24. The OIA subsequently conducted an investigation at the detention centre’s medical service, procured documents from the detention centre, and produced written records of the requested interviews (see paragraph 22 above). The OIA’s report was submitted to the public prosecutor on 18 October 2005. 25. On 24 October 2005 the investigating judge complied with a request lodged by the public prosecutor for the inclusion in the case file of the results of the investigation up until that date, as well as for Y.C.’s medical history to be obtained from the detention centre, and for these documents to be transmitted to the expert Dr H. It was further decided that the scale used to weigh Y.C. at the detention centre be seized and sent for technical examination. 26. On 5 November 2005 the OIA submitted a report containing the results of the supplementary investigation. 27. On 1 December 2005, after being supplied with all pertinent documents by the OIA, the Austrian Human Rights Advisory Board (Menschenrechtsbeirat – hereinafter “the Advisory Board” – an independent monitoring body established in 1999 at the Ministry of the Interior) issued a report on Y.C.’s death. In that report, the Advisory Board considered several points to be problematic: that Y.C., after his visit to Linz General Hospital on 4 October 2005, had been further monitored only by police officers, rather than by medical professionals; that no interpreter had been present during the said hospital visit; that a blood sample had been taken from Y.C. against his will; and that the calculation of Y.C.’s critical weight had been questionable. The issues of Y.C.’s possible dehydration and carrying sickle cell disease had not been addressed in the report, as it had been drawn up before the delivery of the final autopsy report by Dr H. (see paragraph 30 below). 28. On 12 December 2005 the applicant, who was represented by counsel, joined the criminal proceedings as a private party. 29. By an order of 14 December 2005 the investigating judge urged the expert to submit his report. 30. On 4 January 2006 Dr H., the forensic expert who had conducted the autopsy, submitted his final autopsy report (dated 5 October 2005), as well as his expert report on Y.C.’s death, to the Linz Regional Court. He stated in the autopsy report that Y.C.’s body had not shown signs of “significantly acute malnutrition”, nor had there been signs of “classic dehydration”. 31. In the more detailed expert report, Dr H. stated that Y.C.’s body had not shown signs of any injuries; therefore, death caused by the use of force could be excluded. Y.C. had been slim, but had not appeared malnourished. His body had weighed 59.3 kg; his height had been 171 cm. No typical external signs of dehydration had been visible, except for the lips appearing to be slightly dry. The results of the internal investigation had recorded a thickening of the blood, which indicated a possible alternation to the blood while Y.C. had still been alive caused by a lack of hydration. Dr H. noted that a hunger strike alone could not lead to a thickening of the blood, as long as enough fluids were consumed. As concerns the hunger strike, Dr H. stated that it was likely that Y.C. had not eaten solid food for several days, but that it was unlikely that he had engaged in a long-term total hunger strike as the large intestine had still been filled with an abundance of stool along its entire length. 32. Dr H. further stated that neither Y.C.’s external appearance nor the medical reports produced until 4 October 2005 had indicated a life‑threatening situation, although there had been a significant reduction in his weight. Rather, it was more likely that a shift in the electrolyte system had commenced over a period of several days, as indicated by the results of the blood test conducted by Linz General Hospital on 4 October 2005. A post-mortem examination of Y.C.’s blood (conducted in the course of the autopsy) had shown that he had been a carrier of sickle cell trait (Sichelzellanlage). Dr H. explained that sickle cell disease (Sichelzellenkrankheit) was an inherited red blood cell disorder; while red blood cells (containing normal haemoglobin) were disc-shaped, sickle haemoglobin could form stiff rods within the cell, changing it into a sickle shape. Dr H. added that the disease was rare among the white population, occurring mostly among black people. Unlike in the case of people suffering from sickle cell disease, in Y.C.’s blood the trait had been present in the heterozygous form, which is why the disease had remained undetected during his lifetime. In cases like Y.C.’s, symptoms of sickle cell disease only manifested themselves if there were further damaging external factors, such as dehydration or a lack of oxygen. 33. Dr H. concluded that the cause of Y.C.’s death had been dehydration, combined with the fact that he had been a carrier of sickle cell trait, which had caused a shift in the electrolyte system and had ultimately caused his heart to stop beating. Neither the authorities nor Y.C. himself had been aware that he had been a carrier of sickle cell trait. Dr H. stated that Y.C.’s death could only have been prevented if he had been tested earlier for sickle cell trait, or if he had been aware that he was a carrier thereof. However, the hunger-strike protocol had not indicated any necessity for a blood test in that respect. The test results from the hospital on the day of Y.C.’s death would have given reason for further tests. However, the results had only been produced after Y.C.’s death. 34. On 12 October 2005 the public prosecutor made a note in the criminal file (Aktenvermerk) about a conversation with Dr H. The doctor had expressed the opinion that with hindsight Y.C.’s extraordinarily aggressive behaviour at the hospital on the day of his death had resembled a delirious state caused by advanced dehydration and the consequent disintegration of his blood cells. 35. On 13 January 2006 the public prosecutor decided to discontinue the criminal investigation into the death of Y.C., as no sufficient evidence could be found to warrant criminal proceedings. The applicant was informed that he had the right to ask the Council Chamber (Ratskammer) of the Linz Regional Court to conduct a preliminary investigation. However, he was also informed that he would have to bear the full costs of the criminal proceedings should the Council Chamber grant his request but the proceedings did not result in a criminal conviction. This decision was served on the applicant’s counsel on 19 January 2006. The applicant did not request that a preliminary investigation be instituted. 36. On 2 March 2006 the applicant submitted the decision of 13 February 2006 issued by the Upper Austria Independent Administrative Panel (Unabhänigiger Verwaltungssenat Oberösterreich – hereinafter “the IAP”) (see paragraph 46 below) to the public prosecutor and requested him to investigate further. On 13 March 2006 the public prosecutor replied that the documents submitted had already been made available to him, but that they could not change his assessment of the procedural results obtained so far, since every aspect of the legal question to be answered had already been clarified by Dr H.’s autopsy report and his comprehensive expert report. 37. On 15 November 2005 the applicant requested the IAP to review the lawfulness of Y.C.’s detention (Schubhaftbeschwerde) and at the same time lodged a complaint about the conditions of his detention (Maßnahmenbeschwerde). He submitted in particular that Y.C. should not have continued to be kept in detention because he had no longer been fit to be detained on account of his hunger strike. As regards the conditions of Y.C.’s detention, he submitted that the medical treatment of Y.C. had not been in conformity with section 10(1) of the Detention Ordinance (Anhalteordnung – see paragraph 59 below). He furthermore claimed that his brother had been placed in a security cell, without access to water, on the day of his death, in contravention of section 5(5) of the Detention Ordinance. 38. On 13 February 2006 the competent member of the IAP held a hearing during which he examined as witnesses the applicant, a cellmate of Y.C., one of the police doctors who had examined Y.C. during his hunger strike, and the police officers who had been in charge of examining detainees on the day of Y.C.’s death. 39. Y.C.’s former cellmate, H.C., stated that they had gone on hunger strike together to protest the duration of their detention, and that they had not been treated correctly by the police officers; however, he did not specify how that treatment had not been correct. He said that he did not remember the exact day on which they had begun their hunger strike, but that they had not eaten or drunk anything at all for twelve days. H.C. stated that he had had the impression that Y.C. had been “terribly weak” during the three days before his death. 40. According to the witness statements by employees of the NGO Human Rights Association Austria who had visited Y.C. on several occasions, Y.C. had not raised any allegations of ill-treatment during their visits. In fact, with the exception of his former cellmate, all other witnesses who had been in contact with Y.C. until his death had also stated during the IAP hearing that he had not appeared to be ill or weak, but that on the contrary, even on the day of his death he had seemed athletic and strong; which had been corroborated by photographs taken of his dead body and its description by Dr H. in the autopsy report (see paragraph 30 above). 41. One of the police doctors, Dr F.G., gave evidence regarding, inter alia, the reason why the calculation of the critical weight of a detainee on hunger strike was based on his or her weight at the outset of the hunger strike, and not the weight recorded upon admission to the detention centre. He stated that detainees usually lost weight slightly during their detention, but that it was also possible for them to gain weight. He acknowledged that he had not even checked Y.C.’s initial weight, as the 65.5 kg recorded on the day after Y.C. had announced his hunger strike had in principle amounted to a normal weight, given his height. Dr F.G. furthermore stated that on 3 October 2005 Y.C. had walked into the examination room without support. One day later, Y.C. had showed signs of dehydration and had come to the examination room supported by two police officers. Dr F.G. stated that he had accordingly ordered him to be examined at the hospital. 42. H., the police officer who had accompanied Y.C. to and from the hospital on the day of his death, stated that the reason for Y.C.’s placement in solitary confinement had been that – following Y.C.’s behaviour at the hospital – he and the other officer in charge had feared that Y.C. might harm himself or others. H. confirmed that there had been no water outlet in the security cell, but that Y.C. could have requested a water bottle at any time by ringing a bell. 43. B., the police officer who had been in charge of checking on Y.C. while he was being held in the security cell, stated that he had received an order to do so every fifteen to thirty minutes. During the checks, he had had to make sure that the detainee reacted when spoken to. When B. had checked on Y.C. at 12.30 p.m., the latter had moved his head. At the next check at 12.50 p.m., he had showed no reaction and had subsequently been pronounced dead by the emergency doctor, who had immediately been called to the scene. 44. During the IAP hearing on 13 February 2006 the applicant presented an undated and unsigned three-page statement by Dr W.G., whom he had engaged himself and who was a general practitioner in Linz with a focus on nutritional medicine. Dr W.G, who had not examined Y.C.’s body, had based his report on the autopsy report and expert report issued by Dr H., the report of the OIA (see paragraph 24 above) and the report by Linz General Hospital, and had come to the following opinion. On 12 September 2005, the day on which Y.C. had been taken into detention with a view to his expulsion, he had weighed 76.5 kg. On 28 September 2005, the day on which Y.C. had announced that he was on hunger strike, he had had a body weight of only 67 kg. The police doctor had made a mistake in taking the latter as the normal weight of Y.C. for the purposes of calculating his critical body weight. The doctor had not taken into account the fact that Y.C. had already lost 9.5 kg between 12 and 28 September 2005, meaning that Y.C. must have already started his hunger strike before he had officially announced it. From 28 September until the day of his death on 4 October 2005, Y.C. had lost a further 8 kg in body weight. However, the doctor had used Y.C.’s weight on 28 September (namely 67 kg) as a starting point, and had established his critical weight as 54 kg, which in Dr W.G.’s view was incorrect. The police doctor should have based his calculations on how much Y.C. had weighed when he had arrived at the detention centre. If he had, the correct critical weight would have been determined at 67 kg, minus 10%. Instead, Y.C. at the time of his death had already lost approximately 18% of his weight in fluids. For an adult person a loss of even 10% in fluids constituted a life-threatening situation. Dr W.G. assumed that Y.C. had died of dehydration resulting from the erroneous calculation of his body weight. He did not deal with the question of how far the sickle cell trait present in Y.C.’s blood had played a role in his death, nor did he provide any scientific source for his calculations. Dr W.G.’s opinion was later not supported by any of the official experts. 45. The applicant asked the IAP that the second police doctor in charge at the detention centre on the day of Y.C.’s death be questioned, and that another expert report be obtained in order to refute the expert report issued by Dr H. (see paragraphs 30-33 above). The IAP refused these requests. 46. The IAP, at the end of the hearing of 13 February 2006, ruled that Y.C.’s detention pending his expulsion had been unlawful and that the conditions of detention during his hunger strike had violated Y.C.’s right under Article 3 of the Convention to protection against ill-treatment. Concerning the cause of Y.C.’s death, the IAP reiterated the findings of the autopsy report and the expert report attached thereto (see paragraphs 30-33 above). The IAP argued that the State authorities had not fulfilled their role of guarantor of the applicant’s rights under Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention. It found that given the frequency of sickle cell disease among people from sub-Saharan Africa, the State was under an obligation to offer a test for sickle cell disease to all detainees from that specific geographic area, and in particular to those on hunger strike. 47. The Ministry of the Interior appealed against that decision. 48. On 30 August 2007, the Administrative Court quashed the IAP’s decision. It held that the applicant had no locus standi regarding the request for a review of the lawfulness of the detention of his brother because rights under Article 5 of the Convention were not transferable to other persons. Therefore, the IAP had not had authority to issue a decision in that respect. Concerning the complaint under Article 3 of the Convention, it held that the mere fact that a person was detained did not place any duty on the State to take measures (the need for which had not necessarily been foreseeable) because of the genetic disposition of that person without a manifest outbreak of disease in that person. Moreover, it found that the IAP had not respected certain procedural requirements, which is why the Administrative Court referred the case back to the IAP. 49. On 1 April 2008 the applicant lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights concerning the above-mentioned judgment of the Administrative Court; it was registered as Ceesay v. Austria (no. 17208/08). Thereupon, the IAP decided to suspend the fresh proceedings until such time as the Court rendered its decision in respect of this complaint. 50. On 21 May 2010 the Court declared application no. 17208/08 inadmissible, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention, as the proceedings were still pending before the IAP and the complaints lodged by the applicant with the Court were therefore premature. 51. The IAP resumed the proceedings and on 11 June 2010 again issued a decision finding a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the conditions of Y.C.’s detention. It essentially reiterated the reasoning contained in its previous decision, explaining that the proceedings were not aimed at identifying an individual who could be held culpable for Y.C.’s death but at identifying errors inherent in the detention system – specifically, the lack of a standardised test for sickle cell disease for certain high-risk groups and the lack of clear instructions for the staff of the detention centre concerning detainees on hunger strike. 52. The Ministry of the Interior again lodged a complaint, arguing that there had been sufficient rules and instructions in place concerning the treatment of detainees. In the present case, there had not been any indications that Y.C. had suffered from sickle cell disease. Not even hospitals conducted standardised tests for this blood anomaly where there was no concrete suspicion in that respect. It added that the death of Y.C. had nonetheless prompted the Ministry of the Interior to issue a directive to detention centre authorities instructing them to (i) inform detainees who were on hunger strike and who belonged to a high-risk group of the possible consequences of sickle cell disease, and (ii) conduct the necessary tests. 53. On 20 October 2011 the Administrative Court again quashed the IAP’s decision. It reminded the IAP that it was bound by the legal interpretation that the Administrative Court had expressed in its previous judgment concerning the obligations of the State under Article 3 of the Convention towards detainees (see paragraph 48 above). Moreover, it suggested that the IAP order an expert report in order to determine whether the reduced mental and physical condition of Y.C. should have given rise to an investigation into the possibility that he had been suffering from sickle cell disease and whether appropriate medical treatment from that moment onwards could have prevented the death of Y.C. 54. During the course of the new round of proceedings, the IAP ordered an expert report, as suggested by the Administrative Court. In a report dated 19 May 2012, as well as during the hearing of 21 June 2012, the expert in question, Dr L., confirmed that according to his findings, Y.C. had been a sickle cell trait carrier. He added that this was the case in respect of 30% of the population of countries in sub-Saharan Africa, such as the Gambia (where Y.C. had been from), and that this trait served as a protection from Malaria. The fact that a person was a carrier of sickle cell trait did not mean that he or she was ill or had a lower life expectancy. Nonetheless he or she would face a higher risk of death in the event of engaging in strenuous activities (anstrengungsassoziierte Todesfälle), and the trait could also cause rapid dehydration in the event of reduced liquid intake. Dr L. explained that sickle cell disease could only be detected through an analysis of blood samples, but that the need for such an analysis had at no point been clearly indicated in Y.C.’s case, even in the light of his reduced mental and physical condition. 55. The applicant submitted the same unsigned statement that he had already submitted during the hearing of 13 February 2006 (see paragraph 44 above). He did not submit any further requests. When the expert Dr L. was questioned by the IAP regarding the calculation of Y.C.’s critical weight, he stated that he was inclined to believe that Y.C.’s weight had been correctly calculated, but that that calculation had been wrongly recorded. In his opinion, it was unlikely that Y.C. could have lost 9 kg over the course of a sixteen-day hunger strike. 56. On 13 July 2012 the IAP dismissed the applicant’s complaint about the conditions of Y.C.’s detention, basing its decision on the finding contained in the expert report of Dr L. (see paragraph 54 above) that the need for an analysis of Y.C.’s blood in respect of sickle cell trait had not been indicated. It reiterated that according to the Administrative Court’s legal interpretation, by which it was bound, the State had no duty to take measures the need for which had not been foreseeable in respect of a person because of a certain genetic disposition without a manifest outbreak of the disease in that person. Therefore, the authorities’ conduct had not constituted a violation of Article 3. 57. The applicant lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court, which was dismissed on 22 November 2013. 58. On 25 April 2014 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Administrative Court, which, referring to its decisions of 30 August 2007 and 20 October 2011, dismissed it. This decision was served on the applicant on 16 May 2014.

5. By a judgment of the Zenica Cantonal Court of 5 February 2007, three judgments of the Tešanj Municipal Court of 30 July 2008, 31 March 2008 and 15 May 2009 and a judgment of the Zenica Municipal Court of 26 April 2007, which became final on 5 February 2007, 18 August 2008, 23 March 2009, 25 June 2010 and 27 March 2008, respectively, the Zenica-Doboj Canton (Zeničko-dobojski kanton; one of the ten cantons of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) was ordered to pay the applicants different sums in respect of unpaid work-related benefits together with default interest at the statutory rate and legal costs. 6. The writs of execution issued on 2 March 2007, 5 April 2010, 2 March 2010, 14 December 2010 and 24 June 2008, respectively, by the Zenica Municipal Court and the Tešanj Municipal Court, were transferred to the competent bank and were listed among the charges on the debtor’s account. 7. On several occasions thereafter the bank informed the competent courts that enforcement was not possible because the budgetary funds intended for that purpose had already been spent. 8. On 12 July 2008 the first applicant, Mr Suljo Kunić, complained of the non-enforcement to the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“the Constitutional Court”). 9. On 12 October 2011 (decision no. AP 2110/08) the Constitutional Court found a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in Mr Suljo Kunić’s and ten other cases on account of the prolonged non-enforcement of the final judgments in the appellants’ favour. It ordered the government of the Zenica-Doboj Canton to take the necessary steps in order to secure the payment of the cantonal debt arising from the final judgments within a reasonable time. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows: “39. ... The court notes that the judgments [in favour of the appellants] have not been enforced due to the lack of funds on the debtor’s bank account. ... 45. The Constitutional Court reiterates that under the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Article 1 of the European Convention all levels of government must secure respect for individual human rights, including the right to enforcement of final judgments under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and the right to property under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention ... The scope of that obligation is not reduced in the present case, notwithstanding the large number of judgments... [T]he Constitutional Court notes that in Jeličić v. BiH, and again in Čolić and Others v. BiH, the European Court of Human Rights reiterated that ‘it is not open to a State authority to cite lack of funds as an excuse for not honouring a judgment debt. Admittedly, a delay in the execution of a judgment may be justified in particular circumstances, but the delay may not be such as to impair the essence of the right protected under Article 6 § 1’ ... 46. The Constitutional Court agrees with the position taken by the European Court ... it is nevertheless aware of the effects the global economic crisis had on Bosnia and Herzegovina ... The court notes that the federal and the cantonal governments had taken certain steps with the view to enforcement of final court decisions. Section 138 of the Federal Enforcement Procedure Act 2003 provides that the final judgments against the Federation and the cantons shall be enforced within the amount of budgetary funds designated for that purpose ... and that the creditors shall enforce their claims in the order in which they acquired the enforcement titles ... In 2010 and 2011 the amount of funds for that purpose in the budget of the Zenica-Doboj Canton was 100,000 convertible marks. ... 48. The court finds that the crux of the problem in the present case is that the Zenica-Doboj Canton did not identify the exact number of unenforced judgments and the aggregate debt ... without which it is impossible to know when all the creditors will realise their claims against this canton. Furthemore, there should exist a centralised and transparent database of all the claims listed in chronological order according to the time the judgments became final. It should include the enforcement time-frame and a list of partial payments, if any. This will also help to avoid abuses of the enforcement procedure. These measure and adequate funds in the annual budget would ensure that all the final judgments are enforced within a reasonable time ... and the Zenica-Doboj Canton would ensure the respect of its obligations from Article 6 §1 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. ... 50. The court considers that the adoption of section 138 of the Enforcement Procedure Act 2003 had a legitimate aim, because the enforcement of a large number of judgments at the same time would jeopardise the normal functioning of the cantons. However, the limitation of the enforcement in the present case is contrary to the principle of proportionality enshrined in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 which requires that a fair balance is struck between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights ... Section 138 places a disproportionate burden on the appellants ... they are placed in a situation of absolute uncertainty as regards the enforcement of their claims... ... 52. In order to comply with its positive obligation, the government of the Zenica-Doboj Canton must, as explained above, calculate the total amount of the aggregate debt arising from the final judgments and prepare a comprehensive and transparent database ... This court will not specify what a reasonable time-limit should be ... but, in any event, it must be in accordance with Article 6 § 1 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. ... 54. ... The current situation does not give any guarantees to the appellants that their claims against the Zenica-Doboj Canton will be enforced within a reasonable time.” 10. On 16 January 2013 the Constitutional Court adopted a procedural decision to the effect that its decision of 12 October 2011 and eight other decisions on the same matter in cases concerning various individual appellants (see paragraph 15 below) had not been enforced. 11. The final judgments in the applicants’ favour have not yet been enforced.

4. The applicant was born in 1977 and lived in Naberezhniye Chelny, Tatarstan Republic, before his conviction of an unrelated criminal offence. 5. On 7 April 2008 the applicant notified the executive committee of Naberezhniye Chelny of his intention to hold a public event in the form of a hunger strike in front of the local prosecutor’s office beginning from 21 April 2008. On the same day the applicant was informed that his notice did not comply with the requirements of the law. 6. On 16 April 2008 the applicant lodged an addendum to his notice in which he indicated the place, the timing and the goal of the planned event as well as the information about its organiser. He also asked to ensure the protection of a tent (to be positioned near the prosecutor’s office) from 9 p.m. to 9 a.m. daily and the twenty-four-hour presence of an ambulance at the venue of the event. 7. On 17 April 2008 the head of the public relations department of the local executive committee informed the applicant that his planned public event amounted to a “picket” within the meaning of the Public Events Act (hereinafter “PEA”). In breach of the PEA the notice about the event did not contain information about the number of participants or arrangements to be made for preventing disorder and providing medical aid during the event. The applicant was required to align his notice with the PEA in that connection but, according to the Government, he failed to do so. 8. According to the applicant, on 22 April 2008 he started to hold a solo demonstration at noon and continued it until 4 p.m., when he was arrested by the police. 9. According to the Government, on 22 April 2008 at 3.15 p.m. the applicant set up on the lawn in front of the prosecutor’s office a tent and a poster reading “Hunger strike. Call for signatures”. He gathered passers-by and voiced his claims to them. At 3.40 p.m. a police officer drew up a record of an administrative offence allegedly committed by the applicant. He was accused of the breach of the procedure for the organisation of public events, an offence under Article 20.2 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences (hereinafter “CAO”). The case file was then submitted to a justice of the peace, who adjourned the hearing so that the applicant could retain a counsel. It is unclear whether the applicant was arrested by the police or otherwise deprived of his liberty at any moment prior to appearing before the justice of the peace. 10. At 8 p.m. on the same day the applicant returned to the site near the prosecutor’s office and resumed his demonstration. The police ordered him to terminate this allegedly unlawful public event, but he refused. They compiled an administrative offence record, stating that the applicant had committed an offence under Article 19.3 § 1 of the CAO; they also compiled an administrative arrest record (протокол административного задержания). The applicant was then taken to the central police station of Naberezhniye Chelny where he was detained until 24 April 2008 in the afternoon. 11. On 24 April 2008 the justice of the peace of the 8th Court Circuit of Naberezhniye Chelny found the applicant guilty under Article 20.2 § 1 of the CAO and imposed a fine of 1,000 Russian roubles ((RUB), equivalent to 27 euros (EUR) at the time). The court noted that the applicant had intended to hold a non-stop hunger-strike making use of posters for an indefinite period of time; on 22 April 2008 he had held an unlawful picket by way of setting up a tent and a poster reading “Hunger strike. Call for signatures” as well as by gathering passers-by and “campaigning” among them. In breach of the PEA he had failed to specify his arrangements for preventing disorder or providing medical aid during the event. Moreover, the applicant had intended to hold a twenty-four-hour picket in breach of the PEA’s ban on public events between 11 p.m. and 7 a.m. The court concluded that the applicant breached the procedure for the organisation of his public event. 12. The applicant appealed to the Naberezhniye Chelny Town Court. By a decision of 7 May 2008 the Town Court upheld the judgment of the justice of the peace. 13. In separate proceedings, on 7 May 2008 the justice of the peace of the 1st Court Circuit of Naberezhniye Chelny found the applicant guilty under Article 19.3 § 1 of the CAO. The justice of the peace found it established, on the basis of testimony of two eyewitnesses and police officers, that at 8 p.m. on 22 April 2008 the applicant being aware of the administrative offence proceedings pending against him under Article 20.2 of the CAO, had nevertheless disobeyed the lawful police order to stop the picket being held in breach of the PEA. The court sentenced him to seven days of administrative detention. The applicant’s detention from 9 p.m. on 22 April to 3.35 p.m. on 24 April 2008 counted towards his sentence of administrative detention. 14. The applicant appealed against the judgment to the Naberezhniye Chelny Town Court. On 8 May 2008 the Town Court upheld the judgment in a summary manner. 15. On 3 June 2008 the applicant lodged a supervisory-review appeal against the judgment of 7 May 2008. On 8 July 2008 the Deputy President of the Supreme Court of the Tatarstan Republic dismissed it, fully endorsing the findings of the lower courts.

5. The applicants were born in 1964, 1991 and 1982 respectively. The first and second applicants live in Timişoara, while the third applicant lives in Lantosque (France). The applicants are the wife, the daughter and the niece of S.T. respectively. 6. On 13 March 2014 a criminal investigation was opened by the prosecutor’s office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice (“the prosecutor”) against S.T., a medical doctor and employee of a State pension office, on suspicion of bribe-taking. On the same day a search was conducted at the common residence of S.T. and the first applicant, in the first applicant’s presence, accompanied by her lawyer. Documents and money found on that occasion were seized. The first applicant objected to that measure, claiming that some of the assets seized did not concern the ongoing investigation. The objection was included in the search record drawn up by the police on the spot and signed by the first applicant and her lawyer. 7. According to the prosecutor’s decision of 17 March 2014 the movable assets taken away at the search of 13 March, as well as other movable and immovable assets belonging to S.T. and his wife (the first applicant), had been seized under Article 249 of the Criminal Procedure Code (see paragraph 36 below) for the purpose of subsequent special and extended confiscation provided for by Article 1121 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 35 below). The decision listed, among the assets found during the searches conducted in the case, the sum of 107,915 euros (EUR) found in cash. Cash in other currencies had also been seized as well as several items belonging to the second applicant. The prosecutor based the decision on the nature of the crimes under investigation and the need to recover the damages, as well as on the need to investigate possible money-laundering crimes. 8. On 19 March 2014 S.T. was handed a copy of the seizure decision of 17 March 2014 in the presence of his lawyer. On that occasion, after he had been informed of his rights and obligations, he stated that he had no observations or objections in connection with the seizure. 9. On 20 March 2014 the second applicant, represented by her lawyer, was informed of her rights and obligations in connection with the seizure of her property and received a copy of the decision of 17 March 2014. 10. On 25 March 2014 the second applicant, represented by two lawyers of her choice, lodged a complaint with the Caraş-Severin County Court against the prosecutor’s decision of 17 March 2014. She claimed that the seizure of assets for the purpose of subsequent special or extended confiscation provided for by Article 249 of the Criminal Procedure Code, taken together with Articles 112 and 1121 of the Criminal Code, could be ordered only with respect to assets belonging to a suspect or accused. She further explained that the assets listed in the prosecutor’s seizure decision included two flats, two garages and two cars, which had been lawfully acquired by her with money lent by members of her family and should not have been seized. She joined copies of sale contracts and a written statement given by a member of the family. 11. On 10 April 2014 the Caraş-Severin County Court decided with final effect that the seizure decision of 17 March 2014 had been in compliance with the provisions of Article 249 § 4 of the Criminal Procedure Code (see paragraph 36 below), which clearly stipulated that measures such as seizure may be ordered with respect to assets belonging not only to the suspect or accused, but also to any other person. Furthermore, the second applicant had not proved that she had an income or that she had purchased the assets in question with her own money. Therefore, taking into account also the fact that the prosecutor mentioned in the impugned decision that there were suspicions of money laundering, the court concluded that the seizure measure had been lawful and justified for all the assets concerned. 12. On 26 May 2014 S.T. was indicted on 291 counts of bribe-taking committed between 3 February and 13 March 2014 in his capacity as an employee in a public institution, more specifically the chief expert on matters regarding capacity to work and invalidity at the Caraş-Severin County State Pension Office (Casa Judeţeană de Pensii Caraş-Severin). 13. On 23 October 2014 S.T. admitted his guilt in a statement before the Arad County Court. He chose to benefit from the special fast-track procedure provided for by the Criminal Procedure Code for such situations. 14. In his written plea submitted to the court, S.T. explained that some of the assets seized by the prosecutor belonged to his wife and daughter (the first and second applicants), who had not committed any criminal acts. In addition, he alleged that his family’s assets had been acquired with funds obtained from real-estate transactions in 2007 and 2013, and that the prosecutor had failed to prove that the seized assets had been unlawfully acquired. He also mentioned that out of the money seized in cash, the sum of EUR 40,400 had come from the sale of a flat in 2013. A copy of a contract had been submitted in support of that allegation, showing that a flat owned jointly by S.T. together with the first and third applicants had been sold for EUR 40,400. In conclusion, he asked the court to exclude the assets belonging to his family from the confiscation order. 15. On 6 November 2014 the Arad County Court found S.T. guilty on all counts of bribe-taking and sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment, the minimum sentence applicable in the light of his admission of guilt. 16. On the basis of the provisions of Article 289 § 3 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 35 below), the court also ordered the confiscation of various amounts of money and goods received by S.T. as bribes during the above-mentioned period and which had been seized during the investigation. 17. In addition, the court decided to apply the provisions of Article 1121 §§ 1 (m), 2 and 3 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 35 below) and to confiscate, on the grounds that they had been acquired as a result of S.T.’s criminal activity, additional money and property belonging jointly to S.T. and the first applicant (the equivalent of EUR 124,000 in cash in various currencies, a dental practice, a flat and a vehicle), as well as property belonging to the second applicant (a flat and two vehicles). All confiscated property had been previously seized by virtue of the prosecutor’s decision of 17 March 2014. 18. In reply to S.T.’s arguments concerning the assets belonging to his family, the court held that the total value of the seized property could not be justified by the lawful income earned by S.T. together with the first applicant in the five years before the commission of the crimes in question. In addition, the second applicant was a student and did not have any income. An analysis of the documents and expert reports included in the file showed that the annual income of S.T. and his wife, the first applicant, amounted to EUR 35,000, whereas the value of the assets acquired by the family in the preceding five years – the equivalent of EUR 300,000 in bank accounts or in cash, fifteen flats and plots of land, five garages and four vehicles – grossly exceeded their lawful income. However, referring to Decision no. 356 of 25 June 2014 of the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 37 below), the District Court explained that the confiscation measure would apply only to the assets acquired after April 2012. The court therefore decided to lift the seizure order in respect of the assets belonging to the family which did not fall within the scope of the case, having been acquired before April 2012. 19. S.T. and all the applicants lodged appeals against the judgment of 6 November 2014. 20. In her reasons for appeal, the third applicant explained that she had asked her uncle, S.T., to keep for her the EUR 40,400 she had obtained from the sale of her flat in 2013. She claimed that that amount had been found in S.T.’s residence during the search of 13 March 2014 and had been wrongfully confiscated by the Arad County Court. 21. The first two hearings were scheduled for 19 January and 16 February. The applicants’ lawyer requested the postponement of the trial because she could not be present. The next hearing was scheduled for 16 March 2015. 22. On 10 March 2015 the prosecutor submitted to the file a report prepared by the National Integrity Agency (Agenţia Naţionala de Integritate), verifying the assets statements submitted by the first applicant, on the basis of Law no. 176/2010 on integrity in the exercise of functions in public office. The report concluded that there were serious discrepancies between the first applicant’s lawful income and her assets, and said that the information would be sent to the commission for the verification of assets of the Timişoara Court of Appeal for a decision on the further steps to be taken. 23. The applicants submitted to the file an accountant’s report which provided a calculation of the net income earned by S.T. and the first applicant from their salaries between 1991 and 2014. The total amount determined by the accountant was EUR 281,071. They also submitted numerous copies of sale contracts for various properties, as well as a written statement from C.T., a family member who declared that he had lent money to the second applicant. 24. At the hearing of 16 March 2015 the applicants’ lawyer requested that another person be invited to testify as a witness before the court that he had also lent money to the second applicant. With respect to the first applicant, the lawyer applied to the court for an accountant’s report in order to establish the exact difference between her lawful income and the value of the property confiscated from her, taking into account the family’s expenses. 25. The requests were discussed during the hearing, in the presence of all parties. The prosecutor argued that the request to hear a witness should be rejected, since the family’s income could not be established with witness statements. 26. The court of appeal decided to refuse the requests, holding that there were enough elements in the file allowing for the exact calculation of both the family’s income and the value of their assets. In any case, the court held that several hearings had taken place in the appeal proceedings and the applicants had had enough time at their disposal to prepare their defence and submit written evidence. 27. On the merits of their appeal, the applicants’ lawyer argued that all property confiscated had been acquired from the legal income earned jointly by S.T. and the first applicant. In this connection, he referred to the accountant’s report included in the file. As regards the sum of EUR 40,400, the lawyer explained that it had been confiscated by mistake, since it belonged in fact to the third applicant, who had asked her uncle, S.T., to keep it for her. The money had come from the sale of a flat belonging to the third applicant. The lawyer concluded that the confiscation of property belonging to the applicants had been an unlawful and excessive measure. 28. The court postponed the pronouncement of the judgment to 24 March 2015. 29. In the meantime, the first and second applicants submitted written pleadings complaining that the second applicant had never been summoned to appear before the Arad District Court and had never been asked by the courts to submit evidence on how she had acquired the confiscated property. They also claimed that all their assets had been acquired through the efficient management of the family’s lawful income. 30. On 24 March 2015 the Timişoara Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants’ appeal. The court held that from the high number of criminal acts committed by S.T. it could be inferred that he had established a habit in taking bribes which could have started long before the period that had been investigated. At the same time, S.T. and his family, the first and second applicants, had accumulated a considerable fortune in the past five years. The Court of Appeal further observed that it was clear from the evidence in the file that part of the confiscated goods were the direct proceeds of S.T.’s crimes, whereas other assets belonged to the first and second applicants. The court concluded that it could be inferred from an analysis of the lawful income of the first applicant and the lack of income of the second applicant that the assets found in their names had also been acquired through S.T.’s criminal activity. 31. The Court of Appeal observed that there was a considerable discrepancy between the family’s lawful income and its assets, and that S.T. and the applicants had not supplied proof that the confiscated assets had been lawfully acquired. The court reasoned as follows: “Between 03.02.2014 and 13.03.2014 while the defendant was under surveillance he received various sums of money and other goods from 291 people who had come to his office for a medical examination in order to obtain a decision on retirement due to loss of capacity to work or to obtain an official certification of their degree of disability in order to benefit from social security benefits. As the lower court also held, the defendant has confessed to all the charges against him and he has been convicted to three years’ imprisonment. As a result of this criminal conviction, the first-instance court considered that the requirements of Article 1121 of the Criminal Code had been fulfilled and ordered the extended confiscation of money, flats and vehicles, items which had a value exceeding the income of the defendant and his family in the last five years .... As regards the income of the defendant and his family, the court observes that he submitted an accountant’s report showing the family’s income starting with January 1991, but without mentioning their expenses for the same period. In order to establish whether there was a discrepancy between the family’s income and their properties and other goods acquired, the court must compare the amounts of money spent during the period of the acquisition of the properties in question with the income. Based on the documents submitted to the file, including an evaluation report submitted by the National Integrity Agency on 10 March 2015, the court concludes that there is a significant difference between the income and the assets accumulated. The above-mentioned report evaluated especially the assets acquired by the defendant’s wife [the first applicant] mostly from her salary. Even if this salary had been higher than the defendant’s and even assuming that they also had earnings from real-estate transactions, they could not have accumulated enough money to acquire such a large number of properties and vehicles.” 32. As regards the second applicant, the court held that she was currently a student and there was no proof in the file to show that she had ever had an income. Her allegations that the property found in her name had been acquired from donations from other members of the family had not been proved. Therefore, the conclusion of the first-instance court that the property she owned had been purchased with money from her parents was considered correct. 33. As regards the appeal submitted by the third applicant, the court held that no evidence had been submitted to the file to show that EUR 40,400 belonged to her and had been given to S.T. for safekeeping. 34. The Timişoara Court of Appeal concluded with final effect that the first-instance court had correctly applied the legal provisions in the case and had even decided to lift the seizure order in respect of certain items.

6. The applicant was born in Lithuania in 1980 and lives in Ljubljana, Slovenia. 7. The applicant left Lithuania for Slovenia on 2 March 2002. 8. On 13 March 2002 at 10.43 a.m. the applicant was arrested on suspicion of being involved in a robbery at the Radovljica branch of Gorenjska Bank. 9. The robbery had taken place at 9.30 a.m. on the same day. It had involved four men, while three others had assisted in its organisation. The four robbers wore masks. One of them carried a handgun and waited at the entrance, holding three clients at gunpoint. The others jumped over the counter and overpowered two bank employees while one of the robbers emptied the tills. After taking the money, the robbers fled by car towards the railway station. Informed of the bank robbery, the police searched the area. They discovered an abandoned car in nearby woods and soon after saw four men, including the applicant, running away. One of the men, later recognised as A.V., was seen carrying a bag, which he dropped when the police officers approached. The bag was found to contain some of the money stolen from the bank, a handgun and two masks. One of the masks had biological traces belonging to the applicant and another man (E.B.). 10. All four men were arrested and were later identified as the applicant, A.V., M.K. and E.B. They were all Lithuanian nationals. 11. At 2 p.m. on the same day, 13 March 2002, the applicant was taken into police custody. It appears from the decision authorising that measure that the applicant, at the time “an unidentified person”, was immediately informed, in Russian, of the reasons for his arrest, and his right to remain silent, to request a lawyer and to have family members informed of his arrest. It can also be seen from this decision that a registered interpreter, A.G., interpreted for him from and into Russian and that the applicant did not request a lawyer. The decision was notified to the applicant at 5.20 p.m. He refused to sign a document acknowledging receipt of that decision, without providing any reasons for his refusal. 12. On the same day three other Lithuanian nationals, L.K., N.U. and G.V., were arrested on suspicion of aiding and abetting the robbery. 13. On 15 March 2002 the applicant and six other suspects were questioned by the investigating judge of Kranj District Court. The judge informed the applicant of the charges against him, his right not to incriminate himself and his right to remain silent, and also his right to be assisted by a lawyer of his own choosing. As the applicant did not appoint a lawyer, the court assigned D.V. as counsel. During the proceedings, interpreting into Russian and from Russian into Slovenian was provided by A.G. According to the record of the questioning, when asked whether he understood his rights and agreed to the appointment of counsel, the applicant started to cry. The excerpt containing the applicant’s statement reads as follows: “I say that I have a young child. This child will have nothing to eat because our situation is very difficult. I have always worked; I have never done anything like this. I came to Slovenia because I wanted a job. I want to see my child. When asked when I came to Slovenia, I say that I do not remember. When asked if he can describe the robbery, the accused is silent and does not answer. When asked whether I am ready to give my personal data, I state that I was born in Lithuania and that my name is Danas. I say that I will not provide my family name because I am ashamed. When asked, why I am ashamed, I say that I am scared. I am scared that I will never see my child again. What have I done? When asked what he has done to make him scared he will not to see his child again, the accused does not answer, instead he starts crying more. When asked by the public prosecutor whether I would answer any more questions, I say no. When asked whether I would answer questions from my counsel, I nod and say yes. When asked how old I am and whether I have children, I answer that I am 21 and have one child, who means the whole world to me. When asked what circumstances I live in, I say that it is very difficult in Lithuania. The circumstances are difficult. I have no job and no money. When asked how long I have been in Slovenia, I say that I do not know exactly. I think that it has been about a week and a half. When asked who he arrived in Slovenia with, the accused responds by crying. There are no other questions for the accused. When asked whether anyone should be informed about the detention, I say that I do not have any relatives, and I do not know where my wife and child are currently. The defence is hereby concluded.” 14. Another suspect, A.V., described the robbery and the events leading up to it when questioned by the investigating judge. He explained that he and the applicant had travelled to Slovenia together. They had met L.K., who had approached them in a fast-food restaurant when he had heard them speaking Russian. They had gone with him to Bled and met M.K., E.B., N.U. and G.V. a few days before the robbery. After running out of money, they had decided to rob the bank in question. 15. During the questioning of the applicant by the investigating judge, the applicant’s counsel set out reasons for opposing the continuation of the applicant’s detention. The applicant stated on record that he agreed with what had been said by his counsel. 16. Following the questioning, the investigating judge ordered the detention of all seven suspects. The decision was translated into Russian and notified to the applicant on 18 March 2002. His counsel appealed against that decision, and also against the subsequent prolongations of the applicant’s detention, but was unsuccessful. 17. On the day of the above-mentioned questioning, 15 March 2002, the investigating judge gave permission for the interpreter A.G. to visit the applicant and some of his co-accused in order to assist them in their consultations with their counsel. 18. A decision opening a judicial investigation against the seven suspects was issued on 26 March 2002 but was quashed on appeal by a panel of three judges. The judges found that although the details of the allegations against the suspects had been provided in the detention orders, they should also have been fully included in the decision to open an investigation. 19. The questioning of witnesses took place on 2, 3 and 4 April 2002. The applicant and the other six suspects were informed in Russian about their right to attend the questioning. The applicant did not attend those sessions, but his counsel attended them all. The transcripts of the witness statements were translated into Russian and given to the applicant on 19 April 2002. 20. On 8 April 2002 a new decision opening a judicial investigation against the seven accused was issued. It was later challenged unsuccessfully on appeal. The decision was translated into Russian and notified to the applicant on 10 April 2002. On the same day a remand hearing was held at which the applicant, with the assistance of the interpreter A.G., stated that he could not leave the country as he had no passport, that he wanted to wait until the proceedings were over and that he agreed with what had been said by his counsel at the hearing. 21. On 11 April 2002 A.G. informed the Kranj District Court that all the defendants had requested that the transcripts of the witness statements be translated into Russian. 22. On 12 April 2002 the investigating judge decided that the statements given by the suspects to the police should be excluded from the case file as the court could not rely on them. The decision was translated into Russian and notified to the applicant on 16 April 2002. 23. On 17 April 2002 an identification parade was organised and one witness identified the applicant as a person who had visited the bank two days before the robbery. 24. On 28 May 2002 the district prosecutor lodged an indictment, charging the applicant, A.V., M.K. and E.B. with robbery, one count of theft of a motor vehicle and two counts of attempted theft of a motor vehicle. L.K., N.U. and G.V. were charged with aiding and abetting the robbery. The indictment was translated into Russian and challenged unsuccessfully by the applicant’s counsel. 25. On 10 and 11 July 2002 the Kranj District Court held a hearing at which two Russian interpreters were present. The record of the hearing shows that the charges were read out to the defendants, who were also notified of their right not to incriminate themselves and their right to remain silent. The transcript reads as follows: “we, the defendants, state that we understand the content of the charges. ... we, the defendants, understand the notification of our rights.” 26. At the hearing A.V. changed his statement and claimed that a man had offered to find work for him and the applicant. Once they had given him their passports, he had demanded that they take part in the robbery. The applicant had, according to A.V.’s latest account, been too scared to participate, so they had left him in the woods to wait for them. The applicant gave a similar account of events, claiming that he had not been among those who had robbed the bank but had waited for their return in the woods. According to the record of the hearing, the applicant answered questions from the district prosecutor, the presiding judge, his own counsel and counsel for one of his co-defendants. 27. In addition to questioning the defendants, the court also examined a number of witnesses. It can be seen from the record of the hearing that the applicant had trouble with the interpreting of one of the witness statements and could only understand it when he read it. He put questions to the witnesses and commented on witness statements about the height of the robbers, and on police officers’ statements concerning mobile telephones they had seized and the number of people who had fled the scene of the robbery. He also referred to the indictment and commented on allegations about the whereabouts of the stolen money. 28. On 12 July 2002 the applicant’s partner was given permission to visit him in Ljubljana Prison. 29. On 16 July 2002 a hearing was held at which the defendants gave closing statements. The transcript includes the following record of the applicant’s statement: “I agree with what has been said by my defence counsel. There is no evidence that I robbed the bank. The only evidence against me is the hair found in the cap, but I have already explained about the hair in the cap and why that cap happened to be on my head. Two men cannot be in a bank wearing the same cap. A person cannot be forced into something like that; nobody forced me. I was not in the bank. ... I am sad that you consider me to be an offender; you can only sentence me for what I actually did and not for what I did not do. I ask that account be taken of my family situation and that I be sentenced accordingly, but not to imprisonment.” 30. On 16 July 2002 a five-member bench of the Kranj District Court convicted the applicant, A.V., M.K. and E.B. of robbery and acquisition of unlawfully gained property (a stolen car). The applicant and M.K. were sentenced to eight years and four months in prison, E.B. received a sentence of eight years and seven months, while A.V. was sentenced to five years and four months in prison. L.K., N.U. and G.V. were found guilty of aiding and abetting the robbery and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. 31. The judgment contains about twenty pages of reasoning in which the court also responded to arguments relating to the use of Slovenian or Croatian during the robbery. The court noted that not many words had been spoken during the robbery, that all four defendants charged with robbery spoke Russian and were for that reason assisted by Russian interpreters, that they also knew some words in Slovenian as demonstrated during the hearing and that they could have intentionally used words resembling Slovenian. 32. On the same day, the applicant’s detention was extended. The written decision with a Russian translation were notified to the applicant on the following day. 33. On 2 August 2002 the judgment with a translation into Russian were also notified to the applicant. 34. On 6 August 2002 the applicant’s counsel appealed against the District Court’s judgment. He complained about alleged shortcomings in the police investigation, the assessment of evidence and his client’s sentence, but did not raise any complaint regarding the applicant’s understanding of the Russian interpreting provided to him. 35. On the same day the applicant also lodged an appeal, which was composed of five pages of argument written by hand in Slovenian with the assistance of fellow inmates. The applicant complained about the first-instance court’s assessment of the evidence and about his sentence. He maintained that he had known about the robbery but had not taken part in it. 36. On 14 November 2002 the Ljubljana Higher Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It found that A.V. had given a detailed and incriminating description, while having legal assistance, that the applicant had been assisted by counsel who had been appointed for him and by an interpreter at his first appearance before the investigating judge, and that there was no indication that the applicant had not been informed when arrested of the reasons for his arrest in a language he had understood. The court was of the view that if the applicant had not understood the reasons for his arrest he would have mentioned it during his questioning by the investigating judge. The applicant was issued with a Russian translation of the judgment, by which his conviction acquired the force of res judicata. 37. On 23 February 2003 the applicant sent an application entitled “an appeal to the Supreme Court” to the Kranj District Court. The application was written in Lithuanian, with the exception of an introductory explanation in Slovenian, in which the applicant informed the court that he spoke neither Russian nor Slovenian, adding that he understood a little Russian but could not write in it. In the rest of the document the applicant complained about the assessment of the evidence by the lower courts and alleged that his right to use his own language in the criminal trial had been violated. He also alleged that during his first questioning he had not been represented by counsel or provided with an interpreter. Thus, he had not understood the reasons for his arrest. He also submitted that he had stated at the hearing that he did not understand Russian very well. Despite those issues, the Kranj District Court had not provided him with a Lithuanian interpreter. 38. On 24 March 2003 the Kranj District Court instructed the applicant to submit his appeal, which it treated as an application for the protection of legality (an extraordinary remedy by which to challenge the legality of final decisions), in Russian, finding that he had used that language throughout the criminal proceedings and in communication with his counsel. It appears from the Constitutional Court’s decision of 24 March 2005 (see paragraph 41 below) that the Kranj District Court had ordered that the appeal be drafted in Russian after ascertaining that there were no Lithuanian interpreters registered in Slovenia and that translation from that language would therefore have required the assistance of the nearest Lithuanian Embassy. The letter instructing the applicant to submit his application in Russian, and a Russian translation of that letter, were notified to the applicant on 4 April 2003. As the applicant did not reply, on 29 April 2003 the District Court rejected his application as incomprehensible. The decision and a Russian translation were notified to the applicant on 21 May 2003. 39. On 20 August 2004 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against that decision, alleging that the Kranj District Court had violated his defence rights and his right to use his own language and script. He explained that he could not speak or understand Russian very well, and in particular was not able to read decisions and other documents in Russian owing to the different characters, and that he had thus been prevented from effectively defending himself. His constitutional complaint and additional submissions were handwritten in Slovenian. In the proceedings before the Constitutional Court, the Kranj District Court replied to the applicant’s allegations, submitting that he had at no time stated that he had trouble understanding Russian. 40. On 30 November 2004 the applicant sent a letter to the Ministry of Justice, written in Slovenian, asking for an explanation as to why he had not had a Lithuanian interpreter at his trial. The letter was forwarded to the Kranj District Court. It replied on 28 December 2004, explaining that the applicant had used Russian to communicate with the court and with his counsel at all stages of the first-instance proceedings. 41. On 24 March 2005 the Constitutional Court delivered its decision. It observed that the applicant’s situation was an exceptional one, in that he was not required to properly exhaust remedies in respect of the Kranj District Court’s decision. In its view, the applicant, who was detained at the time, could not have been expected to challenge the impugned decision by means of a standard appeal as he had stated that he could not understand the language in which the decision had been written. The Constitutional Court went on to examine the complaint on the merits, finding in favour of the applicant. It noted that the law afforded special protection to a defendant’s right to use his or her own language and script after detention. The person’s own language would in principle be his or her mother tongue but, if the person had a command of another language, the use of the latter could suffice for oral communication in the proceedings. However, the Constitutional Court rejected the District Court’s view that a defendant who was in custody and who had used a certain language in oral proceedings should also submit written submissions in that language, finding that written communication required a higher level of language proficiency. The Constitutional Court noted that the applicant had been assisted by a Russian interpreter in the first-instance proceedings, which had mainly involved oral communication. After an appeal, proceedings were typically in writing and the accused no longer benefited from the assistance of court-appointed counsel. The Constitutional Court therefore found that the applicant, who had explained in his submissions to the Supreme Court that he could not write in Russian, should be allowed to submit them in his own language. It therefore concluded that the court below had violated the applicant’s right to use his own language in the proceedings, as explicitly provided for by section 8 of the Criminal Procedure Act and as guaranteed by Article 62 of the Constitution. It annulled the Kranj District Court’s decision of 29 April 2003 (see paragraph 38 above) and remitted the applicant’s application for the protection of legality for fresh consideration. 42. In the remitted proceedings, the Kranj District Court obtained a Slovenian translation of the applicant’s application for the protection of legality and referred it to the Supreme Court. 43. On 26 January 2006 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s application for the protection of legality as unfounded. The Supreme Court established on the basis of the case file that immediately after placing the applicant in police custody, the police had informed him, with the assistance of the Russian interpreter, of the reasons for his arrest and his right to a lawyer. When questioned by the investigating judge, the applicant had also been assisted by the Russian interpreter and his court-appointed counsel. The Supreme Court found that there was no indication in the file that the applicant had been informed of his right to use his own language in the proceedings, either by the investigating judge or by the Kranj District Court. It also found no indication that the applicant had given any statement concerning that right. However, the lack of such notification, did not, in the Supreme Court’s view, undermine the legality of the final judgment, because the applicant had been assisted by a Russian interpreter and by counsel. The record of the hearing had contained no indication that he did not understand Russian. Moreover, the court noted that neither the applicant nor his counsel had raised any issue of a lack of understanding of Russian. The applicant was issued with an original copy of the Supreme Court’s judgment and a Lithuanian translation. 44. On 10 June 2006 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against the Supreme Court’s judgment, complaining that, while he had a rough understanding of Russian, he could not defend himself orally in that language, let alone in writing. In particular, he alleged that he had not been afforded an opportunity to defend himself in a language that would allow him to clarify the facts of the case and to respond effectively to the charges. He alleged that he had drawn the court’s attention to that fact but that his remark had not been recorded. In addition, the applicant complained that certain documents submitted in evidence had been in Slovenian and had therefore been incomprehensible to him, thus hindering his defence. 45. On 1 September 2007 the applicant was released on parole. 46. On 3 July 2008 the Constitutional Court dismissed (zavrne) the applicant’s constitutional complaint. It observed, inter alia, as follows: “All the complaints relate to the proceedings before the first-instance court. From the questioning by the investigating judge until the end of the trial, including during the appeal proceedings, the applicant was represented by counsel with whom he succeeded in communicating in Russian (that fact was not disputed by the applicant in his constitutional complaint). In his appeal against the first-instance court’s judgment, the applicant did not mention the issues raised in the constitutional complaint but instead complained about police procedure, which is not a matter complained of in the constitutional proceedings. Only in his request for the protection of legality, lodged in his own language, and in his constitutional complaint, did the applicant complain of a breach of his right under Article 62 of the Constitution owing to the conduct of the District Court, which had ignored his remarks about his trouble understanding Russian ... Having regard to the foregoing and to the content of the constitutional complaint, the Constitutional Court examined whether the Supreme Court’s view ... violated the applicant’s right to use his own language provided for in Article 62 of the Constitution and whether there had been a breach of his defence rights under the first line of Article 29 of the Constitution. ... In accordance with section 8 of the Criminal Procedure Act, a court should inform a suspect or accused of the right to use his own language. The notification and the statement of the suspect or accused should be recorded in the hearing transcript in its entirety. The omission of such a notification or a lack of record of such a notification or statement can give rise to a material breach of the rules of criminal procedure under paragraph 2 of section 371 of the Criminal Procedure Act (that is, if such a violation affected his ability to defend himself). However, if the court acts contrary to an explicit request of a suspect or accused to use his own language and to follow the hearing in that language, the court commits a material breach of the rules of criminal procedure in an absolute sense under paragraph 1 of section 371 of the Criminal Procedure Act. In the reasoning of the judgment [the Supreme Court] noted that there was no indication in the record of the hearing that the applicant had mentioned that he had not understood Russian or that he or his counsel had requested the use of the applicant’s native language at the hearing. Nor had the latter issue been raised in the application for the protection of legality. ... The allegation that the court had failed to include the applicant’s statement in the record of the hearing was made for the first time in the constitutional complaint. The Supreme Court convincingly established circumstances that show that the applicant understood Russian well enough to receive a fair hearing using that language ... When considering the right to a fair trial it is important to note (and this also the Constitutional Court’s view) that in his application for the protection of legality the applicant did not raise a complaint that he had not been informed of his right to use his native language. Nor did he complain of that in his constitutional complaint. ... The impugned judgments therefore do not violate the right of the applicant guaranteed in Article 62 of the Constitution ... Having regard to the above findings and the fact that throughout the proceedings the applicant was assisted by counsel with whom he succeeded in communicating, his complaint that his defence rights guaranteed by Article 29 [of the Constitution] had been violated must likewise be dismissed. The complaint that some of the evidence in the proceedings was in Slovenian, thus preventing him from familiarising himself with it and defending himself, was not pursued in the proceedings before the lower courts. He has therefore failed to exhaust remedies in that regard ...” 47. The fees declared at the end of the trial by the interpreter and the applicant’s counsel, and paid for by the State, show that various services were provided to the applicant. Apart from interpreting during the investigation and court hearings, and the written translation of documents, A.G. took part in certain meetings between the applicant and his counsel. The lawyer visited the applicant in the remand prison for consultation purposes on 8 April (forty-five minutes), 2 August (thirty minutes) and 13 September 2002 (twenty minutes), assisted by A.G., as well as on 9 July 2002 (twenty-five minutes), though it is not clear whether on the latter occasion A.G. was present. The lawyer also assisted the applicant during his court appearances. He also lodged applications for remedies on his client’s behalf in the proceedings at first and second instance. 48. The relevant provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia read as follows: Article 29 (Legal Safeguards in Criminal Proceedings) “Anyone charged with a criminal offence must, in addition to absolute equality, be guaranteed the following rights: the right to have adequate time and facilities to prepare his defence; the right to be present at his trial and to conduct his own defence or to be defended by a legal representative; the right to present all the evidence that is to his benefit; the right not to incriminate himself or his relatives or those close to him, or to admit his guilt.” Article 62 (Right to Use One’s Own Language and Script) “Everyone has the right to use his own language and script as provided by law in the exercise of his rights and duties and in procedures before State and other authorities performing a public function.” 49. The relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act (Official Gazette no. 63/94 with the relevant amendments) governing the use of languages in criminal proceedings read as follows: Section 4 “(1) Any arrested person shall be advised immediately, in his native language or in a language he understands, of the reasons for his arrest. An arrested person shall immediately be instructed that he is not bound to make any statements, that he is entitled to the legal assistance of counsel of his own choosing and that the competent body is bound to inform his immediate family of his arrest at his request. ... Section 7 (1) Charges, appeals and other submissions shall be filed with the court in the Slovenian language. ... (3) A foreigner who has been deprived of his freedom shall have the right to file submissions with the court in his own language; in other cases foreign subjects shall be allowed to file submissions in their own language solely on the condition of reciprocity.” Section 8 “(1) Parties, witnesses and other participants in the proceedings shall have the right to use their own languages in investigative and other judicial actions and at the main hearing. If a judicial action or the main hearing is not conducted in the language of those persons, an oral translation of their statements and of the statements of others, and a translation of documents and other written evidence, must be provided. (2) Persons referred to in the preceding paragraph shall be informed of their right to have oral statements and written documents and evidence translated for them; they may waive their rights to translation if they know the language in which the proceedings are being conducted. The fact that they have been informed of their right, as well as their statements in that regard, should be placed on record. (3) Translations shall be done by a court interpreter.” (b) Grounds of appeal 50. The relevant provision of the Criminal Procedure Act concerning grounds of appeal reads as follows: Section 371 “(1) A material breach of the provisions of criminal procedure shall be deemed to exist: ... 3) ... where the defendant, counsel, the injured party acting as prosecutor or the private prosecutor was, notwithstanding his request, deprived of his right to use his own language during investigative or other court actions or at the main hearing and his right to follow the proceedings in that language (section 8) ...; ... (2) A material breach of the provisions of criminal procedure shall also be deemed to exist if in preparation for a hearing or in the course of a hearing or in giving judgment the court omitted to apply a provision of this Act or applied it incorrectly, or if in the course of the hearing the court violated the rights of the defence, such that the act or omission influenced or might have influenced the legality and regularity of the judgment.” 51. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (“the Charter”) enshrines the right to a fair trial (Article 47) and respect for the rights of the defence (Article 48(2)). 52. On 30 November 2009 the Council of the European Union adopted a Roadmap for strengthening the procedural rights of suspected or accused persons in criminal proceedings (“the Roadmap”). The Roadmap gave rise to Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings (“Directive 2010/64/EU”). Directive 2010/64/EU lays down common minimum rules to be applied within the European Union for the purposes of interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings and in proceedings for the execution of the European arrest warrant. It came into force on 15 November 2010. 53. The following recitals of Directive 2010/64/EU are relevant: “... (7) Strengthening mutual trust requires a more consistent implementation of the rights and guarantees set out in Article 6 of the ECHR. It also requires, by means of this Directive and other measures, further development within the Union of the minimum standards set out in the ECHR and the Charter. ... (9) Common minimum rules should lead to increased confidence in the criminal justice systems of all Member States, which, in turn, should lead to more efficient judicial cooperation in a climate of mutual trust. Such common minimum rules should be established in the fields of interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings. ... (14) The right to interpretation and translation for those who do not speak or understand the language of the proceedings is enshrined in Article 6 of the ECHR, as interpreted in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. This Directive facilitates the application of that right in practice. To that end, the aim of this Directive is to ensure the right of suspected or accused persons to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings with a view to ensuring their right to a fair trial. ... (17) This Directive should ensure that there is free and adequate linguistic assistance, allowing suspected or accused persons who do not speak or understand the language of the criminal proceedings fully to exercise their right of defence and safeguarding the fairness of the proceedings. ... (19) Communication between suspected or accused persons and their legal counsel should be interpreted in accordance with this Directive. Suspected or accused persons should be able, inter alia, to explain their version of the events to their legal counsel, point out any statements with which they disagree and make their legal counsel aware of any facts that should be put forward in their defence. ... (21) Member States should ensure that there is a procedure or mechanism in place to ascertain whether suspected or accused persons speak and understand the language of the criminal proceedings and whether they need the assistance of an interpreter. Such procedure or mechanism implies that competent authorities verify in any appropriate manner, including by consulting the suspected or accused persons concerned, whether they speak and understand the language of the criminal proceedings and whether they need the assistance of an interpreter. (22) Interpretation and translation under this Directive should be provided in the native language of the suspected or accused persons or in any other language that they speak or understand in order to allow them fully to exercise their right of defence, and in order to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings. ... (24) Member States should ensure that control can be exercised over the adequacy of the interpretation and translation provided when the competent authorities have been put on notice in a given case. ... (30) Safeguarding the fairness of the proceedings requires that essential documents, or at least the relevant passages of such documents, be translated for the benefit of suspected or accused persons in accordance with this Directive. Certain documents should always be considered essential for that purpose and should therefore be translated, such as any decision depriving a person of his liberty, any charge or indictment, and any judgment. It is for the competent authorities of the Member States to decide, on their own motion or upon a request of suspected or accused persons or of their legal counsel, which other documents are essential to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings and should therefore be translated as well. ... (32) This Directive should set minimum rules. Member States should be able to extend the rights set out in this Directive in order to provide a higher level of protection also in situations not explicitly dealt with in this Directive. The level of protection should never fall below the standards provided by the ECHR or the Charter as interpreted in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights or the Court of Justice of the European Union. (33) The provisions of this Directive that correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR or the Charter should be interpreted and implemented consistently with those rights, as interpreted in the relevant case-law of the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union.” 54. Article 2 of Directive 2010/64/EU reads, in its relevant part, as follows: Right to interpretation “1. Member States shall ensure that suspected or accused persons who do not speak or understand the language of the criminal proceedings concerned are provided, without delay, with interpretation during criminal proceedings before investigative and judicial authorities, including during police questioning, all court hearings and any necessary interim hearings. 2. Member States shall ensure that, where necessary for the purpose of safeguarding the fairness of the proceedings, interpretation is available for communication between suspected or accused persons and their legal counsel in direct connection with any questioning or hearing during the proceedings or with the lodging of an appeal or other procedural applications. ... 4. Member States shall ensure that a procedure or mechanism is in place to ascertain whether suspected or accused persons speak and understand the language of the criminal proceedings and whether they need the assistance of an interpreter. 5. Member States shall ensure that, in accordance with procedures in national law, suspected or accused persons have the right to challenge a decision finding that there is no need for interpretation and, when interpretation has been provided, the possibility to complain that the quality of the interpretation is not sufficient to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings. ... 8. Interpretation provided under this Article shall be of a quality sufficient to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings, in particular by ensuring that suspected or accused persons have knowledge of the case against them and are able to exercise their right of defence.” 55. Article 3 of Directive 2010/64/EU reads, in its relevant part, as follows: Right to translation of essential documents “1. Member States shall ensure that suspected or accused persons who do not understand the language of the criminal proceedings concerned are, within a reasonable period of time, provided with a written translation of all documents which are essential to ensure that they are able to exercise their right of defence and to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings. 2. Essential documents shall include any decision depriving a person of his liberty, any charge or indictment, and any judgment. ... 5. Member States shall ensure that, in accordance with procedures in national law, suspected or accused persons have the right to challenge a decision finding that there is no need for the translation of documents or passages thereof and, when a translation has been provided, the possibility to complain that the quality of the translation is not sufficient to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings. ... 7. As an exception to the general rules established in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 6, an oral translation or oral summary of essential documents may be provided instead of a written translation on condition that such oral translation or oral summary does not prejudice the fairness of the proceedings. 9. Translation provided under this Article shall be of a quality sufficient to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings, in particular by ensuring that suspected or accused persons have knowledge of the case against them and are able to exercise their right of defence.” 56. Article 5 § 1 of Directive 2010/64/EU deals with the quality of interpretation and translation, providing as follows: “1. Member States shall take concrete measures to ensure that the interpretation and translation provided meets the quality required under Article 2(8) and Article 3(9).” 57. Furthermore, Article 7 of Directive 2010/64/EU reads: Record-keeping “Member States shall ensure that when a suspected or accused person has been subject to questioning or hearings by an investigative or judicial authority with the assistance of an interpreter pursuant to Article 2, when an oral translation or oral summary of essential documents has been provided in the presence of such an authority pursuant to Article 3(7), or when a person has waived the right to translation pursuant to Article 3(8), it will be noted that these events have occurred, using the recording procedure in accordance with the law of the Member State concerned.” 58. On 22 May 2012 the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union adopted another directive relating to the measures set out in the Roadmap, namely Directive 2012/13/EU on the right to information in criminal proceedings (“Directive 2012/13/EU”). It entered into force on 21 June 2012. 59. The following recitals of Directive 2012/13/EU are relevant: “(25) Member States should ensure that, when providing information in accordance with this Directive, suspects or accused persons are provided, where necessary, with translations or interpretation into a language that they understand, in accordance with the standards set out in Directive 2010/64/EU. ... (35) Where information is provided in accordance with this Directive, the competent authorities should take note of this in accordance with existing recording procedures under national law and should not be subject to any additional obligation to introduce new mechanisms or to any additional administrative burden. (36) Suspects or accused persons or their lawyers should have the right to challenge, in accordance with national law, the possible failure or refusal of the competent authorities to provide information or to disclose certain materials of the case in accordance with this Directive. That right does not entail the obligation for Member States to provide for a specific appeal procedure, a separate mechanism, or a complaint procedure in which such failure or refusal may be challenged. ... (38) Member States should undertake all the necessary action to comply with this Directive. A practical and effective implementation of some of the provisions such as the obligation to provide suspects or accused persons with information about their rights in simple and accessible language could be achieved by different means including non-legislative measures such as appropriate training for the competent authorities or by a Letter of Rights drafted in simple and non-technical language so as to be easily understood by a lay person without any knowledge of criminal procedural law.” 60. The relevant parts of Articles 3, 4 and 8 of Directive 2012/13/EU provide as follows: Article 3 Right to information about rights “1. Member States shall ensure that suspects or accused persons are provided promptly with information concerning at least the following procedural rights, as they apply under national law, in order to allow for those rights to be exercised effectively: (a) the right of access to a lawyer; (b) any entitlement to free legal advice and the conditions for obtaining such advice; (c) the right to be informed of the accusation, in accordance with Article 6; (d) the right to interpretation and translation; (e) the right to remain silent. 2. Member States shall ensure that the information provided for under paragraph 1 shall be given orally or in writing, in simple and accessible language, taking into account any particular needs of vulnerable suspects or vulnerable accused persons.” Article 4 Letter of Rights on arrest “1. Member States shall ensure that suspects or accused persons who are arrested or detained are provided promptly with a written Letter of Rights. They shall be given an opportunity to read the Letter of Rights and shall be allowed to keep it in their possession throughout the time that they are deprived of liberty. ... 5. Member States shall ensure that suspects or accused persons receive the Letter of Rights written in a language that they understand. Where a Letter of Rights is not available in the appropriate language, suspects or accused persons shall be informed of their rights orally in a language that they understand. A Letter of Rights in a language that they understand shall then be given to them without undue delay.” Article 8 Verification and remedies “1. Member States shall ensure that when information is provided to suspects or accused persons in accordance with Articles 3 to 6 this is noted using the recording procedure specified in the law of the Member State concerned. 2. Member States shall ensure that suspects or accused persons or their lawyers have the right to challenge, in accordance with procedures in national law, the possible failure or refusal of the competent authorities to provide information in accordance with this Directive.” 61. Both of the aforementioned directives were incorporated into the Slovenian legal system by means of an amendment to the Criminal Procedure Act (Official Gazette, no. 87/2014), which was passed on 21 November 2014 and became applicable as of 20 March 2015.

4. The applicants are Russian nationals. They were owners of flats in Moscow. The municipal authorities reclaimed the flats, and the applicants’ title to the real property in question was annulled. 5. In 1977 a number of flats in a residential building located at 15-3 Ulitsa Tsyurupy, Moscow, were assigned by the City of Moscow to the Ministry of Communications. The flats were used as temporary housing for foreign specialists seconded to the Ministry. In 1991 the flats were transferred to the Rostelekom Open Joint Stock Company, the Ministry’s successor. On 18 February 2009 the flats were transferred from Rostelekom to the City of Moscow. It appears that the flats remained vacant. 6. In 2008-2009 a group of people, including a police officer, a lawyer, a notary and several Rostelekom employees, forged documents pertaining to three flats located at 15-3 Ulitsa Tsyurupy, Moscow, showing that the flats were owned by private individuals and, following their deaths, were inherited by their “heirs”. The relevant property deeds were forged by notary K. and then registered by the City Registration Department. Then the “heirs” sold the flats to private parties. Subsequently the flats were bought by the applicants. Each transaction with the flats was reviewed and approved by the City Registration Department. 7. On 8 August 2012 a criminal investigation was opened into the City’s loss of title to the flats. 8. On 7 December 2012 the Housing Department of the City of Moscow (the “Housing Department”) was recognised as a victim of the crime. 9. On 9 December 2013 the Perovskiy District Court of Moscow found nine defendants, including several Rostelekom employees, guilty of fraud. The court established, inter alia, that the defendants had forged the documents and had had unlawfully registered the flats as private property to the detriment of the City of Moscow. Notary K. was questioned as a witness. 10. On 11 March 2014 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 9 December 2013 on appeal. 11. According to the Government, notary K. was also found guilty of fraud and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. 12. In 2014 the Housing Department brought civil actions seeking restitution of the flats. 13. The Cheremushkinskiy District Court of Moscow granted the Housing Department’s claims. The court invalidated the transactions in respect of the flats and the applicants’ title to the flats and ordered their eviction. The court applied the domestic law provisions which allowed the owner to recover its property from a bona fide purchaser if the said property left the owner’s possession against its will. The court considered that the City of Moscow had not had intent to divest itself of the flats and had a right to recover the stolen flats from the applicants. 14. The Moscow City Court upheld the judgments of the District Court on appeal. As regards Ms Titova (application nos. 4919/16), the City Court discerned no evidence in the material of the case file that would substantiate her claim that she had bought the flat in good faith. The City Court took into account that she had bought the flat a month and a half after the previous transaction and that the purchase price of the flat had been obviously lower than its market value. In the City Court’s view, Ms Titova, if having acted with due care and diligence, should have had doubts as to the legitimacy of seller’s title and sale of the flat. 15. Subsequently, the City Court refused to grant the applicants leave to bring a cassation appeal against the judgments in their respective cases. 16. According to the Government, the applicants were not evicted and continue to reside in the flats. 17. The details pertaining to each case are summed up in Appendix II below.

5. The applicant was born in 1985 and lives in Nicoreni. 6. In January 2012 the applicant had an agreement with a person (“X”) according to which he promised to help him apply for a Spanish visa at the Spanish consulate in Moscow. They were to travel to Moscow by train, however, X did not show up at the train station at the time of leaving and the applicant left for Moscow alone with the money he had previously obtained from X in the amount of 520 euros. He did not return to Moldova until October 2015. 7. In the meantime X lodged a criminal complaint against the applicant accusing him of fraud. Criminal proceedings were initiated against the applicant in March 2012 on the basis of that complaint. 8. Since the prosecutor in charge of the case could not locate the applicant, he applied to an investigating judge for a detention warrant in respect of the applicant for a period of thirty days. The prosecutor argued in support of the remand that the applicant had been hiding from the investigating authorities. 9. On 8 February 2013 the Râșcani District Court ordered the applicant’s remand in custody for a period of thirty days. In support of its decision, the court argued that the applicant had been absconding from the investigating authorities and that he could hinder the investigation and influence witnesses. 10. On 9 October 2015 the applicant returned to Moldova from the Russian Federation. At the border he was informed that he was being wanted by the police and that he had to present himself at the Râșcani Police Station. The applicant telephoned the police station and agreed to come on 13 October 2015. 11. On 13 October 2015 the applicant went to the Râșcani Police Station where he was immediately arrested and placed in detention. 12. On 15 October 2015 the applicant appealed against the order of 8 February 2013. He argued, inter alia, that he had not been aware of the criminal investigation against himself and that he had learned about it upon his return to Moldova. Moreover, after learning about the investigation he had immediately contacted the Police Station and presented himself there. He also submitted that there were no reasons to believe that he would abscond or interfere with the investigation. 13. On 2 November 2015 the Chișinău Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It did not give an answer to the applicant’s argument that he had not been aware of the criminal investigation against him. 14. The applicant’s detention was prolonged on several other occasions until 16 March 2016 on identical grounds and all his appeals were dismissed. 15. In the meantime the applicant was detained in Prison no. 13. According to him, he was detained in an overcrowded cell; the cell was equipped with a squat toilet which was not properly separated; the food was insufficient and of poor quality; he could have only one hour of outside exercise per day and only one shower per week. 16. By a final judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice of 12 July 2017 the applicant was convicted of fraud and given a suspended sentence of four years imprisonment.

5. The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Budapest. 6. On 20 July 2015 a quarrel broke out between the applicant and his common-law wife, H.M. The latter called an ambulance because the applicant was under the influence of alcohol and was behaving oddly, and had a violent outburst. 7. At about 4.40 p.m., instead of an ambulance, police officers E.Sz. and T.Z. appeared at the applicant’s flat, handcuffed the applicant and took him to the Orosháza police department, arriving there at about 5.10 p.m. 8. According to the applicant he had no injuries when he was put into the police car. He was allegedly assaulted at the police station. While he was handcuffed and in the room for short-term arrestees, one of the three police officers present either kicked or pushed him from behind onto the floor. He hit his face and nose, which started to bleed. He also suffered injuries to his teeth. He fainted and when he regained consciousness, about fifteen minutes later, he found himself handcuffed to a bench, his knees hurting. His request for help was allegedly disregarded by the police officers at first, but when it became apparent that he could not walk, he was taken to hospital. 9. At 7.45 p.m. the applicant was examined by Dr CS.H. at Orosháza Hospital. He had bruises on the bridge of his nose and around his two wrists, abrasions on his right thigh, scratches below his left knee, and his left tibia was broken. He was hospitalised following the examination. 10. On 22 July 2015 the applicant was examined by Dr CS.H. of the Department of Traumatology, and further injuries were noted on his body: bruises on his upper left arm, an abrasion around the right side of his collar‑bone, scratches around the left side of his collar-bone, bruises on both sides of his hips, two loose teeth, one broken and one missing tooth in the upper jaw. 11. The head of Orosháza police station of his own motion filed a criminal complaint against unknown perpetrators alleging “ill-treatment committed in the course of official proceedings”. The Central Investigation Office opened an investigation into ill-treatment committed in the course of official proceedings, assault causing actual bodily harm, and grievous bodily harm. 12. In his testimony the applicant stated that he had been kicked from behind when taken into custody. At that time he had been handcuffed and had fallen onto his face on the floor, as a consequence of which his nose had started to bleed. He explained that he had remained unconscious for 15‑20 minutes and when he had regained consciousness, his nose had been bleeding and he had felt pain in his knee. He had asked for help, but only when the police officers realised that he was unable to stand unaided had he been taken to hospital. 13. H.M. was questioned as a witness. Describing the circumstances of the incident before the police arrived she stated that the applicant had not mentioned to her before the incident that he had hurt his leg. She also stated that on the day of the incident the applicant had been found by her daughter lying on the kitchen floor. She confirmed the applicant’s version of events in so far as she maintained that she had seen no injuries on the applicant when he was put into the police car. 14. K.B., the daughter of H.M., also questioned as a witness, stated that on 20 July 2015 at around 12.30 p.m. she had found the applicant lying on the kitchen floor and not breathing. She proceeded to wake him up and could tell that he had been drinking alcohol. She had also seen the applicant earlier that day falling over in the yard, but he had sustained only minor injuries to his arm and leg. 15. According to the police report, when the police officers arrived at the applicant’s flat, the applicant was sitting on the floor and was unable to communicate. He did not identify himself, despite the officers’ order. When the police officers tried to handcuff him, he resisted, swinging his head from side to side. He fell to the ground and his nose started bleeding. He could only be put in the police car with the use of force, and when inside it he kept insulting the police officers. At the police station he continued to behave aggressively and tried to hit his head against the floor. He therefore had to be handcuffed and laid on the floor. He was not injured during these measures and his handcuffs were removed when he calmed down at around 7 p.m. He refused to be examined by a doctor. 16. The Central Investigation Office also questioned E.Sz. and T.Z. and two other police officers who had been on duty at the police station at the time of the applicant’s placement in the room for short-term arrestees, and a third officer who had come on duty at around 6 p.m. the same day. E.Sz. and T.Z. confirmed what was in the police report and the other three witnesses denied any knowledge of ill-treatment having been inflicted on the applicant. They all stated that the applicant had been drunk and had been handcuffed to prevent him causing harm to himself. 17. The two members of the medical staff of Orosháza Hospital who had been present during the applicant’s treatment could not recall the event in detail but remembered that the applicant had not complained about ill‑treatment by the police officers and, although limping, was able to walk unaided to the x-ray examination room. 18. On 1 November 2015 the medical expert appointed by the Central Investigation Office expressed the opinion that the applicant’s leg had been broken one or two weeks prior to the incident and that it could not be determined whether the injuries to his teeth had been caused before or during his detention for questioning at the police station. According to the expert opinion, it was implausible that the applicant would have been capable of reconstructing the events of the day, owing to his drunkenness. 19. On 17 December 2015 the Central Investigation Office discontinued the criminal proceedings for lack of any conclusive evidence (as regards ill‑treatment committed in the course of official proceedings and assault causing actual bodily harm) and for the absence of a crime (as regards causing grievous bodily harm). According to the Investigation Office, it could not be established which injuries occurred during the police measures and whether they were caused by ill-treatment or the applicant’s own behaviour. The decision also stated that the applicant’s tibia could not have been broken during the incident and that the applicant’s credibility was questionable due to his drunkenness. 20. The applicant filed a complaint against the discontinuation order. He maintained that his colleagues and supervisors, as well as the members of his household could have confirmed that he had no leg injury before the incident if they were heard as witnesses or if specific questions were put to them in this regard. He also submitted that Dr CS.H. (see paragraph 9 above) had been biased and questioned the credibility of the statement in the expert opinion of 1 November 2015 concerning his drunkenness (see paragraph 18 in fine above). 21. On 18 February 2016 the chief prosecutor’s office dismissed the complaint. It endorsed the first-instance decision concerning the assessment of evidence and the legal classification thereof, informing the applicant of the possibility of pursuing substitute private prosecution proceedings.

6. The applicant was born in 1975 and is detained in Tekirdağ. 7. On 9 September 1995 the applicant was arrested and taken into police custody on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation. 8. On the same day the public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court prolonged the applicant’s detention in police custody for a period of up to 15 days. 9. On 13 September 1995 the applicant’s statements were taken by the police in the absence of a lawyer. The applicant confessed to being a member of an illegal organisation and having been involved in a murder. 10. On 14 September 1995 the applicant participated in a reconstruction of the events (yer gösterme) with another suspect K.A., organised by the police in the absence of a lawyer. According to a report, drafted by police officers and signed by the applicant and K.A., both of the accused gave the details of the murder which they had committed. 11. On 22 September 1995 the applicant was examined by a doctor from the Istanbul Forensic Institute. A collective medical report was drawn up in respect of the applicant and five other suspects. According to the report, there were no traces of ill-treatment on the applicant’s body. 12. On 22 September 1995 the applicant was heard by a public prosecutor and an investigating judge respectively. In his statements to the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, the applicant denied his police statements alleging that they had been taken under duress. Following his questioning, the investigating judge ordered the applicant’s detention on remand. 13. On 9 October 1995 a public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court filed an indictment with that court, charging the applicant with attempting to undermine the constitutional order, an offence prescribed by Article 146 § 1 of the former Criminal Code. 14. On 7 December 1995 the applicant was heard by the trial court during the first hearing in the presence of his lawyer. The applicant denied all the charges against him and stated that his statements at the police had been taken under duress. 15. In the meantime, State Security Courts were abolished by Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004. Accordingly, the case was transferred to Istanbul Assize Court. 16. On 13 September 2007, relying on, inter alia, the applicant’s and his co-accused K. A.’s statements to the police, the Istanbul Assize Court held that the applicant had committed the offence under Article 146 § 1 of the Criminal Code and sentenced him to life-imprisonment. 17. On an unknown date the applicant’s lawyer appealed against the judgment of 13 September 2007. 18. On 1 December 2008 the Court of Cassation upheld the above judgment.

4. The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Yerevan. 5. On 30 December 2004 an investigator decided to institute criminal proceedings in connection with alleged usury by the applicant, proscribed by Article 213 § 1 of the Criminal Code (“the CC”). 6. On 10 January 2005 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan ordered a search of the applicant’s apartment. 7. On 20 June 2005 the applicant was formally charged under Article 213 § 2 (1) and (2) of the CC with performing usury as a profession which resulted in dire financial consequences for the injured parties. On the same day the investigator decided, as a preventive measure, to have the applicant give a written undertaking not to leave his place of residence. 8. On 23 June 2005 the investigator decided to confiscate for security the applicant’s property. 9. On 10 August 2005 the investigator sent the bill of indictment to the Kentron and Nork-Marash district prosecutor (“the prosecutor”) for approval but on 15 August 2005 the prosecutor refused to approve it and returned the case to the investigator for further investigation. 10. On 15 October 2005 the investigator initiated another set of criminal proceedings, under Article 178 § 2 (2) of the CC, concerning the acquisition of property rights through fraud by the applicant. On the same day this case was merged with the case on usury. 11. On 8 and 29 December 2005 respectively the investigator ordered forensic handwriting examinations to be conducted. The results of these examinations were received on 13 and 20 January 2006 respectively. 12. On 7 March 2006 the investigator decided to amend the applicant’s charges and to bring new charges against him under Article 178 §§ 2 (2) and 3 (1), Article 182 § 3 (2), Article 213 § 2 (1) and (2), and Article 349 § 1 of the CC on account of fraud in large and particularly large amounts, extortion in particularly large amounts, usury performed as a profession which resulted in dire financial consequences for the injured parties, and forgery of evidence. 13. On the same date the investigator lodged an application with the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan, seeking to have the applicant detained for a period of two months, which was rejected by the District Court. However, upon an appeal by the prosecutor, on 28 March 2006 the Court of Appeal overturned the District Court’s decision and ordered the applicant’s detention for a period of two months. 14. On 29 and 30 March and 13 April 2006 the investigator lodged applications with the District Court for a search warrant and to confiscate information covered by bank secrecy. These applications were granted on 29 and 31 March and 13 April 2006. 15. On 14 July 2006 the supervising prosecutor approved the bill of indictment and the case was sent to the District Court, which took it over on 24 July 2006. 16. By the District Court’s decision of 18 August 2006 the case was set for trial. Between 25 August 2006 and 11 October 2007, the court held twelve hearings which were adjourned because of the absence of victims and/or witnesses. In addition, on ten occasions the hearings were adjourned because of applications by the prosecutor or on the court’s own motion, and on nine occasions because the applicant’s applications were granted. On three occasions the court decided to have the absent witnesses and/or victims brought by force to the hearing. 17. On 9 July 2007 the District Court granted an application by the applicant’s counsel to have him released on bail. 18. On 15 October 2007 the powers of the judge in charge of the applicant’s case were suspended. On 1 November 2007 another judge took over the case and the examination of the case started anew. 19. Between 21 November 2007 and 23 December 2010, the court held forty hearings which were adjourned because of the absence of the applicant or his lawyer or because of applications lodged by them. In addition, on thirty-five occasions the hearings were adjourned because of the absence of the victims or witnesses or because of applications lodged by them, and on thirty-two occasions because the prosecutor’s applications had been granted or because the court had decided to adjourn the case of its own motion. On five occasions the court decided to have the absent witnesses and victims brought by force to the hearing. 20. On 28 August 2009 and 12 October 2010 respectively the prosecutor decided to amend the charges and/or to bring new charges against the applicant. 21. In March and June 2010 the District Court partially granted or refused applications, introduced by the applicant and one of the victims, requesting that it order a forensic examination. 22. On 31 January 2011 the District Court gave judgement, finding the applicant guilty of five counts of the offences set out in Article 178 § 3 (1) (fraud), Article 182 § 3 (2) (extortion), Article 213 § 2 (1) and (2) (usury), and Article 349 § 1 (forgery of evidence) of the CC and sentenced him to nine years’ imprisonment, confiscated half of his property and imposed a fine of 400,000 Armenian drams (AMD). It appears that during the proceedings the District Court examined forty-seven witnesses, about thirty pieces of documentary evidence and five expert opinions, one of which was ordered by the District Court. 23. The applicant and the prosecutor appealed against this judgment. 24. On 3 October 2011 the Criminal Court of Appeal rejected the appeals and upheld the District Court’s judgment. 25. The applicant’s counsel lodged an appeal on points of law. 26. On 21 November 2011 the Court of Cassation declared the appeal inadmissible for lack of merit.

4. The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Čurug. 5. On 2 August 2002 the applicant and one of his colleagues (hereinafter “the plaintiffs”) instituted civil proceedings against their employer seeking payment of salary arrears and other employment-related benefits. 6. On 8 February 2013, after two remittals the First Instance Court in Novi Sad, specifically its Detached Section in Bečej, ruled partly in favour of the plaintiffs, ordering their employer to pay each of them specified sums in respect of salary arrears. The remainder of their claims was rejected. 7. On 15 April 2013 the Court of Appeal in Novi Sad reversed a part of the above judgment, while upholding the remainder. This judgment was served on the plaintiffs on 6 June 2013. 8. On 29 January 2014 the Supreme Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ appeal on points of law as the value of their respective claims was below the statutory threshold allowing for this remedy. 9. On 9 April 2013 the plaintiffs lodged the constitutional appeal, complaining of a violation of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time in the impugned proceedings. By its decision of 9 December 2015, the Constitutional Court found a violation of their right to a hearing within a reasonable time and awarded each of them EUR 800 in respect of the non‑pecuniary damage suffered.

5. The applicant was born in 1934 and lives in Bogdany. 6. On 26 January 2004 the applicant obtained from the State a deed of title to an agricultural plot of land (an official Land Registry title) based on a decree issued by the Varvynska local administration on 22 December 2003. This amounted to the official registration of her title to the land in accordance with the domestic procedures. At that point the applicant had not filed a request for the boundaries of the plot to be marked out and was not farming the land. 7. On 26 July 2004 the local administration concluded a lease agreement with the private company B., according to which the company would rent the applicant’s land and pay the rent to the local administration. The applicant was not informed about this agreement. She learnt of the lease agreement only in September 2004, after the private company B. had planted seeds on the land. 8. On 4 October 2004 the applicant requested the local administration to allow her to establish the boundaries of her land. In this connection, on 19 October 2004, the local administration ordered the termination of the lease agreement with company B. and authorised the applicant to carry out work to mark out of the boundaries of her land. 9. In July 2005 the company removed its crop from the applicant’s land. On 25 July 2005 amendments were introduced to the lease agreement of 26 July 2004, excluding the applicant’s plot of land from the list of leased lands. From then on the applicant’s land ceased to be a leased property, and company B. has not used it since. In the same month the boundaries of the applicant’s land were established. 10. On 20 January 2006 the applicant lodged a civil claim with the domestic courts against the local administration and company B. Claiming that the lease agreement of 26 July 2004 infringed her property rights and should have been declared invalid, she sought compensation for the use of the land by company B. She argued that the amount of compensation to be paid to her should correspond to the value of the crop that had been harvested from her land. 11. On 2 June 2006 the Varva Local Court of Chernigiv Region allowed the applicant’s claim. In particular, the court found that once the applicant had received a title to the plot of land in question, the local administration should not have concluded any agreement concerning the land with other parties. As to the boundaries, the court found that the local administration had unlawfully linked their establishment with the existence of the applicant’s ownership rights. It also noted that despite the fact that the boundaries had not been marked out, the local administration should have learned about the applicant’s title to the land in question from the land registry and local land plans. The court added that after lodging her request on 4 October 2004 for the boundaries of the plot to be marked out, the applicant had tried to accelerate the process by applying to the local administration and other authorities, to no avail. The court concluded that the lease agreement of 26 July 2004 had violated the applicant’s property rights and was to be declared invalid. The court also held that under domestic law the applicant was entitled to compensation for the use of her property equal to the value of the crops taken from her land (29,210 Ukrainian hryvnas (UAH); 4,493 euros (EUR) at the material time). The compensation, in the court’s view, should have been paid to the applicant both by the local administration and by company B., as they were jointly and severally liable for the unauthorised use of the applicant’s land. 12. The local administration appealed. On 12 September 2006 the Chernigiv Regional Court of Appeal quashed the above-mentioned judgment. The court noted that the use of the applicant’s land by company B. had been lawful since it had been based on the lease agreement. The court further stressed that under Article 125 of the Land Code of Ukraine, the right of the owner of a plot of land to use it arose only once its boundaries had been marked out and after receipt by the owner of the document certifying that right. The appellate court concluded that the applicant was not entitled to compensation as the boundaries of her land had been marked out only in July 2005; as she could not have used the land before that date, she could not claim an interest in the harvested crop. 13. The applicant appealed on points of law. On 4 January 2007 the Supreme Court of Ukraine refused to examine the merits of the applicant’s appeal on points of law, finding that it was frivolous. 14. On an unspecified date the applicant lodged another civil claim against company B., claiming the value of the land that had been used by B., as well as rental charges for the use of her land. On 7 June 2006 the Varva Local Court of Chernigiv Region left this claim unexamined because of the applicant’s attitude, citing the fact that she had been absent from the court hearings in her case on numerous occasions without good reason.

5. The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in the village of Akhaldaba. 6. On 16 August 2004 the applicant and two other men (“the brothers”) were arrested on identical charges of aggravated murder and illegal manufacturing, possession, and carrying of firearms. 7. The charges against the applicant and the brothers were based on a statement given by the victim’s father, Mr V.N., who claimed to have witnessed the crime, and on other evidence, namely a hand grenade seized from the brothers’ home, as well as several forensic reports. 8. According to Mr V.N., there was a long-running dispute between his family and the respective families of the applicant and the brothers. On two occasions, one two years earlier and the second earlier that year, the three accused attempted to rob and threaten his family, but he chose not to notify the police. Early in the morning on 14 August 2004, Mr V.N. went to work on a farm near the village and was later joined by his son. At the time of the murder, at about 10 a.m., he was working in the farmhouse while his son was outside. As he heard a gunshot, he rushed to the window and saw his son lying on the ground, about forty to forty-five metres from the building. One of the accused was holding a gun, while his brother and the applicant were shouting at him to fire another shot, which he did. The three men then ran off. Mr V.N. first ran up to his son, whose body was shaking, and then ran home to bring his car back to help him. Once he got home, he took out a gun. At that moment he was visited by his neighbours, who told him the news about his son’s death. Mr V.N. did not tell the visitors that he had been at the crime scene and witnessed his son’s murder, or that he knew anything about the shooting. He drove them to the farmhouse to see his son’s body and once there started claiming that the brothers and the applicant had killed him, without mentioning that he had witnessed the crime. It appears that he later told the police that he had witnessed the crime. 9. Three witnesses, a father and son – Mr M.M. senior and Mr M.M. junior, and Mr S.P., testified that they lived in the same village, knew the victim’s family, and on the morning of 14 August 2004 had also been working on the farm, around two hundred metres from the crime scene. None of them had seen the victim’s father at the farm either before the murder or immediately after. According to them, however, the victim passed by their plot at around 9 a.m. and they heard shots after about fifteen to twenty minutes. They rushed to the crime scene and found the victim dead. Mr M.M. senior sent his son to notify Mr V.N. of the murder. Mr M.M. junior was joined by Mr D.M., Mr V.N.’s neighbour, along the way. They found Mr V.N. at home. On hearing the news, Mr V.N. took his car and drove Mr M.M. junior and Mr D.M. to the crime scene, without mentioning that he had witnessed the murder, or that he knew anything about it. Once Mr V.N. arrived at the crime scene, he started blaming the brothers and the applicant, without mentioning that he had personally witnessed the crime. 10. According to several witness statements, the applicant was seen in the village sometime between 9 and 10 a.m. Ms T.M. said that she had seen him in her yard at 9.10 a.m. Mr D.K. stated that he had seen him in Ms T.M.’s yard on the morning of 14 August 2004, without specifying the exact time. Mr G.G. could recall seeing him in the village shop sometime between 10 and 11 a.m. He stated that the shop was located approximately two kilometres from the crime scene. The shopkeeper stated that the applicant had spent about two to three hours in the shop, without specifying the exact time. The applicant had allegedly heard the news about the murder while there. He was not with the brothers at the time. 11. A forensic biological examination report (no. 140/162) ordered by a prosecutor and implemented by the Forensic Centre of the Ministry of Labour, Health and Social Affairs between 2 September and 22 October 2004 provided an analysis of bloodstains found on the trousers of one of the brothers. The blood was of type AB (II), the same as that of the victim, while the owner of the trousers had blood type AB (IV). 12. A forensic soil examination report (no. 1700/10) ordered by a prosecutor and implemented by the Forensic and Special Research Centre of the Ministry of Justice between 7 September and 6 October 2004 provided an analysis of soil found on the brothers’ shoes in relation to soil at and around the crime scene. It found that the traces of soil on the brothers’ shoes seized from their home had the same characteristics as the soil at the crime scene. 13. On 8 May 2006 the Tbilisi Regional Court convicted the applicant of aggravated murder and sentenced him to fifteen years’ imprisonment. The brothers were convicted of aggravated murder and illegal possession of firearms, and were sentenced to seventeen and sixteen years’ imprisonment, respectively. 14. The first-instance court fully relied on Mr V.N.’s statement (see paragraph 8 above). It accordingly found that the ongoing dispute between the three men and the victim and his family had been the underlying cause of the crime. It continued to note that at around 10 a.m., the applicant and the brothers had gone to the victim’s farm and killed him with a gun. After one of the accused fired the first shot, his brother and the applicant shouted at him to shoot again, which he did. The gun was never recovered. In addition, the court relied on the forensic biological examination (see paragraph 11 above) and forensic soil examination (see paragraph 12 above), and other forensic evidence such as a forensic examination of the victim’s body and of the hand grenade, without elaborating on their relevance to the applicant’s conviction. 15. The applicant’s argument that he had an alibi for the presumed time of the crime in the light of the statements given by some of the defence witnesses (see paragraph 10 above) was dismissed by the court. It noted that the statements in question were inconsistent, contradictory and aimed at shielding the accused from criminal responsibility. 16. On 13 June 2006 only the applicant appealed against the judgment of 8 May 2006. He emphasised that unlike his co-accused, no piece of forensic evidence available in the criminal case file implicated him personally in the crime. He argued that the only piece of evidence connecting him to the murder was the eyewitness statement given by the victim’s father. However, it was doubtful whether the latter had even been at the crime scene, given the evident contradictions between his account and the statements given by witnesses M.M. junior and D.M., that they had found him at home shortly after the murder, and that he had not mentioned having witnessed the crime, despite having gone with them to the crime scene to verify the tragic news (see paragraph 9 above). He argued that Mr V.N.’s version that he had gone home after having witnessed his son’s murder without notifying anyone and without telling Mr M.M. junior and Mr D.M. that he had been at the crime scene, without any other evidence corroborating his account, created serious doubts as to the veracity of his claim to have witnessed the event. The applicant further claimed to have an alibi to the effect that he had been seen alone in the centre of the village around the time of the murder, and noted that Mr V.N. might have been implicating him out of revenge. He argued that given the lack of any response to his main arguments, the conviction rendered by the first-instance court had relied on a mere doubt devoid of any evidence, in violation of Article 503 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 31 below). 17. On 21 September 2006 the Supreme Court, sitting as a court of second and final instance, held a hearing and upheld the lower court’s verdict. It reasoned that the lower court had acted in full compliance with Article 18 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 31 below) and had assessed the factual circumstances of the case fully and objectively. In upholding the lower court’s verdict, the Supreme Court fully relied on the statement of the victim’s father, the statements of the other witnesses who were told by him that the applicant had killed his son, and the forensic evidence, without addressing any of the applicant’s arguments, including that none of the cited evidence had implicated him, and that the lower court had failed to address his arguments in that regard. 18. On an unspecified date in May 2016 the applicant was released from prison. 19. On 19 September 2004 the applicant was remanded in custody and placed in Tbilisi Prison no. 5. He was allegedly held in an overcrowded cell, had to take turns with other prisoners to sleep, and was unable to shower for months. The toilet in the cell was not separated from the living area. He also alleged that there were rodents in his cell. 20. On an unspecified date in 2005 the applicant was transferred to Tbilisi Prison no. 1. According to him, the conditions there were identical. 21. On 31 March 2006 he was transferred from Tbilisi Prison no. 1 to the newly built Rustavi Prison no. 6. 22. On 16 December 2006 the applicant was transferred to Rustavi Prison no. 2. During his time there, he was allegedly exposed to harmful emissions from a nearby concrete factory. It does not appear that he complained to the prison authorities about any aspect of his detention conditions. 23. On 6 April 2007 the applicant was returned to Rustavi Prison no. 6. He stayed at that prison until his transfer to the prison hospital on 11 January 2009 (see paragraph 27 below). 24. It does not transpire from the case file that the applicant raised any concerns before the prison administration or any domestic authority about the conditions of his detention in any of the penal institutions referred to above. 25. Upon the applicant’s readmission to Rustavi Prison no. 6 on 6 April 2007 (see paragraph 23 above), he underwent a standard medical examination upon entry and was diagnosed with neurocirculatory dystonia but was not prescribed any treatment. It does not appear that the applicant lodged any complaints in that respect. 26. On 23 June 2008 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Department of Prisons, apparently for the first time, about headaches, and requested to have a medical examination administered in that regard. On 17 December 2008, in view of the applicant’s complaint that the Government had allegedly left his medical complaints – including those concerning headaches – unaddressed, the President of the Section decided to indicate to the Government, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, to implement all necessary measures to assess his state of health. It transpires from the information submitted by the Government that on 28 July 2008 the applicant was consulted by a neurologist concerning the headaches. He was diagnosed with neurocirculatory dystonia, hypertensive hydrocephaly syndrome, and post-traumatic brain condition, and the relevant treatment was prescribed. The applicant complained again about headaches on 18 September and 11 November 2008. The applicant’s submissions dated 29 January 2009 revealed that he had been seen by a neurologist on an unspecified date in October 2008. As regards the complaint of 11 November 2008, no immediate reaction followed from the authorities. On 14 January 2009, the applicant was consulted by a neurologist and a skull X-ray was carried out. The neurologist concluded that no pathological signs could be observed and prescribed treatment for the applicant’s headache. No complaints regarding headaches appear to have been raised following that date. As regards the other health-related complaints, on 28 October 2008 the applicant was examined and diagnosed with a chronic inflammation of the gallbladder. On 19 November 2008 an ultrasound exam was performed which confirmed the diagnosis of the chronic inflammation of the gallbladder. The relevant treatment was prescribed. The interim measure was lifted on 8 February 2012. 27. On 11 January 2009 the applicant was transferred to the prison hospital, where he underwent a series of examinations and tests. On 16 January 2009, he was diagnosed with tuberculosis. On the same day, he was put on a DOTS (Directly Observed Treatment, Short course) programme, the strategy for the detection and treatment of tuberculosis recommended by the World Health Organisation. 28. On 12 February 2009 the applicant was placed in a facility in Ksani for prisoners with tuberculosis. 29. On 9 July 2009 he was placed in Tbilisi Prison no. 1 and on 21 September 2009 successfully finished his treatment in the framework of the DOTS programme.

4. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Nizhniy Novgorod. 5. On 25 July 2002 the applicant’s 51-year-old brother Aleksandr Alekseyvich Anoshin was murdered by a policeman in the alcohol recovery centre of the Sovietsky District Police Department of Nizhniy Novgorod (медицинский вытрезвитель при Советском РУВД г. Нижнего Новгорода). 6. Earlier that day, at about 7 p.m., he was stopped in the street by a police patrol as he was staggering home after having drinks with workmates. He was driven to the centre and left alone on a bed in a recovery room, as centre staff sat down to a game of cards nearby. One hour later Mr Anoshin started banging on the door and asking to be let out. Officer M., who together with his partner K. had just returned from patrol duty, got annoyed at the disruption, pushed Mr Anoshin away from the door and demanded that he calm down. Mr Anoshin fell on the bed and his head slammed against the wall. He then got to his feet and stepped towards the officer. Officer M. punched the applicant’s brother in the head and chest five times, and strangled him until he was unconscious using a squared piece of a broken wooden chair. M. laid Mr Anoshin down on the bed, and walked out. Officer An. watched this scene from the doorway. 7. At 10 p.m. the applicant’s brother died of asphyxia. 8. On 3 August 2002 the Prosecutor’s Office of the Sovietsky District opened a criminal investigation into the death. The investigation lasted four years and was handled in turn by at least six different investigators. They inspected the scene, conducted witness interviews, commissioned forensic reports, and staged reconstructions. 9. The centre staff initially testified that they had found the applicant’s brother unwell in his bed, but then changed their story, saying that they had seen him hang himself using a bed sheet tied to the bars of his cell window. The forensic reports (on the cause of death, the nature of the injuries, the origin of blood on the wall and the presence of metallic traces on the sheet) refuted the hanging hypothesis, pointed to a violent death and incriminated the centre staff. However, the investigation was put on hold thirteen times because no credible suspect had been identified. 10. In March 2006 M. was interviewed for the first time. 11. By August 2006 the case against him had gone to trial. 12. On 1 August 2008 the Sovietsky District Court of Nizhniy Novgorod convicted M. of murder and violent abuse of official power and sentenced him to fourteen years’ imprisonment and a three-year ban from police service. Neglect-of-duty charges brought against his two co‑defendants (Officers An. and Ag.) were dropped as time-barred. 13. At the trial, M. was directly incriminated by An., Ag., and K. Officers An. and Ag. confessed that the suicide story had been a cover-up condoned by commanders of Sovietsky Police Department. 14. On 14 November 2008 the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court upheld the sentence. 15. The applicant and three of her brother’s four children each claimed from the State 3,000,000 Russian roubles (RUB – approximately 69,000 euros (EUR)) for emotional distress caused by the crime. On 25 May 2009 the Sovietsky District Court awarded RUB 150,000 (approximately EUR 3,400) to each claimant. 16. On 14 August 2009 the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court upheld that decision.

6. The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Enfield (United Kingdom). 7. The complaints raised in this application arise out of the Turkish military intervention in northern Cyprus in July and August 1974. The general context of the property issues arising in this connection is set out in the cases of Cyprus v. Turkey ([GC], no. 25781/94, §§ 13-16 and 28-33, ECHR 2001‑IV), and Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (dec.) ([GC], nos. 46113/99 and 7 others, §§ 4-16, ECHR 2010). 8. In 1997 the applicant was gifted five plots of land, or shares in them, by her aunt, who died in 1998. In 2008 she was also gifted an additional share of one of the plots of land by her mother. According to the certificates of ownership provided by the Department of Lands and Surveys of the Republic of Cyprus, the applicant is the sole owner of four plots of land and owns a 9/16 share of the fifth plot. 9. The land lies in the village Koma Tou Yialou (Kumyali) in the “TRNC”. The total area of the land is some 18 dönüm.[1] 10. In 2007 the applicant instructed a law firm in Nicosia, which duly obtained a valuation report on the land from a Turkish Cypriot chartered surveyor. The valuation report of 3 December 2007 assessed each of the five plots of land and provided valuations for them, which ranged from 500 pounds sterling (GBP) per dönüm to GBP 10,000 per dönüm. 11. In October 2011 the applicant obtained a further valuation report by a chartered surveyor from the Republic of Cyprus. This report valued the five plots of land, including the economic loss and interest (all calculated for the period between 1974 and 2011), at 2,690,962 euros (EUR) in total. 12. In February 2017 the applicant obtained a new valuation report from the Land Registration Office of the Republic of Cyprus which assessed the value of the property in question, including economic loss and interest accrued since 1997 (when the applicant became owner of the property) to December 2016, at EUR 2,088,366 in total. 13. In May 2008 the applicant, through her Turkish Cypriot representatives, filed a claim with the IPC under Law no. 67/2005 (see paragraphs 41-43 below) ‒ supported by an affidavit ‒ claiming restitution of her property and/or compensation at the property’s current market value and damages for loss of use of the land in question. The total compensation sought was GBP 100,000 per dönüm (GBP 1,800,000 or approximately EUR 2,285,000). 14. In her affidavit the applicant attested that the property in question had been transferred to her after 1974 by her aunt, who had owned it since before 1974. The affidavit also attested that there were no mortgages, liabilities or restrictions on the property in question, that the applicant lived in South Cyprus in a house owned by a Turkish Cypriot, and that she was paying rent to the Republic of Cyprus. The file also contained the applicant’s identity documents (British passport and Cypriot identity card), certificates from the Republic of Cyprus Land Registry and Surveys Department concerning the ownership and legal status of the applicant’s plots of land (indicating no mortgages, liabilities or other restrictions), and a document issued by the relevant Cypriot authority showing that the applicant lived in a house owned by a Turkish Cypriot and had been billed 270 Cypriot pounds (CYP) by way of rent for the period 1 April 2003 to 30 June 2004. 15. The applicant’s claim was communicated to the “TRNC” Attorney General as provided under Law no. 67/2005 and the relevant IPC Rules (see paragraph 43 below). 16. On 5 May 2010, the Attorney General’s Office submitted an opinion to the IPC in reply to the applicant’s claim. It relied on an affidavit by the “TRNC” Director of the Land Registry and Surveys Department, who explained that their records showed that one of the registered owners of the property in question was Chrystollou Nicola Stavrinou (the applicant’s aunt), that Maria Nicola Stavrinou (the applicant’s mother) was the owner of part of one of the plots of land, and that the applicant had failed to demonstrate that she was the legal heir of the two registered owners. He also considered that the applicant’s compensation claim was excessive and unfounded. 17. A directions hearing before the IPC took place on 25 May 2010. The applicant’s representative stated that they had received the Attorney General’s opinion only on the day of the hearing and thus asked for an adjournment in order to prepare their case. The Attorney General’s representative did not object and the hearing was adjourned until 1 June 2010. 18. At a directions hearing on 1 June 2010 the applicant’s representative undertook to obtain a valuation report and a document showing that the plots of land had been transferred to the applicant by way of donation. The Attorney General’s representative requested that documents showing that the applicant was the legal heir of Chriystolleuo Nicola Stavrou [sic.] should be provided, as well as proof of the amount of rent she was paying for the Turkish Cypriot house where she lived in the South, or alternatively the lease agreement by which the house had been allocated to her. The Attorney General’s representative also undertook to submit a search document from the “TRNC” Land Registry and Surveys Department, and indicated that he reserved his right to submit and request further documents. The hearing was adjourned so that the parties could obtain the relevant documents. 19. On 3 June 2010 the Attorney General submitted the search document of the “TRNC” Land Registry and Surveys Department relating to the plots included in the applicant’s claim. 20. On 6 June 2012, through her representative, the applicant asked permission to amend her initial claim. She submitted that she had in the meantime become the sole owner of the plot of which she had previously owned a 5/6 share and that in October 2011 she had obtained a valuation report indicating that the value of her properties was EUR 2,690,962 (see paragraph 8 above). 21. At a preliminary hearing on 18 June 2012, after the Attorney General’s representative stated that he had no objections with regard to the amendment of the applicant’s claim; the President of the IPC accepted the amendment and instructed the applicant to submit her amended claim and the Attorney General’s Office to submit an opinion in that regard. 22. On 6 July 2012 the applicant complied with the order and amended her claim, seeking compensation in accordance with the new findings and developments concerning her property title. 23. On 20 November 2012 the applicant submitted the documents requested by the Attorney General’s representative on 1 June 2010 (see paragraph 18 above). In particular, the applicant submitted certificates issued by the head of the local community (mukhtar) explaining that there were inconsistencies in the spelling of the applicant’s aunt’s name in different documents. The mukhtar explained that the latter had held Cypriot identity document no. 327090 and had been variously known as: Christallou Nikola Stavrinou, Chriystallou Nicola Stavrinon, Christallou Nicola Stavrinou, Christalla Nikola and Chrystallou Nicola, but these were one and the same person. The mukhtar further certified that she had never married and that before her death she had gifted her immovable property to her sister’s daughter, the applicant (Andriani Ioannou, holder of a Cypriot identity card). In support of the mukhtar’s certificates, the applicant submitted her aunt’s identity documents (including a Cypriot identity document). The applicant also submitted documents showing the transfer of title from her aunt to her in respect of the plots of land in question. She also submitted documents showing that she had been allocated a Turkish Cypriot house in the South and had paid CYP 342 by way of rent for the period 1 June 2000 to 31 December 2001 and CYP 270 for the period 1 April 2003 to 30 June 2004. 24. A preliminary hearing before the IPC scheduled for 10 January 2013 was adjourned due to the absence of the Attorney General’s representative, who could not attend the hearing for family reasons. 25. At a preliminary hearing on 25 January 2013 the “TRNC” authorities were represented by the Attorney General’s representative and the under‑secretary of the Housing Affairs Department. They asked the applicant to submit the birth certificates of her aunt and her mother and a title deed for the property which she now owned in its entirety. The hearing was adjourned to enable the applicant to obtain the documents in question. 26. On 19 February 2013 the applicant submitted the requested documents, which also included documents confirming that her aunt had never been married. 27. At a preliminary hearing on 25 April 2013 the “TRNC” representatives asked the applicant to submit certificates from the mukhtar showing that the names Andriani Joannou, Andriani Ioannou and Andriani Georgiou Antoniou all referred to the applicant, and further certificates showing that her aunt had been variously known as Chrystollou Nicola Stavrinou, Chrystolleuo Nicola Stavriou, Chrystolleui Nicolou Stavriou, Nikola Hristallu (Nicola Hrystallou), Hristalla Nicola and Hrystallou Nicola (Nikola), and that her mother had been variously known as Maria Nicola Stavrinou, Maria Stavrinou, Maria Georgiou and Maria Georgios, and that their antecedent Nikolas Stavrinou (Nicolas Stavrinou), had also been known as Nicola Stavrinou and Nicola Stavrinu. The hearing was adjourned to permit the applicant to obtain the requested documents. 28. On 9 May 2013 the applicant submitted certificates from the mukhtar showing that the aforementioned different names referred to the same individuals, namely the applicant, her mother, her aunt and their antecedent, respectively. The mukhtar’s certificates also identified these individuals on the basis of their identity card numbers. A certificate dated 8 May 2013 indicated that the applicant’s mother was variously known as Maria Nicola (Nicolas, Nikola, Nikolas) Stavrinou and her aunt as Chrystolleui Nicolou Stavriou. 29. At a preliminary hearing on 24 October 2013, at which the applicant was also present, the “TRNC” representatives argued that the mukhtar’s certificates were incomplete and that the names Maria Nicola (Nicolas, Nikola, Nikolas) Stavrinou, for the applicant’s mother, and Chrystolleui Nicolou Stavriou, for the applicant’s aunt, should be added. The representative further argued that an official document should be submitted showing that the applicant’s aunt had not married and did not have any other heirs. He also requested a document showing that there were no liabilities attaching to the property in question. Upon production of these documents, the Attorney General’s representative would be prepared to settle the case by paying GBP 60,000 to the applicant. 30. In reply, the applicant’s representative stated that they would obtain the requested documents. However, he pointed out that they had already produced documents showing that the applicant’s aunt had never married and this was anyway apparent from the fact that she had never changed her last name. The applicant’s representative also pointed out that the applicant’s aunt had transferred the property in question to the applicant while she was still alive. He asked for an adjournment in order to consider the Attorney General’s settlement offer. 31. On 16 January 2014 the applicant’s representative asked that a hearing be held before the IPC. 32. A further examination of the case before the IPC took place on 1 March 2016. The President and members of the IPC questioned the applicant’s representative with regard to the instructions he had received from the applicant concerning the case. As the applicant was not present and could not be reached at that time to give clear instructions concerning the case, the hearing was adjourned. 33. On 9 March 2016 the applicant’s Turkish Cypriot representatives informed her representative in the Republic of Cyprus that the fact that an application had been lodged with the Court had caused them upset. They also stated that they would not represent the applicant in further proceedings. 34. A hearing before the IPC was held on 28 June 2016. The applicant’s Turkish Cypriot representative explained that she had informed the applicant of her wish to withdraw from the case. However, she was unable to provide an official document to that effect and the hearing was therefore adjourned in order for the representative to complete the formalities for withdrawal. 35. On 19 August 2016 the applicant took over the files from her Turkish Cypriot representatives. 36. At a hearing on 28 September 2016 the IPC accepted the applicant’s Turkish Cypriot representatives’ withdrawal from the case and decided that the applicant should be contacted directly during the future course of the proceedings. Another hearing was scheduled for 12 October 2016. 37. On 15 October 2016 the applicant informed the IPC that she had not received the summons to the hearing of 12 October 2016 until 13 October 2016. 38. A further meeting for the examination of the case, at which the applicant was personally present, was held on 2 March 2017. The “TRNC” representatives argued that the applicant should provide further documents showing the exact dates of birth of her mother and her aunt as well as the respective death certificates. Furthermore, they argued that the applicant could not be considered to be a legal heir of her aunt for the purpose of Law no. 67/2005 as she had obtained the property at issue from her aunt while the latter was still alive. The applicant contended that these arguments were being raised for the first time now and she therefore asked for a formal hearing to be opened in her case. The President of the IPC instructed the applicant that the opinions expressed by the “TRNC” representatives did not represent the official position of the IPC and that the matter would be decided after the examination of all the circumstances of the case. The proceedings before the IPC are still pending.

4. The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Belgrade. 5. On 9 May 2005 the applicant lodged a claim seeking ownership of 265 shares of the company Tri Grozda a.d. Beograd 6. On 14 September 2007 the Belgrade Court of First Instance delivered a judgment in favour of the applicant. 7. On 13 December 2011 the Belgrade Court of Appeal reversed the judgment of 14 September 2007, and rejected the applicant’s claim. 8. On 3 April 2012 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal, complaining of a violation of his right to a trial within a reasonable time and requesting compensation in that regard. 9. On 23 September 2014 the Constitutional Court found a violation of the applicant’s right to a trial within a reasonable time. It held that the finding of a violation had constituted sufficient just satisfaction in the particular circumstances of the present case for the following reasons. First, the nominal value of the impugned shares was only slightly higher than 200 euros. The case was thus of minor importance for the applicant. Secondly, it considered that the applicant had contributed to the length of the civil proceedings by failing to lodge a constitutional appeal earlier.

6. The applicant was born in 1990 and lives in Alphen aan den Rijn. 7. On 19 August 2009 the applicant, who was then nineteen years of age, was arrested on suspicion of distribution of child pornography (three pictures of a 16-year-old girl) in April of that year. He was informed that he had the right to consult a lawyer. 8. At the police station the applicant was taken into police custody (inverzekeringstelling) and, before he had consulted his lawyer (who had not been immediately available) but with his consent, police officers commenced the so-called social interview (sociaal verhoor), during which questions were put to him about his personal circumstances and his personality but not about the offence of which he was suspected. He told the officers, inter alia, that he had a brain disorder: he had cavernous hemangiomas (clusters of abnormal blood vessels) in his brain and spinal cord. This did not affect his functioning other than that it might have a bearing on his trust in others; moreover, while he was allowed to play football he could not head the ball. When the applicant’s lawyer became available the police officers suspended the interview to give the applicant the opportunity to consult his lawyer by telephone. After that conversation, the applicant stated that his lawyer would come to see him at the end of the afternoon and that, on the advice of his lawyer, he would not answer any more questions. The interview was terminated. The applicant met with his lawyer later that day. 9. The following day, 20 August 2009, the applicant was interviewed twice, including concerning distribution of child pornography, of which he was suspected. At the beginning of the interview, the applicant stated that he would prefer to have his lawyer present. He was told that this was not possible and the interview was started. The applicant replied to the questions put to him. 10. In the course of the interview the police officers questioning the applicant noted that he made a spasm-like movement with his arm. They asked him whether he was having an epileptic fit. The applicant confirmed that he was. The police officers then decided to interrupt the interview and call a doctor. They heard the applicant say that the seizure could have been caused by a combination of stress and other factors. The interview was resumed. 11. A final interview was held with the applicant on 21 August 2009. Audio recordings were made of all the interviews. 12. The applicant was released from police custody on 21 August 2009. 13. On 25 March 2011 the Regional Court (rechtbank) of The Hague found the applicant guilty of distribution of child pornography and sentenced him to a suspended sentence of two weeks’ imprisonment and to eighty hours’ community service. The Regional Court was of the opinion that the applicant should have been enabled to consult his lawyer prior to being interviewed by the police for the first time. However, it did not appear from the subsequent interviews that they had been conducted without the applicant having been able to consult his lawyer. Given, moreover, that the contents of the interviews that had been conducted after the applicant had received legal assistance had not substantially differed from the content of the interview that had taken place without legal assistance, the Regional Court considered that the finding that a procedural requirement had not been complied with (vormverzuim) sufficed. The applicant lodged an appeal (hoger beroep). 14. On 3 July 2013 the Court of Appeal (gerechtshof) of The Hague quashed the decision of the Regional Court, convicted the applicant of the same offence and sentenced him to forty hours’ community service. As regards the claim that the applicant ought to have been assisted by a lawyer during the police interviews, the Court of Appeal held as follows: “At the hearing on appeal counsel submitted that at the time of the police interviews the suspect had the mental age of a 15 or 16-year old, and also that he was suffering from a brain disorder which may have caused him to have epileptic seizures. Counsel did not submit (medical) data to substantiate that claim. In the opinion of the Court of Appeal, the above does not entail an indication for the officers who interviewed the suspect that he had the mental age of a 15 or 16-year old, nor that the brain disorder from which the suspect is apparently suffering was capable of causing an epileptic seizure. After the suspect had, in the eyes of the interviewing officers, made ‘a kind of spastic’ movement, they had consulted a physician before resuming the interview. The Court of Appeal considers that this was the correct course of action. The Court of Appeal does not agree with counsel that the interviewing officers ought reasonably to have considered the suspect as vulnerable or underage. This means in the light of the Salduz case-law that the suspect, who was an adult at the time, was not entitled to have a lawyer present at his interview.” 15. The Court of Appeal based its conviction of the applicant on the following evidence: - a complaint lodged with the police by the victim, who claimed that in March 2009 (when she had been 16 years old), she had shown the applicant various parts of her body via webcam, that she had subsequently been told by a third party that the applicant had sent photographs of her to that third party, and that she had been told by two other parties that they had received photographs of her; - a further statement made by the victim to the police, according to which she had taken a photograph of a part of her body and sent it to the applicant by mobile telephone; - a statement made by the applicant to the police on 20 August 2009 to the effect that he had sent several photographs (showing parts of the victim’s body), one of which he had taken by means of a screen shot while the others had been sent to him by the victim, to a third party via mobile telephone and that he had also uploaded them onto an image-hosting website; - a statement made by the aforementioned third party to the police, according to which she had received two photographs from the applicant showing parts of the victim’s body; and - a record drawn up by a police officer whose investigations into the victim’s allegations had shown that the photographs showing part of the victim’s body were accessible on the world wide web via a profile with a name used by the applicant on the above-mentioned image-hosting website. 16. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad), complaining, inter alia, of the refusal to allow him to be assisted by his lawyer during police questioning. On 18 November 2014 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal with summary reasoning, in accordance with section 81 of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act (Wet op de rechterlijke organisatie). Under that provision, the Supreme Court may limit its reasoning in a decision to a finding that a complaint does not provide grounds to overturn the judgment appealed against or does not require answers to questions of law in the interests of the uniform application or development of the law.

5. The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Zagreb. 6. In the former Yugoslav socialist regime all employees contributed to housing funds. The funds thus obtained were used, inter alia, to build blocks of flats. The flats were distributed to employees, who acquired protected tenancies in respect of them and other already existing socially owned flats. Each publicly owned company drew up a list of persons to be granted specially protected tenancies. When a person on such a list was granted a specially protected tenancy, his or her housing needs were considered to have been met and his or her name would be removed from the list. 7. The applicant was employed by a socially owned company, S. All employees of S. paid contributions to a housing fund in the amount of 3% of their monthly salaries. 8. On 31 October 1988 company S. granted the applicant a specially protected tenancy of a flat measuring 65.08 square metres in the Zagreb suburbs, with the right to occupy it together with her husband and two daughters. However, since that decision was not yet final, company S. entered into an agreement with the applicant on 7 December 1988 giving her the right to move into the flat with her family and to care for that flat. The applicant moved into the flat and has been living there ever since. 9. The decision to grant the applicant a specially protected tenancy was challenged by three other employees and quashed by the Zagreb Basic Court of Associated Labour (Osnovni sud udruženog rada u Zagrebu). 10. On 27 March 1990 the housing committee of company S. drew up a priority list for the distribution of flats. The applicant was the first on the list. On 23 April 1990 the company’s workers’ council approved the priority list. On the basis of that list she was entitled to have a decision allocating a flat to her issued. On 27 April 1992 the flats of the company S. were transferred for management to the Zagreb Municipality. 11. On 9 and 15 May 1990, respectively, two other employees of company S. brought an action before the competent court, seeking to have the priority list declared null and void. Competence in the matter was subsequently transferred to the Zagreb Municipal Court, which on 3 February 1999 dismissed the claims on the merits since there was no possibility under the relevant law to bring such an action at all. A civil action could be brought to challenge the decision on allocation of a flat but not to challenge a priority list. 12. On 23 June 2004 the Zagreb County Court amended the judgment of 3 February 1999 so as to declare the actions inadmissible on the same grounds, namely that the priority list could not be challenged before a court of law. 13. Meanwhile, on 3 June 1991 Parliament had enacted the Protected Tenancies (Sale to Occupier) Act (Zakon o prodaji stanova na kojima postoji stanarsko pravo), which abolished the specially protected tenancies and regulated the sale of socially owned flats previously let under a specially protected tenancy. 14. On 29 November 1995 the applicant asked the Zagreb Municipality as the owner of the flat to conclude a contract for the sale of the flat with herself as the buyer. The Zagreb Municipality did not take any decision within the prescribed time-limit of sixty days. 15. On an unspecified date in 2005 the applicant re-submitted to the Zagreb Municipality her request to purchase the flat she occupied. The request was refused on 6 July 2005 because she had not been granted a specially protected tenancy in respect of that flat. 16. On 26 September 2005 the applicant brought a civil action against the City of Zagreb, which in the meantime had become the owner of the flat she occupied, seeking a judgment in lieu of the contract of sale of the flat in question. 17. The claim was dismissed by the Zagreb Municipal Court on 18 June 2007 on the grounds that the applicant had not acquired a protected tenancy of the flat in question, since the priority list did not constitute a decision on the granting of protected tenancies within the meaning of the Housing Act. 18. The judgment was upheld by the Zagreb County Court on 8 April 2008. The court held that the applicant did not have a final decision on allocation of the flat to her. 19. In a subsequent constitutional complaint lodged by the applicant, she complained that her right to equality before the law, her right to an appeal as well as her right to a fair trial had been violated. She argued that she had been the first on a priority list drawn up by company S. for the distribution of flats. The only reasons she had not been formally granted a specially protected tenancy of the flat she had been occupying were the challenge of the priority list by her co-workers and the delay in the civil proceedings before the Zagreb Municipal Court. However, once those proceedings had ended, all of the conditions for recognition of her specially protected tenancy of the flat at issue had been met. The one-year validity of the priority list was to be counted from the date of its being confirmed, which in the applicant’s case had occurred when the national courts had dismissed all the objections concerning that list. By not recognising her right to a specially protected tenancy, the national authorities had deprived her of the possibility to purchase the flat she occupied under favourable conditions. She also relied on some other decisions of the Constitutional Court whereby it had granted protection to persons in situations comparable to her own. 20. On 11 May 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint on the grounds that the findings of the lower courts that she had not acquired a specially protected tenancy of the flat at issue had been correct. It further held that the decisions the applicant had relied on concerned persons who had had specially protected tenancies which they had subsequently lost.

4. The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Štitare. 5. On 30 May 2000 the Belgrade Third Municipal Court ordered a socially-owned company KMG Trudbenik (hereinafter “the debtor company”), based in Belgrade, to pay to the applicant a specified amount on account of salary arrears, plus the costs of the civil proceedings (judgment no. P1 863/99). This judgment became enforceable on 19 June 2000. 6. On 13 March 2002, upon the applicant’s request to that effect, the Fourth Belgrade Municipal Court ordered the enforcement of the said judgment and further ordered the debtor company to pay the applicant’s enforcement costs (enforcement order no. I-VIII 101/2002). 7. On 7 October 2003 the enforcement proceedings were suspended due to the institution of compulsory settlement proceedings before the Belgrade Commercial Court (“the Commercial Court”). 8. On 9 December 2011 the Commercial Court opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor company. 9. On 6 March 2012 the applicant submitted his request for enforcement of the 30 May 2000 judgment (“enforcement request”) to the insolvency manager. The insolvency manager neither rejected the applicant’s claim nor forwarded it to the Commercial Court. 10. On 24 February 2014 the applicant thus submitted his enforcement request with the Commercial Court, and on 1 October 2014 he supplemented it. 11. On 6 August and 27 October 2014 the applicant complained about the inactivity of the acting judge in the insolvency proceedings. 12. On 13 October 2014 the Commercial Court rejected the applicant’s enforcement request as having been lodged out of time. 13. On 28 January 2015 the Commercial Appellate Court rejected the applicant’s appeal, and upheld the Commercial Court’s decision of 13 October 2014. 14. On 24 March 2015 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal, complaining of the decision of 28 January 2015. 15. However, on 19 May 2016 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s appeal as unfounded.

4. The applicant was born in 1974 and at the time of lodging his application he was serving his prison sentence in the Bolu F-type prison. 5. On 25 January 2008 the applicant wrote a letter to the Ministry of Justice, in which he had praised the imprisoned leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan by using the honorific “sayın”, meaning esteemed. 6. Pursuant to the Regulations on the administration of penitentiary institutions and the execution of sentences, the applicant was found guilty of breaching a prison order by the Bolu F-type Prison Disciplinary Board (referred hereafter as “the board”). 7. On 1 February 2008 the applicant was sentenced to 11 days’ solitary confinement on the orders of the Board, on account of his statements in the above-mentioned letter. 8. On 26 February 2008 the Bolu Enforcement Judge rejected the applicant’s objection. 9. On 11 March 2008 the Bolu Assize Court upheld the judgment of 26 February 2008.

5. The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Zujūnai. 6. In 1988 the applicant was provided with a plot of land of 0.15 hectares for residential purposes. 7. In 1992 the authorities allocated him an additional plot of land of 0.05 hectares and similar additional plots were allocated to another twenty‑four people. 8. On 15 April 1993 the applicant purchased a total of 0.2 hectares of land from the State. At that time there was no detailed plan of Vilnius County. Nevertheless, the plot of land assigned to the applicant was approved by the county’s chief architect. 9. The applicant obtained an official permit for the construction of a house on the land and has been living there since 2004. The house is the permanent residence of the applicant and his family. The plot of land of 0.05 hectares, which has been allocated to the applicant in 1992 (see paragraph 7 above), is where waste water treatment equipment, the gas and water supplies and an electricity meter were installed. 10. In 2006 two neighbours started court proceedings against the applicant. They claimed that 0.05 hectares of the applicant’s land occupied part of a street and that the applicant had built a concrete fence around it, making it impossible to use the street. They asked the court to establish an easement (servitutas) for access to it. 11. On 26 September 2006 the Vilnius District Court held that the neighbours’ rights had not been breached because they had access to their own land. However, the court ordered the applicant to give one of the neighbours access to an electricity meter. 12. The applicant’s neighbours appealed but on 4 January 2007 the Vilnius Regional Court upheld the decision of the court of first instance. The court held that in accordance with the provisions of domestic law, an easement could be established only if it was impossible to use property in any other way (see paragraph 42 below). This meant that an easement could only be established if it was objectively necessary. The fact that the neighbours had to use another road and that entry to their own property was more difficult was not grounds to limit another person’s property rights, namely those of the applicant. 13. The applicant’s neighbours lodged an appeal on points of law, and on 19 November 2007 the Supreme Court found that there were two civil cases regarding the same situation and suspended the proceedings until the other case had finished (see paragraph 15 below). 14. On 29 May 2009 the Supreme Court upheld the Vilnius Regional Court’s decision of 4 January 2007. The court found that the applicant had purchased the plot of land of 0.2 hectares in 1993. The lawfulness of the purchase agreement had been proven by the domestic courts (see paragraph 17 below). The fact that the applicant was a bona fide owner of the land had not been denied and could only be so by reopening the proceedings involved. The court thus held that the mere fact that the applicant’s neighbours wanted to use his land because it was more convenient was not enough to establish an easement. 15. In October 2007 the prosecutor’s office started court proceedings and asked the domestic courts to annul the decisions of the national authorities and the purchase agreement that had entitled the applicant to 0.05 hectares of land, to apply restitution, to return the plot of land of 0.05 hectares to the State and to pay the applicant 15 Lithuanian litai (LTL, approximately 4.34 euros (EUR)) in compensation. The prosecutor argued that the authorities had breached domestic law by allocating the applicant a plot of land of 0.05 hectares, thus it had to be returned to the State. The prosecutor also noted that the applicant had paid 1,500 roubles for the land, which amounted to approximately LTL 15. The prosecutor also stated that he had only found out about the violation on 30 August 2007, when he had received a report from an expert. 16. On 11 April 2008 the Vilnius District Court held that the land had been sold to the applicant in breach of the provisions of domestic law (see paragraph 65 below). The contested decisions had been related to property rights over the land, which was a legitimate interest of the community as a whole, and thus the prosecutor’s claim was related to the public interest. The applicant was ordered to return the plot to the State, with the State having to repay him the LTL 15. The parts of the order allocating the additional plot of 0.05 hectares to the applicant and the relevant part of the purchase agreement were annulled. 17. The applicant appealed. On 10 December 2008 the Vilnius Regional Court noted that according to the prosecutor and the court of first instance any breach of legal norms regulating the division of land was a breach of the public interest. However, twenty-five people altogether, including the applicant, had been allocated additional plots at the time (see paragraph 7 above), but the prosecutor had only found a breach of the public interest in the applicant’s case. The court also found that when the applicant had been allocated the first plot of land (see paragraph 6 above), there had been no other plots demarcated and the land in front of his had been vacant. He thus could not have anticipated that the additional plot of 0.05 hectares would occupy part of the road because the road had not existed at the time the detailed plan had been drawn up or when the applicant had purchased the land (see paragraph 8 above). The court stated that the mechanism of allocating the additional plot to the applicant had been breached, but that he was a bona fide owner. Mistakes had been made by the authorities and taking the land from the applicant would have disproportionate consequences for him. The court observed that the applicant’s neighbours could easily access their land using other roads and their rights had not been breached. Consequently, the court overturned the first-instance decision and dismissed the prosecutor’s complaints. The case file contains no information of whether there was an appeal on points of law. 18. The prosecutor applied to reopen the proceedings that had ended on 10 December 2008 (see paragraph 17 above). He argued that the Vilnius Regional Court had made a mistake in its application of the law and submitted that the additional plot of land should only have been allocated to the applicant after land reform plans had been carried out. Moreover, the allocation of 0.05 hectares to the applicant had been against the public interest because he had constructed a concrete fence on the road. The prosecutor added that an appeal on points of law had in fact been submitted after the appeal decision, but had been rejected by the Supreme Court. 19. On 4 December 2009 the Vilnius District Court held that an application to reopen proceedings could only be lodged against a decision that had been appealed against (see paragraph 57 below). The prosecutor had alleged that the Vilnius Regional Court rather than the District Court had made a mistake. If the prosecutor’s request were to be satisfied and proceedings reopened, the court of first instance would have to decide on the lawfulness of a decision by a higher court and domestic law did not provide for the possibility of a court of first instance annulling decisions made on appeal. As a result, the prosecutor’s application to reopen the proceedings was dismissed. 20. The Prosecutor General lodged a separate complaint. On 25 May 2010 the Vilnius Regional Court held that proceedings concerning a decision by an appellate court could not be reopened. Otherwise, appeals on points of law would be useless and the reopening of proceedings would be used as an opportunity to make proceedings more protracted. Moreover, there was a three-month time-limit to apply to reopen proceedings (see paragraph 58 below). The disputed decision had been adopted on 10 December 2008 and the prosecutor had sought to reopen proceedings on 8 July 2009, therefore the time-limit had been missed. As a result, the court upheld the Vilnius District Court’s decision of 4 December 2009. 21. The Prosecutor General lodged an appeal on points of law. On 21 December 2010 the Supreme Court decided that the Prosecutor General could apply to reopen proceedings in all cases that had been terminated by a first-instance or appeal decision (see paragraphs 56 and 57 below). Moreover, the mere fact that a district prosecutor had brought civil proceedings did not mean that the Prosecutor General had to know about it. The court thus held that those processes (see paragraphs 18 above and 24 below) had been different and that the time-limit to apply to reopen proceedings had not been missed. Finally, the Supreme Court observed, without further specifications, that the lower courts had failed to properly assess the circumstances which had led to an alleged violation of the public interest and remitted the application to reopen proceedings for fresh examination by the appellate court. 22. On 14 July 2011 the Vilnius Regional Court held that the first‑instance decision (see paragraph 19 above) had lacked reasons for why a clear mistake in the application of the law had been made (see paragraph 57 below) and without them the appellate court could not decide whether the Prosecutor General’s request to reopen proceedings had been examined properly. The court thus decided to return the case to the Vilnius District Court. 23. On 25 October 2011 the Vilnius District Court held that an application to reopen proceedings on the grounds of a mistake in the application of the law required not only that the mistake had to be clear, but also be one of substance (see paragraph 57 below). A clear mistake could be a failure to apply a required legal rule, a failure to properly interpret the substance of a legal rule, an obvious misinterpretation of the circumstances and so on. In the case in question, the Prosecutor General’s application could not lead to a conclusion that the proceedings had to be reopened. The Vilnius Regional Court’s decision (see paragraph 17 above) had been wide‑ranging, it had given well-grounded responses to every violation of domestic law alleged by the Prosecutor General and had come to a reasoned conclusion. Reopening proceedings would thus lead to a repeated assessment of the facts and would be contrary to the domestic law and the main purpose of reopening proceedings. There was no information that the Prosecutor General had lodged an appeal on points of law against the Vilnius Regional Court’s decision (see paragraph 17 above). Even if an appeal on points of law had been submitted and rejected, that meant that the court of cassation had not considered that there had been grounds to examine the case. As a result, the Prosecutor General’s request to reopen the proceedings was dismissed. 24. The Prosecutor General submitted a separate complaint. On 9 March 2012 the Vilnius Regional Court held that the conclusions of the lower court that there was no public interest at stake had been unfounded. Violations of domestic regulations had already been found and those regulations were necessary in the process of the sale or rent of State property. Violations of such regulations were directly related to a breach of the public interest. The court thus decided to reopen the proceedings. 25. On 15 June 2012 the Vilnius District Court ruled that the decision of 11 April 2008 to oblige the applicant to return 0.05 hectares of land to the State and to pay him LTL 15 had been justified. The court held that the additional plot of 0.05 hectares had been allocated to the applicant in breach of the requirements of domestic law and that by holding that the rights of the applicant’s neighbours had not been breached and that the applicant had been a bona fide party to the purchase agreement, the Vilnius Regional Court had made a clear mistake in the application of the law. The court thus annulled the Vilnius Regional Court’s decision of 10 December 2008 and upheld that of the Vilnius District Court of 11 April 2008 (see paragraph 16 above). 26. The applicant submitted a separate complaint. On 25 January 2013 the Vilnius Regional Court upheld the decision of the court of first instance (see paragraph 25 above). It also held that the applicant’s argument that he could not have known that part of his land would block the road was not convincing enough as there had been a plan of the whole of the Zujūnai settlement and it had been obvious that there was a continuing road which was part of the 0.05 hectares of land in question. The court further held that the applicant had not been diligent enough and that ignorance of the law could not absolve someone of responsibility (see paragraph 37 below). The fact that the applicant had to return 0.05 hectares of land to the State did not prevent him from asking for an easement over the part of the State land where his waste water equipment and gas and water supplies were installed. The court thus rejected the applicant’s argument that the order to return 0.05 hectares of land to the State prevented him from using his house. 27. The applicant lodged two appeals on points of law. The Supreme Court dismissed the first one as not raising important legal issues but merely disputing the facts established by the lower courts on 22 February 2013. The second appeal on points of law was dismissed on 26 April 2013. The Supreme Court accepted that if a person’s appeal was dismissed as not raising important legal issues, he or she could, within the time-limit prescribed by law, submit another appeal on points of law having corrected the deficiencies. However, it found that in the applicant’s case, the deficiencies of the first appeal on points of law had not been corrected, although the applicant had modified his arguments; therefore the complaint was repetitive and could not be accepted in accordance with the existing regulations (šiuo atveju kasacinio skundo trūkumai nepašalinti, skundas pripažintinas pakartotiniu, pagal nustatytą reglamentavimą jis negali būti priimtas). 28. In April 2013 the applicant applied for a suspension of the execution of the decisions of the Vilnius District Court of 15 June 2012 and of Vilnius Regional Court of 25 January 2013 (see paragraphs 25 and 26 above). He also sought to have the proceedings reopened. The applicant submitted that unless the execution of the decisions was suspended, he would have to initiate new proceedings for an easement. 29. On 26 April 2013 the Vilnius District Court rejected the applicant’s request to suspend execution, holding that his arguments did not constitute sufficient grounds. 30. On 2 August 2013 the Vilnius District Court rejected the applicant’s request to reopen the proceedings. It held that his argument that new circumstances had arisen was unfounded. The allegedly new circumstances were the fact that a general plan of the settlements of 1986 had not been registered in the State Register. The court observed that the applicant had been represented by a professional lawyer and must have been able to familiarise himself with the general plan and information about its registration. Furthermore, the fact that the plan had not been registered was not important to the examination of the case. The register had only been established in 1992 and had started functioning in 1996. 31. The applicant submitted a separate complaint. On 27 February 2014 the Vilnius Regional Court upheld the decisions of the lower courts and decided to terminate the applicant’s appellate proceedings. 32. The plot of land of 0.05 hectares was entered in the State Register as State property in May 2013. 33. In January 2015 the authorities conducted an examination of the use of the 0.05 hectares of land and found that the applicant had not removed the fence, trees, a shed and paving stones from the plot. 34. In September 2015 the authorities examined a March 2015 request from the applicant to purchase the plot of land of 0.05 hectares. The authorities stated that the plot could not be purchased as that would be contrary to domestic law (see paragraph 63 below). The same month the applicant was asked to remove the constructions described in the land examination document. It appears that the removal had to be conducted at the expense of the applicant. 35. In March 2016 the authorities held that the constructions had not been removed. 36. In February 2017 the applicant requested that the authorities rent the plot to him. In March 2017 the authorities replied that State land could be rented out if there were constructions on it that were owned by private individuals or legal entities. Such objects did not include temporary constructions, engineering systems, buildings that did not have a clear functional dependency or use, or other constructions designated as serving as dependencies of a main construction. The authorities held that the waste water treatment equipment was not an independent object and thus the applicant could not rent the plot of land.

5. The applicants alleged, before the domestic courts and before the Court, that on 26 August 2002 police detained Mr S. Selami and took him from Gostivar to Skopje where he was severely beaten. Mr S. Selami sustained serious injuries to his head including a brain haemorrhage and fell into a coma. The police brought him to Skopje Hospital, where he underwent brain surgery. He was in a coma for two weeks and was connected to a ventilator for assisted breathing. 6. By a letter of 28 August 2002 the applicants contacted the Ministry of the Interior seeking information about Mr S. Selami’s whereabouts. By a letter of 29 August 2002, the Ministry had informed them that Mr S. Selami had been admitted to Skopje Hospital. 7. According to a medical certificate from Tetovo Medical Centre issued on 29 January 2003 on the basis of the available medical evidence, Mr S. Selami was in a post-operative state (following medical trepanation of his skull and evacuation of the internal brain haemorrhage); parts of his skull and the tough brain membrane had been seriously damaged; he had suffered reduced mobility of all limbs, muscle hypotonia and neck and rib fractures. According to the report, those injuries had qualified as serious and had had permanent effects on the life and body of Mr S. Selami. 8. As to the subsequent establishment of facts by the domestic civil courts, see paragraphs 15-18 below. 9. On 31 August 2002, five days after first having been detained and beaten by the police (see paragraphs 15 to 22 below), an investigating judge of the Skopje Court of First Instance (“the trial court”) opened an investigation against Mr S. Selami and three other persons in connection with their alleged involvement in enemy activities against the State and ordered their pre-trial detention. The investigating judge specified that Mr S. Selami had been hospitalised and that the detention order would be enforced as soon as he was discharged from hospital. Mr S. Selami’s detention was extended on three occasions. The extension orders specified that he had been deprived of his liberty on 18 September 2002 and that he had been held under the detention order in Skopje Hospital until 18 October 2002. 10. On 14 November 2002 Mr S. Selami was indicted for membership of a terrorist group whose aim had been to organise terrorist attacks on the police in order to endanger the security and constitutional order of the State. On 10 December 2002 Mr S. Selami was released on bail on account of, inter alia, the “serious deterioration of [his] health”. 11. By a judgment of 9 September 2003 the trial court discontinued (запира) the criminal proceedings against Mr S. Selami since the prosecution had withdrawn the charges. The remaining accused were acquitted (ослободени од обвинение). 12. On 18 November 2003 Mr S. Selami contacted the Ministry of Justice with a view to securing an out-of-court settlement and payment of 16,170,000 Macedonian denars (MKD – equivalent to 263,000 euros (EUR)) in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage caused, so it was asserted, by the unlawful deprivation of his liberty and the serious injuries that he had sustained at the hands of the police on 26 August 2002. In support he submitted the medical certificate from Tetovo Medical Centre (see paragraph 7 above). 13. In the absence of any response from the Ministry, on 30 January 2004 Mr S. Selami and the applicants submitted two separate lawsuits, one in relation to his unlawful detention and one in relation to his physical ill-treatment by the police, claiming pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages in both. They reiterated that on 26 August 2002 Mr S. Selami had been unlawfully deprived of his liberty; that he had been taken to police stations where he had been beaten and physically ill-treated; and that the police had taken him to Skopje Hospital where he had undergone head surgery. On 19 September 2002 he had been transferred from the hospital to Skopje detention facility in view of his detention on remand. The applicants’ claim was based on section 190(3) of the Obligations Act (Закон за облигационите односи), which entitles a spouse and children to obtain non-pecuniary damages in a case of severe disability of the victim (see paragraph 27 below). 14. Both claims were joined and decided in a single set of proceedings. During the proceedings, the domestic courts commissioned two expert opinions and admitted into evidence extensive medical material issued by relevant medical institutions in Switzerland concerning Mr S. Selami’s earlier injury while at work in that State. 15. In a judgment of 22 April 2010, the Gostivar Court of First Instance ruled partly for Mr S. Selami and, relying on section 189 of the Obligations Act (see paragraph 26 below), it awarded him the equivalent of EUR 18,000 in non-pecuniary damages for the unjustified detention between 19 September and 10 December 2002. It dismissed the remaining part of Mr S. Selami’s claim. As to the applicants’ claims, the court held that the consequences suffered by Mr S. Selami as a consequence of “the unjustified detention” could not be regarded “extremely severe disability”, as required by section 190(3) of the Obligations Act. 16. On the basis of the available medical evidence, the court established that in 1985, while at work in Switzerland, Mr S. Selami had fallen and injured his spine and right leg, which had become dysfunctional. As a result of that injury, he had been certified as disabled for the purposes of work in Switzerland and he had had to use crutches and a disability-adapted car. 17. Relying on the expert evidence admitted at the trial, the court established, as a matter of fact, that during the “incriminating event of 26 August 2002 ... Mr S. Selami had sustained serious bodily injury. As a result of the head trauma, there was haemorrhage ... in the right (part of the brain) ... After the surgery, Mr S. Selami had remained in coma and ... had been connected to a ventilator for assisted breathing. He had recovered after three weeks ...”. The court further referred to the expert opinion according to which Mr S. Selami had sustained strong and intensive physical pain, as well as strong emotional pain and humiliation while being beaten. He had sustained serious head injuries, which had affected, though not permanently, the left side of his body and had provoked other negative psychological effects. 18. Relying on the statements of Mr S. Selami and the first and fourth applicants, the court established that in August 2002 the police had searched their house. They had asked Mr S. Selami to come with them to Gostivar police station. There, he had been questioned in relation to an incident in which two policemen had been killed. He had denied having any connection to that incident. He had been taken by police car to Skopje, where he had been placed in “a cellar or a garage” and beaten. The applicants had not been aware of Mr S. Selami’s whereabouts for several days after which they had discovered that he had been hospitalised in Skopje Hospital. Despite these findings of fact, the Court of First Instance expressed no conclusion about the lawfulness of any detention prior to 19 September 2002 or the treatment suffered by Mr S. Selami during that detention. 19. Both Mr S. Selami and the applicants appealed to the Skopje Court of Appeal. They argued that the first-instance court had not determined their claim in relation to the serious injuries inflicted on him by the police, as a result of which he had had his skull broken; had suffered a brain haemorrhage; had required head surgery; had been immobilised and had lost the full use of his hands. The Solicitor General also challenged the judgment. 20. On 6 April 2011 Mr S. Selami died. 21. On 24 August 2012 the Skopje Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals by Mr S. Selami and the applicants and allowed the appeal by the Solicitor General. It overturned the lower court’s judgment and awarded Mr S. Selami the equivalent of EUR 9,800 in respect of non-pecuniary damage due to his “unjustified detention between 19 September and 10 December 2002”. The court, inter alia, stated: “In the impugned judgment, the first-instance court established ... on the basis of the expert opinion [that Mr S. Selami] had experienced intense pain on his head and body when he had been physically attacked ... every blow had caused physical pain of different intensity, accompanied by swelling and bruises on his body ... Regarding the intensity and duration of the fear, the experts are of the opinion that when arrested and physically assaulted and hit, particularly on his head, [Mr S. Selami] had had intense, unpleasant, emotional experiences of primary fear ... which persisted until he had fallen into a coma ... Regarding the emotional suffering due to his unjustified deprivation of liberty and detention, the experts are of the opinion that the basis for an award of non-pecuniary damages ... is the time calculated as of 26 August 2002 ... when [Mr S. Selami] was arrested by the police ..., transferred to other police stations, where he was subjected to serious physical ill-treatment and beaten, which caused serious bodily injury ... This court considers that the [above] facts were correctly established. ... ... This court established on the basis of medical evidence that in 1989 [Mr S. Selami] had been certified disabled in Switzerland and that he had been receiving disability benefits ever since. The serious injury inflicted on him (during the 2002 detention) had caused his left limbs to become dysfunctional to a minor extent, which cannot be regarded as an extremely severe disability.” 22. The court rejected the applicants’ arguments that the first-instance court had not decided the claim for compensation for damage sustained as a result of Mr S. Selami’s physical ill-treatment. In this connection it stated that: “the operative provisions and the reasons given in the [impugned] judgment clearly and unequivocally confirm that the court had decided the entire claim ... This court considers that the emotional suffering due to unjustified detention is a single type of damage which includes all the detrimental effects on the victim, including his physical ill-treatment ... In assessing the amount of the award, this court took into consideration all the circumstances of the case, including the duration of the unjustified deprivation of liberty, the respect with which the plaintiff was held in his family and in the community, that during the unjustified deprivation of liberty he was physically ill-treated and sustained serious bodily injury, as a result of which his left limbs became dysfunctional to a minor extent, that he was hospitalised and operated on and that he had been disabled before ...” 23. By a final decision of 31 October 2012, delivered by a notary public, the fourth applicant was declared the sole heir of Mr S. Selami’s inheritance, including the compensation awarded to him. The remaining applicants refused to accept being declared heirs of the late Mr S. Selami. 24. On 1 November 2012 the applicants lodged an appeal on points of law against the judgment of the Skopje Court of Appeal reiterating their earlier arguments. The fourth applicant, as the statutory successor of the late Mr S. Selami, lodged the appeal in his name and on behalf of Mr S. Selami. 25. On 11 July 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicants’ appeal on points of law finding no grounds to depart from the established facts and the reasoning given by the lower courts.

5. The applicant company, Virprod-Lux S.R.L., is a company incorporated in Moldova. 6. On 13 April 2000 the Tax Authority seized a building from a State‑owned company, company V., on account of taxes which were due. 7. On 1 October 2000, at the request of the Tax Authority, the building was valued by an estate agency at 352,000 Moldovan lei (MDL). 8. On 29 January 2001 the Department of Privatisation and Administration of State Property sold the building in question to company B. for MDL 360,500 (approximately 29,678 Euros (EUR), following a public auction. 9. On 25 April 2003 the applicant company bought the building from company B. for MDL 628,000 (approximately EUR 22,053). 10. On 29 March 2007 the Prosecutor General’s Office initiated court proceedings in which it sought the annulment of both the sale of the building on 29 January 2001 and the subsequent transaction between company B. and the applicant company. It also sought the return of the building to its initial owner, company V. The reason relied upon by the Prosecutor’s General’s Office was that the valuation of the building conducted by the estate agency had not been carried out in accordance with the provisions of the law. The applicant company opposed the Prosecutor General’s action and argued, among other things, that it was time-barred. 11. On 21 August 2007 the Economic Court of Appeal dismissed the Prosecutor General’s action as time-barred. The court held, inter alia, that in accordance with the statute of limitations, the Prosecutor General’s action could not be initiated more than three years after the events in dispute had taken place. 12. On 11 October 2007 the Supreme Court of Justice upheld an appeal by the Prosecutor General, reversed the judgment of the Economic Court of Appeal, and upheld the action in its entirety. The Supreme Court considered that the Prosecutor General’s action concerned a declaration of the absolute nullity of the contracts in question and that therefore, in accordance with Article 217 of the Civil Code, enacted on 12 June 2003, it could not be limited in time. Following this judgment, the transactions of 29 January 2001 and 25 April 2003 were annulled and each party involved was ordered to return to the other parties whatever they received by virtue of those transactions. 13. On 7 December 2007 the applicant company lodged a revision request against the above judgment in which it indicated that it had carried out an expert evaluation of the disputed building by an independent expert who determined its value at MDL 8,550,000 (approximately EUR 511,440) after the improvements made by the applicant company to it. 14. In the meantime, the applicant company did not leave the disputed building because it had its production line there and it needed time and resources to find another suitable building and to move its production line. 15. Since company V. did not need the disputed building, the applicant company proposed to it and the latter accepted to conclude a friendly settlement agreement in accordance with which company V. agreed that the applicant company would retain ownership of the building in exchange for MDL 325,092 (approximately EUR 19,328). 16. On 20 March 2008, within the framework of the review proceedings, the Supreme Court of Justice upheld the parties’ request to settle the case. It confirmed the friendly settlement agreement between the applicant company and company V., and on that basis it quashed its previous judgment and rejected the Prosecutor General’s action. 17. It is unclear from the materials of the case and the parties’ submissions whether after the adoption of the judgment of 11 October 2007 by the Supreme Court of Justice, company B. returned to the applicant company the amount received as a result of the transaction of 25 April 2003.

5. A list of the applicants is set out in the appendix. 6. On 21 November 1994 the applicants were taken into police custody. Their statements were taken by the police in the absence of a lawyer. All the applicants confessed to having committed the crimes with which they had been charged. On 28 December 1994 they were remanded in custody. 7. On 24 January 1995 the Public Prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court filed a bill of indictment against the applicants (except for Eyyup Yaşar), charging them under Section 125 of the former Criminal Code with carrying out activities with the aim of bringing about the secession of part of the national territory. 8. On 18 June 1999 the Constitution was amended and the military judges sitting on the bench of the State Security Courts were replaced by civilian judges. 9. On 4 December 2001 the Diyarbakır State Security Court convicted the applicants as charged. 10. On 20 November 2002 the Court of Cassation quashed the convictions. 11. State Security Courts were abolished on 16 June 2004 pursuant to Law no. 5190. The case was accordingly transferred to the Diyarbakır Assize Court. 12. On 22 February 2007 the Diyarbakır Assize Court again convicted the applicants under Section 125 of the Criminal Code and sentenced them to life imprisonment. 13. On 6 February 2008 the Court of Cassation upheld the convictions.

6. The applicants in application no. 68125/14 (Wetjen) are a mother and father and their son, born in 2011. The applicants in application no. 72204/15 (Schott) are a mother and father and their three daughters, born in 1999, 2002 and 2004 respectively. All the applicants are members of the Twelve Tribes Church (Zwölf Stämme) who lived in a community of around 100 members of the church in Klosterzimmern. A second community with around 20 members was located in the nearby village of Wörnitz. 7. In 2012 the press reported about the Twelve Tribes Church and its position on the right of parents to apply corporal punishment, especially caning. Furthermore, statements by a former member of the community were published, confirming that children had been punished with rods. 8. In 2012 and 2013 the local youth office (Jugendamt) visited the community, and its spokespersons were invited to a meeting at the Bavarian Ministry of Education. Corporal punishment and the issue of compulsory schooling were discussed at the meeting. 9. On 16 August 2013 the local youth office and the Nördlingen Family Court received video footage from a television reporter showing ten different instances of corporal punishment in the community. The footage, filmed with a hidden camera, showed the caning of various children between the ages of three and twelve. None of the applicants was shown in the video footage. According to the television reporter, the person who carried out the punishment was not, in most cases, a parent of the child being punished. 10. After receiving the video footage, the Family Court initiated a preliminary investigation and on 21 August 2013 heard six witnesses, all former members of the Twelve Tribes community. The witnesses confirmed that various forms of corporal punishment were used in the upbringing of children in the community. These included swaddling (pucken) a child from birth until the age of around three, involving wrapping the child up very tightly to suppress any urge to move. Starting from the age of about three, children would be disciplined by caning, which lasted until about the age of twelve. The witnesses further stated that children were punished by whichever adult was supervising the children at the time and that parents were pressured by the community to conform to the rules of upbringing. 11. On 1 September 2013 the Nördlingen Family Court, upon an application by the competent youth office, made an interlocutory order regarding all children in the Twelve Tribes community, including the applicant children. The court withdrew the applicant parents’ rights to decide where their children should live (Aufenthaltsbestimmungsrecht), and to take decisions regarding the children’s health (Gesundheitsfürsorge), schooling and professional training, and transferred those rights to the youth office. The court based its decision on its finding that there was a reasonable likelihood that the children would be subjected to corporal punishment. The court also ordered that the youth office, when taking the children into care, could have recourse to compulsion, request support from the police and be permitted to enter the premises of the Twelve Tribes community in Klosterzimmern. 12. On 5 September 2013 the youth office took the community’s children into care. They were supported by around 100 police officers, who, at the same time, searched the community’s premises under an order from the Augsburg public prosecutor’s office and seized seven wooden rods. 13. The applicant children were subsequently examined but no physical signs of abuse or beating were revealed. 14. The applicants B., C. and I. Schott were moved to a children’s home. Since the applicant J. Wetjen was then only two years and five months old and was still being breastfed, he and his mother were housed together temporarily in a home under supervision. On 9 December 2013 J. Wetjen was taken from his mother and placed in a foster family. The mother had been ordered to wean her son two months beforehand. However, since she refused, the son was taken from her by force. 15. The Family Court examined the applicant parents on 10 October 2013. The parents stated that they had restrained their son by swaddling, but denied that this amounted in any way to child abuse. They refused to answer any questions about caning, but quoted passages from the Bible, which justified such a practice. 16. On 29 November 2013 the Family Court upheld its interlocutory order of 1 September 2013. On the basis of Articles 1631, 1666 and 1666a of the German Civil Code (see paragraphs 30–32 below), the court stated in its reasoning that there was a high probability that leaving the son in the community or returning him there would lead to him being subjected to corporal punishment, thus infringing his personal dignity and integrity, values protected by the German Basic Law (see paragraphs 26 and 27 below). It further found that the use of corporal punishment from such an early age would prevent the free development of his personality and instead teach unconditional obedience. The court based its assessment on the submissions of the parents, in which they had confirmed that they had disciplined their son. The court found that the statements by other children in parallel proceedings, the video footage and the statements of other witnesses confirmed that the disciplining of children in the community would include corporal punishment. Therefore, it was necessary to take the son out of the community as the option which least infringed the family’s rights, but which ensured that he would not be caned or harmed in any other way. It held that even if the parents might be able to resist pressure from the community, they would not be able to ensure that other community members would not cane the child when supervising him. The court also initiated the main custody proceedings and commissioned a psychologist’s expert opinion on the family. 17. On 28 January 2014 the applicant parents were examined by the Munich Court of Appeal. The father stated that, in his opinion, a mild caning constituted neither violence nor child abuse. Both parents also continued to refuse to answer any questions about whether their son had been caned previously. The court decided against examining the applicant child owing to his age and the mental stress that a hearing would cause and instead heard the guardian ad litem (Verfahrensbeistand). 18. On 5 March 2014 the Munich Court of Appeal upheld the Family Court’s decision in essence. It overturned the decision on the withdrawal of the parents’ right to take decisions regarding their son’s schooling and professional training, because, owing to his age, there was no need for the withdrawal of such a right in an interim decision. The Court of Appeal found it established that the parents considered caning to be part of their son’s upbringing and that the son would be caned if returned to his parents and the community. It based its finding on the statements of the parents and witnesses, and the guidelines in a leaflet entitled Our teachings on child training. The court further noted that bringing up children in this way was not justified by the parents’ freedom of religion. It also found that there had been no other option entailing less of an infringement of the family’s rights because up to that point the parents had not shown any willingness to refrain from disciplining their son, and greater assistance from the youth office would not ensure the safety of the son at all times. It further observed that only the opinion of the expert, expected in the main proceedings, would be able to determine the potential consequences of degrading educational methods aimed at unconditional obedience. 19. On 5 May 2014 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to accept a constitutional complaint by the applicant for adjudication, without providing reasons (1 BvR 770/14). 20. The Family Court examined the applicant children on 9 October 2013. All three daughters stated that they would like to return to their parents and the community. The two younger daughters refused to answer any questions regarding being disciplined or caned, or about the schooling and health‑care system in the community. The oldest daughter confirmed that her two sisters had been caned and that she herself had been caned when she was younger. However, she also stated that this had stopped after her Bat Mitzvah. The applicant parents were examined on 15 November 2013. 21. On 30 November 2013 the Family Court revoked its interlocutory order of 1 September 2013 concerning the parents’ right to decide on the oldest daughter’s place of residence and health, but upheld the rest of the decision. The court considered that it was very likely that the other two girls, if left in the community or returned to it, would be subjected to corporal punishment. The court based its assessment on written submissions from the parents, in which they confirmed that they had disciplined their children but denied beating or abusing them. The court observed that statements by the daughters and other children in parallel proceedings, the video footage and the statements of other witnesses had confirmed that the disciplining of children in the community might include corporal punishment. As in its decision in application no. 68125/14 (see paragraph 16 above), the court held that it had been necessary to take the children out of the community and that there had been no other less infringing measure. Regarding the oldest daughter, the court found that owing to her age there was no longer a risk that she would be caned. The court also initiated the main custody proceedings and commissioned a psychologist’s expert opinion on the family’s situation. 22. In the beginning of December 2013 the oldest daughter was returned to her parents. She has been living with them in the community of the Twelve Tribes Church in Klosterzimmern since. 23. On 5 March 2014 the Munich Court of Appeal upheld the Family Court’s decision in essence. It overturned the decision on the withdrawal of the parents’ right to take decisions regarding professional training for the two younger daughters because there was no need for the withdrawal of such a right in an interim decision. The Court of Appeal found it established that all three children had been caned and that there was a high probability that the two younger children would be caned again if returned to their parents and the community. It based its finding on the statements of the oldest daughter, which had been confirmed by the statements of the former members of the community and the guidelines in the leaflet Our teachings on child training. As in its decision in application no. 68125/14 (see paragraph 18 above) the court also noted that caning was not justified by the parent’s freedom of religion and that there had been no other option entailing less of an infringement of the family’s rights. It further observed that the wishes of the two girls (nine and twelve years old) did not prevent the taking of such a decision because only the expert opinion expected in the main custody proceedings would clarify how relevant the wishes of the girls were and the extent to which they had formed those wishes themselves. 24. On 5 May 2014 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to accept a constitutional complaint by the applicants for adjudication, without providing reasons (1 BvR 959/14). 25. The applicants also appealed the form of execution ordered in the interlocutory order (see paragraph 11 above). The Court of Appeal detached that part of the appeal from the part concerning parental authority (see paragraphs 18 and 23 above), since both parts had to be challenged by distinct remedies and different procedural provisions were applicable. The appeal by the applicants in application no. 68125/14 was declared inadmissible by the Court of Appeal on 4 June 2014 for being belated. The appeal by the applicants in application no. 72204/14 was declared partly inadmissible and partly unfounded by the Court of Appeal on 13 August 2014.

5. The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Sofia. 6. The applicant is a former police officer. Criminal proceedings were brought against him in 1996. 7. By a decision of the competent prosecutor of 6 March 1996, as provided under domestic law at the time, the applicant was placed under house arrest. The period of arrest continued until 3 April 1996, when the applicant was remanded in custody. He was once again placed under house arrest on 1 July 1996 and was released on 30 September 1997. 8. The applicant therefore was deprived of his liberty for one year, six months and twenty-five days. 9. In a final judgment of 27 January 1998 the Sofia Military Court found the applicant guilty of failing to perform his duties and he was given a one‑year suspended prison sentence. 10. In another set of proceedings, in a final judgment of 26 March 2003 the Supreme Court of Cassation convicted the applicant of fraud and sentenced him to one year of imprisonment. 11. The court also held in the second set of proceedings that the applicant should serve a single sentence for all his offences, which was set at one year in prison. 12. On 1 July 2003 the applicant was once again detained and placed in prison to serve his sentence. He was released on 18 September 2003 by a decision of the competent prosecutor. The prosecutor noted that the period of pre-trial detention should have been deducted from the applicant’s sentence, which meant he had already served it. 13. As he had worked in prison the applicant was also entitled to a reduction of his sentence by seventeen days. 14. In 2004 the applicant brought a tort action against the prosecution authorities under section 2(6) of the State and Municipalities’ Responsibility for Damage Act (see paragraph 21 below). He claimed 20,000 Bulgarian levs (BGN) for non-pecuniary damage for his detention in 1996-97 to the extent it had exceeded the set term of imprisonment and BGN 40,000 for his imprisonment between 1 July and 18 September 2003. 15. The domestic courts examined witnesses and a court-appointed psychologist who said that the applicant had been traumatised by the experience and suffered from anxiety, that his personality had been “permanently altered”, that he had difficulties communicating with others, and that his family ties had been “irreparably damaged”. 16. In a judgment of 2 May 2006 the Sofia City Court (hereinafter “the City Court”) allowed the claim in part, finding that the applicant had been detained for nine months and twenty-nine days in excess of his sentence and awarding him BGN 10,000 for non-pecuniary damage. It stated that his detention in 1996-97 had been “unjustified” and that his imprisonment in 2003 had amounted to “unlawful detention without any valid grounds”. 17. In accordance with the applicable provisions of domestic law, the City Court ordered the applicant to pay BGN 2,040 (the equivalent of 1,040 euros – EUR) in court fees, calculated as a pro rata percentage of the part of his claim that had been dismissed. 18. The judgment was upheld on 18 June 2007 by the Sofia Court of Appeal (hereinafter “the Court of Appeal”), which specified that the prosecution authorities were also liable to pay default interest on the above amount, calculated from 18 September 2003. 19. In a final judgment of 24 April 2009 the Supreme Court of Cassation reduced the award to BGN 3,000 (approximately EUR 1,530), plus default interest. It justified the reduction by referring to the “nature of the offences” the applicant had been convicted for, the “regime under which the sentence had been served” and the “socially acceptable criteria for justice”. It did not deal with the matter of court fees and took no separate decision in that regard. 20. The Court has not been informed whether and when the amount above was paid to the applicant. Calculations made with a calculator available on the Internet show that the default interest on BGN 3,000 for the period from 18 September 2003 to 24 April 2009 would be BGN 2,265 (the equivalent of EUR 1,155).

4. The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in İzmir. 5. In March 2002, the applicant, who was a working as a civil servant, was dismissed due gross misconduct. He applied to the administrative courts to have the annulment of that decision. In the course of the proceedings, on 4 July 2006 Law no. 5525, granting amnesty to civil servants who had been subjected to disciplinary proceedings, entered into force. Accordingly, in the light of this new amnesty law, on 10 April 2009 the Supreme Administrative Court decided that there was no need to examine the merits of the case. 6. In the meantime, on 30 September 2005 the criminal proceedings initiated against the applicant had ended with the decision of the criminal court, convicting him of abuse of office. 7. Following the entry into force of the amnesty law, the applicant applied to the administration and asked to be reinstated. His request was refused on 19 December 2006. The applicant initiated proceedings to have the annulment of that decision. 8. By a decision dated 8 January 2008, the Ankara Administrative Court found in line with the applicant’s claims and decided to annul the decision of the authorities by which they had refused to reinstate the applicant. 9. Following appeal, the case was transferred before the Supreme Administrative Court. In the course of the proceedings, the Chief Public Prosecutor at the Supreme Administrative Court filed his written opinion. This opinion included substantial grounds on the merits of the case with a proposal to quash the decision of the first instance court. On 25 May 2009, relying also on the opinion of the Chief Public Prosecutor, the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the decision of 8 January 2008. In particular, the appeal court referred to its previous leading case which had been delivered on 17 October 2008 on a similar case and held that the amnesty law did not put an obligation on the administration to reinstate the applicant. 10. The case was accordingly remitted before the Ankara Administrative Court. On 9 October 2009 the first instance court adhered to the judgment of the appeal court and dismissed the applicant’s case. This decision was served on the applicant on 13 November 2009.

5. The applicants were born in 1957 and 1981 and live in Diyarbakır and Adana respectively. 6. On 17 August 2006 the Adana public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with Adana Magistrate’s Court charging the applicants and five other persons with praising an offence and an offender under Article 215 of the Criminal Code. The public prosecutor alleged that the applicants had signed a petition in September 2005 which had been drafted in order to be sent to several institutions. The petition read as follows: “As a person from Kurdistan, I consider and accept Mr/Esteemed Abdullah Öcalan of Kurdistan as a political actor.”[1] 7. On 19 January 2007 the Adana Magistrate’s Court decided that it lacked jurisdiction in the case due to the possibility of application of section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713) proscribing disseminating propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation. The court then sent the file to Adana Assize Court. 8. On 24 March 2008 the Adana Assize Court convicted the applicants of disseminating propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation under section 7(2) of Law No. 3713 and sentenced them each to two years’ imprisonment. In its judgment, the first-instance court found it established that the above-mentioned petition had been prepared for the purpose of disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK and its leader and that by signing that petition the applicants had committed the offence proscribed in section 7(2) of Law no. 3713. 9. On 13 July 2011 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of 24 March 2008. On 24 August 2011 the Court of Cassation’s judgment was deposited with the first instance court’s registry. 10. On an unspecified date the second applicant started serving his prison sentence. 11. On 19 October 2012 the Adana Assize Court decided to suspend the execution of the applicants’ prison sentence in accordance with Law no. 6352 which had entered into force on 5 July 2012 and which had amended certain provisions of Law no. 3713. The suspension was for a period of three years, on condition that they did not commit an offence through the press, media or other methods of expressing ideas and opinions.

5. The applicant was born in 1985 and lives in Viljandi. 6. At the time of the events at issue, the applicant was serving a prison sentence for robbery and violence against a prison official. According to the risk assessment contained in his individual management plan drawn up by Tartu Prison on 16 January 2013 (kinnipeetava individuaalne täitmiskava), the applicant had been punished five times for criminal acts and was assessed to be a danger to the public, prone to risks and impulsive. 7. On 13 May 2013 the applicant requested prison leave to attend his grandmother’s funeral in Tarvastu, Viljandi County, which is located approximately 80 km from Tartu Prison. The applicant stated in his request that he was aware that the leave would entail him wearing handcuffs and that he would be accompanied by guards. 8. Permission for prison leave under supervision (lühiajaline väljaviimine) was granted on 14 May 2013. The decision (käskkiri) made reference to the fact that the applicant was considered highly dangerous and had received several disciplinary punishments which were still in effect. The decision was accompanied by an order (korraldus) of the same date which detailed how the prison leave would be organised, specifying that the applicant had to be escorted by at least three prison officers and that, as a preventive measure, he had to wear both hand and ankle cuffs. 9. On 15 May 2013 the applicant and his brother (also a prisoner in the same prison), were to be transported to the funeral service in the same prison van. The applicant signed a document about the prison escort regime (kinnipeetavale isikule lühiajalise väljaviimise raames kohaldatav saatmisrežiim) which explained the rules about being escorted, including the obligation to wear hand and ankle cuffs. At 9.30 a.m. he was placed in a single occupancy compartment of a prisoner transport van. It was a Volkswagen Crafter van used by the prison since October 2010, which had one four-person compartment and four single occupancy compartments. Each single occupancy compartment was at least 60 cm wide, 149 cm high and 85 cm long, with a floor area of 0.51 square metres. The compartment in which the applicant was placed was furnished with a plastic seat attached to the floor. There were no handles or seat belt. 10. The prison van reached the vehicle access gate of the prison premises. The applicant then decided not to go to the funeral and was taken back to the prison approximately twenty minutes later. His brother was thereafter transported to the funeral at 10.02 a.m. and reached the cemetery at 10.57 a.m. 11. On 9 September 2013 the applicant lodged a request with Tartu Prison, asking for compensation in the sum of 7,500 euros (EUR), claiming that the use of hand and ankle cuffs had been unjustified and that the prison authorities had wished to expose him to the public and to his family in such degrading circumstances. He added that the van compartment had been too small and without safety equipment, making him fear for his life. The applicant also alleged he had suffered psychological trauma because he had been forced to forego attending his grandmother’s funeral owing to the above-mentioned conditions. The prison dismissed his complaint. 12. On 4 December 2013, repeating the same complaints as those detailed above, the applicant lodged a complaint against Tartu Prison with the Tartu Administrative Court. 13. On 11 March 2014 the Tartu Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint. The court referred to the legal basis for using hand and ankle cuffs and considered it justified. With regard to the conditions in the transport van, the court noted that the applicant had refused to be transferred and therefore had never been subjected to the conditions described. As the applicant had refused to go on prison leave of his own free will, no unlawful action could be attributed to Tartu Prison. The court considered it plausible that the applicant had decided not to attend the funeral because he had not wanted his relatives to have a bad impression of him. However, there was no sign that the prison authorities had particularly wanted to degrade him in front of his family by resorting to the use of hand and ankle cuffs. 14. On 9 September 2014 the applicant lodged an appeal against the first-instance judgment with the Tartu Court of Appeal. He claimed, inter alia, that there had been no reason to conclude that he would have been embarrassed to be in shackles in front of his family, and that the main reason he had decided not to go to the funeral had been the transport conditions. 15. On 7 October 2014 the Tartu Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. Since the applicant had foregone being transferred to his grandmother’s funeral, there had been no unlawful act on the part of the prison authorities. As the transfer van had never left the precincts of the prison, he could not claim compensation for something that might have happened or for any trauma that might have occurred had he taken the prison leave. 16. On 10 November 2014 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, stating that he stood by the same submissions he had made to the lower courts. On 11 February 2015 the Supreme Court refused him leave to appeal on points of law.

4. The applicants were born in 1977 and 1964, respectively, and live in Voronezh. 5. The applicants are lawyers practicing in Russia. 6. Between 2008 and 2010 the applicants, within the group of lawyers, consulted several municipal organisations about various legal issues and provided other legal service. However municipal organisations did not pay for the service and the applicants instituted proceedings seeking to recover the debt. 7. On 22 June 2010 the Sovetskiy District Court of Voronezh granted the applicants claim against the municipal transport company and awarded them 40,020,000 Russian roubles. The judgment was not appealed against and became final. It appears that the judgment was executed at the expense of the municipal budget. 8. On 9 January 2013 the prosecutor of the Voronezh Region applied to the district court for the extension of the time-limits for an ordinary appeal against the judgment of 22 June 2010. 9. On 13 June 2013 the district court refused to extend the time-limits. The prosecutor appealed. 10. On 8 August 2013 the Voronezh Regional Court quashed the decision of the district court and extended the time limit for an ordinary appeal. The court found that the public interest had been concerned as far as the judgment had been executed by means of the municipal budget. Thus the prosecutor had the right to lodge an appeal. 11. On 12 November 2013 the Voronezh Regional Court granted the appeal lodged by the prosecutor and quashed the judgment of 22 June 2010 and ordered the reversal of execution. The judgment became final and was partially executed.

6. The first and second applicants were born in 1953 and 1954 respectively. The first applicant lives in Munich and the second in Erding. 7. The applicants are half-brothers. On 21 May 1993, following a criminal trial based on circumstantial evidence, they were sentenced to life imprisonment for the 1991 murder of W.S, a very popular actor. They lodged an appeal on points of law which was dismissed in 1994. On 1 March 2000 the Federal Constitutional Court decided not to entertain their constitutional appeals (nos. 2 BvR 2017/94 and 2039/94) against the decisions of the criminal courts. An application to the Court lodged by the applicants concerning those proceedings (no. 61180/00) was rejected on 7 November 2000 by a three-judge committee on the grounds that the applicants had not lodged their constitutional appeals in accordance with the procedural rules laid down by the Federal Constitutional Court Act (unpublished decision). 8. The applicants lodged several applications for the reopening (Wiederaufnahme) of the proceedings, the most recent of which was submitted in 2004 and rejected in 2005. In the context of those proceedings the applicants contacted the press, providing them with documents connected to the reopening proceedings and other unspecified documents. 9. The first and second applicants were released on probation in August 2007 and January 2008 respectively. 10. On 14 July 2000 the radio station Deutschlandradio – a public-law entity – published a report entitled “W.S. murdered 10 years ago”. The report stated as follows, giving the applicants’ full names: “Following a six-month trial based on circumstantial evidence S.’s partner, W., and the latter’s brother, L., were sentenced to life imprisonment. Both continue to this day to protest their innocence, and this year had their application for a retrial rejected by the Federal Constitutional Court.” 11. The transcript of this report remained available on the archive pages of the radio station’s website, in the section entitled “Older news items”, under Kalenderblatt, until at least 2007. (b) The Regional Court and Court of Appeal rulings 12. On an unspecified date in 2007 the applicants brought proceedings against the radio station in the Hamburg Regional Court, requesting that the personal data in files concerning them that had appeared on the station’s website be rendered anonymous. 13. In two judgments of 29 February 2008 the Regional Court granted the applicants’ requests, under Articles 823 § 1 and 1004 (by analogy) of the Civil Code (see “Domestic law”, paragraphs 48-49 below). The Regional Court held in particular that the applicants’ interest in no longer being confronted with their acts so long after their conviction outweighed the public’s interest in being informed about the applicants’ involvement in those acts. 14. By two judgments of 29 July 2008 the Hamburg Court of Appeal upheld the judgments, finding that the provision of these old news items had infringed the applicants’ personality rights. In that regard it noted in particular that in 2007 the applicants, who were about to be released, had been entitled to special protection enabling them to no longer be confronted with their criminal acts in view of their aim of reintegrating into society. The court found that they were no longer required to accept these reports being made available to the public, given that they had been prosecuted and convicted of the crime and had thus been sanctioned by society, and that the public had been sufficiently informed of the case. Furthermore, the interference with the exercise of the radio station’s right to freedom of expression had been minimal, as dissemination of the material had not been prohibited but had merely been made subject to the condition that the applicants should not be mentioned by name. 15. The Court of Appeal observed that the fact that material on the Internet was often made permanently available to users and that the information was visibly old did not alter that conclusion. It noted that, for the person requesting anonymity, whether the report in which his or her identity was disclosed was recent or old made no difference. On the other hand, what was decisive for the person’s reintegration into society was whether or not the information mentioning his or her name was still accessible, even though material published on the Internet was generally less widely disseminated than that broadcast on television or radio or in the press. The Court of Appeal also noted the risk that other persons, such as a neighbour, an employer or co-workers, could identify the applicants’ names and contribute to a further spread of old material about the applicants’ involvement in the crime, thereby jeopardising their resocialisation. 16. The Court of Appeal further stated that the fact that the applicants had turned to the public during the most recent reopening proceedings in 2005 – thereby giving rise to reports on them and on those proceedings – did not alter its conclusions, as the applicants had acted in a specific context which had ended with the completion of the reopening proceedings. The Court of Appeal added that the radio station was thus responsible for the interference with the applicants’ rights and that it could not argue that the information in question was contained only in digital archives. In the court’s view, the archived information was accessible in the same way as any other information available on the radio station’s website. The Court of Appeal also noted that the obligation to render material anonymous would not result in falsifying the historical truth as it was only a question of omitting a detail from the report. 17. The Court of Appeal gave the radio station leave to appeal on points of law. (c) The judgments of the Federal Court of Justice 18. In two leading judgments of 15 December 2009 the Federal Court of Justice upheld the appeals on points of law lodged by the radio station (nos. VI ZR 227/08 and 228/08), and quashed the decisions of the Court of Appeal and the Regional Court. The Federal Court of Justice began by observing that the provision of the impugned material constituted interference with the exercise of the applicants’ right to protection of their personality (allgemeines Persönlichkeitsrecht) and their right to privacy under Articles 1 § 1 and 2 § 1 of the Basic Law and Article 8 of the Convention. Those rights had to be balanced against the right to freedom of expression and freedom of the press as guaranteed by Article 5 § 1 of the Basic Law and Article 10 of the Convention (see “Domestic law”, paragraph 46 below). Owing to its particular nature, the scope of the right to protection of personality was not defined in advance but had to be assessed by weighing it against the divergent interests at stake; in order to do so the courts had to take into account, in particular, the specific circumstances of the case and the rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. 19. In the view of the Federal Court of Justice, the Court of Appeal had not taken sufficient account of the radio station’s right to freedom of expression and of the public’s interest in being informed, which formed part of the radio station’s mission. Referring to the criteria established in that regard by the Federal Constitutional Court and its own case-law, the Federal Court of Justice observed in particular that truthful reports could infringe personality rights where the damage they caused outweighed the public’s interest in knowing the truth, for instance when dissemination had a significant impact or when the report stigmatised the person concerned and thus had the effect of isolating him or her socially. However, reports concerning criminal offences were part of contemporary history, which the media had a responsibility to report on. In that regard the Federal Court of Justice observed that the more a case went beyond the scope of ordinary criminal behaviour, the greater the public interest in being informed about it. In the case of reports on topical events, the public’s interest in being informed generally took precedence over the right of the person concerned to protection of his or her personality. In the Federal Court of Justice’s view, anyone who broke the law and harmed others should expect not only to receive criminal sanctions, but also to be the subject of reports in the media. 20. The Federal Court of Justice went on to find that, over time, the interest of the person concerned in no longer being confronted with his or her wrongdoing acquired greater weight. Indeed, once the perpetrator of a crime had been convicted and the public had been sufficiently informed, repeated interference with the right to protection of personality could no longer be easily justified, in view of the interest of the person concerned in being reintegrated into society. Referring to the case-law of the Federal Constitutional Court and this Court’s judgment in Österreichischer Rundfunk v. Austria (no. 35841/02, § 68, 7 December 2006), however, the Federal Court of Justice pointed out that even if offenders had served their sentence, they could not claim an absolute right no longer to be confronted with their wrongdoing. The courts were called upon to consider the seriousness of the infringement of the right to personality and the offender’s interest in resocialisation; in that regard, account had to be taken of the way in which the person concerned was presented in the report and, in particular, the extent of its dissemination. 21. Applying these principles to the case before it, the Federal Court of Justice held that the applicants’ right to protection of their personality should yield to the radio station’s right to freedom of expression and the public’s interest in being informed. It acknowledged that the applicants’ interest in no longer being the subject of reports concerning their crime was considerable, since the crime had been committed a long time previously and they had been released from prison, the first applicant in August 2007 and the second in January 2008. However, in the view of the Federal Court of Justice, in the circumstances of the case the impugned passage from the report of 14 July 2000 did not affect the applicants’ personality rights in a significant manner (erheblich), as it was not liable to cause them to be “pilloried for all time” or to draw them into the spotlight (ins Licht der Öffentlichkeit zerren) in a way that would stigmatise them again as criminals. 22. The Federal Court of Justice first noted that the impugned passage gave a truthful account of a murder – of a very popular actor – that had been the focus of public attention. It noted that the passage recounted, with restraint and objectivity, the circumstances of the crime, the applicants’ conviction and the trial. In the view of the Federal Court of Justice, the passage in question did not stigmatise the applicants as the perpetrators of the crime or as murderers, but stated that the two brothers had been convicted of murder after a six-month criminal trial based entirely on circumstantial evidence and that they continued to protest their innocence; this left it open to the reader to conclude that they had been wrongly convicted. The Federal Court of Justice found that there was therefore no doubt that, on the day on which the transcript of the report had been posted on the radio’s website, the identification of the applicants in the radio programme had been justified in view of the seriousness of the crime, the fact that the victim had been well known, the considerable public attention the crime had received and the fact that the applicants had tried after 2000 to have their convictions quashed using all conceivable remedies (alle denkbaren Rechtsbehelfe). 23. The Federal Court of Justice added that the way in which the transcript of the report had been posted on the Deutschlandradio portal had resulted in limited dissemination. In its view, unlike the prime-time television report that had been the subject of a leading judgment by the Federal Constitutional Court of 5 June 1973 (no. 1 BvR 536/72 – the Lebach judgment), the impugned transcript could be found on the Internet portal only by Internet users actively seeking information on the subject in question. It would not have been found on the radio station’s Internet pages devoted to news items that might be immediately obvious to Internet users; the latter would have had to search under the heading “Older news items” (Altmeldungen), and the transcript would have been marked as such in a clear and visible manner. 24. The Federal Court of Justice also pointed out that the public had a legitimate interest not only in being informed about current events, but also in being able to research past events. Hence, in exercising their freedom of expression the media fulfilled their task of informing the public and helping to shape democratic opinion, including when they made older material available to Internet users. This was particularly true in the case of the radio station in question – a legal entity governed by public law – whose mission included the creation of archives. The Federal Court of Justice considered that a blanket prohibition on access or an obligation to delete any reports concerning offenders named in an Internet archive would result in the erasure of history and in wrongly affording full immunity to the perpetrator in that regard. In the view of the Federal Court of Justice, offenders could not claim such a right. 25. Lastly, the Federal Court of Justice noted that a ban such as that sought by the applicants would have a chilling effect on freedom of expression and freedom of the press: if they were prohibited from making available to Internet users transcripts of old radio programmes whose legality had not been challenged, media outlets such as Deutschlandradio would no longer be able to fulfil their task of informing the public, a task entrusted to them under constitutional law. The resulting obligation for the radio station to regularly check all its archives would unduly restrict its freedom of expression and freedom of the press. In view of the time and personnel that such checks would entail, the Federal Court of Justice found that there was a real risk that Deutschlandradio would cease to archive its reports or would omit information – such as the names of the persons concerned – that might subsequently make such reports unlawful, even though the public had an interest worthy of protection in having access to it. 26. The Federal Court of Justice added that the principles established by the data-protection legislation led it to the same conclusion. In that connection it observed that the provision of the impugned information fell within the scope of the media privilege enshrined in the second sentence of Article 5 § 1 of the Basic Law. Consequently, the provision of the information on the radio station’s website was not subject to the consent of the person concerned or to express authorisation by law. If they were deprived of the possibility of collecting, processing and using personal data without the consent of the person concerned, neither the press nor radio stations would be able to carry out their work as journalists and would thus be unable to perform the tasks recognised and guaranteed by Article 5 § 1 of the Basic Law, Article 10 § 1 of the Convention and Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Those tasks included not only posting reports online, but also ensuring their ongoing availability, notwithstanding the time that had elapsed since the transcript had first been posted (nine years in the present case). The Federal Court of Justice added that the radio station had posted the transcript of the report online solely for journalistic purposes and that it had therefore acted within the remit entrusted to it by constitutional law, namely to inform the public and help shape democratic opinion in the exercise of its freedom of expression. (d) The Federal Constitutional Court ruling 27. On 6 July 2010 the Federal Constitutional Court decided not to entertain the constitutional appeals lodged by the applicants, not to grant them legal aid and not to appoint lawyers to represent them. It stated that it was not giving reasons for its decisions (nos. 1 BvR 535/10 and 547/10). 28. The Internet portal of the weekly magazine Der Spiegel contained a file entitled “W.S. – hammered to death”. The file included five articles that had appeared between 1991 and 1993 in the print and online editions of the magazine. Access to the file was subject to payment. The articles in the file gave a detailed account of the murder of W.S., his life, the criminal investigation and the evidence gathered by the prosecuting authorities, the criminal trial and, in the case of issue no. 49/1992 of 30 November 1992, certain details of the applicants’ lives, including their full names. The article stated that the second applicant came from a broken (zerrüttet) family of six children from a named Bavarian village, that he had been placed in a home at the age of five, where he had learned what it was to be homosexual and, especially, how best to sell himself. It was also reported that he had worked as a hairdresser and a taxi driver before being employed at a petrol station owned by Mrs W., a wealthy childless widow who was a friend of W.S.’s mother and who had adopted him when he was twenty-four years old. As to the first applicant, according to the article he worked for a modest salary in the brewery managed by his half-brother. The article also gave some details provided by the witnesses during their testimony, in particular regarding how the first applicant was viewed by his half-brother. 29. Two of the articles in the file (published in issues nos. 39/1992 of 21 September and 49/1992 of 30 November 1992) were accompanied by photographs, one showing the two applicants in the courtroom of the criminal court, another showing the first applicant with a prison officer, and a third showing the second applicant with W.S. (b) The rulings of the Regional Courts and the Court of Appeal 30. In 2007, on an unspecified date, the applicants made an application for legal aid to the Frankfurt am Main Regional Court with a view to bringing proceedings against the magazine Der Spiegel. 31. On 4 June 2007 the Frankfurt am Main Regional Court dismissed the application on the grounds that it did not have sufficient prospects of success. 32. The applicants then brought a similar application before the Hamburg Regional Court, which granted them legal aid. 33. In two judgments of 18 January 2008 the Hamburg Regional Court granted the applicants’ request and ordered the magazine to put an end to the public’s access to the impugned file in so far as it included photos of the applicants and named them. 34. On 29 July 2008 the Hamburg Court of Appeal upheld the judgments of the Regional Court on the same grounds as those set out in its other judgments of the same day (see paragraphs 14-16 above). It specified that the applicants had the right to bring proceedings against the magazine in the Regional Court in which their application was most likely to succeed. (c) The judgments of the Federal Court of Justice 35. On 9 February 2010 the Federal Court of Justice allowed the appeals on points of law lodged by Der Spiegel (nos. VI ZR 244/08 and 243/08) and dismissed the applicants’ claims. (i) The reasoning regarding the articles 36. With regard to the press articles contained in the file at issue, the Federal Court of Justice adopted essentially the same reasoning as in its judgments of 15 December 2009 (see paragraphs 18-26 above). As to the content of the articles in question it observed that, contrary to the applicants’ claims, the articles did not characterise them as murderers in a provocative manner, but stated that the applicants had been accused of murder and that they had been convicted as charged. The Federal Court of Justice added that the articles in question reported on the applicants’ attitude towards the acts of which they were accused and recalled certain circumstances that had not been elucidated; this left it open to readers to conclude that the applicants had been wrongly convicted. As to the extent of dissemination of the reports, the Federal Court of Justice pointed out that consultation of the file was subject to payment, which further restricted its accessibility. It reiterated that offenders were not entitled to obtain a blanket ban on viewing a report concerning named offenders or an obligation to erase such reports. This was especially true in the case of a serious capital crime that had attracted particular public attention. (ii) The reasoning regarding the photos 37. On the subject of the impugned photos, the Federal Court of Justice pointed out that it had developed a concept of graduated protection (abgestuftes Schutzkonzept) based on sections 22 and 23 of the Copyright Act (see “Domestic law”, paragraph 50 below), which it had clarified following the Court’s judgment in Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 59320/00, ECHR 2004-VI), in response to the reservations of principle which the Court had expressed in that judgment. It observed that, according to that concept of protection, the publication of images of persons who – on account of their importance in contemporary history – were in theory required, under section 23(1)(1) of the Copyright Act, to tolerate the publication of photos of themselves was nevertheless unlawful if the legitimate interests of the person concerned were infringed (section 23(2)). There could be no exception to the obligation to obtain the consent of the person in question unless the report concerned an important event of contemporary history (the court cited Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) [GC], nos. 40660/08 and 60641/08, §§ 29-35, ECHR 2012). 38. Applying these criteria to the case before it, the Federal Court of Justice noted that the photos showed, firstly, the applicants in the dock in the courtroom of the Regional Court; secondly, the first applicant accompanied by a prison officer; and, finally, the second applicant with W.S. It considered that the photos illustrated the articles and underlined the authenticity of the reports, and that, since they had been taken in the context of the event being reported on (the criminal trial), a fact which generally made their publication lawful, they did not affect the applicants more than a photo showing their profile and taken in a neutral context. The Federal Court of Justice observed that the photos in question did not portray the applicants unfavourably or intrude on their intimate sphere, and that their distribution did not “pillory [the applicants] for all time” or present them to the public in a way that stigmatised them again as criminals. The photos – which dated back to 1992 and showed only the applicants’ appearance as it had been at that time – accompanied articles that were clearly identified as old reports with a limited impact. The Federal Court of Justice concluded that, in view of all the circumstances of the case, the applicants had no legitimate interest, within the meaning of section 23(2) of the Copyright Act, in prohibiting the publication of the photos. (d) The Federal Constitutional Court ruling 39. On 6 July 2010 the Federal Constitutional Court decided not to entertain the constitutional appeals lodged by the applicants, not to grant them legal aid and not to appoint lawyers to represent them. It stated that it was not giving reasons for its decisions (nos. 1 BvR 924/10 and 923/10). 40. In 2007, on an unspecified date, the applicants brought proceedings against the daily newspaper Mannheimer Morgen in the Hamburg Regional Court. On the newspaper’s Internet portal (www.morgenweb.de), under the heading “Older news items”, was a news item dated 22 May 2001 which was available until 2007. Only persons with special access rights, such as subscribers and purchasers of certain other printed media, could access this section. However, all Internet users had access to a “teaser” indicating the subject matter of the items available in that section. The teaser referring to the news item of 22 May 2001 gave the full names of the applicants and read as follows: “The proceedings against the two convicted murderers of the very popular actor W.S. will not be reopened for the time being. The Augsburg Regional Court reportedly rejected an application for reopening by the brothers W.W. and M.L. They are expected to appeal against that decision to the Munich Court of Appeal.” 41. In two judgments of 16 November 2007 the Regional Court granted the applicants’ request. 42. On 19 August 2008 the Hamburg Court of Appeal upheld these judgments on the same grounds as those set out in its judgments of 29 July 2008 (see paragraphs 14-16 above). 43. On 20 April 2010 the Federal Court of Justice allowed the appeals on points of law lodged by the newspaper (nos. VI ZR 245/08 and 246/08) and dismissed the applicants’ claims on the same grounds as those set out in its judgments of 9 February 2010 (see paragraphs 35-36 above). 44. On 23 June 2010 the Federal Constitutional Court decided not to entertain the constitutional appeals lodged by the applicants, not to grant them legal aid and not to appoint lawyers to represent them. It stated that it was not giving reasons for its decisions (nos. 1 BvR 1316/10 and 1315/10). 45. The Federal Court of Justice subsequently reaffirmed its case-law in other proceedings instituted by the applicants (nos. VI ZR 345/09 and 347/09 of 1 February 2011, nos. VI ZR 114/09 and 115/09 of 22 February 2011, and no. VI ZR 217/08 of 8 May 2012 concerning the second applicant). In a judgment of 22 February 2011 concerning the second applicant and relating to an article published in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung daily newspaper on 14 January 2005, the Federal Court of Justice noted that, according to the findings of the Regional Court, the applicant had contacted the Süddeutsche Zeitung daily newspaper in August and November 2004 and requested it to continue reporting on him. The newspaper had responded to the request by publishing an article (containing text and photos) about the second applicant. The Federal Court of Justice concluded that, under these circumstances, the public’s interest in being fully (umfassend) informed about the criminal act in question had not weakened or, at least, had resumed in the summer of 2004. This was further demonstrated by the numerous reports regarding the second applicant that could be found until June 2006 on the website of his criminal lawyer. Hence, the applicant had at that time been in the public eye and had not been unlawfully drawn into the spotlight by the publication of the article (no. VI ZR 346/09).

4. The applicant, who was born in 1989, lives in Istanbul. 5. On 14 January 2009 the applicant was taken into police custody on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation. 6. On 17 January 2009 the investigating judge at the Istanbul Assize Court, after questioning the applicant, ordered his pre-trial detention. 7. On 24 June 2009 the Istanbul public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Istanbul Assize Court. 8. The trial commenced before the Istanbul Assize Court and the first preparatory hearing was held on 4 November 2009. 9. In the subsequent hearings held between 17 February 2010 and 3 November 2010, the applicant appeared before the court and the judges ordered his continued detention. 10. The applicant filed an objection against the decision of 3 November 2010. On 29 November 2010 the 12th Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court dismissed this objection without holding an oral hearing, and based on the public prosecutor’s written opinion, which had not been communicated to the applicant or his representative. 11. On 13 February 2013 the applicant was released from detention on remand. 12. According to the latest information in the case-file, the proceedings against the applicant are still pending before the first-instance court.

6. The applicant was born in 1951 and is currently detained in Sofia Prison. 7. On 17 December 2016 the applicant took a flight from Kutaisi, Georgia, to Sofia, Bulgaria. When trying to pass through the passport control at Sofia Airport, he was arrested pursuant to a red notice issued by the National Central Bureau of Interpol for Iran on 14 September 2016. 8. According to the red notice, on 24 June 2016 the applicant and another person had stolen by means of trickery a bag containing 50,000 euros from a foreign-exchange office in Tehran. The applicant’s alleged accomplice had been arrested, but the applicant had fled Iran the same day. 9. The notice went on to say that the offence in connection with which the applicant was being sought was one under Article 656 of the Iranian Penal Code (see paragraphs 38-40 below), and that the maximum penalty in respect of it was three years’ imprisonment. 10. The next day, 18 December 2016, the National Central Bureau of Interpol for Iran confirmed that the applicant was still being sought and sent to the Bulgarian authorities a copy, in Persian, of the warrant for his arrest. 11. The same day the Bulgarian prosecuting authorities detained the applicant for seventy-two hours. On 21 December 2016 they asked the Sofia City Court to place him in detention for up to forty days pending receipt of a formal extradition request by the Iranian authorities. 12. The Sofia City Court heard the prosecuting authorities’ application the same day. In his closing statement, the applicant said: “[S]ending me to Iran would be unfair, because they have no laws, they decide as they please, they will ascribe this to me and I will not make it home. You know their laws! I have no one to protect me there. They have no laws and judges, but decide as they please. Can you give the sheep to the wolves?” 13. Having deliberated immediately after the hearing, the Sofia City Court allowed the prosecuting authorities’ request. It noted, inter alia, that at that stage it was not yet deciding whether to extradite the applicant but simply whether to keep him in custody in the meantime. 14. The applicant’s court-appointed counsel appealed against that decision. However, when the appeal was heard by the Sofia Court of Appeal on 27 December 2016, the applicant said that he had not instructed the court-appointed counsel to lodge it and wished to be represented by counsel of his own choice. In view of the applicant’s statement, the court discontinued the appeal proceedings. 15. In January 2017 the Iranian authorities submitted to the Bulgarian authorities an extradition request in respect of the applicant. The request stated that the act allegedly committed by him constituted an offence under Article 656 § 4 of the Iranian Penal Code (see paragraphs 38-40 below), and specified that according to the text of that provision the punishment envisaged under it was six months’ to three years’ imprisonment. 16. In the request the Iranian authorities assured their Bulgarian counterparts that the applicant would not face torture or inhuman treatment if extradited to Iran. They also expressed their willingness to honour extradition requests by Bulgaria. On that basis, on 26 January 2017 the Bulgarian Minister of Justice confirmed that de facto reciprocity existed between Bulgaria and Iran with respect to extradition. 17. Extradition proceedings against the applicant were opened in the Sofia City Court on 29 January 2017. He had counsel of his own choice and was given an interpreter into Russian, a language that he apparently speaks. 18. The same day the prosecuting authorities presented to the applicant and his counsel the extradition request and the documents enclosed with it (see paragraphs 15 and 16 above). 19. The prosecution also asked the court to keep the applicant in detention until the conclusion of the extradition proceedings. The court allowed that request the same day, 29 January 2017. 20. The court heard the extradition case on 6 and 28 February, 23 March and 12 April 2017. 21. The line of argument taken by counsel for the applicant from the outset was that the evidence enclosed with the extradition request left some doubt about the actual date and time of the offence the applicant had allegedly committed, and that he could not have committed it on the date and at the time initially specified because he had by then already left Tehran. The prosecution urged the court to invite the Iranian authorities to clarify the date and time of the commission of the alleged offence. 22. The court did so, in the exercise of its powers under section 17(3) of the Extradition and European Arrest Warrant Act 2005 (see paragraph 34 below), and in a diplomatic note of 5 April 2017 the Iranian authorities said that the applicant had committed the offence at 1.40 p.m. on 23 June 2016. 23. In his closing statement on 12 April 2017 counsel for the applicant argued that the extradition request, even as supplemented later, failed in various ways to comply with the formal requirements. He said that doubts about the date and time of the commission of the alleged offence – 23 or 24 June 2016 – persisted, and that the available evidence gave rise to misgivings about whether the applicant had really committed the offence. He also pointed out that although Bulgaria had extradition agreements with many States, Iran was not among them. 24. The same day the Sofia City Court allowed the request for the applicant’s extradition to Iran. It found, inter alia, that the extradition request met all formal requirements, and that it was permissible to proceed on the basis of the de facto reciprocity between Bulgaria and Iran. It also noted that the Iranian authorities had given assurances that the applicant would not face torture or inhuman treatment, and that there were no reasons to suspect that he would be exposed to a real risk of such treatment. In particular, Iranian law only envisaged imprisonment in respect of the alleged offence. It was not for the extradition court to delve into the merits of the criminal case. 25. Counsel for the applicant appealed to the Sofia Court of Appeal. He reiterated that the applicant had already left Tehran at the time when the alleged offence had been committed. 26. The appeal hearing took place on 9 May 2017. Counsel for the applicant made the same points as those that he had made at first instance (see paragraphs 21 and 23 above). 27. In a final decision of the same date, the Sofia Court of Appeal upheld the Sofia City Court’s decision to allow the extradition request, for essentially the same reasons. It likewise noted that according to the information from the Iranian authorities, the punishment possibly awaiting the applicant was a term of imprisonment. 28. The court also decided to keep the applicant in detention pending his extradition to the Iranian authorities.

5. The applicants were born in 1963 and 1965 respectively and live in İzmir. They are brother and sister. Their respective children, Sibel Sartık and Nergiz Özer, aged 24 and 15 respectively, were killed by soldiers on 19 January 2005 in south-east Turkey. During the same incident the soldiers also killed three other young people, aged 13, 16 and 22 (see Gülbahar Özer and Others v. Turkey, no. 44125/06, 2 July 2013). The bodies of those three individuals were subsequently handed over to their families, who buried them in Diyarbakır. 6. On 23 January 2005 the prosecutor ordered the release of the bodies of the applicants’ two children. The applicants took the bodies from the morgue in order to take them to the city of Siirt, where they wanted to bury them and where their graves had already been prepared with the help of the municipal officials. 7. On the same date the governor of Siirt issued a decision stating that crowds had gathered at the cemetery in Siirt and had attacked the municipal workers who were preparing the graves. Subsequently, the incidents at the cemetery had escalated and turned into “unlawful demonstrations”. Therefore, “in order to prevent any unwanted consequences”, the governor decided to order the burial of the applicants’ children in the two villages named in the respective birth register records of the two deceased. 8. While the applicants, together with the coffins of their two children, were on their way to Siirt, their vehicles were stopped by gendarme soldiers who told the applicants that they were not allowed to bury their children in Siirt. The soldiers told the applicants that, in accordance with the decision taken by the Siirt governor, the bodies would be buried in two other villages. The applicants told the soldiers that they had no connection with the two villages in question which, in any event, had been evacuated by soldiers in the 1990s. They stated that they wanted to bury their children side by side in their family cemetery in Siirt. Despite their objections, the bodies of the two children were confiscated and taken away by the soldiers. 9. The same day the second applicant made an official request to the office of the governor and asked for permission to bury the children in the city of Batman instead. This request was refused but the governor amended his decision so that the applicants’ children could be buried in the same cemetery in the town of Eruh, instead of being buried in two separate villages as he had previously ordered. In accordance with that decision, the applicants’ children were buried by the authorities in the municipal cemetery in Eruh at 1.45 a.m. on 24 January 2005 without any religious ceremony. 10. On 11 March 2005 the applicants brought a case before the Diyarbakır Administrative Court and asked for the Siirt governor’s decision to be annulled. They also requested that the Administrative Court issue an interim measure allowing them to exhume the bodies before they decomposed, and to bury them in a cemetery of their choice. The applicants agreed, in particular, that it was important and necessary to maintain public order. However, they argued that the governor’s decision had completely disregarded the moral values of their society and had aroused anger. The news that their children would not be buried in Siirt and that their bodies had been confiscated by the soldiers had caused an upsurge of emotion in the people waiting at the cemetery in Siirt and as a result they had attacked members of the security forces and local shops with sticks and stones. When the security forces responded to those attacks heavy handedly, scores of people had been injured and more than a hundred people had been arrested. All of that unrest had been caused by the governor’s unlawful decision. No such incidents had taken place during the burial of the three other individuals who had been killed at the same time as their children. In their complaint the applicants also referred to their rights under Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention. 11. On 30 March 2006 the Diyarbakır Administrative Court rejected the case. It noted that the governor’s decision had been based on section 11/C of the Law on the Administration of Provinces, which provided that the governor had a duty to maintain peace and public order in the province under his responsibility. The decision had been taken because the people who had gathered at the cemetery in Siirt and who were waiting for the bodies to arrive had thrown stones at municipal workers and members of the security forces. The decision to bury the bodies in the town of Eruh had therefore been taken with a view to maintaining public order. The Administrative Court considered that, although the applicants had the right to bury their children in a cemetery of their choice, the refusal to permit them to do so had been in compliance with the restrictions set out in the second paragraphs of Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention and in section 13 of the Turkish Constitution. 12. The applicants appealed against the decision and maintained that the incidents at the cemetery referred to by the Administrative Court had only occurred after the crowds had found out about the authorities’ refusal to allow them to bury their children in Siirt. They repeated their argument that the three others killed by the soldiers at the same time as their children had been buried by their families in Diyarbakır without incident. The applicants also reiterated their request for an interim measure. 13. The request for an interim measure was rejected by the Supreme Administrative Court on 13 December 2006. In a decision of 24 October 2008 the Supreme Administrative Court also rejected the appeal lodged by the applicants against the decision of the Diyarbakır Administrative Court. In reaching its conclusion the Supreme Administrative Court stated that the incidents at the Siirt Cemetery had begun when the people who had gathered there had insisted that the applicants’ two children be buried next to the graves of members of the PKK. 14. The decision of the Supreme Administrative Court was communicated to the applicants on 19 March 2009.

5. The applicant was born in 1985 and lives in Oryol. He is currently serving his sentence in IK-7 in the village of Areyskoye, Krasnoyarsk Region. 6. The applicant, his partner and his mother were living in Oryol when the applicant was charged with drug-related crimes. 7. On 2 December 2009 the Federal Penal Authority (“Федеральная служба исполнения наказаний”, “the FSIN”) of Russia sent a telegram to the FSIN department for the Oryol Region (“the Oryol FSIN”) instructing the latter to send each month up to forty people detained in remand prisons and sentenced to a term of imprisonment in a strict-regime facility to the Krasnoyarsk Region. The instruction was valid as of 1 December 2009 until further notice. 8. On 7 December 2009 the Sovetskiy District Court of Oryol convicted the applicant of drug-related crimes and sentenced him to twelve years’ imprisonment in a strict-regime post-conviction detention facility. On 2 February 2010 the Oryol Regional Court upheld the conviction on appeal. 9. Acting on the basis of the FSIN of Russia’s instruction of 2 December 2009, on an unspecified date the Oryol FSIN decided, in view of the overcrowding in the post‑conviction detention facilities in the Oryol Region, that the issue of which particular facility the applicant would be transferred to should be resolved by the FSIN department for the Krasnoyarsk Region (“the Krasnoyarsk FSIN”). The latter allocated the applicant to IK-7, a strict-regime post-conviction detention facility in the village of Areyskoye, Krasnoyarsk Region (about 4,200 km from Oryol), to serve his sentence. The applicant has been detained there since 20 April 2010. 10. The applicant has repeatedly asked the penal authorities at different levels to transfer him to a detention facility located closer to Oryol so that he could effectively maintain family ties while serving his sentence. 11. On 12 November 2010 the FSIN of Russia rejected the applicant’s request, informing him that, under Article 81 of the Code on the Execution of Sentences (“the CES”), in the absence of exceptional circumstances convicts were to serve their prison term in its entirety in the same detention facility, and that there were no such exceptional circumstances in the applicant’s case. They noted as follows: “[a]s regards maintaining the convict’s social ties, the right to receive visits and parcels as well as the right to correspondence and phone calls should be realised in accordance with the laws on execution of sentences in force and does not depend on the place in which he is serving the sentence.” 12. The applicant brought civil proceedings against the Oryol FSIN, claiming compensation for pecuniary and non‑pecuniary damage caused by their decision to transfer him to a penal facility in the Krasnoyarsk Region in breach of his right, under Article 73 § 1 of the CES, to serve his prison sentence in his home region, which had adversely affected his capacity to maintain his family and social ties. 13. On 3 August 2012 the Zavodskoy District Court of Oryol dismissed the claims for damages with reference to Article 73 § 2 of the CES and Ruling No. 1700-O-O of the Constitutional Court of Russia. The court held that the Oryol FSIN’s decision had been lawful because between December 2009 and February 2010 the penal facilities in the Oryol Region had been overcrowded. It also noted that the defendant had acted in accordance with the FSIN of Russia’s instructions. The court did not address the applicant’s argument regarding his difficulties in maintaining family ties because of the distance between his family home and the detention facility. It appears that the applicant did not appeal against the judgment. 14. Between July 2011 and October 2013 the applicant’s partner made long-term family visits to IK-7 on six occasions. In 2014 she gave birth to the couple’s daughter. While in IK-7, the applicant received a number of parcels and phone calls from his mother and partner.

5. The applicants are former employees and heirs of former employees of company F. - C.M.E. S.A. (hereinafter “company F.”), which owned a factory making engines and electric alternators in Aveiro. The company experienced a series of financial problems in 1985, leading to it being unable to continue paying salaries to its staff. 6. On 4 October 1994 the Coimbra Court of Appeal declared company F. insolvent. On 8 May 1995 the case was remitted to the Aveiro Court. 7. By a decision that was made public on 3 July 1995 the Aveiro Court ordered that creditors wishing to declare their claims (reclamação de créditos) should be summoned. 8. Having learnt that a site division and urban development plan (plano de pormenor) encompassing the land of company F. had been drawn up by the municipality of Aveiro, former employees of the company, including some of the applicants, applied to the Aveiro Court on 12 December 1997, requesting that it wait for the plan to be approved before ordering the sale of company F.’s assets. They hoped that the plan would lead to a rise in the land’s value and thus increase the prospects of their recovering what they were owed. 9. On 24 March 2000 the Aveiro Court issued a decision on the classification of the various claims (sentença de graduação de créditos). Some of the creditors appealed against that decision to the Coimbra Court of Appeal. 10. In a decision of 7 November 2000 the Aveiro Court authorised the suspension of the sale (see paragraph 8 above) until the approval of the site division and urban development plan. 11. In a judgment of 23 January 2001 the Coimbra Court of Appeal delivered a judgment on the classification of the former employees’ claims. On 9 February 2001 the first applicant appealed against that judgment to the Supreme Court of Justice. 12. On 19 February 2001 the applicant Rosa Rodrigues Casal (applicant no. 199 in the appended table) lodged an application with the Aveiro Court, seeking to register a claim against the insolvent company. 13. On 6 December 2001 the Supreme Court of Justice delivered a judgment confirming the classification of claims by the Coimbra Court of Appeal (see paragraphs 9 and 11 above). 14. On 27 November 2002 the judicial liquidator informed the Aveiro Court that he had suspended his activities following another court’s decision. In a decision of 29 January 2003 the court appointed a new liquidator. 15. On 15 April 2009, as part of a redraft of the court-distribution map (setting out the geographical areas over which courts had jurisdiction), the proceedings were transferred to the Aveiro Commercial Court. 16. On 29 July 2009 the municipality of Aveiro, the body of creditors and company G. entered into an agreement for the exchange of land between company F., company G., a neighbouring company, and the Aveiro municipality. 17. On an unspecified date a part of the land measuring 17,629.10 sq. m and a separate plot were put up for sale. 18. On 14 July 2011 a session at which offers to purchase could be made took place, and no offers were received. The court ordered the judicial liquidator to submit the documentation concerning that session and the proposal for sale within ten days. 19. On 6 December 2011 the court ordered the judicial liquidator to provide information on the state of the proceedings. 20. Since the judicial liquidator had not replied to the previous request, on 6 March 2012 the court ordered him to urgently provide information on the state of the proceedings, giving him a ten-day time-limit. 21. In the absence of any reply to the two previous requests, on 17 April 2012 the court ordered the judicial liquidator to provide information on the state of the proceedings, and also ordered that he would be fined if he did not provide such a reply. 22. On 23 April 2012 the judicial liquidator informed the court that no offers to purchase had been received, and he proposed to initiate contact with companies which specialised in the real-estate sector. 23. On 2 May 2012 the court ordered the judicial liquidator to establish contact with real-estate companies, and gave him a ten-day time-limit. 24. On 29 May 2012 the judicial liquidator informed the court that he had contacted some real-estate companies, but he requested ten more days in order to finalise the task. On 4 June 2012 he was informed that his request had been granted. 25. On 12 June 2012 the judge ordered the judicial liquidator to draw up a report indicating the detailed amounts to be allocated to each creditor in the light of the Supreme Court of Justice’s judgment (see paragraph 13 above). 26. Following the Aveiro Commercial Court insisting that the judicial liquidator provide information on the progress regarding contact with real-estate companies by way of three notifications (sent to him on 27 September, 19 October and 19 November 2012), on 16 January 2013 he informed the court that only one real-estate company had expressed interest in mediating the sale of the property. 27. On 6 March 2013 the court invited the judicial liquidator to initiate new contact with real-estate companies by email, since until then contact with the real-estate companies had been established in person. 28. On 18 December 2013 the judicial liquidator informed the court that contact by email had been made with 119 real-estate companies, and offers to acquire the property were to be received until 15 January 2014. In the meantime, the court had sent him three notifications in that regard – on 21 May, 10 July and 11 November 2013. 29. On 17 June 2014 the judicial liquidator replied to the 12 June 2012 court order (see paragraph 25 above). He informed the court that most former employees had not detailed the origin of their claims, and therefore it was not possible for him to provide a detailed plan on payment. On the same date the judicial liquidator informed the court that only three real-estate companies had replied and that those replies were negative. He then suggested that a new procedure for a sale by private agreement should be initiated, this time for 50% of the previously requested amount. 30. In reply to the judicial liquidator’s information, on 11 July 2014 the judge ordered him to provide information on the amount already obtained as proceeds of the liquidation (produto da liquidação), by reference to real estate or movable property, in order to assess the practical effects of distributing those amounts among the creditors. As the judicial liquidator did not reply to that request, on 1 July 2015, 21 April 2016 and 13 June 2016 the court insisted that he do so. 31. Meanwhile, on 30 September and 9 October 2015 the judicial liquidator was summoned in two sets of tax enforcement proceedings against company F. 32. On 23 November 2016 the judicial liquidator informed the court of the two sets of tax enforcement proceedings which were ongoing. 33. On 6 July 2017 the court notified the judicial liquidator that he should provide information on the state of the proceedings within ten days. 34. On 1 September 2017 the court insisted that the judicial liquidator provide information on the state of the proceedings. 35. On 20 September 2017 the judicial liquidator informed the court that a new tax issue was an obstacle in the insolvency proceedings. 36. According to the latest information received by the Court on 21 May 2018, the insolvency proceedings were, on that date, still ongoing. 37. On 11 September 1996 the applicants and other individuals (represented in the present case by their heirs) identified by numbers 1 to 131 in the Annex lodged an application with the Court to complain about the duration of the proceedings at issue before the Aveiro Court. 38. In a judgment of 8 June 2000, the Court found a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the excessive length of the proceedings, awarding each applicant the sum of 900,000 Portuguese escudos (PTE – about EUR 4,489) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and PTE 313,840 (about EUR 1,565) to the first applicant for costs and expenses. 39. The just satisfaction was paid to the applicants on 11 and 12 December 2000. 40. By Resolution CM/ResDH(2016)149 adopted on 8 June 2016 at the 1259th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, the Committee of Ministers declared that it had exercised its functions under Article 46, paragraph 2 of the Convention in respect of application no. 34422/97, and decided to close the examination of its enforcement.

5. The applicant was born in 1930 and lives in Valencia. He has lived in San José, a residential district of Valencia since 1962. Since 1974 Valencia City Council (“the City Council”) has allowed licensed premises, such as bars, pubs and discotheques, to open in the vicinity of his home. In view of the problems caused by the noise, the City Council resolved on 22 December 1983 not to permit any more licensed premises to open in the area. However, the resolution was never implemented and new licences were granted. In 1993, the Polytechnic University of Valencia carried out a study of the levels of night-time noise during the weekend on behalf of the City Council. It was reported that in the San José district the noise levels were notably higher to the legally accepted norm. 6. In 1994, the applicant became president of the neighbourhood association of his district. In that position, and in an attempt to improve the noise-pollution situation for both himself and his neighbours, he lodged various claims against the City Council. He also asked for the withdrawal of the business licences of several establishments. The City Council replied that in fact no business activities were being carried out in some of the premises, and that the business activities carried out in the others could not be considered as producing a high level of noise (for example bakeries). Lastly, the licences had in any case expired in many of the establishments. 7. On 28 June 1996 the City Council adopted the municipal Ordinance on noise and vibrations (Ordenanza Municipal de Ruidos y Vibraciones ‑ hereinafter “the Ordinance”). Furthermore, in July 2000, at the applicant’s request, the municipality required the pub located in the basement of the applicant’s building to install a noise limiter. 8. Following a resolution of the City Council, sitting in plenary session on 27 December 1996, which was published in the Valencia Official Gazette on 27 January 1997, the area in which the applicant lives was designated an “acoustically saturated zone” (zona acústicamente saturada). 9. In view of the fact that the levels of noise pollution did not decrease, the applicant decided to replace his windows with double glazing and to install air conditioning in order to alleviate the high temperatures caused by having the windows permanently closed in summer. 10. On 14 June 1999 the applicant brought a preliminary State liability claim before the City Council, relying on Article 15 (right to life and to physical integrity) and Article 18 § 2 (right to privacy and inviolability of the home) of the Constitution. The applicant asked for compensation for the expenses incurred, as well as for compensation in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. 11. Having received no reply from the authorities (silencio administrativo negativo), the applicant lodged a complaint with the Valencia High Court of Justice (“the High Court”) on 5 December 2001. On 5 January 2001 the City Council issued a resolution denying his preliminary State liability claim. The City Council joined the proceedings before the High Court. 12. The applicant provided the court with two reports: the first one of 1 April 1998 prepared by the municipal service for the environment stated that: “Prior to the entry into force of the declaration of an acoustically saturated zone, the levels of disturbance by noise during the night exceeded 65 decibels, mainly during the nights from Thursdays to Sundays from 10 p.m. to 5 a.m. in the morning. ... after the declaration [of the area] as an acoustically saturated zone and the adoption of some corrective measures the levels of disturbance still exceed [those permitted for night-time]. 13. The second report was issued on 28 March 2000 by the same municipal service, which admitted that: “... it must be concluded that ... the limits established in Article 30 § 2 of [the Ordinance] are still being exceeded.” 14. In order to sustain his arguments, the applicant also produced an expert report, produced by an applied physics professor, which was joined to his complaint. The report noted as follows: “The measured noise on the street and the noise perceived by neighbours in their homes, in the Xuquer area of Valencia – which is where the applicant lives – rise high total levels of ... 70 decibels ... Those levels are clearly related to the presence of a concentration of the entertainment industry in that area (pubs and discotheques). 15. As a result of this situation, the expert stated that it could be estimated that the sound levels for instance in a front facing bedroom were approximately 50 decibels (hereinafter dBA) and sometimes they could even reach 60 dBA. The expert highlighted that the City Council had recommended a maximum permitted level at night of 30 dBA. Consequently, there was a difference of 20-30 dBA. However, the expert report pointed out that this was a general estimation and that it was made without measuring the inside of the dwellings concerned. 16. Lastly, the applicant produced a medical report stating that he was suffering from anxiety due to the excessive noise inside his flat. The report concluded by considering that there was a relationship of cause-effect between the noise pollution and his psychiatric illness. 17. During the proceedings, the High Court ordered a legal medical expert report by a specialist in preventive medicine. The appointed expert reported that: “... the nocturnal noise altered necessarily the physiological sleep of Mr Cuenca and his family, [although it is not] possible to ascertain the intensity of the disturbance owing to the lack of corresponding sleep studies”. “... the sleep disturbance as a consequence of that noise produced in Mr Cuenca an ‘anxious depressive syndrome reacting to the noise, change in his psychiatric state manifested by irritability with his, anxiety, diminution of intellectual ability and somatization’”. 18. The City Council maintained that it was not proven that the applicant was suffering the noise level which he claimed in his home, as the environmental noise is perceived differently in each home, according to its height, aspect and other particularities. Furthermore, the City Council had been carrying out extensive activities in order to enforce compliance with the legislation on noise. It could not be said that the City Council tolerated infractions of that legislation. 19. In a judgment of 20 June 2003 the High Court dismissed the complaint. It found that there was no causal connection between the noise pollution and the alleged damage caused to the applicant, since there was no evidence proving that in his particular flat the level of noise pollution exceeded the established limits. Indeed, the applicant had decided to replace his windows without previously asking for a measurement of the noise inside his flat, as provided by Article 54 of the Ordinance. Furthermore, it should be taken into account that the applicant’s flat was on the fourth floor, where the noise would certainly be less intense than on a lower floor. 20. The applicant lodged an amparo appeal before the Constitutional Court, claiming that the State had violated his fundamental rights protected by Articles 14 (equality before the law), 15 (right to life and to physical and moral integrity), 18 (inviolability of the home) and 24 (right to a fair trial) of the Spanish Constitution. This appeal was initially dismissed on 18 October 2004. 21. On 16 November 2004 the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter “the Court”) delivered a judgment in the case of Moreno Gómez v. Spain (no. 4143/02, ECHR 2004‑X). In the light of this judgment, the public prosecutor lodged an appeal against the Constitutional Court’s decision, asking for the admission of the applicant’s amparo appeal. On 31 January 2005 the Constitutional Court upheld the public prosecutor’s appeal and declared the amparo appeal admissible. The Constitutional Court stated that the judgment issued by the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Moreno Gomez: “... justifie[d] entirely the reconsideration of the present amparo appeal, in order to ascertain the measure in which it might deal with an analogous case, and to examine whether the objects of analysis of the [Strasbourg] Court [had been] the same fundamental rights as in this amparo appeal”. 22. In the proceedings before the Constitutional Court, the public prosecutor claimed that there had been a violation of Articles 15 and 18 § 2 of the Constitution. He argued that the Court had already addressed this issue in the case of Moreno Gómez, which had dealt with the exact same situation suffered by the applicant’s neighbour, and declared that Spain had violated Article 8 of the Convention. The prosecutor considered that Moreno Gómez and the applicant’s case were similar in terms of the facts as well as in the object and the merits, which was in principle sufficient to deliver a judgment on the merits on the alleged violations of the right to private and family life and to inviolability of the home. 23. In a judgment of 29 September 2011, served on the applicant on 19 October 2011, the plenary of the Constitutional Court dismissed the amparo appeal, arguing that (1) both cases were not identical, (2) the applicant had not proved that in his particular case the noise at his flat was above the permitted level, (3) that the City Council had indeed adopted specific measures to reduce noise pollution at the applicant’s neighbourhood and (4) that he had not proved that his health problems had been directly caused by noise pollution. The judgment was not adopted by unanimity. 24. Three judges out of twelve issued a dissenting opinion holding that there had been a violation of Articles 10 § 2, 18 §§ 1 and 2 of the Constitution. In particular, the dissenting judges argued that the standard employed by the Constitutional Court to decide when the right to privacy and family life had been infringed should have been based on the case-law of the Court and that prolonged exposure to a high levels of sound that could be qualified as avoidable and unbearable deserved the protection of the courts, given that it impeded him from living a normal life. They reiterated that according to the judgment delivered in the Moreno Gómez case (cited above), the assessment of a violation no longer depended on the evidence provided by the applicant about the seriousness of the noise pollution inside his home. Instead, the decisive element was to be hereafter the location of the house in an excessively noisy area and it would be enough for the applicant to prove the excessive level of noise in the street. Furthermore, the effects of noise on the applicant’s health had been confirmed by the expert report issued in the proceedings before the High Court.

4. The list of applicants is set out in the appended tables. 5. On the dates indicated in the appended tables the applicants obtained monetary court awards against the Municipal Unitary Enterprise Passenger Transport Company of Kotlas (MUP Kotlas Passazhirskoye avtotransportnoye predpriyatiye – муниципальное предприятие муниципального образования Котлас «Пассажирское автотранспортное предприятие»). 6. Some of the judgments in the applicants’ favour have been partly enforced during the insolvency proceedings in respect of the company (see paragraphs 7-10 below), while others remained unenforced to date. 7. The company was incorporated as a municipal unitary enterprise. It was set up by the municipality of Kotlas. The company provided transport services in the town. It had “the right of economic control” (право хозяйственного ведения) over the assets allocated to it. 8. As submitted by the applicants, the prices for the transport services in the town of Kotlas were regulated by the Administration of Arkhangelsk region. 9. On 28 September 2007 insolvency proceedings started in respect of the company. 10. On 18 September 2012 the company was declared insolvent and subsequently liquidated.

5. The applicants’ dates of birth and places of residence are listed in the Appendix. 6. On different dates between 2012 and 2016 (see Appendix) the applicants learned that their right to leave the country had been restricted and that they were no longer allowed to leave Azerbaijan. 7. It appears from the documents in the case files that in all the cases the restriction in question was imposed by the investigating authorities, in the absence of any judicial decision, within the framework of various criminal proceedings in which the applicants were not convicted, accused or suspected persons, but were only questioned as witnesses. 8. The travel bans imposed in respect of the applicants in applications nos. 62775/16 and 43327/16 were lifted by the investigating authorities on 29 January and 21 April 2016 respectively. 9. On various dates the applicants brought an action claiming that the restriction imposed on them was unlawful, either by lodging a complaint with the administrative courts or applying to the ordinary courts for a review of the lawfulness of procedural actions or decisions by the prosecuting authorities under the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter “judicial review”). Some of the applicants used both of the above-mentioned remedies. 10. The applicants claimed, in particular, that the domestic law did not provide for the imposition of travel bans on witnesses in criminal proceedings and that the restriction on their right to leave the country was not justified. 11. In the domestic proceedings relating to all the applications, except application no. 66650/13, the domestic courts refused to examine the applicants’ complaint on the merits. Final decisions were adopted on various dates, by the Supreme Court in the administrative proceedings and the Baku Court of Appeal in the proceedings for judicial review (see Appendix). In their decisions, both the administrative and ordinary courts declared that they did not have competence to examine a complaint relating to the lawfulness of travel bans imposed by the investigating authorities. 12. As regards the applicant in application no. 66650/13, by a decision dated 1 April 2013, a judge at the Sabail District Court dismissed his complaint after examining it on the merits. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows: “Having assessed all the examined evidence, I conclude that the actions of the Prosecutor General’s Office of the Republic of Azerbaijan restricting the right of Mursaliyev Azad Oktay oglu to leave the country are lawful, that the procedure for judicial review as defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Azerbaijan does not provide for a [decision] on the payment of pecuniary or non-pecuniary damages, [and] that, for these reasons, the complaint should not be allowed.” 13. On 5 April 2013 the applicant in application no. 66650/13 appealed against that decision, reiterating that there was no legal basis for restricting his right to leave the country under domestic law. 14. On 12 April 2013 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the first-instance court’s decision justified. The appellate court repeated the reasoning provided by the first-instance court and made no mention of the complaint concerning the legal basis for the imposition of the travel ban.

6. The applicants are the National Federation of Sportspersons’ Associations and Unions (Fédération nationale des associations et syndicats de sportifs – hereafter “FNASS”), the National Rugby Players’ Union (Syndicat national des joueurs de rugby – hereafter “Provale”), the National Professional Footballers’ Union (Union nationale des footballeurs professionnels – hereafter “the UNFP”), the Professional Handball Players’ Association (Association des joueurs professionnels de handball – hereafter “the AJPH”), and the National Basketball Players’ Union (Syndicat national des basketteurs – hereafter “the SNB”). FNASS, which was established in 1992, is a federation of trade unions representing professional athletes, which today comprises the unions representing track and field athletes (SAF), basketball players (SNB), cyclists (UNCP), footballers (UNFP), handball players (AJPH) and rugby players (Provale). It represents around 3,500 professional athletes in France. Its aim is to defend the individual and collective rights and the pecuniary and non-pecuniary interests of professional athletes in all disciplines. The remaining 99 applicants are professional handball, football, rugby and basketball players. 7. On 14 April 2010 the Government issued Order no. 2010-379 on athletes’ health, bringing the Sports Code into line with the principles of the World Anti-Doping Code (hereafter “the Order of 14 April 2010”). The Order was aimed, firstly, at bringing the provisions of the Sports Code into line with the most recent version of the World Anti-Doping Code (hereafter “the WADC”), which entered into force on 1 January 2009 (see paragraph 45 below) following the Third World Conference on Doping in Sport held in Madrid in November 2007 (Title I) and, secondly, to clarify certain provisions of the Sports Code concerning athletes’ health and efforts to combat doping (Title II). The provisions of the Order were ratified by Law no. 2012-158 of 1 February 2012 on strengthening sports ethics and athletes’ rights. They were codified in Articles L. 232-2 et seq. of the Sports Code, which has undergone several amendments since. 8. Article 3 of the Order (Article L. 232-5 of the Sports Code) set forth the tasks and powers of the French Anti-Doping Agency (Agence française de lutte contre le dopage – hereafter “the AFLD”) and provided as follows: “I. – In paragraph I of Article L. 232-5 of the Code, sub-paragraphs 1 to 13 shall be replaced by the following provisions: (1) It shall define an annual programme of tests; ... (3) In the case of athletes subject to the whereabouts requirement referred to in Article L. 232-15, it shall carry out tests subject to the conditions laid down in Articles L. 232-12 to L. 232-16: (a) during sporting events organised by federations approved or licensed by the federations to which powers have been delegated; (b) during the international sporting events defined in Article L. 230-2 with the agreement of the competent international body or, failing that, the World Anti-Doping Agency; (c) during periods of training in preparation for the sporting events referred to in Article L. 230-3; (d) independently of the sporting events referred to in Article L. 230-3 and the periods of training in preparation for them; ...” 9. Article 6 of the Order (Article L. 232-13-1 of the Sports Code, see paragraph 63 below) provided, in particular, that individualised anti-doping testing of athletes included in the testing pool could be carried out at training and sporting venues, but also “at any location chosen with the athlete’s agreement at which the test can be carried out in compliance with the athlete’s right to respect for his or her privacy, including, at his or her request, at home.” 10. Article 7 of the Order added the following: “Article L. 232-15 of the Code shall read as follows: The athletes in the testing pool, designated for a period of one year by the French Anti-Doping Agency, shall be required to provide accurate and up-to-date information on their whereabouts for the purposes of conducting the tests referred to in Article L. 232-5. The athletes concerned shall be: (1) those whose names are on the list of elite athletes or the list of promising young athletes (Espoir) within the meaning of the present Code, or athletes whose names have featured on one of those lists for at least one of the past three years; (2) professional athletes who are licensed by the approved federations or who have been engaged in professional sport for at least one of the past three years; (3) athletes who have been the subject of a disciplinary sanction on the basis of Articles L. 232-9, L. 232-10 or L. 232-17 during the past three years. The information concerned may be computerised by the Agency with a view to organising tests. Computerised processing of information concerning athletes’ whereabouts is authorised by a decision of the Agency’s Board, taken after consultation with the National Commission on Data Processing and Civil Liberties.” 11. In an application registered on 1 June 2010 some of the applicants (unions and twenty-four individual applicants), together with other athletes, requested the Conseil d’État to set aside the Order, and in particular Articles 3 and 7 thereof (see paragraphs 8 and 10 above). With regard to the whereabouts requirement provided for in those Articles, they complained of a “particularly intrusive” testing system which compelled athletes in the testing pool to provide the AFLD with information concerning their places of residence, training and competition so that they could be located at any time, and to undergo immediate tests ordered on a discretionary basis and without advance notice. They complained in particular of the fact that the tests could be carried out independently of sporting events and outside training periods, that is, during periods when athletes were no longer at the disposal of their employer but were on holiday, resting or on sick leave or leave following an occupational injury. They argued that Article 3 infringed their freedom of movement by requiring them to give notice of their whereabouts on an ongoing basis, including during non-professional activities, and also infringed their right to a normal family life and their individual freedom as athletes. In their view, the unconditional implementation of Article 3(I)(3)(d) of the Order, allowing tests to be carried out independently of sporting events and outside training periods, meant that between 6 a.m. and 9 p.m. (the testing period laid down by Article L. 232-14 of the Sports Code, see paragraph 64 below) the athletes in the testing pool faced the permanent prospect of physically intrusive tests. This entailed systematically giving advance notice of their schedule, in breach of the right to establish relationships with their peers and the right to the peaceful enjoyment of their private lives. Lastly, the applicants complained of a breach of the principle of equality, as the whereabouts requirement for the purposes of anti-doping tests was confined to athletes included in the testing pool. 12. In a judgment of 24 February 2011 the Conseil d’État rejected the application in the following terms: “... As regards Articles 3 and 7 of the impugned Order: These provisions provide a strict framework governing the locations where AFLD testing of athletes in the ‘testing pool’ may take place, and the period during which such tests may be carried out. They require the athletes in question, in view of the demands of efforts to combat doping, to provide accurate and up-to-date information on their whereabouts for the purposes of organising tests, including unannounced tests, with a view to the effective detection of the use of doping substances, which can be detected only for a short time after being taken despite having lasting effects. Hence, Articles 3 and 7 of the impugned order, which do not hamper athletes’ freedom of movement, interfere with their right to respect for their private and family life as guaranteed by Article 8, and with individual freedoms, only to the extent that is necessary and proportionate to the general-interest aims pursued by efforts to combat doping, namely to protect athletes’ health and to ensure fair and ethical sporting competitions. In any event, the order under challenge also complies with the provisions of the International Convention against Doping in Sport, which do not have direct effect. The principle of equality does not prevent the regulatory authority from laying down different rules for different situations or from derogating from equality on general‑interest grounds, provided that, in both cases, the resulting difference in treatment is proportionate to the purpose of the rule establishing it. Athletes whose names feature on the list of elite sportsmen and women or the list of promising young athletes, which include amateur athletes and licensed professionals who may be required to notify their whereabouts with a view to anti-doping tests, are not in the same situation as other athletes, in view of the level at which they compete and the greater risk of doping such competition may entail. Likewise, athletes who have been the subject of disciplinary sanctions for doping during the past three years are not in the same situation as other athletes. Furthermore, athletes belonging to the ‘testing pool’ are not in the same situation as persons in other professions and may therefore be made subject to special doping control measures without the principle of equality being breached.” 13. In their initial and additional observations of 22 October 2013 and 17 February 2014 the Government provided the Court with the following information concerning the situation of the individual applicants with regard to the impugned legislation. (a) Eight of the ninety-nine applicants had never been included in the AFLD testing pool (Mr Millo-Chluski, Mr Nallet, Mr Traille, Mr Mas, Mr Domingo, Mr Dusautoir, Mr Heymans and Mr Para). (b) Of the twenty-four applicants who had participated in the domestic proceedings, none had belonged to the testing pool on the date on which the application was lodged with the Court. (c) Eleven applicants who had not participated in the domestic proceedings had belonged to the testing pool on the date on which the application was lodged (Mr Da Silva, Mr Gomis, Mr Ho You Fat, Mr Perquis, Mr Congre, Mr Coulibaly, Mr Cavalli, Mr Cabarry, Mr Huget, Mr Honrubia and Mr Gharbi). According to the Government, these athletes had been included in the testing pool in September and October 2010. They had all undergone testing, some of them between two and eight times. Nine of them had been issued with one or two warnings. One (Mr Huget) had received three warnings, leading to the institution of disciplinary proceedings and to an administrative penalty which he had not contested before the Conseil d’État. Of the eleven aforementioned applicants, six had had their inclusion in the testing pool renewed following two decisions of the AFLD Board of 12 and 25 September 2013. Mr Coulibaly, Mr Cavalli, Mr Gomis, Mr Cabarry and Mr Huget had been removed from the list. (d) With regard to Mr Kerckhof, the Government stated that he had been included in the testing pool on 7 November 2009 and had been kept on the list for a further year from 17 September 2010. During that time he had been found to be in breach of the whereabouts requirement on one occasion. 14. In a letter of 22 August 2016 the Government informed the Court that, by decisions of the AFLD of 4 September and 22 October 2014, five of the six athletes still belonging to the AFLD’s testing pool in 2013 (Mr Honrubia, Mr Perquis, Mr Congre, Mr Da Silva and Mr Gharbi, see paragraph 13 (c) above) had been removed from the list at their request, on the grounds that their names had been on it for four years. (b) Information provided by the applicants 15. In their observations in reply of 3 December 2013 the eight applicants who were not in the AFLD testing pool (see paragraph 13 (a) above) stated that they were in the testing pool of the International Rugby Board (IRB). They stated that they were required to declare their whereabouts in France on the same basis as the applicants included in the AFLD testing pool and that the AFLD, which had subsidiary powers in that regard, was empowered to impose sanctions on them. 16. The twenty-four applicants who had applied to the Conseil d’État also reported as follows on their situation at the time of lodging of the application on 23 July 2011. (a) Four of them (Mr Pierre, Mr Sissokho, Mr Psaume and Mr Talmont) had been included in the testing pool in 2010, and had remained in it for a further twelve months from 11 June 2010. They produced a letter from the AFLD dated 17 June 2011 asking the President of the Professional Football League to send a list of players by 2 September 2011 who should be included or retained in the testing pool. However, they did not produce the updated list of athletes who had been retained in the pool. (b) A further four (Mr Busselier, Mr Ternel, Mr Kiour and Mr Haon) had been included in the testing pool in 2009 or 2010 and had been retained for another twelve months from 23 September 2010. In a letter dated 23 September 2010 to the President of the National Handball League and the President of the French Handball Federation, forwarding the updated list of athletes in the testing pool, the President of the AFLD pointed out that the athletes in question were required to declare their whereabouts every day in accordance with decision no. 54 of 18 October 2007 (see paragraphs 69 and 70 below). (c) A further thirteen applicants who had been included in the testing pool in 2009 submitted that they had been included or retained in the pool on 11 June 2010 for a minimum twelve-month period (Mr Strunc, Mr Soliman, Mr Dondon, Mr Jeanneau, Mr Melody, Mr Kerckhof, Mr Linehan, Mr Maynier, Mr Ouattara, Mr Tsagarakis, Mr Moncade, Mr Pons and Mr Toffin). They produced a letter from the AFLD to the President of the National Basketball League dated 11 June 2010, asking the latter to send a list of players by 30 August 2010 who should be included or retained in the testing pool. The applicants did not furnish the updated list of the athletes retained in the testing pool (however, as regards Mr Kerckhof, see the Government’s observations at paragraph 13 (d) above). (d) Three applicants had been included in the pool in 2009 for a twelve‑month period (Mr Ayed, Mr Guilbert and Mr Dearlove). 17. The remaining applicants stated that they had been included in the testing pool following the Conseil d’État ruling and had joined the application to the Court in their capacity as union members. They did not provide any documents demonstrating that they belonged to the testing pool. 18. In additional observations of 5 December 2013 Mr Da Silva’s lawyer informed the Court that his client had appealed in the following terms to the President of the AFLD against the decision to retain him in the testing pool for an eighteen-month period from 26 September 2013: “... I was first included in the testing pool on 20 September 2010, in other words a full three years ago, and you have just retained my name on the list until 2015 at least, making a total of five years! This is completely unacceptable and disproportionate. I have complied with all the obligations entailed in belonging to the testing pool. This has affected my family life and had a considerable impact on my children, who often see inspectors turn up on my doorstep at 6 a.m. I have always provided details of my whereabouts in good time, have never missed a test and, in three years, have never received the slightest warning, still less tested positive for any banned substance ... Can you kindly explain [the] scientific reasons for keeping me in the testing pool? Does the fact that I’m nearing the end of my career make me a potential cheat? ... Keeping me in the testing pool for another 18 months stigmatises me in the eyes of my teammates as a potential cheat and is not acceptable. I agree that it’s necessary to tackle doping in sport, but not to the detriment of MY life. ... I am therefore asking you to review your position on my inclusion in the testing pool: keeping the same person in the pool for five consecutive years is not an effective way of tackling doping.” 19. The applicant, who was born in 1958, is a French national. She is an international racing cyclist who is on the list of elite athletes and has set numerous world records. She stated that she had undergone more than 1,200 anti-doping tests in the course of her career. She maintained that she had undergone unannounced tests abroad (in the United States, China, Switzerland and Australia) as well as regular tests at World Championship and Olympic events. 20. By a decision of the AFLD’s director of testing of 14 March 2008 the applicant was designated as one of the athletes in the testing pool and subject to individualised testing. At that time athletes could be included in the testing pool for an indeterminate period. 21. The Order of 14 April 2010, cited above (see paragraph 10), laid down a one-year time-limit for inclusion in the pool of athletes to be tested. 22. By a decision of 10 June 2010 taken under the transitional rules, the applicant was re-registered as belonging to the testing pool. 23. In 2011, following three failures to comply with the rules on whereabouts, the applicant gave evidence before a disciplinary board of the French Cycling Federation. She was cleared of misconduct on the grounds that, at the time of the most recent failure to comply, in the United States in June 2011, she had no longer been in the testing pool and had thus no longer been liable for testing. 24. In a letter of 20 December 2011 the AFLD invited the applicant to submit observations on her possible re-inclusion in the testing pool. In a letter, and subsequently during an interview with the President of the AFLD at which her lawyer was present, the applicant expressed her objections. She argued, among other things, that she was included in the testing pool of the Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI). In an email of 16 March 2012 the UCI informed the AFLD that the applicant was no longer in the UCI testing pool. 25. In the meantime, on 10 February 2012, the applicant’s husband and coach was placed under investigation for importing prohibited goods, infringements of the regulations on the trading and use of poisonous substances, and importing doping substances without duly substantiated medical reasons. 26. On 19 March 2012 the AFLD’s director of testing included the applicant in the testing pool. She lodged an application for reconsideration of that decision which was rejected on 22 May 2012. 27. A few days previously the President of the French Cycling Federation (Fédération française de cyclisme) had contacted the President of the AFLD in connection with the applicant’s planned selection for the London Olympics, expressing regret at the time taken to include the applicant in the testing pool. 28. In a decision taken on 27 September 2012, anticipating a Conseil d’État decision of 10 October 2012 (CE, no. 357097) to the effect that the director of testing did not have power to decide on the inclusion of an athlete in the testing pool (see paragraph 60 below), the AFLD Board, in order to prevent a legal vacuum that might adversely affect the implementation of checks on athletes’ whereabouts, approved the applicant’s inclusion in the testing pool. 29. On 11 February 2013 the applicant and her husband brought proceedings in the Paris Criminal Court against the AFLD and three of its senior officials, accusing them of forwarding confidential information to the newspaper L’Équipe concerning the disciplinary proceedings instituted in 2011 and the ongoing criminal proceedings. 30. In a letter dated 20 March 2013 the applicant contested the possibility of her renewed inclusion in the testing pool. 31. By a decision of the AFLD Board of 28 March 2013 the applicant was again designated for inclusion in the “testing pool”. The decision contained the following reasoning: “She maintains ... that, since the entry into force of the Order of 14 April 2010, inclusion in the testing pool is possible only for a non-renewable one-year period. This argument has to be dismissed on the grounds that the provisions of the Sports Code concerning the whereabouts requirement must be read in the light of the ‘principles’ established by the World Anti-Doping Code ... Article 2.4 of the World Anti-Doping Code lays down the principle of checks on whereabouts and possible sanctions for violations of the resulting requirements in the event of three failures to comply ‘within a twelve-month period’. Moreover, limiting inclusion in the pool to a non-renewable one-year period could render the whereabouts checks ineffective; this is clearly not what the legislature intended.” 32. On 28 December 2012 and 28 May 2013 the applicant lodged an application with the Conseil d’État for judicial review of the AFLD’s decisions of 27 September 2012 and 28 March 2013. She argued, in particular, that the rules on whereabouts and the unannounced testing of athletes in the testing pool were contrary to Article 8 of the Convention, and complained of being made subject to these rules for several years. 33. In the meantime, in a memorial of 11 March 2013, the applicant requested the Conseil d’État to refer the following question to the Constitutional Council for a preliminary ruling on constitutionality with regard to the whereabouts requirement: “Do the provisions of Articles L. 232-5-3 and L. 232-15 of the Sports Code establishing rules on the whereabouts and unannounced testing of athletes in the testing pool infringe the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, in the light of Article 34 of the Constitution, Articles 2 and 4 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (freedom of movement, respect for private life and inviolability of the home), Article 66 of the Constitution (‘No one may be detained arbitrarily. The judicial authority, as the guardian of individual freedoms, shall ensure compliance with this principle ...’) and, finally, the principle of equality before the law?” 34. In a decision of 29 May 2013 the Conseil d’État decided not to refer the question. It observed that the provisions complained of did not call into question the individual freedom which Article 66 of the Constitution placed under the protection of the ordinary courts (arbitrary detention), but fell within the jurisdiction of the administrative courts (see the position of the Court of Cassation on this issue at paragraph 73 below). 35. In a judgment of 18 December 2013 the Conseil d’État joined the two applications of 28 December 2012 and 28 May 2013 and rejected them, after deciding not to refer a second question for a preliminary ruling on constitutionality. With regard to the alleged violation of the right to respect for private and family life, the Conseil d’État found as follows: “... Firstly, the aforementioned provisions of the Sports Code relating to the obligations of athletes in the ‘testing pool’ do not infringe the right to freedom of movement or the equivalent right under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the [Convention]. They lay down strict rules for determining the locations where testing of athletes in the ‘testing pool’ may be carried out and the periods and hours during which these tests may be conducted, and preclude the testing of athletes at home without their consent. The computer processing provided for in Article L. 232-15 for the purposes of organising tests is subject to the Law of 6 January 1978 on data processing, files and freedoms. While the arrangements thus defined place restrictions on athletes, notably by requiring them to provide accurate and up-to-date information on their whereabouts, the legislative provisions at issue are justified by the demands of efforts to combat doping. These entail, in particular, the ability to carry out unannounced tests in order effectively to detect the use of certain performance-enhancing drugs which can be detected only for a short time after being taken despite having more lasting effects. Hence, these provisions interfere with the right of the athletes concerned to respect for their private and family life, as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention, only to the extent that is necessary and proportionate to the general-interest aims pursued by efforts to combat doping, namely to protect athletes’ health and to ensure fair and ethical sporting competitions. ... Seventhly, although the provisions of L. 232-15 of the Sports Code, which provide that inclusion in the ‘testing pool’ is ‘for a period of one year’, require the [AFLD] to review periodically the composition of the testing pool, in order to ensure that the athletes are not subjected for unduly long periods and without specific reasons to the constraints linked to the requirement to provide accurate and up-to-date information on their whereabouts, those provisions do not have the purpose or effect of prohibiting the Agency from designating athletes who have already been included in the ‘testing pool’. Thus, the argument that Article L. 232-15 of itself prevents the Agency from designating an athlete previously included in the testing pool must be dismissed.” 36. In a judgment delivered in 2014 the Paris Criminal Court dismissed the applicant’s action against the AFLD. 37. By a decision of 9 April 2015 the AFLD removed the applicant from the list of athletes in the testing pool. 38. In a judgment of 9 March 2017, following proceedings whose fairness he challenged before the Court (see paragraph 4 above), the applicant’s husband was sentenced to one year’s imprisonment, suspended, for importing erythropoietin (EPO). 39. In 1967 the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (“the Committee of Ministers”) adopted Resolution (67) 12 on the Doping of Athletes. This was followed in 1979, 1984 and 1988 by three recommendations, the most recent of which provided for the introduction of out-of-competition doping controls without prior notice (Recommendation No. R (88) 12 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on the Institution of Doping Controls without Warning outside Competitions). 40. Subsequently, the Anti-Doping Convention (ETS No. 135, hereafter “the Council of Europe Convention”) was adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 16 November 1989. This convention, which is the European reference instrument, has been ratified by all the Council of Europe member States and by five non-member States (Australia, Belarus, Canada, Morocco and Tunisia). It lays down a number of common rules and standards on the basis of which the States Parties undertake to adopt the necessary harmonisation measures at national and international level in order to effectively combat doping in sport. A Monitoring Group was set up to monitor implementation of the Convention; its activities involve working with the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA, established in 1999, see paragraph 45 below) and the international sports federations. There is also an Ad Hoc European Committee for the World Anti-Doping Agency (CAHAMA), which is a committee of experts responsible for coordinating the positions of the European countries acting on behalf of WADA. 41. The preamble to the Council of Europe Convention highlights the ethical, moral and health-related aspects of efforts to combat doping: “... Concerned by the growing use of doping agents and methods by sportsmen and sportswomen throughout sport and the consequences thereof for the health of participants and the future of sport. ... Aware that public authorities and the voluntary sports organisations have complementary responsibilities to combat doping in sport, notably to ensure the proper conduct, on the basis of the principle of fair play, of sports events and to protect the health of those that take part in them.” 42. Point 3 of Article 7 of the Council of Europe Convention, entitled “Co-operation with sports organisations on measures to be taken by them”, reads as follows: “Moreover, the Parties shall encourage their sports organisations: (a) to introduce, on an effective scale, doping controls not only at, but also without advance warning at any appropriate time outside, competitions, such controls to be conducted in a way which is equitable for all sportsmen and sportswomen and which include testing and retesting of persons selected, where appropriate, on a random basis ...” 43. An Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention was opened for signature on 12 September 2002 and entered into force on 1 April 2004. Its aim is to ensure the mutual recognition of doping controls and to reinforce the application of the Convention by means of a binding monitoring mechanism. 44. At the fourteenth Council of Europe conference of Ministers responsible for sport, held on 29 November 2016, the Ministers adopted Resolution No. 1.1 on the role of the governments in addressing emerging challenges in the fight against doping in sport at national and international level. The resolution recognised the considerable challenges that had recently threatened the integrity of the international anti-doping system and observed the need to protect athletes against forced or encouraged doping schemes and to provide them with proper anti-doping education. It reaffirmed the Ministers’ support for WADA as the “global anti-doping regulator responsible for standard-setting and monitoring”, and called for a strengthening of WADA’s capacity. It welcomed the enhanced cooperation between the Council of Europe and WADA, and encouraged the Monitoring Group set up to monitor the implementation of the 1989 Convention to continue its standard-setting work in order to offer practical guidance to the States Parties on addressing emerging anti-doping issues in compliance with the Convention. The Ministers recognised that all anti-doping organisations must comply with the rules of good governance and the principle of proportionality, while respecting the fundamental rights of the individuals subjected to the anti-doping regulations, particularly when it came to data protection. 45. Anti-doping activities took on a new dimension in the early twenty‑first century. The World Anti-Doping Agency (hereafter “WADA”) was established in the wake of the scandal that followed the discovery at the 1998 Tour de France of large-scale trafficking in doping substances involving one team and several well-known cyclists. WADA is an independent international organisation and a foundation under Swiss private law. It is composed of and financed by the Olympic Movement and governments. It draws up the WADC, which was adopted in 2003 and came into force on 1 January 2004 and which was subsequently revised in 2009 and 2015. WADA coordinates and supervises worldwide anti-doping activities in all sporting disciplines, with a view to harmonised implementation of a common set of general principles at international level, encompassing the definition of doping offences, the list of prohibited substances, tests, sanctions and the system of exemptions for therapeutic use. 46. The WADC is the instrument for bringing consistency to the anti‑doping practices of the different international federations and States. The introductory part spells out the “fundamental rationale for the World Anti-Doping Code” as follows: “Anti-doping programs seek to preserve what is intrinsically valuable about sport. This intrinsic value is often referred to as ‘the spirit of sport’. It is the essence of Olympism, the pursuit of human excellence through the dedicated perfection of each person’s natural talents. It is how we play true. The spirit of sport is the celebration of the human spirit, body and mind, and is reflected in values we find in and through sport, including: ethics, fair play and honesty, health, excellence in performance, character and education, fun and joy, teamwork, dedication and commitment, respect for rules and laws, respect for self and other participants, courage, community and solidarity. Doping is fundamentally contrary to the spirit of sport.” 47. Article 2 of the WADC lists violations of the anti-doping rules, including the rule on athletes’ whereabouts, which at the relevant time read as follows: “2.4 Violation of applicable requirements regarding Athlete availability for Out‑of‑Competition Testing, including failure to file required whereabouts information and missed tests which are declared based on rules which comply with the International Standard for Testing. Any combination of three missed tests and/or filing failures within an eighteen-month period as determined by Anti-Doping Organizations with jurisdiction over the Athlete shall constitute an anti-doping rule violation.” 48. As worded at the relevant time, Article 5 of the WADC concerning testing specified that the national anti-doping organisations and international federations had jurisdiction in the matter. The relevant parts read as follows: “5.1.1 [The above-mentioned organisations shall p]lan and conduct an effective number of In-Competition and Out-of-Competition tests on Athletes over whom they have jurisdiction, including but not limited to Athletes in their respective Registered Testing Pools. Each International Federation shall establish a Registered Testing Pool for International-Level Athletes in its sport, and each National Anti-Doping Organization shall establish a national Registered Testing Pool for Athletes who are present in that National Anti-Doping Organization’s country or who are nationals, residents, license-holders or members of sport organizations of that country. In accordance with Article 14.3, any Athlete included in a Registered Testing Pool shall be subject to the whereabouts requirements set out in the International Standard for Testing. 49. In its wording at the time of the events, Article 10.3.3 of the WADC, entitled “Sanctions on Individuals”, provided as follows: “For violations of Article 2.4 (Whereabouts Filing Failures and/or Missed Tests), the period of Ineligibility shall be at a minimum one (1) year and at a maximum two (2) years based on the Athlete’s degree of fault.” 50. Article 14.3, entitled “Athletes whereabouts information” provided at the relevant time that the International Federation and the national anti‑doping organisation were to coordinate the identification of athletes and the collecting of current location information and submit them to WADA. 51. The revised version of the WADC, which entered into force on 1 January 2015, contained numerous amendments. Those of interest in the context of the present applications are as follows. Under the revised Article 2.4, a violation is established where three “whereabouts failures” occur within a twelve-month period (rather than eighteen months as previously, see paragraph 47 above). The revised Article 5.2 now provides that “[a]ny Athlete may be required to provide a Sample at any time and at any place” if, according to the comment on the Article by WADA itself, the anti‑doping organisation has a serious and specific suspicion that the athlete may be engaged in doping. 52. The provisions of the WADC operate in conjunction with five international standards. Section 11 of the standard on testing (“Athlete whereabouts Requirements”), as in force at the material time, read, inter alia, as follows: “11.1 Objective/general principles 11.1.1 It is recognised and accepted that (a) No Advance Notice Out-of-Competition Testing is at the core of effective Doping Control; and (b) without accurate information as to an Athlete’s whereabouts, such Testing can be inefficient and often impossible. [11.1.1 Comment: Such recognition is the fundamental rationale underlying Code Article 2.4 and this Section 11 of the International Standard for Testing.] 11.1.2 Therefore, in addition to developing a Test Distribution Plan in accordance with Section 4 of this International Standard, each IF [International Federation] and NADO [National Anti-Doping Organisation] shall create a Registered Testing Pool of Athletes ... Athletes in a Registered Testing Pool shall be subject to and required to comply with the Athlete whereabouts requirements set out in this Section 11: see Code Article 14.3. 11.1.3 An Athlete in a Registered Testing Pool is required to make a quarterly Whereabouts Filing that provides accurate and complete information about the Athlete’s whereabouts during the forthcoming quarter, including identifying where he/she will be living, training and competing during that quarter, so that he/she can be located for Testing at any time during that quarter: see Clause 11.3. A failure to do so amounts to a Filing Failure and therefore a Whereabouts Failure for purposes of Code Article 2.4. 11.1.4 An Athlete in a Registered Testing Pool is also required to specify in his/her Whereabouts Filing, for each day in the forthcoming quarter, one specific 60-minute time slot where he/she will be available at a specified location for Testing: see Clause 11.4. This does not limit in any way the Athlete’s obligation to be available for Testing at any time and place. Nor does it limit his/her obligation to provide the information specified in Clause 11.3 as to his/her whereabouts outside of that 60‑minute time slot. However, if the Athlete is not available for Testing at such location during the 60-minute time slot specified for that day in his/her Whereabouts Filing, and has not updated his/her Whereabouts Filing prior to that 60-minute time slot to provide an alternative time slot/location for that day, that failure shall amount to a Missed Test and shall therefore constitute a Whereabouts Failure for purposes of Code Article 2.4. [11.1.4 Comment: The purpose of the 60-minute time slot is to strike a balance between the need to locate the Athlete for Testing and the impracticality and unfairness of making Athletes potentially accountable for a Missed Test every time they depart from their previously-declared routine. ... After extensive consultation with stakeholders with substantial whereabouts experience, the view was taken that the best way to maximize the chances of finding the Athlete at any time, while providing a reasonable and appropriate mitigation of ‘24/7’ Missed Test liability, was to combine the best elements of each system, i.e. requiring disclosure of whereabouts information on a ‘24/7’ basis, while limiting exposure to a Missed Test to a 60-minute time slot ...]” Under heading 11.3 (“Whereabouts Filing Requirements”), Clause 11.3.1 stated that the athletes concerned had to provide the International Federation or the national anti-doping organisation with the following information: a complete mailing address; details of any disability; specific confirmation of their consent to the sharing of their whereabouts information with other organisations having authority to test them; for each day during the following quarter, the full address of the place where they would be residing (for example, home, temporary lodgings, hotel, and so on); and for each day during the following quarter, the name and address of each location where they would train, work or conduct any other regular activity (for instance, school), as well as the usual time-frames for such regular activities. Clause 11.3.2 provided that the whereabouts information also had to include, for each day during the following quarter, one specific sixty-minute time slot between 6 a.m. and 11 p.m. each day during which the athlete concerned would be available and accessible for testing at a specific location. The comment on this clause stated that the athletes concerned could choose which location to nominate for this sixty-minute time slot: it could be their place of residence, training or competition, or it could be another location (for instance, work or school). A failure to be available for testing at the specified location during the specified time slot would be regarded as a missed test. Clause 11.3.6 specified that athletes could delegate the filing of the information to a third party. Under heading 11.4 (“Availability for Testing”), Clause 11.4.1 provided as follows: “11.4.1 An Athlete in a Registered Testing Pool must specifically be present and available for Testing on any given day in the relevant quarter for the 60-minute time slot specified for that day in his/her Whereabouts Filing, at the location that the Athlete has specified for that time slot in such filing.” 53. The International Convention against Doping in Sport, adopted under the auspices of UNESCO (hereafter “the UNESCO Convention”) came into force on 1 February 2007. The preamble to this Convention reads as follows: “... Conscious that sport should play an important role in the protection of health, ... Concerned by the use of doping by athletes in sport and the consequences thereof for their health, the principle of fair play, the elimination of cheating and the future of sport, ... Mindful also of the influence that elite athletes have on youth, ... Aware that public authorities and the organizations responsible for sport have complementary responsibilities to prevent and combat doping in sport, notably to ensure the proper conduct, on the basis of the principle of fair play, of sports events and to protect the health of those that take part in them, ... Recognizing that the elimination of doping in sport is dependent in part upon progressive harmonization of anti-doping standards and practices in sport and cooperation at the national and global levels, ...” 54. As the WADC is not binding on States because the instruments adopted by WADA are governed by private law, it was decided to draw up an international Convention in order to provide an internationally recognised legal framework allowing States to incorporate the Code into their domestic legislation. The UNESCO Convention has hitherto been ratified by France and by 186 other States. Article 4 stipulates that the provisions of the WADC are not an integral part of the Convention and do not have direct effect in national law. It states that “[i]n order to coordinate the implementation, at the national and international levels, of the fight against doping in sport, States Parties commit themselves to the principles of the Code as the basis for the measures provided for in Article 5 of this Convention.” Articles 3 and 5 provide that States undertake to “adopt appropriate measures at the national and international levels which are consistent with the principles of the Code” and that “such measures may include legislation, regulation, policies or administrative practices”. According to Article 12, States are to encourage the implementation of doping controls in a manner consistent with the Code, including no‑advance-notice and out-of-competition testing. Article 19 encourages States to implement education and training programmes on anti-doping, both for athletes and for the sporting community in general, who should be provided with information on “the harm of doping to the ethical values of sport” and “the health consequences of doping”. 55. Articles 6 and 165 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provide as follows: Article 6 “The Union shall have competence to carry out actions to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States. The areas of such action shall, at European level, be: ... (e) education, vocational training, youth and sport; ” Article 165 “1. ... The Union shall contribute to the promotion of European sporting issues, while taking account of the specific nature of sport, its structures based on voluntary activity and its social and educational function. 2. Union action shall be aimed at: ... - developing the European dimension in sport, by promoting fairness and openness in sporting competitions and cooperation between bodies responsible for sports, and by protecting the physical and moral integrity of sportsmen and sportswomen, especially the youngest sportsmen and sportswomen. 3. The Union and the Member States shall foster cooperation with third countries and the competent international organisations in the field of education and sport, in particular the Council of Europe. ...” 56. The EU contributes to the revision of the WADC. Hence, in a contribution sent to WADA in March 2012 (6846/12), the Council of the European Union expressed its point of view on the whereabouts requirement, referring to an opinion of the “Article 29” Data Protection Working Party (opinion 4/2009). That opinion stressed that the information to be provided concerning the whereabouts and the time slots for controls should be clearly determined by taking into account the requirements of the principles of necessity and proportionality with respect to the purposes of out-of-competition testing. In another contribution concerning the revision of the WADC (no. 6427/13), the Council observed that athletes’ rights could be enhanced by the preparation of guidance aimed at ensuring the proportionality of measures concerning registered testing pools and athletes’ whereabouts.

5. The first applicant (Mr Ryklin) was born in 1958. The second applicant (Mr Sharov) was born in 1956. Both applicants are human rights activists and pro-democracy campaigners. They both live in Moscow. 6. On 21 April 2015 the applicants, with three others, sent written notification to the Moscow Mayor’s office of their intention to hold a demonstration with some 15,000 participants from 7 p.m. to 10 p.m. on 6 May 2015 in Bolotnaya Square. After the expiry of the statutory period for the authority’s reply, on 28 April 2015 the applicants wrote a letter to the Mayor’s office stating that they considered the event of 6 May 2015 to have been approved by the Mayor. 7. On 27 April 2015 the Regional Security and Anti-Corruption Department of Moscow telephoned the applicants and suggested that the event be held on Marshal Vasilevskiy Street. On 30 April 2015 the Department repeated this proposal in a letter. The event organisers were also warned that if they rejected this proposal they would not be allowed to hold a public event at all. 8. According to the applicants, they informed all possible participants in the demonstration about its cancellation by way of posting information on the internet and via various mass-media outlets. 9. At around 7.05 p.m. both the applicants arrived in Bolotnaya Square, where they saw a gathering of some fifty people standing quietly, without any banners. According to the applicants, each positioned himself at a distance from other people with a political banner. The applicants considered that each of them was staging a solo demonstration which did not require prior notification of the authorities. A few minutes later the applicants were arrested and taken to a police van. 10. According to the Government, on 6 May 2015 the applicants, acting in a group of fifty people, organised and held a public assembly without prior notification being given to the authorities. The applicants called upon others to shout the slogans “Freedom to political prisoners”, “Death to fascists” and others; the second applicant held a banner stating that all “Bolotnaya participants” were innocent. The applicants did not respond to the multiple demands by the police that they cease their actions, and at 7.35 p.m. they were taken to the Yakimanka district police station. 11. According to the records of transfer to the police station (протоколы доставления) and the administrative arrest records, the first applicant was brought to the police station at 7.40 p.m. on 6 May 2015 and placed under administrative arrest at the same time. The second applicant was brought to the police station at 7.25 p.m. and placed under administrative arrest at 7.40 p.m. The records of the transfer contained an indication that both applicants were taken to the police station for an administrative offence record to be drawn up. 12. According to the Government, the term of the applicants’ retention in the police station was extended to forty-eight hours. On 6 May 2015 at 10.15 p.m. the first applicant was transported to the police station in Zamoskvorechye District of Moscow. On 7 May 2015 at 4 p.m. he was taken to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow. The second applicant was taken to that same court on 7 May 2015 at 4.10 p.m. 13. At the police stations both applicants were accused of organising and holding a group public event without notifying the authorities in advance, in breach of Article 20.2 § 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences (hereinafter “the CAO”). In particular, they called upon others to shout political slogans; the second applicant had a banner. 14. On 7 May 2015 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court convicted the first applicant under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO and sentenced him to ten days’ detention. The court found that the first applicant, with the second applicant, had organised and held a group public event in the form of a “meeting” with about fifty participants, without notifying the authorities in advance. It dismissed the applicant’s argument that he had staged a solo demonstration, after considering it as a line of defence. The court also refused to admit in evidence a video recording of the events in Bolotnaya Square, because it was “undated and did not contain the entire chronology of events preceding [the applicant’s] arrest”. 15. On the same day the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court heard the case against the second applicant. The court reiterated the description of the administrative offence imputed to the first applicant, found the second applicant guilty under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO, and sentenced him to ten days’ detention. The court dismissed the evidence of two eyewitnesses who stated that the second applicant had been standing alone on the bridge with a banner. It also refused to admit in evidence video recordings and photographs showing the second applicant, because neither of them contained “information about the address”. 16. Both the applicants appealed, insisting that they had staged solo demonstrations. On 13 May 2015 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgments. Referring to the statutory definition of a “meeting” (the presence of people in a specific place in order to publicly express their opinions, essentially on social and political issues), the appellate court considered that some fifty people had been present in Bolotnaya Square, including the applicants, who had called on others to shout political slogans.

5. The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table. 6. On 25 September 2000 the Neamț County Court ordered a state‑owned company to pay the applicant due salary rights. 7. On 9 October 2001 the Roman District Court ordered a private person to reimburse a loan to the applicant. 8. On 14 November 2008 the Brașov County Court ordered the municipality of Brașov to leave a plot of land in the applicant’s full property and possession. 9. On 3 April 2009 the applicant signed a report, drafted on the occasion of the compulsory enforcement of the above judgment, which attested to the restoration of his possession over the land in dispute by placement of metal bars on the free area and by tracing a line with white paint over the area occupied by roads and bridge pillars belonging to the municipality. 10. On 18 July 2008 the applicant contracted a loan of 250,000 euros (EUR) from a bank, with the plot of land used as guarantee. 11. On 22 August 2011 the bank sold the land at a public auction for EUR 325,000, since the applicant had failed to repay the loan within the set deadline. In accordance with domestic law, the remaining amount after the recovery of the debt must be returned to the debtor.

5. The applicant was born in 1980 and lives in Vrbovec. 6. On 16 July and 30 August 2013 the applicant was indicted in the Ivanić-Grand Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Ivanić-Gradu – hereinafter “the Municipal Court”) on charges of uttering serious threats to his neighbours. 7. Following an expert report into the applicant’s mental condition at the time of the commission of the alleged offences, on 2 January 2014 the relevant State Attorney’s Office amended the indictments, arguing that he had committed the offences in a state of mental derangement caused by paranoid schizophrenia which he had been suffering from for a number of years. It also asked that he be placed in a psychiatric hospital in accordance with the Protection of Individuals with Mental Disorders Act. 8. In the meantime, on 26 November 2013 the Municipal Court ordered the applicant’s pre-trial detention on the grounds that he might reoffend. He was detained on 30 November 2013 and on 2 December 2013 he was placed in the Zagreb Prison hospital for treatment. During the proceedings, his pre‑trial detention was extended several times. 9. The applicant challenged the orders for his detention before the Velika Gorica County Court (Županijski sud u Velikoj Gorici), which on 12 December 2013 and 13 January 2014 dismissed his appeals as ill‑founded. Judge LJ.B. took part in these decisions as a member of the appeal panel of the Velika Gorica County Court. 10. On 14 January 2014 the Municipal Court found that the applicant had committed the offence of uttering serious threats against his neighbours in a state of mental derangement and that he posed a threat to others. On this basis, the court ordered his internment in a psychiatric institution, in accordance with the Protection of Individuals with Mental Disorders Act. The court also decided that he would remain detained until the judgment became final. 11. The applicant challenged the first-instance judgment by lodging an appeal with the Velika Gorica County Court. He also challenged the decision to detain him until the judgment became final. 12. On 23 January 2014 the Velika Gorica County Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision to detain him until the judgment became final. Judge LJ.B. took part in this decision as a member of a three‑judge panel. 13. On 3 March 2014 a three-judge panel of the Velika Gorica County Court, on which Judge LJ.B. was sitting, dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the first-instance judgment of the Municipal Court, which thereby became final. 14. The applicant challenged the judgment of the Velika Gorica County Court by lodging a request for extraordinary review of a final judgment with the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) and a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske). He alleged in particular a lack of impartiality on the part of the Velika Gorica County Court, given Judge LJ.B.’s previous involvement in his case. 15. On 4 June 2014 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s request for extraordinary review on the grounds that there was no reason to call the impartiality of Judge LJ.B into question. 16. On 20 May 2015 the Constitutional Court upheld these findings and dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint as unfounded. 17. After the criminal court’s judgment became final, on 19 March 2014 the file was forwarded to the Zagreb County Court (hereinafter “the County Court”) as the court with competence to rule on the applicant’s involuntary placement in a psychiatric hospital under the Protection of Individuals with Mental Disorders Act (see paragraphs 34 and 36 below). The file also contained submissions made by F.Ž., the applicant’s lawyer in the criminal proceedings. At that time, the applicant was still being held in the prison hospital (see paragraph 8 above). 18. On the same day the County Court opened the proceedings for the applicant’s committal to a psychiatric hospital. In the decision opening the proceedings, it noted that the applicant was represented by a legal aid lawyer, R.T. 19. On 21 March 2014 the County Court found that the applicant had not appointed a lawyer to represent him in the proceedings and, as legal representation was mandatory, it appointed him a legal aid lawyer, T.Ž. 20. On 10 April 2014 it committed the applicant to Vrapče Psychiatric Hospital (hereinafter “the hospital”) for a period of six months, starting from 3 May 2014. 21. On 28 July 2014 the hospital asked the County Court to extend the applicant’s involuntary psychiatric confinement on the grounds that the treatment had started to show positive results but had been short, so further treatment was needed. 22. Upon receipt of the request, the County Court opened the proceedings for the applicant’s further involuntary placement in the hospital and appointed the legal aid lawyer T.Ž. to represent him in the proceedings. 23. On 30 July 2014 the judge conducting the proceedings visited the applicant in the hospital. According to a note of the visit, it was possible to communicate with the applicant, he was engaged in therapeutic activities, his mother had been visiting him and he wanted to be given the possibility to take occasional therapeutic leave from the hospital. The note also indicated that T.Ž. had attended the meeting. There is no indication that she asked any questions or otherwise addressed the applicant or the judge during the meeting. 24. On 7 August 2014 the County Court ordered an expert report from S.H., a psychiatrist from a different psychiatric hospital to the one in which the applicant was placed, concerning the possibility of granting the applicant therapeutic leave. S.H. was of the opinion that short-term therapeutic leave from the hospital could be granted. 25. On 20 August 2014 F.Ž., the lawyer who had represented the applicant in the criminal proceedings before the Municipal Court, sent a request to the hospital for information concerning the applicant’s treatment. He stressed that all his previous attempts to contact the hospital had been to no avail. He asked the hospital to consider the possibility of releasing the applicant, as his parents had been actively engaged in finding him employment. This letter appears to have only been received by the County Court on 18 December 2014. 26. Meanwhile, on 27 August 2014 the County Court held a hearing, which was attended by representatives of the hospital and the State Attorney’s Office, as well as the applicant’s legal aid lawyer T.Ž. Those present at the hearing agreed that the applicant should be granted short-term therapeutic leave. The representative of the hospital reiterated its request for the applicant’s further psychiatric confinement (see paragraph 21 above) and the judge conducting the proceedings read out the note of her visit to the applicant (see paragraph 23 above). The representative of the State Attorney’s Office agreed with the request. The legal aid lawyer T.Ž. also agreed with the request, and made no other submissions at the hearing. 27. On the same day the County Court ordered the applicant’s involuntary hospitalisation for a further period of one year. It referred to the judge’s meeting with the applicant (see paragraph 23 above) and noted that neither the representative of the State Attorney’s Office nor the applicant’s legal aid lawyer opposed the hospital’s request. At the same time, the County Court granted the applicant therapeutic leave for the period between 28 and 31 August 2014. 28. The applicant’s father, on behalf of the applicant, challenged the decision on his son’s further involuntary hospitalisation before a three-judge panel of the County Court. He contended that the applicant’s family had never been informed that his psychiatric confinement would be extended, and had only accidentally learned of his further confinement after inspecting the case file in the County Court. The applicant’s father also complained of ineffective legal representation in the proceedings. 29. On 19 December 2014 a three-judge panel of Zagreb County Court dismissed the appeal as ill-founded on the grounds that a lawyer had been duly appointed to represent the applicant in the proceedings concerning his involuntary hospitalisation. 30. The applicant’s father then lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court, arguing that the legal aid lawyer appointed for his son in the proceedings before the County Court had acted as an extended arm of the institutions rather than a lawyer protecting his interests. 31. On 3 June 2015 the Constitutional Court dismissed the constitutional complaint, endorsing the reasoning of the three-judge panel of the County Court. 32. In the meantime, on 22 May 2015 the applicant, through his chosen representative F.Ž., asked to be released from the hospital. 33. On 24 August 2015, following a further examination of the applicant’s situation, the County Court ordered the applicant’s conditional release from the hospital.

5. The applicant was employed by HK Komgrap and Komgrap-Makiš doo, a company based in Belgrade (hereinafter “the debtor”). At the relevant time, the company was predominantly socially-owned (see Stoković and Others v. Serbia, nos. 75879/14 and seq. §§ 10-14, 8 March 2016) 6. Since the debtor had failed to fulfil its obligations towards its employees, the applicant brought a civil claim seeking payment of salary arrears and various social security contributions. 7. On 23 June 2003 the Belgrade Second Municipal Court (Drugi opštinski sud u Beogradu) ordered the debtor to pay to the applicant certain sums in respect of salary arrears and the various social security contributions. This judgment became final and enforceable on 25 July 2005. 8. On 26 September 2005 the applicant applied to the Belgrade Fourth Municipal Court (Četvrti opštinski sud u Beogradu) for enforcement of the judgment of 23 June 2003. 9. On 18 January 2006 the said court ordered the enforcement of the judgment and awarded the applicant the costs incurred in the enforcement proceedings. 10. On 27 October 2010 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal, seeking redress for the non-enforcement of the judgment in question. 11. On 27 November 2013 the Constitutional Court held that the applicant had suffered a breach of the “right to a trial within a reasonable time” with regard to the enforcement proceedings. The court ordered the acceleration of these proceedings and declared that the applicant was entitled to compensation for the non-pecuniary damage suffered in the amount of 800 euros (EUR) converted into the national currency at the rate applicable at the date of settlement. 12. The Constitutional Court held that since the enforcement proceedings in question had not yet been completed, the constitutional appeals were premature in so far as they concerned the pecuniary damage, and dismissed the appeal in that regard.

5. The applicants are: (1) Mr Ibragim Alikhanov, who was born in 1930, (2) Ms Muslimat Alikhanova, who was born in 1936 and (3) Ms Tamara Alikhanova, who was born in 1976. The first and second applicants live in the village of Ruguzh and the third applicant in the village of Gurik, Republic of Dagestan, a region neighbouring the Chechen Republic. The first and second applicants are the parents of Mr Amirkhan Alikhanov, who was born in 1974; the third applicant is his wife. 6. The circumstances of the case can be summarised as follows. 7. On 23 December 2004 Mr Alikhanov was driving on an errand on the road between Khasavyurt and Makhachkala, Dagestan. During the ride he twice called his brother, Mr A. When he called the second time, he said that he was approaching the stationary traffic police checkpoint near Makhachkala and that he would soon arrive at his brother’s place. However, he never arrived. 8. Early on the following day, 24 December 2004, Mr A. went to the “Mars-20” traffic checkpoint on the northern outskirts of Makhachkala to find out whether the traffic police officers had information about either his brother, Amirkhan Alikhanov, or his dark-red VAZ 2108 car with registration number B 235 CC 05 РУС. The police officers who had been on duty on the night of 23 December 2004 told him that during the evening of 23 December 2004 several men in police uniforms and balaclavas had arrived at the checkpoint in three VAZ cars (the 2107, 21099 and 2121 models). The men, who had introduced themselves as officers of the Dagestan Organised Crime Unit (УБОП – “the Organised Crime Unit”) had apparently been waiting for someone to go through the checkpoint. The staff of the checkpoint did not note their cars’ registration numbers. As Amirkhan Alikhanov had been passing through the checkpoint, the officers from the Organised Crime Unit had stopped him and asked to open his car boot. Then they had grabbed him and forced into one of their vehicles. One of the officers had got in Amirkhan Alikhanov’s car and they had all driven off with him and his car to Makhachkala, the capital city of Dagestan. (b) Subsequent developments 9. At 3.21 p.m. on 26 December 2004 Mr A. received a phone call from an unidentified person who said that if he wanted to see his brother alive he should bring 25,000 United States dollars (USD) at 10 p.m. on 28 December 2004 to Khasavyurt bus station. 10. At 12.59 p.m. on 28 December 2004 the same person called Mr A. and told him that he should now add a zero to the amount – meaning that Mr A. would have to pay USD 250,000. Both phone calls were made from the same telephone number, which the applicants noted down. On the following day they informed the law-enforcement authorities about the phone calls (see paragraphs 18-20 below). 11. In April 2005 the first applicant and Mr A. received information from an unspecified source about six bodies found in the forest near the village of Zamay-Yurt, in the Chechen Republic, and immediately went there. According to the locals and certain police officers from Zamay-Yurt, the bodies had been buried in the village cemetery in accordance with Muslim traditions. In a shed at the cemetery, the applicants found Amirkhan Alikhanov’s clothes, which were covered in blood and pierced with bullet holes. Mr A. collected them and took them to the authorities for DNA testing (see paragraphs 46, 49-50 and 53-54 below). 12. According to the applicants, residents of Zamay-Yurt told them that on 25 January 2005 the federal forces had staged a mock fight in the forest: they had shot at dead bodies that they had brought with them. The locals, who had subsequently buried the bodies at the cemetery, said that the bodies had had traces of torture: cigarette and soldering iron burns, pulled out nails, cut off or shot off fingers and noses, kneecaps shot through, and ears. From the state of the corpses, it was evident that all of the six persons had been starved. Furthermore, each body had had a broken right collarbone and traces of a single, execution-style shot to the head. 13. An article about the discovery of the bodies was published in the Novoye Delo newspaper on 29 April 2005. 14. On 11 January 2006 the Dagestan Civil Registry issued a death certificate in respect of Amirkhan Alikhanov, stating that he had died on 23 December 2004 in Zamay-Yurt. 15. The Government submitted that on 23 December 2004 Amirkhan Alikhanov had been abducted from the traffic police checkpoint by unidentified persons, as described by the applicants. However, contrary to the applicants’ submissions, his body had never been found. The conclusions of the forensic expert examination referred to by the applicants concerning the identity of the body found next to Zamay-Yurt had been indecisive, as there had not been enough DNA material on the clothing found at the cemetery. The Government did not submit any information or theories concerning the possible whereabouts of Amirkhan Alikhanov after the abduction. At the same time, they stated that the domestic authorities had looked into the possibility of Amirkhan Alikhanov’s involvement with illegal armed groups in the Chechen Republic. 16. In their submission on the admissibility and merits of the application, the Government confirmed that a report on the discovery of six bodies next to Zamay-Yurt had been broadcast on a federal television channel. The report had shown bodies of bearded men in camouflage uniforms and military boots, with firearms and ammunition next to them. It had been impossible to identify the corpses by their faces owing to bullet wounds to their heads. The broadcast had demonstrated the willingness of the local authorities not to cover up the incident in Zamay-Yurt and had proved that State agents could not have been involved in the alleged abduction. 17. In reply to the Court’s request for a copy of the investigation file in respect of criminal case no. 55826, which had been opened into the abduction of Amirkhan Alikhanov, the Government furnished its contents, which ran to 266 pages. Some of the documents were either missing or partially illegible; most of the documents bore double numbering (that is to say each page bore its original number and also a number ascribed to it when it had been added to the case file). The information contained in the documents submitted can be summarised as follows. 18. On 29 December 2004 the investigators from the Kirovskiy district prosecutor’s office in Makhachkala (“the investigators”) questioned Amirkhan Alikhanov’s brother, Mr A., who stated that on 23 December 2004 his brother, Amirkhan Alikhanov, had been abducted at the “Mars-20” traffic police checkpoint “by servicemen from the Organised Crime Unit”. B.P., a police officer known by the nickname “Stariy”, who had been on duty at the checkpoint at the time, had related the incident’s details to him. On 26 December 2004 he had received a phone call during which the caller suggested to him that he pay USD 25,000 in exchange for his brother. Then on 28 December 2004 the same person had called him again from the telephone number 8-906-447-6785 and had told him that the amount of the demanded ransom had gone up by ten times because Mr A. had complained to the police about the abduction. 19. On 14 January 2005 the investigators again questioned Mr A., whose statement concerning the abduction was similar to the statement given on 29 December 2004. In addition, he stated that Mr B.P., who had been on duty at the traffic police checkpoint, had told him that the abductors had introduced themselves as officers from the Organised Crime Unit and that two traffic police officers from Makhachkala had been with them. The abductors from the Organised Crime Unit had taken Amirkhan Alikhanov away, while one of the traffic police officers had taken his car. After that, he and his relatives had searched for Amirkhan Alikhanov at various police stations and remand prisons, but to no avail. On 26 December 2004, he had received a phone call from the number 8-906-447-6785 during which the caller had made a ransom demand of USD 25,000. On 28 December 2004, the same person had called again from the same number and had requested a ransom, the amount of which had gone up ten times after Amirkhan Alikhanov’s relatives had failed to cooperate. Mr A. stressed that his brother, Amirkhan Alikhanov, had been abducted by servicemen from the Organised Crime Unit. 20. On 15 January 2005 the investigators questioned another relative of Amirkhan Alikhanov, Mr Al., whose statement concerning the abduction was similar to those of Mr A. According to Mr Al., Amirkhan Alikhanov had been abducted by police officers from the Organised Crime Unit, with the assistance of two traffic police officers. 21. On an unspecified date in January or February 2005 the investigators questioned Mr Dzh.G., the owner of telephone number 8-906-447-6785, who stated that he had not used that number and had no information about the abduction as in December 2004 he had lent his passport to a stranger at the mobile telephone shop for the purchase of a SIM card with that telephone number. 22. On 1 February 2005 the investigators questioned the neighbourhood police officer, Mr R.Sh., who stated that the area of Amirkhan Alikhanov’s residence was under his supervision and that he had known Amirkhan Alikhanov since childhood. To his knowledge in December 2004 Amirkhan Alikhanov had been arrested by the police for unknown reasons. 23. On 22 February 2005 the investigators questioned Mr N., another brother of Amirkhan Alikhanov, who stated that as he resided in another region of the Russian Federation, he had learned of the abduction from his relatives. 24. On 27 February 2005 the investigators questioned the third applicant, who stated that she had learnt of her husband’s abduction from her relatives. According to rumours in their village, Amirkhan Alikhanov had been arrested for causing someone’s death in a traffic accident. 25. On 28 March 2005 the investigators questioned a police officer, A.Kh., who stated that at about 6 p.m. on 23 December 2004 he had been on duty at the “Mars-20” traffic checkpoint when two traffic police officers in a red and white police VAZ 2107 car with the beacon light (that is to say flashing roof lights) and the blue registration plate of the Makhachkala traffic police department had arrived at the checkpoint. The witness had no recollection of the events afterwards and stated that he had already been interviewed about the incident during the internal inquiry carried out by the internal security department of the Dagestan Ministry of the Interior. 26. On 28 March 2005 the investigators also questioned another traffic police officer, Mr A.Kh., whose statement concerning the abduction was not furnished to the Court. 27. On 29 March 2005 the investigators again questioned Mr A., who stated that on 25 March 2005 he had learned that in Zamay-Yurt in Chechnya, at some point in January or February 2005, federal servicemen had conducted a special operation and killed six persons. This information had been broadcast during the news programme of one of the federal television channels. On the same date he and his relative, Mr A.G., had gone to that village, where in a shed next to the cemetery they had found various pieces of clothing. Among them he had identified and collected those of his brother, Amirkhan Alikhanov. Then a local resident had shown to them the three graves where the six bodies had been buried. According to the village residents, 28‑29 January 2005, they had heard intensive shooting during a special operation conducted by the federal forces in the vicinity; the servicemen had allegedly brought with them the six persons whom they had allegedly shot there during the special operation and had then buried their bodies. A local hunter had seen the servicemen burying the bodies and informed the local law enforcement authorities of this. Then those bodies had been exhumed and examined by the local prosecutor’s office; subsequently, they had been given to the locals for burial. The local residents had buried the bodies but had kept the clothing for identification. 28. On 5 April 2005 the investigators again questioned Mr A., who, inter alia, again described the circumstances of the discovery of the clothes of his abducted brother in Zamay-Yurt and stated that according to the local residents, a special operation had been conducted there at the end of January 2005 during which six people had been killed and then buried by federal servicemen. One of the local residents, whose identity Mr A. would not provide out of fear for this person’s safety, had told them that at the end of December 2004, two of his relatives had been abducted by servicemen next to the local mosque and that both bodies had subsequently been found among the six corpses at the cemetery. 29. On 11 April 2005 the investigators questioned Mr S.Sh., who stated that his wife, Ms P.N., had assisted the brothers of the abducted Amirkhan Alikhanov in their search for him. On 4 February 2005 she had left the house with a large amount of cash to continue searching for Amirkhan Alikhanov and had not returned. All his attempts to contact her on her mobile telephone had been to no avail. However, on 7 March 2005 a relative of his, Ms A., had managed to have Ms P.N. answer her telephone for a few seconds; behind his wife she had heard a man asking who was calling – then the connection had been cut off. According to Mr S.Sh., his wife’s disappearance was directly related to that of Amirkhan Alikhanov, and both of them had been abducted by the same persons. 30. On an unspecified date in April 2005 the investigators again questioned Mr A., whose statement was similar to the ones he had given before. 31. On 18 May 2005 the investigators questioned A.A., a police officer, who stated that he worked for the Organised Crime Unit in Makhachkala. He denied having any information about the abduction of Amirkhan Alikhanov and stated that the allegations of his participation in Mr Alikhanov’s abduction were unsubstantiated. 32. On 20 May 2005 the investigators questioned another police officer from the Organised Crime Unit, A.M., who also stated that he had no information concerning Amirkhan Alikhanov’s abduction. At the same time, he stated that at the end of December 2004 he had met Mr A. and Mr Al., who had told him about the abduction and had asked him – in return for money – to assist them in their search for their relative, Mr Alikhanov. He had refused and had simply informed them (free of charge) that Amirkhan Alikhanov had not been detained on the premises of their unit. 33. On 5 July 2005 the investigators questioned forensic expert Ms T.I., who stated that her findings, as stated in the forensic report (see paragraph 53 below), had not with absolute certainty established that the blood on the clothes found in Zamay-Yurt had been related to that of the first applicant; their facilities had been limited in their capacity to establish such conclusions. A generic expert evaluation would have helped to draw more certain conclusions. 34. On 7 July 2005 Mr A. requested that the investigators question five police officers concerning their possible involvement in Amirkhan Alikhanov’s abduction. The investigators agreed on 14 July 2005 to grant his request. However, from the documents submitted it does not appear that any of those officers were subsequently questioned. 35. On various dates in July and then in September 2005 the investigators questioned five of the police officers listed as drivers of the police cars in December 2004 (see paragraph 51 below). All of them denied having any information about the abduction. 36. On 8 August 2005 the investigators questioned a traffic police officer, A., who, according to Mr A., had been present at the traffic police checkpoint during his brother’s abduction. The officer confirmed his presence on 23 December 2004 at the checkpoint but denied having any information about the incident. 37. On 15 August 2005 the investigators questioned V.M., the police officer, who stated that he had assisted the applicants in their search for Amirkhan Alikhanov. According to the witness, he had accompanied Mr A. on 24 December 2004 when the latter had gone to various law-enforcement agencies looking for his brother. A few days after the abduction, they had received information that A.A. had participated in the abduction. Then, the witness had spoken with A.A.; the latter, having confirmed that he had been at the “Mars-20” checkpoint on the date of the abduction, had denied his involvement in the incident. 38. On 28 December 2004 the first applicant complained to the Dagestan Prosecutor, requesting that an investigation into the circumstances of Amirkhan Alikhanov’s abduction be opened and that the traffic police officers who had been manning the checkpoint at the time of the events be questioned. 39. On 30 December 2004 the investigators examined the crime scene at the checkpoint. No evidence was collected. 40. On 7 January 2005 the investigators sent a number of requests for information to various police stations and remand prisons in Dagestan, asking whether they were holding Amirkhan Alikhanov in detention. 41. On 8 January 2005 the investigators refused to institute criminal proceedings in respect of Amirkhan Alikhanov’s abduction. 42. On 11 January 2005 the investigators wrote to the Dagestan Ministry of the Interior asking for assistance in establishing the circumstances of Amirkhan Alikhanov’s abduction. The request stated, inter alia, the following: “The [preliminary] investigation file containing material collected in connection with the abduction of Amirkhan Alikhanov at the traffic police checkpoint ... has been forwarded to you for the organisation of an inquiry. Mr B.P., who is a traffic police officer, claimed that at about 6.30 p.m. on 23 December 2004 Amirkhan Alikhanov had been detained by servicemen of the Organised Crime Unit at the “Mars-20” traffic checkpoint and taken in the direction of Makhachkala, while the police officers of the traffic police unit from Makhachkala had taken away his VAZ 2108 car ... However, senior officials of the Organised Crime Unit and of the Makhachkala Department of the Interior denied that Amirkhan Alikhanov had been taken to their [respective] premises. Meanwhile, officer B.P. (“Stariy”) claimed that he knew one of the officers[that is to say abductors], and that he would be able to identify him. Given the circumstances, it is necessary to conduct an inquiry into the officers of the Organised Crime Unit and the Makhachkala Department of the Interior and to facilitate the identification by Mr B.P. of their personnel – [firstly] from photographs and then from a line-up ...” 43. On 12 January 2005 the investigators requested that the Khasavyurt prosecutor’s office assisted them in establishing the circumstances of the abduction by sending an officer to various law-enforcement agencies in that town to enquire whether Amirkhan Alikhanov had been arrested, detained or taken through local checkpoints by their agents. 44. On 14 January 2005 the investigators quashed the decision not to initiate criminal proceedings as unlawful and opened criminal case no. 55826 to investigate the abduction of Amirkhan Alikhanov. 45. On 27 February and 11 March 2005 the third and first applicants respectively were granted victim status in the criminal proceedings. 46. On 29 March 2005 the investigators collected from Mr A. the clothes found by him next to Zamay-Yurt. 47. On 1 April 2005 the investigators sent an assistance request to the Khasavyurt department of the Organised Crime Unit. The request stated, inter alia, the following: “According to the contents of the criminal case file, on 23 December 2004, on his way from Khasavyurt to Makhachkala, Amirkhan Alikhanov was stopped at the “Mars-20” traffic police checkpoint by traffic policemen from Makhachkala ... . During the check of his identity documents a VAZ-2107 pulled over... [and] three unidentified men in balaclavas got out of it, grabbed Amirkhan Alikhanov, forced him into their car and drove off to Makhachkala. One of the traffic police officers from Makhachkala followed them in Amirkhan Alikhanov’s car ... On 29 March 2005 the brother of the abducted person, Mr A., informed the investigators that he had received a phone call from a man who had seen a television programme about a special operation conducted by the federal forces in the Nozhay‑Yurt district [in the Chechen Republic], during which six persons had been killed and that two of the six bodies had been identified by relatives ... . Mr A. had found [there] and brought to us the clothes of the abducted Amirkhan Alikhanov. It is necessary to establish whether Amirkhan Alikhanov’s body was among the six bodies ... .” 48. On 11 April 2005 criminal case no. 55826 (opened in connection with the abduction of Amirkhan Alikhanov) was joined with criminal case no. 558270 (opened in connection with the disappearance of Ms P.N.). The relevant decision stated, among other things, the following: “... The investigation established that the crimes committed against Amirkhan Alikhanov and Ms P.N. were interconnected. The husband of the disappeared Ms P.N., Mr S.Sh., stated that after the disappearance of Amirkhan Alikhanov, his wife (Ms P.N.) and the brothers of Amirkhan Alikhanov (Mr A. and Mr Al.) had been actively involved in the search for him; on several occasions she had visited the Dagestan Organised Crime Unit, where she had had meetings with their operational search officers. On the date of her disappearance she had been expecting a phone call from the head of the anti-kidnapping unit, Mr Gerey; for that meeting she had had a large amount of money in cash on her. Mr S.Sh. believes that his wife’s disappearance [is connected] with officers of the Dagestan Organised Crime Unit and Amirkhan Alikhanov’s abduction. As far as Amirkhan Alikhanov’s abduction is concerned, [the investigation] established that an officer from that department, A.A., had participated in the abduction. The investigators had issued an arrest warrant against him, but superiors at the Organised Crime Unit had obstructed A.A.’s meetings with the investigators. Therefore, there are sufficient grounds to believe that both crimes were committed by the same group of persons ... .” 49. On 11 April 2005 the investigators ordered an expert examination of the clothes found by Mr A. in Zamay-Yurt, and on 27 April 2005 they ordered their forensic expert examination (see paragraph 54 below). 50. On various dates in April and May 2005 the investigators obtained saliva and blood samples from Mr A. and the first applicant for genetic expert evaluation and a DNA comparison with the blood on the clothes found in Zamay-Yurt. 51. On 30 May 2005 the traffic police unit of the Dagestan Ministry of the Interior replied to a request for information from the investigators dated 26 April 2005 and provided them with a list of eight service vehicles used by the traffic police officers in December 2004. 52. On 3 June 2005 the Russian Prosecutor General replied to the applicants’ request for information, stating that the Nozhay-Yurt District Prosecutor’s Office in Chechnya had opened a criminal case in connection with the discovery of unidentified bodies at the Zamay-Yurt cemetery. The brother of Amirkhan Alikhanov, Mr A., had identified the clothes on one of the bodies as those that had been worn by Amirkhan Alikhanov on the day of his abduction. A DNA test of the clothes had been commissioned. The Nozhay-Yurt District Prosecutor’s Office had also been instructed to identify the bodies with the aid of photographs. 53. On 20 June 2005 the expert examination of the clothes found in Zamay-Yurt issued a report, according to which the first applicant’s equilocal genes were similar to those found on the clothes. On the same date, 20 June 2005, the investigators ordered a genetic expert evaluation to establish that the blood on the clothes was that of the first applicant’s relative. The results of this examination were not furnished to the Court. 54. On 31 August 2005 the investigators ordered a forensic expert examination of the comparison of the clothes found in Zamay-Yurt with the description thereof contained in Amirkhan Alikhanov’s medical record kept in the local hospital. On 29 September 2005 the results of the examination were issued, the contents of which were not furnished to the Court. 55. On 14 September 2005 the Dagestan Prosecutor’s Office suspended the investigation for failure to identify the culprits. 56. Between 7 and 29 September 2005 an expert evaluation of the clothes found in Zamay-Yurt was conducted. According to the report of that examination, dated 29 September 2005, the clothes belonged to Amirkhan Alikhanov. 57. On an unspecified date in September 2005 the investigators informed the applicants that the investigation had been suspended. The relevant parts of the letter read as follows: “... Criminal case no. 55826 into the abduction of [Mr Amirkhan] Alikhanov ... was opened on 14 January 2005 ... The investigation has established that at approximately 6 p.m. on 23 December 2004, when [Mr Amirkhan] Alikhanov was driving his VAZ 2108 car from Khasavyurt to Makhachkala, he was stopped at the “Mars-20” ... checkpoint ... and taken to an unknown destination by unidentified men in camouflage uniforms. The investigation has not established the involvement of any law-enforcement officers in the abduction. From the [witnesses’] statements, the items seized, replies to requests, the report on DNA expert evaluation no. 18 of 20 June 2005 and the report on biological test no. 369 of 29 September 2005, it can be seen that [Amirkhan] Alikhanov was killed near the village of Zamay-Yurt ... when resisting the Chechen servicemen, who were conducting a special operation. At present the criminal case is suspended on account of the failure to identify the perpetrators of [Amirkhan] Alikhanov’s abduction.” 58. On 8 November 2005 the military prosecutor of military unit no. 20102 informed the applicants that they had received for investigation from another prosecutor’s office the criminal case file concerning the discovery of six unidentified male bodies in the forest two kilometres to the east of the village of Zamay-Yurt. The case file contained no information on the identification of the bodies, which had been buried as unidentified. There was no information regarding whether the body of Amirkhan Alikhanov had been among them. 59. On 30 November and then on 12 December 2005 the applicants requested that the Dagestan Prosecutor exhume the bodies found in Zamay‑Yurt for post-mortem examination, including the establishment of the cause of Amirkhan Alikhanov’s death. No reply was given to those requests. 60. On 28 December 2005 the Chechnya prosecutor’s office informed the applicants that on 17 July 2005 the criminal case file concerning the discovery of Amirkhan Alikhanov’s body had been transferred to the military prosecutor’s office of the United Group Alignment (the UGA). 61. On 7 March 2006 the Russian Prosecutor General replied to the first applicant’s complaint regarding the investigators’ failure to effectively investigate the abduction. The letter stated, among other things, the following: “ ... the contents of the criminal case file show that at about 6 p.m. on 23 December 2004, on his way from Khasavyurt to Makhachkala, Mr A. Alikhanov was stopped at the permanent “Mars-20” checkpoint for an identity check. At that moment, a VAZ 2107 vehicle pulled over, and the unidentified persons in balaclavas who had arrived in it detained Mr Alikhanov, took him into their vehicle and drove away in the direction of Makhachkala. The traffic police officers who had been manning the checkpoint were questioned by the investigation and stated that the persons who had detained Mr Alikhanov had been, in their opinion, servicemen of the Organised Crime Unit, as they had had special service documents on them ... . In the course of the proceedings, the investigators received information concerning Mr Alikhanov’s murder and the finding of his body among six corpses found on 28 January 2005 on the outskirts of Zamay-Yurt in the Nozhay-Yurt district in Chechnya. In order to verify this information, a genetic expert evaluation was ordered; it concluded that there was a match of your genome with the one found on the clothes in the shed at the Zamay-Yurt cemetery – that is to say the possibility of it belonging to your son, Amirkhan Alikhanov, could not be excluded. According to the information provided by the military prosecutor’s office of the UGA, the six corpses ... had belonged to members of illegal armed groups eliminated during clashes with the federal forces between 25 and 26 January 2005 ... In order to verify the identity of one of those corpses as that of Amirkhan Alikhanov, the military prosecutor’s office is carrying out an additional check into the matter ... .” 62. On 8 June 2009 the investigation of the criminal case was resumed. It appears to be still pending.

4. The applicant was born in 1942 and lives in Glodeni. 5. At the time of the events giving rise to the present application he was a pensioner who received an amount equivalent to some fifty-eight euros (EUR) per month. On 5 May 2014 the Minister of Social Protection organised a meeting with the inhabitants of the applicant’s town. The applicant was also present and after the meeting he asked the Minister a question about the method of calculation of his pension. He contended that the coefficient employed for the calculation had been wrong and that his pension was too small. The Minister replied that his pension was high enough and questioned in an ironic manner whether the applicant even understood the meaning of the words used in his question. The answer infuriated the applicant and he cursed and slapped the Minister in the face. 6. On the same day, following the Minister’s complaint, criminal proceedings were initiated against the applicant on charges of hooliganism. 7. On 12 May 2014 the prosecutor in charge of the case ordered the applicant’s psychiatric examination in order to determine whether he was fit to plead in the criminal proceedings. 8. On 29 May 2014 a commission of psychiatrists speculated that the applicant might suffer from either dementia or amnesia. However, they did not reach a final conclusion and recommended the conduct of an in-patient psychiatric examination. 9. On 2 July 2014, at the prosecutor’s request, the Glodeni District Court ordered an in-patient psychiatric forensic examination of the applicant. The applicant challenged the above decision but without success. His appeal and appeal on points of law were rejected by the Bălți Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Justice on 28 August and 15 October 2014, respectively. 10. On 18 September 2014 the applicant was arrested by a group of five police officers and taken to the Chișinău Psychiatric Hospital. Upon arrival, the applicant was asked to sign several pre-printed documents, the meaning of which was that he was giving his formal consent to hospitalisation and treatment. He signed them, but wrote on one of them that he did not consent to being subjected to a psychiatric examination (nu sunt de acord cu expertiza). 11. On 20 September 2014 the applicant was visited by his son in hospital. After the visit the son employed a lawyer who started to take measures in order to have the applicant released. 12. On 24 September 2014, at the lawyer’s advice, the applicant wrote to the hospital administration a letter stating that he had been hospitalised against his will on 18 September 2014 and that if he had signed anything, he wished to withdraw his signature. 13. On 25 September 2014 the applicant was released from hospital. It appears from a video submitted by the applicant’s representative, that the door of the hospital ward where the applicant was detained was locked and that one could enter or exit only with the approval of the medical staff. 14. On 30 September 2014 the prosecutor in charge of the case applied to the Glodeni District Court to have the applicant remanded in custody pending trial for a period of thirty days. 15. On 4 November 2014 the Glodeni District Court rejected the prosecutor’s request and found that the applicant had been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment as a result of his forceful hospitalisation. 16. By a final judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice of 26 December 2017 the applicant was found guilty as charged and sentenced to a criminal fine of 4,000 Moldovan lei (MDL), the equivalent of some EUR 180.

4. The applicants are owners of residential buildings or apartments which were subject to the rent control system. However, as found by the Constitutional Court, the Czech rent control system was unconstitutional and violated the right of property of owners protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. This situation, described as a “legal vacuum”, existed between 1 January 2002 and 30 March 2006 and no legal basis existed for rent control measures either in the period between 31 March and 31 December 2006. The interference was considered by the Court to be unlawful in this period of time (see R & L, s.r.o., and Others v. the Czech Republic, nos. 37926/05 and 4 others, §§ 123-127, 3 July 2014). 5. The applicant is a co-owner of a tenement building in Prague. One flat in the building was rented under the rent control system. 6. On 16 March 2004 the applicant and three other co-owners lodged a claim against J.M., who occupied the flat, seeking to be paid 3,338 Czech korunas (CZK – 131 euros (EUR)) in respect of the outstanding rent for October and November 2003, CZK 5,118 (EUR 201) in respect of services for the years 2000, 2001 and 2002, and CZK 50 (EUR 2) in respect of the use of equipment in the flat for the period of October and November 2003. 7. On 29 March 2005 the Prague 3 District Court (obvodní soud) decided, inter alia, to split the co-owners’ claim into separate proceedings and to suspend these proceedings pending a final decision on J.M.’s right to the tenancy of the flat. On 30 May 2005 the court decided that J.M. was the tenant of the flat because the tenancy had transferred to her upon the death of her grandfather. Following an appeal by the applicant and the co-owners, on 21 September 2005 the Municipal Court (městský soud) upheld this judgment. On 23 January 2007 the Supreme Court (Nejvyšší soud) dismissed an appeal on points of law (dovolání) lodged by the co-owners. 8. In the meantime, on 28 November 2005, the District Court ordered J.M. to pay CZK 30 (EUR 1.2) to the co-owners of the tenement building. It dismissed the remainder of their action. Following an appeal by the applicant and the co-owners, on 1 March 2006 the Municipal Court upheld this judgment. 9. Following a complaint by the applicant and the co-owners, in a judgment (nález) of 26 July 2007 the Constitutional Court (Ústavní soud) quashed this judgment, referring to its case-law in this matter. 10. By a judgment of 27 November 2007 the Municipal Court upheld on appeal the judgment of the District Court of 28 November 2005. However, after a further appeal, on 19 February 2009 the Constitutional Court quashed it. 11. On 29 May 2009 the Municipal Court quashed the judgment of the District Court of 28 November 2005 on appeal in respect of the co-owners’ claim for payment of CZK 3,388 (EUR 133). On 20 August 2009 the District Court, after refusing a request by the co-owners’ for the amount of CZK 3,388 to be modified, dismissed their action. 12. On 15 September 2011 the Constitutional Court dismissed a constitutional complaint lodged by the applicant against the District Court’s last judgment. 13. On 4 May 2007 the applicant and other co-owners brought an action for damages against the tenant, seeking CZK 172,210 (EUR 6,780). They claimed that during the earlier set of proceedings, J.M. had concealed the fact that her then-husband owned another flat. They therefore claimed damages corresponding to the difference between the market rent and the rent actually paid for the period from 1 May 2004 until 30 November 2006. 14. On an unspecified date, the District Court allowed the State to join the proceedings upon the landlords’ request. 15. In a judgment of 5 May 2011 the District Court dismissed the co-owners’ action, stating that the tenant had not been obliged to disclose her then husband’s ownership in the earlier proceedings and that the landlords could therefore not claim damages in this respect. Neither could they claim unjust enrichment, since the judgment of 30 May 2005 too constituted the legal entitlement under which J.M. had acquired the right to tenancy. In respect of the claimed damages relating to the rent control system, the District Court referred to Constitutional Court’s opinion no. Pl. ÚS-st. 27/09 (hereinafter “the plenary opinion”) of 28 April 2009, according to which ordinary courts could set a new level of rent only pro futuro (that is to say from the date of the bringing of an action by tenants) until 1 January 2007, when Act no. 107/2006 on the deregulation of rents had entered into force. The courts could not, therefore, determine the rent retroactively. Finally, it dismissed the claim for damages against the State as statute-barred. 16. In a separate judgment given on the same date, the District Court, after the co-owners had brought an action for payment of CZK 75,292 (EUR 2,964) against the tenant (and subsequently also against the State), ordered the tenant to pay CZK 60 (EUR 2.36) to the landlords. It dismissed the action in respect of the State as statute-barred. On 21 September 2011 the Municipal Court upheld on appeal this judgment in respect of the tenant but quashed it in respect of the State on the grounds that the publication of the plenary opinion in 2009[1] should have been taken into account for the calculation of the beginning of the three-year statutory limitation period under section 32(1) of the State Liability Act. 17. On 27 October 2011 the Municipal Court upheld the judgment of the District Court of 5 May 2011 concerning the damages claimed by the co-owners in the amount of CZK 172,210 (EUR 6,780). It endorsed the reasoning of the lower court, dismissing the claimants’ objection that the three-year statutory limitation period under the State Liability Act should have started to run on the date of the adoption of the plenary opinion – that is to say on 28 April 2009. 18. In a judgment of 6 February 2012 the District Court ordered the State to pay CZK 4,846 (EUR 191) to the co-owners in respect of the damage they had sustained. 19. On 20 November 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed a constitutional complaint lodged by the applicant against the Municipal Court’s judgment of 27 October 2011. 20. The applicant owns a flat in a tenement building in Pardubice, which was rented under the rent control system. 21. On 31 March 2006 he lodged an action against the tenant seeking the determination of the rent in the locality in question. 22. Following the adoption of the plenary opinion, the applicant applied for the State to be admitted to the proceedings. The Pardubice District Court (okresní soud) dismissed the application motion on 24 June 2009, stating that the admittance of the State would be against the principle of procedural economy. On 19 August 2009 the Hradec Králové Regional Court (krajský soud) upheld this decision on appeal. It specified that as the original issue of the proceedings had been the determination of the rent in the locality in question, the admittance of the State would lead to a claim for damages. It therefore advised the applicant to bring a separate action for damages. 23. In a judgment of 11 January 2010 the District Court decided that the tenant should pay rent of CZK 3,500 (EUR 138) per month during the period from 31 March until 31 December 2006. The court found that both parties agreed that the sum of CZK 3,500 (EUR 138) was the market rent for a flat in the locality in question. At the same time, it dismissed the applicant’s claim in respect of the period from 1 January 2002 until 30 March 2006 and from 1 January 2007 onwards. 24. On 9 December 2010 the applicant brought an action for damages against the State seeking CZK 133,248 (EUR 5,246) with the Prague 1 District Court. The relevant period was defined as being from 1 January 2002 until 31 March 2006 and the sum was calculated as the difference between collected rent and the market rent (CZK (3,500 minus 792) multiplied by six months (the period from 1 January 2002 until 30 June 2002), and CZK (3,500 minus 900) multiplied by forty-five months (the period from 1 July 2002 until 31 March 2006). In a judgment of 9 September 2011 the District Court dismissed this action, accepting the State’s argument that it had become statute-barred. On 22 February 2012 the Municipal Court upheld this judgment on appeal. 25. On 20 November 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed a constitutional complaint lodged by the applicant as manifestly ill-founded. 26. The applicants own a tenement building in Prague. One of the flats is rented under the rent control system. In July 2002 the rent and payment for maintenance services were CZK 2,653.95 (EUR 104) and CZK 424 (EUR 17) respectively, as fixed by the Prague 8 District Court. 27. On 14 September 2003 the applicants informed the tenant that the monthly rent would be increased to CZK 10,000 (EUR 394), but he refused to pay the new rent. The tenancy agreement was terminated on 31 December 2004. 28. On 5 May 2005 the applicants brought an action with the Prague 8 District Court against the former tenant for payment of CZK 117,846 (EUR 4,640) in outstanding rent for the period between November 2003 and December 2004. 29. In a judgment of 17 June 2010 the District Court ordered the tenant to pay CZK 17,223.30 (EUR 678), which corresponded to the difference between the payments that the tenant had actually made during the relevant period and the amount which was supposed to be paid according to the previous judgment of the Prague 8 District Court (see paragraph 26 above). The court referred, inter alia, to the plenary opinion, which banned the general courts from imposing a retrospective increase in rent. 30. On 17 March 2011 the Municipal Court upheld on appeal this judgment in respect of the former tenant’s refusal of the rent increase, ordering the tenant to pay to the applicants CZK 12,028 (EUR 474) in respect of default charges. 31. On 19 March 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal by the applicants on points of law, reiterating the plenary opinion. It further added that the repeal of the price regulation could not be considered as constituting a change in law which would allow the applicants to increase the rent. 32. On 30 October 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed a constitutional complaint lodged by the applicants as manifestly ill-founded. 33. The applicant is the co-owner of a tenement building in Prague in which nine out of eleven flats were rented under the rent control system. 34. On 7 October 2004 he brought an action against the State, represented by the Ministry of Finance, for damages in the amount of CZK 772,524 (EUR 30,414), corresponding to the difference between the regulated rent and the market rent in the locality in question for the period from 1 January 2003 until 31 December 2003. He submitted that the State was responsible for his loss of profit owing to its inactivity and continuing unlawful interference with his proprietary rights. 35. On 9 February 2005 the Prague 1 District Court dismissed the applicant’s action. It held that the failure of Parliament to enact deregulating legislation did not constitute an “incorrect official procedure” within the meaning of the State Liability Act (Act no. 82/1998). It also stated that Article 420 of the Civil Code was not applicable, as the relation between a citizen and the State could not be considered a civil relationship within the meaning of the Civil Code. 36. On 29 August 2005 the Prague Municipal Court upheld this judgment. It endorsed the assessment of the first-instance court as to the inapplicability of the State Liability Act. It further noted that as for the period preceding the adoption of judgment no. Pl. ÚS 2/03 of the Constitutional Court of 19 March 2003 (published in the Official Gazette on 20 March 2003 under the number 84/2003), by which the Constitutional Court had abolished Regulation No. 567/2002 on 20 March 2003, the applicant could not claim the non-existence of legal regulation as this had indeed existed until the Constitutional Court’s judgment. Thus, there had indeed been a decree regulating the matter, and the said judgment did not have retroactive effect. The appellate court also stated that the applicant should have first brought an action against the tenants for the rent to be determined according to the local and material conditions before initiating proceedings against the State. 37. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court, which was dismissed on 29 October 2007. The Supreme Court considered, in particular, that the judgment of the appellate court had been in compliance with its previous case-law. 38. The applicant lodged a constitutional complaint, claiming that he had pursued his action on the basis of the previous case-law of the Constitutional Court, especially judgments no. Pl. ÚS 20/05 and no. I. ÚS 717/05. He submitted that the inactivity of the legislative body had amounted to a violation of his rights – specifically his right to enjoy his possessions. 39. On 30 July 2009 the Constitutional Court quashed the judgment of the Supreme Court and those of the lower courts. It referred to its plenary opinion (see paragraph 15 above). 40. In four following submissions, the applicant supplemented the original wording of his action, specifying that he sought only damages in respect of five out of the nine flats rented under the rent control system and limiting the amount claimed to CZK 501,228 (EUR 19,733) for the period of 1 January 2003 until 31 December 2003 (see paragraph 34 above). 41. In a judgment of 29 November 2011, the District Court ordered the State to pay compensation in the amount of CZK 95,934 (EUR 3,777), dismissing the rest of the applicant’s claim. It held that the applicant’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions had been restricted and found it reasonable to award the applicant the aforesaid sum. As to the method of calculation, it stated: “...the court considers it appropriate to establish the amount of the damage ... as an average of regulated and deregulated rent ...” 42. On 27 June 2012 the Municipal Court reduced on appeal the damages awarded to the applicant to CZK 40,980 (EUR 1,613). It found that the first-instance court had erroneously calculated those damages. It stated that the amount of damages should not exceed the rent that could have been collected in 2007 after Act no. 107/2006 on the deregulation of rents had entered into force. The damages awarded should correspond to the difference between the possible unilaterally increased rent in 2007 and the rent under the rent control system in 2003. In 2003, the applicant had been able to collect CZK 109,956 (EUR 4,329) and in 2007 he had been able to collect CZK 150,936 (EUR 5,942) by renting out the five flats. The difference, therefore, amounted to CZK 40,980 (EUR 1,613). 43. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law which was, however, dismissed by the Supreme Court on 29 April 2015. The Supreme Court reiterated its previous case-law, in particular judgment no. 22 Cdo 3188/2012, in which it had held that an owner of flats should be compensated if rent under the rent control system, taking into account local circumstances and other concrete circumstances, did not cover the justifiable costs of maintenance and repair within a reasonable time and make an adequate profit. In the opinion of the Supreme Court, compensation for the restriction of the right to property could not be considered as constituting compensation for damage and did not cover loss of profit. Nevertheless, the amount awarded must have been .proportional. In this regard, the appellate court correctly applied the amount of rent by using the method of calculation specified in Act no. 107/2006. 44. On 12 April 2006 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint as manifestly ill-founded. It relied on its previous case-law in which it had approved the above-described methods of calculating compensation and had stated that the compensation for unconstitutional restriction of property rights did not constitute a claim for damages and, therefore, did not constitute compensation for loss of profit. 45. The applicant is the owner of a tenement flat in Prague which was rented under the rent control system. 46. On 31 May 2007 he brought an action against the State ( represented by the Ministry of Finance) and his tenant for damages in the amount of CZK 129,448 (EUR 5,096), corresponding to the difference between the regulated rent and the market rent in the locality in question for the period from 1 June 2004 until 31 March 2006. On 20 August 2009 he withdrew the action against the tenant but maintained his claim against the State. He argued that the State was responsible for his loss of profit due to its inactivity and continuing unlawful interference with his proprietary rights. 47. Following a request by the Prague 1 District Court, on 25 June 2009 an expert opinion on the standard level of rent was produced. 48. On 29 November 2010 the Prague 1 District Court awarded the applicant damages in the amount of CZK 98,208 (EUR 3,866) and dismissed the rest of the applicant’s claim in the amount of CZK 31,240 (EUR 1,230), representing the legal interest on the awarded amount from 1 June 2006 until 30 April 2008. 49. On 23 August 2011 the Prague Municipal Court upheld on appeal the first-instance judgment and revoked it in respect of the part concerning legal costs. 50. The applicant lodged a constitutional complaint, alleging a violation of his right to a fair trial and his right to enjoyment of his possessions. He specifically complained that he had not been compensated for his legal costs. The Constitutional Court dismissed the appeal on 10 January 2012 as manifestly ill-founded, asserting that the applicant’s fundamental rights were not at stake. 51. The State lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court, which quashed the decisions of the lower courts in respect of the award of damages and legal costs on 23 April 2013. The rest of the decision of the District Court, namely the part concerning unawarded interest in the amount of CZK 31,240 (EUR 1,230), became final, as no appeal was lodged against it. In its decision, the Supreme Court stated that the lower courts had not assessed correctly the amount of compensation which should have been awarded. It held in this regard that the severity of the restriction of the applicant’s right to property should have been duly examined. 52. The applicant lodged a new constitutional complaint, which was rejected by the Constitutional Court on 26 August 2013 as premature and therefore inadmissible. 53. Following the judgment of the Supreme Court (see paragraph 51 above), in the ensuing proceedings, on 3 February 2014 the District Court reduced damages awarded to the applicant to the amount of CZK 6,439 (EUR 254) and determined the legal costs. The court stated that the compensation should not exceed the rent that could have been collected in 2007 after Act no. 107/2006 on the deregulation of rents entered into force. The damages awarded should correspond to the difference between the possible unilaterally increased rent in 2007 and the rent under the rent control system in the period from 2004 until 2006. During these years, the applicant had been able to collect CZK 5,850 (EUR 230) per month. However, under the rent control system, the rent had been CZK 1,386 (EUR 55), and since 1 January 2007 the amount had been CZK 1,678 (EUR 66) per month. The District Court concluded that the monthly difference corresponded to CZK 292.69 (EUR 12), and in the further period of twenty-two months (1 June 2004-31 March 2006), the monthly difference amounted to CZK 6,439 (EUR 254). 54. On 3 June 2014 the Municipal Court upheld the first-instance judgment but quashed it in respect of the legal costs awarded. 55. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, which the Supreme Court rejected as inadmissible on 14 July 2015. 56. The applicant lodged a third constitutional complaint, which on 19 January 2016 the Constitutional Court dismissed as manifestly ill-founded. Relying on its previous case-law, it concluded that the courts could not have disproportionally interfered with the applicant’s property rights, even though they had calculated the compensation as the difference between the market rent and the deregulated rent under Act no. 107/2006.

6. The background to the refusal to register Ilinden at issue in this case has been set out in detail in the judgments in the following cases: Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v. Bulgaria, nos. 29221/95 and 29225/95, ECHR 2001-IX; United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Ivanov v. Bulgaria, no. 44079/98, 20 October 2005; United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden-PIRIN and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 59489/00, 20 October 2005; Ivanov and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 46336/99, 24 November 2005; United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 59491/00, 19 January 2006; United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Ivanov v. Bulgaria (no. 2), no. 37586/04, 18 October 2011; United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Others v. Bulgaria (no. 2), no. 34960/04, 18 October 2011; Singartiyski and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 48284/07, 18 October 2011; and United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden-PIRIN and Others v. Bulgaria (no. 2), nos. 41561/07 and 20972/08, 18 October 2011. 7. On 27 September 2010 Ilinden’s board of management applied to the Blagoevgrad Regional Court for it to be registered as an association. On 3 February 2012 the Blagoevgrad Regional Court refused the application, and on 23 April 2012 its decision was upheld by the Sofia Court of Appeal. A detailed account of those proceedings may be found in Yordan Ivanov and Others v. Bulgaria (no. 70502/13, §§ 8-18, 11 January 2018). 8. On 23 March 2014 the second and third applicants and seven other people held a meeting at which they resolved to set up Ilinden as an association. They defined Ilinden’s aims and the means that it would use to attain them, adopted its articles of association, and elected its board of management, which consisted of all nine of them. 9. Shortly after that, Ilinden’s board of management applied to the Blagoevgrad Regional Court for it to be registered as an association. 10. In a decision of 30 June 2014 (реш. № 2768 от 30.06.2014 г. по ф. д. № 36/2014 г., БОС) the Blagoevgrad Regional Court refused the application. It first observed that even though Ilinden had declared that it intended to be an association which only served the interests of its members, its aims, as set out in its articles of association, showed that in reality it meant to serve broader public interests (see paragraph 23 below). The court went on to note that Ilinden’s articles of association stated that it would strive for, inter alia, the introduction of the Macedonian language in schools, the protection of the right of Macedonians to refute propaganda about their history and culture, and the protection of Macedonian cultural heritage, which was being “subjected to ethnocide by Bulgarian cultural institutions”. The articles of association also stated that Ilinden would organise seminars and press conferences to expose the reasons which underlay the “policy of forced assimilation and discrimination of, and xenophobia towards, Macedonians in Bulgaria”. According to the articles of association, Ilinden was a “Macedonian organisation based on a Macedonian ethnic foundation and origin within the boundaries of Bulgaria”, and it “would remind [people] of the terror perpetrated by Bulgaria, of the thousands of Macedonians killed, of the violence, the prisons and the deprivation of basic human rights and freedoms of Macedonians after 1913, which amounted to crimes under international law”. For the court, all those statements gave the impression that Ilinden intended to stir up national and ethnic hatred, contrary to Article 44 § 2 of the Constitution (see paragraph 21 below). Moreover, the statements, combined with the existence, albeit brief, of a political party called the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden-PIRIN, whose re-registration had recently been refused, and with the existence of organisations bearing the same or similar names, led to the conclusion that the intention was to mislead society and to obtain the registration of an organisation pursuing political aims (see paragraphs 18-20 below), or an organisation directed against the unity of the nation. This was also contrary to section 7(2) of the Non-Profit Legal Persons Act 2000 (see paragraph 24 below), which barred associations from having misleading names. Lastly, the association’s intended name was not unique, as required by law. 11. Ilinden’s founders appealed. They submitted that the court had misconstrued Ilinden’s articles of association and had erred in finding that its activities would be political or directed against the unity of the nation. The real reason for the refusal to register Ilinden had been that it advocated views which were at odds with the official ones. 12. In a decision of 18 November 2015 (реш. № 2272 от 18.11.2015 г. по ф. д. № 2968/2014 г., САС, ТО) a three-member panel of the Sofia Court of Appeal upheld the refusal to register Ilinden by two votes to one. 13. The court began by saying that when assessing the aims of an association seeking registration, it had to base itself chiefly on the articles of association. But since by law in registration proceedings the court had to examine the reality of the matter rather than carry out a mere formal check, it had to have regard not just to the aims set out in the articles of association, but to the entirety of the articles, and on that basis ascertain the founders’ real aims and intentions. The court also had to bear in mind the traditions which the association purported to represent and the historical figures with which it identified, the past activities, if known, of its founders, leaders and supporters, as well as the positions they had advocated. All those elements had to be juxtaposed with the aims set out in the articles of association, with a view to verifying whether those aims were not in effect a cover for other aims. In doing so, and thus balancing the rights of the founders of the association against the rights of others and the public interest, the court could rely not only on the material in the case file but also on facts which were publicly known and of which it could therefore take judicial notice. 14. In Ilinden’s case, it had been common knowledge, sufficiently publicised in both Bulgarian and foreign media, that since 1990 some of its founders, leaders and supporters had in a persistent manner openly challenged both those who had opposed their views and the State authorities, which had led to a string of breaches of public order – clashes between Ilinden’s supporters and their opponents on account of the views expressed by the former about Macedonian history – reported in the media. Seen against that background, the declaration in Ilinden’s articles of association that people of any ethnicity could become members did not reflect the reality of the situation, which was that the organisation had been conceived as one based purely on Macedonian ethnicity. The same went for the declaration in the articles of association that Ilinden would only resort to peaceful means to achieve its aims. This had been belied by the organisation’s record of provoking its opponents and the State authorities by making strongly worded statements about violence against Macedonians ‑ such statements had featured in its articles of association as well ‑ which had led to real public clashes. The court had to also take into account the complex ethnic and religious situation in some neighbouring countries, as well as the severe migrant crisis affecting all of Europe and Bulgaria in particular, as a front-line State of the European Union. That crisis, coupled with the “recent, likewise commonly known, tragic events in Central European countries”, showed a categorical need to mobilise all available State and social resources. 15. In those circumstances, the application to register Ilinden had to be turned down for two reasons. Firstly, the pursuit of its real aims, seen against the backdrop of the heightened sensitivities of the population in Pirin Macedonia, where it was based, could have led to serious tensions and breaches of public order caused by, or involving, supporters of the organisation, as had happened in the past. In the tense situation facing Bulgaria and its neighbouring States, that had to be seen as a genuine possibility. Secondly, the realisation of Ilinden’s right to freedom of association would infringe the rights of all Bulgarians who did not support its aims or the means which it intended to use to attain those aims. All were entitled to believe that they were not citizens of a State which had committed international crimes, that they did not engage, in their capacity as Bulgarian citizens, in propaganda and manipulation of the history and culture of a neighbouring country and that they were not citizens of a State whose institutions had subjected the cultural heritage of part of its population to ethnocide. The Sofia Court of Appeal concluded that it was necessary to refuse the registration application, even though it recognised that it was also possible to dissolve an already registered association if it engaged in anti-constitutional or unlawful conduct. The refusal was a justified preventive measure. 16. The dissenting judge noted that Ilinden’s founders had complied with all formal requirements of the law. She went on to say that the registration regime was not to be used to hinder the exercise of the fundamental right to associate with others, and that the case called for the direct application of Article 11 of the Convention, which was part of Bulgarian law. She then noted how that Article had been construed by the European Court of Human Rights in several cases, including United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden-PIRIN and Others and United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Others (both cited above), and stated that, in her view, the fact that an association advocated a form of minority consciousness could not justify a restriction of its rights under that Article. The Court’s ruling on that point in Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden (cited above) had to be taken into account when examining the registration request at issue. There was, moreover, no evidence of actions by Ilinden’s founders which ran counter to the prohibition in Article 44 § 2 of the Constitution (see paragraph 21 below). The refusal to register it was thus disproportionate and unjustified. 17. Ilinden’s founders sought to appeal on points of law. On 22 February 2016 the judge-rapporteur of the Sofia Court of Appeal, who under the relevant rules of procedure had to check the appeal’s admissibility before forwarding it to the Supreme Court of Cassation, sent it back to the appellants. He noted that under the applicable rules of procedure, as consistently construed by the Supreme Court of Cassation, no appeal lay against appellate decisions confirming refusals to register an association. In a final decision of 15 July 2016 (опр. № 317 от 15.07.2016 г. по ч. т. д. № 1062/2016 г., ВКС, I т. о.) the Supreme Court of Cassation dismissed the founders’ appeal against the judge-rapporteur’s order. It likewise found that under the applicable rules of procedure, which it had already construed in several cases, the Sofia Court of Appeal’s decision was not amenable to appeal.

5. The applicants were born in 1979 and 1978 respectively and live in Tikhoretsk, Krasnodar region. 6. On 3 January 2005 a young woman (S.) was found near a block of flats in Tikhoretsk with serious head injuries from which she died in a hospital on the following day. Criminal proceedings were initiated and an investigation was conducted firstly by Sh. and later, from 23 January 2005, O. – both investigators with the Tikhoretsk inter-district prosecutor’s office (“the inter-district prosecutor’s office”). Operational and search activities in the case were conducted by the criminal investigation unit of the Tikhoretsk Town and District Police Department (ОУР УВД города Тихорецка и Тихорецкого района, “the Tikhoretsk Police Department”) – in particular by three police officers, Ch., K. and R. Those officers established that B. could have been involved in the crime. On 20 January 2005 B. was arrested and gave a statement incriminating the first applicant. 7. On 21 January 2005 Ch., K. and R. arrested the first applicant in the presence of witnesses and took him to the Tikhoretsk Police Department, where they interviewed him. The applicant denied his involvement in the crime. 8. The applicant’s account of events at the police station is as follows. Officers Ch., K. and R. demanded that he confess to the crime. He refused. They knocked him down, punched and kicked him, beat him with a rubber truncheon, and put a gas mask over his head, blocking his access to air. 9. At 9 p.m. on 21 January 2005 Sh., the investigator, drew up a record of the applicant’s arrest as a suspect. 10. The applicant was taken to the temporary detention facility (IVS) at the Tikhoretsk Police Department. At 10.30 p.m. the IVS officer called an ambulance. 11. The ambulance doctor examined the applicant and recorded multiple haematomas on his chest and back, sharp pain upon palpation in the area of sternum, and the applicant’s complaints about pain in the chest and stomach, weakness and difficulty breathing. The applicant was diagnosed with a fracture of the ribs, multiple contusions and traumatic shock. The doctor noted the applicant’s explanation that he had been beaten up and assessed his condition as grave. 12. At 11.30 p.m. the applicant was brought to Tikhoretsk town hospital for an X‑ray examination. He was examined by a surgeon and by a traumatologist, who diagnosed him with a fracture of the ribs on the left‑hand side. The applicant was taken back to the IVS. 13. On 22 January 2005 the applicant was examined by Sh. – in the presence of an officially assigned lawyer – as a suspect. He denied having been involved in the crime. According to the applicant, he complained to the investigator that the police officers had subjected him to violence in order to coerce him into giving a confession but that he had received no response. 14. On 23 January 2005 the Tikhoretsk Town Court ordered that the applicant be detained on remand. 15. On 31 January 2005 the applicant was charged with causing grievous bodily harm to S. leading to her death. During his examination as an accused on that day and on 20 May 2005 the applicant denied his involvement in the crime and refused to give a statement, citing his right not to incriminate himself. 16. On 25 March 2005 the applicant’s mother lodged a complaint with the inter-district prosecutor’s office submitting that the applicant had been subjected to violence by police officers from the Tikhoretsk Police Department and seeking the institution of criminal proceedings against those officers. On 18 April 2005 O., the investigator, replied that during his examinations as a suspect and as an accused the applicant had not complained that he had been subjected to ill-treatment by police officers. In May 2005 the applicant’s mother complained to the Krasnodar regional prosecutor’s office (“the regional prosecutor’s office) that O. had used unlawful investigation methods. 17. The applicant’s lawyer in a record dated 25 May 2005 noting his being granted access to the case file, stated, inter alia, that the applicant’s involvement in the crime had not been proven as the prosecution case had been based, inter alia, on the second applicant’s confession, which he had subsequently retracted as having been given under coercion. 18. According to an expert opinion of 5 May 2010 (ordered in the course of an inquiry into the applicant’s alleged ill-treatment by the police and prepared by a commission of forensic medical experts from the Krasnodar regional forensic medical examination bureau and a traumatologist), multiple haematomas on the applicant’s chest and back recorded by the ambulance doctor on 21 January 2005 had been caused by multiple blows from a blunt object. Due to the brevity of the description of the haematomas in the medical records it was impossible to establish the time of their infliction. The experts further concluded that the applicant had sustained fractures to two ribs on the left-hand side, which could have been caused by a blunt object on 21 January 2005 in the circumstances described by the applicant – for example as a result of the applicant being punched, kicked or hit with a rubber truncheon. Those fractures, complicated by traumatic shock, gave rise to a long-term health disorder for a period exceeding 21 days and were classified as harm to health of medium gravity. 19. According to the second applicant, at around 8 a.m. on 26 January 2005 police officers K. and R. arrested him at his place of work in his colleagues’ presence and took him to the Tikhoretsk Police Department. 20. The applicant’s account of events at the police station is as follows. K., R. and another police officer demanded that he confess to having inflicted bodily injuries on S. He refused and was then beaten with a rubber truncheon. A gas mask was put over his head and his access to air was blocked. Thereafter the police officers handcuffed him to a ladder at the police station. The applicant spent the night at the police station. The following morning K. and R. started beating him again, demanding that he give a statement of surrender and confession (явка с повинной) and telling him that V. ( another suspect in the case) had already given a statement of surrender and confession incriminating the first applicant and the second applicant, together with B., and himself (that is to say V.) in inflicting head injuries on S. The applicant could not stand the violence any longer and so wrote a statement of surrender and confession that was dictated by the police officers, stating that he and the first applicant, as well as B. and V., had inflicted head injuries on S. 21. His statement of surrender and confession (явка с повинной) was recorded by K. at 1 p.m. on 27 January 2005. 22. At 2.30 p.m. on 27 January 2005 O., the investigator, drew up a record of the applicant’s arrest as a suspect. O. stated in the record that the applicant had been arrested at 2.30 p.m. that day. 23. According to the records of the Tikhoretsk Police Department IVS, in which the applicant was placed on the same day, the applicant did not complain about his health. According to the applicant, at the IVS he was not asked about his state of health and did not undergo any medical examination. 24. On 28 January 2005 the applicant was taken to O. According to the applicant, O. threatened him with further violence by police officers if he refused to repeat his confession. The applicant was examined as a suspect by O. in the presence of an officially assigned lawyer, D. The applicant reiterated his confession incriminating himself, the first applicant, B. and V. in the infliction of head injuries on S. On the same day the Tikhoretsk Town Court ordered that the applicant be detained on remand. 25. On 1 February 2005 from 2.30 p.m. to 4.05 p.m. O. carried out an on-site verification of the applicant’s statements in the presence of D. and the applicant. According to the applicant, he had been told by the police officers “what to show [them] and where”. The applicant again reiterated his confession. These investigative steps were recorded on video. 26. According to the applicant’s mother, who was present during the verification of the applicant’s statements at the crime scene on 1 February 2005, there was a bruise on the applicant’s face and he was limping. His limp was also visible on the video recording, which was shown on a local television channel. 27. On 2 February 2005 the applicant was taken by Kl., a police officer, to his grandparents from whom the applicant requested a sum of money. According to the applicant and his grandmother, when left alone with her, he explained that he had been beaten up by the police officers, that he had confessed to committing a crime out of fear for his life, and that he needed money in order to evade prosecution. His grandmother saw that he was limping and had a bruise on his face. His grandparents gave him the money. 28. On 3 February 2005 the applicant was informed that his mother had retained D., a lawyer, to defend him during the criminal proceedings against him. During their meeting on the same day the applicant told D. that he had given the confession as a result of his having been beaten up by the police officers. During his examination as an accused on the same day he pleaded not guilty and refused to testify, citing his right not to incriminate himself. 29. On 7 February 2005 the applicant’s mother lodged a complaint with the inter-district prosecutor’s office, submitting that over a twenty-four hour period the applicant had been held in police custody and beaten by police officers until he had given a confession. 30. On 15 February 2005 lawyer D. lodged a complaint with the inter‑district prosecutor’s office, submitting that the applicant had been beaten up by police officers and that, as a result, he had given a confession (recorded as a statement of surrender and confession), which was repeated during his examination as a suspect and during the on-site verification of his statements, and that money (given to him by his grandparents) had been extorted from him by the police officers. 31. On 17 March 2005 the applicant lodged a complaint with a prosecutor at the inter-district prosecutor’s office, submitting that he had been unlawfully detained and subjected to violence by police officers from the Tikhoretsk Police Department and had thus been coerced into giving a confession. On the same day he lodged a similar complaint with the investigator in charge of his criminal case, asking to be further examined as an accused. 32. On 25 March 2005 the applicant’s mother lodged another complaint with the inter-district prosecutor’s office, submitting that the applicant had been beaten up by police officers from the Tikhoretsk Police Department. 33. On 30 March 2005 the applicant’s mother once again lodged a complaint with the inter-district prosecutor’s office, submitting that after his arrest on 26 January 2005 the applicant had been threatened and beaten during the night until he had confessed to a crime that he had not committed. 34. On 18 April 2005 D., the lawyer, complained to the inter-district prosecutor’s office that his and the applicant’s complaints had remained unanswered. 35. In a letter of the same date O., the investigator, replied to the applicant’s mother’s complaint dated 25 March 2005 that during his examinations as a suspect and as an accused in the presence of a lawyer the applicant had not complained that he had been subjected to ill-treatment by police officers. O. concluded that he had given his statements voluntarily. 36. On 26 April 2005 the applicant repeated his request to the investigator in charge of his criminal case that he be further examined as an accused, stating that he had not received any reply to his complaint of 17 March 2005 (see paragraph 31 above). 37. On 3 May 2005 the applicant’s mother lodged a complaint with the regional prosecutor’s office, expressing her disagreement with the statement in investigator O.’s letter of 18 April 2005 that the applicant had not complained about his alleged ill-treatment by police officers. She noted that her complaints about the applicant’s alleged beating by the police – as well as similar complaints lodged by the applicant and his lawyer, D. – had remained unanswered, and that O. had failed to examine (in accordance with the law) the applicant’s complaints. 38. During his examination as an accused on 16 May 2005 the applicant retracted his confession statements, asserting that they had been made under coercion exerted by police officers, and pleaded not guilty. 39. The applicant’s lawyer, D., stated in a record dated 23 May 2005 noting his being granted access to the case file that in the course of the preliminary investigation the applicant and D. had repeatedly complained that the applicant had been beaten on 26 and 27 January 2005 by police officers from the Tikhoretsk Police Department, as a result of which he had given a statement of surrender and confession incriminating himself and his co‑accused. They had not received any reply to their complaints and to requests lodged by them for an inquiry and confrontations to be held. 40. On 2 June 2005 an investigator from the regional prosecutor’s office refused to institute criminal proceedings against O. for lack of evidence of a criminal event in his actions. The decision referred to the official records of the investigative activities undertaken and statements made by O., K. and R., which denied any ill-treatment of the applicants. In particular, O. stated that neither he nor the officers of the Tikhoretsk Police Department had used any unlawful physical or psychological measures in relation to the applicants, and that accordingly, no pre-investigation inquiry had been carried out. The decision of 2 June 2005 concluded that the applicants had been arrested, examined as suspects, detained on remand in custody and charged, in accordance with the law. 41. On 29 June 2005 at the preliminary hearing in the applicants’ criminal case the second applicant requested that his statement of surrender and confession of 27 January 2005, the record of his examination as a suspect of 28 January 2005 and the record of the on-site verification of his statements of 1 February 2005 be excluded from evidence on the grounds that his confession had been obtained through the use of physical violence by police officers who had unlawfully kept him in custody for twenty-four hours before his official arrest. The Tikhoretsk Town Court dismissed his request as premature and unfounded, stating that no such request had been lodged during the preliminary investigation in the case. 42. On 30 June 2005 the second applicant’s mother lodged a complaint with the Town Court, submitting that the applicant had been unlawfully detained by the police officers for about twenty-four hours between his actual arrest at his place of work at about 7.45 a.m. on 26 January 2005 and his formal arrest on 27 January 2005. During that time Ch., K. and R. had subjected him to physical and psychological pressure, as a result of which he had made a confession in relation to a crime that he had not in fact committed. She requested that the police officers be prosecuted and that evidence be examined in support of her complaints. 43. On 6 July 2005 the Town Court dismissed the complaint of 30 June 2005 lodged by the second applicant’s mother on the grounds that she had not been authorised to represent the applicant, who was not a minor, and that it was no longer possible to complain under Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“CCrP”) about the police officers’ actions in respect of the preliminary investigation since the preliminary investigation in the case had been completed and the trial had started. On 11 July 2005 the second applicant lodged a complaint (similar to that lodged by his mother on 30 June 2005) with the Town Court. 44. On 14 July 2005 the Town Court heard a certain St., who had allegedly shared a cell with the second applicant in March 2005 at the Tikhoretsk Police Department IVS. St. stated that he had been told by the second applicant that he (that is to say the second applicant) had committed a crime [against S.] together with other people but had decided to deny it and to argue that his statements had been obtained under coercion. St. stated that he knew that no pressure had actually been exerted on the applicant. St. did not remember whether there had been other people present when the applicant had told him this. 45. On the same day the Town Court heard the applicants and their co‑accused. All four defendants complained that they had been subjected to ill‑treatment by police officers. The first applicant argued, inter alia, that the second applicant’s confession incriminating him of having murdered S. had been obtained as a result of the second applicant’s ill-treatment by the police officers and therefore constituted inadmissible evidence. The second applicant reiterated the arguments that he had advanced at the preliminary hearing – namely, that he had actually been arrested on 26 January 2005 and held continuously in police custody, where he had been subjected to violence until he had given a confession. He also stated that when he had been brought to O., the investigator, for questioning on 28 January 2005, he had complained about the above-mentioned ill-treatment; O. had replied that if he did not reiterate his statements he would spend another night with the police officers. The applicant furthermore stated that the police officers had visited him every day and had threatened him; his family had been unaware of his whereabouts; he had given confession statements out of fear for his life; and he had not in fact committed the crime in question. The Town Court ordered that the hearing be adjourned and an inquiry into the applicants’ and their co-defendants’ allegations be carried out by the inter-district prosecutor’s office before the next hearing on 26 July 2005. 46. On 22 July 2005 the Town Court dismissed the second applicant’s complaint of 11 July 2005 (see paragraph 43 above) on the grounds that it was no longer open to him to complain under Article 125 of the CCrP about the police officers’ actions during the preliminary investigation in respect of his case, since the preliminary investigation had been completed and the trial had started. 47. On 23 July 2005 an investigator from the inter-district prosecutor’s office issued a refusal (pursuant to Article 24 § 1 (1) of the CCrP) to open a criminal case for absence of a criminal event under Articles 286 (abuse of powers) and 302 (forced extraction of confession) of the Criminal Code. The investigator relied on statements given by the investigators, O. and Sh., and the police officers, K. and R., all of whom had denied the applicants’ allegations of ill‑treatment. O. also stated that no forensic medical expert examination had been carried out in relation to the applicants since no complaints concerning their state of health or the police officers’ actions had been lodged by them. K. and R. stated that on 21 January 2005 they had established the first applicant’s whereabouts, taken him to the Tikhoretsk Police Department and interviewed him. He had denied his involvement in the crime. He had later been arrested by Sh. The investigator also relied on statements given by K., R. and V.V., a police officer who had been on duty at the IVS, according to which during the first applicant’s arrest and at his arrival at the IVS, respectively, they had heard him saying that he was suffering from a pain in the chest sustained during a fight with someone two days previously. 48. On 28 July 2005 at a hearing in the trial concerning the applicants’ criminal case, M.S., a senior assistant to the prosecutor of the inter-district prosecutor’s office who was representing the prosecution at the hearing, reported the results of the pre‑investigation inquiry, stating that the applicants’ allegations of ill‑treatment by the police officers had not been confirmed. The applicants and their co-defendants objected, considering the inquiry to have been superficial and to have constituted a pure formality. The second applicant requested that an additional inquiry be carried out, since his complaints about extortion by the police officers who had taken him to his grandparents on 2 February 2005, had remained unaddressed. The court ordered that an additional inquiry be carried out before the next hearing on 2 August 2005. 49. On 1 August 2005 an investigator from the inter-district prosecutor’s office issued a decision not to institute criminal proceedings for lack of evidence of a criminal event. He relied on the statements given by Kl., the police officer, that he had taken the second applicant out of the IVS on 2 February 2005 in order to verify his suspected involvement in some thefts; and by taking the applicant to his grandparents he had done him a favour (see paragraph 27 above). The investigator concluded that Kl.’s actions had had no connection with the second applicant’s alleged coercion into making a confession concerning S.’s death. 50. On 2 August 2005 the Town Court examined the results of the additional inquiry, which had been communicated to it by M.S. The applicants considered that inquiry to have been superficial and formalistic. At their request the Town Court examined witnesses. Two witnesses, in whose company the first applicant had spent time immediately before his arrest, stated that the first applicant’s state of health before his arrest had been normal. It also examined G., the second applicant’s colleague, who stated that at about 7.50 a.m. on 26 January 2005 the applicant had left his place of work at the request of two persons who, as he had learned later during the day, had been from the police. 51. In a decision of 2 August 2005 the Town Court dismissed the request for the exclusion from the evidence of the record of the second applicant’s examination as a suspect of 28 January 2005 and the record of the on-site verification of his statements of 1 February 2005 (see paragraph 41 above). Relying on the refusals of 23 July and 1 August 2005 by the inter-district prosecutor’s office to institute criminal proceedings and the official record dated 27 January 2005 of the second applicant’s arrest (which indicated that the applicant had been arrested at 2.30 p.m. on 27 January 2005), the Town Court found that his allegations of police ill‑treatment and unlawful detention had not been based on real facts. As regards the record of the second applicant’s statement of surrender and confession of 27 January 2005, the Town Court excluded it from evidence on the grounds that it had been obtained in the absence of a lawyer. 52. On 5 August 2005 the Tikhoretsk Town Court convicted the applicants, who had pleaded not guilty, of causing grievous bodily harm to S. leading to her death and sentenced the first applicant to twelve years’ imprisonment and the second applicant to nine years’ imprisonment. Relying on the refusals to institute criminal proceedings issued by the inter‑district prosecutor’s office and the regional prosecutor’s office, the Town Court dismissed their allegations of ill-treatment by the police as unfounded. The evidence presented in the case included the record dated 28 January 2005 of the second applicant’s examination as a suspect and the record of the on-site verification of his statements of 1 February 2005 (see paragraph 51 above), as well as the confession statements given by B. and V. during the preliminary investigation and subsequently retracted by them as having been given under coercion exerted by Tikhoretsk Police Department officers. The applicants appealed against that judgment, reiterating their arguments that they had been subjected to violence by the police officers and that the second applicant’s confession incriminating them should have been excluded from evidence as having been given under duress. 53. On 29 March 2006 the Krasnodar Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal, endorsing the trial court’s decision to dismiss the applicants’ arguments concerning their alleged ill-treatment and the request for the exclusion of the second applicant’s incriminating statements allegedly obtained under coercion exercised by the police officers. It referred to the refusals issued by the inter-district prosecutor’s office and the regional prosecutor’s office to institute criminal proceedings into the applicants’ allegations. 54. The applicants lodged applications for supervisory review in respect of their case, which were dismissed on 9 June 2006 by the Krasnodar Regional Court and on 17 September 2007 by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. 55. On 31 May 2011 the Promyshlenniy District Court of Stavropol reduced the first applicant’s sentence of imprisonment by two months, in accordance with the amendments to the Criminal Code. The applicants’ sentences of imprisonment ended and the applicants were released in 2014 (the second applicant) and 2016 (the first applicant). 56. On 6 February 2007 a deputy prosecutor of the regional prosecutor’s office annulled the decision of 2 June 2005 refusing to open a criminal case against O., the investigator. A new refusal was issued on 8 February 2007 and was declared unlawful on 20 November 2007 by the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Krasnodar. A further refusal dated 9 January 2008 pointed out that the allegations of the applicants’ ill-treatment by the police had been the subject of a different inquiry, which was pending. On 6 August 2008 the Krasnodar Regional Court terminated proceedings initiated by the applicants’ mothers to appeal against the refusal of 9 January 2008 on the grounds that it was no longer open to them to complain under Article 125 of the CCrP about the investigator’s actions during the preliminary investigation in respect of the applicants’ case, since the preliminary investigation had been completed. The Regional Court noted that should the unlawfulness of actions on the part of O. or the police officers from the Tikhoretsk Police Department be established during the investigation in the criminal case opened on 5 March 2008 (see paragraph 60 below), the decisions not to open criminal cases against them would be annulled and the proceedings in the criminal case against the applicants would be reopened owing to newly discovered circumstances. 57. Following the numerous complaints lodged by the applicants, on 22 March 2007 a deputy prosecutor from the inter-district prosecutor’s office annulled as unlawful and based on an incomplete inquiry the refusals of 23 July 2005 and 1 August 2005 to institute criminal proceedings, and ordered an additional inquiry. Eight further decisions taken by investigators refusing to open a criminal case between 27 March 2007 and 6 January 2008 were annulled on the grounds that they were unlawful and had been based on an incomplete inquiry. Some of the annulments followed the delivery of court decisions under Article 125 of the CCrP finding refusals to institute criminal proceedings unlawful and unfounded (namely, the Town Court’s decisions of 15 October 2007, 27 December 2007 and 29 January 2008) – particularly in view of the investigating authority’s failure to correct certain deficiencies (highlighted by courts and the supervising authorities) in the inquiry in question. 58. One of those eight decisions not to institute criminal proceedings, dated 23 May 2007, referred to the following statements collected by an investigator during the inquiry: - According to V.Yu., the second applicant’s colleague, shortly after 8 a.m. on 26 January 2005 the second applicant had left his place of work at the request of two men. They had all left by car. Before leaving, the applicant had had no visible injuries and had not complained about his health. Those men had enquired about the applicant’s whereabouts the day before. - The second applicant’s mother stated that she had seen the second applicant during the verification of his statements at the crime scene on 1 February 2005. He had had a bruise on his face and had been limping. - According to the second applicant’s grandmother, on 2 February 2005 two police officers had brought the applicant to her place. He had been handcuffed. He had said that he needed money. When left alone with her, he had explained that he had been beaten unconscious and threatened by the police officers as a result of which he had signed a document at their request. He had had a bruise on the face and had been limping. His grandfather had given him the money he asked for. - According to D., he – as one of the lawyers on duty – had been officially assigned to defend the second applicant during the applicant’s examination as a suspect and during the verification of his statements at the crime scene. D. had not noticed any injuries on the applicant. After those investigative activities he had concluded an agreement with the applicant’s mother to defend the applicant during the criminal proceedings against him. At their next meeting he had informed the applicant about the agreement concluded with his mother, and the applicant had told him that he had not committed the crime and had given statements incriminating himself and the first applicant as a result of coercion exercised by the police officers, who had threatened him and beaten him up. At the applicant’s request D. had lodged complaints concerning his alleged ill‑treatment by the police. The applicant had not shown D. any injuries. 59. The following statements were also received during the inquiry: - According to the second applicant’s mother, the second applicant had been arrested by K. and R., the police officers, at his place of work at 7.45 a.m. on 26 January 2005 in the presence of a team of co-workers, including V.Yu., G. and three others. K. and R. had visited her the day before, when the applicant had not been at home, asking about his whereabouts. They had again come at 7.30 a.m. on 26 January 2005, shown their service identity cards and asked about the applicant’s whereabouts. She had told them that the applicant had gone to work and they had left. When she had gone to the applicant’s place of work she had been told that the applicant had been taken away by two men matching the description of K. and R. From 26 until 28 January 2005 she had called the Tikhoretsk Police Department many times but had been told that the applicant was not there. On 28 January 2005 D. had informed her that the applicant was suspected of having committed a grave crime and had offered his services as a lawyer. - According to S.A. (the second applicant’s girlfriend), after the second applicant’s arrest she had seen the video recording of the verification of the applicant’s statements at the crime scene on a local television channel. She had noticed that the applicant was limping and that his face was bruised and swollen. After the applicant had been taken away by police officers on 26 January 2005, she had called the Tikhoretsk Police Department IVS on 27 January 2005 but had been told that the applicant was not there. On 28 January 2005 she had gone to the Tikhoretsk Police Department to enquire about the applicant’s whereabouts, and had been informed by O., the investigator, that the applicant was suspected of having committed a murder. 60. On 5 March 2008 an investigator of the Tikhoretsk inter-district investigation unit of the investigative committee at the regional prosecutor’s office (“the Tikhoretsk investigative committee”) opened a criminal case under Article 112 § 1 of the Criminal Code (harm to health of medium gravity) in relation to the injuries inflicted on the first applicant by an unknown person at an unknown place at an unknown time in January 2005. By decisions of 5 June, 2 August, 13 September and 22 October 2008 the criminal proceedings were suspended for failure to identify any person to be charged with an offence. Those decisions were annulled by the head of the Tikhoretsk investigative committee. 61. The Tikhoretsk Town Court acknowledged repeatedly that the Tikhoretsk investigative committee’s inaction had been unlawful and that it had failed to conduct the investigation in accordance with the law (namely, the Town Court’s decisions of 30 May, 1 July, 21 August and 26 September 2008). The Tikhoretsk inter‑district prosecutor repeatedly called upon the Tikhoretsk investigative committee to put an end to violations of the CCrP being committed in the course of the criminal proceedings. Thereafter the proceedings were repeatedly terminated for lack of evidence of a criminal event or suspended for failure to identify any person to be charged with an offence, and the relevant decisions were annulled as unlawful and unfounded. 62. In 2010 the criminal case was transferred to the Tikhoretsk Police Department for further investigation for the reason that the police officers’ involvement in the first applicant’s ill‑treatment had not been established. On several occasions the investigation was suspended for failure to identify any person to be charged with an offence and then resumed again. 63. According to the investigating authority, in 2012 a certain N.K. turned himself in to the Tikhoretsk Police Department and confessed that in 2005 he had inflicted bodily injuries on the applicant two days before the applicant’s arrest. The proceedings against N.K. were terminated as time‑barred. 64. In April 2013 an investigator of the Tikhoretsk Police Department was disciplined for violations of criminal procedure in the course of the investigation. On 4 April 2013 the Tikhoretsk Town Court acknowledged numerous shortcomings in the investigation, such as the failure to question the applicant about allegations raised by N.K. in his testimony or to obtain a medical expert opinion as to whether the applicant’s injuries could have been inflicted in the circumstances described by N.K. 65. On 7 October 2008 the Tikhoretsk inter-district prosecutor allowed an application lodged by the applicants for the reopening of the criminal proceedings against the applicants (in the light of newly discovered circumstances) on the grounds that the refusals to institute criminal proceedings in respect of the applicants’ allegations of police ill-treatment (on which the trial court had relied) had later been annulled. 66. On 15 July 2010 the prosecutor terminated the proceedings, holding that the applicants had been lawfully convicted by final judicial decisions, while their allegations of police ill-treatment were being examined in the course of the separate proceedings (concerning the applicants’ complaints about their alleged ill-treatment by the police). On 28 July 2011 the Tikhoretsk Town Court upheld the prosecutor’s decision of 15 July 2010. 67. In parallel with the proceedings described above, a joint pre‑investigation inquiry into both applicants’ allegations of police ill‑treatment was carried out by the Tikhoretsk investigative committee, starting from November 2010 (after a number of refusals to open a criminal case into the second applicant’s alleged ill-treatment had been issued and annulled between 26 November 2009 and 19 November 2010). 68. Between 29 November 2010 and 15 July 2015 seven more decisions not to institute criminal proceedings were taken and subsequently annulled as based on incomplete inquiries. Some of the annulments followed the delivery of court decisions under Article 125 of the CCrP finding refusals to institute criminal proceedings unlawful and unfounded, namely, the Tikhoretsk Town Court’s decisions of 5 March 2011 (which was upheld by the Krasnodar Regional Court on 13 April 2011), 1 April 2013 and 23 April 2013. 69. The most recent decision not to institute criminal proceedings into the applicants’ alleged ill-treatment in police custody – for lack of the constituent elements of crimes under Articles 285 and 286 (abuse of powers) of the Criminal Code in the actions of Ch., K., R. and other police officers, as provided by Article 24 § 1 (2) of the CCrP – was taken on 24 February 2016 by an investigator from the Tikhoretsk district investigation unit of the Krasnodar regional investigative committee. Relying on the police officers’ statements denying that they had ill-treated the applicants, the investigator concluded that no material showing that the police officers could have committed crimes against the applicants had been established. The decision also mentioned other statements, in particular the following: - statements by Sh. and O., the investigators, denying the applicants’ ill‑treatment; - statements by several persons that the first applicant had not had any visible injuries before his arrest; - statements by the police officers K., R. and V.V. (see paragraph 47 above); - statements by D. (see paragraph 58 above); - statements by the police officers K. and R. that the second applicant had been arrested on 27 January 2005 on suspicion of having committed the above-mentioned crime against S. and taken to the Tikhoretsk Police Department, where he had written a statement of surrender and confession, after which he had been arrested by O.; and - statements by S.A. that after the second applicant’s arrest she had seen him being filmed in detention on a programme on a local television channel; she had noticed that his face was an unnatural colour; and she had later seen on the same television channel another programme that had shown the video recording of the verification (with the applicant’s participation) of the applicant’s statements at the crime scene.

12. The applicant was born in 1962 in Jendouba, in the Tunisian Republic (“Tunisia”), and lives in Versoix in the Canton of Geneva. 13. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 14. According to the applicant, on 22 April 1992 he was arrested by the Italian police at his place of residence in Italy and taken to the Tunisian Consulate in Genoa, where he was presented with a bill of indictment stating that he represented a threat to Italian State Security. He alleges that he was then taken to Tunis by Tunisian officials. By his own account, he has never instituted proceedings against the Italian authorities in respect of those events. 15. The applicant further submits that he was arbitrarily detained and tortured in Tunis in the premises of the Ministry of the Interior, from 24 April to 1 June 1992, on the orders of A.K., the then Minister of the Interior. He submits that he was subjected to the so-called “roast chicken” position throughout the entire period of detention and deprived of his basic physiological needs, particularly sleep; he was also beaten on the soles of his feet with a baseball bat and struck all over his body with telephone cords. 16. The applicant submits that he suffers from a series of physical and psychological injuries and disorders. 17. After having been subjected to the alleged torture in Tunisia in 1992, the applicant fled that country in 1993 and took refuge in Switzerland, where he applied for asylum in the same year. The applicant has since been living in the Canton of Geneva. 18. On 8 November 1995 the Swiss authorities granted the applicant asylum. 19. On 14 February 2001, having learnt that A.K. was being treated in a Swiss hospital, the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against him with the Principal Public Prosecutor for the Republic and the Canton of Geneva (“the Principal Public Prosecutor”), for severe bodily injury, illegal confinement, insults, causing danger to health, coercion and abuse of authority. The applicant applied to join these proceedings as a civil party seeking damages. 20. On the same date the Principal Public Prosecutor transmitted to the head of the security police, by internal mail, a request to “attempt to locate and identify the accused individual, who [was] supposedly hospitalised in the Geneva University Hospital, for heart surgery” and “if possible, to arrest him and bring him before an investigating judge”. On receipt of this request, the police immediately contacted the hospital, which informed them that A.K. had indeed been a patient there, but that he had already left the hospital on 11 February 2001. 21. On 19 February 2001 the Principal Public Prosecutor made an order discontinuing the proceedings on the grounds that A.K. had left Switzerland and that the police had been unable to arrest him. This decision to discontinue the proceedings was not challenged by the applicant. 22. By his own account, on 22 July 2003 the applicant asked a Tunisian lawyer to represent him with a view to bringing a civil action for compensation against A.K. and the Tunisian Republic. On 28 July 2003 the lawyer informed the applicant that this type of action had never been successful and advised him not to lodge such a claim. It was allegedly impossible to lodge a civil action of this sort in Tunisia. 23. By a writ dated 8 July 2004, the applicant lodged a claim for damages with the Court of First Instance of the Republic and the Canton of Geneva (“the Court of First Instance”) against Tunisia and against A.K. He claimed 200,000 Swiss francs (CHF), with 5% interest from 1 June 1992, as compensation in respect of the non-pecuniary damage arising from the acts of torture to which he had allegedly been subjected. The applicant submitted that the conditions for reparation of non-pecuniary damage provided for by Articles 82 et seq. of the Tunisian Code of Obligations and Contracts, applicable under section 133 (2) of the Federal Law on Private International Law (Loi fédérale sur le droit international privé, the LDIP, see paragraph 37 below), had been met. 24. On 9 June 2005 a hearing was held before the Court of First Instance; neither of the defendants was in attendance or represented. 25. By a judgment of 15 September 2005, the Court of First Instance declared the claim inadmissible on the grounds that it lacked territorial jurisdiction. The relevant part of the judgment reads as follows: “With regard to an action in tort based on the unlawful acts that were allegedly committed in Tunisia by the defendants, to the claimant’s detriment, the Swiss courts do not have territorial jurisdiction under international law to examine the complaint, given that the defendants are not domiciled or habitually resident in Switzerland, and given also that no illegal act or detrimental outcome occurred in Switzerland, pursuant to sections 2 and 129 of the LDIP.” 26. Under section 3 of the LDIP (see paragraph 37 below), the Swiss courts also lacked jurisdiction under the forum of necessity, given the lack of a sufficient connection between, on the one hand, the case and the facts, and, on the other, Switzerland. In this connection, the Court of First Instance ruled as follows: “All of the acts with regard to whose after-effects the claimant, a Tunisian national, seeks compensation for non-pecuniary damage, were allegedly inflicted on him, as he submits, in Tunisia in 1992, within the premises of the Tunisian Ministry of the Interior, by the Tunisian State and its officials. The mere fact that on account of those acts the claimant applied for and received political asylum in 1995 in Switzerland, where he has since been domiciled, does not, in itself and in the light of current case-law, amount to a sufficient connection enabling a forum of necessity to be established against the defendants in Switzerland and Geneva.” 27. By a writ dated 16 November 2005, the applicant appealed against that decision before the Court of Justice of the Republic and the Canton of Geneva (“the Court of Justice”). His appeal was rejected in a judgment of 15 September 2006. After noting that the appellant had shown that he was unable to bring a civil action in Tunisia, the Court of Justice found as follows: “As the outcome of the present appeal depends on the immunity from jurisdiction of the respondent parties, the question whether there exists a forum of necessity in the appellant’s place of residence can, however, remain undecided.” 28. The Court of Justice thus held that the respondents enjoyed immunity from jurisdiction, since the acts of torture had been perpetrated in the exercise of sovereign authority (iure imperii) and not under private law (iure gestionis). Referring to the judgment delivered by the Court in the case of Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom ([GC], no. 35763/97, ECHR 2001-XI), it further considered that there had been no violation of the applicant’s right of access to a court. 29. The applicant lodged an appeal with the Federal Supreme Court, dated 20 October 2006, in which he asked it to rule that the courts of the Republic and the Canton of Geneva had territorial jurisdiction and to find that the defendants did not enjoy immunity from jurisdiction. With regard to the jurisdiction of the Swiss courts, he argued that the purpose of the introduction of a forum of necessity in section 3 of the LDIP (see paragraph 37 below) had been to avoid denials of justice, especially in cases of political persecution, and that he had provided sufficient evidence that he could not reasonably bring proceedings before a foreign court. As to the immunity from jurisdiction purportedly enjoyed by Tunisia and A.K., the applicant submitted that the exercise of public power did not include an entitlement to commit international crimes such as torture. He specified in this regard that the very definition of torture in Article 1 of the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 10 December 1984 (hereafter: “the Convention against Torture”; see paragraphs 45 et seq. below) ruled out any immunity. Lastly, he referred, in very general terms, to Article 16 of the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (see paragraph 60 below). 30. By a judgment of 22 May 2007, the reasoning of which was notified to the applicant on 7 September 2007, the Federal Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. Reiterating the reasoning in the first-instance judgment, the Federal Supreme Court considered that the Swiss courts did not in any event have territorial jurisdiction. The relevant passages of the Federal Supreme Court’s judgment read as follows: “It must first be considered whether the Swiss courts have jurisdiction to examine the action. 3.1 As Tunisia is not a party to the Convention of 16 September 1988 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Lugano Convention, RS 0.275.11), there exists no convention rule between the two States governing the question of forum, which must therefore be examined in the light of the LDIP (sections 1(1)(a) and 1(2) LDIP). 3.2 In this instance, the jurisdiction of the Swiss authorities cannot be derived from the general rule concerning the international jurisdiction of the State of domicile of the defendant contained in section 2 of the LDIP, since the respondents are not domiciled in Switzerland. The cantonal court was, moreover, right in finding that the criteria, set out in section 129 of the LDIP, for establishing jurisdiction over actions in respect of wrongful acts were not met in so far as the defendants had neither their domicile nor their place of habitual residence or business in Switzerland (section 129(1) LDIP), and neither the wrongful act nor the resultant injury occurred in Switzerland (section 129(2) LDIP). 3.3 In the absence of an ordinary forum, the problem must be addressed under section 3 of the LDIP, which concerns the forum of necessity ... Under the latter provision, where no forum is provided for in Switzerland by the LDIP and where proceedings in another country prove impossible or one cannot reasonable require that they be brought in that country, the Swiss judicial or administrative authorities of the locality with which the case has a sufficient connection have jurisdiction. The application of this rule for assigning jurisdiction thus calls for three cumulative conditions to be met: firstly, the Swiss authorities do not have jurisdiction under another provision; secondly, legal proceedings in another country are impossible or cannot reasonably be required; and, thirdly, the case in question has a sufficient connection with Switzerland. In the present case, the first condition is indisputably fulfilled. Fulfilment of the second condition appears more problematic, but in the light of the third condition, which merits more extensive discussion, it is not necessary to elaborate further on this question. 3.4 Section 3 of the LDIP, which must be interpreted restrictively ... represents a safety valve, intended to avoid denials of justice ... in the event of a negative conflict of jurisdiction. In this connection, the Federal Council, in its authoritative interpretation of this provision, noted that “there are cases that have such a tenuous connection with Switzerland that it is not appropriate to set in motion the entire judicial system in order to resolve them. However, section 3 lays down an exception to this principle. The Swiss authorities must assume jurisdiction even in cases where the connection with our country is very tenuous, where it is impossible to bring proceedings or to lodge an appeal abroad. It is for the claimant or the appellant to demonstrate this impossibility. Where this evidence has been adduced, jurisdiction reverts to the authority of the locality with which the case has a sufficient connection. Where there are several competing fora in Switzerland, it is the first authority before which an action is brought that has jurisdiction. Clearly, the impossibility of bringing and pursuing proceedings abroad can only be examined in the light of the tangible circumstances and of the possible consequences for the individual concerned in the particular case; it will ultimately be for the court to recognise, or not, its jurisdiction” .... . Although section 3 LDIP may thus seem innately paradoxical in so far as proceedings for which there is no basis for connection with an ordinary forum in Switzerland are, ipso facto, lacking in any particular connection with this country, in such a way that determining a “sufficient connection” may prove challenging, and the aim pursued by the law – to prevent a formal denial of justice – difficult to achieve, this legal provision has not in practice been without effect; the cantonal courts in particular have recognised its applicability in the areas of family law, inheritance and proceedings on debt-enforcement and bankruptcy... . Moreover, legal writers have noted that a subsidiary forum must necessarily be recognised in situations of political persecution... However, neither the case-law nor legal opinion provide much in the way of guidance concerning civil actions for compensation in respect of damage resulting from crimes against humanity, life and physical integrity, committed abroad, by foreign perpetrators. 3.5 That being stated, it is necessary to consider what is meant by “case” [“cause” in the French version] in section 3 LDIP. It is settled case-law that the law must, in the first instance, be interpreted literally. An interpretation which deviates from the literal meaning of a text expressed in clear terms is allowable only where there are objective reasons for considering that the text fails to convey the true meaning of the provision concerned. Such reasons may derive from the drafting history, from the aim and sense of the provision concerned and from the structure and layout of the law. If the text is not absolutely clear, if it can be interpreted variously, the approach must be to seek out the true import of the provision having regard to all relevant factors, including in particular the drafting history, the intention pursued by the rule, the spirit and values on which it is based or again its relationship with other legal provisions. The Federal Supreme Court does not favour any one method of interpretation but adopts a pragmatic plurality in its search for the true meaning of the rule; in particular, it takes as a basis a literal understanding of the text only where this offers, with no ambiguity, a solution that is substantively just (ATF 133 III 175 § 3.3.1, V 57 § 6.1; 132 III 226 § 3.3.5 and the judgments cited therein). In itself, the meaning to be attributed to the term “cause” is uncertain in the sense that it does not have a general definition in the laws of civil procedure of the French-speaking cantons (see, however, Bertossa/Gaillard/Guyet/ Schmidt, Commentaire de la loi de procedure civile genevoise, vol. I, Geneva 2002, n.10 ad Article 99/LPC/GE, concerning the force of res judicata, in which the authors consider that identical claims, in terms of their content, based on the same arguments and the same combination of alleged facts, constitute the objective limit of res judicata; that identity is determined by the complete set of legal considerations which formed part of the first application and were adjudicated upon; this was how “cause” was to be understood in former Article 99(2); the alleged facts of the case determine an overall situation [“Sachverhalt”, “Prozessstoff”] which it is for the court to assess) but would appear to equate to “procédure” or “demande en justice” or in German to “Rechtsstreit”, “Rechtssache”, “Prozess”, “Angelegenheit”, “causa litigandi” or “Streitgrund”. At all events, “cause” is not the literal and unambiguous translation of the terms “Sachverhalt” or “fattispecie” used in the German and Italian versions of section 3 of the LDIP. It should be borne in mind, at this point, that the latter terms are usually translated in French as “énoncé” or “exposé des faits” or “état des faits”. As the versions of the law drafted in the three official languages have the same standing, the question arises whether the difference between the French wording and that of the other two versions results from an error in the legislative process, from a difference in meaning which becomes apparent only in the context of specific cases according to a varying understanding of the legal provision in each of the languages, or, lastly, from a linguistic difference attributable either to the non-translatability knowingly taken into account in the drafting or to uncertainty on the part of the legislator as to the meaning to be conveyed (see Schubarth, Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Gesetzestexte, in Rapports suisses présentés au XVIIe Congrès international de droit comparé, Zurich 2006, p. 11 et seq., especially p. 12 s.). It seems clear that the first of these possibilities can be ruled out. To distinguish between the second and third possibilities the understanding of the term “cause” in legal French terminology must be considered. In this regard, the “cause” of the action is the basis of the claim [“base de la prétention”] (‘Streitgrund” rather than “Sachverhalt”), though it should be noted that the legal writers are in some disagreement as to the content and scope of that basis. Some argue that the “cause” must be seen as a legal concept allowing the claim to be defined, while for others the “cause” comes down to a set of facts giving rise to the legal issues in debate or the legal interest invoked (see Vincent/Guinchard, Procédure civile, 24th edition, Paris 1996, n. 519 p. 386 et seq., who conclude that the “cause” of the action is constituted by a legally characterised set of facts). In the case in point, it must be acknowledged that a comparison with the German and Italian versions assists in the interpretation of the French text, supporting the view that the term “cause” should be assigned the restricted meaning of “set of facts” or, to take a literal translation of “Sachverhalt” and “fattispeccie”, “exposé” or “état de faits” and not “procédure”. In other words, it is the “cause” – which concerns the set of facts and the legal argumentation – rather than the person of the applicant which must have a sufficient connection with Switzerland. In the present case, however, the claimant complains of acts of torture that were allegedly committed in Tunisia, by Tunisians resident in Tunisia, against a Tunisian residing in Italy. All of the specific features of the case come back to Tunisia, except for the fact of residence in Italy at the relevant time. The facts of the case thus have no connection with Switzerland, so that the question of whether or not the link with this country is sufficient does not arise. In those circumstances, it is not possible to recognise the jurisdiction of the Swiss courts, short of disregarding the clear text of s[ection] 3 of the LDIP [see paragraph 37 below]. The fact that the claimant then chose to come to Switzerland cannot change anything, since it is a fact subsequent to the events of the case and, moreover, does not form part of it. 4. Since the absence of a sufficient connection between the facts of the case and Switzerland suffices to establish the Swiss courts’ lack of jurisdiction, the appeal must be dismissed, without it being necessary to examine the issue of immunity from jurisdiction. ...” 31. The Swiss Government made submissions before the Grand Chamber describing the action taken by the Tunisian Republic after the fall of the regime in January 2011 in order to establish a new democracy and a political system based on respect for human rights and the rule of law. They considered that the possibility of submitting complaints to the newly established courts was the most direct and “natural” means of promoting reconciliation, re-establishing social peace and improving prevention, whilst also respecting the steps taken to repair the harm done to the victims. In this context, the Government referred to Article 148 § 9 of the Tunisian Constitution of 14 January 2014, worded as follows: “The State commits to implementing the transitional justice system in all areas within the timeline set by the related legislation. In this regard, no claim in respect of the non-retrospective nature of laws, or the existence of a previous amnesty or pardon, or the binding force of double jeopardy, or the statute of limitations or prescription of the crime or punishment, shall be admitted.” 32. The Government observed that the constituent elements of transitional justice had already been set out in “Organic Law no. 2013-53 of 24 December 2013, on the introduction of transitional justice and related organisational arrangements”, enacted by the Tunisian Parliament on 23 December 2013 and published in the Official Gazette on 31 December 2013. The respondent Government specified that Part III of Title I covered “Accountability and criminal liability”, in order to “prevent impunity and ensure that offenders do not escape punishment” (section 6). Section 8 provided for the establishment of specialised divisions in the courts of first instance, composed of judges who would receive special training in transitional justice. They “[would] rule on cases relating to serious violations of human rights”, including torture (section 8 (2)(3)), which – in accordance with section 9 – were not subject to statutory limitation. 33. The Government explained that Part IV of Title I focused more specifically on “Reparation and Rehabilitation” (sections 10 to 13). Pursuant to section 11 § 1: “[t]he compensation of victims of violations is a right guaranteed by law and the State shall offer every form of sufficient, effective redress commensurate with the extent of the violations committed and the individual situation of each victim.” 34. The Government further added that Title II of the law established a “Truth and Dignity Commission” (TDC), which was an independent body whose members were chosen by the Legislative Assembly from among public officials known for their neutrality, impartiality and competence (sections 16, 19 and 38 of the Organic Law). Under section 17, the TDC’s work was to cover the entire period from 1 July 1955 to 31 December 2013, the date of the law’s promulgation. The duration of the TDC’s work was limited to four years, starting from the date of appointment of its members (section 18). 35. Lastly, the Government informed the Court that, according to information obtained by it from the Swiss Embassy in Tunis, persons who considered themselves victims of the former regime had until 15 June 2016 to apply to the TDC. The Commission was currently dealing with over 60,000 cases. In this capacity, it was holding hearings which, since November 2016, had also been held in public. According to the information received, it was foreseen that selected cases would be transmitted to the courts at a later stage in the investigation process. 36. The applicant has not contested these submissions by the Swiss Government (see paragraphs 31-35 above). He specified at the hearing of 14 June 2017 that he had in fact contacted the TDC and had received a simple acknowledgment of receipt in February 2016, but had had no further communication from the TDC since then.

4. In 2005 to 2006 the applicant was prosecuted for various crimes. He was eventually found guilty of aggravated robbery and sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment, the final decision having been adopted on 19 September 2006. 5. From 27 May 2005 to 3 October 2006 the applicant was detained at a pre-trial detention centre (SIZO) in Kropyvnytskyi (then named Kirovograd). 6. From 4 October 2006 to 20 March 2008 the applicant was detained at correctional colony no. 6 in Kropyvnytskyi (hereinafter “the first colony”). 7. According to the applicant, he was held in a dormitory measuring 6 by 8 sq. m and containing twelve double bunk beds. The Government submitted that the dormitory concerned measured 41.68 sq. m and contained ten single beds. They submitted photographs supposedly corroborating their submissions in that regard. 8. The applicant alleged that electricity in the colony had been regularly switched off. The Government submitted that electricity was supplied round the clock but, to reduce power consumption as part of a nationwide energy‑saving strategy, the voltage of the general lighting in the institution had been reduced from 220 to 110 V. The applicant submitted that that meant that, even when the lighting had been on, the cell had been dimly lit and the light insufficient for activities such as reading and sewing. 9. The applicant also alleged that he had not been given the essential items and that he had been “beaten, humiliated, tortured [and] placed in a disciplinary cell”. In particular, he alleged that he had been beaten on arrival at the colony on 4 October 2006 and that the guards had tried to place him into a psychiatric clinic in March 2007. The Government denied those allegations. 10. On 23 May 2008 the applicant was transferred to correctional colony no. 78 in the village of Raikivtsi, Khmelnytsk Region (hereinafter “the second colony”), where he stayed until his release on 25 May 2012. 11. The applicant alleged that the food in the correctional colonies had been inadequate and of a poor quality. He alleged that at both correctional colonies the sanitary conditions had been inadequate in that there had been cockroaches and sometimes mice and rats. The Government denied those allegations. They submitted that the food supply had been in accordance with the relevant regulations and regularly checked. In support of their submissions they submitted a number of logs and reports from the prison authorities showing that portions compliant with the regulations in force had been distributed to the prisoners, and that the sanitary conditions had been checked and found to be appropriate. They also submitted several statements from inmates who alleged that they had served time with the applicant and stated that the conditions of their detention, particularly in terms of the provision of food, clothes and sanitary conditions, had been appropriate. 12. The applicant alleged that he had been repeatedly ill-treated by prison guards, that the prison authorities had intercepted, reviewed, blocked and delayed his correspondence, particularly that with the Court and the Parliamentary Commissioner for Human Rights, and had persecuted and threatened him for having applied to the Court. The Government denied those allegations. 13. It appears from the documents submitted by the parties that the applicant complained many times to various domestic authorities, notably the prosecutor’s office, alleging, in general, ill-treatment and persecution by the prison authorities. In May and August 2010 he withdrew two of his complaints, stating that they had been lodged in a state of heightened emotions. 14. Registers of incoming and outgoing mail from the correctional colonies submitted by the Government show that, in the period from 17 June 2008 to 1 December 2011 – the only period of the applicant’s detention for which specific information in this regard is available – the applicant sent and received more than sixty letters to and from various public entities, most notably various domestic courts, disciplinary commissions of judges, members of Parliament and the Presidential Administration. Under domestic law (see paragraph 21 below) this correspondence was subject to monitoring by the prison authorities. The prison registers show that the applicant also corresponded extensively with other entities, namely prosecutors, the Parliamentary Commissioner for Human Rights and the Court. This correspondence was, under domestic law, exempted from monitoring. 15. The Government also submitted a number of cover letters prepared by the prison authorities relating to the letters sent out by the applicant. For instance, in a cover letter of November 2011 to the Judges Qualifications Commission of Ukraine the governor of the second colony stated that he was forwarding a letter by the applicant concerning the initiation of criminal proceedings against the judges of the trial court that had convicted him. 16. The applicant alleged that the domestic authorities had denied him access to his criminal case file, thus preventing him from obtaining copies of documents related to his application to the Court. The Government denied those allegations. They submitted documents from the domestic courts showing that the applicant had examined his criminal case file on 23 December 2011[1] and 11 January 2012 and that, by a letter of 25 January 2012, the trial court had sent him a number of copies of documents from that file. 17. After sending the Court an authority form empowering Mr Markov to represent him, the applicant sent the Court two letters, in April 2014 and April 2015, informing it that he wished to revoke the lawyer’s authority. He said that the lawyer, by seeking to derive financial benefit from the case, had demonstrated conduct unworthy of his status. 18. In subsequent correspondence between the Registry, the applicant and the lawyer it transpired that the applicant was apparently upset about the lawyer’s inability to help him with matters unrelated to the proceedings before the Court, such as sending him various goods and representation in unrelated domestic judicial and pardon proceedings. 19. When invited to comment on the first revocation, in May 2014 the applicant informed the Court that he wished to cancel that revocation and maintain the lawyer’s authority. Following this cancellation of the first revocation and before the second revocation the lawyer submitted observations in reply to those of the Government on behalf of the applicant. 20. After the second revocation, the lawyer’s comments questioning the seriousness of the applicant’s wish to revoke his authority were forwarded directly to the applicant with an invitation to comment. He did not respond.

5. The applicants were born in 1954, 1952, 1964, 1926, 1952, 1960 and 1956 respectively and live in Donetsk. 6. From the beginning of April 2014 armed groups started to seize official buildings in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and announced the creation of self-proclaimed entities known as the “Donetsk People’s Republic” and “Luhansk People’s Republic” (the “DPR” and “LPR”). 7. In response, on 14 April 2014 the Government, who consider the armed groups to be terrorist organisations, authorised the use of force against them in the legal form of an “anti-terrorist operation”. 8. In June 2014 the armed groups started to seize offices of the National Bank of Ukraine and other regional financial institutions in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. 9. On 24 July 2014 the Ukrainian postal service Ukrposhta suspended its operations on the territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions that were outside the control of the Government, because of frequent attacks on its vehicles and employees by armed groups. 10. On 6 August 2014 the National Bank of Ukraine suspended all financial transactions on the territories outside the control of the Government (see paragraph 20 below). 11. Government forces recaptured some territories in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, but certain parts of the regions have remained outside the Government’s control since that time. One part of the Donetsk region not under the Government’s control is the city of Donetsk. 12. On 2 September 2014, following changes in the law, jurisdiction of the courts in the non-controlled areas was transferred to the relevant courts in the neighbouring regions on the territory controlled by the Government (see paragraphs 34 to 36 below). 13. On 11 November 2014 all social benefit payments in the settlements of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions that were outside the control of the Government were suspended (see paragraph 26 below) 14. In December 2014 the Donetsk Regional Administrative Court and the Donetsk Regional Administrative Court of Appeal were relocated to the cities of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, territory controlled by the Government (see paragraphs 37 and 38 below). 15. The applicants were registered as recipients of social benefits with different departments of the Pension Fund of Ukraine in Donetsk. Some applicants had been receiving their social benefits until 30 June 2014, others until 31 August 2014. 16. On 16 June 2015 the first and second applicants registered themselves with the Labour and Social Security Department of the Krasnoarmiysk District of the Donetsk region (currently the city of Pokrovsk), controlled by the Government. On the same day their social benefits was reinstated, including social benefits due to them for the period 1 July 2014 to 16 June 2015. 17. The sixth applicant was registered with the Labour and Social Security Department of the Obolonskiy District in Kyiv on 9 September 2015. However, she did not apply for reinstatement of her social benefits. 18. The other applicants did not apply to the relevant social authorities on the territory controlled by the Government for reinstatement of their social benefits. 19. According to the Government, the sixth and seventh applicants travelled from Donetsk to the territory controlled by the Government after their social benefits had been suspended. The Government provided a certificate from the State Customs Office stating that the sixth and seventh applicants had entered the territory controlled by the Government on 31 October 2015, through an authorised checkpoint near the frontline between Ukrainian forces and “DPR” armed groups in the town of Zaitseve.

9. Mr Mammadov is an Azerbaijani national who has been involved in various political organisations and local and international non-governmental organisations for a number of years. In 2008 he co-founded the Republican Alternative Movement (“REAL”) and in 2012 was elected its chairman. For several years he has also been the Director of the Baku School of Political Studies, which is part of a network of schools of political studies affiliated with the Council of Europe (see the first Mammadov judgment, § 6). 10. Mr Mammadov maintained a personal internet blog on which he commented on various political issues. In particular, in November 2012, after the enactment of a new law by the National Assembly introducing heavy sanctions for unauthorised public gatherings, Mr Mammadov posted a comment on his blog which he claimed was meant to insult members of the National Assembly. Without naming any names, he went on to state, inter alia, that the National Assembly was composed of “fraudulent people” and compared the entire legislative body to a zoo. Those statements were quoted in the media and elicited a number of seemingly irate responses from various National Assembly members. The responses, also published in the media, ranged in content from retaliatory ad hominem insults to calls for punishment and threats of suing him in court. According to Mr Mammadov, the parliamentarians’ “lawsuit plans were ... temporarily dropped” after the calls for reprisals against him were condemned by one of the Vice‑Presidents of the European Commission, who was visiting the country at the time (ibid., § 7). 11. At the beginning of January 2013 REAL announced that it would consider nominating its own candidate for the upcoming presidential election of November 2013. Mr Mammadov himself announced that he was considering standing as a candidate in the election. According to him, his prospective presidential candidacy was widely discussed in Azerbaijan at that time (ibid., § 8). 12. On 23 January 2013 rioting broke out in the town of Ismayilli, located to the northwest of Baku. According to media reports quoting local residents, the rioting was sparked by an incident involving V.A., the son of the then Minister of Labour and Social Protection and nephew of the then Head of the Ismayilli District Executive Authority (“IDEA”). It was claimed that after being involved in a car accident, V.A. had insulted and physically assaulted passengers of the other car, who were local residents. On hearing of the incident, hundreds (perhaps thousands) of local residents took to the streets and destroyed a number of commercial establishments (including the Chirag Hotel) and other property in Ismayilli thought to be owned by V.A.’s family (ibid., § 9). 13. On 24 January 2013 Mr Mammadov travelled to Ismayilli to get a first‑hand account of the events. On 25 January 2013 he described his impressions from the trip on his blog. On 28 January 2013 Mr Mammadov posted more information on his blog concerning the events, citing the official websites of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism and the Ministry of Taxes and publishing screenshots of those sites. In particular, he noted that, according to those sources and to information posted on V.A.’s Facebook account, the Chirag Hotel was actually owned by V.A. This directly contradicted an earlier denial by the Head of IDEA. The information cited by Mr Mammadov was removed from the aforementioned Government websites and V.A.’s Facebook page within one hour of Mr Mammadov publishing his blog entry. However, the blog entry itself was extensively quoted in the media (ibid., §§ 12-13). 14. On 29 January 2013 Mr Mammadov received a phone call from the Serious Crimes Department of the Prosecutor General’s Office and was orally invited to the department for questioning as a witness. Over the course of the following days he was repeatedly questioned (see ibid., §§ 16‑28). 15. On 4 February 2013 Mr Mammadov was charged with criminal offences under Articles 233 (organising or actively participating in actions causing a breach of public order) and 315.2 (resistance to or violence against public officials, posing a threat to their life or health) of the Criminal Code (ibid., § 27). 16. On the same day, 4 February 2013, Mr Mammadov was remanded in custody for a period of two months (until 4 April 2013) by a decision of the Nasimi District Court (ibid., § 32). 17. On 30 April 2013 the head of the investigation team decided to charge Mr Mammadov under Articles 220.1 (mass disorder) and 315.2 (resistance to or violence against public officials, posing a threat to their life or health) of the Criminal Code, thereby replacing the original charges (ibid., § 49). 18. The original two-month period of Mr Mammadov’s detention was subsequently extended by the decisions of the Nasimi District Court of 14 March 2013 (extended until 4 June 2013), 15 May 2013 (until 4 September 2013) and 14 August 2013 (until 4 November 2013) (ibid., §§ 44, 51 and 53). His appeals against the original detention order of 4 February 2013 (see paragraph 16 above) and the extension orders were rejected (ibid., §§ 34-39, 45-46 and 53). Mr Mammadov also made unsuccessful requests to have his detention replaced by house arrest and to be released on bail (ibid., §§ 40-42 and 47-48). 19. Mr Mammadov’s trial, involving eighteen defendants in total, commenced in November 2013. On 4 November 2013 the Shaki Court for Serious Crimes held a preliminary hearing of the case (see Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), no. 919/15, §§ 21 et seq., 16 November 2017) (“the second Mammadov judgment”). The trial, during which he remained detained, spanned approximately thirty hearings (ibid., § 26). 20. On 17 March 2014 the Shaki Court for Serious Crimes delivered its judgment, convicting him as charged and sentencing him to seven years’ imprisonment (ibid., § 94). 21. On 24 September 2014, following an appeal by Mr Mammadov, the Shaki Court of Appeal upheld his conviction and sentence (ibid., § 121). 22. In November 2014 Mr Mammadov lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court. At the first hearing held on 13 January 2015 the Supreme Court decided, in the absence of any objections, to postpone any further hearing of the case for an indefinite period because it needed more time for examination of the case file (ibid., §§ 123-124). 23. The hearing was resumed on 13 October 2015. By a decision on that date, the Supreme Court quashed the Shaki Court of Appeal’s judgment of 24 September 2014, having found that the lower courts’ rejection of the defence’s requests for the examination of additional witnesses and other evidence had been insufficiently reasoned and were in breach of the domestic procedural rules and the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention. The case was remitted for a new examination by the appellate court (ibid., §§ 124-125). 24. On 29 April 2016, having re-examined the case material and having examined additional evidence, the Shaki Court of Appeal delivered a judgment upholding Mr Mammadov’s conviction and sentence (ibid., §§ 127-129). 25. The Court of Appeal took account of the Court’s finding a violation of Article 5 (1) (c) in the first Mammadov judgment but concluded that it was unfounded. Having heard a number of witnesses it instead concluded that there had been sufficient evidence to charge and convict Mr Mammadov for the crimes with which he had been charged. It made no reference to the violations of other Articles of the Convention in the first Mammadov judgment. It referred to Mr Mammadov’s “disobedience‑provoking” facebook and blog posts and found: “Case circumstances undoubtedly prove that Ilgar Mammadov and Tofig Yagublu travelled to Ismailli town on 24 January 2013 and organised and actively participated in mass riots resulting in an attack on the local government office at about 5 p.m. committed by local residents ... The court collegium notes that Ilgar Mammadov and Tofig Yagublu arrived from Baku and managed to convert spontaneous rallies into organised mass riots within two hours: though in normal circumstances this could look odd the situation was strained, local residents condemned the head of Executive Power N.Alekperov and were excited and as Ilgar Mammadov noted “the situation was flammable”. Ilgar Mammadov and Tofig Yagublu took advantage of these factors and using anti‑government slogans attracted the crowd’s attention, made emotions high and committed criminal acts described above.” 26. It continued: “The court collegium concluded that in compliance with provisions of the Articles 143-146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, sufficient evidence was collected and assessed comprehensively and objectively at the court of first instance. Articles 220.1 and 315.2 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan were correctly applied to the indictees Yagublu Tofig Rashid and Mammadov Ilgar Eldar.” 27. Mr Mammadov made a second appeal in cassation to the Supreme Court on 21 June 2016. By a final decision of 18 November 2016 the Supreme Court upheld the Shaki Court of Appeal’s judgment of 29 April 2016 (ibid., § 149). Mr Mammadov remained in detention from that point until 13 August 2018 (see paragraph 32 below). 28. After the second Mammadov judgment of the Court (see paragraphs 74-80 below) became final on 5 March 2018, Mr Mammadov again appealed to the Supreme Court of Azerbaijan to re-open his case. On 29 June 2018 the Plenum of the Supreme Court accepted his appeal, re‑opened his case and remitted it to the Shaki Court of Appeal. 29. On 13 August 2018, the Shaki Court of Appeal reviewed the judgment of the Shaki Court for Serious Crimes which initially convicted Mr Mammadov on 17 March 2014. Both Mr Mammadov and the Prosecution Service were heard during the appeal. Neither adduced new information. 30. The Court of Appeal re-examined the evidence and recalled that in accordance with this Court’s well established case-law the domestic courts are in a better position to evaluate the evidence. Reviewing the evidence given by police officers it considered that there was “definitely no legal basis to cast doubt on the reliability of the[ir] testimonies”. It then reviewed the other original witness statements and evidence. It affirmed the conclusion in its decision of 29 April 2016 that “sufficient evidence was collected and assessed comprehensively and objectively before the court of first instance”. It concluded: “Thus, as a result of reviewing the appeals, the court finds that the judgment of the Shaki Serious Crimes Court dated 17 March 2014 by which the defendant Ilgar Mammadov was found to be guilty under Articles 220.1 and 315.2 of the Criminal Code and was sentenced to imprisonment for six years under Article 220.1 of the Criminal Code and for four years under Article 315.2 of the Criminal Code and overall for seven years by partial combination of these terms under Article 66.3 of the Criminal Code, was lawful and grounded.” 31. As regards sentencing the Court of Appeal stated as follows: “The court also notes that, during the conditional sentence, the convict is not released from criminal responsibility; when a sentence imposed by the judgment is not enforced, it is served in the special form defined by the law. The court, having regard to the personality of the convict Ilgar Mammadov, the existence of one minor child in his care, the absence of a prior criminal record, the fact that he has served the most part of the sentence and that he has not committed any illegal action during the period of imprisonment and the absence of any complaint or claim directly filed against him in connection with the crime committed, considers that his rehabilitation is possible without his serving the remaining part of his sentence and without his isolation from the public. Accordingly, the court considers that the application of Article 70 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan and conditional enforcement of the remaining part of sentence, along with the determination of a probation period, corresponds to the law and is appropriate from the perspective of attaining the aim of the punishment.” 32. The Court of Appeal decided that the unserved term of one year five months and 21 days should be deducted from his final sentence. Applying Article 70 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan it granted him a two year probation period to expire on 13 August 2020. Mr Mammadov was released from prison the day of the Court of Appeal’s judgment – 13 August 2018. The Court of Appeal indicated: “The supervision of the convicted person’s behaviour shall be assigned to the Enforcement and Probation Department of his place of residence. In accordance with Article 70.5 of the Criminal Code, during the probation period Ilgar Mammadov shall not change his permanent place of residence without informing the supervising authority, shall present himself when called upon by that body, shall not leave the country and shall prove his correction by his behaviour.” 33. In the first Mammadov judgment of 22 May 2014, which became final on 13 October 2014, the Court found violations of Articles 5 § 1(c), 5 § 4, 6 § 2, as well as Article 18 taken in conjunction with Article 5, in relation to criminal charges brought against Mr Mammadov in February 2013 for denouncing on his blog the authorities’ version of the Ismayilli riots of 23 January 2013 and his subsequent pre-trial detention (see paragraphs 9 to 18 above). It awarded Mr Mammadov the sum of EUR 20,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 2,000 in respect of costs and expenses. 34. The Court found that the arrest and detention of Mr Mammadov took place in the absence of any reasonable suspicion that he had committed an offence and therefore constituted a violation of Article 5 § 1(c) (see the first Mammadov judgment §§ 99-101)[1]: “99. For the above reasons, the Court considers that no specific facts or information giving rise to a suspicion justifying the applicant’s arrest were mentioned or produced during the pre-trial proceedings, and that R.N.’s and I.M.’s statements, which were only subsequently produced before the Court, have not been shown to constitute such facts or information. Furthermore, it has not been shown that, following the applicant’s arrest and throughout the entire period of his continued detention falling within the scope of this case, the authorities obtained any new information or evidence of such nature. 100. The Court is mindful of the fact that the applicant’s case has been taken to trial (the applicant’s continued detention during the trial proceedings and the trial hearings themselves have not yet been the subject of a complaint before the Court). That, however, does not affect the Court’s findings in connection with the present complaint, in which it is called upon to examine whether the deprivation of the applicant’s liberty during the pre‑trial period was justified on the basis of information or facts available at the relevant time. In this respect, having regard to the above analysis, the Court finds that the material put before it does not meet the minimum standard set by Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention for the reasonableness of a suspicion required for an individual’s arrest and continued detention. Accordingly, it has not been demonstrated in a satisfactory manner that, during the period under the Court’s consideration in the present case, the applicant was deprived of his liberty on a “reasonable suspicion” of having committed a criminal offence. 35. It also found that the domestic courts, both at first instance and on appeal, had limited themselves in all their decisions to an automatic endorsement of the prosecution’s requests without having conducted a genuine review of the lawfulness of the detention, resulting in a violation of Article 5 § 4. 36. Recalling that the charges brought against Mr Mammadov were not based on reasonable suspicion, the Court further found that the actual purpose of the impugned measures was to silence or punish Mr Mammadov for having criticised the government and for having attempted to disseminate what he believed to be true information which the government was trying to hide (ibid., §§ 141-143, cited at paragraph 187 below). 37. Accordingly, the Court found a violation of Article 18 taken in conjunction with Article 5 (ibid., § 144). 38. The Court also found a violation of the Mr Mammadov’s right to the presumption of innocence under Article 6 § 2 on account of statements made to the press by the Prosecutor General and the Minister of the Interior encouraging the public to believe that Mr Mammadov was guilty (ibid., §§ 127-128). 39. Once the first Mammadov judgment became final on 13 October 2014 it was transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, in order for the Committee to supervise its execution in accordance with Article 46 § 2 (see paragraph 3 above). 40. On 26 November 2014 the Government took its first procedural step in the execution process (see paragraph 102), which was to submit an Action Plan to the Committee (see DH-DD(2014)1450). 41. In the Action Plan, the Government informed the Committee about the state of the domestic criminal proceedings, in particular that following the facts examined in the first Mammadov judgment, Mr Mammadov had been convicted by a judgment of the Shaki Court for Serious Crimes of 17 March 2014, which had been upheld by the Shaki Court of Appeal’s judgment of 24 September 2014. A cassation appeal brought by him against the appellate judgment was pending (see paragraphs 19 to 22). 42. The Government then included quotations from a decision of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of 3 November 2009 “on the application of the legislation by the courts during the examination of requests for the application of the preventive measure of remand in custody in respect of an accused”. 43. Setting out the measures they had “planned and taken in order to give effect to the Court’s judgment”, the Government noted that the first Mammadov judgment had been submitted to the Supreme Court “to be taken into account during the examination of the applicant’s cassation appeal”. 44. The Government Agent’s Office also planned to organise, together with the Supreme Court, a series of training sessions for the judges of first‑instance and appellate courts as regards the implementation of the Plenum’s decision of 3 November 2009. Lastly, according to the Action Plan it was also envisaged that training would be held for prosecutors as regards the principle of presumption of innocence and the requirement of submission of the prosecution’s case files for review by the courts for the purpose of verifying the existence of a “reasonable suspicion”. It was noted that the detailed time-table of the above measures would be submitted to the Committee in due course, following necessary arrangements. 2. Proceedings from the Committee of Ministers’ Human Rights meeting in December 2014 to its Human Rights meeting in December 2016 (a) Overview 45. Following the Government’s submission of the Action Plan (see paragraphs 40 to 44 above) the Committee of Ministers examined the case at the first of its quarterly Human Rights meetings to be held after the judgment had become final (its 1214th Human Rights meeting (2‑4 December 2014) see also paragraph 100 below). It was advised by its Secretariat as follows: “The violation of Article 18, taken in conjunction with Article 5 casts doubt on the merit of the criminal proceedings instituted against the applicant. ... It would therefore be useful if the authorities informed the Committee of the measures which the authorities and bodies concerned (notably, the Prosecutor’s Office and the Supreme Court) intend to take in order to take into account the findings of the Court and to erase, as far as possible, the consequences of this violation for the applicant in the context of the criminal procedure which appears to be pending before the Supreme Court. In the light of the serious findings of the Court in this case, release of the applicant would constitute the first important measure to be envisaged as a matter of priority and without delay, in accordance with the domestic procedures.” At that meeting the Committee of Ministers classified the case in the “enhanced procedure” on the basis that it required “urgent individual measures” and disclosed a “complex problem” (see paragraph 101 below). Having considered the judgment, the Action Plan provided and the advice of its Secretariat, the Committee adopted the following decision: “The Deputies 1. as regards individual measures and considering the circumstances of the case, called upon the authorities, to ensure the applicant’s release without delay; 2. in view of the preoccupying reports about the applicant’s health condition, called upon the authorities to urgently take any necessary action and provide rapidly information in this respect; 3. invited the authorities to indicate the further measures taken or planned in order to give effect to the Court’s judgment, and to erase rapidly, as far as possible, the remaining consequences for the applicant of the serious violations established; 4. noted, in this context, that the criminal proceedings, the initiation of which was criticised by the European Court, are still pending before the Supreme Court; 5. recalled the general problem of the arbitrary application of criminal legislation to restrict freedom of expression and conveyed their particular concern about the finding of a violation of Article 18 taken in conjunction with Article 5 of the Convention; 6. therefore called upon the Azerbaijani authorities to furnish, without delay, concrete and comprehensive information on the measures taken and/or planned to avoid that criminal proceedings are instituted without a legitimate basis and to ensure effective judicial review of such attempts by the Prosecutor’s office; 7. expressed concern about the repetitive nature of the breach of the principle of presumption of innocence by the Prosecutor General’s Office and members of the government, despite several judgments of the Court which, since 2010, have indicated the precise requirements of the Convention in this regard, and insisted on the necessity of rapid and decisive action in order to prevent similar violations in the future; ...” 46. During this period, the Committee of Ministers was informed in the context of the individual measures that Mr Mammadov had initiated a cassation appeal against the decision of the Shaki Court of Appeal of 24 September 2014 (see paragraphs 21-22 above) to the Supreme Court. On 13 January 2015 the Supreme Court postponed the appeal sine die and at its Human Rights meeting of 12 March 2015, the Committee adopted an interim resolution calling for Mr Mammadov’s release “without delay” (see CM/ResDH(2015)43). The Supreme Court ultimately gave its judgment on 13 October 2015 quashing the judgment of the Shaki Court of Appeal (see paragraph 23 above). Examining that judgment, the Committee concluded that the Supreme Court had not taken into account the findings of the first Mammadov judgment. At its examination of the case at its 1243rd Human Rights meeting (from 8-9 December 2015), the Committee: “3. insisted anew on the necessity for the authorities to ensure, without further delay, the applicant’s release ... ... 4. noted that the Supreme Court of Azerbaijan ordered only a partial cassation, which does not appear to take into account the findings of the European Court in the applicant’s case and, in particular, those [findings] relating to the violation of Article 18 in conjunction with Article 5; ...” 47. The Committee of Ministers continued to follow the events concerning Mr Mammadov’s conviction and appeal (see paragraphs 19-27 above). It noted that after the decision of the Supreme Court, the Shaki Court of Appeal on 29 April 2016 re-examined Mr Mammadov’s case and confirmed his conviction (see paragraph 24 above). On 21 June 2016, he again appealed the decision of the Shaki Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court (see paragraph 27 above). 48. Until June 2016, the Committee of Ministers examined the case at each of its quarterly Human Rights meetings (see paragraph 100 below). From June 2016 it decided to examine Mr Mammadov’s situation at its ordinary, monthly, meetings whilst also continuing to examine it at every Human Rights meeting of the Committee.[2] (b) Information submitted to the Committee of Ministers 49. From December 2014 to December 2016 the Committee of Ministers received nineteen submissions of information from Mr Mammadov about the individual measures in the case, submitted under Rule 9 of its Rules (see paragraphs 89 and 93 below) and at a frequency of around one submission every fortnight. He complained about his continued detention stating that the judgment was not executed as he had not been released; the domestic courts had failed to take into account this Court’s findings in the re-opened proceedings; and the domestic courts were taking too long to consider his case. Mr Mammadov also submitted that he had been assaulted and mistreated in detention and that members of his family had been threatened. 50. In addition to their initial Action Plan submitted on 26 November 2014 (see paragraph 40 above) the Government made three submissions to the Committee of Ministers during this period under Rule 8 of the Rules (see paragraph 92 below) and responding to Mr Mammadov’s submissions. On 15 December 2014 (see DH-DD(2014)1521) and 5 August 2015 (see DH-DD(2015)780) they provided information indicating that Mr Mammadov’s health was satisfactory. On 7 March 2016 (see DH‑DD(2016)261) they indicated that national law obliged his appearance at the hearings in his case and as such he was being transferred to Shaki Court of Appeal. 51. Under Rule 9 of the Rules (see paragraph 93 below), the NGO Freedom Now made one submission to the Committee of Ministers on 26 November 2014 (see DH-DD(2015)844). It stated that Azerbaijan had failed to execute the Court’s judgment by failing to release Mr Mammadov or stop domestic judicial proceedings against him and by failing to provide any workable plan to curtail political prosecutions. It urged the Committee to initiate proceedings under Article 46 § 4 of the Convention. 52. Two NGOs, the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights and the Public Association for Assistance to a Free Economy, made a joint submission of information on 6 March 2015 (see DH-DD(2015)264). They criticised the content of the authorities’ Action Plan from 2014 (see paragraph 40 above) and, with reference to other cases against Azerbaijan pending before the Court, underlined a pattern of increased application of criminal legislation to persecute those exercising their freedom of expression. (c) Decisions and Interim Resolutions adopted by the Committee of Ministers during this period 53. In its examination of the case at the nine meetings up to and including December 2016, the Committee of Ministers adopted three interim resolutions and six decisions (one at every Human Rights meeting where the case was examined and an interim resolution was not adopted). 54. All those decisions and resolutions expressed the Committee of Ministers’ insistence that Mr Mammadov should be released immediately and that information should be provided on the general measures envisaged to execute the judgment. The language used by the Committee reflected its growing concerns about the fact that Mr Mammadov remained in detention, notwithstanding its repeated calls for his release. 55. The Committee of Ministers’ addressed its concerns first to the authorities of Azerbaijan in general, then to the highest authorities in Azerbaijan. From the 1236th Human Rights meeting onwards (24 September 2015) it called on the Council of Europe as a whole and member states acting individually to use all means available to ensure Azerbaijan’s compliance with its obligations under the judgment. 56. The Committee also indicated that it would use all the means at the disposal of the Organisation, including under Article 46 § 4 of the Convention (see paragraph 58 below). 57. The last interim resolution adopted in that period was at the Committee of Ministers’ 1259th Human Rights meeting (7-9 June 2016 (see CM/Res/DH(2016)144). It stated: “The Committee of Ministers, under the terms of Article 46 § 2 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which provide that the Committee supervises the execution of final judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (“the Court”) below; Deeply deploring that, despite the Court’s findings on the fundamental flaws of the criminal proceedings engaged against him and notwithstanding the Committee’s repeated calls, the applicant still has not been released; Recalling that it is intolerable that, in a State subject to the rule of law, a person should continue to be deprived of his liberty on the basis of proceedings engaged, in breach of the Convention, with a view to punishing him for having criticised the government. Recalling that the obligation to abide by the judgments of the Court is unconditional; INSISTS that the highest competent authorities of the respondent State take all necessary measures to ensure without further delay Ilgar Mammadov’s release; DECLARES the Committee’s resolve to ensure, with all means available to the Organisation, Azerbaijan’s compliance with its obligations under this judgment; DECIDES in view thereof to examine the applicant’s situation at each regular and Human Rights meeting of the Committee until such time as he is released.” 58. The final decision adopted during this period at its 1273rd Human Rights meeting (6-8 December 2016) stated: “The Deputies 1. noting with the utmost concern that, more than two years after the final judgment of the European Court and notwithstanding the repeated calls of the Committee of Ministers and the Secretary General on the respondent State to release the applicant, he remains detained; 2. recalling the previous decisions and interim resolutions adopted by the Committee of Ministers, particularly the repeated calls of the Committee for the immediate release of the applicant; 3. deeply deplored that the criminal proceedings against the applicant concluded on 18 November 2016 before the Supreme Court without the consequences of the violations found by the European Court having been drawn, in particular, that of Article 18 taken in conjunction with Article 5 of the Convention; 4. firmly reiterated that it is not acceptable that, in a state subject to the rule of law, an individual remains deprived of his liberty on the basis of proceedings carried out in violation of the Convention in order to punish him for having criticised the government and that, in consequence, the continuing arbitrary detention of Ilgar Mammadov constitutes a flagrant breach of the obligations under Article 46, paragraph 1, of the Convention; 5. affirmed their determination to ensure the implementation of the judgment by actively considering using all the means at the disposal of the Organisation, including under Article 46, paragraph 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights; 6. finally expressed their deep concern about the absence of any information from the authorities concerning the general measures taken or envisaged to prevent violations of the rule of law through abuse of power of the kind established in the European Court’s judgment; in this respect, encouraged Azerbaijan to engage in meaningful dialogue with the Committee of Ministers.” 59. Exercising his powers under Article 52 of the Convention the Secretary General of the Council of Europe appointed a representative to visit Baku. On 11 January 2017, the representative attended meetings in the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor’s Office, the Ministry of Justice, and the Administration of the President of Azerbaijan when issues concerning the execution of the judgment were discussed. 60. On 10 February 2017 the President of Azerbaijan signed an Executive Order. According to the analysis of the Secretariat at the 1280th Human Rights meeting ((7-10 March 2017) CM/Notes/1280/H46-2) the Order envisaged the adoption of a number of measures. Amongst others, it foresaw measures regarding: “... the prevention of arbitrary arrests; a liberalisation of criminal policy; an obligation to “strictly comply with the principles of criminal law and general grounds of sentencing”; the elimination of “non-procedural attitudes during criminal prosecution and execution of sentences”; or the implementation of stricter measures to fight notably abuse of power. The Executive Order also foresaw the elaboration within two months of draft laws notably on: the decriminalisation of certain crimes, in particular in the economic field; a greater recourse to alternatives to imprisonment and “a wider application of substitution of remainder of imprisonment by lighter punishment, parole and suspended sentence”. It has also been recommended to the domestic courts to examine the existence of reasonable suspicions of individuals having committed an offence and grounds for arrest, when deciding on measure of restraint, and arguments in favour of alternative measures. In addition, it has also been recommended to the Supreme Court to ensure continued analysis of case law concerning arrest and imposition of imprisonment, and development of fair case law in this field.” 61. The Committee of Ministers adopted the following decision at that 1280th meeting: “1. recalling their previous decisions and interim resolutions calling for the immediate release of Ilgar Mammadov and in particular their decision of December 2016 affirming their determination to ensure the implementation of the judgment by actively considering using all the means at the disposal of the Organisation; 3. in this respect took note with interest of the Azerbaijani authorities’ commitment to examine all avenues discussed during the mission of the representative of the Secretary General to execute the Ilgar Mammadov judgment, as well as of the recent Presidential Executive Order which foresees promising measures for the execution of this judgment; 4. invited the authorities to keep the Committee informed of the concrete measures adopted on the basis of this Executive Order and in particular of those enabling the release of Ilgar Mammadov without further delay; 5. noted the indication given during the meeting by the Azerbaijani authorities that the just satisfaction has been paid to Ilgar Mammadov in December 2015 ...; invited them to confirm this information in writing; ...” 62. At its 1288th Human Rights meeting (6-7 June 2017), the Committee of Ministers’ adopted a decision which recalled the terms of the decision from its previous meeting, called for Mr Mammadov’s “unconditional” release and encouraged urgent progress of the Executive Order. 63. The Committee of Ministers examined the case at its 1293rd (ordinary) meeting (13 September 2017). At that meeting the Secretary General of the Council of Europe called on the Committee of Ministers, should Mr Mammadov’s situation remain unchanged, to trigger proceedings under Article 46 § 4 of the Convention. 64. The Committee of Ministers then examined the case at its 1294th Human Rights meeting (19-21 September 2017). It noted information provided by the Azerbaijan authorities on 6 September 2017 (see DH‑DD(2017)951) that the draft legislative amendments to the Criminal Code to implement the Executive Order had been submitted to parliament; that the authorities considered there was no particular urgency to adopt those reforms but that the amendments could be adopted in the autumn session. In response to questions asked by the Deputies about whether those amendments would assist Mr Mammadov, the Government indicated their position that the Court’s findings of a violation in the first Mammadov judgment concerned the pre-trial phase of proceedings and a second application was pending concerning the criminal proceedings. They informed the Committee that the amendments would help to prevent similar violations. 65. Recalling the statement of the Secretary General, the Committee of Ministers adopted a decision at that meeting which followed the terms of the decisions adopted in March and June 2017 (see paragraphs 60 to 62 above). 66. At its ordinary meeting on 25 October 2017, in light of the lack of further developments, the Committee of Ministers adopted a fourth interim resolution putting Azerbaijan on formal notice that it had failed to fulfil its obligations (see CM/ResDH(2017)379). 67. Finally, at its 1302nd Human Rights meeting (5-7 December 2017) it adopted its fifth interim resolution (CM/ResDH(2017)429) which triggered proceedings under Article 46 § 4: “Recalling anew a. that in its above-mentioned judgment, the Court found not only a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, as no facts or information had been produced giving rise to a suspicion justifying the bringing of charges against the applicant or his arrest and pre-trial detention, but also a violation of Article 18 taken in conjunction with Article 5, as the actual purpose of these measures was to silence or punish him for criticising the government; b. the respondent State’s obligation, under Article 46 § 1 of the Convention, to abide by all final judgments in cases to which it has been a party and that this obligation entails, in addition to the payment of the just satisfaction awarded by the Court, the adoption by the authorities of the respondent State, where required, of individual measures to put an end to violations established and erase their consequences so as to achieve as far as possible restitutio in integrum; c. the Committee’s call, at its first examination on 4 December 2014, of the individual measures required in the light of the above judgment to ensure the applicant’s release without delay; d. the Committee’s numerous subsequent decisions and interim resolutions stressing the fundamental flaws in the criminal proceedings revealed by the Court’s conclusions under Article 18 combined with Article 5 of the Convention and calling for the applicant’s immediate and unconditional release; e. that the criminal proceedings against the applicant concluded on 18 November 2016 before the Supreme Court without the consequences of the violations found by the European Court having been drawn, in particular, that of Article 18 taken in conjunction with Article 5 of the Convention; f. that, over three years since the Court’s judgment became final, the applicant remains in detention on the basis of the flawed criminal proceedings; Considers that, in these circumstances, by not having ensured the applicant’s unconditional release, the Republic of Azerbaijan refuses to abide by the final judgment of the Court; Decides to refer to the Court, in accordance with Article 46 § 4 of the Convention, the question whether the Republic of Azerbaijan has failed to fulfil its obligation under Article 46 § 1; ...” 68. In accordance with the Committee of Ministers’ Rules (see paragraph 94 below) the views of the Republic of Azerbaijan were included in an Appendix to the resolution (see Annex to the present judgment). There, the Government set out the measures adopted to execute the judgment. In respect of individual measures they confirmed payment of the just satisfaction awarded by the Court. They also stated that on 29 April 2016 the Shaki Court of Appeal finalised its examination of Mr Mammadov’s appeal and in doing so it carefully addressed the Court’s conclusions in the first Mammadov judgment and remedied the deficiencies found in the proceedings leading to Mr Mammadov’s conviction. 69. In respect of general measures they referred to the Executive Order presented to the Committee of Ministers during the supervision process in 2017 (see paragraph 60 above). They also confirmed the adoption on 20 October 2017 by the Milli Medjlis of the Law on Amendments to the Criminal Code decriminalising certain acts and creating the possibility for those convicted for serious crimes to apply for conditional release after having served two-thirds of a criminal sentence. 71. On 14 August 2018 the Government of Azerbaijan wrote to the Committee of Ministers informing them of the decision of the Shaki Court of Appeal and Mr Mammadov’s release on 13 August 2018 (see paragraphs 28-32 above). The Committee of Ministers replied to the Government of Azerbaijan on 28 August 2018 asking them a number of questions on the factual and procedural developments in Mr Mammadov’s case. The Government provided a memorandum in reply which was also commented on by Mr Mammadov in a separate submission (see documents DH‑DD(2018)816 and DH-DD(2018)891). 72. The Committee of Ministers examined the first and second Mammadov judgments together in light of those written exchanges at its 1324th (Human Rights) meeting of 18-20 September 2018, and then the first Mammadov judgment at its 1325th ordinary meeting on 26 September 2018. It did not adopt any decisions relevant to the cases at those meetings. 73. According to information provided by the Government of Azerbaijan, on 28 March 2019 the Supreme Court gave its decision in a cassation appeal by Mr Mammadov against the decision of the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court upheld the appeal in part and amended the Shaki Court of Appeal’s judgment of 13 August 2018. It reduced the consolidated sentences imposed on Mr Mammadov to five years, six months and nine days imprisonment. In light of the time Mr Mammadov had already spent in prison, the Supreme Court considered his sentence to have been fully served. The Supreme Court also set aside the conditional sentence of two years imposed by the Shaki Court of Appeal, thus removing its associated restrictions on Mr Mammadov (see paragraphs 31-32 above) including the obligation on him to report to the Enforcement and Probation Department, and restrictions on his residence and travel. 74. On 19 December 2014 Mr Mammadov made a second application to the Court alleging violations of the Convention arising from the conduct of his trial and conviction which followed his pre-trial detention examined by the Court in the first Mammadov judgment (see paragraphs 19-27 above). 75. In the second Mammadov judgment, cited above, the Court found a violation of Article 6 § 1 in connection with his trial and conviction; events also examined by the Committee of Ministers in the execution proceedings for the first Mammadov judgment (see paragraphs 45 to 48 above). 76. In that judgment, delivered on 16 November 2017, after the Committee of Ministers had put Azerbaijan on formal notice in relation to the first Mammadov judgment (see paragraph 66 above), the Court first considered in detail the scope of its examination, stating: “202. The scope of the [first] Ilgar Mammadov judgment was limited, inter alia, to the issues of compatibility with Articles 5 §§ 1 (c) and 4 and Article 18 of the Convention of the applicant’s detention during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. In the present case, however, the Court is called upon to examine a different set of legal issues – namely, whether the criminal proceedings against the applicant, taken as a whole, were fair, as required by Article 6 of the Convention. 203. While the issues to be examined and the legal standards applicable under Article 6 of the Convention are different, both the previous case and the present case concern the same criminal proceedings against the applicant involving the same charges stemming from the same events. As the Court held in the [first] Ilgar Mammadov judgment, during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings, the accusations against the applicant suffered from a prima facie lack of plausibility. In particular, the Court highlighted the fact that the applicant was accused of arriving in Ismayilli one day after the spontaneous and disorganised “acts of hooliganism” had already taken place and that within the short period of two hours, his overall stay in the town, he managed to seize a significant degree of control over the situation, turn the ongoing disorganised rioting into “organised acts” of disorder, establish himself as a leader of the protestors whom he had not known before and who had already gathered without his involvement, and directly cause all of their subsequent disorderly actions. As already noted, this lack of plausibility of the accusations, coupled with the attitude of the authorities towards the applicant’s political activities, called for a high level of scrutiny of the facts. The circumstances on which this previous finding of the Court was based remain unchanged in the present case. The Court will therefore proceed with analysing under Article 6 whether this deficiency has been compensated by the evidence presented at the trial and the reasons provided by the domestic courts.” 77. Then, concluding in respect of Article 6, it found: “237. Having regard to the aforementioned considerations, the Court finds that the applicant’s rights to a reasoned judgment and to examine witnesses were infringed. His conviction was based on flawed or misrepresented evidence and his objections in this respect were inadequately addressed. The evidence favourable to the applicant was systematically dismissed in an inadequately reasoned or manifestly unreasonable manner. Even though the case was remitted once for a new examination by the Supreme Court and an attempt was made to address some of the defence’s requests and objections, none of the shortcomings noted above were eventually remedied. The above findings are sufficient to conclude that the criminal proceedings against the applicant, taken as a whole, did not comply with guarantees of a fair trial.” 78. In relation to Mr Mammadov’s complaint of a violation of Article 18 in conjunction with Article 6 the Court stated in the second Mammadov judgment, cited above: “260. The Court recalls that it has already held in [the first] Ilgar Mammadov judgment (cited above, §§ 142-43) that the restriction of the applicant’s liberty prior to the conviction which is the focus of the present application had been applied for purposes other than bringing him before a competent legal authority on a reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence. This led the Court in that case to find a breach of Article 18 taken in conjunction with Article 5 of the Convention (...). 261. Furthermore, the Court observes that the question of whether Article 6 of the Convention contains any express or implied restrictions which may form the subject of the Court’s examination under Article 18 of the Convention remains open .... 262. Taking those circumstances into account and having further regard to the submissions of the parties and its findings under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the Court considers that there is no need to give a separate ruling on the complaint under Article 18 in the present case (compare Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848/08, § 156, ECHR 2014, with further references).” 79. Concerning the remaining issues, it found that Mr Mammadov’s complaint under Articles 6 and 13 concerning the length of proceedings, and his complaint under Article 17 were inadmissible. It concluded that it was not necessary to examine separately the admissibility or merits of his complaints under Articles 13 and 14, or under Article 18 in conjunction with Article 6. 80. Under Article 41, it awarded him EUR 10 000 for any non-pecuniary damage suffered (ibid., § 269). 81. Following extensive work carried out over a number of decades on the legal principles of State responsibility as set out in a series of Draft Articles, in 2001 the International Law Commission adopted those Articles which became known as the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (the “ARSIWA”). The International Law Commission submitted the text to the United Nations General Assembly in a report which contained commentaries on the Articles.[3] 82. The United Nations General Assembly has given consideration to those Articles on a number of occasions since 2001. At its seventy-first session the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly adopted resolution 71/133 on 19 December 2016 which acknowledged the growing number of decisions of international courts, tribunals and other bodies referring to them, and continued to acknowledge their importance and usefulness. 83. The Articles formulate general conditions under international law for the State to be considered responsible for wrongful actions and omissions, and the legal consequences which flow therefrom. Concerning the applicability of the Articles, paragraph (4) (b) of the General Commentary states as follows: “... Nor do the articles cover such indirect or additional consequences as may flow from the responses of international organisations to wrongful conduct. In carrying out their functions it may be necessary for international organisations to take a position on whether a State has breached an international obligation. But even where this is so, the consequences will be those determined by or within the framework of the constituent instrument of the organisation, and these fall outside the scope of the articles.” 84. Article 30 which relates to cessation and non-repetition reads: “The State responsible for the internationally wrongful act is under an obligation: (a) to cease that act, if it is continuing; (b) to offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, if circumstances so require.” 85. Article 31 is titled “Reparation” and states: “1. The responsible State is under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act. 86. According to the commentaries on that article a number of principles arising from international law should be used to interpret those provisions: “(9) Paragraph 2 addresses a further issue, namely the question of a causal link between the internationally wrongful act and the injury. It is only “[i]njury ... caused by the internationally wrongful act of a State” for which full reparation must be made. This phrase is used to make clear that the subject matter of reparation is, globally, the injury resulting from and ascribable to the wrongful act, rather than any and all consequences flowing from an internationally wrongful act. (10) The allocation of injury or loss to a wrongful act is, in principle, a legal and not only a historical or causal process [...]. But other factors may also be relevant: for example, whether State organs deliberately caused the harm in question, or whether the harm caused was within the ambit of the rule which was breached, having regard to the purpose of that rule. In other words, the requirement of a causal link is not necessarily the same in relation to every breach of an international obligation[4]. In international as in national law, the question of remoteness of damage “is not a part of the law which can be satisfactorily solved by search for a single verbal formula”. The notion of a sufficient causal link which is not too remote is embodied in the general requirement in article 31 that the injury should be in consequence of the wrongful act, but without the addition of any particular qualifying phrase. (11) A further element affecting the scope of reparation is the question of mitigation of damage. Even the wholly innocent victim of wrongful conduct is expected to act reasonably when confronted by the injury. Although often expressed in terms of a “duty to mitigate”, this is not a legal obligation which itself gives rise to responsibility. It is rather that a failure to mitigate by the Injured Party may preclude recovery to that extent ...” 87. Article 32 is titled “Irrelevance of internal law”: “The responsible State may not rely on the provisions of its internal law as justification for failure to comply with its obligations under this part.” 88. Articles 34 to 37 address the constituent elements of reparation, (restitution, compensation and satisfaction): “Article 34. Forms of reparation Full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act shall take the form of restitution, compensation and satisfaction, either singly or in combination, in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. Article 35. Restitution A State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to make restitution, that is, to re-establish the situation which existed before the wrongful act was committed, provided and to the extent that restitution: (a) is not materially impossible; (b) does not involve a burden out of all proportion to the benefit deriving from restitution instead of compensation. Commentary (1) In accordance with article 34, restitution is the first of the forms of reparation available to a State injured by an internationally wrongful act. Restitution involves the re-establishment as far as possible of the situation which existed prior to the commission of the internationally wrongful act, to the extent that any changes that have occurred in that situation may be traced to that act. In its simplest form, this involves such conduct as the release of persons wrongly detained or the return of property wrongly seized. In other cases, restitution may be a more complex act. ... Article 36. Compensation 1. The State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to compensate for the damage caused thereby, insofar as such damage is not made good by restitution. 2. The compensation shall cover any financially assessable damage including loss of profits insofar as it is established. Article 37. Satisfaction 1. The State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to give satisfaction for the injury caused by that act insofar as it cannot be made good by restitution or compensation. 2. Satisfaction may consist in an acknowledgement of the breach, an expression of regret, a formal apology or another appropriate modality. 89. The Committee of Ministers, which is the executive body of the Council of Europe, supervises the execution of the judgments of the Court under Article 46 of the Convention. For this purpose it has adopted Rules of the Committee of Ministers for the supervision of the execution of judgments and of the terms of friendly settlements reflecting the principles of state responsibility in international law. It has also adopted a number of “practical modalities” which govern its daily work. 90. The Committee of Ministers adopted the Rules governing the supervision of the execution of judgments on 10 May 2006 at the 964th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies (later amended on 18 January 2017 at the 1275th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies). 91. Rule 6 states as follows: “Rule 6 - Information to the Committee of Ministers on the execution of the judgment 1. When, in a judgment transmitted to the Committee of Ministers in accordance with Article 46, paragraph 2, of the Convention, the Court has decided that there has been a violation of the Convention or its protocols and/or has awarded just satisfaction to the Injured Party under Article 41 of the Convention, the Committee shall invite the High Contracting Party concerned to inform it of the measures which the High Contracting Party has taken or intends to take in consequence of the judgment, having regard to its obligation to abide by it under Article 46, paragraph 1, of the Convention. 2. When supervising the execution of a judgment by the High Contracting Party concerned, pursuant to Article 46, paragraph 2, of the Convention, the Committee of Ministers shall examine: a. whether any just satisfaction awarded by the Court has been paid, including as the case may be, default interest; and b. if required, and taking into account the discretion of the High Contracting Party concerned to choose the means necessary to comply with the judgment, whether: i. individual measures1 have been taken to ensure that the violation has ceased and that the Injured Party is put, as far as possible, in the same situation as that party enjoyed prior to the violation of the Convention; ii. general measures2 have been adopted, preventing new violations similar to that or those found or putting an end to continuing violations. __________________ 1. For instance, the striking out of an unjustified criminal conviction from the criminal records, the granting of a residence permit or the reopening of impugned domestic proceedings (see on this latter point Recommendation Rec(2000)2 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the re-examination or reopening of certain cases at domestic level following judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, adopted on 19 January 2000 at the 694th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies). 2. For instance, legislative or regulatory amendments, changes of case-law or administrative practice or publication of the Court’s judgment in the language of the respondent state and its dissemination to the authorities concerned.” 92. Rule 8 provides for the accessibility of information submitted in the supervision process: “Rule 8 - Access to information 1. The provisions of this Rule are without prejudice to the confidential nature of the Committee of Ministers’ deliberations in accordance with Article 21 of the Statute of the Council of Europe. 2. The following information shall be accessible to the public unless the Committee decides otherwise in order to protect legitimate public or private interests: a. information and documents relating thereto provided by a High Contracting Party to the Committee of Ministers pursuant to Article 46, paragraph 2, of the Convention; b. information and documents relating thereto provided to the Committee of Ministers, in accordance with the present Rules, by the Injured Party, by non‑governmental organisations or by national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights. ...” 93. Rule 9 allows information to be submitted to the Committee of Ministers by individual applicants, non-governmental organisations and other bodies on the execution of a judgment. It states: “Rule 9 - Communications to the Committee of Ministers 1. The Committee of Ministers shall consider any communication from the Injured Party with regard to payment of the just satisfaction or the taking of individual measures. 2. The Committee of Ministers shall be entitled to consider any communication from non-governmental organisations, as well as national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights, with regard to the execution of judgments under Article 46, paragraph 2, of the Convention. 3. The Committee of Ministers shall also be entitled to consider any communication from an international intergovernmental organisation or its bodies or agencies whose aims and activities include the protection or the promotion of human rights, as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, with regard to the issues relating to the execution of judgments under Article 46, paragraph 2, of the Convention which fall within their competence. 4. The Committee of Ministers shall likewise be entitled to consider any communication from an institution or body allowed, whether as a matter of right or upon special invitation from the Court, to intervene in the procedure before the Court, with regard to the execution under Article 46, paragraph 2, of the Convention of the judgment either in all cases (in respect of the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights) or in all those concerned by the Court’s authorisation (in respect of any other institution or body). 5. The Secretariat shall bring, in an appropriate way, any communication received under paragraph 1 of this Rule, to the attention of the Committee of Ministers. 6. The Secretariat shall bring any communication received under paragraphs 2, 3 or 4 of this Rule to the attention of the State concerned. When the State responds within five working days, both the communication and the response shall be brought to the attention of the Committee of Ministers and made public. If there has been no response within this time limit, the communication shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers but shall not be made public. It shall be published ten working days after notification, together with any response received within this time limit. A State response received after these ten working days shall be circulated and published separately upon receipt.” 94. Rule 11 sets out the procedure in infringement proceedings under Article 46 § 4 of the Convention: “Rule 11- Infringement proceedings 1. When in accordance with Article 46, paragraph 4, of the Convention the Committee of Ministers considers that a High Contracting Party refuses to abide by a final judgment in a case to which it is a party, it may, after serving formal notice on that Party and by decision adopted by a majority vote of two-thirds of the representatives entitled to sit on the Committee, refer to the Court the question whether that Party has failed to fulfil its obligation. 2. Infringement proceedings should be brought only in exceptional circumstances. They shall not be initiated unless formal notice of the Committee’s intention to bring such proceedings has been given to the High Contracting Party concerned. Such formal notice shall be given ultimately six months before the lodging of proceedings, unless the Committee decides otherwise, and shall take the form of an interim resolution. This Resolution shall be adopted by a majority vote of two-thirds of the representatives entitled to sit on the Committee. 3. The referral decision of the matter to the Court shall take the form of an interim resolution. It shall be reasoned and concisely reflect the views of the High Contracting Party concerned. 4. The Committee of Ministers shall be represented before the Court by its Chair unless the Committee decides upon another form of representation. This decision shall be taken by a two-thirds majority of the representatives casting a vote and a majority of the representatives entitled to sit on the Committee.” 95. Rule 16 addresses the adoption of interim resolutions in the execution process and their intended function: “Rule 16 – Interim resolutions In the course of its supervision of the execution of a judgment or of the terms of a friendly settlement, the Committee of Ministers may adopt interim resolutions, notably in order to provide information on the state of progress of the execution or, where appropriate, to express concern and/or to make suggestions with respect to the execution.” 96. Rule 17 states: “Rule 17 - Final resolution After having established that the High Contracting Party concerned has taken all the necessary measures to abide by the judgment or that the terms of the friendly settlement have been executed, the Committee of Ministers shall adopt a Resolution concluding that its functions under Article 46, paragraph 2, or Article 39, paragraph 4, of the Convention have been exercised.” 97. The procedures for the supervision of the execution of judgments were adopted by the Committee of Ministers in 2010 (see Information document: CM/Inf/DH(2010)37). 98. The procedures were based on two principles. The first is that of “continuous supervision”, meaning that all final judgments remain under the continuous supervision of the Committee of Ministers until the Committee closes its supervision procedure by adopting a final resolution (see paragraph 96 above). 99. The second principle is that of prioritisation, as implemented through the Committee of Ministers’ “twin-track” approach. In line with that approach, all cases pending in the supervision process will be examined under the “standard supervision” track unless, because of its specific nature, a case warrants consideration under the “enhanced supervision” track. 100. Applying these two principles means that it is not necessary to include every case pending execution on the agenda of the Committee of Ministers’ quarterly Human Rights meetings. These meetings are dedicated to the supervision of the Court’s judgments and held in March, June, September and December (in accordance with Article 3 of the Statute of the Council of Europe and Section III. 3. of the Committee’s general Rules of Procedure). The cases pending execution remain under the Committee’s continued supervision, as entrusted to the Committee’s secretariat. The Committee’s quarterly meetings are therefore reserved for the examination of a minority of the cases pending which are classified under the enhanced procedure and which may require more active intervention by the Committee such as the adoption of decisions and/or interim resolutions, in the latter case usually following debate and sometimes a vote. 101. The types of cases that may be placed in the enhanced procedure are judgments requiring urgent individual measures; pilot judgments; judgments raising structural and/or complex problems as identified by the Court or by the Committee of Ministers; and interstate cases. 102. In order to allow the Committee of Ministers to effectively carry out its supervision role respondent states should submit Action Plans and/or Action reports to the Committee to inform it of the measures planned and/or adopted to execute a judgment of the Court (see also paragraph 91 above about Rule 6 of the Rules). 103. For cases classified in the enhanced procedure, the Committee of Ministers entrusts its Secretariat with a role of more intensive and pro-active cooperation with States. 104. There have been relatively few applications to the Court under Article 18 in conjunction with Article 5 (for a summary of the Court’s case‑law see the recent judgment in Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], no. 72508/13, §§ 264-282, 28 November 2017). To date there have been nine cases where the Court has found such a violation, including in the first Mammadov judgment. The first was Gusinskiy v. Russia, no. 70276/01, ECHR 2004‑IV. After that, Cebotari v. Moldova, no. 35615/06, 13 November 2007; then two cases against Ukraine: Lutsenko v. Ukraine, no. 6492/11, 3 July 2012, and Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, no. 49872/11, 30 April 2013. Those were followed by Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, no. 69981/14, 17 March 2016, Merabishvili v. Georgia, cited above, Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, no. 47145/14, 19 April 2018, and Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, nos. 48653/13 and 3 others, 7 June 2018. 105. Of the eight cases listed above, three became final relatively recently and have not yet been examined by the Committee of Ministers – Merabishvili, Mammadli, and Rashad Hasanov cited above. Four cases have been examined by the Committee and are pending in the supervision procedure – Gusinskiy, Lutsenko, Tymoshenko and Rasul Jafarov, all cited above. Finally, the Committee of Ministers has closed the supervision procedure in one case, Cebotari, cited above. An overview of the execution process is set out below. (b) Cases pending supervision before the Committee of Ministers where the Court found a violation of Article 18 in conjunction with Article 5 (i) Individual measures 106. In the four cases pending supervision where there has been a violation of Article 18 in conjunction with Article 5, the Committee of Ministers has examined three elements taken by respondent states as individual measures – payment of the just satisfaction, erasure of the negative consequences of the impugned decision, and release of the applicants following the judgment. 107. The Committee noted that payment of the just satisfaction and release of the applicants had occurred in Lutsenko, cited above (examination at the 1172nd Human Rights meeting (4-6 June 2013) and Tymoshenko, cited above (examination at the 1193rd Human Rights meeting (4-6 March 2014)). In Gusinskiy, cited above (examination at the 1243rd Human Rights meeting (8-9 December 2015)), the Committee noted that the applicant was released prior to the Court’s judgment becoming final and the commercial agreement the applicant was intimidated into signing whilst held in detention on remand was not enforced. 108. In Rasul Jafarov, cited above, the applicant was pardoned and released the day that the judgment of the European Court was delivered, however the just satisfaction was not paid in full. Notwithstanding his pardon, as a result of his conviction the applicant was prevented from standing for any elections in Azerbaijan until 2021, and from admission to the Bar Association also until 2021. In the decision adopted at the Committee’s 1294th Human Rights meeting (19-21 September 2017) the Committee: “1. urged the authorities to pay without delay the remaining amount of just satisfaction, including default interest; 2. in view of the seriousness of the consequences which the applicant continues to suffer despite his early release, urged the authorities to explore all avenues including a reopening of the impugned proceedings in order to erase the consequences of the violations found;” (ii) General measures 109. In respect of the general measures taken in the four cases pending supervision to avoid similar violations of Article 18 in conjunction with Article 5, the Committee’s Secretariat’s analysis in the cases of Tymoshenko and Lutsenko (see the Committee’s examination of the case at its 1193rd Human Rights meeting (4-6 March 2014)) indicated: “... reform of the prosecution service and the constitutional reform aimed at strengthening the independence of the judiciary, appear relevant and interesting and a more in-depth examination is under way (both these draft legislative reforms have been examined from a more general point of view by the Venice Commission in 2013 – see CDL‑AD(2013)025E and CDL‑AD(2013)034E). It also underlined that the progress achieved in these respects is also followed in the context of other groups of cases, notably the Oleksandr Volkov case, also dealing with important shortcomings in the organisation of the Ukrainian judiciary.” 110. In the third case, Gusinsky, the Secretariat’s analysis prepared at the 1243rd meeting (8-9 December 2015) advised the Committee in relation to the violation of Article 18 in conjunction with Article 5 that: “... it appears that this violation was closely linked to the vagueness of the law at the time and the absence of effective judicial review of detention of suspects. The new CCP adopted in 2001 appears to have eliminated the vagueness of Article 90 of the 1960 CCP. Effective judicial review has also been introduced. Accordingly, the kind of abuse of power by the executive and the prosecutor services at issue in the Gusinskiy case would today be subjected to effective judicial review. These developments also appear to address the violation of Article 5 found in this case.” 111. In its decision at that meeting the Committee: “... welcomed the efforts made by the Russian authorities aimed at aligning Russian legislation and practice with the Convention requirements under Article 5 of the Convention”. However, the Gusinsky case remains pending to ensure supervision of other elements arising from the judgment in the context of the Committee’s supervision of the Klyakin group v. Russia (see the examination of that group of cases at its 1294th Human Rights meeting (19-21 September 2017)). 112. The general measures in the case of Rasul Jafarov, cited above, were considered by the Committee to be the same as in the first Mammadov judgment and therefore that case also remains pending supervision (examination at the 1294th Human Rights meeting (19-21 September 2017)). (c) Case where the Court found a violation of Article 18 in conjunction with Article 5 and the Committee of Ministers has closed the supervision procedure 113. As mentioned above (see paragraph 105), the Committee of Ministers has closed the supervision process in Cebotari, cited above. In that case, the applicant had been released and acquitted by the domestic courts before the judgment of this Court became final (see Cebotari, cited above, § 36). Concerning the general measures the Committee was advised (see the Order of Business from the 1259th Human Rights meeting (7-8 June 2016)) that: “the reform of the Moldovan prosecution service, and notably the new Law on the Prosecution Service of February 2016, appear to improve and consolidate the independence of the prosecution from executive and legislative powers (in particular as regards the handling of individual cases), exclude political involvement of prosecutors, including the Prosecutor General, and enhance their criminal and disciplinary accountability. Taking also into account the fact that no further violations of Article 18 have been established since, these measures would appear in principle capable of preventing abuse of the kind here at issue. As the question of individual measures is resolved, it is accordingly proposed to close the supervision of the Cebotari case.” 114. Accordingly, the Committee decided to close its supervision of the case at its 1259th Human Rights meeting (8 June 2016 (see Final Resolution CM/ResDH(2016)147)). 115. The idea of introducing infringement proceedings as a procedural possibility in the Convention was set out by the Parliamentary Assembly to the Council of Europe in its Resolution 1226(2000) and followed up in Assembly Recommendation 1477(2000). The initial proposal was to amend the Convention to introduce a system of “astreintes” (daily fines for a delay in the performance of a legal obligation) to be imposed on states that persistently fail to execute a judgment. The Recommendation does not indicate whether the Committee of Ministers or the Court was intended to have the power to impose a fine. 116. The proposal to impose fines was not ultimately taken up in Protocol 14 but it initiated a debate which led to the insertion of Article 46 § 4 in the Convention. That debate was about the need to increase the Committee of Ministers’ powers when supervising the execution of judgments. As it states in the Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 14: “Measures to be taken concerning execution of judgments 16. Execution of the Court’s judgments is an integral part of the Convention system. The measures that follow are designed to improve and accelerate the execution process. The Court’s authority and the system’s credibility both depend to a large extent on the effectiveness of this process. Rapid and adequate execution has, of course, an effect on the influx of new cases: the more rapidly general measures are taken by States Parties to execute judgments which point to a structural problem, the fewer repetitive applications there will be. In this regard, it would be desirable for states, over and above their obligations under Article 46, paragraph 1, of the Convention, to give retroactive effect to such measures and remedies. Several measures advocated in the above-mentioned recommendations and resolutions pursue this aim. In addition, it would be useful if the Court and, as regards the supervision of the execution of judgments, the Committee of Ministers, adopted a special procedure so as to give priority treatment to judgments that identify a structural problem capable of generating a significant number of repetitive applications, with a view to securing speedy execution of the judgment. The most important Convention amendment in the context of execution of judgments of the Court involves empowering the Committee of Ministers to bring infringement proceedings in the Court against any state which refuses to comply with a judgment. 17. The measures referred to in the previous paragraph are also designed to increase the effectiveness of the Convention system as a whole. While the supervision of the execution of judgments generally functions satisfactorily, the process needs to be improved to maintain the system’s effectiveness ... Article 46 – Binding force and execution of judgments ... 98. Rapid and full execution of the Court’s judgments is vital. It is even more important in cases concerning structural problems, so as to ensure that the Court is not swamped with repetitive applications. For this reason, ever since the Rome ministerial conference of 3 and 4 November 2000 (Resolution I), it has been considered essential to strengthen the means given in this context to the Committee of Ministers. The Parties to the Convention have a collective duty to preserve the Court’s authority – and thus the Convention system’s credibility and effectiveness – whenever the Committee of Ministers considers that one of the High Contracting Parties refuses, expressly or through its conduct, to comply with the Court’s final judgment in a case to which it is party. 99. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article 46 accordingly empower the Committee of Ministers to bring infringement proceedings in the Court (which shall sit as a Grand Chamber – see new Article 31, paragraph b), having first served the state concerned with notice to comply. The Committee of Ministers’ decision to do so requires a qualified majority of two thirds of the representatives entitled to sit on the Committee. This infringement procedure does not aim to reopen the question of violation, already decided in the Court’s first judgment. Nor does it provide for payment of a financial penalty by a High Contracting Party found in violation of Article 46, paragraph 1. It is felt that the political pressure exerted by proceedings for noncompliance in the Grand Chamber and by the latter’s judgment should suffice to secure execution of the Court’s initial judgment by the state concerned. 100. The Committee of Ministers should bring infringement proceedings only in exceptional circumstances. None the less, it appeared necessary to give the Committee of Ministers, as the competent organ for supervising execution of the Court’s judgments, a wider range of means of pressure to secure execution of judgments. Currently the ultimate measure available to the Committee of Ministers is recourse to Article 8 of the Council of Europe’s Statute (suspension of voting rights in the Committee of Ministers, or even expulsion from the Organisation). This is an extreme measure, which would prove counter-productive in most cases; indeed the High Contracting Party which finds itself in the situation foreseen in paragraph 4 of Article 46 continues to need, far more than others, the discipline of the Council of Europe. The new Article 46 therefore adds further possibilities of bringing pressure to bear to the existing ones. The procedure’s mere existence, and the threat of using it, should act as an effective new incentive to execute the Court’s judgments. It is foreseen that the outcome of infringement proceedings would be expressed in a judgment of the Court.”

4. The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Piaski. 5. On 2 May 2011 the Koszalin Regional Court issued a payment order (nakaz zapłaty) against the applicant. It stipulated that she was to pay to the claimant, a certain D.K., the sum of 156,000 Polish zlotys (PLN), equivalent to 36,000 euros (EUR). 6. The applicant lodged an appeal (zarzuty) within the time-limit. She complained that the payment order had been based on a lease contract which had turned out to be null and void but which she had secured by a blank bill of exchange signed by her. She challenged that basis for the payment order and considered it illegal and unfounded. She further applied for exemption from the court fees. 7. On 13 July 2011 a court officer from the Koszalin Regional Court (referendarz sądowy) decided to partly exempt her from the fees. The court examined in detail the financial situation of the applicant. In particular it noted that in 2010 her company had generated a gross income of PLN 213,000; however, the expenses exceeded this sum by approximately PLN 50,000. As regards the first four months of 2011 the applicant had declared a gross income of PLN 53,600 and expenses of PLN 48,500; therefore she had generated a net income of over PLN 5,000. Moreover the applicant had declared that she had other financial obligations, amounting to PLN 4,000 per month, which she had been paying on time. The court agreed that her financial situation had been difficult and that she had not initiated the current proceedings. However, the situation of a commercial activity which had been generating a very high income, and even higher costs, did not automatically justify a full exemption from court fees. Moreover, the applicant had declared a net income for the first four months of 2011. In an extensively reasoned decision the domestic court concluded that the applicant should be expected to pay one third of the fees due for lodging an appeal against the payment order. 8. The applicant appealed against the decision of the court officer. She reiterated that her business had generated losses and that she had been financially dependent on her family. The applicant stressed that she had not instituted the civil proceedings, so could not prepare for their costs or limit the sum claimed. 9. On 3 August 2011 the Koszalin Regional Court upheld the decision of the court officer. The applicant was ordered to pay PLN 1,928 (EUR 500) within seven days. 10. On 22 August 2011 the applicant’s lawyer lodged a second request for exemption from the court fees. The applicant submitted that she had wound up her company’s activity as it had been operating at a loss. 11. On 26 August 2011 the court officer of the Koszalin District Court partly allowed the applicant’s request and exempted her from the court fees above PLN 1,000 (equivalent to EUR 250). The court took into account the applicant’s difficult financial situation but noted that the court fee should not have been regarded as less important than the other financial obligations that the applicant had been able to honour, in the amount of PLN 4,000 monthly. Having examined all the arguments relied on by the applicant, the court considered that the situation did not justify a total exemption from the court fees. The applicant did not appeal against this decision. 12. On 16 September 2011 the applicant was ordered to pay PLN 1,000 within seven days. 13. On 29 September 2011 the applicant lodged a third request for exemption from the court fees. She submitted that her financial situation had not improved and that she had no income whatsoever. Moreover her car broke down which generated further costs. 14. On 26 October 2011 the Koszalin Regional Court rejected the applicant’s appeal against the payment order of 2 May 2011 and rejected her third application for full exemption from the court fees as it had been substantially the same as the one lodged before and examined on 26 August 2011. 15. On 10 November 2011 the applicant appealed against the decision of 26 October 2011. She was ordered to pay a court fee of PLN 1,500 for pursuing her appeal. She requested the court to exempt her from that fee. 16. On 22 December 2011 the court partly granted her request. The applicant was ordered to pay a court fee in the amount of PLN 1,000. 17. On 30 March 2012 the Szczecin Court of Appeal rejected her appeal against the decision of 26 October 2011 for failure to pay the fee. The decision was delivered to the applicant on 10 April 2012. It appears that around that time the applicant took up employment. During that period the applicant unsuccessfully attempted to have the proceedings stayed.

6. The applicants are journalists. At the relevant time they were employed by one of the two national television stations in Denmark, Danmarks Radio, hereafter “DR”. The first applicant produced a television programme, described as a documentary, called “When the doctor knows best”, which was broadcast at 8 p.m. on 24 September 2008, and seen by 534,000 viewers. The second applicant was the first applicant’s superior and responsible for the content of the programme. 7. The television programme concerned the treatment of pleural mesothelioma cancer, notably at Copenhagen University Hospital (Rigshospitalet), where Consultant S was in charge of treatment. It focused on two types of chemotherapy medication, Alimta, produced by L, and Vinorelbine, produced by F. Copenhagen University Hospital and S used Vinorelbine as first-line treatment in combination with Cisplatin or Carboplatin, depending on whether the treatment was related to an operation (operable patients) or to prolonging life and relieving pain and symptoms (inoperable patients). 8. Three experts participated in the programme: a medical doctor from Karolinska Hospital in Sweden, a professor from Switzerland and a medical doctor from Grosshandorf Hospital in Germany. They all used Alimta as first-line treatment, most often in combination with Cisplatin or Carboplatin. The programme followed four patients and their relatives, who told their stories, and a narrator spoke as a voice-over throughout the programme. 9. In preparation for the programme, the first applicant had carried out research on the subject which included, inter alia, the following. 10. On 20 September 2004 the European Union had approved the marketing of Alimta in combination with Cisplatin for treatment of patients with inoperable pleural mesothelioma cancer. The background for the approval was, among others, research which had been carried out examining the effect of treatment with Alimta in combination with Cisplatin as compared to treatment with Cisplatin alone (a phase III trial, see paragraph 14 below) as first-line therapy. 11. In July 2007 the Minister for Internal Affairs and Health replied to various questions posed by Members of Parliament as to the treatment of pleural mesothelioma cancer in Denmark. The Minister replied, inter alia, that there was no proof that an Alimta-based treatment was more efficient than other chemotherapy-based treatments, including that offered in Denmark; that the combination of Vinorelbine and Cisplatin, which was used at Copenhagen University Hospital, resulted in a one-year survival rate of 50% and a median lifetime of 12 months, which was exactly the survival rate from using the combination of Alimta and Cisplatin, but that there had been no direct comparison of the two treatments; and that there was no internationally accepted standard chemotherapy for the treatment of pleural mesothelioma cancer, but that several single and combined treatments were used. 12. On 11 June 2008 Copenhagen University Hospital produced a memorandum about pleural mesothelioma cancer and its treatment, which was sent to DR. It stressed that international studies, including of Vinorelbine and Alimta, had not shown that any two-combination regime was superior to other two‑combination regimes. That information was confirmed by the professor from Switzerland in an email of 25 June 2008 and by the medical doctor from Grosshandorf Hospital in Germany in an email of 27 June 2008. The memorandum also referred to a fund aimed at developing research on pleural mesothelioma cancer, in the amount of 90,000 Danish kroner (DKK), equal to approximately 12,000 Euros (EUR), received by S from company F, which produces Vinorelbine. The money had been used to pay nurses and students and for data collection. It emerged that there had been no financial profit for the doctors involved. 13. Having received the above-mentioned memorandum, the first applicant again contacted the professor from Switzerland and the medical doctor at Grosshandorf Hospital in Germany. In essence, they confirmed in subsequent emails of 2 and 21 July 2008 that since there had been no direct comparative clinical studies, there was no scientific evidence that one two‑combination regime was superior to another two-combination regime. 14. Medical research studies involving human subjects are called clinical trials. They are divided into different stages, called phases. Generally, it can be said that the earliest phase trials may look at whether a drug is safe or at its side-effects. A later phase II trial aims to find out whether the treatment works well enough, for which types of cancer the treatment works, more about side effects and how to manage them and more about the best dose to use. A later phase III trial aims to test whether a new treatment is better than existing treatments (standard treatment). These trials may compare a completely new treatment with the standard treatment or with different doses or ways of giving a standard treatment. 15. Subsequent to the broadcast on 24 September 2008 of the television programme, on 27 October 2008 Copenhagen University Hospital and S instituted defamation proceedings before the Copenhagen City Court (Københavns Byret) against the Director of DR and the two applicants, maintaining that the latter, in the programme in question, had made direct and indirect accusations, covered by Article 267 of the Penal Code (Straffeloven), against Copenhagen University Hospital and S, of malpractice regarding certain patients suffering from pleural mesothelioma cancer, allegedly resulting in the patients’ unnecessary death and shortening of life, in the interest of S’s professional prestige and private finances. 16. Before the City Court, the applicants, S, and Medical Director H for Copenhagen University Hospital gave evidence. 17. The first applicant stated, inter alia: “... that she had not criticised Copenhagen University Hospital for improper treatment causing death. Her message was only to point out that the substance of Alimta had been better documented than the substance of Vinorelbine. She had collected statements from patients and experts, but could not state herself whether Alimta was a better product than Vinorelbine ... The experts had not stated whether Alimta in combination with another product was better than Vinorelbine in combination with another product. However, all experts had emphasised that Alimta had been evaluated in a phase III trial, for which reason it was a more thoroughly tested product. ... her questions had been answered during her conversations with professor M on 19 October 2007 and S on 22 October 2007. Subsequently no one had been willing to answer her questions. That was the only real conversation she had had with S. The next time she had called him, he had put down the receiver. When it had not been possible for her to get any response to her many points of criticism, she had contacted H ... she had wanted statements from both H and S as the programme would be unbalanced if they were not heard ... Some found that Alimta had been better documented than Vinorelbine. She was not aware of any trial demonstrating that a combination with Alimta was better than a combination with another medicinal product ...”. S stated, inter alia, the following: “Alimta has been used for second-line therapy in Denmark since 2004, and since 2007 as first-line therapy. Patients had been given the impression in the media that Alimta was a miracle cure. Therefore Copenhagen University Hospital had introduced it as an option. Today, Alimta is used in combination with Carboplatin as the standard therapy for inoperable patients ... Sometimes in autumn 2008, the standard therapy for operable patients had been changed to Cisplatin in combination with Alimta. If some patients were offered Alimta everybody had to be offered Alimta ... After the programme had been broadcast ... patients started mistrusting the Vinorelbine therapy. Afterwards it was not possible to perform the trial [phase II] on this drug. Nor would it be possible to obtain funding for the trial. Therefore no trial had been performed of Vinorelbine ... he had provided the information included in professor M’s memorandum of 23 September 2008 ...he had talked to [the first applicant] several times and had spent a lot of time and energy on explaining cancer therapy... he had also lost confidence in [the first applicant]...” H stated, among other things: “ ...The approval of Alimta by the Danish Medicines Agency for the treatment of mesothelioma only means that a marketing authorisation has been granted for the drug, which means that advertisement of the product is permitted. Vinorelbine has also been approved by the Danish Medicines Agency, but for a wide range of oncological therapies ... in 2003 when Alimta was tested [phase III] the bar had been set quite low. The study compared Alimta with a clearly inferior treatment that would not actually be offered to anybody. It would have been more relevant to study Alimta in combination with Cisplatin versus Vinorelbine with Cisplatin .... S has made a phase II trial of the standard therapy [Vinorelbine] ... Subsequently the standard therapy regimen has been expanded to include Alimta, which is not a better product than Vinorelbine, but eight times more expensive ... if two drugs are equally effective, but one of them is eight times more expensive than the other, patients will be offered therapy using the cheaper drug. ... The standard therapies now offered by Copenhagen University Hospital are Vinorelbine in combination with Cisplatin for inoperable patients and Alimta in combination with Cisplatin for operable patients ... the shift to Alimta as the standard therapy at Copenhagen University Hospital did not reflect that Alimta was medically better. The [applicants’] programme had had a large impact as patients were asking not to be treated with Vinorelbine. Copenhagen University Hospital had therefore had to change medical products because patients had the clear impression that Vinorelbine was not as good as Alimta ... It is quite usual for Copenhagen University Hospital to surrender material to the press and to answer questions, but the questions of [the first applicant] were never-ending. Copenhagen University Hospital has spent about a man-year, or about DKK 400,000, responding to inquiries from [the first applicant], and huge efforts had been made to accommodate her requests ... the programme had created distrust towards both Copenhagen University Hospital and S and had created uncertainty in both patients and relatives. He had received 50 to 100 “hate mails” himself ...” 18. By a judgment of 9 April 2010, the Copenhagen City Court found against the applicants (and the Director of DR) and sentenced them each to 10 day-fines of 1,000 Danish Kroner (DKK). The allegations were declared null and void. The reasoning was as follows: “... Based on the evidence, the City Court accepts as a fact that in 2004, following a phase III trial, EMEA approved Alimta in combination with Cisplatin for treating patients suffering from inoperable malignant pleural mesothelioma and that subsequently the same was approved by the Danish Medicines Agency. The court also accept as a fact that Vinorelbine is a drug dating back more than 20 years whose effect had been documented by clinical experience and approved by the Danish Medicines Agency for a wide range of oncological therapies. Finally, the court also accepts as a fact that it has not been documented that Alimta therapy in combination with a platin medicinal product is more effective than Vinorelbine therapy in combination with a platin medicinal product. As regards the term “experimental drug” the court accepts as a fact that a drug administered to patients in a trial is referred to as an experimental drug, no matter whether the same drug is the standard therapy offered outside the trial setting. No matter that [the applicants] are deemed to have been aware of the above circumstances following their comprehensive research of the matter, it was said in the programme that, for dying patients, [S and Copenhagen University Hospital] had prescribed a “non-approved chemotherapy regimen” not approved for the diagnosis or which was not “the correct chemotherapy”, and that [S and Copenhagen University Hospital] used an “experimental drug”, the “worst-case scenario being that patients would die earlier than if they had been treated with an approved substance”, or that it would have “fatal consequences”. Moreover, the phrase “the only drug with a known effect” was used. Since no account was given in the programme of the above-mentioned trials and approval process and the terminology applied for that process, the court finds that it would seem to a non-professional viewer that Alimta was the only effective drug for mesothelioma, particularly because the programme linked the treatment of two patients with Vinorelbine to their death, whereas the prospect of several more years to live was held out to the one patient who had been given Alimta therapy in Germany. Moreover, the programme also linked S’s use of Vinorelbine to his personal esteem and his “personal research account”, although [the applicants] had been made aware of the research grant management procedure though Professor M’s memorandum of 23 September 2008 before the broadcast. Since no account was given either of the procedure for managing research grants, the court also finds in this respect that it would seem to a non-professional viewer that S had a personal financial interest in starting Vinorelbine treatment rather than Alimta. The [applicants] are therefore considered to have violated Article 267 of the Penal Code. According to the information on [the applicants’] knowledge after their comprehensive research of the matter, the court finds no basis for exempting them from punishment or remitting the penalty under Article 269 of the Penal Code, compare also Article 10 of the Convention. ... [The applicants] are furthermore jointly and severally liable for paying legal costs of DKK 62,250.” 19. On appeal, on 10 June 2011 the judgment was upheld by the High Court of Eastern Denmark (Østre Landsret) with the following reasoning: “In the introduction to the programme ‘When the doctor knows best’ a narrator states, among other things: ‘A Danish doctor is entering a medical congress to show his research results. For years he has gone his own way, he has treated dying patients with chemotherapy that is not approved.’ Later during the programme, it is stated at which hospitals one can receive treatment for pleural mesothelioma cancer, that these hospitals co-operate with Copenhagen University Hospital, and a reference is made to a named Consultant, S, head of the Scandinavian Centre for treatment of pleural mesothelioma cancer. During the various interviews, a narrator states, inter alia: - ‘The doctor does not give his patients the only approved medication. Instead, he uses a test medication. In the worst scenario, that may result in the patients dying earlier than if they had been given the approved substance.’ - ‘There is only one approved chemotherapy against pleural mesothelioma cancer, but that is not offered to SP [one of the patients followed in the programme]. The doctors chose to treat her with a substance that is not approved for the diagnosis, and whose effect on pleural mesothelioma cancer is not substantiated.’ - ‘However, that chemotherapy turned out to have huge consequences for her [SP].’ - ‘S can freely choose the medication that he thinks is best. There is only one treatment which, in comparative studies, has proved to have an effect on pleural mesothelioma cancer. Accordingly, that is the only medication which is approved as treatment. That medication is called Alimta. However, S chose not to use that medication on his patients.’ - ‘Thus, it has not been proved whether Vinorelbine works. According to the calculations made by DR, close to 300 patients in Denmark have been given test medication. In the worst scenario, that may result in patients dying earlier than if they had been given the approved medication.’ -’For her [SP] the lack of effect of treatment by Vinorelbine turns out to have had fatal consequences.’ - ‘The family K ask themselves why S goes his own way. They suspect that he has other interests than those of the patients. That suspicion grows, when they talk to SK’s personal doctor.’ - ‘It turns out, however, that S may also have had other reasons for choosing Vinorelbine. Because he has used this medication in medical tests on the patients. In a phase when they are fighting for their lives.’ -’The question remains: why does S carry out tests with Vinorelbine? Could it have something to do with the prestige which is implicit in having research articles published?’ - ‘We do not know whether it is prestige that impels S.’ - ‘Thus, S will not acknowledge what leading experts agree on; [namely] that Alimta is the only medication whose effect is substantiated.’ - ‘Here it turns out that S has received more than DKK 800,000 over the last five and a half years from the company F. That is the company behind the test medication Vinorelbine. The money has been paid into S’s personal research account. DKK 90,000 is earmarked for the tests. S withheld that information.’ The programme ends by informing us, among other things, that two of the patients who were interviewed have passed away. The narrator says, inter alia: ‘TJ, who was part of S’s tests with Vinorelbine, died on 4 January 2008.’ With these statements, [the applicants] not only passed on assertions by patients, relatives and experts, but also took a stand, so that the programme undisputedly gave the viewers the impression that malpractice has occurred at Copenhagen University Hospital, in that S has deliberately used medication (Vinorelbine), which is not approved for treatment of pleural mesothelioma cancer, and whose effect has not been substantiated, that the medication in question was part of a test, and that the test medication has resulted in patients dying or having their lives shortened. The way that the programme is built up with its beginning and ending, the viewers get the clear impression that the reasons behind this choice of medication [Vinorelbine] were S’s professional prestige and personal finances. Against this background, in the programme, the applicants, as producer of the programme and as chief sub-editor, have made an allegation against Copenhagen University Hospital and S of malpractice and of nourishing irrelevant considerations to the detriment of the lives and health of patients. Such an accusation is likely to disparage [Copenhagen University Hospital and S] in the eyes of their fellow citizens as set out in Article 267 of the Penal Code. It must have been clear to them [the applicants] that they were making such an allegation by way of their presentation of the programme. The applicants have not attempted to establish the truth of the allegation, but have submitted that the allegation shall be unpunishable by virtue of Article 269 (1) of the Penal Code as they acted in lawful protection of an obvious public interest or the interest of others or, in the alternative, that punishment should be remitted under Article 269 (2) of the Penal Code because they were justified in regarding the allegations as true. These provisions must, in connection with Article 267 of the Penal Code, be understood in the light of Article 10 of the Convention on the protection of freedom of expression. A very considerable public interest is related to journalistic discussion about risk to life and health, or suspicion thereof, as regards public hospital treatment. When balancing considerations of freedom of expression with considerations of the protection of the name and reputation of persons and companies, the former is accorded tremendous weight on the scale. That entails acknowledgement of a very far-reaching freedom of expression for the press, and accordingly the press must be permitted, as the public control- and information organ (‘public watchdog’), a certain amount of exaggeration and provocation in connection with their discussion of these questions, when factually there are reasons for expressing criticism. On the basis of the information in the case, including the research material that the applicants possessed before the broadcast of the programme, in particular the emails from [the medical doctor from Grosshandorf Hospital in Germany and the professor from Switzerland], the replies by the Minister for Internal Affairs and Health to various questions [posed by Members of Parliament], and the memorandum of 11 June 2008 produced by Copenhagen University Hospital [about pleural mesothelioma cancer], it can be established that Vinorelbine in combination with Cisplatin or Carboplatin was standard treatment at Copenhagen University Hospital, that the European Union on 20 September 2004 approved the marketing of Alimta in connection with Cisplatin for treatment of inoperable patients with pleural mesothelioma cancer, that there was no substantiation or basis for believing that an Alimta-based treatment was more efficient than the treatment offered by Copenhagen University Hospital, that some patients at Copenhagen University Hospital, who were already about to receive Vinorelbine as standard treatment, were chosen and offered the same medicine as part of a test [it is not known for what], and that S did not make any private financial profit from these tests. Against this background, including the fact that the word ‘approved’ was not explained during the programme, namely the difference between medication approved for treatment and [medication] approved for marketing, and by consistently using the word “test medication”, even though only one patient in the programme participated in tests, [the applicants] made allegations which were based on an incorrect factual basis, of which they must have been aware via the research material. The aim of the programme – to make a critical assessment of the treatment of patients with pleural mesothelioma cancer offered by Copenhagen University Hospital and the responsible consultant – is a legitimate part of the press’s role as ‘public watchdog’, but it cannot justify an allegation, which is built on a factually incorrect basis, and thus a wrong premise. [The applicants], who did not limit themselves to referring to or disseminating statements by experts, patients and relatives, did not have any basis for making such serious allegations against Copenhagen University Hospital and S. The allegations cannot be justified on the grounds that Copenhagen University Hospital and S refused to participate in the programme. Against this background, and since in relation to Article 10 there is no interest to protect when there is no factual basis for the accusations, the allegations are not unpunishable under Article 269 (1), nor is there any basis for remitting the punishment under Article 269 (2) [of the Penal Code]. It is an aggravating factor that the wrongful accusations were disseminated on national television during primetime and on DR’s homepage, by means of which the accusations had a significant spread. Accordingly, [the High Court] agrees [with the Copenhagen City Court’s judgment] that [the applicants] be fined under Article 267, and that the allegations be declared null and void by virtue of Article 273 (1). The High Court thus dismisses the appeal and upholds the judgment of the Copenhagen City Court. The applicants shall be jointly and severally liable for paying legal costs of the High Court appeal to Copenhagen University Hospital and S, in the amount of DKK 90,000, which constitutes the legal fee inclusive of VAT. In fixing the amount, the High Court took into account the scope and duration of the case.” 20. On 27 October 2011 the Appeals Permission Board (Procesbevillingsnævnet) refused the applicants’ request for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court (Højesteret). 21. Subsequent to the broadcast on 24 September 2008 of the television programme, four complaints were lodged with the Patient Insurance Association (Patientforsikringen) relating to the issues raised by the programme. A press release published on the Associations’ website on 9 March read as follows: “As of today, the Patient Insurance Association has received four complaints relating to the treatment of mesothelioma patients with combinatorial drugs other than Carboplatin and Alimta. That treatment was questioned by the Danish Broadcasting Corporation (DR) in a documentary programme in September 2008. The Patient Insurance Association has received four complaints relating to the criticism raised. This means that the persons claiming compensation are either patients or their dependants, one of the reasons being their belief that the combinatorial drugs administered to treat the disease were incorrect ones. All four complaints have been refused, one of the reasons being that the independent medical oncologists who assessed the cases found that it was in compliance with optimum medical standards to treat patients with the selected combination therapy. Two of the cases have been appealed against to the National Agency for Patients’ Rights and Complaints (Patientskadeankenævnet). The National Agency for Patients’ Rights and Complaints upheld the decision of the Patient Insurance Association, finding, inter alia:’... [patients] were offered Carboplatin and Vinorelbine, which must be considered to be as active as other combinations with a favourable profile of adverse reactions’. The other appeal does not concern the issue of combination therapy.”

5. The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Celje. 6. He had been a professional truck driver until he became unable to work due to epilepsy. 7. On 29 September 2003 the applicant was certified as having a “category III work-related disability” as a result of his condition. He was found to have a right to be reassigned to a suitable position of employment where he and others would not be at risk because of his condition, with (retroactive) effect from 14 August 2002. 8. On 21 February 2005 the Celje regional unit of the Pension and Disability Insurance Institute of Slovenia (hereinafter “the regional ZPIZ”) granted the applicant a so-called “allowance for the period of waiting to be reassigned to or employed in a different appropriate position of employment” (hereinafter “waiting period allowance”) from 8 October 2004. Though the sums appear to be lower during the first few months, he had been subsequently receiving around 390 euros (EUR) per month in waiting period allowance. The regional ZPIZ relied on section 123 of the Pension and Disability Insurance Act (hereinafter “the 1992 Act”) and section 446 of the new Pension and Disability Insurance Act (hereinafter “the 1999 Act” – see paragraphs 24 and 25 below). It noted that the applicant had been registered as unemployed on 3 March 2003 and had been a beneficiary under section 22 of the 1999 Act from 1 March 2003 to 7 October 2004. Thus, once his unemployment allowance had come to an end he had become entitled to a waiting period allowance under section 123 of the 1992 Act (see paragraph 24 below). The regional ZPIZ also noted that, under section 193 of the 1992 Act, beneficiaries were entitled to a waiting period allowance until they fulfilled the conditions for retirement (ibid.). 9. On 15 October 2010 the applicant’s doctor informed the regional ZPIZ about a shoulder injury the applicant had sustained and requested a reassessment of his level of disability. 10. On the basis of, inter alia, information provided by the applicant’s doctor, the regional ZPIZ, on 2 February 2011, decided that the applicant had a right to be reassigned to another position of employment with several limitations, such as not to work at unprotected heights or drive category C and E vehicles, with effect from 1 February 2011. Subsequently, on 28 June 2011 it adopted a decision granting him a disability allowance (nadomestilo za invalidnost) from 24 February 2011 onwards. The regional ZPIZ relied on the 1999 Act, which had introduced certain new disability benefits (the term “disability benefit” is used to cover any type of allowance that arises from a disability) and discontinued some of those provided for under the 1992 Act, including the waiting period allowance. Sections 397 and 446 of the 1999 Act stipulated that a right to a disability allowance applied as from 1 January 2003 (see paragraph 25 below). The regional ZPIZ noted in its decision that the applicant had not been insured under the compulsory insurance scheme at the onset of his disability, but had been registered as unemployed on 3 March 2003 within thirty days of the final decision on his disability, as required by section 97 of the 1999 Act. It was established that his capacity to work had in fact further reduced, even though the category (III) of his disability remained unchanged. The regional ZPIZ found that, pursuant to section 94(1)(1) and (3)(1) of the 1999 Act, he should receive a benefit in the form of disability allowance, which in his case amounted to EUR 192.91. It drew the applicant’s attention to section 185 of the 1999 Act, which required beneficiaries to inform the ZPIZ of any change in circumstances which could affect their rights under that Act (see paragraph 26 below). 11. On 21 July 2011 the applicant appealed against the above decision, arguing that in determining the amount of his disability benefit, the regional ZPIZ should have respected the principle of acquired rights. He pointed out that his benefit had reduced considerably, even though his disability had in fact worsened, and claimed that such a decision was unlawful. 12. On 21 October 2011 the central Pension and Disability Insurance Institute of Slovenia (hereinafter “the central ZPIZ”) dismissed the applicant’s appeal, confirming that the regional ZPIZ had properly applied the law and correctly calculated the amount of his disability allowance. 13. On 5 December 2011 the applicant lodged a claim with the Celje Labour and Social Court challenging the above decisions. He reiterated that the disability allowance granted to him under the 1999 Act violated his acquired rights and that instead of increasing his benefit it reduced it by half, which was unlawful and unconstitutional. 14. On 26 March 2012 the Celje Labour and Social Court dismissed the applicant’s claim. It explained that while recipients of disability-related rights under the 1992 Act retained their acquired rights after the date set out in section 446 of the 1999 Act, in the applicant’s case a reassessment of his disability had been carried out on 2 February 2011 due to a worsening of his condition (see paragraph 10 above), which had resulted in further workplace limitations and his rights being consequently determined anew. In cases where a fresh assessment was made the 1999 Act was to be applied. The court concluded that the 1999 Act did not contain the right to a waiting period allowance. Instead, under section 94, it provided for the disability allowance (see paragraph 25 below) which had been correctly granted to the applicant. 15. On 25 April 2012 the applicant appealed against the judgment, repeating the complaints he had made before the first-instance court and alleging that he ought to have been informed of the consequences of a request for a reassessment of his disability. If that had been the case, he would have “forbidden” his doctor from making such a request. Lastly, he reiterated that the decision of the regional ZPIZ of 28 June 2011 (see paragraph 10 above) was unlawful and unconstitutional, as it violated his right to social security; he pointed out that he was unable to survive on the newly determined disability allowance. 16. On 21 June 2012 the Higher Labour and Social Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal, confirming the position of the lower court that the applicant’s case concerned a change in the level of disability, which had required a fresh determination of his disability benefit. In such a situation, section 397(3) of the 1999 Act provided that the applicant acquired rights under the Act. Also, since the applicant’s rights had been determined anew, the Higher Labour and Social Court concluded that there had been no violation of his acquired rights related to social security, and thus no violation of the Constitution. 17. On 4 September 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law before the Supreme Court, arguing that he could not have legitimately expected that the worsening of his disability would result in a severe reduction of his disability benefit. In that connection, he alleged that the Higher Labour and Social Court’s view that the reduction did not interfere with his acquired rights or constitute a violation of his constitutional right to social security was arbitrary, as the court had provided no reasoning for that conclusion. The applicant further alleged that the newly determined amount of disability benefit interfered with his constitutional right to property. 18. On 5 March 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law, finding that the Higher Labour and Social Court had sufficiently explained that the change in his level of disability had required a fresh determination of his benefit in accordance with the 1999 Act. 19. On 21 May 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against the Supreme Court’s judgment, alleging a violation of his constitutional rights to property and social security. He argued that the reduction in the disability benefit had put his subsistence at risk and failed the test of proportionality. 20. On 18 November 2013 the Constitutional Court refused to accept the applicant’s complaint for consideration on the merits, referring to section 55b(2) of the Constitutional Court Act (see paragraph 27 below). 21. In the meantime, on 22 May 2013, the applicant fulfilled the conditions for a retirement pension in the amount of EUR 374.73 and his disability allowance was discontinued from that date. He thus received the disability allowance for a period of twenty-seven months. 22. Data concerning the applicant’s income provided by the Slovenian tax authorities shows that he received EUR 4,908 in 2010 in pension and disability insurance and, after the impugned change in his allowance, EUR 2,902 in 2011 and EUR 2,480 in 2012.

4. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Moscow. 5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6. On 14 April 2006 the applicant was charged with verbal insult of traffic police officers, an offence punishable with a fine or with up to one year’s correctional work (“the first criminal case”). On 2 July 2009 a justice of the peace of the Tsentralnyy Circuit in Novosibirsk found him guilty as charged and sentenced him to a fine. The applicant filed an appeal which was dismissed by the Tsentralnyy District Court in Novosibirsk on 27 September 2010. On 6 December 2010 the Novosibirsk Regional Court dismissed his cassation appeal. 7. On 8 October 2010 the applicant was charged with contempt of court and criminal libel of the judge who presided over the appeal proceedings in the first criminal case (“the second criminal case”). In his speech to the trial court and a blog post, he had accused her of misusing her office for political means. On 11 October 2012 the applicant was found guilty of contempt of court and sentenced to a fine. On 5 February 2013 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation dismissed, in final instance, an appeal against the conviction. 8. On 29 August 2007 the investigator made the applicant sign an undertaking to stay in Novosibirsk for the duration of the proceedings in the first criminal case. He referred to the applicant’s alleged failures to appear for interviews. 9. In August 2008 the first criminal case was submitted for trial. As the sole guardian of his bed-ridden elderly mother, the applicant asked the trial judge to let him travel to Moscow to arrange her financial affairs. On 13 November 2008 his request was refused; the judge held that the application of the travel restriction was justified on account of the applicant’s previous failures to appear. Her decision was upheld on appeal by the District Court on 27 January 2009 and by the Regional Court on 16 March 2009. The Regional Court justified its decision in the following manner: “Mr Manannikov stated at the hearing that, should the travel restriction be lifted, he would move freely in the Russian territory and also go abroad. Mr Manannikov also stated that he had always appeared at interviews with the investigator and court hearings and would continue to do so in the future. His submissions confirm the fact that, if the travel restriction is lifted, Mr Manannikov could leave Novosibirsk which would hinder examination of the criminal case within a reasonable time. Accordingly, the appeal judgment ... is lawful, justified and well-reasoned; there are no grounds to set it aside.” 10. In February 2009 the applicant reiterated his request to be allowed to leave Novosibirsk. It was rejected by first the trial judge on 16 February 2009 and later by the District Court on 8 May 2009. 11. On 26 May 2011 an identical travel restriction was imposed on the applicant in the second criminal case, on the ground that he had allegedly missed an interview with the investigator earlier that month. 12. The travel restriction expired in 2013 after the proceedings in the second criminal case were terminated (see paragraph 7 above). 13. On 12 October 2010 the applicant’s flat was searched in the framework of the second criminal case, allegedly to uncover evidence showing that he had written the blog post. The investigator located and removed his desktop and laptop computers, a memory stick, two CDs and a DVD. He examined the devices, copied the relevant contents onto a disk and put them sealed in the storage. 14. On 18 November 2010 the investigator refused the applicant’s request to make a copy of his application to this Court and supporting documents which were stored on his computer. He stated that “the investigation had no grounds to unseal physical evidence”. 15. The applicant applied for judicial review. On 23 December 2010 the Tsentralnyi District Court dismissed his application, holding that he would be able to make copies of any materials, including physical evidence, after the investigation had been completed. 16. On 21 February 2011 the Novosibirsk Regional Court upheld the District Court’s decision on appeal. 17. The electronics were returned to the applicant in 2013 after the conviction in the second criminal case had become final (see paragraph 7 above). 18. The applicant retained counsel M. to represent him in the first and second criminal cases. 19. On 22 October 2010 the investigator decided to interview M. as an eye-witness to the offence of contempt of court that the applicant was charged with. M. refused to testify on the ground that she was the applicant’s lawyer. The investigator issued the decision to remove M. as the applicant’s counsel, relying on the legal provision that prevented witnesses from representing defendants in the same criminal case. 20. The applicant’s request for a judicial review of the investigator’s decision was unsuccessful. His complaint was rejected by the District Court on 11 February 2011 at first instance and on appeal by the Regional Court on 6 April 2011. 21. Legal-aid lawyer S. was appointed to represent the applicant. The applicant objected to his participation and insisted that M. should be allowed to represent him. 22. After the case was submitted for trial, the applicant complained to the trial court about a breach of his right to be defended by a lawyer of his own choosing. At the preliminary hearing on 1 July 2011, the Novosibirsk Regional Court accepted that the rights of the defence had been undermined by reason of the investigator’s failure to address the applicant’s objections to the participation of the legal-aid lawyer. The Regional Court returned the case to the prosecutor with the instruction to remedy the violation. 23. The prosecutor appealed. On 22 August 2011 the Criminal Panel of the Regional Court rejected the appeal. The Criminal Panel established that the investigator’s order had not been lawful or justified. As counsel M. had refused to testify, no conflict between the interests of the defendant and those of his representative could have arisen, and the investigator had not had any legal grounds to exclude her from the proceedings. 24. On 23 December 2010 the applicant showed up at the District Court to hear the decision on his complaint about the retention of electronic devices (see paragraph 15 above). Towards the end of the pronouncement hearing, the investigator entered the room, accompanied by two bailiffs. They told the applicant that he would be taken to another judge of the same court who would decide on the investigator’s application for his placement for an in-patient psychiatric assessment in the framework of the second criminal case. 25. The applicant insisted that his lawyer M. should be present. Instead, legal-aid lawyer S. was called in to represent him (see paragraph 21 above). The applicant refused the services of the lawyer S. but the court did not rule on his challenge. Moreover, the applicant objected to the prosecutor’s request, in particular, on the ground that he was the sole guardian of his ailing mother who would be left to her own devices in his absence. 26. One hour later the District Court granted the application. It noted that the applicant did not have any known mental issues and had submitted himself to an outpatient psychiatric assessment. The experts observed that the applicant was “egocentric”, had an “exceedingly positive self-image” and “a passion for reform”. However, they were unable to determine the extent to which those character traits were pronounced or to provide responses to the investigator’s questions. Accordingly, the court considered necessary to commit the applicant for an in-patient assessment lasting no longer than thirty days with a view to determining what his mental state had been at the time the imputed offence of libel had been committed. The court further ordered that the custody of the applicant’s mother be transferred to the guardianship authority in the Oktyabrskiy District in Novosibirsk. 27. The applicant was taken to the hospital where he went on a hunger strike in protest against his involuntary placement. He also filed grounds of appeals, complaining in particular about a breach of his right to defend himself through legal assistance of his choosing. On 30 December 2010 the applicant was released, the medical experts were satisfied as to his sanity. 28. On 9 February 2011 the Novosibirsk Regional Court dismissed his appeal in a summary fashion.

6. The applicant was born in 1977. 7. On 25 April 1999 the applicant was arrested and placed in police custody on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation and the murder of thirteen persons. On the same day, she underwent a medical examination. The doctor who examined the applicant noted no sign of injury on her body. 8. On 26 April 1999 police officers at the Istanbul Security Directorate took statements from the applicant in the absence of a lawyer. The applicant confessed that she was a member of the illegal organisation and admitted having planned an attack on a shopping centre and having acted as a lookout while other co-accused started a fire by throwing Molotov cocktails at the shopping centre, killing thirteen persons in March 1999. 9. On 27 April 1999 the applicant was required to confront with two other co-accused before the police, in the absence of a lawyer. According to the record of the confrontation she admitted having carried out the attack on the shopping centre with those two and another co-accused. 10. On the same day an identification parade took place at the Istanbul Security Directorate, in the absence of a lawyer, where one of the eyewitnesses of the incident identified the applicant in front of police officers and the public prosecutor at the State Security Court. 11. On the same day the applicant was also required to participate in a reconstruction of the events (yer gösterme). According to the record drafted by police officers and signed by the applicant, the applicant described in detail what steps she had taken before the attack on the shopping centre and indicated how she had acted as a lookout while the other co-accused threw Molotov cocktails in the shopping centre. 12. On 30 April 1999 the applicant was seen by a doctor at the Forensic Medicine Institution who noted in his report that the applicant bore no traces of ill-treatment. 13. On the same day, the applicant was heard by the Istanbul Public Prosecutor and by the investigating judge, still in the absence of a lawyer. In her statements before both the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, the applicant denied the accusations and maintained that her statements to the police had been given under duress. Subsequently, the investigating judge ordered the applicant’s detention on remand. 14. On 6 May 1999 the public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court filed an indictment with that court, and charged the applicant with carrying out activities for the purpose of bringing about the secession of part of the national territory, pursuant to Article 125 of the former Criminal Code. 15. The state security courts were later abolished by Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, and the case was transferred to the Istanbul Assize Court. 16. On 7 May 2007 relying on, inter alia, the applicant’s statements to the police, the Istanbul Assize Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced her to life imprisonment for membership of an illegal organisation and the murder of thirteen people. In delivering its judgment, the Assize Court further took into consideration several items of evidence, such as the applicant’s statements to the police, public prosecutor and investigating judge, video recordings and written records of the crime scene visits, autopsy reports, eyewitness identifications, and the statements given by some of the accused persons. 17. On 7 May 2009 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the first instance court.

4. The applicants, Ms Bozhana Boyanova Uzunova and Mr Ferad Ismail Seid, were born in 1978 and 1955 respectively, and live in Kardzhali. 5. The applicants co-owned a plot of land of 15,276 square metres near the town of Kapitan Andreevo. 6. On 30 November 2007 the Council of Ministers decided to expropriate 6,218 square metres of the applicants’ plot with a view to building a motorway. The decision allowed preliminary enforcement of the expropriation and stated that the owners were to be given BGN 13,023 (the equivalent of approximately EUR 6,657) in compensation. The decision recorded as owner of the expropriated plot the person from whom the applicants had bought the property. 7. The applicants brought judicial review proceedings in respect of the expropriation decision before the Supreme Administrative Court. In a final judgment of 3 April 2009 that court declared the decision null and void as it had failed to specify the actual owners of the plot to whom compensation was due, and referred the case back to the administrative authorities. The Road Infrastructure Agency requested re-opening of the judicial review proceedings on the ground that it had not been able to take part in them as an interested third party even though its participation was mandatory under the State Property Act 1996 as investor in the construction of the motorway. In a judgment of 12 October 2009 a five-member panel of the Supreme Administrative Court allowed the request, quashed the judgment of 3 April 2009 and remitted the case to be re-examined by a three-member panel of the Supreme Administrative Court. 8. In a final judgment of 28 December 2010 the Supreme Administrative Court found that compensation was due to the applicants as owners of the plot at issue and that it had to be increased to BGN 59,817 (the equivalent of EUR 30,577), in accordance with the conclusions of an expert report obtained in the course of the proceedings. The court also awarded the applicants BGN 600 in costs, to be paid by the Council of Ministers. 9. On 13 January 2011 the applicants invited the Road Infrastructure Agency to pay the compensation due to them. In its response of 21 February 2011, the Agency informed the applicants that due to some changes in the layout of the motorway, a new decision for expropriation of the affected property was being prepared. 10. On 5 July 2011 the Council of Ministers issued a new decision for expropriation, in accordance with which 5,215 square metres of the applicants’ plot were to be expropriated against compensation in the amount of BGN 1,794 (the equivalent of EUR 917). The applicants brought judicial review proceedings in respect of this decision. In a judgment of 26 June 2012, the Supreme Administrative Court declared the decision of 5 July 2011 null and void as it had failed to take account of the binding character of the judgment of 28 December 2010, the latter having determined the dispute between the parties with final effect. In March 2012 the Ministry of Finance unsuccessfully sought reopening of the proceedings ending with the judgment of 28 December 2010 before the Supreme Administrative Court. 11. On 4 July 2012 the applicants once again invited the Road Infrastructure Agency to pay the compensation due to them. They subsequently wrote to the agency again on 15 October 2012, to the Council of Ministers on 14 October 2013 submitting also a writ of enforcement in respect of the sum due, and to the regional governor on 21 February 2014. 12. On 26 February 2015, at the time of submitting their observations on the admissibility and merits in this case, the Government informed the Court that on 15 May 2014 the Road Infrastructure Agency had paid to each applicant BGN 29,908.50, or altogether BGN 59,817 pursuant to the final judgment in their favour of 28 December 2010. 13. On 10 December 2014, 20 January 2015 and 23 March 2015 respectively, the applicants wrote to various authorities, without success, seeking the payment of interest on the above amount for the period of over three years when it had remained unenforced. 14. In the meantime, on 22 November 2013 the applicants brought proceedings before the Sofia Administrative Court in relation to the lack of enforcement of the final judicial decision of 28 December 2010. In particular, they claimed they had incurred pecuniary damage as a result of the lack of enforcement; they also claimed interest on the amount determined in the said judgment for the period of its non-enforcement. On 18 December 2013 the court dismissed their claim as inadmissible. It found, on the one hand, that the applicants had not indicated an individual administrative act as the subject of their judicial review proceedings. If, on the other hand, the applicants’ claim was about the lack of enforcement of a final judicial decision, the court held that the competent body in that connection was the bailiff and the relevant procedure was under chapter XVII of the Code of Administrative Procedure 2006 (“the 2006 Code”). 15. The applicants appealed before the Supreme Administrative Court, alleging a breach of Article 203 of the 2006 Code and a breach of section 1(1) of the State and Municipalities Responsibility for Damage Act (the “SMRDA”), and challenging the lower court’s decision as being unreasoned. In a final decision of 13 February 2014, the Supreme Administrative Court confirmed the lower court’s decision.

5. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Kraljevo. 6. Between June 2003 and December 2004 the applicant, as an entrepreneur, was providing heating installation services to AD Fabrika za proizvodnju konfekcije i trikotaže Raška, a socially-owned company based in Novi Pazar (hereinafter “the debtor company”). 7. On 2 December 2010 the Kraljevo Commercial Court opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor company (St. 31/2010). 8. The applicant duly submitted his claim. 9. On 15 March 2011 the Commercial Court rejected his claim and instructed him to initiate a regular civil suit and request determination of his claim. The applicant lodged a separate civil claim. 10. On 1 December 2011 the Commercial Court ruled in favour of the applicant by recognizing his claim and ordered the debtor company to pay the applicant the costs of the civil proceedings. 11. On an unspecified date thereafter, the said judgment having become final, was acknowledged within the insolvency proceedings. 12. On 22 July 2013 the Commercial Court issued a decision ordering payment of approximately 10 % of the total debt to the applicant. The applicant received this payment on an unspecified date. 13. The debtor company was ultimately struck from the relevant public register on 9 July 2014. 14. On 16 December 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal complaining against the Commercial Court’s decision of 22 July 2013 and that his right to work and right to compensation for work and providing services were infringed, because he received only 10 % of the total debt. He asked further the Constitutional Court to order the payment of the rest of the debt. 15. On 2 March 2015 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal finding that it is not vested with the power to order such a payment. That decision was delivered to the applicant after 24 April 2015.

4. The first applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Horná Kráľová. The second applicant was born in 1980 and lives in Nitra. 5. On 14 March 2014 a judge of the Nitra District Court remanded the applicants in detention pending trial on the charge of continuous criminal offence of insurance fraud. This followed their arrest on 11 March 2014. 6. With respect to the first applicant, the District Court decided that there were reasons to suspect that he would influence witnesses, reoffend and continue to make illegal financial gains. With respect to the second applicant, the District Court concluded that there was a reason to suspect that he would interfere with witnesses and his co-accused to influence the evidence they would give. 7. On 21 March 2014 both applicants lodged an interlocutory appeal, arguing that no specific factual elements had been relied on in the District Court’s decision to justify their pre-trial detention. 8. On 1 April 2014 the Nitra Regional Court dismissed the applicants’ interlocutory appeals, referring to the findings of the District Court. 9. On 24 April 2014 the applicants lodged a constitutional complaint alleging that the decisions on their detention lacked specific reasons justifying their pre-trial detention. They each requested just satisfaction of 5,000 euros (EUR). 10. The Constitutional Court joined their complaints and on 24 September 2014 found a violation of their rights under Article 5 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention. It quashed the relevant part of the decision of the Regional Court and awarded each of the applicants EUR 1,000 as just satisfaction in addition to their legal costs and expenses in the amount of EUR 284. The Constitutional Court noted that where the ordinary courts used only formal and standard phrases in their decisions on detention (as was the case with the applicants), suspicion arose as to whether they had looked properly at the specific circumstances at hand. It concluded that even though the ordinary courts had referred to some specific facts, which allegedly justified the applicants’ detention, they had failed to explain them in their decisions. Furthermore, the Regional Court had not dealt with some of the applicants’ core arguments and thus had not remedied the shortcomings of the District Court’s decision. In view of the above, the Constitutional Court concluded that the applicants’ pre-trial detention had been based on an arbitrary decision lacking proper and sufficient reasoning. 11. In the meantime, on 30 May 2014 the applicants had been released and placed under supervised probation.

8. The applicants are owners of residential buildings or apartments which were subject to the rent-control scheme. Under the relevant legislation they were obliged to let their flats to tenants while charging no more than the maximum amount of rent fixed by the State. The legislation precluded them from unilaterally terminating the leases or selling the flats in question to anyone other than the respective tenants. The particulars of the flats affected by the rent control are set out in Appendices 10 ‑ 17 (columns A ‑ F). 9. The situation of the applicants is structurally and contextually the same as that of the applicants in Bittó and Others v. Slovakia (no. 30255/09, 28 January 2014 (merits) and 7 July 2015 (just satisfaction)), and subsequently decided cases concerning the rent-control scheme in Slovakia (see Krahulec v. Slovakia, no. 19294/07; Bukovčanová and Others v. Slovakia, no. 23785/07; Rudolfer v. Slovakia, no. 38082/07, 5 July 2016; Riedel and Others v. Slovakia, nos. 44218/07, 54831/07, 33176/08, 47150/08; and Mečiar and Others v. Slovakia, no. 62864/09, 10 January 2017; Matuschka and Others v. Slovakia [Committee], nos. 33076/10, 14383/11, Balan and Others v. Slovakia [Committee], nos. 51414/11, 46098/12, and Bajzík and Others v. Slovakia [Committee], nos. 46609/13, 9892/14, 27 June 2017). 10. Two residential building at 27 Panenská St. and 14 Konventná St. in Bratislava were acquired in 2002 by a religious organisation with legal personality, Cirkevný zbor Evanjelickej cirkvi Augsburského vyznania na Slovensku Bratislava (hereinafter “the Bratislava Evangelical Church”). This body established three other entities with legal personalities, including the applicant organisation the Old Town Evangelical Church. 11. The property in question was conveyed by the Bratislava Evangelical Church to the Old Town Evangelical Church by way of donation on 6 February 2013. On 15 February 2013 the previous owner ceased legally to exist and was legally succeeded by the Old Town Evangelical Church and the other two entities. 12. On 22 February 2012 the Old Town Evangelical Church gave formal notices of termination of their lease to the two tenants residing in flat no. 11 situated in the residential building at 27 Panenská St. in Bratislava. By law, these tenants had under certain circumstances the right to claim that the municipality provide them with a substitute flat on the termination of their lease. They did not avail themselves of that right. 13. On 6 August 2013 the Old Town Evangelical Church applied to the Bratislava I District Court for an eviction order against the occupants of this flat who had failed to vacate it by the expiry of the twelve‑month notice period. As the occupants eventually vacated the flat on 25 February 2015, the Old Town Evangelical Church withdrew its action and the proceedings in respect of it were discontinued on 9 March 2015. Until the vacation of the flat, the occupants had paid the Old Town Evangelical Church compensation in an amount equal to the regulated rent. 14. The tenants residing in flats nos. 1 and 9 on 22 Moyzesova St. in Žilina moved in 2002 into flats nos. 5 and 12 within the same building owing to rebuilding of the original flats. The tenants continued to pay the regulated rent. In 2003 flat no. 5 was rebuilt and its area was changed from 110.27 sq. m to 59.18 sq. m. 15. A similar situation arose in the residential building on 33 Pražská St. in Bratislava where in 2014 the tenant residing in flat no. 16 moved to flat no. 9, and in the residential building located on 15 Vrbovská cesta St. in Piešťany, where the tenant living in the flat no. 14 moved to flat no. 25.

4. On 4 September 2000 the President of Russia appointed Ms G. to the office of judge of the Syktyvkar Town Court for a period of three years. 5. On 21 May 2004 the State Council of the Komi Republic appointed Ms G. to the office of justice of the peace of Lesozavodskiy Judicial District of Syktyvkar for three years. On 31 May 2007 the Council extended her appointment for another seven years. 6. On 16 January 2008 the Judicial Qualifications Board granted Ms G.’s application for resignation and terminated her judicial status effective as of 1 April 2008. 7. On 19 November 2009 the acting President of the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic appointed Ms G. as acting justice of the peace for Kutuzovskiy district in Syktyvkar as of 23 November 2009 pending the appointment of a permanent justice. According to the Government, Ms G. served as justice of the peace until 8 February 2010. 8. On 8 April 2010 the acting President of the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic appointed Ms G. to the office of justice of the peace in Vylgort as of 16 April 2010 for a period of one year. 9. On 5, 9 and 29 May and 4 June 2010 the applicant was arrested by the police for (1) driving a vehicle without a registration plate, (2) driving without a driving licence, (3) refusal to take a breath test and (4) driving under the influence. 10. On 4 and 22 June and 6 July 2010 Justice of the Peace G. found the applicant guilty on seven counts of road traffic offences and sentenced him to administrative detention and a fine. 11. On an unspecified date the applicant appealed against the five judgments of 4 June 2010, arguing, inter alia, that the justice of the peace who had considered his cases had been appointed to the office in contravention of the applicable laws. 12. On 24 and 30 June 2010 the Syktyvdinskiy District Court of the Komi Republic dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The District Court discerned no irregularities as regards the appointment of Ms G. to the office of justice of the peace. 13. The applicant did not appeal against the judgments of 22 June and 6 July 2010 in view of the futility of his previous appeals. 14. On 24 December 2009 Justice of the Peace G. dismissed the applicant’s claims against the social-security authorities for interest payments and non-pecuniary damage. 15. The applicant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the justice of the peace who had considered her case had been appointed to the office in contravention of the applicable laws. 16. On 23 April 2010 the Syktyvkar Town Court upheld the judgment of 24 December 2009 on appeal. The Town Court discerned no irregularities as regards the appointment of Ms G. to the office of justice of the peace. 17. On 9 May and 13 July 2010 the applicant was arrested by the police for refusal to take a breath test and driving under the influence respectively. 18. On 13 July 2010 Justice of the Peace G. found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to administrative detention. 19. On an unspecified date the applicant appealed against the two judgments, arguing, inter alia, that the justice of the peace who had considered his cases had been appointed to the office in contravention of the applicable laws. 20. On 6 August 2010 the Syktyvdinskiy District Court upheld the judgments on appeal. The District Court discerned no irregularities as regards the appointment of Ms G. to the office of justice of the peace. 21. On 26 May 1990 Ms Ch. was elected to the office of judge of the Syktyvkar Town Court. 22. On 22 December 1999 the Judicial Qualifications Board granted Ms Ch.’s application for resignation and terminated her judicial status. 23. On 26 August 2010 the President of the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic appointed Ms Ch. as acting justice of the peace in Vylgort for a period of up to one year. 24. On 11 January 2011 the President of the Supreme Court relieved Ms Ch. of her duties of office of acting justice of the peace. 25. On 21 September 2010 the applicant was arrested by the police for leaving the scene of a road traffic accident and refusal to take a breath test. 26. On 15 October 2010 justice of the peace Ch. delivered two judgments, finding the applicant in violation of road traffic rules and sentenced him to administrative detention. The applicant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that Ms Ch. had been appointed to the office in contravention of the applicable laws. 27. On 17 November the Syktyvdinskiy District Court of the Komi Republic upheld both judgments of 15 October 2010 on appeal. The court discerned no irregularity as regards Ms Ch.’s appointment to the office of justice of the peace. 28. On 7 October 2010 Justice of the Peace Ch. allowed an action lodged by Yu. against the applicant and reduced the amount of monthly maintenance Yu. had to pay as child support for the parties’ minor daughter. The applicant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that Ms Ch. had been appointed to her office in contravention of the applicable laws. 29. On 8 December 2010 the District Court upheld the judgment of 7 October 2010 on appeal. The court discerned no irregularity as regards Ms Ch.’s appointment to the office of justice of the peace.

4. The applicants were born in 1939 and 1944 respectively and live in Dumbrăvița, Timiș County. 5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, refer to the same context and domestic criminal proceedings as those described in Association “21 December 1989” and Others v. Romania (nos. 33810/07 and 18817/08, §§ 12-41, 24 May 2011) and Şandru and Others v. Romania (no. 22465/03, §§ 7-47, 8 December 2009). 6. Between 17 and 28 December 1989 many people, including the applicants’ son, participated in anti-communism demonstrations in Timișoara, Bucharest and other cities in Romania. 7. The applicants’ son was killed by gunfire on 23 December 1989 in Timișoara. 8. In 1990 the military prosecutor’s office opened several investigations into the December 1989 armed crackdown on the anti-communism demonstrations. A main criminal investigation concerning the use of violence against civilians in Bucharest and other cities was also registered with the highest prosecutor’s office – the military prosecutors section − under no. 97/P/1990 (current number 11/P/2014). 9. In cases concerning the events in Timișoara, a separate investigation was carried out under file no. 11/P/1996, culminating in the referral to court and subsequent conviction of senior military officers by a decision of the High Court of Cassation and Justice of 3 April 2007, which became final on 15 October 2008. As is apparent from the documents submitted by the parties, the death of the applicants’ son did not form part of this investigation, but in the court proceedings the first applicant nonetheless lodged a civil claim regarding his son’s death during the December 1989 events. The court dismissed it on the grounds that he had failed to submit documents substantiating this claim. 10. As acknowledged by the Government, both applicants are parties in the main criminal investigation file. On 26 June 2013 they brought civil claims before the prosecutor requesting the right to participate, being civil parties in this file. The applicants had first made statements and raised civil claims in criminal investigation files other than file no. 97/P/1990 (current number 11/P/2014) on 11 January 1990 and 1 March 2000. The parties did not inform the Court whether these files had been joined to the main criminal investigation (see paragraph 8 above). 11. The most important steps taken by the prosecutors in the main criminal investigation are summarised in Association “21 December 1989” and Others (cited above, §§ 12-41) and Anamaria‑Loredana Orășanu and Others v. Romania ([Committee] nos. 43629/13 and 74 others, §§ 10‑11, 7 November 2017). Further developments are as follows. 12. On 14 October 2015 the prosecutor’s office closed the main investigation, finding that the offences of homicide and instigation to homicide of which the applicants’ son had been a victim had become statute‑barred. 13. Although the parties have not communicated any information regarding the lodging of an appeal against this decision, it is apparent from the prosecutor’s office website that it was subsequently quashed and to date the main criminal investigation is still ongoing (see Anamaria‑Loredana Orășanu and Others, cited above, § 11).

5. The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Diyarbakır. 6. At the time of the events he was a lawyer practising in that city. 7. On 18 April 2000 the applicant was questioned by the public prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court, on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation, namely Hizbullah. The contents of a computer disk holding detailed information on the applicant’s background, which had been obtained by the security forces in a house belonging to Hizbullah, and police statements of four people, all of whom were accused of being members of the same illegal organisation, were read out to him during the questioning. The applicant denied having any affiliation with the illegal organisation and contested the accuracy of the evidence presented to him. He maintained that he had assisted certain members of Hizbullah as a lawyer and that he always acted within the limits of his profession, without directing those people’s submissions as alleged. He further maintained that certain information in the illegal organisation’s background report, such as the ages of his siblings, was wrong and that this in itself proved that he had not provided the information. He did not benefit from the assistance of a lawyer during questioning. 8. On the same day the applicant gave statements before the investigating judge of the Diyarbakır State Security Court, this time together with his business partner, who was accused of being a member of the same illegal organisation. He reiterated his submissions given to the public prosecutor and added that the fact that he had provided legal assistance to some members of the illegal organisation might have been perceived as a demonstration of support by certain people. The investigating judge refused the public prosecutor’s request for the applicant’s detention and decided that he should be released pending trial. 9. The following day, on 19 April 2000, the public prosecutor objected to the applicant’s release. The applicant was subsequently arrested on the basis of a warrant issued by the Diyarbakır State Security Court. 10. On 20 April 2000 the applicant was taken before the investigating judge, who decided that he should be detained on remand. 11. On the same day the public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Diyarbakır State Security Court, accusing the applicant of membership of an illegal organisation. He relied on the police statements of the four witnesses as well as the background information obtained from the computer disk. 12. On an unspecified date the applicant’s lawyers lodged a petition with the trial court. They argued that there was no evidence against the applicant in that all of the witnesses relied on by the prosecution had denied their statements later on. They further stated that the background information obtained from the computer disk was not reliable. 13. At the hearing on 30 May 2000 the applicant’s lawyers once again challenged the use of the background information obtained from the computer disk, arguing that it was unreliable in that the disk had been de-encrypted and the information extracted in their absence. During the same hearing, the court noted that the four witnesses, who had mentioned the applicant in their police statements, had denied those submissions during the subsequent stages of the proceedings against them. The court held that the applicant should be released pending trial. 14. On 3 September 2001, following statements made by a certain M.S.B., the public prosecutor drew up another bill of indictment against the applicant, once again accusing him of membership of an illegal organisation. The allegations put forward by this latter indictment were joined with the case which was already pending before the State Security Court. 15. At the hearing on 4 December 2001, during which the applicant was not present, M.S.B.’s police statements were read out. On 30 April 2002 the court noted that M.S.B. had denied those statements at a later point. 16. On an unspecified date the public prosecutor submitted his written observations to the court. He argued that the applicant’s guilt was proven by various items of evidence, namely the background report prepared in respect of him, which contained detailed personal information, as well as the background reports and police statements of several other members of Hizbullah. In that connection, he referred to the statements of a certain N.S., who had maintained before both the police and the public prosecutor that the applicant had been a recruiter for the illegal organisation, had given courses to new members and had been in charge of certain cells. The public prosecutor also noted that the applicant’s name had been mentioned in the background reports of several members, including a certain Ş.A. 17. On 18 November 2003 the applicant’s lawyer applied for the expansion of the investigation and the cross-examination of the witnesses who had confirmed the applicant’s membership of Hizbullah. He mentioned, in particular, the names of N.S. and Ş.A., who had given statements against the applicant. The applicant’s lawyer further challenged the credibility of these two witnesses’ statements. In that connection, he argued that N.S. had not repeated his police statements against the applicant at a later point as alleged by the public prosecutor in his written opinion. The lawyer further noted that Ş.A. had claimed to have taken courses run by the applicant until the latter started his military service and asked the trial court to obtain information as regards the dates the applicant had served in the army in order to prove that those allegations were not credible. 18. On 27 January 2004 the court refused the application for the expansion of the investigation, without stating anything as regards the cross-examination of witnesses. 19. On 23 March 2004 the applicant applied to benefit from the Reintegration of Offenders into Society Act (Law no. 4959). 20. During the course of the proceedings, the State Security Courts were abolished and the case was transferred to the Diyarbakır Assize Court. 21. At the hearing on 21 February 2006 the Assize Court read out the police statements of Ş.A., in which he had claimed that the applicant had acted as a mentor within the illegal organisation and had given courses to other members, including him, which had ended when the applicant had started his military service. The trial court stated that although Ş.A. had reiterated his submissions in so far as they concerned himself before the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, he had not mentioned the applicant after his questioning by the police. The court nevertheless added the statements of N.S. and Ş.A. to the case file. The applicant’s lawyers maintained that they did not accept the statements against the applicant. 22. On 18 April 2006 the Diyarbakır Assize Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to six years and three months’ imprisonment. The court relied on certain information obtained from the computer disk, namely the background report on the applicant and reports concerning other members, as well as the statements of N.S. and Ş.A. It also refused the applicant’s application to benefit from Law no. 4959, finding that he had not disclosed any information about the structure of the illegal organisation. 23. The applicant appealed against the judgment. He argued that the trial court had failed to hear evidence from N.S. and Ş.A. despite his requests to that effect and that he had been deprived of the possibility to put his questions to them. 24. On 19 November 2007 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the Diyarbakır Assize Court.

5. The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Mankivka. 6. On 2 April 2007 the applicant underwent surgery in connection with an umbilical hernia (exomphalos). 7. According to the applicant, on 9 February 2008 the police arrested him in Vinnytsya on suspicion of abduction and murder. On the same day he was transferred to Kyiv and placed in detention in a cell of the Shevchenkivskyy district police station. 8. According to the Government, the applicant was arrested in Kyiv on 10 February 2008 on suspicion of abduction and murder, and on the same day he was placed in detention in a cell of the Shevchenkivskyy district police station. 9. According to the applicant, between 10 and 16 February 2008 he was beaten by police officers who tried to force him to confess to the abduction and the murder. In particular, Officer G., the first deputy head of Kyiv Shevchenkivskyy district police station, kicked the applicant in the face and abdomen, injuring the area where he had had the operation for his umbilical hernia (see paragraph 6 above). After the beating, the applicant started suffering from constant pain in his abdomen. 10. On 16 February 2008 the applicant confessed to the murder and the abduction and signed several documents which were undated. On the same day the police transferred him to the Kyiv Temporary Detention Facility (hereinafter, “the ITT”). The ITT medical staff examined the applicant on the same day and noted that he had a bruise under his right eye. 11. According to the applicant, on 19 February 2008 the Kyiv Pre-trial Detention Centre (hereinafter, “the SIZO”) administration refused to admit him because of his poor state of health. This was the second time that the SIZO administration refused to admit him (see paragraph 39 below). The applicant was sent back to the ITT and the ITT staff called an ambulance, which transported him to the Kyiv Medical Emergency Hospital (“the Emergency Hospital”). According to a certificate issued by the Emergency Hospital, the applicant stayed there from 20 to 25 February 2008 and received treatment for “contusion to the abdomen and facial tissue”. 12. On 26 February 2008 the applicant was placed in the SIZO. He was examined by a SIZO doctor, who diagnosed him with a “post-operative condition” following the operation on his umbilical hernia in 2007. 13. On 16 May 2008 the applicant’s defence lawyer complained to the prosecutor’s office regarding the applicant’s ill-treatment by the police officers of the Kyiv Shevchenkivskyy district police station between 10 and 16 February 2008. 14. On 24 June 2008 the investigator dealing with the criminal case against the applicant ordered a forensic medical expert to establish the injuries the applicant had sustained between 9 and 16 February 2008. The forensic medical expert examined the applicant on 4 July 2008 and did not find any injuries on him which could have been inflicted during that period. The expert noted that a liquid was leaking from the applicant’s navel, and recommended that he be examined by a surgeon. 15. On 11 August 2008 the applicant’s lawyer submitted a petition to the prosecutor’s office in which he stated that the applicant had been beaten by Officer G., the first deputy head of the Kyiv Shevchenkivskyy district police station. 16. On 16 September 2008 the investigating officer of the Kyiv Shevchenkivskyy district prosecutor’s office refused to institute criminal proceedings in relation to the applicant’s ill-treatment complaints on the grounds that there were no constituent elements of an offence. The investigating officer based his decision on statements of the investigator and the police officers dealing with the initial investigative activities concerning the applicant. Those questioned denied that the applicant had been ill‑treated. 17. On 29 September 2008 the applicant’s defence counsel lodged a complaint with the Kyiv City public prosecutor against the decision of 16 September 2008. 18. On 16 October 2008 the Kyiv City public prosecutor’s office considered that there were no legal grounds for quashing the decision of 16 September 2008 (see paragraph 16 above). 19. On 18 November 2008 the Kyiv Shevchenkivskyy District Court (hereinafter, “the local court”) quashed the decision of 16 September 2008. It held that, in the course of the inquiry, the investigating officer had failed to question the applicant and Officer G., the police officer whom the applicant had pointed out. The local court also found that the investigator had failed to append to the case file the results of the forensic examination of the applicant’s injuries which his lawyer had referred to in the application of 11 August 2008 (see paragraph 15 above). 20. On 19 December 2008, following an inquiry into the applicant’s ill‑treatment complaints, the prosecutor’s office refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers because there were no constituent elements of an offence. In the course of the above inquiry, Officer G. was questioned. He said that he had not taken part in the applicant’s arrest or in any other investigative activities relating to him. 21. On 1 December 2009 the local court quashed the above decision and remitted the case file for an additional inquiry. The local court noted that the investigating officer had failed to comply with the instructions it had given in the decision of 18 November 2008 (see paragraph 19 above). In particular, the investigating officer had not questioned the applicant and had failed to provide any substantiation for his decision of 19 December 2008 (see paragraph 20 above). 22. On 30 January 2010, following an additional inquiry into the applicant’s ill-treatment complaints, the prosecutor’s office refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers because there were no constituent elements of an offence. In the course of the above inquiry, Officers О., L., Psh., and S., were additionally questioned and they denied physically or psychologically coercing the applicant into making a confession. 23. On 18 May 2010 the local court quashed the above decision and remitted the case file for an additional inquiry. The court noted that the instructions it had given in the decisions of 18 November 2008 and 1 December 2009 (see paragraphs 19 and 21 above) had not been followed by the investigating officer. 24. On 23 August 2010, following an additional inquiry into the applicant’s complaints, the prosecutor’s office refused to institute criminal proceedings against Officer G., the person who had allegedly ill-treated the applicant (see paragraph 9 above), because there were no constituent elements of an offence. In the course of that additional inquiry, the applicant was questioned and he reiterated his account of the events relating to the ill‑treatment. The investigating officer concluded that there was no evidence proving Officer G.’s involvement in those events. 25. On 5 December 2010 and 30 March 2011 the applicant lodged petitions with the Prosecutor General of Ukraine in which he reiterated, inter alia, that he had been ill-treated by Officer G. and that the investigation into his complaints in that respect had been ineffective. 26. On 17 January 2011 a superior prosecutor quashed the decision of 23 August 2010 (see paragraph 24 above) and remitted the case file for an additional inquiry. 27. On 12 April 2011, following an additional inquiry into the applicant’s complaints, the investigating officer refused to institute criminal proceedings against Officer G. because there were no constituent elements of an offence. In the course of the above inquiry, the investigating officer questioned Officer Ovs., who had been on duty at the time of the applicant’s arrest. The officer denied that there had been blood on the applicant’s body in the stomach area. The investigating officer also noted that the applicant had not raised any complaints either during his time at the police station or after his transfer to the Kyiv SIZO. On 30 March 2012 the local court quashed that decision and remitted the case file for an additional inquiry. 28. On 28 June 2012, following an additional inquiry, the prosecutor’s office refused to institute criminal proceedings against Officer G. because there were no constituent elements of an offence. The investigating officer came to the conclusion that it was impossible to question the people who had been at the police station with the applicant in February 2008. On an unspecified date that decision was quashed and the case file was remitted for an additional inquiry. 29. On 7 September 2012, following an additional inquiry, the investigating officer refused to institute criminal proceedings against Officer G. because there were no constituent elements of an offence. On 17 September 2012 a superior prosecutor quashed that decision and remitted the case file for an additional inquiry. 30. On 27 September 2012, following an additional inquiry into the applicant’s complaints regarding ill-treatment, the prosecutor’s office refused to institute criminal proceedings against Officer G. because there were no constituent elements of an offence. In the course of the inquiry, the inspector on duty at the material time, Inspector Ag., was questioned and stated that he didn’t remember whether he had seen the applicant. 31. On 7 May 2013 the local court quashed the decision of 27 September 2012 (see paragraph 30 above) and remitted the case file for an additional inquiry. The court held that the investigating officer had failed to interrogate and/or properly analyse the statements of: - the people who had been detained with the applicant in the cell at the Kyiv Shevchenkivskyy district police station in February 2008; - the ITT and SIZO staff, in relation to the applicant’s alleged ill‑treatment and the SIZO’s alleged refusal to admit him after the court had ordered his arrest; - the medical personnel from the emergency service who had provided the applicant with medical assistance in February 2008; - the surgeon from Buchanska Prison Hospital who had performed an operation on the applicant on 20 January 2010; - the police officers who had arrested the applicant in Vinnytsya on 9 February 2008. 32. On 21 May 2013 the information about the physical injuries inflicted on the applicant was entered into the Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations and the respective pre-trial investigation started, in accordance with the provisions of the new Code of Criminal Procedure. 33. On 27 June 2013, following the results of the pre-trial investigation, the prosecutor’s office issued a decision to terminate the criminal proceedings because there were no constituent elements of an offence. 34. On 4 July 2013 a superior prosecutor quashed the above decision, holding that the investigating officer had failed to follow the instructions given by the local court in its decision of 7 May 2013 (see paragraph 31 above). 35. On 5 July 2013 the investigating officer questioned S., who had been detained with the applicant in the ITT cell. The witness stated that he did not remember the applicant being beaten. 36. On 29 August 2013, following the results of the investigation, the prosecutor’s office issued a decision to terminate the criminal proceedings because there were no constituent elements of an offence. On 18 February 2014 the local court upheld that decision. 37. On 15 April 2014 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal quashed the decision of the investigating officer of 29 August 2013 and the decision of the local court of 18 February 2014 (see paragraph 36 above) and remitted the case file for a pre-trial investigation. The court held that the investigating officer had failed to comply with the instructions given by the local court in its decision of 7 May 2013 (see paragraph 31 above), and in particular had failed to establish the origin of the injuries sustained by the applicant in February 2008. 38. The parties did not submit information about further developments in the case. 39. Meanwhile, on 13 February 2008 the local court had ordered the applicant’s detention on remand and ordered that he be transferred to the SIZO. As indicated before (paragraph 11 above), according to the applicant, the SIZO administration refused to admit him because of his poor state of health. The police then transported the applicant back to the Shevchenkivskyy district police station. 40. On 16 February 2008 the applicant was placed in the ІТТ (see paragraph 10 above). As a result of a medical examination, a bruise was found under his right eye. It was classified as a minor physical injury. 41. Following a deterioration in the applicant’s state of health, the ITT staff called an ambulance, which transported him to the Emergency Hospital. According to a certificate issued by the Emergency Hospital, the applicant stayed in that facility from 20 to 25 February 2008 and received treatment for “contusion to the abdomen and facial tissue” (see paragraph 11 above). 42. On 26 February 2008 the applicant was transferred from the ITT to the SIZO. As indicated in paragraph 12 above, upon his arrival he was examined by a SIZO doctor, who diagnosed him with a post-operative condition following his umbilical hernia operation in 2007 (see paragraph 6 above). 43. According to the applicant, on 29 February, 5, 10, and 16 March 2008 he complained to the SIZO staff of constant pain in his abdomen. The SIZO doctors examined him and established that the pain was due to a post-operative navel fistula. On 21 March 2008 he was examined by a SIZO general practitioner who gave him an anaesthetic. Between 13 May and 2 July 2008 the applicant stayed in the SIZO medical unit and was treated with the following: lactulose, aloe, fluconazole, ascorbic acid, and Captopril. His navel injury was treated with hydrogen peroxide, vitamins В1 and В6, Thiotriazolin, Levomekol (an ointment), Riboxin, and angiotensin-converting enzyme (ACE). After being treated, he was discharged and placed in a cell. 44. On 13 June 2008 the applicant was examined by a surgeon from the Emergency Hospital, who diagnosed a suture sinus (a type of wound complication) following the umbilical hernia operation. He recommended that a bandage be applied to the applicant’s navel area, and also recommended that he be treated with antiseptics, antibiotics and have elective surgery. The surgeon noted that the applicant did not need urgent inpatient treatment, and the applicant was returned to the SIZO on the same day. 45. On 22 October 2008 the applicant was examined in the SIZO by another surgeon, who noted that he did not need inpatient treatment or an urgent operation in connection with his navel fistula. 46. From 26 November to 15 December 2008 the applicant had examinations at the Emergency Hospital in connection with the constant pain in his abdomen. He was diagnosed with omphalitis (inflammation of the navel and the surrounding area) and a suture sinus following the umbilical hernia operation in 2007 (see paragraph 6 above). He was also diagnosed with: ischemic heart disease, myocardial cardiosclerosis, category II hypertension, hypertonic crises of 27 November, 1 and 4 December 2008, category I cardiac failure with cephalgia phenomena, asthenoneurotic syndrome, discirculatory encephalopathy, and chronic acute cholecystopancreatitis. The applicant received the following treatment: antispasmodic drugs, hepatoprotectors, antibiotics, biocatalysts, antihypertensive drugs (inhibitors, angiotensin-converting enzyme, beta-blockers, diuretics), and bandages on his umbilical area. On 5 December 2008 and 30 January 2009 the surgeon from the Emergency Hospital recommended that the applicant have elective surgery on the fistula and continue with the care and treatment of his symptoms under the surgeon, neuropathologist and cardiologist at the SIZO medical unit. 47. Between 9 February and 10 April 2009 the applicant stayed in the SIZO medical unit. He was diagnosed with and received treatment for: omphalitis, a urachal cyst, a navel fistula and suture sinus, ischemic heart disease, encephalopathy and an exacerbation of his chronic pancreatitis. The treatment consisted of oral medication and the application of antiseptic to the applicant’s navel area. 48. On 6 and 7 May 2009 the applicant was examined by the SIZO cardiologist, neuropathologist and surgeon. He was diagnosed with a urachal cyst, a ligature fistula and category II hypertension. He was prescribed outpatient treatment for his symptoms. 49. On 31 July 2009 the SIZO surgeon recommended that the applicant have an operation on the fistula, to be performed in a public hospital. 50. On 4 August 2009 the SIZO informed the applicant’s wife that the operation to remove his navel fistula would be arranged as soon as the court dealing with the criminal case against him allowed him to be transferred to an outside medical facility. 51. On 15 August 2009 the applicant was examined by the SIZO therapist. He was diagnosed with a urachal cyst, a ligature fistula, and category II hypertension. It was recommended that he continue with the prescribed outpatient treatment. 52. On 24 September 2009, during hearings at the Kyiv City Court of Appeal, an ambulance was called for the applicant. The ambulance team suggested that the applicant had peritonitis, and recommended that he be hospitalised urgently. According to the ambulance team report, the person in charge of the prison escort refused to allow him to be hospitalised. After the hearing, the applicant was taken back to the SIZO medical unit. He remained in that unit until 8 October 2009 and was treated for his navel fistula and inflammation of the navel. He received oral medication and antiseptic was applied to his navel area. 53. On 29 September 2009 the applicant was transported to the Emergency Hospital in connection with the constant pain in his abdomen. A duty surgeon and a supervising surgeon diagnosed him with omphalitis with a small amount of purulent discharge. The doctors did not prescribe any emergency operation, but recommended that bandages be applied, with Levomekol and Ceftriakson. On the same date the applicant was returned to the SIZO. 54. Between 24 September and 8 October 2009 the applicant remained in the SIZO medical unit, where he received the necessary treatment. He was discharged with a recommendation that his health be further monitored by the therapist and the surgeon of the SIZO medical unit. 55. On 30 October 2009 the Court granted the applicant’s request under Rule 39 of the Rules of the Court and indicated to the Government that he should be placed in a medical facility where he could receive appropriate medical treatment. 56. On 4 November 2009 the SIZO administration proposed to place the applicant in the Emergency Hospital. The applicant refused that proposal, explaining that he did not trust the Emergency Hospital’s doctors. An ambulance team which had been called for the applicant did not transfer him to the Emergency Hospital, but recommended that he see a surgeon. 57. On the same day V., one of the applicant’s lawyers, asked the SIZO administration to transfer the applicant to Public Hospital no. 6 for inpatient treatment in connection with his fistula. Another of the applicant’s lawyers, A., asked the SIZO to place the applicant in a private hospital. The applicant agreed to be placed in that hospital. Eventually, he was not placed in either of those hospitals. 58. On the same day the SIZO staff called an ambulance for the applicant. The ambulance team noted that the applicant did not require urgent hospitalisation, and recommended that he continue with the outpatient treatment in connection with his fistula. The applicant was then placed in the SIZO medical unit. 59. On 9 November and 16 November 2009, in reply to the requests of the applicant’s lawyers concerning his hospitalisation, the SIZO administration advised that it was not competent to decide on the applicant’s placement in an outside medical facility, and suggested that the lawyers should address the requests to the court dealing with the applicant’s case. 60. On 10 November 2009 the applicant was taken to Public Hospital no. 9 for an examination. The doctors recommended that he have an operation on his navel fistula. On the same date the applicant was returned to the SIZO. 61. On 24 November 2009 an ambulance doctor examined the applicant in the hearing room of the Kyiv City Court of Appeal in connection with the constant pain in his abdomen. The applicant was given treatment for his symptoms. 62. On 26 November 2009 an ambulance doctor examined the applicant in the SIZO in connection with the constant pain in his abdomen, and found that he did not require urgent hospitalisation. 63. On 27 November 2009 a surgeon from the Emergency Hospital examined the applicant and recommended that he continue with the outpatient treatment for his navel fistula. 64. On 4 December 2009, in the light of additional information from the respondent Government on the applicant’s state of health and the treatment provided to him in the SIZO, the Court decided to lift the interim measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (see paragraph 55 above). 65. In December 2009 the applicant lodged several requests with the SIZO administration, asking to be transferred to any medical facility in view of the serious deterioration in his state of health. 66. On 25 December 2009 the SIZO administration informed the applicant’s lawyer that the applicant did not require urgent hospitalisation in an outside medical facility and was receiving adequate medical treatment for his fistula in the SIZO. 67. On 18 January 2010 the applicant was placed in the surgery department of Buchanska Prison Hospital, diagnosed with a ligature fistula of the umbilical area. 68. On 20 January 2010 the applicant underwent an operation to remove the navel fistula. On 26 February 2010 he was discharged and sent back to the SIZO. 69. The Government did not provide information or supporting documents as to the treatment provided to the applicant after his discharge from the hospital. They submitted that the medical documentation for the period of time from 26 February 2010 onwards had been lost. 70. According to the applicant, the cells in which he was kept in the SIZO lacked natural light, and the electric light was dim and constantly on. The inmates slept on beds without mattresses or bed linen. 71. He added that the food was unsatisfactory in terms of quality and quantity, and the prisoners were given tea and bread in the morning, porridge in the afternoon and boiled water in the evening. 72. According to the applicant, he was not provided with food and water on hearing days, since Ukrainian legislation did not make provision for this. It was not possible to have meals or drinks at the courts dealing with his case.