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5. The applicant was born in 1944 and lives in Kłomnice. 6. The applicant is proprietor and editor-in-chief of the local weekly newspaper “Komu i Czemu”, published in the Radomsko and Bełchatów Districts. 7. In issue no. 33 of 18 August 2004 the applicant published an article entitled “Elegantly wrapped dung” (“Łajno – elegancko opakowane”). It read, in so far as relevant: “A poser is someone who does everything to produce external effects by his conduct, speech and, in particular, with the populism he preaches. He is a numbskull posing as the people’s tribune. The only panacea, or universal cure, for such a person is to recognise his intentions and take up a bloodless fight using arguments. An argument against any kind of tricks by a poser or populist will be always a counter‑argument based on reality, logic and the opportunity to put one’s intentions into practice. I remember when, not so long ago, the author of the proposal to develop a quail farm as a panacea against rural unemployment had a go at me in an accommodating local newspaper, accusing me of malice, a willingness to discredit every good idea, and mindlessness leading to nasty mental disease and many other irreversible disorders of the mind. At the same time he declared that he would continue doing his job, that is, condemning farmers to breeding nice little birds in order to collect their eggs. His boss considered the quail business very important, because it would eliminate the need for viagra. There has not been a sideshow like it in the Radomsko District for a long time. So the time is approaching when pilgrimages of men from all over Poland, and maybe even the European Union, will come to Radomsko to taste quail eggs and later begin procreating. I wonder who has gone mad in the district, and why mad ideas, supported by even madder arguments, can be accepted by our officials. But no matter. Every dull boss can be convinced by any rubbish. Once more I want to authoritatively and responsibly declare that neither quail breeding, nor mushroom growing, nor Eternit [a registered trademark for fibre cement], which suddenly seems to have dropped out of the picture, will solve the unemployment problem in the villages of our region. And I will continue calling the actions of dim-witted officials and their dull bosses pretentious and populist, and no numbskull will convince me that I am wrong. ...” 8. The applicant went on to describe in general terms a local economic development programme, which had been presented to him by a businessman. He finished his article with the following paragraph: “This is not a venture of the quail variety by some smart poser or populist who is able to sell his dull bosses dung nicely wrapped in words. And he actually sells it.” 9. On 8 March 2005 M.D., the mayor of the Radomsko District (starosta), G.D., the head and spokesperson of the district’s marketing department, and K.H., an employee of that department, lodged a private bill of indictment against the applicant with the Radomsko District Court. In respect of the impugned article, they accused him of defamation committed through the mass media under Article 212 § 2 of the Criminal Code. In particular, they alleged that the copious use of words such as “numbskull”, “dull boss”, “dim-witted official”, “poser” and “populist” (“palant”, “nierozgarnięty szef”, “przygłupawy urzędnik”, “pozer”, “populista”) had defamed them as local government officials. The statements had lowered them in public opinion and undermined the public confidence necessary for the discharge of their duties. 10. The private prosecutors sought an order requiring the applicant to publish an apology in the weekly newspaper. They further sought reimbursement of their legal costs and payment by the applicant of 5,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) to a charity. 11. The Radomsko District Court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction in the case, and transmitted the private bill of indictment to the Piotrków Trybunalski District Court. The trial court held two hearings. 12. On 8 February 2006 the Piotrków Trybunalski District Court gave its judgment. It held that the use of the words “numbskull”, “poser” and “dim‑witted official” in respect of K.H., and the use of the words “dull bosses” in respect of M.D. and G.D., had amounted to insult (zniewaga) committed through the mass media, within the meaning of Article 216 § 2 of the Criminal Code. The court convicted the applicant under that provision and ordered him to pay a fine of PLN 10,000 (approximately 2,630 euros (EUR)). It also ordered him to reimburse the private prosecutors’ costs (PLN 900, approximately EUR 236) and the costs of the State Treasury (PLN 1,000, approximately EUR 263). 13. As to the facts, the court observed that, since March 2004, the applicant’s newspaper had been publishing articles which were critical of M.D., the mayor of the Radomsko District, and his officials. The newspaper was particularly critical of K.H.’s initiative to develop quail farming in order to tackle the impoverishment of the local population. K.H. was an official in the district’s marketing department. G.D., the head of the marketing department, was also involved in the implementation of this project. In April 2004 the applicant had published an article in which he had made ironic remarks about K.H.’s initiative. In June 2004 a journalist at the same newspaper had published a detailed article on the same subject. The conflict between the applicant and the private prosecutors had intensified with each successively published article. 14. The court further noted that, in his article entitled “Elegantly wrapped dung”, the applicant had again written about the quail farming. Being aware of the publicity which the initiative promoted by K.H. and G.D. had received, the applicant had decided once again to mock the two officials, as well as their superior, M.D. He had referred to K.H., the author of the initiative, as a “poser”, “numbskull” and “dim-witted official”, while the idea of quail farming had been referred to as “nicely wrapped dung”. According to the applicant, this kind of “product” had been sold to “dull bosses”, that is, first G.D. and then M.D., the mayor of the district. 15. The trial court rejected the applicant’s argument that the impugned article had been a simple weekly column in which any similarity to actual persons had been purely coincidental. It found that the article in issue had been part of a campaign carried out by the newspaper against the private prosecutors. They had not been mentioned by name, but they had been easily identifiable on account of the publicity generated by the quail farming project and the earlier articles published by the applicant’s newspaper. The court established that there was no doubt that the words “numbskull”, “dim‑witted official” and “poser” had referred to K.H., and the term “dull bosses” to M.D. and G.D. 16. With regard to the applicant’s criminal responsibility, the trial court noted that a journalist had the right to criticise the actions of public officials, but was not entitled to use media in a manipulative way to wage private wars. The latter behaviour was not only unethical and unprofessional, but also incompatible with the role of the media, which was to serve the State and society. The trial court further held: “The fair criticism and objective coverage, free from personal emotions, which is desired in journalism, gave way to the private interest of the defendant, pursued through expressions which, in common understanding, remain offensive and disrespectful. It is difficult not to agree with the position that the word “numbskull” (“palant”) in the analysed context, although its literal meaning is legally irrelevant, fulfils all the criteria of insult within the meaning of Article 216 of the Criminal Code. Of an equally offensive character are the terms “poser”, “dim-witted official” and “dull boss”. It would be hard to find a person who would not feel offended by similar epithets, especially if formulated in the press. Incidentally, it should also be noted that the word “dung” used in the title of the article has a cruder equivalent, and undoubtedly that equivalent was meant to describe K.H.’s contribution to the development of local entrepreneurship, which was accepted without reservation by his “dull bosses”. “Dull” meaning not sharp, unintelligent, intellectually retarded. However, the court found no grounds to hold that the impugned words had the effect of lowering the private prosecutors in public esteem, or undermining the public confidence necessary for the discharge of their duties as local government officials. Accordingly, it would not be justified to classify the applicant’s acts as coming under Article 212 § 2 of the Criminal Code. The quoted statements were rather harmful to the private prosecutors’ perception of their dignity, and such, in the court’s view, was the defendant’s intention. By using insulting words in respect of the district officials, Maciej Ziembiński intended to derive satisfaction from doing them moral harm. By doing so in a newspaper, he fell within the scope of Article 216 § 2 of the Criminal Code, acting unlawfully, reprehensibly, and, in the absence of circumstances capable of precluding or mitigating his guilt, also culpably.” 17. The trial court noted that the present case involved a conflict between constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech and the right of each citizen to have his reputation protected. However, it found that the applicant’s acts had constituted a blatant abuse of freedom of speech and professional ethics. The court observed that his acts and motivation had been reprehensible, since he had been settling a private conflict with the officials and transgressing basic professional standards. 18. As regards sentence, the court found that, having regard to the circumstances of the case, it would be disproportionate to impose a prison sentence, and that a fine would be the most appropriate penalty. It imposed a fine of PLN 10,000, which it considered proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of the applicant’s guilt. 19. The applicant appealed. He contested the factual findings of the first‑instance court, in particular that his article had concerned the private prosecutors personally. He argued that the impugned article had presented in a sarcastic light people who achieved personal gain by pretending to work, and their dull bosses who accepted such practices. The applicant emphasised that criticism of the quail farm project as a solution to a decline in agriculture in the region had been entirely legitimate. Lastly, he submitted that public figures such as M.D., the district mayor, and other officials had to accept harsh criticism of their activities. 20. On 18 April 2006 the Piotrków Trybunalski Regional Court (“the Regional Court”) upheld the first-instance judgment. It ordered the applicant to pay PLN 1,000 (approx. EUR 256) in respect of the costs of the appeal proceedings. 21. The Regional Court held that the lower court had correctly established the facts of the case. It endorsed the trial court’s findings that the words used in the article had been insulting and harmful to the private prosecutors’ dignity. It further held that, although fair criticism of public authorities and officials was socially desirable and legally accepted, the protection afforded by law did not extend to the use of insulting words which offended human dignity. 22. The judgment was served on the applicant on 29 May 2006.

4. The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Barnaul. 5. In 2001 he became a suspect and then an accused in a criminal case concerning fraud. During the investigation of the criminal case the applicant was under a written undertaking not to leave his place of residence. 6. In March 2003 the prosecutor referred the criminal case to the Industrialnyy District Court of Barnaul (“the District Court”) for trial. 7. On 19 September 2003 the District Court ordered the applicant’s detention pending trial following the complaints by one of the victims and a witness about threats expressed by the applicant in their respect. 8. On 22 September 2003 the applicant’s representatives lodged a cassation appeal against the detention order of 19 September 2003 with the Regional Court via the District Court. 9. On 6 October 2003 the District Court forwarded that appeal to the Regional Court and set its examination on 27 November 2003. 10. On 8 October 2003 the District Court forwarded a copy of the applicant’s appeal to other participants of the criminal proceedings and informed them that they had until 22 October 2003 to submit their comments, if any. 11. On 22 October 2003 victim Shch. submitted her comments on the applicant’s grounds of appeal. 12. On 19 November 2003 the Regional Court received all materials related to the applicant’s appeal against the detention order of 19 September 2003. 13. On 27 November 2003 the Regional Court examined and rejected the applicant’s appeal. 14. The District Court subsequently extended the applicant’s detention on several occasions. 15. On 30 September 2004 the applicant was released under a written undertaking. 16. On 13 December 2005 the District Court found the applicant guilty of fraud and sentenced him to two years’ imprisonment. 17. On 18 May 2006 the Regional Court upheld the applicant’s conviction.

5. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Voronezh. 6. On 7 March 2008 the applicant was arrested and brought to the Tsentralniy district police station, Voronezh (Отдел внутренних дел Центрального района г. Воронежа, “the Tsentralniy OVD”) for having employed offensive language in public. He submitted that after the interview the policemen had ill-treated him. In particular, they had handcuffed his hands behind his back, lifted the handcuffs so that he could only stand on his toes, attached the handcuffs to metal bars and administered several blows to the applicant’s face and chest. A few hours later, the applicant was released. 7. On 8 March 2008 the applicant paid a visit to Voronezh Town Clinical Hospital no. 2 (“the town hospital”). A bruise on the left side of his chest was noted during the examination carried out by a doctor there. 8. On 10 March 2008 the applicant was examined by the Voronezh regional forensic bureau which in addition detected bruises on the applicant’s right eye and right wrist, and scratches on the left of his forehead and both wrists, inflicted by a blunt hard object. The report reflected the timing of these injuries as “one to three days prior”, “possibly 7 March 2008, as argued by [the applicant]”. It further concluded that the injuries in question did not entail any permanent damage to health or disability. 9. On 11 March 2008 the applicant visited local polyclinic no. 4, which diagnosed him as having developed periarthritis as a result of trauma of the wrist joints. 10. On 19 March 2008 the applicant lodged an application with the Tsentralniy district investigation department of the investigative committee at the Voronezh regional prosecutor’s office (Следственный отдел по Центральному району г. Воронежа Cледственного управления Следственного комитета при прокуратуре Российской Федерации по Воронежской области, “the district investigation department”) requesting that criminal proceedings be instituted against the police officers who had ill-treated him at the Tsentralniy OVD on 7 March 2008. 11. On 23 March 2008 an investigator of the district investigation department rejected the applicant’s request as unfounded for lack evidence of a crime. 12. On 24 April 2008 the above decision was set aside by the deputy head of the district investigation department as unfounded, and the case file material was referred for an additional pre-investigation inquiry. 13. Thereafter the applicant’s request was repeatedly rejected and re‑examined. The respective decisions to reject the request were taken by the investigator of the district investigation department on 1 October, 5 November, 11 December 2008 and 13 August 2009 on the basis of: - the applicant’s statements; - the forensic medical report of 10 March 2008 (see paragraph 8 above) and the additional forensic medical report of 1 October 2008, which confirmed the conclusions of the initial report; - the statements of Mr P.M., the applicant’s father, who submitted that on 7 March 2008 at about 9.30 p.m. the applicant’s friends had brought his son from the Tsentralniy OVD, that the applicant had had bruises and had been in shock and had told him that he had been subjected to ill-treatment by the police; - the statements of Ms T.D., a friend of the applicant, who submitted that she had picked the applicant up from the Tsentralniy OVD on 7 March 2008 at about 10 p.m., that the applicant had had no visible injuries and told her that the police officers had ill-treated him by forcing him into a stress position known as “the swallow” (ласточка); - the statements of Ms A.M., the applicant’s wife, who submitted that the applicant had arrived home on 7 March 2008 at approximately 11.55 p.m., that he had had abrasions on his wrists and a black eye, and that he had told her that the police had beaten him up, handcuffed his hands behind his back and suspended him from a metal bar by handcuffs; - the statements of Ms Z.K, the applicant’s mother-in-law, who submitted that she had picked up the applicant’s belongings at the Tsentralniy OVD on 7 March 2008 and had not seen the applicant committing any unlawful acts or police officers applying physical force to the applicant; - the report by police officer V.V., who submitted that on 7 March 2008 at about 6.10 p.m. he and police officer S.S. had apprehended the applicant for having employed offensive language in public; - the statements of officers V.V. and S.S. who denied having applied physical force to the applicant; - the statements of police officer P.A., who submitted that on 7 March 2008 at about 7.00 p.m. the applicant was brought to the Tsentralniy OVD; he had had no visible injuries and had been behaving calmly, and no physical force or measures of restraint had been applied to him; - the statements of police officers S.Sh. and M.V., who had been on duty on 7 March 2008, who submitted that they had had no information about the applicant’s arrest, and that they had not seen physical force or measures of restraint being applied to any of the persons brought to the Tsentralniy OVD on that date; - the statements of several persons who had been detained at the Tsentralniy OVD at the same time as the applicant, who submitted that they had not seen or heard that any unlawful measures had been applied to the applicant by the police officers. 14. All of the above decisions refusing the institution of criminal proceedings against the police officers were subsequently set aside by the deputy head of the district investigation department as unfounded, and an additional pre-investigation inquiry was ordered. 15. On 19 May and 28 October 2008, and 10 August 2009 the Tsentralniy District Court, Voronezh, discontinued the proceedings by which the applicant sought to challenge the lawfulness of the decisions of 23 March, 1 October and 11 December 2008 respectively, refusing to open a criminal case against the police officers as in the meantime the above decisions had been set aside. 16. After the application was communicated to the Russian Government, on 23 March 2011 the district investigation department instituted criminal proceedings under Article 286 § 3 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. 17. On an unspecified date in the end of March 2011 the applicant was questioned as a victim. 18. On an unspecified date in April 2011 the investigator appointed a doctor to carry out a forensic medical examination. 19. On 6 June 2011 the applicant participated in an onsite verification of his statements and in an identity parade of the police officers. Police officers V.V. and S.P. of the Tsentralniy OVD were presented for identification; however, none were recognised by the applicant. 20. On 25 July 2011 the investigation was suspended on the grounds that it was impossible to identify the alleged perpetrators.

5. The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Ossès. 6. On 17 January 2008 he attended a rally organised by a Basque agricultural trade union and by the GFAM (a mutual-benefit land alliance), the “Lurra”, on the occasion of a meeting of the Technical Committee of the Land Use and Rural Settlement Corporation (SAFER) in the Pyrénées-Atlantiques Département. That meeting had been aimed at producing an opinion on the use of the land comprising a farm which Mr F.L. had been operating for several years. The rally was held in a political and trade-union situation where tensions had been heightened by the fact that the majority agricultural union in the Département was backing candidates other than Mr F.L. At the end of the meeting scuffles broke out between the demonstrators and the gendarmerie. 7. The applicant was placed in police custody and brought before the Bayonne Criminal Court under “immediate summary trial” procedure, and charged with intentional violence not entailing total unfitness for work, against gendarmes whose identity has not been established, and against a person exercising public authority, using or threatening to use a weapon, in this instance an umbrella. 8. By judgment of 13 March 2008, the applicant was sentenced to two months’ imprisonment, suspended, for having struck gendarmes with an umbrella, which incident had not entailed unfitness for work on the latter’s part. In its judgment, the court noted that the applicant had refused to answer questions during the investigation or to admit to any wrongdoing, and had denied that he had been carrying an umbrella. The judges noted that witnesses had nevertheless stated that he had attempted to cross the barrier by clambering over demonstrators and trying to hit the gendarmes with his umbrella. The applicant pointed out that he had refrained from appealing in order to calm the situation and in the framework of a friendly settlement of the dispute that had been the cause of the rally. 9. On 24 December 2008, following a request from the Bayonne Public Prosecutor’s Office, the applicant was ordered by the police to give a DNA sample, on the basis of Articles 706-55 and 706-56 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CPP). He was brought before the Criminal Court on 19 May 2009 for refusing to give the sample. 10. By judgment of 27 October 2009, the Bayonne Regional Court imposed on the applicant a fine of five hundred euros. 11. On 3 February 2011 the Pau Court of Appeal upheld that judgment. As regards the legal aspect of the offence, it stated, in particular, that unlike the applicants in the case of S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom ([GC], nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04, ECHR 2008), the applicant had been convicted, rather than suspected, of an offence, which precluded him from arguing that the impugned judgment had entailed a disproportionate interference with his private life. Relying, in particular, on the 16 September 2010 decision of the Constitutional Council (see paragraph 16 below), it held that “the provisions of national law applied [to the applicant] were such as to reconcile respect for private life and the protection of public order in a manner that was neither manifestly unbalanced nor in breach of the requirements of Article 8 of the Convention”. In connection with the substantive aspect of the offence, the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s plea that a sample had already been taken from his headgear during his police custody and that he was entitled to refuse further sampling, given that there had been no DNA profiling the first time. 12. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. His first plea was that the sample geared to identifying his DNA and storing the corresponding data amounted to a disproportionate interference with his private life, having regard to the duration of the data storage and his personal situation (an easily identifiable person who was socially well-established, with a job, a family and a fixed abode). In his second plea, he argued that the Court of Appeal had provided no reasons for its decision in connection with the substantive aspect of the offence. 13. By judgment of 28 September 2011, the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law as follows: “... the Court of Appeal responded adequately and cogently to the main points of the pleadings submitted to it, and characterised all the substantive and purposive aspects of the offence of refusing to undergo a biological test, of which it found the defendant guilty, in full compliance with the provisions of Article 8 of the Convention.”

4. The applicant was born in 1977 and is currently serving a sentence in a correctional colony in the Tambov Region. 5. On 17 July 2007 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of robbery. On the following day the Meshchanskiy District Court of Moscow authorised his detention. 6. On 6 September 2007 the Taganskiy District Court extended the detention. That detention order was upheld on appeal on 22 October 2007 by the Moscow City Court. 7. Another extensions of detention followed on 16 October 2007 and 11 December 2007. The applicant appealed against both detention orders. 8. On 17 January 2008 the applicant was convicted as charged and sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment. The conviction became final on 19 March 2008. 9. On 2 July 2008, in reply to the applicant’s complaint about the failure to examine his appeal, the City Court informed him that his appeal against the detention order of 16 October 2007 was not received by the City Court. However, by a letter of 22 August 2008 the City Court forwarded the applicant’s appeal statement lodged on 17 October 2007 to the District Court, requiring it to perform procedural steps necessary to initiate the appeal proceedings. The City Court also informed the applicant that his appeal complaint of 17 October 2007 was mistakenly attached to another case-file. 10. No further information on organisation of the appeal hearing against the detention order of 16 October 2007 was provided.

6. The applicant was born in 1978 and until his arrest lived in Krasnoyarsk. He is currently serving a sentence in a correctional colony in the Krasnoyarsk Region. 7. On 13 December 2005 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of aggravated kidnapping, murder, fraud and conspiracy. 8. On 27 December 2007 the Krasnoyarsk Regional Court found him guilty as charged and sentenced him to twenty-four years and eleven months’ imprisonment. The first seven years were to be served in a prison and the remaining term in a high-security correctional colony. 9. On 24 December 2008 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld his conviction and sentence on appeal. 10. The parties provided the Court with the applicant’s medical documents, including clinical records, discharge summaries and expert reports. Parts of the clinical records drawn up during his detention and submitted to the Court by the Government are illegible. 11. On several occasions before his arrest the applicant underwent inpatient and outpatient treatment in civilian hospitals. Between 1999 and 2001 he was treated for cerebral concussion, cerebral contusion, vertebral contusion, knee pain and a duodenal ulcer. 12. After his arrest on 13 December 2005 the applicant was taken to a police detention facility in Krasnoyarsk. Two days later he was transferred to remand prison no. 24/1 (“the remand prison”), also in Krasnoyarsk, where resident doctors carried out a general check-up, noting in the medical file that he had sustained a brain injury and suffered from a duodenal ulcer. The doctors found him fit for detention, noting that detention in northerly regions should be avoided. 13. According to the applicant, in 2005 and in 2006 he complained to the prison doctor about various health problems, including stomach pain, but his complaints remained unnoticed by the authorities. His medical records for the period between 2005 and 2007 did not contain any entries regarding his complaints, medical examinations or treatment in that period. 14. On 16 June 2007 the prison doctor saw the applicant after he complained of stomach pain and deteriorating eyesight. He diagnosed the applicant with a duodenal ulcer in the acute phase and myopia, but did not prescribe any treatment. He noted that a specific endoscopy was to be performed. 15. On 19 July and 13 and 16 August 2007 the trial court adjourned its hearings in the applicant’s case as he did not feel well and had complained of severe stomach pain. The court asked the detention authorities to submit detailed information on his actual state of health. 16. In August 2007 the applicant received injections of drotaverine allegedly provided by his mother, a retired doctor, to relieve his stomach pain. On 21 August 2007, at a court’s request, a deputy head of the prison medical ward examined the applicant and observed that he was receiving treatment for an acute duodenal ulcer. In addition, he noted that the applicant was to be transported to Regional Tuberculosis Hospital no. 1 (“the prison hospital”) for the fibrogastroduodenoscopy ordered in June 2007. 17. On 19 October 2007 the applicant was taken to the prison hospital. Multiple tests performed there led to him being diagnosed with first-stage myopia, a duodenal ulcer in remission and duodenitis associated with cicatricial deformation of the duodenum bulb. Omeprazole was prescribed. Insofar as the submitted medical records could be deciphered, the applicant did not receive the prescribed treatment. 18. In March 2009 the applicant was transported to the prison hospital for the second time. This time the doctors prescribed him medication for his myopia and neurological symptoms resulting from the trauma in 1999. The medical records did not contain any information on the actual intake of drugs by the applicant. 19. In October 2009 the applicant’s stomach pain came back. A fibrogastroduodenoscopy showed that he suffered from duodenitis with cicatricial deformation of the duodenum bulb and antral gastritis. The resident doctor saw him in October 2009 and January 2010, prescribing him drug treatment and a special diet. The applicant’s medical records do not contain any information indicating that the doctor’s recommendations were followed. 20. On 19 March 2010 the applicant underwent an in-depth medical examination in the prison hospital. It showed that in addition to his peptic problems, erosive duodenitis and antral gastritis, the applicant had developed first-stage sensorineural hearing loss and his myopia had progressed slightly. A drug programme and special diet were recommended. According to the applicant, the recommendation was not followed by the authorities. His medical documents contain no entries in this regard. 21. In early April 2010 the court had to adjourn several hearings in the applicant’s criminal case owing to his severe stomach pain. It ordered the detention authorities to provide him with anti-ulcer treatment. At the end of that month the applicant was examined in a civilian hospital, which diagnosed him with an aggravated ulcer and acute gastritis. Inpatient treatment was prescribed. The authorities did not admit him for it. 22. The next recurrence of the applicant’s ulcer occurred in autumn 2010. According to the medical records, the applicant did not receive any drugs at that time. An examination on 21 December 2010 showed that his ulcer had grown and the duodenitis and gastric disease had progressed further. A civilian doctor who visited him recommended inpatient treatment, but he remained in the remand prison. The resident doctor prescribed drug treatment in December 2010 and January and March 2011. However, the medical records contain no information concerning the actual provision of the prescribed drugs to the applicant. According to him, only one of the drugs was made available to him. His mother sent him the required drugs in June 2011 to enable him to receive at least some relief. 23. A new acute stomach pain attack occurred in December 2011. The applicant was immediately taken to the prison hospital for an X-ray examination and a surgical consultation. The surgeon concluded that the applicant’s condition did not call for surgery. Over the next few days the applicant was diagnosed with duodenitis and recurring acute gastritis which had passed to the chronic stage. Drug treatment was prescribed, but the Court was not given any records showing that he actually received it. 24. In the meantime the applicant started complaining of mild knee pain and impeded nasal breathing allegedly caused by a broken nose in 2006 while in detention on remand. He stated that he had received some medication for knee pain, but had not undergone any septal surgery. 25. In the beginning of 2012 the applicant underwent a magnetic resonance imaging scan of the brain and spine in a civilian hospital. He paid for the scan himself, which revealed the presence of Schmorl’s nodes, protruded discs, spondylarthrosis and a haemangioma in one of the spinal discs. It also indicated moderate changes within local tissue associated with a cerebrospinal fluid cyst in the arachnoid membrane of the brain. These diagnoses were confirmed by the prison doctor, who found that the applicant’s condition did not call for surgical treatment. 26. The applicant was sent to a prison to serve his sentence. 27. On 23 October 2012 the applicant arrived at the prison in Minusinsk in the Krasnoyarsk Region (“the prison”). On admission he was seen by a prison doctor, who considered him to be in satisfactory health. He was included on a list of detainees subject to regular medical check-ups and enhanced medical attention. 28. The next day he was diagnosed with acute gastritis and degenerative disc disease. He was prescribed a fibrogastroduodenoscopy and several drugs, including nonsteroidal anti‑inflammatory medication and medication to treat his gastritis. He refused to comply with the doctors’ recommendations pertaining to the endoscopy and anti-inflammatory drugs, insisting that they would lead to a further deterioration of his ulcer. He nevertheless took the medication prescribed for gastritis treatment. According to the medical records, the ulcer treatment continued for the following few months. 29. In the meantime, an independent medical specialist and neurologist, Dr M., assessed the applicant’s health and prepared a report on 5 November 2012. It stated that he should be admitted to a neurological or neurosurgical medical facility, where his spinal problems could be treated with nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory medication, neuromuscular blocking agents and painkillers. The doctor gave detailed recommendations concerning the applicant’s treatment. 30. On 29 November 2012 the prison doctor prescribed the applicant vitamin injections and pain-relief ointment to treat his spinal problems. Several days later the doctor authorised an additional hour’s rest from physical activity and prescribed nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory medication, spasm relief analgesics and omeprazole for his peptic problems. 31. In the absence of any positive developments, in January 2013 the doctor amended the spinal treatment and introduced a stronger anti‑inflammatory drug. 32. In March 2013 the applicant was transferred to the prison hospital. Tests showed that his conditions had not progressed. The gastritis and duodenal ulcer were in remission. The applicant was prescribed omeprazole and sucralfate-based medication. According to an entry made in his medical history on 26 March 2013, his attending doctor recommended testing for the bacteria Нelicobacter pylori (“H.pylori”). The test was never performed. 33. After the applicant’s return to the prison his treatment continued in line with the recommendations of the prison hospital doctors. He received meloxicam and omeprazole. However, in May 2013 his duodenal ulcer again worsened. The acute phase lasted about two months. 34. On 17 July 2013 the applicant was examined by a number of medical specialists from a mobile prison hospital. He was diagnosed with a duodenal ulcer in remission, chronic gastritis, erosive duodenitis, osteoarthritis of the left knee, Raynaud’s syndrome, degenerative disc disease, acute back pain and second-stage myopia. He was prescribed drug treatment. The records do not indicate that he received all of the prescribed medications. 35. On 7 August 2013 the prison authorities received a parcel of medication from the applicant’s mother. He was treated with those drugs until 30 August 2013, when he was sent to a correctional colony. 36. On 11 September 2013 the applicant arrived at correctional colony no. 288/17 in Krasnoyarsk. He complained to the resident doctor of nausea and was diagnosed with an ulcer and degenerative disc disease. He was put on a list of detainees for close medical supervision. The doctor noted that the applicant required anti-recurrence ulcer treatment and in-depth examinations every six months, recording that it was necessary for him to be placed on a special diet when the ulcer recurred. 37. On 18 September 2013 the applicant was seen by doctors from the mobile prison hospital and underwent a fibrogastroduodenoscopy. It revealed that he had antral gastritis. According to him, his mother bought him medication for the ulcer treatment and sent it to the correctional colony. 38. In November 2013 the applicant had another severe attack of stomach and back pain. The prison doctor prescribed him drugs, injections of painkillers and vitamins. According to the Government, he refused to take one of the drugs, a nonsteroidal anti‑inflammatory. He disputed that allegation. 39. On 30 August 2013 the applicant filed a complaint against the prison administration, arguing that his treatment fell short of the requirements of Russian law. He stressed that the authorities had failed to properly treat his conditions. 40. On 16 October 2013 the Minusinsk Town Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint, finding that the authorities had provided him with adequate treatment. According to the court, he was regularly seen by a doctor and prescribed medication, including anti-inflammatory drugs and painkillers. They were given to the applicant as prescribed. His condition remained stable between 23 October 2012 and 30 August 2013. 41. On 17 March 2014 the Krasnoyarsk Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal.

4. The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Blagoevgrad. 5. He had been employed by the National Security Service, at the Regional Office of Blagoevgrad, as an agent since 1998. On account of the nature of his duties, he had held a security clearance permitting him access to classified information constituting State secrets. According to the applicant’s job description, being in a possession of such a security clearance had been a prerequisite to him holding his post. 6. On 20 November 2013, the Director of the National Security Service issued a decision to revoke the applicant’s security clearance allowing access to classified information. The decision did not contain any reasoning in respect of that revocation, apart from a reference to section 59, in relation with section 40 § 1 f) and h); section 41 c) and d), and section 42 a) and b) of the Classified Information Protection Act (see paragraphs 12 and 13 below). 7. The applicant lodged an appeal against the revocation with the State Commission for Information Security. The latter, by a decision of 9 January 2014, upheld the revocation. That decision was final and not amenable to judicial review. 8. On 6 March 2014, the Director of the National Security Service ordered that the applicant be dismissed. The reason given for the termination of his employment was the revocation of his security clearance, possession of which was an indispensable precondition for him to be able to perform his duties. 9. The applicant challenged his dismissal at two levels of jurisdiction. He contested the lawfulness of the dismissal procedure, arguing that he was not able to challenge, in the course of the procedure before the State Commission for Information Security, the facts on which the revocation of the security clearance permit was based. The Director of the National Security Service abused his powers in dismissing the applicant, who was not allowed an opportunity to defend himself. 10. By its judgment of 19 March 2015, the Blagoevgrad Administrative Court rejected the applicant’s claims, reasoning that the decision of the Director of the National Security Service to revoke the applicant’s security clearance was a final and valid administrative act, and it rendered the applicant’s dismissal inevitable because he was no longer able to perform his duties. The court added that the applicant had exhausted the remedy provided by law by challenging the revocation decision, and that the latter had become final; in addition, the court was not competent to examine, within the framework of the dismissal proceedings, any questions related to its lawfulness. 11. On 11 July 2016, the Supreme Court of Cassation upheld that judgment, confirming that the decision to revoke the applicant’s security clearance was not amenable to judicial review.

5. The applicant company is a private company that was set up in 2007 and has its registered office in Yerevan. 6. On 7 May 2007 the applicant company and company S. concluded a contract, under which the applicant company had to carry out construction work on the premises of company H. 7. On 18 January 2008 the applicant company initiated compensation proceedings against company S. in the Yerevan Civil Court (“the Civil Court”), arguing that it had completed the construction work as required by the contract of 7 May 2007, but company S. had failed to make full payment for the work. 8. On 21 January 2008 the Civil Court admitted the applicant company’s claim. 9. On 20 February 2008 the Civil Court ordered a forensic technical examination of the construction work which the applicant company had carried out on the premises of company H., and stayed the proceedings. The examination was assigned to the Bureau of Forensic Examinations under the Ministry of Justice (“the Bureau”). In particular, the court ordered the experts to measure the surface area of the construction work and assess the quality of the construction work carried out. 10. On 11 March 2008 the expert in charge of conducting the forensic examination filed a letter with the Civil Court, stating that it was necessary for the Civil Court to ensure his access to the premises of company H. for the purposes of the examination, as that company was not a party to the civil proceedings. 11. On 4 April 2008 the Civil Court resumed the proceedings and summoned company H. to the proceedings as a third party. 12. On 15 May 2008 the Civil Court ordered a forensic technical examination of the construction work on the premises of company H., and again stayed the proceedings. 13. On 28 October 2008 the expert concluded that, owing to the lack of opportunity to access the premises of company H., it had not been possible to carry out the forensic examination ordered by the Civil Court on 15 May 2008. 14. On 19 November 2008 the Civil Court resumed the proceedings. 15. On 19 February 2009 the Civil Court granted the applicant company’s claim. 16. On 27 February 2009, due to reorganisation of the judiciary, the Civil Court decided to transfer the case to the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan. 17. On 4 March 2009 company S. appealed against the judgment of 19 February 2009. 18. On 23 April 2009 the Civil Court of Appeal quashed that judgment and remitted the case, reasoning, inter alia, that in the absence of an expert opinion on the questions posed by the Civil Court as regards the disputed construction work, that judgment was unfounded. 19. On 29 July 2009 the Shengavit District Court of Yerevan (“the District Court”) took over the applicant company’s case. 20. On 26 August 2009 the District Court ordered a forensic technical examination of the construction work on the premises of company H., and stayed the proceedings. 21. On 31 May 2010 the expert concluded that, owing to the lack of opportunity to access the premises of company H., it had not been possible to carry out the forensic examination ordered by the District Court on 26 August 2009. 22. On 7 June 2010 the District Court resumed the proceedings. 23. On 16 July 2010 the District Court ordered a forensic technical examination of the construction work on the premises of company H., and stayed the proceedings. The court ordered that the forensic examination be carried out with the help of the Department for the Enforcement of Judicial Acts (“the DEJA”). It is unclear what the outcome of that order was. 24. On 21 June 2012 the expert concluded that, owing to the lack of access to the premises of company H., it had not been possible to carry out the forensic examination ordered by the District Court on 16 July 2010. 25. On 27 June 2012 the District Court resumed the proceedings. 26. On 3 October 2012 the applicant company filed additional submissions with the District Court. 27. On the same date the District Court ordered a forensic technical examination of the construction work on the premises of company H., and stayed the proceedings. 28. On 25 November and 24 December 2014 the applicant company submitted a letter to the Bureau, enquiring about the progress of the examination ordered by the District Court. 29. On 27 December 2014 the Bureau responded by stating that the examination which had been ordered had not been carried out due to the lack of an expert in the relevant field. The Bureau also noted that it had already recruited and trained relevant experts, and the examination was expected to be carried out in January 2015. 30. On 28 February 2015 the applicant company submitted another letter to the Bureau, reminding it that the examination had not yet been carried out and informing it about the delay that the lack of an expert examination had caused in the civil proceedings. 31. On 5 May 2015 the applicant company submitted a letter to the Ministry of Justice, complaining about the delay in the civil proceedings and requesting that it take measures to expedite them. 32. On 20 May 2015 the Minister of Justice responded by stating that even though it would take one day to carry out the expert examination and approximately five days to complete the report, the examination had not been carried out for reasons such as the lack of an expert in the Bureau, the expert’s inability to access the premises of company H., the excessive workload in the Bureau, and so on. The Minister concluded by stating that the examination could be carried out by the Bureau, provided that the expert was granted access to the premises concerned. 33. On 30 June 2015, apparently after performing the technical examination, the Bureau sent the relevant expert opinion to the District Court. 34. On 9 July 2015 the District Court resumed the proceedings. 35. The District Court held a number of hearings in 2015 and 2016, and on 9 June and 2 August 2016 it also decided to conduct a new examination of the case. 36. On 10 October 2016 the District Court granted the applicant company’s claim in part. 37. On 15 December 2016 company S. appealed against that judgment. 38. On 23 March 2017 the Civil Court of Appeal rejected the appeal and upheld the contested judgment. 39. No appeal on points of law was lodged against the decision of 23 March 2017, which became final.

5. The applicant was born in Syria in 1963. He currently lives in Ilidža, Sarajevo Canton. 6. In 1983 the applicant went to the then Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to pursue his studies. He first studied at Belgrade University, in Serbia, and then at Rijeka University, in Croatia. 7. It would appear that the last time the applicant was in Syria was in January 1993. He stayed for one month and obtained a new Syrian passport. 8. In 1993, having returned from Syria, the applicant met a refugee from Bosnia and Herzegovina (“BH”) in Croatia. They were married in a Muslim wedding ceremony in 1993 and then in a civil ceremony in 1995. They have three children together, born in 1994, 1997 and 1999. 9. During the 1992-95 war the applicant was a member of the El Mujahedin unit which had been organised as a unit within the local forces of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“the ARBH”) in August 1993 (for more information about foreign mujahedin in BH see Al Husin v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, no. 3727/08, §§ 8-14, 7 February 2012). On an unknown date the applicant obtained BH citizenship. 10. Article III of Annex 1A to the Dayton Peace Agreement called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces (including individual advisors, freedom fighters, trainers, volunteers and personnel) from neighbouring and other States, irrespective of whether they were legally and militarily subordinated to any of the local forces. Accordingly, on 14 December 1995 the ARBH disbanded the El Mujahedin unit and ordered its foreign members to leave the country by 10 January 1996. Whereas most of the unit’s foreign members left BH, some of them (such as the present applicant) applied for BH citizenship and continued to live in BH. After the attacks in the United States of 11 September 2001, the official attitude towards foreign mujahedin changed. Many lost their BH citizenship or were deported from BH after being declared a threat to national security. 11. In the immediate aftermath of the 1992-95 war, the applicant acted as the leader of a group of foreign mujahedin and their local supporters based in Donja Bočinja, a village in central BH. The group advocated the Saudi-inspired Wahhabi/Salafi version of Islam. In his role as the group’s leader, the applicant interrogated two local Serbs for a couple of hours in 1998. This led to his conviction for unlawful deprivation of liberty in May 2000 and a suspended prison sentence. 12. On 5 April 2007 the applicant’s BH citizenship was revoked, as a result of which he became unlawfully resident in BH. The authorities held that he had acquired BH citizenship by means of fraudulent conduct, false information and the concealment of relevant facts. 13. On 6 October 2008 the applicant was placed in an immigration centre on security grounds, pursuant to section 99(2)(b) of the 2008 Aliens Act, because it had been established that he posed a threat to national security. 14. Following the dismissal of an asylum claim lodged by the applicant, the Aliens Service issued a deportation order in respect of him on 1 February 2011. It was decided to expel the applicant and to prohibit his re-entry to BH for five years. On 2 March 2011 and 29 November 2011, following appeals by the applicant, the Ministry of Security and the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“the State Court”), respectively, upheld that decision. Thereafter the applicant was detained with a view to his deportation, pursuant to section 99(1)(a) of the 2008 Aliens Act. 15. On 29 December 2011 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal with the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“the Constitutional Court”) against the decisions of the Aliens Service, the Ministry of Security and the State Court of 1 February 2011, 2 March 2011 and 29 November 2011, respectively (see paragraph 14 above). The applicant invoked Articles 2, 3, 5 and 8 of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention. The Constitutional Court gave a decision on 30 October 2012 (see paragraph 20 below). 16. On 22 January 2008 the applicant lodged his first application with the Court (see Al Husin, cited above), complaining, in particular, that his deportation to Syria would expose him to the risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention and that his detention amounted to a breach of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. On 15 March 2011, after a deportation order against the applicant had been issued and become final (see paragraph 14 above), the Court decided, in the interests of the parties and the proper conduct of the proceedings, to indicate to the Government that the applicant should not be expelled to Syria until further notice (Rule 39 of the Rules of Court). 17. In a judgment of 7 February 2012 the Court held that there would be a violation of Article 3 in the event of the applicant’s deportation to Syria (see Al Husin, cited above, § 54). The Court considered that the indication made to the Government under Rule 39 should remain in force until the above-mentioned judgment became final or until the Court took a further decision in that connection (ibid., § 92). The Court furthermore found a violation of Article 5 § 1 with regard to the period of the applicant’s detention from 6 October 2008 until 31 January 2011 because during that time he had been detained without a deportation order having been issued against him (ibid., §§ 62-66; see also paragraph 14 above). As regards his detention from 1 February 2011 onwards, the Court found that there had been no violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention (ibid., §§ 67-69). That judgment became final on 9 July 2012. 18. On 6 March 2012 the Appeals Chamber of the State Court reversed the State Court’s judgment of 29 November 2011, quashed the decisions of 1 February 2011 and 2 March 2011 (see paragraph 14 above) and remitted the case to the Aliens Service for reconsideration. The Appeals Chamber held that the administrative authorities and the State Court had failed to take into account the situation in the country of the applicant’s origin and the potential violations of his rights under Article 3 and 5 of the Convention in the event of his deportation to Syria. 19. On 15 March 2012 the Aliens Service issued a new deportation order in respect of the applicant, which prohibited his re-entry into BH for five years. The order furthermore stated that once the applicant had become subject to expulsion, in the event that he failed to voluntarily leave the country, an additional “removal directions” (zaključak o dozvoli izvršenja) order would be issued specifying a destination country and the manner, the time, and the place of the enforcement thereof. On 3 April 2012 and 4 July 2012, following appeals by the applicant, the Ministry of Security and the State Court, respectively, upheld that decision. The State Court rejected, in particular, the applicant’s complaint concerning the lack of specification of a destination country in the deportation order. It emphasised that under the 2008 Aliens Act a destination country was to be specified only in the relevant removal directions (see paragraph 77 below). 20. On 30 October 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional appeal (see paragraph 15 above). It held that the circumstances of the applicant’s case had changed following the Court’s judgment of 7 February 2012 (see paragraph 17 above) and that consequently, the further examination of his complaints was no longer necessary. 21. On 16 February 2012 the Aliens Service extended the applicant’s detention, with a view to his deportation, for a period of thirty days on the same grounds as before (see paragraph 13 above). Thereafter, throughout 2012 and 2013, the applicant’s detention was regularly examined and extended every month (and, following changes to the 2008 Aliens Act, every two months; see paragraph 76 below). The Aliens Service held that the reasons for the applicant’s detention still pertained – specifically in view of evidence provided by the National Security Agency that indicated that the applicant still posed a threat to national security. He was an unlawful resident in BH who had refused to leave the country voluntarily. Furthermore, the Aliens Service had regard to the Court’s finding that the applicant’s deportation to Syria would have led to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention and to the fact that the conditions for his deportation to a safe third country had not been met. Each time the applicant’s detention was extended, the Aliens Service examined whether it was justified to impose less strict preventive measures. 22. The applicant repeatedly challenged his detention. His appeals were rejected by the Ministry of Security and the State Court, respectively, which had essentially endorsed the reasons advanced by the Aliens Service. 23. On 26 February 2014 the Aliens Service further extended the applicant’s detention. That decision was upheld on 3 March 2014 and 10 March 2014 by the Ministry of Security and the State Court, respectively. 24. On 14 May 2014 the Appeals Chamber of the State Court quashed the judgment of 10 March 2014 (see paragraph 23 above) and remitted the case for re-examination. The Appeals Chamber, referring to the Court’s case-law, held that the applicant should have been informed of the reasons for his continued detention and of the grounds on which he was deemed to be a security risk. It emphasised that it was not necessary to present all of the relevant information to the applicant. However, the information provided to him by the National Security Agency had not satisfied the minimum requirements under Article 5 of the Convention to justify the extension of the applicant’s detention. The Appeals Chamber furthermore emphasised that the courts were entitled to assess the existence of any reasonable doubt – that is to say the reasons given by the National Security Agency. Without such an assessment the examination by a court of the applicant’s case would constitute a pure formality, which would be contrary to Article 5 of the Convention. Furthermore, the State Court’s examination of the possibility to apply other less strict preventive measure had involved the assessment of general and abstract arguments, without any further consideration. The Appeals Chamber invited the State Court to examine that possibility in the light of the circumstances of the case – in particular, the length of the applicant’s detention, the applicant’s personal circumstances and the evidence related to national security. 25. On 5 June 2014 the State Court again upheld the Ministry of Security’s decision of 3 March 2014 (see paragraph 23 above). The court stated that on 21 May 2014 the National Security Agency had submitted classified evidence for the court’s review and “open” evidence for the applicant’s review. On 23 May 2014 the court heard the applicant and disclosed to him the open evidence, the relevant part of which reads as follows: “Imad Al Husin arrived [in Bosnia and Herzegovina] immediately after the outbreak of war ... [At the time he] was a member of the El Mujahedin unit, in which he was one of the main persons in charge of logistical support. The applicant acted as one of the leaders in the formation of a mujahedin community in Donja Bočinja, in the municipality of Maglaj; [the mujahedin community] was a closed community and the first of that sort in Bosnia and Herzegovina ... the applicant was in charge of reconstruction and building and of maintaining contacts with the authorities. Security information shows that Imad Al Husin owns various real estate in Bosnia and Herzegovina worth millions, as well as [holding] bank accounts abroad ... the members of the Bočinja community claimed that they did not ‘respect the laws of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ and did not ‘recognise the Bosnian Government’... [The applicant], as one of the leaders of the mujahedin community, knew that some members of his community had left to fight with other mujahedin, mostly in Afghanistan ... He had contacts with mujahedin who had fought or were still fighting in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Iraq, Libya and Syria. Most of those persons were declared to be a threat to national security ... Imad Al Husin was involved in the humanitarian agency Islamic Relief, [which was] led at the time by Enam Arnaout, who was later convicted of terrorism in the United States ... In 1995 Imad Al Husin maintained contacts with a certain Ahmed Zuhair ... from Saudi Arabia, who has been involved in several terrorist attacks in Bosnia and Herzegovina ... Together with several other foreign citizens, Imad Al Husin has established [several companies, including] PP Al Karamein [and] Bedr Bosna, which have employed mostly former foreign fighters who participated in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 2002 and 2005 the Federal Financial Police discovered a number of irregularities concerning the Bedr Bosna company, mostly concerning tax evasion ... From mid-2007 he maintained closer contacts with members of criminal circles in Sarajevo ... On 25 June 2008 Imad Al Husin attempted to buy ammunition, most probably for a gun, in an ammunition shop located in Hifzi Bjelavca Street ... in Sarajevo ... but was refused because he did not possess a gun licence ... In 2008 he was visited by a certain Hussam Mousaa El Abed, who at the time lived in Denmark; on that occasion he gave [to the applicant] money collected abroad ... Al Abed was suspected of providing financial support to terrorist organisations ... On 3 April 2007 Imad Al Husin obtained a passport from the Syrian Embassy in Belgrade ... His family in Syria is very influential and its members serve at the highest level of Bashar Al Assad’s government. His brother used to be a colonel in the Syrian Army. Imad Al Hussin is or has been in contact with many persons suspected of international terrorism, including [persons] who lived in the mujahedin community in Bočinja, as well as [persons] living abroad who visited the community.” 26. The applicant dismissed all the information as general and unsubstantiated. He in particular denied the assertion that he had advocated the Saudi-inspired Wahhabi/Salafi version of Islam. He argued that he should not have been perceived as a terrorist just because he spoke Arabic and moved in the BH Arabic community. The applicant submitted that on one occasion he and some of his friends had helped the National Security Agency to locate and arrest persons connected with the killing of a police officer. He furthermore pointed out that, following a request by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, the United States State Department’s 2007 Country Report on Terrorism – specifically, the entry for Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which the applicant had been wrongly identified as Abu Hamza al-Masri, an Egyptian national and a convicted terrorist – had been amended in 2008. The applicant also submitted that he had always responded to summonses issued by the authorities. He furthermore provided a certificate issued by the BH Islamic Community confirming that he had been one of its members and statements given by two imams from Sarajevo attesting that the applicant had never given any lectures in their respective mosques. Moreover, the applicant also denied the veracity of the allegation regarding his bank accounts and real estate. He asked to be presented with evidence in support of those claims. 27. The State Court held that the applicant had not succeeded in calling into question or refuting the open evidence submitted by the National Security Agency. Rather, he had used abstract and general statements in an effort to downplay the importance of the information provided therein. Furthermore, the applicant had submitted certain documents (written statements, letters and so on) for the first time at the hearing of 23 May 2014, even though it was apparent that he had had them before. Having assessed the reasons given by the Aliens Service and the Ministry of Security, the content of the classified and open evidence, and the applicant’s arguments, the court concluded that there still existed reasonable doubt as to whether or not the applicant posed a threat to national security and that the imposition of a less strict preventive measure was not justified, given the particular circumstances of the case. The State Court concluded that there had been no violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. The court furthermore held that, contrary to the applicant’s arguments that he feared criminal prosecution in Syria, it was evident from the case file that his family was very influential and close to Bashar Al Assad’s regime. Many members of the applicant’s family occupied high positions in government. His brother was a retired colonel in the Syrian Security Forces. Moreover, on 3 April 2007 the applicant had obtained a passport from the Syrian Embassy in Belgrade. The court concluded that in the prevailing circumstances there were no longer any obstacles to the applicant’s deportation to Syria. Lastly, the court assessed the Ministry of Security’s efforts in finding a safe third country and concluded that it had acted diligently and in close cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, thirty-two countries, including all the Arab states, had refused to accept the applicant, giving as a reason his personality and the circumstances surrounding him. 28. On 16 July 2014 the Appeals Chamber of the State Court upheld the judgment of 5 June 2014. 29. In the meantime, on 27 May 2014 the Aliens Service further extended the applicant’s detention. On 2 June 2014, following an appeal by the applicant, the Ministry of Security upheld that decision. 30. On 11 June 2014 the State Court, following an appeal by the applicant, quashed the decisions of 27 May 2014 and 2 June 2014 (see paragraph 29 above) and remitted the case to the Aliens Service for reconsideration. The court noted in particular that the deportation order had been issued on 1 February 2011 (see paragraph 14 above) and that the applicant had been detained with a view to deportation for more than three years, and on national-security grounds for more than five years. During that time no criminal proceedings had been opened against him. Furthermore, the open evidence presented to the applicant was widely known as it had already been published in the media. The deportation order was unlikely to be enforced: the relevant authorities had contacted more than thirty countries, but none of them had agreed to accept the applicant. Moreover, it was apparent from the case file that the National Security Agency did not have any new evidence that would justify the applicant’s continued detention. The evidence on which his continued detention was based was the same as that which had been cited as justification for his initial detention. The court furthermore added that a concern that the applicant could pose a threat to national security, without any new evidence, was not enough to draw a reasonable conclusion regarding the actual threat that he represented. A detention based solely on security grounds was contrary to Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. The administrative authorities had not justified their conclusion concerning the persistence of a reasonable suspicion that the applicant would pose a risk to national security if released. Furthermore, their examination of the possibility to apply less strict preventive measures had involved general and abstract arguments, without any further explanation being given. The court ordered the Aliens Service to examine such a possibility in the light of the arguments presented in its judgment. 31. Following the remittal of the case, on 20 June 2014 the Aliens Service further extended the applicant’s detention with a view to his deportation and on national-security grounds. On 13 June 2014 the applicant was heard by the Aliens Service concerning the possibility of less strict preventive measures being applied. On that occasion he submitted that he had accommodation (his registered place of residence) outside the Immigration Centre but that he did not have any financial means. Furthermore, the applicant submitted that a preventive measure that included a prohibition on his leaving his registered place of residence, which was in Ilidža, would not have been suitable for him because he needed the services of a medical-care service located in Sarajevo. The Aliens Service held that the circumstances justifying the applicant’s detention remained the same. It furthermore emphasised that all necessary steps were being taken with a view to finding a safe third country to which the applicant could be deported. 32. On 23 June 2014 and 27 June 2014 the Ministry of Security and the State Court, respectively, upheld the Aliens Service’s decision of 20 June 2014. 33. Thereafter, until the end of 2014 and throughout 2015 the applicant’s detention was continually extended. All of his appeals were dismissed by the Ministry of Security, the State Court and the Appeals Chamber of the State Court, respectively. 34. During this period several hearings were held before the State Court. 35. At a hearing of 9 September 2014 the applicant submitted that he had contacted the authorities of the Republic of Turkey concerning the possibility of his moving there, but that his request had been refused on the basis of information provided by the National Security Agency. Moreover, the applicant objected that he had not been given the possibility to comment on the open evidence. Since the National Security Agency did not have any new information concerning the applicant, the State Court decided to join to the applicant’s submissions the minutes of the hearing of 23 May 2014 at which he had had the possibility to comment on open evidence (see paragraph 25 above). 36. At a hearing of 3 March 2015 the State Court presented to the applicant open evidence submitted by the National Security Agency. The same information had already been submitted to the applicant’s representative on 6 February 2015 by the National Security Agency. The information essentially described the applicant’s role as that of the self-proclaimed leader of the mujahidin community in Donja Bočinja and referred to his conviction for unlawful deprivation of liberty in 2000 (see paragraph 11 above). It furthermore stated that until being placed in detention, the applicant had consistently advocated the Saudi-inspired Wahhabi/Salafi version of Islam and had publicly expressed his support for Osama bin Laden. The rest of the information was identical to that disclosed to the applicant at the hearing of 23 May 2014 (see paragraph 25 above). The applicant rejected that information as too general and submitted that no criminal proceedings had ever been initiated against him. 37. In its decisions following the hearing the State Court held in particular that the relevant authorities were diligently working on finding a safe third country, in compliance with Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, and that the applicant still posed a threat to national security. The authorities had contacted more than fifty countries, of which thirty-nine had given a negative response to a request to accept the applicant, while the others had not responded at all. The State Court furthermore endorsed the administrative bodies’ conclusion concerning the possibility of applying a less strict preventive measure. 38. At a hearing of 3 June 2015 the applicant was informed that there had been no new information or evidence submitted against him by the National Security Agency. Accordingly, the State Court decided to join to the applicant’s submissions the minutes from the hearing of 3 March 2015 at which he had had the possibility to comment on the open evidence (see paragraph 36 above). 39. At a hearing of 28 August 2015 the State Court ruled that a report submitted by the National Security Agency on 17 August 2015 did not contain any new information concerning the applicant. The State Court thus joined again to the applicant’s submissions the minutes of the hearing of 3 March 2015 at which he had had the possibility to comment on the open evidence (see paragraph 36 above). 40. At a hearing of 30 November 2015 the State Court held that the National Security Agency’s report, submitted on 16 November 2015, did not contain any new information concerning the applicant. Accordingly, the court again referred to the applicant’s submissions during the hearing of 3 March 2015 at which the open evidence had been presented to him (see paragraph 36 above). (b) The Constitutional Court’s decisions 41. The applicant lodged several constitutional appeals concerning the extension of his detention, relying on Articles 3 and 5 §§ 1 and 4, and on Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention. He alleged in particular that he had not been granted access to closed evidence, that he had been placed in preventive detention and that it was unrealistic to expect any other country to accept a person who had been declared a threat to national security. 42. In a decision of 28 February 2013 (decision no. AP 222/13) the Constitutional Court examined the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention from 12 November 2012 until 10 December 2012 and dismissed his appeal as manifestly ill founded, essentially endorsing the reasoning of the State Court and the relevant administrative bodies. 43. On 17 June 2015 (decision no. AP 2742/13) the Constitutional Court examined an appeal lodged by the applicant against sixteen judgments delivered by the State Court between 14 March 2013 and 25 March 2015 concerning the lawfulness of his detention in the period between 21 March 2013 and 7 June 2015. The Constitutional Court found a violation of Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention with regard to the period of the applicant’s detention from 21 March 2013 until 14 March 2014 (the lawfulness of which had been addressed by the State Court in judgments delivered between 14 March 2013 and 6 January 2014). It dismissed the rest of the applicant’s complaints as manifestly ill-founded. That decision was delivered to the applicant on 13 August 2015. The relevant part of the Constitutional Court’s decision reads as follows: “46. As regards the judgments delivered between 14 March 2013 and 6 January 2014 the Constitutional Court notes ... that is evident that the appellant’s detention was extended in accordance with the law because it had been established that he posed a threat to national security ... The appellant had the possibility to challenge those decisions. However, the fact that the appellant posed a threat to national security was established on the basis of [information held by] the National Security Agency. The appellant alleged that he had not been informed of the charges against him in this respect, but the State Court considered that those arguments were unsubstantiated, because the relevant provisions prohibited the examination of secret evidence if to do so would be against the public interest. 47. The Constitutional Court reiterates that in case no. AP 4064/13 ... it found a violation of Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention in respect of a situation in which ... the appellant had been detained on the basis of [information held by] the National Security Agency whose content had never been disclosed to him, not even in substance, and the State Court had failed to adequately examine that information and assess its reliability. 48. The Constitutional Court does not see any reason to depart from [that] practice ... in the present case as regards the judgments delivered in the period from 14 March 2013 until 6 January 2014, since the content of the [National Security Agency’s] information, on the basis of which he was declared a threat to national security, was not disclosed to the appellant, and the State Court failed to adequately examine that information and assess its reliability. The Constitutional Court concludes that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention in relation to those judgments. ... 55. [As regards the other impugned judgments] ... the Constitutional Court notes that the appellant was detained because it had been established that he posed a threat to national security; his detention was extended in accordance with the law ..., and he had the possibility of [seeking] judicial review of these decisions ... [On 14 May 2014 the Appeals Chamber of] the State Court quashed the judgment of 10 March 2014 because the State Court and the administrative bodies should have disclosed to the appellant the reasons for his detention and the circumstances and facts which had led ... [the National Security Agency] to conclude that he posed a threat to national security ... ... 57. The Constitutional Court notes furthermore that the appellant is a Syrian national and not a stateless person, that his BH citizenship was revoked because it was established that he had acquired it by means of fraudulent conduct, false information and the concealment of relevant facts; and that he was placed in detention ... on national-security grounds and that a deportation order has been issued against him. On the other hand, in its judgment no. 3727/08, cited above, the European Court held ... that there was a real risk that the appellant would be exposed to inhuman treatment if deported to Syria ... It is evident from the impugned judgments that thirty-nine countries have refused a request by BH to accept the appellant. All of the above indicates the existence of special circumstances in the present case. In view of that – and the fact that the authorities have displayed particular diligence in the case of the applicant, who is neither a refugee nor a stateless person ... and the adequate assessment of the existence of a prima facie reasonable suspicion that if released the appellant would pose a threat to national security – the Constitutional Court concludes, all the while taking into account the excessive length of the appellant’s detention, that there was no violation of Article II/3.d of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina and no violation of Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention as regards the rest of the impugned judgments [delivered between 6 January 2014 and 25 March 2015] ... ... 64. The Constitutional Court considers it necessary to emphasise that although it has found a violation of Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention in respect of the judgments delivered between 14 March 2013 and 6 January 2014, given that it did not find such a violation in respect of the rest of the [impugned] judgments, it considers that exceptionally, in the particular circumstances of the case, the finding of a violation is sufficient and that there is no need to remit the case for a rehearing ...” 44. On 22 December 2015 (decision no. AP 2832/15) the Constitutional Court examined an appeal lodged by the applicant against the judgments delivered by the State Court between May and December 2015. The applicant relied on the same provisions as before. The Constitutional Court held that there had been no substantial changes in the legal and factual circumstances of the case since its decision of 17 June 2015 (see paragraph 43 above) and found that there had been no violation of the applicant’s constitutional rights. Essentially, the court referred to the reasons given in its decision of 17 June 2015. It considered that the authorities had acted diligently in their efforts to find a safe third country (more than fifty countries had been contacted) and had examined the possibility of applying a less strict preventive measure. The court had furthermore taken into account the fact that the applicant had been heard regarding the circumstances of his detention in judicial-review proceedings and that an adequate assessment had been made of the (prima facie reasonable) suspicion that if released he would pose a threat to national security. 45. In response to a request from the Aliens Service for new information concerning the applicant, on 25 January 2016 the National Security Agency indicated that it had no new information but that it still considered that the applicant constituted a potential threat to national security. However, taking into account the provisions of the 2015 Aliens Act (see paragraphs 78 and 79 below), the National Security Agency submitted that the purpose of the supervision could be achieved by means of a less strict preventive measure. 46. On 3 February 2016 the National Security Agency submitted to the Aliens Service national-security-related material concerning the applicant; it also indicated to the Aliens Service which part of that material could be disclosed to him. 47. On 10 February 2016 the applicant was heard by the Aliens Service; certain open evidence was presented to him, while certain material remained closed. The applicant submitted to the Aliens Service that he had already been informed of the content of the open evidence during the proceedings before the State Court. He furthermore stated that he had accommodation and his registered place of residence and financial support. The applicant’s wife, who was also heard, confirmed that he would be staying at her house and that she would be providing for him during his stay. 48. On 17 February 2016 the Aliens Service terminated the applicant’s detention, in accordance with the 2015 Aliens Act, because it had exceeded eighteen months (see paragraph 78 below). By the same decision preventive measures were imposed on the applicant, which included the following: a prohibition on his leaving the Sarajevo Canton (which encompasses Ilidža municipality); the duty to report to the Ilidža police in person between 9.30 a.m. and 10.30 a.m. every Wednesday, Saturday and Sunday; and the duty to report to the Aliens Service by telephone (from his landline number) every Monday, Tuesday, Thursday and Friday between 9.30 a.m. and 10.30 a.m. Furthermore, the applicant’s passport, which had expired on 2 April 2009, was seized. In doing so Aliens Service referred to section 119 of the 2015 Aliens Act, which provided that the total period of a person’s detention could not exceed eighteen months (see paragraph 78 below). 49. The preventive measures were to remain in force until the applicant left the country voluntarily or until he was forcibly removed, for as long as the reasons for which he was placed under supervision remained the same. 50. On 10 September 2012 the Aliens Service asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to contact countries which were geopolitically and culturally close to Syria. On 10 October, 9 November and 29 November 2012 the Aliens Service contacted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, asking for updates on the proceedings. 51. By 19 October 2012 Slovenia, Jordan and Cyprus had informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that they were not willing to accept the applicant. 52. Between 9 November 2012 and 27 November 2013 nine countries were contacted (Austria, Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Oman and Yemen). 53. By January 2013 negative responses had been received from twenty-three countries (Estonia, Spain, France, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Lichtenstein, Denmark, Switzerland, Hungary, Moldova, Montenegro, Ukraine, Austria, Norway, the Netherlands, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Poland, Turkey, Germany, Serbia, Italy and Bulgaria). 54. On 21 August and 28 November 2013 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Aliens Service that Yemen and Oman, respectively, had refused to accept the applicant. 55. On 27 November 2013 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates to provide responses to the requests that they agree to accept the applicant. 56. On 9 December 2013 Qatar refused to accept the applicant. 57. On 4 March 2014 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Aliens Service that Kuwait was not willing to accept the applicant. 58. On 30 April 2014 the United Arab Emirates informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that they did not wish to accept the applicant. 59. On 16 June 2014 and 13 November 2014 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs lodged a request with the Syrian Embassy in Belgrade for Syria to accept the applicant. 60. On 8 and 14 August 2014 the Aliens Service and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, respectively, informed the applicant that ten more countries had refused their request (Egypt, Latvia, Lithuania, Greece, Romania, Sweden, Morocco, Croatia, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain). 61. On 12 and 13 August 2014 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs again contacted the United Arab Emirates. 62. On 14 November 2014 and 17 February 2015 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the applicant that there had been no new developments concerning the search for a safe third country. 63. On 18 February and 3 March 2015 the Aliens Service contacted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, asking for updates concerning the proceedings aimed at finding a safe third country. 64. At the request of the Aliens Service, on 19 May 2015 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked Canada to accept the applicant. On 27 August 2015 Canada refused the request. 65. On 15 June 2015 the Aliens Service lodged a request with the Turkish Embassy in Sarajevo for the applicant to be accepted by Turkey. 66. Furthermore, throughout 2015 attempts were made to organise a meeting at Saudi Arabia’s embassy in Sarajevo with a view to discussing the possibility of the applicant’s admission to that country. However, it would appear that the meeting did not take place. 67. On 12 February 2016 the Aliens Service proposed that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs lodge a request for the applicant’s admission to Kazakhstan. On 22 February 2016 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Aliens Service that it had asked the BH Embassy in Russia (which also covered Kazakhstan) to lodge such a request. 68. On several occasions the applicant’s representatives requested access to information concerning the activities undertaken by the authorities with a view to finding a safe third country. Such access was regularly granted and the relevant information provided by the Aliens Service and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 69. The Government submitted the following information concerning conditions in the Immigration Centre. 70. The applicant had been placed in a cell with a surface area of 20.5 square metres in which a maximum of four detainees were held at any one time. Thus, each of them had five square metres of personal space. Each cell had a glass window (160 centimetres tall and 120 centimetres wide), sanitary facilities, direct access to drinking water, and heating. Each inmate was regularly provided with the necessary toiletries. 71. Detainees had three meals per day and a schedule of daily activities (sporting activities, medical examinations, leisure time, and so on). The Immigration Centre possessed a library and premises for religious activities and for spending leisure time. 72. Each detainee had a right to one visit per week. The head of the Immigration Centre could authorise more frequent visits should they be in the interests of the family of the detainee concerned. There were no facilities for conjugal visits. 73. Throughout his detention the applicant was afforded adequate health care, including several examinations conducted by specialists. 74. In his reply to the Government’s observations, the applicant submitted a copy of a decision of 8 November 2007, written in Arabic and issued by the Syrian Ministry of Interior, by which his Syrian nationality had been revoked. The applicant also enclosed a copy of the certified translation, dated 28 July 2015, of that decision into one of the official languages of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

4. The applicant was born in 1982 and is detained in Labytnangi, Yamalo-Nenetskiy Region. 5. On 22 May 2008 the applicant arrived at the IK-8 correctional colony, Yamalo-Nenetskiy Region. 6. On 31 March 2008 the applicant’s wife instituted divorce proceedings. 7. On 9 April 2008 the Justice of the Peace of Circuit no. 2 of the Krasnosulinskiy District of the Rostov Region (“Justice of the Peace”) sent a letter rogatory to the courts of Tyumen Region, asking them to interview the applicant and to establish whether he wished to attend the hearing in person. 8. On 22 April 2008 the Tyumen Regional Division of the Judicial Department received the letter. 9. On 4 July 2008 a Justice of the Peace in Labytnangi fixed an interview with the applicant for 18 July 2008 and sent two summonses to his home address, which his wife had listed in her statement of claim. Both summonses were returned undelivered. 10. On 10 September 2009 the Tyumen courts informed the Justice of the Peace that it had been impossible to reach the applicant. On the same day the Justice of the Peace decided to hold a hearing in the applicant’s absence, noting that although the applicant had his registered residence at the address mentioned by the plaintiff, he had not appeared for an interview before the Justice of the Peace. 11. On 18 September 2008 the Justice of the Peace granted the divorce. On the same day a copy of the decision was sent to the applicant’s home address. 12. On 20 November 2013, the applicant learnt of the judgment of 18 September 2008. He asked for an extension of the time-limit for lodging an appeal against it. He argued that he had never received the judgment of 18 September 2008 and that he had been previously unaware of the divorce proceedings. 13. On 26 December 2013 the Justice of the Peace heard evidence from the applicant’s former wife who claimed that the applicant should have been aware of the divorce proceedings in 2008 because his mother had received the final judgment of 18 September 2008. The Justice of the Peace held that an excerpt of the judgment had been served on the applicant in person on 31 October 2008 and refused the applicant’s application to extend the time limit for lodging an appeal. The hearing was held in the applicant’s absence. The applicant lodged an appeal against the decision. 14. On 15 May 2014 the Krasnosulinskiy District Court of Rostov Region upheld the decision of 26 December 2013, again in his absence.

4. The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Timişoara. 5. On 20 February 2003 the applicant, a bank manager at that time, was placed in pre-trial detention by the Bucharest Anti-Corruption Department of the Prosecutor’s Office, on a charge of taking a bribe in order to favourably influence the acceptance of a loan requested by M.G. 6. By a final judgment delivered on 13 April 2012 the High Court of Cassation and Justice (“the High Court”) convicted the applicant of taking a bribe. Among the evidence which led to his conviction was the transcript of a phone conversation between the applicant and M.G. on 16 September 2002. 7. The conversation had been intercepted on the basis of a warrant issued by the prosecutor under the provisions of Law no. 51/1991 on national security (“Law no. 51/1991”) for the period between 13 August and 12 November 2002. 8. The applicant complained before the domestic courts about the lawfulness of the interception of his phone conversation and the accuracy of the transcript. He alleged that the Court had held that Law no. 51/1991 did not afford the guarantees required under Article 8 of the Convention. However, the High Court merely replied that the impugned interception had been lawful and within the scope of Law no. 51/1991.

5. The applicant was born in 1968 and is currently detained in Jēkabpils Prison. He is a person with special needs. The applicant is deaf and mute since birth and his knowledge of sign language is poor. 6. At least as of 2 March 2001, when his disability was certified as permanent, the applicant has been recognised as being category 3 disabled (the least severe level of disability). On an unspecified date his disability was re-categorised as category 2 (medium level of disability). 7. On 7 May 2008 the applicant was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to fifteen years and six months’ imprisonment. That judgment became final on 24 February 2009. He started serving his sentence in the most restrictive “lower” regime in Liepāja Prison. 8. On 23 December 2011 the applicant was transferred to Brasa Prison. He was placed in the medium regime as he had served one quarter of his sentence. He was held in cell no. 301 (from 1 January 2012 to 26 February 2013) and cell no. 303 (from 26 February to 30 October 2013). 9. On 30 October 2013 the applicant was placed in the most restrictive “lower” regime. He was held in cell no. 203 (from 30 October 2013 until 16 February 2015). 10. On 24 February 2016 the applicant was placed in the least restrictive “higher” regime. It appears that as of that date he was held in three different multi-occupancy cells. The number of his cellmates varied from two to fourteen. Each inmate had no less than 4 sq. m of living space in those cells. 11. According to the applicant, he was held in dormitory‑type cells nos. 301, 303 and 203 together with other inmates, all of whom were in good health except for the applicant. The applicant’s submissions as to the overall surface area in those cells as well as the size of the sanitary facilities were consistent with the Government’s submissions (see paragraph 13 below). His account of the number of inmates was slightly different – he alleged that he had been held together with ten to twenty inmates in cells nos. 301 and 303. However, as concerns cell no. 203 he agreed with the Government – six inmates had been held in that cell. 12. The applicant submitted that the heating had not been sufficient in those cells. He had been neither able to communicate with other inmates, nor with the prison management due to his disability. He had been in social isolation and had not received any special assistance. 13. According to the Government, the applicant was held in three different cells, the conditions of which are detailed in the table below. The calculation of personal space (overall surface area with the in-cell sanitary facility deducted, divided by number of inmates held therein) is based on an approximate measurement of the sanitary facility according to the floor plans of Brasa Prison. Cell no. Period of detention Total number of inmates Overall surface area in sq. m Sanitary facility sq. m Personal space in sq. m 301 14. As regards out-of-cell activities, the Government indicated that while being held in the medium regime – in cells nos. 301 and 303 – the applicant had been able to freely leave those cells in daytime and to use the common area. The Government further submitted that cell no. 301 had been equipped with one window. That window had been fitted with bars and had been placed in a wall (adjacent to a corridor) facing another window (in the corridor). This cell had had three fluorescent lamps, including one night lamp located above the door. Heating had been provided by one heating pipe of 5 cm in diameter and the heaters located in the adjacent corridor and in the hallway. A new automatic boiler had been installed in Brasa Prison, which had ensured a temperature of 18˚C. Heating arrangements in cell no. 303 had been the same as in cell no. 301. 15. While being held in the most restrictive “lower” regime – in cell no. 203 – the applicant had been able to leave this cell only for a daily walk (one hour), to take a shower or for appointments with a doctor, a prison chaplain or a social worker when necessary. 16. Overall, inmates in Brasa Prison had had access to a psychologist, but the applicant had never availed himself of this possibility. He had, however, met with a prison chaplain and a social worker on several occasions. The Government provided records of three conversations between the applicant and a social worker in 2016, including a meeting on 11 April 2016 where the latter had called a non-governmental organisation (Latvijas Nedzirdīgo Savienība) concerning the applicant’s hearing aid. Lastly, the applicant had visited a psychiatrist at least on six occasions in the time period from 1 April 2015 to 7 September 2016. 17. On 27 December 2011 the state of the applicant’s health was examined for the first time in Brasa Prison. It was noted that the applicant was deaf and mute and that he suffered from spondylosis. 18. The applicant submitted an extract of his medical record in Brasa Prison. According to that document (dated 26 July 2016), he had been deaf since birth. On 13 August 2009 a psychiatrist had detected a psychiatric health condition (psihiskas veselības problēmas), namely, “reaction to situations with anxiety” (situācijas reakcija ar trauksmi). On 21 January 2010 the same psychiatrist had detected another sleep-related condition. On 10 December 2015 another psychiatrist diagnosed the applicant as having “organic personality disorder” (organiski personības traucējumi). 19. The Government submitted another extract of the applicant’s medical record in Brasa Prison. According to that document (dated 7 April 2015), upon admission to Brasa Prison the applicant had been diagnosed as being deaf and mute and having spondylosis. During the above-mentioned period the applicant had consulted prison medical staff on thirty‑nine occasions. He had been examined, treated and provided with medication when necessary. No serious health conditions, which would have required an in‑depth examination, had been diagnosed. There had been no indications that outpatient examination or treatment had been necessary. The applicant had most often complained of colds, headache, poor sleep, gastritis and back pain related to spondylosis. Those complaints had not concerned his disability. In 2013 and 2014 the prison medical staff had organised an outpatient medical examination (in relation to tuberculosis) and a consultation by an ophthalmologist to obtain glasses. On 1 April 2015, upon the request of the Prisons Administration (Ieslodzījuma vietu pārvalde), the applicant’s state of health had been examined. It had been satisfactory, he had not had any complaints and he had gained weight while in prison. In sum, his health had not deteriorated. 20. Over the course of two years (2012-14) the applicant lodged some twenty‑five handwritten complaints with various institutions (the management of Brasa Prison, the Prisons Administration, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of the Interior). 21. He informed the authorities that he had been deaf and mute since birth and complained as follows: 1) he had communication problems and conflicts with other inmates (he referred to “conflicts”, having been “influenced”, “offended” and “laughed about” by other inmates); 2) he wished to be transferred to a single or dual-occupancy cell; 3) he wished to be transferred to another prison; 4) he wished to have his prison regime changed; 5) his conditions of detention were inadequate and 6) his medical care was inadequate. 22. His complaints were examined by the Prisons Administration, save for three of them that were examined by the management of Brasa Prison. 23. The following conclusions were made: (1) There had been no real threat to the applicant’s life or health in Brasa Prison. He had not been subjected to psychological harassment. His complaints to the management of Brasa Prison had not concerned any threats from other inmates. (2) The applicant did not have a subjective right to choose his cell or cellmates. It fell within the competence of the management of Brasa Prison. There was a limited number of cells with a capacity of four inmates and those inmates could not be moved for security reasons. (3) The decision concerning the applicant’s transfer to another prison had to be taken by the Prisons Administration. Taking into account that the applicant’s state of health had permitted his placement in any prison, there had been no grounds to transfer him to another prison; he had had to continue serving his sentence in Brasa Prison. (4) The possibility of his transfer to the most lenient prison regime could not be examined before 10 June 2015, when he would have served the relevant proportion of his prison sentence. As to the possibility of his transfer back to the more restrictive prison regime such actions could only be taken in cases of serious or systematic breaches of the prison regime. (5) The conditions in cell no. 301 had been adequate. It had measured 36 sq. m. Natural and artificial lighting as well as heating had been sufficient. The temperature in cell had been 18˚C. The conditions in cell no. 303 had been similar to cell no. 301 – lighting and heating had been adequate. The conditions in cell no. 203 had been adequate. According to the Prisons Administration and the relevant floor plans that cell had measured 19.86 sq. m (including 1.87 sq. m for sanitation facilities). Besides the applicant, it had accommodated five other inmates. A reference was made to the Court’s case-law and the applicable domestic standard of 2.5 sq. m per male inmate. The temperature in the cell had been 18˚C. (6) The applicant’s medical care had been carried out in accordance with domestic law. He had received the necessary medication in response to his complaints. He had never complained to prison doctors of “neurological diseases”, “noises” or “fears”, but he had had at least one consultation with a psychiatrist. In any event, he had been able to complain of the quality of medical care in prison to the Health Inspectorate. 24. On 1 October 2012 a judge of a first-instance court refused to allow the applicant’s application to be transferred to another prison and to have his prison regime changed to a more restrictive one, a request made by the applicant in order to allow him to be held in a cell with a smaller number of inmates. Those issues fell within the realm of criminal law and could not be examined by the administrative courts. 25. On 25 October 2012 another judge refused to allow the applicant’s application to be transferred to another prison and to be relieved from the obligation to continue serving his sentence. As concerns his transfer, reference was made to the decision by the Prisons Administration whereby a conclusion had been drawn that the Administrative Procedure Law had not applied. As concerns judicial review of that decision, such a complaint had already been examined (see paragraph 24 above). As concerns the release application, it fell within the realm of criminal law; this issue could thus not be examined by the administrative courts. 26. The applicant attempted to appeal against the above-mentioned refusals, but his appeal did not appear sufficiently clear. Accordingly, on 21 November 2012 another judge decided not to proceed with his appeal (atstāt bez virzības), asking the applicant to render it more precise. 27. On 10 December 2013 another judge examined further complaints by the applicant. His application to be transferred to a more lenient prison regime and another prison were refused because such complaints had already been examined (see paragraphs 24-25 above). His complaint about insufficient heating in Brasa Prison did not appear sufficiently clear; the judge decided not to proceed with it, asking the applicant to render it more precise. As the applicant did not provide further information, the latter complaint was considered as not submitted (uzskatīt par neiesniegtu). 28. On 2 April 2014 the applicant complained to the administrative courts that the Prisons Administration had extended the time-limit for its last reply. On 29 May 2014 a judge terminated the administrative proceedings in this connection since the Prisons Administration had issued its decision in the meantime. 29. On 31 August 2016 a panel in Brasa Prison examined the possibility of the applicant’s transfer to a more lenient prison regime. The applicant and a sign-language interpreter were present. It was established that the applicant had been working in prison until 18 December 2015; he had stopped working owing to his state of health. He had a category 2 disability. He had completed secondary education but had not pursued his education further owing to being deaf and mute and needing a specialised learning programme. He had been working with an officer and a social worker for rehabilitation purposes. He had regularly visited a chaplain in prison; however, he had not met with a psychologist. He had participated in addiction recovery meetings. He had dedicated his free time to himself. He had received three positive citations (pamudinājums) from the prison management. 30. A conclusion was drawn that the applicant had participated in nearly all the rehabilitation activities provided in the prison taking into account his capabilities. Therefore it was possible to transfer him to a more lenient prison regime in a partly closed prison. 31. On 7 September 2016 the applicant was transferred to a partly closed prison in Jēkabpils, where he was held in a cell with two other inmates. One of them had a similar hearing impairment. 32. The relevant parts of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, ratified by Latvia on 1 March 2010, have been outlined in Grimailovs v. Latvia (no. 6087/03, § 78, 25 June 2013). 33. The relevant parts of the Interim Report of 28 July 2008 (A/63/175) by the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment have been outlined in the above-cited Grimailovs case (ibid., § 79).

5. The applicant was born in 1972 and is detained in Tekirdağ. 6. On 13 November 2003 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of membership of the PKK/KADEK (Workers’ Party of Kurdistan/Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress), an illegal organisation. He was in possession of a fake identity card at the time of his arrest. Subsequently, following the applicant’s directions to the police, the latter conducted a house search in the presence of the applicant on the premises where he and another co-accused had been staying. The police found and seized 40 grams of cyanide, a description and diagrams for the construction of a bomb mechanism handwritten by the applicant, and a fake passport bearing the applicant’s photograph that had been used by him to go to Iran twice. 7. On 14 November 2003 the applicant was taken for questioning to the Istanbul police headquarters. The applicant’s statements to the police were transcribed on pre-printed forms, the first page of which was filled in to indicate, inter alia, that the applicant was suspected of the killing of a certain M.Y. in 1999 on behalf of the PKK/KADEK, of undergoing military and political training at the organisation’s camps abroad and of carrying out other activities for the organisation. The same page also included a pre-printed message which stated, inter alia, that the person being questioned had the right to remain silent and the right to choose a lawyer. It appears from the form that the applicant had refused legal assistance, since the first page of the record includes a pre-printed phrase stating “No lawyer sought” and a box next to it that is marked with a pre-printed “X”. Moreover, according to the record, he also stated that he did not want a lawyer or to remain silent. In his statement, which was fifteen pages long, the applicant admitted that he had become a member of the PKK/KADEK in 1996 and gave a detailed account of all the activities he had carried out for that organisation since then, including the killing of M.Y., opening fire on a police armoured vehicle during a demonstration organised in the aftermath of Abdullah Öcalan’s arrest, and receiving training at the organisation’s camp in Iraq. Moreover, when he was asked whether he wished to benefit from Law no. 3419 on Repentance (Pişmanlık Yasası), the applicant turned the offer down, explaining that he found the relevant Law to be “degrading” and “dishonourable”. Every page of the statement form was signed by the applicant. 8. According to an undated form explaining arrested people’s rights, which the applicant duly signed, he was reminded of his right to remain silent and to have access to a lawyer. According to another document dated 14 November 2003, the applicant had been informed of his rights under Article 135 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as in force at the material time and stated that he would like to give his statements without a lawyer present. This was also a pre-printed form that bore the applicant’s signature and the indication that a copy of a form explaining his rights had been given to him. 9. On 15 November 2003 at 11.10 p.m. two police officers and the applicant signed an incident report according to which the applicant had suddenly moved towards a window while in custody, pushing the officers, and had tried to harm himself by punching the window and hitting his head off it. 10. On 16 November 2003 at midnight the applicant was examined at Haseki Hospital in Istanbul by a doctor who noted the presence of an abrasion on the applicant’s third and fifth fingers of his left hand. 11. According to a report drawn up by the police officers and signed by the applicant and his lawyer, T.D., on 16 November 2003, the applicant had seen his lawyer the same day. 12. On 17 November 2003, the applicant underwent a further medical examination at the branch of the Forensic Medicine Institute responsible for the Istanbul State Security Court at 10.30 a.m. The doctor who examined the applicant also observed the same abrasion, adding that the applicant had told him that it had happened when he had hit the window. That report also bore the applicant’s handwritten complaints according to which he had been subjected to external stress, deprived of sleep and subjected to psychological pressure and had not been informed of his rights. However, the doctor concluded that there were no signs of ill-treatment on the applicant’s body. 13. On the same day the applicant was brought before the public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court, where he was once again informed of his right, inter alia, to have access to a lawyer and his right to remain silent. He stated that he did not wish to benefit from the assistance of a lawyer and that he wanted to remain silent. He complained to the prosecutor that he had been subjected to psychological duress at the Istanbul police headquarters, that he had not been informed of his rights and that he had been denied legal assistance. He alleged that when he had asked to see a lawyer, the police had told him that the lawyer had not wished to come to the interview session. 14. On the same day the applicant was questioned by a single judge at the Istanbul State Security Court without a lawyer present, where he expressed his wish to see a lawyer before giving any statement. Thus, the applicant remained silent and refused to make a statement. At the end of the interview, the judge ordered his pre‑trial detention. 15. On 4 December 2003 the public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court filed a bill of indictment with that court against the applicant and four other persons, charging the applicant with the offence of breaking up the unity of the State and seeking to remove part of the national territory from the State’s control, under Article 125 of the former Criminal Code. The acts attributed to the applicant were as follows: involvement in opening fire on a police vehicle during a demonstration on 16 February 1999; involvement in a demonstration of 20 February 1999 where six police officers had been wounded by gunfire; membership of a terrorist organisation; killing M.Y. on 1 June 1999; and collecting money on behalf of a terrorist organisation through coercion. 16. On 17 March 2004 the Istanbul State Security Court held its first hearing (case no. 2003/332), where the applicant denied all the charges against him, as well as his police statement. He maintained that at the Istanbul police headquarters he had been forced to sign a self-incriminating statement prepared by the police officers and that his request for legal assistance had been disregarded. The applicant’s lawyer also stated that the applicant had not been provided with a lawyer during his pre‑trial detention despite his requests, and repeated this allegation throughout the proceedings. He further stated that the witness testimony given by a certain S.N. during a different set of proceedings before the same court (case no. 1999/285), which also concerned the killing of M.Y., included a description of the suspected killer which bore no resemblance to the applicant. The lawyer, therefore, pleaded the applicant’s innocence and applied for his release. At the end of the hearing, the court held, inter alia, that there was no need to summon S.N. as a witness as he had already testified in case no. 1999/285 and he had not had much information about the killing of M.Y. in any event. It also ordered the applicant’s continued detention. It further decided to request the investigation file concerning the torture allegations of the applicant from the Fatih public prosecutor’s office. 17. By Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, published in the Official Gazette on 30 June 2004, the State Security Courts were abolished. The case against the applicant was therefore transferred to the Twelfth Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court. 18. At a hearing held on 25 August 2004 the applicant’s lawyer informed the trial court that the Fatih public prosecutor had delivered a decision not to prosecute the police officers and that he had lodged an objection (itiraz) against that decision. 19. At a hearing held on 22 November 2004 case no. 2003/332 was joined with case no. 1999/285, which was also pending before the Twelfth Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court. 20. At a hearing held on 6 April 2005 the applicant’s lawyer informed the trial court that the objection against the decision of the Fatih public prosecutor had been dismissed by the Beyoğlu Assize Court. 21. At a hearing held on 20 July 2005, the applicant’s lawyer stated that in accordance with Article 148 § 4 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure, in force as of 1 June 2005, statements taken by the police without a lawyer present should not be used unless confirmed by the individual before a judge or a court. Thus, he asked the court to exclude the applicant’s statements to the police. The trial court did not respond to his application. 22. At a hearing held on 9 November 2005 the trial court received a copy of the Fatih public prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute the police officers who had allegedly ill-treated the applicant. At the same hearing, the applicant’s lawyer, while referring to his previous defence submissions, stated that the applicant’s police statement had no probative value in line with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The trial court did not give a ruling on that issue. 23. At a hearing held on 6 March 2006 the applicant’s lawyer submitted once again that the evidence had been collected in respect of the applicant had been in breach of the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that such evidence should not be used in the trial. The trial court did not respond to this application. 24. At a hearing held on 5 June 2006 the public prosecutor read out his observations on the merits of the case, stating that the applicant should be convicted and sentenced under Article 125 of the former Criminal Code. At the same hearing, the applicant’s lawyer and some of the lawyers of the other co-defendants applied for time to prepare their defence submissions in reply to the public prosecutor’s observations on the merits of the case. The trial court adjourned and granted them further time until the next hearing on 26 July 2006. 25. At a hearing held on 26 July 2006, the trial court noted that two different lawyers of the other co-defendants had informed the court that they would be unable to attend the hearing as one of them had another hearing outside Istanbul and the other one had a hearing in another court in Istanbul. Referring to the absence of those lawyers and the fact that they had not been able to prepare their defence submissions, the applicant’s lawyer also asked the trial court to give them a short period of time to prepare their written observations in reply to the public prosecutor’s observations on the merits. The trial court accepted the excuses of the two lawyers, adjourned and granted all three lawyers further time to prepare their submissions. 26. At the next hearing, held on 13 November 2006, the public prosecutor read out his observations on the merits and reiterated his previous observations. The applicant’s lawyer did not attend that hearing. The lawyer of co-defendant M.A. and the applicant applied for more time to prepare their submissions. The trial court adjourned and granted that application, stating that it would give them time until the next hearing but that it would be for the last time. 27. At the hearing of 12 March 2007 the applicant’s lawyer submitted a seven-page-long defence submission where he reiterated, inter alia, that the applicant had been subjected to torture while in police custody and had been forced by the police to sign his statements. In that respect, he referred to Article 148 of the Code of Criminal Procedure pursuant to which statements that had been obtained through such methods could not be used in evidence. Moreover, the applicant’s lawyer reiterated that Article 148 § 4 of the Code provided for a specific proscription of the use of police statements taken without a lawyer present unless they had been confirmed by the individual before a judge or a court. Thus, he asked the trial court not to use the applicant’s police statements taken without his lawyer present, given that he had never accepted the content of those statements. According to the applicant’s lawyer, it would be a breach of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention were the trial court to rely on the applicant’s statements to the police to convict him. At the same hearing, M.A.’s lawyer once again applied for additional time to prepare defence submissions, citing his inability to meet his client and the voluminous nature of the case file. The applicant’s lawyer stated that in the event of another adjournment of the trial, he would like to make his oral submissions at the next hearing. The trial court noted the reasons put forward by M.A.’s lawyer, adjourned and granted them further time until the next hearing. 28. At the next hearing, held on 2 July 2007, it was noted that M.A.’s lawyer had sent a fax to the trial court in which he had provided an excuse and asked for an adjournment. The applicant’s lawyer was present and reiterated his defence submissions that the evidence against the applicant was unlawful and that it could not be used by the trial court. The trial court did not respond to this application. However, the trial court accepted the excuse of M.A.’s lawyer, adjourned and granted further time to that lawyer for the preparation of his defence submissions on the merits. 29. At the next hearing, held on 8 October 2007, the trial court noted the application lodged by M.A.’s lawyer asking for M.A. to be represented by new counsel. The applicant’s lawyer was present and reiterated his previous defence submissions. The trial court adjourned the hearing with a view to appointing a new lawyer for M.A. and granting that lawyer time to prepare defence submissions. 30. On 12 December 2007 the applicant’s lawyer was present and he once again reiterated his previous submissions. M.A.’s new lawyer applied for additional time to prepare defence submissions and was granted this by the trial court. 31. At a hearing held on 2 June 2008 the applicant’s lawyer sent a fax to the trial court in which he provided an excuse for his inability to attend the trial. The trial court heard evidence from a defence witness in respect of M.A. in relation to his ill-treatment allegations. M.A.’s lawyer further raised a plea of unconstitutionality in relation to the maximum permissible period of detention. The trial court decided to examine the plea of unconstitutionality raised by M.A.’s lawyer, accepted the applicant’s lawyer’s excuse and granted him additional time to prepare his oral submissions. 32. At a hearing held on 19 November 2008 the applicant’s lawyer was present and he once again reiterated his previous submissions. M.A.’s lawyer asked the trial court to conduct an additional investigation and hear S.N. as a witness with a view to shedding light on M.Y.’s killing. That lawyer once again asked for additional time to prepare his defence submissions. The trial court dismissed the plea of unconstitutionality, granted M.A.’s lawyer further time to prepare his defence submissions and adjourned. 33. At the hearing held on 19 December 2008 the applicant’s lawyer was present and he once again reiterated his previous submissions. However, another lawyer for M.A. was present and she applied for additional time to prepare defence submissions. The trial court adjourned and granted her further time. 34. On 13 February 2009 the Twelfth Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court found the applicant guilty as charged, convicted him under Article 125 of the former Criminal Code of breaking up the unity of the State and seeking to remove part of the national territory from the State’s control, and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The trial court listed, among other pieces of evidence, “the statements of the accused throughout the proceedings” in the “evidence” part of its judgment. In the part entitled “assessment of evidence and reasons”, the trial court noted that one of the accused, namely M.Z.Ç., had sent a letter to the court on 12 May 2004 in which he had stated that M.Y. had been abducted and killed by Ma.Y., F.A. and M.H. The trial court concluded that that statement had been corroborated by the autopsy report, a sketch of the scene and a police report establishing that the gun that had been used to kill M.Y. had been the same one that had been used in the demonstration of 20 February 1999. It went on to hold that the defendants’ denial during the trial of their guilt should be dismissed in the light of that evidence. 35. The trial court also noted that documents of an organisational nature and documents containing descriptions for the construction of bomb mechanisms handwritten by the applicant as well as the invoices of the illegal organisation had been found. In view of that evidence and the statements of the witnesses and the victims, it found it established that co-defendants M.Z.Ç. and Ma.Y. had both on their own and on the applicant’s orders attempted to or collected money on behalf of the illegal organisation through coercion. Taking into account the participation of the applicant, M.Z.Ç. and Ma.Y. in the demonstration of 20 February 1999, and their positions within the illegal organisation, the trial court considered that the killing of M.Y. and the completed acts of extortion should be accepted as being “serious enough”, the material element of the offence set out in Article 125 of the former Criminal Code. 36. Lastly, in the “conviction” part of its judgment, the trial court held that the applicant had been a member of an illegal organisation, had taken military training in its mountain camps, had participated in the demonstration on 16 February 1999 on behalf of that illegal organisation and had opened fire on a police vehicle, had been involved in the injury of five policemen on 20 February 1999, and that the three bullet casings found in the scene of that incident had been fired from the pistol that the applicant had used to kill M.Y. on 1 June 1999. The trial court did not assess any evidence in that part of its judgment. 37. The material submitted by the parties to the Court does not contain a copy of the evidence listed either in the “evidence” or in the “assessment of evidence and reasons” parts of the trial court’s judgment. Furthermore, the trial court did not mention any of the defence submissions made by the applicant’s lawyer and merely stated that the applicant had denied the accusations in his defence before the court. Similarly, while twelve out of the fifteen accused that had made incriminatory statements to the police had denied those statements before the trial court, the latter did not conduct any assessment in that regard. 38. At the end of each hearing, the Istanbul State Security Court, and subsequently the Twelfth Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court, considered the applicant’s detention either of their own motion or following an application by the applicant. Each time, they ordered the applicant’s continued detention pending trial, having regard to the nature and seriousness of the offence with which he was charged, the existence of a strong suspicion that he had committed the offence and the state of the evidence. On two occasions the applicant objected to the assize court’s decisions dated 12 March 2007 and 8 October 2007 regarding his continued detention, specifically on 14 March and 15 October 2007. Both of those objections were rejected by the Thirteenth Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court on 21 March 2007 and 24 October 2007 respectively on stereotypical grounds by way of a non-adversarial procedure. More specifically, the examination was conducted on the basis of the case file alone without hearing the applicant or his lawyer although the public prosecutor was consulted on the matter. Moreover, the opinion obtained from the public prosecutor regarding the applicant’s detention was not transmitted to the applicant. 39. On 27 April 2010 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the first-instance court.

4. The applicants are Russian nationals who, at the material time, were living in the Chechen Republic. Their personal details are set out in the appended table. They are close relatives of individuals who disappeared after allegedly being unlawfully detained by servicemen during special operations. The events took place in areas under the full control of the Russian federal forces. The applicants have not seen their missing relatives alive since the alleged arrests. 5. The applicants reported the abductions to law‑enforcement bodies and official investigations were opened. The proceedings were repeatedly suspended and resumed, and have remained pending for several years without achieving any tangible results. The applicants lodged requests for information and assistance in the search for their relatives with the investigating authorities and various law-enforcement bodies. Their requests received either formal responses or none at all. The perpetrators have not been identified by the investigating bodies. 6. Summaries of the facts in respect of each application are set out below. Each account is based on statements provided by the applicants and their relatives and/or neighbours to both the Court and the domestic investigating authorities. The Government did not dispute the principal facts of the cases as presented by the applicants, but questioned the allegation that servicemen had been involved in the events. 7. The first applicant is the mother, and other applicants are brothers of Mr Magomed-Emin Mezhidov, who was born in 1980. 8. Between 13 and 20 May 2002 a military unit of the Russian federal forces in Chechnya under the command of General Bronivitskiy conducted a special operation in the village of Avtury. The military servicemen cordoned off the area and ran identity checks on all the residents. Detained residents were taken to a special filtration camp set up on the outskirts of the settlement. 9. On the morning of 15 May 2002 Mr Magomed-Emin Mezhidov was at home with the first and second applicants. Another relative, Mr M., and a neighbour, were also present. At around 10 a.m. two armoured personnel carriers (“APCs”) arrived at the applicants’ house located in the centre of the village. A group of about twenty armed and masked servicemen in camouflage uniforms broke into the courtyard and threatened all those present with firearms. Having checked the identity documents, the servicemen forced Mr Magomed-Emin Mezhidov into one of the APCs and drove off in the direction of the filtration camp. According to the applicants, the arrest was filmed by journalists. 10. The applicants submitted written statements from Mr B.Dzh., a village resident arrested on 15 May 2002. He had seen Mr Magomed-Emin Mezhidov in the filtration camp. The latter had been exhausted and had complained of ill-treatment by the servicemen. 11. In 2010 Mr Magomed-Emin Mezhidov’s skeletal remains with a bullet hole in the skull were found in a forest near Avtury (see paragraph 17 below). According to the applicants, along with the remains, Mr Magomed‑Emin Mezhidov’s t-shirt, which he had been wearing on 15 May 2002, was found. It had two gunshot holes and a further hole that had been caused by stabbing with a knife. 12. Immediately after the abduction the applicants informed the authorities about it and requested that a criminal investigation be opened into the incident. 13. On 28 November 2002 the Shali district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 59266 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code of Russia (“the CC”) (abduction). On the same day the first applicant was granted victim status. 14. On 28 January 2003 the investigation in the case was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. It appears that the first applicant was informed of that decision on 11 April 2006. 15. On 13 May 2003, in response to an enquiry from the applicants, the investigator informed them that the investigation had been suspended but that operational search activities were under way. 16. On 24 December 2003 and 26 February 2006 the first applicant asked various authorities for assistance in the investigation. It appears that her requests were forwarded to the Chechnya Prosecutor’s Office. By letters of 23 January 2004 and 11 April 2006 the prosecutor’s office informed her that the operational search for the perpetrators was ongoing. 17. On 22 April 2010 the investigating authority found the skeletal remains of Mr Magomed-Emin Mezhidov, and resumed the investigation. On 22 May 2010 the investigation was again suspended. 18. On 21 January 2011 the investigation was resumed again. Three days later the investigating authority obtained a thirty-second video, allegedly made on 15 May 2002. It depicted armed men forcing a person, possibly Mr Magomed-Emin Mezhidov, into an APC. The footage was included in the criminal case file. 19. On 27 January 2011 a new criminal case was opened into the circumstances of Mr Magomed-Emin Mezhidov’s death under Article 105 of the CC (murder). On the same day the investigation in the case was joined to the investigation into the abduction, and suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. It appears that the joint investigation is still pending. 20. The applicants are close relatives of Mr Akhyad Shakhidov, who was born in 1964, and of his brother, Mr Khamzat Shakhidov, born in 1968. The first applicant is the wife of Mr Akhyad Sakharov; the second, third and fourth applicants are his children. The fifth applicant is the wife of Mr Khamzat Shakhidov; the sixth applicant is his son. 21. On the morning of 14 May 2002 a group of about thirty armed military men in camouflage uniforms arrived in APCs and military lorries in the village of Makhkety to carry out an identity check on residents. The men were of Slavic appearance and spoke unaccented Russian. 22. At about 10.30 a.m. the servicemen entered the applicants’ house. Mr Akhyad Shakhidov, Mr Khamzat Shakhidov, the applicants and other family members were at home. The men checked the brothers’ identity documents and searched the premises. Then they forced Mr Khamzat Shakhidov into an APC and took him in the direction of the village of Khattuni, in the Vedeno district. Shortly thereafter, several armed men remaining in the house forced Mr Akhyad Shakhidov into their military lorry and took him in the same direction. 23. On their way out of the village, the military convoy passed a broken‑down UAZ vehicle. The car’s driver, Mr M.K., the head of the Khattuni police department, asked the servicemen for their help with the vehicle, but to no avail. The first applicant, who was following the convoy, asked Mr M.K. where the servicemen were from. The officer replied that they were from Grozny. 24. Another village resident, Mr Zh., was abducted on the same day under similar circumstances. He was released several days later and stated that on the day of the abduction the perpetrators had put him in the same APC as Mr Akhyad Shakhidov and Mr Khamzat Shakhidov. After the ride the men had been separated and he had not seen them again. 25. Immediately after the abduction the applicants informed the authorities thereof and requested assistance in the search for their relatives. 26. On 16 June 2002 the Vedeno district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 73038 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 27. On 22 July 2002 the case file was transferred to the Shali military prosecutor’s office for further investigation. 28. On 17 December 2002 the case file was destroyed by fire. It was reassembled about two years later, in October 2004. 29. On 18 November 2004 the investigation in the case was suspended. 30. On 8 September 2005 the supervising prosecutor ordered that the investigation be resumed. On the same day an examination of the crime scene was conducted. 31. Two days later, on 10 or 11 September 2005, the first and fifth applicants were granted victim status in the case. 32. On 16 September 2005 the Chechnya prosecutor’s office replied to a request from the applicants for information, stating that operational search activities were in progress. 33. On 8 October 2005 it was decided to suspend the investigation. The fifth applicant was informed thereof two days later. 34. On 21 January 2009 the first applicant asked the investigating authorities to provide her with information about the progress of the investigation. On 28 February 2009 the investigators replied that the proceedings were pending. 35. Five years later, on 28 February 2014, the investigation was resumed, particularly, due to the need to examine the applicants’ consistent allegation of the involvement of State servicemen in the abduction, which had not been duly examined since the beginning of the criminal proceedings. On 5 April 2014, the investigators again suspended the proceedings, without having taken any meaningful steps. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 36. The applicants are close relatives of Mr Magomed Israilov, who was born in 1980. The first and second applicants are his late father and mother, who died on 11 June 2013 and 26 March 2014 respectively. The third applicant is Mr Magomed Israilov’s brother. 37. At the material time Mr Magomed Israilov lived with the applicants in the town of Shali, Chechnya. Mr Magomed Israilov’s sister, Ms G.A., was also staying in the house with her son, who was a minor. 38. At around 3 a.m. on 16 August 2002 (in the documents submitted the date was also referred to as 17 August 2002) the family was at home when two APCs and a Ural lorry with a group of about forty to fifty armed servicemen arrived at their house. The servicemen, all of whom were in balaclavas, broke into the house. Having threatened the family members with firearms, they checked their identity documents and searched the premises. They then forced Mr Magomed Israilov and the third applicant out of the house, blindfolded them, tied their hands behind their backs and put them into different APCs. Thereafter, the convoy of military vehicles drove off in the direction of Avtury. 39. The second applicant followed the abductors’ vehicles up to a military checkpoint at the entrance to the military compound of Special Investigative Group-1 (“the military compound”) (Первая Специальная Следственная Группа), located about five hundred metres from their house in the direction of Avtury. He saw the convoy enter the military compound. 40. Mr Magomed Israilov has not been seen since. His abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses, including the applicants and their neighbours. 41. At around 11 p.m. on 17 August 2002 the third applicant was released by the abductors. He was dropped off by the servicemen in front of his aunt’s house in the town of Shali. 42. According to the third applicant, after his abduction he was taken to the military compound. The drive was short, but it was unclear in what direction the vehicle was going. While in detention, he did not see his brother, but heard him screaming. He also heard the guards conversing in unaccented Russian. 43. Searching for their son, the first and second applicants spoke to Colonel T.K., who confirmed to them that Mr Magomed Israilov was detained at the military compound and promised to release him in exchange for money. 44. On 29 August 2002 the Shali district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 59221 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). On the same day the second applicant was granted victim status in the case. 45. On 29 October 2002 the investigation in the case was suspended. 46. On 6 June 2003 the supervising prosecutor overruled the decision to suspend the proceedings and ordered that the investigation be resumed. Subsequently, it was suspended and resumed on several occasions. In particular, it was suspended on 6 June 2003, then resumed on 17 April 2006 and then suspended again on 19 May 2006. 47. On numerous occasions between 2002 and 2006, in particular on 17 March 2003 and 13 March 2006, the applicants complained to various law-enforcement authorities about the abduction and requested assistance in their search for Mr Magomed Israilov. In reply they received letters stating that their complaints had been examined or forwarded to other authorities for examination and that the law‑enforcement agencies were taking measures to establish their relative’s whereabouts. 48. In 2007 the criminal proceedings were resumed and suspended several times, without any tangible results having been achieved. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 49. The first, second and third applicants are respectively the mother, sister and daughter of Mr Razambek Isiyev, who was born in 1983. 50. On 22 July 2002 Mr Razambek Isiyev was driving his car on the Argun-Shali highway. At about 3 or 4 p.m. a group of servicemen in APCs stopped him on the highway and took him to the Federal Security Service (“the FSB”) office in the town of Argun. 51. Later the same day the first applicant contacted Mr M.Kh., the head of a unit at the FSB office, where Mr Razambek Isiyev had been hired the previous day. According to Mr M.Kh., the FSB officer, D.Ts., had told him that Mr Razambek Isiyev had been detained for questioning. 52. At 5 p.m. on 23 July 2002 an APC, a UAZ vehicle and a Ural lorry parked near garages situated next to the applicants’ house. The first applicant saw her son, Mr Razambek Isiyev, inside the UAZ vehicle through its open door. He was pointing in the direction of the garages and explaining something. He saw his mother but before he could say anything the servicemen shut the vehicle door and drove off. 53. At 10 a.m. on 24 July 2002 the servicemen returned to the same place with Mr Razambek Isiyev. This time they used an excavator to dig the ground. They did not find anything and left. 54. On 25 July 2002 the applicants and their relatives gathered in front of the military commander’s office in Argun. Mr M.Kh., the head of the FSB unit, assured the first applicant that he would bring Mr Razambek Isiyev home. For the next several days the first applicant visited the office of the military commander and each time Mr M.Kh. assured her that her son would be released soon. However, Mr Razambek Isiyev has not been seen since. 55. On 3 August 2002 the first applicant complained of the disappearance of her son to the Argun district prosecutor’s office. On the same date the prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 78081 under Article 126 of the CC and granted the applicant victim status in the proceedings. 56. On 3 October 2002 the investigation was suspended, on 27 January 2004 it was resumed, and on 28 January 2004 it was suspended again. 57. On 13 July and 5 August 2004 the North Caucasus military prosecutor’s office forwarded the first applicant’s requests for assistance in establishing her son’s whereabouts to the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102. On 16 August 2004 the latter informed the first applicant that the involvement of their servicemen in her son’s abduction had not been confirmed. 58. On 26 August 2004 the Argun district prosecutor’s office informed the applicants that the investigation of the abduction had been suspended but that search activities were under way. 59. On 12 September 2006 the first applicant asked the investigating authorities to provide her with access to case-file documents. It is unclear whether the request was granted. 60. On 22 February 2007 the first applicant requested the authorities to expedite the search for her missing son. As a result, on 27 March 2007 the investigation was resumed. It was again suspended a month later, on 27 April 2007. 61. On 20 February 2009, 5 August 2010 and 14 February 2011 the applicants asked the investigators to provide them with an update on the progress of the investigation. In reply to the first letter the authorities informed the first applicant that the investigation had been suspended, but that search activities were being undertaken. No reply was given to either the second or the third enquiry. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 62. The first applicant is the mother, and the second applicant the brother of Mr Movsar Limayev, who was born in 1978. 63. At 3.30 a.m. on 28 October 2002 three APCs with smeared registration numbers stopped at the first applicant’s house in the village of Mesket-Yurt. Six armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas jumped over the fence into the courtyard. Two servicemen broke into the house and demanded that the lights be turned on. Then they handcuffed Mr Movsar Limayev, who was in his underwear and barefoot, and took him outside. The intruders ordered the applicants and their relatives to remain in the house. However, the first applicant went outside and saw Mr Movsar Limayev being forced into one of the APCs, which then drove off in the direction of Shali. 64. The applicants have had no news of Mr Movsar Limayev since. 65. On the same day, 28 October 2002, the applicants complained of the abduction to the Shali district police and subsequently to a number of other law‑enforcement agencies. 66. On 31 March 2003 the Shali district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 22053 under Article 126 of the CC. On the same day the first applicant was questioned and granted victim status in the criminal case. 67. On 31 May 2003 the investigation was suspended. 68. On a number of occasions between 2003 and 2005 the applicants complained to various law‑enforcement agencies about the abduction and requested assistance in the search for their relative. In reply they received formal letters, stating either that the investigation was in progress, or that their requests had been forwarded elsewhere. 69. Between November 2005 and August 2006 the criminal case was suspended and resumed several times. The last decision to suspend the investigation of which the applicants were informed was taken on 3 August 2006. 70. On 26 March 2008 the Materi Chechni (Mothers of Chechnya), an NGO with offices in Moscow and the Republic of Ingushetia, complained on behalf of the first applicant to the Prosecutor General’s Office that the investigation into her son’s death had been ineffective. The complaint was forwarded to the investigating authority and included in the criminal case file, but no reply followed. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 71. The first applicant is the wife, and the second applicant the son of Mr Musa Mintsaligov, who was born in 1968. 72. At about 3 a.m. on 10 October 2004 the applicants were at home when a large group of armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms arrived at their house in the village of Valerik, in two APCs and two Ural lorries without registration numbers. A group of about six servicemen broke into the house, forced Mr Musa Mintsaligov outside and took him away to an unknown destination. The servicemen spoke unaccented Russian, most of them were in balaclavas and helmets; those without were of Slavic and Asian appearance. 73. The whereabouts of Mr Musa Mintsaligov remain unknown. His abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses, including the applicants and their neighbours. 74. Immediately after the abduction the applicants informed the authorities thereof and requested that a criminal investigation be initiated. 75. On 15 October 2004 investigators examined the crime scene. 76. On 16 October 2004 an officer of the Valerik traffic police informed the head of the Achkhoy-Martan district police that on the night of the abduction a convoy of military vehicles, consisting of two APCs and two Ural lorries without registration numbers, had left Valerik, passed through a checkpoint, and driven off in the direction of Urus-Martan. 77. On 1 November 2004 the Achkhoy-Martan inter-district prosecutors’ office opened criminal case no. 38052 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 78. Between 26 November and 24 December 2004 the investigators questioned numerous witnesses to the events, most of whom were the applicants’ neighbours and members of their family. They confirmed the circumstances of the abduction as described above. 79. On 25 December 2004 the first applicant was granted victim status in the case and questioned by the authorities. 80. On 1 March 2005 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. It was subsequently resumed on 10 June 2008 and 21 July 2011 following criticism by the supervisors, and then again suspended on 10 July 2008 and 31 July 2011 respectively. 81. In the meantime, on numerous occasions between 2004 and 2006 the applicants complained to various military and law-enforcement authorities about the abduction and requested assistance in the search for their relative. In reply they received letters stating that the law-enforcement agencies were taking measures to establish Musa Mintsaligov’s whereabouts. 82. On 2 July 2010 the first applicant asked the authorities to inform her about the progress in the investigation and to resume the proceedings in the criminal case. Three days later the investigator informed her that the proceedings had been suspended on 10 July 2008 but that operational search activities were in progress. 83. On 2 February 2011 the first applicant asked the investigators to grant her full access to the contents of the investigation file. On 8 February 2011 her request was rejected. 84. On 21 February 2011 the first applicant challenged her lack of access to the criminal case file before the Achkhoy-Martan District Court. 85. On 24 March 2011 the court allowed the applicant’s complaint, having ordered the investigators to grant her full access to the file. 86. On 23 June 2011 the first applicant lodged another complaint with the court, challenging the investigators’ failure to take basic investigative steps. The complaint was rejected on 25 July 2011, because on 21 July 2011 the investigators had already resumed the proceedings. Then, ten days later, the investigation was suspended again. It appears that it is still pending. 87. The applicants are close relatives of Mr Vakhid Yakhyayev, who was born in 1956. The first applicant is his wife, and the second and third applicants are his sons. 88. On 22 April 2002 seven or eight armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms entered the applicants’ house in the village of Goyty. The three applicants, Mr Vakhid Yakhyayev’s father, mother, minor daughter and his daughter-in-law were at home and witnessed the events that followed. Speaking unaccented Russian, the servicemen, who were of Slavic appearance, checked the family’s identity documents. They then said that they would take Mr Vakhid Yakhyayev to the Urus-Martan military commander’s office. After the servicemen had left, the first applicant ran outside and saw an APC and a UAZ- minivan driving away from the house. Mr Vakhid Yakhyayev has been missing ever since. 89. On 22 April 2002 the applicants complained of the abduction to the Urus-Martan district prosecutor’s office. On the same day the latter opened criminal case no. 61077 under Article 126 of CC (abduction) and granted the first applicant victim status in the case. 90. On 22 June 2002 the investigation was suspended and on 21 October 2003 it was resumed. A month later it was suspended again. 91. In October-November 2003 the investigators questioned the three applicants, Mr Vakhid Yakhyayev’s father, mother, minor daughter and his daughter-in-law. All of them confirmed the circumstances of the abduction as described above. 92. On 12 April 2004 the applicants requested that the Urus-Martan district police assist them in their search for Mr Vakhid Yakhyayev. On 2 June 2005 the applicants forwarded a similar request to the Chechnya prosecutor’s office. 93. On 22 February 2006 the applicants requested that the investigation be resumed. It was resumed on 17 July 2006, and then on 28 April 2006 it was suspended again. 94. On 7 August 2006 the applicants requested information on the progress in the investigation and on 28 April 2010 they requested permission to access the investigation file. Their requests were refused, but the applicants successfully challenged the refusal before the Achkhoy‑Martan District Court. Their complaint was granted on 5 October 2010. 95. On 22 June 2011 the applicants asked the investigators to resume the proceedings and inform them of their progress. The next day they received a letter saying that the proceedings had been suspended, but that operational search activities were in progress. 96. On 5 July 2011 the applicants lodged a complaint against the investigators with the Urus-Martan Town Court, seeking the resumption of the investigation. 97. On 21 July 2011 the investigators resumed the proceedings, so the court rejected the applicants’ complaint as groundless. An appeal lodged by the applicants against that decision was upheld by the Chechnya Supreme Court on 24 August 2011. 98. On 31 July 2011 the proceedings were suspended again. 99. In April 2012 the investigators resumed and then again suspended the criminal proceedings. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 100. The first and second applicants are respectively the sister and the wife of Mr Musa Zaurbekov, who was born in 1964. The third, fourth, fifth and sixth applicants are his children, and the seventh applicant is his mother. 101. At about 3 a.m. on 6 May 2003 the applicants and Mr Zaurbekov were at home in Grozny when a group of about ten armed military servicemen in camouflage uniforms broke into their house. Most of the servicemen were in balaclavas and those without were of Slavic appearance. They forced Mr Zaurbekov outside and took him away on foot in the direction of a nearby school, where two APCs and two UAZ vehicles were waiting. The servicemen put Mr Zaurbekov into one of the vehicles and drove off in the direction of Grozny city centre. The abduction took place in the presence of the applicants and their neighbours. 102. The written statements of four neighbours, submitted by the applicants to the Court, confirm the account of the events as described above. 103. The whereabouts of Mr Musa Zaurbekov remain unknown. 104. On 6 May 2003 the first applicant informed the Chechnya prosecutor’s office of the abduction and requested that a criminal investigation be opened. 105. On 16 May 2003 the Staropromyslovskiy district prosecutor’s office in Grozny opened criminal case no. 50052 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 106. On 5 June 2003 the first applicant was granted victim status. 107. On 16 July 2003 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 108. On 20 July 2004 the above-mentioned decision was overruled and the proceedings were resumed. A month later, having not achieved any tangible results, the investigation was suspended. 109. The investigation was subsequently resumed on 30 April 2006, suspended on 30 May 2006, resumed on 2 March 2007, and then suspended again on 3 April 2007. The applicants were not informed of those decisions. 110. On 6 October 2010 the first applicant asked the Stichting Russian Justice Initiative, an NGO based in Moscow, to assist in the search for her brother and lodge information requests with various authorities in an attempt to establish his whereabouts. The second applicant submitted a similar request to the NGO in April 2011. 111. From the documents submitted it transpires that between 2010 and 2011 the applicants contacted the authorities with requests for information, but to no avail. In the autumn of 2011 the first applicant requested that she be allowed to access the investigation file. On 3 November 2011 the investigators granted the request. In 2012 their close relatives and those of Mr Musa Zaurbekov contacted a local human rights NGO, which on their behalf requested various authorities to resume the investigation. 112. On 26 March 2014 the investigation was resumed. The second applicant was granted victim status and questioned by the investigators. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 113. The first applicant is the sister of Mr Aslambek Abdurzakov, who was born in 1976. The second applicant is his mother and the third and fourth applicants are his children. 114. At the material time, Mr Aslambek Abdurzakov was living with his family in the village of Duba-Yurt, Chechnya. 115. At about 4 a.m. on 20 July 2002 (in the documents submitted the date was also referred to as 15 May 2002) the family was at home when a large group of armed military servicemen in camouflage uniforms arrived at their house in an APC and a grey military UAZ minivan. A group of about ten servicemen broke into the house, searched the premises, forced Aslambek Abdurzakov outside, then put him in one of the vehicles and drove off to an unknown destination. 116. The same morning, at some point before the abduction, the same servicemen had broken into the house of Aslambek Abdurzakov’s neighbour, Ms Z.U., and had shot her in the leg. 117. Sometime after the abduction the second applicant received a note, allegedly handwritten by Aslambek Abdurzakov, saying that he was detained in the Urus-Martan remand prison. 118. The whereabouts of Aslambek Abdurzakov remain unknown. 119. On 25 July 2002 the Shali district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 59168 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 120. On 26 July 2002 the first applicant was granted victim status. She and several other witnesses to the abduction were questioned. The applicant’s submissions before the investigators were similar to her account before the Court. 121. On the same date, 26 July 2002, the investigators collected two machine-gun shells found in the house of Ms Z.U., who had been shot in the leg by the abductors. The shells were sent for a ballistics expert examination. 122. On 27 July 2002 the first applicant was questioned again. She confirmed the statement she had given previously and submitted additional information on the registration numbers of the abductors’ APC and the UAZ vehicle. 123. On the same date, 27 July 2002, the investigators questioned the second applicant, who stated, in particular, that a few days after the abduction she had seen the abductors’ UAZ vehicle entering the premises of the Shatoy district police station. 124. On 25 September 2002 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicants were not informed thereof. 125. In 2003 the applicants complained to various authorities about the abduction and requested that an effective investigation be carried out. 126. Between 2006 and 2007 the investigation was suspended and resumed several times. The applicants were not informed of those decisions. 127. On 16 February 2008 the first applicant requested that the investigators inform her about the progress in the proceedings, and sought information from the Federal Service for the Execution of Sentences on the possible detention of Mr Aslambek Abdurzakov in Russian detention facilities. 128. On 20 June 2009 the request was granted in part. The investigators asked the Federal Service for the Execution of Sentences to inform them whether Mr Aslambek Abdurzakov had been detained in a detention facility after his abduction. The outcome of that enquiry is unknown. 129. On 5 March and 20 October 2011 the first applicant was allowed to access the investigation file. 130. On 1 March 2012 the investigation was resumed. The first applicant gave the investigators a blood sample for inclusion in the database for identification of bodies found in the Chechen Republic. A month later, in April 2012, the investigation was suspended again. 131. On an unspecified date in 2012 the first applicant complained to the Shali Town Court of the investigators’ failure to take basic investigative steps. The outcome of those proceedings is unknown. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 132. The applicant is the mother of Mr Saykhan Isayev, who was born in 1984. 133. During the night between 17 and 18 January 2005 armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas arrived at the applicant’s village of Chechen-Aul in an APC, two UAZ- vehicles and a Niva car. The servicemen were armed with machine guns and spoke unaccented Russian. At about 3 a.m. that night a group of about seventeen of them broke into the applicant’s house, searched the premises, violently beat up the applicant’s husband, her three sons and the pregnant wife of one of them. Then the intruders took Mr Isayev away to an unknown destination. 134. The applicant submitted to the Court written statements of several neighbours who saw armed men entering her house and then leaving it with a man on their shoulders. As soon as they left, the neighbours entered the house, saw the injured members of the applicant’s family and learned that Saykhan Isayev had been taken away. His whereabouts remain unknown. 135. On 18 January 2005 the applicant informed the authorities of the abduction and requested assistance in the search for her son. 136. On an unspecified date a decision not to open a criminal case was taken. 137. According to the applicant, shortly after the abduction several agents from the Grozny prosecutor’s office arrived at her house in Chechen-Aul. They advised the applicant and her family not to lodge any official complaints concerning the events. Therefore, for some time after the abduction, fearing for her life and the lives of her family members, she refrained from asking the authorities to open a criminal case. 138. In May 2005 one of the witnesses to the abduction, Mr R.I., was questioned. Her statement was similar to the applicant’s account before the Court. 139. On 8 June 2005 the Grozny district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 44048 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 140. On 20 June 2005 the applicant was granted victim status. 141. On 18 August 2005, 25 and 27 March 2007, and 23 October 2008 several other witnesses, including the applicant’s family members present during the incident, were questioned. Their statements were similar to the applicant’s account before the Court. 142. On 8 October 2005 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. On 2 March 2007 that decision was overruled as premature and the investigation was resumed. The proceedings were subsequently resumed and suspended several times, including at least four suspensions and resumptions between June 2007 and October 2010. 143. In the meantime, on 28 March 2007 two officials from the Chechen-Aul village administration were questioned. They stated, in particular, that prior to the abduction, law-enforcement agencies had made enquiries about Mr Isayev’s home address. 144. On 2 August 2010 and 24 October 2010 two of the applicant’s sons, who had witnessed the abduction, were questioned again. They confirmed the statements they had previously given to the investigators. 145. On 20 October 2010 the investigators examined the crime scene. No evidence was collected. 146. On 4 November 2010 the investigation was suspended again. 147. On 6 April 2016 the investigators resumed the proceedings in order to question the applicant and take a sample of her saliva for inclusion in a database for identification of corpses found in the Chechen Republic. It appears that the investigation is still pending.

4. The applicants were members of the National Bolsheviks Party. 5. On 14 December 2004 a group of about forty Party members, including the applicants, entered the waiting area of the President’s Administration building in Moscow and locked themselves in an office on the ground floor. 6. They asked for a meeting with the President, the deputy head of the President’s Administration Mr Surkov, and the President’s economic advisor Mr Illarionov. They waved placards with “Putin, resign!” («Путин, уйди!») written on them through the window and distributed leaflets with a printed address to the President that listed ten aspects in which he failed to respect the Russian Constitution, and a call for his resignation. 7. The intruders stayed in the office for one hour and a half until the police broke through the door and arrested them. 8. On 16 December 2004 the Khamovnicheskiy District Court of Moscow ordered the applicants’ custody. 9. On 15 and 16 February 2005 the applicants were charged with participation in mass disorders, an offence under Article 212 § 2 of the Criminal Code. According to the statement of the charges, at 12.30 p.m. on 14 December 2004 forty Party members had effected an unauthorised entry into the reception area of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation. They had pushed away the guards at the entrance, knocked over two metal detectors and occupied room no. 14 on the ground floor. They had locked themselves in and blocked the door with a heavy safe. Until the arrival of the police, the Party members, including the applicants, had waved anti‑President placards through the office window, thrown out leaflets and chanted slogans calling for the President’s resignation. They had stayed in the office for approximately one hour, destroyed office furniture and equipment and damaged the walls and the ceiling. 10. On 20 June 2005 thirty-nine persons, including the applicants, were committed for trial before the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow. 11. On 30 June 2005 the Tverskoy District Court held a preliminary hearing. The court ordered, in particular, that all defendants should remain in custody pending trial. 12. The trial started on 8 July 2005. Hearings were held on 11, 14, 27 and 29 July, 1, 3, 10, 12, 15, 19, 22, 23, 29 and 31 August, 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 9, 12, 14, 16, 19, 20, 21, 23, 27 and 30 September, 3, 4, 6, 7, 10, 12, 17 and 24 October and 15, 16, 17, 18, 21 and 22 November 2005. Hearings often continued until late in the evening. 13. According to the applicants, the fast pace of the trial, coupled with the remand centre regulations prohibiting visits on weekends and allowing counsel to see no more than one client per day, prevented them from having a sufficient number of consultations with their counsel. On 1, 2 and 5 September 2005 the applicants asked the court that hearings be held less frequently. They complained that they were tired because on the hearing days they had to get up early. They could not consult a doctor as they left for the courthouse before the facility doctor’s opening hours. They also often left the detention facility before breakfast and returned after supper. They did not therefore receive regular food. Nor could they have a walk in the exercise yard. Finally, they did not have sufficient time for meetings with counsel or relatives. The court rejected their requests and continued to schedule hearings almost every day. 14. On 19 September 2005 counsel unsuccessfully complained, relying on Article 6 § 3 (b) of the Convention, that because of the frequent hearings they did not have sufficient time to meet with the defendants and prepare their defence. 15. While in the courtroom the defendants were held in four metal cages. Counsel tables were placed at a distance of about 1.5 to 2 m from the cages. Police guards were stationed between the cages and the counsel tables. The applicants submitted a courtroom plan and photographs confirming that arrangement. 16. According to the applicants, in the courtroom they could confer with their counsel only during short (two to five minutes) breaks in the hearings. The guards allowed only two counsel to approach the cages at the same time. Given that there were thirty-nine defendants and twenty-four counsel, the defendants could not effectively discuss the case with their counsel. The guards remained near the cages all the time and could hear the applicants’ consultations with their counsel. 17. The defendants asked the judge that conditions be provided in the courtroom for their confidential consultations with counsel. The prosecutor objected, claiming that the defendants could meet their counsel in private in the detention facility. The judge rejected the defendants’ request, finding that the courtroom was not designed for confidential consultations with counsel. The defendants’ meeting with counsel could be held in “some other places”. 18. During the trial the applicants and their co-defendants stated that they had taken part in a peaceful protest against President Putin’s politics. They had come to the President’s Administration to meet the officials and hand over a petition that listed the President’s ten failures to comply with the Constitution and contained a call for his resignation. They had entered the waiting area and, as the guards had attempted to stop them and had threatened them with violence, had locked themselves in an office on the ground floor. They had chanted slogans and distributed leaflets thereby expressing their opinion about important political issues. They denied destroying any furniture or offering resistance to the police. They claimed that the furniture had been destroyed by the guards and the police officers who had arrested them. 19. The guards and the police officers testified that the defendants had forced their passage into the building by knocking down two metal detectors and had locked themselves up in one of the offices. They had resisted the attempts to force the door. After the door had been forced, the witnesses had seen that the furniture in the office had been damaged. As the defendants had refused to leave the office, they had been dragged out by force. 20. Counsel for the defendants asked the guards questions about the names and positions of the persons who had given orders during the arrest operation, the number of persons involved in the arrest operation, the witnesses’ exact positions and duties and about the substance of the orders they had received from their superiors. The witnesses refused to reply referring to the confidential nature of that information. 21. Counsel asked the judge to take measures provided by law, such as a fine, in order to compel the witnesses to reply to the questions. They also asked that the questioning be continued in camera, given that confidential information was to be discussed. They argued that the questions were relevant and important for the defence because it was necessary to understand whether the police and the guards had acted within their powers. The judge rejected their requests, finding that there was no reason to believe that State secrets would be revealed during the questioning of the witnesses. In any event, the questions put by the defence were irrelevant. 22. On 8 December 2005 the Tverskoy District Court found the applicants and their co-defendants guilty of participation in mass disorders. It held as follows: “[The defendants], acting in conspiracy, committed serious breaches of public safety and order by disregarding established norms of conduct and showing manifest disrespect for society ... They effected an unauthorised entry into the reception area of the President of the Russian Federation’s Administration building and took over office no. 14 on the ground floor... They then blocked the door with a heavy metal safe and conducted an unauthorised meeting, during which they waved the National Bolsheviks Party flag and placards, threw anti-[Putin] leaflets out [of windows] and issued an unlawful ultimatum by calling for the President’s resignation, thereby destabilising the normal functioning of the President’s Administration and preventing its reception personnel from performing their service duties, namely ... reception of members of the public and examination of applications from citizens of the Russian Federation ... While performing the above disorderly acts [the defendants] ... destroyed and damaged property in the offices of the reception area of the President’s Administration building ...” 23. Given that the defendants had voluntary compensated the pecuniary damage caused by their actions and taking into account their positive references, the court sentenced the majority of them to various terms of imprisonment (ranging from one year and six months to three years) conditional on two or three years’ probation. They were immediately released. Eight defendants, including five applicants (Mr Osnach, Mr Reznichenko, Ms Ryabtseva, Mr Tonkikh and Ms Chernova), were sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from two years to three years and six months without remission. The court found that those defendants could not be released on probation, taking into account their active role in the commission of the offence, negative references and the fact that some of them had been earlier charged with administrative or criminal offences which however did not result in convictions. 24. The applicants appealed. They complained, in particular, that their defence rights had been substantially curtailed. They also submitted that when determining the sentences the trial court had unlawfully taken into account the defendants’ respective roles in the commission of the imputed offence, given that the charges brought against them were identically phrased and that the role and actions of each defendant had not been detailed. 25. On 29 March 2006 the Moscow City Court upheld the conviction on appeal, finding that the charges had been brought in accordance with the procedure provided by law and the defence rights had been respected.

5. The applicant was born in 1970 and is currently serving a prison sentence. 6. The applicant has been involved in various political organisations and local and international non-governmental organisations for a number of years. In 2009 he co-founded a political organisation named the Republican Alternative Movement (“REAL”) whose initial goal was to oppose the proposed changes to the Constitution, which included abolition of the limits on the re-election of the president, at the constitutional referendum of 18 March 2009. In 2012 the applicant was elected REAL’s chairman. In this capacity, he expressed views opposing the current Government (for more detail, see an earlier judgment of this Court, Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, no. 15172/13, §§ 6-7, 22 May 2014). According to the applicant, REAL was quickly becoming one of the main political forces opposed to the ruling Government. In 2014 it announced that it was beginning a process of transforming itself into a political party. 7. The applicant had intended to stand as a candidate in the presidential elections of November 2013, but was unable to do so owing to the events giving rise to the present case and his nomination as a candidate was rejected by the electoral authorities (for more detail, see Ilgar Mammadov, cited above, §§ 8 and 62-67). During the events giving rise to the present case, he also made an unsuccessful attempt to have himself registered as a candidate for repeat parliamentary elections in Agdash Constituency No. 90 in June 2016. 8. Following the applicant’s arrest described below, another member of the REAL board, Mr Rasul Jafarov, was arrested under charges of illegal entrepreneurship, tax evasion and abuse of power (for more detail, see Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, no. 69981/14, 17 March 2016). According to the applicant, four other current or former members of the REAL board were forced to leave the country owing to the “pressure by the Government”. 9. In the below-mentioned criminal proceedings, one of the applicant’s co-defendants was Mr Tofiq Yaqublu, who was a deputy chairman of the Musavat Party and who also worked as a columnist for the Yeni Musavat newspaper (see Yagublu v. Azerbaijan, no. 31709/13, 5 November 2015). Pursuant to a presidential pardon decree of 17 March 2016, Mr Yaqublu was released from serving the remainder of his prison sentence. 10. The circumstances relating to the Ismayilli events and the applicant’s visit to Ismayilli are described as follows in Ilgar Mammadov (cited above, §§ 9-12): “B. The Ismayilli events of January 2013 9. On 23 January 2013 rioting broke out in the town of Ismayilli, located to the northwest of Baku. According to media reports quoting local residents, the rioting was sparked by an incident involving V.A., the son of the Minister of Labour and Social Protection and nephew of the Head of the Ismayilli District Executive Authority (‘IDEA’). It was claimed that after being involved in a car accident, V.A. had insulted and physically assaulted passengers of the other car, who were local residents. On hearing of the incident, hundreds (perhaps thousands) of local residents took to the streets and destroyed a number of commercial establishments (including the Chirag Hotel) and other property in Ismayilli thought to be owned by V.A.’s family. 10. On 24 January 2013 the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Prosecutor General’s Office issued a joint press statement, placing the blame for the rioting on E.S., a hotel manager, and his relative [El.M.], who had allegedly been drunk and who, it was claimed, had committed acts of hooliganism by damaging local residents’ property and inciting people to riot. 11. Meanwhile, [N.A.,] the Head of IDEA, V.A.’s uncle, publicly denied that the Chirag Hotel belonged to his family. 12. On 24 January 2013 the applicant travelled to Ismayilli to get a first‑hand account of the events. On 25 January 2013 he described his impressions from the trip on his blog. The entire post read as follows: ‘Yesterday afternoon I spent a little longer than two hours in Ismayilli, together with [another member] of our Movement [REAL] and our media coordinator... First, here is [the summary of] what I wrote on Facebook during those hours using my phone: - We have entered the town. - There is a lot of police and their number is growing. The protesters gather each hour or two and make speeches. We are in front of the building of the [Ismayilli District] Executive Authority. There are around 500 police officers in this area. - The cause of the events is the general tension arising from corruption and insolence [of public officials]. In short, people have had enough. We are having conversations with local residents. - The [ethnic] Russians of the village of Ivanovka are also fed up; they tried to come to [Ismayilli] to support the protest, but the road was blocked and they were sent back. - Everybody is preparing for the night. - We are leaving Ismayilli, returning to Baku. The matter is clear to us. Quba was the first call. Ismayilli is the second. After the third call, the show will begin. We came back after having fully investigated the situation in Ismayilli. I wrote that clashes would again take place in the evening, by posting ‘everybody is preparing for the night’ [on Facebook]. People there had been saying ‘We’ll give them hell in the evening; we have procured supplies’ (meaning the fuel for Molotov cocktails had been bought). People are angry. There are also those who do not care and who are afraid, but those who are not afraid are very exasperated and will continue the protest at night. This is no longer a political situation where we could stay there and try to change something; this is already a situation of disorderly crisis which requires conciliatory steps by the State to be resolved. No one should fool oneself or others. The events in Ismayilli were not and are not a calm peaceful protest, it is an extremely violent but just protest and the responsibility for it lies with Ilham Aliyev. As it is with all revolutionary processes, in the beginning the political initiative is still in the hands of the President, but by not taking action he is gradually losing this initiative. When [such leaders] begin to react to the situation, it is usually too late and their actions have no effect. Mubarak, the Shah of Iran, and all others have gone this way’.” 11. A day before posting the above in his blog, on his way back by car from Ismayilli to Baku on 24 January 2013, between 5.41 and 5.46 p.m. the applicant gave a live interview to Azadliq Radio by phone, stating in particular as follows (as quoted in the domestic courts’ judgments): “Our impressions are such that, after the Quba events, this is the most serious warning to the Azerbaijani leadership that the State can no longer be governed in this manner. So, we saw a lot of police. And so, we saw up to five hundred members of various forces, the police and internal troops in front of [the IDEA building]. And people held discussions in small groups and from time to time small groups united and, for example, shouted slogans. Their main demand was for [the Head of the IDEA] to apologise for these events. Because it is claimed that his relative had caused the initial incident [that sparked the riot]. However, the government representatives consider that the State is not responsible [for these events]. Thereafter we spoke to many people from the local population. All of them were discontent, and the main reason was, of course, last night’s event, that is apparently the car accident [that sparked the riot]. But in reality there are deep social and economic problems at the root of this incident. A few families, a few small groups control the entire economy of the whole region, all of them are one another’s relatives, there can be no talk of any competitive, just economy, social infrastructure is undeveloped, people live from pension to pension. Then, there are many complaints. Ordinary people say, for example, that when cash for pensions is brought [to the region] by a bank car, the cash is put into ATMs and is available for withdrawal a week later. The people suspect that that money is invested for interest during that week and those responsible for this make profit from the interest gained on the social funding of the entire region.” 12. Subsequent circumstances are described as follows in Ilgar Mammadov (cited above, §§ 13-15): “13. On 28 January 2013 the applicant posted more information on his blog concerning the events, citing the official websites of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism and the Ministry of Taxes and publishing screenshots of those sites. In particular, he noted that, according to those sources and to information posted on V.A.’s Facebook account, the Chirag Hotel was actually owned by V.A. This directly contradicted the earlier denial by the Head of IDEA. The information cited by the applicant was removed from the aforementioned Government websites and V.A.’s Facebook page within one hour of the applicant publishing his blog entry. However, the blog entry itself was extensively quoted in the media. 14. On 29 January 2013 the Prosecutor General’s Office and the Ministry of Internal Affairs issued a new joint press statement concerning the events in Ismayilli. It noted that ten people had been charged with criminal offences in connection with the events of 23 January 2013, and had been detained pending trial. In addition, fifty‑two people had been arrested in connection with their participation in ‘actions causing a serious breach of public order’; some of them had been convicted of ‘administrative offences’ and sentenced to a few days’ ‘administrative detention’ or a fine, while others had been released. The statement further noted that ‘lately, biased and partial information has been deliberately disseminated, distorting the true nature of the mentioned events resulting from hooliganism’, including information about large numbers of injured people and the disappearance of one individual. The statement refuted that information, noting that only four people had been admitted to the regional hospital with injuries and that no one had disappeared. It further stated, inter alia, the following: ‘Following the carrying out of inquiries, it has been established that on 24 January 2013 the Deputy Chairman of the Musavat Party, Tofiq Yaqublu, and the Co‑chairman of the REAL Movement, Ilgar Mammadov, went to Ismayilli and made appeals to local residents aimed at social and political destabilisation, such as calls to resist the police, not to obey officials and to block roads. Their illegal actions, which were calculated to inflame the situation in the country, will be fully and thoroughly investigated and receive legal assessment.’ 15. On 30 January 2013 the applicant commented on that statement on his blog. He noted that the Government had taken a decision to ‘punish and frighten’ him, and that there were several reasons for that: firstly, the applicant’s blog posting of 28 January 2013, which had revealed facts embarrassing the Government; secondly, the fact that REAL had raised a public debate on the June 2012 legislative amendments aimed at keeping secret information concerning shareholders in companies, creating ‘a more clandestine environment for stealing the oil money’; thirdly, the applicant’s earlier criticism of the National Assembly, in which he compared it to ‘a zoo’, following enactment of the legislation placing ‘severe limitations on the freedom of assembly’ by ‘introducing unjustifiably high monetary penalties for attending unauthorised demonstrations’; and lastly, the REAL Movement’s ‘quickly accumulating strength’ prior to the presidential election, becoming a ‘serious barrier in the eyes of the traditional [political] players’ and threatening ‘to spoil the repeat of the election farce performed year after year’.” 13. On 4 February 2013 the Prosecutor General’s Office charged the applicant with criminal offences under Articles 233 (organising or actively participating in actions causing a breach of public order) and 315.2 (resistance to or violence against public officials, posing a threat to their life or health) of the Criminal Code, in connection with his alleged involvement in a riot in the town of Ismayilli on 24 January 2013. On 30 April 2013 the applicant was charged under Articles 220.1 (mass disorder) and 315.2 of the Criminal Code, thereby replacing the original charges. 14. The applicant, Tofiq Yaqublu and two other defendants, E.I. and M.A., charged solely in connection with the events of 24 January 2013 (see paragraph 20 (b) and (c) below) were joined as defendants to the existing criminal case concerning the events of 23 January 2013. 15. The specific actions attributed to the applicant were described as follows: “Beginning at around 3 p.m. on 24 January 2013, Ilgar Eldar oglu Mammadov, having taken advantage of the fact that from around 9.30 p.m. on 23 January 2013 a group of persons in the town of Ismayilli had engaged in acts of malicious hooliganism causing a serious breach of public order, had deliberately burned, in a publicly dangerous manner, property belonging to various persons [including] the Chirag Hotel, four cars, five mopeds and scooters, and an auxiliary building located in the yard of a private residential house, and had committed acts of violence against Government officials, having, in his false way of thinking, considered [the above events] as a ‘rebellion’, aiming to make the above acts develop and acquire a continuous character in order to create artificial tension and to violate the social and political stability in the country, being a resident of Baku, arrived in Ismayilli and, together with Tofiq Rashid oglu Yaqublu and with the active participation of others, [committed the following:] organised, as an active participant, acts causing a serious breach of public order, by means of openly and repeatedly inciting town residents [E.I.], [M.A.] and others, who had gathered at the square near the administrative building of the Regional Education Department located on the Nariman Narimanov Street opposite to the administrative building of [the IDEA], [to do the following:] [i] to enter in masses into the area in front of the building of [the IDEA], which is the competent body of the executive power of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and by doing so to create difficulties for the movement of traffic and pedestrians, [ii] to disobey the lawful demands to disperse, made by Government officials wanting to stop their illegal behaviour, [iii] to resist uniformed police officers protecting the public order, by way of committing violent acts posing danger to [police officers’] life and health, using various objects, [iv] to disrupt the normal functioning of [the IDEA], State enterprises, bodies and organisations, as well as public-catering, commercial and public-service facilities, by way of refusing to leave, for a long period of time, the areas where the acts seriously breaching the public order were being committed, and [v] to stop the movement of traffic, by way of blocking the central avenue and the Nariman Narimanov Street, and was finally able to achieve that, at around 5 p.m. of the same day in the town of Ismayilli, a group of persons consisting of [E.I.], [M.A.] and others had marched in masses from the mentioned square in the direction of the administrative building of [the IDEA] and had thrown stones at officers of the relevant bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs who were preventing [this march] in accordance with the requirements of the law. By these actions, Ilgar Eldar oglu Mammadov committed the criminal offences under Articles 233 [later replaced by Article 220.1] and 315.2 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan.” 16. The circumstances relating to the applicant’s pre-trial detention and the pre-trial proceedings are described in detail in Ilgar Mammadov (cited above, §§ 16-55). 17. In that judgment, the Court found that, during the pre-trial period, the applicant had been deprived of his liberty without a “reasonable suspicion” of having committed a criminal offence, in breach of the requirements of Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention (ibid., §§ 87-101), that he had not been afforded a proper judicial review of the lawfulness of his detention in breach of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention (ibid., §§ 111-19), that his right to presumption of innocence under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention had been breached owing to the prosecuting authorities’ prejudicial statements made before he had been proved guilty according to law (ibid., §§ 125-28), and that the restriction of the applicant’s liberty had been applied for purposes other than bringing him before a competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence, constituting a breach of Article 18 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 5 of the Convention (ibid., §§ 137-44). 18. After completion of the pre-trial investigation, the applicant’s case was sent to trial at the Sheki Court for Serious Crimes. The applicant was to be tried, together with seventeen others, in connection with the Ismayilli events. 19. The applicant’s formal indictment sent by the prosecution to the trial court appears to have essentially repeated the initial accusations against him (see paragraph 15 above). It added, however, that as a result of the acts of mass disorder committed at around 5 p.m. on 24 January 2013, six specifically named police officers had been subjected to violence threatening their lives and health (see paragraph 48 below). 20. Out of the seventeen other defendants: (a) fourteen were accused of participating in the riots on 23 January 2013 (which involved actions breaching public order, burning of private property, and acts of violence against public officials). They were charged under Articles 186.2.1, 186.2.2, 220.1 and 315.2 of the Criminal Code; (b) one defendant, Mr Tofiq Yaqublu, also an opposition politician, was accused, like the applicant, of “organising” and actively participating in public disorder on 24 January 2013 by means of inciting local residents to commit acts breaching public order and acts of violence. Like the applicant, he was charged under Articles 220.1 and 315.2 of the Criminal Code; and (c) two defendants, E.I. and M.A., were accused of participating, together with the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu, in the continuation of the riot on 24 January 2013 (which involved actions breaching public order and acts of violence against public officials). They were also charged under Articles 220.1 and 315.2 of the Criminal Code. 21. On 4 November 2013 the Sheki Court for Serious Crimes held a preliminary hearing at which it examined a number of applications lodged by the applicant and other defendants. 22. In particular, the applicant applied to the court requesting, firstly, that it hold its hearings in a larger courtroom which could accommodate media representatives and, secondly, that it allow for video and audio recording of the hearings. The court rejected the first request, noting that no media representatives had asked to attend the hearings. It also rejected the second request, finding that the victims of the criminal offences participating in the preliminary hearing had objected to being recorded during the trial. 23. After a break in the preliminary hearing, the defence lodged an objection to the composition of the court, referring to the fact that it had rejected the two previous requests. The court refused to examine the objection, finding that it was ill-founded and intended to delay the trial. It noted in this connection that most of the text of the objection had been pre‑printed before the hearing, indicating an intention by the defence to object to the composition of the court no matter what happened at the hearing. 24. The defence then applied to the court with the following requests: (a) that the applicant be released from detention, with reference to Article 5 of the Convention and various provisions of the domestic law; (b) that the proceedings against the applicant be discontinued owing to the absence of corpus delicti and on the grounds that the charges against him were false; and (c) that the evidence against the applicant obtained at the pre-trial stage, including statements by a number of prosecution witnesses (including those mentioned in paragraphs 48 and 52-56 below), be declared inadmissible on the grounds that it had been unlawfully obtained, and that letters from the Ismayilli Region Police Department (“the Ismayilli RPD”) and the Ministry of National Security (“the MNS”) (see paragraph 73 below) also be declared inadmissible on the grounds that they contained information that had not been verified independently by the prosecution authorities. 25. By an interim decision of 5 November 2013, delivered following the preliminary hearing, the Sheki Court for Serious Crimes decided to reject the applicant’s requests as unsubstantiated, and to “keep unchanged” the preventive measure of remand in custody. 26. The trial spanned approximately thirty hearings. During the course of the hearings, the Sheki Court for Serious Crimes examined testimonial evidence, as well as video recordings and other material. 27. At the time of communication of the application to the respondent Government, the Court requested the parties to submit, inter alia, “the transcripts of the first-instance and higher courts’ hearings, in the parts relating to the applicant”. The applicant was not in possession of copies of the trial transcripts, as he was allowed only to consult them. The Government failed to submit full copies of the transcripts of the first‑instance hearings in the parts relating to the applicant, and limited themselves to submitting a small selection of transcripts of the preliminary hearing and transcripts of hearings of 29 November and 29 December 2013 and 13 January 2014, where the first-instance court dealt with various procedural matters. Parts of the transcripts containing full statements of the witnesses and their cross-examination were not submitted. The Government also submitted a selection of transcripts of appellate and cassation hearings. 28. Below is a brief summary of the evidence examined by the trial court, as described in the court’s judgment itself as well as, where relevant, in the indictment and in the parties’ submissions. (a) Statements made by the accused 29. The statements of the fourteen defendants charged with participation in the events of 23 January 2013 (see paragraph 20 (a) above) concerned only the events of 23 January 2013 and did not include any pertinent information about the events of 24 January 2013. The court examined both the statements they had made at the trial hearings and their pre-trial statements. 30. When heard at the trial hearings, thirteen of the above-mentioned fourteen defendants pleaded not guilty and made statements differing from those made at the pre-trial stage. Ten of them alleged that they had given their pre-trial statements under duress, either psychological pressure or physical ill-treatment. At the conclusion of the trial, two of them retracted their allegations of ill-treatment in custody. 31. One of the above-mentioned fourteen defendants admitted his guilt and confirmed his pre-trial statement admitting participation in public disorder on 23 January 2013. 32. E.I. and M.A., the defendants charged with participation in clashes with the police in the morning (around 10:30 a.m.) and the afternoon (around 5 p.m.) of 24 January 2013 (allegedly after having been incited by the applicant) (see paragraph 20 (c) above), did not mention the applicant or Tofiq Yaqublu in their statements. 33. At the trial hearings, E.I. pleaded not guilty and alleged that he had been beaten and tortured by investigators at the pre-trial stage of the proceedings with the purpose of obtaining a statement favourable to the prosecution. He stated that between about 10 a.m. and 11 a.m. on 24 January 2013, there was a crowd of a hundred or so people moving in the direction of the IDEA building. The police used tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse the crowd, and in response the protesters threw stones at the police. E.I. further stated that in the afternoon of 24 January 2013, and more specifically between 4 p.m. and 5 p.m., he had not been in the town at all but had been attending a funeral in a nearby village. A number of other witnesses gave statements, some of which confirmed his version of the events (see paragraph 46 below). 34. In his pre-trial statement, E.I. had stated that he had been in the town in the afternoon of 24 January 2013 and had participated in the clashes with the police; he had not specified the exact time. 35. At the trial hearings, M.A. pleaded not guilty and alleged that he had been beaten by investigators at the pre-trial stage with the purpose of obtaining a statement favorable to the prosecution. In addition, the investigators had demanded a bribe in the amount of 2,000 US Dollars from him. As to the events of 24 January 2013, M.A. stated that he had been in the town between about 10 a.m. and 11 a.m. and that there had been many people in the town centre. In the afternoon, he had left Ismayilli for another town. According to the applicant, in order to prove this, M.A. had asked the court to examine records of the calls made from his mobile phone during the afternoon of 24 January 2013, but the court failed to do so. 36. In his pre-trial statement, M.A. had stated that on 24 January 2013 he had joined the crowd of protesters and thrown stones at the police; he had not specified the exact time. 37. Lastly, Tofiq Yaqublu and the applicant testified as follows. 38. At the trial hearings, Tofiq Yaqublu stated that he had arrived in Ismayilli at or shortly after 4 p.m. on 24 January 2013, together with journalists M.K. and Q.M. (see paragraphs 61 and 64 below) and another journalist. They parked close to a Unibank building located near the IDEA building. They saw a number of police officers in the area. There were also many journalists waiting to interview the head of IDEA. Tofiq Yaqublu spoke to those journalists for two minutes. He then received a call on his mobile phone and, while talking on the phone, saw the applicant together with a REAL member, N.C. (see paragraph 58 below). He stopped for five to ten seconds to quickly greet the applicant. The situation in the area was calm. He then went to see the burned hotel, where he was approached by two or three police officers who asked him to accompany them to a police station. In the police station, he was taken to S.K., a senior police officer of the Ismayilli RPD (see also paragraph 45 below), who enquired about the reasons for his visit to Ismayilli. A little later M.K. was also asked by phone to go to the police station. Both of them were told to leave Ismayilli and to report in Baku that the situation in the town had calmed down. They were then allowed to leave the police station. According to Tofiq Yaqublu, not counting the time he had spent at the police station, he spent about ten minutes in total in Ismayilli. During that time, he did not see any crowds or any clashes and did not hear anyone shouting slogans. He left Ismayilli at around 5 p.m. 39. Tofiq Yaqublu’s statement at the trial slightly differed from his pre-trial statement. In particular, in his pre-trial statement, Tofiq Yaqublu had stated that he had arrived in Ismayilli at around 3 p.m. There he had seen a small group of eight to ten young locals. He had approached them and questioned them very briefly about the events of the previous night. 40. In his statement at the trial hearings, the applicant submitted that his arrest had been politically motivated. As to the events in question, he stated that, after hearing about the events of 23 January 2013 in the news, the next day he and N.C. (see paragraph 58 below) had gone to Ismayilli by car. At around 3.30 p.m. on 24 January 2013 they had entered the Ismayilli Region and had arrived in the Ismayilli town centre at around 4 p.m. On the way to the town centre, they stopped from time to time and spoke to local residents, without getting out of the car, to receive information about the events that had taken place up to that time. In the town centre, they parked at the central square, where there was a group of journalists. He spoke to the journalists who told him that, despite the situation being calm at that moment, there was an atmosphere of tension in the town. While standing next to the journalists, he then posted some observations on his Facebook page. Just then he saw Tofiq Yaqublu passing by, speaking on his mobile phone. They greeted each other. After that, he, N.C. and one of the journalists went to a nearby teahouse. While they were in Ismayilli, there were no crowds of protesters and no violent clashes happening. After spending around thirty minutes in the teahouse, they left the town. On the way back to Baku, he gave a telephone interview to Azadliq Radio. (b) Statements made by victims and witnesses 41. The trial court heard around one hundred witnesses, the majority of whom were prosecution witnesses. Twenty-three of them had the status of victims of criminal offences and were mostly either police officers who had allegedly suffered minor injuries or owners of damaged or destroyed property. (i) Witness statements concerning the events of 23 January 2013 42. The majority of witnesses and victims of the criminal offences gave statements concerning solely the events of 23 January 2013. According to their statements, there was a spontaneous riot by local residents in the evening of 23 January 2013, sparked by violent behaviour of the director of the Chirag Hotel (E.S.) and his companion (El.M.), both of whom were heavily inebriated, after a car accident in which they had been involved. E.S. and El.M. repeatedly insulted and physically assaulted the other car’s driver and some local residents who were in the vicinity of the accident. This resulted in a fight where E.S. and El.M. got beaten up and, with more people joining the fight, it eventually escalated into a riot. The riot continued late into the night and resulted in injuries to a number of people, including several police officers, and the destruction of various property. 43. The victims included the owner, employees and guests of the hotel and a few bystanders who had lost their property, as well as a number of injured police officers. For example, one of the victims, V.Az., a maid employed by the hotel, stated that some of her personal belongings had been destroyed during the events of 23 January 2013. (ii) Witness statements concerning the events of 24 January 2013 (α) Witnesses who did not mention personally seeing the applicant 44. Two police officers stated that there was public disorder on the morning of 24 January 2013 (according to one, between about 10 a.m. and 11 a.m.; according to the other, between about 11 a.m. and noon). A crowd moved from the area near the administrative building of the Regional Education Department in the direction of the IDEA building, throwing stones at the police. One of the two police officers, E.A., stated that between about 10 a.m. and 11 a.m., he had been injured by a stone thrown at him and had been immediately taken to hospital. 45. S.K., a senior police officer of the Ismayilli RPD, gave a lengthy statement about the events of 23 January 2013. As to those of 24 January 2013, he stated that Tofiq Yaqublu had been detained and brought to him at the police station, and that at that time he had been informed that the applicant had also been in Ismayilli but had been “lost among the crowd and disappeared”. S.K. had spoken to Tofiq Yaqublu for about half an hour, and thereafter the latter had been released. According to S.K., there had been outbreaks of unrest throughout the day on 24 January 2013. 46. Thirteen residents of Ismayilli or various villages around Ismayilli made statements, mostly very scant, containing various types of information relating to the events of 24 January 2013. None of those witnesses’ statements related directly to the charges against the applicant or Tofiq Yaqublu. Seven of them stated that on the afternoon of 24 January 2013, they had travelled in the same bus as E.I. (see paragraph 33 above) from one of the villages in Ismayilli Region to the town of Ismayilli, and had arrived in the evening, by which time there was unrest in the town. Three of them specified that they had arrived in the town between 5 p.m. and 6 p.m., while three others stated that they had arrived between 7 p.m. and 8 p.m. or when “it was already dark”. One did not specify the time of arrival. (β) Police officers 47. Ten police officers mentioned in their pre-trial statements that they had seen the applicant on 24 January 2013. Some of them stated that there had been disorder between about 10 a.m. and 11 a.m. on 24 January 2013. They further stated that on the afternoon of 24 January 2013 (according to three of them, at around 4 p.m.; according to two of them, at around 5 p.m.; according to four of them, between 4 p.m. and 5 p.m.; and one of them did not specify the exact time), they had seen a crowd gathered near the administrative building of the Regional Education Department (only two of them specified the size of the crowd, one of whom stated that there were twenty people, and the other – two hundred people). According to the documents in the case file, at least three of them stated that the people moved to the area close to the Regional Education Department along the “hospital road”, which was the informal name for M.F. Akhundov Street used by locals. All ten of them further stated that they had also seen the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu among the crowd, inciting people to act unlawfully by telling them to “block the road, disobey orders, throw stones, go towards the IDEA building”, and that, following this, the crowd had moved towards the IDEA building and thrown stones at the police. 48. According to their own pre-trial statements (as summarised in the first-instance court’s judgment), six of the above-mentioned police officers had allegedly been hit by stones thrown by the crowd on the afternoon of 24 January 2013. All six of them were recognised as “victims of crime”. Two of them stated that they had not sustained any injuries because they had been wearing thick winter coats, while the others either stated that they had received only minor injuries or did not mention any injuries. One of them was the police officer who subsequently retracted his pre-trial statement (see paragraph 49 below), including the allegation that he had been hit by a stone. There were no medical records or other evidence in respect of any injuries to those police officers. According to the applicant, the very first time the above-mentioned six police officers were questioned about the events of 24 January 2013 was five months later, between 24 and 27 June 2013, and it was at that time that it was first alleged that they had had stones thrown at them on the afternoon of 24 January 2013. The Government remained silent in respect of these specific allegations by the applicant and did not submit any relevant documentary evidence refuting them. Neither did the Government submit full copies of these police officers’ pre-trial statements or relevant excerpts of the trial transcripts reflecting their statements at the trial hearings. 49. One of the above-mentioned six police officers gave a differing statement during the trial hearings, claiming that he had been at the police station the whole day on 24 January 2013. He stated that he had not seen any of the accused committing or inciting others to commit acts of disorder. He explained that he had signed his pre-trial statement without having read it. According to the applicant, three months after the first-instance court had delivered its judgment, that police officer was dismissed from the police service. 50. According to the applicant, another police officer also initially retracted his pre-trial statement, giving a similar explanation to that of the above-mentioned officer, but after a break in the hearing, he asked to be heard again and informed the court that he confirmed the content of his pre‑trial statement. The Government did not submit the transcripts reflecting the statements of this witness at the trial and did not otherwise comment on the above allegation by the applicant. 51. The other police officers’ statements at the trial hearings appeared to confirm their pre-trial statements. (γ) Other witnesses 52. According to the first-instance court’s judgment, two residents of Ismayilli, R.N. and I.M., stated that between about 5 p.m. and 6 p.m. on 24 January 2013 they had seen a crowd of people near the administrative building of the Regional Education Department. They had also seen the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu inciting them to riot, after which the crowd moved in the direction of the IDEA building committing acts of mass disorder. Both R.N. and I.M. specified that the crowd moved in the direction of the building of the Regional Education Department, and from there in the direction of the IDEA building, along the “hospital road” (M.F. Akhundov Street). 53. According to the applicant, during cross-examination by the defence, which was not reflected in the first-instance court’s judgment, both of those witnesses, especially R.N., had given answers contradicting their earlier statements. In particular, the applicant claimed in his appeal (see paragraph 117 below) that, in his witness statement, R.N. had said that from around 3 p.m. on 24 January 2013 he had been at his relative’s home for lunch. After lunch, sometime before 5 p.m., he had gone to the area next to the Regional Education Department, where he had seen the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu inciting a large crowd of people to riot and that thereafter the crowd had attacked the police with stones. During cross-examination at the trial hearings, in response to a question by the defence, he had stated that, in connection with this criminal case, he had participated as a witness in the questioning by the prosecution authorities only two days after the Ismayilli events, and that he had not been a participant in any other investigative steps and had not signed any other procedural documents relating to this case. Following that response, the defence produced a copy of the record of the inspection of the damage to the Chiraq Hotel and N.A.’s house, which had been conducted from 10 a.m. to 4.10 p.m. on 24 January 2013 (see paragraph 65 below). According to the record, R.N. had been present during the inspection as an attesting witness and had signed the inspection record. Despite the fact that this had revealed a clear inconsistency between the record and R.N.’s testimony and his responses to the defence’s questions, raising a number of questions as to the witness’s integrity and the truthfulness of his statements, the presiding judge had hastily dismissed the witness without giving the defence an opportunity to ask any more questions. 54. Similarly, according to the applicant, witness I.M.’s statement contained contradictory details and he had been unable to respond to the defence’s questions seeking clarification. Moreover, the defence had found out that that witness’s son was an employee of the burned hotel owned by V.A. 55. The Government remained silent in respect of the above-mentioned allegations by the applicant in respect of R.N. and I.M.’s self-contradictory statements and did not submit any relevant documentary evidence refuting them. Neither did the Government submit full copies of these witnesses’ pre-trial statements or relevant excerpts of the trial transcripts reflecting their statements at the trial hearings. 56. One resident of a nearby village, R.B., who had been in the town on 24 January 2013, stated, briefly, that there had been disorder in the centre of the town between about 4 p.m. and 5 p.m. and that he had seen the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu in the crowd. R.B. specified that the protesters moved towards the town centre along the “hospital road” (M.F. Akhundov Street). According to the applicant, R.B. also stated that he had not heard exactly what the applicant and Tofiq Yagublu had been saying to people around them (see paragraph 116 below for more detail). 57. N.M., a journalist, stated that he had arrived in Ismayilli between about 3 p.m. and 4 p.m. together with N.C. He had seen several other journalists in the town centre. There had been no rioting or clashes with the police at that time. The applicant did not make any inflammatory statements to local residents. After a while, the witness had gone to a teahouse together with the applicant. 58. N.C., the applicant’s colleague from REAL who had travelled together with the applicant and N.M. to Ismayilli, stated that they had arrived in the town at around 4 p.m. There had been no rioting or clashes with the police at that time. After staying in the square near the IDEA building for twenty-five to thirty minutes, they had gone to a teahouse. At around 5 p.m. they had left the town. 59. I.A., a journalist, stated that there had been some disturbances in the town between about 10 a.m. and 11 a.m. and that the police had used water cannons and rubber bullets against the protesters. At around 4 p.m. other journalists had arrived from Baku. The applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu had arrived with them. At that time, there had been no unrest and no clashes with the police. The applicant had invited him for a tea, but he had refused. At around 5 p.m. the applicant had left the town together with N.M. and N.C. After they had left, in the evening, there had been clashes between protesters and the police, which had continued until around 11 p.m. 60. M.R., a journalist, stated that she had contacted the applicant by phone from Baku while he was in Ismayilli on 24 January 2013. 61. M.K., a journalist, stated that he had travelled to Ismayilli together with Tofiq Yaqublu. They had arrived a little after 4 p.m. Very shortly after their arrival, Tofiq Yaqublu had been taken by plain-clothed individuals to the police station. A few minutes later, he himself had gone to the same police station, where both of them had been told that the situation in the town was now calm and had been asked to go back to Baku. No inflammatory statements were made by Tofiq Yaqublu while they were in Ismayilli. 62. R.C., a journalist, stated that between about 3 p.m. and 4.p.m. he had seen Tofiq Yaqublu in Ismayilli. A little while later, sometime between 4 p.m. and 5 p.m., he had seen the applicant and N.C. and had spoken to them for a few minutes. At around that time, plain-clothed individuals had taken Tofiq Yaqublu to the police station. After the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu had left the town, between about 8 p.m. and 9 p.m. there had been a new round of clashes between the protesters and the police. 63. E.M., a journalist, stated that he had seen Tofiq Yaqublu being taken to the police station; he did not specify the time. He had also seen the applicant. In the evening, after the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu had left the town, there had been clashes between protesters and the police. 64. Q.M., a journalist, stated that he had arrived in Ismayilli at around 4 p.m., together with M.K. and Tofiq Yaqublu. The latter had been taken to the police station a few minutes later. There had been no rioting or clashes with the police at that time. He had not seen the applicant at all while he had been in Ismayilli. (c) Other evidence 65. The court also examined various material evidence, including video recordings and photographs of the events; inspection reports of damage to the Chirag Hotel, a house owned by the head of IDEA, several burned cars and scooters, public light fixtures, and other public and private property; and property documents showing, inter alia, that V.A. had property rights to the hotel. It appears that one of the formal inspections of the damaged property was conducted from 10 a.m. to 4.10 p.m. on 24 January 2013, in the presence of R.N. (see paragraph 53 above) as an attesting witness. 66. As for the injuries to police officers during the events of 23 and 24 January 2013, the court took note of six forensic reports dated between 24 and 26 January 2013 documenting various injuries sustained by six police officers on either 23 or 24 January 2013, and a record of 25 February 2013 showing that one more injured police officer had been admitted to hospital on 24 January 2013. None of these seven injured police officers were the same as the six who had allegedly been hit by stones on the afternoon of 24 January 2013 (see paragraph 48 above). 67. The court ordered forensic examinations in respect of allegations of ill-treatment by a number of the accused, including E.I. and M.A. (see paragraphs 30, 33 and 35 above). According to the forensic reports issued on 25 January 2014 (a year after the events in question), no injuries had been found on them. The court questioned four police officers named by the accused in connection with the alleged ill-treatment, all of whom denied that the accused had been ill-treated. The court noted that the majority of the accused, except one, had not complained of ill-treatment before being heard at the trial hearings. A criminal complaint by one of the accused had been examined by the Sabunchu District Prosecutor’s Office and dismissed. In such circumstances, the court concluded that the defendants’ allegations of ill-treatment were ill-founded. 68. In so far as directly relevant to the specific charges against the applicant, the court examined the following evidence. 69. According to the description given in the court’s judgment, a video recording of 24 January 2013 showed the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu “standing in the centre of the town of Ismayilli, opposite to the administrative building of the Education Department, at a place where acts of mass disorder had been committed”. The description did not specify the time of day when that scene had been shot. 70. Another set of video recordings of the events of 24 January 2013 showed a group of local residents in the centre of the town, in N. Narimanov Street and M.F. Akhundov Street, blocking the roads, shouting slogans and disobeying repeated orders by the police to disperse. The same video contained scenes showing E.I. and M.A. throwing stones at the police and encouraging others in the crowd to do the same and to disobey the police. There was also a scene showing a police officer (who was not one of the officers who claimed to have been injured on the afternoon of 24 January 2013 (see paragraphs 44 and 48 above)) getting injured by a stone and leaving the area limping. Lastly, the video showed the police using a water cannon against the crowd and the protesters dispersing in various directions. The description of the above recordings did not specify the time of day when those scenes had been shot. 71. The court also examined the applicant’s mobile phone geo‑localisation records for 24 January 2013. They indicated that at 2.41 p.m. he had been within the zone of the antenna in the town of Gobustan; at 3.39 p.m. – the antenna in the village of Diyalli in the Ismayilli region; at 3.46 p.m., 3.59 p.m., 4.27 p.m., 4.40 p.m. and 4.58 p.m. – the antenna on Javanshir Street in the town of Ismayilli; at 6.09 p.m. – the antenna in the village of Bizlan in the Ismayilli region; at 7:25 p.m. – the antenna in Gobustan; and at 8.41 p.m. – an antenna in Baku. 72. The court further examined the content of the applicant’s blog post (see paragraph 10 above) and the content of the telephone interview he had given to Azadliq Radio between 5.41 p.m. and 5.46 p.m. on 24 January 2013 (see paragraph 11 above). 73. The court also examined information given by the Ismayilli RPD and the MNS, described in the judgment as follows: “According to letter no. 2/117 of the Ismayilli District Police Department dated 1 April 2013, on 24 January 2013, at places where people were densely gathered in front of the Education Department in Ismayilli, [Tofiq Yaqublu], together with [the applicant], incited people to make assertions against the State and government bodies and their activities. According to letter of 6/2274 of the Ministry of National Security dated 20 April 2013, on 24 January 2013 [Tofiq Yaqublu and the applicant] were in Ismayilli and called on residents to resist the police, to block roads ... and to commit other similar acts aimed at disturbing social and political stability.” 74. On 18 November 2013 the applicant’s lawyers applied to the trial court with a number of requests, in particular: (a) that the applicant be released from pre-trial detention, with reference to Article 5 of the Convention and various provisions of domestic law (this request was similar to the one lodged at the preliminary hearing); (b) that various pieces of evidence against the applicant obtained at the pre-trial stage be declared inadmissible, including statements by a number of prosecution witnesses (including those mentioned in paragraphs 48 and 52-56 above) on the grounds that they had been unlawfully obtained, and the letters from the Ismayilli RPD and the MNS (see paragraph 73 above) on the grounds that they contained information that had not been verified independently by the prosecution authorities (this request was also similar to the one lodged at the preliminary hearing); (c) that additional witnesses for the defence be heard (including I.A., R.C., and E.M. (see paragraphs 59 and 62-63 above)) and other additional evidence (inter alia, contemporaneous media reports concerning the events of 24 January 2013) be examined; and (d) that the hearings be held in a larger courtroom which could accommodate media representatives. 75. The court examined those requests at the hearing held on 29 November 2013 and decided: (a) to reject the request for release on the grounds that the applicant’s circumstances had not changed; (b) to reject the request concerning the inadmissibility of the evidence produced by the prosecution, on the grounds that it was ill-founded; (c) to postpone the examination of the request for admission of additional evidence, because it was not sufficiently substantiated; and (d) to reject the request to change the hearing venue, because media representatives were able to attend the hearings in the current venue. 76. It appears from the transcript of the hearing of 29 November 2013 that there was a verbal altercation between the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu on one side, and some prosecution witnesses on the other, and that the presiding judge called the accused to order on several occasions. The judge also issued a warning to one of the applicant’s lawyers, Mr F. Agayev, for loudly objecting to the court’s decisions to reject the defence’s requests. 77. On 2 December 2013, after having consulted the transcript of the preliminary hearing, the applicant’s lawyers applied to the court to amend some of the wording used in the transcript to describe the applicant’s statement during the preliminary hearing to the effect that he considered the trial to be a sham and did not accept the trial court as a fair tribunal. On 13 December 2013 the court held that the transcript had been correct and that the amendments proposed had the purpose of justifying the applicant’s and his lawyers’ disrespectful attitude towards the court during the preliminary hearing. 78. On 29 December 2013 the applicant applied for access to the transcripts of the trial hearings, arguing that under the Code of Criminal Procedure, the transcript of each hearing had to be drafted within three days of the hearing and made available to the parties within the following three days. The court rejected the request, ruling that the transcripts should be made available to the parties not after each trial hearing, but after the completion of the trial. On 13 January 2014 the court reiterated its position on that matter. 79. On 11 January 2013 one of the applicant’s lawyers applied to the court to terminate the participation in the trial as “victims of crime” of six police officers who had allegedly been hit by stones during the afternoon of 24 January 2013 (see paragraph 48 above). He claimed that the decision granting them victim status had been unsubstantiated. In support of the request, the lawyer argued that all of those police officers had first been questioned five months after the events by the same investigator. He further argued that it had not been shown that the police officers had sustained any injuries, and that there were no forensic reports in this respect. Moreover, having been given victim status, unlike regular witnesses, those persons had been present in the courtroom throughout the entire trial, giving them an ability to coordinate their statements, not only with each other but with other prosecution witnesses. 80. It appears that the above-mentioned application was dismissed by the court. 81. At the hearing held on 13 January 2014 one of the applicant’s lawyers, Mr F. Agayev, lodged a second objection to the composition of the court, arguing, inter alia, that the court was biased: it had rejected all of the defence’s requests and created obstacles to the proper questioning of “fake witnesses” by the defence. The court dismissed the objection, finding, inter alia, that it was ill-founded, that the reasons for the objection were artificial and unsubstantiated, and that it appeared to have been lodged with the purpose of delaying the trial. The court also imposed a fine on the lawyer in the amount of 220 Azerbaijani manats (AZN), under Article 107.4 of the CCrP, for disrupting the court proceedings. 82. In February 2013 the applicant’s lawyers applied to the court to admit and examine as evidence contemporaneous reports by various news agencies, including the Azerbaijan Press Agency (“the APA”) and Trend, showing that no clashes had been reported to be happening in Ismayilli at the time the applicant was there. It appears that this request was rejected. 83. After the Sheki Court for Serious Crimes had delivered its judgment (see paragraphs 85 et seq. below), on 17 March 2014 the applicant’s lawyers and on 19 March 2014 the applicant himself applied for access to the transcripts of the court hearings. On 4, 10, 16 and 22 April 2014 the applicant was given access to the transcripts for a total of seventeen hours and thirty minutes. It appears that one of the applicant’s lawyers, Mr F. Agayev, was not given access to the transcripts because he had refused the demand by a court clerk to hand over all of the technical devices he had been carrying (his mobile phone, tablet, and so on) which could have been used to photograph pages of the transcripts. He had refused that demand on the grounds that there were more than ten volumes of transcripts (a total of about 2,000 to 3,000 pages) and that there was not enough time to properly consult them without the use of technical devices. It appears from the documents in the case file that the applicant’s other lawyer, Mr K. Bagirov, was given access to the transcripts for an unspecified period of time. However, he was not allowed to make copies of the transcripts. 84. On 28 April 2014 the applicant submitted to the Sheki Court for Serious Crimes his remarks concerning the transcripts of the trial hearings, of which he had time to read about 500 pages. He alleged that in a number of instances various statements by witnesses had been distorted or misrepresented in the transcripts in a manner unfavourable to him. By a decision of 12 May 2014 the court refused to accept the applicant’s remarks, holding that the transcripts were accurate. 85. On 17 March 2014 the Sheki Court for Serious Crimes delivered its judgment, deciding as follows. 86. As to the accused whose allegations of ill-treatment were considered to be ill-founded (see paragraph 67 above), the court decided to take into account their pre-trial statements, in which they had admitted the factual accusations against them, as more truthful than their statements at the trial hearings, in which they had pleaded not guilty and claimed to have been ill‑treated at the pre-trial stage. 87. In respect of the other accused and witnesses who had given differing statements at the pre-trial stage and during the trial hearings, including the police officer who had retracted his pre-trial statement (see paragraph 49 above) and the accused E.I. and M.A., the court decided to take into account the pre-trial statements as being more “truthful and objective”, reasoning that the statements they had made later at the trial hearings, which had been more favourable to the accused, had been inconsistent with other evidence and had been designed to help the accused “avoid criminal liability”. 88. With regard to the accusations against the applicant in particular, the court found as follows. 89. The statements of prosecution witnesses, video recordings and other evidence proved that there had been mass disorder in Ismayilli between about 4 p.m. and 5 p.m. on 24 January 2013, that the applicant had been in Ismayilli at that time, and that, together with Tofiq Yaqublu, he had incited local residents, including E.I. and M.A., to commit those violent acts of mass disorder, threatening the lives and health of six police officers. 90. The court further held that the statements made by the applicant on his blog (see paragraph 10 above) and in his interview to Azadliq Radio (see paragraph 11 above) also proved that, even before traveling to Ismayilli, he had had an “intention to organise mass disorder” and that, when in Ismayilli, he was guilty of inciting people to commit acts of disorder and to disobey the police. 91. As to the statements of witnesses Q.M., E.M., R.C., M.K., I.A., N.C. and N.M., who had said that there had been no clashes between protesters and the police in the town at that time and that neither the applicant nor Tofiq Yaqublu had incited anyone to violence or disobedience, the court found that there were inconsistencies in their statements. In particular, the court found as follows: “However, [Q.M.] stated that, after he had greeted [the applicant], he had gone to sleep in the car. In fact, he had not known the whereabouts of [the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu] during that period of time. [M.K.] stated that, after getting out of the car, Tofiq Yaqublu had gone on foot towards the building of the IDEA, whereas during the pre-trial investigation [M.K.] had stated that [Q.M.] had left them, that he himself had frequently changed his location in order to record the people moving around in the square, that he had separated from Tofiq Yaqublu, that Tofiq Yaqublu had been at another place, that [another journalist] had been taking photos, that [N.A., the Head of the IDEA] had started to give an interview at that time, and that, when he had been going for the interview, Tofiq Yaqublu ... had been arrested and taken away by plain-clothed individuals. [E.M.] stated that Tofiq Yaqublu had been arrested before the interview given by [the Head of the IDEA], while [R.C.] stated that the interview ... had lasted about twenty minutes at most and that, during that period of time, he had not been aware of the whereabouts of [the applicant] and Tofiq Yaqublu. As it can be seen from the above, the witnesses who stated that they had been next to [the applicant] and Tofiq Yaqublu at all times concealed the essence of the matter by giving contradictory statements.” 92. The court found that the statements by those witnesses were favourable to the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu because those witnesses knew the defendants personally and wanted to “help them avoid criminal liability”. Their statements were not accepted as “objective, sincere and truthful” because they were “incompatible with the facts of the case and contradicted the irrefutable evidence” of the applicant’s guilt. 93. The court further found that, likewise, the applicant’s and Tofiq Yaqublu’s statements at the trial hearings claiming that there had been no mass disorder while they had been in Ismayilli did not reflect the actual circumstances, and had been made in order to “avoid criminal liability”. 94. The Sheki Court for Serious Crimes convicted the applicant under Articles 220.1 and 315.2 of the Criminal Code and sentenced him to seven years’ imprisonment. 95. The other defendants were also found guilty as charged and given sentences ranging from two years and six months’ to eight years’ imprisonment, with some sentences being conditional. 96. On 14 April 2014 one of the applicant’s lawyers, Mr F. Agayev, lodged an appeal against the judgment of the Sheki Court for Serious Crimes of 17 March 2014. 97. The lawyer pointed out at the outset that at the time of lodging the appeal, neither a full copy of the text of the judgment of 17 March 2014 nor the transcripts of the trial hearings had yet been made available to him. 98. The lawyer argued that the applicant had been convicted following a sham trial by a court which had tried him from a position of “presumption of guilt” throughout the entire proceedings. The applicant’s visit to Ismayilli, as an opposition politician, to find out the reasons for the events of 23 January 2013 had been used by the Government as an excuse to punish him for his legitimate political criticism, a decision which had been taken long before the Ismayilli events. 99. The rights of the defence had been seriously restricted in that the majority of their well-founded requests and objections had been routinely dismissed; the defence had not been given adequate access to trial transcripts and some of the evidence (including some video material); the defence lawyers had not been allowed to use various technical devices, such as laptop and tablet computers, during the trial hearings, and so on. 100. The formal accusations against the applicant (see paragraphs 15 and 19 above) had been written in a manner which did not comply with the norms of the Azerbaijani language, making it difficult to understand exactly what the applicant was accused of. The factual allegations against him were unclear and did not fit the elements of the criminal offences proscribed under Articles 220.1 and 315.2 of the Criminal Code. Given that the applicant had been in Ismayilli for only about one hour and had no prior personal acquaintance with anyone implicated in the riots of the previous night, it was highly improbable – and even physically impossible – for him to have “organised” mass disorder within such a short time frame, as described in the formal accusations. 101. The applicant had been accused and convicted of organising an outbreak of mass disorder which had never happened. All the reliable and meaningful evidence produced at the trial had clearly shown that there had been no acts of mass disorder during the afternoon of 24 January 2013 while the applicant was in the town. 102. Firstly, all video recordings and other relevant material evidence showed that there had been no clashes with the police in the afternoon of 24 January 2013 and that the applicant had not incited anyone to violence or disobedience. 103. In particular, a video recording originally taken from the website of Obyektiv TV, operated by an NGO named the Institute for Reporters’ Freedom and Safety (“the IRFS”), had been edited before its examination by the court (see paragraphs 69-70 above). As to the parts of the video showing clashes between protesters and the police (it appears that, here, the lawyer referred to the scenes described in paragraph 70 above), it was clear from the size and direction of the shadows cast by buildings, people and other objects that the video had been shot during the morning. That fact had been additionally confirmed by the chairman of the IRFS in a letter dated 24 January 2014. The full, unedited version of the video attached to the letter contained scenes shot during the afternoon of 24 January 2013 showing numerous police vehicles on M.F. Akhundov Street advancing in the direction of the IDEA building with no protesters present. Then it showed the applicant, N.C. and N.M. standing near the Education Department and calmly talking to each other, with no one else in the vicinity. Afterwards, Tofiq Yaqublu could be seen talking to R.C. and two others (it appears that the above scenes correspond to the scenes described in paragraph 69 above). Then, it showed Tofiq Yaqublu being taken by the police to a car and driven away. Later, an interview with the head of the IDEA was shown. Throughout the entire video, the situation in the town during the afternoon of 24 January 2013 was calm and under the control of the police. 104. A video made available by the Yeni Musavat newspaper showed the absence of any clashes between protesters and the police during the afternoon of 24 January 2013. According to the applicant’s lawyer, the first‑instance court added that video to the case file but, for unexplained reasons, decided not to use it as evidence. 105. A third video that was examined during the trial had been recorded by a camera installed on the Unibank building, directed at the area of M.F. Akhundov Street near the building of the Regional Education Department. From that angle, if any crowd had passed in the vicinity of the Education Department and headed towards the IDEA building, it would certainly have been reflected in the recording. However, the parts of the video corresponding to the period between 4 p.m. and 5 p.m. on 24 January 2014 did not show any crowd or even a small group of protesters in that area. 106. The applicant’s mobile phone geo-localisation records showed that he had left the town of Ismayilli by 4.58 p.m. Similarly, Tofiq Yaqublu’s mobile phone geo-localisation records showed that he had left the town by 5.17 p.m. 107. On several occasions the defence had requested the trial court to examine a number of contemporaneous news reports by various information agencies, television and radio stations, and other mass-media sources which had closely followed the Ismayilli events. None of them had reported any unrest happening in Ismayilli in the afternoon of 24 January 2013 and had only reported clashes happening in the evening, starting at around 8 p.m. However, the court had rejected the defence’s requests to examine that material. 108. Secondly, the applicant’s version of the events was strongly corroborated by the statements of Tofiq Yaqublu, N.C., N.M., M.K., R.C., I.A., Q.M., E.M. and others. They had all stated that there had been no clashes during the afternoon of 24 January 2013 and that the applicant had not incited anyone to commit any acts of disorder. Those statements were mutually consistent and were also corroborated by all the material evidence, as described above. 109. Two of the accused, E.I. and M.A., had both stated that there had been unrest in Ismayilli during the morning of 24 January 2013, but that they had both been out of town during the afternoon. Neither the investigating authorities nor the court had bothered to check their alibis. Their statements also indirectly corroborated the applicant’s version of the events, namely that there had been no unrest during the afternoon of 24 January 2013. Also, both of them had alleged before the court that they had been ill-treated by the investigating authorities with the aim of obtaining statements incriminating the applicant. 110. Three police officers had mentioned in their statements that there had been no unrest during the afternoon of 24 January 2013. One police officer had testified that he had been injured by a stone during the morning. Their statements also corroborated the applicant’s version of the events. 111. As to the witnesses who had testified against the applicant, the majority of them were police officers. Their statements were contradictory, false, inconsistent in various details (such as, for example, the time and exact locations where they had seen the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu) and conflicted with all the video recordings and other material evidence. 112. In particular, the assertion that six police officers had been hit by stones on the afternoon of 24 January 2013 was false. None of those police officers had reported being injured or hit by stones immediately or soon after the alleged incident. All of them had been recognised as “victims of crime” and questioned by the prosecution for the first time only between 24 and 27 June 2013, five months after the events. There had been no medical evidence of their injuries. By contrast, the injuries sustained by seven police officers on 23 January and during the early hours of 24 January 2013 had been promptly documented either on the same day or a couple of days later. In such circumstances, it was clear that the above-mentioned six police officers had given false testimony against the applicant. The applicant had formally applied to the court to exclude them from the trial as “victims of crime”, but to no avail. 113. When cross-examined by the defence at a trial hearing, one of the above-mentioned six police officers had been unable to name the personnel of the police unit to which he had been deployed and, until assisted by a prosecutor, could not pinpoint his own exact location in Ismayilli at the time when he had allegedly seen the applicant. When the defence lawyer had tried to get him to show, on an official map of Ismayilli, exactly where he had seen the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu standing and inciting the crowd, the presiding judge had forbidden the use of the map. When the defence lawyer had then asked the police officer to describe his location with reference to various landmarks next to the Regional Education Department, the presiding judge had dismissed the question. The defence lawyer had then lodged a second objection to the composition of the trial court. In response, the presiding judge had decided, firstly, to leave the objection unexamined and, secondly, to fine the lawyer in the amount of AZN 220 for having lodged an allegedly unsubstantiated objection designed to delay the hearing. Thereafter, the defence lawyers for all of the accused had been dissuaded from lodging any further objections, having been clearly shown that doing so would be meaningless. 114. Similarly, other police officers had been unable to answer the defence’s questions seeking clarification, or had given statements that differed significantly from their pre-trial statements, only to radically revert back to their pre-trial statements immediately after a break in the hearing announced by the court. On some occasions, the court had dismissed police officers from the witness stand before the defence could complete the cross‑examination. 115. Furthermore, at the trial one of the police officers (see paragraph 50 above) had retracted the written statement he had signed at the pre-trial stage, stating that everything in it had been a product of an investigator’s imagination. 116. The applicant’s lawyer argued that, at the trial hearings, witness R.B. (see paragraph 56 above) had stated that he had seen only about twenty people in the town centre between about 4 p.m. and 5 p.m. on 24 January 2013, and that, although he had seen the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu among them, he had not heard what they had been talking about with the people around them. 117. The lawyer further argued that R.N. was a ”fake witness” engaged by the police and claimed that both witnesses R.N. and I.M. had given knowingly false and contradictory statements as described in paragraphs 53‑54 above. 118. In conclusion, the applicant’s lawyer argued that a proper assessment of the available evidence clearly showed that, contrary to the prosecution’s version of the facts, there had been no acts of mass disorder at the time when the applicant had been in the town (between about 4 p.m. and 5 p.m.) and that some clashes between protesters and the police had taken place several hours before he had arrived in the town (between about 10 a.m. and 11 a.m.) and several hours after he had left the town (after 8 p.m.). Statements given by the prosecution witnesses, to the contrary, had been shown to be contradictory, unreliable or false, and uncorroborated by the available material evidence. Accordingly, there was no corpus delicti in respect of the criminal offences for which the applicant had been convicted. 119. Before the examination of the appeal, on 2 June 2014 the applicant applied to the Sheki Court of Appeal for access to the remaining part of the transcripts of the trial hearings for consultation. His request was granted and the date for his consultation of the transcripts was scheduled for 9 June 2014. However, on 6 and 9 June 2014 he lodged two applications withdrawing his previous request and, instead, asking for a speedy examination of his appeal. 120. During the examination of the appeal by the Sheki Court of Appeal, the applicant’s lawyers lodged a number of applications repeating those lodged with the first-instance court. It appears that all of them were rejected. 121. By a judgment of 24 September 2014 the Sheki Court of Appeal upheld the applicant’s conviction and sentence, essentially reiterating the reasoning of the first-instance court in respect of the charges against him. The judgment did not address any of the arguments raised in the applicant’s appeal. 122. In November 2014 the applicant’s lawyers submitted a number of remarks concerning the transcript of the appellate hearings, and requesting amendments. The Sheki Court of Appeal refused to amend the transcripts. 123. On 14 November 2014 the applicant’s lawyers lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court, reiterating the points raised in the previous appeal. 124. On 19 November 2014 a judge of the Supreme Court requested all the material of the case file from the Sheki Court for Serious Crimes. At the first hearing held on 13 January 2015 the Supreme Court decided, in the absence of any objections, to postpone further hearing of the case for an indefinite period because more time was needed for examination of the case file. The hearing was resumed on 13 October 2015. 125. By a decision of 13 October 2015, the Supreme Court quashed the Sheki Court of Appeal’s judgment of 24 September 2014, having found that the lower courts’ rejection of the defence’s requests for the examination of additional defence witnesses (in particular, two members of REAL and one NGO director) and other evidence (in particular, contemporaneous news reports by various media agencies, additional mobile-phone records, additional video recordings, and so on) had been insufficiently reasoned and were in breach of the domestic procedural rules and the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention. The case was remitted for a new examination by the appellate court. 126. Before the repeat examination of the case by the Sheki Court of Appeal, the applicant, who at that time was serving his sentence in Penal Facility No. 2 in Baku, wrote to the appellate court several times waiving his right to be personally present at the appeal hearings to be held in Sheki, expressing confidence that his lawyers would conduct his defence adequately in his absence. The Sheki Court of Appeal responded each time with an explanation that, under domestic law, the defendant’s presence at appeal hearings was mandatory and invited him to attend the hearings. Finally, on 20 April 2016 the court ruled that the applicant should be brought to Sheki for the appeal hearings. 127. During the hearings at the Sheki Court of Appeal, the applicant’s lawyers lodged a number of applications, including requests for the applicant’s release from detention; for the allegedly unlawfully obtained statements of prosecution witnesses (including those mentioned in paragraphs 48 and 52-56 above) and other evidence produced by the prosecution (including the letters of the Ismayilli RPD and the MNS) to be declared inadmissible; for additional defence witnesses to be heard; for the admission and examination of contemporaneous news reports by various information agencies; and for examination of the video recording taken by the camera installed on the Unibank building. It appears that, apart from the first two requests, all the others were granted. 128. The appellate court re-examined the case material of the first‑instance trial and, in addition, examined new evidence. In particular, it heard two new defence witnesses (both members of REAL). Their statements do not appear to have contained any significant details in respect of the accusations against the applicant. The court also examined a number of contemporaneous news reports and the “Unibank video recording”. 129. By a judgment of 29 April 2016, the Sheki Court of Appeal upheld the applicant’s conviction and sentence. Below is the summary of the appellate court’s reasoning contained in its judgment. 130. The court’s assessment of the evidence examined at the first-instance and appeal hearings began as follows: “Having viewed the recording of the video surveillance camera installed at the ATM of Unibank in the town of Ismayilli, directed at M.F. Akhundov street leading towards the administrative buildings of the IDEA and the Education Department, the court determined that between 4 p.m. and 5 p.m. on 24 January 2013 [the situation] was relatively calm on that street. Having examined [reports] of APA, Trend and other mass media ..., the court noted that the media had reported that, as a continuation of the events starting on 23 January 2013, between 4 p.m. and 6 p.m. on 24 January 2013 there was a general situation of confrontation and tension in the centre of Ismayilli, [and had also reported] about growing numbers of people on the streets in the vicinity of buildings of government bodies. ... It is noted in the 25 January 2013 issue of the Yeni Musavat Online newspaper ... that [E.M.], the newspaper’s correspondent sent to Ismayilli, reported at 4.05 p.m. on 24 January 2013 that ‘currently numerous vehicles – buses, water cannons, and other vehicles, thought to be coming from Baku – are entering the town. The crowd around the area where the government bodies are located has been growing and tension remains.’ At 5 p.m. he reported that ‘... despite the engagement of additional forces, the crowd is growing on the streets where the government bodies are located and around them. According to local rumours, the protest, which started in the town centre yesterday, would continue tonight after dark’.” 131. The court also referred to, as evidence, the letters from the Ismayilli RPD and the MNS, as described in the first-instance judgment (see paragraph 73 above). 132. The judgment continued as follows: “The court does not accept as evidence the statements of witnesses [Q.M., E.M., R.C., M.K., I.A., N.C. and N.M.] that there were no riots between 4 p.m. and 5 p.m. on 24 January 2013 and the statements of [the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu] that they did not incite the public to riot or resist the police, that there were no riots between 4 p.m. and 5 p.m. on 24 January 2013, and that they spent only five to ten minutes in Ismayilli. In particular, [Q.M.] stated that, after he had greeted [the applicant], he had gone to sleep in the car and, in fact, had not known the whereabouts of [the applicant and Tofiq Yaqbulu] during that period of time. [M.K.] stated that, after getting out of the car, Tofiq Yaqublu had gone on foot towards the building of the IDEA, while during the pre-trial investigation [M.K.] had stated that [Q.M.] had left them, that he himself had frequently changed his location in order to record the people moving around in the square, that he had separated from Tofiq Yaqublu, that Tofiq Yaqublu had been at another place, that [another journalist] had been taking photos, that [the head of the IDEA] had started to give an interview at that time, and that, when he had been going for the interview, Tofiq Yaqublu ... had been arrested and taken away by plain-clothed individuals. [E.M.] stated that Tofiq Yaqublu had been arrested before the interview given by [the head of the IDEA], while [R.C.] stated that the interview ... had lasted about twenty minutes at most and that, during that period of time, he had not been aware of the whereabouts of [the applicant] and Tofiq Yaqublu. As it can be seen from the above, the witnesses who stated that they had been next to [the applicant] and Tofiq Yaqublu at all times, concealed the essence of the matter by giving conflicting statements. Moreover, in his interview to ... Azadliq Radio given from 5.41 to 5.46 p.m. on 24 January 2013, Tofiq Yaqublu stated that ‘[he had been] detained at the police station for approximately forty minutes ... [He had been] taken to [S.K.’s] office at the police station [who alleged that Tofiq Yaqublu] had come here to organise sabotage and to prepare people for more protests. [The police were then reassured that Tofiq Yaqublu was indeed a columnist for a newspaper]. For that reason, [he] was released.’ This interview proves that Tofiq Yaqublu was not taken to the police station without a reason, but that he was detained ... because of his actions aimed at disruption and sabotage.” 133. The court then noted that the statements of ten police officers, including five of the six alleged victims of crime (see paragraphs 47-48 above) and witnesses R.N., I.M. and R.B. (see paragraphs 52-56 above) indicated that between about 4 p.m. and 5 p.m. on 24 January 2013 there was mass disorder in front of the building of the Regional Education Department and that the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu had incited people to riot and resist the police. 134. The court referred to the applicant’s interview with Azadliq Radio (see paragraph 11 above). According to the court’s interpretation, contrary to what the applicant had stated in the court proceedings, the content of his interview showed that the situation had not been calm in Ismayilli during his visit. 135. In respect of the witness statements favouring the applicant, the court concluded as follows: “Having come to the same conclusion as the first-instance court, the court considers that ... the witnesses [Q.M., E.M., R.C., M.K., I.A., N.C., and N.M.] wanted to help [the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu], whom they knew and had relations with, avoid criminal liability. The specific circumstances mentioned in their statements cannot be accepted as objective, sincere and genuine because they do not fit the factual circumstances of the case and conflict with other, irrefutable evidence.” 136. As to the video recording by the camera installed on the Unibank building, the court assessed it as follows: “The court holds that the statements of [the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu] ... do not fit the actual circumstances of the case. [Their] statements ... are of a self-defence nature and designed to avoid criminal liability. As the main evidence proving their statements, they rely on the recording dated 24 January 2013 of the video surveillance camera installed at the ATM of Unibank, directed at M.F. Akhundov Street leading towards the administrative buildings of the IDEA and the Education Department. Although the recording shows that between about 4 p.m. and 5 p.m. the situation was relatively calm on that street, it is not the only street leading to the centre (the IDEA [building]); moreover, it cannot be ruled out that individuals could have gone along that street towards the building of the [IDEA] one-by-one and gathered there [afterwards], or could have arrived in the centre from other directions. ...” 137. As to the video evidence originally examined by the first-instance court, the Sheki Court of Appeal mentioned the video recording showing the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu “standing in the centre of the town of Ismayilli, opposite to the administrative building of the Education Department, at a place where acts of mass disorder had been committed”, without specifying the time of day when that scene had been shot (see paragraphs 69 and 103 above). However, the Sheki Court of Appeal did not mention any of the other video recordings of 24 January 2013 relied on by the first-instance court, showing clashes between protesters and the police (see paragraphs 70 and 103 above). 138. The court further noted that, according to the information obtained from the first-instance court, throughout the day on 24 January 2013 forty‑four people had been arrested under the Code of Administrative Offences, including nine people arrested between 4 p.m. and 7 p.m. The court concluded that this was an indication that the situation in the town had not been calm while the applicant was there. 139. The judgment continued as follows: “[The applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu] claimed that the evidence gathered by the prosecution against them had been false. As an example, they referred to the testimony of [R.N.] who had participated, as an attesting witness, in the inspection of the scene of the events [of the previous night] from 10 a.m. to 4.10 p.m. on 24 January 2013, and had later testified that at around 5 p.m. on the same day he had seen [the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu inciting people to commit acts of disorder]. [They] argue that [R.N.] is a person who cooperates with the police and that the police had instructed him to testify against them. However, the court holds that [R.N.’s] presence during the inspection of the scene of the events as an attesting witness does not make it impossible for him to have observed and witnessed an event occurring one hour later.” 140. The appellate court then digressed to discuss at significant length the Court’s judgment in Ilgar Mammadov (cited above). 141. The appellate court’s judgment continued as follows: “Being far from an intention to give an assessment of the European Court’s position in its above-mentioned judgment, the court holds that, first of all, [the applicant’s and Tofiq Yaqublu’s] unlawful actions should be evaluated through the prism of the events that took place in Ismayilli on 23 and 24 January 2013. That is so because those events constituted the reason and grounds for instituting criminal proceedings and the criminal prosecution of [the applicant, Tofiq Yaqublu] and others. As described above, on 23 and 24 January 2013 in Ismayilli, under the organisation and with the active participation of the accused persons, a crowd formed by a large number of residents spontaneously joined together and destroyed, by burning, and partly looted the building of the Chirag Hotel, destroying equipment and items found inside the building, as well as personal belongings of the hotel guests and staff; [they also destroyed, by burning,] three cars in the grounds of the hotel, damaged houses and cars on the streets with stones, [and also destroyed, by burning,] private property of people who had no connection to the events, and inflicted bodily injuries on individuals, including many police officers who were performing their official duty to restore public order. In connection with these events, on 23 January 2013 criminal proceedings were instituted under Articles 186.2.2, 221.2.1, 233 and 315.2 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan and eighteen individuals were charged [in the framework of those proceedings], over fifty individuals were found administratively liable, and twenty-four individuals were recognised as victims. The criminal events that occurred in Ismayilli were the most widely covered news for several days by both local and reputable foreign mass media. In other words, they were not ordinary events that happened in Ismayilli. In connection with the participation of [the applicant] in those events and the criminal offences committed by him, as well as the evidence concerning those offences, the court finds it necessary to reiterate once more the following. Although [the applicant] states that he arrived in Ismayilli at 3.46 p.m. and left before 5 p.m. on 24 January 2013, examination of the detailed invoice of his incoming and outgoing mobile calls, and his blog post of 25 January 2013, where he shared his impressions from his trip by writing ‘yesterday I was in Ismayilli for a little more than two hours together with another member of our movement (REAL) and a media coordinator’, proves that on 24 January 2013 [the applicant] was in Ismayilli from 3.46 p.m. to 6 p.m. [The applicant] insists that, when he was in Ismayilli, there was no mass disorder there. However, this statement is completely refuted by the case material.” 142. In this connection, the court continued: “Victims [in particular, five police officers (of the six mentioned in paragraph 48 above), E.A. (see paragraph 44 above) and V.Az. (see paragraph 43 above)] and witnesses [in particular, R.N., I.M. and R.B. (see paragraphs 52-56 above), as well as S.K. (see paragraph 45 above) and four other police officers (see paragraph 47 above)] stated during both the pre-trial investigation and the first-instance hearings that throughout the day on 24 January 2013, including between 4 p.m. and 6 p.m., mass riots had continued, crowds of people had attacked the [IDEA] building and had stoned police officers. They also testified that they had seen [the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu] standing separately from each other, raising their hands, talking to people surrounding them and saying ‘do not be afraid of anything, enter the building of the IDEA, stone the police officers’. At their instigation, a group of individuals started moving towards the building of the IDEA and [the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu] were also among them. The police attempted to isolate [the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu] from the crowd by requesting them to [step aside], but they disobeyed and moved to the back of the crowd. Another circumstance worth noting is that [two police officers] gave those statements on 28 January 2013 and [R.N. and I.M.] gave their statements on 2 February 2013, that is before [the applicant’s] arrest. At the same time, [R.N. and I.M.] confirmed their statements during face-to-face confrontations with [the applicant].” 143. The court then once again referred to the information reported by the Yeni Musavat Online newspaper (see paragraph 130 above) and the information the applicant had published on his Facebook page (see paragraph 10 above). It then reiterated that nine people had been arrested between 4 p.m. and 7 p.m. on 24 January 2013. 144. The judgment continued: “The above-mentioned circumstances show that on 24 January 2013, when [the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu] were in Ismayilli, the events were unfolding there and that the crowd attacked the IDEA building and committed acts of violence against the police.” 145. The court then found that it was not “believable” that the applicant had visited Ismayilli simply to gather “first-hand information”, considering, inter alia, that his Facebook posts were aimed at “promoting disobedience”. 146. The court also found that the applicant’s Facebook posts of the afternoon of 24 January 2013 and his blog post of 25 January 2013 (see paragraph 10 above) were proof of his intention to organise mass disorder. In particular, it stated: “The above-mentioned [posts by the applicant] demonstrate once again that, before traveling to Ismayilli, the applicant had an intention to organise mass disorder with the aim of defending the REAL movement’s demands for the creation of conditions for a revolt, and that, after he had arrived in Ismayilli, he had carried out his intention.” 147. The court concluded its analysis as follows: “The above-mentioned circumstances of the case prove beyond doubt that on 24 January 2013 [the applicant] travelled to Ismayilli and organised mass disorder there together with [Tofiq Yaqublu]. Moreover, at around 5 p.m. on the same date, as active participants, [they] were able to achieve that a group of individuals formed of [E.I.], [M.A.] and others marched in masses in the direction of the administrative building of the [IDEA], and threw stones at police officers who were preventing [this march] in accordance with the requirements of the law, resulting in the use of violence posing a danger to the lives and health of [six named police officers]. As for [the applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu] arriving from Baku and, within two hours, managing to convert unorganised riots into organised acts of subversion, the court considers that in normal circumstances it would not appear convincing that [this could have been done]; however, it must be taken into account that [the rioters] considered [N.A.], the Head of the [IDEA], responsible for the events, they were enraged and, as [the applicant] himself stated, ‘the situation was flammable’. [The applicant and Tofiq Yaqublu] took advantage of this factor and, using anti-government slogans, attracted [the rioters’] attention, enraged them even more and then committed the criminal offences described above.” 148. On 21 June 2016 the applicant’s lawyer, Mr F. Agayev, lodged a cassation appeal against the Sheki Court of Appeal’s judgment of 29 April 2016, reiterating the points in his previous appeals and arguing further that the appellate court had assessed the evidence in a manifestly arbitrary manner. As an example, he pointed out that the court had failed to duly take into account that the video recording by the Unibank camera clearly refuted the prosecution’s version of the events, according to which the crowd had allegedly moved specifically along M.F. Akhundov Street in the direction of the police positioned near the IDEA building. Moreover, the court had wrongly concluded that the applicant had left Ismayilli at 6 p.m., whereas the mobile phone geo-localisation records showed that his mobile had been last registered in the centre of the town at 4.58 p.m. 149. By a decision of 18 November 2016 the Supreme Court upheld the Sheki Court of Appeal’s judgment of 29 April 2016, finding that the lower court had correctly assessed the evidence and correctly applied the provisions of criminal law and criminal procedure. 150. After the first-instance trial at the Sheki Court for Serious Crimes, on 17 March 2014 the presiding judge sent letters to the Bar Association requesting that disciplinary measures be taken against the applicant’s lawyers, Mr F. Agayev and Mr K. Bagirov. The court stated that they had breached procedural rules and the rules on lawyers’ conduct on numerous occasions throughout the trial, by making unauthorised objections and offensive and disrespectful remarks about various parties and the court, and refusing to wear lawyers’ robes despite numerous demands by the presiding judge. 151. After the proceedings at the Sheki Court of Appeal, on 25 September 2014 the presiding judge of that court also sent letters to the Bar Association requesting that it take disciplinary measures against both lawyers, stating that they had behaved similarly throughout the appellate proceedings. 152. On 10 December 2014 the Bar Association held that Mr K. Bagirov had breached the rules for ethical conduct of advocates. It decided to refer his case to a court with a view to his disbarment and to suspend his activity as an advocate pending a decision by the court. On 10 July 2015 the Nizami District Court delivered a judgment ordering Mr K. Bagirov’s disbarment. The judgment was upheld by the higher courts. Mr K. Bagirov has lodged an application with the Court concerning the matter (Bagirov v. Azerbaijan, no. 28198/15, communicated to the respondent Government on 24 June 2016).

6. The applicant was born in 1950 and is detained in Dob pri Mirni. 7. On 18 March 2006 a person called A.Č. called the police and informed them that three people had been stabbed in the town of Izola. Only the injured people, namely Š.A., S.M, and F.M, were found at the place of the incident. A few hours later the applicant and his two sons, A.R. and E.R., were arrested on suspicion of attempted murder. 8. On 20 March 2006 the applicant, A.R. and E.R. were brought before the investigating judge. The applicant, who was assisted by counsel, gave the following statement in his defence. He alleged that he had intended to meet Š.A. in order to demand that he pay rent for workers who had previously been accommodated in his flat and to cancel their residence registration at that address. Before he set off to a bar where Š.A.’s workers met after work (hereinafter “the bar”), he telephoned his sons and asked them to come and assist him in case he met any trouble from Š.A. After Š.A. refused to resolve the matter, the applicant left the bar and was followed by between ten and twelve of Š.A.’s workers. Š.A. and F.M., one of the workers, started hitting the applicant all over his body. His sons, standing nearby, came to his aid. After Š.A. hit A.R., the applicant, an electrical fitter by profession, took out the knife he used for work, which had a seven- to eight-centimetre blade, and began brandishing it. Among others, he stabbed Š.A. several times in the back. Š.A. then backed off and the applicant and his sons fled the scene. Once at home the applicant gave the knife to his wife, who disposed of it. The applicant also stated that the only injuries he had sustained had been some bruises on his head. 9. The applicant’s sons stated that their father had met with Š.A. and another person and that a fight had started. When they had gone to help him, a number of other men had approached and had started beating them. The applicant’s sons also stated that they had not been carrying any knives themselves. According to them, E.R. had defended himself with a wooden clothes hanger. 10. The injured parties, S.M., F.M., and Š.A., were also questioned in the investigation and they stated, inter alia, as follows. 11. F.M. stated that after leaving the bar he had been attacked by the applicant, who had hit him on the nose with the handle of the knife. S.M. and Š.A. had arrived after that and the applicant had again attacked F.M. E.R. had attacked S.M. while A.R. had attacked Š.A. In the course of the fight the applicant had stabbed F.M. and had also attacked S.M. and Š.A., before fleeing the scene. The applicant and his sons had had knives. The applicant’s knife had had a ten-centimetre blade. 12. S.M. stated that he had heard people saying there was a crowd outside the bar, he had gone out and found F.M. being hit in the face and running. He had then seen the applicant attacking F.M. He had attempted to separate them, but E.R. had stabbed him. E.R. had then fled and the applicant had stabbed him several times, which had caused him to faint. 13. Š.A. testified that after being told that something was going on outside the bar he had gone out and found S.M. and F.M. being attacked. He had attempted to help S.M., who had been stabbed in the neck by the applicant, and F.M. He had been stabbed in the back several times by the applicant. 14. In addition to the accused and the injured parties the investigating judge questioned five witnesses – A.Č., M.H., Đ.Š., Še.A. and I.B. 15. A.Č. testified that he had noticed the applicant and his sons, together with F.M. and another person, standing a few metres from the bar. Š.A. had approached them and a few seconds later they had started to fight. According to A.Č., only those six people had been involved in the fight. He had not seen any weapons, but had seen blood on Š.A.’s shirt. In addition, the third victim (S.M.) had been holding his neck. A.Č. also stated that he had called to his acquaintance M.H. to telephone the police. 16. M.H. gave a fairly detailed account. He explained that he had seen the applicant in the bar arguing with Š.A. and then leaving around thirty minutes before the fight. Twenty minutes later F.M. and S.M. had left the bar as well. Š.A. had received a call and had gone out. After being alerted by A.Č. and seeing the fight through the window, he had gone out of the bar and had seen the applicant and his sons, as well as S.M., F.M., and Š.A., fighting. He testified that the applicant and his sons had been the weaker parties in the fight until the applicant had pulled out a knife, saying, “Now let us see”, and using it to attack Š.A., F.M. and S.M. He added that he had not seen the applicant’s sons handling any knives and also described the applicant’s knife as having a blade of about eight to ten centimetres. 17. Đ.Š., the third witness, stated that between 6 p.m. and 7 p.m. on the day in question he had first seen the applicant and later his sons park their cars in front of the bar where the events at issue took place. Đ.Š. and his friend had then approached the bar and had seen S.M. lying unconscious on the ground. 18. On 10 April 2006 the investigating judge questioned I.B. and Še.A. in the presence of the district public prosecutor and counsel for A.R., who were also allowed to put questions. I.B. told the investigating judge that he had been walking home with Še.A. when he had seen the applicant, his sons, and F.M. coming out of the bar. The applicant had had his hand in his pocket and appeared to be holding something. He had seen him pointing at F.M. and heard him telling his sons, “This is [F.M.]”. He had later seen his brother-in-law (S.M.) lying on the ground with blood on his head. The police and an ambulance had arrived. 19. Še.A. stated that he and I.B. had been on their way home when F.M. had come out of the bar and told them to wait. Še.A. had then noticed the applicant and his sons. He had seen the applicant pointing at F.M. and saying something, whereupon the applicant had gone towards F.M. and hit him in the face with the handle of his knife. As F.M. had moved away, towards the bar, one of the applicant’s sons had approached. Both S.M. and Š.A. had come out of the bar at that moment and a fight had broken out between E.R., S.M., and the applicant and F.M., A.R. and Š.A. Še.A. had approached the fighting men and tried to separate E.R. and S.M. E.R. had then struck S.M. with a knife, but when Še.A. had approached, he had turned to him. Še.A. had got scared and had run away. Še.A. described the knife as being old, with a blade of between ten to fifteen centimetres, but could not remember further details. Še.A. stated during the questioning that his work visa was valid until January 2007. 20. In May 2008 the court summoned the witnesses, including I.B. and Še.A., to a hearing that had been scheduled for 11 September 2008. The summons for I.B. was served on his neighbour while Še.A.’s was served on his wife. The court subsequently cancelled the hearing and ordered that the witnesses, including I.B. and Še.A., be summoned to a hearing on 25 September 2008. However, since I.B. and Še.A. no longer had a place of residence that was registered in Slovenia, the court on 21 November 2008 asked the Police Department for International Cooperation to investigate where the two witnesses were living. Further to another request from the court, the Izola Administrative Unit informed it that Še.A. had cancelled his residence status in Izola on 17 January 2008 and that I.B. had cancelled his on 20 December 2006. It appears that the police registered their enquiries about the whereabouts of I.B. and Še.A. in the Schengen system. 21. After receiving information from the authorities of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Slovenian police informed the court on 23 January 2009 of I.B.’s address, whence the court subsequently sent the summons. On 20 March 2009 the Court received a statement from I.B., given to a notary, in which he excused himself from attending the hearing, saying that he needed a visa to enter Slovenia. However, in order to comply with the summons, he included his testimony, which he had given to the notary. He stated that he did not remember exactly when the incident in question had happened but thought it was around two years earlier, when he had had a temporary job as a construction worker in Slovenia. He had at that time been in the process of moving from the applicant’s apartment to Š.A.’s apartment. As to the incident, he said that he remembered seeing S.M. lying on the ground and the police and ambulance arriving at the scene. 22. In April 2009, further to indications from the authorities of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the injured parties’ counsel that Še.A. was in Italy, the Italian authorities checked their data, but stated that Še.A. had never had any registered address in that country. On 18 May 2009 the Office of the General Police Administration informed the court that the border police had talked to Še.A. when he had crossed the Slovenian border. He had given an address in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Italy and his mobile telephone number. 23. After his wife received the summons at his address in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Še.A. wrote to the court to say that his father was very ill and that therefore he could not travel for the following two to three weeks. In addition, he said that he had been working in Italy since September 2008 and could not travel to Slovenia as he would risk losing his job. He added that he had already given a statement regarding the charges against the applicant and the other defendants and had nothing to add. The court received the letter on 25 May 2009. 24. On 16 May 2006 the district state prosecutor lodged an indictment against the applicant, E.R. and A.R. for the attempted murder of Š.A., S.M. and F.M. 25. Seven hearings were held, taking place on 25 September 2008, 27 November 2008, 29 January 2009, 19 February 2009, 10 April 2009, 29 May 2009 and 17 June 2009. 26. At the hearing of 29 May 2009, at which the applicant and his counsel were present, the court noted that Še.A. had sent a letter in reply to the summons (see paragraph 23 above). After the letter had been read out, the panel of judges took a decision that his and I.B.’s statements to the investigating judge should be read out at the hearing, finding that the conditions set out in point 1 of the first paragraph of section 340 of the Criminal Procedure Act had been met (see paragraph 39 below). The record of the hearing shows that no comments on the reading out of the statements were made by those present. 27. The accused, the injured parties and the witnesses A.Č., M.H. and Đ.Š. were examined at the hearings. - The applicant kept to the statement he had given to the investigating judge and repeated that he had acted in self-defence. He now alleged that the blade of the knife had been only three centimetres long. - A.R. maintained that he had gone to help his father but the workers had started to beat him as well. Š.A. had been on top of him, hitting him until he had managed to escape. A.R. also stated that he had had no plans to meet his brother in Izola that day. - E.R. stated that he had only wanted to have a coffee with a friend but had ended up in a fight, and having to defend himself until he had passed out. He denied that he had had a knife that day and said that he had not seen his brother or father carrying one either. - S.M. repeated what he had said during the investigation (see paragraph 12 above), adding some details about which of the three accused had stabbed him and where, attributing most of the injuries to the applicant. He explained that he had assumed that F.M. had been hit in the face as he had seen him holding his hand there and added that the applicant’s knife blade had been ten to fifteen centimetres long. - F.M. added further details to his statement from the investigation (see paragraph 11 above), testifying how he had been stabbed by the applicant and that he had seen the applicant stabbing S.M. and Š.A. before fleeing the scene. - Š.A. described how he had been stabbed by the applicant and his sons. He also testified that before arriving on the scene he had received a brief telephone call from Še.A., who had told him that the men had been attacked outside. When he had gone outside he had seen S.M. on his knees and the applicant stabbing him. Š.A. denied that the applicant or his sons had called him that day. He was asked to explain the difference between his testimony during the investigation, when he said he had fought with one of the applicant’s sons, and at the hearing, when he had said that he had not fought back. He stated that he had remembered the events better during the investigation. - A.Č. repeated what he had said during the investigation (see paragraph 15 above). - At his first examination M.H. repeated what he had said during the investigation (see paragraph 16 above). Six months later, he changed his statement and alleged, among other things, that the fight had started after Š.A. had first hit A.R. - Đ.Š. stated that he had seen E.R. parking his car and going directly into the bar. He had arrived at the scene with his friends and had found S.M. lying unconscious on the floor. 28. The panel also questioned Dr G.R., the surgeon who had treated all three victims at the local hospital and who explained the severity of the individual wounds sustained by the victims. The court also obtained the testimony of two medical experts. Dr A.Š. made an assessment of the victims’ individual injuries, the most likely manner in which they had been sustained, the angles of the stab wounds, and so forth. The doctor stated that Š.A. had sustained four wounds to his back and a number of wounds to his chest. S.M. had been stabbed seven times from behind, five times in the neck and on the back of the head, once to the left shoulder and once in the left side of his chest. F.M. had been stabbed in the stomach. Dr D.M.S. performed a clinical examination of Š.A. in order to assess his wounds in more detail. 29. The panel also examined several documents that had been called in evidence. Medical reports relating to the applicant and his sons showed that they had sustained minor injuries, the applicant notably sustaining only a few contusions (on the right forearm, above the left scapula and on his left eye, which remained undamaged). Other evidence showed that the applicant had been in a dispute over workers hired by Š.A. who had vacated the applicant’s flat. Š.A. had not made a declaration of a change of residence to the competent administrative authority, although as an employer and new landlord he should have done so. Furthermore, telephone records showed that the applicant and Š.A. had had three conversations on the day of the incident. Moreover, A.R., the applicant’s son, had called his father a number of times that day just before the fight broke out. 30. On 19 June 2009 the Koper District Court panel found the applicant guilty of attempting to murder S.M., F.M. and Š.A. by stabbing the first in the neck, on the back of the head and the left side of his chest, the second in the left side of the stomach and the third in the back. Two of the offences had been aided and abetted by the applicant’s sons, who were each convicted of one count of attempted murder. The court sentenced the applicant to five years and ten months in prison, while his sons were both sentenced to one year and two months in prison. 31. In a judgment of fifty-four pages, the court established on the basis of the testimony, telephone and GPS data that the applicant had called Š.A. on the day of the attack in order to discuss the workers’ change of residence, but they had been unable to resolve the matter. Consequently, the applicant had gone to the bar with a view to get the workers to sign written statements concerning their change of residence. He had asked F.M., who had been in the bar with S.M., to sign the statement, but he had refused. After that the applicant had again called Š.A., but to no avail. Being informed of the situation by the applicant, A.R. and E.R. had joined him and they had together gone in search of F.M. and Š.A. They had stopped F.M. near the bar and the applicant had hit him in the face with the handle of the knife. F.M. had withdrawn in the direction of the bar, and had been joined by S.M. and Š.A., who had been informed about the attack by the telephone call from Še.A. A fight involving the six men had then started, with the accused being prepared for it as they had been equipped with knives. It had finished when the applicant and his sons had left the scene and Š.A. had called the police. 32. The court found that only five minutes had passed between F.M. being stopped by the applicant and his sons and the call to the police, while the fight and stabbing could not have lasted more than two minutes. In particular, the court established that Š.A. had received the call from Še.A. at two minutes and forty eight second past eight in the evening and that less than three minutes later Š.A. had called 113. In the meantime, he had been stabbed several times. As regards the other circumstances of the fight, such as who had hit whom, the court relied on the testimony of S.M., F.M., and the witnesses A.Č. and M.H. The court, taking into account the fact that the injured parties could not have been expected to pay particular attention to what was happening to others while they themselves were engaged in the fight, found their testimony mostly consistent, except for the question of when Š.A. had joined the fight. The court took the view on that point that the fight had only broken out after Š.A.’s arrival, contrary to what he himself had alleged. The court further found M.H.’s initial testimony (see paragraph 16 above) to be the more persuasive of the two, and that it was in line with the findings of the medical experts. It found that E.R. had initially fought with S.M., the applicant with F.M., and A.R. with Š.A. – a fact which the court found confirmed by the testimony of “S.M., F.M., and also the witnesses A.Č. and M.H., and Še.A.” Referring to M.H.’s initial testimony and the applicant’s statement during the investigation, which it found was also supported by Še.A.’s testimony, the court rejected the applicant’s statement at the hearing that his knife had only had a three-centimetre blade. 33. Regarding the applicant’s argument that he had acted in self-defence, the court found that “the statements given by the accused were contradictory and refuted self-defence ... [and] the evidence produced at the hearing completely excluded that possibility [of self-defence]”. The Court found that only the defendants and the three injured parties had engaged in the fight and that if Š.A. had wanted to attack the applicant he could easily have outnumbered the defendants. The applicant and his sons had been motivated by anger towards Š.A. and F.M., while S.M. had become involved because he had tried to protect F.M. As the applicant had failed to convince F.M. to cancel his residence status, he had resorted to violence. If the applicant had felt that he was in danger, he could simply have walked away. Instead, he had provoked a fight, together with his sons. The court also found that while the applicant had admitted to stabbing Š.A. several times in the back, he and the other two defendants had not addressed the fact that the injured parties had sustained other stab wounds too. Moreover, the court noted that none of the witnesses had testified that the applicant had lain on the floor and been kicked by the other men. The court found that since the defendants had been prepared for a fight in advance the injured parties should be believed when they stated that they had in fact been attacked and that they had responded by fighting back. It considered the injured parties’ description of how they had obtained the wounds to be persuasive. Having regard to the fact that the fight was of short duration, the court found that the defendants had pulled their knives out quickly and had quickly “finished with” the injured parties. The court further found that as the victims had sustained fourteen stab wounds altogether, it was plausible that the applicant had not been the only assailant, but that all three defendants had inflicted them. Finally, the court dismissed the applicant’s argument that he had pulled the knife out after being attacked by ten people as “unrealistic”. 34. In the judgment the court also explained the reasons for reading out I.B. and Še.A.’s statements. It noted that the two witnesses had not attended the hearing, despite being properly summoned, and that counsel for the defendants had been offered the possibility to attend their questioning during the investigation. 35. The applicant appealed to the Koper Higher Court, complaining, inter alia, that the first-instance court had violated his defence rights by relying on the record of the testimony that I.B. and Še.A. had given during the investigation. 36. On 7 July 2011 the higher court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. As regards the applicant’s alleged inability to cross-examine I.B. and Še.A. at the trial, the higher court considered that the applicant had had an opportunity to question the witnesses during the investigation. It noted that counsel for the applicant had been informed about the hearing with the investigating judge, as confirmed by an acknowledgment of receipt, but had failed to attend it. According to the higher court, the defence had been aware of the notice of the possibility to participate in the questioning of witnesses during the investigation but had consciously disregarded it. Hence, it had accepted the risk that the witnesses would not be available for questioning at the trial. Moreover, the higher court considered that the applicant had failed to comply with paragraph 2 of section 371 of the Criminal Procedure Act (see paragraph 39 below) as he had not substantiated in what way his inability to question the two witnesses at the trial had undermined the legality of the judgment. 37. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, which was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 24 August 2012. The court confirmed that the first-instance court had correctly applied section 340 of the Criminal Procedure Act by reading out the testimony given by I.B. and Še.A. during the investigation as the witnesses, who were foreigners, had been duly summoned to appear before the court but had refused to attend. The Supreme Court further found that section 178(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act provided that the investigating judge should have sent the request to attend the questioning directly to the defendants as well as to counsel. However, according to the Supreme Court, the applicant had failed to explain how that error on the part of the investigating judge had affected the legality of the impugned judgment. In the Supreme Court’s opinion, the error could only have affected the legality of the judgment if the first-instance court had relied on the testimony of I.B. and Še.A. to a decisive extent, which, however, had not been alleged in the case. 38. The applicant lodged a constitutional complaint. The Constitutional Court dismissed the complaint on 24 December 2012, pursuant to section 55b of the Constitutional Court Act (see paragraph 40 below). 39. The relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act (Official Gazette no. 63/94 with the relevant amendments) read as follows: Section 75 “(1) Counsel is entitled to do everything in a defendant’s interests that the defendant himself can do. ...” Section 178 “... (4) The public prosecutor, defendant and counsel can be present during the questioning of a witness. ... (5) The investigating judge should inform the public prosecutor and counsel in an appropriate manner of when and where a defendant will be questioned. Likewise, he must in an appropriate manner inform the public prosecutor, the defendant, counsel and the injured party of when and where other investigative measures at which they can be present will take place, unless it would be dangerous to wait. If the defendant has counsel, the investigating judge in principle informs only him. If the defendant has been detained and the investigative measures are to be carried out outside the area of the court’s jurisdiction, the investigating judge must decide whether the presence of the defendant is necessary. ...” Section 244a “(1) Under the provisions of this section, questioning the defendant or a witness can be carried out by means of modern technical equipment for voice and image transmission (video-conferencing). (2) Questioning the defendant or a witness can be carried out by means of video-conferencing if: ... (iii) the competent authority has made a proper request to another country in accordance with the law or international treaties or (iv) for any other justified reason which makes it undesirable or impossible for the person to appear before the authority conducting the hearing. ...” Section 340 “(1) In addition to the instances specified in the present Act, the record of witnesses’ statements ... can be read out, on the basis of a decision by a panel and only in the following circumstances: (i) if the persons questioned have died, or have been affected by a mental illness, or cannot be found, or are unable to appear in court because of old age, illness or some other weighty reason, or their appearance would involve great difficulty, or if they live abroad and fail to appear at the main hearing despite being duly summoned; (ii) if witnesses or experts refuse to testify at the main hearing without a legal justification. ... (4) The reasons for reading out the record shall be indicated in the transcript of the main hearing ...” Section 342 “After examining each witness or expert, and after reading each record or other written document, the presiding judge shall ask the parties and the injured person to make comments if they so wish.” Section 371 “(1) A substantial violation of the provisions of criminal procedure shall be deemed to exist: ... (viii) if the judgment relies on evidence which was obtained by a violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, or evidence it should not have relied on, in accordance with the provisions of the present Act, or evidence which was obtained on the basis of such impermissible evidence; ... (2) A substantial violation of the provisions of criminal procedure shall also be deemed to exist if in preparation for a hearing or in the course of a hearing or in giving judgment the court omitted to apply a provision of this Act or applied it incorrectly, or if in the course of the hearing the court violated the rights of the defence, which influenced or might have influenced the legality and regularity of the judgment.” 40. Section 55b, paragraph 2, of the Constitutional Court Act (Official Gazette no. 15/94 with relevant amendments) provides as follows: “(2) A constitutional complaint shall be accepted for consideration: - if there has been a violation of human rights or fundamental freedoms which has had serious consequences for the complainant; or - if it concerns an important constitutional question which exceeds the importance of the particular case in question.” 41. On 26 June 1997 the Slovenian Parliament ratified the “Treaty between Slovenia and the Republic of Macedonia concerning Legal Aid in Civil and Criminal Matters”, which entered into force on 5 September 1997. Article 3 of the Treaty states that legal assistance comprises, among other things, the service of legal documents and the questioning of witnesses. Article 32 provides that participants in criminal proceedings and counsel can be present when an act of legal assistance is carried out in the requested state. 42. The 1959 Council of Europe Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters entered into force with respect to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on 26 October 1999 and with respect to Slovenia on 17 October 2001. It provides in Articles 8 and 10, respectively, as follows: Article 8 “A witness or expert who has failed to answer a summons to appear, service of which has been requested, shall not, even if the summons contains a notice of penalty, be subjected to any punishment or measure of restraint, unless subsequently he voluntarily enters the territory of the requesting Party and is there again duly summoned.” Article 10 “1 If the requesting Party considers the personal appearance of a witness or expert before its judicial authorities especially necessary, it shall so mention in its request for service of the summons and the requested Party shall invite the witness or expert to appear. The requested Party shall inform the requesting Party of the reply of the witness or expert. ...” 43. The Second Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters was adopted on 8 November 2001. It entered into force with respect to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on 1 April 2009. However with respect to Slovenia it entered into force only on 1 July 2013, which is after the proceedings in the applicant’s case had been concluded. Article 9 regulates hearings by video‑conference. 44. On 29 May 2000 the Council of the European Union adopted the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European Union (2000/C 197/01), which aims at facilitating mutual judicial assistance between the authorities of the Member States. It supplements the 1959 Council of Europe Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. Article 10 regulates hearings by video-conference. It sets out that such hearing can be requested if a person is in one Member State’s territory and has to be heard as a witness or expert by the judicial authorities of another Member State and it is not desirable or possible for the person to be heard to appear on its territory in person.

5. The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Budapest. 6. She is the widow of a well-known Hungarian poet, György Faludy. They married in 2002, and their relationship, partly due to a significant difference in age, as well as their life and work, were constantly the subject of widespread media coverage. They often appeared in the tabloids. 7. The applicant’s husband died in 2006. 8. On an unspecified date in 2008 an article was published in a daily newspaper, Blikk, based on an interview with the applicant, revealing that she wanted to have a child who would be a blood relative of both her and her late husband and have the same intellect and attitude as him. The applicant explained that she envisaged her own sister and her late husband’s grandson being the parents of that child. 9. Following some talks with the applicant, on 26 March 2008 Helyi Téma, at the material time the biggest weekly journal, republished the same story, adding that the late poet’s grandson had dismissed the idea of having a child with the applicant’s sister. The front page of the newspaper contained a photograph of the applicant with her late husband and the headline “Trampling on the memory of Faludy. The widow does everything for the limelight”. Despite a previous request by the applicant, the article made no mention of a book to be published on the applicant’s late husband. 10. Subsequently, in reaction to a complaint by the applicant, the newspaper published an additional article on the book under publication; however, it did not appear on the front page as the applicant’s had presumably wished. The applicant asked for a further article to be published but the newspaper declined. 11. Dissatisfied, the applicant lodged a civil action against the publisher of the weekly newspaper under article 78 of the (old) Civil Code, alleging a violation of her personality rights, in particular her right to reputation. She maintained that the headline published on 26 March 2008 had negatively affected her public image. She sought an injunction against any further infringement of her right to reputation, an apology from the publisher and compensation for non-pecuniary damage in the amount of 4,000,000 Hungarian forints (HUF – approximately 13,000 euros (EUR)). 12. According to the witnesses who gave evidence before the first-instance court, the applicant had been truly saddened by the way the article had presented her family plans, especially that her statements had been hurtful to the memory of her late husband. She had also received a lot of criticism from her acquaintances. In a judgment of 5 April 2009 the Budapest Regional Court granted an injunction against any further infringement, ordered a public apology and obliged the publisher to pay the applicant HUF 600,000 (EUR 2,000) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The remainder of the applicant’s claim for compensation was dismissed. The court established the following: “..the private life of the plaintiff and her late spouse was previously at the centre of media attention ... György Faludy and the plaintiff have already shocked public opinion with the declaration of their love. It turned out that she seduced the poet from a man ... The poet-prince (költőfejedelem) happily introduced to the world his then yet unknown lover, who became his muse and who was 65 years younger than him. The Kossuth Prize winner and internationally recognised poet had a tendency to push the boundaries, openly admitted his homosexual adventures and love affairs, and held that taboos were to be dismantled. Therefore, when the country just began to digest and accept his relationship with Fanny, the poet accepted an offer from Penthouse magazine, which has since closed down, agreeing to be presented in the magazine in high-quality erotic pictures with his lover ... [The plaintiff] had even been subject of numerous hurtful and degrading remarks and attacks during György Faludy’s life. The media echoed that opinion, doubting her true feelings towards her husband, and some of the publications stressed that theirs was a marriage of convenience ... They planned to adopt a child during the poet’s lifetime, but since that plan failed, György Faludy came up with the idea of having a child through his son, but since his son was terminally ill, that plan could not go ahead either. ... ...the plaintiff’s idea can be said to be bizarre and eccentric, nonetheless, how she has spoken about childbearing does not, following the rules of formal logic, mean that she has trampled on her husband’s memory. Based on the witness statements and the role the plaintiff’s late husband played in public life, the court concluded that the applicant’s idea about childbearing was not contrary to the thinking of György Faludy...” 13. The Regional Court added that both the applicant and her late husband had unusual, provocative personalities and ways of thinking, and the statement according to which she had infringed her late husband’s memory did not correspond to reality and was unjustifiably hurtful. According to the court, statements in a front page headline constituted journalistic opinion, and were protected by the right to freedom of expression, as long as they were not devoid of any factual basis and did not amount to a blatantly humiliating or offensive value judgment. The court concluded that the statement that the applicant did everything for the limelight had not infringed her personality rights, whereas the statement that she had trampled on her husband’s memory had infringed her right to reputation and dignity (33.P.22.472/2009/16.). 14. On 8 December 2011 the Budapest Court of Appeal reversed the previous judgment finding an infringement of the applicant’s reputation and dismissed her action in its entirety. The court reiterated the Constitutional Court’s case-law on the different fundamental rights at stake, pointing out that even shocking, disturbing or inaccurate opinions were protected by the right to freedom of expression and were not susceptible of proof. It also stressed that statements should be assessed in context and with regard to their background. The court explained in detail that the applicant and her husband had triggered controversial reactions and “everyday people with an average mindset” would have had an opinion on their relationship and marriage. It held that the headline was not a statement of fact but a value judgment expressed in connection with the applicant’s own “peculiar” statements. According to the court, the main issue at stake was whether, in the light of the applicant’s own conduct “diverging from the widely‑accepted social and ethical norms”, the statement could be regarded as unreasonably hurtful and humiliating. The court also found that the headline could not have infringed the applicant’s reputation since her own statements were irrational and undignified, putting György Faludy’s grandson in an embarrassing situation. 15. The applicant lodged a petition for review with the Kúria. In a judgment of 12 September 2012, the Kúria endorsed the finding of the second-instance court that the headline did not constitute a statement of fact but a value judgment concerning the unusual manner in which the applicant intended to start a family. Since it was not devoid of factual basis, it could not be considered humiliating, hurtful or offensive and as such had not infringed the applicant’s dignity. The court nonetheless stated that it was irrelevant whether the applicant’s previous unconventional conduct justified the value judgment (Pfv.IV.20.710/2012/5.).

5. The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Slavonski Brod. 6. The applicant is a local political figure in Slavonski Brod. She was the head of administration for all kindergartens in Slavonski Brod, and during several local elections ran for mayor of that town. While the applicant held the position of head of administration for all kindergartens in Slavonski Brod, Z.B. sought and obtained employment in one of the kindergartens in Slavonski Brod as a teacher. One of the conditions for obtaining such employment was holding Croatian citizenship, and Z.B. presented a certificate confirming such citizenship. At a certain point in time Z.B., as an employee of a kindergarten in Slavonski Brod, was a subordinate of the applicant. In February 2008 Z.B. was appointed head of administration for all kindergartens in Slavonski Brod. 7. On 23 October 2008 the applicant held a press conference entitled “All victims of the human resources policy of the mayor of Slavonski Brod, M.D.”, where she alleged that the mayor of Slavonski Brod was involved in various irregularities in the employment of civil servants in local public institutions. The applicant thereby also alleged that the mayor had appointed Z.B. as the manager of a kindergarten run by the municipality even though she had used invalid documents and held only citizenship of the former Yugoslavia, and that together the mayor and Z.B. had denied a Croatian war veteran’s daughter employment (see paragraph 11 below). 8. On 24 November 2008 Z.B. instituted a private prosecution against the applicant in the Slavonski Brod Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Slavonskom Bordu) on charges of defamation related to the above-mentioned statement. 9. During the proceedings the applicant contended that she had wanted to show all irregularities concerning the mayor’s employment of local civil servants, and that she had learnt that Z.B. had requested Croatian citizenship only after she had been employed as manager of the kindergarten. The applicant also submitted that a councillor in the local assembly had provided her with certain documents concerning Z.B., including an annulled citizenship certificate. 10. On 21 May 2010 the Slavonski Brod Municipal Court acquitted the applicant on the grounds that the material obtained during the proceedings showed that Z.B. had been registered in 1985 in the register of births of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which at the time had been one of the former Yugoslav republics. She had been registered as a Croatian citizen on 13 October 2008, whereas she had lodged her application for employment at the kindergarten on 12 February 2008. In the circumstances, the Slavonski Brod Municipal Court considered that the applicant demonstrated the veracity of her statements. 11. On 23 May 2011, upon an appeal by Z.B., the Slavonski Brod County Court (Županijski sud u Slavonskom Brodu) quashed the first-instance judgment and ordered a retrial, on the grounds that not all of the relevant facts had been properly established. 12. After a retrial, on 26 January 2012 the Slavonski Brod Municipal Court found the applicant guilty of defamation for having said “[the mayor] appointed people who are using invalid documents to crucial positions, for example Z.B., who unfortunately still has citizenship of the former Yugoslavia” and “[the mayor], together with his manager [Z.B.], fired a girl on the pretence that, as the child of a [Croatian] war veteran, she had no right to preferential treatment with regard to employment”. The applicant was given a suspended sentence of sixty days’ imprisonment with a probation period of one year. The Slavonski Brod Municipal Court held that it was a well-known fact that Yugoslavia no longer existed, and that therefore Z.B. could not have Yugoslav citizenship. Moreover, Z.B. had acquired Croatian citizenship in 1992, but her citizenship certificate had later been annulled in 2008 due to some administrative irregularities, and later she had been issued with a new certificate. The Slavonski Brod Municipal Court therefore held that the applicant had uttered untrue information concerning Z.B. in public, amounting to defamation. The applicant was also ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings in the amount of 8,250 Croatian kunas (HRK). 13. The applicant appealed, and on 30 May 2012 the Slavonski Brod County Court dismissed her appeal, upholding the first-instance judgment. 14. The applicant then lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske), complaining, inter alia, that her freedom of expression had been violated by the judgments of the lower courts. 15. On 26 September 2012 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant’s constitutional complaint inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded. 16. The decision of the Constitutional Court was served on the applicant’s representative on 11 October 2012. 17. On 4 October 2007 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted Resolution 1577 (2007), “Towards decriminalisation of defamation”, in which it urged those member States which still allowed prison sentences for defamation, even if those sentences were not actually imposed, to abolish them without delay.

4. The applicant was born in 1988 and lives in Istanbul. 5. On 12 May 2009 the judge at the Istanbul Assize Court decided to restrict access to the investigation file relating to an investigation against the applicant and others pursuant to Section 10 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713), which was in force at the material time. 6. On 31 October 2009 the applicant was arrested and taken into custody on suspicion of membership of a terrorist organisation. 7. On 1 November 2009 the applicant’s police statement was taken at the Anti-Terror Branch of the Istanbul Security Directorate, in the presence of his lawyer. He was questioned at length about his telephone conversations that had been intercepted. The police read out the transcripts of the said telephone conversations and asked the applicant to comment on them. He was further questioned in relation to allegations about aiding and abetting a terrorist organisation as well as his participation in several illegal demonstrations on behalf of this terrorist organisation and several incidents of assault and battery. He was further asked questions about a co‑accused’s incriminating statements. 8. On 2 November 2009 the public prosecutor questioned the applicant in the presence of his lawyer. The prosecutor read out the transcripts of the intercepted conversations to the applicant. The applicant did not deny that he had had these conversations but claimed that they were not made with the intention to plan a terrorist action. 9. On the same day the judge at the Istanbul Assize Court ordered his pre-trial detention. 10. On 2 November 2009 the applicant’s lawyer asked the court to lift the restriction of access to the investigation file. On 10 November 2009 the Istanbul Assize Court rejected this objection. 11. On 4 November 2009 the applicant’s lawyer filed an objection against the decision on the applicant’s detention, and requested his release. On 12 November 2009 the Istanbul Assize Court, relying on the public prosecutor’s written opinion, which had not been communicated to the applicant or his representative, dismissed the objection without holding a hearing. 12. On 25 November 2009 the Istanbul public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Istanbul Assize Court, charging the applicant with aiding and abetting of a terrorist organisation, and looting. 13. On 4 December 2009 the Istanbul Assize Court accepted the indictment. On the same date the restriction on the file was lifted. 14. On 26 February 2010 the applicant was released. 15. According to the latest information in the case file, the criminal proceedings against the applicant are still pending.

10. The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Vila Nova de Gaia. The applicant’s husband, Mr António Rui Calisto Fernandes, was born in 1957. He died on 8 March 1998 following a series of medical problems that occurred after he had undergone minor surgery for the removal of nasal polyps. 11. On 26 November 1997 Mr Fernandes was admitted to the ear, nose and throat (ENT) department of Vila Nova de Gaia Hospital (“the CHVNG”) for a nasal polypectomy. He underwent the operation on 27 November 1997 and was discharged from hospital on 28 November 1997 at 10 a.m. 12. On 29 November 1997, at 1 a.m., the applicant took her husband to the emergency department of the CHVNG because he was suffering from violent headaches and was in an agitated state. There he was examined by the doctors on duty, in particular by a neurologist. The doctors considered that Mr Fernandes was suffering from psychological problems and prescribed tranquilisers. The applicant claims that they recommended her husband’s discharge but that she objected. 13. In the morning Mr Fernandes was examined by the new medical team on duty. At 10 a.m. he underwent a lumbar puncture which revealed that he had bacterial meningitis. He was transferred to the hospital’s intensive care unit. 14. On 30 November 1997 a scan revealed a cerebral oedema. On 2 December 1997 another scan revealed that the cerebral oedema had diminished. 15. On 5 December 1997, following an improvement in his clinical condition, Mr Fernandes was transferred to the hospital’s general D. ward, where he was under the care of Dr J.V. He was diagnosed with two duodenal ulcers on 10 December 1997. 16. Mr Fernandes was discharged from hospital on 13 December 1997 as his condition was considered to be stable. A follow-up scan as an outpatient was recommended. 17. On 18 December 1997 Mr Fernandes, who was suffering from vertigo and headaches, was admitted to the emergency department of the CHVNG. He was examined by Dr J.V., who kept him under observation because he had acute diarrhoea, abdominal pain and severe anaemia. Mr Fernandes received blood transfusions. 18. On 19 December 1997 an endoscopy was performed on Mr Fernandes, confirming that he had a gastroduodenal ulcer. 19. On 23 December 1997 Mr Fernandes was discharged from hospital. He was prescribed a special diet and medication. A medical appointment was fixed for 9 February 1998. 20. The applicant’s husband continued to suffer from severe abdominal pain and diarrhoea. On 9 January 1998 he returned to the emergency department of the CHVNG. He was examined by Dr J.V., who did not consider it necessary to admit him. Mr Fernandes therefore returned home the same day. 21. On 25 January 1998 Mr Fernandes was readmitted to the CHVNG. A colonoscopy revealed infectious ulcerative colitis. Bacteriological tests showed the presence of the Clostridium difficile bacterium. Mr Fernandes was placed on a drip and treated with antibiotics. 22. At the request of the applicant and her husband, Dr J.V. discharged the latter on 3 February 1998. Dr J.V. prescribed oral treatment and referred Mr Fernandes for further treatment in the hospital’s outpatient department. 23. On 17 February 1998 Mr Fernandes was admitted to Santo António General Hospital in Oporto after he was found to be suffering from chronic diarrhoea and microcytic anaemia. He underwent various examinations including a colonoscopy, an endoscopy and blood tests. The medical team considered several possible causes, including an infection with the Clostridium difficile bacterium, but all these possibilities were subsequently ruled out. However, a cytomegalovirus was detected and treatment was given. 24. On 5 March 1998 Mr Fernandes was examined by a doctor who judged the situation to be under control. 25. On 6 March 1998 Mr Fernandes’s condition deteriorated. He was examined by a doctor who suspected a possible perforated viscus. An X‑ray and an abdominal ultrasound were carried out. The latter showed ascites in the abdomen but did not confirm the initial diagnosis. At 5.30 p.m. the applicant’s husband was examined by another doctor who detected some resistance to abdominal palpation. A gas analysis showed metabolic alkalosis, but there were no signs of hypocalcaemia. A sigmoidoscopy was performed which showed that the applicant’s husband had rectocolitis. 26. On 7 March 1998 at 1 p.m. the applicant’s husband was placed on oxygen because he had difficulty breathing. At 3 p.m. Mr Fernandes was examined by a general physician and subsequently by a surgeon. The latter decided that urgent surgery was needed as there was widespread peritonitis. Mr Fernandes was taken to the operating theatre at 4 p.m. and was brought out again a few minutes later in order to be prepared for surgery, in particular by being given a blood transfusion. He re-entered the operating theatre at 8 p.m. He died the following day at 2.55 a.m. 27. According to the death certificate issued by Santo António Hospital, the applicant’s husband died from septicaemia caused by peritonitis and a perforated viscus. 28. On 13 August 1998 the applicant wrote a joint letter to the Ministry of Health, the regional health authority for the North region and the Medical Association, stating that she had received no response from the hospitals to explain the sudden deterioration in her husband’s health and his death. 29. On 30 October and 23 December 1998 the regional health authority for the North region sent the applicant copies of the reports drawn up by the CHVNG and Santo António Hospital on the basis of her husband’s medical records. 30. On 30 May 2000 the applicant requested an update on progress in the proceedings from the regional health authority, stating that she had still received no clear explanations concerning the events preceding her husband’s death. In a letter of 5 July 2000 the authority informed her that the file had been sent to the Inspectorate General for Health (Inspeção‑Geral da Saúde – “the IGS”) with a view to the opening of an investigation. 31. By an order of 20 September 2000 the Inspector General for Health ordered an investigation (processo de averiguações). 32. On 6 November 2001 an inspector was appointed to head the investigation. 33. On 7 February 2002 the IGS informed the applicant that evidence would be taken from the members of the medical team which had treated her husband and that an expert medical report would be prepared. 34. The applicant gave evidence on 3 April 2002. 35. On 23 September 2002 expert medical reports were requested. Reports prepared by experts in the fields of internal medicine, gastroenterology and general surgery were submitted in November 2002. According to the reports, in view of the deterioration in his state of health after the nasal polypectomy, it would not have been possible to save the applicant’s husband’s life. 36. The report of the investigation was submitted on 28 November 2002. It found, on the basis of the expert medical reports received, that the treatment administered to the applicant’s husband had been appropriate. 37. In an order of 12 December 2002 the Inspector General for Health declared the investigation closed, finding that there had been no medical negligence and that there were no grounds for instituting disciplinary proceedings against the doctors who had treated the applicant’s husband. 38. In a letter of 17 February 2003 the applicant appealed against the order. She argued that the final report had not answered her questions, complaining about areas of uncertainty and about the duration of the investigation and its findings. 39. On 28 March 2003 the Inspector General for Health informed the applicant that he had set aside the order of 12 December 2002 and ordered the reopening of the investigation. 40. On 26 September 2005, in view of the questions raised by the applicant, the medical experts were requested to provide additional information. 41. A new investigation report was submitted on 23 November 2005, clarifying the facts and taking account of the answers provided by the three medical experts. The report stated that there were no grounds for criticising the health-care personnel who had been involved in the care of the applicant’s husband in the CHVNG and Santo António Hospital, as the patient had received proper and appropriate medical assistance in terms of his diagnosis, supervision and treatment. The report further noted that his discharge had been justified on each occasion in view of the improvement in his state of health. The report concluded as follows: “The results of the investigation ... following the reopening of the proceedings and the fresh inquiries and medical reports do not indicate that there was any negligent or careless conduct in breach of good medical practice. There is therefore no need to take legal or disciplinary action against any persons involved in the [patient’s] care ...” 42. Taking this report into account, the Inspector General for Health made a fresh order discontinuing the proceedings on 27 December 2005. 43. In a letter of 1 February 2006 the applicant appealed against that order, complaining of unclear points and omissions. She also raised the possibility that the sudden deterioration in her husband’s health and his eventual death might have been caused by bacteria present in the operating theatre on the day of the nasal polypectomy, that the diagnoses may have been made in haste and that there may have been negligence and carelessness in the medical treatment administered to her husband. She further complained that the internal medicine and gastroenterology reports had been prepared each time by the same experts. The applicant therefore requested the reopening of the investigation and the preparation of a fresh expert medical report. 44. The Inspector General for Health wrote to the applicant on 2 March 2006 informing her that he had set aside his previous order and ordered fresh expert assessments to be carried out by different experts in the fields of internal medicine and gastroenterology. 45. The applicant gave evidence again on 27 April 2006. 46. The medical experts submitted their reports on 20 May and 10 July 2006. The expert in gastroenterology stated that it was possible, albeit rare, for a nasal polypectomy to cause meningitis. He further considered that the applicant’s husband had received appropriate treatment but that his discharge on 3 February 1998 may not have been wise in view of his clinical condition. The expert concluded that the applicant’s husband had suffered a series of complications which were uncommon but could occur, and that he had received proper medical care at the CHVNG. As to the care in Santo António Hospital, the expert considered that the condition of the applicant’s husband had been extremely complicated and had given rise to doubts as to the best way to proceed. In his report, the expert in internal medicine rejected the idea of a hospital-acquired infection on the grounds that, had that been the case, the antibiotics administered to the patient would have had no effect. In his view, the meningitis had developed unexpectedly. He further took the view that the applicant’s husband’s discharge on 3 February 1998 had been appropriate but that he should have continued to be monitored as an outpatient. 47. On 25 July 2006 a report was drawn up on completion of the investigation, which concluded as follows: “... The content of the most recent expert medical reports shows ... that there are no grounds for a finding of disciplinary liability for negligence against any of the health‑care professionals involved in A.’s medical treatment... ... the decision by the assistant doctor [J.V.] to refer the patient for outpatient treatment was not appropriate and sufficient from a clinical viewpoint in so far as, in order to prevent a recurrence of the colitis caused by Clostridium difficile ..., the patient should have remained in hospital under close medical supervision ... ... Hence, the doctor in question did not act with the necessary care and diligence, thereby incurring disciplinary liability on account of his negligent conduct in the medical assistance provided ... in D. ward of the CHVNG’s medical department between 25 January and 3 February 1998. The medical opinions make no criticisms of the assistance provided in the gastroenterology department of Santo António General Hospital in Oporto ...” 48. In the light of this report the Inspector General made an order on 26 July 2006 for the opening of disciplinary proceedings against Dr J.V. 49. By a letter dated 31 July 2006 the applicant was informed that the disciplinary proceedings initiated against Dr J.V. would be stayed pending the outcome of the criminal proceedings (see paragraphs 59-68 below). 50. In the meantime, on 31 August 1998, the Medical Association acknowledged receipt of the applicant’s letter of 13 August 1998, informing her that steps would be taken in response to it. 51. The case was referred to the Medical Association’s regional disciplinary council for the North region. The latter obtained the patient’s medical records and sought the opinions of four specialist panels: gastroenterology, infectious diseases, general surgery and ear, nose and throat (ENT). 52. In its report of 14 July 1999, the gastroenterology panel issued the following conclusions: “... A simple X-ray of the abdomen performed the day before the patient’s death did not detect any dilatation or perforation of the colon. The patient’s death was caused by peritonitis as a result of the perforation of the duodenal ulcer. The difficulties in diagnosing the condition were understandable in view of the patient’s serious clinical condition and the fact that his abdominal pains were explained by the inflammatory disease in the colon. The role of the corticosteroids in aggravating or reactivating the peptic ulcer ... is not currently considered a risk factor ... However, given that the patient had already experienced one episode of intestinal bleeding, there would have been grounds for weighing up the use of these drugs. ... The decisions to discharge the patient [from hospital] may have delayed the diagnosis or the commencement of treatment. Nevertheless, after examining the documents submitted to me, I am unable to confirm whether these discharge decisions adversely affected his diagnosis or programme of treatment. ...” 53. The conclusions of the report of 17 April 2000 by the infectious-diseases panel read as follows: “1. In our opinion the diagnosis of meningitis, most likely resulting from the nasal polypectomy, was inexplicably delayed. The fact that there was no one on the medical team trained in this type of diagnosis (for example, a specialist in infectious diseases) may be regarded as the only explanation for such an incident. However, this was not the immediate cause of the patient’s death. 3. The procedure has been undermined to an incalculable extent by the fact that no autopsy was performed, although an autopsy is mandatory (mandatória) in cases of this type in order to shed light on the chain of events.” In its report the panel further held as follows: “The inhuman conditions described in this process, as regards how the patient was treated, are another example of the situation encountered on a daily basis in our hospitals; a reflection of the appalling structural and operational conditions which require urgent analysis and change. This board of the Infectious-Diseases Panel of the Medical Association must have a fundamental role in advocating the rights of patients and doctors in order to create better conditions of care for the former and better working conditions for the latter. We reiterate, once more, the need to consider the creation of infectious-diseases departments/units in hospitals of the same type as Vila Nova de Gaia Hospital, in order to improve the quality of care in this regard.” 54. In a report of 24 April 2001 the general-surgery panel found that there had been no negligence or medical malpractice in the hospitals concerned. The report read as follows: “1. A perforated duodenal ulcer requires immediate surgery. In the present situation the perforated ulcer ... was difficult, if not impossible, to diagnose given the clinical context in which it occurred. Furthermore, in view of the seriousness of the patient’s clinical condition, the approach to surgery had to be given careful consideration and the patient had to be prepared by means of various measures. ...” 55. In a report dated 1 August 2001 the ENT panel concluded as follows: “1. Meningitis following micro-endoscopic surgery for nasal polyps is described as one of the (major) complications of this type of surgery, estimated in the literature to occur in between 0.6% and 1% of cases. These figures will be higher in the event of a repeat operation, as in the present case (surgery was performed in 1993 as stated on page 314 of the file concerning the operation). 2. The post-operative CT scan of the brain carried out on 29 November 1997 does not show any discontinuity in the bones at the base of the skull ... which suggests that no invasive endocranial surgery was carried out. 3. The description of the surgery performed on the patient on 26 November 1997 (page 310 of the file) does not give any indication of clinical malpractice or negligence. 4. No ENT procedures were performed during any of the patient’s subsequent stays in Vila Nova de Gaia Hospital or in Santo António Hospital.” 56. In an order of 28 December 2001 the regional disciplinary council for the North region decided, after having examined the conclusions of the different specialist panels, to take no further action on the applicant’s complaint, on the ground that there was no evidence of misconduct or medical negligence. 57. The disciplinary council observed the following: (i) meningitis was a complication that could arise in between 0.6% and 1% of cases following a nasal polypectomy; the figures were liable to be higher for a repeat operation, as in the case in question; (ii) the applicant’s husband had received appropriate treatment during his various hospital stays; (iii) the patient’s bacterial meningitis (Pseudomonas) had been treated properly; (iv) although the infectious-diseases panel had suggested that the presence of a specialist in that discipline might have enabled a diagnosis to be made sooner, this had not been a decisive factor in the development of the clinical situation; (v) the perforation of the duodenal ulcer had been the cause of the peritonitis. This had been difficult to diagnose in view of the patient’s serious clinical condition, a fact acknowledged by the gastroenterology and general-surgery panels; (vi) although the infectious-diseases panel had considered that too long a period had elapsed between the diagnosis of the perforated duodenal ulcer and surgery, the time taken to prepare for the operation had been justified since the patient had been suffering from intestinal disease and had severe anaemia, sepsis and a fluid and electrolyte imbalance, as noted by the general-surgery panel. 58. On 29 April 2002 the applicant lodged an appeal against that order with the Medical Association’s National Disciplinary Council. On 18 March 2003 the appeal was declared inadmissible as being out of time. 59. On 29 April 2002 the applicant lodged a complaint for negligent homicide with the Oporto criminal investigation and prosecution department. 60. She gave evidence on 7 June 2002. 61. By order of the Criminal Investigation Court of 27 September 2002 the applicant was given leave to intervene in the proceedings as an assistant to the public prosecutor (assistente). 62. On 7 December 2007 the public prosecutor’s office made its submissions, charging Dr J.V. with homicide by gross (grosseira) negligence. In support of their decision the prosecuting authorities referred to the report appended to the IGS order of 25 July 2006. They considered that Dr J.V. should not have discharged the applicant’s husband on 3 February 1998 in so far as the patient’s clinical condition had been problematic and he had been infected with the Clostridium difficile bacterium. 63. The case was referred to the Vila Nova de Gaia District Court. During the trial the court heard evidence from the applicant, the accused, eight doctors who had been involved in treating the applicant’s husband in the CHVNG and in Santo António Hospital, and the five medical experts appointed in the context of the proceedings before the IGS. The court also sought the opinion of the Medical Association’s Disciplinary Council. 64. On 15 January 2009 the District Court acquitted Dr J.V. of the charges against him. In particular, it took the view that the findings made by the IGS in its order of 26 July 2006 could not be taken into consideration as they had not been confirmed by the five medical experts who had given evidence during the trial. 65. As to the facts, the District Court considered, inter alia, the following to be established: “The patient’s hospitalisation on 18 December 1997 ... was not the result of a lack of medical supervision of his clinical condition ... since it was unconnected to the complications arising out of the meningitis. In fact, it resulted from acute anaemia caused by intestinal bleeding from a duodenal ulcer; ... The decisions to discharge the patient on 13 and 23 December 1997 were appropriate, given that, in the former case, the problem of bacterial meningitis had been resolved, [the patient] had completed the course of antibiotics, he no longer had any symptoms or fever, had a slightly increased white-blood cell count, a falling neutrophil count and normal sedimentation rate, and was not complaining ... and, in the latter case, that is to say, the patient’s hospitalisation from 18 to 23 December 1997, the patient was not complaining of abdominal pain, diarrhoea or bleeding ... with the result that it was possible to continue treating his ulcer with a dietary regime while monitoring him on an outpatient basis ... When the patient was admitted to Santo António Hospital, laboratory tests were carried out for Clostridium difficile. The results were negative on two occasions.” 66. On the subject of the surgery preceding the death of the applicant’s husband, the District Court observed as follows: “... the patient was in a very serious clinical state, with septic shock and multiple organ dysfunction. For that reason, he was placed on artificial ventilation and vasoactive drugs and fluids were administered ..., together with hydrocortisone to deal with possible acute adrenal insufficiency (falência supra-renal aguda), and broad-spectrum antibiotics; ... in this medical context the patient’s prospects of survival were very uncertain, in view of the septic shock and multiple organ dysfunction; ... a simple abdominal X-ray and an abdominal and pelvic ultrasound scan were therefore requested, which did not reveal a perforation of the intestine.” 67. In the District Court’s view, it had not been demonstrated that the care provided to the applicant’s husband during his stay in hospital from 25 January to 3 February 1998 had not been in accordance with good medical practice, or that he should have been kept in hospital for longer. The court therefore concluded that there was no causal link between the treatment administered by Dr J.V. to the applicant’s husband in the CHVNG and his death, which had been caused by a perforated viscus that was unconnected to the colonic disease treated by the accused. It held: “...there was no evidence to show that the treatment administered by the accused for the Clostridium difficile infection was incomplete, that the patient was discharged prematurely on 3 February 1998 or, in sum, that the accused was responsible for the death of the patient on 8 March 1998.” 68. The applicant did not appeal against that judgment. 69. On 6 March 2003 the applicant brought an action in the Oporto Administrative and Fiscal Court against the CHVNG, Santo António Hospital and the eight doctors who had been involved in treating her husband while he was in hospital, claiming compensation for the damage she had suffered on account of her husband’s death. She alleged, inter alia, (i) that her husband’s meningitis had been caused by Pseudomonas cepacia bacteria which, she alleged, had been present in the operating theatre during the nasal polypectomy; (ii) that the meningitis had been diagnosed too late, allowing the illness to become serious; (iii) that the administering of excessive doses of medication and the lack of a suitable prophylactic had caused the duodenal ulcer which had led to her husband’s death. 70. In the context of these proceedings the applicant was granted legal aid in the form of exemption from payment of the court fees and the fees of a lawyer of her own choosing. 71. Between 4 and 24 April 2003 the eight doctors contested their standing to be sued (ilegitimidade passiva), relying on Article 2 of Legislative Decree no. 48051 of 21 November 1967. 72. On 16 April 2007 the court gave a preparatory decision (despacho saneador) specifying which facts were considered to be established and which remained to be established. In accordance with Article 2 of Legislative Decree no. 48051 of 21 November 1967 it further held that the doctors among the defendants did not have standing in so far as they had been sued only for negligent conduct. Accordingly, it declared the claim admissible only in respect of the hospitals. 73. On 17 January 2011 the applicant gave evidence. 74. During the three hearings the court heard evidence from the following witnesses: (i) eleven doctors who had been involved in treating the applicant’s husband during his various stays in the CHVNG and Santo António Hospital; (ii) the general practitioner of the applicant’s husband; (iii) two doctors who were friends of the family; (iv) the inspector who had written the final report on completion of the investigation within the IGS; and (v) the medical experts in gastroenterology and internal medicine whose reports had formed the basis for the last IGS decision. 75. On 24 May 2011 the court made an order concerning the facts. Taking into account the medical records of the applicant’s husband and the various statements made by the witnesses who had given evidence, the court considered it established, inter alia, (i) that a polypectomy was a straightforward surgical operation which posed minimal risk and that the patient had been informed accordingly; (ii) that the operating theatre had been aseptic and sterilised at the time of the polypectomy; (iii) that the origin of the bacterium linked to the patient’s meningitis had not been proven. The court dismissed the possibility of a hospital-acquired infection, pointing out that in that case the prescribed treatment would have had no effect; (iv) that the medication prescribed in the CHVNG and Santo António Hospital could cause intestinal problems and hence could give rise to colitis; (v) that the applicant’s husband had been treated with drugs to protect his stomach in the CHVNG; (vi) that the gastroduodenal perforation had not been detected until the operation was being performed; and (vii) that the applicant’s husband had died from septicaemia caused by peritonitis resulting from a perforated viscus. 76. On 23 January 2012 the Oporto Administrative and Fiscal Court delivered a judgment in which it dismissed the applicant’s claims. On the facts, the judgment stated, inter alia, as follows: “The Pseudomonas bacterium was resistant to the various antibiotics that were tried ... When the patient attended Vila Nova de Gaia Hospital on 18 December 1997 he had completely recovered from his bacterial meningitis. ... On 25 January 1998 the patient again attended Vila Nova de Gaia Hospital, where he was diagnosed with pseudomembranous colitis caused by Clostridium difficile ... The colitis was successfully treated in that hospital ...; Throughout his stay in Vila Nova de Gaia Hospital he was given treatment to protect his stomach. ... When he was admitted (to Santo António Hospital on 17 February 1998) he had chronic diarrhoea ... and was diagnosed with suspected inflammatory bowel disease. Medication was prescribed in keeping with that diagnosis. ... While in Santo António Hospital he was kept under observation, received daily medication and underwent various tests. ... On 6 March 1998 ... nothing had made it possible to predict the gastroduodenal perforation ... the tests carried out that day ... did not confirm the existence of any duodenal perforation such that the situation had to be kept under review; ... It was not until 7 March 1998 that the patient’s acute abdominal syndrome was diagnosed, calling for urgent surgery ... it was only during the operation that the patient was found to be suffering from a duodenal perforation; ... The perforation had occurred 24 hours before surgery.” 77. The judgment concluded as follows: “ ... in view of the facts that have been established, it is not possible to determine at what point the defendants, by their actions or omissions, breached the rules of good medical practice ... It is considered established that [Mr Fernandes’s] death was caused by sepsis due to peritonitis resulting from the perforation of his duodenal ulcer... No doubts persisted regarding the diagnosis of meningitis, the procedure adopted, the sequence of treatment and the resolution of the problem, as all the various after‑effects were duly explained. Hence there were no differences of opinion regarding the need to prescribe and use antibiotics in the context of [Mr Fernandes’s] meningitis and other conditions, although it was explained that colitis is a bacterial imbalance caused by antibiotics (the very ones which have undesirable effects on intestinal flora). Nevertheless, it was not possible to determine the agent or identify the cause of the bacterium linked to the meningitis and it could therefore not be established with certainty whether the sinus surgery was the source of the problem or was simply one factor causing the infection. The other factors and circumstances preceding the operation ... thus cease to be relevant. It is nonetheless surprising that the death of the claimant’s husband should have occurred ... given that he had been strong and in good health and that the microsurgery on his sinuses was a straightforward operation. However, it has not been demonstrated that the therapy or medication administered to [Mr Fernandes] at any point was unsuited to his clinical condition. There was therefore no breach of the rules of good medical practice (either by action or omission). Accordingly, one of the cumulative conditions for establishing civil liability, namely an unlawful act, is absent.” 78. The applicant appealed against the judgment to the Supreme Administrative Court. She contested the facts deemed to be established, arguing that only by studying the circumstances before, during and after the operation would it be possible to understand what type of bacterium her husband had contracted. She further reiterated that her husband had contracted a hospital-acquired infection and had not received adequate treatment either in the CHVNG or in Santo António Hospital. 79. On 26 February 2013 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s claims, upholding the judgment of the Oporto Administrative and Fiscal Court. It first of all declined to review the facts considered by the lower court to have been established, on the grounds that the hearings had not been recorded and that no new documents had been submitted which could cast doubt on the evidence forming the basis for the court’s decision. The Supreme Administrative Court summed up its judgment as follows: “The lower court considered, in sum, that it had not been possible to identify the nature and origin of the bacterium that caused the meningitis and that it had not been demonstrated that the illnesses subsequent to [the patient’s] treatment and recovery from that illness ... had been the consequence of incorrect diagnosis or treatment. For that reason it found that no breach of the rules of good medical practice had been demonstrated that might have caused the patient’s death. The claimant takes a different view of the matter. However, she bases her arguments mainly on allegations that have not been proven, and in particular the allegation that the meningitis was caused by the Pseudomonas bacterium, allegedly acquired in hospital ... and that the patient did not receive appropriate prophylactic treatment to protect his stomach during his treatment with antibiotics. Accordingly, these claims can be summed up as allegations of medical negligence which are unsupported by the established facts.”

6. The applicant was born in 1942 and lives in Yerevan. 7. On 9 May 2007 at around 10.30 p.m. a certain S.V. was shot dead following an argument in front of a restaurant owned by the applicant’s son, Levon Gulyan, aged 30. Later that evening a team of law-enforcement officers arrived at the crime scene, which included several police officers of the local Shengavit district police station (“the police station”), investigators of the Shengavit district prosecutor’s office (“the prosecutor’s office”) and two officers of the Principal Department for Criminal Intelligence (“the PDCI”) of the Armenian police: the deputy head of the PDCI, H.T., and the head of the Homicide Unit, G.T. 8. On 10 May 2007 at around 3-4 a.m. Levon Gulyan was taken by police officers to the police station in connection with the incident. PDCI Officers H.T. and G.T. had a talk with him for several hours, after which he was taken to the prosecutor’s office, where between 11.40 a.m. and 12.55 p.m. he was questioned as a witness by the prosecutor. He was kept at the police station until around 10 p.m. Levon Gulyan stated during questioning that he had gone out of his restaurant to smoke that evening when he had noticed a group of young people having an argument. He had unsuccessfully tried to calm them down and then had gone back into the restaurant. Later, when leaving the restaurant, he had seen police cars and other vehicles and found out that someone had been fatally shot. He had not seen the murder or heard gun shots. Two employees of his restaurant, barman H.M. and waitress M.G., were also questioned. M.G. stated that Levon Gulyan had been outside the restaurant when gunshots had been heard. 9. On 11 May 2007 Levon Gulyan appeared again at the police station. The applicant alleged that Levon Gulyan had been kept there for the whole day and night and had been released in the morning of 12 May 2007 in order to be able to participate in a parliamentary election taking place on that day, on the condition that he return to the police station a few hours later. The Government alleged that Levon Gulyan had not been kept at the police station on 11 May 2007 and that he had gone home. 10. On 12 May 2007, at around noon, Levon Gulyan appeared again at the police station. 11. At around 2 p.m. he was taken from there by car to the PDCI which was situated at the Armenian police headquarters, by two PDCI officers, V.G. and S.M., on the order of the head of the PDCI, H.M. 12. At 2.30 p.m. Levon Gulyan’s entry into the police headquarters was recorded. 13. At around 3.20 p.m. Levon Gulyan was found dead in the courtyard of the police headquarters with multiple injuries. It appears that he had fallen from the window of the office of the head of the Homicide Unit, G.T., which was situated on the second floor of the building. 14. At an unspecified time an examination of the scene of the incident and an external examination of the body were carried out. The relevant records stated that Levon Gulyan was lying 2 m from the building with his head towards the building and his legs towards the opposite building. He was leaning on the left frontal part of his body. His shoe laces were missing and were found in his trouser pockets, while a lock of hair was found lying about 1 m away from his body. The frame of the window from which he had apparently fallen was 40 cm wide. 15. On the same day, that is 12 May 2007, a prosecutor of the Yerevan prosecutor’s office took a statement from PDCI Officer G.T., who submitted that Levon Gulyan had been brought to his office at around 2.30 p.m. and he had had a talk with him for about thirty minutes about the circumstances of the murder. In order to report to the deputy head of the PDCI, H.T., the results of the talk, he had then left the office but had not wanted to leave Levon Gulyan alone, so he had taken him to Officer S.M.’s office. On his way to H.T.’s office he had bumped into Officer A.M. and told him to stay with Levon Gulyan in S.M.’s office and to send S.M. for lunch. At around 3.30 p.m., when he had been in H.T.’s office, he had heard noises in the corridor. He had gone out and learned that somebody had fallen from the window. He had run to the courtyard and seen Levon Gulyan lying on the ground. He had immediately called an ambulance and tried to provide first aid, but Levon Gulyan had already died. Later he had learned from A.M. that the latter had moved Levon Gulyan to his (that is to say G.T.’s) office so that S.M. had been able to go for lunch. Levon Gulyan had jumped out of the window of the office when A.M. had gone out to fetch some water. 16. The prosecutor also took a statement from PDCI Officer A.M. who submitted that at around 3 p.m. Levon Gulyan had been taken by Officer S.M. to G.T.’s office. Then Officer S.M. had said that he had had to go for lunch, while G.T. had been at that moment reporting to the deputy head of PDCI, H.T., so he had stayed with Levon Gulyan. He had seen Levon Gulyan earlier in Officer S.M.’s office and had been aware that he had been summoned in connection with the murder. Since he had been dealing with that case, he had decided to ask him some questions. Levon Gulyan had been tired and irritated, so he had decided to change the subject and had asked some unrelated questions concerning his restaurant. Levon Gulyan had then asked for permission to smoke and later for some water. There had been no water or bottle in the office. He had gone to a nearby office to fetch water but had then heard the sound of a window opening and a “boom”. He had run back to the office but there had been no one. The window had been open so he had immediately understood that Levon Gulyan had escaped. He had quickly run to the courtyard and had seen Levon Gulyan lying on his back, with blood around his head. There had been no one there, but later the members of his unit had arrived. A.M. submitted that he could not give their names as he had been in a state of shock. 17. The prosecutor instituted criminal proceedings under Article 110 § 1 of the Criminal Code (provoking a person to suicide), relying on G.T.’s and A.M.’s above statements, including their allegation that Levon Gulyan had fallen and died while trying to escape through the window. 18. Following the institution of proceedings, on the same day the prosecutor questioned PDCI Officers G.T. and A.M. as witnesses. They made submissions similar to those made earlier that day (see paragraphs 15 and 16 above). Officer G.T. explained that he had left his office to report to the deputy head of the PDCI, H.T., because Levon Gulyan, during their conversation, had provided the name of a previously unknown person who had been involved in the argument with S.V. 19. The prosecutor furthermore ordered a forensic medical examination, asking the medical examiner to clarify, inter alia, the injuries to Levon Gulyan’s body, whether they could have been sustained as a result of the fall and hitting obstacles on the way down, and his position when sustaining those injuries. 20. On 13 May 2007 the requested medical examination was performed, resulting in medical report no. 402, according to which Levon Gulyan had suffered open injuries to his skull and closed and blunt-force-trauma injuries to his thorax and spine, with multiple fractures and bruises, which had been sustained by colliding with obstacles and the ground as a result of the fall and had caused his death. When sustaining the injuries to the skull and the area of the left shoulder girdle, Levon Gulyan had been facing, with the left part of his head and the area of his left shoulder girdle, towards the object that had caused the injuries, whereas when sustaining the injuries to his thorax and the shoulder and lower spine, Levon Gulyan had been facing with the back surface of his thorax towards the object that had caused the injuries. Apart from the above‑mentioned injuries there were also bruises on the left side of his abdomen, the left elbow joint, the dorsal surface of the left wrist and the outer surface of the right ankle joint, as well as scratches in the areas of the right elbow joint, the dorsal surface of the wrist joint and the palm, the anterior surface of the left elbow joint, the outer surface of the right ankle joint and the frontal surface of the left knee joint, which had been caused by blunt objects while still alive and could be qualified as minor injuries. 21. On 14 May 2007 the applicant was recognised as a victim and informed of his rights. He was questioned on the same day. 22. On the same date the prosecutor ordered a forensic examination of marks, specifically fingerprints found on the window. 23. On 15 May 2007 an additional examination of the scene of the incident and the building was performed. It was noted that there was a yellow gas pipe passing horizontally along the wall at some distance from the building about two metres below the window. There was also an entresol floor below the ground floor, covered by a shed that stretched from the building into the courtyard. It appears that there was no open exit from the courtyard to the street. 24. On the same date the prosecutor ordered a forensic examination of fibres on Levon Gulyan’s clothes and under his fingernails, and of some smears found on the windowsill. 25. On 17 May 2007 the prosecutor questioned the deputy head of the PDCI, H.T., as a witness. 26. On 18 May 2007 a medical examination was performed, which found that it could not be ruled out that the lock of hair found at the scene had belonged to Levon Gulyan. 27. On 19 May 2007 the prosecutor, following a request by the applicant, decided to order another medical examination of Levon Gulyan’s body to be performed by two foreign experts from Germany and Denmark. That decision stated that on 12 May 2007 Levon Gulyan had been invited to the PDCI for an “operative talk”. The experts were asked to clarify the injuries on Levon Gulyan’s body and their origin, including whether there had been any injuries which could suggest that he had been ill-treated prior to his fall. 28. On the same date the experts conducted the requested medical examination, producing report no. 418, which concluded that the cause of death had been a massive blunt-force trauma to the head and chest. The experts found multiple lesions on the head and body, but no typical defence lesions. The lesions were fresh and had been sustained while still alive. They had been caused by severe blunt force trauma and could, as stated, have been caused by a fall from a height. The distribution of the lesions and the position of the body at the scene suggested that the deceased had hit the ground with the head and the upper part of the body first, and that he might have hit an object on the way down, possibly the pipe seen on the outside of the building under the window. There were no lesions that could not be explained by a fall from a height. On the other hand, it could not be ruled out that a few of the smaller bruises and abrasions could have been caused by another impact (such as a punch or blow) prior to the fall. The experts, having examined the scene of the incident, found no indentations or other indications of a person having hit the shed. They did not examine the gas pipe. 29. On 21 May 2007 the results of the forensic examination of the marks were produced in report no. 16080702, which stated that the fingerprints found on the internal side of the middle part of the window frame and on the left window pane belonged to Levon Gulyan. There was also a palm print and one fingerprint on the window which did not belong to him. 30. On 4 June 2007 the prosecutor ordered an additional forensic examination of the marks. The forensic expert was asked whether the palm print and the fingerprint, which did not belong to Levon Gulyan, belonged to PDCI Officers G.T. or A.M., or to a third person, H.M., the cleaning lady who had apparently cleaned G.T.’s office on 13 May 2007. 31. On 12 June 2007 the results of the forensic examination of the fibres and smears were produced in report no. 16170705, which stated, inter alia, that foreign natural and chemical fibres had been found on Levon Gulyan’s clothes and under his fingernails, which were fit for a further comparative examination. The fibres found on his clothes did not have the same generic origin as those taken from the pipe and the entresol shed. The smears found on the windowsill had the same generic origin as the samples taken from the soles of Levon Gulyan’s shoes. 32. On 18 June 2007 the results of the additional forensic examination of the marks were produced in a report, which stated that the palm print and the fingerprint found on the window did not belong to PDCI Officers G.T. or A.M. or to the cleaning lady. 33. By letter of 12 July 2007 the prosecutor, in reply to an enquiry made by the Yerevan prosecutor’s office, stated, inter alia, that the officers of the police station, having received an assignment to find and bring eyewitnesses, had brought Levon Gulyan to the prosecutor’s office for questioning, which had happened only once on 10 May 2007. He had been accompanied by police officers but not handcuffed. No other investigative measures with his participation had been planned for the period of 10 to 12 May 2007 and the question of his appearance on 12 May 2007 at the PDCI was to be clarified with that authority. 34. At some point during the investigation, the Prosecutor General’s Office ordered that an investigative experiment be conducted in order to clarify the mechanics of Levon Gulyan’s fall, but there was no follow-up to that decision because of the absence of a suitable dummy. 35. On 6 August 2007 the head of Armenian police issued a conclusion on the results of an official inquiry into Levon Gulyan’s death, finding that PDCI Officer A.M. had shown a low level of professionalism by leaving Levon Gulyan alone in the office as a result of which Levon Gulyan had attempted to escape and died, while PDCI Officer G.T., as Officer A.M.’s superior, had not properly supervised his subordinate. Both of them were to be subjected to a disciplinary sanction. 2. Investigation by the Special Investigative Service (SIS) and the applicant’s appeals to the courts (a) Investigation by the SIS, termination of the criminal proceedings and the applicant’s challenge before the courts 36. On 12 December 2007 the investigation was taken over by the SIS and assigned to investigator G.P. 37. On 19 December 2007 the investigator questioned PDCI Officer G.T. as a witness. Officer G.T. stated that Levon Gulyan had been invited to the PDCI in order to clarify the discrepancies between his statement and that of waitress M.G., who had also been invited to the PDCI. In his opinion, Levon Gulyan, having found out that M.G. had also been invited, had decided to escape in order not to take part in a confrontation alongside her, as this would have revealed the fact that he had made a false statement. G.T. alleged that Levon Gulyan had found out about the imminent confrontation by overhearing his telephone conversation with another police officer. 38. On 12 March 2008 the investigator terminated the criminal proceedings. This decision, which, following an appeal by the applicant, was approved by the supervising prosecutor, stated that on 12 May 2007 Levon Gulyan and M.G. had been separately invited to the PDCI to clarify the discrepancies between their statements. At the PDCI he had been taken to the office of the head of the Homicide Unit G.T., who had had a talk with him for about thirty minutes, during which Levon Gulyan had provided the nickname of one of the persons who had been involved in the argument with S.V. G.T. had then left the office in order to report this new piece of information, while Levon Gulyan had remained with the deputy head of the Homicide Unit A.M., with whom he had had a talk of a general nature. During their conversation Levon Gulyan had found out that M.G. had also been invited to the PDCI. Realising the imminence of a face-to-face confrontation with her, during which he would not have been able to conceal the identity of those involved in the argument, including that of the murderer, he had decided to escape. For that purpose he had asked Officer A.M. for some water. After A.M. had gone out to fetch some water, Levon Gulyan had tried to escape through the window but had fallen from a height of about 7 m and had died on the spot. Taking into account that Levon Gulyan had not been subjected to violence, threats, or inhuman or degrading treatment during his stay at the PDCI, and the fact that his escape had been motivated by his intention to conceal the identity of the offenders and his death had been the result of a fall, there was no corpus delicti in the actions of the police officers. Nor was there a criminal element in A.M.’s actions, specifically the fact that he had left Levon Gulyan alone in the office, because Levon Gulyan had had only the status of a witness as opposed to that of a suspect or accused. 39. On 7 April 2008 the applicant contested that decision before the courts, complaining in detail that the investigation had not been impartial, transparent and effective. He relied on, inter alia, Articles 2, 5 and 13 of the Convention. 40. On 6 June 2008 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan allowed the appeal and ordered that the case be resumed. The District Court held that the investigator’s decision had been unfounded and violated individual rights and that no proper investigation had been carried out and a number of important circumstances had not been established. In its decision, reasoned in detail, the District Court found, inter alia, that: (a) the investigating authority had failed to determine the lawfulness of taking Levon Gulyan and others between 10 and 12 May 2007 to the law-enforcement agencies and keeping them there for extended periods of time; (b) the allegations raised in the press and by some of the witnesses, including barman H.M., that Levon Gulyan had been ill-treated with the purpose of coercing a confession during his stays at the law-enforcement agencies had not been investigated, including the allegation that such acts had been committed in G.T.’s office and had led to his being thrown out of the window; (c) not all reasonable steps had been taken to secure evidence, including questioning police officers, to prevent their possible collusion and preserve the scene of the incident; (d) no proper assessment had been made of the fact that Levon Gulyan had neither been summoned nor gone voluntarily to the PDCI; (e) the events preceding the incident had not been properly clarified, in view of the multiple discrepancies in the statements made by the police officers, which also cast doubt on their credibility and the validity of the conclusions reached by the investigating authority on the basis of those statements; (f) no proper assessment had been made of the alleged behaviour of the deputy head of the Homicide Unit, A.M., upon his return to G.T.’s office, specifically his reaction to the open window; (g) it had not been clarified whether Levon Gulyan had been able to move about freely while at the PDCI; (h) no investigation had been carried out into the fact that his shoe laces had been missing at the time of the incident and had been found in his trouser pockets; (i) no convincing evidence had been obtained concerning Levon Gulyan’s fall and the preceding events; the investigating authority from the very outset had carried out the investigation on the premise that Levon Gulyan had attempted to escape and had died as a result of a fall, but had failed to carry out a complete and objective investigation into his motives, including the fact that he had only been a witness and that the window had been more than 7 m high and there had been numerous obstacles in the police building; (j) while, according to the official version, Levon Gulyan had hit an obstacle or obstacles during the fall, which could have been the gas pipe, no explanation had been provided for the absence of any particles on his clothes and under his fingernails of the pipe in question or any other possible obstacle, such as the entresol shed, or vice versa; nor had it been clarified whose fibres had been discovered on Levon Gulyan’s clothes and no samples had been taken in that connection from police officers; (k) no explanation had been provided or samples taken from police officers in relation to the palm print found on the window, which had not belonged to Levon Gulyan; (l) the investigation had not clarified the mechanics of Levon Gulyan’s fall and had not carried out in that connection an investigative experiment because of the absence of a suitable dummy, despite the fact that such an experiment had been ordered by the Prosecutor General’s Office; no measures had been taken to obtain such a dummy from the Prosecutor General’s Office of Russia within the framework of inter-State legal assistance; (m) no investigation had been carried out in connection with the findings of foreign experts concerning the other injuries found on Levon Gulyan’s body, such as small bruises and scratches; (n) it had not been clarified how a lock of hair belonging to Levon Gulyan had been found lying at a distance from his body; (o) the applicant and other victims in the criminal case had not been involved in any investigative or other procedural measures and had had no possibility to pose questions to the police officers or the experts; and (p) the remains of a cigarette found in the ashtray in G.T.’s office had not been seized and examined to determine whether it had been Levon Gulyan who had smoked it. 41. On 16 June 2008 the prosecutor lodged an appeal against this decision. 42. On 21 July 2008 the Criminal Court of Appeal dismissed the prosecutor’s appeal and upheld the findings of the District Court. It further added that the investigation had been flawed and based on only one premise, that of Levon Gulyan’s attempted escape. Furthermore, the explanation provided for that sole premise was farfetched and the investigating authority, having showed a one-sided approach to the assessment of the collected evidence, had failed to carry out an impartial, objective and full investigation in that connection, thereby reaching inaccurate conclusions. The investigating authority had failed to explain and assess why Levon Gulyan, who had already been questioned, had been “invited” and then, having been de facto deprived of his liberty, transferred to the PDCI in order to carry out “investigative measures, including a cross-examination” by officials who had had no authority to do so, which had violated his right to liberty and resulted in his demise. There had been no instruction from the investigator to carry out a face-to-face confrontation and, moreover, by taking Levon Gulyan to an alleged confrontation, the PDCI officers had violated Article 206 § 2 of the CCP, pursuant to which a witness had had to be questioned at the location where the investigation had been in train or, if necessary, where he or she had been located, whereas the PDCI could not be considered to have been either of those. The assessment of evidence had not been objective since the investigating authority had given preference to the statements of the police officers without a proper evaluation of other evidence in the case. The resulting decision, which had been taken in violation of the Constitution and Article 2 of the Convention, had amounted to a two-page document which had failed to make even a single reference to any evidence. (b) Resumption of the criminal proceedings, their subsequent termination and the applicant’s challenge before the courts 43. On 16 August 2008 the investigation was resumed and assigned to the same SIS investigator. 44. On 18 August 2008 the SIS investigator sent a letter to the PDCI, requesting that an investigation be carried out in order to find out whether Levon Gulyan’s fall had been witnessed by any police officers, and to report back. 45. Between September 2008 and April 2009 the investigator conducted a number of interviews, including with Officers A.M., G.T., V.G. and S.M., the head of PDCI, H.M., as well as two other PDCI officers, H.S. and E.V. The applicant and his representatives were present at these interviews and were apparently able to pose questions. Levon Gulyan’s wife and the cleaning lady were also questioned as witnesses during the same period. 46. On 13 September 2008 the Prosecutor General’s Office of Armenia sent a letter to the Prosecutor General’s Office of Russia, enquiring about the availability of a 178-cm-tall dummy weighing 95 kg for the purpose of carrying out an investigative experiment. 47. By letter of 1 December 2008 the Prosecutor General’s Office of Russia replied that they did not have at their disposal a dummy matching the specified characteristics. However, they had purchased dummies 170 cm tall and weighing 40 kg, one of which could be provided to the Armenian authorities. It appears that there was no follow-up to this offer. 48. On 16 April 2009 the investigator terminated the criminal proceedings. This decision, which, following an appeal by the applicant, was approved by the supervising prosecutor, provided a similar account of events to the decision of 12 March 2008, with the exception that it stated that Levon Gulyan had found out about the imminent confrontation with waitress M.G. from a telephone conversation he had overheard between PDCI Officer G.T. and his colleagues, and that Levon Gulyan had hit a pipe during the fall. The decision similarly concluded that there was no corpus delicti in the actions of the police officers. It referred, inter alia, to the statements of a number of police officers, medical reports nos. 402 and 418 and reports nos. 16080702 and 16170705. Relying on the latter two documents, the decision stated that the fact that Levon Gulyan had climbed onto the windowsill without any external assistance was substantiated by his fingerprints found on the window and the smears found on the windowsill, left by his shoes. 49. On 3 July 2009 the applicant contested that decision before the courts, complaining, inter alia, that the investigating authority, lacking from the very outset the intention of establishing the truth, following the resumption of the criminal proceedings had carried out an investigation which had been a pure formality and had ignored the issues raised in the court decisions. He relied, inter alia, on Articles 2, 5 and 13 of the Convention. 50. On 2 December 2009 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan dismissed the applicant’s arguments and upheld the investigator’s decision of 16 April 2009. 51. On 11 December 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal against this decision. 52. On 5 February 2010 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the decision of the District Court. 53. On 25 February 2010 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. 54. On 27 August 2010 the Court of Cassation allowed the applicant’s appeal on points of law, quashing the decisions of the lower courts and obliging the investigating authority to remedy the violations of individual rights which had taken place in the course of the investigation. The Court of Cassation stated at the outset that the authorities were required under Article 2 of the Convention to carry out an effective investigation with the aim of providing a convincing explanation for the death of Levon Gulyan who, at the material time, had been under the supervision of the PDCI officers. It further held that not all measures had been taken yet for the authorities to be considered to have fulfilled this requirement. In particular, no investigative experiment had been performed to determine the mechanics of Levon Gulyan’s fall, whereas the necessity of such an experiment had been confirmed by the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan, the investigating authority and the supervising prosecutor. The investigating authority was still reasonably capable of taking measures to obtain the necessary dummy, since it could be ordered from the same company which provided dummies to the Prosecutor General’s Office of Russia. However, the investigating authority had not taken any measures in that connection in the four months following the letter of 1 December 2008. It was therefore necessary to obtain the dummy in question, carry out the experiment, compare its results with the other evidence and, if necessary, carry out other investigative measures. The Court of Cassation held that a conclusive finding on the fulfilment of the procedural obligation of Article 2 of the Convention would be possible only following the implementation of the experiment in question and, if necessary, of the resulting other measures. A global assessment of the effectiveness of the investigation would be possible after taking into account all such evidence. Therefore, the questions raised by the applicant in his appeal could be answered only after the investigation had been completed. (c) Resumption of the criminal proceedings, their subsequent termination and the applicant’s challenge before the courts 55. On 18 January 2011 the investigation was resumed and assigned to the same SIS investigator. 56. On 24 January 2011 the investigator applied to the Prosecutor General’s Office, requesting assistance in obtaining an appropriate dummy from the Prosecutor General’s Office of Russia. 57. By letter of 18 March 2011 the Prosecutor General’s Office replied that the fact of Levon Gulyan’s death as a result of an attempted escape through a window had been established and it was impossible to guarantee the objective legitimacy of results by carrying out the investigative experiment, since Levon Gulyan, from the moment he had climbed onto the windowsill and until his collision with the ground, had performed conscious and intentional actions characteristic exclusively of his physical fitness and mentality, which were impossible to replicate with the help of a dummy or through any other experiment and research, and it was objectively impossible to approximate the circumstances of an investigative experiment to the actual event and to establish through such investigative experiment any circumstances having evidentiary value. 58. On 21 March 2011 the investigator terminated the criminal proceedings on the same grounds as previously, reiterating, inter alia, the position set out by the Prosecutor General’s Office. 59. On 2 May 2011 the applicant contested that decision before the courts. 60. On 25 May 2011 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan allowed the applicant’s appeal and to oblige the investigator to restore his violated rights. It found that the investigating authority had failed to carry out a full and comprehensive investigation, to show due diligence and to comply with the requirements of the Court of Cassation’s decision of 27 August 2010. Instead of obtaining the necessary dummy for the purpose of ensuring the effectiveness of the investigation and giving a global assessment to the incident through comparison of evidence, the investigating authority had decided once again to terminate the proceedings by relying – without any proper reasoning – on the prosecutor’s unfounded letter of 18 March 2011, which had had no evidentiary value. 61. On 3 July 2011 the prosecutor lodged an appeal against this decision. 62. On 30 June 2011 the Court of Appeal dismissed the prosecutor’s appeal and upheld the decision of the District Court 63. On 18 July 2011 the prosecutor lodged an appeal on points of law. 64. On 26 August 2011 the Court of Cassation declared the appeal on points of law inadmissible. (d) Resumption of the criminal proceedings and their subsequent termination 65. On 8 September 2011 the investigation was resumed and assigned to the same SIS investigator. 66. On 6 December 2011 the SIS investigator sent enquiries to the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Emergency Situations, the Armenian police and the National Security Service, inquiring whether they had a dummy weighing 95 kg and with a height of 178 cm. It appears that none of those authorities had at their disposal a dummy of the required size. 67. On 8 February 2012 the investigator terminated the criminal proceedings on the same grounds as previously. This decision stated, inter alia, that it had been impossible to carry out an investigative experiment because of the absence of a dummy and, even if such an experiment were to be carried out, this would not lead to the establishment of any circumstances having evidentiary value. 68. The applicant alleges that he had never been informed about this decision and a copy of it was served on him only in April 2015 after he had applied to the authorities for additional information and copies of documents in order to submit them to the Court.

5. The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Kragujevac. 6. On 14 December 2006 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the Kragujevac Clinical Centre requesting damages. In the course of the proceedings eleven hearings were held, whereas five hearings were scheduled, but were not held. 7. On 20 May 2011 the applicant’s claim was rejected as unfounded by the Kragujevac Court of First Instance. 8. On 26 December 2011 the Kragujevac Appellate Court (“the Appellate Court”) quashed the decision of 20 May 2011 and remitted the case to the first instance court. 9. In the resumed proceedings the applicant sought recusal of the acting judge twice, but both of his motions were rejected. 10. On 4 October 2012, after three held hearings and two hearings which were not held, expert examination and the increase of the applicants claim, the case was transferred to the Kragujevac High Court (“the High Court”). 11. On 20 March 2013, following the applicant’s two other recusal requests, one of which was adopted, the High Court rejected the applicant’s damages claim as unfounded. The applicant appealed. 12. On 21 August 2014 the Appellate Court rejected the applicant’s appeal and upheld the decision of 20 March 2013. Thereafter, the applicant filed an appeal on points of law, which was rejected by the Supreme Court of Cassation only on 21 December 2016. 13. In the meantime, on 7 February 2013, the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court complaining about the length of the pending civil proceedings, seeking non-pecuniary damages in the amount of 3,000 euros and publication of the decision of the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court transferred the case-file to the Appellate Court, as a competent court to deal with the length complaints of the pending cases, pursuant to Article 8a of the Law on the Organization of the Courts. However, on 23 September 2014 the Appellate Court established that it no longer had jurisdiction to deal with the applicant’s complaint since it found that the civil proceedings had been finished. The applicant’s case-file was thus returned to the Constitutional Court. 14. On 6 November 2014 the Constitutional Court returned the case-file to the Appellate Court, which on 28 November 2014 again found that it had no jurisdiction to deal with the case. The Appellate Court then transferred the case-file further to the Supreme Court of Cassation, as the competent court. The applicant appealed. 15. On 22 January 2015 the Supreme Court of Cassation rejected the applicant’s appeal and upheld the decision of 28 November 2014. It also partially adopted the applicant’s complaint concerning the length of the proceedings and awarded him 200 euros for non-pecuniary damage, whereas the rest of claim rejected. 16. On 21 October 2015 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s appeal in regards to the length of the proceedings. The Constitutional Court established that even though the impugned proceedings had lasted seven years and eight months, they were very complex and the applicant largely contributed to its length, whereas the competent courts acted efficiently.

5. The applicant was born in 1925 and lives in Brighton. 6. The applicant has been active in the peace movement since 1948 and has been a regular attender at public demonstrations since then. 7. In 2005 the applicant began participating in demonstrations organised by Smash EDO. The object of Smash EDO was to close down the activities in the United Kingdom of EDO MBM Technology Ltd, a United States-owned company which manufactured weapons and weapon components and had a factory in Brighton. Serious disorder and criminality were features of a number of Smash EDO protests. Smash EDO protests therefore attracted a substantial policing presence. 8. The applicant was twice arrested at Smash EDO demonstrations for obstructing the public highway but has never been convicted of any offence. 9. In March 2010 the applicant made a subject access request to the police under section 7 of the Data Protection Act 1998 (see “Relevant domestic law and practice”, below) for information relating to him. Sixty‑six entries from nominal records for other individuals and information reports which incidentally mentioned him, concerning incidents between March 2005 and October 2009, were disclosed to him. Those records were held on a police database known as the “Extremism database”, which at the relevant time was under the responsibility of the National Public Order Intelligence Unit of the police (NPOIU). 10. Most of the records related to demonstrations at the office of EDO MBM Technology Ltd but thirteen entries related to other demonstrations. They included, for example, the recording of his attendance at the Trades Union Congress (“TUC”) Conference in Brighton in September 2006; at a demonstration at the Labour Party Conference in Bournemouth in September 2007; at a pro-Gaza demonstration in Brighton in January 2009 and at a demonstration against “New Labour” organised by a number of trade unions in September 2009. In the great majority of cases, the information recorded about Mr Catt was his name, presence, date of birth and address. In some cases his appearance was also described. A photograph of the applicant taken at a demonstration in September 2007 was also disclosed to him in response to his subject access request. 11. In August 2010 the applicant asked the Association of Chief Police Officers (“ACPO”) to delete entries from nominal records and information reports which mentioned him. In September 2010 ACPO declined to do so. They did not give reasons. 12. On 17 November 2010 the applicant issued proceedings against ACPO for judicial review of the refusal to delete the data. He contended that the retention of his data was not “necessary” within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. Permission to seek judicial review was granted in March 2011 (see section B, below). 13. In January 2012, HM Inspectorate of Constabulary published a report on undercover police operations designed to obtain intelligence about protest movements (see paragraphs 50 to 53 below). The report concluded that information was being unnecessarily retained in police records. Although the report was concerned with covertly obtained intelligence, it also led to an extensive review of the database covering overtly obtained intelligence and resulted in the deletion of a large number of nominal records and information reports. After that deletion process, the number of reports which mentioned the applicant was apparently reduced to two. 14. Following the judicial review proceedings, the applicant wrote to the police to make a further subject access request. The police replied on 12 November 2015 stating: “... the records are held to help UK policing manage a future risk of crime – of which [you] could be the victim. The records themselves should not and will not be disclosed [to you] for what are obvious reasons. An intelligence database loses all efficacy if it is not kept confidential.” 15. In answer to a question asked by the Court when communicating the case the Government indicated that they had discovered four additional records mentioning the applicant in the database. They clarified that as a result, at the time the case was determined by the domestic courts there had in fact been six rather than two records in the database mentioning the applicant. 16. Of the four additional records, two concerned references to the domestic legal proceedings by third parties. The Government indicated in their submissions that one of those has since been deleted. The other two referred to the applicant. One was dated 15 April 2011 and detailed the applicant’s presence at five separate events, not organised by Smash EDO, where there was a significant police operation and arrests occurred. The other was dated 19 July 2011 and related primarily to a third party but mentions the applicant’s attendance at an event which was not organised by Smash EDO. There is no indication of whether there was any police presence or arrests at that event. 17. The Government stated that the police could not provide any explanation of why the reports were not disclosed previously. However, they were investigating the matter. They indicated that they had informed the Supreme Court and the applicant of the additional reports. 18. In a witness statement dated 6 June 2011 prepared in the context of the proceedings introduced by the applicant before the High Court, the then National Coordinator explained the functions of the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU) and the position as regards retention of data relating to the applicant. In his witness statement, the National Coordinator clarified that the material which had been disclosed to the applicant following his subject access request of March 2010 was not all the material held in respect of the applicant: a considerable amount of further information had not been disclosed on the grounds that disclosure would prejudice the investigation or detection of crime and that the material was thus exempt from disclosure under section 29 of the Data Protection Act (see “Relevant domestic law and practice”, below). 19. After explaining the nature of his activities and the various units supervised by him, the National Coordinator continued: “16. The term ‘domestic extremism’ is not prescribed by law. It is a descriptor generally used by the police service and partners to describe the activity of individuals or groups who carry out criminal acts of direct action to further their protest campaigns, outside the democratic process.” 20. He then provided examples of how intelligence reports had assisted in policing a Smash EDO protest in 2010 and confirmed that, in his view, the applicant’s data were being processed lawfully and fairly. 21. A hearing in the judicial review proceedings took place on 9 February 2012. With the agreement of the parties, the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis was joined as a defendant. The High Court handed down its judgment on 30 May 2012. The court considered that Article 8 was not engaged in the case and that, even if it were, the interference was justified under Article 8 § 2. The applicant was granted permission to appeal by the Court of Appeal on 31 October 2012. 22. Following a two day hearing during which legal representatives for the applicant, an NGO, the NHRI for England and Wales, ACPO and the Secretary of State presented their arguments, the Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the appeal in a judgment of 14 March 2014. It found that the inclusion of the applicant’s personal data in the database constituted an interference with his Article 8 rights which was not justified. The court said that it did not doubt the importance to modern policing of detailed intelligence gathering and that it accepted the need for caution before overriding the judgment of the police about what information was likely to assist them in their task. It noted that, for present purposes, that task was to obtain a better understanding of how Smash EDO was organised in order to be able to forecast the place and nature of its next protest and to anticipate the number of people likely to attend and the tactics they were likely to adopt. 23. The court said that it was “not easy to understand how the information currently held on Mr Catt can provide any assistance in relation to any of those matters”. It referred to the comment in the statement of the National Coordinator that it was valuable to have information about the applicant’s attendance at protests because he associated with those who had a propensity to violence and crime. However, it considered that the statement did not explain why that was so, given that the applicant had been attending similar protests for many years without it being suggested that he had indulged in criminal activity or actively encouraged those that did. The court continued: “44. ... The systematic collection, processing and retention on a searchable database of personal information, even of a relatively routine kind, involves a significant interference with the right to respect for private life. It can be justified by showing that it serves the public interest in a sufficiently important way, but in this case the respondent has not in our view shown that the value of the information is sufficient to justify its continued retention. It is striking that [the National Coordinator] does not say that the information held on Mr Catt over many years has in fact been of any assistance to the police at all. The Divisional Court considered that it was not practically possible to weed out from time to time information held on particular individuals. There is, however, no evidence to support this conclusion and we are not satisfied that it is correct. It should not be overlooked that the burden of proving that the interference with Mr Catt’s article 8 rights is justified rests on the respondent. 45. That leaves the question whether the interference with Mr Catt’s rights is in accordance with the law. This is very much a live issue given the relatively vague nature of some aspects of the regime contained in the MoPI Code and Guidance and the criticisms voiced by the Divisional Court in C (paragraph [54]) [see “Relevant domestic law and practice”, below] and by the Strasbourg court in M.M. v. the United Kingdom (2012) (Application no. 24029/07). However, in the light of the conclusion to which we have come on the question of proportionality it is unnecessary for us to reach a final decision on the point.” 24. The Supreme Court granted the Commissioner and ACPO leave to appeal. Following a three day hearing during which legal representatives for the applicant, an NGO, the NHRI for England and Wales, ACPO and the Secretary of State submitted arguments, it upheld the appeal in a judgment of 4 March 2015 by a majority of four justices to one. All five justices agreed that Article 8 was applicable and that retention of the data amounted to an interference with the applicant’s rights under that article. 25. Lord Sumption delivered the leading opinion for the majority. He set out the applicable legal framework for collection and retention of data. After reviewing the requirements for “lawfulness” under Article 8 of the Convention, by reference to S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04, § 99, ECHR 2008, he concluded that the interference was in accordance with the law. He noted that the Data Protection Act laid down principles that were germane and directly applicable to police information and contained a framework for their enforcement. These principles were supplemented by a statutory Code of Practice and administrative Guidance (see “Relevant domestic law and practice”, below), compliance with which was mandatory. While, inevitably, there were discretionary elements in the scheme, their ambit was limited. Lord Sumption considered the applicant’s argument that the Code of Practice and the Guidance did not enable him to know precisely what data would be obtained and stored or for how long to be unrealistic. He explained that the infinite variety of situations in which issues of compliance might arise and the inevitable element of judgment involved in assessing them made complete codification impossible. However, he noted, any person who thought that the police held personal information about him could seek access to it under section 7 of the Data Protection Act and, if he objected to its retention or use, could bring the matter before the Information Commissioner. 26. Lord Sumption then turned to consider the proportionality of the interference. He observed that political protest was a basic right recognised by the common law and protected by Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention. He summarised the facts of the applicant’s case, including the nature of Smash EDO’s activities and the applicant’s attendance at public demonstrations, and the framework for police collection and retention of data in this context. He concluded that the retention of information, including some which related to persons such as the applicant against whom no criminality was alleged, was justified. The starting point, in his view, was the nature and extent of the invasion of privacy involved in the retention of information of this kind, which he described as minor. While the information stored was personal information because it related to individuals, it was in no sense intimate or sensitive information. Rather, it was information about the overt activities in public places of individuals whose main object in attending the events in question was to draw public attention to their support for a cause. Although the collation of the information in the form in which it appeared in police records was not publicly available, the primary facts recorded were and always had been in the public domain; no intrusive procedures had been used to discover and record them. 27. He then addressed the justification for retaining the personal data for someone who has a clean record and for whom violent criminality must be a very remote prospect indeed. Referring back to the National Coordinator’s statement (see paragraphs 18 to 20), he identified three reasons for the need to retain such data: (1) to enable the police to make a more informed assessment of the risks and threats to public order; (2) to investigate criminal offences where there have been any, and to identify potential witnesses and victims; (3) to study the leadership, organisation, tactics and methods of protest groups which have been persistently associated with violence. He also underlined some basic facts about intelligence-gathering commenting: “31 ... Most intelligence is necessarily acquired in the first instance indiscriminately. Its value can only be judged in hindsight, as subsequent analysis for particular purposes discloses a relevant pattern ... The most that can be done is to assess whether the value of the material is proportionate to the gravity of the threat to the public ...” 28. Lord Sumption further considered that the retention in a nominal record or information report of information about third persons such as the applicant did not carry any stigma of suspicion or guilt. It did not imply that all those mentioned as participating in events such as Smash EDO protests were being characterised as extremists. It was further noteworthy that the material was not usable or disclosable for any purpose other than police purposes, except as a result of an access request by the subject under the Data Protection Act. It was not used for political purposes or for any kind of victimisation of dissidents and was not available to potential employers. The material was also periodically reviewed for retention or deletion according to rational and proportionate criteria based on an assessment of danger to the public and value for policing purposes. 29. In conclusion, Lord Sumption was of the view that sufficient safeguards existed to ensure that personal information was not retained for longer than required for the purpose of maintaining public order and preventing or detecting crime, and that disclosure to third parties was properly restricted. 30. Lady Hale concurred with Lord Sumption but indicated: “51. ... it would be more objectionable if the police were to retain a nominal record collecting together all the information that they currently hold about him. Such dossiers require particular justification, not least because of their potentially chilling effect upon the right to engage in peaceful public protest. Mr Catt may be a regular attender at demonstrations, some of which are organised by a group which resorts to extreme tactics, but he himself has not been involved in criminal activity at those or any other demonstrations, nor is he likely to be in the future. Had the police kept a nominal record about him, therefore, I would have been inclined to agree with Lord Toulson that it could not be justified.” 31. Lord Toulson, dissenting, agreed that the collection and retention of the data by the police was in accordance with the law. However, he considered that retention of the data was disproportionate. He explained that he had no difficulty in accepting in general terms the explanation given in the National Coordinator’s statement, but that there had to be limits, particularly in the case of a person who had never been accused of violence and had been assessed not to be a threat. The statement did not explain why it was thought necessary to maintain for many years after the event information on someone whom the police had concluded, as they had in July 2010, was not known to have acted violently and did not appear to be involved in the coordination of the relevant events. Nor did it explain why it was thought necessary and proportionate to keep details of the applicant’s attendance at other political protest events such as the Labour Party conference and the TUC conference. 32. He agreed with the Court of Appeal that the Commissioner had not shown that the value of the information relating to the applicant was sufficient to justify its continued retention. As to the suggestion that it would place too great a burden on the police to undertake frequent reviews, Lord Toulson pointed out that there was no evidence from the police that this would be over-burdensome. On the contrary, he said, the thrust of the evidence was that they did carry out regular reviews so there was nothing to indicate that deleting their historic records of the applicant’s attendances at protest events would create any real burden. 33. Lord Toulson accepted that, when investigating serious organised crime, it was necessary for the police to be able to collate and keep records of the details of their investigations. However, he did not agree that there was any risk of that being hampered by upholding the decision of the Court of Appeal in the applicant’s case. While the court should be slow to disagree with the evaluation of the potential usefulness of evidence by the police if a clear reason for it had been advanced, on the facts of this case Lord Toulson could not see what value they had identified by keeping indefinitely a record of the applicant’s attendances at events where he had done no more than exercise his democratic right of peaceful protest. He concluded: “69. One might question why it really matters, if there is no risk of the police making inappropriate disclosure of the information to others. It matters because in modern society the state has very extensive powers of keeping records on its citizens. If a citizen’s activities are lawful, they should be free from the state keeping a record of them unless, and then only for as long as, such a record really needs to be kept in the public interest.”

6. Under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention the applicants complained of the excessive length of enforcement proceedings. 7. The circumstances of the cases as presented by the parties may be summarized as follows. 8. Between 18 December 2000 and 16 April 2003, the first, second, third and fourth applicants lodged separate civil complaints with the Čačak Municipal Court (Opštinski sud u Čačku) against the same socially owned‑company, Akcionarsko društvo Fabrika reznog alata Čačak, requesting the payment of salary related damages. 9. On 26 December 2007, the Čačak Municipal Court ruled in favour of the applicants. 10. On 30 July 2008 Čačak District Court (Okružni sud u Čačku) upheld this judgment on appeal. 11. On 31 March 2009 the applicants lodged a joined enforcement request which was accepted by Čačak Municipal Court on 2 April 2009. 12. On 22 June 2005 the fifth applicant lodged her civil complaint with the Čačak Municipal Court against Akcionarsko društvo Fabrika reznog alata Čačak requesting the payment of an allowance. 13. On 21 April 2008 the Čačak Municipal Court ruled in favour of the fifth applicant. In the absence of an appeal, this judgment subsequently became final. 14. On 27 October 2009 the fifth applicant lodged an enforcement request which was accepted by Čačak Municipal Court on 28 October 2009. 15. On 27 August 2003 the sixth applicant lodged her civil complaint with the Čačak Municipal Court against Akcionarsko društvo Fabrika reznog alata Čačak requesting the payment of salary related damages. 16. On 24 April 2008 the Čačak Municipal Court ruled in favour of the sixth applicant. 17. On 29 October 2008 the Čačak District Court upheld this judgment on appeal. 18. On 31 December 2008 the sixth applicant lodged an enforcement request which was accepted by Čačak Municipal Court on 08 January 2009. 19. On 22 April 2003 the seventh applicant lodged his civil complaint with the Čačak Municipal Court against Akcionarsko društvo Fabrika reznog alata Čačak requesting the payment of salary related damages. 20. On 11 November 2008 the Čačak Municipal Court ruled in favour of the seventh applicant. In the absence of an appeal, this judgment subsequently became final. 21. On 9 April 2009 the seventh applicant lodged an enforcement request which was accepted by Čačak Municipal Court on 4 February 2010. 22. Since the judgment rendered in favour of the applicants remained unenforced, on 24 February 2014, the sixth and the seventh applicants and on 19 May 2014, the first, second, third, fourth and fifth applicants, lodged their appeals with the Constitutional Court. 23. In so doing, the applicants complained about the length of enforcement proceedings in question and the ultimate non-enforcement. 24. Pursuant to the Amendments to Court Organization Act (Zakon o izmenama i dopunama Zakona o uređenju sudova; published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, no. 101/13) the complaint concerning the length of proceedings was transmitted to the Kragujevac Court of Appeal which then itself forwarded the matter to the Čačak High Court (Viši sud u Čačku), i.e. the former Čačak District Court. 25. On 27 January 2015 the Čačak High Court found that the first, second, third and fourth applicants’ right to a trial within a reasonable time had been violated and awarded them 200 euros (EUR) each in respect of the non-pecuniary damage suffered due to the length of the enforcement proceedings. It, further, ordered the Čačak Court of First Instance (Osnovni sud u Čačku), i.e. the former Čačak Municipal Court, to speed up the enforcement proceedings and enforce the judgment rendered in the applicants’ favour. 26. On 11 February 2015 the applicants complained to the Supreme Court of Cassation claiming that the compensation awarded was too low and, accordingly, inadequate for the violation found. On 26 March 2015 the Supreme Court of Cassation rejected the applicants’ appeals. 27. On 14 January 2015 the Čačak High Court found that the fifth applicant’s right to a trial within a reasonable time had been violated and awarded her EUR 100 in respect of the non-pecuniary damage suffered due to the length of the enforcement proceedings. It also ordered to the Čačak Court of First Instance to speed up the proceedings and enforce the judgment. 28. On 2 February 2015 the fifth applicant complained to the Supreme Court of Cassation of the insufficient redress. Her appeal, however, was rejected on 22 April 2015. 29. On 2 December 2014 the Čačak High Court found that the sixth applicant’s right to a trial within a reasonable time had been violated and awarded her EUR 300 in respect of the non-pecuniary damage suffered due to the length of the enforcement proceedings. Her appeal to the Supreme Court of Cassation concerning the amount of the compensation awarded was rejected on 6 May 2015. 30. On 20 February 2015 the Čačak High Court found that the seventh applicant’s right to a trial within a reasonable time had been violated and awarded him EUR 80 in respect of the non-pecuniary damage suffered due to the length of the enforcement proceedings. His appeal to the Supreme Court of Cassation concerning the amount of the compensation awarded was rejected on 19 May 2015. 31. Between 3 August 2015 and 30 December 2015 all applicants lodged new appeals with the Constitutional Court. 32. They complained, inter alia, about the failure of domestic authorities to enforce the final judgments rendered in their favour, and that the amount of compensation awarded by the competent courts in respect of the breach of their right to a trial within a reasonable time had been too low. 33. Between 12 May 2016 and 9 June 2016 the Constitutional Court found that due to the failure of domestic authorities to enforce the judgments rendered in the applicants’ favour their right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions had, indeed, also been violated. The Constitutional Court, accordingly, awarded the applicants with pecuniary damages in the amounts granted by the judgments that had remained unenforced. 34. However, the Constitutional Court rejected the applicants’ complaints concerning the insufficient redress as regards the violation of their right to a hearing within a reasonable time since it considered the awards given by the domestic courts as reasonable compensation for the violations found. 35. The Constitutional Court lastly emphasized that, in any event and due to the changes in legislation, it could not have assessed the specific reasons for the amounts awarded by other courts in this respect.

5. The applicant was born in 1944 and lives in Afidnes Attikis. 6. On 2 November 2001 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against C.T. for breach of duty and extortion concerning acts he had allegedly committed as mayor of Kifissia Municipality. The applicant gave a statement under oath on the same day, repeating the allegations in his criminal complaint. He made a further statement under oath related to his criminal complaint on 21 December 2001. 7. At the time the complaint was lodged C.T. was a member of the Greek Parliament. In accordance with Article 62 of the Constitution, the public prosecutor asked Parliament to lift C.T.’s immunity from prosecution for breach of duty, extortion and bribery. That request was rejected on 20 March 2002. 8. On 5 August 2003 the applicant, relying on the Court’s judgments in Cordova v. Italy (no. 1) (no. 40877/98, ECHR 2003‑I) and Cordova v. Italy (no. 2) (no. 45649/99, ECHR 2003‑I (extracts)) resubmitted his criminal complaint, arguing that Parliament’s rejection of the request to lift C.T.’s immunity had violated his right to a fair trial under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. On 21 October 2003 the criminal complaint was submitted to Parliament. On 2 February 2004 the President of Parliament rejected the request to lift C.T.’s immunity, relying on Article 83 § 8 of Parliament’s Regulation, according to which a request to lift a member’s immunity for a criminal complaint based on the same facts as a previous request was inadmissible. 9. On 18 March 2004 the applicant lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights, complaining under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that Parliament’s refusal to lift C.T.’s immunity had violated his right of access to a court. On 16 November 2006 the Court delivered a judgment concluding that the refusal by the President of Parliament to lift C.T.’s immunity for acts that had allegedly been committed prior to his election had violated the applicant’s right of access to a court under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (Tsalkitzis v. Greece, no. 11801/04, 16 November 2006). To date, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe has not yet concluded the supervision of the execution of the judgment under Article 46 § 2 of the Convention. 10. In the meantime, on 4 April 2004 the applicant appeared on a television show on the nationwide ALTER Channel and reiterated the allegations made in his criminal complaint. 11. On 2 July 2004 C.T. lodged a criminal complaint against the applicant for false accusation, perjury and slander. Following a preliminary examination, criminal proceedings were initiated against the applicant. On 15 November 2007 the applicant was convicted in absentia by a three‑member panel of the Athens Court of First Instance. He was sentenced to twenty months’ imprisonment and deprivation of his political rights (decision no. 63131/07). C.T. joined the proceedings as a civil party. The applicant lodged an appeal against the decision. 12. Before the three-member panel of the Athens Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”), the applicant submitted that his trial for slander should have been suspended pursuant to Article 366 § 2 of the Criminal Code or, in any event, that it should have been adjourned in respect of all the charges, pursuant to Article 59 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. At a hearing on 25 May 2009 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s application to suspend or adjourn the trial and proceeded to examine C.T.’s criminal complaint. In particular, it held the following: “... Following this, the party who had filed the criminal complaint, Vasileios Tsalkitzis, lodged application no. 11801/04 with the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, complaining that Greece had not lifted C.T.’s parliamentary immunity and that criminal proceedings had not been initiated against him. That Court ... held that the refusal of the President of the Greek Parliament had violated Article 6 § 1 of the Convention ... Therefore, the following issues have been identified concerning: a) the relation of international conventions to current constitutional provisions; b) the act in question of the President of the Greek Parliament and whether it breaches constitutional provisions and the above-mentioned international convention; and c) the question of whether or not it is possible to suspend the current criminal case being tried following the criminal complaint dated 2.11.2001 by the defendant Vasileios Tsalkitzis against ... C.T ... The matter of the supremacy of the Constitution does not appear to be contradicted by the above-mentioned European Court of Human Rights judgment, which identifies the issue as the act of the President of Parliament of not putting the request to the Plenary of the Greek Parliament, which resulted, according to the judgment, in impeding the applicant’s and the case’s access to the competent criminal court ... It is noted that the President of Parliament’s act was based on Article 82 of Parliament’s Regulations... According to the foregoing, it is clear that the Greek Parliament has irrevocably dismissed the request of the public prosecutor of the Athens Court of First Instance, thus refusing to lift the immunity of the member of Parliament against whom the criminal complaint was lodged ... on the basis of a legitimate procedure foreseen by the above-mentioned constitutional provisions. Therefore, according to the legislation, there is absolutely no possibility of reconsidering the issue and, eventually, of instituting a criminal prosecution. During the ... Plenary meetings of the Greek Parliament, the issue of the well-foundedness of the accusation was examined as a whole, as were all aspects of the case, securing the work of the deputy and at the same time protecting him from malicious acts. In addition, and this is important, the whole case file which had been created following the preliminary examination was taken into account, as was the opinion of the competent public prosecutor who, following a review of the case, considered that there was no reason to initiate criminal proceedings against C.T. for the offences of which he had been accused ...” 13. Subsequently, the Court of Appeal proceeded to examine witnesses. The trial record shows that the applicant left the building following a short break after the examination of the first three witnesses for the prosecution. His lawyer then contacted him to find out his whereabouts and informed the court that he was not feeling well and had thus left the building. The hearing continued in the presence of his lawyer. In total, five prosecution witnesses were heard, including C.T., who joined the proceedings as a civil party, and one defence witness. It does not transpire from the information provided that the applicant or his representative requested the examination of any other defence witness and that such a request was refused. In view of the applicant’s absence, the Court of Appeal asked his representative to express the applicant’s views on the accusations. The applicant’s representative stated that his client denied all the charges and insisted on the truthfulness of his allegations against C.T. 14. The Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance verdict, including the sentence of twenty months’ imprisonment and the deprivation of political rights (decision no. 4512/2009). 15. On 9 November 2009 the applicant appealed on points of law. He stated, inter alia, that the proceedings should have been suspended or adjourned pursuant to Article 366 § 2 of the Criminal Code and Article 59 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On 5 May 2010 the Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal on points of law (decision no. 912/2010). In particular, it held the following: “... It is clear from this new provision (Article 59 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) ... that in order to adjourn a trial owing to an interlocutory criminal issue (ποινικό προδικαστικό ζήτημα) concerning Articles 224, 229, 362, 363 of the Criminal Code, a criminal prosecution must have been instituted for an act attested to on oath or for which a legal complaint has been submitted or one which a defendant has alleged or disseminated information about. As regards Article 366 § 2 of the Criminal Code ... the suspension of criminal proceedings is obligatory, but also requires a prior criminal prosecution for the act that a defendant has alleged or disseminated information about ... In the present case ... the court dismissed the above requests, providing full and correct reasoning, in particular because the immunity of the person against whom the criminal complaint had been lodged, who is now a civil party and member of Parliament, had not been lifted. Hence, a criminal prosecution had not been instituted, which is a prerequisite for the suspension and adjournment of criminal proceedings against a defendant who requests them. It can be concluded from the above-mentioned considerations that the court correctly interpreted and implemented the above-mentioned provisions, and did not violate them, when it proceeded to examine the allegations of false accusation, perjury and slander against the defendant-appellant on points of law and dismissed the defendant’s request on the grounds that a criminal prosecution had not been instituted against the current civil party, former mayor and now member of Parliament, without suspending and adjourning the proceedings until the end of the previously instituted proceedings against him ...” 16. The decision was finalised on 4 June 2010 (καθαρογραφή) and the applicant was able to receive a copy on 7 June 2010. The applicant was imprisoned from 13 May 2010 to 21 May 2010 as he was not able to pay the fine to which his sentence had been commuted. On 21 May 2010 his sentence was commuted to community service and he was released. Finally, on 31 May 2010 the applicant paid 5,799.94 euros in lieu of serving his sentence.

5. The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Cluj-Napoca. He is a university professor and contributor to various magazines and newspapers, mainly of an economic and financial nature. At the time of the relevant events he had already published more than 180 articles in various local or national publications. 6. Prior to parliamentary elections held at the end of November 2008, the applicant wrote an article about M.I.-I., who was standing as a candidate for one of the national parties. The article, headlined “Attention! He also wants [to be] in Parliament”, was published on the front page of F., a newspaper, on 6 November 2008. It read as follows: “After five rounds of free parliamentary elections, ordinary people, who are politically active only when they vote, have come to an uncontroversial conclusion: there is something wrong with people who become candidates for various political functions. Without even knowing exactly what [is wrong], most people of good moral and professional character often choose not to vote any more. They make that choice especially when they learn that the person appearing on the electoral poster asking for votes has never done anything remarkable in his or her profession. ... It is therefore no longer surprising that the Romanian Parliament is the institution that enjoys the least public confidence. Time has consolidated the public’s belief that most candidates want to become parliamentarians so that they can for a couple of years take advantage of the privileges they grant themselves or of those informal benefits which come through the development of the system of relationships associated with their functions. There are candidates who do everything to become parliamentarians in order to shield their criminal record from the [criminal] acts they committed before becoming senators or deputies. Among the many cases of that type, I today present you one. And if I do this it is not to help the voters, because imposture by an individual reveals itself without reserve to the perceptive masses, whereas one by a group or party does not, especially when one can use all the presidential and municipal logistical powers, impressive amounts of funds and an unsuspected power to persuade individuals with little training. One such case is that of Mr M.I.-I. This gentleman is in good physical condition, especially after living a comfortable life as a manager at R. Cluj [a public company], and now wants to use his skills in Parliament. And he does not intend to reach such a position only based on his well-known lucidity, but also with the help of some financial support for the intellectual efforts he wishes to make for the benefit of the many. For that purpose, he borrowed 15 billion Romanian lei for a period of 12 months, namely until 31 October 2008 – to invest on the stock market and earn a bit more than the creditor would request as interest, based on perfectly legal documents. It is just that at one point the moral profile of this representative of the Democratic Party of Cluj showed itself clearly. Not having made as much [profit] as he hoped, the candidate M.I.-I. decided not to repay the loan thus contracted, after imploring the creditor to have mercy, to postpone and not enforce the contract. Even though he knows that the contract weighs against him, he is relying on that defect of Romanian justice of postponing the adjudication of cases. In fact, Mr M.I.-I. brought a case before a court which had no jurisdiction to assess the case. But he hopes in the near future to be able to invoke his immunity as a member elected by the nation, just like his spiritual guardian, who left us without a maritime fleet. That is why I say that we must be careful about what Mr M.I.-I. signs and promises! For the following day he might no longer admit to anything, he may switch to another political party, if he is given more, he may even sell part of the electoral district where he ran and if nobody wants it, he can go to Smirnov because it is warmer in Tiraspol than in Huedin.” 7. On 9 April 2009 M.I.-I. brought a civil action against the applicant: he sought 25,000 euros (EUR) for non-pecuniary damage as the article had allegedly seriously affected his reputation and made him lose the election by approximately one hundred votes. M.I.-I. also complained about the publication by the applicant of another defamatory article on 21 January 2009, which was in a similar vein. He also complained about the distribution of leaflets before the election, which had reproduced the contents of the article of 6 November. He alleged that all the material had been meant to discredit him as a candidate. 8. The applicant confirmed that he was the author of the article in question and that everything he had written had been true, as proved by documents from the Arbitration Tribunal of the Cluj Chamber of Commerce, which would become available to the court. He further denied contributing in any way to the publication or distribution of other articles and leaflets concerning M.I.-I. 9. On 20 July 2009 the Cluj-Napoca Court of First Instance allowed the claims lodged by M.I.-I. and held that the article of 6 November 2008 had contained defamatory statements about him. It further held the applicant liable to pay EUR 20,000 for non-pecuniary damage and 3,291 Romanian lei (RON) in legal costs. 10. The court held that the applicant had not proved that his statements were true. The procedure before the Arbitration Tribunal, invoked by the applicant in his defence, had concerned a commercial dispute between M.I.-I. and the applicant’s brokerage company, in which the claims of M.I.-I. had been partially granted on 7 April 2009, as the repayment deadline had been set for 30 April 2010. The court considered that even if true, the applicant’s statements had been defamatory and should not have been made public in the media, especially since they concerned matters of a private, commercial nature. 11. The court further noted that the applicant’s statements had been reproduced in electoral leaflets, which had been distributed in several public places, in bus stations and private mailboxes. The court held that even if it was not the applicant who had produced or distributed the leaflets, there was a causal link between the publication of the article and the harm caused to M.I.-I.’s reputation because if he had not produced his article in the first place, there would have been no leaflets and no amplification of the negative effects on M.I.-I.’s image. 12. The court then focused on the terms used by the applicant in his article, in particular calling the defendant an impostor, which was found to be insulting and lacking factual justification as there existed no criminal complaints of fraud against M.I.-I. It concluded that the language used, conveying the idea that M.I.-I. would accept any compromise for money and would therefore betray the electorate, his party and his country, had exceeded the limits of admissible criticism and had disparaged him. 13. The applicant appealed, arguing before the Cluj County Court that the publication of the article in question during a parliamentary election campaign had had the role of informing the public, in good faith, about a political figure. In such a situation, the limits of admissible criticism were wider. He argued that during election campaigns the press had the essential role of informing the public about future members of the Romanian Parliament. He argued that the amount of damages awarded by the first-instance court had been disproportionate and had had an obvious punitive purpose. 14. In a final judgment of 21 January 2010 the County Court essentially upheld the reasoning of the lower court. It considered that the manner in which the applicant had acted proved that he had not complied with the duties and responsibilities inherent in the exercise of the freedom of expression: “The seriousness of his allegations and of the acts imputed to M.I.-I. hold him [the applicant] responsible for showing the highest rigour and a special caution, the lack of which would breach the rights of others.” 15. The County Court confirmed that the lower court had correctly estimated that it had been necessary to balance the right to private life on the one hand and freedom of expression which contributed to a debate of public interest on the other, holding that: “To insult, to defame a person cannot be justified and legitimate when one party aims to unilaterally expose in the press private litigation of a commercial nature involving two private parties. In assessing the existing conflict between the exercise of freedom of expression in the press and the necessity to protect the reputation and the rights of others, the court estimates that even though the applicant’s allegations made in a press article during an electoral campaign, concerned a potential member of the Romanian Parliament, thus were of public interest, there are limitations to freedom of expression, the applicant having been bound to act within the limits given by the public interest in protecting the reputation and the rights of another person, including his or her right to be presumed innocent. Undoubtedly, when the article was published in the newspaper F., the applicant did not comply with the minimum requirements of diligence prescribed by Article 10 § 2 of the Convention, in the sense of acting in good faith and in accordance with the journalistic ethics so as [to ensure that] the provided information be trustworthy, notwithstanding the dose of exaggeration or provocation allowed in such situations.” 16. Nevertheless, the County Court allowed the applicant’s appeal in part and reduced the damages to EUR 5,000, considered to be more proportionate to the damage sustained by M.I.-I.

6. The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Istanbul. 7. On 11 December 1995 the applicant, a traffic control officer, was hit by a car while on duty. He suffered bodily injuries as a result of the accident. An official disability report indicated that he had a reduced working capacity of 60%. 8. On the basis of this report the applicant, while reserving the right to increase his claims in due course, made an initial request for compensation to the Ministry of Interior, claiming 20,000 Turkish liras (TRY) in pecuniary damages and TRY 5,000 in non-pecuniary damages. 9. Following tacit dismissal of the claim by the Ministry, the applicant brought a case for compensation before the Istanbul Administrative Court for the amounts he had specified in his request to the Ministry. 10. During the course of the proceedings, the court decided of its own motion to order an expert report to determine the exact amount of pecuniary damage suffered by the applicant. The report, which was submitted to the court on 26 September 2005, indicated the applicant’s pecuniary damages as 157,077 TRY. The applicant did not submit a request to the court to increase his initial claims in the light of that report. The Istanbul Administrative Court in its decision delivered on 15 February 2006 only awarded him the amounts initially requested by him.

6. The applicant company was established in 1991 and has its registered office in Bratislava. It is the operator of two private television channels and the broadcaster of a television programme, JOJ PLUS. The present case concerns a commentary (glosa) delivered during a television programme broadcast on 12 April 2010 after the crash of the plane in which the late President of Poland, Lech Kaczynski, had been travelling. 7. The commentary’s title was “Compassion in Accordance with Protocol”; the commentary contained the following: “The crash of a Polish plane carrying the presidential couple on board is a true human tragedy. The whole of Poland is in mourning and politicians are more or less expressing their condolences. That is required by diplomatic protocol. Thus, Slovak russophile politicians too shed a tear, albeit a forced one, over the death of the russophobe, Lech Kaczynski. Even ordinary citizens, not bound by any protocol, are expressing their sorrow. Jews, homosexuals, liberals, feminists and left‑oriented intellectuals are bitterly sorry for the death of a man who represented an extreme Polish conservativism, and who was a symbol of a country where people who are not white heterosexual Catholic Poles were born as a punishment. I am sorry, but I do not pity Poles. I envy them.” 8. Following the broadcast of the above-mentioned commentary, the Broadcasting Council (Rada pre vysielanie a retransmisiu) commenced administrative proceedings against the applicant company, pursuant to section 19(1)(a) of the Broadcasting and Retransmission Act (Law no. 308/2000 Coll., as amended - “the Broadcasting Act”), on 25 May 2010. 9. On 14 September 2010 the Broadcasting Council found that the applicant company had breached its obligations under the Broadcasting Act in that the manner of processing and presenting the content of the commentary had interfered with the dignity of the late Polish President, Lech Kaczynski. It fined the applicant company 5,000 euros (EUR). 10. The Broadcasting Council assessed the conflict between the applicant company’s freedom of expression and the protection of the human dignity of the late President. On the one hand, it acknowledged the aim of the commentator to express his opinion and his subjective stance on the social and political event through criticism, sarcasm and irony, which were inherent to journalistic expression. On the other hand, where the Broadcasting Council found difficulties was in particular the content of the last two sentences of the commentary (“I am sorry, but I do not pity the Poles. I envy them”). The Broadcasting Council concluded that the manner in which the commentator had presented his opinion – that is to say his lack of regret for the Polish President’s death – had contravened the duty to respect his human dignity. According to the Broadcasting Council, the degree of sarcasm and irony in the broadcast commentary had been so high that its content and the manner in which the author’s opinion had been presented had been sub‑standard and had dishonoured the late President. 11. The Broadcasting Council noted that Mr Kaczynski, as President, was sufficiently recognisable as an “individual”, which was a prerequisite for the applicability of the protection of the dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms of “others” under section 19(1)(a) of the Broadcasting Act. It concluded that by broadcasting the aforesaid commentary the applicant company had committed an administrative offence (správny delikt) – in particular a breach of its duties under the said provision – and that imposing a fine on it in that respect was in order. It considered such a measure to be necessary in a democratic society, as it served a legitimate aim – that is to say the protection of the right to human dignity. 12. On 10 March 2011 the Supreme Court upheld the Broadcasting Council’s decision. It rejected the applicant company’s argument that the Broadcasting Council had sanctioned it for voicing its political opinion. Rather, the Supreme Court confirmed the Broadcasting Council’s conclusion about the defamatory character of the commentary in question and the interference with the late President’s human dignity. 13. The applicant company lodged a complaint before the Constitutional Court challenging the decisions of the Broadcasting Council and the Supreme Court under Articles 6 § 1 and 10 of the Convention and Articles 26 (freedom of expression) and 46 (right to judicial protection) of the Constitution. It alleged that the decisions in question had been arbitrary, unfair and insufficiently reasoned and that their respective authors had breached its freedom of expression by sanctioning it for voicing its opinion regarding the late President as a politician. 14. On 27 July 2011 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant company’s complaint. It considered, inter alia, that the above-mentioned authorities had duly explained their conclusions, without having overly strayed from a reasonable interpretation of the applicable rules and established practice. The Constitutional Court noted that the impugned commentary had expressed not only sarcasm and criticism of the late President’s policy but also a positive attitude towards his death. This very fact had interfered with his right to respect for his human dignity, which led the Constitutional Court to conclude that the domestic authorities’ decisions had not been arbitrary. As to the applicant company’s complaint under Article 10 of the Convention (and Article 26 of the Constitution), the Constitutional Court held that a general court could not bear “secondary liability” for a violation of fundamental rights and freedoms of a substantive nature unless there had been a constitutionally relevant violation of procedural rules. Given that it had rejected the complaint concerning the alleged violation of procedural rules, it also had to reject the complaint relating to an alleged violation of a substantive provision.

5. The applicant was born in 1969 and is currently detained in Lannemezan Prison. 6. The applicant was a member of the Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut – “the FIS”) and left Algeria prior to the dissolution of that political group by a judgment of the Algiers Administrative Court dated 19 March 1992. After spending some time in Pakistan he entered the United Kingdom in January 1993 using the false name of Elias Serbis. On 26 February 1993 he applied for political asylum in that country, claiming to have been forced to leave Algeria because of his membership of the FIS. His application was refused on 10 August 1994. 7. On 25 July, 17 and 26 August, 3, 4 and 7 September and 6 and 17 October 1995 eight terrorist attacks were carried out in France. 8. Although no organisation explicitly claimed responsibility, certain factors, such as the existence of virulent press statements against France and the mode of operation of the attacks, pointed to the involvement of the Armed Islamic Group (Groupement Islamique Armé – “the GIA”). 9. In the course of the judicial investigation aimed at identifying the perpetrators, telephone tapping operations carried out on public payphones used by a certain B.B. led to a number of persons being arrested and to the search being focused on the United Kingdom and an individual named Elyes (also known as Elyesse or Eliass). The sources of these names or pseudonyms were a telephone conversation of 1 November concerning Elyes and the Western Union bank, a search of B.B.’s home during which a document was found showing that a sum of money had been transferred to B.B. from that bank on 16 October 1995, and the decoding of a list of telephone numbers found on B.B.’s person and at his home and featuring three numbers in England preceded by the name “Elyesse” or “Eliass”. B.B., who was arrested on 1 November 1995, also directly implicated “Ylies”, claiming that he had funded the campaign of attacks from London and had been kept informed of their progress. 10. On 3 November 1995 the French National Surveillance Directorate informed the investigators that the individual known as “Elyes, Ilyes, Lyes, Iliesse, Eliass or Elyasse”, whom B.B. had identified as having funded the attacks, might be the applicant. The latter, who was living in London, was suspected of being one of the leaders of the GIA in the United Kingdom, in particular because of his involvement with the publication Al Ansar (or Al Ansaar) which the GIA used as a mouthpiece abroad. 11. The investigations carried out in London established that the applicant had a home there and had a set of keys to a second London address, which served as the offices of the magazine Al Ansar and as a meeting place for all the persons involved in publishing and distributing it. On the premises the investigators found, among other items, the following: contracts for three mobile phones in the names of three of the applicants’ acquaintances and corresponding to the numbers identified at the home of B.B., who had rung the numbers before and after each attack; a receipt for the rental of a post-office box in the name of Fares ELIASS with the applicant’s fingerprints on it; letters and statements from the FIS; a statement saying that only the GIA was entitled to conduct the jihad; a letter from the GIA to the French President calling on him to convert to Islam; a letter commenting on the attacks carried out in France; copies of press articles on anti-terrorism mentioning the names of judges and members of the intelligence service; a piece of paper on which “Notre Dame 33‑1‑43‑54-46-12” was written, corresponding to the telephone number of the Western Union branch at 4 rue du Cloître Notre Dame in Paris; and a receipt dated 21 July 1995 issued by a branch of Thomas Cook in London for a sum of 5,000 pounds sterling (GBP). 12. The applicant was arrested and placed in police custody from 4 to 7 November 1995 under the Prevention of Terrorism Act. 13. On 7 November 1995 the applicant was detained pending extradition under the terms of an international arrest warrant issued on the same day in connection with the investigation into the attack carried out on 6 October 1995 close to the Maison Blanche metro station. 14. Three further international arrest warrants were issued concerning the applicant: on 24 November 1995 in relation to the attack of 17 October at the Gare d’Orsay station; on 29 January 1996 in the case concerning a conspiracy to prepare terrorist attacks; and on 16 January 2001 in relation to the attack carried out on 25 July 1995 at the Saint-Michel suburban rail station. 15. The applicant lodged habeas corpus applications which were dismissed in June 1997 and in 2001. On 8 October 2001 the British Home Secretary ordered his removal to France, but that order was quashed by the High Court, Queen’s Bench Division, on 27 June 2002. 16. On 6 April 2005 the Home Secretary signed a fresh order for the applicant’s extradition in the light of the assurances provided by the French authorities concerning the safeguards of a fair and impartial trial in France. On 14 October 2005 the High Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant. 17. On 1 December 2005 the applicant was handed over to the French authorities and was remanded in custody the following day. 18. By an order of 5 February 1999 the applicant was committed for trial in the Paris Criminal Court for involvement – in France and in England, from an unspecified date until 4 November 1995 – in an association or conspiracy formed with a view to the preparation, in the form of one or more material acts, of one of the terrorist acts in question. The investigating judge stated, in particular, as follows: “- [the applicant] was responsible for distributing the journal Al Ansar, a propaganda outlet of the Armed Islamic Group; - ... was involved on this account in disseminating propaganda for that organisation, which is banned in France; - ... was the main contact person in Europe for [D.Z.], alias Abou Abderhamane Amine, in organising and carrying out the GIA’s activities in Europe; - ... was tasked with sending money to GIA members still in France to enable them to fund and carry out attacks; - ... was in contact with numerous persons involved in and convicted of criminal conspiracy with a view to a terrorist enterprise.” 19. In a judgment of 29 March 2006 accompanied by over thirty pages of reasoning, the Criminal Court first of all set out the facts with regard to the “political/religious background”, the emergence of the FIS and then the GIA, the “background to the attacks” in 1995 – which it listed and described as attributable in all likelihood to the GIA – and the “context surrounding Rachid Ramda”. 20. Ruling on the criminal charges, the court began by examining the case against the applicant. It found that it could be established with certainty, on the basis of precise and concurring physical evidence, that the applicant had indeed used various false names and aliases which had come up in the course of the investigations, a fact the court described as “beyond doubt and indisputable”. With regard to the GIA’s funding the court, having noted the prosecution’s claims that the applicant had funded the GIA groups which carried out the attacks in France during the second half of 1995, examined the factual evidence in the case file at length and in detail. It observed in particular that, according to one witness who was a GIA member, the organisation’s groups had different specialisations depending on their location, with the London group being responsible for sending funds. The court further noted that the applicant had transferred GBP 5,000 on 16 October 1995, two days before the attack of 17 October 1995. This was established by the statements of the British police officers tasked with keeping the applicant under surveillance and of the staff of the Western Union branch where the transfer had been made, and also by the discovery of the applicant’s fingerprints on the transfer slip kept by the Western Union branch. The court also observed that one of the perpetrators of the attacks, B.B., had stated that the money used in preparing the various attacks had always been supplied by the applicant from London. The court inferred that the facts as a whole “demonstrate[d] that Rachid Ramda was indeed responsible for funding terrorist groups on French soil”. Furthermore, in response to the public prosecutor’s submissions concerning the applicant’s role in disseminating GIA propaganda, the first-instance court also considered the various items of factual evidence before it, and in particular the wealth of correspondence and propaganda documents relating to the GIA’s views and actions that had been found during the searches of the various premises used by the applicant, as well as the statements by a GIA member confirming the applicant’s role as a member of the team publishing the magazine Al Ansar, which was the GIA outlet used in particular to claim responsibility for attacks. It also noted the presence at the applicant’s home of pamphlets promoting terrorism and killing with specific reference to France. The court concluded that the applicant had played a part in disseminating GIA propaganda and ideas. 21. Turning next to the applicant’s involvement in a criminal conspiracy in connection with a terrorist enterprise, the court found this offence to have been made out, as the investigation had shown that several groups located in the Lyons area, in Paris and in Lille had been behind the 1995 attacks. All the members had either been directly involved or had played an indirect role by aiding and abetting and providing resources, and all of them were either known activists or claimed to be activists within the GIA. The court found that the applicant’s contacts with the various members of these networks, who had the shared goal of carrying out attacks, were sufficient to establish his conscious and deliberate participation in a conspiracy to carry out terrorist acts on French soil. In its judgment the court set out, among other findings, the facts showing the existence of links to eight members of three groups forming a support network for the GIA. 22. Accordingly, the Criminal Court found the applicant guilty of criminal conspiracy in connection with a terrorist enterprise, on the basis of Articles 450-1 and 421-1 of the Criminal Code. It sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment and ordered his permanent exclusion from French territory. The court cited as reasons for imposing the prison sentence the fact that “by providing funding and issuing propaganda on behalf of the GIA, Rachid RAMDA not only enabled the attacks to be carried out but acted as a propagandist, potentially attracting new members to strengthen the networks spread over several European countries”. It further cited the fact that “his double talk reveal[ed] both his bad faith and his complete lack of regret or remorse”. The court awarded one euro (EUR) in damages to the association SOS Attentats, which had joined the proceedings as a civil party. 23. In a final judgment of 18 December 2006 the Paris Court of Appeal upheld that judgment. While referring expressly to the statement of facts as established in the judgment, it devoted some thirty pages to analysing the charges against the applicant, giving reasons. First of all, the Court of Appeal gave further details concerning the evolution and operation of the GIA. It also specified that the case before it concerned “the series of attacks carried out in France in the summer and autumn of 1995”, and that “the facts of the case at hand concern[ed] the preparation of the attacks and the actions enabling the attacks, which started in France in July 1995, to be carried out”. The Court of Appeal went on to list the eight attacks carried out between 25 July and 17 October 1995. With particular reference to the evidence of the existence of an information hub based in London which the applicant had allegedly managed, it found this to be established on the basis of the telephone calls made on the day after the killing of the imam S. in Paris; two days before the attack on the Saint-Michel suburban rail station; on the day of that attack and the day after the attempted attack on the Paris‑Lyon high-speed railway line at Cailloux-sur-Fontaines; on 12 September 1995, a few days after the attack of 3 September on Boulevard Richard Lenoir in Paris, the attempted attack of 4 September on Place Charles Vallin in Paris and the attack of 7 September in rue Jean-Claude Vivand in Villeurbanne; the day after the shooting at the Col de Maleval and the arrest of three people; five days before the attack of 6 October and two days after it; on 16 October 1995, in other words just before the attack of 17 October; and, finally, on 1 November 1995, immediately after a telephone conversation between B.B. and S.A.B. concerning preparations for an attack on the Wazemmes market in Lille, with B.B. stating that the purpose of the call was to report to the applicant on the “final preparations” for the Lille attack. 24. The Court of Appeal also emphasised the existence of several items of factual evidence pointing to the applicant’s involvement as the supervisor of a structure set up to fund the GIA’s activities. These included the fact that the applicant had sent funds from England on 16 October 1995 under the false name of Philippe Hervier, which had been received by B.B. at the Rivoli branch of the Rivaud bank under the false name of A. Benabbas, and which matched an entry in A.T.’s accounts book marked “36,800 francs, Lyseo” and B.B.’s statements; the payment by the applicant of GBP 5,000 and 50,000 French francs (FRF), as shown by an entry in A.T.’s accounts book which mentioned funds sent by “Walid”, a false name used by the applicant or the first name of one of his acquaintances who could be contacted in order to reach him; statements from several individuals concerning services offered in return for payment, fundraising, the sending of substantial sums of money, a transfer of EUR 4,000 to M. and the existence of a receipt for GBP 100. 25. Lastly, the Court of Appeal noted a series of facts demonstrating, firstly, that the applicant had been “the main contact person ... in organising and carrying out the GIA’s activities in Europe”, as was clear in particular from a telephone conversation of 2 December 1995, from the statements of a witness who was a GIA member, and from the detailed content of several documents seized in London (press statements, authorisations to conduct the jihad, documents on the management of funds, articles and handwritten notes on the activities of Islamist groups in Europe and anti-terrorist activities, notes on military weapons and the handling of explosives, and so on); secondly, that he had been “the GIA’s main propaganda agent outside Algeria”, with “his role on the magazine Al Ansaar” (particularly in the light of documents seized at the applicant’s London address, namely a note on how to make the magazine more dynamic, a letter explaining the means of distributing it, a piece of computer equipment which the applicant would have been unable to afford, letters from readers and GIA sympathisers, a large number of magazines detailing the GIA’s ideas and violent actions, a substantial amount of correspondence relating to Algerian and Islamic issues, some testimonies, and a list of post-office boxes in numerous countries, used by the magazine’s subscribers); thirdly, that he had been at the centre of “the London cell which revolved around [him and which] also served as a rallying point for young recruits passing through”, as demonstrated by the personal histories of four of them; and fourthly, that he had been a leader with “a strategic role in the GIA’s external organisation”, as demonstrated by his links to members and correspondents of other Islamist terrorist groups worldwide. 26. The Court of Appeal echoed the reasons given by the Criminal Court and added that there was sufficient evidence in the case to demonstrate that the applicant had been contacted regularly in order to be kept informed of events, that he had been responsible for funding GIA operations in Europe, that he had acted as a conduit for the GIA’s military command and as a propaganda agent for that organisation, especially through the magazine Al Ansar, that he had given shelter to fugitives passing through London and had sometimes been called upon to coordinate the GIA’s external activities. The Court of Appeal therefore concluded as follows: “The Court of Appeal, like the first-instance court, therefore finds it established that the GIA created ‘an external structure’ in Europe designed to enable it to pursue its goal of overthrowing the Algerian regime, including by attacking institutions and people in countries that supported or were deemed to support that regime, by setting up networks in Belgium and France in particular which provided support to the Algerian guerrillas by supplying weapons, munitions and various items of equipment, supplying jihadists and providing safe havens (accommodation and false identity papers) to fighters who were fleeing the maquis or had arrived to carry out attacks, organised and coordinated by a cell in London in charge of fundraising and using funds acquired lawfully or unlawfully. ... [the applicant] knowingly played a decisive role, by means of the material acts referred to by the Criminal Court and by this court above, in the achievement of the GIA’s goal, participating from London in the implementation of the group’s external structure, and played a vital role within the organisation whose aim was to prepare, assist in and carry out the attacks which took place.” 27. In a judgment of 14 March 2007 the Court of Cassation dismissed an appeal on points of law by the applicant. 28. In a judgment of 13 February 2001 the Investigation Division of the Paris Court of Appeal indicted B.B., S.A.B. and the applicant for the attack of 17 October 1995 and committed them for trial before the Paris special Assize Court. The applicant was charged with aiding and abetting the crimes of attempted murder, destroying or damaging property belonging to others by the use of an explosive substance causing mutilation or permanent disability and temporary total unfitness for work of over eight days or of a maximum of eight days, in connection principally or incidentally with a terrorist enterprise, and with the related offence of a breach of the explosives legislation in connection with a terrorist enterprise. 29. On 3 August and 27 November 2001 the Investigation Division of the Paris Court of Appeal upheld the orders issued by the Paris investigating judge on 27 April (concerning the attack of 25 July 1995) and 13 July 2001 (concerning the attack of 6 October 1995) for the indictment of the applicant and B.B. and their committal for trial before the special Assize Court. The applicant faced trial for aiding and abetting the crimes of murder, attempted murder, destroying or damaging property belonging to others by the use of an explosive substance causing death, mutilation or permanent disability and temporary total unfitness for work of over eight days or of a maximum of eight days, in connection with a terrorist enterprise, and for the related offence of a breach of the explosives legislation in connection with a terrorist enterprise. 30. These three judgments of the Investigation Division specified that the applicant had aided and abetted by: transmitting instructions from the GIA ordering attacks with explosives and providing B.B. with instructions on manufacturing; relaying to the GIA leadership operational information provided by the perpetrators of the attacks; providing the perpetrators with the funds needed not just to manufacture the explosive devices but also to make all the logistical arrangements for preparing and carrying out the attacks. The judgments of 13 February and 3 August 2001 added the fact that the funds had also been intended, if necessary, to enable the perpetrators based in France to flee. 31. In these judgments the judges noted in particular the following facts in relation to the applicant. The three mobile phones used by the applicant had received calls from B.B. on 16 and 22 October and 1 November 1995; a receipt for an exchange transaction performed on 16 October 1885 at 3.50 p.m. (Paris time) for an amount of FRF 36,800 had been discovered at B.B.’s home, together with a notice of transfer of FRF 38,000 from an English branch of Western Union, and the checks carried out established that the applicant had gone into a Londis shop in Wembley containing a Western Union office at 2.34 p.m. on 16 October 1995 and had re-emerged at 3.26 p.m. (London time); the applicant’s fingerprints had been found on the transfer slip kept by the Western Union office in the Londis shop; the words “LYESO – FF 36,600” had been found in the credit column of B.B.’s accounts and the words “West Union” and “West-Union Bank” had also been entered by B.B. in a document logging the details of the 17 October attack; the applicant had possessed the details of the Western Union branch in rue du Cloître in the Notre-Dame district of Paris; an exchange receipt dated 21 July 1995, for an amount of GBP 5,000 exchanged at a rate of 7.5%, had been found at the applicant’s home, with the number of a public payphone in Corbeil-Essonnes used by A.T. written on the back, and an entry had been made in the credit column of B.B.’s accounts for the sum of “5,000 pounds sterling from [W.], converted at a rate of 7.5%”; a sum of GBP 6,945 had been sent on 20 July 1995; between 20 and 25 July 1995 the sum of FRF 300 had been entered as expenditure for the purchase of a “GB ticket”, demonstrating that the funds, after being exchanged in England, had been transported to Paris in the days leading up to the attack at the Saint‑Michel suburban rail station; and a letter from British Telecom had been found, addressed to “Walid” at 122 Hamlet Gardens, the applicant’s address. The judges also noted, as evidence against the applicant, the content of a hard disk found in a London flat to which the applicant had keys, containing two financial reports, one relating to the activities of the GIA in Belgium and the other to a set of accounts for the period from September 1994 to 1 November 1995, the date of B.B.’s arrest. 32. In its judgment of 13 February 2001 concerning the attack of 17 October 1995 the Investigation Division observed in particular that the applicant’s three telephone numbers had been called repeatedly from payphones used by B.B., around the time of the different attacks and in particular on the day before the attack of 17 October 1995. It compared these calls with the statements made by B.B. and a further accomplice, who had been planning an attack on Lille city market, according to which they had reported to the applicant on preparations for the operations, and in particular for the attack of 17 October 1995. The Investigation Division also noted that the applicant had made a transfer of FRF 36,800 from London the day before that attack – as shown by the fact that his fingerprints had been found on the transfer slip in the Western Union office in London – which had been received by B.B. in Paris on the same day. The link between that transfer and the attack of 17 October 1995 had also been established by B.B.’s statements and by a call made to the applicant’s mobile phone the same day, after the money had been received. 33. In its judgment of 3 August 2001 relating more specifically to the attack of 25 July 1995, the Investigation Division stressed that the applicant’s English mobile phone had been called two days before that attack from a public payphone in Paris close to B.B.’s home from which other calls had been made, including a call to a mobile phone belonging to a member of the French GIA network, made one minute before the applicant was called. Furthermore, the day before the attack and then on the day itself, the applicant had received calls from France on his various numbers, including from a payphone close to the previous one, concerning his role as an intermediary between the perpetrators of the attacks and the person masterminding them in Algeria. Above all, the Investigation Division noted that the applicant had on 2 and 20 July 1995 sent sums of GBP 5,000 and GBP 6,945 respectively which were directly linked to the attack carried out on 25 July 1995. 34. Lastly, in its judgment of 27 November 2001 the Investigation Division also noted that it was clear from these different elements that the applicant had sent funds to the perpetrators of the attacks, not just in relation to the campaign of attacks as a whole but also for use directly in carrying out the attack of 6 October 1995. With regard to the latter, it noted that the instructions issued by the GIA concerning the campaigns, which had been accompanied by advice on the manufacture of explosives, had been transmitted via the applicant, who had also funded all the operational arrangements put in place in France in order to ensure the success of the attacks, and that the recipients had been required to report to him on how the money had been used. A number of telephone calls had established that the applicant had been kept informed of the progress of the attacks, and in particular of the attack of 6 October 1995, which had been followed by a telephone call on 8 October 1995 telling the applicant that everything had gone well on 6 October. 35. On 26 October 2007 the Paris special Assize Court, composed of seven professional judges, found the applicant guilty as charged in connection with the three attacks. It sentenced him to life imprisonment with a minimum term of twenty-two years. The applicant appealed on 29 October 2007. 36. The appeal proceedings before the Paris special Assize Court, this time composed of nine professional judges, took place from 16 September to 13 October 2009. One hundred and ninety-six individuals joined the proceedings as civil parties, as did the RATP (the Paris public-transport operator), the SNCF (the French national rail company), the Guarantee Fund for victims of terrorist acts and other crimes, the Government Law Officer and the association SOS Attentats. 37. At the hearing of 16 September 2009 counsel for the applicant made submissions requesting the termination of the proceedings and a finding that the prosecution was null and void, on the basis of the ne bis in idem principle. Citing Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 and the judgment in Sergey Zolotukhin v. Russia, delivered by the Grand Chamber of the Court on 10 February 2009, they argued that the material acts which the Assize Court was called on to examine were the same as those of which the applicant had previously been convicted by the Paris Court of Appeal in its final judgment of 18 December 2006. In counsel’s view, the material acts alleged in the Assize Court proceedings, namely the transfer of funds to the perpetrators of the attacks, the transmission of instructions to the same perpetrators, and the monitoring of the preparation and carrying-out of the attacks, had also been alleged in the Criminal Court proceedings. 38. In an interlocutory judgment of 17 September 2009 the special Assize Court dismissed the objection regarding a breach of the ne bis in idem principle, finding as follows: “Although Rachid RAMDA’s defence counsel correctly points out that Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 must be understood as prohibiting the prosecution or trial of a second ‘offence’ in so far as it arises from identical facts or facts which are substantially the same, the following factors need to be taken into consideration in the present case: - The facts on which the criminal courts based their finding that Rachid RAMDA was guilty, while they related to criminal acts dealt with in the current set of proceedings, were by no means confined to them. In finding the offence of criminal conspiracy to be made out – a separate offence that is provided for and punishable under Article 450-1 of the Criminal Code – the courts considered all the elements apt to substantiate the accused’s involvement in the conspiracy, which was aimed at organising, developing and ensuring the continuation of a movement that was bent on imposing its cause, in particular by using clandestine methods and material and intellectual resources (recruitment of and regular contact with activists, dissemination of information on the GIA’s activities and views, fundraising, seeking donations of weapons and various items of equipment, etc.), without necessarily pursuing the sole objective of carrying out the attacks that are the subject of the proceedings. - The facts to be considered by this court differ substantially from the earlier ones in that they relate to criminal conduct aimed at the achievement of one-off objectives which were determined with precision and were not inextricably linked, and which were driven by a specific motivation consisting in particular in providing others, in full knowledge of the situation, with the means of deliberately harming human life or individuals’ physical or mental integrity by the use of explosives. - In these circumstances the finding that Rachid RAMDA was guilty and his conviction by the Paris Court of Appeal cannot lead the Assize Court to find that his prosecution has lapsed and to declare the criminal proceedings against him null and void. - It is thus the task of the Assize Court, on conclusion of the proceedings and in the light thereof, to rule, by answering the questions raised before it, as to whether or not Rachid RAMDA is guilty of aiding and abetting as charged ...” 39. In an interlocutory judgment of 24 September 2009 the special Assize Court of Appeal deferred its decision on a request for further information and eventually rejected the request in a further interlocutory judgment of 8 October 2009. 40. Sixty-three questions concerning the applicant alone were put to the special Assize Court of Appeal. Twenty-six related to the circumstances surrounding the attack of 25 July 1995, eighteen to the events surrounding the attack of 6 October 1995 and nineteen to the attack of 17 October 1995. The questions gave precise details of the various alleged acts and where and when they had been committed, and listed the names of dozens of victims of killings and attempted killings, mutilation or permanent disability, injuries resulting in unfitness for work of up to eight days or more, and victims of damage to their property. The answer to sixty-one of the questions was “yes”, by a majority (some questions, followed by a list of victims and requiring an individual reply in each case, were also found partly “devoid of purpose”), and two questions were found to be “devoid of purpose”. Besides details regarding the places and dates concerned in each instance, as well as the indication of the victims according to the damage suffered (death, mutilation or permanent disability, temporary total unfitness for work of over eight days and of a maximum of eight days, destruction of or damage to property), the questions related in particular to whether or not the applicant’s actions had been premeditated (questions nos. 2, 8, 28 and 46), and to incitement of others to commit certain acts (questions nos. 5, 11, 20, 25, 31, 36, 43, 49, 57 and 62), the assistance lent by the applicant to the perpetrators of the attacks (questions nos. 10, 19, 24, 30, 35, 42, 48, 56 and 61) and whether the applicant had issued instructions to others to commit certain crimes (questions nos. 6, 12, 21, 26, 32, 37, 44, 50, 58 and 63). The parties did not comment on these questions. 41. An affirmative answer was given to the questions whether the applicant had knowingly assisted in the manufacture or possession of explosive devices and in issuing instructions to that effect, in the context of the attacks of 25 July and 6 and 17 October 1995, and whether he had knowingly incited others to manufacture or possess such devices in the context of the attacks of 25 July and 17 October 1995. 42. In a judgment of 13 October 2009 the special Assize Court of Appeal found the applicant guilty and sentenced him to life imprisonment with a minimum term of twenty-two years, and ordered his permanent exclusion from French territory. It adjourned the civil hearing for a later date. The applicant appealed on points of law. 43. On 15 June 2011 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law. Regarding his ground of appeal to the effect that no reasons had been given for the finding of guilt, based in particular on Article 6 of the Convention, it found as follows: “Firstly, the impugned questions, which were put in accordance with the law, established in all aspects the acts of aiding and abetting of which Mr Ramda was found guilty. Secondly, the judgment convicting Mr Ramda included the answers which the judges comprising the special Assize Court of Appeal gave immediately after the oral proceedings, on the basis of their personal conviction and by a majority following a secret vote, to the questions concerning his guilt which were put to them in accordance with the operative provisions of the committal orders and were the subject of adversarial argument. Accordingly, and given that steps were taken to ensure the prior investigation of the charges contained in the indictment, the free exercise of the rights of the defence, and the public and adversarial nature of the proceedings, the requirements laid down by the statutory and Convention provisions relied on were satisfied.” 44. As to the ground of appeal concerning a breach of the ne bis in idem principle on account of the applicant’s final conviction by the Paris Court of Appeal on 18 December 2006 on the basis of identical facts, the Court of Cassation held that criminal conspiracy was a separate offence from the crimes prepared or committed by its members and also from the offences characterised by certain material acts that embodied it. ...

5. The applicant was born in 1989 and lives in Manisa. 6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7. On 7 July 2009 the applicant was dismissed from the Expert Gendarmerie School due to non-compliance with disciplinary rules. 8. On 28 July 2009 the applicant brought an action before the Supreme Military Administrative Court and requested the annulment of the decision to dismiss him. 9. On 6 January 2010 the Supreme Military Administrative Court rejected the applicant’s case, taking into account the “secret documents” submitted by the Ministry of Defence. These documents were not disclosed to the applicant. 10. On 5 May 2010 the applicant’s request for rectification was rejected by the same court.

6. The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Tbilisi. 7. On 7 November 2002 the applicant was sentenced to a suspended term of five years’ imprisonment for breaching public order and resisting a police officer. 8. On 4 July 2004 a police officer, the head of the criminal investigation unit at the Gldani-Nadzaladevi district police department in Tbilisi (“the district police department”), ordered a personal search of the applicant to be carried out in urgent circumstances. The relevant decision stated that having examined the inquiry file (მოკვლევის მასალები) in respect of the applicant, who was suspected of possession and use of narcotic substances, the police officer had decided, under, inter alia, Articles 290, 321, and 325 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Georgia (“the CCP”) (as cited in paragraph 37 below), that a personal search of the applicant should be conducted for the purpose of seizing any unlawful substances. The decision consisted mainly of pre-typed standard phrases with the applicant’s first and last names added by hand, noting that he was suspected of unlawful drug possession. It was signed by the police officer himself and the head of the relevant district police department. 9. According to the official version of events, at around 5.20 p.m. on the same date, as the applicant was entering a billiards hall with two friends, two police officers waiting in a vehicle parked opposite the hall called to him. The applicant approached them. He was then searched, without the police having a judicial warrant for that purpose. The police report on the personal search, which was drawn up subsequently at the police department, stated: “... given that there were sufficient grounds to suspect that the arrested person would try to destroy evidence (narcotic substance heroin) showing that he or she had committed a crime, a personal search of [Archil Jugheli Kobiashvili born in 1973 and living at ...] was conducted.” The report further noted that before being searched the applicant had been asked to “indicate where he was keeping the heroin”. The applicant had pointed to “the trouser pocket in which he was carrying heroin wrapped in white paper”. A yellow powder had been discovered there as a result. Two attesting witnesses, Mr U.K. and Mr L.Ts., who had attended the search, as well as a police officer, Sh.Sh., signed the report on the personal search. The applicant refused to countersign it. The search lasted from 5.20 to 5.45 p.m. 10. The applicant was formally arrested at 6 p.m. on suspicion of unlawful use and possession of the narcotic substance heroin. He again refused to sign the arrest record. 11. On what appears to be the same date (the document is not dated) the head of the relevant district police department wrote a report to the Tbilisi Gldani-Nadzaladevi district prosecutor, informing him of the personal search of the applicant that had taken place at 5.45 p.m. on 4 July 2004. According to that note, the relevant investigative measure had been conducted in urgent circumstances in the absence of a judicial warrant and before the initiation of criminal proceedings. The police officer asked the prosecutor to apply to the Gldani-Nadzaladevi District Court with a request for legalising the search post-factum. 12. According to the investigation file, on the same date, that is on 4 July 2004, on the basis of the above-mentioned request, the Tbilisi Gldani-Nadzaladevi district prosecutor lodged an application with the Gldani-Nadzaladevi District Court in Tbilisi to have the search of 4 July 2004, which it claimed had been urgent, legalised. The request simply provided the place the applicant had been arrested, the substance that had been revealed as a result of the search, and the offence the applicant had been suspected of. In accordance with Article 290 of the CCP and with reference to section 7(4) and sections 8 and 9 of the Law on the Conduct of Undercover Investigations, the prosecutor asked the court to legalise the search. In support of the request the prosecutor submitted three documents. The first was a handwritten note by Officer Sh.Sh., according to which the search had been conducted, on the basis of “operational information” (ოპერატიული ინფორმაცია), by him, by another police officer N.O., and by the driver, police officer M.Ts., and that as a result of the search attended by witnesses, heroin had been found on the applicant. The above note, in contrast to the police report on personal search of the applicant (see paragraph 9 above) stated that at the time of the arrest, the applicant had been under the influence of drugs. 13. The second document was a handwritten note from L.Ts., one of the witnesses who had attended the search. He stated that while walking along the street, he had been approached by police officers with a request to attend a personal search. He confirmed that the substance had been found in the back right pocket of the applicant’s jeans and that the applicant had stated that it belonged to him. The third document submitted to the court was a handwritten note from the other attesting witness to the search, U.K., who provided a short description of the circumstances of the applicant’s personal search in terms identical to those used by L.Ts. 14. According to the case-file, the prosecutor’s request to have the personal search of the applicant legalised, as submitted to the court, included neither a copy of the decision ordering the search in urgent circumstances nor the inquiry file in respect of the applicant (see paragraph 8 above). It also appears that a copy of the police report on personal search of the applicant was likewise missing from the case-file available to the court (see paragraph 9 above). 15. On 5 July 2004 the court examined the request and the documents produced by the public prosecutor’s office in accordance with Articles 290 and 293 of the CCP and declared the search lawful. It concluded: “Having reviewed the reasoning of the request, [the court] consider[s] that the personal search of Archil Kobiashvili was conducted because of an exigent need, in compliance with the rules of criminal procedural legislation and that there is a legal basis for granting [the request].” The procedure was conducted in writing and the applicant was not allowed to submit his observations regarding the circumstances of the search. The decision stated that no appeal lay against it. 16. On an unspecified date the applicant was formally charged with buying and possessing a large quantity of drugs, an offence under Article 260 § 2 (a) of the Criminal Code. 17. On 5 August the two attesting witnesses were questioned again. They maintained their initial statements, describing in more detail the circumstances of the applicant’s search. On 7 August 2004 Officer Sh.Sh., who was also questioned in the capacity of a witness, again confirmed that he had acted with two other police officers, N.O. and M.Ts., on the basis of operational information. According to that information, a certain person on land adjacent to a billiards hall was under the influence of drugs. 18. On 26 August 2004 a forensic examination by the investigating authorities established that the substance discovered during the search was 0.059 grams of heroin. In addition, on 27 August 2004 a narcotics test revealed that the applicant was not a drug addict, although he did require “preventive treatment.” 19. The applicant remained silent during the investigation. 20. On 10 December 2004 the Gldani-Nadzaladevi District Court opened the applicant’s trial. The applicant, describing the events that had taken place in front of the billiards hall, pleaded not guilty. He claimed that he had not been searched either before or after his arrest and that the substance allegedly discovered on him had belonged to the police. He explained that the police had taken him to the police station, where they had “heated up” an injection of drugs (opium) and administered it to him by force. He had then been taken to a toxicology clinic to be tested. 21. On 21 December 2004 U.K., one of the attesting witnesses, was questioned in court. He claimed that he had not attended the applicant’s search on 4 July 2004 but had been approached at around 10 p.m. at the construction site where he had been working by police officers who had taken him directly to the police station. There, they had dictated to him a text which he had signed. In addition, he had signed a hand-written report without reading it. In reply to a question as to whether the police had insulted him, U.K. replied that they had been swearing at the police station and that he had been scared. He also alleged that the police had threatened to arrest him. 22. On 27 December 2004 Officer Sh.Sh was questioned in court. He confirmed that the applicant had been arrested and searched on the basis of operational information. He maintained that the search had been attended by two witnesses who had been approached in the street. The second police officer, N.O., when questioned in court on 9 March 2005, explained that he had acted on the basis of operational information according to which “there [had been] a person in Mukhiani IV district, who could have been under the influence of drugs”. He further stated that he was not sure whether visually it had been evident that the applicant had been under the influence of drugs. Arguing that U.K.’s testimony before the trial court was untrue, he confirmed the official version of the search of the applicant and maintained that the latter’s personal search had been conducted immediately at the scene of his arrest. 23. In the meantime, L.Ts., the second witness to the search, refused to appear before the court. After being served with a summons, on 18 February 2005 he wrote a brief note to the judge informing her of his inability to attend the hearing on 22 February 2005 because of a planned trip to the United States. 24. The court also heard evidence from two friends of the applicant who had been with him at the time of his arrest. They stated that all three of them had been standing in front of a billiards hall when the police had called to the applicant and the latter had approached their vehicle. They both claimed that the applicant had been immediately taken away by the police without any search having been conducted on the spot. 25. In his final statement, the applicant’s defence counsel asked the court to dismiss the report on the applicant’s personal search as null and void, on account of various procedural irregularities. He also claimed that the second alleged witness to the search, L.Ts., was a police agent, a former police officer who had acted in many similar criminal cases as an attesting witness. 26. On 18 April 2005 the Gldani-Nadzaladevi District Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to six years’ imprisonment, to which was added six months from a previous sentence. The court found that the applicant’s guilt was proven by the statements given by the two police officers who had arrested and searched him, and by the results of the personal search. As regards U.K.’s contradictory claims, the court concluded that it “had not been unequivocally established that he had not been a witness to the personal search and had only signed the papers at the police station”. Consequently, the court decided not to take account of the part of U.K.’s testimony where he had denied being present during the search. The court further held that it could not take into account the statements of the applicant’s friends, given that the two men were friends of the accused and therefore wanted to get him out of trouble. 27. The applicant appealed against that decision to the Tbilisi Court of Appeal, arguing again that he had not been searched at the time of his arrest and that his conviction had been based on planted evidence. He claimed that the first-instance court had not drawn objective conclusions from his friends’ statements and the testimony of U.K. in which the latter had claimed not to have witnessed the search. The applicant also criticised the fact that no evidence had been heard from L.Ts. He provided the witness’s address and requested that he be questioned in court. At the same time, he asked the court to re-examine all the witnesses, namely the two police officers, U.K., and his friends. 28. On 3 June 2005 the appeal proceedings started. The appeal court heard evidence from the two arresting officers, who confirmed the official version of events. They both stated that as far as they could recall, the operational information had simply stated that there had been a person at a certain address under the influence of drugs. None of them could recall exactly who had received that information at the police station and whether it had been provided by telephone or by some other means. 29. The appeal court further examined L.Ts., the second attesting witness to the search, who confirmed that he had been present during the search in question at the request of the police, and had seen that a yellowish substance had been discovered in the applicant’s trouser pocket. He contested the allegations of the defence that he was a former police officer or had otherwise cooperated with the police in the past. The first attesting witness, U.K., confirmed the evidence he had given before the first-instance court. He refuted the allegation that he had attended the applicant’s personal search and claimed that he had been forced to sign several documents at the police station. He alleged that he had been subjected to psychological as well as physical pressure by the police. At the same time, in reply to a question put by the prosecutor, U.K. said that having learnt that the documents he had signed concerned the applicant, he had gone to see the latter’s brother and had told him everything. He had then gone with one of the applicant’s cousins to the Public Defender’s Office and had given them a detailed statement concerning the circumstances of the case. 30. The two friends of the applicant were also questioned in the appeal court. They confirmed the evidence given to the first-instance court. 31. At the hearing of 18 November 2005 the applicant’s defence counsel applied to the appeal court to exclude as inadmissible evidence, among other things, the police report on the applicant’s personal search. Defence counsel argued, firstly, that the search had been conducted without a judicial warrant or the authorisation of a senior investigator, in violation of the relevant provisions of the CCP. In support of his argument he referred to the fact that the decision to conduct a personal search had not been duly signed by a senior investigator, had not indicated the exact time at which it had been issued, and had included detailed information about the identity of the applicant, including his name and address, and the type of narcotic substance, heroin, that he allegedly had on his person, facts which had become known to the police only after the arrest and search of the applicant. Moreover, he alleged that the decision had not been read out to the applicant before the search. Secondly, in his evidence before the first and second‑instance courts, U.K. had unequivocally claimed that he had not witnessed the personal search of the applicant and had been forced to sign certain documents at the police station. As for the second witness, L.Ts. had lied about his prior working experience with the police and was thus unreliable. In support of his arguments, the defence submitted a letter from the Ministry of the Interior, according to which L.Ts. had been working for the Ministry in 1996. Thirdly, the defence emphasised that the friends of the applicant had consistently maintained that the latter had not been searched at the place of his arrest. The defence thus requested that the search report be excluded as an inadmissible piece of evidence, in accordance with Article 111 of the CCP. 32. On 6 December 2005 the appeal court dismissed the applicant’s request in its entirety. In connection with the search decision, they concluded that it had been taken by an authorised police officer in line with the requirements of Article 67 of the CCP. They further considered that it was unclear as to whether the decision had indeed been read out to the applicant prior to the personal search being carried out; therefore they were not in a position at that stage of the proceedings to assess that alleged breach of procedure. 33. On 21 February 2006 the appeal court upheld the first-instance judgment. The court considered that the applicant’s guilt was confirmed by the reports of his arrest and the personal search, the statements of the arresting officers, and other evidence in the case file. In connection with the evidence of U.K., the appeal court found the testimony he had given in court not credible as it contradicted the case materials. Furthermore, it was “illogical” and had apparently been given under the influence of the applicant’s family. The appeal court also relied on the statement of L.Ts., disregarding the applicant’s complaint concerning his being a former police officer. It dismissed the evidence of the two friends of the applicant as unreliable. 34. On 6 March 2006 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. He maintained that serious procedural irregularities that had taken place during the pre-trial investigation had undermined his ability properly to defend his case, and that his conviction was based on unlawful evidence, notably on a falsified decision to carry out a personal search in urgent circumstances, which had served as a basis for the unlawful search and untrue witness statements. He also denounced as unsubstantiated the appeal court’s decision refusing his request concerning the inadmissibility of evidence. 35. On 12 June 2006 the Supreme Court of Georgia declared the applicant’s appeal inadmissible on the grounds that it did not satisfy the requirements of Article 547 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 36. On 3 January 2011 the applicant was released from prison upon the expiry of his prison sentence.

6. The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Istanbul. 7. On 16 June 1999 the applicant was arrested and taken into custody on suspicion of belonging to an illegal organisation, namely Hizbullah. 8. On 21 June 1999 the applicant’s statements were taken by the police in the absence of a lawyer. During his interrogation, he confessed being a member of the Hizbullah and gave a detailed account of his acts within the illegal organisation. 9. On 22 June 1999 the applicant was heard by the Diyarbakır public prosecutor and the investigating judge at the Diyarbakır State Security Court, again in the absence of a lawyer. In his statements before both the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, the applicant denied the accusations and maintained that his statements to the police had been given under duress. On the same date, upon the order of the investigating judge, the applicant was placed in pre-trial detention. 10. On 30 June 1999 the public prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court filed an indictment with that court, charging the applicant under Article 168 § 2 of the former Turkish Criminal Code, namely for membership of an illegal armed organisation. 11. On 9 November 1999 the applicant was released pending trial. 12. The State Security Courts were later abolished by Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, and the case was transferred to the Diyarbakır Assize Court. 13. On 12 June 2008, relying on, inter alia, the applicant’s statements to the police, the Diyarbakır Assize Court convicted the applicant under Article 314 § 2 of the new Turkish Criminal Code and sentenced him to six years and three months’ imprisonment. In convicting the applicant, the Assize Court further took into consideration information on computer hard disks and print-outs, which had been seized in a house belonging to the illegal organisation, as well as the statements of several witnesses who had testified against the applicant. 14. On 4 June 2009 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the first-instance court.

6. The applicants live in Astrakhan. 7. The first applicant has been or is a guardian (a foster parent) of the second to eighth applicants. R. was a minor, who remained in the first applicant’s care from 20 July 2001 until 26 July 2010. 8. At birth R. was diagnosed with several serious health conditions. He spent the first eight months of his life in hospital. As his condition remained very serious and unstable, his natural parents considered themselves unfit to attend to his needs and agreed for their son to be put into the care of the first applicant, who had qualifications in medicine and was an experienced paediatrician. 9. On 20 July 2001 the first applicant took R. from hospital and brought him at her place of residence. 10. On 23 November 2001 the Trusovskiy District Council in Astrakhan appointed the first applicant to act as R.’s guardian. The decision stated that R.’s parents were unable to ensure proper care of their child, who had serious congenital diseases, and that therefore they gave their consent in writing to the first applicant’s guardianship over R., and to his transfer into her care. 11. Eventually, at various dates in the period from 2003 to 2009 the first applicant also was appointed guardian to the second to eighth applicants. 12. Between 2001 and 2007, the first applicant and R.’s parents maintained good relations. 13. In 2007 R.’s state of health became more stable, and his parents expressed their wish to take him back into their care. The first applicant refused to return the boy. 14. On an unspecified date the first applicant brought a claim against R.’s parents in an attempt to have them deprived of their parental authority over him. She argued that they had left R. in the children’s hospital shortly after his birth; that they had not expressed any interest in his life, health and development; that they had not visited him; and that financial support they had given had been inadequate given the child’s special needs. According to the first applicant, R.’s parents were now interested in the boy only with a view to improving their living conditions, as having a disabled child in their care could entitle them to better social housing. The first applicant thus insisted that R.’s parents had evaded their parental duties and thus should be divested of their parental authority over R. 15. In the proceedings before the first-instance court, the Ministry of Education and Science of Astrakhan Region (hereinafter “the childcare authority”) provided an expert report on the issue, in which they considered that R.’s parents “[did] not show any interest in his life or health condition, they [did] not participate in his upbringing, they [did] not provide any financial maintenance and [had] chosen not to fulfil their parental duties”. The report concluded that they should be deprived of their parental authority. 16. On 11 November 2008 the Trusovskiy District Court of Astrakhan (“the District Court”) dismissed the first applicant’s claim. In particular, it rejected as unfounded the first applicant’s argument that R.’s parents had abandoned him in the children’s hospital; it observed in this connection that no evidence had been submitted to it – in the form of a written statement by R.’s parents or certificates from any health institutions – to show that R.’s parents had ever formally renounced their parental authority over the boy. The court further observed that the decision to transfer their son under the first applicant’s guardianship had been taken by the child’s parents at a very difficult time of their lives, when they had faced a very stressful situation of being unable, on their own, to attend to their son’s needs. 17. The District Court also rejected the first applicant’s allegation concerning R.’s parents’ unwillingness or failure to visit their son in the absence of any obstacles. In the latter connection, the court observed that the first applicant had had a negative attitude towards R.’s parents’ unexpected visits, and she had never informed them of the child’s absence from his place of residence (for outings and trips abroad). Also, R.’s parents had been unable to obtain information about R.’s heath from the relevant healthcare institutions, as the latter had refused give them any such information at the first applicant’s written request. 18. The court also referred to statements of a number of witnesses which confirmed that R.’s parents had helped the first applicant with his maintenance, both financially and by providing various services requested by the first applicant; in particular, they had had maintenance and repair work in the first applicant’s housing done; they had ensured private transport for R.’s visits to medical appointments; they had supplied medicine and food for R.’s special diet; they had taken his clothes for cleaning and brought him clean clothes. 19. The court further considered the deprivation of parental authority to be an extraordinary measure that could only be applied on the grounds established in Article 69 of the Russian Family Code (see paragraph 68 below). In the circumstances of the case, the court did not discern any grounds justifying such a measure. At the same time, the court urged R.’s parents “to change their attitude towards [R.’s] upbringing” and imposed on the competent childcare authority an obligation to monitor their compliance with their parental obligations”. It also noted that the financial support provided by R.’s biological parents was insufficient and ordered that they pay the first applicant one quarter of their monthly income as child maintenance. 20. On 12 March 2009 the Astrakhan Regional Court (“the Regional Court”) upheld the first-instance judgment on appeal. 21. On 26 February 2009 the District Court dismissed an application by R.’s parents to have their son returned to them. 22. It established, in particular, that the first applicant had been taking good care of R.; that she had actively involved relevant specialist healthcare professionals to ensure that he had received the necessary medical treatment and constant care; she had created all conditions necessary for his life and development, taking into account his special needs. The court also noted that for the period when R. had remained in the first applicant’s care, there had been improvements in his state of his health and progress in his physical and psychological development. It furthermore referred to the evidence confirming that the first applicant’s foster children lived in good living conditions; that they played as a group; that their leisure activities were well organised, and included group nature outings. 23. The District Court also established, with reference to the available written evidence and witness statements, that, until that moment, R.’s parents had not maintained contact with R., and had never enquired as to his health. 24. It further observed, with reference to the opinions of healthcare professionals and representatives of the childcare authority who had monitored R., that an abrupt change of surroundings, separation from the people he knew and immediate transfer to his biological parents could seriously traumatise the boy, endanger and harm his psychological state and thus aggravate his conditions. The boy would need a lengthy adaptation period to get used to his natural parents. 25. The court thus concluded that it would be in the child’s best interests to continue living with the first applicant for the time being. 26. The judgment became final on 13 March 2009. 27. On an unspecified date, R.’s parents brought a claim against the first applicant. They complained that she had been obstructing their contact with R. and requested that the court grant them access to the boy, and determine the manner in which they could exercise their contact rights. 28. By a judgment of 7 May 2009 the District Court determined R.’s parents’ rights of contact with the boy. It established that they should have access to him each Friday from 4.30 to 5.30 pm at the first applicant’s home, and each Sunday from 2 to 4 pm at their home in the first applicant’s presence. 29. On 10 June 2009 the Regional Court upheld the first-instance judgment on appeal. 30. The case file reveals that R.’s parents complied with the established order of their contact with R. 31. On an unspecified date R.’s parents brought another claim against the first applicant and the childcare authority before the District Court. They asked for their son’s return and termination of the first applicant’s guardianship over him. 32. In the ensuing proceedings both parties were represented by lawyers. 33. In the context of those proceedings, two reports were drawn up by psychologists of the childcare authority. They reflected the results of monitoring by psychologists of contact sessions between R. and his parents. 34. The first report dated 29 December 2009 described two contact sessions that had taken place at various times on 25-27 December 2009. It stated, in particular, that R.’s parents had established good psychological contact with the child, and that they had showed a caring and loving attitude towards the boy. The report furthermore stated that, in view of R.’s special condition and the considerable delay in his physical and psychological development, his interaction with the adults was very limited; however, the parents managed to establish tactile and emotional contact with him. Overall, in so far as his conditions made it possible to ascertain, the child felt psychologically comfortable and calm in the presence of his parents. At the same time, the experts pointed out that the child was very fragile and that, for his psychological comfort, he constantly needed the presence of the first applicant. The experts also stated that R.’s parents had insufficient understanding of their son’s emotional state and interests, the particularities of his psychological condition and his capabilities. The report concluded that it was necessary to continue the process of the child’s adaptation to his parents and to that end the duration of the contact sessions between R. and his parents should be extended. 35. The second report dated 4 May 2010 described two contact sessions that had taken place on 29 and 30 April 2010. It noted the child’s very serious condition, which greatly limited his interaction with the outside world. It further stated, in particular, that R.’s parents had successfully established psychological contact with their son; that they understood adequately his psychological particularities, emotional state, needs and capabilities. According to the report, when with his parents, R. felt calm and comfortable. In the course of their interaction, R.’s parents had created a warm and beneficial environment propitious for the child’s development. 36. In the proceedings before the court, the childcare authority expressed a generally favourable opinion regarding R.’s return to his biological parents, but pointed out that, in view of R.’s state of health, his integration into his family should be gradual. In particular, the duration of his contact sessions with the parents, which to then had taken place twice a week in daytime, could be extended and could include night-time contact. 37. On 4 May 2010 the District Court allowed R.’s parents’ claims. 38. It examined in detail the circumstances of R.’s transfer to the first applicant’s care and the relations between the first applicant, R.’s parents and R. from that time forward. It pointed out, in particular, that R.’s parents had surrendered their son to the first applicant’s care given his very serious condition and her experience as a paediatrician; at that time they had considered themselves incapable of ensuring the specialist care he needed. 39. It rejected as untenable on the facts the first applicant’s argument that R.’s parents had abandoned their son in the hospital without valid reasons. It noted in this connection: “Neither the statements made by [R.’s] parents nor relevant medical documents [to confirm that argument] were presented to the court. The [defendants] denied this fact. They submitted that they had not abandoned their child. On the contrary, they wanted him to get better and to return to his family. It follows from the material in the case file that [R.] was given into the care of the guardian after his parents’ futile attempts to provide him with due medical care and in the child’s [best] interests ... [R.’s parents] did not intend to abandon their child ... Even though he was under the [first applicant’s] guardianship, [his] family took an interest in his life and health, they provided ... financial support.” 40. The District Court further referred to statements of various witnesses. In particular, eleven witnesses described the first applicant as a kind, caring and empathetic person, who helped other families with children with disabilities. They also stated that she had taken good care of R., that as a paediatrician she had attended to his needs, and that his condition had visibly improved owing to her efforts. The witnesses furthermore stated that the first applicant went with her foster children on trips, within the country and abroad. With respect to those statements the District Court noted that they confirmed only the first applicant’s good and caring attitude towards R. and the fact that she had duly performed her obligations towards him. However, in the court’s view, those statements did not show that R.’s parents were unable to take good care of the boy, nor that in view of R.’s physical and psychological condition he should continue living with the first applicant. 41. The court also referred to statements of Ms Z., a paediatrician, who submitted that she had known and been treating R. since he had been eight months old when he had been given into the first applicant’s care. The child had suffered from a serious congenital illness and had spent considerable time in hospital. At that time, his condition was stable, yet serious owing to his diagnosis – a central nervous system disorder and mobility impairments. The child needed constant appropriate care and supervision rather than mere medical treatment. The child had grown in ten years, had changed emotionally. He reacted to the people around him. However, he could not take care of himself. He could not eat, drink or walk on his own. He was in need of constant care. Ms Z. also added that she had accompanied the first applicant when she had taken R. to Austria for medical treatment. The boy had had a different reaction when the first applicant had held him in her arms and when Ms Z. had held him in her arms. 42. Ms M., one of the psychologists who had drawn up the reports of 29 December 2009 and 4 May 2010 (see paragraphs 34 and 35 above), submitted that it had been established in the course of monitoring that R.’s parents had learnt to identify and adequately understand specific psychological and physical particularities of their son. They showed genuine interest in the child and surrounded him with truly parental attention, love and care. They regularly consulted psychologists concerning the psychological condition of a child with developmental difficulties, asking about the requisite material and toys for, and how they should build communication, with such a child. 43. The District Court went on as follows: “Accordingly, as a result of monitoring of the contact sessions, it has been established that [R.’s] parents communicated with [him] in a calm, sincere and benevolent manner. They successfully established psychological contact with him. They understood adequately his psychological particularities, emotional state, needs and capabilities. When with his parents, [R.] felt calm and comfortable. In the course of their interaction, they created a warm and beneficial environment favourable for the child’s development. According to the report on the plaintiffs’ living conditions ... in a two-room flat, the conditions were found satisfactory and corresponding to the family’s needs and favourable for children’s upbringing and living. [R.’s] parents provided the conditions necessary for [his] living and upbringing. ... The adduced materials reveal that [R.’s] parents are a stable ... family. They are well-to-do and make an adequate living. They have permanent employment [and a] stable income. They provided positive personal references from their employers and from their place of residence. They do not have a history of psychiatric diseases or criminal records. Accordingly, they meet all the conditions and can raise the child and provide him with due care.” 44. The court dismissed the first applicant’s argument that R.’s parents were seeking to cancel her guardianship in order to obtain better social housing. According to the court, this allegation had been refuted in the course of the proceedings by the explanations provided by R.’s parents, and by the evidence proving that their minor children, including R., owned shares in their flat. 45. It further rejected the argument advanced by the childcare authority that the child should be gradually integrated into his parents’ family (see paragraph 36 above). In the court’s view, such gradual integration would have a negative impact on the child’s psychological state. Furthermore, it would interfere with his right to live and be brought up in his family. The court further stated that R.’s parents were his natural parents; they showed due care and love for him, and had by that time established psychological contact with him on the basis of contact sessions that had taken place over a considerable period of time, in particular in their flat. The child understood that his mother and father were his parents, in so far as his psychological development allowed it. The court also pointed out that the childcare authority had admitted that the reunification of R. with his family ultimately served his interest. 46. The District Court thus considered that “no convincing evidence [had been] submitted to show that [R.’s] parents [had been] unable to bring up their child with due care and attention”, and concluded as follows: “Regard being had to the above, the court holds that the plaintiffs’ claim should be granted and they should be reunited with their child in order for them to continue exercising their parental rights in respect of the child’s education and development. ... the court holds that the [administrative] decision ... [of] 23 November 2001 ... should be terminated as no longer needed.” 47. The first applicant appealed against the first-instance judgment. 48. On 23 June 2010 the Regional Court examined the first applicant’s appeal submissions, where she and her lawyer made their case in person. 49. It then upheld the judgment of 4 May 2010 on appeal. It considered that the District Court had thoroughly examined the case and accurately established the relevant circumstances; that on the basis of various pieces of written evidence, the report of 4 May 2010 regarding the effects of R.’s parents’ contact with him and a report on their living conditions being amongst their number, as well as on the basis of numerous witness statements, the first-instance court had taken a justified and well-reasoned decision that R.’s transfer to his biological family had been in his best interests. 50. On 26 July 2010 R. was transferred to his parents. 51. On an unspecified date the first applicant brought an action against R.’s parents on behalf of herself and on behalf of the other applicants in an attempt to gain access to R. She averred, in particular, that for the nine years during which R. had remained in her care, she and her foster children – the other applicants – had formed a family with a special bond existing between them; she further complained that, after R.’s transfer to his parents, there had been no contact between R. and the applicants, as R.’s parents had obstructed their attempts to maintain contact. 52. On 19 April 2011 the Sovetskiy District Court of Astrakhan (“the District Court”) dismissed the applicants’ claim. 53. It observed, in particular, that Article 64 of the Russian Family Code (see paragraph 65 below) vested the authority to represent and protect a child’s interests in his or her natural parents, unless the latter’s interests stood in conflict with their child’s. The District Court stated, with reference to the available evidence and witness statements, that after R.’s transfer to his biological parents, they had established all the requisite conditions for the boy’s life and education, and had been fully able to attend to his needs. In particular, R. had undergone all the necessary medical examinations; and his parents had complied with healthcare professionals’ recommendations as regards his care and medical assistance. The court concluded that R.’s parents were acting in his interests. 54. The District Court further noted that R.’s parents as well as the childcare authority objected to the applicants’ communication with R. It also observed that it was impossible to find out R.’s opinion on the matter in view of his medical conditions. 55. The District Court went on to observe that the first applicant was not a member of R.’s family or a relative, within the meaning of Article 67 of the Russian Family Code (see paragraph 66 below), nor did she have any legal ties with him after her guardianship over the boy had been terminated by a court decision, with the result that she did not pertain to the category of individuals entitled to seek access to the child under the Russian Family Code. In the court’s view, statements of a number of witnesses confirming R.’s attachment to the first applicant and her taking good care of him “were not grounds for including the first applicant in the category of individuals entitled under the relevant legal provision to claim access to the child”. 56. The first applicant appealed arguing, in particular, that the first‑instance court had erred, in the absence of a forensic expert examination of the matter, in its finding that the second applicant had been incapable of having and forming attachments to her and the other applicants; she complained that her request to have such an expert examination ordered had been rejected by the District Court. The applicant also argued that the first-instance court should have applied Article 67 of the Russian Family Code by analogy, as the relationship between the applicants and R. had been similar to that between biological family members. 57. On 8 June 2011 the Regional Court upheld the judgment of 19 April 2011 on appeal. It noted, in particular: “When dismissing the [first applicant’s] claims, the [first-instance] court considered that, as set forth in Article 67 of the Family Code of the Russian Federation, the right of access to a child is granted to grandfathers, grandmothers, brothers, sisters and other relatives, while [the first applicant] is, as a matter of law, not regarded as a member of the family or a relative of a minor or any other person whose relationship with him is governed by family law (appointed guardians, custodians, de facto guardians) given that her guardianship has been terminated. The [Regional Court] upholds the above finding of the first-instance court. By virtue of the Family Code of the Russian Federation, the right of access to a child is granted to a grandmother, a grandfather, brothers and sisters, [and] the child’s close relatives who take part in his upbringing and education. Accordingly, the legislation protects [the relevant rights] of close relatives. The right of access to a child is not guaranteed to other individuals.” 58. As regards the first applicant’s argument that the first-instance court should have applied Article 67 of the Russian Family Code by analogy and should have considered her as R.’s family member given the nature of ties between them, the appellate court noted as follows: “When resolving the dispute, the court did not apply the law by analogy. ... [T]he members of the family, as a matter of law, are understood only as the individuals directly indicated in the Family Code of the Russian Federation. The resolution of a dispute by analogy would otherwise contradict the essence of the family relationship.” 59. The court also rejected the applicant’s argument that the first‑instance court had failed to determine the degree of R.’s attachment to the applicants; it stated in this connection that the argument in question “lacked a legal basis”. 60. The Regional Court also endorsed the District Court’s findings that R.’s parents had provided the requisite care to R.; and that they had carried out necessary medical and rehabilitation measures. It “[discerned] no evidence that R.’s rights or interests [had been] infringed” and dismissed the first applicant’s argument to that end as unsubstantiated.

5. The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Stryzhavka. 6. On 12 September 2006 the applicant submitted a written notice to the mayor of Vinnytsia informing him that the Chumatskyy Shlyakh civic youth association (“the Association”) registered in Vinnytsia, of which he was chairman, intended to hold a picket (пікет) outside the Vinnytsia Regional Authority (“the regional authority”) building. The notice read as follows: “We inform you that, starting from 14 September 2006 our organisation will hold a picket [in front] of the [regional authority] for an indefinite term in view of the unhealthy, in our view, social and economic state of affairs in the region. Beginning of the picket: 14 September 2005 at 14:00. Place: square in front of the [regional authority] building; Responsible person according to the decision of the Association’s management: Chumak S.V. [the applicant]. Chairman of the [Association] Chumak, Sergiy Viktorovych.” 7. According to the Government, the Association’s officially registered chairman at the material time was a certain Igor Viktorovyh Chumak. The applicant was neither the chairman, nor could he even be a member of the Association because according to the Association’s charter, membership was open to persons under the age of twenty-eight. At the time of the relevant events the applicant was older. 8. On 13 September 2006 the mayor’s office forwarded the applicant’s notice to the police, requesting that they maintain public order during the demonstration. 9. On 14 September 2006 the Association started the picket as intended. According to the applicant, several other local groups joined the action and two small camping tents (measuring 2 by 2 metres) were erected by the walls of the regional authority building on a 15-metre wide street for storing handout materials and displaying the protesters’ slogans. 10. On 15 September 2006 the executive committee of Vinnytsia City Council instituted administrative proceedings seeking “to enjoin the [Association] not to organise and carry out pickets on the streets and squares of Vinnytsia and to oblige it to uninstall the unlawfully erected ‘small architectural structures’ (малі архітектурні форми).” The plaintiff alleged that the protesters had been breaching the peace and public order by offending passers-by, acting arrogantly towards them, obstructing the traffic and pedestrians and endangering the lives and health of local residents. Referring to Article 182 of the Code of Administrative Justice (“the CAJ”, see paragraph 20 below), which provided for the lodging of an action before the start of a picket, the plaintiff asked the court to admit its action for consideration out-of-time on the grounds that only after the picket had started had it become apparent that the protesters intended to engage in inappropriate conduct. The statement of claim was supplemented with applications by V.Ch. and Y.S., two passers-by, addressed to the police, in which they complained that the protesters had “acted arrogantly”, had offended their feelings and had erected tents obstructing pedestrians and spoiling the street aesthetics. 11. On the same date the Leninskiy District Court in Vinnytsia (“the District Court”) held a hearing at which the applicant, representing the Association, denied the allegations that the picketers had engaged in any inappropriate conduct. According to him, during the hearing he had unsuccessfully made several requests for the production of evidence. Notably, he had requested that V.Ch., Y.S. and the police officers present at the site of the picket be summoned for questioning; that the police authorities be asked whether any incidents of unlawful conduct by the picketers had been documented; and that the site be inspected in order to determine whether, in fact, the camping tents mounted by the picketers had obstructed the traffic or the passage of pedestrians. 12. Later on the same date, the District Court allowed the claim, having decided that the case file contained sufficient evidence that the protesters had behaved inappropriately. The relevant part of the judgment read as follows: “... [the] executive committee ... did not and could not have known about a possible breach of public order by the participants of the event, which fact resulted in missing the time-limit for lodging a court action as required by paragraph 1 of Article 182 of the Code of Administrative Justice of Ukraine; the court therefore resets the procedural time-limit ... The court, when deciding the case, takes into account that the participants in the event installed small architectural edifices on the pavement. In addition, during the event, they acted arrogantly, thus offending other citizens, obstructed the passage of pedestrians along Soborna street, and endangered road users, a fact confirmed by the complaints from Y.S. and V.Ch. In addition, the court has regard to the fact that in the notice of the event it is stated that it will be held indefinitely. Also the number of protesters is not defined ... and it may gradually increase. Accordingly, at any time during the picket of indeterminate length, it cannot be excluded that those taking part might repeatedly breach public order.” 13. The court also noted that the picket “may potentially encroach upon the rights and freedoms of other local residents” and held as follows: “[the court holds] to prohibit [the Association] and other persons taking part in the action from organising and carrying out peaceful assemblies in the streets and squares of Vinnytsia, [and] from installing small architectural edifices in Vinnytsia; ... oblige them to dismantle the small architectural edifices installed in the square in front of the [Administration’s] building ... To allow immediate enforcement of the court ruling ...” 14. At 9 p.m. on 15 September 2006 the protesters were dispersed by the police. 15. On 29 September 2006 the local registry office informed the applicant that V.Ch. and Y.S. were not registered as residents at the addresses indicated by them in their complaints lodged with the police. 16. On 8 October 2006 the applicant lodged an appeal against the court judgment of 15 September 2006, which he signed as the Association’s chairman. He submitted that under Article 182 of the CAJ, a plaintiff’s action could not be examined when it had been lodged out of time. He further submitted that the court’s factual conclusions had been devoid of an evidentiary basis. In particular, there was no evidence whatsoever that the protesters had breached the law, apart from the complaints by V.Ch. and Y.S., who had given false home addresses and thus could not be identified. The applicant further complained that the court had rejected his request that those individuals be located and summoned, and that the police officers present at the site of the picket also be summoned for questioning concerning the alleged breaches of the law by the protesters. He also regretted that the court had refused his requests that the relevant police reports documenting the purported breaches of the law (if any) be produced and an inspection of the picket site be carried out with a view to determining whether the tents erected by the activists could count as “architectural structures” and whether there had been any obstruction of traffic or pedestrians. Lastly, the applicant complained that the sanction imposed by the District Court (a total and permanent ban on the Association organising peaceful assemblies in Vinnytsia) had been arbitrary and disproportionate. 17. On 22 November 2006 the Vinnytsia Regional Court of Appeal examined the applicant’s appeal and decided that, in view of the circumstances of the case (namely, the short notice of the intention to hold a picket and the indefinite period during which the participants planned to continue their demonstration) the administrative action lodged by the executive committee could be accepted for examination. It agreed with the District Court’s findings of fact and noted, in particular, that by installing the tents, the protesters had breached section 16 of the Populated Localities Development Act and section 18 of the Automobile Roads Act. At the same time, the Court of Appeal found that the sanction imposed on the protesters had been disproportionate. In particular, the Constitution of Ukraine generally allowed peaceful assemblies, which could therefore not be prohibited in a blanket manner. Nevertheless, it did not envisage a form of assembly such as the “picketing” of administrative buildings “with the installation on the streets of small architectural structures”. Accordingly, the court found that the term “peaceful assemblies” in the operative part of the District Court’s judgment had to be substituted with the term “pickets”. The court then rejected the applicant’s remaining arguments as unsubstantiated. 18. On 1 April 2009 the Higher Administrative Court of Ukraine dismissed an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant.

6. The first applicant was born in 1955 and at the time of the events lived in Baku. The second applicant was born in 1986 and resides in Baku. 7. The medical documentation in the case file shows that the first applicant suffered from a number of serious illnesses before his arrest. In particular, he suffered from end-stage kidney failure and from 28 January 2006 underwent dialysis in a specialist centre three times per week. He also suffered from a number of cardiovascular diseases and twice underwent surgery on his heart. 8. The first applicant further suffered from a severe form of type 2 diabetes and, as a result of the chronic diabetes, had severe problems with his eyesight for which he underwent surgery in 2005. As a result of the above-mentioned illnesses, he had very limited physical mobility. In particular, he could hardly move and was incapable of changing his clothes or taking a bath without assistance. 9. On 20 June 2007 the first applicant was arrested by agents of the Ministry of National Security (“the MNS”) on suspicion of planning to murder Z.F., at that time the head of the Absheron District Executive Authority, because of a professional dispute between them. 10. On 21 June 2007 the first applicant was charged with the attempted murder of a public official under Articles 29 and 277 of the Criminal Code. On the same day the prosecutor requested that the judge apply the preventive measure of remand in custody (həbs qətimkan tədbiri). 11. On 21 June 2007 the Sabail District Court, referring to the official charges brought against the first applicant and the prosecutor’s request, remanded the first applicant in custody for three months. The judge substantiated the necessity of the measure by the seriousness of the first applicant’s alleged criminal acts and the possibility of his absconding from and obstructing the investigation. The relevant part of the decision read as follows: “Having examined the material in the criminal case and having agreed with the submissions of the First Deputy Prosecutor General of the Republic of Azerbaijan that the accused, A. Aslanov, attempted to commit a particularly serious crime, that it was needed to prevent his unlawful actions, that there were sufficient grounds to believe that, if released, he would abscond from the investigation and disrupt the establishment of the truth about the case and relying on Articles ... decided ...” 12. On 22 June 2007 the first applicant appealed against that order, claiming that his detention was unlawful. He submitted, in particular, that there was no justification for remanding him in custody. He also complained that the court had failed to take into account his personal situation, such as his state of health and age, when it had ordered his pre‑trial detention. 13. On 11 July 2007 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The appellate court made no mention of the first applicant’s particular complaints. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows: “The court bench considers that the first-instance court, having taken into account that A. Aslanov could obstruct the investigation, the nature of the criminal act, and the fact that the punishment for committing such an act is over two years’ imprisonment, was correct in considering it necessary to apply the preventive measure of remand in custody in respect of him. Therefore, the court bench does not consider that the representative’s appeal should be allowed at this stage of the investigation.” 14. On 20 June 2007 the first applicant was taken to the pre-trial detention facility of the MNS and detained in a cell alone. 15. On 22 June 2007 the first applicant’s state of health significantly deteriorated and he was urgently transferred to the medical facility of the Penitentiary Service (“the medical facility”). However, as it was impossible to undergo dialysis there, the first applicant was taken to the Central Oil Workers’ Hospital, where he had regularly undergone dialysis before his arrest. 16. It appears from the medical documentation in the case file that, following the first applicant’s dialysis at the Central Oil Workers’ Hospital, he was taken directly to the medical facility, where he remained until his death. 17. On 22 January 2008 the first applicant’s situation worsened during his dialysis at the Central Oil Workers’ Hospital. He died the same day. 18. His death certificate dated 24 January 2008 indicates that the cause of death was acute heart failure. 19. A post mortem report dated 25 January 2008 also concluded that the death had resulted from acute heart failure. 20. A criminal inquiry into the first applicant’s death was launched by the Nizami District Prosecutor’s Office. By a decision of 1 February 2008 it refused to institute criminal proceedings, finding that there had been no criminal aspect to his death. 21. On 28 February 2008 the first applicant’s family was provided with a copy of that decision. It does not appear from the case file that that decision was appealed. 22. On 25 June 2007 the first applicant’s lawyer asked the investigating authorities to order a forensic medical examination in order to establish whether the first applicant’s detention was compatible with his state of health. In that connection, he submitted that the first applicant suffered from a number of serious illnesses which could not be treated in detention. 23. On 9 July 2007 the investigator in charge of the case ordered a forensic medical examination. The investigator asked the experts to establish whether the first applicant suffered from coronary heart disease, postinfarction cardiosclerosis, end-stage kidney failure, diabetes and poor eyesight and if so, to determine the level of seriousness of the conditions and establish whether he could continue his medical treatment in the medical facility where he was being detained. 24. The two experts issued forensic medical report no. 124/TM, which indicated that the examination had begun on 9 July and ended on 23 July 2007. The report confirmed that the first applicant suffered from a number of serious illnesses. However, the experts concluded that he could be treated in the medical facility if he was under the full control of an endocrinologist, ophthalmologist, cardiologist and nephrologist and continued his dialysis. 25. On 30 July 2007 the first applicant’s lawyer asked the investigator to order a new forensic examination with the participation of foreign experts. In particular, he noted that the first applicant could not be provided with dialysis or adequate medical assistance in respect of other conditions in the medical facility and that his detention in these circumstances amounted to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. 26. By a decision of 6 August 2007 the investigator dismissed the request. The part of the decision regarding the first applicant’s medical care in detention reads as follows: “In accordance with the forensic report’s findings, in the medical facility where he was detained the accused A. Aslanov was placed under the full control of the doctors specialising in the medical fields indicated in the report and the continuity of his [dialysis] has, until now, been ensured.” 27. On 27 September and 11 October 2007 the first applicant’s lawyer asked the Ministry of Justice to provide him with a copy of the document listing the serious illnesses precluding the detention of prisoners. By a letter of 7 November 2007 the Ministry of Justice refused to provide it, finding that the document in question was irrelevant to the first applicant’s case as it concerned prisoners who had already been convicted as a result of a final court decision. 28. On 23 November 2007 the first applicant’s lawyer lodged a civil action with the Sabail District Court, complaining of incompatibility of the first applicant’s detention with his state of health and inadequate medical treatment. In particular, the lawyer asked the court to acknowledge a violation of the first applicant’s right to medical assistance in detention and declare unlawful the Ministry of Justice’s decision not to provide him with the document listing the serious illnesses precluding the detention of prisoners. On 27 November 2007 the first applicant’s lawyer asked the President of the Sabail District Court to examine the case as soon as possible in view of the real risk to the first applicant’s life. 29. On 26 January 2008 the first applicant’s lawyer received a copy of a decision dated 3 December 2007 by the Sabail District Court refusing to examine on the merits the complaint lodged on 23 November 2007. The Sabail District Court refused to admit the action on the grounds that the first applicant had failed to specify the rights that he considered had been breached. 30. On 4 February 2008 the first applicant’s lawyer on behalf of his family lodged an appeal against the Sabail District Court’s decision of 3 December 2007, claiming that it was unlawful. 31. By a decision of 7 February 2008 the Sabail District Court quashed its decision of 3 December 2007 and decided to examine the complaint on the merits. 32. According to the Sabail District Court’s decision of 4 March 2008, the first-instance court decided to leave without examination the action due to failure of the parties to attend the hearing. The court relied on Article 259.0.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provided that the action was left without examination if the parties failed to attend the hearing without asking in advance the court to examine the action in their absence. 33. On an unspecified date the criminal investigation was completed and the case was referred to the Assize Court for trial. 34. On 5 October 2007 the Assize Court held a preliminary hearing. The first applicant requested that the court discontinue his pre-trial detention. In that regard, he submitted that his continued detention violated his rights under Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention as it was incompatible with his state of health and he was not being provided with adequate medical assistance. 35. On the same day the Assize Court dismissed the request, finding that the preventive measure of remand in custody should be left unchanged. The Assize Court made no mention of the first applicant’s particular complaints and did not provide any reasons for his continued detention. The decision was not amenable to appeal. 36. On 16 November 2007 the Assize Court found the first applicant guilty under Articles 29 and 277 of the Criminal Code and sentenced him to eleven years and three months’ imprisonment. The court held that he had attempted to murder Z.F., but that the planned murder had not been completed for reasons beyond his own control. 37. Following the first applicant’s death on 22 January 2008 (see paragraph 17 above), on 21 February 2008 the Sumgayit Court of Appeal decided to continue the appeal proceedings in respect of the first applicant at the request of the second applicant. 38. On 29 May 2008 it dismissed the appeal and upheld the Assize Court’s judgment. 39. On 28 October 2008 the Supreme Court upheld the first applicant’s conviction.

5. The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Osijek. 6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7. On 6 November 2000, in inheritance proceedings following the applicant’s grandmother’s death, the applicant’s relative, M.J., and the applicant’s father were declared the beneficiaries in respect of a house, which was not registered in the land register, by a decision of the Zabok Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zaboku). 8. On 18 October 2007 M.J. brought a civil action against the applicant in the Zabok Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zaboku) asking that court to recognise his ownership of a share of half of an inherited piece of property and to order the applicant to allow him to register his ownership in the land register. He set the value of the dispute (vrijednost predmeta spora) at 110,000 Croatian kunas (HRK). 9. In the proceedings before the first-instance court, on 5 November 2007 the applicant contested the value of the dispute and suggested that it be set at HRK 300,000. 10. At the hearing held on 23 January 2008 the applicant, inter alia, withdrew her objection to the value of the dispute as indicated by the claimant, and stated that she agreed with it. 11. In its judgment of 25 April 2008 the Zabok Municipal Court accepted M.J.’s claim. 12. The applicant lodged an appeal with the Zlatar County Court (Županijski sud u Zlataru) and on 16 September 2009 the second-instance court dismissed her appeal as ill-founded, upholding the first-instance judgment. 13. On 24 November 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske), challenging the lower courts’ judgments. 14. On 27 May 2010 the Supreme Court declared the applicant’s appeal on points of law inadmissible ratione valoris. It interpreted M.J.’s civil action as being composed of two separate claims arising from different factual and legal bases - the first one for recognition of ownership, and the second for obtaining an order securing the registration of his ownership in the land register (hereinafter “the issuance of a clausula intabulandi”). The Supreme Court thus halved the value of the dispute and held that the value of each claim did not reach the necessary ratione valoris threshold of HRK 100,001 (approximately 13,300 euros (EUR)) for an appeal on points of law to be admissible. The relevant part of this decision reads as follows: “The claimant in his civil action indicated the value of the dispute as HRK 110,000. Pursuant to section 37(2) of the CPA [(Civil Procedure Act)], if the claims in the civil action arise from a variety of grounds, or different claimants put forward individual claims or individual claims are raised against several defendants, the value of the dispute must be established in accordance with the value of each individual claim. In the instant case the claimant made two non-monetary claims, one concerning property rights - for recognition of ownership -, and a claim under the law on obligations - for the issuance of a clausula intabulandi , namely for obtaining an order securing registration of his ownership in the land register. Therefore, the value of the dispute has to be established in relation to the value of the dispute of each claim. Consequently, the value of the dispute of each claim ... has to be established by dividing the indicated unique value of the dispute by [these] two [claims]. Given that the claimant indicated the [unique] value of the dispute as HRK 110,000, and that this amount should be divided by [the number of the claims], the value of the dispute of each claim does not exceed the amount of 100,000. It follows that an appeal on points of law by the defendant is inadmissible.” 15. The applicant then lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske), arguing that M.J.’s action had two aspects which could not be separated, and that the Supreme Court’s decision finding that the case concerned two separate claims had therefore been arbitrary and had violated her right to a fair hearing, in particular her right of access to the Supreme Court, as guaranteed under Article 29 of the Constitution. 16. On 17 February 2011 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint. It held that the applicant in her constitutional complaint “did not demonstrate that the Supreme Court had failed to respect the provisions of the Constitution concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms, namely that it had applied relevant law in an arbitrary manner” and that therefore “the present case did not raise a constitutional issue.” Its decision was served on the applicant’s representative on 3 March 2011.

5. The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Batumi. 6. On 16 February 2004 the applicant’s son, G.B., fell off a crane while fixing electric cables. He was admitted to the intensive care unit of Batumi Hospital No. 1 (“the hospital”). His injuries included a fractured skull and brain damage. 7. On 28 February 2004 doctors observed that G.B. had gastrointestinal bleeding and he was given the relevant treatment. On 5 March 2004 he was transferred to a general medical ward as there had been an improvement in his condition. 8. On 6 March 2004 G.B.’s state of health deteriorated and he was transferred back to the intensive care unit because of a bleeding duodenal ulcer. Urgent surgery was performed on 10 March 2004 to stop the bleeding, but he died on 14 March 2004. 9. It appears from the criminal case files that the applicant refused to allow an autopsy of G.B.’s body. 10. On 17 February 2004 the hospital informed the Batumi police that G.B. had been admitted with traumatic injuries. An investigator visited the hospital but was unable to question him in view of his state of health. 11. On 24 March 2004 the investigator returned to the hospital to enquire about the incident of 16 February 2004 (see paragraph 6 above) and was informed that the applicant’s son had died. An investigation was launched into G.B.’s death and the applicant was questioned the following day. 12. On 2 April 2004 the investigator ordered an examination by a panel of experts of the Forensic Bureau under the Ministry of Labour, Health and Social Affairs (“the forensic bureau”) of the Ajarian Autonomous Republic (“AAR”) in order to determine the exact cause of G.B.’s death. The examination was carried out between 6 April and 18 June 2004. The report that followed (“report no. 9-k” or “the first report”) stated as follows: “1. As ... no autopsy was performed upon [G.B.’s] death, the exact cause of his death is unknown to the ... panel [even though] the [related] medical records indicate abdominal bleeding ... 4. We consider that a medical error was committed with respect to G.B.’s treatment in terms of the timing of the surgery, which was caused by an incorrect assessment of the clinical, endoscopy and laboratory data.” 13. On 23 June 2004 a criminal medical negligence case was opened against the relevant doctors of the hospital, in which the applicant was granted victim status. 14. The experts of the forensic bureau who had participated in the panel examination (see paragraph 12 above) were questioned as part of the investigation. The majority confirmed the earlier findings, stating that the therapeutic treatment had been adequate, but an assessment of the delay in surgery was the exclusive competence of a surgeon on the panel. The latter reiterated the findings of the report that the surgery had been delayed in view of several previously registered relapses of bleeding. He added however that this might not have made any difference to the fatal outcome. 15. The head of the expert panel further stated that a conclusive finding on the exact cause of death could not be reached without a forensic examination of the body. 16. On 7 July 2004, relying on the findings of the expert panel, a prosecutor applied to the first-instance court for permission to exhume G.B.’s body in order to determine the exact cause of his death. The request was granted on 8 July 2004. 17. On 14 July 2004 the applicant refused to allow the exhumation despite being warned of its importance for the case. 18. On 2 August 2004 the case was closed as the prosecuting authority was unable to establish a causal link between the alleged medical negligence and G.B.’s death without an exhumation of his body. 19. On 4 August 2004, relying on the findings of the panel of experts in report no. 9-k (see paragraph 12 above) the Batumi city prosecutor wrote to the Minister of Labour, Health and Social Affairs of the AAR. He noted that despite the closure of the investigation, the family’s resistance to allow an exhumation of the body to determine the precise cause of death, and the inability to establish criminal responsibility on the part of the doctors in question, the conclusion of the panel of experts that a medical error had been committed in the course of G.B.’s treatment called for “the implementation of adequate measures to prevent similar violations.” 20. On 27 September 2004, referring to the findings of the prosecutor and the panel of experts in report no. 9-k concerning the medical error committed in the course of G.B.’s treatment, the director of the hospital dismissed the neurosurgeon who had been in charge of G.B.’s treatment (მკურნალი ექიმი) and reprimanded two intensive care specialists and a surgeon. 21. On various dates the applicant asked for the investigation to be reopened. 22. On 1 August 2006 the prosecutor’s office granted the applicant’s request and reopened the investigation under Article 130 § 2 of the Criminal Code (the offence of abandoning a patient in distress, see paragraph 51 below). 23. Several witnesses were questioned, including the then director and deputy director of the hospital, who had considered the family’s resistance as grounds for not carrying out an autopsy upon G.B.’s death. 24. On 21 September 2006 the investigator obtained a second exhumation order from the court in order to determine the exact cause of G.B.’s death. The applicant once again refused to allow implementation. 25. On 4 January 2008 the prosecutor terminated the case as there was no proof causally linking the medical error with G.B.’s death. It does not appear that the applicant appealed against that decision, despite it being amenable to appeal within fifteen days of service upon the parties. 26. On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a claim with the Batumi City Court against the hospital, its medical staff and the Ministry of Labour, Health and Social Affairs of the AAR. She argued that her son’s death had been caused by medical negligence, namely incorrect and delayed treatment of his gastroduodenal bleeding. 27. Between 18 and 28 October 2004, at the request of the Batumi City Court, the Quality Control Inspectorate of the Ministry of Labour, Health and Social Affairs (“the inspectorate”) implemented an inspection of the hospital in connection with G.B.’s death, which was carried out by a panel of experts. They reached the following conclusions (“the second report”): “The institution is carrying out medical practice without a licence in the following fields: cardiology, plastic and reconstructive surgery, proctology, urology, paediatrics, epidemiology, clinical transfusion and expert assessments of temporary incapacitation. In relation to patient G.B., non-licensed activity was carried out in the following fields: cardiology and clinical transfusion. Out of the 29 doctors who took part in patient G.B.’s treatment, the invited specialists ... in endoscopy and ophthalmology do not hold a licence to practise medicine. A neurosurgeon (currently dismissed from the post) and an intensive care specialist are practising medicine independently despite being ... junior doctors. The doctor ... working as a transfusion specialist is a certified paediatrician ... ... [I]t is evident that the surgery, the sole purpose of which was to definitively determine the cause of bleeding and stop it, was carried out too late. It is difficult to determine whether the scope of the surgery was adequate, as it is impossible to determine the exact location of the ulcer (there is no forensic pathology examination report concerning the body and the two endoscopy specialists reached different conclusions concerning the ulcer’s location). It is also worth mentioning that a pathomorphological analysis of the material obtained during the surgery was not carried out...” 28. An undated study of the relevant medical files, ordered by the inspectorate from a professor of surgery at the Tbilisi State Medical University (“the third report”) noted the difficulty of making categorical claims in the absence of an autopsy of the body. It nevertheless pointed to a lack of adequate supervision by a surgeon, despite the relapses of abdominal bleeding, inadequacies in the choice of treatment, and a lack of appropriate diagnostic measures for the timely detection and possibly even aversion of the otherwise risky surgery. Stressing that it was conventional treatment methods that had been insufficiently explored, the report continued to note that it would be incorrect to make a categorical assertion, such as in the first report, as regards the medical error in relation to the delay in the otherwise high-risk surgery. 29. On an unspecified date two experts of the forensic bureau gave statements to the court and confirmed the findings of the first report that a medical error had been committed in terms of the delay in surgery. They further indicated that the cause of G.B.’s death, according to the medical records, was gastroduodenal bleeding which could have been averted by timely and adequate medical treatment. 30. On 20 January 2006, relying on the expert reports and the medical documentation available in the case files, the Batumi City Court ruled in favour of the applicant. It concluded that the doctors of the hospital had been responsible for a medical error resulting in the patient’s death. It further noted that the participation in the patient’s treatment of doctors not holding the appropriate medical licences reinforced the conclusion that he had not been offered adequate medical care. The court took the decision of the hospital director of 27 September 2004 dismissing the neurosurgeon in charge of G.B.’s treatment and reprimanding two intensive care specialists and a surgeon (see paragraph 20 above) as acknowledgment that medical negligence had been committed in the course of G.B.’s treatment. 31. The applicant was awarded 2,756 Georgian laris (GEL, approximately 1,070 Euros (EUR)) in respect of pecuniary damage. Relying on section 10 of the Patient Rights Act (see paragraph 46 below) the court also awarded non-pecuniary damages in the amount of GEL 6,000 (approximately EUR 2,331). As the contract concerning G.B.’s treatment had only been concluded with the hospital, the latter was found to be the only appropriate respondent and was accordingly ordered to pay the corresponding amount. Both the applicant and the hospital appealed, disagreeing with the court’s assessment of the facts and the scope of the award. 32. On 9 February 2007 the Kutaisi Court of Appeal upheld the lower court’s reasoning. It noted as follows: “Based on an analysis of the evidence before it, the appellate court concludes that in the course of Mr G.B.’s treatment in [the hospital] the medical negligence of the medical staff (insufficient attention towards the patient, misdiagnosis) caused harm to a person’s health and eventually caused the patient’s ... death.” 33. The appellate court continued to note that: “In addition to establishing that harm was caused to a person’s health as a result of the medical negligence of the [hospital] staff, it can also be established from the case files that [the hospital] was carrying out unlicensed activities in a number of medical fields and at the same time some of the medical staff did not have authorisation to practise medicine independently, in violation of the requirements of the [relevant legislation]...” 34. The Kutaisi Court of Appeal further found the hospital to be the only appropriate respondent to pay the damages in respect of the medical negligence of the doctors. As regards who should be held responsible for the hospital and its doctors operating without the necessary licences, it was noted that: “The Ministry of Health of the AAR cannot be held responsible in the present case ... for [the hospital] operating in certain medical fields without the requisite licences considering that, in accordance with section 54 of the Health Care Act, the issuance of such licences is [the exclusive competence] of the Ministry of Health of Georgia. Accordingly, the claim for ... pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages with respect to the Ministry of Health of the AAR is groundless.” 35. The appellate court upheld the lower court’s award of non‑pecuniary damages and increased the amount of pecuniary damages to GEL 6,953 (approximately EUR 2,701). 36. Both parties appealed, disagreeing with the court’s assessment of the facts and the scope of the award. 37. On 14 May 2008 the Supreme Court adopted a decision without holding an oral hearing. Referring to the evidence available in the case files, the court found that despite the fact that the exact cause of death could not be determined without an exhumation of the body, the case files confirmed that gastroduodenal bleeding was the cause of death and that a medical error had been committed in terms of the surgery and an incorrect assessment of the various data. 38. The Supreme Court further upheld the lower courts’ findings that the hospital had been carrying out unlicensed medical activities and noted as follows: “It is confirmed ... that [the hospital] was carrying out unlicensed medical activities in the following fields: cardiology, plastic and reconstructive surgery, proctology, urology, paediatrics, epidemiology, clinical transfusion and expert assessments of temporary incapacitation. Unlicensed medical activities performed in respect of Mr G.B. were in the following fields: cardiology and clinical transfusion. Of the medical staff invited to treat ... Mr G.B. ... the endoscopy specialist and ... an ophthalmologist did not have a certificate [authorising them] to practise medicine. [Those] appointed as junior doctors ... the neurosurgeon (currently dismissed) and ... the intensive care specialist were practising medicine independently. The doctor ... certified as a paediatrician was working as a transfusion specialist. The Court of Cassation upholds the views of the appellate court that this gave rise to a violation of ... the Health Care Act and ... the Medical Practice Act.” 39. The Supreme Court noted that the Ministry of Health of Georgia was the entity responsible for issuing licences to medical institutions and that the applicable legislation did now allow medical institutions and individual doctors to practise medicine without requisite licences (see paragraphs 44‑45 below). It did not elaborate on whether responsibility could be attributed to the respondent Ministry of Health of the AAR. 40. The award of pecuniary damages in the amount of GEL 6,953 (approximately EUR 2,701) was upheld. 41. As regards the question of non-pecuniary damages, the Supreme Court found that domestic law did not entitle the applicant to receive an award for non-pecuniary damage for the death of her son. In particular, it observed as follows: “Under Article 1007 of the Civil Code, harm caused to a person’s health during his or her treatment at a medical institution (a result of surgery or misdiagnosis etc.) shall be compensated on a general basis. In accordance with Article 413 of the Civil Code, monetary compensation for non-pecuniary damage may be requested only in the cases expressly provided for by law, in the form of reasonable and fair compensation. The Civil Code does not define moral (non-pecuniary) damage... Under Article 413 of the Civil Code, not all types of moral harm (mental suffering) shall be compensated, even if there is no doubt as to its existence, only those for which compensation is expressly provided for by law... Accordingly, in accordance with the practice of the Supreme Court of Georgia, non-pecuniary damage resulting from the infringement of the right to life of a person’s husband, child or other relative shall not be compensated as it is not expressly provided for by law...” 42. The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower court’s interpretation that the right to claim non-pecuniary damages under section 10(a) of the Patient Rights Act also applied to the death of a relative, and noted that that right was strictly personal. The Supreme Court therefore rejected the applicant’s claim for non-pecuniary damages, noting that: “It is undisputed that a parent is subjected to moral pain as a result of the death of a young child, but it shall not be compensated considering that it is not expressly provided for by the law in force.”

4. The first applicant company, Könyv-Tár Kft, is a limited liability company with its registered office in Budapest. The second applicant company, Suli-Könyv Kft, is a limited liability company with its registered office in Tata. The third applicant company, Tankönyv-Ker Bt, is a limited partnership company with its registered office in Budapest. 5. The applicant companies are schoolbook distributors. 6. The Hungarian school system was entirely reorganised by a series of measures adopted in 2011 and 2012. The schools, formerly decentralised, became subject to centralised State management. On 9 December 2011 and 24 July 2012 respectively, Acts nos. CLXVI of 2011 and CXXV of 2012 (collectively referred to as “the New Regulations”) were published in the Official Gazette; they contained, inter alia, provisions amending Act no. XXXVII of 2001 on the Schoolbook Market. The amendments came into force on 1 October 2012 and were effective from the school year starting in September 2013. The essence of the new legislation was already contained in the first amendment, published in December 2011. 7. The applicant companies submitted that the Hungarian schoolbook distribution market, as a whole, had previously involved three groups of market participants: the publishers, the distributors and the schools. Prior to the New Regulations’ entry into force, it could be considered a semi-regulated market; in respect of the publishers this meant that the legislature had established the requirements for a book to qualify as a schoolbook, and it often applied certain measures in this context, such as maximum prices or State subsidies based on indigence. However, the schoolbook distribution sector in itself was an unregulated market. The schoolbook distributors’ clients were the schools, which, in an often highly competitive market, were able to select the publishers and schoolbook distributors, the former for the products they offered and the latter mainly for their reliability and accessibility and for the discounts promoted. 8. The task of distributors included not only the provision of logistical services but the processing of orders, the management of customised billing and the handling of returns. Most of the companies dealing with the distribution of schoolbooks leased warehouses and delivery vehicles for a two-to-four-month period when performing their activities, which were predominantly seasonal in nature. Besides their regular staff, ranging from three to fifty-seven employees, they employed an additional ten to thirty seasonal workers, normally students, for the compilation of schoolbook packages. Larger market participants generally had their own vehicles and storage bases where they performed both retail and wholesale activities. These companies bought the books from the publishers and made them available to the smaller distributors. There were well over thirty market-dominant schoolbook distributors operating in the country (six large and about thirty medium-sized distributors). 9. Participants in the market strove to acquire as many schools as possible as clients, in particular those which were located in the area close to the distributors’ warehouses, in order to be able to optimise delivery costs. They made continuous efforts to keep hold of their clients, the schools, by providing flexible and prompt services. The wholesale price margin was generally about 3% to 5%, and the operating profit about 1% to 5%. 10. The first applicant, Könyv-Tár Kft, distributed educational materials for elementary and secondary schools. In this activity, it had business relationships with some 200 publishers, sixty of them being schoolbook publishers. In 2012 it supplied 126 schools. 11. The second applicant, Suli-Könyv Kft, served directly (i) 90% to 95% of schools in Komárom-Esztergom County; (ii) 100% of schools in the western part of Pest County; (iii) 65% to 70%) of schools in the northern part of Pest County; (iv) 95% to 100% of schools in Győr-Moson-Sopron County; (v) 95% to 100% of schools in Vas County; (vi) 85% to 90% of schools in Veszprém County; and (vii) 25% to 30% of schools in Budapest. Moreover, it supplied more than 1,200 schools indirectly via subcontractors dealing exclusively in schoolbook retail, competing with another five large distributors. 12. The third applicant, Tankönyv-ker Bt, supplied about thirty-five schools in two counties. 13. The New Regulations introduced a new system of schoolbook distribution in Hungary, laying down that “schoolbook supply” ­– comprising the order and purchase of school textbooks and their delivery to schools, and the collection of the purchase price from schools – was a public-interest responsibility of the State. 14. According to the reasoning of the relevant bill, the legislature’s intention was to discharge these duties through a single, State-owned non-profit book distribution company, Könyvtárellátó Kiemelten Közhasznú Nonprofit Kft (Non-profit Library Supplier Limited Liability Company; hereinafter “Könyvtárellátó”). A description of the objectives pursued gave the following reasons for the decision: “to strengthen the schoolbook procurer’s position through the uniform and centralised procurement of schoolbooks ... and ... to make schoolbook distribution more transparent by generating competition in a stronger position, that of the procurer.” 15. The applicant companies submitted that the New Regulations had centralised and monopolised the schoolbook distribution market with a guaranteed margin of 20% for the State-owned schoolbook distributor, without providing any compensation for former market participants, including themselves. As a consequence, the applicant companies and other schoolbook distributors had effectively been barred from the market (which was either their exclusive or major field of activity), where they had been operating freely prior to the entry into force of the New Regulations. 16. The applicant companies filed a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court, requesting that the New Regulations be repealed. However, in their submissions to the Court, they stated that this was not an effective remedy because even if the Constitutional Court had repealed the New Regulations, they would have needed to reinvest a significant amount of money in order to re-establish their business, and would have been unable to repair the damage they had already sustained. 17. On 14 April 2014 the Constitutional Court terminated the proceedings without an examination of the merits of the applicant companies’ complaint. The Constitutional Court noted that subsequent legislation, Act no. CCXXXII of 2013 on Schoolbook Supply in the National Public Education System, had been enacted, and had entered into force on 1 January 2014. This legislation repealed Act no. XXXVII of 2001 on the Schoolbook Market entirely, including the impugned New Regulations. The Constitutional Court found that the examination of the provisions’ alleged unconstitutionality had thus become redundant. As of 1 January 2014, Act no. CCXXXII of 2013 had completely removed any schoolbook distribution based on the free market, and had introduced an entirely State-organised form of schoolbook supply to the Hungarian public education system. The applicant companies did not file a constitutional complaint against Act no. CCXXXII of 2013.

4. The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Kičevo. 5. On 2 February 2010 the applicant submitted a written statement in which he denied that he had collaborated with the State security bodies after 1944. Such a statement was to be submitted to the Fact Verification Commission (“the Lustration Commission”) by public officials and was required under the Additional Requirement for Public Office Act of 2008 (“the 2008 Lustration Act”). By a decision of 12 September 2011, the Lustration Commission confirmed that the applicant satisfied the additional condition for the performance of the office of a judge, having confirmed that he had not collaborated with the security bodies of the past regime. 6. On 16 November 2012 the Lustration Commission, on a request by its chairman, reopened the lustration proceedings in respect of the applicant and, on the basis of “new facts and evidence”, quashed its decision of 12 September 2011. The Commission’s decision, which referred to submissions made by a third person (namely a certain Z.T., who was identified in connection with the chairman’s request) in its introduction, relied on three files concerning three people (one of whom was Z.T.), from which it established that the applicant – referred to in those files as an “operational liaison” (оперативна врска) – had provided relevant information to the State security bodies in the 1970s. The relevant parts of those notes read as follows: “... I [the handler] met with [the applicant], a law student [at the time], on two occasions on which he expressed a wish to collaborate with the State Security Office (Служба за државна безбедност) ... ... the relationship (пријателската врска) – [the applicant] informed me that [code name] had exchanged letters with ... ... the conversation with [the applicant] was on my [the handler’s] initiative ... the source [the applicant] was used occasionally, during his stay in Skopje. He was reassigned for use to ...” 7. The Lustration Commission found that, under the Law on determining conditions limiting the exercise of public office, access to documents and the publication of information about cooperation with State security bodies (“the 2012 Lustration Act”, which had replaced the 2008 Lustration Act), the applicant had collaborated with the State security bodies. Its decision stated, inter alia: “... [the applicant] had provided the security bodies with information about certain people of interest for the State Security Office ... on the basis of documentary evidence, it was established that the State Security Office had used [the applicant] as an operational liaison ... ... the Lustration Commission established that [the applicant], as a secret collaborator, informant or operational liaison, [in the process of] creating and storing information about certain people, by which their rights and freedoms had been violated on political or ideological grounds, had collaborated with the State security services in a conscious, secret, organised and continuous manner, in return for favours in getting promoted, by which the condition specified in sections 4 and 18 of the [2012 Lustration Act] is fulfilled.” 8. After the Lustration Commission published the above decision (and the notes of the security bodies referred to in the decision) on its website, the applicant requested (making a non-disclosure statement) and obtained a redacted copy of those documents, in the form in which they were published on the Commission’s website. They were redacted to withhold the identities of the handler(s) who had drawn them up and the third persons in respect of whom the applicant had allegedly provided information to the security bodies. The documents were not signed by the applicant or the handler. The applicant also asked to be provided with a complete and unredacted copy (целосна копија) of those documents. 9. In a written statement of 27 November 2012, certified by a notary public, P.K., the handler who had drawn up some of the notes to which the Lustration Commission had referred in its decision, stated, inter alia: “... I drafted [the notes] (содржината) concerning [the applicant] without [his] knowledge, according to my interpretation (по мое видување) and following a spontaneous conversation that he had not requested, let alone intended to be used for a role as a secret collaborator or informant. I avow that [the applicant] was not recorded or registered by the security bodies as such ... Neither I nor my colleagues, as far as I know, had requested that he be registered as a secret collaborator, informant, operational liaison ... neither had [the applicant] made a request to collaborate with the security service ... I submit that the contents of the official records are not truthful (веродостојни) and at times [the applicant] had not provided the information in any organised manner, i.e. ... he had not been an organised liaison with the State Security Office ...” 10. On 30 November 2012 the applicant challenged the Commission’s decision before the Administrative Court. He complained that, inter alia, the Lustration Commission had not held an oral hearing and it had not provided sufficient reasoning for its findings, in particular to show that his alleged collaboration had satisfied the criteria specified in section 18 of the 2012 Lustration Act. In support of this complaint, he referred to P.K.’s statement, which he appended to his claim. He also argued that according to the documents in his case file, no measures had been taken against the persons in respect of whom he had allegedly provided information to the security bodies. He further challenged the veracity and authenticity of the documents in question, claiming that only copy documents had been admitted into evidence, that they had not been signed by the handler or himself and that no official stamp had been affixed on them. In that connection, he subsequently submitted a letter from the Intelligence Service (Управа за безбедност и контраразузнавање) dated 2013, in which it was confirmed that the applicant had not been registered in its records and that the documents used in the impugned proceedings had not been from its archives. Given the complexity of the case, the applicant requested that the court hold a public and oral hearing in order to establish the relevant facts. In that regard he requested that the court hear oral evidence from P.K. and an expert (стручен помагач), V.P., a university professor and former intelligence officer, regarding the reliability of the documentary evidence against the applicant and whether he could be regarded as a collaborator within the meaning of the 2012 Lustration Act. In this respect, he submitted a copy of a statement made by V.P. and published on a news portal in which V.P. had underlined the qualitative criteria of such collaboration and the difference between “an informant” and “a collaborator”. In that statement V.P. defined “an informant” as “a person who had not established a relationship of collaboration (соработнички однос), but had provided information to the security services without having signed a collaboration agreement”. 11. At a hearing held in private, and in the absence of the parties, on 20 December 2013, the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s claim. Referring to the information in the relevant documents (see paragraph 6 above), which it found truthful (having compared the copy documents in the applicant’s case file with the originals), the court confirmed the Lustration Commission’s findings that the applicant had collaborated with the security services in a conscious, secret, organised and continuous manner as a secret informant, notably as an operational liaison. The relevant parts of the decision read as follows: “[the applicant] had followed, provided and transferred information about people ... whereby their rights and freedoms had been violated on political or ideological grounds during the communist era ... irrespective of whether [those people] had been criminally prosecuted. ... [the applicant] had agreed to cooperate with the State Security Office. His friendly relationship with the handler did not preclude collaboration within the meaning of the law, and indeed such a relationship suggests that the collaborator knew to whom and why he had been providing information. For these reasons, the court does not accept (не ја прифати) the certified statement appended to the claim. The court made its decision at a hearing held in private because the Commission had correctly established the relevant facts on the basis of written material and [the applicant] had not submitted any evidence that led to different facts.” 12. On 24 January 2014 the applicant requested that the Lustration Commission grant him access to the original documents in his case file. In reply, the Commission informed him that the originals had been returned to the State Archives. 13. The applicant appealed against the above-mentioned decision of the Administrative Court reiterating his complaints and arguing that that court had not held an oral hearing at which it could hear the testimony of the parties, P.K. and V.P., in order to establish as a fact whether there had been any collaboration within the meaning of the 2012 Lustration Act, that is whether the applicant’s actions had been conscious, secret, organised and continuous. The reasoning provided by the lower bodies in that respect had not been sufficient. Furthermore, there was no evidence that in return for providing information he had obtained any favours in getting promoted, which was a requirement for the alleged collaboration to fall within the meaning of section 18(4) of the 2012 Lustration Act. On the other hand, there was evidence that the materials on which the impugned decisions were based had not been reliable (see paragraph 9 above) and that he had not been aware that the information would reach the State Security Office. The authenticity of the files used against him had also been compromised in that they had not been from the archives of the Intelligence Service on the one hand, but that they had seemingly been drawn up by handlers at the State Security Office – which was the predecessor of the Intelligence Service – on the other hand. Furthermore, they had been admitted into evidence as copy documents, without having their authenticity confirmed by the security bodies. He asked for an oral hearing to be held. 14. At a hearing held in private, and in the absence of the parties, on 12 June 2014, the Higher Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the lower court’s decision without hearing the testimony of the witnesses proposed by the applicant. The court confirmed the findings of the lower authorities after it had verified that the contents of the documents in the applicant’s case file, admitted as copy documents, were identical to the originals from the State Archives. It held that, owing to the applicant’s conduct, the human rights and freedoms of others had been violated. The court added: “Taking into consideration that the Lustration Commission carries out only a verification of facts to determine if there has either been collaboration or no collaboration with State security bodies, reports drawn up by handlers in [such bodies] are to be regarded as facts”. 15. On 15 July 2014 the State Judicial Council declared that the applicant’s position as a judge had been terminated (престанок на вршење на судиската функција). 16. On 13 November 2015 the applicant submitted audio recordings and a transcript of taped telephone conversations which allegedly involved the then chairman of the Lustration Commission and a member of parliament from the ruling political party. The material concerned conversations in which that member of parliament informed the chairman of the Lustration Commission that certain material regarding the applicant had been submitted before the Commission by Z.T. and asked that the proceedings be conducted as quickly as possible. The applicant contended that on 6 April 2015 the audio material was made public by the then political opposition in the respondent State and was also made available online.

6. The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Znamensk. 7. The applicant is a former military officer. He performed his military service and lived with his family in Znamensk, a closed administrative unit (закрытое административно-территориальное образование) of the Astrakhan Region. Since 1975 he was registered at the place of residence at 71 the 9th May avenue, apartment 18, in Znamensk. In 1998 he was dismissed from military service and registered as a person in need of housing in the city of his choosing, Moscow. 8. In 2002 the applicant’s family of two was included in the list of persons entitled to the receipt of a housing certificate. In 2004 a domestic court declared the applicant’s son, his wife and their son (the applicant’s grand-son) the applicant’s family members. The applicant requested the housing authority to modify its earlier decision to include the above persons into the list of family members entitled to the Housing certificate. In 2006 the City Inter-Departmental Commission Responsible for the State Housing Certificates Program of the Department of the Housing Policy and Housing Fund of Moscow (the Moscow housing commission) rejected his request and annulled its decision of 2002, referring to a change of legislation concerning the financing of the resettlement from closed administrative units. The applicant challenged the refusal in court. 9. On 9 April 2007 the Znamensk Town Court of the Astrakhan Region granted his claim, having found the reference to the legislative changes inapplicable to the applicant’s case. The court confirmed the applicant’s and his four family members’ right to housing provision in the form of the housing certificate, to be performed at the expense of the federal budget and at the place of the claimants’ registration as persons in need of housing. The court ordered the Moscow housing commission to include the applicant’s family of five in an “order list” (список-заявка) for receipt of a State housing certificate. The judgment became final on 20 April 2007. It appears that the debtor authority’s representatives were not present at the hearing and asked to examine the case in their absence, on the basis of their written submissions. 10. According to the letter of 4 July 2017 by the Znamensk Town Court, on 6 June 2007 the court sent a copy of the judgment to the respondent authority by fax and mail. The court registry kept the transmission record stating that the fax passed “normally”. The court file contained no further documents evidencing the receipt of the judgment by the respondent. 11. On 10 February 2011 the Department of the Housing Policy and the Housing Fund of Moscow conducted a campaign for re-registration of persons in need of housing and sent the applicant a letter setting out a list of eleven documents to be provided, including, among others, a duly certified copy the decision to dismiss the applicant stating the reasons for the dismissal, as well as documents confirming his title to the flat in Znamensk. 12. According to the applicant, on 26 March 2011 he sent the requisite documents to the authority by mail. He submitted a copy of the request of 10 February 2011 and the postal receipt dated 26 March 2011 and containing the requesting authority’s address in the “destination” part, in support of his submissions. 13. On 5 May 2015 the City Property Department of the Government of Moscow informed the Representative of the Russian Federation to the Court that at some point they had examined the applicant’s unspecified application concerning the housing issue. The authority established that a number of documents were missing from the applicant’s, namely, a duly certified copy of the decision to dismiss the applicant stating the reasons for the dismissal, as well as documents confirming his title to the flat in Znamensk, and invited the applicant to provide the documents. The applicant’s address specified in the letter read as follows: 71 the 9th May avenue, apartment 118. Despite several reminders, the applicant had failed to provide the requisite documents. Accordingly, on 3 July 2012 the Department of Housing Policy and Housing Fund of Moscow had decided to strike the applicant’s family off the lists of persons in need of housing. There had been no grounds to provide them with housing. The authority had not received a copy of the judgment of 9 April 2007 for execution. 14. According to the letter of 22 August 2016 by the Department of the Housing Policy and the Housing Fund of Moscow to the Representative of the Russian Federation to the Court, the authority has not received a copy of the judgment of 9 April 2007, and the applicant had not applied “with documents” for a housing certificate. The authority further stated that, pursuant to a Decree of the Moscow Government of 14 February 2012 No. 43-ПП On Housing Provision to Some Categories of Citizens, as of that date the provision of housing certificates had been ensured by the Housing Provision Department of the Ministry of Defence. 15. On 1 November 2011 the administration of the closed administrative unit Znamensk of the Astrakhan Region concluded a social tenancy agreement with the applicant in respect of the three-room flat in Znamensk (see paragraph 7 above). The agreement stipulated that five applicant’s family members, namely, his son, his daughter, his son’s wife and their two children moved into the flat together with the applicant. 16. In 2016 the applicant’s son divorced from his wife. The two children remained with her. On 6 February 2017 a domestic court granted the applicant’s request to discontinue the son’s ex-wife and their children’s use of the flat. On 20 June 2017 the social-tenancy agreement of 1 November 2011 was amended to specify that the three family members (the applicant’s wife, son and daughter) moved into the flat together with the applicant.

6. The applicant was born in 1952 and died in 2013. 7. On 21 February 2002 P., a businessman, contacted the police complaining that the applicant, who was then the director of a municipal housing management agency, was demanding money from him in exchange for permission to use some premises managed by his agency. The applicant had allegedly assured P. that some of the money would be used to bribe representatives of any supervising authorities who might enquire into the use of the premises. 8. On the same day the police, in the presence of two attesting witnesses, gave P. several banknotes marked with a luminescent substance only visible in special lighting to be given to the applicant as the bribe, and an audio recorder. 9. Later that day P. went into the applicant’s office and then came out saying that he had delivered the money. 10. The police went in to arrest the applicant. The same attesting witnesses followed. In their presence, the luminescent substance was discovered on the applicant’s hand and pocket. The marked banknotes were discovered in one of the rooms adjoining his office. These investigative steps were video recorded. 11. On the same day the applicant wrote and signed a statement confessing to having accepted the money from P. He subsequently retracted the confession, claiming that it had been extracted under “physical and psychological pressure” from the police. 12. The applicant was charged with fraud, apparently because he actually had no statutory authority to let the premises in question. 13. In the course of the pre-trial investigation a certain T.V.S., who was apparently an employee of the applicant’s agency, stated that, on an unspecified date, apparently prior to P.’s complaint to the police, the applicant had asked her to show the premises in question to P. 14. The attesting witnesses made formal statements to the investigating authority describing the events of 21 February 2002 which they had observed. They stated, in particular, that they had entered the applicant’s office after the police and, when they entered, two police officers were already holding the applicant. 15. In the bill of indictment the victim, the attesting witnesses and T.V.S. were identified as witnesses to be summoned in the course of the trial. 16. In the course of the trial the applicant pleaded not guilty and argued that the banknotes had been planted on the agency premises by the police, who had also smeared his hand and pocket with the luminescent substance to frame him. The traces of the substance on his hand could come from shaking P.’s hand. 17. According to the Government, P. testified in the course of the trial on two occasions in April 2004. It appears that he repeated the substance of his statements to the police (see paragraphs 7 and 9 above). 18. The attesting witnesses were repeatedly summoned to testify at the trial but failed to appear as they could not be found at the home addresses they had given to the authorities. The court records submitted to the Court show that the hearings were adjourned and rescheduled on at least thirty-three occasions due to the “witnesses’ failure to appear” (судовий розгляд відкладено у зв’язку з неявкою свідків) and that the trial court repeatedly requested the help of police and of the prosecutor’s office in locating and escorting the witnesses to the hearings. It appears that those measures concerned both the attesting witnesses and T.V.S. However, despite those efforts, those witnesses failed to appear and their pre-trial statements were read out at the trial. 19. On 5 October 2009 the Kharkiv Kominternivsky District Court convicted the applicant of fraud and sentenced him to two years’ detention in a semi-open penal institution, but waived enforcement of the sentence as it had become time-barred (see paragraph 24 below). In convicting the applicant, the court relied on: the statements of P., the attesting witnesses and T.V.S.; audio and video evidence; police reports documenting the delivery of the marked banknotes to P. and their subsequent discovery, as well as the discovery of the luminescent substance on the applicant’s hand and pocket; statements of the police officers who had organised the investigative actions in question; the results of expert analysis confirming the discovery of the luminescent substance from the same source on the banknotes, on the applicant’s hand and in his pocket; and the applicant’s confession. The court dismissed the applicant’s allegation that his confession had been extracted under duress as unsubstantiated. 20. The applicant appealed, arguing in particular that P., the attesting witnesses and T.V.S. had not been examined in the course of the trial as they failed to appear at the trial (“которые уклонились от явки в суд первой инстанции”). 21. On 4 February 2010 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, stating that there was sufficient evidence of the applicant’s guilt. There was no reason to distrust the statements of the victim and the witnesses which were corroborated by the other evidence in the file, including audio and video evidence. The court perceived no reason for the witnesses to falsely testify against the applicant. 22. In his appeal on points of law to the Supreme Court the applicant stated that the witnesses had ignored summons to appear at the trial and the trial court had failed to ensure their presence. The attesting witnesses had stated that, when they entered the office, the police officers already held the applicant (see paragraph 14 above). This showed that the police were behaving in a violent way towards the applicant and it was comprehensible why he could be intimidated and falsely confess under such pressure. 23. On 9 June 2010 a Supreme Court judge denied the applicant leave to appeal on points of law. The judge noted that matters of fact were not subject to review by the Supreme Court, that the judicial decisions were based on properly assessed evidence and the conclusions were reasoned and gave no reason to doubt them. The criminal-law characterisation of the applicant’s actions was correct and the punishment lawful. There were no grounds to open review proceedings.

5. The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Liski, Voronezh Region. 6. In 2009 the applicant started to run a business as an “individual entrepreneur” (индивидуальный предприниматель). 7. In February 2013 he lodged a notification with the Liski unit of the south-eastern branch of the Consumer Protection Agency (“the Liski Unit”) about his intention to extend his business to the sale of foods. In this notification he specified, inter alia, three different addresses as follows: the address at which he was actually residing (that he called “адрес места жительства”), his “registration address” (адрес места регистрации) which corresponded to his registered residence address and the address of the place of this new business (адрес фактического осуществления заявленного вида деятельности) for stands selling food. 8. The applicant’s business was subject to an inspection in July 2014. It appears that the applicant was aware that this inspection took place. The inspection was recorded in an inspection document dated 23 July 2014. 9. On 28 July 2014 an official of the Liski Unit contacted the applicant on his mobile number and, it appears, informed the applicant of the intention to institute administrative offence proceedings against him and that a hearing in this regard would be held on 6 August 2014 (see, however, paragraph 10 below). On the basis of the inspection document the Liski Unit compiled on 6 August 2014 a record of the alleged administrative offence, accusing the applicant of non‑compliance with the technical regulations (Article 14.43 of the Federal Code of Administrative Offences – “the CAO”). Specifically, the applicant was accused of several counts relating to (i) the absence of equipment and/or proper storage arrangements respecting temperature requirements for food products, in particular for perishable foods; (ii) the fact that certain stored goods had not been accompanied by documents certifying their origin, quality and safety. The offence record contained the applicant’s mobile telephone number; his registered residence address and the business address (the location of the stalls); his actual residence address was not specified in the offence record. 10. The offence record states that the applicant came to the Liski Unit on 6 August 2014 but then left the building before any offence record could be compiled, having stated that he had not been properly informed of the actual purpose of the meeting. Thus, the applicant was not present during the compiling of the record. 11. It is unclear whether the applicant received a copy of it at the time. 12. The Liski Unit instituted proceedings before the Commercial Court of the Voronezh Region (see paragraph 36 below). 13. On 12 August 2014 the court adopted a decision to initiate a case and to examine it by way of a summary procedure. According to the Government, on 13 August 2014 this decision was dispatched, by registered mail, “to the applicant’s two addresses”; both letters were subsequently returned following expiry of the retention period. Unlike for subsequent proceedings (see paragraphs 15 and 21 below), the Court has not been provided with any relevant evidence such as postal slips or dispatch cards. However, it appears that one letter was dispatched to the applicant’s registered residence address and was then returned to the court for lack/absence of the addressee at that address (see paragraph 31 below). 14. On 10 October 2014 the court decided to examine the case by way of an ordinary procedure because it was necessary to hear the defendant (that is to say the applicant). A preliminary hearing was scheduled for 11 November 2014 and the applicant’s or his representative’s presence was required. It was indicated in the relevant court order that information on the progress of the case (including the time and place of hearings) was available on the court’s Internet site and at the information stand at the entrance to the court. 15. According to the Government, the notification was dispatched on 13 October 2014 but then was returned to the court following expiry of the retention period. The Government has provided the Court with a dispatch card showing that the notification was dispatched on 14 October 2014 to the applicant’s registered residence address and then returned to the court on 24 October 2014 with a note listing reasons for return with “expiry of the retention period” being checked. 16. On 11 November 2014 the court adjourned to 9 December 2014 and it required the parties to be present. On 12 November 2014 letters were sent by registered mail to the applicant’s registered residence address and the location of the business (the stalls). Those letters were subsequently returned to the court as undelivered. The dispatch card listed reasons for re‑dispatch, with “expiry of the retention period” being checked. 17. The Government has also submitted a dispatch card showing that the notification was delivered to the Liski Unit on 19 November 2014. 18. On 10 December 2014 the court heard the case and acquitted the applicant. Neither the applicant nor his representative was present, and they lodged no submissions. It was indicated in the judgment that the applicant had been “duly informed” of the hearing. 19. The Government has submitted no specific information or documents relating to the dispatch of the trial judgment. 20. The Liski Unit appealed to the 19th Commercial Court of Appeal. According to the Government, on 19 December 2014 a copy of their statement of appeal was dispatched to the applicant. The Court has not been provided with any relevant dispatch card or postal slip. 21. By a decision of 26 December 2014 the appeal court scheduled a hearing for 28 January 2015. According to the Government, this decision was dispatched to the applicant but was then returned to the court as not claimed within the retention period. 22. The Government has also submitted a dispatch card showing that the notification was dispatched to the Liski Unit on 30 December 2014 and was handed over to it on 12 January 2015 as confirmed by a signature (of its official). 23. On 4 February 2015 the appeal court adjourned the hearing to 4 March 2015. According to the Government, the correspondence enclosing this decision was dispatched to the applicant by registered mail but was then returned to the court as not claimed within the retention period. The Court has not been provided with any relevant dispatch cards or postal slips. 24. On 12 March 2015 the 19th Commercial Court of Appeal held an appeal hearing and heard the Liski Unit’s representative. The appellate court admitted as evidence new documents submitted by the Unit, one of which was meant to demonstrate that the applicant had indeed been aware of the administrative hearing on 6 August 2014 (see paragraph 9 above). 25. By a decision of the same date the appeal court then quashed that judgment, found the applicant guilty, and imposed a fine of 20,000 Russian roubles (RUB – equivalent to 298 euros (EUR) at the time). This decision became final and enforceable on the same date. The appeal decision reads as follows: “[The applicant] is absent from the appeal hearing; he has been duly informed about the time and place of the hearing. Pursuant to Articles 123, 156 and 266 of the CComP [Code of Commercial Procedure] the case is being examined in his absence ... This decision ... may be challenged by way of a cassation appeal before the Commercial Court of the Central Circuit within two months ...” 26. According to the Government, the correspondence enclosing the appeal decision was dispatched to the applicant but was then returned to the court undelivered. The Court has not been provided with any relevant dispatch card or postal slip. 27. According to the applicant, he first learnt about the trial and appeal decisions on 3 June 2015 during a conversation with an official of the Liski transport prosecutor’s office. The applicant then accessed the website of the Commercial Court of the Voronezh Regional Court. At his request, on 29 June 2015 he was given access to the case file at the registry of that court and was provided with the court decisions of 10 December 2014 and 12 March 2015. The applicant then lodged an application for a cassation‑appeal review in respect of the appeal decision of 12 March 2015 and requested the restoration of the time-limit for a valid reason. 28. In his statement of appeal the applicant argued, as to the matter of notification in the appeal proceedings, that he had not been provided with the Liski Unit’s statement of appeal and had not been informed of the start of the appeal proceedings. It should have been clear to the appeal court from the case file that the notifications to the registered residence address had been returned. However, the appeal court persisted in sending notifications to that address while failing to use alternative means such as a telephone communication on his mobile number that was mentioned in the case file. Moreover, the appeal court could have asked the Liski Unit’s representative whether she had the applicant’s actual residence address or his telephone contacts. The appeal court could have required the representative to hand over a notification to the applicant in person. The appeal court had been aware of a business notification and, specifically, could have sought submission of the 2013 notification document (see paragraph 7 above) indicating the applicant’s actual residence address while the Liski Unit’s representative had omitted to disclose it. The applicant insisted that he had not received any notifications; no correspondence, including by registered mail, had been handed over to him by any official of the postal service; he had never refused any such correspondence. In particular, despite the requirements of the law, when returning correspondence, the postal service had not specified that the addressee had not been present/residing at the address and had not indicated the source of their information about that. 29. On 22 July 2015 the Commercial Court of the Central Circuit examined the applicant’s application for the restoration of the time-limit for cassation review. The court held as follows: “Under Article 276 of the CComP an application for cassation review may be lodged within two months of the date on which an impugned judicial decision acquired legal force, unless otherwise provided by the CComP. It is noted, however, that the statement of cassation appeal in respect of the appeal decision of 12 March 2015 was dispatched to the first-instance court on 8 July 2015 – that is to say after the expiry of the relevant period ... The case file contains no indisputable proof that the impugned court decision was in a timely manner dispatched to and received by [the applicant]. It is also noted that he was actually served with the court decisions in respect of the present case on 29 June 2015 in the Commercial Court of the Voronezh Region. Thus, the court finds it acceptable to grant the application for restoration of the time-limit ...” 30. On 6 October 2015 the Commercial Court of the Central Circuit held a public hearing while noting the absence of the parties and that they had been duly notified of the cassation hearing but had chosen not to attend. The cassation court then proceeded with the examination of the case on the basis of the case file and the parties’ arguments concerning the charge and procedural matters. The cassation court then upheld the appeal decision. In particular as regards the matter of notification, it considered that the decision to start proceedings had been dispatched to the applicant but that he had avoided being served with judicial notifications; however, he had been able to continue to keep himself informed, via the court’s website, of the appeal proceedings after the first-instance judgment against him (see the “Relevant domestic law and practice” section below). The decision of 6 October 2015 reads, in the relevant parts, as follows: “In his cassation appeal [the applicant] asks this court to set aside the appeal decision of 12 March 2015, referring to the wrong application of the substantive and procedural laws. In their observations in reply the administrative authority objects ... The parties were duly notified of the time and place of the [cassation] hearing but their representatives have not appeared before this court. Thus, the cassation appeal has been examined in their absence ... Having examined the case file and having examined the arguments raised in the cassation appeal and observations in reply, the cassation court finds no grounds for granting the cassation appeal ... This court dismissed the cassation appeal in the part concerning the alleged non‑notification of the appeal hearing. Pursuant to Article 121 § 1 of the CComP, a commercial court informs parties to a case of the initiation of that case, the time and place of a hearing, or a procedural act, by way of dispatching a court decision. When applying the above provision it is relevant that it follows from Article 121 § 6 and Article 123 § 1 that before a hearing or before taking a procedural act a court must have information that the participants have received a copy of the first judicial act in a given case or must have information relating to Article 123 § 4. A first judicial act means a decision to initiate a case. ... Where a case file contains a document concerning the handing over (о вручении) of the first judicial act to the person or information relating to Article 123 § 4, this person is deemed to have been duly notified of appeal, cassation or supervisory review proceedings ... , provided that the relevant court fulfils its obligations relating to the posting of information regarding dates and places of hearings on the official Internet site ... Pursuant to Article 9 § 1 and Article 41 §§ 2 and 3 of the CComP, participants in commercial-court proceedings bear the risk of adverse consequences that may arise from their taking a certain procedural action or from omitting to take it; they use their procedural rights in good faith and fulfil their procedural obligations ... failure to comply with such obligations entail the consequences prescribed by the CComP ... The decisions to initiate a case and to start the examination of the case were dispatched to [the applicant], as required by the law, but he evaded (уклонился) receipt of the court notifications. Given the above-mentioned legal provisions and the presumption of good-faith conduct on the part of the participants in a commercial case, this court concludes that [the applicant] should have been aware of the time and place of the appeal hearing and could have accessed the relevant information on the processing of the case via accessible official sources ... This decision may be challenged before the Supreme Court of Russia within two months of the adoption of this decision, as prescribed by Article 291.1 of the CComP.” 31. In his cassation appeal before the Supreme Court of Russia the applicant mentioned, inter alia, the following information: “As can be seen from a certificate on registered mail postal dispatches (I have received this certificate on 25 July 2015; see its original enclosed herewith) the decision of 12 August 2014 ... was dispatched on 13 August to the following address [the applicant’s registered residence address]. It was then sent back to the court on 21 August 2014, as indicated “because there was no addressee”, and was handed over to the court on 1 September 2014. This confirms that I did not evade the receipt of this notification or any subsequent notification ...” 32. Referring to Article 30.12 of the CAO, on 30 December 2015 the Supreme Court upheld the appeal decision and the first cassation-appeal decision.

5. The applicant was born in 1991 and lives in Kyiv. 6. At the time of the events she belonged to an artistic group called the St Luke Brotherhood, which was known for its provocative public performances. 7. On 16 December 2010 the applicant, together with three other members of the above-mentioned union, made what she described as an “act of performance”, which, according to both parties’ accounts, consisted of the following. They went to the Eternal Glory Memorial to those who perished in the Second World War, which contained the tombs of thirty-two soldiers, including that of an Unknown Soldier. The applicant took a frying pan prepared in advance, broke some eggs into it and fried them over the Eternal Flame at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. Two of her friends joined her and fried sausages on skewers over the flame. Another member of the group filmed the event. Two police officers approached them and made a remark that their behaviour was inappropriate, without further interference. On the same day the applicant posted the video on the Internet on behalf of the St Luke Brotherhood. It was accompanied by the following statement: “Precious natural gas has been being burned, pointlessly, at the Glory Memorial in Kyiv for fifty-three years now. This pleasure costs taxpayers about 300,000 hryvnias [UAH] per month. And this is only one ‘eternal flame’ pagan temple, whereas there are hundreds or even thousands of them throughout Ukraine. On 16 December the St Luke Brotherhood reacted to this by an act of protest in the Glory Park in the capital. It showed that people should use the ‘eternal flame’. We suggest to the outraged representatives of the Communist Party of Ukraine to follow the example of ancient Roman vestal virgins and to carry out around-the-clock duty at the ‘eternal flames’, keeping the fire lit manually by wood. There is no doubt that communists will have no problems with fulfilling this task, because they already have experience of taking care of the Lenin monument in Kyiv and their financing is much better than that which the vestal virgins had.” 8. While the parties did not provide a copy of the video in question to the Court, it was possible to view it on several publicly available websites. In addition to the factual account from the parties summarised above, the Court notes that the soundtrack to the video was a famous 1974 Soviet song “The battle is going on again” (devoted to the victory of the 1917 revolution and optimism about the future of the communist regime). The video started with the following opening titles: “The St Luke Brotherhood presents”, “Recipe of the day”, “Eternal fried eggs on the eternal flame”. The participants in the performance did not make any public address and their conversation was not audible. They had no posters or other visual aids, apart from the food and cooking utensils. It could be seen on the video that once the applicant had broken the eggs in the frying pan and was about to approach the fire, while her friends held skewers with sausages, the two police officers appeared and the applicant explained something to them and they left. In order to reach the flame the applicant had to step over a sculpture of a wreath of oak leaves and step on the words “Glory to the Unknown Soldier”. 9. There were several complaints to the police that the action on the video had amounted to desecration of the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier and called for criminal prosecution. 10. On 21 December 2010 the police questioned D., one of the women who had participated in the performance. She submitted that she had not known the other members of the group and that she had met them by chance. As they had allegedly explained to her, they had been hungry and had intended to cook food in order to eat it. 11. On the same day criminal proceedings were instituted against D. and three unidentified persons on suspicion of hooliganism. 12. On 23 December 2010 D. wrote a confession that she had participated in a protest against inappropriate use of natural gas and that she regretted it. She knew only the first names of the other participants. 13. On 24 December 2010 another criminal case was opened against her and three unidentified persons in respect of the same event, this time on suspicion of desecration of a tomb. It was joined to that opened earlier. Subsequently the charge of hooliganism was dropped. 14. The police retrieved photos of several persons who might have been involved in the incident from the passport office’s database and showed them to D. She recognised the applicant. 15. On 5 February 2011 the investigator questioned the applicant’s grandmother and mother, who lived at the address of the applicant’s registered residence. They submitted that they knew nothing about her involvement in the event in question. They also stated that the applicant did not in fact live there and denied knowing her whereabouts or having her contact details. They only knew that she had left for western Ukraine, without further details. The grandmother stated that the applicant had visited her about two weeks earlier. The applicant’s mother had seen her about a week earlier and had received a telephone call from her two days earlier. 16. On 18 February 2011 the investigator severed the criminal case in respect of the applicant and two unidentified persons on suspicion of desecration of the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier by a group following a prior conspiracy. 17. On the same day the applicant was declared wanted by the police. 18. On 17 March 2011 the investigator applied to the Pecherskyy District Court of Kyiv (“the Pecherskyy Court”) for the applicant’s detention as a preventive measure pending trial. His arguments were as follows: the offence of which the applicant was suspected was punishable by a prison term of more than three years; the applicant had absconded, as a result of which she had been declared wanted by the police; and she could reoffend or hinder the establishment of the truth if at liberty. 19. On 25 March 2011 a judge of the Pecherskyy Court allowed that application in part: he ordered the applicant’s arrest with a view to bringing her before the court for examination. 20. On 29 March 2011 at 9 p.m. the applicant was arrested at the flat of a certain Z. in Kyiv. As the latter subsequently stated during her questioning, the applicant had been living there from 25 March 2011 at the request of an acquaintance. 21. On 31 March 2011 the applicant was questioned as an accused in the presence of her lawyer. While insisting that her only intention had been to protest against the inappropriate use of natural gas, she confessed to the offence and expressed remorse. 22. On the same day the investigator once again applied to the Pecherskyy Court for the applicant’s detention as a preventive measure. His reasoning was the same as before. 23. On 31 March and 1 April 2011 two deputies of the Kyiv Regional Council applied to the Pecherskyy Court for the applicant’s release in exchange of their personal guarantee of her adequate procedural behaviour. 24. On 1 April 2011 the Pecherskyy Court remanded the applicant in custody as a preventive measure pending trial. It noted that she was accused of a serious offence punishable by imprisonment of from three to five years. Furthermore, the judge referred to the fact that the applicant had absconded and had therefore been put on the wanted list. It was also considered that she might hinder establishing the truth if at liberty. In so far as the applicant’s lawyer relied on her positive character references from various sources, the court noted that those could not guarantee her compliance with all the procedural requirements. While having noted that the applicant also relied on the letters of personal guarantee from the people’s deputies, the judge did not further comment on them. It was specified in the ruling that the term of the applicant’s detention was to be calculated from 29 March 2011. Under the applicable legislation, the duration of pre-trial detention was limited to two months, with the possibility of further extensions. 25. The applicant’s lawyer appealed. He submitted that his client was willing to cooperate with the investigation and that there were no reasons for her detention. It was further pointed out in the appeal that the applicant had been declared wanted by the police on the very same day the criminal case against her had been opened. The lawyer noted that there had not been a single summons sent by the investigation to the applicant’s address prior to her arrest. According to her, she had found out about the charge against her only on the day of her arrest on 29 March 2011. Lastly, the lawyer submitted that the first-instance court had not considered any less intrusive preventive measures as an alternative to detention and that it had left without consideration the people deputies’ letters of guarantee. 26. On 11 April 2011 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal rejected the above appeal. It noted that the Pecherskyy Court had already duly examined all the arguments raised in it. 27. On 25 May 2011 the applicant was indicted. On the same day the case was sent to the Pecherskyy Court for trial. 28. On 10 June 2011 the applicant applied to the court for release under an undertaking not to abscond. She submitted that she enjoyed positive character references, had no criminal record and had cooperated with the investigation. Furthermore, the applicant observed that by that time the investigation had already been completed and could not therefore be hampered. She emphasised that her actions had been nothing else than a protest driven by good motives. Several members of parliament and other prominent figures joined her in that application and expressed their wish to act as her personal guarantors. 29. On 17 June 2011 the Pecherskyy Court held a preparatory hearing, during which it rejected the applicant’s application for release with reference to the seriousness of the charge against her, “the nature and the circumstances of the offence of which she [was] accused”, as well as the fact that she had been declared wanted by the police. The judge also stated, in general terms, that there were no grounds for the applicant’s release under a personal guarantee. 30. On 30 June 2011 the applicant applied once again to be released. On the same day the Pecherskyy Court allowed that application and released her under an undertaking not to leave the town. 31. On 4 October 2012 the Pecherskyy Court found the applicant guilty of the desecration of the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, acting as part of a group of persons following a prior conspiracy. The court noted that the applicant had convinced D. and two other people, whose identities remained unestablished, to carry out a performance at the “Eternal Glory” memorial aimed at protesting against the waste of natural gas caused by the burning of the Eternal Flame. D., who was questioned in court, confirmed that account of events. The court also questioned the memorial keeper, who had witnessed the performance from a distance, and the two police officers who had spoken to the applicant and her friends (see paragraph 7 above). Furthermore, the court examined the video-recording of the performance as material evidence. 32. The judgment mentioned the statement made by the applicant during the hearing that in her opinion people bringing flowers to the memorial did not really understand what exactly it was dedicated to. She insisted that she had not committed any crime as her performance had not been meant to desecrate the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. Furthermore, she maintained that there could not be a tomb beneath the Eternal Flame because of the gas pipe. 33. The Pecherskyy Court held that the applicant’s arguments had no impact on the legal classification of her actions and that they were refuted by the evidence as a whole. The judgment further stated in that regard: “... the court considers that by committing deliberate acts in a group which showed disrespect for the burial place of the Unknown Soldier and for the public tradition of honouring the memory of soldiers who perished defending or liberating Kyiv and the lands of Ukraine from the fascist hordes, and by subsequently presenting those actions as a protest, [the applicant] has tried to escape social condemnation of her conduct and criminal liability for the offence.” 34. Relying on local authority documents, the court dismissed the applicant’s submission that there was no established location for the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. 35. The court did not discern any aggravating or mitigating circumstances in the case. At the same time, in deciding on the penalty, it took into account, on the one hand, the fact that the applicant did not have a criminal record, that she was working as a political analyst and got positive character references by her place of residence and work. On the other hand, the court noted that the criminal offence in question was of medium gravity and that the applicant did not show any remorse for what she had done. As a result, she was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment, suspended for two years. 36. On the same date the Pecherskyy Court exempted D. from criminal liability under the surety of her employer. 37. The applicant appealed. Relying on the definition of the desecration of a burial place under the Burial and Funeral Business Act (see paragraph 47 below), she maintained that in the absence of any intention by her to “defile the family or social memory of a deceased or to show contempt for a burial place, or social and religious principles and traditions”, there were no constituent elements of a crime in her actions. The applicant reiterated her argument that her performance had been nothing more than a protest. Lastly, she submitted that the criminal proceedings against her had violated her right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention. 38. The prosecutor also appealed, considering the sentence to be too lenient. 39. On 18 December 2012 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. It stated that desecration of a tomb could have different expressions, indicating an insulting attitude, mockery or disrespect towards a tomb or the person buried therein, regardless of the stated motives. As regards the applicant’s argument on her right to freedom of expression, the court noted that that right was not unlimited and that the restriction in the applicant’s case was in accordance with the law and pursued a legitimate aim. The appellate court also rejected the prosecutor’s appeal. 40. The applicant further reiterated her arguments in an appeal on points of law lodged by her, which was, however, rejected by the Higher Specialised Court for Civil and Criminal Matters on 11 April 2013.

5. The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Nizhniy Novgorod Region. 6. On 25 January 2006 the applicant’s wife, I., gave birth to a son, N. On 25 August 2008 I. gave birth to another son, V. The family lived in Vladimir. 7. In July 2011 the applicant and I. divorced. 8. On 8 October 2011 the applicant took the children away from their home in Vladimir and brought them to the town of Shakhunya in Nizhniy Novgorod Region where his mother lived. He did not obtain I.’s consent. 9. On an unspecified date the applicant applied to the Shakhunskiy District Court of Nizhniy Novgorod Region for a residence order under which N. and V. would live with him in Shakhunya. On 24 October 2011 I. lodged a counterclaim, asking for a residence order under which the children would live with her in Vladimir. 10. On an unspecified date in November 2011 the applicant returned the children to their mother in Vladimir. 11. On 19 January 2012 experts appointed by the court issued their report. They found that the applicant was self-confident, domineering and inclined to lie. He was emotionally stable but, at the same time, easily carried away and fickle in his interests, which could mean that he would not always wish to take care of his children. The applicant strived to spend a lot of time with the children and was against punishing them. I. was seen to be impulsive, anxious, diffident and emotionally unstable. Her intellectual capacities were low. Her manner of upbringing was erratic: she vacillated between excessive demands and punishments and insufficient demands and punishments. Her manner of upbringing could be detrimental to the children’s psychological development. The children were anxious and stressed. N. had a closer emotional connection with his father than with his mother. As regards V., any situations involving his mother were stressful to him because they were associated with excessive demands and punishments. 12. The childcare authority issued an opinion that the children should reside with their mother. The mother had better living conditions. The children attended school (N.), a nursery school (V.) and various extracurricular activities at her place of residence in Vladimir. I. took good care of the children and did not prevent them from seeing their father. 13. The applicant submitted audio recordings of his conversations with his children. A psychologist, who had analysed those recordings, stated in court that the parents were both uncooperative and were both equally responsible for the stress from which N. and V. suffered. The audio recordings submitted by the applicant showed that he had tried to manipulate the children into saying that they wanted to live with him. In her opinion, the children had a stronger attachment to the mother. It was preferable that they lived with her in Vladimir where the living conditions were more comfortable and where they had constantly lived since their birth. 14. On 20 February 2012 the Shakhunskiy District Court granted I.’s application for a residence order in her favour and dismissed a similar application by the applicant. The court doubted the authenticity of an employment certificate from a private company submitted by the applicant. Given that he had not produced any official documents confirming his employment, the court found that he had not proved that he had a permanent income. There was no evidence that the applicant had supported his children financially during the period since his separation from I. in February 2011 until October 2011, when the children had been living with their mother. He had started to pay child maintenance only after he had lodged his application for a residence order in October 2011. The applicant had moreover asked that the children’s residence be fixed at his mother’s address, which showed that he did not have any intention of taking care of them personally. It was clear from the audio recordings submitted by the applicant, as analysed by a psychologist, that the applicant had attempted to manipulate the children and to force them to make a choice between the parents. He was therefore willing to reach his aims by any means, even at the price of making his children suffer. He had moreover taken the children away from their home in Vladimir and brought them to his mother’s residence in Shakhunya without I.’s consent. According to witness statements, I. had always taken good care of the children. It was I. who had always accompanied them to school and extracurricular activities. The fact that she had a partial disability had never so far prevented her from raising them and caring for them. The fact that the applicant’s living conditions were better was insufficient in itself for making a residence order in his favour. Nor was the court convinced by the applicant’s assertion that the children had a stronger attachment to him than to their mother. The children had always lived with their mother, except for several weeks during the summer holidays when they had stayed with him at his mother’s residence in Shakhunya. There was no evidence that I. had shouted or excessively punished the children. Although the experts had indeed found her manner of upbringing to be erratic, their report did not mention that she could cause detriment to their psychological development. Moreover, it was evident from the audio recordings that it was the applicant who had tried to turn the children against their mother. The childcare authorities had also considered that it was in the children’s interest to live with the mother. Given that I. had never prevented the applicant from seeing the children, the applicant would be able to visit them as often as he liked, while the children would continue living in the environment familiar to them. 15. On 29 May 2012 the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal, finding that it had been lawful, well reasoned and justified. The applicant’s cassation appeal was rejected by a judge of the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court on 30 November 2012. (b) Second residence order 16. In January 2013 the applicant applied to the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Vladimir for a reconsideration of the children’s residence arrangements. He asked for a residence order under which N. and V. would live with him in Vladimir. He submitted, in particular, that the children wished to live with him. He had been picking them up from school almost every day lately and bringing them back to I. only to sleep. I. shouted at the children, slapped them and humiliated them. She did not work and lived on social benefits and child maintenance. In the alternative, he asked for a contact order, claiming that I. occasionally prevented him from seeing the children. 17. On 4 March 2013 N. and V. were assessed by a psychologist who found that their psychological state was good. They were resigned to their parents’ divorce and no longer experienced any negative emotions in that connection. Their relationship with their mother was friendly and supportive. They considered her as family, while their father was considered to be a friend who came regularly to play with them. 18. On 22 March 2013 the childcare authority issued its opinion on the case. It found that both parents had satisfactory living conditions. N. had expressed a wish to live with the applicant. The childcare authority considered that it was desirable to perform a psychological expert examination of the children to assess their attachment to each parent. However, I. objected to any assessment of her children by a psychologist. The childcare authorities had however learned that she had secretly seen a psychologist. The children had told the psychologist that they wished to live with their father. However, given that the children had not yet reached an age at which they were able to form their own opinions on the matter, as they were still highly impressionable and changeable, the childcare authority considered that it was possible for the children to continue living with their mother. The applicant should be able to have regular contact with the children for two weekends per month. 19. On 6 May 2013 the Oktyabrskiy District Court rejected the applicant’s application for a residence order and maintained the residence order in favour of I. It found it established that I. was unemployed and that the applicant had a permanent job. The living conditions of both parents were satisfactory. The court took note of the expert report of 19 January 2012 (see paragraph 11 above), observing that the experts had found that the parent-child relationships were complicated in the applicant’s family. The expert report did not however contain an explicit finding that the children were attached to their father more than to their mother. The applicant had not proved that I. had shouted at the children, humiliated them or neglected her parental responsibilities. Evidence showed that she was taking good care of the children. There was therefore no reason to change the children’s residence arrangements established by the judgment of 20 February 2012. 20. The court further held that N. and V. were entitled to maintain contact with their father and his paternal family and determined the contact schedule as follows. The applicant was to be able to have contact with the children each weekend from 5 p.m. on Saturday until 7 p.m. on Sunday at the applicant’s place of residence, with the mother’s prior agreement. 21. On 25 September 2013 the Vladimir Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal. A cassation appeal by the applicant was rejected by a judge of the Vladimir Regional Court on 14 May 2014. (c) Third residence order 22. On 4 October 2013 the applicant lodged a new application for a residence order in his favour with the Oktyabrskiy District Court. He submitted that V. currently lived with him and did not want to return to his mother who shouted at him and physically punished him. Both V. and N. had stated many times that they wanted to live with him. He devoted a lot of time to the children by picking them up after school, bringing them for walks and educating them. He had a comfortable and stable income and good living conditions. By contrast, I. did not work and did not have any income except social payments and the child maintenance payments that she received from the applicant. It was therefore the applicant who maintained the children financially. The applicant further relied on the expert report of 19 January 2012 (see paragraph 11 above) from which it was apparent that the children had a stronger attachment to their father than to their mother, that any situations involving their mother were stressful for them and that the mother’s methods of upbringing were detrimental to the children’s psychological development. The applicant submitted audio recordings of many conversations he had had with the children between March 2012 and September 2013. The children invariably stated that they wanted to live with the applicant, complained that their mother shouted at them and whipped them with a belt, and protested, crying, that they did not want to return living with her. 23. On 19 February 2014 the childcare authority issued its opinion on the case. It found that V. had indeed lived with the applicant during his (V.’s) illness from 25 September to 31 October 2013. He had however then returned to his mother. The children also stayed with the applicant on weekends. The applicant always accompanied V. to nursery school and N. to extracurricular activities. He paid child maintenance without delay and regularly gave additional financial support to the children. The applicant and I. were attending mediation sessions. The applicant was in permanent employment and had a high stable income. I. was partly disabled and did not work. Her mother and grandmother helped her in raising the children. According to I., the children were very attached to their father, spoke to him over the telephone every day and spent their holidays with him. The childcare authority concluded that the children were attached to both parents, that I. was taking good care of their health and development and that their living conditions were comfortable. It was therefore possible for the children to continue living with their mother. 24. A representative of the childcare authority stated at the hearing that she had followed the family for some time. She had the impression that the children were equally attached to both parents and both parents took equally good care of them. Recently she noted positive changes in the highly conflictive relationship between the parents. In particular, the mother allowed the father to spend more time with the children than before. The father picked up the children from school and they spent weekends and part of their holidays with him. She considered that there was no reason to change the children’s residence arrangements and recommended that the children should continue living with their mother. 25. I. stated that she loved her children and took good care of them. She also alleged that the applicant’s motives for asking for a residence order in his favour were mercenary as he wanted to use the flat that belonged to the children. She therefore asked that the residence order previously granted to her be maintained. 26. The applicant’s neighbour stated that she often saw the applicant walking and playing with the children. She thought that he was a very good father and that the children loved him. In October 2013 I. had come to the applicant’s flat in the middle of the night on at least three occasions. She had shouted, had threatened to break the windows and to take the children away from the applicant by force. The neighbours had had to call the police, who took I. away. 27. In reply to the applicant’s request to play the audio recordings submitted by him on 4 October 2013 (see paragraph 22 above), the judge stated that it was not necessary because the other party had not contested them. The applicant’s written description of those audio recordings had been examined at the hearing. 28. The applicant also asked that a copy of the expert report of 19 January 2012 be admitted as evidence. Both I. and the childcare authority objected, arguing that the expert examination had been made two years before and was therefore out of date. The court rejected the application, finding that the expert report had been analysed by the courts which had issued previous residence orders. 29. On 19 February 2014 the Oktyabrskiy District Court ordered an expert psychological examination of the children to assess their relationship with both parents. 30. On 8 April 2014 the expert found that it was not possible to make an expert report because I. had refused to come to the examination or to bring the children. The court considered that it was not necessary to reiterate the order for an expert examination as there was sufficient material for making a decision on the case. 31. On 8 April 2014 the Oktyabrskiy District Court rejected the applicant’s application for a residence order in his favour. The court found no circumstances warranting the change of the residence arrangements established in the residence orders of 20 February 2012 and 6 May 2013. It had no reason to doubt that I. loved her children and took good care of them. The applicant’s allegations that I.’s manner of upbringing were detrimental to the children’s development had not been confirmed by the evidence in the case. The criminal proceedings on charges of fraud against her had been discontinued. Her living conditions were satisfactory. The fact that she had no employment or income did not justify granting a residence order to the applicant. She did not prevent the applicant from seeing the children as much as he liked. As indicated in the judgment of 6 May 2013, the expert report of 19 January 2012 did not contain an explicit finding that the children were more attached to their father than to their mother. The childcare authorities had found that the children had been equally attached to both parents. There were therefore no reasons to issue a residence order in favour of the applicant. 32. On 1 July 2014 the Vladimir Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal, finding that it had been lawful, well-reasoned and justified. In particular, it held that the applicant had not proved that there had been sufficient reasons to change the residence arrangements established by the earlier residence orders. No exceptional circumstances warranting the children’s separation from their mother had been established. It had not been proved that the children had had an exceptionally strong attachment to the father or wished to live with him and him only. In such circumstances, and taking into account the children’s age, their established way of life, the satisfactory living conditions of both parents and the opinion of the childcare authorities’ on the case, the decision to maintain the residence order in favour of the mother was in the best interests of the children. The Regional Court further dismissed the applicant’s complaint that the District Court had not assessed the family situation with sufficient thoroughness because it had not questioned the children and had refused to admit the expert report of 19 January 2012 as evidence. The Regional Court held that, given that the children were under ten years old, their opinion on the residence issue could not be taken into account. As regards the expert report of 19 January 2012, it had been made in the framework of separate proceedings and had been already assessed by the courts in those proceedings. The District Court considered that the expert opinion was not necessary because the evidence included in the case file was already sufficient to adjudicate the dispute. 33. A cassation appeal by the applicant was rejected by a judge of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on 8 December 2014. 34. On 4 December 2014 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Vladimir authorised, against the applicant’s will, a trip abroad for the children for the winter holidays. On 15 December 2014 the children left for Germany with their mother. They returned to Russia on 9 January 2015. The decision of 4 December 2014 was later annulled by the Oktyabrskiy District Court because it found that it had no territorial jurisdiction over the case. 35. On an unspecified date I. applied to the Leninskiy District Court of Vladimir for a judicial authorisation for the children to travel to Germany during the approaching school summer holidays, complaining that the applicant had refused to give such an authorisation. The applicant submitted in reply that if the children left for the entire summer holidays he would not be able to see them for three months. He also submitted that there was a risk that the children might not return from Germany. He asked for an interim measure prohibiting the children from leaving Russia pending the proceedings. 36. On 12 March 2015 the Leninskiy District Court rejected the applicant’s application for interim measures, finding that the application of interim measures requested would amount to a prejudgement of the case. 37. On 6 May 2015 the Leninskiy District Court authorised the children’s trip abroad for the period from 1 June to 31 August 2015. The court found it established that I. intended to travel to Germany together with V. and N. during the summer school holidays. She had received an accommodation guarantee from her new partner’s sister, who lived permanently in Germany. The applicant had however refused to give V. and N. an authorisation to travel without giving reasons. The court found that the parents could not exercise parental rights to the detriment of their children’s rights. In particular, the children’s right to travel could not be made dependant on the parents’ willingness to authorise their going abroad, especially in the case of a disagreement between the parents. The court considered that the children’s trip abroad would not breach the applicant’s rights and would encourage the children’s development, education and broad-mindedness. 38. The applicant appealed. He submitted that under domestic law if a child left Russia accompanied by one of the parents an authorisation from the other parent was not required; such authorisation was required only if the child went abroad unaccompanied by the parents. A judicial travel authorisation could be given only if one of the parents had formally objected to the child’s going abroad (see paragraph 51 below). Given that the applicant had never lodged such an objection in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law, the judicial travel authorisation had been unlawful and unnecessary. 39. On 9 July 2015 I. married her partner, a national of Germany. She then left for Germany with N. and V. In September 2015 she gave birth to a child. N. and V. are now living in Germany with their mother, her new husband and their half-brother. 40. The applicant lodged an additional appeal, submitting that although the decision of 6 May 2015 had not yet become enforceable, I. had been able to leave with the children for Germany. That fact had clearly demonstrated that a judicial authorisation was not required for leaving Russia. It had however been used by I. to obtain a German visa for the children, which she could not have otherwise obtained without his agreement. The applicant also complained that the children had not returned to Russia by 31 August 2015, although the judicial authorisation had been valid only until that date. 41. On 2 December 2015 the Vladimir Regional Court upheld the decision of 6 May 2015 on appeal. The Regional Court held that it had been lawful, well reasoned and justified. In particular, it found that the applicant had not submitted to the District Court any evidence showing that the trip abroad would have been contrary to the children’s best interests. 42. On 8 September 2015 the bailiffs service opened, at the applicant’s request, enforcement proceedings in respect of the contact order of 6 May 2013 (see paragraph 20 above). 43. In October 2015 the applicant complained about the bailiffs’ inaction to the Oktyabrskiy District Court. On 16 December 2015 the Oktyabrskiy District Court rejected his complaint, finding that the bailiffs had taken measures to enforce the contact order but enforcement had been impossible through no fault of the bailiffs service, specifically because I. and the children had been living in Germany. On 3 March 2016 the Vladimir Regional Court upheld that decision on appeal. Cassation appeals by the applicant were rejected by a judge of the Vladimir Regional Court on 21 October and then by a judge of the Supreme Court on 30 December 2016. 44. Meanwhile, the bailiffs asked the Oktyabrskiy District Court for a suspension of the enforcement proceedings on the grounds that I. and the children were abroad and it was therefore impossible to take any coercive measures against her. On 8 February 2016 the Oktyabrskiy District Court rejected the bailiffs’ request, finding that the children’s residence abroad was not a sufficient reason to suspend the enforcement proceedings. 45. The applicant also submitted numerous requests to various Russian authorities, including in January 2016 to the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation, for assistance in recovering his children and in enforcing the contact order of 6 May 2013. In December 2015 he complained of the authorities’ inaction to the Leninskiy District Court. On 4 February 2016 the Leninskiy District Court rejected the applicant’s complaint, finding that those authorities had no competence in the matter. The only authority competent to assist him in re-establishing contact with his children was the bailiffs service. On 12 May 2016 the Vladimir Regional Court upheld that judgment on appeal. 46. According to the Government, in April 2016 the bailiffs service advised the applicant to apply for recognition and enforcement of the contact order to the competent German authorities, via the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation, in accordance with the Convention of 19 October 1996 on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children. There is no evidence that the applicant used that procedure. 47. On an unspecified date I. applied to the Leninskiy District Court for a residence order under which N. and V. would live with her in Germany. The applicant lodged a counterclaim, asking for a residence order under which the children would live with him in Vladimir. He also asked for an interim order to return the children to Russia and to ensure that until their return the children communicated with him via VOIP calls every Wednesday, Friday and Sunday at 9 p.m. (Moscow time). On 24 May 2016 the Leninskiy District Court refused the applicant’s application for an interim order, finding that he had not proved that the failure to take interim measures might complicate or make impossible the execution of the forthcoming judgment. On 22 June 2016 the Vladimir Regional Court upheld that decision on appeal. The residence order proceedings are pending.

5. Following the establishment of the communist regime in Romania in 1947, the State proceeded to nationalise buildings and agricultural land on a large scale. After the fall of the communist regime, the State enacted a series of laws aimed at affording redress for breaches of property rights by the former regime (see paragraphs 43-51 below). 6. Laws nos. 112/1995 and 10/2001 established the principle of restitution of nationalised residential property and compensation in cases where restitution was no longer possible. Law no. 112/1995 introduced a cap on compensation, but this was subsequently abolished by Law no. 10/2001. 7. Law no. 247/2005 attempted to harmonise the administrative procedures for restitution of properties covered by the above-mentioned laws and by the special legislation concerning restitution of agricultural land. 8. On 12 October 2010, the Court adopted a pilot judgment in the case of Maria Atanasiu and Others v. Romania (nos. 30767/05 and 33800/06, 12 October 2010), in which it singled out the deficiencies of the restitution mechanism, indicating to the respondent State under Article 46 of the Convention that new steps needed to be taken in order to process the restitution claims with more efficiency. 9. On 15 May 2013 Law no. 165/2013 came into force, setting out various procedures available to petitioners seeking settlement of their restitution claims. 10. Based on the parties’ observations and comments regarding the new remedies set out by Law no. 165/2013, on 29 April 2014 the Court found in its judgment in the case of Preda and Others v. Romania (nos. 9584/02 and 7 others, §§ 134-40, 29 April 2014), that the mechanism established by the new law offered a range of effective remedies that needed to be exhausted by those claimants whose complaints referred to one of the following situations: the existence of concurrent titles to property with respect to the same plot of agricultural land; the annulment of such title to property without any compensation; the delivery of a final judgment confirming the right to compensation in respect of the unlawful seizure by the State of any type of immovable property, without fixing the amount; the failure to pay such compensation awarded in a final judgment; and the prolonged failure to give a decision on a restitution claim. 11. However, the Court also held that Law no. 165/2013 did not contain any provisions of a procedural or substantive nature capable of affording redress on the matter of the existence of final judgments validating concurrent titles to property with respect to the same residential property. Furthermore, no procedure was available to former owners who, in the absence of restitution, would have been entitled to compensation but who did not to have access to it because the circumstances rendering restitution impossible had become known after the expiry of the time-limit for lodging compensation claims (ibid., § 124). 12. The complaints set out in the present applications reflect the circumstances described above (see paragraph 11). In particular, the applicants have alleged that their title to the property (building and appurtenant land) had been acknowledged by the domestic courts; however, owing to the sale of the property by the State, the applicants were prevented from enjoying their respective right. They claimed that this deprivation, together with the total lack of compensation for it, had imposed on them an excessive and disproportionate burden. 1. Facts concerning application no. 10346/03, lodged by Ms Dora Dickmann (a) Restitution of the immovable property located on Şoseaua Giurgiului 13. In 1950, under Decree no. 92, the State nationalised the building and its appurtenant land located at 22 Şoseaua Giurgiului in Bucharest, which belonged to the applicant’s predecessors. 14. In 1997 the applicant lodged a claim with the domestic courts for restitution of the above-mentioned property, alleging that its nationalisation had been unlawful and that therefore the property right had left her predecessors’ rightful ownership only when it had been transferred to her as heritage. The claim was formulated against Bucharest City Council and B., a State-owned company responsible for the management of property belonging to the State. 15. In its judgment of 6 June 1997 the Bucharest Fourth District Court allowed the claims and ordered that the property be returned to the applicant, in her capacity as sole heiress of its rightful owners. The court held that the immovable property had been nationalised unlawfully, since the applicant’s predecessors had not belonged to any of the social categories covered by the nationalisation decree and thus their right of property had been valid and continuous, being transferred as heritage to the applicant; the State could not therefore claim a valid title to the property. 16. The judgment was not appealed against and thus became final. 17. On 12 May 1998 the Mayor of Bucharest issued a restitution decision in respect of the immovable property located on Şoseaua Giurgiului, in compliance with the operative part of the judgment of 6 June 1997. (b) Sale by the State of the flats located in the Şoseaua Giurgiului property 18. Under the terms of contracts entered into in accordance with Law no. 112/1995, company B., managing the building (see paragraph 14 above), had sold the flats located therein to the tenants. 19. The sale contract in respect of the first-floor flat was concluded on 5 November 1996 between B., representing the State, and the tenants, S.N. and S.P. 20. The sale contract in respect of the ground-floor flat was concluded on 23 June 1997 between B. on behalf of the State, and the tenant, S. A.-L. (c) Steps taken under ordinary law and under Law no. 10/2001 to obtain the rescission of the sale contracts 21. On an unspecified date in 2000 the applicant lodged before the domestic courts two civil actions seeking the rescission of the sale contracts of 5 November 1996 and 23 June 1997 respectively, in so far as the State had sold property which it had not owned. 22. The final judgment of 7 February 2002 given by the Bucharest Court of Appeal dismissed the claim in respect of the first-floor flat, holding that the applicant did not have legal standing to ask for the rescission of the sale contract, in so far as she had not been a party thereto. 23. In its final judgment of 14 October 2003, the Bucharest Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s claim in respect of the ground-floor flat, holding that the buyer had acted in good faith and had thus acquired a valid title to the property, in accordance with the provisions of Law no. 10/2001, which had entered into force in the meantime. The court also held that the applicant was eligible for compensatory measures pursuant to the notice of claim (notificare) lodged with the administrative authorities under Law no. 10/2001 (see paragraph 25 below). 24. On 12 August 2002 the applicant lodged another action before the domestic courts, seeking again the rescission of the sale contract concerning the first-floor flat. This time, however, she based her claim on the provisions of Law no. 10/2001. In its final judgment of 1 February 2006 the Bucharest Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s claim, holding that in so far as the sale contract had been concluded by the buyers in good faith, it was in compliance with the law. (d) Steps taken under Law no. 10/2001 to obtain restitution of the flats 25. On 12 October 2001 the applicant lodged a notice of claim with the Bucharest City Hall under Law no. 10/2001, seeking reparatory measures in respect of the two flats. Several documents were appended to the application, including a copy of the judgment of 6 June 1997 and a copy of the inheritance certificate attesting to the fact that the applicant was the sole heiress of her predecessors. 26. On 23 and 24 April 2015 the Bucharest City Hall requested the applicant to complete her administrative file with documents related to her claim. However, the request did not reach the applicant, as the contact information mentioned in the 2001 application was no longer valid. 27. As far as the Court is aware, no decision has been taken in respect of this claim. 2. Facts concerning application no. 10893/04, lodged by Ms and Mr Gion (a) Steps taken by the applicants to obtain the restitution of flat no. 30 located in Victoria Street, Piteşti, and the sale of the flat by the State 28. On 6 May 1977 flat no. 30, located in building A/4, Victoria Street, Piteşti – the applicants’ property – was seized by the State under Decree no. 223/1974, following the applicants’ decision to leave the country. They were not notified of the administrative decision to confiscate the property. 29. Between 1991 and 1995, the applicants wrote several letters to various domestic authorities, including the Piteşti City Council, the Piteşti Prefect’s Office and the director of company R., which managed the building on behalf of the State, seeking to obtain possession of the flat. The replies stated that the applicants’ claims could not be granted, as no relevant legislation had yet been enacted concerning reparatory measures in respect of previously nationalised property. In one of the replies sent by the Piteşti City Council on 1 May 1995, the applicants were informed that flats which had been nationalised under Decree 223/1974 could not be purchased by their current tenants from the local authorities. 30. On 9 July 1996 the applicants lodged a claim with the administrative authorities, seeking reparatory measures in respect of flat no. 30, in accordance with the provisions of Law no. 112/1995. 31. On 17 January 1997 company R. sold the flat to the tenants, S.C. and S.M. 32. On 16 May 1997 the administrative authorities dismissed the applicants’ claims lodged under Law no. 112/1995, in view of the fact that the flat had already been sold to its tenants. (b) Restitution of the immovable property located in Piteşti 33. On 30 August 1999 the applicants lodged before the Argeş County Court an action against Piteşti City Council, aiming to recover possession of flat no. 30. They claimed that the confiscation of the property had been unlawful, as on the one hand it had been in breach of the Constitution in force at the time, and on the other hand, they had not been notified of the administrative decision to confiscate it. 34. On 22 May 2000 the County Court allowed the applicants’ claims. The defendant appealed. On 23 March 2001 the Piteşti Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal because no statement of appeal had been submitted. The decision thus became final. 35. On 19 September 2002 the applicants, assisted by a bailiff, recovered possession of flat no. 30; the relevant minutes mentioned that the flat was empty and unfurnished. (c) Challenge to the enforcement of the judgment of 22 May 2000 36. On 1 October 2002 S.C. and S.M. challenged the enforcement of the judgment of 22 May 2000 (see paragraph 34 above). They claimed to be the rightful owners of flat no. 30, having bought it in good faith in 1997; furthermore, in so far as they had not been parties to the proceedings terminated by the outstanding judgment of 22 May 2000, they were not bound by it (inopozabilă). 37. By a final judgment of 25 June 2003, the Piteşti Court of Appeal allowed the claims of S.C. and S.M. In its reasoning, the court essentially held that the sale contract had been validly and lawfully concluded by the tenants, who had acted in good faith at the time of the sale. Moreover, the judgment of 22 May 2000 awarding the applicants title to the property was unenforceable (inopozabilă) against the buyers, because they had not been parties to the respective proceedings. (d) Steps taken under ordinary law to obtain the rescission of the sale contract 38. On 22 November 2006 the applicants lodged an action against S.C. and S.M. seeking to recover possession of flat no. 30 and urging the courts to find the sale contract unlawful. Their claims were allowed by the Piteşti District Court on 23 January 2008. 39. An appeal lodged by the defendants was allowed by the Argeş County Court on 16 June 2008. The court considered that the sale of the flat had been lawful. At the same time, it held that the applicants were entitled to compensation for the flat, equivalent to its market value at the date of payment. 40. The applicants have not lodged any claims under Law no. 10/2001.

11. The applicant was born in 1943 and lives in Ploieşti. 12. At around 8.40 p.m. on 3 December 2004 the applicant, who at the time was a judge serving with the Dâmbovița County Court, was involved in a car accident. Throughout the domestic proceedings and in his application to the Court, he alleged, inter alia, that a third party – a certain D.I. – had crashed his car into the back of the applicant’s car. As a result of this impact, the applicant’s car had been shunted into the back of a stationary military lorry, of which the driver was a certain J.C.P. 13. Following the collision with the applicant’s car, D.I.’s car bounced off the applicant’s car and collided with another car which had been driving on the oncoming lane (hereinafter “the fourth driver”). The fourth driver was never the subject of any investigation. (a) The conduct of the investigation 14. On the same date, on 3 December 2004, the Ploieşti Police Department (hereinafter “the Police Department”) initiated, of its own motion, a criminal investigation into the circumstances of the accident. The Police Department’s investigation was supervised by the Prosecutor’s Office attached to the Ploieşti District Court (hereinafter “the District Court Prosecutor’s Office”). 15. The Police Department carried out an on-site investigation. According to the minutes of the report drawn up on the on-site investigation it took measurements and photographs, produced a detailed description of the site of the accident, identified the drivers involved in the incident and had medical personnel collect blood samples from all three drivers in order to establish the level of alcohol in their blood. Also, it asked the Ploieşti Forensic Service (hereinafter “the Forensic Service”) to produce toxicology reports in respect of the alcohol levels found in the drivers’ blood. In addition, it took statements from some of the passengers of the vehicles involved in the incident. 16. Between 4 December 2004 and 6 September 2005 the Police Department took statements from the remaining passengers of the vehicles involved in the accident, as well as from the applicant, D.I., and J.C.P. and asked the Forensic Service to produce a forensic expert report on the medical care needed by the applicant following the accident. 17. The toxicology reports – produced on 6 December 2004 – concluded that only the applicant had alcohol in his blood that night. 18. The forensic expert report on the medical care needed by the applicant following the accident – produced on 27 June 2005 – noted that the applicant had been committed to hospital three times by 6 May 2005. He was diagnosed, inter alia, with polytrauma, post-traumatic mesentery rupture, and fractured and/or displaced bones and body parts. He had undergone three surgical operations, including one involving the removal of part of his intestines, and had required a lower tracheotomy because of respiratory complications. The report further noted that the applicant’s physical examination by the forensic expert had disclosed a diminished power of compression in his right hand and reduced amplitude in the abduction movement of his right arm. The report concluded that the applicant had suffered injuries that could have been caused on 3 December 2004 by collision with or compression by hard objects or surfaces following a car accident. The injuries required between 200 and 250 days of medical care and their severity had endangered the applicant’s life. The presence of any disability was to be assessed after the end of the recovery treatment. 19. On 22 June 2005 the applicant joined the proceedings as a civil party, claiming pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages. 20. On 2 August 2005 the District Court Prosecutor’s Office declined jurisdiction in favour of the Prosecutor’s Office attached to the Ploieşti Court of Appeal (hereinafter “the Court of Appeal Prosecutor’s Office”) on account of the applicant’s status as a judge. The latter Prosecutor’s Office instituted criminal proceedings in rem on 6 September 2005 because the accident had caused the applicant severe injuries, giving rise to the offence of involuntary serious bodily harm. 21. Between 7 and 24 October 2005 the Court of Appeal Prosecutor’s Office took statements from several of the witnesses to the accident, including the fourth driver, and heard evidence from the applicant. Also, it instructed the applicant to submit, by 31 October 2005, his views on the technical expert report which he had requested, and the names of further witnesses he had asked to be heard. 22. On 28 October 2005 the applicant’s lawyer asked the Court of Appeal Prosecutor’s Office to postpone the deadline set for the applicant, inter alia, because he was unable to consult the applicant or submit evidence to the file on account of the latter’s serious medical condition. (b) The prosecutor’s office’s decisions to discontinue the proceedings 23. On 5 December 2005 the Court of Appeal Prosecutor’s Office discontinued the criminal proceedings brought against D.I. and J.C.P. and the criminal investigation concerning the applicant. It held that J.C.P. had parked the lorry correctly. Also, the applicant was responsible for causing the accident because he had been driving under the influence of alcohol and had failed to adapt his speed to the traffic conditions. However, the elements of an offence had not been met in his case because the alcohol level found in his blood had been below the legal threshold of 0.8‰. 24. The applicant challenged the decision before the Prosecutor General attached to the Court of Appeal Prosecutor’s Office (hereinafter “the Prosecutor General”). He argued, inter alia, that the prosecutor’s office had failed to produce a technical expert report and had ignored or misinterpreted the available evidence, whether intentionally or not. 25. On 3 January 2006 the Prosecutor General dismissed the applicant’s challenge. He reiterated the findings of the prosecutor’s office. In addition, he held that the applicant had not applied the brakes of his car before the impact with the lorry. He added that no technical expert report was necessary, considering that the evidence already obtained was conclusive. 26. The applicant appealed against the decisions of 5 December 2005 and 3 January 2006 before the Ploieşti Court of Appeal (hereinafter “the Court of Appeal”). He reiterated the arguments which he had put forward to the Prosecutor General. In addition, he argued that the investigators had ignored his request for evidence to be included in the file which could have allowed him to prove that his blood samples had been collected unlawfully or under suspicious circumstances. 27. On 17 April 2006 the Court of Appeal declared itself without jurisdiction and referred the case to the Ploieşti District Court (hereinafter “the District Court”) on the grounds that the applicant had retired from his post as judge. After the District Court took over the case it adjourned the proceedings five times between 13 June and 6 October 2006 on procedural grounds, and in order to have time to examine the case. 28. On 13 October 2006 the District Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the prosecutor’s office’s decisions. It held that the applicant had been responsible for the accident. He had failed to adapt his speed to the traffic conditions in order to avoid potential danger. 29. Upon an appeal on points of fact and of law (recurs) by the applicant, the Prahova County Court on 18 December 2006 quashed that judgment and ordered the District Court Prosecutor’s Office to reopen the criminal proceedings instituted against D.I. and J.C.P. It also ordered the prosecutor’s office to produce a technical expert report that would clarify the circumstances of the accident. The available evidence attested that brake marks caused by the applicant’s car had been found and the witness statements on whether the lorry had been correctly parked were contradictory. Furthermore, a forensic expert report was needed with regard to the alcohol level in the applicant’s blood. (a) The conduct of the investigation 30. On 3 April 2007 the Forensic Service produced a psychiatric forensic expert report concerning the applicant. The report concluded that the applicant had suffered from a post-traumatic stress disorder which could have been aggravated by any state of conflict. The applicant’s psychological suffering might also have been exacerbated by the repeated surgical interventions, but could not be medically quantified. Prior to the accident the applicant had not been registered as a patient with psychological problems. There was a clear connection between the chronic post-traumatic stress and all the conflict situations he was experiencing. 31. On 10 April 2007 the Forensic Service produced a forensic expert report concerning the applicant’s blood. It concluded that there had been some irregularities in the collection of his blood samples. Among other things, it appeared that the second blood sample had been collected at a time when the applicant was in fact no longer present in the hospital’s stabilisation room. The report also noted the applicant’s argument that there had been an excessive use of disinfectants at the time when the samples were collected and that this could have altered the reading of the alcohol level found in his blood. The experts stated that, if the methodology used to collect the blood samples had not been observed, the result of the alcohol test might have been affected. 32. On 16 May 2007 the District Court Prosecutor’s Office reopened the criminal proceedings instituted against D.I. and J.C.P. and referred the case back to the Police Department for the investigative measures ordered by the court. Subsequently, from 7 June to 22 November 2007, the applicant asked the Police Department and the prosecutor’s office for additional evidence to be included in the file, including a technical expert report concerning the circumstances of the accident and new forensic expert reports on his blood alcohol level and the dynamics of the accident. In addition, he complained repeatedly about the delays in the investigation. 33. On 3 October 2007, following the Police Department’s request of 14 August 2007 for a forensic expert report concerning the alcohol in the applicant’s blood, the Mina Minovici Forensic Institute (hereinafter “the Forensic Institute”) informed the Police Department that the substances used when the biological samples had been collected from the applicant could not explain the presence of alcohol in his blood. 34. On 20 December 2007 an expert assigned by the Police Department on 9 September 2007 produced a technical expert report on the causes of the accident. After having examined the available evidence, the expert concluded that J.C.P. could have prevented the accident if he had complied with the traffic regulations concerning vehicles stopping on public roads at night. Moreover, the first impact had been that between the applicant’s car and the lorry, after which D.I. had crashed into the applicant’s car. Furthermore, D.I. had complied with the traffic regulations and the speed limits, and had kept a safe distance from the car in front of him. He concluded that the applicant and D.I. could not have avoided the accident. 35. The private experts chosen by the applicant and by D.I. to participate in the activities of the expert appointed by the Police Department, leading to the report of 20 December 2007 submitted comments on that report. The expert chosen by the applicant concluded that the applicant’s car had crashed into the lorry after having been hit by D.I.’s car, and that D.I. could have avoided the accident if he had kept a proper lookout and a sufficient distance from the car in front of him. 36. Between 22 and 25 January 2008 the Police Department heard evidence from J.C.P. and two of the witnesses to the accident. It dismissed the applicant’s request for a re-enactment of the circumstances of the accident on the grounds that such a re-enactment could be made only on a theoretical level, by producing a technical expert report which would determine the circumstances in which the traffic accident had taken place. Also, it dismissed the applicant’s requests for a new forensic expert report on his blood alcohol level and for a new technical expert report on the grounds that the Forensic Institute and the expert had dealt with the objectives set. On 4 February 2008 it recommended discontinuing the criminal proceedings. 37. On 18 August 2008 the District Court Prosecutor’s Office dismissed the Police Department’s recommendation. It held that the available evidence was contradictory and insufficient to clarify the circumstances of the case. It therefore ordered the Police Department to instruct the Forensic Institute to produce a forensic expert report on the applicant’s alcohol level. The prosecutor’s office also asked the Police Department to mandate the Bucharest Inter-County Laboratory for Criminological Reports (hereinafter “Laboratory for Criminological Reports”) to produce a technical expert report on the circumstances of the accident. Furthermore, depending on the outcome of the forensic expert report, the Police Department was also instructed to produce a second version of the technical expert report assessing whether the accident could have been avoided given the applicant’s alcohol level at the time of the accident. 38. On 19 February 2009, in response to the Police Department’s 21 October 2008 request for a forensic expert report, the Forensic Institute informed the Police Department that – given the contradictory and incomplete evidence – there were serious doubts as to whether the blood collected and examined belonged to the applicant. 39. On 30 March 2009 the Police Department dismissed the applicant’s request for a new forensic expert report to be produced with regard to his blood alcohol level on the grounds, inter alia, that a new report would not be necessary or conclusive for the case. On the same date the Police Department asked the Laboratory for Criminological Reports to produce the technical expert report ordered by the prosecutor’s office. 40. Following a challenge by the applicant against the Police Department’s decision of 30 March 2009, the District Court Prosecutor’s Office informed the applicant on 30 April 2009 that the criminal investigation file had been sent to the Laboratory for Criminological Reports and that in the absence of the file his challenge could not be examined within the legal time-limit. The applicant’s subsequent complaint of 8 May 2009 against the notification of 30 April 2009 was dismissed by the Prosecutor’s Office attached to the Ploieşti County Court on 16 June 2009 as inadmissible. 41. On 21 April 2009 the Laboratory for Criminological Reports informed the Police Department that, in the light of their extreme workload and the small number of experts available, the technical criminological report in respect of the applicant’s case could not be produced before 2011. 42. Nevertheless, on 29 September 2010 the Laboratory for Criminological Reports produced the aforementioned report. It concluded, inter alia, that given the speed needed to avoid an impact with the lorry, the applicant could not have avoided it. It could not be established whether D.I. could have avoided hitting the applicant’s car, or whether J.C.P. could have prevented the accident, nor was it possible to establish the manner and the order in which the applicant’s car and D.I.’s car had collided. It estimated that the applicant’s and D.I’s cars had probably collided after the applicant’s car had hit the lorry. 43. On 6 January 2011, having noted that the case-file had been returned by the Laboratory for Criminological Reports, the applicant reminded the District Court Prosecutor’s Office of his challenge against the Police Department’s decision of 30 March 2009. 44. On 28 January 2011 the Police Department dismissed a request by the applicant for a new technical expert report to be produced by a court‑appointed expert on the grounds that the report of 29 September 2010 had clarified as far as possible the circumstances of the accident. The applicant’s challenge against the Police Department’s decision was dismissed by the District Court Prosecutor’s Office on 3 March 2011. (b) The prosecutor’s office’s decisions to discontinue the proceedings 45. On 21 February 2011 the District Court Prosecutor’s Office discontinued the criminal proceedings against D.I. and J.C.P. on the grounds that not all the elements of an offence had been established. It held that J.C.P. had parked the lorry correctly. Neither the applicant nor D.I. had adapted their speed to the road conditions. However, the technical expert report of 29 September 2010 had been unable to establish with any certainty whether D.I. could have avoided the accident. Furthermore, according to the forensic expert report of 27 June 2005, the applicant’s injuries had been caused mainly by his car’s head-on impact with the lorry. 46. On 23 March 2011 the higher-level prosecutor of the District Court Prosecutor’s Office dismissed the applicant’s challenge against the decision of 21 February 2011. It held that according to the available evidence the said decision had been lawful. The only blame for the accident that could be established with certainty was that of the applicant. He had been driving his car too fast at night. 47. On 30 March 2011 the applicant appealed to the District Court against the District Court Prosecutor’s Office’s decision of 21 February 2011. He argued, inter alia, that the prosecutor’s office’s decision had relied only on part of the evidence on file. Also, he criticised the expert report of 29 September 2010. 48. Shortly afterwards, the applicant requested the High Court of Cassation and Justice to transfer the case to another court, on the basis of legitimate suspicion regarding the judges of the District Court. The High Court of Cassation and Justice granted the applicant’s request on 21 June 2011, noting the positions of the parties and the fact that the applicant had lodged criminal complaints against the judges and prosecutors from Ploieşti (see paragraph 62 below). It transferred the case to the Bucharest District Court. 49. On 30 September 2011 the Bucharest District Court dismissed the applicant’s objections against the expert report of 29 September 2010 and confirmed the prosecutor’s office’s decision in so far as it discontinued the criminal proceedings against J.C.P. According to the available evidence, the lorry had been legally parked by J.C.P., the applicant first hit the lorry and then his car was hit by D.I. 50. Concerning the criminal proceedings against D.I., the court considered that D.I. had not discharged his lawful duty to drive preventively. The decision to discontinue the proceedings against D.I. was contradictory, considering that the same decision acknowledged that D.I. had breached his legal duty. Also, the conclusion of the expert report of 20 December 2007 that D.I. could not have avoided the accident was at odds with the provisions of the relevant domestic legislation concerning preventive driving. 51. However, in the absence of evidence on file clarifying the existence or non-existence of a causal link between D.I.’s action and the applicant’s injuries, the court could not retain the case for examination. Consequently, it quashed the decision in so far as it had ordered the discontinuation of the proceedings against D.I. and ordered the prosecutor’s office to produce a new forensic expert report determining the possible existence of a direct connection between D.I.’s actions and the applicant’s injuries. It took the view that this new forensic expert report should be able to establish whether the applicant’s injuries had been produced by the impact between his car and the lorry or by the impact between D.I.’s car and the applicant’s car or by a combination of the two events. 52. The District Court noted that the statute of limitations for criminal liability was close to becoming applicable. However, it considered that it could not retain the case for examination and indict D.I. because, in the absence of the requested evidence, the existence of all the elements of an offence could not be established beyond any doubt. 53. D.I.’s appeal on points of fact and of law against this judgment was dismissed as inadmissible by the Bucharest Court of Appeal on 16 January 2012. (a) The conduct of the investigation 54. On 5 April 2012 the District Court Prosecutor’s Office reopened the criminal proceedings against D.I. On 6 April 2012, it asked the Forensic Service to produce the forensic expert report requested by the court. The Forensic Service produced the said report on 11 April 2012 and concluded, inter alia, that a very short period of time had elapsed between the two impacts. It could not be established on the basis of the applicant’s injuries which of the two events had been the cause. A combination of the two impacts was possible. 55. On 25 April 2012 the applicant asked the Court of Appeal Prosecutor’s Office to take over the case on the grounds that the case was complex and the proceedings had been lengthy. The Prosecutor General granted his request on 26 April 2012 on the ground that there was a risk that the statutory limitation period would expire. 56. On 28 May 2012 the Court of Appeal Prosecutor’s Office dismissed the applicant’s respective requests of 12 April and 18 May 2012 for a simulation of the accident to be carried out and for a new forensic expert report to be produced by the Forensic Institute. It held that – in the light of the conclusions of the available reports – the evidence requested by the applicant was neither relevant nor necessary for the case. (b) The prosecutor’s office’s decisions to discontinue the proceedings 57. On 30 May 2012 the Court of Appeal Prosecutor’s Office discontinued the criminal proceedings against D.I. on the grounds that not all the elements of an offence had been established. The forensic expert report of 11 April 2012 could not establish how many of the medical-care days needed by the applicant had been the result of the self-inflicted injuries or of the injuries caused by D.I., or whether the latter’s actions had generated any need at all for medical-care days. Consequently, there was doubt regarding the causal link between D.I.’s actions and the applicant’s injuries, and this doubt worked in D.I.’s favour. 58. On 18 June 2012 the Prosecutor General dismissed the applicant’s challenge against this decision. He held that the statute of limitations had taken effect on 3 June 2012 and that the investigation in the case therefore could not be continued. 59. On 18 July 2012 the applicant asked the District Court to quash the Prosecutor General’s decision of 18 June 2012 and to retain the case for examination. He argued, inter alia, that the statute of limitations had not taken effect. Also, the prosecutor’s office had breached his right to defence by dismissing his request for a review of the expert report dated 11 April 2012 by the Forensic Institute. 60. By final judgment of 21 December 2012 the District Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the decision of the Prosecutor General. The court held that according to the relevant criminal law provisions, including the provision concerning the more lenient criminal law, the statute of limitations in respect of D.I.’s offence had taken effect on 3 June 2012. 61. The applicant’s appeal on points of fact and of law against the judgment was dismissed as inadmissible by the Court of Appeal on 7 March 2013 on the grounds that the judgment of the District Court was not amenable to appeal. However, the Court of Appeal referred to the Constitutional Court a constitutional challenge by the applicant to the relevant legal provisions concerning appeals against prosecutor’s office’s decisions. The latter court dismissed the constitutional challenge as unfounded on 24 September 2013. 62. Between 19 November 2008 and 30 September 2011 the applicant submitted several challenges and several criminal and disciplinary complaints to the relevant hierarchical or supervisory authorities, including the Superior Council of Magistrates, against many of the investigating and judicial authorities involved in the investigation and examination of the cases concerning him. His complaints included allegations of bias, of handling his cases in an abusive and unlawful manner and of favouring D.I. and J.C.P. 63. With one exception (see paragraph 48 above), the applicant’s complaints either were dismissed by the competent authorities on the grounds that no unlawful acts had been committed or in some cases appear to remain pending. In some decisions relating to the applicant’s complaints, such as a decision delivered by the Prosecutor’s Office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice on 10 September 2009 and a decision delivered by the Prosecutor General on 25 October 2011, the competent authorities indicated that the applicant was motivated by a subjective dissatisfaction with the outcome of the investigation, or even by a desire to take revenge on the investigators. 64. On 28 November 2006 the applicant brought proceedings before the Dâmbovița County Court against his car insurance company seeking a judgment ordering the insurance company to comply with its contractual obligation to compensate him for the total loss of the insured vehicle and to pay him non-pecuniary damages for the psychological suffering incurred following the insurance company’s allegedly unjustified refusal to comply with its contractual obligation. The applicant also brought proceedings against the company from which he was leasing his car in order to make the judgment binding on that company. On 16 September 2010 the court ordered that D.I. and J.C.P. be joined as third parties to the proceedings. 65. Eventually, on 27 November 2013, the Dâmbovița County Court dismissed the proceedings initiated by the applicant against the insurance and lease companies on the grounds that the applicant had failed to pay the required judicial stamp duty. 66. The former Romanian Code of Criminal Procedure, which was in force at the material time (until 31 January 2014), provided that the object of a civil action was to hold the defendant civilly liable for damage caused by an act which was the subject matter of the criminal proceedings. A civil action could be joined to the criminal proceedings by the lodging of a civil‑party claim (Article 14). The injured party could lodge such a claim either during the criminal proceedings or before the trial court, up until the day the indictment was read out in court (Article 15). If an injured party had not joined criminal proceedings as a civil party, he or she could initiate separate proceedings before the civil courts for damages caused as a result of the offence. Civil proceedings had to be stayed pending the final judgment of the criminal courts. An injured party who had joined criminal proceedings as a civil party could initiate separate civil proceedings if the criminal proceedings had been stayed. If the criminal proceedings were re‑opened, the civil proceedings opened before the civil courts had to be stayed. An injured party who had initiated civil proceedings could abandon those proceedings and lodge a request (for joining a civil claim to the criminal proceedings) with the investigating authorities or the trial court if the indictment had been made or the trial was resumed after the stay. The civil proceedings could not be abandoned once the civil court had delivered judgment, even if it was not yet a final one (Article 19). An injured party who had joined the criminal proceedings as a civil party could initiate civil proceedings, if the criminal court, by a final judgment, had left the civil action unexamined (Article 20). The final judgment of the criminal court was res judicata for the civil court which was called to examine the civil action in so far as it concerned the existence of the act, the person who had committed it and that person’s guilt. By contrast, the final judgment of the civil court was not res judicata for the investigating authorities and the criminal court in so far as it concerned the existence of a criminal act, the person who had committed it and that person’s guilt (Article 21). 67. The former Romanian Code of Civil Procedure, in force until 14 February 2013, provided that a civil court could suspend the proceedings when criminal proceedings had been instituted for an offence which could have a decisive influence on the judgment that had to be delivered, and that the suspension had to remain in force pending a final judgment in the case which had triggered the suspension (Article 244). The court suspended the civil proceedings by an interlocutory judgment amenable to appeal, which could be lodged as long as the proceedings were suspended (Article 2441). 68. The former Romanian Civil Code, in force until 1 October 2011, provided that any person who was responsible for causing damage to another would be liable to make reparation for it regardless of whether the damage was caused through his or her own actions, through his or her failure to act or through his or her negligence (Articles 998 and 999). 69. Legislative Decree no. 167/1958 on the statute of limitations, in force until 1 October 2011, provided that the right to lodge an action having a pecuniary scope was time-barred unless it was exercised within three years (Articles 1 and 3). The time-limit for lodging a claim for compensation for the damage suffered as a result of an unlawful act started to run from the moment the person became, or should have become, aware of the damage and knew who had caused it (Article 8). However, the time‑limit was interrupted by the lodging of a court action (Article 16). A new term of the statute of limitations started to run after its interruption (Article 17). 70. The new Romanian Civil Code, in force since 1 October 2011, provides that a person with discernment is liable for all damage caused by his actions or inactions and is bound to make full reparation (Article 1349). With regard to the existence of the damage or of the guilt of the perpetrator of the unlawful act, the civil court is not bound by the provisions of criminal law or by the final judgment of acquittal or of closing the criminal trial (Article 1365). The right to lodge an action, including one with a pecuniary scope, is time-barred if not exercised within three years, unless the law provides otherwise (Articles 2500, 2501 and 2517). The time-limit for lodging a claim for compensation for the damage suffered as a result of an unlawful act starts to run from the moment the person becomes, or should become, aware of the damage and knows who caused it (Article 2528). The time-limit can be interrupted by the lodging of a court action or of a civil‑party claim during the criminal proceedings instituted, or before the court, up to the moment when the court starts the judicial examination of the case (Article 2537). If the time-bar is interrupted by the lodging of a civil‑party claim, the interruption remains valid until the order to close or suspend the criminal proceedings or the decision of the court to suspend the proceedings is notified, or until the criminal court has delivered a final judgment (Article 2541).

5. The applicants were born in 1949 and 1950, respectively, and lived in Podgorica, where the second applicant still lives. 6. On 25 July 2000 the applicants’ mother instituted civil proceedings against Podgorička banka Societe Generale Group ad Podgorica (hereinafter “respondent”) seeking the payment of her savings, which she had deposited with the respondent’s legal predecessor Titogradska osnovna banka Titograd. 7. On an unspecified date the applicants continued the above-mentioned proceedings in their mother’s stead as she had passed away in the meantime. 8. On 25 July 2008 the First Instance Court in Podgorica ruled partly in favour of the applicants. 9. On 19 January 2010 the High Court in Podgorica reversed the first‑instance judgment by dismissing the applicants’ claims in their entirety. This judgment was upheld by the Supreme Court on 19 October 2010. 10. On 5 December 2010 the Supreme Court’s judgment was served on the applicants. 11. On 3 February 2011 the applicants lodged a constitutional appeal. 12. On 12 April 2012 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicants’ appeal, which decision was served on the applicants on 29 May 2012.

5. The applicant company is a legal entity registered in Vilnius. 6. In 1994 the Government adopted a resolution establishing the Development Plan for the Curonian Spit National Park (hereafter “the development plan”). The main objectives of the development plan were published in the Official Gazette (Valstybės žinios) (see paragraph 53 below). The development plan explicitly indicated that the buildings with a former military objective, situated in the adjacent dunes, had to be removed (nukeliami) and the natural environment fully restored. 7. In 1998 the Government decided to privatise the former Soviet (later the – Russian Federation) military buildings, without the land, in Juodkrantė, the Neringa Municipality, within the Curonian Spit National Park. There were two military barracks, a canteen, a store house and two sheds. 8. In 1999 the State Property Fund carried out a public auction, at which the applicant company was the only participant and purchased the buildings for 226,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL, approximately 65,454 euros (EUR)). The purchase agreement, which was concluded in February 2000, indicated that the applicant company had to lease the land assigned to the buildings (įsipareigoja išsinuomoti šiam objektui priskirtą žemės sklypą). 9. In September 2001 the Neringa Municipality decided to prepare a detailed plan of the area where the buildings were sited. The purpose of the plan was to designate a plot of land near the existing buildings, providing an opportunity to renovate the buildings or to build new recreational buildings. 10. In August 2002 the authorities in charge of the Curonian Spit National Park decided that renovation of the buildings had to meet the requirements applicable to the whole area. The buildings had to be integrated in the landscape; as they were sited in the forest, the purpose of the use of the land had to be changed. 11. In September 2002 the Klaipėda Region department of environmental protection decided that the purpose of the use of the land, on account of its specific location, could only be changed if the projects were approved by those managing protected areas or with the approval of the Ministry of Environment. In August 2003 the same department rejected a detailed plan submitted by the applicant company, seeking to amend the purpose of the land so that it became a recreational area. 12. The applicant company instituted court proceedings, urging the court to declare unlawful the authorities’ rejection of the detailed plan proposed by the applicant company (see paragraph 11 above) and to oblige them to accept it. 13. The applicant company’s claim was dismissed on 23 October 2003 by the Klaipėda Regional Administrative Court and on 27 January 2004 by the Supreme Administrative Court. The courts held that in accordance with domestic law there was no possibility to build new recreational buildings in the Curonian Spit National Park (see paragraph 53 below). The courts thus held that the applicant company’s detailed plan was contrary to the development plan. 14. In January 2004 the applicant company asked the authorities to conclude a lease agreement in respect of the land assigned to the buildings. The authorities replied that the applicant company had to provide a plan of the land. However, as there was no detailed plan of the area, the land could not be leased. The applicant company was also obliged to pay the land tax. 15. The applicant company instituted court proceedings and complained that it had to pay the land tax but the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court on 30 April 2004 and the Supreme Administrative Court on 17 September 2004 held that it had to pay the land tax because it had been using the land in question. 16. In February 2006 the applicant company asked the authorities to include the land in question in the landscape management recreational zone. In March, the Protected Areas Service replied that the development plan of 1994 indicated that the buildings had to be demolished. It said that it would formulate provisions in the explanatory report regarding the possibility to compensate the applicant company for the buildings. In this case, the applicant company would be able to acquire other buildings owned by the authorities. 17. In November 2011 the applicant company proposed that the land under its buildings be included in the recreational zone and that a compensation mechanism be determined for the buildings if the area had to be redeveloped. In December 2011 the authorities replied that the redevelopment of the area had been determined in 1994 and that they could not agree with the applicant company’s proposals. The authorities indicated that any decision regarding the applicant company’s buildings had to be taken by the Government. 18. In January 2012 the applicant company complained about the refusal of its proposal (see paragraph 17 above) to the State Territorial Planning and Construction Inspectorate. It claimed that it had legitimate expectations that it would be able to use its possessions in an appropriate manner, namely that it would be allowed to reconstruct the buildings without increasing their height. In February 2012 the Inspectorate replied that when approving the Curonian Spit National Park Management Plan (hereafter “the Management Plan”), a decision on a compensation mechanism and time-limits would also have to be taken. 19. In April 2012 the applicant company examined a draft of the Management Plan and found that its buildings were indicated as objects to be redeveloped (rekultivuojami objektai) but that that decision had not been explained. The applicant company asked the authorities to amend the draft so that it included the issue of compensation for the buildings or included the buildings in the landscape management recreational zone. 20. In May 2012 the Ministry of Environment and the Protected Areas Service replied that they had set up a working group to determine a compensation mechanism for the property that had to be expropriated. 21. In May 2012 the applicant company asked the authorities to inform it about the conclusions of the working group. In June 2012 the authorities replied that the working group had to be set up before 29 June 2012. 22. The working group was set on 20 July 2012 and had to provide its proposals before 19 November 2012. 23. In February 2010 the applicant company asked the authorities for planning permission to carry out major renovation work on one of the buildings, namely the canteen. The authorities replied that they could not issue planning permission and that the applicant company had to provide them with the lease agreement in respect of the land assigned to the buildings. Only after such agreement was provided, the authorities would examine the applicant company’s request. 24. The applicant company lodged a complaint with the domestic courts against the authorities’ refusal to issue planning permission for renovation of the canteen. On 30 August 2010 the Klaipėda Regional Administrative Court allowed the claim, holding that the applicant company had been paying the land tax, which was evidence that it had been using the plot of land. 25. On 9 May 2011 the Supreme Administrative Court allowed an appeal lodged by the authorities. It held that the applicant company had not provided any information proving that it was the owner of the plot of land, so the authorities had not been obliged to issue planning permission for renovation of the canteen. The applicant company applied for the reopening of the proceedings. Its request was refused by the Supreme Administrative Court in January 2012. 26. On 6 June 2012 the Government approved the Management Plan by Resolution No. 702 (see paragraph 54 below) and asked the Ministry of Environment to set up a working group to assess the legal grounds for expropriating property for public needs (dėl darbo grupės teisinėms prielaidoms paimti turtą visuomenės poreikiams sudarymo). The working group was set up on 20 July 2012 and its proposals were to be submitted by 19 November 2012. The Management Plan included the reserve land in Juodkrantė, indicating that its purpose was to compensate for the possible losses incurred by lawful owners of buildings that had been earmarked for demolition. 27. On 4 July 2012 the applicant company lodged a complaint with the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court, urging it to revoke the part of the Government Resolution where it had been decided that the buildings at 21 Miško street (the location of the applicant company’s buildings) would be demolished and to order the authorities to amend the Management Plan. The applicant company argued that the issue of compensation and the time-limits for the demolition of property had not even been mentioned in the Management Plan. It also argued that clear indications on compensation for the buildings and for the land tax were needed. 28. On 23 July 2012 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court refused to examine the claim. The reasons were provided in two short paragraphs, which mainly reiterated the provisions of domestic law (see paragraph 62 below). The applicant company had complained about the lawfulness of the Government Resolution. The court considered that issues as to whether acts adopted by the Government were in accordance with the Constitution or laws fell within the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. It stated that it was not within the area of competence of the administrative courts to examine the lawfulness of the activities of, inter alia, the Government (as a collegial institution). As regards an amendment to the Management Plan, the court stated that that was linked to the first part of the claim and thus would not have any legal consequences on the applicant company. 29. In August 2012 the applicant company lodged a separate complaint and asked the Supreme Administrative Court to examine the case on the merits. It claimed that the first-instance court had misinterpreted the provisions of the Law on Administrative Proceedings, and thus limited the applicant company’s right of access to a court. The applicant company thought that when the Government had approved the Management Plan, it had been implementing the function of public administration, and that that document had had a direct influence on the applicant company’s rights and obligations, and was thus an individual legal act that had to be examined before the administrative courts. On 28 November 2012 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the decision of the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court of 23 July 2012. It held that the applicant company had questioned the lawfulness of both the Management Plan and the development plan. The Supreme Administrative Court held that when the Government had approved the Management Plan, it had been carrying out the function of State power. Moreover, the court had already ruled on the issue of the attribution of the Management Plan to the jurisdiction of the administrative courts and had decided that it had not been attributable to those courts (see paragraph 79 below). The court indicated that a legal act could consist of textual and graphic information (tables, drawings, schemes, plans, symbols, emblems). The Constitutional Court had already held that all parts of a legal act were interrelated and were of equal legal effect (see paragraph 77 below). The court further held that the present case was in substance identical to cases already examined by it, and that there were no grounds to reach a different conclusion on the nature of the Management Plan. The court explained that the applicant company could only raise the issue of the lawfulness of the Government Resolution in the context of an individual case regarding violation of its specific rights (by complaining against an individual legal act, by which the Government Resolution and the decisions of the Management Plan would be implemented). It could then ask the court examining that case to refer the issue to the Constitutional Court. The applicant company’s request to organise the procedure to amend the Management Plan so that it included the land in question in the landscape management recreational zone was dismissed because the applicant company had failed to address the authorities or the courts after the approval of the Management Plan. 30. The applicant company then applied for the reopening of the proceedings. On 3 April 2013 the Supreme Administrative Court rejected its application on the grounds that the applicant company’s claims had been dismissed for being outside the administrative court’s jurisdiction and the proceedings could only be reopened if an administrative case had been examined on the merits. 31. In October 2011 the applicant company asked the authorities which documents were necessary for the proposed renovation work. In November 2011 the authorities replied that it was not clear from the applicant company’s request which building (“specific, not complex or non‑specific” (ypatingas, nesudėtingas ar neypatingas), as defined in the domestic law) it was aiming to renovate. The applicant company had indicated major repair work. The authorities stated that a detailed plan was not necessary, the location of the building to be renovated was not important and a document proving ownership of the land (see paragraph 25 above) was not necessary either. 32. In May 2013 the Neringa Municipality inspected the applicant company’s buildings and held that they were in a state of disrepair. It requested that the applicant company appoint a person responsible for the maintenance of the buildings before 3 June 2013, remove the damaged parts of the buildings before 1 July 2013 and renovate the buildings before 31 May 2014. 33. On 30 December 2013 the applicant company asked the authority in charge of the Curonian Spit National Park to issue planning permission to carry out major repair work in order to renovate the buildings. The same month the applicant company received a response that permission could not be issued because it would be contrary to the Management Plan of 6 June 2012 (see paragraph 26 above). 34. The applicant company instituted court proceedings before the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court against the decision of the authority in charge of the Curonian Spit National Park of 30 December 2013 (see paragraph 33 above). It urged the court to order the authority to issue the planning permission required for it to carry out major repair work and to award it EUR 48,489 in respect of pecuniary damage for the land tax and property tax it had paid between 2000 and 2014. 35. In the course of proceedings the applicant company submitted a draft friendly settlement agreement to be concluded by the State, proposing that the State compensate it for the removal of the buildings by providing the applicant company with lease rights to State-owned land measuring 0.7685 hectares in Neringa with construction rights. The State representative refused to agree to the proposal because it was in breach of domestic law (see paragraph 63 below). 36. On 14 November 2016 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court held that the refusal of the authority in charge of the Curonian Spit National Park to issue the planning permission required to carry out major repair work was in accordance with the relevant domestic law. The applicant company also asked the court to refer the question of whether the Management Plan was in accordance with the Constitution to the Constitutional Court. The court acknowledged that the authority’s decision had lacked a seal of approval but held that that shortcoming could not be regarded as grounds to overrule the decision. The court also held that the authority had not acted unlawfully, so there were no grounds for awarding the applicant company pecuniary damages. Moreover, domestic law did not require that the Management Plan contain a compensation mechanism for the buildings to be “removed”. However, the Management Plan in question indicated that an area in Juodkrantė had been designated to compensate for the losses incurred by the lawful owners of the buildings to be removed. Thus the Management Plan provided for the opportunity to compensate for possible losses. As regards the referral to the Constitutional Court, the court held that the applicant company had mistakenly stated that the decision to remove the buildings had only been indicated in the Management Plan. The court stated that it was a commonly known fact that the applicant company’s buildings had been earmarked for removal at the time the purchase agreement had been concluded, and the applicant company, as a diligent legal entity, should have assessed the legal status of the buildings and the restrictions on their use. The legitimate expectations of the applicant company had not been breached as it had not proved the need to refer the issue to the Constitutional Court. The court also pointed out that the buildings had not been taken from the applicant company for the needs of society (see paragraph 45 below). However, when using them the applicant company had to follow the legal regulations, which established that construction in the area in question was not allowed and that it was attempting to protect its rights in the wrong way. The decision that had had legal consequences for the applicant company had been the decision to privatise the buildings and to sell them to the applicant company. 37. In December 2016 the applicant company appealed and asked the Supreme Administrative Court to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court; to overrule the decision of the authority in charge of the Curonian Spit National Park of 30 December 2013; to order the authority to issue the applicant company with the planning permission required to carry out major repair work and to award it EUR 48,489 in respect of pecuniary damage. The proceedings are still ongoing. 38. On 15 April 2015 the Government adopted Resolution No. 389 approving the start of the amendment of the Management Plan. One of the purposes set out in the resolution was to combine the interests of the State and municipalities with those of the relevant natural and legal persons. 39. In June 2016 the applicant company submitted its proposals, namely that the area in which its buildings were located be included in the landscape management zone and that the buildings there should not exceed one storey with an attic. If the proposal to redevelop the land were maintained, the applicant company wanted a clear decision on time-limits for redevelopment and a compensation mechanism. 40. On 20 June 2016 the Protected Areas Service indicated that the land on which the applicant company’s buildings were sited was not affected by the amendment of the Management Plan. It also indicated that the reply could be appealed against to the Supreme Administrative Disputes Commission (“the commission”) or to the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court in one month from its reception. 41. In July 2016 the applicant company lodged a complaint with the commission about the reply of the Protected Areas Service (see paragraph 40 above). The applicant company stated that it had paid EUR 41,887 in land tax and EUR 22,795 in property tax between 2000 and 2014. It also stated that although the Management Plan had entered into force in 2012, it had not been proven that removing the buildings was necessary in the interests of society. There had also been no indications about the exact time-limits and procedure for the removal of the buildings. The applicant company thus asked the commission to overrule the decision of the Protected Areas Service of 20 June 2016 and to order it to amend the Management Plan in accordance with the applicant company’s proposals. 42. In August 2016 the commission closed the case, stating that the issue was not within its competence. The applicant company appealed against that decision, claiming that it had been formal and lacked reasoning, and that the commission had ignored the fact that the Protected Areas Service’s reply of 20 June 2016 had indicated that it was amenable to appeal before the administrative courts or the commission (see paragraph 40 above). 43. On 15 December 2016 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court dismissed the applicant company’s appeal. It held that the applicant company had been represented by professional lawyers and the mere fact that the Protected Areas Service had erroneously indicated that its decisions were amenable to appeal did not discharge the applicant company of the obligation to follow the appeal procedure as laid down in domestic law (see paragraph 50 below). The court held that the applicant company had to address the State Territorial Planning and Construction Inspectorate with its complaint. 44. In January 2017 the applicant company appealed before the Supreme Administrative Court. The proceedings are still ongoing.

5. The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Klaipėda. 6. On 19 February 2012 V.M. complained to the Klaipėda police that on that day he had been beaten up in the stairwell of his residential building by two teenagers, fifteen-year-old A.K. (the applicant’s son) and seventeen‑year-old V.O. He was examined by a court medical expert, who found bruises and swelling on his face, concussion, contusions in the chest area and a resulting inflammation of the right lung, and a compression fracture of the spine. The injuries were categorised as a minor health impairment (nesunkus sveikatos sutrikdymas). The police opened a pre-trial investigation. 7. When interviewed by the police, V.M. stated that at about 5 p.m. on 19 February 2012 he had heard a noise in the stairwell of his residential building and had gone out of his apartment to check. He had seen four teenagers smoking cigarettes and listening to loud music on a mobile phone, and there had been cans of beer at the window. V.M. had asked the teenagers to leave the building and two of them had done so. However, A.K. had refused to leave, so V.M. had threatened to call the police. Then A.K. had approached V.M. and punched him in the face. That had angered V.M., so he had blocked the exit of the stairwell and had tried to grab A.K. He had managed to grab A.K. by the coat, shaken him and told him to leave the building. Then V.O. had approached V.M. and tried to hit him but V.M. had managed to dodge the punches. At that moment A.K. had hit V.M. in the head and kicked him in the back, as a result of which V.M. had fallen down a flight of stairs. While he had been lying down, A.K. and V.O. had kicked him several times in the back and the face. V.M. had screamed for his wife to call the police and had eventually lost consciousness. He had come to in his apartment and the police had soon arrived. 8. The applicant’s son, A.K., was interviewed as a witness, with the applicant present during the interview. A.K. stated that on the day in question he and his three friends, including V.O., had entered the stairwell of a residential building in their neighbourhood to get warm. They had stayed in the stairwell for a while, talking and listening to music on a mobile phone, but they had not been smoking or drinking alcohol. After some time, V.M., whom they had not known, had come out of his apartment and had begun yelling at the teenagers. A.K. had asked him to stop yelling, after which V.M. had grabbed A.K. by the neck and kicked him in the legs. A.K. had stood up and tried to leave but had been unable to do so because V.M. had been standing in the way. V.M. had tried to grab A.K. and punch him, so A.K. had punched V.M. twice in self-defence. Then V.M. had grabbed A.K.’s leg and A.K. had fallen down. When he had stood up, he had seen V.M. holding V.O. by the neck and trying to drag him inside the apartment. V.O. had asked A.K. to push V.M. and A.K. had done so. V.O. had managed to free himself and had pushed V.M. as well, and V.M. had fallen on the ground. Then A.K. and V.O. had run away. A.K. stated that V.M. had been the first to hit him and that he had hit V.M. only in self-defence. As a result, A.K. had broken his right hand, although he was not sure at which exact moment that had happened. He also stated that he had not seen V.O. hit V.M. 9. V.O.’s mother joined the proceedings as her son’s representative and was questioned as a witness. She stated that after finding out about the allegations against her son, she had spoken to V.M. and the latter had told her that the conflict had broken out between him and A.K., whereas V.O. had only intervened later to help A.K. V.M. had also told her that A.K. had punched him first. She further stated that her son had likewise told her that he had not hit V.M. but had only held him. 10. The police held a confrontation between V.M. and A.K., with the applicant present, during which they both essentially repeated their previous statements (see paragraphs 7 and 8 above). The police also accompanied them both to the location of the incident (the stairwell) and they each showed how their claimed version of events had unfolded. 11. On an unspecified date V.O. was charged with causing a minor health impairment and a breach of public order under Articles 138 § 1 and 284 § 1 of the Criminal Code. 12. On 19 November 2012 the Klaipėda District Court held an oral hearing in which A.K. was questioned as a witness and the applicant did not participate. A.K. essentially repeated his previous testimony (see paragraph 8 above). 13. On 27 November 2012 the Klaipėda District Court convicted V.O. of the charges against him. The court considered that even though V.O. had denied his guilt, it had been proved by other evidence: V.O. had admitted that he had participated in the altercation with V.M. and that he had instructed A.K. to push V.M., and credible witness testimony had shown that “the victim had been assaulted not only by [A.K.] but by [V.O.] as well”. The court held that V.O. had committed the criminal offence while acting together with a minor below the age of criminal responsibility (A.K.), that he had encouraged A.K. to assault V.M., and that he had not stopped A.K. from doing so; accordingly he had to assume all the consequences of the criminal activity in question. V.O. was sentenced to one year of restriction of liberty and ordered to study or work during that period. The court allowed in part a civil claim lodged by V.M. for damages in respect of the assault, and ordered V.O. to pay him 240 Lithuanian litai (LTL) (approximately 70 euros (EUR)) in respect of pecuniary damage and LTL 2,000 (approximately EUR 580) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 14. V.M. appealed against that judgment, asking that the award be increased in respect of non-pecuniary damage. On 21 March 2013 the Klaipėda Regional Court partly allowed his appeal. It upheld V.O.’s conviction and increased the award in respect of non-pecuniary damage to LTL 5,000 (approximately EUR 1,450). 15. In May 2013 V.M. lodged a civil claim against the applicant and her son. V.M. submitted that A.K.’s violent actions had impaired his health and had caused him physical and psychological suffering. He claimed LTL 20,000 (approximately EUR 5,800) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage jointly from the applicant and A.K. 16. The Klaipėda District Court instructed V.M. to amend his claim and to indicate the specific actions of A.K. which had allegedly caused him harm. In June 2013 V.M. lodged an amended claim in which he submitted that A.K. had punched him in the face, arms and head, had kicked him in the back, as a result of which he had fallen down a flight of stairs, and that while he had been lying down, A.K. had kicked him again several times. 17. The applicant and her son contested the claim. They argued that V.M. could not have relied on the courts’ findings in the criminal proceedings against V.O. because A.K. had not been convicted in those proceedings and had only had the status of a witness. They also argued that V.M. should have submitted his claim not only against A.K.’s mother (the applicant) but also against A.K.’s father, who they argued was equally responsible for the actions of his minor son. Lastly they submitted that the amount of the claim was excessive because A.K. was a student and did not have any income, and the applicant was unemployed. 18. At an oral hearing held on 8 November 2013, V.M. stated that A.K. had been the one who had started the assault. V.M. submitted that the courts in the criminal proceedings had ruled that V.O. and A.K. had committed the assault together (see paragraph 13 above); thus, even though A.K. could not have been held criminally liable because of his age, his actions had been established by a final court judgment. Meanwhile the applicant and her son’s lawyer argued that the judgments given in the criminal proceedings against V.O. did not have a res judicata effect (neturi prejudicinės galios) in the present civil proceedings because the criminal and the civil proceedings had concerned different parties and the courts in the criminal proceedings had not made any findings as to A.K.’s guilt in the operative part of their judgments. The lawyer also submitted that in the criminal proceedings it had not been identified which injuries had been caused by V.O. and which by A.K. 19. On 28 November 2013 the Klaipėda District Court partly allowed V.M.’s claim. Referring to the material in the criminal case file, the court considered it established that A.K. had punched V.M. in the face, arms and head and had kicked him in the back, as a result of which V.M. had fallen down a flight of stairs, and that while he had been lying down, A.K. had kicked him again several times (see paragraphs 7 and 13 above). It also referred to the findings of the court medical expert who had examined V.M. and determined the injuries caused to him during the assault (see paragraph 6 above). The court further stated: “When questioned during the pre-trial investigation, [A.K.] confessed that he had hit the victim and had pushed him down the stairs, stating that he had done so in self‑defence ... As a result of [A.K.’s] actions, the victim had suffered harm. These facts were established in the course of criminal proceedings, during the pre-trial investigation (Article 182 § 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure); the defendants have not provided any facts that could disprove [A.K.’s] guilt, so there is no need to prove these established facts with regard to [A.K.’s] unlawful actions and guilt (šių nustatytų faktų dėl atsakovo [A.K.] neteisėtų veiksmų ir kaltės nereikia įrodinėti).” 20. The court further held that there had been a causal link between A.K.’s actions and the harm suffered by V.M., so there were sufficient grounds for awarding V.M. damages. It dismissed the defendants’ argument that A.K.’s father should have been one of the defendants, taking note of V.M.’s argument that A.K.’s father lived separately from his family and that V.M. did not have any information about him, and stating that the civil claimant had had the freedom to choose the defendants against whom he wished to submit his claim. 21. The court, having regard to A.K.’s young age and the applicant’s difficult financial situation, allowed V.M.’s civil claim in part and awarded him LTL 2,000 (approximately EUR 580) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and LTL 1,500 (approximately EUR 435) in legal costs. The court ordered that the above amounts were to be paid by A.K., and that if he did not have sufficient assets they were to be paid by the applicant. The applicant’s obligation to pay those amounts would end when A.K. turned eighteen years old or when he obtained sufficient assets (see paragraph 32 below). 22. The applicant and her son appealed against that decision, raising essentially the same arguments as those presented in their initial reply to the civil claim (see paragraph 17 above). V.M. also submitted an appeal in which he asked for his claim to be allowed in full and to be awarded LTL 20,000 (approximately EUR 5,800) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. 23. On 28 April 2014 the Klaipėda Regional Court dismissed the appeal lodged by the applicant and her son. It stated: “The defendants in their appeal submitted that the judgment [in the criminal proceedings against V.O.] had not assessed [A.K.’s] guilt in respect of the criminal offence and that the court could thus not have relied on the circumstances established in the judgment of 27 November 2012. This argument cannot be accepted. The Klaipėda District Court’s judgment of 27 November 2012 and the Klaipėda Regional Court’s judgment of 21 March 2013 established that unlawful actions had been committed by the defendant [A.K.] as well. The first-instance court correctly stated that the circumstances which had been established in the course of the criminal proceedings could be relied on and that there was no need to prove them (baudžiamojoje byloje nustatytomis aplinkybėmis galima vadovautis ir jų nebereikia įrodinėti) (Article 182 § 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure). The [court] notes that the fact that the defendant has not been prosecuted in criminal proceedings does not preclude his civil liability ... The first-instance court drew the well-founded conclusion that the conditions for the civil liability of the defendants were present: unlawful actions, fault, a causal link determining civil liability, and the damage caused to [V.M.].” 24. The court partly upheld the appeal submitted by V.M. and increased the award in respect of non-pecuniary damages to LTL 8,000 (approximately EUR 2,320). The applicant and A.K. were also ordered to pay the legal expenses incurred by V.M. at the appellate stage, amounting to LTL 300 (approximately EUR 87). 25. Subsequently the applicant and her son lodged two appeals on points of law in which they argued that the decisions of the first-instance and the appellate courts had been contrary to the law and the principles of fairness, reasonableness and good faith. In particular, they submitted that awarding a higher amount in respect of non-pecuniary damage against them (EUR 2,320) than had been awarded against V.O. (EUR 1,450), who had been convicted in criminal proceedings had been contrary to the law and unjustified. However, on 29 May 2014 and 31 July 2014 the Supreme Court declined to examine the appeals as raising no important legal issues.

5. The applicant was born in 1971 and is serving a prison sentence in Vilnius. 6. The applicant lived with V.K. They raised two boys, Ra.K. and Ro.K. (also see paragraphs 54-58 below), born in 2002 and 2004 respectively. 7. In April 2011 the applicant’s and V.K.’s family was put on the list of families at social risk. Both parents were later warned for not having fulfilled their parental duties properly. According to the social services, later that year V.K. was allocated social housing; she had no property of her own. 8. By a judgment of 20 October 2011, the Kaunas City District Court convicted the applicant of having caused physical pain to each of the boys (Article 140 § 2 of the Criminal Code) and of attempting to influence a witness (Article 233 § 1 of the Criminal Code – see paragraph 69 below). The court established that in 2009 the applicant had several times been physically violent towards Ra.K. and Ro.K. The court relied on statements given by social workers who had seen bruises on the boys’ bodies and in whom the children – who since 15 October 2009 had been living in a care institution – the “Pastogė” children’s home, because V.K. could not guarantee their safety at home – had confided. The court also referred to the testimony which the children had given to forensic psychiatrists, statements given by police officers, and V.K.’s testimony. The psychiatrists had concluded that the children were afraid of the applicant; they had openly told them that he had been beating them. The psychiatrists recommended that the children not be questioned further [during those criminal proceedings] in order to avoid the applicant exerting an influence on the children’s testimony, bearing in mind the fact that – while visiting the children in the children’s home – he had already asked them not to recount his actions. The psychiatrists had no objective or subjective information indicating that V.K. had exerted any influence on the children’s testimony. 9. The Kaunas City District Court also established that on 4 November 2010 the applicant had caused negligible health impairment to V.K. by inflicting bruises and scratches to her head, belly, elbow and knee, and that although a pre-trial investigation in that regard had been discontinued, V.K. had been informed that it was possible for her to bring a private prosecution against the applicant under Article 140 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 69 below). The court also established that the applicant had attempted to influence V.K. to change her testimony by threatening her, even after the start of the court proceedings in the case concerning the alleged physical violence against the two boys. Having noted that the applicant had three prior convictions, the records of which had not yet expired, the court found him guilty and sentenced him to deprivation of liberty for ten months. However, given that pending the trial the applicant had been detained from 29 November 2010 until 20 October 2011, the court deemed that he had already served his sentence. Accordingly, the applicant was released in the courtroom. 10. As it transpires from the documents in the case file, in July 2011 V.K. lodged a complaint with a prosecutor, alleging that the applicant had shown pornographic films to their children and had sexually abused their children in their home. When questioned by the pre-trial investigator on 29 July 2011, V.K. stated that the abuse had taken place during the period between 24 April 2009, when V.K. had been treated as an in-patient in hospital for an illness unrelated to this case, and 15 October 2009, when V.K. had moved to a social care home (nakvynės namai) in Kaunas and the children had been placed in the Pastogė children’s home. V.K. also stated that she had learned about this abuse on 27 May 2011, when her sons had confided in her after confiding in her family members Z.S. and V.F. (see also paragraph 14 below). 11. On 29 July 2011 V.K. confessed to the pre-trial investigator that Ra.K. was not the biological son of the applicant and that she and the applicant had only agreed that they would give the applicant’s surname to Ra.K. in order to obtain social benefits (see also paragraphs 54-58 below). 12. V.K. was again questioned on 18 August 2011. She confirmed that she had known about her obligation to deliver the children for questioning on 22 August 2011 and promised to deliver them (see paragraph 17 below). 13. In summer 2011 the investigators found in the applicant’s possession a number of DVD disks of pornographic content, containing one file depicting a child under the age of fourteen, and fifteen files depicting a child under the age of eighteen. 14. On 5 August 2011 the investigator questioned a number of witnesses. Among those witnesses was Z.S. (the mother of the husband of V.K.’s sister). Another witness was V.F. (Z.S.’s daughter). These two witnesses stated that they had learned on 27 May 2011 from Ra.K. and Ro.K. that the applicant had showed them pornographic films and that he had also abused them sexually by asking them to perform oral sex on him – as shown in those films. Also on 27 May 2011 Z.S. and V.F. had given the same information to the boys’ mother, V.K. 15. When questioned, A.A., one of the boys’ schoolteacher, told the pre‑trial investigator that she had not noticed any alarming changes in the boys’ behaviour. Neither had she observed any improper behaviour on the part of the applicant towards that boy. Another witness, a former work colleague of the applicant, stated that the applicant had raised the boys together with V.K.; he added that they had had family quarrels, but that that was nothing exceptional. According to that witness, the applicant had taken good care of the two boys. 16. On 17 August 2011 the prosecutor wrote to V.K., informing her that the two boys were to be questioned by the pre-trial investigation judge. V.K. was informed that she had an obligation to bring her sons for questioning and that she had a right to be present during that questioning. 17. On 22 August 2011 the applicant’s sons were questioned at the premises of the Kaunas police. The records indicate that persons who arrived at the police station were: a Kaunas City District Court judge, the prosecutor, the pre-trial investigator, a representative of the child welfare authority, a psychologist from Kaunas police and the boys’ mother, V.K. Those people agreed that the boys would be questioned and that a video and audio recording would be made. The questioning itself took place in a special room for the questioning of children (vaikų apklausos kambarys); the boys were questioned by the psychologist, and it appears that no other person was in that room during the boys’ questioning. The psychologist assured the boys that the content of their testimony would be known only to the judge. The boys described the details of how the applicant had sexually abused them in 2009. One of them, Ro.K., who at that time was seven years old, stated that “I am aware that I should not perjure myself (žinau, kad nebūtų melagingų parodymų)” because “my mother said so”. He also told the psychologist that the mother had also told him that “if I and my brother say nothing, and are silent, then our father [the applicant] would be released from prison, and our mother would be put in prison”. The boy said that he was not angry with his father; he only wanted for his father not to know where he and his brother lived. 18. On 31 August 2011 the applicant was charged with the sexual assault of a young child (Article 150 § 4 of the Criminal Code). On 26 May 2012 final criminal charges under Articles 150 § 4, 153 and 309 §§ 2 and 4 were served on the applicant (see paragraph 69 below). 19. On 23 September 2011 the Kaunas City District Court ordered a forensic psychological examination of Ra.K. and Ro.K. Two forensic experts – a child psychologist and a child psychiatrist – then questioned the boys in Vilnius between 20 October and 21 November 2011. The experts concluded that the children were able to remember events that had taken place in 2009. The children had no tendency to fantasise or to imagine things. The psychologists, however, emphasised that the boys’ testimony could have been affected by the long period of time – two years – that had elapsed since the events in question. Moreover, both parents exerted both direct and indirect sway over the children: V.K.’s direct and indirect influence was illustrated by Ro.K.’s statements that his mother would go to prison if he stayed silent (see paragraph 17 above), and the applicant’s indirect impact on the children was illustrated by the fact that they feared physical violence. The psychologists recommended that the boys not take part any further in the pre-trial investigation, and nor in the court proceedings, because this would be too stressful for them. 20. On 23 November 2011 the applicant was arrested. He was searched and placed in pre-trial detention, where he remained until his conviction was upheld by the Court of Appeal on 9 December 2013 (see paragraph 51 below). 21. When questioned by the pre-trial investigator on 24 November 2011, V.K. stated that she was very much afraid of the applicant. She noted that in the past he had been physically violent towards her and the children. Having learned that he had been released from prison on 20 October 2011 (see paragraph 9 in fine above), she feared retaliation and that he would search for her and for the children in order to make them change their testimony in the proceedings regarding the alleged sexual violence. 22. On 25 November 2011 V.K. gave her agreement to the child welfare authority that both children would be placed in a care institution. 23. As later confirmed by the child welfare authority during the criminal proceedings in respect of the applicant, on 5 December 2011 the Kaunas Municipality gave temporary guardianship of Ra.K. and Ro.K. (laikinoji globa) to a children’s home (vaikų globos namai) in Kėdainiai, because from 1 December 2011 onwards V.K. could not be located and the children’s parents could not take care of them. The children were placed in the children’s home in Kėdainiai. 24. In December 2011 the applicant asked the prosecutor to organise a confrontation (akistata) between him and V.K. The prosecutor refused the request, considering that there were no essential discrepancies between their respective testimony. Moreover, according to the prosecutor, “V.K.’s testimony [was] not the only evidence on the basis of which the question of the applicant’s criminal liability would be decided”. The prosecutor likewise denied the applicant’s request that a confrontation be staged between him and the witnesses V.F. and J.S., deeming that there were no essential contradictions between their and the applicant’s respective versions of events. By a final ruling of 8 February 2012 a pre-trial investigation judge of the Kaunas City District Court upheld the prosecutor’s decision. 25. On 11 January 2012 the applicant asked the prosecutor to be allowed to take a polygraph test, in order to prove that he had been “smeared” by V.K. The prosecutor dismissed the request, stating that the Code of Criminal Procedure did not permit polygraph test results to count as evidence. 26. On 20 March 2012 the applicant lodged a written request for the prosecutor to stage a confrontation between him and the two children. He argued that they had incriminated the applicant when questioned by the experts only because they had been swayed by their mother. The applicant accordingly requested that a new forensic examination of the children be undertaken now that the boys resided at the children’s home and were free of their mother’s influence. He drew the prosecutor’s attention to the civil court’s decision of 2 November 2011 whereby the court had acknowledged that V.K. had acted dishonestly (see paragraphs 54-58 below). The applicant also asked the prosecutor to obtain the applicant’s previous criminal file (see paragraphs 8 and 9 above), alleging that already in the course of those proceedings witnesses had stated that V.K. had been “coaching” (moko) the children what to say to the authorities, as was the case in the present proceedings. The applicant emphasised that the case-file material in respect of the previous criminal case also contained the records of the questioning of his children, and that from that material it was plain that V.K. had been lying. He also asserted that the earlier material proved that in autumn 2009 V.K. had already planned to accuse the applicant of sexually abusing his children. The applicant requested that a psychiatric examination (psichiatrinė ekspertizė) be performed on V.K. 27. On 6 April 2012 the prosecutor refused the applicant’s requests. He considered that a confrontation between the applicant and the two children could be a traumatic experience for the latter. The prosecutor also considered that there were no grounds for ordering a fresh psychiatric examination of the two boys, because, in his view, the earlier expert reports had been properly reasoned, comprehensive, and had raised no doubts. The prosecutor also refused the applicant’s request that the material relating to his previous criminal conviction be added to the file pertaining to the instant case, noting that the judgment regarding his earlier conviction (nuosprendis) had been added to his case file, but holding that other material from the earlier criminal case file had not constituted evidence directly relevant to the circumstances being investigated in the instant criminal case. Lastly, the prosecutor considered that there was no information in the file which could lead one to doubt the testimony of V.K. or her credibility. 28. On 23 April 2012 that decision was upheld by the pre-trial investigation judge of the Kaunas County District Court, whose decision was non‑appealable. The judge considered that the prosecutor was free to choose which pre-trial investigation actions to undertake, and that he did not have to comply with the parties’ requests which were not obligatory to him (Article 178 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, see paragraph 70 below). For the judge, the prosecutor’s decision refusing the applicant’s request had been properly reasoned and lawful. 29. In reply to the applicant’s complaint about V.K.’s lack of interest in her sons, in April 2012 the Children’s Rights Ombudsman, E.Ž., informed him that as at that time V.K. had not visited their sons at the children’s home, she was not interested in their lives, and she was keeping her residential address secret. The child welfare specialists of Kaunas and Kėdainiai tried to establish V.K.’s residential address and intended to ask a court to limit V.K.’s parental rights in respect of the two boys. 30. On 28 May 2012 the pre-trial investigator repeatedly refused to join the material contained in the applicant’s earlier case file (see paragraphs 8 and 9 above) to the file relating to the instant case of sexual violence. She reasoned that joining the two sets of material “[was] not possible because in [the earlier] criminal case the pre-trial investigation had been terminated and that case [had] already been examined in court”. 31. By a final decision of 1 June 2012 the Kaunas City District Court refused the applicant’s request for the prosecutor to be removed as not impartial. 32. On 9 August 2012 the prosecutor drew up a bill of indictment, charging the applicant with having systemically and on an unknown number of occasions using physical violence towards his sons and then, having subjected them to his will, forced them to orally appease his passion, which amounted to a crime under Article 150 § 4 of the Criminal Code. The prosecutor also charged the applicant under Article 309 §§ 2 and 4 of the Criminal Code with possession of pornographic materials depicting children and with showing those materials to Ro.K. and Ra.K. (see paragraph 69 below). 33. Once the criminal file was transferred to the Kaunas Regional Court, the applicant – during a hearing of 17 September 2012 – complained that the prosecutor had ignored his numerous requests, including a request for him to ensure that V.K. would not accompany their children to their examination by the experts (see paragraphs 16 and 17 above). He maintained that V.K. should be questioned in court. 34. On 4 October 2012 the Kaunas Regional Court considered that V.K. should be questioned, “because her testimony [was] important for the criminal case”. When V.K. did not appear at three court hearings held on 17 September, 27 September and 4 October, the court ordered the police to find her and bring her in. 35. In October 2012 the police informed the court that they could not locate V.K., because since 15 February 2012 she had been on the list of persons without a place of residence and no one had answered the door at V.K.’s last known place of residence. She could not be reached by telephone either. The police noted that “recently” V.K. had been hiding from the pre-trial investigator in the applicant’s case and had not given details of how she could be reached. 36. On 20 September 2012 the applicant asked the trial court for two social workers, J.J. and A.P., who had seen his family in 2009, be summoned and examined. The trial court secured their attendance, and on 4 October 2012 those two social workers testified that they had not observed the children talking about sex or stating that they had been violated sexually. On the same day the applicant asked that another witness, D.V., who was a family friend, be examined. The court granted the request and D.V. testified in court that there had been fights between the applicant and V.K., but that the children had not shown any interest of a sexual nature. 37. On 23 November 2012, in court proceedings that were closed to protect the rights of the children, the Kaunas Regional Court found the applicant guilty of sexual violence against his children. The applicant and his lawyer took part in the court hearings. The applicant questioned the two witnesses, Z.S. and V.F., the cross-examination of whom the prosecutor had refused earlier (see paragraphs 14 and 24 above). Other witnesses – Ra.K.’s and Ro.K.’s teachers and their guardians at the children’s home – testified in court that the two boys were serious and honest. Those witnesses stated that the boys had told them that the applicant had been physically violent, but that they had not mentioned having been abused sexually. The applicant did not confess to committing sexual abuse. However, the court found him guilty on the basis of the testimony that Ra.K. and Ro.K. had given to the pre-trial investigation judge on 22 August 2011 (see paragraph 17 above). The trial court also gave weight to the testimony that the boys had given to the child psychologist and the child psychiatrist (see paragraph 19 above). The trial court noted that, according to those experts, Ra.K. and Ro.K. were not prone to fantasising; the children were also able to understand and remember the facts on which the charges of sexual assault against the applicant were based. The court’s verdict was also based on the testimony of Z.S. and V.F. In reply to the applicant’s argument that V.K. had pressured her sons to testify against him, the trial court noted that Z.S. and V.F. had been the first people the boys had told about the abuse; they had only told their mother later. There was no evidence in the file that V.K. had influenced the boys’ testimony. Lastly, the trial court noted that the applicant had acknowledged having been physically violent towards his sons, which was confirmed by the earlier judgment under which the applicant had been convicted of acts of violence (see paragraphs 8 and 9 above). 38. The trial court convicted the applicant of committing sexual assault against a young child (Article 150 § 4 of the Criminal Code) and of possession of pornographic material depicting a child or presenting a person as a child (Article 309 § 2 of the Criminal Code). He was sentenced to eleven years of deprivation of liberty. 39. However, the trial court acquitted the applicant of crimes listed under Articles 153 and 309 § 4 of the Criminal Code because the applicant had denied committing those crimes and it was impossible to establish from the children’s testimony which pornographic films the applicant had shown to the children and when he had shown them. 40. The applicant appealed, insisting that the trial court should not have relied on his sons’ testimony because they had been swayed by their mother, who had been living with them at the relevant time and who had accompanied them to the questioning of 22 August 2011 (see paragraph 17 above). The applicant emphasised the fact that V.K. had “consciously (sąmoningai)” avoided coming into contact with the law enforcement authorities. He was also dissatisfied with the fact that during both the pre‑trial investigation and the trial the authorities had denied him the possibility to add to the new criminal file the material from the previous criminal proceedings (see paragraphs 8 and 9 above). The applicant claimed that the reports by child psychiatrists ordered during proceedings in respect of the earlier case against the applicant contained information about the applicant’s behaviour towards his children in 2009. He stated that in those reports the psychologists had confirmed that the children had described the situation openly, without hiding anything. He could be understood as implying that at that time the children had not mentioned any sexual violence exerted against them by the applicant. The applicant also submitted that the expert reports produced in 2011 had been inconclusive, but had not been examined at the courtroom. 41. By letters of 28 December 2012 and 20 May and 23 August 2013, as well as during the appellate court hearing of 25 October 2013, the applicant asked the Court of Appeal to make sure that V.K. would be summoned to appear before the Court of Appeal so that he could question her. The applicant pointed out that he had been wrongfully accused of exerting sexual violence towards his children by V.K., and that, because he had not been able to have her cross-examined, he had not had a fair trial. 42. On 20 May 2013 the applicant also provided the Court of Appeal with (i) a number of documents from the Pastogė children’s home and (ii) V.K.’s written explanations to the child welfare authorities. The applicant submitted that those documents proved that V.K. had intended to wrongfully accuse the applicant, and that she had “got rid of the children (atsikratė) immediately after (vos tik po)” they had been questioned and the expert examinations had been concluded, on 23 November 2011 (see paragraphs 19, 22 and 23 above). The applicant asked the Court of Appeal to add those documents to the case file. 43. During the hearing of 6 June 2013 before the Court of Appeal the applicant reiterated his request that V.K. be summoned for examination. He provided documents relating to V.K.’s place of work and the conclusions reached by the Children’s Rights Ombudsman (see paragraph 29 above). The appellate court added those documents to the file. The prosecutor agreed with the applicant’s request for V.K. to be summoned and examined. The prosecutor noted that since the applicant had provided documents regarding V.K.’s place of work, “it was possible to take measures to determine V.K.’s place of residence and to try to summon her for examination before the court”. The Court of Appeal decided to examine the evidence, and to grant the applicant’s request and to summon V.K. for examination. 44. Exercising his right to conduct his defence, the applicant also lodged a number of other requests. However, the Court of Appeal refused each and every one of them. In particular, the court considered irrelevant the applicant’s request for the summons of one of his children’s school teacher, his neighbours, and doctors who had treated V.K. because although those people could provide information about interaction within the applicant’s family, “none of them could provide information about the circumstances of the crime committed”. Similarly, although requested by the applicant, so far it had not been necessary to call and question the forensic experts who had examined the two children (see paragraph 19 above), because the reports issued by those experts had been provided and the court had a right to examine them and to rely on them. The Court of Appeal considered that it could always come back to the applicant’s request for the cross-examination of the experts in court, should it consider that those expert reports needed clarifying. As for the applicant’s request that certain documents be added (see paragraph 42 above), the appellate court stated that those concerned only V.K.’s personality, and were therefore unrelated to the applicant’s crime. Lastly, the appellate court deemed that the applicant’s request for the addition to the current case file of materials – the minutes of court hearings and the children’s psychological reports from the applicant’s earlier criminal case file (see paragraph 8 above) – was without purpose (netikslingas) because those materials concerned the applicant’s earlier crime. 45. During the appellate court hearing of 25 October 2013 the applicant repeated his request for V.K. to be cross-examined in court, stating that this was indispensable if his right to a fair trial were to be respected. In his view, she had accused him of committing sexual crimes against the children and had coached them to lie in this respect. He underlined that he had had no possibility to question V.K. before the trial court. 46. The Court of Appeal noted that a summons had been sent to V.K. to two different addresses in Kėdainiai and in Kaunas, but that these had been returned to the court marked “does not live at this address (negyvena)” and “uncollected (neatsiėmė)”. Another summons had been sent to V.K.’s workplace; however, the office administrator had explained in writing that V.K. was on maternity leave. The Court of Appeal also had information that V.K. was registered as living within the Kaunas Municipality, but no specific residential address for her was registered. The social insurance authorities informed the court that V.K. was on maternity leave and was receiving maternity benefits, but there was no information about her place of residence. 47. The applicant’s lawyer also asked the appellate court to take measures to ensure that V.K. be found. He noted that the Court of Appeal had initially realised (suprato) that V.K. had to be examined (see paragraph 43 above), but had later backtracked on that issue. The lawyer also considered that the Court of Appeal should have reopened the examination of the experts’ conclusions, because, in his view, they also contained certain statements by the experts acquitting the applicant. 48. The prosecutor considered that the case could be heard without V.K., “because the court [had] exhausted all the possibilities” for ensuring that she be found and examined before the court. 49. Having discussed the issue, the Court of Appeal decided that the proceedings could continue without V.K.’s participation, deeming that the court had taken all possible measures to locate her. The Court of Appeal also stated that the trial court had not relied on V.K.’s testimony when finding the applicant guilty. 50. The appellate court then proceeded to examine the evidence in the case, which, as it transpires from the minutes of the Court of Appeal hearing, consisted of reading out the forensic expert reports (see paragraph 19 above). It also dismissed the applicant’s request for the court records (bylos teisiamojo posedžio protokolus) of the applicant’s criminal case of 2011 (see paragraph 8 above) to be added to the evidence. Although the applicant submitted that those records showed that at that time V.K. had lied to the court, and also asserted that at that time the prosecutor had noted that V.K. had had a prior conviction for perjury, the Court of Appeal considered that that document had no direct connection with the present case. Furthermore, the copies of the court records, as provided by the applicant, had not been certified as authentic, which constituted further grounds for rejecting the applicant’s request. 51. By a ruling of 9 December 2013 the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s appeal. It observed that notwithstanding the trial court’s and the appellate court’s efforts to summon V.K. for questioning, she could not be located. Even so, the applicant’s guilt was proved by other pieces of evidence in the case, all which were consistent with each other. According to the psychologists, Ra.K. and Ro.K. did not have a tendency to fantasise, which would have precluded them from accurately depicting the facts. When questioned by the pre-trial investigation judge and by forensic experts, the boys were mature enough to understand what had happened to them, given that they were then seven and nine years old. Even though the applicant asserted that Ra.K. and Ro.K. had been influenced by their mother, V.K., the applicant’s power over them was equally strong. The court dismissed the applicant’s accusation that V.K. had had a motive for inciting the boys to accuse their father of sexual violence and for influencing their testimony. For the appellate court, even though V.K. had accompanied the boys to their questioning, she had not taken part either in the boys’ questioning by the pre-trial investigation judge or in their questioning by the forensic experts. Likewise, although the pre-trial investigation had been opened on the basis of a complaint by V.K. in July 2011, the charges against the applicant had been brought only after the boys’ questioning in August 2011, when credibility of V.K.’s complaint had been verified. Even so, the trial court had not relied on V.K.’s testimony in finding the applicant guilty. The Court of Appeal also found that the statements given by the witnesses Z.S. and V.F. about what the applicant’s children had told them were basically identical and consistent with other evidence, such as psychiatrists’ reports; therefore, there was no reason not to believe those statements. Even though the applicant had tried to challenge those two witnesses as not being impartial, asserting that they were members of V.K. family, the appellate court found no objective basis for believing that those two witnesses had had any motive for incriminating the applicant. Moreover, neither of the two witnesses was a “close relative” of V.K. within the meaning of that term under Lithuanian criminal law (see paragraph 69 below). Lastly, it was the court’s prerogative to decide what evidence to take into account. As for the applicant’s request that his neighbours, his sons’ teachers and his work colleagues be questioned in order to prove that in 2009 he had worked long hours and had therefore had no practical opportunity to sexually abuse his children, the Court of Appeal deemed that there was no reason to believe that the testimony given by those people would outweigh the entirety of the rest of the incriminating evidence in the case, which for that court was consistent. 52. On 15 January and on 26 February 2014, the applicant lodged two appeals on points of law, which he drafted himself. He argued, inter alia, that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention, in that the trial and appellate courts had refused his request that the witnesses for the defence be summoned and examined under the same conditions as those under which the prosecutor’s witnesses had been examined. In particular, even though the Kaunas Regional Court had ordered that V.K. be summoned to the hearing, the police had never executed that instruction, notwithstanding the fact that V.K. had been receiving welfare benefits from the Kaunas social care authorities. As a result, V.K. had never been examined in the courtroom. The applicant also pointed out the fact that V.K. had only come to the police three months after she had learned about the alleged abuse of their children; later, she had abandoned their children immediately after they had been questioned by the authorities. The applicant reiterated his contention that his conviction had mainly been based on the testimony of witnesses who were V.K.’s relatives. The applicant’s appeals on points of law also indicate that he had added to them the court records from his 2011 trial where, according to the applicant, the prosecutor had mentioned V.K.’s prior conviction for perjury. 53. On 19 February and 11 April 2014 the Supreme Court refused to examine the applicant’s appeals on points of law, holding that they did not raise questions of law. 54. In July 2011 V.K. started civil court proceedings, asking that the applicant be required to pay child support in respect of her two children, Ro.K. and Ra.K. During the court hearings it came to light that the applicant was the biological father of only one of those children – Ro.K. In court V.K. confessed to having lied in her civil lawsuit, and acknowledged that the biological father of Ra.K., born in June 2002, was a certain man whose surname she did not remember. V.K. also stated that she had started closely communicating (artimai bendrauti) with the applicant in August 2002, and had asked him to agree to give his surname to the boy so that she could receive social benefits. Afterwards, on 3 May 2004 a son, Ro.K., had been born to them. V.K. testified that the applicant had taken care of both children. V.K. also stated that she did not work, received social benefits, and lived not in the social housing allocated to her in Kėdainiai, but in a rented flat in Kaunas. She acknowledged that from October 2009 until February 2011 both boys had lived in the Pastogė children’s home and that they had been taken care of by the State, but nevertheless asked that the applicant should be ordered to pay her child support in respect of the previous three years. 55. In its decision of 2 November 2011 the Kėdainiai District Court held that V.K. had been “dishonest (nesąžininga)”, because she had misled the authorities about the true paternity of her son Ra.K. in order to cheat them into granting her social benefits. To make matters worse, she had also withheld from the court the fact that the boys had been in the care of the State between 2009 and 2011, and had claimed child support for this period during which she had not been actually taking care of them. 56. The court nevertheless awarded V.K. monthly child support of 300 Lithuanian litai (LTL – approximately 90 euros (EUR)) in respect of the applicant’s child, Ro.K., to be paid by the applicant until he came of age, as well as child support in the amount of LTL 1,200 (EUR 350) due for the four-month-period between March and July 2011 (that is to say from the day on which the boy had ceased to be cared for by the State until the day on which V.K. had lodged her lawsuit). As to the other child, Ra.K., the court held that V.K.’s claim had to be dismissed because, in the light of the established circumstances, the record in the case file testifying to the applicant being Ra.K.’s father was not sufficient to give rise to legal consequences, since the purpose of that record was not to confirm the paternity but to obtain welfare benefits. 57. In 2012, the child welfare authority in Kėdainiai lodged a civil claim, seeking that the applicant be required to reimburse it for the money it had spent in respect of Ro.K. The authority pointed out that on 25 November 2011 V.K. had brought both boys to them and had signed an agreement that both children would be placed in the children’s home in Kėdainiai (see paragraph 22 above), stating that she planned to move abroad. For that reason, in December 2011 the Kėdainiai Municipality had granted temporary guardianship (laikinoji globa) in respect of both boys to the children’s home. The representative of the child welfare authority also stated that during the hearing of 2 November 2011 V.K. had confessed that the applicant was not Ra.K.’s biological father (see paragraph 55 above). Despite being aware of this fact, the applicant had taken no steps to challenge or to annul his status as Ra.K.’s father. On the contrary, he had written letters in which he recognised both boys as his sons and promised to live with them and to take care of them when he was released from prison. The representative of the child welfare authority also pointed out that V.K. had placed the children in the children’s home in Kėdainiai “by deceit (apgaule)”; she had also refused the social housing offered to her and deregistered from her official place of residence in Kėdainiai. According to information received from the charity organisation Caritas, V.K. had also stolen things (dirbdama apsivogė) at her workplace; she lived somewhere in Kaunas and did not work, and she also was keeping her actual residential address secret. 58. On 23 July 2012 the Kėdainiai County District Court allowed the claim. It noted that the applicant was detained pending the criminal case, and V.K. would not visit her children in the children’s home – she “was not interested in their lives (nesidomi jų gyvenimu)” and was hiding her place of residence. Given that the applicant had not challenged his paternity of Ra.K., he had all the paternal rights and obligations provided by the law, including the duty to financially support the children (see paragraph 71 below). The court thus ruled that the applicant and V.K. should each pay LTL 300 in respect of each child to the children’s home, until the children came of age. 59. During the course of the applicant’s arrest on 23 November 2011 (see paragraph 20 above), a body search was performed on him and certain objects, such as his telephone, comb and spectacles were taken. The applicant was placed in pre-trial detention in Kaunas. 60. It transpires from 25 January 2012 letter from the prosecutor to the applicant that as early as in November 2011 the applicant wrote to the Committee on Legal Affairs (Teisės ir teisėtvarkos komitetas) of the Seimas, complaining about the non-return of his spectacles. The Committee forwarded the applicant’s complaint to the prosecutors, and it reached the Kaunas regional prosecutor’s office on 2 January 2012. Afterwards, on 25 January 2012 the prosecutor wrote to the applicant that a pre-trial investigation officer would resolve the issue. 61. As can be seen from later court rulings, on 20 March 2012 the applicant submitted a number of requests to the prosecutor, including a repeated request that his spectacles be returned to him. On 6 April 2012 the prosecutor ordered the pre-trial investigator to look into the matter, and the investigator returned that item to the applicant on 20 April 2012. 62. The applicant later started civil proceedings for damages, claiming that the taking away of his spectacles had caused him physical and emotional suffering. He asserted that without spectacles he had had difficulties in reading and writing, and that therefore his eyesight had deteriorated. The absence of spectacles had also resulted in difficulties in communicating with others. 63. By a decision of 26 February 2015, the Vilnius City District Court allowed the applicant’s claim, and awarded him EUR 1,000 in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. It held that by taking away the applicant’s spectacles the authorities had breached the applicant’s property rights, as protected under Article 23 of the Constitution and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights. Moreover, taking away the applicant’s spectacles had been not only unlawful, but had also caused him inconvenience in his private life, which in itself had been “a traumatic experience” and had also “degraded his human dignity (sumenkino žmogiškąjį orumą)”, although the court did not elaborate further. 64. The applicant appealed. He argued that the pre-trial investigator had intentionally ignored his numerous oral and written requests for the spectacles to be returned to him because she had understood that without spectacles he would have difficulties in reading the documents in his criminal file. The applicant also stated that the Kaunas remand facility had not had an ophthalmologist on its staff, and that the pre-trial investigator had not allowed him to be sent to Lukiškės Remand Prison in Vilnius (which had had an ophthalmologist) on the grounds that this would extend the criminal investigation. Being detained, he had had only limited possibilities to defend his rights, and his complaints to the State authorities for a long time had remained unanswered. The applicant asked that the sum awarded in non-pecuniary damages be raised. 65. The State authorities responsible for the applicant’s conditions of detention asked that the applicant’s civil claim be dismissed. 66. On 22 February 2016 the Vilnius Regional Court partly amended the lower court’s decision. The appellate court noted at the outset that certain provisions of the Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure applied to the applicant’s civil claim (see paragraphs 72 and 73 below). The appellate court acknowledged that there had been no legal grounds for the applicant’s spectacles being taken away. However, the court also pointed out that there was no information in the file to the effect that the spectacles which had been taken away during the applicant’s search had been prescribed by a doctor. The court noted that, pursuant to Article 45 of the Law on the Execution of Pre-trial Detention (see paragraph 74 below), people in detention were entitled to the same level of medical care as those outside prison, and that healthcare services operated in remand facilities. Accordingly, if the applicant had had problems with his vision, he could have asked the authorities to have his eyesight checked, an opportunity of which he had not availed himself. In this connection the appellate court dismissed as unproven the applicant’s argument that, in order to be seen by an ophthalmologist, he would have had to be transferred from a remand facility in Kaunas to Lukiškės Remand Prison in Vilnius, and that the investigator had refused to send him there for examination. Moreover, it was clear from the criminal case file that he had been able to write during the period in detention that he spent without his spectacles. The court noted that on 9, 12, 20 and 27 December 2011 the applicant had submitted various requests to the pre-trial investigator. He also had corresponded with other persons. Having small handwriting, the applicant had successfully managed to write between the lines of a small-squared page. The court also underlined that the applicant’s claim that his eyesight had become worse had not been substantiated by medical documents. Lastly, the duration of the time when the applicant had been without spectacles could have been significantly shorter had he acted in a proactive manner and asked the authorities to return them in a timely fashion. The court considered that there was no proof in the file that the applicant had asked for the return of his spectacles earlier than on 20 March 2012. In sum, since the inconvenience caused to the applicant could have been easily resolved had he shown some initiative, and given that his need for spectacles had not been proved, the appellate court considered that an acknowledgement that the spectacles had been taken away constituted sufficient compensation for the damage suffered. 67. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. He submitted, inter alia, that the pre-trial detention facility in Kaunas had not had an eye doctor on its staff, and that therefore he had had no opportunity to obtain spectacles in detention. This had caused the applicant serious physical suffering. The applicant relied on the Court’s judgments in Kudła v. Poland ([GC], no. 30210/96, ECHR 2000‑XI) and Mandić and Jović v. Slovenia (nos. 5774/10 and 5985/10, 20 October 2011). 68. By a ruling of 17 May 2016 the Supreme Court refused to accept the applicant’s appeal on points of law for examination, as not raising questions of law.

6. The applicant was born in 1982 and lives in Switzerland. He grew up in Iran and entered Switzerland in 2009. 7. The applicant applied for asylum under the name of L.B. on 13 August 2009, stating that he had entered Switzerland illegally the same day. He was questioned twice, on 18 August and 24 August 2009, by the Swiss authorities responsible for asylum and migration (until 31 December 2014 the authority was called the Bundesamt für Migration, but it was renamed with effect from 1 January 2015 as the Staatssekretariat für Migration, SEM – hereafter “the asylum authorities”). An interpreter was present at both hearings and the record was translated for the applicant prior to his signing it. A member of a non-governmental organisation was present at the second hearing as a neutral witness, in order to guarantee the fairness of the hearing. He had the opportunity to add comments at the end of the record of the hearing about any irregularities, but he made no such observations. 8. During the hearings the applicant stated that he had attended a number of demonstrations in connection with the presidential election in 2009. He had been arrested during one such demonstration on 15 June 2009 in I. He was subsequently placed in prison, where he was severely tortured every day. After twenty-two days in prison, he was scheduled to appear in court on 6 July 2009. He was placed in a bus with about thirty-five other people but managed to escape during a disturbance caused by one of the other detainees when disembarking from the bus. He then managed to hide with his relatives. After his escape, the authorities had sent a court summons to his home and, when he had failed to appear, the court had sentenced him in absentia to thirty-six months’ imprisonment. He managed to leave the country on 25-26 July 2009 with the help of a smuggler. In support of his account, the applicant submitted copies of his identity card, a court summons of 9 July 2009 and a judgment of 21 July 2009. He explained that the judgment had been sent to his home and that a neighbour had given it to him prior to his departure. 9. On 4 February 2013 the asylum authorities rejected his asylum application and ordered him to leave Switzerland, finding that his account was not credible as it was contradictory and, in relation to key aspects, not sufficiently substantiated. Despite repeated questions, the applicant had been unable to describe what he had experienced during his imprisonment in a detailed and differentiated manner. He had also contradicted himself regarding his transportation from the prison to court and his escape. Neither his alleged arrest in connection with his participation in a demonstration nor his subsequent detention and escape therefrom had been credible. The documents submitted by the applicant could not lead to a different result as they could easily be bought in Iran and falsified. Moreover, the alleged conduct of the Iranian authorities in sending a court summons to the applicant’s home after his escape, rather than going there to arrest him on the spot, was not credible, nor was his submission that the judgment of 21 July 2009 had been sent to his home and given to a neighbour prior to his departure. 10. As the applicant did not appeal, the decision became final. 11. On 13 November 2013 the applicant, through a lawyer, lodged an application for his asylum application to be reconsidered. He was by that time using the identity of A. and stated that he had entered Switzerland legally under that name in May 2009 based on a visa to visit his sister, who lived there. In substance, he stated that his relationship with his father had broken down entirely and that as a result he risked being arrested upon his return because his father had ties to the secret service. Moreover, he had been baptised as a Christian on 25 August 2013. Emphasising that Iran applied the death penalty for apostasy, he alleged that he was at risk of ill‑treatment on account of his conversion. He submitted a copy of his baptism certificate, issued by a Pentecostal church, a Protestant house church, to support his account. 12. On 17 January 2014 the asylum authorities, who treated the applicant’s request as a second asylum application, questioned the applicant in person. An interpreter was present and the record was translated for the applicant prior to his signing it. A member of a non-governmental organisation was present as a neutral witness in order to guarantee the fairness of the hearing. He had the opportunity to add comments at the end of the record of the hearing if he witnessed any irregularities, but did not make any such observations. 13. During the hearing, the applicant stated that he had first had contact with a Catholic church in Switzerland in 2011 and then with the Pentecostal church from early 2013. The members of the latter had gradually become his family. One of them had invited him home once or twice a week to familiarise him with the Bible. He had regularly attended church services and after about six or seven months had been baptised in that church. For him, being a Christian meant believing in Jesus Christ and spreading his message. He stated that he continued to study the Bible and recited parts of it. The principle of honesty enshrined in Christianity was particularly important to him. Even if he were unable to manifest his belief in the future, he would always retain the truthfulness of his faith, which nobody could take away from him. He submitted statements that he had attended different churches to support his account. The applicant did not make any submissions regarding the risk allegedly caused by the broken relationship with his father and the latter’s ties to the secret service. 14. On 26 February 2014 the asylum authorities rejected the applicant’s application. They considered that his conversion to Christianity did not in and of itself expose him to a real risk of ill-treatment. Such a risk could exist if he proselytised or attracted public attention in another way. Based on his statement, they considered that he did not intend to practise his faith in such a manner. There were no indications that the Iranian authorities were even aware of his conversion. They also doubted that the applicant’s conversion was genuine and lasting, noting, in particular, that it had occurred after the applicant’s first asylum application had been rejected, that the baptism had taken place in a house church rather than a church recognised by the State, and that the applicant did not base his conversion on the key aspects of Christianity, but on the personal relationships he had formed with members of his church community. 15. On 31 March 2014 the applicant, represented by a lawyer, appealed against that decision. He pointed out that there had been an increased number of arrests of members of Christian house churches since 2010 and argued that his conversion to Christianity in and of itself exposed him to a real risk of ill-treatment. A Christian convert faced a much greater risk of ill-treatment than those born into the Christian religion. His conversion to Christianity was genuine and lasting. He had first had contact with a Catholic church in Switzerland in 2011 and was serious in practising his faith, as evidenced by the documents he had submitted. 16. On 14 May 2014 the Federal Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal as manifestly ill-founded. It expressed doubts as to whether his conversion had been genuine or was lasting, but found that this did not have to be determined. It considered that a person could only face a real risk of ill-treatment upon return to Iran if that person’s Christian faith had been manifested in Switzerland in such a way as to make it visible to the outside and if it could be assumed that his or her family and acquaintances in Iran would learn about that active manifestation of faith, even if it was short of proselytising. If close family members were “fanatic” Muslims, they might denounce the conversion to the secret service. In addition, conversion to Christianity might be seen as treason. Where a conversion had taken place abroad, there had to be both an assessment of whether it was genuine and the extent to which it had become publicly known. Even assuming that the applicant’s conversion had been genuine and was lasting, the court considered that he did not manifest his Christian faith in the manner described. There were no indications that the Iranian authorities had even become aware of his conversion. 17. On 2 May 2016 the applicant, through a lawyer, lodged an application for temporary admission under section 83 of the Aliens Act. He relied on the risks presented by the Iranian authorities and non-state actors on account of his conversion and active membership of a Christian community in Switzerland, as well as his participation in a demonstration in Berne in August 2015 against human rights violations and the persecution of Christians by the Iranian authorities. In that connection, he had signed a letter of protest addressed by the organisers to the Iranian Government, which were thus aware of his conversion. To support his account he submitted photographs, letters of support from various persons and several reports. 18. On 14 June 2016 the asylum authorities rejected his application, which they had treated as a further asylum application. They noted that the applicant had previously been through two sets of asylum proceedings and that the alleged risk of ill-treatment on account of his conversion to Christianity had already been examined. It was not necessary to examine the matter again as the applicant had not put forward any arguments that could give rise to an assessment that was different from that of the Federal Administrative Court in its judgment of 14 May 2014. 19. It was true that the Iranian authorities took an interest in the activities of their citizens abroad, but such monitoring was focused on people who stood out from the large number of Iranians critical of the Government and who were perceived as a serious threat by the authorities because of their political or religious activities. Whether a person “stood out” was not so much a question of visibility and the possibility of identifying the person concerned, but was rather one of public exposure. The personality of the individuals concerned, the form of their appearances in public and the content of their public statements were relevant parameters in that regard. The asylum authorities considered that mere participation in a demonstration against the Iranian Government, without the applicant acting in a particular manner or holding a special function, was not sufficient for him to be perceived as a concrete threat by the Iranian authorities. They also noted that there were no indications that the authorities had taken any measures against him. 20. The Iranian authorities were aware that Iranian citizens at times attempted to rely on conversion to Christianity abroad in order to obtain refugee status in Western countries. Such circumstances would be taken into account by the Iranian authorities but would not, upon someone’s return, lead to ill-treatment within the meaning of the refugee definition. Moreover, it was possible to practise religions other than Islam in Iran in a discreet and private manner. Citing the criteria contained in the Federal Administrative Court’s judgment of 14 May 2014, the State Secretariat for Migration did not contest, per se, the fact that the applicant was part of a Christian circle in Switzerland. There were, however, no indications that he was involved in a leading function or was particularly exposed in other ways in connection with his Christian faith. His participation in a demonstration and the signing of a letter of protest to the Iranian Government did not lead to a different conclusion. He was only an ordinary member of a Christian organisation and there was, therefore, no concrete risk that the Iranian authorities had become aware of his conversion. The asylum authorities concluded that the applicant did not meet the requirements of the refugee definition or those for temporary admission. 21. On 13 July 2016 the applicant lodged an appeal against that decision, in substance repeating his earlier submissions. On 30 August 2016 the Federal Administrative Court dismissed the appeal as manifestly ill‑founded, fully endorsing the asylum authorities’ reasoning. 22. On 4 October 2016 the State Secretariat for Migration set a deadline for the applicant’s voluntary departure, which passed on 31 October 2016.

3. The applicant, who is now deceased, was born in 1937 and lived in Paris. 4. On 23 June 2009 the guardianship judge of the District Court of the 15th Administrative District of Paris placed the applicant, who was then seventy-two years of age, under enhanced protective supervision (curatelle renforcée) for five years, on an initial request from his adoptive daughter. In order to reach her decision, the judge first of all requested the opinions of Dr M.F. and Dr J‑P.B., two specialists, who each drew up a medical certificate, on 25 November 2008 and 14 March 2009 respectively. She appointed M.-C.M as supervisor (see paragraphs 24 to 34 below for further details on the protective supervision system). 5. The applicant applied to the Paris Regional Court for the lifting of the measure, in the alternative for his placement under ordinary supervision, and in the further alternative for the reduction of the period of supervision to twenty-four months. On 18 December 2009 the Paris Regional Court dismissed those requests. It noted that the report drawn up by Dr R., a neuropsychiatrist whom the applicant had consulted, had ruled out any form of dementia but had confirmed a slight cognitive impairment and some psychological fragility and vulnerability, rendering a protective measure necessary in view of the extent of the applicant’s personal assets. The court agreed with Dr B. that the applicant had previously considered the management of his real property as a hobby, that he no longer had the physical and mental capacities for performing that task, that it was important that he be relieved of the said task of managing his business interests and tax returns, and that, similarly, he should no longer be allowed to dispose of his property. However, the court considered that the measure could be adjusted on the basis of the cognitive impairment noted, allowing him to hold a bank account and a cash withdrawal card. 6. The applicant requested his supervisor’s authorisation to marry M.S., a friend whom he had known since 1996 and who had become his partner in 2008. The supervisor interviewed M.S. and the applicant, at first separately and then together. They informed her of the importance which they attached to the religious dimension of marriage. On 17 December 2009 the supervisor refused to authorise the marriage on the grounds that she had only known the applicant for a few months and that she therefore lacked the necessary background to authorise a wedding. 7. By order of 21 December 2009, the guardianship judge ordered a social inquiry, and commissioned the Département Union of Family Associations (the “UDAF”) to gather information on the applicant’s living conditions, lifestyle, social status and circle of friends. The applicant appealed to the Paris Court of Appeal against that order. 8. On 21 December 2009 the guardianship judge commissioned a medical opinion, on her own initiative, in order to consolidate her knowledge of the case file with an eye to determining the applicant’s capacity to enter into wedlock. 9. On 18 January 2010 the psychiatrist appointed by the judge drew up a detailed medical certificate concluding that the applicant suffered from intellectual disorders. While noting the applicant’s capacity to consent to marriage, the psychiatrist considered him incapable of dealing with the consequences of his consent in terms of his property and finances. In his report, quoting passages from his interview with the applicant, the psychiatrist gave his personal opinion on the facts of the case, including works carried out by the applicant on his apartment. He also considered that some of the arguments put forward by the applicant in favour of his marriage “bordered on the absurd”, including the fact that his grandmothers had also remarried at an advanced age and that he wanted help in looking after himself and carrying out everyday chores. 10. On 1 March 2010 the Paris Court of Appeal declared inadmissible the applicant’s appeal against the order of 21 December 2009. It held that it was in the interests of a vulnerable adult for the guardianship judge to take all the necessary action to ensure his protection, bearing in mind that a person under a supervision order can only get married with the authorisation of the supervisor, or failing that, of the judge, who could order a social inquiry or an inspection by a person of his or her choosing. The court noted that that was precisely the option which had been taken by the guardianship judge in issuing two separate orders for a medical examination and a social inquiry. 11. On 1 June 2010 the UDAF submitted its report. It emphasised that there was a financial stake at the heart of a major family conflict, in which the applicant’s interest and well-being did not seem to be given much consideration. It noted that the applicant’s daughter and M.S. accused each other of being primarily interested in the applicant’s fortune, and that it was unclear whether the latter was being influenced by anyone. The UDAF added that the applicant was deeply affected by the conflict and that he seemed to consider marriage as a way of ensuring that he had someone at his side to assist him and to organise his daily life, and to avoid having to end his life on his own. 12. On 24 June 2010, after hearing the applicant and his daughter, the guardianship judge dismissed the applicant’s request. While noting that no one disputed the latter’s attachment to M.S., it ruled that that was insufficient to justify authorising the planned wedding. Having pointed out that the applicant and M.S. were former alcoholics and that the applicant was apparently still drinking, the judge stated that he “was therefore only seeking greater safety in marriage in order to prevent a possible break-up and therefore the risk of ending his life alone”. Furthermore, she considered that the lack of clarity as to the financial implications of the marriage was particularly worrying as the applicant was torn between his daughter and M.S., and financial considerations had manifestly led to a serious conflict between the two, quoting the UDAF’s findings on that point. Without pronouncing on the religious dimension mentioned by the applicant, she concluded that the planned marriage as it stood was not in the applicant’s interests. The applicant appealed. 13. By judgment of 6 September 2011 the Paris Court of Appeal upheld the guardianship judge’s decision of 24 June 2010. It noted that although the applicant had on several occasions expressed the wish to marry M.S., the serious disorders from which he had been suffering for several years had severely affected his judgment, as noted in the medical certificates of 14 March 2009 and 18 January 2010. Moreover, his anosognosia had prevented him from planning his joint life with his partner, taking account of the financial and legal implications of marriage. Furthermore, while the applicant seemed emotionally attached to his partner, the court noted that since they had been living together the applicant had been managing his affairs in an increasingly unreasonable manner, and his supervisor had not always been able to protect his interests. In particular, the applicant had had work carried out in the family apartment to the tune of 250,000 euros a few months after his wife’s death, and had placed her furniture in storage under somewhat questionable conditions. The court of appeal also noted that a draft handwritten will had been prepared on 14 August 2009 in M.S.’s favour, observing that according to his lawyer’s submissions, the applicant held assets of some 6,000,000 euros and had concluded with his deceased wife a universal community of assets contract. The court of appeal further noted that the applicant’s relations with his daughter, M.D., had seriously deteriorated. The court of appeal concluded that although the inquiries ordered by the guardianship judge had mentioned the applicant’s and M.S.’s mutual affection, the psychopathological turn in his disorders and his failing perception of the realities of his finances were such that he could not give his informed consent to marriage. 14. The applicant appealed on points of law. In that appeal he also put a request for a preliminary ruling (a “QPC”) on the constitutionality of Article 460 (1) of the Civil Code. He submitted that that provision contravened, in particular, the principle of freedom of marriage by making the marriage of a supervisee subject to the supervisor’s authorisation, or failing that, to that of the guardianship judge. 15. By decision of 29 June 2012 (no. 2012-260 QPC), the Constitutional Council, noting that the right to marriage was based on Articles 2 and 4 of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, declared Article 460 (1) of the Civil Code to be in conformity with the Constitution, given that it did not prohibit marriage but rather permitted it with the supervisor’s authorisation, the withholding of which could be brought before a court, which was required to organise adversarial proceedings followed by a reasoned decision, against which an appeal also lay. The court also considered that, having regard to the personal and pecuniary obligations stemming from marriage, the latter was an important civil act with which the said restrictions on freedom of marriage did not interfere disproportionately. 16. On 5 December 2012 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law. On the one hand, it noted that the Constitutional Council had declared Article 460 (1) of the Civil Code constitutional, and on the other, held that the Paris Court of Appeal had lawfully reasoned its decision by analysing not only the relevant medical certificates but also the other documents on file, thus enabling it to deduce that the applicant was incapable of providing informed consent to his marriage owing both to the psychopathological evolution of his disorders and to his loss of control over the realities of his financial situation. 17. On 15 February 2016 counsel for the applicant informed the Court of his client’s death on 4 February 2016. 18. On 6 September 2016 he informed the Court of M.S.’s intention to pursue the application. The Registry of the Court invited the Government to present their comments on that development.

6. The applicant was born in 1977 and is a life-sentenced prisoner. He has been detained in X Prison since 2008. 7. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 8. Following a referral by the prison medical unit for the applicant to undergo a colonoscopy, the prison director issued an order on 9 November 2010 assigning a three-member escort team equipped with firearms, ammunition and bulletproof vests to take the applicant to Y Hospital. On the same date an escort plan (saateplaan) was drawn up, which included a section headed “Relevant circumstances for the execution of an escort task”. It gave an overview of the applicant’s past criminal behaviour, noting that he had been sentenced to life imprisonment for aggravated murder, and, while in prison, had been convicted for handling narcotic substances and repeatedly punished for acts of violence against public officials. The escort plan also included a personal risk assessment. It was noted that the applicant reacted aggressively to lawful orders of the officials when he thought that they were being unreasonable and also in situations where he felt cornered. He did not respect the prison regime and was prone to self-harm. Moreover, he was considered to become more dangerous in situations where he interpreted information in a manner expecting a favourable outcome for himself which nevertheless did not follow. The risk of his absconding was considered to be higher when outside prison. Against that background, it was considered necessary for the applicant to wear handcuffs and ankle cuffs. 9. On the same day the applicant was transferred from the prison to a public hospital. The prison officers remained in the room with him during his examination and he was restrained by handcuffs and ankle cuffs. 10. According to the applicant, he was not allowed to wear his own clothes during the visit. The members of the escort team could overhear the conversation between him and the doctor and were able to follow the examination of his internal organs on a monitor. 11. According to the Government, the applicant had not requested to wear his own clothes during the visit. They submitted an explanation given on 11 August 2016 by a doctor at Y Hospital, who noted that he did not remember the particular visit, but asserted that although members of the escort team would normally stay in the examination room, a screen would be placed between them and the patient. The quality management specialist of the hospital confirmed that screens were commonly used, as they prevented prison officers from directly observing the examination, but allowed them to intervene if needed. The Government also submitted detailed information about the hospital’s floor plan and noted that the relevant examination room measured 40 square metres, so the prison officers had not been in the immediate vicinity of the applicant. 12. Following a referral by the prison medical unit for the applicant to be taken to hospital for an examination by an ear, nose and throat specialist, the prison director issued an order on 27 October 2011 assigning a four-member escort team equipped with firearms and ammunition to take the applicant to Y Hospital. The information about the applicant’s criminal behaviour and personal risk assessment was repeated (see paragraph 8 above) and it was considered necessary for him to wear handcuffs and ankle cuffs during the visit. 13. On the same day the applicant was transferred from prison to Y Hospital. 14. According to the applicant, he was not allowed to wear his own clothes during the visit. In his application, he stated that the prison officers had remained in the room during the examination and could overhear the conversation between him and the doctor. In his observations he submitted that he had, very shortly after being taken to the hospital, asked to be returned to prison and had refused to go in to see the doctor as he had been embarrassed to be seen in handcuffs and ankle cuffs. 15. The Government submitted that the applicant had not requested to wear his own clothes. They stated that although it appeared from the note in the applicant’s escort plan that he had refused to see a doctor at the hospital because of his handcuffs and ankle cuffs, his medical file nonetheless revealed that a short meeting between the applicant and the doctor might have taken place. According to information obtained from the hospital, the relevant doctor’s room had measured 33.5 square metres. 16. On 30 January 2012 the deputy director of the prison granted the applicant’s request to visit his newborn daughter (who had undergone surgery and was in a serious condition) in hospital. The applicant had submitted a request to be allowed to wear his own clothes during the visit. A six-member team (four of whom were required to stay in the immediate vicinity of the applicant and two of whom had the task of “securing the convoy”) equipped with firearms and ammunition was assigned to escort the applicant. According to the escort plan, which contained information about the applicant’s criminal behaviour and personal risk assessment (see paragraph 8 above), it was considered necessary for him to wear handcuffs and ankle cuffs. The visit took place on 31 January 2012. 17. According to the applicant, the prison officers had been aware that the visiting hours at the hospital were from 12 noon to 7 p.m., but he had been transferred to the hospital at around 11 a.m. His visit with his daughter had lasted only ten minutes because he had been there during the time that medical procedures were being performed on the patients. Furthermore, he had wanted to touch his child and the doctors had given their permission, but the prison officers had stopped him from doing so. The prison officers had remained with him at all times and could overhear the conversation between the applicant and the doctor regarding his daughter’s health. 18. Relying on information provided by X Prison, the Government stated that in the relevant intensive care unit of the hospital the visiting hours were twenty-four hours a day. However, the time of the visit outside the hospital’s general visiting hours (from 12 noon to 7 p.m.) had been specifically agreed with the hospital so as to minimise contact between the applicant and other people. According to the escort plan, the applicant had arrived at the hospital at 10.50 a.m. and the visit had ended at 11.15 a.m. 19. The Government submitted an explanation drafted on 2 April 2012 by the head of the escort team on duty on the day of the visit. It stated that no medical procedures had been performed on the applicant’s daughter during the visit and that the visit had not been terminated – the applicant had wished to leave the hospital himself. 20. The Government also submitted an explanation given on 18 August 2016 by the head of the hospital board, who admitted not remembering the actual visit but stated that according to the hospital rules and code of good conduct, the intensive care unit was very quiet and any information was passed on quietly, so as not to disturb anyone. Staff had to be careful that the information was not heard by anyone other than the person concerned. Given the medical condition of the applicant’s daughter, it was unlikely that permission had been granted to touch or hold her as this could have worsened her condition. 21. Following the dismissal of his claims by X Prison, the applicant lodged a claim with the Tartu Administrative Court on 5 February 2012, alleging that the conditions and circumstances of the above-described visits had been unlawful. 22. On 16 April 2012 he lodged a claim with the Tartu Administrative Court requesting compensation for non-pecuniary damage in the amount of 30,000 euros (EUR), based on the same complaints. In this claim he argued, inter alia, that the limitations on the visit to see his daughter and the inability for him to touch her had been unlawful. The court joined the two sets of proceedings. 23. By a judgment of 29 January 2013, the Tartu Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint in full. It held that the use of handcuffs and ankle cuffs had been permitted by law, based on preventive security considerations and, as such, had been proportionate. In the “facts and proceedings” (asjaolud ja menetluse käik) part of the judgment the court noted that the applicant had complained about the prison officers remaining in the examination room during the medical procedures and about his visit to see his daughter having taken place at the wrong time and being of limited duration. The court did not address these complaints in its reasoning part of the judgment. 24. On 28 February 2013 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Tartu Court of Appeal, asking it to overturn the first-instance judgment and uphold his complaint in full. In the appeal he noted, inter alia, that the Tartu Administrative Court had failed to respond to the reasoning supporting his claims and had failed to address the breach of doctor-patient confidentiality in its judgment. 25. By a judgment of 26 August 2014, the Tartu Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s complaint in full, but amended some of the reasoning provided by the first-instance court. It confirmed the Administrative Court’s conclusion about the use of handcuffs and ankle cuffs during the medical examination. It noted that in his appeal the applicant had claimed that the Administrative Court had failed to address the obligation to wear prison clothing, the manner in which the prison officers had carried their weapons and special equipment and the breach of doctor-patient confidentiality. The Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s complaint about the prison officers’ presence during his hospital visits, as the prison officers had had a duty under the Regulation of the Minister of Justice “Prisoner Escort Duties and Procedures” (see paragraph 36 below) to escort and guard him. The regulation also required that at least one member of the escort team maintain visual contact with the prisoner at all times. Even if they had overheard a conversation between the applicant and the doctor, they had had an official duty to maintain the confidentiality of that information. The court also addressed and dismissed the applicant’s complaints about the obligation to wear prison clothing and about the prison officers carrying firearms. In the “facts and proceedings” part of the judgment, the Court of Appeal noted that the applicant had, inter alia, complained that the visit to see his daughter had taken place at the wrong time, limiting his visit. The court did not address this complaint in its reasoning part of the judgment. 26. On 26 September 2014 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court. He reiterated his complaints about the handcuffs and ankle cuffs and the presence of the prison officers during the visits. The applicant also stated that the Court of Appeal had failed to address his complaint regarding the prison officers having taken him to see his child at the wrong time (thereby restricting the duration of the visit) and having stopped him from touching his daughter. 27. On 15 January 2015 the Supreme Court refused to examine the applicant’s appeal on points of law.

6. The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Vienna. 7. From January 2008 she held several seminars entitled “Basic Information on Islam” (Grundlagen des Islams) at the right-wing Freedom Party Education Institute (Bildungsinstitut der Freiheitlichen Partei Österreichs). The seminars were not only open to members of the Freedom Party or invited guests, but were also publicly advertised on its website. In addition, the head of the Freedom Party, H.-C.S., had distributed a leaflet specifically aimed at young voters, advertising them as “top seminars” in the framework of a “free education package”. The applicant had not been involved in the selection of participants. 8. Two of the seminars were held on 15 October and 12 November 2009 respectively, with around thirty participants at each. One of the participants was an undercover journalist working for a weekly journal, N. 9. At the journal’s request, a preliminary investigation was instituted against the applicant, and on 11 February 2010 she was questioned by the police concerning certain statements she had made during the seminars which had been directed against the doctrines of Islam. 10. On 12 August 2010 the Vienna public prosecutor’s office (Staatsanwaltschaft Wien – “the public prosecutor”) brought charges against the applicant, pursuant to Article 283 of the Criminal Code, for inciting to hatred (Verhetzung). Hearings were held on 23 November 2010 and on 18 January and 15 February 2011. 11. At the hearing on 18 January 2011 the Vienna Regional Criminal Court (Landesgericht für Strafsachen Wien  “the Regional Court”) informed the applicant that the court might adopt a different legal classification in the matter from the one contained in the charge. The hearing was therefore postponed to give her time to properly prepare a defence. 12. At the end of the hearing on 15 February 2011 the Regional Court acquitted the applicant in relation to several of the statements originally included in the indictment under Article 283 of the Criminal Code. This was partly because the public prosecutor had withdrawn the indictment concerning certain statements and partly because it could not be established that the applicant had made some of the other statements exactly – or at least approximately – as they were worded in the indictment. She was however convicted of disparaging religious doctrines (Herabwürdigung religiöser Lehren), pursuant to Article 188 of the Criminal Code, concerning the three remaining statements. She was ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings and a day‑fine of 4 euros (EUR) for a period of 120 days (amounting to EUR 480 in total), which would result in sixty days’ imprisonment in the event of default. The court considered the applicant’s repeated infringements to be an aggravating factor and the fact that she did not have a previous criminal record to be a mitigating factor. The court found her guilty of publicly disparaging an object of veneration of a domestic church or religious society – namely Muhammad, the Prophet of Islam – in a manner capable of arousing justified indignation (geeignet, berechtigtes Ärgernis zu erregen). 13. The statements which the court found incriminating were the following: English translation: “I./ 1. One of the biggest problems we are facing today is that Muhammad is seen as the ideal man, the perfect human, the perfect Muslim. That means that the highest commandment for a male Muslim is to imitate Muhammad, to live his life. This does not happen according to our social standards and laws. Because he was a warlord, he had many women, to put it like this, and liked to do it with children. And according to our standards he was not a perfect human. We have huge problems with that today, that Muslims get into conflict with democracy and our value system ... 2. The most important of all Hadith collections recognised by all legal schools: The most important is the Sahih Al-Bukhari. If a Hadith was quoted after Bukhari, one can be sure that all Muslims would recognise it. And, unfortunately, in Al-Bukhari the thing with Aisha and child sex is written... II./ I remember my sister, I have said this several times already, when [S.W.] made her famous statement in Graz, my sister called me and asked: “For God’s sake. Did you tell [S.W.] that?” To which I answered: “No, it wasn’t me, but you can look it up, it’s not really a secret.” And her: “You can’t say it like that!” And me: “A 56-year-old and a six-year-old? What do you call that? Give me an example? What do we call it, if it is not paedophilia?” Her: “Well, one has to paraphrase it, say it in a more diplomatic way.” My sister is symptomatic. We have heard that so many times. “Those were different times” – it wasn’t okay back then, and it’s not okay today. Full stop. And it is still happening today. One can never approve of something like that. They all create their own reality, because the truth is so cruel ...” German original: “I./1. Eines der großen Probleme, die wir heute haben, ist dass Mohammed als der ideale Mann, der perfekte Mensch, der perfekte Muslim gesehen wird. Das heißt, das oberste Gebot für einen männlichen Moslem ist es, Mohammed nachzumachen, sein Leben zu leben. Das läuft nicht nach unseren sozialen Standards und Gesetzen ab. Weil er war ein Kriegsherr, hatte einen relativ großen Frauenverschleiß, um das jetzt einmal so auszudrücken, hatte nun mal gerne mit Kindern ein bisschen was. Und er war nach unseren Begriffen kein perfekter Mensch. Damit haben wir heute riesige Probleme, weil Muslime mit der Demokratie und unserem Wertesystem in Konflikt geraten... 2. Die wichtigsten von allen Rechtsschulen anerkannten Hadith-Sammlungen: Die allerwichtigste ist die Sahih Al-Bukhari. Wenn eine Hadith nach Bukhari zitiert wurde, dann können Sie sicher sein, dass es alle Muslime anerkennen. Und in der Al-Bukhari ist auch blöderweise das geschrieben mit der Aisha und dem Kindersex... II./ Ich erinnere mich an meine Schwester, das hab ich schon ein paar Mal erzählt, als [S.W.] in Graz ihren berühmten Sager gemacht hat, ruft mich meine Schwester an und sagt: "Um Gottes willen. Hast du ihr das gesagt?" Worauf ich gesagt habe: "Nein, ich war’s nicht, aber es ist nachzulesen, es ist nicht wirklich ein Geheimnis. " Und sie: "Das kann man doch so nicht sagen." Und ich : "Ein 56-Jähriger und eine 6-Jährige ? Wie nennst du das? Gib mir ein Beispiel? Wie nennen wir das, wenn’s nicht Pädophilie ist?" Sie: "Na ja, das muss man ein bisschen umschreiben, diplomatischer sagen." Meine Schwester ist symptomatisch. Das haben wir schon so oft gehört. "Das waren doch andere Zeiten" – das war damals nicht o.k., und es ist heute nicht o.k. Punkt. Und es passiert heute auch noch. So was ist nie gutzuheißen. Sie legen sich alle eine Wirklichkeit zurecht, weil die Wahrheit so grausam ist...“ 14. The Regional Court found that the above statements essentially conveyed the message that Muhammad had had paedophilic tendencies. It stated that the applicant was referring to a marriage which Muhammad had concluded with Aisha, a six-year-old, and consummated when she had been nine. The court found that by making those statements the applicant had suggested that Muhammad was not a worthy subject of worship. However, it also found that it could not be established that the applicant had intended to decry all Muslims. She was not suggesting that all Muslims were paedophiles, but was criticising the unreflecting imitation of a role model. According to the court, the common definition of paedophilia was a primary sexual interest in children who had not yet reached puberty. Because paedophilia was behaviour which was ostracised by society and outlawed, it was evident that the applicant’s statements were capable of causing indignation. The court concluded that the applicant had intended to wrongfully accuse Muhammad of having paedophilic tendencies. Even though criticising child marriages was justifiable, she had accused a subject of religious worship of having a primary sexual interest in children’s bodies, which she had deduced from his marriage with a child, disregarding the point that the marriage had continued until the Prophet’s death, when Aisha had already turned eighteen and had therefore passed the age of puberty. In addition, the court found that because of the public nature of the seminars, which had not been limited to members of the Freedom Party, it was conceivable that at least some of the participants might have been disturbed by the statements. 15. The Regional Court further stated that anyone who wished to exercise their rights under Article 10 of the Convention was subject to duties and responsibilities, such as refraining from making statements which hurt others without reason and therefore did not contribute to a debate of public interest. A balancing exercise between the rights under Article 9 on the one hand and those under Article 10 on the other needed to be carried out. The court considered that the applicant’s statements were not statements of fact, but derogatory value judgments which exceeded the permissible limits. It held that the applicant had not intended to approach the topic in an objective manner, but had directly aimed to degrade Muhammad. The court stated that child marriages were not the same as paedophilia, and were not only a phenomenon of Islam but also used to be widespread among the European ruling dynasties. Furthermore, the court reasoned that freedom of religion as protected by Article 9 of the Convention was one of the foundations of a democratic society. Those who invoked their freedom of religion could not expect to be exempt from criticism, and even had to accept the negation of their beliefs. However, the manner in which religious views were attacked could engage the State’s responsibility in order to guarantee the peaceful exercise of the rights under Article 9. Presenting objects of religious worship in a provocative way capable of hurting the feelings of the followers of that religion could be conceived as a malicious violation of the spirit of tolerance, which was one of the bases of a democratic society. The court concluded that the interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression in the form of a criminal conviction had been justified as it had been based in law and had been necessary in a democratic society, namely in order to protect religious peace in Austria. 16. The applicant appealed, arguing that the impugned statements were statements of fact, not value judgments. She referred to several of the documents which she had submitted as evidence which, in her view, clearly confirmed that when Muhammad had been fifty-six years old, he had had sexual intercourse with the nine-year-old Aisha. She stated that it was no more than reasonable to present those facts in the light of the values of today’s society. It had not been her intention to disparage Muhammad. She had merely criticised the notion that an adult had had sexual intercourse with a nine-year-old child and raised the question whether this amounted to paedophilia. If one were to follow the arguments of the Regional Court, it would mean that someone who had married a child and managed to maintain the marriage until the child had come of age could not be described as a paedophile. She further contended that she had not used the term “paedophile” in the strict scientific sense, but in the way it was used in everyday language, referring to men who had sex with minors. She stated that she had never said that Muhammad had been a paedophile because he had married a child, but because he had had sexual intercourse with one. In any event, her statements were covered by her rights under Article 10 of the Convention, which included the right to impart opinions and ideas that offended, shocked or disturbed. 17. On 20 December 2011 the Vienna Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht Wien – hereinafter “the Court of Appeal”) dismissed the applicant’s appeal, confirming in essence the legal and factual findings of the lower court. The Regional Court had based its findings on the facts as submitted by the applicant, namely that Muhammad had married Aisha when she had been six years old and consummated the marriage when she had been nine. It had rightly made a distinction between child marriages and paedophilia. It had not based its findings on an unpredictable definition of the term “paedophilia” but on a common definition which was comparable to that used by the World Health Organisation. As regards the alleged violation of Article 10 of the Convention, the Court of Appeal, referring to the Court’s case-law (İ.A. v. Turkey, no. 42571/98, ECHR 2005‑VIII, and Aydın Tatlav v. Turkey, no. 50692/99, 2 May 2006), found that it had to examine whether the comments at issue were merely provocative or had been intended as an abusive attack on the Prophet of Islam. It concluded that the latter was the case as Muslims would find the applicant’s statements – “he liked to do it with children”, “the thing with Aisha and child sex” and “a 56-year-old and a six-year-old? What do you call that? Give me an example? What do we call it, if it is not paedophilia?” – wrong and offensive, even if Muhammad had married a six-year-old and had had intercourse with her when she had been nine. 18. The Court of Appeal stated that the reason for the applicant’s conviction had not been that the events had purportedly taken place more than a thousand years ago and similar conduct would no longer be tolerable under today’s criminal law and contemporary moral and value concepts, but because the applicant had accused Muhammad of paedophilia by using the plural form “children”, “child sex”, “what do we call it, if it is not paedophilia?” without providing evidence that his primary sexual interest in Aisha had been her not yet having reached puberty. Moreover, there were no reliable sources for that allegation, as no documentary evidence existed to suggest that his other wives or concubines had been similarly young. On the contrary, his first wife had been fifteen years older than him, as could be seen from the documents submitted by the applicant herself. Even if the applicant had had the right to criticise others’ attempts to imitate Muhammad, her statements showed her intention to unnecessarily disparage and deride Muslims. Harsh criticism of churches or religious societies (Religionsgesellschaften) and religious traditions and practices was lawful. However, the permissible limits were exceeded where criticism ended and insults or mockery of a religious belief or person of worship (Beschimpfung oder Verspottung einer Religion oder von ihr verehrten Personen) began. The interference with the applicant’s freedoms under Article 10 of the Convention had therefore been justified. As to the applicant’s argument that those who had participated in the seminar knew of her critical approach and could not be offended, the Court of Appeal found that the public seminar had been offered for free to young voters by the Austrian Freedom Party Education Institute, and at least one participant had been offended, as her complaints had led to the applicant being charged. 19. On 16 April 2012 the applicant lodged a request for a renewal of the proceedings (Antrag auf Erneuerung des Strafverfahrens) with the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof), pursuant to Article 363a of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung), and relying on Article 6 § 1, Article 7 § 1 and Article 10 of the Convention. 20. On 6 June 2012 the applicant lodged her application with the Court. 21. On 11 December 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed the request for a renewal of the proceedings. As regards the alleged violation of Article 10, it found that the applicant’s conviction under Article 188 of the Criminal Code constituted an interference with the right to freedom of expression, which had however been justified under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. Referring to the Court’s case-law (Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 20 September 1994, Series A no. 295‑A; İ.A., cited above; Wingrove v. the United Kingdom, 25 November 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑V; Aydın Tatlav, cited above; and Giniewski v. France, no. 64016/00, ECHR 2006‑I), it held that the aim of the interference had been to protect religious peace and the religious feelings of others and was therefore legitimate. The Court had stated many times that in the context of religion member States had a duty to suppress certain forms of conduct or expression that were gratuitously offensive to others and profane. In cases where the impugned statements not only offended or shocked, or expressed a “provocative” opinion, but had also been considered an abusive attack on a religious group – for example an abusive attack on the Prophet of Islam, as in the applicant’s case – a criminal conviction might be necessary to protect the freedom of religion of others. Where a conviction was based on Article 188 of the Criminal Code, the principles developed under Article 9 and 10 of the Convention had to be considered when examining whether a statement was capable of “arousing justified indignation”. A statement could not be considered as arousing indignation if it was compatible with Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention. The courts therefore had to examine the meaning of the impugned statement, as well as the context in which it had been made and whether the statement was based on fact or was a value judgment. Only by considering all of those points could the question of the ability to arouse justified indignation be examined. 22. Applying the above considerations to the applicant’s case, the Supreme Court held that she had not aimed to contribute to a serious debate about Islam or the phenomenon of child marriage, but merely to defame Muhammad by accusing him of a specific sexual preference, based on the assumption that he had had sexual intercourse with a prepubescent child, in order to show that he was not a worthy subject of worship. The court, whilst not misjudging the importance of the debate about sexual contact between adults and children, found that the applicant had not contributed to a debate of general interest because she had made her allegation primarily in order to defame Muhammad. On the basis of the Regional Court’s findings that the applicant’s statements qualified as value judgments, the Supreme Court held that they had not been a contribution to a serious debate. The case had to be distinguished from the case of Aydın Tatlav (cited above), in which a scientific book, published in its fifth edition, had contained a passage of harsh criticism of religion, which had not been offensive. In the present case the criminal conviction constituted a measure necessary in a democratic society within the meaning of Article 10 of the Convention. Moreover, the measure taken by the Criminal Court had also been proportionate, as the applicant had only been ordered to pay a fine of EUR 480. The Supreme Court therefore dismissed the applicant’s request for a renewal of the proceedings. 23. The Supreme Court’s judgment was served on the applicant’s counsel on 8 January 2014.

4. The applicant was born in 1968 and has been serving a prison sentence in Lukiškės Remand Prison since 16 January 2002. 5. On 16 May 2014 the applicant lodged a civil claim against the State, alleging that he was being detained in overcrowded and unsanitary cells. He also complained that toilets were not properly partitioned from the rest of the cells and thus the prison staff could see him use the toilet. He submitted that his health had deteriorated as a result of the inappropriate conditions of his detention and claimed 450,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL, approximately 130,300 euros (EUR)) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 6. On 19 January 2015 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court allowed the applicant’s claim in part. It firstly held that the time-limit for claiming damages was three years after the damage arose, and accordingly dismissed the part of the applicant’s claim concerning the period before 16 May 2011 as time-barred. On the basis of documents provided by the prison administration, the court found that from 16 May 2011 to 15 May 2014 the applicant had spent 1,082 days in Lukiškės Remand Prison. During that period, for thirteen days and one afternoon he had had 3.24 sq. m of personal space and on one afternoon he had had 2.65 sq. m of personal space, in breach of the domestic standard of 3.6 sq. m. For the remaining time the personal space available to him was found to be in compliance with the requirement of 3.6 sq. m. 7. The court also quoted the report of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“the CPT”) on its visit to Lithuania in 2012. According to that report, nearly all the inmates in Lukiškės Remand Prison were confined to their cells for twenty-three hours per day, with no out-of-cell activities other than outdoor exercise lasting one hour in small and dilapidated yards (see paragraph 13 below). The court noted that the prison administration had not provided any evidence that the situation in the prison had changed. 8. Furthermore, the court ruled that toilets had not been partitioned from the rest of the cells in the manner required by relevant domestic regulations. It stated that, in accordance with accepted social norms, inability to use the toilet in private was degrading and humiliating to the individual. 9. The court considered that the applicant had not proved that his health had deteriorated as a result of the conditions of his detention. It awarded the applicant EUR 80 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, taking into account the “scope, intensity and duration” of the violation of his rights and the economic conditions in the country. 10. The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision, arguing that the first-instance court had erred by dismissing part of his claim as time-barred, that the conditions in Lukiškės Remand Prison had not improved and that his health had deteriorated because of them. On 10 November 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the first-instance court’s decision in its entirety.

4. The applicant was born in 1946 and lives in Čačak. 5. On 7 September 2005 the applicant instituted civil proceedings before the Court of First Instance (Osnovni sud) in Kotor seeking redress regarding various contractual issues. 6. On 4 December 2008 the Court of First Instance in Kotor ruled in favour of the applicant. 7. On 17 November 2009 the High Court (Viši sud) in Podgorica upheld this judgment on appeal. 8. On 20 May 2010 the Supreme Court quashed the previous judgments and ordered a re-trial. 9. On 12 August 2011 the Court of First Instance in Kotor ruled against the applicant. This judgment was upheld by the High Court in Podgorica and the Supreme Court on 6 April 2012 and 12 September 2012 respectively. 10. The Supreme Court’s judgment was served on the applicant on 20 October 2012. 11. The applicant lodged a constitutional appeal on 28 November 2012. 12. On 30 June 2015 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s appeal. This decision was served on the applicant on 25 September 2015.

4. The applicant was born in 1946 and lives in Lisichansk-18, the Lugansk region of Ukraine. 5. In 1972 the applicant suffered 100 per cent disability as a result of a traffic accident. In 1994 the Lisichansk Town Court of the Lugansk Region of Ukraine found the State Health Care Institution of the Sanitary and Epidemiology Monitoring of the Ministry of Railways of the Russian Federation (“the institution”) responsible for the accident and ordered it to pay to the applicant compensation and to reimburse his medical expenses. Since that time, the applicant has been involved in several sets of proceedings concerning various types of allowances and compensation due to him. 6. On 17 July 1995 by the Lisichansk Town Court ordered the increase of the monthly payments due to the applicant in respect of compensation, allowances and medical expenses. It appears that the debtor institution complied with the judgment in part and in May 2000 discontinued payments due under the judgment. 7. On 31 March 2006 the Perm Regional Court of Russia allowed the applicant’s request for compulsory execution of the above judgment in Russia as from May 2000. It was enforced on 30 March 2007. 8. The applicant sued the defendant institution for medical expenses, various types of allowances and compensation, as well as index-linking and arrears in the respective payments, and acquired several judgments by Russian courts in his favour listed in Appendixes I and II. 9. In course of the proceedings the defendant institution was replaced by the Federal Health Care Institution “Hygiene and Epidemiology Center of the Perm Region and the Komi-Perm Autonomous Region” and subsequently by Federal Health Care Institution “Hygiene and Epidemiology Center of the Perm Region”, its legal successors. 10. He complained about non-enforcement to the Ministry of Finance, the prosecutor’s office and various other authorities, but to no avail. 11. The judgments were enforced fully or in part on dates listed in Appendixes I and II. Some of them have not been enforced, as shown in the tables below.

5. The applicants are joint owners of the property at number 274, Republic Street, Valletta. The property, known as the “King’s Own Band Club” (hereinafter referred to as “the KOBC”), is a four‑storey building of 864 square metres, and is located in a prime site in Malta’s capital city. 6. Initially, the property belonged to the applicants’ ascendants. In 1946, the applicants’ ascendants entered into a rent agreement with the KOBC, whereby they willingly rented the said property for 500 pounds sterling (GBP) annually (around 1,164.69 euros (EUR)). In 1955 legislation specifically regulating the lease of property to band clubs (Act V of 1955, hereinafter “the 1955 amendments”) was introduced. 7. By law (The Civil Code read in conjunction with the Re‑letting of Urban Property (Regulation) Ordinance – see relevant domestic law below), the applicants are obliged to renew, on an annual basis, the lease entered into by their ascendants, and may not demand an increase in rent. According to the applicants’, the property’s market rental value (in 2014) was EUR 269,100 annually. 8. Part of the property is utilised as a band club, and part of the property is operated as a restaurant and bar. The applicants claim that the operation of the restaurant and bar is a profitable economic activity that generates an income to the caterer of around EUR 150,000 or more annually. 9. In 2009, amendments were introduced to allow for increases in certain rents and to establish a cut-off date for existing protected leases relating to commercial properties, which are thus to come to an end in 2028. These amendments did not affect the applicants’ property which is rented out as a band club. The amendments however also gave the relevant Minister the power to regulate conditions relating to clubs, thus allowing for the possibility of future amendments (see paragraph 19 below). 10. In 2011, the applicants filed proceedings before the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional jurisdiction. The proceedings were brought against the Attorney General (hereinafter referred to as “the AG”), the Prime Minister (hereinafter referred to as “the PM”) and the King’s Own Band Club (the lessee). The applicants claimed that their right to peaceful enjoyment of the property as protected under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention was being breached. They claimed that they were being denied the use of their property without being provided with adequate compensation. The applicants further submitted that, in 2009, the law had been amended, allowing for an increase in rent and the establishment of a cut‑off date for existing “protected rents”, but the amendments in the law did not cover properties rented out as clubs. Therefore, in contrast with other commercial rents, the annual rent for the club could not be raised, and the rent contract could not be terminated. The applicants claimed that the law was discriminatory and was therefore in violation of Article 14 of the Convention. 11. On 8 October 2013, the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional jurisdiction found that the applicants had suffered a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in so far as the interference with the applicants’ property rights had not been proportionate. The applicants had submitted that the property had a rental value of EUR 269,100 a year, while the AG and the PM had submitted that the property had a rental value of EUR 93,000 a year. Irrespective of which value one was to consider, the court concluded that the rent being received by the applicants was disproportionate. Keeping in mind the estimated rental values presented before the court, and the income that the KOBC was generating from its bar, the court awarded EUR 300,000 in damages to the applicants (to be paid half by the AG and the PM jointly, and half by the KOBC). The costs of the proceedings were to be paid, half by the AG and PM, and the other half by the KOBC. 12. The court further concluded that the applicants had not suffered any discrimination as no satisfactory proof had been presented showing that they were discriminated against when compared to other owners leasing their property as a club. 13. The AG, PM and KOBC filed an appeal before the Constitutional Court. 14. On 6 February 2015 the Constitutional Court overturned in part the judgment of the first‑instance court, and concluded that there had been no violation of the applicants’ rights. The Constitutional Court ordered that the costs of proceedings at both instances be paid by the applicants. 15. The Constitutional Court found that contrary to that pleaded by the Government, the applicants did have title of ownership over the property at issue. However, in line with domestic case-law the Constitutional Court concluded that, because the agreement had been entered into voluntarily with full knowledge of the consequences it would lead to (that is, that the rent due could not be raised and the rent agreement could not be terminated), then the applicants could not allege a violation of their rights. This was so, even if due to the rate of inflation throughout the years, the rent due was now to be considered low. The Constitutional Court further held that the amendments to the law of 2009, mentioned by the applicants, did not affect their position which remained the same as that when the rent agreement had been entered into [in 1946], and therefore there was no reason for the principle of pacta sunt servanda (“agreements must be complied with”) not to be given full effect. 16. On 6 May 2015, the applicants filed an application for retrial. They claimed that the Constitutional Court had committed an error of fact and applied a wrong interpretation of the law. They noted that the protection given in law to clubs was introduced in 1955 while their predecessors in title had entered into a lease agreement in 1946. 17. Nevertheless, the applicants also instituted proceedings before this Court on 20 July 2015. 18. On 3 February 2016 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicants’ request for a re‑trial. The Constitutional Court held that, as the law stood, retrial could not be applied in regard to a case of a constitutional nature. The costs of the proceedings were to be paid by the applicants. 19. Pending the constitutional redress proceedings (on appeal), on 1 January 2014, the Conditions Regulating the Leases of Clubs Regulations (hereinafter ‘the Regulations’), Subsidiary Legislation Chapter 16.13 of the Laws of Malta came into force (see relevant domestic law). 20. The Regulations provided that the rent payable to the owners by the band clubs holding the property under title of lease was to be increased by 10% (from the previous year) every year until 2016 and as from 1 January 2016 the rent was to be increased by 5% (from the previous year) every year until 2023, following which it would increase every year according to the index of inflation. As from 2015 the tenant also had to pay an additional rent calculated at the rate of 5% on the annual income derived by the club. As a result in 2015 the total annual rent paid to the applicants by the KOBC was EUR 2,876. 26 and in 2016 EUR 3,017.20,

4. The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Novi Sad. 5. On 1 June 2004 the applicant instituted civil proceedings seeking reimbursement for income she had lost because of a car accident. 6. On 25 February 2008 the Novi Sad Court of First Instance delivered a judgment partly in favour of the applicant and ordered the defendant to pay her a certain amount in that respect. 7. On 30 October 2008 the Novi Sad District Court partly quashed the judgment of 25 February 2008 and remitted the case, upholding the remainder of the judgment. 8. On 2 July 2010 the Novi Sad Court of First Instance rejected the applicant’s claim in the remitted part. 9. On 30 January 2012 the Novi Sad Court of Appeal partly upheld the judgment of 2 July 2010 and partly reversed it granting certain applicant’s claims. 10. On 5 February 2015 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s complaint about the length of those proceedings, taking into consideration that the civil courts had rendered four judgments at two instances and that the proceedings had been complex.

6. The applicant was born in 1949, he is a lawyer and lives in Nicosia. 7. The applicant was appointed as an IDC judge on 1 October 1997 and as its President on 6 December 2001. 8. By a letter dated 18 July 2005 the two main trade unions and the two corresponding employers’ federations submitted a complaint to the Supreme Court, alleging misconduct on the part of the applicant in the exercise of his judicial functions. The letter referred, in general, to complaints received by members of trade unions and employers’ federations who had carried out duties as lay members of the IDC, concerning the applicant’s conduct towards litigants, witnesses, lawyers and lay members of the court during proceedings. 9. The applicant was served with a written notice from the Supreme Court dated 1 September 2005, informing him of the allegations against him and noting that the Supreme Court had decided that it was justified to activate Rule 3 of the Procedural Rules concerning the exercise of the SCJ’s disciplinary authority (“the Procedural Rules”; see paragraph 41 below). The applicant was provided with a copy of the letter of complaint and was requested to send his comments within seven days. 10. By a letter dated 7 September 2005 the applicant submitted his comments to the Supreme Court with regard to the allegations against him. The applicant observed, inter alia, that the complaint was so general and vague that he was unable to identify the precise events on which it was based as he had presided over numerous proceedings. He also informed the Supreme Court that the authors of the letter had given a copy to the press and that it had been published in a newspaper on 21 July 2005. 11. On 16 September 2005 the Supreme Court decided, in accordance with Rules 4 and 5 of the Procedural Rules (see paragraph 41 below), to appoint an investigating judge to look into the allegations against the applicant. 12. On 19 September 2005 the Supreme Court appointed the then President of the District Court of Nicosia as investigating judge. 13. In a letter dated 5 December 2005 the investigating judge informed the applicant of his appointment. He also provided the applicant with statements he had taken from twenty-eight people during his investigation and invited the applicant to submit a supplementary statement, if he so wished, within ten days. 14. On 16 December 2005 the applicant made a lengthy supplementary statement to the investigating judge, providing his comments on the statements collected by the judge and referring to various proceedings in which the witnesses had been involved. He also noted that he did not view his comments as a supplementary statement as such, since it was only at that time that the complaint had become more precise, at least in part. Furthermore, he observed that the witness statements covered a period of six years, when he had sat in about three thousand cases. The statements could not therefore provide the full picture. He suggested that statements should be taken from a number of lay members of the court and provided the investigating judge with their names and telephone numbers. 15. On 21 December 2005, upon completion of the investigation, the investigating judge submitted a report to the Supreme Court summarising his investigation and the evidence collected. The report was accompanied by all the material he had collected, including the statements given by the witnesses and the applicant. The report made no recommendation. 16. By a letter dated 10 February 2006 the chief registrar of the Supreme Court informed the applicant that the court had decided that a disciplinary process was warranted. He provided the applicant with the charge sheet drawn up by the Supreme Court at a meeting it had held on 9 February 2006. This included two charges of misconduct, and details of the preparatory investigation by the investigating judge. The charges against the applicant were as follows: “First Charge Misconduct (Articles 153 § 7 (4) and 157 § 3 of the Constitution) Particulars While you exercised the duties of President of the Industrial Disputes Court you repeatedly displayed oppressive, disparaging, scornful and, more generally, insulting behaviour towards the lay members of the Court, both inside and outside the courtroom and, at the same time, in the course of proceedings you sometimes ignored them, sometimes did not allow them to put questions and sometimes did not allow them to ask for clarification on the matters at issue. Second Charge Misconduct (Articles 153 § 7 (4) and 157 § 3 of the Constitution) Particulars While you exercised the duties of President of the Industrial Disputes Court you repeatedly displayed oppressive, disparaging, scornful and, more generally, insulting and even humiliating behaviour towards lawyers and/or litigants and/or witnesses during the proceedings, including ironic comments at their expense and/or innuendos, with the result that, owing to the agitation and disruption caused to them, the entire proceedings were diverted from their proper course.” 17. A list of fifteen witnesses was attached to the charge sheet. 18. In his letter the chief registrar summoned the applicant to appear on 9 March 2006 before the SCJ (see paragraph 36 below) to answer the charges. He informed the applicant that the proceedings would not be held in public unless he so wished and that, pending the proceedings, he would have to refrain from carrying out his duties. 19. On 9 March 2006, before the applicant answered the charges against him, his lawyer raised several preliminary objections. In particular, he argued that the investigation had been incomplete as statements had not been taken from the people indicated by the applicant. Furthermore, he argued that the charge sheet was incomplete, defective and vague; it did not give sufficient information to the applicant about the offences in relation to the actual content of the two charges he was facing. 20. The SCJ ruled the same day that the charge sheet, taken together with the fifteen statements, provided sufficient information to the applicant about the facts on which the charges had been based. In that regard, it noted that the applicant had commented on all the details referred to in the statements in a lengthy statement. The SCJ also held that the investigation had been adequate and had provided grounds for bringing charges. 21. The applicant then pleaded not guilty to the charges. 22. A hearing was set for 29 March 2006. The applicant’s lawyer agreed that the proceedings would not be held in public. 23. Hearings commenced on the scheduled date. The SCJ set out the procedure to be followed: every witness would read out the statement he or she had given to the investigating officer and would then be cross-examined by the applicant’s lawyer. Following a request by the applicant’s lawyer, the SCJ also held on the same day that in view of the defence’s line of argument all the files of the proceedings in which the witnesses had sat as members of the IDC, from the applicant’s appointment as president of the IDC onwards, should be brought before it. The hearing was scheduled to continue on 31 March 2006. 24. Following a request by the applicant’s lawyer, leave was given by the SCJ on the latter date for the applicant to have full access to the IDC registry’s archives in order to enable him to examine and collect any elements that could help his defence. 25. The hearings continued, with around seven more sessions being held. Files of the proceedings over which the applicant had presided and in which the witnesses had been involved were admitted as exhibits. They were filed in separate bundles by reference to the particular witness and were recorded in the list of exhibits. 26. During the proceedings it was clarified that the charge sheet was limited to the period subsequent to the applicant’s appointment as President of the IDC. Further statements that related to pending proceedings and complaints that had previously been dealt with by the Supreme Court were removed from the charge sheet. Ten out of the fifteen witnesses listed on the charge sheet ultimately testified. They comprised six lay members, two lawyers and two people who had been witnesses in proceedings over which the applicant had presided. The witnesses read out and confirmed the contents of their statements. They were then cross-examined by the applicant’s lawyer. 27. In addition, at the suggestion of the applicant’s lawyer, the court also summoned the IDC’s registrar. 28. After the conclusion of the witness statements and an address by the applicant’s lawyer, the SCJ found on 29 May 2006 that a prima facie case had been established against the applicant. It therefore called the applicant to put forward his defence. 29. The applicant took until 23 June 2006 to set out his defence case, testifying himself and calling thirty-six witnesses. They consisted of twenty-six lay members of the IDC, nine lawyers and a representative from the redundancy fund. The proceedings concluded with the applicant’s lawyer addressing the court. He raised the issue of the charge sheet again and also submitted that because the Supreme Court and the SCJ had the same composition, the same judges had examined the witness statements, had decided to refer the case to trial, formulated the charge sheet and overseen the proceedings. Those judges had also acted as prosecutors and had then tried the case. He argued that that was contrary to the rules of natural justice and the right to a fair trial. He stressed, however, that this had nothing to do with the judges as individuals. 30. In a decision of 19 September 2006 the SCJ found, by a majority of twelve to one (the President and eleven justices concurring), that on the basis of the evidence and all the material facts before it, the applicant’s alleged misconduct had been proved. The SCJ assessed the evidence given by the eleven witnesses and made specific reference to events transcribed in the records of court proceedings over which the applicant had presided and in which the witnesses had been involved. It referred to ten specific cases. After hearing the applicant, in accordance with Rule 26 (see paragraph 41 below), the SCJ removed him from office. 31. The relevant parts of the decision read as follows: “... Rule 13 secures for the judge against whom proceedings are brought all the rights provided for in Article 12 § 5 of the Constitution for persons who are charged with a criminal offence. That constitutional provision secures the well-known rights that an accused has in a criminal trial and are identical to those secured under Articles 6 §§ 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which was ratified by the House of Representatives by law in 1962 (Law 39/62). Furthermore, the provisions of Article 30 of our Constitution, which are the equivalent to those of Article 6 of the Convention, are also applicable. ... At no stage did the Supreme Council of Judicature function as a public prosecutor against Mr Kamenos. The President and Members of the Supreme Council of Judicature did not put a single question to the witnesses who were listed on the charge sheet, or to those summoned on behalf of Mr Kamenos, which might have been construed as cross-examination for the purpose of contesting the witnesses’ allegations. On the contrary, the President and Members of the Supreme Council of Judicature asked very few questions, and they were solely for the purpose of clarification; special reference will be made to some of those questions at the appropriate stage. Not a single question was put to Mr Kamenos. The Supreme Council of Judicature was not seeking to pursue a procedure of prosecution against Mr Kamenos in the form of a confrontation between prosecution and defence. For that reason, and despite having such powers under Rule 16, the relevant provision of the Constitution on the judicial process and the procedure to be followed in investigating disciplinary cases, it did not assign the duties of prosecutor to the judge-investigator or to any other judicial official. In that way, which was the declared intention of the Supreme Council of Judicature, more rights were secured for Mr Kamenos than those which he had under the aforementioned Articles of the Constitution and the Rule. That was precisely the aim of the procedure followed by the Supreme Council of Judicature, which essentially remained an audience for the witnesses’ statements. It follows that this is the appropriate moment to refer to the suggestion made by Mr Kamenos’s lawyer in his final address. Its subject relates directly and absolutely to what we have just said. The lawyer alleged that the Supreme Council of Judicature had functioned in a dual capacity, given that it had judged the case and simultaneously exercised the duties of prosecutor. Clarifying his position, he said that that is inferred from the fact that the President and Members of the Supreme Council of Judicature put questions to the witnesses. In our opinion, that suggestion is unfounded and unjustifiable. It is unfounded for the reasons which we explained above, and unjustifiable because it conflicts with what the lawyer said to us at the beginning of the proceedings, when he ... spoke in praise of the powers invested by the Constitution in the Supreme Council of Judicature, describing its work as difficult and important [in those instances] when it is called upon to decide whether a judge displayed misconduct and is obliged, again in accordance with the Constitution, to terminate the latter’s services in the event of conviction. In brief, Mr Efstathiou not only accepted but also praised as correct the competence, arising from the Constitution, of the Supreme Council of Judicature, which is made up of the full bench of the Members of the Supreme Court, the highest judicial authority in the State. ... [The applicant’s lawyer] asked many witnesses to express an opinion on the extent to which they considered that Mr Kamenos’s decisions were correct. Most of them, including the lawyers, gave the right reply, namely, that it was not for them to judge Mr Kamenos’s decisions. In the same way, the Supreme Council of Judicature is not judging the correctness of Mr Kamenos’s decisions. We do not have such competence. That belongs to the Supreme Court. The competence of the Supreme Council of Judicature is only to decide whether the charges of improper behaviour (misconduct) are proved, which [behaviour] in the case we are examining and according to the particulars of the charges, is continuous (κατά συρροή, διαρκής) and directly refers to the function of Mr Kamenos as the President of the Industrial Disputes Court. ... We previously stated that certain witnesses called by Mr Kamenos, evidently in an endeavour to tone down or explain what the witnesses listed on the charge sheet had testified to and who touched on Mr Kamenos’s behaviour in the course of the hearing, in essence confirmed what those witnesses had said. Several examples follow ... ... From the evidence that we have analysed above, we find that the charges have been proved. ... We wish to clarify that the purpose of this procedure is not to punish Mr Kamenos but to protect the public by adopting of a strict standard of judicial behaviour in order to preserve public confidence in the integrity, prestige and independence of the judicial system. We borrow and adopt the above principle from the decision (Investigation concerning Judge Bruce Van Voorhis, No. 165) given in February 2003 by the Commission of Judicial Performance of the State of California, in the United States of America, which concerned a procedure against a specific judge whose services were also terminated for misconduct, with facts and particulars similar to the case before us. In essence, we translate the principle which that Commission adopted and recorded on page 31 of the decision. The principle is based, as stated in the decision, on what was said by the Supreme Court of the State, that the purpose of the procedure was not to punish judges who have erred but to protect the judicial system and those who are subject to the formidable power exercised by judges. ... Evaluating the above with great care, caution and, we would say, anxiety, we are led to the conclusion that everything imputed to Mr Kamenos as stated in the two charges has been proved. In accordance with the relevant provisions of the Constitution, which are referred to in our decision, the proof of a charge of misconduct against a judge leads to the termination of his services.” 32. The dissenting judge found in his decision that the evidence was not sufficient to prove such a serious charge as misconduct. As regards the procedure, the judge noted, inter alia, that the Supreme Council of Judicature had asked the witnesses very few questions and that they had been for the purposes of clarification. Furthermore, with regard to the investigation and the object of the hearing, he observed: “A judicial official with the duties of prosecutor was not appointed, a possibility which is referred to in Rule 16, and we adopted the following approach: every witness read his statement to the investigating officer out loud and, immediately after, was cross-examined by Mr Kamenos’s lawyer. During the cross-examination or subsequently members of the Supreme Council of Judicature asked the witnesses a few questions for clarification purposes. This is also exactly what happened in the case of Mr Kamenos and the 36 witnesses called by him. ... Before referring to the evidence, it is useful if we outline the methodology which led to the taking of statements by the Investigating Officer. He did not himself take the initiative of collecting evidence in view of the accusation, as he explains in his report. The persons who signed the accusation did not have any personal knowledge of the circumstances and statements were taken from all those they ... named, and from others subsequently named by those who had been initially summoned. The investigation into the manner in which Mr Kamenos exercised his duties in general was therefore not systematic and that is also the reason for not taking statements from a number of other persons whom Mr Kamenos himself indicated. Besides, as we have seen, of the 28 statements which the Investigating Office took, only 15 were attached to the charge sheet, with a further reduction to 10 in the course of the hearing. They did not include statements which, as the Investigating Officer reported, not only expressed no complaints but stated that Mr Kamenos’s conduct had been irreproachable in all respects. Consequently, as is in any case self-evident, the object of the hearing is [to determine] whether, on the basis of the evidence of those ten witnesses, the charge has been substantiated as formulated. That is to say, whether, from each individual’s evidence and the correlation between them, to the extent possible, there arises conduct as cumulatively stated on the charge sheet, [and] in the case of the second charge “with the result that, owing to the agitation and disruption they were caused, the entire proceedings were diverted from their proper course”. This (was the wording), without any specification on the charge sheet of a definite, specific incident at a specific time, ... in relation to a specific person in the context of a specific case. The witnesses who remained on the charge sheet (whose statements I shall of course return to), as lay members of the court, or as lawyers or witnesses, did not submit a complaint there and then about what they considered to be objectionable conduct. ... Nor did the litigants in any specific case which could be related to the charge sheet make a complaint at the time, or appeal or employ any other legal means so that any objectionable conduct would be examined also from the aspect of its effect on the final outcome. That was what occurred in the cases of Athanasiou v. Reana Manuf. & Trade Co.Ltd and others (2001) 1 C.L.R. 1635, and Fanos N. Epiphaniou Ltd v. Melarta and others (2002) 1 C.L.R.654, in which the Supreme Court annulled decisions issued by the Industrial Disputes Tribunal under the presidency of Mr Kamenos, using strong language about the degree of his intervention in the proceedings and the appearance of partiality to which it could give rise. Of course, the charge sheet does not extend to those cases and does not concern the issue of interventions as such ... The core of the charge is the conduct attributed to Mr Kamenos at the expense of lay members of the court, lawyers, litigants and witnesses, and it is in the light of such considerations that I shall go on to examine the evidence adduced.” 33. The applicant continued to receive all the benefits that came with his post during the proceedings. It appears from a letter sent to him by the Treasury of the Republic of Cyprus that the applicant was considered as having retired from the date of his dismissal, 19 September 2006. He was paid a retirement lump sum and started receiving his pension.

4. The applicant was born in 1982 and lives in Warsaw. 5. On 29 November 2012 the Warsaw-Wola District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) ordered the applicant’s detention on remand on suspicion of drug dealing, as well as facilitating and benefiting from prostitution, committed in an organised criminal group. The domestic court relied on a strong likelihood that the applicant had committed the offences in question, on the fact that he faced a severe penalty and that he was suspected of acting with accomplices. The likelihood that the applicant had committed the offences in question was established, in particular, on the basis of the testimony of a key prosecution witness (the so-called “crown witness”). 6. On 8 January 2013 the Warsaw Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) dismissed the applicant’s appeal against this decision. It stressed that the sole fact that the applicant faced a severe penalty and had been suspected of committing offences in an organised criminal group justified a suspicion that, if released, the applicant would try to obstruct the proceedings by influencing witnesses or his accomplices. 7. The applicant’s detention on remand was extended by the Warsaw Regional Court on 21 February, 27 May and 8 August 2013. In these decisions, the court repeated the reasons originally relied on. In its decision of 21 February 2013, the Warsaw Regional Court further noted that the case against the applicant was complex, and indicated a number of steps that still had to be taken in order to terminate the investigation. The court noted that not all of those steps required the applicant’s detention and urged the prosecutor to accelerate the proceedings. 8. The applicant appealed against all these decisions, without success. 9. On 21 November 2013 the Warsaw Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) ordered a further extension of the applicant’s detention on remand. It relied on the same grounds as previously given for his detention. The applicant appealed. The decision was upheld on appeal on 12 December 2013. 10. The bill of indictment against the applicant was lodged with the Warsaw Regional Court on 30 December 2013. The applicant was charged with ten offences committed in an organised criminal group and – in the case of some of the offences – as a re-offender. The charges included facilitating prostitution by renting an apartment to prostitutes and collecting money from them, and a number of counts of drug possession and distribution. The bill of indictment concerned altogether seventeen accused, charged with 150 offences. Later, the number of accused in the proceedings dropped to fourteen. The prosecutor requested that the court hear over 90 witnesses, including five “crown witnesses”. 11. Subsequently, the applicant’s detention pending trial was extended by the Warsaw Regional Court’s decisions of 10 January and 7 May 2014 and by the Warsaw Court of Appeal’s decisions of 30 December 2014, 28 April, 27 August and 26 November 2015, and of 25 February and 25 May 2016. The domestic courts continued to rely on the same grounds for detention as in their previous decisions. They also stressed the complexity of the case and the links between the co-accused within an organised criminal group which, according to the domestic courts, justified a suspicion that, if released, they would attempt to obstruct the proper course of the proceedings. 12. The appeals by the applicant against decisions extending his detention and all his applications for release were unsuccessful. 13. On 9 May 2016 the trial court ordered the applicant’s release on bail for 80,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) (approximately 20,000 euros (EUR)). The applicant appealed against this decision, contesting the amount of bail as excessive. On 25 May 2016 the Warsaw Court of Appeal upheld the decision. It underlined that the amount of bail had to take into consideration not only the financial situation of the applicant, but also the gravity of the charges against him. The court also stated that it had taken into consideration the fact that the applicant had abused his procedural rights in order to obstruct and delay the proceedings. It indicated that the amount in question had to be such that the prospect of its loss would constitute a genuine deterrent against any illegal activities which, until that moment, had been prevented by the applicant’s detention. 14. On 30 May 2016 the Warsaw Regional Court again ordered the applicant’s release on bail of PLN 80,000. It also imposed a prohibition on leaving the country. The applicant paid the security required by the court and was released on 31 May 2016. 15. The case against the applicant and his co-accused appears to be pending before the Warsaw Regional Court (no. XII K 1/14). The material includes 188 volumes.

5. The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Kilis. 6. On 17 October 1999 the applicant sat an examination in order to become a civil servant. She was successful in the examination and on an unspecified date she was informed by the State Personnel Department attached to the Prime Minister’s office that she had been appointed to the post of security officer in the Kilis branch of TEDAŞ (Türkiye Elektrik Dağıtım A.Ş. – Turkish Electricity Distribution S.A.), a State-run electricity company. 7. On an unspecified date TEDAŞ informed the applicant that she would not be appointed to the post in question as she did not fulfil the requirements of “being a man” and “having completed military service”. 8. On 4 September 2000 the applicant lodged an action against TEDAŞ with the Gaziantep Administrative Court requesting the annulment of the decision of the Kilis Branch of TEDAŞ not to appoint her to the post in question and a stay of execution of this decision. 9. On 9 May 2001 the Gaziantep Administrative Court ordered the stay of execution of TEDAŞ’s decision not to appoint the applicant as a security officer. The court considered that “being a male” was not a requirement for the post. 10. On 23 July 2001 the applicant was offered a contract by the Kilis branch of TEDAŞ subject to a probationary period of six months. On an unspecified date the applicant took up her duties. 11. On 4 October 2001 the Gaziantep Administrative Court annulled the decision of the Kilis branch of TEDAŞ. The court held that the requirement of “having completed military service” should be considered to apply only to male candidates and that there had been no restriction on women working as security officers in TEDAŞ. It further noted in that connection that since there had not been a specific requirement to recruit only male candidates for the said post, the fact that the applicant had been rejected solely on account of her sex had been unlawful. 12. On 28 January 2002 TEDAŞ lodged an appeal against the judgment of 4 October 2001, requesting that the Supreme Administrative Court order a stay of execution of the judgment of the Gaziantep Administrative Court and subsequently quash it. 13. On 12 April 2002 the Twelfth Division of the Supreme Administrative Court granted the stay of execution of the judgment of 4 October 2001. 14. On 11 June 2002 TEDAŞ informed the applicant that her contract of employment had been terminated on 27 May 2002 by virtue of the Supreme Administrative Court decision of 12 April 2002. 15. On 26 December 2002 the Twelfth Division of the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the judgment of 4 October 2001. The Supreme Administrative Court considered that given that there had been a requirement of “having completed military service”, the post had been reserved for male candidates only. The Supreme Administrative Court therefore found that the decision not to appoint the applicant to the post had been in accordance with the law. 16. On 23 October 2003 the Gaziantep Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s case by following the reasoning of the Supreme Administrative Court. 17. The applicant appealed against the decision of 23 October 2003 and argued that the Supreme Administrative Court’s interpretation, namely that the post in question must have been reserved only for male candidates given that there was a requirement to complete military service, ran counter to the principle of equality and the State’s positive obligation to ensure non‑discrimination between men and women. In support of her arguments, the applicant maintained that this obligation was set out not only in Article 10 of the Constitution but also in Article 2 § d of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women as well as Article 3 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. She further argued that it was of no importance to dwell on whether the post in question had been reserved for male candidates only, since such a reservation itself would be contrary to the prohibition on discrimination on the basis of sex in access to employment as set out in the relevant international instruments and European Union regulations. On 16 November 2017 the Twelfth Division of the Supreme Administrative Court unanimously upheld the decision of 23 October 2003, without replying to the arguments of the applicant. 18. On 6 December 2007 the Supreme Administrative Court’s General Assembly of Administrative Proceedings Divisions (Danıştay İdari Dava Daireleri Genel Kurulu), the composition of which included some members of the Twelfth Division, delivered a decision in favour of R.B., who, like the applicant had been a female candidate for TEDAŞ whose application to be appointed to the post of security officer had been rejected by TEDAŞ on account of not fulfilling the requirements of “being a male” and “having completed military service”. The General Assembly held that the requirement of “having completed military service” should be considered to apply only to male candidates. It found, however, that it was unlawful to refuse to appoint R.B. on that ground. 19. On an unspecified date, the applicant applied for rectification of the decision of 16 November 2007, and maintained the arguments she had submitted during appeal (see paragraph 17 above). Relying on the right to a fair hearing, she argued that her submissions concerning the prohibition of discrimination were also supported by the findings of the Supreme Administrative Court’s General Assembly of Administrative Proceedings Divisions in its decision concerning the case of R.B.; she therefore requested the Supreme Administrative Court to rectify its decision of 16 November 2007. 20. In the rectification proceedings the judge rapporteur of the Twelfth Division submitted his written opinion on the merits of the case and argued, inter alia, that the decision of 16 November 2007 should be rectified in the light of the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court’s General Assembly of Administrative Proceedings Divisions of 6 December 2007 in the case of R.B. He also noted in that connection that Turkey had ratified the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and that pursuant to its Article 11, the State was bound to take all appropriate measures to ensure, inter alia, the right to the same employment opportunities on a basis of equality of men and women, including the application of the same criteria for selection in matters of employment. 21. On 24 June 2009 the Twelfth Division of the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s application for the rectification of its previous decision, holding that none of the reasons put forth by the applicant for rectification fell within the exhaustive list of permissible grounds for rectification indicated in section 54 (1) of the Administrative Procedure Act (Law no. 2577) and that its previous decision was in accordance with law and procedure. Therefore the Gaziantep Administrative Court’s decision of 23 October 2003 became final.

4. The first applicant, Mr Stemplys, was born in 1963 and lives in Marijampolė. The second applicant, Mr Debesys, was born in 1954 and lives in Vilnius. 5. The first applicant was detained in the Pravieniškės Correctional Facility from 6 April 2005 to 28 August 2015. 6. On 19 December 2012 he submitted a civil claim against the State, alleging that he was being detained in overcrowded and unsanitary cells and that his health had deteriorated as a result. He claimed 250,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL – approximately 72,400 euros (EUR)) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 7. On 26 February 2013 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court allowed the applicant’s claim in part. It firstly held that the time-limit for claiming damages was three years from the damage being caused, and thus dismissed the part of the applicant’s claim concerning the period before 19 December 2009 as time‑barred. The court then found that from 19 December 2009 to 19 December 2012 (the day when the applicant had submitted his complaint) he had had between 1.98 and 2.74 sq. m of personal space, in breach of the domestic standard of 3.1 sq. m. However, the court found that the sanitary conditions in the cells complied with relevant domestic hygiene norms. It also dismissed as unproven the applicant’s claim that his health had deteriorated. The court further underlined that the applicant was detained in a dormitory-type facility, he was able to move around freely during the day, and various leisure and educational activities were available. He was awarded LTL 1,000 (approximately EUR 290) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 8. On 7 October 2013 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance court’s judgment in its entirety. 9. On an unspecified date the applicant submitted a new civil claim against the State concerning the conditions of his detention after 19 December 2012, claiming LTL 63,750 (approximately EUR 18,500) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 10. On 21 October 2013 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court allowed the applicant’s claim in part. It found that from 19 December 2012 to 21 October 2013 (the day the court issued its decision) the applicant had had 1.98 sq. m of personal space, in breach of the domestic standard of 3.1 sq. m, and that during that period for fourteen days he had been placed in solitary confinement as a disciplinary measure, where he had had 3.47 sq. m of personal space, in breach of the domestic standard of 3.6 sq. m. Again, the court found that the sanitary conditions in the cells complied with relevant domestic hygiene norms, and dismissed as unproven the applicant’s claims that his health had deteriorated. He was awarded LTL 400 (approximately EUR 116) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 11. On 25 August 2014 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance court’s judgment in its entirety. 12. The second applicant was detained in the Pravieniškės Correctional Facility from 19 May 2001 to 20 December 2013. 13. On 28 June 2012 he submitted a civil claim against the State, alleging that he was being detained in overcrowded and unsanitary cells and that his health had deteriorated as a result. He claimed LTL 125,000 (approximately EUR 36,200) in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. 14. On 26 February 2013 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court allowed the applicant’s claim in part. It firstly held that the time-limit for claiming damages was three years from the damage being caused, and thus dismissed the part of the applicant’s claim concerning the period before 28 June 2009 as time‑barred. The court then found that from 28 June 2009 to 28 June 2012 (the day when the applicant had submitted his complaint) he had had around 2.55 sq. m of personal space, in breach of the domestic standard of 3.1 sq. m. However, the court found that the sanitary conditions in the cells complied with relevant domestic hygiene norms. It also held that the deterioration in the applicant’s state of health was not related to the conditions of his detention. The court further underlined that the applicant was detained in a dormitory-type facility, he was able to move around freely during the day, and various leisure and educational activities were available. He was awarded LTL 1,000 (approximately EUR 290) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. 15. On 15 October 2013 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance court’s judgment in its entirety. 16. On 15 May 2013 the applicant submitted a new civil claim against the State concerning the conditions of his detention after 28 June 2012, claiming LTL 33,875 (approximately EUR 9,800) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. 17. On 16 September 2013 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court allowed the applicant’s claim in part. It found that from 28 June 2012 to 15 May 2013 (the day when the applicant had submitted his complaint) the applicant had had between 1.59 and 2.77 sq. m of personal space, in breach of the domestic standard of 3.1 sq. m. Again, the court found that the sanitary conditions in the cells complied with relevant domestic hygiene norms and found no causal link between the deterioration in the applicant’s state of health and the conditions of his detention. The applicant was awarded LTL 500 (approximately EUR 145) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 18. On 18 September 2014 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance court’s judgment in its entirety.

4. The applicants are Russian nationals who, at the material time, lived in the Chechen Republic. Their personal details are set out in the appended table. They are close relatives of individuals who disappeared after allegedly being unlawfully detained by servicemen during special operations. The events concerned took place in areas under the full control of the Russian federal forces. The applicants have not seen their missing relatives since the alleged arrests. 5. The applicants reported the abductions to law‑enforcement bodies, and official investigations were opened. The proceedings were repeatedly suspended and resumed, and have remained pending for several years without any tangible results being achieved. The applicants lodged requests for information and assistance in the search for their relatives with the investigating authorities and various law-enforcement bodies. Their requests received either only formal responses or none at all. The perpetrators have not been identified by the investigating bodies. 6. Summaries of the facts in respect of each application are set out below. Each account is based on statements provided by the applicants and their relatives and/or neighbours to both the Court and the domestic investigative authorities. The Government did not dispute the principal facts of the cases, as presented by the applicants, but questioned the involvement of servicemen in the events. 7. The applicant is the mother of Mr Alik Tazuyev (in the documents submitted also spelled as Tuzayev), who was born in 1985. 8. At the material time Mr Alik Tazuyev was staying at his grandmother’s house in the village of Sernovodsk (also spelled as Sernovodskoye or Sernovodskaya). 9. At about 2 a.m. on 15 July 2002 a group of armed men in camouflage uniforms arrived in three military UAZ vehicles, two Niva cars and one VAZ car, all without registration plates. Most of the men were unmasked and spoke unaccented Russian; those of them who were in balaclavas were apparently of Chechen origin. The men broke into the house of Mr Alik Tazuyev’s grandmother, forced Mr Tazuyev into one of their vehicles and drove off. Having passed unhindered through several checkpoints on the way, they drove to the Nadterechniy district department of the Federal Security Service (“the FSB”) located in the neighbouring village of Znamenskoye. Relatives of the abducted persons followed the abductors and found special pass no. 168 for an UAZ-3962 vehicle with the registration number C688XX95RUS (in some documents B688XX95RUS), which had been issued on 1 May 2002 by the commander of the United Group Alignment in the North Caucasus Region . 10. According to the applicant, that night several other residents of Sernovodsk were abducted under similar circumstances. 11. On 17 July 2002 the Achkhoy-Martan inter-district prosecutor opened criminal case no. 63049 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code (“the CC”) (abduction) into the abduction of Mr Alik Tazuyev and the other abducted residents of Sernovodsk. 12. On 20 July 2002 the applicant was granted victim status in the case. 13. Over the following months the investigators sent requests to law‑enforcement authorities in Chechnya, including the FSB, for them to check if the abducted persons had been taken into their custody. The replies were all in the negative. 14. On 17 September 2002 the investigation in the case was suspended. 15. On 25 June 2003 in reply to the applicant’s request the investigators informed her that the criminal proceedings had been suspended but that operational search activities continued. 16. On 22 January 2004 a lawyer, who represented relatives of one of the abducted persons, lodged a complaint to the prosecutor of Chechnya, alleging the ineffectiveness of the investigation. He also submitted that the relatives of the abducted persons had followed the abductors and had found the special pass issued by the commander of the United Group Alignment forces. A copy of that pass was attached to the complaint. 17. On 11 March 2004 the investigators resumed the proceedings and several days later added the special pass to the evidence in the case file. 18. Between 30 March and 10 April 2004 the investigators questioned several relatives of the abducted persons and their fellow village residents, who confirmed the relatives’ account of the events. 19. On 11 April 2004 the investigation was suspended. 20. A copy of the criminal file submitted by the Government lacked one volume, the one covering the investigation between mid-2004 and early 2012. 21. According to the documents submitted by the applicant, the investigation was resumed on 21 June 2007, and then suspended on 31 July 2007. 22. According to the documents submitted by the Government, on 23 January 2012 the investigators resumed the proceedings again. By February 2012 they had established that the UAZ vehicle with a special pass had belonged to a private person, Mr A.E., who denied any involvement in the abduction. 23. On 16 February 2012 the investigators obtained the applicant’s DNA sample for comparison with samples obtained from unidentified bodies, but to no avail. 24. Subsequently, the investigation was suspended on 23 February and 25 September 2012, 22 August and 12 September 2013, and 16 January and 14 February 2014; it was resumed on 20 September 2012, 5 August, 11 September and 23 December 2013, and 13 February 2014 respectively. 25. In the meantime, on 23 January 2014 the investigators established that the military forces based in Khankala had been provided with vehicle registration plate K688XX95RUS. 26. On 13 February 2014 the investigators found that they had wrongly identified Mr A.E. as the owner of the UAZ vehicle, and that his car was of a different series. 27. It appears that the proceedings are still pending. 28. On an unspecified date the applicant complained of the investigators’ inaction to the Achkhoy-Martan District Court, which on 26 June 2007 dismissed her complaint as unsubstantiated. 29. The applicant is the mother of Mr Dmitry Kulishov, who was born in 1980. 30. At about 11 p.m. on 14 March 2005 a group of armed men in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas arrived in two grey VAZ vehicles and broke into Mr M.Ts.’s flat in Grozny, where Mr Dmitry Kulishov was temporarily residing. They took him away to an unknown destination. 31. On 15 March 2005 Mr M.Ts. lodged a complaint with the local police about Mr Dmitry Kulishov’s abduction. The applicant joined that complaint. 32. On 26 March 206 the Leninskiy district prosecutor in Grozny declined to open a criminal case. 33. On 9 April 2005 the above decision was overruled by a supervising authority. Two days later the prosecutor opened criminal case no. 40071 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 34. On 15 March 2005 the investigators questioned Mr M.Ts., who submitted that in the evening of 14 March 2005 his neighbours, Mr S. and Mr V., had visited his flat, where he lived with Mr Dmitry Kulishov. At about 10.55 p.m. he had left the flat to buy some bread in a nearby shop. On his way back he saw five men in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas. Armed with machine guns, they stood at the entrance to his block of flats. Mr M.Ts. tried to enter the block of flats, but the men did not let him in. They spoke Russian with a Chechen accent. Sometime later the armed men left the flat with Mr Dmitry Kulishov. They put him in a grey VAZ vehicle without registration plates and drove him away. 35. On 16 April 2005 the applicant was granted victim status. 36. On 14 June 2005 the investigators questioned Mr V. and Mr S. They confirmed the account of the events given by Mr M.Ts. Mr V. also submitted that he had heard that Mr Dmitry Kulishov had been taken to the Chechen Ministry of the Interior and then transported to an unknown destination. 37. On 11 July 2005 the investigation was suspended after it had failed establish the identity of the perpetrators. On 13 February 2006 that decision was overruled by the supervising prosecutor and the investigation was resumed. One month later it was suspended again. 38. Subsequently, the proceedings were resumed on 21 August 2006, 12 February 2007, 6 May 2009, 9 July and 21 September 2009, 20 December 2011, 4 June 2012, and 9 October and 12 December 2013; they were suspended on 25 August 2006, 16 March 2007, 5 June and 21 October 2009, 19 January and 4 July 2012, and 11 November 2013, respectively. 39. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 40. On an unspecified date, the applicant lodged a complaint with the Leninskiy District Court in Grozny, alleging that the investigation had been ineffective and that the investigators had failed to take basic steps. She also complained about the investigators’ decision to suspend the proceedings. 41. On 6 December 2008 the court ruled in the applicant’s favour. It ordered the investigating authorities to resume the proceedings and take necessary investigative measures. 42. The first applicant is the mother of Mr Askhab Soltagirayev, who was born in 1973. The second applicant is his wife. The third, fourth, and fifth applicants are his children. 43. In 2001 Mr Askhab Soltagirayev was pardoned under a Government amnesty aimed at former members of illegal armed groups. In 2000 his brother, Mr Alikhan Soltagirayev, had allegedly been killed by Russian servicemen. 44. At the material time the applicants, save for the first applicant, resided together in the town of Gudermes. On 12 April 2002 Russian servicemen conducted a special operation in the area, as a result of which many men were arrested. 45. At around 3 a.m. on that date a group of ten to fifteen servicemen in camouflage uniforms (some in balaclavas), armed with grenades and machine guns broke into the applicants’ house. The unmasked intruders were of Slavic appearance and spoke unaccented Russian, while the masked ones spoke Chechen. Some of them searched the house, while the others seized Mr Askhab Soltagirayev and his passport, took him outside and put him in a grey UAZ minivan. Then the servicemen departed in the direction of the town centre, accompanied by another grey UAZ car and an Ural lorry. 46. Later in the morning the applicants and their relatives went to the Gudermes District Department of the Interior (“the ROVD”), where many people were waiting for the release of relatives who had been detained on the same day under similar circumstances. At around 10 a.m. one of the arrested men, Mr Askhab from the village of Belorechye (also referred to as Ilaskhan‑Yurt), was released and told the applicants that their relative had been detained in the ROVD along with other men. On the same day two ROVD officers, Mr D. Yasayev and Mr I. Makayev, confirmed that Mr Askhab Soltagirayev had been detained there until at least 2 p.m. and then taken to the premises of a department of the Federal Security Service. The head of the ROVD later informed Mr Askhab Soltagirayev’s uncle that his nephew had not been detained on their premises. 47. The applicants have not seen Mr Askhab Soltagirayev since his abduction. 48. According to the applicants, despite attempts made by them to persuade the authorities to initiate a criminal investigation into the abduction of 12 April 2002, the Gudermes district prosecutor dissuaded them from lodging an official request. For that reason, their request for an investigation was officially registered only on 14 May 2004. 49. Between 27 and 29 May 2004 the police questioned the second applicant and her relatives and examined the crime scene. No evidence was collected. 50. On an unspecified date in May or June 2004 one of the police officers reported to his superior that according to the applicants’ neighbours, a special operation had been conducted on the day of the abduction. 51. On 3 June 2004 the Gudermes district prosecutor opened criminal case no. 35035 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 52. Five days later the second applicant was granted victim status and questioned. 53. In June 2004 the investigators contacted law-enforcement authorities in Chechnya to check whether Mr Askhab Soltagirayev had been arrested. The replies were all in the negative. 54. In June and July 2004 the investigators questioned the first and second applicants and their six relatives, including Mr Said‑Magomed. They submitted that Mr Askhab Soltagirayev’s detention at the ROVD had been acknowledged by Mr D. Yasayev and Mr I. Makayev. 55. On 21 June and 16 July 2004 the investigators questioned officers Mr D. Yasayev and Mr I. Makayev. Both stated that they did not know Mr Askhab Soltagirayev and had neither arrested him nor informed anyone of his arrest. 56. On 6 August 2004 the deputy head of the ROVD stated that Mr Askhab Soltagirayev had never been detained on their premises. 57. On 3 August 2004 the investigation was suspended after it had failed to establish the identity of the perpetrators. The second applicant was informed of that decision. 58. On 13 February 2008 the first applicant asked the investigators to grant her victim status in the case. 59. On 6 March 2008 the proceedings were resumed and the first applicant’s request was granted. The proceedings were suspended one month later. 60. On 21 April 2008 the investigation was resumed. In May 2008 the investigators questioned several of Mr Askhab Soltagirayev’s relatives, who reiterated their previous submissions. 61. Subsequently the proceedings were suspended on 21 May and 11 July 2008, 29 June, and 13 September and 23 December 2009; they were resumed on 11 June 2008, 5 May, 11 August and 13 November 2009 respectively. 62. In the meantime, on 20 June 2008 the deputy district prosecutor criticised the investigators for their failure to take basic steps such as confronting the applicants with Mr D. Yasayev and Mr I. Makayev, or establishing whether other persons had been detained in the ROVD on 12 April 2002. 63. In August 2008 the investigators replied to the above-mentioned criticism. They submitted that, under the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure, they were under no obligation to conduct a confrontation. As regards persons detained in the ROVD at the time of the abduction, the investigation had not obtained any relevant information. Operational search measures to establish them would be taken. 64. On 18 March 2009 the first applicant asked the investigators to allow her to study the case file. On 21 March 2009 her request was refused. The applicant lodged an appeal with the Gudermes District Court in Chechnya against the investigators’ refusal (see paragraph 67 below). Before the appeal court delivered its judgment she was allowed to access the investigation file. 65. On 30 October 2009 the deputy district prosecutor again criticised the investigators, noting that their failure to carry out confrontations between witnesses, to establish the persons allegedly detained with Mr Askhab Soltagirayev in the ROVD, or to check whether former servicemen from the “Vostok” battalion of the Russian Ministry of Defence had been involved in the abduction. 66. It appears that the proceedings are still pending. 67. On an unspecified date the first applicant lodged a complaint with the Gudermes District Court in Chechnya regarding the investigators’ refusal to allow her to access the case file. 68. On 12 May 2009 the court dismissed the applicant’s complaint, stating that on 6 May 2009 she had already been granted access to the case file. 69. The applicant is the brother of Mr Anzor Tangiyev, who was born in 1978. 70. On 24 May 2000 Mr Anzor Tangiyev stayed overnight in the flat of his neighbour, Mr A.D., in a block of flats in Grozny. 71. At about 4 a.m. on 25 May 2000 about twenty armed men in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas broke into the flat, took both Mr Anzor Tangiyev and Mr A.D. to the courtyard, tied their hands behind their backs, pulled their T-shirts over their heads and laid them on the ground. They then forced Mr A.D. in one of the UAZ vehicles, drove him to an unknown destination and placed him in a basement. Mr A.D. was ill-treated by the abductors for four days to make him confess to membership in illegal armed groups. On the fourth day of his detention Mr A.D. was taken to a different room, where he saw Mr Anzor Tangiyev, who bore signs of ill-treatment, including a broken finger on his right hand. Mr Anzor Tangiyev told the servicemen that Mr A.D. did not participate in illegal armed groups. Then Mr A.D. was taken back to the basement. From a conversation he had overheard between the servicemen and from the noise of nearby helicopters Mr A.D. understood that he was being detained at the Khankala military base, the headquarters of the federal military forces located in the suburbs of Grozny. 72. On 17 June 2000 Mr A.D. was blindfolded and taken in an APC to the centre of Grozny, where he was released in front of the publishing house building. 73. According to the applicant, immediately after the incident Mr Anzor Tangiyev’s mother complained to the military and civilian authorities about the abduction, but the criminal proceedings were not opened. The Government did not dispute that submission. 74. Between 2003 and 2009 the applicant complained of his brother’s abduction to various authorities. He complained to the Chechen prosecutor’s office, the President of Chechnya, the Russian Prosecutor General, the Russian Ministry of the Interior, and the Russian President on 21 June, 15 July, 4 and 9 August 2003 and 15 January 2004 respectively. It appears that no replies followed. 75. On 9 March 2010 the Shali district investigative committee opened criminal case no. 38001 under Articles 126 (abduction) and 286 (abuse of authority) of the CC. 76. The Government did not submit a copy of the criminal case file requested by the Court. From the documents submitted by the applicant, it appears that the investigation proceeded as follows. 77. On 10 March 2010 Mr Anzor Tangiyev’s mother was granted victim status in the criminal case and questioned. She stated that immediately after the abduction she had contacted the mother of Mr A.D., who had already searched for him. The mother of Mr A.D. had told her that Mr Anzor Tangiyev and Mr A.D. had been detained together. On an unspecified date Mr Anzor Tangiyev’s mother had met Mr S., who had promised her that she would arrange the release of her son in return for her handing over to Mr Ser. 1,000 United States dollars (USD). Mr Anzor Tangiyev’s mother had collected the money, but before she had been able to transfer it Mr S. had died. According to Mr Anzor Tangiyev’s mother, after the abduction she had lodged complaints about it with various civilian and military authorities (including prosecutors) but no proper investigation had followed. 78. On 16 and 27 March 2010 the investigators questioned Mr A.D. His statements were similar to the account of the events given by the applicant in his submissions to the Court. Among other details he noted that some of the abductors had spoken unaccented Russian and that from his neighbors, who had witnessed the abduction, he had learned that the abductors had arrived in UAZ minivans. Mr A.D. alleged that the culprits had belonged to the federal forces and had apprehended him together with Mr Anzor Tangiyev on suspicion of membership in illegal armed groups. Mr A.D. stated that after his release he had been questioned about the circumstances of the abduction by police officers from the Staropromislovskiy district temporary department of the interior. 79. On 9 June 2010 the investigators suspended the proceedings after it had failed to establish the identity of the perpetrators. On an unspecified date that decision was overruled, and the investigation was resumed. 80. On 11 January 2011 the proceedings were suspended again. The applicant was not informed thereof. 81. On an unspecified date between January and April 2013 the applicant lodged a request with the investigators for them to resume the investigation and grant him victim status in the criminal case. On 15 April 2013 the request was refused as ill-founded. 82. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 83. The first applicant is the mother of Mr Timur Tsakayev, who was born in 1976. The second applicant is his grandmother, and the third applicant is his brother. 84. Mr Timur Tsakayev was a relative of Mr Ramzan Tsakayev, a well‑known Chechen fighter against the Russian federal forces who lived in the village of Alkhan-Yurt. Fearing persecution on that account, Mr Timur Tsakayev and his family moved to Ingushetia in 1999. In order to visit his relatives in Chechnya, he used, again, for fear of persecution, a passport in the name of Mr Islam Khalidov. 85. In October 2001 Mr Timur Tsakayev went to Alkhan-Yurt to visit his grandmother. At about 3 a.m. on 2 November 2001 the family members were woken up by the noise of two APCs and an Ural lorry, which pulled up at their gate. A group of forty to fifty armed servicemen in balaclavas and camouflage uniforms cordoned off the house and searched its premises. Mr Timur Tsakayev showed them his passport, which was in the name of Islam Khalidov. The servicemen took him and his uncle Musa to the back yard and questioned them in unaccented Russian. 86. Meanwhile, the other servicemen locked Mr Timur Tsakayev’s relatives in the house. An hour later, they let Musa go and put Timur Tsakayev in the Ural lorry, which, according to local residents, already contained other apprehended men with sacks over their heads. The Ural and one of the APCs drove away shortly thereafter. The other APC left later in the morning. 87. The whereabouts of Mr Timur Tsakayev remain unknown. 88. For several months after Mr Timur Tsakayev’s abduction his relatives complained to various authorities, referring to him by the name of Islam Khalidov. In February 2002 the first applicant disclosed her son’s true identity to the authorities. 89. On 3 August 2003 Mr Timur Tsakayev’s aunt asked the Urus‑Martan district prosecutor to open a criminal case into his abduction. On the same day the investigators questioned her and examined the crime scene. No evidence was collected. 90. On 5 October 2003 the Urus-Martan district prosecutor opened criminal case no. 34095 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 91. After the opening of the criminal proceedings the investigators requested various law-enforcement authorities to inform them of whether they had arrested or detained Timur Tsakayev. The replies received were in the negative. 92. On 5 December 2003 the investigation was suspended after it had failed to establish the identity of the perpetrators. 93. On 1 January 2004 the investigation was resumed, and one month later suspended again. 94. The Government did not submit a copy of the case-file documents concerning the subsequent developments in the proceedings. According to the applicants, the proceedings were resumed on 25 March 2006, 12 April 2007, and 10 February 2010 and suspended on 25 April 2006 and 16 May 2007 respectively. 95. In the meantime, on 9 June 2008 the first applicant asked the investigators to grant her victim status, but to no avail. 96. On 26 March and 19 May 2009 the applicant repeated her request for victim status. She also asked the investigators to grant her access to the case‑file documents. 97. On 10 February 2010 the first applicant was granted victim status, and on 27 May 2010 she was provided with copies of documents from the investigation file. 98. In 2012 the Government submitted to the Court an update on the criminal proceedings; according that update the investigation had been resumed on 12 December 2011. 99. On 30 December 2011 the investigators questioned a former head of the Alkhan-Yurt municipal administration, who stated that Mr Timur Tsakayev had been involved in an illegal armed group. At that time (the year 2001), several authorities – including the FSB, the Main Intelligence Directorate (Главное Разведывательное Управление), the federal military forces and the police – conducted arrests of the members of that group. He also stated that illegal armed groups also moved around in the vicinity of the village. 100. On 31 January 2012 the investigators asked the FSB, the Federal Armed forces and the Ministry of the Interior whether special operations had been conducted in Alkhan-Yurt in 2002. No relevant information was provided. 101. On 3 February 2012 the first applicant’s DNA was compared with DNA samples taken from unidentified corpses, but no match was found. 102. It appears that the proceedings are still pending. 103. The applicants are three sisters of Mr Aslan Bachakov, who was born in 1974. 104. On 9 October 2001 Russian military forces in Chechnya conducted a special operation in the town of Argun. It was cordoned off and surrounded by military vehicles. 105. At about 8 a.m. a group of armed servicemen in balaclavas and camouflage uniforms arrived at the applicants’ house in an APC bearing the identification number 023, two UAZ vehicles and one VAZ vehicles. Prior to the incident, the APC had been seen on the premises of the Argun military commander’s office. 106. The servicemen threatened the applicants with firearms, searched the premises and detained Mr Aslan Bachakov. One of them, having introduced himself as an officer from the military commander’s office, assured the applicants that their brother would be questioned and then released. Thereafter, the men forced Mr Bachakov into one of the UAZ vehicles and drove off to an unknown destination. 107. The whereabouts of Mr Aslan Bachakov remain unknown. His abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses, including the applicants and their neighbours. 108. Immediately after the events, the applicants went to the Argun military commander’s office, where an unidentified officer confirmed Mr Bachakov’s detention on their premises. However, in the course of the applicants’ subsequent visits to the office, the serviceman denied it and refused to disclose information about his whereabouts. 109. On the same date, 9 October 2001, the applicants formally informed the authorities of the abduction and requested that a criminal case into the incident be opened. 110. On 1 March 2002 the Argun inter-district prosecutor opened criminal case no. 78026 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 111. On 7 March 2002 the first applicant was granted victim status in the criminal proceedings. 112. On 10 March 2002 the Argun Department of the Ministry of the Interior (the Argun town police) provided the investigators with a statement that between 7 and 10 October 2001 a special sweeping-up operation had been conducted in the town. Several military vehicles, including two APCs, had been involved in that operation. Shortly after the end of the operation, another town resident, Mr Kh. U., complained that on 9 October 2001 armed men in camouflage uniform had abducted Mr A.B. and driven him off to an unknown destination. The Argun town police had no information about Mr Aslan Bachakov’s apprehension. 113. On 1 May 2002 the investigation was suspended after it had failed to establish the identity of the perpetrators. 114. On 10 April 2003 the first applicant asked the investigators to resume the proceedings. Nine days later the proceedings were resumed. 115. On 16 May 2003 the investigators questioned Mr L.S., who was the neighbour of Mr Bachakov. He confirmed that on the morning of 9 October 2001 a sweeping-up operation had been carried out by servicemen and police officers in APCs. Immediately after the APCs’ departure at the end of the operation, several UAZ vehicles and a Zhiguli car had arrived at Mr Bachakov’s house. Armed men in camouflage uniform had forced him into a vehicle and taken him away to an unknown destination. Later that day Mr L.S., Mr Aslan Bachakov’s wife and the applicants had gone to the Argun military commander’s office. They had been told that the military authorities had not arrested Mr Aslan Bachakov. 116. On 19 May 2003 the investigators suspended the proceedings. The first applicant was informed of that decision. 117. On 22 March 2005 the Argun town prosecutor examined the investigation file and concluded that Mr Aslan Bachakov had most probably been abducted by an illegal armed group. He also noted several shortcomings on the part of the investigators, including the fact that they had sent no information requests to the law-enforcement authorities. 118. On 20 April 2009 the first applicant asked a member of the Chechen Parliament for help in the search for her brother. That request was forwarded to the investigators. By a letter dated 18 May 2009 the investigators informed her that the proceedings had been suspended but that operational search measures were ongoing. 119. On 7 October 2010 the proceedings were resumed. 120. On 28 October 2010 the investigators obtained a sample of the first applicant’s DNA for comparison with DNA taken from unidentified remains; the results of that comparison remain unknown. 121. In November 2010 the investigators questioned several witnesses to the events, who mainly confirmed the account of the events submitted by the applicants, and examined the crime scene. No evidence from Mr Aslan Bachakov’s house was collected. 122. On 26 November 2010 the proceedings were suspended. Subsequently, they were resumed on 21 June and 5 October 2011, 27 January and 8 May 2014; and then suspended again on 21 July and 6 October 2011 and 27 February and 8 June 2014 respectively. 123. It appears that the proceedings are still pending. 124. On 23 September 2010 the first applicant lodged a complaint with the Shali Town Court in Chechnya, alleging that the investigators had failed to take basic steps and had prematurely suspended the proceedings. 125. On 18 October 2010 the court dismissed the complaint, having found that on 7 October 2010 the proceedings had been resumed. On 8 December 2010 the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic upheld that decision on appeal. 126. The applicants are close relatives of Mr Olkhazur Osmayev, who was born in 1971. The first applicant was his father, who died on 12 June 2017. The second applicant is his mother. The third and fourth applicants are his brothers. 127. At about 1 a.m. on 20 April 2002 about fifteen servicemen in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas armed with machine guns broke into the applicants’ house in the village of Mesker, ordered the men to go out to the courtyard and locked the women and children in the house. After searching the premises, the servicemen handcuffed Mr Olkhazur Osmayev and his two brothers (the third and fourth applicants) pulled their jackets over their heads and put them in a car waiting in the street. Then they took the three men first to the Shali district military commander’s office and then the Shali ROVD, where they were questioned by a Russian-speaking investigator. A few days later the third and fourth applicants were released. As for Mr Olkhazur Osmayev, the applicants have had no news of him since the above-mentioned events. 128. On 20 April 2002 the applicants complained of the abduction to the Shali district prosecutor. 129. On 24 April 2002 the third and fourth applicants were questioned by the police. Their statements were similar to those submitted by them to the Court. 130. On 26 April 2002 the Shali district prosecutor opened criminal case no. 59097 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 131. In May 2002 the investigators sent requests concerning Mr Osmayev’s whereabouts to various authorities, including the Shali military commander, the FSB and the police stations in the Shali district. 132. On 26 June 2002 the investigation was suspended after it had failed to establish the identity of the perpetrators. 133. On 29 May 2003 the supervising prosecutor overruled the decision to suspend the investigation and ordered the proceedings be resumed. 134. On 5 June 2003 the second applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case. 135. On 29 June 2003 the investigation was suspended again. 136. On 19 July 2003 the Department of the Federal Security Service of the Chechen Republic (“the Chechen FSB”) in the Shali district of Chechnya confirmed at the investigators’ request that the third and fourth applicants had been arrested between 10.20 p.m. and 11.05 p.m. on 20 April 2002. The arrest had been carried out by Major K., who had left the Chechen Republic and could therefore not be questioned. 137. On an unspecified date in 2005 the second applicant contacted the Chechen Parliament, seeking its assistance in the search for her son. On 18 July 2005 her letter was forwarded to the Chechnya Prosecutor; on 20 June 2005 it was forwarded onwards to the Shali district prosecutor. It is not clear whether a reply followed. 138. On 27 February 2006 the second applicant asked the Shali district prosecutor to expedite the investigation into Mr Osmayev’s abduction. On 14 March 2006 the prosecutor informed her that the proceedings had been suspended but that the search was still in progress. 139. On 3 March 2008 the NGO Materi Chechni on the applicants’ behalf asked the head of the Chechen Parliament by letter to assist in the search for Mr Osmayev. The letter was forwarded to the investigators, who replied on 17 April 2008 that operational search activities in respect of the case were ongoing. 140. On 18 May 2009 the second applicant repeated the request to the head of the Chechen Parliament. On 21 June 2009 she received a reply similar to that of 17 April 2008. 141. On 22 March 2010 the applicants requested that the investigation be resumed and that they be allowed to access the investigation file. 142. On 18 May 2010 the investigators replied that the criminal case had been transferred to the Main Investigations Directorate of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation in the South Federal Circuit and that the applicants would be able to access the file once it had been returned. 143. On 23 June 2010 the deputy Shali prosecutor noted numerous shortcomings in the investigation; two days later he gave instructions to the investigators comprising a list of thirty nine measures to be taken. 144. On 28 June 2010 the investigation was resumed. On 7 June 2010 the investigators asked the Chechen FSB to send them a copy of the criminal case file related to the arrest of the third and fourth applicants on 20 April 2002. On 24 July 2010 the FSB replied that the case file had been sent to the Chechnya Prosecutor in 2003. The investigators searched for that file in the archives, but to no avail. 145. In July 2010 the investigators questioned two brothers, Mr R.S. and Mr Sh.R. Both of them had been apprehended in Mesker on the night of 19‑20 April 2002 and had been put in an UAZ vehicle, together with three other detainees. On the morning of 20 April 2002 the brothers had been taken to the Shali police station, questioned and subsequently released. 146. On 28 July 2010 the proceeding were suspended. It appears that they are still pending. 147. On 15 June 2010 the applicants lodged a complaint with the Shali District Court regarding the investigators’ failure to resume the investigation and to take all measures possible to solve the crime. 148. On 28 June 2010 the Shali District Court dismissed the complaint, referring to the recent decision to resume the proceedings (see paragraph 144 above), which had been taken earlier. 149. The applicants appealed against that decision to the Chechnya Supreme Court, which dismissed their appeal on 22 December 2010. 150. The first applicant is the mother of Mr Ilyas Movsarov, who was born in 1975. The second applicant is his brother and the third applicant is his wife. 151. At the material time Mr Ilyas Movsarov lived with his wife, the third applicant, and their two minor children in Grozny. 152. On the night of 29-30 April 2002 a group of armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas arrived in three UAZ vehicles at Mr Movsarov’s house. Having broken in, they searched the premises and checked Mr Movsarov’s identity documents. Then they forced him outside, put him in one of the vehicles and drove off to an unknown destination. 153. The next day the applicants went to the Staropromyslovskiy ROVD in Grozny. The head of the department, Mr B., informed them that their relative had been detained by officers from the Regional Department of the Fight against Organised Crime of the Chechnya Ministry of the Interior (Региональное управление по борьбе с организованной преступностью Министерства внутренних дел Чеченской Республики – “the RUBOP”). 154. According to the applicants, Mr Ilyas Movsarov was subsequently seen while being held in detention on the premises of the RUBOP. His whereabouts remain unknown. 155. On 30 April 2002 the third applicant complained to the Grozny prosecutor about Mr Movsarov’s abduction. 156. On the same day the third applicant and three neighbours of Ilyas Movsarov were questioned by investigators. Their statements were consistent with the applicants’ submissions to the Court, as described above. The third applicant noted that the abductors had spoken unaccented Russian. 157. On 4 June 2002 the Grozny prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 54031 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 158. On 21 August 2002 the third applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case and questioned by the investigators. During the interrogation she stated that her husband’s abductors had taken their television set. 159. On 4 September 2002 the investigation was suspended after it had failed to establish the identity of the perpetrators. 160. On 11 April 2003 the proceedings were resumed. 161. On 14 May 2003, having questioned several witnesses, who made statements similar to those of the applicants’, the investigators suspended the proceedings. 162. On an unspecified date between 2007 and 2008 a relative of Mr Movsarov (apparently his daughter) asked the Chechen President to assist in the search for her father. By a letter dated 30 January 2008 she was informed that the proceedings had been suspended, but that operational search activities were still ongoing. 163. On 6 June 2009 the investigators resumed the proceedings and sent a number of requests to various authorities, including law-enforcement bodies, concerning Mr Movsarov’s whereabouts, but no positive replies were received. 164. On 4 July 2010 the first applicant was granted victim status in the case. Two days later the proceedings were suspended. They were subsequently resumed on 8 September and 23 December 2010, 8 October and 6 December 2011, and 3 July 2012 and suspended on 8 October 2010, 23 January and 9 October 2011, and 6 January and 3 August 2012, respectively. 165. In the meantime, on 28 December 2010 the investigators opened criminal case no. 23083 under Article 162 of the CC (robbery) into the misappropriation of the applicants’ television set. The third applicant was granted victim status in that case. Shortly thereafter it was joined with case no. 54031. 166. It appears that the proceedings are still pending. 167. On 30 July 2010 the first applicant lodged a complaint with the Staropromyslovskiy District Court in Grozny, challenging the investigators’ failure to take basic investigative steps. 168. On 27 September 2010 the court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the decision to suspend the proceedings had already been overruled. The Chechnya Supreme Court upheld that decision on appeal on 15 December 2010. 169. The application was lodged by the parents of Mr Adlan Moltayev (also spelled as Maltayev), who was born in 1979. 170. On 25 September 2018 the Court was informed that the father and the mother of Mr Adlan Moltayev had died on 16 January 2017 and 1 April 2018 respectively, and that their daughter, Ms Larisa Khatsiyeva, wished to pursue the application in their stead. 171. At about 4 a.m. on 11 March 2002 a group of armed men in camouflage uniforms arrived in an APC and an UAZ vehicle at the applicants’ house in the village of Achkhoy-Martan. Speaking unaccented Russian, the men searched the premises, forced Mr Adlan Moltayev outside, put him in the APC and drove off to an unknown destination. 172. The abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses, including the applicants and their neighbours. 173. The whereabouts of Mr Adlan Moltayev have remained unknown ever since. 174. On 11 April 2002 Mr Adlan Moltayev’s relatives informed the authorities of his abduction. On the same day the crime scene was examined by investigators from the Achkhoy-Martan inter-district prosecutors’ office. No evidence was collected. 175. The next day the Achkhoy-Martan prosecutor opened criminal case no. 63027 under Article 127 of the CC (unlawful deprivation of liberty). Several requests were sent to law-enforcement authorities in order to establish whether Mr Adlan Moltayev had been arrested and placed in custody. The replies received were all in the negative. 176. In April 2002 the investigators questioned several witnesses; the copies of their statements furnished by the Government to the Court were illegible. 177. On 14 April 2002 the first applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case and questioned by the investigators. Her account of the events was similar to those submitted by the applicants to the Court. 178. On 12 June 2002 the investigators suspended the proceedings after it had failed to establish the identity of the perpetrators. 179. Between 2003 and 2007 the second applicant lodged a number of requests with various authorities for them to assist in the investigation and in the search for her son: on 16 July 2003 she contacted the Chechnya Prosecutor; on 16 February 2004 she contacted the Russian President; on 24 January 2005 she contacted the Chechen President; on 29 June 2005 she contacted the Russian State Duma; on 3 February 2006 she contacted the Chechen President and the Chechen Government; and on 3 August 2007 she contacted the Achkhoy-Martan prosecutor. Each request was forwarded to the investigators, who replied that the proceedings had been suspended but that operational search measures were being undertaken. 180. On 17 June 2008, the proceedings were after the supervisors voiced their criticism. Having sent dozens of requests for information concerning the possible participation of Mr Moltayev in illegal armed groups, the investigators suspended the proceedings on 17 July 2008. 181. On 27 March 2009 the proceedings were resumed again. Three days later the investigators questioned (i) Mr Moltayev’s neighbour, who had witnessed the abduction and who confirmed the account of the events submitted by the applicants, and (ii) the second applicant, who repeated the statements that she had previously given. 182. On 17 April 2009, at his own request, the first applicant was granted the status of civil claimant in the criminal case. 183. On 30 April 2009 the investigators suspended the proceedings and on 3 March 2010 resumed them. On the same date the second applicant was granted victim status. The next day the proceedings were suspended again. 184. On 18 January 2011 the first applicant lodged a request to be allowed to access the case file. His request was dismissed on 20 January 2011. Subsequently he lodged a complaint with the Urus‑Martan Town Court in Chechnya against the investigators on that account (see paragraph 188 below). 185. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 186. On 15 March 2010 the applicants complained to the Achkhoy‑Martan District Court in Chechnya. They alleged that the instigators had not taken all necessary measures to investigate the incident. The court allowed the complaint in part on 12 April 2010. 187. On 29 September 2010 the applicants again lodged a complaint regarding the investigators’ inaction. The outcome of that complaint remains unknown. 188. On 1 February 2011 the applicants lodged a complaint with the Urus‑Martan Town Court in Chechnya concerning their lack of access to the case file. On 5 April 2011 their complaint was allowed and the investigators were ordered to grant the applicants full access to the investigation file. 189. The applicants are the mothers of Mr Bayali (also spelled as Bay‑Ali) Bashkuyev and Mr Umar Arsayev, who were born in 1987 and 1986 respectively. 190. In the early hours of 31 March 2004 a group of armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms arrived at the village of Elistanzhi, Chechnya, in APCs that bore no registration plates. The servicemen spoke unaccented Russian and were of Slavic appearance. Between midnight and 1.15 a.m. on that date they made a forced entry into the applicants’ houses, arrested Mr Bashkuyev and Mr Arsayev, put them into the military vehicles, and drove off to an unknown destination. 191. The whereabouts of Mr Bashkuyev and Mr Arsayev have remained unknown ever since. Their abduction took place in the presence of the applicants and several neighbours. 192. On 31 March 2004 an officer from the Vedeno police department, after the applicants had lodged a complaint with it, reported to the deputy Vedenskiy district prosecutor the abduction of Mr Bayali Bashkuyev and Mr Umar Arsayev. On the same date the crime scene was examined. No evidence was collected. 193. On 1 April 2004 the Vedeno district prosecutor opened criminal case no. 43017 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 194. On 8 April 2004 the investigators questioned police officers stationed at road checkpoints along the way to the applicants’ village. According to the copies of their statements furnished by the Government, the road police officers confirmed the passage of two APCs on the night of the abduction. 195. On 16 July 2004 the applicants were granted victim status in the case and questioned. Their statements were similar to those submitted by them to the Court. 196. On 1 June 2004 the investigation was suspended after it had failed to establish the identity of the perpetrators. 197. On 24 July 2007 the investigators’ supervisors overruled as unlawful the decision to suspend the investigation and ordered the investigation to be resumed. Between July and August 2007 the investigators sent a number of requests to law-enforcement authorities asking whether Mr Bashkuyev and Mr Arsayev had been suspected of criminal activities and arrested on that account. Replies in the negative were given. 198. On 24 August 2007 the proceedings were suspended; on 21 December 2010 they were resumed. 199. On 11 and 12 January 2011 the second and then the first applicant were questioned by the investigators. Both applicants submitted that neither Mr Bashkuyev nor Mr Arsayev had participated in or supported illegal armed groups. 200. On 12 January 2011 the investigators obtained DNA samples from both applicants for comparison with those held in a database of unidentified remains. 201. Subsequently, the proceedings were suspended on 27 January 2011, 10 September 2012 and 28 November 2013, and resumed on 30 August 2012 and 28 October 2013. 202. By a letter of 6 March 2017 the investigators informed the applicants that the proceedings had been suspended but that operational search measures to establish the identity of the perpetrators continued. 203. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 204. On an unspecified date in September 2013 the applicants lodged a complaint with the Vedeno District Court alleging the investigators’ failure to take basic steps to solve the crime and asking that the proceedings be resumed. 205. On 18 September 2013 the court dismissed the complaint, having found that the investigators had already resumed the criminal investigation. In a separate ruling given on the same date the court pointed to certain procedural flaws in the investigation. 206. On unspecified dates in 2015 the applicants lodged claims against the Ministry of Finance of Russia seeking compensation for non-pecuniary damage sustained as a result of the abduction. 207. On 12 May 2015 the court, in decisions adopted separately in respect of each applicant, dismissed the claims as unfounded. On 7 and 16 July 2015 the Chechnya Supreme Court upheld the above decisions on appeal. 208. According to the applicants, in 2017 the domestic courts declared Mr Umar Arsayev dead.

5. The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Korostyshiv. 6. The applicant, at the relevant time a judge of the Radomyshl District Court (“the District Court”), was convicted of abuse of office for having exploited a certain Mr I. as a worker on the renovation of his father’s house under the following circumstances. In April 2007 the applicant, having sentenced I. to fifteen days’ imprisonment for disorderly conduct, had the site manager for the house renovation, Mr Sh., check I. out of the police detention facility (“the facility”) where the latter was serving his sentence and take him to the construction site where he was to work under Sh.’s direction. Then, in November 2007, a police officer, G., conspired with the applicant in drawing up a report falsely accusing I. of another episode of disorderly conduct. G. fabricated written statements by false witnesses, P.S. and I.A., incriminating I., and submitted the file to the applicant. Knowing that I. was innocent and the report was false, the applicant convicted I. and sentenced him to another fifteen days’ detention. The same scheme was used to exploit I. on the construction site. 7. On 21 November 2007 officers of the Security Service discovered I. on the construction site in Sh.’s company. 8. According to the transcript of his statement dated 23 January 2008, which was also video-recorded, Sh. stated that the applicant had employed him to work on his father’s house, that in April 2007 I. had worked on the site on terms he had negotiated with the applicant and that in November I. had worked while serving his fifteen-day sentence. The applicant had instructed Sh. to collect I. from the detention facility, so he had done so. The statement was signed by Sh. on the first and second pages, where his rights as a witness were explained. The statement consists of three more type-written pages containing the transcript of the interview but is not signed by Sh. at the end. It contains a note by the investigator to the effect that Sh. did not sign because he failed to appear when summoned by the investigator. The file contains a report of the same date, signed by Sh., to the effect that he had watched the video recording of his interview and had no comment to make. 9. On 23 January 2008 I. was interviewed by the investigator. He stated that around May (sic) 2007 he had been sentenced to fifteen days’ imprisonment for disobeying the orders of a police officer. While serving his sentence he had worked on the construction of a house belonging to the applicant, under the direction of Sh. After his release, he had agreed to work for the applicant in return for payment and had carried out construction work for him in June and October 2007. He had then stopped working for the applicant. On 8 November 2007 he had been taken from his home by police officers, who had told him that the applicant had accused him of stealing some cables from the building site. He had been taken to the office of the applicant, who had told him that since he refused to work for money, he would have to work for free. As he had refused to work for free, the applicant had responded that then he would rot in a cell, and had given him a fifteen-day sentence. While he had been serving his sentence, Sh. had taken him out of the detention facility several times and he had worked on the applicant’s construction site: he had refused to build a fence and had done some other work on the site. He had not been remunerated. The applicant had visited the site once and had seen him working but they had not spoken. 10. On 12 September 2008 I. made a notarised statement to the effect that his statement incriminating the applicant had been given “under the influence of psychological violence and trickery” (з застосуванням щодо мене психологічного насильства та обману) and that in fact he had worked willingly and for remuneration. 11. On 30 September 2008 I. was again interviewed by the investigator. The interview was video-recorded. He largely confirmed the tenor of his statement of 23 January 2008 and denied knowingly signing the notarised statement repudiating it. In addition to repeating various elements of his statement of 23 January 2008, he said that although the house where he had worked formally belonged to the applicant’s father, it was the applicant himself who had organised the work. He stressed that he had not been remunerated for his work in April and November 2007 and had not worked voluntarily. In September 2008 the applicant had made him visit a notarial office to formalise some papers, the nature of which he was not clear about. 12. The applicant and his co-defendant, former police officer G., stood trial before the Vinnytsya Regional Court of Appeal, which was acting as the trial court. 13. The applicant testified that he had had no connection to his father’s house or work on it. He had not requested that I. be sent there. When convicting I., he had not been aware that the charges against him had been false. I. had worked voluntarily and for remuneration. The applicant did not deny that Sh. had been the construction site manager on the renovation of his father’s house but argued that it had been his father who had been concerned by those works and that the applicant himself had had minimal contact with Sh. The phone number which the prosecution argued he had used to contact Sh. in fact belonged not to him but to his father. 14. G. admitted that he had forged the administrative arrest report in respect of I. but stated that he had done it at the request of officers B. and S. (see paragraphs 15 and 16 below). He said that the applicant had not been involved and had been unaware of the forgery when convicting I. 15. B., the head of the detention facility, testified that in late October or early November 2007 the applicant had told him that I. had stolen some things from his construction site and had asked B. to bring I. to him. On 8 November 2007 he had taken I. from his home to the police station. He denied having instructed G. to forge documents in I.’s case. On 12 November 2007 B. was informed by another officer that a stranger claiming to be a court officer showed up at the station and was asking for prisoners to perform works at the court. This was refused. Sometime afterwards the applicant called the station to discuss the release of prisoners and spoke to the commanding officer of the station who gave permission for release of prisoners. 16. S., an officer on duty at the police station, testified that I. had on several occasions been handed over to a person introduced as an employee of the District Court, supposedly for work at the court. On 21 November 2007 the applicant had called personally and asked that I. be handed over for such work. The applicant contested the way S.’s testimony was recorded in the domestic court’s judgment and asserted that S. had not identified him by name. It appears that S. also denied having given any unlawful instructions to G. concerning I.’s case. 17. Other police officers testified that Sh. had checked I. out of the facility on several occasions. 18. P., a District Court officer, stated that he was in charge of taking prisoners from the police detention facility to the District Court to carry out work, and that he knew I. well. However, in November 2007 the latter had not worked at the court. 19. The applicant’s father confirmed that he had bought the house and had had Sh. perform renovation works on it. He denied knowing I. 20. On 3 July 2009 the trial court, noting that I. had failed to appear despite the fact that summonses had been duly sent to him, ordered the police to escort I. to the next court hearing on 10 July 2009. 21. On 8 July 2009 the police reported that I. could not be found at his last known address in Radomyshl and that his whereabouts were unknown. His mother, niece and another neighbour had informed the police that I. had not been living at his usual address in Radomyshl for some time, having left to work in Kyiv. Although he visited briefly from time to time, they had no way of contacting him. 22. On 24 July 2009 the trial court asked the Zhytomyr regional prosecutor to establish the whereabouts of I. and Sh., and to escort them to the hearing scheduled for 17 September 2009. The prosecutor in turn asked the Security Service for assistance in establishing the whereabouts of those two individuals. On 4 September 2009 the Security Service reported essentially the same information as gathered by the police on 8 July 2009. They also stated that Sh. was not living at his address and his whereabouts were unknown. 23. On 17 September 2009 the trial court again ordered that the police bring I. to the next court hearing on 29 September 2009. The police could not locate I. at his last known address. His mother gave the same explanation for his absence. 24. On 29 September 2009 the trial court decided that as the presence of I. and Sh. could not be ensured, their statements should be read out and video recordings of their interviews shown. 25. According to the applicant, he met with I. several times and attempted to persuade him to testify, but I. refused, stating that officers of the Security Service had threatened him with imprisonment if he did. 26. On 5 November 2009 the trial court convicted the applicant and G. of abuse of office under the circumstances described in paragraph 6 above and sentenced each of them to five years’ imprisonment, suspended for three years. In convicting the applicant, the court relied on: (a) I.’s statements, including the one video-recorded, and Sh.’s statement; (b) evidence presented by the co-defendant G. and witnesses B., S. and P. (see paragraphs 14 to 18 above); (c) evidence that the applicant had had regular telephone contacts with Sh. at the relevant time; (d) expert evidence to the effect that it had been Sh. who had signed for I. in the register of prisoners taken out of the detention facility in April and November 2007 and evidence of police officers that Sh. had taken I. from the detention facility; (e) the statements of witnesses P.S. and I.A., who had been identified in the forged police report as witnesses to I.’s alleged disorderly conduct (see paragraph 6 above), to the effect that their statements had been forged. They stated that they did not know I., had not observed him committing the offence, and had not made any statements about it to the police. P.S. testified at the trial. I.A. gave video-recorded evidence in the course of the pre-trial investigation but did not testify at the trial; (f) expert evidence showing that the signatures attributed to P.S. and I.A. on the statements incriminating I. had in fact been made by certain police officers; and (g) the statements of other witnesses, primarily police officers, concerning the circumstances of I.’s arrest. 27. The applicant appealed in cassation to the Supreme Court. He argued that Sh.’s statement should not have been relied upon because Sh. had not signed it and had not been examined at the trial. The applicant also stated that the trial court had misstated I.’s evidence, in particular by ascribing to I. statements which were not in his video-recorded interview shown in the course of the trial. In that interview I. had also made other statements indicating that he had worked voluntarily. The applicant questioned the trial court’s decision to trust the statements given by I., a drunk who had a prior conviction for murder and who had failed to remember the content of the notarised statement he had signed just weeks before, which showed that he was susceptible to signing anything presented to him by the investigator. 28. On 22 April 2010 the Supreme Court held a hearing to examine the appeal. No representative for the defence was present. A prosecutor was present and made oral submissions in opposition to the appeal. At the close of the hearing the court ordered that references to Sh.’s statement be struck from the judgment, since he had not signed his pre-trial statement and thus his statement was inadmissible. The court listed the remaining evidence supporting the applicant’s conviction and considered that, other than Sh.’s statement, the evidence was admissible and sufficiently supported the verdict. The court upheld the remainder of the judgment.

5. The applicant was born in 1969 and is now serving his sentence in a detention facility at Nizhniy Tagil. 6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7. On 7 November 2013 a group of nine detainees, including the applicant, was scheduled for a transfer from a police station to a remand prison. A Gazel prison van was available for transfer. It was designed to transport a maximum of seven prisoners, but Police Major V., who was in charge of the transfer, took the decision to take all nine prisoners at once to save fuel. 8. The prison van was manned by four officers. Driver G. and Major V. were seated in the front, and Officers K. and D. were riding in the rear part of the cabin next to the prisoner cells. 9. Five prisoners were placed in the large cell in the van, and three prisoners in individual cells. As the applicant was a former law-enforcement officer, the transfer regulations required that he should be separated from the other detainees. However, no other individual cells were available, so he was allowed to ride in the rear together with Officers K. and D. 10. Approximately half way to the destination, prisoners Sa., Ma. and Mu. kicked out the door of the large cell and attacked the convoy officers. Prisoner Mu. overpowered Officer D. and seized his holster containing a handgun. A struggle for the gun ensued and Mu. fired a shot at the floor. Prisoner Sa. grabbed Officer D. from behind, and a second shot was fired. 11. Meanwhile, Officer K. pushed prisoner Ma. aside, drew his gun and told everyone to freeze or he would shoot. Prisoners Sa. and Mu. were still struggling with Officer D. for the gun. Officer K. shot at Sa. and hit him. 12. Major V. came running to the back of the van and opened the door. More shots followed. Eventually, prisoner Mu. released the gun and threw it out of the van. At some point, a bullet ricocheted, wounding the applicant in his left shin. 13. The applicant was taken to a local military hospital where his wounded leg was put in a cast. On the following day he was discharged and transferred to a prison hospital. 14. In December 2013 the applicant complained to a prosecutor that he had been injured as a consequence of the grossly negligent actions of convoy officers who had breached the transfer regulations. 15. On 9 January 2014 an investigator with the Bashkortostan Regional Division of the Investigations Committee refused to open a criminal case. He found no indications of gross negligence arising from the decision to transport two prisoners in excess of the van’s design capacity and that not putting the applicant in a cell had been motivated by “considerations of budgetary austerity and saving money allocated for the purchase of fuel”. 16. On 4 December 2014 a deputy prosecutor of the Kirovskiy District in Ufa rejected the applicant’s complaint against the investigator’s decision. 17. On 30 April 2015 the Kirovskiy District Court in Ufa upheld the investigator’s decision as lawful, noting that it had been within his competence to issue such a decision, and that the decision contained no defects of form. On 20 July 2015 the Supreme Court of the Bashkortostan Republic rejected an appeal against the District Court’s judgment. 18. On 14 September 2015 the acting head of the regional division of the Investigations Committee ordered an additional “pre‑investigation inquiry” into whether an offence of negligence causing grievous bodily harm had been committed. Ten days later the investigator refused to institute criminal proceedings: “... it does not appear possible to establish with certainty that the bullet which hit [the applicant] was shot from the handgun of Officer V., rather than from [the handgun of] Officer D., while it was in the possession of prisoner Mu. Besides, under Article [41] of the Criminal Code, causing damage to interests protected by criminal law is not a criminal offence if the act causing such damage was based on a reasonable risk assessment and sought to achieve a socially useful objective, such as preventing an attempted escape in the instant case.” 19. On 8 February 2016 the deputy head of the regional division upheld the investigator’s decision refusing to institute criminal proceedings. 20. On 5 May 2016 the supervising deputy prosecutor of the Bashkortostan Republic set the decision aside and ordered a forensic assessment of the applicant’s injury. On 6 June 2016 the investigator with the Central Investigations Department in Ufa again refused to institute criminal proceedings, noting that the applicant’s medical record could not be located. It had been sent to the facility where he was serving his sentence and that facility had not responded to the investigator’s request for a copy. 21. In parallel criminal proceedings, on 22 December 2014 the Ordjonikidzevskiy District Court in Ufa convicted prisoners Mu. and Sa. of attempted escape from prison and sentenced them to five years’ imprisonment each. Convoy Officers K., D. and V. had been given the status of injured parties in those proceedings. The applicant testified as a witness.

4. The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Riga. 5. On 23 April 2003 criminal proceedings were instituted. 6. On 29 April 2003 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of attempted bribery. 7. On 2 May 2003 the applicant was detained on remand. On 25 July 2003 he was released and police supervision was imposed instead, under which he was obliged not to leave his home district without the authorisation of the investigation authorities, and to report to the local police department twice a week. 8. On 27 November 2003 a bill of indictment was served on the applicant and his two co-accused (D.E. and V.M.). On 2 December 2003 a judge of the Riga Regional Court (Rīgas apgabaltiesa) accepted the criminal case for trial. The first hearing was scheduled to take place from 1 to 4 August 2005. 9. On 1 August 2005 the hearing was adjourned for an indefinite period owing to D.E.’s poor state of health and the fact that the applicant’s defence lawyer was on vacation. 10. On 1 October 2005 the new Criminal Procedure Law entered into force; it introduced new rules concerning, inter alia, conflicts of interest faced by judges. In the light of the new rules, on 22 February 2006 the hearing was adjourned because one of the judges of the Riga Regional Court had had to recuse herself from the trial. 11. On 31 July 2006 the hearing was adjourned because the prosecutor and the applicant’s defence lawyer were due to go away on holiday. 12. On 13 November 2006 the hearing was adjourned once again owing to D.E.’s poor state of health. On 15 November 2006 a judge from the Riga Regional Court requested the hospital in which D.E. was being treated to provide information about her state of health. On 20 November 2006 the court was informed that D.E. had been discharged from the hospital and placed under the care of her family doctor. 13. On 27 February 2007 the hearing was adjourned for unspecified reasons. 14. On 26 June 2007 the hearing was adjourned again owing to D.E.’s poor state of health. On the same day the Riga Regional Court ordered that D.E. undergo a medical examination in order for her capacity to participate in the proceedings to be determined. The findings of that examination were delivered less than one month later and indicated that D.E. was able to participate in the proceedings. 15. On 27 September 2007 the Riga Regional Court scheduled the next hearing for 27 December 2007. On 18 October 2007 D.E.’s lawyer requested that that hearing be rescheduled in order to accommodate his taking planned holidays. The court dismissed that request, noting that six hearings had already been adjourned and that further delays in the proceedings could not be allowed. 16. On 27 December 2007 the hearing was adjourned, as the prosecution needed to replace the charge against the applicant with a more lenient one. 17. On 11 January 2008 the Riga Regional Court started to hear the parties’ arguments regarding the merits of the case. On 15 January 2008 it convicted the applicant of attempted bribery and sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment. 18. On 4 February 2008 the applicant submitted an appeal. On 1 December 2008 the appellate court upheld the lower court’s judgment. 19. On 30 December 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, arguing, inter alia, that his right to a trial within a reasonable time had been breached. In this respect he referred to several provisions of national and international law, including Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 20. By a final decision of 26 January 2009 the Senate of the Supreme Court (Augstākās tiesas Senāts) refused the applicant leave to appeal on points of law, noting, inter alia, that the applicant’s “reference to violations of certain laws and international legal provisions was formalistic.”

5. The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Bucharest. 6. On 11 December 2011 one of the applicant’s neighbours called the police to complain about the fact that the applicant had stored personal items in the common space of their apartment building. 7. At 6 p.m. on 11 December 2011 two police officers arrived at the applicant’s door and asked for his identification papers without giving their names or informing him of the purpose of their visit. The applicant asked them what the purpose of their request was but they did not answer. For that reason, the applicant refused to present his papers, telling the police officers to come “some other time” (altădată). 8. The police officers immobilised the applicant, threw him to the ground and then handcuffed him. Noting the escalation of events, the applicant’s partner, G.C., searched for his identification papers and handed them all to the police officers: identity card, pension benefits slip and a certificate that he had been a fighter in the 1989 Revolution. 9. The police officers took the papers without looking at them and took the applicant to police station no. 19 to be identified. 10. At the police station the applicant was struck with fists, feet and truncheons. The pain was so intense that the applicant soiled himself. During the beating, the applicant’s mobile phone and still camera were destroyed and his clothes were torn. 11. When the beating ended, the police officers checked the applicant’s papers and then left him alone for fifteen minutes in a room. When they returned they informed him that they were leaving on a mission. After being again left alone, the applicant managed to find the officer on duty at the police headquarters (ofiţerul de serviciu) to ask permission to use the toilet. The police officer sent him home to clean himself up. 12. The applicant went home and then returned to the police section to recover his identity papers. 13. On 16 December 2011 the applicant was examined by a forensic doctor at Mina Minovici National Forensic Institute (“the Forensic Institute”). The doctor drafted a medical report dated 16 December 2011; a copy of the report was given to the applicant on 4 January 2012. It noted that the applicant had borne traces of violence on his wrists, arms and legs as a consequence of having been hit with a hard object; that he had complained of chest pains; and that the injuries could have dated from 12 December 2011 and had needed four to five days of medical care. 14. Two weeks after the incident, the applicant received by mail an offence report (proces verbal de contravenţie) drafted by the police officers on 23 December 2011 in his absence, whereby he was fined 100 Romanian lei (RON) for “refusal to present data necessary for his identification”. 15. On 11 December 2011 two police officers were directed by the officer on duty at police station no. 19 to settle a conflict between the applicant and a neighbour. Upon arrival, the police officers asked the applicant to present his identity papers, but he became violent and refused to comply. When the applicant tried to return to his apartment the police officers handcuffed him and transported him to the police station. After his identity had been established, the applicant left the police station. 16. The applicant lodged a criminal complaint against the two police officers, accusing them of unlawful deprivation of liberty, unlawful investigation and torture, and seeking compensation. The complaint was registered with police station no. 19 on 13 January 2012. On 7 August 2012 the file was sent for investigation to the internal investigations department of the Bucharest General Police Headquarters, and police officers from that department were delegated to conduct all relevant investigations. 17. These investigators heard evidence from the two police officers, from the officer on duty on the day of the events and from the neighbour’s husband (see below). 18. On 11 September 2012 the investigating police officers heard evidence from the neighbour’s husband, who declared that when the applicant, “known as a mentally ill person”, had refused, in inappropriate and disrespectful language, to present his identification papers and had attempted to return to his apartment, the police officers had immobilised him on the ground and handcuffed him, without ill-treating him in the process. 19. The officer on duty declared on 3 October 2012 that he had not spoken at all to the applicant on the night in question and had only seen him when the police officers had brought him in to establish his identity; those same officers had subsequently advised him to leave the police station – the officer on duty stated that he had seen the applicant again when he was leaving the building. He added that as he had been very busy in his office he had seen the applicant only for a couple of seconds, and had thus not been in a position to see whether the applicant had been injured. 20. Lastly, the two police officers gave their statements on respectively 4 and 5 October 2012. One of the officers declared that at the time of the events in question, the applicant had been under the influence of alcohol, because he had smelled of alcohol and had displayed a defiant attitude towards the police officers. Both officers mentioned in very similar terms that when asked to present his identification papers, the applicant had tried to evade the measure (“se sustrage măsurii legitimării”) and had attempted to re-enter his apartment by using physical force; for this reason, they had proceeded to handcuff him and had taken him to the police station. Both officers denied having inflicted any harm on the applicant, claiming that they had acted proportionately in view of the applicant’s opposition to their request. 21. G.C., the applicant’s partner, was never heard by the investigators. 22. On 12 November 2011 the prosecutor’s office attached to the Bucharest County Court decided not to prosecute. On the basis of the evidence in the file, attesting, inter alia, to the fact that the applicant was known as a person who engaged in violent behaviour and who was frequently under the influence of alcohol, the prosecutor decided that the injuries suffered by the applicant had been superficial and that the use of force had been proportionate and necessary in order to immobilise him and take him to the police station, as provided for by Articles 26 § 1 (2) and Article 31 § 1 a) and b) of Law no. 218/2002 on the Organisation and Functioning of the Romanian Police (see paragraph 26 below). 23. The applicant lodged an objection. The prosecutor’s decision was upheld on 22 March 2013 by the head of the above-mentioned prosecutor’s office, who considered that the police intervention had been rendered necessary by the applicant’s violent behaviour and had not been excessive, as demonstrated by the fact that the injuries suffered had been insignificant. 24. The applicant lodged a complaint with the Bucharest County Court against the two decisions. He mainly argued that the investigation had been superficial, and that the conclusions of the investigation had been based exclusively on the statements given by the two police officers who had behaved aggressively towards him, while his partner, for instance, had never been heard. He contested the prosecutor’s opinion that the injuries incurred had been superficial. He referred to the Court’s relevant case-law, which required a plausible explanation for any traces of violence sustained while a person had been under police supervision. He also contested the proportionality of the police reaction, pointing out that he had merely refused orally to show his identification and that the police officers could not claim or prove that they had sustained any traces of violence during that intervention. 25. On 11 June 2013 the County Court dismissed the complaint and consequently upheld the prosecutors’ decisions. The court considered that the police intervention had been lawful. It further held that the applicant’s minor lesions had been caused when he had fallen at the moment of his being immobilised by the police, which had been necessary because of the applicant’s verbal and physical resistance. The court considered that the applicant had not been kept unlawfully in the police station but had been released as soon as his identity had been established, and that the consequences of the police intervention had not been serious enough to constitute the crime of torture, as alleged by the applicant. The decision was final, no further appeal being possible.

6. The applicant was born in 1952. 7. On 30 May 2012 the applicant was arrested and detained in connection with a suspicion of making two threats by telephone against certain M.S. and Š.O. 8. In the course of the investigation, the Zagreb Municipal State Attorney’s Office (Općinsko državni odvjetništvo u Zagrebu) commissioned a psychiatric expert report on the applicant’s mental health at the time of the offence, including, if appropriate, the existence of a need for his psychiatric internment. 9. On 28 June 2012 the psychiatric expert, E.S., submitted her report, which stated that the applicant suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. She found that he was incapable of understanding and controlling his actions and that he posed a danger to others, which warranted his psychiatric internment. The expert noted that she had not inspected any medical documents concerning the applicant’s previous psychiatric treatment, but she had interviewed him, examined the criminal case file and a medical report from the prison administration. 10. On 10 July 2012 the Zagreb Municipal State Attorney’s Office indicted the applicant in the Zagreb Municipal Criminal Court (Općinski kazneni sud u Zagrebu) on charges of making serious threats. It asked that the measure of involuntary psychiatric internment be ordered in respect of the applicant, as provided under the Protection of Individuals with Mental Disorders Act. 11. On 27 July 2012 a three-judge panel of the Zagreb Municipal Criminal Court found that the indictment was flawed as it had been based on an incomplete expert report, which had not taken into account all the medical documentation concerning the applicant’s previous psychiatric treatment. The indictment was thus returned to the Zagreb Municipal State Attorney’s Office with an instruction to commission an additional expert report. 12. On 24 August 2012 E.S. produced a supplement to her report, which she prepared with a psychologist. She explained that she had obtained the applicant’s medical record from his general practitioner, V.P., but had not obtained anything from his psychiatrist, V.G. (a university professor), who had in the meantime retired and could not be reached. The expert also stated that, in her view, the applicant’s diagnosis had already been clear after the first examination and that she did not need further documents to provide a diagnosis. She thus reiterated her previous opinion on the basis of the new records she had obtained. 13. On 28 August 2012 the Zagreb Municipal State Attorney’s Office submitted a new indictment against the applicant in the Zagreb Municipal Criminal Court. This indictment was confirmed and accepted on 3 October 2012 and the case was sent to trial. 14. Meanwhile, on 30 August 2012, the applicant was released from pre‑trial detention because the maximum period had expired (see paragraph 31 below). 15. At a hearing before the Zagreb Municipal Criminal Court on 4 December 2012, the applicant asked that his psychiatrist V.G., his general practitioner V.P. and several other witnesses, including his neighbours, be heard. He said they could all give evidence as to his mental state. He also argued that he had had previous conflicts with the victims and asked that the police be requested to submit relevant information about those incidents. 16. At the same hearing, several prosecution witnesses and the expert witness E.S. were questioned. E.S. reiterated the findings and opinion she had previously given. She also argued that the evidence concerning the applicant’s mental state at the moment of the commission of the offence could not be given by his general practitioner or his psychiatrist. 17. In the meantime, on 11 September and 13 December 2012 the applicant submitted medical reports by his psychiatrist V.G. according to which he suffered from chronic stress and maladaptation to the environment. This was a behavioural disorder which needed further psychological treatment. V.G. also stressed that the applicant’s psychiatric internment could create adverse effects for his treatment. He pointed out that the applicant participated in an outpatient psychiatric treatment for years and that there were positive developments in his behaviour, in particular related to the abstinence from alcohol. 18. At a hearing on 18 December 2012, the Zagreb Municipal Criminal Court heard further witnesses for the prosecution. It dismissed all the applicant’s requests for the taking of evidence on the grounds that they were irrelevant. In particular, the trial court held that the general practitioner V.P. did not have sufficient expertise to give evidence on the applicant’s mental capacity and that her documents had been taken into account by E.S. The trial court considered that the same arguments applied to V.G. 19. At a hearing on 23 January 2013 the parties gave their closing arguments. The applicant argued that E.S.’s expert opinion was flawed and incomplete as it had not taken into account the existing medical documentation related to his treatment but only the medical record held by his general practitioner. At the same time, her opinion was contrary to the findings of his psychiatrist V.G. 20. On the same day the Zagreb Municipal Criminal Court found that the applicant had committed the offence of making serious threats while lacking mental capacity. Relying on E.S.’s report, it decided that he should be placed in a psychiatric hospital for a period of six months. The Zagreb Municipal Criminal Court found the medical reports produced by V.G. (see paragraph 17 above) unreliable on the grounds that they contradicted the findings of the expert witness E.S. and that they had been produced by a doctor whom the applicant had paid privately. 21. The applicant appealed against the judgment to Zagreb County Court (Županijski sud u Zagrebu), alleging numerous substantive and procedural flaws. He pointed out that his psychiatrist V.G., who had treated him for six years, had not been consulted in the course of the proceedings. He also referred to a report by V.G., which found that there were no grounds for his being placed in a psychiatric institution and that any such decision could have severe consequences for his health. 22. On 9 July 2013 the Zagreb County Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on the grounds that all the relevant facts had been correctly established. It stressed that the expert witness E.S. had taken into account the applicant’s medical record held by his general practitioner V.P., which also included the findings of his psychiatrist V.G. The Zagreb County Court therefore considered that it had not been necessary to question V.P. and V.G., particularly since they were not certified court experts as was the case with E.S. The Zagreb Municipal Criminal Court judgment thereby became final. 23. On 23 October 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske), complaining that the proceedings had been unfair. 24. On 27 November 2013 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant’s constitutional complaint inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded. It considered that the applicant was simply repeating his arguments from the proceedings before the lower courts challenging their decisions although those decisions did not disclose any arbitrariness or unfairness. 25. After the Zagreb Municipal Criminal Court’s judgment became final (see paragraph 22 above) it was sent for implementation to a single judge of the Zagreb County Court, as provided for under the Protection of Individuals with Mental Disorders Act (see paragraph 32 below). 26. In the meantime, the applicant went to Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, where he was examined by two experts in forensic psychiatry, A.K. and A.B.M., and a psychologist, S.P. In a report of 10 August 2013 the experts stated that the applicant had various mental disorders of a histrionic type, but did not have paranoid schizophrenia. They also stated that he was fully conscious of his acts and could adopt a critical attitude towards his own conduct. 27. On 21 October 2013 a judge of the Zagreb County Court ordered that the applicant be sent to the psychiatric hospital. 28. The applicant appealed against that decision to a three-judge panel of the Zagreb County Court, referring, inter alia, to the expert report drafted on 10 August 2013 (see paragraph 26 above). 29. On 7 November 2013 a three-judge panel of the Zagreb County Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on the grounds that there had been nothing in his arguments to raise any doubts about the necessity for his committal to the hospital as established by the Zagreb Municipal Criminal Court. 30. According to the available information, the applicant is still at large as he could not be located by the relevant authorities in order to execute the psychiatric internment order.

4. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Simferopol. She is a single mother and has a son who at the time of the accident in question was eight years old. 5. On 24 July 1995 the applicant was knocked down by a trolley bus. She suffered an open craniocerebral injury and contusion of the brain. As a result, the applicant received the status of a disabled person with the lowest degree of disability (третя група інвалідності). 6. In January 1996 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Tsentralnyy District Court against the Simferopol Trolley Bus Company, claiming compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage to her health caused by the accident. In particular, as pecuniary damage the applicant claimed compensation for medicines, additional nutrition, treatment in a sanatorium, transport expenses, and compensation for loss of earnings. 7. On 25 February 2003 the applicant lodged an application with the Court (Litvinyuk v. Ukraine, no. 9724/03) complaining, inter alia, under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the lengthy examination of her case by the domestic courts. 8. On 1 February 2007, while the proceedings were still pending before the national courts, the Court delivered a judgment on the applicant’s first application (no. 9724/03), finding that the length of the proceedings in her case had been excessive. The Court took into consideration the period after 11 September 1997, when the Convention had come into force in respect of Ukraine. The length of the proceedings within the Court’s competence was nine years and twenty two days. 9. The Court, in particular, noted the following: “47. As for the issues that were at stake for the applicant, the Court notes that following the traffic accident the applicant was seriously injured and received a disability degree. Given that the applicant was a single mother and had a child to raise, the compensations for loss of earnings and for expenses sustained as a result of a poor state of her health were of undeniable importance for the applicant. The Court therefore considers that what was at stake for the applicant called for an expeditious decision on her claims.” 10. On 27 March 2007 the Simferopolskiy District Court found against the applicant. On 24 December 2007 the Court of Appeal of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea quashed this decision and remitted the case to a first-instance court for fresh examination. On 23 April 2008 the Supreme Court of Ukraine upheld the decision of the court of appeal. 11. On 13 May 2009 the Simferopolskiy District Court partly found for the applicant. On 29 July 2009 the Court of Appeal of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea quashed this decision and remitted the case to a first-instance court for fresh examination. On 15 October 2009 the Supreme Court of Ukraine upheld the decision of the court of appeal. 12. On 10 November 2009 the Simferopolskiy District Court left the applicant’s case without consideration because she had failed to appear in court without giving plausible reasons on 28 October 2009 and 10 November 2009. The applicant lodged an appeal against this decision stating that she had not been aware about the above-mentioned hearings. On 27 January 2010 the Court of Appeal of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea rejected the applicant’s appeal. The court noted that the applicant had been duly notified about the date of the hearings. On 5 October 2011 the Supreme Court of Ukraine upheld the decisions of the lower courts. A further attempt by the applicant to have the above decisions reviewed in the light of newly discovered circumstances was to no avail.

7. The applicant was born in 1973, lives in Austria since 2001 and is currently in detention pending extradition at Vienna-Josefstadt Prison. 8. The application concerns proceedings for extradition from Austria to Kosovo, which have the following background: 9. S.Lu. is the former husband of the applicant’s sister, T.L. In the course of an argument on 9 October 2001, S.Lu. stabbed the applicant in the chest. On 27 May 2002 S.Lu. was convicted in Austria of attempted intentional homicide (versuchter Totschlag) committed in a comprehensible state of emotion (in einer allgemein begreiflichen heftigen Gemütsbewegung) under Articles 15 and 76 of the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch) and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. The applicant testified as a witness during that trial. 10. After S.Lu. was released from prison in 2005, the applicant’s sister reported him to the police for having repeatedly raped her during their marriage, and for threatening to kill her and her family. Out of fear of her husband, she changed her and her children’s names. An order to determine S.Lu.’s whereabouts (Ausschreibung zur Aufenthaltsbestimmung) was issued by the Vienna public prosecutor’s office in 2008 and is in effect until 2 February 2018. 11. On the basis of an international arrest warrant issued by the Mitrovica District Court (Kosovo) on 26 November 2010 and 6 May 2011, the applicant was apprehended and taken into detention pending extradition by a decision of the Vienna Regional Criminal Court (Straflandesgericht Wien – hereinafter “the Criminal Court”) of 15 January 2016. On 20 January 2016 the Ministry of Justice of Kosovo requested the applicant’s extradition. According to the arrest warrant, the applicant was suspected of aggravated murder under Article 147 § 7 in conjunction with Article 24 of the Kosovo Criminal Code. He had allegedly ordered L.Q. in July 2010 to murder S.Lu. (his former brother-in-law) for a payment of 30,000 euros (EUR). On 3 August 2010 L.Q. fired gunshots at a car in the vicinity of the intended victim S.Lu., but instead killed N.Lu., S.Lu.’s cousin. 12. During the extradition proceedings, the applicant alleged that he had nothing to do with the murder in Kosovo. He claimed that the accusations had been invented by S.Lu. as revenge for the applicant’s having testified against him during the criminal proceedings in Austria. Furthermore, the “Lu. clan” (the family of S.Lu.) was very influential in Kosovo and had connections to the highest Government officials and the justice authorities there, which is why the applicant could not expect a fair trial in that jurisdiction. In addition, the conditions of detention in Kosovo prisons were deplorable and would amount to torture, inhuman and degrading treatment. Because of the threat emanating from S.Lu. and his family, the applicant would have to fear for his life there. They could easily get to him in prison by using their connections. 13. On 24 February 2016, after having held an oral hearing, the Criminal Court declared the applicant’s extradition to Kosovo permissible. It held that during the extradition proceedings, the court was not called on to examine whether the applicant was guilty or innocent, but merely to assess whether there was enough evidence to raise suspicions against him, which according to the documents submitted by the Kosovo authorities was the case. None of the evidence offered by the applicant had been capable of dispelling these suspicions immediately and without doubt, as would have been required by section 33(2) of the Extradition and Legal Aid Act (Auslieferungs- und Rechtshilfegesetz – hereinafter “the Extradition Act”). The fact that S.Lu. had been convicted of attempted intentional homicide in 2002 and the allegation that he wanted to take revenge on the applicant did not dispell the suspicion either. Furthermore, the court remarked that S.Lu.’s cousin had actually been killed, which called into question the applicant’s theory of that being a contrived story. It could equally be argued that the applicant had wanted to take revenge on S.Lu. for stabbing him. Concerning the applicant’s fear for his life in Kosovo, the court stated that the mere possibility of inhuman or degrading treatment did not suffice. The applicant had failed to adduce specific evidence of an actual, individual threat of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. Furthermore, in case of extradition to a member state of the Convention, the responsibility of the extraditing state was limited, as the person concerned could seek protection against a violation of the Convention in the receiving state. 14. On 24 March 2016 the applicant appealed. He submitted that if extradited to Kosovo, he risked treatment contrary to Article 3, because Lu. Clan wished to take revenge on him. In fact, Sm. Lu., a very influential member of that clan, was detained at Mitrovica prison and following extradition to Kosovo, he would be detained at that prison as well. Security in prison in Kosovo was a problem, as prisoners became frequently victims of aggression, and he would therefore also risk to become the victim of an assault. 15. On 31 May 2016 the Vienna Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht Wien ‑ hereinafter “the Court of Appeal”) dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It confirmed the Criminal Court’s finding that the applicant had failed to substantiate a real and individual risk of being subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, or that the Kosovo authorities would not be able to protect him from third, private parties. Furthermore, members of the allegedly influential Lu. clan were themselves imprisoned in Kosovo. In particular, on 21 January 2008 S.Lu. was convicted in Kosovo for issuing a dangerous threat against the applicant, which demonstrated that the Kosovo authorities were indeed capable of taking adequate measures to protect the applicant. Moreover, the Lu. clan could not be that influential if it was not capable of keeping its own members out of prison. Concerning the conditions of detention, the court held that the report on Kosovo by the Committee for the Prevention of Torture (hereinafter “the CPT”) of 2011 (see paragraph 30 below) did not state that ill-treatment was the rule in Kosovo prisons, but that there were merely sporadic incidents of violence. The mere possibility of ill-treatment by prison officers did not suffice to stop the applicant’s extradition. In relation to the material conditions of detention in Mitrovica Detention Centre, where the applicant alleged he would most likely be held if extradited, the Court of Appeal again quoted the above-mentioned CPT report of 2011, where it was found that inmates were able to move freely within that facility during the day and could exercise outside on a daily basis for three and a half hours, and that fitness and computer rooms have recently been installed. 16. On 13 June 2016 the Austrian Federal Minister of Justice (Justizminister) approved the applicant’s extradition to Kosovo. 17. On 20 June 2016 the applicant requested that the Court indicate to the Austrian Government to stay his extradition to Kosovo under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. He complained under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention that he would run the risk of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or even death, as the Lu. clan wanted to take revenge on him and the Kosovo authorities were not willing or able to afford him protection. 18. On 22 June 2016 the Court granted the applicant’s request. 19. On 17 June 2016 the applicant lodged applications for the reopening (Wiederaufnahme) of the extradition proceedings and a stay of the extradition with the Criminal Court. He produced a certified declaration by L.Q., who had retracted his previous confession to the police that the applicant had ordered the murder of S.Lu. He asserted that he had been tortured by the Kosovo police during his questioning and had been pressured into blaming the applicant for ordering the murder. L.Q. alleged that he had fallen unconscious several times because of the “mental and physical torture”. L.Q. averred that he did not even know the applicant in person. The applicant further submitted into evidence several sworn statements from family members and friends, who attested that his life was in danger in Kosovo because of threats from S.Lu. and his clan. 20. On 23 June 2016 the Criminal Court dismissed the applicant’s applications. It held that in accordance with section 33(2) of the Extradition Act, the applicant had failed to adduce evidence which would have been capable of immediately dispelling the suspicion against him raised in the extradition request. L.Q.’s declaration did not constitute objective evidence and did not indicate any violations in Kosovo of the applicant’s rights under the Convention either. The applicant appealed. 21. On 18 July 2016 the applicant lodged an application for a renewal (Erneuerung) of the extradition proceedings with the Supreme Court under Article 363a of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung – hereinafter “the CCP”), requesting suspensive effect at the same time. 22. On 6 September 2016 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s application. It found that the new evidence the applicant had produced in the proceedings before it were a matter for the pending reopening proceedings, not for requesting a renewal of the extradition proceedings. In relation to the alleged violations of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention in the event of his extradition, the Supreme Court found that mere allegations referencing general reports on the human rights situation were not capable of substantiating a real and immediate risk to the applicant under these provisions. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the applicant did not have a right under the law to request suspensive effect, which is why that request had to be rejected. 23. On 24 January 2017 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the Criminal Court’s decision of 23 June 2016 (see paragraph 20 above). The court found that the applicant had failed to produce objective evidence which would have indicated a real and immediate risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention if extradited to Kosovo and therefore would have warranted a reopening of the extradition proceedings. While the sworn statement by L.Q. in principle raised doubts in relation to the suspicions against the applicant, it had not constituted the only evidence against him. More pertinent had been the fact that, during the criminal proceedings against L.Q. in Kosovo, a microcassette had been put into evidence by S.Lu. which had allegedly contained a conversation confirming his statements that the applicant had been to blame for the murder. In addition, L.Q.’s initial incriminating statements against the applicant had been made in the presence of his lawyer. Moreover, L.Q. had not specified what exactly the police had allegedly done to him, which had made it impossible to evaluate whether the alleged treatment had actually amounted to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment. The Court of Appeal reiterated that it was in any event for the Kosovo courts to evaluate the evidence against the applicant. In sum, it confirmed that the statement by L.Q. was not capable of immediately dispelling the suspicion against the applicant on which the extradition request was based. Lastly, the Court of Appeal found that despite not being a State Party to the Convention or the Council of Europe, Article 22 of the Constitution of Kosovo granted the Convention direct effect under and superiority to national law, therefore domestic law equally offered protection from violations of the Convention. The Court of Appeal’s decision to dismiss the applicant’s appeal was served on his counsel on 30 January 2017.

5. The applicant was born in 1987 and lives in Łomża. 6. On 7 August 2010 the applicant had a motorcycle accident in which he broke his right arm and right thigh. Between 13 and 22 December 2010 the applicant underwent an arthroscopy on his right knee. Between 25 January and 15 February 2011 the applicant underwent rehabilitation treatment in Łomża Regional Hospital and during this stay no dysfunction was diagnosed in his right foot. 7. Subsequently, between 28 March and 26 July 2011, he was detained in Białystok Remand Centre. While in prison, he was examined three times (on 1 and 18 April and on 13 May 2011) by an orthopaedist, who observed that the applicant required physical therapy in the light of a limitation of his knee-joint movement, the atrophy of a thigh muscle, and an injury to a peroneal nerve. On 11 April 2011 the applicant was examined by a neurologist who likewise found atrophy of the thigh muscle and impaired bending of the right foot, which he attributed to an injury to the peroneal nerve. The applicant never received any physical therapy during his imprisonment, instead being offered only nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory medicines. 8. On an unspecified date, but not later than 27 March 2012, the applicant brought a civil action against the State Treasury/Białystok Remand Centre for infringement of his personal rights, claiming that the prison healthcare system had failed to provide him with appropriate medical care during his detention and, moreover, that the cells had not met the minimum spatial requirement of 3 square metres per person and had been mouldy and infested with insects. He requested 200,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) in compensation, the equivalent of approximately 48,300 euros (EUR). 9. On 27 March 2012 the Białystok Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) exempted the applicant from the court fees. 10. On 20 January 2014 the Białystok Regional Court granted the applicant PLN 23,000 (approximately EUR 5,550) and dismissed the remainder of his action. The court held, particularly on the basis of the medical expert opinion, that the applicant had had a motorcycle accident and had required physical therapy as recommended by the prison orthopaedist. However, he had not been given any, either in prison or outside, which had resulted in a deterioration of his health. The court established that, due to the lack of physical therapy, the applicant had suffered atrophy of the thigh muscle and foot drop affecting his right foot. The court compared this finding with the fact that upon his arrival the applicant had not been suffering from foot drop, the pain in his knee had not been severe, and his right leg muscles had been working more effectively. The court emphasised that the applicant had not been offered proper treatment despite a worsening of his symptoms. These changes in his physical condition would not have been irreversible, but the break in the therapy had entailed a prolonged rehabilitation process. The court stated that the rehabilitation process for the applicant would be long and arduous, a situation which could have been avoided had the defendant acted appropriately. The court held that the applicant had suffered physical pain of significant seriousness, which, in turn, had had negative psychological consequences. The court therefore found the applicant’s claim for compensation for lack of adequate medical care partly justified. The claim concerning the alleged overcrowding and inadequate sanitary conditions was dismissed in full. The court also ordered the applicant to reimburse PLN 3,186 (EUR 766) for the costs of the defendant’s legal representation and PLN 10,932 (EUR 2,628) in court fees (in total: PLN 14,118 (EUR 3,394)). 11. The applicant did not lodge an appeal against the first-instance judgment. 12. Following the defendant’s appeal against the judgment, on 12 September 2014 the Białystok Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) amended the judgment, reduced the compensation granted to the applicant to PLN 13,000 (EUR 3,095), and upheld the first-instance court’s findings of fact and law. The applicant was not ordered to pay the court fees for the proceedings before that court. This court pointed out that in the experts’ opinions it was not specified, even approximately, what the effects of the negligence might be, how much longer the rehabilitation process would take, or how much stronger the pain had become in comparison to pain experienced previously by the applicant.

5. The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Varna. 6. The applicant and his wife divorced on 21 August 2006 pursuant to a court-approved agreement between the two of them. Under the terms of this agreement, the applicant undertook to pay child support to the two children born during the marriage and agreed to his wife’s keeping his family name after the divorce. 7. Subsequently, the applicant learned that his former wife had conceived their second child, born in 2003, as a result of a relationship with another man during her marriage to the applicant. The applicant underwent a DNA test to determine whether he was the father of the younger child. The DNA test ‒ the result of which the applicant received on 15 January 2007 ‒ established that he was not the biological father of the second child. The results of this DNA test were never considered by a court. 8. Shortly thereafter, in February 2007, the applicant brought a civil claim in court, seeking to contest his paternity of the child in question. On 1 March 2007 the Varna Regional Court dismissed his request, finding that it was time-barred due to the expiry – in 2004 – of the year-long limitation period counting from the child’s birth or from learning thereof (see the section “Relevant domestic law and practice” below”). This finding was confirmed by two higher judicial instances, the final decision being pronounced by the Supreme Court of Cassation on 19 September 2007. 9. The applicant brought subsequent proceedings in which he sought to stop paying child support to the second child. On 20 May 2008 his claim was rejected by the Varna District Court, which found that it had not been proven that the applicant was not the child’s father, given that he had not rebutted the legal presumption under Article 32 (1) of the Family Code 1985 (“the 1985 Code”).

4. The applicant was born in 1939 and lives in Ankara. 5. The applicant is the owner of an apartment in Ankara. On an unspecified date, the applicant brought a case before the Ankara Administrative Court against the Çankaya Municipality and the Ankara Metropolitan Municipality for the annulment of the construction permit pertaining to a neighboring building which was being built opposite his apartment. 6. On 14 December 1999 the Ankara Administrative Court accepted the applicant’s request and revoked the construction permit based on a breach of height restrictions. According to this judgment, the building in question was constructed 1.48 meters higher than the norm that was laid down in the zoning plan in force. 7. On 17 February 2000 the Çankaya municipal executive committee (belediye encümeni) ordered the demolition of the illegally constructed part of the building in order to comply with the administrative court’s judgment. However, it did not implement the said decision. 8. On 19 November 2001 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the administrative court’s judgment. 9. In the meantime, on 3 August 2001 the Çankaya municipal council (belediye meclisi) amended the zoning plan and sent its decision to the Ankara Metropolitan Municipality for approval. 10. On 26 October 2001 the Ankara Metropolitan Municipality withheld its approval, holding that the zoning plan had been amended with the aim of legalizing the previously revoked building permit and thereby avoiding the demolition of the illegal construction. 11. On 5 December 2001 the Çankaya municipal council insisted in its previous decision and the amended zoning plan thus came into force. 12. Subsequently on 31 December 2001 the applicant brought a case before the Ankara Administrative Court for the annulment of the Çankaya municipal council’s decision of 5 December 2001. 13. On 31 March 2003 the Ankara Administrative Court annulled the said decision for, inter alia, encouraging unlicensed construction practices. 14. On 21 February 2005 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the administrative court’s decision and on 18 October 2005 it rejected the Çankaya Municipality’s rectification request. This decision was served on the applicant on 13 December 2005.

5. The applicant was born in 1985 and is currently serving a life sentence for murder in Mountjoy Prison, Dublin. 6. In the early hours of 9 November 2008, the applicant killed a man in Limerick. It was a case of mistaken identity. The applicant had set out to kill another man at the behest of a well-known criminal figure in the city in the context of a feud between criminal gangs. The applicant mistook the victim, S.G., who had no connection whatsoever to the criminal milieu, for the intended target. S.G., who was 28 years old, was walking home when the applicant shot and wounded him on the street. He then pursued his victim into the back garden of a nearby house where he shot him several times, inflicting five wounds in all, including a fatal head wound. 7. On 24 February 2009 investigating police carried out a search of the applicant’s residence. They arrested him there at 7.15 a.m. He was brought to a police station shortly before 8.00 a.m. There he was informed of his rights, including a right of access to a solicitor. He requested legal advice from a particular solicitor, whom the police duly notified. At 9.55 a.m. the solicitor telephoned the police station and spoke to the applicant. This first consultation lasted two minutes. 8. The first police interview commenced at 10.12 a.m. and lasted fifty minutes. All of the interviews were video recorded, and were conducted without the applicant’s solicitor being physically present in the interview room. At no stage did the applicant or his solicitor request the presence of the latter during questioning. It was confirmed during the subsequent proceedings that, in view of police practice at that time, such a request would have been denied. 9. Another solicitor, Mr O’D., who was acting on behalf of the first solicitor, arrived at the police station at 11.00 a.m. and represented the applicant from that point onwards. The police concluded the first interview at 11.03 a.m. The applicant then had a consultation with the solicitor lasting nine minutes. The second interview commenced at 11.19 a.m. and lasted twenty-three minutes. The third interview started at 12.07 p.m. and lasted one hour and fifty-four minutes. The fourth interview began at 3.00 p.m. and had a duration of one hour and thirty-nine minutes. The fifth interview, beginning at 5.59 p.m., lasted for two hours and seven minutes. The final interview of the day took place between 10 p.m. and 11.42 p.m., a duration of one hour and forty-two minutes. The applicant, who did not request or have any further contact with his solicitor that day, did not make any admissions to police. 10. The following day, 25 February 2009, the police continued to question the applicant. Three interviews took place in the morning and afternoon, lasting almost five hours in total. The applicant was brought before the District Court, which extended his detention for a further 72 hours. His solicitor was present at the court hearing. The applicant was brought back to the police station where another interview, the tenth, took place between 10.38 p.m. and 11.25 p.m. During this interview, the police informed him that his former girlfriend, G, who was also the mother of his young daughter, had been arrested in Dublin early the previous morning on suspicion of withholding information. She was being held in detention and interviewed by police about her knowledge of the killing. He was given certain details about her replies to police questions. Once again, the applicant did not request further consultations with his solicitor and did not make any admissions. 11. The interviewing of the applicant continued on 26 February 2009. The eleventh interview began at 9.03 a.m. and lasted seventy-two minutes. Questioning recommenced at 12.22 p.m. for one hour and twenty-one minutes. The police impressed on him that G was enduring the hardship of detention as well as separation from her young daughter on account of the applicant’s refusal to admit to the crime. They also underlined the fact that the victim had been an entirely innocent man. The thirteenth interview took place between 3.02 p.m. and 4.15 p.m. During it, the applicant asked to consult his solicitor. Questioning stopped while the police made contact with the solicitor. The consultation between the applicant and his solicitor was again by telephone. It lasted approximately two minutes. 12. The next interview, the fourteenth, commenced at 5.32 p.m. In the first minutes, the police asked the applicant about text messages sent to Ms G. around the time of the murder. At some point the applicant asked to speak to his solicitor again. The interviewers replied that he had just spoken to the solicitor, to which the applicant said that he had not been able to speak to him properly. It is not clear from the documents in the case-file when this occurred. The interview continued. At around 6.15 p.m. the applicant again asked to speak with the solicitor, saying that he would answer questions afterwards. A moment later the interview was briefly suspended while one of the officers left the room to fetch a glass of water. He returned at 6.20 p.m. and for the remaining 15 minutes the officers questioned him about his background and his sporting interests. Before ending, they informed him that Ms G was alright. The interview concluded at 6.35 p.m. 13. As requested by the applicant, the solicitor arrived at the police station at 6.52 p.m. He and the applicant spoke for about ten minutes. According to a memo written by a police officer some hours afterwards, the solicitor then approached the officers conducting the interviews and told them, on an off‑the‑record basis, that the applicant was prepared to admit to the murder provided that Ms G. was released. The police replied that they wanted the applicant to tell the truth about the killing. The solicitor conferred again with the applicant for ten minutes and then informed the police that there would be no admissions before Ms G.’s release. The police replied that a confession taken in such circumstances would not be accepted in court, as it would be regarded as inducement. The solicitor then consulted with the applicant for a further 10 minutes, after which he indicated to the police that the applicant would not admit to anything prior to Ms G. being released and then left the police station. 14. The fifteenth interview commenced at 7.42 p.m. The applicant refused to answer the first two questions posed to him, but then stated that he had been present at the scene around the time of the murder. At that moment another police officer entered the interview room and stated that the applicant’s solicitor had telephoned the station and wished to speak to him. The interview was immediately suspended to allow the applicant confer with his solicitor. This consultation took about four minutes. When the interview resumed at 7.51 p.m., the applicant admitted to shooting the victim. As the interview continued, he provided a number of other details about the crime: how he had been driven to the scene in a particular car; the clothes he had been wearing and which he had burned later; how many shots he had fired, and where; the fact that he had used his right hand to shoot; the fact that the gun had jammed and that he had cleared it by ejecting bullets. He also sketched a map of the crime scene to indicate where each event had taken place. Beyond this, he refused to answer the questions put to him. The interview ended at 9.05 p.m. At the conclusion of the interview, the applicant made a particular gesture. He removed a set of rosary beads that he wore around his neck as a memento of his dead brother, and asked the police give them to the victim’s family. 15. The sixteenth interview took place between 10.09 p.m. and 11.29 p.m., a duration of 90 minutes. The police repeatedly asked him to explain why he had killed an innocent man, but the applicant refused to answer. 16. By that time, Ms G. was no longer in custody, having been released at 9 p.m. that same day. 17. There were five further interviews the next day, 27 February 2009, with a combined duration of seven hours and twenty-seven minutes. The applicant continued to refuse to answer the questions put to him about the identity of the intended victim, about his own association with a well‑known criminal figure in the city, and about calls and messages to and from his mobile phone around the date of the murder. In the twentieth interview, held that evening, he indicated on a map how the crime had unfolded, and stated that when he caught up with him in the back garden, the victim had said “please stop” just before the fatal shots were fired. 18. Two further interviews were held on 28 February, lasting two hours and three minutes in all. The police showed the applicant various items of evidence retrieved from the scene of the crime, including unfired bullets, bullet casings, bullets removed from the victim’s body, and items of the victim’s clothing. He made no comment on this or any other question put to him. At 3.15 p.m. police charged the applicant with murder and brought him before the District court. 19. The applicant pleaded not guilty. He was tried in the Central Criminal Court. 20. The first trial, in 2011, was inconclusive, the jury failing to reach a verdict. 21. The second trial commenced on 16 January 2012 and lasted 22 days. At the outset, the applicant sought to exclude the admissions he had made to the police. In accordance with domestic law, his challenge was considered by the trial judge in the absence of the jury. This process, a voir dire (a trial within a trial to determine the admissibility of evidence) took ten days. The trial judge viewed more than twenty hours of the video records of the interviews. During that process, the recording of the interview was played on screen and then the interviewing officers gave evidence concerning the videos and were cross-examined by the legal representatives for the prosecution and defence. At the end, counsel for both sides made submissions to the judge in regard to the questions of inducement of threat, oppression and fairness. 22. On the eleventh day of the trial the judge ruled as follows: “The defence object to the prosecution proposal to call evidence of various admissions made by Barry Doyle in the course of interviews that took place while he was in custody .... The defence contend that these admissions are inadmissible and rely on three grounds. 1) That the admissions were made involuntarily as a result of a combination of threats, inducements and oppression. 2) That the admissions were made as a result of breaches of the accused’s constitutional right of access to legal advice. 3) The admissions were made as a result of breaches of the requirement of fundamental fairness. ... The onus of proof in respect of admissibility is on the prosecution and if confessions are to be admitted in evidence the Court must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that it is proper to do so. ... With regard to the question of legal access Barry Doyle had two consultations with his solicitor while he was in [the police station] prior to making admissions and he was also represented by that solicitor in court when an application was made to extend his detention. The Court does not consider the length of time that either consultation lasted to be relevant in the context of this case. The Court also holds that the [police] were entitled to continue interviewing Barry Doyle in interview 14 when he had complained that a short telephone conversation with his solicitor was not a proper consultation and when his solicitor’s arrival at the [police] station was expected within an hour. The Court is satisfied that there was no breach of Barry Doyle’s constitutional right to legal advice. In considering the question of oppression the Court observed Barry Doyle in video recordings over a period of in excess of 20 hours and holds that he appeared to be physically and mentally strong throughout. He engaged with the [police] when he chose to do so and refused to answer questions when he did not wish to do so. ... With regard to the questioning by [the police officers], the Court finds that the interviews were conducted in a careful, patient and structured way in which some of the results of the [police] investigation were gradually revealed to Barry Doyle. The Court also holds that Barry Doyle first began to engage with [the police] in a limited way, essentially as a result of [their] appeal to Barry Doyle’s humanity. This engagement was built on ... and ultimately the accused told the [police] about his involvement in the death of [S.G.]. The Court holds that the interviews conducted by [police] were at all times professional and courteous and involved no oppression. The Court also holds that Barry Doyle was in full control of himself throughout the interviews and holds that he made the admissions that he did because he chose to do so. With regard to the question as to whether some of the promptings by the [police] to Barry Doyle to the effect that he should tell the truth and not keep [G] away any longer from their child, the question arises as to whether this, or any other related promptings made prior to interview 15 and relating to the release of [G], could amount to an inducement. The first thing to be said is that these remarks must be viewed in the overall context of all that had taken place, which included the various responses of Barry Doyle regarding the death of his brother, the responses regarding his own family, his children by a previous relationship to his relationship with [G], as well as read or taken in the context of the limited answers he had given about living in Limerick and the fact that he had conceded ... that being in custody on suspicion of the murder of [S.G.] was the lowest point in his life. The context also includes the gradual unfolding of the evidence in the case to him and the context further includes numerous appeals to him to tell the truth. Notwithstanding the context in which they occurred, ... even if these promptings could possibly amount to an inducement when objectively viewed they were not immediately acted on and their effect, whatever it may have been, was dissipated by the consultation Barry Doyle had with his solicitor and his solicitor’s interaction with [the police]. This broke any possible causative link and it is highly relevant that the solicitor told the detectives that Barry Doyle would not admit to the offence and that they would have a bit more work to do. The Court holds that when Barry Doyle came to make his admissions in interview 15 he made them voluntarily. Accordingly, the Court holds that the admissions were made not as a result of oppression and were not made as a result of any threat or inducement. Finally, the Court has considered the objection made by the defence that the admissions were made as a result of a breach of fundamental fairness. The Court has considered all the objections in the round and bears in mind [the relevant Supreme Court case-law]. The Court holds that there is no breach of the requirements of fundamental fairness and accordingly holds that the confessions made by Barry Doyle are admissible in evidence.” 23. Following the conclusion of the voir dire proceedings, the trial resumed. The jury was shown excerpts from the video recordings and received transcripts of the interviews. There was other evidence before the court. This included ballistic evidence, evidence about the car the applicant had travelled in, and evidence given by G. There was evidence from another witness, C, who said she had been present when the killing had been ordered, and, the day after the murder, had heard the applicant confirm that he had carried it out. 24. Following the final submissions of the prosecution and defence, the judge summarised the case and gave instructions to the jury in the Judge’s Charge. He instructed the jury to be careful when considering the evidence and underlined their obligation to examine neutrally the question of whether the applicant had been induced to confess to the crime, with a detailed explanation of what that meant in the circumstances. The judge also warned the jury that it may be dangerous to convict a person on confession evidence alone without corroboration. The judge went on to explain in detail why that was the case, and what corroboration evidence meant in the circumstances. 25. On 15 February 2012 the applicant was unanimously convicted by a jury of the murder of S.G. He received the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. 26. The applicant appealed against his conviction, raising 27 grounds. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on 8 June 2015. Insofar as relevant, the Court of Appeal decided as follows. 27. It first dealt with the submission that the police had resorted to inducement or threat to elicit his confession to the murder. It agreed with the position taken by the trial judge that the fact that the applicant had consulted with his lawyer immediately before admitting the crime in the fifteenth interview represented a significant interruption in the process of police questioning. Of even greater significance was the fact that the police rejected the proposal of the applicant to confess in return for the release of G, which the solicitor conveyed to the applicant. With no room for ambiguity or misunderstanding in this respect, the response of the police was sufficient to refute the argument about inducement or threat. Nor did the Court of Appeal accept that, during the course of the interviews, the police resorted to implied inducement or threat. It considered that, as found by the trial judge, the transcripts showed the police trying to appeal to his better nature and to his essential humanity. This interpretation of the evidence was borne out by the applicant’s gesture of remorse following the fifteenth interview (see paragraph 14 above). It was also supported by the fact that the applicant had retained a degree of precision and control over the admissions he was prepared to make. He provided certain precise details to the police about his own actions but gave nothing away about the other persons implicated in the murder. The fact that he did not ask about G’s release after admitting the murder further suggested that there was no element of inducement. It concluded on this point: “48. The Court holds that the learned trial judge was entitled to find on the evidence that the prosecution had established that the admissions made by the appellant were not brought about by any inducement or threat. The Court is also satisfied that the judge’s interpretation of the interviews was correct. It concludes that the proposal by the appellant’s solicitor not only dissipated any possible belief in an offer by the [police] but also constituted an approach that actually negated belief in an inducement ...” 28. The Court of Appeal then considered the argument that the applicant had not been granted sufficient access to legal advice and, as a result, had been subjected to oppression during questioning. The applicant further complained of irretrievable prejudice caused by the continuation of the fourteenth interview despite his request to consult his solicitor, which was not cured but actually compounded by the subsequent consultation. The judgment states: “69. The appellant had access to his solicitor for as much time and on as many occasions as he or his lawyer requested, in which circumstances it is hard to see how he can say that there was oppression because of the inadequate legal advice availability. The solicitor ... did not ask to be present for the interviewing by the [police]. No doubt, had he asked for that facility, it would have been refused but that simply did not happen and it was not the understanding at the time that a lawyer was entitled to be present. That, however, does not make the detention of the appellant retrospectively unconstitutional on the basis of a hypothetical refusal of a request that was not made. ... 72. It was submitted by the appellant that if a solicitor had been present throughout the interviewing of Barry Doyle, the interviews would have proceeded differently. But it is by no means clear that that would have been of any great assistance to him; the questions would still have been asked and he could well have been in the same situation of deciding that he was going to confess to the extent, limited in degree as it was, that he actually did in interview 15 and followed up in later interviews.” 29. The Court of Appeal again referred to the fact that all interviews had been recorded, so that the trial judge was able to see precisely what had happened during them. The police had respected the custody regulations, and while they had repeatedly questioned him they had permitted him breaks and access to a solicitor. There was no sign of oppression or unfairness. 30. The Court of Appeal also reviewed in detail the content of the Judge’s Charge to the jury, following a challenge that it had been inadequate and incorrect, and it rejected that complaint. It considered that most of the challenges to the judge’s charge concerning the applicant’s admissions amounted to a complaint that the judge’s charge had not adopted the applicant’s arguments. The Court of Appeal rejected this recalling that “118. It would not have been correct for the judge to tell the jury what the appellant wanted him to say” and “121 ... it is not the function of the trial judge to make another speech either for defence or prosecution ...”. The Court of Appeal also noted that the applicant criticised the Judge’s Charge on the question of the dissipation of inducement or threat, and recalled that the judge had consulted with the lawyers of both parties in advance on the presentation of that issue and both had indicated their agreement. Overall, the Court of Appeal concluded: “159. The appellant’s advisors legitimately advanced every ground of objection in defending their client. All of their extensive submissions were fully ventilated and carefully considered by the trial judge. The many issues were re-visited in a hearing in this Court that occupied two full days of oral argument and which were also explored in comprehensive submissions that were of great assistance to the Court. 160. The Court is satisfied that none of the grounds of appeal can succeed. The trial was satisfactory and the conviction of Mr Doyle was safe.” 31. On 8 June 2015 the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, identifying three issues for examination, one of which is of central relevance to the present application: “Whether or not the appellant was, in the circumstances of this case, entitled to consult with a solicitor, and have a solicitor present, prior to and during the 15th interview with the [police], during which admissions were alleged to have been made. This raises the question of whether the right to have a solicitor present during questioning is a matter of right of the detained person, or a matter of concession by the [police]. Whether the matters set out in the applicant’s application, under the heading ‘relevant facts considered not to be in dispute’, or any of them, constituted threats or inducements to the applicant, and calculated to extract a confession from him. This is a matter not decided by the court of trial, or the Court of Appeal. Secondly, if they do constitute such threats or inducements, whether their effect had ‘dissipated’, or ‘worn off’, by the time of the admissions relied on by the State, as held by the trial judge, and whether or not there was any evidence on which it could have been determined that the effect of these threats, or inducements, (if any), had ‘dissipated’, or ‘worn off’, by the time of the alleged admissions.” 32. On 18 January 2017 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, by a majority of six to one. Six members of the court gave judgment. 33. In the first judgment, the Chief Justice limited her remarks to the first issue above. She recalled that reasonable access to a solicitor was a constitutional right for persons in detention. As a matter of constitutional law, the concept of basic fairness of process applied from the time of arrest, as the Supreme Court had recently affirmed in a judgment that took into account the relevant Convention jurisprudence – DPP v. Gormley and DPP v. White, [2014] IESC 17 (“Gormley”). Since the question of the presence of a solicitor during questioning did not arise on the facts in Gormley, any statements in the judgment on this matter were obiter. She continued: “15. ... [I]t is clear that the appellant requested access to a solicitor and obtained access to a solicitor. He had access to legal advice. He had access to the solicitor before the important Interview 15, and he had access, at the solicitor’s request, during that interview, when the solicitor phoned in and sought to speak to the appellant as Interview 15 was underway. The interview was interrupted to enable the appellant to speak to his solicitor. There was no request to have the legal adviser present during the interview. 16. I am satisfied that the constitutional right of access to legal advice was met by the attendance of the appellant with his solicitor prior to Interview 15, and indeed by the telephone call from his solicitor which interrupted Interview 15. 17. The constitutional right is a right of access to a lawyer. The right is one of access to a lawyer, not of the presence of a lawyer during an interview.” [emphasis in the original] 34. She considered that the requirements of the Convention had also been met. Regarding the second issue in the appeal she concurred with Charleton J (see below). 35. The second judgment was given by O’Donnell J, who also confined his analysis to the first issue. He too regarded statements in Gormley about a more general right to the presence of a solicitor during detention as obiter. Referring to relevant Convention case-law he observed: “8. Given the fact that the jurisprudence of the ECtHR has to date largely been developed in the context of civil law systems with early supervision of investigation by a magistrate, it cannot be said that it has been definitively determined that the Convention requires a bright-line rule that in a common law system, an accused person must have not just access to, but the assurance of the presence of, a lawyer during any detention. This is particularly so because, until now, the Convention jurisprudence has not adopted any absolute rule that evidence obtained in breach of a Convention right must be inadmissible, but rather has applied a test of considering the overall fairness of the proceedings.” 36. In his view, the legal argument for adopting an absolute rule of presence of a lawyer as a matter of constitutional principle therefore rested almost entirely on the reasoning of the Miranda decision of the US Supreme Court. However, that authority had not been followed in Irish jurisprudence in the fifty years since it was decided. In the present case, the voluntary nature of the confession was not in doubt, and the admission of the applicant’s statement had not been held to be unfair. Were a bright-line rule to be adopted, it would have the potential to exclude key evidence in the shape of statements given voluntarily without the benefit of legal advice in circumstances otherwise beyond criticism. He stated: “14 ... I would for my part stop short at this point of finding that in addition to the videotaping of interviews, the access to and advice from a lawyer (provided if necessary by the State), and the requirement that only statements found to be voluntary beyond reasonable doubt be admitted in evidence, the Constitution nevertheless requires and perhaps has always required, the presence of a lawyer at all times during questioning, as a condition of admissibility of any evidence obtained.” 37. He concluded: “84. The appellant’s conviction was based upon a confession of his guilt, supported by significant independent evidence. This included a description by the appellant of what happened at the scene of the crime examination of matters unknown to the garda, and ballistic evidence. The conviction was supported by independent testimony from Ms. [G.], to whom he (the appellant) made inculpatory remarks outside the confines of a garda station. It was corroborated by evidence from Ms [A.], who was present both when the order was given to the appellant to commit the murder, and the following day when the appellant was challenged as to whether or not he had shot the right man, and when he asserted, incorrectly, that he had. The voluntary nature of the confession was proved to the satisfaction of the trial judge based upon a detailed review of all the evidence, including 20 hours of interview process. There is no basis, under the law, upon which it can be contended that the evidence was inadmissible, or that the trial herein was an unfair one. ...” 38. MacMenamin J gave the third judgment. He recalled that at the time of the applicant’s arrest and trial, the relevant precedent of the Supreme Court, Lavery v. Member in Charge Carrickmacross Garda Station [1999] 2 IR 390, did not accept that a suspect was generally entitled to the presence of a solicitor during police questioning. 39. He rejected the argument that the applicant’s will had been sapped, notably during the fourteenth interview. While the police had continued to question him even after he had requested another consultation with his solicitor, nothing had been elicited in that interview that had carried through to the next interview. There was no basis to consider that the applicant’s position, at that point in time or subsequently, had been irretrievably prejudiced. 40. As to the argument that, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Gormley and also Convention and US case-law, there was now a right to have a solicitor present during police questioning, MacMenamin J held that it could not succeed in the instant case. He stated: “46. ... [W]hat I think is imperative to bear in mind, is that here (subject to the point made regarding the immaterial Interview 14), the appellant was granted access to a solicitor at the outset of his custody, during his custody, prior to the relevant interview, and even during that interview. His limited confession was that he accepted that he had killed [S.G.]. Unavoidably, the appellant must face the fact that the logic of what is sought to be applied here is a retrospective recognition and application of a then unrecognised constitutional right to have a lawyer present throughout interviews.” [emphasis in the original] 41. The judge continued that he would be prepared, in light of recent developments in law and procedures, to recognise in future cases a right under the Constitution to have a solicitor present during police questioning. He then referred to a number of relevant ECtHR judgments, in particular the case of Salduz v. Turkey [GC], no. 36391/02, ECHR 2008. He considered that the facts of the present case were very different, and that the two must be distinguished. He added that, for the purposes of Article 6 of the Convention, the relevant issue was always whether criminal proceedings as a whole had been fair. 42. Charleton J, with whom Laffoy J concurred, dealt first with the inducement issue. He reviewed in detail the applicant’s evidence and the circumstances in which it was taken by police. He considered that in the thirteenth interview the references to G’s situation constituted a clear inducement to confess. However, the fact that he was granted access to independent legal advice from his chosen solicitor was important. He then referred to several factors – including the evidence of remorse, the fact that the applicant limited his admissions to his own role, the fact that he did not retract his statement, and the gesture involving the beads – which constituted material on which the decision of the trial judge could reasonably be made. The decision could not be disturbed. 43. On the issue of access to a solicitor, Charleton J noted that the Court of Appeal had followed the existing Supreme Court case-law to the effect that there was no constitutional right to have a solicitor present during questioning. The Gormley case had not established such a right, since this point had not arisen on the facts of that case. While the fundamental requirement of basic fairness applied from the time of arrest, it did not necessarily follow that all of the safeguards of a fair trial, especially legal representation, must also be applied in full from the outset. 44. O’Malley J agreed that the appeal should be dismissed. However, she took a different approach to MacMenamin and Charleton JJ in relation to the implications of the right of access to legal advice. She agreed with the conclusion of MacMenamin J that there was no causative link between the applicant’s admissions and the absence of the solicitor during questioning, and that this was sufficient to dispose of the issue in the present case. However, she considered that the issue might properly arise for consideration in another case. She saw some strength in the argument that this should now be regarded as a right flowing from the constitutional right to a fair trial. The State had in effect anticipated this by modifying police practice in this respect. She noted that the issue might arise in the context of statutory provisions that permit the drawing of inferences from a failure to answer questions. As this was not an appropriate case to reach a definitive view, she reserved her position on the question. She stated: “71 ... I consider that the question of the existence of such a right does not truly arise on the admittedly unusual facts of this case. 72. Largely, this is because of the unusually central role, discussed above, taken by [the solicitor] in the events immediately preceding the admissions. Prior to that, it is true that the appellant did not see his solicitor for any great length of time. However, it is also clear that he was aware of his right to see him; that he saw him when he wanted to, for as long as he wanted; and that he was under no pressure to relinquish or curtail his right of access. It is also clear that while he answered some questions in some interviews he did not incriminate himself prior to Interview No.15. 73. I do not accept the contention that the statement by the appellant (in Interview No. 14) that he would answer questions when he saw his solicitor demonstrates that he was ‘irretrievably prejudiced’ by the [police] decision to continue asking questions despite the request for the solicitor. I cannot see that it should be interpreted as a decision to incriminate himself - he committed himself to nothing, and certainly not to admitting guilt. There is no evidence that his will was overborne to any extent, still less to the extent that a consultation could not assist him. 74. The actual admissions came about in the circumstances discussed above. The role of the solicitor was, in fact, far more central than would be envisaged where a lawyer is present in the interview room - the [police] and the appellant were actually communicating through him, rather than directly with each other. He had complete privacy to advise his client while carrying on the discussion with the [police] and also a greater degree of control than would be normal over what was said on behalf of the client and how it was presented. For the reasons already discussed, therefore I consider that not only was the trial judge entitled to conclude that the admissions were the result of a fully voluntary decision by the appellant, but that there is nothing to indicate that the exercise of the right now contended for would have altered the situation in any material respect.” 45. McKechnie J dissented. On the issue of the presence of the solicitor during questioning, he first rejected the applicant’s argument that the amount of contact he had had with his solicitor during the period of detention did not amount to reasonable access. The real question at issue was if, where reasonable access to legal advice has been afforded, a solicitor’s attendance at the interview process was as of right or by concession. He referred to the recent change of police practice in this respect and observed: “136. [A]lthough this newly-established practice is not definitive in the legal analysis of whether such a right exists, nonetheless the shifts which I have described, being both potent and influential, are significant and should not be underestimated. Reality, as it now stands, must be faced up to.” 46. Turning to Convention case-law, he analysed the Salduz judgment and considered that it did not directly support the applicant’s argument. He considered, however, that this Court’s interpretation of Article 6 had evolved since then, citing the following cases: Dayanan v. Turkey, no. 7377/03, 13 October 2009; Navone and Others v. Monaco, nos. 62880/11 and 2 others, 24 October 2013; A.T. v. Luxembourg, no. 30460/13, 9 April 2015; Simons v. Belgium (dec.), no. 71407/10, 28 August 2012; and Brusco v. France, no. 1466/07, 14 October 2010. In drawing out the main points of this case-law he stated: “150. ... [I]t seems clear that the judgments have made express reference to a suspect’s right to have a lawyer present during the interview process. Thus on one reading it could be said that this right has already been clearly established. However, I am not aware of any decision reflecting the particular facts of Mr. Doyle’s situation ... in which the Court has definitively declared the existence of such right.” 47. He next referred to Directive 2013/48/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and in European arrest warrant proceedings, and on the right to have a third party informed upon deprivation of liberty and to communicate with third persons and with consular authorities while deprived of liberty (OJ 2013 L 294, p. 1–12). Under the Directive, the right of suspects or accused persons for their lawyer to be present and to participate effectively in during questioning is provided for. Although the Directive did not apply to Ireland, it “illuminate[d] the directional focus” of other EU Member States, and “offer[ed] further evidence of a prevailing trend amongst fellow members of the Union”. Moreover, the Directive had been referred to by in A.T. v. Luxembourg (cited above). In addition, he took note of the position of the Committee for the Prevention of Torture, which considered that the right of access to a lawyer should include the right to legal assistance during questioning (CPT/Inf (2011) 28, at § 24). He then summarised the position in the different jurisdictions of the United Kingdom, noting that in each of them provision was made for solicitors to be present during questioning. In view of all of this material, he saw a “significant shift in the acknowledgment of this right across other diverse legal regimes”: “167. ... I believe that on balance the existing case law of the ECtHR is already to the effect that the Convention does in fact require the presence of a lawyer during questioning. The judgments [referred to above] and many others, all make express reference to the existence of such a right in clear-cut and deliberate terms. To the reservation that this position has not been definitively spelled out, I believe that if the settled and current trend of dealing with the availability of legal protection should continue, then it is more likely than not that the outcome of any case where the precise point was directly in issue would support the conclusion which I have arrived at. Of course this anticipation may be wrong, but, even if so, the existing state of jurisprudence is of such force in this regard that such of itself is highly influential in calling for such a right. ...” 48. He then set out a series of considerations in support of according constitutional status to the right to the presence of a solicitor during questioning: the substantial length of detention permitted by law, allowing for multiple interviews throughout the day over a number of days; the daunting and frightening effect that detention may have on many people; even where the accused is a hardened criminal, the importance of preserving their rights too; the increasing complexity of the criminal law; the limits of judicial control, which prohibits rather than prevents abuse. He did not consider that existing safeguards were sufficient to overcome the inequality in the interview room. While the recording of interviews permitted judicial scrutiny of the actions of the police, he was “not convinced that this ex post facto supervision is an adequate surrogate for the presence of a solicitor at the interview itself.” 49. Article 38.1 of the Constitution enshrines the principle of fairness in the criminal process: “No person shall be tried on any criminal charge save in due course of law”. 50. The right of access to a solicitor, when requested by or on behalf of a person in detention, was recognised as being a constitutional right by Finlay C.J. in The People (DPP) v. Healy [1990] 2 I.R. 73, where he stated: “The undoubted right of reasonable access to a solicitor enjoyed by a person who is in detention must be interpreted as being directed towards the vital function of ensuring that such person is aware of his rights and has the independent advice which would be appropriate in order to permit him to reach a truly free decision as to his attitude to interrogation or to the making of any statement, be it exculpatory or inculpatory. The availability of advice from a lawyer must, in my view, be seen as a contribution, at least, towards some measure of equality in the position of the detained person and his interrogators. Viewed in that light, I am driven to the conclusion that such an important and fundamental standard of fairness in the administration of justice as the right of access to a lawyer must be deemed to be constitutional in it origin, and to classify it as merely legal would be to undermine its importance and the completeness of the protection of it which the courts are obliged to give.” 51. In the case The People (DPP) v Pringle (1981) 2 Frewen 57, it was held by O’Higgins CJ that, in the absence of an express guarantee against self‑incrimination in the Irish Constitution, it was not possible to infer a right to have a solicitor present during questioning. 52. In the case Lavery v. Member in Charge, Carrickmacross Garda Station (cited above, see paragraph 38), O’Flaherty J affirmed that position: “Counsel for the State submitted to the High Court Judge that in effect what [the solicitor] was seeking was that the [police] should give him regular updates and running accounts of the progress of their investigations and that this was going too far. I agree. The solicitor is not entitled to be present at the interviews. Neither was it open to the applicant, or his solicitor, to prescribe the manner by which the interviews might be conducted, or where.” 53. The core issue in DPP v. Gormley and DPP v. White (cited above, see paragraph 33) which was repeatedly referred to by the Supreme Court in the present case was, according to Clarke J: “8.1. ... whether the entitlement to a trial in due course of law, guaranteed by Article 38(1) of [the Irish Constitution], encompasses an entitlement to have access to legal advice prior to the conduct of any interrogation of a suspect arrested .... If that proposition is accepted at the level of general principle then many more questions of detail would, of course, arise. Questions such as ... the extent to which a lawyer is entitled to be present during the questioning as well as being entitled to advise the suspect prior to questioning... . By no means do all of those issues arise on the facts of these cases.” [Emphasis added] 54. On the main question raised in the Gormley case Clarke J stated: “8.7. The first issue which perhaps arises is as to whether it is appropriate to regard any part of the investigative stage of a criminal process as forming part of a ‘trial in due course of law’. It is clear that the ECtHR takes such a view. It must, of course, be recalled that, in many civil law countries, there are formal parts of the investigative process which are judicial or involve prosecutors who have a quasi-judicial status. The line between investigation and trial is not necessarily the same in each jurisdiction. Furthermore, it is important to emphasise a potential distinction between a formal investigation directly involving an arrested suspect and what might be termed a pure investigative stage where the police or other relevant prosecuting authorities are simply gathering evidence. 8.8. I am persuaded that the point at which the coercive power of the State, in the form of an arrest, is exercised against a suspect represents an important juncture in any potential criminal process. Thereafter the suspect is no longer someone who is simply being investigated by the gathering of whatever evidence might be available. Thereafter the suspect has been deprived of his or her liberty and, in many cases, can be subjected to mandatory questioning for various periods and, indeed, in certain circumstances, may be exposed to a requirement, under penal sanction, to provide forensic samples. It seems to me that once the power of the State has been exercised against a suspect in that way, it is proper to regard the process thereafter as being intimately connected with a potential criminal trial rather than being one at a pure investigative stage. It seems to me to follow that the requirement that persons only be tried in due course of law, therefore, requires that the basic fairness of process identified as an essential ingredient of that concept by this Court in State (Healy) v. Donoghue applies from the time of arrest of a suspect. The precise consequences of such a requirement do, of course, require careful and detailed analysis. It does not, necessarily, follow that all of the rights which someone may have at trial (in the sense of the conduct of a full hearing of the criminal charge before a judge with or without a jury) apply at each stage of the process leading up to such a trial. However, it seems to me that the fundamental requirement of basic fairness does apply from the time of arrest such that any breach of that requirement can lead to an absence of a trial in due course of law. In that regard it seems to me that the Irish position is the same as that acknowledged by the ECtHR and by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 55. Later in his judgment he observed: “9.10 ... [T]he question as to whether a suspect is entitled to have a lawyer present during questioning does not arise on the facts of this case for the questioning in respect of which complaint is made occurred before the relevant lawyer even arrived. However, it does need to be noted that the jurisprudence of both the ECtHR and the United States Supreme Court clearly recognises that the entitlements of a suspect extend to having the relevant lawyer present.” 56. In a concurring judgment, Hardiman J stated: “For many years now judicial and legal authorities have pointed to the likelihood that our system’s option for the very widespread questioning of suspects who are held in custody for that purpose, was very likely to attract a right on the part of such suspects, not merely to be advised by lawyers before interrogation, but to have lawyers present at the interrogation, and enabled to intervene where appropriate. This has now come to pass in countries with similar judicial systems... and also under the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’)... It is notable, however, that Mr. Gormley has not asserted that right to its full extent but has asserted only a right to have a lawyer to advise him, in custody, before the questioning starts. Manifestly, however, it will not be long before some person or other asserts a right to legal advice in custody on a broader basis. I say this in explicit terms in order that this may be considered by those whose duty it is to take account of potential developments.” 57. Following the Gormley case, and acting on the advice of the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Irish police force changed its practice so as to permit a solicitor to be present during the questioning of a suspect. In April 2015 it published a code of practice on the subject, setting out in detail the manner in which police officers should give effect to a suspect’s entitlement to the presence of a solicitor. 58. In December 2015, the Law Society of Ireland published a document entitled “Guidance for Solicitors Providing Legal Services in Garda Stations”. The document sets out advice for solicitors, in light of the relevant law and the police code of practice. 59. Article 3(1) – (3) of Directive 2013/48, entitled “The right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings” reads as follows: “1. Member States shall ensure that suspects and accused persons have the right of access to a lawyer in such time and in such a manner so as to allow the persons concerned to exercise their rights of defence practically and effectively. 2. Suspects or accused persons shall have access to a lawyer without undue delay. In any event, suspects or accused persons shall have access to a lawyer from whichever of the following points in time is the earliest: (a) before they are questioned by the police or by another law enforcement or judicial authority; (b) upon the carrying out by investigating or other competent authorities of an investigative or other evidence-gathering act in accordance with point (c) of paragraph 3; (c) without undue delay after deprivation of liberty; (d) where they have been summoned to appear before a court having jurisdiction in criminal matters, in due time before they appear before that court. 3. The right of access to a lawyer shall entail the following: (a) Member States shall ensure that suspects or accused persons have the right to meet in private and communicate with the lawyer representing them, including prior to questioning by the police or by another law enforcement or judicial authority; (b) Member States shall ensure that suspects or accused persons have the right for their lawyer to be present and participate effectively when questioned. Such participation shall be in accordance with procedures under national law, provided that such procedures do not prejudice the effective exercise and essence of the right concerned. Where a lawyer participates during questioning, the fact that such participation has taken place shall be noted using the recording procedure in accordance with the law of the Member State concerned; (c) Member States shall ensure that suspects or accused persons shall have, as a minimum, the right for their lawyer to attend the following investigative or evidence‑gathering acts where those acts are provided for under national law and if the suspect or accused person is required or permitted to attend the act concerned: (i) identity parades; (ii) confrontations; (iii) reconstructions of the scene of a crime.” 60. For a detailed summary of the recitals and other relevant provisions of the directive see Beuze v. Belgium [GC], no. 71409/10, §§ 82-85, 9 November 2018). 61. Directive 2013/48, which had to be transposed by 12 November 2016, applies to all EU Member States except for Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom.

4. The applicants were born in 1990, 1988 and 1957, respectively and live in Chișinău. 5. The first and the second applicants were arrested on 8 and 9 April 2009, as a result of the mass protest which took place in Chișinău after the elections of 5 April 2009. They were placed in detention for ten and seven days respectively. Later the charges against them were dropped. 6. The third applicant was accused of fraud and placed in detention pending trial between 15 and 18 April 2004 and between 28 July and 3 August 2005, i.e. for nine days. Later the charges against him were dropped. The Government disputed the fact that the third applicant was detained between 28 July and 3 August 2005. 7. On different dates the applicants brought civil actions under Law No. 1545 (on compensation for damage caused by illegal acts of the criminal investigation bodies, the prosecution authorities or the courts) seeking 115,000 Moldovan lei (MDL) (the equivalent of 6,765 euros (EUR)), MDL 600,000 (the equivalent of EUR 36,700) and MDL 80,000 (the equivalent of EUR 4800), respectively, in compensation for non‑pecuniary damage. On 11 December 2013, 3 July 2013 and 28 May 2014 respectively, the Supreme Court of Justice concluded that the applicants’ detentions had been unlawful and in breach of Article 5 of the Convention and awarded them MDL 15,000 (the equivalent of EUR 835), MDL 7,000 (the equivalent to EUR 428) and MDL 6,000 (the equivalent of EUR 317) respectively as compensation for the damage caused. The domestic courts found inter alia that the third applicant had been detained between 15 and 18 April 2004 and between 28 July and 3 August 2005. 8. In addition, the first and the second applicants were part of a group of persons considered to be victims of the events of April 2009 and were awarded by two Government decisions MDL 10,000 (the equivalent of EUR 625) and MDL 7000 (the equivalent of EUR 444), respectively.

5. The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Suponevo, the Bryansk Region. 6. The applicant has been editor of a weekly newspaper, Bryanskiye Budni (Брянские будни), since he founded it in 1999. 7. In June 2010 the prosecuting authorities conducted a check into compliance with fire safety rules at the Tymoshkovykh shopping centre (ТРЦ Тимошковых). The report stated that fifteen breaches of the rules had been found. 8. On 21 June 2010 the prosecutor applied to a court with a request, inter alia, to order N.K. Timoshkov, the owner of the shopping centre, to rectify the breaches. 9. By a final decision of 2 August 2010 the application was allowed in that part. 10. Enforcement proceedings were instituted and subsequently discontinued. 11. In September 2011 the prosecuting authorities conducted another check. They found that the breaches had not been rectified and, moreover, found new ones. Overall, fifty violations of fire safety regulations were found, of which fifteen were considered to pose a threat to the life and health of people inside the centre. 12. The bailiffs’ decision to discontinue the enforcement proceedings was set aside. 13. At the same time the prosecutor instituted new court proceedings against the shopping centre, seeking to have the fire safety breaches rectified. The prosecutor also asked the court to close the shopping centre temporarily as a provisional measure until fire safety regulations had been complied with fully. 14. On an unspecified date the Bryansk Regional Court ordered the shopping centre to close temporarily. The proceedings on the merits remained pending, and a further hearing was scheduled for 27 March 2012. 15. On 23 March 2012 the Regnum Centre news portal published an article on its website about the temporary closure of the Tymoshkovykh shopping centre due to breaches of fire safety rules. 16. On 26 March 2012 the iBryansk.ru news portal published an article on its website about a meeting between Mr Timoshkov and representatives of the Ministry of Emergency Situations, the Bryansk prosecutor, the head of the Bryansk Administration and Mikhail Klimov, a deputy governor of the Bryansk Region. 17. On 27 March 2012 the bnews32.ru news portal published an article about a court order to close the shopping centre. The article also stated that the owner of the shopping centre considered the measure to be too severe, and that Nikolay Denin, governor of the Bryansk Region, had instructed Mr Klimov to personally take charge of the matter. 18. On the same date Regnum Centre published an article that at the 27 March 2012 hearing the Bezhitskiy District Curt of Bryansk had dismissed an application to lift the provisional measure. The article also stated that Mr Timoshkov had been very active in connection with the closure of the shopping centre and had already met representatives of the Ministry of Emergency Situations, the Bryansk prosecutor, the head of the Bryansk Administration and Mr Klimov. The news portal reported that as the court hearing had taken place after the meeting, Mr Timoshkov had been outraged by the decision and had said as follows: “In my opinion, which is shared by officials at the Ministry of Emergency Situations and Deputy Governor Klimov, there is no threat to people’s safety. I do not know why [the court delivered] such a decision. We shall appeal against it.” 19. On 29 March 2012 the province.ru news portal published an article on its website saying that the Bryansk prosecutor’s office had applied to the court to lift the suspension of the shopping centre’s activities, as announced by the deputy prosecutor, A. Stupak, at a meeting of the regional Duma. The article said that he had stated that the breaches that had been found were not considered by the Ministry of Emergency Situations as posing a threat to the life of employees and customers at the centre and that the owner had rectified some of them. 20. On 30 March 2012 the Tymoshkovykh shopping centre reopened. 21. On 11 April 2012 province.ru published an article on its website which read as follows: “On 27 March the building was closed due to breaches of fire safety rules. By a court decision provisional measures were applied for one month pending rectification of the breaches. Those events caused a stir. Businessmen talked to the regional prosecutor. Town and regional officials pleaded on behalf of the business. As a result, on 30 March the prosecutor’s office withdrew its complaint and the shopping centre opened again. However, yesterday the regional court refused to lift the provisional measures. That means that before 27 April the building may be closed again. Today the shopping centre is open as usual. However, tenants say that bailiffs might visit them again on 13 April. In the meantime, the businessmen are going to again ask the prosecutor’s office for clarification.” 22. On 29 March 2012 the applicant published an article in Bryanskiye Budni no. 639/12 headlined “... and were Timoshkov’s errand boys” (“... и служили у Тимошкова на посылках”)[1], where he criticised the officials who had taken the side of the shopping centre in the above events. The relevant part of the article reads as follows: “The finest forces were mustered in support of Timoshkov. The most notorious sages gathered at the table – deputy governor Mikhail Klimov, the head of the town administration Sergey Smirnov and other officials. They were ordered to rescue their patron Timoshkov, and they did so. Quite a few establishments have been closed on account of a breach of fire safety rules, yet no such cavalry ever came to their rescue. The highest officials rushed to defend the interests of businessman Timoshkov ... The corrupt Bryansk officials gave themselves away and did not even understand what had happened. Actually, they would not have been very embarrassed even if they had realised that they had revealed their connections. ‘Who are you with, masters of culture?’ they used to say in the times of Stalin. Another question needs to be asked in Bryansk: ‘Who are you with, masters of thievery? Who are you defending?’” 23. The original Russian version is given below: “На подмогу Тимошкову бросили лучшие силы. За столом собрались самые отъявленные мудрецы – заместитель губернатора Михаил Климов, глава городской администрации Сергей Смирнов и другие чиновники. Им дали команду спасать кормильца Тимошкова, и они спасали. Мало ли заведений было закрыто из-за нарушений противопожарных норм, но никому не бросали на выручку такой десант. Интересы отдельно взятого коммерсанта Тимошкова кинулись защищать высшие чиновники ... Брянские коррупционеры засветились и даже не поняли, что случилось. Впрочем, не слишком бы и смутились, если бы все-таки сообразили, что приоткрыли свои связи. «С кем вы, мастера культуры?» - говаривали при Сталине. Для Брянска напрашивается другой вопрос: «С кем вы, мастера воровского ремесла? Кого защищаете?” 24. On 23 April 2012 Mr Klimov brought an action for defamation against the applicant and sought damages of 500,000 Russian roubles (RUB). He asserted, in particular, that the following passages were untrue and damaging to his honour and reputation: 1. “The finest forces were mustered in support of Timoshkov. The most notorious sages gathered at the table – deputy governor Mikhail Klimov, the head of the town administration Sergey Smirnov and other officials. They were ordered to rescue their patron Timoshkov, and they did so ... The highest officials rushed to defend the interests of businessman Timoshkov.” 25. On 27 September 2012 the Bryansk District Court of the Bryansk Region allowed the claim. In its decision it relied on a linguistic expert’s examination of 1 August 2012. According to the expert’s report, the passages in question were susceptible of being looked at in terms of their factual accuracy. In the first and second passages the information had been presented in the form of assertions. The third passage had contained rhetorical questions which had expressed the author’s opinion. However, there was also an implied assertion that those concerned, including the claimant, were “masters of the thieves’ trade”, that is they had been engaged in unlawful activities. 26. The court dismissed the applicant’s argument that all the facts described in the article were true, whereas in the passages concerned he had expressed his opinion. Relying on the above report, the court found that the claimant had been referred to in the passages concerned, which constituted negative statements that had discredited his moral character and damaged his honour, dignity and business reputation. 27. The court ordered the applicant to publish a retraction within ten days of the judgment’s entry into force and awarded the claimant damages of RUB 5,000 (approximately 125 euros (EUR)). 28. The applicant appealed. 29. On 27 November 2012 the Bryansk Regional Court upheld the judgment. 30. On 19 February 2013 the Bryansk Regional Court refused leave to the applicant to lodge a cassation appeal.

8. The applicants were born in 1949 and 1923 respectively and lived in Bucharest, where the first applicant still lives. 9. The applicants were co-owners of two adjacent plots of land in Montenegro. 10. On 13 June 2009, during a visit to the plots, the first applicant noticed a metal fence built partly on their property. The fence divided the two plots of land and made it impossible for them to access one plot from the other. It appears that the fence had been erected some time in February 2009. 11. On 15 July 2009 the applicants, who had legal representation, instituted civil proceedings for trespass (radi smetanja posjeda) against B.Ć., their neighbour. 12. On 27 June 2011 the Court of First Instance (Osnovni sud) in Kotor ruled in favour of the applicants and ordered B.Ć. to remove the fence and pay the applicants 1,435 euros (EUR) in respect of legal costs. The court was satisfied that the applicants had lodged their claim in time, given that the deadline for initiating proceedings was 30 days from the day on which they had noticed the trespass, taking into account that 13 and 14 July were national holidays. In doing so the court relied on section 77 of Property Act (see paragraph 14 below). 13. On 20 December 2011 the High Court (Viši sud) in Podgorica, ruling on an appeal lodged by B.Ć., quashed the previous judgment and rejected the applicants’ claim (tužba se odbacuje) as submitted out of time. The court held that 13 and 14 July were indeed national holidays when the courts did not sit. It considered, however, that the 30-day period within which the applicants could institute proceedings was mandatory “[in which case] there could be no shifting of the time-limit when its last day fell on a day when the courts [did] not sit”. The time-limit had therefore expired on 13 July 2009, and the applicants had not filed their claim until 15 July 2009.

5. The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Vienna (Austria). 6. The applicant is a businessman associated with a major Austrian financial and industrial group. Under a complex corporate and contractual arrangement, he had an office in Bratislava (Slovakia). It was situated at the same address as premises of other entities belonging to the group. 7. Although no formal charges were brought against him, an investigation into various transactions involving the applicant was carried out in Austria on suspicion of, inter alia, investment fraud, breach of confidence and insider trading. In the context of this investigation, the Austrian prosecution service asked their Slovakian counterparts to search the above-mentioned premises and to seize documents relevant to the investigation. 8. The search took place in 2009 and business documents and electronic storage media were seized, including from the applicant’s office, and later handed over to the Austrian authorities. 9. In a judgment of 7 December 2010 the Constitutional Court found that the warrant issued in Slovakia for the search and seizure did not extend to the applicant and his office and that the terms of the warrant had therefore been exceeded, in violation of the applicant’s rights to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions, respect for his private life, and judicial and other legal protection. Accordingly, the Public Prosecution Service of Slovakia (“the PPS”) was ordered to stop violating the applicant’s rights and to ask the Austrian authorities for the return of the unlawfully seized items with a view to their restitution to the applicant. 10. On 6 September 2011 the PPS asked the law firm representing the applicant in Slovakia to specify whether they were entitled to receive on his behalf the items that had meanwhile been returned by the Austrian authorities. A power of attorney to that effect was submitted on 12 September 2011. 11. On 1 February 2012 the Bratislava I District Police Directorate issued a decision restoring those items to the applicant, identifying them as six specific units of electronic storage media. 12. The applicant claims, and this has not been disputed by the Government, that the media to be returned to the applicant contained, inter alia, legal advice protected by lawyer-client privilege. 13. On 27 February 2012 the PPS summoned the applicant’s lawyer to its premises on 7 March 2012 with a view to restoring the above-mentioned possessions to the applicant. 14. On 7 March 2012 at 9.10 a.m. those items were restored to the applicant’s lawyer and, at 9.15 a.m., they were all seized from him again with reference to a letter rogatory from the Vienna office of the Prosecution Service of Austria of 14 April 2011. That letter sought specifically the seizure of the same items as were to be restored to the applicant and referred to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, the Schengen Implementing Convention, and the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European Union. 15. The record of this operation indicates that the applicant’s lawyer was informed that under Article 89 § 1 of the Code of the Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”) he was under a duty to surrender the objects in question and that he had been warned that if he did not do so, they could be taken from him under Article 91 of the CCP and he could face a fine under Article 70 of the CCP and a referral for disciplinary proceedings by a competent body, in response to which he surrendered the items voluntarily. However, he added that he protested on the grounds that he considered the re-seizure to be an obstruction of implementation of the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 7 December 2010 and stated that further reasons would be added to the protest later. 16. The applicant lodged a series of requests, complaints and repeated complaints with all levels of the PPS raising two groups of arguments. First, he complained as regards execution of the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 2010. In particular, he argued that the PPS had failed to execute that judgment properly in that (i) not all of his documents unlawfully seized in 2009 had been restored to him and (ii) the PPS had failed to ensure that the Austrian authorities returned or destroyed all the copies they had made of the material unlawfully seized and transmitted to them. Second, the applicant challenged the re-seizure of 7 March 2012, arguing that he had only learned of the decision to dismiss his complaint against the decision of 1 February 2012 restoring the items in question the day before their scheduled restoration and re-seizure. Accordingly, he had had no possibility of being present in person. As the items had been seized again immediately after having been returned to his lawyer, the applicant had not had time to verify their condition and to confer with his lawyer on how to respond. In that regard, his lawyer could not, even in theory, have checked the condition of some of the material concerned because it was encrypted. Moreover, it was protected from seizure by lawyer-client privilege. Lastly, the applicant argued that the Austrian authorities knew about the items they had asked to be seized again exclusively from the results of their unlawful initial seizure. Therefore, the re-seizure had served the sole purpose of rectifying the initial seizure, which was against the object and purpose of the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 2010, and for which his lawyer had been arbitrarily exploited. 17. All the complaints were dismissed, of which the applicant and his lawyer were ultimately informed by letters of the Office of the Prosecutor General of 10 August and 31 December 2012. The reasons given were as follows: All the seized items, of which the applicant was unquestionably the owner, had been returned to him. There was no duty to return all of the items at once. Should he demonstrate his ownership in respect of other items, these could still be restored to him at a later stage. As regards the restoration or destruction of any copies made by the Austrian authorities, the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 2010 did not specify any duties on the part of the PPS. In any event, it was open to the applicant to assert his rights in that respect before the relevant Austrian authorities. As the items in question had been returned to the applicant on 7 March 2012, the previous unlawfulness of their seizure had been rectified and there had been no obstacle to seizing them again. The re-seizure complied with all the requirements under the applicable statute and the relevant international rules and as such was lawful and justified. As the applicant had authorised a lawyer to receive on his behalf the items to be returned to him, it had been apparent that he had had no intention of participating personally in the dealings with the PPS. Had he manifested any wish to do so, this would have been taken into account. Accordingly, he could not complain of being unable to defend his rights and interests adequately in relation to the re‑seizure. 18. On 11 March 2013 the applicant lodged a fresh complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution, arguing that by failing to ensure full compliance with the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 7 December 2010 and seizing the restored items again, the Slovakian authorities had been responsible for a violation of a number of his rights, including respect for his private life and correspondence and the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions and of failing to provide an effective remedy. In substance, he advanced similar arguments to those mentioned above, including, in particular, that the items that had been seized again contained legal advice protected from seizure by lawyer-client privilege. 19. On 16 May 2013 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible. In the pertinent part of its decision, it quoted extensively from the letter of the Office of the Prosecutor General of 31 December 2012, pointed out that its task was to review the constitutionality but not the legality as such of the challenged decisions, and found no constitutionally relevant arbitrariness or other shortcoming in the position the PPS had taken in his case. A written version of the decision was served on the applicant’s lawyer on 15 July 2013 and no appeal lay against it. 20. On 18 April 2012 the Constitutional Court declared inadmissible a complaint by which the applicant’s then lawyer had challenged in his own name the re-seizure of 7 March 2012. 21. The complaint had been lodged on 9 March 2012 and included, inter alia, claims of a violation of the lawyer’s own rights under Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention. In particular, he complained that he, as the applicant’s representative, had not been given access to the letter rogatory underlying the seizure and that he had been granted no time to confer with the applicant. He had thereby been prevented from exercising his profession as a lawyer in relation to his instructions from the applicant. Moreover, he was bound by the duty of confidentiality as regards the affairs of the applicant as his client and this duty had not been lifted. Forcing him, on pain of sanctions, to surrender the applicant’s documents had therefore interfered not only with his own personal integrity but also with his constitutional function as an advocate. Being aware that the re-seizure was reviewable by the PPS and that a constitutional complaint was admissible only upon exhaustion of ordinary remedies, he asked to be exempted from the obligation to exhaust such remedies on account of special circumstances. These, in his view, lay in particular in the attitude of the PPS until then regarding execution of the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 2010 and the imminent risk of the re‑seized items being handed over to the Austrian authorities. 22. The Constitutional Court found no merit, however, in the lawyer’s plea for an exemption from the requirement of exhaustion of available ordinary remedies and, accordingly, rejected his complaint for his failure to do so.

5. The first applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Vranje. 6. On 19 January 2004 the Vladičin Han Municipal Court ordered a socially-owned company DP PK Delišes (hereinafter “the debtor company”), based in Vladičin Han, to pay the first applicant specified amounts on account of debt, plus the costs of the civil proceedings. This judgment became final on 15 March 2004. 7. On 27 May 2004, upon the first applicant’s request to that effect, the Vladičin Han Municipal Court ordered the enforcement of the said judgment and further ordered the debtor company to pay the first applicant the enforcement costs. 8. On 30 January 2014 the Leskovac Commercial Court opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor company (St. 1/14). 9. As a result, the ongoing enforcement proceedings against the debtor company were stayed by the Municipal Court’s decision of 12 March 2014. 10. The first applicant duly submitted his respective claim. 11. The insolvency proceedings against the debtor company are still ongoing. 12. On 23 January 2013 the first applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. 13. On 28 May 2015 the Constitutional Court found a violation of the first applicant’s right to a hearing within a reasonable time. It further awarded him 500 euros (EUR) as just satisfaction for non-pecuniary damage. The Constitutional Court dismissed the first applicant’s complaint concerning his right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions as well as his request for pecuniary damages, since the insolvency proceedings were still pending. That decision was delivered to the first applicant on 13 July 2015. 14. The second applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Niš. 15. He was employed by DOO EI-7 Oktobar, a socially-owned company based in Niš (hereinafter “the debtor company”). 16. On 22 December 2005 the second applicant concluded the settlement with the debtor company before the Niš Municipal Court, by which the debtor company was obliged to pay the second applicant specified amounts on account of salary arrears and social insurance contributions, plus the costs of the civil proceedings. This settlement became final on an unspecified date. 17. On 17 December 2010, upon the second applicant’s request to that effect, the Niš Municipal Court ordered the enforcement of the said settlement and further ordered the debtor company to pay the second applicant the enforcement costs. 18. On 5 September 2008 the Niš Municipal Court ordered the debtor company to pay the second applicant specified amounts on account of salary arrears and social insurance contributions, plus the costs of the civil proceedings. This judgment became final by 23 December 2008. 19. On 28 December 2010, upon the second applicant’s request to that effect, the Niš Municipal Court ordered the enforcement of the said judgment and further ordered the debtor company to pay the second applicant the enforcement costs. 20. On 30 June 2007 and 15 October 2007 respectively, the Republic Agency for Peaceful Settlement of Labour Disputes ordered the debtor company to pay the second applicant specified amounts on account of salary arrears and social insurance contributions. These decisions became final on unspecified dates. 21. On 27 December 2010 and 28 December 2010 respectively, upon the second applicant’s request to that effect, the Niš Municipal Court ordered the enforcement of the said decisions and further ordered the debtor company to pay the second applicant the enforcement costs. 22. On 23 May 2012 the Niš Commercial Court opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor company (St. 115/12). As a result, the ongoing enforcement proceedings against the debtor company were stayed. 23. The second applicant duly submitted his respective claims. 24. On 24 December 2015 the second applicant’s claims were formally recognised. 25. The insolvency proceedings against the debtor company are still ongoing. 26. On 11 February 2013 the second applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. 27. On 18 June 2015 the Constitutional Court dismissed his appeal as lodged out of time. It found that the second applicant failed to lodge his appeal within thirty days as of the date when the decisions on the staying of the enforcement proceedings as a result of opening of the insolvency proceedings had been delivered to him. That decision was delivered to the second applicant after 16 July 2015. 28. The third applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Kragujevac. 29. He was employed by DP Industrija Filip Kljajić, a socially-owned company based in Kragujevac (hereinafter “the debtor company”). 30. On 13 May 2002 the third applicant concluded the settlement with the debtor company before the Kragujevac Municipal Court, by which the debtor company was obliged to pay the third applicant specified amounts on account of salary arrears, plus the costs of the civil proceedings. This settlement became final on an unspecified date. 31. On 27 August 2002, upon the third applicant’s request to that effect, the Kragujevac Municipal Court ordered the enforcement of the said settlement and further ordered the debtor company to pay the third applicant the enforcement costs. 32. On 5 March 2010 the Kragujevac Commercial Court opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor company (St. 45/10). 33. The third applicant duly submitted his respective claim. 34. On 25 October 2010 the third applicant’s claim was formally recognised. 35. On 2 August 2012 the third applicant was paid 13.12 % of his recognized claim. 36. The insolvency proceedings against the debtor company are still ongoing. 37. On 10 May 2013 the third applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. 38. On 28 December 2015 the Constitutional Court dismissed his appeal as lodged out of time. It found that the third applicant failed to lodge his appeal within thirty days as of the date when the decision on opening of the insolvency proceedings had been rendered or as of the date when he had submitted his claim in the insolvency proceedings. That decision was delivered to the third applicant on 29 January 2016.

6. The applicants were born in 1973 and 1976 respectively and live in Switzerland. At the relevant time, they were members of a research cooperative called the East Scientific Research Cooperative (Doğu Bilimsel Araştırmalar Kooperatifi – “the Cooperative”). 7. Between 30 May and 1 June 2005 the Cooperative organised an exhibition in Diyarbakır as part of the fifth Diyarbakır Culture and Art Festival, entitled “Witnesses of War Talk”. Within the context of the exhibition, photographs of deceased members of the PKK (an illegal armed organisation), deceased members of the security forces who had been killed in security operations, persons who had lost their lives in prison, victims of enforced disappearances and victims of assassinations by unknown assailants in south-east Turkey were publicly displayed. The exhibition also included statements from family members of deceased and disappeared individuals, presenting their relatives and containing their personal views on the disturbances going on in south-east Turkey, and their wish for an enduring peace. 8. On an unspecified date a criminal investigation was launched against the applicants and five other people in relation to a charge of disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK. On 31 May 2005 the applicants gave a statement to the investigating judge. Both of the applicants maintained that the exhibition in question had been organised for purely sociological reasons, and that they had conducted interviews with the families of the deceased which had also been included in the exhibition. They asserted that there had been no intention to disseminate propaganda in favour of the PKK. The investigating judge dismissed an application by the public prosecutor to remand the accused in custody. 9. On 6 October 2005 the public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Diyarbakır Assize Court, charging the applicants and five other suspects with disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713. 10. Throughout the proceedings before the Diyarbakır Assize Court the applicants repeated their previous statements and contended that photographs of deceased members of the security forces had also been displayed in the exhibition alongside those of members of the PKK. 11. On 18 May 2006 the Diyarbakır Assize Court convicted both applicants of disseminating propaganda in favour of an illegal organisation under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713. The applicants were sentenced to two years and a year and eight months’ imprisonment, respectively. In its judgment, the court observed that the invitations to the exhibition had referred to the armed conflict between the security forces and the PKK as a “war”, and the PKK members as “guerrillas”, thus glorifying the deceased terrorists and inciting young people to become members of the PKK. The court also noted that a “war” was an armed conflict between two States and a “guerrilla” was an armed person who fought against unjust occupation. The court further observed that a couple of photographs of deceased soldiers had also been displayed in order to conceal the accused’s intention to incite young people to join the PKK. 12. On 9 June 2009 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment in respect of the second applicant, holding that the case should be reviewed in the light of Article 231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Law no. 5271), which regulates the suspension of a judgment’s pronouncement. However, the trial court’s judgment of 18 May 2006 became final in respect of the first applicant. On 3 August 2009 the decision of the Court of Cassation was filed with the registry of the first-instance court. 13. On 22 October 2009, in accordance with Article 231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Diyarbakır Assize Court decided to suspend the pronouncement of its judgment in respect of the second applicant on the condition that he did not commit another intentional offence for a period of five years. 14. The first applicant served the sentence arising from the judgment of 18 May 2006.

7. The first applicant was born in 1937, the second applicant was born in 1930, the third applicant was born in 1934, the fourth applicant was born in 1945, the fifth applicant was born in 1930, the sixth applicant was born in 1954, the seventh applicant was born in 1926 and the eighth applicant was born in 1929. They all live in Vilnius. 8. On various dates in 1991 the first, second, third, sixth, seventh and eighth applicants applied for restoration of their property rights to land which had been nationalised by the Soviet regime. The fourth and fifth applicants did so in 2000. 9. Between 1995 and 2001 the administrative authorities or courts acknowledged that the first, second and third applicants had the right to have their property rights restored in respect of plots of land in Gudeliai, and that the fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth applicants had the right to have their property rights restored in respect of plots of land in Kriaučiūnai. Gudeliai and Kriaučiūnai were former villages which had become part of the Vilnius city municipality in 1996. 10. In 2005 and 2006 the Vilnius County Administration (hereinafter “the VCA”) restored the applicants’ property rights by giving them the following plots: - the first, second and third applicants – a total of ten hectares in Gudeliai; - the fourth and fifth applicants – a total of two hectares in Kriaučiūnai; - the sixth and seventh applicants – a total of 8.149 hectares in Kriaučiūnai; - the eighth applicant – 4.6663 hectares in Kriaučiūnai. 11. On various dates in 2008 the prosecutor of the Vilnius Region (hereinafter “the prosecutor”) lodged claims with the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court, seeking to have the applicants’ property rights to some of the land given to them annulled. The prosecutor submitted that part of the applicants’ land was covered by forests. Since those forests were situated in a city, they were considered forests of national importance (valstybinės reikšmės miškai) and could therefore only be owned by the State (see the relevant domestic law cited in Beinarovič and Others v. Lithuania, nos. 70520/10 and 2 others, §§ 86-89, 12 June 2018). As a result, the prosecutor argued that the VCA’s decisions restoring the applicants’ property rights to such forests had to be declared unlawful and their effects annulled. 12. In all of the applicants’ cases, the courts upheld the prosecutor’s claims. The final decisions were taken by the Supreme Administrative Court between January and March 2010. By virtue of those decisions, the applicants’ property rights were annulled with respect to the following plots: - the first, second and third applicants – 3.66 hectares; - the fourth and fifth applicants – 0.52 hectares; - the sixth and seventh applicants – 1.22 hectares; - the eighth applicant – 1.2 hectares. 13. In 2010 and 2011 the fourth and fifth applicants sent several letters to the VCA and subsequently to the National Land Service (the institution which took over the relevant functions of the VCA after an administrative reform – hereinafter “the NLS”), asking that their rights to 0.52 hectares be restored by new land in Kriaučiūnai being given to them or, if that was not possible, land of equivalent value in a different area in Vilnius. It does not appear that they received any answers from those institutions. 14. On 9 November 2011 the NLS adopted a decision to restore the seventh applicant’s property rights by giving her 0.251 hectares of agricultural land. The decision stated that her rights to the remaining 0.78 hectares would be restored later. However, the seventh applicant submitted to the Court that that decision had not been related to her property rights annulled by the domestic courts (see paragraph 12 above), and the Government did not argue otherwise. 15. In February 2012 all the applicants received letters from the NLS confirming that, after the courts had annulled their property rights, they had retained the right to have those property rights restored. The applicants were informed of the forms of restitution provided for by the domestic law (ibid., § 92) and asked to inform the authorities of their preferred form of restitution. The applicants again received similar letters from the NLS in July 2012 stating that there were 4,806 other candidates waiting to receive plots for the construction of an individual home in the Vilnius city area, and thus the restitution process would take a long time. The applicants were asked to consider alternative forms of restitution, such as being given a plot of land in a rural area, a plot of land for the construction of an individual home in a different city, or monetary compensation (ibid.). 16. On 25 May 2012 the NLS adopted a decision to restore the eighth applicant’s property rights by giving her 0.4419 hectares of agricultural land. The decision stated that her rights to the remaining 0.7581 hectares would be restored later. 17. In July 2012 the fourth applicant received a letter from the NLS informing her that a plot of land was being prepared for her in Medininkai, in the Vilnius Region. The fourth applicant replied to that letter by stating that she had never agreed to be given land in that area, and asked the NLS to stop any preparation in that regard. 18. In August 2012 all the applicants sent letters to the NLS in which they asked, inter alia, to be allocated plots of land for the construction of individual homes in Vilnius in the order of priority, or to receive compensation in respect of the pecuniary damage which they had sustained as a result of the annulment of their property rights. 19. On 26 May 2016 the NLS held a meeting for candidates to receive plots of land in certain areas around Vilnius, including Kriaučiūnai. The eighth applicant’s representative took part in that meeting and chose two plots. The fifth applicant took part in that meeting but did not choose any plots. 20. On 3 June 2016 the NLS adopted a decision to restore the eighth applicant’s property rights by giving her 0.24 hectares of agricultural land. The decision stated that her rights to the remaining 0.5181 hectares would be restored later. 21. On 17 June 2016 the NLS informed the first, second and third applicants (or their heirs – see paragraphs 5 and 6 above) that their property rights to 3.66 hectares would be restored by monetary compensation of 2,646 euros (EUR). However, the applicants did not agree to this proposal, and it was not carried out. 22. In February 2017 the NLS sent a letter to the seventh applicant, asking her to indicate the area in which she wished to receive a plot. The seventh applicant’s heir (see paragraph 3 above) replied that same month, indicating her choice. 23. On 29 November and 14 December 2017 the NLS held meetings for candidates to receive plots of land in certain areas around Vilnius, including Kriaučiūnai. The fifth, sixth and eighth applicants took part in those meetings but did not choose any plots. During the latter meeting, the fifth applicant stated that she would not choose any plots because her complaint was being examined by the European Court of Human Rights. 24. On 9 January 2018 the NLS held a meeting for candidates to receive plots of land in certain areas around Vilnius, including Kriaučiūnai. The seventh applicant’s heir (see paragraph 3 above) took part in that meeting but did not choose any plots. 25. In January 2018 the first, second and third applicants (or their heirs – see paragraphs 5 and 6 above) sent a letter to the NLS stating that they had expressed their wish for their property rights to be restored in kind and not by monetary compensation. They informed the NLS that their complaint was being examined by the European Court of Human Rights, and that the NLS should refrain from any unilateral actions which might make the Court’s decision impossible to implement. 26. At the date of the latest information provided to the Court (12 October 2018), the applicants’ property rights had still not been restored with respect to the following plots: - the first, second and third applicants – 3.66 hectares; - the fourth and fifth applicants – 0.52 hectares; - the sixth and seventh applicants – 1.22 hectares; - the eighth applicant – 0.5181 hectares.

5. The applicant was born in 1971 and is serving a prison sentence in Valuyki, the Belgorod region. 6. On 14 June 2006 Ms I., a university student, disappeared. 7. On 15 June 2006 her mother reported her missing to the Severnyy police department of the Kominternovskiy district of Voronezh, which initiated a search for her. According to the applicant, on the morning of 17 June 2006 the police searched his flat without drawing up a record. They then searched his car. According to police records, the applicant’s car was searched between 10.10 and 11.20 a.m. that day in connection with I.’s disappearance by an investigator of the Severnyy police department. 8. After the search the applicant was taken to the Severnyy police department, where he was interviewed about I.’s whereabouts. He stated that he knew I. and had last seen her on 14 June 2006 but was unaware of her whereabouts. A record of his “explanation” (объяснение) was drawn up by operative officer M. 9. According to the applicant, police officers beat him up in order to extract information from him about I.’s whereabouts. 10. According to the Government, after being interviewed the applicant was released and later taken again to the police station. A record drawn up by operative officer M. states that at 9 p.m. on 17 June 2006 the applicant was taken in for committing petty hooliganism in the vicinity of the police station by swearing at passers-by. It is stated in the record that he had no injuries. According to a decision delivered by the acting head of the Severnyy police department in administrative proceedings conducted the same day, the applicant was found guilty of petty hooliganism and fined. At 11.50 p.m. that evening his administrative detention was ordered by the police. 11. The applicant was detained at the Severnyy police department until 10.40 a.m. on 19 June 2006. He was then taken to the Sovetskiy police department, where further operative measures in connection with I.’s disappearance were carried out. 12. According to the applicant, he was subjected to beatings and given electric shocks by police officers of the Sovetskiy police department in order to make him give information about I.’s whereabouts. He allegedly had a cap put on his head so that he could not see anything and was taken by car out of town, where he was beaten up and given electric shocks with wires attached to his little fingers. His mouth was taped so that he would not scream. When he was ready to give a statement in order to stop the torture, he was taken to a river bank and shown a dead body. He was thrown on the ground and kicked. When taken back to the Sovetskiy police department, he made a confession statement to an investigator in the presence of the same police officers who had ill‑treated him. 13. According to the applicant’s “explanation” (объяснение) given to investigator S. of the Sovetskiy district prosecutor’s office of Voronezh on 19 June 2006, he confessed to the murder of I. by strangulation. He also stated that he had been beaten up and had received all his injuries at the Severnyy police department, but had not been subjected to any ill‑treatment at the Sovetskiy police department, and had no complaints against its officers. The applicant was then taken to the place where he had allegedly hidden I.’s body. According to a record drawn up by investigator S., an examination of the place was carried out between 11 p.m. and midnight, and a woman’s body was recovered. 14. At 12.50 a.m. on 20 June 2006 investigator S. arrested the applicant as a suspect and questioned him between 1 and 1.50 a.m., and then between 11 and 11.15 a.m., in the presence of P., a State-appointed lawyer invited by investigator S. The applicant reiterated his earlier self‑incriminating statements, as well as the statements concerning his ill‑treatment at the Severnyy police department. He also stated that he had burnt I.’s body after he had strangled her. Between 11.30 a.m. and 1.32 p.m. his statements were verified at the scene of the crime by investigator S. in the presence of lawyer P. and operative officers of the Sovetskiy police department. The applicant also showed where he had hidden the victim’s mobile telephone. 15. On 20 June 2006 investigator S. ordered a forensic medical examination of the applicant. That day an operative officer of the Sovetskiy police department took him to the Voronezh Regional Forensic Medical Bureau. An expert recorded multiple bruises and abrasions on his face, head, trunk and upper and lower extremities. The applicant stated that the injuries had been inflicted after his arrest on 17 June 2006 by police officers who had punched him in the head and different parts of his body and beaten him with a rubber baton on the back and legs. The expert concluded that the injuries could have been inflicted by a blunt object between one and three days before the examination. 16. On 21 June 2006 the applicant was questioned as an accused by investigator S. in the presence of lawyer P. He confirmed his earlier self‑incriminating statements and statements concerning his alleged ill‑treatment at the Severnyy police department. 17. On the same day the Sovetskiy District Court of Voronezh (“the District Court”) ordered the applicant’s detention at a hearing in the presence of lawyer P. He was placed in detention facility SIZO-36/1. In the criminal proceedings that followed the applicant was represented by a lawyer hired for him by his family. 18. On 28 June 2006 investigator S. communicated the applicant’s allegations concerning the unlawful actions of the police officers from the Severnyy police department to the Kominternovskiy district prosecutor’s office of Voronezh. An investigator of that prosecutor’s office carried out a pre-investigation inquiry and refused to institute criminal proceedings into the applicant’s complaint. His two decisions of 1 July and 2 August 2006 were annulled by his superiors on the grounds that they had been based on an incomplete inquiry. 19. In the most recent refusal of 29 September 2006 to institute criminal proceedings for lack of evidence that the officers of the Severnyy police department had committed a crime, the investigator established the facts as follows, relying on the police officers’ statements. On 17 June 2006 certain operative officers of the criminal search unit of the Severnyy police department carried out operational-search activities in connection with I.’s disappearance. In order to check the applicant’s involvement in I.’s disappearance they took him to the Severnyy police department with his consent and interviewed him. After receiving his “explanation” M. released him. That evening M. took him to the police station again for swearing on the street near the police station. From 9.50 p.m. on 17 June until 10.40 a.m. on 19 June 2006 the applicant was detained in a cell for administrative offenders. He was then taken to the Sovetskiy police department. No physical force was used against him, and no complaints were made by him. 20. The investigator noted that on the two occasions the applicant had been taken to the Severnyy police department – first, for giving statements in relation to I.’s disappearance, and second, for having committed the administrative offence – he had had no injuries. In the same decision the investigator suggested that the applicant’s injuries could have been inflicted by a third party outside the Severnyy police department, between 17 and 19 June 2006, between one and three days before his medical examination by the forensic expert on 20 June 2006. 21. On an unspecified date the applicant also complained about the unlawful actions of officers of the Sovetskiy police department, explaining that he had blamed the officers of the Severnyy police department for all his injuries for fear of reprisals from the officers of the Sovetskiy department, in whose hands he had been at the time. An investigator of the Sovetskiy district prosecutor’s office of Voronezh carried out a pre‑investigation inquiry and refused to institute criminal proceedings into the applicant’s complaint. His decision of 10 August 2006 was annulled by his superior as unlawful and unfounded. 22. In the most recent refusal of 21 September 2006 to institute criminal proceedings for lack of evidence that a crime had been committed, the investigator found, relying on statements by the operative officers of the Sovetskiy police department, that the applicant had been taken to the station with his consent and had confessed to the murder of I. He had also shown where he had hidden her body voluntarily, without any coercion. 23. An appeal by the applicant of 17 May 2007 against the investigators’ decisions was not examined by the District Court because by that time he had been convicted by a final judgment, as was stated by the court in a letter of 4 June 2007. 24. At his trial the applicant pleaded innocent and submitted that he had given the self-incriminating statements at the preliminary investigation stage as a result of physical coercion by officers of the Severnyy and Sovetskiy police departments. His counsel requested that the records of the investigative measures carried out on 19, 20 and 21 June 2006 be declared inadmissible, arguing, inter alia, that they had been obtained in the presence of lawyer P., who had been invited by investigator S. in breach of the relevant procedure and without the applicant’s consent. 25. The District Court dismissed the request, noting that all investigative measures since the applicant’s arrest as a suspect on 20 June 2006 had been carried out in the presence of lawyer P. Moreover, there was no evidence that the applicant had rejected her services. Following his confession, recorded in his “explanation” to the investigator of 19 June 2006, the applicant had shown where he had hidden I.’s body, which had not required the presence of a lawyer. The court based its findings on the self‑incriminating statements given by the applicant in the preliminary investigation, noting that his allegations of ill‑treatment in police custody had been examined and dismissed by the Sovetskiy and Kominternovskiy district prosecutor’s offices in decisions of 21 and 29 September 2006 respectively. 26. On 25 October 2006 the District Court convicted the applicant of aggravated murder and sentenced him to twelve years’ imprisonment. 27. On 30 November 2006 the Council of the Voronezh Regional Bar Association examined a disciplinary case against lawyer P. which originated in a complaint by the applicant. It found that P. had defended the applicant at investigator S.’s direct invitation, surpassing the Council of the Voronezh Regional Bar Association in breach of the relevant procedure. P. was subjected to disciplinary liability in the form of a warning. On 5 December 2006 the Council informed the applicant of its decision, explaining that there was nothing to suggest that P. had failed to properly defend the applicant. However, it had established a breach of the procedure for providing legal assistance at the invitation of the investigating authorities. 28. On 6 February 2007 the Voronezh Regional Court upheld the judgment on an appeal by the applicant, fully endorsing the trial court’s findings. 29. Applications by the applicant for supervisory review of his case were dismissed by the Regional Court.

5. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Istanbul. 6. On 2 October 2004 the Büyükçekmece Magistrates’ Court issued a search warrant allowing the gendarmerie to conduct searches of public places and suspected persons in a designated area. 7. Late at night on the same day, the gendarmerie carried out a search at the Sancak Hotel, which is owned by the applicant. The records drawn up afterwards noted that during the course of the search, a certain M.Ş. had approached the plain-clothes officers outside the hotel and told them that he had a girl inside. It was then established that M.Ş. trafficked women. He and a woman in the hotel were both taken to the gendarmerie headquarters. 8. The search records, which were prepared a few hours after the search and signed by the hotel’s manager, showed that five women of foreign nationalities had been staying at the hotel with some men and that they had all been taken to the gendarmerie headquarters. 9. On 3 October 2004 the gendarmerie questioned several men as suspects and five women as victims. They all confirmed that they had been staying at the hotel for prostitution purposes. Some of the women were asked whether they knew of any complicity between the traffickers and the management of Sancak Hotel, to which they responded in the negative. 10. On the same day the applicant was arrested and taken into the custody of the gendarmerie on suspicion of facilitating prostitution. 11. On 4 October 2004 the applicant gave statements to the gendarmerie. He denied having provided premises for prostitution. He argued that he did not allow procurers into his hotel and had never seen M.Ş. before. 12. On the same day, the gendarmerie also questioned the hotel’s manager, who stated that both he and the applicant were very strict about keeping procurers out of their hotel. 13. On 30 May 2005 the Büyükçekmece Public Prosecutor issued an indictment against the applicant and three other persons. He accused them of failure to obey an order from an official authority under Article 526 § 1 of the Criminal Code (Law no. 765) in force at the time, on the ground that they had provided premises for prostitution in their hotels. 14. On 1 June 2005 the Misdemeanours Act (Law no. 5326) and the new Code of Criminal Procedure (Law no. 5271) entered into force. 15. On 10 June 2005 the Büyükçekmece Magistrates’ Court assessed the case without holding a hearing. Establishing that the accused had provided premises for prostitution in their hotels, it held that the applicant had failed to obey the orders of an official authority as charged and should be punished accordingly. It then sentenced him to an administrative fine of 100 Turkish liras (TRY)[1] pursuant to Section 32 of the Misdemeanours Act (Law no. 5326). 16. The applicant objected to that decision, arguing that his defence rights had been restricted in that the court had sentenced him to the fine solely on the basis of the statements taken previously by the police, and without hearing him in person. He maintained that he accepted clients into his hotel in compliance with the relevant regulation and that he could not be expected to refuse to offer accommodation to foreign nationals or to question their motives for staying there. 17. On 3 February 2006 after examining the case on the basis of the case file, the Bakırköy Assize Court upheld the decision of the Magistrates’ Court. That decision was final. 18. On 24 May 2006 an official letter was sent to the applicant. It was indicated on the envelope that the applicant was invited to a hearing concerning his case, which would be held on 10 July 2006. The envelope did not show any confirmation that the letter had been served on him. 19. The applicant’s lawyer stated that he had received a copy of the final decision at the registry of the Büyükçekmece Magistrates’ Court on 11 July 2006. In support of his claim, he submitted a copy of the Assize Court’s decision, on which a lawyer working at his office had noted that he had been served with the copy in person on that date. That document was later stamped and certified as an authentic copy by the registry of the domestic court. 20. Following communication of the present application, on 21 December 2009 a public prosecutor prepared an assessment report, summarising the events in the case. He concluded that the final decision had been served on the applicant on 26 May 2006. 21. On 2 January 2014 both the applicant and the Government were asked under Rule 54 § 2 (c) of the Rules of Court to provide the Court with a document indicating the notification date of the final decision by 16 January 2014 at the latest. The parties did not respond to that request. 22. On 3 November 2017 the Government were once again asked to provide documents regarding the commencement of the six-month time‑limit, in particular the content of the envelope from the Büyükçekmece Magistrates’ Court dated 24 May 2006 and the document in support of the public prosecutor’s claim that the final decision had been served on the applicant on 26 May 2006. On 30 November 2017 the Government informed the Court that they could not find the requested documents.

7. The applicant was born in 1980. He arrived in Russia in 2003. He travelled to Tajikistan on a number of occasions to visit his parents for short periods of time. 8. On 3 May 2011 the applicant was charged in absentia in Tajikistan with participating in an extremist religious movement, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and an international search and arrest warrant was issued in his name. On 6 May 2011 the Tajik authorities ordered his pre-trial detention. 9. On 3 November 2013 the applicant was arrested in Moscow and detained. On 4 November 2013 the Meshchanskiy District Court of Moscow (“the District Court”) ordered his detention pending extradition. 10. On 4 December 2013 the Tajik prosecution authorities requested the applicant’s extradition on the basis of the above charges. The request included assurances regarding his proper treatment, which were formulated in standard terms. 11. On 12 December 2013 the District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 3 May 2014. 12. An appeal by the applicant of 16 December 2013 was dismissed by the Moscow City Court (“the City Court”) on 3 February 2014. 13. On 29 April 2014 the District Court again extended the applicant’s detention until 3 August 2014. 14. An appeal by the applicant of 5 May 2014 was dismissed by the City Court on 23 July 2014. 15. On 9 October 2014 the applicant’s extradition was refused by the Deputy Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation, owing to the absence of culpable actions under Russian criminal law. 16. On 13 October 2014 the applicant was released from detention. 17. On 13 October 2014, immediately after his release, the applicant was rearrested for violating migration regulations. 18. On 14 October 2014 the District Court found the applicant guilty of violating migration regulations, fined him and ordered his administrative removal. Allegations by the applicant regarding a real risk of ill-treatment were dismissed, and he was detained pending expulsion. The District Court assessing the risks stated that “[t]he claims of the representative ... are of a speculative nature and not confirmed by the case materials” 19. The above judgment was upheld on appeal by the City Court on 24 October 2014. Claims by the applicant under Article 3 of the Convention were dismissed with reference to the District Court’s assessment of the case, which took into consideration “...the nature of the administrative offence, the character of the accused [who was criminally convicted in Russia]... the length of his stay in Russia and other circumstances of the case”. 20. According to the latest submissions of his representative in 2015, the applicant was still in detention. 21. On 18 December 2013 the applicant lodged a request for refugee status, referring to persecution in Tajikistan and a real risk of ill-treatment. 22. On 15 September 2014 his request was refused by a final administrative decision of the migration authorities. The applicant challenged that decision in the courts, referring, inter alia, to the risk of ill‑treatment. 23. On 12 November 2015 his appeals were dismissed by a final decision of the City Court.

4. The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Manisa. 5. On 17 August 1999 the applicant’s daughter, Nesrin Delibaş, lost her life following the collapse of the building where she resided in Düzce as the result of an earthquake (see M. Özel and Others v. Turkey, nos. 14350/05 and 2 others, § 16, 17 November 2015 for further details regarding that earthquake). According to official records, fourteen other people lost their lives as a result of the collapse of the same building. 6. Shortly after the incident, criminal proceedings were brought against the contractor (H.E.) and the architect (S.D.) of the building in question. On 27 August and 31 August 1999 H.E. and S.D. were questioned by the police and the Düzce public prosecutor, respectively. They denied all accusations in respect of the collapse of the building. 7. During an expert examination of the remains of the building on 26 August 1999, certain problems were noted with the building’s reinforcing rods. It was also noted that the metal brackets had not been properly fastened to the girders. Apart from H.E. and S.D., against whom charges had already been brought in connection with the collapse of the building, the experts also identified the involvement of T.A., a civil engineer, and İ.Ö., the Head of Technical Services of the Municipality of Düzce (“the Municipality”), in the preparation and authorisation of the respective construction project. 8. On 31 August 1999 the police questioned İ.Ö., the Head of Technical Services of the Municipality. He denied all accusations in respect of the collapse of the building. 9. According to another report dated 7 September 1999, the expert examination of the collapsed building revealed that the granulometry of the concrete used in the building was very poor, that the concrete contained a very high proportion of pebbles, that the water-to-cement ratio in the concrete mix was not appropriate and had resulted in the formation of pores in the concrete, and that the ironwork had worked loose from the concrete because the metal brackets had corroded. 10. On 14 September 1999 the applicant asked to join the proceedings as a civil party. He added that he wished to lodge a criminal complaint against all individuals who had been involved in the construction of the defective building in their different capacities, including the public officials who had authorised its construction and occupation. 11. On 23 September 1999 the Düzce public prosecutor disjoined the investigation against the Head of Technical Services of the Municipality (İ.Ö.) from those against H.E. and S.D. in view of the special judicial procedures that had to be followed in respect of the prosecution of civil servants under the Law on the Prosecution of Civil Servants and Public Officials (Law no. 4483). 12. On 24 September 1999 the Düzce public prosecutor’s office filed a bill of indictment with the Düzce Assize Court against H.E. and S.D. in respect of the deaths caused by the collapse of the building in question on 17 August 1999. The public prosecutor accused them of endangering the lives of others by carelessness, negligence or inexperience under Article 383 § 2 of the Turkish Criminal Code in force at the material time (Law no. 765), emphasising in particular the structural shortcomings in the building noted by the experts (see paragraph 7 and 9 above). 13. At the hearing held on 21 October 1999 the applicant requested the investigation of all municipal officials who had authorised the construction and occupation of the building despite its failure to comply with the relevant technical regulations. Over the course of the criminal proceedings, the applicant repeated this request at least ten times. 14. According to an expert report added to the criminal case file on 29 April 2001, the following people had responsibility for all private construction undertaken within the municipal boundaries: (i) the contractor, who was responsible for the realisation of the project in compliance with the technical and work safety standards; (ii) the project engineer, who was responsible for all technical aspects of the project, including compliance with all relevant rules and regulations; (iii) the municipal representative, who was responsible for examining the calculations and the plan prepared by the project manager, verifying the compatibility of the project with the regulations in force, and authorising the project; and (iv) the technical implementation officer, who was in charge of inspecting the construction work on behalf of the Municipality. On this basis, the experts concluded that H.E. and S.D. bore 25% and 37.5% responsibility for the collapse of the building. The experts stated that they could not, however, offer opinions on the responsibility of anyone other than the two defendants in the case (H.E. and S.D.). 15. On 21 June 2001 the Düzce Assize Court held that the statutory period during which H.E. and S.D. could be held criminally liable in connection with a collapse of the building had started running in 1985 – when the last official licence for the building was obtained – and had already expired by the date of the earthquake. The case was accordingly discontinued for having become time‑barred. The applicant appealed. 16. On 21 October 2002 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the first-instance court. It held that the statutory time-limit was to be calculated from the date on which the building collapsed, that is to say from 17 August 1999, the date on which the offence in question had been committed. 17. On 14 August 2003 an additional indictment was filed against T.A., the civil engineer who had taken part in the construction of the building in question (see paragraph 7 above). It was noted in the indictment that T.A. had obtained licences to secure the illegal extension of the building subsequent to its construction. 18. On 11 December 2003 the Düzce Assize Court convicted H.E., S.D. and T.A. as charged and sentenced each of them to 10 months’ imprisonment and a fine, but decided to suspend execution of the sentences under Section 6 of the Execution of Sentences Act (Law no. 647). The applicant appealed against this judgment and once again requested an investigation into the responsibility of the relevant municipal officials in relation to the collapse of the building. 19. On 6 July 2004 the Court of Cassation once again quashed the first‑instance court’s judgment, this time as the court had not taken any decision as regards the applicant’s request to join the proceedings as a civil party in respect of the case subsequently brought against T.A. 20. On 5 October 2004 the Düzce Assize Court commissioned a new expert report from the Yıldız Technical University in Istanbul. The expert report subsequently released on 21 April 2005 found that the building in question had collapsed on account of the structural problems noted in the earlier expert reports, as well as its illegal extension subsequent to its construction. It was also stated in the report that the defendants jointly bore 75% of the responsibility for the collapse of the building. The remaining 25% responsibility lay with the Municipality officials on account of their failure to duly inspect the building before issuing it with the necessary permits for occupation. 21. On 7 June 2005 the Düzce Assize Court convicted H.E., S.D. and T.A. as charged, and sentenced each of them, once again, to 10 months’ imprisonment and a fine. Execution of the sentences was suspended pursuant to Article 51 § 1 of the new Criminal Code (Law no. 5237). Relying on the findings of the later expert report as regards the responsibility of the municipal officials for the collapse of the building, it also decided that a criminal complaint should be filed against the relevant officials with the Düzce public prosecutor’s office. The defendant H.E lodged an appeal against this judgment. 22. On 5 December 2005 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment for the third time. It found that the assize court had failed to evaluate the case in the light of the new Criminal Code (Law no. 5237) which had entered into force on 1 June 2005. 23. On 21 February 2007 the Düzce Assize Court decided to discontinue the criminal proceedings in respect of all three of the defendants as the prosecution of the offence in question had become time-barred. 24. On 23 October 2007 the Court of Cassation held firstly that the decision of the first-instance court, in so far as it concerned S.E. and T.A., was null and void, since the earlier judgment of 7 June 2005 had already become final in their regard as they had not lodged an appeal. It then went on to uphold the decision to discontinue the proceedings in respect of H.E. only. 25. On 16 August 2000 the applicant, along with his wife and other daughter, instituted compensation proceedings before the Sakarya Administrative Court against the the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement (Bayındırlık ve İskan Bakanlığı), the Düzce governor’s office and the Municipality of Düzce, in respect of the death of their daughter Nesrin Delibaş. The applicant and his wife each claimed 2,000 Turkish liras (TRY) in respect of pecuniary damage and TRY 1,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. Their daughter claimed TRY 500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage only. 26. On 29 December 2005 the Sakarya Administrative Court commissioned an expert report to determine responsibility on the part of the administration for the collapse of the building. 27. As regards the findings in the reports adduced to the criminal case file, the experts noted that the quality of the concrete used in the construction and certain structural elements of the building had been below the required standard. The building had, moreover, been illegally extended after its construction. The municipal officials had failed to duly inspect the building during its construction phase or before issuing the necessary permit for its occupation. They had also failed to carry out a soil survey in the area and to identify the potential “disaster zones” in the event of an earthquake, with a view to limiting the height of buildings in such areas. The experts concluded that, in view of such failures, the Municipality had been 50% responsible for the collapse of the building in question. On the other hand, it found that the other two defendants had not been at fault. 28. Relying on that expert report, on 27 June 2007 the Sakarya Administrative Court partially accepted the applicant’s claims against the Municipality, and awarded him TRY 1,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage in accordance with his request, plus interest. It also awarded his wife and daughter TRY 1,000 and TRY 500, respectively, in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. It rejected their claims in respect of pecuniary damage as being unfounded. 29. On 14 September 2007 the applicant and his family received a total of TRY 11,371.80 (approximately 6,455 euros (EUR) at the material time) from the Municipality as compensation. In the meantime, the Municipality appealed against the judgment of the Sakarya Administrative Court. 30. On 23 May 2012 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the judgment of the lower administrative court.

4. The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Belebey, Republic of Bashkortostan. 5. In October 2007 the applicant and his family moved from Uzbekistan to Russia, apparently for the purpose of obtaining Russian nationality as well as seeking medical treatment for the applicant’s drug addiction. 6. In December 2007 the Uzbek authorities charged the applicant with large-scale drug-trafficking committed in October 2007 and issued a detention order and an international search warrant. 7. On 12 July 2008 the applicant was arrested in Moscow and on 14 July 2008 the Dragomilovskiy District Court of Moscow ordered the applicant’s detention pending extradition, without setting any time-limit. 8. On 9 December 2008 the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office ordered the applicant’s extradition. 9. On 28 January 2009 the Moscow City Court confirmed the lawfulness of the applicant’s arrest and detention, and upheld the extradition. 10. In the meantime, on 4 March 2009 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the judgment of 28 January 2009. 11. On 10 August 2009 the applicant issued an authority form to lawyers to lodge an application with the Court on his behalf. 12. On 21 August 2009 the extradition order was enforced and the applicant was transferred to Uzbekistan. 13. On 28 August 2009 the applicant’s lawyers – who were apparently unaware of the extradition − requested an interim measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in order to stay the removal. On 1 September 2009 the Court indicated the relevant measure to the Russian Government. 14. However, after the Russian Government had informed the Court about the extradition on 21 August 2009, the interim measure was lifted on 7 October 2009. 15. The parties submitted no information on related events in Uzbekistan. 16. On an unspecified date the applicant joined his family in Russia.

4. The applicant was born in 1980 and is detained in Atyrau, Kazakhstan. 5. According to the applicant’s submissions, he left Kazakhstan in 2008 and lived in Saudi Arabia and Syria as a student until June 2011. He did not wish to return to his country as a number of people had been detained on charges of religious extremism in Kazakhstan and some of his friends had left the country after coming under pressure from the Kazakhstan government because of their political and religious identity. 6. In June 2011 the applicant arrived in Turkey. The Government submitted that subsequent to his arrival in Turkey, two entry bans were issued against him on the grounds that he was suspected of having provided logistical support to foreign nationals who were engaged in international terrorism. 7. On an unspecified date the applicant was taken into police custody and thereafter transferred to the Kumkapı Foreigners’ Removal Centre with a view to his removal to Kazakhstan. As the applicant applied for asylum while in detention, on 28 October 2011 he was released pending the determination of his asylum application. On the same day he was notified that he should go and reside in Denizli province. 8. On 4 November 2011 the applicant lodged his asylum application again – this time with the Denizli Governor’s Office. On the same day a police officer from Denizli Security Headquarters held a preliminary interview with the applicant. The applicant stated that he had learned that he was being sought for by the Kazakhstan authorities on terrorism charges and asked to be granted leave to stay in Turkey. He submitted that his removal to Kazakhstan would expose him to a risk of death. According to a report dated 22 November 2011 concerning the applicant’s interview of 4 November 2011, the interpreter who was appointed by the police authorities noted that the applicant spoke Turkish. 9. On 28 November 2011 the applicant was notified that his asylum application had been rejected. According to the report of 22 November 2011, the police officer who had interviewed the applicant found that the latter had failed to submit any concrete evidence concerning his nationality, identity and the problems he had experienced in Kazakhstan. The officer, however, found it established that the applicant feared to be returned to his country and that it was known to the Turkish authorities that he would be prosecuted if returned to Kazakhstan. 10. On 29 November 2011 the applicant objected to the rejection of his asylum application. He once again submitted that he would be exposed to a real risk of death if he were to be removed to Kazakhstan. 11. According to the Government’s submissions, on 26 December 2011 his objection was dismissed. 12. On 12 January 2012 the applicant lodged an application to be allowed to leave Turkey with the Denizli Security Headquarters and informed the police that he had been offered a visa to enter and live in Egypt. 13. On 18 January 2012 the police authorised the applicant to leave the country. 14. According to a document dated 6 January 2012 sent by the Deputy Director of the General Police Headquarters to a number of police authorities, during a meeting held on 4 January 2012 the ambassador of Kazakhstan in Ankara requested the Turkish Interior Minister to extradite Kazakhstan nationals who had been involved in terrorist acts and in respect of whom Kazakhstan had issued wanted notices (“Red Notices”) via Interpol. A formal extradition request in respect of such persons was submitted by the Kazakhstan embassy in Ankara to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 31 December 2011. According to the document prepared by the embassy, the applicant and four other persons were members of the “Islamic Jihad Union”, a terrorist organisation which carried out terrorist attacks in the western region of Kazakhstan. They had been detained by the Turkish authorities upon receipt of a Red Notice via Interpol by Kazakhstan. The embassy pointed out that subsequent to their asylum claims, four of those persons, including the applicant, had been released from detention in Turkey. The Kazakhstan authorities considered that these five persons had been in the process of preparing a new terrorist attack in their country and that following their release four of them had organised a terrorist attack in the Atyrau province of Kazakhstan, in co-operation with another terrorist organisation, Jund al-Khilafa (“Soldiers of the Caliphate”). The embassy accordingly requested the Turkish authorities not to grant asylum to them and to extradite them to Kazakhstan. 15. On 19 January 2012, while he was waiting at Istanbul Atatürk Airport to board a flight to Egypt, the applicant was taken into police custody on the basis of the extradition request submitted to the Turkish authorities by the Kazakhstan embassy. 16. On 23 January 2012 the Interpol-Europol department attached to the General Police Headquarters informed the Ministry of Justice and a number of security departments that a Red Notice had been issued by Kazakhstan via Interpol in respect of the applicant on the basis of terrorism-related offences. 17. On 24 January 2012 the Bakırköy Magistrates Court ordered the applicant’s detention within the context of the extradition proceedings for a period of forty days. The applicant was then placed in detention in Maltepe Prison, in Istanbul. 18. On 25 January 2012 the applicant lodged a petition with the Bakırköy Assize Court and challenged his detention. In his petition, he stated, inter alia, that a person who would be subjected to torture or other forms of ill-treatment in his country of origin should not be extradited to that country. 19. On 27 January 2012 the Bakırköy Assize Court dismissed the applicant’s petition challenging his detention. 20. On 28 February 2012 the Bakırköy Assize Court rejected the extradition request submitted by the Kazakhstan authorities. During the hearing held on the same day the assize court did not find it necessary to appoint an interpreter for the applicant as he spoke Turkish. According to the reasoning contained in the court’s decision, in his defence submissions the applicant had contended that he had been wrongly accused of being a member of al‑Qaeda or Islamic Jihad and had asked the court not to extradite him to Kazakhstan. The Bakırköy Assize Court held that the applicant could not be extradited to Kazakhstan because the charge against him in Kazakhstan fell within the scope of one of the offence categories, precluding extradition, listed in Article 18 § 1 (b) of the Criminal Code, as in force at the material time (see paragraph 30 below). The court also ordered the applicant’s release from detention. The decision of 28 February 2012 became final as no appeal was lodged against it. 21. On 28 February 2012 the applicant was released from prison but was immediately transferred to the Kumkapı Foreigners’ Removal Centre in Istanbul. According to a document dated 29 February 2012, the applicant was informed that he was being held pending the outcome of the deportation procedure conducted in this respect. 22. On 7 March 2012 the Deputy Director of General Security ordered the Istanbul Police Headquarters to deport the applicant. 23. On 12 March 2012, while in detention, the applicant appointed his representatives to undertake the necessary legal and procedural actions on his behalf before the domestic authorities and the Court by way of a issuing a power of attorney before a notary public. 24. According to the applicant’s submissions, on 21 March 2012, when Mr Yılmaz, one of his representatives, went to the Kumkapı Foreigners’ Removal Centre to meet him, he was orally informed by officers at the centre that the applicant had been deported to Kazakhstan on 12 March 2012. 25. Upon a request by the applicant’s lawyer, on 31 May 2012 the Istanbul Police Headquarters sent a letter to the applicant’s lawyer informing him that the applicant had been deported to Kazakhstan on 12 March 2012. 26. In a letter dated 10 May 2014, Mr Yılmaz submitted that the applicant had been remanded in custody and placed in Atyrau Prison upon his return to Kazakhstan. The lawyer stated that he did not have information as to whether the applicant had been subjected to ill-treatment in Kazakhstan given that the applicant’s family members had refrained from answering his questions regarding that matter during their telephone conversations with him. 27. Between 28 February and 12 March 2012 the applicant was detained at the Kumkapı Foreigners’ Removal Centre. The applicant claimed that the centre had been overcrowded at the time of his detention. He had not been allowed exercise outdoors or any other type of social activity throughout his detention. The applicant further alleged that there had been hygiene problems at the centre and that the quantity of the food provided had also been poor. 28. The Government submitted that the Kumkapı Foreigners’ Removal Centre, where the applicant had been held, had a capacity of 300 persons and that a total of between 100 and 140 persons had been held during the period between 28 February and 12 March 2012. Detainees were accommodated on three floors: the first two floors were reserved for male detainees, and the third floor for females. There were four dormitory rooms on the first floor, respectively measuring 50, 58, 76 and 84 sq. m. On the second floor there were five dormitories measuring 50, 58, 69, 76 and 84 sq. m. There was a total of 120 bunk beds in the ten rooms reserved for male detainees and all rooms received natural light. There were also five showers and six toilets per floor, as well as a cafeteria measuring 69 sq. m, where breakfast, lunch and dinner were served daily on each floor. The detainees had the right to outdoor exercise if the physical conditions and the number of staff available allowed. A doctor was present on the premises every week and the detainees also had access to medical care in cases of emergency. As for the hygiene in the facility, there were six cleaning staff working full time.

5. The first applicant is one of the founders and the chief executive officer of the second applicant, a non-profit organisation. 6. The second applicant is the publisher of the Risale-I Nur Collection, an exegesis on the Qur’an written by Muslim Turkish scholar Said Nursi in the first half of the 20th century. The books from that collection were used for religious and educational purposes in Russian mosques and medreses. 7. On 28 March 2005 the prosecutor of the Tatarstan Republic instituted criminal proceedings against members of the religious movement Nurculuk (Нуржулар) based on the writings of Said Nursi. They were charged with incitement of hatred or discord, as well as abasement of human dignity, an offence under Article 282 of the Criminal Code, for having distributed Said Nursi’s books from the Risale-I Nur Collection. 8. On 24 April 2006 the prosecutor of the Tatarstan Republic applied to the Koptevskiy District Court of Moscow, asking that the following books from the Risale-I Nur Collection published by the second applicant be declared extremist and banned (see sections 1 and 13 of the Suppression of Extremism Act cited in paragraphs 41 and 42 below): - “Faith and Man”, 2000 edition, translated by M.G. Tamimdarov; - “The Foundations of Sincerity”, 2000 edition, translator not specified; - “The Truths of an Eternal Soul”, 2000 edition, translated by M. Sh. Abdullaev; - “The Truths of Faith”, 2000 edition, translator not specified; - “The Guide for Women”, 2000 edition, translated by M. Sh. Abdullaev; - “The Fruits of Faith”, 2000, translated by M. G. Tamimdarov; - “Ramadan. Care. Thankfulness”, 2000 edition, translator not specified; - “Munajat (Prayer). The Third Ray”, 2002 edition, translated by M. G. Tamimdarov; - “Thirty-three Windows”, 2004 edition, translated by M. Irsala; - “The Foundations of Brotherhood”, 2004 edition, translated by M. G. Tamimdarov; - “The Path of Truth”, 2004 edition, translated by M. Sh. Abdullaev and M. G. Tamimdarov; - “The Staff of Moses”, year of publication not specified, translated by T. N. Galimov and M. G. Tamimdarov; - “The Short Words”, year of publication not specified, translated by M. G. Tamimdarov; and - “Book for the Sick”, 2003 edition, translated by M. G. Tamimdarov. 9. The prosecutor enclosed expert opinions prepared in the framework of the criminal cases against the members of Nurculuk by four psychologists and a psychiatrist. The experts found that the above-mentioned texts attempted to subconsciously influence the reader to form irrational values and opinions. The reader was thus deprived of the ability to think critically and independently and to choose his religion freely. The texts led the reader to form a negative opinion about adherents of other faiths and thus encouraged hatred and enmity towards them. They also advocated the idea of people’s superiority or inferiority, depending on their religion. In particular, the texts by Said Nursi incited the reader to look at non-believers with disdain and aversion, and therefore promoted discord between believers and non-believers. Muslims guilty of apostasy from Islam were even denied the right to life. The experts concluded that Said Nursi’s texts formed in the reader feelings of aversion, anger, hatred and enmity towards non-believers. 10. The second applicant and the Council of Mufti of Russia were invited to participate in the proceedings as third parties. 11. On 4 August 2006 the Council of Mufti of Russia submitted an alternative expert opinion by a panel of experts consisting of a doctor of theology and a doctor of religious philosophy. The experts found that in his books, Said Nursi explained the foundations of the Islamic doctrine, and provided a commentary on the Qur’an. His commentary was in conformity with the classical version of Islam. The books did not contain any extremist statements and did not call for violence or ethnic or religious enmity. Although some texts indeed morally condemned sinners and non-believers, blaming them for the immorality of modern society, such discourse was characteristic of all religious texts. A perusal of the texts also revealed that their author promoted the peaceful coexistence of religions and dialogue between them. The experts criticised the conclusions made by the prosecutor’s experts who, in their opinion, were incompetent in religious matters and did not have even a basic knowledge of Islam. The reproaches made by them against Said Nursi’s books could have been made against any theological treatise, be it Muslim, Christian or Judaic, or any other religious text. 12. In his letter of 4 August 2006 the Chief Mufti of Russia endorsed the above-mentioned expert opinion. He said that the prosecutor’s experts had interpreted faith in the righteousness of any religion and the preaching of that faith as propaganda about people’s superiority or inferiority, depending on their religion. The experts’ findings had therefore been based on anti‑religion concepts and could be applied to any religious text. Said Nursi’s books did not contain any calls to do harm to non-believers or adherents to other religions, to infringe their rights or to otherwise violate Russian laws. 13. Counsel for the second applicant submitted the following documents to the Koptevskiy District Court: - a letter from the president of the Central Spiritual Board of Muslims of Russia, stating that Said Nursi’s texts could not be qualified as extremist or fanatical. They did not contain any calls for violence, ethnic or religious hatred or for overthrowing governments. Rather, they promoted Islamic values of goodness, love and belief in God; - a letter from the president of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the Tatarstan Republic affirming that Said Nursi was a respected commentator of the Qur’an. He called for love towards all people irrespective of their ethnic origin, race or religion and advocated clemency, compassion, peace, brotherhood and mutual understanding. He encouraged interreligious dialogue and opposed all radical actions and attitudes; - a letter from the Ombudsman of the Russian Federation arguing against declaring Said Nursi’s texts extremist literature as this would violate the rights of Muslims to freedom of religion; - a letter by Professor J. from the International Islamic University in Malaysia, stating that Said Nursi’s texts called for reconciliation, peaceful co-existence and cooperation between different religions and cultures, as well as for justice, tolerance, freedom and love; - a specialist opinion by the Department of Islamic Studies of the Tatarstan Republic Institute of History, according to which the books by Said Nursi called for self-development and moral perfection, and spoke against violence. For that reason his books were an important tool in the fight against religious extremism. Although he indeed stated that Islam was superior to other religions and to atheism, such statements were inherent in all religious texts; - a letter from Mr M., a Catholic priest and the Secretary for Interreligious Dialogue of the Society of Jesus, affirming that the texts written by Said Nursi belonged to mainstream Islam and were rooted in the centuries-old Islamic tradition. They did not contain any elements of extremism. On the contrary, they were a moderating force in Islam, proposing to Muslims a way of life that was tolerant and open to others. They explicitly endorsed Muslim-Christian cooperation and unity, and stimulated friendship and positive relations between Muslims and followers of Christianity; - a copy of the decision of 1984 of the prosecutor’s office of Istanbul not to initiate criminal proceedings against the publisher of the Risale-I Nur Collection in Turkey. The prosecutor’s office referred to an expert opinion which did not find any indications of a criminal offence in Said Nursi’s texts; - copies of expert opinions delivered in 1960 by a group of Turkish experts at the request of several Turkish prosecutors. The experts had found that the books by Said Nursi did not contain any harmful or unlawful statements; - a letter from the Council on Religious Matters of the Committee of Ministers of the Turkish Republic, stating that Said Nursi’s books contained directions on moral and religious issues inspired by the Qur’an and did not touch on politics. Said Nursi had been a respected theologian who had always distanced himself from political, ideological and extremist activities, as well as from radical Islam. He had proclaimed that the truth was to be found through dialogue and had spoken against hatred and all forms of compulsion; - a letter from the Ministry of Justice of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Mufti of Egypt, submitting that Said Nursi’s texts were beneficial to the reader as they taught love of God and high moral values, and condemned envy, hatred, anger and resentment; - a letter from the director general of the Research Centre for Islamic History, Art and Culture of the Organisation of Islamic Conference, stating that Said Nursi’s texts promoted love of God, the importance of prayer and high moral values. His books did not contain any insulting or hostile statements against adherents of other religions or persons belonging to other races; - a letter from Dr T., a professor of the Institute of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies of the University of Durham, submitting that Said Nursi’s books did not contain any statements aimed at stirring up religious hatred. Said Nursi had been extremely careful throughout his life to foster a sense of solidarity between followers of different religions and that was reflected in his texts. Nor did his books contain statements promoting the idea of exclusiveness, superiority or inferiority of people based on their religious affiliation or ethnic origin or justifying extremist activities. Said Nursi was one of the few modern Muslim scholars who unequivocally opposed the ideas of extremism, political activism or offensive jihad. His texts provided a welcome antidote to the militancy of the contemporary Islamic discourse as they proscribed military jihad altogether, be it offensive or defensive, and said that Islam was not to be defended by the sword but by the force of reason, progress and civilisation. 14. On 9 November 2006 the Koptevskiy District Court ordered an expert opinion and appointed a panel of experts consisting of a philologist, a linguist psychologist, a social psychologist and a psychologist from the Linguistics and Psychology Departments of the Russian Academy of Science. 15. Counsel for the second applicant appealed, submitting that the appointed experts were incompetent in religious matters. He asked the court to appoint persons with expertise in religious issues. On 26 December 2006 the Moscow City Court rejected the appeal and upheld the decision of 9 November 2006. 16. On 15 February 2007 the experts delivered their joint report, finding that Said Nursi’s texts encouraged religious discord between believers and non-believers, contained negative and humiliating statements about non‑believers and promoted the notion that believers had superiority over non-believers. Accordingly, they made the following findings: “1. The printed texts submitted for expert review contain statements aiming to incite religious discord (between believers and non-believers, that is on grounds of attitude to religion) and also statements substantiating and justifying the necessity of disseminating the above statements and declarations. 2. The printed texts submitted for expert review contain verbal expressions giving humiliating depictions, an unfavourable emotional assessment and a negative evaluation of people on the basis of their attitude to religion. 3. The printed texts submitted for expert review contain propaganda about the superiority or inferiority of citizens based on their attitude to religion (believers or non-believers) and contain statements substantiating and justifying the necessity of disseminating such ideas and world-views. They do not advocate ideas concerning people’s superiority or inferiority based on their ethnic origin.” 17. Counsel for the second applicant submitted to the Koptevskiy District Court the following specialist opinions, criticising the report of 15 February 2007: - a specialist opinion by Mr Mu., president of the Russian Islamic University, who found that the court-appointed experts were not competent in religious matters and that they had quoted and analysed Said Nursi’s statements out of context. Although in his books Said Nursi indeed criticised the Western way of life and condemned non-believers, he did not promote hatred or enmity towards those who did not share his opinion. Moreover, similar statements were present in all religious texts; - a specialist opinion by Mr S., a doctor of law specialising in Muslim law, who expressed similar criticisms of the report of 15 February 2007 and found that Said Nursi’s texts did not contain any propaganda in favour of discrimination, hatred or religious superiority. On the contrary, they were permeated with ideas of brotherhood, friendship and goodness, while anger and hatred were clearly condemned; - a specialist opinion by Mr Me., a doctor of philosophy specialising in religious matters, who came to the same conclusions. He found, in particular, that Said Nursi’s texts were no different from other religious texts in terms of assuming that their religion was superior to the others and condemning non-believers. 18. Counsel for the second applicant again asked the court to appoint experts in religious matters. On 9 April 2007 the Koptevskiy District Court rejected his request, finding that only experts in psychology, social psychology and linguistics could analyse the meaning of the texts. 19. On 28 April 2007 the Koptevskiy District Court ordered an additional expert opinion by the same experts. 20. On 15 May 2007 the experts delivered an additional expert report, confirming their previous findings. 21. During a closed hearing before the Koptevskiy District Court, two of the experts who had prepared the expert reports submitted by the prosecutor confirmed their previous findings. They said that the texts had been analysed from the perspective of social psychology. One of them, however, added that the analysed texts did not contain any explicit calls for social, racial, ethnic or religious discord. 22. Two of the court-appointed experts were also questioned and confirmed their findings. 23. A co-president of the Council of Mufti of Russia stated that Said Nursi was a world-renowned Muslim scholar whose texts formed an integral part of the official teachings of Islam. They did not contain any extremist statements. Any religious text would be found irrational and extremist by an atheist. The ban on Said Nursi’s books would hinder the religious life of Russian Muslims and unjustifiably restrict their freedom of religion. 24. A specialist called by the applicants, a doctor of philosophy, criticised the experts appointed by the prosecution for taking fragments of text out of context and thereby distorting their meaning. Said Nursi’s texts indeed proclaimed the superiority of Islam over other religions, but all religions did that. 25. On 21 May 2007 the Koptevskiy District Court declared the books written by Said Nursi extremist material. After summarising the applicable domestic law, the submissions by the parties and the documents produced by them in support of their positions, it referred to the expert opinions commissioned by it. It held: “It follows from [the court-appointed expert reports of 15 February and 15 May 2007] that Said Nursi’s books from the Risale-I Nur Collection [list of books] contain statements aiming to incite religious discord (between believers and non-believers, that is on grounds of attitude to religion) and also statements substantiating and justifying the necessity of disseminating the above-mentioned statements and declarations. The books contain verbal expressions giving humiliating depictions, an unfavourable emotional assessment and a negative evaluation of people on the basis of their attitude to religion. The books contain propaganda about the superiority or deficiency of citizens on the basis of their attitude to religion (believers or non-believers). They also contain statements substantiating and justifying the necessity of disseminating such ideas and world-views. The court does not have any reason to doubt these expert reports ...” The court then rejected the specialist opinions submitted by the applicants, finding that only experts in psychology, social psychology and linguistics were competent to establish the meaning of the contested texts. It held that the specialists cited by the applicants did not have such expertise. It also rejected the oral submissions by the co-president of the Council of Mufti of Russia on the grounds that he was an interested party. It continued: “In view of the above, the court concludes that the books from the Risale-I Nur Collection by Said Nursi are extremist literature. Their content aims to incite religious discord and advocate the idea of the superiority or inferiority of citizens, depending on their religion. They also advocate and justify the necessity of such actions.” 26. On 18 September 2007 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 21 May 2007 on appeal, finding that it had been lawful, well-reasoned and justified. It stressed that the subject matter of the case was the specific editions of the books, rather than Said Nursi’s teaching as such. 27. In May 2008, the applicant, a religious association, commissioned the Klass publishing house to print the book “The Tenth Word: The Resurrection and the Hereafter” («Десятое Слово о воскресении из мертвых») from the Risale-I Nur Collection by Said Nursi. 28. The prosecutor of the Krasnoyarsk Region applied to the Zhelezhnodorozhniy District Court of Krasnoyarsk for protection of the interests of the Russian Federation, asking that the book be declared extremist material and all printed copies be confiscated. He relied on previous decisions by the Russian courts, which had declared other works from the Risale-I Nur Collection extremist, and on a report of 24 December 2008 by specialists from the Astafyev Krasnoyarsk State Pedagogical University. 29. The report of 24 December 2008 had been prepared by a panel of “specialists” consisting of a philologist, a psychologist and a doctor of philosophy in religious studies. They had made the following finding: “The book ‘The Tenth Word: The Resurrection and the Hereafter’ by Said Nursi submitted for expert review is ideological literature addressed to a wide audience. The gist of the book is propaganda about the exceptional nature, superiority or deficiency of persons on the basis of their attitude to religion. The text under review aims to arouse feelings of aversion, anger, enmity and discord against non-believers. The book substantiates and justifies extremist activity.” That finding was based, among other things, on the fact that the book contained military metaphors which, according to the specialists, could incline the reader to see the reality through the prism of the conditions of a military camp, a military ground and potential military actions. The specialists also noted that the value of such a world-view was stressed by positive epithets. The specialist report cited the following expressions: “Listen, this state is a military ground; an exhibition of wonderful royal art; The military camp becomes like a lavish colourful blossoming garden on the Earth’s surface. The armies of the Eternal King are plentiful, consisting of angels, jinn, people and ignorant animals and plants in a battle for the preservation of their lives. Having received God’s order: ‘Prepare your weapons and equipment for the defence!’, all thorny trees and plants on the Earth link up their little bayonets, resembling a majestic military camp ready for battle ... The One Wise and Almighty creates anew, from nothing, by a simple order ‘Be and it comes true’, and places in perfect order, wisely and in balance all parts and minute details of unit-like bodies of all animals and other living creatures who are like an army; every century, every spring He creates on the Earth’s surface hundreds of thousands of species and tribes of living creatures who are like an army. How can you doubt that He can ... He says ‘He who will resurrect you on the Resurrection Day is He for whom the entire universe is like an obedient soldier. It obeys with perfect submissiveness the order ‘Be and it comes true’. It is as easy for Him to create spring as it is to create a single flower’.” 30. The applicant organisation was invited to participate in the proceedings as a third party. It submitted, in particular, that the opinion of 24 December 2008 had been made by specialists who had no knowledge of Islam and who had therefore incorrectly interpreted the text. 31. The Zhelezhnodorozhniy District Court ordered an expert opinion and appointed a panel of experts consisting of two psychologists and a doctor of philosophy in religious studies from the Lomonosov Moscow State University. 32. On 28 April 2010 the court-appointed experts delivered their joint report, finding as follows: “The book ‘The Tenth Word: The Resurrection and the Hereafter’ from the Risale-I Nur Collection by Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, 2005 edition, is a popular exposition of the Qur’an. Its aim is to acquaint the reader with Said Nursi’s point of view. The main part of the text is devoted to lauding and glorifying God and his wisdom, as is customary for any monotheistic religious tradition. Said Nursi’s ideology, or his world-view, is quite traditional for Islam, as well as for any monotheistic religion. The author’s objective is to ‘show that the truths of Islam are reasonable, solid and interrelated’, which is a typical objective of any theologian ... The verbal means used in the book do not go beyond value judgments used in any religious literature ... Under a normal perception of the text the book does not contain anything that could have a possible incentive influence on the human consciousness, will, socio‑psychological characteristics or conduct. Possible aberrant perceptions of the textual material by emotionally unstable or easily suggestible people cannot be evaluated in the framework of the present review, as they would require an evaluation of the readers rather than of the text itself ... The book does not contain any statements, appeals or declarations which could be definitely interpreted as incitement of social, racial, ethnic or religious discord associated with violence or as calls to violence ... The book does not contain any ideas which could be definitely interpreted as propaganda about the exceptional nature, superiority or deficiency of persons on the basis of their attitude to religion or their social, racial, ethnic, religious or linguistic affiliation ... The book does not contain any statements which could be definitely interpreted as statements aiming to humiliate persons on the basis of their sex, race, ethnic origin, native language, origin, attitude to religion, affiliation to a social group or on any other basis ... From a scientific point of view, the book is not different from any other religious text; it does not substantiate, justify or advocate the idea that people have an exceptional nature, superiority or deficiency on the basis of their religious affiliation or attitude to religion ... Islam, like any other religion as well as atheism, is characterised by a psychologically based belief in the superiority of its world-view over all other world‑views, which made it necessary to substantiate the choice of that world-view ...” 33. At the hearing the applicant organisation requested the District Court to secure the attendance and in-court examination of the Moscow State University experts to clarify several of their findings which could be considered ambiguous. The District Court rejected that request, finding that the applicant organisation had not made it at the preliminary hearing and that it was not possible to clarify an expert report by questioning the experts; it would have been necessary to order an additional expert report, which the applicant organisation had not requested. The request to question the experts had therefore been “formal, unjustified” and an attempt “to prevent the court from examining the case and deciding on the matter”. 34. The District Court also rejected as irrelevant a request for the examination of additional material about Said Nursi’s life and teachings. It also refused to read the text of the book, noting that the book was sufficiently quoted in the report by specialists from the Astafyev Krasnoyarsk State Pedagogical University. 35. On 21 September 2010 the Zhelezhnodorozhniy District Court of Krasnoyarsk granted the prosecutor’s application, declared the book “The Tenth Word: The Resurrection and the Hereafter” by Said Nursi extremist and ordered the destruction of the printed copies. After summarising the applicable domestic law and the submissions by the parties, it held as follows: “According to the specialists’ report of 24 December 2008 by the Astafyev Krasnoyarsk State Pedagogical University, [the specialists] read the book ‘The Tenth Word: The Resurrection and the Hereafter’ from the Risale-I Nur Collection by Bediüzzaman Said Nursi ... Having analysed the textual content of the book, its syntax structures, the genre characteristics and the methods of structuring the text and expressions, the panel of specialists came to an unanimous finding that, as a whole, the book ‘The Tenth Word: The Resurrection and the Hereafter’ from the Risale-I Nur Collection by Bediüzzaman Said Nursi is ideological, and at the same time religious, literature inciting religious discord and containing propaganda about the exceptional nature, superiority or deficiency of persons on the basis of their attitude to religion. In particular, it incites discord between Muslims and non-believers, which term is understood to include adherents of other religions as well as those who do not belong to any religion. The gist of the book is a breach of religious equality consisting in forming in the reader a negative and aggressive attitude towards non-believers and adherents to other religions, which amounts to inciting hatred and discord against them (see [specialist report of 24 December 2008]). According to the specialists’ report mentioned above, the values inspired in the reader by the text are the exceptional nature of the Islamic faith, which is presented to the reader as the ultimate truth. People are divided into two groups: those who do not follow the Islamic faith are described by the author as ‘the dissolute’, ‘the philosophers’ and ‘the idle talkers’; and those who belong to that religion are described by the author as ‘the faithful’ and ‘the just’. It follows that believers and non-believers are rated differently on the basis of their adherence to the Islamic religion: the unfaithful are rated negatively, while the faithful to Islam are rated positively. The author uses in his text disparaging words and expressions to belittle the European culture, which is understood, in the light of the religious contents of the book, as religious confessions other than Islam. The author uses military metaphors in the text, which inevitably inclines the reader to see the reality through the prism of the conditions of a military camp, a military ground and potential military actions. The value of such a world-view is stressed by positive epithets. Simultaneously, through the use of verbal means and expressions, the author implicitly (that is covertly rather than openly, by influencing the subconscious) forms in the reader’s mind the idea of an enemy, the notion of a potential aggressor. Taken together, it creates in the reader’s mind an idea that it is necessary to be ready for a fight. The structure of the book is such that in the subsequent text the idea of the necessity to fight, of being ready for a fight, is, on the one hand, attenuated as it is not expressed directly; on the other hand, having been already stated earlier, it may be reinforced in the readers’ minds because the text inspires the idea that non-believers commit a crime consisting in the very fact of not believing and which, according to the text under review, does not merit forgiveness. Thereby the author of the book attempts to influence the reader’s psyche on a subconscious level and to influence the mechanisms of his faith, that is to form on an irrational basis conscious values and attitudes. It may deprive the reader of the capacity to think critically about changes happening in real life, may undermine his ability to make independent decisions and thereby breach the right to freedom of religion. According to the book, anyone who does not accept Islam, a non-believer, is the most inferior person who is deprived of his rights, is a criminal not deserving forgiveness. The book suggests to the reader corporate norms and a model of society where all people follow the same rules; the actions of all members of such a society are tightly regulated, they are encouraged to comply like obedient soldiers, military officers or civil servants who must unquestioningly carry out orders and commands (see [expert report of 24 December 2008]). According to the specialists’ report mentioned above (see [specialists’ report of 24 December 2008]), the book ‘The Tenth Word: The Resurrection and the Hereafter’ from the Risale-I Nur Collection by Bediüzzaman Said Nursi is potentially addressed to different people. On the one hand, the text is addressed to non-believers who do not have a developed ability to think critically. If the reader does not have a certain ideology of life, the text may influence him ideologically and form in his mind the ideas described above by methods of emotional induction and on the least rational level. On the other hand, the text is addressed to readers who have a religious world-view other than Islam, as it calls on them to accept the only true God – Allah. The author suggests to the reader that it is normal to change one’s world-view and that the author desires it. The text is also addressed to people who accept the Islamic religious worldview, revere Allah and are ready to carry out his will and his commandments, which follows from a reconstruction of such an addressee’s characteristics: readiness to fight for ‘eternal life’ and the constant service of Allah and his messengers in such forms as may transpire from respective orders. The text is also addressed to readers who ‘delay’ religious activity ... until an undetermined future point, which may however come at the will of someone who has the right to command and give orders. The text uses the expression ‘little man’, which may be understood as ‘the most common’ man who perceives himself as a ‘little man’. The author suggests that the essence of such a person, if he is not a follower of Islam, is an ‘infinitely big crime’. In addition, the reader is encouraged to take responsibility for his parents; to save them he must accept the advocated Islamic religious creed. It means that any person who identifies with his parents, who has the slightest feeling of existential guilt for them, may be moved to adopt the view of the world suggested by the author. To sum up, in the opinion of the panel of specialists, the psychological characteristics of the potential addressees (readers) mentioned above are not essential for understanding the text of the book because the text itself, by its specific structure and its [psychological] methods of holding attention and suggestion, is capable, after a long reading, to transmit the advocated religious ideology to any person who is in search of ideological support for his life, who is inclined to reflection and is in the process of self-development.” 36. The court considered the findings of the report by the Astafyev Krasnoyarsk State Pedagogical University to be credible because they had been made by specialists with professional expertise in the spheres of social psychology, psycholinguistics, philosophy and religious studies who had used scientific methods of analysis. The specialists had confirmed their findings when questioned at the hearing. 37. By contrast, the court rejected the expert report of 28 April 2010 by the Lomonosov Moscow State University, prepared at its own request, as “not credible”. It held that the report of 28 April 2010 was insufficiently reasoned and was based on assumptions. In particular, the experts had not explained what they understood by “a normal perception” and “possible aberrant perceptions by emotionally unstable or easily suggestible people”. It was not clear what the experts meant when saying that “the book [did] not contain any statements which could be definitely interpreted as incitement of social, racial, ethnic or religious discord associated with violence or as calls to violence”, that “the book [did] not contain any ideas which could be definitely interpreted as propaganda about the exceptional nature, superiority or deficiency of persons on the basis of their attitude to religion or their social, racial, ethnic, religious or linguistic affiliation”, or that “the book [did] not contain any statements which could be definitely interpreted as statements aiming to humiliate persons on the basis of their sex, race, ethnic origin, native language, origin, attitude to religion, affiliation to a social group or on any other basis”. The court considered that the experts’ wording gave reason to believe that such interpretations could not be excluded, but that interpretations could in fact differ depending on the reader’s individual perceptions. The experts had not cited the statements which, in their opinion, could be subject to different interpretations and had not explained why they had come to that conclusion. The court further found that the comparison of the book with other monotheistic religious texts had been misconceived because it had not asked for a comparative study. If the book contained propaganda about the exceptional nature, superiority or deficiency of persons on the basis of their attitude to religion or their social, racial, ethnic, religious or linguistic affiliation, it was irrelevant that other religious texts also contained such statements. Lastly, the District Court noted the absence of a linguist or a philologist in the panel of experts. In the court’s view, that omission undermined the comprehensive nature of the study. 38. The District Court concluded that the book “The Tenth Word: The Resurrection and the Hereafter” by Said Nursi was extremist literature because it was aimed at inciting religious discord and contained propaganda about the exceptional nature, superiority or deficiency of persons on the basis of their attitude to religion. Its contents substantiated and justified the necessity of carrying out such activity. It therefore had to be seized wherever it was found and on whatever information medium it was reproduced. 39. On 29 November 2010 the Krasnoyarsk Regional Court rejected an appeal lodged by the applicant organisation, endorsing the reasoning of the District Court in a summary fashion. 40. According to the Government, only the editor’s copy of the book was seized. It proved impossible to seize the other copies as they had already been distributed.

5. The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Podgorica. 6. On 6 September 2003 the applicant lodged an application with the Commission for Restitution (Komisija za restituciju nepokretnosti) in Berane requesting restitution of the property expropriated from his father in 1969. 7. Following the adoption of a new Restitution Act (Zakon o povraćaju oduzetih imovinskih prava i obeštećenju), on 28 December 2005, the applicant submitted another application to the newly established Commission for Restitution and Compensation in Berane (Komisija za povraćaj oduzetih imovinskih prava i obeštećenja) requesting compensation. 8. In 2008 all the Commissions for Restitution and Compensation were consolidated into three regional Commissions in Bar, Bijelo Polje and Podgorica. Due to the location of the expropriated property, the applicant’s request was assigned to the Commission with its seat in Bijelo Polje (hereinafter “the Commission”). 9. On 19 February 2009 the applicant sought opinion from an independent expert regarding the expropriated property. 10. On 21 July 2009 the Commission also requested an assessment report on the expropriated property. The report was submitted to the Commission on 24 July 2009. 11. Due to Commission’s inactivity, on 4 September 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal (žalba zbog ćutanja uprave) with the Appeals Commission (Komisija za žalbe u postupku za povraćaj imovinskog prava ili obeštećenja). 12. On 23 October 2009 and 5 December 2013 the applicant filed complaints with the Ministry of Finance and the Administrative Court, respectively, about the Appeals Commission’s inactivity. 13. On 24 December 2013 the Appeals Commission ordered the Commission to decide on the applicant’s request within a period of 30 days. 14. On 13 October 2014 the Commission ruled against the applicant. 15. On 23 December 2014 the Appeals Commission upheld that decision on appeal. 16. The applicant filed and action with the Administrative Court seeking redress. 17. On 17 April 2015 the Administrative Court rejected the applicant’s claim as unfounded. This decision was served on the applicant on 23 April 2015. 18. On 23 June 2015 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. On 24 July 2015 the Constitutional Court rejected his appeal for failure to make proper use of other available domestic remedies. According to the Constitutional Court, the applicant should first have made use of an additional request for the judicial review of his case (zahtjev za vanredno preispitivanje sudske odluke).

4. The applicant, is a company specialising in air transportation. 5. At the time of the events it had a valid air operator certificate (an “AOC”) issued by the Moldovan Civil Aviation State Authority (the “CASA”). 6. On 1 June 2007 the CASA issued an order banning all flights of aircraft registered in Moldova to Iraq and Afghanistan, with effect from 15 July 2007. 7. Between 4 and 8 June 2007, all Moldovan aviation companies were subjected to a check by the European Union Safety Committee. As a result, some irregularities concerning compliance with the European norms in the field of aviation safety were detected. The European Union Safety Committee also found that some aviation companies did not comply with the rule according to which the companies have to have their principal place of business in the state of registration. One of the conclusions set down in the visit report drawn up by the European Union Safety Committee was that the CASA failed to demonstrate the ability adequately to enforce and implement the relevant safety standards. According to the report, the CASA had undertaken to remedy the situation within three months. 8. On 18 June 2007 the CASA sent the applicant company aviation instruction no. 2584 and asked it to present by 21 June 2007 a plan for remedying the irregularities found by the EU Safety Committee. The corresponding plan was sent by the applicant company to the CASA on 21 June 2007. 9. Also on 18 June 2007 the CASA sent the applicant company aviation instruction no. 2585 requesting it to undertake measures with a view to remedying some of the irregularities before 20 July 2007 and other irregularities before 20 September 2007. 10. On 21 June 2007 the CASA issued order no. 102/GEN withdrawing the applicant company’s AOC, and thereby terminating its activity. The CASA relied on the fact that the applicant company flew to destinations such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Congo, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, New Zealand and United Arab Emirates. The CASA argued that those destinations involved security risks and that it had no resources to ensure flight security in those territories. 11. On 22 June 2007 the applicant company wrote to the CASA and asked it to reverse its decision on the grounds that it had not explained exactly what irregularities formed the basis for the withdrawal of the AOCs and that the CASA had not afforded it enough time to remedy the alleged irregularities. 12. The CASA refused to reverse its decision, and on 28 June 2007 the applicant company challenged it in the Chişinău Court of Appeal. The applicant submitted, inter alia, that according to section 23 of the Law on Civil Aviation, the CASA was entitled to suspend or withdraw the AOCs only if the companies failed to remedy the irregularities found by the CASA within the prescribed time-limit. It also made reference to section RAC‑AOC 0170 from the Regulations in the Field of Civil Aviation according to which an AOC could be revoked only after being initially suspended. Since the CASA had not observed those legal provisions, its actions were unlawful. 13. On 3 December 2008 the Chişinău Court of Appeal rejected the applicant company’s action, finding that the CASA had been entitled to withdraw its AOC because serious irregularities threatening the safety of the flights had been found by European experts, and because those irregularities had not been remedied. The Court of Appeal did not indicate the irregularities to which it referred. The court also found that the applicant company had failed to comply with the CASA’s order of 1 June 2007 prohibiting flights to Iraq and Afghanistan as of 15 July 2007. The applicant companies challenged the decision before the Supreme Court of Justice. 14. On 29 April 2009 the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the appeal and upheld the judgment of the Court of Appeal after finding that the CASA was entitled to revoke the AOC since the applicant company had failed to comply with its instructions concerning the ban on all flights of aircraft registered in Moldova to Iraq and Afghanistan, with effect from 15 July 2007.

6. The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Ljubljana. 7. He and M. have three children, triplets born on 28 October 1996. 8. On 20 January 2003 the Kranj District Court dissolved the marriage of the applicant and M., and determined that M. would have sole custody of their three children. 9. In November 2002 the applicant and M. concluded an agreement on contact arrangements with the assistance of the Kranj Social Work Centre (hereinafter “the Centre”). According to the agreement, contact between the applicant and his children was to take place twice a week and during the holidays. 10. The contact meetings initially took place without any apparent problems. However, the Centre’s records show that in 2004 M. reported that the children no longer wanted contact with their father. In June 2006 M. sent a letter via her lawyer to the applicant, notifying him that contact was no longer possible because the children had been distressed in relation to the applicant’s visits. The Centre’s records of June 2006 indicate that the applicant was willing to cooperate with the Centre and attend parental counselling with M., who said that she was going to attend therapy sessions with the children, so that they could deal with the distress they felt in relation to their father. No contact between the applicant and the children took place between July 2006 and November 2008 (see paragraph 22 below). 11. In the years following the dissolution of marriage (see paragraph 8 above), the relationship between the applicant and M. deteriorated. The Centre’s records indicate that by 2003 they rarely talked to each other and that their troubled relationship prevented the conclusion of any agreement with respect to the contact arrangements. 12. On 5 July 2006 the applicant initiated court proceedings, seeking an order to formalise his contact with the children three times a week and during the holidays. He argued, inter alia, that the mother had been trying to restrict his contact with the children and that the children had been refusing contact because she had manipulated them. The applicant also believed that the Centre had not been impartial in dealing with the case. 13. In her submissions to the court, M. objected to the applicant’s allegations, maintaining that she had never restricted contact or been manipulating the children. She argued that the children had been expressing their discontent with the contact sessions since 2004 and that in 2006 they had started rejecting contact with their father because they had been afraid of his anger and criticism. 14. The Centre in its opinion noted that both parents should join individual therapy. In case they did not manage to come to an agreement with respect to the temporary contact arrangements, it suggested the court to suspend the contact. 15. On 6 July 2006 the court issued an interim order stating that contact would continue in accordance with the 2002 agreement between the parents (see paragraph 9 above). On 14 July 2006 the applicant applied to amend the interim order, proposing that the mother be required to pay a monetary fine and that police assistance at the time of contact be given in the event that the bailiff did not succeed in taking the children to contact. 16. On 13 November 2006 a court-appointed psychiatrist, Dr T., submitted her opinion to the court. As regards the children, she noted that they expressed fear and reluctance to the way the applicant had acted in the past (yelling, physical punishment, the way they played games and his negative remarks about M.). They found the contact unpleasant and refused it. The expert further noted that while M. had not limited contact, she had stopped encouraging the children. Dr T. suggested that contact take place once every other week, initially in the presence of someone the children trusted, and in circumstances permitting their interests to be taken into account. Dr T. also opined that in order to improve the relationship between the applicant and his children, the parents would benefit from counselling. 17. On 29 April 2008 the Kranj District Court (in non-contentious proceedings) granted the applicant regular contact with his children once a week with an eventual extension of contact to weekends, until the end of the school year in the presence of the school psychologist or someone else from their school. The court also annulled the interim order and dismissed the request to amend it (see paragraph 15 above), finding that at the time the request had been made the court had not had sufficient grounds for making the decision. 18. On 2 October 2008 the Ljubljana Higher Court when deciding the appeal determined that starting from 12 November 2008 contact between the applicant and his children would take place every other Wednesday from 2 until 3.30 p.m. in the presence of an expert caseworker from the Centre. It also determined that M. was to ensure that the children went to the Centre. Relying on the opinion of Dr T. (see paragraph 16 above), the court held that the children had refused contact with the applicant and that this was not the result of the manipulation of M. but originated in their negative experiences with the contact sessions in the past. Nonetheless, in view of the fact that the father and the children had had no contact since June 2006 and that the contact sessions had never before been carried out with the assistance of experts, the court concluded that the negative attitude of the children was not enough to discontinue contact. When fixing the new contact arrangements, the Higher Court emphasised that the presence of an expert from the Centre at the contact sessions was mainly to provide expert assistance in establishing mutual trust between the applicant and the children. It also opined that it was not necessary for the contact sessions to take place at the Centre, and that they could take place somewhere in the vicinity, in a more relaxed environment for the children and the applicant. 19. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, which the Supreme Court rejected as inadmissible on 18 February 2010. 20. The Centre cancelled the first contact session scheduled for 12 November 2008 because it had received the relevant court decision (see paragraph 18 above) only two days before and had found the organisation of the session impossible. 21. On 20 November 2008 the applicant and M. were invited to a meeting at the Centre to discuss and reach an agreement on how the contact sessions would work and be organised under the Centre’s supervision. No agreement was reached. Nonetheless, on 10 December 2008 the Centre sent its proposed expert guidelines (strokovna izhodišča) for the organisation of the contact sessions to the parents, outlining its expectations and tasks. The Centre records show that in the course of preparing the children for contact, the caseworkers talked to the children, who firmly rejected the idea of any contact with the applicant and asked the caseworkers for permission not to attend the contact sessions. 22. On 26 November 2008 the first contact session between the applicant and the children took place under the supervision of two caseworkers of the Centre. The Centre’s records show that during the session the children frequently asked if they could leave and told the applicant that they did not want to see him. The caseworkers interrupted the session after around fifteen to twenty minutes because they decided that the continuation of the contact session was not in the children’s interests. The second contact session took place on 10 December 2008. According to the Centre’s records, at the beginning of the session the children again told the applicant that they did not want to see him. After one of the children left the session, the caseworker told the other two children that they could leave if they so wished, but that it was their opportunity to listen to what their father had to say. According to the Centre’s records, on 24 December 2008 the applicant arrived early to prepare for the third contact session. At the beginning of the session the children repeated that they did not want to see the applicant. The caseworker present at the session started crying and asked the father if he could feel the children’s distress. The Centre’s records show that on the next eight occasions, the last being on 15 April 2009, the applicant arrived early to prepare for the contact sessions, which lasted at most a couple of minutes before the children left the room. 23. On 28 April 2009, after conducting an interview with the children, the Centre informed the applicant that a contact session scheduled for 29 April 2009 had been cancelled on the basis of section 119 of the Marriage and Family Relations Act (see paragraph 45 below) because it would be a serious psychological burden for the children. 24. The sessions were supervised by a team of four caseworkers (a psychologist, social worker and two pedagogues), with two caseworkers present during each session. After every session the Centre’s caseworkers talked to the children and conducted a review (evalvacija) of contact with the parents. It appears from the Centre’s records of the interviews with the children that they expressed a dislike of their father and refused any contact with him. The records of 18 February and 4 March 2009 indicate that one of the caseworkers told the children that she believed that they did not want contact but that the court had decided differently. 25. Meanwhile, the applicant via his lawyer repeatedly warned the Centre that they had not started with a meaningful implementation of the above-mentioned court decision (see paragraph 18 above). In particular, he complained that they had not offered any expert help to him or the children, had not been sufficiently active in helping to establish contact and had not cooperated with both parents. He also expressed the opinion that the Centre’s officials had been biased, as they knew the mother personally and had worked with her in business matters, and asked the Centre to appoint an independent expert who would not know either of the parents personally and could work with both of them in establishing mutual trust between the applicant and the children. The applicant also suggested that the school psychologist (whom the children trusted) join the process at the Centre. Lastly, he proposed organising contact sessions outside the Centre in a more informal environment, such as during a short trip with someone they trusted. 26. The Centre’s expert team, composed of a psychologist, social worker, pedagogue (pedagog) and lawyer, met five times between December 2008 and May 2010 to discuss implementation of the contact order under the Centre’s supervision. On 15 January 2009 the expert team decided to propose to the court that it issue an interim order to suspend contact with immediate effect because the contact sessions were not in the children’s interests. 27. On 11 October 2011 the Centre prepared a risk assessment for the children and an action plan for the children and parents (see paragraph 43 below). According to the assessment, the applicant did not trust the work of the caseworkers and was unaware of his problematic behaviour, while the mother had refused to attend counselling with the applicant and had been generally too passive. It opined that contact would benefit the children only if the parents, through the parental therapy (starševska terapija) suggested to them, changed their behaviour. 28. On 30 January 2009 the Centre lodged an application with the Kranj District Court asking the court to order that contact be organised within the framework of family therapy, initially with the parents attending the therapy alone or, if that was not possible, to suspend contact between the applicant and the children. It held in this connection that a parent refusing to attend the therapy would be responsible for the absence of contact between the applicant and his children. The Centre simultaneously applied for an interim order to immediately suspend the applicant’s contact with his children. The Centre noted that, notwithstanding its professional work, and the applicant’s cooperation and good intentions, the children continued to categorically refuse any contact with the applicant. It also noted that the four Centre officials (caseworkers) who had been present during the contact sessions saw no prospect of the relationship between the applicant and the children improving in the framework of the supervised contact sessions and that the children were not willing participants in them. In such circumstances, in the absence of any relationship between the applicant and his children, and for the time being, they also did not foresee the possibility of organising contact sessions outside the Centre. It submitted that the conditions for the applicant maintaining contact with his children could only be created by the applicant and M. jointly, and that they had been unable to achieve this so far. In their further submissions to the court, the Centre noted that the contact sessions were a serious burden for the children and that the continuation of contact would amount to gradual psychological abuse. It also emphasised that the applicant and his lawyer did not trust the Centre and believed that the officials were biased. 29. The applicant opposed the application, arguing that the Centre had aligned itself with M. and had neglected the obligations imposed on it by the court to monitor contact and assist the applicant and his children in improving their relationship (see paragraph 18 above). The activities of the Centre had been aimed at suspending contact instead of actively establishing it with the help of an expert. He noted, in particular, that at the first contact session the children had actively communicated with him. The first session after a long time had been crucial from an emotional standpoint, but had lasted only fifteen minutes because of the caseworker’s intervention. The next contact session had started with the caseworker’s appeal to the children that they could leave. He argued that the children had been put under systematic pressure by M. and, indirectly, the Centre. Moreover, the Centre had been biased in its submissions and the only impartial opinion − on which the court should base its decision − was that of the expert psychiatrist, Dr T. In the course of the proceedings the applicant also requested that the court issue an interim decision ordering M. to attend family therapy with him with a view to establishing communication between them. 30. On 9 February 2009 the Kranj District Court dismissed the Centre’s request for an interim order to suspend contact between the applicant and his children (see paragraph 28 above). It held that the 2008 contact order had taken into account the applicant’s characteristics and attitude, as well as the fact that the children had not had any contact with him since 2006. In order to overcome the existing alienation and initial difficulties in re-establishing contact, the order specified a third party who would help and offer advice in this regard. The court noted that the records did not show that the Centre had played an active role in implementing the 2008 contact order. In particular, contact was limited to the children entering the Centre under strict protocol, stating that they did not want contact, and them leaving the premises together with the caseworkers. The court concluded that Dr T.’s recommendations regarding how the contact sessions should be conducted had not been followed properly. The court further held that there was no reason not to try systematic family therapy in parallel to the contact sessions at the Centre, especially by preparing the children for contact directly before the sessions. The children, represented in the proceedings by M., appealed against the decision. On 16 April 2009 the Ljubljana Higher Court allowed the appeal and remitted the case to the first-instance court. It noted that a critical change in circumstances had occurred since contact was formalised in 2008, and that there was a risk to the children’s psychological development. 31. On 29 April 2009 the Kranj District Court issued an interim order temporarily suspending contact between the applicant and his children. The court observed that the children continued to refuse contact with the applicant and that during five supervised contact sessions there had been no progress in establishing a relationship between him and them. The court held that the Centre’s experts responsible for counselling were of the opinion that their attempts at establishing contact had been unsuccessful and not in the children’s interests, even though they had done everything possible. It thus concluded that continuing with contact would be a psychological burden, threatening the development of the children and that this could cause them irreparable harm. The applicant lodged an objection, arguing that the first-instance court had not taken into account the fact that the 2008 contact order had never been implemented because the Centre had not carried out any activities in this regard but had instead been working towards the discontinuation of contact. His objection was dismissed as unfounded. He then appealed. On 13 April 2011 the Ljubljana Higher Court dismissed the appeal, finding that it was preferable for the children not to be forced into contact with the applicant. The court reiterated that in terms of the interim order it was irrelevant what the cause was of the traumatic experience the children had in relation to contact, but noted that this could be relevant in the context of potential family therapy. 32. During the proceedings the court asked the expert psychiatrist Dr T. to update the opinion provided during the 2008 proceedings (see paragraphs 17 and 18 above). Dr T. conducted interviews with each child and the parents. In her expert opinion of 20 October 2010 she noted that the children resented any contact with their father because they were preoccupied with their previous negative experiences with him (see paragraph 16 above). They saw it as a decision forced upon them which did not take into account their emotional needs and wishes. The expert observed that the children had not established an emotional connection with their father at a young age and had expressed an irrational fear of their father linked to them feeling insulted. Their resentment was also the main reason for the difficult implementation of supervised contact. Given their age and the circumstances, she believed that establishing contact would not benefit the children. In the opinion she also noted that M. had not prevented contact and that the children’s resentment did not seem to be based on the alleged manipulation. Furthermore, noting that the applicant was capable, motivated and eager to act in his relationship with the children in a way that would not harm them, the expert suggested that the applicant and M. start parental therapy. She explained that the process of forming a relationship with the father was still open and dynamic and that therapy was aimed at establishing mutual trust between parents. When giving evidence to the court (see paragraph 34 below) Dr T. pointed out that therapy involving counselling and teaching appropriate communication to both parents would stand an 80% chance of success. She also noted that M. should obtain some advice on appropriate communication with the children regarding the importance of their contact with their father and communication with the applicant and submitted that if M. refused to attend counselling, this would call into question her motivation to help the children. Lastly, the expert held that she had not noticed any mistakes in the work of the Centre’s caseworkers during the contact sessions. 33. At a hearing on 21 June 2011 the judge suggested concluding an agreement outlining everyone’s participation in family therapy. While the Centre’s representative agreed, noting that this would be in the children’s best interests, M. refused to participate in any kind of family therapy. 34. The Kranj District Court held four hearings at which it examined the expert Dr T., the applicant, two caseworkers from the Centre, the school psychologist and M. It rejected a request by the applicant that psychological tests be carried out. It found in this connection that, taking into account the children’s age, the examination by Dr T. was sufficient as it fully explained the relationship between the applicant and children and that a psychologist would offer no other specific knowledge relevant to the outcome of the case. 35. On 21 June 2011 the Kranj District Court (in non-contentious proceedings) issued a decision on the basis of section 106(5) of the Marriage and Family Relations Act (see paragraph 45 below) discontinuing contact between the applicant and his children. It dismissed the remainder of the Centre’s application, for the obligatory participation in family therapy (see paragraph 28 above), and the applicant’s request for an interim measure ordering family therapy (see paragraph 29 above). The court observed that the supervised contact sessions had been unsuccessful, which had been acknowledged by the Centre, the expert psychiatrist and the applicant. It found that the children, who were almost fifteen years old at the time of the court’s deliberations and thus able to form their own opinion on contact (section 410 of the Civil Procedure Act, see paragraph 47 below), had categorically refused any contact with the father because of their past negative experiences and that supervised contact had caused them mental distress. It held that in such circumstances the reason for the interruption of contact was no longer important. It noted that the children were going through adolescence and that it was possible that they were displaying loyalty to M. by refusing contact with the applicant. In any case, the contact sessions were no longer in the children’s interests because they were a serious psychological burden for the children and were, due to the disagreements between the parents, traumatic for them. The court stated that, according to the expert’s opinion, any attempt to establish contact under the current conditions would not benefit the children. It also noted that, although the applicant was very motivated and keen to establish contact with the children, he had appeared stressed and under pressure during the supervised contact sessions. Moreover, the court held that he was partly responsible for unsuccessful contact because he had been too impatient, had felt offended and angry and had been unable or had not known how to get close to the children, for which he had unreasonably blamed the Centre’s caseworkers. Lastly, the court also found it inappropriate to order family therapy involving the participation of the children. It noted in this connection that M. had not agreed to it and that the children had clearly refused any cooperation with their father during the contact sessions and were seriously distressed. The latter was crucial for deciding that they should not be forced in any further proceedings for the establishment of contact. The court dismissed the applicant’s request for an interim measure ordering family therapy for the same reasons, interpreting it as therapy for all family members, including the children. 36. The applicant appealed, maintaining, inter alia, that the solution for re-establishing contact between him and the children, as advised by Dr T., was family therapy, initially with the parents alone and later with the children, which had been refused by M. He disagreed with the court’s opinion that the reasons resulting in the discontinuation of contact were no longer relevant and pointed out that the children’s alienation from him was the result of wrong decisions taken by the administrative authorities and wrong assessment of the evidence by the court. He repeated his request to appoint a psychologist, who could explore the negative attitude of the children towards him. He also argued that the initiation of family therapy and a gradual introduction of visits would have been in the best interests of the children, who needed a father figure in their life, as had also been confirmed by Dr T. 37. On 11 January 2012 the Ljubljana Higher Court upheld the Kranj District Court’s decision (see paragraph 35 above). In the court’s view, the main reason for the children’s negative attitude towards contact with the applicant were his personal characteristics, as indicated by the court expert, combined with the inadequate participation of M. It found that the opinion of expert Dr T. based on a paedopsychiatric examination of the children and psychiatric diagnostics had provided sufficient grounds for the decision to discontinue contact and that the court-appointed expert had concluded that further tests were unnecessary given the age of the children. The court also stressed that the decision to discontinue contact had not been based solely on the opinion of the children. Other evidence, namely the expert’s opinion, the Centre’s report and the hearing of M. and the applicant, confirmed that contact was not beneficial to the children, who continued to refuse any contact with the applicant. It confirmed that M. had not prevented contact but that, according to the expert’s opinion, she should have played a more active role. The court also observed that the expert believed that the children’s interests required that family therapy be carried out and that such therapy would have an 80% chance of success in the present case. However, the Higher Court found that there was no case-law on the question of whether a custodial parent could, without any relevant legal basis, be forced to participate in family therapy. It also found that family therapy should not, in any event, be ordered because it would only be successful if the applicant’s behaviour changed and M. displayed changes in her attitude. Lastly, although it had been established convincingly that family therapy could be successful in the present case, it had not been established equally convincingly that the applicant would succeed in overcoming the personal difficulties which had hindered the relationship between him and the children. 38. On 18 April 2012 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint reiterating his previous complaints (see paragraph 36 above). 39. On 15 June 2012 the Constitutional Court decided not to accept a constitutional complaint by the applicant for consideration, finding that it did not concern an important constitutional issue or entail a violation of human rights which had serious consequences for him. The Constitutional Court rejected his constitutional complaint in part regarding the lower courts’ decision not to order M. to join family therapy with him because the applicant lacked legal interest. 40. On 8 April 2009 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Inspectorate for Social Matters at the Ministry for Work, Family and Social Matters (hereinafter “the Inspectorate”). On 20 May 2009 the inspector to whom the case had been allocated (hereinafter “the Inspector”) asked the Centre to submit a written report and copies of the applicant’s family files. 41. On 25 August 2011 the Inspectorate issued an audit report, which found a number of flaws in the Centre’s handling of the applicant’s case. As a preliminary matter the report noted that, the decision to conduct an extraordinary inspection of the work of the Centre in the present case had not been taken until 11 August 2010 because the Inspector had found it inappropriate to influence the ongoing court proceedings. However, shortly thereafter the Inspector had been absent from work for almost a year and had been unable to conclude the audit until 31 August 2011. 42. As to the audit’s findings, the report stated that the Centre had violated several legislative provisions and professional regulations, including section 106 and 119 of the Marriage and Family Relations Act and section 92 of the Social Assistance Act (see paragraphs 45 and 46 below). The report found, in particular, that the Centre: (i) had not identified the problem that the parents had not been acting in the children’s best interests as regards contact, particularly M., who had refused to cooperate with the applicant; (ii) had, consequently, not tried to resolve the problems between the parents, which was one of the reasons that supervised contact could not be established; (iii) had not offered the parents the social service of home or personal help even though the applicant had been willing to accept it; (iv) had not assessed the attitude of M.’s parents, who had been living with the children, despite this issue being raised by the applicant; (v) had not realised that, by not providing these services, it had been following M.’s wishes but failing to safeguard the children’s best interests; (vi) despite having been entrusted by the court with the task of re-establishing contact between the applicant and his children it had concluded, on the basis of an incorrect assessment of the facts regarding the alleged harmful behaviour of the applicant during the contact visits in the past, that the children’s contact with the applicant should be discontinued; (vii) had not provided proper reasoning for the request to discontinue contact, even though the discontinuation ordered by the court had been ultimately justified because the contact visits under the Centre’s supervision had not been in the children’s interests; (viii) had not treated both parents equally and its officials’ methods of approach and communication, especially with the applicant, had been often inappropriate; (ix) had not drawn up a proper assessment of the situation or an action plan; (x) together with M., had burdened the then still young children with the need to make a decision concerning the desired contact even when different contact from that determined by the court could have been arranged only by the parents’ agreement; and (xi) had not assessed how well the children had been prepared for contact. 43. The report also noted that the situation in the applicant’s family could not be fixed or changed by any measures within the remit of the Inspectorate but only by the parents themselves. In particular, the report emphasised that the parents were responsible for the situation of distress and were the only ones who could resolve it (with the intervention of the Centre). Consequently, the Centre could not be held responsible for the absence of contact. The Inspector, however, noted that the director of the Centre should appoint a new team to deal with the applicant’s children, make a proper assessment of the situation and draw up an action plan, of which both parents should be informed. The Inspectorate also set out general measures to be undertaken in order to improve the Centre’s work in protecting children’s best interests following dissolution of marriage or family life. In particular, it stated that guidelines for internal monitoring, professional criteria for the improvement of teamwork, and special training programmes were to be set up for all officials responsible for assisting families after a marriage break-up. Finally, official J.P., who was the last remaining member of the team dealing with the applicant’s family in the department of family assistance, was asked to retake certain parts of her professional examination. 44. On 31 August 2011 the Inspectorate ordered the Centre to carry out the proposed measures within the specified time-limit and to file written reports on their implementation. On 3 April 2012 the Inspectorate issued a final report on the extraordinary inspection, noting that the Centre had implemented all the imposed measures properly.

5. The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Kumanovo. 6. The applicant had been in pre-trial detention since 21 October 2008 in connection with proceedings (КОК бр. 3/09) related to a suspicion of criminal conspiracy (злосторничко здружување) and abuse of office (злоупотреба на службената положба и овластување) when, on 26 December 2009, the investigating judge of the Skopje Court of First Instance (Основен суд Скопје, “the trial court”) opened a new investigation in respect of him and fourteen other people. The new investigation related to allegations of criminal conspiracy, abuse of office and extortion (изнуда) related to alleged money laundering and the unlawful acquisition of property (КОК бр. 17/10). 7. At the same time the investigating judge ordered that the applicant be held in pre-trial detention for thirty days, starting from 25 December 2009. The order applied also to thirteen other suspects and was based on all three grounds specified in section 199(1) of the Criminal Proceedings Act (Закон за кривичната постапка, Official Gazette no. 15/2005 – “the Act”), namely a risk of absconding, reoffending and interfering with the investigation. As to the risk of absconding and reoffending, the judge relied on the gravity of the charges, the potential penalty, the circumstances under which the alleged offences had been committed and the links between the suspects. She further held that there was a risk of interference with the investigation if the suspects were released as the investigation had just begun and there were a number of investigative actions pending, including the questioning of witnesses. 8. The applicant lodged an appeal, arguing that he had already been held in detention in relation to the other set of criminal proceedings and the reasons provided by the investigating judge were not relevant and sufficient to justify another detention order. 9. On 30 December 2009 a three-judge panel of the trial court, dismissed the applicant’s appeal and endorsed the investigating judge’s findings. As to the risk of the applicant’s absconding, the panel, in addition to the gravity of the charges and the potential penalty, took into account his previous history of being in “conflict with the law” (и претходно доаѓал во судир со законот) and the fact that there were parallel criminal proceedings against him for similar criminal offences. The panel considered that the fact that the applicant had a family and three children who were still minors could not suffice as a guarantee of his presence during the proceedings. The panel took note of the detention order in the other set of proceedings, but held that the question concerned two separate and independent sets of criminal proceedings. In the light of all the circumstances, the court was of the opinion that a further extension of the applicant’s detention had been warranted. 10. On 21 January 2010 a three-judge panel ordered a thirty-day extension of the pre-trial detention of the applicant and some of the other suspects. The extension was ordered on all three grounds of the Act. The panel based its decision on the same reasons as before. It also referred to the applicant’s possessions in the respondent State, and considered that, in the circumstances, there were insufficient guarantees to ensure his presence during the proceedings. 11. Appeals by the applicant were dismissed by the Skopje Court of Appeal (Апелационен суд Скопје, “the Court of Appeal”) on 8 February 2010. The Court of Appeal reiterated that the gravity of the charges, the severity of the penalty and the fact that the suspects had acted as a well‑organised group indicated a risk of flight and of reoffending if the applicant were to be released. It further held that there was a risk of interference with the investigation in view of the fact that some of the witnesses and suspects who were still at large had not yet been examined. 12. On 22 February 2010 a three-judge panel ordered another thirty-day extension of the applicant’s pre-trial detention on the same grounds as before. 13. On 23 March 2010 the applicant and the other suspects were indicted before the Skopje Court of First Instance. The applicant was charged with money laundering, abuse of office and extortion. In the course of the proceedings, the prosecutor withdrew the charge of abuse of office and amended the extortion charge to one of violence (насилство). 14. On 24 March 2010 a three-judge panel ordered another thirty-day extension of the pre-trial detention of the applicant and other accused. The panel excluded the risk of interference with the investigation from the list of grounds for the detention since the investigation had been completed and an indictment lodged. It reiterated the arguments justifying the applicant’s detention on the grounds of the risk of absconding and reoffending. 15. On 12 April 2010 the Court of Appeal partially overturned the panel’s decision in relation to its reliance on the possibility of reoffending. It held that there was no risk of reoffending given that the applicant and his co-accused had been detained. However, the Court of Appeal upheld the panel’s finding regarding the risk of absconding and held that a further extension of the detention order had been justified on the basis of the gravity of the charges and the potential penalty. 16. Three-judge panels ordered further extensions of the pre-trial detention of the applicant and the other co-accused on 23 April, 19 May, 21 June, 22 July, 20 August, 20 September, 20 October, 18 November, 17 December 2010 and 17 January 2011. In each order the panel provided the following reasoning regarding the risk of absconding: “The material and verbal evidence adduced so far corroborates the reasonable suspicion that the accused have committed the crimes with which they are charged. Having regard to the nature, character and type of offences with which the accused have been charged, as well as the gravity of the charges and the potential penalty ... the panel considers that there is a real risk of flight if the accused are released. The risk of flight is further supported by the financial circumstances of the [accused] ... [the applicant] ... has been in conflict with the law ... The panel has taken into consideration the fact that the accused have families and children, and that [the applicant] has immovable property in his name, but it considers that the accused’s family and material situation are insufficient guarantees of their presence at trial ...” 17. The applicant appealed against the extension orders, arguing, inter alia, that the panels had not given sufficient reasons to substantiate the risk of his absconding, given that they had only relied on the gravity of the charges and the potential penalty. The panels had referred to his family situation and possessions, without providing an explanation for why they considered that those circumstances were not sufficient to guarantee his presence at trial. Lastly, the applicant sought his release and the replacement of the detention order with a more lenient measure, such as house arrest. 18. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding that the three‑judge panels had given sufficient reasons for the applicant’s continued detention. In decisions dated 13 May and 16 December 2010 the Court of Appeal stated: “The court considers that the circumstances related to the type, gravity and the specific circumstances of the criminal offences with which the accused has been charged, the manner in which the criminal offences were committed and the potential penalty, indicate a risk of flight if the accused is released in order to avoid eventual criminal responsibility for the criminal offences in question, as the first-instance court rightfully decided, providing sufficient reasoning, which this court finds acceptable. In that connection, the allegations made by the accused in his appeal are of no relevance and cannot be accepted as sufficient evidence that the accused, if released, will not abscond. In that connection, the court took into account the accused’s request to replace detention with house arrest or another, more lenient, measure ... but the court has dismissed that request because in its view, at this stage of the proceedings, custody in prison is the only effective measure to exclude the risk of the accused absconding ...” 19. Meanwhile, the applicant made several unsuccessful applications for release on bail. On 14 May 2010 he applied to the Skopje Court of First Instance for the detention order to be replaced with release on bail. As a guarantee he offered immovable property owned by third persons, valued at an estimated 860,221 euros (EUR), and offered to give his passport to the court as a further guarantee. 20. On 26 May 2010 a three-judge panel rejected the applicant’s bail application. On 3 June 2010 the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the applicant and upheld the panel’s decision. It held that the guarantees offered by the applicant were not sufficient to ensure his presence during the proceedings, given the gravity of the charges, the potential penalty and the complexity of the proceedings, which involved many defendants and a large volume of evidence. It also took note of the fact that the applicant had been convicted at first-instance in a separate set of criminal proceedings on similar charges. 21. On 23 July 2010 the applicant again applied for release on bail because his wife had had an operation and was unable to take care of their children. As security, he offered immovable property owned by third persons (accompanied by written statements by the owners certified by a notary public), whose value was estimated at EUR 1,230,614. Furthermore, another person offered to make a court deposit of EUR 100,000. 22. On 6 August 2010 a three-judge panel refused the applicant’s request, finding that the nature and the amount of bail offered by the applicant did not offer sufficient guarantees for his presence during the proceedings. On 30 September 2010 the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the applicant, relying on the gravity of the charges, the severity of the penalty and the complexity of the proceedings. It also took into account his previous history of being in conflict with the law and the fact that he had been convicted for similar offences by a first-instance judgment in another set of criminal proceedings. 23. On 25 October 2010 the applicant again applied for release on bail. He offered security of immovable property owned by third persons of an estimated value of EUR 1,230,614 and a court deposit of EUR 110,000. On 10 November 2010 a three-judge panel once again refused his bail application, relying on the gravity of the charges and the potential penalty. Additionally, it stated that the applicant had already been convicted in a separate set of criminal proceedings and sentenced to an effective prison sentence, although that conviction was still under appeal. The fact that the applicant had a family and possessions in the respondent State could not provide sufficient guarantees of his presence during the proceedings. Lastly, the applicant was advised that he could lodge an appeal against the decision with the Court of Appeal. 24. The applicant appealed against the panel’s decision. On 6 December 2010 the Skopje Court of Appeal upheld his appeal and overturned the panel’s decision. The court granted bail as requested and ordered the annulment of the applicant’s detention after the guarantee had been deposited. It further ordered that the applicant be put under house arrest. The Court of Appeal considered that the proposed bail was a sufficient guarantee of the applicant’s presence during the proceedings, given his personal circumstances and the gravity of the charges. 25. On 9 December 2010 the public prosecutor lodged a request for the protection of legality (барање за заштита на законитоста) with the Supreme Court. On 10 December 2010 the Supreme Court granted the prosecutor’s request and overturned the Court of Appeal’s decision of 6 December 2010, declaring the applicant’s appeal inadmissible. The Supreme Court held that the Criminal Proceedings Act explicitly excluded the possibility of an appeal against a panel decision dismissing a request for release. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal had not been allowed by law to decide on the merits of the applicant’s appeal and should have rejected it as inadmissible. 26. On 26 January 2011 the Skopje Court of First Instance convicted the applicant of the charges against him and sentenced him to twelve years’ imprisonment. The court also decided that he should remain in custody until the judgment had become final. The conviction was upheld on appeal.

5. In May 2008 the first applicant turned to the child welfare authorities because she was pregnant and was in a difficult situation: she did not have a permanent home and was temporarily staying with her parents, the fourth and fifth applicants. 6. When the first applicant was twenty-eight weeks’ pregnant she visited the local hospital and requested a late abortion. On 1 July 2008 the hospital sent a notice to the child welfare authorities indicating that the applicant was in need of guidance concerning the unborn child and follow-up with regard to motherhood. It also indicated that she needed to stay at a parent-child institution (“family centre”). The child welfare authorities opened a case with the first applicant’s consent. She agreed to stay at a family centre for three months after the child was born, so that her ability to give the child adequate care could be evaluated. 7. On 25 September 2008 the first applicant gave birth to a son, X, the second applicant. The identity of X’s father was unknown to the authorities and the first applicant refused to reveal his name. Four days later, on 29 September 2008, the first applicant and X moved to the family centre. For the first five days the fourth applicant (X’s grandmother) also stayed with them. The staff soon became concerned about the first applicant’s parenting abilities and X’s development. On 14 October 2008 they asked for an emergency meeting with the child welfare authorities because X had lost a lot of weight and the first applicant did not show any understanding of his needs. 8. On 17 October 2008 the first applicant withdrew her consent to stay at the family centre. She wanted to leave and take X with her. On the same day the child welfare authorities decided to take X into immediate compulsory care and place him in a foster home on an emergency basis. In the decision they stated that the family centre’s staff had had to check on the family every third hour to make sure that X was receiving enough food. Without those checks, they doubted whether X would have survived. After the placement, the first applicant had weekly half-hour visits with X. The fourth applicant (the grandmother) was present at most of the visits, the fifth (the grandfather) at some of them. 9. The first applicant appealed against the decision of the child welfare authorities to the County Social Welfare Board (fylkesnemnda for barnevern og sosiale saker), claiming that she and X could live together with her parents. Her mother, the fourth applicant, was staying at home and was willing to help take care of X. They were also willing to accept help from the child welfare authorities. 10. On 23 October 2008 the family centre drew up a report of the first and second applicants’ stay. The report stated, inter alia: “The mother does not care for her child in a satisfactory manner. During the time the mother and child have stayed [at the family centre] ..., the staff here ... have been very concerned that the child’s needs are not being met. In order to ensure that the child’s primary needs for care and food are met, the staff has intervened and followed-up the child closely day and night. The mother is not able to meet the boy’s practical care needs. She has not taken responsibility for caring for the boy in a satisfactory manner. The mother has needed guidance at a very basic level, and she has needed advice to be repeated to her several times. Throughout the stay, the mother has made statements that we find very worrying. She has expressed a significant lack of empathy for her son, and has several times expressed disgust with the child. The mother has demonstrated very little understanding of what the boy understands and what behaviours he can control. The mother’s mental functioning is inconsistent and she struggles considerably in several areas that are crucial to the ability to provide care. Her ability to provide practical care must be seen in light of this. The mother’s mental health is marked by difficult and painful feelings about who she herself is and how she perceives other people. The mother herself seems to have a considerable unmet care need. Our assessment is that the mother is incapable of providing care for the child. We are also of the opinion that the mother needs support and follow-up. As we have verbally communicated to the child welfare service, we believe it to be important that the mother is taken especially closely care of in the time following the emergency placement. The mother is vulnerable. She should be offered a psychological assessment and treatment, and probably needs help to find motivation for this. The mother should have an individual plan to ensure follow-up in several areas. The mother has resources (cf. the abilities tests) that she needs help to make good use of.” 11. On 26 October 2008 the County Social Welfare Board rejected the appeal (see paragraph 9 above). It concluded that it was the first applicant who would be responsible for the daily care of X, not the fourth applicant, and that the first applicant was unable to provide the care that X needed. Furthermore, the fourth applicant had stayed with the first applicant and X during the first days at the family centre, but had not noticed the first applicant’s lack of parenting skills, even though it had been obvious to the staff. 12. On 27 October 2008 X was sent to a child psychiatry clinic for an evaluation. The team at the clinic carried out six different observations between 3 and 24 November 2008. Their conclusions were set out in a report dated 5 December 2008, which read, inter alia: “[X] was a child with significantly delayed development when he was sent to us for evaluation and observations. Today he is functioning as a normal two-month-old baby, and has the possibility of a good normal development. He has, from what can be observed, been a child at high risk. For vulnerable children the lack of response and confirmation, or other interferences in interaction, can lead to more or less serious psychological and developmental disturbances if they do not get other corrective relationship experiences. The quality of the earliest interaction between a child and the closest caregiver is therefore of great importance for psychosocial and cognitive development. [X] bears the mark of good psychosocial and cognitive development now.” 13. The first applicant appealed against the Board’s decision of 26 October 2008 to the City Court (tingrett) which, on 26 January 2009, upheld it in full. In the judgment the court found that X had shown signs of both psychological and physical neglect when he was taken into local authority care. Moreover, it did not find that the first applicant’s abilities to take care of X had improved or that the support of the fourth and fifth applicants would be sufficient to ensure that X was given adequate care. The first applicant did not appeal to the High Court. 14. Following the judgment by the City Court on 26 January 2009, the local authorities applied to the County Social Welfare Board for a care order, submitting that the first applicant lacked parenting skills. 15. On 2 March 2009 the Board accepted the child welfare authorities’ application. X remained in the foster home where he had already been placed on an emergency basis in October 2008, when first taken into care (see paragraph 8 above). The Board also decided that contact rights for the first applicant should be fixed at six two-hour visits per year, under supervision. It concluded, on the basis of the report from the family centre, that if X were returned to the first applicant, there would be serious deficiencies in both the physical and psychological caregiving, which could not be remedied with assistance measures. For those reasons the Board found that it would be in the best interests of X to be placed in care. 16. The first applicant appealed against the Board’s decision and again submitted that the authorities had not tried to intervene in other ways before immediately taking X into care, and that the decision was based on insufficient evidence. 17. On 19 August 2009 the City Court overturned the Board’s decision and decided that X should be reunited with the first applicant, but that there was a need for a readjustment period. It found, inter alia, that X’s problems with weight gain could have been due to an eye infection. 18. As a consequence of the judgment, the first applicant’s visits with X were increased with the goal of reunification. According to the child welfare authorities, the visits were characterised by hostility from the first applicant and her parents towards the foster mother. The authorities claimed that after the visits, X had reacted strongly, he had become tired, anxious and insecure, and his sleeping patterns had changed. 19. The child welfare authorities appealed against the City Court’s judgment and concurrently applied for its implementation to be suspended. They claimed that it was unlikely that the eye infection could have been the reason for X’s slow weight gain. Moreover, the first applicant had had visits with X, but they had not worked well even though she had been given advice on how to improve them. X had had strong reactions after the visits. 20. On 8 September 2009, the City Court decided to suspend enforcement of its judgment until the High Court had adjudicated the case. 21. On 9 October 2009, the child welfare authorities decided to appoint two experts, a psychologist, B.S., and a family therapist, E.W.A., who submitted their report on 20 February 2010 (see paragraph 29 below). 22. Meanwhile, on 12 October 2009, the High Court (lagmannsrett) granted leave to appeal on the ground that the ruling of, or the procedure in, the City Court had been seriously flawed (see paragraph 66 below). It also upheld the City Court’s decision to suspend the implementation of the judgment. 23. On 3 March 2010, the High Court appointed an expert to assess the case, psychologist M.S., who also submitted a report. 24. In its judgment of 22 April 2010, the High Court confirmed the Board’s decision that X should be taken into compulsory care. It also reduced the first applicant’s contact rights to four two-hour visits per year. 25. The High Court had regard to the information in the report produced by the family centre on 23 October 2008 (see paragraph 10 above). It also took account of the family consultant’s testimony before the court, in which it had been stated that the first applicant’s mother had lived with her at the family centre for the first four nights. It went on to state: “It was particularly after this time that concerns grew about the practical care of the child. The agreement was that [the first applicant] was to report all nappy changes etc. and meals, but she did not. The child slept more than they were used to. [The family consultant] reacted to the child’s breathing and that he was sleeping through meals. Due to weight loss, he was to be fed every three hours around the clock. Sometimes, the staff had to pressure the mother into feeding her son.” 26. The High Court found that the family centre had made a correct evaluation and – contrary to the City Court – considered it very unlikely that the evaluation would have been different if X had not had an eye infection. 27. Furthermore, the High Court referred to the report of 5 December 2008 from the child psychiatry clinic (see paragraph 12 above). It also took into account the report of the court-appointed expert, M.S. (see paragraph 23 above). 28. As the stay at the family centre had been short, the High Court found it appropriate to consider the first applicant’s behaviour (“fungering”) during the contact sessions that had been organised subsequent to X’s placement in foster care. Two persons had been entrusted with the task of supervising the sessions, and both had written reports, none of which had been positive. The High Court stated that one of the supervisors had given an “overall negative description of the contact sessions”. 29. The High Court also referred to the report of the psychologist and the family therapist appointed by the child welfare authorities (see paragraph 21 above). They had assessed X in relation to the reactions that he had shown after visits from the first applicant. In their report, they noted, inter alia: “there does not seem to be much contact between the mother and [X], including in the periods with frequent contact sessions. He turns away from his mother and prefers to seek contact with others. He tries to distance and protect himself by protesting against his mother, by refusing to eat, by not looking at her and then seeking out the person to whom he has a secure attachment, namely his foster mother. [X] becomes uncertain and insecure when he is not ‘read’ and understood. ... ... the biggest source of stress for [X] is probably not meeting his mother and her extended family during the contact sessions in itself, but the amount of contact and the pressure arising from [utterances to the effect that] ‘now you’re coming back home’, and an atmosphere dominated by the mother’s hostility towards the foster mother. It is also a problem that the mother makes negative and offensive statements about the foster mother, so that the atmosphere becomes unpleasant and insecure. It is concluded that [X] has reached his tolerance threshold for contact on the occasions when he has fallen asleep immediately once the contact session is over, when he has cried afterwards, been difficult to regulate and calm down, and had difficulties sleeping.” 30. Furthermore, the High Court noted that the court-appointed psychologist, M.S. (see paragraph 23 above), stated in court that the contact sessions had appeared to be so negative that she was of the opinion that the mother should not have right of access to her son. The contact sessions were, in her view, “not constructive for the child”. In conclusion to the question of the first applicant’s competence as a carer, she stated in her report that the stay at the family centre had illustrated that the first applicant “had problems handling and retaining information in such a manner that it could be used to guide her behaviour”. She went on to state: “It is not a question of a lack of willingness, but of an inadequate ability to plan, organise and structure. Such manifestations of cognitive impairment will be invasive in relation to caring for the child and could result in neglect.” 31. The High Court agreed with the conclusion of expert M.S., before proceeding to the question whether assistance measures could sufficiently remedy the shortcomings in the first applicant’s lack of parenting skills. In that respect, it noted that the reasons for the deficiencies in competence as a carer were crucial. The High Court referred at this point to the expert’s elaboration on the first applicant’s medical history, namely how she had suffered from serious epilepsy since childhood and until brain surgery had been carried out in 2009, when the first applicant had been 19 years old. 32. The High Court noted that expert M.S. had also pointed out that the first applicant’s medical history must necessarily have affected her childhood in several ways. Her summary as regards the illness and its consequences read as follows: “Anamnestic information from the school, the specialist health service and the family provides an overall picture of weak learning capacity and social functioning from early childhood into adulthood. [The first applicant] performed poorly at school despite good framework conditions, considerable extra resources and good efforts and motivation on her own part. It is therefore difficult to see any other explanation for her performance than general learning difficulties caused by a fundamental cognitive impairment. This is underlined by her consistently low IQ score – regardless of the epilepsy surgery. She also had problems with socio-emotional functioning, which has also been a recurring topic in all documents that deal with [the first applicant’s] childhood and adolescence. A lack of social skills and social adaptation is reported, primarily related to social behaviour that is not adequate for her age (‘childish’) and poor impulse control. It is also stated that [the first applicant] has been very reserved and had low self-confidence, which must be seen in conjunction with her problems.” 33. The High Court based its assessment on the description of expert M.S. concerning the first applicant’s health problems and the impact they had had on her social skills and development. It further noted that placement at a family centre (see paragraphs 7-8 above) had been attempted as an assistance measure. The stay had been supposed to last for three months, but had been interrupted after just under three weeks. As a condition for staying longer, the first applicant had demanded a guarantee that she be allowed to take her son home with her after the stay. The child welfare authorities could not give such a guarantee, and the first applicant had therefore returned home on 17 October 2008. 34. The High Court noted that relevant assistance measures were assumed to consist of a supervisor and further help and training in how to care for children. However, the High Court found that it would take so long to provide the first applicant with sufficient training that it was not a real alternative to continued foster-home placement. Furthermore, the result of such training was uncertain. In this connection, the High Court attached weight to the fact that both the first applicant and her immediate family had said that they did not want follow-up or assistance if X was returned to them. It agreed with the conclusions of the court-appointed expert, M.S., who had stated in her report: “In my assessment, there are grounds for claiming that there were serious deficiencies in the care the child received from the mother, and also serious deficiencies in terms of the personal contact and security he needed according to his age and development. [The first applicant’s] cognitive impairment, personality functioning and inadequate ability to mentalise make it impossible to have a normal conversation with her about the physical and psychological needs of small children. Her assessments of the consequences of having the child returned to her care and what it will demand of her as a parent are very limited and infantile, with her own immediate needs, there and then, as the most predominant feature. It is therefore found that there is a risk of such deficiencies (as mentioned above) continuing if the child were to live with his mother. It is also found that satisfactory conditions for the child cannot be created with the mother by means of assistance measures under the Act relating to Child Welfare Services, section 4-4 (e.g. relief measures in the home or other parental support measures), due to a lack of trust and a reluctance to accept interference from the authorities – taking the case history into consideration.” 35. The High Court’s conclusions in its judgment of 22 April 2010 was that a care order was necessary and that assistance measures for the mother would not be sufficient to allow the son to stay with her. The conditions for issuing a care order under the second paragraph of section 4-12 of the Child Welfare Act were thus met (see paragraph 65 below). In this connection, the High Court also gave weight to the attachment that X had formed to his foster parents, particularly the foster mother. 36. The first applicant did not lodge an appeal against the judgment. 37. On 18 July 2011 the child welfare authorities requested the County Social Welfare Board to deprive the first applicant of her parental responsibility for X, which would then be transferred to the authorities, and to grant X’s foster parents, with whom he had stayed since he was taken into care (see paragraph 8 above), permission to adopt him. The identity of X’s biological father was still unknown to the authorities. In the alternative, the authorities’ proposed that the first applicant’s contact rights be removed. 38. On 29 July 2011 the first applicant applied for termination of the care order or, in the alternative, extended contact rights with X. 39. On 18 October 2011 the first applicant gave birth to Y, the third applicant. She had married the father of Y in the summer of that same year. The new family had moved to a different municipality. When the child welfare authorities in the first applicant’s former municipality became aware that she had given birth to another child, it sent a letter expressing concern to the new municipality, which started an investigation into her parenting abilities. 40. On 28, 29 and 30 November 2011 the County Social Welfare Board, composed of a lawyer, a psychologist and a lay person, held an oral hearing at which the first applicant was present together with her legal representative. Twenty-one witnesses were heard. 41. On 8 December 2011 the Board decided that the first applicant should be deprived of her parental responsibility for X and that X’s foster parents should be allowed to adopt him. The Board found that there was nothing in the case to indicate that the first applicant’s parenting abilities had improved since the High Court’s judgment of 22 April 2010. Therefore she was still considered incapable of giving X adequate care. Moreover, the Board stated: “In her statement before the County Social Welfare Board, the mother maintained her view that the care order was a conspiracy between the child welfare service, [the parent-child institution] and the foster parents for the purpose of ‘helping a woman who is unable to have children’. In the mother’s words, it was a question of ‘an advance order for a child’. The mother had not realised that she had neglected [X], and stated that she spent most of her time and energy on ‘the case’. The reports from the contact sessions between the mother and [X] consistently show that she is still unable to focus on [X] and what is best for him, but is influenced by her very negative view of the foster mother and of the child welfare service. [The first applicant] has married and had another child this autumn. Psychologist [K.M.] has stated before the Board that he observed good interaction between the mother and child and that the mother takes good care of the child. The Board takes note of this information. In the County Social Welfare Board’s opinion, this observation can in any case not be used as a basis for concluding that the mother has competence as a caregiver for [X]. The County Social Welfare Board finds it reasonable to assume that [X] is a particularly vulnerable child. He experienced serious and life-threatening neglect during the first three weeks of his life. Reference is also made to the fact that there have been many contact sessions with the mother, some of which have been very stressful for [X]. All in all, he has been through a lot. He has lived in the foster home for three years and does not know his biological mother. If [X] were to be returned to the care of his mother, this would require, among other things, a great capacity to empathise with and understand [X] and the problems he would experience, not least in the form of mourning and missing his foster parents. The mother and her family appeared to be completely devoid of any such empathy and understanding. Both the mother and grandmother stated that it would not be a problem, ‘he just had to be distracted’, and thus gave the impression of not having sympathy with the boy and therefore also being incapable of providing the psychological care he would need in the event of a return.” 42. In addition, the Board had especially noted the conclusions of expert M.S. They were quoted by the High Court in its judgment of 22 April 2010 (see paragraph 34 above). The Board found that this description of the first applicant was still accurate. In any event, it was decisive that X had established such a connection to his foster family that removing him would result in serious and permanent problems for him. 43. The Board assumed that the alternative to adoption would have been continued foster care on a long-term basis, and noted that the foster parents were X’s main caregivers and the ones he thought of as his parents. The foster parents were moreover considered suitable and wanted to take care of X as their own child. The Board made general reference to the Supreme Court’s decision in Norsk Retstidende (Rt.) 2007 page 561 (see paragraph 69 below) and found that the considerations underlying the following passage from that judgment – reiterated in Aune v. Norway, no. 52502/07, § 37, 28 October 2010 – were also pertinent to the present case: “‘A decision that he should remain a foster child would tell him that the people with whom he has always lived and who are his parents and with whom he established his earliest ties and sense of belonging should remain under the control of the Child Welfare Service — the public authorities — and that they are not viewed by society as his true parents but rather as foster parents under an agreement that can be terminated. ...’” 44. In conclusion, the adoption would be in X’s best interests. The Board took Article 8 of the Convention into consideration when making its decision. 45. The first applicant appealed against the decision, claiming that the Board had made a wrongful evaluation of the evidence when deciding that she was unable to give X adequate care. She considered that it would be in X’s best interest to be returned to her and stressed that her situation had changed drastically. The first applicant was now married and had another child that she was taking care of. She had a good support system in her husband and her extended family, and was also prepared to accept help from the child welfare authorities. Moreover, in her view, removing X from the foster home would only cause him problems in the short term; no long-term problems could be expected. She also claimed that the visits between her and X had worked well. 46. The child welfare authorities opposed the appeal and submitted that the first applicant’s ability to care for X had not changed since the High Court’s judgment of 22 April 2010. The visits between X and the first applicant had not worked well. She had had outbursts during the visits and had left before the time was up. Afterwards X had reacted negatively. The first applicant and her mother had manifested a very negative attitude towards the authorities. Moreover, X had a good attachment to his foster family and had lived with them for over three years. He was a vulnerable child and he needed a caregiver who was sensitive to his needs. They also noted that the first applicant had exposed X and their story on the Internet, together with pictures of them, which could be harmful for X. It was in the best interests of X to be adopted by the foster family. 47. On 22 February 2012 the City Court, comprised of one professional judge, one psychologist and one lay person, in accordance with section 36-4 of the Dispute Act (see paragraph 66 below), upheld the decision after having held an oral hearing which lasted for three days and during which twenty-one witnesses were heard. The first applicant was present together with her legal counsel. 48. The City Court initially noted that the first applicant’s general situation had improved. She had married in August of 2011, her husband had a permanent job and they had a daughter, Y. It also noted that the child welfare authorities in the couple’s current municipality were conducting an ongoing inquiry concerning the mother’s ability to care for Y. A staff member of the authorities in that new municipality had testified at the oral hearing, stating that they had not received any reports of concern other than that from the authorities in the first applicant’s former municipality. As part of their inquiry they had made observations at the first applicant’s home. They had observed many good things but also that the parents might need some help with routines and structure. The City Court found that this indicated that the authorities in the municipality to which the first applicant had moved thought that the parents could give Y adequate care if assisted by the authorities. She was not a child with any special care needs. 49. However, on the basis of the evidence, the situation was different with regard to X, whom several experts had described as a vulnerable child. The City Court referred in particular to a statement from a professional at the Children’s and Young People’s Psychiatric Out-Patient Clinic (Barne- og ungdomspsykiatrisk poliklinikk – BUP) explaining that, as late as December 2011, X was easily stressed and needed a lot of quiet, security and support. If he was to have a sound emotional development in the future, the carer would have to be aware of that and take it into account. When the first applicant gave evidence in court, she had clearly shown that she did not realise what challenges she would face if X were to be moved from the foster home. She could not see his vulnerability, her primary concern being that he should grow up “where he belonged”. The first applicant believed that returning him would be unproblematic and still did not understand why the child welfare authorities had had to intervene when he was placed in the emergency foster home. She had not wished to say anything about how she thought X was doing in the foster home. In the City Court’s view, the first applicant would not be sufficiently able to see or understand X’s special care needs, and if those needs were not met, there would be a considerable risk of abnormal development. 50. Furthermore, the City Court took account of how the foster parents and supervisor had described X’s emotional reactions after contact sessions with his mother in the form of inconsolable crying and his needing a lot of sleep. During the contact sessions, X had repeatedly resisted contact with the first applicant and, as the sessions had progressed, reacted with what had been described as resignation. The City Court considered that a possible reason for that could be that the boy was vulnerable to inexpedient interaction and information that was not adapted to his age and functioning. The first applicant’s emotional outbursts in situations during the contact sessions, for example when X had sought out his foster mother and called her “mummy”, were seen as potentially frightening and not conducive to X’s development. 51. The City Court held that the presentation of evidence had “clearly shown” that the “fundamental limitations” that had existed at the time of the High Court’s judgment still applied. Nothing had emerged during the City Court’s consideration of the case to indicate that the first applicant had developed a more positive attitude to the child welfare authorities or to the foster mother, beyond a statement made by her to the extent that she was willing to cooperate. She had snubbed the foster mother when she had said hello during the contact sessions and had never asked for information about X. The first applicant had left in frustration forty minutes before the last visit had been scheduled to end. Everyone who had been present during the contact sessions had described the atmosphere as unpleasant. The City Court considered that one possible reason why the first applicant’s competence at contact sessions had not improved was that she struggled so much with her own feelings and with missing X, that it made her incapable of considering the child’s perspective and protecting him from her own emotional outbursts. An improvement was contingent upon her understanding X and his needs and on her being willing to work on herself and her own weaknesses. The first applicant had not shown any positive developments in her competence in contact situations throughout the three years she had had rights of access. The fact that her parents, the fourth and fifth applicants, had a remarkably negative attitude to the municipal child welfare authorities did not make it any easier for her. 52. The first applicant had claimed in court that she was a victim of injustice and that she would fight until X was returned to her. To shed light on her own situation, she had chosen to post her story on the Internet in June 2011 with a photograph of herself and X. In that article and several comments posted during the autumn of 2011, she had made serious accusations against the child welfare authorities and the foster parents – accusations which she had admitted in court were untrue. The first applicant did not consider that public exposure and repeated legal proceedings could be harmful for the child in the long term. 53. The City Court noted that psychologist K.M., who had examined and treated the first applicant, had testified that she did not meet the criteria for any psychiatric diagnosis. He had counselled her in connection with the trauma inflicted on her by having her child taken away. The goal of the treatment had been to make the first applicant feel like a good mother. He believed that the previous assessments of the first applicant’s ability to provide care had at that time been incorrect, and argued before the City Court that the best outcome for X would be to be returned to his biological mother. However, the City Court stated that psychologist K.M.’s arguments had been based on research conducted in the 1960s, and found them to be incompatible with recent infant research. It noted that the other experts who had testified in court, including psychologists B.S. and M.S., had advised against returning X to his mother, as this would be very harmful for him. 54. In conclusion thus far, the City Court agreed with the County Social Welfare Board that the first applicant had not changed in such a way as to indicate that it was highly probable that she would be able to provide X with proper care. It endorsed the Board’s grounds, holding that the first applicant’s clear limitations as a carer could not be mitigated by an adapted transitional scheme, assistance measures or support from her network. It did not find reason to discuss other arguments regarding her ability to provide care in more detail, as returning X to her was in any case not an option owing to the serious problems it would cause him to be moved from the foster home. The City Court agreed at this point with the County Social Welfare Board in its finding that X had developed such attachment to his foster parents, his foster brother and the general foster home environment that it would lead to serious problems if he would have to move. X had his primary security and belonging in the foster home and he perceived the foster parents as his psychological parents. On those grounds, the care order could not be revoked. 55. Turning to the issues of deprivation of parental responsibility and consent to adoption, the City Court stated at the outset that when a care order has been issued, it is in principle sufficient for removal of parental rights that this is in the child’s best interests. At the same time, it had been emphasised in several Supreme Court judgments that removal of parental responsibility is a very invasive decision and that therefore strong reasons are required for making such a decision (see, inter alia, paragraph 67 below). The requirements in respect of adoption were even more stringent. However, the questions of deprivation of parental responsibility and consent to adoption had to be seen in conjunction, since the primary reason for depriving someone of parental responsibility would be to facilitate adoption. The court also took into consideration that if the mother retained her parental responsibility, she might engage in conflicts in the future about the rights that such responsibility entailed, such as exposing the child on the Internet. 56. The City Court went on to declare that adoption could only be granted if the four conditions in the third paragraph of section 4-20 of the Child Welfare Act were met (see paragraph 65 below). In the present case, the decisive factor would be whether adoption was in X’s best interests and whether consent for adoption should be given on the basis of an overall assessment. Regarding that assessment, several Supreme Court judgments had stated that strong reasons must exist for consenting to adoption against the will of a biological parent. There must be a high degree of certainty that adoption would be in the child’s best interests. It was also clear that the decision must be based not only on a concrete assessment, but also on general experience from child-psychology research. Reference was made to the Supreme Court’s judgment in Rt. 2007 page 561 (see paragraph 69 below). 57. Applying the general principles to the instant case, the City Court first noted that X was at the time three and a half years old and had lived in his foster home since he was three weeks old. His fundamental attachment in the social and psychological sense was to his foster parents, and it would in any event be a long-term placement. X was moreover a vulnerable child, and adoption would help to strengthen his sense of belonging with his foster parents, whom he regarded as his parents. It was particularly important to a child’s development to experience a secure and sound attachment to its psychological parents. Adoption would give X a sense of belonging and security in the years ahead for longer than the period a foster-home relationship would last. Practical considerations also indicated that persons who had care and control of a child and who in reality functioned as its parents should attend to the functions that followed from parental responsibility. 58. The City Court noted that adoption meant that the legal ties to the biological family were broken. In its opinion, X, despite spending the first three weeks of his life with his mother and having many contact sessions, had not bonded psychologically with her. That had remained the case even though he had been told at a later stage that the first applicant had given birth to him. 59. Furthermore, the court took account of the fact that even if no more contact sessions were organised, the foster parents had taken a positive view of letting X contact his biological parent if he so wished. 60. Based on an overall assessment, the City Court found that it would be in X’s best interests for the first applicant to be deprived of her parental responsibility and for the foster parents to be allowed to adopt him. The court believed that particularly weighty reasons existed for consenting to adoption in the case. 61. The City Court lastly stated that since it had decided that X should be adopted, it was unable to decide on contact rights for the first applicant, since that question would be up to the foster parents to decide on. It mentioned that section 4-20a of the Child Welfare Act provided a legal basis for fixing rights to access subsequent to adoption (see paragraph 65 below, where that provision is reiterated, and paragraph 72 below, on the “open adoption”-system). The City Court was, however, not competent to examine or decide on such rights since its competence was dependent on a party to the case having made a request to that effect. In the instant case, none of the parties had done so. 62. The first applicant appealed against the judgment, claiming that the City Court had evaluated the evidence incorrectly when considering her ability to give X the necessary care. She also argued that the City Court should have obtained an evaluation by an expert witness concerning her and her husband’s ability to provide adequate care. She submitted an evaluation made by the municipality in which she currently lived, dated 21 March 2012. 63. On 22 August 2012, the High Court decided not to grant leave to appeal. It stated that the case did not raise any new legal issues of importance for the uniform application of the law. As concerned the new evidence, the court noted that the evaluation dated 21 March 2012 had been made by, inter alia, an expert who had testified before the City Court and that the document would not change the outcome of the case. Moreover, it observed that the first applicant had not asked for an expert witness to be heard in the City Court and had not given any reasons as to why it was necessary to appoint an expert before the High Court. Thus there were no reasons for leave to appeal to be granted. 64. The first applicant appealed against the decision to the Supreme Court (Høyesterett) which, on 15 October 2012, refused leave to appeal.

7. The applicant company has its seat in Rovaniemi. 8. The applicant company is a limited liability company which was carrying out business in the asphalt sector until February 2000. In 2002 the Finnish Competition Authority (kilpailuvirasto, konkurrensverket) started to investigate whether the applicant company, among others, had been involved in nationwide or regional cartels in this sector. 9. On 31 March 2004 the Competition Authority lodged an application before the Market Court (markkinaoikeus, marknadsdomstolen), requesting that the court impose a penalty payment on the applicant company, among others, on the grounds that it had participated in a cartel from 1995 to 2000. 10. Between 14 November and 18 December 2006 the Market Court held an oral hearing in the course of which forty-eight witnesses were heard. Documentary evidence, including telephone recordings were also presented to the court. 11. On 19 December 2007 the Market Court found, inter alia, that the applicant company had taken part in a cartel in respect of asphalt contracts commissioned by the central government authorities, by participating in territorial allocation of markets, by participating to a minor degree in price-fixing activities and by participating in restrictions on the supply of asphalt mass. A penalty payment (seuraamusmaksu, påföljdsavgift) of 75,000 euros (EUR) was imposed on the applicant company. With regard to the allegation of territorial allocation and price-fixing in the markets for local government and private sector asphalt contracts, the Market Court found that the applicant company had not participated in a cartel. 12. The Market Court found that the territorial allocation of the markets and the bid-rigging between the companies involved in the cartel had amounted to a single continuous infringement of competition law rules, and that they were not to be regarded as individual unconnected infringements. According to the court, the infringements of competition law rules had lasted for more than seven years. Although some companies had participated in the infringements for a longer time than others, all the companies had infringed the competition law rules for three years at least. In addition, geographically, the infringements covered the entire country in respect of central government asphalt contracts, and several regions of the country in respect of local government and private sector contracts. 13. The Market Court found it established that between 1996 and 2000 the applicant company had agreed with three other asphalt companies about the allocation of central government asphalt contracts, and had done the same with three more asphalt companies between 1999 and 2000. Moreover, from 1996 until the end of 2000, the applicant company had agreed with another cartel company in advance the prices to be offered in competitive bidding, and had tendered accordingly. Between 1996 and 2000, as far as central government asphalt contracts were concerned, it had also agreed with the other cartel companies that none of them would supply asphalt mass to companies outside the cartel. The court held that the applicant company had infringed the prohibition on the division of markets by its above-mentioned conduct regarding central government asphalt contracts. 14. When considering the amount of the penalty payment the Market Court took into account, for each company, its turnover from the asphalt business in Finland during the last year of its participation in the infringement of competition law rules. In addition, considering the relatively low turnover of the applicant company, its market position, and the regionally limited scope of the related restriction of competition, the Market Court held that it was not justifiable to penalise the applicant company with a penalty payment exceeding the normal scale. 15. Concerning the evidence, the Market Court noted that evidence in competition law cases could be either direct or indirect, such as economic evidence. As direct evidence was not always available, an assessment was to be made of whether indirect evidence was sufficient to prove the existence of a cartel. The court found that, in the present case, the economic evidence alone was not sufficient to prove the existence of a cartel. The court also found that the existence of a cartel could not be proved on the basis of hearsay evidence. In the present case, the Market Court reached its conclusion in respect of the central government asphalt contracts by relying, inter alia, on the testimonies of eight witnesses. However, to the extent that those testimonies contained hearsay evidence, such evidence was not taken into account. As far as local government and private sector contracts were concerned, the Market Court analysed the evidence for restrictions of competition region by region and found it sufficient in respect of certain regions while insufficient in respect of others. As regards the regions where the applicant company was doing business (Northern Finland and North Karelia), the Market Court found that the evidence in support of a cartel was not sufficient. In this context, the Market Court stated, inter alia, that the testimonies of two witnesses who had been heard on this matter had been based solely on what the witnesses had heard from other people, whereas other witnesses had not given evidence that was capable of substantiating the existence of a cartel for local government and private sector contracts in this particular region. 16. In January 2008, the Competition Authority and the defendant companies, including the applicant company, lodged appeals at the Supreme Administrative Court (korkein hallinto-oikeus, högsta förvaltnings­domstolen). In its appeal, the Competition Authority contested the interpretation adopted by the Market Court as regards the scope of the cartel, arguing that there was nothing to suggest that the territorial allocation of markets did not encompass contracts in all the above mentioned categories of works and pointing out that the exclusion of supplies of asphalt mass outside the cartel companies affected competition in the entire sector. The Competition Authority maintained that there had been a single, nationwide cartel encompassing the entire market for state, local authority and private sector asphalt contracts. In so far as evidence was concerned, the Competition Authority argued, inter alia, that even hearsay evidence should have been taken into account by the Market Court. The company which had been found to play a leading role in the cartel lodged a partial appeal. In its appeal, the applicant company claimed that the Market Court had drawn the wrong conclusions from the evidence, as the Competition Authority had not been able to show that the company had participated in a cartel. In its response to the appeal brought by the Competition Authority, the applicant company reiterated its submissions already made before the Market Court and argued, inter alia, that reliance on any elements of hearsay in the evidence should remain excluded. 17. On 25 February 2009 the Supreme Administrative Court held a preparatory meeting with the parties for the oral hearing of the case. The oral hearing itself was held between 20 and 23 April 2009, at which the court again heard six key witnesses. Four of them had been called by the Competition Authority, and two by one of the asphalt companies. The parties, including the applicant company, did not ask the court to hear any other persons. 18. On 29 September 2009 the Supreme Administrative Court overturned the Market Court’s decision. In its judgment, the Supreme Administrative Court held that the Competition Authority’s application was well-founded in respect of all but one of the defendants. Inter alia, the Supreme Administrative Court concluded that the applicant company had participated in a nationwide cartel between May 1995 and 15 February 2000, and the applicant company was ordered to pay a penalty payment of EUR 500,000. 19. In regard to matters of procedure, the Supreme Administrative Court noted that the concept of “criminal charge” had an autonomous meaning in the established case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, and that therefore certain sanctions imposed in administrative-law proceedings fell within the scope of Article 6. The court stated that in the light of that case-law, the procedure for imposing a penalty payment under the Restriction of Competition Act had to be considered to fall within the scope of Article 6 (see Jussila v. Finland [GC], no. 73053/01, § 43, ECHR 2006‑XIV). The court further noted that the Court of Justice of the European Communities, when applying Article 6 as a part of the general principles of Community law, had held that the proceedings under Community competition law had to comply with the requirements of Article 6. The Supreme Administrative Court, citing the case of Jussila, considered that while Article 6 of the Convention under its criminal limb thus applied to proceedings imposing a penalty payment, in such cases the Article 6 requirements were not necessarily identical to the requirements which were applicable in the core areas of criminal procedure. 20. In its judgment, the Supreme Administrative Court made a number of general statements about the assessment of evidence in competition proceedings. It emphasised at the outset that the domestic legislation in this regard was based on the principle of free assessment of evidence. This meant, inter alia, that the court was to take into account all evidence adduced before the Market Court, in addition to the evidence adduced in its own proceedings, while also bearing in mind the finality of the Market Court’s findings to the extent that it had not been challenged by a party on appeal. 21. The court also referred to the particular difficulties in obtaining evidence of practices aimed at restricting competition. In this context, it cited the relevant case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The court thus recalled that as the prohibition of anti-competitive agreements and the penalties which offenders may incur are well known, it is normal for the activities relating to restrictive practices and agreements to take place in a clandestine fashion, for meetings to be held in secret, and for the associated documentation to be reduced to a minimum. Evidence of unlawful contact between economic operators will normally be only fragmentary and sparse, so that it is often necessary to reconstitute certain details by deduction. In most cases, the existence of an anti-competitive practice or agreement must be inferred from a number of coincidences and indicia which, taken together and in the absence of another plausible explanation, may constitute evidence of an infringement of the competition rules (see Aalborg Portland and Others v. the Commission, Joined cases C‑204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C‑219/00 P, ECLI:EU:C:2004:6, §§ 55-57). Accordingly, the competent court was not precluded from taking into account circumstantial evidence, or from drawing inferences from various elements of proof, including testimony containing references to what the witness has heard from others. Various factual elements attesting to similar events or patterns occurring in a given market, alongside other kinds of circumstantial evidence may, in the absence of any other reasonable explanation, demonstrate the existence of restrictive practices. Furthermore, the court cited case-law of the General Court of the EU emphasising that while the competition authority must produce sufficiently precise and consistent evidence to support the firm conviction that the alleged infringement of competition rules took place, it is not necessary for every item of evidence produced to satisfy those criteria in relation to every aspect of the infringement. It is sufficient if the body of evidence relied on, viewed as a whole, meets that requirement (see JFE Engineering Corp. and Others v. the Commission, Joined cases T-67/00, T-68/00, T-71/00 and T-78/00, ECLI:EU:T:2004:221, §§ 179-180). 22. The court stated that the evidence provided in a competition law case could not be subject to the same requirements as evidence in criminal cases, inter alia, because Finnish competition law was a part of EU competition law. In this regard, the court also cited case-law of the General Court of European Union (see BPB plc v. the Commission, Case T-53/03, ECLI:EU:T:2008:254, § 64), according to which a standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt cannot be required in competition cases. It further cited case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union according to which it is incumbent on the Commission as competition authority to prove the infringements of competition rules and to adduce evidence capable of demonstrating to the requisite legal standard the existence of the circumstances constituting an infringement, and where such evidence had been presented the court was entitled to consider that it was for the defendant to provide another explanation for the incriminating circumstances. This did not unduly reverse the burden of proof or set aside the presumption of innocence (see Montecatini Spa v. the Commission, Case C-235/92 P, ECLI:EU:C:1999:362, §§ 179-181). 23. According to the Supreme Administrative Court, circumstantial evidence as well as inferences could also be relied on for establishing prohibited cooperation in the absence of any alternative reasonable explanation. When drawing such inferences, the court was not precluded from taking into account hearsay evidence alongside other scattered evidence. It was essential to take a holistic approach to the evidence presented. When it came to the duration of the infringement of competition law rules, it was sufficient that the presented evidence related to facts sufficiently close in terms of time, in order that it could be established with reasonable certainty that the suspected infringement had continued without interruption between the dates when the alleged cartel had started and ended. 24. In this case, the Supreme Administrative Court had at its disposal all written evidence, including economic and financial evidence, as well as the records of statements made by all of the witnesses heard by the Market Court. The court also heard six witnesses in person. The gist of testimonies relied on is cited in the judgment. The court’s findings indicate, inter alia, that independently of each other, a number of witnesses mentioned examples from different geographical regions in different parts of Finland where the companies had agreed about the allocation of markets either by geographical regions or by the volumes of contracts. The witnesses expressed a common understanding that a cartel had dominated the Finnish asphalt markets throughout the country in respect of both local government and private sector contracts and central government contracts. Several witnesses also reported consistently on the practices by which the cartel companies had agreed the price to be offered by each of them in competitive bidding. The witnesses reported that the practices followed in competitive bidding had been intended to ensure that the markets were divided as agreed. The reported tendering practices were confirmed by the recordings of telephone calls presented as evidence, and by the written evidence relating to certain competitive biddings. Furthermore, the witnesses reported consistently on how the cartel had supervised the geographical division of the markets. In addition, three witnesses testified before the court about their experience regarding the alleged division of the markets, the related false invoices and the supply of cost-free asphalt mass, as well as some consistent hearsay. They testified that if the contracted works had not corresponded to the amounts agreed in advance, the company which had been awarded too many contracts would pay compensation to those which had received too few contracts, for example by means of false invoices. These witnesses also testified about the pressure exerted by cartel members on smaller companies to join the cartel and about measures taken to conceal the infringements. 25. On the basis of the evidence before it, the Supreme Administrative Court found that a single nationwide cartel had existed between 1994 and 2002 in respect of central and local government as well as private sector asphalt contracts. It found that the Competition Authority had presented extensive evidence of the existence of the cartel, by means of witness statements, documents, telephone recordings and other evidence. Although the evidence provided by the Competition Authority had not covered all incidents in the asphalt markets during the period covered by its application, either geographically or in terms of time, it had nevertheless permitted the court to get an overall picture of the functioning of the asphalt markets during the period in question. The evidence had excluded the possibility that the established facts were a matter of similar practices which had coincided accidentally. Taking into account what is generally known about the functioning of cartels on the basis of earlier experience and research, the most credible explanation for the similarity between the events which had occurred in different regions and the observations made by the witnesses was that the asphalt companies had agreed about the territorial allocation of the asphalt markets in the whole of Finland, as well as about the measures for implementing the agreed allocation in practice. In its final conclusion, the court stated that the Competition Authority had adduced extensive evidence of the existence of a cartel, while the defendants had not been able to refute the credibility or reliability of that evidence, nor the conclusions which the Competition Authority had drawn from it. 26. As to the applicant company’s participation in the cartel, the Supreme Administrative Court held that: “(1274) [o]n the basis of [the three witness] statements adduced before the Market Court and the Supreme Administrative Court and the written evidence consisting of the [chart on the geographical division of the markets], it has been shown that [the applicant company] took part in the cartel, in particular in Lapland and the North Karelia region. It had been agreed that the area of Northern Finland was allocated to [the applicant company], and in general the other cartel companies had no right to do business there. (1275) In addition, it has been shown that there were restrictions in respect of works on central government contracts as well as the supply of asphalt mass. When taking into account that works commissioned by the State were executed throughout the country, the restrictions relating to such contracts necessarily affected the whole State territory. (1276) On the above-mentioned grounds, [the applicant company] has participated in the nationwide cartel the existence of which the Supreme Administrative Court has found established in Part 9 of the present judgment.” 27. It further held that the applicant company had taken part in this cartel for almost five years. It had been established that the applicant company through its representatives had been an active operator in the cartel, taken initiatives for agreements regarding bidding for contracts, hampered the business of new and smaller companies in the market and exerted pressure on other companies to join the cartel. 28. The Supreme Administrative Court based its above mentioned findings concerning the applicant company on one witness statement given directly before it, which was corroborated by several witness statements given before the Market Court. The court noted that witnesses heard before it and the Market Court had given evidence about matters based on what they had experienced, heard or inferred concerning the applicant company’s conduct. Those statements could not be excluded when assessing the nature and extent of the restrictions of competition in which the applicant company had been involved. The court specifically stated that the economic evidence of the applicant company’s unusual financial performance was not taken into account as evidence of the existence of the cartel. Moreover, the court found that the applicant company had not been able to present any credible alternative explanations for its behaviour on the markets, or to refute the Competition Authority’s conclusions. 29. The applicant company had thus participated in a very serious and extensive cartel, which had aimed to eliminate all functioning competition in the Finnish asphalt markets and which had been particularly harmful for this sector. However, in determining the penalty payment, account was taken of the relatively small market share of the applicant company and the regional and temporal dimensions of the applicant company’s infringements, which were smaller than those of the prime participants in the cartel. 30. After the Supreme Administrative Court’s decision of 29 September 2009, and on the basis of that decision, the Finnish State and several municipalities brought compensation claims in the civil courts against the participants in the cartel, including the applicant company. Those claims amounted to several million euros in total. 31. On 28 November 2013 the Helsinki District Court (käräjäoikeus, tingsrätten) rejected the Finnish State’s claims against all asphalt companies, including the applicant company. The Finnish State was ordered to pay the asphalt companies’ litigation costs, some EUR 2.6 million. On the other hand, most of the municipalities won their cases against the asphalt companies. The applicant company lost two out of the four cases brought against it, but it was not ordered to pay any compensation to either of those two municipalities, since another asphalt company had already been ordered to do so. 32. The Finnish State appealed against the District Court judgment. Also, in three of the four cases which the municipalities had brought against the applicant company appeals were lodged with the Court of Appeal (hovioikeus, hovrätten). 33. On 20 October 2016 the Helsinki Court of Appeal accepted the claims of the Finnish State against the asphalt companies in four cases out of seven. The applicant company was among those asphalt companies which lost their case against the State, and it was ordered to pay some EUR 1.7 million in compensation to the State. Moreover, the Court of Appeal rejected the appeals of most of the municipalities. The applicant company thus won all of its three cases against the municipalities before the Court of Appeal. 34. The applicant company appealed against the judgment of the Court of Appeal in respect of the claim by the Finnish State which it had lost. Two of the three cases brought by the municipalities against the applicant company were also appealed against to the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen). 35. On 6 September 2017 the Supreme Court refused the applicant’s request for leave to appeal. The judgment of 20 October 2016 by the Court of Appeal thus became final in respect of the applicant company. 36. On 25 September 2014 the applicant company requested the Supreme Administrative Court to annul its decision of 29 September 2009. 37. On 3 January 2017 the Supreme Administrative Court decided to suspend the proceedings until the Strasbourg Court renders a decision in the present case.

5. The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Carate Urio (Como). 6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7. The applicant is a well-known Italian journalist. At the material time, specifically from January 2007 until 15 July 2008, he was the editor-in-chief of Libero, a national daily newspaper that sold around 125,000 copies per day. 8. On 17 February 2007 one of the main Italian newspapers, La Stampa, published an article covering the story of a thirteen-year old girl who had undergone an abortion. The article suggested that the girl had been forced to undergo the abortion by her parents and G.C., the guardianship judge (giudice tutelare) who had authorised the procedure. Later that day it was reported that there had been no pressure placed on the teenager, and that she had decided alone to terminate the pregnancy. This clarification was widely disseminated by different sources: in particular, the National Press Agency (ANSA) issued a number of press releases on 17 February 2007 clarifying the events; the television news bulletins broadcast by Rai2 and Rai3 (Italy’s public national television channels) reported that the news concerning the alleged pressure on the teenager was false; the newspapers Corriere della Sera and La Repubblica reported the facts of the case in the same vein. 9. On 18 February 2007 two articles were published in Libero concerning the events involving the teenager. Despite the clarification disseminated the previous day by other media, both articles reported that the girl had been forced to undergo an abortion by her parents and G.C. 10. The first article, written by an unknown person under the pseudonym “Dreyfus”, was entitled “Judge orders abortion. The law is stronger than life” (Il giudice ordina l’aborto. La legge più forte della vita). 11. It was worded as follows: “A teenager from Turin has been forced by her parents to [have an abortion] ... the magistrate has heard the parties and has applied the law – the law! – ordering the compulsory abortion ... she did not want. She struggled ... [N]ow the young mother (you are still considered as a mother even if your son died) is hospitalised as mentally ill. She had screamed in vain ‘if you kill my son, I will commit suicide’ ... if there were the death penalty, and if [it were ever] applicable, this would have been the case, [f]or the parents, the gynaecologist and [G.C.] ... the medicine and the judiciary are accomplices in the [coercive abortion]”. 12. The second article, written by the journalist A.M., was entitled “Forced to abort by her parents and the judge” (Costretta ad abortire dai genitori e dal giudice). The relevant parts read as follows: “Pregnant [girl] at the early age of thirteen undergoes abortion and is hospitalised in a psychiatric centre ...) After the abortion [the thirteen-year old girl] accused her family of forcing her to [have an abortion]...” 13. On 27 April 2007 G.C. filed a criminal complaint against the applicant and A.M. with the Milan District Court. The applicant was charged with defamation, aggravated by the fact that the offence consisted of imputing a specific fact (Article 595 §§ 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code), and failure of newspaper’s editor-in-chief to control what had been published – omesso controllo (Article 57 of the Criminal Code). 14. In a judgment of 26 January 2009, filed in the relevant registry on 20 March 2009, the District Court found the applicant guilty of omesso controllo, as far as the article drafted by A. M. was concerned, and of aggravated defamation since, as head of the newspaper, he was responsible for the article published under the pseudonym “Dreyfus”. The applicant was ordered to pay a fine of 5,000 euros (EUR), damages in the sum of EUR 10.000 and costs in the sum of EUR 2,500 (to be paid jointly with A.M.), with publication of the judgment in Libero. 15. It concluded: (i) that both articles contained false information, and (ii) that the content of both articles had severely damaged the reputation of the victim, clearly overstepping the boundaries of the applicant’s right to freely impart information. 16. The applicant lodged an appeal. 17. In its judgment of 17 June 2011, filed in the relevant registry on 24 June 2011, the Milan Court of Appeal quashed the first-instance judgment in part. It pointed out that the articles at issue had reported false information, since the thirteen-year old girl had decided alone to terminate the pregnancy. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal found that the penalty imposed was too lenient, particularly in the light of the seriousness of the offence committed, and a finding that the applicant was a recidivist. The Court of Appeal thus increased the penalty to one year and two months’ imprisonment, and upheld the fine of EUR 5,000. The Court of Appeal did not suspend the enforcement of the penalty and decided to record the conviction on the applicant’s criminal record. In addition, the damages were also increased from EUR 10,000 to EUR 30,000. 18. The applicant appealed on points of law. 19. In a judgment of 26 September 2012, deposited in the relevant registry on 23 October 2012, the Court of Cassation upheld the Court of Appeal’s findings, assessing, inter alia, the compatibility of the conviction and the sentence imposed in the light of the case-law of the Court. In particular, the Court of Cassation sought to justify the imposition of a custodial sentence by arguing that there were exceptional circumstances in the case. In particular, the imposition of the detention measure had been justified by a set of concurrent factors, such as the existence of the aggravating circumstance of “imputing a specific fact”; the applicant’s personality, his criminal record (the applicant being a recidivist) and the fact that the publication of false information had undermined the reputation of G.C., a member of the judiciary. 20. By a decision of 30 November 2012, filed in the relevant registry on the same date, the Milan Court responsible for the execution of sentences (Tribunale di Sorveglianza di Milano) ordered the applicant to serve his sentence under house arrest (pericolo di fuga), on the grounds that there was no risk that he might abscond. 21. On an unspecified date, relying on Article 87 § 11 of the Constitution, the applicant filed a request with the President of the Italian Republic to convert the remainder of the detention period into a fine. 22. By a decree of 21 December 2012 the applicant’s request was granted and his sentence was commuted into the payment of a EUR 15,532 fine. 23. In his decision to commute the applicant’s penalty, the President relied on the criticism expressed by the European Court of Human Rights with respect to the imposition of custodial sentences on journalists. He also expressed his concerns about the ongoing review of the legislation on defamation, which was on hold owing to difficulties in striking a balance between the need to set out more lenient sanctions while at the same time ensuring more effective redress measures. 24. The applicant spent twenty-one days under house arrest, starting 30 November 2012 until 21 December 2012, when he was released (see paragraphs 20-22).

5. The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Staro Oryahovo. 6. The applicant was driving his car along a road in the region of Varna on the evening of 10 March 2014. As established subsequently by the prosecution and the domestic courts in criminal proceedings opened into the incident that took place that evening, his car was weaving in an unsteady manner and he was spotted by patrolling police officers parked on the side of the road. They signalled for him to pull over, but instead of complying he sped away. According to the applicant’s own statements given in the context of those proceedings, he was afraid that the police would charge him or take his licence away as he had consumed alcohol earlier that evening. The prosecution and the courts established that the officers chased after him in their car, using flashing police lights and their siren. He only stopped when his car reached a field and could not go further. The police car stopped too. 7. The parties have presented differing accounts of the circumstances in which the applicant was arrested. 8. According to the applicant, one of the officers kicked him in the left leg and then pushed him violently to the ground as he was trying to get out of his vehicle. The applicant fell on his back and then three officers continued to kick him. The assault lasted a few minutes, after which they handcuffed him. One of the officers hit him on the head with a rubber truncheon before they drove him to the police station. 9. According to the police officers, the applicant had jumped out of his car after it had come to a halt and had started running through the field in an attempt to escape. The officers had run after him, the applicant had slipped and fallen and the police had caught up with him. As he had resisted arrest, wriggling and struggling, they had used force which had consisted in twisting his arms in order to handcuff him. Once they had managed to handcuff him, the officers had driven him to the police station. 10. According to written statements made during the criminal proceedings by several police officers present at the police station when the applicant was taken there, he told everyone present at the time that his clothes were muddy because he had tripped and fallen, which was also why he had a limp. As stated by the officers and by the applicant himself in the course of those proceedings, he made no complaints at that point in time. According to police records of the evening when the applicant was arrested, he refused to take an alcohol test or to sign the arrest report and was given a fine for refusing the alcohol test. As it emerges from the officers’ statements, they discovered that he had no identity documents on him and called his brother, who brought them to the police station accompanied by a friend. The records indicate that the officers released the applicant immediately after checking his papers. 11. According to a written statement made on 11 March 2014 by the applicant’s brother to the police in the context of an official follow-up conducted into the events, on leaving the station, he asked him what had happened but the applicant stated that he did not wish to speak about it and preferred to be left alone in his home. Instead, his brother drove him to the local medical centre as he had noticed that the applicant was having difficulties breathing. On examination, a doctor noted a suspected broken left ankle and told the applicant to go to hospital. No ambulance was provided and the applicant’s brother drove him there. It follows from medical documents that the doctors operated on him immediately as they had established that he had a broken rib which had pierced one of his lungs. 12. The applicant’s hospital record, signed by the doctor who had treated him and the head of the unit, stated that the applicant had been in hospital between 11 and 14 March 2014 and that he had a broken rib and a broken ankle. Upon his discharge on 14 March 2014, a different doctor examined the applicant and issued him with a medical certificate which recorded that he had a broken rib, a bruise of about 8 mm on his right eyebrow, and a fracture of the fibula close to the ankle that was in a cast. It also contained the phrase that it was not excluded that the injuries had been sustained in the manner suggested by the applicant, namely as a result of being hit or kicked. The certificate stated that no other traumatic injuries were present. 13. On 11 March 2014 the police officer in charge of radio communications between patrolling officers and who was on duty on the night of the incident produced a written report to provide information for his superior and to receive whatever orders were deemed necessary. As well as repeating the account of the two arresting officers, he stated that he personally had seen the applicant at the station and that the applicant had told him that he had fallen while running and that his back was hurting. The officer had offered to call in medical staff from the local medical centre to check the applicant on the spot, but he had refused, saying that he did not need a doctor and wished to be released instead. 14. A different police officer was sent to the local medical centre. In a written report he drew up on 11 March 2014 on his visit, he confirmed the existence of a record there that the applicant had visited it the previous evening and had been checked by a doctor who had directed him to the hospital for treatment of a suspected fractured ankle. Another officer visited the hospital the same day. In a written report he listed his findings, namely that the applicant had been admitted and treated for a broken rib and broken leg the previous night. The report indicated that in a conversation with the applicant conducted during that visit, the latter had told the officer that he could not remember the events in detail, but that he was certain that after the car chase two police officers had beaten and then handcuffed him before taking him to the police station. The applicant also gave a handwritten statement to an officer that day. In it he referred to the car chase, stated that he had wanted to escape as he had felt drunk, that when he had got out of his car the policemen had grabbed him, that one of them had pulled him to the ground and that the other one had handcuffed him. He concluded by saying that the injuries had most likely been caused during his arrest, given that immediately beforehand he had only been driving his car and did not remember breaking his leg and rib when he had brought the car to a stop. 15. On the same day the applicant’s brother also gave a written statement to the police (see paragraph 11 above). 16. The two police officers involved in the car chase and the arrest also gave written statements on 11 March 2014. In addition to the description above (see paragraph 9), the officers stated that once the applicant had been handcuffed and put inside the police car, he had leaned on one of them and moaned. When asked if he had a problem and wished to be taken to a medical centre, he had refused and said, “It’s nothing”. At the police station the applicant had refused to be tested for alcohol or to sign the arrest report. 17. On 13 March 2014 the Varna District Prosecutor, acting on his own initiative, opened criminal proceedings in relation to the conduct of the two officers who had arrested the applicant. The order for the opening of those proceedings indicated that it was “against the guilty official from the Ministry of the Interior who, acting in the context of his professional functions, had caused bodily harm to the applicant on 10 March 2014 in Varna”. A number of investigative steps were carried out. The investigating authorities questioned several police officers as witnesses, including the two involved in the applicant’s arrest and those who had been at the police station on the night of the incident. The latter all stated that they had seen the applicant at the police station on the night in question. He had been calm, had smelt of alcohol and been visibly intoxicated, his clothes had been muddy and he had limped. The applicant, his brother and the friend of the brother who had accompanied him to collect the applicant from the police station, were also interviewed. The brother and his friend stated that the applicant had not told them anything about the circumstances of his arrest and that the brother had learned that the applicant had been beaten by the police from the doctors at the hospital. 18. A forensic medical expert was appointed on 30 May 2014 to establish the nature of the injuries sustained by the applicant and the type of instrument used. The expert was given a list of specific questions that needed to be answered. The forensic medical report, containing a comprehensive and independent assessment, concluded that the three injuries recorded in the medical certificates drawn up in the immediate aftermath of the events (see paragraph 12 above) were incompatible with the applicant’s allegations that the officers had hit him all over his body for a few minutes. In particular, being kicked by someone wearing boots or being hit for several minutes would have left the applicant with many more traces on different parts of his body, not just the three strictly localised injuries mentioned above. The report further indicated that the injuries could have been received as a result of falling over while moving in accelerated fashion, for example by running and falling. 19. In a decree of 31 October 2014 for terminating the criminal proceedings, the prosecution established that the version of events given by the applicant at different stages of his questioning were not consistent. In particular, he had stated initially that he had sprained his ankle after tripping and falling, but had later changed his story and said that the injury had been the result of an intentional and prolonged beating by police officers. Furthermore, when questioned on 27 March 2014, the applicant had stated that the police officers had started hitting and kicking him after he had left his car voluntarily. When interviewed again on 28 May 2014, he had asserted that the officers had brutally pulled him out of the car and had thereafter only kicked him rather than hit him. He had tried to use his arms to protect his head from the kicks. He had stated that he could not remember or recognise the police officers who had beaten him, whether in a personal confrontation or from pictures. He had also complained that three officers had beaten him, while it had been unequivocally established that there had only been two patrolling officers. In addition, when on 6 October 2014 the investigator had handed the investigation file over to the applicant, he had signed the related acknowledgement, indicating that he did not wish to acquaint himself with the evidence, read the documents in the file, which was voluminous, and that he had no requests, comments or objections to the investigation. 20. The prosecutor concluded in the decree for termination of the proceedings that the applicant’s complaints were not supported by the evidence. The force used by the officers had been necessary for neutralising and detaining him in the circumstances, given that he had effectively been running away from the police and actively disobeying their orders to stop. The force had involved one officer holding the applicant on the ground, using one knee to press on his body, while the second officer had helped by handcuffing him. There was no evidence pointing to the officers having used violence or undue force when apprehending the applicant. The applicant challenged the prosecutor’s decision in court. 21. The prosecutor’s decision to terminate the proceedings was confirmed at two levels of jurisdiction. In particular, the first-instance court, the Varna District Court, observed in its decision of 24 November 2014 that two officers had arrested the applicant after a long car chase, when he had tried to escape despite clear orders to the contrary. The officers had worn police uniforms that had been clearly visible and identifiable and had been driving a police car with flashing police lights and a siren while chasing the applicant. He had not only refused to stop but had actively avoided being caught. As to the differing versions of the events thereafter, the court found that the applicant’s submissions were inconsistent and not supported by the evidence. As a consequence, the court gave no weight to his testimony, finding that it was incompatible with the rest of the evidence. 22. The second-instance court, the Varna Regional Court, upheld those findings in a final decision on 9 January 2015.

4. The applicants were born in 1971 and 1976 respectively and are detained in Kharp. 5. The applicants were co-defendants in domestic criminal proceedings. 6. In July 2003 the applicant was arrested in the town of Syktyvkar on suspicion of committing a criminal offence. He was ordered not to leave his town of residence. He was subsequently detained on an unspecified date. His detention was later extended. On 29 January 2004 the Syktyvkar Town Court extended his detention until 19 February 2004. On 18 February 2004 the prosecuting authorities completed their pre-trial investigation and submitted the case for trial. On 10 March 2004 the Syktyvkar Town Court extended the applicant’s detention. On 21 April 2004 the trial judge returned the criminal case to the prosecutor and dismissed the defence’s application for release, thereby maintaining detention on remand. 7. The applicant was also accused of committing a criminal offence in the town of Ivanovo. In April 2004 the Syktyvkar Town Court ordered his detention in relation to this criminal offence too. 8. Subsequently, the related proceedings were pursued before the courts in the town of Ivanovo. 9. On 3 August 2004 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Ivanovo extended the applicant’s detention “pending investigation” (under Article 109 of the Code of Criminal Procedure – hereinafter “the CCrP”) until 5 October 2004. 10. On 13 September 2004 the District Court scheduled a preliminary hearing in the criminal case and also held that the applicant should remain in detention, pending trial (Article 228 of the CCrP). 11. In December 2004 a local newspaper published an article recounting the relevant events and also indicating that the accused should be presumed innocent until proved guilty. 12. In the meantime, it appears that the district judge returned the case to the prosecutor, which entailed, apparently, modifying the legal basis for the applicant’s detention pending trial (Article 255 of the CCrP) or pending investigation (Article 109 of the CCrP); this in turn necessitated the re‑calculation of the respective periods of detention. 13. In particular, on 20 December 2004 the judge decided to return the criminal case to the prosecutor (Article 237 of the CCrP) and held that the applicant should remain in detention. The applicant appealed. On 14 February 2005 the Ivanovo Regional Court upheld the judgment. 14. On 18 February 2005 the prosecutor received the case file. 15. On 9 March 2005 the prosecutor lodged an application for a fresh detention order to be issued (apparently under Article 109 of the CCrP, since the case was again “pending investigation”). 16. On 14 March 2005 the District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 4 June 2005. On 24 March 2005 the Regional Court upheld the judgment. These court decisions were examined on 3 March 2006 by the Presidium of the Regional Court on supervisory review. The Presidium upheld them, also stating that the applicant’s detention between October 2004 and March 2005 had been lawful. 17. In the meantime, the applicant lodged an application for release. On 1 February 2006 the District Court dismissed it. The applicant appealed. On 23 March 2006 the Regional Court stated that this decision was not appealable. 18. In the meantime, on 20 February 2006, the District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 23 May 2006. On 23 March 2006 the Regional Court upheld this extension. 19. It appears that, in the meantime, in February 2006 the court again returned the case to the prosecutor. Apparently, the case was resubmitted to the court in or around August 2006. 20. On 21 December 2006 the applicant was convicted of an armed robbery undertaken by a group of people. On 14 June 2007 the Regional Court upheld the judgment. 21. Mr Mityanin brought a civil claim under Article 1070 § 1 and Article 1100 of the Civil Code for compensation because there had been no valid court decision authorising his detention from 20 February until 10 March 2004 (see above). By a judgment of 4 October 2012 the Town Court ruled that (i) during the relevant period the case against the applicant had been pending before the trial court and that his continued detention had thus been lawful; and (ii) in the absence of any element of illegality there was no legal basis for awarding compensation. It stated as follows: “The detention matter had been determined by a court and in compliance with the rules that had been applicable at the time. The staff of the detention centre had no legal reasons for releasing [the applicant] after 19 February 2004, including in view of the absence of any information from the prosecutor that the case had been submitted for trial to the Town Court. Consequently, [the applicant’s] detention from 19 February to 27 April 2004 was lawful. In addition, this court takes into account the decision of 21 April 2004 in the part concerning the dismissal of the application for release and the decision to maintain detention on remand. Hence, as regards the object of this case, there has been no violation of the rights or freedoms (including those under Article 5 of the Convention) ... Since the detention was lawful, there is no lawful basis for compensation on account of any non-pecuniary damage ...” 22. On 27 December 2012 the Komi Regional Court upheld the judgment. “Under Article 227 §§ 1 and 3 of the CCrP receiving a criminal case a judge must forward it if another court is competent, to list a preliminary hearing or list a hearing. Where a case concerns a defendant who is detained on remand, a judge must decide within fourteen days. Pursuant to Article 228 § 3 of the CCrP a judge must also determine whether the preventive measure should be amended or cancelled ... It follows from those rules that as soon as a criminal case is submitted for trial the detention matter is decided under Article 227 of the CCrP. The authorised period of detention had not yet expired when the case was submitted for trial. The detention matter was then determined by the judge within the applicable time-limits. Thus, there is no legal basis for awarding compensation. Pursuant to Article 61 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a court is bound in respect of the circumstances that were ascertained by a final and enforceable court decision in another case. Those circumstances cannot be contested during the examination of another case between the same parties ... Thus, it was correctly taken into account that the Regional Court of the Komi Republic had stated in its decision of 25 May 2012 (in reply to an application for release) that the detention from 19 February to 27 April 2004 had been lawful.” 23. On 12 January 2008 the authorities in Syktyvkar opened criminal proceedings against the applicants and others under Article 210 of the Criminal Code in respect of the creation and functioning of a “criminal community” (преступное сообщество). 24. On an unspecified date Mr Mityanin was formally charged with this criminal offence. 25. On 18 January 2008 a local newspaper published an article entitled “Boxers in detention”, stating that it was the first time that a criminal case under this provision of the Criminal Code had been initiated in the region and that it concerned well-known sportsmen. 26. The article read as follows: “This is the first time that the law-enforcement authorities of the region have filed charges against a group of former sportsmen, [having accused] them of running a criminal community. ... Officially, they are all businessmen, sports benefactors or organisers of various sports events. Unofficially, the law-enforcement authorities believe, they are members of the so-called Loginovskaya Gang, which was created in the second half of the 1990s ... According to information [issued by] the press office of the FSB [the Federal Security Service], the gang members devised an efficient mechanism of securing regular income by way of extortion from businessmen. Those who did not cooperate were subjected to various forms of pressure, such as arson in respect of businesses or vehicles, or violence ... The law-enforcement authorities have been working on the gang for several years. On 12 January 2008 the investigating unit of the regional department of the FSB initiated criminal proceedings against the gang leaders and active members. They are accused of committing an offence under Article 210 of the Criminal Code (“Running a criminal community”). Lawyers say that this Article of the Criminal Code is rarely used because it is exceedingly difficult to prove the running of a criminal community. In our region this is the first time it is being used ... According to information [issued by] the press office of the regional department of the FSB, two more persons – [the first applicant’s first name and last name] and [the second applicant’s first name and last name] – are already serving prison terms for other offences. In December 2006 the Ivanovo [District Court] convicted them of robbery. [The first applicant’s last name] was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment ... The arrest of the suspects received wide coverage in the Ezhvinskiy district of Syktyvkar ...” 27. The article was accompanied by photographs of the arrested people, including the applicant. 28. Mr Mityanin brought court proceedings under Articles 152 and 152.1 of the Civil Code (see paragraphs 43-45 below) against the newspaper. According to the applicant, it was stated in the article that he had been an active member of the so-called “Loginovskaya Gang”, which had lived off income from the extortion and “protection” of businesses, with recourse to violence against, and the destruction of the property of, business people who refused to cooperate. The applicant sought, inter alia, a refutation (опровержение) of the allegation that he was an active member of the criminal community, considering this statement to be defamatory. According to the applicant, the author of the article (who referred to official sources) implied that the applicant had been a member of a notorious “gang”, and that he was therefore guilty of committing an offence under Article 210 of the Criminal Code. 29. By a judgment of 17 October 2011, the Syktyvkar Town Court of the Komi Republic dismissed Mr Mityanin’s claims. The court considered that the applicant had not proved that the information in the article had been untrue, and that that information had corresponded to the fact that there was an ongoing criminal investigation in respect of, inter alia, the applicant. A successful defamation claim would require that the following conditions be met cumulatively: (i) the information in question had been disseminated to at least one other person; (ii) the content of such information had tarnished the dignity, honour or business reputation of the person concerned; and (iii) the information did “not correspond to reality” (that is to say it [was] untruthful). The court concluded that the applicant had failed to establish the falsity of the contested information. Lastly, noting that a newspaper was not required to verify information coming from an official source, the court ruled that the case disclosed an exception to the requirement that consent had to be given for the publishing of information relating to one’s private life and one’s photograph. In the court’s view, as required in order for a statutory exception to be made, the case disclosed “an interest relating to public and State security”, while the publication had been aimed at informing the public of the “appearance of a person in relation to a criminal investigation”. The judgment also reads as follows: “Having obtained the investigator’s approval, the press officer of the regional department of the Federal Security Service provided the respondent with information about the criminal investigation opened in respect of the claimant and [the] implication [of his involvement] in the criminal community ... The investigating authority was interested in receiving further information, in particular as regards possible eyewitnesses to the crimes. Thus, the respondent was given the above‑mentioned information and [the applicant’s] photograph.” 30. Mr Mityanin lodged an appeal against the Syktyvkar Town Court’s judgment. On 8 December 2011 the Komi Regional Court upheld the judgment, referring to the fact that the newspaper had acquired the contested information from an official source, had referred to this source in the article, and had merely recounted this information. The appeal court pointed out that the information had been true and non-defamatory, since it had “corresponded to the information [adduced by] the preliminary investigation”; it was important to apprise the public of the appearance of the person in relation to a case receiving media coverage. 31. In the meantime, in a separate defamation case the applicant challenged another article (apparently with similar content) published by another newspaper in April 2011. By a default judgment (заочное решение – that is to say without hearing either of the parties) of 7 September 2011, the Town Court considered that the respondent had failed to prove the veracity of the impugned statements; the court awarded Mr Mityanin 5,000 Russian roubles (RUB) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and ordered the newspaper to publish a refutation. It appears that this judgment was not appealed against, and thus became final. The applicant subsequently referred to the judgment of 7 September 2011 in the course of the criminal trial, alleging a violation of the presumption of innocence. The court refused to allow a copy of the judgment to be placed in the case file, considering, inter alia, that the findings of the civil court were irrelevant for the determination of the criminal charge. 32. It appears that on 23 June 2014 the applicant was convicted of several counts of multiple offences (including murder and membership of a criminal community) and sentenced to life imprisonment. The applicant submits that in the statement of appeal he and his co-defendants raised certain arguments relating to the above-mentioned publication. On 10 July 2015 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the judgment. 33. On 4 December 2003 the applicant was arrested in the town of Syktyvkar on suspicion of committing robbery and theft in Syktyvkar. On 5 December 2003 the Syktyvkar Town Court authorised his detention. On 29 January 2004 his detention was extended until 19 February 2004. On an unspecified date, the prosecutor completed the investigation and submitted the case for trial. On 21 April 2004 the judge returned the case to the prosecutor, and held that the preventive measure of detention should remain unchanged. On 27 April 2004 an investigator ordered the applicant’s release in exchange for an undertaking from him not to leave his area of residence. However, the applicant was not released. 34. In separate proceedings, in March 2004 the applicant was charged in relation to an armed robbery in the town of Ivanovo. On 29 April 2004 the Ukhtinskiy Town Court of the Komi Republic authorised the applicant’s detention pending investigation in relation to this robbery. The applicant did not appeal. 35. The applicant was then transferred to the town of Ivanovo for further proceedings. 36. On 24 June 2004 his detention was extended until 5 August 2004; on 3 August 2004 his detention was extended until 5 October 2004. On 7 September 2004 the case was submitted to the Oktyabrskiy District Court of the Ivanovo Region. On 13 September 2004 the District Court ordered that the applicant’s detention pending trial be continued. Later on, the judge returned the case to the prosecutor. It was resubmitted to the judge on an unspecified date. On 20 December 2004 the District Court again returned the criminal case to the prosecutor and, inter alia, ordered him to redraft the bill of indictment. The District Court also ordered that the applicant be kept in detention pending the prosecutor’s further actions. On 14 February 2005 the Regional Court upheld the above-mentioned decisions. The applicant’s detention was extended in 2005. In August 2005 the criminal case was resubmitted for trial before the District Court. It appears that in February 2006 the court again returned the case to the prosecutor. Apparently, the case was resubmitted to the court in or around August 2006. 37. On 21 December 2006 the applicant was convicted of a number of criminal offences. He was then transferred to a prison in the Komi Republic. 38. In 2012 the applicant lodged complaints concerning the lawfulness of his detention from 19 February until 29 April 2004. The relevant prosecutor’s office refused to deal with this complaint. He challenged it under Chapter 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter “the CCP” – see paragraph 53 below) and asked to be taken to a court hearing from the detention facility. The Syktyvkar Town Court replied to the motion by indicating that the motion would be dealt with at a hearing on the merits. By a judgment of 24 September 2012 the Town Court heard the respondent and dismissed the applicant’s complaint. The court indicated in the judgment that it was appropriate to examine the case without the claimant being present because the applicable legislation made no provision for conveying a claimant to a court hearing. As to the merits of the complaint, the court indicated that the applicant’s complaint had been dealt with the appropriate official, in compliance with the applicable procedure and that the official had provided reasons for dismissing the complaint. The applicant appealed; on 3 December 2012 the Komi Regional Court upheld this judgment. 39. The applicant also brought proceedings (again under Chapter 25 of the CCP) against the head of the relevant remand centre, who had kept him there allegedly unlawfully during the contested period. On 24 September 2012 the same judge of the Town Court heard the respondent and rejected the applicant’s claims in that case too. Having listed the relevant provisions of Article 5 of the Convention, the CCrP and the Code of Civil Procedure as well as the procedural history of the criminal case (see paragraphs 33-34 above), the court concluded that the applicant’s detention during the impugned period had been in compliance with the legislation in force at the time in question; that the head of the remand centre had had no legal basis for releasing the applicant, having information that the criminal case had been pending before a trial court. On 3 December 2012 the Regional Court upheld the judgment, considering as follows: “The first-instance established the relevant circumstances and based its judgment on the provisions of the CCrP. It was right to conclude that there had been no legal basis for releasing the applicant after 19 February 2004, given that the head of the remand centre had had information that the criminal case had been submitted for trial. Thus, [the applicant’s] detention from 19 February to 29 April 2004 had been lawful ... The court was correct to dismiss the argument that, receiving no extension decision, the head of the remand centre should have released [the applicant] after 19 February 2004 ... Article 255 § 2 of the CCrP provides that the detention pending trial should not exceed six months, except for situations listed in paragraph 3 ... Thereafter, the relevant court can extend detention in cases relating to serious and particularly serious offences ... Thus, given that the criminal case was submitted for trial before the Syktyvkar Town Court and taking note of the decision of 21 April 2004 (in the part relating to the dismissal of the application for release), this decision should be de facto considered as a decision to extend [the applicant’s] detention within the time-limits mentioned in Article 255 of the CCrP ...”

4. The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Yerevan. 5. On 5 October 2001 the Government adopted Decree no. 950 by which it approved the procedure for the designation of plots of land and real estate situated within Yerevan as alienation zones, and established rules for the payment of compensation, price offers, and their implementation. 6. On 1 August 2002 the Government adopted Decree no. 1151-N by which it approved as an alienation zone real estate situated within the administrative boundaries of the Kentron District of Yerevan, containing land to be taken for State needs with a total area of 345,000 square metres. 7. A special body, the “Yerevan Construction and Investment Project Implementation Agency” (hereinafter “the Agency”), was set up to manage the implementation of the project. 8. The applicant owned a building measuring 240.2 square metres and had a lease on the plot of land on which it stood, measuring 437.8 square metres, situated in the centre of Yerevan. This property was included in the alienation zone of real estate to be taken for State needs. The applicant had acquired these pieces of property on 17 December 2003 for 1,000,000 Armenian drams (AMD, approximately 1,767 euros (EUR) at the material time). 9. On 7 September 2004 the applicant signed an agreement with the Agency by which she gave up her property for 265,020 US dollars (USD). The contract also provided for a financial incentive of USD 78,006 to be paid to the applicant. Thus, the final amount of the sale, including the additional 15% required by law, was equal to USD 394,479, of which the applicant received USD 355,031, as USD 39,447 was levied as income tax. 10. On 13 January 2006 the Anti-Corruption Department of the Prosecutor General’s Office instituted criminal proceedings against Agency officials for deliberately overestimating the market value of the applicant’s property and overpaying her. The applicant testified as a witness in the course of the investigation of the criminal case. 11. According to the applicant, at some point during the proceedings the head of the Agency demanded that she pay back USD 180,000, otherwise she could be held criminally liable for appropriation of State funds. On 3 February 2006 the applicant transferred AMD 75,820,000 (approximately EUR 133,958) to the Agency’s account. 12. By a prosecutor’s decision of 28 February 2006 the investigation of the case was terminated for absence of evidence that a crime had been committed. The relevant parts of this decision state the following: “...it has not been established that [a number of residents of the expropriation zone] had fraudulently misappropriated others’ property ... and therefore their actions lack corpus delicti. As a result of the investigation of the criminal case it has not been established that the officials of [the Agency] have failed to perform properly their official duties or have used their official capacity to the detriment of the interests of their service...” 13. The applicant subsequently demanded that the Agency return the AMD 75,820,000 paid to its account. On 2 April 2007 she received a reply from the head of the Agency, stating that she had transferred the amount in question to the Agency’s account without any documentary proof. According to the applicant, she contacted the Agency on two occasions thereafter, demanding the return of money transferred to its account, but received no response. 14. On 30 October 2007 the applicant lodged a claim with the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan, seeking to recover the money paid back to the Agency, the amount of income tax collected from her, and damages for unlawfully retention of her assets. The applicant claimed that she had paid back part of the sales price received because she was confused as a result of her conversation with the head of the Agency. 15. In its reply the Agency claimed that, by paying back the amount in question, the applicant had in fact accepted that she had been overpaid and for that reason the criminal proceedings had been terminated. The Yerevan Mayor’s office, which had been involved in the proceedings, submitted a similar argument to that of the Agency. 16. On 27 May 2008 the applicant withdrew her claim for damages. 17. On 16 July 2008 the Civil Court of Yerevan partially granted the applicant’s claims. In doing so, it stated that the amount of AMD 75,820,000 was to be returned to the applicant since there was no legal basis for the Agency to keep that amount, on the ground that the decision to terminate the criminal proceedings confirmed that the applicant had not committed any illegal act. 18. Upon the Agency’s appeal, on 20 October 2008 the Civil Court of Appeal quashed the judgment and remitted the case for a fresh examination on the merits. The decision also stated that the Ministry of Finance should have been involved in the proceedings since the applicant’s claims could have implications for the State budget. 19. On 4 August 2009 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan delivered its judgment by which it rejected the applicant’s claims. The court stated, in particular, that there should be a causal link between the damage allegedly suffered and the fault of the person who allegedly caused the damage, and that the claimant bore the burden of proof in this regard. 20. The applicant lodged an appeal, arguing that the court had applied the provisions of law concerning compensation for damages but that she had withdrawn her claim for damages and had merely demanded the return of her property unlawfully kept by the Agency. She further argued that she had not been charged with any offence in the course of the criminal proceedings; the fact that she had paid the amount in question was confirmed by the payment slip, and moreover the Agency had never denied being in possession of her property. 21. On 4 May 2010 the Civil Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s appeal. The relevant part of the judgment read as follows: “Article 1099 § 4 provides that monetary assets and other property given in fulfilment of non-existent obligations are not subject to return as unjust enrichment if the acquirer proves that the person demanding return of the property had knowledge of the absence of an obligation ... As a result of the examination of the materials of the civil case it has been revealed that the claimant returned the amount in question on the basis of [the Agency’s] demand which was not based either on the law or ... on a contract. In particular, from the legal point of view the respondent [Agency’s] demand for the return of AMD 75,820,000 had no legal basis and the failure to respect it could not of itself bring about ... negative consequences for the claimant. ... [the applicant] had no financial obligation towards [the Agency]. The fact that [the applicant] was aware of having no obligations towards the respondent [Agency] is also supported by the fact that, apart from [the agreement of 7 September 2004], the parties have not concluded any other ... agreements or an agreement to return a sum of money or another agreement in relation to it. In view of the foregoing, it can be concluded that paragraph 4 of Article 1099 of the Civil Code is fully applicable in the present ... civil case. As regards [the applicant’s] argument that [the Agency] had informed her that the General Prosecutor’s Office was investigating matters relating to the ... agreement concluded with her, as a result of which she had been confused and therefore had returned the amount to [the Agency]; the Court of Appeal notes in this respect that this argument may serve as an independent legal basis to dispute [the Agency’s] actions in judicial proceedings ...” 22. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. She argued that in the course of the proceedings it had not been substantiated that, when making the payment, she had been aware of the fact that she did not have any obligations towards the Agency, since she had been informed to the contrary, namely that she had been overpaid and that she could be held criminally liable if she did not return the money. 23. On 21 July 2010 the Court of Cassation declared the appeal inadmissible for lack of merit. 24. According to Article 31, everyone shall have the right to dispose of, use, manage, and bequeath his property in the way he sees fit. No one can be deprived of his property, save by a court in cases prescribed by law. Property can be expropriated for the needs of society and the State only in exceptional cases of paramount public interest, in a procedure prescribed by law, and with prior equivalent compensation. 25. According to Article 132 § 1, monetary assets are objects of the civil law. 26. According to Article 274, the owner has the right to demand the return of his property from the unlawful possession of another person. 27. According to Article 1092, a person who has acquired possession of the property (acquirer) of another person (victim) without any legal or contractual basis has an obligation to return the unlawfully acquired property (unjust enrichment) with the exception of the cases stated in Article 1099 of the Code. 28. According to Article 1099 § 4, monetary assets and other property given in fulfilment of non-existent obligations are not subject to return as unjust enrichment if the acquirer proves that the person demanding return of the property had knowledge of the absence of an obligation or had provided the property for charitable purposes. 29. Paragraph 4 provides that the Yerevan Construction and Investment Project Implementation Agency is responsible for taking the plots of land and real estate, for drawing up price offers to proprietors, and for the supervision and implementation of payment of compensation for expropriation of property. 30. For the purpose of implementation of construction projects in Yerevan, the Government decided to designate real estate (plots of land, buildings and constructions) situated within the administrative boundaries of the Kentron District of Yerevan as expropriation zones, to be taken for the needs of the State, with a total area of 345,000 square metres.